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W.L.M. KING PAPERS

Memoranda and Notes

1940-1950

MG 26 J 4 Volume 387

Pages C271375-C272339

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
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NOTE RE ECONOMIC CONTROL

C 271795

The Report on Far Eastern Commission Activities, which is referred to in the text of this memorandum, is contained in Appendix A.

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CONFIDENTIAL

JAPANESE PEACE SETTLEMENT: ECONOMIC DEMILITARIZATION AND ECONOMIC CONTROL

I

INTRODUCTION

1. The economic foundation of the modern war machine of a country such as Japan is so great that for a stable peace settlement it will not be sufficient for the victor nations merely to disband Japanese military forces and destroy their armaments. Such security arrangements as are made to ensure that Japan will not again be able to embark on a career of aggression must include economic measures designed to prevent Japan from producing the means of making war. This can be accomplished in part by a short term programme for the elimination of those industries in Japan which are suitable solely for the production of war equipment and the reduction in capacity of other industries which, while essential in a peace time economy, are nevertheless readily adaptable to war production.

2. To ensure that Japanese war industries cannot be rebuilt and that war-supporting industries cannot be rapidly expanded in the future, further long-term economic measures will probably be necessary. One of the main characteristics of the pre-war Japanese economy was the high degree of centralized control, which made it readily adaptable to the requirements of an aggressive war. This concentration of economic power was not a purely recent development, being in some respects a carry-over from feudal times. The Zaibatsu, the great family of banking and commercial firms which controlled a large proportion of Japanese industry before the war, had been part of the fabric of Japanese economic life throughout Japan's modern period. While the occupation authorities have been taking steps to break up the Zaibatsu, it is doubtful whether the long traditions of economic organization which have nurtured these enormous trusts and holding companies can be completely eliminated in the course of a few years. The re-emergence of these financial and industrial organizations would make the Japanese economy again readily susceptible to rapid mobilization for war. Continuous allied direction of Japanese domestic economic affairs is obviously impracticable: the task of developing economic democracy in Japan is one which the Japanese people must themselves undertake. It would appear, however, that in the interests of security the victor nations must be prepared to keep a continuous check on the development of the Japanese economy over an extended period of time.

3. The formulation of a short term programme for the economic demilitarization of Japan has already been taken in hand by the Far Eastern Commission and practical measures have been carried out by the occupation authorities. This programme can presumably be completed at the peace conference and implemented before the final withdrawal of occupation troops. The drafting of long term economic policies to ensure that Japan will not be able to reconstitute a war economy and the devising of machinery for carrying out these policies are also tasks which must be included in the

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peace settlement.

4. As a Pacific power and as a prospective participant in the Japanese peace settlement Canada will share with the other nations concerned the responsibility of establishing conditions of peace and stability in the Far East. As a major trading nation we will be particularly concerned with security measures vis-a-vis Japan in the economic field. Security must be our primary consideration in the peace settlement; once the requirements of security are satisfied, however, it is in our interests to ensure that no unnecessary obstructions are put in the way of free multilateral trade.

5. The purpose of the ensuing sections of this paper is to show what has been accomplished with respect to a short-term economic demilitarization programme, how this programme might be completed at the peace conference, to discuss certain aspects of long range economic controls for Japan, and to indicate what types of control appear to be feasible and likely to be most acceptable to Canada. It is not possible at this stage to formulate any fully-rounded proposal for long term supervision of the Japanese economy; even if it were possible, the Canadian government would not wish to commit itself in advance to support the adoption of any particular plan or to participate in its implementation. It is hoped that the material supplied will be useful as a basis for discussion.

II.

Economic Demilitarization

6. The pattern of post-surrender economic activity in Japan was laid down in the Potsdam Declaration of July, 1945:

"Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy and permit the exaction of just reparations in kind, but not those which would enable her to re-arm for war. To this end access to, as distinguished from control of, raw materials shall be permitted. Eventual Japanese participation in world trade relations shall be permitted."

7. A general programme for the economic demilitarization of Japan was laid down in the basic post-surrender directive issued by the United States Government to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in September, 1945:

"1. Economic Demilitarization

"The existing economic basis of Japanese

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military strength must be destroyed and not be permitted to revive.

"Therefore a program will be enforced containing the following elements, among others; the immediate cessation and future prohibition of production of all goods designed for the equipment, maintenance, or use of any military force or establishment; the imposition of a ban upon any specialized facilities for the production or repair of implements of war, including naval vessels and all forms of aircraft; the institution of a system of inspection and control over selected elements in Japanese economic activity to prevent concealed or disguised military preparation; the elimination in Japan of those selected industries or branches of production whose chief value to Japan is in preparing for war; the prohibition of specialized research and instruction directed to the development of war-making power; and the limitation of the size and character of Japan's heavy industries to its future peaceful requirements, and restriction of Japanese merchant shipping to the extent required to accomplish the objectives of demilitarization.

"The eventual disposition of those existing production facilities within Japan which are to be eliminated in accord with this program, as between conversion to other uses, transfer abroad, and scrapping will be determined after inventory. Pending decision, facilities readily convertible for civilian production should not be destroyed, except in emergency situations."

A programme almost identical with the one outlined above was included in the paper, "Basic Post-Surrender Policy for Japan", which was unanimously approved by the Far Eastern Commission on June 19, 1947.

8. Certain measures have been taken to implement this programme, but as a whole it has been only partially accomplished Immediately after the Japanese surrender the Supreme Commander prohibited the manufacture of arms, ammunition and implements of war and parts and components thereof. The war potential industries such as iron, steel, chemicals, light metals, and heavy machinery were permitted to continue operation only on a limited scale. Systems of inspection and control were set up to check on the activities of those war industries which were permitted to resume operation for the production of essential civilian goods.

9. All these measures, while instrumental in bringing about an immediate reduction in the Japanese industrial war potential, depend for their effectiveness on the administrative control of the Supreme Commander, backed up by the presence of the occupation troops. To make the economic demilitarization of Japan sufficiently effective to permit the withdrawal of occupation troops in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration, further and more drastic measures would be necessary - i.e. the destruction or removal of

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that part of the Japanese industrial war potential over and above what is necessary for the maintenance of a peace-time economy.

10. Work of the Far Eastern Commission.

The Far Eastern Commission has devoted considerable time and effort to these tasks with only very limited success. In the first place a programme of interim reparations removals was drawn up, based on a preliminary survey of Japanese war industries and war-supporting industries. This programme called for the removal of those facilities which would obviously be in excess of Japanese peace-time requirements. A final reparations programme was to be drawn up later, after more exhaustive surveys of the Japanese economy had been carried out and peace-time industrial requirements had been more accurately estimated. This interim reparations removals programme was approved by the Far Eastern Commission by June, 1946; its implementation has been impossible, however, since member nations of the Far Eastern Commission have been unable to resolve the difficult problem of the division of shares. Deeming the relief of certain needy countries a matter of urgency, the United States Government finally by-passed the Commission in April, 1947 by issuing an interim directive to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, providing for the removal of thirty percent of the available reparations assets to China, the Philippines, the Netherlands (for Netherlands East Indies), and the United Kingdom (for Burma, Malaya, and colonies). A copy of this United States directive, F.E.C. 216/1, is attached. It is expected that the limited removals permitted under this directive, in accordance with the interim reparations removal programme, will get under way shortly.

11. After drawing up the interim reparations removals programme mentioned above, the Far Eastern Commission approached the problem of reducing Japanese industrial war potential by endeavouring to determine Japanese peace-time needs in the various industries concerned. In this connection two policy decisions have been reached:

(1) Assured production capacity levels for Japan: (F.E.C. 083/5, approved February 20th, 1947, copy attached).

This paper specifies interim production capacity levels for certain designated industries, to be maintained in Japan during the period of the occupation. Under this policy decision the Supreme Commander would be permitted to designate specific plants for retention in Japan so that the owners and management concerned could be assured that the production facilities in question would not be removed in any later reparations or disarmamant programme.

(2) Determination of the peaceful needs of Japan: (See Report on Commission Activities, Appendix 30)

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this policy decision states that the peace-time needs of the Japanese people should be defined as substantially the standard of living prevailing in Japan during the period 1930-1934. Data for this period would be used to estimate Japanese peaceful needs in 1950, due allowance being made for technological developments, balance of payments, and employment.

These policy decisions are two very small parts of what must be a fairly extensive programme for the economic demilitarization of Japan.

12. The Far Eastern Commission has under consideration two further papers which would go a long way toward completing the economic demilitarization programme:

(1) Reduction of Japanese Industrial War Potential. (Latest version, F.E.C. 084/19; minor amendments are now being considered in the Steering Committee; copy attached).

This paper specifies the action to be taken with respect to various categories of industry which are deemed to constitute the Japanese industrial war potential. For industrial facilities in these categories in excess of Japanese peace-time requirements the paper would require either destruction or removal as reparations. The paper would also establish for the period of the occupation a ban on primary war industries and limits for the production capacity of certain war-supporting industries.

(2) Reparations Removals of Industrial Facilities and Merchant Shipping from Japan. (F.E.C. 218; this paper was submitted by the United States delegation in April but so far has only been discussed in subcommittee. FEC 218/1, an explanatory paper and C2-242, the subcommittee's report are also attached). This paper is intended to be the final reparations removal programme and includes precise definitions of the peace-time requirements of Japan in terms of actual production capacities in the industries to be affected.

13. Even the approval of these papers the initial economic demilitarization programme cannot be completed until reparations removals have been carried out and some disposition is ordered for production facilities in war-supporting industries which are in excess of peace-time requirements, but which are not actually removed as reparations. The reparations removal programme cannot be accomplished until some agreement is reached on the division of reparations shares. Progress towards the solution of this problem has been painfully slow and at the moment it would appear that final settlement will be attained only at the peace conference.

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14. For the peace settlement the principal task with respect to economic demilitarization of Japan may therefore be summarized as follows: to review and if approved to make provision for the immediate implementation of the programme for the reduction of Japanese industrial war potential, as set forth in the proposals now before the Far Eastern Commission, to be completed prior to the final withdrawal of all occupation troops.

15. The Canadian representative on the Far Eastern Commission has been instructed to vote in favour of both papers mentioned in paragraph 12 above, subject to certain changes being made in the section on the aluminum industry in FEC 218. (A separate memorandum concerning Canadian interests in the Japanese aluminum industry is being prepared.) Interested departments of government consider the short term economic demilitarization programme which has been drawn up by the Far Eastern Commission to be satisfactory in its present form, but recommend that Canada should resist any further changes which would have the effect of further reducing Japanese industrial capacity.

III

Long Term Economic Controls

16. The short term programme for eliminating Japanese industrial war potential which has been discussed in Part II of this memorandum will have the effect of preventing for a limited period only the emergence in Japan of an industrial economy suitable for war production. Furthermore, the ban on primary war industries and the limits on the production capacities of war-supporting industries which are laid down in F.E.C. 084/19 will be valid only for the period of the occupation. If permanent economic demilitarization is to be achieved, some system of long-term controls over Japanese industrial development will be necessary. The permanent economic demilitarization of Japan was one of the objectives included in the Potsdam Declaration; moreover, the terms in which this objective is expressed clearly foreshadow the establishment of long-term economic controls (see paragraph 6 above). Such controls may well prove to be the keystone of any security system which may be established to prevent Japan from again distrubing the peace.

17. Economic Controls

In the first place economic controls would presumably be continuous and preventive, and, if properly administered and supported by the principal supplying countries of Japan, should make it extremely difficult for Japan to build up an air force, a navy, or a properly mechanized army.

18. Secondly economic controls would vastly simplify the method of applying pressure to Japan when minor violations of the peace treaty occur. In other words,

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they would make possible minor penalties for minor crimes. A system of continuous economic controls would permit the application of limited as well as comprehensive sanctions, and such action could be taken long before Japan would be in a position to commit overt acts of agression.

19. Conversely, a system of flexible economic controls would permit the Allied Powers to keep a constant check on Japan while permitting her to resume gradually her normal functions as an independent nation. Initially imposed restrictions could be relaxed progressively as a peaceful economy develops in Japan.

20. Finally, in the case of Japan, exterior controls over imports of certain strategic raw materials, together with other economic restrictions, will go a long way toward keeping in check the development of those industries which form the back-bone of a war economy. For example, Japan has to rely on imports for practically all the raw materials needed in the manufacture of iron and steel. Similarly with aluminum: of all the large aluminum producing countries, Japan is among those most deficient in the natural resources requisite for economical production; in the past she has had to rely heavily on imports for her supply of bauxite and, in addition, found it necessary to supplement domestic production of aluminum with large imports of aluminum ingots.

21. Military Guarantees.

Such economic controls as are devised for Japan will probably have to be supplemented by a military agreement between the principal allied powers to guarantee the continued demilitarization of Japan. If a system of economic restrictions is not devised, however, the control of Japan after the peace treaty would have to depend almost entirely on these military guarantees. A security system of military character, involving the stationing of troops in or near Japan by the great powers, might not be entirely conducive to peace and stability in the Pacific area. The overriding consideration, particularly for the United States and the U.S.S.R., might well become not the demilitarization of Japan but the securing of strategic advantage in the Far East. The emergence of new points of friction between these two powers in the north Pacific area might adversely affect our own security. If these considerations are to be given any weight, it would follow that Canada's interests would be best served by a security system for Japan based on economic controls rather than one which was predominantly military.

22. Moreover, a security system which was purely military in character could not be nearly so flexible as one based mainly on economic controls. It would amount to the removal of all direct controls exercised by the Allied powers during the critical period after the end of the occupation. Should Japan attempt to build up her war potential again and embark on a career of aggression, her history might quite likely follow the

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pattern of Nazi Germany after World War I -- a series of minor violations of the peace treaty, none of which would be considered sufficiently flagrant by the Allied powers to warrant the drastic step of military action. A system of military security provides for only one type of preventive action, which would probably be taken only at the eleventh hour. What is required is a system of continuous restrictions which can be progressively relaxed as a reward for good behaviour.

23. Form of Economic Controls

If it is assumed that long-term economic controls for Japan are to be established, the problems arise as to how and where they should be applied and what form they should take. In view of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 20 above, it seems evident that any system of controls which is devised should take advantage of Japan's dependence on external sources of supply for key raw materials. This might be done in the following ways.

(a) Imports of key raw materials and certain classes of manufactured goods might be made subject to licensing by an international authority. By comparing applications for import licenses with periodic estimates of the requirements of Japanese industry, both for legitimate domestic consumption and the export trade, the international agency should be able to detect very quickly whether any stockpiling of strategic raw materials was taking place or whether any war potential industries were being expanded above the levels necessary for reconstruction purposes and normal peace-time requirements. If a further check on the imports actually entering Japan seems necessary, a staff of Allied inspectors might be attached to the Japanese customs administration.

(b) As well as handling import licenses, the international agency might also be made controlling authority for foreign exchange transactions. Foreign exchange could then be withheld from the Japanese when the import of key raw materials or manufactured goods was undesirable for security reasons.

24. With regard to (a) above, the functions of the international agency obviously require that it should have an inspection branch charged with investigating Japanese industry and rendering reports on production for the domestic and foreign markets and periodic estimates of import requirements. Special investigations could be made whenever a Japanese importer appeared to be applying for licenses covering excessive quantities of raw materials in the restricted category.

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25. As foreign exhange is a requisite of all import transactions, control of it by an international agency could be the logical stage of the import process at which to have restrictive measures available to the allied powers. Canadian foreign exchange machinery has worked very efficiently since it was established during the war, and might provide a suitable model for control machinery for Japan. Whether the system would work in the face of Japanese non-cooperation is a question which would require further study.

26. Any small international technical bodies located in Japan to administer controls of imports and foreign exchange and to carry out inspections of Japanese industry would require a considerable measure of cooperation from the Japanese themselves, -- cooperation which could only be ensured if machinery for punitive action were readily available. In a sense this machinery already exists in the United Nations. The countries responsible for the exercise of economic controls over Japan would not, however, all be represented on the Security Council at any given time. It might be more appropriate if, in the agreement establishing the international economic control agency, the nations concerned undertook to support the authority of the control agency with economic sanctions whenever necessary.

27. The essential feature of the scheme outlined above for keeping acheck on the direction of Japanese industrial development is the control of imports guaranteed by the threat of economic sanctions. Other systems of economic control for Japan based on this principle might possibly be worked out: for instance, the principal supplying nations for Japan might agree to annual or semi-annual overall quotas for Japan of strategic raw materials, and Japan might be required in the peace treaty to purchase these materials only from those countries which subscribed to the control system. It is submitted, however, that the method suggested above, of an internationally administered import licensing system coupled with allied control of Japan's foreign exchange resources, would probably prove the simplest and most effective. This control system should be reasonably flexible, in that no rigid quotas for key imports into Japan would have to be fixed. Moreover, Japan would be free to buy materials in the restricted category in any market of her choice. In other words, the system should provide a minimum of interference in the normal movement of trade between Japan and other nations.

28. <u>International Council</u>.

In the system of long-term economic controls for Japan outlined above mention is made only of technical international agencies to carry out inspections of Japanese industry, issue import licenses and administer

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foreign exchange control. The whole system naturally presupposes some formal agreement between the powers who undertake the responsibility of maintaining long-term economic controls over Japan. It is probable that the number of nations willing to participate in the administration of economic controls for Japan would be larger than those willing to assume definite military commitments for the continued disarmament and demilitarization of Japan. If, as is likely, the Japanese settlement requires more than one instrument, the second instrument might include both military and economic guarantees, with a small group of nations assuming military commitments, and a larger group undertaking to operate a system of economic controls. Alternatively, two separate instruments might be drawn up. In any case, agreements supplementary to the peace treaty signed by Japan would have to provide for the establishment of a responsible international council whose functions would include the direction of the technical bodies suggested in paragraphs 23-25 above.

29. The Australian Department of External Affairs has under consideration a plan involving a supervisory council whose main function would be to ensure that Japan carries out her obligations under the peace treaty. Dr. E.H. Norman, Head of the Canadian Liaison Mission in Tokyo, has suggested a similar plan: a control council made up of representatives of the powers signatory to the peace treaty, with full power to carry out inspections within Japan.

30. Of all the possible functions of any international council established for the control of Japan after the signature of the peace treaty, we need concern ourselves here only with those relating to economic matters. One may speculate that some of these functions might be:

(a) To direct an inspectorate, an import licensing agency and a control section for the foreign exchange board in Japan;

(b) To consider appeals from the rulings of the import licensing authority and the exchange control board;

(c) To check on the movement of Japanese capital abroad;

(d) To investigate complaints of foreign traders with regard to discrimination and unfair trade practices;

(e) To recommend to member nations the application of limited or comprehensive economic sanctions when certain violations of the peace treaty occur.

31. Apart from its main work of ensuring that the requirements of security in the economic field are fulfilled, the international council should be in a position to work in cooperation with other international bodies, such as the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, in any plans drawn up for the reconstruction and economic

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rehabilitation of Far Eastern Countries. There are indications that the United States may not wish to see Japanese war-supporting industries kept under severe restrictions for a protracted period, and the suggestion has been made that Japan should be reconstituted as the "workshop of Asia". This policy would undoubtedly cause some uneasiness amongst the former victims of Japanese aggression, especially if the peace settlement did not provide adequate international machinery capable of preventing the recrudescence of Japan's industrial war potential. If, however, Japanese industrial development is under the constant scrutiny of an Allied inspectorate and subject to restrictive economic measures, there is no reason why it should not make a substantial contribution to the rehabilitation of neighbouring Far Eastern countries without becoming a threat to their security.

32. The United Kingdom has had under consideration a system of economic controls for Japan not unlike the one which has been outlined in the foregoing paragraphs. If such a system of control is considered feasible detailed studies would be required on the following subjects:

(a) The organization of an import licensing system.

(b) The organization of a foreign exchange control board for Japan.

(c) Allied supervision of the Japanese customs administration.

(d) The possible prohibition of certain industries in Japan. (the United Kingdom, for instance, has proposed that production of the following items in Japan should be banned for an indefinite period: aircraft, alumina, aluminum, magnesium, explosives, all types of armaments, synthetic oil and synthetic rubber).

(e) The listing of raw materials and other manufactured goods to be subject to import licensing.

33. The great danger of any system of economic controls for Japan established by the Allied Powers is that it may be subject to abuse by the administering nations. As Canadian interests include the rapid re-establishment of Japan as a trading nation Canada should examine any proposal put forward for the long term economic control of Japan to ensure that its main objective is to fulfil security requirements and not to handicap Japan in the competition for world markets.

34. Canadian Interests

Economic controls of any kind involving restrictions on the normal movement of commodities in open markets are, of course, quite repugnant to the Canadian way of thinking. The existence of controls over Japanese imports would probably cause some inconvenience to Canadian traders and

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would limit the development by Canadian producers of what were very promising markets before the war.

35. So far as these markets are concerned, an examination of Canadian trade with Japan before the war will show that some of our most valuable exports had a direct relationship with the development by Japan of her war economy. In 1939 nearly 60% of Canada's exports to Japan by value consisted of aluminum and nickel -- both strategic raw materials; and a further 25% was made up of copper, lead, zinc, scrap iron and steel, all items necessary in a war economy. Canadian exports of aluminum and nickel rose in value from approximately $2 millions in 1934 to $7½ millions in 1937 and $16 millions in 1939. The rapid increase in Japanese imports of these metals during the pre-war years no doubt reflects the final effort made by Japan to accumulate stock-piles of raw material for military requirements in anticipation that trade might be interrupted. It is quite clear that Canadian exports of this kind made a substantial contribution to the Japanese war potential since in the case of both nickel and aluminum ingots Canada was one of Japan's principal sources of supply.

36. In any system of economic controls for Japan aluminum and nickel would almost certainly be designated strategic raw materials and therefore be subject to import licensing and possible restrictions. Security may only be had for a price, however, and even if our Japanese market for these two metals was entirely eliminated the loss of $16 millions in annual trade would not be an excessive amount to pay, as compared with the $842 millions which made up only the budgetary cost of our very limited war effort against Japan.

37. As Canadian prosperity depends so largely on foreign trade any controls over the economy of one of our former customers and suppliers will be of great interest to us. If the establishment of long term controls for Japan seems likely the Canadian Government may be compelled to consider in the near future whether our interests would be best protected by Canadian participation in any control machinery which is established.

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FEC-216/1

8 April 1947

FAR EASTERN COMMISSION

INTERIM DIRECTIVE REGARDING ADVANCE TRANSFERS OF JAPANESE REPARATIONS AND REPARATIONS ALLOCATION PROCEDURES FOR INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES IN JAPAN

(References: FEC-216; FEC-211/3; FEC-201)

Note by the Secretary General

1. The enclosure, a United States interim directive to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers regarding advance transfers of Japanese reparations and reparations allocations procedures for industrial facilities in Japan, is circulated herewith for the consideration of the Far Eastern Commission and is referred to COMMITTEE NO. 1: REPARATIONS.

2. This directive was forwarded to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers on 4 April 1947.

3. A certified copy of the United States interim directive to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers has been filed with the Commission in accordance with Section III, paragraph 4, of the Terms of Reference.

4. The attention of all concerned is invited to the classification of this document which prohibits the dissemination of the information contained therein to unauthorized persons or to the press.

NELSON T. JOHNSON
Secretary General

FEC-216/1

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ENCLOSURE

INTERIM DIRECTIVE REGARDING ADVANCE TRANSFERS OF JAPANESE REPARATIONS AND REPARATIONS ALLOCATION PROCEDURES FOR INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES IN JAPAN

Serial No. 75 4 April 1947

The following interim directive, Serial No. 75, received from State, War, and Navy Departments, issued under the provisions of paragraph III, 3, of the Terms of Reference of the Far Eastern Commission, is furnished for your guidance:

PART A

1. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers should effect immediate delivery of assets within Japan in accordance with the provisions of the directive, Serial No. 69, February 19, 1947, regarding the Delivery of Reparations Goods in Japan, as advance payment on account of ultimate reparations shares providing:

a. that such assets fall within categories of Japanese facilities and equipment which have been properly declared as available for reparations transfer by the Far Eastern Commission and designated for removal by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers;

b. that such assets should be declared by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to China, the Philippines, the Netherlands (for Netherlands East Indies) and the United Kingdom for Malaya, Burma and its colonial possessions in the Far East;

c. that such assets should be delivered to a recipient country only after it has supplied evidence acceptable to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, or to some other agent or agency hereafter designated to evaluate and pass judgment on such evidence, that the

(1) immediate and useful employment of such assets is practicable, and

(2) employment of rehabilitated, repaired or reconstructed facilities can contribute, directly, to immediate relief and rehabilitation requirements of the war-devastated economy of the claimant country or, indirectly, to the relief needs of other parts of Asia devastated by Japanese armed forces;

d. that no country listed in paragraph b should receive delivery of more than 5 per cent, excepting China which may receive 15 per cent, in quantity or value of any single category of assets available as determined in paragraph a above, and authorized for transfer under the provisions of paragraph c above.

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2. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers should designate for delivery on advance transfer account such a balanced selection of plants and facilities as will not represent disproportional reduction of value or quality of over-all residual industrial capacities available for later transfer as reparations.

3. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers should maintain such records as necessary to enable offset for any such advance transfers to be made against ultimate fulfillment of approved and recognized over-all national reparations shares.

PART B

1. The following procedures should govern SCAP implementation of those aspects of the Japanese reparations program providing for the removal from Japan of industrial facilities and equipment.

a. In accordance with provisions of directives to SCAP regarding availability for reparations transfer of categories of Japanese industry, SCAP should be responsible for final selection of those particular industrial facilities and equipment to be made available for removal from Japan as reparations.

b. SCAP should be responsible for preparing an inventory of individual Japanese industrial facilities selected under a above. This inventory shall include any available information which would aid a prospective claimant in determining the utility of the individual facility, such as technical specifications, make, age and condition.

c. SCAP should be responsible for assigning monetary valuation to industrial facilities selected and listed under a and b. Procedures for uniform monetary valuation should be determined by SCAP. Valuations should be in sufficient detail to permit charges to be made for parts of plants which may be allocated separately. Values assigned to reparations assets referred to in a and b above need have no relation to any other values as long as these values are consistent among the reparations assets comprised of industrial facilities and equipment.

d. SCAP should submit to representatives of countries, members of the FEC the inventory provided in b, and the valuation provided in c.

e. Upon receipt of the inventories and valuations mentioned herein, a country, member of the FEC may lodge with SCAP claims for the allocation to it of particular industrial facilities.

f. Upon receipt of directives indicating the over-all shares assigned to each country, SCAP should set up appropriate reparations accounts for recipient countries. The value of the facilities received by any one country should not exceed its percentage share of the total value of the industrial facilities selected and valued by SCAP for removal as reparations. As provided in the directive, Serial No. 69, February 19, 1947, regarding the Delivery of Reparations Goods in Japan, a recipient country will make a commitment to accept a specific facility at the time allocation is made. SCAP should likewise agree to reserve the accepted facility for the claimant country. At such time SCAP will make an initial charge of the monetary value assigned to the facility (in accordance with 1 c above)

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to the reparations account of the recipient country. When the final title is taken by a recipient country to an individual facility aboard ship, a final charge shall be made against the reparations account of the recipient country, taking into account, if necessary, any unforeseen loss of value.

g. From these items of industrial facilities and equipment declared available for reparations removals SCAP should allocate particular industrial facilities to each country on the basis of claims submitted by that country. To the extent that claims of two or more countries are in conflict, he will work out what seems to him the most reasonable allocation, taking into primary consideration the proportion of each country's allocation still unfilled. After taking into account this primary consideration, consideration should be given the following four items in stated order of priority:

(1) claims for whole plants and related facilities, as opposed to claims for portions thereof.

(2) claims for parts of plants or related groups of items which can be integrated with the existing industrial pattern of the claimant country.

(3) the extent to which the claimed item or items would replace property which was destroyed, damaged or looted in the war, or requires replacement because of excessive wear incident to prosecuting the war against Japan.

(4) the extent to which the claimant country depended in pre-war years on imports from Japan of the item or items (or products thereof) claimed.

h. In making allocations as provided by paragraph g, SCAP should, to the extent practicable, give consideration to striking a fair and equitable balance as between all claimant countries of items:

(1) in integrated or consolidated units.

(2) of modern and efficient design and manufacture.

(3) in good working condition.

i. Each country represented on the FEC should be permitted to have a reparations technical mission in Japan. These missions should be afforded full opportunity for inspection of plants declared available, and should be kept fully informed by SCAP of all designations and allocations. They should be authorized by their Governments to receive inventories, valuations and other communications from SCAP relating to reparations, to lodge claims, to make commitments to accept title to plants selected, to accept final title to industrial facilities on reparations account, and to make all necessary arrangements with SCAP including scheduling the required shipping for the actual removal of allocated facilities in accordance with the principles laid down in the directive, Serial No. 69.

j. SCAP should organize a Reparations Technical Advisory Committee (RTAC) composed of the heads of the above Reparations Technical Missions located in Japan and chaired by a Representative of SCAP appointed by SCAP. The function of this Committee should be to assist SCAP, in an advisory capacity, in

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the development of technical and administrative procedures to assure an orderly removal of reparations goods from Japan, and in the settlement of conflicts between claimant countries arising over claims for particular facilities. In the event of disagreement between SCAP and a member country concerning the allocation of a particular facility by SCAP, if a formal protest is made to SCAP by two-thirds of members of RTAC, SCAP, who has final authority in such matters, may, in his discretion, refer the dispute to the U.S. Government.

k. Claims for individual facilities must be filed with SCAP by a claimant country within six months after the fixing of a claimant country's final reparations percentage share, or receipt from SCAP of a final inventory and valuation of the facility, whichever is the later date.

l. Each claimant will arrange for transportation for its reparations goods at the port and will be prepared to accept transfer of title no later than two years after the designation of the goods for application to that country's reparations account, providing that such goods have been delivered to the loading point at the port within a reasonable time before the end of that period.

m. Industrial facilities, machinery or equipment (other than specialized war-making equipment) declared available for reparations, but either

(1) unclaimed for application against recognized reparations claims on Japanese assets from within Japan, or

(2) unaccepted as prescribed by 1 l above,

should not be destroyed or otherwise disposed of by SCAP pending receipt of further directives.

n. The provisions of this paper shall apply to any country not a member of the FEC which may be declared eligible to receive reparations from Japan in industrial facilities, except that no country not a member of the FEC shall be a member of the RTAC.

2. The provisions of paragraph 1 c and d requiring a monetary valuation for industrial facilities shall not operate to delay delivery of goods under the provisions of Part A of this directive. As soon as recognized and approved national reparations shares have been determined and announced by directive to SCAP all of the provisions of Part B of this directive will govern and provisions of Part A of this directive will be rendered inoperative.

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FEC-083/5

27 February 1947

FAR EASTERN COMMISSION

ASSURED PRODUCTION CAPACITY LEVELS FOR JAPAN
(References: FEC-083 Series; SC-043; C2-023 Series)

Note By the Secretary General

1. Enclosure "A", a policy decision relating to assured production capacity levels for Japan, was unanimously approved at the forty-sixth meeting of the Far Eastern Commission, 20 February 1947.

2. The letter of transmittal of the Secretary General, forwarding this decision on behalf of the Commission to the Secretary of State of the United States Government in accordance with the terms of Reference, is circulated herewith as Enclosure "B".

3. With respect to the question of release to the press, the United States Member announced that the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers had requested that the policy should not be released until he had designated specific plants.

4. The attention of all concerned is invited to the classification of this document which prohibits the dissemination of the information contained therein to unauthorized persons or to the press.

NELSON T. JOHNSON
Secretary General

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ENCLOSURE "A"

ASSURED PRODUCTION CAPACITY LEVELS FOR JAPAN

1. Interim assured production capacity levels are hereby established for each of the eight categories of Japanese industry listed below.

The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, upon consultation with the Allied Council for Japan in accordance with the Terms of Reference and the Allied Council for Japan, may designate for retention specific plants and establishments, associated with each category, whose aggregate production capacity does not exceed the level established for that category. Such designation should be interpreted to mean that:

a. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, upon consultation with the Allied Council for Japan in accordance with the Terms of Reference of the Allied Council for Japan, decides that operation of these plants and establishments, individually and collectively, is practical in terms of current needs for their products, and in terms of such conditioning factors as availability of raw materials, power, and labor;

b. Owners and management are assured that the particular facility will not be subject to removal under the Interim Program or subsequent disarmament or reparations programs.

2. Machine Tool Industry

The assured production capacity level for Japan's machine tool industry should be placed at a balanced type-size aggregate of 7,500 units annually.

3. Arsenals, Army and Navy

No assured production capacity level should be assigned to Army and Navy arsenals.

4. Aircraft Industry (including aircraft engines)

No assured production capacity level should be assigned to the aircraft industry.

5. Iron and Steel Industry

The assured production capacity level for Japan's iron and steel industry should be placed at an aggregate of 2.0 million metric tons of steel ingot, and an aggregate of 800,000 metric tons of pig iron annually.

6. Light Metals Industry

No assured production capacity for Japan's light metals industry should be given.

/ 7.

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7. Thermal Electric Power Industry

The assured production capacity level for Japan's thermal electric power industry should be placed at an aggregate installed public utility capacity of 1.0 million kilowatts.

8. Soda Ash, Chlorine, and Caustic Soda Industry

The assured production capacity level for Japan's soda ash, chlorine, and caustic soda industry should be placed at 207,000 metric tons of soda ash, of which 72,000 are required to produce caustic soda, 28,000 metric tons of chlorine, and 80,000 metric tons of caustic soda annually.

9. Sulphuric Acid Industry

The assured production capacity level for the Japanese sulphuric acid industry should be placed at 3,000,000 metric tons annually.

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ENCLOSURE "B"

20 February 1947

The Honorable George C. Marshall
Secretary of State
Washington, D.C.

My Dear Mr. Secretary:

The Terms of Reference of the Far Eastern Commission provide that one of the functions of the Commission should be to "formulate the policies, principles and standards in conformity with which the fulfillment by Japan of its obligations under the Terms of Surrender may be accomplished."

It is further provided that when such decisons are made by the Far Eastern Commission. "The United States Government shall prepare directives in accordance with the policy decisions of the Commission and shall transmit them to the Supreme Commander through the appropriate United States Government agency."

At the forty-sixth meeting of the Far Eastern Commission held at 2516 Massachusetts Avenue, Northwest, Washington, D.C., on 20 February 1947, the enclosed policy decision relative to Assured Production Capacity Levels for Japan was unanimously approved.

As Secretary General of the Far Eastern Commission, I have been instructed to forward this decision to you on behalf of the Commission, in order that the appropriate directives may be prepared and transmitted to the Supreme Commander in accordance with the Terms of Reference.

Before the enclosed policy decision was formally approved by the Commission, the Chinese Representative made a statement setting forth the position of his Government with regard to paragraph 5, Iron and Steel Industry, of the enclosed decision. He recommended that his statement be recorded in the minutes and be transmitted to the Supreme Commander for his information. Excerpt from the draft minutes of the Commission's forty-sixth meeting, including this statement verbatim, is enclosed. The French Representative expressed his concurrence in the Chinese statement. The Commission has accordingly instructed me to ask that the United States Government in transmitting the appropriate directive based on the enclosed policy decision to the Supreme Commander, also forward the Chinese statement for the Supreme Commander's information.

In adopting the enclosed policy decision, the Commission accepted the recommendation of the Supreme Commander that the decision not be released to the press until specific plants had been designated by the Supreme Commander pursuant to the terms of the enclosed policy. The Commission would appreciate it if the Supreme Commander could inform us when in his opinion the release of this policy decision to the press would be appropriate.

/The

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The Australian Representative pointed out that consultation with the Allied Council, as provided by the enclosed policy decision, might involve public disclosure of its contents and desired that it be understood that a Power would not be violating the Commission's decision on publication if it raised any question connected with the policy at a meeting of the Allied Council.

Sincerely yours,

Nelson T. Johnson
Secretary General

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FEC-084/19

FEC-RESTRICTED

FEC-084/19

29 July 1947

FAR EASTERN COMMISSION

REDUCTION OF JAPANESE INDUSTRIAL WAR POTENTIAL
(References: FEC-084 Series; SC-037 Series;
C2-022 Series)

Note by the Secretary General

1. The enclosure, a proposed policy relative to the Reduction of Japanese Industrial War Potential, was approved by the Steering Committee at its seventy-third meeting, 29 July 1947, is forwarded herewith for the consideration of the Far Eastern Commission.

2. The Chinese, French, and New Zealand members opposed the motion approving the enclosure.

3. The Chinese member accepted paragraph 5 b (2) of the enclosure on condition that a statement to the effect that it was his Government's understanding that the meaning of the paragraph would include equipment for manufacturing heavy prime movers, cranes, mining equipment and chemical equipment, be incorporated in the minutes of the Commission meeting at which the policy is adopted.

4. In accordance with paragraph 3 of FEC-067/3 the Steering Committee recommends that the text of the enclosure be released to the press in the normal procedure.

NELSON T. JOHNSON
Secretary General

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RESTRICTED

ENCLOSURE

REDUCTION OF JAPANESE INDUSTRIAL WAR POTENTIAL

1. Summary

Subject to the provisions stated in paragraph 10, the following actions, as detailed in paragraph 2-9, should be taken during the period of the occupation, in order to reduce Japanese industrial war potential:

a. All special purpose industrial machinery and equipment functionally limited to use in connection with combat equipment end-products, should be destroyed.

b. All other industrial machinery and equipment in primary war industries, and such other industrial facilities in secondary war industries and war-supporting industries as may be in excess of the peaceful needs of the Japanese economy should be made available for claim as reparations.

c. During the period of the occupation, a prohibition should be maintained against the re-establishment of primary war industries; and specified war-supporting industries should be limited to the productive capacity levels remaining after completion of the reduction program outlined above, except as modifications in these levels may be authorized by the Far Eastern Commission.

2. Primary War Facilities

a. Definitions:

(I) Primary War Facilities are defined as plants and establishments primarily engaged in the development, manufacture, assembly, testing, repair, maintenance, or storage of combat equipment end-products and civil aircraft, and plants and establishments building merchant vessels above a size to be determined by the Far Eastern Commission.

(2) Combat Equipment End-Products are defined as weapons, ammunition, missiles and explosives used for military purposes; chemical or bacterial warfare agents; ultra-shortwave radio equipment (radar); naval combatant vessels; armoured vehicles; or aircraft (including air frames and aircraft engines).

b. Disposition:

(I) All firms and organizations, whether publicly or privately owned and operated, whose activities have related primarily to the operation of primary war facilities and whose continued existence is deemed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to be undesirable from a security standpoint, should be dissolved by the Supreme Commander, who should at the same time seize their records and register all their key executive, managerial, research and engineering personnel

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(2) All plants and establishments identified by the Supreme Commander as primary war facilities should be impounded, and their machinery and equipment made available for reparations, subject to the following limitation: All buildings, machinery, and equipment in primary war facilities which, by virtue of initial design, construction or major structural change, are, as individual items, special purpose in nature and functionally limited to use in connection with combat equipment and end-products should be destroyed.

3. Secondary War Facilities

a. Definition:

Secondary war facilities are defined as plants and establishments primarily engaged in manufacturing, repairing or maintaining major fabricated component parts, sub-assemblies, accessories, or equipment especially designed for use in the products of primary war facilities.

b. Disposition:

(1) In plants and establishments identified by the Supreme Commander as being originally organized or completely reequipped to operate as secondary war facilities, as defined in subparagraph a above, all machinery and equipment, except as noted under (3) below, should be made available for reparations.

(2) In plants and establishments other than those covered in (1) above, all machinery and equipment, except as noted under (3) below, should be disposed of under the recommendations in paragraph 5 covering the industry with which, in the opinion of the Supreme Commander, they were associated prior to their conversion or diversion to war production.

(3) All buildings, machinery, and equipment in secondary war facilities which by virtue of initial design, construction, or major structural change are as individual items special purpose in nature and functionally limited to use in connection with combat equipment end-products should be destroyed.

4. Dispersed Machinery and Equipment from Primary and Secondary War Facilities.

All special purpose machinery and equipment, as defined under 2 b (2) and 3 b (3) above, should be sought out in locations to which they may have been removed from primary and secondary war facilities, and should be destroyed wherever found. Other machinery and equipment which was formerly used in primary and secondary war facilities but subsequently dispersed, need not be sought out and identified under the provisions of this paragraph but should be treated under paragraph 5, as a part of the industry with which it is associated.

5. War Supporting Industries

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a. Over-All Policy

As a supplementary measure designed further to reduce Japan's industrial war potential, that portion of existing capacity in selected war-supporting industries which is in excess of that necessary to meet the peaceful needs of the Japanese people, as defined by the Far Eastern Commission, should be made available for removal as reparations.

b. Application

(1) The following specific industries are considered as being "war-supporting," for purposes of the industrial removals provided for in para 5 a:

(a) The iron and steel industry, producing pig iron, steel ingots and basic shapes

(b) The coal carbonization industry

(c) The non-ferrous metals industry, producing pig, ingot and basic shapes

(d) The light metals industry, producing alumina, primary aluminum and magnesium, rolled, drawn or extruded shapes.

(e) The metal working machinery industry producing machine tools, cutting tools and secondary metal working machinery.

(f) The ball and roller bearing industry

(g) That part of the chemical industry producing industrial explosives, sulphuric acid, soda ash, caustic soda, chlorine, chemical nitrogen and calcium carbide (In the case of industrial explosives "capacity which is in excess of that necessary to meet the peaceful needs of the Japanese people" is defined as capacity which is in excess of that necessary to meet Japanese domestic requirements)

(h) The railway equipment industry

(i) The automotive industry

(j) The electric power industry

(k) The cement and abrasives industries

(l) The steel merchant shipbuilding and repair industry (residual after removals effected under para. 2)

(m) The merchant marine, fishing, whaling and cannery fleets, including publicly and privately owned steel vessels of 100 tons or over (this shall not be interpreted to prevent vessels of less than 100 tons being considered for reparations)

(n) The oil refining and synthetic fuel industry and storage

(o) The synthetic rubber industry

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(p) The heavy electrical equipment industry

(2) In addition to reduction in capacity in the specific industries listed above, a further reduction in the total inventory of metal-working machinery in Japan should be effected in so far as this may be required to eliminate metalworking capacity in excess of the peaceful needs of the Japanese people as defined by the Far Eastern Commission.

6. Residual Capacity

After the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers has completed the selection for delivery to claimant countries of industrial plants or facilities within the categories of industry approved for removal as reparations by the Far Eastern Commission, and, after the destruction of special purpose machinery as defined in paragraphs 2 and 3, residual productive capacity in the industries designated in this paper which is in excess of Japan's peaceful needs, as defined by the Far Eastern Commission, should be appraised from the standpoint of the individual and collective war potential represented by this capacity, and a decision made by the Far Eastern Commission as to its disposition.

7. Property of Nationals of Members of the United Nations

The property of nationals of members of the United Nations should be dealt with in accordance with FEC-226/1.

8. Reparations

Removal or destruction of industrial capacity for security purposes under the terms of this policy should not be limited in order to compensate for the effects of industrial removals for reparations.

9. Post-Removal Restrictions on Japanese Industrial Capacity

Throughout the period of the occupation the following limitations of Japanese industrial capacity should be maintained.

a. Primary War Facilities:

Within the framework of the definitions given in paragraphs 2 and 3:

(1) The following should be prohibited in Japan: The establishment, possession or operation of any facilities for the development, manufacture or assembly of combat equipment end-products; the development, manufacture, assembly, importation or possession of any special purpose machinery and equipment as defined under paragraphs 2 b (2) 3 b (3); the development, manufacture or assembly of any combat equipment end-products, or their possession except as authorised by the Supreme Commander, after consultation with the Allied Council for Japan in accordance with the Terms of Reference of the Allied Council for Japan, for the purposes of the occupation; the building of merchant vessels above a size to be determined by the Far Eastern Commission; the development, manufacture or assembly of civil aircraft; and the participation by the Japanese Government or Japanese nationals in

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the ownership or airborne operation of civil aircraft.

(2) Japan should be directed to prohibit any of its nationals from taking part in the ownership or operation of primary war facilities outside of Japan.

b. War-Supporting Industries

The capacity levels remaining in the iron and steel, light metals, metal-working machinery, shipbuilding, oil refining and storage, synthetic oil and synthetic rubber industries, after the completion of the industrial removals proposed in this paper and after the disposition of remaining "excess" facilities as provided for under paragraph 6, should constitute the permissible maxima in these industries until the end of the present phase of the occupation of Japan or until I January 1949, whichever is the earlier, pending a decision as to the long-term disarmament controls. These maxima should be subject to review by the Far Eastern Commission, and, if the Commission expects still to be charged on 1 January 1949 with responsibility for post-surrender policies respecting Japan, the Commission should assess the situation before that date with a view to the adoption of an appropriate policy to be put into effect on 1 January 1949, on which date the provisions herein specified regarding productive capacity maxima in these industries will lapse. If, at any time during the occupation, the Supreme Commander considers an adjustment in these levels necessary, he should, after consultation with the Allied Council for Japan in accordance with the Terms of Reference of the Allied Council for Japan, recommend such an adjustment and submit to the Far Eastern Commission appropriate supporting data. Changes in the established levels can be made after adoption by the Far Eastern Commission of a policy decision authorizing such a change.

10. Occupation Needs

The Supreme Commander should be authorized to except temporarily from the provisions of this paper particular primary war facilities, secondary war facilities and facilities in war-supporting industries, in so far as such facilities are required to meet the needs of the occupation. In such cases the Supreme Commander will after consultation with the Allied Council for Japan in accordance with the Terms of Reference of the Allied Council for Japan provide an explanation of reasons for retention and an estimated date of removal or destruction.

11. Records of Property Removals and Destruction

The Supreme Commander should keep records of all property removed from Japan or destroyed in the execution of the policies in this paper.

12. The provisions of this policy decision will apply until an appropriate decision on this question by the Peace Conference.

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FEC - 218

9 April 1947

FAR EASTERN COMMISSION

REPARATIONS REMOVALS OF INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES AND MERCHANT SHIPPING FROM JAPAN

(References: FEC-216/1, FEC-211 series, FEC-201)

Note by the Secretary General

1. The enclosure, a United States policy proposal regarding Reparations Removals of Industrial Facilities and Merchant Shipping from Japan, is circulated herewith for the consideration of the Far Eastern Commission and is referred to COMMITTEE NO. 2: ECONOMICS.

2. The United States member has informed the Secretary General that a further statement discussing the proposal set forth in the enclosure will be submitted to the Commission shortly.

3. The attention of all concerned is invited to the classification of this document which prohibits the dissemination of the information contained therein to unauthorized persons or to the press.

NELSON T. JOHNSON
Secretary General

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ENCLOSURE

REPARATIONS REMOVALS OF INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES AND MERCHANT SHIPPING FROM JAPAN

The following specific actions should be taken with respect to reparations removals of industrial facilities and merchant shipping from Japan:

1. All facilities of the nature indicated, or in excess of the stated capacity levels in the following specified industrial categories, should be made available for claim as reparations:

a. Iron and Steel Industry

(Definition: "Plants and establishments primarily engaged in the production of pig iron or steel ingots or in the production of basic steel shapes, such as rails, rods, bars, tubes, plates, strips, sheets and structural shapes by rolling, drawing or extruding steel ingots.")

(1) That portion of Japan's blast furnace capacity that is in excess of the capacity required to produce 2,000,000 metric tons of metal per year, should be made available for claim.

(2) That portion of Japan's capacity for the production of steel ingots that is in excess of the capacity required to produce 3,500,000 metric tons per year should be made available for claim.

(3) That portion of Japan's capacity for the production of basic steel shapes that is in excess of the capacity required to produce 2,650,000 metric tons per year of balanced type basic steel shapes should be made available for claim.

b. Chemical Industry.

(1) General

No facilities should be removed which are needed to produce chemicals necessary to achieve essential production of fertilizers in Japan. In so far as the foregoing is not contravened thereby reparations removals in the chemical industry should be accomplished as hereinafter prescribed.

(2) Nitric Acid Industry

(Definition: "Plants and establishments primarily engaged in the production of nitric acid by the oxidation of ammonia.")

(a) That portion of Japan's capacity for the production of nitric acid by the oxidation of ammonia that is in excess of the capacity required to produce 30,000 metric tons per year (as 100 percent acid), should be made available for claim subject to the following limitation.

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i. No synthetic ammonia capacity should be included in the facilities made available for claim.

(3) Sulphuric Acid Industry

(Definition: "Plants and establishments primarily engaged in the production of sulphuric acid.")

(a) That portion of Japan's capacity for the production of sulphuric acid that is in excess of the capacity required to produce 3,500,000 (50° Baume) metric tons annually should be made available for claim. All facilities made available for claim should be of the contact type as distinguished from the lead chamber type but in so far as possible, should not include any contact plants when they are serving as integral functional units in other manufacturing plants not made available for claim.

(4) Soda Ash, Caustic Soda, and Chlorine Industries.

(Definition: "Plants and establishments engaged in (a) the production of soda ash, including integrated facilities for the conversion of soda ash to caustic soda, or (b) in the production of caustic soda and chlorine by the electrolytic process".

(a) That portion of Japan's capacity for the production of soda ash which is in excess of the capacity required to produce 500,000 metric tons per year, including integrated facilities in excess of those required to produce 200,000 metric tons of caustic soda from soda ash, should be made available for claim.

(b) That portion of Japan's capacity for the production of caustic soda and chlorine in electrolytic plants which is in excess of the capacity required to produce 82,500 metric tons of caustic soda and 75,000 metric tons of chlorine per year should be made available for claim.

c. Machine Tool Industry, Ball and Roller Bearing Industry and Machine Tools.

(1) Machine Tool Industry.

(Definition: "Plants and establishments engaged in the production of non-portable, power-driven machines designed to shape metal by the progressive cutting away of stock in the form of chips or shavings or by abrasive action.")

(a) That portion of Japan's capacity for the production of machine tools that is in excess of the capacity required to produce a balanced type-size aggregate of 10,000 machine tools per year should be made available for claim.

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(2) Ball and Roller Bearing Industry.

(Definition: "Plants and establishments primarily engaged in the manufacture or assembly of complete ball and roller bearings or their major component parts, namely balls, rollers, races and cages.")

(a) That portion of Japan's capacity for the production of ball, roller, and similar bearings that is in excess of that required to produce bearings to the value of 32,500,000 yen annually at 1943-44 average prices should be made available for claim.

(3) Machine Tools

(Definition: "Available stock in Japan of non-portable, power-driven machines designed to shape metal by the progressive cutting away of stock in the form of chips or shavings, or by abrasive action.")

(a) That portion of Japan's inventory of machine tools that is in excess of a balanced type-size aggregate of 250,000 machine tools should be made available for claim.

d. Thermal Electric Power Industry.

(Definition: "Plants and establishments primarily engaged in the production of electric energy through the use of fuel as the basic energy source.")

(1) All thermal power plants in excess of those required to produce an aggregate of 2,100,000 kilowatts should be made available for claim.

e. Steel Merchant Shipbuilding and Ship Repair.

(Definition: "Shipyards, including all facilities, plants and establishments located within their confines, primarily engaged in the building, repair or maintenance of steel ships over 100 gross tons.")

(1) All shipbuilding and ship repair facilities in excess of those required to build 150,000 gross tons of new shipping annually and to service a merchant fleet of 3,000,000 gross tons should be made available for claim, subject to the following limitations:

(a) All facilities for building vessels of over 3,000 light displacement tons each should be included in the facilities made available for claim.

(b) Immovable installations, in yards made available for claim, should be destroyed, except for buildings usable for other purposes.

(c) Two 20,000 tons drydocks should be retained for purposes of servicing world shipping touching at Japanese ports.

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f. Petroleum Refining and Storage Facilities

(Definition: "Plants and establishments for processing of crude petroleum and alcohol, (but excluding synthetic crudes derived from coal), including all straight run distillation plants and natural (casing-head) gasoline plants, thermal cracking units, vacuum distillation plants for the manufacture of ordinary and high grade lubricating oils, and isooctane plants, including any isomerization, polymerization or alkylation equipment. All tankage, whether surface or underground, connected with tank farms or refineries, used primarily for storage of petroleum and petroleum products in bulk.")

(1) All refining capacity in excess of that required to process 40,000 barrels of crude oil per day should be made available for claim.

(2) All storage capacity in excess of 10,000,000 barrels should be made available for claim.

g. Aluminum and Magnesium

(Definition: "Plants and establishments primarily engaged in the production of alumina, primary or secondary aluminum and magnesium and their alloys.")

(1) All facilities in excess of 25,000 metric tons per year aluminum reducing capacity should be made available for claim.

h. Primary War Facilities

(Definitions:

Primary War facilities are defined as Army and Navy arsenals and privately owned plants and establishments primarily engaged in the development, manufacture, assembly, testing, repair, maintenance, or storage of combat equipment end-products and civil aircraft, and plants and establishments building merchant vessels of over 3,000 light displacement tons.

Combat Equipment End Products are defined as military end-products which may be identified as weapons, ammunition, missiles, explosives, chemical or bacteriological warfare agents, ultra-shortwave radio equipment (radar), naval combatant vessels, armored vehicles or aircraft including air frames and aircraft engines).

(1) All plant and equipment in this category not subject to being destroyed or scrapped under existing policy should be made available for claim subject to the following limitations:

(a) Those facilities, attached to primary war facilities, which have been engaged in the production of military supplies essentially similar in character to such consumer goods as textiles, clothing, processed foods, fertilizers, fuels, pharmaceuticals and related and dependent industries should remain in Japan, if in the judgment of SCAP they are needed to meet the peaceful needs of the Japanese people.

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i. Merchant Shipping

(Definition: "Cargo vessels, passenger-cargo vessels and tankers of more than 100 gross tons each, including both wooden and steel ships.")

(1) Merchant ships in excess of an aggregate of 2,000,000 gross tons should be made available for claim, subject to the following limitation:

(a) All vessels of more than 3,000 light displacement tons each or with a maximum speed in excess of 15 knots should be made available for claim.

j. Nickel Smelters

(Definitions: "Plants and establishments primarily engaged in the smelting of nickel from its ores.")

(1) All nickel smelters should be made available for reparations claim.

k. Synthetic Rubber

(Definition: "Plants and establishments primarily engaged in the production of synthetic rubber.")

(1) All facilities in the synthetic rubber industry should be made available for claim.

l. Synthetic Oil

(Definition: "Plants and establishments engaged in the manufacture of liquid fuels from coal, whether by high-pressure hydrogenation, the Fischer-Tropsch process, or low temperature carbonization.")

(1) All facilities of the synthetic oil industry should be made available for claim, subject to the following limitation:

(a) Any machinery or equipment in such plants which is suitable for use in production of synthetic ammonia, and, which, in the judgment of SCAP should be transferred for use in production of synthetic ammonia for fertilizer manufacture should be exempted from claim.

2. Industrial facilities not specified for removal above, but which are made idle because of reparations removals prescribed herein, may be made available for reparations removals unless new essential uses for them can be found in Japan. Decisions as to availability of such facilities should be made by SCAP and their ultimate disposition should be made in accordance with directives which prescribe the implementation of reparations removals.

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21 April 1947

FAR EASTERN COMMISSION

REPARATIONS REMOVALS OF INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES AND MERCHANT SHIPPING FROM JAPAN
(Reference: FEC-218)

Note by the Secretary General

1. The enclosure, a statement discussing the proposals contained in FEC-218, Reparations Removals of Industrial Facilities and Merchant Shipping from Japan, submitted by the United States member, is circulated herewith for the information of the Far Eastern Commission and is referred to COMMITTEE NO. 2: ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL AFFAIRS.

2. The attention of all concerned is invited to the classification of this document which prohibits the dissemination of the information contained therein to unauthorized persons or to the press.

NELSON T. JOHNSON
Secretary General

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ENCLOSURE

REPARATIONS REMOVALS OF INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES AND MERCHANT SHIPPING FROM JAPAN

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

1. The Potsdam Declaration states, in paragraph 11:

"Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy and permit the exaction of just reparations in kind, but not those which would enable her to rearm for war."

2. Interim Reparations Program. Policy decisions approved by the Far Eastern Commission, May 1946 to Sept. 1946. FEC documents: 059/9, /10, /12, /17, /18, /23, /33.

3. Determination of the Peaceful Needs of Japan, FEC-106/1, approved by the Far Eastern Commission on 23 Jan. 1947:

"The Far Eastern Commission determines as a matter of policy that the peaceful needs of the Japanese people should be defined as being substantially the standard of living prevailing in Japan during the period of 1930-34.

"Data about the standard of living during 1930-34 should for present purposes be used to make an estimate of Japan's peaceful needs in 1950. In estimating the nature and size of the industrial structure within that level, account should be taken of such factors as technological developments, the balance of payments and employment.

"Acceptance of the above policy should not be interpreted to mean acceptance in advance of a specific level for any particular industry."

4. Provisional surveys of Japan's requirements in "1950" in the following industries: iron and steel, petroleum, machine tools, shipping and shipbuilding. Studies by the Department of State. FEC 058 series.

5. Level of Economic Life in Japan. Reports by Subcommittee No. 2 of Committee No. 2 of the FEC on the peaceful needs of Japan for iron and steel, light metals, synthetic oil, synthetic rubber, ball and roller bearings, chemicals. FEC C2-027 series.

DISCUSSION

A. General

Within the general framework for Japanese reparations enunciated in the Potsdam Declaration the recommendations contained in the "Conclusions" of this paper are based on three underlying and interrelated considerations: requirements for the economic disarmament of Japan; the desirability of supplying reparations to nations engaged in the war against Japan; and

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the necessity for leaving in Japan industrial capacity adequate to meet the peaceful needs of its people.

In reaching the conclusions herein presented, account has been taken of the following:

1. Criteria established by the Far Eastern Commission for determining the peaceful needs of Japan, including the use of the 1930-34 period, adjusted for population increase, technological developments, employment requirements and foreign trade requirements, as a statistical base.

2. Recommendations of Subcommittee 2, of Committee 2, regarding the peaceful needs of Japan in specific industrial categories.

3. Data and recommendations made available by the Supreme Commander, and based on actual experience and analysis of Japanese requirements over the past eighteen months.

4. Special research studies on Japanese industrial requirements and foreign trade made by the Department of State.

Because of the many variables affecting the concepts "rated" or "designed" capacity and the many uncertainties arising as to obsolescence, war damage, and disrepair of facilities, it has been necessary to state the "Conclusions" of this paper in terms of "capacity required to produce" the stated amounts which must be retained in Japan to support its peaceful requirements. Capacity in excess of the stated amounts will be made available as reparations, unless it is so designed as to be usable only to produce military end-products, in which case, it will be destroyed.

Similarly, the previously mentioned uncertainties as to total industrial capacity make it impossible to state in exact terms, at this time, the capacities which will be made available under this program as reparations. However, analysis of Japanese industrial statistics indicates that the total pool of industrial facilities which will be made available will be of very considerable size. It should also be noted that while no attempt has been made to set precise levels for industries supplementary to those included in the "Conclusions" because of the obvious difficulty of measurement, this paper covers such industries by providing that capacity made idle as a consequence of required removals shall be made available as reparations.

B. Discussion in Support of Specific Recommendations

(1) Iron and Steel Industry

In the period 1930-34 average annual consumption of finished steel in Japan was 2,347,000 m.t., or 35.3 kg. per capita. Direct military uses of finished steel during these years are estimated as approximately 5% of total consumption, leaving for civilian consumption 33.6 kg. per capita. Applying thisfigure to an estimated population of 79 million in 1950, Japan's peaceful needs for finished steel are estimated at 2,650,000 m.t. annually. This

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amount is slightly less than requirements estimated by Sub-committee No. 2 of Committee No. 2 on a slightly different basis.

In order to produce 2,650,000 tons of finished steel annually, Japan will require 3,500,000 tons of ingot steel, on the assumption that about 25% of the ingot steel used will become "self-generated" scrap. By carefully selecting the relative types and amounts of electric furnace, open hearth, and Bessemer capacity required to produce 3,500,000 tons of ingot steel, it will be possible to adjust for present surpluses of scrap and shortage of coking coal, to minimize disruptions of integrated operations, and to make available for reparations claim a better balance of types of steel-making facilities.

On the basis of 1930-34 consumption, requirements for pig iron for castings in a normal peacetime year are estimated at 600,000 m.t. The amount of pig iron required to produce 3,500,000 m.t. of ingot steel depends on numerous factors not determinable in advance, e.g. availability of scrap, degree to which electric furnaces are used, relative costs of scrap and pig iron, etc. Requirements for pig iron for steel ingot production would be 1,750,000 m.t. if the same scrap to pig ratio were used as in 1930-34. On this basis total requirements would be 2,350,000 m.t. However, larger ratios of scrap to pig iron were used in steel ingot production in 1935 and 1936. The recommendation that capacity to produce pig iron in Japan be reduced to 2,000,000 m.t. is based on no fixed assumption as to the ratio of scrap to pig in steel production. It is believed that imports of pig iron will be required, but that these will be relatively small, and certainly not in excess of the 648,000 m.t. average annual imports of the period 1930-34.

(2) Chemical Industry

(a) General

Because of the importance of chemical fertilizers for maximum production of foodstuffs in Japan, it is recommended that no facilities be removed which are needed to produce chemicals necessary to achieve essential production of fertilizers in Japan. Since however, in estimating requirements for these basic chemicals, full use of facilities required for fertilizer production has been assumed, it is not anticipated that this provision will be found to be in conflict with the retention levels set for the specified branches of the industry.

(b) Nitric Acid Industry

Average annual domestic consumption of nitric acid during the period 1930-34 for all uses was about 26,900 m.t. (as 100% acid) of which about 1,800 m.t. appear to have been for military uses. Allowing for population increase, it is estimated that Japan's peaceful needs for nitric acid in a normal postwar year should be met by production of 30,000 m.t. of nitric acid annually. Retention of annual capacity required to produce this amount of acid is therefore

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recommended. Subcommittee No. 2 of Committee No. 2 has recommended virtually the same retention figure for nitric acid.

Nitric acid is produced by oxidation of ammonia, which is essential in the production of ammonium sulfate required as a fertilizer in Japan. In order to insure adequate fertilizer production in Japan, it is recommended that no synthetic ammonia capacity shall be included in the facilities made available for claim.

(c) Sulphuric Acid Industry

In determining the peaceful needs of the Japanese people for sulphuric acid, careful consideration has been given to its essential uses in the production of chemical fertilizers, synthetic fibres and other applications. On the basis of data made available by SCAP, ("Fertilizers in Japan", Report No. 55 of the National Resources Section of SCAP, dated 10 Sept. 1946), it is estimated that annual requirements for chemical nitrogenous fertilizers will be about 2,000,000 m.t., of which 1,600,000 m.t. will be ammonium sulfate and the balance calcium cyanamide. Requirements for calcium superphosphate will be about 1,500,000 m.t.

In the synthetic fibre industry, it seems imperative to place no obstacle in the way of operation in a normal peacetime year of all remaining operable or repairable capacity, which amounts to 160,000 m.t. annually. Requirements for the many other uses of sulphuric acid have been estimated on the basis of average annual consumption in the period 1930-34.

Total Japanese peaceful needs on this basis are as follows, in terms of 50°Baume acid:

For 1,600,000 m.t. of ammonium sulphate	1,920,000 m.t.
For 1,500,000 m.t. of calcium superphosphate	855,000 m.t.
For 160,000 m.t. of synthetic fibre	385,000 m.t.
For all other uses	340,000 m.t.
TOTAL	3,500,000 m.t.

Requirements for fertilizers make up approximately 80% of the total.

The recommended figure of 3,500,000 m.t. exceeds the estimate of Subcommittee No. 2 by 100,000 m.t., the difference being due to a correspondingly higher estimate of sulphuric acid consumption in superphosphate manufacture.

As in the interim program, it is recommended that all facilities made available for claim will be of the contact type. In order to provide minimum interference with the operations of Japanese facilities not included in the reparations program, it is stipulated that insofar as possible, the sulphuric acid plants

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designated for removal should not include those serving as integral functional units in other manufacturing plants not made available for claim.

(d) Soda Ash, Caustic Soda and Chlorine Industries

Chlorine. In the period 1930-34, average annual consumption of chlorine in Japan was 38,000 m.t. With allowance for population change only, requirements in "1950" would appear to be about 45,000 m.t. However, in 1930-34, production of rayon pulp in Japan was negligible, whereas it is believed that in "1950" Japan will be able to produce the 200,000 m.t. of rayon pulp required for 160,000 m.t. of synthetic fiber. Production of this amount of rayon pulp will require about 10,000 m.t. of chlorine, which must therefore be added in its entirety to the figure of 45,000 m.t. It is also considered necessary to leave an additional amount of 20,000 m.t. for new uses due to technological changes (sanitation, insecticides, etc.) and for possible exports of bleaching powder, bringing the total requirements to meet Japan's peaceful needs in a normal peacetime year to 75,000 metric tons. This is the level recommended by Subcommittee No. 2 and is also identical with the level to which the industry is to be reduced under the interim reparations removal program.

Caustic Soda. In the period 1930-34, total domestic consumption of caustic soda in Japan averaged 108,800 m.t. annually, of which 44,000 m.t. were used in the production of synthetic fiber and 64,400 m.t. for all other uses. Allowing for the increase in population, it is estimated that on this basis about 80,000 m.t. of caustic soda will be required for all uses except production of synthetic fiber, for which 176,000 m.t. will be required, making a total of 256,000 m.t.

Japan was formerly an exporter of caustic soda and it has seemed advisable to make allowance for a moderate amount of exports in a normal peacetime year. It is therefore recommended that Japan should be allowed to retain the capacity required to produce 282,500 m.t. of caustic soda annually, of which 82,500 m.t. would be produced as a co-product in the plants making electrolytic chlorine and the remaining 200,000 m.t. would be made from soda ash. These recommendations are in essential conformity with the retention levels recommended by Subcommittee No. 2. The recommendations regarding capacity for production of caustic soda by the electrolytic process is identical with that in the interim program, which did not, however, specify a level for total caustic soda capacity.

Soda Ash. Average annual consumption of soda ash in Japan in the period 1930-34 was 209,000 m.t. of which 72,000 m.t. were required for production of caustic soda to supplement that produced in electrolytic caustic soda-chlorine plants. The remaining 137,000 m.t. were used for other purposes such as manufacture of glass, pulp products, soap, dyes, in food processing and for other uses. Allowing for population increase, these other requirements in a normal peacetime year

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are estimated at 163,000 m.t. In addition, 300,000 m.t. of soda ash will be needed to make the 200,000 m.t. of caustic soda which must be produced from Soda ash (see under Caustic Soda.) It is considered that a small margin should be left for possible exports, and it is therefore recommended that Japan should be allowed to retain the capacity required to produce 500,000 m.t. of soda ash annually. This level is identical with that set by Subcommittee No. 2 and also conforms to the provision of the interim program in terms of capacity required to produce.

(3) Machine Tool Industry, Ball and Roller Bearing Industry and Machine Tools

(a) Machine Tool Industry

Reduction of Japan's machine tool industry to a capacity of 27,000 units yearly was recommended in the Interim Removals Program (FEC-059/10). Studies made of this industry indicate that Japan's peaceful needs can be met by retention of capacity sufficient to produce a balanced type-size aggregate of 10,000 machine tools annually. Judging from estimates of peak production of machine tools, this retention level would amount to less than 20% of present capacity.

(b) Ball and Roller Bearing Industry

It is recommended that capacity be retained in this industry sufficient to produce ball and roller bearings valued at 32,500,000 yen (in 1943-1944 average prices) annually. These retentions are estimated to amount to only slightly more than 10% of average 1943-1944 production, and are recommended in view of:

(1) requirements for bearings in various products needed in the Japanese civilian economy; (2) the cumulative effect on security of other measures recommended in this program; and (3) Japan's limited ability to pay for imports.

(c) Machine Tools

The capacity retention level recommended for the machine tool industry is adequate to maintain holdings of about 175,000 machine tools. Retention of about 40% of present inventory, or 250,000 tools, however, is recommended for the following reasons: (1) the need for machine tools in making repairs of damaged plants, particularly in view of the effect repairs to war damaged and worn out plants may have on capacity available for reparations removals; (2) the problems involved in properly relocating the supply of tools in an economy disorganized by plant removals; and (3) the fact that holdings of this amount cannot be maintained in view of recommended removals in the machine tool industry, and, as present tools lose their usefulness, holdings will be reduced to a level of about 175,000 tools.

(4) Thermal Electric Power Industry

Under the interim program, that portion of Japan's

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thermal electric generating capacity that is in excess of her requirements after reduction of industrial capacity in accordance with the remainder of the interim program, is to be made available for claim; in the directive, the required retention level was estimated at 2.1 million KW. In the intervening months, additional studies of the Japanese electric power industry have been made, which indicate that retention of 2.1 million KW of thermal electric capacity, in addition to existing hydro-electric capacity, is necessary in order to meet peacetime energy requirements. Although slightly less than the average thermal capacity of 2.2 million KW in the period 1930-34, the increase in dependable hydro capacity is believed to be adequate to provide for the increase in population and for some technological change in the direction of increased use of electric energy. In view of the peculiarities of the Japanese power system and the administrative and technical problems involved in selecting plants, without severely affecting the grids, removals greater than those recommended herein appear impossible under the term of reference of FEC-106/1.

(5) Steel Merchant Shipbuilding and Ship Repair

The recommendations for capacity for new construction (150,000 gross tons annually) and servicing (for a fleet of 3,000,000 gross tons) are identical with the provisions of the interim program. This capacity would permit the ultimate building and maintenance of a merchant fleet of 3,000,000 gross tons, or about three-fourths the gross tonnage held in the period 1930-34. A merchant fleet of at least this size appears essential in view of Japan's great dependence on external trade and its limited ability to pay for imports. An extensive analysis of this question is made in "A Provisional Survey of Japan's Shipping and Shipbuilding Requirements in 1950" which is being made available to the FEC by the U.S.

It is the view of qualified experts that the recommendation which makes available for claim all facilities which can be used for building vessels of over 3,000 light displacement tons is an adequate guarantee against the construction of ships capable of conversion to military use. The limitation on size of individual vessels is expressed in terms of light displacement tons rather than gross tons because of the greater ease with which a limitation on gross tonnage could be evaded. According to naval authorities, it is possible to design a vessel in such a way that its gross tonnage is low, but yet the vessel might be undesirably large in terms of light displacement tons, or could more easily embody other characteristics undesirable from a security point of view.

(6) Petroleum Refining and Storage Facilities

Studies of consumption in the period 1931-34 indicate that in a normal peacetime year Japan's civilian economy will need 17.8 million barrels of petroleum products, probably made up of 5.2 million bbls. of gasoline, 1.5 million bbls. of lubricating oil and the balance (11.1 million bbls.) of Diesel fuel, fuel oils and other petroleum products. Maximum supply of refined products from domestic crudes is expected to be slightly less than two million

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bbls. The remainder will have to be imported, either as crude oil to be refined in Japan, as refined products or as a combination of the two. It is anticipated that most of the crude oil available to Japan will come from the Persian Gulf area, and refined products largely from the NEI. The accompanying tabulation is based on statements of petroleum technologists as to product yields which may be expected from indigenous and Persian Gulf crudes when processed in Japanese refineries. Domestic production of crude oil is estimated at 2.3 million bbls. annually. On the basis of 40,000 bbl. daily throughout capacity and a 300 day operating year required crude oil imports will be 9.7 million bbl. yearly.

Estimated Petroleum Balance, Japan, on Basis of 40,000 bbl. day Refining Capacity
(in thousands of barrels)

	Yield from domestic crudes		Yield from Persian Gulf crudes		Total yield from Jap refineries	Estimated total requirements	Estimated Imports of refined products
	Per bbl	Total	Per bbl	Total			
Gasoline	14.0%	332	41.0%	3,977	4,299	5,200	901
Kerosene	13.3%	306	10.5%	1,019	1,325)		
Diesel fuel	16.7%	384	14.7%	1,426	1,810)	11,100	5,374
Fuel oil	20.7%	476	21.8%	2,115	2,591)		
Lube oil	16.0%	368	---	---	368	1,500	1,132
Asphalt	8.0%	(184)	---	---	(184)		
Refinery losses	11.3%	---	12.0%	---	---		
TOTAL	100.0%	1,856	100.0%	8,537	10,393	17,800	7,407

It is apparent from these calculations that Japan will not produce all of its requirements of any of the major petroleum products when operating refineries with a throughput of 40,000 bbls. a day on domestic and Persian Gulf crudes. Japan will consequently not produce an exportable surplus of any type of petroleum product, and in a normal peaceful year will need imports of refined products equivalent to more than 40% of total requirements, in addition to crude oil imports aggregating more than 80% of total crude oil consumption.

The savings to Japan in foreign exchange through imports of 9.7 million bbls. of crudes annually versus imports of an equivalent quantity of refined products (8.5 million bbl.) cannot be accurately foretold in view of uncertainties in the world petroleum situation and in sources and availability of shipping. However based on current average cost of $4 per barrel for petroleum products delivered to Japan and the prediction by petroleum technologists that Persian Gulf crudes will cost about $2.80 per barrel delivered to Japan, annual savings to the Japanese in foreign exchange would be about $7,000,000.

The recommended retention level for storage capacity represents facilities adequate to handle less than seven months' supply. This is only half as much storage capacity in relation to annual consumption as Japan had in 1931. However, it is believed that the recommended storage capacity is adequate to assure uninterrupted supply of crude petroleum

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to refineries and of refined products to consumers.

(7) Aluminum and Magnesium

The interim program provides for removal from Japan of all facilities for the production of primary aluminum, but authorizes retention of all existing facilities for the melting of scrap aluminum into secondary ingot. However, subsequent investigation has shown that no separate industry for producing secondary ingot by remelting of scrap exists in Japan. It has also been found that much of the aluminum scrap available in Japan can be usefully employed for civilian products only after a purification process consisting of reconversion to alumina followed by electrolytic reduction to aluminum metal. In view of the cost to the Japanese of importing aluminum metal, it is recommended that Japan be allowed to retain 25,000 m.t. of aluminum reducing capacity. It is considered that adequate security safeguards with regard to the use of aluminum are provided by the removal of the entire aircraft industry and of all rolling capacity designed solely for the processing of the light metals and their alloys.

The following estimates of annual aluminum requirements in Japan were drawn up by the indicated Japanese sources:

DESIRED ALUMINUM PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION

APPLICATION	METRIC TONS PER YEAR	
	ESTIMATE BY LIGHT METAL CONTROL ASS.	ESTIMATE BY LIGHT METAL ROLLING MILLS' ASS.
1. Cooking and Household Utensils	15,000	15,000
2. Transmission Lines, Elec. Cables	10,000	--
3. Elec. Communication Industry	4,000	3,500*
4. Transportation Industry	4,000	5,500
5. Architectural Uses	1,000	1,500
6. Chemical Industry	3,000	600
7. Medical Instruments	1,000	900
8. Coins	2,000	2,000
TOTAL	40,000	29,000

*) Including foil

Source: SCAP, Ec. & Sci. Sec., Special Rept. No. 9, April 3, 1946, "The Aluminum Industry of Japan"

Under the provisions of the interim program, rolling capacity adequate to handle 15,000 m.t. of fabricated aluminum annually was to be left in Japan. This equipment was to be obtained from any surplus available in other branches of the non-ferrous metals industry. In effect, all facilities primarily engaged in the fabrication of aluminum and magnesium and their alloys would be made available for claim. The present program likewise requires that all light metal rolling be done on surplus facilities available in other branches of the non-ferrous metals industry, and that all light metal

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rolling facilities as such should be made available for claim.

The interim provision for removal of all facilities for production of magnesium remains unaltered.

(8) Primary War Facilities

See discussion presented in FEC-084 and C1-001.

(9) Merchant Shipping

Under the provisions of paragraph (5), Steel Merchant Shipbuilding and Ship Repair, all facilities for the construction of ships of more than 3,000 light displacement tons each will be made available for claim. To provide adequate security it is necessary to prevent the construction of ships which could be converted to effective types of combatant ships and consistent with this position it is considered necessary to remove as reparations all existing ships which exceed 3,000 light displacement tons and all ships which have a speed in excess of 15 knots. This provision will make a limited number of Japanese ships now operating available for claim as reparations. Removal of all ships which exceed the permitted size and speed limitation is recommended even though the estimated tonnage presently available is less than 2,000,000 gross tons.

It is estimated that Japan will require 2,300,000 to 2,500,000 gross tons of shipping for foreign trade in the normal postwar period and will require an additional 600,000 gross tons as a minimum for the coastwise trade. Limiting Japan to a total of 2,000,000 gross tons of shipping will permit the use of only 1,400,000 gross tons in the near-seas and over-seas trade and 600,000 tons in the coastwise trade. It is estimated that Japan will be able to carry approximately 60% of its overseas trade in Japanese ships if permitted a total of 2,000,000 gross tons of merchant shipping. This would be only about three-fourths of the amount of merchant shipping she had in the period 1930-34. A comprehensive analysis of Japan's merchant shipping requirements is made in "A Provisional Survey of Japan's Shipping and Shipbuilding Requirements in 1950", which is being made available to the FEC by the U.S.

(10) Nickel Smelters

Japan had no domestic production of nickel before 1937 and supplied her needs entirely from imports. Production between 1937 and 1945 was from very low grade ores and recovery was very expensive. None of the Japanese nickel mines is now operating and no production is planned. Importation of nickel ores or concentrates for processing in Japan is considered infeasible. It is therefore recommended that all nickel smelters be made available for claim, thus providing as reparations facilities not needed by the Japanese.

(11) Synthetic Rubber and

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(12) Synthetic Oil

The interim program provides that all capacities in these two industries be made available for reparations claim, with the exception of machinery and equipment in the synthetic oil industry which can be used in the production of synthetic ammonia for fertilizer manufacture. No new information has become available in the intervening period which would indicate any necessity for altering the interim policy decisions which are therefore repeated unchanged in the present program.

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C2-242

14 July 1947

C2-242

FAR EASTERN COMMISSION

COMMITTEE NO. 2: ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL AFFAIRS

LEVEL OF ECONOMIC LIFE IN JAPAN

POLICY TOWARDS JAPANESE INDUSTRY AND SHIPPING

(References: FEC-058 Series; FEC-059 Series; FEC-083/5; FEC-106/1, -218/1; C1-001 Series; C2-027 series)

Note by the Secretary General

1. The enclosure, a report by Subcommittee No. 2: Level of Economic Life in Japan, on FEC-218, Reparations Removals of Industrial Facilities and Merchant Shipping from Japan, and related documents, is circulated herewith for the consideration of COMMITTEE NO. 2: ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL AFFAIRS.

2. Enclosure "A" contains a general statement on the papers under consideration and the assumptions made in drawing up the report.

3. Enclosure "B" contains discussion of specific recommendations.

4. Enclosure "C" contains a proposed policy statement.

5. Enclosure "D" contains reference material.

NELSON T. JOHNSON
Secretary General

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ENCLOSURE "A"

LEVEL OF ECONOMIC LIFE IN JAPAN:
POLICY TOWARDS JAPANESE INDUSTRY AND SHIPPING

1. The following papers dealing with the above subject have been referred to the Subcommittee:

No.	Title	Submitted by	Date of Paper	Date Referred to Subcommittee
FEC-058	Policy towards Japanese Industry	U.K.	10 May '46	12 May '46
C1-001/4	Interim Reparations Removals	U.K.	10 Jun '46	24 Jun '46
C1-001/6	" " "	U.K.	24 Jun '46	1 Jul '46
C1-001/9	" " "	Neth.	28 Jun '46	1 Jul '46
C1-001/11	" " "	Neth.	7 Aug. '46	7 Aug '46
FEC-218	Reparations Removals of Industrial Facilities & Merchant Shipping from Japan	U.S.	9 Apr '47	10 Apr '47

In addition the following reports of the Subcommittee have been referred back for reconsideration along with FEC-218:

C2-027/1	Level of Economic Life in Japan: Iron and Steel, Light Metals, Synthetic Oil, Synthetic Rubber	6 Jan '47
C2-027/2	Level of Economic Life in Japan: Metal Working Machinery	14 Jan '47
C2-027/3	Level of Economic Life in Japan: Railway Equipment	29 Jan '47
C2-027/4	Level of Economic Life in Japan: Ball and Roller Bearings	10 Feb '47

A further report, C2-027/5, Level of Economic Life in Japan: Chemical Industry, was not on the Committee's agenda when the other reports were referred back but the Subcommittee has assumed that it was the Committee's intention that this report should also be reconsidered.

In addition to the above, the Subcommittee has also considered FEC-218/1, Reparations Removals of Industrial Facilities and Merchant Shipping from Japan, which contains the statement referred to in paragraph 2 of the cover page of FEC-218.

The present report embodies the views of the Subcommittee on all the above papers.

2. The general aim of the Subcommittee has been to fix levels for industry and shipping such as would, in its view, permit Japan an economy sufficient to meet her peaceful needs as at present defined by the Far Eastern Commission (FEC-106/1) and which at the same time would be consistent with the provision of the Potsdam Declaration that Japan shall not be permitted to retain those industries "which would enable her to re-arm for war". No provision has been made for the delivery of goods for reparations from current production. Should it be decided that goods from current production are to be made available for reparations the proposed figures may require revision.

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3. It is the understanding of the Subcommittee that, if a policy such as is suggested in Enclosure "C" is adopted by the Commission, the existing policies on Interim Reparations Removals (FEC-059 series) will be superseded. The majority of the Subcommittee also considered that such a policy would supersede the policy on Assured Production Capacity Levels (FEC-083/5), but several members did not consider that this would necessarily be so. The U.S. Member desired it recorded that his Government intended FEC-218 to be considered as a proposal regarding that industrial capacity and merchant shipping to be retained in Japan to meet Japan's peaceful needs (as defined in FEC-106/1) during the occupation of Japan (as defined in FEC-084/12). Capacity surplus to those levels would be considered available for reparations removal and the Far Eastern Commission decision to this effect would be final. Adoption of FEC-218 would supersede the FEC policy decisions previously adopted dealing with interim removals and with assured production capacity levels for Japan. The U.S. Member had made these points clear when FEC-218 was presented for the consideration of the Far Eastern Commission, and, had requested that the policy proposal be negotiated on that basis. It was the understanding of the Chinese and Netherlands Members that the report in its present form was not complete as to the categories of industry to be made available for reparations. Moreover, it was their view that the level of each industry as proposed herein was not final, because the Subcommittee could not take into account some factors relevant to the economic life and needs of Japan as a whole nor of the needs of the claimant countries.

4. In the view of the majority of the Subcommittee the policy adopted, taken in conjunction with FEC-084/12, Reduction of Japanese Industrial War Potential (which the Subcommittee has assumed will be adopted substantially in its present form) should constitute a comprehensive policy for the reduction and limitation of Japanese industrial capacity and shipping. It was suggested that the levels proposed in Enclosure "C" be considered from this point of view.

5. Attention is called to the fact that the recommended levels of industrial capacity to be retained in Japan are stated throughout this paper in terms of capacity required to produce a certain quantity and not in terms of rated or designed capacity.

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ENCLOSURE "B"

DISCUSSION OF SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Size of Merchant Vessels

Paragraphs 2.a.(1) and 9.a.(1) of FEC-084/12 require the Far Eastern Commission to determine the size of merchant vessels, above which the facilities for their construction shall be regarded as primary war facilities. Merchant vessels for this purpose include all vessels other than naval combatant vessels.

The Subcommittee had before it the U.S. proposal contained in FEC-218 that this size should be 3,000 light displacement tons and proposals by the Netherlands and United Kingdom members that it should be 5,000 gross registered tons. The other members felt that they could not usefully discuss these proposals without instructions and it was therefore agreed to pass both proposals on to the Committee without comment rather than delay the submission of the report.

The Subcommittee proposes, if it is thought desirable by the Committee, to keep the subject of shipping and shipbuilding on its agenda and to issue a supplementary report as soon as practicable.

2. Iron and Steel Industry, producing pig iron, steel ingots and basic shapes

The Subcommittee has already submitted a report covering the iron and steel industry (C2-027/1), the conclusions of which, so far as concerns the total amount of capacity to be retained in Japan, are substantially in agreement with those contained in the proposal submitted by the U.S. representative in FEC-218.

After discussion of the amount of steel used for castings and the ratio between steel ingots and basic shapes in Japanese steel-making practice, the majority of the Subcommittee favored revising the figure which it originally proposed for basic shapes and accepting the United States proposal of 2.65 million metric tons per annum.

In connection with paragraph 5. of C2-027/1 the Chinese member desired to submit for the information of the Committee a discussion on steel used for military purposes. This is contained in Enclosure "D", section 1.

The interim reparations removal program provided that Japanese capacity for making steel in electric furnaces should be reduced to 100,000 metric tons per annum, made up as far as possible of furnaces of individual charge capacity of 1½ metric tons or less; and that no Bessemer capacity should be removed. The U.S. proposal contains no such provisions and if accepted, would mean a modification of the interim decision.

The Far Eastern Commission has already agreed that Japan should retain an additional 300,000 metric tons per annum of electric furnace capacity at least until 30 June 1947. It seems that the conditions which prompted this decision are likely to continue for some time and the majority of the Sub-

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committee therefore considered that it would be necessary to permit Japan to retain more than 100,000 metric tons per annum after 30 June 1947. After consideration of the arguments contained in FEC-218/1 the majority of the Sub-committee favored the United States proposal that it should be left to SCAP to decide the relative amounts of open hearth and electric furnace capacity to be retained.

Although not objecting to the U.S. proposal that there should be a better balance of types of steel-making facilities for reparations, the minority was of the opinion that the final decision as to the relative amounts of open hearth and electric furnace to be retained in Japan should be made by the Far Eastern Commission on the basis of relevant data to be submitted by SCAP.

The majority of the Subcommittee considered that it should be specifically stated that no Bessemer capacity should be removed.

3. Coal Carbonization Industry

The Subcommittee considers that Japan should be permitted to retain sufficient coke-oven capacity to supply the needs of her iron and steel and other industries using high-temperature coke, at the levels determined under the over-all program of industrial reduction. The Subcommittee does not consider that it is necessary to attempt to fix an exact level for the industry, since coke-oven facilities are almost always integrated with the facilities which use the coke.

The Subcommittee therefore agreed that it would be sufficient to indicate to the Supreme Commander that coke-oven facilities related to the coke-consuming industries which are made surplus by reductions in the latter should also be made available for reparations.

4. Non-ferrous metals industry producing pig ingot and basic shapes

a. Nickel smelters

The Subcommittee accepts the view expressed in FEC-218 and FEC-218/1 that all nickel smelters in Japan should be made available for reparations claim.

b. Copper

FEC-218 does not propose any specific level for the copper industry. The majority of the Subcommittee considered, however, that such a level should be fixed.

The consumption of copper in Japan during the period 1930-1934 averaged 66,800 metric tons per annum. Allowing for increased population, Japan would on this basis require about 80,000 metric tons of copper in "1950". It has not been possible to make an estimate of consumption of copper for military uses during the period 1930-1934. The Subcommittee has therefore not made any adjustment on this account, but has assumed that this factor is roughly counterbalanced by increased requirements due to technological changes, e.g. increasing

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electrification.

Mine production of copper in Japan was incompletely reported until 1940. Available figures of pre-war production are given in the following table:

Thousands of metric tons

Year	Mines reporting in each year	Total production
1935	55.4	?
1936	54.8	?
1937	52.2	?
1938	53.3	?
1939	52.4	?
1940	49.6	73.9
1941	47.1	77.0

The above figures suggest that total production in the years 1935 to 1939 was probably at least as great as in 1940 and 1941. It therefore appears likely that Japan will be able to produce 80,000 metric tons of copper per annum from domestic mining.

It is the view of the majority of the Subcommittee that Japanese capacity to smelt, refine and fabricate copper in excess of an amount sufficient to deal with 80,000 metric tons per annum of copper metal should be made available for reparations claim, subject to the provision that any surplus capacity in the rolling industry may, if necessary, be used in the aluminum industry under the terms of paragraph 2.c.(1).(b) in Enclosure "C".

c. Other non-ferrous metals

Owing to the conflicting data regarding the present capacity in other non-ferrous metal plants and in view of their relative unimportance in the Japanese industrial structure, the Subcommittee considers that any capacity in the lead, zinc, tin and ferro-alloy industries surplus to Japan's peaceful needs should be dealt with by the application of the general principle contained in paragraph 7 of Enclosure "C".

5. Light metals industry producing alumina, primary aluminum and magnesium, rolled, drawn or extruded shapes

The majority of the Subcommittee is doubtful about the statement contained in FEC-218/1 to the effect that, if Japan is to reprocess scrap so as to produce a satisfactory grade of aluminum for civilian purposes, she will need to retain primary aluminum facilities, i.e., facilities of the type which must be used in the manufacture of virgin aluminum from bauxite, because she has no separate secondary aluminum facilities, i.e., facilities especially adapted to the reprocessing of aluminum scrap. It is thought possible that facilities other than primary aluminum facilities would be available in Japan that could be used for reprocessing at least the major part of the existing scrap into aluminum which is satisfactory for producing civilian goods. Until evidence is available to the contrary the majority of the Subcommittee does not feel that it can support the proposal that

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Japan should retain primary aluminum facilities.

The Subcommittee considers that some aluminum rolling capacity should be left in Japan. The majority of the Subcommittee favored the provisions of the interim program with regard to rolled, drawn and extruded aluminum shapes (FEC-059/9).

The Subcommittee accepts the proposal contained in FEC-218 that all magnesium capacity in Japan should be made available for reparations claim.

6. Metal working machinery industry, producing machine tools, cutting tools and secondary metal working machinery

a. Machine tools

The Subcommittee has already submitted a report covering the metal working machinery industry (C2-027/2/ the conclusion of which so far as the machine tool industry is concerned is the same as that contained in the proposal submitted by the U.S. representative in FEC-218. The Subcommittee therefore recommends that Japan be allowed to retain capacity to produce a balanced type-size aggregate of 10,000 machine tools per year.

b. Cutting tools and secondary metal working machinery

The U.S. proposal (FEC-218) makes no reference to cutting tools and secondary metal working machinery, the intention being that this equipment should be covered by the general provision contained in paragraph 2. of FEC-218. The majority of the Subcommittee, however, adheres to its recommendation in C2-027/2 that Japan be allowed to retain capacity to produce sufficient cutting tools and secondary metal working machinery to maintain the inventory of this equipment at a level appropriate to the proposed inventory of machine tools (See paragraph 18).

7. Ball and roller bearing industry

The Subcommittee has already submitted a report covering the ball and roller bearing industry (C2-027/4) the conclusions of which are the same as that contained in the U.S. proposal (FEC-218), which the Subcommittee therefore accepts.

8. Chemical industry

The Subcommittee has already submitted a report covering the chemical industry (C2-027/5) the conclusions of which are the same as those contained in the U.S. proposal in FEC-218 in the case of the nitric acid and the soda ash, caustic soda and chlorine industries. In the case of sulphuric acid the level proposed by the U.S. is 3.5 million metric tons (62% acid equivalent) whereas the Subcommittee proposed 3.4 million metric tons. In addition the Subcommittee recommended levels for industrial explosives and calcium carbide, whereas the U.S. proposal contains a clause (paragraph 1.b,(1) of FEC-218) that capacity which would

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otherwise be removable should be retained, if necessary to achieve essential production of fertilizers in Japan.

After considering the points of difference, the Subcommittee has come to the following conclusions:

a. Industrial explosives

The majority of the Subcommittee considered that a specific level should be fixed for this industry, and, at the request of the United Kingdom member, the Subcommittee reconsidered the figure of 20,000 metric tons per annum which they had put forward in C2-027/5. The United Kingdom member pointed out that the figures on which the Subcommittee had based their previous recommendation included some production for export and that capacity for export was, by the terms of FEC-084/12, not to be allowed to Japan. He proposed that the figure be reduced to 10,000 metric tons per annum.

The U.S. member said that the reasons for fixing the level originally proposed by the Subcommittee still appeared to him to be sound. Rehabilitation of the coal mines would take a considerable time and it appeared certain that Japan would have to depend much more on domestic sources of metallic ores than in 1930-34, with a consequent relative increase in demand for industrial explosives. The fixing of an exact level was admittedly difficult but he was unable to see that there was any very strong security reason for imposing such a severe restriction that Japan might have to import industrial explosives. He said that the Subcommittee was agreed that Japan would have to retain capacity for manufacturing the basic chemicals involved and their conversion into industrial explosives consisted of little more than the addition of inert material, for which relatively simple equipment was required.

After discussion in the Subcommittee, the majority agreed that the level should be fixed at 10,000 metric tons per annum but that it should be stated that if additional capacity was required to meet temporary needs it should be open to the Supreme Commander, after informing the Far Eastern Commission for the reasons for so doing, to retain such additional capacity pending a decision by the Far Eastern Commission.

b. Sulphuric acid

Further examination of the statistical basis for the calculation of sulphuric acid required for fertilizer production in 1950 shows that 100,000 metric tons more will be required for the purpose than the Subcommittee allowed. The majority of the Subcommittee therefore recommends that Japanese capacity to produce sulphuric acid in excess of an amount sufficient to produce 3.5 million metric tons (62% acid equivalent) should be made available for reparations claim.

c. Soda ash, Caustic soda and chlorine

The U.S. proposal is identical with that of the Subcommittee and the majority of the Subcommittee therefore recommends that it be adopted.

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The minority pointed out that the 1930-1934 average consumption figure of chlorine (38,000 metric tons annually) which the Subcommittee had projected to "1950" already included some production for sanitation and insecticide purposes. The majority recommendation to leave an additional amount of 20,000 metric tons for sanitation and insecticides and possible export, in their opinion, constitutes at least a partial double counting.

The minority also cannot accept the reasoning that the additional 20,000 metric tons, representing a 52% increase compared to the base period consumption figure, is required for new uses due to technological developments. The phrase "technological development", as used in "Determination of the Peaceful Needs of Japan" (FEC-106/1) cannot be interpreted to allow net addition to the productive capacity of Japan over and above what is necessary to meet the peaceful needs of Japan as defined by the FEC. It is their understanding that such factors as technological developments can only be taken into account to compensate for the decline of productive capacity in one industry, such as cotton textiles, since the base period by the development of another industry, such as rayon.

If the Far Easter Commission decides that there should be more chlorine capacity left in Japan for some additional new uses, the quantity should be decided on the merits of each specific case, but it is not within the competence of the Subcommittee to decide on such quantity based on technological argument.

The minority, therefore, could not agree to the figures recommended by the majority of the Subcommittee.

d. Chemical nitrogen

The U.S. proposal for nitric acid is in line with that of the Subcommittee and the majority of the Subcommittee therefore recommends that the U.S. proposal be adopted. The Chinese and Netherlands members desired to fix a level for synthetic ammonia.

e. Calcium carbide

The majority adhered to the Subcommittee's proposal that Japanese capacity to manufacture calcium carbide in excess of an amount sufficient to produce 430,000 metric tons annually should be made available for reparations claim.

f. General clause

Because of the need for the maximum fertilizer production to enable the Japanese to produce as much of their food requirements as possible, the majority of the Subcommittee were prepared to accept the clause proposed by the U.S. in paragraph 1.b.(1) of FEC-218 on condition that its application is limited to the sulphuric acid and calcium carbide industries.

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The minority noted that the proposed general clause relating to the chemical industry contained in FEC-218 was to be applicable only to the sulphuric acid and calcium carbide industries. On the basis of the data available to the Subcommittee the figures recommended for these industries would be sufficient for Japanese fertilizer requirements in "1950". In view of the importance of fertilizer in connection with Japan's food problem the minority requested additional data with a view to reconsidering the levels proposed for these two industries. As no additional data was produced, the minority suggested the substitution of the following for the proposed general clause:

> "If, in the view of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, the above levels of capacity are insufficient to meet Japan's peaceful needs for fertilizer in "1950", he should inform the Far Eastern Commission and supply additional data in order to enable the Commission to review the levels if it should consider it necessary to do so."

9. Railway equipment industry

The U.S. proposal in FEC-218 contains no specific reference to the railway equipment industry, the U.S. view being that this industry would be covered under the general provision of paragraph 2. of FEC-218. It is the view of the majority of the Subcommittee, however, that it is both possible and desirable to specify a level in this industry, and it adheres to the proposal contained in Enclosure "B" of C2-027/3.

10. Automotive industry

In the view of the majority of the Subcommittee the reduction in the inventory of machine tools (proposed in paragraph 18. below) and in the capacity for manufacturing machine tools (proposed in paragraph 6.a. above) gives sufficient assurance against undue expansion in this industry. The Subcommittee considers that in effecting the reduction in the machine tool inventory, attention should be paid to reducing capacity in the automotive industry to a level no higher than is necessary to meet the peaceful needs of Japan. The proposal contained in paragraph 5 of Enclosure "C" has been drafted accordingly.

11. Electric power industry

The majority of the Subcommittee is in agreement with the views expressed in FEC-218/1.

12. Cement and abrasives industries

a. Cement

(1) The U.S. proposal in FEC-218 contains no specific reference to the cement industry, although it is listed in FEC-084/12 as one of the war supporting industries which are to be reduced. The majority of the Subcommittee favoured the fixing of a definite level rather than leaving to SCAP the determination of the amount of capacity to be retained.

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(2) The Subcommittee has examined the "Preliminary Study of Japanese Requirements in the Cement Industry, 1950" (FEC-058/2), submitted by the U.S. representative, together with such other information on the cement industry of Japan as it has been able to obtain.

(3) The 1930-1934 average consumption of cement in Japan, according to the statistics of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, was about 3 million metric tons annually. It is believed, however, that these statistics did not take account of all production of cement in Japan during this period (See note "C" to table 1 on page 8 of FEC-058/2). On the other hand no reports of consumption for military purposes during this period are available. The majority of the Subcommittee has arbitrarily assumed that the unreported production and the cement used for military purposes roughly offset each other. For this reason no deduction has been made from the figure of 3 million metric tons for military uses. Allowing for population increase requirements in "1950" would be about 3.6 million metric tons.

(4) The Subcommittee considers that in order to meet the peaceful needs of Japan some capacity for manufacture for export purposes should be retained.

(5) Exports of cement from Japan during the period 1930-1934 averaged 667,000 metric tons annually. Assuming that the pattern for the cement industry in "1950" will be the same as in 1930-1934, exports in "1950" would be about 800,000 metric tons.

(6) The Subcommittee considers, however, that, since cement manufacture is one of the few potential export industries for which the raw material requirements may be met in normal times almost entirely from domestic sources, it is desirable to leave an export capacity somewhat higher than 800,000 metric tons annually. In 1936 Japan attained an export figure of 1,109,000 metric tons. After taking into consideration the extent to which exports were used by the Japanese in later years for military purposes on the Asiatic continent, and also the probably effective demand for Japanese cement in "1950", the majority of the Subcommittee has reached the conclusion that an allowance of 900,000 metric tons a year for exports would be reasonable.

(7) The majority of the Subcommittee therefore concludes that Japan should be allowed to retain capacity sufficient to produce about 4,500,000 metric tons of cement annually, of which about 3,600,000 metric tons would be for domestic consumption and about 900,000 metric tons for export.

b. Abrasives

In the view of the majority of the Subcommittee any reduction in this industry for security reason should

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be limited to equipment manufacturing artificial abrasives, i.e., those which are produced by a process of chemical change of the raw materials, since it appears that no purpose would be served by restricting facilities for producing natural abrasives, even if it were practicable to do so.

Some information regarding abrasives is to be found in Report No. 44 of the Natural Resources Section of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. The majority, however, considered that the available information was insufficient to fix an exact level and also considered that the implementation of any policy based on exact figure presented great difficulties. The majority was therefore willing to leave to the judgment of the Supreme Commander the question of how much capacity needed to be retained to meet Japan's peaceful needs.

The minority argued that the paper on Reduction of Japanese Industrial War Potential (FEC-084/12) imposes an obligation on the Subcommittee to determine what portion of the abrasives industry is necessary to meet the peaceful needs of the Japanese people as defined by the Far Eastern Commission, and that the insufficiency of data and difficulties of policy implementation are not much greater for abrasives than for some other industries studied by the Subcommittee. As production of aircraft and military weapons is not possible without adequate supply of abrasives, and in view of the fact that no proposal was made for natural abrasives, the minority considers that the fixing of a level of artificial abrasives is highly desirable. A reduction of productive capacity to that required for Japan's peaceful needs will provide a ready means of checking upon Japanese compliance with the machine tool program and will not greatly increase unemployment or demands for foreign exchange in view of the small size of the industry.

The minority proposed, therefore, that that portion of Japan's capacity for the production of artificial abrasives which is in excess of the capacity required to produce 3,200 metric tons per year should be made available for reparations claim, based on the following facts: Until 1942 Japan relied substantially on imports for grinding and polishing substances. A small artificial abrasives industry was started in 1933 but remained relatively unimportant until the war. The average imports in 1930-1934 period amounted to 3,200 metric tons per year, covering both natrual and artificial abrasives. Since there are no available breakdown figures of imports and since the domestic production of artificial abrasives was almost negligible in that period, it is reasonable to presume that 1930-1934 total domestic consumption of artificial abrasives could not be greater than 3,200 metric tons. So far as the consumption for military purposes during that period is concerned, no reports are available. It is assumed that the allowance necessary to meet increase of population and technological changes and the artificial abrasives used for military purposes roughly offset each other.

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13. The steel, merchant shipbuilding and repair industry

The Subcommittee had before it the U.S. proposal contained in FEC-218 and proposals submitted by the Netherlands and the United Kingdom members. The Netherlands member proposed that the figures of 150,000 gross tons and 3,000,000 gross tons in paragraph 1.e.(1) of FEC-218 be reduced to 80,000 gross registered tons and 2,200,000 gross registered tons respectively, and that the figure of 3,000 light displacement tons in paragraph 1.e.(1). (a) be changed to 5,000 gross registered tons. He also proposed the substitution of the following for paragraph 1.e.(1).(c):

> "One drydock of 15,000 gross registered tons and two drydocks of 5,000 to 10,000 gross registered tons should be retained for purposes of servicing world shipping touching at Japanese ports. No other drydocks larger than 5,000 gross registered tons and no floating docks should be retained."

The United Kingdom member proposed the substitution of 5,000 gross registered tons for the figure of 3,000 light displacement tons in paragraph 1.e. (1).(a). In addition the Netherlands and United Kingdom members proposed that the following be added as 1.e.(2):

> "During the period in which this policy is in force, Japan should not be allowed to build ships of a size greater than 5,000 gross registered tons or a maximum speed greater than 12 knots."

As already indicated in paragraph 1. (size of merchant vessels), the other members of the Subcommittee thought that they could not usefully discuss these proposals without instructions and it was, therefore, agreed to forward the above proposals to the Committee without comment.

14. The merchant marine, fishing, whaling and cannery fleet, including publicly and privately-owned vessels of 100 tons or over

The Subcommittee had before it the U.S. proposal contained in FEC-218 and proposals submitted by the Netherlands and United Kingdom members. The Netherlands member proposed that a figure of 5,000 gross registered tons be substituted for the figure of 3,000 light displacement tons in paragraph 1.i.(1).(a) of FEC-218 and that the figure of 15 knots in the same sub-paragraph be reduced to 12 knots. He also proposed that not more than 150,000 gross registered tons of oil tankers should be retained. He calculates that this tonnage would be more than sufficient to meet Japanese peaceful needs. The United Kingdom member proposed that a figure of 5,000 gross registered tons be substituted for 3,000 light displacement tons in paragraph 1. i.(1).(a) and that the definition be extended to cover whale factory ships, if that was not already the intention.

The proposal in FEC-218 includes wooden ships, whereas paragraph 5.b.(1).(m) of FEC-084/12 refers only to steel ships. The Subcommittee agreed with the U.S. proposal in

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FEC-218 to include wooden vessels in the aggregate figure of the merchant fleet which Japan is to retain. After discussing the United Kingdom proposal to extend the definition the Australian, Netherlands and United Kingdom members agreed to put forward the following alternative:

> "Defined as all vessels of more than 100 gross registered tons other than naval combatant vessels."

As already indicated in paragraph 1. (size of merchant vessels) the other members of the Subcommittee thought that they could not usefully discuss proposals on shipping without instructions and it was therefore agreed to forward the above proposals to the Committee without comment.

15. Oil refining and synthetic fuel industry and storage

a. Synthetic fuel

The majority of the Subcommittee accepts the proposal contained in FEC-218 for the Japanese synthetic oil industry, which is the same as the interim removal decision. A minority of the Subcommittee opposed the inclusion of an escape clause (FEC-218, paragraph 1.b. (1).(a)) on the same grounds as those on which it opposed a similar escape clause for sulphuric acid and calcium carbide in the proposal on chemicals (See paragraph 8.f.).

b. Petroleum refining

(1) The majority of the Subcommittee considered that the level proposed for petroleum refining was too high, for the following reasons:

(a) Japanese oil refining was built up to a high level almost solely for the purpose of preparing for war. Even in the period 1930-1934, when such preparations were already being made, the major part of Japanese imports of oil was in the form of finished products.

(b) There is considerable doubt as to whether there exists at the present time a workable capacity of refining equipment as great as 12 million barrels a year. Estimates vary but the Mining Bureau of the Japanese Ministry of Commerce and Industry, on 28 January 1947 claimed a working capacity of 7,674,000 barrels a year, of which 3,170,000 barrels was in the indigenous oil field zone. The latter figure is dubious, since in the same report a figure of production of only 1,572,500 barrels from domestic sources is mentioned and production from indigenous resources has never exceeded 2.5 million barrels. The majority considered that to fix a figure of 12 million barrels a year in these conditions would constitute an inducement to the Japanese to reconstruct the industry on a scale which past experience shows to have been uneconomic and which could probably only be maintained behind a barrier

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of protection and government aid. In view of the importance of oil in war, the Subcommittee considered it highly undesirable to encourage such a development.

(c) If the Japanese were allowed to retain capacity to refine 12 million barrels of oil a year (40,000 barrels a day) and this capacity were fully used, there would be a surplus of fuel oil and kerosene in Japan and this could only be disposed of by export. This does not appear from the table given on page 7 of FEC-218/1 because requirements of kerosene, diesel oil and fuel oil are lumped together. It seems undesirable on security grounds that Japan should become an exporter of refined oil products.

(d) On the basis of information available for the pre-war period and for present and anticipated future production it is considered that the allowance for refinery fuel and losses in the figures given in FEC-218/1 is too low. During 1946 on a total intake of indigenous and imported crude of just below 2 million barrels, refinery fuel and losses amounted to 23.7%. Furthermore, the Japanese estimate refinery fuel and losses at 16.5% in 1948, if they are permitted to distill about 4.5 million barrels of Californian crude in their best Pacific Coast refineries.

(e) No allowance is made in the calculation in FEC-218/1 for the fact that there is insufficient cracking capacity as compared with distilling capacity in Japan. According to the latest figures obtained by the Petroleum Advisory Group, there is only cracking capacity for an intake of 1,560,000 barrels a year of reduced crude, which is equivalent to 3,300,000 barrels of Persian Gulf crude.

(f) The calculation of the savings to Japan in foreign exchange is affected by the factors mentioned above and on the basis of current prices of crude oil from the Persian Gulf and refined products from the United States and current freight costs, it is estimated that the saving would amount to only about 2 million dollars rather than the figure of 7 million dollars a year estimated in FEC-218/1, even if no account is taken of the possible loss that would arise owing to the necessity of disposing of asurplus of kerosene and fuel oil (See table in Enclosure "D", Section 2). It seems reasonable to assume that when the refineries in the Netherlands East Indies resume large scale production Japan will be able to draw the greater part of her refined oil products from the N.E.I. as she did before the war and this would probably decrease the cost of imports of refined products and consequently the saving obtained through the importation of crude oil.

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(2) In reply to the foregoing majority report the U.S. member put forward the following additional comments:

"The U.S. Government has presented data, (FEC-218/1, paragraph 6) which indicate that retention in Japan of oil refining capacity of 40,000 barrels per day would result in a substantial saving in foreign exchange (approximately $7,000,000 per year). Data presented by the Netherlands representative confirm this conclusion. The smaller saving in exchange shown in the Netherlands member's data is accounted for by the use of lower prices for refined products, a higher price for crude oil, and a different schedule of yields of refined products. The figures for yields of refined products (FEC-218/1) were prepared by expert U.S. petroleum technologists who are familiar with the types of crude oil produced in the Persian Gulf Area and with Japanese refinery methods and practice.

"There is considerable overlap in the specifications, nomenclature and use of kerosene, diesel oil, gas oil, fuel oil and heavy oil. Because of this overlap it is not possible to make accurate estimates of the Japanese requirements for each of these products. For these reasons the products in this range have been grouped and the total requirements estimated at 11,100,000 barrels annually. The assertion by the Netherlands member that Japan will have an exportable surplus of fuel oil in "1950", if the Japanese are permitted to retain refining capacity of 40,000 barrels a day, is not necessarily true. There are strong indications to the contrary. During the period 1931-1936 civilian consumption of fuel oil rose very rapidly from 124,000 barrels in the first year to 1,191,000 barrels in 1936. Consumption in 1936 was more than double that of 1935 indicating a turn to the use of fuel oil during a period when it was necessary to import this product and at a time when coal production was in excess of 41 million tons per year. It is reasonable to assume that this trend may continue (particularly in view of less favorable long-run coal production prospects in Japan) and fuel oil will be used in greater quantities in fishing, industrial operations, railroad transportation and in ship bunkering, particularly in coastwise and near seas shipping. In such case, Japan will probably require all of the estimated production of 2,591,000 barrels of fuel oil (FEC-218/1) and may even exceed the very high estimate of more than 4,000,000 barrels yield made by the Netherlands member. Japan's requirements of fuel oil for the next twelve months are estimated to be 1,362,000 barrels for industrial purposes. This estimate does not include requirements for shipping or other normal peacetime uses which will increase as normal ecnomic activity is resumed.

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(3) The Netherlands representative submitted a reply to the above comments of the U.S. member which is contained in Enclosure "D", Section 3.

(4) After considering a proposal that Japanese oil refining capacity should be reduced to an amount necessary to process its indigenous crude only, the majority of the Subcommittee felt that this would be too severe a reduction and agreed to recommend that Japan be allowed to retain capacity to process 4.5 million barrels of crude oil annually provided that not more than half of this capacity was in the Pacific Coast area. This would permit Japan to manufacture sufficient fuel oil for her needs but would not allow any capacity for export. (See table in Enclosure "D", Section 2).

c. Oil storage

(1) The majority of the Subcommittee considered that the figure of 10 million barrels for oil storage proposed in FEC-218 was too high for the following reasons:

(a) It is claimed in FEC-218/1 that 10 million barrels, which represents less than seven months supply, is only half as much storage capacity in relation to annual consumption as Japan had in 1931. This argument is misleading as figures published by the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey indicate that nearly 90% of the 1931 figure represented nearly 10 years consumption, both naval and civilian, at the 1931 rate.

(b) The Japanese Petroleum Law of 1934 required the oil companies to keep at all times reserve stocks equal to six months commercial consumption in addition to current working stocks. This law had the effect of forcing both Japanese and foreign oil companies to increase their storage capacity considerably. This was avowedly a measure to increase Japan's preparedness for war and had nothing to do with peacetime civilian requirements.

(c) For the fiscal year 1947-1948 the Petroleum Advisory Group shows estimated stocks at the beginning and end of the period of 35 to 40 days consumption on the basis of a total consumption of 10.8 million barrels. On the assumption that the tankage would be halffull, this would amount to 70 to 80 days consumption.

(d) On the basis of the information available to it, the majority of the Subcommittee considered that for a country like Japan which has to rely for the major part of its oil products on imports, a figure of 75 to 90 days storage capacity would be normal and would not be too low for peaceful activities. This would amount to between 3.75 million and 4.5 million barrels.

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(2) In reply to the foregoing majority report the U.S. member put forward the following additional comments:

"In order to introduce some factual information as a basis for discussion of the level of petroleum storage to be retained in Japan, data on stocks of petroleum in the United States during the period 1925-1944 were made available to the Subcommittee. These data include all supplies of oil for all purposes in the U.S. held by producers. Not included in these stocks are bulk supplies held by distributors in the distribution system. The average stocks of all oil, at the year end, for the period 1925-1944 was 179 days supply. The period 1931-1940 shows the same average. Total storage capacity was, of course, considerably in excess of this figure. Supplies for export and military use are included in the total stock figures. However, export demand for the period averaged only 11.4 percent of the total supply and military use of petroleum by the U.S. prior to 1940 was a very small part of the total consumption. If Japan is permitted to maintain stocks comparable to that of the U.S. average shown above, a storage capacity of 10,475,000 barrels will be required. Japan's geographical location with respect to the major oil producing areas, and dependence upon tanker supply and a relatively poor internal distribution system, would indicate a need for relatively larger storage capacity than would be required in an oil producing country with a highly developed distribution system. With regard to the assertion by the Netherlands representative that the U.S. would be expected to have extraordinarily large stocks because of a difference in the basic laws of the U.S. and other petroleum producing countries, the Chief of the Petroleum Division, U.S. Department of State has made the following statement in which Mr. Max Ball, Director, Oil and Gas Division, U.S. Department of Interior, a recognized petroleum authority, concurs:

> "While it is true that in the early phase of the development of the American oil industry the "law of capture" governed oil field practice and that therefore above-ground storage was constructed in the volume necessary to accommodate the frequently excessive rates of production, this is no longer the case. Relatively little new above-ground tankage has been constructed in the U.S. in recent years and at the same time the level of production has increased. Consequently at the present time the volume of above-ground storage in the U.S. in the opinion of all experts is quite closely related to the level of consumption and the requirements of the distribution system. Accordingly, the ratio obtaining for the U.S. between tankage capacity and consumption is considered to be a reasonable ratio for any area of the world."

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The Netherlands member presented a commentary on the U.S. statement which is contained in Enclosure "D", Section 4.

(3) In the light of the information submitted, the majority of the Subcommittee agreed to recommend that Japan be allowed to retain 5 million barrels of oil storage capacity, which the majority considered to be a reasonable compromise between the conflicting proposals before it. Some discussion arose as to whether special provision should be made for underground storage but it was agreed that, if the above figure of 5 million barrels is accepted, decision on this point could be left to SCAP.

16. Synthetic rubber industry

The proposal of the Subcommittee on this industry contained in C2-027/1 agrees with the U.S. proposal in FEC-218, and the Subcommittee recommends its adoption.

17. Heavy Electrical equipment industry

The Subcommittee considered a proposal submitted jointly by the Chinese, Netherlands and Philippine members that Japanese facilities to produce heavy electrical equipment (defined as generators above 5 KVA, electric motors above 5 hp, transformers above 5 KVA, and converters) in excess of an amount sufficient to manufacture annually the following balanced type-size aggregate capacities should be made available for reparations claim: Generators, 450,000 KVA; electric motors, 225,000 hp; transformers, 1,800,000 KVA; and converters, 60,000 KW. The statistical basis for the determination of these figures is contained in Enclosure "D", Section 5.

The majority of the Subcommittee had doubts as to the administrative feasibility of the proposal but agreed to forward it to the Committee for consideration. The members who submitted the proposal did not agree that its administrative feasibility was doubtful.

18. Inventory of metal-working machinery

a. Machine tools

The Subcommittee has already proposed in C2-027/2 that Japan should be allowed to retain a machine tool inventory of 175,000 units. It is argued in FEC-218/1, however, that the retention of a larger number is desirable in view of the temporary need for machine tools in repairing damaged plants, and the problem of relocating the supply of tools after plant removals.

The majority of the Subcommittee was not fully convinced by the U.S. arguments and, for the time being, preferred to adhere to the proposal it had already made.

b. Cutting tools and secondary metal-working machinery

The Subcommittee considers that it is unnecessary to fix any specific level for cutting tools and secondary

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metal-working machinery and that the decision on the quantity to be retained should be left to SCAP.

19. Primary war facilities

The majority of the Subcommittee considered that paragraph 1.h.of FEC-218 was covered by paragraph 2. of FEC-084/12 but thought it desirable to mention specifically in its proposal in Enclosure "C", the limitation referred to in paragraph 1.h.(1).(a).

20. Industrial facilities not specified above

The majority of the Subcommittee accepted the general principle contained in paragraph 2. of FEC-218, but considered that it needed redrafting, more particularly to provide for the industries listed in paragraph 5.b. of FEC-084/12 which were not otherwise specified in the policy proposal contained in Enclosure "C".

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ENCLOSURE "C"

LEVEL OF ECONOMIC LIFE IN JAPAN:
POLICY TOWARDS JAPANESE INDUSTRY AND SHIPPING

1. In accordance with paragraphs 2.a.(1) and 9.a.(1) of FEC-084/12, the Far Eastern Commission determines that the size of merchant vessels, defined as all vessels other than naval combatant vessels, above which plants and establishments for building them are defined as primary war facilities, should be

- 3,000 light displacement tons (US proposal)
- 5,000 gross registered tons (UK and Netherlands proposal)

2. Japanese capacity in the following war-supporting industries in excess of the amounts stated below should be disposed of in accordance with paragraphs 5.a. and 6. of FEC-084/12.

a. Iron and Steel Industry

(Defined as plants and establishments primarily engaged in the production of pig iron, steel ingots and basic shapes).

(1) Pig Iron

Capacity to produce 2,000,000 metric tons annually.

(2) Steel Ingots

Capacity to produce 3,500,000 metric tons annually, including all existing Bessemer capacity.

(3) Basic Shapes

Capacity to produce 2,650,000 metric tons annually.

b. Non-Ferrous Metals Industry

(1) Nickel Smelting Industry

(Defined as plants and establishments primarily engaged in the smelting of nickel from its ores)
Nil

(2) Copper Industry

(Defined as plants and establishments primarily engaged in smelting copper ore or concentrates, refining the product of the smelters, and fabricating copper or its alloys).

Capacity to smelt and refine 80,000 metric tons annually of copper metal and capacity for

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fabricating copper or its alloys sufficient to utilize 80,000 metric tons annually of copper metal. Any capacity in the copper fabricating industry required to carry out the provisions contained in subpara.c.(1) (b) below should be additional to this amount.

c. Light Metals Industry

(Defined as plants and establishments primarily engaged in the production of alumina, primary or secondary aluminum and magnesium, and in rolling, extruding and drawing of aluminum and magnesium and their alloys).

(1) Aluminum

(a) Alumina and primary aluminum

Nil

(b) Rolled drawn and extruded shapes

Capacity to produce 15,000 metric tons of shapes annually. Such equipment should be of a general purpose character and can be obtained from any surplus available in other branches of the non-ferrous metals industry.

(2) Magnesium

Nil

d. Metal Working Machinery Industry

(1) Machine Tool Industry

(Defined as plants and establishments engaged in the production of non-portable power driven machines designed to shape metal by the progressive cutting away of stock in the form of chips, shavings or by abrasive action).

Capacity to produce a balanced type-size aggregate of 10,000 machine tools annually.

(2) Cutting Tools and Secondary Metal Working Machinery Industry

(Defined as plants and establishments engaged in the production of secondary metal forming and cutting machines and equipment).

Capacity to produce sufficient cutting tools and secondary metal working machinery to maintain the inventory of this equipment at a level appropriate to the permitted inventory of machine tools. (See subpara. n below)

e. Ball and Roller Bearing Industry

(Defined as plants and establishments engaged in the manufacture or assembly of complete ball and

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roller bearings or their major component parts, namely, ball rollers, races and cages).

Capacity for the production of ball and roller bearings to the value of 32,500,000 yen annually at 1943-44 average prices.

f. Chemical Industry

(1) Industrial Explosives Industry

(Defined as plants and establishments engaged in the production for industrial explosives).

Capacity to produce 10,000 metric tons annually, provided that, if additional capacity is required to meet temporary needs, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers may, after informing the Far Eastern Commission of the reasons for so doing, retain such additional capacity pending a decision by the Far Eastern Commission.

(2) Sulphuric Acid Industry

(Defined as plants and establishments engaged in the production of sulphuric acid).

Capacity to produce 3,500,000 metric tons of 62% acid equivalent, provided that no facilities should be removed which are needed to achieve essential production of fertilizers in Japan.

(3) Soda Ash, Caustic Soda and Chlorine Industry

(Defined as plants and establishments engaged in: (a) the production of soda ash including integrated facilities for the conversion of soda ash to caustic soda; and (b) the production of caustic soda and clorine by the electrolytic process).

(a) Capacity to produce 500,000 metric tons of soda ash annually.

(b) Capacity to produce 282,500 metric tons of caustic soda annually, of which 200,000 metric tons should be produced from soda ash, and the remaining 82,500 metric tons by the electrolytic process.

(c) Capacity to produce 75,000 metric tons of chlorine annually by the elctrolytic process.

(4) Nitric Acid Industry

(Defined as plants and establishments engaged in the production of nitric acid.)

Capacity to produce 30,000 metric tons of nitric acid annually (as 100% acid).

(5) Calcium Carbide Industry

(Defined as plants and establishments engaged in the production of calcium carbide).

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roller bearings or their major component parts, namely, ball rollers, races and cages).

Capacity for the production of ball and roller bearings to the value of 32,500,000 yen annually at 1943-44 average prices.

f. Chemical Industry

(1) Industrial Explosives Industry

(Defined as plants and establishments engaged in the production for industrial explosives).

Capacity to produce 10,000 metric tons annually, provided that, if additional capacity is required to meet temporary needs, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers may, after informing the Far Eastern Commission of the reasons for so doing, retain such additional capacity pending a decision by the Far Eastern Commission.

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Capacity to produce 3,500,000 metric tons of 62% acid equivalent, provided that no facilities should be removed which are needed to achieve essential production of fertilizers in Japan.

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(a) Capacity to produce 500,000 metric tons of soda ash annually.

(b) Capacity to produce 282,500 metric tons of caustic soda annually, of which 200,000 metric tons should be produced from soda ash, and the remaining 82,500 metric tons by the electrolytic process.

(c) Capacity to produce 75,000 metric tons of chlorine annually by the elctrolytic process.

(4) Nitric Acid Industry

(Defined as plants and establishments engaged in the production of nitric acid.)

Capacity to produce 30,000 metric tons of nitric acid annually (as 100% acid).

(5) Calcium Carbide Industry

(Defined as plants and establishments engaged in the production of calcium carbide).

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Capacity to produce 430,000 metric tons annually, provided that no facilities should be removed which are needed to achieve essential production of fertilizers in Japan.

g. Railway Equipment Industry

(Defined as plants and establishments primarily engaged in the production of steam, electric and diesel locomotives, passenger cars and freight cars.

Capacity to produce 255 steam, electric and diesel locomotives; 870 passenger cars; and 3,200 freight cars annually.

h. Thermal Electric Power Industry

(Defined as plants and establishments primarily engaged in the production of electric energy through the use of fuel as the basic energy source).

Capacity to produce and deliver to the line at the power plants an aggregate of 2,100,000 kilowatts.

i. Cement Industry

(Defined as plants and establishments engaged in the production of Portland cement, blast furnace cement and similar types of cement).

Capacity to produce 4,500,000 metric tons annually.

j. Steel Merchant Shipbuilding and Ship Repair Industry

(Defined as ship yards and docks, including all facilities, plants and establishments located within their confines, primarily engaged in the building, repair, or maintenance of steel ships over 100 gross registered tons).

(1) Capacity required to service a merchant fleet of
- 3,000,000 gross tons (U.S. proposal)
- 2,200,000 gross registered tons (Netherlands proposal)

and to build
- 150,000 gross tons (U.S. proposal)
- 80,000 gross registered tons (Netherlands proposal) of new shipping annually subject to the following limitations

(a) All facilities for building vessels of over
- 3,000 light displacement tons (U.S. proposal)
- 5,000 gross registered tons (Netherlands and U.K. proposal)

should be disposed of in accordance with paragraphs 5a and 6 of FEC-084/12.

(b) Immovable installations, in yards made available for reparations claim, should be destroyed, except for buildings usable for other purposes.

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(c) ⁎ Two 20,000 tons drydocks should be retained for purposes of servicing world shipping touching at Japanese ports (U.S. proposal)

⁎ One drydock of 15,000 gross registered tons and two drydocks of 5,000 to 10,000 gross registered tons should be retained for purposes of servicing world shipping touching at Japanese ports. No other drydocks larger than 5,000 gross registered tons and no floating docks should be retained. (Netherlands proposal)

k. The Merchant Marine Fishing, Whaling and Cannery Fleet

⁎ (Defined as cargo vessels, passenger-cargo vessels and tankers of more than 100 gross tons including both wooden and steel ships). (U.S. proposal)

⁎ (Defined as all vessels of more than 100 gross registered tons other than naval combatant vessels) (Proposal of majority of Subcommittee)

An aggregate of
⁎ 2,000,000 gross tons (U.S. proposal)
⁎ 2,000,000 gross registered tons of which not more than 150,000 gross registered tons should be tankers (Netherlands proposal)

subject to the limitation that all vessels of more than

⁎ 3,000 light displacement tons or with a maximum speed of more than 15 knots (U.S. proposal)
⁎ 5,000 gross registered tons or with a maximum speed of more than 15 knots (U.K. proposal)
⁎ 5,000 gross registered tons or with a maximum speed of more than 12 knots (Netherlands proposal)

should be disposed of in accordance with paragraphs 5a and 6 of FEC-084/12

l. The Oil Refining and Synthetic Fuel Industry and Storage

(1) Synthetic Oil Industry

(Defined as plants and establishments engaged in the manufacture of liquid fuels from coal, whether by high-pressure hydrogenation, the Fischer-Tropsch process, or low-temperature carbonization.)

Nil, subject to the following limitation:

(a) Any machinery or equipment in such plants, which is suitable for use in the

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production of synthetic ammonia and which, in the judgment of SCAP, should be transferred for use in the production of synthetic ammonia for fertilizer manufacture, should be exempted from claim.

(2) Petroleum Refining Industry

(Defined as plants and establishments for the processing of crude petroleum and alcohol (but excluding synthetic crudes derived from coal), including all streight run distillation plants and natural (casing-head) gasoline plants, thermal cracking units, vacuum distillation plants for the manufacture of ordinary and high grade lubricating oils, and iso-octane plants, including any isomerization, polymerization or alkylation equipment.)

Capacity to process 4,500,000 barrels of crude oil annually, of which not more than half should be in the Pacific Coast area.

(3) Oil Storage

(Defined as all tankage, whether surface or underground, connected with tank farms or refineries, used primarily for the storage of petroleum and petroleum products in bulk.)

Storage capacity of 5,000,000 barrels.

m. Synthetic Rubber Industry

(Defined as plants and establishments primarily engaged in the production of snythetic rubber.)

Nil.

n. Inventory of Metal Working Machinery

(1) Machine Tools

(Defined as the existing stock in Japan of non-portable, power-driven machines designed to shape metal by the progressive cutting away of stock in the form of chips or shavings, or by abrasive action.)

A total inventory of 175,000 units of a balanced type-size.

3. *During the period in which this policy is in force, Japan should not be allowed to build ships of a size greater than 5,000 gross registered tons or a maximum speed greater than 12 knots. (Netherlands and U.K. proposal)

4. Coal Carbonization Industry

(Defined as plants and establishments primarily engaged in the production of high-temperature coke.)

Capacity related to the coke-consuming industries and made surplus by reductions in these industries should be disposed of in accordance with paragraphs 5a and 6 of FEC-084/12.

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5. Automotive Industry

(Defined as plants and establishments primarily engaged in the manufacturing of engines and chassis of standard size passenger cars and trucks and in the assembly of finished vehicles of these types.)

In effecting the reduction in the inventory of machine tools under the terms of paragraph 2 n.(1) above, special attention should be paid to reducing capacity in the automotive industry to a level no higher than is necessary to meet the peaceful needs of Japan.

6. Primary War Facilities

Those facilities, attached to primary war facilities as defined in paragraph 2a of FEC-084/12, which have been engaged in the production of military supplies essentially similar in character to such consumer goods as textiles, clothing, processed foods, fertilizers, fuels, pharmaceuticals and related and dependent industries should be retained in Japan, if in the judgement of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers they are needed to meet the peaceful needs of the Japanese people.

7. Industrial facilities not specified above but which are made superfluous because of reparations removals prescribed herein should be made available for reparations claim unless new essential peaceful uses for them can be found in Japan. Decisions as to availability of such facilities should be made by SCAP. In applying the policy in this paragraph special attention should be paid to facilities for the production of non-ferrous metals other than copper and nickel, abrasives and heavy electrical equipment Ø, and to the inventory of cutting tools and secondary metal working machinery, and any facilities in these industries not removed as reparations should be disposed of in accordance with paragraph 6 of FEC-084/12.

8. This policy taken in conjunction with FEC-084/12 supersedes the policies contained in FEC-059, -059/4, -059/6, -059/13, -059/15, -059/21, -059/29, -059/34, and FEC-083/5.

ǂ Denotes proposals which the Subcommittee agreed to send forward without comment.

Ø The majority of the Subcommittee had doubts as to the administrative feasibility of the following proposal but agreed to forward it to the Committee for consideration. If adopted, it would become paragraph 2.o. and the word 'heavy electrical equipment' would be deleted above:

2. o. Heavy Electrical Equipment Industry

(Defined as generators above 5KVA, electric motors above 5 Hp, transformers above 5KVA and converters.)

Capacity to manufacture annually the following balanced type-size aggregate capacities:

Generators	450,000 KVA
Electric motors	225,000 hp
Transformers	1,800,000 KVA
Converters	60,000 KW

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ENCLOSURE "D"

Section I

Finished Steel Consumed by the Japanese Army and Navy in the 1930-1934 Period

(Submitted by Chinese Member of Subcommittee 2)

No adequate statistical data are available on military uses of steel by Japan during the 1930-1934 period. The Chinese member of the Subcommittee has made a study of the finished steel consumed by the Japanese Army and Navy in that period and has found that it is possible to arrive at an approximation by projection of the steel distribution figure for the years 1938 through 1943 as follows: (see table attached)

(a) It is assumed that steel distribution to the Army and Navy was in direct relation to their respective indices of ordnance production; this assumption is not unreasonable since ordnance production indices after 1938 do follow the same trend as the steel distribution. Therefore, in order to estimate pre-1938 steel distribution to the Army, the average quantity of steel distributed to the Army during the year 1938-1943 was compared with the average of Army ordnance production indices for the same period. With this ratio as a starting point, the steel distribution to the Army for the 1931-1937 period was estimated from the ordnance production indices for those years. (Column 3).

(b) Steel distribution to the Navy was projected in the same way, on the basis of naval ordnance production indices (Column 4).

The steel distribution figures for the Japanese Army and Navy derived by this method takes us only as far back as 1931, with the average annual consumption from 1931 to 1934 amounting to 192,600 metric tons. Since we know the active strength of Japanese armed forces from 1930 to 1937, we can easily interpolate the steel distribution figure for 1930 and obtain the figure of the average steel distribution to the Japanese Army and Navy in the 1930-1934 period approximately amounting to 180,000 metric tons annually, or 7.5% of the average annual total consumption.

The Chinese member regrets that he has failed to figure out the quantity of finished steel consumed by the Japanese Air Forces and that used for indirect war purposes, because of the lack of adequate information for such calculations, though he wishes to point out that in the paper "Proposed Amendment to C1-001, Presented by U.S. Delegate" the amount of steel used for direct and indirect war purposes was once estimated as not less than 25 per cent of the total consumption in the 1930-1934 period.

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Year	Ordnance Production by years (1) Army Adjusted Production Indices	(2) Navy Adjusted Production Indices	Steel Distribution by Year 1,000 Metric Tons (3) Army	(4) Navy	(5) Total
1930	.....	.....	.....	.....	....
1931	100	100.0	43.3	152.0	195.3
1932	117	52.6	50.7	79.9	130.6
1933	192	78.9	83.3	119.9	203.2
1934	206	100.0	89.3	152.0	241.3
1935	240	110.5	104.2	167.9	272.1
1936	281	126.3	122.7	191.9	314.6
1937	444	168.4	192.5	255.9	448.4
1938	1,020	210.5	433.5	593.8	1,027.3
1939	1,125	236.8	594.8	615.5	1,210.3
1940	1,440	321.1	716.3	760.3	1,476.6
1941	1,945	526.3	970.8	1,047.8	2,018.6
1942	2,350	826.3	891.5	1,122.3	2,013.8
1943	2,925	1,405.3	1,071.0	1,208.5	2,279.5
1931-1934	....	.....	.....	.....	770.4
1938-43	10,805	3,526.3	4,677.9	5,348.2	.....

Column (1): Taken from The Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japan's War Economy, Appendix Table C-153, prices for 1931-194 adjusted in accordance with wholesale price indices of the Bank of Japan. (National Income of Japan, p. 84, for 1931-1943, and The Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japan's War Economy, p. 96 for 1943.

Column (2) Taken from ibid., Appendix Table C-055, basic year changed from 1941 to 1931.

Columns (3 & (4): Figures after 1937 taken from ibid., Appendix Table C-24; Converted from a fiscal year to calendar year basis by assuming that steel distribution in any calendar year was approximately equal to 3/4 of quantities in the corresponding fiscal year plus 1/4 of those in the previous fiscal year, since the Japanese fiscal year runs from 1 April to 31 March.

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SECTION II

ESTIMATED PRODUCTION JAPANESE OIL REFINERIES (IN BARRELS)

YIELDS IN VOLUME %

	Domestic crude	Persian Gulf full cracking	Crude no cracking	Only Domestic crude	Domestic plus Persian Gulf crude (max. cracking capacity 5200 bbl/day)				Estimated 1950 needs
TOTAL YEARLY INTAKE				2,300,000	3,000,000	4,500,000	6,000,000	12,000,000	
TOTAL DAILY INTAKE based on 300 working days per year				7,700	10,000	15,000	20,000	40,000	
Gasoline	14.0	40.0	20.0	322,000	602,000	1,202,000	1,712,000	2,912,000	5,200,000
Kerosene	13.0	10.5	12.5	299,000	372,500	530,000	696,500	1,446,500)	
Diesel oil	17.0	14.5	14.5	391,000	492,500	710,000	927,500	1,797,500)	10,200,000
Fuel oil	20.0	20.0	45.0	460,000	600,000	900,000	1,312,500	4,012,500	900,000
Lube oil	16.0	-	-	368,000	368,000	368,000	368,000	368,000	1,500,000
Asphalt	5.0	-	-	115,000	115,000	115,000	115,000	115,000	-
Refinery fuel & loss	15.0	15.0	8.0	345,000	450,000	675,000	868,500	1,348,500	-
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0	2,300,000	3,000,000	4,500,000	6,000,000	12,000,000	17,800,000

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ESTIMATED IMPORT REQUIREMENTS IN 1950 (in barrels)

	Estimated 1950 consumption	To be imported				
Total yearly intake (bbls.)		2,300,000	3,000,000	4,500,000	6,000,000	12,000,000
Total daily intake (bbls.) based on 300 working days a year		7,700	10,000	15,000	20,000	40,000
Gasoline	5,200,000	4,878,000	4,598,000	3,998,000	3,488,000	2,288,000
Kerosene/Diesel Oil	10,200,000	9,510,000	9,335,000	8,960,000	8,576,000	6,956,000
Fuel Oil	900,000	440,000	300,000	-	- 412,500	-3,112,500x
Lube Oil/Asphalt	1,500,000	1,017,000	1,017,000	1,017,000	1,017,000	1,017,000
Persian Crude Oil	-	-	700,000	2,200,000	3,700,000	9,700,000
TOTAL	17,800,000	15,845,000	15,950,000	16,175,000	16,368,500ø	16,848,500ø

x Exports
ø Net Imports

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SAVING IN IMPORTING PERSIAN CRUDE OIL INSTEAD OF FINISHED PRODUCTS
(BASED ON ESTIMATED 1950 CONSUMPTION)

	Product Prices in U.S. $ cif Japan	Cost of Imported Products* ($ U. S. 000)				
Total yearly intake (bbls)		2,300,000	3,000,000	4,500,000	6,000,000	12,000,000
Total daily intake (bbls) based on 300 working days a year		7,700	10,000	15,000	20,000	40,000
Gasoline	4.192	20,141	18,985	16,508	14,402	9,447
Kerosine/Diesel Oil	3.485	33,142	32,532	31,226	29,887	24,242
Fuel Oil	2.868	1,262	860	-	- 1,183 Ø	-8,927 Ø
Persian Crude Oil	2.871	-	2,010	6,316	10,623	27,849
Aggregate Cost (excluding lube oil/asphalt)		54,545	54,387	54,050	53,729	52,611
Saving			158	495	816	1,934

* Omitting lubricating oil and asphalt the cost of which is unchanged throughout.
Ø On the assumption that the proceeds of fuel oil exports are the same as the landed cost in Japan.

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SECTION III

GENERAL REMARKS BY THE NETHERLANDS MEMBER ON THE ADDITIONAL COMMENTS ON LEVEL OF JAPANESE PETROLEUM REFINING INDUSTRY BY THE UNITED STATES MEMBER (ENCLOSURE B, para. 15 b (2))

> "Data presented by the Netherlands representative confirm this conclusion" i.e. that retention in Japan of oil refinery capacity of 40,000 barrels per day would result in a substantial saving in foreign exchange. (page 14, 1st subpara., 2nd sentence)

According to the Netherlands calculations the saving in foreign exchange will not amount to more than $2,000,000 in the case of shipping finished products from the West Coast of the U. S. A. However, when using the assumption made by the U. S. experts in their calculation (refined products will come largely from the N. E. I.) instead of a saving of foreign exchange, a loss of foreign exchange of over $1,000,000 a year was calculated.

> "Smaller saving shown in Netherlands data accounted for by use of lower prices for refined products and higher price for crude oil and a different schedule of yields of refined products." (Page 14, 1st subpara. 3rd sentence)

Netherlands prices are based on actual costs in producing areas and actual costs for shipping both of which are regularly published in the U. S. A. The prices used in U. S. calculation are incorrect and show no proper relation to actual prices.

The Netherlands figures of yields for refinery products are more in line with actual conditions in Japan than the U. S. figures.

The basis for the calculation of a saving in foreign exchange in the U. S. proposal FEC-218/1 is therefore not in accordance with the facts, both as to the prices of products and to yields of products on crude oil.

> "Figures for yields of refined products in FEC-218/1 were prepared by expert U. S. petroleum technologists who are familiar with the types of crude oil products in the Persian Gulf area and with Japanese refinery methods and practice." (page 14 1st subpara., 4th sentence)

The U. S. experts have used in their calculations a cracking capacity three times as high as actually exists in Japan and have taken for refinery fuel and loss a figure of 11.3% on domestic crude as gainst 23.7% obtained under actual practice in 1946 and of 12.0% on Persian Gulf crude while Japanese estimates for 1947/8 for U. S. crudes in their best Pacific Coast refineries in 16.5%.

The Netherlands figures although still rather optimistic are in line with actual conditions in Japan.

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Because of considerable overlap in specifications, nomenclature and use of kerosene, diesel oil, gas-oil, fuel oil and heavy oil, it is not possible to make accurate estimates of the Japanese requirements of each of these products and therefore the products in this range have been grouped together. (page 14, 2nd subpara., first 3 sentences)

The oil experts of SCAP have made and are still making separate estimates for kerosene gas-oil, diesel oil and fuel oil consumption and when ordering these products apparently have no difficulty in knowing what they want.

Explanation to show that Netherlands statement, that Japan will have an exportable surplus of fuel oil for "1950" if the Japanese are permitted to refine 40,000 barrels a day, is not necessarily true. (page 14, remainder of 2nd subpara.)

The American estimate of 2,591,000 barrels of fuel oil in FEC-218/1 is based on an incorrect assumption for cracking capacity (three times as high as what exists at the moment).

The Netherlands figure of 4 million barrels is not "a very high estimate " but is an estimate based on existing cracking capacity.

Japan's requirements of fuel oil for the next 12 months are estimated by the Petroleum Advisory Group of the Area Petroleum Office of SCAP in February 1947 at 1,094,300 barrels as against an American figure in the present paper of 1,362,000 barrels.

According to the Petroleum Advisory Group, had the Japanese wished, they could have restricted their consumption to less than 12,600,000 barrels in 1934 without any serious effects on their over-all economy. This would correspond with a consumption of 15,000,000 barrels in "1950", instead of the U. S. estimate in FEC-218/1 of 17,800,000 barrels.

The above mentioned consumption of 1,094,300 barrels of fuel oil in the next 12 months includes 1,018,800 barrels of fuel oil for use in the steel industry where according to the PAG: "It is questionable whether the import of oil for this purpose will continue to be financed after coal-production has reached a more satisfactory level."

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SECTION IV

GENERAL REMARKS BY THE NETHERLANDS MEMBER ON THE ADDITIONAL COMMENTS ON OIL STORAGE BY THE UNITED STATES MEMBER (ENCLOSURE B, para. 15 c (2))

> U. S. argument trying to show that a stock of 179 days supply is normal for the USA and that the ratio obtaining for the USA between tankage capacity and consumption is considered to be a reasonable ratio for any area of the world. (pages 15 & 16)

The table showing that the supply of all oils at the end of the year for the period 1925-'44 and 1931-'40 is 179 days supply shows other pertinent stocks which have to be taken in consideration. The table shows that the supply of crude oil at the end of the year for the period 1925-'44 was 109 days consumption, and for the period 1931-'40 106 days consumption. Therefore, the storage needed for finished products is only 70-73 days consumption. The figures give no reason to believe that bulk supplies held by distributors in the distribution system are excluded and the figures do include supplies for export and for military and naval use.

The export demand alone over that period is given by the U. S. member in his additional comments as 11.4% of the total supply.

The stocks of motor gasoline are given in the same book as 52 days consumption for the period 1921-'25 and 36 days for 1926-'30.

The logical conclusion by taking into account all figures and by not leaving out an important item like crude oil (which amounts to more than 60% of the total stocks and for which there would appear to be little need in a country like Japan, which produces practically no crude oil) is that the figure of 75-90 days storage on consumption proposed by the Netherlands member after consulting oil experts in Holland, London and the United States with long experience in the Far East is correct.

The statement of the Chief of the Petroleum Division of the U. S. Dept. of the Interior and the Director of the Oil & Gas Division of the Dept. of the Interior confirms the remarks of the Netherlands representative about excessive crude oil storage before the U. S. started to conserve the underground crude oil reserves and that therefore we should not go too far back when looking at U. S. stock figures. Stocks of all oils excluding crude but including exports and military and naval stocks were 69 and 54 days for the periods 1936-'40 and 1941-'44 respectively.

The question involved is, whether for a country like Japan a storage capacity of 75-90 days supply (Netherlands proposal) or 205 days supply (the U. S. proposal in FEC-218/1) is more reasonable. As mentioned above, even the U. S. figures if interpreted correctly prove the first to be the case. In this connection attention is drawn to the fact that the average storage in Japan in the period 1930-'36 was as follows:

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Motor Gasoline

	total yearly consumption barrels	total stock barrels	total stocks in days total consumption
1930-1931 average	5,185,000	424,750	30
1935-1936 "	7,387,000	572,500	28
Estimated 1950 consumption Total 17,800,000 barrels of which	5,200,000		

Diesel Oil

	total yearly consumption barrels	total stock barrels	total stocks in days total consumption
1930-1931 average	9,492,000	369,750	14
1935-1936 "	14,316,000	571,000	14½
Estimated 1950 consumption Total 17,800,000 barrels of which	10,200,000		

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SECTION V

DETERMINATION OF ANNUAL REPLACEMENT CAPACITY OF HEAVY ELECTRIC EQUIPMENT IN JAPAN

Item I. Generators

(a) Hydro-electric plants

Present generation facilities in 1493 plants (NRS Report No. 39) have a total licensed capacity of 6,154,815 KW or 7,700,000 KVA or which 758 plants of less than 1000 KW each represent less than 5% of the total. The average capacity of the remaining 735 plans is 8000 KW or 10,000 KVA.

Based on a life expectancy of 25 years (Mark's Mechanical Engineers' Handbook) the required annual generator replacement capacity will be 4% or 7,700,000 or 308,000 KVA.

(b) Thermal Electric Plants

The retention of 2,100,000 KW or 2,630,000 KVA of thermal electric plant capacity is proposed in FEC-218.

Allowing an average life of 20 years to the generators (Mark's Mechanical Engineers' Handbook), the annual replacement capacity will be 5% of 2,630,000 or 131,500 KVA.

The total annual generator replacement requirements for the hydroelectric and thermal electric plants is 439,500 KVA, say 450,000 KVA.

Item II. Electric Motors

During the period 1930-34, the average number of motors installed was 153,800 with an aggregate rated horsepower of 3,150,000 (Factory Statistics).

Allowing for population increase, the total horsepower needed in 1950 will be 3,780,000.

Based on an average life expectancy of 16 years (Mark's Mechanical Engineers' Handbook) for electric motors the annual replacement horsepower needed will be 5.85% of 3,780,000 equals 222,000, say 225,000 hp.

Item III. Transformers

There are no available data on the total installed capacity of transformers in Japan. However, this figure can be estimated by considering the ratio of installed transformer capacity to the installed generating capacity.

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The total electric generating capacity proposed to be retained is 10,330,000 KVA about 25% of which represent thermal electric generating capacity and the rest hydroelectric. An examination of Japan's electric power grid systems (Civil Affairs Handbook Nos. 31-357, -358, -367, and -387) show that the ratio of transformer to generator capacity in the hydroelectric plant systems is 4. In the case of the thermal electric plants which are usually located near the load supplied, the ratio is 2. It may be assumed, therefore, that the overall transformer to generator capacity ratio is 3.5. The estimated installed transformer capacity is 3.5 times 10,330,000 KVA equals 36,000,000 KVA.

Based on an average life expectancy of 20 years (Fowle's Electrical Engineers' Handbook), the annual transformer replacement capacity required will be 5% of 36,000,000 or 1,800,000 KVA.

Item IV. Converters

There are no available data on the installed capacity of converters in Japan. Neither are there any information regarding direct current consumption of the different industries requiring this type of electric energy. It is believed that a large portion of the direct current power requirements of Japan, especially for its electric railways, electrolytic equipment, etc. is handled by mercury-arc rectifiers and that no more than 15% of the total generating capacity to be retained, or 1,200,000 KW, represents the installed converter capacity.

Assigning a life expectancy of 20 years to converters, the annual replacement capacity required will be 5% of 1,200,000 or 60,000 KW.

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NOTE RE ALUMINUM

Far Eastern Commission documents FEC 218, FEC 218/1 and C2-242, which are referred to in the text of this memorandum, are attached to the memorandum entitled "Economic Demilitarization and Economic Control."

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JAPANESE PEACE SETTLEMENT: ALUMINUM EXPORTS FROM CANADA TO JAPAN

I

INTRODUCTION

1. Canadian exports of aluminum in bars to Japan in 1939 were valued at $7,800,000. The fact that these exports rose from $3,500,000 in 1937 to $6,000,000 in 1938 and nearly $8,000,000 in 1939 indicates that Japan was importing this strategic raw material from Canada to bolster her war economy. It also indicates that in a period of foreign exchange shortage Japan looked to Canada as the cheapest source of aluminum supply. While the export figures for the period 1937-39 cannot be taken as an indication of Japan's post-war requirements of aluminum from Canada, it is apparent that Canada has the principle foreign interest in the future of the Japanese aluminum industry.

2. In the succeeding sections an account is given of the Japanese aluminum industry for the pre-war period and its phenomenal wartime growth. The pros and cons of permitting Japan to retain an aluminum reduction industry are then considered. And finally there is a discussion of Japan's probable aluminum consumption requirements and her need to retain certain aluminum fabricating facilities.

II

Japanese Aluminum Industry

3. Aluminum was of great importance to the peacetime metal manufacturing industries of Japan. Production of aluminum in Japan itself did not begin, however, until 1934, and, although the Japanese output increased during 1935-38, it represented only about 2.5 percent of the world total. Almost no bauxite, the chief raw material, is available in Japan proper, however, and before World War II interrupted world trade, Japan imported about half of the aluminum it consumed. Its consumption of aluminum, therefore, amounted to about 5 percent of the world total. In 1940 production in Japan proper approximated 35,000 tons. After 1940 the capacity of the industry in Japan increased to several times its former size, however, and the wartime output became much greater than would be justified in peacetime.

4. During the war Japan built more aluminum plants than any other country in the world, but most of them had a much smaller capacity than the plants in the United States and Canada. It has been estimated that primary production of aluminum in the Japanese Empire reached a wartime peak of about 120,000 tons (as compared to about a million tons for the United States).

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5. In pre-war years aluminum became a vital part of the growing heavy industry of Japan. Not only was it needed for the military and naval programme but it was substituted for many metals which Japan would otherwise have had to import in order to supply even civilian requirements. In 1934, 38% of the aluminum consumed in Japan went into transportation (land, water, and air); 16% into household utensils and food equipment; 17% into electric cables and wire; 8% into machinery; 8% into steel metallurgy; 4% into nonferrous alloys; 3% into building; 2% into chemical equipment.

6. During the peak of wartime activity this pattern of aluminum consumption would naturally change; a greater proportion would be consumed in the transportation industry, 65 percent or more probably going into the production of aircraft alone. The percentage going into machinery, steel metallurgy, and nonferrous alloys would also increase.

7. In many uses aluminum alloys can be substituted for certain alloy steels. Aluminum can also be substituted for copper in cables and wire. Aluminum foil can replace lead and tin in many uses.

8. For a number of years (1917-34) Japan was engaged in the fabrication of aluminum from imported crude metal and scrap, while domestic consuming industries continued to increase their demands for the metal. The many early attempts to establish primary aluminum ingot smelters were unsuccessful, owing chiefly to lack of bauxite and shortages of power. Under increasing pressure from military authorities, however, smelting facilities were established -- in spite of the handicaps encountered in the earlier attempts. The Government first encouraged the construction of hydro-electric plants. By 1932 some excess power was available for aluminum production; the first successful plant came into operation in 1934.

9. Direct Government control of the industry was first established by the Light Metals Manufacturing Law, which licensed all Japanese aluminum companies. Those licensed were exempted from certain custom duties and certain taxes. Direct subsidies were given to certain manufacturers of aluminum products.

10. Development of hydroelectric power was the prime factor in the expansion and location of the Japanese aluminum industry. From 9 to 10 percent of all electric power was consumed in the production of aluminum. About 12 aluminum producing plants were reported in Japan proper and about 8 in other Empire areas; the average output of each of these plants was smaller by far than that of plants in the United States or Canada. Relatively wide distribution of the industry in small plants allowed it to take advantage of the limited excess power in each area. Such distribution had also strategic significance from the standpoint of national defense. The industry is completely integrated with larger industrial and chemical interests.

11. Little detailed information is available as to the development of aluminum plants in Formosa, Korea, and Manchuria or their relation to aluminum supply and

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demand in Japan proper. Aluminum-producing companies known to exist in the early part of 1938 included one in Formosa and one in Manchuria.

12. The Five-Year Plan as announced by the Japanese Department of Commerce and Industry in 1937 intended to increase aluminum plant capacity to about 175,000 tons. Except when operating at peak capacity under great pressure, the actual output of these plants probably would have been less than this stated capacity, or about 75,000 tons of ingot in Japan proper (including Formosa and Korea at that time) and about 45,000 tons in Manchuria. A national cartel of all Japanese producers was organized under state direction in order to promote this plan. Several plants were projected and several new companies announced their intention of engaging in aluminum production.

13. One of the most important factors influencing the development of aluminum plants on the mainland was the shortage of power in Japan proper. On December 1, 1934 the Government established the Manchuria Electric Corporation; after 1936 the development of power in Manchuria and Korea became a virtual Government monopoly. The first development was a coal steam plant at Fushun. A hydroelectric plant was to be built on the Sungari River above Kirin. These plants were to be the basis of wartime aluminum plant expansion on the mainland.

14. A well-integrated aluminum industry requires a steady source of supply of such materials as bauxite, fluorspar, soda ash, fuel (coal, natural gas, or oil), and petroleum coke or similar electrode material. In addition the industry requires abundant electric power. Not all aluminum-producing countries have all these materials and power available locally, however, and Japan is of the large aluminum-producing countries among those most deficient in the natural resources requisite for economical production. In some countries, electric power from coal-steam plants is used for aluminum reduction, but from the long-range viewpoint this use of coal is considered extravagant.

15. The original plans concerning raw material supplies for Japan's new industry called for the use of Manchurian shale or Korean alunite as a substitute for bauxite. When subsequent experience demonstrated that use of these materials was not economical,* the aluminum plants turned to bauxite imported from Greece, British India, and the Netherlands. In 1936 bauxite was discovered in the three mandated islands of Palau, Yap, and Ponape; reserves were reported to amount to 5 million tons. Such a supply would provide sufficient bauxite to operate Japan's aluminum industry at an annual rate of 20,000 tons of ingots for about 50 years under present technique. Bauxite deposits were also reported

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* The cost of producing aluminum from alunite, as reported by one company, was 1,500 yen per metric ton or about 19.7 cents per pound of aluminum, as contrasted with 10.5 cents per pound as reported by one Japanese company using good bauxite.

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in Shantung Province, China, but it is not known here whether Japan exploited these during the occupation. In 1939 the total Japanese imports of bauxite from outside the Empire were 278,124 metric tons.

16. Marked expansion in the production of aluminum in Japan was echieved in a brief period of 7 years. Starting at 664 metric tons by one company in 1934, output increased to 10,500 tons by 5 companies in 1937. The level of output attained during 1936 and 1937 appears to coincide more nearly with the nation's normal requirements than that of earlier (or later) years. Thereafter capacity grew rapidly as additional power became available, and by 1940 production in Japan proper is estimated to have reached about 35,000 tons. Production continued to increase after this. Total output for the Empire as a whole is estimated to have reached 120,000 tons or more.

17. So rapid a development was in part due to Japan's needs for aluminum in heavy industry; production which had been developed to fill the growing civilian needs was projected to satisfy the demands of war. After 1937 the aluminum-producing companies of Japan pooled as a direct war necessity their resources and interests in order to develop aluminum production in Manchuria and Korea, and in 1940, shortage of power in Japan proper gave even greater impetus to the development of the industry in Manchuria.

18. Operation of aluminum plants in Japan proper will always be economically vulnerable because of the lack of raw material supplies. Except for a small development in the Unfederated Malay States, Japanese interests owned no foreign source of supply. An aluminum industry in Japan proper without subsidy, protective tariff, or other aid probably could not compete in the world market if it had to resort to substitutes for bauxite; in fact, it is doubtful whether the industry, using bauxite, could compete successfully on a very large scale in export trade, were it stripped of all subsidy and protection, as it would probably be forced to pay too high a price either for the requisite power or raw materials, or both.

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Far Eastern Commission Discussion of the Future of the Japanese Aluminum Industry

19. Of the policy decisions on interim reparations removals passed by the Far Eastern Commission in May 1946, FEC-059 contained the following section relating to the aluminum industry:

> "Light Metals Industry.
> (Definitions: "Plants and establishments primarily engaged in the production of alumina, primary or secondary aluminum and magnesium, and in the rolling, extruding, drawing, forging and casting of aluminum and magnesium and their alloys.")
>
> All facilities identified within this category should be made available for claim, subject to the following limitations:
>
> (1) No facilities engaged in remelting light metal scrap into secondary ingots should be made available for claim.
>
> (2) In cement plants converted to produce alumina from clays or shales, only the equipment introduced to effect such conversion should be made available for claim.
>
> (3) Sufficient rolling and drawing equipment should be retained to handle 15,000 metric tons per annum of fabricated aluminum. Such equipment should be of a general purpose character and can be obtained from any surplus available in other branches of the non-ferrous metals industry."

20. An early draft of this paragraph under discussion in April 1946 omitted any provision for the retention in Japan of plants engaged in the secondary processing of aluminum. Our representative on the Far Eastern Commission was instructed to oppose this omission on the grounds that the removal of such plants might, at a future date, be prejudicial to the export of Canadian aluminum ingots to Japan for processing. The Economic Committee of the Far Eastern Commission in the meantime proposed that sufficient rolling and drawing equipment should be retained in Japan to handle 15,000 metric tons per annum of fabricated aluminum. In view of the action taken by the Economic Committee our representative did not feel it necessary to state the Canadian position on this point.

21. In April of this year the United States delegate submitted FEC-218 to the Far Eastern Commission, which sets forth the steps to be taken for the final reparations removals programme. The section affecting the light metals industries reads as follows:

> "Aluminum and Magnesium
> (Definition: "Plants and establishments primarily engaged in the production of alumina, primary or secondary aluminum and magnesium and their alloys.")
>
> (1) All facilities in excess of 25,000 metric tons per year aluminum reducing capacity should be made available for claim."

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22. By way of explanation the United States included the following commentary in FEC-218/1 relating to the paragraph quoted above from FEC-218:

"Aluminum and Magnesium

The interim program provides for removal from Japan of all facilities for the production of primary aluminum, but authorizes retention of all existing facilities for the melting of scrap aluminum into secondary ingot. However, subsequent investigation has shown that no separate industry for producing secondary ingot by remelting of scrap exists in Japan. It has also been found that much of the aluminum scrap available in Japan can be usefully employed for civilian products only after a purification process consisting of reconversion to alumina followed by electrolytic reduction to aluminum metal. In view of the cost to the Japanese of importing aluminum metal, it is recommended that Japan be allowed to retain 25,000 m.t. of aluminum reducing capacity. It is considered that adequate security safeguards with regard to the use of aluminum are provided by the removal of the entire aircraft industry and of all rolling capacity designed solely for the processing of the light metals and their alloys.

The following estimates of annual aluminum requirements in Japan were drawn up by the indicated Japanese sources:

DESIRED ALUMINUM PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION

APPLICATION	METRIC TONS PER YEAR	
	ESTIMATE BY LIGHT METAL CONTROL ASS.	ESTIMATE BY LIGHT METAL ROLLING MILLS' ASS.
1. Cooking and Household Utensils	15,000	15,000
2. Transmission Lines, Electric Cables	10,000	-
3. Elec. Communication Industry	4,000	3,500#
4. Transportation Industry	4,000	5,500
5. Architectural Uses	1,000	1,500
6. Chemical Industry	3,000	600
7. Medical Instruments	1,000	900
8. Coins	2,000	2,000
TOTAL	40,000	29,000

Including foil

Source: SCAP Ec. & Soc. Sec. Special Rept. No. 9, April 3, 1946, "The Aluminum Industry of Japan"

Under the provisions of the interim program, rolling capacity adequate to handle 15,000 m.t. of fabricated aluminum annually was to be left in Japan. This equipment was to be obtained from any surplus available in other branches of the non-ferrous metals industry. In effect, all facilities primarily engaged in the fabrication of aluminum and magnesium and their alloys would be made available for claim. The present program likewise requires that all light metal rolling be done on surplus facilities available in other branches of the non-ferrous metals industry, and that all light metal rolling facilities as such should be made available for claim."

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23. The report (C2-242 of July 14, 1947, to be found in the Annex) of a subcommittee set up by Committee No. 2 on Economic and Financial Affairs of the Far Eastern Commission, reported as follows on FEC-218's proposal for the future of the Japanese aluminum industry:

> "The majority of the Subcommittee is doubtful about the statement contained in FEC-218/1 to the effect that, if Japan is to reprocess scrap so as to produce a satisfactory grade of aluminum for civilian purposes, she will need to retain primary aluminum facilities, i.e. facilities of the type which must be used in the manufacture of virgin aluminum from bauxite, becuase she has no separate secondary aluminum facilities, i.e., facilities especially adapted to the reprocessing of aluminum scrap. It is thought possible that facilities other than primary aluminum facilities would be available in Japan that could be used for reprocessing at least the major part of the existing scrap into aluminum which is satisfactory for producing civilian goods. Until evidence is available to the contrary the majority of the Subcommittee does not feel that it can support the proposal that Japan should retain primary aluminum facilities.
>
> The Subcommittee considers that some aluminum rolling capacity should be left in Japan. The majority of the Subcommittee favored the provisions of the interim program with regard to rolled, drawn and extruded aluminum shapes (FEC-059/9)."

In a proposed policy statement (enclosure "C" to C2-242 on "Level of Economic Life in Japan: Policy towards Japanese Industry and Shipping") the Subcommittee recommended that the capacity of the Japanese aluminum industry in excess of the amounts stated below should be made available for reparations claim.

> "(a) <u>Alumina and primary aluminum</u>
>
> Nil
>
> (b) <u>Rolled, drawn and extruded shapes</u>
>
> Capacity to produce 15,000 metric tons of shapes annually. Such equipment should be of a general purpose character and can be obtained from any surplus available in other branches of the non-ferrous metals industry."

24. The Canadian member on the Far Eastern Commission had already received instructions to support the provisions of FEC-059 on interim reparations removals which called for the complete elimination of the Japanese aluminum reduction industry, and for the retention of sufficient rolling and drawing equipment to handle 15,000 metric tons per annum of fabricated aluminum. However some ambiguity exists regarding the precise interpretation of the next sentence in FEC-059 and the recommendation in Annex C of C2-242 (2) c (1) (b) which says "such equipment should be of a general purpose character and can be obtained from any surplus available in other branches of the non-ferrous metals industry." As indicated above the United States paper FEC-218/1 interprets this sentence as meaning that all facilities primarily engaged in the fabrication of aluminum are to be made available for claim, and the 15,000 metric tons of aluminum are therefore to be handled by surplus equipment drawn from other branches of the non-ferrous metals industry. The Canadian Government had not

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interpreted FEC-059 in this sense when instructing its member on the Far Eastern Commission to support this paper.

25. To remove any doubt as to the position of the Canadian Government an amendment to C2-242 is being introduced into the Far Eastern Commission. It will call for the removal of all aluminum reduction facilities from Japan for economic and security reasons, and the retention of 25,000 metric tons of integrated aluminum fabricating facilities. The supporting argument for this amendment is given in the succeeding paragraphs.

26. It is considered that it would be of the greatest advantage to Japan to utilize her electric power resources primarily for those industries whose products would have a large foreign exchange producing export market, that could be developed in the course of years. To employ this power for the electrolytic reduction of aluminum, which consumes more than any other manufactured product -- roughly 10 kilowatt hours per pound of ingot -- militates against such a utilization.

27. It has been proposed in FEC-218 that (apparently by making use of scrap aluminum already in Japan as a base material) 25,000 tons of commercial grade aluminum ingot could be produced annually without large imports of raw materials.

28. This is not the case: employing the process described (conversion of scrap to alumina with caustic soda followed by electrolytic reduction) approximately $102 worth of imported coal, salt, fuel oil, cryolite, petroleum coke and pitch would be required for each metric ton of aluminium produced (See Table A). There are technical difficulties standing in the way of operating the described process exclusively on scrap, and it has hitherto always been applied in conjunction with the standard Bayer process for treating bauxite.

29. In addition, aluminium scrap is disappearing rapidly from the market the world over. Japan is no exception; by April 1947 the supply of ingot plus scrap had dwindled to 37,800 tons, from a high of approximately 144,000 tons just after V-J Day. When scrap is no longer available and the reduction of aluminium is based on bauxite, the cost of imported raw materials would be raised by roughly an additional $26 per metric ton of aluminium ingot produced. (See Table B).

30. The process employed in the reduction of aluminium demands a large amount of hydroelectric power continuously. In spite of the fact that there are many short swift flowing streams in Japan, which do generate an abundance of hydroelectric power, this power is spasmodic as there are no large storage facilities for water to offset the water shortage during the usual dry period, which customarily lasts as long as four months, or one-third of the year.

31. The operation of industrial plants on an intermittent basis is expensive and incompatible with continuous low cost operation. Consequently, reliance is placed in Japan on thermo-electric stations, the fuel for which is coal, to maintain power during the dry period.

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About 10% of all power generated is produced in this way. For 1948, the tonnage of coal to be consumed in all the thermo-electric stations of the country is estimated at 3.5 million tons (for 3 billion K.W.H.), while the estimated shortage of coal to be met by imports will be 7.8 million tons. This deficiency is likely to be a permanent feature of Japan's peacetime economy.

32. In view of what has been stated above, it is not considered in the best interests of Japan to operate an industry which, when based on steam power, consumed 14 to 30 tons of coal for every ton of aluminium produced. Against this statement the argument may be raised that a large proportion of the energy requirements of the Japanese aluminium reduction plants is derived from hydroelectirc power which would otherwise be wasted. This is true in part, but it is calculated that to supply the electrical energy for an aluminium ingot production of 25,000 metric tons annually, an absolute minimum of from 23,000 to 47,000 tons of coal would be consumed. (See Table C). These figures are based on the assumption that as much as 12,000 of the 25,000 metric tons of aluminium could be produced in plants using as a power source direct current generators which could not be connected to the general power transmission grid, and that the hydro stations supplying the energy for the remaining 13,000 metric tons have to be supplemented by steam stations for only a part of the year.

33. It is felt that aluminium is an essential commodity in the reconstruction of Japan, but in view of the foregoing it would seem to be more economical to import ingot into the country at the current price of approximately 14 cents per pound (U.S. $308.64 per metric ton) F.A.S. Canadian Port, which is the rough equivalent of 16-16-1/2 cents per pound (U.S. $352.74-$363.76 per metric ton) C.I.F. Japanese Port.

34. Furthermore, if ingot were to be imported into Japan. more satisfactory control could be maintained from a security standpoint. If, on the other hand, ingot production were allowed, control would not be absolute since the steel and brass industry (which will remain, in part at least) will provide fabricating facilities which could in emergency be improvised or converted for aluminium fabrication by the Japanese in a relatively short time.

35. For reasons stated below, to dismantle all primary fabricating facilities (as proposed in FEC-218) is neither practical nor desirable for Japan's normal peacetime economy:

(a) It is a priori more efficient and economical to use equipment that has been designed for the purpose (i.e. the very facilities it is proposed to dismantle) than to utilize other equipment not so designed which can, except within narrow limits, only be used after alteration or conversion. Perhaps it will be argued that efficiency is an internal affair of the Japanese, but to achieve a healthy export economy they must be given the opportunity of employing the lowest cost methods in the light metal industry, as in every field.

(b) There are certain plants producing commodities such as cooking utensil sheet and aluminium foil, which can not by any stretch of the imagination be classified as war potential.

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(c) While it is true that surplus brass rolling equipment could be used to turn out aluminium sheet of certain tempers and widths, this is not the most efficient use for such equipment. Many details of layout would not apply to aluminium and if brass and aluminium were rolled alternately on the same mill, elaborate precautions would be required for maintaining the rolls in condition to produce good aluminium sheet.

(d) Brass fabricating plants are not suitable for the production of the heat-treatable alloys used in transportation and architecture. If the special heat treating furnaces were installed in the brass mills, they would only have to be taken from aluminium plants which are already functioning.

36. In short, it is felt that Japan's light metal economy would be best served by eliminating the aircraft and reduction plants, as a means of security control, and by permitting the operation of the rolling mills, extrusion plants and foundries necessary for the entire allowable peacetime consumption of the metal.

37. In proposing that 25,000 tons of integrated fabricating facilities be left in Japan instead of 15,000 tons as proposed in FEC-218 and C2-242, we are raising the level of projected Japanese consumption of aluminum products. Canada, with a population one-seventh that of Japan is consuming in peacetime about 35,000 tons per annum. To cut Japan's supply of aluminum to 15,000 tons would be to disregard the tremendous increase in the use of aluminum in recent years, and to restrict the availability of aluminum for inclusion in export products. It is thought that, with elimination of the Japanese aircraft industry, 25,000 tons per annum would be the minimum peaceful requirement of Japan for aluminum.

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TABLE "A"

Estimated Imports of Raw Materials for Japanese Aluminium Smelting Industry Based on Scrap Aluminium*

per metric ton of ingot produced

		Dollars per metric ton ingot
Salt for caustic soda manufacture	0.6 tons @ $15	$9.00
Coal for caustic soda manufacture	1.4 tons @ $10	14.00
Fuel oil for alumina calcination	1.6 barrels @ $3	5.00
Cryolite	.10 tons @ $200	20.00
Petroleum coke	0.55 tons @ $55	30.00
Soft pitch	0.20 tons @ $45	9.00
Coal for steam power* 1/2 x 1/10 x 30 tons =	1.5 tons @ $10	15.00
	Total -	$102.00

* It is presumed that 50% of the aluminium production is derived from electrical energy from the grid, which, during one-third of the year, is in turn based on steam power to the extent of 10% of the total amount generated annually. As Japan produces insufficient coal for her total requirements, the fuel thus consumed can be taken to be imported coal for the purpose of this estimate.

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TABLE "B"

Estimated Imports of Raw Materials for Japanese Aluminium Smelting Industry Based on Bauxite

per metric ton of ingot produced

		Dollars per metric ton ingot
Salt for Solvay soda	0.30 tons @ $14	$4.50
Coal for Solvay soda	0.15 " " $10	1.50
Fuel oil for alumina calcination	1.6 barrels @ $3	5.00
Cryolite	0.10 tons @ $200	20.00
Petroleum coke	0.55 " " $55	30.00
Soft pitch	0.20 " " $45	9.00
Coal for steam power* 1/2 x 1/10 x 30 tons =	1.5 " " $10	15.00
Bauxite	4.16 " " $9	37.50
Coal for Bayer process team	0.55 " " $10	5.50
Total, using bauxite		$128.00

* It is presumed that 50% of the aluminium production is derived from electrical energy from the grid, which, during one-third of the year, is in turn based on steam power to the extent of 10% of the total amount generated annually. As Japan produces insufficient coal for her total requirements, the fuel thus consumed can be taken to be imported coal for the purpose of this estimate.

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T A B L E "C"

Estimated Coal Required for Thermo-Electric Stations to Supply a 25,000 Metric Ton Japanese Aluminium Smelting Industry.

Total annual ingot production	25,000 m.t.	
Less quantity presumably produced by means of DC hydro power at smelter site	12,000 m.t.	
Quantity based on electric power from the grid		13,000 m.t.
Kilowatt hours of electrical energy from the grid		312,000,000 KWH
Portion presumably generated in stand-by thermo-electric stations		35,000,000 KWH
Coal consumed in thermo-electric stations at 1.5 to 3.0 pounds per KWH		23,750 to 47,500 m.t.

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NOTE RE NICKEL

Far Eastern Commission Documents FEC 218, FEC 218/1 and C2-242, which are referred to in the text of this memorandum, are attached to the Memorandum entitled "Economic Demilitarization and Economic Control."

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JAPANESE PEACE SETTLEMENT: NICKEL EXPORTS FROM CANADA TO JAPAN

1. As the source of over 80% of the world's supply of nickel, Canada has a preponderant interest in any restrictions that may be imposed in the Japanese peace settlement on the import of this strategic raw material into Japan. Canadian nickel exports to Japan in the peak year of 1939 were valued at $8,000,000, comprising over 25% of Canadian exports to Japan in that year. While it is recognized that Japanese imports of nickel were abnormally high from the "China incident" of 1937 to the attack on Pearl Harbour in December 1941 due to the high consumption of nickel by Japanese war industries and concurrent stock piling activities, and that a peaceful Japanese economy would not require imports of nickel in the quantities of the immediate pre-war years, it will be in the Canadian interest to oppose any unreasonable restrictions being imposed on the import of nickel into Japan.

2. Nickel is generally regarded as one of the most vital strategic metals because of its exceptionally wide range of industrial, metallurgical and military uses. Next to manganese, nickel is probably the most important metal in the development of a modern munitions industry. Although world nickel requirements are not great quantitatively, the qualities imparted to steel by the presence of nickel are such that the metal acquires an importance out of all proportion to the amount used. Nickel has an exceptionally wide range of applications as metal and alloy besides the usual type of uses in chemical compounds. G.A. Roush in his book on "Strategic Mineral Supplies" lists the leading metallurgical, chemical and military uses of nickel. This list is attached as Appendix "A" to this paper. It should be observed, in particular, that many of the military uses of nickel are identical with the ordinary industrial uses of the metal. In addition, of course, there are a number of strictly military uses among which are armour plate for both naval and military use, many items of naval construction, gun forgings, recoil springs and bullet jackets.

3. Before 1937 Japan had no smelting or refining facilities for nickel ore; she imported her requirements in nickel bars, rods, sheets, etc. from Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom and Norway where the world's great nickel smelters are located. In 1937 as a part of her plans to establish a self-sufficient "national defence economy" Japan began experiments in the smelting and refining of low-grade nickel ores from Celebes in the Netherlands East Indies, New Caledonia, and domestic mines, principally the Notsuma mine in Hyoga Prefecture, Honshu. During the war Japan relied on her nickel stock piles, imports of nickel ore and matte from Celebes, when she occupied this island and the development of her own low-grade nickel mines. Since her defeat in 1945, Japan has discontinued the importation of nickel ore and has stopped domestic nickel mining.

4. The United States proposal of April 9, 1947 on "Reparations Removals of Industrial Facilities and

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Merchant Shipping from Japan", known as FEC-218, calls for the complete removal of all plants and establishments in Japan primarily engaged in the smelting of nickel from its ores. FEC-218/1 states the supporting argument for this proposal in the following words:

> "Japan had no domestic production of nickel before 1937 and supplied her needs entirely from imports. Production between 1937-1945 was from very low grade ores and recovery was very expensive. None of the Japanese nickel mines is now operating and no production is planned. Importation of nickel ores or concentrates is considered unfeasible. It is therefore recommended that all nickel smelters be made available for claim, thus providing as reparations facilities not needed by the Japanese."

The report (C2-242 of July 14, 1947) of a Sub-committee, set up by Committee No. 2 on Economic and Financial Affairs of the Far Eastern Commission, accepted the view expressed in FEC-218 and FEC-218/1 that all nickel smelters in Japan should be made available for reparations claim. The Canadian member on the Far Eastern Commission has been instructed to support this proposal.

5. Whether or not the Far Eastern Commission approves as a policy statement FEC-218, or some modification of it, with a provision for the removal of the nickel smelting industry from Japan, it is most improbable that these facilities will have been removed from Japan as reparations before this subject comes up for consideration at the Japanese Peace Conference. At the time this paper is being written no information is available in Ottawa concerning the present state of Japanese nickel smelters. No information is available concerning the number and capacity of smelters, the type and state of machinery installed, what damage may have occurred as a result of the war, or whether any remaining smelters have been changed over for other use. An effort is being made to secure this information.

6. It is recommended that the Canadian Delegation at the Japanese Peace Conference support the implementation of the proposal in FEC-218 that the Japanese nickel smelting industry be made available for reparations claim. This industry was subsidized by the Japanese Government as part of its "national defence economy." Processed nickel may be imported by Japan more economically from abroad. This would also give the Allies a better security check on the import of this strategic raw material into Japan. Canadian trade interests would be furthered by such an arrangement as Canada produces nickel more economically than other countries and could therefore look forward to a market for this metal in Japan.

7. At the Japanese Peace Conference consideration is likely to be given to the desirability for security purposes of imposing certain limitations on the import

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of certain strategic raw materials into Japan. This might take the form of a schedule of import quotas attached to the Peace Treaty. Such a schedule could be modified by the signatories, perhaps through an Allied Control Council for Japan that they might set up, in the light of the changing import requirements of a peaceful Japanese economy. If nickel is included in any such list of strategic raw materials whose import into Japan is placed under quota, it would be in the Canadian interest to see that the nickel quota is fixed fairly, having regard first to security requirements and second to the increased uses found for nickel in recent years and the use of this metal to many of Japan's export industries.

8. In considering the quota for future nickel imports into Japan it would be desirable to endeavour to distinguish between Japan's legitimate industrial requirement for this important metal and the possible use of this metal in a revived munitions industry. The Far Eastern Commission in determining the peaceful needs of Japan has selected the 1930-34 period adjusted for population increase, technological development, employment requirements and foreign trade requirements as a statistical base. The following table gives a list of the total deliveries of nickel to Japan for the years 1929-1939.

Total deliveries to Japan in tons		Deliveries per capita in lbs.	
1929	-699 tons	.020	
30	- 777 ")average	.022)	average
31	- 927 ")1930-34	.026)	for 1930-34
32	-2151 ")2112 tons	.061)	.060 lbs. per
33	-3313 ")per annum	.094)	capita per
34	-3391 ")	.097)	annum
35	-4309 ")average	.123)	average for
36	-2987 ")for 1935-	.085)	1935-39
37	-8787 ")39, 7316	.251)	.209 lbs. per
38	-9573 ")tons per	.273)	capita per
(1st 9 mos.) 39	-10922 ")annum	.311)	annum

9. The very substantial difference between the period 1930-34 and the period 1935-39 is almost certainly due to the increased demands of the Japanese armament programme and the building up of nickel stock piles in the event imports might be curtailed. Although the peaceful industrial and armament consumption of nickel cannot be accurately separated for the period under consideration, it is not likely that the imports during the period 1930-34 included a substantial amount for the armament industry. If we take the average annual import of nickel by Japan for the base period 1930-34 as 2,100 tons, then the allowable figure for 1947, adjusted for the increase in population, would be approximately 2,500 tons.

10. In adjusting the quota of nickel consumption to Japan's post-war economy consideration should be given to the many peaceful industrial uses of nickel which have been developed since the early 1930's.

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Canada and the United States in 1946 (the first fairly normal post-war year) doubled their domestic consumption of nickel over the peak year of 1937. If Japan is to maintain a substantial standard of living comparable to the advancing standards in other countries, the setting of import quotas for key materials essential for the functioning of a peaceful economy should be determined in a rational and liberal manner. Since Canada and the United States have doubled their domestic consumption of nickel over the peak year of 1937, it is not unreasonable that a comparable increase over the consumption of the base period 1930-34 should be allowed for future Japanese peaceful industrial use. This interpretation of Japan's nickel import requirement would place the quota at approximately 5,000 tons per annum, (an amount substantially less than the average obtaining during the period 1935-39; 7,316 tons). In the event that Japan should prejudice this liberal consideration of her requirements by using her nickel imports in the manufacture of war materials the supplying countries could easily coerce Japanese industry by cutting off nickel exports to Japan.

11. The future supply of nickel in the world is ensured for some time by the vast reserves of Canadian ore. There have been no recent discoveries of sizeable nickel deposits which would affect Canada's predominance in the post-war period, although the Petsamo deposits in northern Finland will probably supply most of the requirements of the Soviet Union and New Caledonian ores will probably continue to supply a small percentage of the world's needs. As in the past, some Canadian metal will continue to be refined at the Mond plant in Clydach, Wales, and in all probability Falconbridge ores will continue to be refined at Kristiansand in Norway. Nickel in Canada is mined exclusively by the International Nickel Company. As war-time requirements of this metal by Canada's allies have let up considerably, the International Nickel Company is interested in re-establishing so far as possible its peace-time markets. The resumption of exports of nickel from Canada to Japan is, therefore, of considerable importance to this Company and to Canada as a whole.

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APPENDIX "A"

USES OF NICKEL

Metallurgical Uses. -- The following list presents the leading metallurgical uses of nickel, giving both the form in which the metal is used and the type of use or equipment:

Low Nickel Steels (0.5 to 7 Per Cent Nickel). -- These furnish a metal of high strength, ductility, and toughness, that finds a place in numerous industries.

Automotive and Aircraft Construction: Axles, gears, crank and cam shafts, frames, roller bearings, connecting rods, steering knuckles, bolts and nuts.

Railway Equipment: Locomotive frames, forged main and side rods, valve gear, axles, roller bearings, boiler plate and tubes, staybolts, engine bolts, crossings, frogs and switch points.

Power Equipment: Turbine rotor forgings, turbine blades, reduction gears, marine crank and turbine shafts, pump shafts, roller bearings, chain drives, high pressure steam valves.

Architectural and Bridge Construction: Bars, plates, eye-bars, angles, beams, channels, and other shapes.

Mining and Excavating Machinery: Racks and pinions, crusher jaws, forged and rolled shafts, cast and forged gears, oil-well drilling bits.

Heavy Mill Machinery: Hydraulic press columns, cross heads, hammer piston rods, cast and forged rolls, die blocks, shear blades.

Shop Machinery: Shafts, spindles, gears, chains.

Agricultural Machinery: Tractor shoes, sprockets, gears, shafts.

Miscellaneous Machinery: Heat-treated forgings, gears, axles, shafts, chains, roller and ball bearings.

Machine Tools: Die blocks, punches, track chisels, band and disc saws, cutters, shovels.

High Nickel Steels (7 to 35 Per Cent Nickel, Usually Accompanied by Chromium). -- This group includes the heat-resistant and corrosion-resistant (stainless) steels, of which a few of the leading uses are: Building trim, cooking utensils, marine fittings, automobile hardware and trim, power equipment, oil-well equipment, furnace parts, submarine periscope tubes, turbine blades, stranded cable, chemical apparatus, pump rods, bolts, nuts, nails, wire.

Cast Nickel Steels (1 to 4 Per Cent Nickel). -- These uses coincide in many cases with those of the wrought nickel steels, for applications where lower stresses will permit the use of castings: Mining and excavating machinery, locomotive and ship construction, steel mill machinery, road-building machinery, electrical machinery, rolling mill machinery, oil-refining and power-plant equipment, large gears,

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crusher frames, tube mill balls, tractor and power shovel frames, oil-well tools, sheaves and sprockets, gears and cams, tractor shoes, bucket teeth, conveyor link chains.

Low Nickel Cast Irons (0.5 to 3 Per Cent Nickel, with Sometimes the Addition of Chromium or Manganese). -- This group gives castings of improved hardness, strength, and machining properties, used in: Cylinders; cylinder sleeves and liners; cylinder heads; pistons and piston rings for gas, oil, gasoline, and steam engines, pumps and compressors; valve lifters, bushings and seat rings; cut gears and cams; machine tools; glass molds; forming and stamping dies, pipe mill plugs, automobile manifolds, clutch plates, couplers, differential spiders, and brake drums; machine tool tables and beds; grate bars and stoker parts; crusher frames; pots for lead, zinc, aluminum, and caustic.

Medium Nickel Cast Irons (3 to 5 Per Cent Nickel). -- Resistance grids for current control and for heating; heavy stamping dies.

High Nickel Cast Irons (10 to 15 Per Cent Nickel). -- These are nonmagnetic, and have high electrical resistance. They are used mainly in electrical machine castings.

White Nickel Cast Iron (4 to 5 Per Cent Nickel). -- Where extreme hardness and resistance to abrasion is required, this is used in crusher liners, rolls, and pumps handling abrasive material.

Corrosion-resistant Cast Iron (12 to 30 Per Cent Nickel). -- The ability to withstand atmospheric and chemical corrosion at elevated temperatures makes these irons well suited for oil refinery equipment, automobile and Diesel engine parts, resistance grids, sheaves for glass lehrs, mine equipment, and chemical apparatus of various types.

Ferro-nickel Alloys. -- These alloys may be made with wide variations of magnetic, electrical and thermal properties, depending on the percentage of nickel used.

Nonmagnetic Alloys (10 to 25 Per Cent Nickel) -- Transformer, motor and generator parts, and other varied uses in the electrical industry.

Highly Magnetic Alloys (45 to 80 Per Cent Nickel). -- Electrical sheathing of submarine cable, radio and other special types of electrical transformers, telephone and telegraph relay parts.

Low Expansion Alloys (35 to 45 Per Cent Nickel). -- Length standards, measuring tapes, precision instruments, watch making, bimetallic thermostats, wire for wire glass, control devices for temperature and electricity, struts in aluminum automobile engine pistons.

Nickel Silver (10 to 30 Per Cent Nickel, with Varying Percentages of Copper and Zinc, and Sometimes Small Amounts of Aluminum, Lead, Tin, or Iron). -- Used as a base metal in silver-plated ware and jewelry, for flat keys, plumbing fixtures, architectural trim, building and marine hardware, lighting fixtures.

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Nickel Bronzes (0.5 to 7.5 Per Cent Nickel, with Varying Percentages of Copper, Zinc, Tin and Lead). -- Used in valve castings, steam packing, pressure castings, worm gears, bearings, rolling mill housing nuts, and ship propellers.

Nickel Brasses (1.5 to 6.5 Per Cent Nickel, with Varying Percentages of Copper and Zinc, and Frequently Small Amounts of Manganese, Aluminum, Iron, or Lead). -- The nickel serves as a decolorizer, giving a lighter color to the brass or making even a white brass, and improves the mechanical properties and resistance to corrosion for any of the ordinary uses for brass.

Copper-nickel Alloys (2.5 to 45 Per Cent Nickel). -- Used in condenser tubes, corrosion resistant castings, valves and valve trim, electrical resistance wire, coinage, and numerous minor applications.

Monel Metal (67 Per Cent Nickel, 28 Per Cent Copper, and Small Percentages of Iron, Manganese, Silicon, Carbon, and Sulfur, and Sometimes Aluminum). This is a special type of the copper-nickel alloys, developed originally by the International Nickel Company as a natural alloy, by reduction of the nickel matter without separation of the metals; other companies now produce similar compositions. The manifold uses to which monel has been put are too detailed to give in full; the following items give only a few of the more important applications in the different fields.

Aeronautics: Gasoline tanks, propeller sheathing, pontoons, landing gear, and instrument parts.

Architecture and Building: Roofs, flashing and trim.

Automotive: Instrument panels, molding, and windshield frames.

Chemical: As a corrosion resistant element in a wide variety of chemical equipment.

Dry Cleaning: Solvent handling systems and cleaning machinery.

Electrical: Pole line hardware.

Food Preparation and Service: Processing and handling equipment for packing and canning; service and steam tables, counters, dish washers, et cetera, in hotels, restaurants and hospitals; soda fountain tops, sinks and bars; ice cream freezing, packing, and serving equipment.

Hospital: Utensils, sterilizers and operating room equipment.

Laundry: Washers, extractors, starching machinery.

Marine: Fittings, hardware, shafting, propellers.

Metal Pickling: Baskets, tanks, tie rods, racks.

Petroleum: Pump rods and valves, filters, condenser tubes, and strainers.

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Power: Pumps and pump parts: valves and valve parts, shafts, impellers, turbine blades, expansion joints, gaskets, and instruments.

Pulp and Paper: Cylinder molds, beater bars, and evaporator tubes.

Textiles: Dyeing, finishing and bleaching equipment, tanks, vats, pails, and dippers.

Heat and Electrical Resistance Alloys (35 to 85 Per Cent Nickel, Along with Chromium, and Sometimes Iron). -- These alloys have a high electrical resistance, and a marked resistance to atmospheric corrosion at high temperatures, making them applicable for carburizing boxes, rabble arms and shoes, shafts and discs in annealing and heating furnaces, the interior construction of enameling furnaces, heat exchangers, and electrical resistors for ovens, furnaces, stoves, grills, toasters, percolators, and other industrial and domestic heating appliances.

Light Alloys. -- Several of the aluminum base alloys contain up to 5 per cent nickel, with small percentages of other metals, such as copper, iron, silicon, manganese, and titanium.

Other Alloys. -- Some of the minor alloys in which nickel plays an important role are gold-nickel (white gold), aluminum and zinc base die castings, a nickel-molybdenum-iron alloy highly resistant to corrosion by hydrochloric acid, and a nickel-cobalt-titanium alloy used in rectifier tubes.

Malleable Nickel. -- Pure nickel metal is produced in various forms, rods, bars, plates, strips, sheets, tubes, wire, angles, channels, and other special shapes, as well as in forgings and castings, and in these forms finds uses in the chemical, electrical, dairy, food, and petroleum industries, as well as in coinage. Where the equipment is too massive to permit the use of a solid nickel construction, a nickel-clad steel plate may be used.

Catalyst. -- Finely divided nickel may be used as a catalyst in a number of chemical reactions, the most important of which is the hydrogenation of oils, such as cocoanut or cottonseed, to form a solid fat.

Plating. -- Pure nickel is extensively used in electroplating on such metals as steel, brass, copper, zinc alloy die castings, and a number of others, either as a primary coat, or as an undercoat for a subsequent chromium plate. Although the thickness of the plate applied is usually only 0.0001 to 0.001 inch, the process is used so widely that the aggregate tonnage of nickel consumed in plating anodes is considerable.

Storage Batteries. -- Nickel is used in storage batteries of the Edison type, not only in electroplating on the steel making of the body and container of the cell, but also in the form of oxide as the active material of one electrode.

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Chemical Uses. -- Industrial uses for nickel compounds are largely confined to the oxide and sulfate, although a wide variety of nickel chemicals are produced for laboratory purposes, as well as for minor industrial uses. The oxide is used in the positive electrode of alkaline storage batteries, in the ceramic industry in ground coat enamels for steel, and as a raw material for the production of nickel chemicals. The sulfate, either in simple form or combined with ammonium as the double salt, is extensively used in electroplating baths.

Military Uses. -- Many of the military uses are identical with the ordinary industrial uses of the metal, the only difference being the emphasis which the emergency demand establishes, but, in addition to these, there are many strictly military uses among which are armor plate for both naval and military use, many items of naval construction, gun forgings, recoil springs, and bullet jackets.

(Extract from page 72 to page 75 of "Strategic Mineral Supplies" by G.A. Roush - 1939.)

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NOTE RE SHIPPING

Far Eastern Commission Documents FEC 218, FEC 218/1 and C2-242, which are referred to in the text of this memorandum, are attached to the Memorandum entitled "Economic Demilitarization and Economic Control."

Attention is called to paragraphs 30 and 31 of the memorandum entitled "Reparations."

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JAPANESE PEACE SETTLEMENT:

THE JAPANESE SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY

1. Proposals for the removal of Japanese merchant shipping and ship-building and repair facilities as reparations are being considered by the Far Eastern Commission under the general heading of industrial reparations removals. (See FEC 218, FEC 218/1 and C2-242).

2. The Deputy Minister of Transport, in the attached letter of August 1, has indicated his Department's views on appropriate levels for the Japanese shipping industry from the point of view of Canadian shipping interests.

3. Other factors which we must consider in determining policy with regard to Japanese shipping are the requirements of military security and the requirements of a viable economy for Japan. We are not in the position at the moment to provide any figures for the maximum levels of Japanese ship-building and shipowning consistent with security requirements. As to Japan's peace-time economic requirements, the principles underlying our general attitude to restrictions on the Japanese economy should lead us to favour a fairly high level for the shipping industry to permit Japan to carry a fair proportion of her own trade and earn some foreign exchange through shipping services.

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SECRET

DEPUTY OF MINISTER OF TRANSPORT

OTTAWA, August 1st, 1947.

Dear Sir,

I beg to acknowledge receipt of your communication of the 26th ultimo, together with the enlosed documents, with regard to the future of Japanese shipping.

The matter is one of material concern to Canada's shipping interests and I have accordingly confidentially discussed the matter in some detail with the late Chairman of the Shipping Board, Mr. A. L. W. MacCallum, and the views hereinafter expressed may be regarded as those of both the Department and our shipping people.

Our new Canadian deep-sea fleet, which has come into being as a result of the wartime shipbuilding programme, is and will be engaged in competitive international sea trades and its competition will be with the Allied maritime companies, particularly the United Kingdom, Norway, the Netherlands, France, Greece and also Sweden and Denmark. All these countries are now engaged in building up their merchant fleets and we must face the fact that in the not too distant future they will have at least as large an ocean-going fleet as they had in the pre-war years, and in addition that the United States expects to occupy a much larger place in deep sea shipping than she did before the war.

We are of the opinion that the United States, and, to a lesser extent, Canada, should reasonably expect to find themselves this larger place for their own postwar ocean-going merchant ships by taking over some of the space previously occupied by the German and Japanese fleets--in fact, we consider that Canada is entitled to a reasonable share of such space.

The documents accompanying your communication put forward two proposals in so far as Japanese shipping is concerned.

The first considers that postwar Japanese shipping should be limited to a global figure of 1.5 million gross tons, of which 1.25 tons would be used for essential inter-island, coastal and near-seas trades of that country; the balance of .25 million gross tons of ocean-going vessels, not exceeding 5,000 gross tons each, to be permitted to engage in deep sea foreign trade.

The second proposal is that the global figure for Japanese shipping be established at 2.5 million gross tons, of which 1.5 million gross tons would be engaged in inter-island, coastal and near-seas trades, and the balance of 1

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The Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs,
East Block,
OTTAWA.

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million gross tons be permitted to engage in foreign deep-sea operations.

We would not raise any objection to permitting Japan to have reasonably adequate tonnage to take care of the inter-island, coastal and near-seas trades, whether this figure be 1.25 or 1.5 million gross tons, but on the foreign deep sea trades, we definitely recommend proposal No. 1, whereby Japanese ocean-going shipping would be restricted to around one-quarter of a million gross tons.

It should, however, be noted that this conclusion is reached purely from the standpoint of our own shipping and there is the possibility that those in final authority may feel that Japan might be allowed more than the proposed one-quarter of a million gross tons to assist her in balancing her out payments by a certain amount of invisible exports in the way of shipping services.

In so far as the remaining large ships belonging to Japan are concerned, it is considered that they should be turned over as reparations as was done in the case of the German ships.

I am returning under separate cover documents Nos. FEC-058/11 and Secret EIPS/583, also an additional copy of the latter document, which you forwarded with your letter of July 29th.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd.) C. P. Edwards

Deputy Minister.

Encl.

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NOTE RE CIVIL AVIATION

Far Eastern Commission Document FEC 218, which is referred to in the text of this memorandum, is attached to the memorandum entitled "Economic Demilitarization and Economic Control."

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JAPANESE PEACE SETTLEMENT:
CIVIL AVIATION

1. Civil aviation and the aircraft industry rate very high as a war potential in the Japanese economy and comparatively low in their importance to the Japanese peace-time economy. Security measures must be correspondingly severe and need not be greatly tempered by economic considerations.

2. With regard to short term demilitarization measures it should be noted that according to the reparations proposals now before the Far Eastern Commission (FEC-218) the entire Japanese aircraft industry is to be either destroyed or removed as reparations.

3. As for long term controls, security measures will likely include the following restrictions with regard to the Japanese aircraft industry and civil aviation, to apply during the period of Allied control:

(a) Prohibition of the manufacture of all aircraft.

(b) Imports of aircraft to be restricted to those types suitable for civilian use within Japan.

(c) Prohibition of Japanese operation of external air lines.

4. In addition to the above measures, Australia and New Zealand will probably propose that Japan should be forbidden to operate internal air services and that all internal services should be operated by an international organization. Furthermore, they feel that Japan should not be allowed to provide technical ground personnel.

5. These latter restrictions which Australia and New Zealand may wish to impose upon Japan are in excess of Canadian security requirements as outlined in the letter of August 1st from the Chiefs of Staff Committee. It is most unlikely that Canada will wish to participate in any scheme for the international operation of Japanese internal air lines. In general, Canadian interests would be served if the peace treaty provides for non-discrimination with respect to traffic rights in Japan so far as members of the United Nations are concerned.

6. Canadian civil aviation interests are more likely to be affected by trusteeship agreements for the Pacific islands formerly under Japanese control. If the United States wish to withhold landing rights on these islands from other nations for security reasons they should undertake not to extend such rights to their own civil air lines.

7. In connection with any discussions at Canberra on Japanese civil aviation it should be borne in mind that Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom had conversations with the United States in May relating to the future of Japanese civil aviation.

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NOTE RE TRADE

Attention is called to the "Trade Notes" which are contained in Appendix D.

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JAPANESE PEACE SETTLEMENT:
RESUMPTION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE.

1. In addition to measures for economic demilitarization and the long term economic control of Japan, the Japanese peace settlement will have to establish conditions governing the resumption of international trade by Japan. The occupation authorities have already taken steps toward the restoration of normal trading activities by permitting the entry of private traders into Japan.

2. In the Far Eastern Commission and elsewhere the Canadian Government has frequently expressed support for the early restoration of pre-war conditions of trade in Japan. Within the limits of the economic restrictions which may prove necessary for security reasons we will presumably continue to support all measures tending to permit Japan to resume normal trading activities.

3. It is possible that the suggestion might be made at some stage that in addition to the economic restrictions discussed in the paper entitled "Economic Demilitarization and Economic Control", the right to negotiate commerical treaties should be withheld from Japan for a probationary period. In view of our general attitude that economic restrictions should be kept at a minimum consistent with security requirements we would presumably wish to take a cautious attitude toward the curtailment of Japan's rights to negotiate commercial treaties unless such restrictions are obviously essential for security purposes.

4. To facilitate the resumption of normal trading conditions in Japan the peace treaty should presumably contain economic clauses which, as a minimum, should cover the following points:

(a) Provision for the exchange of most favoured nation treatment with respect to import and export duties and internal taxes on imports within the limits of restrictions which are applied to Japan in this field.

(b) Provision for the exchange of national and most favoured nation treatment in commerce, industry, shipping and other forms of business activity in Japan.

(c) Provision for the protection by the Japanese Government of United Nations traders and exports into Japan against all forms of discrimination.

5. In general, the clauses in the Japanese peace treaty on economic relations might be patterned on Article 82 of the Italian peace treaty.

6. With reference to item (c) in paragraph 4 above a clear undertaking by the Japanese Government to protect the interests of foreign import-export traders is very important. Japanese export associations before the war used various discriminatory and unethical practices which had the effect of res-

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t ecting the operations of foreign traders. Mr. Ke erdine, the special representative of the Department of Trade and Commerce in the Canadian Liaison Mission in Tokyo, has stated that the trade associations which have been formed since the Japanese surrender to assist the Japanese Board of Trade are for the most part resurrections of the pre-war organizations, in many instances headed by the original office holders. The possibility that as soon as occupational control is lifted these associations may revert to their pre-war attitude toward foreign interests must be taken into account. It may prove necessary to back up diplomatic representations concerning any discrimination against foreign traders with some form of readily applicable economic pressure. This would be possible if machinery for the long term economic control is established.

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JAPANESE PEACE SETTLEMENT: CANADIAN INTEREST IN REGULATION OF JAPANESE FISHING

I

INTRODUCTION

1. Before the war Japanese floating canneries operating off the coasts of Alaska and British Columbia disturbed Canadian and United States fishing interests in these waters. The Japanese Peace Conference will furnish an opportunity for Canada and the United States to put forward for inclusion in the Peace Treaty proposals for prohibiting the Japanese from again disturbing their legitimate interests in the west coast and North Pacific fisheries.

2. Section II of this paper outlines something of the extent of the Japanese fishing industry in the prewar period. Japan then accounted for nearly a third of the world's catch of fish. A third of her population was supported directly or indirectly then by the fisheries. Exports of fishery products were second only to silk exports in value. An industry of this size and extending as it did over such a wide area inevitably impinged on the interests of most of Japan's Pacific neighbours who today are in a position to propose the imposition of limitations on the Japanese fishing industry.

3. It is not the purpose of this paper to account for all these conflicts of interest. Its object is to indicate something of Canadian Pacific fishing interests, the prewar clash of Japanese and Canadian and American fishing interests, the measures proposed in the Far Eastern Commission to regulate Japanese fishing during the occupation period, and finally to suggest a possible use of the Japanese Peace Treaty to protect the Canadian Pacific fishing industry from being disturbed by improper Japanese encroachment.

II

The Japanese Fishing Industry in the Prewar Period

4. Before the war Japan accounted for nearly one third of the world's catch of fish. Of the various industries in Japan none appears to be so indigenous and so well adapted as the fisheries. The country has a long indented coast line with excellent fishing ports. A large part of the population have been fishermen from time immemorial. In the years prior to the war one third of the population of Japan was supported directly or indirectly by the fisheries. Fish is second only to rice in the national diet; fish and rice, with some green vegetables and fruit, form a fairly balanced and healthful diet for the Japanese.

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5. The annual value of fish and processed fish products by Japan proper usually approximated 600 million yen, of which 440 million yen were consumed in Japan and the remainder, valued at 160 million yen were exported, principally to the United Kingdom, the United States, Germany, France, and countries of the Far East. Japanese exports to her colonies were relatively small compared with exports to foreign countries. Exports of fishery products as a whole, while second only to silk exports in value, accounted for only about five percent of the value of exports of all commodities from Japan proper to all areas.

6. Exports consisted mainly of canned fish and shell fish, boiled, dried and salted fish, fish oils (including whale), fish meal, and seaweeds. Canned products (principally salmon, trout, tuna, sardines and crab meat) accounted for slightly less than half of the quantity and slightly more than half of the value of total exports.

7. The Japanese areas of operation extended from the South China Sea to and including the waters off the coast of Alaska, but were principally in the inshore and offshore waters of Japan and in the Bering Sea and Sea of Okhotsk, off the coast of Siberia. Japanese operations in the Siberian fisheries were carried on under special concessions from the Soviet Union. The rivers, streams and fresh-water lakes of Japan also abound in fish and shellfish; aquiculture is a highly developed industry, the chief products being carp, eels, oysters (including pearl and seed oysters), seaweeds, and goldfish. Whaling operations extended to the Antarctic Ocean; other operations, some experimental, were carried on off the coasts of the United States, Mexico and Argentina during the last decade.

8. Of special interest to Canada is the fact that in the middle 1930's Japan operated nine floating crab canneries aggregating 37,000 tons, six floating salmon canneries totalling 20,000 tons, and two whaling factory ships of 27,000 tons and employing thirteen killer boats. Antarctic whaling operations subsequently expanded to six factory ships of 100,000 tons employing forty-eight killer boats.

9. The loss of European markets in 1940, Western Hemisphere markets in 1942, and the gradual contraction of Asiatic markets owing to Allied operations in that area, have seriously affected the Japanese fisheries. Furthermore, curtailment of the fisheries have probably reduced the domestic food supply, although it is believed that the Japanese home market is largely dependent upon products of aquiculture and the catches made by the smaller boats making short trips and operating close to shore. In 1936 there were in operation from the ports of Japan proper slightly more than 300,000 nonpowered boats and 59,000 powered vessels of less than 20 tons each. These

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agencies of production are probably adequate for civilian needs alone; but the increased demands of the armed forces for preserved fish (and other preserved foods) have probably created a shortage of civilian supplies.

10. Should Japan be denied the privilege of employing in the fisheries large vessels capable of speedy conversion to military use, the whale fishery and the salmon and crab fisheries operated with floating canneries would be eliminated. Practically the entire production of whale oil is for export and between 80 and 95 per cent of the pack of salmon and crab meat is exported. Floating canneries produce from 10 to 20 percent of the total pack of canned salmon and about half of the total pack of canned crab meat. Moreover, should restrictions on the type and size of vessels be extended to include some of the larger trawlers, purse seine vessels, and tuna clippers, the catch of tuna, cod, and certain other so-called deep sea species would be noticeably curtailed.

11. Japanese operations in the Okhotsk Sea and in the Bering Sea off the coast of Siberia were carried on under agreement between the Governments of Japan and the Soviet Union. These fisheries, together with the floating canneries, were responsible for practically the entire Japanese production of canned crab meat and the bulk of the pack of canned salmon.

12. Should Japan retain these fishing privileges and be permitted to operate floating canneries after the war, production would probably increase to its pre-war volume within a few years. If, however, the Soviet Union should bar the Japanese from these fisheries, and if floating canneries are not permitted the Japanese salmon and crab fisheries would be reduced to negligible proportions. Furthermore, should the Soviet Union exclude Japan from their fisheries, the Soviets probably would also repossess Karafuto which, in the past, has been one of the bases for Japanese fishery operations in the Okhotsh Sea.

13. The loss of Korea, Formosa, and other island possessions will further restrict and reduce the Japanese fisheries. These colonies, particularly Korea and Formosa, have extensive fisheries of their own. The Japanese Government and Japanese fishing interests have aided in their development and exploitation; hence, it is believed that Japanese interests and the central government exercised some measure of control over the bulk of the production and trade of the colonies. Furthermore, Japanese vessels operating from Japanese ports exploited the fisheries in some of the colonial areas. About 20 percent of the total Japanese catch of sardines was taken in Korean waters. It is therefore believed that the loss of the colonies would not only materially reduce the Japanese production and trade in fishery products, but private corporations in Japan would lose the bulk of their capital invested in these fisheries.

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14. Thus, restrictions on the size and type of fishing vessels permitted, exclusion from Soviet waters, and the loss of colonies would seriously curtail Japanese operations and production, but the effect would be more pronounced an Japanese production primarily for export, particularly products of the salmon, crab and whale fisheries.

15. Should Japan be deprived of the fisheries enumerated above, the most serious consequences would be the loss of products for export. Initially, production for home consumption would register a noticeable decline. However, it is believed that within a relatively short period aquiculture and the fisheries in and around the coasts of Japan proper could be expanded sufficiently to offset the losses resulting from depriving Japan of most of its former colonial and extra-territorial fisheries. Therefore, it is unlikely that in these circumstances Japan would be forced to import fish for domestic consumption.

16. Most of the Japanese exports of canned fish and shellfish was exported to the United States and European countries, principally the United Kingdom. There was also an appreciable market for canned sardines in the Philippine Islands and the British and Dutch colonies in the Far East. Also exported to these and other Asiatic countries were large quantities of dried fish and edible seaweeds . In the postwar period it is anticipated that a great many Asiatic countries, formerly substantial markets for Japanese products, will increase appreciably their production of fishery products for home consumption. Even if such production falls short of normal requirements, it is believed that imports may be sought from other sources before reverting to Japan. This may be particularly true of such countries as China, the Philippine Islands, and the Dutch and British possessions.

17. The United States and European markets for Japanese canned fish and shellfish may eventually be recovered, provided Japan is left in a position to produce these export products. However, should the Soviet Union repossess Karafuto and take over for its nationals the fisheries formerly operated by Japanese in the Okhotsk and Bering Seas, then markets for canned salmon and canned crab might be supplied by the Soviet Union instead of Japan.

18. Marine products exported from Japan supplied substantial amounts of foreign exchange to the country, as production was based almost entirely on domestic raw materials. The severe curtailment of the fishery industry in Japan would deprive the country of one important means of obtaining international credit in the postwar period.

III

Canadian Pacific Fishing Interests

19. The area in which Canadian and United States fisheries clash with the Japanese is in the North

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Pacific. Therefore a brief review of the Canadian Pacific fishing industry is necessary to an understanding of the problems of Canadian-Japanese fishing relations, and of the Canadian attitude towards the future of the Japanese fishing industry.

20. One of the most important fishing areas in the world is the North Pacific and until the last three-quarters of a century this was hardly developed. The waters are pure and cold, and yield the best quality salmon and halibut found in the world.

21. The Canadian share of the North Pacific fishery is in the ratio of 1:3 to the United States, but this is still greater than the Russian or Japanese share. The Pacific coast of Canada is 7180 miles in length, and is exceptionally well sheltered.

22. The most important product of this area is the salmon, which comes from the Fraser, Skeena, Nass and other British Columbia rivers, to supply two fifths of the total Canadian produce of fish. The salmon canning industry, which began in 1864 in California, had its start in British Columbia in 1870, and by 1900 sixty-nine canneries were operating in a well established industry. The other main product of the North Pacific, the halibut, was not exploited until after 1903, and since then most of the other resources of the Pacific coast have been tapped. There are now two shore whaling stations on the Queen Charlotte Islands.

23. With the increasing rate of exploitation of the Pacific coast fisheries, a general decline in the stocks soon became apparent. By the First War it came to be recognised that some efforts would have to be made to prevent the exhaustion and utter depletion of this national resource. The function of conservation is to offset the dangers to supply inherent in the technological advances of the modern industrial age. But the habits of salmon and halibut are such that effective conservation cannot be carried on from within the generally accepted three-mile limit of territorial waters.

24. Accordingly, joint action by Canada and the U.S.A. became necessary in order to regulate the high seas fisheries. In 1918 the Canadian-American Fisheries Conference was appointed to consider a settlement of outstanding fishery questions between the two countries. In 1922 it was agreed to consider the halibut question separately, and this led to the signing of a treaty "For the protection of the Pacific Halibut" on March 2, 1923. This was ratified and came into force on November 1, 1924. At that time floating canneries had not been invented, and it was possible to gain a considerable measure of success because neither the Japanese nor any other interests could interfere with these bi-lateral arrangements. A simplified and more effective agreement came into effect on May 9, 1931, and by now the halibut stocks have been restored to and maintained at a high level of productivity.

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25. The question of salmon conservation was long-delayed by opposition from private American vested interests. However, since the Salmon Conservation Treaty came into force in 1937, the International Pacific Salmon Fisheries Commission has achieved a certain degree of success. The failure of all earlier agreements between Canada and the United States was due to controversial tariff qualifications introduced into the conventions, designed to protect the United States market, which were unacceptable to the Canadian Government.

26. The main achievement of the International Pacific Salmon Fisheries Commission so far has been the completion of two large-scale fishways which were undertaken in 1944 at Hell's Gate Canyon, in the State of Washington. In the first season after their construction, 90% of the salmon runs were successful in passing through and reaching their spawning grounds up the Fraser river.

27. The success of this project, and many similar ones, is of great importance to the development of conservation measures, for several reasons. Salmon return at the end of their four-year life cycle, to spawn in exactly the same place in which they were hatched. After one or two years in the fresh water, they proceed to sea. It is when returning to spawn that they reach their greatest size and maturity, and that is when they are caught. They are in their prime of condition, having stored up enough energy at sea to carry them upstream. Once they enter fresh water they cease to eat, and begin to deteriorate. After spawning they die. From this, it follows that if they are unable to reach their spawning grounds because of obstacles, they do not complete their cycle, and the stocks are reduced.

28. Following the construction of a railroad, there occurred a rock slide into the Canyon in 1911, which added to the natural obstacles and hazards of the river bottom. As a result, the Fraser River stocks declined very rapidly after 1913. This canyon is 60 feet wide at low water, and the entire Fraser Valley drains through it at a great velocity into Puget Sound. Consequently, the success of this joint enterprise, accomplished by both Canadian and United States funds and technological talent, demonstrates the advantages of international co-operation accruing to the greater benefit of all concerned. It is predicted that the Fraser's production of salmon will soon reach the high levels of 1900-13.

IV

Japanese Penetration of North Pacific Fishing Area

29. No regulations or controls for purposes of conservation can be effective anywhere unless these controls are applied to all who fish in the areas under regulation.

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30. By 1930, the intensity of exploitation of the North Atlantic fisheries had its corollary in the development of floating canneries and refrigeration ships. The primary fishing countries, Norway and the United Kingdom, were being driven by the depletion of the North Atlantic to seek other fishery areas, and a proposed expedition by Norwegian and United Kingdom vessels to fish for halibut off the Pacific Coast was averted in 1937 by diplomatic action on the part of Canada and the U.S.A.

31. At the same time, however, Japanese interests desirous of pushing farther afield, and equipped with floating canneries (a technique they quickly learned from the Norwegians and British), began to exert considerable pressure on the Japanese government to grant licences to engage in the salmon fishing off Alaska. Six floating salmon canneries totalling 20,000 tons, and nine floating crab canneries totalling 37,000 tons were put into operation in the 1930's.

32. Under this pressure, the Japanese government authorized a three-year scientific expedition to Bristol Bay whose purpose was to investigate the fishery resources in the Alaskan waters. This expedition arrived in 1936, and canned some salmon experimentally. All this aroused considerable concern and alarm among the fishing interests on the Pacific coasts of Canada and the United States, especially when reports began to come in of Japanese fishing as close as twenty to thirty miles offshore. Although the Japanese Government had issued no licences for such activities, and denied any knowledge of them, the United States State Department was finally convinced that such transgressions were taking place. Considerable pressure was put on the administration by the west coast fishing industries to protect their interests, and at last on November 22, 1937, a Note was addressed to the Japanese Government by the United States State Department. It summarized the situation, called the attention of the Japanese Government to the activities of the Japanese crab fishing and canning fleets which had operated in Bristol Bay since 1930, and accused them of engaging in salmon fishing on a commercial scale. A very strong protest was made against these activities, based on their danger to the United States conservation measures and fishery industry. As a result, the Japanese withdrew their expedition in 1938, and agreed to continue their policy of not granting licences to their nationals to engage in the Alaskan salmon fishery, but with the reservation that this action was without prejudice to the question of rights under international law.

33. They backed down because of the already strained relations with the United States over the China incident, and the desire to avoid further complications in United States-Japanese relations. Naturally, the exchange of notes was not a permanent settlement. As Canada's interest

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in this problem in similar to the United States' interest, we are equally concerned in the establishment of a stable and equitable solution of the whole question at the Peace Settlement.

V

Japanese Fishing since the Surrender

34. Immediately following the occupation of Japan SCAP authorized the Japanese to fish in certain designated areas east and south of Japan proper. These areas were extended by successive directives on September 27, October 13 and November 5, 1945. (See map in Appendix to Memorandum on Whaling). The purpose of this policy was to provide food and employment for the Japanese, and to utilize the resources of a large fishing fleet.

35. On March 26, 1946, the United States member on the Far Eastern Commission proposed a policy paper FEC-035 which would have allowed the Japanese to resume their fishing activities anywhere except near territories under Allied jurisdiction. This was vigorously opposed by all other members, especially the Chinese, Soviet and Australian.

36. Nevertheless, a further extension of the area was contemplated by SCAP, and this was effected by a directive of June 22, 1946 (SCAPIN 1033) (see appendix of Whaling Memorandum). This extension doubled the former area, but is a directive which did not interfere with the other member countries. Apart from the Soviet, this was acceptable to the other members, and there followed an Australian proposal on December 13th to limit Japanese fishing and whaling to this area (FEC - 035/1). This paper was designed to prohibit Japanese Antarctic whaling, but indicated the Australian approval of the existing area for fishing. This is the area still in force, because there has been too much opposition to any further extensions. The matter is temporarily dormant in the FEC, as it has been overshadowed in importance by the Antarctic whaling controversy these past eight months. The FEC had agreed early this year to deal with the fishing and whaling questions separately, and very little headway has been made since then towards settling the future of Japanese fishing.

37. A United States counter proposal to FEC 035/1 would have allowed Japanese fishing anywhere except within the fifty miles of land under allied jurisdiction (C2-014/2 of January 10, 1947). This was not acceptable to us, because we felt that a 50-mile limit was not sufficient to protect the salmon, halibut, tuna, pilchard and other fisheries off the British Columbia coast, which extend to the edge of the continental shelf or bank (200 fathoms - 1200 feet depth). Most of these fisheries extend beyond 50 miles. The Department of Fisheries contends that salmon belong to the country where they are spawned, and that offshore Japanese operations with purse seins beyond 50 miles would capture salmon while on their runs to the rivers where they propagate. For

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these and other reasons, we supported the Australian proposal and opposed the United States paper (C2-014/2).

38. During the discussion in the Far Eastern Commission on the regulation of Japanese fishing during the occupation period, the Department of Fisheries expressed the following views on Canadian interests for the guidance of the Canadian member:

> "The Japanese Government should be allowed to re-establish its fishing fleet to such an extent as would enable it to supply the needs of the Japanese people for fish and contribute to the needs of neighbouring countries for this food, and, moreover, every assistance should be given them to reach this end. On the other hand it should be equally emphasized that the Japanese people should not be allowed, at this stage, to construct or operate factory ships or any vessel which can preserve or process its products so that it may be able to fish in areas remote from the neighbouring waters of Japan, thus enabling an incursion into fisheries that are not in the immediate vicinity of Asia.
>
> It must be remembered that in 1938 the aggressive policy of the Japanese fisheries gravely threatened the fruits of the wise conservation policy which was developed by Canada and the United States on the west coast of this continent and that the Declarations of the President of the United States regarding the protection of the United States' right to protect fisheries in waters contiguous to its shores, were largely provoked by the aggressive and acquisitive policy of the Japanese Government. This policy also threatened the fisheries of the west coast of Canada. It would not, however, be successfully pursued unless a means were available of preserving the fish caught over considerable periods of time. Such a means is available in the "factory ship", hence our opposition to them in the hands of the Japanese people".

39. In sub-committee the United States paper was rejected five to one, in January. A revision of the Australian paper was prepared by the sub-committee as C2-014/3 and finally all members, including the United States, agreed that Japanese fishing should be limited to a definite area. The paper also prohibited factory ships, and had our support. However, neither this paper nor any revision of the original United States paper (FEC-035) has been passed by the Far Eastern Commission, and the situation with regard to Japanese fishing stands where it did on June 22, 1946, when SCAPIN 1033 was issued. The entire emphasis in the Far Eastern Commission has since shifted to the more controversial problem of Japanese whaling.

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VI

Postwar Conservation Measures

40. On September 28, 1945 the President of the United States issued a proclamation regarding the establishment of fish conservation zones in areas of the high seas contiguous to the coasts of the United States. He said:

> "The Government of the United States regards it as proper to establish conservation zones in those areas of the high seas contiguous to the coasts of the United States wherein fishing activities have been or in the future may be developed and maintained on a substantial scale. Where such activities have been or shall hereafter be developed and maintained by its nationals alone, the United States regards it as proper to establish explicitly bounded conservation zones in which fishing activities shall be subject to the regulation and control of the United States. Where such activities have been or shall hereafter be legitimately developed and maintained jointly by nationals of the United States and nationals of other States, explicitly bounded conservation zones may be established under agreements between the United States and such other States; and all fishing activities in such zones shall be subject to regulation and control as provided in such agreements. The right of any State to establish conservation zones off its shores in accordance with the above principles is conceded, provided that corresponding recognition is given to any fishing interests of nationals of the United States which may exist in such areas."

41. The Canadian Government proposed to assert a parallel policy in a joint resolution to be introduced into both Houses of Parliament during the past session. However, as it was found that neither the United States nor the Canadian Government was ready to take the necessary steps to implement such a policy, it was decided not to introduce such a joint resolution before Parliament rose. In informing the House of this decision, on July 4th, 1947, the Secretary of State for External Affairs developed to some extent Canada's international fisheries policy. The remarks are quoted here in full:

> Mr. Reid: I wonder if the minister would answer a question with reference to the statement made in connection with offshore fisheries, a matter I brought up last year. The minister said earlier in the year that he intended to bring down a resolution in regard to Canada's attitude towards these fisheries. Will he make a statement now in the light of the fact that that resolution has not be brought down?
>
> Mr. St. Laurent: The hon. member is quite right. It was stated in the house that it was the intention of the government to introduce a resolution to assert a policy that would in fact be in accord with that announced by the President of the United States, and drafts of resolutions were prepared to make sure that there would be a uniform policy for the western hemisphere. The terms of the resolution

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were discussed with out United States friends. So far it has not appeared that we had reached the point where we were both agreed as to the best form of language to be used, and for that reason it was felt that it might be preferable to wait until there had been complete agreement on the exact language before bringing the resolution before the house. I should like to give hon. members the assurance that as far as the government is concerned the general policy is in accord with that which was expressed by the President of the United States.

Mr. Hazen: Will an act be passed by the congress of the United States, or is the proclamation which the President made sufficient: Are we to pass legislation here before legislation is passed by congress?

Mr. St. Laurent: Those are precisely matters which are now under discussion. The two governments are in accord as to the aims to be achieved, but there has not yet been full agreement as to what is the best way of laying the foundation for an effort to get international agreement to the implementation of proper conservation methods for offshore fisheries.

Mr. Hazen: Has there been correspondence with any of the other commonwealths, or have they been consulted about this principle? I do not say that is necessary, but I was wondering if that had taken place in the interests of conservation.

Mr. St. Laurent: The answer would depend upon the meaning one gives to the word "consultation". These are matters which are brought to the knowledge of the others, and the observations which any may have to make are welcomed and considered. The objective we are pursuing is to try to get a policy which will ultimately become world wide, and which can be implemented to the benefit of the whole of humanity.

42. It will be observed from the above that the United States and Canada are in the process of formulating new concepts of international law with regard to fish conservation in the high seas. It has been pointed out above that the habits of salmon and halibut are such that effective conservation cannot be carried on from within the generally accepted three mile limit of territorial waters. Nor is a 50 mile limit adequate in all cases. The pre-war encroachments of the Japanese on the North American west coast fisheries and their willful disregard of the provisions of Canada-United States halibut and salmon conservation agreements had a good deal to do with the decision of the United States to enunciate this coastal fisheries conservation policy so shortly after Japan's surrender, and the decision of the Canadian Government to follow suit.

43. Just what measures will be required to implement President Truman's proclamation, and the Canadian

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joint resolution when adopted, have not yet been fully worked out. There will require to be some provision for obtaining a measure of international agreement on recognition of the high seas fisheries conservation zone regulations. Such a project might be submitted to the Fisheries Committee of the Food and Agriculture Organization and the Regional Fisheries Councils to be established by the F.A.O.

44. It is suggested that as a start toward international recognition of the North American offshore fishery conservation zones the possibility be explored of requiring the Japanese Government to undertake in the Peace Treaty to introduce domestic legislation requiring Japanese nationals to abide by all the conservation regulations in force in the various fisheries zones, whether established by multilateral agreement, bilateral agreement, or domestic legislation of the littoral state.

VII

Japanese Competition with Canadian Pacific Fishing Interests

45. The fisheries conservation zones to be established on the basis of President Truman's proclamation of September 28, 1945 are supposed to be for strictly scientific purposes and are supposed to have nothing to do with eliminating undesirable competition. Already the United States Government has found it necessary to inform the Mexican Government, following the issuance of a Mexican offshore fisheries conservation proclamation, that the United States would have to reserve the right under international law to carry on fishing operations in any zones established by the Mexicans if in the view of the United States authorities the zones in question were being operated on other than purely scientific conservation methods.

46. It is likely that an increasing measure of international cooperation and agreement can be reached in the establishment of wise conservation measures for the conservation of the fish resources of the world that are found in the high seas. Such international cooperation and agreement would be prejudiced if certain states endeavoured to use conservation as a cloak for the protection of their fishing industries against legitimate foreign competition. It would not appear to be in the Canadian interest to confuse these two matters.

47. Accordingly, consideration must be given next to whether the Japanese Peace Treaty can be used to eliminate or curtail Japanese competition with Canadian Pacific fishing interests. Suppose that the Japanese do agree in the Peace Treaty to be bound by the various fisheries conservation regulations in force. Will this eliminate Japanese competition? It may curtail it, but in view of the lower wages paid Japanese fishermen it appears not

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improbable that the Japanese might still be prepared to fish off Canada's west coast.

48. The Department of Fisheries has indicated that in their view fish belong to the country in whose rivers they spawn. Presumably, according to this view, other species of fish spawning on offshore shoals would belong to the country claiming the shoal. This view has not yet received general recognition. It might be difficult, and probably would be unwise, to attempt to seek general agreement for compelling the Japanese to recognize this doctrine in the Peace Treaty if other signatories are not prepared to accept it as binding on themselves.

49. The Department of Fisheries has proposed that the Japanese be prohibited from operating floating canneries. There would be difficulties in the way of securing general acceptance of such a prohibition as other countries are operating such vessels in the North Atlantic Fisheries and might object to any effort to cast opprobrium on the operation of floating canneries as a fishing technique. As the six floating salmon canneries operated by the Japanese before the war aggregated only 20,000 tons it is apparent that the 5,000 ton limit proposed for Japanese ship owning and building would not affect them as it would the whaling factory ships.

50. It is not known what policies the United States will propose at the Peace Conference to restrict the Japanese fishing industry. However, as the Canadian share of the North Pacific fishery is in the ratio of 1:3 to the United States, and since our interests in this field are similar, it is suggested that Canada and the United States should consult together prior to the Japanese Peace Conference regarding objectives to be pursued in dealing with the future of the Japanese fishing industry in the Japanese Peace Treaty.

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

PRINCIPAL FISHING AREAS OF THE WORLD

Based on *Bol'shoi Sovetskii Atlas Mira* (Great Soviet World Atlas), Vol. I, Moscow, 1937, Plate No. 64

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

PRINCIPAL FISHING AREAS OF THE NORTH PACIFIC
(Compiled by Gordon W. Hewes)

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CONFIDENTIAL

JAPANESE PEACE SETTLEMENT:
REGULATION OF JAPANESE WHALING ACTIVITIES.

1. The question of Japanese whaling in the Antarctic will receive more attention in the discussion of the Japanese peace settlement than its importance at first appraisal would seem to warrant. This is because Japanese Antarctic whaling cannot be discussed without raising the fundamental questions of the security controls required for Japan and the level of economic activity to be permitted Japan, and because Australia, the United Kingdom and New Zealand in particular will wish to air their dissatisfaction with the arbitrary policy pursued by the United States in dealing with this subject during the occupation period in disregard of the views of the other ten members of the Far Eastern Commission.

2. A full account of the discussion in the Far Eastern Commission attending the authorization by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan of the 1946-47 and 1947-48 Japanese Antarctic whaling expeditions is given in later paragraphs of this paper, as its discussion forms the background against which this subject will be debated at the Japanese peace conference.

3. The Japanese peace conference will furnish a fresh opportunity for consideration of the pros and cons of Japanese whaling in the Antarctic. If the United States proposal that decisions at the peace conference should be taken by a simple two-thirds majority is adopted it will put it in the power of seven States members of the Far Eastern Commission to dictate the future of the Japanese Antarctic whaling industry. Such a decision cannot be taken lightly. It will not only have a long term effect but the wisdom of the decision may have a far-reaching effect on the actual success of the peace settlement. To place discussion on this subject in its proper perspective, therefore, it would appear desirable for it to be postponed until some measure of agreement has been reached on the broader questions of the security controls required for Japan and the level of economic activity to be permitted that country. While no agreed views on these two fundamental questions may be reached at the Canberra meetings it would appear desirable, nevertheless, that discussion of Japanese whaling should be deferred until these primary questions have at least been opened up.

4. A fair evaluation of the arguments for and against inserting a clause in the Japanese peace treaty prohibiting Japanese whaling in the Antarctic must balance (a) such threat that these activities might cause to the security of Allied nations, and (b) the danger of Japan continuing her pre-war practice of disregarding international whale conservation conventions, against (c) Japan's need for whale products, while being short of the foreign exchange required to purchase them from other countries.

5. In addition to these three fundamental factors, there is a fourth -- Japanese competition in Antarctic whaling -- that should be examined. If Japan is allowed to participate in Antarctic whaling she must be allotted -- if she observes the International Whaling Convention-- a quota out of the agreed annual Antarctic catch limit of 16,000 blue whale units. Such an allotment could cut down

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the quotas of the established Antarctic whaling countries, and make it more difficult for countries, such as Australia, wishing to enter this field to obtain as large a share as they might wish. Further, in view of the low wages paid Japanese sailors the Japanese could market whale products at a lower price than any of their competitors.

6. While Japanese competition cannot be ignored, no delegation attending the Japanese Peace Conference is likely to argue that this should be a controlling factor in deciding the future of the Japanese Antarctic whaling industry. Indeed, members of the Far Eastern Commission have taken pains to point out that in deciding the future levels of various Japanese industries they were not taking into account the extent to which such Japanese industries competed in world markets with their own. This is surely the only way in which a just and lasting peace settlement can be drafted. Accordingly, Japanese competition need not be taken into account by the Canadian delegation in weighing the pros and cons of prohibiting Japanese whaling in the Antarctic.

7. In protesting SCAP authorization of Japanese Antarctic whaling expeditions in the 1946-47 and 1947-48 seasons, members of the Far Eastern Commission built their principal arguments on the threat to the security of Allied countries in the revival of the Japanese whaling industry. The bad Japanese pre-war record of using fishing boats to chart the coasts of potential victims of their aggression has made all countries highly suspicious of Japanese fishing vessels approaching their coasts. Japanese whaling factory ships were transformed during the war into submarine tenders and oil tankers. Sailors manning whaling ships constitute a trained reserve of naval personnel.

8. The extent to which Japanese Antarctic whaling activities actually constitute a serious threat to the security of Allied countries can only be determined when something is known of the continuing general security controls to be imposed on Japan in the peace settlement. For the purpose of this paper it will be assumed that some measure of general agreement is reached at the Peace Conference on this fundamental problem. Accordingly it will only be necessary for us to consider here any special threats to Allied security in Japanese Antarctic whaling. First, it seems doubtful whether Japanese whalers in the Antarctic could spy on or threaten the coasts of any neighbouring country. Australia is 2,000 miles away from the whaling areas. A provision that Japanese fishing vessels shall not enter territorial or fish-conservation waters would prevent spying en route to and from the Antarctic. Second, a proposed general limitation on Japanese ship-owning and ship-building to vessels under 5,000 tons would preclude Japanese whaling factory ships from being built which could be transformed into submarine tenders for war purposes. Third, sailors on whaling vessels would presumably be no better fitted for naval service than sailors on other types of deep sea vessels. It would be quite impossible to prohibit a maritime nation like Japan from having any deep sea vessels. An Allied inspectorate could, if considered desirable, check to see that shore training establishments for sailors and officers of the Japanese merchant marine and fishing fleets were not giving instruction regarding the operation of warships, etc. It is considered, therefore,

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that if adequate general security controls are agreed upon to prevent Japan from again becoming an aggressor nation, then adequate measures can be taken to control any significant threat to the security of Allied nations that there might be in Japanese Antarctic whaling.

9. The importance of Antarctic whaling to the Japanese economy can only be determined after some conclusions have been reached regarding (a) Japan's need for whale products and (b) her probable balance of foreign payments in the postwar period. The Antarctic whale catch is an important source of fats and oils for Japan; providing in the 1946-47 season over 1/3 of Japan's total production. Whale meat is a valuable supplementary source of protein in the Japanese diet. The other whale products are also consumed in Japan now. The annual value of Japan's Antarctic whale catch has been estimated by the United States to be $10,000,000. If Japan had to purchase these whale products from abroad it would mean a further charge on her already adverse balance of foreign payments. From a Canadian point of view the expenditure of Japan's short supply of foreign exchange (and any foreign credits she may be able to obtain to meet the deficit in her balance of foreign payments) on whale products which she could fish for herself would mean that much less that she could spend on other imports, including those from Canada.

10. Having established that Japan could ill afford the foreign exchange to purchase needed whale products or substitutes abroad, and having concluded that Japanese Antarctic whaling would not constitute an uncontrollable security threat to Allied nations, there remains to be considered the key question of whether Japan can be trusted to observe international conventions for the conservation of whale stocks. For there is no doubt that Japan had an ugly pre-war record of non-observation of the International Whaling Convention. She conducted her Antarctic whaling operations in a wasteful and selfish manner, and earned the mistrust of other whaling nations.

11. In spite of these facts, the United States Government considered that Japan's need for whale products was so great and her adverse balance of foreign payments was so serious (the U.S. has financed the deficit during the occupation) that they authorized two postwar Japanese Antarctic whaling expeditions in the face of protests from other Allied countries interested in whaling. In doing so, the United States Government indicated that they thought Japan should be given a new chance, that Allied inspectors accompanying the Japanese expeditions could see to it that the International Whaling Convention was observed, and that remodelled equipment on Japanese factory ships would ensure the efficient extraction of all usable whale products. Japanese Antarctic whaling, they argued, was necessary for the rehabilitation of a self-supporting economy in Japan. There is a good deal of force in these arguments.

12. On balance, therefore, it would seem wise for the Canadian delegation not to support inclusion in the Japanese Peace Treaty of a clause prohibiting the Japanese from whaling in the Antarctic. It should, however, support inclusion of a general clause which would bind the Japanese to comply with all fish and sea mammal conservation measures

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contained in general international convention, bilateral agreements or statutes of littoral states. The Japanese Government would then be expected to adopt as law binding upon its nationals regulations in force in the particular fishery. During the period of Allied control of Japan it should also be open to any Control Commission established to assign inspectors to accompany Japanese Antarctic whaling expeditions, to inspect whaling ships and their equipment, to examine records and assure themselves in any other reasonable way that the Japanese are observing the International Whaling Convention.

PRE-WAR BACKGROUND

13. After centuries of whaling carried on by whaling vessels based on shore stations, mainly in the North Atlantic, the whaling industry was revolutionized in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The possibilities of the technique of steamships, guns, and explosive shells were exploited with increasing rapidity and efficiency. The whaling industry expanded at a tremendous rate and whaling activities, which had formerly been confined to the North Atlantic, were extended throughout the world. Factory ships were invented, and these now range up to twenty thousand tons.

14. In the 1924-25 whaling season, 65 catcher boats and 13 floating factories were used, and by the 1938-39 season this number had increased to 281 catcher boats and 34 floating factories. The number of whales killed throughout the world increased from 1,136 in the 1919-20 season to 54,664 in the 1937-38 season.

15. This increasing rate of exploitation of a valuable natural resource was the result of unregulated competition carried on by private interests whose short-sighted and selfish policies were threatening the extinction of many species of whales.

16. As the need for conservation of whale stocks was recognized, the machinery of the League of Nations was used in 1931 to secure an international agreement for the regulation of whaling. Twenty-six countries interested in pelagic (or open-sea) whaling agreed upon a convention which was opened for signature on September 24, 1931. The most important whaling countries at that time were Norway, the United Kingdom and Germany. This convention aimed at the protection of those species threatened with extinction and at providing a basis for the rational exploitation of whale stocks as a crop and not as an exhaustible mined resource.

17. At that time Japan was not interested in Antarctic whaling. However, largely owing to the non-co-operation of certain countries, the Geneva Convention did not come into force until it was ratified on January 16, 1935. The United Kingdom had not signed until October 18, 1934. When it came into force, it became law for eighteen countries which had signed it and ten countries which had acceded to it. Canada acceded on September 12, 1935.

18. This agreement, and subsequent ones based on it, for the regulation of whaling before the war, largely failed

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in their objectives because of the non-co-operation of certain countries, particularly Japan. The latter only became interested in Antarctic whaling in the 1935-36 season, but by 1940 had become one of the most important countries engaged in that activity. Their share of whales killed increased from two percent in 1935-36 to twenty percent in 1938-39.(1)

19. In spite of her interest in whaling, Japan consistently refused to participate in any conservation programme. This illustrates the bad Japanese pre-war record, when they caught immature whales, and in every way took advantage of the restrictions which other whaling countries had voluntarily imposed upon themselves. Their methods were considered wasteful, depredatory and totally unsatisfactory from the point of view of other interested parties, at whose expense the Japanese operated in the Antartic. To illustrate this, the Japanese caught 9,857 whales in the 1940-41 season, using six factory and forty-five killer ships. These factory ships had up to fourteen whale reducing boilers, and ranged up to 16,000 gross tons. The figure for whales of all kinds captured should be compared with the figure of 16,000 blue whale units(2), which was the limit agreed upon internationally, in 1944, to be set for the total catch in the Antarctic in the first post-war season, (which was 1945-46). This limit allowed for the fact that the depleted whale stocks had had an opportunity to recuperate during the war, and was calculated for a maximum reproduction rate of two to two-and-a-half years. This figure is generally accepted as the maximum number of whales which should be taken from the Antarctic at any time in order not to reduce existing levels of the whale stocks.

20. During the war whaling activities became very hazardous owing to danger from submarines, etc., and gradually all whaling ceased in the Antarctic. During the war all the Japanese factory, and most whaling, ships were sunk. However these were replaced to the extent that on December 22, 1945, the Japanese Government reported that there were twenty-nine whaling vessels capable of operation.

1945-46 SEASON(3)

21. Directives were issued by SCAP on September 27, October 13 and November 5, 1945, authorizing Japanese fishing in a large area east and south of Japan. (4)

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(1) See Appendix I

(2) By Article 4 of the 1944 Protocol it was agreed that a blue whale unit should be calculated on the basis that one blue whale equals

two fin whales
two-and-a-half hump backed whales
six sei whales

(3) See Appendix II International Whaling Conference Acts 1945.

(4) See Appendix III Map

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In order to utilize the resources of the Japanese fishing and whaling industries to supplement the Japanese food supplies, SCAP, on 30th November 1945, authorized eighteen specified vessels (ranging from 74 to 360 tons, being nine catchers and nine whalers) to engage in whaling operations in the Bonin Island area from December 1 to March 31, 1946. This area lies from 600 to 700 miles south of Tokyo, and was an important pre-war source of whales for Japan.

22. This authorization followed a request by the Japanese Government, on November 8, stating that if whaling were permitted with available whaling vessels, approximately five hundred and fifty whales could be caught in the Bonin Island area. The methods used are largely the same as for Antarctic whaling, and the whales are of the same species. For purposes of comparison between the relative importance to Japan of coastal and Antarctic whaling, the 1946-47 Antarctic expedition brought back twenty-one thousand metric tons of whale meat, while the yield from coastal whaling from shore stations (which is carried on all year round) was eleven thousand metric tons.

23. A statement of the United States policy respecting Japanese fishing and whaling, which had been sent to SCAP for his guidance, was circulated as FEC-035(5) (see page 7) for the consideration of the Far Eastern Commission on March 26, 1946. This sought Far Eastern Commission approval for a directive already issued, which laid down regulations governing Japanese whaling and fishing, and generally encouraged the Japanese fishing industry. It also proposed to allow the Japanese to fish anywhere except near territories under the jurisdiction of the United States or Allied countries, without defining how far "near" was. The initial reaction to this in the Far Eastern Commission was unfavourable, as this policy was not agreeable to most of the Far Eastern Commission member countries. Although they took the matter under more active consideration, nothing was done until several months later.

24. On May 13 SCAP authorized the building of 416 steel fishing vessels including 19 whaling ships, and it became known that an extension of the Japanese fishing area (beyond that laid down in November 1945) was being contemplated by SCAP.

25. This matter was raised in the Allied Council for Japan on June 2 by the Soviet member, who opposed the proposed extension, on the grounds that it would constitute recognition of the right of the Japanese to have a larger fishing fleet. This view was circulated in the Far Eastern Commission as C2-014.

26. Nevertheless on June 22 SCAP extended the Japanese fishing area eastward to almost double its former area, (SCAPIN 1033 of June 22).(6). This was expected to furnish an increase of from 3,000 to 5,000 metric tons of fish per month for consumption in Japan.

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(5) Appendix IV FEC-035

(6) See Appendix IV Map

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1946-47 SEASON (7)

27. During the summer the Japanese Government pressed SCAP for permission to resume Antarctic whaling in the 1946-47 season. On August 6, Japanese Antarctic whaling within a defined area was authorized (SCAPIN 1103) (8). The expedition was to be accompanied by SCAP staff observers, was not to approach nearer than twelve miles of land, and was required to adhere to all International Agreements for the conservation of whales. It was not to set a precedent nor to be considered to be an expression of Allied policy. This move was justified by SCAP as "an emergency humanitarian measure aimed at providing the Japanese with food".

28. The immediate reaction was an outburst of very strong protests from the New Zealand, Australian, United Kingdom and Norwegian Governments, who objected most strenuously to the proposals. Their reasons were primarily based on security considerations, but the Australians wished to claim Japanese whaling vessels as reparations and to displant them in the Antarctic whaling. Several other countries also wished to build up their own whaling and fishing industries in the post-war period at the expense of the Japanese, but the United States resolutely opposed such policies.

29. Several counter proposals were suggested, ranging from a joint-allied expedition with the Japanese vessels, to a Japanese manned expedition under SCAP. Time was short, and preparations were going forward for a Japanese manned and operated expedition, so that in the end all these proposals came to nothing. Two United States officials were designated to accompany the two fleets.

30. The United States policy was not to penalize the Japanese for a past bad record, but to give them a chance to prove their worth. It was a test of the extent to which the Japanese had become democratized, and willing to abide by the rules as one of the family of civilized nations. In giving every encouragement to the Japanese, SCAP authorized the conversion of three ten thousand ton oil tankers to whaling factory ships on August 23, 1946. Two more were under construction which would be at sea in time to spend the whole season of four months in the Antarctic.

31. On October 1, at a meeting of Far Eastern Committee No. 2, the United Kingdom member suggested that the whole question of the extension of whaling areas should be taken up by the FEC. Up until then all dealings on the subject had been going on through diplomatic channels. Also on October 1 a Sub-Committee of Committee 2, which had been set up on July 2 to examine the Soviet proposal C2-214, presented its report as C2-214/1. This mild paper approved SCAP 1033 of June 22 (extending the area of Japanese fishing) which had evoked the original Russian protest.

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(7) For purposes of comparison the
1940-41 catch was over 9,000 whales
1945-46 " " approx. 550 whales
1946-47 " " 1,175 whales

(8) See Appendix VI (Map) and VII SCAPIN 1103.

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FLEETS DEPART

32. The whaling fleets left Japan in the last two weeks of November, accompanied by four allied observers (one Australian) who were to ensure compliance with the terms of International whaling conventions. The fleets consisted of two factory, seven carrier, and twelve killer ships. One month was taken to reach the whaling grounds off Wilkes Land, and by December 31, one hundred and sixty-seven whales had been captured.

33. On December 13 the Australian amendment to the United States paper (FEC-035) was put before the Far Eastern Commission as FEC-035/1.(9). It limited Japanese fishing and whaling to the area laid down in SCAPIN 1033 of June 22, 1946. It also reserved the right to claim Japanese whaling vessels as reparations, and implied the elimination of Japanese Antarctic whaling by providing that Japan's resumption of Antarctic whaling should be conditional upon an agreement being reached among all the parties to the International Whaling Conventions to that effect.

34. Prior to 1945 Australia had had no more interest in whaling than Canada, and although she was a party to the various international agreements for the regulation of whaling, the end of the war found her with no whaling vessels or trained personnel.

35. An American counter-proposal(C2-014/2) was circulated on January 10, in the Far Eastern Commission Committee No. 2, as an alternative to the Australian paper FEC-035/1. This would permit Japanese fishing and whaling, subject to certain restrictions, anywhere except within fifty miles of territory under Allied jurisdiction, and even within that limit if special arrangements were made with the country concerned. One of the restrictions was abstinence from interference with the conservation measures of littoral states. The gulf between the views of the United States Government and the other ten members of the Far Eastern Commission was very wide at this point, and has virtually remained so ever since.

36. For several months longer the issue remained a live one in the Far Eastern Commission, and many attempts were made to force the opinions of the majority of the members into a unanimous decision. As the United States State Department and SCAP were unalterably opposed to any restrictions of Japanese Antarctic whaling, and as they had the authority, under the existing arrangement for the occupation, to allow Japanese whaling to be carried on, there was no way of achieving a unanimous policy decision in the Far Eastern Commission.

37. The Australians presented a revision (C2-014/3) of their first paper on whaling (FEC-035/1) on January 22, which was again supported, with only slight moderations, by ten of the eleven Far Eastern Commission members. Discussions were postponed while members sought instructions from their governments, in view of the fundamental conflict in principle between the United States and Australian attitudes.

(9) See Appendix VII FEC-035/1

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38. As a result, a very full discussion took place on February 6, with a thorough airing of the views of each member. The United States were interested in expanding the Japanese fishing and whaling as peaceful industries, in order to help offset the restrictions of the war supporting industries, to earn foreign exchange, and to provide food and employment for the Japanese.

39. The remaining members stressed the menace which a fully restored Japanese fishing industry would constitute to the security of all Pacific powers. Before the war there had been considerable trouble in the East Indies, Australia and the Philippines from Japanese interfering with the local fishing industries and engaging in espionage. A large fleet would provide trained personnel and reserve ships in time of war.

40. The Canadian member supported the Australian view and stated that he would be disturbed if the Japanese were given the right to go within fifty miles of the coast of British Columbia. He understood that limit would be insufficient to prevent interference with fish that spawn in rivers and which rightly belong to those countries in which the rivers are located.

41. Other members strongly criticized the bad Japanese pre-war record for their short-sighted methods of widespread exploitation and depletion of stocks. Only the United Kingdom member suggested in moderation that the Japanese industry should not be curtailed because it competed with their own or because they wanted to expand theirs at the expense of the Japanese. The issue was referred to a sub-committee.

SEPARATE PAPERS FOR FISHING AND WHALING

42. During March it was agreed, in Committee No. 2, that a compromise should be worked out, using FEC-035 as the basis of a policy, but providing that Japanese whaling outside of the area laid down in SCAPIN 1033 (which did not include the Antarctic) should be subject to approval by the Far Eastern Commission. It was decided to treat whaling and fishing in separate papers, and discussion was postponed pending the presentation of United States papers on these subjects separately.

43. By the 15th of March Japanese Antarctic whaling operations had ceased. The two fleets had captured 1,175 whales which yielded 30,774 metric tons of whale products and 4,400 litres of liver oil.

44. On May 28 the United Kingdom presented its paper on whaling (FEC-231) (10) which proposed to limit Japanese whaling to the area in which they are allowed to fish, and from shore stations only, not factory ships. This proposal was based on security considerations.

45. By June 6 the United Kingdom paper reached Committee No. 2, but after presentation, discussion of it was

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(10) Appendix IX FEC-231

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postponed because several members were without instructions.

46. After a lengthy discussion was held on June 12 on the United Kingdom paper (11), it was forwarded to the Steering Committee. The security aspect of the problem was gone into most thoroughly. The Steering Committee in turn forwarded the paper (FEC-231) to the Far Eastern Commission.

47. At the full Commission meeting on June 19, General McCoy, the United States delegate, virtually vetoed the paper and stated that the State Department, after lengthy consideration, had concluded that the Supreme Commander not only had the right to authorize Japanese Antarctic whaling, in the interest of the Allied occupation of Japan, but that he should do so again in the 1947-48 season.

48. A Department of State press release (12) was made on June 25 from Washington, announcing that SCAP had authorized a second Japanese Antarctic expedition on June 22, and giving the reasons for this decision. The security threat was denied, and the logic of the argument rested on the fact that not to utilize the Japanese whaling facilities would cost the United States taxpayer $10,000,000 in foreign exchange.

49. Immediate protests were made against this unilateral decision, by the United Kingdom and Australian Ambassadors and the New Zealand Minister in Washington. Efforts to prevent the second Japanese expedition were redoubled, and considerable pressure was put upon Secretary of State Marshall to countermand SCAP's order, with no success.

50. The Australian Ambassador, at the Far Eastern Commission meeting on June 26, made a very strong protest (13), and reviewed the events of the previous year, stating the grounds for his complaint. Previously, on June 23, the High Commissioner for Australia in Ottawa had sent us a note, requesting the support of the Canadian delegate in advance for Mr. Makin, the Australian Ambassador at Washington.

51. In our reply, dated June 26, our policy was outlined, and accorded with the instructions which had consistently been sent to our representative on the Far Eastern Commission. Although Canada is a party to all International Whaling Conventions, she actually has no direct interest at present in Antarctic whaling. This factor made it impossible for us to take a prominent part in discussions in the Far Eastern Commission, or to be active diplomatically. In accordance with the general policy of the Canadian Government, our representative in the Far Eastern Commission followed a course of moderation, and our attitude to the question was decided upon as a matter of principle. While we sympathized with the view of countries, such as the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, etc., whose interests were vitally affected, we also fully appreciated the responsibility of the United States, as occupying power, for the maintenance of food

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(11) Appendix X Appendix to Minutes of the 62nd Meeting of Committee No. 2
(12) Appendix XI - Department of State Press Release, June 25, 1947.
(13) Appendix XII Minutes of 63 Mtg. of the FEC.

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levels in Japan. However, we continued our general support for the principle in the United Kingdom paper (FEC-231) that Japanese whaling should be restricted until its future should be determined at a peace conference.

52. The whole question was considered of such importance by the Australian, New Zealand and United Kingdom Governments that discussions in the Far Eastern Commission were suspended for the next few weeks, while direct diplomatic representations were made to the United States Secretary of State by their representatives in Washington. As a result, all the previously heard arguments were gone into in great detail again, but without in the least changing the situation. Preparations continued to go forward for the second Japanese expedition regardless of this opposition.

53. The chief United States argument rested on the Japanese need for foreign exchange. The United Kingdom protested against the procedural method by which the State Department had authorized SCAP's decision while the whole matter was under discussion and papers on the subject were before the Far Eastern Commission.

54. The Australian's main objection was to the whole idea of Japanese whaling in waters south of Australia, as they are most anxious to displant the Japanese from all such activities.

55. On July 8 instructions were sent to the Canadian Ambassador in Washington along the following lines:

> "We are compelled to balance our relative disinterest in Antarctic whaling and our appreciation of the force of the United States arguments regarding their responsibilities as occupying power for the Japanese food supply against the fact that the United States determination to exercise her powers of taking unilateral action, contrary to the fairly stated views of friendly Pacific nations who have an immediate interest in this question, will surely blur one of the objectives of the Far Eastern Commission which was to work out agreed views of member nations on policies to be pursued by the Japanese Government during the period of occupation. The ease with which the United States Government has permitted the force of its own arguments to overrule those of other nations may affect at some other time special Canadian interests, and we cannot lightly contemplate a situation where arguments put forward in earnest by us would be similarly overruled. For these reasons we consider it desirable that you continue to give general support to the United Kingdom proposals, but you should not take a prominent part in the discussions unless you see some viable means of resolving the disagreements."

56. Following the presentation of an Australian aide-memoire of June 23, and oral representations to the United States Secretary of State by the Australian Ambassador on July 3, the United States Department of State issued a reply in the form of an aide-memoire on July 10, (14), which refuted all the Australian complaints

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(14) Appendix XIII

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and protests in fairly strong terms. This was regarded by the Australians as putting an end to their diplomatic negotiations, and their tactics were accordingly altered to force the matter to a vote in the Far Easterm Commission. This would have obliged the United States to use their veto power, thus placing their action in a very unfavourable light politically.

57. Although the Australians had terminated their diplomatic negotiations, the United Kingdom Government had not, and was therefore anxious that discussions in the Far Eastern Commission should not be resumed until the results of their dealings with the State Department were known. They found it necessary on July 21 to request the Australians by telegram not to press the matter in the Far Eastern Commission.

58. At the Far Eastern Commission meeting of July 24, the United Kingdom member asked that the Australian member's statement of protest against the United States action be printed and circulated. Discussion was therefore postponed a further week, although the Australian Ambassador was under instructions to force a vote on the matter. It was unfortunate that in this particular matter there was an apparent lack of co-ordination between the policies of the United Kingdom and Australia, possibly due to inadequate liaison, and the fact that the Australian Government felt their concern in the matter to be of more importance than the United Kingdom's.

NUTRITIONAL FACTORS IN THE JAPANESE FISHING INDUSTRY

59. On July 2, a report was circulated for the information of the Far Eastern Commission, on the subject of protein requirements and major sources of protein in the Japanese diet. It was prepared by the United States State Department Division of Research for the Far East.

60. In connection with the United States State Department Press release of June 25, 1946, and earlier SCAP announcements to the press, one of the reasons given for the need for Japanese whaling was that whale meat provided an important source of proteins and the products from the first Antarctic expedition equalled one-third of Japan's annual indigenous meat supply.

61. It is interesting to note that whale meat contributes one-half of one percent of the total protein intake; seventy-five percent of the Japanese protein intake is supplied by vegetables; and of the animal sources, eighty-two percent comes from fish. However, the whaling industry is a very important source of fats and oils. The 1946-47 season's Antarctic catch supplied 12,260 metric tons of oil, whereas the total domestic production in that year was only 21,000 metric tons.

CONCLUSION

62. While nothing can now prevent the sailing of the second Japanese Antarctic whaling expedition, the matter

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cannot be considered as finally settled. That will have to await the peace conference at which the whole question of the future of Japanese whaling is certain to be aired thoroughly.

63. Although it has been clearly stated that these expeditions do not constitute precedents, and do not represent expressions of Allied policy, it would in actual fact be very difficult to discontinue them as long as the United States is the occupying power. The United States Government regards the 1947-48 expedition as necessary to the rehabilitation of a self-supporting economy for Japan, and is certain to view a 1948-49 expedition in the same light. Therefore, any significant alterations in the present trends would have to be brought about at the peace conference, and probably would not be effected until the United States forces withdraw from Japan.

64. After having made every effort to prevent the sailing of the second expedition, the United Kingdom, Norwegian and other governments will give up the issue and accept the expedition as a fait accompli. However, their energies will probably then be directed to working out a long-range policy regarding Japanese whaling, with a view to restricting Japanese whaling in the future, and especially in the 1948-49 season.

65. The Australians, who have no pelagic (or open-sea) whaling industry at the present time, are anxious to build one up in the future, and think they might get a start by claiming Japanese whaling ships as reparations. The reasons for Australia starting a whaling industry are sound, as the best Antarctic whaling grounds lie less than two thousand miles south of Sydney. However, this would bring them into direct competition with the Japanese, unless some restrictions were to be imposed on the latter.

66. This partially explains the importance which the Australian Government attaches to the restriction of Japanese whaling, and their demand for Japanese whaling vessels as reparations. The security threat to Australia could be eliminated by restricting the size of the vessels, and is not a factor of sufficient importance to explain the present Australian attitude.

67. In the Far Eastern Commission the Australians have refuted the United States contention that an Allied expedition under SCAP, and with Japanese vessels, would result in the loss of foreign exchange to Japan. They have pointed out that all the proceeds of such an expedition, after the slight expenses of the expedition itself had been met, would be at SCAP's disposal, and there would not result an extra burden on the United States taxpayers from it.

68. Another Australian argument has been removed by SCAP, who has undertaken that the wasteful methods employed by the Japanese in the 1946-47 season (15), will not be repeated, and to this end, is seeing that the equipment, etc., of the Japanese ships is being brought up to the proper state of efficiency before the next season, to conform with the practices and standards of other countries which engage in whaling.

(15) Appendix XIV.

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69. As long as the United States is responsible for the occupation of Japan, i.e., until the peace settlement, SCAP will continue to support all measures which are designed to provide food, employment, and foreign exchange for the Japanese. This conflicts fundamentally with the Australian policy respecting whaling.

70. This conflicts fundamentally with the Australian policy respecting whaling, and it may be difficult for us to avoid becoming involved in the matter.

71. However, since the probable Canadian long-term policy, which is not likely to be opposed to Japanese Antarctic whaling for all time, tends to be closer to United States policy than to Australian, the Canadian delegation should avoid giving the Australians any encouragement to think that we would support a proposal for a clause in the Peace Treaty designed to prevent the Japanese from engaging in Antarctic whaling, even if they were to adhere to the international regulations for the conservation of whales.

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APPENDIX I

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Table I

NATIONALITY OF MEN ENGAGED IN WHALING

	1936-37	1937-38	1938-39
Norwegian	7,678	7,615	7,517
Japanese	837	1,840	2,793
German	255	886	1,386
British	454	675	866
Others	97	211	143
Total	9,321	11,227	12,705

Table II

JAPAN'S POSITION IN WHALING IN THE ANTARCTIC SEA

A - No. of Catch

	Japan	Norway	England	Panama	Argentine	Total incl.others
1935-36	639	14,421	12,538	2,499	944	30,991
1936-37	1,965	15,039	12,361	2,389	1,014	34,579
1937-38	5,565	14,960	16,111	1,527	1,062	46,039
1938-39						

B - Percentage

	Japan	Norway	England	Panama	Argentine	Total incl.others
1935-36	2.0	46.5	40.4	7.9	3.2	100
1936-37	5.7	43.5	35.7	6.9	2.9	100
1937-38	12.1	32.5	35.0	3.3	2.3	100
1938-39	19.7	30.0	29.2			78.9

Table III

RESULTS OF WHALING IN JAPANESE WATERS AND ANTARCTIC OCEAN

	Japan Proper	Colonial Water	Antarctic Ocean			
Year Ending Mar.31	No. of Catches	No. of Catches	Mother	Tender Ships	Crews	No. of Catches
1928	1,177	369				
1933	1,124	206				
1934	1,156	202				
1935	1,356	123	1	3	213	213
1936	1,598	173	1	5	343	639
1937	1,641	173	2	13	766	1,965
1938	1,814	236	4	31	1,796	5,565

Coastal Whaling

Japanese coastal whalers in 1946, operating 19 land stations and four killer boats, captured 1,863 whales. The catch included 1,030 sperm, 574 sei, 231 fin, 20 humpback and 8 blue whales.

Grand Total - 22,501 metric tons of whale products.

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FIG. 2



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F.E.C. 035

26th March, 1946.

STATEMENT OF UNITED STATES POLICY WITH RESPECT TO FISHING AND AQUATIC INDUSTRIES IN JAPAN

During the period of occupation, the Supreme Commander should be guided, subject to military considerations, by the following general principles:

a. In order to meet domestic consumption requirements, the Supreme Commander should

(1) Insist that appropriate available vessels, facilities, gear, equipment and supplies in Japanese hands be put to use;

(2) Take such steps as he may deem practical and necessary to provide sufficient fuel for allocation to fishing boats;

(3) Require the Japanese Government to rehabilitate the production facilities of the fishing, fish fertilizer and seafood processing industries, and facilities for distribution of their products; and

(4) Furnish such other assistance, subject to general policies governing aid to to Japanese industry, as he deems necessary.

b. The coastal fisheries and fish culture should be utilized as the primary sources for domestic consumption. To the extent that fish culture and coastal fisheries are unable to meet the minimum domestic requirements, deep sea fisheries and other fisheries in water open to Japanese operation may be utilized where security and political considerations permit. Deep sea fishing in areas near United States territory or near United States island responsibilities should not be authorized. Japanese fishing should not be permitted near areas under Allied jurisdiction without prior permission from the country concerned. These prohibitions should continue until international agreements are negotiated permitting Japanese fishing in these areas.

c. In order to determine (1) the effect on Japanese food supply of restrictive measures enforced for security or other reasons, and (2) the extent to which the United States and other nations should be permitted to exploit fisheries previously exploited by the Japanese, the Supreme Commander should immediately obtain from the Japanese Government available surveys and other data concerning the resources of all Pacific fishing areas previously exploited by the Japanese.

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d. Japanese fishing operations should conform strictly to:

(1) The provisions of agreements relating to whaling to which the United States is a party;

(2) The provisions of other agreements relating to conservation to which the United States is a party;

(3) The policies or rules governing specific fisheries announced by the United States, or by other governments in conformity with policies announced by the United States with respect to coastal fisheries;

(4) The Japanese national and local regulations for the conservation of fisheries.

e. Such fishery products may be exported as can be produced by vessels, facilities, gear, equipment and supplies not suitable for or convertible to use in providing for domestic consumption, and which are needed (1) to supply United Nations needs for animal proteins and oils or (2) to secure foreign exchange for essential imports.

f. In the establishment of local security regulations consideration should be given to ensuring the maximum production of seafood products consistent with security requirements.

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C271946

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

AG 800.217 (6 Aug 46) NR
(SCAPIN - 1103)

APO 500
6 August 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR: IMPERIAL JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

THROUGH: Central Liaison Office, Tokyo

SUBJECT: Japanese Whaling Operations in the Antarctic

1. Reference is made to the following:

a. Memorandum for Imperial Japanese Government from General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, AG 800.217, (3 Nov 45) NR, (SCAPIN - 233), 3 November 1945, subject: "Whaling Industry."

b. Memorandum from Imperial Japanese Government to General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, C.L.O. No. 2416 (EA), 19 May 1946, subject: "Whaling in the Antarctic Ocean," with enclosure thereto.

2. Japanese whaling operations in the Antarctic are hereby authorized for the 1946 - 1947 season. Such operations will be conducted only in that part of the Pacific and Indian Ocean of the Antarctic bounded by south latitude 55 degrees on the north and that part of the Antarctic land mass on the south generally known as Wilkes Land, South Victoria Land and the Ross Shelf and between east Longitude 90 degrees on the east of Greenwich and West Longitude 170 degrees on the west of Greenwhich, hereinafter referred to as the Antarctic Whaling Area, during the period and under the conditions set forth by the International Whaling Conventions or modifications thereof which may be adopted prior to the season.

3. The following vessels are authorized to conduct whaling operations in the Antarctic Whaling Area:

	Name of Vessel	Gross Tonnage (Metric Tons)
a. Factory Ships:	Hashidate Maru	10,020
	Nisshin Maru No.1	10,000
b. Whalers or (killer Boats):	Fumi Maru No.2	300
	Fumi Maru No.3	300
	Fumi Maru No.5	387
	Koyoo Maru	370
	Seki Maru	300
	Seki Maru No.3	298
	Seki Maru No.5	300
	Shonan Maru No.8	350
	Shonan Maru No.11	350
	Takunan Maru No.2	350
	Takunan Maru No.3	350
	Takunan Maru No.8	350
c. Carriers	Benshu Maru	983
	Benshu Maru No.32	782
	Benshu Maru No.35	993
	Benshu Maru No.36	1,000

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Name of Vessel	Gross Tonnage (Metric Tons)
San Diego Maru	7,268
Tadotsu Maru	10,000
Tenyo Maru	10,000

4. The following applies to the vessels listed in paragraph 3:

a. Each vessel will be marked and operated in conformity with directives from the Administrator, Naval Shipping Control Authority.

b. Each vessel will display in the usual manner the flag of the Japanese Merchant Marine.

c. The master of each of the factory ships listed in paragraph 3 during the period enroute to and from the Antarctic Whaling Area will forward a daily radiogram to the Japanese Bureau of Fisheries in Tokyo listing the location of his ship at 1200 hours on the date the radiogram is dispatched.

d. The master of each of the factory ships listed in paragraph 3 during the whaling operations in the authorized Antarctic Whaling Area will forward a daily radiogram to the Japanese Bureau of Fisheries in Tokyo listing the following information:

(1) Location of his ship at 1200 hours on the date radiogram is dispatched.

(2) Number and kind of whales processed on his ship during the previous 24-hour period and output of whale oil, meat, blubber, and other products.

e. Applications for frequency for radio communications by the whaling fleet will be made to Civil Communications Section, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

f. Each vessel will proceed to and return from the Antarctic Whaling Area by the most direct route and without approaching any land nearer than 12 miles. The route to be followed by each vessel to and from the Antarctic Whaling Area will be supplied by the Imperial Japanese Government to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and the Commander, Naval Activities Japan (COMNAVJAP), 15 days prior to departure of each vessel from Japanese ports and from the Antarctic Whaling Area.

g. The master of each of the factory ships on departing from the Antarctic Whaling Area will dispatch a radiogram to the Japanese Bureau of Fisheries in Tokyo stating date of departure.

h. On departure from and arrival at their home ports in Japan each vessel will clear its respective port through the duly constituted port authorities of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers at that port.

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i. The vessels are authorized to leave Japanese ports for the Antarctic Whaling Area during the period 1 November 1946 to 15 December 1946. Return from the Antarctic Whaling Area to the home port of each vessel must be accomplished by one month after the closing of the whaling season in the Antarctic or by 30 April 1947, which ever occurs first.

j. The Japanese Bureau of Fisheries will maintain at its office in Tokyo a file of all radiograms required to be dispatched in accordance with paragraph 4 for reference by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers when desired.

5. The whale oil produced by the operations of the vessels listed in paragraph 3 will be brought to Japan and as soon as possible after arrival the oil will be suitably stored and safely guarded. The Imperial Japanese Government will notify the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers the location of the place or places where the whale oil is stored and amount in storage within ten days after it is safe in storage. Final disposition of the whale oil will be the subject of a further memorandum from the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to the Imperial Japanese Government.

6. The attention of the Imperial Japanese Government is called to memorandum on the whaling industry mentioned in reference 1a above. Reports called for in accordance with this memorandum will be submitted to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers by 1 June 1947.

7. This authorization does not establish any precedent for whaling operations in the Antarctic area or any other area for any subsequent period of time nor is it an expression of Allied policy relative to ultimate determination of national jurisdiction, international boundaries or fishing and whaling operations in the area concerned or in any other area.

FOR THE SUPREME COMMANDER:

/s/ John B. Cooley

JOHN B. COOLEY,
Colonel, AGD,
Adjutant General.

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FEC-035/1 Dec. 13, 1946.

JAPANESE FISHING, WHALING, AND PEARL FISHING

1. Subject to the following restrictions, the Japanese should use their existing resources to the maximum extent possible in order to obtain fish for domestic consumption and export. In particular.

(1) Appropriate available vessels, facilities, gear, equipment, and supplies in Japanese hands should be put to full use.

(11) Production facilities of the fishing, fish fertilizer, and seafood processing industries, and facilities for distribution of their products, should be rehabilitated.

(111) The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers should take such steps as he may deem practical and necessary to provide sufficient fuel for allocation to fishing boats.

2. (a) Japanese fishing operations should be permitted, subject to security considerations, within the following area: From a point midway between Nosappu Misaki and Kaigara Jima at approximately 43°23' North Latitude, 145°51' East Longitude; to 43°North Latitude, 146°30' East Longitude; thence to 45° North Latitude, 165° East Longitude; thence south along 165th Meridian to 24°North Latitude; west along the 24th Parallel to 123° East Longitude; thence north to 26° North Latitude, 123°East Longitude; thence to 32°30' North Latitude, 125° East Longitude; thence to 33° North Latitude, 127°40' East Longitude; thence to 40° North Latitude, 135° East Longitude; to 45°30' North Latitude, 140° East Longitude; thence east to 45°30' North Latitude, 145° East Longitude; thence east to 45°30' North Latitude, 145° East Longitude rounding Soya Misaki at a distance of three (3) miles from shore; south along 145th Meridian to a point three (3) miles off the coast of Hokkaido; thence along a line three (3) miles off the coast of Hokkaido, rounding Shiretoko Saki and passing through Nemuro Kaikyo to the starting point midway between Nosappu Misaki and Kaigara Jima.

(b) No extension of Japanese fishing beyond the foregoing area should be permitted without prior authorization by the Far Eastern Commission, which will consult with all established international bodies concerned with managing or agreeing on the utilization or exploitation of marine resources.

(c) Japanese fishing operations should strictly conform to international agreements relating to conservation.

3. (a) Japanese whaling from land stations should be permitted, subject to security considerations, within the area specified in paragraph 2 (a) above.

(b) Japanese whaling from land stations should not be permitted outside that area without prior approval by the Far Eastern Commission, which will consult with the international authority for whaling.

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(c) No Japanese pelagic whaling should be permitted anywhere, including the area specified in paragraph 2 (a). The Far Eastern Commission will not authorize eventual re-entry of Japan into pelagic whaling without agreement being reached in the international authority for whaling.

(d) Japanese whaling should strictly conform to the International Whaling Convention.

4. Japanese pearl fishing should be permitted, subject to security considerations, within the area laid down in paragraph 2 (a), but should not be permitted outside that area without prior authorization by the Far Eastern Commission.

5. Nothing in the foregoing should be interpreted to prevent removal as reparations of Japanese fishing, whaling, and pearl fishing ships, equipment, and other facilities.

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FEC 231

28 May, 1947.

JAPANESE WHALING

1. The Far Eastern Commission decides as a matter of policy that the Japanese should be permitted to capture whales within the area in which they are permitted, from time to time, to fish. The provisions of the International Whaling Agreements to which the United States is a party should be observed except so far as they are in conflict with this statement of policy.

2. Japanese whaling should be conducted from shore stations and the Japanese should not be permitted to make use of factory ships or of any other vessels for the purpose of treating whales at sea.

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Appendix to the Minutes of the sixty-second Meeting of Committee No. 2: Economic and Financial Affairs held on 12 June 1947.

ITEM 4 - JAPANESE WHALING: VERBATIM RECORD OF DISCUSSION

MR. WHITMAN: Mr. Chairman, as far as I know the United States has not formally or at any length discussed before the Commission its position with regard to pelagic whaling by Japan, at least in recent months. Most of the conversations that have gone on have been diplomatic onversations but it now seems desirable, in view of the fact that this has been reintroduced to the Commission as a policy question, to have the reasons for the United States position set forth in some detail. In setting forth the position of my Government I intend to proceed by basing my discussion on a number of arguments that have been advanced principally by the United Kingdom in favor of its proposal in FEC-135/1. I feel, therefore, that I should give the United Kingdom delegate the opportunity first to outline and discuss, as he might wish, the reasons in favor of this policy since I must first verify my understanding of the arguments in favor before I can proceed to state the United States position. I would like to make clear that the United States emphatically refutes any acceptance of a great many of the arguments that have beenadvanced in favor of restriction of Japanese whaling. Therefore, I think I might first let any of the other members state their position before I proceed with my statement.

MR. EVERSON: Well, since the ball is thrown at me I will try and catch it. The United Kingdom Government has studied this question intensively. My Government has for some time taken a deep interest in the regulation of whaling because the United Kingdom ships and crews were, I think, before the war second in importance in this field only to the Norwegians. We found before the war that the stock of whales was being depleted by overfishing and by the undesirable practices of certain whalers in that they captured undergrown and lactating whales and overfished certain areas. Consequently, international agreements were sought among all whaling nations and eventually conventions were signed under which certain nations agreed to restrict their catches of whales in order to preserve the stock. They also agreed that inspectors should travel on their whalers and that these inspectors should insure that certain other provisions were carried out, such as that whales under a certain size should not be taken, that whaling ships should only operate at certain seasons of the year, that lactating and pregnant whales should not be taken, and similar regulations of that sort, and that when whales were lawfully taken the processes through which the blubber was put should be in accordance with the most modern practice so that the fullest advantage was taken of the available supplies. Now, Japan did not sign the whaling conventions and continued before the war to fish without any regard for the conventions. We have adequate evidence that the Japanese violated almost every clause of the

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international conventions. They took undersized whales and violated all those other provisions relating to the kind of whale to take. They fished out of season and they did not adequately process all of the whales that they took. The position now facing the nations interested in whaling is this: Under the conventions which have been signed to limit the catch of whales in order to preserve the stock only 16,000 blue whale units can be taken each year by all of the countries concerned. That limit is observed by reporting catches week by week to the international station at Sandes Fjiord in Norway, which is the reporting centre.

Now the British Government is informed that the number of factory ships which will proceed to the Antarctic whaling grounds for the next season will be capable of treating 16,000 blue whale units without any Japanese participation. The position therefore is that if the Japanese participate the catch of the ships of other nations will have to be reduced, and, while we do not wish to exclude the Japanese merely because they are a defeated nation, we do think we are justified in excluding them because if they take some part of this regulated total of 16,000 blue whale units their inefficient methods of processing the whales they take will produce the result that the world will acquire less whale oil and other products than if the Japanese were excluded. That is the main ground on which we should exclude the Japanese.

Now it has been argued that Antarctic whaling should also be prohibited for security reasons. My Government doesn't think the security reasons are of enormous importance, but it does feel that in the context of regulating Japanese shipping in general we should take care that the Japanese are not allowed to keep any large vessels or the facilities for building them; any unduly fast vessels, any vessels which are adaptable to naval use, any vessels which provide especially arduous training for crews, or any vessels which preserve the know-how for building the kind of ships that are useful in wartime.

Now on some of those grounds there are therefore objections to allowing the Japanese to possess whaling factories. I think my Australian colleague is in a better position to reinforce the arguments for security. The British Government supports them on those grounds.

It has been argued that the Japanese can't do without whales. Those arguments are of course put forward by Mr. Whitman and I will try to refute them if he raises them. I think that is all I need to say now.

MAJOR PLIMSOLL: Mr. Chairman, before Mr. Whitman replies I might state that the views of the Australian Government are very close to those of the United Kingdom. We are opposed to any expedition by the Japanese before the peace treaty, which will determine the long-term future of the Japanese whaling industry.

We consider that because of the record of the Japanese before the war, and in particular their violation of the international whaling conventions, they do not deserve to be trusted to whale at this stage and that their permanent future must have special consideration.

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My Government attaches very great importance to the security aspects of Japanese whaling. An Antarctic expedition, of course, will be very close to Australian home waters, and the expedition last year was conducted mainly in waters adjacent to Australian Antarctic territories. The ships that the Japanese use for whaling are capable of being used for naval purposes. In particular, we know that before the war the Japanese specifically designed some of their ships in order to carry midget submarines. The craft generally can be used for naval uses. In addition to that, there is the fact that these vessels will be carrying Japanese crews that are given experience in southern waters and given an opportunity to make meterorological observations, soundings, and scientific investigations. We know that in time of war whaling crews form an important part of any navy - they are used to rugged conditions and they are used to operations in unusual waters. For those reasons we feel that the security of Australia and New Zealand demands that the Japanese should not be allowed to participate in whaling in the Antarctic.

As far as the recent expedition to the Antarctic is concerned, we are not at all satisfied that the Japanese conducted that expedition in the way in which we had been assured they would. I have circulated to the Commission a report of the Australian observer on that expedition - that is C2-231/2 - and it demonstrates very clearly what our Chairman has shown: that the Japanese whaling methods were such that the output of oil was far less than would have been secured by any Allied expedition. My Government estimates that the Japanese, from the number of whales that they captured, could have taken at least 3,000 more tons of oil. So that if we allow the Japanese to catch whales at the expense of Allied ships - and we know that the Allied ships can catch up to the full 16,000 - the total amount of oil available to the world will be reduced very considerably.

I think, Mr. Chairman, that further remarks can be made later after we hear Mr. Whitman.

MR. WHITMAN: May I ask one question? I haven't had an opportunity to read this report. Has that just come out?

MAJOR PLIMSOLL: It has only just been circulated to the Commission, but I gave a copy to the American Government a little while earlier.

MR. WHITMAN: Not knowing the details of that report I would like to ask this question. I have always understood that some of the less oil taken was because of an increased use of blubber for other things in addition to oil. Is that part of the 3,000?

MAJOR PLIMSOLL: I think the reasons why the oil was short were in the main two. First, the ships were not fully equipped they didn't leave Japan equipped to obtain the maximum amount of oil from the whales. The second reason was that the Japanese wanted whale meat and therefore did not treat all the parts of the whale that could have given oil. As far as whale meat is concerned, I think the output is not nearly of the importance that some people attribute to it. The yield of the last expedition would give the Japanese about half a pound per head a year - an infinitesimal amount. The Japanese got along very well without any whale meat during the war, and I can't see that it has suddenly become important.

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MR. WHITMAN: Mr. Chairman, I am very happy to find that I apparently misunderstood in part the position of the United Kingdom on one of these issues. It was not clear in the diplomatic correspondence that I have seen that your position was exactly the same as stated today with regard to your justification for excluding Japan from the 16,000 limit. I will come to that point in due time.

The United States Government believes that the Japanese should be allowed to continue to whale in the Antarctic. It believes that they should be allowed to do so as a matter of assisting themselves to meet their very dire food situation. It does not see how we can encourage the Japanese on the one hand to do the utmost to take care of themselves and at the same time cut them off from resources which are of substantial importance to them in this field of proteins and oils. The 1946/1947 expedition produced a quantity of meat equal to 34% of their total consumption of animal meat and animal protein from indigenous sources. The situation during the war must be quite carefully studied, because during the war the Japanese had sources of 350,000 tons of soy beans per year and we are able now to procure less than 50,000 tons of soy beans per year. The total protein situation has deteriorated progressively. If the requisite protein foods and oils for the calendar year 1948 are not obtained from whaling operations it will fall upon the U.S., which continues in the interests of all the Allies to supply the entire Japanese food deficit, to make up this deficiency, something, which, in view of the manifold demands on fats and oils resources -- proteins -- it can ill afford to do.

Now, with regard to the Japanese situation in protein and oil, I would like to refer to certain pertinent sections of the recent food report on Japan which I trust will shortly be circulated to the Commission. I might point out that this report, familiarily known as the Harrison report, has been greatly criticized by SCAP as not being as generous to the Japanese as the Hoover report was to the Germans, so it cannot be charged as containing pro-Japanese bias. It was quite bitterly attacked on those grounds. But in the field of Japanese requirements for proteins and fats the position of the report is quite clear-cut and cannot be contradicted.

NUTRITIONAL STATUS OF JAPANESE POPULATION

"Before the war the nutritional content of the food consumed by the Japanese people was never physiologically adequate for while the caloric intake prior to 1941 was sufficient, there never was sufficient protein, fats and vitamins in the average diet of the population. The food of both farmers and industrial workers has always been primarily rice, with inadequate amounts of protein derived chiefly from consumption of fish and soy bean products. Meat and milk products have never been available except in limited quantities and only provided a small portion of the average food consumption.

"The inadequacies and dietary deficiencies of the foodstuffs available to the majority of the population were increased and accentuated during the war. After V-J Day the deficiencies increased still more.

"The present ration schedules do not appear to provide sufficient food for good health, both because of the

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reduction from prewar in the total intake and an even greater deficiency than prewar in proteins, fats and oils, and vitamins.

"Nutritional and health surveys of representative samples of various classes of the population have revealed that despite the distribution of important foods, a state of chronic malnutrition generally exists due to continuing dietary deficiencies of which the most serious is the shortage of protein, milk and fat products.

"Two-thirds of the children under 6 and five-sixths of the school children and adolescents are suffering from chronic malnutrition.

"Physical examinations in 1946 of samples of the population indicated that 30 percent of the urban population and 27.5 percent of the rural population showed clinical symptoms associated with vitamin deficiencies and malnutrition. The death rate from tuberculosis in Japan has increased 50 percent since 1931 and is now seven times that of the United States and four times that of Germany.

"The 1946-47 Japanese indigenous food production was low in body-building proteins and provides on an overall average less than half the total proteins normally required and only one-third of the animal protein necessary for the maintenance of good health. The Public Health Section of SCAP has pointed out that these deficiencies are 'a major factor in their (the Japanese) undernourishment and low resistance to all diseases, particularly such chronic diseases as tuberculosis'."

Thus, in my opinion and in the opinion of my Government, any protein and fat available to the Japanese, and particularly through their own efforts, is of very significant consequence. Let me now proceed to discuss various of the arguments for preventing the Japanese from securing additional food supplies through whaling.

It has been the understanding of my Government, and a number of the officials have felt, that a part of the argument against the Japanese fishing was that such fishing would reduce the whales that could be caught by other countries operating in the Antarctic because of the very proper limitation now placed by treaty upon the total catch of whales in any one season. I am very happy to hear, as I stated before, that the United Kingdom does not introduce that argument in this case.

MR. EVERSON: I should like to say that the idea that we used that argument was entirely due to misunderstanding by the State Department. We have never used it and we never used words to justify anybody saying that we used it.

MR. WHITMAN: Well, Mr. Chairman, I would interrupt myself and say that I very much regret that it was not made clear, and there certainly were words that confused me as well as other people in the Department, because my Government has felt that one of the most serious consequences of any agreement to limit Japanese whaling would be a step direct or indirect, towards abandoning the fixed position of my Government that Japan's position as a defeated nation should not be

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taken advantage of to gain economic and trade advantages for the victors. This is a position which we consider most important and the abandonment of it would put us in a most damaging light with respect to our own economic interests, which, of course, are strongly urging in all directions that we should prevent the Japanese from doing this and prevent them from doing that, because if we do not their own interests are going to be injured. My Government has resisted, I believe successfully attacks and pressure from our own businessmen and we emphatically do not wish to agree to anything which prejudices our position on that ground.

Then, going beyond that, we proceed to the argument that Japanese participation reduces the total catch. When my Government has had more opportunity of reading the statement circulated by the Australian observer, I may have something in the future to say on that. It is a somewhat technical subject so it may be necessary for me to add to my remarks on that particular ground. As far as we can determine, however, from our conversation with SCAP and from what has been reported to us previously, the Australian observer during the last expedition reported that the expedition was conducted in accordance with the international conventions, except in one particular case, which was: "The discarding of certain poor oil-bearing bones during processing since facilities of the factory ships did not permit this to be done and at the same time secure maximum recovery of whale meat." But the Supreme Commander has assured the Department of State and the United States Government that the factory ship in question will be modified before another expedition to permit the necessary processing in complete conformity with the conventions and that all regulations of the convention will be observed. In addition I point out that it seemed to me that the Japanese should, in view of their severe protein shortage, be permitted to have a somewhat higher ratio of whale meat and a somewhat lower rate of oil. This seems to me to be hardly a sufficient argument for completely eliminating them from whaling.

I would now like to proceed to the argument that because of their bad performance before the war the Japanese should not be permitted to whale at present. I have no question that the Japanese did violate the conventions, which they really did not violate because they did not sign, but, in any case, used methods in whaling which were contradictory to the consensus of opinion of other governments as to measures to be taken to preserve whales. The U.S. Government cannot agree that the Japanese should be penalized in the future because of this past bad record of pelagic whaling. Acceptance of the principle that future disabilities should be placed on the Japanese because of their manifold past violation of the rules of international economy in the commercial and other fields could only retard the reorientation of Japan as a peace-loving and law-abiding member of the family of nations. And, as already stated, the Supreme Commander has undertaken to insure that the Japanese comply with all international regulations during another expedition.

Now, to elaborate on that somewhat. We know that the Japanese were also acting in violation of what are considered to be proper rules for conducting trade in general. They conducted various forms of economic warfare including the use of subsidies, both open and hidden, and of regulations by which they forced traders out of their own and other markets

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and all other kinds of practice which, if the international trade charter is adopted, will presumably be ruled out as a proper way of conducting international business. The fact that the Japanese did not conduct trade in what other countries then and now consider to be a proper fashion and because they violated principles which seemed to be the only possible ones for sound international trade, cannot be used to eliminate Japan from trade. That, of course, would mean essentially putting them in jail forever and you would have to support them. They must reenter trading fields and they must be educated to become law-abiding members of the family of nations. It can't happen if they are officially restricted. They have to be guided and controlled but not prevented from conducting legitimate peaceful activities. That is a very strong view of my Government and we do not see that Japan's operation in whaling was different, certainly not in kind, and I am not at all certain it differed in degree. Certainly very strong cases can be made against practices by the Japanese in other fields. I don't think that it would be particularly worthwhile to try to document in which particular field the malpractice of the Japanese was more serious, but certainly the principle that you can prevent them from conducting peaceful economic activity because before the war they had not behaved properly is a principle that my Government cannot accept.

Now, let me come to the question of security which, with all due regard to the position of the other governments and with also, I believe, an understanding that Antarctic whaling comes closer to other countries than it is to the U.S., my Government still cannot see a present or future security threat in Japanese whaling. In the first place it is quite clear, I think, that there is no present security threat. The control of the Japanese is sufficiently complete - the families and the Government itself are hostages - to prevent two whaling ships at present being a threat to any Allied Powers. In addition, there are the Allied fleets in the Pacific which are certainly adequate protection at the moment against two Japanese whaling ships. Therefore, apparently, the argument must look to the future, some future day, ten, twenty years from now, when, conceivably, Japan might again be in a position to attempt to dominate other countries. The question of future Japanese whaling, whether in the Antarctic or in other waters, clearly must be decided in the peace treaty. If the treaty prohibits such whaling it is difficult to see how an expedition last year, this year, or next year, would give the Japanese such additional meteorological observations that they did not accumulate before 1940, which at some future day - obviously quite a long time from now - would constitute a security threat. If, on the other hand, the treaty has no prohibition against Japanese Antarctic whaling, it seems quite clear that all these aspects of non-security (training of crews, weather observations etc.) if they are such, and I deny it, could easily be cultivated by the Japanese in a period after the treaty. Therefore, it is extremely difficult for me, and for my Government, to see, how factory ships going to the Antarctic this year constitute an immediate or future security threat.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I wish to say that it is regrettable, in the interests of international cooperation, that my Government has found it necessary to take this position on Japanese whaling. But I must say in all earnestness that from the standpoint of the logic of the situation I feel that the position of my Government is extremely sound, and we regret, and it is unfortunate for me certainly, to have to be in

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opposition to the majority on this point.

MR. AHMAD: Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask four questions, purely to enable myself to understand the subject more clearly. (1) Could I have the total amount of oils and fats required by Japan? (2) Thr proportion Japanese whaling represents out of the total supplies. (3) The ratio between the amount covered by whales caught in Japanese home waters and those in the Antarctic area. The fourth question is really addressed to the Chairman. I want to find out whether it is intended to debar Japan from signing the international whaling agreement at a future date. (4) Suppose at a future date they want to sign that agreement, would it still be intended to debar them from whaling in the Antarctic?

MR. EVERSON: That would have to be decided by the peace conference. At present Japan can't sign any international agreement.

MR. WHITMAN: I would like to clarify this first question. By requirements, do you mean physiological requirements, what the doctors say the Japanese need, or do you mean the nimimum which SCAP said he requires?

MR. AHMAD: I was thinking primarily of your food plan for Japan - total quantities required and the quantity of various items that have to be supplied.

MR. WHITMAN: I can guess the first one right now. The proteins is 10,000 tons from whales as against 50,000 tons required; however, that is an import.

DR. HART: May I ask two questions of the same nature as the questions of our Indian delegate? (1) What is the amount of fish and whales caught by the Japanese and the amount of fish exported out of Japan. (2) What is the cost per unit of whaling and the cost of soy protein in Japan. I think this question is partly economic and partly medical but the economic question is more important. If you will give these figures, which will certainly be found in the Harrison report, I think we can easily see what is the importance of the whole whaling question for Japan and the necessity of it.

MR. WHITMAN: The other fishing is about 3,000,000 tons at the moment and the amount of fish exported, which was very little, was some crab. I will have to check on that. On the question of cost I would like to be clear as to exactly what you mean. As for the cost of the whale protein I don't know exactly what you would figure actually. Some of the oil is sold to other countries. SCAP has a net income from the expedition last year of $3,000,000. So on that basis the cost is zero.

DR. HART: If you give the cost of the whaling expedition you can easily calculate the cost of the protein.

MR. EVERSON: Do you mean the yen cost per unit for producing protein by whaling as compared to the unit cost of protein by other means?

MR. WHITMAN: That is an extremely complex question.

DR. HART: No. That is a question that any nutritionist will ask because whaling will only have an economic advantage

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if the cost per unit is cheaper or lower.

MR. EVERSON: I don't think the point is very important because we have to get all the protein we can get nowadays. Whatever the cost we have to go after it. As far as my country is concerned we would go after whale protein whatever the cost.

MR. WHITMAN: I still don't see that that question can be answered sensibly. The yen price of whale protein is obviously completely irrelevant.

DR. HART: It is not irrelevant because if the cost of whale protein is much higher than the cost of other proteins, it would be much better to get that other protein.

MR. WHITMAN: The only way of approaching that would be to determine whether the Japanese resources that went into whaling could have obtained an equal amount of protein if they had been used some other way.

MR. EVERSON: I agree that the question is irrelevant.

MR. WHITMAN: We have speculated whether you could use those ships to do other kinds of fishing as floating canneries or something like that. That would be an alternate way of using the same resources to get protein.

MR. HU: How large is the existing whaling fleet at this stage and to what extent can it be converted to other purposes?

MR. WHITMAN: There are two factory ships and I would have to check on the exact number of killer ships. Those are fairly flexible anyway, being small, about 200 tons. On the other question I would have to have the advice of experts. It gets to be a very complex issue because it will depend upon the agreement of the other countries to extend the fishing area for Japan to be able to use the fleets very usefully in other waters.

MR. EVERSON: I should like to make some remarks in reply to Mr. Whitman's statement. He started off by talking about the value of Antarctic whaling in connection with the Japanese food supply and mentioned that whale meat brought in by the last expedition provided Japan with 34% of her supply of animal protein. That, I am afraid, I must call a very misleading statement. The Japanese never have been accustomed to derive much protein from meat, animal meat. They have never been accustomed to have what we regard as an adequate supply of protein at all. The main supply of protein for the Japanese always came from fishing and that we do not deny them. To talk of the whale meat as 34% of the Japanese supply makes one think that it is of vast importance to the Japanese, but, as Major Plimsoll pointed out, the information at our disposal leads us to think that it amounted to about eight ounces per head of the population for a whole year, which is obviously an insignificant amount. In other words, if the Japanese did not have this whale meat they would not suffer from a nutritional point of view in a noticeable degree. Secondly, he said that if the Japanese did not have this whale meat the U.S. would have to supply some alternative food. We shall never agree, I fear, with our U.S. colleague about the quantity of food that Japan requires to import. We haven't yet had the Harrison report and perhaps one ought to reserve judgment

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about the supply of food to Japan until one sees it, but the Committee is very well aware that my Government takes the views from the information that has been available to it that if Japanese indigenous supplies of food, including those derived from fishing, were adequately controlled and distributed Japan could get by - I don't say she would be well fed - but could get by without imports. Now, he went on to say that examinations of Japanese indicate that they are suffering from nutritional deficiencies. I find that a rather surprising remark to hear from the U.S. member because only two or three weeks ago in the Allied Council for Japan Colonel Sams went to great pains to say that the Japanese public health was much better now than it had ever been. I suppose Mr. Whitman distinguishes between nutritional troubles and health in general. But I don't think one can contend that if the health of the Japanese is generally improved their nutritional deficiencies can be serious. I don't think the two things are compatible. Moreover, when one talks of discovering in the Japanese diseases which are a consequence of vitamin deficiency, I don't think it is a bit surprising that one can find a higher incidence of those troubles in Japan than one would in the U.S. or even in my country. The Japanese never had a balanced diet. Before the war these troubles were common in Japan. You had cases of diseases like beri beri in Japan which are unheard of in countries which eat an adequate supply of other foods including green vegetables. Now, I would like to say one more word about this accusation, I must call it, that the United Kingdom is defending an economic interest in trying to prevent the Japanese from whaling. I think I have said in this Committee more than once that the United Kingdom Government had carefully considered whether it would be proper to impose limitations on Japanese industry in the interests of defending its own industries. Some of our industries suffered very severely from what we regarded as unfair Japanese competition before the war and there was a good deal of pressure on the United Kingdom Government to take steps now to defend those industries from future competition of the same kind. The United Kingdom Government deliberately took a decision against such action. They felt and decided that the only adequate reasons that they could hold for curtailing the capacity of Japanese industries was their security interest in them. That has been quite apparent in the discussions we have had in the Economic Committee on the level of industry, because His Majesty's Government has never proposed that the Japanese textile industry should be curtailed. That would have been the first industry that we should have suggested harnessing if we wanted to put a brake on any Japanese industry that competed unfairly with our own economic interests. Mr. Whitman said that his Government did not accept the argument that Japanese participation in whaling would reduce the net yield as we contend it would but he gave no arguments on the other side. He also went on to say that the Japanese will observe the conventions next year. Well, we were told that last year and the Supreme Commander dispatched a ship which was incapable of observing the conventions - a ship which only had three boilers when it ought to have had seven, apparently. It mustn't be considered surprising then if we have a certain amount of skepticism as to whether this promise that the Japanese will observe the conventions next season will be observed in any more detail than it was last time. Of course, we have only seen the Australian observer's report. I haven't seen reports yet from either the British observer or the two American observers and it can't be conclusively stated that the violation observed by the Australian was the only one that occured. I should like to see a complete report on the expedition and I think one ought to be presented promptly to

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this Committee or to the Commission.

Now, Mr. Whitman used a curious argument about not excluding the Japanese from whaling. He said that his Government took a view that you couldn't exclude Japanese from world trade because they did undesirable things in world trade before the war. Well, of course we don't want to exclude them from world trade but there is a difference between trade and whaling. We want all the trade we can have; we want the greatest possible interchange of trade among nations, but whaling is limited we want people to catch only the 16,000 units and we have shown that if the Japanese do catch any part of those 16,000 blue whale units the net result will be that the world will enjoy the use of less whale oil than if they didn't. Mr. Whitman wound up on a note of regret that he couldn't reach agreement on this. This was not the opinion of the Commission. That was like the Irishman complaining that he was the only one in step when the regiment marched past. I think there is a fair amount of agreement, especially among countries most involved, that the Japanese ought not to be allowed to whale this season.

MR. WHITMAN: I only want to point out two very minor points to clarify the record rather than to repeat any of my statement, which I think will stand on its own grounds with reference to the points covered. The question of the public health situation I feel has nothing to do with the question of chronic malnutrition. Public health, as I understand the term, is mainly concerned with the control of communicable disease, especially venereal diseases. I am sure there is no necessary connection between venereal disease and chronic malnutrition. It is an outstanding achievement of modern public health methods that communicable diseases can be controlled even when general health conditions are poor. I believe, therefore, that there is no contradiction between the position Colonel Sams took with the Allied Council and the information he provided the Harrison Committee.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FOR THE PRESS

JUNE 25, 1947
No. 522

In answer to inquiries at his conference today Secretary Marshall read the following SCAP announcement previously released in Tokyo:

"A second SCAP- controlled and Japanese-manned Antarctic whaling expedition has been authorized by the Supreme Commander pursuant to instructions from the United States Government.

"The reasons for this action are obvious. The last whaling expedition produced for Japanese consumption some 21,000 metric tons of needed protein foods which helped make up the food deficit in Japan. It also produced for the world market, which is in short supply, over 12,000 tons of whale oil and 11 tons of vitamin A and D oil. It is expected that the second expedition will provide an equivalent amount of whale meat for consumption in Japan and an equivalent amount of needed oils for allocation to other parts of the world by the International Emergency Food Council.

"There is a continuing food shortage in Japan. The burden of supplying the deficit imports of food continues to fall upon the United States, which is also endeavoring to meet demands for food from many other countries. With their whaling fleets and trained crews the Japanese possess a means of providing additional food for themselves and of helping to meet a world deficit in oils. These utilities at this moment of need must be used.

"Not to do so would mean a direct cost to the United States of over U.S. $10,000,000, the equivalent of approximately 40,000 tons of wheat and an additional loss of approximately U.S. $6,000,000 in foreign exchange from the sale of whale oil. There was no Antarctic whaling during the war and the supply of whales there has accordingly increased so that no undue diminution of the whaling potential is involved.

"The second expedition, as was the case with the first, is being organized under the immediate supervision of Colonel Hubert G. Schenck, Chief of SCAP's Natural Resources Section. Allied observers will supervise as before. The Antarctic waters in which the whaling is to be conducted are international. The SCAP observers accompanying the vessels will submit full radio reports daily and will require implicit observance of international whaling regulations.

"As SCAP-controlled Japanese-manned ships operating to repatriate 5 1/2 million Japanese prisoners of war and civilians have during the past 18 months entered numerous Allied ports in the west and southwest Pacific without incident, it is believed that no problem of security is involved in this second whaling expedition."

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FAR EASTERN COMMISSION

Extracts from the Minutes of the Sixty-third Meeting of the Far Eastern Commission Held in the Main Conference Room, 2516 Massachussets Avenue, N.W., Washington. 26 June 1947, 10:30 A.M.

Representatives Present

Major General Frank R. McCoy (United States) Chairman
His Excellency Norman J. O. Makin (Australia)
Mr. R. E. Collins (Canada)
His Excellency Dr. V. K. Wellington Koo (China)
Mr. Paul Guerin (France)
His Excellency M. Asaf Ali (India)
His Excellency Dr. A. Loudon (Netherlands)
His Excellency Sir Carl Berendsen (New Zealand)
Mr. J. U. Jovellanos (Philippines)
Mr. S. K. Tsarapkin (U.S.S.R)
Mr. H.A. Graves (United Kingdom)

Secretary General

Mr. Nelson T. Johnson

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ITEM 2 - JAPANESE WHALING (FEC-231/4; 231 series, FEC-035, FEC-035/1)

MR. MAKIN presented the following formal statement:

"My Government's opposition to the resumption of Japanese Antarctic whaling is well-known. It has been stated by Australian representatives at meetings of this Commission and of its Committees, and has been pointed out in aide-memoires to the State Department. Australia's position has been unambiguous from the beginning: we are opposed to any deep-sea whaling by the Japanese before the permanent future of this industry has been decided by the peace conference.

"This opposition has been based on many grounds. We consider that the presence of Japanese in Australian or Antarctic waters constitutes a threat to the security and welfare of Australia. Factory ships are capable of conversion into tankers and submarine refuelling vessels, and chasers can be converted into naval patrol craft. We know that during the war former Japanese whaling vessels were used for naval purposes, and proved of great value to the enemy because they were specially constructed in order to be readily converted into war uses. Moreover, the crews of these ships are given an opportunity to gain valuable experience in Antarctic waters and to make scientific observations. These things should not be permitted before the peace conference has had an opportunity to discuss and determine the whole question of the military disarmament and control of Japan. I would like to point out, Mr. Chairman, that if these arguments seem to carry much more weight in Australia and New Zealand than they apparently do in Washington, it is because both Dominions are exposed and alone in the South Pacific and are the ones most closely affected by these operations of the Japanese. Ninety per cent of the whales captured by the Japanese last year were taken off Australian Antarctic territories.

"The Japanese violations of international whaling conventions in the past are well known. Their depredations have done much to reduce the numbers of whales now living in these seas and thus to reduce the quantity of whale oil available to the world. The Japanese ruthlessly killed all the whales they could get, regardless of sex or age, regardless of whether they were with calf or not. A few years of enforced abstinence from whaling would do no more than allow the Japanese to make some recompense to the rest of the world for their past conduct in reducing the total number of whales to its present figure. Moreover, Mr. Chairman, we have no confidence that the Japanese

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in future will observe the international whaling conventions with any better faith than in the past.

"Another Japanese expedition to the Antarctic will not increase the quantity of oil available to the world this year. The international whaling conference has limited the total catch to 16,000 blue whale units. Exclusive of the Japanese, at least sixteen Allied factory ships will be operating in 1947/48, and they will be able to attain the maximum of 16,000 whales. Therefore, any Japanese catches will be at the expense of Allied vessels. But not only will the total number of whales captured be no greater; the total output of oil will probably be smaller. Japanese whaling methods before the war were most wasteful and unsatisfactory, and they continued to be so last year. My Government has estimated that, from the whales which were captured by the Japanese last year, at least 3,000 tons more oil could have been obtained, which at the present price of £100 a ton represents a loss of £300,000, or some $1,000,000. I understand that the Norwegian Government has made estimates which are even higher. We are informed that the Supreme Commander intends to take steps to improve the Japanese ships and methods so that this waste will not continue, but we cannot forget that ships were allowed to leave Japan last year obviously unfitted for their job, despite the fact that the Supreme Commander's attention had been drawn to the dangers of waste. I might add, for the information of members who might not have already perused it, that I have had distributed to members, on 11 June, a copy of the official report of the Australian observer who accompanied the last Japanese whaling expedition to the Antarctic--this is document C2-231/2, and fully bears out what I have been saying about waste and infringements of the international conventions.

"At this stage, Mr. Chairman, I should like to recapitulate the course of events over the past year. My Government, in common with the Governments of New Zealand, Norway and the United Kingdom, protested very strongly in 1946 against the Japanese expedition to the Antartic last year. Our protests were of no avail, and the expeditions sailed. However, we did receive certain assurances from the United States Government, one of which was that the question of the future of the Japanese whaling industry was a matter of Allied consultation and decision. We were also assured that the Australian Government would be fully consulted in connection with any future proposals concerning Japanese whaling with which the United States was concerned. I understand that similar assurances were given to the Governments of New Zealand, Norway and the United Kingdom.

"Last December my Government introduced a paper into the Far Eastern Commission -- FEC-035/1 -- which would have had the effect of forbidding Japanese whaling in the Antarctic. This paper was carefully considered

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in the economic committee, and by the end of February had secured the support of every country represented on the Commission with the exception of the United States. At this stage the American member, finding himself outvoted by 10 to 1, suggested that the committee agree to divide the paper into two separate papers covering fishing and whaling, and the committee was led to believe that the United States was preparing a paper which would have forbidden Japanese Antarctic whaling. On that understanding the committee adjourned its discussion, and whenever members raised questions subsequently they were assured that the papers were being prepared. Suddenly my Government was confronted on 27th May with a statement from General Hilldring that a second Japanese expedition was contemplated, and this was followed swiftly on 9 June with an aide-memoire bluntly announcing that an expedition would definitely be authorized--a unilateral act which disregarded the wishes of every other member of this Commission and every other interested Government. Apparently, Mr. Chairman, the three months' respite which the economic committee gave the United States Government as a matter of courtesy resulted, not in an American counter-proposal designed to meet the views of other Governments, but in the rest of the Commission being lulled into a sense of false security and in the ultimate frustration of their wishes.

"Surely no one could maintain that the assurances given to my Government in 1946 have been fulfilled. There was no real 'Allied consultation and decision'. My Government was not 'fully consulted in connection with future proposals concerning Japanese whaling'. Apparently General MacArthur's proposal for a second expedition was considered in Washington for some weeks before any other Government was informed. If we had been approached frankly in April and informed of the Supreme Commander's proposals and the United States views, we are confident we could have reached a detailed agreement acceptable to all. My Government proposed last year that the expedition should be manned by Allied crews, and assured the United States of Australia's ability to provide the crew of one factory ship and ancillary craft. I remember very well an interview which I had with Mr. Dean Acheson on 5 October, in which I renewed that offer. But apparently, in all the consideration given to this latest expedition before other Governments were consulted, no consideration was given to the earlier Australian offer to provide crews, or to the possibility of an Allied expedition.

"Immediately my Government learned that a second expedition was contemplated, we made an earnest endeavour to find a solution which would not only meet our position but satisfy the United States. The chief argument posed by the United States appears as follows in an aide-memoire to my Government on 9 June of this year: 'The protein food products and whale oil provided by the

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expedition will be a vitally necessary component of Japanese food and oil supplies during the calendar year 1948 .... If the requisite protein foods and oil for calendar 1948 are not obtained from whaling operations, it will fall upon the United States, which continues in the interest and to the advantage of all the Allies to supply the entire Japanese food deficit, to make up the deficiency, something which, in view of the manifold demands on its fats and oils resources, it can ill afford to do.'

"My Government carefully considered this argument. We are not unappreciative of the burdens borne by the United States, and on many occasions in this Commission and in Japan we have shown a willingness to cooperate in sharing or relieving those burdens. You must remember that we did not have much time to act on this matter. If we had been consulted last April, we could have discussed various proposals in detail. But we did what we could. Mr. Macmahon Ball discussed the position with General MacArthur and officials of his staff. Here in Washington last week we began to discuss a proposal which I can best summarize by quoting from an aide-memoire which I have since given to the State Department:

" 'The difficulties of the United States Government in financing relief for Japan and the difficulties of the Supreme Commander in securing adequate supplies are fully appreciated. The Australian Government is prepared to play its part in relieving these difficulties. To this end it proposes that a factory ship and chasers should be made available to Australia immeidately for use in the coming whaling season. The Australian Government is in a position to man these ships and operate them more efficiently than the Japanese, thus increasing the amount of oil available. The allocation of the food products to relieve the Japanese food shortage would be entirely a matter for determination by the Supreme Commander, and the oil would be allocated as at present by the International Food Emergency Committee, thus assuring supplies at least as adequate as those which would be obtained from the proposed Japanese expedition. The Australian Government is prepared to consider methods of payment which would avoid the cost being a charge on United States revenue. If a separate Australian expedition is not considered feasible or desirable, Australia is prepared to conduct the expedition in association with other Allies, in particular the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Norway.'

"In putting forward that proposal, Mr. Chairman my Government deliberately refrained from going into detail because we wished to give full opportunity for the United States to state, and for us to take account of, the practical difficulties and views of the Supreme Commander and the United States Government. There are obviously many courses open in giving effect to our offer,

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such as allocating a ship as advance reparations deliveries or leasing a ship, and there are many ways of considering the financial problems involved. We feel that details can readily be worked out if agreement is first reached on the fundamental principles: that Japanese Antarctic whaling this year should be forbidden; and that the Allies themselves should be given all rights of operating any emergency expedition for the purpose of obtaining whale meat and oil for the Japanese, to be allocated by SCAP and the International Emergency Food Committee.

"My Government feels this is a matter for decision by the Far Eastern Commission, not for unilateral action by one Government. My Government's position has been supported at Committee level by nine other Governments, and I hope they will remain firm.

"Furthermore, finally I say, surely when a matter of this description is to be decided, the claims and rights and furthermore the feelings of members of those who have been allied governments together should at least receive much greater consideration than those that indeed accommodate the ideas of a government that has been an enemy of each and every one of the members of this particular Commission. And that being so, I do feel that the considerations that are due to Australia in this matter are such that should immediately engage the considerations of this Commission, and that we should determine as to what the policy shall be in regard to situations of this character, and I accordingly move the adoption of the paper before the Commission, FEC-231/4."

MR. MAKIN accordingly moved and SIR CARL BERENDSEN seconded the motion that the Commission approve FEC-231/4.

SIR CARL BERENDSEN said that his Government took the same general position as that taken by the Australian Government. He said that he had on the previous day lodged, through diplomatic channels, a protest on behalf of his Government with regard to the permission granted the Japanese by the Supreme Commander to conduct a future whaling expedition. The main objections of the New Zealand Government to such an expedition were concerned with the security aspect of the matter. The New Zealand Government had no direct economic interest in Japanese whaling except to insure proper conservation of whales and the proper use of whale products. His Government did not feel that there had been proper consultation by the United States Government in this matter with the Allies. There was full realization on the part of New Zealand of the difficulties confronting the United States in meeting its responsibility for feeding the Japanese people, and the New Zealand Government wished to share in this responsibility just as it had in the more vital responsibilities of making the necessary sacrifices to win the war.

In conclusion, SIR CARL said that his vote would certainly be cast for FEC-231/4, and he urged the United States Representative to give due consideration to the very deep convictions of the New Zealand Government and people on this matter.

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DR. LOUDON said that in the opinion of the Netherland's Delegation two matters were involved with regard to whaling: first, the general principle of whaling, and second, the specific problem of whaling by the Japanese. With regard to the formulation of a general whaling policy, it was the view of the Netherlands Government that the principle of freedom of whaling should prevail, provided the international whaling conventions were strictly observed. With regard to whaling by the Japanese, it was the Netherlands view that because of the status of Japan as an ex-enemy country, if any whaling were to be permitted in order to enable the Japanese to obtain necessary food, it should be restricted to two expeditions which should be carried out under strict observation to insure adherence to the international whaling conventions.

MR. GRAVES said that the United Kingdom position was in full accord with that which had just been presented by the Australian Representative. He pointed out that since the formal statement by General McCoy to the effect that the United States Government could not approve the proposed policy (page 1, minutes 62nd FEC meeting), a directive had been issued by the Supreme Commander to the Japanese Government granting authorization for another whaling expedition. In view of these developments it was now the view of the United Kingdom Government that to bring FEC-231/4 to a vote at present might hinder the progress of diplomatic negotiations being carried on by various Governments, including his own. For this reason, and for the further reason that Chinese, Philippine, and Soviet reservations were still maintained on the paper, he said that he would welcome postponement of final action on the paper.

MR. GUERIN said that the French view on this subject was in accord with that expressed by the Australian Government. The French Government regarded a whaling expedition to the Antarctic as a matter of international concern and a matter for consideration by the Far Eastern Commission, and it considered the security aspects to be of paramount importance. MR. GUERIN also agreed with the suggestion of the United Kingdom Representative that, in view of the diplomatic negotiations now going on, final action on FEC-231/4 should be postponed.

DR. KOO said that China's interest in whaling had heretofore been very limited. The main interest of his Government in this question for the time being centered around the security aspect of the question. China had experienced the Japanese tactic of carrying out strategic surveys under the guise of fishing expeditions, and he therefore appreciated the concern of other Representatives with regard to the Antarctic whaling expeditions by the Japanese. Although the Chinese Delegation fully appreciated the need of supplying food during the period of the occupation, the danger, in connection with whaling expeditions, of increasing or restoring Japanese war potential should be very carefully considered. It was as a measure of restricting such restoration that the Chinese Delegation had consistently supported the proposal shown in FEC-231/4. However, the matter had been referred to the Chinese Government for further instructions, and such instructions had not yet been received. He therefore supported the suggestion of Mr. Graves that final action be deferred.

MR. MAKIN said, that although he was not unmindful of the reasons offered for postponement of final action, the feeling of urgency on the part of the Australian Government in this matter was so great that he would suggest that any postponenment be

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for some period less than a week. He thought that the Commission might well hold a special meeting on Saturday, 28 June 1947, in order to reach a final decision on this extremely urgent subject.

MR ASAF ALI said that the Indian Government at present was not directly affected by the question of Japanese whaling. It was possible, however, that in the future the Government of India would take a very lively interest in long-range agreements pertaining to worldwide allocations and participation in whaling operations. With regard to the question of security, he felt that more than security from Japan was involved, and he said that his own Government was interested in international agreements which would secure India against the activities of any Government in waters close to India.

MR. ASAF ALI realized that the minimum economic needs of Japan must be taken into consideration and that consequently any attempt to deal with the particular decision of the Supreme Commander to authorize a Japanese whaling expedition would necessarily lead to a broader consideration of the economic and financial aspects of the occupation. He therefore thought that the Australian position, as supported by other Representatives, deserved very earnest consideration on the part of the United States.

MR ASAF ALI said that he would support the request of the United Kingdom Representative for postponement of final action on FEC-231/4.

MR. COLLINS said that although his Government had no direct interest in whaling and was in full sympathy with the economic difficulties confronted by the United States as the Power responsible for the maintenance of the Japanese food supply, it nevertheless regretted this unilateral action which had been taken by the Supreme Commander in the face of the opposing opinions of the majority of the Commission. The Canadian Delegation had supported the United Kingdom proposed policy statement and would continue to do so. He thought, however, that the Australia proposal of an Allied whaling expedition constituted a feasible means of solution of the economic difficulties and at the same avoided unilateral action, with its numerous unfortunate aspects. He therefore urged earnest consideration of this suggestion. He had no wrong views on the length of time final action on FEC-231/4 should be postponed.

GENERAL McCOY said that he greatly appreciated the exchange of views which had just taken place on this very important subject. He was not in a position to reply to the particular charges concerning the United States Government which had been raised in the formal statement by the Australian Representative. However, he felt that a certain amount of misunderstanding of the United States action had arisen and he presumed that this misunderstanding had been at least partly caused by the fact that diplomatic negotiations on the subject of whaling had commenced subsequently to the beginning of consideration of the subject by Committee No.2. He thought that, since any Japanese whaling expedition would not leave Japan until October in any event, there was ample time for

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these negotiations to be carried through. He therefore took the view that under the circumstances which had been enumerated during the foregoing discussion the United Kingdom request for postponement should be granted.

MR. MAKIN said that on the assurance that there would be time for consideration of such alternative proposals as might be submitted through diplomatic channels, he was prepared to concur in the decision to postpone final action on FEC-231/4. However, he urged that Representatives continue to regard the subject as one of urgency, particularly because if an Allied expedition were to be organized, a tremendous amount of preparation would be necessary before October.

THE COMMISSION unanimously agreed to postpone further consideration of FEC-231/4.

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T E L E T Y P E

From THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

WASHINGTON,

July 17th, 1947.

CYPHER - TK

WA-2258

The Department of State has considered the Australian Embassy's aide-memoire of June 23, 1947, together with the points made orally by the Australian Ambassador to the Secretary of State on July 3, 1947, and desires to state its position as follows:

The great importance which the Australian Government attaches to the question of a second Japanese-manned Antartic whaling expedition under the control of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers is noted. The Australian Government's views regarding such an expedition were first made known in the Embassy's aide-memoire of May 7 following reports in Japan that a second expedition was under consideration. On May 27 Assistant Secretary Hilldring acquainted representatives of the Australian, New Zealand, United Kingdom and Norwegian Governments with the United States position in the matter. On May 29 Ambassador Makin suggested the possibility to the Under Secretary of State that Australia undertake the expedition on behalf of Japan, and was informed by the Under Secretary that this Government would be glad to consider any specific proposals the Australian Government might wish to submit along these lines. On June 9 an aide- memoire was handed a representative of the Australian Embassy informing it that the United States Government had found it advisable to approve a second expedition on the urgent request of SCAP as necessary to the rehabilitation of a self-supporting economy for Japan. On

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June 17, six weeks after the Australian Government had become aware that a second expedition was under consideration, and three weeks after the United States position had been clarified to the representative of the Australian Government by Assistant Secretary Hilldring, an officer of the Embassy approached an officer of the Department of State to request the informal reaction of the United States Government to a proposal of the Australian Government to operate a Japanese whaling unit during the forthcoming whaling season in place of another Japanese-manned expedition under the control of the Supreme Commander. The United States Government would have been ready fully and promptly to state its view on this proposal at any time during the previous six weeks, but its position by June 18, when the proposal was placed before the responsible officers of the Department, had reached a definitive form in the statement already prepared and approved for reading by General McCoy to the Far Eastern Commission on June 19. Although the Supreme Commander requested authority by May 15 to conduct a second expedition in order to allow adequate time for the necessary preparations, it was not until June 19, over a month after this date, that final approval of the expedition was dispatched to him, affording the interested governments ample time to submit any views or counterproposals they might have.

The United States Government has been guided in its reply by the fact that the expedition last year under the Supreme Commander's control resulted in the acquisition of considerable quantities of foreign exchange through the sale abroad of part of the whale oil obtained on the expedition. These funds have been available for the purchase of other foods needed in Japan, permitting a significant reduction of the occupation burden on the American taxpayer, and would not be obtained by the United States from the 1947-48 expedition

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under the Australian proposal.

As indicated in the United States Government's aide-memoire of June 9 to the Australian Embassy, this Government perceives no security threat to any nation in a second whaling expedition under the control of the Supreme Commander. In the absence of apparent security risk, or of any probability that International Whaling Regulations will not be fully observed, there appears to be no justification for the abandonment of the second expedition. The United States regards the expedition as necessary to the rehabilitation of a self-supporting economy for Japan, which is the policy of this Government. It is regretted that under the circumstances the United States Government does not feel free to accept the Australian Government's proposal contained in the Embassy's aide-memoire of June 23, Ends.

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Japanese Peace Settlement: Control of Narcotic Drugs

1. On the recommendation of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations at its 4th Session (March 28th) adopted a resolution that provisions should be included in the Japanese peace treaty for the control of narcotic drugs in Japan. The resolution read as follows:

> "The Economic and Social Council having considered the problem of the control of narcotic drugs in Japan, and the recommendations of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs on this subject,
>
> "Having noted that the most stringent measures for the control of narcotic drugs should be incorporated in the peace treaties to be concluded with Japan,
>
> "Recommends to the Governments responsible for negotiating these treaties that provision should be made in them for the most stringent control in the period after the conclusion of the treaties of all transactions concerning narcotic drugs in Japan, and that to ensure effective operation this control should be under the supervision of such control authorities as may be established by the peace treaties and of the United Nations, whose expert bodies will be available to give such information and advice as may be requested."

2. As Canada has played an active part in the development of international control in the traffic narcotic drugs, and as Colonel C.H.L. Sharman, Canadian delegate, has been elected Chairman of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs at its first two sessions, it would be appropriate for the Canadian delegation attending the Japanese peace conference to take the lead, if necessary, in proposing inclusion of provisions in the Japanese peace treaty for the control of narcotic drugs.

3. In this paper there is given a full account of the discussions in the Commission on Narcotic Drugs leading to the adoption of the recommendation for treaty control of narcotic drugs in Japan which was submitted to the Economic and Social Council. Some account of the consideration of this resolution in the Economic and Social Council is also included.

4. At the first session of the United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs, which met at Lake Success from November 27 to December 12, 1946, the United States representative, Mr. H.J. Anslinger (U.S. Commissioner of Narcotics) made a statement (annexed) about conditions found in Japan by the United States military authorities when they entered that country after Japan's surrender. It showed that the Japanese Government had exercised in the past no organized control over distribution, that there was no central authority for the suppression of illicit traffic and that it had wilfully violated its treaty obligations. Proof was found that the Japanese Government had knowingly submitted to the Permanent Central Opium Board false and fraudulent reports grossly understating and thereby concealing their actual production of narcotic drugs, particularly heroin. Two sets of records were maintained by the Japanese Governments, one false, which was

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furnished to the Board, and another containing the true production figures. The United States representative similarly made a statement regarding the conditions which the United States military authorities found in Southern Korea. As in the case of the statement regarding Japan, the charges made by the United States representative before the Opium Advisory Committee in 1937, 1938 and 1939 in Geneva were now shown to be fully supported. The Commission took note of the report of the Permanent Central Opium Board that the United States occupying authorities had established a strict centralized supervision of narcotics in Japan and Korea and desired to associate itself with the expression of the Board's appreciation of the initiative taken by the military authorities responsible at Pacific Headquarters, by the Department of State and by the Commissioner of Narcotics of the United States in bringing about this desirable result.

5. A proposal was later submitted by the Chinese representative, Dr. Szeming Sze, regarding the future control of narcotic drugs in Japan with a view to preventing that country from again becoming a centre of the illicit traffic.

6. An Ad Hoc Committee of seven members (China, France, India, Netherlands, United Kingdom, United States and U.S.S.R.) was appointed to study the proposal and in their report there was unanimous agreement upon the following five points:

"1. The production of raw materials <u>for the purpose of manufacturing narcotic drugs</u> and the manufacture or conversion of narcotic drugs shall be prohibited in Japan.

"3. The import of narcotic drugs into Japan <u>shall not exceed</u> the total of the estimates of the Supervisory Body for medical and scientific needs, <u>irrespective of any estimates furnished by the Japanese Government</u>.

"4. The distribution of narcotic drugs within Japan shall be strictly regulated and controlled by the Government of Japan, which shall submit regular reports to the United Nations.

"5. The keeping of any Government stocks of narcotic drugs in Japan shall be prohibited, <u>but a reserve stock for normal consumption</u> (as envisaged by Article 5 of the 1931 Convention), <u>but not for conversion or for export, may be allowed</u> to the extent authorized by the Supervisory Body.

"6. The export of all <u>narcotic substances</u> shall be prohibited."

7. It was also recommended that the Government of Japan should be bound by the provisions of all international conventions in respect of narcotic drugs and by the further obligations set out in the present proposals.

8. The Committee studied the proposal from various aspects and gave special consideration to the paracticability of establishing an international stock pile by the United Nations as recommended by the Chinese delegate. Some considered that such a stock pile should be established by an international

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authority, the charter of such authority to be approved by the Economic and Social Council, and this was accepted as an amendment to the proposal of the delegate for China. Other members considered that adequate security would be provided by requiring all imports of narcotic drugs into Japan to receive the prior sanction of an Inspectorate appointed by the United Nations. It was accordingly decided, since all were agreed on the same objective, that both these alternatives should be laid before the Narcotic Commission.

9. Under the Chinese proposal, referred to as Alternative "A", paragraph 2 would read:

> "A stock pile of narcotic drugs shall be established by an international authority at the proposed Far Eastern Regional Office of the United Nations or at some suitable centre designated by the Economic and Social Council on the recommendation of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs. The Charter of this authority shall be approved by the Economic and Social Council."
>
> Paragraph 3 would read:
>
> "The import of narcotic drugs.....shall be permitted only from the international stock pile."
>
> A paragraph 7 would be added:
>
> "The above-mentioned measures of narcotic control shall be supervised by United Nations inspectors."

On the other hand, Alternative "B" would require paragraph 3 to read as follows:

> "3. (a) Imports of narcotic drugs into Japan shall be made only by the Government of Japan, which shall send all indents through an Inspectorate appointed for this purpose by the United Nations.
>
> (b) Such imports shall not exceed the total of the estimates of the Supervisory Body for medical and scientific needs, irrespective of any estimates furnished by the Japanese Government.
>
> (c) Suppliers of narcotic drugs shall not comply with such indents unless they are validated by the United Nations Inspectorate.
>
> (d) Countries producing narcotic drugs shall ensure that no consignment of such drugs is supplied from their territory to Japan unless it is covered by written sanction from the United Nations Inspectorate.
>
> (e) All indents for and supplies to Japan shall be regularly reported to the United Nations and to the Permanent Central Opium Board."
>
> Article 7 to be omitted.

10. Doubts were expressed as to the practicability of maintaining an international stock pile of narcotic drugs and some members considered that adequate security could as

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effectively and more conveniently be provided by requiring all imports of narcotic drugs into Japan to receive the prior sanction of an Inspectorate appointed by the United Nations prohibiting manufacturers from complying with Japanese indents for such drugs unless endorsed by the Inspectorate and requiring Governments of the countries of manufacture to ensure that no consignment of such drugs leaves their territory for Japan except with the written sanction of the United Nations Inspectorate.

11. The Committee felt that both suggestions should be laid before the Commission for consideration.

12. In order to ensure that the terms of such control are incorporated in the Peace Treaties which are presently to be concluded with Japan it was recommended that the Economic and Social Council should be requested to send their recommendations in regard to Japan to the Far Eastern Commission, with copies to all Governments represented on the Commission and to the Allied military authorities now in control of Japan.

13. The report of the Ad Hoc Committee was duly approved by the Narcotic Commission which decided to forward both Alternatives "A" and "B" to the Economic and Social Council. In order that the Economic and Social Council might be guided by an expression of the technical opinions of the Commission with regard to the merits of the two alternatives, a roll call vote was taken. The majority, consisting of the delegates for France, India, Netherlands, Peru, Turkey and the United Kingdom, voted for Alternative "B" . The delegates for China, Egypt and the United States voted for Alternative "A", while the delegates for Canada, Iran, Mexico, Poland, U.S.S.R. and Yugoslavia abstained. In support of Alternative "B" it was stated that an Inspectorate involved machinery which could be established more easily and more quickly, while the expense involved would be less. It would mean strengthening the existing machinery of international control and in fact would be correcting the known weaknesses in the present system; it was also felt that, against Alternative "A", such a large stock of narcotic drugs would involve practical difficulties of administration, including difficulties in preventing leakages and in finding, the necessary technical personnel.

14. In support of Alternative "A" it was stated that one stock pile would cover Japan and any other countries in the region which might wish to use the facilities of the stock pile. If the Far Eastern stock pile were shown to be successful, it could become a model for other regions. The proposed international authority could take its place beside the Permanent Central Opium Board and the Supervisory Body as another cog in the international machinery of narcotic control. It was felt that the expense need not necessarily be great, nor should one be overcome by fears of possible practical difficulties of administration which were already being faced by national authorities.

15. Colonel C.H.L. Sharman strongly recommended that Canada confirm at the next meeting of the Economic and Social Council the preference expressed by the Narcotic Commission for Alternative "B". From a number of angles administrative obstacles to the efficient application of Alternative "A" might well be found insuperable, while from the practical standpoint the dangers of having an enormous stock of narcotics located in one stock pile at any given point and particularly in the Orient would be asking for trouble. Alternative "A" would also involve the creation of another control body with technical adjuncts, thus adding to the two international control bodies (the Permanent Central Opium Board and the Supervisory Body) now in existence. The whole policy envisaged

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for years past has been that there should eventually be but one such Body and that when a convention for the limitation of production has been achieved the control necessitated thereby should not involve the formation of an additional Body but should be merged with the two existing Bodies into one overall authority.

16. Another advantage in relation to Alternative "B" is that the method of control envisaged therein could easily be handled by the existing Bodies, i.e., the Permanent Central Opium Board and the Supervisory Body, thus not only avoiding the necessity for the creation of a new Body, but at the same time avoiding the enormous administrative and safeguarding difficulties which those with expert knowledge of narcotic administration unanimously envisage.

17. When the 4th Session of the Economic and Social Council met on March 12, 1947 to consider the report of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs Colonel C.H.L. Sharman, Chairman of the Commission, in introducing the report made the following remarks concerning the recommendation for the control of narcotic drugs in Japan:

> "The Chinese delegate had submitted a proposal for the total prohibition of the manufacture of narcotic drugs in Japan and for the creation of a United Nations stock of narcotic drugs which would be the sole source of supply for the medical and scientific needs of Japan. Two alternatives had been suggested: alternative (a) proposed the creation of an international stock for the legitimate needs of Japan: alternative (b) proposed that all import of narcotic drugs into Japan should be subject to the santion of a United Nations inspectorate.
>
> "With a view to incorporating such terms of control in the peace treaties with Japan, the Commission had recommended that the Council should send its recommendations in regard to Japan to the Far Eastern Commission, with copies to all governments represented on the Commission, and to the Allied Control Commissions."

18. Mr. Walter Nash of New Zealand suggested that the cooperation of certain specialized and other agencies with the Narcotics Commission might be invited; he proposed the World Health Organization; the Food and Agriculture Organization; the International Monetary Fund; the Bank of International Development and Reconstruction; and the International Chamber of Commerce. The International Chamber of Commerce could help by refusing to handle narcotics; the International Bank could withhold financial support from the countries producing them.

19. The Council decided to ask the Committee on Social Affairs to examine the report of the Narcotic Commission. On March 4 the Committee on Social Affairs took up the report of the Narcotic Commission when, after considerable discussion in relation to the control of narcotics in Japan, the New Zealand delegate proposed a compromise recommendation as follows:

> "The Committee recommends to the Economic and Social Council to take steps necessary to advise the

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Governments responsible for drafting the peace treaty with Japan of the necessity for making provision in the treaty for complete control during the occupation and the post-occupation period of the manufacture, importation and distribution of all narcotic drugs and that to ensure effective operation this control should be under the general supervision of the United Nations."

This provoked further discussion during which the New Zealand delegate expressed disagreement with the recommendation of the Narcotic Commission that the export of narcotics from Japan should be specifically prohibited. Colonel Sharman pointed out that the United States Military Government in Japan had found unquestionable evidence of wilful violations of treaty obligations by the Japanese Government, as well as of false and fraudulent reports to the Permanent Central Opium Board, and that for this reason the Commission felt that it was dangerous to allow Japan any surplus stock beyond her medicinal requirements. At the request of the Byelorussian representative a decision upon the New Zealand resolution was postponed until a later meeting, while it was decided to delete any reference to Korea.

19. During the following week the Committee did not again take up narcotic questions but there was an extensive interchange of opinions as to whether or not the resolution in relation to Japan submitted by the New Zealand representative went far enough. There was agreement on the part of the United Kingdom and United States representatives, and the Secretariat and the Chairman of the Narcotic Commission, that such resolution should be strengthened, at least to some extent. Eventually, Dr. Sze (a member of the Chinese delegation and acting therefor in the Social Affairs Committee, and who was also Rapporteur of the Narcotic Commission) spent several hours with the Director of the Narcotic Division and the Chairman of the Narcotic Commission in an endeavour to draft a resolution which would be sufficiently comprehensive, and a form of words was evolved which met with the approval of all three. Later, to the surprise and without the prior knowledge of the Secretariat or Colonel Sharman, Dr. Sze negotiated with the U.S.S.R. delegate in relation to the resolution in question and emerged from his encounter with a very much emasculated formula, which was in fact considerably weaker than the original New Zealand resolution, which it was desired to strengthen. Meanwhile, Dr. Sze had returned to Washington and it was only possible to advise him by telephone that in so far as both the Secretariat and the Narcotic Commission were concerned his resolution as it now stood was quite unacceptable. The Secretariat and Colonel Sharman proceeded to prepare a draft resolution untilizing the New Zealand wording as far as possible, but embodying the absolute minimum standard required. This resolution read:

"THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL
HAVING NOTED that the most stringent measures for the control of narcotic drugs should be incorporated in the peace treaties to be concluded with Japan HEREBY RESOLVES to recommend to the Governments responsible for making those treaties that provision should be made in them for the most stringent control, in the period after the conclusion of the treaties, of all transactions concerning narcotic drugs in regard to Japan and that to

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ensure effective operation this control should be under the supervision of the United Nations, whose expert bodies would be available to give such information and advice as may be requested."

21. This draft resolution made no specific reference to export of narcotics from Japan and made provision for the expert bodies of the United Nations being available to give such information and advice as might be requested by the Governments responsible for formulating the peace treaty with Japan. This was shown to the United Kingdom and the United States delegates, as representing the absolute minimum that the Narcotic Commission could recommend, and received their approval, in fact both delegates at the next meeting of the Committee on Social Affairs on March 12 proposed the necessary amendments to the New Zealand resolution which also were agreed to by the New Zealand delegate. When the resolution was finally approved it was in fact slightly stronger than the minimum required in that it referred to such control "being under the supervision of such control authorities as may be established by the peace treaties, and of the United Nations, whose expert bodies will be available to give such information and advice as may be requested."

22. A memorandum was also prepared pointing out that so far as exterior control was concerned the Permanent Central Opium Board might well be called upon to guarantee the efficacy thereof, but that there remained the other half of the problem, i.e. internal control, involving distribution within the country for which new machinery would be necessary.

23. The Economic and Social Council at its meeting on March 28 adopted the resolution quoted in paragraph 1 of this paper.

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STATEMENT MADE BY MR. HARRY J. ANSLINGER, THE UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE ON THE COMMISSION ON NARCOTIC DRUGS REGARDING JAPAN

The United States Military Government in Japan found that opium was produced in limited quantities in Japan proper, Formosa, Korea and quite extensively in Manchuria. This report deals with Japan proper. The opium produced in Japan was collected by a government monopoly agency, the Tokyo Hygienic Laboratory and by it distributed to the other monopoly agency at Osaka and to the five privately owned opium factories.

No complete figures of opium production are available inasmuch as these were kept at the Tokyo Hygienic Laboratory and are alleged to have been destroyed by bombings in 1945.

Figures available at the five factories indicate that, exclusive of the quantities used at the Tokyo and Osaka Monopoly Agencies, 193,447.514 kilograms were distributed between 1930 and 1945.

No information is available from which conclusions as to the probable quantities used at the Tokyo and Osaka plants can be safely drawn. Coca leaves were not produced in Japan proper although large quantities were produced in Formosa.

There were six factories in Japan proper manufacturing narcotic drugs from opium and raw morphine:

1. Tokyo Hygienic Laboratory, which produced codeine phosphate.

2. Osaka Hygienic Laboratory, which produced medicinal opium.

3. Hoshi Pharmaceutical Company Industries Limited, which produced heroin hydrochloride and morphine hydrochloride.

4. The Takeda Pharmaceutical Industries Limited, Tokyo, which produced narcopon and morphine hydrochloride.

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5. Sankyo Company, Limited, Tokyo, which produced heroin hydrochloride and morphine hydrochloride.

6. The Dai Nippon Pharmaceutical Company, Limited, Osaka, which produced heroin hydrochloride and morphine hydrochloride.

There were five factories producing cocaine from coca leaves procured from South America, Okinawa and Formosa, and from crude cocaine procured from Formosa:

1. Hoshi Pharmaceutical Company, Limited, Tokyo.
2. Sankyo Company, Limited, Tokyo.
3. Koto Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Company, Shizuoka Prefecture.
4. Takeda Pharmaceutical Industries, Limited, Osaka.
5. The Shionogi Pharmaceutical Company, Limited, Osaka.

The total production of heroin hydrochloride from 1930 through 1944 was 13,798.830 kilograms, or an average of 919.922 kilograms per year.

The total production of morphine hydrochloride from 1930 through 1945 was 14,391.533 kilograms or an average of 899.471 kilograms per year.

The total production of cocaine hydrochloride from 1936 through 1945 was 16,851.057 kilograms or an average through 1944 of 1123.404 kilograms per year.

The Hygienic Laboratories at Tokyo and Osaka were government owned and operated. The privately owned factories were licensed annually by the Central Government. Factories were required to submit quarterly reports of raw materials processed and production therefrom. There was no limitation as to quantities of narcotic drugs they could sell and

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no records or reports of sales were required. There was no governmental inspection or supervision of these plants.

Jobbers and wholesalers were not licensed by the Central Government but obtained authorization annually from the Governor of each prefecture to deal in narcotic drugs. They were not required to submit reports as to their purchases, sales or inventories. This careless system accounted for large scale diversion.

Any physician or pharmacist duly licensed by the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs to engage in their respective professions were ipso facto authorized to purchase, sell or dispense narcotic drugs. No further annual registration was necessary. They were not required to maintain records of their purchases, sales or inventories.

No periodical inspection or supervision of manufacturers, wholesalers, physicians or pharmacists was carried out. There was, therefore, no organized control over distribution.

No effort was made by the manufacturers and wholesalers to safeguard their crude and finished narcotic drug stocks. These drugs were stored in unprotected rooms with glass, panelled, or thin wire screen doors, with cheap locks which could be easily forced. Crude and processed drugs were scattered throughout the laboratories and in the largest plant in Japan, women were seen preparing packages of morphine under open sheds in the yard.

This situation has been corrected by the installation of brick storage vaults, heavy steel doors and dial combination locks.

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The officials of the Japanese Government and the manufacturers maintained that their production merely equaled their consumption and the narcotic drugs they produced were only sufficient to meet their legitimate medical needs.

No authentic figures were available as to the number of addicts in Japan proper, however, it has been disclosed that the number is probably considerably greater than the reports of Japanese officials have led us to believe.

A raid on a Geisha House during the summer of 1946 disclosed that four of the seven inmates were addicted. Some addicts have been found who require ten grains morphine daily. One addicted practitioner recently arrested had been posing as a narcotic official in order to gain access to narcotic supplies and had thus robbed seventeen hospitals during a three months period.

A directive issued October 12, 1945, prohibited the growth, planting of narcotic drug plants or seeds and the importation, exportation and manufacture. It also froze all marihuana and heroin stocks and ordered all records to be preserved and maintained.

A directive issued November 2, 1945, ordered the seizure of all heroin and its derivatives and preparations and making it unlawful for the Japanese to possess, transport or sell it.

A directive issued January 22, 1946, ordered the establishment of an effective narcotic control.

The American Armed Forces in Japan seized the following amounts of crude and finished narcotic drugs as of January 19, 1946:

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Crude opium	47,838	kilograms
Medicinal opium	620	"
Morphine hydrochloride	1,235	"
Morphine sulphate	15	"
Crude morphine	871	"
Coca leaves	14,500	"
Crude cocaine	888	"
Cocaine hydrochloride	775	"

Seizure reports will be submitted.

Eight Japanese were arrested in April 1946, and later convicted of an attempt to smuggle into Japan approximately seven tons of opium which had been removed from army stocks in Manchuria.

There was no central authority for the suppression of the illicit traffic and the maxium sentence under the Home Ordinance was three months. The situation was corrected on June 19, 1946, by the enactment of narcotic legislation similar to the American narcotic law which provides for annual registration, monthly reports, sales by means of order forms or prescriptions, et cetera. The penalty was increased to five years. As of July 19, 1945, 77,311 were already registered under the provisions of the new Act. Enforcement in charge of an American official is being carried out by approximately 200 native inspectors. Courts are now meting out five-year sentences which inaugurates a new era in narcotic enforcement in Japan. Stocks have been inventoried and those held by registrants have been leveled off to a six months' supply.

The Japanese Government wilfully violated its Treaty obligations. It has been definitely established from a survey of the production records of the drug factories and interviews with officials that the Japanese Government knowingly submitted to the Permanent Central Opium Board, false and fraudulent reports, grossly understating and thereby con-

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cealing their actual production of narcotic drugs, particularly heroin.

Two sets of records were maintained by the Japanese Government, one false, which was furnished the board and another containing true production figures. One official, when questioned regarding these records stated this falsification was done "to save the face of Japan". The official was removed from office by the Japanese Government at the direction of the Military Government. A comparison of true production of heroin with the quantities reported to the Board during the years 1937 and 1938 is as follows:

	Quantity Reported to Board	Actually Produced
1937	200 kilograms	1673.965 kilograms
1938	200 "	1392.469 "

October 27, 1937, the Japanese Government, through Eiicha Baba, Minister of Home Affairs, issued Directive No. 29, marked "Most Secret" directing certain drug manufacturers to produce stipulated quantities of heroin hydrochloride and morphine hydrochloride for the Manchurian Government. Quoted are articles (1) and (5) of the Directive.

"(1) To enforce the Monopoly of narcotic drugs in Manchuria, the production for the necessary amount to be supplied to the Monopoly Bureau of that said country is approved."

"(5) Extreme secrecy is to be maintained concerning these productions and storings."

In compliance with this directive between October 1937 and August 1938, 1,199.600 kilograms of heroin hydrochloride and 300 kilograms of morphine hydrochloride were produced in Japan and shipped to the Opium Monopoly Bureau, Army Arsenal, Mukden, Manchuria.

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The raw morphine for the production was furnished by the Formosa Government. Neither the production nor the shipments of the heroin hydrochloride or the morphine hydrochloride were reported to the Permanent Central Opium Board by the Japanese Government. This vividly demonstrates the need for inspection by an international body if treaties controlling a commodity are to be effective.

The Permanent Central Opium Board which met in London during October of this year stated:

"It is evident that the American occupying authorities have taken great interest in the control of narcotics and have taken especial care to establish a strict centralized supervision. The Board desires to express its appreciation to the military authorities responsible at Pacific Headquarters for their work..."

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WAR CRIMES INDICTMENT OF JAPANESE

The indictment, presented to the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, charges twenty-eight high Japanese officials with certain war crimes. During the whole period covered by the indictment, successive Japanese Governments, through their military and naval commanders and civilian agents in China and other territories which they had occupied or designed to occupy, pursued a systematic policy of weakening the native inhabitants' will to resist by atrocities and cruelties, by force and threats of force, by bribery and corruption, by intrigue amongst local politicians and generals, by directly and indirectly encouraging increased production and importation of opium and other narcotics and by promoting the sale and consumption of such drugs among such people. The Japanese Government secretly provided large sums of money, which, together with profits from the government-sponsored traffic in opium and other narcotics and other trading activities in such areas, were used by agents of the Japanese Government for all the above-mentioned purposes. At the same time, the Japanese Government was actively participating in the proceedings of the League of Nations Committee on Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs and, despite her secret activities above-mentioned, professed to the world to be co-operating fully with other member nations in the enforcement of treaties governing traffic in opium and other narcotics to which she was a party.

This participation in and sponsorship of illicit traffic in narcotics was effected through a number of Japanese governmental organizations such as the

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Manchurian Affairs Board, the China Affairs Board and the Southern Region Affairs Board, which were combined in 1942 to form the Greater East Asia Ministry, and numerous subsidiary organizations and trading companies in the various occupied and so-called independent (puppet) countries which were operated or supervized by senior officers or civilian appointees of the Army and the Navy.

Further, revenue from the above-mentioned traffic in opium and other narcotics was used to finance the preparation for and waging of the wars of aggression set forth in the indictment and to establish and finance the puppet governments set up by the Japanese Government in the various occupied territories.

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NOTE RE REPARATIONS

Despatch No.1561 of July 22 from Washington, which is referred to in paragraph 4 of this memorandum, is contained in Appendix A.

The Report on Commission Activities is also contained in Appendix A.

The Summary of Canadian War Effort and Losses in the Pacific Theatre, referred to in paragraph 14, is attached to the memorandum entitled "Restitution and the Protection of Property, Rights and Interests."

In addition to the documents referred to in the text of the memorandum, the following items are attached:

Telegram (No. 10 of June 26) from Canberra to Ottawa, re Australian views on Japanese reparations.

Telegram (No. 17 of June 27) from Wellington to Ottawa, re New Zealand views on Japanese reparations.

Despatch (No. A 460 of May 20) from Canadian High Commissioner (London) to Ottawa, re claims of the United Kingdom, Burma and the Colonies for Japanese reparations.

Copies of the Final Act of the Paris Conference on Reparation are being sent to Canberra, but are not being included in the brief.

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JAPANESE PEACE SETTLEMENT: REPARATIONS.

1. Reparation may be defined as the obligation of the vanquished to compensate the victor to the greatest possible extent for war loss, budgetary cost, and damage to property arising out of the war. The principle of exacting reparations in kind which has been adopted after the recent war permits reparations programs to be integrated with policies of economic demilitarization for security purposes. Another generally accepted principle, which is progressively being given more and more weight in reparations discussions, is that reparations should not become a crippling burden on the vanquished country, since the existence of economically depressed areas anywhere in the world is detrimental to world-wide economic recovery. In the exaction of reparations, therefore, considerations of justice and security must be balanced by the requirements of a viable economy in the defeated country. This approach to the reparations question is evident in the Potsdam Declaration, paragraph 11 of which states:

> "Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy and permit the exaction of just reparations in kind, but not those which would enable her to re-arm for war."

2. Canadian Interests

Canada's approach to the problem of Japanese reparations has taken into account the requirements of justice, security and economic recovery. In view of the loss of Canadian lives and the personal injuries suffered in the war against Japan, the budgetary cost of the war, and the damage wrought upon Canadian property in all parts of the Far East, the government has an obligation to the Canadian people to secure the payment of reparations by Japan, and to this end Canada has taken part in the work of the Far Eastern Commission relating to reparations. Insofar as the reparations programme for Japan has been designed to bring about a reduction in Japan's industrial war potential, the Canadian government has supported it as a necessary security measure to ensure that Japan will not again be able to re-arm for war. On the other hand, the Canadian government has at all times taken the view that a viable economy for Japan is in the long run more in the interests of the victor countries than the exaction of reparations. We have frequently taken the position that our chief interest with regard to the peace settlement in Europe and the Far East is in the revival of economic activity in enemy countries after security requirements have been satisfied.

3. Within the framework of the broad considerations mentioned above, the Canadian attitude to programmes for the exaction of reparations from Japan has been further conditioned by the following three facts:

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(a) Canada's war effort and losses in the conflict with Japan were small in comparison with those of most other member nations of the Far Eastern Commission.

(b) Private claims against Japan on record in Canada (and without advertisement) exceed the value of Japanese assets held by the Canadian Government by approximately $11 millions. A large proportion of these claims will not be covered by such restitution and compensation clauses as the peace treaty may contain.

(c) Japanese industrial assets available for reparations, being designed for the use of cheap labour and not easily adaptable to Canadian requirements, are not of much interest to Canadian industrialists.

It was originally suggested that in view of (a) above, Canada might waive her claim for reparations against Japan, as was done in the case of Italy. This course was deemed to be unwise principally because of the consideration mentioned in (b). In spite of efforts made to interest Canadian manufacturers in some of the Japanese industrial plants and facilities to be made available as reparations, the statement in (c) has proved to be largely true. Aluminium Limited is the only Canadian company which has shown an active interest in obtaining Japanese industrial assets on the Canadian reparations account.

4. Canada has taken part in all the work of the Far Eastern Commission relating to reparations. Owing to the shortage of personnel in the Department of External Affairs, the lack of research facilities in Ottawa, and the limited nature of our interests in Japanese reparations, Canada did not participate actively in the drafting of the interim reparations removal programme. The final reparations removal programme has not been of special interest to us except insofar as it may affect the Japanese aluminum industry. With regard to the various proposals which have been considered by the Far Eastern Commission for handling the reparations problem, we have indicated our willingness to cooperate in any scheme which would satisfy the majority of the nations concerned (e.g. the establishment of an Inter-Allied Reparations Committee which was considered in April, 1946, and the convening of a Reparations Conference which was proposed for August, 1946). Canada has participated actively in the recent discussions relating to the division of shares of Japanese internal assets. In general, our relatively small interest has enabled us to take a fairly flexible attitude to most of the problems which have come before the Commission. (See paragraph on reparations on page 3 of memorandum enclosed with despatch No.1561 of July 22 from Washington).

5. Work of the Far Eastern Commission

Although the Far Eastern Commission has devoted a great deal of its time to Japanese reparations the record of accomplishment is not impressive. It includes an interim reparations removal programme and a number of general policy decisions relating to the selection of

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plants for reparations removal, the delivery of reparations goods and the principles to be observed in the division of reparations shares. (See Report on Commission Activities, Part III, Section C, page 12). If the Far Eastern Commission makes any progress in the next few months it may be able to add to this list a final reparations removal programme and a policy decision on the principles for the division of shares of Japanese shipping reparations.

6. The Far Eastern Commission has made no policy decision with respect to the payment of reparations by Japan in any form other than the removal of industrial equipment. The disposition of and accounting for Japanese external assets and the payment of reparations from current production have not been considered at any length in the Far Eastern Commission. With regard to the division of reparations shares the Commission's efforts have been confined to spadework on the problem of dividing up Japanese internal assets in the form of industrial equipment only. It is probable that most of these issues will be still outstanding when the peace conference is called and they will very likely be subject to considerable discussion at Canberra. On a good many questions the Canadian position is still fluid. Full accounts of the views of other Commonwealth governments on reparations questions will be very useful to the Canadian government in the formulation of reparations policy.

7. External Assets

This is one of the principal questions which the Far Eastern Commission has left unsolved, and which may well be raised at the peace conference. The U.S.S.R. has consistently maintained that the Commission is not empowered under its terms of reference to make decisions affecting the disposal of Japanese external assets or to take these assets into account in the determination of reparations shares. When the Far Eastern Commission first met in March, 1946, the Soviet representative indicated that in his government's view the jurisdiction of the Commission included only questions pertaining to the territory of Japan itself, i.e., the Japanese islands. From this position the Soviet Union has never withdrawn. This attitude may no doubt be explained in part by the Soviet's unwillingness to have the Far Eastern Commission discuss the large-scale removals of industrial equipment from Manchuria which were carried out by the U.S.S.R. early in 1946. The U.S.S.R. has maintained that this equipment was war booty of the Red Army and the removals are therefore not relevant to the reparations question.

8. The United Kingdom has attached great importance to Japanese external assets and has expressed the view that they will be double the value of capital equipment removed from Japan as reparations. (See DO telegram 152 of June 21, attached). Consequently, the United Kingdom has been unwilling to discuss any scheme for the division of reparations shares which does not take external assets into account.

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9. The United States and the Soviet Union carried on prolonged discussions which revolved mainly around the question of external assets through direct diplomatic channels without reaching any satisfactory conclusions. (See FEC 081/3, attached). The Far Eastern Commission has since avoided the external assets question and has devoted its efforts to devising some scheme for reaching an agreement on the division of shares of reparations to be removed from Japan. Progress towards a solution of the problem of division of shares has been very slow, and at the moment it does not appear likely that the question will be settled for some time to come. The Australians particularly are anxious to see the whole reparations question left over to the peace conference. The peace conference would not of course be hindered in any way from discussing external assets, and it is probable that the United Kingdom too will not be displeased if a fresh approach to the division of shares question, taking external assets into account, can be made at the peace conference.

10. Our basic policy with regard to external assets has been that while we are quite willing to have our holdings of Japanese external assets taken into account in the final division of reparations shares, we wish to reserve the right to dispose of them. Since our share of Japanese reparations is likely to be very small, the question as to whether external assets are taken into account or not in the division of shares has not been a particularly important one from our point of view. External assets should, of course, be taken into account if an equitable distribution of other reparations assets is to be devised. Our approach to this problem in recent months has, however, been conditioned by our desire to see an early settlement of the reparations problem, and accordingly we have taken the realistic view that if the Far Eastern Commission is to make any progress towards the settlement of this question, external assets would have to be ignored.

11. So far as the Canberra conference is concerned therefore, we may continue to take the attitude that we would be willing to cooperate in any scheme which will effect a settlement of the division of shares problem, whether it takes account of Japanese external assets or not. Our only reservation would be that stated at the beginning of paragraph 10 above, that we retain the right to dispose of any Japanese assets within Canadian jurisdiction at our own discretion.

12. Division of Shares

In the Far Eastern Commission the United Kingdom has consistently taken the view that division of shares should be made on "broad political lines". There was a disposition among some of the other delegations to give some consideration to the use of statistical data in determining reparations shares, but as both the United States and the U.S.S.R. came to adopt the United Kingdom view, the Commission as a whole fell into line and a policy decision was adopted in May, 1947, by the Commission, indicating that the division of shares should be on a "broad political basis". (See Report on Commission Activities, Appendix 26, attached).

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13. This relatively meaningless phrase has not brought the eleven nations concerned much closer to a solution of the shares problem. In May the Australian member indicated his Government's displeasure with the method which was being adopted by the Commission for working toward an agreement and in expressing the view that the whole reparations problem should be left over to the peace conference he implied that Australia favoured the use of statistical data in some form as an aid in solving the problem of the division of shares. (See WA 1416 of May 6, attached). There is a good deal to be said in favour of the statistical approach and quite possibly some sort of partial agreement might be reached between a few countries whose statistics might be reasonably reliable. On the other hand, as the United Kingdom has pointed out, the use of statistical data would probably only stimulate fruitless discussions and there is little likelihood that sound bases of comparison could be arrived at. It would in fact be difficult to compute the war losses and damage suffered by Far Eastern countries invaded by the Japanese.

14. We originally favoured a limited use of statistical data in the determination of the division of reparations shares and at the request of this Department, the Bureau of Statistics prepared a brief statistical summary of the Canadian war effort and losses in the Far East for use in this connection. (Copy attached). As the discussions progressed in the Far Eastern Commission it became more and more apparent that statistical data would not likely figure in any system devised to arrive at an agreed division of shares. In view of the change in circumstances our representative was instructed not to press for the use of statistical data in this connection.

15. In view of our comparatively small interest in Japanese reparations it would seem desirable that we should keep our attitude flexible; however, all evidence tends to support the United Kingdom view that there could be no real basis of comparison between the statistical data presented by the various countries concerned.

16. A word should be said with regard to the Commission's recent efforts to devise a method for the division of shares of Japanese internal assets available for reparations. In April of this year the Far Eastern Commission Reparations Committee passed the following resolution:

(a) Each country represented on the Commission should submit within fourteen days the percentage share of reparations, determined on broad political lines, which it desires to receive from industrial assets within Japan declared available for reparations.

(b) In addition, each member willing to do so should submit conclusions that would facilitate the establishment by the Far Eastern Commission of reparations percentage shares for member countries, provided that the conclusions submitted have the tentative support of either his government or the head of his government's Far Eastern Commission delegation.

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17. It was decided that the Canadian representative on the Far Eastern Commission should lodge a claim on behalf of the Canadian Government for 1½% of the reparations assets available in compliance with (a) above. In determining this figure the following points were taken into account:

(1) The budgetary cost of the war and the amount of private claims against Japan voluntarily filed with the Custodian of Enemy Property in relation to the amount of Japanese assets held by the Custodian.

(2) The relationship of the Canadian percentage share to the type of reparations for which Canadian bids will probably be made.

(3) The information available on views of other countries concerning an appropriate share for Canada.

(4) The 1½% share allotted to Canada in the category of industry and other capital equipment to be removed from Germany in accordance with the final act of the Paris Conference on reparations.

(5) The tactical advantage to be gained by setting the Canadian claim at a modest figure.

18. In compliance with part (b) of the resolution mentioned above the Canadian representative on the Far Eastern Commission tabled a schedule of group percentages representing the official but tentative views of the Canadian Government. (See C1-219/16, attached). The principle underlying the grouping applied in this schedule is purely quantitative, that is, no country in group II would receive as large a share as either of the countries in group I, and no country in group III would receive as large a share as any other countries in groups I and II. In drawing up this schedule the Department gave some consideration to the following points:

(a) Large quantities of Japanese external assets will be retained by China and the U.S.S.R.

(b) The United States is expected to give away a large proportion of their share of Japanese internal assets to China, the Philippines and Korea.

(c) The United States interim directive to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers covers the following transfers of available Japanese internal assets:

(1) To China, 15%.

(2) To the United Kingdom (for Burma, Malaya, and Colonies) 5%.

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(3) To The Philippines, 5%.

(4) To the Netherlands (for Netherlands East Indies) 5%.

19. All Far Eastern Commission countries have tabled the percentage share which they wish to receive from industrial assets within Japan declared available for reparations, and several delegations have tabled overall schedules. The Reparations Committee of the Commission is currently having considerable difficulty in devising a scheme to produce a single schedule totalling 100% which will be acceptable to all countries concerned. It is not unlikely that an impasse will be reached, in which case the whole question may be left over to the peace conference.

20. It should be noted that Canada's claim for 1½% has not been challenged by any other country. Any new proposals for solving the problem of division of shares should be studied carefully to ensure that the advantages gained by our modest and realistic claim based on "broad political considerations" will not be jeopardized.

21. Renunciation of Claims and Disposition of Reparations Assets

Another aspect of the division of shares problem which may be discussed at Canberra is whether or not a recipient nation may dispose of its reparations receipts as it sees fit. In the overall schedule of reparation percentage shares which the United States Government has submitted to the Far Eastern Commission Reparations Committee, China and the United States are each assigned 29%, the two largest shares. It is generally known that the United States intend to dispose of industrial equipment received as reparations to other countries of their own choosing. The United Kingdom have indicated that they would regard this as an undesirable use of reparations and feel that it would be contrary to the practice agreed upon in respect of reparations from Germany (see D.O. telegram No. 153 of June 21).

22. The relevant section (Article 1, paragraph (h)) of the Final Act of the Paris Conference on Reparations reads: "If any signatory government renounces its share or part of its share in German reparation ..... the shares or part thereof thus renounced or remaining shall be distributed rateably among the other signatory governments."

23. If the United Kingdom raises this subject at Canberra it might be appropriate to direct attention to the following points:

(a) According to the Commission policy decision on division of reparations shares (Report on Commission Activities, Appendix 26) the percentage share of any country is to be determined on a broad political basis, due account being taken of the damage suffered and the contribution made to the defeat of Japan by the country concerned. While any

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consideration may be included in the term "broad political basis" it would hardly be right to attach undue weight to the plans which the United States have made with regard to the disposition of its reparations receipts at the expense of the other two factors which the policy decision specifically states must be taken into account.

(b) We would probably concur in the principle of Article 1(h) of the Final Act of the Paris Conference on Reparation, i.e. that if any country renounces all or part of its percentage share in Japanese reparations the percentage renounced should be distributed rateably amongst the other recipient countries.

(c) A recipient country should have reasonable latitude in disposing of reparations receipts claimed (as distinct from reparation percentage share awarded) so long as security considerations are satisfied. No restrictions in this regard should go further than Article 4(a) of the Final Act of the Paris Conference on Reparation, and preferably not as far. (Article 4(a) states: "No signatory government shall request the allocation to it as reparation of any industrial or other capital equipment removed from Germany except for use in its own territory or for use by its own nationals outside its own territory." It should be borne in mind that any aluminum plants which might be obtained on the Canadian reparations account will probably not be suitable for actual installation in Canada. It would therefore be undesirable from our point of view to be too closely restricted in our disposition of reparations assets.)

(d) The United States' intention to distribute reparations facilities which are received from Japan to countries of their own choosing (e.g. the Philippines, China and Korea) has a constructive feature which should be noted. A considerable proportion of the industrial assets to be made available for removal as reparations from Japan is likely to be more or less obsolete and in poor condition. Moreover, the lack of transportation, adequate power supply, technical and administrative personnel, and other facilities which will be necessary for the proper reinstallation of Japanese equipment will make it extremely difficult for countries such as the Philippines, China and Korea to absorb and make use of Japanese reparations assets in the form of industrial plant. In view of the need for a speedy economic recovery in the Far East it might, therefore, be advisable for the United States

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to be allowed a comparatively free hand in disposing of such Japanese reparations assets as they claim under their share. Whereas the United States Government might find it extremely difficult to obtain Congressional appropriations for assisting China and the Philippines to install Japanese equipment allotted to those countries as reparations, the United States administration would not have the same difficulty in obtaining appropriations to cover the installation of Japanese plant allocated to the United States. In this way it would be possible for China, Korea and the Philippines to receive, over and above their own share of Japanese reparations, further industrial plant which would be installed with the technical and material aid of the United States. Thus the United States share of reparations might be a more effective contribution to reconstruction in the Pacific area than the reparations assets allocated to the countries concerned in their own right.

24. Reparations from Current Production

None of the decisions which have so far been taken by the Far Eastern Commission rule out the possibility that Japan might pay reparations in current production. (See Report on Commission Activities, Appendix 26). The question is still open never having been discussed at any length in the Far Eastern Commission. The United Kingdom is known to be strongly opposed to any plan for the payment of reparations in current production; Australia is known to favour such a scheme, and opinion in the United States is divided.

25. The case for reparations from current production was well stated in an article in the Washington Post for May 11, (Attached as an enclosure to Despatch 1028 of May 14 from Washington). Some of the disadvantages of this policy are noted below.

26. The payment of reparations from current production would necessitate an entirely new approach to the whole question of the economic demilitarization of Japan, both with respect to levels of industry and the type and duration of the economic controls which might be established for Japan.

27. If reparations were to be paid from current production it is unlikely that there would be any substantial movement of goods under such a scheme for two or three years in view of the present economic disorganization of Japan and the general shortage of primary raw materials. By that time the industrialized countries of the West would be in a position to supply the capital goods needed for the reconstruction and economic development of Far Eastern countries.

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28. The export of capital goods as reparations would make the principal recipient countries in the Far East economically dependent on Japan. This situation would encourage the formation of an economic bloc in the Far East which would be detrimental to multilateral trade and would have far-reaching political implications.

29. The Canadian Government has always taken the view that payment for essential imports should be the first charge on the Japanese economy. Payment of reparations in terms of current production would postpone indefinitely the establishment in Japan of a normal peacetime economy, and such a development would not be in the interests of Canadian export trade.

30. Shipping Reparations

Reparations from Japanese shipping has only recently been discussed by the Far Eastern Commission. The United States has submitted a proposal with respect to the division of shares which reads as follows:

> "Merchant ships of Japanese registry declared available for reparations will be distributed among reparations recipient countries in proportion to proven losses of merchant shipping incurred during their respective periods of belligerency in the war against Japan and as a result of participation in action against Japan up to and no more than the total value of such losses."

The French representative on the Far Eastern Commission has suggested that the active clause of the United States proposal should agree with Article 5 of the Final Act of the Paris Conference on Reparation, substituting "Japan" for "Germany" and "members of the Far Eastern Commission" for "signatory governments." This would make global shipping losses rather than proven losses in the war against Japan the basis for division of shares. The United Kingdom has not yet indicated its views, but will probably propose something similar to the French amendment. The Indian representative has indicated that his government feels that Japanese merchant ships available for reparations should be included within the pool of Japanese internal assets declared available for reparations.

31. The Canadian representative on the Far Eastern Commission has indicated that we would favour a separate share-out of shipping reparations and that we support the principle of the United States proposal. The Canadian member has submitted to the F.E.C. Reparations Committee an amendment to the United States proposal, providing that in the distribution of shipping reparations due account should be taken of the type and size of merchant ships lost by claimant countries. Our interest in shipping reparations is a limited one, since government records show that only two vessels of Canadian registry, the Empress of Asia (16,909 g.r.t.) and the Shinai (2410 g.r.t.), were lost as a result of Japanese action.

32. Selection and Distribution of Reparations Assets

Canada has had little occasion to quarrel with the interim and final reparations programmes which have been

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submitted by the United States and revised by technical sub-committees. Our only special interest in this connection has been to protect Canadian interests in the Japanese aluminum industry. An amendment is now being prepared for the section on aluminum in the final reparations removal programme. In addition, an engineer employed by Aluminium Limited is now in Japan as a member of the Canadian Reparations and Restitution Team. He will be responsible for making inspections of Japanese plants and facilities in the aluminum industry which will be made available for reparations, and for recommending action to the Canadian Government when the time for making reparations bids has come. We are further endeavouring to protect special Canadian interests in Japanese reparations by pressing for changes in the procedure for the selection of reparations assets which would permit members of the Reparations Technical Advisory Committee (on which Canada is represented) to make recommendations to the Supreme Commander with respect to the allocation of particular plants and installations to recipient countries.

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TELEGRAM

FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

IMMEDIATE

SECRET

CYPHER

No. 152

LONDON, June 21st, 1947.

No. 152. Secret. Addressed to Canada No. 152, Australia No. 125, New Zealand No. 107. My telegram May 31st (to Canada No. 131, to Australia No. 108, to New Zealand No. 94). Paragraph 4.

Japanese reparations.

Following is list of percentages which we propose to communicate to United Kingdom representative with a view to his tabling it officially in F.E.C.:

United Kingdom, Burma and the Colonies	25 per cent
United States of America and the Philippines	32 per cent
China	14 per cent
India	9 per cent
Australia	8½ per cent
Netherlands	5 per cent
U.S.S.R.	2 per cent
Canada	1½ per cent
New Zealand	1½ per cent
France	1½ per cent

2. In framing this list we have been guided in part by broad political considerations and in part by statistical and other data available. We have also had in mind in particular

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the follo ing considerations:

(i) United Kingdom claim is not for United Kingdom only but for United Kingdom, Burma and the Colonies. Allocations for United Kingdom recommended by other delegations lend colour to belief that this fact has not been adequately appreciated in Commission. Fact is that Burma, Malaya, Hong Kong, Borneo and certain Western Pacific Islands in particular suffered heavy de/a tation and have a practical and urgent need for a substantial share of the equipment which is now to be disposed of.

(ii) According to our information value of Japanese external assets is at the very least double the value of assets likely to be available from Japan proper. Our list has accordingly been framed to allow for the very substantial quantity of external assets held, especially by China and U.S.S.R. (whom we estimate to hold together not less in value than 75% of Japanese external assets). (We estimate that United States of America and Philippines broadly together hold 15%, and all other countries, including those in the British Commonwealth, not more than 10%).

3. We regard it as a matter of urgency that His Majesty's United Kingdom Ambassador, Washington, should represent consideration in 2 (i) above at high level to United States authorities whose official list allots to United Kingdom same percentage only as that allotted to Philippines alone and it is desirable that when he does so, he should be in position to show, if necessary, how United Kingdom claim gets into general picture of claims which would, in our view, be reasonable for other countries. We feel that this approach cannot be delayed beyond Monday, June 30th. United Kingdom representative on Reparations Committee would be instructed as soon as possible thereafter to make before the Committee a further full statement

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of our views, on general lines indicated in paragraph 2 above, and when this statement has been made to table the United Kingdom list.

4. In view of urgency it would, therefore, be appreciated if, should other British Commonwealth Governments have any comments, these could be received not later than the 27th June, repeat 27th June. Government of India, with whom we are in touch on this matter, have asked that there should be exchange of information between all British Commonwealth countries concerned and we would suggest that any comments should accordingly be repeated to Government of India Commerce Department, New Delhi, as well as to other recipients of this telegram.

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS

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23 October 1946

FAR EASTERN COMMISSION

U.S. - U.S.S.R. NEGOTIATIONS REGARDING JAPANESE REPARATIONS

Note by the Secretary General

1. The enclosure, a memorandum summarizing negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union regarding Japanese Reparations, submitted by the United States member, is circulated herewith for the information of the Far Eastern Commission.

2. The attention of all concerned is invited to the classification of this document which prohibits the dissemination of the information contained therein to unauthorized persons or to the press.

NELSON T. JOHNSON
Secretary General

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ENCLOSURE

U.S. - U.S.S.R. NEGOTIATIONS REGARDING JAPANESE REPARATIONS

23 October 1946

1. On February 28, 1946, a Soviet Representative in the Far Eastern Commission stated the view that consideration of Japanese external assets for reparations lay outside the jurisdiction of the Far Eastern Commission. Led by the representative of the United Kingdom, all other representatives rejected that position. A stalemate was thereby created to which the most likely resolution was thought to be transfer of negotiations on this subject from the Commission to diplomatic channels. In mid-March and again in mid-April, the State Department began conversations with the Soviet Ambassador on the quest of Japanese reparations and discussed, as a matter of courtesy, a United States proposal for establishment of an Inter-Allied Reparations Committee within the Far Eastern Commission to handle all aspects of Japanese reparations. The Soviet Ambassador expressed personal reservations regarding the proposal. Nevertheless, the United States Representative on the Far Eastern Commission submitted that proposal to the Commission. Subsequent Soviet comment indicated that the United States proposal remained unacceptable.

2. It was clear during initial Far Eastern Commission discussion of the availability of Japanese external assets for reparations, and confirmed during the diplomatic conversations between the State Department and the Soviet Ambassador, that the point of sensitivity in the Soviet position was the problem of war booty. The State Department made an effort to assuage Soviet apprehensions on this point by evolving a formula which the Soviets might accept and which, at the same time, the United States could support. It provided that (1) all countries at war with Japan should retain all Japanese assets held by them on June 1, 1946; (2) the total amounts of such assets, including war booty however defined, held by each country should be considered in determining its allocated share of reparations from assets within Japan; (3) war booty, as such, need not be separately evaluated in reports of Japanese external assets. This formula conceded to the Soviets a clear commitment that war booty removals from Manchuria would be given neither legalistic nor separate statistical consideration. It offered a commitment that the United States would propose that all countries at war with Japan report among their holdings of Japanese assets, holdings of military equipment. When presented to the Soviet Embassy on June 24, the initial reaction was friendly. The proposal was dispatched to Moscow and a formal Soviet reply was awaited.

3. No Soviet reply having been received, the United States Representative on the Far Eastern Commission circulated, on July 25, a proposal for a Reparations Conference. To be sponsored by the Far Eastern Commission, that Conference was to comprise eleven countries, meet by August 15 and remain in continuous session until a comprehensive reparations settlement had been reached. The comprehensive settlement would become formal policy following ratification by the Far Eastern Commission. On August 13, the Secretariat of the Far

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Eastern Commission circulated acceptances from all member countries except the Soviet Union. The United States member of the Far Eastern Commission was reluctant to force the Conference proposal to a vote without obtaining formal prior expression of Soviet views. Although the August 15 date passed and despite disappointment over delay, the United States postponed action in the Commission.

4. On September 4, a Soviet Representative presented to the State Department a reply to the June 24 United States proposal. His reply contained Soviet acceptance of the invitation to participate in a Reparations Conference which would discuss all aspects of Japanese reparations problems, subject, however, to five conditions. In short, these conditions were, (1) exclusion of Soviet war booty removals from the common reparations fund; (2) exclusion from the Conference agenda of any consideration of Japanese assets in the Kurile Islands or South Sakhalin; (3) retention in Korea of Japanese assets in Korea and exclusion of such assets from the reparations fund; (4) shares of reparations to be determined on a broad political basis; and, (5) compensation for damage to United Nations assets in Japan; in former or ceded Japanese territories, to be met from the common reparations pool. The State Department indicated to the Soviet Representative that these conditions would be given careful study.

5. The State Department answered the Soviet Representative on September 26, stating that it (1) could not accept exclusion of Red Army war booty removals from the common reparations pool; (2) could not endorse the Soviet position regarding Sakhalin and the Kuriles, but believed the principle involved could supply a basis for further negotiation; (3) welcomed Soviet endorsement of the United States proposal that Japanese assets in Korea should be retained for the benefit of the Korean people; (4) could agrée that reparations shares be reached on a broad political basis; and (5) could agree that compensation for damaged United Nations property be accomplished out of the common reparations pool. In addition, the State Department stated that the urgency of reaching decision, which could serve as basis for General MacArthur's implementation of a reparations program necessitated putting the United States Reparations Comference Proposal to a Commission vote at an early date. If that proposal failed passage in the Far Eastern Commission, the United States would invite whatever member countries desired to do so to join in a Reparations Conference outside the Commission's jurisdiction. The Soviet Representative promised to ask his Government to expedite settlement of the issues in controversy. The State Department agreed not to take up the matter in the Far Eastern Commission until the October 10 meeting.

6. At the October 10 meeting of the Far Eastern Commission, the United States member announced that he would ask for a vote on his Conference Proposal at the Commission's October 24 meeting. If that proposal failed passage, he would present, at that time, he said, a practical alternative. Representatives of the other ten countries expressed satisfaction with the United States announcement.

7. On October 11, a Soviet Representative presented to the State Department a clarification of the Soviet statement of September 4. He believed that the United States had misinterpreted the Soviet position. The Soviet Government was prepared to discuss Japanese external assets "in Manchuria (and) also agreed to discuss Japanese external assets in China, India, Indonesia, Philippines and other countries." However, explicit fulfillment was desired of the following conditions: (1) reassurance that the U.S.S.R. would receive a

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definite allotment from reparations assets in Japan, to be determined without regard for Red Army removals of war trophies or regard for Japanese property located in ceded territories; (2) trophies of the Red Army in Manchuria not to be subject to discussion; (3) Japanese property in Sakhalin and the Kuriles not to be subject to discussion; (4) clarification of United States willingness to commit itself to support (1) and (2) above. The Soviet Representative went on to inquire whether the U.S. note of September 26 which left open the possibility of reaching agreement on the Sakhalin and Kuriles question implied that the United States would stand with the U.S.S.R. if countries not represented at Yalta offered opposition to a bilaterally agreed principle.

8. On October 16, the State Department informed the Soviet Representative that it (1) would oppose the discussion of the question of Red Army war trophy removals from Manchuria as a separate and distinct subject, and the legality of such removals was not proper for Conference consideration; (2) expects that the Soviet Union will receive a reparations allotment from assets within Japan; and (3) was prepared to discuss the problem of Sakhalin and the Kuriles with an open mind and in such a conciliatory manner as would contribute to settlement of the reparations problem as a whole.

9. On October 17, a Soviet Representative informed the State Department that the Soviet Embassy could not consider that United States replies to the Soviet note of September 4 constituted acceptance of the Soviet position. That position, he said, was a final one and agreement in it by the United States was a necessary perquisite for Soviet participation in a Reparations Conference. The Soviet Representative expressed his personal appreciation of the patience and conciliatory attitude shown by General Hilldring during these very prolonged discussions, and General Hilldring likewise thanked Admiral Ramishvili for his patience and conciliatory attitude. If there are to be further conversations on this subject, the Soviet Representative said, the initiative must come from the United States Government.

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TELETYPE

From THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES

To THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

IMPORTANT

CYPHER - TK WASHINGTON, May 6th, 1947.

WA-1416

WA-1416. Your Ex-1162 of May 2nd Japanese reparations, devision of shares. Following is text of statement made at yesterday's Special Commission meeting by the Australian Ambassador, Begins:

"I should like to make a statement to the Commission of Australia's general views on reparations.

For some weeks we have been carefully surveying all the circumstances connected with this matter, and are now conclusive in our opinion that the division of shares could be determined, with other vital questions, in the peace settlement. Reparations cannot be dealt with separately and apart from the over-all aspects that will govern the future relations of nations in the Pacific. The Peace Conference is the only body which has the power to treat the Japanese problems as a whole, and to allocate reparations in such a way that they will form a logical part of the whole settlement and contribute to the establishment of a just and durable peace in the Pacific.

Australia does not challenge the right of the Far Eastern Commission to determine the total volume of reparations from Japan or the forms which those reparations should take, such as industrial assets, gold and precious metals, current production, or other forms, as part of the duty of the Commission to determine what should be destroyed or removed from Japan in the interests of security of the Allied nations. On the contrary, Australia has consistently stated that the Far Eastern Commission should regard the fixing of these levels as one of its main tasks and should undertake this work as speedily as possible.

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Settlement of reparations has been long delayed and, candidly, Australia feels that there is no evidence that agreement within this Commission is very much closer than it was twelve months ago. We are fully conscious of the desire of devastated countries to receive reparations assets as soon as possible, and I might add that my own country is equally anxious to have its own claims satisfied without delay. However, we feel that any further progress that may be made within the Commission in the discussion of shares will prove to be quite illusory, and that a considerable amount of time would be wasted covering ground that will have to be traversed again in some other place. The only body where we can expect a final settlement, backed by our representatives at the highest level and taking into account all the relevant factors, is the Peace Conference. It is likely that a Peace Conference will be called at an early date. The Australian Minister for External Affairs, Dr. Evatt, stated in the House of Representatives on 26th February, 1947, that "the time is rapidly approaching when the Far Eastern Commission work should be vested in a Pacific Peace Conference which can deal as a whole with the problem of the settlement with Japan". The early calling of a Conference will overcome some of the difficulties in the Far Eastern Commission which have made it unsatisfactory as a means of effective participation in the control of Japan. It will put an end to piecemeal settlements and the unsatisfactory position which has developed owing to failure to agree on the basic policy as a whole drafted in December, 1945. With the early calling of a Conference there is no reason why this matter of reparations should not be made the subject of consideration by that body.

That is the practical aspect of the matter. However, I should like to emphasize that Australia also holds that, on legal grounds,

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the Far Eastern Commission has no jurisdiction over the division and allocation of reparations. The terms of reference of the Far Eastern Commission empower it to formulate policies, principles, and standards in conformity with which the fulfilment by Japan of its obligations under the terms of surrender may be accomplished. The only reference to reparations in the terms of surrender is through Japan's acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration, which stated that "Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy and permit the exaction of just reparations in kind but not those which would enable her to rearm for war". It is clear from this that the Far Eastern Commission can prescribe the total amount of reparations to be provided by Japan, including the kinds of reparations and the manner in which they are provided, but that the apportionment of those reparations is not a function of the Far Eastern Commission. This conclusion is strengthened if we take account of the fact that reparations is not a reserved function in paragraph III, 3 of the Commission's terms of reference. It is reasonable to assume that it would have been reserved if the allocation of reparations has been intended as an F.E.C. function, because it is impossible to expect sovereign Governments to agree that the division of shares could be the subject of unilateral decision by one Government.

As I have already indicated, the Australian Government does not consider that the present discussions in the Reparations Committee on the division of reparations shares are likely to be very productive. The Reparations Committee has proposed that each country should submit the percentage share of reparations, determined on broad political lines, which it desires to receive from industrial assets within Japan available for reparations. The Australian Government has been greatly impressed by the views of the United States Government, as expressed at several meetings of the Reparations Committee, to the effect

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that the submission of a figure for one country is of little value unless the percentages for all other claimants are calculated in the same submission. For example, it means very little for a country to say that it desires 15 percent of total reparations for itself unless it discloses what proportion that percentage bears to allocations to every other country. To meet this difficulty, the American Government has suggested in the Reparations Committee that each country should table a list of eleven percentages. However, there are two objections to this: A political objection that a country may shrink from the odium that might attend the giving of particular percentages to particular countries, and the practical difficulty that member Governments have only scanty statistical data as to the losses and contribution of some of the other member Governments. For the first reason, the American Government has expressed a reluctance to table its own list of eleven percentages unless a substantial number of other Governments are prepared to do likewise; for the second reason, some other Governments feel they cannot prepare lists for all countries. The Australian Government fully appreciates and shares that reluctance.

We consider that the method proposed in the Reparations Committee is too much in the nature of guess-work and a blind venture. The original percentage tabled by each country for itself would be a stab in the dark made in ignorance of many important considerations. The next step after submission of such figures is shrouded in mystery. If we assume, as it must be assumed, that tables of eleven percentages will not be forthcoming, the Commission will find itself in a blind alley and will once again consume time discussing procedures, as we have done so often in the past.

The Australian Government, therefore, proposes that there should

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be a careful working out of a scheme of distribution based on justice and calculated on broad political lines, taking into account the relative contribution of each nation to victory, and its physical losses and damage and the personal injuries and loss of life of its servicemen, internees, and other nationals. Such personal losses should, in our view, be a prominent feature of a reparations scheme. Japanese war crimes put this aspect in a special category. There are arrangements for the punishment of war crimes, and there should also be a special compensation to Governments acting on behalf of victims and their relatives. The Australian Government proposes that a tribunal of three independent and preferably judicial persons be established to make the necessary investigations, and that this tribunal report direct to the Peace Conference, which should be summoned as soon as possible. In this way we shall achieve what our American colleague has so often and so rightly called for -- a table of eleven percentages, responsibly prepared and accompanied by complete factual supporting material. Of course, the views of the tribunal may not prove acceptable in their entirety -- no bench can satisfy all claimants. But the final adjustments and adoption of the allocations should be made at the Peace Conference, which alone has power to take account of all relevant factors and at which will be assembled foreign Ministers of all our countries armed with plenipotentiary powers.

My Government beleives that this offers the only way to a speedy and just settlement of reparations. The alternative course, which is now before the Reparations Committee, is obscure, unlikely to secure agreement, and certain to be prolonged. On the other hand, the course which I have just suggested is likely to produce a definite result within a few months by which time, I hope, the Peace Conference will be assembled and ready to ratify the Reparations Agreement.

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I do not expect, Mr. Chairman, that all my colleagues will be able to express their Government's views on this statement today, and I have no doubt that you will adjourn debate until a later meeting." Ends.

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C 272017

FEC-RESTRICTED

C1-219/16

C1-219/16

25 July 1947

FAR EASTERN COMMISSION

COMMITTEE NO. 1: REPARATIONS

DIVISION OF REPARATIONS SHARES
(Reference: C1-219/1)

Note by the Secretary General

1. The enclosure, schedules of national percentage shares of reparations from industrial assets from within Japan, submitted by members of Committee No. 1 at the 92nd, 93rd, 96th, 98th, 101st, 108th, 111th, 113th and 117th meetings of the Committee, is circulated herewith for the further consideration of COMMITTEE NO. 1 REPARATIONS.

2. The invididual percentage requested by each country for itself and listed in column 1 of the enclosure represents the official position of the respective Government. The U.S.S.R. U.K., U.S., Netherlands and French schedules in columns 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 respectively, together with the group schedule submitted by by Chinese Member represent the official positions of the six Governments. The group plan proposed by the Canadian member represents the official tentative views of his Government. The Philippine schedule represents the views of the head of his country's Delegation to the Far Eastern Commission. The schedules of the Indian, New Zealand and U.S. Members were submitted in a personal capacity.

3. This paper supersedes C1-219/15.

NELSON T. JOHNSON
Secretary General

C1-219/16

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ENCLOSURE

FEC-RESTRICTED

PROPOSED NATIONAL PERCENTAGE SHARES OF INDUSTRIAL ASSETS FROM JAPAN

	1 % Share Requested by Each Country	2 USSR Schedule (official)	3 U.S. Schedule (official)	4 U.K. Schedule (official)	5 Netherlands Schedule (official)	6 France Schedule (official)	7 (Philippines) Delegation's Schedule	8 (U.S.) Mr. Barnett's Schedule (personal)	9 (N.Z.) Col. Powles' Schedule (personal)	10 (India) Mr. Ahmad's Schedule (personal)
AUSTRALIA	28.0	2.5	8.0	8.5	6	7.5	7.0	9.0	8.5	9.5
CANADA	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	2	2.0	1.5	2.0	1.5	1.5
CHINA	40.0	25.0	29.0	14.0	24	20.0	25.0	25.0	**	25.0
FRANCE	12.0	3.0	2.0	1.5	6	12.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0
INDIA	18.0	7.0	4.0	9.0	6	6.0	4.0	5.0	8.0	12.5
NETHERLANDS	12.0	5.0	4.0	5.0	12	10.0	6.0	5.0	6.0	5.0
NEW ZEALAND	2.0	2.0	1.5	1.5	2	2.0	1.5	2.0	2.0	1.5
PHILIPPINES	15.0	7.0	8.0	*	9	9.5	15.0	9.0	8.0	7.0
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS	14.0	14.0	5.0	2.0	5	4.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	4.0
UNITED KINGDOM	25.0	5.0	10.0	25.0	15	10.5	9.0	9.0	9.0	10.0
UNITED STATES	29.0	15.0	29.0	*	15	16.5	28.0	29.0	**	22.0
Non-FEC Countries		1.0								
TOTAL	196.5	100.0	100.0	100.0	100	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Canadian Proposal: Official tentative

I. China and U.S.A. 50%

II. Australia, India, Netherlands, Philippines, U.K. *** 40%

III. Canada, France, N.Z., USSR..... 10%

Total 100%

*U.S. and Philippines to receive 52%

Chinese Schedule: Official

China 40%

U.S.A. & Philippines..... 50%

Australia, Canada, India, New Zealand, U.K. 20%

France, Netherlands, USSR.. 10%

Total 100%

** minimum of 50% divided between China & U.S.

*** U.K. to receive the largest share in this group

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CL-219/16

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C 272019

This is a "Guard" message and must not be published or re-transmitted, and may only be distributed as Top Secret message with appropriate safeguards.

TELEGRAM

FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

IMPORTANT

SECRET GUARD

CYPHER

NO. 153 LONDON, June 21st, 1947.

No. 153. Secret. Australia No. 126. New Zealand No. 108.

My telegram to Canada No. 152, Australia No. 125, New Zealand No. 107 of today.

Japanese reparations.

United States authorities have not concealed from us fact that they are claiming more from Japanese internal assets than they have use for themselves and it is thought likely that their intention is to pass on part of their allocation to other powers of their own choosing. We should regard this as undesirable use of reparations receipts and it would, moreover, be contrary to practice agreed upon in respect of reparations from Germany when it was laid down in paragraph 1 H of Final Act of Paris Conference that "if any signatory Government renounces its shares or part of its shares in German reparations..... the shares or part thereof, thus renounced or remaining, shall be distributed rateably among the other signatory powers".

2. It would seem reasonable that principle accepted unanimously in German settlement should be equally applicable to Japanese and it is one which we should wish to support provided it has reasonable chance of acceptance in F.E.C. We should be grateful to learn whether other British Commonwealth

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Governments share our view on this point.

3. Meanwhile, we are explaining our view to United Kingdom Ambassador at Washington and propose to leave it to his discretion whether he should mention it when he makes approach to United States authorities foreshadowed in paragraph 3 of my telegram under reference as argument for questioning great disparity between percentage figures which United States have proposed for themselves (32%) and for United Kingdom, Burma and Colonies (8%) point being that we can make practical use of percentage (25%) of reparations material for which we have asked.

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DOMINIONS AFFAIRS

Sent: 5:55 p.m.
Rec'd: 4:52 p.m.

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CONFIDENTIAL

CANADIAN EMBASSY

No. 1028 May 14, 1947.

Sir:

I have the honour to enclose for your information copies of a special article by Alfred Friendly entitled "U.S. Plans 'Hypo' for Lagging Japan" which appeared in the Sunday edition of the Washington Post.

2. This article, which purports to outline State Department thinking on possible revision of policy to include reparations from current production, is of particular interest in the light of Mr. Acheson's Cleveland speech of May 8 (My WA-1469 of May 10) and its reference to the necessity of reconstructing Japan as the workshop of Asia.

3. There is no doubt as to the reliability of this report on tentative State Department views, at least in the Division of Japanese and Korean Economic affairs, whence the "leak" came on which the article is based. Mr. Martin, the head of this Division, has been thinking along these lines for some time, and tried the thesis out on a small study group of the Institute of Pacific Relations last week. In the development of this argument, it is assumed that none of the Asiatic countries, with the possible exception of India and the Netherlands Indies, is capable of assimilating the type of plants that would be received from the present program of reparations out of capital equipment. This view appears to be fairly widely shared here, and is supported by Frank Tamagna, the Federal Reserve Board expert on Far Eastern financial questions who has recently returned from a trip to China and Japan. It is also agreed that in the rehabilitation of China and other Far Eastern areas it would be a grace economic mistake to postpone the stimulus to self-help by making consumers goods available as reparations. The conclusion therefore is that, if it were politically and economically feasible, the appropriate course would be for Japan to furnish digestible capital goods such as the textile machinery and transportation equipment mentioned in the enclosed article, out of current production.

4. This article is obviously a trial balloon, and it is recognized that there are many difficulties in the way of such a scheme. One, that of persuading the potential recipients and erstwhile victims to agree to the level of Japanese industry which would be required and to furnish the necessary raw materials, is mentioned by Mr. Friendly. Others would include the regime of control, both domestic and international, which would be required to ensure the completion of a program of this sort.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient servant,

(Sgd.) H.H. WRONG

The Secretary of State
for External Affairs,
OTTAWA, Canada.

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WASHINGTON

Subject U.S. Plans 'Hypo' for Lagging Japan"

Date May 11, 1947 *Publication* The Washington Post

Reparations-Out-of-Production Idea Studied

U. S. Plans 'Hypo' for Lagging Japan

By Alfred Friendly
Post Reporter

WEARY of pouring American money down a bottomless pit, State Department experts are deliberating a new plan involving a "cranking up" of the Japanese economy, The Washington Post learned last week.

It involves rehabilitation of Japanese trade and industry to the point where it can support itself and pay its war reparations out of its current production.

The plan is still only in the discussion and exploratory stages. Its general outlines, however, have been talked over with persons high on the staff of General MacArthur, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

The United States is pumping 225 million dollars a year into Japan in the form of food and supplies. This is a minimum "anti-disease and unrest" necessity. This relief payment is supposed to end after 1948, but unless the Japanese economy improves materially the need for continuing payments will still be compelling.

But the Japanese economy shows no signs of improvement. On the contrary, it has deteriorated notably ever since November.

A second necessity, intimately connected with the first, is that of helping solve the economic difficulties of the countries of the Far East which fought Japan. As long as Japan continues to live only by virtue of an economic oxygen tent provided by the United States, its neighboring countries—China, the Philippines, Korea, the Netherland East Indies, French Indo-China, etc.—have no hope of obtaining reparations from her to help restore their own economies.

Own Bootstraps Policy

ACCORDINGLY, the State Department has about reached the conclusion that two basic policies which we have followed since VJ-Day must be subjected to a considerable overhauling.

The first policy relates to Japanese economic recovery. The directives on this matter have said, in effect, "You got yourself into this jam; now it's up to you to get yourself out as best you can, by your own efforts."

The second policy calls for the Japanese payment of reparations out of its capital, in the form of plant, equipment, reserves and other physical and financial assets. Though the Potsdam Declaration did not close the door to a system of reparations out of current production, it did not direct that method to be undertaken.

These two policies, certain State Department officials believe, are not working out. In the first place, Japan shows no signs of getting herself out of the jam. It is on the brink of starvation. Mass unrest, particularly in the urban centers, provides a sterile field in which to plant the seeds of democracy.

In the second place, it is becoming increasingly clear that transferring Japanese industrial equipment, piecemeal or *en gross*, to its neighbors as reparations is not very successful.

Much of Japan's industrial equipment is obsolescent, was undermaintained during the war and has deteriorated since. It is difficult and uneconomical to move (it's pretty hard and fairly futile to pick up and move a blast furnace, for example). Besides, it takes much technical skill for a neighboring nation to absorb the equipment into its own economy.

It is questionable whether China, for instance, would have the technical ability to take over a large part of Japan's steel plant, or whether the Philippines could absorb the erstwhile Japanese aluminum industry.

There are, however, many items which Japan could produce with its present equipment which would be inordinately useful to the countries ravaged by war. China needs coastal and river vessels which could be produced in Japanese shipyards. Railroad equipment, textile and food processing machinery and plants could also be turned out in Japan to fill urgent needs of nearby lands.

Is it possible, then, to modify the policies we have followed as regards Japan, and reorient Japanese industry? Can it be made to develop surplus as well as maintain its own economic life?

Can't Boost Subsidy

STATE DEPARTMENT groups worrying about the problem hope that the answers to both questions will be in the affirmative. But they admit the presence of several extremely difficult problems and conditioning factors:

1. No additional financing of the new plan can be counted on from the American Government. As a practical matter, it is felt that Congress would not agree to a subsidy larger than the present annual 225 million.

2. The countries of the Far East are not going to be particularly happy to see us help build up the Japanese economy while their own economies are in such a sad state. Yet these countries must cooperate in the plan if it is to be a success.

Accordingly, the United States must be able to demonstrate that the plan will be to their benefit. It is at this point that the scheme of reparations out of current production comes into the picture. The prospect of reparations payments may serve to make the rehabilitation plan palatable to Japan's neighbors and to enlist their tangible help in the form of financing.

3. A large segment of the Japanese nation has relaxed into complacent dependency on American largesse. It will be difficult to reorganize its industry, and its psychology, to produce on a higher level and to export the surplus. Much pressure will be needed to force Japan to produce under a rational system. Up to this point the pressure that MacArthur has exerted has been less than successful.

4. Success of the plan depends on securing a much larger supply of imported raw materials than Japan has been receiving. Although production facilities are ample for a much higher rate of industrial activity—enough to produce large exports of finished goods—Japan stands desperately in need of coal, raw cotton and many other commodities.

5. To obtain these raw materials, and for other purposes, considerable financing is needed, over and above the 225 million dollars a year supplied by the United States. The hope is that some of this financing can be done by private industry, interested in imports from Japan, and some by neighboring countries, in the hope that initial outlays will produce ultimate reparations.

275 Million Gap

STATE DEPARTMENT economists calculate that some 800 million dollars will be needed to do the job in 1948. Of this, Japan is assured the 225 million and can make up about 300 million from the sale of her increased exports. This leaves a deficit of about 275 million.

To make this up, there is some 150 million in gold and silver owned by Japan. The remaining 125 million, it is hoped, can be provided by trade credits, by nearby countries and by private business interests.

Far Eastern experts admit the enormous difficulties in the proposed program, and concede that their plans are still tentative, far from adoption. But, they insist, this plan or some other must replace a present system which holds in it precisely the same promise as does pouring sand down a rat hole.

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Date May 11, 1947 *Publication* The Washington Post

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2. The countries of the Far East are not going to be particularly happy to see us help build up the Japanese economy while their own economies are in such a sad state. Yet these countries must cooperate in the plan if it is to be a success.

Accordingly, the United States must be able to demonstrate that the plan will be to their benefit. It is at this point that the scheme of reparations out of current production comes into the picture. The prospect of reparations payments may serve to make the rehabilitation plan palatable to Japan's neighbors and to enlist their tangible help in the form of financing.

3. A large segment of the Japanese nation has relaxed into complacent dependency on American largesse. It will be difficult to reorganize its industry, and its psychology, to produce on a higher level and to export the surplus. Much pressure will be needed to force Japan to produce under a rational system. Up to this point the pressure that MacArthur has exerted has been less than successful.

4. Success of the plan depends on securing a much larger supply of imported raw materials than Japan has been receiving. Although production facilities are ample for a much higher rate of industrial activity—enough to produce large exports of finished goods—Japan stands desperately in need of coal, raw cotton and many other commodities.

5. To obtain these raw materials, and for other purposes, considerable financing is needed, over and above the 225 million dollars a year supplied by the United States. **The hope is that some of this financing can be done by private industry, interested in imports from Japan, and some by neighboring countries, in the hope that initial outlays will produce ultimate reparations.**

275 Million Gap

STATE DEPARTMENT economists calculate that some 800 million dollars will be needed to do the job in 1948. Of this, Japan is assured the 225 million and can make up about 300 million from the sale of her increased exports. This leaves a deficit of about 275 million.

To make this up, there is some 150 million in gold and silver owned by Japan. The remaining 125 million, it is hoped, can be provided by trade credits, by nearby countries and by private business interests.

Far Eastern experts admit the enormous difficulties in the proposed program, and concede that their plans are still tentative, far from adoption. But, they insist, this plan or some other must replace a present system which holds in it precisely the same promise as does pouring sand down a rat hole.

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FROM: THE MINISTER OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, WELLINGTON, NEW ZEALAND

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA

IMMEDIATE

SECRET

CYPHER

NO. 1[illegible]

WELLINGTON, June 27th, 1947.

Addressed Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, London, No. 133, repeated External Ottawa No. 16, External Canberra No. 131, Government of India, Commerce Department, New Delhi, No. 12. Secret.

Your telegram No. 107, addressed Canada as No. 152, Australia as No. 125.

Japanese reparations.

Thank you for informing us of your proposed list of reparation percentages. We appreciate force of arguments in paragraph 2 of your telegram under reference and agree that concentration of Japanese external assets in non-British countries cannot be ignored in any attempt to arrive at a fair division of internal assets. For this and other reasons we believe the official United States schedule underestimates the share which should be alloted to the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, even when allowance has been made for external assets, it is felt that China is entitled to a fairly large share of industrial assets from Japan in view of the duration of her resistance and the enormous loss of life suffered. Accordingly, having regard to the figures given in the United Kingdom list and in view of our reluctance to take action which would embarrass the United Kingdom, we are reconsidering the question of whether we should lodge an official list. If, however, it is finally decided that a list should be

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lodged on behalf of New Zealand, we may find that our proposed figures for United Kingdom and China will differ considerably from those in United Kingdom schedule.

So far as New Zealand's own percentage is concerned, we consider that 2% is a reasonable minimum and we would be disappointed if the other British Commonwealth countries could not support that figure.

MINISTER OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

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C 272025

This is a "Guard" message and must not be published or retransmitted, and may only be distributed as Top Secret message with appropriate safeguards.

FROM: THE MINISTER OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, WELLINGTON, NEW ZEALAND

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA

SECRET

CYPHER

NO. 17

GUARD

WELLINGTON, June 27th, 1947.

Addressed Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, London, No. 135, repeated External Ottawa No. 17, External Canberra No. 132. Secret. Your telegram No. 108, addressed to Canada as No. 153 and Australia as No. 126.

Japanese reparations.

We entirely agree that principle referred to in first paragraph of your telegram under reference should be applicable in cases where a Government renounces part of the share initially assigned to it. Our representatives on FEC will be instructed fully to support this principle if question is raised in the Commission.

MINISTER OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Sent: 8:55 p.m.
Rec'd: 8:55 a.m.

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OFFICE OF THE

HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR CANADA,-

CANADA HOUSE,

LONDON , S.W.1.

20th May, 1947.

To.AR..425/3.

No. A. 460.

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to the question of Japanese reparations, and to inform you that we have received from the Dominions Office three statistical tables which have been prepared in regard to the claims of the United Kingdom, Burma, and the Colonies for Japanese reparations. Two copies of these tables are enclosed for your information.

2. In transmitting these tables to you I have been asked to point out that the United Kingdom Government has always maintained that the division of Japanese reparation shares should be on a broad political basis and not approached by way of a detailed study of comparative statistics. Accordingly, the tables should be regarded as being very much in the nature of background material.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,

(Sgd.) N.A. Robertson.
High Commissioner.

The Right Honourable
The Secretary of State for
External Affairs,
Ottawa.

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Japanese Reparations

Table 1 - United Kingdom, Burma and Colonial Claim - Summary

(Monetary Values expressed in terms of £ stg.)

	Unit	TOTAL CLAIM- United Kingdom Burma & Colonies	United Kingdom	Burma	Colonies
MAIN CLAIMS					
A. Physical Damage					
Total	£ stg.mn.	548.02	13.11	309.23	225.68
Excluding Shipping	"	529.45	-	309.20	220.25
Shipping Only	"	18.57	13.11	0.03	5.43
B. Budgetary and Occupation Costs					
Total	£ stg.mn.	1,943.89	1,650.00	39.00	254.89
Budgetary Costs	"	1,713.40	1,650.00	19.00	44.40
Occupation Costs	"	230.49		20.00	210.49
C. Man-Years in Armed Forces	000	3,319	2,500	162	657
D. Military Loss of Life	Number	27,231	18,000	5,940	3,291
OTHER CLAIMS					
1. Undermaintenance	£ stg.mn.	171.82	100.00	5.83	65.99
2. Under-export	"	1.92			1.92
3. Overseas Disinvestment	"	500.00	500.00		
4. Costs of Reoccupation	"	59.80		23.20	36.60
5. Man-Years other than in Armed Forces	000	9,096	2,000	4,072	3,024
6. Loss of life other than Military	Number	318,785		173,000	145,785

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Japanese Reparations

Table 2 - United Kingdom, Burma and Colonial Claim - Summary.

(Monetary Values expressed in terms of U.S. Dollars)

	Unit	Total Claim- United Kingdom Burma and Colonies	United Kingdom	Burma	Colonies
MAIN CLAIMS					
A. Physical Damage Total	$ mn.	2,679.82	64.11	1,512.13	1,103.58
Excluding Shipping	"	2,589.01	-	1,511.99	1,077.00
Shipping only.	"	90.81	64.11	0.15	26.55
B. Budgetary and Occupation Costs Total	$mn.	9,505.62	8,068.50	190.71	1,246.41
Budgetary Costs	"	8,378.53	8,068.50	92.91	217.12
Occupation Costs	"	1,127.10	-	97.80	1,029.30
C. Man-Years in Armed Forces	000	3,319	2,500	162	657
D. Military Loss of Life	Number	27,231	18,000	5,940	3,291
OTHER CLAIMS					
1. Undermaintenance	$mn.	840.20	489.00	28.51	322.69
2. Under-export	$mn.	9.39			9.39
3. Overseas Disinvestment	"	2,445.00	2,445.00		
4. Costs of Reoccupation	"	292.42		113.45	178.97
5. Man-years other than in Armed Forces	000	9,096	2,000	4,072	3,024
6. Loss of Life other than Military	Number	318,785		173,000	145,785

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Japanese Reparations

Table 3 - United Kingdom, Burma and Colonial Claims - Shipping Losses

	Total-United Kingdom, Burma and Colonies		United Kingdom		Burma		Colonies (a)	
	Gross Tonnage 000	Value £ st. mn.	Gross Tonnage 000	Value £ st. mn.	Gross Tonnage 000	Value £ st. mn.	Gross Tonnage 000	Value £ st. mn.
A. Total War Losses								
All vessels	10,870	326.10	10,511	315.33	1	0.03	358	10.74
Vessels 500 G.T. and over	10,840	325.20	10,487	314.61	-	-	353	10.59
Vessels 300 G.T. and under 500 G.T.	30	0.90	24	0.72	1	0.03	5	0.15
B. War Losses Attributable to German Italian Activity								
All vessels	10,251	307.53	10,074	302.22	-	-	177	5.31
Vessels 500 G.T. and over	10,226	306.78	10,050	301.50	-	-	176	5.28
Vessels 300 G.T. and under 500 G.T.	25	0.75	24	0.72	-	-	1	0.03
C. War Losses Attributable to Japanese Activity								
All vessels	619	18.57	437	13.11	1	0.03	181	5.43
Vessels 500 G.T. and over	614	18.42	437	13.11	-	-	177	5.31
Vessels 300 G.T. and under 500 G.T.	5	0.15	-	-	1	0.03	4	0.12

(a) Includes Newfoundland losses
(b) Source of tonnage figures - Ministry of Transport
(c) Value has been assessed at the rate of £30 per Gross Ton - the conversion factor adopted and used at the Paris Conference on German Reparations (1945) as representing replacement costs in 1938.

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NOTE RE RESTITUTION

The Report on Commission Activities, referred to in the text of this memorandum, is contained in Appendix A.

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JAPANESE PEACE TREATY:
RESTITUTION AND THE PROTECTION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS AND INTERESTS.

1. While restitution is not likely to be extensively discussed at Canberra, it is possible that some attention may be given to it in connection with reparations. The purpose of this paper is to indicate briefly the steps which have been taken by the Far Eastern Commission in this field, the desiderata for the peace settlement, and the nature of special Canadian interests.

2. Restitution may be defined as the obligation to restore and the right to exact the return of specific identifiable property wrongfully taken from the victor or its approved claimants. Restitution and the protection of the property, rights and interests of United Nations nationals are not specifically mentioned in the Potsdam declaration. Allied objectives on these subjects are mentioned only briefly in the Basic Post-Surrender Policy for Japan. A sub-paragraph to paragraph 4 of Section IV states that "Full and prompt restitution will be required of all identifiable property, looted, delivered under duress, or paid for in worthless currency." Paragraph 3 of Section II ("Protection of United Nations Interests") states that "It shall be the duty of the Supreme Commander to protect the interests, assets, and rights of all members of the United Nations and their nationals."

3. Restitution may conveniently be treated under two headings:

(a) The restitution of property looted in territories occupied by the Japanese during the war;

(b) The restitution of property confiscated within Japan.

(For a brief account of the work of the Far Eastern Commission on these subjects, see Report of Commission Activities, Section C, pp. 15-16).

4. Work of the Far Eastern Commission.

The Far Eastern Commission has issued two policy decisions regarding the restitution of looted property, the second being merely a minor amendment to the first. (See Report of Commission Activities, Appendices 27 and 28). These papers are to be superseded by a third policy statement on this subject which is now in the final drafting stages. Unlike the earlier papers, this new policy statement covers all types of looted property and specifies action to be taken with respect to unidentifiable looted property. (See FEC-011/32 attached).

5. With regard to the restitution of property confiscated within Japan, the Far Eastern Commission has issued only one policy decision: "Interim Principles for Restitution of Identifiable Property Confiscated in Japan from Allied Nationals." (Report on Commission Activities, Appendix 29). This paper provides for restitution to persons and organizations now in Japan only, and excepts from its provisions the

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restoration of large-scale industrial enterprises. It should be noted that the policy provides that restitution of property should be made without prejudicing the claim of the original owners against the Japanese or other enemy Government and/or their nationals for damages to property, rent, depreciation, and other ascertainable losses.

6. The Far Eastern Commission has issued only one policy decision which has to do with the protection of the rights and interests of United Nations nationals: "Destruction or Removal of United Nations' Property in Japan." (Report, Appendix 44). This paper defines the treatment of United Nations property which falls in those categories of industry which are subject to destruction or removal under other Far Eastern Commission policies relating to the reduction of Japanese industrial war potential.

7. Treaty Requirements

The desiderata for the peace treaty may be briefly summarized as follows:

(a) Restitution clauses confirming the policies laid down by the Far Eastern Commission for the occupation period concerning property looted from territories occupied by Japan during the war.

(b) Clauses providing for:

1. Restoration of all legal rights and interests of the United Nations and their nationals as they existed at the time of the outbreak of hostilities;

2. The return of all property in Japan of the United Nations and their nationals as it now exists;

3. The payment of compensation in yen to the United Nations or their nationals who suffered a loss by reason of injury or damage to property in Japan.

In general, the provisions of Articles 75 and 78 of the Italian peace treaty would appear to cover our main requirements for the Japanese treaty.

8. There are a number of detailed points relating to restitution which will have to be covered in the peace settlement, but concerning which Canadian policy has not yet been determined. Some of these are listed below:

(a) Whether the payment of compensation for loss or damage to property should be in full or in part, and if in part, in what proportion.

(b) The territories of the former Japanese Empire to which the compensation clause outlined above should apply. Korea, Southern Sakhalin and Formosa might almost certainly be included, but whether "Manchukuo" should similarly be covered is questionable.

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(c) Whether United Nations nationals who were owners of Japanese Government and municipal securities should be entitled to any compensation.

(d) Whether United Nations nationals who had minority interests in Japanese corporations and who did not have controlling rights in these corporations should be entitled to any compensation.

(e) Whether Japan should be required to pay any compensation for personal injury and loss of life suffered by servicemen, internees and other nationals of the United Nations. (This is a point in which the Australians are particularly interested.)

If restitution is discussed at any length at Canberra, some of the above questions might be raised by the other delegations, in which case a report on their views would be useful.

9. Special Canadian Interests.

Canadian owners of property in Japan may be considered in three classes:

(a) Large corporations. Aluminium Limited of Montreal, the Sun Life Assurance Company of Montreal and the Manufacturers' Life Insurance Company of Toronto are the three large firms which had substantial holdings in Japan before the war. Separate papers are beimg prepared on their interests.

(b) Missionary societies, religious organizations and educational institutions. Restitution and the payment of compensation for losses and damage will be of particular importance to claimants in this category, since they are less capable of sustaining losses than the corporations mentioned in (a) above.

(c) Private individuals who owned real property in Japan or who held securities in Japanese corporations.

For a summary of private claims filed with the Custodian of Enemy Property with respect to losses suffered by Canadian residents as a result of the war with Japan, see paragraph 5 of Canadian War Effort and Losses in the Pacific Theatre. As at September 30, 1946 (at which time no advertisement for claims had been made) claims with respect to property in Japan amounted to nearly $7 millions. These claims would presumably be covered in part by restitution and the payment of compensation.

10. Compensation for loss or damage resulting from the war to Canadian property in territories occupied by the Japanese will presumably have to be paid by the governments of those territories, or, if they do not propose to pay any such compensation, by the Canadian Government. This, too, is a subject on which it would be useful to have the views of other Commonwealth Governments.

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FAR EASTERN COMMISSION

RESTITUTION OF LOOTED PROPERTY
(References: FEC-011/12, -011/31)

Note by the Secretary General

1. The enclosure, a revision of FEC-011/12, Commission policy on Restitution of Looted Property, was approved by the Steering Committee as its seventy-third meeting, 29 July 1947 and is forwarded herewith for the consideration of the Far Eastern Commission.

2. FEC-011/12, Restitution of Looted Property was approved by the Far Eastern Commission on 18 July 1946 and amended by FEC-011/21, Restitution of Looted Property, approved on 10 October 1946.

3. The Chinese and Soviet positions are reserved on the enclosure, and the French member opposed it.

4. In accordance with paragraph 3 of FEC-067/3 the Steering Committee recommends that the enclosure be released to the press in the normal procedure.

NELSON T. JOHNSON
Secretary General

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FEC-RESTRICTED

ENCLOSURE

RESTITUTION OF LOOTED PROPERTY

1. This policy supersedes FEC-011/12 (Restitution of Looted Property approved 18 July 1946, and transmitted to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers on 24 July 1946 as Directive Serial No. 57) as amended by FEC-011/21 (Restitution of Looted Property, approved 10 October 1946, and transmitted to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers on 16 October 1946 as Directive Serial No. 61), and also supersedes FEC-047/2 (Disposition of Captured Japanese Merchant Vessels, filed with the Far Eastern Commission on 24 May 1946 and transmitted to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Power on 13 May 1946 as Directive Serial No. 44).

2. Immediate steps should be taken to restore to Allied countries property which is found in Japan and which is identified in accordance with this paper as having been located in an Allied country at or during the time of occupation of that country, and which was removed by fraud, force or duress by the Japanese or their agents. The fact that payment was made should be disregarded unless their is conclusive evidence that fraud, force or duress did not take place. Restitution of industrial and transportation machinery and equipment should be deferred, however, so long as its retention is required for the safety of the occupation forces. In such cases the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers should provide an explanation of reasons for retention and an estimated date of restoration. Special policies with respect to ships are stated below.

3. Steps should be taken to restore to Allied countries ships of all types and sizes found in Japanese waters which are identified as having been registered in an Allied country at the time of seizure or sinking by the Japanese or their agents, or at the time of acquisition by the Japanese or their agents by fraud, force or duress. The fact that payment was made should be disregarded unless there is conclusive evidence that fraud, force or duress did not take place. Within the limits of easibility ships found in Japanese waters, whether seaworthy, sunk or damaged, should on the request of the claimant country, be refitted, or salvaged, repaired and refitted, as a matter of priority in Japanese yards, to permit their return in a condition substantially similar to that at the time they came into Japanese hands. The foregoing costs should be borne by the Japanese Government.

4. The processing of claims for industrial and transportation machinery and equipment found in Japan should not be permitted in general to delay removals of machinery and equipment on reparations account, but no item for which restitution claim has been received by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers should be allocated on reparations account until the claim has been acted upon. On the other hand, no restitution claim should be recognized for articles already delivered to particular countries on reparations account.

5. The claimant government should take delivery at a point in Japan designated by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers except that at the discretion of the Supreme Commander and by agreement with the recipient country, (A) in the case of Allied vessels subject to restitution the Supreme Commander may make delivery at Western Pacific points

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outside Japan whenever delivery will thereby be facilitated, in which case any costs of supporting and repatriating ships' crews used for such delivery should not be borne by the recipient country unless it specifically agrees to do so; and (B) in the case of delivery of other items of looted property, unutilized outgoing shipping space of Japanese vessels being employed in the importation of goods or repatriation of Japanese from a restitution recipient country to Japan may be made available at the expense of the Japanese Government but at the risk of the Recipient country to deliver such items at points outside Japan. Expenses incurred after delivery to the claimant government should be borne by that government, except that in the case of delivery within Japan, relevant transportation expenses within Japan and any dismantling, packing and repair necessary for proper transportation, including the necessary manpower, materials and organization, should be borne by Japan and be included in restitution. The recipient government should indemnify the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers against all claims made in respect of the property received.

6. Restitution claims for property other than ships should be made by the government of the Allied country from whose territory the property claimed was removed; and restitution made to that government. In the case of ships, restitution claims should be filed by, and restitution made to, the government of the country whose flag the vessels were wearing or on whose register of shipping the vessels were borne at the time of sinking, seizure or acquisition as specified in paragraph 3.

7. No property, including cultural objects, should be included in Japanese exports which the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers considers as probably subject to restitution. If items later found to be subject to restitution should be exported or liquidated equitable compensation should be made to that country to which the items exported or liquidated should have been restored.

8. After full opportunities have been given for inspection of objects known to have been looted the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers should be authorized to liquidate property including stocks of gold, silver, other precious metals, precious stones and jewels but not cultural objects, known to have been looted but not identified pursuant to the terms of this paper, the proceeds of such liquidation to form a secured fund to be used as collateral or as payment for imports required for self-liquidating production programs in Japan of a link or modified link character. The Governments of Australia, China, France, India, Netherlands, Philippines and U. K. should have a priority right to purchase items offered for liquidation by foreign exchange acceptable to SCAP, up to but not exceeding their recognized national reparations percentage shares (adjusted to total 100%, applicable to this pool) of industrial assets available from within Japan. The initial value of this secured fund is to be preserved by SCAP or successor authority. In the final disposition of this secured fund, the claims of countries specified above against the fund should constitute a permanent and inviolable lien payable in U.S. Dollars, or, at the direction of SCAP, in foreign exchange acceptable to the recipient countries in accordance with the percentages mentioned above. The secured fund shall be distributed to the recipient countries not later than 1 January 1950.

9. Without prejudice to other arrangements which may be made between the interested parties, the foregoing restitution policies, especially those in paragraph 6 are not intended to give the Allied government concerned the right to withhold from a person who is a national of another Allied Power any property as to which he may establish a legitimate title.

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10. The Far Eastern Commission should recommend to the Government of those countries within whose territories may be found objects looted or acquired by fraud, force or duress by the Japanese such as:

a. Industrial and transportation machinery and equipment;

b. Gold, other precious metals, precious gems, foreign securities, foreign currencies, and other foreign exchange assets;

c. Cultural objects;

d. Agricultural products and industrial raw materials;

e. Ships;

that bilateral arrangements to be drawn up providing for restitution according to these principles.

11. The Far Eastern Commission should request the U.S. Government to forward this statement of policy through the usual channels to States which are not represented on the Far Eastern Commission and within whose territories looted objects may be found.

12. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers shall create an agency comprising one representative from each of the restitution and reparations teams in Japan of the eleven member countries of the Far Eastern Commission to advise on restitution matters. In addition, the Supreme Commander or his deputy should act as the non-voting chairman of the agency. It may meet at the call of the Supreme Commander or at the request of any member. The Supreme Commander should notify the United States Government of the views of the agency when his views conflict with those of the majority of the member countries.

13. In applying standards of identification with respect to claims for looted property, SCAP should observe the following principles:

a. In cases of doubt, the presumption should be in favor of the claimant country whenever permitted by the broadest application of law, equity and common sense.

b. In cases of doubt as to the adequacy of the evidence of ownership submitted to support a claim for an object known to have been looted, the Supreme Commander shall inform the other members of the advisory agency of the existence of the claim. The advisory agency, after examining the evidence, shall give its advice to the Supreme Commander as to whether the claim should be approved or the provisions of paragraph 8 above applied.

14. No claims for the restitution of looted property should be lodged with SCAP after 8 months from the issuance of a directive to SCAP giving effect to this policy decision; provided that after such terminal date, claims may, with the concurrence of SCAP, be lodged for property known to have been looted but not yet identified pursuant to the provisions of this paper; and provided also that adequate opportunity be given to representatives of looted countries both before and after such terminal date to inspect property known to have been looted but not yet identified.

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CANADIAN WAR EFFORT AND LOSSES IN THE PACIFIC THEATRE

(Summary prepared by the Dominion Bureau of Statistics.)

It should be noted that the present figures are not as accurate as the ones pertaining to Germany, the war effort against Japan having been of smaller scope and much more difficult to summarize in statistical terms.

1. Budgetary Cost of the War against Japan

(a) Armed Services, $548 millions.

Data were prepared in consultation with Department of National Defence and Department of Finance. Direct costs of war against Japan were included.

(b) Mutual Aid, $294 millions.

This is mutual aid to China, Australia, New Zealand and India. The latter was on British account and amounted to $161 millions of the above total. Nothing was added for mutual aid to U.S.S.R. because C.M.A.B. officers expressed the view it had little to do with Japanese war. Estimates were prepared by Dominion Bureau of Statistics using Mutual Aid accounts.

(c) Repatriation of Canadians from Japanese territories, $350 thousands.

This is a small item included at the request of Mr. Ignatieff, who provided it.

The total of the above three items, 1(a), 1(b) and 1(c) is $842 millions in round figures.

2. Estimated man-years served in war against Japan

(a) Number of man-years served in the forces against Japan, 147,825.

R.C.N.	4,940
Army	89,625
Air Force	53,260

Figures provided by Deputy Minister of National Defence to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, May 9, were on a basis which could not be reconciled with the financial estimates above. The figures for the Navy and Air Force have now been revised downward in consultation with the Services themselves.

(b) Number of man-years served in the production of munitions and war supplies for the war in the Pacific, 427,073.

Estimates made by Economic Research Branch, Department of Reconstruction and Supply. Seventy per cent of the total is finished munitions. The bulk of the remainder is essential materials (except foodstuffs). It was assumed that all munitions produced between V.E. and V.J. Days were for use in the Pacific Theatre. It was also assumed that shipments to Pacific War Zone countries after 1942 were for the troops operating

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against Japan. Some allowance was made for shipments to the United States and the United Kingdom which might have been destined for use in the Far East.

(c) Number of man-years served in the production of wartime food exports to Pacific War Zone above peace time level, 116,373.

Estimates on same basis as in the case of Germany.

3. Fatal Military Casualties, 964

This includes fatal battle, deaths whilst P.W., presumed killed and missing. Wounded and injured are excluded.

Letter from National Defence to External Affairs of April 29, 1946.

4. Shipping Losses

(a) Empress of Asia, 16,909 gross tons, sunk in the Singapore approaches by Japanese submarine action of February 5, 1942.

(b) Shinai, 2,410 gross tons, seized at Kuching, North Borneo, by the Japanese in December, 1941.

Naval Service Records

5. Private Claims

Claims for property loss or damage arising out of the war have been voluntarily filed with the Custodian of Enemy Property. As at September 30, 1946 these claims amounted to $14,667,357.93 for all countries in the Far East, constituted as follows:-

Japan	$6,842,217.03
French Indo-China	50,000.00
Korea	937,019.58
Strait Settlements	946,207.00
British Malaya	26,365.61
Philippine Islands	1,744,311.64
China	1,807,405.44
Hong Kong	1,199,369.92
Burma	159,384.13
Netherlands East Indies	699,414.78
Manchukuo	223,928.72
British North Borneo	31,734.08

Advertisement for claims may result in substantial changes in the total value of claims.

This information was supplied by the office of the Custodian.

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JAPANESE PEACE SETTLEMENT:

CANADIAN LIFE INSURANCE INTERESTS

A. Reinstatement of Policy holders

1. At the outbreak of war in the Pacific, two Canadian life insurance companies had a substantial volume of business in Japan. These companies were the Manufacturers Life Insurance Company and the Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada. The combined insurance of these two companies in force in Japan at the outbreak of hostilities is estimated at Y54,-000,000 (Approx. $16,000,000.00). They had written no new business in Japan for several years prior to the war and their local operations were limited to the administration of old business which had originated prior to 1938.

2. After December 7, 1941, the Canadian life companies lost all contact with their policy holders in Japan and possessed no means of knowing which policies were maintained in force by payment of premiums or under the automatic non-forfeiture provisions therein and which had lapsed either by non-payment of premiums due or exhaustion of equity.

3. Both companies adopted a conservative policy in dealing with such business in their annual balance sheets, actuarial reserves thereon being maintained on the assumption that all policies were kept in force, so that if after the peace settlement such policies are dealt with in accordance with their terms the companies are not likely to suffer otherwise than from the excess of mortality actually experienced. While the latter may be heavy, it is not likely to prove disastrous in any case.

4. The danger facing the companies in respect of such business is that by reason of Government action or Peace Treaty provisions they will not be permitted to deal with the policies in question according to their own terms but will be forced to make extra-contractual concessions which may immediately be much more costly and inequitable than any effect of actual mortality.

5. The kind of intervention that the companies fear is found in the Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, signed at Versailles, June 28, 1919. Section 11 (eleven) of the General Provisions in the Annex to Section V of Part X, Economic Clauses, of the Treaty is as follows:-

"Contracts of live insurance entered into between an insurer and a person who subsequently became an enemy shall not be deemed to have been dissolved by the outbreak of war, or by the fact of the person becoming an enemy.

Any sum which during the war became due upon a contract deemed not to have been dissolved under the preceding provision shall be recoverable after the war with the addition of interest at five per cent per annum from the date of its becoming due up to the day of payment.

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Where the contract has lapsed during the war owing to non-payment of premiums, or has become void from breach of the conditions of the contract, the assured or his representatives or the person entitled shall have the right at any time within twelve months of the coming into force of the present treaty to claim from the insurer the surrender value of the policy as the date of its lapse or avoidance.

Where the contract has lapsed during the war owing to non-payment of premiums the payment of which has been prevented by the enforcement of measures of war, the assured or his representative or the persons entitled shall have the right to restore the contract on payment OF the premiums with interest at five per cent per annum within three months from the coming into force of the present Treaty."

6. It will be noted in all of these provisions that while the insurers are protected to some extent as to interest accruing on defaulted premiums, there is no protection against the impairment of health suffered by the policyholders during the period of default. The adverse selection resulting from the departure from contractual provisions forced by the foregoing paragraphs if adopted, not only in respect of enemy holders but as well policyholders of allied nationality in Japan, would constitute a burden on the companies which they consider they should not and cannot be fairly expected to bear. If, for instance, reinstatement of the policies in question is to be permitted without submission of the usual evidence of good health, the companies will be, not only immediately but indefinitely committed to payment of benefits which must be a charge upon other policyholders.

7. It must be remembered that while the Peace Treaty provisions following the First Great War had a very slight effect upon Canadian life insurance companies, since that war was confined largely to the continent of Europe, where the insurance business of the Canadian companies was small, that effect will be multiplied many times if similar provisions are invoked in the forth-coming Japanese peace treaty because of the comparatively large interests of our Canadian companies in Japan.

8. The situation is not changed in principle by reason of the fact that the companies have a great body of Canadian policyholders. The companies will not go bankrupt, but only by reason of the fact that they have a large number of Canadian policyholders among whom the loss occasioned by unrestricted reinstatement of poor Japanese risks would be spread. Not only is the principle of reinstatement at the option of the insured contrary to the essence of a life insurance contract, but the resulting loss on poor risks would place an undue financial strain on the companies and a subsequent loss to the Canadian policyholders of security in their economic investments. It is highly desirable therefore, that Canadian life insurance companies should be protected from any onerous provisions in the peace treaty which will work hardship on Canadian policyholders.

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9. The Canadian companies have reached the conclusion that provision in the Japanese peace treaty for the reinstatement of policyholders in Japan is unnecessary; but they are fully prepared to enter into a Gentleman's Agreement (this proposal is supported by the British Life Officers Association) or undertaking that their policyholders in former enemy territory will be treated generously as set out in Appendix A.

10. Some countries have seized on the fact of war to enforce by legislation extensive liberalization of the conditions of life insurance contracts. The Chinese Government, for instance, has recently enacted legislation giving to the courts the right to vary the terms of the written contract. While this action of the Chinese Government was designed to alleviate hardships incurred through excessive inflation, the precedent established by such legislation may have far-reaching results. The Japanese Government may adopt similar legislation to relieve hardships to Japanese policyholders resulting from depreciation of the yen. Such action would have very considerable repercussions on the financial stability of foreign insurance companies in Japan.

11. It is expected that the Japanese peace treaty will probably protect pre-war contracts in the same manner as set out in Section IV of Part VII of the Treaty of Peace with Italy. Section IV reads as follows:-

> "1. The existence of the state of war shall not, in itself, be regarded as affecting the obligation to pay pecuniary debts arising out of obligations and contracts which existed, and rights which were acquired, before the existence of the state of war, which became payable prior to the coming into force of the present Treaty, and which are due by the Government or nationals of Italy (Japan) to the Government or nationals of one of the Allied and Associated Powers or are due by the Government or nationals of one of the Allied and Associated Powers to the Government or nationals of Italy (Japan).
>
> 2. Except as otherwise expressly provided in the present Treaty, nothing therein shall be construed as impairing debtor-creditor relationships arising out of pre-war contracts concluded either by the Government or nationals of Italy (Japan)."

12. In view of the action of the Chinese Government in giving permission to the courts to vary the terms of contracts, it is desirable that a clause relating to life insurance contracts be included in the foregoing provisions. This clause would be to the effect that there shall be no modification or liberalization of provision of life insurance contracts by the Japanese Government, notwithstanding the inability of the parties, by reason of war, to fulfil the provisions of the policy.

Claims in restitution

13. In addition to the problem of reinstatement of policyholders, the Canadian companies are greatly

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concerned over the status of their business since the outbreak of hostilities in December, 1941. Under the direction of the Japanese Minister of Finance, certain assets of the Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada were placed in a Special Custodian account and the business of both the Sun Life and the Manufacturers Life was transferred to the Kyoyei Life Reinsurance Co. Ltd. in April 1942. Following their transfer, it has been reported that the affairs of the three companies were intermingled, on April 1, 1945, the Kyoyei Life was dissolved and taken over by the Hoken Chuokai (The Life Insurance Companies Association). Since the downfall of the Japanese Empire, the direction of all such economic questions have been assumed under the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan.

14. The Canadian companies are disturbed about the effect of the amalgamation of their business with that of two Japanese insurance companies. It is therefore essential that the Japanese authorities assume responsibility for restoring all property, legal rights and interests in Japan of the Sun Life Assurance Company and the Manufacturers Life Company as they existed on December 7, 1941. Such property, rights and interests should be restored free of all encumbrances and charges of any kind to which they may have become subject as a result of the war and without the imposition of any charges by the Japanese Government in connection with their return. All measures, including seizures, sequestration or control, taken by the Japanese Government against the property of the Canadian life companies since the outbreak of hostilities should be nullified.

15. A summary of the business of the Canadian companies in force in Japan as of December 7, 1941, is attached as Appendix B.

Alternative Settlement of Claims

16. In view of recent exchanges between the Canadian life companies and SCAP, it is possible that all business (including responsibility for all liabilities) of the Canadian companies in Japan may be assumed by the Kyoyei Life Reinsurance Company. If such an arrangement can be brought to fruition on favourable terms, the Canadian companies are desirous of withdrawing all business interests in Japan as soon as possible. Therefore, in the event that agreement is reached on the matter before the peace treaty is written, a clause in the treaty would be required to protect the companies from receiving their old business back again. A provision should be included to the effect that agreements or contracts concluded through the direction of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers shall not be dissolved or invalidated by any provision of the Treaty.

17. In peroration, the interests of Canadian insurance companies in the Japanese peace treaty are:-

1. Reinstatement: That no treaty provision, legislation or regulation will be enacted in the peace treaty to compel companies to go beyond the terms of their policies with the policyholders.

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2. Legislative discrimination: That a clause should be included in the treaty whereby the terms of the policies will not be impaired by legislation of the Japanese Government.

3. Restitution: That all property, legal rights and interests of Canadian insurance companies in Japan as of December 7, 1941, be restored in full without encumbrances or restrictions by the Japanese authorities.

4. Protection of alternative restitution plan: That any agreement or contract concluded under the direction of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers with the Canadian life companies shall not be revoked by any provision or regulation in the peace treaty.

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APPENDIX A

PROPOSALS OF CANADIAN COMPANIES

1. The Canadian companies agree that they will be prepared voluntarily to go beyond policy terms at least to the extent indicated below, such concessions to be regarded as the minimum basis which will be applied to policyholders in enemy hands:-

(a) The companies will, from the date of occupation to some date shortly following liberation, apply an automatic premium loan providing for the accumulation of office premiums at 4% compound interest only; the debt will be allowed to accumulate until it equals either the cash value or the mathematical reserve maintained by the company for the policy, whichever is normally used by the company for automatic premium loan advances.

The cash value or reserve to be used will be that for the end of a period covered by the premium being advanced, even where this constitutes a liberalization of contract terms.

The automatic premium loan will apply provided at least one full year's premium has been paid. Special cash values and reserves for this purpose will be calculated when necessary for policies less than three years in force, i.e. to ensure the operation of the automatic premium loan at earlier policy durations than provided by the policy terms.

(b) All debt existing at the date of occupation will accumulate through the period at only 4% compound interest.

(c) Where the life assured has survived but his policy has lapsed even after the application of the automatic premium loan outlined above, the companies will extend generous treatment to his application for reinstatement. The normal underwriting requirements will be relaxed to the extent that mortality estimated to be 50% in excess of normal will be treated as normal, with corresponding relaxation where the estimated mortality is higher than this figure, except where the sum assured is greater than the equivalent of $5,000 Canadian; for cases not exceeding this amount, the companies will accept personal statements by the assured in lieu of medical examination, unless there is indication of an impairment. This reinstatement proposal will remain in effect for a reasonable time following liberation.

(d) Any company will be at liberty to make more generous concessions to its policyholders if it sees fit.

2. Policies in force upon liberation will generally be subject to a debt and appropriate cases will be offered a redating plan for the net amount at risk in order to extinguish the debt.

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3. Where death has occurred after a policy has lapsed no claim will be recognized.

4. The plan proposed herein will apply to any policy in which there is no enemy interest where the policyholder has been caught in enemy hands and has, therefore, been unable to correspond with the company.

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APPENDIX B

SUN LIFE AND MANUFACTURERS LIFE BUSINESS

1. Business Figures - December 1941

	Sun Life	Manufacturers Life
Business in force	Y 40,500,000	Y 13,600,000
ASSETS		
Bonds	Y 16,734,000	5,100,000
Policy Loans, Cash, etc	7,226,000	1,000,000 (X)
	23,960,000	Y 6,100,000 (X)
	Y 22,065,000	Y 7,100,000
	Y 1,895,000	Y 1,000,000 (X)

X Estimated

The foregoing figures show in summary form the companies' positions in Japan at the outbreak of war in the Pacific.

At December, 1941, the Sun Life had a substantial surplus in yen amounting to approximately Y 1,895,000, while figures for the Manufacturers Life show an approximate deficit of Y 1,000,000.

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JAPANESE PEACE SETTLEMENT

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POLITICAL PROVISIONS

1. It is presumed that the Japanese peace treaty will contain clauses guaranteeing human rights and fundamental freedoms to persons under the jurisdiction of the Japanese Government. Such clauses would presumably follow fairly closely the articles in Part II of the Italian Peace Treaty.

2. In the peace treaty Japan will no doubt also be required to renounce her League of Nations mandate over the former Japanese mandated islands and Japanese sovereignty over all territories ceded to other powers under the territorial clauses.

3. The work of the Far Eastern Commission with respect to constitutional and legal reform is described in the Report on Commission Activities (contained in Appendix A), pages 9-12 and appendices 8-13. The Canadian Government supported the adoption of the policy decision requiring that the situation with respect to the new constitution should be reviewed by the Japanese Diet not sooner than one year and not later than two years after it goes into effect (see Report on Commission Activities, Appendix 12.) If the peace treaty is to be signed before the terms of this policy decision have been fulfilled we would presumably support the inclusion in it of clauses requiring the Diet to carry out this review.

4. The question as to whether special clauses should be contained in the Japanese peace treaty by which the Japanese Government would bind itself to take special measures to prevent the resurgence of ultra-nationalist societies, and the question of whether the terms of the purge directives issued by the occupation authorities should be written into the peace treaty are discussed in items 5 and 6 of Appendix D.

5. It is possible that some of the Allied nations may take the view that any Allied control machinery which is established to ensure that Japan fulfils the terms of the peace treaty should be given powers of intervention in Japanese internal political affairs to ensure that groups with aggressive policies do not regain control of the government. The Canadian Government, however, is likely to take the view that any control council established should not be given a specific mandate in this regard. While every effort should be made to encourage the development of democratic institutions in Japan it would seem desirable that there should be a minimum of interference in domestic political affairs, since the responsibility for building a democratic Japan must in the final analysis rest with the Japanese people themselves. The economic recovery of Japan should go a long way toward fostering the growth of political and economic democracy in Japan.

6. The political clauses of the Japanese peace treaty will presumably include an article similar to Article 44 in the Italian peace treaty, by which the Allied Powers are required to notify their former enemies within a stated period which of their pre-war bilateral treaties they desire to keep in force or revive. In this connection a list of bilateral treaties between Japan and Canada is attached.

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BILATERAL TREATIES
BETWEEN CANADA AND JAPAN

INSTRUMENT	DATE	TREATY SERIES
JAPAN		
Convention (Ottawa/Tokyo) for the exchange of money orders between the two countries	Oct. 1,1889	CTS 1889/S/1
Signed by the Postmaster General of the Dominion of Canada and the Minister of State for Communications of Japan.		
Came into force	Oct. 1,1889	
Terminable on 12 months' notice		
Convention (Ottawa/Tokyo) for the exchange of postal parcels between the two countries	Jun.22,1890	
Superseded by the Postal Parcels Agreement signed at Ottawa, on 13th March, 1914.		
Treaty (London) of commerce and navigation between the United Kingdom and Japan	Jul.16,1894	BTS 1894/23 HBCT 1908/508
Ratifications exchanged at Tokyo	Aug.25,1894	
Supplemented by -		
An Exchange of Notes regarding British Colonies	Jul.16,1894	
A Convention signed at Tokyo	Jul.16,1895	
Acceded to by Canada under a Convention between the United Kingdom and Japan signed at Tokyo	Jan.31,1906	BTS 1906/13
Denounced by Japan	Jul.17,1910	
to expire	Jul.17,1911	
Expired	Jul.17,1911	
Art.5 prolonged for a period of two years as regards the Dominion of Canada by an Exchange of Notes between the United Kingdom and Japan dated	Jul. 7,1911	BTS 1911/17
For an interpretation of the terms "British subjects" as used in this Treaty see Circular of Dec.2,1899, on file 639-13.		
Exchange of Notes (London) between the United Kingdom and Japan providing that British Colonies acceding to the Treaty of Commerce of July 16, 1894, will not be bound by stipulations of Article II.	Jul.16,1894	HBCT 1908/522
Convention (Supplementary) (Tokyo) between the United Kingdom and Japan respecting the duties to be charged on British goods imported into Japan	Jul.16,1895	HBCT 1908/524 BTS 1896/2
Ratifications exchanged at Tokyo	Nov.21,1895	
Acceded to by Canada under a Convention between the United Kingdom and Japan signed at Tokyo	Jan.31,1906	BTS 1906/13

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BILATERAL TREATIES
BETWEEN CANADA AND JAPAN

INSTRUMENT	DATE	TREATY SERIES
JAPAN - continued		
Denounced by Japan	Jul.17,1910	
to expire	Jul.17,1911	
Expired	Jul.17,1911	
Convention (Tokyo) between the United Kingdom and Japan respecting the commercial relations between Canada and Japan	Jan.31,1906	HBCT 1908/535 BTS 1906/13
Ratifications exchanged at Tokyo	Jul.12,1906	
Denounced by Japan	Jul.17,1911	
to expire	Jul.17,1911	
Expired	Jul.17,1911	
Treaty (London) of commerce between the United Kingdom and Japan	Apr. 3,1911	BTS 1911/15 HBCT 1931/384
Ratifications exchanged at Tokyo	May 5,1911	
Supplemented by -		
Notes of	Jul.14,1924	
Treaty signed at London	Jul.30,1925	
Acceded to by Canada under Art.26 subject to conditions	May 1,1913	
Denounced by -		
United Kingdom	Jul.26,1941	BTS 1941/23
Canada	Jul.26,1941	
Abrogated by Declaration of War	Dec. 7,1941	
Agreement (London) between the United Kingdom and Japan for the consolidation of peace and the preservation of the common interests (so-called Treaty of Alliance)	Jul.13,1911	BTS 1911/18
Ratifications not required.		
Duration: 10 years from date of coming into force.		
Came into force	Jul.14,1911	
Declaration	Jul. 8,1920	LNTS 1/24
Terminated under Art.IV of the Pacific Ocean Treaty between the United States of America, the British Empire, France and Japan, relating to their Insular Possessions and Insular Dominions in the Pacific Ocean, signed at Washington on	Dec.13,1921	
Agreement (Ottawa/Tokyo) for the exchange of postal parcels between the two countries	Mar.13,1914	CTS 1914/S/1
Came into operation on the day fixed by comment consent between the two Postal Administrations (Art.15).		
Terminable on one year's notice.		

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BILATERAL TREATIES
BETWEEN CANADA AND JAPAN

INSTRUMENT	DATE	TREATY SERIES
JAPAN - continued		
Detailed Regulations (Ottawa/Tokyo) for the execution of the Agreement concerning the Exchange of Postal Parcels signed at Ottawa on the 13th March 1914	Mar.13,1914	CTS 1914/S/2
Amended by Additional Articles	Dec.16,1924	CTS 1924/S/1
Agreement (London) between the British Empire and Japan regarding the measurement of tonnage of merchant ships	Nov.30,1922	BTS 1923/1 BSP 116/493 LNTS 16/208
Ratification not required.		
Concurred in by Canada under Minute of Council, P.C.2148, of	Sep. 9, 1916	
Terminable after 12 months' notice.		LNTS 19/288 ?
Abrogated by an Exchange of Notes.	Jul.27,1923	LNTS 19/288 ?
Additional Articles (Ottawa/Tokyo) amending the Detailed Regulations for the execution of the Postal Post Agreement signed at Ottawa on the 13th March, 1914	Dec.16,1924	CTS 1924/S/1
Convention (London) between the United Kingdom and Japan supplementary to the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of the 3rd April 1911	Jul.30,1925	HBCT 1931/394 BTS 1927/22
Exchange of Notes (Ottawa) constituting an agreement for the exemption from double taxation of shipping profits	Sep.21,1929	LNTS CTS 1929/10
Registered with League of Nations.	Nov.13,1929	
Exchange of Notes (Ottawa) constituting an agreement respecting the customs treatment of imports	Dec.26,1935	CTS 1936/1
Came into force	Jan. 1,1936	
Declaration (Ottawa) of war against Japan	Dec. 7,1941 ?	CG

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Japanese Peace Settlement: "War Criminals"

A - Canada's participation to date:

1. The United Nations war Crimes Commission together with its Collateral Commission for the Investigation of War Crimes was set up in October, 1943 with the primary objects of investigating and recording the evidence of war crimes, identifying when possible the individuals responsible, reporting to the Government concerned cases in which it appears that adequate evidence may be expected to be forthcoming, and, as extended later, giving of advice to Governments on technical questions of law and procedure. This work was regarded as an essential preliminary to ensure the just and orderly trial of war criminals.

2. In connection with this Commission, several countries decided at the same time, in view of the considerable number of atrocities committed either on their respective soil, or against their respective nationals, to create a special national organization to cope with the problem. It is for that reason that we found a War Crime Bureau in France, an Enemy War Crimes Investigation Committee in China, a Special Investigation Organization in Russia, and a War Crimes Investigation Unit at the Canadian Military Headquarters in London, working in collaboration with the War Crimes Section of National Defence in Ottawa, and with the Canadian War Crimes Advisory Committee.

3. This first step was followed by the Moscow Declaration on German atrocities of 1943, which laid down that at the time of granting the Armistice to Germany (and to Japan) the handing over of war criminals should be required in order that they might be sent back to the countries in which their crimes had been committed to be judged and punished according to the laws of those countries. The Declaration redefined and made concrete the principles and procedure which were to be applied to the prosecution and trial of the war criminals, and was also to be utilized to show the German (and Japanese) people the firm resolution of bringing war criminals to justice. On the other hand it gave assurance against unorganized revenge.

4. As it was apparent, however, that in certain cases, the National Courts would be inadequate to deal with war crimes, for the ordinary rules and procedures would not be adaptable to the extraordinary circumstances in which the crimes were committed, it was advocated that special United Nations Tribunals or mixed Allied Military Tribunals for the trial of enemy nationals alleged to have been involved in atrocities should be organized and established. Certain cases indeed would have to be tried before special United Nations Tribunals, rather than by National Courts.

5. While the United Nations War Crimes Commission had jurisdiction over, and was responsible for, all war crimes committed in the European sector as well as the Eastern area, a plan was approved providing for

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joint military investigation and prosecution by all interested countries of Japanese war criminals, with the Supreme Commander in the Far East establishing International Military Tribunals for the trials. The organization in the field for the prosecution of war criminals under the jurisdiction of General MacArthur consisted of a unit of his special staff, known as the Legal Section, of which Colonel A.C. Carpenter was the chief. Any other country, however, whose nationals had been victims of atrocities were given the right to assist in prosecuting cases involving such atrocities by providing members for the Military Commission trying the cases, and also the members of the Prosecution Staff. This permitted some sort of centralization in one office of the work of all nations concerned in those crimes.

6. It was for that purpose that the Canadian Government created a Crimes Advisory Committee which was to work with the various similar organizations in other countries, like in the United States and the United Kingdom, and which would especially direct its activities towards the question of Far Eastern War Crimes. It may be pointed out here that though the examination of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal in the Far East did not indicate any connection between it and the United Nations War Crimes Commission, it still came under the latter's jurisdiction as the United Nations War Crimes Commission had been created for dealing with war crimes in all theatres.

7. Meanwhile, a preliminary screening of reports from liberated prisoners of war from the Far East had been carried on by officers of National Defence.

8. In November, 1945 the United States put forward some proposals for dealing with Far Eastern war criminals of all grades, which proposals the Canadian Government soon afterwards accepted. These proposals considered three classes of trials of war criminals, as follows:

Type 1 (a) Trials of those responsible for conspiracy to break the peace.

Type 1 (b) Trials of those responsible for atrocities during occupation.

Type 1 (c) Trials of those responsible for individual acts of atrocities.

9. It was understood then that the job of dealing with the first two classes would rest principally upon the United States, seconded by the British authorities. The Canadian Government would mainly deal with the third category, namely Type 1 (c), since Canada would not be setting up its own military courts. Indeed, as Canada was not going to be an occupying force we were to depend on the British or the United States authorities to convene courts for the trial of any cases which Canada was interested in prosecuting. In those cases Canada was required to prepare the case and provide a prosecuting officer. However, Canada was permitted to have a military representative on the court if this was desired.

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10. As far as the Canadian Government was concerned it was also decided, when the case of the Canadian-born Japanese Kanao Inouye came up for trial under the Canadian Treachery Act, that all cases of Far East war criminals would be dealt with in Japan or Hong Kong.

11. Moreover, as by international law, a belligerent as such may try and punish war criminals, that there must also be trial before punishment, and that the belligerent may make provision in a manner appropriate to its juris-prudence for the procedure to be followed at such trials, it became evident that the Canadian Government needed a proper vehicle for giving itself the power of carrying on this obligation and to provide for the punishment of enemy war criminals by Canadian military courts and authorities, this was resolved by the passing, under the War Measures Act, of the War Crimes Regulations on September 10, 1945.

12. The frame of the Organization having been set up, it was now a question of sending the appropriate officers within this organization as to have Canada represented as one of the Allies, as Canada had also to share with the other nations the general responsibility of ensuring the proper trial of the Far East war criminals.

13. The Canadian Army supplied most of the men for these proceedings by sending a group of eight officers and two warrant-officers, all engaged in the trial and prosecution of Japanese war criminals on behalf of the Canadian Government. Brigadier H. G. Nolan was sent to Japan as associate prosecutor of the Major War Crimes Trials while Colonel Thomas Moss, M.C., K.C., (who was later replaced, because of ill health, by Lieutenant-Colonel Griffin) was appointed at the request of the Government of the United States as law member of military commissions trying lesser war criminals, together with Major J.T. Loranger who was detailed to Hong Kong at the request of the Government of the United Kingdom.

14. The whole body of the Canadian officers was designated as the Canadian War Crimes Liaison Detachment in Japan, working before the military commissions with a Sub-Detachment in Hong Kong. Also in order to give to the Military Tribunal some sort of an "international flavour" in the trying of major Japanese war criminals, Canada was also invited to have a member on the International Tribunal, and the Honourable, Mr. Justice S. E. MacDougall was appointed for that position. This organization and the personnel has remained pretty well the same ever since its appointment, and by May, 1947 Canada had three classes of persons concerned with the Trials of war criminals in the Pacific area:

(a) those participating in the trial of <u>major Far Eastern war criminals</u>;

Honourable Mr. Justice E.S. MacDougall (Judge)
Brigadier H.G. Nolan (Prosecutor)

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(b) Canadian investigation team in Tokyo under Lieutenant-Colonel J.F. Orr with a Sub-Detachment in Hong Kong.

(c) Military Judicial officers whose duties were to participate in the trials of lesser war criminals, represented in Tokyo by Lt. Col. M. J. Griffin and in Hong Kong by Major J.T. Loranger as members of the United States and United Kingdom Military Courts respectively.

15. As this memo is being written, the following situation exists with regard to those three classes of persons mentioned above:

(a) The International Military Tribunal, (major Far Eastern War Criminals) is adjourned from June 23 to the end of August, acting on the motion of the Defence that they need time to prepare for a Pacific phase. Earlier this year, the Defence also succeeded in securing three weeks adjournment on similar grounds. We have been informed that Defence tactics are to drag out the trial interminably, and this last adjournment will more likely result in protracting the trial for at least another three months. The trial of Premier Tojo et al is not expected to terminate earlier than the end of 1947 and possibly may extend into 1948. Upon its completion, there will no doubt be the usual process of confirmation of sentence, appeals from sentence, pleas for clemancy, and so on.

(b) It was announced on May 16, 1947 that the Canadian Division of the Legal Section (Investigation Team) composed of five Canadian officers, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel J.F. Orr had completed their work on the minor war crimes trials in Japan and subsequently they sailed for Canada. During the period of the year ending in April, 1947 Lieutenant-Colonel Orr and his officers took part in the prosecution of a total of forty-seven war criminals in Japan. There were six common trials involving twenty-five defendants and twenty-two individual trials. The sentences varied from several years to twenty, thirty and forty years, and to hanging. These criminals were the Japanese that the prisoners of war came in personal contact with. They were camp commanders, camp staffs and guards.

Major G.B. Puddicombe, in charge of the Canadian Sub-Detachment in Hong Kong acted as prosecutor during the same period and secured convictions against eleven war criminals. Five of these were tried at one time in a very lengthy camp trial. The total therefore of war

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criminals tried and sentenced in the Far East and in whom Canada was vitally interested is fifty-eight.

Aside from proscuting cases, this Canadian Division also acted as a liaison between the Legal Section and the repatriated Canadian prisoners of War.

(c) Any substantial Canadian interest in the trials involving lesser war criminals has ceased, and full retribution in the form of sentences of hanging and long imprisonment has been exacted from the Japanese war criminals who were particularly culpable in respect of Canadian prisoners of war. In fact, it is so that the withdrawal of our representative in Japan, Lieut-Col. Griffin, has been agreed upon by the Department of National Defence with the concurrence of the Department of External Affairs and the U.S. authorities, without a replacement being necessary, and our representative at Hong Kong, Major J.T. Loranger might remain there, only because requested by the U.K. Government, with the possibility of being appointed President of the British War Crimes Court in Hong Kong.

16. In view of the above, it may therefore be concluded that as far as Canada is concerned, all the accused war criminals in which we had a special interest have now been tried and sentenced in Japan and Hong Kong; there remain approximately thirty cases in Japan in which Canada is concerned to a slight extent. They will be prosecuted by representatives of the United States, United Kingdom, and other nations against whose nationals the great bulk of their particular crimes were alleged to have been committed. These cases have been taken care of by handing over affidavits of Canadian prisoners of war, and other material, with relevant documents, to the American Group who, being the parties primarily interested, are conducting the actual prosecution. There is finally a Japanese Major General in Hong Kong against whom there are Canadian specifications and who will be tried by the British Military Tribunal in that city.

As experience had demonstrated that investigation of a case against a particular war criminal discloses the probability that lesser war crimes had been committed by others, usually subordinate to the party under investigation, and that this state of affairs could progress "ad infinitum", the United Kingdom authorities at the beginning of 1947 decided to release minor Japanese war criminals, which action was agreed to by the Canadian authorities, diminishing thereby considerably the cases in which we would have been interested.

A copy of an article on War Crimes Trials, written by Major W.P. McClemont, E.D. of the Directorate of Administration in the Branch of the Adjutant-General, Canadian Army Headquarters, has been attached to this memo for reference by the Delegation; the interesting detailed information contained in it may be useful in completing the general outline of this memo.

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B - Possible Provisions for the Japanese Peace Treaty:

17. It would appear from the foregoing that the responsibility still to be assumed by Canada in this question of war criminals in the Far East, and particularly with regard to the coming Peace Treaty with Japan, would be as follows:

(a) To ensure that the Peace Treaty contains the necessary general clauses with respect to Japanese war criminals still to be tried by other countries, or who might unexpectedly still have to be tried for crimes against Canadians, and which would guarantee therefrom the establishment and maintenance of international law and order - in demonstrating that war crimes do not pay.

On that point it has been suggested by Lieutenant Colonel Orr that though the definition of war crimes appeared to be well understood in text books on military and international law, some general recognition of the definition on the part of the Japanese would be most desirable. In other words, the Japanese should admit the existence of war crimes as such in the Treaty and should further admit that their nationals had committed them and that it was equitable as well as just that such persons should have been tried for these crimes, and finally that their convictions and sentences were a logical result of their unlawful actions.

It should be noted indeed that the Japanese were not signatories to the Geneva Convention prior to World War II and that they do not therefore consider that what we define as war crimes are anything other than the operations of war. Accordingly, the greatest care should be taken to have them admit the unlawfulness of war crimes and the justice of prosecuting the perpetrators of them.

(b) That the Peace Treaty also contains the necessary clauses which would bring about the detailed legal implementation of what had already been done on the matter. This would imply:

(i) That all convictions and sentences should be confirmed by the Treaty in some general terms and that it would be desirable to have the Japanese signify their full acceptance and agreement of what has taken place in respect of war crimes trials, and the present and future disposition of war criminals.

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(ii) That the serving of sentences should be carried out in full, once they have been confirmed by military authorities. We have been informed, however, that this confirmation has not yet taken place.

(iii) That limited amnesty along broader lines than that already suggested by the United Kingdom might be desirable. This should include all crimes not likely to merit capital punishment. In the same direction, sentences might be mitigated by the application of any existing local laws of general application; it should be remembered, however, that, in this regard, Japanese law is quite generous in remitting sentences after a portion of same has been served.

(iv) That all sentences imposed in Japan be served in that country.

In connection with the question of amnesty, special reference was made by Lieutenant-Colonel Orr of the Department of National Defence to Lieutenant Kato from Niigata Camp, to the persons responsible for the murder of Canadian priests in the Philippines, and to the persons responsible for the execution of Flying Officer Siddall R.A.F. and Warrant Officers Low and Smith, R.C.A.F. These are the types of war criminals to whom such amnesty should not be made applicable and in respect of whom the honour of Canada should demand punishment. It might be mentioned here that some of these war criminals have been recently apprehended, but that the preparation of the cases against them is not fully complete, nor have they been too well identified. In the case of the Philippine priests, the suspected criminals have not yet been apprehended.

(c) That provisions be made for the question of the property of war criminals which has been impounded and blocked in accordance with the basic directive issued by the Post-Surrender Military Government. Though this question will most probably be handled by the U.S. authorities, it would be appropriate for Canada to be in a position to discuss the matter, especially with reference to confidential memorandum F.E.C.-204/1, March 10, 1947, copies of which are attached.

18. It may be noted that in the Instrument of Japan's Surrender signed at Tokyo Bay, 1945 the only mention of war criminals was made by the fact that the Japanese signatories accepted the provisions set forth at Potsdam, namely the Potsdam Declaration of July, 1945 which provided

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for the dealing of all war crimes by the Allied powers. It read as follows:

> "We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, but stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners."

The terms in the Instrument of Japan's Surrender with regard to this point may be found in the attached copy of same.

19. Its acceptance did, of course, leave complete freedom to the Allies in the question of the trial of Japanese war criminals as well as in the insertion of whichever clause they would think best to insert into the coming Treaty of Peace with Japan. In this connection, it might be useful, however, to mention Article 45 of the Peace Treaty with Italy with regard to war criminals which would appear to be presumably the best precedent for the case in question, and which has so far proved to be quite satisfactory for dealing with the problem in Italy. The text states indeed:

> "1. Italy shall take all necessary steps to ensure the apprehension and surrender for trial of:
>
> (a) Persons accused of having committed, ordered or abetted war crimes and crimes against peace or humanity;
>
> (b) Nationals of any Allied or Associated Power accused of having violated their national law by treason or collaboration with the enemy during the war.
>
> 2. At the request of the United Nations Government concerned, Italy shall likewise make available as witnesses persons within its jurisdiction, whose evidence is required for the trial of the persons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article.
>
> 3. Any disagreement concerning the application of the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall be referred by any of the Governments concerned to the Ambassador in Rome of the Soviet Union, of the United Kingdom, of the United States of America, and of France, who will reach agreement with regard to the difficulty."

20. To sum up, it may be said that the following points should particularly retain the attention of the Canadian Delegation throughout the Canberra discussions:

(a) To bear in mind that Canada has never taken an over-active interest in the United Nations War Crimes Commission, though we always have had a representative on this Organization;

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(b) That the Canadian interest in enemy war crimes in the Far East has never been so extensive as that of other countries like the United States of America, Australia, China and the United Kingdom.

(c) That therefore Canada's interests in the matter are much more of a general nature than of specific obligations, namely the maintenance of international law and order and the safeguarding of the accepted laws and usages of war together with the proper application of justice.

(d) Accordingly, it would be appropriate for the Canadian Delegation not to take the lead in the discussion of this particular subject, but to give its support to, and informally approve, any proposal which would appear to guarantee the maintenance of the above mentioned principles of international law and order and to assure the application of the various points outlined in paragraph 17 of this memorandum.

21. Copies of the following documents, most of which have already been referred to in this memo, and which may be required by the Delegation, are attached:

C.T.S. 1945, No.19 - Instrument of Japan's Surrender.

Confidential F.E.C.-204/1 - Memorandum on Property of War Criminals.

C.T.S. 1945, No.16 - Declaration and other documents regarding the defeat of Germany.

C.T.S. 1947, No. 4 - Treaty of Peace with Italy.

"War Crimes Trials" by Major W.P. McClemont, E.D.

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TREATY SERIES, 1945

No. 19

INSTRUMENT OF JAPAN'S SURRENDER

Signed at Tokyo Bay, Japan, September 2, 1945

OTTAWA
1945

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INSTRUMENT OF JAPAN'S SURRENDER SIGNED AT TOKYO BAY, JAPAN, ON THE 2nd SEPTEMBER, 1945, TOGETHER WITH RELATED DOCUMENTS.

INSTRUMENT OF SURRENDER

We, acting by command of and in behalf of the Emperor of Japan, the Japanese Government and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters, hereby accept the provisions set forth in the declaration issued by the heads of the Governments of the United States, China and Great Britain on 26 July 1945, at Potsdam, and subsequently adhered to by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which four powers are hereafter referred to as the Allied Powers.

We hereby proclaim the unconditional surrender to the Allied Powers of the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters and of all Japanese armed forces and all armed forces under Japanese control wherever situated.

We hereby command all Japanese forces wherever situated and the Japanese people to cease hostilities forthwith, to preserve and save from damage all ships, aircraft, and military and civil property and to comply with all requirements which may be imposed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers or by agencies of the Japanese Government at his direction.

We hereby command the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters to issue at once orders to the Commanders of all Japanese forces and all forces under Japanese control wherever situated to surrender unconditionally themselves and all forces under their control.

We hereby command all civil, military and naval officials to obey and enforce all proclamations, orders and directives deemed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to be proper to effectuate this surrender and issued by him or under his authority and we direct all such officials to remain at their posts and to continue to perform their non-combatant duties unless specifically relieved by him or under his authority.

We hereby undertake for the Emperor, the Japanese Government and their successors to carry out the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration in good faith, and to issue whatever orders and take whatever action may be required by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers or by any other designated representative of the Allied Powers for the purpose of giving effect to that Declaration.

We hereby command the Japanese Imperial Government and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters at once to liberate all allied prisoners of war and civilian internees now under Japanese control and to provide for their protection, care, maintenance and immediate transportation to places as directed.

The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the state shall be subject to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers who will take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate these terms of surrender.

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Signed at Tokyo Bay, Japan, at 0904 I on the second day of September, 1945.

MAMORU SHIGEMITSU,

By Command and in behalf of the Emperor of Japan and the Japanese Government.

MOSHIJIRO UMEZU,

By Command and in behalf of the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters.

Accepted at Tokyo Bay, Japan, at 0908 I on the second day of September, 1945, for the United States, Republic of China, United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and in the interests of the other United Nations at war with Japan.

DOUGLAS MacARTHUR,

Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

C. W. NIMITZ,
United States Representative.

HSU YOUNG-CHANG,
Republic of China Representative.

BRUCE FRASER,
United Kingdom Representative.

DEREVYANKO,
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Representative.

T. A. BLAMEY,
Commonwealth of Australia
Representative.

MOORE COSGRAVE,
Dominion of Canada Representative.

LECLERC,
Provisional Government of the French
Republic Representative.

D. E. L. HELFRICH,
Kingdom of the Netherlands Repre-
sentative.

LEONARD M. ISITT,
Dominion of New Zealand Representative.

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APPENDIX A

PROCLAMATION ORDERING TO CEASE HOSTILITIES AND CARRY OUT THE TERMS OF THE INSTRUMENT OF SURRENDER ISSUED BY THE JAPANESE EMPEROR ON THE 2nd SEPTEMBER, 1945.

(Translation)

PROCLAMATION

Accepting the terms set forth in Declaration issued by the heads of the Governments of the United States, Great Britain and China on July 26th, 1945 at Potsdam and subsequently adhered to by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, We have commanded the Japanese Imperial Government and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters to sign on Our behalf the Instrument of Surrender presented by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and to issue General Orders to the Military and Naval Forces in accordance with the direction of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. We command all Our people forthwith to cease hostilities, to lay down their arms and faithfully to carry out all the provisions of Instrument of Surrender and the General Orders issued by the Japanese Imperial Government and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters hereunder.

This second day of the ninth month of the twentieth year of Syōwa.

Seal of the Emperor — HIROHITO.

NARUHIKO-Ō,
Prime Minister.

MAMORU SHIGEMITSU,
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

IWAO YAMAZAKI,
Minister for Home Affairs.

JUICHI TSUSHIMA,
Minister of Finance.

SADAMU SHIMOMURA,
Minister of War.

MITSUMASA YONAI,
Minister of Navy.

CHUZO IWATA,
Minister of Justice.

TAMON MAEDA,
Minister of Education.

KENZO MATSUMURA,
Minister of Welfare.

KOTARO SENGOKU,
Minister of Agriculture and Forestry.

CHIKUHEI NAKAJIMA,
Minister of Commerce and Industry.

NAOTO KOBIYAMA,
Minister of Transportation.

FUMIMARO KONOE,
Minister without Portfolio.

TAKETORA OGATA,
Minister without Portfolio.

BINSHIRO OBATA,
Minister without Portfolio.

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APPENDIX B

IMPERIAL ORDER NAMING MAMORU SHIGEMITSU
TO SIGN THE INSTRUMENT OF SURRENDER
ISSUED ON THE 2nd SEPTEMBER, 1945

(Translation)

H I R O H I T O,

By the Grace of Heaven, Emperor of Japan, seated on the Throne occupied by the same Dynasty changeless through ages eternal,

To all to whom these Presents shall come, Greeting!

We do hereby authorise Mamoru Shigemitsu, Zyosanmi, First Class of the Imperial Order of the Rising Sun to attach his signature by command and in behalf of Ourselves and Our Government unto the Instrument of Surrender which is required by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to be signed.

In witness whereof, We have hereunto set our signature and caused the Great Seal of the Empire to be affixed.

Given at Our Palace in Tokyo, this first day of the ninth month of the twentieth year of Syōwa, being the two thousand six hundred and fifth year from the Accession of the Emperor Zinmu.

HIROHITO.

Seal of
the
Empire.

NARUHIKO-Ō,
Prime Minister.

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APPENDIX C

IMPERIAL ORDER NAMING YOSHIJIRO UMEZU
TO SIGN THE INSTRUMENT OF SURRENDER
ISSUED ON THE 2nd SEPTEMBER, 1945

(Translation)

H I R O H I T O,

By the Grace of Heaven, Emperor of Japan, seated on the Throne occupied by the same Dynasty chang through ages eternal,

To all to whom these Presents shall come, Greeting!

We do hereby authorise Yoshijiro Umezu, Zyosanmi, First Class of the Imperial Order of the Rising Sun, Second Class of the Imperial Military Order of the Golden Kite, to attach his signature by command and in behalf of Ourselves and Our Imperial General Headquarters unto the Instrument of Surrender which is required by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to be signed.

In witness whereof, We have hereunto set Our signature and caused the Great Seal of the Empire to be affixed.

Given at Our Palace in Tokyo, this first day of the ninth month of the twentieth year of Syōwa, being the two thousand six hundred and fifth year from the Accession of the Emperor Zinmu.

Seal of
the
Empire

HIROHITO.

YOSHIJIRO UMEZU,
Chief of the General
Staff of the Imperial
Japanese Army.

SOEMU TOYODA,
Chief of the General
Staff of the Imperial
Japanese Navy.

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TREATY SERIES, 1945

No. 16

DECLARATION AND OTHER DOCUMENTS

REGARDING

THE DEFEAT OF GERMANY

AND THE ASSUMPTION OF SUPREME AUTHORITY

WITH RESPECT TO GERMANY

BY THE

GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM,

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS,

AND THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF

THE FRENCH REPUBLIC

Signed at Berlin, June 5, 1945

OTTAWA
1945

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SUMMARY

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I. Declaration regarding the defeat of Germany and the assumption of Supreme authority with respect to Germany by the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Provisional Government of the French Republic, signed at Berlin on the 5th June, 1945 3

II. Statement by the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Provisional Government of the French Republic on zones of occupation in Germany, signed at Berlin on the 5th June, 1945 9

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IV. Statement by the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Provisional Government of the French Republic on consultation with Government of other United Nations, signed at Berlin on the 5th June, 1945 11

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DECLARATION AND OTHER DOCUMENTS REGARDING THE DEFEAT OF GERMANY AND THE ASSUMPTION OF SUPREME AUTHORITY WITH RESPECT TO GERMANY BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, AND THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC.

Signed at Berlin on the 5th June, 1945.

I

DECLARATION[x]

The German armed forces on land, at sea and in the air have been completely defeated and have surrendered unconditionally and Germany, which bears responsibility for the war, is no longer capable of resisting the will of the victorious Powers. The unconditional surrender of Germany has thereby been effected, and Germany has become subject to such requirements as may now or hereafter be imposed upon her.

There is no central Government or authority in Germany capable of accepting responsibility for the maintenance of order, the administration of the country and compliance with the requirement of the victorious Powers.

It is in these circumstances necessary, without prejudice to any subsequent decisions that may be taken respecting Germany, to make provision for the cessation of any further hostilities on the part of the German armed forces, for the maintenance of order in Germany and for the administration of the country, and to announce the immediate requirements with which Germany must comply.

The Representatives of the Supreme Commands of the United Kingdom, the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the French Republic, hereinafter called the "Allied Representatives," acting by authority of their respective Governments and in the interests of the United Nations, accordingly make the following Declaration:—

The Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Provisional Government of the French Republic, hereby assume supreme authority with respect to Germany, including all the powers possessed by the German Government, the High Command and any state, municipal, or local government or authority. The assumption, for the purposes stated above, of the said authority and powers does not effect the annexation of Germany.

The Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Provisional Government of the French Republic, will hereafter determine the boundaries of Germany or any part thereof and the status of Germany or of any area at present being part of German territory.

In virtue of the supreme authority and powers thus assumed by the four Governments, the Allied Representatives announce the following requirements arising from the complete defeat and unconditional surrender of Germany with which Germany must comply:—

---

[x] The Canadian Government has been consulted on this Declaration and has expressed its agreement.

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Signed at Berlin on the 5th June, 1945.

I

DECLARATION[x]

The German armed forces on land, at sea and in the air have been completely defeated and have surrendered unconditionally and Germany, which bears responsibility for the war, is no longer capable of resisting the will of the victorious Powers. The unconditional surrender of Germany has thereby been effected, and Germany has become subject to such requirements as may now or hereafter be imposed upon her.

There is no central Government or authority in Germany capable of accepting responsibility for the maintenance of order, the administration of the country and compliance with the requirement of the victorious Powers.

It is in these circumstances necessary, without prejudice to any subsequent decisions that may be taken respecting Germany, to make provision for the cessation of any further hostilities on the part of the German armed forces, for the maintenance of order in Germany and for the administration of the country, and to announce the immediate requirements with which Germany must comply.

The Representatives of the Supreme Commands of the United Kingdom, the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the French Republic, hereinafter called the "Allied Representatives," acting by authority of their respective Governments and in the interests of the United Nations, accordingly make the following Declaration:—

The Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Provisional Government of the French Republic, hereby assume supreme authority with respect to Germany, including all the powers possessed by the German Government, the High Command and any state, municipal, or local government or authority. The assumption, for the purposes stated above, of the said authority and powers does not effect the annexation of Germany.

The Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Provisional Government of the French Republic, will hereafter determine the boundaries of Germany or any part thereof and the status of Germany or of any area at present being part of German territory.

In virtue of the supreme authority and powers thus assumed by the four Governments, the Allied Representatives annouce the following requirements arising from the complete defeat and unconditional surrender of Germany with which Germany must comply:—

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[x] The Canadian Government has been consulted on this Declaration and has expressed its agreement.

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Article 1

Germany, and all German military, naval and air authorities and all forces under German control shall immediately cease hostilities in all theatres of war against the forces of the United Nations on land, at sea and in the air.

Article 2

(a) All armed forces of Germany or under German control, wherever they may be situated, including land, air, anti-aircraft and naval forces, the S.S., S.A. and Gestapo, and all other forces or auxiliary organisations equipped with weapons, shall be completely disarmed, handing over their weapons and equipment to local Allied Commanders or to officers designated by the Allied Representatives.

(b) The personnel of the formations and units of all the forces referred to in paragraph (a) above shall, at the discretion of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Allied State concerned, be declared to be prisoners of war, pending further decisions, and shall be subject to such conditions and directions as may be prescribed by the respective Allied Representatives.

(c) All forces referred to in paragraph (a) above, wherever they may be, will remain in their present positions pending instructions from the Allied Representatives.

(d) Evacuation by the said forces of all territories outside the frontiers of Germany as they existed on the 31st December, 1937, will proceed according to instructions to be given by the Allied Representatives.

(e) Detachments of civil police to be armed with small arms only, for the maintenance of order and for guard duties, will be designated by the Allied Representatives.

Article 3

(a) All aircraft of any kind or nationality in Germany or German-occupied or controlled territories or waters, military, naval or civil, other than aircraft in the service of the Allies, will remain on the ground, on the water or aboard ships pending further instruction.

(b) All German or German-controlled aircraft in or over territories or waters not occupied or controlled by Germany will proceed to Germany or to such other place or places as may be specified by the Allied Representatives.

Article 4

(a) All German or German-controlled naval vessels, surface and submarine, auxiliary naval craft, and merchant and other shipping, wherever such vessels may be at the time of this Declaration, and all other merchant ships of whatever nationality in German ports, will remain in or proceed immediately to ports and bases as specified by the Allied Representatives. The crews of such vessels will remain on board pending further instructions.

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(b) All ships and vessels of the United Nations, whether or not title has been transferred as the result of prize court or other proceedings, which are at the disposal of Germany or under German control at the time of this Declaration, will proceed at the dates and to the ports or bases specified by the Allied Representatives.

Article 5

(a) All or any of the following articles in the possession of the German armed forces or under German control or at German disposal will be held intact and in good condition at the disposal of the Allied Representatives, for such purposes and at such times and places as they may prescribe:—

(i) all arms, ammunition, explosives, military equipment, stores and supplies and other implements of war of all kinds and all other war material;

(ii) all naval vessels of all classes, both surface and submarine, auxiliary naval craft and all merchant shipping, whether afloat, under repair or construction, built or building;

(iii) all aircraft of all kinds, aviation and anti-aircraft equipment and devices;

(iv) all transportation and communications facilities and equipment, by land, water or air;

(v) all military installations and establishments, including airfields, seaplane bases, ports and naval bases, storage depots, permanent and temporary land and coast fortifications, fortresses and other fortified areas, together with plans and drawings of all such fortifications, installations and establishments;

(vi) all factories, plants, shops, research institutions, laboratories, testing stations, technical data, patents, plans, drawings and inventions, designed or intended to produce or to facilitate the production or use of the articles, materials and facilities referred to in sub-paragraphs (i), (ii), (iv) and (v) above or otherwise to further the conduct of war.

(b) At the demand of the Allied Representatives the following will be furnished:—

(i) the labour, services and plant required for the maintenance or operation of any of the six categories mentioned in paragraph (a) above; and

(ii) any information or records that may be required by the Allied Representatives in connection with the same.

(c) At the demand of the Allied Representatives all facilities will be provided for the movement of Allied troops and agencies, their equipment and supplies, on the railways, roads and other land communications or by sea, river or air. All means of transportation will be maintained in good order and repair, and the labour, services and plant necessary therefor will be furnished.

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Article 6

(a) The German authorities will release to the Allied Representatives, in accordance with the procedure to be laid down by them, all prisoners of war at present in their power, belonging to the forces of the United Nations, and will furnish full lists of these persons, indicating the places of their detention in Germany or territory occupied by Germany. Pending the release of such prisoners of war, the German authorities and people will protect them in their persons and property and provide them with adequate food, clothing, shelter, medical attention and money in accordance with their rank or official position.

(b) The German authorities and people will in like manner provide for and release all other nationals of the United Nations who are confined, interned or otherwise under restraint, and all other persons who may be confined, interned or otherwise under restraint for political reasons or as a result of any Nazi action, law or regulation which discriminates on the ground of race, colour, creed or political belief.

(c) The German authorities will, at the demand of the Allied Representatives, hand over control of places of detention to such officers as may be designated for the purpose by the Allied Representatives.

Article 7

The German authorities concerned will furnish to the Allied Representatives:—

(a) full information regarding the forces referred to in Article 2(a), and, in particular, will furnish forthwith all information which the Allied Representatives may require concerning the numbers, locations and dispositions of such forces, whether located inside or outside Germany;

(b) complete and detailed information concerning mines, minefields and other obstacles to movement by land, sea or air, and the safety lanes in connection therewith. All such safety lanes will be kept open and clearly marked; all mines, minefields and other dangerous obstacles will as far as possible be rendered safe, and all aids to navigation will be reinstated. Unarmed German military and civilian personnel with the necessary equipment will be made available and utilised for the above purposes, and for the removal of mines, minefields and other obstacles as directed by the Allied Representatives.

Article 8

There shall be no destruction, removal, concealment, transfer or scuttling of, or damage to, any military, naval, air, shipping, port, industrial and other like property and facilities and all records and archives, wherever they may be situated, except as may be directed by the Allied Representatives.

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Article 9

Pending the institution of control by the Allied Representatives over all means of communication, all radio and telecommunication installations and other forms of wire or wireless communications, whether ashore or afloat, under German Control, will cease transmission except as directed by the Allied Representatives.

Article 10

The forces, nationals, ships, aircraft, military equipment, and other property in Germany or in German control or service or at German disposal, of any other country at war with any of the Allies, will be subject to the provisions of this Declaration and of any proclamations, orders, ordinances or instructions issued thereunder.

Article 11

(a) The principal Nazi leaders as specified by the Allied Representatives, and all persons from time to time named or designated by rank, office or employment by the Allied Representatives as being suspected of having committed, ordered or abetted war crimes or analogous offences, will be apprehended and surrendered to the Allied Representatives.

(b) The same will apply in the case of any national of any of the United Nations who is alleged to have committed an offence against his national law, and who may at any time be named or designated by rank, office or employment by the Allied Representatives.

(c) The German authorities and people will comply with any instructions given by the Allied Representatives for the apprehension and surrender of such persons.

Article 12

The Allied Representatives will station forces and civil agencies in any or all parts of Germany as they may determine.

Article 13

(a) In the exercise of the supreme authority with respect to Germany assumed by the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Provisional Government of the French Republic, the four Allied Governments will take such steps, including the complete disarmament and demilitarisation of Germany, as they deem requisite for future peace and security.

(b) The Allied Representatives will impose on Germany additional political, administrative, economic, financial, military and other requirements arising from the complete defeat of Germany. The Allied Representatives, or persons or agencies duly designated to act on their authority, will issue proclamations, orders, ordinances and instructions for the purpose of laying down such additional requirements, and of giving effect to the other provisions of this Declaration. All German authorities and the German people shall carry out

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unconditionally the requirements of the Allied Representatives, and shall fully comply with all such proclamations, orders, ordinances and instructions.

Article 14

This Declaration enters into force and effect at the date and hour set forth below. In the event of failure on the part of the German authorities or prople promptly and completely to fulfil their obligations hereby or hereafter imposed, the Allied Representatives will take whatever action may be deemed by them to be appropriate under the circumstances.

Article 15

This Declaration is drawn up in the English, Russian, French and German languages. The English, Russian and French are the only authentic texts.

5th June, 1945 Berlin.

16-40 Hours.

Signed by the Allied Representatives:

B. MONTGOMERY, F.M.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER.

G.K. ZHUKOV.

F. De LATTRE De TASSIGNY.

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II

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STATEMENT BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, AND THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC ON ZONES OF OCCUPATION IN GERMANY.

Germany, within her frontiers as they were on the 31st December, 1937, will, for the purposes of occupation, be divided into four zones, one to be allotted to each Power as follows:—

an eastern zone to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;
a north-western zone to the United Kingdom;
a south-western zone to the United States of America;
a western zone to France.

The occupying forces in each zone will be under a Commander-in-Chief designated by the responsible Power. Each of the four Powers may, at its discretion, include, among the forces assigned to occupation duties under the command of its Commander-in-Chief, auxiliary contingents from the forces of any other Allied Power which has actively participated in military operations against Germany.

2. The area of "Greater Berlin" will be occupied by forces of each of the four Powers. An Inter-Allied Governing Authority (in Russian, Komendatura) consisting of four Commandants, appointed by their respective Commanders-in-Chief, will be established to direct jointly its administration.

5th June, 1945.

III

STATEMENT BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, AND THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC ON CONTROL MACHINERY IN GERMANY.

In the period when Germany is carrying out the basic requirements of unconditional surrender, supreme authority in Germany will be exercised, on instructions from their Governments, by the British, United States, Soviet and French Commanders-in-Chief, each in his own zone of occupation, and also jointly, in matters affecting Germany as a whole. The four Commanders-in-Chief will together constitute the Control Council. Each Commander-in-Chief will be assisted by a Political Adviser.

2. The Control Council, whose decisions shall be unanimous, will ensure appropriate uniformity of action by the Commanders-in-Chief in their respective zones of occupation and will reach agreed decisions on the chief questions affecting Germany as a whole.

3. Under the Control Council, there will be a permanent Co-ordinating Committee composed of one representative of each of the four Commanders-in-Chief, and a Control Staff

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organised in the following Divisions (which are subject to adjustment in the light of experience):—

Military; Naval; Air; Transport; Political; Economic; Finance; Reparation, Deliveries and Restitution; Internal Affairs and Communications; Legal; Prisoners of War and Displaced Persons; Man-power.

There will be four heads of each Division, one designated by each Power. The staffs of the Divisions may include civilian as well as military personnel, and may also in special cases include nationals of other United Nations appointed in a personal capacity.

4. The functions of the Co-ordinating Committee and of the Control Staff will be to advise the Control Council, to carry out the Council's decisions and to transmit them to the appropriate German organs, and to supervise and control the day-to-day activities of the latter.

5. Liaison with the other United Nations Governments chiefly interested will be established through the appointment by such Governments of military missions (which may include civilian members) to the Control Council. These missions will have access through the appropriate channels to the organs of control.

6. United Nations organisations will, if admitted by the Control Council to operate in Germany, be subordinate to the Allied control machinery and answerable to it.

7. The administration of the "Greater Berlin" area will be directed by an Inter-Allied Governing Authority, which will operate under the general direction of the Control Council, and will consist of four Commandants, each of whom will serve in rotation as Chief Commandant. They will be assisted by a technical staff which will supervise and control the activities of the local German organs.

8. The arrangements outlined above will operate during the period of occupation following German surrender when Germany is carrying out the basic requirements of unconditional surrender. Arrangements for the subsequent period will be the subject of a separate agreement.

5th June, 1945.

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IV

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STATEMENT BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, AND THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC ON CONSULTATION WITH GOVERNMENTS OF OTHER UNITED NATIONS.

By the Declaration regarding the defeat of Germany issued at Berlin on the 5th June, 1945, the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Provisional Government of the French Republic have assumed supreme authority with respect to Germany. The Governments of the four Powers hereby announce that it is their intention to consult with the Governments of other United Nations in connection with the exercise of this authority.

5th June, 1945.

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EXTRACT FROM CANADIAN ARMY JOURNAL

VOLUME 1, NUMBER 3 JUNE 1947

WAR CRIMES TRIALS

The purpose of this article is to give an account of the prosecution and trial of Japanese war criminals who were charged with offences against the officers, non-commissioned officers and private soldiers of the Canadian army. Their crimes were to a large extent committed against these troops after they had become prisoners-of-war by formal surrender at Hong Kong on Christmas Day, 1941. The fullest retribution consistent with the principles of justice has been exacted from the perpetrators of these deliberate violations of the laws and usages of war. Prior to the surrender there were many atrocities, such as murder and rape for which the Commanding Officers and Premier Tojo and his associates have been or are being tried.

In order to clearly understand the nature of these War Crimes trials in Tokyo and Hong Kong it will be necessary to give something of their legal and historical background.

First it must be pointed out that after the Allies had successfully defeated Italy, Germany and Japan in that order, a United Nations War Crimes Commission was set up. The purpose of that commission was to bring to trial all persons who had either violated the laws and usages of war, or who had committed crimes against humanity, including the peoples of their own countries. In this Second World War the aggressor powers had sunk to far greater depths of depravity than they had in World War 1. It was considered that they should be charged with these offences and tried, and that an attempt should be made to create a new international morality and outlaw aggressive war in the future by making an example of those who had initiated it this time. As a result, the international trial of Goering, Hess, Ribbentrop and associates took place at Nuremburg, and you are familiar with the fate of most of them - the hangman's noose. Hitler escaped by committing suicide previously in Berlin. These men were classed as major war criminals.

WAR LORDS OF JAPAN

In a similar category were Hideki Tojo, Premier of Japan and Chief of Staff, and his associates who were the War Lords of Japan. They also are on trial for crimes against humanity and have been so for over a year. Their crimes were the absolutely unprovoked war against China and eventually in 1941 against the United States, Great Britain, France, The Netherlands, Australia and any nation which they wished to enlist in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. In both cases history will show that these men were simply unprincipled international gangsters who gained control of the governments of their respective countries

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and proceeded to wage aggressive wars to satiate their lust for power. Unfortunately, by modern methods of propaganda and political oppression they enlisted millions of supporters. What followed is the history of World War II.

H/Capt. James Barnett, former padre of the Royal Rifles of Canada, Quebec, has already given evidence in person at the international trial of Premier Tojo and his colleagues. In December 1940 Capt. Barnett was on the witness stand for several days in Tokyo and told of the St. Stephen's Massacre in Hong Kong, where on 25 December 1941, 70 Allied soldiers sick or wounded in hospital were bayoneted by the Japanese and all of the nurses raped and some of them murdered. Such were the early manifestations of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in action.

In addition to the major war criminals there were many atrocities committed during the fighting itself which warranted investigation. These cases have resulted in the trials of lesser war criminals in almost every Allied country in the world, and are continuing today. The trial of General Kurt Meyer is an example of this type of case. A General Tanaka is now on trial in Hong Kong on very similar charges. The chief witness against him was Dr. S.M. Banfill, Medical Officer for the Royal Rifles, who was dispatched to Hong Kong in March 1947. He gave evidence of the Salesian Mission Massacre, where it is alleged the Japanese were under orders to kill all prisoners, and did so.

As a result of the action taken by the Allies to prosecute War Crimes and endeavour to outlaw War, Canada passed the War Crimes Regulations (Canada) on 30 August 1945, shortly after the fall of Japan. She has good reason to do so because Canadians had suffered more at the hands of the Japanese than any other nation against whom our forces had been sent. The fall of Japan revealed a greater volume of atrocities to Canadians of the Hong Kong Force than to all of the five Divisions which fought in Europe at intervals from 1940 to 1945. And this despite the fact that the only Canadians involved were two Battalions and a Headquarters. These were the troops which Canada sent to Hong Kong in November 1941, and who had been killed or captured by Christmas of that same year.

The War Crimes Regulations, which were similar to those enacted by Great Britain and the United States, provided for the trial of war criminals before military commissions constituted similarly to courts-martial. They provided, however, for the admission of statements, affidavits, and documents much more freely than would be the case before a court-martial or a civil criminal court. This was done because of the obvious difficulty in securing the actual presence at the trials of thousands of witnesses residing in many parts of the world. Many witnesses have of course attended.

The history of the fall of Hong Kong can be briefly told because it was, unfortunately, a campaign of short

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duration. First, a brief description of its location and strategic importance is in order.

Hong Kong is a British colony, having been first ceded by the Chinese to Great Britain in 1841, precisely 100 years before it was taken from her by the Japanese. Over the century it was developed into one of the great commercial ports of the world and was the chief inlet and outlet for the trade of South China. This great city is near the mouth of the Canton River and 75 miles south of the City of Canton. It is divided into two parts, the City of Victoria on the Island of Hong Kong and Kowloon on the mainland and across the harbour. Between them they have a population of 2,000,000 people, mostly Chinese. The island and harbour and part of the mainland were acquired as a defensive base for the China trade. Hong Kong is 1,100 miles from the southerly trip of Japan and 1,400 miles from Singapore. Unfortunately, by the Washington Naval Conference of 1921-2, to which Japan was a party, Great Britain agreed not to fortify it as a first-class naval base. Its strategic security therefore depended on the efficiency of such naval and air forces as might be based on Singapore. It will be recollected that the Prince of Wales and the Repulse, based on Singapore, were sunk by enemy air action on 10 December 1941, a black day indeed in naval history.

EMPIRE IN SORE STRAITS

In view of the possibility of Japan entering the War on the side of Germany, Great Britain did what she could to strengthen her position in the Far East, not really with a view to fighting Japan but to deterring her. It must be remembered that the Empire was in sore straits. She had been driven out of Greece and Crete earlier in 1941 and was unable to dislodge Rommel from Africa. However, the great battleships, the Prince of Wales and the Repulse, were sent to Singapore, and Canada, being nearest and having troops available, sent the Royal Rifles of Canada from Quebec and the Winnipeg Rifles from Winnipeg with a Headquarters and supporting services to Hong Kong. The Canadian Force was led by Brig. J.K. Lawson, a very able Permanent Force Officer of the Canadian Army. He was killed in action on 19 December 1941 while engaged with the enemy at point-blank range.

The storm soon broke, first at Pearl Harbour on 7 December 1941. On the following day Hong Kong, which stood on the path to Singapore and could be used as an advance naval base, was attacked by a division of Japanese, with another in reserve. This attack was put in from the mainland of China. The Japanese, on the third day, achieved air superiority by knocking out the British airfield.

By 11 December the position on the mainland around Kowloon could no longer be held and both it and Victoria were subjected to constant air bombardment. The combined forces, British, Canadian and Indian, numbering in all 12,000 withdrew to the island of Hong Kong. The Chinese populations - a million in each of the cities - rioted, and it was difficult to supply them with food. On 13

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December the Japanese demanded immediate surrender. This was refused and for four days the Japanese shelled and bombed the Island and then sent another ultimatum. A day later they landed across the Lyemun passage and infiltrated into several commanding positions. The Canadians counter-attached at Ty Tam and Wong Nei Chong gaps (here Brig Lawson fell) but were repulsed by mortar and machine guns with heavy casualties. By the 22 December there were isolated pockets of resistance including Stanley Peninsula. Supplies were exhausted, and the Japs held the water reservoirs. On the 23 and 24 December 1941 the Japanese dive-bombed the remaining British and Canadian positions. On Christmas Day the Governor accepted the inevitable and surrendered. It has been a valiant fight against overwhelming odds.

The Canadians who landed in Hong Kong were 1,974 all ranks, and of this number 286 were killed in action, died of wounds, or were murdered, and 272 were killed or died from mistreatment as prisoners-of-war. Such a situation, insofar as soldiers taken prisoner is concerned, had no parallel in either German or Italy.

The balance of the Canadian Force were taken prisoner at Hong Kong and there followed for them 3½ years of misery, torture, starvation and slavery. In the first place, communication with relatives was never established to any extent at all, despite the efforts of the International Red Cross. The result was that for years the next-of-kin did not know whether a son, a husband or father was living or dead. A few were able to get some meagre word through as the result of the repatriation of some Canadian civilians in 1944, but by this time the Canadians were scattered in 15 camps in Hong Kong and Japan. As a result, little information was available from these fortunate repatriates. It is not to be wondered at, then, that when these prisoners were finally reunited with their families the wife had suffered as much through worry and uncertainty as had her husband from the privations and brutality which he had endured.

The Canadians were kept in Hong Kong prison camps for more than a year and during that time their constant diet of rice was so small that many robust men lost as much as 100 poinds in weight. Rice three times a day for years became so monotonous that they actually seasoned it with toothpowder and even boot grease. They were required to work long hours every day as labourers, even when sick with dysentery, beri-beri and other deficiency diseases. If they could stand they went to work, and beatings by the guards were the order of every day. The Commander of the camps in Hong Kong was a Col. Tokunaga and the medical officer was Capt. Saito.

The Canadian Medical Officers in the various camps were hard-pressed to care for the sick and the dying. They were constantly interfered with by the Japanese camp officials and were supplied with much less than a bare minimum of medicine or drugs. Red Cross supplies of these precious items were frequently diverted. The situation was further aggravated by the Japs cutting

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the ration of the sick who were already suffering from deficiency diseases. Their theory was no work, less rations, and so the vicious circle progressed. It had been authoritatively stated that on release, 45% of the prisoners were suffering from diseases directly attributable to lack of food and water. Lt. Col. J.N.B. Crawford, RCAMC, gave evidence of these matters at the trial of Col. Tokunaga, Capt. Saito, and others of the camp staffs in Hong Kong in November 1946. These officers were sentenced to hang for these and other war crimes committed by them.

In 1943 and 1944, over 1,100 of our Canadian prisoners were shipped to Japan and distributed among many camps. They were still on a starvation ration and worked in coal, iron, and nickel mines, shipyards, foundries, dockyards and industrial plants. Well over 100 died there, some from outright brutality and exposure, others from disease and lack of treatment and still other from malnutrition.

Altogether, 1,418 Canadian prisoners of war were repatriated to Canada in the fall of 1945 and in most cases for the first time their relatives knew that they were alive. All were shaken in mind and body and spirit. The Medical Corps provided them with every medical and nutritional treatment available and were able to restore most to much better health and weight. Some, of course, are still in hospitals, and some unfortunately, have minds that have been shattered beyond repair.

COMMISSION BEGINS WORK

It was at this stage that the United War Crimes Commission for the Far East began its work. It was very apparent that many war crimes had been committed, so in October 1945 a War Crimes Section in the Directorate of Administration was established under Lt. Col. J.O.F.H. Orr, MBE, and Assistant Judge Advocate General from Vancouver, and former Crown prosecutor for that city. The Section proceeded to prepare the cases against the Japanese. At the same time it maintained liaison with the War Crimes trials then proceeding in Europe. In this connection, it secured 150 interrogations for these trials and dispatched as witnesses some 26 ex-service men and German PW's. However, the principal project was amassing the evidence for the Far East and this involved the securing of approximately 1,100 affidavits from the repatriates. These documents could be used as evidence at the trials of the Japanese. Lt. Col. Orr and his associates analyzed these stories and found that there were 68 Japanese who should be charged and requested the Supreme Command of the Allied Powers under General MacArthur to apprehend these accused. With only one or two exceptions they were arrested, and incarcerated in Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, to await their trials.

In April 1946, Lt. Col. Orr and Capts (now Majors) J.D.C. Boland and J.H. Dickey proceeded to Japan to prosecute some 60 of the cases before the Military war Crimes Commissions to be convened in Tokyo. Sergeant-Majors Shepherd, Manchester, Preston and S/Sergeant Martin accompanied them.

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the ration of the sick who were already suffering from deficiency diseases. Their theory was no work, less rations, and so the vicious circle progressed. It had been authoritatively stated that on release, 45% of the prisoners were suffering from diseases directly attributable to lack of food and water. Lt. Col. J.N.B. Crawford, RCAMC, gave evidence of these matters at the trial of Col. Tokunaga, Capt. Saito, and others of the camp staffs in Hong Kong in November 1946. These officers were sentenced to hang for these and other war crimes committed by them.

In 1943 and 1944, over 1,100 of our Canadian prisoners were shipped to Japan and distributed among many camps. They were still on a starvation ration and worked in coal, iron, and nickel mines, shipyards, foundries, dockyards and industrial plants. Well over 100 died there, some from outright brutality and exposure, others from disease and lack of treatment and still other from malnutrition.

Altogether, 1,418 Canadian prisoners of war were repatriated to Canada in the fall of 1945 and in most cases for the first time their relatives knew that they were alive. All were shaken in mind and body and spirit. The Medical Corps provided them with every medical and nutritional treatment available and were able to restore most to much better health and weight. Some, of course, are still in hospitals, and some unfortunately, have minds that have been shattered beyond repair.

COMMISSION BEGINS WORK

It was at this stage that the United War Crimes Commission for the Far East began its work. It was very apparent that many war crimes had been committed, so in October 1945 a War Crimes Section in the Directorate of Administration was established under Lt. Col. J.O.F.H. Orr, MBE, and Assistant Judge Advocate General from Vancouver, and former Crown prosecutor for that city. The Section proceeded to prepare the cases against the Japanese. At the same time it maintained liaison with the War Crimes trials then proceeding in Europe. In this connection, it secured 150 interrogations for these trials and dispatched as witnesses some 26 ex-service men and German PW's. However, the principal project was amassing the evidence for the Far East and this involved the securing of approximately 1,100 affidavits from the repatriates. These documents could be used as evidence at the trials of the Japanese. Lt. Col. Orr and his associates analyzed these stories and found that there were 68 Japanese who should be charged and requested the Supreme Command of the Allied Powers under General MacArthur to apprehend these accused. With only one or two exceptions they were arrested, and incarcerated in Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, to await their trials.

In April 1946, Lt. Col. Orr and Capts (now Majors) J.D.C. Boland and J.H. Dickey proceeded to Japan to prosecute some 60 of the cases before the Military war Crimes Commissions to be convened in Tokyo. Sergeant-Majors Shepherd, Manchester, Preston and S/Sergeant Martin accompanied them.

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Maj. C.G. Puddicombe and Sgt. Maj. Hogg went to Hong Kong to prosecute Col. Tokunaga, the notorious "Kamloops Kid", and other before the Commissions in that colony. The spring and summer of 1946 was spent largely in completing the cases for trial. There were complications because of the many nations represented and the fact that many of the same Japanese were wanted for atrocities to English, Dutch, Americans, New Zealanders and Indians, as well as Canadians. However, that situation rectified itself, and to-day in Japan there are 10 tribunals trying cases every day. The result is that practically all of the important Canadian cases in both Japan and Hong Kong have been disposed of and there have been seven sentences of death, while many of the accused have been sentenced to 30, 40 or 50 years' imprisonment with hard labour. The remainder will likely be completed by midsummer of 1947. The United States and other nations still have about 700 accused to try. It must be said to the credit of Canada that Lt. Col. Orr had all of his cases ready for trial well ahead of schedule.

Canada has, from a judicial standpoint, shared the historical responsiblity for these trials in the Far East with the United States, Great Britain and the other occupying nations. The Hon. Mr. Justice E. Stuart McDougall of the Quebec Superior Court has been a member of the International Tribunal trying Premier Tojo and the other major war criminals. Brig. H.B. Nolan, OBE, a former Vice Judge Advocate General, has been one of the chief prosecutors before that tribunal. Col. Thomas Moss, MC, has been a Law Member and President of the Military Commissions convened in Japan to try the lesser war criminals. Early in 1947 he returned for reasons of health and was replaced by Lt. Col. M.J. Griffin, E.D. Maj. J.T. Loranger has throughout performed the duties of Law Member on the Hong Kong commissions.

Naturally many interesting legal points have arised during the trials. The "Kamloops Kid" escaped the death penalty awarded by a military tribunal because he was thought to be a Canadian citizen born in British Columbia. However, he was then tried for treason as a British subject. His defence was that he was in reality a Japanese citizen, but it failed to save him, and he had again been sentenced to be hanged. The case has points of similarly to the trial of Lord Haw Haw.

Two Canadians with the RCAF were taken prisoners in Java, and there executed by the Japanese. Due to the disturbed conditions on this island, and Australian war crimes team investigating the case was ambushed and murdered by natives in the area of the crime - an instance of a crime upon a crime. However, the Japanese charged with responsibility for the death of the Canadian airmen were apprehended recently and are awaiting trial.

It will be seen that retribution has finally overtaken these callous and brutal Japanese who were indifferent to what happened to our Canadian prisoners, whether from starvation or continual mistreatment. They have been afforded the fairest of trials and treated according to our principles of justice. They have received the same

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benefit of the doubt which is accorded to any Canadian citizen who is charged with a criminal offence. A number have been found not guilty of any charge, others have received light sentences, and others, after a period spent in custody, have been released because of the minor character of their offences. A large number have received lenghty sentences commensurate with their guilt, and a number will forfeith their lives.

These trials and the punishments meted out clearly illustrate the old maxim "As ye sow so shall ye reap". There is a clear lesson for future: those who start an aggressive war and those who blindly follow the inhuman dictates of their superiors will do so at the risk of personal punishement as war criminals.

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APPENDIX A.

FAR EASTERN COMMISSION

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1. Report by the Secretary General on the Activities of the Far Eastern Commission.
2. Despatch No. 1561 of July 22 from Washington to Ottawa, enclosing a memorandum entitled "Canada and the Far Eastern Commission" which should be read in conjunction with (1) above.
3. The Far Eastern Commission as an International Agency (Memorandum prepared in the Canadian Embassy, Washington.)
4. Teletype WA-2013 of June 27 from Washington to Ottawa concerning the role of the Far Eastern Commission in the peace negotiations.

See also Appendix B. Item 2(b), paragraph 5.

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FOR THE PRESS

CONFIDENTIAL - NOTE FUTURE RELEASE DATE

Not to be Released until Following Background Conference by Major General Frank R. McCoy Far Eastern Commission Chairman at Far Eastern Commission Headquarters 2516 Massachusetts Ave., N. W., Thursday Afternoon July 17, 1947

(Note: Hour to be Announced)

REPORT BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE FAR EASTERN COMMISSION

(February 26, 1946 - July 10, 1947)

Office of the Secretary General
Far Eastern Commission
2516 Massachusetts Ave. N. W.
Washington 8, D. C.

PRESS RELEASE NO. 35

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
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REPORT BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE FAR EASTERN COMMISSION

(February 26, 1946 - July 10, 1947)

PREFACE

From its beginning the control of Japan has been an Allied responsibility. It was to the Allied Powers that the Japanese surrendered on August 14, 1945. General MacArthur formally accepted that surrender on September 2, 1945 as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Since February 26, 1946 the task of formulating Allied policies under which the Japanese were to fulfill the obligations imposed upon them by the Terms of Surrender has been carried out by the Far Eastern Commission, an inter-Allied body composed of representatives of eleven nations and meeting regularly in Washington.

Welcoming the members of the Far Eastern Commission at their first meeting, the United States Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes, outlined in broad terms the responsibility that had been entrusted to the Commission by the Moscow Agreement of Foreign Ministers. "Peace in the Pacific," he said "is an essential cornerstone to a stable world structure. The guidance of Japan to a position of peaceful association with other nations is therefore a task of major responsibility. That responsibility now belongs to you of the Far Eastern Commission .... The Terms of Reference agreed to last December in Moscow placed the final and ultimate responsibility for formulating the policies and principles upon which the peace and security of the Pacific may well be based, in your hands."

As the occupation forces under General MacArthur's command have carried on their work in Japan, the Far Eastern Commission in Washington has been engaged in formulating Allied policy. The following summary describing the structure of the Commission and giving an account of its activities has been prepared by the Secretary General of the Commission in the hope that it will acquaint the public at large with the work of an important international organization concerned with the formulation of principles for the control of Japan.

NELSON T. JOHNSON
Secretary General

Washington, D.C.
July 17, 1947

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I. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND

Japanese Surrender

The first official Japanese surrender offer, made in response to the Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945 (Appendix 1) came on August 10, 1945. Acceptance of this offer entailed the appointment of a Supreme Commander to receive the surrender on behalf of the Allied Powers, with the understanding that from the moment of surrender the authority of the Japanese Emperor and the Japanese State were to be subject to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. On August 14, 1945 General Douglas MacArthur was designated Supreme Commander. On September 2, 1945, acting for the Republic of China, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the United States, and in the interests of the other United Nations at war with Japan, General MacArthur formally accepted the surrender of Japan on board the United States battleship Missouri. Representatives of the following nine nations also signed the instrument of surrender with General MacArthur: Australia, Canada, China, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Occupation forces which first went ashore under General MacArthur's leadership were in the main United States troops, and the policy directives under which the Supreme Commander began enforcing Japanese fulfillment of the surrender terms were issued to him by the United States Government. A statement of United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan was forwarded in substance to General MacArthur by radio on August 29, 1945 and following formal approval by the President, was dispatched by special messenger on September 6. Further directives covering specific policy matters not included in the basic statement were subsequently forwarded through the channels of the United States Government as the occasion required.

Far Eastern Advisory Commission

Growing out of negotiations originally begun on August 21, 1945, a Far Eastern Advisory Commission was convened in Washington on October 30, 1945, for the purpose of making "recommendations" on the "formulation of policies, principles, and standards by which the fulfillment by Japan of its obligations under the instrument of surrender may be determined." The Commission met regularly over the next two months. It was composed of representatives of Australia, Canada, China, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The Soviet Union declined the proposal to take part in the Far Eastern Advisory Commission because of its purely advisory character. In December 1945 the Advisory Commission undertook a trip to Japan and returned to Washington in February 1946.

Establishment of the Far Eastern Commission

At the Moscow Meeting of Foreign Ministers in December 1945 further negotiations between the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom were conducted on the subject of greater Allied participation in the control of Japan during the occupation, and with the concurrence of China the three Foreign Ministers on December 27, 1945 issued a communique estab-

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lishing Terms of Reference for a Far Eastern Commission to replace the Far Eastern Advisory Commission. (Appendix 2). The Moscow Agreement was made known one day after the Advisory Commission had left Washington on its trip to Japan. Accordingly upon this body's return to Washington the Far Eastern Commission came into being, consisting of representatives of those Powers which had been members of the Advisory Commission, and a Soviet representative. Headquarters were established in the former Japanese Embassy in Washington, and the first meeting of the Far Eastern Commission was held there on February 26, 1946.

Terms of Reference

Under its Terms of Reference the Far Eastern Commission has two principal functions: first, to formulate "the policies, principles, and standards in conformity with which the fulfillment by Japan of its obligations under the Terms of Surrender may be accomplished"; and second, "to review, on the request of any member, any directive issued to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers or any action taken by the Supreme Commander involving policy decisions within the jurisdiction of the Commission." In addition, the Commission is empowered "to consider such other matters as may be assigned to it by agreement among the participating Governments." Making recommendations with regard to either the conduct of military operations or territorial adjustments, however, is specifically excluded.

The Terms of Reference provide that the Commission should "respect existing control machinery in Japan, including the chain of command from the United States Government to the Supreme Commander and the Supreme Commander's command of occupation forces." Policy decisions of the Commission are transmitted to the United States Government, and the United States Government is then made responsible for preparing directives in accordance with these decisions and transmitting the directives to the Supreme Commander for his guidance. As sole executive authority for the Allied Powers in Japan, the Supreme Commander is charged with the implementation of the directives prepared in accordance with Commission policy decisions.

The Commission may take action by a majority vote, provided the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and China all concur in the action taken.

The Terms of Reference stipulate, however, that the "United States Government may issue interim directives to the Supreme Commander pending action by the Commission whenever urgent matters arise not covered by policies already formulated by the Commission; provided that any directives dealing with fundamental changes in the Japanese constitutional structure or in the regime of control, or dealing with a change in the Japanese Government as a whole will be issued only following consultation and following the attainment of agreement in the Far Eastern Commission."

While the main seat of the Commission is in Washington, the Terms of Reference authorize it to meet in Tokyo or in any other place it may desire. The Commission is authorized to make such arrangements through the Chairman as may be practicable for "consultation" with the Supreme Commander.

No time limit is placed upon the functioning of the Commission by the Terms of Reference. The Commission "shall cease

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to function when a decision to that effect is taken" in accordance with the voting procedure described above. Prior to concluding its functions, however, the Commission is directed by the Terms of Reference to transfer such functions as may appropriately be transferred to "any interim or permanent security organization of which the participating governments are members."

Allied Council for Japan

The Moscow Agreement which established the Terms of Reference of the Far Eastern Commission also established Terms of Reference for an Allied Council for Japan, which was to have the function of "consulting with and advising the Supreme Commander in regard to the implementation of the Terms of Surrender, the occupation and control of Japan, and of directives supplementary thereto." The seat of the Allied Council for Japan was to be in Tokyo. The Chairman of the Council would be either the Supreme Commander himself or his Deputy. In addition, the membership would include representatives of China, the Soviet Union, and a member representing jointly the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and India.

Reference to the Allied Council is made in the Terms of Reference of the Far Eastern Commission as follows: "The Commission in its activities will proceed from the fact that there has been formed an Allied Council for Japan ..." The Terms of Reference of the Allied Council include the following provision with reference to the Far Eastern Commission: "If, regarding the implementation of policy decisions of the Far Eastern Commission on questions concerning a change in the regime of control, fundamental changes in the Japanese constitutional structure, and a change in the Japanese Government as a whole, a member of the Council disagrees with the Supreme Commander (or his Deputy), the Supreme Commander will withhold the issuance of orders on these questions pending agreement thereon in the Far Eastern Commission."

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II. ORGANIZATION OF THE COMMISSION

Commission

The Far Eastern Commission is composed of representatives of the eleven nations referred to in the Terms of Reference. Major General Frank R. McCoy, United States Army (Retired), the United States Representative, who serves with the personal rank of Ambassador, was unanimously elected Chairman of the Commission at its first meeting. In most cases the representatives of the other countries are the Chiefs of Mission of those countries in Washington. A list of representatives and their alternates follows in alphabetical order, and a complete roster of the personnel of each national delegation on the Commission will be found in the Appendix (Appendix 3).

Australia	Ambassador Norman J.O. Makin Alternate: Major J. Plimsoll
Canada	Ambassador Hume Wrong Alternate: Mr. Ralph E. Collins
China	Ambassador V. K. Wellington Koo Alternate: Dr. Shao-Hwa Tan
France	Ambassador Paul E. Naggiar, Special Ambassador of the Republic of France to the Far Eastern Commission Alternate: Mr. Francis Lacoste
India	Ambassador M. Asaf Ali Alternate: Mr. B. R. Sen
Netherlands	Mr. O. Reuchlin Alternate: Dr. R. H. van Gulik
New Zealand	Sir Carl Berendsen, New Zealand Minister to the United States Alternate: Mr. G. R. Powles
Philippines	Ambassador Carlos P. Romulo, Permanent Representative of the Republic of the Philippines to the United Nations and on the Far Eastern Commission Alternate: Mr. F. C. Rodriguez
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	Ambassador Nikolai V. Novikov Alternate: Mr. S. K. Tsarapkin
United Kingdom	Sir George Sansom, His Britannic Majesty's Minister to the British Embassy in Washington Alternate: Mr. H. A. Graves
United States	Major General Frank R. McCoy U. S. A. (Ret) Alternate: Major General John H. Hilldring, Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas

A list of both present and former representatives on the Far Eastern Commission with their dates of service will be found in the Appendix (Appendix 4).

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Steering Committee

A Steering Committee of the Commission has been established and is responsible for organizing Commission business and co-ordinating the functions of the various working committees described below. Recommendations from working committees regarding resolutions and policy proposals are normally considered by the Steering Committee before being forwarded to the Commission. Areas of disagreement between members are canvassed, and wherever possible are resolved before proposals are forwarded to the Commission itself for consideration. The Chairman of the Steering Committee is Sir Carl Berendsen (New Zealand) and the Deputy Chairman is Mr. O. Reuchlin (The Netherlands).

A list of members of the Steering Committee follows: (See also Appendix 3).

Australia	Major J. Plimsoll
Canada	Mr. Ralph E. Collins
China	Dr. Shao-Hwa Tan
France	Mr. Francis Lacoste
India	Mr. B. R. Sen
Netherlands	Mr. O. Reuchlin
New Zealand	Sir Carl Berendsen
Philippines	Mr. F. C. Rodriguez
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	Rear Admiral S. S. Ramishvili
United Kingdom	Mr. H. A. Graves
United States	Dr. George H. Blakeslee

Committees

The Commission has also established seven working committees to consider and make appropriate recommendations on various aspects of Commission business. Each of the working committees is composed of delegates from all of the eleven nations constituting the Commission.

Officers and the principal fields of business of the working committees are listed as follows:

Committee No. 1: Reparations

Chairman:	Major J. Plimsoll (Australia)
Deputy Chairman:	Dr. R. H. van Gulik (Netherlands)
Subjects for consideration.	Japanese reparations; restitution of looted property

Committee No. 2: Economic and Financial Affairs

Chairman:	Mr. F. C. Everson (United Kingdom)
Deputy Chairman:	Mr. Roswell H. Whitman (United States)

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Subjects for consideration:	Extent and character of Japanese industry, commerce and agriculture necessary for a viable economy in Japan; measures necessary to establish such an economy, such as regulation of Japanese foreign commerce, control of agriculture, control of fishing and aquatic industries, control of transportation and communication, and control of industries; democratic agrarian reform; liquidation of monopolistic financial and industrial concerns (Zaibatsu); complete elimination of Japanese war industry; reduction, control and reconversion to peacetime production of industry, commerce, shipping, shipbuilding and other industries which were used for war purposes during wartime; control of scientific and industrial research; stocks of strategic raw materials; relief problems, such as prevention of mass unemployment, public health, food, housing, and financial problems.

Committee No. 3: Constitutional and Legal Reform

Chairman:	Mr. B. R. Sen (India)
Deputy Chairman:	Mr. Ralph E. Collins (Canada)
Subjects for consideration:	The Emperor institution, Diet, Cabinet, local government, political parties; a Bill of Rights; Japanese Constitution and machinery for drafting a new constitution; judiciary; electoral system; reform of the police system.

Committee No. 4: Strengthening of Democratic Tendencies

Chairman:	Mr. G. G. Dolbin (U. S. S. R.)
Deputy Chairman:	Dr. T. T. Mar (China)
Subjects for consideration:	Positive policy for democratization of the Japanese; removal from the Government and governmental institutions, as well as from organs of local administration and self-government, of all militarist and totalitarian elements who actively supported the aggressive policy of Japan; dissolution of former military, semi-military, fascist, nationalistic and secret organizations; trade unions and peasants' organizations; supervision of elections in order to insure free expression of the people's will; activities of the Japanese Diet; educational system; public information, including press and radio and public entertain-

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ment, e.g., theatres and movies; political and social status of women; working of the Japanese constitution; State Shinto.

Committee No. 5: War Criminals

Chairman:	Mr. Hsuan-tsui Liu (China)
Deputy Chairman:	Mr. F. C. Rodriguez (Philippines)
Subjects for consideration.	Identification, apprehension and trial of persons suspected of war crimes; punishment of convicted war criminals.

Committee No. 6: Aliens in Japan

Chairman:	Mr. Francis Lacoste (France)
Deputy Chairman:	Mr. F. C. Everson (United Kingdom)
Subjects for consideration:	Status and property of persons other than Japanese nationals

Committee No. 7: Disarmament of Japan

Chairman:	Mr. O. Reuchlin (Netherlands)
Deputy Chairman:	Rear Adm. S. S. Ramishvili (USSR)
Subjects for consideration:	Disarmament and dissolution of Japanese armed forces; disposition of Japanese armaments and military equipment; long-range control of armaments necessary for internal police security in Japan.

Each of these committees appoints ad hoc subcommittees as the occasion may require, and several committees have one or two standing subcommittees.

Secretariat

In its capacity as host to the Commission, the United States Government has furnished the headquarters for the Commission, has underwritten the Commission's budget, and has in the main provided the staff for the Commission's secretariat.

Nelson T. Johnson, former United States Ambassador to China and Minister to Australia is Secretary General of the Commission, and Samuel S. Stratton is his Deputy. The Commission has agreed that any nation is free to nominate and pay the salary and expenses of members of the Secretary General's staff, and upon this basis Mr. Donald G. Badger of Australia was appointed by the Secretary General to the position of Economic Secretary. The remainder of the Secretariat are citizens and employees of the United States.

The Secretariat is charged with the performance of all of the technical and administrative duties which Commission and committee meetings involve, including preparation of committee agenda and minutes, procurement, analysis, and dissemination of informational material about Japan; receiving and distributing official communications from governments; handling official Commission policy decisions and consultations; advising Commission members on questions of procedure; and performing such other functions as may be specifically assigned.

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III. ACCOMPLISHMENTS

The United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy Statement issued by the United States Government to General MacArthur in September 1945 covered a wide variety of subjects, providing for democratic, constitutional, and economic reform, as well as for military disarmament. From time to time as the occupation progressed, this basic policy was supplemented and elaborated by further United States policy directives intended to meet particular situations arising in Japan. By the time the Far Eastern Commission began its operation, therefore, a considerable number of exclusively United States policies had already been transmitted to the Supreme Commander, and the occupation of Japan based upon these policies was already under way. Under the Terms of Reference of the Far Eastern Commission these policies were subject to review by the Commission, and the Commission was authorized to modify them if it so desired. On all subjects within its Terms of Reference the Commission was authorized to formulate such additional Allied policies as might be deemed necessary. When a policy was formulated and issued as a directive it superseded previous directives in conflict with it.

To date 41 policy decisions have been adopted by the Commission and a total of 12 formal consultations with the Supreme Commander on matters relating to policy have been approved.

A. BASIC POST-SURRENDER POLICY FOR JAPAN

Growing out of discussions begun by the Far Eastern Advisory Commission well over a year ago, and under consideration since that time, a statement of Basic Post-Surrender Policy for Japan to cover the period of the occupation was approved by the Far Eastern Commission on 19 June 1947 (Appendix 5). Members of the Commission felt that a general formulation of the overall purposes and objectives of the Allied Powers in Japan would be useful, and continued with the drafting of such a policy statement at the same time that other policy decisions on specific issues were being considered and approved.

Based on the Potsdam Declaration and expanding principles set forth in the United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan, this statement declared the ultimate objectives of the Commission's work to be both to insure that Japan would not again become a menace to the peace and security of the world, and to bring about the earliest possible establishment of a democratic and peaceful government which would carry out its international responsibilities, respect the rights of other states, and support the objectives of the United Nations.

The Commission's formulation of Basic Policy covered in broad outline all phases of the control of Japan. It defined the nature of Allied authority in regard to the military occupation and in relation to the Japanese Government. In the field of political reform militarists and ultra-nationalists were to be excluded from public office; war criminals were to be punished; and individual liberties and democratic processes were to be encouraged. Economically, the Basic Policy provided for economic demilitarization, for promotion of democratic forces in industry and agriculture, for resumption of peaceful economic activity, for eventual participation in world trade, and for equality of commercial opportunity in Japan among all United Nations and their nationals. The Basic Policy also set forth in detail standards for the disarmament and demilitarization of Japan. Finally, it established general principles to be followed in the determination of percentage shares of reparations for claimant countries.

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When the text of the Basic Post-Surrender Policy for Japan was released to the press, the Secretary General issued the following statement:

"The Far Eastern Commission in adopting the Basic Post-Surrender Policy for Japan on 19 June 1947 gave final approval to a set of fundamental principles which had been under continuing examination since the organization of the Commission.

"The Commission's Basic Post-Surrender Policy for Japan will be effective until such time as the treaty of peace comes into force."

B. JAPANESE CONSTITUTION

Date of Japanese General Elections

One of the first items with which the Commission concerned itself was the general election for the first post-surrender House of Representatives in the Japanese Diet. This election had been scheduled by the Japanese Government, after several postponements, for April 10, 1946. Within the Commission the thought was expressed by some members that the election as scheduled was premature; candidates representing long-suppressed liberal forces of Japan would not have had enough time, it was felt, to organize themselves in such a way that the results of the election would adequately reflect the real extent of liberal political thought in Japan. Moreover, on March 6, 1946 the Japanese Cabinet had announced completion of a preliminary draft of a proposed revision of the Japanese Constitution. This announcement had an important bearing on the election for the House of Representatives because of the part the new Diet would be likely to play in adopting proposed constitutional revisions.

On March 20, 1946, the Commission accordingly approved a message of consultation with the Supreme Commander, communicating to him the doubts expressed by members as to the date of the general election and requesting the Supreme Commander's views on the advisability of postponing the election (Appendix 6). The Supreme Commander subsequently replied that it was "probable that the new Diet will be the most truly responsive body to the will of the people that has ever served Japan and will provide the basis for a much more representative cabinet." Under these circumstances, he went on, any postponement of the election "would have a profound adverse reaction upon the purposes and success of the occupation." He added that, in any case, if "the results of the election prove disadvantageous to the purposes of the occupation. The remedy is always in my power to require the dissolution of the Diet and the holding of a new election under such provisions as are deemed necessary." (Appendix 7). After considering the Supreme Commander's reply, the Commission voted on a proposal to require postponement of the election; a majority agreed that no action was necessary.

Draft Japanese Constitution

Revision of the Japanese Constitution was of major concern to the Allied Powers. Although the Meiji Constitution of 1889, which was still in effect, possessed a deceptively liberal appearance, it was actually a highly undemocratic document and had contributed greatly to perpetuating the basic feudal structure of Japanese life. During the period of military

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aggression the Meiji Constitution had served as a tool by which militaristic and ultra-nationalistic elements were able to obtain political power and exercise it without restraint in behalf of their designs for conquest.

The appearance on March 6, 1946, therefore, of a draft revision of the Meiji Constitution, which was sponsored by the Japanese Government and released with the personal endorsement of General MacArthur, focussed the Commission's attention urgently upon the question of constitutional reform. Essentially the Commission's responsibility amounted to insuring that any new constitution adopted should not be inconsistent with the principles of the Potsdam Declaration and, as prescribed by the Potsdam Declaration, should be a free expression of the will of the Japanese people.

In order to prevent hasty consideration by the Diet of the Government-sponsored draft, give the Japanese people themselves, as they approached the general election for the House of Representatives, a clear indication of their own prerogatives in the matter of constitutional reform, and enunciate at the very beginning the Commission's own authority in the matter of constitutional reform, the Commission on March 10, 1946 approved a policy decision entitled "Draft Japanese Constitution" (Appendix 8). In this policy it was stated that "the Commission notes the encouragement given to the Japanese people in the Supreme Commander's announcement that this draft of a proposed constitution has his personal approval. It is somewhat apprehensive that this approval may be misunderstood by the Japanese public and taken to mean that this particular draft has the approval of the Powers represented on this Commission." The policy accordingly provided that the Supreme Commander should make known to the Japanese people that the Submission of a draft constitution by the Government did not preclude favorable consideration of other proposals or drafts which might subsequently be submitted to the Diet. Furthermore, the policy provided, the Supreme Commander should also make known to the Japanese the fact "that the Far Eastern Commission must be given an opportunity to pass upon the final draft of the constitution to determine whether it is consistent with the Potsdam Declaration and any other controlling document before it is finally approved by the Diet and becomes legally valid."

Criteria for Adopting a New Constitution

For the purpose of determining whether any constitutional revision actually did represent the free will of the Japanese people, the manner in which such a constitutional revision was adopted would be of very great importance. Before turning their attention, therefore, to the task of drawing up a set of principles by means of which it would be possible to determine whether or not a new constitution conformed with the requirements of the Potsdam Declaration, the Commission first proceeded to establish criteria governing the method of adopting a new Japanese constitution. This policy, which was approved on May 17, 1946, provided that the new constitution should have "complete legal continuity" from the Meiji Constitution of 1889, and that "adequate time and opportunity should be allowed for the full discussion and consideration of the terms of the new constitution" (Appendix 9). The manner in which the new constitution was adopted, the policy declared, should "demonstrate that it affirmatively expresses the free will of the Japanese people."

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Basic Principles for a New Constitution

A Commission policy decision setting forth principles for use as a basis in determining whether or not a new constitution conformed with the Potsdam Declaration was approved on July 2, 1946 (Appendix 10). Among the requirements set forth in this decision was the principle that the sovereign power should reside not, as in the past, in the Emperor, but in the people. The Commission declared that retention of the Emperor system in its "present constitutional form" was not considered desirable and that "the Japanese should be encouraged to abolish the Emperor Institution or to reform it along more democratic lines".

Under the terms of the Commission's decision, an acceptable constitution should provide for a representative government based upon universal adult suffrage, with an executive deriving its authority from and responsible to either the electorate or a fully representative legislative body. The constitution should accord the legislature full legislative powers, including complete control over the raising and spending of public funds. An independent judiciary should be established. The Prime Minister and the Ministers of State - all of whom should be civilians and of whom a majority, including the Prime Minister, should be selected from the Diet- should form a Cabinet collectively responsible to the legislature. If the chief executive were to be directly elected to that office by the people, then the provision that a majority of the Cabinet should be chosen from the legislature need not apply. It was further provided that all property of the Imperial Household should be declared property of the State. Retention of the Privy Council and the House of Peers "in their present form and with their present powers" was declared to be undesirable. Provisions guaranteeing fundamental civil rights and local self-government were also included in the Commission's decision.

After deciding on this policy, the Commission continued to consider carefully the progress of the Government-sponsored draft constitution within the Japanese Diet, and was in frequent consultation with the Supreme Commander during this period.

Further Policies Relating to a New Japanese Constitution

On September 25, 1946 the Commission approved a policy decision setting forth additional principles and policies governing a new Japanese constitution (Appendix 11). These included an affirmation of the Commission's previous decision, taken in the policy on Basic Principles, to the effect that all Cabinet Ministers should be civilians, together with a further decision that the House of Councillors, the proposed new upper house of the Diet, "should not have any predominance" over the House of Representatives. In this connection the Commission declared that it considered "essential its continuing right to scrutinize the implementing legislation very carefully to insure that such predominance is not established."

In accordance with this decision, the Commission has received to date from the Supreme Commander thirty-five laws implementing the new Japanese Constitution, after it had been officially promulgated on November 3, 1946. The Commission has consulted with the Supreme Commander several times in connection with some of these laws, and reserves the right to review them.

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Review of the New Constitution

When it became clear that the Japanese Government intended to adopt the new constitution by means of approval by the Diet, some doubt was expressed within the Commission as to whether this particular method would in fact represent a free expression of the will of the Japanese people within the meaning of the Potsdam Declaration and the Commission's own policy on Criteria for the Adoption of a New Japanese Constitution (See Appendix 9). In the first place, there was still some dissatisfaction on the part of Commission members as to the composition of the then existing Diet, based upon arguments already suggested in the Commission's consultation concerning the advisability of postponing the date of the general election for the House of Representatives (See Appendix 6). In addition there was a feeling among certain members that the Government-sponsored revision had not been before the Japanese people sufficiently in advance of the April elections so as to become a real election issue, and so that the Diet then elected could be said to have a clear mandate from the Japanese people to approve the Government-sponsored constitution. Another opportunity to express themselves on this new constitution should be given to the Japanese people, it was felt, in order to make doubly sure that the new constitution actually did represent the freely expressed will of the Japanese people.

These considerations, coupled with an equally strong desire to give the Japanese people and the Allied Powers a chance to examine the new constitution in actual operation, led the Commission on October 17, 1946 to approve a policy decision calling for subsequent review of the new constitution (Appendix 12). Not sooner than one year after the new constitution went into effect on May 3, 1947 and not later than two years, the policy provided, "the situation with respect to the new constitution should be reviewed by the Diet", and "without prejudice to the continuing jurisdiction of the Far Eastern Commission at any time, the Commission shall also review the constitution within this same period." Also included was a provision that the Commission, "in determining whether the Japanese constitution is an expression of the free will of the Japanese people, may require a referendum or some other appropriate procedure for ascertaining Japanese opinion with respect to the constitution." Meanwhile, the provision for review should not alter the status of the new constitution, once it had gone into effect, as the "legal successor of the present constitution."

Issuance of the Review Policy Decision

At the request of the United States representative the Commission approved this policy decision on constitutional review with the understanding that the "time and manner of issuance" of the decision would be a subject for further consideration by the Commission. On December 12, 1946 the Commission approved a decision directing that the terms of the policy decision on Review of a New Japanese Constitution "should be formally communicated to the Government of Japan" (Appendix 13), and on March 20, 1947 the text of the policy decision on constitutional review was released to the press.

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C. REPARATIONS

Interim Reparations Removals

The Potsdam Declaration provided that "Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy and permit the exaction of just reparations in kind, but not those which would enable her to re-arm for war." It has been the task of the Far Eastern Commission to determine; (1) exactly what "just reparations in kind" should be, (2) how much of the Japanese industrial machine could be included in reparations without undermining the essential Japanese peacetime economy, and (3) how reparations thus made available were to be apportioned among the various claimant countries.

As a first step toward an over-all reparations settlement, the Commission at an early stage adopted a series of policy decisions which together comprised a program of so-called "interim reparations removals." It was felt that a final reparations settlement might require a considerable period of time, but that relatively swift agreement could be reached on the designation for reparations of industrial facilities which were obviously in excess of Japan's peacetime needs and which were in those industries most directly part of Japanese war potential. The Commission has still to determine whether further capacity is to be removed as reparations from these or other industries.

Adoption of the interim program was intended to allow the Supreme Commander to designate immediately certain plants which would be removed as reparations, and to prepare the Japanese for some of the readjustments in their peacetime economy that would eventually be required before their reparations obligations were completely fulfilled.

The program of "interim removals" adopted by the Commission was confined to industrial facilities which were considered basic to Japan's war economy. This program, however, did not authorize any actual removals from Japan, in spite of its name, but merely authorized the designation by the Supreme Commander of appropriate industrial facilities within Japan to be made "available for claim" as reparations. No actual transfer of the facilities thus designated could be undertaken until some determination had been made of the various percentages of available assets which claimant countries were to receive, and of the procedure by which such percentage shares were to be fulfilled with specific Japanese facilities.

The pertinent Commission policy decisions establishing the interim removal program follow.

1. Arsenals, Aircraft, and Light Metals

On May 13, 1946 the Commission adopted a policy to the effect that, with certain exceptions, facilities in Army and Navy arsenals, all aircraft plants and establishments, and all light metals plants and establishments should be made available for reparations claim (Appendix 14).

2. Machine Tools, Sulphuric Acid, and Shipbuilding

On May 23, 1946 the Commission approved a policy decision providing for interim removals in the machine tool, sulphuric acid, and shipbuilding industries (Appendix 15). Under this

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policy all installations of the Japanese machine tool industry, except that portion required for the production of a "balanced type-size aggregate" of 27,000 units annually were to be made immediately available for reparations claim. Subject to certain specified limitations, all Japanese capacity for the production of sulphuric acid in excess of 3.5 million metric tons annually was likewise to be made immediately available for reparations claim. All naval shipbuilding facilities, and those remaining shipbuilding facilities in excess of that required to build 150,000 gross tons annually and to service a merchant fleet of 3,000,000 gross tons, were to be made available for claim, subject to certain specified limitations.

3. Ball and Roller Bearings

On May 29, 1946 the Commission approved a policy making available for reparations claim all ball and roller bearing capacity in Japan in excess of 32.5 million yen per year, computed on a basis of 1943-44 average prices (Appendix 16).

4. Iron and Steel, Thermal Electric Power, and Soda Ash, Chlorine and Caustic Soda

On June 12, 1946 a policy was approved providing for interim removals in the iron and steel, thermal electric power, and soda ash, chlorine, and caustic soda industries (Appendix 17). With certain specified limitations, these policies, when carried out, would leave Japan with facilities for an annual production of 3.5 million metric tons of steel ingot, 2.0 million tons of pig iron, 2.1 million thermal-electrically generated kilowatts of power, 75,000 metric tons of chlorine, 82,500 metric tons of caustic soda in electrolytic plants, and 630,000 metric tons of soda ash.

5. Privately-Owned Munitions

On June 20, 1946 the Commission approved a policy that all privately-owned munitions plants, with certain exceptions, should be made available for reparations claim (Appendix 18).

6. Synthetic Oil and Synthetic Rubber

On September 12, 1946 the Commission approved a policy to the effect that all facilities in the synthetic oil and synthetic rubber industries should be made available for claim, subject to the condition that synthetic oil plants designated for actual or potential conversion to the manufacture of sulphate of ammonia and fertilizers should be retained in operation until the supply of nitrogen from other sources became adequate (Appendix 19).

7. Steel Rolling Industry

On December 6, 1946 a policy was approved making available for reparations claim all steel rolling capacity in excess of that required to produce a "balanced annual output" of 2,775,000 metric tons of rolled steel products (Appendix 20). This policy decision was accompanied by another approved on the same date (Appendix 21) authorizing the Supreme Commander to retain in Japan until June 30, 1947 certain electric steel furnace capacity together with the rolling mills integrated with it. The Supreme Commander had indicated to the Commission that these furnaces were temporarily required because of a current coal shortage. If at any time before June 30, 1947 the Supreme Commander should consider that in order to meet the needs of

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the occupation an extension of this retention policy was necessary, the Far Eastern Commission declared that it would review the situation. On 26 June 1947 the Commission extended this retention policy temporarily for a period of one month until July 31, 1947, (Appendix 22) while considering a request from the Supreme Commander, in view of the continuing coal shortage in Japan, for an extension of the provisions of the policy for an additional full year.

Reparations in Relation to Dissolution of the "Zaibatsu"

A policy relating to the selection of specific plants within those industries covered under the terms of the interim removal program was adopted by the Commission on May 13, 1946 (Appendix 23) preliminary to the broader statement on selection of plants for reparations set forth immediately below. This policy required that the general objective of dissolving the so-called "Zaibatsu" industrial and financial monopoly should be one of the criteria employed in the selection of specific plants.

Selection of Plants for Reparations Removals, Destruction or Retention in Japan

The Commission on May 22, 1947 approved a policy decision establishing in broader terms the criteria for selection of plants for reparations (Appendix 24). Security and industrial disarmament requirements were emphasized, so that facilities employed in primary and secondary war industries should be removed in preference to other facilities. A fair balance should be sought, the policy declared, between the general preferences of reparations claimants for modern, integrated, and efficient equipment, and the legitimate needs of the Japanese peacetime economy for similar equipment. Occupation policies of dissolving large industrial and banking corporations, already referred to above, constituted another criterion. Consistent with the above standards, an order of preference in the selection of plants was indicated, so that the property of the "Zaibatsu" and other large industrial and financial concerns would be selected first; followed by plants and equipment owned by other Japanese, the Japanese Government and by Axis Nationals and Governments; and finally by plants and equipment owned by nationals and Governments of neutral countries. Under the terms of the Commission's decision, property of nationals of Members of the United Nations was to receive special treatment in accordance with another policy decision. (See Page 22 below, and Appendix 44).

Delivery of Reparations Goods

Another step in the direction of a final settlement of reparations was taken by the Commission on February 13, 1947, when a policy was approved providing that "the Japanese Government should bear all costs connected with dismantling, packing, transporting to a port in Japan for waterborne craft or for airborne craft, handling and loading on board the craft at that port", of all reparations goods subsequently allocated for delivery to claimant countries. The total costs thus sustained by the Japanese were to be divided up and added to the reparations accounts of the various recipient countries in proportion to their national percentage shares of reparations goods from Japan, with the proviso, however, that the addition of these costs "should not affect the distribution of reparations received by claimant countries". In other words, the addition of these delivery costs was not to reduce the actual amount of

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goods delivered as reparations. Title to the reparations goods would pass to the recipient country when the goods were delivered on board at the designated port, the policy provided, and the responsibility of arranging for their further transportation from Japan would rest upon the recipient country (Appendix 25).

Division of Reparations Shares

Progress has been made toward determining the various national percentage shares of reparations goods. The Commission on May 8, 1947 approved a policy entitled Division of Reparations Shares, comprising certain paragraphs extracted from a preliminary draft of the Basic Post-Surrender Policy for Japan (See Appendix 5) which set forth in broad terms the criteria to be used in determining shares for each country (Appendix 26). Under the terms of this policy, the shares of particular countries in the total settlement of reparations from Japan were to be determined on a "broad political basis, taking into due account the scope of material and human destruction and damage suffered by each claimant country as a result of the preparations and execution of Japanese aggression, and taking also into due account each country's contribution to the cause of the defeat of Japan, including the extent and duration of its resistance to Japanese aggression". The policy further provided that reparations should be "in such a form as would not endanger the fulfillment of the program of demilitarization of Japan and which would not prejudice the defraying of the cost of occupation and the maintenance of a minimum civilian standard of living". The policy expressly provided, furthermore, that these references to reparations should be "without prejudice to the views of Governments on the overseas assets issue."

At the present time the Commission is proceeding with discussions looking toward final agreement as to specific shares, determined on the basis of this broad policy.

Restitution of Looted Property

Closely related to reparations is the problem of recovering and returning to the original owners property which had been looted by the Japanese during the war and the identity and original ownership of which could be clearly established. On July 18, 1946 the Commission approved a policy requiring the restitution of specified categories of identifiable property looted from occupied countries and of ships found in Japanese waters which had been seized or sunk by the Japanese (Appendix 27). This policy established the principle that the fact that the Japanese had made payment "should be disregarded unless there is conclusive evidence that fraud or duress did not take place." On October 10, 1946 this policy was amended, in response to a request from the Supreme Commander for clarification of the paragraph dealing with ships damaged or sunk, to provide that the deadline of December 31, 1946 should not apply in certain cases to the repairing and returning of damaged ships (Appendix 28).

The Commission is currently considering revisions of this policy which would liberalize the standards of identification and expand the categories of looted objects. Separate consideration is also being given to a policy for replacing cultural objects looted by the Japanese from occupied areas and subsequently lost or destroyed.

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Restitution of Property Confiscated Within Japan

A further policy of the Commission, which sets forth on an interim basis certain principles to be used by the Supreme Commander in making restitution to nationals of any of the United Nations of any identifiable property which had been located in Japan prior "to the outbreak of hostilities between their government and the Government of Japan", and which was looted or confiscated by the Japanese, was adopted on March 6, 1947 (Appendix 29). As an interim measure this policy made provision only for natural persons present in Japan, or juridical persons "where the holders of a controlling interest are nationals of Members of the United Nations now resident in Japan", or charitable and religious institutions financed primarily by non-Japanese funds. It was stipulated, however, that the right to restitution did not constitute permission "to operate properties where the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers considers the operations of such property injurious to the occupying forces or to the purposes of the occupation." On the other hand, the Supreme Commander was authorized to operate any properties which, "upon consultation with the Allied Council for Japan in accordance with the Terms of Reference of the Allied Council for Japan" he considered "to be beneficial to the occupying forces and/or the accomplishment of the purposes of the occupation" without awaiting the restitution of title or the transfer of possession of such properties, provided that "in such cases compensation for the use of the property should be paid for the account of the owner."

D. JAPANESE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

Establishing policies which will make possible in Japan an economy capable of sustaining the various political reforms contemplated by the Potsdam Declaration but which would not enable Japan to rearm for war has constituted another major part of the Commission's work.

Determination of the Peaceful Needs of Japan

In practical terms, the achievement of this objective entails the fixing of specific production levels for various Japanese industries. Before any determination could be taken on levels to be prescribed for individual industries, however, it was necessary first to reach some over-all decision establishing in general terms the basis on which a viable peacetime Japanese economy should be built. A policy decision covering this subject was approved by the Commission on January 23, 1947, establishing the principle that the "peaceful needs of the Japanese people should be defined as being substantially the standard of living prevailing in Japan during the period 1930-1934." (Appendix 29). In order to determine the extent of industrial capacity which would be required to permit this 1930-1934 standard, the Commission selected the statistical year "1950" as an early normal post-war year - in terms of population growth, etc. - on the basis of which specific Japanese post-war peacetime needs could be projected. In estimating the nature and size of the industrial structure within the 1930-34 level, account should be taken of such factors as technological development, balance of payments, and employment. The Commission's policy further provided that acceptance by the Commission of this level "should not be interpreted to mean acceptance in advance of a specific level for any particular industry."

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The Commission is currently proceeding with a consideration of the next step in this task, namely, determining the exact levels to be fixed for specific industries, and in that connection is also considering the subject of the reduction of industrial war potential.

Inter-Allied Trade Board

World trade, particularly for a country like Japan which is deficient in natural resources, is an important factor in a healthy economic life. The Potsdam Declaration provided that the Japanese should eventually be permitted to participate in world trade, and the Commission has accordingly devoted its attention to the form that such trade should take. Because many of the problems involved are of a specialized or technical nature the establishment of a special body concerned with Japan's world trade was decided upon as a first step. On October 10, 1946, the Commission approved as a policy decision the Terms of Reference for an Inter-Allied Trade Board for Japan, to be composed of representatives of all of the nations which are members of the Far Eastern Commission (Appendix 31). Within a broad framework of policies on trade subsequently to be laid down by the Commission, the function of the Board was to be to consult with and advise the United States Government as to the disposition of exports from Japan and the procurement of imports required for Japan. Although the Board in general was to function independently, under the provisions of its Terms of Reference "all recommendations of the Board involving matters of policy shall be subject to the approval of the Far Eastern Commission."

The first meeting of the Board was held on October 24, 1946. Mr. Roswell H. Whitman, United States member, was elected Chairman. The Board accepted the offer of the Secretary General of the Far Eastern Commission to have the Commission Secretariat provide necessary services, and Mr. Donald G. Badger of Australia, Economic Secretary of the Commission was designated by the Secretary General to serve as Secretary of the Trade Board. A list of members of the Trade Board will be found included in Appendix 3.

To date the Board has been concerned primarily with the allocation of Japanese textile exports, the marketing of Japanese raw silk, and the problems of reopening Japan to private trade.

Sources of Japanese Imports and Destination of Japanese Exports

In furtherance of the trade program for Japan, the Far Eastern Commission on May 8, 1947 approved two policy decisions setting forth the criteria that should govern the conduct of Japanese world trade - the first entitled "Sources of Japanese Imports" (Appendix 32), and the second "Destination of Japanese Exports" (Appendix 33).

The primary objective of the Japanese import program, it was declared, should be to "minimize the cost and difficulty of procurement," with particular attention being paid to price, other terms of purchase, and assurance of meeting scheduled requirements. The needs of countries other than Japan should be duly considered where commodities in world short supply are involved. In the procurement of commodities in world surplus, the policy said, account should be taken of other relevant factors, such as "the interests of all Members of the United Nations, including any new trade situations" and "pre-war patterns of trade,

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so long as the pre-war patterns of trade reflect current economic interests of the countries concerned." The United States responsibility for the prevention of such disease or unrest as would endanger the occupation is also recognized.

The primary object of the export program, the Commission declared, should be to "maximize the proceeds", with consideration being given to "price, the purchasing power of the currency for which the commodity is sold, and the availability of necessary imports which can be procured with the proceeds of the export". Commercial exports are to be made "only to those recipients who agree to provide imports necessary for Japan in exchange or agree to pay for Japanese exports in foreign exchange usable for procuring necessary imports". The interests of all Members of the United Nations are to be considered, and "the Inter-Allied Trade Board may recommend individual treatment for different types of exports", just as it may do in the case of imports. The principles in accordance with which foreign exchange is to be considered usable, and by which prices should be fixed are also set forth in this policy decision.

Allied Trade Representatives

In providing for imports into and exports from Japan, General MacArthur had for some time been assisted by a group of trade specialists representing the various countries comprising the Far Eastern Commission, who worked with the Supreme Commander pursuant to arrangements informally worked out earlier in the Commission. These trade representatives advised the Supreme Commander's headquarters as to the needs and interests of their respective nations in connection with specific Japanese exports and imports, and assumed any other duties that arose in connection with delivering and paying for goods in question. Because of a desire within the Commission to formalize the duties of these representatives, the Commission on March 13, 1947 approved a policy decision covering the functions of Allied Trade Representatives in Japan (Appendix 34). This decision, which detailed the functions already informally accepted by the Commission, was specifically designated as an interim policy, subject to review in the light of experience.

Food Supply for Japan

Because of the extensive food shortage and desperate conditions prevailing in most of the territories devastated by the Japanese, the Commission on April 25, 1946 adopted a policy providing that, "except to the extent that the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, with the advice of the Allied Council for Japan, determines that imports are essential immediately for the safety of the occupation forces, no imports shall be permitted which will have the effect of giving to the Japanese a priority or preferential treatment over the requirements of the peoples of any Allied Power or liberated area." (Appendix 35).

Included in this policy was a request to the United States Government to review immediately the food import program for Japan in consultation with the various international food allocating authorities.

In expressing his concurrence in the policy, the United States Representative stated for the record that the principles adopted by the Commission were in full accord with those upon which the United States had, in the past, acted in supplying food to Japan.

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This decision of the Far Eastern Commission was duly communicated to the United States Government. The United States Government, as the Government immediately responsible for applying policy to the allotment of food to meet requisitions from the Supreme Commander in Japan, accepted this decision as a guide to it in determining amounts of food to be supplied Japan, and at the same time communicated a copy to the Supreme Commander, not as a directive but for his information as to the policy which would govern the United States as well as the other Governments participating in the Far Eastern Commission in the allotment of food supplies.

Short Period Economic Controls

In further recognition of world-wide economic shortages, the Commission on February 27, 1947 approved a policy decision requiring the Japanese to help as far as possible in supplying goods needed in areas which had been deprived of them because of Japanese aggression (Appendix 36). Production of goods required for export by Japan was to be increased, while consumption by Japan of textiles and other necessary consumer goods was to be curtailed. In the case of textiles, consumption in Japan was, with certain exceptions, not to exceed 2 1/2 pounds per person annually. Because of the emergency nature of the policy, provision was made for its termination automatically on December 31, 1947, unless extended by the Commission.

Another subject within the economic field to which consideration is still being given is the subject of agrarian reform, although as yet no policy decision has been reached. This subject is being considered from both its economic and political aspects.

E. STRENGTHENING OF DEMOCRATIC TENDENCIES

The Potsdam Declaration provided for "strengthening of democratic tendencies" in Japan, and much of the Commission's work has been directed to this end, especially in constitutional reform.

Trade Unions

In addition, two formal policy decisions covering aspects of this subject in the field of political and social reform have been adopted. The first, entitled "Principles for Japanese Trade Unions", was approved on December 6, 1946. (Appendix 37). In accordance with this policy, Japanese workers are to be encouraged to form themselves into trade unions. Discrimination against employees because of union membership is forbidden, and the passage of appropriate legislation to guarantee the right of workers to participate in trade union activity is required. Strikes or other work stoppages may be prohibited in accordance with the terms of this policy only where such stoppage would "directly prejudice the objectives or needs of the occupation." Also guaranteed was the right of trade unions to participate in political activities and to support political parties, and encouragement was given to "organized participation by trade unions and their officials in the democratization process in Japan", with the qualification, however, that such participation should not hinder the principal responsibility of unions to organize for the protection of union members and union interests.

The Commission's trade union policy also provided that "the Japanese should be free to choose the form of organization of

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their unions" with emphasis being placed on the importance of a solid local basis for future trade union activity. The formation of trade unions was to be a process of democratic self-expression and initiative; trade union officials and standing committees were to be elected by the workers by secret ballot and democratic methods. Trade union organizations should be protected against spying activities by the police and other Government agencies. Undemocratic workers' organizations, such as the "Patriotic Industrial Associations", should be dissolved, and no person subject to "purge" directives should be allowed to hold office in a trade union.

Revision of the Japanese educational system is the second specific subject within the general field of "democratic tendencies" on which the Commission has adopted a formal policy decision. On March 27, 1947 a policy was approved providing in detail standards and principles for the revision of the traditional Japanese educational system (Appendix 38). One of these principles specified that "education should be looked upon as the pursuit of truth, as a preparation for life in a democratic nation, and as a training for the social and political responsibilities which freedom entails." The Commission's decision provided certain guiding objectives for education, among them "the dignity and worth of the individual", and an emphasis upon the "inter-dependent character of international life". Equal opportunity for both sexes was to be provided at all levels of education. Teachers with records as exponents of ultra-nationalistic and militaristic ideas were to be excluded from educational activity, and provision was made for the issuance of new textbooks from which the objectionable doctrines of militarism, Emperor-worship and State Shintoism would be expunged. The Commission policy also provided that the Japanese Government should exercise such control over the educational system as would insure the achievement of the objectives of the occupation, particularly the reforms called for by this policy decision; but subject to this provision and to the maintenance of standards prescribed by the Government, responsibility for the administration of educational establishments should in due time be decentralized. Provision was made in regard to the difficult problem of finance: "In order that educational standards in poor districts should not be lowered by the inability of some local bodies to provide sufficient finance from local revenue, finance for education should come for the most part from the national government, which should be responsible for the maintenance of an adequate level of education throughout Japan. Local and private bodies should be encouraged to supplement these funds provided by the national government."

F. WAR CRIMES

Shortly after the surrender of Japan a United States policy directive was sent to General MacArthur providing for the apprehension, trial, and punishment of war criminals both within Japan and in areas previously dominated by the Japanese. This directive accorded with a provision of the Potsdam Declaration specifying that "stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners." Because of the international nature of the problem of war criminals, the Far Eastern Commission decided that any policy dealing with the subject ought more appropriately to be an Allied rather than a unilateral United States policy. Using the United States directives as the basis of its consideration, therefore, the Commission formulated a policy decision relative to war criminals, which was approved on April 3, 1946 (Appendix 39).

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In the Commission's policy the term "war crimes" was defined to include: (a) "planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements and assurances or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing;" (b) "violations of the laws or customs of war," including deportation as slave labor of civilian populations, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war, improper treatment of hostages, and wanton destruction of cities; (c) "murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population before or during the war," or prosecution on political, racial, or religious grounds. Any of these offenses was declared punishable if committed since or in the period immediately preceding the Mukden Incident of September 18, 1931. The function of the Supreme Commander with respect to these trials was carefully defined, and procedures providing for the arrest and detention of suspects and gathering of information relating to the alleged crimes were detailed.

The Commission policy differed in several significant respects from the original United States directive. In the first place, the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, already set up in Tokyo to try accused war criminals, was enlarged to include a judge nominated by each nation represented on the Far Eastern Commission; this meant the addition to the Tribunal of judges representing the Philippines and India. Also, judges were to be nominated for each international court by each state represented on the Far Eastern Commission, and not by the Supreme Commander. Finally, the responsibility of the Supreme Commander to carry out the judgments of the tribunal, as well as his power to approve, reduce, or alter sentences imposed, was made subject to consultation on these points with the Allied Council for Japan and with representatives in Japan of other nations who were members of the Far Eastern Commission but were not represented on the Council.

Apart from those major war criminals whose indictments were based on offenses of an international scope, the policy decision also provided for the establishment of national military courts to deal with persons who were suspected of war crimes committed in or against the nation concerned and who were not held for trial by an international military tribunal. Such courts could be set up by the military command of any nation participating in the occupation of areas previously dominated by Japan. Where such suspected war criminals were known to be within the territorial limits of another military command, they might be extradited, subject to certain conditions, to the military court of the nation by which they were accused of war crimes.

Property of War Criminals

The Commission's decision had also required that "military commanders should take under their control, pending subsequent decisions as to its eventual disposition, property, real and personal, found in areas of their respective jurisdiction and owned or controlled by persons taken into custody....." The Supreme Commander in March 1947 requested instructions as to the disposition of impounded and blocked property, and therefore the Commission on June 12, 1947 adopted a policy (Appendix 40) to govern the disposition of such property. Property of convicted war criminals, under the Commission's decision, was to be forfeited if so ordered by a tribunal, and in the absence of an order was to be returned to the owner or to his legal heirs, unless subject to other occupation policy directives requiring impounding, forfeiture, or restitution. Property forfeited or

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fines levied were to be made available for occupation costs. Property of accused persons who were acquitted or who died before completion of trial was to be returned to them or to their legal heirs, except where otherwise provided by occupation policy directives.

G. ALIENS IN JAPAN

In formulating policy for the treatment of non-Japanese nationals in Japan, the Commission used another United States directive as the basis of its consideration. The Commission's policy decision was adopted on June 5, 1946 and was entitled "Aliens in Japan" (Appendix 41). It defined the status and determined the treatment to be accorded non-Japanese in Japan. Under the terms of the Commission's policy a distinction in status was made between the nationals of Members of the United Nations, neutral nationals, and Axis nationals other than Japanese, with special provisions for treatment being set out for each category. In addition, special principles governing the treatment of Formosans and Koreans in Japan were prescribed, including their repatriation and the protection of their property. Prisoners of non-Japanese nationality detained solely on political, racial or religious grounds were ordered released.

Japanese Taxation of Aliens

The Commission on July 18, 1946 approved a policy providing that "no Japanese taxation should discriminate against aliens" and that no capital levy should be made by the Japanese with respect to property inside or outside Japan owned by nationals of Members of the United Nations (Appendix 42).

Legal Jurisdiction Over Aliens

In order to anticipate and provide for the contingency that United Nations nationals resident in Japan might be made subject to the jurisdiction of Japanese courts during the period of the occupation, the Commission on August 15, 1946 approved a policy limiting the extent of Japanese legal authority in this regard (Appendix 43). By the terms of the Commission's policy "the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers should provide that no criminal jurisdiction of any sort should be exercised by Japanese courts with respect to nationals of Members of the United Nations," but that such criminal jurisdiction should be exercised by Allied military courts. Japanese courts should exercise no civil jurisdiction over nationals of Members of the United Nations attached to or accompanying the armed forces, it was provided, and decisions in civil cases affecting other nationals of Members of the United Nations should be reviewed by the Supreme Commander, who was given authority to revise these decisions or to take any other action considered necessary in order to protect the interests of these nationals.

Destruction or Removal of United Nations Property in Japan

In order to protect as far as possible the property of nationals of Members of the United Nations from the effects of the reparations program, a policy was approved on April 24, 1947 providing that United Nations property which is subject to destruction pursuant to Commission policy decisions should be destroyed irrespective of the nationality of its owner, but that United Nations owners should be entitled to full compensation for the value of their interest at the time of destruction (Appendix 44). United Nations property which is subject to

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removal in accordance with Commission policies, however, was not to be selected for removal so long as Japanese-owned industrial facilities within the same category were available. If such property should nevertheless be made available for reparations, the Government of the owner was to be given reasonable opportunity to remove the property as part of its own share of reparations, and in addition the Japanese Government was to compensate the owner in yen.

H. DISARMAMENT

Those sections of the Commission's Basic Post-Surrender Policy for Japan relating to disarmament (See Appendix 5) stipulated that "Japan is not to have any army, navy, airforce, secret police organization, or any civil aviation, or gendarmerie, but may have adequate civilian police forces." All military equipment was to be surrendered and high military officials were to be taken into custody and held for future disposition. Active exponents of militarism and anti-democratic practices were to be excluded from public office and from teaching positions. The policy further provided that future production of military equipment was to be prohibited and that "Japan shall be restricted to the maintenance of those industries which will sustain the level of economy and standard of living fixed in accordance with principles determined by the Far Eastern Commission and consistent with the Potsdam Declaration."

A more detailed statement of these general principles is still under consideration by the Commission as a specific policy decision on the subject of disarmament and the control of future Japanese military activity; but no final agreement has so far been reached.

Japanese Atomic Research

All Japanese research and activity in the field of atomic energy were forbidden by the Commission "for the time being" in a policy decision adopted on January 30, 1947 (Appendix 45), except that "the mining, processing and refining of radioactive materials in Japan for authorized purposes, such as radium for medical uses, should be permitted only in those instances specifically approved by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and under his surveillance." At the same time the Commission took cognizance of discussions under way within the United Nations on the subject of atomic energy control by providing that in the field of atomic energy research, Japan should eventually be governed by "such decisions by the United Nations on international control of atomic energy as are applicable," and by "additional restrictive policies established for the disarmament and control of Japan."

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July 26, 1945

APPENDIX 1

PROCLAMATION BY HEADS OF GOVERNMENTS, UNITED STATES UNITED KINGDOM, AND CHINA, DEFINING TERMS FOR JAPANESE SURRENDER

(Potsdam Declaration)

1. We -- the President of the United States, the President of the National Government of the Republic of China, and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, representing the hundreds of millions of our countrymen, have conferred and agree that Japan shall be given an opportunity to end this war.

2. The prodigious land, sea and air forces of the United States, the British Empire and of China, many times reinforced by their armies and air fleets from the west, are poised to strike the final blows upon Japan. This military power is sustained and inspired by the determination of all the Allied Nations to prosecute the war against Japan until she ceases to resist.

3. The result of the futile and senseless German resistance to the might of the aroused free peoples of the world stands forth in awful clarity as an example to the people of Japan. The might that now converges on Japan is immeasurably greater than that which, when applied to the resisting Nazis, necessarily laid waste to the lands, the industry and the method of life of the whole German people. The full application of our military power, backed by our resolve, will mean the inevitable and complete destruction of the Japanese armed forces and just as inevitably the utter devastation of the Japanese homeland.

4. The time has come for Japan to decide whether she will continue to be controlled by those self-willed militaristic advisers whose unintelligent calculations have brought the Empire of Japan to the threshold of annihilation, or whether she will follow the path of reason.

5. Following are our terms. We will not deviate from them. There are no alternatives. We shall brook no delay.

6. There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace, security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world.

7. Until such a new order is established and until there is convincing proof that Japan's war-making power is destroyed, points in Japanese territory to be designated by the Allies shall be occupied to secure the achievement of the basic objectives we are here setting forth.

8. The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine.

9. The Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be permitted to return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives.

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10. We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, but stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners. The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. Freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights shall be established.

11. Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy and permit the exaction of just reparations in kind, but not those which would enable her to re-arm for war. To this end, access to, as distinguished from control of, raw materials shall be permitted. Eventual Japanese participation in world trade relations shall be permitted.

12. The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as these objectives have been accomplished and there has been established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people a peacefully inclined and responsible government.

13. We call upon the government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction.

* * * * * *

December 27, 1945

APPENDIX 2

TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE FAR EASTERN COMMISSION

I. Establishment of the Commission

A Far Eastern Commission is hereby established composed of the representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States, China, France, the Netherlands, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India, and the Philippine Commonwealth.

II. Functions

A. The functions of the Far Eastern Commission shall be:

1. To formulate the policies, principles, and standards in conformity with which the fulfillment by Japan of its obligations under the Terms of Surrender may be accomplished.

2. To review, on the request of any member, any directive issued to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers or any action taken by the Supreme Commander involving policy decisions within the jurisdiction of the Commission.

3. To consider such other matters as may be assigned to it by agreement among the participating Governments reached in accordance with the voting procedure provided for in Article V-2 hereunder.

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B. The Commission shall not make recommendations with regard to the conduct of military operations nor with regard to territorial adjustments.

C. The Commission in its activities will proceed from the fact that there has been formed an Allied Council for Japan and will respect existing control machinery in Japan, including the chain of command from the United States Government to the Supreme Commander and the Supreme Commander's command of occupation forces.

III. Functions of the United States Government

1. The United States Government shall prepare directives in accordance with policy decisions of the Commission and shall transmit them to the Supreme Commander through the appropriate United States Government agency. The Supreme Commander shall be charged with the implementation of the directives which express the policy decisions of the Commission.

2. If the Commission decides that any directive or action reviewed in accordance with Article II-A-2 should be modified, its decision shall be regarded as a policy decision.

3. The United States Government may issue interim directives to the Supreme Commander pending action by the Commission whenever urgent matters arise not covered by policies already formulated by the Commission; provided that any directives dealing with fundamental changes in the Japanese constitutional structure or in the regime of control, or dealing with a change in the Japanese Government as a whole will be issued only following consultation and following the attainment of agreement in the Far Eastern Commission.

4. All directives issued shall be filed with the Commission.

IV. Other Methods of Consultation.

The establishment of the Commission shall not preclude the use of other methods of consultation on Far Eastern issues by the participating Governments.

V. Composition

1. The Far Eastern Commission shall consist of one representative of each of the States party to this agreement. The membership of the Commission may be increased by agreement among the participating Powers as conditions warrant by the addition of representatives of other United Nations in the Far East or having territories therein. The Commission shall provide for full and adequate consultations, as occasion may require, with representatives of the United Nations not members of the Commission in regard to matters before the Commission which are of particular concern to such nations.

2. The Commission may take action by less than unanimous vote provided that action shall have the concurrence of at least a majority of all the representatives including the representatives of the four following Powers: United States, United Kingdom, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and China.

VI. Location and Organization

1. The Far Eastern Commission shall have its headquarters in Washington. It may meet at other places as occasion requires

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including Tokyo, if and when it deems it desirable to do so. It may make such arrangements through the Chairman as may be practicable for consultation with the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

2. Each representative on the Commission may be accompanied by an appropriate staff comprising both civilian and military representation.

3. The Commission shall organize its secretariat, appoint such committees as may be deemed advisable, and otherwise perfect its organization and procedure.

VII. Termination

The Far Eastern Commission shall cease to function when a decision to that effect is taken by the concurrence of at least a majority of all the representatives including the representatives of the four following Powers: United States, United Kingdom, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and China. Prior to the termination of its functions the Commission shall transfer to any interim or permanent security organization of which the participating Governments are members those functions which may appropriately be transferred..

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APPENDIX 3

ROSTER OF PRESENT FAR EASTERN COMMISSION PERSONNEL

I. DELEGATIONS

AUSTRALIA

H. E. Hon. N. J. O. Makin (Ambassador)
Mr. Alfred Stirling
Major J. Plimsoll
Major General J. A. Chapman
Captain S. H. K. Spurgeon, RAN
Mr. H. W. Bullock

CANADA

H. E. Mr. H. H. Wrong (Ambassador)
Mr. R. E. Collins
Commander F. J. D. Pemberton, RCN(R)
Mr. R. L. Rogers

CHINA

H.E. Dr. V. K. Wellington Koo (Ambassador)
Dr. Shao-Hwa Tan
Mr. Yun-Chu Yang
Dr. Shou-Chin Wang
Dr. T. T. Mar
Mr. Hsuan-Tsui Liu
Mr. Chen Yun
Mr. P. Y. Hu
Dr. U. Y. Yen
Mr. T. L. Tsui
Mr. King Ching
Mr. S. S. Chen
Mr. E. H. Chow
Mr. John Young

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CHINA (Cont'd)

Dr. Anthony Koo
Mr. K.K. Tsien
Mr. S. Y. Liang
Mr. S. Y. Huang
Miss Dorothy Wei

FRANCE

H. E. Mr. Paul E. Naggiar (Ambassador)
Mr. Francis Lacoste
Mr. Paul Guerin
Mr. Robert Douteau
Colonel Albert J. P. Lebel
Mr. Pierre Sauvageot
Mr. Louis Bacquier
Mr. Marcel Clement
Mr. Jacques de Ferluc

INDIA

H.E. Mr. M. Asaf Ali (Ambassador)
Mr. B. R. Sen
Mr. M. O. A. Baig
Mr. M. Ahmad
Mr. M. S. Sundaram
Colonel Nowabzada Sher Ali Khan
Mr. W. Ahmad
Mr. S. N. Banerji

NETHERLANDS

Jhr. O. Reuchlin (Minister, Charge d'Affaires ad interim)
Dr. R. H. van Gulik
Dr. H. M. J. Hart
Captain F. Stam

NEW ZEALAND

H. E. Sir Carl Berendsen (Minister)
Mr. G. R. Powles
Mr. J. S. Reid
Air Commodore J. L. Findlay
Mr. R. B. Taylor

PHILIPPINES

H. E. General Carlos P. Romulo (Ambassador)
Mr. F. C. Rodriguez
Mr. Leonides S. Virata
Mr. Salvador P. Lopez
Col. A. Bautista
Mr. J. U. Jovellanos

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

H. E. Mr. N. V. Novikov (Ambassador)
Mr. S. K. Tsarapkin
Rear Admiral S. S. Ramishvili
Mr. G. G. Dolbin
Mr. A. P. Korobochkin
Mr. S. M. Sergeev

UNITED KINGDOM

Sir George Sansom (Minister)
Mr. H. A. Graves

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UNITED KINGDOM (Cont'd)

Mr. B. Cockram
Mr. F. C. Everson
Mr. M. B. Thresher
Mrs. J. Locke
Brigadier J. D. P. Chapman
Major L. A. Summersell
Mr. A. C. Christelow

UNITED STATES

H. E. Major General Frank R. McCoy (Chairman)
The Honourable John H. Hilldring
Dr. George H. Blakeslee
Mr. Erle Dickover
Mr. Robert W. Barnett
Mr. Hugh Borton
Lt. Col. George W. Childs
Lt. Col. Trevor N. Dupuy
Mr. Daniel Fahey
Miss Katherine B. Fite
Captain Frank Fenno, Jr., USN
Mr. Ernest A. Gross
Mr. Charles L. Hodge
Mrs. S. G. Kallis
Lt. Col. Jean K. Lambert
Mr. Edwin M. Martin
Mr. Leonard Meeker
Lt. Col. Allen G. Pixton
Mr. W. A. Rudlin
Mr. Frank A. Schuler
Mr. Burr Smith
Mr. C. E. Snow
Mr. William T. Stone
Colonel C. B. Westover
Mr. Roswell H. Whitman
Miss Edna V. Culbreth

II. COMMITTEES

STEERING COMMITTEE

Chairman:	Sir Carl Berendsen	(New Zealand)
Deputy Chairman:	Mr. O. Reuchlin	(Netherlands)
Secretary:	Mr. Samuel S. Stratton	
Australia	Major J. Plimsoll Mr. Alfred Stirling (Acting)	
Canada	Mr. R. E. Collins	
China	Dr. Shao-Hwa Tan Mr. Yun-Chu Yang Dr. T. T. Mar	
France	Mr. Francis Lacoste	
India	Mr. B. R. Sen Mr. M. Ahmad	
Netherlands	Mr. O. Reuchlin Dr. R. H. van Gulik	
New Zealand	Sir Carl Berendsen Mr. G. R. Powles	
Philippines	Mr. F.C. Rodriguez	
United Kingdom	Mr. H. A. Graves Mr. F. C. Everson	
United States	Dr. George Blakeslee	
U.S.S.R.	Rear Admiral S. S. Ramishvili	

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COMMITTEE NO. 1: REPARATIONS

Chairman:	Major J. Plimsoll	(Australia)
Deputy Chairman:	Dr. R. H. van Gulik	(Netherlands)
Secretary:	Mr. David K. Eichler	
Australia	Major J. Plimsoll Mr. H. W. Bullock (Acting)	
Canada	Mr. R. E. Collins	
China	Dr. Shou-Chin Wang Dr. Anthony Koo Mr. K. K. Tsien	
France	Mr. Robert Douteau	
India	Mr. M. Ahmad	
Netherlands	Dr. R. H. van Gulik	
New Zealand	Mr. G. R. Powles Mr. R. B. Taylor	
Philippines	Mr. F. C. Rodriguez Mr. J. U. Jovellanos	
United Kingdom	Mr. H. A. Graves Mr. M. B. Thresher	
United States	Mr. Robert W. Barnett Mr. Erle R. Dickover Mr. Burr Smith	
U. S. S. R	Mr. A. P. Korobochkin	

COMMITTEE NO. 2: ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL AFFAIRS

Chairman:	Mr. F. C. Everson	(United Kingdom)
Deputy Chairman:	Mr. Roswell H. Whitman	(United States)
Secretary:	Mr. Donald G. Badger	
Australia	Major J. Plimsoll Mr. H. W. Bullock (Acting)	
Canada	Mr. R. E. Collins	
China	Dr. Shou-Chin Wang Mr. K. K. Tsien Dr. Anthony Koo	
France	Mr. Robert Douteau	
India	Mr. M. Ahmad	
Netherlands	Dr. R. H. van Gulik Dr. H. M. J. Hart	
New Zealand	Mr. G. R. Powles Mr. R. B. Taylor	
Philippines	Mr. F. C. Rodriguez Mr. J. U. Jovellanos	
United Kingdom	Mr. F. C. Everson Mr. M. B. Thresher	
United States	Mr. Roswell H. Whitman Mr. Erle R. Dickover Mr. Robert W. Barnett	
U. S. S. R.	Mr. A. P. Korobochkin	

COMMITTEE NO. 3: CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL REFORM

Chairman:	Mr. B. R. Sen	(India)
Deputy Chairman:	Mr. R. E. Collins	(Canada)
Secretary:	Mr. Ralph A. Jones	
Australia	Major J. Plimsoll Mr. H. W. Bullock (Acting)	
Canada	Mr. R. E. Collins	
China	Mr. Hsuan-Tsui Liu	
France	Mr. Paul Guerin	

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COMMITTEE NO. 3: CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL REFORM

India	Mr. B. R. Sen
Netherlands	Dr. R. H. van Gulik
New Zealand	Mr. G. R. Powles
	Air Commodore J. L. Findlay
Philippines	Mr. F. C. Rodriguez
	Mr. J. U. Jovellanos
United Kingdom	Mr. F. C. Everson
United States	Mr. Hugh Borton
	Mr. Erle R. Dickover
U. S. S. R.	Mr. G. G. Dolbin

COMMITTEE NO. 4: STRENGTHENING OF DEMOCRATIC TENDENCIES

Chairman:	Mr. G. G. Dolbin	(U. S. S. R.)
Deputy Chairman:	Dr. T. T. Mar	(China)
Secretary:	Mr. Carl H. Pfuntner	
Australia	Major J. Plimsoll	
	Mr. H. W. Bullock (Acting)	
Canada	Mr. R. E. Collins	
China	Dr. T. T. Mar	
France	Mr. Paul Guerin	
India	Mr. M. S. Sundaram	
Netherlands	Dr. R. H. van Gulik	
New Zealand	Mr. G. R. Powles	
	Mr. R. B. Taylor	
Philippines	Mr. F. C. Rodriguez	
	Mr. J. U. Jovellanos	
United Kingdom	Mr. B. Cockram	
United States	Mr. William T. Stone	
	Mr. Frank Schuler	
U. S. S. R.	Mr. G. G. Dolbin	

COMMITTEE NO. 5: WAR CRIMINALS

Chairman:	Mr. Hsuan-Tsui Liu	(China)
Deputy Chairman:	Mr. F. C. Rodriguez	(Philippines)
Secretary:	Mr. Ralph A. Jones	
Australia	Major J. Plimsoll	
	Mr. H. W. Bullock (Acting)	
Canada	Mr. R. L. Rogers	
China	Mr. Hsuan-Tsui Liu	
France	Mr. Paul Guerin	
India	Mr. M. O. A. Baig	
Netherlands	Mr. O. Reuchlin	
New Zealand	Air Commodore J. L. Findlay	
	Mr. G. R. Powles	
Philippines	Mr. F. C. Rodriguez	
United Kingdom	Mr. F. C. Everson	
United States	Miss Katherine Fite	
U. S. S. R.	Rear Admiral S. S. Ramishvili	

COMMITTEE NO. 6: ALIENS IN JAPAN

Chairman:	Mr. Francis Lacoste	(France)
Deputy Chairman:	Mr. F. C. Everson	(United Kingdom)
Secretary:	Mr. Carl H. Pfuntner	
Australia	Major J. Plimsoll	
	Mr. H. W. Bullock (Acting)	
Canada	Mr. R. E. Collins	
China	Mr. Yun-Chu Yang	
	Dr. T. T. Mar	

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COMMITTEE NO. 6: ALIENS IN JAPAN

France	Mr. Francis Lacoste
India	Mr. M. Ahmad
Netherlands	Dr. R. H. van Gulik
New Zealand	Air Commodore J. L. Findlay Mr. G. R. Powles
Philippines	Colonel A. Bautista Mr. F. C. Rodriguez
United Kingdom	Mr. F. C. Everson
United States	Mr. C. E. Snow
U. S. S. R.	Mr. S. M. Sergeev

COMMITTEE NO. 7: DISARMAMENT OF JAPAN

Chairman:	Mr. O. Reuchlin (Netherlands)
Deputy Chairman:	Rear Admiral S.S. Ramishvili (U.S.S.R.)
Secretary:	Mr. Henry L. Trepagnier, Jr.
Australia	Major General J. A. Chapman Captain S. H. K. Spurgeon, RAN
Canada	Commander F. J. Pemberton, RCN(R)
China	Dr. T. T. Mar
France	Colonel Albert J. P. Lebel
India	Colonel Nowabzada Sher Ali Khan
Netherlands	Mr. O. Reuchlin Colonel R. Roos Captain F. Stam
New Zealand	Mr. G. R. Powles Air Commodore J. L. Findlay
Philippines	Colonel A. Bautista Mr. F.C. Rodriguez
United Kingdom	Brigadier D. Chapman Major L. A. Summersell
United States	Lt. Col. T. N. Dupuy Captain Frank Fenno, Jr., USN
U. S. S. R.	Rear Admiral S. S. Ramishvili

III. INTER-ALLIED TRADE BOARD FOR JAPAN

Chairman:	Mr. Roswell H. Whitman (United States)
Secretary:	Mr. Donald G. Badger
Australia	Mr. James U. Garside Mr. H.W. Bullock
Canada	Mr. H. A. Scott Dr. T. N. Beaupre
China	Dr. Shou-Chin Wang Mr. K. T. Hu
France	Mr. Robert Douteau Mr. Louis Bacquier
India	Mr. M. Ahmad Mr. S. N. Banerji
Netherlands	Dr. R. H. van Gulik
New Zealand	Mr. R.W. Marshall Mr. J. S. Scott
Philippines	Mr. Marciso Ramos Mr. J. Teodoro, Jr.
United Kingdom	Mr. A. E. Percival Mr. F. C. Everson Mr. J. E. Chadwick Mr. M. B. Thresher
United States	Mr. Roswell H. Whitman Mr. Dean O. Bowman
U. S. S. R.	Mr. J. I. Krasuik

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IV. SECRETARIAT

Secretary General	Mr. Nelson T. Johnson
Deputy Secretary General	Mr. Samuel S. Stratton
Special Assistants to the Secretary General	Mr. Harold W. Moseley Mr. John P. Gardiner Mr. Henry L. Trepagnier, Jr.
Documents Officer	Mr. C. H. Pendleton
Administrative Officer	Mr. Carl H. Pfuntner
Recording Secretary	Mr. Donald G. Badger
Economic Secretary	Mr. Frank L. Turner
Research and Analysis Secretary	Mr. David K. Eichler
Reparations Secretary	
Assistant Research and Analysis Secretary	Mr. Ralph A. Jones
Assistant Documents Officer	Mr. Gene W. Abbott

Staff

Miss Theresa M. Catella
Miss Juliana Clark
Miss Lucille C. De Pretis
Miss Gloria Engel
Mr. George Forbus
Mr. Rudolph Holtz
Miss Elizabeth A. Huff
Mr. James V. Kennedy
Miss Christine M. Koerner
Mr. Frank D. Lewis
Miss Mary Martin
Mrs. Louise Mitchell
Mr. Robert Mosley
Miss Miriam Nieland
Miss Mary Ann Rollman
Miss Doraine Russell
Mr. Harold M. Stern
Mrs. Theresa Swope
Mr. Doyle A. Walker
Miss Kathleen M. Welsh

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APPENDIX 4

ROSTER OF FORMER COMMISSION PERSONNEL, INCLUDING LIST OF PAST AND PRESENT COMMISSION REPRESENTATIVES WITH THEIR TERMS OF SERVICE

AUSTRALIA

Chief Representatives

H. E. Sir Frederic Eggleston	Feb. 26, '46 - Mar. 17 '46
Lieutenant General Sir John Lavarack	Mar. 17, '46 - May 29 '46
The Right Honorable Dr. H. V. Evatt	May 29, '46 - Jul. 19 '46
Major J. Plimsoll	Jul. 19, '46 - Oct. 8, '46
H. E. The Honorable Norman J. O. Makin	Oct. 8, '46 - Present

Former Delegation Members

Mr. John Oldham
Dr. John Andrews

CANADA

Chief Representatives

H. E. Mr. Lester B. Pearson	Feb. 26, '46 - Oct. 9 '46
H. E. Mr. H. H. Wrong	Oct. 9, '46 - Present

Former Delegation Members

Mr. E. Herbert Norman
Dr. George S. Patterson
Major General H. F. Letson
Brigadier N. E. Rodger
Mr. Paul Tremblay
Mr. A. E. Ritchie
Mr. B. J. Bachand
Mr. Charles Hebert

CHINA

Chief Representatives

H. E. Dr. Wei Tao-Ming	Feb. 26, '46 - Jul. 9 '46
H. E. Dr. V. K. Wellington Koo	Jul. 9, '46 - Present

Former Delegation Members

Dr. Liu Shih-Shun
Dr. C. L. Hsia
Dr. Lin Mou-Sheng
Col. Lin Shen-Mu
Dr. Howard K. C. Wang
Lieut. T. L. Chow

FRANCE

Chief Representative

H.E. Mr. Paul E. Naggiar — Feb. 26, '46 - Present

Former Delegation Members

Captain Maurice Holley Williams
Mr. Block-Laine

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INDIA

Chief Representatives

The Honorable Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai	Feb. 26, '46 - Jan. 31, '47
H. E. Mr. M. Asaf Ali	Mar. 5, '47 - Present

Former Delegation Members

Mr. J. Vesugar
Mr. R. R. Saksena
Mr. E. Radbone
Mr. P. A. Menon
Mr. S. K. Kirpalani
Mr. M. S. Rajendrasinhji

NETHERLANDS

Chief Representatives

H. E. Dr. A. Loudon	Feb. 26, '46 - Jul. 1, '47
Jhr. O. Reuchlin	Jul. 1, '47 - Present

Former Delegations Members

Dr. A. D. A. de Kat Angelino
Dr. G. A. Ph. Weyer
Rear Admiral J. E. Meyer Ranneft
Dr. J. G. de Beus

NEW ZEALAND

Chief Representative

H. E. Sir Carl Berendsen	Feb. 26, '46 - Present

PHILIPPINES

Chief Representative

H. E. General Carlos P. Romulo	Feb. 26, '46 - Present

Former Delegation Members

Mr. Manuel A. Adeva
Mr. Solomon V. Arnaldo
Mr. T. Baja
Mr. Thomas de Castro
Senator Tomas Confesor
Mr. Ciriaco Coronel
Mr. Manuel V. Gallego
Dr. Melquiades J. Gamboa
Mr. Delfin Garcia
Dr. Jose F. Imperial

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

Chief Representatives

H. E. Mr. Andrei Gromyko	Feb. 26, '46 - June 19, '46
H. E. Mr. N. V. Novikov	June 19, '46 - Present

Former Delegation Members

Major General A. V. Vasiliev
Mr. Fedor Orekhov
Mr. L. I. Pavlov
Mr. Anatoli A. Ermolaev

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UNITED KINGDOM

Chief Representatives

H.E. The Right Honorable Lord Halifax	Feb. 26, '46 - May 13 '46
Sir George Sansom	May 13, '46 - Present

Former Delegation Member

Group Captain J. R. Wilson

UNITED STATES

Chief Representative

H.E. Major General Frank R. McCoy	Feb. 26, '46 - Present

Former Delegation Members

Honorable Benjamin V. Cohen
Colonel C. Stanton Babcock
Mr. William W. Bishop, Jr.
Mr. John K. Emmerson
Mr. A. V. Freeman
Mr. John K. Galbraith
Mr. Albert H. Garretson
Mr. John Hazard
Mrs. Marion A. Johnston
Mr. William W. Lockwood
Brig. General James McCormack Jr.
Mr. Hamilton Robinson

FORMER MEMBERS OF THE SECRETARIAT

Mr. Hugh D. Farley	(Deputy Secretary General)
Mr. Richard B. Finn	(Executive Secretary)
Mrs. Jane M. Alden	(Legal Secretary)
Mrs. B. Reubens	(Economic Secretary)
Mr. William D. Misfeldt	(Asst. Documents Officer)
Mrs. Dorothy E. Barstow	
Miss Lucille L. Bailey	
Mr. Franklin Falkenhainer	
Mr. Russell Jenkins	
Miss Wilma L. McElroy	
Miss Mary Ann McGuigan	
Miss Demetria Panagos	
Mrs. Margaret Robertson	
Miss Barbara Quandt	
Miss Ann Shelton	
Mr. Joseph Whalen	

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June 19, 1947

APPENDIX 5

BASIC POST-SURRENDER POLICY FOR JAPAN

This document is a statement of general policy relating to Japan after surrender. It does not deal with all matters relating to the occupation of Japan requiring policy determinations. Such matters as are not included or are not fully covered will be dealt with separately.

PREAMBLE

WHEREAS on September 2, 1945, Japan surrendered unconditionally to the Allied Powers and is now under military occupation by forces of these Powers under the command of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and

WHEREAS representatives of the following nations, namely, Australia, Canada, China, France, India, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, the U. S. S. R., the United Kingdom, and the United States of America, which were engaged in the war against Japan, have on the decision of the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers met together at Washington as a Far Eastern Commission, to formulate the policies, principles and standards in conformity with which the fulfillment by Japan of its obligations under the Terms of Surrender may be accomplished,

THE NATIONS COMPOSING THIS COMMISSION, with the object of fulfilling the intentions of the Potsdam Declaration, of carrying out the instrument of surrender and of establishing international security and stability,

CONSCIOUS that such security and stability depend first, upon the complete destruction of the military machine which has been the chief means whereby Japan has carried out the aggression of past decades; second, upon the establishment of such political and economic conditions as would make impossible any revival of militarism in Japan; and third, upon bringing the Japanese to a realization that their will to war, their plan of conquest, and the methods used to accomplish such plans, have brought them to the verge of ruin,

RESOLVED that Japan cannot be allowed to control her own destinies again until there is on her part a determination to abandon militarism in all its aspects and a desire to live with the rest of the world in peace, and until democratic principles are established in all spheres of the political, economic, and cultural life of Japan,

ARE THEREFORE AGREED:

To ensure the fulfillment of Japan's obligations to the Allied Powers;

To complete the task of physical and spiritual demilitarization of Japan by measures including total disarmament, economic reform designed to deprive Japan of power to make war, elimination of militaristic influences, and stern justice to war criminals, and requiring a period of strict control; and

To help the people of Japan in their own interest as well as that of the world at large to find means whereby they may develop within the framework of a democratic society an intercourse among themselves and with other countries along economic and cultural lines that will enable them to satisfy their reasonable individual and national needs and bring them into permanently peaceful relationship with all nations;

AND HAVE ADOPTED the following basic objectives and policies in dealing with Japan:

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powers necessary to effectuate the Surrender terms and to carry out the policies established for the conduct of the occupation and the control of Japan.

The Supreme Commander will exercise his authority through Japanese governmental machinery and agencies, including the Emperor, but only to the extent that this satisfactorily furthers the objectives and policies stated herein. According to the judgment and discretion of the Supreme Commander the Japanese government may be permitted to exercise the normal powers of government in matters of domestic administration, or the Supreme Commander may in any case direct action to be taken without making use of the agencies of the Japanese Government.

After appropriate preliminary consultation with the representatives of the Allied Powers in the Allied Council for Japan, the Supreme Commander may, in cases of necessity, take decisions concerning the removal of individual ministers of the Japanese Government, or concerning the filling of vacancies created by the resignation of individual cabinet members. Changes in the governmental machinery, or a change in the Japanese Government as a whole, will be made in accordance with the principles laid down in the Terms of Reference of the Far Eastern Commission.

The Supreme Commander is not committed to support the Emperor or any other Japanese governmental authority. The policy is to use the existing form of government in Japan and not to support it. Changes in the pre-surrender form of the Emperor institution and in the form of government in the direction of modifying or removing its feudal and authoritarian character and of establishing a democratic Japan are to be encouraged.

3. Protection of United Nations Interests

It shall be the duty of the Supreme Commander to protect the interests, assets, and rights of all members of the United Nations and their nationals. Where such protection conflicts with the fulfillment of the objectives and policies of the occupation, the government of the nation concerned shall be informed through diplomatic channels and shall be consulted on the question of proper adjustment.

4. Publicity as to Policies

The peoples of the nations which have participated in the war against Japan, the Japanese people, and the world at large shall be kept fully informed of the objectives and policies of the occupation, and of progress made in their fulfillment.

PART III - POLITICAL

1. Disarmament and Demilitarization

Disarmament and Demilitarization are the initial tasks of the military occupation and shall be carried out promptly and with determination. Every effort shall be made to bring home to the Japanese people the part played by those who have deceived and misled them into embarking on world conquest, and those who collaborated in so doing.

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PART I - ULTIMATE OBJECTIVES

1. The ultimate objectives in relation to Japan, to which policies for the post-surrender period for Japan should conform are:

a. To insure that Japan will not again become a menace to the peace and security of the world.

b. To bring about the earliest possible establishment of a democratic and peaceful government which will carry out its international responsibilities, respect the rights of other states, and support the objectives of the United Nations. Such government in Japan should be established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people.

2. These objectives will be achieved by the following principal means:

a. Japan's sovereignty will be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor outlying islands as may be determined.

b. Japan will be completely disarmed and demilitarized. The authority of the militarists and the influence of militarism will be totally eliminated. All institutions expressive of the spirit of militarism and aggressions will be vigorously suppressed.

c. The Japanese people shall be encouraged to develop a desire for individual liberties and respect for fundamental human rights, particularly the freedoms of religion, assembly and association, speech and the press. They shall be encouraged to form democratic and representative organizations.

d. Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy and permit the exaction of just reparations in kind, but not those which would enable her to rearm for war. To this end access to, as distinguished from control of, raw materials should be permitted. Eventual Japanese participation in world trade relations will be permitted.

PART II - ALLIED AUTHORITY

1. Military Occupation

There will be a military occupation of the Japanese home islands to carry into effect the surrender terms and further the achievement of the ultimate objectives stated above. The occupation shall have the character of an operation in behalf of the Powers that have participated in the war against Japan. The principle of participation in the occupation of Japan by forces of these nations is affirmed. The occupation forces will be under the command of a Supreme Commander designated by the United States.

2. Relationship to Japanese Government

The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government will be subject to the Supreme Commander, who will possess all

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Japan is not to have any army, navy, airforce, secret police organization, or any civil aviation, or gendarmerie, but may have adequate civilian police forces. Japan's ground, air and naval forces shall be disarmed and disbanded and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters, the General Staff and all secret police organizations shall be dissolved. Military and naval material, military and naval vessels and military and naval installations, and military, naval and civilian aircraft, wherever situated, shall be surrendered to the appropriate Allied commanders in their zones of capitulation of the Japanese troops and shall be disposed of in accordance with decisions of the Allied Powers already adopted or which may be adopted. Inventories shall be made and inspections authorized to insure complete execution of these provisions.

High officials of the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters, and General Staff, other high military and naval officials of the Japanese Government, leaders of ultra-nationalist and militarist organizations and other important exponents of militarism and aggression will be taken into custody and held for future disposition. Persons who have been active exponents of militarism and militant nationalism will be removed and excluded from public office and from any other position of public or substantial private responsibility. Ultra-nationalistic or militaristic social, political, professional and commercial societies and institutions will be dissolved and prohibited.

The restoration, even in a distinguished form, of any anti-democratic and militaristic activity shall be prevented, particularly on the part of former Japanese career military and naval officers, gendarmerie, and former members of dissolved militaristic, ultra-nationalistic and other anti-democratic organizations.

Militaristic, ultra-nationalistic and anti-democratic doctrines and practices, including para-military training, shall be eliminated from the educational system. Former career military and naval officers, both commissioned and non-commissioned, and all other exponents of militaristic, ultra-nationalistic and anti-democratic doctrines and practices shall be excluded from supervisory and teaching positions.

2. War Criminals

Stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including those who visited cruelties upon prisoners of war or other nationals of members of the United Nations. Persons charged by the Supreme Commander, or appropriate United Nations Agencies with being war criminals shall be arrested, tried and, if convicted, punished. Those wanted by another of the United Nations for offenses against its nationals, shall, if not wanted for trial or as witnesses or otherwise by the Supreme Commander, be turned over to the custody of such other nations.

3. Encouragement of Desire for Individual Liberties and Democratic Processes

Freedom of worship and observance of all religious shall be proclaimed and guaranteed for the future. It should also be made plain to the Japanese that ultra-nationalistic, militaristic and anti-democratic organizations and movements will not be permitted to hide behind the cloak of religion.

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The Japanese people shall be afforded opportunity and encouraged to become familiar with the history, institutions, culture and the accomplishments of the democracies.

Obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people shall be removed.

Democratic political parties, with rights of assembly and public discussion and the formation of trade unions shall be encouraged, subject to the necessity for maintaining the security of the occupying forces.

Laws, decrees, and regulations which establish discrimination on grounds of race, nationality, creed or political opinion shall be abrogated; those which conflict with the objectives and policies outlined in this document shall be repealed, suspended or amended as required, and agencies charged specifically with their enforcement shall be abolished or appropriately modified. Persons unjustly confined by Japanese authority on political grounds shall be released. The judicial, legal and police systems shall be reformed as soon as practicable to conform to the policies set forth herein and it shall be the duty of all judicial, legal and police officers to protect individual liberties and civil rights.

PART IV - ECONOMIC

1. Economic Demilitarization

The existing economic basis of Japanese military strength must be destroyed and not be permitted to revive.

Therefore, a program will be enforced containing the following elements, among others; the immediate cessation and future prohibition of production of all goods designed for the equipment, maintenance, or use of any military force or establishment; the imposition of a ban upon facilities for the production or repair of implements of war, including naval vessels and all forms of aircraft; the institution of a system of inspections and control designed to prevent concealed or distinguished military preparation; the elimination in Japan of those industries or branches of production which would provide Japan with the capacity to rearm for war; and the prohibition of specialized research and instruction contributing directly to the development of war-making power. Research for peaceful ends will be permitted, but shall be strictly supervised by the Supreme Commander to prevent its use for war purposes. Japan shall be restricted to the maintenance of these industries which will sustain the level of economy and standard of living fixed in accordance with principles determined by the Far Eastern Commission and consistent with the Potsdam Declaration.

The eventual disposition of those existing production facilities within Japan which are to be eliminated in accord with this program, as between transfer abroad for the purpose of reparations, scrapping, and conversion to other uses, will be determined, after inventory, in accordance with the principles laid down by the Far Eastern Commission or pursuant to the Terms of Reference of the Far Eastern Commission. Pending decision, no such facilities either suitable for transfer abroad or readily convertible for civilian use, shall be destroyed except in emergency situations.

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2. Promotion of Democratic Forces

Organizations of labor in industry and agriculture, organized on a democratic basis, shall be encouraged. Other organizations in industry and agriculture, organized on a democratic basis, shall be encouraged if they will contribute to furthering the democratization of Japan or other objectives of the occupation.

Policies shall be laid down with the object of insuring a wide and just distribution of income and of the ownership of the means of production and trade.

Encouragement shall be given to those forms of economic activity, organization and leadership deemed likely to strengthen the democratic forces in Japan and to prevent economic activity from being used in support of military ends.

To this end it shall be the policy of the Supreme Commander:

a. To prohibit the retention in important positions in the economic field of individuals who because of their past associations or for other reasons cannot be trusted to direct Japanese economic effort solely towards peaceful and democratic ends; and

b. To require a program for the dissolution of the large industrial and banking combinations accompanied by their progressive replacement by organizations which would widen the basis of control and ownership.

3. Resumption of Peaceful Economic Activity

The policies of Japan have brought down upon the people great economic destruction and confronted them with economic difficulty and suffering. The plight of Japan is the direct outcome of its own behavior, and the Allies will not undertake the burden of repairing the damage. It can be repaired only if the Japanese people renounce all military aims and apply themselves diligently and with single purpose to the ways of peaceful living. It will be necessary for them to undertake physical reconstruction and basically to reform the nature and direction of their economic activities and institutions. In accordance with assurances contained in the Potsdam Declaration, the Allies have no intention of imposing conditions which would prevent the accomplishment of these tasks in due time.

Japan will be expected to provide goods and services to meet the needs of the occupying forces to the extent that this can, in the judgment of the Supreme Commander, be effected without causing starvation, wide-spread disease and acute physical distress.

The Japanese authorities will be expected, and if necessary directed, to maintain, develop and enforce programs subject to the approval of the Supreme Commander, which are designed to serve the following purposes:

a. To avoid acute economic distress.

b. To assure just and impartial distribution of available supplies.

c. To meet the requirements for reparations deliveries

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d. To make such provision for the needs of the Japanese population as may be deemed reasonable in accordance with principles formulated by the Far Eastern Commission in the light both of supplies available and of obligations to other peoples of the United Nations and territories formerly occupied by Japan.

4. Reparations and Restitution

Reparations

For acts of aggression committed by Japan and for the purpose of equitable reparation of the damage caused by her to the Allied Powers and in the interests of destruction of the Japanese war potential in those industries which could lead to Japan's rearmament for waging war, reparations shall be exacted from Japan through the transfer of such existing Japanese capital equipment and facilities or such Japanese goods as exist or may in future be produced and which under policies set forth by the Far Eastern Commission or pursuant to the Terms of Reference of the Far Eastern Commission should be made available for this purpose. The reparations shall be in such a form as would not endanger the fulfillment of the program of demilitarization of Japan and which would not prejudice the defraying of the cost of the occupation and the maintenance of a minimum civilian standard of living. The shares of particular countries in the total sum of the reparations from Japan shall be determined on a broad political basis, taking into due account the scope of material and human destruction and damage suffered by each claimant country as a result of the preparation and execution of Japanese aggression, and taking also into due account each country's contribution to the cause of the defeat of Japan, including the extent and duration of its resistence to Japanese aggression.

Restitution

Full and prompt restitution will be required of all identifiable property, looted, delivered under duress, or paid for in worthless currency.

5. Fiscal, Monetary, and Banking Policies

While the Japanese authorities will remain responsible for the management and direction of the domestic fiscal, monetary, and credit policies, this responsibility is subject to the approval and review of the Supreme Commander, and wherever necessary to his direction.

6. International Trade and Financial Relations

Eventual Japanese participation in world trade relations shall be permitted. During occupation and under suitable controls and subject to the prior requirements of the peoples of countries which have participated in the war against Japan, Japan will be permitted to purchase from foreign countries raw materials and other goods that it may need for peaceful purposes. Japan will also be permitted under suitable controls to export goods to pay for approved imports. Exports other than those directed to be shipped on reparations account or as restitution may be made only to those recipients who agree to provide necessary imports in exchange or agree to pay for such exports in foreign exchange usable in purchasing imports. The proceeds of Japanese exports may be used after the minimum civilian standard of living has been secured to pay for the

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costs of non-military imports necessary for the occupation which have already been made since the surrender.

Control is to be maintained over all imports and exports of goods and foreign exchange and financial transactions. The Far Eastern Commission shall formulate the policies and principles governing exports from and imports to Japan. The Far Eastern Commission will formulate the policies to be followed in the exercise of these controls.

7. Japanese Property Located Abroad

The clauses herein on reparations and references to this subject are without prejudice to the views of Governments on the overseas assets issue.

8. Equality of Opportunity for Foreign Enterprise within Japan

All business organizations of any of the United Nations shall have equal opportunity in the overseas trade and commerce of Japan. Within Japan equal treatment shall be accorded to all nationals of the United Nations.

9. Imperial Household Property

Imperial Household property shall not be exempt from any action necessary to carry out the objectives of the occupation.

XXX XXX

March 20, 1946

APPENDIX 6

JAPANESE GENERAL ELECTION

The Far Eastern Commission has given some short preliminary and tentative consideration to the position that may arise after the forthcoming Japanese elections. Having regard to the established position throughout the country of the more reactionary political parties, and to the very short period available to the parties of a more liberal tendency to circulate their views and organize support, the members of the Commission are not without the apprehension that the holding of the election at such an early date may well give a decisive advantage to the reactionary parties and thus create the embarrassment of a Japanese Government elected in terms of the Potsdam Declaration "in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people", which might not, in fact, truly represent their wishes, and with which it might prove impossible for the Supreme Command to co-operate. From another point of view, the Commission feels the difficulty of expecting a fully instructed, intelligent and authoritative expression of the views of the Japanese people on their political future during this uncertain period when the whole of the future economic structure of Japan is still in doubt, and when a proportion of the electorate must necessarily be disfranchised owing to absence. Finally, the issue of the draft Constitution, of which you have approved, makes the Constitution at this late stage an election issue, upon which there can be little time for consideration by the Japanese people, and at the same time may give an undue political advantage to the political party preferring this Constitution.

The Far Eastern Commission would be most grateful if the Supreme Commander could let them have a very early expression of his views generally, and in particular on the following

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questions:

1. Does the Supreme Commander share the apprehension expressed above?

2. If so, would he consider it possible and desirable to require a further postponement of the Japanese elections, and in that case, for what period?

3. If the Supreme Commander should not consider a further postponement desirable at this late date, would he express his views on the desirability, as an alternative, of publicly prescribing that the forthcoming election will be regarded as a test of the ability of Japan to produce a responsible and democratic government in full accordance with the wishes of the people and that further elections will be held at a later date.

* * * * * *

March 29, 1946

APPENDIX 7

JAPANESE GENERAL ELECTION

(Reply of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers)

The basis of occupational policy is the utilization of the Japanese Government to the fullest extent, under SCAP supervision and control. This is only possible through a functioning legislative body to enact new laws required to implement SCAP directives and to provide for routine governmental business. The alternative is government by Imperial Edict which denies to the Japanese People the right to participate in their own domestic affairs. Such emphasis upon the power of the Emperor would obviously be both undemocratic and unwise and would negative the basic principles envisaged at Potsdam, which we have proclaimed and are meticulously following. The present Diet is completely unsatisfactory because of its war attaint and its unrepresentative character, having been elected in 1942 under Tojo's control. It is imperative that a more representative body be organized at the earliest possible date. The urgent requirements of the present situation demand an expression of popular will. The results of the election will serve to define more clearly the political picture, to clarify political issues and political parties and to indicate the nature and trend of popular opinion. It will also provide for popular participation in the determination of major questions. The suffrage base has been greatly broadened through the lowering of the minimum age requirement and the removal of restrictions on sex. By the application of the purge directive of January 4th 90 per. centum of the members of the present Diet, as well as many other persons holding high government office in the war administration, have been removed from government service and barred from public office or activity as officers of political parties. No political group has hereby suffered so greatly as the reactionaries. Every candidate for the New Diet, of whom there are over 3000, has been screened for affiliation or association with militarism and ultra-nationalism. Many reforms in the electoral system have been accomplished. The election laws are now sufficiently democratic to provide ample opportunity for a free expression of the popular will. The campaign and the election are being carefully watched and closely studied by the forces under my command, with the objective of verifying the democratic nature of the electoral process.

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It is probable that the new Diet will be the most truly responsive body to the will of the people that has ever served Japan and will provide the basis for a much more representative cabinet. Under any circumstances it will certainly be a great improvement over the last Diet along democratic and liberal lines. There is no ground for supposition that the reactionary party will secure a greater advantage as a result of the election at this time than at a later date. Political activity is now widespread. Any postponement of the election would inevitably result in greater advantage to the more experienced and better organized reactionary group severely crippled by the purge order who would thereby be provided the opportunity to regroup and strengthen.

Any postponement would certainly be misunderstood by the Japanese People, and would have a profound adverse reaction upon the purposes and success of the occupation. Should the results of the election prove disadvantageous to the purposes of the occupation, the remedy is always in my power to require the dissolution of the Diet and the holding of a new election under such provisions as are deemed necessary.

The Commission expressed the following view: "Finally, the issue of the draft Constitution, of which you have approved, makes the Constitution at this late stage an election issue, upon which there can be little time for consideration by the Japanese people, and at the same time may give an undue political advantage to the political party preferring this Constitution."

The Commission seems to be laboring under a confusion of thought in believing that the constitution has been put forth by any particular party. The Cabinet itself does not represent any party. The Prime Minister, Shidehara, is completely independent and has no party affiliations whatsoever. All parties in Japan, except the Communistic Party, overwhelmingly favor the proposed constitution, which represents the work of men from many different groups and many different affiliations. It has created confidence in the Cabinet but cannot be regarded as an appreciable factor in the elections as practically every candidate except the Communist support it. My own approval of it will have no slightest effect in any way on the election returns of any party or any candidate.

/The following additional information has also been received from the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers./

The following from Nippon Times, 26 March 1946, appears to impartially estimate the existing political situation and may be of interest to the commission: HEADING "Parties are probing chances for victory." SUBHEADING "Difficulty found in making estimates as election set up has been changed." Article "What party will have the majority support of the people at the coming general elections? That is not a problem of interest only to the people for all the political parties themselves would like to know the answer to that problem. Already the progressive party with Kan Inukai, the Liberal Party with Tsuruhei Matsuno, the Social Democratic Party with Niyiyzo Hirano, the Communist Party with Kyuichi Tokuda, and the Kyodoto with Tadao Ikawa, as their respective election campaign managers, are busily engaged now in figuring the prospect of their parties, with statistics and tabulations, reports the Mainichi.

"Yet all parties are finding it difficult to make estimates because it is yet unknown how woman voters, new youth voters,

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and the Restricted Plural Ballot System will affect the election. Furthermore, as most of the candidates are new men, their strength and positions are unknown. As a result all parties are unable to predict correctly the election results and, therefore, are determined to place more emphasis on their campaign activities.

"The Progressive Party, after studying the situation all over the country, recognizes the popularity of the Social Democratic Party, but calculates results favorable to itself, because its candidates are mostly influential men in their localities who have public confidence. The progressive party is succeeding mainly to the grounds of the former Minseito, with the addition of the anti-Hatoyama faction. Thus it believes it is stronger than the Liberal Party. The Progressive Party thus estimates that it will have 150 to 200 members elected, and further believes that it will be able to bring into its organization, independent and neutral candidates who compose more than 1/2 of the candidates.

"On the other hand, the Liberal Party is certain of winning more than 1/2 of the members from almost 20 prefectures and of having about 200 members elected, thereby becoming the First Party.

"The Social Democratic Party is confident of gaining the support of majority of the voters in Aomori, Iwate, Akita, Fukushima, Tokyo, Yamanashi, Nagano, Niigata, Aichi, Fukuoka and Kagoshima. As to the result of the election, the Social Democratic Party believes that the 3 parties, progressive, Liberal and Social, and Social Democratic, will occupy the three main positions, each with 150 members elected. The party's candidates, the party headquarters insists, have gained the true support of the masses.

"The Communist Party has about 100 candidates, and its campaign meetings are well attended. But the observations made by the above mentioned 3 parties say that the Communist Party will have less than 10 members elected.

"The Kyodo Party is hopeful of having about 30 candidates elected, its influence being strong in Hokkaido, Nagano and Ibaragi.

"The election of independent, neutral and small party candidates, is estimated at about 80 to 90.

"Informed government circles observe that the Liberal Party will become the First Party with about 150 elected, while the 2nd and 3rd parties will come with only a 20 to 30 difference. It is yet to be seen whether the Liberal Party or the Social Democratic Party will become the 2nd party.

"The actual results will depend on the future campaign but it is observed that the Social Democratic Party will cut into the grounds of the Progressive and Liberal Parties, and particularly influence the youths who newly gained franchise rights."

With reference to the three specific questions listed in the request of the Far Eastern Commission for consultation with the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers on the subject of the date of the forthcoming Japanese general election, the following answers were received from the Supreme Commander for the consideration of the Commission:

Appendix 7

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"1. Question: Does the Supreme Commander share the apprehensions expressed above?

Answer: No.

"2. Question: If so, would he consider it possible and desirable to require a further postponement of the Japanese elections, and in that case, for what period?

Answer: No.

"3. Question: If the Supreme Commander should not consider a further postponement desirable at this late date, would he express his views on the desirability, as an alternative, of publicly prescribing that the forthcoming election will be regarded as a test of the ability of Japan to produce a responsible and democratic government in full accordance with the wishes of the people and that further elections will be held at a later date.

Answer: The suggested statement seems wholly unnecessary. The conditions it would announce are inherent in the situation and are completely understood, as I can require dissolution of the Diet and call for another election at any time."

x x x x x x

March 10, 1946

APPENDIX 8

DRAFT CONSTITUTION

The Commission has received from the United States Government the text of a draft constitution which appears to have been drawn up in compliance with an Imperial rescript, the text of which has also been supplied by the United States Government, along with the Supreme Commander's comments on that text.

The opening sentences of this draft indicate to the Commission that it will be presented to the first session of the Japanese Diet which will be chosen at the forthcoming general elections. The Commission therefore assumes that this and possibly other texts will be debated in the Diet and that amendments may be offered and perhaps other proposals introduced.

The Commission, therefore, desires that the Supreme Commander keep it informed of the progress and development of this and other drafts that may be considered by the Diet.

For mindful of its responsibilities under its Terms of Reference for the formulation of policy in regard to the implementation of the surrender terms, and of the important bearing which this or any other proposed changes in the constitutional structure of Japan may have upon the decisions in carrying out that responsibility, the Commission desires that the Supreme Commander for the Allies make clear to the Japanese Government that the Far Eastern Commission must be given an opportunity to pass upon the final draft of the Constitution to determine whether it is consistent with the Potsdam Declaration and any other controlling document before it is finally approved by the Diet and becomes legally valid.

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The Commission believes that in this way hasty action by the Japanese Diet will be prevented and time given for all elements inside and outside the Diet to consider this very important question and bring to that consideration all available thought produced by the freely expressed will of the Japanese people.

In this connection the Commission notes the encouragement given to the Japanese people in the Supreme Commander's announcement that this draft of a proposed constitution has his personal approval. It is somewhat apprehensive that this approval may be misunderstood by the Japanese public and taken to mean that this particular draft has the approval of the Powers represented on this Commission.

As such is not necessarily the case and as the Commission does not want to take any action in regard to this or any other draft constitution that might prejudice Japanese public opinion for or against any proposal of this nature, it considers that the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers should in some appropriate manner make it known to the Japanese people that while this draft of a proposed Constitution is a document of obvious merit and is available now for consideration and study, the fact that it is a draft prepared by the Government does not preclude favorable consideration of other proposals or drafts which may be submitted to the Diet for study and comparison.

The Commission requests that the United States Government inform the Supreme Commander of its views as expressed above, and since the constitutional issue is one that is likely to influence the votes of the electors, it do so with a minimum of delay.

x x x x x x

May 17, 1946

APPENDIX 9

CRITERIA FOR THE ADOPTION OF A NEW JAPANESE CONSTITUTION

The Criteria for the adoption of a new Constitution should be such as to ensure that the Constitution, when finally adopted, is, in fact, a free expression of the will of the Japanese people. To this end, the following principles should be observed.

a. Adequate time and opportunity should be allowed for the full discussion and consideration of the terms of the new constitution.

b. Complete legal continuity from the Constitution of 1889 to the new Constitution should be assured.

c. The new Constitution should be adopted in such a manner as to demonstrate that it affirmatively expresses the free will of the Japanese people.

x x x x x x

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July 2, 1946

APPENDIX 10

BASIC PRINCIPLES FOR A NEW JAPANESE CONSTITUTION

1. The Japanese Constitution should recognize that sovereign power resides in the people. It should be so framed as to provide for:

a. A representative government based upon universal adult suffrage consisting of:

(1) An executive deriving its authority from and responsible to either the electorate or a fully representative legislative body;

(2) A legislature, fully representative of the electorate, which should have full legislative powers including full control over raising of public revenue and expenditure of public funds;

b. The establishment of an independent judiciary;

c. The guarantee of fundamental civil rights to all Japanese and to all persons within Japanese jurisdiction. All Japanese shall enjoy equal rights before the law and no special privileges of particular social groups such as the nobility shall be allowed;

d. The popular election of heads of institutions of local government such as prefectures, cities, towns and villages;

e. The popular election of local assemblies such as prefectural, city, town, and village.

f. The adoption of constitutional amendments in a manner which will give effect to the freely expressed will of the Japanese people.

2. Though the ultimate form of government in Japan is to be established by the freely expressed will of the Japanese people, the retention of the Emperor Institution in its present constitutional form is not considered consistent with the foregoing general objectives. Consequently, the Japanese should be encouraged to abolish the Emperor Institution or to reform it along more democratic lines.

3. If the Japanese people decide that the Emperor Institution is not to be retained, constitutional safeguards against the institution will obviously not be required, but the constitution will have to conform to the requirements of paragraph 1 and shall also provide:

a. That the legislature shall have sole authority over financial measures and any other organ shall possess only a temporary veto power over other legislative measures;

b. That the prime minister and the ministers of state, all of whom shall be civilians and of whom a majority, including the prime minister, shall be selected from the Diet, shall form a Cabinet collectively responsible to the legislature. If a system of government is adopted

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whereby the chief executive is elected to that office by the people, the provision that a majority of the Cabinet members shall be chosen from the legislature should not necessarily apply;

c. That the legislative organ shall have the power to meet at will.

4. If the Japanese decide to retain the Institution of the Emperor, the following safeguards in addition to those enumerated in 1 and 3 above will be necessary:

a. When a Cabinet loses the confidence of the legislature it shall either resign or appeal to the electorate;

b. The Emperor shall have no powers other than those to be conferred on him by the new Constitution. He shall act in all cases in accordance with the advice of the Cabinet;

c. The Emperor shall be deprived of all military authority such as that provided in Articles XI, XII, XIII, and XIV of Chapter 1 of the Constitution of 1889;

d. All property of the Imperial household shall be declared property of the State. The expenses of the Imperial household shall be appropriated by the legislature.

5. The retention of the Privy Council and the House of Peers in their present form and with their present powers is not considered consistent with the foregoing general objectives.

x x x x x x

September 25, 1946

APPENDIX 11

FURTHER POLICIES RELATING TO A NEW JAPANESE CONSTITUTION

The Far Eastern Commission reaffirms its previous decision, taken in Basic Principles for a New Japanese Constitution, /Appendix 10/, that all cabinet ministers should be civilians, and further decides as a matter of policy that the House of Councillors should not have any predominance over the House of Representatives. The Commission considers essential its continuing right to scrutinize the implementing legislation very carefully to insure that such predominance is not established.

x x x x x x

October 17, 1946

APPENDIX 12

PROVISIONS FOR THE REVIEW OF A NEW JAPANESE CONSTITUTION

1. The new constitution, which will in due season after promulgation become the legal successor of the present constitution with such changes as have been made or may be made as a result of consideration and policy decision of the Far Eastern Commission, shall be subject to further review by the Diet and the Far Eastern Commission in terms of the following paragraph.

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2. In order that the Japanese people may have an opportunity, after the new constitution goes into effect, to reconsider it in the light of the experience of its working, and in order that the Far Eastern Commission may satisfy itself that the constitution fulfills the terms of the Potsdam Declaration and other controlling documents, the Commission decides as a matter of policy that, not sooner than one year and not later than two years after it goes into effect, the situation with respect to the new constitution should be reviewed by the Diet. Without prejudice to the continuing jurisdiction of the Far Eastern Commission at any time, the Commission shall also review the constitution within this same period. The Far Eastern Commission, in determining whether the Japanese constitution is an expression of the free will of the Japanese people, may require a referendum or some other appropriate procedure for ascertaining Japanese opinion with respect to the constitution.

x x x x x x

December 12, 1946

APPENDIX 13

ISSUANCE OF THE POLICY DECISION ON REVIEW OF THE JAPANESE CONSTITUTION

The terms of the policy decision contained in Provisions for the Review of a New Japanese Constitution [Appendix 12], should be formally communicated to the Government of Japan.

The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers should be informed that the time and manner of public announcement of this policy decision are still being considered by the Far Eastern Commission.

x x x x x x

May 13, 1946

APPENDIX 14

INTERIM REPARATIONS REMOVALS ARMY AND NAVY ARSENALS; AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY; LIGHT METALS INDUSTRY

The action specified below should be taken with respect to facilities identified in the three listed categories of Japanese industry. Such action, under the Interim Reparations Removal Program, should be taken without prejudice to further removals that may be ordered under a final reparations program.

1. Army and Navy Arsenals

(Definitions: "Plants and establishments owned and operated by the Japanese Army or Navy engaged in the development, production, maintenance, testing or storage of equipment or supplies for use in war or warlike purposes. (Arsenals as defined herein embraces a broad category of facilities distinguished by their ownership rather than by the nature of the operation and departs from the more usual connotation of ordnance manufacture.) Privately owned arsenals will be treated in a separate paper.")

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a. All facilities within this category should be made available for claim, subject to the following limitations:

(1) Special purpose Machinery and Equipment

All machinery, equipment and accessories which by virtue of initial design, construction, or major structural change are, as individual items, special purpose in nature and functionally limited to use in connection with equipment or supplies for war or warlike purposes, should be held pending further instructions concerning their disposition.

(2) Shipyards

Shipbuilding and ship repair facilities should be disposed of in accordance with policy to be decided later.

(3) Non-armament Facilities

Those facilities which have been engaged in the production of such non-durable consumer goods as textiles, clothing, processed foods, and pharmaceuticals, should be left for disposal under the final reparations program, and not be made available for claim under the Interim Program Reparations Removal Program.

(4) Fertilizer and Fuel Facilities

Those facilities which can be readily used in the production of fertilizer and fuel, other than synthetic oil, should be left for disposal later and not be made available immediately for claim under the Interim Reparations Removal Program.

2. Aircraft Industry

(Definitions: "Plants and establishments primarily engaged in the manufacture or assembly of finished aircraft, airframes, aircraft engines, and aircraft propellers, or in supplying fabricated materials, semi-finished, or finished parts, components, or accessories, (exclusive of arms and armaments, instruments and communication equipment) especially designed for incorporation in finished aircraft.")

a. All facilities in plants and establishments originally designed, constructed, and equipped, or converted through major change in the nature of installed machinery and equipment to serve in this category should be made available for claim.

b. Plants and establishments within this category, other than those covered in (a) above, the use of whose products by the aircraft industry represents merely a diversion during the war without major change in character of product from former peacetime civil consumption, or in the nature of installed machinery and equipment, should not be made available for claim pending Allied decision as to the final disposition of the industry with which they are normally associated.

3. Light Metals Industry

(Definitions: "Plants and establishments primarily engaged in the production of alumina, primary or secondary aluminum and magnesium, and in the rolling, extruding, drawing, forging and casting of aluminum and magnesium and their alloys.")

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a. All facilities identified within this category should be made available for claim, subject to the following limitations:

(1) No facilities engaged in remelting light metal scrap into secondary ingot should be made available for claim.

(2) In cement plants converted to produce alumina from clays or shales, only the equipment introduced to effect such conversion should be made available for claim.

(3) Sufficient rolling and drawing equipment should be retained to handle 15,000 metric tons per annum of fabricated aluminum. Such equipment should be of a general purpose character and can be obtained from any surplus available in other branches of the non-ferrous metals industry.

* * * * * *

May 23, 1946

APPENDIX 15

INTERIM REPARATIONS REMOVALS

MACHINE TOOL INDUSTRY: SULPHURIC ACID INDUSTRY; SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY

The action specified below should be taken with respect to facilities identified in the three listed categories of Japanese industry. Such action, under the Interim Reparations Removal Program, should be taken without prejudice to further removals that may be ordered under a final reparations program.

1. Machine Tool Industry

(Definition: "Plants and establishments primarily engaged in the manufacture of non-portable, power-driven machines designed to shape metal by the progressive cutting away of stock in the form of chips or shavings, or by abrasive action.")

a. That portion of Japan's capacity for the production of machine tools that is in excess of a balanced type-size aggregate of 27,000 units annually, should be made available for claim.

2. Sulphuric Acid Industry

(Definition: "Plants and establishments primarily engaged in the production of sulphuric acid.")

a. That portion of Japan's capacity for the production of sulphuric acid that is in excess of 3.5 million metric tons annually, should be made available for claim. All facilities made available for claim should be of the contact process type, as distinguished from the lead chamber type, but should not include any contact plants, when they are serving as integral functional units in:

(1) a non-ferrous metal smelting plant;

(2) a fertilizer manufacturing establishment in which the contact process plant is not supported by a lead chamber plant of at least equivalent capacity.

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(2) In cement plants converted to produce alumina from clays or shales, only the equipment introduced to effect such conversion should be made available for claim.

(3) Sufficient rolling and drawing equipment should be retained to handle 15,000 metric tons per annum of fabricated aluminum. Such equipment should be of a general purpose character and can be obtained from any surplus available in other branches of the non-ferrous metals industry.

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May 23, 1946

APPENDIX 15

INTERIM REPARATIONS REMOVALS

MACHINE TOOL INDUSTRY: SULPHURIC ACID INDUSTRY; SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY

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(1) a non-ferrous metal smelting plant;

(2) a fertilizer manufacturing establishment in which the contact process plant is not supported by a lead chamber plant of at least equivalent capacity.

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3. Shipbuilding Industry

(Definition: "Shipyards, including all facilities, plants, and establishments located within their confines, primarily engaged in the building, repair, or maintenance of steel ships over 100 gross tons.") The term "merchant shipping" when used in this report should be construed to include steel cargo and passenger vessels and tankers over 100 gross tons.

a. All facilities located in naval shipyards whether publicly or privately owned, that were originally organized or were converted through major change in the original structure or in the size and volume of installed machinery and equipment to build, service, or repair naval combat vessels or specialized naval auxiliary ships should be made available for claim under the Interim Reparations Removal Program subject to the following limitations:

Special Purpose Structures, Machinery, and Equipment

(1) All structures, machinery, equipment and accessories which by virtue of initial design, construction, or major structural change are, as individual items special purpose in nature and functionally limited to use for purposes of an exclusively military nature, should be held pending further instructions concerning their disposition.

(2) No facilities should be made available pending certification by the SCAP that they are not necessary for purposes of the occupation.

b. That portion of Japan's shipbuilding capacity, located in shipyards other than those covered in a above in excess of that necessary to build 150,000 gross tons of merchant shipping annually and to service and repair a merchant fleet aggregating 3.0 million gross tons, should be made available for claim subject to the following limitations:

(1) No facilities should be made available for claim until such time as Japan's merchant fleet is restored to a level which, in the judgment of SCAP, is sufficient to meet the needs of the occupation.

(2) Two 20,000 ton drydocks should be retained for purposes of servicing foreign ships touching at Japanese ports.

Reference to 3.0 million tons should not in any way imply acceptance of this tonnage for the ultimate size of the Japanese merchant fleet.

* * * * * *

May 29, 1946

APPENDIX 16

INTERIM REPARATIONS REMOVALS
BALL AND ROLLER BEARING INDUSTRY

The action specified below should be taken with respect to facilities identified in the following category of Japanese industry. Such action, under the Interim Reparations Removal Program, should be taken without prejudice to further removals that may be ordered under a final reparations program.

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1. Ball and Roller Bearing Industry

(Definition: "Plants and establishment primarily engaged in the manufacture or assembly of complete ball and roller bearings, or their major component parts, namely balls, rollers, races, and cages".)

a. That portion of Japan's capacity for the production of ball and roller bearings that is in excess of 32.5 million yen (based on 1943-1944 average prices) per year, should be made available for claim. Facilities selected for removal should include all plants and establishments whose products are specifically adapted to use in aircraft or other war material.

* * * * * *

June 12, 1946

APPENDIX 17

INTERIM REPARATIONS REMOVALS:
IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY; THERMAL ELECTRIC POWER:
SODA ASH, CHLORINE, AND CAUSTIC SODA INDUSTRY

1. Iron and Steel Industry

(Definition: "Plants and establishments primarily engaged in the production of pig iron or steel ingot".)

a. That portion of Japan's capacity for the production of steel ingot that is in excess of 3.5 million metric tons annually should be made available immediately for claim. In selecting plants for removal first consideration should be given to electric furnace capacity, which should be reduced to an aggregate of 100,000 metric tons annual capacity made up as far as possible of furnaces of individual charge capacity of 1-1/2 tons or less. No Bessemer steel capacity should be removed.

b. That portion of Japan's capacity for the production of pig iron that is in excess of 2.0 million metric tons annually should be made available immediately for claim.

Plants and establishments engaged in the process of rolling will be treated in a supplementary paper.

2. Thermal Electric Power

(Definition: "Plants and establishments primarily engaged in the production of electric energy through the use of fuel (coal) as the basic energy source".)

a. That portion of Japan's thermal electric generating capacity that is in excess of her requirements after the reduction of her industrial capacity in accordance with the remainder of this program (tentatively estimated at capacity in excess of 2.1 million kw.) should be made available for claim subject to the following limitations:

(1) In undertaking removals giving effect to this program, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers should give special attention to the inter-relation of hydro and thermal electric capacities, and should retain facilities, including stand-by

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June 12, 1946

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SODA ASH, CHLORINE, AND CAUSTIC SODA INDUSTRY

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b. That portion of Japan's capacity for the production of pig iron that is in excess of 2.0 million metric tons annually should be made available immediately for claim.

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(Definition: "Plants and establishments primarily engaged in the production of electric energy through the use of fuel (coal) as the basic energy source".)

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(1) In undertaking removals giving effect to this program, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers should give special attention to the inter-relation of hydro and thermal electric capacities, and should retain facilities, including stand-by

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equipment, necessary to ensure at all seasons the distribution of sufficient electric power to satisfy demands as they may be manifested in each supply area after completion of the other phases of the interim program.

(2) If, in the course of effecting these removals, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers should find that thermal electric capacity reduced to 2.1 million kw. would not be adequate to meet Japan's requirements as modified by the reduced industrial demand consequent upon completion of the other phases of the interim program he should so advise the Far Eastern Commission and should state to what total capacity Japan's thermal electric generating plants can be reduced without violating the consideration set out in (1) above.

3. Soda Ash, Chlorine, and Caustic Soda Industry.

(Definition: "Plants and establishments primarily engaged in the production of soda ash (sodium carbonate), chlorine, and caustic soda (sodium hydroxide).")

a. That portion of Japan's capacity for the production of chlorine and caustic soda in electrolytic plants which is in excess of about 75,000 metric tons of chlorine and about 82,500 metric tons of caustic soda, should be made available for claim.

b. That portion of Japan's capacity for the production of soda ash that is in excess of 630,000 metric tons, should be made available for claim. Removal of this excess soda ash capacity should be accomplished by seizure of one large modern soda ash plant, together with its integrated facilities for conversion of soda ash to caustic soda.

XXX XXX

June 20, 1946

APPENDIX 18

INTERIM REPARATIONS REMOVALS: PRIVATELY OWNED MUNITIONS PLANTS

Privately-owned Munitions Plants

(Definition: Privately-owned plants and establishments primarily engaged in manufacture of weapons, missiles, ammunition and military explosives.)

All facilities within this category that were originally organized for munitions production, or were converted to munitions production through such major change in the volume and character of their equipment as to render them unsuitable for reconversion to peace-time purposes, should be made available for claim, subject to the following limitation:

Special Purpose Machinery and Equipment

All machinery, equipment, and accessories, which by virtue of initial design, construction, or major structural change, are, as individual items, special

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purpose in nature and functionally limited to use in connection with the manufacture of equipment or supplies for war or warlike purposes, should be held pending further instructions concerning their disposition.

x x x x x x

September 12, 1946

APPENDIX 19

INTERIM REPARATIONS REMOVALS:
SYNTHETIC OIL AND SYNTHETIC RUBBER INDUSTRIES

The action specified below should be taken with respect to facilities identified in the following categories of Japanese industry. Such action, under the Interim Reparations Removals Program, should be taken without prejudice to further removals that may be ordered under a final reparations program.

1. Synthetic Oil Industry

(Definition: Those plants and establishments both government and privately owned, engaged in the manufacture of petroleum products from coal, whether by high-pressure hydrogenation, the Fischer-Tropsch hydro-carbon synthesis, or low temperature carbonization).

a. All facilities identified within this category should be made available for claim, subject to the following reservation:

(1) Any plant designated as suitable for actual or potential conversion to the manufacture of sulphate of ammonia for fertilizers should be retained in operation until the supply of fixed nitrogen from other sources becomes adequate.

2. Synthetic Rubber Industry

(Definition: Plants and establishments engaged in the production of synthetic rubber).

a. All facilities which have been engaged in the production of synthetic rubber should be made available for claim.

x x x x x x

December 6, 1946

APPENDIX 20

INTERIM REPARATIONS REMOVALS: STEEL ROLLING INDUSTRY

(Definition: Plants and establishments engaged in producing basic steel shapes, such as rails, rods, bars, tubes, plates, strips, sheets, and structural shapes, by rolling, drawing and extruding steel ingots.)

That portion of Japan's steel rolling capacity in excess of that required to produce a balanced annual output of

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2,775,000 metric tons of rolled steel products should be made immediately available as reparations.

x x x x x x

December 6, 1946

APPENDIX 21

INTERIM REPARATIONS REMOVALS: TEMPORARY RETENTION OF ELECTRIC STEEL FURNACES

In view of the current coal shortage in Japan, electric steel furnaces in excess of the 100,000 metric tons annual capacity referred to in Interim Reparations Removals: Iron and Steel Industry; Thermal Electric Power; Soda Ash, Chlorine, and Caustic Soda Industry, /Appendix 17/, together with the rolling mill capacity integrated with such electric furnaces, may be retained in Japan up to 30 June 1947 to a maximum of an additional 300,000 metric tons annual capacity.

If before 30 June 1947 it should be the opinion of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers that, in order to meet the needs of the occupation, an extension of the period is necessary, he should furnish the Far Eastern Commission with a statement of his reasons so that a review of the position may be made.

The above policy should not postpone the designation of these facilities under the interim reparations removal program.

x x x x x x

June 26, 1947

APPENDIX 22

TEMPORARY EXTENSION OF FAR EASTERN COMMISSION POLICY ON TEMPORARY RETENTION OF ELECTRIC STEEL FURNACES (FEC-059/30)

The provisions of Interim Reparations Removals; Temporary Retention of Electric Steel Furnaces /Appendix 21/, are hereby extended until 31 July 1947, pending decision by the Far Eastern Commission on the subject of further review of these provisions.

x x x x x x

May 13, 1946

APPENDIX 23

REMOVAL OF FACILITIES FROM JAPAN FOR REPARATIONS-- PRIORITY ACCORDING TO OWNERSHIP OR CONTROL

Among the criteria to be employed in the selection of individual plants and items of equipment for removal from Japan as reparations should be the principle of reinforcing the occupation objective of dissolving large industrial and banking corporations which have exercised control over a great part of Japanese trade and industry.

Appendix 20, 21, 22 and 23

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The following interests, combinations, and concerns, which assisted in Japanese aggression, and their subsidiaries and affiliates, should be included with others which have been or may be designated: Mitsui; Mitsubishi; Sumitomo; Kuhara; Okura; Yasuda; Mori; Rikken; Nissan; Mangyo; and Nakajima.

XXX XXX

May 22, 1947

APPENDIX 24

SELECTION OF PLANTS FOR REPARATIONS REMOVALS, DESTRUCTION OR RETENTION IN JAPAN

1. Within those amounts of industrial capacity determined by the Far Eastern Commission for retention in Japan, for destruction or for removal as reparations, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers should in selection specific plants, machinery, equipment, and other facilities, give consideration to the following:

a. Security and industrial disarmament requirements: facilities which have been employed in primary and secondary war industries and facilities in war-supporting industries, the operation of which was directly and closely related to war industries, should be removed in preference to those not so employed.

b. The achievement of a fair balance between:

(1) The general preferences of reparations claimants for plants, machinery, equipment and other facilities

(a) Of modern and efficient design and manufacture

(b) In good working condition and capable of being removed from Japan with minimum loss of value and efficiency

(c) In consolidated or integrated units

(d) Of special value or need to claimant countries, and

(2) The legitimate needs, as determined by the Far Eastern Commission, of Japan's peacetime economy for similar equipment having due regard for the geographical location of individual plants in reference to markets, raw materials, manpower, fuel supply, and complementary facilities; for variations in specific products as among types, sizes and other variable characteristics; and for the feasibility of repair and rehabilition in Japan.

c. The occupation policies of dissolving large industrial and banking corporations which have exercised control over a great part of Japanese trade and industry.

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d. Consistent with the provisions of paragraphs a, b, and c, the following order of preference in the selection of particular plants, machinery and equipment for removal:

(1) Plants and equipment owned by the "Zaibatsu" concerns and other big industrial and financial concerns and companies

(2) Plants and equipment owned by other Japanese nationals, the Japanese Government, and by nationals and Governments of the countries which were allies of Japan.

(3) Plants and equipment owned by nationals and Governments of the neutral countries.

2. Property of nationals of Members of the United Nations should be dealt with in accordance with Destruction or Removal of United Nations' Property in Japan, /Appendix 43/.

* * * * * *

February 13, 1947

APPENDIX 25

DELIVERY OF REPARATIONS GOODS IN JAPAN

1. In delivering reparations goods in Japan to claimant countries, the Japanese Government should bear all costs connected with dismantling, packing, transporting to a port in Japan for waterborne craft or for airborne craft, handling, and loading on board the craft at that port. The port should be designated by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers after consultation with the claimant country. None of the above-mentioned costs should be paid by the recipient country; however, all those costs involved in the delivery of reparations goods should in the future be appropriately charged toward the reparations accounts of the recipient countries in the same proportions as their respective national shares of reparations from Japan. The charging of these costs to the reparations accounts of recipient countries should not affect the distribution of reparations received by claimant countries.

2. When particular reparations goods have been designated for delivery to a particular country, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers will afford claimant countries the opportunity to be consulted prior to and represented at the dismantling and packing of such goods and to make such constructional plans and drawings as may be necessary for the purpose of re-erection, provided the making of such plans and drawings shall not be permitted to delay unduly the process of dismantling and removal. Before proceeding with the removal of designated goods from their location, the Supreme Commander will require the recipient country to provide him with a written undertaking to accept such goods, provided they are delivered on board at the designate port free from any major damage sustained in the processes of dismantling, packing, transporting, handling, and loading. The Japanese Government will be required to make good any damage or shortage resulting from the processes of dismantling, packing, transporting, handling,and loading if such damage or shortage occurred prior to delivery on board the carrying craft.

3. The goods in question should become the property of

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(1) Plants and equipment owned by the "Zaibatsu" concerns and other big industrial and financial concerns and companies

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the recipient country when they have been delivered on board at the designated port and thereafter they become the entire responsibility of such recipient country. Receipt for the goods shall be given by the recipient country when they have been delivered on board the carrying craft at the designated port.

4. Each recipient country will be responsible for arranging for the waterborne or airborne craft necessary to transport its reparations goods from the designated port in Japan.

* * * * * *

May 8, 1947

APPENDIX 26

DIVISION OF REPARATIONS SHARES

For acts of aggression committed by Japan and for the purpose of equitable reparation of the damage caused by her to the Allied Powers and in the interests of destruction of the Japanese war potential in those industries which could lead to Japan's rearmament for waging war, reparations shall be exacted from Japan through the transfer of such existing Japanese capital equipment and facilities or such Japanese goods as exist or may in future be produced and which under policies set forth by the Far Eastern Commission or pursuant to the Terms of Reference of the Far Eastern Commission should be made available for this purpose. The reparations shall be in such a form as would not endanger the fulfillment of the program of demilitarization of Japan and which would not prejudice the defraying of the cost of occupation and the maintenance of a minimum civilian standard of living. The shares of particular countries in the total sum of the reparations from Japan shall be determined on a broad political basis, taking into due account the scope of material and human destruction and damage suffered by each claimant country as a result of the preparations and execution of Japanese aggression, and taking also into due account each country's contribution to the cause of the defeat of Japan, including the extent and duration of its resistance to Japanese aggression.

The clauses herein on reparations and reference to this subject are without prejudice to the views of Governments on the overseas assets issue.

* * * * * *

July 18, 1946

APPENDIX 27

RESTITUTION OF LOOTED PROPERTY

1. Immediate steps should be taken to restore to Allied countries objects in the four categories listed below which are found in Japan and which are identified as having been located in an Allied country at the time of occupation of that country, and which were removed by fraud or duress by the Japanese or their agents. The fact that payment was made should be disregarded unless there is conclusive evidence that fraud or duress did not take place. Restitution of any object included

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in category a which follows should be deferred, however, so long as its retention is required for the safety of the occupation forces. In such cases the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers should provide an explanation of reasons for retention and an estimated date of restoration:

a. Industrial and transportation machinery and equipment.

b. Gold, other precious metals, precious gems, foreign securities, foreign currencies, and other foreign exchange assets.

c. Cultural objects

d. Agricultural products and industrial raw materials.

2. Steps should be taken to restore to Allied countries ships of all types and sizes found in Japanese waters which are identified as having been registered in an Allied country at the time of seizure or sinking by the Japanese or their agents, or at the time of acquisition by the Japanese or their agents by fraud or duress. The fact that payment was made should be disregarded unless there is conclusive evidence that fraud or duress did not take place. Restitution of such Allied vessels should be accomplished as rapidly as conditions permit and should be completed not later than December 31, 1946.

3. Within the limits of feasibility, ships damaged or sunk and found in Japanese waters, on the request of the claimant country should as a matter of priority be salvaged, repaired, or refitted as may be necessary to permit their return in a condition substantially similar to that at the time they came into Japanese hands. The costs of necessary salvage, repair and refitting in Japan should be borne by the Japanese Government but should be applied against the reparations apportionment to the claimant country.

4. The processing of claims for industrial and transportation machinery and equipment found in Japan should not be permitted in general to delay removals of machinery and equipment on reparations account, but no item for which restitution claim has been received by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers should be allocated on reparations account until the claim has been acted upon. On the other hand, no restitution claim should be recognized for articles already allocated to particular countries on reparations account.

5. The claimant government should take delivery at a point in Japan designated by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers except that in the case of Allied vessels subject to restitution the Supreme Commander may at his discretion make delivery at Western Pacific points outside Japan whenever delivery will thereby be facilitated. Expenses incurred after delivery to the claimant government should be borne by that government, except that in the case of delivery with Japan, relevant transportation expenses within Japan and any dismantling, packing and repairs necessary for proper transportation, including the necessary manpower, materials and organization, should be borne by Japan and be included in restitution. The recipient government should indemnify the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers against all claims made in respect of the property received.

6. Restitution claims for property other than ships should be made by the government of the Allied country from whose

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territory the property claimed was removed; and restitution made to that government. In the case of ships restitution claims should be filed by, and restitution made to, the government of the country whose flag the vessels were wearing or on whose register of shipping the vessels were borne at the time of sinking, seizure or acquisition as specified in paragraph 2.

7. No items should be included in Japanese export programs which the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers considers as probably subject to restitution as defined above. If items later found to be subject to restitution should be exported, equitable compensation should be made to that country to which the items exported should have been restored.

8. Without prejudice to other arrangements which may be made between the interested parties, the foregoing restitution policies especially those in paragraph 6, are not intended to give the Allied government concerned the right to withhold from a person who is a national of another Allied Power any property as to which he may establish a legitimate title.

9. The Far Eastern Commission should recommend to the Government of those countries within whose territories may be found looted objects such as:

a. Industrial and transportation machinery and equipment;

b. Gold, other precious metals, precious gems, foreign securities, foreign currencies, and other foreign exchange assets;

c. Cultural objects;

d. Agricultural products and industrial raw materials;

e. Ships;

that bilateral arrangements be drawn up providing for restitution according to these principles.

10. The Far Eastern Commission should request the U. S. Government to forward this statement of policy through the usual channels to States which are not represented on the Far Eastern Commission and within whose territories such looted objects may be found.

* * * * * *

October 10, 1946

APPENDIX 28

RESTITUTION OF LOOTED PROPERTY

The policy adopted by the Far Eastern Commission on 18 July 1946 regarding the Restitution of Looted Property, /Appendix 26/, is revised as follows:

(1) In the last sentence of paragraph 2, the words "if seaworthy" are added after the words "Allied vessels".

Appendix 27 and 28

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(2) In paragraph 3, the following sentence is added: "Salvage, repair or refitting should be completed as soon as possible but not necessarily before 31 December 1946."

x x x x x x

March 6, 1947

APPENDIX 29

INTERIM PRINCIPLES FOR RESTITUTION OF IDENTIFIABLE PROPERTY CONFISCATED IN JAPAN FROM ALLIED NATIONALS

1. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers should be authorized to restore to nationals of any of the United Nations identifiable property, tangible or intangible, which was located in Japan prior to the outbreak of hostilities between their government and the government of Japan and owned by them at that time or lawfully acquired thereafter, and which was seized, confiscated, or sequestered, formally or otherwise, during the recent hostilities by the Japanese Government, members of its armed forces, or by official or private Japanese or other enemy individuals or groups, provided that:

a. Subject to the discretion of the Supreme Commander, restitution should be made at this time only to:

(1) Natural persons present in Japan;

(2) Juridical persons where the holders of a controlling interest are nationals of Members of the United Nations now resident in Japan;

(3) Charitable and religious institutions financed primarily by non-Japanese funds, where a duly authorized agent or properly qualified person is resident in Japan to receive title;

b. Without in any way prejudging the definitive policy later to be adopted by the Far Eastern Commission with respect to the disposition of large-scale enterprises, only small-scale commercial and industrial enterprises should be restored at the present time;

c. Though title to gold, other precious metals and foreign exchange may be restored to the United Nations owners, they should remain subject to the laws and regulations in force at any time governing the custody, control and transfer of such assets;

d. The Supreme Commander is satisfied as to the identification of such property.

2. The policy for restitution of similar property to nationals of Members of the United Nations who are not resident in Japan at present will be dealt with in a future paper.

3. For the purpose of determining whether property was in fact confiscated it should be assumed that all property taken by the Japanese or other enemy Government, Armed Forces, or nationals during the recent hostilities from nationals of any of the United Nations was confiscated whether or not payment was made at the time of acquisition unless it can be definitely shown that no duress or fraud was involved.

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4. The restitution of property should be made without expense for the owners and without prejudicing the claim of the original owners against the Japanese or other enemy Government and/or their nationals for damages to property, rent, depreciation, and other ascertainable losses. To facilitate the preparation and adjudication of claims, agreed statements as to the extent and condition of the property restored should be drawn up at the time of its return. The Japanese Government should be required to furnish to the owner a complete inventory of the property together with a report by the Japanese official administrator on the management of it and, in the case of industrial and commercial concerns, a closing balance sheet.

5. If payment to restoree was made at the time of confiscation the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers should require persons repossessing the property to agree to remit such amounts to the Japanese Government as a prerequisite to restitution. However, actual payment of such amounts should be made only after settlement of claims as specified in paragraph 4 above.

6. If funds received in payment for confiscated property were blocked by the Japanese Government, such funds should be unblocked and the owner permitted to draw upon them on the same basis as depositors in general draw upon their bank funds, except that in the event that the confiscated property is returned such funds should be unblocked only in an amount sufficient to make the payment required in paragraph 5 above.

7. The right to restitution provided in the foregoing paragraphs and even the completion of restitution should not be considered as permission to operate properties where the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers considers the operations of such property injurious to the occupying forces or to the purposes of the occupation. Similarly, the operation of properties considered by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers upon consultation with the Allied Council for Japan in accordance with the terms of Reference of the Allied Council for Japan to be beneficial to the occupying forces and/or the accomplishment of the purposes of the occupation should not await restitution of title or the transfer of possession of such properties; but in such cases compensation for the use of the property should be paid for the account of the owner.

8. Japanese nationals injured by the provisions of the foregoing paragraphs should look to the Japanese Government for relief.

x x x x x x

January 23, 1947

APPENDIX 30

DETERMINATION OF THE PEACEFUL NEEDS OF JAPAN

1. The Far Eastern Commission determines as a matter of policy that the peaceful needs of the Japanese people should be defined as being substantially the standard of living prevailing in Japan during the period of 1930-1934.

2. Data about the standard of living during 1930-1934 should for present purposes be used to make an estimate of Japan's peaceful needs in 1950. In estimating the nature and size of the industrial structure within that level, account should be taken of such factors as technological developments,

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the balance of payments and employment.

3. Acceptance of the above policy should not be interpreted to mean acceptance in advance of a specific level for any particular industry.

x x x x x x

October 10, 1946

APPENDIX 31

TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE INTER-ALLIED TRADE BOARD FOR JAPAN

1. At the request of the United States Government the Far Eastern Commission hereby establishes the Inter-Allied Trade Board for Japan. The United States Government will request each of the Governments represented on the Far Eastern Commission to appoint a representative to the Board. The Board will meet in Washington, D.C.

2. The purpose of the Board is to provide easy and rapid means of consultation between the United States Government as the principal occupying power and the other Governments represented on the Far Eastern Commission regarding the disposition of exports available from Japan and the furnishing of imports required for Japan, which lie beyond the scope of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Power's own authority to arrange.

3. Within the framework of the Potsdam Declaration, policies established in accordance with the Terms of Reference of the Far Eastern Commission and the declared objectives of the occupation, the functions of the Inter-Allied Trade Board for Japan will be to make recommendations to the United States Government on:

a. The disposition of commodities available for export from Japan;

b. The sources from which commodities shall be imported into Japan;

c. The best arrangements for facilitating Japanese exports and imports generally.

All recommendations of the Board involving matters of policy shall be subject to the approval of the Far Eastern Commission.

EXPORTS

4. In the case of commodities which are in short world supply the Inter-Allied Trade Board may use any statistical data and consult with allocating authorities and other similar organizations.

5. In considering the disposition of other commodities which may be made available for export from Japan, the Board shall consider any evidence or arguments which may be presented to it by its members and shall either recommend that the commodity be disposed of at the discretion of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers or shall recommend an allocation of the commodity which in its opinion, shall further the objectives of the Allied Powers with respect to Japan as stated in the Potsdam Declaration and insure the equitable distribution

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of the supply among countries which wish to purchase the commodity.

6. It shall be the responsibility of the Board to make recommendations as to terms of sale of Japanese exports.

IMPORTS

7. It shall be the responsibility of the Board to make recommendations as to the terms of purchase of Japanese imports so as to further the announced objectives of the occupation, giving full weight to the desirability of minimizing the cost of procurement.

8. In considering procurement of commodities which are required by Japan, the Board shall either (a) decide that the commodity can be acquired at the discretion of the authorities making the purchase or (b) shall recommend the source of the commodity in such manner as, in its opinion, shall further the announced objectives of the Allied Powers with respect to Japan and provide for the equitable distribution of purchases among the supplying countries.

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May 8, 1947.

APPENDIX 32

SOURCES OF JAPANESE IMPORTS

1. The primary objective in selecting the sources of imports into Japan should be to minimize the cost and difficulty of procurement. Factors to be taken into account are price, terms of purchase other than price, and assurance of meeting scheduled requirements.

2. In determining the sources of imports into Japan of commodities in world short supply due consideration should be given to the needs of countries other than Japan in addition to the factors mentioned in paragraph 1.

3. In procurement of commodities in world surplus or in procurement of any commodity whose export to Japan is of substantial commercial importance to a member of the United Nations while primary consideration should be given to the objectives outlined in paragraph 1 above, consideration should also be given to such other relevant factors as the interests of all members of the United Nations, including any new trade situations or demands arising in post-war circumstances and pre-war patterns of trade, so long as the pre-war patterns of trade reflect current economic interests of the countries concerned. Taking into account the foregoing principles the Inter-Allied Trade Board may recommend individual treatment for different types of imports.

4. This statement of policy will in no way be permitted to jeopardize the fulfillment of United States responsibilities for the prevention of such widespread disease or civil unrest as would endanger the occupying forces or interfere with military operations.

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May 8, 1947

APPENDIX 33

DESTINATION OF JAPANESE EXPORTS.

1. The primary objective in selecting the destinations of exports from Japan, subject to paragraphs 3 and 4, is to maximize the proceeds. Factors to be taken into account are price, the purchasing power of the currency for which the commodity is sold, and the availability of necessary imports which can be procured with the proceeds of the export.

2. Commercial exports as distinct from commodity movements on reparations account or restitutions shall be made only to those recipients who agree to provide imports necessary for Japan in exchange or agree to pay for Japanese exports in foreign exchange usable for procuring necessary imports. Foreign exchange is considered usable under any of the following circumstances:

a. Freely convertible into currencies which can be used for the purpose of procuring necessary imports.

b. Inconvertible, but usable to pay for imports already or concurrently purchased, but not paid for.

c. Inconvertible, but stable in value and subject to a specific agreement with the area within which the currency is valid- subject to the condition that excess balances of the currency in question arising from sale of Japanese exports, not usable for purchase of imports within a reasonable time period, will be made convertible into dollars.

3. In determining the destination of exports from Japan of commodities in world short supply or commodities whose import is of substantial commercial importance to a Member of the United Nations, consideration should be given to the interests of all Members of the United Nations. Proper consideration should be given to the factors mentioned in paragraph one and also to other factors including the requirements of countries for the commodities concerned, any new situations or demands arising in post-war circumstances and the pre-war patterns of trade, so long as the pre-war patterns of trade reflect current economic needs of the countries concerned. Taking into account the foregoing principles, the Inter-Allied Trade Board may recommend individual treatment for different types of exports.

4. For allocated commodities the price should be the same to all recipients and should in general be fixed according to the following principles:

a. The price should be the established world price where such a price exists.

b. Where there is no established world price the price should be fixed in equitable relation to export prices of equivalent goods from other sources and to the domestic prices in the recipient countries which have substantial markets for the commodity.

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March 13, 1947

APPENDIX 34

ALLIED TRADE REPRESENTATIVES IN JAPAN

1. The Far Eastern Commission establishes as a policy decision the following status for the Allied trade representatives in Japan.

2. The trade representatives shall represent their governments and for the time being exercise the following functions:

a. To know what items are desired by their governments for import from Japan and for export to Japan.

b. To keep the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers currently informed as to progress of import and export programs, and items requested or suggested by their governments.

c. To accept for their governments terms of sale, with Japanese selling agencies, agreed to by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

d. To accept delivery of Japanese exports F. O. B. Japanese port, and to handle details of ocean shipping and insurance.

e. To delivery to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers all documents from their governments covering imports and to facilitate such importation and delivery.

f. To supply the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers with all financial data such as costs, sale prices, and claims, and any necessary documents affecting imports from and exports to their governments.

g. To maintain an operating relationship with military or diplomatic liaison missions which their governments have established in Japan, in order to coordinate action and take care of routine matters such as communication.

h. The trade representatives may use secret code for communication with their governments through the Missions of their governments in Japan.

3. The functions of the Allied trade representatives defined in this interim document may subsequently be reviewed by the Far Eastern Commission in the light of experience.

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April 25, 1946

APPENDIX 35

FOOD SUPPLY FOR JAPAN

In view of the world food shortage, which will be at its most critical stage over the next three months, and in view of

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the conditions prevailing in the territories of the Allied Powers, the Far Eastern Commission:

1. Decides as a matter of policy that, except to the extent that the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, with the advice of the Allied Council for Japan, determines that imports are essential immediately for the safety of the Occupation Forces, no imports shall be permitted which will have the effect of giving to the Japanese a priority or preferential treatment over the requirements of the peoples of any Allied Power or liberated area; and

2. Requests the United States Government, in the light of the policy set out above, immediately to review the food import program for Japan in consultation with the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, the Combined Food Board, and other allocating authorities.

* * * * * *

February 27, 1947

APPENDIX 36

SHORT PERIOD CONTROLS OVER THE JAPANESE ECONOMY TO RELIEVE WORLD SHORTAGES

STATEMENT OF POLICY

1. During the present period of world shortages Japan should supply, to the maximum extent consistent with the objectives of the occupation, goods needed in areas which, as a result of Japanese aggression, have been deprived of them during the war. Whenever necessary to attain these objectives, Japanese consumption of such goods should be restricted to minimum requirements.

2. Restriction of Japanese domestic consumption

a. Whenever it is necessary in order to attain the objectives stated in paragraph 1, Japanese consumption of textiles and necessary consumption goods such as hardware, rubber goods, pottery and electrical goods, which before the war found a ready market in certain countries, should be restricted to minimum requirements.

b. Except as determined by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to be required to meet objectives of the occupation, the Japanese use of textiles should not exceed a consumption of 2⅛ lbs. per head per annum for all household textiles and clothing, with additional supplies of textiles permitted to workers to the extent necessary to maintain or increase production or to farmers to the extent necessary to increase deliveries of food; such additional supplies should not exceed 50 million lbs. per annum, except at the discretion of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to meet occupation objectives.

3. Encouragement of production

Measures should be continued or taken to stimulate Japanese production of goods required for exports, particularly coal, textile machinery, mill stores and similar light equipment in addition to those specified in paragraph 2 a above

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and to ensure that the types produced are those in demand in countries requiring supplies from Japan.

4. This policy statement in no way affects decisions as to reparations removals or the future level of Japanese economic life.

5. This policy should be terminated on 31 December 1947 unless extended by the Far Eastern Commission.

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December 6, 1946

APPENDIX 37

PRINCIPLES FOR JAPANESE TRADE UNIONS

1. Japanese workers should be encouraged to form themselves into trade unions for the purpose of preserving and improving conditions of work participating in industrial negotiations to this end, and otherwise assisting the legitimate trade union interests of workers, including organized participation in building up a peaceful and democratic Japan.

2. The right of trade unions and their members to organize for these purposes should be assured and protected by law. The freedom of workers to join trade unions should be provided for by law. All laws and regulations preventing trade unions achieving these objectives should be immediately abrogated. Employers should be forbidden to refuse employment to, or discriminate against, a worker because he is a member of a trade union.

3. Trade unions should have the right of free assembly, speech and the press, and access to broadcasting facilities on a nondiscriminatory basis, provided only that such assembly, speech, or writing does not directly interfere with the interests of the occupation.

4. Trade unions should be encouraged to negotiate with the employers on behalf of their members regarding terms and conditions of employment. The Japanese Government should establish mediation and arbitration machinery for dealing with industrial disputes that cannot be settled by direct and voluntary negotiation between the worker or his representative and the employer. The mediation and arbitration machinery should operate under conditions assuring the protection of the interests of the workers, and if employers are represented on the machinery, trade unions should be given equal representation.

5. Strikes and other work stoppages should be prohibited only when the occupation authorities consider that such stoppages would directly prejudice the objectives or needs of the occupation.

6. Trade unions should be allowed to take part in political activities and to support political parties.

7. Encouragement should be given to organized participation by trade unions and their officials in the democratization process in Japan and in measures taken to achieve the objectives

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of the occupation, such as the elimination of militaristic and monopolistic practices. But such participation should not be encouraged in such a way as to hinder the achievement of the principal obligation and responsibility of the unions and their officials to organize for the protection of union members and union interests.

8. Trade unions should be encouraged to promote adult education and an understanding of democratic processes and of trade union practices and aims among their members. The Japanese Government should as far as possible assist trade union officials in obtaining information on trade union activities in other countries. These objectives should be given due weight when allocations of paper supplies and imports of foreign publications are made.

9. The Japanese should be free to choose the form of organization of their unions, whether on a craft, industry, company, factory or territorial basis. Emphasis should be placed on the importance of a solid local basis for future trade union activity in Japan. However, unions should be allowed to form federations or other groupings, for example in the same area or in related industries or on a nationwide basis.

10. The formation of trade unions should be a process of democratic self-expression and initiative, proceeding from the workers themselves. Employers should not be allowed to take part in the organization or conduct of unions or to finance them.

11. Trade union officials and standing committees should be elected by the workers concerned by secret ballot and democratic methods. It should be the responsibility of the unions to ensure that all officials have been democratically elected at regular stated intervals and that all their activities are democratically conducted.

12. No person who is subject to the purge directive of 4 January 1946, or to subsequent purge directives, should be allowed to hold office in a trade union. All persons who were directly connected in the past in a responsible capacity with the obstruction or repression of trade union organization or activity should be prohibited from employment as union officials, in labor agencies or as mediators, conciliators, or arbitrators. All persons who held office in government-sponsored or controlled trade unions should be subject to screening before being allowed to take office again.

13. Japanese Government and other agencies which were set up or functioned for the purpose of obstructing or in such a way as to obstruct free labor organization and legitimate trade union activities should be abolished or their powers in respect to labor revoked. No police or other government agencies should be employed in spying on workers, breaking strikes, or suppressing legitimate union activities.

14. Any undemocratic workers' organizations or their affiliates, such as the Patriotic Industrial Associations, should be dissolved and not allowed to revive. No new workers' organizations with militaristic, ultra-nationalistic, fascist, or other totalitarian aims should be permitted.

15. Persons who have been imprisoned because of activity or "dangerous thoughts" in connection with trade unions and other labor organizations should be released.

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16. The balance sheet and table of income and expenditure of each trade union showing also the source of large contributions should be available for public inspection. Safeguards such as annual audit by a professionally competent auditor appointed by the members should be taken to ensure the accuracy of these statements.

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March 27, 1947

APPENDIX [illegible]

POLICY FOR THE REVISION OF THE JAPANESE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

Guiding Principles and Objectives

1. Education should be looked upon as the pursuit of truth, as a preparation for life in a democratic nation, and as a training for the social and political responsibilities which freedom entails. Emphasis should be placed on the dignity and worth of the individual, on independent thought and initiative, and on developing a spirit of inquiry. The inter-dependent character of international life should be stressed. The spirit of justice, fair play, and respect for the rights of others, particularly minorities, and the necessity for friendship based upon mutual respect for people of all races and religions, should be emphasized. Special emphasis should also be placed on the teaching of the sanctity of the pledged word in all human relations, whether between individuals or nations. Measures should be taken as rapidly as possible to achieve equality of educational opportunity for all regardless of sex or social position. The revision of the Japanese educational system should in large measure be undertaken by the Japanese themselves and steps should be taken to carry out such revision in accordance with the principles and objectives set forth in this paper.

Training, Recruitment, and Conditions of Service of Teachers.

2. Those teachers and other educational officials whose record shows them to have been pronounced exponents of ultra-nationalistic, militaristic, or totalitarian ideas, should be forbidden to teach or engage in other employment connected with education.

3. Short refresher courses and vacation schools for teachers should be opened, so far as possible, in order to train them in democratic ideas.

4. The development of modern techniques of teaching should be encouraged and opportunities should be provided for teachers to become acquainted with these techniques. In this connection, regard should be had to the value of affording teachers opportunities of transferring from one institution to another.

5. As a corrective to the regimented and limiting nature of normal school training in the past, and to provide teachers with aims and techniques in harmony with the objectives of the occupation, special emphasis should be placed upon the reorganization of normal schools and the establishment of teachers training institutes staffed with the most competent instructors available for inculcating democratic principles. Endeavors should

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be made to increase the proportion of teachers who have had a university training.

6. The teaching profession should be recognized as of vital importance to the future welfare and democratic development of the nation, and its economic status should be improved to a degree commensurate with this importance. Consideration should be given to the establishment of salary scales affording all teachers a reasonable standard of living according to their abilities, qualifications, and responsibilities without the necessity of supplementing their income from outside sources. A basic living wage should be guaranteed for all teachers, with increases according to their qualifications.

Textbooks, Curricula and Teaching Methods.

7. Teaching of ultra-nationalism, state Shintoism, veneration of the Emperor, exaltation of the state over the individual, and race superiority, should be eliminated from the educational system.

8. Textbooks and other reading material that contain such ideas as those outlined above should be withdrawn from use in schools. New textbooks should be issued which give an understanding of progressive ideas. Foreign books should be made available, especially in central libraries, and for teachers. These objectives should be given due weight when allocations of paper supplies and imports of foreign publications are made.

9. Courses in social sciences, civics, constitutional law and government, current events, world affairs and international cooperation should be made an integral part of the educational system at appropriate levels of teaching.

10. Teaching of military subjects should be totally forbidden in all educational institutions. The wearing by students of military-style uniforms should be forbidden. Classical sports such as KENDO, which encourage the martial spirit, should be totally abandoned. Physical training should no longer be associated with the SEISHIN KYOIKU. Greater emphasis should be placed on games and other recreational activities than on pure calisthenics and drill. If former servicemen are employed as drill instructors, or in connection with physical training or sport, they should be carefully screened.

11. Imperial rescripts should not be used as a basis of instruction, study, or ceremonies in schools.

12. Independent thinking on the part of teachers and students should be encouraged.

13. Uniform minimum standards should be prescribed for the different levels of instruction in all the schools of Japan, whether public or private.

Adult Education

14. Adult education should be promoted rapidly by the use of all suitable facilities such as evening classes, university extension courses, the radio, the cinema, and libraries.

Vocational Education

15. Japanese youth should be provided with opportunities for varied vocational training and guidance and appropriate organizations for this purpose.

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Educational Administration and Finance

16. The Japanese Government should seek advice from representatives of all walks of life either through a non-official advisory council or otherwise.

17. The Japanese Government should exercise such control over the education system as will ensure the achievement of the objectives of the occupation, particularly the reforms called for by this policy decision. Subject to the foregoing, and to maintenance of standards prescribed by the Government, the responsibility for the local administration of educational establishments should in due time be decentralized. Japanese parents and citizens should be encouraged to feel a sense of individual responsibility for the achievements of the objectives set out in paragraph 1. Where practicable they should be associated with the control, development, and work of the schools and other educational institutions.

18. The plans enumerated in this paper should be closely correlated with the reforms in the social, economic and political life of the nation. In the implementation of the educational policies outlined above, funds should be allocated for all essential educational reform commensurate with the needs and resources of the nation.

19. In order that educational standards in poor districts should not be lowered by the inability of some local bodies to provide sufficient finance from local revenue, finance for education should come for the most part from the national government, which should be responsible for the maintenance of an adequate level of education throughout Japan. Local and private bodies should be encouraged to supplement these funds provided by the national government.

General

20. Free and compulsory education should be provided for all Japanese children for a minimum period of six years and should be extended to higher age groups as rapidly as possible.

21. More opportunities should be provided for higher education.

22. Equal opportunity for both sexes should be provided at all levels of education -- primary, secondary, and tertiary.

23. Encouragement should be given to the formation and reorientation of educational associations, parent-teacher associations; and to assist in making the Japanese people aware of the significant changes in the direction of education in a democratic Japan, such groups should be encouraged to consider practical problems of education.

24. Discrimination against the graduates of private schools in civil service appointments should be eliminated, provided the schools in question conform to educational standards laid down for the public educational system.

25. Educational institutions of foreign foundation in Japan have played a useful part in the past in widening and deepening the scope of Japanese education, and should be given equal rights to those of Japanese institutions in future.

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April 3, 1946

APPENDIX 39

APPREHENSION, TRIAL AND PUNISHMENT OF WAR CRIMINALS IN THE FAR EAST

1. The term "war crimes" as used herein, includes:

a. Planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements and assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing.

b. Violations of the laws or customs of war. Such violations shall include but not be limited to murder, ill treatment or deportation to slave labor or for any other purpose of civilian population of, or in, occupied territory, murder or ill treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, or elsewhere improper treatment of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or village or devastation not justified by military necessity.

c. Murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war or prosecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime defined herein whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.

2. The offense need not have been committed after a particular date to render the responsible party or parties subject to arrest but, in general, should have been committed since, or in the period immediately preceding the Mukden incident of September 18, 1931. The preponderance of cases may be expected to relate to the years since the Lukouchiao incident of July 7, 1937.

3. All practicable measures should be taken to identify, investigate, apprehend, and detain all persons suspected of having committed war crimes, as defined in paragraph 1 above, and all persons whom any one of the United Nations or Italy charges with such crimes.

4. Suspected war criminals should be held in close confinement, without access to the press or other media of public information, and without distinction as to rank or position, as befits ordinary criminals.

5. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers should have:

a. power to appoint special international military courts (which term should be held to include tribunals of any type) composed of military, naval, or air force officers or civilians representing any two or more of the states members of the Far Eastern Commission for the trial under any applicable law, domestic or international, including the laws and customs of war, of the Far Eastern war criminals indicted by the Governments of these states, and

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b. power to prescribe, subject to consultation with the representatives of those governments, rules of procedure for such courts. The Supreme Commander shall appoint to each international court a judge nominated by each state represented on the Far Eastern Commission which signifies its desire to participate in the work of such court. In the appointment of the international courts and in all trials before them, the international character of the courts and of the authority by which they were appointed and under which they act should be properly emphasized and recognized, particularly in dealings with the Japanese people. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers should have, (1) the responsibility for carrying out the judgments of any international courts appointed by him, and (2) the power to approve, reduce or otherwise alter any sentences imposed by any such courts, but not to increase the severity thereof, after consultation with the Allied Council for Japan and the Representatives in Japan of the other Powers, members of the Far Eastern Commission.

6. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (a) should promptly establish an agency, acting under his Command to investigate reports of war crimes, to collect and analyze evidence, to arrange for the apprehension and prompt trial of suspects, to prepare, supervise and conduct the prosecution of individuals and organizations before international military courts or tribunals, and to recommend to the Supreme Commander which individual and organizations should be prosecuted, before what courts they should be tried and what persons should be secured as witnesses, and (b) should provide, after discussion with the local representatives of the nations involved, and in a manner consistent with efficient administration, for equitable inclusion in the membership of such agency of suitable representatives of the States members of the Far Eastern Commission. This agency should advise the Supreme Commander and other Military commanders for the Allies on matters relating to war criminals. This agency should attach importance to the investigation of the evidence that offenses of the type described in paragraph 1 a above have been committed, should collect and analyze the evidence of such offenses and should recommend to the Supreme Commander a plan as indicated in paragraph 5 above for the appointment of an international court for the trial of such offenses and the charges to be preferred. This agency should also maintain a central record and information office of Japanese war criminals and war crimes, the records and files of which should be available to any interested United Nations.

7. The military command of any nation (including the United States) participating in the occupation of areas previously dominated by Japan may establish special national military courts to deal with war criminals not held or requested by the Supreme Commander for trial by an international military court or tribunal of the types referred to in paragraph 6 above. Such courts should be separate from courts which may be set up to deal with current offenses against the occupation or infractions of military discipline.

8. Military commanders of forces of occupation in the Far East should promptly comply with a request by the government of any one of the United Nations or Italy for the delivery to it of any person who is stated in such request to be charged with a war crime, subject to the following exceptions:

a. Persons who have held high political, civil or military positions in the Japanese Empire or in one of its

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allies, co-belligerents or satellites, should not be delivered, pending decision whether such person should be tried before an international military court or tribunal. Suspected war criminals desired for trial before such a court or tribunal or persons desired as witnesses at such trials will not be turned over to the nation requesting them so long as their presence is desired in connection with such trials.

b. Where persons are requested by more than one of the Governments above mentioned for trial of a war crime, the military commanders concerned should make their determinations based on all circumstances, including the relative seriousness of the respective charges against such a person and the national interests involved, and should deliver the requested person to a particular United Nation or Italy accordingly.

9. Compliance with any request for the delivery of a suspected war criminal should not be delayed on the ground that other requests for the same person are anticipated.

10. Delivery of a suspected war criminal to a requesting government should be subject to the condition that if such person is not brought to trial, tried and convicted within six months from the date he is so delivered, he will be returned to the authority who made delivery if he has been requested for trial by any of the other United Nations or Italy.

11. Military commanders should take under their control pending subsequent decisions as to its eventual disposition, property, real and personal, found in areas of their respective jurisdiction and owned or controlled by persons taken into custody pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 3 above.

12. Such measures as are deemed necessary should be taken to insure that witnesses to war crimes will be available when required.

13. The execution of death sentences should be deferred if there is reason to believe that the testimony of those convicted would be of value in the trial of other war criminals.

14. Any national of any United Nation who may be requested, or who there is reason to believe may be desired, by his government as a renegade or quisling, should be arrested. Such persons should normally be turned over as soon as practicable to their government.

15. Military commanders having custody of alleged offenders requested under paragraphs 8 and 14 above, if in doubt as to whether such persons should be turned over to the demanding nation for trial, should consult their government and, in appropriate cases, leave the matter to be dealt with through diplomatic channels. Within the main islands of Japan, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers will have custody of such alleged offenders and should consult the Joint Chiefs of Staff in cases of doubt.

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June 12, 1947

APPENDIX 40

PROPERTY OF WAR CRIMINALS

1. The property of convicted war criminals should be forfeited if so ordered by a tribunal. If not so ordered, it should be returned to the owner or to his legal heirs, unless it is subject to other occupation policy directives of general application requiring impounding, forfeiture or restitution. The Far Eastern Commission should recommend to member governments that they inform the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers of any sentences imposed by their tribunals on convicted war criminals which involve forfeiture of or levy upon property within his jurisdiction. Upon receipt of such information, the Supreme Commander should cause the property of persons so convicted to be forfeited pursuant to the tribunal's order.

2. Such property forfeited or fines levied at the direction of the Supreme Commander pursuant to an order of a tribunal should become available for occupation costs.

3. The property taken under control by military commanders of accused persons who have been acquitted or who die before completion of trial should be returned to the accused persons or the legal heirs as the case may be, provided that where it is claimed that its acquisition was unlawful or inconsistent with occupation policy directives, or where its release to these persons would be inconsistent with such directives, the acquittal or death should not prevent its forfeiture or other treatment pursuant to occupation policy directives.

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June 5, 1946

APPENDIX 41

ALIENS IN JAPAN

1. The major policies in regard to aliens in Japan including Formosan-Chinese and Koreans are that:

a. Aliens should be allowed, if they so desire, to leave Japan as early as possible, except such persons who are held as war criminals or for security reasons; and

b. Subject to the general control of the Supreme Commander the Japanese authorities should be held responsible for the care, safety, and welfare of such persons and for their transportation to ports of embarkation.

2. To carry out these policies, the following steps should be taken:

a. Neutral Nationals.

All nationals of neutral nations should be required to register with the appropriate military authorities and their respective governments should be notified as to the

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in the Second World War (Bulgaria, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Rumania and Siam) should be identified and registered and may be interned or their activities curtailed as may be necessary under the circumstances. Diplomatic and consular officials of such countries except those identified as loyal to the cause of the United Nations should be taken into honorable custody, held for investigation, and thereafter repatriated in accordance with the provisions of subparagraphs (2), (3), (4), and (5) below.

Property, real and personal, owned or controlled by persons who have been detained or arrested under the provisions of the foregoing paragraph should be taken under control pending directions as to its eventual disposition.

(2) Those non-Japanese enemy nationals who were known as agents or propagandists of Nazism and Fascism (including research experts and students, scientifically skilled persons, persons holding administrative posts in commerce or government and all those who sought repatriation to enemy countries during the period of hostilities) should be interned and, after confirmation and agreement by the appropriate authorities in their home countries, repatriated.

(3) Those non-Japanese enemy nationals not subject to internment and repatriation should be given their freedom unless internment is necessary for their protection.

(4) The voluntary repatriation of enemy or ex-enemy nationals of non-Japanese nationality not subject to forceable repatriation should be permitted.

(5) Transportation to a port of embarkation for transoceanic destination should be at the expense of Japan and repatriation therefrom should be provided in accordance with appropriate arrangements between the governments concerned.

g. Formosan-Chinese and Koreans.

(1) The Supreme Commander should treat Formosan-Chinese and Koreans as liberated people in so far as military security permits. They are not included in the term "Japanese" as used in this paper - but they have been Japanese subjects and may be treated, in case of necessity as enemy nationals. They should be identified as to nationality, place of residence and present location. They may be repatriated if they so desire under such regulations as the Supreme Commander may establish. However, priority will be given to the repatriation of nationals of the United Nations.

The Supreme Commander, if he finds it necessary, should direct the repatriation of Formosan-Chinese and Koreans and coordinate such repatriation with the repatriation of Japanese nationals from Korea and Formosa.

(2) Arrangements for the repatriation of Formosan-Chinese should be made with the government of China by the United States Government.

(3) Pending completion of arrangements for the repatriation of Koreans formerly resident in Korea north of 38° North Latitude, between the Soviet Union and the

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location and status of these persons. All nationals of neutral nations who have actively participated in any way in the war against one of the United Nations should be arrested for disposition in conformity with other instructions. Neutral nationals should be accorded no special privileges of communications or business relations with their home countries or people resident outside Japan. The persons, archives, and property of diplomatic and consular officials of neutrals should be accorded full protection.

b. United Nations Nationals.

(1) Civilians who are nationals of the United Nations should be, except as noted below, repatriated, if they so desire upon the concurrence of the government concerned. All such civilians resident or interned in Japan should be identified, examined closely and, if the Supreme Commander deems it advisable, placed in custody or restricted residence. The Supreme Commander should inform the representatives of the nationals' government of the reasons for the arrest or restricted residence of those nationals and consult with them concerning future treatment of such persons. Any such person who has played an active part in the formulation or execution of the Japanese program of aggression or who is believed to be desired by his government as a renegade or quisling should be held for disposition in accordance with applicable directives.

(2) Persons of Japanese race claiming citizenship of any other United Nation should be repatriated only upon concurrence of the government of such nation.

c. Stateless persons, Central European refugees from Nazi oppression and Italian non-Fascists should be assimilated in treatment to United Nations nationals, providing such persons have not supported the Axis cause.

d. Responsibilities of the Japanese Authorities.

Measures should be taken on behalf of United Nations nationals and neutrals to insure the health, welfare and transportation to a port from which they may embark for trans-oceanic destinations, and should, in so far as practicable, by the responsibility of the Japanese Government. Any deficiencies resulting in the carrying out of these measures in respect to United Nations nationals should be supplied by the Supreme Commander and the cost thereof should be charged to the Japanese Government. Repatriation from such a port should be provided in accordance with appropriate arrangements between the governments concerned.

e. Political, Racial and Religious Prisoners.

Prisoners of non-Japanese nationality found held by the Japanese should be examined for identification and their records reviewed for determination of the cause of detention. All those found to be detained solely on political, racial or religious grounds, should be released except those whom the Supreme Commander decides to hold for security reasons. Those detained should be given prompt trial.

f. Non-Japanese Nationals of the Countries which are or have been at war with the United Nations in the Second World War.

(1) All nationals of countries except Japan with which any of the United Nations are or have been at war

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United States, the Supreme Commander, if he finds it necessary, may repatriate such Koreans to that part of Korea south of 38° North Latitude.

(4) When arrangements have been entered into as indicated in subparagraphs (2) and (3) above, and subject to such arrangements, the Supreme Commander should permit voluntary repatriation of Formosan-Chinese and Koreans and may direct their repatriation if he deems such action necessary. Priority, however, should be given to the repatriation of nationals of the United Nations.

(5) Formosan-Chinese and Koreans should be protected from hostile Japanese elements. The Supreme Commander should insure that the Japanese authorities make adequate provision in fact for the care, safety and welfare of Formosan-Chinese and Koreans pending their repatriation.

h. Protection of Property

(1) Within such limits as are imposed by the military situation, the Supreme Commander should take all reasonable steps necessary to preserve and protect the property of United Nations Nationals in Japan.

(2) Record of wages, bank deposits and ownership of securities and other personal property of all aliens should be preserved.

i. Return to Homes in Japan

Aliens having homes in Japan and not held as war criminals or for security reasons, should be permitted to return to their homes as soon as conditions permit.

j. Use of UNRRA and Voluntary Agencies

UNRRA and private relief agencies may be used at the discretion of the Supreme Commander wherever available in the care and repatriation of United Nations nationals and those assimilated to them in treatment.

x x x x x x

July 18, 1946

APPENDIX 42

JAPANESE TAXATION OF ALIENS

1. No Japanese taxation should discriminate against aliens.

2. No capital levy should be levied by the Japanese authorities in respect to property in or outside Japan owned by United Nations nationals. Any capital levy on corporations and unincorporated associations should be so devised as to exempt from the effects of the levy, the shares and interests in the said corporations and unincorporated associations held by United Nations nationals. If in the opinion of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, exceptional circumstances justify the imposition of any such capital levy, he should refer the matter for consideration of the Far Eastern Commission.

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August 15, 1946

APPENDIX 43

EXERCISE OF CRIMINAL AND CIVIL JURISDICTION OVER NATIONALS OF MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS

1. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers should provide that no criminal jurisdiction of any sort will be exercised by the Japanese courts with respect to nationals of Members of the United Nations, but that such criminal jurisdiction will be exercised by military courts of Members of the United Nations as follows:

a. In the case of military, naval or air force personnel and persons attached to or accompanying the armed forces, by courts of the nation of the forces of which they are a part. A national of a Member of the United Nations who is present in Japan on official business and for the purpose of performing functions in the interest of the occupation is to be regarded as "attached to or accompanying the Armed Forces".

b. In the case of a national of one of the occupying powers, by a military court of his nationality; and

c. In the case of other nationals of Members of the United Nations, by the Allied military court having jurisdiction in the particular territory. Such courts should be composed of three members appointed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, one of whom should be a representative of that nation whose national is held for trial, provided that if, in the judgment of the Supreme Commander, selection of such a representative would obstruct or unnecessarily delay the proceedings because of the non-availability of qualified personnel, then a representative of some other nation may be designated.

2. The authority of the Japanese to take into custody any national of a Member of the United Nations should be strictly limited:

a. To those areas of Japan not actually in Allied military occupation, and

b. In such areas, only to those cases in which there is reasonable evidence that a serious offense has been committed. The Japanese authorities should be placed under specific orders to hand over such a person forthwith to the nearest Allied military authorities.

3. Provision should be made that no civil jurisdiction of any sort will be exercised by the Japanese courts with respect to nationals of Members of the United Nations attached to or accompanying the armed forces. Civil jurisdiction in these cases should be exercised in a manner determined by the Supreme Commander.

4. Decisions in all civil cases affecting other nationals of Members of the United Nations or in which such nationals are or may become parties, should be reviewed by the Supreme Commander or his representative, who may revise the decision or take such other action as may be considered necessary for the protection of their rights.

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5. The Supreme Commander should take such steps as he deems necessary, including suspension of proceedings, to ensure that in the conduct of such civil cases the rights of nationals of Members of the United Nations parties thereto are adequately protected.

6. It is recognized that the available United States legal officers will be barely sufficient to deal with such cases as involve United States nationals. The Supreme Commander may therefore advise the responsible commanders of other Allied forces that assistance in such cases as involve their nationals must be supplied by them.

7. The term, "nationals of Members of the United Nations," as used in this document includes, wherever applicable, organizations and corporations of Members of the United Nations as well as persons.

* * * * * *

April 24, 1947

APPENDIX 44

DESTRUCTION OR REMOVAL OF UNITED NATIONS' PROPERTY IN JAPAN

1. This policy decision deals with the treatment of the property in Japan of nationals of Members of the United Nations when such property forms part of an industry, the capacity of which is subject to reduction either by the destruction or by the removal of plants under the terms of relevant policies of the Far Eastern Commission.

2. Such property shall be regarded as United Nations property for the purpose of this policy decision and shall hereafter be so termed

a. if owned by nationals of Members of the United Nations, or

b. if it has been treated as enemy property by the Japanese Government, or

c. if owned by a corporation, the stock of which is substantially owned directly or indirectly by nationals of Members of the United Nations, or

d. if owned by a corporation in which a minority of the stock is owned by nationals of Members of the United Nations but nationals of Members of the United Nations nevertheless have controlling rights.

3. United Nations property which is subject to destruction, in accordance with policies of the Far Eastern Commission on the disarmament of Japan and the reduction of Japanese industrial war potential, should be destroyed irrespective of the nationality of the owner.

4. When such United Nations property is destroyed, the United Nations owners should be entitled to full compensation for the value of their interest in the plant at the time of destruction.

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5. United Nations property within the categories of industrial plants and facilities which are subject to removal in accordance with policies of the Far Eastern Commission should not be selected for removal so long as Japanese owned industrial facilities within the same categories are available for removal.

6. When such United Nations property is selected for removal, the owner's government should be given a reasonable opportunity to remove the property or any part of it from Japan, expenses being borne by the Japanese Government to the same extent as in the removal and delivery of other reparations goods. If such industrial facilities are removed by the owner's government the value of such property which is removed should be applied against the reparations account of that government. Any such property which the owner's government fails to remove within a reasonable time should be made available to other governments from the reparations pool.

7. When such United Nations property is made available for reparations, the United Nations owners should be entitled to full compensation for the value of their interest in the plant at the time of removal.

8. When a United Nations owner is entitled to compensation under paragraphs 4 or 7 above, such compensation should be paid to the owner by the Japanese Government in yen, and should not be charged to the reparations share of the government of which the United Nations owner is a national. Such compensation should be distinct from and additional to any other claims for compensation which the owner may have with respect to this property.

9. The Japanese Government should remain responsible for safe-guarding and maintaining United Nations property until it is disposed of in accordance with the foregoing paragraphs.

x x x x x x

January 30, 1947

APPENDIX 45

JAPANESE RESEARCH AND ACTIVITY IN THE FIELD OF ATOMIC ENERGY

1. Japanese research or other activity in the field of atomic energy should be governed by the following:

a. such decisions by the United Nations on international control of atomic energy as are applicable;

b. additional restrictive policies established for the disarmament and control of Japan.

2. In view of continuing discussion of the foregoing, the Far Eastern Commission considers that the Japanese should not be permitted at present to conduct research in the field of atomic energy, or to develop or use atomic energy. The Commission accordingly establishes the following policy:

a. All research in Japan, of either a fundamental or applied nature, in the field of atomic energy should be prohibited, including:

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(1) all research or development which has for its purpose the production of fissionable atomic species;

(2) all research or development which has for its purpose the separation or concentration of fissionable species of atomic isotopes from the naturally occurring isotope mixture of a chemical element.

b. All development or construction in Japan which has for its purpose the utilization of atomic nuclear energy should be prohibited.

c. The mining, processing, and refining of radioactive materials in Japan for authorized purposes, such as radium for medical uses, should be permitted only in those instances specifically approved by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and under his surveillance.

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C272176

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

July 22, 1947.

No. 1561

Sir:

With reference to your teletype No. EX-1815 of July 16 regarding the Japanese peace settlement, I have the honour to enclose for your information a memorandum on Canada and the Far Eastern Commission, indicating Canadian interest in the various aspects of the Commission's work and our participation and contribution to the Commission's activities.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient servant,

(Sgd.) H.H. WRONG

The Secretary of State
for External Affairs,
OTTAWA, Canada.

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C 272177

CANADA AND THE FAR EASTERN COMMISSION
(FEC-215/11)

I. General Instructions

When the Far Eastern Advisory Commission was formed in October 1945, the Canadian delegation was instructed as follows: "Canada, as a nation facing the Pacific, is directly affected by developments in the Far East. She is therefore concerned to contribute to reaching whatever settlement may be best calculated to eliminate Japan as a threat to peace, to assist in the formation by the Japanese of a stable and democratic form of government and to provide a basis for conditions of peace and eventual prosperity in East Asia. Thus, while the absence of Canadian occupation forces in Japan and the limited extent of active participation in the war in the Far East may deter the Canadian Government from taking the initiative in bringing forward proposals, especially in the early sessions of the Commission, the Canadian representative should not hesitate to make clear Canadian interest and concern."

It was further stated that, while it would appear desirable to ensure the retention of single U.S. military command over Japan during the occupation period (except perhaps in small areas), favourable consideration should also be given to any proposals directed toward the strengthening of the Commission as the agency of international control over occupation policy.

Finally, the Canadian delegation was informed that the Canadian Government gave general support to the United States statement of initial policy as approved by the President and transmitted to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. (This statement was the basis of the Far Eastern Commission's "Basic Post-Surrender Policy for Japan", which was finally approved by the F.E.C. on 19 June, 1947.)

II. Canadian Interest in the F.E.C.

From these instructions it is clear that Canada's interest in the work of the F.E.C. was conceived in terms of an involvement stemming initially from geographic location with consequent specific interests of a vested nature, broadened to include at the next level an interest in Far Eastern stability (a peaceful but economically sound Japan) and ultimately an interest in the Commission itself as an instrument of international cooperation.

Canada's representation on the F.E.C. may therefore be most easily reviewed in terms of these three aspects of the Commission's work.

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III. Canada's Participation in and Contribution to Commission Activities.

(1) Protection of Interests

Specific Canadian interests in Japan are as follows:

(a) Resident commercial or industrial activities (aluminum processing and insurance).

(b) Trade (lumber, silk, etc.)

(c) Missionary activity

(d) Property

(e) Reparations (including restitution of property looted from other areas of the Far East)

F.E.C. deliberations on the treatment of aliens in Japan have involved (a) and (d) above, and while not initiating policy proposals in these fields, the Canadian member of the appropriate committee has endeavoured to see that in consideration of such subjects as taxation of aliens and the removal or destruction of United Nations property (FEC-226/1) Canadian interests were protected insofar as might be consonant with international practice and the balancing of interests as between the Canadian Government and private individuals or concerns. In this latter regard, Canada was instrumental in the adoption of the final form of the policy on "Destruction or Removal of United Nations Property in Japan".

Trade with Japan has been dealt with by the Commission both in the consideration of general export-import policies and in the establishment of the Inter-Allied Trade Board. In connection with the former, the Canadian representatives participated actively in the formulation of policy papers on the "Sources of Japanese Imports" and "Destination of Japanese Exports", to ensure that the criterion of pre-war patterns of trade should be taken into account in any control measures which might be applied. Initially following the U.K. thesis that the IATB should be subordinate to the F.E.C., the Canadian representatives eventually agreed to the U.S. thesis that it would function more effectively as an independent advisory body dealing with technical problems. Since its inception Canada has been represented on it by the Commercial Counsellor of the Embassy. One of the main Canadian interests, both in the IATB and the Commission, has been to hasten the opening of Japan to private trade, and the Canadian representatives on both bodies have consistently supported any proposals which might expedite this.

In connection with the policy paper on Japanese education, the Canadian delegation was under instructions to see that adequate safeguards should be incorporated

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to protect the position of the missionary institutions which had played such an important role in Japanese education before the war, and it was partly as a result of Canadian support that this policy, in its final form, included the following provision: "Educational institutions of foreign foundation in Japan have played a useful part in the past in widening and deepening the scope of Japanese education, and should be given equal rights to those of Japanese institutions in future."

Finally, in approaching the delicate and vexatious problem of reparations, the Canadian delegation has been in the fortunate position of having gained, through the modesty and realism of the Canadian submission, universal agreement to the share claimed (though the division of shares is by no means settled), and has therefore been able to devote its energies in this field to the more congenial task of assisting in any way possible in the formulation of policies and procedures which would expedite the final settlement. In this latter role, the Canadian delegation has played a minor but not inconsiderable part, and in the development of policy on restitution of looted property, where its relatively neutral position was obvious, has been able to offer substantial assistance. At the moment, aside from supporting and proposing methods of overcoming what appears to be a complete impasse in the solution of the division of shares, the Canadian delegation is endeavouring to obtain approval for a provision in the "Reparations Allocations Procedures" paper which would enable technical experts of the claimant countries to advise SCAP as to those plants and facilities in Japan which would be most useful if made available as reparations.

(2) <u>The Stability of East Asia</u>

On the second level of interest (the creation of a peaceful, democratic and economically "viable" Japan) the Canadian contribution and participation has been much more in evidence on the political than on the economic side. One reason for this has been the fact that Canada has held the vice-chairmanship of Committee No. 3 (Japanese Constitution), which in effect meant the active chairmanship of this committee during the period when it was dealing with the highly complex and very important problem of the adoption of the new Japanese Constitution. While not necessarily taking the lead, Canadian representatives participated actively in the drafting of committee proposals and in the exposition of committee decisions, and played a considerable part in determining the Commission's effective influence upon the ultimate form of the Constitution and the provision for its later review by the Japanese and the F.E.C. This involved questions both of tactics (vis-a-vis the Supreme Commander) and of constitutional content, and it may be said that throughout this phase of the Commission's work, the Canadian delegation endeavoured to achieve a just balance between the obvious institutional requirements of a "democratic" Japan, the views expressed by the Supreme Commander, and the jurisdictional authority of the F.E.C

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to protect the position of the missionary institutions which had played such an important role in Japanese education before the war, and it was partly as a result of Canadian support that this policy, in its final form, included the following provision: "Educational institutions of foreign foundation in Japan have played a useful part in the past in widening and deepening the scope of Japanese education, and should be given equal rights to those of Japanese institutions in future."

Finally, in approaching the delicate and vexatious problem of reparations, the Canadian delegation has been in the fortunate position of having gained, through the modesty and realism of the Canadian submission, universal agreement to the share claimed (though the division of shares is by no means settled), and has therefore been able to devote its energies in this field to the more congenial task of assisting in any way possible in the formulation of policies and procedures which would expedite the final settlement. In this latter role, the Canadian delegation has played a minor but not inconsiderable part, and in the development of policy on restitution of looted property, where its relatively neutral position was obvious, has been able to offer substantial assistance. At the moment, aside from supporting and proposing methods of overcoming what appears to be a complete impasse in the solution of the division of shares, the Canadian delegation is endeavouring to obtain approval for a provision in the "Reparations Allocations Procedures" paper which would enable technical experts of the claimant countries to advise SCAP as to those plants and facilities in Japan which would be most useful if made available as reparations.

(2) <u>The Stability of East Asia</u>

On the second level of interest (the creation of a peaceful, democratic and economically "viable" Japan) the Canadian contribution and participation has been much more in evidence on the political than on the economic side. One reason for this has been the fact that Canada has held the vice-chairmanship of Committee No. 3 (Japanese Constitution), which in effect meant the active chairmanship of this committee during the period when it was dealing with the highly complex and very important problem of the adoption of the new Japanese Constitution. While not necessarily taking the lead, Canadian representatives participated actively in the drafting of committee proposals and in the exposition of committee decisions, and played a considerable part in determining the Commission's effective influence upon the ultimate form of the Constitution and the provision for its later review by the Japanese and the F.E.C. This involved questions both of tactics (vis-a-vis the Supreme Commander) and of constitutional content, and it may be said that throughout this phase of the Commission's work, the Canadian delegation endeavoured to achieve a just balance between the obvious institutional requirements of a "democratic" Japan, the views expressed by the Supreme Commander, and the jurisdictional authority of the F.E.C

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In addition, Mr. E.H. Norman, of the Canadian delegation, was responsible for the preparation of a paper which was circulated in the F.E.C. (C4-004 of April 16) containing an analysis of the secret societies of Japan which served as part of the basic information for the committee on the strengthening of democratic tendencies in Japan.

The Canadian delegation also contributed something to the Commission's work on economic problems, and participated actively in the initial stages of the drafting of an emergency statement on the supply of food for Japan.

(3) International Cooperation

As an emerging power in the international scene, Canada is vitally interested in the broad question of international organization, and insofar as the F.E.C. is concerned, has consistently attempted to strengthen the authority and effectiveness of the Commission within the bounds of practicality, making due allowance for the primary responsibility of the United States as the occupying Power. For this reason the Canadian delegation has on a number of occasions taken issue with the United States, not so much on matters of substance as on the question of whether the Far Eastern Commission, as a responsible international body charged with the formulation of policy for the occupation of Japan, should be allowed to discharge its responsibility in an effective way. Examples of this may be found in Canadian action in the Commission on such subjects as food for civilian relief, Commission authority in connection with the new Japanese Constitution, demilitarization of Japan, and, more recently, the reduction of Japanese industrial war potential and Japanese whaling.

IV. Miscellaneous

The Canadian delegation has also taken an active part in connection with the following questions:

(1) Publicity for Commission meetings

(2) Vice-chairmanship of F.E.C.

(3) Secretary General's Report (FEC-215/11)

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THE FAR EASTERN COMMISSION AS AN INTERNATIONAL AGENCY

The F.E.C. as an international agency is distinctly limited in scope in view of the terms of reference, which define its two principle functions as (1) the formulation of policies for the fulfilment of Japan's obligations under the Terms of Surrender and (2) the review of directives to SCAP or actions by SCAP involving policy decisions within its jurisdiction. In practice the emphasis has been laid on the first function, which, together with the commitment to respect the existing regime of control, has been developed from the outset by the United States into a frequently controversial but consistently maintained distinction between policy (the function of the F.E.C.) and "implementation", for which the Supreme Commander alone is responsible. An obviously ambiguous distinction in practice, this interpretation, coupled with the veto power which may be exercised by the United States in its protection of SCAP's sphere of action, has contributed a good deal to the sense of frustration which has been an almost constant element in the Commission's work.

In any consideration of the F.E.C., it must be borne in mind that it was not established to make final decisions (as a peace conference would do), but to supply a background of general policy within which SCAP was to carry out the practical job of control during the occupation period. Equally important is the fact that the occupation was a going operation before the establishment of the F.E.C., and not only had basic policies already provided in the form of U.S. directives, but also had begun to develop its own patterns and objectives. Any effort on the part of the F.E.C. to formulate policy was therefore from the outset conditioned by existing U.S. policies and action taken by SCAP, with the U.S. ever on the alert to protect the Supreme Commander against the F.E.C.

In other words, the real job, the occupation of Japan, would be carried on whether the Commission acted or not, and in those fields where U.S. directives were not available, such as reparations, it was always open to the U.S. under the terms of reference to take action unilaterally on the grounds of urgency; this was in fact done in the case of the interim directive on Advance Transfers of Reparations. Thus in most instances the U.S. could afford to sit tight until an acceptable policy was evolved, or, if need be, use the threat of veto to block Commission action of which it disapproved. It has shown its readiness to exercise the veto in connection with Commission action on the constitution, on food policy and on whaling, although the veto as such has never formally been used.

The remaining "Veto Powers", on the other hand, are in the position of being equally able to block unpalatable decisions, but totally without influence over what will in that event occur in Japan. Only the U.S.S.R. has made serious use of its power in this regard, through its refusal to permit the consideration of external assets in connection with the reparations problem. The net result of this has been a virtually

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complete impasse on the question of division of shares. But, as noted above, the impasse could be and was resolved in part by emergency action by the U.S.

As has been pointed out in previous reports on the F.E.C., one result of the combination of a veto power held by each of a minority of members, and a functioning occupation in relation to which the Commission could often act only as a sort of off-stage chorus, has been that the onus of exposition is laid upon the suppliants -- those countries that cannot hinder but can only hope through persuasion to gain the acceptance of their points of view. (In practice, of course, a veto-less power such as Australia can in effect manoeuver in terms of the veto, if it can persuade one of the veto group, such as the U.K., to give it procedural support; a tactic which Dr. Evatt, despite his public strictures against the veto, has not hesitated to use.)

The only way in which the F.E.C. can be really dangerous to the United States is in the passage of a policy which is sufficiently specific that an afterthought on the part of the U.S. would require F.E.C. approval for successful implementation. Such has been the case with policy on levels of industry, and the normal length of time required for the adoption of important decisions of this sort has given the U.S. opportunity to apprehend the danger. Consequently, in connection with the paper on war potential originally drafted by the U.S., it is now realised that if probable future policy along the lines of current thinking, as opposed to that of a year ago, is to be safeguarded against a potential veto, there must be a definite terminal date for the policy which has been proposed. This, from the U.S. standpoint, is the danger of the F.E.C. So long as nothing is done, the situation is still in U.S. hands. Once a policy is passed, any other veto power is in a position to block an alteration. Hence, in case of doubt, no policy is good policy so far as the U.S. is concerned.

In the peace conference, if the same voting procedure were adopted, there would be a somewhat similar situation, since without an agreement on the treaty the occupation regime would presumably continue and the U.S. would still in practice call the tune.

Nevertheless, the United States has already gone on record as favouring a two-thirds majority vote in the drafting of the treaty, and the elimination of the veto. This would appear to mean that in its analysis of the voting record in the F.E.C. the United States has come to the conclusion that it can count on the support of enough delegations to swing any important issue against the U.S.S.R., and that it is sufficiently anxious to bring about a final peace settlement (as opposed to a U.S. occupation) and sufficiently apprehensive of potential Soviet obstruction to be willing to take the chance that the above analysis is correct.

Another explanation is possible, however, or at least an additional element in the interpretation of the U.S. position. In the last analysis the U.S. can, if

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necessary, refuse to accept any settlement obviously obnoxious in terms of U.S. interests, and, disposing as it does of force majeure in the area, could conceivably cut loose from the by now somewhat attenuated concept of allied or United Nations' control and negotiate a separate peace, as has already been suggested more than once for Europe. Only in this instance the U.S.S.R. has no beach-head, and for all practical purposes a U.S. peace would be the peace for Japan. This would be all the more feasible, even though somewhat fantastic, in that the U.S. is probably ready to accept a settlement with the minimum of post-occupation security controls; hence the lack of international jurisdiction over Japan from now on would probably be less distressing to the United States than to any other vitally interested power. If there is anything is this argument, it would follow that the United States possesses a hidden veto in any case, the possibility of independent action open to no one else. Under these circumstances the U.S. position is adequately safe-guarded in either event, and it can afford to accumulate the good will involved in offering to forego the veto at the peace conference. One might suggest, of course, that this action was taken in the context of a practical certainty that the U.S.S.R. would never agree, and was therefore a cheap and safe gesture of benevolence.

What is much more likely to be in the U.S. mind at the moment, however, is the simple notion that in any genuine conflict the issue would undoubtedly be between themselves and the U.S.S.R., and that, in the absence of any Soviet satellites among the remaining F.E.C. countries, all right-thinking countries would rally to the U.S. side.

Because of the unique position of the United States, the F.E.C. as an international agency has almost by definition been a side-show since its inception. This is not to say, of course, that the U.S. has not attempted to cooperate within the limits of its cumbrous and internally conflicting form of government. A U.S. representative on the Commission lives in the traditional Teutonic nightmare of a battle on two fronts, in that whichever department he personally may represent, he must do battle both with State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee and with the F.E.C. It is also true that the Soviet delegation has on several occasions revised its position to make the organization work, and that the F.E.C. has succeeded despite its handicaps in accomplishing a few things of real value. The history of the F.E.C., however, is probably more of academic interest than anything else, in that similar organizational forms would probably result in quite different modes of behaviour under altered circumstances. The peace conference will differ in two important respects: it will probably be public or semi-public, and it will be attempting to formulate final decisions of a genuinely international character. Even if the technical voting procedure were to remain unchanged, there would undoubtedly be a different approach on the part of the veto powers, especially the U.S.

Looking at the situation from the point of view of Canada, it would seem that F.E.C. procedure, if adopted

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for the Japanese peace conference, would put us more or less where we now are in the U.N., and well ahead of our status in the European peace. As things stand in the F.E.C., we have on occasion differed in judgment as to what should be done about specific political developments in Japan, but our overall objective has not been dissimilar from that of the U.S., and on points of detail we can usually gain recognition for our proposals if they make any sense at all. All things considered, therefore, our association in the Japanese settlement on an F.E.C. basis would probably be adequate recognition, while on the basis currently proposed by the U.S. we should be better off than ever before.

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C 272185

TELETYPE

FROM THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER- TK WASHINGTON, June 27th, 1947.

WA-2013

WA-2013. Your EX-1474 of June 11th. Japanese Peace Settlement, paragraph 1 (role of the Far Eastern Commission in the peace negotiations).

The suggestion made in our WA-1236 of April 22nd was that the FEC might be used on an ad hoc basis in the preparation of draft recommendations in connection with such matters of substance as might naturally follow from the work that the Commission has already done on industrial levels, war potential, constitutional reform and the like. The arguments in favour of this suggestion are:

(a) The fact that the Working Committees of the Commission have been studying various aspects of the Japanese problem for over a year and should be able to contribute something useful at least on the technical level, and

(b) the probability that formal work on the peace settlement will be delayed until after the next session of the United Nations. Meanwhile, particularly if the reparations question is either settled or finally recognized as insoluble within the FEC, the Commission will probably have very little on its agenda, and might as well be used for preparatory studies and the airing of views.

2. There are, however, a number of objections or obstacles to such a proposal. The chief of these

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is the likelihood that neither the United States nor Australia would consider it. Dr. Evatt's position with regard to the FEC was made clear in his speech of June 6th, when he stated categorically that "it would be wrong in principle to accept the FEC as the peace-making body for Japan. Its procedures are governed by the veto. Furthermore, the Commission was set up to deal with occupation policy and not with the functions of peace-making". Although the use of the Committees of the FEC as ad hoc working groups would not involve either the veto or the Commission's terms of reference, since no decisions would be taken by the Commission, it is probable that Dr. Evatt would refuse to accept any suggestion that would bring the FEC into the picture, partly because he would not like to recognize the possibility that there may be any considerable delay before the Peace Conference is convened. Similarly with the United States. While United States thinking on the question is still tentative, the State Department has apparently never given any serious consideration to the possibility of associating the FEC in any way with the peace settlement, both because of the procedural difficulties associated with the Commission and (more relevant in the present case) because it is not intended that any significant part should be played in the negotiations by the senior members of the present United States delegation on the FEC.

3. Moreover, while much useful preliminary work might be done by Committees in the FEC, any such airing of views would of necessity be unofficial (an approach which is never appreciated by the U.S.S.R., to whom all points of view seem to be either official or irrelevant).

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While the members of FEC Working Committees from the lesser Powers could probably participate fully in these informal discussions, insofar as they had anything at all to contribute, the members from the United States and the other veto Powers might be in a rather embarrassing position, and might find it very difficult to participate without disclosing tentative conclusions which their Governments would wish to keep to themselves until the full-dress negotiations begin.

4. On balance, therefore, it would seem to be extremely doubtful that any suggestion of FEC participation, on however informal a basis, is likely to be adopted.

CANADIAN AMBASSADOR

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APPENDIX B

THE CANBERRA CONFERENCE

(Views expressed by British Commonwealth governments concerning the conference generally and the agenda in particular.)

1. Canadian Views:

a. Telegram, Ottawa-Canberra (HC) April 19.	70
b. Telegram, Ottawa-London (HC) June 27.	1051
c. Teletype, Ottawa-Washington, July 4.	FX-1695
d. Telegram, Ottawa-Wellington (HC) July 10.	157
e. Teletype, Washington-Ottawa, July 10.	WA-2161
f. Telegram, Ottawa-London (Crosec) July 14.	136
g. Telegram, Ottawa-Canberra (Ext) August 4.	6

2. United Kingdom Views:

a. Telegram, London (HC) - Ottawa, June 23.	1012
b. Letter, Holmes-Pearson, June 27	
c. Telegram, London (Crosec)-Ottawa, June 29.	D.543
d. Letter, Holmes-Pearson, July 4	
e. Telegram, London (Crosec)-Ottawa, July 5.	D.586.

3. Australian Views:

a. Telegram, Canberra (Ext) - Ottawa, June 26.	9
b. Telegram, Canberra (Ext) - Ottawa, July 9.	13
c. Despatch, Canberra (Ext) - Ottawa, July 10.	640
d. Telegram, Canberra (Ext) - Ottawa, July 23.	18

See also 2 (d) above

4. New Zealand Views:

a. Telegram, Wellington (Ext) - Ottawa, July 5.	18
b. Telegram, Wellington (HC) - Ottawa, July 9,	214

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C 272189

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA

TO: THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR CANADA, CANBERRA, AUSTRALIA

IMMEDIATE

SECRET

CYPHER

NO. 70 Ottawa, April 19, 1947

Reference telegram No. 6 of April 17 from Australian Minister of External Affairs. Japanese peace settlement.

Pleace convey reply along following lines to Australian invitation for meeting of Commonwealth representatives to be held in Canberra to discuss this subject. Begins:

1. Canadian Government recognizes that there is a real possibility that the United States may propose on short notice the early conclusion of a peace settlement with Japan and make known at the same time its plans for the settlement. Accordingly, it would seem desirable for those countries desiring to communicate their views on the Japanese peace settlement to the United States Government to do so soon.

2. Informal discussion of the procedure for and substance of the Japanese peace settlement among Commonwealth Governments would be useful. We appreciate the invitation of the Australian Government for Commonwealth Governments to hold a meeting in Canberra in May to discuss these matters. It would be difficult for us to arrange to send a suitable delegation to Australia for such talks.

3. An informal preliminary discussion of the Japanese peace settlement was held in Washington two weeks ago among Commonwealth representatives on the Far Eastern Commission. We are inclined to think that, because informed Commonwealth Government advisers on Japanese affairs are stationed in Washington to attend meetings of the Far Eastern Commission, it might be more convenient to

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continue informal exchange of views in Washington. Any changes in or additions to F.E.C. personnel there could be made for the purpose of these talks. In the talks there might be considered, among other things, the possibility of having the Far Eastern Commission transformed into a Commission to prepare the peace settlement with Japan.

4. It is our view that such meetings, if held, should continue to be of an informal and private nature for the purpose of exchanging views, and should not be expected to lead to the formulation of a single Commonwealth policy to which all members of the Commonwealth would be committed in the later stages of the Japanese settlement. Ends.

We are requesting our High Commissioners in London, Wellington and Pretoria to communicate similar messages to other Commonwealth Governments.

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

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FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

TO : THE ACTING HIGH.COMMISSIONER FOR CANADA IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

CYPHER: - PUBLEX

SECRET:

Ottawa, June 27, 1947.

NO. 1051

Reference your telegram No. 1012. Japanese Peace Settlement.

We have received and are studying United Kingdom draft proposals for Agenda of Canberra Conference. You may inform your British Commonwealth colleagues that we most heartily endorse United Kingdom observation that object of Conference would not be to aim at production of any agreed British Commonwealth draft for Japanese treaty. We are also opposed, of course, to any suggestion that British Commonwealth should be represented as a unit at the international Conference. Geography dictates that Canada should give very careful consideration to United States views on Pacific settlement and we therefore share United Kingdom concern that these preliminary Commonwealth talks should not give rise to any misunderstanding in the United States. We propose to inform United States Government of our intentions in attending these talks.

We shall resist firmly Australian efforts to add other subjects to the agenda of the Conference. Our Acting High Commissioner in Canberra is being instructed to reply in this sense to note he has received suggesting that matter of revising His Majesty's Royal style and titles be discussed at Conference.

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

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TELETYPE MESSAGE

TO: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR - WASHINGTON

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS - OTTAWA

SECRET

CYPHER

Ex-1695

July 4, 1947

Reference my three immediately following teletypes, Japanese peace settlement.

1. You will note from D.O. Circular Telegram D. 543 of June 20 and Telegram No. 1012 of June 23 from our Acting High Commissioner in London that the United Kingdom is greatly concerned that the United States should have no occasion to suppose that the forthcoming conference in Canberra will produce an agreed Commonwealth policy on the Japanese settlement, much less a Commonwealth draft for a Japanese peace treaty. That the Australians are still entertaining some hopes on this score is clear from their telegram No. 9 of June 26, since they indicate that the conference might provide "an approach to broad agreement on main policies". The headings under Item 3 of their proposed agenda indicate that they have some fairly specific proposals to discuss and no doubt they will press for as much support as they can get for their ideas, emphasizing the advantages they see in close Commonwealth co-operation in the peace negotiations.

2. As you know, we have made clear our feelings with respect to the formulation of any Commonwealth policy on the peace settlement at the Canberra meeting, and we share fully the wish of the United Kingdom that there should be no misunderstanding on this score in Washington. It is particularly important that there be no misconception of Canada's position. From the strategic point of view and that of security in the Pacific area we are likely to be more affected by the policy of the United States than by that of the other Commonwealth members, and we will naturally wish to consider

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United States views on the Japanese peace settlement very carefully before formulating our own position. The Canadian delegation will not be going to Canberra with the intention of making any commitments to the policies which are discussed there, so that our position in later negotiations should not be prejudiced in any way.

3. For reasons of prestige the Australian Government may be under some temptation to play up the significance of the forthcoming meeting at Canberra and give it a more formal and general character than we would wish. Our Acting High Commissioner in Australia has been instructed to inform the Australian Government that we would not be willing to discuss changes in His Majesty's Royal Style and Titles or any of the subjects listed under items 10 and 11 of their proposed agenda. In all statements in the House and in press conferences we have taken care to emphasize that our understanding of the projected meeting is that it will be informal and purely exploratory in character.

4. It would be appreciated if you would avail yourself of an opportunity in the near future to discuss the Japanese peace settlement with a senior official of the State Department, to discover any new developments in United States thinking on this subject, particularly on procedural matters, and, inter alia, to indicate our general position with respect to the forthcoming Commonwealth meeting in Canberra.

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FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA

TO : THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR CANADA IN NEW ZEALAND, WELLINGTON

SECRET

CYPHER

NO. 157

Ottawa, 10th July, 1947.

Your telegrams No. 212 and 214 of July 9th. It is expected that the Prime Minister will announce today that the Minister of National Defence, Mr. Claxton, will attend the Canberra Conference. Norman from Tokyo and Collins from the Far Eastern Commission will be advisers who, with the High Commissioner to Australia will constitute the delegation. We are still strongly opposed to widening agenda in any way and will emphasize noncommittal and exploratory character of talks. There is no possibility of Canada agreeing to Australia and New Zealand being given determining voices on Commonwealth policy in the Pacific for reasons which you will understand.

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

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T E L E T Y P E

From THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES

To THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

SECRET WASHINGTON, July 10th, 1947.

CYPHER - TK

WA-2161

WA-2161. Your EX-1695 of July 4th. Japanese Peace Settlement.

I have today explained to Mr. Norman Armour, Assistant Secretary of State, our attitude towards the Canberra Conference, emphasizing that it will result in no commitments on policy and that the Canadian Government will certainly not formulate its position without giving full consideration to the views of the United States Government. I told Mr. Armour that it would be useful for our representatives to be familiar with the views of the State Department on some matters before the Conference met, and that we should be particularly glad to find out what they were thinking about the best procedure for negotiating the settlement. I am not sure that this will result in very much, but he undertook to pass on the suggestion to the officers directly concerned.

CANADIAN AMBASSADOR

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C 272196

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

TO : THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS, LONDON.

SECRET

CYPHER-PUBLEX

NO. 136

Ottawa, July 14, 1947.

Addressed Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations No. 136, repeated External Canberra No. 5, External Wellington No. 12, Primus Pretoria No. 4, Foreign New Delhi No. 32. Reference your circular telegrams No. D. 543 of June 20th and D. 586 of July 5, External Canberra's telegram addressed Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs No. 154 of June 26th, and External Wellington's telegram addressed Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations No. 137 of July 5th.

Japanese Peace Settlement

We feel that your proposals concerning agenda for Commonwealth conference, together with items 1 to 9 of Australian draft agenda and New Zealand suggestions in their telegrams under reference include all subjects which delegations are likely to wish to discuss at the meeting. We agree with you that owing to the short duration of the conference, discussions on questions of substance of the Japanese settlement will have to be in general terms only. We heatily support the view expressed by you and by the New Zealand Government that it would be undesirable for the conference agenda to include items unrelated to the Japanese settlement, and we hawe informed the Australian Government that we would find it difficult to discuss the topics listed under item 10 of their draft agenda. We will of course have no objection if other Commonwealth Governments wish to discuss matters of regional interest.

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C272197

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA

TO: THE MINISTER OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA, AUSTRALIA

SECRET
CYPHER - PUBLEX

SECRET

No. 6

August 4, 1947

Addressed External Canberra No. 6, repeated Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, London, No. 146, External Wellington No. 3, Primus Pretoria No. 5, Foreign New Delhi No. 36. Secret.

1. Your telegram No. 18 of July 23. Agenda for Canberra Conference. We feel that it is most important that Canberra discussions should not he held to a rigid and detailed agenda. Rather than the full list of topics contained in your telegram under reference we would prefer to see paragraph 2 of Circular Telegram D. 543 of June 20 and paragraphs 1 - 9 of your telegram No. 9 of June 26 used as a basis for the agenda.

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

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TELEGRAM

C272198

FROM THE HIGH COMMISSIONNER FOR CANADA IN GREAT BRITAIN

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

SECRET

CYPHER - PUBLEX LONDON, June 23, 1947.

NO. 1012

No. 1012. Secret.

Japanese Peace Settlement.

My telegram No. 942, June 10th.

Dominions Office will be sending to you very shortly draft proposals for agenda of Canberra Conference. This draft was examined by High Commissioners at Dominions Office and a few suggested changes made. The chief anxiety on all sides was to make pellucidly clear that only an exchange of views was contemplated and not the formulation of a common policy. There was, in the first place, some anxiety in Washington on this score and United Kingdom is particularly anxious to allay these fears. There were said to be rumours that Marshall was under pressure to hold a meeting on Japanese settlement before the Canberra Conference is scheduled to take place. For this reason, it was McNeil's view, which seemed to be shared by Beasley, that they should avoid undue publicity about the Conference.

2. As for the agenda McNeil emphasized United Kingdom view that procedural issue should be discussed but that substance of Japanese settlement should be considered only on very broad lines, in view of fact that there was only a fortnight available for discussion. Beasley said that they were not approaching the Conference with any hard and fast ideas and thought that the discussion should be "broad and non-restrictive". He gave no indication of an Australian

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intent to secure commitments on a "Commonwealth line", but I presume Evatt may wish to commit us all to an "Australian line".

3. Evatt has suggested that some officials from the Secretariats and delegations might arrive in Canberra several days before the Conference begins in order to make preliminary arrangements. When my opinion was asked, I said that I did not know what our secretarial arrangements would be, but I thought it might be that someone from our Canberra office could take part in preliminary discussions, a suggestion which both Addison and Beasley seemed to think sensible.

ACTING HIGH COMMISSIONER.

Sent: 1.10 p.m.
Rec'd: 9.03 a.m.

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C272200

BY AIR

OFFICE OF THE
HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR CANADA
CANADA HOUSE, LONDON, S.W.1.

27th June, 1947.

SECRET

Dear Mr. Pearson,

Yesterday I accompanied Mr. Kenneth Greene when he paid a call on Sir. Eric Machtig. During the course of a friendly conversation, Sir Eric made a few comments with regard to the forthcoming Canberra Conference which added a little, I think, to the impression we have gained of the United Kingdom's views.

Sir Eric expressed frankly his fears that Dr. Evatt would wish to discuss the Japanese settlement in much more detail than the United Kingdom considered appropriate at this brief Conference and at this stage. The United Kingdom want only a general discussion. So much we had already learned from Mr. McNeil, as reported to you in our telegram No. 1012 of June 23rd. From what Sir Eric said, I judged that the anxiety of the United Kingdom not to be involved in detailed questions of substance may be due to other reasons than their lack of preparation, the briefness of the Conference or their nervousness about upsetting the United States. Sir Eric seems to fear a clash with the Australians on the basic principles of the Settlement. He said that the Australians apparantly favoured the view that Japan must be totally disarmed and deindustrialized and that we should "continue to keep our foot on her neck". The United Kingdon (and Sir Eric thought we would probably share their view on this point) favour the disarmament of Japan but consider it important that Japan should emerge as a viable state. Sir Eric may have reasons of which I am unaware for describing Australian policy in these terms. Judging, however, from Australian public statements and their representations to the Dominions Office, I should have thought it an overstatement.

Sir Eric expressed the wish of the United Kingdom that the Conference should be purely an exchange of views. He feared, however, that Dr. Evatt would want to commit us all to his line. His emphasis on this point was due, I think, not only to the sensitivity which he knows Canadians feel about a united Commonwealth front, but also to the wish of the United Kingdom to maintain its freedom of action under the Australian threat. We asked Sir Eric if he thought Dr. Evatt was likely to propose the formation of a Commonwealth panel as he had informally suggested in connection with the German Settlement last January and whether he was likely to argue that Australia should speak

L.B. Pearson, Esq., O.B.E.,
Under-Secretary of State for
External Affairs,
OTTAWA.

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for the whole Commonwealth. Sir Eric said that he thought Dr. Evatt would consider either of these suggestions only as a second choice; what he really wants is that Australia should be admitted as a high-level member in the determination of the settlement. He does not want the United Kingdom to be excluded because he wants United Kingdom support. However, if a situation should develop in which only one country of the Commonwealth could be included in the inner circle, Dr. Evatt would want Australia to be that country. Sir Eric did not say that this suggestion would be unacceptable to the United Kingdom, but he certainly implied that it would. He simply asked us rhetorically to imagine how far Australia would get in pressing its views on powers like the Soviet Union and the United States.

Sir Eric was careful to express what is undoubtedly the very real sympathy of the United Kingdom with the desire of Australia to have appropriate views on the Settlement. The trouble with Dr. Evatt's claims, however, was that he paid little regard to practical politics. Dr. Evatt, for instance, wanted to exclude Russia and France from the high level of the Japanese settlement because the Russians had come in at the last moment and the French, he said, had helped the Japanese enter South East Asia. There might be some logic in this argument, Sir Eric said, but it was obviously quite useless to put it forward.

I asked Sir Eric if the United Kingdom had come to any tentative conclusions on the question of procedure in drawing up the Japanese settlement. He indicated that they had not gone very far in their thinking on this subject. He spoke with some approval of the suggestion that the Far Eastern Commission be used as a basis but said that the Australians would not listen to this idea. Another difficulty which faced the United Kingdom with regard to this suggestion was that South Africa was not included in the F.E.C. From what I have learned elsewhere, I do not think this remark was intended to imply that South Africa had been pressing its claim for a voice in the settlement.

It may well be that the United Kingdom is hoping for Canadian support in several ways in Canberra. On the general questions of whether the terms of the Japanese settlement should be Carthaginean or not, they would expect, I think, that we should be closer to their thinking than to the Australian view, particularly as their view also seems to be closer to that of the United States. They would also count on our known antipathy to any suggestion of an agreed Commonwealth policy or to the conception that one nation should speak for all to help them resist the pressure which they expect from Dr. Evatt. Perhaps it was with this in mind that Sir Eric said he deplored the suggestion sometimes made by Dr. Evatt that Canada was not primarily interested in the Pacific settlement. We were a Pacific power and had a very obvious interest in seeing that peace was maintained in that area.

As Mr. Greene has left London, he has not seen or approved this letter. I have sent a copy, however, to Canberra.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) J.W. Holmes.

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C272202

TELEGRAM

FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

SECRET

CYPHER

LONDON, June 29th, 1947.

CIRCULAR D. 543

Circular D. 543. Secret.

Japanese Peace Settlement.

We have been considering on basis of ideas which now come to be generally agreed between us as regards composition and level of proposed British Commonwealth Conference at Canberra what form discussions there could best take. Question, as we see it, is governed by following two important considerations:-

(a) Object of Conference is

(1) To discuss procedure to be adopted in reaching Japanese Peace Settlement, and

(2) To exchange views regarding basic issues affecting future treatment of Japan with particular reference to manner in which these are to be dealt with in Japanese Peace Treaty. Discussions under (2) will probably have to be on broad lines if ground is to be covered in the time available for our talks.

(b) Object of Canberra Conference would not in our view (which will no doubt be shared by other Commonwealth Governments) be to aim at production of any agreed British Commonwealth draft for Japanese Treaty. United States Government have already shown themselves to be sensitive to any suggestion that this is subject of Conference. While it is not intended to discuss Japanese Peace Settlement with

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any other power in advance of British Commonwealth meeting one of its purposes is (as suggested in my telegram Circular D. 367 of 11th April) to prepare the ground for informal discussions with the Americans.

2. Subjects which we think that in light of above would fail to be discussed at Canberra can conveniently be set out as follows:-

(1) Procedure to be adopted in reaching settlement,

(a) Membership of peace making body,

(b) Voting procedure, i.e., whether

(i) Straight majority vote,

(ii) Percentage majority vote,

(iii) Majority vote with special position accorded to certain powers,

(iv) Unanimous vote.

(2) Form which settlement should take.

Main question under this head is whether there should be a single instrument (i.e., Japanese Peace Treaty) or two (i.e., the Japanese Peace Treaty preceded by a separate Treaty of Disarmament and Control on the lines of draft published by United States in June, 1946.

(3) Content of settlement.

Under this heading we contemplate exchanges of view regarding in general the kind of Japan we should hope to see in the long term and as to how in particular our objectives in this respect can be reconciled with the needs of military security and with the various economic considerations which apply. Among matters which might conveniently be discussed at the Conference are the following:

(a) Arrangements for termination of occupation and for subsequent security control of Japan (whether covered in one instrument or two)

(b) Arrangements for economic supervision in Japan

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(e.g., of customs administration and exchange control)

(c) Inter-allied organisation in Japan to supervise execution of control provisions of the Treaty.

(d) Reparations and the future level of Japanese industry.

3. Above is not, repeat not, of course intended as an exclusive survey of scope of Conference. We should be grateful for comments of other British Commonwealth Governments. In order to save time we suggest that these should be repeated to other Governments at same time.

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS

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C272205

OFFICE OF THE
HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR CANADA
CANADA HOUSE
LONDON, S.W.1.

SECRET

4th July, 1947.

Dear Mr. Pearson,

I have conveyed to the Commonwealth Relations Office the views on the United Kingdom draft proposals for the agenda of the Canberra Conference expressed in your telegram No. 1051 of 27th June. The Canadian views were received with satisfaction. The United Kingdom officials concerned are hoping to have your specific comments on their draft agenda as soon as possible, but in the meantime they were glad to have this indication of your general views, which seem in all respects to be in agreement with their views.

When I visited the Commonwealth Relations Office I was shown the text of a draft agenda which had come from Australia, the text of which has been repeated to Ottawa. This seemed to include somewhat more detail than I think the United Kingdom had contemplated. The view expressed to me, however, was that although the United Kingdom delegation did not wish to be involved in excessive detail, nevertheless it was difficult to avoid this entirely. Whether the Conference was to become bogged down in detail or devote itself to a discussion of general principles would probably be decided by the attitude of the participants rather than by the terms of the agenda.

The United Kingdom will not agree to Dr. Evatt's suggestion that the matter of revising the Royal style and titles should be discussed at the Conference, or that any subjects not specifically relevant to the Japanese settlement should be included. There would, of course, be no harm in Commonwealth representatives exchanging views on such matters as the Royal style and titles informally at dinner, but this would be a different matter from formal discussion at the Conference table.

There were two parts of the Australian answer which the Commonwealth Relations Office were querying, but I am not certain whether these will be mentioned in their reply when it goes forth. The Australian reply (the text of which I have not with me) suggested that one of the aims of the Conference was to reach agreement on the subjects under discussion. As the Commonwealth Relations Office, like ourselves, are somewhat nervous of Dr. Evatt's intentions,

L.B. Pearson, Esq.,
Department of External Affairs,
OTTAWA

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they have looked at this phrase with a certain amount of suspicion. However, they think it may be harmless enough. It is not a subject on which a protest can easily be made, for the object of all discussion may be described as the reaching of agreement. There is no harm in the participants in the Canberra Conference reaching an agreement if they are able to do so, provided, of course, that the right to disagree is also accepted.

In another part of their draft agenda the Australians suggested that consultation with the United States was one of the procedural matters to be discussed. The United Kingdom, on the other hand, take the view that the discussions they have had with the United States have been merely part of the preparation of data for the Conference. I think it probable that they will say something on this subject in their reply. It seems not unlikely that a clash between the United Kingdom and Australia on the subject of consultation with the United States may result. In my letter of 26th June I reported the Australian objection to the United Kingdom's consulting with the United States over intervention in Indonesia before consulting with Australia. It looks as if Dr. Evatt was determined to press the argument that the United States should not be consulted before Australia. This argument is, of course, consistent with the theory that the Commonwealth should agree on a line before discussions with a foreign power. I see no likelihood of the United Kingdom accepting a principle which would infinitely complicate its relations with the United States.

That the United Kingdom is taking the Canberra Conference pretty seriously is, I think, evident in the fact that the total number of persons who, according to present expectations, will set out for Australia is about 35. This number includes clerical staff and such supernumeraries as Lady Addison, Mrs. McNeil, and Lady Addison's maid. This large number may be attributed in part to the fact that the delegation will include two Cabinet Ministers who must carry on some, at least, of their other responsibilities at long distance. The principal members of the United Kingdom delegation will probably be Lord Addison, Hector McNeil, Malcolm Macdonald, E.J. Williams (United Kingdom High Commissioner in Australia), A.D.F. Gascoigne, (United Kingdom Representative in Tokyo), and M.E. Dening Assistant Under-Secretary of State in charge of the Far Eastern Department in the Foreign Office). Among the officials who will accompany the delegation are Francis Cumming-Bruce, Private Secretary to Lord Addison, and Morris James, of the Far Eastern Section in the Commonwealth Relations Office, and J.F. Ford, of the Far Eastern Economic and Industrial Planning Staff in the Foreign Office. There will probably be other members of the Foreign Office and other Government Departments whose names have not yet been determined.

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C 272207

I have not received any information about the delegations from other Commonwealth countries, except that Mr. R. Jones will be going from Pretoria. Mr. Jones will be known in Ottawa, as he was Acting High Commissioner for South Africa for a short time.

My endeavours to secure further information with regard to the United Kingdom views on the procedure and substance of the Japanese settlement have not yet been very fruitful. Several Foreign Office papers are now in the last stages of preparation, and I am hoping to receive copies of them on an informal basis before they reach a higher level. One of these papers is concerned with procedure. From discussions I have had I do not think that views on procedure here have reached a very definite stage. The Foreign Office paper, I understand, considers the virtues of majority voting, weighted voting, or the liberum veto. My impression is that the British would like to use the Far Eastern Commission, at least as a basis for membership, provided that they could satisfy South Africa. They may also have to find a place for Burma, and thereby begin a process which could lead to a considerable extension of the membership of any peace conference. The United Kingdom officials realize that Australia does not like the idea of using the Far Eastern Commission in any way, but they think this objection may be due largely to the Australian fear that the present procedural rules of the F.E.C. would of necessity be carried over. From my talks with Hayden and Bridgland, of the Australian External Affairs Office here, I should gather that Australian objections to the F.E.C. go farther than this, and include a belief that the members and staff of the F.E.C. are quite inadequate. You have no doubt received more definite information on this subject from Washington and Canberra.

In talking both to the United Kingdom and separately to the Australian officials here I have endeavoured to find out whether they have any very specific schemes for achieving their ends. I have said that we in Canada were sympathetic with Australia's desire to have a voice in the Japanese settlement appropriate to her interests and to her efforts in defeating Japan. However, I should like to know if they had any plans for achieving this purpose which might be politically practicable. The answers so far have been pretty vague. It may be that the Australians do not wish to commit themselves to any particular piece of machinery so that they will have more room in which to manoeuvre, and possibly to accept a compromise which they could represent to the Australian people as a substantial victory. One of the reasons why nothing specific has been put out either by the United Kingdom or Australia may be that neither one of them wishes to face the somewhat embarrassing question of what would happen if there was room on the platform for only one member of the Commonwealth. Dr. Evatt may prefer to

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settle that question in the latter days of the Conference when some agreement must be reached. The United Kingdom would not be at all anxious, however, to make any promises in advance.

I was surprised to find that Peter Hayden, who has just arrived from Canberra, and with whom you may have discussed these matters when he passed through Ottawa, was optimistic about the Soviet attitude. Whether he reflects prevailing opinion in Canberra on this subject I do not know, but I suspect that he does. He thought that the Russians would probably be prepared to concede something, at least, to the Australian claim. He pointed out that McMahon Ball had frequently supported the Soviet view and opposed the Americans in Tokyo. It may be, of course, that although Dr. Evatt has not of late been a very great favourite in Moscow, nevertheless the Russians might think that his well-known differences with the United States on a number of Far Eastern matters could be exploited. On the other hand, the Australians seem confident, because of assurances they have had from Mr. Acheson, that the Americans will support their claims. I asked if Mr. Acheson and the others had committed themselves to supporting any specific arrangement for Australian participation, but I gather that the assurances were in general terms.

I have sent copies of this letter to Canberra, Pretoria, and Wellington.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd.) J.W. Holmes.

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TELEGRAM C272209

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS

TO : THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

SECRET

CYPHER LONDON, 5th July, 1947.

CIRCULAR D. 586

Addressed Australia, repeated Canada, New Zealand and South Africa Circular D. 566, Secret, and by Secretary of State for India to Government of India, Secret.

Thank you for your telegram No. 154 containing Commonwealth Governments' proposals for agenda of Canberra talks. As you will have seen from my telegram of 20th June, Circular D. 543, we think that the exchange of views on the future treatment of Japan will have to deal with major issues only and be on broad lines if the ground is to be covered in the time available. It will not be possible, as we see it, to go into the more detailed and technical aspects of the Japanese settlement. Subject to this we agree with the Commonwealth Government in hoping that it will be possible to cover, in the main, the general issues arising on the subjects mentioned in paragraphs 1 - 9 of your telegram under reference.

2. As regards items proposed in your paragraph 10, we agree strongly with view expressed by New Zealand Government in their telegram No. 137 (repeated Canberra as No. 134) of 5th July (to which we shall be sending a separate reply, repeating to other Commonwealth Governments concerned as soon as possible) that it would be unwise if it can be avoided to overburden agenda with matters not directly concerned with Japan. Our comments on individual items proposed by Australian Government in paragraph 10 of telegram No. 154 are being sent separately (see my immediately following telegram).

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS

Sent: 6:05 p.m.
Rec'd: 2:25 p.m.

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C272210

FROM: THE MINISTER FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA, AUSTRALIA

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA

CYPHER

NO. 9 CANBERRA, June 26th, 1947.

Addressed Secretary of State for Dominions Affairs, London, No. 154, repeated to External Wellington No. 160, External Ottawa No. 9, Primus Pretoria No. 11, External Affairs Department, New Delhi, No. 24.

Japanese Peace Settlement

We have given consideration to the scope of the forthcoming Conference in Canberra of British Commonwealth representatives. With a view to full discussion and an approach to broad agreement on main policies, we propose the following provisional agenda:-

(1) Adoption of provisional agenda.

(2) Participation in the Japanese Settlement;

(I) Which countries are to participate in Japanese Peace Conference;

(II) Method of voting;

(III) Proposed date, urgency of proceeding with settlement;

(IV) Venue;

(V) Approaches to be made to the United States and other Governments regarding steps to be taken before the Peace Conference;

(VI) Whether single Instrument or more.

(3) Machinery for securing achievement of basic objectives of Allied Powers:-

(a) Countries to be represented on Supervisory Commission;

(b) Means of reaching decisions;

(c) Method of provision for implementation of terms of

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Japanese Peace Treaty;

(d) Economic and military provisions.

(4) Disarmament and demilitarization.

(5) Territorial provisions of Treaty, with special reference to disposal of strategic islands whose future has not been decided and to the possibility of establishing United Nations bases for prevention of Japanese military resurgence.

(6) Political provisions of Treaty aimed at constructive reform and democratization of Japan.

(7) Reparations and standard of living of Japan in relation to other countries.

(8) Economic provisions designed to prevent resurgence of Japan as a threat to peace while allowing her the means to sustain her economy up to agreed level.

(9) Exclusion of Japan from whaling industry.

(10) Opportunity should be taken to discuss other matters of interest to Governments which will be represented at the Conference:-

(a) The title of British Commonwealth representatives in the United Kingdom and in the Dominions;

(b) The title and functions of the Dominions Office and any changes in offices in the Dominion Governments which might be desirable consequent upon the change in the title of the Dominions Office;

(c) Post-war use of Pacific bases, with special regard to implementation of discussions at Prime Ministers' Conference in 1946;

(d) Proposed Nauru Trusteeship Agreement.

(11) Other matters of common interest that any delegation may wish to include.

MINISTER FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

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C272212

FROM: THE MINISTER FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA, AUSTRALIA

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA

CYPHER

NO. 13

CANBERRA, July 9th, 1947.

Addressed Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, London, No. 169; repeated to External Wellington No. 168, External Ottawa No. 13, Prime Minister South Africa No. 15.

Canberra Conference on Japanese Settlement

Your Circular D. 586 and Circular D. 587 and New Zealand telegram to you No. 137.

(1) We agree that the exchange of views on treatment of Japan should deal with major issues on broad lines but would hope the discussions would provide guidance for later study and inter-Commonwealth exchanges on the detailed aspects you refer to. Moreover, preparations for the Conference should result in officials, who may attend as advisers, being in a position to exchange a good deal of information on technical aspects while in Canberra.

(2) We also entirely agree with the New Zealand comment on additional items, and feel it important that the opportunity should not be missed to discuss matters of special regional significance, such as the Trusteeship Agreement for Nauru and the Pacific bases, in relation to which joint British Commonwealth action has already been approved in principle at the Prime Ministers' Conference.

(3) The two points concerning Japan specially mentioned by New Zealand (termination of occupation and relation of control to United Nations) are clearly of great importance, and we are giving consideration to them so that they also can be discussed at the Canberra Conference.

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(4) We are telegraphing separately to United Kingdom and New Zealand as regards particular aspects of Nauru question.

MINISTER FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

Sent: 8:00 p.m.
Rec'd: 9:55 a.m.

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
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AIRMAIL

SECRET

OFFICE OF THE
HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR CANADA
CANBERRA

CANBERRA

10th July, 1947.

No. 640

Sir:

With reference to previous communications concerning the forthcoming British Commonwealth discussions on Japanese peace problems in Canberra, I have the honour to report a number of developments during the past week in connection with Australia's preparations for the talks.

2. The Minister for External Affairs, Dr. Evatt, announced on July 8th that he would leave Sydney on July 11th for Tokyo to meet General MacArthur. While in Japan, Dr. Evatt said, he would "consult with General MacArthur and the Australian representatives in order to ascertain at first hand and from those on the spot facts essential to the consideration of the peace settlement with Japan".

3. We understand that Dr. Evatt originally intended to travel to Japan by air and to make a side trip by air to Nanking. His distaste for air travel, however, persuaded him to travel to and from Japan by ship, and his absence from Australia, therefore, will be longer than was contemplated originally. His absence from Canberra is expected to handicap the Australian authorities in making decisions in regard to the forthcoming talks.

4. Dr. Evatt announced also on July 8th that the British Commonwealth "Conference" at Canberra would begin on August 26th. Referring indirectly to press reports from the United States (please see attached editorial from the Melbourne "Age" of July 9th) that Washington authorities suspected that Dr. Evatt intended at the forthcoming Canberra meeting to form a British Commonwealth bloc to oppose the United States in the Pacific Peace Settlement, the Minister for External Affairs said:-

> "The holding of these discussions is in accordance with long established practice by which British Commonwealth countries discuss together, without commitment, matters subsequently to be discussed at international conferences. This procedure is well understood by all nations concerned and, indeed, has been frequently followed by other nations co-operating on a basis of regional or other special interests.

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"The forthcoming discussions at Canberra are regarded by Australia as of great importance, as the Settlement with Japan will largely determine the future security of Australia. Moreover, the Conference will be the first of its kind held in Australia."

5. In commenting on the foregoing, it is perhaps permissible to speculate that although Dr. Evatt might recognise the impossibility of the formation of a British Commonwealth bloc under Australian inspiration and leadership at Canberra, he personally would welcome such a development and would promote it if he considered its achievement possible. Our impression is that the Australian authorities are under no illusions concerning Canada's probable attitude to a common policy for British participants in the Japanese Peace Settlement.

6. Establishment of an Australian Advisory Committee to examine questions related to the Japanese Settlement has been announced by Dr. Evatt. The Committee, said the Minister, would meet under the Chairmanship of Sir Frederick Eggleston, formerly Australian Minister to China and later to the United States of America, and who, under the Minister's general direction, has been working on problems related to the Japanese Settlement in conjunction with Departmental officers at Canberra and abroad. It was expected that the Committee would include six members of Parliament (three Government and three non-Government members) in addition to a representative group of Australians specially versed in one aspect or another to the subject. Dr. Evatt's announcement of plans to establish the Committee followed criticism by the Leader of the Opposition, Mr. Menzies, concerning Dr. Evatt's "one-man" policy in regard to Japan.

I have the honour to be
Sir,
Your obedient servant,

(sgd) C.M. Croft

Acting High Commissioner for Canada

The Right Honourable
The Secretary of State for
External Affairs,
OTTAWA CANADA

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FROM: THE MINISTER FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA, AUSTRALIA.

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA.

CYPHER - PUBLEX

NO. 18

CANBERRA, July 23rd, 1947.

Addressed Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, London, No. 190; repeated External Wellington No. 187, External Ottawa No. 18, Primus Pretoria No. 19, Austcom New Delhi No. 272.

Agenda for Canberra Conference

My telegram No. 169 to Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, repeated Wellington No. 168, Ottawa No. 13, Pretoria No. 15 and telegram from Prime Minister of Canada to Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations No. 136, repeated Canberra No. 5, Wellington No. 2, Pretoria No. 4, New Delhi No. 32, and telegram from Primus South Africa to Canberra No. 33, Ottawa No. 20, Wellington No. 28, London No. 712.

We propose that section of agenda dealing with Japanese settlement should in general follow these lines:

1. Procedural questions.

A. Countries to participate.

B. Method of reaching decisions.

C. Time of Peace Conference.

D. Venue.

E. Single instrument or more (final settlement or settlement by stages?)

F. Adherence of other Governments.

2. Approaches to be made to United States and other Governments.

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A. United States of America.

B. Other Governments.

3. Basic objectives of the Allied Powers.

4. Control or supervision of Japan (machinery for securing achievement of basic objectives of Allied Powers)

A. Supervisory Commission for Japan.

B. Functions of Supervisory Body.

C. Voting.

D. Means of enforcement, etc.

E. Extent of military occupation.

5. Territorial provisions.

A. Boundaries of Japan.

B. Manchuria, including Dairen and Port Arthur.

C. Korea.

D. Islands formerly under Japanese control.

i. Disposal.

ii. Japanese recognition.

iii. Fishing rights.

6. Disarmament and demilitarization.

A. Military, naval and air.

B. Atomic energy.

C. Chemical and bacteriological warfare.

D. Manufacture.

E. Naval ship building.

7. (a) Constructive reform and democratization.

A. Review of constitution.

B. The purge.

C. Public service.

D. Education.

E. Secret ultra-nationalistic societies.

F. Special police and para-military organization.

G. State Shintoism.

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H. Civil rights in Japan and ex-Japanese territories.

(b) Treaties, etc.

A. Japanese rights and interests outside Japan.

B. Treaties

i. Bilateral.

ii. Multilateral.

iii. Peace Treaties.

iv. Other treaties.

C. Recognition of Occupation Acts.

(c) International relations.

8. Economic and financial provisions.

A. Trade unions and employers associations.

B. Land reform.

C. Dissolution of the Zaibatsu.

D. Economic equality.

E. Maintenance of domestic employment.

F. Transition controls.

G. Access to raw materials.

H. Commercial policy.

I. Fiscal policy.

J. Fishing, whaling and sealing.

K. Pearling.

L. Shipping.

M. Heavy industries.

N. Civil aviation.

O. Property rights and interest.

9. Reparations restitution and costs of occupation.

A. General reparations.

B. Compensation for prisoners of war, internees, etc.

C. Restitution.

D. Occupation costs.

MINISTER FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

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C 272219

FROM: THE MINISTER OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, WELLINGTON, NEW ZEALAND

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA

IMMEDIATE

SECRET

CYPHER

NO. 18 WELLINGTON, July 5th, 1947.

Addressed Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations No. 137, repeated External Canberra No. 134, External Ottawa No. 18, Primus Pretoria No. 20, Foreign New Delhi No. 13, Totara Washington No. 365. Secret. Reference your telegram Circular D. 543 and telegram from External Canberra addressed Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs No. 154, repeated External Wellington No. 160, External Ottawa No. 9, Primus Pretoria No. 11, External New Delhi No. 24.

Japanese Peace Settlement.

Telegrams under reference together appear to cover satisfactorily questions with which Canberra Conference could most usefully be concerned. However, while representatives will no doubt welcome the opportunity for a general exchange of views, we feel strongly that it would be unwise - and especially as time for Ministers to be overseas is so limited - to overburden agenda with matters not directly concerned with Japan or the Japanese settlement unless issue is one which it is agreed requires the urgent consideration of all Commonwealth members. In view, however, of their special regional significance, the inclusion of such matters as the use of Pacific bases and Nauru Trusteeship Agreement might be considered.

2. It is assumed that Item 3 of provisional agenda prepared by Australian Government would afford opportunity for a general discussion on future security control and on problem

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C272220

of termination of the occupation. However, we would suggest that future of B.C.O.F. be added as a specific item to agenda.

3. Second additional item we would propose is the future relation of Japan to the United Nations and the relation of the future security arrangements for Japan to security arrangements under the United Nations.

MINISTER OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Sent 1:09 p.m.

Rec'd. 12:50 a.m.

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C 272221

T E L E G R A M

FROM: THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR CANADA IN NEW ZEALAND

TO : THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

S E C R E T

CYPHER - O.T.P. WELLINGTON, July 9th, 1947.

NO. 214

No. 214. July 9th. Secret. Confidential. My telegram No. 212 of July 8th, paragraph 1, and my telegram No. 206 of June 30th. Japanese Peace Settlement.

1. Wellington has learned from London that Canada will be represented by Minister at Canberra meeting.

2. Understand that Prime Minister is under pressure from Evatt to join him in demand that Australia and New Zealand be given determining voices on Commonwealth policy in the Pacific. Permanent officials are worried over preparation for meeting and any information you can send me which might help them to draft an independent line for Mr. Fraser would be appreciated. This is on assumption that you wish me to continue discussions on this subject with McIntosh to keep him informed of your position and to keep you informed.

HIGH COMMISSIONER

Sent: 5:30 p.m.
Rec'd: 6:14 a.m.

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APPENDIX C

Views of various Governments on the Japanese Peace Settlement

1. Australia.

a. Telegram, Canberra (HC) - Ottawa, April 23.	68
b. Telegram, Canberra (HC) - Ottawa, May 7.	78
c. Despatch, Canberra (HC) - Ottawa, June 12.	584
d. Despatch, Canberra (HC) - Ottawa, June 19.	611
e. Telegram, Nanking-Ottawa, July 9	243
f. Article, Christian Science Monitor, August 1.	

2. United Kingdom.

a. Despatch, Washington-Ottawa, April 7.	739
b. Despatch, London (HC)-Ottawa, July 17.	A.627

See also Appendix B, Item 2(d), page 3.

3. United States.

a. Letter, Wrong-Pearson, April 12.	
b. Telegram, Tokyo-Ottawa, May 2.	81
c. Despatch, Tokyo-Ottawa, June 18.	147
d. Teletype, Washington-Ottawa, July 11.	WA-2190
e. Teletype, Washington-Ottawa, July 16.	WA-2241

4. China

a. Telegram, Nanking-Ottawa, July 17.	258
b. Telegram, Nanking-Ottawa, July 17.	259

5. France

Despatch, Paris-Ottawa, July 23.	506
Despatch, Paris-Ottawa, July 28.	509

6. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

a. Despatch, Moscow-Ottawa, June 17.	303
b. Telegram, Moscow-Ottawa, August 4.	245

See also Appendix B, Item 2(d) page 4.

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TELEGRAM

C272223

FROM: THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR CANADA IN AUSTRALIA

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

SECRET

CYPHER - O.T.P. CANBERRA, April 23rd, 1947.

NO. 68

No. 68. April 23rd. Secret. Following for Pearson, Begins:

Reference your telegram No. 69 of April 18th. Australian views on Japanese Peace settlement.

While observing carefully the instructions in the first paragraph of your message, we have had a lengthy and friendly informal discussion with the Secretary of External Affairs Department, Dr. John Burton, and the Chief of the Department's Asiatic Section, William Forsyth. In this message we will report, first, what we were told, and will conclude with our assessment of its significance.

1. Burton said that Dr. Evatt was more than disgusted with the procedure adopted for the European peace discussions and he hoped that entirely different arrangements would be made for the Pacific settlement. Australia did not wish to find herself in the Pacific peace discussions in the position allotted Canada in the European settlement.

2. While Australia's preparations for Pacific peace discussions were still incomplete, Dr. Evatt felt that a Peace Conference should be called soon, as a number of the questions in which Australia had been most interested had been settled arbitrarily and unilaterally by the United States.

With reference to specific points (a), (b), (c) and (d) mentioned in your telegram, Burton said:-

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3. (a) Australia was not impressed with the value of the Far Eastern Commission for initial peace-making, due to the veto power held there by the big nations and due to the fact that the United States of America and the U.S.S.R. dominated proceedings. Dr. Evatt hoped that the preparatory verbal peace-making would be made outside the unfavourable (to Australia) atmosphere of London and Washington. Holding of a preliminary Conference in Australia of the British Commonwealth group and/or interested Powers, would give Australia an initiative she desired.

4. (b) Doctor Evatt was determined that the role of the "Big Five" in the Pacific peace settlement would be less decisive than that of the "Big Four" in Europe. All foreign Powers which had participated in the war should have just hearings and should share the responsibility for the Treaty and the execution of its terms.

5. (c) Australia's ideas of post-occupation control had not been evolved fully. In Australian view, some Allied military forces in Japan would be necessary and it was felt that it was not unlikely that the existing military arrangements would be continued in modified form. Australia probably would be in a position to continue to supply some forces.

6. (d) We were not able to obtain any information on this point.

7. Burton admitted that the possibility of Australia representing the British Commonwealth in the peace negotiations in Japan had been considered informally in the Department. However, he said it was felt that however much Australia might welcome this honour and responsibility, it was realized that the concurrence of all interested sections of the Commonwealth could not be obtained easily.

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C272224A

Australia was strongly opposed to the principle of a Council of Foreign Ministers conducting negotiations and would not subscribe to it in the Pacific.

8. Burton said that Sir Frederick Eggleston is acting as a Special Adviser to the Department on Pacific affairs. He had done some research on Australia's plans for Pacific peace settlement but also was being consulted on other matters. If possible, he would let us have, on an informal basis, some of the material prepared by Sir Frederick.

9. After considering Burton's statements carefully, we feel that Dr. Evatt is more concerned with the extent of Australia's participation in the Pacific peace settlement than in protecting and advancing the welfare of the other smaller nations. We think he would welcome for Australia a role as representative of the other British Commonwealth Nations, but we are certain he is under no illusions about Canada's probable attitude and we understood from Burton that other Commonwealth partners might not agree. Our impression is that Dr. Evatt will oppose the Council of Foreign Ministers principle for the Pacific as long as Australia is outside the Council, but if she were invited in, either as the British Commonwealth spokesman or as a smaller Power with special interests, he would abandon his present interest in the rights of the other interested non-veto Powers. Ends.

ACTING HIGH COMMISSIONER

Sent: 6:45 p.m.
Rec'd: 11:00 a.m.

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TELEGRAM

C 272225

FROM: THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR CANADA IN AUSTRALIA

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

SECRET

CYPHER - O.T.P.

NO. 78 CANBERRA, May 7th, 1947.

No. 78. May 7th. Secret. Following for Pearson, Begins:

Reference your telegram No. 69 of April 18th and our reply No. 68 of April 23rd. Australian views on Japanese peace settlement.

1. Further guarded and informal enquiries have elicited the following information.

(a) The Australian External Affairs Departmental Committee on Japan, over which Sir Frederick Eggleston presides, has prepared the main points of a draft Treaty for Japan. This draft Treaty is being considered by Doctor Evatt. Principles of it may receive Cabinet approval within a month or two.

(b) The Treaty Committee's initial planning visualized provision for a "Pacific Security Commission" which would have maintained administrative powers in Japan following the peace. The Commission would have control over the Japanese Government. This proposal, however, has been dropped in favour of a plan for an "Allied Supervisory Council", the function of which would be to guarantee that Japan carried out the terms of the Peace Treaty adequately. The Departmental view was that the Supervisory Council, as well as the previously considered Security Commission, should consist of representatives of countries constituting the Far Eastern Commission. It was proposed that if Supervisory

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Council plans were adopted, garrison forces would be maintained in Japan. These could be constituted proportionately on much the same basis as present occupation forces.

(c) Doctor Evatt's plan to hold a preliminary Conference of interested Commonwealth Governments in Canberra is still being considered. The reply of the United Kingdom has not yet been received.

(d) The Australian External Affairs Department is satisfied that the United States State Department's views on participation of smaller Powers in the Pacific settlement have moved away from the rigidity of Byrnes' four-Power plan, and Australia feels confident that the State Department will back her claims for "an adequate voice".

(e) The foregoing has been obtained on a confidential basis. In addition, the Australian press has carried reports that the Australian Government would resist strongly the United States' plan for disposal of reparations from Japan. Doctor Evatt apparently has made it known that he will object to United States plan and also "the arbitrary assessment of Japan's resources and Allied nations needs and claims".

The Prime Minister announced yesterday that the Australian Government believed there should be no resumption of private person-to-person trade between Australia and Japan until the Peace Treaty had been concluded. There was no possibility of Australia following lead of the United States in assuming full scale trade with Japan in the near future.

2. In informal and confidential discussions with Australian authorities on Japanese peace settlement, we received the impression that Australia strongly distrusts the suspected policy of the United States of stimulating recovery of Japan as a "buffer" to the U.S.S.R. in the Pacific. Australians feel that the United States is being

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misled by the docility of the Japanese people in the initial post-hostilities period. From the Australian standpoint, Japan remained a greater menace in the Pacific than the U.S.S.R. In any event, a restored Japan could not be trusted as an Ally.

We believe Australia will oppose any provisions in the peace settlement which would facilitate a speedy restoration of Japan, economically or militarily. From ideological, racial and historical standpoints, Australia apparently still considers Japan the greatest menace to her security. Ends.

ACTING HIGH COMMISSIONER

Sent: 6:00 p.m.
Rec'd: 9:35 a.m.

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VIA AIRMAIL

SECRET

OFFICE OF THE
HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR CANADA

CANBERRA, June 12, 1947.

No. 584

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to my secret despatch No. 578 of June 5th last and previous communications concerning the proposed British Commonwealth preliminary conference on Japanese peace problems scheduled for Canberra in August.

2. The most interesting development in this connection during the past week has been, in our opinion, a critical reference by the Minister for External Affairs, Dr. Evatt, to the alleged lack of interest of the United Kingdom Government in problems of the Pacific and South-East Asia - i.e. the international problems of most pressing concern to Australia. The reference to the allegation in question was made in a statement on Foreign Affairs tabled by Dr. Evatt in the House of Representatives on June 6th (reference my despatch No. 582 of June 10th). Following is the text of Dr. Evatt's reference to the United Kingdom:

> "The lessening of British influence as expressed in concrete terms of forces or economic interests is one thing; but any lessening of British interest, evidenced by failure to give to South East Asia and the Pacific their rightful place in British political thinking, is a very different thing and should be guarded against. For there are now, and there will be in the future, area problems of great magnitude which can be satisfactorily solved only if Britain, Australia and New Zealand make a joint approach towards them, bringing to bear on them the full contribution of experience and knowledge which each has to make.
>
> "There is a natural tendency among some groups in the United Kingdom, to become engrossed with problems of foreign policy on both sides of the Atlantic to the exclusion of problems in the Pacific and South East Asia. The official British Labour pamphlet earlier referred to illustrates this observation. Although approaching current international problems with refreshing frankness, it cannot be said to evidence much interest, still less grave concern, in the Pacific and the Far East.
>
> "On a long range view, it is essential for Britain to retain, and indeed develop, a real awareness of what is occurring in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, where there are many general interests to be safeguarded and where things can be achieved only by the closest co-ordination of British, New Zealand and Australian effort.
>
> "Co-operation of this kind presupposes that Australia for her part will continue to equip herself for her increasing regional responsibilities. On the British side it presupposes recognition that there will be many occasions on which Australia and New Zealand, on account of their location, their special

The Right Honourable
The Secretary of State for
External Affairs,
OTTAWA, Canada.

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area knowledge and other factors, could be accepted as the best judge of what is best likely to preserve British Commonwealth interests in this part of the world. There has already been some application of these principles; for example, in the appointment of an Australian to represent the four British Commonwealth countries on the Allied Council in Japan, and in the appointment of an Australian as Commander of the British Commonwealth occupation forces. The principle cannot be limited and will no doubt be extended."

3. The Australian press in reporting Dr. Evatt's statement on Foreign Affairs gave prominence and there by indirect support to the Minister's complaint against the United Kingdom. You will be interested particularly, however, we think, in the final paragraph quoted above in which Dr. Evatt claims for Australia and New Zealand a definitive role in regard to British Commonwealth policy in the Pacific and South-East Asia. It was perhaps unfortunate that his claim was coupled with criticism of the United Kingdom Government, particularly as the United Kingdom Government apparently is co-operating with Dr. Evatt in regard to the Canberra conference.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient servant,

(Signed) Paul Malone

for (C.M. Croft)
Acting High Commissioner for Canada.

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C272230

OFFICE OF THE
HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR CANADA

CANBERRA

TOP SECRET

No. 611

June 19th, 1947.

Sir:

I have the honour to refer to your secret telegram No. 102 of June 11th and our reply No. 94 of June 14th, relating to preparation of documentation for Canadian representatives who will be attending the British Commonwealth talks on Japan in Canberra in August.

2. Attached are two copies of a memorandum consolidating available information on Australia's attitude towards the Japanese Peace settlement, and our estimates of the significance of the Australian outlook on the question. Unfortunately it has been necessary to prepare the document in haste to ensure its despatch by this week's bag.

3. Mr. Malone, who prepared the memorandum, wishes to emphasize that all information therein has been obtained from Officers of the Australian Department of External Affairs on the Basis of informal discussions. The Australian views on peace proposals reported therein are subject to revision and possibly to abandonment when papers prepared on the departmental level are considered by the Minister and the Cabinet.

4. All Australian views on peace proposals were obtained by Mr. Malone from departmental Officers associated with the committee which has been working on the Japanese Peace settlement, under the Chairmanship of Sir Frederick Eggleston. They are forwarded merely as a guide to probable Australian policy and not in any sense as a statement of it. It would be appreciated if all Officers in Ottawa who have access to the memorandum will keep this fact in mind, as the Australian authorities anticipate possible drastic revisions by Dr. Evatt, particularly as he intends to visit Japan before the British Commonwealth conference is convened in Canberra.

5. We will continue to keep you informed of developments here to the best of our ability. We are confident that the confidence entrusted in us by Officers of the Australian Department of External Affairs in providing confidential information will be respected in Ottawa.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient servant,

(Signed) C.M. Croft

Acting High Commissioner for Canada

The Right Honourable,
The Secretary of State for External Affairs,
OTTAWA, CANADA.

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TOP SECRET

OFFICE OF THE
HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR CANADA

MEMORANDUM DEALING WITH AVAILABLE INFORMATION AND OPINION ON AUSTRALIA'S APPROACH TO JAPANESE PEACE PROBLEMS

INTRODUCTION:

1. Australia's main concern in regard to Japan is that she should never again be permitted to develop the means of waging aggressive war. Having felt the impact of Japanese aggression once Australia is haunted by the possibility of Japanese military might being resurrected in the same manner as Germany's after the First World War.

2. Despite Japan's present weakened position Australia still considers her the greatest potential menace to her security in the Pacific. Therefore, Australia's attitude to the Peace Settlement will be that it should provide for rigid control of all forms of Japanese life and that there should be an Allied Supervisory Body within Japan to guarantee that its provisions are executed satisfactorily. Australia believes that the Pacific Peace Settlement should provide for the utmost demilitarization of Japan and the ultimate "democrarization" of her people. Australia is not satisfied with post-armistice reforms accomplished in Japan to date.

3. Australia distrusts the suspected United States policy of rebuilding Japan as a "buffer" against the U.S.S.R. in the Pacific. Even under present circumstances in the Pacific, Australia fears Japan more than the U.S.S.R. The pre-war Japanese ideology is more distasteful to Australians than the current Russian ideology.

4. Australia's attitude to Japan appears to be influenced unduly by emotional factors. Australian servicemen suffered from barbaric cruelty at the hands of the Japanese and this fact has made a deep impression on the nation. An indication of Australia's emotional approach to the Japanese problem was the statement by the Prime Minister, Mr. Chifley, that Australia did not feel it would be appropriate to engage in private trading with Japan until the Peace Treaty had been signed (my secret telegram No. 78 of May 7th). After General McArthur had announced plans for the resumption of private trading with Japan in the near future Australia, realizing the dangers of competition, reversed its attitude and complained that its proposed quota of private traders to visit Japan was not large enough.

5. In our opinion, the Australian people and the Australian Government, perhaps unwittingly exaggerate the importance of the role Australia played in the defeat of Japan. The present tendency in Australia is to overlook completely the resistance of China to Japan and to minimumize the effects of the British campaigns in South-East Asia. There is an inclination to attach

.... undue

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undue importance to co-operation the United States received from Australia in victories of the United States forces against Japan. The importance of Australia's contribution to the defeat of Japan has been enhanced in the Australian view by the important political and military roles played by Australia in the occupation of Japan - i.e. as representative of a number of British Commonwealth nations. The forthcoming visit of Dr. Evatt to Japan (reference my telegram No. 94 of June 14th) can be expected to equip the Minister with a particularly authoritative voice at the proposed Canberra Conference.

6. Convinced that Australia played an important and decisive role in the defeat of Japan, the Australian Government is determined to play an equally important and decisive role in the Peace Conference. Australia's resentment of the United Kingdom's alleged lack of interest in developments in this part of the world was reported in our secret despatch No. 584 of June 12th. Australia's claim to the right to play a definitive role in regard to British Commonwealth policy in the Pacific and South-East Asia was reported in the same despatch. From this it might be reasonable to conclude that Australia would expect her plans for the Peace Settlement to receive special consideration at the proposed Canberra Conference.

CANBERRA CONFERENCE

7. We believe that the factors which influenced the Australian Minister for External Affairs, Dr. Evatt, in planning the British Commonwealth Conference in Canberra would include:

(a) A desire to produce concrete evidence for her Asiatic neighbours of Australia's leadership in British Commonwealth affairs in regard to the Pacific and South-East Asia.

(b) The intention of equipping Dr. Evatt, as probable chairman of the Conference, with initiative in procedure which Australia might not achieve if the Conference were held in London or Washington.

(c) Determination to prevent monopolization of the Pacific Peace Settlement by the Great Powers. Australia, as a smaller power, hopes to win backing of other Commonwealth nations to guarantee that she will have an important voice in the Pacific Settlement.

(d) The egotism of Dr. Evatt. It is well known that Dr. Evatt is not averse to winning prominence for himself at International Conferences. Canberra will offer a more effective stage for this than any other Conference center. Promotion of plans for the Canberra Conference have been a personal (that is Dr. Evatt) rather than a Government policy. It should be added, however, that Dr. Evatt personifies the Australian Government's policies in the Foreign and British Commonwealth field.

(e) Australia has enjoyed the warm support of New Zealand in arranging the Conference as a result of co-operation between the two Dominions effected by the Australia-New Zealand Agreement.

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AUSTRALIA'S VIEWS ON HER PARTICIPATION IN PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AND ON MILITARY INDUSTRIAL AND ECONOMIC CONTROL OF JAPAN AFTER PEACE TREATY

8. The following information was obtained in an informal interview with the Secretary of the Department of External Affairs on Australia's views on questions raised in your secret telegram No. 102 of June 12th:

(a) Australia's views concerning its own participation in peace negotiations and methods and degree of Commonwealth co-operation (reference Paragraphs 7 and 9 of our telegram No. 68):

Australia will not seek a special role for herself in Japanese Peace negotiations and will resist efforts of any other participating country to obtain undue influence. If special rights, however, are granted to any one country, Australia will demand equal rights. As explained in our secret telegram No. 68 of April 23rd, Australia is not impressed with the value of the Far Eastern Commission as a peace-making agency. Her prime objection is based on the veto power held by the "Big Nations". It is probable, however, that Australia will agree that the F.E.C. is the least objectionable agency which might be approved by other powers. If the veto right is retained by any member of the F.E.C., Australia may attempt to win a similar power.

In regard to Commonwealth co-operation, the Australian authorities do not expect the forthcoming Canberra Conference necessarily to result in uniformity of policy. Its objective will be to facilitate exchanges of information and perhaps to promote agreement on procedure.

The Conference may be asked, also, to consider informally other questions of British Commonwealth interest, such as the titles and status of High Commissioners and the designations of the various departments of External Affairs in view of Commonwealth constitutional changes resultant upon developments in India.

(b) Australia's views on military control of Japan after the peace treaty (reference paragraph 1 (B) of our telegram No. 78):

In regard to military control, Australia feels that the proposed Supervisory Commission should have military enforcement agencies in Japan. It is recognized, however, that domestic political considerations in the various Commonwealth countries, including Australia, may necessitate elimination or reduction of participating military forces.

(c) Australia's views on industrial and economic control of Japan after the Peace Treaty (reference our telegram No. 78 paragraph 2):

.... Australia's

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Australia's special interests in the field of industrial and economic control of Japan, after the peace treaty, include provision against dumping of Japanese goods, which was made possible in the past by cheap labour; elimination of Japanese activities in the whaling industry and elimination of restrictive and dishonest trade practices, which, Australia alleges, Japan used before the war. Australia will insist that Japanese industrial trusts be broken up.

AUSTRALIAN PEACE PROPOSALS

Control of Japan:

As reported in telegram No. 78 of May 7th, Australia favours the establishment of an Allied Supervisory Commission for Japan to secure achievement of basic objectives of the Allied Powers. The Commission which would sit in Japan would be supported by Allied Garrison Forces. Australia suggests that the Garrison Forces should be under the undivided command of the United States and that the permanent Chairman of the Commission should be the representative of the United States. No term of life for the Commission has been suggested but the Australian view is that the necessity for its existence would continue for a long period.

Territorial Provisions:

The following territorial provisions are favoured:

(a) Korea (Chosen)

Korea eventually should be re-established as an independent state. In the meantime proposals for a Four-Power Trusteeship for a period up to five years should be considered.

(b) Manchuria

Japan should recognize the restoration of Manchuria to China.

(c) Dairen

The commercial port of Dairen should be internationalized.

(d) Port Arthur

The joint use of Port Arthur as a naval base by the U.S.S.R. and China should be recognized in accordance with the Section of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of August 14th, 1945, concerning agreement on Port Arthur.

(e) Southern Sakhalin (Karafuto)

The restoration of the southern half of Sakhalin, as well as the islands adjacent, to the U.S.S.R. should be recognized by Japan.

.... (f) Kurile

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(f) Kurile (Chishima) Islands

The handing over of the Kurile Islands to the U.S.S.R. should be recognized by Japan.

(g) Formosa (Taiwan)

Japan should recognize the restoration of Formosa to China.

(h) Pescadores

Japan should recognize the restoration of the Pescadores to China.

(i) Ryukyu (Liu Chiu) Islands

Japan should cede the Ryukyu Islands to the United States.

(j) Bonin Islands

Japan should cede the Bonin Islands to the United States.

(k) Volcano Islands

Japan should cede the Volcano Islands to the United States.

(l) Marshalls, Carolines and Marianas

Japan should renounce all rights and recognize the United States trusteeship, as approved by the Security Council.

(m) Marcus Islands

Japan should cede Marcus Islands to the United States.

(n) Spratley Islands

Japan should renounce her previous claim to the Spratley Islands, which should be placed under United States control.

(o) Quelpart (Saishu) Island

Japan should cede Quelpart Island to Korea.

(p) Tsushima Islands

The Tsushima Islands should remain under Japanese sovereignty.

(q) Japanese Claims in Antarctica

Japan should relinquish her claims to the Falkland Islands and Ross Dependencies.

.... Political:

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Political:

Australia will recommend:

(a) A review of the new constitution, which came into force on May 3rd, 1947, by a constituent body and its submission for approval by the Supervisory Commission before finalization by the constituent body and submission for adoption by Referendum of the Japanese people.

(b) A sweeping purge of objectionable Japanese from public office and provision for keeping them out of office.

(c) Japanese adherence to International Treaties and Agreements approved by the Allied Powers.

(d) Implementation by Japan of F.E.C. policy decisions on trade unions and education; implementation by Japan on land reform proposals made at the Sixth Meeting of the Allied Council for Japan and breaking up of the various undertakings controlled and operated by the respective Zaibatsu. For this purpose Corporations should be formed to take over the assets of the undertakings. Such Corporations might preferably be operated by Joint Stock Corporations rather than by the State, which if given control might adopt the tactics of the Zaibatsu.

(e) Japan should recognize the abolition of double nationality and should guarantee that secret ultra-nationalistic societies would be kept in check. The Japanese Government should undertake not to re-establish any special police and para-military organizations.

(f) No attempt should be made by the Japanese Government to re-adopt the system of providing State subsidies for Shinto shrines, clergy, or organizations.

(g) Japan should undertake to set up a democratic public service commission.

Japanese Rights and Interests outside Japan.

Japan should renounce all right and interests, both public and private located outside Japan.

Government and private assets should be set off against reparations claims.

Japanese fishing should be controlled strictly.

Japanese whaling equipment should be available as reparations.

Japan should be prevented from whaling in the Antarctic.

Japanese pearling should be subject to licence.

Japan should be prevented from pearling in Australian waters.

.... Disarmament

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Disarmament and Demilitarization.

Japan should remain completely disarmed and demilitarized.

No atomic research in Japan should be allowed.

All armament manufacture except the manufacture of small arms for the police and industrual explosives should be forbidden.

Merchant shipbuilding should be limited in size to a maximum of 5,000 tons per vessel. Total tonnage should be limited.

Prisoners of War and War Graves:

Japanese prisoners of war should be repatriated. The cost of repatriation should be borne by the Japanese Government.

The Japanese Government should make free grants of land, if requested, to Allied Powers for war graves.

War Criminals:

All war criminals should be brought to justice.

Reparation, Restitution, and Costs of Occupation:

Japan should make available reasonable reparations, taking into account the relative contribution of each nation to victory and its physical losses and damage, and the personal injuries and loss of life of its servicemen, internees and other nationals.

Japanese Government should undertake to make full restitution to United Nations nationals of seized property from Allied countries removed by Japanese agents.

Occupation costs should have priority over reparations.

Economic and Financial:

Commercial relations with other countries should be re-established with Japan after the signing of the Treaty.

Most Favoured Nation treatment should be granted to all members of the United Nations.

Japan should be granted access to, as distinguished from control of raw material.

The payment of debts owing to United Nations nationals by Japanese should be enforced by the Japanese Government subject to supervision of the Supervisory Commission.

Communications:

Civil Aviation

During the period of the authority of the Supervisory Commission for Japan, Japan should be forbidden to have an aviation manufacturing industry, and to operate aircraft.

.... Internal

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Internal aviation should be run by an international corporation.

International Relations:

The Supervisory Commission should approve all measures connected with the re-establishment of Japanese foreign relationships.

Japan should not maintain any armed forces at home or abroad.

CONCLUSION

It will be evident from the foregoing that Australia's ideas on the methods of converting Japan from an aggressive and totalitarian state to a peace-loving democracy are likely to come into conflict with those of other powers. The Australians expect that both the United Kingdom and the United States will not, for instance, share their views on economic controls. Differences with the United Kingdom Delegation at the forthcoming Canberra Conference are anticipated. No indication has been given of the stand Canada is expected to take at the Conference.

CANBERRA, A.C.T.
June 19, 1947.

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FROM: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO CHINA, NANKING

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA

SECRET

CYPHER - O.T.P. NANKING, July 9th, 1947.

NO. 243

No. 243. July 9th. Secret. Your despatch No. 172.

1. In strict confidence I had a hasty view of draft treaty with Japan prepared by a few friends in Australia appointed by Evatt who has not yet seen the same.

2. It provides for creation of a Supervisory Committee of representatives of nations making up Far Eastern Commission with United States representative as permanent Chairman.

3. Control of Japan proper would be vested in this Committee which would have sweeping powers, including decision as to length of time control would last. No provision made as yet placing this Committee in any way under United Nations.

4. Small military force under American Command to be based at Okinawa and I presume furnished by various nations which would continue military control until terminated by Committee. Not certain on make up.

5. Resumption of trade, control thereof and reparations (words omitted-repetition requested) draft provides complete abolition of all Japanese military forces, prohibition of production of all armaments and no access to raw materials suitable for the manufacture of arms except under Committee's control.

6. Provides right of access to approved raw materials but no ownership thereof in foreign lands.

7. Limits shipbuilding to ships under five-thirty thousand tons and then only such thereof as Committee feels

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necessary for coastal trade and sufficient international trade to permit nation to exist.

8. Prohibits all Japanese aviation and provides that necessary domestic lines to be operated by an international company or organization.

9. Provides Japanese police force for domestic purposes under final control of Committee who can use same to enforce orders of Committee.

10. Territorial adjustments much in line with your suggestions.

11. Reparations after amount fixed to be under control of Committee.

12. Balance of your list covered by draft but did not have time to gather anything but (words corrupt-repetition requested).

13. Will try and get Chinese plans later in the week.

CANADIAN AMBASSADOR.

Sent: 5:00 p.m.
Rec'd: 9:00 a.m.

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From The Christian Science Monitor, August 1, 1947.

EVATT WANTS JAPAN TO AID ITS VICTIMS

By Gordon Walker, Chief Far Eastern Correspondent of the Christian Science Monitor.

Tokyo.

The clearest statement of aims by any Allied power on the subject of Japan's coming peace treaty has been delivered by Australia here in the form of a proposal that the Japanese treaty be integrated by the Allies into an over-all plan for economic development of the entire Pacific area.

The proposals put forward by Dr. Herbert V. Evatt, Australian Minister for External Affairs, who is at present visiting Tokyo, are considered to be highly significant in view of the apparent efforts, led by Australia, to make the five British Commonwealth participants a solid voting bloc in any future peace conference.

The Evatt proposal was clear-cut and appeared to envisage a type of regionalism which would harness Japan in the future to the economic welfare of other Pacific nations, rather than merely delineate Japan's own development.

Cites U.N. Charter

The peace, Dr. Evatt stated, should be established in accordance with the objectives of the United Nations Charter - a peace which would give security from future agression and at the same time help raise the standards of living of all the peoples of South and East Asia and the Pacific.

"Gradual economic development of Japan should be part of the general plan for economic betterment of East and Southeast Asia and the Pacific as a whole", Dr. Evatt declared.

He inferred that too much attention is being given to peace treaty aims which would concern Japanese future living standards only in terms of foreign trade, industrial potential, and other fixed standards.

"It would be unjust if Japan's population obtained privileges and benefits denied to countries which she has devastated" Dr. Evatt asserted.

Envisages Control

The Australian Cabinet Minister further stated that Australia envisages a post-treaty supervisory allied control commission, which would, among its other duties, co-ordinate the Japanese economy with those of Pacific and Eastern Asiatic regions.

He referred specifically to the fact that the Allies are showing a tendency to view Japan's postwar economy in terms of a level comparable to that achieved by Japan in 1934. He

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exoressed the view that such a level should not be either underwritten or permitted - unless other Pacific nations acheived a commensurate level at the same time.

Thus Australia, for a long time the champion of little nations in the United Nations, stepped into the Japan peace treaty arena with a noteworthy proposal aimed at benefiting the little man throughout the Pacific.

This time, however, Australia does not claim to be itself a small nation in terms of voice, but a nation whose war effort entitles it to be one of the principals in any peace conference in Japan.

Australia to Play Key Role

Dr. Evatt stated that Australia accepts the democratic principle that despite varying contributions to the common victory, all nations which played any substantial part in the Pacific war should be represented at the forthcoming peace conference. And they went on to quote Gen. Douglas MacArthur's assertion that Australia had contributed immeasurably to the Pacific victory.

Whether or not Australia is capable of speaking for the other members of the British Commonwealth of Nations, meanwhile, still is an open question. But it is clear that when the Commonwealth nations hold their scheduled meeting on treaty policy next month in Canberra, Australia will play a major if not the chief role as the biggest contributor in the war against Japan.

Australia's pre-eminent role in Commonwealth policy toward Japan already has been indicated in the selection of an Australian as head of the Commonwealth representation on the Allied Control Council for Japan. Australia also has been selected as the site for the Commonwealth policy-making conference next month.

Some Accord Expected

It is probable for instance, that the other Commonwealth powers will agree with Australia on the regional aspects of the peace treaty aims.

It also is likely that the other Commonwealth powers will agree with Australia's proposal as reiterated here by Dr. Evatt, that the United States take over the former Japanese mandated islands, such as the Carolines, Marshalls, and Marianas.

Whether the United Kingdom will go along with Australia in its insistence on the United States formula rejecting a four-power preliminary discussion on the Japan peace treaty, however, is another question.

Dr. Evatt stated that Australia is irrevocably opposed to four-power preliminary discussions. He stated that all discussions should be by the eleven nations that participated in the Pacific

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fighting, and that a two-thirds majority should be required on all voting.

Dr. Evatt gave as his reason for an 11-nation conference the fact that the fundamentals of the treaty already have been accepted in the basic policy formulated in the Far Eastern Advisory Commission.

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CANADIAN EMBASSY

Washington, D.C., April 7, 1947.

No. 739

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to my teletype WA-959 of March 26 and to previous correspondence regarding the possibility of an early peace conference for Japan.

2. An informal meeting of Commonwealth representatives was held last week under the chairmanship of Sir George Sansom, but at the request of New Zealand, to discuss the general question of the peace conference and more particularly the continuing regime of control which might be imposed upon Japan. Sir George indicated that in his personal view he doubted whether any elaborate system of control involving the placing of Allied representatives in the various Japanese government departments, such as has apparently been considered by at least the Treasury in the U.K., wouldserve any purpose other than to annoy the Japanese. Insofar as the machinery is concerned, he feels that in informal "Council of Ambassadors" could do everything that any more elaborate body other than the United Nations itself might achieve, and from the standpoint of maintaining a check on Japanese activities, pointed out that properly staffed embassies before the war had been able to obtain a fairly accurate picture of practically everything except naval construction. On the side of sanctions, he tends to look back to the period at the turn of the century when the various foreign powers had in effect put Japan on probation, with the understanding that she would be accepted as a full member of the community of nations with regard to such things as commercial treaties, etc., as soon as the countries concerned were reasonably satisfied with Japan's administration insofar as it affected foreign interests. He suggested, therefore that complete tariff autonomy and the right to negotiate treaties might be withheld until it is considered that Japan has fulfilled her obligations to the Allied powers and has shown convincing evidence of a desire to maintain a democratic regime. The final privilege to be granted at the end of any such probationary period would be full membership in the United Nations. Sir George recognized that this suggestion would probably be directly counter to United States thinking on the subject, and suspected that the United States approach would be to get the Japanese into as many international organizations as possible on the assumption that their early participation would have a beneficial effect upon their international outlook. For this reason, among others, he thought that we should all give serious consideration to the problem, in order that we might not be caught unprepared by a

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The Secretary of State
for External Affairs,
OTTAWA, Canada.

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fully developed United States plan in the same manner as the other nations had been unprepared to participate fully in the development of policy for the occupation of Japan.

3. The Australian representative indicated that they were thinking in terms of some sort of Pacific Council under the United Nations but without a veto. To study the problems connected with the peace conference and the subsequent regime of control, Australia has already set up a Committee headed by Sir Frederick Eggleston, and including the Ambassador to China, the Commonwealth representative on the Allied Control Council in Japan and the Australian representative on the F.E.C.

4. On the procedural side, no one had anything very definite to suggest, although New Zealand, like ourselves, is concerned with the part which countries other than the Big Four will be permitted to play. It seems to be generally agreed, however, that although the F.E.C. might not be permitted to take part in the preparation for the peace conference, its very existence might well constitute a precedent for greater participation by the non-veto powers than has been the case in Europe.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

(Sgd.) H.H. Wrong

Ambassador.

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SECRET

OFFICE OF THE

HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR CANADA,

CANADA HOUSE,

London, S.W.1.

No. A. 627. 17th July, 1947.

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to your despatch No. 1241 of June 30th and other communications concerning the meeting of Commonwealth representatives in Canberra to discuss questions relating to the Japanese Peace Settlement.

2. We shall endeavour to forward to you as soon as possible as much information as we can obtain on United Kingdom views on the subjects to be discussed at Canberra. It would be more useful for you, I think, to have copies of United Kingdom working papers rather than our interpretations based on oral discussions. Mr. Holmes has been negotiating privately with the officials concerned, and had hoped that some of these papers might have been available before this. The chief difficulty is that the officials concerned are naturally hesitant about letting us see these papers in their early stages unless they also make them available to representatives of other Commonwealth countries. They fear, however, that any advance indication of their views which reached Canberra might be the subject of official telegrams from Dr. Evatt. They are quite prepared to discuss their views and moderate them in the course of the Canberra talks, but they do not wish to carry on a telegraphic controversy with the Australians on the basis of purely tentative working papers before the Conference opens. Mr. Holmes is hoping, however, that he may secure more documents privately and confidentially, and I think it would be best that these, if obtained, should be sent by him informally to Mr. Menzies. If you wish to ask any questions or make any comments on these papers it would be desirable that they should be made through this office.

3. In paragraph 3 of your despatch No. 1241 you state that the opinion has been expressed in some quarters that the United Kingdom might be inclined to go a considerable way to accommodate Australian views on procedural matters. I am surprised to hear this opinion, as our impressions of United Kingdom intentions had been quite different. In this connection I should like to refer you, in particular, to Mr. Holmes' letter of 27th June to Mr. Pearson, in which he described the views expressed by Sir Eric Machtig to Mr. Kenneth Greene. Sir Eric seemed not at all disposed to accept an Australian proposal for unified

/Commonwealth

The Right Honourable
The Secretary of State for External Affairs,
Ottawa.

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Commonwealth representation if this were put forward. It may be, of course, that because of the precedent established in Tokyo by which an Australian representative acts for several Commonwealth countries, some analagous arrangement might develop for the Peace Conference. I hardly think, however, that this would be welcomed by the United Kingdom. From our point of view I do not think anyone here, and, so far as I can judge, In Canberra, has the slightest illusion that we should be prepared to participate in any arrangement according to which the Commonwealth would have a single spokesman.

4. As for the arrangements for the Conference, Mr. Holmes has just seen a series of telegraphic exchanges between the United Kingdom High Commissioner in Canberra and the Commonwealth Relations Office, which are reassuring on the subject of Australian intentions. The Commonwealth Relations Office had asked their High Commissioner to make enquiries about plans, as they feared that the Australians might be contemplating a conference elaborate in scale and with a good deal of publicity. However, the Secretary of the Australian External Affairs Department, Mr. Burton, told the United Kingdom representative that they had in mind an informal exchange of views very much along the lines of the meetings of Commonwealth Ministers which have been held in London. They did not contemplate holding any public sessions and would prefer that the press be provided from time to time with agreed communiques according to the precedents established in the London meetings. They did not propose to table any working papers at the Conference lest it might be assumed that they were trying to secure the consent of other representatives to their policy. Their policy, was, in fact, not determined. They were entering the discussions with an open mind, and Burton said also that any papers which they might have prepared now would probably have to be altered as a result of Dr. Evatt's talks in Tokyo. Mr. Burton expressed some dismay at the large number of delegates from the United Kingdom. The Australians, he said, had thought in terms of about five persons on each delegation. They were planning to have the conference round a table which would seat only about 25 persons and as many advisers.

5. As you know, India will be represented at the Canberra Conference. However, the Conference is due to open eleven days after the division of India. It is not yet known here whether India and Pakistan will be represented by a single delegation chosen before the dissolution of the single State, or whether Pakistan might ask to send a separate delegation.

6. A more difficult problem for the United Kingdom is the question of Burma. I regret that we have not yet replied to your telegram No. 1086 of 5th July, in which you

/asked

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asked us to secure United Kingdom views on the possible participation of the Mongolian People's Republic Indonesia, Burma, Ceylon, Pakistan, and India in the Japanese settlement. The question in your telegram was immediately put to the United Kingdom authorities, but they do not, as yet, seem to have made up their minds on the subject. I believe that there is, in fact, some not unnatural difference of opinion among Government Departments. The Burma Office and the Colonial Office have been pressing for an invitation to Burma to attend the Canberra talks. Even though the Burmese have declared their intention of leaving the Commonwealth, it is being argued by some that even at this late hour efforts might be made to show the Burmese the advantages of the Commonwealth association. My impression, however, is that the C.R.O. takes the view that Burma has decided to leave the Commonwealth and that she should therefore be excluded from its privileges. It is taken for granted, of course, that an invitation to Burma would have to come from the Australian Government, and that no action would be taken without consultation among the member States. Whether the question is actually raised depends on the outcome of the argument going on in Whitehall. Apparently the Burmese themselves have not been sounded out as to whether or not they would like to go to Canberra. There is no question of Ceylon being included in the Canberra discussions, as her new status will not have been achieved for some time yet. Whether or not she will be a candidate for a place in the "Japanese Peace Conference" will depend on her status at the time.

7. As for the participation of the above-mentioned states in the treaty discussions, the United Kingdom are, I think, committed to the view that these discussions should, in the first place, be among the members of the Far Eastern Commission. It seems to be the opinion in Government Departments that they were committed to this policy by Mr. Bevin's statement to this effect at Margate. In view of the fact that General Hilldring has proposed initial discussions among the eleven states members of the F.E.C., the United Kingdom are not likely to press for additions. Their chief concern in this regard has been over South Africa, but they still have had little indication of anxiety on the part of the South Africans to take part. They will, however, be likely to agree with the United States view that in the second stage there should be a general conference of all states who were at war with Japan. At this stage they would certainly support the inclusion of Burma. I am sorry that we have not yet been able to secure any United Kingdom views on the inclusion at any stage of the Mongolian People's Republic, Indonesia, or Viet-Man.

8. Up to the present there has been little public discussion of the Canberra Conference or the Japanese settlement. However, the announcement in the press this morning of the United States invitation to F.E.C. members

/will

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will probably attract attention. I am enclosing the text of the comment by "The Times" Diplomatic Correspondent who has been made aware of the difficulties concerning Indian and Burmese participation. He also suggests that the importance Canada attaches to the meeting in Canberra may be judged by the nomination of Mr. Claxton. This comment reflects a certain amount of anxiety here about the Canadian reaction to the United States invitation, as it is taken for granted that we are less enthusiastic than other members of the Commonwealth about the meeting in Canberra and more sensitive to the wishes of the United States.

9. I am sending copies of this despatch to Canberra, Wellington, Pretoria and Moscow.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,

Your obedient servant,

(Sgd.) Frederick Hudd
(For) High Commissioner.

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EXTRACT FROM "THE TIMES, dated July 17th, 1947.

JAPANESE PEACE TREATY

.....

OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

Our Diplomatic Correspondent writes:-

There are other considerations which may have played some part in deciding the British Government to ask for a postponement. South Africa and Burma, countries which, although not members of the Far Eastern Commission, have a vital interest in the security of the Indian Ocean, have each expressed a wish to have some say in the drafting of the treaty with Japan. Moreover, by August 19, the division of India into two dominions will have become effective. It therefore seems that the composition of the conference, at present confined to 11 nations, may, at least in one case, need revision.

Canada has marked her sense of the importance of the Canberra meeting by nominating as the leader of her delegation the Minister of National Defence, Mr. Brooke Claxton, who has already had experience of the procedure of peace conferences, since he headed the Canadian delegation in Paris after the departure of the Prime Minister.

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C 272251

CANADIAN EMBASSY

Washington, D.C., April 12, 1947.

Dear Mr. Pearson:

Mr. Stone and Mr. Collins called yesterday on Mr. John Carter Vincent, head of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs in the State Department, and had with him an informal discussion of U.S. views on the Japanese peace settlement.

Although Mr. Vincent was careful to explain that there was as yet no official policy on this subject, and that he had not discussed it with General Marshall, he seemed quite willing to give us his own personal views. While he obviously would prefer to keep the Far Eastern Commission entirely out of the peace settlement, he agreed that the existence of the Commission would probably preclude any serious consideration of a treaty dictated by the four "veto" powers and would almost of necessity mean that all eleven countries represented on the F.E.C. would be fully associated in the negotiations. Mr. Vincent thought there might be some pressure from the U.S.S.R. to increase the number of active participants by the addition of the Outer Mongolian Republic, but he doubted very much whether it would be feasible to reduce the number below the eleven countries now on the F.E.C. One of the reasons, incidentally, why he does not want the Commission itself to play any part is that he hopes that veto would be eliminated in whatever conference is established.

/On the

L. B. Pearson, Esq.,
Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs,
OTTAWA, Canada.

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On the question of timing, Mr. Vincent, pointed out that the positions of the United States and the Soviet Union are reversed in the European and Far Eastern situations, and that it would be preferable, from the standpoint of the United States, to complete the job of squeezing concessions out of the U.S.S.R. on Germany before being placed in the position of having to resist the expected Soviet demands for concessions in Japan. He doubted very much, however, whether it would be possible to complete the European treaties before preparations are made for the Japanese settlement, and suggested that a preliminary procedural conference might well be held early this summer.

Mr. Vincent did not seem to have any very definite opinion on the specific regime of control to be maintained after the signing of the peace, but he had obviously been approached by the British, as he mentioned, among other possible alternatives, the informal "Council of Ambassadors" which has been suggested by Sir George Sansom and to which I referred in my despatch No. 739 of April 7. He himself would like to see the Far Eastern Commission dissolved as soon as the treaty is completed, and would be against any positive provisions in the treaty requiring the Japanese to achieve any particular standards. He would prefer a minimum of essential negative provisions in the interests of security, and would apparently like to see complete sovereignty restored to the Japanese as soon as possible. While his remarks on this general subject were fairly vague, it seems that he is not very receptive to the British suggestion that various rights, such as those of making independent commercial treaties, should be withheld from Japan until the Allied Powers are satisfied of her good intentions.

The net impression was that the State Department are assuming that Canada and the other F.E.C. countries will probably be fully associated in the Japanese peace settlement, and that the State Department would welcome any practical suggestions that we might care to offer.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd.) H. H. Wrong

Ambassador.

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C272253

FROM: THE CANADIAN LIAISON MISSION, TOKYO, JAPAN

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA

SECRET

TOKYO, May 2nd, 1947.

CYPHER - O.T.P.

NO. 81

No. 81. May 2nd. Secret. Your telegram No. 76. I have informally talked to Mr. Ball and Mr. Atcheson along lines set forth in your telegram under reference.

1. Mr. Ball's views:

(a) As you know, Doctor Evatt has publicly expressed desire for an early Peace Treaty with Japan. Australian Government is most anxious to play a direct part in drafting Japanese Peace Treaty. The Powers concerned would be the eleven now represented in F.E.C. Actual peace drafting body would be preferably successor to F.E.C.

(b) If full independence achieved, Korean Government might be invited to join eleven power Congress.

(c) Australian Government desires strict carrying out of demilitarization and demobilization.

(d) Some control over Japan, not necessarily military, should be maintained for at least a generation.

(e) Precise type of control and powers directly responsible for maintaining it should not be decided now but at the Peace Conference.

2. Mr. Atcheson's views:

(a) State Department has been working on draft treaty for some time. He had promised to show me as soon as possible, some parts of this draft; I have been holding this telegram in the hope of seeing it but decided not to wait longer. Mr. Atcheson was unable to say when United States Government would make known officially its plans

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for convening Peace Conference, but SCAP was particularly anxious to see Peace Conference convened as soon as practicable. Failure of Moscow Conference strengthened this view.

(b) United States expects Soviet Government to insist on Four Power settlement but United States will endeavour to broaden it to include the eleven Powers. F.E.C. as presently constituted, considered unsuitable body for drafting treaty.

(c) Preparatory work in drafting treaty might be done conveniently in Tokyo.

(d) Post-occupation control as stated recently by SCAP should be vested in United Nations. Mr. Atcheson was vague as to practical details on this point. (It might be observed that Pacific islands are to be administered by United States under a United Nation authority).

3. I have been informed reliably that Japanese Government may be invited to report its views, without prejudice, to Peace Commissioners.

4. Former Foreign Office officials now employed in Central Liaison Office have been working on a series of data papers relating to Japanese hopes for peace settlement. These include inter alia

(a) Request to maintain armed force of one hundred thousand. (This decision Foreign Office seems rather unfortunate in view of German experience following first world war).

(b) Small air force to patrol coast and outlying islands.

(c) Retain Kuriles and possibly southern Sakhalin as a bulwark against Soviet.

(d) Ryukyus administered for some time by United States but would hope eventually to maintain Japanese sovereignty over these islands.

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(e) Despite whatever post-occupation controls may be devised, Japanese hope that United States or United Nations will not maintain long-term military or naval bases in Japan proper as this induces among Japanese a "Colonial-minded" psychology.

5. While these views of the Japanese have not been officially presented, I understand that there is considerable sympathy for them in General Headquarters.

6. I hope to be able to send you further information on this subject in the near future.

NORMAN

Rec'd: 11:55 a.m.

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C 272256

CANADIAN LIAISON MISSION

Tokyo, June 18, 1947.

No. 147

SECRET

Sir,

I have the honour to report on a conversation I had with Mr. Atcheson yesterday in which I raised some points mentioned in your telegram 129 of June 12th.

2. I explained my visit on the grounds that as a matter of general interest in the peace treaty I would appreciate his views on some aspects of the problem. I reminded him of his offer, reported in my telegram No. 81 of May 2nd, to show me something of the State Department's draft. He stated that what he had in mind was simply the documentation contained in the State Department publication "Occupation of Japan - Policy and Progress", which we already possess here. Obviously there was some misunderstanding because I understood his offer to include some background study of the peace settlement, but in the circumstances I felt I could not pursue the matter further.

3. Among the views he expressed to me, which he emphasized were merely personal, was that he would like to see Japan enter the United Nations and affiliated organizations as soon as the Peace Treaty is signed.

4. He did not think that there would be any danger from ultra-nationalistic societies in the future because he felt the majority of Japanese, particularly the Government, are anxious to rehabilitate themselves in the eyes of the world. He said he felt the Japanese would do their utmost to follow U.S. wishes; he felt that no country is more friendly disposed to the United States than Japan; that Japan should accordingly regard any security measures such as air bases in neighbouring islands as more of a protection than a threat.

5. While Mr. Atcheson felt that the Russians might be difficult on a number of points, their position in the Far East was so much weaker than in the German settlement, they could not successfully oppose the convening of the eleven nations for a peace convention. He felt that perhaps the Chinese, whose government-controlled press has expressed increasingly hostile views on the occupation, would prove as difficult a delegation as the Russian. He said that the Chinese were finally realizing their early expectations on reparations were highly inflated, and to cover their disappointment were accusing SCAP of retaining military potential in Japan.

6. In referring briefly to Mr. Ashida's, the new Foreign Minister's statement reported some time ago in the press when the latter expressed the hope that Japan might be permitted to retain the Kuriles and Okinawa for sentimental reasons, he said that the statement was very foolish and ill-

The Right Honourable
The Secretary of State for External Affairs,
O T T A W A, Canada.

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timed, and could only arouse Russian and Chinese ire. He felt that this view, however, was typical of some of the old-style Japanese officials who were still thinking in an outmoded fashion. However, he felt that even the men of his type would be sufficiently sensitive to world opinion, the United States in particular, not to adopt any policy which would arouse the suspicion of the Western world.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient servant,
(Signed) E.H. Norman.

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TELETYPE

SECRET

From THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES

To THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, July 11th, 1947.

CYPHER - TK

WA-2190

WA-2190. Peace Conference for Japan.

Following is the text of a proposal made simultaneously by General Hilldring this afternoon to representatives of all countries members of the Far Eastern Commission with the exception of the U.S.S.R., as the Soviet Ambassador was unable to be present. Begins:

Record of oral statement on Peace Treaty for Japan

The Government of the United States desires to hold, as soon as practicable, a Conference composed of representatives from the 11 States members of the Far Eastern Commission to discuss a Peace Treaty for Japan, but such a Conference to be outside the Far Eastern Commission. Such an 11-Power Conference is advocated because it would provide a broad representative basis of participation to include all of those nations with a primary interest in Japan. It is the view of this Government that other States at war with Japan should be given an opportunity to present their views while the Treaty is being drafted and that after the draft has reached a sufficiently advanced stage, it should be considered by a general conference of all the States at war with Japan.

This Government further suggests a tentative date of August 19, 1947, for convening an initial Peace Conference. In view of the various commitments of the Foreign Ministers of the Governments concerned, it does not appear practicable to the Government of the United States to propose that

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such a Conference be on the Foreign Minister Level, so that it is envisaged that it would initially be composed of Deputies and experts. The Government of the United States should be pleased to be host for such a Conference in or near Washington or at San Francisco if preferred by other interested Powers.

With regard to voting procedure to be adopted at such a Conference, this Government is disposed to favor decision by a simple two-thirds majority.

The meeting today is being held with representatives of States members of the Far Eastern Commission in order to obtain such positive views as they may have on the various questions relating to the drafting of the Peace Treaty with Japan. This Government would appreciate an expression of the views of your Government on the points raised above and on any other questions concerning a Japanese Peace Conference. It is anticipated that your Government will wish to consider these suggestions prior to expressing its views, and, consequently, officers of this Government will be ready to discuss these matters individually with representatives of your Government as soon as it is convenient for you to express your views. Ends.

2. The most obvious remark in connection with this proposal is that it would appear to be deliberately designed to forestall the Commonwealth Conference at Canberra, although State Department officials phrase it that the Canberra Conference has not prevented them from putting forward this proposal which is alleged to have been developing for some time.

3. General Hilldring made it clear that the United States wished to have full consultation with all 11 countries regarding this suggestion, with the intention of settling all

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procedural questions before the Conference convenes. It is the intention then that the Deputies and experts should proceed to work out a draft treaty. At a later stage, the Conference would go into the second phase in which it would be hoped that the Foreign Ministers themselves could give the draft their final approval. At a still later date, the formal Peace Conference of all belligerents would be called.

4. General Hilldring stated that the reason for suggesting that Deputies and experts undertake the initial work was primarily the tight schedule facing the Foreign Ministers over the next six months, but that he had also been influenced by the success which had attended the work of the Deputies in connection with the European Peace Settlement. As their Deputy, the United States are thinking in terms of a retired Ambassador.

5. With reference to the proposal that other States at war with Japan should be given an opportunity to present their views while the Treaty is being drafted, General Hilldring stated that he had no definite ideas at this stage as to how the other countries should be associated in the work of the Conference, but that it was not expected that they should present their views until the draft had reached a relatively advanced stage.

6. The State Department hopes, somewhat wistfully, to keep this proposal out of the press until the interested Governments have had an opportunity to express their views. They seem to expect, however, that there is a good chance that a leak may occur over the weekend.

CANADIAN AMBASSADOR

Rec'd: 6.37 p.m.

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C272261

TELETYPE

From THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES

To THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

CYPHER - TK WASHINGTON, July 16th, 1947.

WA_2241

WA-2241. My WA_2233 of July 16th. Japanese Peace Treaty.

Following is text of official press release of today's date, Begins:

The Honourable John H. Hilldring, Assistant Secretary for Occupied Areas, and Mr. John Carter Vincent, Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, met Friday afternoon, July 11th, with Embassy representatives of the United Kingdom, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, the Philippines, India, Australia, New Zealand, France, the Netherlands, and Canada to lay before them proposals in regard to a Conference on a Japanese Peace Treaty.

The representatives were informed that the United States Government desires to hold a Conference to discuss a Peace Treaty for Japan as soon as practicable. The Conference would be composed of representatives of the eleven States members of the Far Eastern Commission, but the Conference would be outside the Far Eastern Commission. Such an Eleven-Power Conference is advocated because it would provide a broad representative basis of participation to include all of those nations with a primary interest in Japan. It is the view of the United States Government that other States at war with Japan should be given an opportunity to present their views while the Treaty is being drafted and that after the draft has reached a sufficiently advanced stage, it should be

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C 272262

considered by a General Conference of all the States at war with Japan.

A tentative date of August 19th, 1947, was suggested to the Embassy representatives for convening a Conference. In view of the various commitments of the Foreign Ministers of the Governments concerned, it does not appear practicable to the Government of the United States to propose that such a Conference be on the Foreign Minister level, so that it is envisaged that it would initially be composed of Deputies and experts. The Government of the United States should be pleased to be host for such a Conference if desired by other interested Powers.

The Embassy representatives were informed of the United States desire to obtain the views of the other concerned Governments on the various questions relating to the drafting of a Peace Treaty for Japan and were invited to discuss the matter further after they had had an opportunity to consult with their respective Governments. Ends.

CANADIAN AMBASSADOR

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C 272263

FROM: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO CHINA, NANKING

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA.

S E C R E T

CYPHER - O.T.P.

No. 258 NANKING, July 17th, 1947.

No. 258. July 17th. Secret. Reference Japanese Peace Treaty. Had talk with Yeh, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, today.

1. Australia has lodged objection here against date of proposed preliminary conference in the United States and wants postponement thereof.

2. China has notified the United States that she approves holding Conference and date thereof.

3. Seems pleased that strategy will likely block Australian Conference.

4. China wants Treaty completed as early as possible to clear the air out here.

5. Evidently very desirous of elimination of MacArthur control at the earliest possible moment.

6. China feels that if agreement must be reached on contents of treaty by arrangement with Allied Powers, Russia will use the veto thus provided to prevent Treaty as she has done in the case of Germany.

7. China concurs in American proposal that two-thirds-rule shall apply, subject to the following amendment.

8. That the two-thirds must always include majority of Big Four present and voting.

9. Alleges that while he knows Commonwealth does not generally vote as a bloc, still fears that if it did, it would virtually control all decisions under two-thirds rule.

CANADIAN AMBASSADOR.

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FROM: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO CHINA, NANKING.

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA.

SECRET

CYPHER - O.T.P.

No. 259 NANKING, July 17th, 1947.

No. 259. July 17th. Secret.

Reference Japanese Peace Treaty.

Yeh, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Discussing contents of proposed Treaty, says that:

1. Japan must be completely demilitarized and prevented from operating any heavy industries capable of being used for armament purposes.

2. Japan must be subject to control Commission made up of four Allied Powers for a period of ten years.

3. By assuming (work corrupt) ceiling must be placed on her foreign trade and she must be permitted to reach such ceiling within ten years.

4. Peace treaty must not be a vindictive one.

5. China needs a strong peaceful democratic Japan shorn of military potential and with decent living standards.

6. Reparations must be reasonable.

7. Russia has received more than her share in alleged war booty she looted in Manchuria.

8. Does not look with favour upon any control subsequently by United Nations.

9. My reference to Big Four means China, United States, Russia and Great Britain.

10. No final draft of Treaty yet decided upon.

CANADIAN AMBASSADOR.

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C 272265

CONFIDENTIAL

CANADIAN EMBASSY

Paris, 25th July, 1947.

NO. 506

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to your despatch No. 421 of June 26th concerning the peace settlement with Japan. On the 16th of July I paid a call on M. Baudet, Directeur d'Asie-Oceanie Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with the object of talking over with him in an informal way some of the questions involved in the peace treaty with Japan. M. Baudet started the conversation by telling me of the United States proposal to hold a preliminary conference composed of the states represented on the Far Eastern Commission. This was the first I had heard of the United States proposal which had not yet become public. M. Baudet expressed his gratification at this move on the part of the United States Government. In particular he commented favorably upon the proposal that decisions at this preliminary conference should be taken by a two-thirds majority. This, as he pointed out, would mean that the Soviet Government's veto could not be employed. The French Government, he added, had never liked the existence of the veto power in the Far Eastern Commission.

2. I then attempted, I fear quite unsuccessfully, to draw M. Baudet out further on some of the questions of procedure mentioned in your despatch under reference and also on questions of substance relating to the Japanese peace settlement. He was not at all forthcoming and I shall have to seek another opportunity to discuss these aspects of the settlement with other French officials.

3. I also raised the question of the Japanese peace settlement in the course of conversation at luncheon today with M. Dennery, Directeur d'Amerique, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. M. Dennery said that the French Government were very much interested in the peace settlement with Japan. When I pressed M. Dennery for some indication of French views, however, he contented himself with saying that on the one hand the return

The Secretary of State

for External Affairs,

OTTAWA.

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of Japan to her place in the international community was necessary. On the other hand, it would be necessary to insure that Japan should not again become a threat to security in the Far East. It was a question of striking a balance between these two considerations.

4. M. Dennery then mentioned the forthcoming Commonwealth meeting to be held in Canberra in August to discuss the Japanese peace settlement. He wondered whether the United States in choosing August as the month in which to hold the eleven-power preliminary meeting on the Japanese peace treaty had not deliberately intended the date to clash with that of the Commonwealth meeting. M. Dennery asked me whether we thought the Americans would be concerned at the idea of a "crystallization" of Commonwealth opinion as a result of the Canberra meeting before the conference took place. I said that if "crystallization" meant the taking of hard and fast decisions by the Commonwealth representatives at Canberra this was certainly not the conception of the Canadian Government. I pointed out that the idea of the Canberra meeting had originated with Dr. Evatt. So far as the Canadian Government were concerned we considered it as an occasion for mutual exchanges of views of a purely exploratory and preliminary character. M. Dennery asked whether other Pacific problems in addition to the Japanese peace treaty would be discussed at Canberra. I said that it was the Canadian Government's understanding that the discussions would be confined to the Japanese peace treaty.

5. I am enclosing herewith a clipping from "Le Monde" of the 26th of July which is interesting in view of the fact that "Le Monde" is very close to the Quai d'Orsay and its leading articles are generally regarded as being "inspired" by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

6. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the High Commissioner for Canada in London.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant.

(Sgd.) C.S.A. Ritchie
Counsellor.

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C272267

LE MONDE 26 juillet 1947

LES AMERICAINS ET LE JAPON

Alors que, depuis la conférence à trois de Moscou, l'Extrême-Orient semblait épargné par les rivalités internationales, l'invitation lancée par les Etats-Unis aux onze nations de la commission consultative de Washington pour une conférence préliminaire de la paix avec le Japon vient de déclencher une querelle dont les développements, aisément prévisibles, rappellent curieusement les disputes européennes au sujet de l'Allemagne.

A l'invitation américaine la diplomatie soviétique, fidèle à une coutume solidement établie, n'a pas tardé a répondre non. Les raisons de ce refus sont, à vrai dire, assez fortes. Se référant aux décisions prises pendant la guerre au Caire, à Yalta et à Potsdam, le Kremlin fait valoir que l'initiative "unilatérale" de Washington est contraire à l'esprit des accords conclus en ces trois occasions entre les quatre belligérants, et affirme que seul le conseil des ministres des affaires étrangères de l'U.R.S.S., des Etats-Unis, de Grande-Bretagne et de Chine était habilité à prendre une telle mesure. Il est évident que les Russes, déjà pratiquement isolés dans les conseils d'Extrême-Orient, entendent ainsi sauvegarder le privilège du veto dont ils disposent au sein de la commission consultative. A quoi les Américains répliquent que rien dans les textes cités, et notamment dans la déclaration de Potsdam, ne légitime expressément une interprétation aussi restrictive.

Des autres invités, seuls jusqu'ici les Pays-Bas, soucieux, on le devine, de ne pas mécontenter en ce moment le State Department, ont répondu oui sans ambages. La Grande-Bretagne, d'accord sur la procédure proposée par les Etats-Unis, demande seulement que la conférence, fixée d'abord au 19 août, soit reculée jusqu'en septembre, après celle qui, à Canberra, doit réunir les représentants du Commonwealth britannique. Car l'Angleterre, en l'occurrence, ne saurait négliger l'avis de ses dominions. Et cependant qu'elle sollicite pour l'Union Sud-Africaine, la Birmanie et même le Pakistan nouveau-né un siège à la table de la paix, elle doit prêter l'oreille aux prétentions de l'Australie, dont le fougueux ministre des affaires étrangères entend placer son mot dès l'ouverture des débats. La Chine n'a pas encore fait connaître sa réponse; mais, sans parler de l'idée d'une paix séparée, qu'elle semble garder en tête, il est peu probable qu'elle soit disposée à lâcher sans contre-partie, elle aussi, son droit de veto. La France enfin se réserve; tout au plus peut-on supposer que la formule américaine, qui la rétablit sur un pied d'égalité par rapport à ses partenaires de la commission consultative ne doit pas être pour lui déplaire.

Ce qui fait la gravité de ces disputes de procédure, c'est qu'elles recouvrent des divergences plus sérieuses encore sur les conceptions mêmes de la paix avec le Japon. La politique des Etats-Unis se dessine clairement. En Asie comme en Europe, las des difficultés qu'ils n'ont cessé de rencontrer auprès de leurs anciens alliés, ils envisagent sans répugnance une collaboration avec les vaincus d'hier, dont le soutien, aujourd'hui, grève inutilement leurs finances, et dont le concours, demain, moyennant quelques précautions d'ordre militaire et politique, leur serait d'un rendement autrement efficace. Aussi bien la Chine, comme la France, ne peut-elle que protester, en demandant qu'un ordre de priorité soit observé dans le relèvement des pays ruinés par la guerre. La discussion des réparations, là-bas comme ici, se poursuit sans issue; ce sera bientôt celle du niveau de

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l'industrie nippone. Querelles où l'U.R.S.S., peu désireuse de voir s'élever à ses frontières, grâce aux cartels de la Ruhr ou aux trusts Mitsui, de redoutables bastions américains, fait, à l'Est comme la l'Ouest, entendre la même voix. Le seul élément original est la question raciale, Australie et Nouvelle-Zélande s'inquiétant plus que jamais du fourmillement jaune, auquel la politique du "shôgun Mac Arthur" risque de donner un nouvel essor.

Mais ce qui confère au problème un aspect tout autre, c'est que le Japon, au contraire de l'Allemagne, est dans la main d'un seul occupant. Nul n'ignore, même à Moscou, que les Etats-Unis, s'ils le veulent, auront là bas le dernier mot. Et le désastre économique qui menace aujourd'hui le Japon suffirait, s'il était besoin, à renforcer leur volonté. Sans doute la pauvreté foncière de l'archipel nippon, qui ne recèle en ses frontières en quantité suffisante aucune des matières premières nécessaires à la guerre moderne, rend-elle son relèvement imcomparablement moins dangereux que celui de l'Allemagne. La paix en Extrême-Orient n'en réunit pas moins tous les éléments d'un conflit pareil à celui qui se déchaîne actuellement en Europe. Triste consolation.

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C 272269

CANADIAN EMBASSY

Paris, 28th July, 1947.

CONFIDENTIAL

NO. 509

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to Mr. Ritchie's despatch, No. 506 of July 25th, concerning the peace settlement with Japan, and your despatch No. 493 of July 14th asking whether any information is available regarding the French delegation to the forthcoming conference on the Japanese peace treaty. Mr. Ritchie today paid a visit to the Quai d'Orsay where he had an informal talk with M. de Boissaison of the Direction d'Asie-Oceanie.

2. M. de Boissaison began by saying that the Quai d'Orsay had informed the French Ambassador in Washington that the procedure suggested by the United States for the preliminary conference on the peace treaty with Japan was quite satisfactory to the French Government with the proviso that any decisions reached at this preliminary stage should not be considered as binding on the Governments represented. Such decisions if reached by a two-thirds majority must certainly receive full consideration at the later conference of the eleven foreign ministers.

3. M. de Boissaison said that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs understood from M. Massigli that the United Kingdom Government favoured holding the conference of the eleven foreign ministers first and the Conference of experts later. He said that the Foreign Office had explained to M. Massigli that in their view the foreign ministers conference should take broad decisions in principle and draw up directives for the work of the conference of officials. In this way the latter conference would have guidance in its work. After officials had worked out the details of the treaty with Japan in accordance with the directives of the Conference of Foreign Ministers, the draft treaty would have to be re-submitted to the Conference of Foreign Ministers for final approval. M. de Boissaison said that the French Government had no particular views on this question of procedure. The French Ambassador in Washington had been instructed to say to the United States Government that if an alteration in the procedure of the kind suggested by the United Kingdom Government seemed desirable to the other Governments represented the French Government would have no objection to it.

4. Mr. Ritchie referred to the Soviet's refusal to attend the preliminary conference proposed by the United States Government and to their alternative proposal that the Japanese peace settle-

The Secretary of State for
External Affairs,
OTTAWA

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ment should be dealt with through four members of the Council of Foreign Ministers: the United States, United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and China. M. de Noissaison said that this procedure would obviously be undesirable from the French point of view. The United States invitation to an eleven-member conference had been welcomed to the French Government because it had seemed to rescue them from an awkward predicament. The French Government could hardly accept the procedure suggested by the Soviet Government which did not place France on an equal footing with the other four members of the Council of Foreign Ministers in matters affecting Japan. On the other hand, the four powers represented at Potsdam when the constitution of the Council of Foreign Ministers had been decided upon had probably not contemplated that France would be associated with them on a footing of equality in drawing up the Japanese peace treaty. It had to be admitted, M. de Boissaison added, that France had not the same degree of direct interest in the Pacific as the other four members of the Council.

5. The conversation then turned on the Canberra meeting of the countries of the British Commonwealth. M. de Boissaison said that while he appreciated that it was not intended to take hard and fast decisions at Canberra no doubt a general line of policy would be approved as applying to the countries of the Commonwealth. Mr. Ritchie explained the Canadian point of view concerning the Canberra meeting in much the same terms as he had used in talking to M. Dennery on the same subject (see my despatch under reference). He emphasized that the Canadian Government regarded the Canberra meeting as being of an exploratory character. M. de Boissaison said that he was aware that the Canadian Government were anxious that it should not be thought that a British bloc was being formed at Canberra. This point of view had been explained to the French Ambassador in Ottawa by the Department of External Affairs.

6. So far as the date of the preliminary conference on the Japanese peace treaty was concerned M. de Boissaison said that the French Government had no strong feeling one way or the other. He supposed that the date of the preliminary conference would be postponed so that it would not clash with the Canberra meeting. One had to remember that the United Nations would be meeting about mid-September.

7. Mr. Ritchie enquired whether the French Government had taken any decision as to the policy which the French delegation would follow on questions of substance at the preliminary conference. M. de Boissaison said that in fact the French authorities had not yet given any very detailed study to the questions involved. The direct interest of France in the peace treaty with Japan was of a very limited kind. The French delegation would doubtless follow the policy of moderation and of compromise if differences should arise among the powers more directly concerned than France. They would go to the conference "les mains dans les poches", an expression which Mr. Ritchie took to mean that they would have no very definite programme of French demands and no elaborate and detailed instructions on the different points involved in

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the peace settlement. M. de Boissaison confirmed the latter assumption by saying that he thought that the French delegation's instructions would be short and general in character. France, M. de Boissaison added, was however interested in reparations from Japan. The Japanese had caused very extensive damage in Indochina. So far as the restoration of the Japanese economy was concerned, M. de Boissaison said that it appeared inevitable that the Japanese economy would have to be re-established on a prosperous footing. It was a question of deciding how this could be dome without Japan becoming a threat to security and it was also a question of deciding the tempo at which the process of Japan's restoration should be accomplished. A balance would have to be struck between these different factors. M. de Boissaison indicated, however, that France's primary interest was in the effect which the Japanese negotiations might have on the relations between the great powers. He added that decisions taken on the Japanese treaty would have inevitable reactions on the peace settlement with Germany and that the French Government always had this aspect of the matter in mind.

8. Mr. Ritchie enquired whether any decisions had been taken as to the personnel of the French delegation to the preliminary conference. M. de Boissaison replied that while no final decision had been taken he thought it likely that the French delegation to the Far Eastern Commission would simply be transferred on bloc to the conference. In that case M. Naggiar would be going accompanied by M. Lacoste and other members of the French delegation to the Far Eastern Commission, but he said that he could not confirm this officially as yet. M. Naggier is now in Paris and in the course of a recent conversation with M. Desy, the Canadian Ambassador to Brazil, he told him that he would be going to the conference presumably as head of the French delegation.

9. A copy of this despatch will be sent to the High Commissioner for Canada in London.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient servant,

C.S.A. Ritchie

for Ambassador.

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CANADIAN EMBASSY

SECRET

Moscow, June 17th, 1947.

No. 303

Sir:

I have the honour to refer to your telegram No. 134 of 11th June concerning the forthcoming Commonwealth talks to be held in Canberra on the Japanese Peace Settlement. Our files of the Soviet Press are relatively complete on the subject of Japan, but a careful study of them indicates that there is no available information on the subjects mentioned by you. I have discussed this discreetly with the counsellor of the Chinese Embassy, the United States Charge d'Affaires, and members of the United Kingdom Embassy, who substantiate this conclusion.

2. I am of the opinion that the Soviet Government will demand special privileges for the Big Four in treaty drafting. It would be difficult for the Russians to reverse the very strong stand they have taken on this question in connection with the German Peace Settlement and the treaties with the German satellites. In view of the record of the Control Council in Tokyo, where I believe the Australian and Soviet members have so often opposed General MacArthur, the Russians might consider that the interests of the United States and the other powers are sufficiently different to avoid giving the veto to the Americans, but in the long run they are more likely to fear the heavy concentration of Anglo-Saxon countries participating in the conference.

3. I think it almost certain that they will propose the participation of the Mongolian People's Republic, and possibly also the Indomesian Republic and Burma. As regards Viet-Nam they are in a difficult spot, and their attitude in this may well depend on the developments in French internal affairs between now and the calling of the conference.

4. I am convinced that the Russians will demand the withdrawal of troops within a brief period of the conclusion of the Peace Treaty and will resist any suggestion that military control in its present form continue. On the other hand, it is quite conceiveable that they will request industrial and economic control of Japan by United Nations, or Big Four, administration. This would give them the opportunity to introduce observers into the economic scene.

5. I am making a selection of the more important articles on Japan which have appeared in the Soviet press during the past six weeks. There is not time to have them copied before the closing of to-day's bag, but I shall forward them by the next mail together with my comments and any further information I am able to secure on this subject.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient servant

(Signed) R.A.D. Ford

Charge d'Affaires, a.i.

The Right Honourable
The Secretary of State
for External Affairs,
OTTAWA, Canada.

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FROM: THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, CANADIAN EMBASSY, MOSCOW, U.S.S.R.

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA.

CODE

NO. 245

MOSCOW, August 4th, 1947.

No. 245. August 4th. Izvestiya August 3rd has leading article on the Peace Treaty with Japan by Leontev.

2. Article starts by claiming it is not and cannot be within the competence of the Far Eastern Commission to draft treaty and that there are also some countries not represented on the Commission who are vitally interested in Japan, in many cases with more justification than some present.

3. All past experience is said to show that the drafting of a peace treaty is too complicated for the work to be carried out successfully by a conference of many Powers. Only correct method is drafting by the four Great Powers which played decisive role in the defeat of Japan and between whom agreements have already been concluded on a number of important questions with regard to terms of post-war settlement. These undertakings must be made the basis of the peace treaty, preliminary text of which must be drafted by the Big Four. "They too must determine by a joint decision precisely which other Powers are to be invited to take part in the final drafting of that Treaty and in what form" principle of unanimity of four Great Powers must be. Article says Bevin, Hoover and Western press have "ignoble aims of diminishing role of Soviet Union in defeat of Japan". However history shows basic factor in victory over Japan was that U.S.S.R bore overwhelming share in defeat of Germany.

4. In conclusion article declares that there can be no return to system of "juggling votes" as at Paris Conference, and that the Soviet Union stands for retention of principle (word omitted) Great Powers guaranteeing drafting of concerted decisions on all questions affecting interests of peace and security which apply fully to questions of drafting Peace Treaty with Japan. Ends.

CHARGE D'AFFAIRES

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APPENDIX D

MATERIAL SUBMITTED BY DR. E.H. NORMAN, HEAD OF THE CANADIAN LIAISON MISSION IN TOKYO.

1. Despatch, Ottawa-London (HC) July 9. 1318
2. Post-war Control Machinery
3. Japanese Entry into Comity of Nations
4. Territorial Settlement
5. SCAP Directives and the Peace Treaty
6. Dissolution of Ultra-Nationalist Societies
7. Trade Notes

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C 272275

TOP SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Ottawa, July 9, 1947.

No. 1318

Sir,

On June 12 I cabled Mr. E.H. Norman in Tokyo, requesting him in the following terms to prepare memoranda relating to the Japanese peace settlement for use at the Commonwealth conference in Canberra:-

"(a) Resumption by Japan of normal diplomatic relations and participation by Japan in the United Nations and other international organizations. Your assessment of probable views of the Japanese Foreign Office would be appreciated.

"(b) Dissolution of nationalist organizations and secret societies. We would appreciate your comments as to whether permanent machinery should be established to maintain provisions of the purge directives.

"(c) Protection of Japanese nationals who showed sympathy or took action in support of the cause of the Allies.

"(d) Views of the Japanese and of the occupation authorities on the disposition of the Loochoo and other minor Japanese islands."

2. As requested in my telegram No. 149 of June 28, Mr. Norman has cabled a summary of his observations on the points mentioned above. A copy of Mr. Norman's telegram, No. 147 of July 4, is attached for your information.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

(Sgd.) David M. Johnson

(for) Secretary of State for External Affairs.

The Acting High Commissioner for
Canada in the United Kingdom,
Canada House,
London, S.W.1.,
ENGLAND.

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C 272276

FROM: THE CANADIAN LIAISON MISSION, TOKYO, JAPAN

TO : THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA

TOP SECRET

CYPHER - O.T.P. TOKYO, July 4th, 1947.

NO. 147

No. 147. July 4th. Top Secret. Your telegram No. 129 of June 12th and your telegram No. 149 of June 28th.

Following are condensed views on your questions above-mentioned telegrams and additional relevant comments. Views enlarged in later memoranda.

1. Your question No. 1.

(a) Japan might properly be allowed entry into affiliated United Nations Organization very soon after the Peace Treaty.

(b) Entry into United Nations Organization main bodies might come as soon as Control Council described in (c) below recommends.

(c) Control Council might be stipulated for a period of twenty years, or less if so recommended by the Control Council. Although such an organization will present many international and structural difficulties, some such control seems essential for a short period at least. Its existence, which would necessarily impair Japanese sovereignty, would be the chief reason for entry into United Nations Organization.

(d) Control Council would be made up of representatives of signatory Powers and would sit in Tokyo, United States should hold executive power, i.e., for carrying out any punitive measures that might be recommended, decision preferably majority, without veto. Although Control Council's function would be advisory, reporting progress as to Japan periodically to United Nations, it should be vested with full power to carry out investigation within Japan. Some such authority to be essential if Control Council is not to be reduced to useless status of Allied control. Both structure of

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control and criteria of Japanese should be kept as simple as possible. Any ad hoc control composed of Heads of Diplomatic Missions in Japan would not adequately discharge task of such a control.

(e) Japanese representation abroad. Once majority of signatory Powers have ratified Treaty, there would seem to be no objection to such nations as wished to exchange diplomatic representation coming to Japan to do so.

2. Your question No. 4.

(a) Original SCAP campaign against ultra-nationalist organization was admirably conceived and governing directive appears to have been implemented quite effectively by Japanese Government. The Economic difficulties of the coming years and resentment by numbers of Japanese at some aspects of the Peace Treaty might easily give rise to increased activity of such forces which, despite present quiescence, must still be latent in Japanese society. Only permanent guarantee against such activity is to encourage steady growth of genuinely liberal and peaceful forces of Japan.

(b) One of the main functions of the Control Council would be to report on growth or continued decline in influence of such organizations.

(c) It may be of value to refer to documentation in Departmental files of my studies prepared in 1945-1946 while with Counter-Intelligence, Tokyo, to appreciate both widespread and deep roots of Japanese ultra-nationalist organizations and to assume they must still be at least latent.

(d) Present United States counter-intelligence policy assumes complete eradication of single and ultra-nationalist forces and is concentrated chiefly against Leftist and Labour organizations (not only Communist). This policy is carried out with the assistance of Japanese agencies which are used without questioning too deeply their motives and background.

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(e) SCAP directives. I would be reluctant to include all directives as part of peace settlement because many are too complicated or too ephemeral to be implemented through an internationally guaranteed Treaty. This is especially true of economic directives where many were designed to cover what may have been a passing rather than permanent problem. Basic directives might be singled out for inclusion in Treaty recommendations, such as:

(1) Demilitarization and disarmament plan;

(2) Purge;

(3) Basic freedoms;

(4) Political and constitutional.

In some of these, for instance (2), machinery might be set up, preferably the Control Council, to consider appeals against Japanese implementation of directives.

3. Your question No. 3.

One of the functions of the Control Council would be to watch and report upon treatment accorded by Japanese to their own nationals who had co-operated with the Allies. Any attempt at special privileges or protection might reduce their future usefulness without achieving purpose of such a provision in the Treaty.

4. Your question No. 4. I am meeting Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ashida, shortly, so I will reserve discussion.

5. Miscellaneous suggestions.

(a) Criteria of judgment on Japan's future actions should not be too detailed. Suggest basic freedoms should form main body of such criteria, for example, individual liberty, freedom of political organization, except those specified in directive of January 4th, 1946, freedom of press, freedom of religion, freedom of civil liberties.

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(b) If Control Council considers action necessary on any of the above-mentioned points, it must be prepared to convince United States by reason of its being either Executive Agency in Control Council or, failing that, the paramount Power in the Pacific. This would, of course, confer virtual veto power on United States despite any formal arrangement requiring majority decision. In view of the existing circumstances this would still seem preferable to granting veto power to all of Great Powers.

(c) F.E.C. experience should be drawn on at every stage of peace settlement, especially in considering what basic directives might be written into Peace Treaty.

6. These opinions are the result of my thinking and I have deliberately attempted not to qualify them by considerations of what thinking of other national representatives might be. I shall attempt to do this later. I believe Australia will be pressing for more severe controls than those which I have outlined and United States may wish to ease them to some extent, although SCAP has recently expressed himself as favouring some continued supervision after the Peace Treaty.

7. I would be grateful to have your comments on my observations.

NORMAN

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Paper No. 1

JAPANESE PEACE SETTLEMENT: SECRET

POST-WAR CONTROL MACHINERY

It is assumed that there should be some continuing authority for the control of Japan after the Peace Treaty is signed. The authority for such a control would be derived from the Treaty. There has been some doubt as to the practical possibility of setting up such a machinery because United States views on the matter were somewhat obscure, but General MacArthur's statement to a group of editors (please refer to Despatch No. 154) in which he anticipated a continuing supervision of Japan for at least a generation, is most reassuring, coming as it did on the eve of the conference in Canberra. Because of the strong Australian desire for comparatively long supervision of Japan, this development is most gratifying and gives greater assurance of harmony among the Pacific powers.

1. Machinery for Control

It would seem to be most essential that the machinery for control should be simple and flexible and the criteria which are to be set up should also be kept at a modest level so that what will of necessity be a task already complicated by such considerations as United States-Soviet relations need not be further tangled by structural and technical confusion. And most important, if a control council is established to supervise and enforce a series of complex and detailed criteria, the frustrations and deadlocks that will almost certainly arise will demonstrate to the Japanese the ineffectiveness of the control and thus tend to bring into contempt the Peace Treaty as a whole.

The Control Council should properly be composed of all signatory powers to the Peace Treaty. It would sit most logically in Tokyo. The only reasonable authority to which it should report would be to an appropriate section of the United Nations. (Possibly in the course of the next two or three years regional councils of the United Nations might be established in which case the Pacific Council would be the parent body.) The Control Council should not in itself have executive authority but only advise the United Nations authority. The latter body would be charged with authority to invoke sanctions against Japan should its behaviour so warrant it. In the present situation the only conceivable Power in an effective position to carry out such action would be the United States so that it might be designated the Executive Power of the Control Council, or rather that Power in the Control Council which alone of the Control Council acts on behalf of the parent organization. In other words, the Control Council would be the body to inspect, supervise and recommend action to the parent organization but not in itself to initiate and carry out action.

In the light of the experience of the Allied Council which has dragged on for over a year accomplishing very little, it does seem that the Control Council should be vested with authority to inspect

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1. Machinery for Control

It would seem to be most essential that the machinery for control should be simple and flexible and the criteria which are to be set up should also be kept at a modest level so that what will of necessity be a task already complicated by such considerations as United States-Soviet relations need not be further tangled by structural and technical confusion. And most important, if a control council is established to supervise and enforce a series of complex and detailed criteria, the frustrations and deadlocks that will almost certainly arise will demonstrate to the Japanese the ineffectiveness of the control and thus tend to bring into contempt the Peace Treaty as a whole.

The Control Council should properly be composed of all signatory powers to the Peace Treaty. It would sit most logically in Tokyo. The only reasonable authority to which it should report would be to an appropriate section of the United Nations. (Possibly in the course of the next two or three years regional councils of the United Nations might be established in which case the Pacific Council would be the parent body.) The Control Council should not in itself have executive authority but only advise the United Nations authority. The latter body would be charged with authority to invoke sanctions against Japan should its behaviour so warrant it. In the present situation the only conceivable Power in an effective position to carry out such action would be the United States so that it might be designated the Executive Power of the Control Council, or rather that Power in the Control Council which alone of the Control Council acts on behalf of the parent organization. In other words, the Control Council would be the body to inspect, supervise and recommend action to the parent organization but not in itself to initiate and carry out action.

In the light of the experience of the Allied Council which has dragged on for over a year accomplishing very little, it does seem that the Control Council should be vested with authority to inspect

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any situation in Japan which appears to be a violation of the peace terms or of basic directives. One of the chief factors which frustrated the activity of the Allied Council has been its inability to get full and accurate information on a given topic since it has been entirely dependent for required information on G.H.Q. and this has often been reluctantly and inadequately granted. The British Commonwealth representative, for example, who has been genuinely interested in seeing the task of the occupation properly conducted, has suffered greatly from inaccessibility of full and relevant information. To prevent the right of inspection being abused by any power, it may be advisable to add the proviso that a request for information or inspection on any question must have the support of at least two members of the Council, i.e. that there must be a seconder for the motion.

The responsibility and task of inspection, if it is to be done properly at all, will not be a light one so that it should have attached to it a reasonably efficient secretariat. Partly for this reason the work of the Control Council can scarcely be properly discharged by a council composed of heads of diplomatic missions in Tokyo meeting from time to time. Under this circumstance the Council would degenerate into a mere exchange of information with occasional reports back to the governments of the representatives concerned, and there could scarcely be an efficient system of regular reporting to the higher authority. This would not mean that there need be any hard and fast barrier between foreign missions in Tokyo and the Control Council in Tokyo, e.g. there is no reason why diplomatic secretaries working in missions could not as part of their duties work on the secretariat of the council.

Since the Council will not be an executive authority itself, the question of voting procedure need not be too thorny. Such decisions as would be necessary should quite properly be made by normal majority vote, eliminating the need for a veto. Since the United States is the paramount authority in the Pacific and may be vested with executive authority for Japan for the carrying out of the peace terms in Japan, it would have in fact a virtual veto power in the Council. This results from the actual existing forces in the Pacific but fortunately as this Power is one which we need not fear, we could probably influence it more fruitfully when we so wished by persuasion than by hoping to see the United States proposal overriden by resort to the veto by one of the Big Four. However, since it would be undesirable for other Powers to have no voice whatever in the control of Japan, by vesting the Control Council with independent rights of investigation and by giving it a voting procedure by majority, the United States would be in most matters reluctant to flout public opinion of the world by running counter to majority decisions of the Council. Further, without the veto (which if it existed would only be used against the United States by the Soviet Union) the Council might have a much franker exchange of views and a greater disposition to put matters to a vote than has been the case with the F.E.C.

If a control authority is set up in Japan, to achieve serious results, its length of life should not be limited to a period of five or ten years. Its existence would then act only as an irritant to the Japanese who would from its very start anticipate its early dissolution, and those who resented its presence would wait in sullen patience, depending on the laboriously slow processes of international organizations to work in their favour. It would seem advisable if the Control Council is to be established at all, to limit its length to what might be termed a short generation, that is twenty or twenty-five years. The Council itself in its reports

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to the parent body might, after a period of years, recommend that Japanese progress had been so favourable that continued growth could now be better encouraged by dissolution of the Council. The fact that the Council had discretionary power to advise its own dissolution might become an incentive to the Japanese to live up to the provisions of the Peace Treaty and to the political and constitutional standards which have been set forth during the occupation.

2. Criteria for Control Council

As suggested above, a very elaborate set of criteria by which the Council would judge Japanese performance would add unnecessary complication to a fairly difficult task and might well encourage Japanese to assay a test of strength against the Council by deliberately breaking some of the comparatively minor criteria. If successful in small breaches, they would then be encouraged to attack the more vital provisions. Accordingly it would seem wiser to start from what might be called the lowest common denominator of the desiderata which the signatory powers wish to see maintained in Japan. These should be:

(1) Continued demobilication and demilitarization. In the field of industry it should not be too difficult, by reason of the investigating power of the Control Council, to ascertain whether industrial development was in any way moving in the direction of militarization.

(2) Perhaps the most important criteria would be those of basic liberties, i.e. freedom of the individual from arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, freedom of religion, freedom of press and freedom of political organization (except those specifically named in the directive of January 4, 1946 as ultra-nationalistic and thus a potential menace to the occupation and peaceful development of Japan). Violations of civil liberties and other developments which are clearly against the spirit of the new constitution would be matters for investigation by the Control Council. In this connection the Control Council could also aid in the free access to news from the outside world.

An important aspect of freedom of the press and publication in which the Control Council could play a useful part would be the insistence that in the interests of freedom of the press, Japanese who so wished could freely have access to sources of news and media of information outside Japan proper. This is worth emphasizing when one recalls the distorting of news and poisoning of the public mind that went on in the years before the outbreak of the Pacific war through government control of information from abroad, strict censorship of news and restriction of radio to long wave.

(3) One of the most important functions of the Control Council would be to report periodically on the decline or recrudescence, as the case may be, of the ultra-nationalist societies. (A separate memorandum on the topic of the ultra-nationalist societies is being included in this set of documentation of papers.)

(4) The question has been raised as to what provision might be made for protecting, after the occupation, those Japanese who have conspicuously helped the Allied cause during the occupation, or who have shown themselves active in combatting militarist or ultra-nationalist influence. To write a clause into the Peace Treaty of this type would seem to defeat its purpose as it would set aside rather artificially from the rest of the Japanese community these individuals who by that very token could be politically and socially ostracized in such a fashion as to make legal redress very difficult.

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If, however, such individuals were subjected to brutal persecution, legal or terroristic, or were made a victim of an unscrupulous campaign, that in itself should be a primary concern of the Control Council in reporting on the progress of the liberalization of Japan. If sufficiently serious, such a trend would warrant a joint diplomatic protest from the signatory powers, instructing the Japanese Government to do all in its power to remedy the situation if the Japanese nation wished to convince the world that reforms had been genuine and lasting.

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Paper No. 2

JAPANESE PEACE SETTLEMENT: SECRET

JAPANESE ENTRY INTO COMITY OF NATIONS

1. Restoration of Normal Relations Between Japan and Other Nations

From a formal point of view it would be proper for Japan to enter into normal diplomatic relations with other countries when a majority of the signatory powers have ratified the Peace Treaty. Even before this there might be an interim stage of representation by a diplomatic agent preceding accredited plenipotentiaries. From a practical point of view it would seem mutually advantageous for Japan and other powers to reestablish normal diplomatic relations as soon as possible. There is no doubt that Japanese of all opinion are agreed on the desirability of both an early peace and the earliest possible resumption of normal trade relations; the advantages to Japan are too obvious to require enumeration. The possible existence of a Control Council or some similar supervising machinery in Japan after the signing of the Peace Treaty should not necessarily be an obstacle to the reestablishment of diplomatic relations with the outside world.

From the point of view of foreign countries, and in this particular case, Canada, it seems reasonable and advantageous to reestablish diplomatic relations at an early date following the signing of the peace treaty. The present situation whereby Allied Powers have to work through SCAP's headquarters rather than directly through the Japanese Government, while justified in terms of the situation following the surrender, is exceedingly cumbrous and has proved itself in many instances, usually through no fault of G.H.Q. itself, rather unsatisfactory. The sooner Allied countries are accredited directly to a Japanese government the sooner it should be possible to re-open trade and to learn at first-hand Japanese political and economic developments, and in the contrary direction to introduce directly into Japan information and cultural media which although technically free to enter Japan through SCAP approval have in fact been consistently held up so that virtually no influence other than American has been felt in contemporary Japanese life. While it is natural and even desirable that American influence in Japan should be paramount, there is no reason why it should be exclusive. This situation would seem to be unhealthy for Japan and other nations with a legitimate interest in the Far East.

2. Japanese Entry into United Nations

It is the view of responsible Americans and for example the Head of Diplomatic Section, Mr. Atcheson, that Japan should enter the United Nations as soon as the Peace Treaty is signed. It is also the desire of Japanese officials, including the present Foreign Minister Ashida, that Japan be admitted with the minimum of delay. (See Appendix 1 to this paper entitled "Japanese Interest in the United Nations.") This view has much to commend itself in that undoubtedly Japanese reform would be speeded by the opportunity of Japan to mix freely and equally with other nations in the United Nations. For this reason as far as can be seen at present there should be no serious objection to Japan entering with those organizations affiliated with the United Nations as a first step. The real problem, however, if there is to be some control maintained by the signatory powers over

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Japan for a period of years, is whether this control by its very existence would not so impair Japanese sovereignty even though it in fact interfered very little with Japanese internal affairs as to create a real obstacle to Japan's joining the United Nations as a free sovereign state. It would for instance be a somewhat anomalous situation if one of the powers in the Control Council found itself in some disagreement with Japan and Japan were to plead its case against that nation before the very international organization where the Control Council would also be reporting on Japanese development.

On the other hand, to exclude Japan from the United Nations for the total period of the control which might well be ten years or even twenty years, would seem to be unnecessarily rigid. Some compromise ought to be sought between immediate entry and entry only at the end of some control period. This problem may be approached in two ways. (1) The question raised above concerning the incompatibility between the existence of the Control Council and Japan's eligibility to enter the United Nations as a free sovereign state may be excessively theoretical so that in fact the existence of the Control Council need not be deemed an insuperable obstacle. As suggested above, since the Control Council would be rather an investigating than an executive agency, its existence might not be really regarded as such a serious barrier to entry into the United Nations. Rather than theorize about this matter further, one might better leave the question temporarily in abeyance until the nature of the control authority for Japan is more precisely outlined.

(2) If the existence of the Control Council is considered sufficient reason for delaying Japanese entry into the United Nations, then rather than wait for the full time when the control is over, the Control Council might properly propose in the course of a few years that in view of Japanese progress (assuming that Japan does in fact keep moving in the direction charted by SCAP) it be forthwith admitted to the United Nations. Such a proposal on the part of the Control Council, if accepted by the United Nations, could be the result of a recommendation by the Control Council in the light of favourable Japanese progress to bear down no heavier than is absolutely necessary upon Japanese sovereignty so as to make the Japanese entry into the United Nations a practical matter.

As a further suggestion in this matter one might consider the possibility of a Control Council through its chairman or deputy chairman acting on behalf of Japan within the United Nations as long as Japan is not a full member. In this way the Japanese would feel that they have some protection against encroachment, injuries, or threats from other countries, and, seeing that the Control Council would be in a position to bring a case on Japan's behalf before the United Nations they might look upon it with greater feeling of confidence than if it (the Control Council) were a body authorized only to investigate and report back to the United Nations.

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Appendix I
to Paper No. 2

JAPANESE INTEREST IN THE UNITED NATIONS

It cannot be said that there is in Japan a wide general interest in the United Nations Organisation, and the references to it in the Japanese press are rare. In fact it is doubtful whether the man in the street knows anything about it beyond the name, if he knows that. In governmental circles, however, increasing interest has been shown and from time to time statements have been made by the Prime Minister and others expressing a wish that Japan may be able to join the United Nations.

During the debate on the constitution in August, 1946, Prime Minister Yoshida discussing the Article renouncing war expressed the hope that Japan would soon be able to join the United Nations Organisation.

Dr. Sasaki, Soichi former member of the House of Peers, has expressed similar views in the Diet and in the press. In "Nippon Times" of 1st May, in an article on the Constitution, Sasaki, criticising the war renunciation clause, said:

"The only way for Japan to contribute to the establishment of world peace is, therefore, to take part in the international movement in which the countries of the world combine efforts to establish universal peace.

"She must either join the United Nations Organisation or, if she must stay outside, she must at least attain a position in which she can have her say in some form or other.

"So long as Japan is bound by the constitutional stipulation for the renunciation of war, she may find herself unable in the event of her entry into the United Nations Organisation to fulfil the duty devolving on its member perfectly."

Interest has also been shown at the highest level. In a recent interview with Roger Baldwin, Director of the American Civil Liberties Union, the Emperor was reported to have expressed great faith in the United Nations Organizations.

There are at present three groups which owe their existence to an interest in the United Nations Organisation. These are the United Nations Dissemination Committee (Kokusai Rengo Fukkyu Kai), the United Nations Study Committee (Kokusai Rengo Kenkyu Doshi Kai), and the United Nations Research Association (Kokusai Rengo Kenkyu Kyo Kai).

The two former organisations have been instituted by two separate groups from the Japan Institute of International Affairs (Nippon Gaisei Gakkai) while the lastnamed was instituted by members of the Japan Association of Foreign Affairs. However, as a result of suggestions made by Dr. Roger Baldwin from the American Civil Liberties Union all these bodies are soon to be united as "The United Nations Association of Japan". Mr. Ito, Nobufumi who is Chairman of both the United Nations Dissemination Committee and the United Nations Study Committee, is at present conducting negotiations with Mr. Matsudaira, Tsuneo, President of the United Nations Research Association to finalize the arrangements for the amalgamation.

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The membership of these organisations at present probably numbers no more than one hundred each. The United Nations Dissemination Committee, has adopted the policy of developing local committees. Five local committees have been formed or are being formed in centres outside Tokyo.

The Tokyo branch of the United Nations Dissemination Committee produces a magazine called "The United Nations" (Kokusai Rengo) which has been in being since November of last year. The circulation is probably not more than one thousand, and in any case in view of paper shortage, it is doubtful whether circulation could be expanded much beyond this. Four numbers of about 90 pages each have so far been published. In addition to a number of general articles on international affairs, the magazine contains specific documentary material on United Nations activities including a list of official documents concerning the United Nations received by the Japanese organisations, a day to day record of United Nations activities, and a translation of the United Nations charter.

The Secretary of the United Nations Dissemination Committee, Mr. Ito, who is also editor of the magazine, recently stated that he intends to concentrate on the development of local committees, because it was in areas outside Tokyo where the development of international consciousness was required. He also mentioned that he was active in developing students' committees, though when asked the specific name of such an organisation at the Imperial University, Tokyo, he said that one had not been developed there yet. The United Nations Dissemination Committee meets every fortnight at the Industry Club (Kogyo Kai), which is run by the Japan Chamber of Commerce. A number of commercial organisations have contributed financially to aid the development of the Dissemination Committee, and there is reason to believe that it has close liaison with the Foreign Office.

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APPENDIX II

TRANSLATION OF THE INTRODUCTORY REMARKS FROM VOLUME I, NO. 1 OF JAPANESE MAGAZINE "UNITED NATIONS", PUBLISHED 1st NOVEMBER, 1946.

It has been decided that the second general meeting of the United Nations which has become a solid reality in the world political situation will soon be held. This is not the first time there has been an organisation like the United Nations. Even in recent centuries, although there has not been much evidence of such in Asia, in Europe after the Thirty Years War such an organisation was set up under the terms of the Treaty of Westphalia and more than 160 years later after the Napoleonic Wars the Holy Alliance was set up. About 100 years later, immediately after the first World War, the League of Nations was organised. Under the terms of the Treaty of Westphalia an International Society of Europe was established. The Holy Alliance aimed to strengthen an autocratic system of government, but it was carried away by the strong tide of liberalism and nationalism. The League of Nations raised the banner of making the world safe for democracy, but instead of democracy, totalitarianism flourished and in the end the League fell into decay. The present United Nations Organisation has not raised the standard of any particular "ism", but has been quietly urging the insurance of world peace and stability, and appears to respect political realities. However, as it is supported by a great number of countries, including in the first place the three Great Powers, America, the Soviet and Great Britain, it is natural that from the standpoint of present world politics we must pay the closest attention to it. From this point of view alone, it is necessary that we should study it. Indeed, although it may not be necessary to turn back to earlier days in order to understand the present organisation, it is really valuable to study the differences and similarities between it and the League of Nations. No, more than that, it is necessary. The United Nations is a world organisation, indeed one may call it the framework of world politics. We cannot understand present movements inside this framework simply by studying the organisation. We must investigate political movements in each country, international economic trends, the direction of ideas in each country and general cultural changes. If we collate all this information, the significance of the framework and its suitability or not will become clear to us. The framework cannot change suddenly and the movement of world politics, economics and ideas is already in progress and does not stop. To study the United Nations, research in both these directions is necessary.

Those of us interested in this organisation, who worked at Geneva in the past, commenced this study at the beginning of this year. However, that alone is not enough. Today when politics have become a matter for the people, study by a few of the people only is useless, and it has become very necessary for there to be understanding and co-operation by the people as a whole. Because when we speak of the democratisation of politics, international politics are naturally included, we have been thinking along the lines of making democracy an actuality as far as the United Nations is concerned. If we think ahead of when the new Constitution has been brought into effect, how will our country be able to carry on unless we have the closest liaison with an organisation such as the United Nations? Quite apart from the Constitution what will be our economic situation? Do not world economics have a profound influence upon it? One does not need to refer to the realm of ideas, but it appears that there too great advances are always being made. From the standpoint of the present position of our country I think that it cannot but be that the people as a whole must understand

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the United Nations. Today, when there is a doubt as to whether or not we shall be able to enter the United Nations Organisation, there are perhaps some who are over anxious, but I am confident that the first necessity is study and understanding. This magazine has been produced with the intention of deepening the understanding of the United Nations Organisation among all classes in our country. Its first object is the dissemination of the United Nations idea. Among those of us who remember the time some years ago when we left the League of Nations there is a feeling that somehow or other Japan was the country which put the seal of destruction upon that world organisation and there are some who feel that if ever the opportunity should occur, we should do our utmost to restore a world organisation. We belong to that group. Accordingly, we are earnestly studying this United Nations Organisation, making comparisons between the present and the past, and if the opportunity is given to us we hope to be able to use our efforts to improve the United Nations. The study that we are making is only on the surface, but because the United Nations Organisation has been created by man, it is not perfect. We shall make every effort to improve its imperfections so that the organisation may make further progress. We hope for and are anxious to maintain the world peace which is its objective. We hope that the true functions of the new Japan shall be not only to increase the happiness of the people of the world, but shall also be to contribute to the progress of ideas and culture. Perhaps there are some in Japan today who say that this is simply a dream, but I think that there is no value in working for the reconstruction of the new Japan unless we have such a dream as this. We earnestly hope for the co-operation and understanding of the whole nation.

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Paper No. 3

SECRET

JAPANESE PEACE SETTLEMENT:

TERRITORIAL SETTLEMENT

In discussing the territorial settlement we might properly proceed from the Cairo Declaration which calls for the restoration to Chinese sovereignty or for the independence of all territories seized through a series of wars by Japan, viz, Formosa, Manchuria and Korea. The terms of the Declaration however do not necessarily apply to territory acquired by Japan through treaty negotiation in contrast to annexation following a successful war.* Japan acquired a de facto sovereignty over the Ryukyus after China refused to ratify the treaty of 1879. The Chinese have never abandoned entirely their claim to the islands, particularly since the treaty of Shimonoseki (1895) by which Japanese ownership of the islands was regularized, is regarded as the first of the predatory treaties after victorious war (Sino-Japanese war of 1894-5). The Kuriles were acquired by treaty negotiation with Russia in 1875 in exchange for Japanese recognition of Russia's claim to Sakhalin. Neither of these archipelagos, and certainly not the Kuriles, can be strictly defined as territory acquired from neighbouring countries as a result of predatory war. Thus, the disposition of these two groups of islands is likely to present to the Peace Conference the only serious territorial problems. The disposition of the Bonins will be briefly touched upon in this memorandum also. Discussion of the future of the former Japanese mandated islands can scarcely be treated conveniently here since they have already become the object of international negotiation; consequently it is not intended to pursue the subject of their disposition in this memorandum.

(a) Ryukyus

Despite the legal ambiguity outlined above it is most unlikely that the powers represented at the

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* The relevant section of the Cairo Conference reads as follows: "It is their (the Three Great Allies) purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed." The phrase "taken by violence and greed" is somewhat ambiguous since greed could refer to territory acquired by treaty negotiations in which Japan exerted pressure on China. In any case the disposition of the Ryukyus, in the light of the Cairo Declaration, remains ambiguous and accordingly has to be considered at some length.

/Peace Conference

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Peace Conference, and particularly the United States and China, would permit the return to Japan of the Ryukyus. Through various spokesmen the Chinese have expressed opposition to Japanese re-acquisition of the Ryukyus. Through the authoritative voice of SCAP in recent weeks the United States has expressed the view that these islands (specifically Okinawa) should go to the United States as "our strategic frontier" in the Far East. The islands themselves are not valuable to Japan in terms of natural resources. They were used by Japan in the past as stepping stones for expansion towards the continent. Thus in a Japan committed to peace the return of these comparatively poor islands is not a matter of really vital importance. On the other hand they are too thinly populated a group of islands to warrant independence as a separate state. Their disposition lends itself to three possibilities; (i) occupation and annexation by the United States, (ii) acquisition by China, (iii) trusteeship under the United Nations with their administration entrusted, most logically, to the United States.

Of these possibilities the third seems the most reasonable both because it is more in keeping with the spirit of Allied declarations from the Atlantic Charter to the Charter of the United Nations, and at the same time it will satisfy the United States concern for Pacific security. The second would not seem justified both because original Chinese claim to the Ryukyus is historically obscure and because the natives of the islands are culturally and linguistically remote from the Chinese, and the latter, at least in recent years, have not shown themselves conspicuous for their tolerance and restraint as colonizers.

One exception to the disposition of the Ryukyus as set forth above might be mooted namely, the future of Daito Island. This island is described by some geographers as part of the Ryukyus but actually it stands off at some distance to the east. It is comparatively rich in sugar so that with the loss of Formosa, even the sugar from such a small island will have considerable value to Japan. To give Japan free access to the produce of the island might be both an equitable and practical settlement, with the proviso that the island must be open to inspection to prevent its being converted into a military base by the Japanese.

(b) Bonins

The same settlement for them as the Ryukyus would seem reasonable, namely trusteeship under United States administration.

(c) Kuriles

The Kuriles could not be said to have been acquired by the Japanese by forceful seizure. But Sakhalin, which was the Russian quid pro quo in the treaty of 1875 by which Japan's claim to the Kuriles was recognized in exchange for Sakhalin, was reduced by half its size as a result of the Japanese victory in the Russo-Japanese war. The value of the islands in later years to Japan was primarily strategic in that their bleak and fog-ridden shores provided an excellent blanket for naval manoeuvres. It was from these waters that

/the task

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the task force which attacked Pearl Harbor set forth on its fateful mission. In addition to their strategic value, their proximity to rich fishing waters makes them of some economic importance. In view of the increased difficulty facing Japan in securing sources of food, the loss of the Kuriles will have some economic significance.

In accordance with the terms of the Yalta Agreement, Soviet forces occupied the Kuriles immediately after Soviet entry into the war against Japan. Despite the criticism of the Yalta Agreement, and in particular the agreement to cede the Kuriles to the Soviet Union, at the present time there seems to be no practical alternative to Soviet possession of the Kuriles. The occupation of the Kuriles by the Soviet Union is a primary concern to the United States with its interest in North American continental defence. Thus, unless that Power at the Peace Conference is prepared to contest possession of these islands by the Soviet Union it would scarcely be the province of any other Power to propose the retrocession of these islands by the Soviet Union with some alternative disposition made of them. Undoubtedly such a proposal would be bitterly opposed by the Soviet Union with all the diplomatic force at its disposal. Judging from what has been published in responsible United States and British journals it appears to be unlikely that these two Powers are contemplating such a move.

Conclusion: Japanese Opinion

It is difficult to assess at the time of writing what weight Japanese opinion or rather Japanese Government views will have upon the deliberations of the Peace Conference. It does seem safe to say that at present on some points relating to the peace settlement responsible United States officials are inclined to give a sympathetic ear to the ideas which have been cautiously put forward by Japanese Government quarters (please refer to secret telegram No. 147). For this reason some remarks on current Japanese opinion may be of interest.

Some weeks ago the present Foreign Minister, Mr. Ashida, made a statement that for "sentimental reasons" Japan wished to have back the Kuriles and Ryukyus. This statement caused considerable stir among foreign observers and press representatives on the one hand and the Japanese themselves on the other, so that within a matter of days the Foreign Minister, in a rather equivocal statement, attempted to show that he had been misquoted. There were too many witnesses to his own words, however, for his denial to be entirely credible. Unless one is to assume that Mr. Ashida is perfectly foolish and irresponsible (and judging from my talk with him I would very much doubt this to be the case since he appears to be an unusually cautious and thoughtful man) one can only assume that this was another case of a trial balloon. Since SCAP, very shortly after Mr. Ashida's statement, told visiting foreign editors and publishers that Okinawa ought to go to the United States as a "strategic frontier", the trial balloon may be said to have been only too successful in drawing out General MacArthur but unsuccessful in that it received very little sympathy abroad and considerable criticism in the Japanese press which attacked

/Ashida

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Ashida for raising doubts and suspicions in the minds of foreign observers.

Whatever the Japanese may be planning in the way of putting forth their views for at least the unofficial consideration of the Peace Conference, any desire for the retention of the Ryukyus deserves little consideration in view of the primary strategic value of the islands and their comparative poverty (with the exception of Daito Island, a possible disposition of which is briefly suggested above).

With regard to the Kuriles, Japanese interest in them will run up against an adamant Soviet claim and the realities of Soviet occupation of the islands, so that Japanese opinion on the subject can hardly be a decisive factor at the Peace Conference. Nevertheless if the Japanese are able to negotiate directly with the Russians in securing permission to fish in waters adjacent to the Kuriles there would appear to be no reason for otherpowers objecting to such an arrangement providing the Japanese were obliged to live up to existing international regulations on fishing. In the case of waters near the Kuriles, however, to make an issue at the Peace Conference of Japanese rights to fish in these waters might defeat its own end by antagonizing the Russians. Japanese interest in securing fishing rights in those waters would probably be further advanced if they were left for direct negotiations with the Russians after the signing of the Peace Treaty rather than made an issue at the Peace Conference.

In addition to the specific reference such as Mr. Ashida's to the Ryukyus and Kuriles, there are continual expressions of hope in the Japanese press for an early peace treaty. As far as the press has been covered in this office there have been no very striking or original views advanced as to what the nature of the peace terms should be, probably because the Japanese are nervous lest any such expression of their wishes might have a contrary effect. However, as an example of one forthright and bold statement by a prominent Japanese, a resolution recently moved in the House of Representatives by the veteran parliamentarian Ozaki Yukio is given as an appendix to this paper. Some comment on the resolution and its sequel will be included in the appendix.

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Appendix to
Paper No. 3

In the session of the House of Representatives Ozaki Yukio, Independent, submitted a resolution to the Speaker of the House which as reported by JIJI PRESS reads as follows:

> "We hope that the coming peace conference will break a precedent fundamentally and will be based not on power, victory or defeat, but on reason befitting humanity. The decision includes three points: namely, (1) Formosa, the Ryukyu Islands, Korea and Manchuria shall be put under the United Nations supervision for some time to come, and after the situations in those countries have been stabilized, a plebiscite shall decide whether they will become independent or become a member of another nation; (2) Reparations shall be based on the fair calculation of the losses of our country and of the Allied Powers, and only the balance shall be paid; (3) If the victor nations demand unreasonable reparations, we shall oppose them, based on reason and the fair estimation of losses on both sides, and be uncooperative in the withdrawal of the objects of reparations."

As a glance at this resolution will reveal, the mover has used more daring if not inflammatory language on the subject of the Peace Treaty than can be found in any recent public statements by a Japanese politician or official. What is puzzling about the matter is that Ozaki is not an obscure politician seeking publicity but an historical figure of the past who has consistently and over many decades spoken up sometimes as the only voice in the Diet against Japanese foreign policy. (Please refer to my despatch No. 60 of March 14.) He is now a man of advanced years and it might be charitable to attribute these remarks to his age which has left him out of touch with current affairs. Unfortunately from the evidence available, despite his years, and even despite a mild stroke he suffered some time recently, Ozaki can not be dismissed as a babbling dotard.

An alternative explanation is that he was used, perhaps unwittingly, by others as a mouthpiece to try out the effect on the public and the Allies of his resolution. In any case he would be a good choice for such an unscrupulous exploitation since he enjoys a unique position in the Diet as its oldest member having been continuously a member of every Diet since its first session in 1889, since he is independent of all party ties, and finally, since he enjoys a wide prestige both in Japan and among foreign observers as the outstanding exemplar of Japanese parliamentary liberalism. Further, Ozaki has a rather choleric temper and through many years of solitary opposition has perhaps become a chronic critic or gadfly so that words of attack come easier to his lips than those of compromise and conciliation. It may well be that officials in the Foreign Office or some politicians in the Diet have suggested to him that such a resolution coming from him would be both appropriate and helpful to Japanese interests. This was definitely suggested to me as the explanation by a responsible official in Government Section of G.H.Q. who recently had the task of

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going to the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives and asking him to pass an order to Matsuoka, the Speaker of the House, to have Ozaki's resolution expunged from the record of the House as being contrary to the Potsdam Declaration. (This is the first time that a G.H.Q. official has intervened openly in the conduct of affairs in the Diet.)

This resolution and the sequel has been described at some length not becauss it may be of any importance in itself but because it may reveal some of the currents of thought within Japanese official circles. It certainly fits in with the similar effort of Foreign Minister Ashida, described in the preceding memorandum.

Another feature of Ozaki's resolution which may bear further attention is his recommendations on reparations. Some observers in Tokyo are coming to the view that the United States is becoming increasingly pessimistic of reaching a satisfactory settlement on reparations and would be glad to see it dropped intirely from the peace settlement. Whether this in fact will be United States policy would be rash to speculate upon now, but at least it may be wise to consider the possibility of the Peace Conference being faced with a United States proposal to drop the question of reparations entirely.

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Paper No. 4

SECRET

JAPANESE PEACE SETTLEMENT:

SCAP DIRECTIVES AND THE PEACE TREATY

As suggested in telegram No. 147, a policy of writing into the peace terms all SCAP directives might lead to administrative chaos and political confusion in Japan even if the Japanese Government were honestly attempting to live up to these terms. The reason for fearing this is that so many of the directives were designed for some very specific purpose or to meet a situation that was extraordinary or transitional so that in the necessarily changing situation of the future years for the Japanese Government to have brought to its attention a directive, the purpose and usefulness of which has been outlived, might induce a state of mental paralysis in the Japanese Government.

This is not to say that the Japanese should be tacitly encouraged to forget or encroach upon the basic reforms which have been so admirably charted by SCAP. On the contrary, in order to deepen the respect in Japan for SCAP's pioneering work it seems desirable not to complicate future developments by confusing the issues with many detailed criteria, relying rather on the basic broad foundations laid by the occupation. Taking an example of some complex directive such as the dissolution of the Zaibatsu or land reform, in the coming years a Japanese Government may wish to approach these still unsolved problems in some way other than specified in the directives on the subject and yet not be violating the spirit of those directives. It is possible for instance that a Diet with a predominantly conservative majority may genuinely feel that land reform is seriously reducing the food production in the country even though raising the standard of living of the peasants and that therefore the nation cannot for the present at least afford the luxury of reform. Are they as the Government representative of the Japanese electorate to be prevented from taking steps in a matter which is primarily of internal Japanese economic concern? Alternatively, a government of strong socialist inclination might wish to reduce the compensation of landlords as now provided in the Land Reform Bill as an incentive to greater peasant proprietorship (the reform at present is dragging very slowly because of the reluctance of many peasants to buy land at current prices). Must the hand of such a government be inhibited because of the obligation to keep to the letter of the original SCAP directive on land reform? It seems that the more one ponders the subject the more one apprehends that insoluble difficulties would be raised by specifically writing into the Peace Treaty all SCAP directives, particularly those relating to the minutiae of administration and economic process. To do so would be to fit a straight jacket upon the body politic of the Japanese nation, which should be encouraged to grow as much as possible through its own efforts and political leadership, provided the direction of its growth is peaceful and fundamentally democratic.

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One way to proceed in this matter would be to start, as so many things in contemporary Japan do, from the Potsdam Declaration which is short, simple, and unlike many general declarations, though broad in outline is not too ambiguous. The relevant section from the Declaration for our present purpose would be:

> "The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. Freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights, shall be established."

Flowing from this, the most important directives to have either specifically guaranteed or, in some approximate form incorporated in the Peace Treaty, would be those which require the implementation of those liberties listed immediately above. As most of these democratic reforms have now been incorporated into Japanese basic or constitutional law, a workable method by which to treat the subject would be to require of the Japanese Government in the Peace Treaty that it live up to those liberties set forth in the Potsdam Declaration if it wished to win the confidence of the other nations and earn an equal standing with them. If Japanese legislation on the subject is specifically referred to in the Peace Treaty and the Japanese Government is enjoined to conform to their own legislation on the subject, the signatory powers would then be casting themselves in the role of a supreme court which in a very technical and laborious manner would be called upon to interpret all future Japanese legislation in the field, overriding such legislation when the letter or spirit of Japanese enacted law was deemed to have been broken. As suggested in Paper No. 1, if a Control Council is set up to investigate Japanese development after the Peace Treaty and report to some higher authority such as the United Nations, its responsibility would be to assess the whole trend in Japan as moving towards the desired goal or away from it, and to make the appropriate recommendations.

In deciding whether the controlling directives in the field of civil liberties and democratic reform should be specifically referred to in the Peace Treaty as requiring continuing Japanese observance, or whether the same general provisions should be incorporated afresh in the Peace Treaty, it would seem most helpful to draw on F.E.C. experience where the study of relevant documents has created a fitting background of experience. Perhaps the surest method would be to outline in the preamble to the appropriate section of the Peace Treaty the desiderata in this field and then to specify the basic three or four directives, including the one requiring the disbanding of nationalist societies and the purge of undesirable elements as key examples.

To go beyond this and prescribe in detail economic and administrative matters in Japan would not only create confusion but because of the comparative ease with which such

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minute provisions could be circumvented or ignored would bring the whole Peace Treaty into contempt with the Japanese. Simplicity and lucidity combined with a firm spirit that the Japanese must never return to their militarist past should be the guiding principles in this field.

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Paper No. 5

SECRET

JAPANESE PEACE SETTLEMENT:

DISSOLUTION OF ULTRA-NATIONALIST SOCIETIES

The question of the possible recrudescence in Japan of nationalism in its most virulent and aggressive form must be faced by those framing the peace. SCAP and his staff set about at an early date and in a most business-like fashion to implement both the Potsdam Declaration and the joint State-War-Navy directive on the subject of the dissolution of ultra-nationalist societies, culminating in the great directive of January 4, 1946. The Japanese Government in due course took cognizance of the directive and compiled a more detailed list of societies using as the exemplar the various types of society listed in the appendix to the SCAP directive. The Japanese Government duly took note of the SCAP directive that any society so listed would not legally be permitted to reorganize in some other guise in the future. As a corollary to this dissolution of the societies, the purge in various fields of public life which has been going on steadily for the past year excluded from public activity many prominent exponents of aggressive nationalism. Before, however, assuming that the task so well begun by SCAP has been finally accomplished, it is necessary to recall two or three factors.

1. Nature of Ultra-Nationalist Societies

It is not proposed here to submit a lengthy or even summarized history of the organizations of Japanese ultra-nationalism. Some details on the more recent history up to the end of the war may be found in studies now within the Department prepared by E. H. Norman during the war, but more particularly after the surrender while serving in C.I.S., SCAP. A summary of the method by which criteria for societies were drawn up and listed in the SCAP directive referred to above may be found in the document prepared by E. H. Norman for the Far Eastern Commission. For the present purpose it will be sufficient to point out that the roots of Japanese extreme nationalism go back many generations and thrust themselves into many different levels of Japanese life. Compared to the political and social organization of Nazi Germany, the Japanese oligarchic state was infinitely complex. In the case of the Third Reich, although German militarism and racial feeling antedated the rise of the Nazi movement, the structural form taken by a revived German militarism was comparatively simple, built as it was like a pyramid from the Fuerher to the lowest gauleiter with Nazi officials and party members ranged in hierarchical order between the apex and the base. This made identification of greater and lesser war criminals in Nazi Germany easier and also the weeding out of the most dangerous Nazis a simpler process. In the case of Japan however, the task of discovering the most dangerous political organizations and individuals was much more difficult. For one thing the societies themselves were manifold with a bewildering nexus of inter-relationships. During different phases of the history of Japanese aggression

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there was a continual rising and falling of Japanese societies so that an organization which was among the most fanatical and dangerous twenty years ago, may have become virtually defunct by the eve of Pearl Harbor. The only guiding threads were the dominant personalities and the consistent character of the propaganda and activity which had to be traced in the study of these societies in order to discover a significant pattern.

Another feature of Japanese ultra-nationalism was what might be termed the division of labour between the societies. Some specialized in propaganda directed to one nation or race of Asia; another concentrated upon organizing the Japanese peasants in the interests of army propaganda; other societies again drawing sometimes exclusively from the army and sometimes from civilians and army alike, existed chiefly for the purpose of bringing pressure from behind the scenes on the Government to compel it to take a more aggressive stand on foreign policy; others again were primarily instruments of terror directed against liberal or moderate elements in Government or public life; while two or three of the least important societies slavishly imitated the Nazi model but never succeeded in dominating the field as in the case of the Nazis and Italian Fascists. Whatever the form these societies took, however, their roots were deep and tortuous. Behind them was the compelling mystique - the myth of the divine mission of Japan which as a magnet brought together the far flung societies in a single purpose, namely to build a totalitarian military state in Japan as a base for successful expansion abroad.

To assume that the framing of these directives and their implementation by the Japanese Government through publishing a list of banned societies alone will end once and for all the possibility of the revival of Japanese nationalists would be to fly in the face of historical experience and to adopt a policy of excessive optimism which might betray one into a serious under-estimation of potential dangers.

2. Present Situation in Japan

There is something almost ominous in the fact that to date there have been no prosecutions by the Japanese authorities for violations of the purge directive or of directives dealing with the dissolution of nationalist societies. Is it to be understood that there has been not one case of an overt violation of a directive which has by law ruled out of political activity thousands of the most capable and ambitious politicians, officials, publicists, industrialists, etc., or should one assume that there have been violations but that these have been so cunningly executed that they have thus far escaped the attention of a large police force and a comparatively alert and observant press? To assume the first would be to believe in the almost miraculous obedience to authority of the Japanese who, despite their reputation for docility, do have in their midst many fanatical and unregenerate types; it would also assume a far greater ignorance on the part of the procurators and police of Japan than could scarcely be credible.

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On the other hand it would be unfair to the Japanese authorities to assume that they are part of a vast conspiracy to hoodwink SCAP by conniving at consistent or flagrant violations of the directive in question. The question may be approached perhaps in this way. We may assume that there are still a considerable number of fanatical and subversive elements in Japan who have decided on the policy of lying low and waiting rather than inviting greater repression by provocative behaviour. It is still possible that there have been infractions of directives, particularly with regard to the continued activity in politics of purged nationals working behind the scenes; in fact the press has intimated as much on several occasions. The Japanese Government apparently does not wish to focus much attention on the problem because there have been shady elements in the higher bureaucracy and political parties so that publicity could be embarrassing to them; secondly, the Japanese Government has been anxious to impress the rest of the world with the picture of a Japan where there is no evidence left of subversive activities of an ultra-nationalist nature.

Despite this, there are a few clues that suggest that there could still be danger from the quarter of unreformed ultra-nationalism lurking within Japanese society which deserve at least passing consideration.

On July 2, Mr. Sato Naotake, a member of the House of Councillors, veteran diplomat, last Japanese Ambassador to Moscow and recently Principal of the School for Training Diplomats (see Despatch No.121), a man of strong conservative leanings, well informed and discreet, made a rather significant interpellation which might serve as a starting point for our brief examination. The interpellation and the Prime Minister's answer reads as follows:

Sato: "In his administrative speech yesterday the Prime Minister failed to touch on the problem regarding extreme nationalists. However, in my opinion it is necessary to take measures for checking future activities of extreme nationalists like ultra-leftists. What opinion has the Prime Minister on this point?"

Prime Minister: "As the problem regarding rightists has not come to the surface, I refrained from touching the problem in my administrative speech yesterday. However it will be included in the problem regarding thorough-going democratization of Japan."

There are two significant points in this interchange; first, that a man so well informed both on world and Japanese affairs as Mr. Sato would deem it necessary to raise the question in the Upper House; second, the Prime Minister in his reply, while suggesting that the problem was not serious at least for the present, indirectly admitted that the danger might be latent and that much of the task of democratization still lay in the future. As a sequel and further comment on this interchange, another member of the House of Councillors, Mr. Hani Goro (Independent) a well known historian with leftist leanings, made the following statement:

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"Sato warned the Government against the danger of the revival of a nationalistic ideology; this has a special significance because he is from the bureaucratic circles. Katayama's reply was unsatisfactory and gave the audience the impression that no danger of the revival of nationalistic elements had existed. We must accurately grasp the reality from the international standpoint. After World War I, Fascism came to power, and several days ago it was reported that the plot of the nationalistic organizations of France to overthrow the French regime through armed force was nipped in the bud. These facts clearly indicate the possibility of the re-emergence of nationalistic elements in our country. Elimination of nationalistic ideology is a prerequisite for the democratization of our country. I believe that Sato's warning is a very timely one."

Without full access to relevant United States Army reports on politics, it is impossible to attempt a detailed picture of the present situation with regard to possible re-emergence of ultra-nationalist societies but the social millieu of present day Japan which could still be a hotbed for extremism, should be described and this will be briefly attempted.

The chief reservoir of the feudal influence, where old political legends and the mystique of Imperial Japan still survive, is the Japanese countryside. The land reform, the blueprint of which was so admirably conceived by experts in G.H.Q., and which since has been translated into Japanese legislation, has as yet scarcely affected the social psychology and political habits of the countryside. It is significant that from the members of the Diet, a great majority of deputies who are furthest to the right are elected from rural constituencies. It is to these areas which have scarcely felt the impact of new ideals and reform that millions of ex-servicemen and repatriated P.O.W.'s have returned. These ex-servicemen, rightly or wrongly, feel that they have not been granted adequate relief by the Government and that their reception in the homeland was cold even to the extent of being contemptuous. They feel that they were only pawns in the vast tragedy of war and that they are no more to blame for Japan's aggression and defeat than the civilians who worked at home in factories or offices, and in contrast to these they suffered greater risks and discomforts.

In addition to this feeling of resentment which is in the hearts of many of these repatriates is the old antagonism between country and town which has been revealed in recent months in even sharper form by the refusal of many farmers to sell their produce at standard prices for the provisioning of cities, necessitating in many areas forced collections which in turn have exacerbated the hostility between country and city.

From such glimpses as one gets of country life, particularly political, one deduces that the old local boss, usually a small landowner or a henchman of a larger landowner, still dominates the village community. (One might compare him both in power and psychology to the Spanish cacique.) These leaders in the countryside either ran for local offices in the recent elections or backed agents of their own selection and were overwhelmingly successful in dominating these elections. It should be emphasized that the colouring of the psychology of these rural politicos is still feudal. This means amongst other things, passive acceptance by the rural populace of the political

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leadership of the traditional local "strong man" with the community regarded as a corporate body whose interests he alone should represent whether he be in office or behind the scenes.

The outstanding authority today in Japan on the subject of religion, Mr. W. K. Bunce, who drafted the directive on the separation of Shinto from the State, has recently admitted that the old ideas of Shintoism are still strong in the countryside and that the Emperor, despite his abjuration of divinity on New Years Day 1946, is still regarded by the rural masses as the Son of Heaven.* Through the organizations of farmers, through the local schools and in the municipal assemblies, the old feudal psychology will still prevail as long as these Japanese-style caciques maintain their dominant position in the communities. The situation described, so far from being alarming or exceptional, is what anyone with a pre-war knowledge of Japan would expect. Sweeping political changes have been carried out in the fields of constitutional law and government structure, but the new ideas inspiring these changes, and in turn stimulated by them, will seep into the comparatively impervious countryside only at a very slow rate. The continuing lag of feudal psychology and political practice in the Japanese countryside again need not alarm us provided we are aware of it and appreciate that time and steady progress alone will overcome it. This lag becomes dangerous, however, if a Japanese Government in the future either through weakness or as a deliberate policy permitted pernicious myths concerning the surrender, or legends concerning "the Holy war for Greater East Asia" to be revived. These myths could easily find a fertile ground in the Japanese countryside, bearing the evil fruits of chauvinism, political irrationalism, and a vengeful hatred towards those Japanese who have cooperated with the Allies.

Turning briefly to the cities, it is relevant to note that the unemployed in Japan number approximately five millions, with well over half this number in the cities. Gangsterism is rife and here again the feudal institution of ward bosses who control the livelihood of small retail merchants and who take an active part in local politics is still powerful. Recently published figures of the crimes committed by organized city gangs make disturbing reading. The heads of these gangs are known as oyabun (chief) who have their kobun (henchmen) scattered throughout the ward or city. In contemporary Japan the most profitable field of activity is their

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* As an example of the continuing strength of irrationalism in politics, please refer to Despatch No. 25 describing Jiko-sama, self-styled "sun-goddess".

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control of the 40,000 or more tekiya* (street stall sellers). Battening upon these street stall sellers, underworld leaders have acquired not only vast sums through extortion or blackmail but have been active in political campaigning. According to a report of Government Section, G.H.Q., the Hatoyama Tokyo political machine (Hatoyama, although a purgee, is known to have close connections with the Liberal Party of which he was the original founder) was dependent upon these oyabun and their strong-arm men and their ready cash to roll up a heavy majority in the elections both of last year and this year. This type of political pressure of course is nothing new in Japanese politics but it is significant that despite the recent police drive against them, these elements are still able to play so active a part in the economic and political life of Japanese cities.

These details may appear remote from the subject under discussion but in examining contemporary Japan one must assess the potential forces which might be the carriers of a reviving nationalism and in the city areas it is these oyabun who would be among the transmitters of the virus since they or their agents are sufficiently close to the ordinary people to act as the carriers of malicious rumours and the organizers of mob violence. It is further significant that there have been an increasing number of assaults by these gangsters of a political nature. To date the most spectacular incident was an attack by men armed with knives upon Kikunami, who was the head of the National Congress of Industrial Organizations (the largest union federation in Japan). Attacks of a similar nature, chiefly against trade unionists, though with less prominent victims have, according to foreign newspapermen, been carried out with impunity.

Behind the vast army of underworld bosses and political knaves stands the group, now a formidable number, of purged politicians, officials, businessmen, and ultra-nationalist leaders. These men who set the pace in Japanese public affairs in the war-making years are mostly still in the prime of life, therefore still ambitious, capable and restless.

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* The existence of large numbers of these small street stalls afforded opportunity for blackmail. These stalls occupied city property and were, therefore, likely to lose their locations at any time that the police disapproved their operations. Often operating without licence, they were particularly vulnerable to blackmailing. The evil effects of tekiya control caused not only financial extortions, terrorisms and warfare but led also to tight political control over the areas under gang influence. While the American type of political boss does not exist in Japan, the gangster controlled type of political machine has been steadily growing. Some Liberal Party observers declare that their own party domination over the Tokyo region, dating back to Hara's day, is the direct outgrowth of this system. Some of the evils popularly attributed to the tonari gumi in reality derived from the gangster system.

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Although they suffered no punitive measures from the purge other than being debarred from public office, it would hardly be human nature for the majority of them to accept their forced inactivity with grace or resignation. As long as the occupation forces are in Japan vigilant against violations of the purge directive which provides penalties for the clandestine activity of these men working behind the scenes in the field from which they were specifically debarred, these purgees will no doubt remain comparatively quiet. But with the end of the occupation now in sight, one cannot but wonder whether a future Japanese Government will be able to withstand the pressure and intrigue of such of these purgees as may be anxious to return to political life. These are men, it should be recalled, who have acquired in the jungle of pre-war Japanese politics, the skills and crafts of political intrigue, demagogy and mass propaganda. Many of them look with contempt on the contemporary leaders in Japan, regarding them as mere amateurs in the field. While many of them may find an outlet for their energies in channels that are either innocuous or even helpful, it would be naive to assume that the most significant number of them will tamely accept the ban under which they are now placed. If Japanese society and economy degenerates in the years to come, these are the people who might well be the "General Staff" to revive Japanese nationalism, while the rank and file would be found in the feudal countryside on the one hand, and the vast underworld of the cities on the other.

3. Future Policy

Once the Peace Treaty is signed and the occupation forces withdrawn, the best guarantee against the revival of extreme nationalism in any form would be a reasonably stable economy based on peaceful trade and a government committed to evolutionary progress along democratic lines. To bring this fond hope down to practicalities, one method would be, if a Control Council were set up in Japan, to assure it wide powers of investigation so that alarming symptoms of a reviving ultra-nationalism could be aired before the world and appropriate pressure brought upon the Japanese Government to remedy the situation. Any observers wishing to study these symptoms must bear in mind that the Japanese have shown themselves extremely adept at creating loosely organized societies with innocuous or even praiseworthy titles which exert very real and sinister influence in public affairs. There is much food for thought also in the developments of the Weimar Republic in Germany where the Nazis towards the end of that ill-fated regime were permitted to become virtually a state within a state.

A hopeful feature of contemporary Japan is that many Japanese seem genuinely anxious to win the confidence and regard of other nations. This desire must be played upon skilfully by the Allied Powers working either through a Control Council set up in the Peace Treaty or through their representatives in Tokyo. If the Japanese Government and the ordinary respectable citizen realizes that an attitude of complacency towards the recrudescence of ultra-nationalism will seriously impair Japanese reputation and credit with the outside world, this will act as one of the

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best instruments in helping to keep Japan's feet firmly placed along the path which General MacArthur has so brilliantly charted.

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Paper No. 6

SECRET

JAPANESE PEACE SETTLEMENT:

TRADE NOTES

1. Starting from the premise that Japan's future economy will, to a major extent, depend upon her ability to produce and export to foreign markets in order to finance imports of foodstuffs, essential raw materials and manufactured equipment, it is believed the level of Japanese industries to be permitted will require to undergo review. In explanation, it is probable that the earlier discussions in the F.E.C. had in mind an export trade led by raw silk as in prewar years, when this commodity represented nearly 50% in value of Japan's exports. Synthetics have so reduced the demand for natural silk that unless there is a drastic change raw silk in the future will take an unimportant position in Japan's overall export trade.

2. To compensate for this loss expansion should take place in other established classifications of export items, and also new lines should be developed. The country has no raw materials of any importance to offer, and the other alternative is therefore in manufactured goods. This would necessitate a higher level in basic industries, and in assessing actual needs recognition should be taken of Japan's internal requirements for purposes of rehabilitation. Vast quantities of materials, both domestic and imported, will be needed to rebuild her cities, provide the basis of rehabilitating public utilities, including the reconstruction of transportation systems, railroads, rolling stock, etc., to correct the damage to the coal mines and equipment caused by improper working during the war years, to repair the damage to harbour facilities, etc., all of which work must of necessity be undertaken concurrently with peacetime industrial development and any export programme.

3. Increased production for export and access to the markets of the world will have to be permitted, but it is considered that some form of control over Japan's exports and imports should be maintained for some years. For several years prior to the war a great many of Japan's export industries were quite heavily subsidized by the Government in order that merchandise could be sold at low prices with a view to accumulating funds abroad. It is in order to prevent the recurrence of this and other similar practices that an adequate control is suggested.

4. Persistent reports would indicate that the United States is favouring a more lenient attitude towards Japanese industries, and it might perhaps be assumed that this attitude will be extended to the medium and heavier industries, the manufactures from which could be disposed of in the markets of the Far East. This applies to such items as machine tools, internal combustion engines, railroad equipment, electrical apparatus, textile machinery, etc. Major objections to any expansion of Japan's exports in these lines is to be expected, but following surveys and negotiations a level satisfactory to all might be found.

5. Textile Industries. Here again levels satisfactory

/to all

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to all will doubtless require negotiating. Canadian interest is directed to controlling Japan's exports of better classes of cotton textiles.

6. It is considered that provisions should be made in the peace treaty for the protection of the foreign individual and foreign traders operating in Japan. Unfair discrimination against foreign traders, as also unethical business methods and tactics, were rampant in the immediate prewar years, in some cases sponsored by the Government, in others, encouraged from the same source. These practices were first noticeable during the early 30's and as anti-foreignism developed after the outbreak of the China Incident the Japanese made no effort to disguise their intentions. Discrimination and other unfair practices took form in several directions but were most evident in the activities of the numerous trade associations covering both imports and exports. These associations became increasingly under direct Government control during the second half of 1930. Since the occupation measures have supposedly been taken to dissolve the associations and to replace them by the Boeki Kodan. The Boeki Kodan are government trade promotion groups working under the direct guidance and supervision of the Boeki-cho. Officials of these groups in many instances are ex-officers of the former trade associations.

Discrimination was also very apparent in the allocation or distribution of permits during the period of foreign exchange control extending from 1937 to the outbreak of war.

Perhaps in the related section of the peace treaty foreigners and foreign firms trading within Japan in the future could be assured equal trading rights and opportunities with the Japanese and protection from any form of restraint or discriminatory conditions. Channels would have to be provided for appeals in case of such discrimination or recognized unfair treatment.

7. Consideration might be given to the affect of possible U. S. loans to Japan. It is to be anticipated such loans will tend to give the United States a preferred position even after the establishment of a commercial exchange rate and a return to normal trading. Attention is drawn to the press release of SCAP's interview with press representatives on March 18th, when in replying to a question on possible U.S. loans to Japan he is reported to have suggested that "credits given to Japan to date for food and other supplies should constitute a first claim against Japanese earnings, and any further loans a first lien against anything taken out of Japan in the way of trade".

8. Government Subsidies. These are matters of internal policy and the results of their application to export industries would be for the country affected to discuss direct with the Japanese Government, and if necessary to take whatever retaliatory or protective steps indicated. Subsidies to shipping interests are less easily countered, but the limitation on size of vessels to be permitted Japan in the future should assist in removing the danger of the world-wide competition offered by Japan in prewar years and made possible by government subsidies of one or other type.

9. Tariffs. In general, tariff question are for direct negotiation between Japan and individual interested nations and therefore unlikely to be taken up in drafting the peace treaty.

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10. Offered for consideration is the subject of taxation, direct and indirect, to which Allied nationals may be subjected to in the future, particularly through the years during which Japan will be recovering from the disastrous war of her own making. Technicalities involved might preclude any discussion of this subject in peace treaty negotiations.

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APPENDIX E

NOTES ON PERSONALITIES

1. Dr. Evatt:

   Despatch, Canberra (HC)-Ottawa July 2 — 639

2. Representatives to the Far Eastern Commission

   Despatch, Washington-Ottawa, July 5 — 1434

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SECRET

AIRMAIL

OFFICE OF THE
HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR CANADA

July 2, 1947.

No. 639

Sir,

... I have the honour to forward three copies of a memorandum containing an estimate and appraisal of the Australian Minister for External Affairs, Dr. Evatt. It is hoped that this document may be of general interest to the Department and of particular interest to the Canadian delegates to the forthcoming British Commonwealth Conference on Japanese problems in Canberra and the ensuing meeting of the General Assembly of the United Nations. The memorandum was prepared by Mr. Malone.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

(Sgd.) C. M. Croft

Acting High Commissioner for Canada.

The Right Honourable,
The Secretary of State
for External Affairs,
OTTAWA, Canada.

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C 272312

SECRET

OFFICE OF THE

HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR CANADA

MEMORANDUM ON
THE RIGHT HONOURABLE HERBERT VERE EVATT
MINISTER FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AND ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

.....

HIS CAREER:

At the age of 53, Dr. Evatt can look back on a career rich with accomplishment and personal distinction. Born of relatively poor parents in Sydney, in 1894, he was educated at State Schools and the University of Sydney. At Sydney University he proved an outstanding undergraduate in the field of extra-curricular activities as well as in his studies.

Upon graduation he was admitted to the Sydney Bar where, as a youthful advocate, he quickly established a reputation for exceptional ability. His first active connection with politics came in 1925 when he was elected to the New South Wales Parliament as a Labour Member. He held his seat until 1929. In 1930, when he was only 36, the Scullin Commonwealth Labour Government appointed him to the Australian High Court, which approximates the Supreme Court of Canada.

As a member of the High Court Bench from 1930 to 1940, Dr. Evatt proved himself one of the outstanding jurists Australia has produced. A number of his dissenting judgments were upheld by the Privy Council and his ability held the high, if grudging, respect of his less liberal associates on the Bench, most of whom had been appointed by non-Labour Governments.

Dr. Evatt's years on the Bench witnessed his authorship of a number of books which constituted brilliant essays on political, historical and constitutional subjects. His books established him as a liberal scholar without peer in the Commonwealth.

In 1940, Dr. Evatt resigned from the High Court to contest the Commonwealth Elections as a Labour Candidate. He was elected and when the Labour Party assumed office in October, 1941 following the collapse of the anti-Labour coalition, he was appointed Minister for External Affairs and Attorney-General. Following the elections in 1946, the Labour Parliamentary Caucus elected him Deputy-Leader of the Labour Party.

Dr. Evatt achieved independence of means as a result of his marriage in 1920 to a wealthy Sydney woman. He and his wife, who is of American descent, have one son and one daughter, both of whom are reported to have been adopted. Dr. Evatt's success in every pursuit he has followed and his freedom from financial worries have combined to make him a man of exceptional self-confidence and self-assurance.

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HIS CHARACTER:

Dr. Evatt constitutes a complex study with many conflicting angles. He is an undoubted liberal and yet is intensely selfish and self-centered. He holds high rank in his Party but is not trusted by it. His ability is great but it is limited by quirks of his own temperament. His sagacious mind functions in an aggressive, egocentric personality which continually fails on the human level to keep pace with the power of his intellect.

Thus, he constitutes the anomaly of a considerably disliked and entirely selfish man who, despite his lack of warmth and understanding on the human level, has become one of Australia's outstanding leaders. The accomplishments and achievements in political life which might be considered the full due of his intellectual ability and physical and mental energy, however, constantly are being foreshortened by the distrust of the less brilliant around him - distrust when it is not positive dislike.

Dr. Evatt is intensely ambitious, restless, eager for power for its own sake, ruthless in his judgment of men and in making decisions. If he fails at times as a politician it is because he is temperamentally out of the reach of his fellow men, but he sustains his high position by brilliance unchallenged in his own field. He is brusque, curt, rude, no respecter of persons or positions and jealous of contempories. He permits no rising star in his galaxy to challenge his own unshaded position as the central sun.

Driving his policy onward by sheer weight of mind, plus ruthless indifference to feelings of others, his own goal is his only end and his persistence in reaching it at all costs has carried him far. His goal for the future undoubtedly is the Prime Ministership but the resentful political personalities around him - colleagues whose admiration for his ability is outweighed by resentment of his egocentric methods - may well prevent him from achieving it. The deputy-leadership of the Party does not carry the right of succession to the prime-ministership.

HIS POLICIES

Considering his legal background, Dr. Evatt has not proved an outstanding Attorney-General. This is understandable in view of his main interest lying with his other portfolio in a realm where he holds undisputed sway. His appointment as Minister for External Affairs coincided with but was not necessarily responsible entirely for an upheaval in the conduct of Australia's foreign policy.

Primary credit for the abandonment by the Australian Labour Party of its traditional isolationism undoubtedly is due to Japan and the history of the Pacific war. Dr. Evatt's main contribution has been the almost contemptuous casting off of the Opposition Parties' unfailing subservience to Britain in the field of foreign affairs in favour of aggressive and outspoken negotiations in which Australia has not hesitated to tell Britain what should be done.

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Australia undoubtedly still nourishes deep resentment towards Britain for the fall of Singapore and the inability of the United Kingdom to come to Australia's help in her hour of need. Dr. Evatt does not hesitate at times to capitalize on this feeling. The present foreign policy of Australia which, in effect, is the foreign policy of Dr. Evatt, is based on his conviction of Australia's right to equality in the world. His hatred of the old traditional policy of subserviently following Britain and his realistic and positive opinion that Australia should stand on her own feet and make her own decisions, whether they are in accord with British policy, dominate his thinking.

Dr. Evatt is not necessarily hostile to Britain; he is primarily pro-Australian, i.e. - pro-Evatt. Handicapped by the lack of Australian "big guns" in world power politics, he is fully prepared to speak with the authority of the entire British Commonwealth behind him if such authority can be obtained. The Anzac Agreement of 1945 provided Dr. Evatt with the backing of New Zealand in foreign affairs. The appointment of Australians as political and military leaders of the British Commonwealth (not including Canada) representation in Japan following the Armistice marked another step forward in increasing the volume of Australia's voice in world affairs.

World-wide recognition and acclaim have been won by Dr. Evatt by his outspoken opposition to the Great Powers at International Conferences. In what measure this opposition is sincere and not merely a means of winning acclaim for himself would be difficult to assess. It would be equally difficult to assess the force of the impact Dr. Evatt has made in world politics.

One is tempted to think of him in relation to the Great Powers as a small boy throwing pebbles at bigger boys with the intention of annoying them and attracting their attention rather than causing them any real concern, and knowing that his lack of manners will be treated indulgently by his victims and will win the admiration of other smaller boys. On the other hand, the role played by Dr. Evatt at San Francisco appears to prove that the Great Powers do not necessarily have a monopoly of ability and vision in regard to constructive international planning.

Dr. Evatt's pin-pricking attitude to the United States may appear ungrateful in view of the service of the United States to Australia during the Pacific War. He appears to be unduly sceptical of the political and economic stability of the United States and he has indicated, at times, a tendency to display more friendliness to the U.S.S.R. than might be expected from him, particularly since occasional friendly overtures by him have been rebuffed. The opportunism of his policy can be seen clearly in regard to the U.S.S.R. At one moment he is prepared to play the role of compromiser between the U.S.S.R. and the Western democracies; in the next, having failed to receive co-operation from the U.S.S.R., he is prepared to lead an attack on her.

Dr. Evatt's attitude to Canada seems to have become more friendly than it was at one stage of the Pacific War when he was openly critical of Canada's inability to send more fighting men to the Pacific theatre. It would be reasonable to suspect, however, that he shares the feeling

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of many Australians that Canada's policies are subject to undue influence from the United States. Dr. Evatt perhaps sees in Canada also a barrier to his hope of becoming a creator and definer of policy for the entire British Commonwealth, particularly in the Pacific and Asiatic areas.

The rapid development of the Australian Department of External Affairs and the extension of Australia's Commonwealth and Foreign representation under Dr. Evatt's guidance constitute a notable achievement. This achievement, however, appears to be more of a personal accomplishment than a genuine effort to establish a new Australian foreign policy on firm and lasting foundations. All policy decisions must go through him and be subservient to him. He is not anxious to have full-statured men following the paths he charts. At all times he wishes to pull the strings and be the voice "of" when he isn't being the voice "on". Imaginatively and intellectually he sees a wide path a long way ahead. As long as he is able to give personal attention to the course, he follows it methodically and perseveringly but often other pursuits and the intrusion of temperament and character weaknesses cause him to lose sight of the goal.

A tireless worker himself he demands strenuous service from his subordinates. To them he is a driver of men rather than a leader. They admire his ability but fear his temper and impatience. Fear and nervousness discourage their initiative. Diplomatic appointments abroad have been made by Dr. Evatt mainly on the basis of expediency and political considerations rather than with a view to establishment of a competent and enterprising foreign service.

Politically, Dr. Evatt has been described as a 19th century liberal. As a member of the Australian Labour Party, he is a Socialist in principle but in reality is so only in a remote and limited academic sense. He is not really interested in internal political considerations except as they affect himself. He is more directly immersed in the international scene which has become for him, as far as his Party is concerned, his private preserve.

HIS FUTURE:

Unless the hostility to him within hiw own Party unexpectedly gives way, Dr. Evatt's chances of becoming Prime Minister are not the best. High positions in Australia which might come his way in future if he decided to retire from politics would include the Governor-Generalship or the Chief Justiceship of the High Court. These might fail to satisfy his ambition. It is possible that he will seek the pinnacle of his career in the external field, possibly within the United Nations. At present he is reported to be interested in the Presidency of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

CONCLUSION:

In Dr. Evatt is seen a first-rate intellect with a top level capacity for critical, analytical and constructive thinking lined up with an egocentric and domineering personality and temperament. It is true that on occasions Dr. Evatt can show a measure of geniality and affability and he is by no means humourless. These

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attributes lie lightly on the surface, however, and fail to cloak the ambition, determination and ruthlessness which are the keynotes of his character. These characteristics, when viewed at close range, present a compelling but disturbing spectacle.

.....

CANBERRA
July 2, 1947
PM/MH

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C 272317

CONFIDENTIAL

CANADIAN EMBASSY

July 5, 1947.

No. 1434

Sir:

With reference to your teletype No. EX-1474 of June 11th requesting memoranda on the Far Eastern Commission for the use of our delegations at the Commonwealth meeting in Canberra, and at the Japanese Peace Conference, I have the honour to enclose some notes on F.E.C. personalities prepared by Mr. Collins of this Embassy.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient servant,
(Signed) H.H. Wrong

The Secretary of State
for External Affairs,
OTTAWA, Canada.

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F.E.C. Personalities

- I -

So far as the Commonwealth meeting is concerned, only two members of FEC delegations are likely to be present, Major J. Plimsoll (Australia) and Colonel G.R. Powles (New Zealand)

Major Plimsoll, who is in the curious position of being on the staff of the Australian Military Mission but working full time on the FEC and, for all practical purposes, reporting directly to Dr. Evatt, has probably been the most effective single personality in the Commission. Formerly on the research staff of one of the Australian banks, he is a natural politician, and has contributed a great deal to the work of the Commission at all levels. He is young, a very hard worker, and a subtle negotiator, both in his presentation of material in debate and in lobbying behind the scenes. (He is practically the only person in the Commission who has any influence on the Soviet delegation). After a near-resignation over the recent developments in Australian policy, he is now on the way to becoming Dr. Evatt's right hand man on Japanese affairs, and is accompanying Dr. Evatt on his visit to General MacArthur. Major Plimsoll has been an excellent chairman of the Reparations Committee, and can be counted on to fill such a position at any time with efficiency, moderation and good humour.

Colonel Powles, an ex-lawyer, is now First Secretary in the New Zealand Legation and has been a full-time member of the New Zealand delegation. While less prominent than Major Plimsoll, partly because of Sir Carl Berendsen's active role in the Commission and the Steering Committee, Colonel Powles is one of the most respected representatives on the FEC. He has a good mind and is a very able advocate. He has not held any chairmanships (Sir Carl is chairman of the Steering Committee), but should be good in such a position.

- II -

It is impossible to forecast accurately who will turn up at the Peace Conference itself, but the following brief notes on other delegations may be of some use (Sir Carl Berendsen does not expect or intend to participate):

U.S.

None of the three senior members (General McCoy, Dr. Blakeslee, Mr. Dickover) is likely to play any part. The only member of the U.S. delegation who has been particularly effective in FEC work as an individual is Mr. Robert W. Barnett, a young China expert who has been handling Japanese reparations both in the FEC and in the Japanese & Korean Economic Affairs Division of the State Department. He is very able, though at times a trifle heavy-handed as representative of the chief power on the FEC, and is a "liberal" in his attitude both toward Far Eastern problems and toward the domestic problem (the War Department). As the State Department technical expert on Japanese reparations he will probably be on the U.S. delagation at the Peace Conference if he is still in government service at the time.

U.K.

Although Sir George Sansom has left the FEC to take

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up a teaching post at Columbia, it is possible that he might be recalled again as an adviser at the Peace Conference. Sir George needs no introduction as an authority on Japan, but it should be noted that despite his charm and wisdom he was probably less influential in the Commission than might have been expected, perhaps because he considered occupied Japan chiefly a U.S. responsibility and the FEC largely a formality.

The remaining active members of the British delegation, some of whom might appear at the Conference, are all of good calibre. Mr. H.A. Graves (Counsellor), a product of the consular service in Japan, has a mild personality but is both respected and liked. He has not held any chairmanship. Mr. F.C. Everson (First Secretary) has taken over the Economics Committee replacing Sir George Sansom, and is very forceful in his fulfillment of this office, being on occasion embarrassingly blunt in his insistence upon dealing expeditiously with matters in hand. Somewhat angular both in appearance and approach, he has a keen mind and a good grasp of the relevant facts, but is disinclined to suffer fools gladly or otherwise.

U.S.S.R.

The oustanding Soviet contribution to the FEC has been Admiral Ramishvili, who is a regular member of the Steering Committee and, during the long absence of Ambassador Novikov, acting representative on the Commission. Formerly in charge of the educational side of the naval training program in Russia, he was with the Soviet purchasing mission before coming to the FEC, and is the only member of the Soviet delegation who can dispense with an interpreter. (He is, incidentally, a man of broad general education, and speaks both Spanish and French). Stout and genial, his shrewd sense of humour has done a great deal to maintain the unusually good relationships that have obtained between the Two Worlds in the FEC. Perhaps because he himself is ostentatiously Georgian, he is (or at least gives a very good imitation of being) surprisingly independent both in negotiation and in his personal contacts. It is to be hoped that he will be on the Soviet delegation at the Peace Conference.

Neither Mr. G.G. Dolbin or Mr. A.P. Korobochkin, the Soviet members of the working committees, are particularly outstanding. Both are still learning English, and while pleasant personally, are not particularly apt in negotiation or particularly desirable candidates as chairmen.

China

Like Sir George Sansom, Dr. Wellington Koo hardly requires any comment here, except to note that the Chinese delegation has gained immensely in effectiveness and prestige since he replaced Ambassador Wei Taoming.

Here again it is impossible to tell who will be sent to the Peace Conference. Dr. S.H. Tan, who is next to the Ambassador on the delegation and the regular member on the Steering Committee, has been thoroughly competent. On the economic side (including reparations), two of the younger members, Dr. K.K. Tsien and Dr. Anthony Koo (a nephew of the Ambassador) have been consistently good. One person who should be treated gingerly, however, is the Ambassador's private secretary, Mr. H.T. Liu, who has represented China on the Constitutional Committee and is now chairman of the committee on War Crimes. In one sense very able and unusually forthright for a Chinese, he is somewhat of a menace in committees because of his dogmatic approach, based on his confidence in his own logical powers, and is definitely a liability in the chair.

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France

Mr. P.E. Naggiar, who is France's special Ambassador for the FEC, is an example of French cultural assimilation (he is Lebanese) and has the Gallic predelection for logical and legal consistency almost at the expense of attention to the substance of the question at hand. Actually, he has not contributed a great deal when sitting on the Commission, but has been very clear-headed whenever problems of jurisdiction under the Terms of Reference are involved.

Mr. F. Lacoste is Minister in charge of Far Eastern Affairs in the French Embassy, and might turn up at the Conference, although he has not been active in the FEC for some time. Very amiable personally, he is inclined to be slightly too fussy to be efficient in the chair. (He is chairman of the committee on Aliens in Japan).

Another member of the French delegation who might turn up is Mr. Robert Douteau. Formerly in the French foreign service in Japan, M. Douteau is a "perfect" diplomat: handsome in a clean-cut way, cultured (he amuses himself writing an unofficial and probably unpublishable biography of Washington), intelligent and sociable, he has done a good job on committees despite the cloud under which France labours in the FEC. It has been said that his outlook tends at times to be distressingly reminiscent of Vichy.

Netherlands

Most of the original Netherlands delegation has now left (Ambassador Loudon, Dr. de Kat Angelino, and Dr. G.A.Ph. Weyer). Dr. de Kat tended to rubber-stamp U.S. policies, perhaps because of his fear of left-wing colonial developments, and was more of an academic expert than a maker or proponent of policy. Dr. Weyer, on the other hand, was an effective representative in economic matters, where the Netherlands have frequently been at odds with the U.S.

Of the present group, it is quite likely that the newest arrival, Dr. R.H. Van Gulik, may appear at the Conference, since he is one of the leading younger experts on China and Japan. He has an incredible flair for languages, having written a treatise in Chinese which was published in Chungking during the war while he was with the Netherlands Embassy there, although he is primarily a Japanologist. His academic publications have been narrowly cultural (he is currently publishing an exhaustive work on the hanging of Chinese pictures), but his competence is presumably of much wider scope. It is too early as yet to estimate his capacities in committee work. He will, however, be taking over, as Deputy-Chairman, the acting chairmanship of the Reparations Committee. As member of this committee he is replacing Dr. Hart, who, although reputedly a well-known statistician in the Netherlands Indies and a very well-meaning individual, has been one of the Committee's chief trials.

India

It would require a Lytton Strachey to do anything like justice to Sir Girja Bajpai, who formerly represented India on the FEC and who might possibly be at the peace negotiations. He was undoubtedly the most brilliant individual in the Commission, disposing of a combination of eloquence and mordant wit that made him a scourge of the local philis-

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tines. Dr. Sen, Minister in the Indian Embassy and now alternate delegate, has had long administrative experience in India and takes his work seriously. Mr. J. Vesugar, the former alternate, was respected by the other members despite a slight tendency toward confusion in his presentation of a case. The other Indian members have been personable, competent, but not outstanding.

The Philippines

The Philippines have played little part in Commission work, and individual members of the delegation are consequently difficult to assess. General Romulo, on the rare occasions when he has attended meetings of the full Commission, has tended to deliver orations worthy of a much larger audience.

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APPENDIX F

DECLARATIONS OF THE GREAT POWERS CONCERNING JAPAN

1. The Cairo Declaration
2. The Yalta Agreement
3. The Potsdam Declaration
4. Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between U.S.S.R. and Chinese Republics.

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C272323

THE CAIRO CONFERENCE

Joint Communique, December 1, 1943.

President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and Prime Minister Churchill, together with their respective military and diplomatic advisers, have completed a conference in North Africa.

The following general statement was issued:

The several military missions have agreed upon future military operations against Japan.

The three great Allies expressed their resolve to bring unrelenting pressure against their brutal enemies by sea, land and air. This pressure is already rising. The three great Allies are fighting this war to restrain and punish the agression of Japan.

They covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion. It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed.

The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall be become free and independent.

With these objects in view, the three Allies, in harmony with those of the United Nations at war with Japan, will continue to persevere in the serious and prolonged operations necessary to procure the unconditional surrender of Japan.

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AGREEMENT REGARDING JAPAN

Between the Leaders of the Three Great Powers--
The United States of America
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland

Signed at Yalta February 11, 1945

The leaders of the three Great Powers--the Soviet Union, the United States of America and Great Britain-- have agreed that in two or three months after Germany has surrendered and the war in Europe has terminated the Soviet Union shall enter into the war against Japan on the side of the Allies on condition that:

1. The status quo in Outer-Mongolia (The Mongolian People's Republic) shall be preserved;

2. The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 shall be restored, viz:

(a) the southern part of Sakhalin as well as all the islands adjacent to it shall be returned to the Soviet Union,

(b) the commercial port of Dairen shall be internationalized, the pre-eminent interests of the Soviet Union in this port being safeguarded and the lease of Port Arthur as a naval base of the USSR restored,

(c) The Chinese-Eastern Railroad and the South-Manchurian Railroad which provides an outlet to Dairen shall be jointly operated by the establishment of a joint Soviet-Chinese Company it being understood that the preeminent interests of the Soviet Union shall be safeguarded and that China shall retain full sovereignty in Manchuria;

3. The Kuril islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union.

It is understood, that the agreement concerning Outer-Mongolia and the ports and railroads referred to above will require concurrence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek. The President will take measures in order to obtain this concurrence on advice from Marshal Stalin.

The Heads of the three Great Powers have agreed that these claims of the Soviet Union shall be unquestionably fulfilled after Japan has been defeated.

For its part the Soviet Union expresses its readiness to conclude with the National Government of China a pact of friendship and alliance between the USSR and China in

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order to render assistance to China with its armed forces for the purpose of liberating China from the Japanese yoke.

February 11, 1945.

Franklin D. Roosevelt
Winston S. Churchill

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C272326

PROCLAMATION DEFINING TERMS FOR JAPANESE SURRENDER
(THE POTSDAM PROCLAMATION)

July 26, 1945.

(1) WE--THE PRESIDENT of the United States, the President of the National Government of the Republic of China, and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, representing the hundreds of millions of our countrymen, have conferred and agree that Japan shall be given an opportunity to end this war.

(2) The prodigious land, sea and air forces of the United States, the British Empire and of China, many times reinforced by their armies and air fleets from the west, are poised to strike the final blows upon Japan. This military power is sustained and inspired by the determination of all the Allied Nations to prosecute the war against Japan until she ceases to resist.

(3) The result of the futile and senseless German resistance to the might of the aroused free peoples of the world stands forth in awful clarity as an example to the people of Japan. The might that now converges on Japan is immeasurably greater than that which, when applied to the resisting Nazis, necessarily laid waste to the lands, the industry and the method of life of the whole German people. The full application of our military power, backed by our resolve, will mean the inevitable and complete destruction of the Japanese armed forces and just as inevitably the utter devastation of the Japanese homeland.

(4) The time has come for Japan to decide whether she will continue to be controlled by those self-willed militaristic advisers whose unintelligent calculations have brought the Empire of Japan to the threshold of annihilation, or whether she will follow the path of reason.

(5) Following are our terms. We will not deviate from them. There are no alternatives. We shall brook no delay.

(6) There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace, security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world.

(7) Until such a new order is established and until there is convincing proof that Japan's war-making power is destroyed, points in Japanese territory to be designated by the Allies shall be occupied to secure the achievement of the basic objectives we are here setting forth.

(8) The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine.

(9) The Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be permitted to return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives.

(10) We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, but stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners. The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic

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tendencies among the Japanese people. Freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights shall be established.

(11) Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy and permit the exaction of just reparations in kind, but not those which would enable her to re-arm for war. To this end, access to, as distinguished from control of, raw materials shall be permitted. Eventual Japanese participation in world trade relations shall be permitted.

(12) The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as these objectives have been accomplished and there has been established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people a peacefully inclined and responsible government.

(13) We call upon the Government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction.

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T R E A T Y

Of Friendship and Alliance Between Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Chinese Republic

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the President of the National Government of the Chinese Republic,

desiring to strengthen the friendly relations which have always existed between the Soviet Union and the Chinese Republic, by means of an alliance and good-neighborly post-war collaboration,

filled with determination to render assistance to each other in the struggle against aggression on the part of the enemies of the United Nations in this world war and to collaborate in the common war against Japan until her unconditional surrender,

expressing the unflinching desire to cooperate in the cause of the maintenance of peace and security for the good of the peoples of both countries and all peace-loving nations,

acting on the basis of the principles enunciated in the joint declaration of the United Nations of January 1, 1942, in the Four-Power Declaration signed in Moscow on October 30, 1943, and in the Charter of the World United Nations Organization,

have resolved to conclude with this purpose the present Treaty and have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries:

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics -- Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the USSR;

the President of the National Government of the Chinese Republic -- Wang Shih-tse, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Chinese Republic,

who after the exchange of their credentials found in due form and good order, have agreed on the following:

Article 1.

The High Contracting Parties undertake jointly with the other United Nations to prosecute the war against Japan until final victory. The High Contracting Parties undertake mutually to render each other all the necessary military and other assistance and support in this war.

Article 2.

The High Contracting Parties undertake not to enter into separate negotiations with Japan and not to conclude without mutual consent an armistice or peace treaty either with the present Japanese government or with any other government or organ of authority set up in Japan which will not clearly renounce all aggressive intentions.

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Article 3.

The High Contracting Parties undertake after the termination of the war against Japan jointly to take all measures within their power to render impossible a repetition of aggression and violation of peace by Japan.

If one of the High Contracting Parties finds itself involved in hostilities against Japan as a result of the latter's attack on this Contracting Party, the other High Contracting Party will immediately render the Contracting Party involved in hostilities all military and other support and assistance with the means at its disposal.

This article remains in force until the time when at the request of both High Contracting Parties the responsibility for the prevention of further aggression on the part of Japan is placed on the United Nations Organization.

Article 4.

Either of the High Contracting Parties undertakes not to conclude any alliance nor to take part in any coalition directed against the other Contracting Party.

Article 5.

The High Contracting Parties, considering the interests of security and economic development of either of them, agree to work jointly in close and friendly collaboration after the coming of peace and to act in accordance with the principles of mutual respect for their sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-intervention in the internal affairs of the other Contracting Party.

Article 6.

The High Contracting Parties agree to render each other every possible economic assistance in the post-war period for the purpose of facilitating and accelerating rehabilitation of both countries and to make their contribution to the cause of world prosperity.

Article 7.

Nothing in the present Treaty should be interpreted in a way that would affect the rights and obligations of the High Contracting Parties as members of the United Nations Organization.

Article 8.

The present Treaty is to be ratified within the shortest possible time. Exchange of ratification instruments shall be effected in Chungking as early as possible.

The Treaty enters into force immediately upon its ratification and remains in force for thirty years. Unless either of the High Contracting Parties, one year before the expiration of the

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term of the Treaty, gives notice of its desire to denounce it, the Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely, and either of the High Contracting Parties can discontinue its operation by giving notice to this effect to the other Contracting Party one year in advance.

In testimony whereof the Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty and affixed their seals thereto.

Done in Moscow on August 14, 1945, which corresponds to the fourteenth day of the month of August of the 34th year of the Chinese Republic, in two copies, each in the Russian and Chinese languages, both texts having equal force.

On Authorization of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR
V. MOLOTOV

On Authorization of the President of the National Government of the Chinese Republic
WANG SHIH-TSE

A G R E E M E N T

Between Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Chinese Republic On Chinese Changchun Railway

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the President of the National Government of the Chinese Republic, desiring to strengthen the friendly relations and economic ties between the two countries on the basis of full regard for the rights and interests of each of the parties, have agreed on the following:

Article 1.

After the expulsion of the Japanese armed forces from the Three Eastern Provinces of China, the main trunklines of the Chinese-Eastern Railway and the South-Manchurian Railway running from Manchuria Station to Pogranichnaya Station and from Harbin to Dalny and Port Arthur, united into a single railway under the name of the Chinese Changchun Railway, will become the common property of the USSR and the Chinese Republic and will be operated by them jointly. Commonly owned and jointly operated will be only those lands and auxiliary railway spurs that were built by the Chinese-Eastern Railway during the Russian and joint Soviet-Chinese administration, also by the South-Manchurian Railway in the period of Russian administration, which are destined to serve the direct needs of these railways, as well as the auxiliary enterprises directly serving these railways and built in the above-stated periods of time. All the other railway spurs, auxiliary enterprises and lands will be fully owned by the Chinese Government. The joint operation of the above railway will be exercised by a single administration under Chinese sovereignty as a purely commercial transport enterprise.

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Article 2.

The Contracting Parties agree that the right of common ownership of the above railway belongs to both parties equally and should not be transferred either fully or in part.

Article 3.

For the joint operation of the above railway, the Contracting Parties agree to found the Chinese-Soviet Society of the Chinese Changchun Railway. A Board of Directors of 10 members is to be set up in the Society, five of whom are to be appointed by the Chinese Government and five by the Soviet Government. The Board of Directors will have its seat in the town of Changchun.

Article 4.

From among members of the Board of Directors of Chinese citizenship the Chinese Government appoints the President of the Board of Directors and an Assistant President of the Board. The Soviet Government appoints from among the members of the Board of Directors of Soviet citizenship a Vice-President of the Board of Directors and an Assistant Vice-President of the Board. In adopting decisions on the Board of Directors, the vote of the President of the Board is counted as two votes. Seven persons constitute a lawful quorum of the Board of Directors.

All important questions on which the Board of Directors cannot reach agreement should be referred for consideration to the Governments of the Contracting Parties for equitable and friendly settlement.

Article 5.

An Auditing Committee is to be set up in the Society, consisting of six members, three of whom are to be appointed by the Chinese Government and three by the Soviet Government. The Chairman of the Auditing Committee is to be elected from among the members of Soviet citizenship, and the Vice-Chairman, from among the members of Chinese citizenship. In passing decisions in the Auditing Committee the Chairman's vote is counted as two votes. Five persons constitute a lawful quorum of the Committee.

Article 6.

For the management of current affairs, the Board of Directors appoints a Manager of the Chinese Changchun Railway from among the Soviet citizens and an Assistant Manager from among the citizens of the Chinese Republic.

Article 7.

The Auditing Committee shall appoint a Chief Controller and his Deputy. The Chief Controller shall be appointed from among the Chinese citizens and his deputy from among the Soviet citizens.

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Article 8.

The Chiefs and Assistant Chiefs of the Services and Department of the railway, also station masters of big stations, shall be appointed by the Board of Directors. The Manager of the railway shall have the right to propose candidates to the above posts. Individual members of the Board of Directors may also propose such candidates by agreement with the Manager of the railway.

In cases when the Chief of a Service or a Department is a Chinese citizen, the Assistant Chief must be a Soviet citizen. In cases when the Chief of a Service or a Department is a Soviet citizen, the Assistant Chief must be a Chinese citizen.

Chiefs of Services and Departments and their Assistants, as well as station masters, shall be appointed from among Chinese and Soviet citizens on a parity basis.

Article 9.

The Chinese Government bears the responsibility for the guarding of the railway. For the purpose of guarding the railway, premises, equipment and other property, as well as to prevent destruction, loss or theft of transported goods, the Chinese Government shall set up and control a railway police force. At the same time the railway police must maintain the usual order on the railway. As to police duties in implementation of this article, they shall be defined by the Chinese Government upon consultation with the Soviet Government.

Article 10.

Only during the war with Japan may the railway be used for transporting Soviet troops.

The Soviet Government is entitled to ship on the railway in transit, without customs inspection, military supplies in sealed cars which will be guarded by the railway police, and the Soviet Union shall not appoint its own armed escort.

Article 11.

The Chinese Government shall not levy customs duties or any other taxes or dues upon goods in transit from one Soviet station to another, as well as from Soviet territory to Port Dalny or Port Arthur and back. Upon reaching Chinese territory such freights shall be subject to customs inspection.

Article 12.

The Chinese Government undertakes fully to supply the coal requirements of the railway on the basis of a special agreement.

Article 13.

The Chinese Government shall levy taxes on the railway just as oh Chinese state railways.

Article 14.

The Contracting Parties agree to provide the Board of

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Directors of the Chinese Changchun Railway with working capital in the sum defined in the Charter of the railway.

Profits and losses from the operation of the railway shall be shared equally by the Parties.

Article 15.

Within one month after the signing of the present Agreement, the Contracting Parties shall appoint three representatives from each Party to work out in Chungking a Charter for the joint operation of the railway. The drawing up of the Charter should be completed within two months, after which it shall be submitted for approval to both Governments.

Article 16.

Property coming under the common ownership of the USSR and the Chinese Republic and subject to joint operation in accordance with Article 1 of the present Agreement must be defined by a Committee which is to be composed of three representatives from each Government. The above committee must be set up in Chungking within one month after the signing of the present Agreement, and within three months after the beginning of the joint operation of the railway the Committee must complete its work and submit its suggestions for approval to both Governments.

Article 17.

The present Agreement has been concluded for a term of thirty years. After the expiration of this term the Chinese Changchun Railway with all its property shall pass into the complete ownership of the Chinese Republic without any compensation.

Article 18.

The present Agreement comes into force as from the day of its ratification. Done in Moscow, August 14, 1945, which corresponds to the fourteenth day of the month of August of the 34th year of the Chinese Republic, in two copies, each in the Russian and Chinese languages, both texts having equal force.

On Authorization of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR
V. MOLOTOV

On Authorization of the President of the National Government of the Chinese Republic
WANG SHIH-TSE

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AGREEMENT ON PORT ARTHUR

The two Contracting Parties, in conformity with the Soviet-Chinese Treaty of Friendship and Alliance and as an addition to it, have agreed on the following:

I. With a view to consolidating the security of China and the USSR and preventing repetition of aggression on the part of Japan, the Government of the Chinese Republic agrees to the joint use by both Contracting Parties of Port Arthur as a naval base.

II. The exact boundaries of the area of the naval base mentioned to the preceding paragraph are defined by the description and map attached hereto (see Appendix).

III. The Contracting Parties have agreed to convert Port Arthur into a purely naval base/open for use by warships and merchant vessels of China and the USSR only.

A Chinese-Soviet military commission shall be set up to take charge of problems of the joint use of the above naval base, composed of two Chinese and three Soviet representatives. The Chairman of the commission shall be appointed by the SovietSide and the Vice-Chairman by the Chinese Side.

IV. The defense of the above naval base is entrusted by the Government of China to the Government of the USSR. For the defense of the naval base the Government of the USSR shall erect the necessary installations there, the expenses being borne by the Government of the USSR.

V. Civil administration in this area belongs to China, and in making appointments to respective leading posts the Chinese Government shall take into account the interests of the USSR in the given area. Civil administration in the town of Port Arthur shall be appointed and dismissed by the Chinese Government by arrangement with the Soviet Military Command.

Such suggestions as the Soviet military command in this area may make to the Chinese civil administration for the purpose of insuring security and defence shall be satisfied by the above administration. In disputable cases the question shall be referred for consideration and decision to the Chinese-Soviet military commission.

VI. The Soviet Government is entitled to maintain in the area stated in paragraph 2 its military naval and air forces and determining their disposition.

VII. Simultaneously, the Soviet Government is charged with the duty of setting up and maintaining lighthouses, signal system and other equipment necessary for the safety of navigation in this area.

VIII. After the expiration of the term of the present Agreement, all equipment and public property built by the USSR in this area are to be transferred to the Chinese Government as the property of the latter without any compensation.

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II. This Agreement has been concluded for a term of thirty years. The Agreement comes into force as from the day of its ratification.

In testimony whereof the Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Agreement and affixed their seals thereto.

Done in Moscow on August 14, 1945, which corresponds to the fourteenth day of the month of August of the 34th year of the Chinese Republic, in two copies, each in the Russian and Chinese languages, both texts having equal force.

On Authorization of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR
V. MOLOTOV

On Authorization of the President of the National Government of the Chinese Republic
WANG SHIH-TSE

AGREEMENT ON PORT DALNY

In view of the fact that the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance has been concluded between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Chinese Republic and that the USSR has guaranteed to respect China's sovereignty over the Three Eastern Provinces as an inseparable part of China, in order to insure the interests of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Dalny as a port for imports and exports of commodities, the Chinese Republic hereby expresses its consent:

I. To declare Dalny a free port open to trade and shipping of all countries.

II. The Chinese Government agrees to set aside for leasing to the USSR piers and warehouses in the said port on the basis of a separate agreement.

III. The administration in Dalny will be exercised by China. The chief of the port shall be appointed from among Soviet citizens by the Manager of the Chinese Changchun Railway by agreement with the Mayor of the town of Dalny. The Assistant Chief of the port shall be appointed in the above manner from among Chinese citizens.

IV. In peacetime Dalny shall not be included in the sphere of operation of regulations covering a naval base contained in the Agreement on Port Arthur of August 14, 1945, and shall become subject to the military regime established in this zone only in the event of war with Japan.

V. Goods coming from abroad to this free port and transported over the Chinese Changchun Railway directly to the territory of the USSR, also goods transported from the USSR over the above railway through the free port for export or materials and equipment for port installations coming from the USSR are exempted from customs duties. The above goods must be transported in sealed cars.

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Chinese import duties shall be levied on goods entering China through the free port. Goods exported from other parts of China to the free port are subject to export duties during the period while such duties continue to be levied in China.

VI. The present Agreement has been concluded for a term of thirty years.

VII. The present Agreement comes into force as from the day of its ratification. In testimony whereof the Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Agreement and affixed their seals thereto.

Done in Moscow on August 14, 1945, which corresponds to the fourteenth day of the month of August of the 34th year of the Chinese Republic, in two copies, each in the Russian and Chinese languages, both texts having equal force.

On Authorization of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR
V. MOLOTOV

On Authorization of the President of the National Government of the Chinese Republic
WANG SHIH-TSE

A G R E E M E N T

On Relations Between Soviet Commander-in-Chief and Chinese Administration After Entry of Soviet Troops Into Territory of Three Eastern Provinces of China in Connection with the Present Joint War Against Japan

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the President of the National Government of the Chinese Republic, desiring that after the entry of Soviet troops on the territory of the Three Eastern Provinces of China in connection with the present joint war of the USSR and China against Japan, the relations between the Soviet Commander-in-Chief and the Chinese Administration should correspond to the spirit of friendship and allied relations existing between the two countries, have agreed on the following:

1. After the entry of Soviet troops, as a result of hostilities, into the territory of the Three Eastern Provinces of China, the supreme authority and responsibility in the zone of hostilities on all questions relating to the prosecution of the war for the period necessary for operations shall rest with the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet armed forces.

2. A Representative of the National Government of the Chinese Republic and personnel shall be appointed for the restored territory who shall:

a) establish and direct in accordance with the laws of China an administration on territory cleared of the enemy;

b) render assistance in establishing cooperation on restored territories between Chinese armed forces, both regular and irregular, and Soviet armed forces;

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c) insure active collaboration between the Chinese administration and the Soviet Commander-in-Chief and in particular issue instructions to local organs to this effect, being guided by the requirements and wishes of the Soviet Commander-in-Chief.

3. To insure contact between the Soviet Commander-in-Chief and the Representative of the National Government of the Chinese Republic, a Chinese Military Mission will be appointed at the headquarters of the Soviet Commander-in-Chief.

4. In the zones under the supreme authority of the Soviet Commander-in-Chief, the administration of the National Government of the Chinese Republic for the restored territory shall maintain contact with the Soviet Commander-in-Chief through a representative of the National Government of the Chinese Republic.

5. As soon as any part of the restored territory ceases to be a zone of direct hostilities, the National Government of the Chinese Republic shall assume full authority as regards civilian affairs and shall render the Soviet Commander-in-Chief every assistance and support through its civil and military organs.

6. All persons belonging to the Soviet armed forces on Chinese territory shall be under the jurisdiction of the Soviet Commander-in-Chief. All Chinese nationals both civilian and military shall be under Chinese jurisdiction. This jurisdiction shall also extend to the civilian population on Chinese territory even in the event of crimes and offences against the Soviet armed forces, with the exception of crimes and offences committed in the zone of hostilities which are subject to jurisdiction of the Soviet Commander-in-Chief. In disputable cases questions shall be decided by mutual agreement between the Soviet Commander-in-Chief and the Representative of the National Government of the Chinese Republic.

7. A separate agreement shall be concluded concerning financial questions involved in the entry of Soviet troops onto the territory of the Three Eastern Provinces of China.

8. The present Agreement comes into force immediately upon ratification of the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between the USSR and China signed on this date.

Done in Moscow on August 14, 1945, which corresponds to the fourteenth day of the month of August of the 34th year of the Chinese Republic, in two copies, each in the Russian and Chinese languages, both texts having equal force.

On Authorization of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	On Authorization of the President of the National Government of the Chinese Republic
V. MOLOTOV	WANG SHIH-TSE

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On Rendering Assistance to Central Government of China, on China's Sovereignty Over Manchuria and on Events in Sinkiang

Moscow, August 14, 1945.

Honorable Mr. Minister,

In connection with the signing on this date of the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between China and the USSR, I have the honour of placing on record that the following provisions are understood by both Contracting Parties in the following way:

1) In accordance with the spirit of the above Treaty and for the implementation of its general idea and purposes, the Soviet Government is ready to render China moral support and assistance with military equipment and other material resources, this support and assistance to be given fully to the National Government as the Central Government of China.

2) In the course of the negotiations on ports Dalny and Port Arthur, also on the joint operation of the Chinese Changchun Railway, the Soviet Government regarded the Three Eastern Provinces as part of China and again confirmed its respect for China's full sovereignty over the Three Eastern Provinces and recognition of their territorial and administrative integrity.

3) As to the latest events in Sinkiang, the Soviet Government confirms that, as stated in Article 5 of the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, it has no intention to interfere in the internal affairs of China.

In the event that you, Mr. Minister, confirm your agreement with such an understanding of the above points, the present note and your answer to it shall constitute part of the above Treaty of Friendship and Alliance.

Accept, Mr. Minister, assurances of my very high esteem.

V. MOLOTOV

Mr. Wang Shih-tse,
Minister of Foreign Affairs
of the Chinese Republic,
Moscow.

In his note, Mr. Wang Shih-tse, Minister of Foreign Affairs of China, declared his complete agreement with such an understanding of the above-stated points.

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On Independence of the Mongolian People's Republic

Moscow, August 14, 1945.

Mr. People's Commissar,

In view of the desire for independence repeatedly expressed by the people of Outer Mongolia, the Chinese Government declares that after Japan's defeat, if a plebiscite of the people of Outer Mongolia confirms this desire, the Chinese Government will recognize the independence of Outer Mongolia within her present boundaries.

The above statement will be binding after the ratification of the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance signed by the Chinese Republic and the USSR on August 14, 1945.

I beg you, Mr. People's Commissar, to accept assurances of my very high esteem.

WANG SHIH-TSE

Mr. V. M. Molotov,
People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the USSR,
Moscow.

Moscow, August 14, 1945.

Mr. Minister,

I hereby confirm receipt of your note in which you state that

"In view of the desire for independence repeatedly expressed by the people of Outer Mongolia, the Chinese Government declares that after Japan's defeat, if a plebiscite of the people of Outer Mongolia confirms this desire, the Chinese Government will recognize the independence of Outer Mongolia within her present boundaries.

"The above statement will be binding after the ratification of the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance signed by the Chinese Republic and the USSR on August 14, 1945."

The Soviet Government takes note with satisfaction of the above note of the Government of the Chinese Republic and declares on its part that it will respect the state independence and the territorial integrity of the Mongolian People's Republic (Outer Mongolia).

I beg you, Mr. Minister, to accept assurances of my very high esteem.

V. MOLOTOV

Mr. Wang Shih-tse,
Minister of Foreign Affairs
of the Chinese Republic,
Moscow.

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CENSORSHIP ACTIVITIES CHRONOLOGICAL REPORT

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I N D E X

CENSORSHIP ACTIVITIES CHRONOLOGICAL REPORT

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APPENDICES

NO. 1 Radio Broadcasting Censorship, Quebec Election Campaign

NO. 2 Personnel - Co-ordination Committee, and all Branches of Censorship.

NO. 3 Circulars Issued by Press Censors

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PART I

CENSORSHIP CO-ORDINATION COMMITTEE

Sept. 1, 1939 — A censorship under "The Censorship Regulations 1939" was authorized by His Excellency the Governor General in Council. (P.C. 2481)

Provisions of "The Censorship Regulations 1939" were applied to cables, transoceanic radio communications, radio telegraphy and telephones. (P.C. 2499)

Sept. 2, 1939 — Provisions of "The Censorship Regulations 1939" with respect to Postal Censorship were applied. (P.C. 2506)

Sept. 3, 1939 — The Committee of the Privy Council with approval of His Excellency the Governor General provided for the establishment of "The Censorship Co-ordination Committee" to consist of a Chairman (to be appointed by the Government in Council) and six members,

one to be appointed by the Minister of National Defence,
two to be appointed by the Minister of Transport,
two to be appointed by the Acting Secretary of State,
one to be appointed by the Postmaster General,

this Committee to be empowered to direct and co-ordinate the censorship activities of the several departments of the Government of Canada. (P.C. 2513)

The Committee of the Privy Council on the recommendation of the Postmaster General, and with the approval of His Excellency the Governor General, appointed WALTER S. THOMPSON, ESQ. Chairman of the Censorship Co-ordination Committee. (P.C. 2515)

Sept. 5, 1939 — The Committee of the Privy Council upon the recommendation of the Minister of National Defence with the approval of His Excellency the Governor General, authorized the appointment of cable and transoceanic radio censorship personnel in such numbers as the Minister of National Defence might determine as follows:

Chief Cable Censor	$13.00 per day
Deputy Chief Cable Censor . . .	10.00 per day
Censor	9.00 per day
Assistant Censor	7.00 per day
Decoder	3.50 per day.

(P.C. 2549)

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Sept. 5, 1939 (Continued) The following were designated as Members of the Censorship Co-ordination Committee to represent the Departments named: (P.C. 2513)

Department of National Defence .	COL. MAURICE A. POPE
Department of Transport	LIEUT. COL. R. P. LANDRY
. . . . .	COM. C. P. EDWARDS, O.B.E.
Acting Secretary of State	MAJOR L. CLARE MOYER, K.C.
. . . .	OSWALD MAYRAND, ESQ.
Post Office Department	J. A. SULLIVAN, ESQ., K.C.

Sept. 6, 1939 His Excellency the Governor General on the recommendation of the Acting Secretary of State approved the establishment of a Press Censorship.

The provisions of "The Censorship Regulations 1939" with respect to Radio Communications within Canada, were applied. (P.C. 2563)

Sept. 7, 1939 His Excellency the Governor General on the recommendation of the Postmaster General approved the appointment of OSWALD MAYRAND, ESQ. as a member of the Censorship Co-ordination Committee.

The first meeting of the Censorship Co-ordination Committee was held with Mr. Walter S. Thompson, Chairman, presiding. Those present were:

COL. MAURICE A. POPE	Department of National Defence
E. G. BENNETT,ESQ.	Department of Transport
COM. C. P. EDWARDS, O.B.E.	Department of Transport
LIEUT. COL. R. P. LANDRY . .	Canadian Broadcasting Corporation
MAJOR L. CLARE MOYER	Department of the Secretary of State
F. E. JOLLIFFE	Post Office Department.

The scope, aims and application of Censorship in its various branches were discussed.

The Chairman indicated that he intended to pursue a policy of continual informal contacts and discussions among members of the Committee, with formal meetings only as required.

It was agreed that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police should be invited to have a representative sit in with the Committee from time to time, and also that J. F. MACNEILL, ESQ., of the Justice Department be made available to the Committee when required.

Committee of the Privy Council on the recommendation of the Postmaster General, and with the approval of His Excellency the Governor General approved two-way franking privileges to the Censorship Committee. (P.C. 2581)

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Sept. 12, 1939 — OSWALD MAYRAND, ESQ., having indicated that he could not continue to serve as a member of the Censorship Co-ordination Committee, the Acting Secretary of State appointed CLAUDE MELANCON, ESQ. to replace him, and P. C. 2580, as relating to OSWALD MAYRAND,ESQ. was rescinded.

Sept. 14, 1939 — P. C. 2652 was passed authorizing the following compensation for persons drawn from outside the service for Postal Censorship work:

Examiners	$5.00 per day
Examiners in Charge . .	$7.00 per day, plus a living allowance of $30.00 per month, in each case where a person may be required to reside in a place other than his present domicile, in order to perform Censorship duty.

Sept. 22, 1939 — By Order in Council (P.C. 2722) the title of WALTER S. THOMPSON, ESQ., was changed from CHAIRMAN OF THE CENSORSHIP CO-ORDINATION COMMITTEE, to DIRECTOR OF CENSORSHIP.

Sept. 22, 1939 — A meeting of the Censorship Co-ordination Committee was held in the office of the Right Honourable Minister of Justice and Acting Secretary of State, at ten-thirty a. m. Those present were:

Right Honourable Ernest Lapointe
Honourable P. J. Arthur Cardin
Honourable J. E. Michaud
Honourable C. G. Power
Walter S. Thompson, Esq.
Lieut. Col. R. P. Landry
Claude Melancon, Esq.
Major L. Clare Moyer.

The meeting decided that no political broadcasts should be given except from studios, and then only after the text of such broadcast had been submitted and approved by the Censorship authorities.

Sept. 24, 1939 — PREMIER MAURICE DUPLESSIS announced the dissolution of the Quebec Legislature, and the calling of a General Provincial Election. The Radio Broadcasting Censorship relating to political broadcasts, was at once ordered into force, and was actively applied until the day of the Election, October 25th. (See Appendix 1, for Radio Broadcasting Report During Quebec Election Campaign)

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Sept. 27, 1939 — Under P. C. 2882, authority was granted for the appointment of Press and Film Censorship personnel as follows, and with compensation noted:

Press Censor for Canada.	15.00 per day
Deputy Press Censor for Canada . .	14.00 per day
Censor	12.00 per day
Assistant Censor	10.00 per day
Examiner	5.00 per day

such personnel to be reimbursed for actual travelling expenses incurred in the performance of their duties.

The Post Office was authorized to pay Examiners at the rate of fifty cents per letter of one page, and up to one dollar per letter, for letters containing two pages or more for examination of uncommon language mail. (P.C. 2894)

Oct. 4, 1939 — The Director of Censorship concurred in the recommendation of the Press Censor for the banning of the French language Communist paper "CLARTE". (See Appendix 3, Circular No. 12)

Oct. 10, 1939 — A meeting of the Censorship Committee was held with Mr. Walter S. Thompson, the Director, presiding. Those present were:

COLONEL MAURICE A. POPE	Department of National Defence
LIEUT. COL. W. W. MURRAY	Department of National Defence
COM. C. P. EDWARDS, O.B.E.	Department of Transport
LIEUT. COL. R. P. LANDRY	Canadian Broadcasting Corporation
MAJOR L. CLARE MOYER	Department of the Secretary of State
J. A. SULLIVAN, ESQ.	Post Office Department
J. SYDNEY ROE, ESQ.	Department of National Revenue
G. H. LASH, ESQ.	General Executive Assistant to the Director.

The meeting discussed in detail, the various branches of censorship up to the date, and in particular the desirability of setting up a Publications Examination Branch to examine all language publications printed in Canada, and especially foreign language publications entering Canada from outside. It was agreed that a Sub-Committee be appointed to discuss the subject further, and to formulate recommendations for the consideration and approval of the Director.

Oct. 13, 1939 — A Sub-Committee, appointed at the Committee meeting on October 10th, met with Mr. Walter S. Thompson, Director, in the Chair. Those present were:

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F. E. JOLLIFFE, ESQ. . . . . Post Office Department
J. SYDNEY ROE, ESQ. . . . . Department of National Revenue
SUPERINTENDENT K. DUNCAN . . Royal Canadian Mounted Police
MAJOR L. CLARE MOYER, K.C. . Department of the Secretary of State
C. J. HANRATTY, ESQ. . . . Deputy Press Censor
G. H. LASH, ESQ. . . . . General Executive Assistant to the Director

It was agreed to establish a Publications Examination Branch, and to ask H. D. Scully, Esq., to permit J. SYDNEY ROE, ESQ., Examiner of Publications for the Department of of National Revenue to head the new Publications Examination Branch.

Oct. 16, 1939

A request was sent to the Acting Secretary of State of Canada, for an Order in Council prohibiting all enemy language publications other than purely scientific, educational and religious works from entering Canada.

Oct. 18, 1939

A letter was sent to every known publication in Canada, instructing each to send, on and after October 23rd, one copy of each issue of their publication to the Examiner of Publications.

The COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS agreed to the appointment of J. S. ROE, ESQ., as EXAMINER OF PUBLICATIONS, for the Censorship Committee.

Oct. 25, 1939

On the recommendation of the Treasury Board the Censorship Co-ordination Committee was allotted $76,770. from the War Appropriation. Of this sum $75,000. was for the expenses of the Committee, and the balance for expenses in connection with the issuances of Orders in Council.
(P.C. 3291)

Oct. 28, 1939

At the request of the Naval Authorities, the Director of Censorship wrote to all chartered banks, stock brokerage houses, financial houses, and trust companies operating in Halifax, asking them to issue instructions to all officers and employees not to mention naval or military operations in the Halifax area in any oral or written communications with clients situated outside of the City of Halifax. Special instructions to this effect were sent to all such companies operating leased telephone and telegraph wires out of Halifax.

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Nov. 16, 1939 — The Chiefs of Staff Committee, Department of National Defence, recommended to the Minister that to prevent the leakage of vital information from Halifax, land telegraph, postal, commercial radio, and long distance telephone, censorship be applied to the Halifax area. The recommendation was signed by: T. V. Anderson, Major General, Chief of the General Staff; P. W. Nelles, Rear Admiral, Chief of the Naval Staff, and G. M. Croil, Air Vice Admiral, Chief of the Air Staff.

On the further recommendation of the Director of Censorship, it was suggested to the Minister that he submit the report of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, to the Council of the Cabinet, for final approval.

Nov. 17, 1939 — The recommendations of the Chiefs of Staff Committee respecting censorship activities in the Halifax area, were approved by the Council, and by the Minister of National Defence.

To meet the Censorship of Land Telegraphs, Regulation No. 13, Sub-Paragraph (a) was amended to read as follows:

> (a) With reference to the operations, works or property of any cable company, telegraph company or telephone company and so far as concerns trans-oceanic radio communications with reference to the operations, offices, works or property of any radio telegraph company, the Minister of National Defence.

and Sub-Paragraphs (b) and (c) were compressed into one paragraph (b) to read as follows:

> (b) With reference to the operations, offices, works or property of any radiotelegraph or radiotelephone station, radio broadcasting station or any other class of radio station whether for transmission or reception, or both, which do not form part of any of the classes of telecommunication hereinbefore in this paragraph mentioned, the Minister of Transport.

Nov. 19, 1939 — The special censorship activities were placed in operation in the Halifax area.

Nov. 21, 1939 — Upon a recommendation of the Press Censors, the Director of Censorship applied to the Acting Secretary of State for an Order under Regulation 15, of the Defence of Canada Regulations, prohibiting further publication of the Toronto Communist newspaer "The Clarion".

The application was granted, and "The Clarion" was closed by the Police on this date. (See Appendix 3 , Circular 31)

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PART II

PRESS CENSORSHIP

With the appointment of CLAUDE MELANCON, ESQ., to act as Joint Press Censor for Canada with MAJOR L. CLARE MOYER, Press Censorship was actively established.

A headquarters was opened in the Governor General's Waiting Room in the Union Station, and several days later was transferred to the permanent office at Room 907, Victoria Building. Here the Committee also established headquarters.

Sept. 16, 1939 — C. J. HANRATTY, ESQ. was appointed Deputy Press Censor for Canada.

Sept. 18, 1939 — A Press Censorship office was opened in Montreal, in temporary quarters with Mr. CLAUDE MELANCON, in charge.

Sept. 30, 1939 — Press Censorship headquarters in Montreal was established at its permanent location in the Post Office Building, Place d'Armes.

Oct. 1, 1939 — JACQUES GIROUARD, ESQ. was appointed Assistant Censor at Montreal.

Oct. 4, 1939 — The French language Communist weekly paper "CLARTE" published at Toronto, was banned by the Acting Secretary of State on the recommendation of the Press Censors. (See Appendix 3, Circular 12)

Nov. 1, 1939 — WILFRID EGGLESTON, ESQ. was appointed Censor at Ottawa.

Nov. 5, 1939 — JACQUES GIROUARD, ESQ. was transferred from the Montreal to the Ottawa Press Censor's Office.

Nov. 6, 1939 — A twenty-four hour Press Censorship service was established in Ottawa.

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Nov. 21, 1939 — The English language Communist paper, the "CLARION" published at Toronto, was banned by the Acting Secretary of State on the recommendation of the Press Censors. (See Appendix 3 , Circular 31)

Nov. 30, 1939 — It was decided to open Press Censorship offices in Halifax, Nova Scotia, and Toronto, Ontario, with Assistant Censors in charge. The following individuals were selected to occupy these positions:

Halifax - - - H. B. JEFFERSON, ESQ.

Toronto - - - WARREN BALDWIN, ESQ.
BERTRAM B. PERRY, ESQ.

The duties of these Assistant Press Censors at the points noted, were authorized to begin December 1st.

From the time of inauguration, daily, the Press Censorship Staff have been constantly engaged in providing rulings, investigating violations of the Regulations, issuing warnings, interviewing newspapermen, writers, photographers, news associations, and large numbers of people engaged in various phases of the publishing and news-gathering industries. They also examined large quantities of manuscript, read books, pamphlets, and other types of publications, and gave advice to people in all parts of the country on various questions connected with their work.

They distributed copies of the Censorship Regulations and of the Defence of Canada Regulations, to every daily newspaper and every news wire service in the Dominion, and also to a number in the United States as well.

They sent a copy of the Censorship Regulations to every known publisher in the Dominion of Canada, and to many individual correspondents and free-lance writers.

From September 4th. to November 29th, they issued thirty-three instructions in circular form (Appendix 3,) In the majority of instances, these were sent to all the daily and weekly newspapers in Canada; to the Parliamentary Press Gallery correspondents, and to News Associations and Wire Services.

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They worked in close collaboration with the Radio Broadcasting Censor with respect to the broadcasting of news, and they made a daily examination of all news broadcast each day, by all radio stations in Canada.

They also made a daily examination of the complete news files of the Canadian Press, the United Press, and the Transradio Press Service.

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PART III

EXAMINATION OF PUBLICATIONS

Oct. 18, 1939 — The Examination of Publications went into effect under the supervision of J. S. ROE, ESQ., Examiner of Publications for the Department of National Revenue. (Part I — "Censorship Co-ordination Committee", Page 5, October 18th, 1939)

He selected a staff of nine, all seconded from duty, by the Department of National Revenue, without charge to the Committee.

Oct. 23, 1939 — Commencing on this date, in accordance with the instructions contained in a letter sent on October 18th to every known publication in Canada, one copy of each issue was to be sent for Examination to the Examiner of Publications. He examines all publications in Canada, except those in the French language, the French language publications being examined in the office of the Press Censor for Canada, Montreal.

Attached list is the day to day tabulation of the number of publications examined by Mr. Roe and his staff, from October 28th, to November 30th, inclusive.

Oct. 26, 1939 — At the request of the Press Censors, the Department of National Revenue prohibited 36 publications from entering Canada, between September 26, and November 30th.

The names and bases of these prohibitions, and the dates when the prohibiting orders were issued, will be found in Appendix 4, Part (I).

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CANADIAN PUBLICATIONS EXAMINED

DAILY BY THE EXAMINER OF PUBLICATIONS

DATE RECEIVED	QUEBEC AND MARITIME PROVINCES	ONTARIO	BRITISH COLUMBIA AND WESTERN PROVINCES	FOREIGN LANGUAGES	TOTAL
Oct. 28	42	71	72	17	202
Oct. 30	62	108	188	20	378
Oct. 31	16	52	82	7	157
Nov. 1	26	48	42	10	126
Nov. 2	26	56	31	23	136
Nov. 3	29	73	29	17	148
Nov. 4	46	147	85	30	308
Nov. 6	62	115	209	17	403
Nov. 7	13	53	44	14	124
Nov. 8	25	55	85	16	181
Nov. 9	29	40	31	16	116
Nov. 10	31	74	25	16	146
Nov. 13	112	265	301	60	738
Nov. 14	12	20	21	8	61
Nov. 15	25	58	54	18	155
Nov. 16	28	86	43	24	181
Nov. 17	35	63	37	43	178
Nov. 18	44	125	56	16	241
Nov. 20	78	127	247	36	488
Nov. 21	9	16	77	8	110
Nov. 22	28	83	56	20	187
Nov. 23	28	36	28	9	101
Nov. 24	35	140	33	33	241
Nov. 25	44	102	63	15	224
Nov. 27	42	93	232	26	393
Nov. 28	12	38	86	15	151
Nov. 29	26	53	39	13	131
Nov. 30	32	52	43	22	149

INDIVIDUAL EXAMINATIONS - GRAND TOTAL: 6154

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CANADIAN PUBLICATIONS EXAMINED

(FRENCH)

In the office of the Press Censor for Canada, (Montreal) the following French language publications have been received regularly since October 25th, 1939:

Dailies 11

Weeklies . . . 97

Monthlies . . . 49

Bi-monthlies. . 4

These have been read and examined and reported upon upon regularly as they are received by an Examiner of Publications, attached to the Press Censor's Staff.

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PART IV

RADIO BROADCASTING CENSORSHIP

(See Separate Folder A)

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PART V

COMMERCIAL RADIO CENSORSHIP

Sept. 4, 1939 — Censorship established at all (33) Radio Coast Stations throughout the Dominion, except on the Great Lakes. The Officer-in-Charge of each station is acting as Censor.

Three Limited Coast Stations on the East Coast, licensed to private companies at Brooklyn, Lockeport and Lunenburg for Radiotelephone Communication to their own ships and fishing vessels, suspended from operation.

Authority to communicate with their own ships within twenty miles of their Radio Coast Stations, previously granted to certain companies operating Private Commercial Radio Stations on the West Coast, withdrawn.

Sept. 5, 1939 — The operation of all (3,770) Amateur Experimental Radio Stations suspended.

The operation of 11 Experimental Radio Stations, licensed to private individuals, suspended.

Sept. 16, 1939 — Censorship established at all Radio Stations, operated by the Telegraph Branch, Department of Public Works. The Officer-in-Charge of each station is acting as Censor.

Sept. 18, 1939 — Censorship established on all (approximately 700) privately owned point-to-point radio stations, licensed for communication between isolated points not served by any other means of electrical communication. The licensees are held responsible for the proper operation of their stations and the officer-in-charge of each station is acting as Censor.

The transmission of weather forecasts by Radio Coast Stations from Montreal east, suspended.

Sept. 20, 1939 — The broadcasting of weather forecasts by Broadcasting Stations from Montreal east, and by CBL (Hornby), suspended.

Sept. 25, 1939 — After investigation of the work being undertaken by the licensees of certain Experimental Radio Stations, twenty more stations of this class were suspended from operation as their experiments were not essential to the successful prosecution of the war. The licensess of Experimental Radio Stations remaining in operation are now engaged in essential work.

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Sept. 27, 1939 An organization was set up for the handling of reports respecting dangers to navigation and storm warnings, in accordance with the wishes of Naval Authorities.

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PART VI

POSTAL CENSORSHIP

Prior to Sept. 1939

Prior to the outbreak of hostilities, a detailed book of instructions was prepared for the guidance of those engaged in censorship work in time of war or emergency. The various forms, stationery, and other equipment used in censorship work were either printed or prepared in such a manner as to be run off at a moment's notice.

For a year previous to September 1939, the post office was intercepting and examining enemy propaganda entering Canada. In addition, representatives of the Department were actively engaged on the various war committees set up by the Government during that period.

Sept. 3,1939

Immediately on the declaration of war by the authorities in the United Kingdom, and anticipating similar action in Canada within a few hours, steps were taken to advise all concerned that postal communication with Germany, Czechoslovakia, and former Austria, was suspended.

Order in Council P.C. 2513 of the 3rd September, 1939, appointing a Censorship Co-ordination Committee, on which the Postal Censorship is represented, for the purpose of co-ordinating censorship efforts of the various censorships in Canada.

Sept. 6,1939

A postal censorship instituted by the Post Office Department under the direction of F. E. JOLLIFFE, Esq., Chief Postal Censor, Ottawa, with censorship staffs at Ottawa and Vancouver. Mails from Canada to the following places are now censored:

Belgium
Bulgaria
China
Denmark
Esthonia
Finland
Holland
Hungary
Italy
Japan
Latvia
Lithunania
Luxembourg
Norway
Ruthenia
Russia
Siam
Spain
Slovakia
Sweden
Switzerland
Yugoslavia

Sept. 14,1939

Censorship extended to include Japanese mails sent in transit via Canada to the Netherlands, Belgium, and Spain.

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Sept. 14,1939 — The Ottawa Censorship examines all mails to the aforementioned countries with the exception of those addressed to China and Japan which are examined at the Vancouver Station.

The informatation obtained from the censorship of mails to these countries is referred to the various Government Departments interested at Ottawa, also to the various war boards and any other interested office, such as the Chief Postal Censor, London, and the Chief Postal Censor, Hong Kong.

In addition, the Canadian Postal Censorship undertakes the examination of publications, mostly in foreign languages, both published within Canada, and in places outside of Canada. Copies of the various issues are examined and reports prepared which are sent to the Chief Press Censors, Ottawa, for their information.

The postal censorship is responsible for the fulfilment of the regulations of the Foreign Exchange ControlBoard, as regards mails sent outside of Canada. A check is made at the office of mailing to see that the requirements are fulfilled and also a further check is made in the Censorship Stations at Ottawa and Vancouver where mails are examined to the above mentioned countries.

There is at the present time a staff of approximately sixty-five examiners in the Ottawa Censorship and twenty-five in the Vancouver Censorship.

While interesting information is picked up in the censorship which is of use to the Military and Naval Authorities and the Police, it has been found, as in previous censorships, that the information of greatest value relates to enemy trading. This is particularly evidenced in the mails from Japan sent in transit via Canada to destinations in Europe.

In addition to the above phases of censorship, there is a confidential censorship of mails to and from persons in Canada suspected of having enemy sympathies or for other reasons. This also is undertaken at Ottawa, and the results obtained forwarded to the R.C.M.P who have asked that mails to or from these persons shall be examined.

Oct. 24,1939 — Request from the United Kingdom authorities for the exchange of Postal Censorship liaison officers between Canada and the United Kingdom.

During the Great War, a postal censorship liaison officer from the United Kingdom was sent to Canada, although a similar Canadian officer was not sent to the United Kingdom.

This question was first brought up in June 1939, and the suggestion made that liaison officers should be exchanged between the postal censorships, particularly as regards matters affecting transit mails. It is most desirable that liaison officers be exchanged for the purpose of consultation and advice in regard to the treatment of mails in the two censorships concerned. Moreover, the British Censorship operates on a much larger scale than the one in Canada, and undertakes various branches of censorship not yet extablished in this country. This refers principally to the secret and testing postal censorship sections which have not yet been developed here.

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Oct. 26, 1939 The Canadian Postal Censorship is at the present time examining and disposing of approximately 35,000 items of letter mail per week, in addition to the daily examination of foreign language publications.

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PART VII

CABLE AND TELEGRAPH CENSORSHIP

Prior to Sept. 1939

(1). For at least one year prior to September, 1939, the matter of Cable and Telegraph Censorship had engaged the attention of the Military Authorities.

Experience had taught that the imposition of censorship on these communication media would have dual purposes:

(a) The prevention, so far as it was possible of information of a character that might endanger our national security from reaching the enemy; and

(b) The interception of messages whose contents might be of value to the military, naval and air forces, and also to those vested with the task of waging economic warfare.

With this was associated the acquisition of information relating to hostile persons and agencies in Canada, whose operations might be considered inimical to the state.

The Censorship was thus negative in the sphere of restricting the means whereby information relating to the movement of our armed forces, or of ships and shipping, might be disseminated; and it was positive in the sphere of assembling information that would be useful in the prosecution of the war.

These factors required of the Cable Censorship a close liaison with the Military, Naval and Air Force Intelligence Branches, with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the Economic Warfare Committee, the Wartime Prices and Trade Board and the other Censorship jurisdictions -- Postal, Radio and Press.

(2). The whole field was given considerable study for more than a year prior to the outbreak of the war, by officers of the National Defence Department assigned to that duty by the Chief of the General Staff. The work fell principally to Colonel Maurice Pope, M.C., now Director of Military Operations and Intelligence.

(3). About September, 1938, when it appeared that the Czecho-Slovak crisis might result in war, steps were taken to ensure that a definite scheme of Cable Censorship was drafted, and that personnel were ear-marked for the key positions embraced by the scheme.

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(4). An inter-departmental committee studied Censorship among other features relating to national security, and from their deliberations emerged the Regulations for Censorship, drafted by Colonel Pope, and relating to the censorship of cabled communications.

At the same time the various communication companies were apprised of the circumstances, and their co-operation enlisted so that, should war break out, the imposition of Censorship might be carried out without dislocating any essential services.

(5). Since it was contemplated that Cable and Telegraph Censorship -- chiefly the former -- would come within the sphere of the Minister of National Defence, the precautionary arrangements were completed through the Officers Commanding the Military Districts.

The Districts principally concerned were

No. 6, Halifax;
No. 4, Montreal;
No. 2, Toronto; and
No. 11, Victoria (Vancouver).

In each of these Districts the D.O.C. ear-marked for appointment One Cable Censor, who, in turn, did likewise in connection with Assistant Cable Censors.

(6). The original scheme contemplated the following personnel:

North Sydney	-	1 Assistant Cable Censor
Canso, N.S.	-	1 Cable Censor
		3 Assistant Censors
		1 Clerk
Halifax, N.S.	-	1 Cable Censor
		5 Assistant Censors
		1 Clerk
Montreal, P.Q.	-	1 Deputy Chief Cable Censor
		20 Assistant Censors
		2 Clerks
Toronto	-	1 Senior Cable Censor
		8 Assistant Censors
		1 Clerk
Vancouver	-	1 Cable Censor
		8 Assistant Censors
		3 Clerks
Ottawa	-	1 Chief Cable Censor
		1 Assistant Censor
		1 Clerk

This was a total of 61.

(7). Experience plus added unforeseen responsibilities have somewhat varied the structure; but essentially it remains as indicated

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(8). The original plan also contemplated that when the use of code in commercial cablegrams became general, there would be added a sufficient number of decoders to facilitate the work of expeditiously handling traffic. The figure envisaged was 33 decoders.

(9). In April, 1939, D. O's. C. were given authority to make certain purchases that would be needed in the event of war, and an imprest account of $200 per office was set as an amount for furnishing the offices.

(10). The scheme was carefully drafted so that, when when a pre-arranged message was sent to the D. O.'s C. concerned to institute censorship, the machinery would move immediately.

(11). This message was issued on the night of September 2nd — 3rd, 1939. In a few hours all stations reported that censors had been installed, and the work begun.

SECTION II

Sept. 1939 (1). By Order in Council P.C. 2954, (5th/9/1939) Captain W. W. Murray, M.C., Reserve of Officers, was appointed Chief Cable Censor, with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, C. M. He assumed his duties on September 10th.

(2). Censorship Regulations were comprehensive, and, at this date, three months after Censorship was begin, have required very little amendment.

From time to time elucidations and amplifications of the regulations have been necessary; but in general the principles which guided their drafting remain constant, and the language of the Regulations has not been altered.

(3). The duties of the Cable Censors, installed at the points indicated, are to carry out those regulations broadly covered by Sub-Paragraphs (a) and (b) of Paragraph (1) in the foregoing.

Having regard to the inexperience of the vast majority of them, and to the magnitude of the task, and its complicated character, there is every reason for saying that those duties have been carried out efficiently and with due consideration for the needs of the public generally.

(4). In its other aspects — the assembling of information relating to the activities of enemy agencies both in Canada and elsewhere — the work is such that it cannot be committed to writing.

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(5). During October, transoceanic Radio Telephony was permitted under certain restrictions, between Canada, and Rome, Brussels, and Amsterdam, via New York; and from Canada to Australia. This required the imposition of a censorship of this service which has been carried out under the Chief Telegraph Censor at Montreal, and Vancouver.

SECTION III

Nov. 1939

The Chief Cable Censor has now become Chief Telegraph Censor, since the institution of censorship on landline communications at Halifax, and Nova Scotia generally.

It is shortly contemplated to permit the use of Commercial Codes, to be prescribed by the Government, and all arrangements in this connection have been completed.

Only the employment of the additional decoders awaits the decision when this is to become effective

For Personnel see Appendix 2.

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C 272364

CENSORSHIP CO-ORDINATION COMMITTEE

OTTAWA, CANADA

October 31st, 1939.

Walter S. Thompson, Esq.,
Director of Censorship,
Censorship Co-ordination Committee,
Ottawa, Canada.

Dear Sir:

I have the honour to submit herewith my report concerning the application of censorship to political addresses broadcast during the electoral campaign held in the Province of Quebec between September 25 and October 25, 1939.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Yours very truly,

R. P. Landry.

(R. P. Landry)
Radio Broadcasting Censor.

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TO:

MR. WALTER S. THOMPSON
DIRECTOR OF CENSORSHIP

REPORT ON

CENSORSHIP OF POLITICAL BROADCASTS

PROVINCE OF QUEBEC ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN

SEPTEMBER 25 - OCTOBER 25, 1939.

OTTAWA
OCTOBER 31, 1939.

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Report on Censorship of Political Broadcasts
Province of Quebec Electoral Campaign
September 25 - October 25, 1939.

INTRODUCTORY

In the early days of September 1939, the Censorship Co-ordination Committee was created under the provisions of the War Measures Act, Chap. 206 of the Revised Statutes of Canada 1927, for the purpose of applying censorship in accordance with the Defence of Canada Regulations and the Censorship Regulations 1939.

On September 26, 1939, I was appointed radio broadcasting censor by the Minister of Transport. I was thus charged with the responsibility of applying censorship relating to broadcasting in Canada.

Upon the existence of a state of apprehended war, on September 1, 1939 the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation took certain precautionary measures and issued directives to all broadcasting stations for the security, defence, peace, order and welfare of the country. These directives were subsequently revised by the censorship authorities, and in the light of the existing war emergency, some were ratified and kept in force while others were annulled.

One of my first concerns was to establish a proper liaison between broadcasters and the censorship office. I considered that the Station Relations Department of the CBC offered the necessary requisites, and with your concurrence and that of the General Manager of the CBC this department is now acting as "liaison" between broadcasting stations and myself as broadcasting censor. The normal flow of communications between myself and broadcasting stations is, therefore, cleared through this channel.

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Amongst the more important questions I had to contend with at the start was the application of censorship to the broadcast of talks and commentaries. A general directive was issued requesting all stations to supply to the Supervisor of Station Relations of the CBC a resumé of all talks and commentaries previous to broadcast permission being granted. In cases of doubt as to whether a broadcast might contravene the Defence of Canada Regulations, the texts of such talks are submitted for examination.

Subsequently, particular attention was given to the broadcast of political addresses, and after due consideration of the principles involved, as also after consultation with yourself and the members of the Government Sub-Committee on Censorship, it was decided, on September 22nd, that all political broadcasts would be confined to studio broadcasting and that the texts of such broadcasts would be submitted in advance, for examination, previous to broadcast permission being granted. The ruling applies to municipal, provincial and federal election broadcasts as also to other political addresses. Directives were issued accordingly to the Supervisor of Station Relations of the CBC on September 22nd, with a request that all broadcasting stations in Canada be informed of this decision. A circular letter, to this effect, was sent out to all stations on September 25th.

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REPORT

On Sunday, September 24th, the Premier of Quebec, announced provincial elections for October 25th. Thus it appeared that the Quebec electoral campaign would first witness the application of censorship of political broadcasting.

Although rules governing the censorship of political broadcasts had been decided on, the methods of application yet remained to be determined. After a minute consideration of the problem under its various aspects, it was agreed that detailed censorship of political broadcasts relating to the forthcoming campaign could best be handled with the help of assistant censors.

On September 28th, Messrs Paul Fontaine, K.C. and Roméo Gibeault, advisory counsel of the Department of Justice, as also Dr. Maurice Ollivier, K.C. Law Clerk of the House of Commons, were appointed assistant censors. On the same day, an office was opened in Montreal with adequate clerical help so as to provide these gentlemen with the necessary working facilities.

On October 3rd, Mr. Fontaine was transferred to Quebec City and assumed the functions of assistant censor at that point. An office duly equipped was provided for in the Chateau Frontenac.

On October 5th Mr. Jacques Fortier, Departmental Solicitor of the Department of Transport, was appointed assistant censor at New Carlisle. However, due to illness in the family he had to return immediately and was replaced by Mr. J. E. Gaboury, K.C., Departmental Solicitor of the Department of National Revenue.

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On October 13th, Mr. René de la Durantaye, barrister, of the Department of the Secretary of State, was appointed assistant censor at Rimouski.

In addition to the transportation cost, a per diem allowance at the rate of $15.00 was approved in lieu of subsistence for the assistant censors at Montreal and Quebec cities. In view of the lower cost of living at New Carlisle and Rimouski, the assistant censors at these respective points were allowed a per diem allowance in lieu of subsistence at the rate of $10.00.

The assistant censors were handed copies of the Defence of Canada Regulations and the Censorship Regulations 1939.

The following representatives of the Station Relations Department of the CBC were appointed by the Supervisor of Station Relations to act as liaison between the political parties and the assistant censors:

Montreal	-	Maurice Goudrault, K.C.,Manager, Station CBF
Quebec	-	Aurèle Séguin, Manager,Station CBV
Rimouski	-	G. A. Lavoie, Manager, Station CJBR
New Carlisle	-	Dr. C. H. Houde, Manager, Station CHNC

The directives I issued respecting the interpretation to be given of the censorship regulations were in the main that the deletions to be made, if any, to the texts submitted for examination, should be confined to the dispositions of Regulation 39 of the Defence of Canada Regulations. It was explained that a broad interpretation should be made to apply and that the best possible service be given to all parties; it was intended that no hardship should be placed on anyone by setting time limits which might be considered inadequate for the submission and examination of texts. I impressed upon all that nothing but statements contravening the regulations should be deleted, and stressed the fact that

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abusive comments on any race, religion or creed, as also malicious, scandalous or defamatory matter came under the purview of the regulations made under the Canadian Broadcasting Act 1936, the application of which was vested with the CBC. I requested that infringements, if any,be reported.

During the campaign a total of 440 texts were submitted for examination to the censors as follows: 3 at Ottawa; 256 at Montreal; 121 at Quebec City; 34 at Rimouski and 26 at New Carlisle.

The following political parties were represented:

L'Union Nationale
Independent Union Nationale
Liberal
Action Libérale Nationale
Conservative
Independent Conservative
C.C.F.
National
Independent
Communist

A statement showing texts submitted on behalf of each party is appended to this report.

All matter which was considered to contravene the Defence of Canada Regulations was deleted by the censors, and roughly, I would say that such deletions applied to approximately 25% of the texts submitted.

In spite of all precaution taken, it was reported that speakers on behalf of l'Union Nationale Party infringed on the directives issued in respect of the procedure adopted. The first case reported was of a speaker who, notwithstanding the deletions made by the censor, read the text of his address in its entirety including the deleted parts; it became necessary for the operator at the studios to discontinue the transmission during the time at which the said deleted parts were being read; thus creating a

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suspension on the air at various intervals during the broadcast. Other cases reported were to the effect that speakers, whilst complying with the deletions made by the censor, announced in each instance where deletions had been made, that so many words or lines had been deleted by the censorship of Mr. Lapointe. In all cases thus reported, immediate action was taken to prevent a recurrence of similar infractions.

I append, for your information, copies of all directives issued both to broadcasting stations as also to the assistant censors.

According to the provisions of the Canadian Broadcasting Act 1936, the broadcasting of political addresses ceased at midnight on Sunday, October 22. On the following day the services of the assistant censors were withdrawn.

On October 25th the management of all broadcasting stations in the Province of Quebec were charged with the responsibility of applying censorship to political broadcasts.

I am pleased to report the fact that no complaints were received from any political party, nor speakers or others, in respect to the methods adopted in the application of censorship or again in the way the regulations were interpreted by the censors.

I feel it my duty to commend very highly on the excellency of the services rendered by the assistant censors who, to my knowledge, acquitted themselves of a delicate task with the utmost impartiality, tact and judgment. They were indeed most helpful and their services were very valuable to me. I should also express my utmost satisfaction of the very good services rendered by the Stations Relations Department of the CBC as also of the close cooperation

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received from CBC employees at Montreal and Quebec, as also from the management of Station CHNC at New Carlisle and Station CJBR at Rimouski.

The whole humbly submitted,

(R. P. Landry)
Radio Broadcasting Censor.

O T T A W A
October 31, 1939.

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SCHEDULE OF POLITICAL ADDRESSES BROADCAST
DURING PROVINCE OF QUEBEC ELECTORAL
CAMPAIGN - SEPT.25-OCT.25,1939.

POLITICAL PARTIES	OTTAWA	MONTREAL	QUEBEC	RIMOUSKI	NEW CARLISLE	TOTAL
Union Nationale		90	62	18	13	183
Liberal	3	134	48	16	13	214
Action Libérale Nationale		15	10			25
Conservative		3				3
Independent Conservative		1				1
Independent Union Nationale		1				1
C.C.F.		7				7
Parti National			1			1
Independent		4				4
Communist		1				1
	3	256	121	34	26	440

APPENDIX I

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APPENDIX 2

Confidential CIRCULAR C.

THE FOLLOWING TELEGRAPHIC MESSAGE WAS SENT FROM TORONTO ON SEPTEMBER 1ST, 1939, TO ALL CANADIAN PRIVATELY-OWNED STATIONS:

" A PROCLAMATION HAS BEEN ISSUED UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THE GOVERNOR-IN-COUNCIL IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE WAR MEASURES ACT STOP UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE ALL STATIONS ARE REQUIRED TO SUPPLY TO THE STATION RELATIONS DEPARTMENT TORONTO IN ADVANCE OF BROADCAST FULL PARTICULARS AS TO ALL TALKS SCHEDULES INCLUDING THE TITLE AND NATURE OF THE TALK AND SPEAKER IN EACH INSTANCE STOP IT IS REQUESTED THAT STATIONS SUBMIT INFORMATION AS FAR AS POSSIBLE IN ADVANCE TO PERMIT OF CONSIDERATION UNDER REQUIREMENTS OF THE AUTHORITIES STOP PLEASE DO NOT BROADCAST ANY TALK BEFORE RECEIPT OF REPLY FROM THIS DEPARTMENT STOP IT WILL BE UNDERSTOOD THAT THIS PROCEDURE DOES NOT NECESSARILY INVOLVE THE SUBMISSION OR EXAMINATION OF MANUSCRIPTS IN ADVANCE STOP IT IS LAID DOWN IN THE HOPE THAT IT MAY AVOID SITUATIONS WHICH MIGHT MAKE NECESSARY THE IMPOSITION OF DETAILED CENSORSHIP STOP PROCEDURE WILL NOT OF COURSE RELIEVE STATIONS OF THEIR RESPONSIBILITY UNDER THE BROADCASTING REGULATIONS."

(Sgd.) "H. N. STOVIN"

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CANADIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION

APPENDIX 3

IN REPLY REFER TO FILE No.....

341 Church Street,
Toronto, September 13, 1939.

Circular Letter No. C 3.

To All Broadcasting Stations:

I refer you to my telegram of September 1st in which I advised that until further notice all Canadian radio stations are required to furnish the Station Relations Department with details of all talks stations may wish to schedule. As I intimated in my foregoing communication this procedure has been adopted in the hope that it will avoid the necessity for detailed censorship. In an endeavour to realize this hope I feel sure that I can count on your fullest co-operation. I hope that my following remarks may be of assistance to you in clarifying the procedure applicable in this regard. For purposes of greater clarity I shall deal with each question in a separate numbered paragraph:

1. DEFINITION OF "TALKS". The word "talks" is widely interpreted and is deemed to include all spoken word broadcasts, except the following:

(a) Commercial radio continuity,
(b) Short announcements connecting musical programmes,
(c) Drama which does not deal directly or indirectly with the subjects of war or international affairs, minority or racial problems.

2. FOREIGN LANGUAGE BROADCASTS. Spoken word broadcasts in Canada in languages other than French and English are prohibited until further notice.

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3. TALKS APPLICATION PROCEDURE. I would request you to carefully observe the following points in making application to carry talks over your station:

(a) In order to insure satisfactory clearance, applications should be submitted as far in advance of desired date of broadcast as possible, and should be forwarded weekly.

(b) Applications should include full and precise details. These details should include not only the name of the speaker, the title, time and date of broadcast, but also the nature and a brief resumé of the talk, and the auspices under which it is to be given. Where the station is in doubt as to the acceptability of the talk, it would expedite procedure to include with the application copies, in duplicate, of the script of the proposed broadcast. I do not think I need to point out that it is particularly necessary to scrutinize talks dealing with war, international affairs, domestic politics, racial and minority problems. I would suggest that in talks on these subjects full particulars are especially necessary in order to obviate reference back to the station concerned for more complete details.

4. RECRUITING TALKS, APPEALS, SPOT ANNOUNCEMENTS: Your station will, no doubt, receive requests from officers and various military units for permission to use your facilities for recruiting purposes. In such cases I would request you to advise that application for use of such facilities should be made by officer or unit concerned directly to the Acting Deputy Minister of National Defence, Department of National Defence, Ottawa. The aforementioned Department will inform the Corporation of the decision reached, who will in turn advise you. Requests by organizations and individuals, not under the direct auspices of the militia or military forces for time on your station either for recruiting or other

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patriotic purposes should be referred prior to broadcast to the Station Relations Department.

I would point out that this reference requirement will be a form of protection for your station and will insure that the medium of radio will be used only where the element of urgency or the importance of the request justifies the granting of broadcasting facilities. The alternative would not only result in serious disruption of essential programme schedules, but would also seriously detract from the effectiveness of radio appeals.

5. PROGRAMME LOGS. All broadcasting stations in Canada will file a true copy of their programme logs with the Station Relations Department, 341 Church St., Toronto, Ont. The programme logs should be mailed not later than seven days following the operations they record.

6. CONFIDENTIAL INSTRUCTIONS. From time to time the Station Relations Department will receive directions and instructions from the Censorship Co-ordination Committee for transmission to all broadcasting stations in Canada. Usually such instructions will be marked "CONFIDENTIAL NOT FOR PUBLICATION". In no case where a station is requested to follow certain directions is the station to broadcast or to indicate in any way that action, restraint, or restrictions are being taken because of instruction or direction.

7. CANADIAN BROADCASTING REGULATIONS. I feel I should caution you once again that the procedure applicable in connection with the submission of talks does not relieve stations of their liability under the above-mentioned regulations.

Your early acknowledgement and understanding of this letter is requested and, in conclusion, may I once again request your close co-operation. I feel you will agree that only through the co-operation of all concerned can radio in Canada hope to adequately meet the demands of the present critical situation.

Yours faithfully,

H.N.Stovin
Supervisor of Station Relations.

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APPENDIX 4

TELETYPE MESSAGE - COPY

TO: H.N. STOVIN, Station Relations
TORONTO

FROM: R.P. LANDRY DATE: Sept. 22, 1939.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL RE POLITICAL BROADCASTS. In the interest of the public safety and order during the period of war emergency the Censorship Co-ordination Committee has decided that all political broadcasts shall in future be confined exclusively to studio broadcasting. Therefore no station should be given permission to carry any political address made by anyone at a public meeting. Further the Committee directs that the complete text of all political broadcasts be submitted in advance before permission is given to broadcast any such political speeches or talks by any radio broadcasting station or network of stations. The CBC rules now existing in respect to political broadcasts still hold good. A copy of the directives in this respect will be forwarded to you. In the meantime please apply. I think you better await my letter before circularizing the stations.

R P LANDRY

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APPENDIX 5

IN REPLY REFER TO FILE NO.....

Ottawa, Ontario,
September 25th, 1939,

CIRCULAR LETTER NO. C-5.

To all Canadian Broadcasting Stations:

During the period of war emergency political broadcasts must be confined to studio broadcasting. No station is permitted to carry any political address made at a public meeting.

The text of all proposed studio broadcasts of a political nature must be forwarded in duplicate well in advance to the Supervisor of Station Relations, and no broadcasts must be proceeded with until permission has been received by the station from this Department.

These decisions were taken by the Censorship authorities and communicated to me on Friday morning, September 22nd. It was felt that the radio station managements have no satisfactory means of controlling statements contravening the Defence of Canada Regulations when broadcasts are picked up from public platforms.

It is to be understood that the permission to broadcast political speeches from a studio does not relieve the management of the broadcasting station of its responsibility under the Broadcasting Act, the Broadcasting Regulations made thereunder, or the Defence of Canada Regulations.

Kindly acknowledge that these instructions are thoroughly understood.

Yours faithfully,

(H. N. Stovin)
Supervisor of Station Relations

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APPENDIX 6

TELETYPE MESSAGE COPY

CH-16.

GOUDRAULT

COPY DUPONT BEAUDET LANDRY BUSHNELL

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM HAS BEEN ADDRESSED TO ALL QUEBEC STATIONS EXCEPT CBF AND CBM FOR THIS IS INTENDED AS NOTICE TO THEM.

"TO EXPEDITE THE PROCEDURE OF HANDLING TALKS OF A POLITICAL NATURE PROPOSED FOR BROADCAST IN THE QUEBEC ELECTION CAMPAIGN, THE CENSORSHIP AUTHORITIES ARE ESTABLISHING AN EXAMINATION OFFICE IN MONTREAL. PLEASE DISREGARD MY FORMER INSTRUCTIONS TO FORWARD MANUSCRIPTS AND PARTICULARS AS PER MY TELEGRAM OF SEPT 26TH TO OTTAWA UNTIL OTHERWISE DIRECTED THESE SHOULD BE ADDRESSED TO STATION RELATIONS DEPT 1231 ST CATHERINE ST WEST MONTREAL"

MR GOUDRAULT WILL ACT AS MONTREAL LIAISON OFFICER FOR THE STATION RELATIONS DEPT. FULL PARTICULARS OF PROCEDURE ARE BEING TELETYPED TO HIM.

STOVIN SEPT 28-12.06 PM SAS ACK AP ACK MBL

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APPENDIX 7

TELETYPE MESSAGE -COPY

TO: H.N. STOVIN

FROM: R.P. LANDRY DATE: OCT.4, 1939.

AN ASSISTANT CENSOR HAS BEEN APPOINTED AT QUEBEC CITY. PAUL FONTAINE, K.C., DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ARRIVED AT QUEBEC THIS MORNING AND WILL EXAMINE TEXTS SUBMITTED BY QUEBEC STATIONS AND I HAVE REQUESTED MR. SEGUIN TO MAKE NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS FOR CLERICAL ASSISTANCE. WILL YOU PLEASE ADVISE THE QUEBEC STATIONS TO USE THE CENSORSHIP SERVICE BOTH AT MONTREAL AND QUEBEC AND I SHALL BE GLAD TO RECEIVE YOUR VIEWS.

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APPENDIX 8

TELETYPE MESSAGE COPY

CH-22

LANDRY

TNX YR HQ-7. SHALL ESTABLISH LIAISON AT CBV, QUEBEC, AND ADVISE STATIONS. WITH RESPECT TO THREE RIVERS - SHERBROOKE- AND ROUYN I AM CHECKING WITH THE POST OFFICE DEPT. TO ASCERTAIN THE POINT OF QUICKEST SERVICE, MONTREAL OR QUEBEC. ACCORDING TO HIS ADVICE I BELIEVE WE SHLD ADVISE THE STATIONS IN THOSE RESPECTIVE TOWNS RE PROCEDURE. DO YOU CONCUR?

STOVIN OCT 4-2.25 PM FW ACK MBL

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APPENDIX 9

TELETYPE MESSAGE -COPY

CH-36.

LANDRY

RE ESTABLISHMENT OF CENSOR OFFICE IN QUEBEC:
THE DISTRICT OF POSTAL SERVICE IN MONTREAL HAS ADVISED ME OF THE VARIOUS MAIL SERVICES FROM ROUYN, THREE RIVERS AND SHERBROOKE AS CHOICE BETWEEN QUEBEC AND MONTREAL. SHALL DIRECT THE STATIONS IN THESE CITIES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE INFORMATION SUPPLIED BY HIM. LIAISON IS BEING ESTABLISHED IN QUEBEC.

STOVIN OCT 4-4.50 PM SAS ACK MBL

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C O P Y

APPENDIX 10

October 9th, 1939.

Walter S. Thompson, Esq.,
Director of Censorship,
Ottawa.

Dear Mr. Thompson:

I was advised by long distance telephone from Mr. Aurèle Séguin, manager of Station CBV, Quebec, that on Saturday night, October 7th, Mr. Noel Dorion Broadcast a political address from the studios of CHRC at Quebec City. It was reported that Mr. Dorion read those parts from his text which had been deleted by the censorship authorities as contravening the Defence of Canada Regulations. I was advised that the Studio Operator cut off the speaker from the air for the time he was so reading those parts of his address which had been deleted by the censor.

Mr. Séguin reported that Mr. Dorion had intimated he had received instructions from the Honourable Mr. Duplessis to read the entire text notwithstanding any deletions made by the censorship authorities. It was pointed out that this procedure would create a false impression on the listening public in that it would tend to make believe that l'Union Nationale party was the only party subjected to censorship; this particularly due to the fact that speakers broadcasting on behalf of other political parties comply with the decisions of the censorship authorities and do not read any parts which might have been deleted as contravening the Defence of Canada Regulations.

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As a temporary measure I instructed Mr. Séguin to communicate by telephone with the station managers in Quebec City with a view of having them point out to the speakers that the reading of any part contained in their text which has been deleted by the censorship authorities, apart from being an infringement to Regulation 39 of the Defence of Canada Regulations, constitutes also an infringement of Regulation 61.(1) of the same Regulations which reads as follows:

> "61.(1) Any person who attempts to commit, or does any act preparatory to the commission of, an offence against any of these Regulations, shall be deemed to be guilty of an offence against that Regulation."

As I am writing to you, another such incident is being reported to me by Mr. Paul Fontaine. It appears that on Sunday evening, October 8th, Mr. Jean Blais, of the l'Union National party, contravened the regulations in the same way. Mr.Fontaine says that most likely other speakers will do the same tonight.

After consultation with yourself, Mr. Murray, Mr. J. F. MacNeill, K.C., of Justice Department, Mr. Paul Fontaine, K.C., Mr. Maurice Ollivier, K.C., and Mr. Gibeault, I have taken the following action:

1. I have instructed the censors to delete those parts of any texts which contravene the Defence of Canada Regulations by cutting out the said deletions with scissors.

2. I have requested the Supervisor of Station Relations of the CBC to wire all station managers in the province of Quebec instructions to the effect that they should request from the speakers, previous to the broadcast taking place, the official texts which were handed to them by the representative of the Station Relations Department of the CBC, after examination by the censorship authorities, and compare same with the official text in their possession.

The station managers were further instructed to notify all speakers that they must adhere strictly to the official text and that in the case of departure from same,

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or in the case they might make use of any other text, there would be an immediate discontinuance of the entire speech.

For your information, I attach hereto a copy of the telegrams sent to the censors and to the station managers.

I am, Sir,

Yours very truly,

Radio Broadcasting Censor.

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APPENDIX 11

COPY - TELEGRAM

Ottawa, le 9 octobre, 1939.

Sent to:

Maurice Ollivier, C.R.
R. Gibeault,
Censeurs, Montréal.

Paul Fontaine, C.R.,
Censeur, Château Frontenac,
QUEBEC.

J.E. Gaboury, Censeur
C/o CHNC, New Carlisle, P.Q.

CONFIDENTIEL ET URGENT INSTRUCTIONS AUX CENSEURS. En vue d'éliminer toute tentative d'infraction aux règlements concernant la Défense du Canada dans la lecture des textes d'adresses politiques irradiés des studios des postes radiophoniques il a été décidé de modifier la procédure suivie jusqu'ici dans l'exercise de la censure. A l'avenir les censeurs retrancheront en coupant aux ciseaux toutes parties de textes enfreignant les règlements concernant la Défense du Canada. Il n'y aura donc plus lieu de se servir de l'étampe "contraire aux règlements de la Défense du Canada". Les deux copies des textes dûment revisés seront remises au représentant du département des Relations des Postes de Radio-Canada. Des instructions sont données aux gérants de postes à l'effet de vérifier le texte utilisé par tout orateur en vue de déterminer qu'il soit conforme au texte reçu de la Censure et les gérants de postes ont instructions d'empêcher tout orateur d'irradier dans le cas où des modifications auraient été apportées à la copie qui leur a été remise par la Censure ou encore dans le cas où il se servirait d'un autre texte que le texte officiel. S'il vous plait procéder de la façon susdite.

RP Landry

CENSEUR DE LA RADIODIFFUSION

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APPENDIX 12

Confidential CIRCULAR C-9

THE FOLLOWING TELEGRAPHIC MESSAGE WAS SENT FROM TORONTO ON OCTOBER 9TH, 1939, TO THE FOLLOWING CANADIAN STATIONS: CHNC CJBR CBJ CHGB CHRC CKCV CBV CHLN CHLT CFCF & CFCX CHLP CKAC CBM & CBF CKRN CKCH CKCO CBO,

"CIRCULAR NUMBER C 9 NOT FOR PUBLICATION OR BROADCASTING STOP WITH RESPECT TO POLITICAL BROADCASTING I AM TODAY DIRECTED TO INFORM YOU OF THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS STOP ITEM ONE BEFORE ANY TALK OF A POLITICAL NATURE MAY BE BROADCAST YOU WILL OBTAIN FROM THE SPEAKER A COPY OF HIS TEXT AND COMPARE IT WITH THE OFFICIAL TEXT IN YOUR POSSESSION AS PASSED BY THE CENSORSHIP AUTHORITIES AND WHICH TEXTS IN BOTH CASES SHOULD BEAR THE STAMP OF THE CENSORSHIP AUTHORITIES STOP ITEM TWO IN THE CASE OR CASES WHERE THE OFFICIAL TEXT MAY HAVE BEEN MODIFIED BY THE SPEAKER PERMISSION TO BROADCAST IS WITHDRAWN STOP ITEM THREE THE SPEAKER SHOULD BE NOTIFIED IN ADVANCE THAT HE MUST STRICTLY ADHERE TO THE OFFICIAL TEXT AND THAT ANY ATTEMPT TO DEPART THEREFROM OR TO MAKE USE OF ANOTHER TEXT WILL RESULT IN THE IMMEDIATE DISCONTINUANCE OF THE BROADCAST AND SHOULD SUCH CASE ARISE YOU ARE INSTRUCTED TO DISCONTINUE THE BROADCAST IN ITS ENTIRETY STOP PLEASE ACKNOWLEDGE BY TELEGRAPH RECEIPT AND UNDERSTANDING OF THESE INSTRUCTIONS."

(Sgd.) "H. N. STOVIN"

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APPENDIX 13

Confidential CIRCULAR C 13

THE FOLLOWING TELEGRAPHIC MESSAGE WAS SENT FROM TORONTO ON OCTOBER 12TH, 1939, TO THE FOLLOWING CANADIAN STATIONS: CHNC CJBR CBJ CHGB CHRC CKCV CBV CHLN CHLT CFCF & CFCX CHLP CKAC CBM & CBF CKRN CKCH,

"PURSUANT TO DIRECTIVES IN RESPECT TO CENSORSHIP AND PARTICULARLY MY TELEGRAPHED CIRCULAR C 9 SHOULD IT BE NECESSARY FOR YOU TO DISCONTINUE BROADCASTING OF ANY POLITICAL TALK HERE FOLLOWS TEXT IN ENGLISH AND FRENCH THE APPROPRIATE ONE OF WHICH SHOULD BE BROADCAST IN EXPLANATION OF SUCH DISCONTINUANCE

"ENGLISH QUOTE WE REGRET TO INFORM YOU THAT WE HAVE BEEN OBLIGED TO DISCONTINUE THE ADDRESS OF MR X BY VIRTUE OF THE DEFENCE OF CANADA REGULATIONS AND THE DIRECTIVES ISSUED THEREUNDER UNQUOTE

"FRENCH QUOTE NOUS REGRETTONS DE VOUS INFORMER QUE NOUS AVONS ÉTÉ FORCÉS DE DISCONTINUER LA CAUSERIE DE MONSIEUR X EN VERTU DES RÈGLEMENTS CONCERNANT LA DÉFENSE DU CANADA ET DES DIRECTIVES S'Y RAPPORTANT UNQUOTE

"PLEASE ACKNOWLEDGE BY RETURN WIRE

H. N. STOVIN
SUPERVISOR OF STATION RELATIONS"

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APPENDIX 14

IN REPLY REFER TO FILE NO.....

341 Church Street,
Toronto, Ontario.
October 13, 1939.

CONFIDENTIAL

CIRCULAR LETTER NO. C-14

TO ALL BROADCASTING STATIONS

Talks Application Procedure

I refer you to the procedure applicable to talks, detailed in my telegram to you of September 1st, and my circular letter No. C-3 of September 13th.

As you are aware, this procedure was adopted in the hope that it might avoid the necessity for detailed radio censorship. In this time of national emergency it is, of course, essential that no material be broadcast which might affect prejudiciously the efficient prosecution of the war, or would be of a nature that might contravene the Defence of Canada Regulations. At the same time it is the desire of the Censorship Co-ordination Committee and all concerned that the ordinary avocations of life should be interfered with as little as possible, and that all liberties and rights, consistent with our national safety, be scrupulously respected and preserved.

I think I should stress at this time that the procedure applicable to talks was not, and is not, intended to reduce more than is absolutely necessary the subject matter of broadcast talks. For the impression to be created that the subjects permissible for radio broadcasting had been seriously reduced, would be both unwarranted and undesirable. Where stations have wished to schedule talks on non-controversial subjects - travelogues, sports talks, household hints broadcasts and so forth, the procedure has been to authorize, where possible, such talks in terms of a series.

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Where it has been desired to give talks dealing directly or indirectly with the war, international affairs, domestic politics, racial or minority problems, however, it has been necessary to make each broadcast the subject of a separate application. This precaution should not be interpreted to mean that talks on these subjects are prohibited or even discouraged. Such an interpretation would be totally inconsistent with the desire of the authorities concerned to maintain as far as possible, even in a time of war, normal broadcasting services. In fact, I think you will agree that objective and non-vituperative discussion of these matters is in the general interest, and should be encouraged. The talks application procedure should be regarded, not as a restriction on radio speech, but rather as a safeguard to ensure as far as possible that no material broadcast is in contravention of the foregoing Defence of Canada Regulations.

The Corporation does not, and cannot assume, the duty of detailed censorship. The responsibility for detailed examination of scripts rests with the station concerned. The fact that permission is given for the broadcast of any given talk or talks does not exempt stations from this liability. This statement applies to all talks. Further, subject to such directions as stations receive, needless to say, they are at liberty to formulate and apply such policies of their own as, in their opinion, are necessary for the efficient acquittal of the responsibilities reposed in them.

Should you desire clarification on any point raised in this letter, please do not hesitate to let me know. I should also appreciate an acknowledgement confirming your understanding of its contents.

Yours faithfully,

H. N. Stovin
Supervisor of Station Relations

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COPY

APPENDIX 15

CENSORSHIP CO-ORDINATION COMMITTEE
OTTAWA CANADA

Montreal, October 13, 1939.

Major Gladstone Murray,
General Manager,
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation,
180 Wellington Street,
Ottawa, Ont.

Re Infringement of Directives
by Station CBF

Dear Major Murray:

I have to report that the directives issued in respect to the censorship of political broadcasts have been infringed on Station CBF last night.

Two nights ago, Mr. Boyer of L'Union Nationale spoke over the radio from Station CBF, and, at various times, announced that deletions had been made to the text by the censorship of Mr. LaPointe.

Directives had already been issued to all station managers to the effect that speakers should be warned in advance that they must strictly adhere to the official text and that any attempt to depart therefrom or to make use of any other text would result in the immediate discontinuance of the broadcast, and definite instructions were given so that, should such cases arise, the stations would discontinue the broadcast in its entirety.

After this occurrence, I spoke to Mr. Goudrault, the manager of Station CBF, and made it very plain to him that it was of the highest importance that the directives issued in respect to political broadcasts should be very strictly adhered to. As a matter of fact, I was apprehensive that a recurrence of the infringement referred to above might happen and I took special precautions to warn Mr. Goudrault so that he would instruct his operators accordingly. Notwithstanding these instructions, I am sorry to report that during a speech made by Mr. Ernest Simard, between ten and ten-thirty p.m. last night, Mr. Simard departed from the text and announced that six words had been cut off by Mr. Lapointe's censorship; he was nevertheless allowed to carry on with his address.

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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I am sure you realize fully the importance of having directives applied uniformly throughout the country, I can see that if there should continue to exist a lack of cooperation in carrying out the instructions, various situations will arise which would not only be embarrassing to the Censorship Committee, but would also have a repercussion on the Government and the CBC.

It would be appreciated if you would kindly issue the necessary instructions to the officials concerned in order that the directives issued by the Censorship Co-ordination Committee will be complied with.

Yours faithfully,

(sgd) R.P. Landry
Radio Broadcasting Censor

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MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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APPENDIX 16

TELETYPE MESSAGE COPY

ML-62

RICHARDSON

CONFIDENTIAL

REFERENCY TO YOUR HQ-59.

PLEASE SEND OUT POSTERS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO ALL CANADIAN STATIONS AND PARTICULARLY TO THE STATIONS IN T[redacted] PROVINCE OF QUEBEC. INSTRUCT STOVIN TO ISSUE CIRCULAR IN REGARDS TO SAME. THE QUESTION OF THE CENSORSHIP BUDGET HAS BEEN TAKEN UP BY MR THOMPSON WITH THE MINISTER. I SHALL FOLLOW IT UP MONDAY.

R.P. LANDRY OCT. 13-6.10 PM JG ACK JRH

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MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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O.

APPENDIX 17.

C O P Y

Ottawa, October 17, 1939.

Walter S. Thompson, Esq.,
Director of Censorship,
Censorship Co-ordination Committee,
Ottawa.

Dear Mr. Thompson:

For your information, I attach hereto copy of a letter which I directed to Mr. Murray concerning the infringement of directives issued in regards to censorship of political broadcasts.

As I explained to you verbally, the CBC officials decided it would be opportune to make a statement over station CBF, at Montreal, after each political broadcast. The statement which now appears in French is as follows:

> "La Société Radio-Canada, à la suite de la causerie que vous venez d'entendre, croit juste et nécessaire de faire immédiatement une mise au point. La censure des textes de toute causerie politique relève strictement du comité de censure qui a charge de l'application des règlements concernant la Défense du Canada et non de la Société Radio-Canada ni d'aucune autre autorité au pays."

For your information, I have had this statement translated by the Bureau of Translation, and it reads as follows:

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MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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"Following the broadcast which you have just heard, the CBC deems it proper and necessary to restate its position. The Committee of Censors entrusted with the administration of the Defence of Canada Regulations is alone responsible for the censorship of all political speeches, and neither the CBC nor any other Government authority have any say in the matter."

I have discussed this matter with Mr. Murray yesterday afternoon, and it was suggested that the above statement be altered as follows:

"Censorship is conducted under the direction of the Censorship Co-ordination Committee appointed in accordance with the Defence of Canada Regulations."

It would seem to me that if it is found advisable to make any statement, the latter statement would be less objectionable. I would be inclined to believe that i might be better to delete any statement whatever, because, as you know, the directors or managers of all stations are responsible for the application of the Defence of Canada Regulations, and the mere fact that texts of political broadcasts are submitted in advance to censors does not relieve such officials of the stations from their responsibility to carry out the provisions of the Defence of Canada Regulations. Furthermore, I believe that any such statement as mentioned above relating to the application of censorship brings forth unnecessarily a matter which is considered to be very contentious, and although the regulations must be applied the least said about it the better.

I should be very glad if you would be kind enough to let me have your observations in the matter.

Yours faithfully,

Radio Broadcasting Censor.

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C 272402

TELETYPE MESSAGE COPY APPENDIX 18

TO M. NEILL

FROM A. BELL DATE OCT. 17, 1939.

RUSH

Col. Landry advises that at the conclusion of political addresses over CBM-CBF and possibly CBV a statement has been made indicating that the text of the address has been the subject of examination by the Censorship Co-ordination Committee and not of the CBC. This form of statement was, I understand, drawn up by Dr. Frigon and authorized by Col. Landry. This question has now been considered by the C.C.C. and it is deemed advisable that such statements should be deleted immediately. Please wire at once all stations concerned in Quebec election campaign as follows: "Confidentail C (Blank) I have been directed to advise you that effective immediately no commentary statement or other reference shall be made either at beginning or conclusion of political broadcasts to fact that text of political address has been subject to examination by Censorship authorities. Only permissible statement is that similar facilities are available under same conditions for expression of opposing views. Please confirm understanding by wire H.N. Stovin".

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APPENDIX 19

Confidential CIRCULAR C-15

THE FOLLOWING TELEGRAPHIC MESSAGE WAS SENT FROM TORONTO ON OCTOBER 17, 1939, TO THE FOLLOWING STATIONS: CHNC CJBR CBJ CHGB CHRC CKCV CBV CHLN CHLT CFCF CFCX CHLP CKAC CBM CBF CKRN CKCH.

" CONFIDENTIAL C-15 I HAVE BEEN DIRECTED TO ADVISE YOU THAT EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY NO COMMENTARY STATEMENT OR OTHER REFERENCE SHALL BE MADE EITHER AT THE BEGINNING OR CONCLUSION OF POLITICAL BROADCASTS TO THE FACT THAT THE TEXT OF POLITICAL ADDRESS HAS BEEN SUBJECT TO EXAMINATION BY CENSORSHIP AUTHORITIES STOP THE ONLY PERMISSIBLE STATEMENT IS THAT SIMILAR FACILITIES ARE AVAILABLE UNDER THE SAME CONDITIONS FOR EXPRESSION OF OPPOSING VIEWS STOP PLEASE CONFIRM UNDERSTANDING BY WIRE "

(Sgd.) "H. N. Stovin"

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APPENDIX 20

TELETYPE MESSAGE - COPY

ML 42

R.P. LANDRY

RUSH

OCTOBER 17TH STOVIN WIRED ME CIRCULAR NO.15 CONTAINING INSTRUCTIONS TO CANCEL SPECIAL CLOSING ANNOUNCEMENTS ON ALL POLITICAL AT CBF & CBM. YOU WILL RECOLLECT PREPARING YOURSELF THIS ANNOUNCEMENT WHICH I CONSIDER VERY APPROPRIATE AND AN ENLIGHTENMENT FOR THE LISTENING PUBLIC WHO THUS UNDERSTAND CLEARLY THAT THE CENSORSHIP IS A DEFENCE REGULATION AND NOT A BROADCASTING CENSORSHIP. KINDLY INSIST FOR THE MAINTENANCE. OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT.

M. GOUDRAULT OCT 19-4.50 PM JG ACK MBL

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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C 272405

APPENDIX 21

TELETYPE MESSAGE - COPY

TO: M. GOUDRAULT MONTREAL STUDIOS

FROM: R. P. LANDRY DATE: OCTOBER 19, 1939.

RE YOUR ML-42 SORRY BUT THE ANNOUNCEMENT MUST BE OFF THE AIR.

R.P. LANDRY.

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MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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APPENDIX 22

TELETYPE MESSAGE - COPY

TO: H.N. STOVIN STATION RELATIONS
TORONTO

FROM: R.P. LANDRY DATE: OCTOBER 19, 1939.

I have received this morning information to the effect that certain stations in the province of Quebec are putting on newscasts of political activities. I am further informed that these newscasts are not being submitted to the censors previous to their release. It is considered that such newscasts constitute in fact political broadcasts and therefore the texts of such news should be submitted in advance to the censors. Would you be so kind as to notify all stations accordingly.

R.P. LANDRY

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
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APPENDIX 23

TELETYPE MESSAGE - COPY

COL. LANDRY

THANK YOU FOR YOUR HQ-16 IN REFERENCE TO NEWSCASTS OF POLITICAL ACTIVITIES BEING BROADCAST BY CERTAIN QUEBEC STATIONS. WE ARE SENDING A WIRE TO ALL QUEBEC STATIONS IMMEDIATELY ADVISING THEM THAT UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCE SHOULD SUCH NEWSCASTS BE BROADCAST WITHOUT FIRST HAVING BEEN PASSED BY THE CENSORS. FOR YOUR INFORMATION SEVERAL OF THESE NEWSCASTS HAVE BEEN CARRIED ON SUBSIDIARY HOOKUP BUT IN EACH CASE WE HAVE INSISTED THAT THE MATERIAL BE PASSED BY THE CENSORS BEFORE PRESENTATION.

STOVIN OCT 19-4.00 PM SAS ACK MBL

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MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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C 272408

APPENDIX 24

TELETYPE MESSAGE COPY

TO H.N. STOVIN STATION RELATIONS
TORONTO

FROM: R.P. LANDRY DATE: OCTOBER 19, 1939.

RE YOUR CH-29. FROM A LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE WHICH I RECEIVED FROM QUEBEC, I BELIEVE THE STATIONS DO NOT SEEM TO UNDERSTAND THAT POLITICAL NEWSCASTS CONSTITUTE IN FACT A POLITICAL BROADCAST AND SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TWO DAYS PREVIOUS TO THE ELECTION AS PER REGULATION 8 PARA. 5. I THINK IT WOULD BE A GOOD THING TO ADVISE THEM THAT THESE BROADCASTS ARE NOT TO BE ALLOWED.

R.P. LANDRY.

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C 272409

COPY

APPENDIX 25

October 19th, 1939.

MEMORANDUM TO MR. MURRAY:

I have received a report by telephone from Quebec City to the effect that certain stations are putting on 15 minutes political newscasts. I have directed that insofar as censorship is concerned such newscasts are to be considered as political broadcasts and the text of the news must be submitted to the censor prior to their being broadcast.

I have been requested to give advice as to whether these newscasts would be permitted after October 22. As you know, Subsection 5 to Section 22 of the Canadian Broadcasting Act 1936 stipulates that:

> "(5) Political broadcasts on any dominion, provincial or municipal election day and on the two days immediately preceding any such election day are prohibited."

I would appreciate receiving your direction as soon as possible.

(SGD) R. P. Landry

Radio Broadcasting Censor.

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MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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C 272410

APPENDIX 26

TELETYPE MESSAGE - COPY

TO: H.N. STOVIN STATION RELATIONS
TORONTO

FROM: R.P. LANDRY DATE: OCTOBER 19, 1939.

IN reference to political newscasts direction has been secured as to whether these broadcasts would be permitted in the province of Quebec after Sunday October 22nd. I have discussed the matter with the General Manager and I am directed to inform you that as these broadcasts constitute political broadcasting they should not be permitted after Sunday night in accordance with subsection 5 of Section 22 of the Canadian Broadcasting Act 1936 which prohibits the broadcasting of political speeches forty-eight hours previous to the voting day. Will you please take the necessary steps to advise all stations accordingly.

SECRETARY

CBC

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APPENDIX 27

TELETYPE MESSAGE - COPY

CH-29

SECRETARY

THANK YOU FOR YOUR HQ-18. WE WROTE ALL QUEBEC STATIONS IN BOTH FRENCH AND ENGLISH BRINGING TO THEIR ATTENTION ALL POLITICAL BROADCASTING REGULATIONS. IF YOU DEEM IT NECESSARY, HOWEVER, WE WILL REMIND STATIONS OF REGULATION 8, PARAGRAPH 5, BY WIRE TODAY.

STOVIN OCT 19-4.00 PM SAS ACK MBL

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APPENDIX 28

Confidential

CIRCULAR C-18

THE FOLLOWING TELEGRAPHIC MESSAGE WAS SENT FROM TORONTO ON OCTOBER 19, 1939, TO THE FOLLOWING STATIONS: CHNC CJBR CBJ CHGB CHRC CKCV CBV CHLN CHLT CFCF CFCX CHLP CKAC CBM CBF CKRN CKCH.

" CONFIDENTIAL C-18 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WE ARE ADVISED THAT CERTAIN QUEBEC STATIONS ARE BROADCASTING NEWSCASTS OF POLITICAL ACTIVITIES WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN PASSED BY CENSORS PREVIOUS TO BROADCASTING STOP IT HAS BEEN RULED SUCH NEWSCASTS CONSTITUTE IN FACT POLITICAL BROADCASTS THEREFORE TEXT MUST BE SUBMITTED IN ADVANCE TO CENSORS STOP UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES MUST SUCH NEWS BE BROADCAST WITHOUT HAVING FIRST BEEN PASSED STOP PLEASE ACKNOWLEDGE UNDERSTANDING BY WIRE "

(Sgd.) "H. N. STOVIN"

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APPENDIX 29

TELETYPE MESSAGE - COPY

CH 24

LANDRY

WITH REFERENCE TO THE PROHIBITION OF POLITICAL BROADCASTS FOR THE TWO DAYS PROCEEDING ELECTION I PRESUME THAT THIS PROHIBITION DOES NOT EXTEND TO THE MENTION OF POLITICAL ACTIVITIES CONTAINED IN NEWS FURNISHED TO STATIONS BY REGULAR NEWS AGENCIES.

E.G. TRANS RADIO ANF B.U. PM ETC.

STOVIN OCT 20-12.35 PM SAS ACK MBL

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APPENDIX 30

TELETYPE MESSAGE - COPY

TO: H.N. STOVIN, Station Relations
Toronto

FROM: R.P. LANDRY DATE: OCTOBER 20, 1939.

Re your CH-24. This is a matter for the CBC to decide. My personal view is that there should be no prohibition to the mention of political activities contained in news furnished to stations by regular news agencies during the two days preceding election. However, this is not a direction and you may wish to consult the General Manager in t the matter.

R P LANDRY

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MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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APPENDIX 31

TELETYPE MESSAGE - COPY

LANDRY

HAVE BEEN ADVISED BY STATION CKRN ROUYN THAT THEY ARE CARRYING SPOT ANNOUNCEMENTS ADVISING OF COMING MEETING FMR ALL PARTIES. I BELIEVE THAT SUCH ANNOUNCEMENTS SHOULD BE SUBMITTED TO THE CENSORS FOR EXAMINATION BEFORE BEING BROADCAST, BUT WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR CONFIRMATION BEFORE PERSUING MATTERS FURTHER.

STOVIN OCT 20-12.33 PM SAS ACK MBL

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APPENDIX 32

TELETYPE MESSAGE -COPY

TO: HN. STOVIN, STATION RELATIONS
TORONTO

FROM: R. P. LANDRY DATE: OCTOBER 20, 1939.

RE your CH-23. I do not think it is necessary to have announcements by stations informing the public of political meetings being held by all parties submitted to censorship.

R P LANDRY

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MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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APPENDIX 33

TELEGRAM - COPY

OTTAWA, 20 octobre, 1939.

Monsieur Paul Fontaine, CR.,
Censeur de la Radiodiffusion,
Château Frontenac,
Québec, P.Q.

POUR FAIRE SUITE A MON TELEPHONE VEUILLEZ COMMUNIQUER AVEC LE GERANT CKCV ET LUI ENJOINDRE DE SOUMETTRE AU PREALABLE TOUS TEXTES CONCERNANT L'IRRADIATION DE NOUVELLES POLITIQUES

R P LANDRY
CENSEUR DE LA RADIODIFFUSION

CHARGE CBC

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C 272418

APPENDIX 34

COPY - TELEGRAM

Montreal, 22 octobre, 1939

Paul Fontaine C.R.
Chateau Frontenac,
Quebec.

Maurice Ollivier, C.R.,& R. Gibeault
Mont Royal,
Montréal, P.Q.

J. E. Gaboury, C.R.,
CHNC,
New Carlisle, P.Q.

René de la Durantaye
CJBR,
Rimouski, P.Q.

IRRADIATION DES CAUSERIES POLITIQUES TERMINERA MUNUIT CE SOIT STOP S'IL VOUS PLAIT ME FAIRE PARVENIR A OTTAWA COPIES DES TEXTES QUI VOUS ONT ETE SOUMIS STOP NE PAS OUBLIER DE VOUS PROCURER PIECES JUSTIFICATIVES POUR TOUTES DEPENSES EXTRAORDINAIRES

R P LANDRY

CHARGE CBC

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C 272419

OCTOBER 25, 1939.

APPENDIX 35

TELEGRAM - COPY

C. MONTREAL QUE 24 1245 P

COL R P LANDRY

CENSORSHIP COORDINATION COMMITTEE

CHATEAU LAURIER OTTAWA ONT CARE TC

FINAL INSTRUCTIONS HAVE BEEN ISSUED TO THE MANAGERS OF CBM CBJ CBF AND CBM TO PROCEED TONIGHT WITH SPEECHES OR INTERVIEWS OF CANDIDATES IN PRESENT ELECTION IN THE SAME MANNER AS DURING CAMPAIGN THE ONLY DIFFERENCE IS THAT LOCAL MANAGER WILL EXERCISE PERSONALLY CENSORSHIP OF MANUSCRIPTS SUBMITTED BY SPEAKERS STOP WE WILL PERMIT HOOKUPS OF STATIONS AT THE ABOVE CONDITIONS REGARDING CENSORSHIP STOP THIS WILL TAKE CARE OF USUAL CANDIDATES INTERVIEWS TONIGHT SO FAR AS OUR OWN STATIONS ARE CONCERNED STOP PLEASE LET ME KNOW WHETHER THIS PROCEDURE MEETS WITH REQUIREMENTS OF CENSORSHIP BOARD

(SGD) AUGUSTIN FRIGON

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APPENDIX 36

COPY - TELEGRAM

Ottawa, October 25, 1939.

Dr. A. Frigon,
Assistant General Manager
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation
1440 St. Catherine St.W.,
Montreal, P.Q.

Re your telegram no objection to procedure as outlined in your telegram.

(SGD) R P LANDRY

CHARGE CBC

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C 272421

APPENDIX 37

Confidential

CIRCULAR C-21

THE FOLLOWING TELEGRAPHIC MESSAGE WAS SENT FROM TORONTO ON OCTOBER 27, 1939, TO THE FOLLOWING STATIONS: CHSJ CFNB CKCW CHNC.

" CONFIDENTIAL CIRCULAR NO. C-21 NOT FOR PUBLICATION OR BROADCASTING STOP WITH RESPECT TO NEW BRUNSWICK POLITICAL ELECTION BROADCASTS I AM TODAY DIRECTED TO ADVISE YOU OF FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS STOP NOTWITHSTANDING CIRCULAR LETTER C-5 SUBMISSION OF TEXTS OF POLITICAL ADDRESSES NOT NECESSARY STOP STATION MANAGER HOWEVER CHARGED WITH FULL RESPONSIBILITY TO EXAMINE TEXTS AND INSURE THAT NO MATERIAL BROADCAST LIKELY TO CONTRAVENE EITHER DEFENCE OF CANADA OR BROADCASTING REGULATIONS STOP FURTHER IN VIEW OF ITS SPECIFIC RESPONSIBILITY UNDER THE ACT AND REGULATIONS THE CBC MUST MAINTAIN UPTODATE PICTURE OF CAMPAIGN STOP TO THIS END STATION RELATIONS DEPARTMENT SHOULD BE INFORMED NIGHT LETTER OF ALL NETWORK OR LOCAL BOOKINGS OR CHANGES OF POLITICAL BROADCAST BOOKINGS INCLUDING DATE TIME AUSPICES AND NAME OF SPEAKER AND NO SPEECH SHOULD BE BROADCAST UNTIL AUTHORIZED STOP PLEASE CONFIRM UNDERSTANDING BY WIRE "

(Sgd.) "H. N. STOVIN"

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CANADIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION

APPENDIX 38

IN REPLY REFER TO FILE NO.....

341 Church Street,
Toronto, Ontario,
October 30, 1939.

CIRCULAR LETTER NO. C 22

NOT FOR PUBLICATION OR BROADCASTING

Dear Sir:

The purpose of this Circular is to clarify the contents of Circular C-21 addressed to you by telegram on October 27th. The Censorship Co-ordination Committee has decided to alter the existing procedure in reference to political broadcasts. All previous directions are cancelled and the following substituted therefor:

(a) It shall not be necessary to submit to this Department copies of the texts of political addresses;

(b) Station managers are charged with the full responsibility to examine texts and ensure that nothing contained therein contravenes either the Defence of Canada or the Broadcasting Regulations;

(c) Copies of texts of all political addresses should be submitted to station managers in triplicate. After examination by station manager and any necessary deletions made thereto, in accordance with Defence of Canada Regulations, one copy will be returned to the speaker, one copy will be forwarded to the Secretary, Censorship Co-ordination Committee, Victoria Building, Ottawa, and one copy will be retained by the station for its records;

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C 272423

C-22

Page 2

(d) It is desired that the Station Relations Department be kept informed daily by night letter of all reservations made by political parties, both for network or station broadcasting, the information to include the date and auspices under which broadcast is to take place and the name of the speaker. No address should be broadcast until authority has been given by this Department.

Yours faithfully,

H. N. Stovin
Supervisor of Station Relations

This Circular Letter has been sent to the following stations:

CFCY	Charlottetown,	P.E.I.
CHSJ	Saint John,	N.B.
CFNB	Fredericton,	N.B.
CKCW	Moncton,	N.B.
CHNC	New Carlisle	P.Q.

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
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CANADIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION 272424

APPENDIX 39.

IN REPLY REFER TO FILE NO.....

341 Church Street,
Toronto, Ontario,
October 31, 1939.

Circular Letter No. C-24

To All Broadcasting Stations:

Political Broadcasting

I refer you to the procedure applicable to political broadcasts as detailed in my circular letter No. C-5.

I am now directed by the Censorship Co-ordination Committee to advise you that this procedure has been modified, and until or unless otherwise advised, the following directives will apply to all political broadcasting, be it Dominion, Provincial or Municipal in character.

As heretofore, during the period of war emergency, political addresses must be confined to studio broadcasting. No station is permitted to carry any political address made at a public meeting. In future, stations will not be required to submit the texts of such speeches prior to broadcast. Stations will, however, be required to forward to this Department particulars of these addresses, in advance of desired date of broadcast. Such particulars should include name of speaker, the auspices, if any, under which the speech is to be given, time and date of broadcast. This is in accordance with the war emergency procedure, which stipulates that permission must be given in advance for all spoken word presentations.

Station managers will be charged with the full responsibility of detailed examination of the texts of all political addresses. It will be their

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duty to ensure that no material broadcast is of a nature likely to contravene the Defence of Canada Regulations or the Broadcasting Regulations. Station managers will require speakers to furnish them with three (3) copies of their proposed address. These copies should be examined and the deletions marked on each copy. One copy should be retained by the station, one given to the speaker, and the third forwarded to the Censorship Co-ordination Committee, 140 Wellington Street, Ottawa. Texts sent to the Censorship Co-ordination Committee will not require postage, and may be sent, if necessary, after the broadcast has taken place.

In interpretation of the Defence of Canada Regulations, and in the application of Censorship directives, I would like to assure you that the Censorship Co-ordination Committee will be glad to offer a broad advisory guidance.

I would much appreciate an acknowledgement of this communication.

Yours faithfully,

H. N. Stovin
Supervisor of Station Relations

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CANADA

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C 272426

CENSORSHIP CO-ORDINATION COMMITTEE

The Staff of the Director of Censorship consisted of:

Director of Censorship

General Executive Assistant

Private Secretary

Stenographers (2)

File Clerk

Office Boy

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C272427

PRESS CENSORSHIP

The Staff of the Joint Press Censors for Canada consisted of:

OTTAWA

Press Censor for Canada

Deputy Press Censor (Sept. 16th - Nov. 30th)

Censor (Nov. 1st - Nov. 30th)

Assistant Censor (Nov. 6th - Nov. 30th)

Stenographers (2)

Office Boy (2)

File Clerk - Stenographer

MONTREAL

Press Censor for Canada

Assistant Censor (Oct. 1st - Nov. 5th)

Examiner of Publications

Stenographer

File Clerk

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C 272428

EXAMINATION OF PUBLICATIONS

The Staff of the Examiner of Publications consisted of:

Examiner of Publications

Dominion Customs Appraisers (2)

Principal Customs Excise
Checking Clerk

Principal Clerk

Clerks (5)

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
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RADIO BROADCASTING CENSORSHIP

The Staff of the Radio Broadcasting Censor consisted of:

Radio Broadcasting Censor

Stenographer

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CABLE AND TELEGRAPHIC CENSORSHIP

OTTAWA

Chief Telegraph Censor

VANCOUVER

Cable Censor
Assistant Cable Censors (7)
Clerks (3)
Messenger

TORONTO

Senior Cable Censor
Assistant Cable Censors (8)
Clerk

MONTREAL

Deputy Chief Cable Censor
Assistant Cable Censors (21)
Clerks (2)

HALIFAX

Cable and Telegraph Censor
Telegraph Censors (7)
Clerk
Decoders (4)

CANSO

Cable Censor
Assistant Cable Censors (3)
Clerk

NORTH SYDNEY

Assistant Censor
Decoders (3)

TOTAL: 69

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POSTAL CENSORSHIP

The Staff of the Postal Censor consisted of:

	Chief Postal Censor	- Ottawa
2	Examiners in Charge	- Ottawa
39	Examiners	- Ottawa
10	Temporary Censorship Clerks	- Vancouver
1	Part Time Censorship Clerk	- Victoria

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Epreuve illisible

C 272432

THE COMMERCIAL RADIO CENSORSHIP

The Staff of the Radio (Commercial) Censor consisted of:

(a) Chief Radio (Commercial) Censor

(b) 33 Officers-in-Charge of Radio Coast Stations of the Department of Transport, all permanent members of the Department.

(c) The Officers in Charge of the small radio stations licensed to operate for point-to-point radio communication in isolated areas — 700 approx.

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Epreuve illisible

C272433

PROHIBITED PUBLICATIONS

(I)

The Department of National Revenue on the recommendation of the Press Censors, placed prohibitions against the importation of the following publications into Canada, -- the bases for the prohibition, variously Section 13 and Item 1201, Schedule "C" of The Customs Tariff Act, and Regulation 39A, of the Defence of Canada Regulations:

Sept. 26, 1939	"Detroiter Abend-Post"	Published daily in the German language at 1442 Brush Street, Detroit, Michigan.
	"Morgen Freiheit" (Morning Freiheit)	A Jewish language newspaper published daily at 50 East 13th Street, New York, N.Y.
Sept. 30, 1939	"Liberation"	Published weekly by Pelley Publishers, Asheville, North Carolina.
	"New Masses"	Published weekly by Weekly Masses Co. Inc., 461 Fourth Avenue, New York, N.Y.
Oct. 13, 1939	"War"	A pamphlet issued by Socialist Labor Party, 61 Cliff Street, New York, N.Y.
	"All-Pets Magazine"	Published monthly by Lightner Publishing Co., 2810 South Michigan Avenue, Chicago, Ill.
Oct. 14, 1939	"The Communist"	Published monthly by the Communist Party of the U.S.A., P. O. Box 148, Sta. D, New York.
	"Pacifist Program In Time of War	Published at Pendle Hill, Wallingford, Pa.
	"Heimatbote"	A weekly newspaper in the German language, published at 600-West North Avenue, Chicago, and 179 East Second Street, Winona, Minn.
	"Le Libertaire"	An organ of the Anarchist Union, published in Paris, France.
	"Look"	Published semi-monthly by Look,Inc., 715 Locust St., Des Moines, Iowa.

COLOURED PAPER
PAPIER DE COULEUR

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Oct. 21, 1939	"Soviet Russia Today"	Published monthly by S. R. T. Publications, Inc., 114 East 32nd Street, New York, N.Y.
Oct. 27, 1939	"Social Justice"	Published weekly by the Social Justice Publishing Co., Royal Oak, Michigan.
Nov. 20, 1939	"Technocracy"	Published monthly by Technocracy Inc., 155 East 44th Street, New York, N.Y.
	"Christian Reminders On War"	A pamphlet published at 7221 4th Avenue N. W., Seattle, Washington.
	"Magyar Jovo" (Hungarian Future)	A semi-weekly newspaper in the Hungarian language published by the Hungarian Daily Journal Publishing Co., 413 East 14th Street, New York, N. Y.
	"News from Germany"	A periodical bulletin in English, issued at Starnberg, Germany.
	"L'Adunate Dei Refrattari"	A weekly newspaper in the Italian language, published at Newark,N.J.
	"I. W. M. A. Press Service" (International Working Men's Association)	Published monthly in Spanish, French, Swedish, German, and English, at Stockholm, Sweden.
	"Nouvel Age"	A daily newspaper in the French language, published in Paris, France.
	"Tagliche Volkszeitung" (People's Paper)	A daily newspaper in the German language, published at 1307 Howard Street, Omaha, Nebraska
	"Jednota" (Union)	A weekly newspaper in the Slovak language, published at Middletown, Pennsylvania.
	"Founding of the First International"	A pamphlet published by the Co-operative Publishing Society of Foreign Workers in the U.S.S.R., Moscow, U.S.S.R.
	"Le Reveil Anarchiste"	A newspaper in the French language, published at Geneva, Switzerland.
	"Labour Monthly"	A monthly publication, published in London, England.

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Nov. 28, 1939	"Der Staats-Anzeiger"	A semi-wwekly newspaper in the German language, published at 112 Sixth Street, Bismark,N.D.
	"Deutsch-Amerikanische Bürger-Zeitung" (German-American Citizens' Journal)	A newspaper in the German language published weekly at 921 West Agatite Street, Chicago, Illinois.
	"Slovenska Obrana"	A semi-weekly newspaper in the Slovak language, published by Obrana Press, Inc., 454 Lackawanna Avenue, Scranton, Pa.
	"Armageddon"	A pamphlet in the Serbian language printed in Jugoslavia.
	"Unity For Peace and Democracy"	A pamphlet by Earl Browder, published by Workers Library Publishers, Inc., New York, N.Y.
	"Russkoye Obozrenie" (Russian Review)	A weekly newspaper in the Russian language, published by the Russian Review Publishing Co., 2117 West Grand Avenue, Chicago, Illinois.
	"The Liberation of West Ukraine and West Byelorussia"	A bulletin in the English language published in Moscow, U. S. S. R.
	"XXII Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution"	A bulletin in the English language published in Moscow, U. S. S. R.
	"Not America's War"	A pamphlet by Phil Frankfeld, published by the Communist Party of New England, 15 Essex Street, Boston, Massachusetts.
	"Behind The War Headlines"	A pamphlet by J. Fields, published by Workers Library Publishers, Inc. New York, N. Y.
	"The Meaning of the Soviet-German Non-Agression Pact"	A pamphlet by V. M. Molotov, published by Workers Library Publishers, Inc., New York, N.Y.

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PUBLIC ARCHIVES
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PROHIBITED PUBLICATIONS

(II)

The following Canadian newspapers were banned by Order of the Acting Secretary of State of Canada, with the concurrence of the Director of Censorship. This action was recommended by the Joint Press Censors for Canada.

October 4th - CLARTE - A French language Communist weekly newspaper, published in the City of Toronto. (See Appendix 3, Circular 12)

November 21st - THE CLARION - An English language weekly Communist newspaper, published in the City of Toronto. (See Appendix 3, Circular 31)

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CANADIAN PUBLICATIONS

Press Censorship has kept actively in contact with and exercised control over 1,447 different publications in Canada. They are made up as follows:

Daily	109
Weekly	961
Semi-monthly, monthly and quarterly	277
TOTAL	1,447

Of this number:

English total	1,105
French "	184
Bilingual "	14

The remaining 144 are divided among the following languages:

Jewish	Chinese
Russian	Japanese
Ukrainian	Swedish
Croatian	Finnish
German	Norwegian
Yugo-Slavian	Danish
Czecho-Slovakian	Icelandic
Slovakian	Italian
Hungarian	Greek
Roumanian	

The following pages provide a numerical tabulation of the various groups divided according to Daily, Weekly, Semi-monthly, Monthly and Quarterly publications with a further division according to provinces.

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C272438

CANADIAN DAILY NEWSPAPERS

Daily Papers (all languages)...	109
English	84
French.....	11
Bilingual.....	1
Business (English).....	1
University (English).....	2
Jewish.....	2
Chinese.....	4
Japanese.....	2
Ukranian.....	1
Finnish.....	1
	109

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CANADIAN DAILY NEWSPAPERS

Prince Edward Island:	English	2
Nova Scotia:	English	9
New Brunswick:	English	5
Province of Quebec:	English	5
	French	10
	Bilingual	1
	Jewish	1
	University (English)	1
Ontario:	English	35
	French	1
	Finnish	1
	Jewish	1
	Business (English)	1
	Chinese	2
	University (English)	1
Manitoba:	English	6
	Ukranian	1
Saskatchewan:	English	5
Alberta:	English	6
British Columbia:	English	11
	Chinese	2
	Japanese	2
		109

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Epreuve illisible

C 272440

WEEKLY PUBLICATIONS

DOMINION OF CANADA

Total all languages.....	981
English.....	822
French.....	104
Bilingual.....	7
German.....	8
Jewish.....	7
Finnish.....	3
Russian.....	1
Swedish.....	3
Norwegian.....	1
Scandinavian.....	1
Danish.....	1
Icelandic.....	2
Polish.....	4
Ukranian.....	7
Croatian.....	1
Czecho-Slovakian.....	1
Yugo Slavian.....	1
Hungarian.....	2
Italian.....	3
Greek.....	1
Slovak.....	1

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WEEKLY PUBLICATIONS

C272441

DOMINION OF CANADA

Prince Edward Island

Total all languages	4
English	4

Nova Scotia

Total all languages	38
English	36
French	1
Danish	1

New Brunswick

Total all languages	21
English	19
French	2

Quebec

Total all languages	138
English	32
French	95
Bilingual	5
Italian	1
Czecho-Slovakian	1
Slovak	1
Greek	1
Jewish	2

Ontario

Total all languages	347
English	333
French	2
Bilingual	1
mJewish	2
Finnish	3
Italian	1
Yugo Slavian	1
Polish	2
Ukranian	1
Hungarian	1

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C 272442

WEEKLY PUBLICATIONS

Manitoba

Total all languages	94
English	73
French	1
Jewish	3
German	4
Hungarian	1
Russian	1
Swedish	2
Norwegian	1
Icelandic	2
Polish	2
Ukranian	3
Croatian	1

Saskatchewan

Total all languages	156
English	148
French	2
Bilingual	1
German	4
Ukranian	1

Alberta

Total all languages	98
English	95
French	1
Ukranian	2

British Columbia

Total all languages	83
English	80
Italian	1
Swedish	1
Scandinavian	1

Yukon Territory

Total all languages	2
English	2

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C 272443

SEMI-MONTHLY, MONTHLY AND QUARTERLY PUBLICATIONS

English	196
French	69
Bilingual	6
Ukranian	2
Norwegian	1
Icelandic	1
Roumanian	1
Finnish	1
TOTAL	277

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PUBLIC ARCHIVES
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SEMI-MONTHLY, MONTHLY AND QUARTERLY PUBLICATIONS

Prince Edward Island		
Total all languages	1	
English		1
Nova Scotia		
Total all languages	8	
English		8
New Brunswick		
Total all languages	5	
English		4
French		1
Quebec		
Total all languages	122	
English		52
French		64
Bilingual		6
Ontario		
Total all languages	88	
English		86
French		1
Finnish		1
Manitoba		
Total all languages	21	
English		15
French		2
Ukranian		2
Norwegian		1
Icelandic		1
Saskatchewan		
Total all languages	8	
English		7
Roumanian		1
Alberta		
Total all languages	8	
English		7
French		1
British Columbia		
Total all languages	16	
English		16

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C272445

CANADA

CENSORSHIP CO-ORDINATION COMMITTEE

OFFICE OF THE RADIO
BROADCASTING CENSOR

OTTAWA, CANADA
November 30, 1939.

Walter S. Thompson, Esq.,
Director of Censorship,
Censorship Co-ordination Committee,
Ottawa.

Dear Mr. Thompson:

As requested in your letter of October 25th, I have prepared a chronological report of censorship activities covering the period September 1 to November 30, which I have the honour to submit herewith.

Yours faithfully,

Radio Broadcasting Censor.

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C 272446

TO:

WALTER S. THOMPSON, ESQ.,
DIRECTOR OF CENSORSHIP

CHRONOLOGICAL REPORT OF ACTIVITIES RELATED TO CENSORSHIP APPLYING TO RADIO BROADCASTING

SEPTEMBER 1 - NOVEMBER 30, 1939.

OTTAWA,
NOVEMBER 30, 1939.

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SECRET
CBC

CHRONOLOGY OF ACTIVITIES RELATED TO CENSORSHIP APPLYING TO RADIO BROADCASTING SEPTEMBER 1 - NOVEMBER 30, 1939.

PART I

Precautionary Measures Applied by The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation Previous to the Establishment of Censorship.

September 1: On announcement of the Government's proclamation, under the War Measures Act, all broadcasting stations were advised that full particulars concerning talks must be submitted to the Corporation prior to broadcast. It was defined in the advice that the procedure did not necessarily encompass or convey a detailed censorship and that stations were not relieved of their responsibilities under the broadcasting regulations.

Stations carrying foreign language programmes were communicated with. It was suggested that they voluntarily suspend broadcasts in languages other than French and English. In the case of sponsored programmes in foreign languages, it was carefully explained to the management of the stations concerned that there would be no objection to the same sponsors broadcasting in English or French.

September 3: Arrangements were made whereby those programmes of United States origin carried by the CBC might be transmitted to Canada free of news flash interjection; this monitoring required special line service, the cost of which was considered too high to place on a permanent basis.

September 4: The Columbia Broadcasting System undertook to delete, from feed to Canada, news flashes originating in the United States.

Canadian stations associated with the United States network voluntarily refrained from carrying commentaries originating from Berlin.

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September 5: The Dominion Government announced the creation of the Censorship Co-ordination Committee which included a senior officer of the Corporation to look after broadcasting interests.

September 8: The special monitoring line for incoming programmes from United States was cancelled.

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C272449

PART II

General Activities Concerning the Application of Censorship to Broadcasting in Canada.

September 4: Appointment by the Cabinet of members of the Censorship Co-ordination Committee.

September 5: Public announcement of the creation of the Censorship Co-ordination Committee and members appointed thereto.

Directives were issued by the Director of Censorship to all stations to refrain from broadcasting information with respect to the transport of storage of war materials; the sailing or arrival of seagoing vessels; any action taken by the RCMP in connection with certain German nationals; movement of the armed forces and supposed plans for the utilization of such forces; any works or measures in connection with the defence and fortification of any place; any report or statement likely to prejudice the recruiting, training or discipline of the forces. (Circular C-1)

September 6: Enforcement by Order in Council (P.C.2563) of the provisions of the Censorship Regulations 1939 with respect to radio communications within Canada.

A summary of the general broadcasting situation was compiled showing that there are at present 92 radio broadcasting stations operating in Canada as follows:

(a) long wave broadcasting stations : 85
(b) short wave broadcasting stations: 7

The CBC owns and operates ten long wave broadcasting stations.

Privately-owned stations affiliated with the CBC national and regional networks total 27.

Supplementary private radio stations total 29.

The line facilities are available to these stations under the CBC's wire line contract with the wire line companies, and the CBC program service is available to them in whole or in part.

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Non-network radio stations privately-owned total 19.

"Affiliated" radio stations are those with which the CBC has an agreement whereby the stations are obligated to carry a stipulated number of hours of CBC sustaining programs and the same stations are"must" stations when any region or combination of regions are purchased by commercial radio advertisers. For this purpose, the CBC national network is divided into five regions: Maritimes, Quebec, Ontario, Prairies and British Columbia.

"Supplementary" radio stations are those to which wire line facilities (under the wire line contract with the wire line facilities companies) and CBC program service may be made available.

"Non-network" stations are those to which no line facilities are presently available under the wire line contract.

In addition to the CBC networks which, as may be seen from the exemplification, are rigid, there are subsidiary hookups which are flexible and may be comprised of two or more stations in the Dominion of Canada.

The following privately owned stations are associated with United States networks:

CFCX, Montreal	-	NBC Blue Network
CFCF, Montreal	-	NBC Blue Network
CKAC, Montreal	-	CBS Network
CFRB, Toronto	-	CBS Network
CFRY, Toronto	-	CBS Network
CKLW, Windsor	-	Mutual Network

The following CBC stations are associated with United States networks:

CBF, Montreal	-	NBC Red Network
CBM, Montreal	-	NBC Red Network
CBL, Toronto	-	NBC Red & Blue Networks

The CBC engages in an exchange of programs import and export with all three American networks and has imported programs by shortwave from the BBC and foreign countries.

September 7: First meeting of the Censorship Co-ordination Committee held at Ottawa under the chairmanship of Walter S. Thompson for the purpose of having the members meet and also for a general discussion of the Defence of Canada Regulations and the Censorship Regulations 1939.

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C272451

September 8: Confirmation by the Minister of Transport of my appointment as a member of the Censorship Co-ordination Committee pursuant to the provisions of Order in Council P.C.2513, dated September 3, 1939.

The following recommendations were made to the Director of Censorship with reference to the application of censorship of radio broadcasting in Canada:

(1) Censorship of News: It was recommended that all news broadcast in Canada should be cleared through a central bureau common to press and radio news services. It was agreed that the matter should be left in abeyance for further information and consideration.

In respect to news flashes originating from American networks, it was decided to release the special monitoring line facilities which had been established temporarily by the CBC.

(2) Talks and Commentaries: It was recommended that consideration be given to the continuation of the procedure already adopted by the CBC in respect to the broadcasting of talks and commentaries. This was agreed to and the directives contained in Circular C. dated September 1, 1939, were allowed to stand.

(3) Use of Station Relations Department Facilities as Liaison Between Broadcasting Censors and Broadcasting Stations: It was recommended and agreed that regulations applying to censorship be made applicable to all stations in Canada through the Station Relations Department of the CBC as a clearing point.

(4) Sanctions in Respect to Infringement of Regulations: It was recommended and agreed that sanctions in respect to infringement of regulations made under the authority of the Censorship Co-ordination Committee be applied through the Department of Transport, which is the licensing authority, but after reference to the CBC.

(5) Oath of Allegiance: It was recommended that all station managers be served with the Oath of Allegiance. The matter was deferred.

(6) Responsibility of Application of Censorship by Station Managers: It was recommended and agreed that all station managers be charged with the responsibility of applying censorship in accordance with the directives issued from time to time.

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September 8: The Canadian Press, the British United Press, the Trans-Radio News Service and the Christian Science Monitor were requested to file with the Secretary of the Censorship Committee a copy of all news material sent to Canadian stations whether used or not each day.

September 9: Directives were issued to all stations requesting to refrain from broadcasting news regarding arrival or sailing of ocean-going vessels. (Circular C-2)

September 12: A request was received from the CBC to consider the extension to privately-owned broadcasting stations of a policy whereby the sale of networks to individuals or commercial organizations for the broadcasting of opinion is not permitted. After due consideration, it was decided that the matter was one which pertained exclusively to the CBC, and since all radio stations had already been warned to follow closely the directives issued in regards to censorship, and since there had been no proof of wrong doing in this respect, it was considered inadvisable to interfere.

The policy of the CBC requesting the discontinuance of broadcast on Canadian stations in languages other than French or English was ratified.

September 13: Directives were issued to all stations outlining the general procedure applicable to talks. (Circular C-3)

Directives were issued to all stations prohibiting spoken words broadcasts in Canada in languages other than English and French. (Circular C-3)

September 14: A circular letter was directed to all stations by the Director of Censorship notifying that I have been appointed to serve on the Censorship Co-ordination Committee in respect to censorship applicable to broadcasting and also outlining the general procedure to be followed in respect to directives issued from time to time.

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September 15: I interviewed Mr. C. F. Crandall, President of the British United Press. Mr. Crandall gave a full account of the facilities used by the B.U.P. in the transmission of its messages to Canada for broadcasting purposes. It was agreed that copies of all news originating in New York, Buffalo and Seattle and transmitted to Canada for broadcasting would be filed with the Committee. No question of policy was discussed in regards to censorship as this had already been taken up previously with the Director of Censorship.

September 20: Directives were issued by the CBC to all stations requesting the discontinuance of broadcasting of sponsored or sustaining weather forecasts or weather information.

September 21: Directives were issued to all stations requesting to mail daily to the Censorship Coordination Committee at Ottawa, true copies of all news released by their respective station. (Circular C-4)

September 22: A meeting was held in the office of the Minister of Justice; the following were present:

The Minister of Justice, the Minister of Public Works, the Postmaster General and the Minister of Fisheries; the Director of Censorship, the Press Censors and the Radio Broadcasting Censor.

The Minister of Justice asked explanations concerning the application of censorship to both press and radio in respect to political addresses. The Director of Censorship outlined briefly the action taken by the Press Censors and the Radio Broadcasting Censor in respect to the deletion of statements which might be considered to contravene the Defence of Canada Regulations. He also stated that the general attitude was that more could be obtained through cooperation than by the application of rigid enforcements.

Subsequently, particular attention was given to the broadcast of political addresses, and after due consideration of the principles involved, it was agreed that all political broadcasts would be confined to studio broadcasting and that the text of such broadcasts would be submitted in advance, for examination, previous to broadcast permission being granted. The ruling to apply to municipal, provincial and federal election broadcasts as also to other political addresses.

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September 22: Directives were issued to the Supervisor of Station Relations of the CBC to circularize all broadcasting stations of the decision mentioned above in respect to the procedure to be followed concerning political broadcasts.

September 25: Directives were issued to all stations to the effect that during the period of war emergency political broadcasts will be confined to studio broadcasting and further, that the text of all political addresses must be submitted in advance of broadcast permission being granted. (Circular C-5)

September 26: The Minister of Transport appointed me censor to act under the provisions of the Censorship Regulations 1939 and the Defence of Canada Regulations with respect to radio broadcasting in Canada.

In view of the announcement of elections in the province of Quebec for October 25th, methods of application to the rules governing the censorship of political broadcasts were determined, and it was agreed that detailed censorship of political broadcasts relating to the forthcoming campaign could best be handled with the help of assistant censors.

September 28: Messrs Paul Fontaine, K.C., and Roméo Gibeault, Advisory Counsel, Department of Justice, as also Dr. Maurice Ollivier, K.C., Law Clerk of the House of Commons, were appointed assistant censors to act in respect of the political addresses broadcast during the Quebec electoral campaign.

An office was opened in Montreal to provide due working facilities.

Rates of expenditures were approved to include transportation cost and a per diem allowance at the rate of $15.00 in lieu of subsistence.

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September 28: Mr. Maurice Goudrault, K.C., manager of Station CBF, Montreal, was appointed, by the Supervisor of Station Relations of the CBC, to act as liaison between the political parties and the assistant censors at Montreal.

September 29: A letter was directed to Honourable Maurice Duplessis, Premier of Quebec, explaining the procedure adopted in respect to the censorship of political broadcasts.

One of my first concerns was to acquaint myself with the situation concerning the release of news for broadcasting purposes, in Canada. I had the occasion of discussing the matter with Mr. C.F.Crandall and Mr. R. W. Keyserlingk of the British United Press, and Mr. Herbert Moore of the Trans-Radio Press Service. I received from them a complete picture of the way news are being distributed to the various Canadian stations.

In view of the fact there does not exist in Canada any exclusive radio news agencies, it was agreed that all news secured for press releases would apply to newscasts. The following news agencies were requested to file all news releases with the Committee: Canadian Press, British United Press, Trans-Radio Press Service and the Christian Science Monitor. Apart from this, stations were requested to also file copies of all local news.

October 1: Directives were issued to the effect that no further information might be broadcast regarding the detention of individuals, the location or activities of internment camps, the number of aliens interned, etc. (Circular C-6)

October 3: Mr. Paul Fontaine was transferred to Quebec City where he assumed the functions of assistant censor. An office was duly equipped for him in the Chateau Frontenac.

October 4: Mr. Aurèle Séguin, manager of station CBV, Quebec, was appointed, by the Supervisor of Station Relations of the CBC, to act as liaison between the political parties and the assistant censor at Quebec City.

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October 5: Directives were issued to all stations pointing out that it is not permissible for the stations to carry commercial radio continuity or spoken word references exhorting the public directly or indirectly to make purchases in anticipation of rising prices of goods or merchandise. (Circular C-7)

Mr. Jacques Fortier, Departmental Solicitor, Department of Transport, was appointed assistant censor at New Carlisle to act in respect to political addresses broadcast during the Quebec electoral campaign.

In addition to his transportation cost, a per diem allowance at the rate of $10.00 was approved.

October 6: Directives were issued to all stations in reference to weather forecasts pointing out that exception has been made to the ruling already given in that it would be permissible for stations to reinstate the broadcast of local temperature readings. The permission, however, not to be interpreted to mean that stations are permitted to carry forecasts of temperature local or otherwise. (Circular C-8)

Dr. C. H. Houde, Manager of station CHNC, New Carlisle, was appointed, by the Supervisor of Station Relations of the CBC, to act as liaison between the political parties and the assistant censor at New Carlisle.

October 7: Mr. J. E. Gaboury, K.C., Departmental Solicitor, National Revenue, was appointed assistant censor to replace Mr. Jacques Fortier at New Carlisle.

The same rate of expenditures as granted Mr. Jacques Fortier was approved, i.e. transportation cost plus a per diem allowance of $10.00.

October 9: Directives were issued to all stations in the province of Quebec as also to stations CKCO and CBO, Ottawa, outlining the procedure to be followed in respect to the verification of texts submitted for political broadcasting, and at the same time instructing the station managers that any departure from the procedure adopted should result in the immediate discontinuance of the broadcast. (Circular C-9)

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October 9: Mr. Jacques Fortier relinquished his duties as assistant censor at New Carlisle.

October 10: A second meeting of the Censorship Co-ordination Committee was held under the chairmanship of Mr. W. S. Thompson, mainly for the purpose of discussing generally problems relative to the various divisions with a view of securing better co-ordination.

Directives were issued to all stations guarding against the possibility of continuity and announcements being used as code messages. (Circular C-11)

Directives were issued to all stations calling their special attention to Regulation 39 of the Defence of Canada Regulations. (Circular C-10)

Directives were issued to all stations clarifying the instructions already given in respect to the submission to the Censorship Committee of copies of news included in newscasts. (Circular C-12)

October 12: Directives were issued to all stations in the province of Quebec outlining the announcement to be made in the case it became necessary to discontinue broadcasting of any political addresses in accordance with directives issued on October 9. (Circular C-13)

A complaint was received that station CBF, Montreal, infringed on the directives issued in respect to the censorship of political broadcasts.

October 13: Action was taken in respect to infringement of directives by station CBF, Montreal.

Directions were issued to all stations with regards to the procedure applicable to talks, and advising that the detailed examination of scripts rests with the Station Manager. (Circular C-14)

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October 13: The Minister of Transport authorized budgetary expenditures totalling $15,000 for expenses related to radio broadcasting censorship for the period covering September 3, 1939 to March 31, 1940, the disbursements to be paid and accounted for by the CBC.

Mr. René de la Durantaye, Barrister, Department of the Secretary of State, was appointed assistant censor at Rimouski to act in respect of the political addresses broadcast during the Quebec electoral campaign.

Apart from transportation costs, a per diem allowance at the rate of $10.00 was approved.

Mr. J. A. Lavoie, Manager of station CJBR, Rimouski, was appointed, by the Supervisor of Station Relations of the CBC, to act as liaison between the political parties and the assistant censor at Rimouski.

October 17: Directives were issued to all stations in the province of Quebec advising that no commentary, statement or other reference should be made, either at the beginning or conclusion of political broadcasts, to the fact that texts of political addresses have been subject to the examination of censorship authorities. (Circular C-15)

Directives were issued to all stations advising that no mention may be made in the press or over the radio of actual movements of troops in Canada and further that no speculative or conjectural mention may be made regarding the probable movements of troops within Canada or from Canada. It was pointed out that this prohibition also applies to the sending of such information to the press and radio organizations outside of Canada. (Circular C-16)

Directives were issued to all stations to the effect that reported attempts at sabotage should not be used without specific authority from the press censors. (Circular C-17)

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October 19: Directives were issued to all stations in the province of Quebec to the effect that the text of political newscasts must be submitted in advance to the assistant censors previous to broadcast permission being granted. (Circular C-18)

A complaint was received to the effect that station CKCV infringed on directives issued in respect to political broadcasts by not submitting political newscasts for examination by the censor. Action was taken the same day to ensure that directives issued be followed.

October 20: Directives were issued to all stations to the effect that speculative or conjectural items relative to probable appointments in personnel of the Department of National Defence were prohibited. (Circular C-19)

October 21: Directives were issued to all Canadian stations advising that as of October 23rd it will not be necessary to submit to the Censorship authorities copies of news supplied to them by recognized agencies which include Canadian Press, Trans-Radio Press Service, British United Press and the Christian Science Monitor. It was pointed out that news obtained from all other sources should continue to be submitted. (Circular C-20)

October 23: The assistant censors at Montreal, Quebec, Rimouski and New Carlisle were withdrawn.

October 25: The managers of all broadcasting stations in the province of Quebec were charged with the responsibility of applying censorship to political broadcasts.

October 27: Directives were issued to stations CHSJ, CFNB, CKCW, N.B., and CHNC, New Carlisle, P.Q. advising that submission of texts of political addresses to the Censorship Committee would not be necessary in the future and that station managers were charged with full responsibility to examine these and ensure that nothing likely to contravene either the Defence of Canada or the broadcasting regulations might be broadcast. (Circular C-21)

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October 28: Application was made to the Minister of Transport, through the Civil Service Commission, for the appointment of Miss D. Christianson, Winnipeg, as a Clerk Grade 2.

October 30: Directives were issued to all stations outlining the new procedure to be followed in reference to political broadcasts. (Circular C-22)

Directives were issued to all stations advising that it is permissible to mention the transfer of a military unit after completion of the movement provided that such movement is not made to a seaport or a location near a seaport which might suggest assembly preparatory to transfer overseas. (Circular C-23)

Directives were issued to all stations in respect to general directions applying to political broadcasting. (Circular C-24)

October 31: Report of Censorship Activities Related to Political Addresses Broadcast during the Quebec Electoral Campaign between September 25th to October 25th, 1939, submitted to the Director of Censorship.

November 2: In reference to the financial procedure related to expenditures connected with censorship, I explained to the General Manager of the CBC that I have had a long discussion with the Director of Censorship in respect to the procedure to be adopted, and that Mr. Thompson is definitely of the opinion that the control of expenditures relating to the broadcasting division of the Censorship Co-ordination Committee should be under my direct supervision as Chief Broadcasting Censor. It was pointed out that all expenditures related to censorship were being accounted for within each department concerned. Mr. Thompson felt that expenditures involved in respect to the censorship of broadcasting were directly relevant of the Minister of Transport and since the Minister had already signified his approval of the budget for the present fiscal year and had already outlined the method of accounting to be kept, he felt the responsibility for the approval and the payment of all such expenditures rested on myself as broadcasting censor.

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November 2: I explained that Mr. Thompson thought he should not derogate from the procedure adopted by all other departments, and as he is not called upon to authorize requisitions and vouchers by those departments, he feels he should not be called upon to make an exception for those expenditures which are particularly related to the censorship of broadcasting.

November 3: The approval of the General Manager of the CBC was requested for the appointment of an assistant censor to be selected from the staff of the CBC.

November 7: The General Manager of the CBC advised that in respect to the financial procedure to be followed concerning the payment of expenditures attributable to the censorship of radio broadcasting, the procedure was originally laid down by the Minister and that he would explain the new difficulties at the earliest opportunity.

November 8: Advice was received from the General Manager of the CBC that the Minister of Transport confirmed the view that the appointment of an assistant censor, if made, should not be from the staff of the CBC. It was further pointed out that while recognizing that the work of broadcasting censorship must be burdensome at times, the Minister still hopes that I should be able to get along without this new appointment. Mr. Murray stated that if, however, it was literally impossible for the work to go forward satisfactorily without an intermediate assistant, a very strong case for the appointment will have to be made and, if approved, will be from outside the staff of the CBC.

The General Manager of the CBC advised that in respect to the financial procedure the Minister confirms the view expressed in Mr. Murray's letter of November 7th. The Minister wishes the existing arrangement to stand, pointing out that he himself has undertaken no detailed responsibility in the matter.

November 9: Directives were issued to all stations cautioning them against the mention of reported presence of British cruisers at South American ports or in South American waters. (Circular C-25)

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November 10: Directives were issued to all stations advising that no mention, factual or conjectural may be made with respect to gold movements either into Canada or out of Canada or within Canada. (Circular C-26)

November 14: Directives were issued to all stations advising against the use of any items coming from United States ports referring to British ships as U-Bait and describing new methods of camouflage. (Circular C-27)

Directives were issued to all stations advising that no mention, factual or speculative, is permitted of the probable time of departure from Canada or the probable time of arrival overseas of any naval, military, or air forces, even if such information is contained in dispatches emanating by wire, mail or radio, from British Islands or the continents of Europe and has been passed by censors overseas. (Circular C-28)

November 17: Directives were issued to all stations that no mention may be made of the presence of British warships in United States Pacific waters. (Circular C-29)

November 18: Directives were issued to all stations advising that the greatest care should be exercised in dealing with letters from soldiers at home or abroad and submitted for broadcasting. (Circular C-30)

November 20: Directives were issued to all stations reminding them that no mention or any kind is permitted of the movement of armed forces from one point to another point in Canada or to any point abroad. (Circular C-31)

November 22: Directives were issued to all stations outlining that no references may be made until further notice of movements or conjectured movements or to incidents or supposed incidents affecting any of His Majesty's ships until after official release by the Minister of Information in Great Britain. (Circular C-32)

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November 23: Directives were issued to all stations advising that no mention is to be made of the flight of pilots westward from Trenton to pick up United States planes. (Circular C-33)

November 28: Directives were issued to all stations advising that there will be lessening of the restrictions relating to the publication of weather forecasts particularly on the sea coastal areas of Canada. This easing of the regulations, which will come into effect on December 1, 1939, applies only to printed publication. It was pointed out, therefore, that there is no lessening of the regulations now in force respecting radio broadcasting of weather information. (Circular C-34)

All radio stations in the City of Montreal were warned to exercise extreme caution in connection with any proposed broadcasts by Paul Bouchard, Barrister, who is a candidate in the St. James by-election being held on December 18. This was done because of utterances made by this individual at a recent meeting held in Montreal and which were considered to be highly seditious.

Miss D. Christianson, Winnipeg, Manitoba, was appointed as Clerk Grade 2, under the provisions of Order in Council P.C. 77/3854, dated November 28.

Radio Broadcasting Censor

November 30, 1939.

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C 272464

CIRCULAR LETTERS OF DIRECTIVES

ISSUED BETWEEN

SEPTEMBER 1 - NOVEMBER 30, 1939.

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CONFIDENTIAL - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

To Newspapers, News Association, Special Correspondents, Radio Stations:

In order to assist in the defence of Canada and the efficient prosecution of the war, requests will be made upon you from time to time to refrain from publishing certain information. I think it advisable, however, to indicate to you as quickly as possible, that no information should be published at the present time with respect to the following:

1. The transport or storage of war materials.
2. The sailing or arrival of sea-going vessels.
3. Action taken by the R.C.M.P. in connection with certain German nationals.
4. Movement of the armed forces and supposed plans for the utilization of such forces.
5. Any works or measures connected with the defence and fortification of any place.

There should not be published,

a. any report or statement likely to prejudice the recruiting, training or discipline of the forces.

b. any photographs which might be directly or indirectly useful to the enemy as indicating the nature of Canada's defence plans.

(Signed) W. S. Thompson

Censorship Co-ordination Committee.

Ottawa, Sept. 5.

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C 272466

D O

Confidential CIRCULAR C.

THE FOLLOWING TELEGRAPHIC MESSAGE WAS SENT FROM TORONTO ON SEPTEMBER 1ST, 1939, TO ALL CANADIAN PRIVATELY-OWNED STATIONS:

" A PROCLAMATION HAS BEEN ISSUED UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THE GOVERNOR-IN-COUNCIL IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE WAR MEASURES ACT STOP UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE ALL STATIONS ARE REQUIRED TO SUPPLY TO THE STATION RELATIONS DEPARTMENT TORONTO IN ADVANCE OF BROADCAST FULL PARTICULARS AS TO ALL TALKS SCHEDULES INCLUDING THE TITLE AND NATURE OF THE TALK AND SPEAKER IN EACH INSTANCE STOP IT IS REQUESTED THAT STATIONS SUBMIT INFORMATION AS FAR AS POSSIBLE IN ADVANCE TO PERMIT OF CONSIDERATION UNDER REQUIREMENTS OF THE AUTHORITIES STOP PLEASE DO NOT BROADCAST ANY TALK BEFORE RECEIPT OF REPLY FROM THIS DEPARTMENT STOP IT WILL BE UNDERSTOOD THAT THIS PROCEDURE DOES NOT NECESSARILY INVOLVE THE SUBMISSION OR EXAMINATION OF MANUSCRIPTS IN ADVANCE STOP IT IS LAID DOWN IN THE HOPE THAT IT MAY AVOID SITUATIONS WHICH MIGHT MAKE NECESSARY THE IMPOSITION OF DETAILED CENSORSHIP STOP PROCEDURE WILL NOT OF COURSE RELIEVE STATIONS OF THEIR RESPONSIBILITY UNDER THE BROADCASTING REGULATIONS."

(Sgd.) "H. N. STOVIN"

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C 272467

Confidential CIRCULAR C-1

THE FOLLOWING DIRECTION WAS SENT FROM TORONTO ON SEPTEMBER 6th, 1939, BY THE CANADIAN ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS TO ALL PRIVATELY-OWNED RADIO STATIONS:

" - CONFIDENTIAL - NOT FOR PUBLICATION -

TO: NEWSPAPERS, NEWS ASSOCIATIONS, SPECIAL CORRESPONDENTS, AND RADIO STATIONS

In order to assist in the defence of Canada and the efficient prosecution of the war, requests will be made upon you from time to time to refrain from publishing certain information. I think it advisable, however, to indicate to you, as quickly as possible, that no information should be published at the present time with respect to the following:

1. The transport or storage of war materials.

2. The sailing or arrival of sea going vessels.

3. Action taken by the R.C.M.P. in connection with certain German nationals.

4. Movement of the armed forces and supposed plans for the utilization of such forces.

5. Any works or measures in connection with the defence and fortification of any place.

There should not be published:

(a) Any report or statement likely to prejudice the recruiting, training or discipline of the forces.

(b) Any photographs which might be directly or indirectly useful to the enemy as indicating the nature of Canada's defence plans. "

Note: The above direction was also conveyed to all other Canadian stations.

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CIRCULAR C-2.

THE FOLLOWING TELEGRAPHIC MESSAGE WAS SENT FROM TORONTO ON SEPTEMBER 9TH, 1939, TO ALL CANADIAN PRIVATELY-OWNED STATIONS:

" FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS HAVE BEEN RECEIVED FROM THE CENSORSHIP CO-ORDINATION COMMITTEE 'NOT FOR PUBLICATION' STOP YOU WERE ASKED NOT TO CARRY NEWS REGARDING ARRIVAL OR SAILING OF OCEAN GOING VESSELS STOP THIS WILL NOT APPLY TO S.S. FLINT CITY BRINGING ATHENIA SURVIVORS TO HALIFAX THIS WEEKEND"

(Sgd.) "H. N. STOVIN"

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CO

CANADIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION

272469

IN REPLY REFER TO FILE No.....

341 Church Street,
Toronto, September 13, 1939.

Circular Letter No. C 3.

To All Broadcasting Stations:

I refer you to my telegram of September 1st in which I advised that until further notice all Canadian radio stations are required to furnish the Station Relations Department with details of all talks stations may wish to schedule. As I intimated in my foregoing communication this procedure has been adopted in the hope that it will avoid the necessity for detailed censorship. In an endeavour to realize this hope I feel sure that I can count on your fullest co-operation. I hope that my following remarks may be of assistance to you in clarifying the procedure applicable in this regard. For purposes of greater clarity I shall deal with each question in a separate numbered paragraph:

1. DEFINITION OF "TALKS". The word "talks" is widely interpreted and is deemed to include all spoken word broadcasts, except the following:

(a) Commercial radio continuity,
(b) Short announcements connecting musical programmes,
(c) Drama which does not deal directly or indirectly with the subjects of war or international affairs, minority or racial problems.

2. FOREIGN LANGUAGE BROADCASTS. Spoken word broadcasts in Canada in languages other than French and English are prohibited until further notice.

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C 272470

3. TALKS APPLICATION PROCEDURE. I would request you to carefully observe the following points in making application to carry talks over your station:

(a) In order to insure satisfactory clearance, applications should be submitted as far in advance of desired date of broadcast as possible, and should be forwarded weekly.

(b) Applications should include full and precise details. These details should include not only the name of the speaker, the title, time and date of broadcast, but also the nature and a brief resumé of the talk, and the auspices under which it is to be given. Where the station is in doubt as to the acceptability of the talk, it would expedite procedure to include with the application copies, in duplicate, of the script of the proposed broadcast. I do not think I need to point out that it is particularly necessary to scrutinize talks dealing with war, international affairs, domestic politics, racial and minority problems. I would suggest that in talks on these subjects full particulars are especially necessary in order to obviate reference back to the station concerned for more complete details.

4. RECRUITING TALKS, APPEALS, SPOT ANNOUNCEMENTS: Your station will, no doubt, receive requests from officers and various military units for permission to use your facilities for recruiting purposes. In such cases I would request you to advise that application for use of such facilities should be made by officer or unit concerned directly to the Acting Deputy Minister of National Defence, Department of National Defence, Ottawa. The aforementioned Department will inform the Corporation of the decision reached, who will in turn advise you. Requests by organizations and individuals, not under the direct auspices of the militia or military forces for time on your station either for recruiting or other

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patriotic purposes should be referred prior to broadcast to the Station Relations Department.

I would point out that this reference requirement will be a form of protection for your station and will insure that the medium of radio will be used only where the element of urgency or the importance of the request justifies the granting of broadcasting facilities. The alternative would not only result in serious disruption of essential programme schedules, but would also seriously detract from the effectiveness of radio appeals.

5. PROGRAMME LOGS. All broadcasting stations in Canada will file a true copy of their programme logs with the Station Relations Department, 341 Church St., Toronto, Ont. The programme logs should be mailed not later than seven days following the operations they record.

6. CONFIDENTIAL INSTRUCTIONS. From time to time the Station Relations Department will receive directions and instructions from the Censorship Co-ordination Committee for transmission to all broadcasting stations in Canada. Usually such instructions will be marked "CONFIDENTIAL NOT FOR PUBLICATION". In no case where a station is requested to follow certain directions is the station to broadcast or to indicate in any way that action, restraint, or restrictions are being taken because of instruction or direction.

7. CANADIAN BROADCASTING REGULATIONS. I feel I should caution you once again that the procedure applicable in connection with the submission of talks does not relieve stations of their liability under the above-mentioned regulations.

Your early acknowledgement and understanding of this letter is requested and, in conclusion, may I once again request your close co-operation. I feel you will agree that only through the co-operation of all concerned can radio in Canada hope to adequately meet the demands of the present critical situation.

Yours faithfully,

H.N.Stovin
Supervisor of Station Relations.

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Confidential CIRCULAR C-4

THE FOLLOWING TELEGRAPHIC MESSAGE WAS SENT FROM TORONTO ON SEPTEMBER 21ST, 1939, TO ALL CANADIAN STATIONS EXCEPT THE FOLLOWING: CHCK CFCF CKAC CBM CBF CBL CBY CFRB CFRX CKLW CKIC.

" EFFECTIVE THIS DATE PLEASE MAIL DAILY TRUE COPIES OF ALL NEWS RELEASED BY YOUR STATION ADDRESSING IT TO THE SECRETARY CENSORSHIP COORDINATION COMMITTEE VICTORIA BUILDING ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY WELLINGTON STREET OTTAWA STOP PLEASE ACKNOWLEDGE INSTRUCTION BY MAIL."

(Sgd.) "H. N. STOVIN"

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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CANADIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION C272473

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IN REPLY REFER TO FILE NO.....

Ottawa, Ontario.
September 25th, 1939.

CIRCULAR LETTER NO. C-5.

To all Canadian Broadcasting Stations:

During the period of war emergency political broadcasts must be confined to studio broadcasting. No station is permitted to carry any political address made at a public meeting.

The text of all proposed studio broadcasts of a political nature must be forwarded in duplicate well in advance to the Supervisor of Station Relations, and no broadcasts must be proceeded with until permission has been received by the station from this Department.

These decisions were taken by the Censorship authorities and communicated to me on Friday morning, September 22nd. It was felt that the radio station managements have no satisfactory means of controlling statements contravening the Defence of Canada Regulations when broadcasts are picked up from public platforms.

It is to be understood that the permission to broadcast political speeches from a studio does not relieve the management of the broadcasting station of its responsibility under the Broadcasting Act, the Broadcasting Regulations made thereunder, or the Defence of Canada Regulations.

Kindly acknowledge that these instructions are thoroughly understood.

Yours faithfully,

(H. N. Stovin)
Supervisor of Station Relations

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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C 272474

Confidential

CIRCULAR C-6

THE FOLLOWING TELEGRAPHIC MESSAGE WAS SENT FROM TORONTO ON OCTOBER 1st, 1939, TO ALL CANADIAN STATIONS:

" CONFIDENTIAL C-6 NOT FOR PUBLICATION IT IS THE DESIRE OF THOSE CONCERNED WITH ALIEN INTERNMENT THAT NO FURTHER INFORMATION BE PUBLISHED OR BROADCAST AT PRESENT REGARDING THE DETENTION OF INDIVIDUALS THE LOCATION OR ACTIVITIES OF INTERNMENT CAMPS THE NUMBERS OF ALIENS INTERNED ETC EFFECTIVE NOON TODAY STOP PLEASE ACKNOWLEDGE YOUR UNDERSTANDING BY MAIL."

(Sgd.) "H. N. STOVIN"

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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CANADIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION C 272475

341 Church Street,
Toronto, Ontario.
October 5th, 1939.

CONFIDENTIAL

Circular Letter No. C 7

To All Broadcasting Stations:

MENTION OF PRICE

I have been directed to advise you that, until further notice, it will not be permissible for stations to carry commercial radio continuity or other spoken word references exhorting the public directly or indirectly to make purchases in anticipation of a rise in the price or prices of goods or merchandise.

I think you will appreciate that the effect of such intimations is to cause persons to make abnormal purchases. In such fashion, a serious depletion may be occassioned in the stock of the product mentioned on the air. Accordingly, I would request you to delete from radio continuities all exhortations to buy in expectation of increased prices and all statements forecasting an advance in such prices which might have this effect.

Please be good enough to let me have an acknowledgement indicating your understanding of the contents of this communication.

Yours faithfully,

'Sgd' H.N. Stovin,
Supervisor of Station Relations.

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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C272476

CANADIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION

IN REPLY REFER TO FILE NO.....

341 Church Street,
Toronto, Ontario.
October 6th, 1939.

Circular Letter No. C 8

Dear Sir:

I refer you to my telegram, dated September 20, in which I requested you to discontinue the broadcasting of all sponsored or sustaining weather forecasts or weather information.

I am now directed to advise you that an exception has been made to this ruling, and that it will be permissible for stations to reinstate the broadcast of local temperature readings. This permission should not be interpreted to mean, however, that stations are now at liberty to carry forecasts of temperature, local or otherwise.

I would appreciate an acknowledgement of this communication.

Yours faithfully,

H. N. Stovin
Supervisor of Station Relations

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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CIRCULAR C 9

THE FOLLOWING TELEGRAPHIC MESSAGE WAS SENT FROM TORONTO ON OCTOBER 9TH, 1939, TO THE FOLLOWING CANADIAN STATIONS: CHNC CJBR CBJ CHGB CHRC CKCV CBV CHLN CHLT CFCF & CFCX CHLP CKAC CBM & CBF CKRN CKCH CKCO CBO,

"CIRCULAR NUMBER C 9 NOT FOR PUBLICATION OR BROADCASTING STOP WITH RESPECT TO POLITICAL BROADCASTING I AM TODAY DIRECTED TO INFORM YOU OF THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS STOP ITEM ONE BEFORE ANY TALK OF A POLITICAL NATURE MAY BE BROADCAST YOU WILL OBTAIN FROM THE SPEAKER A COPY OF HIS TEXT AND COMPARE IT WITH THE OFFICIAL TEXT IN YOUR POSSESSION AS PASSED BY THE CENSORSHIP AUTHORITIES AND WHICH TEXTS IN BOTH CASES SHOULD BEAR THE STAMP OF THE CENSORSHIP AUTHORITIES STOP ITEM TWO IN THE CASE OR CASES WHERE THE OFFICIAL TEXT MAY HAVE BEEN MODIFIED BY THE SPEAKER PERMISSION TO BROADCAST IS WITHDRAWN STOP ITEM THREE THE SPEAKER SHOULD BE NOTIFIED IN ADVANCE THAT HE MUST STRICTLY ADHERE TO THE OFFICIAL TEXT AND THAT ANY ATTEMPT TO DEPART THEREFROM OR TO MAKE USE OF ANOTHER TEXT WILL RESULT IN THE IMMEDIATE DISCONTINUANCE OF THE BROADCAST AND SHOULD SUCH CASE ARISE YOU ARE INSTRUCTED TO DISCONTINUE THE BROADCAST IN ITS ENTIRETY STOP PLEASE ACKNOWLEDGE BY TELEGRAPH RECEIPT AND UNDERSTANDING OF THESE INSTRUCTIONS."

(Sgd.) "H. N. STOVIN"

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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CANADIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION

IN REPLY REFER TO FILE NO.....

341 Church Street,
Toronto, Ontario.
October 10, 1939.

CONFIDENTIAL

Circular Letter No. C 10

To All Broadcasting Stations:

I have been directed to bring to your special attention Defence of Canada Regulation Number 39.

This Regulation stipulates in part that "no person shall by word of mouth spread reports or make statements, false or otherwise, intended or likely to ..... prejudice His Majesty's relations with foreign Powers."

In view of this provision Canadian stations are under a responsibility to guard against any such references (either in the form of news or otherwise) being made to any foreign power which in the present conflict is not officially recognized as an enemy of His Majesty's Government.

I would appreciate an acknowledgement of this communication.

Yours faithfully,

H. N. Stovin
Supervisor of Station Relations

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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C 272479

CANADIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION

IN REPLY REFER TO FILE NO.....

341 Church Street,
Toronto, Ontario.
October 10, 1939.

CONFIDENTIAL

Circular Letter No. C 11

To All Broadcasting Stations:

RE: CODE MESSAGES

I have been directed by the Censorship authorities to draw to your attention the possibility of continuity or announcements being used as code messages. I would caution that in this fashion there could be relayed information likely to prejudice the defence of Canada or the efficient prosecution of the war.

Accordingly, I would suggest that you examine all continuity and announcements in order to prevent any such occurence. As a precautionary measure some stations have reserved and employed the right to revise any or all sponsored continuity or announcements.

In the event you should have reasonable doubt as to the purpose of any such announcements or continuity or the integrity of any sponsor an immediate report from you should be made.

An acknowledgement of this communication would be much appreciated.

Yours faithfully,

H. N. Stovin
Supervisor of Station Relations

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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C 272480

CANADIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION

IN REPLY REFER TO FILE NO.....

341 Church Street,
Toronto, Ontario,
October 10, 1939.

CONFIDENTIAL, NOT FOR PUBLICATION

OR BROADCASTING

Circular Letter No. C 12

To All Broadcasting Stations:

I refer you to our Circular C-4, dated September 21st, which read as follows:

"EFFECTIVE THIS DATE PLEASE MAIL DAILY TRUE COPIES OF ALL NEWS RELEASED BY YOUR STATION ADDRESSING IT TO THE SECRETARY CENSORSHIP COORDINATION COMMITTEE VICTORIA BUILDING ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY WELLINGTON STREET OTTAWA STOP PLEASE ACKNOWLEDGE INSTRUCTION BY MAIL."

It has come to our attention that some broadcasting stations are sending "true copies" of all news received in their respective offices or studios. Please note the above instruction directs, "true copies of all news released by your station."

The word "released" refers to the news which you broadcast or may in other manner distribute to the public.

We would ask you, therefore, to confine your submissions to the Secretary of the Censorship Co-ordination Committee, Victoria Building, 140 Wellington Street, Ottawa, Ont., to true copies of news material actually broadcast or distributed in other manner to the public.

Confirmation of your understanding is desired for our records.

Yours faithfully,

H. N. Stovin
Supervisor of Station Relations.

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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C 272481

Confidential

CIRCULAR C 13

THE FOLLOWING TELEGRAPHIC MESSAGE WAS SENT FROM TORONTO ON OCTOBER 12TH, 1939, TO THE FOLLOWING CANADIAN STATIONS:

CHNC CJBR CBJ CHGB CHRC CKCV CBV CHLN CHLT CFCF & CFCX CHLP CKAC CBM & CBF CKRN CKCH,

"PURSUANT TO DIRECTIVES IN RESPECT TO CENSORSHIP AND PARTICULARLY MY TELEGRAPHED CIRCULAR C 9 SHOULD IT BE NECESSARY FOR YOU TO DISCONTINUE BROADCASTING OF ANY POLITICAL TALK HERE FOLLOWS TEXT IN ENGLISH AND FRENCH THE APPROPRIATE ONE OF WHICH SHOULD BE BROADCAST IN EXPLANATION OF SUCH DISCONTINUANCE

"ENGLISH QUOTE WE REGRET TO INFORM YOU THAT WE HAVE BEEN OBLIGED TO DISCONTINUE THE ADDRESS OF MR X BY VIRTUE OF THE DEFENCE OF CANADA REGULATIONS AND THE DIRECTIVES ISSUED THEREUNDER UNQUOTE

"FRENCH QUOTE NOUS REGRETTONS DE VOUS INFORMER QUE NOUS AVONS ÉTÉ FORCÉS DE DISCONTINUER LA CAUSERIE DE MONSIEUR X EN VERTU DES REGLEMENTS CONCERNANT LA DÉFENSE DU CANADA ET DES DIRECTIVES S'Y RAPPORTANT UNQUOTE

"PLEASE ACKNOWLEDGE BY RETURN WIRE

H. N. STOVIN
SUPERVISOR OF STATION RELATIONS"

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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CANADIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION

IN REPLY REFER TO FILE NO.....

341 Church Street,
Toronto, Ontario.
October 13, 1939.

CONFIDENTIAL

CIRCULAR LETTER NO. C-14

TO ALL BROADCASTING STATIONS

Talks Application Procedure

I refer you to the procedure applicable to talks, detailed in my telegram to you of September 1st, and my circular letter No. C-3 of September 13th.

As you are aware, this procedure was adopted in the hope that it might avoid the necessity for detailed radio censorship. In this time of national emergency it is, of course, essential that no material be broadcast which might affect prejudiciously the efficient prosecution of the war, or would be of a nature that might contravene the Defence of Canada Regulations At the same time it is the desire of the Censorship Co-ordination Committee and all concerned that the ordinary avocations of life should be interfered with as little as possible, and that all liberties and rights, consistent with our national safety, be scrupulously respected and preserved.

I think I should stress at this time that the procedure applicable to talks was not, and is not, intended to reduce more than is absolutely necessary the subject matter of broadcast talks. For the impression to be created that the subjects permissible for radio broadcasting had been seriously reduced, would be both unwarranted and undesirable. Where stations have wished to schedule talks on non-controversial subjects - travelogues, sports talks, household hints broadcasts and so forth, the procedure has been to authorize, where possible, such talks in terms of a series.

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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Where it has been desired to give talks dealing directly or indirectly with the war, international affairs, domestic politics, racial or minority problems, however, it has been necessary to make each broadcast the subject of a separate application. This precaution should not be interpreted to mean that talks on these subjects are prohibited or even discouraged. Such an interpretation would be totally inconsistent with the desire of the authorities concerned to maintain as far as possible, even in a time of war, normal broadcasting services. In fact, I think you will agree that objective and non-vituperative discussion of these matters is in the general interest, and should be encouraged. The talks application procedure should be regarded, not as a restriction on radio speech, but rather as a safeguard to ensure as far as possible that no material broadcast is in contravention of the foregoing Defence of Canada Regulations.

The Corporation does not, and cannot assume, the duty of detailed censorship. The responsibility for detailed examination of scripts rests with the station concerned. The fact that permission is given for the broadcast of any given talk or talks does not exempt stations from this liability. This statement applies to all talks. Further, subject to such directions as stations receive, needless to say, they are at liberty to formulate and apply such policies of their own as, in their opinion, are necessary for the efficient acquittal of the responsibilities reposed in them.

Should you desire clarification on any point raised in this letter, please do not hesitate to let me know. I should also appreciate an acknowledgement confirming your understanding of its contents.

Yours faithfully,

H. N. Stovin
Supervisor of Station Relations

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
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CIRCULAR C-15

THE FOLLOWING TELEGRAPHIC MESSAGE WAS SENT FROM TORONTO ON OCTOBER 17, 1939, TO THE FOLLOWING STATIONS: CHNC CJBR CBJ CHGB CHRC CKCV CBV CHLN CHLT CFCF CFCX CHLP CKAC CBM CBF CKRN CKCH.

" CONFIDENTIAL C-15 I HAVE BEEN DIRECTED TO ADVISE YOU THAT EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY NO COMMENTARY STATEMENT OR OTHER REFERENCE SHALL BE MADE EITHER AT THE BEGINNING OR CONCLUSION OF POLITICAL BROADCASTS TO THE FACT THAT THE TEXT OF POLITICAL ADDRESS HAS BEEN SUBJECT TO EXAMINATION BY CENSORSHIP AUTHORITIES STOP THE ONLY PERMISSIBLE STATEMENT IS THAT SIMILAR FACILITIES ARE AVAILABLE UNDER THE SAME CONDITIONS FOR EXPRESSION OF OPPOSING VIEWS STOP PLEASE CONFIRM UNDERSTANDING BY WIRE "

(Sgd.) "H. N. Stovin"

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
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CIRCULAR C-16

THE FOLLOWING TELEGRAPHIC MESSAGE WAS SENT FROM TORONTO ON OCTOBER 17, 1939, TO ALL CANADIAN PRIVATELY-OWNED STATIONS:

" CONFIDENTIAL C-16 NOT FOR PUBLICATION FOLLOWING DIRECTION HAS BEEN RECEIVED FROM THE CENSORSHIP COMMITTEE STOP NO MENTION MAY BE MADE IN THE PRESS OR OVER THE RADIO OF ACTUAL MOVEMENTS OF TROOPS IN CANADA STOP NO SPECULATIVE OR CONJECTURAL MENTION MAY BE MADE IN THE PRESS OR OVER THE RADIO REGARDING THE PROBABLE MOVEMENT OF TROOPS WITHIN CANADA OR FROM CANADA STOP THE PROHIBITION ALSO APPLIES TO THE SENDING OF SUCH INFORMATION TO PRESS AND RADIO ORGANIZATIONS OUTSIDE OF CANADA STOP AT A CONFERENCE IN OTTAWA YESTERDAY CALLED BY THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE AND ATTENDED BY THE MINISTER AND HIS DEPUTIES AND REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PRESS AND THE CENSORSHIP AUTHORITY IT WAS AGREED THAT THERE IS AN IMPERATIVE NEED OF THESE REGULATIONS BEING CLOSELY OBSERVED STOP ANY EXCEPTIONS WILL BE EXPRESSLY AUTHORIZED BY THE CENSORS STOP APPLICATION FOR SUCH MUST BE MADE THROUGH STATION RELATIONS DEPARTMENT STOP PLEASE ACKNOWLEDGE UNDERSTANDING BY MAIL "

(Sgd.) "H. N. STOVIN"

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
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C 272486

Confidential

CIRCULAR C-17

THE FOLLOWING TELEGRAPHIC MESSAGE WAS SENT FROM TORONTO ON OCTOBER 18, 1939, TO ALL CANADIAN PRIVATELY-OWNED STATIONS:

"CONFIDENTIAL C-17 NOT FOR PUBLICATION I HAVE BEEN DIRECTED BY CENSORSHIP AUTHORITIES TO NOTIFY YOU AS FOLLOWS QUOTE REPORTS ARE CURRENT IN CERTAIN CENTRES OF REPORTED ATTEMPTS AT SABOTAGE STOP THESE SHOULD NOT BE USED WITHOUT SPECIFIC AUTHORITY FROM THE PRESS CENSORS UNQUOTE PLEASE ACKNOWLEDGE YOUR UNDERSTANDING BY MAIL"

(Sgd.) "H. N. STOVIN"

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
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CIRCULAR C-18

THE FOLLOWING TELEGRAPHIC MESSAGE WAS SENT FROM TORONTO ON OCTOBER 19, 1939, TO THE FOLLOWING STATIONS: CHNC CJBR CBJ CHGB CHRC CKCV CBV CHLN CHLT CFCF CFCX CHLP CKAC CBM CBF CKRN CKCH.

" CONFIDENTIAL C-18 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WE ARE ADVISED THAT CERTAIN QUEBEC STATIONS ARE BROADCASTING NEWSCASTS OF POLITICAL ACTIVITIES WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN PASSED BY CENSORS PREVIOUS TO BROADCASTING STOP IT HAS BEEN RULED SUCH NEWSCASTS CONSTITUTE IN FACT POLITICAL BROADCASTS THEREFORE TEXT MUST BE SUBMITTED IN ADVANCE TO CENSORS STOP UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES MUST SUCH NEWS BE BROADCAST WITHOUT HAVING FIRST BEEN PASSED STOP PLEASE ACKNOWLEDGE UNDERSTANDING BY WIRE "

(Sgd.) "H. N. STOVIN"

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
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Confidential CIRCULAR C-19

THE FOLLOWING TELEGRAPHIC MESSAGE WAS SENT FROM TORONTO ON OCTOBER 20, 1939, TO ALL CANADIAN PRIVATELY-OWNED STATIONS:

" CONFIDENTIAL C-19 NOT FOR PUBLICATION FURTHER TO OUR CONFIDENTIAL C SIXTEEN SPECULATIVE OR CONJECTURAL ITEMS RELATIVE TO PROBABLE APPOINTMENTS IN PERSONNEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE WERE ALSO PROHIBITED BY AGREEMENT MADE AT THE MEETING HELD IN OTTAWA STOP PLEASE ACKNOWLEDGE UNDERSTANDING BY MAIL "

(Sgd.) "H. N. STOVIN"

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
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CIRCULAR C-20

THE FOLLOWING TELEGRAPHIC MESSAGE WAS SENT FROM TORONTO ON OCTOBER 21, 1939, TO ALL CANADIAN PRIVATELY-OWNED STATIONS:

"CONFIDENTIAL C-20 NOT FOR PUBLICATION PLEASE BE ADVISED OF THE FOLLOWING REVISION EFFECTIVE AS OF OCTOBER 23 OF DIRECTION CONTAINED IN CIRCULAR C 4 IT WILL NOT BE NECESSARY FOR STATIONS TO SUBMIT TO CENSORSHIP AUTHORITIES NEWS SUPPLIED BY RECOGNIZED AGENCIES WHICH INCLUDE CANADIAN PRESS TRANSRADIO BRITISH UNITED PRESS AND THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR STOP NEWS OBTAINED FROM ALL OTHER SOURCES SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE SUBMITTED AS PREVIOUSLY ADVISED STOP PLEASE ACKNOWLEDGE UNDERSTANDING BY MAIL

(SGD.) "H. N. STOVIN"

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C 272490

Confidential

CIRCULAR C-21

THE FOLLOWING TELEGRAPHIC MESSAGE WAS SENT FROM TORONTO ON OCTOBER 27, 1939, TO THE FOLLOWING STATIONS: CHSJ CFNB CKCW CHNC.

" CONFIDENTIAL CIRCULAR NO. C-21 NOT FOR PUBLICATION OR BROADCASTING STOP WITH RESPECT TO NEW BRUNSWICK POLITICAL ELECTION BROADCASTS I AM TODAY DIRECTED TO ADVISE YOU OF FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS STOP NOTWITHSTANDING CIRCULAR LETTER C-5 SUBMISSION OF TEXTS OF POLITICAL ADDRESSES NOT NECESSARY STOP STATION MANAGER HOWEVER CHARGED WITH FULL RESPONSIBILITY TO EXAMINE TEXTS AND INSURE THAT NO MATERIAL BROADCAST LIKELY TO CONTRAVENE EITHER DEFENCE OF CANADA OR BROADCASTING REGULATIONS STOP FURTHER IN VIEW OF ITS SPECIFIC RESPONSIBILITY UNDER THE ACT AND REGULATIONS THE CBC MUST MAINTAIN UPTODATE PICTURE OF CAMPAIGN STOP TO THIS END STATION RELATIONS DEPARTMENT SHOULD BE INFORMED NIGHT LETTER OF ALL NETWORK OR LOCAL BOOKINGS OR CHANGES OF POLITICAL BROADCAST BOOKINGS INCLUDING DATE TIME AUSPICES AND NAME OF SPEAKER AND NO SPEECH SHOULD BE BROADCAST UNTIL AUTHORIZED STOP PLEASE CONFIRM UNDERSTANDING BY WIRE "

(Sgd.) "H. N. STOVIN"

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CANADIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION C 272491

IN REPLY REFER TO FILE NO.....

341 Church Street,
Toronto, Ontario,
October 30, 1939.

CIRCULAR LETTER NO. C 22

NOT FOR PUBLICATION OR BROADCASTING

Dear Sir:

The purpose of this Circular is to clarify the contents of Circular C-21 addressed to you by telegram on October 27th. The Censorship Co-ordination Committee has decided to alter the existing procedure in reference to political broadcasts. All previous directions are cancelled and the following substituted therefor:

(a) It shall not be necessary to submit to this Department copies of the texts of political addresses;

(b) Station managers are charged with the full responsibility to examine texts and ensure that nothing contained therein contravenes either the Defence of Canada or the Broadcasting Regulations;

(c) Copies of texts of all political addresses should be submitted to station managers in triplicate. After examination by station manager and any necessary deletions made thereto, in accordance with Defence of Canada Regulations, one copy will be returned to the speaker, one copy will be forwarded to the Secretary, Censorship Co-ordination Committee, Victoria Building, Ottawa, and one copy will be retained by the station for its records;

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(d) It is desired that the Station Relations Department be kept informed daily by night letter of all reservations made by political parties, both for network or station broadcasting, the information to include the date and auspices under which broadcast is to take place and the name of the speaker. No address should be broadcast until authority has been given by this Department.

Yours faithfully,

H. N. Stovin
Supervisor of Station Relations

This Circular Letter has been sent to the following stations:

CFCY	Charlottetown,	P.E.I.
CHSJ	Saint John,	N.B.
CFNB	Fredericton,	N.B.
CKCW	Moncton,	N.B.
CHNC	New Carlisle	P.Q.

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Confidential CIRCULAR C-23

THE FOLLOWING TELEGRAPHIC MESSAGE WAS SENT FROM TORONTO ON OCTOBER 30, 1939, TO ALL CANADIAN PRIVATELY-OWNED STATIONS:

" CONFIDENTIAL C-23 NOT FOR PUBLICATION IT IS PERMISSIBLE TO MENTION THE TRANSFER OF A MILITARY UNIT AFTER COMPLETION OF THE MOVEMENT PROVIDED THAT SUCH MOVEMENT IS NOT MADE TO A SEAPORT OR A LOCATION NEAR A SEAPORT WHICH WOULD SUGGEST ASSEMBLY PREPARATORY TO TRANSFER OVERSEAS STOP THIS PERMISSION WILL BE WITHDRAWN WHEN IT BECOMES NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN COMPLETE SECRECY REGARDING ALL MILITARY AND NAVAL MOVEMENTS "

(SGD.) "H. N. STOVIN"

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
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272494

CANADIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION

IN REPLY REFER TO FILE NO.....

341 Church Street,
Toronto, Ontario,
October 31, 1939.

Circular Letter No. C-24

To All Broadcasting Stations:

Political Broadcasting

I refer you to the procedure applicable to political broadcasts as detailed in my circular letter No. C-5.

I am now directed by the Censorship Co-ordination Committee to advise you that this procedure has been modified, and until or unless otherwise advised, the following directives will apply to all political broadcasting, be it Dominion, Provincial or Municipal in character.

As heretofore, during the period of war emergency, political addresses must be confined to studio broadcasting. No station is permitted to carry any political address made at a public meeting. In future, stations will not be required to submit the texts of such speeches prior to broadcast. Stations will, however, be required to forward to this Department particulars of these addresses, in advance of desired date of broadcast. Such particulars should include name of speaker, the auspices, if any, under which the speech is to be given, time and date of broadcast. This is in accordance with the war emergency procedure, which stipulates that permission must be given in advance for all spoken word presentations.

Station managers will be charged with the full responsibility of detailed examination of the texts of all political addresses. It will be their

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duty to ensure that no material broadcast is of a nature likely to contravene the Defence of Canada Regulations or the Broadcasting Regulations. Station managers will require speakers to furnish them with three (3) copies of their proposed address. These copies should be examined and the deletions marked on each copy. One copy should be retained by the station, one given to the speaker, and the third forwarded to the Censorship Co-ordination Committee, 140 Wellington Street, Ottawa. Texts sent to the Censorship Co-ordination Committee will not require postage, and may be sent, if necessary, after the broadcast has taken place.

In interpretation of the Defence of Canada Regulations, and in the application of Censorship directives, I would like to assure you that the Censorship Co-ordination Committee will be glad to offer a broad advisory guidance.

I would much appreciate an acknowledgement of this communication.

Yours faithfully,

H. N. Stovin
Supervisor of Station Relations

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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Confidential

CIRCULAR C - 25

THE FOLLOWING TELEGRAPHIC MESSAGE WAS SENT FROM TORONTO ON NOVEMBER 9, 1939, TO ALL CANADIAN PRIVATELY-OWNED STATIONS:

" CONFIDENTIAL C-25 NOT FOR PUBLICATION I AM DIRECTED TO PARTICULARLY CAUTION YOU THAT AT REQUEST OF NAVAL AUTHORITIES NO MENTION IS TO BE MADE OF REPORTED PRESENCE OF BRITISH CRUISERS AT A SOUTH AMERICAN PORT OR IN SOUTH AMERICAN WATERS STOP PLEASE CONFIRM UNDERSTANDING BY MAIL "

(SGD.) "H. N. STOVIN"

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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C 272497

Confidential

CIRCULAR C - 26

THE FOLLOWING TELEGRAPHIC MESSAGE WAS SENT FROM TORONTO ON NOVEMBER 10, 1939, TO ALL CANADIAN PRIVATELY-OWNED STATIONS:

" CONFIDENTIAL C-26 NOT FOR PUBLICATION I AM DIRECTED TO ADVISE YOU THAT NO MENTION FACTUAL OR CONJECTURAL MAY BE MADE WITH RESPECT TO GOLD MOVEMENTS EITHER INTO CANADA OR OUT OF CANADA OR WITHIN CANADA STOP PLEASE CONFIRM UNDERSTANDING BY MAIL "

(SGD.) "H. N. STOVIN"

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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Confidential

CIRCULAR C - 27

THE FOLLOWING TELEGRAPHIC MESSAGE WAS SENT FROM TORONTO ON NOVEMBER 14, 1939, TO ALL PRIVATELY-OWNED STATIONS IN CANADA:

" CONFIDENTIAL C-27 NOT FOR PUBLICATION I AM DIRECTED TO ADVISE YOUR STATION THAT YOU ARE NOT TO USE ANY ITEMS COMING FROM USA PORTS REFERRING TO BRITISH SHIPS AS U-BAIT AND DESCRIBING NEW METHODS OF CAMOUFLAGE STOP PLEASE ACKNOWLEDGE YOUR UNDERSTANDING BY MAIL "

(SGD.) "H. N. STOVIN"

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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CANADIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION C 272499

IN REPLY REFER TO FILE NO.....

341 Church Street,
Toronto, Ontario,
November 14, 1939.

Confidential - Not For Publication

CIRCULAR C - 28

TO ALL BROADCASTING STATIONS

Dear Sir:-

I am directed to advise that no mention, factual or speculative, is permitted of the probable time of departure from Canada, or the probable time of arrival Overseas, of any naval, military, or air forces, even if such information is contained in dispatches emanating by wire, mail or radio, from British Islands or the continents of Europe, and has been passed by censors Overseas. It cannot be broadcast in Canada without the approval of the Broadcasting Censor for Canada.

I would much appreciate an acknowledgement by mail of your understanding of this communication.

Yours faithfully,

H. N. Stovin
Supervisor of Station Relations

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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C 272500

Confidential

CIRCULAR C - 29

THE FOLLOWING TELEGRAPHIC MESSAGE WAS SENT FROM TORONTO ON NOVEMBER 17, 1939, TO ALL PRIVATELY-OWNED STATIONS IN CANADA:

" CONFIDENTIAL C-29 NOT FOR PUBLICATION I AM DIRECTED TO ADVISE YOU THAT ON REQUEST OF NAVAL AUTHORITIES NO MENTION MAY BE MADE OF THE PRESENCE OF BRITISH WARSHIP IN UNITED STATES PACIFIC WATERS STOP PLEASE ACKNOWLEDGE UNDERSTANDING BY MAIL "

(SGD.) "H. N. STOVIN"

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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CANADIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION C 272501

341 Church Street,
Toronto, Ontario,
November 18, 1939.

IN REPLY REFER TO FILE NO.....

CIRCULAR LETTER NO. C-30

Confidential - Not for Publication

To All Broadcasting Stations:

I am directed to advise you that the greatest care should be exercised in dealing with letters from soldiers at home, or abroad, and submitted for broadcasting. Frequently, such letters contain information useful to the enemy. The fact that such letters are marked as passed by the Censor at the place of origin does not relieve broadcasting stations and station managers of responsibility. All such correspondence containing doubtful material should be referred in advance of broadcast to this Department for submission to the Censorship Co-ordination Committee.

I would appreciate an acknowledgement confirming your understanding of the contents of this communication.

Yours faithfully,

H. N. Stovin
Supervisor of Station Relations

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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C 272502

CANADIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION

IN REPLY REFER TO FILE NO.....

341 Church Street,
Toronto, Ontario,
November 20, 1939.

CONFIDENTIAL - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

CIRCULAR C - 31.

TO ALL BROADCASTING STATIONS

I have been requested to bring again to the attention of all stations the direction that until further notice, no mention of any kind is permitted of the movement of armed forces from one point to another point in Canada, or to any point abroad.

I would appreciate acknowledgement of your understanding by return mail.

Yours faithfully,

H. N. Stovin

H. N. Stovin
Supervisor of Station Relations

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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Confidential CIRCULAR C - 32

THE FOLLOWING TELEGRAPHIC MESSAGE WAS SENT FROM TORONTO ON NOVEMBER 22, 1939, TO ALL BROADCASTING STATIONS IN CANADA:

" CONFIDENTIAL C-32 NOT FOR PUBLICATION I AM DIRECTED TO ADVISE YOU THAT FOR REASONS REGARDED AS HIGHLY IMPORTANT BY THE ADMIRALTY AND CANADIAN NAVAL SERVICE NO REFERENCE MAY BE MADE UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE OF MOVEMENTS OR CONJECTURED MOVEMENTS OR TO INCIDENTS OR SUPPOSED INCIDENTS AFFECTING ANY OF HIS MAJESTY'S SHIPS UNTIL AFTER OFFICIAL RELEASE BY THE MINISTER OF INFORMATION IN GREAT BRITAIN STOP REFERENCES TO ACTIVITIES OF HIS MAJESTY'S CANADIAN SHIPS MUST BE SUBMITTED TO THE BROADCASTING CENSOR AND PERMISSION MUST BE GRANTED PREVIOUS TO THE BROADCAST OF SAME STOP PLEASE ACKNOWLEDGE UNDERSTANDING BY WIRE "

(SGD.) "H. N. STOVIN"

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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CIRCULAR C - 33

THE FOLLOWING TELEGRAPHIC MESSAGE WAS SENT FROM TORONTO ON NOVEMBER 23, 1939, TO ALL BROAD-CASTING STATIONS IN CANADA:

" CONFIDENTIAL C-33 NOT FOR PUBLICATION I AM DIRECTED TO ADVISE YOU THAT NO MENTION IS TO BE MADE OF THE FLIGHT OF PILOTS WESTWARD FROM TRENTON TO PICK UP UNITED STATES PLANES STOP PLEASE ACKNOWLEDGE UNDERSTANDING BY MAIL "

(SGD.) "H. N. STOVIN

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CANADIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION

341 Church Street,
Toronto, Ontario,
November 28th, 1939.

IN REPLY REFER TO FILE NO.....

CONFIDENTIAL - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

CIRCULAR C - 34

TO ALL BROADCASTING STATIONS

I have been requested to direct you that on and after December 1st, 1939, there will be a lessening of the restrictions relating to the publication of weather forecasts, particularly in the seacoast areas of Canada. These restrictions were placed in effect some weeks ago by an arrangement between the Naval authorities and the Meteorological Service of Canada, and were not formally a decision of the Censorship authorities.

The form which the weather forecasts will take on and after December 1st is now the subject of discussion between the Naval authorities and Meteorological Service, and will be made known when the first report is issued to the press by the Meteorological Service on December 1st.

This easement of the regulations with respect to the publication of weather forecasts and meteorological information applies only to printed publications. It does not apply to information to be given over the air. There is no lessening of the regulations now in force respecting radio broadcasting of weather information, and newspapers and other publications carrying on radio broadcasts of any nature will please note and observe this fact.

I would appreciate acknowledgement of your understanding by return mail.

Yours faithfully,

H. N. Stovin
Supervisor of Station Relations

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C272506

OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER

MEMORANDUM

J. A. G.

The Prime Minister wishes the following papers attached to the accompanying "Sequence of Events" --

✓ 1) McNaughtons Creed Bars Conscription clipping Oct.23

✓ 2) General Stuarts report

3) "Get together the General's Statements"

✓ 4) Col. Ralston's despatch (from England) re concern about reinforcements (Oct.13 ✓ No. 2763

DR

Taken from Ring Binder
and given to Prime Minister
Nov.19

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
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Extracts from
Minutes of Cabinet War Committee
August 3, 1944

7. General Stuart reported that although the Army had been fighting for some twelve months in Italy and two months in France, the reinforcement situation was very satisfactory. At present there were reinforcement personnel available for three months at the intensive battle casualty rate.

This favourable situation resulted from unexpectedly low casualties to date and maintenance of the flow of reinforcements from Canada. The only factor which was causing anxiety was the shortage of reinforcement personnel for French Canadian units. It was hoped that measures now in hand would permit these fine units to be maintained.

8. Mr. King expressed the appreciation of the War Committee of the comprehensive review submitted by General Stuart and the satisfaction of the government with the command of the Army overseas.

. . . .

10. The Minister of National Defence submitted a memorandum of proposals in regard to amendments to the manpower ceiling of the Army overseas. Copies of the memorandum were circulated.

It was recommended:

(a) that the authorized ceiling be raised formally from 232,736 to s34,500, to provide for the 1,764, all ranks, required to meet additional commitments already approved outside the ceiling;

(b) that further additions to establishments and new units, involving personnel of 6,856, essential to meet operational and administrative requirements, be approved.

(Of these, some 2,100 would be required for the United Kingdom, 2,400 for theatres of operations and about 2,000 for a contingency reserve; all would be drawn from available reinforcement personnel.)

(c) that a 12th infantry brigade be formed fromed from existing units to serve the 5th Armoured Division in Italy, involving a increase of 569, all ranks, and a net decrease in cost for nine months of 1944-45 of $48,144.00

It was proposed that all of the above requirements would be met from the overseas pool which was adequate to meet these demands without any change in the projected supply of manpower from Canada.

(Departmental memorandum, Aug.2, 1944 - C.W.C. document 837).

11. General Stuart supported the recommendations submitted and reported that General Crerar and General Burns concurred.

While formation of the new brigade would increase, by some 900, estimated net casualty replacement requirements to the end of March, 1945, this was a risk which he was prepared to accept in the present situation.

Formation of the new brigade would greatly increase the strength and fighting capacity of the 5th Armoured Division in Italy.

12. Mr. Ralston submitted a memorandum on the manpower ceiling from the Chief of General Staff, and read a memorandum on the reinforcement situation submitted by Lieutenant-General Stuart.

(Memorandum, C.G.S. to the Minister; Chief of Staff, C.M.H.Q. to C.G.S., Aug.2, 1944).

13. The War Committee, after discussion approved the recommendations submitted by the Minister.

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PUBLIC ARCHIVES
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Extracts from
Minutes of Cabinet War Committee
August 8, 1944

C 272508

7. General Stuart reported that although the Army had been fighting for some twelve months in Italy and two months in France, the reinforcement situation was very satisfactory. At present there were reinforcement personnel available for three months at the intensive battle casualty rate.

This favourable situation resulted from unexpectedly low casualties to date and maintenance of the flow of reinforcements from Canada. The only factor which was causing anxiety was the shortage of reinforcement personnel for French Canadian units. It was hoped that measures now in hand would permit these fine units to be maintained.

8. Mr. King expressed the appreciation of the War Committee of the comprehensive review submitted by General Stuart and the satisfaction of the government with the command of the Army overseas.

. . . .

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It was recommended:

(a) that the authorised ceiling be raised formally from 232,736 to 234,500, to provide for the 1,764, all ranks, required to meet additional commitments already approved outside the ceiling;

(b) that further additions to establishments and new units, involving personnel of 6,856, essential to meet operational and administrative requirements, be approved.

(Of these, some 2,100 would be required for the United Kingdom, 2,400 for theatres of operations and about 2,000 for a contingency reserve; all would be drawn from available reinforcement personnel.)

(c) that a 12th infantry brigade be formed fromed from existing units to serve the 5th Armoured Division in Italy, involving a increase of 569, all ranks, and a net decrease in cost for nine months of 1944-45 of $48,144.00

It was proposed that all of the above requirements would be met from the overseas pool which was adequate to meet these demands without any change in the projected supply of manpower from Canada.

(Departmental memorandum, Aug.2, 1944 - C.W.C. document 837).

11. General Stuart supported the recommendations submitted and reported that General Crerar and General Burns concurred.

While formation of the new brigade would increase, by some 900, estimated net casualty replacement requirements to the end of March, 1945, this was a risk which he was prepared to accept in the present situation.

Formation of the new brigade would greatly increase the strength and fighting capacity of the 5th Armoured Division in Italy.

12. Mr. Ralston submitted a memorandum on the manpower ceiling from the Chief of General Staff, and read a memorandum on the reinforcement situation submitted by Lieutenant-General Stuart.

(Memorandum, C.G.S. to the Minister; Chief of Staff, C.M.H.Q. to C.G.S., Aug.2, 1944).

13. The War Committee, after discussion approved the recommendations submitted by the Minister.

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Ontario
Office of the
Prime Minister & President of the Council

C272509

Copy

September 30th, 1944.

Rt. Hon. W. L. Mackenzie King, P.C., M.P.,
Prime Minister of Canada,
House of Commons,
Ottawa, Ontario.

Dear Mr. King:

When I returned a week ago, the statement made by Major Smythe and the reply of the Department of National Defence were brought to my attention. Knowing that the facts disclosed in his statement regarding reinforcements were correct, I expected that some appropriate action would result from inquiry into the facts by members of the Government, which I assumed would naturally follow public disclosure of a situation which is a matter of widespread concern amongst all Canadians overseas.

As Ontario has contributed such a large proportion of our armed forces, the Government of Ontario should be informed as to what will be done to meet a situation which has so direct a bearing on many of our own responsibilities. I would therefore be pleased to know at your earliest convenience what action the Dominion Government intends to take in dealing with the urgent need for trained reinforcements.

Yours very truly,

(signed) George A. Drew

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CA 105 44 R

Urgent

Secret

October 9, 1944.

C272510

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER:

Re. Trained Reinforcements

Attached is a first draft of a proposed telegram to Mr. Ralston on this subject.

The more I think of the issue raised by Smythe and Drew, the more difficult does it seem to me to answer it effectively unless the two points are kept separate. It is perfectly obvious that the impression they are trying to create, and are in fact creating where they are believed, is that the Army authorities have no choice but to send untrained reinforcements because of the shortage in numbers. It is almost impossible to allay this impression without a categorical statement that the numbers are adequate. The Defence Department itself has helped to create the impression by the nature of its advertisement for recruits, which has certainly suggested to the ordinary person that the need was really urgent. This could be met by making it clear that the numbers are ample at the present time, and that the recruits are needed to make sure that the numbers continue to be adequate some months hence, if hostilities continue. Once that point is cleared up, it is unlikely that anyone will believe that the Army authorities are deliberately sending untrained reinforcements when trained reinforcements are available, although the occasional man may slip through the net in an army of half a million.

If Mr. Ralston attempts to base a statement solely on the adequacy of training, people are bound to know of the occasional exception, and ugly rumours will continue to spread.

The attached draft has been gone over with Mr. Heeney and carries his judgment. There has not yet been an opportunity to discuss it with General Pope or Mr. Macdonald. Mr. Heeney thinks that General Murchie should also be brought into the picture, and that it might be possible to work out a second telegram embodying some more definite suggestions as to what might be said in a statement. The matter is being followed up this afternoon.

J.L.R.

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Draft

SECRET

C 272511

Following from the Prime Minister for Ralston. Begins:

As you have probably heard, the Premier of Ontario, on his return from overseas, at once endorsed the charges by Major Smythe that untrained men were being sent as reinforcements to the army. Mr. Drew wrote to me last week stating that he knew the facts disclosed in Smythe's statement were correct and asking what action the Dominion government intended to take in dealing with the urgent need for trained reinforcements. The letter was acknowledged and passed on to Power for reply. In his reply Power stated it was the responsibility of the government of Canada, through the Departments of National Defence, to maintain the armed services at their full efficiency and added that the government had discharged and would continue to discharge that duty in the light of its responsibility to Parliament and to the Canadian people. He refrained from making any statement bearing more directly on the point. The correspondence has not yet been made public, but, in a speech at Hamilton on Friday evening, Drew is quoted as follows:

"I was visited today by a number of young officers and men who are determined to tell their own story of the ghastly need of reinforcements.

"If Mr. King wants to know where I got my information I can tell him. It was from officers and men of the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry and other units. I can give the names of the units and the places where they were short. But Mr. King knows the terrible need of reinforcements in France and Italy. He has had reports and I know it.

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"James Layton Ralston didn't need to go to Italy to find it out. And the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation didn't need to play its constant game of presenting the Government's side by broadcasting a speech by Ralston from Italy to the whole of Canada, aimed at showing there was no need of reinforcements.

"By all means let there be an investigation, but let there be no delay in sending reinforcements to the front. They need them now and they need them badly, not only as to numbers, but as to trained men. And it doesn't have to wait for Mr. Ralston's return."

Similar statements were made by Drew in a speech the previous evening to the Canadian Corps Association in Toronto. On that occasion he is reported as follows:

"The man who bears the heaviest load of guilt for this shameful situation is James Layton Ralston. His word has been accepted because of his record in the last war. He was a very gallant soldier who did not hesitate to express his belief in those days that men who were fit to fight should be compelled to bear arms in battle. Because of his bravery in action, and because of the stand he took at that time, he has been trusted. He has betrayed that trust."

Smythe has repeated his charges and listed the following units as those to which untrained reinforcements were sent:

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"North Nova Scotias, North Shore Regiment, N.B., Reg. de Maisonneuve, Reg. de Chaudiere, Royal Regiment of Canada, Queen's Own Rifles, Essex Scottish, Royal Winnipeg Rifles, South Saskatchewan Rifles, Calgary Highlanders, Canadian Scottish."

For obvious reasons, I have refrained from entering into controversy with Drew. Unfortunately there is no one else who can reply with sufficient authority except yourself.

The impression Drew is seeking to create is that untrained reinforcements have to be sent into action because there is a shortage of men overseas with adequate training while adequately trained men are being kept in Canada because they have not volunteered for general service.

~~The only attempt at~~ an effective reply to these charges was made by a private individual named Mrs. Kenneth Blois, whose husband was recently killed in France. The text of ~~her~~ Mrs Blois broadcast was given in full in the Toronto Star of October 4th which may now be available overseas. I shall have a copy sent to Canada House by the next bag. In substance her reply is that training is the responsibility of the general staff and that the government is merely responsible for appointing competent officers. She adds that she has more confidence in Stuart and Crerar than in Smythe.

This explanation is clearly adequate on the point of training, though it should come from someone with authority. But, to meet Drew's point, I believe the public must be assured that reinforcements are available in adequate numbers and have been available long enough to have had time to receive proper training. Any apprehension as to the effect of such a statement on recruiting can ~~surely~~ be allayed by pointing out that recruits who

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enlist now are required to make sure there is no shortage some months hence if hostilities should be prolonged and that the need for recruits has obviously no bearing on the present position as to reinforcements.

It is, I believe, of the greatest urgency that the present campaign should not continue unchecked and that you should take the earliest opportunity to make an authoritative statement. ~~I do not need to emphasize the desirability of making such a statement~~ it would be well to have the statement as brief and categorical as possible, ~~In order~~ that ~~it~~ your statement may have the greatest public impact.

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OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER

Urgent

MEMORANDUM

Secret and Urgent

CA/0544 R

For the Prime Minister:

Attached are: C272515

1. Memorandum from Mr. Heeney re conversations with General Pope and General Murchie.

2. Strictly private telegram to Mr. Ralston.

3. Revision of official telegram to Mr. Ralston.

In revising the official telegram, in addition to the suggestions you made by telephone, I transposed two paragraphs from the upper part of page 3 of the first draft to the bottom of page 4 of the present draft, as they seemed to come in more logical sequence at that point.

Mr. Heeney has also read and concurred in the revisions.

I am holding originals for dispatch as I receive word

J.W.P.

October 9, 1944.

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SECRET

C272516

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER:

I have consulted both General Pope and the Chief of the General Staff on the first draft of the telegram prepared by Mr. Pickersgill for you to send to Mr. Ralston. After conferring together, they express the opinion that the draft covers the ground completely, and they have no suggestions for additional word that might be sent to Mr. Ralston on the subject.

Murchie can give us no useful up-to-date information as to the reinforcement position. His figures are five or six weeks old, and he can therefore only draw conclusions by making allowances for casualties incurred in the meantime. However, he is not alarmed, and knows no cause for alarm, nor any justification for the statements made by Premier Drew. I gather, privately, that our actual reinforcement position at the front is likely to be much better than the British, and certainly just as good as the American. This, of course, does not give any assurance for what may happen later on.

I have not consulted Mr. Macdonald, for in the circumstances there is nothing that he can usefully do. Any statement to be made must come from Mr. Ralston, not only because he is the Minister responsible, but also because he has the figures and we have not.

A. D. P. H.

October 9, 1944.

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C 272517

FROM: SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA.

TO: HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR CANADA, LONDON.

2203

Ottawa, October 9, 1944.

Would you please have the following strictly private message from the Prime Minister delivered to the Honourable J. L. Ralston:

Begins. I regret to have to trouble you with the matter referred to in the telegram sent herewith, but for unfortunate reasons you will understand, I regret it is impossible for the Acting Minister to deal with this matter. I think it would be unwise for me to be drawn into any controversy coming so completely within the purview of the Defence Department. Ends.

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

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C 272518

FROM: SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA.

TO: HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR CANADA, LONDON.

Ottawa, October 9, 1944.

SECRET

No. 2204

Will you please have the following urgent message from the Prime Minister delivered to the Hon. J. L. Ralston. Begins:

As you have probably heard, the Premier of Ontario, on his return from overseas, at once endorsed the charges by Major Smythe that untrained men were being sent as reinforcements to the army. Mr. Drew wrote to me last week stating that he knew the facts disclosed in Smythe's statement were correct and asking what action the Dominion government intended to take in dealing with the urgent need for trained reinforcements. The letter was acknowledged and passed on to Power for reply. In his reply Power stated it was the responsibility of the government of Canada, through the Departments of National Defence, to maintain the armed services at their full efficiency and added that the government had discharged and would continue to discharge that duty in the light of its responsibility to Parliament and to the Canadian people. He refrained from making any statement bearing more directly on the point. The correspondence has not yet been made public, but, in a speech at Hamilton on Friday evening, Drew is quoted as follows:

"I was visited today by a number of young officers and men who are determined to tell their own story of the ghastly need of reinforcements.

"If Mr. King wants to know where I got my information I can tell him. It was from officers and men of the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry and other units.

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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I can give the names of the units and the places where they were short. But Mr. King knows the terrible need of reinforcements in France and Italy. He has had reports and I know it.

"James Layton Ralston didn't need to go to Italy to find it out. And the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation didn't need to play its constant game of presenting the Government's side by broadcasting a speech by Ralston from Italy to the whole of Canada, aimed at showing there was no need of reinforcements.

"By all means let there be an investigation, but let there be no delay in sending reinforcements to the front. They need them now and they need them badly, not only as to numbers, but as to trained men. And it doesn't have to wait for Mr. Ralston's return."

Similar statements were made by Drew in a speech the previous evening to the Canadian Corps Association in Toronto. On that occasion he is reported as follows:

"The man who bears the heaviest load of guilt for this shameful situation is James Layton Ralston. His word has been accepted because of his record in the last war. He was a very gallant soldier who did not hesitate to express his belief in those days that men who were fit to fight should be compelled to bear arms in battle. Because of his bravery in action, and because of the stand he took at that time, he has been trusted. He has betrayed that trust."

Smythe has repeated his charges and listed the following units as those to which untrained reinforcements were sent:

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"North Nova Scotia, North Shore Regiment, N.B., Reg. de Maisonneuve, Reg. de Chaudiere, Royal Regiment of Canada, Queen's Own Rifles, Essex Scottish, Royal Winnipeg Rifles, South Saskatchewan Rifles, Calgary Highlanders, Canadian Scottish."

An effective reply to these charges was made by a private individual named Mrs. Kenneth Blois, whose husband was recently killed in France, but this is the only reply I have seen which has been accorded any real publicity. The text of Mrs. Blois' broadcast was given in full in the Toronto Star of October 4th which may now be available overseas. The following quotations are especially pertinent:

"You know and we all know perfectly well that if 'green,' 'inexperienced' and 'untrained' troops were thrown into battle and suffered high casualties due to their lack of training, that is the responsibility of the high command of the Canadian army. If such a thing happened it would be the duty of the government to remove Gen. Stuart, chief of staff of the Canadian Army and also Gen. Crerar, the direct commander of the army in the field of action.

"The government does not command the army or decide what troops go into action. The government could only be held responsible for having entrusted the army to the command of incompetent men; and be called upon to remove them.

"Maj. Smythe's charges, therefore, raise only one issue, namely, should Gens. Stuart and Crerar be removed? Are they guilty of the crime of throwing unprepared troops into action? Are they incompetent commanders? Is the Canadian public to believe that our army is led by irresponsible and utterly untrustworthy men? That is the question and there is no getting away from it. It is either Gen. Stuart and Gen. Crerar and the other responsible general officers of the Canadian army or Maj. Smythe.

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C272521

"As a test of confidence, Maj. Smythe's charges are not an issue of politics. It is not a case of Maj. Smythe versus the government. The government comes into the matter only indirectly, to remove the commanders if Maj. Smythe's charges are true. The test of confidence is between Maj. Smythe and Gen. Crerar, who commands the Canadian army and who decides what, when and where our troops go into action. . . . . .

" ..... I regard as contemptible and despicable the spreading of terrible charges against the men leading our army in battle by one who does not give a single fact to support such charges; .....

..... If political protection can make it possible to attack the army command with impunity, then military discipline will cease to exist in the Canadian army. I think this can be the only result of the partisan campaign around Major Smythe's charges."

This explanation is clearly adequate on the point of training, though it should come from someone with authority. In the light of what Mrs. Blois has said, would it not be wise to have a statement come from Stuart and Crerar?

For obvious reasons, I have refrained from entering into controversy with Drew. Unfortunately there is no one else who can reply with sufficient authority except yourself.

The impression Drew is seeking to create is that untrained reinforcements have to be sent into action because there is a shortage of men overseas with adequate training while adequately trained men are being kept in Canada because they have not volunteered for general service. To meet Drew's point, I believe the public must be assured that reinforcements are available in

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adequate numbers and have been available long enough to have had time to receive proper training. Any apprehension as to the effect of such a statement on recruiting can surely be allayed by pointing out that recruits who enlist now are required to make sure there is no shortage some months hence if hostilities should be prolonged and that the need for recruits has obviously no bearing on the present position as to reinforcements.

It is, I believe, of the greatest urgency that the present campaign should not continue unchecked and that you should take the earliest opportunity to make an authoritative statement.

Offered sent 9-10-44

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Approved
9-10-44

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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272523

TELEGRAM

From THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR CANADA IN GREAT BRITAIN
To THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

LONDON, October 15th, 1944

MOST IMMEDIATE
TOP SECRET
PERSONAL
AND PERSONAL

No. 2763. Top Secret. Strictly private - no circulation. Following for the Prime Minister from Ralston, Begins:

1. Your cables No. 2203 and No. 2204 just received on return from Belgium. Think what have already broadcast sums up situation re training in few words. Could make much fuller statement on training but to cover hostile statements should deal with numbers as well. On that point I regret to say that conditions and prospects of which I have learned will, I feel, necessitate reassessment in light of the future, particularly regarding infantry involving, I fear, grave responsibilities.

2. Seeing Crerar tomorrow and under circumstances am trying to leave for Canada on Sunday if transportation available, bringing Stuart. Would ask early opportunity to present situation.

3. Will try and prepare and send as part 2 to this message a draft statement which may be issued in my name if you approve and think something must be issued before I return. Ends.

MASSEY

Rec'd 8:10 p.m.

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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COLOURED PAPER
PAPIER DE COULEUR

272523

TELEGRAM

From THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR CANADA IN GREAT BRITAIN

To THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

LONDON, October 13th, 1944

MOST IMMEDIATE

TOP SECRET

CYPHER

No. 2763

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3. Will try and prepare and send as part 2 to this message a draft statement which may be issued in my name if you approve and think something must be issued before I return. Ends.

MASSEY

Rec'd 2:10 p.m.

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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COLOURED PAPER
PAPIER DE COULEUR

TELEGRAM

C 272524

From THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR CANADA IN GREAT BRITAIN

To THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

MOST IMMEDIATE

TOP SECRET

LONDON, October 13, 1944.

CYPHER

NO. 2770

No. 2770. Top Secret. Strictly private - no circulation. Following for the Prime Minister from Ralston, Begins:

Reference paragraph 3 of my telegram No. 2763. Regret unable to send draft statement tonight. Will try to send it evening October 14th. Ends.

LR
15-10-44

HIGH COMMISSIONER

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
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C272525

TOP SECRET

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, Canada

TO: THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR CANADA, LONDON, ENGLAND.

IMMEDIATE

TOP SECRET. STRICTLY PRIVATE

Cypher:

Ottawa, October 13, 1944

NO. 2247

Following for Hon. J.L.Ralston from Prime Minister:

Begins: Your message number 2763 just received. Seeing you will be returning so soon, a further statement can await your return. My cables were sent before your broadcast from Brussels. Latter much appreciated. All good wishes. Ends.

LL 15-10-44

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
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for War Council re Reinforcements 14-10-44

R/ Binder

SECRET C 272526

SECRETARIAT,
CABINET WAR COMMITTEE

CANADA

PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE

10th October, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER

Attached is a statement on the infantry reinforcement situation furnished by CGS, based on information received at N.D.H.Q. from Canadian Military Headquarters, London.

2. While returns from overseas are made under the head of "effective" reinforcements, N.D.H.Q. is not in a position to state categorically that all shown on the statement are immediately available for drafting to units.

Maurice Pope

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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MEMORANDUM

SECRET

Department of National Defence

H.Q.S. 9011-7-3 (DAG(A))

TO: C.G.S.

OTTAWA 10 OCT 44

C 272527

Infantry Situation Overseas - O.Rs. Only
Exclusive Paratps and SS Bn

Attached herewith as Appendix 'A' is schedule showing rft situation overseas as at 31 AUG 44, as reported by CMHQ and adjusted for draft in transit to UK (249 Officers, 2535 O.Rs.) on 31 AUG 44.

2. Insofar as Inf O.Rs. is concerned it will be noted that strengths Overseas, exclusive of paratps and SS Bn, were 48,334. After providing for the filling up of Ests (34,267), there would be a balance of 14,067 - adding personnel in transit 1,610 - total rft pool 15,677.

M.S to C.W.C. Herewith statement on Rft situation Overseas compiled from figures received from CMHQ.

3. Battle casualties reported to D.Records NDHQ during month of SEP 44 were as under:

Killed	1,303
Missing & POW	145
Wounded	4,318
Total	5,766

4. Rft pool at 30 SEP 44 should therefore have been about 10,000, less any wastage other than battle casualties which should now be comparatively small.

The a/m pool would have also been increased by:

(a) Recoveries from casualties during the month.
(b) Remusterings to Inf from other Corps during month.

No figures are available for either of these items.

J.C. Murchie
LIEUT.-GENERAL
C.G.S.
OCT 10 1944

While casualties shown above were those actually reported to NDHQ during the month, it is felt that it is quite reasonable to accept those as equivalent to casualties actually suffered during the month, since numbers reported to NDHQ during the first week of OCT 44 (and applicable to SEP) have, if anything, been slightly below those reported during the early part of SEP 44 (applicable to AUG).

6. It will be noted that the rft pool, including numbers in transit, at 31 AUG 44 was equal to about 45% of Unit Ests, and that the pool remaining at 30 SEP 44 would still be about 30% of Ests, not including recoveries and remusterings during the month of SEP 44.

7. No shipping accommodation was available for Inf rfts during the month of SEP 44 but approximately 1,000 have been despatched already during the month of OCT 44 and it is expected that an additional 3,000 Inf will be included in mid-OCT and end of OCT drafts.

for (A.C. Spencer),
Brigadier,
Acting Adjutant-General.

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MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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C272528

No. /

OVERSEAS SITUATION

(Based on Canmilitry Cables as of 31 AUG 44)

TOP SECRET

HQS 8251 (Org A2A)

OTTAWA, Ontario.

6 OCT 44.

	Strength O/S as at 31 AUG 44 Excl X List, Q List and NETD		Unit Establishments		Reinforcements on Strength O/S (2) minus (3)		Reinforcements Despatched to Arrive After 31 AUG 44		TOTAL (4) plus (5)	
(1)	(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)		(6)	
	Off	OR's	Off	OR's	Off	OR's	Off	OR's	Off	OR's
CAC Recce (Inf)	251	2452	114	1741	137	711	1	55	138	766
Others	1396	17998	792	12449	604	5549	-	-	604	5549
RCA Field	1194	12941	738	10031	456	2910	24	179	480	3089
Medium	329	3816	178	3234	151	582	-	-	151	582
A/A (Lt & Hvy)	494	6333	270	5205	224	1128	-	5	224	1133
A/Tank	527	5728	280	4898	247	830	-	-	247	830
Survey	116	1391	66	1189	50	202	1	-	51	202
RCE	863	16844	579	14173	284	2671	3	16	287	2687
RC Sigs	589	10872	496	9466	93	1406	3	105	96	1511
CIC Rifle & Motor	2728	44550	1578	31690	1150	12860	56	1525	1206	14385
MG & Support	311	3784	129	2577	182	1207	1	85	183	1292
Paratroops	52	731	36	621	16	110	1	114	17	224
RCASC	1025	31134	830	27664	195	3470	9	126	204	3596
RCAMC	1567	10466	1464	9452	103	1014	51	151	154	1165
Nursing Sisters	2020	-	1910	-	110	-	4	-	114	-
RCOC	474	8375	377	6911	97	1464	-	8	97	1472
RCEME	494	14977	502	13957	(8)	1020	37	61	29	1081
RCAPC	436	247	390	243	46	4	-	-	46	4
CDC	438	1363	419	1238	19	125	3	-	22	125
CPC	64	1424	67	1376	(3)	48	-	-	(3)	48
C Pro C	105	2428	81	2131	24	297	-	3	24	300
CFC (Field)	78	1997	75	1961	3	36	-	-	3	36
C Int C	173	504	112	431	61	73	2	3	63	76
Miscellaneous	2330	14902	2176	12586	154	2316	51	87	205	2403
Unallocated	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	12	2	12
TOTAL ALL ARMS	18054	215257	13659	175224	4395	40033	249	2535	4644	42568

Notes: (a) No deduction has been made for net wastage Overseas after 31 AUG 44.
(b) Brackets wherever used indicate shortages.
(c) Balance of CFC included in Miscellaneous
(d) Spec Serv Bn not included above. Strength reported as 50 Off 704 OR's.

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CANADIAN ARMY OVERSEAS

SECRET

C272529

ESTIMATED NUMBER OF INFANTRY REINFORCEMENTS BECOMING AVAILABLE FOR FIELD

					MONTH IN WHICH AVAILABLE FOR FIELD (Note F)						
				1944	1945						
				By 31 Dec	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL
OTHER RANKS											
RFTS TRAINED OR IN TRAINING (27 Oct) (Note A)											
	UK	6657									
	21 Army Gp	(285)									
	AAI	995	7370								
Balance Remustering in UK (Note B)			2115								
			9485	9500	9500	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
Despatches from Canada (Note C) (Subject to availability of shipping)											
20 Nov	Infantry		2400		2400	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
	Other Arms to be remustered		700		300(Note B)	400	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
24 Nov	Infantry		875		----	875	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
	Other Arms to be remustered		700		----	-----	700	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
26 Nov	Infantry		250		----	250	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
16 Dec	Infantry		1375		----	-----	1375	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
	NCO's and tradesmen		750		----	-----	-----	750	-----	-----	-----	-----
23 Dec	Infantry		700		----	-----	700	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
	NCO's and tradesmen		750		----	-----	-----	750	-----	-----	-----	-----
	Lower PULHEMS		500		----	-----	-----	500	-----	-----	-----	-----
				9000	----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
				18500	12200	1525	2775	2000	-----	-----	-----	-----
FROM CANADA (Note D) (Subject to availability of Shipping)											
	JAN 45		2250		----	-----	-----	2250	-----	-----	-----	-----
	FEB 45		2250		----	-----	-----	-----	2250	-----	-----	-----
	MAR 45		2000		----	-----	-----	-----	-----	2000	-----	-----
	APR 45		2000		----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	2000	-----
	MAY 45		2000		----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	2000
				10500	----	-----	-----	4250	-----	-----	-----	-----
RECOVERIES FROM CASUALTIES (Note E)											
	NOV & DEC 44		2700		2700 (Note G)	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
	JAN 45		1400		----	1400	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
	FEB 45		1400		----	-----	1400	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
	MAR 45		1400		----	-----	-----	1400	-----	-----	-----	-----
	APR 45		1400		----	-----	-----	-----	1400	-----	-----	-----
	MAY 45		1400		----	-----	-----	-----	-----	1400	-----	-----
				9700	----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
				38700	14900	2925	4175	5650	3650	3400	2000	2000

Note A Rfts trained or in training Overseas at 27 OCT are as advised in CMHQ 1/Manpower/2/3 dated 8 Nov 44

Note B Numbers to be remustered Overseas subsequent to 27 OCT are as advised in CMHQ 1/Manpower/2/3 dated 8 Nov 44

Note C Numbers to be despatched from Canada NOV and DEC 44 estimated from most up-to-date returns from Training Ests and subject to:

(i) By-passing Trg Bde in some instances

(ii) Possible limitation of leave to embarkation leave (only) in some instances.

(iii) Authority to despatch as Infantry General Duty Ptes, 750 confirmed NCOs and 750 Tradesmen under special Pay arrangement.

(iv) Lowering of Physical Standards for Infantry General Duty to permit '2' in PULHEMS under any grading other than 'L'.

Note D Numbers to be despatched after 31 DEC 44 estimated as normal output from Trg Stream, incl. normal conversions from N.R.M.A.

Note E Recoveries from casualties as advised in CMHQ 1/Manpower/2/3 dated 8 Nov 44(for Nov and Dec) and as estimated by COS (CMHQ) for 1945.

Note F Dates of availability of Rfts for Field based on estimates of COS and AAG (Req) (CMHQ) and/or those advised in CMHQ 1/Manpower/2/3 dated 8 Nov 44.

Note G Some of this number might not be sufficiently hardened by the end of the year.

H.Q.S.9011-13-1 (DAG(A)) -- 19 NOV 44

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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SECRET

C 272530

CANADIAN ARMY OVERSEAS

ESTIMATED INFANTRY REINFORCEMENT SITUATION OVERSEAS

TO 31 MAY 45

Other Ranks

Month	Deficiency in Units at Beginning of Month	Becoming Available for Field during Month: Recoveries from Casualties	From Remustering & from Arrivals from Canada prior to 27 Oct 44	From Arrivals from Canada subsequent to 27 Oct 44: Infantry	From Other Arms	From NCOs and Tradesmen	From Lowering PULHEMS	TOTAL	Estimated Gross Casualties during Month	Deficiency in Units at end of month	In Training not Available for Field at end of Month	AVAILABLE FOR FIELD
Nov & Dec 44	-	2700	9500	2400	300	-	-	14900	14200	DEC 700(surplus)	6300	(Following Month 1525) (Later 4775)
Jan 45	700(surplus)	1400	-	1125	400	-	-	2925	6000	JAN 2375(Def.)	7025	(Following Month 2775) (Later 4250)
Feb	2375(Def.)	1400	-	2075	700	-	-	4175	6000	FEB 4200(Def.)	6500	(Following Month 4250) (Later 2250)
Mar	4200(Def.)	1400	-	2250	-	1500	500	5650	6000	MAR 4550(Def.)	4250	(Following Month 2250) (Later 2000)
Apr	4550(Def.)	1400	-	2250	-	-	-	3650	6000	APR 6900(Def.)	4000	(Following Month 2000) (Later 2000)
May	6900(Def.)	1400	-	2000	-	-	-	3400	6000	MAY 9500(Def.)	4000	(Following Month 2000) (Later 2000)
		9700	9500	12100	1400	1500	500	34700	44200			

Gross Casualties are as estimated by COS (CMHQ)

Progression of Availability from Training Establishments in UK

Month	ADD Arrivals from Canada	DEDUCT Available for Field	In Training at end of Month
Oct 44	-	-	9500
Nov & Dec	9000	12200	6300
Jan 45	2250	1525	7025
Feb	2250	2775	6500
Mar	2000	4250	4250
Apr	2000	2250	4000
May	2000	2000	4000
	19500	25000	

Reconciliation

Available for Field from Arrivals from Canada subsequent to 25 Oct 44 -

Infantry	12100
From Other Arms	1400
From NCOs & Tradesmen	1500
From Lowering PULHEMS	500
	15500
Still in Training - 31 May 45	4000
TOTAL	19500

NOTE: The above figures subject to availability of shipping, casualties being not greater than projected and proportion of recoveries being maintained on the scale estimated.

See also note on statement - "Estimated Number of Infantry Reinforcements Becoming Available for Field"

H.Q.S. 9011-15-1 (DAG(A)
19 Nov 44

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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C 272531

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRETARIAT,
CABINET WAR COMMITTEE

CANADA

PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE

16th October, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER

Attached is a memorandum setting out the scheme of Army reinforcement.

Maurice Pope

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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CONFIDENTIAL

Oct. 20, 44

ARMY REINFORCEMENT

Army Reinforcement is carried out in three stages:

(a) The man is enlisted and trained in Canada, after which he is dispatched to the reserve pool at the overseas intermediate base, namely, the United Kingdom.

(b) At the overseas intermediate base the man undergoes further training while awaiting his turn for dispatch to the theatre of operations.

(c) On arrival in the theatre of operations he is held in a base reinforcement depot until such time as he is posted to a field unit to fill a vacancy in its establishment.

2. As some 6 to 9 months must elapse before the newly enlisted recruit can be made fit to join his ultimate unit, the staffs responsible for the provision of an adequate flow of reinforcements from the home country to the field are required, in the light of the information then available to them, to forecast the Army's future requirements upwards of a year in advance.

3. The Reinforcement Plan for the calendar year 1944 was finally cast in November, 1943, since which time it has now and then been amended to meet new or changed conditions reported from overseas.

4. So far as infantry reinforcements are concerned (there is a surplus of reinforcements in the reserve pool overseas for all other arms and services) the following estimated rates of over-all wastage were laid down. These rates were based on the best information available

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from our own experience and also that of the War Office.

Estimated Infantry Wastage - 1944

No. of months (approx.)	Category	Percentage Rate of Wastage.
4	Quiet	.75
3	Intense	20.
5	Normal	6.

5. When these estimated rates of wastage were fixed it was fairly certain that cross-Channel operations were unlikely to take place before May of this year. It was of course contemplated that operations would continue in the Italian theatre throughout the year, and provision therefor was included in the above figures. The .75 per cent Quiet rate was known from the Army's own previous experience. The 20 per cent Intense rate of over-all infantry wastage has been the basis of Canadian and British calculations for a number of years. The period for the 6 per cent rate of Normal wastage was based on the knowledge that the capacity of units to fight at an Intense rate is limited.

6. The Reserve Pool, which was fixed at a figure of 3 months at the Intense rate, (i.e., for infantry - 60 per cent of the strength of the field units) was fully up to establishment during the first 5 or 6 months of this year.

7. In the light of circumstances prevailing in Canada, as well as those relating to shipping, it was planned to provide for an orderly and regular flow of reinforcements from the home country to the overseas intermediate base throughout 1944. To meet the expected wastage it was calculated that (over and above the proportion of casualties which would become fit for a second tour of duty) some 48,000 reinforcements of all arms and services would be required and it was arranged to dispatch an average of 4,000 a month from January to December, inclusive. This plan has been adhered to. As the Reserve Pool was bound to be drawn on somewhat heavily during the period of Intense wastage, it was fully realized that an even flow of reinforcements from Canada would not maintain it up to establishment, i.e., 3 months' Intense. On the contrary, it had been calculated that the infantry holdings of reinforcements might fall as low as .9 of a month's 'Intense' requirements. The criterion, however,

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was the field units should be kept up to strength, not the Reserve Pool.

8. War, however, is anything but an exact science. Its day-to-day or month-to-month developments refuse to be bound by hard and fast rule. That the casualties that have been incurred have not been in line with calculations made nearly a year ago should occasion no surprise. All arms and services, other than infantry, have suffered less than was expected. This is possibly due, in some measure, to the fact that Allied air superiority has largely prevented the German Air Force from operating against our troops not only on the battlefield but also in the rearward areas. Infantry wastage, on the other hand, has been sensibly higher than was estimated. In this connection it is to be noted that Intense fighting has continued for a longer unbroken period than was expected.

9. Staff calculations made in Ottawa indicate that the strength of the Reserve Pool as of 1 Oct 44 should be approximately 30 per cent of the established strength of the infantry units in the field. They are, however, unable to assess the degree of immediate availability of these particular reinforcements.

M.P.

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C 272535

? Oct 20, 1944

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER:

Re: Canadian Army overseas;
reinforcement position

General Pope and I have considered the questions which you mentioned to me last night, and have gone over the relevant War Committee Minutes from 1940. We have the following observations which may be of some value in guiding discussion at this afternoon's meeting:

1. The Minutes of the War Committee make it quite clear that in accepting Army proposals for additional formations since the very early days of the war, you have stated quite categorically that such additional commitments are approved on the understanding that the manpower position was such that these additional demands would not endanger the basic government policy with regard to voluntary overseas service.

As recently as August 3rd of this year the Minister put forward certain proposals involving further "capital" manpower requirements, notably the formation of a new 12th Infantry Brigade for inclusion in the 1st Corps. At that time it was stated that the reinforcement situation was "entirely satisfactory" and that the requirements of the new formation would not endanger the reinforcement position of the Army as a whole.

(C.W.C. Minutes August 3, 1944, paras. 10 et seq., also National Defence memorandum August 2, para (b) (IV).

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2. On the other hand, the Minister of National Defence has always been careful not to give an unqualified assurance that the Army overseas establishment could continue to be supported by the voluntary system.

3. We understand that sufficient reinforcements are available for the remainder of this calendar year. The problem resolves itself into what steps should be taken now to ensure their continued sufficiency from January 1st, 1945, onwards.

In considering possible alternatives to the employment of N.R.M.A. personnel for this purpose, the following should, perhaps, be considered, though there are serious objections to be raised in each case:

(a) disbandment of some units or formations;

(b) reduction of physical standards for reinforcements;

(c) acceptance of lower establishment in combatant units;

(d) the adoption of some means of drawing upon large R.C.A.F. surpluses of personnel.

4. Apart from consideration of such drastic alternatives as suggested above, enquiry should, in any event, be made along the following lines:

(a) have transfers to infantry from other arms been carried out to the maximum possible extent; and,

(b) have General Service personnel in Canada been combed out to the maximum possible extent?

A. D. P. H.

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C 272537

TOP SECRET

October 26th, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER:

Robertson, Pope and I have been trying, this morning, to discover a fruitful approach for this afternoon's discussion by the Cabinet War Committee and I am attaching a draft agenda which we think may prove useful.

I have discussed it with Mr. Power and he agrees that this approach may assist in directing the War Committee to the concrete problems involved, and so reduce the possibility of continuing the more general discussion which is unlikely to achieve the objective in view.

With reference to item 4 , "Re-examination of availability of General Service personnel" - we feel strongly that the various figures submitted should be very carefully gone into. There are several items which require much clearer explanation than has been given to date. Mr. Power has suggested that this re-examination might be undertaken by Mr. Ralston, Mr. Macdonald and himself. We feel that this might prove a most useful procedure for, at the moment, the situation in fact is anything but clear.

A.D.P. H.

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TOP SECRET

CABINET WAR COMMITTEE

Army overseas; reinforcements

1. Proposals of the Chief of the General Staff:

(a) Infantry from present training stream	1,500
(b) Personnel from other arms	1,500
(c) Lowering of age for despatch overseas: 19 - 18½ years	500
(d) N.C.O. reversions to ranks	750
(e) Withdrawals from establishments and services in Canada	750
(f) Reduction in physical standards for infantry	500
Total by these methods	5,000 (5,500)

this we feel should not be approved - it is not recommended

2. N.R.M.A. personnel enlistments:

(a) Financial incentives

(i) War service gratuites increases
(ii) Increased "fighting" pay for operational infantry

(b) Special recruiting appeal.

3. Utilization of R.C.A.F. surpluses:

(a) Availability

(b) Training

4. Re-examination of availability of General Service personnel:

(a) In Canada

(b) In the United Kingdom.

5. - Examination of selection from other sides
1. probable length of war
2. probable further casualties
3. reducing units

} among troops from Italy sending Fresh troops reduction of commitments

A.D.P. Heeney.

Privy Council Office,
October 26th, 1944.

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950.000 ex forces [illegible]
940.000 [illegible] U.K.
[illegible] New Zealand
[illegible]

OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER

MEMORANDUM

C272539

[illegible] 460,000

Personal Service - Sept. 13

CXA

135,000

deduct

[illegible]

add [illegible]

deduct [illegible]

3 [illegible]

14,000 ex Operational [illegible]

63,000 [illegible] Operational

[illegible]

50,000 ex training [illegible]

[illegible]

N.W.R.9.

[illegible]

60,000 — + 8,000 on long leave

30,000 ex Operational [illegible]

14,000 ex [illegible] Operational

11,000 ex training [illegible]

[illegible]

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TOP SECRET
URGENT

Ottawa, October 23rd, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER:

Re: Army reinforcements

Robertson and I have, this afternoon, given further thought to methods whereby the very real military problem of reinforcements, with which the Army is faced, can be met without resulting in the grave political consequences involved in changing the terms of service of N.R.M.A. personnel.

It seems to us that the following, taken together and actively pursued, might offer a reasonable prospect of success in obtaining the necessary minimum of infantry reinforcements:

General Service personnel:

1. Vigorous prosecution of every effort to obtain the maximum numbers of General Service personnel from the Army:

(a) in Britain, and
(b) in Canada.

N.R.M.A. enlistments:

2. A new determined drive to obtain the maximum numbers of volunteers for General Service from N.R.M.A. personnel in Canada. This would require:

(a) concerted political support, for example, all French-speaking Ministers going into the training camps, mobilizing leaders of Quebec opinion in every possible way, probably Ministerial initiatives among N.R.M.A. personnel of foreign extraction - in fact every possible effort at the highest level, and

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(b) financial incentives to enlistment, including:

(i) extension of war gratuities and other benefits to the whole period of service to those who enlist and, possibly,

(ii) raising the pay of general duties infantry, that is, the men who actually do the fighting and the dirty work, and who actually suffer the highest rate of casualties. (This might be regarded as similar to "flying pay" for R.C.A.F. aircrew). The proposed increase in pay might be connected with the raising of rates for service in the Japanese war and put into effect immediately.

Transfers from R.C.A.F.:

3. Some means to be found whereby the increasingly large surpluses of R.C.A.F. personnel, aircrew and ground-crew, can be brought to the assistance of the Army.

Depending upon the results to be derived from 1, 2 and 3 above:

Reinforcement pool:

4. Acceptance (perhaps temporarily only) of a lower reinforcement pool.

(Stuart's recommendation calls for a "two months' pool", that is, one month's estimated requirements being kept in each operational theatre, and one month's requirements in the British Isles.)

The sufficiency of this lower reserve would, of course, be determined by the casualty rate after December 31st and the success achieved by the methods mentioned in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 above.

If these prove insufficient, then:

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Reductions in establishment, physical standards:

5. Modification downward of the Army overseas. In this connection the government's Military Advisers should be asked to recommend the least objectionable course from the military point of view. There might have to be a combination, but the following methods have been mentioned:

(a) reduction in physical standards for infantry;

(b) reduction of battalion establishments (3 instead of 4 rifle companies);

(c) elimination of a Division.

All of the above courses are clearly open to political objection, but not to the most serious political objections taken to the course suggested in Stuart's report, namely the compulsion of N.R.M.A. personnel for overseas reinforcements.

We are hopeful that at tomorrow's meeting of the War Committee Mr. Ralston may have for consideration and examination, various alternative courses.

It seems to us that before any irrevocable decision is taken the above solutions, or at least some of them, should be explored very carefully.

A.D.P.H.

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TOP SECRET
NAR/SR
30.10.44

C 272543

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER

There are now before Council only two possible methods of raising the infantry reinforcements needed for overseas:

(1) Compulsory despatch of N.R.M.A. personnel overseas.

(2) Getting the needed men by a combination of a more rigorous combing out of General Service personnel both in Canada and the United Kingdom, plus an intensified campaign for voluntary conversion of N.R.M.A. personnel.

These are real alternatives so long as the Cabinet remains united and is prepared to give its complete support to whichever course is finally approved.

If the Cabinet breaks up because agreement cannot be reached on the first course, then prospects of raising the needed numbers of men by the second method become very remote. It would need all the efforts of a united government to make either method effective. If people who prefer Course 1 resign because it is not adopted, they make impossible the fulfilment of Course 2, which represents the only other hope of getting effective reinforcements overseas in time.

Whatever may be the domestic political consequences of resignation from the Government on this issue at the moment it seems pretty clear that the military consequences must be:

(1) The elimination of all possibility of despatching N.R.M.A. personnel overseas, whatever the need for them may prove to be;

(2) The failure in advance of the alternative plan for getting reinforcements, because such a plan would have no hope of achieving the results aimed at either from General Service establishments or from N.R.M.A. personnel if it did not have the fullest support of the Minister of National Defence.

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C272545

JAG/
30.10.44

Numerical Statement of Canadian Forces on Active Service

1) ROYAL CANADIAN NAVY (as at September 30, 1944)

Naval personnel	AFLOAT	officers	5,560		
		ratings	34,249	37,809	
	ASHORE	o	5.564		
		r	48,312	53,876	
Total afloat and ashore				91,685	
Total Active Service strength					92,198

2) CANADIAN ARMY (as at September 13, 1944)

	European Zone	Canada & Adj Terr	Missing, PoW, Extended Leave	Total
Active Force	262,906	136,319	11,130	410,355
GS				
NRMA		59,760	8,623	68,383
CWAC	1,273	12,105		13,378
Total	264,179	208,184	19,753	492,116
Reserve Force		89,146		
Total Cdn Army	264,179	297,330	19,753	581,262

3) ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE (as at August 25, 1944)

	Officers	Airmen	Officers (WD)	Airwomen (WD)	Total
In CANADA	16,932	108,630	505	11,855	137,922
Newfoundland	369	3,040	30	709	4,148
Labrador	39	858	2	-	899
United States	59	55	5	78	197
Overseas	17,511	40,486	88	1,272	[illegible]
T o t a l	34,910	153,069	630	13,914	202,523

4) RECAPITULATION (total forces only)

NAVY	92,198	
ARMY	581,262	
RCAF	202,523	875,983

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C 272546

JAG/
30.10.44

Numerical Statement of Canadian Forces on Active Service

1) ROYAL CANADIAN NAVY (as at September 30, 1944)

Naval personnel	AFLOAT	officers	5,860		
		ratings	34,249	37,809	
	ASHORE	o	5,564		
		r	48,312	53,876	
Total afloat and ashore				91,685	
Total Active Service strength					92,198

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C272547

TOTAL STRENGTH OF CANADIAN ARMY

Overseas - as at 31 Aug 44

I Effectives:	(a) Western Europe	104,751
	(b) Italy	67,325
	(c) United Kingdom	61,989 ø
	Total Effectives	234,065
II Non Effectives (Hospital Patients, Detention, Courses, Special Employment, Disposal Stream)	Total	26,263
	GRAND TOTAL OVERSEAS	260,328

Canada

At 27 Sep 44 General Service personnel numbered 136,750 of whom 16,146 were Officers and 120,604 were Other Ranks.

ø Note: At 23 Sep 44 this number had been reduced to 55,809, made up of 35,158 in static units, i.e., H.Q., Hospital Staffs, Ordnance Depots and Workshops, Engineer Maintenance Units, Forestry Corps, Training Establishments, etc. The remaining 20,651 were reinforcements of whom fit infantry were 5,847, fit other arms 11,528, unfit all arms 3276.

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C272548

INFANTRY REINFORCEMENTS AVAILABLE BETWEEN 23 Sep 44 and 31 Dec 44.

1. On 23 Sep 44 actual Infantry reinforcements available were as follows:

Western Europe	300
Italy	1400
United Kingdom	5800

On 31 Dec 44 it is estimated that in Western Europe and Italy there will be a deficiency in the strength of Units in the Field of 2350 Infantry.

2. At the same date it is estimated that there will be in the United Kingdom 3600 reinforcements in training, none of whom will be immediately available for the field.

3. During the period 23 Sep 44 to 31 Dec 44 we shall despatch from Canada 11,000 reinforcements, either trained as infantry or capable of being trained as Infantry.

This number will be obtained only by taking 1500 men from other Arms, reverting 750 N.C.O.'s to the ranks, by utilising 750 tradesmen as infantry, and 500 by lowering the Pulhems standard under "P" and "U" classifications. (This lowering of Pulhems standard is conditional upon the approval of the Field Commanders)

4. From 1 Jan 45 to 31 May 45 it is estimated that an additional 10,500 Infantry reinforcements can be despatched from Canada.

5. It may be asked why, out of the total of 120,000 other ranks G.S. personnel in Canada at 23 Sep 44, only the above mentioned numbers of Infantry reinforcements can be shipped overseas. The answer is to be found in the following facts:

(a) 67,000 of the 120,000 are overage, underage, or are in Pulhems 3, 4 and 5.

(b) 11,000 Infantry will embark for overseas in the period 23 Sep to 31 Dec 44
10,500 Infantry will embark in the period 1 Jan to 31 May 45
6,000 Other Arms will embark in the period 23 Sep to 31 Dec 44.
3,500 Other Arms will embark in the period 1 Jan to 31 May 45

(c) Wastage - 20% of 53,000 -- 10,600

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C 272549

(d)	O.T.C, C.T.T.C., Medical and Dental Students	3,000
(e)	Key personnel, Provost Corps, Dental Corps, Medical Corps, Instructional Staffs, etc.	8,400

(a reduction from present strength which is 14,500)

.....

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ACTUAL AND PROJECTED CASUALTIES UP TO 31 DEC 44.

1. The actual battle casualties in Infantry in both War Theatres from 1st July to 25th October were 22,500.

2. The estimated battle casualties in infantry from 28th October to 31st December, 1944 are 16,000. (This estimate takes no account of losses through sickness. Sickness might add 1000 to 2000 additional casualties over the period in question.)

(Note - In a previous estimate, infantry casualties from September 23 to October 31, 1944, were estimated at 22,207. Actual casualties incurred from September 23 to October 25 have been approximately 6,000. Adding this figure to the estimated 16,000 for the remainder of the period, we have a total of 22,000).

3. The estimate of casualties is based on a forecast for Western Europe of six weeks intense activity with casualties at 1,500 per week for a total of 9000, and three weeks normal at 640 for a total of 1920. Italy -- four weeks quiet at 25 per week for a total of 100, and five weeks intense at 1000 for a total of 5000.

4. The forecasts of activity have been concurred in by Field Marshal Montgomery, Commanding the 21st Army Group in Western Europe and by the Headquarters of the Eighth Army in Italy.

.....

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NET POSITION AT 31 DEC 44.

1. As already indicated under the heading "Reinforcements available between 23 Sep 44 and December 31, 1944," there will be at the latter date a deficiency of 2350 in the strength of Infantry units in the field.

2. There will be available in England on the same date 8600 Infantry reinforcements in training.

3. Of this number 3600 will become available in January to offset the deficiency in Infantry Field Units. A total of 3000 Infantry reinforcements will become available in February. 2000 Infantry reinforcements will become available in March.

4. After making good in January the deficiency existing on 31 Dec 44, we shall have left about 1250 Infantry reinforcements. To this number we shall have to add a certain number of returned casualties who will become fit for infantry duty in the field. A generous estimate of the number likely to become available in this way is 1400 per month.

5. It would appear, therefore, that to meet battle casualties in January we shall have a total of 2650 Infantry reinforcements. Assuming that the activity on both fronts would be normal in the month of January we may expect Infantry casualties of 4300 for the month. If the activity is intense the Infantry casualties would be 10,000 for the month.

6. Projecting the reinforcement position into later months of 1945 it would seem that in February there would be available for the field units 3000 reinforcements, plus an estimated 1400 recoverable casualties. In March we estimate 4250 Infantry reinforcements, plus 1400 returning casualties. In April we estimate 2250 Infantry reinforcements, plus 1400 returning casualties. Thereafter the reinforcements would be at a continuing rate of 2000 monthly, depending on future enlistments.

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COMPARISON OF AVAILABLE REINFORCEMENTS WITH RECOMMENDED REQUIREMENTS.

It is now necessary to relate what this paper shows has been done in the way of despatching additional infantry to the U.K. with the actual requirement as recommended.

This recommendation asked for a pool of 15,000 Infantry reinforcements to be established overseas by 31 Dec 44 and a monthly increment from Canada, beginning Jan 45, of 3,000 Infantry reinforcements.

It will be noted from previous paragraphs that 15,500 additional infantry or potential infantry reinforcements will have been despatched to the U.K. in the period November 44 to May 45. It should be noted that of this number only 700 will be available in the field in January. The balance becomes available in February, March, April and May.

It is evident therefore that the 15,500 being sent from Canada should be counted against the five monthly increments of 3,000 a month in the first five months of 1945. This leaves a pool of 15,000 Infantry reinforcements required by 31 Dec 44 unprovided for.

A monthly increment of 3,000 was calculated on the following basis. The forecast of activity from January to June was taken as three months intense, two months normal and one month quiet. This works out at about 36,000 Infantry casualties. It is assumed for purposes of calculation that these casualties will be suffered at the rate of 6,000 a month. It was felt also that the pool could diminish progressively by about 1,600 a month thereby emerging at end of June at a strength of 5,000 as opposed to the original strength of 15,000. It was assumed further recoverable casualties will be at about 1,400 a month. Hence the requirement of 3,000 Infantry reinforcements from Canada per month.

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As stated above it was assumed for purposes of calculation that casualties will be suffered at an equal rate of 6,000 per month. This is unlikely to happen in practice. It is always possible that within the first two months of the year casualties at the intense rate might be suffered for from four to six weeks. A pool is necessary for this purpose. Without an adequate pool there would be no means of replenishing heavy casualties when they were in excess of our estimated casualties and there would be no means of meeting the progressively increasing monthly deficiencies beginning at 31 Dec 44.

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N.R.M.A.

C272555

As at 27 Sep 44:

Total Strength N.R.M.A.	68,489
Less on extended leave	8,743
Total in Service	59,746

Trained as Infantry	16,000	
Age and category suitable for Inf.	26,000	
Total potential Inf.		42,000
Remainder - being unavailable as Infantry		17,746

Provided shipping offered is accepted by 5 Nov 44 it is estimated that 8,000 N.R.M.A. trained infantry could be made available in theatre by mid January. It is estimated that an additional 7,000 could be despatched and made available by mid February.

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CANADIAN ARMY OVERSEAS

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "A" C 272556

STATEMENT SHOWING PROJECTED INFANTRY REINFORCEMENT SITUATION OVERSEAS AS AT END OF EACH MONTH NOV 44 - MAY 45

Deficiency beginning of Month		Becoming Available during Month: Recoveries from Casualties	From Remusterings & from Arrivals from Canada prior to 25 OCT	From Arrivals from Canada subsequent to 25 OCT		TOTAL	Estimated Gross Casualties during Month	Deficiency end of Month	Progression of Availability from Training Establishments in UK
44 (25 OCT)		1,700	7,150			8,850	9,000	30 NOV - 150	DEC 3,600
DEC	150	1,400	1,200	2,400	Infantry	5,000	7,200	31 DEC 2,350	JAN 3,600
JAN 45	2,350	1,400	2,090	900 700	Infantry Other Arms	5,000	6,000	31 JAN 3,350	FEB 3,000
FEB	3,350	1,400	-	2,200 800	Infantry Other Arms	4,400	6,000	28 FEB 4,950	MAR 4,250
MAR	4,950	1,400	-	2,250 1,500 500	Infantry NCO's and Tradesmen Lower Pulhems	5,650	6,000	31 MAR 5,300	APR 2,200
APR	5,300	1,400	-	2,250	Infantry	3,650	6,000	30 APR 7,650	MAY 2,000
MAY	7,650	1,400	-	2,000	Infantry	3,400	6,000	31 MAY 10,250	JUN 2,000
		10,100	10,350	15,500		35,950	46,200		

S. 9011-7-8 (DAG(A))
CT 44

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TOP SECRET

CANADIAN ARMY OVERSEAS

STATEMENT SHOWING NUMBER OF INFANTRY REINFORCEMENTS BECOMING AVAILABLE AS PROJECTED

APPENDIX "B"

FOR PERIOD COMMENCING 25 OCT 44

					1944 NOV	DEC	1945 JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL
OCT 44	RFTS Trained or in TRAINING (25 OCT)												
		UK	6,250										
		21 Army Gp	1,200										
		AAI	900	8,350	7,150	1,200							
	Balance Remustering in UK			2,000			2,000						
				10,350									
NOV	From Canada (10 NOV)	Infantry		2,400		2,400							
		Other Arms to be remustered		700			700						
	" " (23 NOV)	Infantry		900			900						
		Other Arms to be remustered		800				800					
DEC	" " (16 DEC)	Infantry		1,375				1,375					
		NCO's and tradesmen		750					750				
	" " Late	Infantry		825				825					
		NCO's and Tradesmen		750					750				
		Lower Pulhems		500					500				
				9,000	7,150	3,600	3,600	3,000	2,000				
JAN 45	From Canada			2,250					2,250				
FEB	" "			2,250						2,250			
MAR	" "			2,000							2,000		
APR	" "			2,000								2,000	
MAY	" "			2,000									2,000
				10,500					4,250				
NOV 44	Recoveries from Casualties			1,700	1,700								
DEC	" " "			1,400		1,400							
JAN 45	" " "			1,400			1,400						
FEB	" " "			1,400				1,400					
MAR	" " "			1,400					1,400				
APR	" " "			1,400						1,400			
MAY	" " "			1,400							1,400		
				10,100									
				39,950	8,850	5,000	5,000	4,400	5,650	3,650	3,400	2,000	2,000

HQS 9011-7-8
30 OCT 44

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LEAVE.

The calculated reinforcement requirements make no provision for additional reinforcements required to carry any system of leave to Canada. By 31 Dec a substantial number of Canadian Troops (estimated at approximately 11000) will have been serving out of Canada for four continuous years, of which at least six months have been in an active theatre of operations. The institution of leave to Canada would have a most beneficial effect upon morale and must be most seriously considered, particularly in the case of those troops serving in Italy who now face their second winter under very difficult battle conditions.

Institution of leave to Canada on a basis of 500 individuals per month returning to Canada would involve 500 additional reinforcements per month, for the months of November, December, January and February. By March the return flow would eliminate the requirement except to the extent that personnel granted leave had for various reasons remained in Canada. The estimate of this loss is 50% of those being granted leave, which would mean that in March and succeeding months there would be a drain on the reinforcement stream of 250 per month additional to all battle, sickness and accident casualties.

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C 272558A

MS Notes (PM)

October 22, 1944

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C 272559

OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER

MEMORANDUM

Kingsmere
Sunday morning
Oct 22, 1944

P.M. & P.Ms as revised Sunday afternoon

~~London Cables~~

1/ I am fearful lest the most critical Situation, since the summer 1939, confronts Canada today that there is. It is beset with possible consequences so dangerous to the reputation of Canada's war effort in Europe and Asia, & to the future of Canada, and to future relations between Canada and other parts of the Commonwealth & between the Commonwealth & the United States of America, and to all international activities and policies, including those of being considered with respect to world organization for the maintenance of world peace that I dare not leave Ottawa at this time. I should like to be talking to you, and to all Canadians by radio this evening. All the crucial matters & all the critical junctures that I want to discuss with you & the Canadian people, and in advance of the Situation, and in advance of the meetings

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OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER C272560

MEMORANDUM

In your opinion ~~when is the opportune~~ in London
~~Selection~~ consideration as they are
at the moment or are likely to
become ~~unsatisfactory~~ at any time
~~in the~~ before the conclusion of
the war render it necessary that
Staff talks in London should.

~~The~~ The ~~Cabinet~~ War Committee of
~~the~~ Cabinet had ~~previously~~ this day
the 19th inst a report ~~of~~ from General Stewart, ~~the Chief~~
the Chief of Staff of the Canadian Army
~~Staff~~ now returning with GOC Nfld Force
the views of Defence
from England on the Overseas Army
~~in the West Indies~~ recommending that
Colonel Stewart should
come in case General [illegible]
and

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OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER

MEMORANDUM

3. ~~The question has recommended itself~~ would commend itself to Parliament if consideration were given to any ~~plan~~ recommendation for terminating conscription should commend itself to Parliament that Parliament should be reassembled ~~as~~ not later than January 31st 1945; ~~a decision~~ the most convenient decision in the House of Commons, ~~with a question~~ ~~to be followed by an immediate~~ conscription, ~~is~~ to be put through under closure ~~the only~~ the adoption of closure as a means without undue discussion of obtaining a decision ~~from the House on the question of conscription~~ to be recommended ~~and the~~ by the Government and of the Government ~~that~~ the House ~~for the~~ and ~~the~~ certainly a dissolution of Parliament ~~itself~~, with a General election

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OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER

MEMORANDUM

5/. I should—if parliament could be brought together before November, the last week of the first month, I think it would be the middle of the month or the 2nd or third week of November that the discussion in parliament might take place. The end of November, ~~the application of the~~ allowing for such a ~~use of closure and the~~ business as the time is behind each of the question. Assuming ~~the~~ ~~election of December 1st~~ an election on November 15th or Nov. 30th, it would be January 15th or January 30th before the results of the election would be known, and even then there would be an interval ~~of~~ before parliament could ~~be~~ ~~summoned~~ and ~~the~~ ~~new~~ ~~ministry~~ ~~could be~~ ~~sworn in~~. A new parliament would have to be summoned ~~by proclamation~~ and ~~the~~ ~~new~~ ~~ministry~~ ~~could be~~ ~~sworn in~~ before legislation could be enacted ~~for~~ ~~the~~ ~~coming~~ ~~year~~ ~~or~~ ~~complete~~ ~~session~~ could be enacted ~~by~~ ~~the~~ ~~end~~ ~~of~~ ~~December~~ ~~or~~ ~~January~~ ~~1st~~ ~~at~~ ~~the~~ ~~latest~~ ~~for~~ ~~the~~ ~~coming~~ ~~year~~ ~~or~~ ~~complete~~ ~~session~~ ~~could~~ ~~be~~ ~~enacted~~

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OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER

MEMORANDUM

extending over two months, thus
[illegible] required by our election acts or
~~short notice~~ so as to prevent of
obtaining the vote of the absent
electors in different parts of the
world. [illegible] in the election would be
confusion
for service overseas, [illegible] as necessary
~~to~~ to maintain the Canadian
Army at full strength ~~for~~ for the
duration of the war in Europe or during
running of the war. ~~This~~
~~This must mean~~ This means
~~and I can see no way to~~
~~obtain any provision~~, [illegible] As a
the consequence [illegible] of a
general election in the midst
~~has already been~~ announced,
[illegible] ago,

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OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER

MEMORANDUM

~~the terms of the present parliament~~ ~~being about to expire~~, ? can ~~~~ ~~consistently~~ see no escape from the ~~~~ ~~~~ ~~~~

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OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER

MEMORANDUM

[illegible] to my suggestion re, [illegible]
[illegible] the terms of the Treaty if
they can only [illegible] Treaty
enough, I feel disposed to
ask Dan think if Dan were
to [illegible] terms which
in Dan opinion the present
circumstances of the war, on the
Allied side, [illegible]
[illegible] the taking of [illegible] to help the Allied cause
the resist movement [illegible]
[illegible] to express the [illegible] response
-ment required for Canada's
[illegible]
in raising & conscription
Canada the Min. Stays in the war

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OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER

MEMORANDUM

~~re situation~~

~~and situation [illegible]~~

~~[illegible]~~

2/ ~~[illegible]~~ may do? decide as to ~~what~~ what ~~action~~ I am responsible. for a decision ~~[illegible]~~ from you, ~~[illegible]~~ ~~[illegible]~~ I am quite prepared as in my duty to ~~[illegible]~~ take responsibility for the wrong any decision ~~[illegible]~~ from the Canadian Government may take in relation to any matter in so far as it ~~[illegible]~~ relates ~~[illegible]~~ to the Canadian forces, ~~[illegible]~~ ~~[illegible]~~ ~~[illegible]~~ and the Canadian ~~[illegible]~~

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OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER

MEMORANDUM

~~I recognize however~~
that in this matter, I have a special
responsibility to bring to the attention
of Council what ~~seems~~ appears to me
in ~~this connection~~ the present circumstances
~~the~~ the ~~Government~~ decision ought and which
it cannot fail to have for meeting
efforts upon the immediate and
prospective efforts of all the United
Nations and in particular those
of the United Kingdom. I also
recognize that once a claim has
been brought ~~& the attention~~
~~of Japan pressed~~ upon the
British Government we have the
right our own ~~must be best responsible~~
Council ~~to~~ to take responsible
~~full~~ all aspects of the situation
~~and have not been~~ fully thought
out ~~by~~ that Government ~~and~~
~~the situation that must~~
~~have~~ arise ~~and~~ ~~consultation~~
~~with~~ [illegible]

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C272568

OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER

MEMORANDUM

91

have brought the matter ~~before~~ Cabinet

Have finally thought out before on the formulation of ~~the~~ proposal

and upon request to draft the proposed for the despatch of this matter has been

decision in these troubles cannot

fail to ~~be~~ blame for receiving officials

reminders and ~~suggestions~~, also

upon the ~~previous~~ efforts of the

and peace

United Nations, and ~~in~~ particular

and

that of the United Kingdom, ~~that~~

~~for~~ ~~for~~ the British Government as well as

~~that~~ of Canada, as the ~~leaders~~

~~for~~ for their reasoning ~~which~~ how fast it moves

to be adopted in their attitude and that those

of all concerned, and the

highest measure of ~~friendship~~

and ~~co~~operation in endeavouring

to find ~~the~~ solution ~~that~~

~~is to be brought to the satisfaction~~

that would ~~not~~ ~~injure~~ the

effective consequences ~~of~~ from

~~the~~

if ~~the~~ ~~the~~ a course cannot

be followed a course cannot

be found which would

avoid the results contained in

using in Canada ~~the~~ ~~the~~ ~~the~~ ~~the~~ ~~the~~

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OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER

MEMORANDUM

~~[illegible]~~ Eby

9 Mrs. Fleming is the first and only person seen in the ~~[illegible]~~ Legacy ~~[illegible]~~ I think more than I have felt it ~~[illegible]~~ important to ~~[illegible]~~

~~[illegible]~~

~~[illegible]~~

~~[illegible]~~

ascertain your views before deciding on a matter of policy which ~~[illegible]~~ for the Government to decide ~~[illegible]~~ French Delegation ~~[illegible]~~ anything but ~~[illegible]~~ Canadian to in the meanings I know you will appreciate why I feel it of the ~~[illegible]~~ important ~~[illegible]~~ ascertain your mind in so far as any must express

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OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER

MEMORANDUM

Ukrainian bishops & general discussion
re visit of
12 Kindest regards.
I am glad to receive the
Pope's recent meeting with State
Dept and such relationships exist

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C 272571

CORRESPONDENCE

BETWEEN

The PRIME MINISTER

AND

The Honourable J. L. RALSTON, M.P.,

relative to the resignation of Mr. Ralston
as Minister of National Defence

NOVEMBER 1st to NOVEMBER 14th, 1944

OTTAWA
EDMOND CLOUTIER
PRINTER TO THE KING'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY
1944

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C272572

Correspondence between The Prime Minister and The Honourable J. L. Ralston, M.P., relative to the resignation of Mr. Ralston as Minister of National Defence, November 1st to November 14th, 1944

Hon. J. L. Ralston, M.P., to the Prime Minister, November 1, 1944

MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE
CANADA

November 1st, 1944.

Right Honourable W. L. MACKENZIE KING, P.C., M.P.,
Prime Minister of Canada,
Ottawa, Canada.

Dear Mr. PRIME MINISTER:

When I returned on October 18th from a visit to the Canadian troops in Italy, in Northwestern Europe and the United Kingdom, I felt compelled to recommend as a result of my own observations and inquiries in the battle theatres, and on the information and advice received from my officers, that due to Infantry casualties being much greater than had been forecasted on the best information available, it had become necessary to secure substantial numbers of additional trained Infantry personnel in order to make reasonable provision for the reinforcement of our troops overseas.

Since it appeared clear to me that enough volunteer personnel could not be made available to meet the need, I considered that I had no alternative but to recommend that N.R.M.A. personnel be sent overseas as reinforcements. I felt that this was necessary to fulfil our pledges to our fighting men.

The whole question was discussed at very considerable length both at meetings of the Cabinet and of the War Committee of the Cabinet. My recommendation was not accepted.

Alternatives were suggested such as reducing our commitments or breaking up units or formations. I felt I could not concur in this when these trained N.R.M.A. men were available; and that at this crucial period Canada's duty was to support our men in the line, and not to relax but to go on with the task to help shorten the war and speed the victory.

It was suggested that, if a further appeal were made to trained N.R.M.A. personnel by Ministers of the Crown and others, such personnel might volunteer for General Service in sufficient numbers to meet the need. This suggestion involved delays which I considered would be serious if the appeal was not successful. Consequently I wished to be assured that it was Government policy that if, after the appeal, the need for reinforcements overseas still existed and volunteers were not available, N.R.M.A. personnel would be sent. This was the course which I and some other colleagues had understood would follow from your speech in 1942. It was in effect what I, as Minister, have repeatedly said in the House since then.

No such assurance was forthcoming. On the contrary it has developed in the discussions that the Government as a whole (certain colleagues excepted) do not consider that your speech committed the Government to this course.

I consider myself bound by what I have said in the House. Our differences are fundamental on the vital matter of reinforcing our troops, and consequently and as requested by you, I at once tender my resignation as Minister of National Defence.

In the stand I have taken I have considered that my first thought should be my duty to our fighting men in our Overseas Army.

I wish every success to the distinguished citizen who I understand will take up the duties of this Department, and at the same time I want to express to you my very sincere appreciation of the opportunity I have had of serving in Canada's war activities.

Yours very sincerely,

(Sgd.) J. L. RALSTON.

22052—1½

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The Prime Minister to Hon. J. L. Ralston, M.P., November 3, 1944

OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER
CANADA

OTTAWA, November 3, 1944

The Honourable J. L. RALSTON, M.P.,
Mayfair Apartments,
Ottawa.

Dear Colonel RALSTON:

I thank you for your letter of the 1st instant which I received while at a meeting of the Cabinet yesterday forenoon. I regret that until today I have not had an opportunity to send you a reply.

You will recall that it was not until the 19th of October that you informed the Cabinet War Committee that you had received a report from the Chief of Staff at Canadian Military Headquarters in London, stating that the future effective maintenance of our forces in the two theatres of operations required that additional personnel be made available from Canada.

This was the first report made to the government that the army's reinforcement position was causing concern. You will recall the assurance given the Cabinet during the first week of August, that additional military commitments then being sought would not adversely affect this position. During discussions at Quebec, at the time of the Conference in September, when future plans for the Canadian army, navy and air force were being considered, no intimation was given of any prospective insufficiency of reinforcements for the Canadian army.

From the 19th of October, as you are aware, the Cabinet has been giving its time almost exclusively to a most careful study of the whole situation, exploring every possible aspect of it, but without deciding upon any of the courses explored.

There is one paragraph in your letter to which I regret I must take exception. You say, "Our differences are fundamental on the vital matter of reinforcing our troops, and consequently, as requested by you, I at once tender my resignation as Minister of National Defence". Surely you are in error when you say that "our differences are fundamental on the vital matter of reinforcing our troops". From the outset, the government has been agreed that the matter of reinforcing our troops was "vital". I have never agreed to a single increase in our military commitments without first asking and receiving assurances that the additional commitment would not jeopardize our capacity to provide needed reinforcements. The only difference which exists is one of the method or methods of meeting this fundamental vital necessity.

In your letter you also say "In the stand I have taken I have considered that my first thought should be my duty to our fighting men in our overseas Army". I need scarcely say that I have always had the same thought and conception of duty towards all of our fighting men. It is for this reason that I have striven as I have to see that Canada's effort in the present war should be the maximum of which our country is capable. That is why I feel so strongly that at the present time no course of action should be taken if it can possibly be avoided, which, while not certain of accomplishing its purpose, would divide the country and thereby prejudice much that has been so magnificently accomplished throughout more than five years of war—and this on the eve of certain victory.

I have made it clear that I am prepared to follow the course outlined in my speeches in parliament in 1942, if that course should ever be necessary, but I do not believe that it has become necessary.

There has not been a time since the war began that it has not been recognized that resort to conscription for service overseas would occasion the most serious controversy that could arise in Canada. I can think of no course of action fraught with greater danger to our war effort—to say nothing of the unity and strength of Canada today and for generations to come—than a general election at this late stage of war on the conscription issue. I believe that such an issue would almost certainly arise were the House of Commons to be asked to endorse an Order in Council extending the terms of service of N.R.M.A. personnel to include service overseas. Until it is apparent that conscription for overseas service is necessary to the full support of Canada's forces overseas, and that its application would prove effective, the Government would not be justified in taking the risk of widespread national dissension.

As to any request by me for your resignation, you will recall that on several occasions you stated that if the recommendation contained in the report of the Chief of Staff was formally made to the Cabinet and not accepted, you would feel compelled to resign, in view of what you had said in parliament. Subsequently you stated that you saw clearly that the Cabinet were not disposed to accept your recommendation. In view of your possible resignation on these grounds, I felt it necessary to ascertain the views of General McNaughton. This I did, and ascertained that General McNaughton was not satisfied that compulsory service was necessary to provide full support for the army overseas. In reply to my further inquiries, General McNaughton indicated to me that, with the co-operation of the Cabinet, he believed it would be possible to obtain the necessary reinforcements by voluntary means, and that in this belief he would be prepared to assume the responsibility of Minister of National

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The Prime Minister to Hon. J. L. Ralston, M.P.,
November 3, 1944

OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER
CANADA

OTTAWA, November 3, 1944

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Mayfair Apartments,
Ottawa.

Dear Colonel RALSTON:

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You will recall that it was not until the 19th of October that you informed the Cabinet War Committee that you had received a report from the Chief of Staff at Canadian Military Headquarters in London, stating that the future effective maintenance of our forces in the two theatres of operations required that additional personnel be made available from Canada.

This was the first report made to the government that the army's reinforcement position was causing concern. You will recall the assurance given the Cabinet during the first week of August, that additional military commitments then being sought would not adversely affect this position. During discussions at Quebec, at the time of the Conference in September, when future plans for the Canadian army, navy and air force were being considered, no intimation was given of any prospective insufficiency of reinforcements for the Canadian army.

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REPEAT
REPETER

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Defence should you resign. In these circumstances, I expressed the opinion that there should not be further delay in reaching a decision.

I cannot express to you too sincerely my own thanks for your great services as a colleague in the years we have shared the responsibilities of office. Nor can I too warmly express my recognition of what your services in all war activities have meant to Canada in these most difficult years.

Yours very sincerely,

(Sgd.) W. L. MACKENZIE KING.

Hon. J. L. Ralston, M.P., to the Prime Minister, November 6, 1944

J. L. RALSTON

OTTAWA, November 6, 1944.

Right Honourable W. L. MACKENZIE KING, P.C., M.P.,
Prime Minister of Canada,
Ottawa, Canada.

Dear PRIME MINISTER:

Your letter of November 3rd came to my apartment very late in the evening of that date. On consideration I felt that it called for an answer, and I regret that over the week-end imperative matters which I could not escape have prevented my writing you earlier.

In the second, third and fourth paragraphs of your letter you appear to imply that the main issue was in some way affected by the fact that the need to provide for additional Infantry reinforcements was not reported by me until October 19th on my return from my overseas inspection trip. I think this has really no bearing on the issue of sending N.R.M.A. men as reinforcements or on my recommendation to that effect. If it has any bearing it seems to underline the urgency of the necessity which I reported. I cabled you from London on October 13th indicating my apprehensions. I reported to you personally on the 18th, the same day I arrived home. I reported to War Committee the next day. I do not think your letter represents all the information given by me to you or to War Committee or to Cabinet from time to time with regard to the reinforcement situation; but suffice it to say that I have not at any time withheld any information which appeared to require attention.

The point is that when I obtained information which led me to believe that the need for Infantry reinforcements could not be met by Departmental action alone, I so reported at the earliest possible date, and I presented this information as fully as possible with my recommendation for action. The fact that such information was not expected or was disturbing has no bearing, I think, on the essential question of the necessity which I presented.

Regarding the assurance as to reinforcements given in August: You refer to the combining of existing units in Italy into an Infantry Brigade. Any assurance on this point was given by the Officers who knew the situation, and as I have already told you, the Corps Commander advised me when I was in Italy recently that the casualties sustained by this Brigade were no greater than those which had been forecasted for the Units if they had operated separately.

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The discussions at Quebec, of which you make mention, had nothing to do with the reinforcement situation overseas, but were in connection with participation in the War against Japan.

The point is that we are faced with a practical situation which has to be met.

You take exception to my statement that "our differences are fundamental on the vital matter of reinforcements". I have given the facts regarding these differences in my letter of resignation. I think, when my recommendation has not been accepted, when there is disagreement between us as to what was the policy to which the Government committed itself in 1942, and when there is disagreement as to what is the present policy, that these are fundamental differences.

You say you are prepared to follow the course outlined in your speeches in Parliament in 1942 if that course should ever be necessary, but you do not believe it has become necessary. There is disagreement between us on the vital point as to the meaning of the word "necessary". Your view, recently expressed, is that you consider it means "necessary to win the war", "necessary to defend Canadian soil", "necessary to avert some great calamity or catastrophe". I took the word "necessary" to mean primarily "necessary to keep our Overseas Army reinforced". I always thought that this was the meaning given to the word in Council and Parliamentary discussions. There is, I think, a vital and fundamental difference between us on this point.

In my letter of resignation I said that my first thought was my duty to our fighting men in our Overseas Army. You say that for the proper accomplishment of this purpose nothing should be done which would divide the country, and in this connection you speak of a General Election.

I must point out that when Bill 80 was introduced and discussed in the House, nothing was said about an election. The declared procedure, as appears from your speeches, was that if the Government decided that it was necessary to send N.R.M.A. personnel overseas, it would go to Parliament, announce its decision, and ask for a vote of confidence, and that there would be no second debate on the question of conscription. You said that debate would have to be curtailed and that only a short time, if any, would be allowed for discussion. The suggestion now of a General Election on the matter is the introduction of a new condition not contemplated or discussed at the time Government policy was laid down two years ago.

You mention that you always received assurances that additional commitments would not jeopardize our capacity to provide needed

reinforcements. I recall that I have repeatedly said that I could not undertake that reinforcements would always be available wholly from volunteers. My point now is that due to an unexpectedly heavy proportion of Infantry casualties and the developments of the war we need trained reinforcements, which I consider on the best examination I can make of the situation are not available from volunteers. And we have unused manpower resources in the trained N.R.M.A. personnel, which I think we are bound to use.

In this connection I should remind you that all the formations which we are seeking to support today are formations which had been authorized by the Government and approved by Parliament previous to your speeches in 1942.

This brings me to your point about disunity in Canada. My speeches in the House make it clear, I think, that I have realized, from the first time the question was raised, the grave possibilities of division. That is why from the beginning to the end of my association with the Department of National Defence I have done everything I could to avoid it, and to maintain a wholly volunteer Army overseas. I have had regretfully to come to the conclusion that to make reasonable provision for reinforcements it was necessary to recommend action to make N.R.M.A. men available. It seemed obvious that some measure of difference or disunity could not be avoided whichever course were taken. What weighed so heavily with me in the stand I have taken were our pledges to our fighting men and indirectly to their families.

I want to thank you most sincerely for your very generous references to any services I may have rendered to Canada during these difficult years.

Yours very truly,

(Sgd.) J. L. RALSTON.

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The Prime Minister to Hon. J. L. Ralston, M.P., November 10, 1944

Secret

Ottawa,
November 10, 1944.

The Honourable J. L. RALSTON, K.C., M.P.,
Ottawa.

Dear Colonel RALSTON:

I have duly received your letter of November the 7th. It seems to call for one or two observations.

The statement in my letter of the 3rd instant, regarding the assurance as to reinforcements, given in August, has relation to the assurance specifically given at that time by the Chief of Staff to the War Committee of the Cabinet that the reinforcement situation was satisfactory. You will recall that the matter arose out of proposals submitted by you on the recommendation of Lt.-General Stuart for the authorization of certain additional personnel for various units and formations of the army overseas, including the formation of the additional infantry brigade to which you refer. The assurance sought and given had direct reference to the state of the reinforcement pool.

The reference in my letter to the discussions at Quebec was not to any specific matter discussed there, but rather to the fact that no question of any possible need of additional reinforcements was raised at that time. If, on September 14th, at the time members of our War Committee and our own Chiefs of Staff were in conference with Mr. Churchill and the British Chiefs of Staff, and the probable duration of the war and the future employment of our forces were under discussion, there was any possibility of our having to resort to conscription to obtain additional reinforcements for the army, before the end of the war in Europe, surely that possibility should have been made known. In the absence of any such information, members of the Cabinet were entitled to assume that the reinforcement situation continued to be satisfactory.

What was meant by the word "necessary" as used in my speeches in parliament in 1942, will I think be wholly clear from the context as it appears in Hansard. I think you are in error in attributing to me any different significance to the word "necessary" than that which it has in my speeches in parliament.

The reference to a general election in my letter, as in our previous discussion on the matter, was not to its being *"a condition"* to the application of conscription under existing legislation, but to a general election being an almost inevitable *consequence* of any such attempt

to impose conscription at this stage of the war. I felt that this possibility must be taken into account as it bears directly upon the question of the best method of securing additional trained men for overseas service. In deciding upon the best method for the attainment of a given aim, it is imperative to take into account the probable, as well as any known consequences of each and every possible course of action.

In your letter you recognize the grave possibilities of division resulting from the course you recommended. It is because I took so grave a view of the probable division which would result, and of the possibility that disunity and division in the country might seriously weaken our support for the army, as well as for other phases of our war effort, that I believed it was preferable to redouble our efforts to secure the required results by voluntary means, including a special appeal to the N.R.M.A. personnel and a review of the employment of the very considerable number of General Service personnel serving in Canada and the United Kingdom.

Yours very sincerely,

(Sgd.) W. L. MACKENZIE KING.

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The Prime Minister to Hon. J. L. Ralston, M.P., November 10, 1944

OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER
CANADA

Confidential

OTTAWA, November 10, 1944

The Honourable J. L. RALSTON, K.C., M.P.,
Ottawa.

Dear Colonel RALSTON:

I notice that in a reply to a request for an explanatory statement on your resignation, which appeared in the press of the 7th instant, you are reported as having said that you feel "that responsibility for informing the public belongs primarily to the Prime Minister". With this, of course, I am in complete accord, and in the broadcast I made on Wednesday night (the 8th instant), I sought to discharge that responsibility.

The report added that you had said you recognized that in this matter the public and the armed forces were entitled to full information consistent with military security. With this also, I agree.

The report continues: "I would assume, said Colonel Ralston in his statement, that the Prime Minister would inform the public of the circumstances by making available my letter of resignation and any further correspondence between us in the matter. The correspondence will speak for itself. I therefore refrain from making any statement at present".

In addition to the obligation upon a member of a government to respect military secrecy in making information public, there is also the obligation of secrecy respecting Cabinet deliberations, imposed by the oath of the Members of the Privy Council, "to keep close and secret all such matters as shall be treated, debated and resolved on in Privy Council, without publishing or disclosing the same, or any part thereof, by word, writing or any otherwise to any person out of the same Council, but to such only as be of the Council."

The Privy Councillor's oath is not less binding upon the Prime Minister than upon all other members of the Privy Council. It is an obligation I am bound to respect, one of which I must take the fullest account in considering the course to be pursued in making available to the public the correspondence which has passed between us concerning your resignation.

I have the added responsibility for which I will be held accountable by parliament, of advising the Crown as to the time and place at which publicity should be given to such communications. This responsibility is particularly great at a time of war.

In your letter of November 1st you say: "The whole question was discussed at very considerable length both at meetings of the Cabinet and of the War Committee of the Cabinet". In subsequent paragraphs you proceed to set forth matters which were "treated and debated" in Council.

I cannot feel that I would be justified, in the light of this obligation, in advising the publication of those portions of your letter relating to the deliberations in Council or of those portions of my reply referring to what you have said respecting these discussions.

I believe there should be an exchange of letters between us with respect to which no question as to the propriety of publication could arise.

Yours very sincerely,

(Sgd.) W. L. MACKENZIE KING.

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Hon. J. L. Ralston, M.P., to the Prime Minister, November 14, 1944

J. L. RALSTON

OTTAWA, November 14, 1944.

Right Honourable W. L. MACKENZIE KING, P.C., M.P.,
Prime Minister of Canada,
Ottawa, Canada.

Dear Mr. PRIME MINISTER:

I have your letter of November 10th marked "Secret", in reply to mine. (It refers to my letter of November 7th; I presume you mean my letter of November 6th.)

With reference to the assurances given by the responsible Officers to the War Committee, I had the same assurances as you, and as explained to me and to you the changed situation arises from the unexpectedly heavy proportion of Infantry casualties.

Regarding the meeting at Quebec, I still think that this has, for the reasons mentioned in my letter of November 6th, really no relevance to my recommendation.

You speak as if "any possibility" of having to resort to conscription for overseas service had not been in mind. May I point out that your speeches in 1942 envisage that very possibility, and the initiation and passing of Bill 80 was in the light of that possibility.

You will recall also that I went to you at Quebec regarding certain reports I had heard as to your expressed attitude on this matter; and the fact that I asked you, and you gave me, your assurance then that you would stand by your speeches in 1942, indicates that, at least in my mind, the possibility still existed; although I must say that at the time I had no expectation of the developments which have since occurred.

As a matter of fact, it was, I think, at the next meeting of War Committee following the Quebec Conference that I did indicate, as a result of further information received in the meantime, the possibility of difficulties regarding Infantry reinforcements and the necessity, in my view, for keeping N.R.M.A. personnel available in the light of the uncertainties.

May I again come back to the real crux of this matter, which is the actual and urgent situation which I reported instantly on my return from overseas, and which I considered left me no alternative but to recommend as I did.

Yours very truly,

(Sgd.) J. L. RALSTON.

Hon. J. L. Ralston, M.P., to the Prime Minister, November 14, 1944

J. L. RALSTON

OTTAWA, November 14, 1944.

Right Honourable W. L. MACKENZIE KING, P.C., M.P.,
Prime Minister of Canada,
Ottawa, Canada.

Dear Mr. PRIME MINISTER:

I have your letter of November 10th regarding the release of my letter of resignation and the further correspondence between us.

I do not think there could be any injury to security whatever in publishing the letter and the correspondence, particularly in view of the information given to the public in the speeches by yourself and the Minister of National Defence and by the Minister of Justice.

Regarding Privy Council secrecy, I feel I ought to point out that your own speech of November 8th contains references to matters treated, debated and resolved in Council discussions, and I am sure these references would not have been made had you not considered that they were permissible. Furthermore, you had no hesitation in May 1942 in publishing the correspondence regarding Honourable Mr. Cardin's resignation, which contained references to Council discussions.

In any case, permission to make such matters public is vested in the Crown, and since the matter is of intense public interest I beg most respectfully to suggest that you advise His Excellency to assent to the release of my letter and the further correspondence.

Your very truly,

(Sgd.) J. L. RALSTON.

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OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER

MEMORANDUM

Original Letter from Col. Ralston dated November 1, 1944, and top carbon of Prime Minister's Reply, dated November 3, 1944, filed* in a brown envelope (marked "Ralston") on top shelf of safe.

* transferred to PM's ring binder Nov 15/44

November 5 the two letters mentioned were, by the Prime Minister's direction, placed in a sealed envelope and delivered personally into the Hands of the Governor General at Government House (7:03 p.m.)

J. A. G.

returned by Gov Gen 1007
filed in PM's ring binder

See also docket at end of this binder

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C 272587

OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER

MEMORANDUM

Copy No. 1 of Ralston letter, together with carbon No. 2 of Prime Minister's letter delivered in a sealed envelope personally to General McNaughton by Roger (12:50 p.m.)

November 4, 1944

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COPY

C 272588

2

MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE
CANADA

November 1st, 1944

Right Honourable W. L. Mackenzie King, P.C., M.P.,
Prime Minister of Canada,
Ottawa, Canada.

Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

When I returned on October 18th from a visit to the Canadian troops in Italy, in Northwestern Europe and the United Kingdom, I felt compelled to recommend as a result of my own observations and inquiries in the battle theatres, and on the information and advice received from my officers, that due to Infantry casualties being much greater than had been forecasted on the best information available, it had become necessary to secure substantial numbers of additional trained Infantry personnel in order to make reasonable provision for the reinforcement of our troops overseas.

Since it appeared clear to me that enough volunteer personnel could not be made available to meet the need, I considered that I had no alternative but to recommend that N.R.M.A. personnel be sent overseas as reinforcements. I felt that this was necessary to fulfil our pledges to our fighting men.

The whole question was discussed at very considerable length both at meetings of the Cabinet and of the War Committee of the Cabinet. My recommendation was not accepted.

Alternatives were suggested such as reducing our commitments or breaking up units or formations. I felt I could not concur in this when these trained N.R.M.A. men were available; and that at this crucial period Canada's duty was to support our men in the line, and not to relax but to go on with the task to help shorten the war and speed the victory.

It was suggested that, if a further appeal were made to trained N.R.M.A. personnel by Ministers of the Crown and others, such personnel might volunteer for General Service

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C 272589

in sufficient numbers to meet the need. This suggestion involved delays which I considered would be serious if the appeal was not successful. Consequently I wished to be assured that it was Government policy that if, after the appeal, the need for reinforcements overseas still existed and volunteers were not available, N.R.M.A. personnel would be sent. This was the course which I and some other colleagues had understood would follow from your speech in 1942. It was in effect what I, as Minister, have repeatedly said in the House since then.

No such assurance was forthcoming. On the contrary it has developed in the discussions that the Government as a whole (certain colleagues excepted) do not consider that your speech committed the Government to this course.

I consider myself bound by what I have said in the House. Our differences are fundamental on the vital matter of reinforcing our troops, and consequently and as requested by you, I at once tender my resignation as Minister of National Defence.

In the stand I have taken I have considered that my first thought should be my duty to our fighting men in our Overseas Army.

I wish every success to the distinguished citizen who I understand will take up the duties of this Department, and at the same time I want to express to you my very sincere appreciation of the opportunity I have had of serving in Canada's war activities.

Yours very sincerely,

"J. L. RALSTON"

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C 272590

final
3

Ottawa,
November 5, 1944

The Honourable J. L. Ralston, M.P.,
Mayfair Apartments,
O t t a w a.

Dear Colonel Ralston:

I thank you for your letter of the 1st instant which I received while at a meeting of the Cabinet yesterday forenoon. I regret that until today I have not had an opportunity to send you a reply.

You will recall that it was not until the 19th of October that you informed the Cabinet War Committee that you had received a report from the Chief of Staff at Canadian Military Headquarters in London, stating that the future effective maintenance of our forces in the two theatres of operations required that additional personnel be made available from Canada.

This was the first report made to the government that the army's reinforcement position was causing concern. You will recall the assurance given the Cabinet during the first week of August, that additional military commitments then being sought would not adversely affect this position. During discussions at Quebec, at the time of the Conference in September, when future plans for the Canadian army, navy and air force were being considered, no intimation was given of any prospective insufficiency of reinforcements for the Canadian army.

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From the 19th of October, as you are aware, the Cabinet has been giving its time almost exclusively to a most careful study of the whole situation, exploring every possible aspect of it, but without deciding upon any of the courses explored.

There is one paragraph in your letter to which I regret I must take exception. You say, "Our differences are fundamental on the vital matter of reinforcing our troops, and consequently, as requested by you, I at once tender my resignation as Minister of National Defence". Surely you are in error when you say that "our differences are fundamental on the vital matter of reinforcing our troops". From the outset, the government has been agreed that the matter of reinforcing our troops was "vital". I have never agreed to a single increase in our military commitments without first asking and receiving assurances that the additional commitment would not jeopardize our capacity to provide needed reinforcements. The only difference which exists is one of the method or methods of meeting this fundamental vital necessity.

In your letter you also say "In the stand I have taken I have considered that my first thought should be my duty to our fighting men in our overseas Army." I need scarcely say that I have always had the same thought and conception of duty towards all of our fighting men. It is for this reason that I have striven as I have to see that Canada's effort in the present war should be the maximum of which our country is capable. That is why I feel so strongly that at the present time no course of action should be taken if it can possibly be avoided, which, while not certain of accomplishing its purpose, would divide the country and thereby prejudice much that has been so magnificently accomplished throughout more than five years of war - and this on the eve of certain victory.

I have made it clear that I am prepared to follow the course outlined in my speeches in parliament in 1942, if that course should ever be necessary, but I do not believe that it has become necessary.

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There has not been a time since the war began that it has not been recognised that resort to conscription for service overseas would occasion the most serious controversy that could arise in Canada. I can think of no course of action fraught with greater danger to our war effort - to say nothing of the unity and strength of Canada today and for generations to come - than a general election at this late stage of war on the conscription issue. I believe that such an issue would almost certainly arise were the House of Commons to be asked to endorse an Order in Council extending the terms of service of N.R.M.A. personnel to include service overseas. Until it is apparent that conscription for overseas service is necessary to the full support of Canada's forces overseas, and that its application would prove effective, the Government would not be justified in taking the risk of widespread national dissension.

As to any request by me for your resignation, you will recall that on several occasions you stated that if the recommendation contained in the report of the Chief of Staff was formally made to the Cabinet and not accepted, you would feel compelled to resign, in view of what you had said in parliament. Subsequently you stated that you saw clearly that the Cabinet were not disposed to accept your recommendation. In view of your possible resignation on these grounds, I felt it necessary to ascertain the views of General McNaughton. This I did, and ascertained that General McNaughton was not satisfied that compulsory service was necessary to provide full support for the army overseas. In reply to my further inquiries, General McNaughton indicated to me that, with the co-operation of the Cabinet, he believed it would be possible to obtain the necessary reinforcements by voluntary means, and that in this belief he would be prepared to assume the responsibility of Minister of National Defence should you resign. In these circumstances, I expressed the opinion that there should not be further delay in reaching a decision.

I cannot express to you too sincerely my own thanks for your great services as a colleague in the years we have shared the responsibilities of office. Nor can I

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too warmly express my recognition of what your services in all war activities have meant to Canada in these most difficult years.

Yours very sincerely,

(S'G'D.) W. L. MACKENZIE KING.

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C 272594

Top Secret
and Personal

Ottawa, November 4, 1944

General The Hon. A. G. L. McNaughton, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.,
Minister of National Defence,
O t t a w a.

Dear General McNaughton:

I enclose for your information and strictly confidential, personal file, copies of the letters which have passed between Colonel Ralston and myself with respect to his resignation.

Yours sincerely,

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OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER

MEMORANDUM

Replacement required
of Relation to PM
Nov 6/44

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COPY

Secret

Ottawa,
November 10, 1944

The Honourable J.L. Ralston, K.C., M.P.,

Ottawa.

Dear Colonel Ralston:

I have duly received your letter of November the 7th. It seems to call for one or two observations.

The statement in my letter of the 3rd instant, regarding the assurance as to reinforcements, given in August, has relation to the assurance specifically given at that time by the Chief of Staff to the War Committee of the Cabinet that the reinforcement situation was satisfactory. You will recall that the matter arose out of proposals submitted by you on the recommendation of Lt.-General Stuart for the authorization of certain additional personnel for various units and formations of the army overseas, including the formation of the additional infantry brigade to which you refer. The assurance sought and given had direct reference to the state of the reinforcement pool.

The reference in my letter to the discussions at Quebec was not to any specific matter discussed there, but rather to the fact that no question of any possible need of additional reinforcements was raised at that time. If, on September 14th, at the time members of our War Committee and our own Chiefs of Staff were in conference with Mr. Churchill and the British Chiefs of Staff, and the probable duration of the war and the future employment of our forces were under discussion, there was any possibility of our having to resort to conscription to obtain additional reinforcements for the army, before the end of the war in Europe, surely that possibility should have been made known. In the absence of any such information, members of the Cabinet

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were entitled to assume that the reinforcement situation continued to be satisfactory.

What was meant by the word "necessary" as used in my speeches in Parliament in 1942, will I think be wholly clear from the context as it appears in Hansard. I think you are in error in attributing to me any different significance to the word "necessary" than that which it has in my speeches in parliament.

The reference to a general election in my letter, as in our previous discussion on the matter, was not to its being "a condition" to the application of conscription under existing legislation, but to a general election being an almost inevitable consequence of any such attempt to impose conscription at this stage of the war. I felt that this possibility must be taken into account as it bears directly upon the question of the best method of securing additional trained men for overseas service. In deciding upon the best method for the attainment of a given aim, it is imperative to take into account the probable, as well as any known consequences of each and every possible course of action.

In your letter you recognise the grave possibilities of division resulting from the course you recommended. It is because I took so grave a view of the probable division which would result, and of the possibility that disunity and division in the country might seriously weaken our support for the army, as well as for other phases of our war effort, that I believed it was preferable to redouble our efforts to secure the required results by voluntary means, including a special appeal to the N.R.M.A. personnel and a review of the employment of the very considerable number of General Service personnel serving in Canada and the United Kingdom.

Yours very sincerely,

(Signed) W.L. Mackenzie King

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C O P Y

OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER
CANADA

C 272598

Confidential

Ottawa,
November 10, 1944

The Honourable J. L. Ralston, K.C., M.P.,

O t t a w a.

Dear Colonel Ralston:

I notice that in a reply to a request for an explanatory statement on your resignation, which appeared in the press of the 7th instant, you are reported as having said that you feel "that responsibility for informing the public belongs primarily to the Prime Minister". With this, of course, I am in complete accord, and in the broadcast I made on Wednesday night, (the 8th instant), I sought to discharge that responsibility.

The report added that you had said you recognised that in this matter the public and the armed forces were entitled to full information consistent with military security. With this also, I agree.

The report continues: "I would assume, said Colonel Ralston in his statement, that the Prime Minister would inform the public of the circumstances by making available my letter of resignation and any further correspondence between us in the matter. The correspondence will speak for itself. I therefore refrain from making any statement at present".

In addition to the obligation upon a member of a government to respect military secrecy in making information public, there is also the obligation of secrecy respecting Cabinet deliberations, imposed by the oath of the Members of the Privy Council, "to keep close and secret all such matters as shall be treated, debated and resolved on in Privy Council, without publishing or disclosing the same, or any part thereof, by word, writing or any otherwise to any person out of the same Council, but to such only as be of the Council."

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The Privy Councillor's oath is not less binding upon the Prime Minister than upon all other members of the Privy Council. It is an obligation I am bound to respect, one of which I must take the fullest account in considering the course to be pursued in making available to the public the correspondence which has passed between us concerning your resignation.

I have the added responsibility for which I will be held accountable by parliament, of advising the Crown as to the time and place at which publicity should be given to such communications. This responsibility is particularly great at a time of war.

In your letter of November 1st you say: "The whole question was discussed at very considerable length both at meetings of the Cabinet and of the War Committee of the Cabinet". In subsequent paragraphs you proceed to set forth matters which were "treated and debated" in Council.

I cannot feel that I would be justified, in the light of this obligation, in advising the publication of those portions of your letter relating to the deliberations in Council or of those portions of my reply referring to what you have said respecting these discussions.

I believe there should be an exchange of letters between us with respect to which no question as to the propriety of publication could arise.

Yours very sincerely,

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MEMORANDUM FROM MINISTER OF JUSTICE:

A letter from a resigning Minister to the Prime Minister referring to discussions in Cabinet is, it is to be noted, merely a private confidential letter. The Cabinet has no legal existence. The members of the Cabinet are Ministers of the Crown and resign as Ministers of the Crown, but their resignation in such case is to the Governor in Council.

It follows that the letter cannot be required to be produced by Parliament on an order for return or address to the Crown. It is, in the first place, not an official document and, in the second place, in any event is of a confidential character.

Discussions in Cabinet and statements relating to these discussions are confidential and cannot be revealed, without violation of the oath of a Privy Councillor, without consent given by or on behalf of the King. The following extracts set out the position:

Anson's Law and Custom of the Constitution, 4th ed. Vol. II, Part I, at pp. 120 and 121-2:

" "Closely connected with what has gone before is the secrecy which is imposed on ministers as to what passes in the Cabinet. Formally this depends on the oath of the Privy Councillor.....

"Disclosures of Cabinet discussions are now made only with permission of the Sovereign; and it is the practice that this permission should be obtained through the intervention of the Prime Minister, and that the disclosure should be strictly limited by the terms of the permission granted. Lord Melbourne remonstrated strongly with William IV on learning that Lord J. Russell had, without reference to the Prime Minister, received the King's permission to disclose in Parliament a correspondence between himself and Lord Durham, and the discussions in the Cabinet on which this correspondence was based: 'If the arguments in the Cabinet are not to be protected by an impenetrable vel of secrecy, there will be no place left in the public counsels for the free investigation of truth and the unshackled exercise of the understanding.' The lack of any record of Cabinet discussions may, at times when disclosures are permitted to be made, cause questions to be raised as to their accuracy. The irregular disclosures in 1931 showed the grave difficulty of determining the true state of facts. The rule of secrecy is usually waived to allow a minister who resigns to explain the grounds of his action."

Jennings on Cabinet Government, at p. 208:

"The Cabinet deliberates in secret; its proceedings are confidential. The Privy Councillor's oath imposes an obligation not to disclose information; and the Official Secrets Acts forbid the publication of Cabinet as well as other official documents. But the effective sanction is neither of these. The rule is, primarily, one of practice. Its theoretical basis is that a Cabinet decision is advice to the King, whose consent is necessary to its publication. Its practical foundation is the necessity of securing free discussion by which a compromise can be reached, without the risk of publicity for every statement made and every point given away.

"A minister who resigns from the Cabinet usually desires to make an explanation in Parliament. Since this involves an explanation of Cabinet discussions, he must secure the King's consent. For this purpose he asks permission through the Prime Minister. Lord Melbourne objected in 1834 to the King's giving consent without consultation with the Prime Minister as

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'subversive... of all the principles upon which the Government of this country has hitherto been conducted.' When Lord Derby resigned, he asked permission to state his reasons, and permission was given. But four months later he returned to the subject. This, the Queen said, 'is a most unusual and, she cannot hardly but think, hardly constitutional course.' In reply to Lord Derby's explanation, General Ponsonby wrote: 'Her Majesty expects that, whenever a Privy Councillor makes any statement in Parliament respecting proceedings in Her Majesty's Council, the Queen's permission to do so should be first solicited, and the object of the statement made clear; and that the permission thus given should only serve for the particular instance, and not be considered as an open licesence.' Lord Salisbury described this statement as "a valuable addition to Constitutional Law'".

Bagehot on The English Constitution, 2nd ed., at p. 14:

"The most curious point about the cabinet is that so very little is known about it. The meetings are not only secret in theory, but secret in reality. By the present practice, no official minute in all ordinary cases is kept of them. Even a private note is discouraged and disliked. The House of Commons, even in its most inquisitive and turbulent moments, would scarcely permit a note of a cabinet meeting to be read."

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Alpheus Todd on Parliamentary Government in England, Vol. II, 2nd ed., p. 84.

"The obligation of keeping the king's counsel inviolably secret is one that rests upon all cabinet ministers and others responsible advisers of the crown, by virtue of the oath which they take when they are made members of the Privy Council.

"As has been already observed, this secrecy is not a mere personal privilege or protection, either to the sovereign or to the minister, that may be waived by mutual consent; but is based upon constitutional principle and state policy, it being of the first importance that there should be entire freedom and immunity in the confidential intercourse between the crown and its immediate advisers, and that nothing which has passed in council should be afterwards disclosed so long as public injury might ensue from differences of opinion being known.

"Moreover, nothing that has passed between the sovereign and his ministers, in their confidential relations with each other, may be disclosed to any other person, or to either House of Parliament, without the express permission of the sovereign.

. . . . . .

And this permission would only be accorded for purposes of state, as to enable a minister to explain and justify to Parliament his political conduct. It would not be granted for the purpose of enabling Parliament to scrutinise the motives of a political act which was not itself impeachable on public grounds."

. . . . . .

"The papers and correspondence sought from government departments should be of public and official character and not private or confidential." May, p.692. "....the opinions of the law officers of the Crown given for the guidance of ministers in any question of diplomacy or state policy, being included in the class of confidential documents, have generally been withheld from Parliament." Correspondence passing between the Prime Minister and one of his ministers with reference to resignation would be private and confidential.

. . . . . .

".... Secrecy is, therefore, an essential part of the parliamentary system, and hence it is the habit, while making public the fact that a meeting of the cabinet has taken place, and the names of the members present, to give no statement of the business transacted. Not only is no official notice of the proceedings published, but it is no less important that they should not be in any way divulged. In fact, by a well-recognised custom, it is highly improper to refer in Parliament, or elsewhere, to what has been said or done at meetings of the cabinet, although reticence must at times place certain members in a very uncomfortable position. Occasionally it becomes well-nigh intolerable. This is true where a cabinet breaks up owing to dissensions over an issue that excites keen public interest, and in such cases the story of what happened may be told in a way that would be thought inexcusable under other circumstances." (Lowell, the Government of England, pp65-6)

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C 272603

COPY

J.L. RALSTON

OTTAWA

November 14, 1944.

Right Honourable W.L. Mackenzie King, P.C., M.P.,
Prime Minister of Canada,
OTTAWA, Canada.

Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

I have your letter of November 10th marked "Secret", in reply to mine. (It refers to my letter of November 7th; I presume you mean my letter of November 6th.)

With reference to the assurances given by the responsible Officers to the War Committee, I had the same assurances as you, and as explained to me and to you the changed situation arises from the unexpectedly heavy proportion of Infantry casualties.

Regarding the meeting at Quebec, I still think that this has, for the reasons mentioned in my letter of November 6th, really no relevance to my recommendation.

You speak as if "any possibility" of having to resort to conscription for overseas service had not been in mind. May I point out that your speeches in 1942 envisage that very possibility, and the initiation and passing of Bill 80 was in the light of that possibility.

You will recall also that I went to you at Quebec regarding certain reports I had heard as to your expressed attitude on this matter; and the fact that I asked you, and you gave me, your assurance then that you would stand by your speeches in 1942, indicates that, at least in my mind, the possibility still existed; although I must say that at the time I had no expectation of the developments which have since occurred.

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As a matter of fact, it was, I think, at the next meeting of War Committee following the Quebec Conference that I did indicate, as a result of further information received in the meantime, the possibility of difficulties regarding Infantry reinforcements and the necessity, in my view, for keeping N.R.M.A. personnel available in the light of the uncertainties.

May I again come back to the real crux of this matter, which is the actual and urgent situation which I reported instantly on my return from overseas, and which I considered left me no alternative but to recommend as I did.

Yours very truly,

(Signed) J. L. Ralston

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As a matter of fact, it was, I think, at the next meeting of War Committee following the Quebec Conference that I did indicate, as a result of further information received in the meantime, the possibility of difficulties regarding Infantry reinforcements and the necessity, in my view, for keeping R.C.A.F. personnel available in the light of the uncertainties.

May I again come back to the real crux of this matter, which is the actual and urgent situation which I reported instantly on my return from overseas, and which I considered left me no alternative but to recommend as I did.

Yours very truly,

(Signed) J. L. Ralston

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C 272605

COPY

J. L. RALSTON

OTTAWA

November 14, 1944

Right Honourable W.L. Mackenzie King, P.C., M.P.,
Prime Minister of Canada,
OTTAWA, Canada.

Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

I have your letter of November 10th regarding the release of my letter of resignation and the further correspondence between us.

I do not think there could be any injury to security whatever in publishing the letter and the correspondence, particularly in view of the information given to the public in the speeches by yourself and the Minister of National Defence and by the Minister of Justice.

Regarding Privy Council secrecy, I feel I ought to point out that your own speech of November 8th contains references to matters treated, debated and resolved in Council discussions, and I am sure these references would not have been made had you not considered that they were permissible. Furthermore, you had no hesitation in May 1942 in publishing the correspondence regarding Honourable Mr. Cardin's resignation, which contained references to Council discussions.

In any case, permission to make such matters public is vested in the Crown, and since the matter is of intense public interest I beg most respectfully to suggest that you advise His Excellency to assent to the release of my letter and the further correspondence.

Yours very truly,

(Signed) J. L. Ralston

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Confidential

C 272606

Ottawa,
November 15, 1944

A. D. P. Heeney, Esq., K.C.,
Clerk of the Privy Council,
East Block,
O t t a w a.

My dear Arnold:

I. I enclose herewith the original letter received from the Honourable Angus Macdonald, dated November 13th, and a draft of the reply which I propose to send to Macdonald.

I should be obliged if you would look over these two communications and show them to the Minister of Justice, and also to Mr. Robertson, giving me the benefit of your joint views.

2. I enclose copy of a draft letter to His Excellency the Governor General, which I should be pleased if you would also discuss with the Minister of Justice and Mr. Robertson.

3. You will notice that in the letter to His Excellency I speak of enclosing a file of correspondence. That file I shall send to you as soon as all of the letters have been copied. I should be grateful if you, the Minister of Justice, and Mr. Robertson would go over this file and give me the benefit of your joint opinion as to what portions of the letters between Colonel Ralston and myself should be eliminated. After this has been done, I should be glad to have you see Sir Shuldham Redfern and show him the proposed draft of my letter to the Governor General, so that, in case His Excellency may have any comments to make upon it, I may have these to consider before submitting a final letter.

Yours sincerely,

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Ottawa, November 16, 1944

The Honourable A. L. Macdonald, K.C., M.P.,
Minister of National Defence for Naval Services,
O t t a w a.

My dear Macdonald:

I wish to acknowledge your letter of November the 13th, which I have read and considered carefully.

The two questions which you raise relate directly to important Cabinet deliberations over the past few weeks, and which are still in progress. You will appreciate the reasons, therefore, which cause me to refrain, at the moment, from sending more than this line of acknowledgment. In the circumstances, I doubt if any good purpose would be served by my attempting to deal with these questions at length in further correspondence.

There is, however, one statement in your letter to which I feel I must draw your attention. In the paragraph on page two, referring to my remarks at the Reform Club at Quebec on September 14th, you write "In the course of your remarks there you said, in effect, 'We have said that we would apply conscription only if it would be absolutely necessary. It has not been necessary up to the present. Is it likely to become necessary, the war being in the stage which it has now reached? If it should become necessary, then some one else will have to enforce it and I will retire.'"

What I said at Quebec, in reference to the war in Europe, was in effect that conscription would not be resorted to unless it was necessary; that now it was apparent that the war was going to end soon, and that it would be the glory of the men overseas to be able to say they had enlisted voluntarily.

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After speaking of the war in Europe, I then turned to the war in Asia, and spoke of there being no likelihood of conscription being applied in the case of the troops being sent from Canada to fight Japan. It was in this connection - and in this connection only - that I used some words to the effect that, if it were decided to resort to conscription in the war against Japan, in such case, someone else would have to enforce it and that I would retire. You will recall that it had previously been agreed as government policy that there would be no conscription in the war against Japan. That was much in my mind at the time I spoke, and was what occasioned the reference.

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C 272609

Ottawa
November 17th, 1944

His Excellency
The Right Honourable The Earl of Athlone,
K.G., P.C., G.C.B., etc.,
Governor General of Canada,
Ottawa, Ontario.

My dear Governor General:

I have already shown to Your Excellency the correspondence exchanged between the former Minister of National Defence and myself, concerning his resignation, also the letters exchanged between us concerning the publication of this correspondence.

In a further letter, dated November the 14th, of which I am enclosing a copy, Colonel Ralston suggests that I advise Your Excellency to assent to the release of his letter of resignation and the further correspondence.

The House of Commons reassembles on Wednesday next, November the 22nd, and I shall be expected, at the opening of its proceedings, to make a statement upon the resignation of the former Minister of National Defence and to table such of the relevant correspondence as, in the circumstances, may be appropriate.

It now becomes necessary for me to advise Your Excellency as to the course to be pursued, inasmuch as the correspondence in question refers to discussions and deliberations in the Cabinet.

I have considered this question very carefully and have come to the conclusion that it is in the

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C 272609

Ottawa
November 17th, 1944

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K.G., P.C., G.C.B., etc.,
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It now becomes necessary for me to advise Your Excellency as to the course to be pursued, inasmuch as the correspondence in question refers to discussions and deliberations in the Cabinet.

I have considered this question very carefully and have come to the conclusion that it is in the

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public interest that all of the correspondence in question, including that concerning its publication, should be made available to the House of Commons and I so advise Your Excellency.

Had it not been that, notwithstanding the references made in my letter to him of the 10th instant, Colonel Ralston saw fit, on November the 12th, to issue an extensive public statement on the subject there might have been reasons of military security in addition to those of Cabinet secrecy which would have made it necessary for me to advise Your Excellency against permitting disclosure of certain portions of the correspondence which relate to the reinforcement position of the Army. In the circumstances, however, these reasons no longer obtain since the references in the correspondence, to which exception might have been taken on this ground, have already been made public in Colonel Ralston's statement which has been widely reproduced in the press.

I am, Your Excellency,

Yours very sincerely,

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C 272611 (COPY)

Minister of Mines and Resources

Ottawa
November 17, 1944

My dear King,

A week ago this evening, after Council, you handed me a reply to my letter to you of November 3rd. Since then I have been confined to my home by illness until today, and so have had to delay my reply until now.

May I say quite frankly that your letter was a disappointment to me. The urgency of the need for action in the matter of reinforcements does not appear to be in dispute. If they are to be supplied in time there is practically only one source from which they can come, and that is the pool of trained men called up under the N.R.M.A. This was indicated pretty clearly in your recent radio address.

There are only two methods whereby they may be made available; either by these men volunteering for active service overseas, or by conscripting them into overseas service. Frankly, I doubt very much if your appeal - or, indeed, any appeal which might be made - will produce the numbers required. No matter what we think about it, this question is being discussed today everywhere throughout Canada. It is being discussed in the camps where these men are training, and the controversy will not help to get the necessary number of volunteers. Because of the urgency of the matter, it appears to me quite definite that if the needed numbers are not secured from the fully-trained men available, within the next few weeks, then the Government has no recourse but to act under the powers conferred by "Bill 80".

There are two good reasons why this should be done.

Our Canadian soldiers, both in Italy and on the western front since Invasion Day, have brought great honour to Canada. Their losses have been considerable. There are many who will never return. Every ship which returns to our shores from Britain carries its quota of wounded men and they will continue to come in increasing numbers. Amidst the trials and dangers which our fighting infantry have to face, they should not be asked to go into battle with their ranks depleted, or to take lesser rest periods than they are entitled to, when there are over forty thousand infantry reinforcements available in Canada, forty percent of whom are

1

The Right Honourable W. L. Mackenzie King, P.C., Ph.D., M.P.,
Prime Minister of Canada,
Ottawa.

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practically fully trained. As I see it, this certainly is not keeping faith with our soldiers.

The second reason is that when "Bill 80" became law at least nine out of every ten people in Canada believed - and had a right to believe - that the Government meant to use its powers, should it become necessary in order to maintain the required reinforcements. What else could they think? Your own declarations, the declarations of your colleagues, including my own, could convey no other meaning; and all this applied with equal force when we all urged a "Yes" vote at the time of the plebiscite. In the speeches I made in support of an affirmative vote on the plebiscite my position was clearly taken, but no more clearly than that of many others, including those members of the Government who spoke in its support. That position was that if the Home Defence Army were needed to reinforce our Army Overseas it would be made available for that purpose.

Frankly, I feel that there is an obligation of honour here to keep faith with the people of Canada. You will reply that you do not propose to break faith with the people, and I certainly do not wish to suggest that you do; but there is no denying that the storm of indignation rising across Canada has its origin in a growing belief that the Government is trying to evade what the people believe were honest commitments. I am bound to say that the speech of the Minister of Justice in Quebec City on November 4th certainly did nothing to lessen this belief.

I am sorry I was not at Council when you brought forward the matter of calling the House together. You will agree, I am sure, that the Government should reach if possible a clear understanding of the course to be taken when it meets. But, in any event, I wish to make my own position clear. If the men have not come forward from this trained pool by voluntary enlistment by the end of the present month in the numbers required to meet the need, I would count myself remiss in my duty if I did not make it clear to you that I shall be unable longer to support the present policy.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd) T. A. Crerar

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C 272613

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CANADA

MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE
FOR NAVAL SERVICES

Ottawa, 18th November, 1944.

Dear Mr. King:-

Let me thank you for your letter of the 16th November in reply to mine of the 13th instant.

You say that my questions "relate directly to important Cabinet deliberations ..... which are still in progress". It is precisely because there is a direct relationship, and because that relationship is fundamental, that I wish to see the Government come to a decision on my questions. Without such a decision I do not think that the Cabinet deliberations can be brought to a logical head.

It seems to me particularly imperative that the Government should consider and decide these two questions before the House of Commons meets on Wednesday next.

With regard to your speech at the Reform Club in Quebec, my recollection on this point is clear. I am sorry that it does not coincide with yours. I am quite sure that you made use of the sentence, "If it" (conscription) "should become necessary, then some one else will have to enforce it and I will retire". That sentence stood by itself, complete and unmodified, and it referred to the Canadian war effort generally. With all respect, I must say that I do not think it can be qualified by words used later on to describe the nature or extent of our war effort against Japan.

Yours very truly,

(Sgd) A. L. Macdonald

Rt. Hon. W. L. Mackenzie King, P.C., M.P.,
Prime Minister of Canada,
Ottawa, Canada.

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C 272614 (C O P Y)

Minister of Mines and Resources

O t t a w a
November 17, 1944

My dear King,

A week ago this evening, after Council, you handed me a reply to my letter to you of November 3rd. Since then I have been confined to my home by illness until today, and so have had to delay my reply until now.

May I say quite frankly that your letter was a disappointment to me. The urgency of the need for action in the matter of reinforcements does not appear to be in dispute. If they are to be supplied in time there is practically only one source from which they can come, and that is the pool of trained men called up under the N.R.M.A. This was indicated pretty clearly in your recent radio address.

There are only two methods whereby they may be made available; either by these men volunteering for active service overseas, or by conscripting them into overseas service. Frankly, I doubt very much if your appeal - or, indeed, any appeal which might be made - will produce the numbers required. No matter what we think about it, this question is being discussed today everywhere throughout Canada. It is being discussed in the camps where these men are training, and the controversy will not help to get the necessary number of volunteers. Because of the urgency of the matter, it appears to me quite definite that if the needed numbers are not secured from the fully-trained men available, within the next few weeks, then the Government has no recourse but to act under the powers conferred by "Bill 80".

There are two good reasons why this should be done.

Our Canadian soldiers, both in Italy and on the western front since Invasion Day, have brought great honour to Canada. Their losses have been considerable. There are many who will never return. Every ship which returns to our shores from Britain carries its quota of wounded men and they will continue to come in increasing numbers. Amidst the trials and dangers which our fighting infantry have to face, they should not be asked to go into battle with their ranks depleted, or to take lesser rest periods than they are entitled to, when there are over forty thousand infantry reinforcements available in Canada, forty percent of whom are

The Right Honourable W. L. Mackenzie King, P.C., Ph.D., M.P.,
Prime Minister of Canada,
O t t a w a.

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practically fully trained. As I see it, this certainly is not keeping faith with our soldiers.

The second reason is that when "Bill 80" became law at least nine out of every ten people in Canada believed - and had a right to believe - that the Government meant to use its powers, should it become necessary in order to maintain the required reinforcements. What else could they think? Your own declarations, the declarations of your colleagues, including my own, could convey no other meaning; and all this applied with equal force when we all urged a "Yes" vote at the time of the plebiscite. In the speeches I made in support of an affirmative vote on the plebiscite my position was clearly taken, but no more clearly than that of many others, including those members of the Government who spoke in its support. That position was that if the Home Defence Army were needed to reinforce our Army Overseas it would be made available for that purpose.

Frankly, I feel that there is an obligation of honour here to keep faith with the people of Canada. You will reply that you do not propose to break faith with the people, and I certainly do not wish to suggest that you do; but there is no denying that the storm of indignation rising across Canada has its origin in a growing belief that the Government is trying to evade what the people believe were honest commitments. I am bound to say that the speech of the Minister of Justice in Quebec City on November 4th certainly did nothing to lessen this belief.

I am sorry I was not at Council when you brought forward the matter of calling the House together. You will agree, I am sure, that the Government should reach if possible a clear understanding of the course to be taken when it meets. But, in any event, I wish to make my own position clear. If the men have not come forward from this trained pool by voluntary enlistment by the end of the present month in the numbers required to meet the need, I would count myself remiss in my duty if I did not make it clear to you that I shall be unable longer to support the present policy.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd) T. A. Crerar

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C 272616

Ottawa,
November 18, 1944

The Honourable T. A. Crerar, M.P.,
Minister of Mines and Resources,
O t t a w a.

My dear Crerar:

I have received your letter of the 17th instant, which has been delivered by hand.

I am sending this word of acknowledgment by hand, that you may know that it has been duly received, and that I have carefully noted its representations.

It was decided at the meeting of Council on Thursday that a meeting would be held on Monday afternoon to consider the matters which require attention before the House of Commons reconvenes.

Yours sincerely,

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C 272617

CANADA

MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE
FOR NAVAL SERVICES

Ottawa, 18th November, 1944.

Dear Mr. King:-

Let me thank you for your letter of the 16th November in reply to mine of the 13th instant.

You say that my questions "relate directly to important Cabinet deliberations ..... which are still in progress". It is precisely because there is a direct relationship, and because that relationship is fundamental, that I wish to see the Government come to a decision on my questions. Without such a decision I do not think that the Cabinet deliberations can be brought to a logical head.

It seems to me particularly imperative that the Government should consider and decide these two questions before the House of Commons meets on Wednesday next.

With regard to your speech at the Reform Club in Quebec, my recollection on this point is clear. I am sorry that it does not coincide with yours. I am quite sure that you made use of the sentence, "If it" (conscription) "should become necessary, then some one else will have to enforce it and I will retire". That sentence stood by itself, complete and unmodified, and it referred to the Canadian war effort generally. With all respect, I must say that I do not think it can be qualified by words used later on to describe the nature or extent of our war effort against Japan.

Yours very truly,

(Sgd) A. L. Macdonald

Rt. Hon. W. L. Mackenzie King, P.C., M.P.,
Prime Minister of Canada,
Ottawa, Canada.

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Ottawa,
November 18, 1944

The Honourable Angus L. Macdonald, M.P.,
Minister of National Defence for Naval Services,
O t t a w a.

My dear Macdonald:

I have just received your letter of today, which has been delivered by hand.

As you are aware, the Cabinet is to meet again on Monday afternoon to consider the matters which require attention before the House of Commons reconvenes.

I am sorry that you question my statement as to what I said and what I meant in speaking at the Reform Club, Quebec, when I referred to circumstances under which I would find it necessary to retire, and which, I must repeat, were wholly in reference to the application of conscription in the war against Japan.

Colonel Ralston, who was not at the luncheon, came in the course of the following day to tell me he had understood I had made a statement such as you attributed to me in your letter of the 13th instant, and asked whether I was changing our policy. I made to him the reply which, in substance, is that which I have made to you in my letter of the 16th instant, namely, that the remarks I made as to possible retirement were solely in reference to the war against Japan. Colonel Ralston's reply to me was that he had not thought of that point.

If, in your mind, there was any doubt of my good faith in a matter so all-important, I fail to understand why no mention of it was made by you to me at that time, or any time since, until your letter to me on the 13th instant.

Yours sincerely,

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C 272619

CANADA

MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE FOR AIR

OTTAWA
23rd November 1944

Rt. Honorable W. L. Mackenzie King,
Prime Minister of Canada,
Ottawa, Ont.

My dear Prime Minister,

It is with the deepest regret that I ask you to accept my resignation as a member of your Cabinet.

I am unable to accept the policy which the Government has now adopted with respect to the National Resources Mobilization Act. I do not believe such a policy to be necessary at this time, nor will it save one single Canadian casualty.

I parted company with Colonel Ralston after the most mature consideration largely on the grounds that the number of troops which he reported as being required was comparatively so small, the means to remedy the situation without placing undue strain on the men at the Front so readily available, and the end of the war so imminent that weighing everything in the balance we were not justified in provoking a national scission.

I cannot accept now from a new Minister, General McNaughton, a recommendation which I reluctantly felt obliged to reject when made by an old comrade and tried associate, Layton Ralston.

May I add that the task which you confided to me in May 1940 of organizing the British Commonwealth Joint Air Training Plan has now been completed and the Plan is being wound up. The Royal Canadian Air Force Overseas has reached the peak of its expansion.

I shall always treasure the years of association with you and my colleagues and I thank you and them for all the kindness and consideration they have shown.

Yours very sincerely,

(Sgd) Charles G. Power.

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C

DRAFT

C ~~272620~~

dated as 27

Ottawa,
November 26, 1944

The Honourable C.G. Power, K.C., M.P.,
157 Daly Avenue,
Ottawa.

My dear Power:

I duly received, on the 23rd instant, your letter of that day tendering your resignation as a member of the government.

Since its receipt, I have, as you know, hoped you might find it possible to reconsider your decision. I have felt that the importance of the service which, as a member of the government, you might continued to render Canada's war effort would outweigh the other considerations on which you have felt it necessary to resign. As, however, you have ~~felt~~ that you must adhere to your original decision, I have most reluctantly been obliged to advise His Excellency that it should be accepted, ~~to which~~ advice His Excellency has given his consent.

I need not mention how great is my regret ~~at the severance of official relations with~~ so old a colleague and so close a friend. The regret, I feel, will be shared by all members of the government.

On my own behalf and on theirs, I would like warmly to reciprocate the feelings you have expressed as to what the years of our association have meant to all of us personally; also to express ~~appbehddfion~~ of what your services in the Ministry at a time of war have meant to our country and the cause of freedom.

Yours sincerely,

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Ottawa,
November 27th, 1944.

The Honourable C. G. Power, K.C., M.P.,
157 Daly Avenue,
Ottawa, Ontario.

My dear Power:

I duly received, on the 23rd instant, your letter of that day tendering your resignation as a member of the government.

Since its receipt, I have, as you know, hoped that you might find it possible to reconsider your decision. I have felt that the importance of the service which, as a member of the government, you might have continued to render Canada's war effort would have outweighed the other considerations on which you felt it necessary to resign. As, however, you have come to the conclusion that you must adhere to your original decision, I have most reluctantly been obliged to advise the Governor General that your resignation should be accepted; to this advice His Excellency has given his consent.

I need not say how great is my regret that so trusted a colleague and so close a friend should leave the Ministry at this time. This regret will, I know, be shared by all members of the government.

On my own behalf and on theirs, I would like warmly to reciprocate the feelings you have expressed as to what the years of our association have meant to all of us personally; also to express appreciation of what your services in the Ministry at a time of war have meant to our country and to the cause of freedom.

Yours sincerely,

(SGD.) W. L. MACKENZIE KING.

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C272622

Re Grounds for Power's Resignation

1. Number of troops required so comparatively small;

2. The means to remedy the situation without placing undue strain on the men at the front;

3. End of war so imminent, not justified in provoking a national scission.

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Extract from Memorandum
by Charles G. Power
Ottawa, 20th November 1944

"If on the other hand we have Dissolution and and an Election takes place Laurier's formula would be useful. He said in a letter to Rowell dated June 3rd, 1917, that one must be prepared "to give up normal Party divisions, indeed so much do I believe this that I am quite prepared to see my friends take a different attitude from my own and support Conscription whilst I will oppose it."

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272624

C

Statement on resignation of Hon. C. G. Power, M.P.

Hon. members will recall that on Friday of last week, I informed the House that the report that the Honourable the Minister of National Defence for Air had tendered his resignation was correct. I added that I wished further to consider the matter carefully before reaching a decision on the advice which I wished to tender His Excellency regarding the acceptance of the Minister's resignation. I had hoped that over the weekend I might find it possible to persuade Mr. Power that the importance of the service which he was capable of rendering the country at this time of war, as a Minister, should outweigh all other considerations and that he might, as a consequence, withdraw his resignation. Mr. Power has felt, however, that he should not withdraw his letter and I have this morning very reluctantly been obliged to ask His Excellency to accept it. This His Excellency has done.

I now would ask leave to read the letters which have been exchanged between Mr. Power and myself with respect to his resignation as a member of the government and be permitted to table the correspondence which has passed between us.

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C 272626

Disposition of General Service (Volunteers)

G. S. troops in United Kingdom

Effectives	over 50,000
Non-effectives (i.e. hospital patients, detention, etc.)	over 25,000

G.S. troops in Canada over 135,000

Officers	over 15,000
Other ranks	120,000

Breakdown of other ranks in Canada:

Over age, under age and low categories	67,000
Fit for combat service	53,000

(of whom 14,500 are key personnel, provost corps, dental corps, medical corps, instructional staff, medical and dental students, etc.)

Remainder of 53,000 are not all trained or being trained as infantry - and are in all stages of training.

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	Enrolments under N.R.M.A.	Voluntary enlistments from N.R.M.A.	Excess of voluntary enlistments over enrolment
June	1,500	2,975	1,475
July	1,350	1,350	
August	1,225	1,350	125
September ...	1,050	1,350	300
October	1,075	850	225
Total	6,200	7,875	1,675

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272628

	Enrolments	Conversion to gen. service	Conversions to other services	Discharges	Total	Strength at end of year
1941*	31,500	7,500	4,200	3,300	15,000	16,500
1942	69,500	18,000	1,300	8,200	27,500	
Total including						
1942	101,000	25,500	5,000	11,500	42,500	58,500
1943	34,000	6,500	300	11,000	17,800	
Total including						
1943	135,000	32,000	5,800	22,500	60,300	74,700
1944†	15,000	10,000	200	11,000	21,200	
Grand Total	150,000	42,000	6,000	33,500	81,500	‡68,500

*Commencing March †To end of September ‡At end of September

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C 272629

OFFICE OF THE MINISTER

CANADA

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL WAR SERVICES

OTTAWA, November 6th, 1944.

Sir,

I have the honour to enclose herewith copy of my memorandum of this date, "Reinforcements for French-Canadian Infantry Regiments now Overseas", of which copies will be available for Privy Council meeting tomorrow.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

L. R. LaFlèche

The Rt. Hon. W. L.Mackenzie King,
Prime Minister of Canada,
O T T A W A.

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DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL WAR SERVICES

OTTAWA, November 6, 1944.

MEMORANDUM

Re: Reinforcements for French-Canadian Infantry Regiments now Overseas

There are four French-Canadian infantry Regiments in the field, and we have recently been told that the reinforcement situation is more strained in their connection than in the case of the English speaking infantry units.

The undersigned is to conduct an intensive recruiting campaign amongst, principally, N.R.M.A. personnel who would require but a short period of training to prepare them for early use against the enemy in Europe. Compilations as to numbers, composition and other relevant details have already been submitted by others.

A Memorandum, "Attitude of N.R.M.A. Personnel", dated to-day, from the Adjutant General's office, is interesting, but is lacking in details which, to the undersigned, seem essential. Without going at too great length into the general situation, it will suffice, at the moment, to say that the organization and the atmosphere surrounding National Defence, whether in regard to the Army, the Navy or the Air Force, from the point of view of French Canada, have been faulty. This atmosphere has to be changed. Assurances must be given with some proofs of earnest purpose. There is mistrust and a feeling of insecurity as to the principle of equal privilege for equal sacrifice.

The French-Canadian does not believe that he has, as have other Canadians, a Marshal's baton in his cartridge case.

Referring to undated "Top Secret" collection of five memoranda, produced at the meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Reinforcements to-day in Privy Council Chamber, such memoranda, mutatis mutandis, might apply generally, but insofar as an appeal to French-Canadians is concerned, amongst other things, the following points deserve attention:-

1. As an appeal to patriotism and for sentimental reasons, the Canadian flag might be blessed and handed on parade, in all due ceremony, to a platoon commander or the commander of a much larger detachment, with instructions to carry it to the chosen regiment overseas.

2. It would cause deep satisfaction if the proper compliments were paid when "O Canada" is played.

3. Any officers who have not been overseas and who do not show plainly that they wish to proceed overseas, and, likewise, any recruiting officers who are not quite keen or capable or whose conduct is not such as to command

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the respect of the community, should be removed whether by despatch overseas or back to civil life. The families of the young men asked to join up for active service set great store upon the morale value of thosewho appeal to them and who command them.

4. French-Canadian N.R.M.A. men, when circumstances permit, should be trained or stationed in the Province of Quebec, where they will be equally at home as English speaking N.R.M.A. men are when trained or stationed in English speaking communities.

5. To make it clear that the voluntary system will remain in force with no mention made of any alternative. Should reconsideration become necessary, then let it be in the light of conditions as they may then be.

Home defence was organized in order to protect the country against a possible invasion and sabotage. These dangers have gradually disappeared. There is an imperative need to fill the ranks of our infantry Regiments, and this fact must be impressed upon the men who are trained and who will be responsive to the proper appeal. This can be done if favourable conditions are created.

6. The capitalization of regimental traditions and the creation of close ties of comradeship between the men going to a Regiment, those now serving, and those who will have served in the same Regiment.

7. A dofinite campaign to create a deeper feeling of respect for those who go to defend Canada.

8. Appropriate ceremonies, such as the signing of the attestation papers before the flag which is to be carried to the Regiment overseas.

9. Careful explanation to certain persons for the purpose of spreading the truth about the necessity to live at peace with one's neighbours, but this principle works both ways. There may be no domination or an attempt at dominating or the creation of a monopoly of privileges unless one is prepared to take the responsibility for the inevitable reaction. The place to lay the foundation of a sense of security and to begin the practice of fair treatment is in Canada, during the training period, which must be scrupulously maintained both in Great Britain and then on the field of battle. Unless the situation is changed, there will be very marked internal discord, similar to the situation as it existed during and after the First Great War.

10. The effects of jibes and insults addressed to French speaking N.R.M.A. men have been very harmful. These men must be treated as men. They can be appealed to as well as any others. The fact that French-Canadians constitute thirty-six per cent of the total home defence strength should be made public.

11. Direct assurances, such as were given when mobilization under N.R.M.A. began, must be given to the fathers, the mothers, the families and very particularly the spiritual advisers of these young men.

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12. To make it clear that those who offer for service in Europe will not, by the terms of their engagement, become obligated to serve against Japan.

13. In regard to War Service Gratuities, let any retroactive effect in that regard be generous, perhaps even going back to the date the volunteer joined upon being called up.

14. Confirmed N.R.M.A. non-commissioned officers, if they volunteer, to retain both pay and allowances and their rank badges.

15. To give short leave to those who volunteer --- the purpose is to permit them to go home to explain their action to their families and friends and to re-adjust their affairs in the light of their new status.

16. A number of subalterns and sergeants, who have seen active service overseas, should be brought back to mingle with N.R.M.A. men and offer to lead them back overseas.

17. To make certain that wherever there are N.R.M.A. men, they be made available, by those who now command them, to appeals by recruiting agents (e.g. the 6th Division).

18. Recruiting to be done for individual French-Canadian units overseas, and upon volunteering for overseas service, the man be permitted to put up his chosen Regiment's badge and to wear it in Canada, in the British Isles, and, of course, when he joins his chosen regiment.

19. The recruiting campaign to be carried out, of course, by the Department of National Defence (Army), but in regard to French-Canadians, principles and plans to be under the general direction of the undersigned, who has offered to find reinforcements for the four French-Canadian Regiments.

20. The campaign would be directed, not necessarily exclusively but very greatly concentrated, upon the N.R.M.A. men to begin with.

21. Definite approaches to individuals and, in some cases, to men in small or large groups. Similar individual approach to be made through an organization on parochial lines to the next-of-kin of members of the N.R.M.A.

22. A general advertising campaign by all legitimate means found appropriate, for the purpose of explaining duties, reasons and the true position of the citizen soldier in Canada and overseas during and after this war.

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23. To give greater scope in the matter of organizing platoons or even larger bodies to proceed overseas as such to some chosen regiment. NOTE

L. R. LaFlèche.

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OFFICE OF THE MINISTER

CANADA

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL WAR SERVICES

PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL

OTTAWA,
November 6th, 1944.

Sir,

The meeting of committee of Council on reinforcements, which had been set for Saturday, the 4th of this month, was postponed until this forenoon. There being no time to lose, and as it was understood that I would proceed in my own way, I spent the weekend in Montreal, laying the foundation for a campaign to find reinforcements for the four French-Canadian regiments overseas. It is certain that immediately after you carry out your intention of leading the appeal to the Nation, it will be possible for me to commence an energetic campaign. Those persons to whom the situation was explained discreetly and, in the circumstances, to best possible advantage, reacted in the most favourable way. A number of persons, each a key man in his particular field of influence, are standing by to lend their full support as soon as we may proceed.

It is my great pleasure to inform you of my one and one-half hours' conference with His Excellency Archbishop Charbonneau. His Excellency was obviously in admiration of the manner in which you handled the crisis and was thoroughly in accord with your actions. He could see Peace in Canada.

Archbishop Charbonneau volunteered to write his suffragan Bishops to ask them to help me in finding men for overseas service. His Excellency informed me that he would call in the authorities of "Le Devoir" in this connection, and would ask them to cease criticizing the war effort and even to support the government's reaffirmed policy. His Excellency explained what has been a somewhat difficult situation in this respect, which warrants my saying that Archbishop Charbonneau will take action in regard to "Le Devoir", but some allowance must be made as to just what the publication will do, even in response to His Excellency's definite request, as already mentioned.

His Excellency and I agreed that we should like to meet His Eminence Cardinal Villeneuve upon the Cardinal's return to Canada, which, it is expected, will

....P.T.O.

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be within a short time. We were also agreed that it would please His Eminence to carry on his traditional patriotic attitude, manifested so frequently since the beginning of the war.

I have the honour to be

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

L. R. Laflèche.

The Right Honourable W.L. Mackenzie King,
Prime Minister of Canada,
OTTAWA.

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Note: Comments in pencil transcribed from Mr Henry's letter to General McNaughton, Secret, Nov. 8/44 (Jas).

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL WAR SERVICES C 272635

OTTAWA, November 6, 1944.

MEMORANDUM

Re: Reinforcements for French-Canadian Infantry Regiments now Overseas

There are four French-Canadian infantry Regiments in the field, and we have recently been told that the reinforcement situation is more strained in their connection than in the case of the English speaking infantry units.

The undersigned is to conduct an intensive recruiting campaign amongst, principally, N.R.M.A. personnel who would require but a short period of training to prepare them for early use against the enemy in Europe. Compilations as to numbers, composition and other relevant details have already been submitted by others.

A Memorandum, "Attitude of N.R.M.A. Personnel", dated to-day, from the Adjutant General's office, is interesting, but is lacking in details which, to the undersigned, seem essential. Without going at too great length into the general situation, it will suffice, at the moment, to say that the organization and the atmosphere surrounding National Defence, whether in regard to the Army, the Navy or the Air Force, from the point of view of French Canada, have been faulty. This atmosphere has to be changed. Assurances must be given with some proofs of earnest purpose. There is mistrust and a feeling of insecurity as to the principle of equal privilege for equal sacrifice.

The French-Canadian does not believe that he has, as have other Canadians, a Marshal's baton in his cartridge case.

Referring to undated "Top Secret" collection of five memoranda, produced at the meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Reinforcements to-day in Privy Council Chamber, such memoranda, mutatis mutandis, might apply generally, but insofar as an appeal to French-Canadians is concerned, amongst other things, the following points deserve attention:-

approved in principle, with the reservation that the timing of such action was a matter for careful consideration (CADAH)

1. As an appeal to patriotism and for sentimental reasons, the Canadian flag might be blessed and handed on parade, in all due ceremony, to a platoon commander or the commander of a much larger detachment, with instructions to carry it to the chosen regiment overseas.

2. It would cause deep satisfaction if the proper compliments were paid when "O Canada" is played.

O approved in principle

3. Any officers who have not been overseas and who do not show plainly that they wish to proceed overseas, and, likewise, any recruiting officers who are not quite keen or capable or whose conduct is not such as to command

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the respect of the community, should be removed whether by despatch overseas or back to civil life. The families of the young men asked to join up for active service set great store upon the morale value of thosewho appeal to them and who command them.

approved in principle

4. French-Canadian N.R.M.A. men, when circumstances permit, should be trained or stationed in the Province of Quebec, where they will be equally at home as English speaking N.R.M.A. men are when trained or stationed in English speaking communities.

✓ 5. To make it clear that the voluntary system will remain in force with no mention made of any alternative. Should reconsideration become necessary, then let it be in the light of conditions as they may then be.

Home defence was organized in order to protect the country against a possible invasion and sabotage. These dangers have gradually disappeared. There is an imperative need to fill the ranks of our infantry Regiments, and this fact must be impressed upon the men who are trained and who will be responsive to the proper appeal. This can be done if favourable conditions are created.

approved, so far as may prove practicable

6. The capitalization of regimental traditions and the creation of close ties of comradeship between the men going to a Regiment, those now serving, and those who will have served in the same Regiment.

7. A dofinite campaign to create a deeper feeling of respect for those who go to defend Canada.

8. Appropriate ceremonies, such as the signing of the attestation papers before the flag which is to be carried to the Regiment overseas.

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9. Careful explanation to certain persons for the purpose of spreading the truth about the necessity to live at peace with one's neighbours, but this principle works both ways. There may be no domination or an attempt at dominating or the creation of a monopoly of privileges unless one is prepared to take the responsibility for the inevitable reaction. The place to lay the foundation of a sense of security and to begin the practice of fair treatment is in Canada, during the training period, which must be scrupulously maintained both in Great Britain and then on the field of battle. Unless the situation is changed, there will be very marked internal discord, similar to the situation as it existed during and after the First Great War.

10. The effects of jibes and insults addressed to French speaking N.R.M.A. men have been very harmful. These men must be treated as men. They can be appealed to as well as any others. The fact that French-Canadians constitute thirty-six per cent of the total home defence strength should be made public.

11. Direct assurances, such as were given when mobilization under N.R.M.A. began, must be given to the fathers, the mothers, the families and very particularly the spiritual advisers of these young men.

"Upon General LaFlèche's explanation that the assurance intended were to the effect that French-Canadians would serve under French-Canadian officers and NCO's, that they would receive promotion on merit and that they would be given decent treatment, it was agreed that this was a matter for discussion [with General McNaughton]; the Committee, however, saw no objection to the principle if it proved practicable in operation". (HDPH)

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12. To make it clear that those who offer for service in Europe will not, by the terms of their engagement, become obligated to serve against Japan.

covered specifically by terms of para 42 of Cabinet Committee report of Nov 6/44

13. In regard to War Service Gratuities, let any retroactive effect in that regard be generous, perhaps even going back to the date the volunteer joined upon being called up.

provision might be made for rank badges to be retained until the personnel in question had proceeded overseas

14. Confirmed N.R.M.A. non-commissioned officers, if they volunteer, to retain both pay and allowances and their rank badges.

15. To give short leave to those who volunteer -- the purpose is to permit them to go home to explain their action to their families and friends and to readjust their affairs in the light of their new status.

approved in principle

16. A number of subalterns and sergeants, who have seen active service overseas, should be brought back to mingle with N.R.M.A. men and offer to lead them back overseas.

17. To make certain that wherever there are N.R.M.A. men, they be made available, by those who now command them, to appeals by recruiting agents (e.g. the 6th Division).

18. Recruiting to be done for individual French-Canadian units overseas, and upon volunteering for overseas service, the man be permitted to put up his chosen Regiment's badge and to wear it in Canada, in the British Isles, and, of course, when he joins his chosen regiment.

19. The recruiting campaign to be carried out, of course, by the Department of National Defence (Army), but in regard to French-Canadians, principles and plans to be ~~under the general direction of the undersigned~~ dis Russell with, who has offered to find reinforcements for the four French-Canadian Regiments.

General Pâche

approved in principle

20. The campaign would be directed, not necessarily exclusively but very greatly concentrated, upon the N.R.M.A. men to begin with.

covered by para 46 of Committee report of Nov 6/44

21. Definite approaches to individuals and, in some cases, to men in small or large groups. Similar individual approach to be made through an organization on parochial lines to the next-of-kin of members of the N.R.M.A.

22. ~~A general advertising campaign~~ When deemed advisable, general publicity by all legitimate means found appropriate, for the purpose of explaining duties, reasons and the true position of the citizen soldier in Canada and overseas during and after this war.

Consideration might be given to regional adjustment of the organization on a parochial basis where appropriate (ADPH)

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23. To give greater scope in the matter of organizing platoons or even larger bodies to proceed overseas as such to some chosen regiment.

approved in principle.

L. R. LaFlèche.

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SECRET

Ottawa, November 8th, 1944.

The Honourable A. G. L. McNaughton,
Minister of National Defence,
Ottawa, Ontario.

Dear General McNaughton:

You will remember that, at yesterday's meeting of the Cabinet, when the Minister of National War Services submitted a memorandum dated November 6th on reinforcements for French-Canadian infantry regiments, the Prime Minister suggested that General LaFleche should discuss it with you.

This morning Mr. King asked me to call the other members of the Cabinet Committee together in order that General LaFleche might have the benefit of their views before discussing his proposals with you.

The Committee met at 12.30 today, under the acting Chairmanship of Mr. Mackenzie, and considered in turn the specific suggestions made in the numbered paragraphs of General LaFleche's memorandum. It was recognized that any conclusions reached were subject to your concurrence, as Minister of National Defence. Subject to this proviso, the Committee's views were as follows:

Paras. 1 and 2 - approved in principle, with the reservation that the timing of such action was a matter for careful consideration.

Para. 3 - approved in principle.

Paras. 4 and 5 - approved in principle.

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Para. 6 - approved, so far as may prove practicable.

Paras. 7 and 8 - approved in principle.

Para. 9 - reduced to read:

> "The place to lay the foundation of a sense of security and to begin the practice of fair treatment is in Canada, during the training period, which must be scrupulously maintained both in Great Britain and then on the field of battle."

Para. 11 - Upon General LaFleche's explanation that the "assurances" intended were to the effect that French-Canadians would serve under French-Canadian officers and N.C.O.s, that they would receive promotion on merit and that they would be given decent treatment, it was agreed that this was a matter for discussion with you; the Committee, however, saw no objection to the principle if it proved practicable in operation.

Para. 12 - approved in principle.

Para. 13 - It was felt that this matter had been covered specifically by the terms of para. 42 of the Cabinet Committee's report of November 6th, already approved by Council.

Para. 14 - The Committee felt that provision might be made for rank badges to be retained until the personnel in question had proceeded overseas.

Paras. 15, 16, 17 and 18 - approved in principle.

Para. 19 - amended to read:

> "19. The recruiting campaign to be carried out, of course, by the Department of National Defence (Army), but in regard

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to French Canadians, principles and plans to be discussed with General LaFleche who has offered to find reinforcements for the four French-Canadian Regiments".

Para. 20 - approved in principle.

Para. 21 - It was felt that this was covered by para. 46 of the Committee's report of November 6th; consideration might be given to regional adjustment of the organization on a parochial basis where appropriate.

Para. 22 - amended to read:

"22. When deemed advisable, general publicity by all legitimate means found appropriate, for the purpose of explaining duties, reasons and the true position of the citizen soldier in Canada and overseas during and after this war."

Para. 23 - approved in principle.

I am sending a copy of this letter to General LaFleche who will, I understand, take an early opportunity of discussing the situation with you.

Yours sincerely,

A. D. P. Heeney.

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PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE

C272642

MEMORANDUM

SECRET

November 11th, 1944.

For the Prime Minister:

Attached is a copy of the Minutes of last night's meeting of the special Cabinet Committee.

Mr. Gardiner has all of the names which have been suggested for various forms of assistants and is following the matter up actively this morning.

You might perhaps wish to have a word with Mr. Gardiner himself as to how he is progressing.

A. D. P. H.

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SECRET

Ottawa, November 10th, 1944.

CABINET COMMITTEE ON RECRUITING

A meeting of the Cabinet Committee was held in the Privy Council Chamber on Friday, November 10th, 1944, at 8 p.m.

Present:

The Minister of National Defence (General McNaughton), in the Chair,
The Minister of Veterans Affairs (Mr. Mackenzie),
The Minister of Agriculture (Mr. Gardiner),
The Minister of National Revenue (Mr. Gibson),
The Minister of National War Services (General LaFleche),
The Minister of National Health and Welfare (Mr. Claxton).

The Secretary to the Cabinet (Mr. Heeney).

Also present:

Mr. A. W. Roebuck, M.P.

The Chief of the General Staff (Lieutenant-General Murchie),
The Adjutant General (Major General Walford),

The Secretary, Wartime Information Board (Mr. Andrew).

---

1. The Minister of National Defence spoke of the urgency of setting up a civilian organization to conduct an individual canvass of next of kin of N.R.M.A. personnel of infantry standards, and outlined his ideas as to how such an organization could most helpfully be set up. The Army would be responsible for contact with N.R.M.A. personnel themselves, but would welcome suggestions and initiatives from whatever source and would give every facility to persons accredited by the Committee for participation in the appeal to the men in uniform.

It was suggested that in order to set up the civilian organization as quickly and efficiently as possible a small sub-Committee be appointed under the chairmanship of the Minister of Agriculture. This sub-Committee could proceed at once and would receive the closest co-operation from the Department of National Defence.

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2. The Committee, after considerable discussion, agreed:

(1) that a sub-Committee, to consist of:

Mr. Gardiner (Chairman),
Mr. Mitchell,
General LaFleche,
General McNaughton

Mr. Andrew, Secretary

---

be appointed to proceed forthwith to set up and direct a civilian organization to conduct individual canvass of next of kin of N.R.M.A. personnel of infantry calibre; for this purpose the sub-Committee to obtain at once the services of the most effective organizer available and such other assistants as might be required.

(2) that the Army appoint at once an officer to maintain continuous contact with the Secretary of the sub-Committee in order that the latter might be kept fully and currently informed of all facts necessary or helpful to the conduct of the special appeal;

(3) that the Adjutant General obtain for the sub-Committee a report upon the composition and state of the voluntary recruiting committees in order to determine whether they might be made use of to good effect;

(4) that the Adjutant General have prepared for the use of the sub-Committee cards of next of kin for canvassing purposes;

(5) that Wartime Information Board and the Army Public Relations Branch collaborate in the prompt preparation and issue, under authority of the sub-Committee, of information with respect to the composition of N.R.M.A., of the Army in Canada and overseas, provision for leave to overseas personnel, training, war gratuities and benefits, demobilization and other related subjects upon which there was public misunderstanding, as well as such statements as those recently made in speeches of the Prime Minister and General McNaughton;

(6) that the sub-Committee arrange for an early meeting of appropriate editors and publishers in Ottawa for conference with General McNaughton, Army officers and possibly others;

(7) that the sub-Committee call to Ottawa at once persons specially qualified to assist in their work;

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(8) that the sub-Committee give consideration to:

(a) the despatch by Mr. Gardiner to each Senator and Member of Parliament of a letter enlisting his support;

(b) approaches to Labour leaders, heads of Farm organizations and (later) to heads of Churches;

(c) utilizing the services of Members of Parliament;

(d) the preparation of instructions to civilian canvassers.

(9) that the sub-Committee proceed without further authorization to the immediate setting up of the necessary organization and the institution of such action along the above lines as they deem appropriate and that a progress report be submitted to the Cabinet at the next meeting.

A. D. P. Heeney
Secretary to the Cabinet.

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COLOURED PAPER
PAPIER DE COULEUR

C272645A

Original Letter

Alex Walker and Officers of Dominion Command
CANADIAN LEGION, B E S L

Ottawa, November 7, 1944

(urging Government to act on mandate of plebiscite and invoke provisions of N R M A and send men called up under the act overseas immediately as essential reinforcements

t PM

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MEMORANDUM

Re Canadian Legion, B.E.S.L. Dominion Command

Interview and communication - November 7, 1944

Concluding sentence:

"We would urge that the government of Canada now act on the mandate of the plebiscite and invoke the provisions of the National Resources Mobilization Act and send all fully trained personnel called up under that Act overseas as essential reinforcements."

Their representations wholly inaccurate - e.g.:

"The battle casualties, exclusive of normal wastage, are according to the latest figures about twice the rate of recruitments. Artillery, R.C.A.F., and other specialized branches of the service are being stripped to provide reinforcements for the infantry....."

"There are also reports coming back from the front that troops with inadequate infantry training are being sent to the front and that troops in the front line have abnormally long periods of service without corresponding days of rest, and that the dangers of battle fatigue are mounting."

"All this is taking place despite the fact that we have some 70,000 fully trained and equipped soldiers in Canada who are performing no useful service. What were these men called up for, and why were they trained if it were not to meet an emergency such as has now arisen?"

".....now is the time for the government to implement its pledges given at the time of the plebiscite."

W. L. M. K.

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"There are also reports combing back from the front that troops with inadequate infantry training are being sent to the front and that troops in the front line have abnormally long periods of service without corresponding days of rest, and that the dangers of battle fatigue are mounting."

"All this is taking place despite the fact that we have some 70,000 fully trained and equipped soldiers in Canada who are performing no useful service. What were these men called up for, and why were they trained if it were not to meet an emergency such as has now arisen?"

".....now is the time for the government to implement its pledges given at the time of the plebiscite."

W. L. M. K.

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MEMORANDUM

Re Canadian Legion, B.E.S.L. Dominion Command

Interview and communication - November 7, 1944

Concluding sentence:

"We would urge that the government of Canada now act on the mandate of the plebiscite and invoke the provisions of the National Resources Mobilization Act and send all fully trained personnel called up under that Act overseas as essential reinforcements."

Their representations wholly inaccurate - e.g.:

"The battle casualties, exclusive of normal wastage, are according to the latest figures about twice the rate of recruitments. Artillery, R.C.A.F., and other specialized branches of the service are being stripped to provide reinforcements for the infantry....."

"There are also reports combing back from the front that troops with inadequate infantry training are being sent to the front and that troops in the front line have abnormally long periods of service without corresponding days of rest, and that the dangers of battle fatigue are mounting."

"All this is taking place despite the fact that we have some 70,000 fully trained and equipped soldiers in Canada who are performing no useful service. What were these men called up for, and why were they trained if it were not to meet an emergency such as has now arisen?"

".....now is the time for the government to implement its pledges given at the time of the plebiscite."

W. L. M. K.

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C 272649

HIS MAJESTY THE KING
Patron-in-Chief of the British Empire Service League

Grand Patron
HIS EXCELLENCY THE RIGHT HONOURABLE THE EARL OF ATHLONE, K.G., GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF CANADA

Grand President
LT.-GENERAL SIR RICHARD TURNER, V.C., K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O.

Dominion Honorary Presidents
LT.-COLONEL JAMES McARA, V.D. MAJOR-GENERAL L. R. LAFLECHE, D.S.O.
MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN A. GUNN, C.M.G., D.S.O.
VICE-ADMIRAL PERCY NELLES, R.C.N. AIR MARSHAL W. A. BISHOP, V.C., D.S.O., M.C., D.F.C.

Dominion First Vice-President
WM. WALKER, ESQ. K.C.

Dominion President
ALEX. WALKER, ESQ., C.B.E.

Dominion Second Vice-President
E. J. STRUTHERS, ESQ.

Dominion Honorary Treasurer
CAPTAIN G. H. ROCHESTER

Dominion Chairman
A. E. MOORE, ESQ.

Dominion Third Vice-President
CAPTAIN A. D. PIPER

Immediate Past Dominion President
MAJOR-GENERAL W. W. FOSTER, D.S.O., V.D.

General Secretary
J. C. G. HERWIG, ESQ.



DOMINION COMMAND
OTTAWA, CANADA

P.O. BOX 640
CABLE ADDRESS: CANLEG

November 7th, 1944.

The Rt. Hon. W. L. Mackenzie King, P.C., C.M.G., M.P.,
Prime Minister of Canada,
O t t a w a.

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:-

It has long been the considered conviction of the Canadian Legion that this war demands the total mobilization of our Nation's resources and that any thought that it could be fought on a purely voluntary basis is pure romanticism. All recognize the inadequacy of attempting to finance the war by volunteer subscription and it would be so obviously unjust that it could not even be considered feasible. The volunteer method of using our manpower is no less inadequate and even more unjust. Four years ago the Government recognized the necessity of compulsory military service but refused to apply that principle to service overseas because of previous election commitments. Two years ago the Legion co-operated with the Government in a plebiscite designed to release the Government from that pledge. Two-thirds of the people who voted across Canada voted yes, and in eight out of nine Provinces the percentage was overwhelmingly higher. At the time the responsible Government heads, including the Prime Minister, gave us assurance that if the situation demanded it conscription for overseas service would be imposed. We come now asking that that promise be implemented because all information available to us indicates that it has become necessary.

The battle casualties, exclusive of normal wastage, are according to the latest figures about

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twice the rate of recruitments. Artillery, R.C.A.F., and other specialized branches of the Service are being stripped to provide reinforcements for the infantry, and only a few days ago one of the responsible overseas officers in charge of reinforcements announced that we were scraping the bottom of the manpower barrel.

There are also reports coming back from the front that troops with inadequate infantry training are being sent to the front and that troops in the front line have abnormally long periods of service without corresponding days of rest, and that the dangers of battle fatigue are mounting.

All this is taking place despite the fact that we have some 70,000 fully trained and equipped soldiers in Canada who are performing no useful service. What were these men called up for, and why were they trained if it were not to meet an emergency such as has now arisen?

The fact that Colonel Ralston after a personal survey of conditions at the front and with a full knowledge of all the facts regarding recruiting and casualties has felt it necessary to resign rather than longer consent to this tragic and unjust situation is an eloquent commentary on the need, and in itself justifies us in asking that now is the time for the Government to implement its pledges given at the time of the plebiscite.

There is bitterness in Canada today. Bitterness because of avoidable inequalities of burdens and of sacrifice -- bitterness because of a tragic waste of manpower when the issues of civilization are at stake -- bitterness because the courage and sacrifice of our men overseas are not being matched with corresponding sacrifice, courage and self-forgetfulness at home. This bitterness is not confined to the people in Canada, but is also found among fighting men of all services overseas. We would lose all claim to represent the veterans and fighting men of Canada if under these circumstances we did not use all the power and influence at our disposal to see that the courage and devotion of our armies were matched by the full-souled support of the Government and people of Canada.

And so in the light of these circumstances, we would urge that the Government of Canada now act on the mandate of the plebiscite and invoke the provisions of the N.R.M.A., and send all fully trained personnel called

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up under that Act overseas immediately as essential reinforcements.

Respectfully submitted,

awalker.

ALEX. WALKER,
Dominion President

A. E. MOORE,
Dominion Chairman

Wm. WALKER,
Dominion 1st Vice-President

E. J. STRUTHERS,
Dominion 2nd Vice-President

A. D. PIPER,
Dominion 3rd Vice-President

G. H. ROCHESTER,
Dominion Honorary Treasurer

GEO. CASSADY,
For British Columbia Command

S. CARL HECKBERT,
For Alberta Command

E. S. WILSON,
For Saskatchewan Command

L.D.M. BAXTER,
For Manitoba Command

J. BOYD, JR.,
For Quebec Command

T. MAGLADERY,
ERLE BURGESS,
For Ontario Command

H. D. LOCKHART,
For New Brunswick Command

C. B. LUMSDEN
For Nova Scotia Command

A. BARNETT,
For Great Lakes Command

R. D. MESS
For Tuberculous Veterans' Section

C. L. HALL
For Imperial Veterans' Section

J.C.G. HERWIG
General Secretary.

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SECRET

MINUTES OF A CONFERENCE OF GOsC AND DOsC
HELD IN THE DEFENCE COUNCIL CHAMBERS
AT 0900 HRS, 14 NOV 44

There were present:

Lt-Gen J.C. Murchie (Chairman)	- CGS
Maj-Gen A.E. Walford	- AG
Maj-Gen H.A. Young	- QMG
Maj-Gen J.V. Young	- MGO
Maj-Gen R.B. Gibson	- VCGS
Maj-Gen G.R. Pearkes	- GOC-in-C, Pacific Comd
Maj-Gen H.M. Ganong	- GOC, 6 Div
Maj-Gen P.E. Leclerc	- GOC, "W" Force
Maj-Gen F.F. Worthington	- Comd, Camp Borden
Brig W.C. Thackeray	- Comd, Petawawa
Brig P. Earnshaw	- DOC, MD 1
Maj-Gen A.E. Potts	- DOC, MD 2
Brig F.L. Armstrong	- DOC, MD 3
Maj-Gen E.J. Renaud	- DOC, MD 4
Brig E. Blais	- DOC, MD 5
Brig D.A. White	- DOC, MD 6
Brig G.G. Anglin	- DOC, MD 7
Brig R.A. MacFarlane	- DOC, MD 10
Brig G.A.H. Trudeau	- DOC, MD 12
Brig F.M.W. Harvey	- DOC, MD 13

1. In opening the meeting, the Chairman extended a welcome to all Comds to NDHQ in order that they might hear from MND concerning the Government policy in regard to the problems now facing the Army. He further expressed his thanks to all for their cooperation in the success of the 7th Victory Loan.

MND Address

2. In his opening remarks, MND stated that the purpose of the conference was to place before all Comds the grave problem now facing the Army in the matter of rfts for the Army Overseas. There was a short-term deficiency of Inf rfts for the Army Overseas, a situation which had arisen owing to two factors - firstly, enemy tactics and action and, secondly, the fact that Inf cas had far exceeded official forecasts based on previous op experience. In all Arms, other than Inf, there was an adequate supply of rfts.

3. To meet the short-term deficiency in Inf, MND stated that the meeting must consider ways and means of making rfts available from the following alternatives:

(a) Recoveries from cas.

(b) Remustering to Inf from other Arms where there is a surplus. In this connection, MND stressed the need for persuasion and careful explanation to NRMA of the national necessity. Draftees should be made to realize how great a contribution to the state they would render by volunteering for general service.

(c) Trained Inf in Canada.

(over)

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4. MND then gave the meeting the latest figures as to Inf rfts available in the coming months and the expected rates of cas which served to emphasize the short-term problem. Remustering and priority for Inf, on the basis of current cas rates, would, in time, adjust the situation but the problem was to meet the deficiencies in the immediate future.

5. On the question of NRMA personnel, MND stated that it had been decided to make the figures available to the public and that they would be published weekly in order that the public should know the exact situation and in this manner lend their fullest support. The policy of the Government was to use the volunteer method, not compulsion, and to this end every means should be taken to enlist the support of the public and to emphasize to NRMA personnel the opportunity and public responsibility which is theirs in this time of national emergency.

6. Personnel suitable for Inf must be withdrawn from HWEs and reductions must be effected in HWEs and in op units in Canada. Details on these points would be supplied later by CGS and AG.

7. He suggested to the meeting that a study be made of the possibility of accelerating the rate of trg without compromising the standard of trg. He assured all Comds of full cooperation from NDHQ in the way of trg eqpt and other requirements.

8. On the subject of trained Inf NRMA now suitable for service overseas, MND stated that there were available in Pacific Comd 8,000 fully trained and a further 8,000 at an advanced state of trg. This 16,000 represented the total trained Inf personnel amongst the 60,000 NRMA effectives in Canada.

9. In conclusion, MND assured the meeting of the Government's determination to support the Army Overseas and he again urged that personal attention be given to the paramount question of NRMA converting to general service.

Comments by Comds

10. At the conclusion of MND address, Comds reported that active recruiting campaigns had been conducted over the past year. Although successful at first, the results now and prospects for the future were not encouraging in view of the fact that for the most part only "hardened cases" now remained incl those not eligible for overseas for security reasons. Factors which contributed against conversion were (a) home influence opposed to overseas service, (b) attractions such as farm leave, not available to GS personnel, (c) rates of remuneration on civilian jobs and (d) the anamolous situation that whereas men would not volunteer, nevertheless they would willingly accept compulsory service overseas.

11. In replying to the above, MND stated that under present policy, the previous situation with regard to farm leave would no longer exist since this would be restricted to men not suitable for service in the fd and again a change had been made in the policy of remuneration to men employed on civilian projects whereby soldiers would not receive more than Army pay and, moreover, such emp would be restricted to men not suitable for service in the fd in Combatant Areas.

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GS Aspects of the Problem

12. After MND had left the meeting, the Chairman stated that it was not for them to discuss the Government policy as stated by MND but rather to apply themselves to implement the policy. The policy may be summarized as involving:

(a) Reduction in HWEs.

(b) Reduction in op tps.

(c) Inducement to NRMA to convert.

NRMA Policy

13. The Chairman then discussed the Government policy with regard to the emp and trg of NRMA personnel, for details of which, see Appendix "A".

GS Aspects

14. The Chairman stated that the GS aspects were:

(a) Review of op units, trg ests and trg centres and fmns in order to:

(i) Release fit GS for overseas.

(ii) Release unfit GS for emp where they, in turn, can release fit GS for overseas service.

(iii) Release fit and suitable NRMA for remustering to Inf.

(b) Preparation of plans for remustering suitable NRMA to Inf.

Reduction in Coast and AA Arty Defs

15. (a) In Jul and Aug 44, all 9.2" btys and the third gun of the remaining 6" btys were placed in maintenance and only those CD and AMTB btys considered essential to present forms and scales of attack were left in action. In view of this, the Chairman considered that with the exception of Fairview Bty (Prince Rupert), no further reductions could be made.

(b) As regards Fairview, this is a 8" Bty (US) on railway mountings which was installed to supplement Prince Rupert defs pending installation of modern eqpt at Barrett. Fairview is not in the ultimate plan which provides only one CD Bty for this port.

(c) The changed outlook in the strategical situation is now such that AA Arty Defs can be further reduced.

(d) Subject to agreement of the Chiefs of Staff Committee and the US War Dept, in the case of the Fairview Bty, the GS proposals were as follows:

(i) Retain AA Arty Defs at Esquimalt and Prince Rupert but withdraw them from Vancouver - Sea Island Area (manpower saving 64-1173).

(ii) Retain AA Arty Defs at Halifax but withdraw them from

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(Over)

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Sidney (manpower saving 45 - 786).

(iii) Withdraw 8" Bty at Fairview (manpower saving 2 - 126).

(iv) Temporary depletions in strs of remaining Coast and AA Arty Units resulting from the withdrawal of personnel suitable for trg as Inf to be accepted.

Comments by Meeting

16. GOC-in-C, Pacific Comd, concurred and suggested further that Prince Rupert might be reduced by 50% and the bty at Patricia Bay disbanded.

17. DOC, MD 6, concurred in the reductions in Atlantic Comd.

Reductions in 6 Div

18. The Chairman then discussed proposed reductions in 6 Div (for details see Appendix "B").

19. GOC-in-C, Pacific Comd concurred in the proposals provided he be relieved of his present op responsibilities in Pacific Comd. The Chairman agreed that this would be done.

Reorg of Trg Ests

20. The GS proposals on this subject are as follows:

(a) CAC

(i) Conc A27 from Dundurn to Camp Borden.

(ii) Conc CAC Basic at Camp Borden. Convert Newmarket and Orillia to Inf Basic, on 4 and 2 coy Est respectively.

(iii) Increase present Inf Basic by 1500.

(iv) Economy 45-374.

(v) Further examination will be started at once to see if not possible reduce 33 CACTE.

(b) Arty Mobile - Svy

There are now Nos 1, 2 and 3 ATCs. It is proposed to (i) reduce No 2 immediately by one increment, (ii) disband A2 as soon as personnel can be moved and (iii) further examination to see if one ATC can meet requirements.

(c) Arty - CD & AA

Strike off two increments from A23 Coast and AA Arty TC with an immediate saving of 39-233. Further reduction to be made as soon as excess personnel moved.

(d) RCE

Owing to numbers not possible to reduce immediately. Eventually, it is proposed to reduce each TC by one increment (33-368). Consideration should be given to only one TC being maintained.

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RESERVE ARMY

24. Several Comds raised the question of the future of the Reserve Army. The recruiting value of the Reserve Army was stressed and Comds emphasized the urgent need for official action to make public the continuing need for the Reserve Army. It was also pointed out that a special badge for the Reserve Army should be authorized as a distinguishing mark between the Reserve Army and NRMA.

25. As a result of the recommendation from all Comds, the Chairman agreed:

(a) To arrange for a press release clarifying the difference between the Reserve Army and NRMA.

(b) That consideration would be given to the possibility of a press release reiterating the role and consequent need for the Reserve Army.

(c) That consideration would be given by the AG to the possibility of arranging that A & T Staff of Reserve Army Units might wear the GS badge.

(d) That MGO would take prompt action in regard to the provision of a suitable badge, along the lines of the present GS badge, for the Reserve Army to distinguish from NRMA.

26. This concluded the GS portion of the meeting, which then adjourned for lunch.

Chairman

Lt-Gen, CGS

SD 1-2129

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(e) RCOC - RCEME

No reduction possible owing to numbers. Future requirements will enable manpower saving 30-300.

(f) RCASC

No reduction possible owing to numbers. By Mid-Dec, reduction of one increment at each Trg Centre is expected. Intention is to maintain only one Trg Centre, saving 84-1100

(g) RCAMC

Basic A32 Peterborough - Advanced A22 Camp Borden. It is proposed to conc all trg at Camp Borden as soon as possible.

(h) RC Sigs and Radar

Reductions in these will also be made as soon as possible.

Plans for Remustering Inf

21. The Chairman explained that this would depend upon the numbers available and the time factor involved. Consideration should be given to the following plans:

Plan I - Utilize the present Inf Trg Centres.

Plan II - Use of op Inf Bns from which unfit personnel will be withdrawn.

Plan III - Form a trg bn in each Inf Bde in Pacific Comd.

Plan IV - Form a special Trg Est in Eastern and Western Canada and, if necessary, in Central Canada, at which fmns conversion trg would be carried out after which personnel would be posted to op inf Bns.

22. The Chairman discussed briefly the advantages and disadvantages of each of the foregoing plans and requested comments from the Comds. After general discussion, opinion was divided as to whether Plan I or Plan IV was the more suitable. The main arguments may be summarized as follows:

Plan I — Pro - Time factor, in that existing org and AIs would be utilized.

Con - New men exposed to influence of "hardened cases".

Plan IV — Pro - New environment conducive to conversion.

Con - Shortage of suitable AIs.

23. The Chairman stated that the above factors would be taken into consideration when the final decision was reached at NDHQ.

(Over)

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APPENDIX "A"

FUTURE POLICY NRMA

1. Fit NRMA personnel will not in future be employed on civilian work. Such work as is considered essential for the National War Effort may be performed by the Employment Coys.

2. Fit NRMA personnel will be trained as soldiers. Personnel in other Arms who are suitable for Infantry will be remustered. Every effort will be made to maintain a high standard of Training.

3. NRMA (Employment Coys) employed on civilian work will not be paid at civilian rates but will continue to draw Army pay and allowances. Pioneer Corps will be formed by NRMA personnel unfit for service in Combatant Units Overseas.

4. While war is not yet advanced to the stage where the Government can announce a detailed plan of demobilization, it has been decided, as far as possible, to follow the principle that those who have made the greatest sacrifice should first be demoblized. It is obvious that those who have served in an actual theatre of operations have made the greatest sacrifice and will be released in advance of any NRMA personnel remaining.

5. There should be no discriminatory treatment of NRMA personnel.

6. NRMA personnel will not be treated as a separate force but will continue to be treated exactly like GS personnel.

7. In short everything possible should be done to create a feeling on the part of the NRMA that they are soldiers who are well treated and who are being well trained to take part in overseas action.

8. Future canvassing of NRMA personnel regarding conversion will be carried out individually on in small groups rather than by talking to large gatherings. All told of the need for their services and the practical benefits to their own future of becoming a volunteer and enjoying the full opportunities for successful re-establishment in civil life.

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Appx "B"

HQS 20-1-5

GS(DSD) SD 1(a) 13 Nov 44

PROPOSED REDUCTIONS IN 6 DIV

UNITS TO BE DISBANDED

HQ Units

Div HQ

RCA

HQ Div Arty
Two Fd Regts
Two LAA Btys
HAA Bty

RCE

HQ RCE
Three Fd Coys

RC Sigs

Div Sigs (Less Three Inf Bde and One Fd Regt Sec)

CIC

Def and Emp Pl

RCASC

HQ RCASC
29 Coy RCASC

RCAMC

Two FDSs
One Fd Hyg Sec
Two Fd Ambs

RCOC

Ord Beach Det

RCEME

Inf Bde Wksp
Three LADs (A)

C Int C

FS Sec

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APPENDIX "C"

SECRET

272660

6 DIV AND UNBRIGADED INF BNS IN CANADA

HQS 20-1-5 (DSD)

1. (a) 6 Div as a formation will be disbanded. 14, 15 and 16 Inf Bdes and certain Div units detailed hereunder will be retained with a primary role of training. The units to be retained are representative of the Arms and Services in a proportion to meet Army requirements. Inf will have the major representation.

(b) CD Inf Bns and other unbrigaded Inf Bns in Canada will be retained.

2. The following units of 6 Div will be retained:-

(a) One Inf Bde GP

HQ Inf Bde
Def Pl
Inf Bde Sig Sec
three Inf Bns
Fd Regt & Sig Sec
LAA Bty
FD Coy
Fd Amb
LAD(A)
LAD(B)
Pro Sec

(b) Two Inf Bdes (each)

HQ Inf Bde
Def Pl
Inf Bde Sig Sec
three Inf Bns
LAD(A)

(c) 31 (Alta) Recce Regt
Saint John Fus (MG)
LAD(A)
LAD(B)

3. GOC-in-C, Pac Comd, will nominate the Inf Bde to be organized as an Inf Bde Gp, and the units to comprise this Bde Gp.

4. The following units will be reorganized, reduced or disbanded dependent upon the requirements for these Services to serve the above. Only that portion of these units will be retained that is essential to augment the static services in Pac Comd:-

28 Coy RCASC
45 Coy CDC
6, 8 and 19 Fd Cash Offices
10 Provost Coy (less one Sec)

5. The units to be disbanded are detailed in Appendix "A" attached.

6. Any of these units or dets therefrom which are now serving with exercises "Eskimo" and "Polar Bear" will be retained but will become units or dets of those units which are to continue; any which have no representation in the continuing units will not be disbanded until completion of these exercises, but any parts of these units which are not engaged in the exercises will have their personnel withdrawn as detailed below. Personnel fit for Inf who are engaged on these exercises will not be withdrawn until they can be replaced without prejudice to the conduct of the exercises.

7. NRMA Personnel

(a) All personnel who by age and Pulhems Profile are suitable for Inf, and who come from units to be disbanded or are in continuing units of Arms and Services other than Inf, will be withdrawn, remustered to and trained as Inf.

(b) Personnel who by reason of age or Pulhems Profile are unsuitable for Inf, will be withdrawn from Inf Bns.

/2.....

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MINUTES OF AFTERNOON MEETING OF GOsC-in-C & DOsC HELD IN COUNCIL CHAMBERS, NATIONAL DEFENCE BLDG, OTTAWA, 14 NOV 44 at 1430 HRS

PRESENT:	Major-General	A E WALFORD	AG (In Chair)
	Lieut-General	MURCHIE	CGS
	Major-General	GIBSON	Vice CGS
	Major-General	PEARKES, VC	GOC-in-C, Pac Cmd
	Major-General	LECLERC	GOC, "W" Force
	Major-General	POTTS	DOC, MD 2
	Major-General	WORTHINGTON	Cmdr, Camp Borden
	Major-General	RENAUD	DOC, MD 4
	Major-General	GANONG	GOC-in-C, 6th Div
	Brigadier	ARMSTRONG	DOC, MD 3
	Brigadier	EARNSHAW	DOC, MD 1
	Brigadier	TRUDEAU	DOC, MD 12
	Brigadier	WHITE	DOC, MD 6
	Brigadier	HARVEY, VC	DOC, MD 13
	Brigadier	THACKRAY	Cmdr, Petawawa
	Brigadier	CHESLEY	D/CGS (C)
	Brigadier	MacFARLANE	DOC, MD 10
	Brigadier	GRAHAM	D/CGS (R)
	Brigadier	BLAIS	DOC, MD 5
	Brigadier	SPENCER	VAG (1)
	Brigadier	NOEL	VAG (2)
	Brigadier	De LALANNE	DAG (A)
	Brigadier	FERGUSON	DAG (B)
	Colonel	JENKINS	DMO & P
	Colonel	FULLER	DSD
	Colonel	CREIGHTON	DMT
	Colonel	CURTIS	RCEME
	Colonel	TOSLAND	LO to NSS
	Colonel	SAUNDERS	DOS (A)
	Colonel	MacDERMID	D Adm
	Colonel	WALLIS	D Org (R)
	Lieut-Col	MORRISEY	AAG Org (R)
	Lieut-Col	TURNBULL	AAG Org (A)
	Lieut-Col	FINLAYSON	Secy, QMG
	Lieut-Col	WILLS	PA to AG
	Major	ANDERSON	DPR
	Sgt	JAMESON	CWAC, Secy.

The AG stated that the meeting would be primarily concerned with methods by which best results could be obtained, under the policy laid down, to induce NRMA personnel to become GS. It had been emphasized by the Minister and the CGS at the conference held in the morning that the immediate phase of the problem could only be met by the conversion of NRMA personnel, and that the reinforcement problem for the moment and as far as one could foresee was confined to Inf GD. The AG added that the matter had been carefully considered by the Cabinet and under their authority a Committee had been constituted to assist in creating outside the Army the proper attitude towards conversion. It was believed that this Committee would be of great assistance. The following outline was given for the position which it was desired to reach -

(1) All combat category and trained GS personnel to be despatched to UK as reinforcements;

(2) All combat category but only partially trained personnel should be in the process of completing training in order to be available for the reinforcement stream as early as possible.

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(3) All HWEs of units within this country to be staffed by personnel unfit for Overseas service and in the case of HWE of HQ, etc, a very large proportion of CWAC.

(4) Personnel of age and category unsuitable for Overseas service and not required as HWE to be concentrated in Employment Companies in order to avoid diversion from training of any fit soldier in process of training for service Overseas.

GOC-in-C, Pac Cmd, stated that he had found the main reason NRMA refused to become GS soldiers was because they did not wish to leave Canada, believing their chances for an early return to civil life to be better if they remained in Canada rather than if they proceeded Overseas. He further stated that 3,000 NRMA from his Command had obtained harvest leave during the past year, that they knew same had been obtained against his wishes and that they felt sure they would receive the same consideration next year. In addition he stated that because of the strong desire of NRMA to remain in Canada they would invent numerous excuses to do so. (See Note A, Page 6).

Information was requested by the AG as to methods used in various Districts which had proven successful in the conversion of NRMA soldiers of two and three years' service.

DOC, MD 13, advised that from his experience he had found that the men were willing enough to go if sent, but they took the attitude that the Government did not need them, otherwise they would be sent. In support of this the DOC added that he had been told so by men on numerous occasions and believed that if sent these men would do the job. The GOC, "W" Force, concurred in this view and stated the men were good soldiers now except for their desire to remain in Canada.

Information was requested by the AG as to whether or not a substantial increase in CWAC available would assist in the release of fit men from HWE to go into the training stream.

GOC-in-C, Pac Cmd, and DOC, MD 2, advised that this did not apply to them in that there were very few fit GS around their Headquarters to be replaced. Cmdr, Camp Borden, stated that he could use five to six hundred replacements.

With respect to the attitude toward further service in Canada by returned men, it was the general consensus of opinion that these men felt they had done their job, that they enlisted for service Overseas not in Canada and felt that duty in Canada was a decided let-down, that Canada owed them everything and though they were fit to perform the duty they would not do so. Generally it was considered that returned men were unsuitable for duty as HWE.

Suggested that a Rehabilitation Centre be established at NETD in UK for the purpose of advising the men of what Canada had been doing towards the war effort so that on return here they would have a more receptive attitude towards service in Canada. It was generally believed that if this were done the men would disembark in a very different frame of mind.

The matter of enlisting released RCAF personnel, both male and female, into the Army was discussed. The AG stated that if they came over to the Army their rights gained while serving

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with the RCAF would be protected, and that they would be employed as far as possible in the trades in which they had been employed in the RCAF. The general feeling was that this might apply to the RCAF (WD) but that it was difficult to enlist discharged airmen in the Army because they felt they would be letting the RCAF down by enlisting in the Army. The AG stated it was clear that the greater proportion of men so enlisted would be Inf GD, but he felt that certain skilled tradesmen in trades deficient Overseas should not be placed where they would not be performing duty in their own trade. He added that men were now being sent over in their present corps with a record of qualifications and authority has been given to CMHQ to remuster them. Until such time as remustered these men will carry their rank and trades pay and continue to carry it for six months after being remustered and then given the opportunity to regain their rank in the new Arm. He stated that the instructions would be clarified in this respect.

Cmdr, Borden, expressed the view that highly skilled tradesmen deeply resented becoming GS if they knew they were not to be employed in their own professions. He further added that these men, while of value in their own line might not be suitable for Inf. He stated that he did not agree with the practice of NDHQ requesting so many men of a certain type because it was not always practicable to fill the order as they were only allowed to release a certain number of senior NCOs at one time.

The matter of NRMA receiving more leave than GS was then discussed. Cmdrs, Borden and Petawawa, advised that for some time past they have been compelled to place men on draft immediately on completion of training, often without any leave and in numerous cases had found it necessary to recall them from leave in order to catch the draft. They further maintained that it was not practicable to train GS men with NRMA instructors and that if the present rate of withdrawals continued this situation would become inevitable. DOC, MD 13 and Cmdr, Borden, stated that in many cases men had left Canada without leave which normally they would receive after six months' service, had landed in England and been shipped to France still without leave, thereby losing leave altogether. The AG in reply stated that he had not been aware of this and that if GS were not able to obtain leave certainly NRMA should not have it, the policy being that there was to be no discrimination between the two. It was pointed out that the urgent call for men was often necessitated by the circumstances of sailing. In support of this it was pointed out that where accommodation was allotted for perhaps 2,000 men, advice would at times be received that the boat could accommodate a possible 4,000 and we must fill that or lose the 2,000.

Cmdrs, Petawawa and Borden, requested that they be allowed 30 days prior to sailing date to complete documentation, clothing, leaves, etc. The DAG(A) advised that estimates were made on a 30-day basis now, but that it did not always apply as sailing dates were changed so frequently. Cmdr, Borden, suggested that an advanced forecast be supplied as to the number of men required and the sailing date. In reply to this the DAG(A) stated that this was not always possible in view of the fact that sailings were often changed with very little notice.

The suggestion was put forth that it might assist in the conversion of NRMA veterans if they were allowed to serve Overseas with units for which they might have some sentimental attachment.

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The DOsC, MDs 4 and 5, were in favour of this policy generally. DOsC, MDs 7 and 2, expressed the opinion that with new recruits this would lift morale, particularly in the case of younger men. GOC-in-C, Pac Cmd, held the view that if they would not go over with one regiment it was not likely they could be persuaded to go with another. It was generally felt that this policy would be of assistance in dealing with new recruits and younger men, but would not have much bearing on the old timers.

The steps proposed to be taken immediately were outlined by the AG as follows:-

(1) Removal from operational units men unfit for service in those units if they were to go active as units. This would mean the withdrawal from Inf Battalions of men not of age or Pulhems suitable for GS Inf and from the units of other Arms men not suitable for Overseas service in those Arms. It would also mean that Operational and Holding Units would hold only personnel who, if they went GS, could go Overseas.

(2) Transfer to Employment Companies of men unfit for HWE. Employment Companies will be authorized within a couple of days on the basis of one company per District. These Companies will be organized purely as labour units. Replacements are needed for men now on essential industrial work such as the production of munitions and metals required in munitions, railway projects, preparation of bricks for construction of Sunnybrook Hospital in Toronto, etc.

In respect to the question of discarding men for security reasons, it was suggested by the AG that information be supplied to NDHQ by DOsC as to NRMA personnel in their respective Districts who, for security reasons, cannot be sent Overseas. He stated that authority would be issued for transfer of such men on the grounds of security to vacancies on HWE, and if for security reasons they were also barred from HWE, they would then be placed in Employment Companies. Men falling in this class would be Doukhobors, Mennonites, aliens, men under observation by RCMP, etc. The AG stated that if DMI categorized a man as unfit for service Overseas regardless of Pulhems, he was to be removed from the operational unit.

Propaganda put out by other Ministries was discussed with particular reference to NSS and Labour Departments. DAG(A) advised that the attitude of Labour was that the Army had a number of men doing nothing and so might well meet demands.

It was suggested that something should be done to prevent local MPs from obtaining exemptions and leave for Army personnel. In this connection it was pointed out that in many cases prominent people were misdirecting prospective recruits and influencing members of the Army to absent themselves without leave and become deserters, when actually they were such only because of misguidance.

In reply to a question the AG advised that there would be an early establishment for Employment Companies and all applications for assistance would be filled from that Company and would only be granted after the application was approved by Labour. Under this plan it would be impossible for employers to specify individual men.

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DOC, MD 13, suggested that all NRMA personnel replacements be granted acting rank only. In this connection DAG(A) advised that all NCOs in non-operational units were acting rank.

DOC, MD 13, stated that replacements were needed in his District and suggested that same should be returned men rather than NRMA. DOC, MD 7, added he was also short staffed and requested that District demands be filled first. Cmdrs, Petawawa and Borden, pointed out that if District demands were filled first they would be unable to obtain instructors. D/CGS (A) stated that no one was overstaffed at present and they were making distribution as well as could be expected. He pointed out that the RO providing for members of "G" staff screening incoming personnel for possible Assistant Instructors was not being carried out in some Districts and urged DOsC to see that this was done. He further added that numerous instructors were now employed looking after reinforcements in certain Arms which were not now required and probably never would be. Urged removal from Training Centres of such personnel in order to relieve the strain on instructors. It was stated that once the Employment Companies were organized it would relieve the strain considerably.

With respect to the employment of returned men as instructors, it was felt that these men would render more valuable service if posted near their homes. This was generally agreed and a suggestion put forth that a Board sit Overseas and discuss the matter with the men being returned and post them in home vicinities as much as possible. In this connection Cmdrs, Petawawa and Borden, voiced the opinion that they should be used where most needed regardless of location and stated that if these men were approached on the other side respecting service in Canada, they would be more receptive to the idea of serving where needed rather than close to home.

In reply to a question DAG(A) advised that it was the intention to despatch approximately 15,000 men Overseas by 31 Dec 44. In answer to a question as to the actual objective the AG stated that it was desired to establish a reserve of 15,000 trained Infantry from conversions, release of GS, etc. CGS added that this was pool to meet estimated casualties after the New Year and was put forward as a basis for planning.

General discussion revealed that the DOsC felt strongly that they would be unable to provide any number approaching 15,000 men by 31 Dec 44. They wished to go on record as stating that after examination of the facts as given they were of the opinion that the numbers stated could not be produced by the means laid down within the time given, but would use every effort to secure the maximum results.

CGS pointed out that as soldiers it was their duty to give the plan a 100% try-out. He summarized their attitude as being that under the existing policy which has been given by the Government and knowing the requirements, they did not feel that the requirements could be met under existing Government policy. DOsC should return to their Districts and do their best to make the policy effective. He further stated that they had made their views quite clear to the Minister at the morning session, but that he would place before the Minister their point of view as above set out.

Adjourned 1705 hrs.

(A E Walford),
Major-General,
Adjutant-General.

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NOTE A: Verbatim remarks of one senior officer. These were indicative of views generally expressed:-

"The reason men do not go active is because they do not want to go Overseas. They do not want to leave Canada and will invent a hundred and one different excuses. Their one interest is to go back to civil life, farming or industry or whatever it is. They are not interested, they are narrow, they have been miseducated for twenty-five years and have no feeling of patriotism whatsoever. Healthy specimens, etc. every time you approach them it is always -'Why pick on me?- Why do I have to go? - Fellows known to me are being discharged, they don't have to go, why pick on me? - I don't want to go - I will go after I go home and talk to my parents and see what they say'. The fundamental thing is that men do not want to go. For all you say about them not going back to civil life until the others are disbanded, the men do not believe it. During seeding and harvest they know I fought tooth and nail all summer to prevent them going on harvest leave, but they know perfectly well I was over-ruled and eventually some of them were ordered to go back. We had 3,000 men or more on harvest leave who know they went against my wishes and they believe they will get it again next year. They will quote and say only a month ago certain men were ordered to go back. They know perfectly well there are men going back to civil life all the time, including officers, and they believe their chances are better for an early return to civil life in Canada than Overseas. They do not want to go over, they want to get back to civil life and will invent any possible excuse."

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PUBLIC RELATIONS

C 272667

P.N. 713-44

OTTAWA, Nov. 16 -- Measures to bring into operation the conclusions reached at the conference of the general officer commanding Pacific Command and the officers commanding all military districts in Canada, held in Ottawa this week, will be put into effect by the D.O's.C. on their arrival at their headquarters, to which they are now en route, according to a statement issued today by General A.G.L. McNaughton, Minister of National Defence.

The Minister also stated that further information and analysis of the composition of the N.R.M.A. are being prepared by the statistical branches of the Army. These will be issued promptly on completion for the information of the public.

Following is the text of the statement:

"Yesterday I issued to the Press a brief statement summarizing the matters which were under consideration at my conference the previous day with the General Officer Commanding Pacific Command and Officers Commanding all Military Districts in Canada.

"The principal matter dealt with was the provision of reinforcements for overseas and particularly the question of trained reinforcements for the Infantry, which is the part of the problem in which the situation may become acute. This whole matter was examined objectively and with the utmost frankness with the purpose of providing the Army overseas with its requirements.

"I have drawn from the minds and great experience of these officers their considered views as to the steps which are open to be taken and the results which would follow.

"Measures to bring the conclusions reached into operation were decided and these will be put into effect by the D.O's.C. on their arrival at their Headquarters, to which they are now en route. The results will be reported

65M-6-44 (4867)
H.Q. 1772-45-24
K.P. 10750

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65M-6-44 (2887)
H.Q. 1772-45-24
K.P. 10730

REPEAT
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C 272668

te me by telegram. Meanwhile, further information and detailed analysis of the composition of the N.R.M.A. are being prepared by the statistical branches. These will be issued promptly on completion for the information of the public."

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PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE

C 272670

MEMORANDUM

Mr. Gibson.

Will you pls. substitute this revised full record of the War Committee meeting of the 19th October for the original sent you by Mr. Heeney.

MAURICE POPE
MAJOR - GENERAL

OCT 30 1944

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MEMORANDUM C272669

Privy Council Office

Ottawa,.....

There seems to be a feeling in the minds of the staff that by drawing on all our available holdings and by reducing somewhat our very high physical and other high standards throughout the present tight period.

Oct 20-44

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Original Draft

TOP SECRET 272671

CABINET WAR COMMITTEE

19th October, 1944

REPORT OF THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE.

The Minister of National Defence gave the Committee a general report on his visit to the Army in the United Kingdom, Italy, and in Northwest Europe. The main impression he had derived from his talks with senior and subordinate officers was the seriousness of the reinforcement position. In Italy he learned that, at the present rate of wastage, the reinforcement group in that theatre would exhaust the numbers it then had on hand in a matter of one month or less. The shortages, Mr. Ralston said, were entirely in the Corps of Infantry, the losses of which had been nearly 75 per cent of the total losses the Army had incurred, as against approximately 50 per cent that had originally been expected. This heavy wastage was due partly to the fact that intense fighting had continued without break. The Army was faced with a succession of strong points and ridges which had to be taken in succession, and even in the Valley of the Po the country was very close. It was anything but an open plain with long fields of fire which perhaps might be expected. This involved continuous infantry fighting with consequent heavy losses in that arm.

2. In order to keep the Army up to strength every effort was being made to recover casualties as quickly as possible, and these men on being put into battle as soon as they had recovered from their wounds felt that a great deal was being asked of them. The weather had been bad, and while the High Command were doing everything in their power to drive back the enemy they were determined not to waste men needlessly. It was hoped that the Adriatic sector, in which the Canadian Corps was fighting at present, might be helped forward by pressure against Bologna, which it was intended the Fifth Army should exert in that direction.

3. Mr. Ralston referred to the question of the beer ration, which was causing much discontent amongst the Canadians, who were irritated by the fact that their neighbouring British comrades were being given a full ration of Canadian

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C 272672

beer, while they were receiving only a fraction of a ration of British beer for themselves. He had taken the matter up with Riddell Webster, the Quarter-Master General at the War Office, who had taken a sympathetic view and had promised to do everything in his power to rectify the present unsatisfactory position.

4. He had seen the 1st Army Tank Brigade, which was an outstandingly good Unit. It was presently serving with United States Forces.

5. All ranks were thoroughly familiar with the provisions of the War Service Gratuity Scheme, with which they were well satisfied.

6. The question of leave was the subject of considerable complaint. In the Italian theatre there were no less than 11,000 men who had been serving in the Army for over four years and in Italy for one year and for whom no provision for leave had yet been made. They had been going into and coming out of the line with great regularity and in their view the only way to get out of the theatre was either to be wounded or killed. He felt that some provision for leave would require to be made for these men.

7. The situation in Italy had been complicated by the fact that a number of U.S. divisions had been withdrawn from the theatre in order to carry out the invasion of Southern France. This had brought the opposing forces in Italy to something approaching parity and it would be impossible to drive the Germans back to the Alps without additional strength. If this were not done and the troops settled down to winter warfare, the Germans might well be enabled to release some 10 divisions from Italy for employment elsewhere.

8. On his return to London from Italy, Mr. Ralston had gone in to the man-power situation with General Stuart. He had also discussed the matter with General Crerar, who was beginning to feel fit once more but desired further consultation with his medical advisors before resuming his command.

9. From London Mr. Ralston proceeded to Brussels, where he discussed the situation with General Simonds, who was temporarily commanding the Army. In this theatre the present task of the Canadians was to drive the Germans from the left bank of the Schelde Estuary. This was a difficult operation, which he described in some detail.

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10. In Belgium Mr. Ralston had also seen General Montgomery, who had told him that the Canadian Army in his command were in good shape. General Montgomery desired a free hand in the grouping of his forces in order to meet the requirements of the tactical situation. Mr. Ralston had previously agreed in this but had taken occasion to point out to General Montgomery that men fought better when grouped with their own people than with strangers. As to the length of the war, General Montgomery had said it would be necessary to beat the German in battle. They had done so at Caen and Falaise, and had driven the enemy back to Holland and his own country. This had increased the length of our lines of communication, and another big battle would be required to achieve the enemy's defeat. The key to this was the Port of Antwerp, without which the supplies could not be accumulated in the forward area. The Canadian Army was busy clearing the approaches to the port at the present time. It was his hope that the enemy would fight a big battle with the bulk of his troops well west of the Rhine, but of this he was not certain. Nor was he sure that the Canadian troops would participate in this battle.

11. General Montgomery had made no predictions as to the length of the war. The enemy had to be well and thoroughly beaten in the field and he pointed out that withdrawals were by no means the same as defeat.

12. On his return to London Mr. Ralston had gone into the question of reinforcements again with General Stuart and his staff and he had now come to the War Committee to report the result of his examination. Mr. Ralston said that the Army was faced with a serious situation. The Infantry had suffered heavy casualties. Indeed, they were 40 per cent more than had been expected. He had had the position examined as at the end of November and also at the end of the calendar year, and the result showed the position was balanced on a very thin edge, if indeed we were not on the wrong side of the ledger. In the circumstances something would have to be done if the Army was to carry on. Stuart drafted a report on the situation as of 31st December next, which he would later bring to the Committee's notice.

13. Mr. Ralston then referred to the situation with regard to French-speaking infantry units. Both the Maisoneuve Regt. and Fusiliers Mont Royal were under strength. There were only 600 reinforcements available for French-Canadian units to the end

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of this year and all French-speaking men had been withdrawn from the Black Watch and the Artillery to meet this deficiency. There had been some question of drafting in Maquis from France, but General Vanier had pointed out that this was quite impracticable. There was the possible expedient of introducing an English-speaking company into each of these regiments. The idea had been examined but rejected as being inexpedient. The position was that in England from now to the end of the year 12,000 reinforcements would be available for dispatch to the field, but according to General Stuart's calculations this number would be 2,000 short of the numbers required.

14. Mr. Ralston said that he could not derive any satisfaction from the report he felt bound to give to the War Committee. The Army at home had lived up to its undertaking and had furnished all the reinforcements that had earlier been agreed upon. The abnormal rate of infantry wastage had brought about the situation which somehow had to be made good. Mr. Ralston then read the report which General Stuart had today addressed to him, a summary of which follows:

15. General Stuart began by advising the Minister of National Defence that he had kept the reinforcement situation under constant review since December of last year when he had taken over his present appointment, and that until about two months ago he was satisfied with the general position. His optimism up to that time had been based on the general strategic situation, the overall reinforcement holdings and, lastly, his expectation, based on the 21 Army Group's forecast, that fighting activity would be intense and normal in alternate months. In August every indication had pointed to an early German collapse. Today, however, because of German strategy in denying us the use of the Channel ports, a German collapse could not be regarded as being imminent. Our superior strength could not be deployed against the Germans simply because of the lack of suitable port facilities. Good planning therefore demanded that we must be prepared for a prolongation of the war into 1945.

16. General Stuart had attached an appendix to his report, giving an analysis of the reinforcement situation as of 23rd of September last, with a projection to the end of the year. On the 31st of

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December next it was estimated that there would be an infantry deficiency of about 2,000, and a holding of some 15,000 in the other Arms. It was probable, however, that shipping delays and consequent non-completion of training by that time would shrink these figures to well under 10,000, which was an insufficient margin. It must be remembered that in war nothing is certain, and that forecasts were apt to go wrong. Indeed, he felt that the situation on 31 December next was likely to be worse than that shown in his forecast. He said this because of the experience of the last two months. Infantry casualties had been greater than was anticipitated for two main reasons, the first of which was that they had been expected to work out at 45 per cent of total casualties, whereas they had actually proved to amount to 75 per cent of the total. The second reason was that forecasts must be based on an anticipated scale of activity. As he had previously stated, his earlier calculations had been based on the 21 Army Group's estimated scale of activity, which was alternate months of intense and normal fighting. Actually, since the beginning of the invasion our casualties had been at a continuous intense rate.

17. The detail in the appendix to his report did not stress the tightness of the infantry position during the past two months or at the present time. At the end of September of this year he would liked to have sent some two or three thousand infantry to Italy. He had been unable to send more than 500. At the end of October he would like to send several thousand but he would only be in a position to send 1,000. He expected considerable infantry shortages to develop in Italy during late October and early November. Moreover, as a result of sending 1,000 infantry reinforcements to Italy at the end of October it was possible that there would be a corresponding shortage in Northwest Europe.

18. It was important to note, General Stuart reported, that as the result of an aggressive remustering programme the infantry reinforcement situation had progressively improved since the 2nd of September. An over-all infantry deficiency in Western Europe of 3,299 had been changed to an

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over-all surplus of 590 on the 11th of October. The Italian position was that on the 14th of October there was an over-all deficiency of about 100 infantry.

19. It could be argued from a study of paragraphs 4 to 12 of the appendix attached to his report that it would be possible to remuster to infantry considerable numbers from the other Arms. An aggressive remustering programme was being carried out and would be continued. It would be appreciated, however, that there was a limit to what could be done. They had now remustered to infantry practically all surplus other Arms that met infantry age and physical standards and who were not highly skilled tradesmen in these other arms. Further numbers would be remustered from the 6,000 and more men of other arms expected to reach the United Kingdom from Canada before the end of the year, and he had issued instructions that additional men of other arms, and tradesmen, should be remustered to general duty infantry. This would help the infantry situation and he hoped that it would result in changing the minus holding of infantry as of 31st December to a small plus holding. This, however, would not alter the main fact of having on the 31st of December a total holding of trained reinforcements in the United Kingdom, in Northwest Europe and Italy of less than 10,000 in all Arms, with little or no infantry.

20. Other matters which caused General Stuart considerable concern were the shortage of French-speaking infantry reinforcements and the question of leave, particularly in the case of troops serving in Italy. In respect of French-speaking reinforcements, the bottom of the barrel had been reached. For the balance of the year less than 600 other ranks were in sight. It was a distressing condition and he was afraid that there was only one solution to the problem. The question of leave was beginning to affect morale in Italy. It might soon do likewise in Europe. Winter conditions in both theatres would aggravate the situation. The men knew that the absence of a generous leave policy was due to a shortage of reinforcements. The men could not understand why they who had volunteered must keep on going into battle and living constantly in the greatest

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danger and discomfort when trained reinforcements were available in Canada living in comparative safety and luxury.

21. The only solution he could see was to find an additional 15,000 infantry to add to the reinforcement pool on or before the 31st of December and to ask that the number of replacements sent monthly from Canada be increased to 5,300, of which 4,300 should be infantry. The above addition to the pool would give one month's holding in each theatre and one month's holding in the United Kingdom for each theatre.

22. It would be apparent, of course, that he was leading up to a recommendation that the future effective maintenance of the Canadian Forces in the two theatres required that additional personnel be made available from Canada for service overseas. Actually such was his belief.

23. He assured the Minister that he was not anxious to make this recommendation. On the other hand, he considered that, as Chief of Staff C.M.H.Q., one of his major responsibilities was to ensure that formations in the field were supplied with adequate and well trained reinforcements. He was satisfied that the reinforcements sent and being sent to both theatres had been well trained. He was satisfied that, up to the present time, reinforcements had been adequate in respect of over-all numbers, but, by reason of a series of military reasons beyond his control, he had to admit that the number of reinforcements in respect of the infantry arm, had been inadequate. He was not satisfied, and he had attempted to express his reasons in this letter, that the number of anticipated reinforcements would be adequate to meet the future requirements for the war against Germany.

24. He recommended, therefore, that if the numbers required could not be found from GS service personnel in Canada, that the terms of service of NRMA personnel be extended to include overseas service in any theatre.

25. The Prime Minister said that General Stuart's report raised very large questions. First of all, Parliament would have to meet in

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order to discuss them. There would possibly be a division in Parliament, and from Parliament there would have to be an appeal to the people. This would take at least 68 days to achieve. The discussions in Parliament would also take time. In the circumstances, an election could not be held before the end of the year. This would bring us into 1945, and by then the situation might well be changed.

26. The results, however, Mr. King continued, would be much more serious. The country would be divided from coast to coast; province would be ranged against province. At the present time the Government was planning its programme to be implemented at the end of the war with Germany and was planning Canadian participation in the war against Japan. This new proposal might well result in civil war in Canada. He could see no other prospect. The beneficial effect of bringing in overseas conscription in the outcome of the war against Germany was at least doubtful. In any event, it would play into Germany's hands. The enemy would immediately say that German resistance had required Britain to conscript Canadians in order to achieve victory. The effect would be world-wide. At the moment Australia, New Zealand and South Africa were reducing the scale of their war efforts. Great Britain had effected a reduction in the strength of the British Army. Canada in the meantime was planning for demobilization, the implementation of post-war programmes, and planning to cut down her Air Force and her Navy, and in these circumstances he was sure public opinion could not see why Canadians should be singled out for the application of conscription overseas. Germany's strength was steadily lessening. Her hold on Europe was steadily being contracted. The United Nations were steadily gaining new allies. Why, in such circumstances, overseas conscription for Canadians should be essential was at least puzzling. If, on the other hand, Mr. King said, the armies of the United Nations had a precarious hold on a few beach-heads on the west coast of Europe and we were faced with a really desperate situation, the need for drastic action could be recognized, but such was not the case. The action proposed was not necessary for the winning of the war but to keep the army to its maximum strength. When overseas conscription became necessary in the last war it did so at a time when France was threatened with defeat. It was then necessary to take this action to win the war, but this could not be truly said today.

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Victory was certain and the only question of doubt was its timing. Mr. Churchill had held off the invasion of Europe for over two years in order to avoid heavy loss of life and to ensure that when the attack was launched it would meet with success. It might be possible for those responsible for planning the grand strategy of the war to take into account the conditions obtaining in Canada. In the last three months France had been liberated and her Armies had been added to those of the United Nations. Belgium had been freed. The liberation of Greece was proceeding apace. The German satellite nations had practically all dropped out. The Russian Armies were now operating on German soil. They had crossed the Carpathians into Hungary. Such was the picture as Mr. King saw it and in the light of all this, to have conscription introduced and the five-year old policy of the Government reversed at this stage did not seem reasonable.

27. But this was not all. Cabinet decisions had of course to be taken on military advice, but this might come from several quarters. The Chief of Staff at C.M.H.Q. had reported what he required to keep the Army up to strength into 1945. The military advisors of the British Government seemed to take a more favourable view of the situation. At this stage Mr. King read to the Committee a telegram, Circular D.1540, dated 14th October, 1944, from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, giving a summary of an appreciation, dated 27 September, by the Military Advisors of the United Kingdom Government on the weaknesses in Germany's capacity to resist. This summary showed that although the morale of the German troops in the West has recovered from the low level to which it had sunk during the retreat across Northern France and the Low Countries, the German position was extremely bad and by reason of her losses in men, materiel and territory, irrevocably weakened. This appreciation on the part of the British military authorities could not be studied too carefully, particularly when the question the War Committee had to consider applied to our own Army. There was also a question as to when a decision to impose overseas conscription could be expected to have an effect on the course of the war. He wished to do everything possible to win the war, including overseas conscription were this necessary, but he could not bring himself to say that it was. The War Committee had to ask themselves what bearing would an affirmative decision in this respect have, not over the next few months

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but over not less than the next thirty years, on our relations within Canada, within the Commonwealth, and with other nations. We were planning our participation in the occupation of Germany and our part in the war against Japan. Would it help in these respects to raise the issue of conscription at the present time, and should, as some people thought, another major war occur in the next generation or so, would another legacy such as the one that had been left to us twenty-five years ago, when overseas conscription was carried out to save the war, be of advantage to Canada particularly when conscription for Canada could in no sense be said to be required to ensure the success of the United Nations at the present time?

28. Such, said Mr. King, were the considerations that he had been turning over in his mind since yesterday when he had had a talk with Mr. Ralston. They were not final or complete, and the question would require the fullest and most careful consideration. We had been fortunate in the achievement of a very fine national war effort and he asked if we should be wise to jeopardize it at the last minute by raising internal dissention of an appalling nature. The post-war period would be difficult throughout the world and we would not be able to escape the difficulties that lay ahead. We should therefore hold on firmly and calmly to our present position so as to be capable of meeting what lay ahead.

29. So far, Mr. King said, he had not expressed a thought as to the political aspect. Power was nothing to him save insofar as it could be helpful to Canada. We were on the verge of an electoral campaign in which the Government's programme had been drawn up to help the lot of the people. All this would be lost if the conscription issue were allowed to arise. If it did, the opposition would sweep the country. They would say the Canadian war effort had been fully commensurate with our country's position. An entire province would be solid against the country, and not one province only. But in any event, could the Government decide upon an action which would allow one province to be ranged against the remainder of the country? If this proposed action were essential to victory, then well and good, but was it really necessary to be drawn into internal dissension of this kind? Was there not some way to meet the situation? He fully desired that the Army be

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kept up to the required strength, but if at the present moment Britain were reducing the size of her army, could not Canada do something of the same order? It was not his wish to see a Canadian division disbanded, but could not something be done in the way of reducing the establishment of the units for which reinforcements were lacking? Canadian standards were of the highest, but was it necessary for us to continue to maintain them? We had matched British standards in increasing our armies -- could we not continue to match British standards in reducing them at this stage? This, Mr. King suggested, was perhaps a possible way out of the difficulty.

30. In all this, Mr. King said, one thing had caused him considerable surprise. Throughout the whole course of the war he had always asked in respect of any increase in the size of the Army if the particular increase in question would jeopardize the Government's policy in respect of voluntary enlistment for overseas. He had always been assured in this respect by the Government's military advisors. Only two months ago when the question of an additional infantry brigade for the Army in Italy had been up for consideration he had asked that the Government be given the most definite assurance that such an increase in the establishment would not affect the Government's policy in this respect. He thought that both the War Committee's minutes and the documents attached thereto would bear out his statement that the War Committee had been given the most definite assurances on this subject. He wondered if this formation need to be continued and if, on the contrary, it could not be used as reinforcements. He was certain that he would never have agreed to this particular increase had he known that the reinforcement position was likely soon to be adversely affected. It might be true that the losses that had been incurred had not been anticipated. On the other hand, this change of mind with regard to overseas conscription had not been anticipated either. The invasion has been carried out successfully and smoothly. France and Belgium had been liberated and this was to the credit side of the United Nations. Mr. Churchill had told him that he regretted the heavy losses that we had borne at Caen. Mr. Ralston had said that General Montgomery was not sure that we would be called upon to take part in the next big battle on the Western Front. This seemed to be but a recognition that the Canadians had done their fair share. It would be reasonable to make our position known

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to the High Command so that the country would not be faced with the gravest political issue in twenty-five years. The thought also occurred to him that there could be a question as to who would have the last word as to the final disposition of the standing Army at home. He was aware of the bitterness in the minds of men of the overseas forces. The real thing to realize now was what it would mean to bring up the issue of conscription at this stage, of the civil and political strife it would raise, and the effect it would have on our participation in the war against Japan.

31. Mr. Ralston said that he appreciated the tolerant way in which the Prime Minister had dealt with this question. He reviewed the courses of action which appeared to be open. The units might be allowed to waste down in strength. This was something he could not view with equanimity. He had so recently seen the men in hospital who had been badly wounded, who, if positive action were not taken, would feel that their great sacrifices had been in vain. Their families would think so too. He was perhaps taking an emotional view of the situation but it was something he could not contemplate in the position he held.

32. Mr. Ralston felt similarily with regard to reduction of establishments. The reason that would be given would be that additional men were not available but the Army overseas felt that the men were available at home. It was difficult to send men to other units.

33. It was impossible to take an easy view of the situation. Planning had to proceed on the probabilities as they could be assessed at the present time. So far, the position was in hand, but if the fighting kept up at its present rate of intensity we should shortly find ourselves in a very unsatisfactory position. He had said in Parliament that the ultimate function of the Home Army would be to maintain the Overseas Army in the event of the need arising. The whole idea of allowing the latter to fall in strength would play into the hands of certain elements of the Opposition. To date this situation had been held more or less in balance, but the future was very uncertain. So far as he was concerned, Mr. Ralston said that he had done all that was in his power to make the voluntary system work.

34. With regard to his military advisors, he said that he wished to be fair to General Stuart. Never had Mr. Ralston had more loyal support than he had received from this officer.

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He knew the policy of the Government and had done his best to live up to it. Mr. Ralston said that amongst others, General Pearkes had been a tower of strength and no man had done more than he to bring about the GS enlistment of men of the NRMA. General Letson had been equally loyal.

35. Mr. King said he had not referred to Mr. Ralston's principal military advisors but to the differences which had grown up between the two sections of the Army.

36. Mr. King said he must again ask if this proposal for overseas conscription was necessary to win the war. Twenty-five years ago Sir Robert Borden had been able to say it was but such could not be said in Parliament today.

37. Mr. Ralston observed that his point was that conscription was necessary to maintain the Canadian Army. His had been a straightforward policy, namely, conscription if necessary.

38. The Prime Minister said that in his view the question was what would be necessary to win the war. Only two months ago the War Committee had been told in respect of the organization of the 12th Brigade that the reinforcement position was entirely satisfactory. They were now being told otherwise.

39. Mr. Ralston pointed out that the three units taken to form the 12th Brigade were then already in existence. This had not required any additional men, only an increase in the number of reinforcements required to maintain them.

40. Mr. King said that before inviting General Stuart to enter the meeting he would like to have the views of other members of the War Committee. He felt it of the greatest importance to take whatever time would be necessary to have every aspect of the subject fully explored.

41. The Minister of Justice said he was much concerned with the implications of Mr. Ralston's statement. He was afraid that the situation was bound to create much bitterness. He was aware of feelings of resentment in the overseas army against the NRMA, who were trained soldiers but not available for overseas service.

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Actually, he pointed out, the NRMA limitations applied to only some 7 per cent of the total strength of the armed forces. There was an unfortunate impression abroad in the country that the NRMA men were composed entirely of French-Canadians, while the fact was that these men were composed of approximately one-third only of French-Canadians, one-third of English-Canadians, and one-third of people who had more or less recently come to the country from Europe. Moreover, there was a large number of conscientious objectors, none of whom, contrary to the popular belief, was a French-Canadian. If on top of this the knowledge became general that the Army was not being maintained to establishment, it would be said that this was because of the French-Canadian attitude. He could see that the situation was going to be very difficult. Young men in the forces were bitter and they had a feeling that they had been let down by the French-Canadians. With Parliament and the country divided on the issues, the scars would remain for a long time. It would be most unfortunate if this situation were to develop after the country had made such a fine effort for five long years. Personally he felt that the policy of voluntary enlistment having been agreed upon at the outset, its retention would give the best possible return.

42. Mr. Howe said he would like to think the matter over before expressing an opinion.

43. Mr. Michaud said that he, too, would like to think the matter over. He, however, said that he still believed that the effect of changing the Government's policy in this respect would turn out more against Canada than help to win the war.

44. Mr. Macdonald said that he would like further time for reflection before expressing his views.

45. Mr. Power commended Mr. Ralston for having brought the question to the Government's attention. He was aware that many people thought it pretty hard to send men back to the lines as soon as they had recovered from their wounds when there were men in Canada who could take their share of the burden. With regard to the idea of reducing unit establishments he would like a little time to think out its implications. He thought, however, that everything possible should be done to avoid the issue being raised at the

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present time. It appeared to him that the war might be over soon, in which circumstances it would seem most regrettable to disrupt the country for a generation to come.

46. At this point Generals Murchie and Stuart had joined the meeting.

47. The Prime Minister gave a summary of the previous discussion.

48. General Stuart said that the organization of the 12th Infantry Brigade had no effect whatever on the casualties which had been incurred. Actually these had been of the same order as if units had continued in their former roles. He stressed the fact that the organization of the 12th Brigade had had no effect whatever on the proposals he had made to the Minister of National Defence regarding conscription. He said that three months ago he had taken an optimistic view of the reinforcement situation because he was then satisfied that the strength of the reserve pool in the United Kingdom, together with the reinforcements to be received over the next five months from Canada when related to the number of casualties expected to be incurred over that period, would leave a satisfactory balance. He had been wrong in his estimate. Instead of a total of 40,000 casualties to the end of the year we had incurred some 30,000 to the end of September, with 29,000 more anticipated to the end of the year. He had to estimate that there would be by then a deficit of 20,000. He had been wrong in his previous estimates, but then at the time he had been obliged to work on the British rates of wastage. But for the last six weeks we have based our calculations on rates struck from actual Canadian experience. Our difficulties arose only in respect of infantry and the explanation was perhaps that the British rates were based on their experience obtained throughout the world, whereas the Canadian Forces were concentrated in France and Italy where fighting had been intense, without let-up since D-Day. He had been advised by the 21 Army Group that casualties would alternate monthly from intense to normal, whereas fighting had been practically intense throughout. The British forecast had been wrong and in consequence they had been required to break up several divisions. We had been wrong in our estimates, but he was unable to see how we could have done better.

49. Mr. King inquired if there was any obligation to hold the Canadian Forces up to peak strength. Could we not match the British in reductions?

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50. General Stuart replied that this was something the Army would fail to understand, particularly when they were so well aware of the existence of well trained personnel in Canada.

51. Mr. King doubted if the Canadian people would understand the enactment of overseas conscription at the present time when all authorities had said that victory is certain. The British had adopted lower unit establishments. Could we not do likewise? He also inquired if our units were likely to be employed with the same degree of intensity throughout the Autumn.

52. General Stuart said that we had not fought more intensively than had the others, though possibly some United States forces had had a breathing spell. The Canadian Army was presently occupied in freeing the lower reaches of the Schelde, which was a difficult task and involved hard fighting. Casualties were running at 1,000 to 1,200 a week.

53. The Prime Minister said that the question would be relatively simple were there no other issues involved. The question before the Government was what in the long run would be best for winning the war, and consequently what would be best in the interests of Canada.

54. General Stuart referred to the position of the French-Canadian Infantry Battalions for which there were only 600 reinforcements in sight until the 31st of December. The Fusiliers Mont Royal and the Maisonneuve regiments had an existing deficit of 600.

55. Mr. King referred to General Montgomery's remark that it would be possible to introduce English reinforcements into the French-Canadian units, and inquired if General Stuart thought this possible.

56. General Stuart replied that the attitude of the troops themselves would have to be taken into account. If we were to amalgamate two units, a brigade would be lacking one battalion, and this would not be understood when it was felt that men were available at home. He felt that we must contemplate that fighting would continue on into 1945. The Canadian Army would not finish its present task below Antwerp until well into next month. This would enable the build-up against the frontiers of Germany to be undertaken. If this could be done, the Allies would win the next great battle, but he could not say what would happen after that. The Germans might continue a war of desperation for some time to come. Personally he felt that the German Army would fight a big battle on the frontiers of their country. He felt that the Canadian Army should continue and at the same pace that it had fought hitherto.

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57. The Prime Minister said that the Government would have to be careful in reaching a decision. They would have to bear in mind all the many and varied activities of Canada in the past five years when contemplating the action proposed, the effect of which would be to cancel out all the good that had been achieved. He felt that some solution could be found. He referred General Stuart to the British appreciation dated 14th October, 1944, which he had read to the Committee.

58. General Stuart said that he had asked the British Chiefs of Staff two questions, firstly, did they consider there was yet still a possibility of Germany giving up this year, to which the answer had been that the possibility existed, but of its probability they were not as hopeful as they had been two months or so ago. Secondly, he had asked if the war had not come to an end by November, would the High Command maintain the maximum pressure on Germany, to which answer had been made that the High Command would continue maximum pressure on the enemy irrespective of the weather, and there would therefore be no opportunity to rest the troops.

59. Mr. King asked if this strategic decision to press on regardless of other considerations was one which rested with the High Command alone. It was a question that involved the expenditure of much life and cost, whereas a more deliberate policy might avoid a situation which would wreck havoc so far as Canada was concerned. The issue was a very big one, which would require consideration by the full Cabinet.

60. General Stuart said that were it not for him, the issue would have been raised earlier.

61. Mr. King said that the Government had relied on General Stuart's advice, which had now proven to be not too well founded. General Stuart would understand that the War Committee had received assurances from him that the programmes he had recommended in the past would not lead to conscription. General McNaughton had given him similar assurances in the past. The effect of the conscription issue in Canada would be nothing but appalling. The issue was not the same as in 1917. Conditions then were very different.

62. General Stuart said that he was the officer to whom the two Commanders in the field had to look to for reinforcements. If he could

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meet their needs under the present policy he settled direct with them, but when he saw that he could no longer do so he must make a recommendation to enable him to fulfill his responsibilities. He had done so and it was now for the Government to decide what to do.

63. The Prime Minister agreed, but he said that the Government had a right to ask General Stuart in helping to seek an honourable course of action which would maintain the situation. It would take a little time to settle the question. There would have to be a reference to Parliament, with a probable election to follow, and the question in his mind was what would the position be by the time the Government could take action? It was not impossible that the war would be over by Christmas, at which time the country would be divided by an election campaign on this issue.

64. The War Committee decided to continue the discussion of this on Friday, the 20th of October, before assembling the entire Cabinet to meet on Tuesday, 24th of October.

Maurice Pope
(Maurice Pope)
Military Secretary.

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TOP SECRET

PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE

MEMORANDUM

C272689

FOR MR. GIBSON.

I transmit herewith for the Prime Minister's information copies of the full record of the minutes of the Cabinet War Committee for October 24th, 26th and 27th.

Maurice Pope

(Maurice Pope)
Military Secretary.

31st October, 1944.

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Prime Minister's full record

TOP SECRET

CABINET WAR COMMITTEE

Meeting October 24th, 1944

Army overseas; reinforcements

1. The Prime Minister, for the benefit of Mr. Crerar and Mr. Ilsley who had not been present at the previous meeting, described briefly the nature of the report of the Minister of National Defence, with particular reference to the shortage of reinforcements.

All members of the government had been asked to attend a Cabinet meeting to be held that afternoon, but he had thought that further discussion of the question in the War Committee that morning might fill a useful purpose.

2. The Minister of National Defence said that the situation was that an additional pool of infantry reinforcements would have to be set up before December 31st, if not from General Service men, then from N.R.M.A. personnel. Casualties had been more than 60% greater than had been expected. Some weeks ago, the Canadian Army in Northwest Europe had been 3,200 deficient of infantry personnel. It was now up to strength but had no reserve in hand.

3. The Minister of Mines and Resources asked if men of other arms, such as artillery men, who are being remustered into infantry, were acutally trained for this arm?

4. Mr. Ralston said that such men were given a further course of training of from four to six weeks duration to fit them for their new duties. This course of training had received the approval of the Army Commander; it was apparently sufficient for the purpose. By reason of the casualties they had sustained since last June, the Canadian battalions in the Western European theatre were by now nearly new units, and, as their record these last few weeks had been fully up to the standard of the operations carried out last summer, there could be no doubt but that the system was working well.

5. Mr. Ralston then went over General Stuart's memorandum of October 19th, 1944, in which the Chief of Staff, C.M.H.Q. London, recommended that, if the numbers required (15,000) could not be found from General Service personnel in Canada, that the terms of service of N.R.M.A. personnel be extended to include overseas service in any theatre.

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6. Mr. Ralston also read from a draft aide memoire he had prepared for use at the Cabinet meeting to be held later in the day. It had not yet reached final form, and he hoped to have it revised during the luncheon interval.

Taking a short-term view, the Minister had concluded that, as of November 30th, there would be a surplus of 1,300 infantry in Northwest Europe, and a shortage of 100 in Italy, with 2,000 in the United Kingdom to meet December casualties. The long-term view was that, as of December 31st, infantry units would be deficient some 3,780, but that this number might possibly be reduced by 2,000 due to the effect of remustering men from the other arms. The reserve pool, however, would have a nil strength.

7. Mr. Ralston also read a memorandum submitted to him by the Chief of the General Staff, which examined all the possibilities of finding additional men from the Army in Canada.

General Murchie began by saying that General Stuart had asked for an addition of 15,000 infantry to the end of the calendar year, and thereafter reinforcements from Canada at the rate of 4,000 a month, of whom 3,000 should be infantry. He felt we must accept the proposition that the war would continue after the turn of the year, and concurred in General Stuart's figures as to overseas requirements.

The Adjutant-General had examined all possible sources of additional reinforcements from the Army in Canada. As a result of this examination, it was judged that, by accelerating the training of infantry personnel in the training centres, by the remustering in England of reinforcements of other arms to be sent during the course of this year, by the reduction in the age at which young soldiers could be sent overseas from 19 to 18½ years, by sending non-commissioned officers as privates, by withdrawing suitable personnel from the establishments in Canada at some cost to the efficiency of the administrative services, and by a certain reduction in the infantry physical standards, it might be possible to increase the numbers of reinforcements sent from Canada during the remaining period of this year to the extent of 5,500.

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General Murchie's memorandum added that, in the past six months, there had been a very intense campaign to induce N.R.M.A. personnel to enroll for General Service. They had already obtained 6,000, but in recent weeks there had been some falling off.

Other possible courses of action to ease the existing shortage would be:

(a) to reduce the number of rifle companies in infantry battalions from four to three;

(b) to disband one infantry division at present overseas; and,

(c) to extend the terms of service of N.R.M.A. personnel.

(Memorandum, C.G.S. to the Minister, Oct.23, 1944).

8. Mr. King said that there were two aspects to the problem, namely, military considerations and those of a political nature.

We should go as far as possible along the lines suggested by the Chief of the General Staff to meet the present situation. Where there was a will a way could be found, and he was sure that the War Committee would agree that everything possible should be done.

From the political aspect, the government would have to ask themselves what was involved in the adoption of conscription, so that they might be in a position to come to a final conclusion.

There was one point, however, that should first be considered, namely, what further inducements might be offered to N.R.M.A. men to enlist for General Service. In the suggestions already made that morning, there had been no mention of a plan, which had previously been tentatively discussed, of offering N.R.M.A. men who enlisted for General Service their full time for the computation for their war service gratuities. If this course were decided upon, and the men advised to this effect, there might be a quite favourable response. In any event, it would be a right and proper thing to do.

At the outset, the government had decided on a policy of voluntary enlistment for

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the Army overseas. In June, 1940, a completely new situation had arisen which had exposed Canada to the risk of attack. The government had therefore decided to use all available resources for the defence of Canada, and the N.R.M.A. men had been conscripted for this very purpose. They had fulfilled the role which had been asked of them and they deserved credit from the government for what they had done. These men had not been living in luxury, and it seemed not improbable that the great majority of them would not very much have preferred to be at home, or in their usual employment. Some, too, might have wished to go overseas but had been prevented from doing so by personal reasons. To grant such of them as volunteered for General Service their full time for the war services gratuity might be one method of inducing them to do so. Moreover, they might see that such action would be better for their own personal future, the country's future, and to ensure better relations within the Army.

9. Mr. King said that another expedient would be a special general appeal to the N.R.M.A. personnel for an increased number of enlistments for General Service. Perhaps the military authorities might not be the best suited for this purpose.

In any event, such an appeal should be backed up by the government, and Mr. King, on his own account, was prepared to address all these men to this end. He would not say to them that their going overseas was necessary to win the war, but that they were needed overseas to maintain the Army at its present strength. The people at home in civilian life were doing their duty; would the men not assume this additional obligation? They would be better for it if they did. Some success might be achieved in this way.

In this connection, it was important that the N.R.M.A. men should be treated justly. Was it fair to them to look upon them as being unpatriotic? Actually, they had been called up to defend their country at home. Was it not important to look upon their side of the case, particularly as they had done all that had been asked of them? These men were not trained in world affairs and consequently were not men of a wide outlook. Many of them had the problem of personal domestic affairs. If, therefore, the government could get them to change their minds at the last hour, was there any reason to deny them the advantages enjoyed by their predecessors?

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If these methods did not achieve the desired end, then consideration would have to be given to whether the public interest would be best served by deciding on overseas conscription. Such a policy would encounter strong opposition. The government would have to decide whether this course was necessary to win the war, and this would have to take precedence over the very natural desire to keep the Army overseas up to strength. There was a tremendous risk involved. There was no danger of the war being lost if we did not take this course. Thus the military and political aspects were very much bound together.

10. The War Committee then discussed the considerations involved in making the grant of the war services gratuity retroactive in the case of N.R.M.A. personnel who enlisted for General Service.

It was generally agreed that two time limits would be required; one in respect of previous service and second, a limit to the length of time the offer would remain open.

11. Mr. Ralston said that, to take a practical view, it must be borne in mind that the reports of Army and civilian committees who have been engaged in encouraging the N.R.M.A. men to volunteer were that a very general attitude of mind amongst these men was that, if the government wanted them to go overseas, then the government should say so.

12. Mr. King said that there were two objectives to keep in view. The first was that it was necessary to get the men to volunteer now if they were to be of any value to the war effort, and second, incidentally by this course to liquidate the standing Army in Canada. We could not go too far in achieving both these ends, and success in the one would bring about success in the other.

If the government were to decide to send the men overseas now, we should have to think of the effect of that decision on the success of the current Victory Loan, its effects on Canada, on the country's participation in the war in the Pacific. Such a decision would give rise to civil strife such as we have never known and it would have a serious effect on Canada's relations, not only within the Commonwealth, but all over the world. The leaders of the three Great Powers had pretty well decided that the future peace of the world would require to

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be maintained by force, but if we began by using force within Canada at the present time, all hopes of Canada's participation in a world-wide security organization would go by the board.

13. The Minister of National Defence for Air referred to the Derby Scheme of 1915-16, under which the U.K. government exerted every means within its power to encourage voluntary enlistment prior to the adoption of national service. It would be appropriate to do something along these lines in Canada.

If the Canadian forces could get a month's rest on the conclusion of present operations to clear the approach to the Port of Antwerp, we should save some 5,000 or 6,000 casualties, and to this extent improve our reinforcement position.

14. Mr. King enquired if consideration had been given to the idea of granting men serving in the infantry overseas an increase in pay. An increase of this kind might have some effect in improving morale, which, it had been said, was suffering by reason of the inability to grant leave to men who had served for a long time in operational theatres.

15. Mr. Ralston said that obviously such action, if decided upon, would need to be made retroactive.

16. Mr. Power, however, thought otherwise. Mr. Churchill had recently announced a British decision to this end and to take effect as from a certain date. Canada might do the same.

17. Mr. King referred to the number of men presently being demobilized from the R.C.A.F. Could the services of a proportion of these men be secured for the Army? It had been pointed out that the training they would require would prevent them from becoming available before next February, but even so, they would be helpful in improving the general reinforcement position.

18. The War Committee, after further discussion, deferred consideration of the matter pending its discussion by the Cabinet as a whole.

The meeting adjourned at 1.50 p.m.

(Maurice Pope)
Major General
Military Secretary.

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CABINET WAR COMMITTEE

Meeting October 26th, 1944

Army overseas; reinforcements

1. The Prime Minister said that he thought it would be useful if the members of the War Committee were, to explore further possible ways of getting the men needed, to take certain of the proposals or suggestions that had been made in sequence. An agenda had, therefore, been prepared under four heads:

1. Proposals of Chief of the General Staff;

2. N.R.M.A. personnel enlistments;

3. Utilization of R.C.A.F. surpluses; and

4. Re-examination of availability of General Service personnel.

2. There followed a general discussion of the proposals which had been made by the Chief of the General Staff in his memorandum to the Minister, dated October 23rd, 1944 and the matter of a special appeal to N.R.M.A. personnel to enlist, at the conclusion of which Lieutenant-General Murchie joined the meeting.

3. The Chief of the General Staff said that his proposals contemplated finding additional men from General Service personnel serving in Canada in six different ways:

(a) Infantry from the present training stream 1,500

1500 men could be made available by accelerating the progress of personnel now in training and who normally would not have become ready for draft before January, 1945, by curtailing their leave other than embarkation leave, and by dispensing with the additional training given at the Training Brigade Group at Debert. Provided these men were given adequate refresher training in the United Kingdom, he was prepared to recommend the adoption of this step.

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(b) Personnel suitable for infantry from other arms — 1,500

Some 1,500 men could be remustered as infantry from those now training as reinforcements for other arms.

(c) Lowering of age limit — (500)

500 fully trained men could be obtained by lowering the age limit for despatch overseas, from 19 years to 18½ years. He would not recommend this course.

(d) Reversion of N.C.O.'s to rank of private — 750

750 N.C.O.'s could be required to revert to the rank of private on condition that their present rate of pay and allowances would be continued for a period of six months after their reversion. He agreed with this as it is in line with present policy in respect of tradesmen.

(e) Withdrawal from establishments and services of fit men — 750

Some 750 men could be obtained by withdrawing from various establishments and services in Canada skilled personnel who are of fit age and profile for infantry. The withdrawal of these men might seriously affect the standard of efficiency in the supply and maintenance service at home, but he was prepared to agree to this course provided that the consequences were clearly understood.

(f) Reduction in physical standards — 500

In the event it was decided to reduce the physical standards for infantry reinforcements to PULHEMS 2 in all but "L", he estimated that 500 additional personnel could be made available before December 31st.

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He would prefer to see these physical standards for infantry retained, but he considered that this was a matter for the field commanders and the Director-General of Medical Services.

Were action taken under the above heads, less the despatch of young soldiers before they reached the age of 19 years, some 5,000 additional infantry reinforcements could be made available before December 31st.

4. The Minister of National Defence said that he would like the foregoing proposals to be considered in relation to other courses of action that might be adopted. He would not like to be responsible for them unless they were included in a general policy to meet the whole problem.

5. The War Committee were generally agreeable to proposals (a), (b), (d), (e) and (f), as explained by General Murchie.

6. Mr. King said that, with regard to further enlistments from N.R.M.A. personnel, the suggestion that had been made that such men might be made eligible for war service gratuities for the time they had been training could be justified if it led to trained men being obtained quickly.

7. The Minister of Finance felt that two time limits would require to be laid down, namely, that the man could not be made eligible for the gratuity for a period of his N.R.M.A. service longer than was required for training. If this were not done, then a man who had spent three years in the N.R.M.A. might be entitled to a greater war service gratuity than a General Service man who had been overseas for a year. The criterion should be a length of time equal to the normal training period, say, six months.

8. The Minister of National Defence was of opinion that anything done under this head must be related to the special recruiting appeal which had been suggested. He was not sanguine as to the success which would attend such an appeal and referred to the reports that he had received as to the recruiting campaign which had been carried out with respect to the 13th Infantry Brigade and other units in the spring of 1944.

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These reports described in considerable detail the spirit of resistance built up in the minds of N.R.M.A. men against conversion to General Service.

9. Mr.King referred to the suggestion of granting "fighting" pay for operational infantry. The infantry were exposed to harder conditions than any other arm of the Service, suffered the most severe casualties, and were the least well paid. This proposal might be worthy of consideration.

10. Mr.Ilsley felt bound to say that he saw great difficulties in this proposal. The war service gratuity scheme had been originally designed to reward the men who actually fought overseas, but the Service departments had taken the stand that it would be impossible to distinguish between overseas men.

Actually, under the war service gratuity scheme the overseas men would eventually draw an extra $30 a month. This was a considerable amount of money which had not proved to be effective as an inducement to the man serving under the N.R.M.A. "Fighting" pay would run into very considerable figures.

11. The Minister of National Defence for Air suggested the expedient of making infantry a trade, and thus making them eligible for tradesmens' rates of pay. The infantry man did the dirty work in the field and ran greater risks than those in other arms and it was but just that this be recognized.

12. The War Committee, after further discussion, tentatively agreed that consideration might be given to having N.R.M.A. men made eligible for the war service gratuities for a period of six months prior to their enlistment for General Service.

13. Mr. Power said that, with respect to a special recruiting appeal, a statement would have to be made by the Prime Minister that the Army was short of infantry reinforcements, including an appeal to the N.R.M.A. men to volunteer to fill the gap.

14. Mr. King said that when this matter was brought to the attention of the public, a very full statement would have to be made. It would be necessary for this statement to say that there

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were some 120,000 General Service men serving in Canada, and to explain why it was impossible to find the 15,000 men required as additional infantry reinforcements. It would also have to state the number of N.R.M.A. men and how many of these had already converted to General Service, how many of them remained, and how many further men could be obtained therefrom by the imposition of conscription.

A statement of this kind would be the strongest reason for showing the doubtful wisdom of resorting to overseas conscription. It would also have to say that the government had only learned of this situation during the past week and give the government's appreciation as to how long the war would continue and the estimate of casualties that it was expected were still to be incurred. In this connection, the appreciation as to the continued duration of the war could not be that of the Cabinet, but of those who were responsible for the direction of the war and who would have to be consulted.

15. The Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs suggested that possibly it would not be necessary to disclose the Canadian position in all its detail, but only so much as would be necessary to achieve the object of the government's policy.

16. Mr.King agreed, but said it would be necessary to give the reasons underlying the need for a special recruiting campaign.

17. Mr. Ralston thought the question was more of a domestic nature and wondered if it would be necessary to discuss the matter outside of Canada.

18. Mr.King said the question was of a domestic nature from the point of view of the Department of National Defence, but from the point of view of the government, a matter of concern to our Allies.

19. There followed some discussion as to the security aspect of the statement which in certain circumstances would have to be made. It was noted that a good deal of information concerning the strength of the Army had been given in Parliament and that more could be made known without resort to specific detail.

20. Mr. Power inquired of General Murchie if he had any further information with regard to the proposal for establishing an R.C.A.F. regiment.

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21. General Murchie said no word in this regard had reached him as yet.

22. Mr.Power said that, in view of the training the surplus R.C.A.F. men who were being discharged would require, they could have no effect on the Army position before February or March next year. It was agreed, however, that they would materially help the situation from the long-term point of view.

23. Mr.King felt that it would be very helpful to all the members of the War Committee if the three Defence Ministers met to inquire as to the availability of infantry reinforcements from the 120,000 General Service men serving in Canada, and also those serving in the Army in the United Kingdom.

24. The War Committee agreed that the Defence Ministers should re-examine the availability of General Service personnel and report at the next meeting to be held the following morning.

(Maurice Pope)
Major General
Military Secretary.

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CABINET WAR COMMITTEE

Meeting October 27th, 1944

Army overseas; reinforcements

1. The Minister of National Defence for Air reported that the Defence Ministers had, the previous night, gone carefully into the matter of the numbers of General Service personnel, in Canada and Britain, who could be made available for infantry reinforcements.

One conclusion to be drawn was that, of the 120,000 General Service men in the Army in Canada, not more than 15,000 could be made available overseas, under present physical standards, before the first of June.

The standards for infantry were extremely high, particularly the "S" and "M" factors which represented "stability" and mental capacity respectively. "Stability" covered ability to stand the strain of modern war.

General Stuart had reported that as many as 11% of the men serving in Italy had had to be taken out of the line. They were kept in the theatre, however, so that as many as possible could be recovered for further service.

The Adjutant General was enquiring if the Medical Services would agree to accepting a lower PULHEMS standard. There were some 61,000 General Service men in Canada who had No.3 ratings somewhere in their PULHEMS charts.

2. Mr. Power was of opinion that, in the circumstances, Mr. Ralston had been quite right in bringing the matter of reinforcement requirements to the urgent attention of the War Committee.

It was evident that, to those who would oppose the adoption of a conscription measure, the fact that we had some 120,000 General Service personnel in the Army in Canada and some 90,000 overseas would be very difficult to explain. Nevertheless, unless the physical standards were lowered (and this would probably be opposed by the commanders in the field), he did not see how the necessary numbers of men could be obtained.

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The bald fact was that, assuming that the infantry overseas would have incurred the presently estimated 22,000 casualties between the 23rd of September and the 31st of December, the position on January 1st, 1945, would be that the field units would be up to strength and that there would be only some 750 infantry reinforcements available in the United Kingdom. On February 1st, some 3,000 more reinforcements would be available to replace casualties sustained in January. Therefore, if there were intensive fighting in the first month of next year, units would average about 10% below strength.

3. The Minister of National Defence said that this over-all 10% deficiency would be borne entirely by rifle companies and that, therefore, the position would be really worse than would at first appear.

4. The Minister of National Defence for Naval Services made reference to the large numbers of General Service men in Canada who, under present regulations, could not be called upon either because of their PULHEMS ratings or because of their age. With regard to the 90,000 General Service men in the United Kingdom, allowances had to be made for Forestry Corps, Staffs and necessary services. He did not think that many additional men could be found from these sources.

5. Mr. Power, with regard to estimated rates of casualties, said that the figures on which his report were based assumed that, for the remainder of the year, there would be 3½ weeks of intensive wastage, 6 weeks at normal rates, with the rest quiet.

The department had cabled to the commanders of both theatres to report as to the scale of fighting anticipated from now to the end of the year.

6. Mr. Power expressed the conclusion that, should the government decide that overseas conscription should not be imposed, there were but three alternative possible courses of action:

(a) to lower physical standards;

(b) to reduce the strength of front line units - that is, from 4 rifle companies to 3; and

(c) to see that the troops were given a period of rest.

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In any event, it was his own opinion that, if the government came to an immediate decision to send N.R.M.A. personnel overseas, it was doubtful if they would get there in time to be available by January 1st.

7. Mr. Ralston thought that, in the event of the decision being taken within the next few days, it would be possible to have N.R.M.A. reinforcements ready for despatch by November 24th. The time was admittedly tight, but recourse would first be had to the operational battalions in Western Canada who were in a comparatively high state of training.

8. Mr. Macdonald felt that the matter of lowering physical standards should be considered very carefully, and should only be done after information had been obtained as to what other armies were doing in this respect. It would be imprudent for us to fix our standards lower than the others.

If General Stuart's estimates of casualties were right, we would be short of 1,000 to 2,000 infantry by the 1st of January, with no reserves. During the period July to September, inclusive, the casualties had actually amounted to 18,000. The estimate for September 23rd to December 21st was 20,000, which, on the basis of experience, did not seem to be out of the way.

9. Mr. Power felt that the Army would reach the end of the calendar year with units up to strength but without reserves on hand, and that, should there be heavy fighting during January, no reinforcements would be available under present arrangements.

10. Mr. King expressed the view that, in these circumstances, it would be desirable to await receipt of information from the field commanders as to the prospects of activity for the remainder of the year, together with the report from the Medical Service as to the lowering of physical standards, before bringing the matter again before the Cabinet.

With respect to the French Canadian regiments, would it be feasible to have French troops serve with them under Canadian command?

11. Mr. King enquired if the time had not yet come to endeavour to have both portions of the Canadian Army united under Canadian command.

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U.S. troops had been taken out of the Italian theatre to carry out the invasion of Southern France. Could they not be returned to the Italian theatre so as to release the 1st Canadian Corps?

It seemed to him that such a solution would be but fair and reasonable at this stage. If this move took place, there would be no fighting and therefore no casualties being incurred while it was being accomplished. The Canadian fighting at Caen had enabled the American wing to do what it had done. The government wanted Canadian forces to be brought together under Canadian leadership. He quite appreciated that any decision along these lines would require the agreement of the Higher Command.

12. Mr. Ralston said that he was generally favourable to the objective of bringing the Army together whenever it proved possible to do so, but there were, at present, great difficulties in the way and it was unlikely that this proposal would solve the problem before the War Committee. There would be difficulty in finding other formations to relieve the Canadians in Italy. The government had, of course, the right to order the divisions out of the theatre, but such an order would not be well received in present circumstances.

13. Mr. Macdonald felt that it must be concluded that there would probably be no practicable alternative to shortening our line, with which view Mr. Power agreed.

14. Mr. Howe said that, to him, the situation appeared fairly simple, namely that we would run out of reinforcements by the end of the year, and that there were only two alternative courses - either to shorten our line or to send more men from home.

15. The Minister of Finance felt that there were only two alternative policies which the government might adopt - either they should impose conscription or agree and state that, at this stage in the war, conscription would not be imposed. In the latter event, it should be accepted that the line would be shortened, if necessary, and the N.R.M.A. problem would have to be settled either by their discharge or their assignment to fulfil labour needs in Canada.

16. The War Committee deferred further consideration of the matter pending replies

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from the commanders overseas and reports from the Adjutant General with respect to medical standards.

The meeting adjourned at 1.50 p.m.

(Maurice Pope)
Major General
Military Secretary.

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TOP SECRET

Ottawa, November 4th, 1944.

PERSONAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER:

Re: Army overseas; reinforcements; recent Cabinet discussions

Attached are memoranda for your own personal records of the meetings of the Cabinet held on October 24th, 25th, 27th, 30th and 31st, and November 1st, 2nd, and 3rd.

You will notice that these have been marked "Prime Minister's private record" and "Top Secret" and "Personal". It may be convenient to have them on paper suitable for including in a ring binder.

As I indicated to you a few days ago these memoranda are by no means a full report of all the discussions which took place at these meetings. They may, however, prove useful as a supplement to your own records, and to record the times of meetings, the names of those present, and the principle lines followed by the discussions.

No copy of these documents will be kept in the Privy Council files, though I shall retain here, with my private papers in the Privy Council safe, for a limited period, one copy of the memorandum of each meeting together with my pencilled notes in case you may wish to check my recollection of any points discussed. After a few weeks these copies and my notes will be destroyed.

I take it that this course meets with your approval.

P.L.

A. D. P. H.

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TOP SECRET

PERSONAL

Ottawa, October 24th, 1944.

THE CABINET

Notes of discussions at a meeting of the Cabinet held in the Privy Council Chamber on Tuesday, October 24th, 1944, at 3.00 p.m.

Present:

The Prime Minister (Mr.Mackenzie King), in the Chair,
The Minister of Mines and Resources (Mr. Crerar),
The Honourable J.H. King,
The Minister of National Defence (Mr. Ralston),
The Minister of Veterans Affairs (Mr. Mackenzie),
The Minister of National Defence for Air (Mr. Power),
The Minister of Finance (Mr.Ilsley),
The Minister of Transport (Mr.Michaud),
The Minister of Munitions and Supply and Minister of Reconstruction (Mr.Howe),
The Minister of Agriculture (Mr. Gardiner),
The Secretary of State (Mr. McLarty),
The Minister of Trade and Commerce (Mr. MacKinnon),
The Postmaster General (Mr. Mulock),
The Minister of National Revenue (Mr. Gibson),
The Minister of National Defence for Naval Services (Mr. Macdonald),
The Minister of Justice (Mr.St.Laurent),
The Minister of Labour (Mr. Mitchell),
The Minister of Public Works (Mr.Fournier),
The Minister of Fisheries (Mr.Bertrand),
The Minister of National War Services (Mr. LaFleche),
The Minister of National Health and Welfare (Mr. Claxton).

The Secretary to the Cabinet (Mr. Heeney).

Army overseas; reinforcements

1. The Prime Minister reviewed, at length, the discussions which had taken place at meetings of the Cabinet War Committee since the return of the Minister of National Defence, the preceding week, from his visit to the Army overseas.

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Mr. Ralston, upon his return, had reported to the War Committee that the reinforcement situation was such as to cause him grave concern. Investigation in the field had revealed the fact that, on the whole, the standard of training of infantry reinforcements had been satisfactory; on the other hand, the high incidence of infantry casualties rendered the numbers provided for under existing arrangements inadequate to meet estimated future requirements. In the latter connection, the Minister had submitted to the War Committee a report from the Chief of Staff, Canadian Military Headquarters overseas, recommending that an additional 15,000 reinforcements be provided by December 31st, and that, if adequate numbers could not be found from General Service personnel, the terms of service of N.R.M.A. personnel be extended to include service overseas.

2. The Minister of National Defence reviewed the reinforcement situation in detail and read to the meeting General Stuart's report of October 19th, a draft aide memoire which he had submitted that morning to the War Committee, and a report by the Chief of the General Staff upon possible sources from which reinforcement requirements could be met.

The present situation and the estimated increased needs for the future had resulted directly from the high percentage of infantry casualties experienced in operations in Western Europe and in Italy. An addition of 15,000 men by the end of the year would, on revised estimates, provide a pool of one and a half months' requirements and maintain the necessary flow of men to the two major operational theatres.

The two unknown but governing factors were, of course, the casualty rate from now on and the date of the end of hostilities. Estimated requirements were based in the former respect upon experience over the past four months; in the latter respect upon the probability of having to face a continued campaign during the winter.

(Memorandum, Chief of Staff, C.M.H.Q. overseas, to Minister, Oc.19, 1944; Minister's aide memoire, Oct.21,1944; Memorandum, C.G.S. to the Minister, Oct.23, 1944).

3. Mr. Ralston said that, in placing this problem before the government, he was not closing his mind to any possible solution which would provide the necessary men, but, at the moment,

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he could see no alternative to recommending that N.R.M.A. personnel be made available by alteration in their terms of service.

4. Mr. King drew attention, at length, to the military and national considerations involved in the problem before the Cabinet, and reviewed the discussion of these factors which had taken place in the War Committee.

No hasty decision should be reached, but full opportunity given for calm and considered deliberation upon a problem which involved the gravest consequences.

(Cabinet War Committee Minutes, Oct.19, 20 and 24, 1944).

5. The Cabinet, after discussion, agreed to continue consideration of the matter at a meeting to be held the following day.

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Prime Minister's private record

TOP SECRET

PERSONAL

Ottawa, October 25th, 1944.

THE CABINET

Notes of discussions at a meeting of the Cabinet held in the Privy Council Chamber on Wednesday, October 25th, at 3 p.m.

Present:

The Prime Minister (Mr. Mackenzie King), in the Chair,
The Minister of Mines and Resources (Mr. Crerar),
The Honourable J. H. King,
The Minister of National Defence (Mr. Ralston),
The Minister of Veterans Affairs (Mr. Mackenzie),
The Minister of National Defence for Air (Mr. Power),
The Minister of Finance (Mr. Ilsley),
The Minister of Transport (Mr. Michaud),
The Minister of Munitions and Supply and Minister of Reconstruction (Mr. Howe),
The Minister of Agriculture (Mr. Gardiner),
The Secretary of State (Mr. McLarty),
The Minister of Trade and Commerce (Mr. MacKinnon),
The Postmaster General (Mr. Mulock),
The Minister of National Revenue (Mr. Gibson),
The Minister of National Defence for Naval Services (Mr. Macdonald),
The Minister of Justice (Mr. St. Laurent),
The Minister of Public Works (Mr. Fournier),
The Minister of Fisheries (Mr. Bertrand),
The Minister of National War Services (General LaFleche),
The Minister of National Health and Welfare (Mr. Claxton).

The Secretary to the Cabinet (Mr. Heeney).

Army overseas; reinforcements

1. The Prime Minister, referring to the discussion at the meeting held the previous day, suggested that the Cabinet should concentrate upon examining every possible means, short of compulsion, of meeting the needs of the Army overseas; if these proved incapable of producing the necessary results then the question of compulsory service and the issues raised thereby should be considered.

For the guidance of the War Committee in their further consideration of the problem, the other Ministers might now give expression to their views.

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2. The Ministers present, other than those of the War Committee, expressed, individually, their views upon the problem under discussion, in the light of the report submitted at the previous meeting by the Minister of National Defence.

3. Mr.King proposed that the War Committee should meet the next day, for further examination of the matter in the light of the opinions expressed by other members of the government; the full Cabinet could then meet again on Friday.

4. The Cabinet, after discussion, deferred decisions pending further consideration of the problem by the Cabinet War Committee at a meeting to be held the following day.

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PERSONAL

Ottawa, October 27th, 1944.

THE CABINET

Notes of discussions at a meeting of the Cabinet held in the Privy Council Chamber on Friday, October 27th, at 4 p.m.

Present:

The Prime Minister (Mr. Mackenzie King), in the Chair,
The Minister of Mines and Resources (Mr. Crerar),
The Honourable J. H. King,
The Minister of National Defence (Mr. Ralston),
The Minister of Veterans Affairs (Mr. Mackenzie),
The Minister of National Defence for Air (Mr. Power),
The Minister of Finance (Mr. Ilsley),
The Minister of Transport (Mr. Michaud),
The Minister of Munitions and Supply, and Minister of Reconstruction (Mr. Howe),
The Secretary of State (Mr. McLarty),
The Minister of Trade and Commerce (Mr. MacKinnon),
The Postmaster General (Mr. Mulock),
The Minister of National Revenue (Mr. Gibson),
The Minister of National Defence for Naval Services (Mr. Macdonald),
The Minister of Justice (Mr. St. Laurent),
The Minister of Labour (Mr. Mitchell),
The Minister of Public Works (Mr. Fournier),
The Minister of Fisheries (Mr. Bertrand),
The Minister of National Health and Welfare (Mr. Claxton).

The Secretary to the Cabinet (Mr. Heeney).

Army overseas; reinforcements

1. The Prime Minister referred to further discussions of the problem by the Cabinet War Committee at meetings held the previous day and that morning, at which various proposals for meeting the need for reinforcements had been carefully examined.

It had been decided at that morning's meeting of the War Committee to communicate with the commanders in the field (Lieutenant-General Crerar, Lieutenant-General Simonds and Lieutenant-General Burns) to enquire as to the probable employment of the Army overseas, over the next few months, and to have them express their views on the acceptability of infantry reinforcements of

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lower category. The question of physical and mental standards for infantry was also under review by Army medical officers.

Meantime, the War Committee had been generally agreeable to acceptance of proposals by the Chief of the General Staff for obtaining certain additional General Service personnel in Canada for employment as infantry reinforcements. These involved - acceleration of training, remustering from other arms, reversions of N.C.O.'s and withdrawals from establishments ((a), (b), (d), and (e), in General Murchie's memorandum of October 23rd). Taken together, these methods were capable of producing some 5,000 men. A proposal for reducing the age limit for despatch overseas had not been recommended and had not been approved.

2. Mr.King said that, in the circumstances, it seemed best to await information from the field commanders and from medical authorities before taking any further decision.

3. The Minister of National Defence observed that the enquiries which had been made of the field commanders related also to the latest forecast of activity for Canadian forces. The field commanders had been requested to consult the higher command.

The proposals put forward by the Chief of the General Staff, apart from that relating to a reduction of physical standards for infantry reinforcements, would produce an estimated 4,500 men. It was not yet known what might be anticipated from any lowering of physical standards.

4. The Cabinet, after further discussion, adjourned consideration of the problem to the next meeting to be held the following Monday, October 30th.

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PERSONAL

Ottawa, October 30th, 1944.

THE CABINET

Notes of discussions at a meeting of the Cabinet held in the Privy Council Chamber on Monday, October 30th, 1944, at 3 p.m.

Present:

The Prime Minister (Mr.Mackenzie King), in the Chair,
The Minister of Mines and Resources (Mr.Crerar),
The Honourable J.H. King,
The Minister of National Defence (Mr.Ralston),
The Minister of Veterans Affairs (Mr.Mackenzie),
The Minister of Finance (Mr.Ilsley),
The Minister of Transport (Mr.Michaud),
The Minister of Munitions and Supply, and Minister of Reconstruction (Mr.Howe),
The Secretary of State (Mr. McLarty),
The Minister of Trade and Commerce (Mr. MacKinnon),
The Postmaster General (Mr.Mulock),
The Minister of National Revenue (Mr.Gibson),
The Minister of National Defence for Naval Services (Mr.Macdonald),
The Minister of Justice (Mr.St.Laurent),
The Minister of Labour (Mr. Mitchell),
The Minister of Public Works (Mr.Fournier),
The Minister of Fisheries (Mr. Bertrand),
The Minister of National War Services (Mr. LaFleche),
The Minister of National Health and Welfare (Mr. Claxton).

The Secretary to the Cabinet (Mr.Heeney).

Army overseas; reinforcements

1. The Prime Minister, after drawing attention to the consequences of failure to reach an early and satisfactory conclusion, said that the immediate question before the government was the determination of the course which would effectively produce the greatest number of men to reinforce the Army overseas.

2. Mr. King then read a draft of a public statement which had been prepared as a basis for discussion.

The statement was in the form of questions and answers and dealt with the whole reinforcement situation including training, casualties and reserves and an analysis of the methods open to the government and the consequences which might be expected to

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follow their adoption.

3. The Minister of National Defence for Naval Services submitted and explained memoranda which embodied the results of his further examinations with the Army Staff, of the present and prospective reinforcement situation.

These memoranda, copies of which were circulated (and subsequently collected) described: the total strength of the Army overseas (effectives and non-effectives); the estimated infantry reinforcements available, September 23rd to December 31st; the estimated net position at the end of the year. Available reinforcements were compared with recommended requirements. A statement was made of the N.R.M.A. position at September 27th and an explanation was given of the problem of leave.

Attached appendices analyzed the projected infantry reinforcement situation on a monthly basis to May 1945 and the number of infantry reinforcements becoming available each month.

(Departmental memoranda and attached appendices, Oct. 30, 1944).

4. Mr. Macdonald said that his examination of the facts and figures led him to conclude that the memoranda submitted contained reasonably accurate estimates and provided a satisfactory basis for consideration of the question before the Cabinet.

With respect to physical and mental standards for General Service personnel in Canada for infantry reinforcements, Medical Officers were prepared to accept a lowering under "P" (physical) and "U" (upper body) classifications, but were unwilling to go below present "M" (mental) and "S" (stability") classifications. The figure of 20% for wastage prior to embarkation might bear re-examination. The remainder were over-age, under-age, in lower physical categories, students, or minimum key personnel.

With respect to probable casualties, the previous estimate of 22,000 from September 23rd to December 31st was borne out by forecasts of activity for Western Europe and Italy received from the field commanders and concurred in by the high command.

The net position at the end of the year showed a deficiency of 2,350 in the strength of infantry field units, with insufficient numbers of reinforcements coming forward in January to meet anticipated casualties during that month at normal or intense rates of activity. The position would have improved somewhat from February onward.

It was estimated that 8,000 N.R.M.A. trained infantry personnel could be made available in operational theatres by mid-January and an

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additional 7,000 by mid-February. 16,000 were now trained as infantry and of adequate category.

5. The Minister of National Defence submitted a memorandum from the Chief of Staff, C.M.H.Q. overseas, making certain amendments and additions to General Stuart's memorandum as submitted to the Cabinet War Committee by Mr.Ralston on October 19th.

In the light of additional information received, General Stuart re-affirmed his recommendation that a reinforcement pool of 15,000 men was required.

(Memorandum, General Stuart to the Minister, Oct.30, 1944, and attached revised page 4 of memorandum of Oct.19).

6. The Cabinet, after considerable discussion, adjourned to 3 p.m., the following day.

A.D.P.H.

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PERSONAL

Ottawa, October 31st, 1944.

THE CABINET

Notes of discussions at a meeting of the Cabinet held in the Privy Council Chamber on Tuesday, October 31st, 1944, at 3 p.m.

Present:

The Prime Minister (Mr. Mackenzie King), in the Chair,
The Minister of Mines and Resources (Mr. Crerar),
The Honourable J. H. King,
The Minister of National Defence (Mr. Ralston),
The Minister of Veterans Affairs (Mr. Mackenzie),
The Minister of Finance (Mr. Ilsley),
The Minister of Transport (Mr. Michaud),
The Secretary of State (Mr. McLarty),
The Minister of Trade and Commerce (Mr. MacKinnon),
The Postmaster General (Mr. Mulock),
The Minister of National Revenue (Mr. Gibson),
The Minister of National Defence for Naval Services (Mr. Macdonald),
The Minister of Justice (Mr. St. Laurent),
The Minister of Labour (Mr. Mitchell),
The Minister of Public Works (Mr. Fournier),
The Minister of Fisheries (Mr. Bertrand),
The Minister of National War Services (General LaFleche),
The Minister of National Health and Welfare (Mr. Claxton).

The Secretary to the Cabinet (Mr. Heeney).

Army overseas; reinforcements

1. The Prime Minister referred to discussion the previous day and at earlier meetings of the Cabinet.

The question for decision was whether the government would agree to continue overseas service on a voluntary basis, attempting to find the necessary additional men for infantry reinforcements by means of a special appeal, or whether the government would agree upon compulsory overseas service and call Parliament for the purpose of supporting their decision in this respect.

2. The Secretary of State suggested that a possible compromise course might be to conduct the proposed special appeal for N.R.M.A. enlistment during a limited period, in the meantime making the necessary arrangements for transport of additional

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personnel overseas in time to meet the anticipated January need; if, by a certain date in November sufficient N.R.M.A. personnel had not been obtained, then a "selective draft" might be imposed to provide the minimum numbers required.

Such a course might be considered as one which would meet the serious objections to the adoption of compulsory overseas service at this time and, at the same time, provide a guarantee that the necessary men would be found to meet the reinforcement need.

3. The Ministers present discussed at length the suggestion made by Mr. McLarty, and other proposals for the conduct of a special appeal to be directed principally at obtaining "conversions" from trained N.R.M.A. personnel.

The points raised at previous meetings were again reviewed and the arguments for and against an immediate decision in favour of the extension of N.R.M.A. service were considered in relation to the general national interest and the need for doing everything possible to support the Army overseas.

4. The Minister of National Defence throughout the discussion emphasized again the importance of providing a "pool" of reinforcements to be available to meet future contingencies.

5. Mr. King once more stated the nature of the problem and summarized the arguments which had been advanced. The results of the decision to be taken should be judged for the long as well as the short term, from the international as well as the national point of view and as one affecting vitally the interests of the nation as a whole as well as those of the Army.

The draft statement which he had submitted the previous day was capable of revision in any way to meet the views of the Cabinet.

6. Mr. Ralston felt that, after hearing the discussions which had taken place in the War Committee and in the Cabinet, since his return from overseas, he would have no alternative to recommending that the terms of service of N.R.M.A. personnel be amended so as to make them available to meet reinforcement requirements overseas.

7. The Cabinet, after further discussion, adjourned to 3 p.m., the following day.

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PERSONAL

Ottawa, November 1st, 1944.

THE CABINET

Notes of discussions at a meeting of the Cabinet held in the Privy Council Chamber on Wednesday, November 1st, 1944 at 3.00 p.m.

Present:

The Prime Minister (Mr. Mackenzie King), in the Chair,
The Minister of Mines and Resources (Mr. Crerar),
The Honourable J. H. King,
The Minister of National Defence (Mr. Ralston),
The Minister of Veterans Affairs (Mr. Mackenzie),
The Minister of Finance (Mr. Ilsley),
The Minister of Transport (Mr. Michaud),
The Secretary of State (Mr. McLarty),
The Minister of Trade and Commerce (Mr. MacKinnon),
The Postmaster General (Mr. Mulock),
The Minister of National Revenue (Mr. Gibson),
The Minister of National Defence for Naval Services (Mr. Macdonald),
The Minister of Justice (Mr. St. Laurent),
The Minister of Labour (Mr. Mitchell),
The Minister of Public Works (Mr. Fournier),
The Minister of Fisheries (Mr. Bertrand),
The Minister of National War Services (General LaFleche),
The Minister of National Health and Welfare (Mr. Claxton).

The Secretary to the Cabinet (Mr. Heeney).

Army overseas; reinforcements

1. The Minister of National Defence for Naval Services reported the views of the G.O.C. on the Pacific Coast (in whose district the great majority of trained N.R.M.A. infantry were located) upon the conversion of N.R.M.A. personnel to General Service, reviewing the steps which had been taken to encourage enlistment, and analyzing the motives of those who were unwilling to enlist for overseas service.

General Pearkes had expressed the view, when consulted by Mr. Ralston himself, that a total of perhaps 1,500 trained infantrymen might be anticipated from personnel of the four stations in British Columbia over a period of about three weeks. It was his view that such an appeal would be most effective if made by the Minister, and that the appeal should make no reference to the possibility of conscription.

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As to N.R.M.A. personnel accepting a government decision to despatch them overseas by an extension of their terms of service, General Pearkes was of opinion that no serious trouble would result.

2. Mr. Macdonald also reported the results of further scrutiny with the Army Staff of the figures of General Service personnel in Canada.

By the various methods already put forward, a total of not more than 5,500 could be obtained in Canada; an additional 500 to 1,000 might be secured by reverting N.C.O.'s at present engaged in training. The medical officers held to their opinion that no further lowering of the PULHEMS categories could be accepted for general duties infantry.

3. The Minister of National Defence, in reference to the reported views of General Pearkes, drew attention to the delays involved and to the doubtful results of the proposed appeal in producing numbers sufficient to create what was regarded as the necessary minimum pool.

4. The Prime Minister referred to the discussion at the previous meeting.

All were agreed that a special appeal should be made to increase the numbers of conversions from N.R.M.A. personnel, though difference existed as to whether a decision should or should not be taken at this time, upon acceptance of compulsory overseas service if the appeal failed to produce a stated number by a stated date.

The Cabinet should keep before them, in reaching a decision, the general considerations to which attention had been drawn and should adopt the course which would have the effect of maintaining the national war effort and producing the men required.

The Minister of National Defence had reached the conclusion that decision should be taken now in the matter of conscription and that, if the special appeal failed, compulsion should then be adopted forthwith.

5. Mr. King said that he retained his strong belief in the voluntary system and the majority of the Cabinet were of the opinion that the government's policy should not now be changed in this respect.

On the other hand, the Minister of National Defence felt otherwise. In the circumstances, it was the Prime Minister's duty to find someone who would be prepared to accept responsibility for meeting the reinforcement situation in accordance with government policy.

6. The Cabinet, after discussion, adjourned to 11 o'clock the following morning.

A. D. P. H.

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PERSONAL

Ottawa, November 2nd, 1944.

THE CABINET

Notes of discussions at a meeting of the Cabinet held in the Privy Council Chamber on Thursday, November 2nd, 1944, at 11 a.m.

Present:

The Prime Minister (Mr. Mackenzie King), in the Chair,
The Minister of Mines and Resources (Mr. Crerar),
The Honourable J. H. King,
The Minister of Veterans Affairs (Mr. Mackenzie),
The Minister of Finance (Mr. Ilsley),
The Minister of Transport (Mr. Michaud),
The Secretary of State (Mr. McLarty),
The Minister of Trade and Commerce (Mr. MacKinnon),
The Postmaster General (Mr. Mulock),
The Minister of National Revenue (Mr. Gibson),
The Minister of National Defence for Naval Services (Mr. Macdonald),
The Minister of Justice (Mr. St. Laurent),
The Minister of Labour (Mr. Mitchell),
The Minister of Public Works (Mr. Fournier),
The Minister of Fisheries (Mr. Bertrand),
The Minister of National War Services (General LaFleche),
The Minister of National Health and Welfare (Mr. Claxton),
The Minister of National Defence (General McNaughton).

The Secretary to the Cabinet (Mr. Heeney).

Army overseas; reinforcements

1. The Prime Minister welcomed General McNaughton.

2. The Minister of National Defence thanked the Prime Minister and expressed his full realization of the difficulties of the task which he had undertaken.

The Canadian Army had been designed as one that could be supported upon the manpower available in Canada, after studies which had gone back over twenty years.

It was his belief that there was no need to depart from the voluntary principle upon which the Army had been built and that the Army could be maintained on that basis in the hard battles that laid ahead. He did not exclude the possibility of having to resort to compulsory overseas service but felt

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strongly that the government must first satisfy themselves of the necessity of such a step by exhausting every method possible.

3. The Cabinet, after further discussion, adjourned to the following day at 3 p.m.

A. D. P. H.

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PERSONAL

Ottawa, November 3rd, 1944.

THE CABINET

Notes of discussions at a meeting of the Cabinet held in the Privy Council Chamber on Friday, November 3rd, 1944, at 3 p.m.

Present:

The Prime Minister (Mr. Mackenzie King), in the Chair,
The Minister of Mines and Resources (Mr. Crerar),
The Honourable J. H. King,
The Minister of Veterans Affairs (Mr. Mackenzie),
The Minister of Finance (Mr. Ilsley),
The Secretary of State (Mr. McLarty),
The Minister of Trade and Commerce (Mr. MacKinnon),
The Postmaster General (Mr. Mulock),
The Minister of National Revenue (Mr. Gibson),
The Minister of National Defence for Naval Services (Mr. Macdonald),
The Minister of Justice (Mr. St. Laurent),
The Minister of Labour (Mr. Mitchell),
The Minister of Public Works (Mr. Fournier),
The Minister of National War Services (General LaFleche),
The Minister of National Health and Welfare, (Mr. Claxton),
The Minister of National Defence (General McNaughton).

The Secretary to the Cabinet (Mr. Heeney).

Army overseas; reinforcements

1. The Minister of National Defence reported upon his preliminary review with Staff Officers of the reinforcement position.

There was no difficulty with arms other than infantry. The infantry position was quite adequate to the end of November. At the end of December there would be a deficiency of 2,350 in infantry units, against a total number of 8,600 in various stages of training. Reserves of infantry would fall to zero by the spring. These calculations were based upon accepted estimates of casualties over the coming months.

2. General McNaughton spoke of the action proposed to provide the necessary additional infantry reinforcements. Conversions of N.R.M.A. personnel must proceed at a much higher rate in November and December and it would be necessary to undertake special measures to accomplish this purpose.

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As a preliminary step it was intended to recall from civil employment all N.R.M.A. personnel, many of whom were apparently so engaged at higher than Army rates of pay. It was also intended that an immediate appeal for enlistments should be instituted not later than Armistice Day, after carefully devised plans for such an appeal had been concerted.

3. The Cabinet, after considerable discussion, noted with approval the Minister's report and agreed that the following Committee be appointed to consider and make recommendations upon, at the next meeting, the early institution of a co-ordinated programme calculated to obtain the maximum numbers of General Service enlistments from N.R.M.A. personnel and others:

General McNaughton (Convener),
Mr. Mackenzie,
Mr. Gardiner,
Mr. Mulock,
Mr. Gibson,
General LaFleche,
Mr. Claxton,

Mr. Heeney.

It was understood that the Committee would obtain the advice and assistance of appropriate Army officers, officials of the Wartime Information Board, and other departments and agencies of government concerned, and that consideration would be given to:

(a) obtaining the support of the Churches, the press, War Veterans' associations and other voluntary organization;

(b) a full public statement, by the Prime Minister or the Minister of National Defence, upon the reinforcement position;

(c) the employment of N.R.M.A. personnel for other than military duties;

(d) the extension of war gratuities benefits available to N.R.M.A. personnel who enlisted for General Service;

(e) priority in discharge for General Service personnel;

(f) priorities in government employment for returned ex-Service men, and

(g) such other action as might assist in obtaining the object in view.

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Army; compulsory overseas service

4. The Minister of National Defence for Naval Services, referring to the special appeal which was to be made to increase enlistments for General Service, enquired what was to be done if these special measures failed to obtain the numbers required to provide adequate reinforcements for the Army overseas.

Did the government intend to introduce compulsory service only in the event of some dire extremity involving a danger to Canada herself, or would conscription be adopted if it proved necessary to obtain the reinforcements required to maintain the Army at its present strength. This was a question of vital importance upon which a decision should now be reached. There had been a marked divergence of opinion as to whether or not government policy in this particular had changed since 1942 at the time of the plebiscite.

5. The Minister of National Defence said that, while he believed that it would be possible to retain the voluntary system, he did not exclude conscription as a possibility.

Compulsion should, however, be resorted to only after a full statement of the position had been made to the public and if every possible other means had failed to produce the numbers of men necessary to enable Canada to bear her just share in the winning of the war.

6. The Cabinet adjourned to the following Tuesday at 3 p.m.

A. D. P. H.

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C 272727

Order in Council authorizing the despatch of National Resources Mobilization Act, 1940, personnel to the U.K., European and Mediterranean theatres of war.

P.C. 8891

AT THE GOVERNMENT HOUSE AT OTTAWA

THURSDAY, the 23rd day of NOVEMBER, 1944.

PRESENT:

HIS EXCELLENCY

THE GOVERNOR GENERAL IN COUNCIL:

WHEREAS it is essential in the national interest and for the efficient prosecution of the war to provide for the adequate reinforcement of the Canadian forces overseas;

AND WHEREAS it has now become necessary, in order to ensure provision of adequate reserves to meet requirements for the reinforcement of the Canadian forces fighting in Europe and in the Mediterranean, to extend the locality of service of certain personnel who have been called out for training, service or duty, pursuant to the provisions of the National Resources Mobilization Act, 1940;

NOW THEREFORE, His Excellency the Governor General in Council, on the recommendation of the Minister of National Defence and under and by virtue of the provisions of the National Resources Mobilization Act, 1940, and the War Measures Act, is pleased to order and doth hereby order as follows:-

Notwithstanding the provisions of any other statute, law, regulation or order, the Minister of National Defence is hereby authorized and directed to despatch to the following localities of service, namely; the United Kingdom and/or to European and/or Mediterranean operational theatres such personnel, in such numbers as may be approved by the Governor in Council (the number hereby approved being sixteen thousand) who are serving by reason of their having been called out for training, service or duty pursuant to the provisions of the National Resources Mobilization Act, 1940, as are or may from time to time hereafter be required, in the opinion of the said Minister, for training, service or duty within the said localities of service; such personnel to be detailed from such units, depots and establishments as may be designated by the said Minister; and the Minister of National Defence is hereby authorized and directed to issue or cause to be issued all orders and to take all steps necessary to give effect to this authorization and direction; and all personnel so despatched or to be despatched are respectively hereby required (in addition to all other obligations for training, service or duty) to perform while in the said localities of service such training, service or duty as may be ordered by any superior officer.

Further/

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C272727A

Further, all personnel so despatched or who may at any time be despatched are, pursuant to Section 64 of the Militia Act, hereby placed on active service beyond Canada for the defence thereof.

Certified to be a true copy,

A. D. P. Heeney,
Clerk of the Privy Council.

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REPEAT
REPETER

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Further/

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C 272728A

Further, all personnel so despatched or who may at any time be despatched are, pursuant to Section 64 of the Militia Act, hereby placed on active service beyond Canada for the defence thereof.

Certified to be a true copy,

A. D. P. Heeney,
Clerk of the Privy Council.

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Clerk of the Privy Council.

REPEAT
REPETER

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PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE 272729

MEMORANDUM C

Prime Minister

Attached, in the form of minutes, are the conclusions reached by this morning's meeting on the points arising from discussions in the House.

Those marked with blue pencil should not, it was felt, be the subject of reference in any statement.

Pickersgill is using these minutes as the basis of his draft in these particulars

Dept.

No. 25-44

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SECRET

Ottawa, November 25th, 1944.

CABINET COMMITTEE

A meeting of a special Cabinet committee was held in the Privy Council Chamber on Saturday, November 25th, 1944, at 4.00 p.m.

Present:

The Minister of Veterans Affairs (Mr. Mackenzie),
The Minister of Justice (Mr. St.Laurent),
The Minister of National Defence (General McNaughton),

The Deputy Minister of Justice (Mr. Varcoe),
The Judge Advocate General (Brigadier Orde),
The Deputy Judge Advocate General (Colonel Nolan),
Mr. J.W. Pickersgill,

The Secretary to the Cabinet (Mr. Heeney),
The Military Secretary to the War Committee (Major General Pope).

Army; reinforcements; extension of terms of N.R.M.A. personnel

1. Mr. Heeney explained that the Prime Minister had requested that the meeting be called to consider questions arising out of the discussions in the House of Commons in the past two days in relation to Order in Council P.C.8891.

A draft agenda was circulated.

2. The Committee, after discussion at length, agreed:

(1) That Order in Council P.C.8891 did not require amendment with respect to localities of service or otherwise;

(2) That provision should be made (by the enactment of an appropriate Order in Council under the War Measures Act) for

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the extension of benefits under the War Service Grants Act, 1944, to N.R.M.A. personnel who serve overseas under the provisions of P.C.8891, such benefits to be computed on the basis of the duration of such overseas service;

(3) That the calculation of the number of N.R.M.A. personnel approved for despatch overseas under the provisions of P.C.8891 should be made as from the moment of embarcation;

(4) That N.R.M.A. personnel might convert to General Service at any time without limitation; the additional benefits resulting therefrom to be calculated from the actual date of conversion;

(5) That P.C.8891 covered all personnel who were serving or might serve in consequence of having been called up under the N.R.M. Act, though the number approved thereunder by the Governor in Council for despatch to overseas localities of service was limited to 16,000;

(6) That should it become necessary to approve the despatch overseas of additional N.R.M.A. personnel, the additional numbers to be despatched would be fixed by Order in Council under the general authority provided by P.C.8891;

(7) That, in the event of Orders in Council being required under (6) above, there would be no occasion for any further Parliamentary discussion; and

(8) That the government should not, at this time, make any announcement with regard to discharged R.C.A.F. personnel beyond that already made by Mr. Power in connection with the winding up of the B.C.A.T.P, the disposition of air and ground crew to be reviewed by the departments concerned (Army, Air, Selective Service).

A.D.P. Heeney.

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THE MONTREAL STAR

Office of the
President

C 272732

November 22nd, 1944

Dear Mr. King-

Knowing your own conscientious feeling with respect to sending men overseas who have not volunteered for that service, I have been thinking a great deal during the past few weeks about your position in the present crisis. The immense burden now resting upon you: the seriousness of the decision called for, and the responsibilities attached to that decision.

My own conscientious conviction is that the unexpected emergency of reinforcing our infantry wholly justifies the sending of trained draftees.

The emergency is not in the Navy: it is not in the Air Force. In these two gallant services, which have borne the stress and strain of the most terrific struggle in history, there has ever been a surplus of volunteers. A heavy waiting list standing by: more than were needed for the two services which exposed the volunteers to the greatest dangers, and which called for the most heroic efforts and the greatest sacrifices.

Despite all that it was thought necessary to have a plebiscite to let the people say whether or not men should be drafted for service anywhere.

The answer was yes; with an overwhelming majority. The draft was accordingly put into effect, and you then took the position that draftees would not be sent overseas unless an emergency arose; and then not without the approval of Parliament.

Now, because of the unparalleled success of the European invasion: because of the might with which was has been waged on this so-called "impregnable front" demanding the employment of infantry to a degree never dreamed of: an emergency arises which calls for trained infantry reinforcements in numbers wholly unanticipated.

The Navy and the Air Forde, which have borne the burden and engaged the enemy in deadly combat for the past four years, have still a surplus of volunteers. That is good: it is more than good, it is magnificent.

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But these men cannot be turned to reinforce infantry for which they have no training whatsoever. But from the draftees, trained infantry reinforcements are ready for immediate despatch overseas: there to be available to reinforce and relieve our tired and hard-pressed troops.

That the emergency will shortly exist no one has even attempted to deny. Those against sending draftees argue that a sufficient number of these to meet the nearby emergency will volunteer.

The answer to that argument no one is qualified to give.

On the contrary, we hear reports from various districts that draftees are saying "we are ready, it is the Government's responsibility to sned us, but why should we now volunteer if our Government is not yet convinced that the emergency has arisen?"

My dear Mr. King, if trained draftees are now sent because of the admitted emergency for infantry reinforcements no one, not even in Quebec, can say that you have failed them: that you have not fully lived up to the understanding clearly set forth by you - stated and re-stated on many occasions.
But our boys in the fighting lines might have very good reason to feel that they have been let down.

Your Government has done a magnificent job, and The Star has never failed to say so. At all times we have endeavoured sincerely to give you support and praise for fine achievements, and now regret having to take a position opposite to your attitude on the question of reinforcements.

With kind personal regards,

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd) J. W. McConnell.

The Rt. Hon. W. L. Mackenzie King,
Prime Minister,
Ottawa, Ont.

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

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No. 47A **EDITION SPECIALE -- SPECIAL EDITION** Vol. 76

Gazette officielle de Québec

(PUBLIÉE PAR LE GOUVERNEMENT DE LA PROVINCE)

Quebec Official Gazette

(PUBLISHED BY THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT)

PROVINCE DE QUÉBEC — QUÉBEC, LE JEUDI, 30 NOVEMBRE 1944

PROVINCE OF QUEBEC — QUEBEC, THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 30TH, 1944

Décret ministériel du Conseil des Ministres de la Province de Québec, à l'encontre de la

Conscription

pour service outre-mer

Ministerial Decree of the Council of Ministers of the Province of Quebec, against

Conscription

for service overseas

Voir pages 2-3 — See pages 2-3

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ARRÊTÉ EN CONSEIL
CHAMBRE DU CONSEIL EXÉCUTIF

Numéro 4546

Québec, le 30 novembre 1944.

Présent: Le Lieutenant-Gouverneur-en-Conseil

Concernant l'établissement de la conscription pour service militaire outre-mer

ATTENDU QUE, tout particulièrement lors des élections générales provinciales du mois d'octobre 1939, d'abord, et lors des élections générales fédérales de 1940, ainsi qu'en de nombreuses circonstances avant et après ces dates, le Premier Ministre actuel du Canada et les membres de son cabinet se sont formellement et catégoriquement opposés à la conscription pour service au-delà des mers;

ATTENDU QU'à maintes reprises et de façon précise, la province de Québec a manifesté son opposition à la conscription militaire pour service au-delà des mers, et, cela, à la suite d'une campagne de plus de vingt-cinq ans menée par les chefs du parti libéral;

ATTENDU QUE depuis trois ou quatre ans, contrairement à ses promesses formelles et à ses engagements sacrés, le gouvernement fédéral actuel a établi un système de conscription déguisée pour service militaire au-delà des mers;

ATTENDU QUE, tout dernièrement, le gouvernement fédéral a adopté un arrêté ministériel établissant ouvertement un système de conscription militaire pour service au-delà des mers;

ATTENDU QUE l'établissement de la conscription pour service outre-mer vient à l'encontre des promesses et engagements formels et catégoriques du Premier Ministre actuel du Canada et des membres de son cabinet;

ATTENDU QUE la violation de ces promesses sacrées et de ces engagements formels est à l'encontre de l'unité nationale bien comprise et de nature à déprécier la valeur de la parole et des promesses solennelles du gouvernement du pays;

ATTENDU QUE la province de Québec est respectueuse de la légitime liberté d'opinion de tous et chacun, mais qu'elle a le droit d'exiger et qu'elle entend exiger le respect de ses opinions et des engagements contractés à l'endroit du peuple;

ORDER IN COUNCIL
EXECUTIVE COUNCIL CHAMBER

No. 4546

Quebec, November 30th, 1944.

Present: The Lieutenant-Governor in Council

Concerning the establishment of Conscription for military service overseas

WHEREAS, more particularly at the time of the general Provincial elections of the month of October, 1939, both then, and at the time of the general Federal elections of 1940, as well as on several occasions before and after these dates, the actual Prime Minister of Canada and the members of his cabinet formally and categorically declared themselves opposed to conscription for service overseas;

WHEREAS on many occasions and in a definite manner, the Province of Quebec has manifested its opposition to military conscription for overseas service, and, this, following a campaign carried on for more than twenty-five years by the leaders of the Liberal Party;

THAT for three or four years, contrary to its formal promises and to its sacred pledges, the present Federal Government has established a system of disguised conscription for military service overseas;

THAT just lately the Federal Government has adopted an Order in Council openly establishing a system of military conscription for service overseas;

THAT the establishment of conscription for service overseas is contrary to the formal and explicit promises and pledges of the present Prime Minister of Canada and the members of his cabinet;

THAT the violation of these sacred promises and these formal pledges is opposed to a true conception of national unity and liable to depreciate the value of the given word and solemn promises of the Government of the country;

THAT the Province of Quebec respects lawful freedom of opinion of each and everyone, but it has the right to exact and it intends to exact the respect of its opinions and the pledges made to the people;

ATTENDU QUE la violation des engagements sacrés et des promesses solennelles est la manifestation d'une politique hitlérienne incompatible avec la mentalité canadienne et les saines traditions du Canada.

IL EST ORDONNÉ, en conséquence, sur la proposition de l'honorable Premier Ministre:—

QUE le Premier Ministre du Canada, le Très Honorable W. L. Mackenzie King, et les autorités fédérales soient en conséquence avisés:

1) QUE le gouvernement de la province de Québec, reflétant l'opinion de l'immense majorité du peuple de la province, réclame le respect intégral des engagements formels contractés et des promesses sacrées faites au peuple à l'encontre de l'établissement d'un service militaire obligatoire pour service outre-mer, c'est-à-dire à l'encontre d'une conscription déguisée ou apparente pour service au-delà des mers;

2) QUE le présent arrêté ministériel soit publié dans la Gazette Officielle de Québec afin de porter à la connaissance du public l'énergique et ferme protestation du gouvernement de la province à l'encontre des procédés adoptés par les autorités fédérales, contrairement aux engagements formels et aux promesses solennelles du Premier Ministre actuel et chef du parti libéral, le Très Honorable W. L. Mackenzie King, et des membres de son ministère.

A. MORISSET,
Greffier du Conseil Exécutif.

7919-o

THAT the violation of sacred pledges and solemn promises is the manifestation of a Hitlerian policy incompatible with Canadian mentality and the sound traditions of Canada.

IT IS ORDAINED THEREFORE, upon recommendation of the Honourable the Prime Minister;—

THAT the Prime Minister of Canada, the Right Honourable W. L. Mackenzie King and the Federal authorities, be therefore notified:

1) THAT the Government of the Province of Quebec, reflecting the immense majority of the people of the Province, claims integral respect of the formal pledges contracted and the sacred promises made to the people, in opposition to the establishment of compulsory military service for duty overseas, that is to say, in opposition to conscription, whether disguised or apparent, for overseas service;

2) THAT the present Order In Council be published in the Quebec Official Gazette so as to inform the public of the energetic and firm protest of the Government of the Province, against the proceedings adopted by the Federal authorities, as being contrary to the formal pledges and solemn promises of the actual Prime Minister and Leader of the Liberal Party, the Right Honourable W. L. Mackenzie King and the Members of his cabinet.

A. MORISSET,
Clerk of the Executive Council.

7919

QUÉBEC: — Imprimé par RÉDEMPTI PARADIS, imprimeur du Roi.

QUEBEC: — Printed by RÉDEMPTI PARADIS, King's Printer.

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C O P Y

C 272736

OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER
CANADA

Ottawa, November 3, 1944

The Honourable J. L. Ralston, M.P.,
Mayfair Apartments,
O t t a w a.

Dear Colonel Ralston:

I thank you for your letter of the 1st instant which I received while at a meeting of the Cabinet yesterday forenoon. I regret that until today I have not had an opportunity to send you a reply.

You will recall that it was not until the 19th of October that you informed the Cabinet War Committee that you had received a report from the Chief of Staff at Canadian Military Headquarters in London, stating that the future effective maintenance of our forces in the two theatres of operations required that additional personnel be made available from Canada.

This was the first report made to the government that the army's reinforcement position was causing concern. You will recall the assurance given the Cabinet during the first week of August that additional military commitments then being sought would not adversely affect this position. During discussions at Quebec, at the time of the Conference in September, when future plans for the Canadian army, navy and air force were being considered, no intimation was given of any prospective insufficiency of reinforcements for the Canadian army.

From the 19th of October, as you are aware, the Cabinet has been giving its time almost exclusively to a most careful study of the whole situation, exploring every possible aspect of it, but without deciding upon any of the courses explored.

There is one paragraph in your letter to which I regret I must take exception. You say, "Our differences are fundamental on the vital matter of reinforcing our troops, and consequently, as requested by you, I at once tender my

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C 272737

resignation as Minister of National Defence". Surely you are in error when you say that "our differences are fundamental on the vital matter of reinforcing our troops". From the outset, the government has been agreed that the matter of reinforcing our troops was "vital". I have never agreed to a single increase in our military commitments without first asking and receiving assurances that the additional commitment would not jeopardize our capacity to provide needed reinforcements. The only difference which exists is one of the method or methods of meeting this fundamental vital necessity.

In you letter you also say "In the stand I have taken I have considered that my first thought should be my duty to our fighting men in our overseas Army." I need scarcely say that I have always had the same thought and conception of duty towards all of our fighting men. It is for this reason that I have striven as I have to see that Canada's effort in the present war should be the maximum of which our country is capable. That is why I feel so strongly that at the present time no course of action should be taken if it can possibly be avoided, which, while not certain of accomplishing its purpose, would divide the country and thereby prejudice much that has been so magnificently accomplished throughout more than five years of war - and this on the eve of certain victory.

I have made it clear that I am prepared to follow the course outlined in my speeches in parliament in 1942, if that course should ever be necessary, but I do not believe that it has become necessary.

There has not been a time since the war began that it has not been recognized that resort to conscription for service overseas would occasion the most serious controversy that could arise in Canada. I can think of no course of action fraught with greater danger to our war effort - to say nothing of the unity and strength of Canada today and for generations to come - than a general election at this late stage of war on the conscription issue. I believe that such an issue would almost certainly arise were the House of Commons to be asked to endorse an Order in Council extending the terms of service of N.R.M.A. personnel to include service overseas. Until it is apparent that conscription for overseas service is necessary to the full support of Canada's forces overseas, and that its application would prove effective, the Government would not be justified in taking the risk of widespread national dissension.

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CANADA

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C 272738

As to any request by me for your resignation, you will recall that on several occasions you stated that if the recommendation contained in the report of the Chief of Staff was formally made to the Cabinet and not accepted, you would feel compelled to resign, in view of what you had said in parliament. Subsequently you stated that you saw clearly that the Cabinet were not disposed to accept your recommendation. In view of your possible resignation on these grounds, I felt it necessary to ascertain the views of General McNaughton. This I did, and ascertained that General McNaughton was not satisfied that compulsory service was necessary to provide full support for the army overseas. In reply to my further inquiries, General McNaughton indicated to me that, with the co-operation of the Cabinet, he believed it would be possible to obtain the necessary reinforcements by voluntary means, and that in this belief he would be prepared to assume the responsibility of Minister of National Defence should you resign. In these circumstances, I expressed the opinion that there should not be further delay in reaching a decision.

I cannot express to you too sincerely my own thanks for your great services as a colleague in the years we have shared the responsibilities of office. Nor can I too warmly express my recognition of what your services in all war activities have meant to Canada in these most difficult years.

Yours very sincerely,

"W. L. Mackenzie King"

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C O P Y

C 272737

OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER
CANADA

Ottawa, November 3, 1944

The Honourable J. L. Ralston, M.P.,
Mayfair Apartments,
O t t a w a.

Dear Colonel Ralston:

I thank you for your letter of the 1st instant which I received while at a meeting of the Cabinet yesterday forenoon. I regret that until today I have not had an opportunity to send you a reply.

You will recall that it was not until the 19th of October that you informed the Cabinet War Committee that you had received a report from the Chief of Staff at Canadian Military Headquarters in London, stating that the future effective maintenance of our forces in the two theatres of operations required that additional personnel be made available from Canada.

This was the first report made to the government that the army's reinforcement position was causing concern. You will recall the assurance given the Cabinet during the first week of August that additional military commitments then being sought would not adversely affect this position. During discussions at Quebec, at the time of the Conference in September, when future plans for the Canadian army, navy and air force were being considered, no intimation was given of any prospective insufficiency of reinforcements for the Canadian army.

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C 272740

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C 272741

As to any request by me for your resignation, you will recall that on several occasions you stated that if the recommendation contained in the report of the Chief of Staff was formally made to the Cabinet and not accepted, you would feel compelled to resign, in view of what you had said in parliament. Subsequently you stated that you saw clearly that the Cabinet were not disposed to accept your recommendation. In view of your possible resignation on these grounds, I felt it necessary to ascertain the views of General McNaughton. This I did, and ascertained that General McNaughton was not satisfied that compulsory service was necessary to provide full support for the army overseas. In reply to my further inquiries, General McNaughton indicated to me that, with the co-operation of the Cabinet, he believed it would be possible to obtain the necessary reinforcements by voluntary means, and that in this belief he would be prepared to assume the responsibility of Minister of National Defence should you resign. In these circumstances, I expressed the opinion that there should not be further delay in reaching a decision.

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Yours very sincerely,

"W. L. Mackenzie King"

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C 272721

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Yours very sincerely,

"W. L. Mackenzie King"

REPEAT
REPETER

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C O P Y

C 272748

OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER
CANADA

Ottawa, November 3, 1944

The Honourable J. L. Ralston, M.P.,
Mayfair Apartments,
O t t a w a.

Dear Colonel Ralston:

I thank you for your letter of the 1st instant which I received while at a meeting of the Cabinet yesterday forenoon. I regret that until today I have not had an opportunity to send you a reply.

You will recall that it was not until the 19th of October that you informed the Cabinet War Committee that you had received a report from the Chief of Staff at Canadian Military Headquarters in London, stating that the future effective maintenance of our forces in the two theatres of operations required that additional personnel be made available from Canada.

This was the first report made to the government that the army's reinforcement position was causing concern. You will recall the assurance given the Cabinet during the first week of August that additional military commitments then being sought would not adversely affect this position. During discussions at Quebec, at the time of the Conference in September, when future plans for the Canadian army, navy and air force were being considered, no intimation was given of any prospective insufficiency of reinforcements for the Canadian army.

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I cannot express to you too sincerely my own thanks for your great services as a colleague in the years we have shared the responsibilities of office. Nor can I too warmly express my recognition of what your services in all war activities have meant to Canada in these most difficult years.

Yours very sincerely,

"W. L. Mackenzie King"

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C 272745

Top Secret
and Personal

Ottawa, November 4, 1944

General The Hon. A. G. L. McNaughton, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.,
Minister of National Defence,
O t t a w a.

Dear General McNaughton:

I enclose for your information and strictly confidential, personal file, copies of the letters which have passed between Colonel Ralston and myself with respect to his resignation.

Yours sincerely,

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C 272747

4

MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE
CANADA

November 1st, 1944

Right Honourable W. L. Mackenzie King, P.C., M.P.,
Prime Minister of Canada,
Ottawa, Canada.

Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

When I returned on October 18th from a visit to the Canadian troops in Italy, in Northwestern Europe and the United Kingdom, I felt compelled to recommend as a result of my own observations and inquiries in the battle theatres, and on the information and advice received from my officers, that due to Infantry casualties being much greater than had been forecasted on the best information available, it had become necessary to secure substantial numbers of additional trained Infantry personnel in order to make reasonable provision for the reinforcement of our troops overseas.

Since it appeared clear to me that enough volunteer personnel could not be made available to meet the need, I considered that I had no alternative but to recommend that N.R.M.A. personnel be sent overseas as reinforcements. I felt that this was necessary to fulfil our pledges to our fighting men.

The whole question was discussed at very considerable length both at meetings of the Cabinet and of the War Committee of the Cabinet. My recommendation was not accepted.

Alternatives were suggested such as reducing our commitments or breaking up units or formations. I felt I could not concur in this when these trained N.R.M.A. men were available; and that at this crucial period Canada's duty was to support our men in the line, and not to relax but to go on with the task to help shorten the war and speed the victory.

It was suggested that, if a further appeal were made to trained N.R.M.A. personnel by Ministers of the Crown and others, such personnel might volunteer for General Service

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C272748

in sufficient numbers to meet the need. This suggestion involved delays which I considered would be serious if the appeal was not successful. Consequently I wished to be assured that it was Government policy that if, after the appeal, the need for reinforcements overseas still existed and volunteers were not available, N.R.M.A. personnel would be sent. This was the course which I and some other colleagues had understood would follow from your speech in 1942. It was in effect what I, as Minister, have repeatedly said in the House since then.

No such assurance was forthcoming. On the contrary it has developed in the discussions that the Government as a whole (certain colleagues excepted) do not consider that your speech committed the Government to this course.

I consider myself bound by what I have said in the House. Our differences are fundamental on the vital matter of reinforcing our troops, and consequently and as requested by you, I at once tender my resignation as Minister of National Defence.

In the stand I have taken I have considered that my first thought should be my duty to our fighting men in our Overseas Army.

I wish every success to the distinguished citizen who I understand will take up the duties of this Department, and at the same time I want to express to you my very sincere appreciation of the opportunity I have had of serving in Canada's war activities.

Yours very sincerely,

"J. L. RALSTON"

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final
C 272749

Ottawa,
November 5, 1944

The Honourable J. L. Ralston, M.P.,
Mayfair Apartments,
O t t a w a.

Dear Colonel Ralston:

I thank you for your letter of the 1st instant which I received while at a meeting of the Cabinet yesterday forenoon. I regret that until today I have not had an opportunity to send you a reply.

You will recall that it was not until the 19th of October that you informed the Cabinet War Committee that you had received a report from the Chief of Staff at Canadian Military Headquarters in London, stating that the future effective maintenance of our forces in the two theatres of operations required that additional personnel be made available from Canada.

This was the first report made to the government that the army's reinforcement position was causing concern. You will recall the assurance given the Cabinet during the first week of August, that additional military commitments then being sought would not adversely affect this position. During discussions at Quebec, at the time of the Conference in September, when future plans for the Canadian army, navy and air force were being considered, no intimation was given of any prospective insufficiency of reinforcements for the Canadian army.

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From the 19th of October, as you are aware, the Cabinet has been giving its time almost exclusively to a most careful study of the whole situation, exploring every possible aspect of it, but without deciding upon any of the courses explored.

There is one paragraph in your letter to which I regret I must take exception. You say, "Our differences are fundamental on the vital matter of reinforcing our troops, and consequently, as requested by you, I at once tender my resignation as Minister of National Defence". Surely you are in error when you say that "our differences are fundamental on the vital matter of reinforcing our troops". From the outset, the government has been agreed that the matter of reinforcing our troops was "vital". I have never agreed to a single increase in our military commitments without first asking and receiving assurances that the additional commitment would not jeopardize our capacity to provide needed reinforcements. The only difference which exists is one of the method or methods of meeting this fundamental vital necessity.

In your letter you also say "In the stand I have taken I have considered that my first thought should be my duty to our fighting men in our overseas Army." I need scarcely say that I have always had the same thought and conception of duty towards all of our fighting men. It is for this reason that I have striven as I have to see that Canada's effort in the present war should be the maximum of which our country is capable. That is why I feel so strongly that at the present time no course of action should be taken if it can possibly be avoided, which, while not certain of accomplishing its purpose, would divide the country and thereby prejudice much that has been so magnificently accomplished throughout more than five years of war - and this on the eve of certain victory.

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There has not been a time since the war began that it has not been recognized that resort to conscription for service overseas would occasion the most serious controversy that could arise in Canada. I can think of no course of action fraught with greater danger to our war effort - to say nothing of the unity and strength of Canada today and for generations to come - than a general election at this late stage of war on the conscription issue. I believe that such an issue would almost certainly arise were the House of Commons to be asked to endorse an Order in Council extending the terms of service of N.R.M.A. personnel to include service overseas. Until it is apparent that conscription for overseas service is necessary to the full support of Canada's forces overseas, and that its application would prove effective, the Government would not be justified in taking the risk of widespread national dissension.

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I cannot express to you too sincerely my own thanks for your great services as a colleague in the years we have shared the responsibilities of office. Nor can I

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too warmly express my recognition of what your services in all war activities have meant to Canada in these most difficult years.

Yours very sincerely,

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REPEAT
REPETER

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272753

J. L. Ralston

Ottawa,
November 6, 1944

Right Honourable W. L. Mackenzie King, P.C., M.P.,
Prime Minister of Canada,
Ottawa, Canada.

Dear Prime Minister,

Your letter of November 3rd came to my apartment very late in the evening of that date. On consideration I felt that it called for an answer, and I regret that over the week-end imperative matters which I could not escape have prevented my writing you earlier.

In the second, third and fourth paragraphs of your letter you appear to imply that the main issue was in some way affected by the fact that the need to provide for additional Infantry reinforcements was not reported by me until October 19th on my return from my overseas inspection trip. I think this has really no bearing on the issue of sending N.R.M.A. men as reinforcements or on my recommendation to that effect. If it has any bearing it seems to underline the urgency of the necessity which I reported. I cabled you from London on October 13th indicating my apprehensions. I reported to you personally on the 18th, the same day I arrived home. I reported to War Committee the next day. I do not think your letter represents all the information given by me to you or to War Committee or to Cabinet from time to time with regard to the reinforcement situation; but suffice it to say that I have not at any time withheld any information which appeared to require attention.

The point is that when I obtained information which led me to believe that the need for Infantry reinforcements could not be met by Departmental action alone, I so reported at the earliest possible date, and I presented this information as fully as possible with my recommendation for action. The fact that such information was not expected or was disturbing has no bearing, I think, on the essential question of the necessity which I presented.

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Regarding the assurance as to reinforcements given in August: You refer to the combining of existing units in Italy into an Infantry Brigade. Any assurance on this point was given by the Officers who knew the situation, and as I have already told you, the Corps Commander advised me when I was in Italy recently that the casualties sustained by this Brigade were no greater than those which had been forecasted for the Units if they had operated separately.

The discussions at Quebec, of which you make mention, had nothing to do with the reinforcement situation overseas, but were in connection with participation in the War against Japan.

The point is that we are faced with a practical situation which has to be met.

You take exception to my statement that "our differences are fundamental on the vital matter of reinforcements". I have given the facts regarding these differences in my letter of resignation. I think, when my recommendation has not been accepted, when there is disagreement between us as to what was the policy to which the Government committed itself in 1942, and when there is disagreement as to what is the present policy, that these are fundamental differences.

You say you are prepared to follow the course outlined in your speeches in Parliament in 1942 if that course should ever be necessary, but you do not believe it has become necessary. There is disagreement between us on the vital point as to the meaning of the word "necessary". Your view, recently expressed, is that you consider it means "necessary to win the war", "necessary to defend Canadian soil", "Necessary to avert some great calamity or catastrophe". I took the word "necessary" to mean primarily "necessary to keep our Overseas Army reinforced". I always thought that this was the meaning given to the word in Council and Parliamentary discussions. There is, I think, a vital and fundamental difference between us on this point.

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In my letter of resignation I said that my first thought was my duty to our fighting men in our Overseas Army. You say that for the proper accomplishment of this purpose nothing should be done which would divide the country, and in this connection you speak of a General Election.

I must point out that when Bill 80 was introduced and discussed in the House, nothing was said about an election. The declared procedure, as appears from your speeches, was that if the Government decided that it was necessary to send N.R.M.A. personnel overseas it would go to Parliament, announce its decision, and ask for a vote of confidence, and that there would be no second debate on the question of conscription. You said that debate would have to be curtailed and that only a short time, if any, would be allowed for discussion. The suggestion now of a General Election on the matter is the introduction of a new condition not contemplated or discussed at the time Government policy was laid down two years ago.

You mention that you always received assurances that additional commitments would not jeopardize our capacity to provide needed reinforcements. I recall that I have repeatedly said that I could not undertake that reinforcements would always be available wholly from volunteers. My point now is that due to an unexpectedly heavy proportion of Infantry casualties and the developments of the war we need trained reinforcements, which I consider on the best examination I can make of the situation are not available from volunteers. And we have unused manpower resources in the trained N.R.M.A. personnel, which I think we are bound to use.

In this connection I should remind you that all the formations which we are seeking to support today are formations which had been authorized by the Government and approved by Parliament previous to your speeches in 1942.

This brings me to your point about disunity in Canada. My speeches in the House make it clear, I think, that I have realized, from the first time the question was raised, the grave possibilities of division. That is why

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from the beginning to the end of my association with the Department of National Defence I have done everything I could to avoid it, and to maintain a wholly volunteer Army overseas. I have had regretfully to come to the conclusion that to make reasonable provision for reinforcements it was necessary to recommend action to make N.R.M.A. men available. It seemed obvious that some measure of difference or disunity could not be avoided whichever course were taken. What weighed so heavily with me in the stand I have taken were our pledges to our fighting men and indirectly to their families.

I want to thank you most sincerely for your very generous references to any services I may have rendered to Canada during these difficult years.

Yours very truly,

(Sgd.) J. L. Ralston

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re Resignation 1756

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C 272757

J.L. RALSTON

OTTAWA

November 14, 1944.

Right Honourable W.L. Mackenzie King, P.C., M.P.,
Prime Minister of Canada,
OTTAWA, Canada.

Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

I have your letter of November 10th marked "Secret", in reply to mine. (It refers to my letter of November 7th; I presume you mean my letter of November 6th.)

With reference to the assurances given by the responsible Officers to the War Committee, I had the same assurances as you, and as explained to me and to you the changed situation arises from the unexpectedly heavy proportion of Infantry casualties.

Regarding the meeting at Quebec, I still think that this has, for the reasons mentioned in my letter of November 6th, really no relevance to my recommendation.

You speak as if "any possibility" of having to resort to conscription for overseas service had not been in mind. May I point out that your speeches in 1942 envisage that very possibility, and the initiation and passing of Bill 80 was in the light of that possibility.

You will recall also that I went to you at Quebec regarding certain reports I had heard as to your expressed attitude on this matter; and the fact that I asked you, and you gave me, your assurance then that you would stand by your speeches in 1942, indicates that, at least in my mind, the possibility still existed; although I must say that at the time I had no expectation of the developments which have since occurred.

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As a matter of fact, it was, I think, at the next meeting of War Committee following the Quebec Conference that I did indicate, as a result of further information received in the meantime, the possibility of difficulties regarding Infantry reinforcements and the necessity, in my view, for keeping N.R.M.A. personnel available in the light of the uncertainties.

May I again come back to the real crux of this matter, which is the actual and urgent situation which I reported instantly on my return from overseas, and which I considered left me no alternative but to recommend as I did.

Yours very truly,

(Signed) J. L. Ralston

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OTTAWA, Canada.

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(Signed) J. L. Ralston

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C.272761.

J. L. RALSTON

OTTAWA

November 14, 1944

Right Honourable W.L. Mackenzie King, P.C., M.P.,
Prime Minister of Canada,
OTTAWA, Canada.

Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

I have your letter of November 10th regarding the release of my letter of resignation and the further correspondence between us.

I do not think there could be any injury to security whatever in publishing the letter and the correspondence, particularly in view of the information given to the public in the speeches by yourself and the Minister of National Defence and by the Minister of Justice.

Regarding Privy Council secrecy, I feel I ought to point out that your own speech of November 8th contains references to matters treated, debated and resolved in Council discussions, and I am sure these references would not have been made had you not considered that they were permissible. Furthermore, you had no hesitation in May 1942 in publishing the correspondence regarding Honourable Mr. Cardin's resignation, which contained references to Council discussions.

In any case, permission to make such matters public is vested in the Crown, and since the matter is of intense public interest I beg most respectfully to suggest that you advise His Excellency to assent to the release of my letter and the further correspondence.

Yours very truly,

(Signed) J. L. Ralston

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J. L. RALSTON

OTTAWA

November 14, 1944

Right Honourable W.L. Mackenzie King, P.C., M.P.,
Prime Minister of Canada,
OTTAWA, Canada.

Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

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C 272763

MEMORANDUM
of the Prime Minister

Ottawa, ...

Copies of Relations
Letters also Cross
& Macdonald & my replies
re
W.L. Letter from Roberts-Austen 1895

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MEMORANDUM

Office of the Prime Minister

Ottawa, 3.41.

From Rowe

Top Secret Correspondence
One original + 3 carbons
Please - give to me

COLOURED PAPER
PAPIER DE COULEUR

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3

MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE
CANADA

November 1st, 1944

Right Honourable W. L. Mackenzie King, P.C., M.P.,
Prime Minister of Canada,
Ottawa, Canada.

Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

When I returned on October 18th from a visit to the Canadian troops in Italy, in Northwestern Europe and the United Kingdom, I felt compelled to recommend as a result of my own observations and inquiries in the battle theatres, and on the information and advice received from my officers, that due to Infantry casualties being much greater than had been forecasted on the best information available, it had become necessary to secure substantial numbers of additional trained Infantry personnel in order to make reasonable provision for the reinforcement of our troops overseas.

Since it appeared clear to me that enough volunteer personnel could not be made available to meet the need, I considered that I had no alternative but to recommend that N.R.M.A. personnel be sent overseas as reinforcements. I felt that this was necessary to fulfil our pledges to our fighting men.

The whole question was discussed at very considerable length both at meetings of the Cabinet and of the War Committee of the Cabinet. My recommendation was not accepted.

Alternatives were suggested such as reducing our commitments or breaking up units or formations. I felt I could not concur in this when these trained N.R.M.A. men were available; and that at this crucial period Canada's duty was to support our men in the line, and not to relax but to go on with the task to help shorten the war and speed the victory.

It was suggested that, if a further appeal were made to trained N.R.M.A. personnel by Ministers of the Crown and others, such personnel might volunteer for General Service

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in sufficient numbers to meet the need. This suggestion involved delays which I considered would be serious if the appeal was not successful. Consequently I wished to be assured that it was Government policy that if, after the appeal, the need for reinforcements overseas still existed and volunteers were not available, N.R.M.A. personnel would be sent. This was the course which I and some other colleagues had understood would follow from your speech in 1942. It was in effect what I, as Minister, have repeatedly said in the House since then.

No such assurance was forthcoming. On the contrary it has developed in the discussions that the Government as a whole (certain colleagues excepted) do not consider that your speech committed the Government to this course.

I consider myself bound by what I have said in the House. Our differences are fundamental on the vital matter of reinforcing our troops, and consequently and as requested by you, I at once tender my resignation as Minister of National Defence.

In the stand I have taken I have considered that my first thought should be my duty to our fighting men in our Overseas Army.

I wish every success to the distinguished citizen who I understand will take up the duties of this Department, and at the same time I want to express to you my very sincere appreciation of the opportunity I have had of serving in Canada's war activities.

Yours very sincerely,

"J. L. RALSTON"

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final

C 272766

Ottawa,
November 3, 1944

The Honourable J. L. Ralston, M.P.,
Mayfair Apartments,
O t t a w a.

Dear Colonel Ralston:

I thank you for your letter of the 1st instant which I received while at a meeting of the Cabinet yesterday forenoon. I regret that until today I have not had an opportunity to send you a reply.

You will recall that it was not until the 19th of October that you informed the Cabinet War Committee that you had received a report from the Chief of Staff at Canadian Military Headquarters in London, stating that the future effective maintenance of our forces in the two theatres of operations required that additional personnel be made available from Canada.

This was the first report made to the government that the army's reinforcement position was causing concern. You will recall the assurance given the Cabinet during the first week of August, that additional military commitments then being sought would not adversely affect this position. During discussions at Quebec, at the time of the Conference in September, when future plans for the Canadian army, navy and air force were being considered, no intimation was given of any prospective insufficiency of reinforcements for the Canadian army.

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From the 19th of October, as you are aware, the Cabinet has been giving its time almost exclusively to a most careful study of the whole situation, exploring every possible aspect of it, but without deciding upon any of the courses explored.

There is one paragraph in your letter to which I regret I must take exception. You say, "Our differences are fundamental on the vital matter of reinforcing our troops, and consequently, as requested by you, I at once tender my resignation as Minister of National Defence". Surely you are in error when you say that "our differences are fundamental on the vital matter of reinforcing our troops". From the outset, the government has been agreed that the matter of reinforcing our troops was "vital". I have never agreed to a single increase in our military commitments without first asking and receiving assurances that the additional commitment would not jeopardise our capacity to provide needed reinforcements. The only difference which exists is one of the method or methods of meeting this fundamental vital necessity.

In your letter you also say "In the stand I have taken I have considered that my first thought should be my duty to our fighting men in our overseas Army." I need scarcely say that I have always had the same thought and conception of duty towards all of our fighting men. It is for this reason that I have striven as I have to see that Canada's effort in the present war should be the maximum of which our country is capable. That is why I feel so strongly that at the present time no course of action should be taken if it can possibly be avoided, which, while not certain of accomplishing its purpose, would divide the country and thereby prejudice much that has been so magnificently accomplished throughout more than five years of war - and this on the eve of certain victory.

I have made it clear that I am prepared to follow the course outlined in my speeches in parliament in 1942, if that course should ever be necessary, but I do not believe that it has become necessary.

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There has not been a time since the war began that it has not been recognised that resort to conscription for service overseas would occasion the most serious controversy that could arise in Canada. I can think of no course of action fraught with greater danger to our war effort - to say nothing of the unity and strength of Canada today and for generations to come - than a general election at this late stage of war on the conscription issue. I believe that such an issue would almost certainly arise were the House of Commons to be asked to endorse an Order in Council extending the terms of service of N.R.M.A. personnel to include service overseas. Until it is apparent that conscription for overseas service is necessary to the full support of Canada's forces overseas, and that its application would prove effective, the Government would not be justified in taking the risk of widespread national dissension.

As to any request by me for your resignation, you will recall that on several occasions you stated that if the recommendation contained in the report of the Chief of Staff was formally made to the Cabinet and not accepted, you would feel compelled to resign, in view of what you had said in parliament. Subsequently you stated that you saw clearly that the Cabinet were not disposed to accept your recommendation. In view of your possible resignation on these grounds, I felt it necessary to ascertain the views of General McNaughton. This I did, and ascertained that General McNaughton was not satisfied that compulsory service was necessary to provide full support for the army overseas. In reply to my further inquiries, General McNaughton indicated to me that, with the co-operation of the Cabinet, he believed it would be possible to obtain the necessary reinforcements by voluntary means, and that in this belief he would be prepared to assume the responsibility of Minister of National Defence should you resign. In these circumstances, I expressed the opinion that there should not be further delay in reaching a decision.

I cannot express to you too sincerely my own thanks for your great services as a colleague in the years we have shared the responsibilities of office. Nor can I

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too warmly express my recognition of what your services in all war activities have meant to Canada in these most difficult years.

Yours very sincerely,

[Sgd.] W. L. MACKENZIE KING.

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Yours very sincerely,

(S'G'D.) W. L. MACKENZIE KING.

REPEAT
REPETER

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C 272770

J. L. Ralston

Ottawa,
November 6, 1944

Right Honourable W. L. Mackenzie King, P.C., M.P.,
Prime Minister of Canada,
Ottawa, Canada.

Dear Prime Minister,

Your letter of November 3rd came to my apartment very late in the evening of that date. On consideration I felt that it called for an answer, and I regret that over the week-end imperative matters which I could not escape have prevented my writing you earlier.

In the second, third and fourth paragraphs of your letter you appear to imply that the main issue was in some way affected by the fact that the need to provide for additional Infantry reinforcements was not reported by me until October 19th on my return from my overseas inspection trip. I think this has really no bearing on the issue of sending N.R.M.A. men as reinforcements or on my recommendation to that effect. If it has any bearing it seems to underline the urgency of the necessity which I reported. I cabled you from London on October 13th indicating my apprehensions. I reported to you personally on the 18th, the same day I arrived home. I reported to War Committee the next day. I do not think your letter represents all the information given by me to you or to War Committee or to Cabinet from time to time with regard to the reinforcement situation; but suffice it to say that I have not at any time withheld any information which appeared to require attention.

The point is that when I obtained information which led me to believe that the need for Infantry reinforcements could not be met by Departmental action alone, I so reported at the earliest possible date, and I presented this information as fully as possible with my recommendation for action. The fact that such information was not expected or was disturbing has no bearing, I think, on the essential question of the necessity which I presented.

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Regarding the assurance as to reinforcements given in August: You refer to the combining of existing units in Italy into an Infantry Brigade. Any assurance on this point was given by the Officers who knew the situation, and as I have already told you, the Corps Commander advised me when I was in Italy recently that the casualties sustained by this Brigade were no greater than those which had been forecasted for the Units if they had operated separately.

The discussions at Quebec, of which you make mention, had nothing to do with the reinforcement situation overseas, but were in connection with participation in the War against Japan.

The point is that we are faced with a practical situation which has to be met.

You take exception to my statement that "our differences are fundamental on the vital matter of reinforcements". I have given the facts regarding these differences in my letter of resignation. I think, when my recommendation has not been accepted, when there is disagreement between us as to what was the policy to which the Government committed itself in 1942, and when there is disagreement as to what is the present policy, that these are fundamental differences.

You say you are prepared to follow the course outlined in your speeches in Parliament in 1942 if that course should ever be necessary, but you do not believe it has become necessary. There is disagreement between us on the vital point as to the meaning of the word "necessary". Your view, recently expressed, is that you consider it means "necessary to win the war", "necessary to defend Canadian soil", "Necessary to avert some great calamity or catastrophe". I took the word "necessary" to mean primarily "necessary to keep our Overseas Army reinforced". I always thought that this was the meaning given to the word in Council and Parliamentary discussions. There is, I think, a vital and fundamental difference between us on this point.

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REPEAT
REPETER

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In my letter of resignation I said that my first thought was my duty to our fighting men in our Overseas Army. You say that for the proper accomplishment of this purpose nothing should be done which would divide the country, and in this connection you speak of a General Election.

I must point out that when Bill 80 was introduced and discussed in the House, nothing was said about an election. The declared procedure, as appears from your speeches, was that if the Government decided that it was necessary to send N.R.M.A. personnel overseas it would go to Parliament, announce its decision, and ask for a vote of confidence, and that there would be no second debate on the question of conscription. You said that debate would have to be curtailed and that only a short time, if any, would be allowed for discussion. The suggestion now of a General Election on the matter is the introduction of a new condition not contemplated or discussed at the time Government policy was laid down two years ago.

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In this connection I should remind you that all the formations which we are seeking to support today are formations which had been authorized by the Government and approved by Parliament previous to your speeches in 1942.

This brings me to your point about disunity in Canada. My speeches in the House make it clear, I think, that I have realized, from the first time the question was raised, the grave possibilities of division. That is why

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from the beginning to the end of my association with the Department of National Defence I have done everything I could to avoid it, and to maintain a wholly volunteer Army overseas. I have had regretfully to come to the conclusion that to make reasonable provision for reinforcements it was necessary to recommend action to make N.R.M.A. men available. It seemed obvious that some measure of difference or disunity could not be avoided whichever course were taken. What weighed so heavily with me in the stand I have taken were our pledges to our fighting men and indirectly to their families.

I want to thank you most sincerely for your very generous references to any services I may have rendered to Canada during these difficult years.

Yours very truly,

(Sgd.) J. L. Ralston

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C 272774

Secret

Ottawa,
November 10, 1944

The Honourable J. L. Ralston, K.C., M.P.,

Ottawa.

Dear Colonel Ralston:

I have duly received your letter of November the 7th. It seems to call for one or two observations.

The statement in my letter of the 3rd instant, regarding the assurance as to reinforcements given in August has relation to the assurance specifically given at that time by the Chief of Staff to the War Committee of the Cabinet that the reinforcement situation was satisfactory. You will recall that the matter arose out of proposals submitted by you on the recommendation of Lt.-General Stuart for the authorization of certain additional personnel for various units and formations of the army overseas, including the formation of the additional infantry brigade to which you refer. The assurance sought and given had direct reference to the state of the reinforcement pool.

The reference in my letter to the discussions at Quebec was not to any specific matter discussed there, but rather to the fact that no question of any possible need of additional reinforcements was raised at that time. If, on September 14th, at the time members of our War Committee and our own Chiefs of Staff were in conference with Mr. Churchill and the British Chiefs of Staff, and the probable duration of the war and the future employment of our forces were under discussion, there was any possibility of our having to resort to conscription to obtain additional reinforcements for the army, before the end of the war in Europe, surely that possibility should have been made known. In the absence

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C 272775

of any such information, members of the Cabinet were entitled to assume that the reinforcement situation continued to be satisfactory.

What was meant by the word "necessary" as used in my speeches in Parliament in 1942, will I think be wholly clear from the context as it appears in Hansard. I think you are in error in attributing to me any different significance to the word "necessary" than that which it has in my speeches in parliament.

The reference to a general election in my letter, as in our previous discussion on the matter, was not to its being "a condition" to the application of conscription under existing legislation, but to a general election being an almost inevitable consequence of any such attempt to impose conscription at this stage of the war. I felt that this possibility must be taken into account as it bears directly upon the question of the best method of securing additional trained men for overseas service. In deciding upon the best method for the attainment of a given aim, it is imperative to take into account the probable as well as any known consequences of each and every possible course of action.

In your letter you recognise the grave possibilities of division resulting from the course you recommended. It is because I took so grave a view of the probable division which would result, and of the possibility that disunity and division in the country might seriously weaken our support for the army, as well as for other phases of our war effort, that I believed it was preferable to redouble our efforts to secure the required results by voluntary means, including a special appeal to the N.R.M.A. personnel and a review of the employment of the very considerable number of General Service personnel serving in Canada and the United Kingdom.

Yours very sincerely,

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C272776

Confidential

Ottawa,
November 10, 1944

The Honourable J. L. Ralston, K.C., M.P.,

O t t a w a.

Dear Colonel Ralston:

I notice that in a reply to a request for an explanatory statement on your resignation, which appeared in the press of the 7th instant, you are reported as having said that you feel "that responsibility for informing the public belongs primarily to the Prime Minister". With this, of course, I am in complete accord, and in the broadcast I made on Wednesday night, (the 8th instant), I sought to discharge that responsibility.

The report added that you had said you recognized that in this matter the public and the armed forces were entitled to full information consistent with military security. With this also, I agree.

The report continues: "I would assume, said Colonel Ralston in his statement, that the Prime Minister would inform the public of the circumstances by making available my letter of resignation and any further correspondence between us in the matter. The correspondence will speak for itself. I therefore refrain from making any statement at present".

In addition to the obligation upon a member of a government to respect military secrecy in making information public, there is also the obligation of secrecy respecting Cabinet deliberations, imposed by the oath of the Members of the Privy Council, "to keep

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C272777

close and secret all such matters as shall be treated, debated and resolved on in Privy Council, without publishing or disclosing the same, or any part thereof, by word, writing or any otherwise to any person out of the same Council, but to such only as be of the Council."

The Privy Councillor's oath is not less binding upon the Prime Minister than upon all other members of the Privy Council. It is an obligation I am bound to respect, one of which I must take the fullest account in considering the course to be pursued in making available to the public the correspondence which has passed between us concerning your resignation.

I have the added responsibility for which I will be held accountable by parliament, of advising the Crown as to the time and place at which publicity should be given to such communications. This responsibility is particularly great at a time of war.

In your letter of November 1st you say: "The whole question was discussed at very considerable length both at meetings of the Cabinet and of the War Committee of the Cabinet". In subsequent paragraphs you proceed to set forth matters which were "treated and debated" in Council.

I cannot feel that I would be justified, in the light of this obligation, in advising the publication of those portions of your letter relating to the deliberations in Council or of those portions of my reply referring to what you have said respecting these discussions.

I believe there should be an exchange of letters between us with respect to which no question as to the propriety of publication could arise.

Yours very sincerely,

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POOR PRINT
Epreuve illisible

C 272778

Confidential

Ottawa,
November 10, 1944

The Honourable J. L. Ralston, K.C., M.P.,

O t t a w a.

Dear Colonel Ralston:

I notice that in a reply to a request for an explanatory statement on your resignation, which appeared in the press of the 7th instant, you are reported as having said that you feel "that responsibility for informing the public belongs primarily to the Prime Minister". With this, of course, I am in complete accord, and in the broadcast I made on Wednesday night, (the 8th instant), I sought to discharge that responsibility.

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I cannot feel that I would be justified, in the light of this obligation, in advising the publication of those portions of your letter relating to the deliberations in Council or of those portions of my reply referring to what you have said respecting these discussions.

I believe there should be an exchange of letters between us with respect to which no question as to the propriety of publication could arise.

Yours very sincerely,

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Ottawa, November 10, 1944

The Honourable T. A. Crerar, M.P.,
Minister of Mines and Resources,
O t t a w a.

My dear Crerar:

As mentioned to you over the 'phone on Saturday afternoon (the 4th instant), I had at that time duly received your letter of the previous day. You will appreciate the reasons which caused me to ask you if I might be permitted a delay of a few days before sending a reply. I regret that the very urgent matters to which I have since had to give the closest attention have occasioned so long a delay.

Since your letter was received, I have spoken to the people of Canada on the question of reinforcements for the army. It was agreed in connection with the appeal then made that it would be contrary to sound judgment for me to say anything which would imply doubt in the success of the policy on which the appeal is based. I, personally, continue to hold that opinion. I adhere very strongly to the view that it is psychologically unsound for one to commit oneself for or against any particular course of action until the outcome of the particular policy being pursued is known. Otherwise controversy between alternative methods is bound to develop which in itself would almost certainly prove to be prejudicial to the success of the method being pursued. It seems to me that to achieve our objective, there must be utmost concentration on the course it has been agreed to follow with no suggestion that it is not likely to succeed.

I have made it clear that I am prepared to follow the course outlined in my speeches in Parliament in 1942 if that course should every be necessary. If I have left any doubt on that point, I assure you now that that the policy set forth in 1942 has not changed.

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re plebiscite

As to what was implicit in the plebiscite and parliament's action thereon, I cannot do better than refer you to what was set forth in the statement I made in the House of Commons on June 10th, 1942, at which time I was speaking on behalf of the government. The interpretation of the plebiscite and of parliament's action thereon were clearly set forth at the time when the matter was one which was fresh in the memories of all.

re para 7 conscription and its defeat

In reply to the specific question of your letter: "In short, is the utilization, as reinforcements, of the trained men we have in Canada, beyond those of their number who enlist voluntarily, definitely 'out' as a matter of Government policy?", I cannot do better than quote from what I said in a broadcast delivered on the night before last (the 8th instant) in which, referring to the draftees, I said: "..so long as they are in the army and adequately trained, they will continue to be a potential ultimate reserve of reinforcements whose compulsory employment in any theatre may, in the light of developing circumstances, have to be reconsidered".

Again, may I apologize for not having found it possible to send you a more immediate reply.

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C 272782

OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER
CANADA

Ottawa, November 3, 1944

The Honourable J.L. Ralston, M.P.,
Mayfair Apartments,
Ottawa.

Dear Colonel Ralston:

I thank you for your letter of the 1st instant which I received while at a meeting of the Cabinet yesterday forenoon. I regret that until this morning, I have not had an opportunity to send you a reply.

You will recall that it was not until the 19th of October that the Cabinet was informed by you that you had received a report from the Chief of Staff that he was leading up to a recommendation that the future effective maintenance of our Canadian forces in two theatres required additional personnel be made available from Canada for overseas. A

The Chief of Staff in his report stated that he was satisfied that the reinforcements sent and being sent to both theatres had been well trained, and that he was satisfied that up to the time of reporting to you, reinforcements had been adequate in respect to over-all numbers, but for a series of military reasons beyond his control, he had to admit that reinforcements had been inadequate as to numbers in respect to the infantry arm. The report of the Chief of Staff went on to say that he was not satisfied that anticipated reinforcements would be adequate "to meet future requirements in this war against Germany". B

The report of the Chief of Staff concluded, as you will recall, as follows: "I recommend, therefore, if the numbers required cannot be found from general service personnel in Canada, that the terms of service of C

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N.R.M.A. personnel be extended to include overseas service in any theatre."

This was the first intimation made to the government that the assurance given the Cabinet by the Chief of Staff during the first week of August, to the effect that if an additional brigade were added to the formations in Italy at that time, it would not adversely effect the manpower situation of the Canadian army overseas, you will recall the Cabinet was also assured at that time by the Chief of Staff that there was no need to resort to compulsion to maintain the army.

You will recall that the members of the War Committee of the Cabinet met with Mr. Churchill and the Chiefs of Staff of the United Kingdom at Quebec on September 14th at which time future plans for the Canadian army, navy and air force were considered, and that at that time no intimation was given either by our Chief of Staff or yourself of any insufficiency of reinforcements should Canada's army be concerned, or any probability of a need to resort to conscription for overseas service in order to obtain the required numbers. As I have said, it was not until October 19th that the Cabinet was informed that such a possibility might become necessary.

From that moment up to the present, as you are aware, the Cabinet gave its time almost exclusively to a most careful study of the whole situation, exploring every possible aspect of it but without commitment to any of the courses suggested. Members of the Cabinet were fully agreed that resort to compulsion by Canada to secure reinforcements would not, at any time, be necessary "to meet future requirements of this war against Germany" or to win the war; where a difference of view presented itself was first as to it not being possible to secure reinforcements where needed from present and future general service personnel, not in Canada only but from the numbers already overseas in the United Kingdom, and elsewhere in Europe.

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I have already drawn attention to the recommendation of the Chief of Staff that "if the numbers required cannot be found from general service personnel in Canada, that the terms of service of N.R.M.A. personnel be extended to include overseas service in any theatre." Apart from the reference to the finding of necessary personnel being restricted to Canada, it was clearly a matter for the government and not for the Chief of Staff to determine whether or not the desired end was to be effected by the extension of the terms of service of N.R.M.A. personnel to include overseas service in any theatre. That is wholly a matter of government policy.

There has not been a time since the government was formed that it has not been recognized that resort to conscription for service overseas would occasion the most serious controversy that could arise in Canada. I can think of no course of action fraught with greater danger to the war effort of Canada - to say nothing of Canada's unity in the present and for generations to come - than a general election at the present time on a conscription issue. I cannot see how that could be avoided should it become necessary to have parliament re-assemble to give effect to an order-in-council extending the terms of service of N.R.M.A. personnel to include service overseas in any theatre. Until that has become imperative to obtain for Canada's forces overseas the full support which they must have, I should hesitate to take the responsibility of adopting such a course. As the head of the administration, I could not recommend that it be followed.

I have made it clear that I am prepared to follow the course outlined in my speeches in parliament in 1942, if that course should ever be necessary, but I do not believe that it has become necessary.

There is one paragraph in your letter to which I regret I must take the strongest exception. You say "Our differences are fundamental on the vital matter of reinforcing our troops, and consequently,

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as requested by you, I at once tender my resignation as Minister of National Defence". To say that "our differences are fundamental on the vital matter of reinforcing our troops" is to state something which is not a fact. No one in Canada from the beginning of the war to the present moment has regarded the matter of reinforcing our troops as "fundamentally vital". At no moment in the war, have I agreed to a single step being taken without the specific assurance that it would not affect the vital necessity of our troops having all the needed reinforcements, and that without the necessity of any resort to conscription. The difference that exists between us is solely that of by what method or methods this fundamental vital necessity can be most effectively met.

As you are aware, in referring at different times in the Cabinet to the report of the Chief of Staff, you stated that if the recommendation it contains was formally made, and it was not accepted, in view of what you had said in parliament you would feel compelled to resign. It was not until after you had said that you saw clearly that the cabinet were not prepared to agree to the enactment of an order in council involving service overseas, and that if agreement could not be reached on this course, either immediately or later on, that, having told the cabinet that I had ascertained from General McNaughton, the former commander of the Canadian Army, that he was not satisfied that the course that you had suggested was necessary to give the Army the fullest support and that he was prepared to assume the responsibility with the co-operation of the cabinet of obtaining full support for the Army without any change in the Government's policy as stated by myself in parliament, that I said I thought there should not be longer delay in reaching a decision when, as I had also ascertained, General McNaughton was prepared to take office immediately.

In your letter you say "In the stand I have taken I have considered that my first thought should be my duty to our fighting men in our overseas Army." I need scarcely say that I have always had the same thought and conception of duty with respect to our fighting men in every branch of the armed services. It is for this reason, above all others, that I have striven as I have to see that Canada's effort in the present war should be an utmost effort in all directions. It is why I feel so

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C 272786

strongly at the present time ~~that~~ must no course of action should be taken if it can possibly be avoided, which ~~would not be a~~ quite certain of accomplishing its purpose, ~~but~~ would divide the country and thereby prejudice much that has been so magnificently accomplished throughout more than five years of ~~war~~, and this on the eve of certain victory.

I cannot express to you too sincerely my own ~~deep~~ ~~appreciation~~ ~~for~~ your services as a colleague in the years we have shared the responsibilities of office. ~~Nor~~ can I ~~thank you~~ too warmly ~~for~~ what your services ~~in all our activities have meant particularly~~ in ~~the~~ most difficult years ~~of our country's history~~.

Yours very sincerely,

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OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER
CANADA

C 272787

Ottawa,
November 3, 1944

The Honourable J. L. Ralston, M.P.,
Mayfair Apartments,
O t t a w a.

Dear Colonel Ralston:

I thank you for your letter of the 1st instant which I received while at a meeting of the Cabinet yesterday forenoon. I regret that until today I have not had an opportunity to send you a reply.

You will recall that it was not until the 19th of October that you informed the Cabinet War Committee that you had received a report from the Chief of Staff at Canadian Military Headquarters in London, stating that the future effective maintenance of our ~~Canadian~~ forces in the two theatres of operations required that additional personnel be made available from Canada.

The Chief of Staff in his report stated that he was satisfied that the reinforcements sent, and being sent to both theatres had been well trained. He was also satisfied that up to the time of his report to you, the provision for reinforcements had been adequate in respect of over-all numbers, but that for the last two months because of a series of military reasons beyond his control, ~~he had to admit that~~ reinforcements had ~~been~~ inadequate as to numbers in respect of the infantry arm. The report of the Chief of Staff went on to say that he was not satisfied that anticipated reinforcements would be adequate "to meet future requirements of this war against Germany", and

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As you are aware, in referring at different times in the Cabinet to the report of the Chief of Staff, you stated that if the recommendation it contains was formally made, and it was not accepted, in view of what you had said in parliament you would feel compelled to resign. It was not until after you had said that you saw clearly that the cabinet were not prepared to agree to the enactment of an order in council involving service overseas, and that if agreement could not be reached on this course, either immediately or later on, that, having told the cabinet that I had ascertained from General McNaughton, the former commander of the Canadian Army, that he was not satisfied that the course that you had suggested was necessary to give the Army the fullest support and that he was prepared to assume the responsibility with the co-operation of the cabinet of obtaining full support for the Army without any change in the Government's policy as stated by myself in parliament, that I said I thought there should not be longer delay in reaching a decision when, as I had also ascertained, General McNaughton was prepared to take office immediately.

In your letter you say "In the stand I have taken I have considered that my first thought should be my duty to our fighting men in our overseas Army." I need scarcely say that I have always had the same thought and conception of duty with respect to our fighting men in every branch of the armed services. It is for this reason, above all others, that I have striven as I have to see that Canada's effort in the present war should be an utmost effort in all directions. It is why I feel so

REPEAT
REPETER

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C 272786

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I cannot express to you too sincerely my own ~~deep~~ ~~appreciation of~~ your services as a colleague in the years we have shared the responsibilities of office, nor can I ~~thank you~~ too warmly ~~for~~ what your services ~~in all war activities have meant particularly~~ in ~~the~~ most difficult years ~~of our country's history~~.

Yours very sincerely,

REPEAT
REPETER

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C 272786

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Yours very sincerely,

~~acknowledge~~

express my recognition of

in all war activities
have meant to Canada

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REPETER

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OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER
CANADA

C 272787

Ottawa,
November 3, 1944

The Honourable J. L. Ralston, M.P.,
Mayfair Apartments,
O t t a w a.

Dear Colonel Ralston:

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You will recall that it was not until the 19th of October that you informed the Cabinet War Committee that you had received a report from the Chief of Staff at Canadian Military Headquarters in London, stating that the future effective maintenance of our ~~Canadian~~ forces in the two theatres of operations required that additional personnel be made available from Canada.

The Chief of Staff in his report stated that he was satisfied that the reinforcements sent, and being sent to both theatres had been well trained. He was also satisfied that up to the time of his report to you, the provision for reinforcements had been adequate in respect of over-all numbers, but that for the last two months because of a series of military reasons beyond his control, ~~he had to admit that~~ reinforcements had ~~been~~ inadequate as to numbers in respect of the infantry arm. The report of the Chief of Staff went on to say that he was not satisfied that anticipated reinforcements would be adequate "to meet future requirements of this war against Germany", and

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he concluded by recommending that "if the numbers required cannot be found from general service personnel in Canada, that the terms of service of N.R.M.A. personnel be extended to include overseas service in any theatre."

This was the first intimation made to the government that the army's reinforcement position was causing concern, ~~and in this connection~~ you will recall the assurance given the Cabinet during the first week of August, that additional military commitments then being sought would not adversely affect this position.

During discussions at Quebec, at the time of the Conference in September, when future plans for the Canadian army, navy and air force were being considered, no intimation was given of any prospective insufficiency of reinforcements for the Canadian army.

From the 19th of October, as you are aware, the Cabinet has been giving its time almost exclusively to a most careful study of the whole situation, exploring every possible aspect of it, but without deciding upon any of the courses explored.

There has not been a time since the war began that it has not been recognized that resort to conscription for service overseas would occasion the most serious controversy that could arise in Canada. I can think of no course of action fraught with greater danger to ~~the~~ our war effort ~~of Canada~~ - to say nothing of the unity and strength of Canada today and for generations to come - than a general election at this late stage of war on the conscription issue. Such an issue would almost certainly ~~have arisen~~ had ~~parliament been~~ called to endorse an Order in Council extending the terms of service of N.R.M.A. personnel to include service overseas. Until it is apparent that conscription for overseas service ~~will be effective~~ and is necessary to the full support of Canada's forces overseas, as the head of the Administration, I could not recommend taking the risk of widespread national dissention.

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I have made it clear that I am prepared to follow the course outlined in my speeches in parliament in 1942, if that course should ever be necessary, but I do not believe that it has become necessary.

There is one paragraph in your letter to which I regret I must take exception. You say, "Our differences are fundamental on the vital matter of reinforcing our troops, and consequently, as requested by you, I at once tender my resignation as Minister of National Defence". Surely you are in error when you say that "our differences are fundamental on the vital matter of reinforcing our troops". From the ~~beginning of this war,~~ the government has been agreed that the matter of reinforcing our troops was "vital". ~~Since the outbreak of war~~ I have never agreed to a single increase in our military commitments without first asking and receiving assurances that the additional commitment would not jeopardize our capacity to provide needed reinforcements. The only difference which exists is one of the method or methods of meeting this fundamental vital necessity.

As you will recall, on several occasions you stated that if the recommendation contained in the report of the Chief of Staff was formally made to the Cabinet and not accepted, you would feel compelled to resign, in view of what you had said in parliament. Subsequently you stated that you saw clearly that the Cabinet were not prepared to agree to compulsory overseas service. I had ascertained that General McNaughton was not satisfied that ~~this course~~ was necessary to provide full support for the army. He had also indicated that, with the co-operation of the Cabinet, he believed it would be possible to obtain the necessary reinforcements by voluntary means, and that in this belief he would be prepared to assume the responsibility of Minister of National Defence, In these circumstances, I thought there should not be further delay in reaching a decision.

In your letter you also say "In the stand I have taken I have considered that my first thought should be my duty to our fighting men in our overseas Army." I need scarcely say that I have always had the same thought

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and conception of duty towards all of our fighting men. It is for this reason that I have striven as I have to see that Canada's effort in the present war should be the maximum of which our country is capable. That is why I feel so strongly that at the present time no course of action should be taken if it can possibly be avoided, which, while not certain of accomplishing its purpose, would divide the country and thereby prejudice much that has been so magnificently accomplished throughout more than five years of war—and this on the eve of certain victory.

I cannot express to you too sincerely my own thanks for your great services as a colleague in the years we have shared the responsibilities of office. Nor can I too warmly express my recognition of what your services in all war activities have meant to Canada in these most difficult years.

Yours very sincerely,

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C 272791

3rd reminder

OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER
CANADA

Ottawa,
November 3, 1944

The Honourable J. L. Ralston, M.P.,
Mayfair Apartments,
O t t a w a.

Dear Colonel Ralston:

I thank you for your letter of the 1st instant which I received while at a meeting of the Cabinet yesterday forenoon. I regret that until today I have not had an opportunity to send you a reply.

You will recall that it was not until the 19th of October that you informed the Cabinet War Committee that you had received a report from the Chief of Staff at Canadian Military Headquarters in London, stating that the future effective maintenance of our forces in the two theatres of operations required that additional personnel be made available from Canada.

This was the first ~~intimation~~ made to the government that the army's reinforcement position was causing concern. You will recall the assurance given the Cabinet during the first week of August, that additional military commitments then being sought would not adversely affect this position. During discussions at Quebec, at the time of the Conference in September, when future plans for the Canadian army, navy and air force were being considered, no intimation was given of any prospective insufficiency of reinforcements for the Canadian army.

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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From the 19th of October, as you are aware, the Cabinet has been giving its time almost exclusively to a most careful study of the whole situation, exploring every possible aspect of it, but without deciding upon any of the courses explored.

There has not been a time since the war began that it has not been recognized that resort to conscription for service overseas would occasion the most serious controversy that could arise in Canada. I can think of no course of action fraught with greater danger to our war effort - to say nothing of the unity and strength of Canada today and for generations to come - than a general election at this late stage of war on the conscription issue. I believe that such an issue would almost certainly arise were the House of Commons to be asked to endorse an Order in Council extending the terms of service of N.R.M.A. personnel to include service overseas. Until it is apparent that conscription for overseas service is necessary to the full support of Canada's forces overseas, and that its application would prove effective, the Government would not be justified in taking the risk of widespread national dissention.

I have made it clear that I am prepared to follow the course outlined in my speeches in parliament in 1942, if that course should ever be necessary, but I do not believe that it has become necessary.

There is one paragraph in your letter to which I regret I must take exception. You say, "Our differences are fundamental on the vital matter of reinforcing our troops, and consequently, as requested by you, I at once tender my resignation as Minister of National Defence". Surely you are in error when you say that "our differences are fundamental on the vital matter of reinforcing our troops". From the outset, the government has been agreed that the matter of reinforcing our troops was "vital". I have never agreed to a single increase in our military commitments without first asking and receiving assurances that the additional commitment would not jeopardize our capacity to provide needed reinforcements.

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The only difference which exists is one of the method or methods of meeting this fundamental vital necessity.

You will recall, on several occasions you stated that if the recommendation contained in the report of the Chief of Staff was formally made to the Cabinet and not accepted, you would feel compelled to resign, in view of what you had said in parliament. Subsequently you stated that you saw clearly that the Cabinet were not prepared to agree to compulsory overseas service. I had ascertained that General McNaughton was not satisfied that compulsory service was necessary to provide full support for the army overseas. He had also indicated that, with the co-operation of the Cabinet, he believed it would be possible to obtain the necessary reinforcements by voluntary means, and that in this belief he would be prepared to assume the responsibility of Minister of National Defence. In these circumstances, I thought there should not be further delay in reaching a decision.

In your letter you also say "In the stand I have taken I have considered that my first thought should be my duty to our fighting men in our overseas Army." I need scarcely say that I have always had the same thought and conception of duty towards all of our fighting men. It is for this reason that I have striven as I have to see that Canada's effort in the present war should be the maximum of which our country is capable. That is why I feel so strongly that at the present time no course of action should be taken if it can possibly be avoided, which, while not certain of accomplishing its purpose, would divide the country and thereby prejudice much that has been so magnificently accomplished throughout more than five years of war - and this on the eve of certain victory.

I cannot express to you too sincerely my own thanks for your great services as a colleague in the years we have shared the responsibilities of office. Nor can I too warmly express my recognition of what your services in all war activities have meant to Canada in these most difficult years.

Yours very sincerely,

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C 272794

OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER
CANADA

Ottawa, November 15, 1944

His Excellency
The Rt. Hon. The Earl of Athlone, K.G., P.C., G.C.B., etc.
Governor General of Canada,
Government House,
O t t a w a.

My dear Governor General:

Your Excellency has already seen the correspondence concerning his resignation which has been exchanged between Colonel Ralston and myself; also the correspondence exchanged between Colonel Ralston and myself concerning the publication of these communications.

I have since received from Colonel Ralston a further letter dated November 14th regarding the publication of the correspondence, a copy of which I am enclosing herewith.

Your Excellency will observe that in its concluding paragraph Colonel Ralston points out that permission to make such matters public is vested in the Crown, and suggests that I advise Your Excellency to assent to the release of his letter of resignation and the further correspondence.

As the House of Commons reassembles on Wednesday next, November 22nd, I shall be expected, at the opening of its proceedings, to make a statement on Colonel Ralston's resignation, and to table such of the correspondence as may be approved by Your Excellency.

It now becomes necessary for me to advise Your Excellency as to the course to be pursued. My advice, in

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C272795

a word, is that, of the letters exchanged between Colonel Ralston and myself those portions only be tabled which do not violate the obligation of secrecy respecting Cabinet deliberations, imposed by the oath of the members of the Privy Council, and the obligation upon a member of a Government to respect military secrecy in making information public.

I enclose a complete file of the correspondence. I have indicated the portions which I believe violate the obligation of Cabinet secrecy and the portions which I believe to be in the nature of a disclosure of military information. Excepting these portions I am prepared to advise the tabling of the remainder

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C 272796

Ottawa, November 15, 1944

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Governor General of Canada
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C 272798

OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER

MEMORANDUM

correspondence sent to Mr Heeney by messenger
November 15, 1944 2 45 pm

1. Covering letter, PM to ADPh Nov 15
2. Hon. Angus Macdonald to PM Nov 13
3. Draft reply PM to Macdonald Nov 15
4. Suggested draft reply, PM to GG Nov 15
5. Ralston to PM (copy) 2nd copy Nov 1
6. PM to Ralston (copy) 2nd copy Nov 3
7. Ralston to PM (copy) Nov 6
8. Ralston to PM (copy) Nov 14 regn
9. Ralston to PM (copy) Nov 14 rls crsp
10. Crerar to PM (orig) Nov 3
11. PM to Crerar (copy) Nov 10
12 Mmdm, Minister of Justice (orig) re secr ecy (undated)
13. PM to Ralston (copy) Nov 10 Regn

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OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER

MEMORANDUM

Prime Minister

To complete his file of correspondence, Mr. Heeney would like to have a copy of your letter of November 10 to Colonel Ralston regarding RELEASE OF CORRESPONDENCE.

(This item is not among the copies which you gave to me this morning).

November 16, 1944 J.A.G.

Sent to Mr Heeney
Nov 16 1.50 pm.

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EH

OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER

MEMORANDUM

G272800

correspondence sent to Mr Heeney by messenger
November 15, 1944 2 45 pm

1. Covering letter, PM to ADPh Nov 15
2. Hon. Angus Macdonald to PM Nov 13
3. Draft reply PM to Macdonald Nov 15
4. Suggested draft reply, PM to CG Nov 15
5. Ralston to PM (copy) Nov 1
6. PM to Ralston (copy) Nov 3
7. Ralston to PM (copy) Nov 6
8. Ralston to PM (copy) Nov 14 regn
9. Ralston to PM (copy) Nov 14 rls crep
10. Crerar to PM (orig) Nov 5
11. PM to Crerar (copy) Nov 10
12. Mmdm, Minister of Justice (orig) re secr coy (undated)

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COLOURED PAPER
PAPIER DE COULEUR

C 272800A

APPENDIX

extra copy of
News

"Total Strength
of Canadian Army"

extra copy of
Report of Cabinet Committee
Nov 6/44

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COLOURED PAPER
PAPIER DE COULEUR

MEMORANDUM
Office of the Prime Minister. C 272801

Ottawa,.....

Mr King:

Herewith the matter
asked for. Would it be well
to add a handwritten "Yours
sincerely" to see it again?

W.L.M.K.

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Top Secret

OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER

MEMORANDUM C 272802

Prime Ministers

re Legion delegation

I think all the information re. GS troops in Canada & the U.K. that might be helpful is in the attached memorandum, pages 1-3

I believe it would be useful to give a breakdown of troops in Canada as indicated on pages 2 & 3 but-that it would not be helpful and be very dangerous to give a U.K. breakdown,

9.XI.44

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TOP SECRET

C-272803

TOTAL STRENGTH OF CANADIAN ARMY

Overseas - as at 31 Aug 44

I Effectives:	(a) Western Europe	104,751
	(b) Italy	67,325
	(c) United Kingdom	61,989
	Total Effectives	234,065
II Non Effectives (Hospital Patients, Detention, Courses, Special Employment, Disposal Stream)	Total	26,263
	GRAND TOTAL OVERSEAS	260,328

Canada

At 27 Sep 44 General Service personnel numbered 136,750 of whom 16,146 were Officers and 120,604 were Other Ranks.

ø Note: At 23 Sep 44 this number had been reduced to 55,809, made up of 35,158 in static units, i.e., H.Q., Hospital Staffs, Ordnance Depots and Workshops, Engineer Maintenance Units, Forestry Corps, Training Establishments, etc. The remaining 20,651 were reinforcements of whom fit infantry were 5,847, fit other arms 11,528, unfit all arms 3276.

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INFANTRY REINFORCEMENTS AVAILABLE BETWEEN

23 Sep 44 and 31 Dec 44.

1. On 23 Sep 44 actual Infantry reinforcements available were as follows:

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C

Western Europe	300
Italy	1400
United Kingdom	5800

On 31 Dec 44 it is estimated that in Western Europe and Italy there will be a deficiency in the strength of Units in the Field of 2350 Infantry.

2. At the same date it is estimated that there will be in the United Kingdom 600 reinforcements in training, none of whom will be immediately available for the field.

3. During the period 23 Sep 44 to 31 Dec 44 we shall despatch from Canada 11,000 reinforcements, either trained as infantry or capable of being trained as Infantry.

This number will be obtained only by taking 1500 men from other Arms, reverting 750 N.C.O.'s to the ranks, by utilizing 750 tradesmen as infantry, and 500 by lowering the Pulhems standard under "P" and "U" classifications. (This lowering of Pulhems standard is conditional upon the approval of the Field Commanders)

4. From 1 Jan 45 to 31 May 45 it is estimated that an additional 10,500 Infantry reinforcements can be despatched from Canada.

5. It may be asked why, out of the total of 120,000 other ranks G.S. personnel in Canada at 23 Sep 44, only the above mentioned numbers of Infantry reinforcements can be shipped overseas. The answer is to be found in the following facts:

(a) 67,000 of the 120,000 are overage, underage, or are in Pulhems 3, 4 and 5.

(b) 11,000 Infantry will embark for overseas in the period 23 Sep to 31 Dec 44
10,500 Infantry will embark in the period 1 Jan to 31 May 45
6,000 Other Arms will embark in the period 23 Sep to 31 Dec 44.
3,500 Other Arms will embark in the period 1 Jan to 31 May 45

(c) Wastage - 20% of 53,000 -- 10,600

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(d)	O.T.C, C.T.T.C., Medical and Dental Students	3,000
(e)	Key personnel, Provost Corps, Dental Corps, Medical Corps, Instructional Staffs, etc.	8,400

(a reduction from present strength which is 14,500)

.....

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ACTUAL AND PROJECTED CASUALTIES UP TO 31 DEC 44.

1. The actual battle casualties in Infantry in both War Theatres from 1st July to 25th October were 22,500.

2. The estimated battle casualties in infantry from 28th October to 31st December, 1944 are 16,000. (This estimate takes no account of losses through sickness. Sickness might add 1000 to 2000 additional casualties over the period in question.)

(Note - In a previous estimate, infantry casualties from September 23 to October 31, 1944, were estimated at 22,207. Actual casualties incurred from September 23 to October 25 have been approximately 6,000. Adding this figure to the estimated 16,000 for the remainder of the period, we have a total of 22,000).

3. The estimate of casualties is based on a forecast for Western Europe of six weeks intense activity with casualties at 1,500 per week for a total of 9000, and three weeks normal at 640 for a total of 1920. Italy -- four weeks quiet at 25 per week for a total of 100, and five weeks intense at 1000 for a total of 5000.

4. The forecasts of activity have been concurred in by Field Marshal Montgomery, Commanding the 21st Army Group in Western Europe and by the Headquarters of the Eighth Army in Italy.

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NET POSITION AT 31 DEC 44.

C 272807

1. As already indicated under the heading "Reinforcements available between 23 Sep 44 and December 31, 1944," there will be at the latter date a deficiency of 2350 in the strength of Infantry units in the field.

2. There will be available in England on the same date 8600 Infantry reinforcements in training.

3. Of this number 3600 will become available in January to offset the deficiency in Infantry Field Units. A total of 3000 Infantry reinforcements will become available in February. 2000 Infantry reinforcements will become available in March.

4. After making good in January the deficiency existing on 31 Dec 44, we shall have left about 1250 Infantry reinforcements. To this number we shall have to add a certain number of returned casualties who will become fit for infantry duty in the field. A generous estimate of the number likely to become available in this way is 1400 per month.

5. It would appear, therefore, that to meet battle casualties in January we shall have a total of 2650 Infantry reinforcements. Assuming that the activity on both fronts would be normal in the month of January we may expect Infantry casualties of 4300 for the month. If the activity is intense the Infantry casualties would be 10,000 for the month.

6. Projecting the reinforcement position into later months of 1945 it would seem that in February there would be available for the field units 3000 reinforcements, plus an estimated 1400 recoverable casualties. In March we estimate 4250 Infantry reinforcements, plus 1400 returning casualties. In April we estimate 2250 Infantry reinforcements, plus 1400 returning casualties. Thereafter the reinforcements would be at a continuing rate of 2000 monthly, depending on future enlistments.

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COMPARISON OF AVAILABLE REINFORCEMENTS WITH RECOMMENDED REQUIREMENTS.

It is now necessary to relate what this paper shows has been done in the way of despatching additional infantry to the U.K. with the actual requirement as recommended.

This recommendation asked for a pool of 15,000 Infantry reinforcements to be established overseas by 31 Dec 44 and a monthly increment from Canada, beginning Jan 45, of 3,000 Infantry reinforcements.

It will be noted from previous paragraphs that 15,500 additional infantry or potential infantry reinforcements will have been despatched to the U.K. in the period November 44 to May 45. It should be noted that of this number only 700 will be available in the field in January. The balance becomes available in February, March, April and May.

It Is evident therefore that the 15,500 being sent from Canada should be counted against the five monthly increments of 3,000 a month in the first five months of 1945. This leaves a pool of 15,000 Infantry reinforcements required by 31 Dec 44 unprovided for.

A monthly increment of 3,000 was calculated on the following basis. The forecast of activity from January to June was taken as three months intense, two months normal and one month quiet. This works out at about 36,000 Infantry casualties. It is assumed for purposes of calculation that these casualties will be suffered at the rate of 6,000 a month. It was felt also that the pool could diminish progressively by about 1,600 a month thereby emerging at end of June at a strength of 5,000 as opposed to the original strength of 15,000. It was assumed further recoverable casualties will be at about 1,400 a month. Hence the requirement of 3,000 Infantry reinforcements from Canada per month.

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As stated above it was assumed for purposes of calculation that casualties will be suffered at an equal rate of 6,000 per month. This is unlikely to happen in practice. It is always possible that within the first two months of the year casualties at the intense rate might be suffered for from four to six weeks. A pool is necessary for this purpose. Without an adequate pool there would be no means of replenishing heavy casualties when they were in excess of our estimated casualties and there would be no means of meeting the progressively increasing monthly deficiencies beginning at 31 Dec 44.

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N.R.M.A.

As at 27 Sep 44:

Total Strength N.R.M.A.	68,489
Less on extended leave	8,743
Total in Service	59,746
Trained as Infantry	16,000
Age and category suitable for Inf.	26,000
Total potential Inf.	42,000
Remainder - being unavailable as Infantry	17,746

Provided shipping offered is accepted by 5 Nov 44 it is estimated that 8,000 N.R.M.A. trained infantry could be made available in theatre by mid January. It is estimated that an additional 7,000 could be despatched and made available by mid February.

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LEAVE.

The calculated reinforcement requirements make no provision for additional reinforcements required to carry any system of leave to Canada. By 31 Dec a substantial number of Canadian Troops (estimated at approximately 11000) will have been serving out of Canada for four continuous years, of which at least six months have been in an active theatre of operations. The institution of leave to Canada would have a most beneficial effect upon morale and must be most seriously considered, particularly in the case of those troops serving in Italy who now face their second winter under very difficult battle conditions.

Institution of leave to Canada on a basis of 500 individuals per month returning to Canada would involve 500 additional reinforcements per month, for the months of November, December, January and February. By March the return flow would eliminate the requirement except to the extent that personnel granted leave had for various reasons remained in Canada. The estimate of this loss is 50% of those being granted leave, which would mean that in March and succeeding months there would be a drain on the reinforcement stream of 250 per month additional to all battle, sickness and accident casualties.

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CANADIAN ARMY OVERSEAS

TOP SECRET

STATEMENT SHOWING PROJECTED INFANTRY REINFORCEMENT SITUATION OVERSEAS AS AT END OF EACH MONTH NOV 44 - MAY 45

APPENDIX "A"

Deficiency beginning of Month		Becoming Available during Month: Recoveries from Casualties	From Remusterings & from Arrivals from Canada prior to 25 OCT	From Arrivals from Canada subsequent to 25 OCT		TOTAL	Estimated Gross Casualties during Month	Deficiency end of Month	Progression of Availability from Training Establishments in UK	
NOV 44 (25 OCT)		1,700	7,150			8,850	9,000	30 NOV - 150	DEC	3,600
1 DEC	150	1,400	1,200	2,400	Infantry	5,000	7,200	31 DEC 2,350	JAN	3,600
1 JAN 45	2,350	1,400	2,000	900 700	Infantry Other Arms	5,000	6,000	31 JAN 3,350	FEB	3,000
1 FEB	3,350	1,400	-	2,200 800	Infantry Other Arms	4,400	6,000	28 FEB 4,950	MAR	4,250
1 MAR	4,950	1,400	-	2,250 1,500 500	Infantry NCO's and Tradesmen Lower Pulhems	5,650	6,000	31 MAR 5,300	APR	2,200
1 APR	5,300	1,400	-	2,250	Infantry	3,650	6,000	30 APR 7,650	MAY	2,000
1 MAY	7,650	1,400	-	2,000	Infantry	3,400	6,000	31 MAY 10,250	JUN	2,000
		10,100	10,350	15,500		35,950	46,200			

H.Q.S. 9011-7-8 (DAG(A))
30 OCT 44

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CANADIAN ARMY OVERSEAS

STATEMENT SHOWING NUMBER OF INFANTRY REINFORCEMENTS BECOMING AVAILABLE AS PROJECTED FOR PERIOD COMMENCING 25 OCT 44

APPENDIX "B"

					1944		1945						
					NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL
OCT 44	RFTS Trained or in TRAINING (25 OCT)												
		UK	6,250										
		21 Army Gp	1,200										
		AAI	900	8,350	7,150	1,200							
	Balance Remustering in UK			2,000			2,000						
				10,350									
NOV	From Canada (10 NOV)	Infantry		2,400		2,400							
		Other Arms to be remustered		700			700						
	" " (23 NOV)	Infantry		900			900						
		Other Arms to be remustered		800				800					
DEC	" " (16 DEC)	Infantry		1,375				1,375					
		NCO's and tradesmen		750					750				
	" " Late	Infantry		825				825					
		NCO's and Tradesmen		750					750				
		Lower Pulhems		500					500				
				9,000	7,150	3,600	3,600	3,000	2,000				
JAN 45	From Canada			2,250					2,250				
FEB	" "			2,250						2,250			
MAR	" "			2,000							2,000		
APR	" "			2,000								2,000	
MAY	" "			2,000									2,000
				10,500					4,250				
NOV 44	Recoveries from Casualties			1,700	1,700								
DEC	" " "			1,400		1,400							
JAN 45	" " "			1,400			1,400						
FEB	" " "			1,400				1,400					
MAR	" " "			1,400					1,400				
APR	" " "			1,400						1,400			
MAY	" " "			1,400							1,400		
				10,100									
				39,950	8,850	5,000	5,000	4,400	5,650	3,650	3,400	2,000	2,000

HQS 9011-7-8
30 OCT 44

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Carlos R. Ruiz

C 272814

TOP SECRET

TO THE PRIME MINISTER AND MEMBERS OF THE CABINET:

Attached is a copy of a report of the Cabinet Committee, appointed at the meeting of the Cabinet held on November 3rd, to review the position with respect to N.R.M.A. personnel and consider methods of increasing to the maximum extent the flow of available enlistments for General Service.

This report, which has been gone over and revised in certain particulars after consultation with the Army Staff, includes a summary of N.R.M.A. statistics.

It was understood that members of the Cabinet Committee may make verbal additions to the proposals set out therein when the report is laid before the Cabinet at a meeting to be held on Tuesday, November 7th, 1944.

A.D.P. Heeney,
Secretary to the Cabinet.

6th November 1944.
Privy Council Office.

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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Report of Cabinet Committee

on

Army enlistments for General Service

General A.G.L. McNaughton, Chairman
Mr. Ian A. Mackenzie
Mr. J.G. Gardiner
Mr. W. P. Mulock
Mr. Colin Gibson
General L.R. LaFleche
Mr. Brooke Claxton

Mr. A.D.P. Heeney, Secretary.

6th November 1944.

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TOP SECRET

Copy No. 1

Introduction

1. The Army have supplied figures showing the composition and distribution of the N.R.M.A. This is summarized below.

2. Since March 1941, 150,000 men have been enrolled in the N.R.M.A. Of these, 42,000 have gone active, 6,000 have joined the Navy or Air Force, 33,500 have been discharged, etc., and 8,676 are on extended leave from depots.

3. Of the balance of 59,679, 6,000 joined in 1941, 25,000 in 1942, 17,000 in 1943 and 10,000 in 1944.

4. The figures show that of a total of about 60,000, there are 26,000 in operational units, 8,000 in non-operational units and 8,000 in the training stream or a total of 42,000 considered as suitable for infantry. Of these, 15,700 are in British Columbia. The 42,000, suitable for infantry, originate as follows: Ontario 10,250, Quebec 16,300, the Maritimes 2,600, the Prairies 10,000 and British Columbia 2,850.

5. Of the 60,000 (which excludes those on extended leave), 17,000 speak English only, 12,000 speak French only, 14,000 speak English and French and 15,000 are of other races. It appears that not more than 37% are of French origin.

6. The Army have also supplied a note on the attitude of N.R.M.A. personnel towards enlistment for General Service. It appears that they have a group loyalty to their N.R.M.A. comrades. They do not see the need of going overseas. They are subject to pressure from home and similar influences. They have a sense of importance, even martyrdom. Their attitude has been encouraged by the financial benefits and other amenities which have accrued to the N.R.M.A.

General lines to be followed as regards the nation

7. The people of Canada are deeply disturbed at what has taken place. Everything possible should be done to allay their alarm and obtain their confidence and their co-operation. This can't be done by skating around the problem. The first step is to state the facts as soon and as frankly as possible and then to indicate positive lines of policy and action. It must be demonstrated that the situation should and can be met by the voluntary co-operation of the Canadian people. We want reinforcements and unity.

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8. The sights of the nation should be raised to show the vision of a progressive Canada going into the peace as a united nation. The aim should be to lower the national temperature by raising the sights.

9. The place of the N.R.M.A. in the total war effort should be put in its proper perspective.

General lines to be followed as regards N.R.M.A.

10. It should be emphasized that the requirement for home defence has largely passed and the need is now for reinforcements overseas. N.R.M.A. no longer have this justification for not volunteering. The present situation should be explained in terms which provide the N.R.M.A. with a face-saving opportunity of conversion against the background of a fresh situation requiring reappraisal of his own responsibilities.

11. Everything possible should be done to break down the sense of apartness of the N.R.M.A. They should be led to identify themselves with the man overseas. The positive superiority of the volunteer should be played up. Canada has chosen to fight the war in the best possible way, that is by volunteers, and the volunteers are the best people to do it. We need the kind of men who volunteer.

12. Canadians overseas have a sense of national unity and a feeling of national pride. N.R.M.A. personnel should be made to project themselves and their position into the post-war period. The comradeship which all men in the army feel for each other as volunteers will continue after the war. In the greatest event in his lifetime, a man will either have taken a man's part or not. There is a finality about this comradeship. You either belong to it or you don't. The bond of union possessed by Canada's fighting men is part of Canada's post-war capital.

13. Naturally Canada will recognize in equivalent degree, the contribution that has been made in the Canadian voluntary spirit. When demobilization becomes possible, first preference in discharge and employment opportunities will be given to those with overseas service.

14. Not only do we want to avoid division into volunteers and non-volunteers, we also want to avoid division into racial groups. The present unity of Canada and the future unity of Canada will be strengthened if these men volunteer. The R.C.N. and R.C.A.F. have been built up and achieved their notable records on a voluntary basis. The Canadian Army in Italy and Northwestern Europe have achieved an equally high record - all on a voluntary basis. Some 900,000 men have volunteered; only 68,000 remain in the army who have not. The winning of

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the war, the future of the country and the welfare of those who have volunteered and of those who have not volunteered all depend on the remainder deciding to take part in the great comradeship.

15. Similarly, it would not be fair to allow N.R.M.A. personnel preferential treatment by giving them civilian work at civilian rates of pay.

Civilian action recommended

16. The people are anxiously looking for a statement of the position. On Sunday, November 5th, General McNaughton will speak at Arnprior and on Monday, November 6th, to the Legion Branch at Ottawa. On Monday, it should be announced that the Prime Minister will give a radio speech on Wednesday, the 8th.

17. On Wednesday, the 8th, the Prime Minister should give a speech over a national network. This should review the facts as frankly as possible, admit a possible future shortage of infantry reinforcements to be guarded against. The speech should indicate the policy of the government and the action it is taking.

18. It should mention Col. Ralston's service in the highest terms and frankly admit the difference of opinion, then state that Gen. McNaughton, like the government, believes that the need can and should be met by voluntary means.

19. The speech should minimize the importance of the N.R.M.A. by lifting people's sights beyond the N.R.M.A. People are shirking their duty if they do not take a long view.

20. Without referring particularly to the N.R.M.A. situation, the speech should say that while the war is not yet advanced to the stage where the government can announce a detailed plan of demobilization, it had been decided as far as possible, to follow the principle that those who have made the greatest sacrifices should first be demobilized. It is obvious that those who have served in an actual theatre of operations have made the greatest sacrifice and should be released in advance of any N.R.M.A. personnel remaining.

21. The speech should not contrast the provision of reinforcements with national unity. It should put forth the voluntary effort as the best method to do the job in the light of all the circumstances.

22. It should contain an appeal to young men to volunteer and to the general public to do what they can to encourage volunteers among N.R.M.A. personnel and others.

23. The speech should avoid any political note and should also be given in French.

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24. The speech should immediately be given nation-wide distribution to the armed forces and to the civilian population.

25. The heads of churches should be requested to assist by asking parents to urge their sons to volunteer. Those who have served overseas should be asked to visit the soldiers in Canada.

26. The owners and editors of newspapers should be invited to Ottawa to meet Gen. McNaughton and the Army Staff. At this meeting, special attention should be paid to the publishers and editors whose circulation extends to the different racial groups.

27. Also, on a different occasion, representatives of all the Veterans' organizations should be asked to meet Gen. McNaughton at Ottawa.

28. The assistance of various individuals should later be sought, e.g., L.W. Brockington, who is doing a weekly series over the CBC and who might slant his talks so as to help in this.

29. A nation-wide publicity campaign in the press and over the radio is recommended against at this time because:

(a) it would not reach the people for whom it was intended;
(b) it would arouse opposition; and
(c) it would over-emphasize the importance of the N.R.M.A.

30. In short, our effort on the civilian side should be designed:

(a) to create a favourable atmosphere for the government's policy; and,
(b) to persuade people to do their utmost to urge others to volunteer.

31. In this connection, a card should later be obtained from the army for each N.R.M.A. man. This should give information about him and give the name of his next of kin. A civilian organization should canvass each next of kin.

Army action recommended

32. Since the N.R.M.A. are in the army, personal approach to secure their conversion must be regarded as primarily an army job. The steps recommended here are intended to build on existing army practices, not replace them.

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33. The army should be told that this has top priority and should be asked to submit a program for Cabinet backing.

34. The reputation of Gen. McNaughton is the biggest weapon we have to induce a favourable attitude on the N.R.M.A. To make the most of this, there should, if possible, be something in the nature of a "new deal" for N.R.M.A. personnel and others so as to create the most favourable attitudes. For example,

(a) there should be no discriminatory treatment of N.R.M.A. personnel;

(b) N.R.M.A. personnel should not be treated as separate problems or as a separate force, but should be treated exactly like General Service personnel;

(c) officers with the best records in securing recruits should, where possible, be transferred to positions where they can be most useful;

(d) every effort should be made to prevent training becoming a matter or routine so that men feel that they are soldiers who are trained to do a soldier's job. For this purpose, new officers from overseas might be attached to units and camps to stimulate training and produce other action along the lines indicated. These officers might conceivably be found at the staff college at Kingston;

(e) auxiliary services, canteens, movies, etc., should be maintained on the best scale possible and staffed with the best personnel available; and,

(f) in short, everything possible should be done to create a feeling on the part of the N.R.M.A. that they are soldiers who are well treated and who are being well trained to take part in overseas action.

35. The men should not be talked to in large formations, but should be canvassed individually or in small groups. A card should be prepared for each man and the result of each interview entered and reported to the person holding the next of kin card. If the man says "I would go if my mother agrees", the man canvassing the mother should know this.

36. No doubt many officers believe that the N.R.M.A. should be sent overseas. Their loyal sympathetic support should be sought. The regimental officers responsible for interviewing the men should themselves be instructed on how best to proceed. Army examiners should advise though they should not act as recruiting officers.

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37. Gen. McNaughton should make an inspection tour of the formations in the west and visit the N.R.M.A. camps. During such visits, he might speak to the men.

38. Later, Gen. McNaughton should make a radio speech in which he mentions the results of some of his own findings and experience.. In part of this he might address himself to the men with whom he served in two wars.

39. Civilians like Corbett and Westwater, who have visited the troops overseas and been very successful in conducting group discussions with them, might visit N.R.M.A. formations to engage in discussions with them.

40. Gen. McNaughton should issue messages to the army overseas and in Canada.

41. The employment of soldiers on civilian jobs should be re-examined. N.R.M.A. personnel suitable for use as infantry, should be called back for training unless immediately engaged on work of prime essentiality. N.R.M.A. troops working at essential civilian jobs, should only receive soldiers' pay. Consideration should be given to mustering, in pioneer battalions, the N.R.M.A. personnel who are unlikely to become efficient soldiers.

42. Consideration should be given at a later date to providing N.R.M.A. personnel who convert, with war service grants and credits on the basis of service not exceeding, say, six months prior to conversion, conditional, upon this taking place before, say, January 1st. Under no circumstances should this form part of a recruting campaign.

Possible action by Council

43. Direct that the recruiting, training and transportation of reinforcements overseas and the conversion of N.R.M.A. personnel is to have top priority. ✓

44. Direct that procedure is to be along the lines suggested in this memorandum. ✓

45. Appoint Major General Pope, Messrs. Heeney and Dunton and others to assist the army. ✓

46. Set up machinery for the canvassing of next of kin, including the appointment of someone in each province and in each constituency to direct this work. ✓

— add overseas leave —

6th November 1944.

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DISCUSSIONS OF MILITARY TRAINING, REINFORCEMENTS AND SUGGESTED COMPULSORY SERVICE OVERSEAS IN THE CANADIAN ARMY

October, November, 1944

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Comments by Staff Columnists	II
Editorial Comments	III
Reports of public meetings, statements by political and service leaders	IV
Press accounts of anticipated Canadian Commitments in the War against Japan (RCAF, RCN)	enc

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REINFORCEMENTS AND CONSCRIPTION SITUATION

IV. Reports of public meetings, statements by political and service leaders.

I. BLOIS, Mrs. Edna	Broadcast reply to Smythe charges.	Toronto Star.	Oct.	4.
2. BRACKEN, John	Statement at Montreal reply to Armstrong.	Montreal Star.	Nov.	1.
	Statement at Ottawa "clear obligation".	Ottawa Journal	"	3.
	Statement at Ottawa re resignation of Colonel Ralston.	Toronto Globe and Mail	"	7.
	Statement re "King betrayed his trust".	Ottawa Journal	"	10.
3. CANADIAN LEGION	Address by ALEX. WALKER, President, at Verdun, Que.	Ottawa Citizen	Oct.	28.
	Text of Memorandum on Conscription to Prime Minister.	do.	Nov.	9.
	Statement by Alex WALKER re arousing public opinion for Conscription	Toronto G & M	Nov	17

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Churchill, Rt. Hon. Winston — Speech in Paris Nov 11, 1944 — Ottawa Citizen Nov 13 — TG & M Nov 13

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4. COLDWELL, M. J.	C.C.F. Meeting at Montreal.	Montreal Star	Nov.	2.
	Return to Ottawa	Ottawa Citizen	"	2.
	Statement to B.U.P.	Ottawa Journal	"	2.
	Calls for full statement on Ralston case.	do.	"	3.
	Interview (Toronto) re calling Parliament.	Montreal Gazette	"	6.
	Fort William statement re calling of Parliament.	Ottawa Journal	"	7.

5. DOUGLAS, T. C.	Statement of Policy re conscription.	Ottawa Citizen	Oct. 25.

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6. DREW, George	Speech at Toronto United Services Branch, Canadian Corps Association	Toronto Telegram	Oct. 6
	Speech at Hamilton, West Centre District Prog.Cons.Ass'n	Hamilton Spectator	" 7
	Interview Gazette reporter	Montreal Gazette	" 31
GIBSON,Hon.Colin	Speech at Port Elgin "The people are worried"	Toronto G.& M.	Nov.17
7. HERRIDGE, Hon. W.D.	Statement on the conscription issue	Ottawa Citizen	" 8
HOWE, Hon.C.D.	Speech at Chicago "conscription is politics" - editorial re	Toronto G & M.	" 16
LAFLECHE, Maj.Gen. L. R.	Reinforcement situation in French-speaking units	Mtl Gazette	" 14
8. McNAUGHTON, Gen. A.G.L.	Exchange of letters between Gen.McN. and Col. Ralston re retirement	Ottawa Citizen	Sep.29
	Queen's University Convocation - "tolerance would solve problems"	Toronto G & M	Oct.23

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McNaughton contd.	Arnprior speech	Ottawa Citizen	Nov. 6
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POWER, Hon.C.G.	Statement re ending of Air Training Plan	Ottawa Journal	" 17

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9. RALSTON, Hon. J. L.	Extracts from speech H. of C. July 10/44	Montreal Gazette	Nov.	3.
	Statement since resignation "Up to King to give facts".	Ottawa Journal	"	7.
	Farewell Message to Defence Dept.	Ottawa Citizen	"	10.
	King not releasing Ralston's letter.	Ottawa Journal	"	10.
	" "	Toronto Globe & Mail	"	10.
	Editorial "Mr. Ralston must speak".	do.	"	11.
	Text of Statement	Montreal Gazette	"	13.

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10.	ST. LAURENT, Hon. L. S.	Speech at Quebec.	Ottawa Journal	Nov. 6.
		do.	Le Devoir	" 6.
11.	SMYTHE, Major C.	Statement at Toronto	Ottawa Citizen	Nov. 4.
	Villeneuve, Cardinal	Message to Canadian Forces overseas (from Lond on)	Ottawa Citizen	Nov 11
	"Claim Cardinal Stands Behind Conscription		Toronto G+M	Nov 20

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PRESS CLIPPINGS

Office of
The Prime Minister

Name of Publication Toronto Globe and Mail

Date November 24, 1944

Subject

A Historic Document

Ottawa, Nov. 23 (CP).—Text of Order-in-Council making available 18,000 home defense troops for service overseas:

Whereas it is essential in the national interest and for the efficient prosecution of the war to provide for the adequate reinforcement of the Canadian forces overseas;

And, whereas it has now become necessary, in order to ensure provision of adequate reserves to meet requirements for the reinforcement of the Canadian forces fighting in Europe and in the Mediterranean, to extend the locality of service of certain personnel who have been called out for training, service or duty, pursuant to the provisions of the National Resources Mobilization Act, 1940;

Now therefore his Excellency the Governor-General-in-Council, on the recommendation of the Minister of National Defense and under and by virtue of the provisions of the National Resources Mobilization Act, 1940, and the War Measures Act, is pleased to order and doth hereby order as follows:

Notwithstanding the provisions of any other statute, law, regulation or order, the Minister of National Defense is hereby authorized and directed to despatch to the following localities of service, namely: The United Kingdom and/or to European and/or Mediterranean operational theatres such personnel, in such numbers as may be approved by the Governor-in-Council (the number hereby approved being 18,000) who are serving by reason of their having been called out for training, service or duty pursuant to the provisions of the National Resources Mobilization Act, 1940, as are or may from time to time hereafter be required, in the opinion of the said Minister, for training, service or duty within the said localities of service; such personnel to be detailed from such units, depots and establishments as may be designated by the said Minister;

And the Minister of National Defense is hereby authorized and directed to issue or cause to be issued all orders and to take all steps necessary to give effect to this authorization and direction; and all personnel so despatched or to be despatched are respectively hereby required (in addition to all other obligations for training, service or duty) to perform while in the said localities of service such training, service or duty as may be ordered by any superior officer.

Further, all personnel so despatched or who may at any time be despatched are, pursuant to Section 64 of the Militia Act, hereby placed on active service beyond Canada for the defense thereof.

(Signed) Clerk of the Privy Council.

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Notwithstanding the provisions of any other statute, law, regulation or order, the Minister of National Defense is hereby authorized and directed to despatch to the following localities of service, namely: The United Kingdom and/or to European and/or Mediterranean operational theatres such personnel, in such numbers as may be approved by the Governor-in-Council (the number hereby approved being 16,000) who are serving by reason of their having been called out for training, service or duty pursuant to the provisions of the National Resources Mobilization Act, 1940, as are or may from time to time hereafter be required, in the opinion of the said Minister, for training, service or duty within the said localities of service; such personnel to be detailed from such units, depots and establishments as may be designated by the said Minister;

And the Minister of National Defense is hereby authorized and directed to issue or cause to be issued all orders and to take all steps necessary to give effect to this authorization and direction; and all personnel so despatched or to be despatched are respectively hereby required (in addition to all other obligations for training, service or duty) to perform while in the said localities of service such training, service or duty as may be ordered by any superior officer.

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Scope of P.C. 8891

Order-in-Council P.C.8891 applies to all personnel who are serving or may serve in consequence of having been called up under the National Resources Mobilization Act.

Its enactment consequently accords with the procedure laid down in 1942, namely, that the Order-in-Council deals "with the members of the forces as a whole". This one Order-in-Council covers the entire force.

It was in reference to such an Order-in-Council that it was stipulated that the government would seek a vote of confidence.

In addition to making all N.R.M.A. personnel liable for service in European theatres, the Order-in-Council authorizes the Minister of National Defence to despatch overseas a maximum of 16,000 N.R.M.A. personnel.

In calculating the number of N.R.M.A. personnel so despatched, men will be counted as N.R.M.A. personnel only if they have embarked without converting to general service. All N.R.M.A. personnel who convert to G.S. before embarkation will be excluded from the 16,000.

(Possible addition)

Should it become necessary to despatch overseas additional personnel beyond the 16,000 the additional numbers would be fixed by Order-in-Council under the general authority provided by P.C. 8891.

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Retype on Stiff Sheet C272891

Scope of P.C. 8891

Order in Council P.C. 8891 applies to all personnel who are serving or may serve in consequence of having been called up under the National Resources Mobilization Act.

Its enactment consequently accords with the procedure laid down in 1942, namely, that the Order in Council deals "with the members of the forces as a whole." This one order in council covers the entire force

It was in reference to such an Order in Council that it was stipulated that the government would seek a vote of confidence.

In addition to making all N.R.M.A. personnel liable for service in European theatres, the Order in Council authorizes the Minister of National Defence to despatch overseas a maximum of 16,000 N.R.M.A. personnel.

In calculating the number of N.R.M.A. personnel so despatched, men will be counted as N.R.M.A. personnel only if they have embarked without converting to general service. All N.R.M.A. personnel who convert to G.S. before embarkation will be excluded from the 16,000.

(Possible addition)

Should it become necessary to despatch overseas additional personnel beyond the 16,000, the additional numbers would be fixed by Order in Council under the general authority provided by P.C.8891.

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MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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MEMORANDUM
Privy Council Office

272832

Ottawa, November 14th, 1944.

The Prime Minister

For information.

A.D.P. Heeney.

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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C 272833

CANADA

WARTIME INFORMATION BOARD

OFFICE OF THE
GENERAL MANAGER

O t t a w a,
November 13, 1944.

Confidential

Memorandum to Members of the Cabinet

The following observations on Canadian public opinion have been reported to WIB during the past week. While open to possible later correction, they come from sources which we have found reliable in the past.

THE CONSCRIPTION QUESTION

Reports this week deal almost exclusively with this issue, which is described as the subject of "constant discussion" since Mr. Ralston's resignation, almost overshadowing the war itself. Reports written up to November 11 are summarized below. It should be remembered that they come mainly from professional and business people who, though they attempt to report general opinion in their areas, do not fully represent the less articulate labor and farm groups.

1. Before the cabinet changes - As reported last week, feeling was already rising before Mr. Ralston's resignation. The campaign waged by certain newspapers and speakers had had some effect, and this had been intensified by the decline of belief in early victory and by lengthening casualty lists.

2. The cabinet changes - On Mr. Ralston's resignation almost all observers reported sympathy with his position as "honest" and "courageous", while the prestige of General McNaughton was balanced against the feeling that he was on the wrong side. Some letters stressed his great popularity with the soldiers, the "shrewdness" of the Prime Minister in securing him, and the belief that the whole thing would now "blow over", while others expressed surprise and disappointment at his acceptance of the post. General McNaughton's Arnprior and Ottawa speeches seem to have strengthened the latter reaction, observers asking how his proposed measures can remedy the immediate situation, and reporting "waning confidence" and "rudely shattered faith" in him. Enough

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uncertainty is implied, however, to suggest that most of the public would be willing to "give him a chance", though whether this has survived Colonel Ralston's statement may be questioned. In Quebec his appointment was received with delight as a "master-stroke".

3. Demands for information - Before Mr. King's speech many observers reported confusion, anxiety and widespread demands for a clear statement of "all the facts", even those most favorable to the government's position emphasizing the necessity of the fullest information. It was stressed that the political aspects of the situation were of small concern to the public as compared with their fear that lives were being unnecessarily sacrificed. This demand seems to have been partly satisfied by Mr. King's speech, but precise figures on casualties and reinforcements are still wanted.

4. Mr. King's speech - Though observers suggest that the Prime Minister had a large and eager audience, specific comments on the speech are not yet numerous. The trend of those received is to the effect that it was "inadequate" and "disappointing" and did not materially change the situation. This interpretation is strengthened by the reports of continuing concern and demands for immediate conscription written after November 8. Some sympathy is expressed for the Prime Minister's "difficult position". The figures on the number of French-speaking NRMA men came as a surprise to some, while the more prejudiced felt sure they had been "juggled" in some way. Two reports, one French and one English, agree in criticizing the speech for "glossing over the real issue" -- the unanimous opposition to conscription in Quebec.

5. Anti-conscription sentiment - While majority opinion is reported to favor conscription almost everywhere outside Quebec, a few English-speaking observers report arguments against it. These centre around the idea that it is too late to impose it now, and stress the stigma attached to draftees in the last war, the difficulty of training men who do not want to fight, and the possible splitting of the country without corresponding advantage. One report characterizes the conscription campaign as "unscrupulous" but admits that it has markedly affected soldiers' relatives.

6. Group differences - The last poll on this issue was released on November 13, 1943, and the figures shown (17% for conscription in Quebec, 71% outside Quebec) can no longer be relied upon. All Gallup Polls, however, have shown that conscription sentiment rises with age and with economic status, being

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relatively low among those under 30 and in the lower income brackets. The National Executive of the Labor-Progressive Party has endorsed Mr. King's speech and pledged support to General McNaughton, and the official CCF attitude may be assumed to be similar to that of Mr. Coldwell. It should be noted, however, that 67% of CCF supporters stated a year ago that they would vote for conscription for overseas service.

7. Present situation - Comment on Mr. Ralston's speech is not yet available, but these reports suggest that it will tend to crystallize opinion still further in favor of immediate conscription, everywhere except in Quebec, which is reported to be "solidly behind King and McNaughton". Even moderate opinion elsewhere is influenced by considerations which have frequently been mentioned: belief in the general fairness and logic of conscription, alarm lest NRMA men be demobilized first, criticism of their employment at civilian jobs, concern about the increasing ill-feeling towards them, and fear of open conflict between them and general service soldiers. A number of observers mention the role being played by the press and the Canadian legion in keeping public emotions stirred up. At the moment, the Canadians represented by our reports are predominantly critical of the government on this issue, but are waiting to see what will happen next.

A. D. Dunton
General Manager

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MEMORANDUM
Privy Council Office

C 272835

Ottawa, November 22, 1944.

The Prime Minister

For information.

A.D.P. Heeney.

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
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C 272836

CANADA

WARTIME INFORMATION BOARD

OFFICE OF THE
GENERAL MANAGER

Ottawa,
November 20, 1944.

CONFIDENTIAL

Memorandum to Members of the Cabinet

The following observations on Canadian public opinion have been reported to WIB during the past week. While open to possible later correction, they come from sources which we have found reliable in the past.

1. The war - As the sixth war-winter begins Canadians are reported to be showing some signs of war-weariness. They are still entirely confident of victory, but in spite of speculation aroused by the cutting down of air establishments and war contracts, the general impression is that "it may last a long time yet". This lessened optimism is, of course, a large factor in the present agitation about conscription.

2. The conscription issue - Letters written between November 11 and 18 reflect unabated interest in the controversy, but do relatively little to change the picture presented last week, except that attention is now focussed on the meeting of Parliament.

a) Public interest - Of 30 reports received since last week, almost all stress the question as the main topic of discussion. "People are taking sides over the Ralston incident to the exclusion of everything else" (St. John); "King, Ralston and McNaughton are the most talked-about people of the day" (London).

b) General McNaughton - A number of late reports from French-speaking Quebec are unanimous in warm approval of the selection of General McNaughton: it was a "master-stroke", "everyone is rejoicing over it", it is "more appreciated than any move made since the war began". The new Minister is praised as "a real Canadian, not a hybrid", and hope is expressed that he will unite all Canadian soldiers again in a distinctively Canadian force. Most English-speaking comments are sceptical, if not hostile, but a few pay tribute to General McNaughton's sincerity and his devotion to the interests of the army.

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c) Mr. King's speech - Most later comments tend to confirm last week's report that the speech did not succeed in allaying public concern and misgiving. One Winnipeg report says that it "did quite a lot to ease the mental tension here", but that Col. Ralston's statement left things "more confused than ever".

d) Col. Ralston's statement - Relatively few comments have been received, but most of these are to the effect that Col. Ralston "showed up well" and that he is admired for his stand. There is still a strong demand for a full statement on "what he really found in Europe".

e) Calling of Parliament - This announcement has caused a great deal of interest and speculation as to what will happen. There is some criticism of it as a "waste of time", but also hope that politics will be forgotten and the situation honestly faced and dealt with.

f) Present attitudes - The majority of reports from English-speaking areas, though reflecting some lessening of emotional tension, are still firmly in favor of immediate conscription. The controversy has clearly aroused a genuine anxiety about reinforcements, and people are talking a good deal about the long periods spent in the front line and about men recently transferred to the infantry who have become casualties. Observers also stress the demand for "equality of sacrifice", the talk about "appeasement of Quebec", the fear of open conflict between returned soldiers and NRMA men, and protests against men now overseas having later to fight against Japan. The superiority of a volunteer army is said to be sharply questioned, and the plea for "national unity" rejected on the ground that it does not exist now.

A minority of observers report some opposition to conscription on the grounds that it would disrupt the country, that the pledge made to NRMA men should be honored, and that conscripts would be of little use at the front. A Victoria observer says that individuals are more generous in their attitudes than are the groups which are passing resolutions, and that "King and McNaughton will live to be glad they have taken this attitude".

A. D. Dunton
General Manager

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SECTION 1

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PRESS CLIPPINGS C 272837

Office of
The Prime Minister

Name of Publication Toronto Daily Star

Date October 4, 1944

Subject

SOLDIER'S WIDOW, SMYTHE GIVE VIEWS ON THE ARMY

"My opinion of Major Conn Smythe's charges" was the subject of a broadcast over CKEY Tuesday evening by Mrs. Edna Blois. The text of her address follows:

I speak to you tonight, not as a military expert, but as the widow of Lieut. Kenneth Blois, a young Canadian who lost his life on the battlefield of France a few weeks ago. His father, Col. Blois, an outstanding hero of the last war, gave his life for the cause of freedom some 20 years ago.

You will recall that about two weeks ago Maj. Connie Smythe, on returning to Canada, made the serious charge that "green" and "untrained" troops were being thrown into action with the result that Canadian casualties were inordinately heavy. These charges were contained in a public statement and were of course calculated to produce a public reaction. It was very natural that the charge should find the sharpest reaction among the families of servicemen and particularly those who, like myself, have lost their loved ones on the field of battle. I want to give you my own reaction to Maj. Smythe's charges. Let me make it quite clear, however, that I do not ask you to accept the opinions I express as a complete answer to Maj. Smythe's serious charges. This must come from competent military authorities and this I feel sure will be forthcoming in due course.

Frankly, my first reaction to Maj. Smythe's charges was one of momentary alarm. He is a Canadian sportsman who has public standing. And then I asked myself, "Why did Maj. Smythe as an army officer see fit to make these charges public before taking them up with his superior officers?" "Could it be that the charges flowed from some political motive?"

These questions became more pointed in my mind when a short time later Premier Drew returned from England and immediately issued a statement corroborating Maj. Smythe's charges. I was struck by the fact that Premier Drew declared that he had not read Maj. Smythe's statement but he went on from there to repeat it almost word for word. I then remembered that our press had reported that Premier Drew had interviewed Maj. Smythe shortly before the latter returned to Canada and so I came to the conclusion that Premier Drew himself may have been the author and inspirer of the Maj. Smythe charge. This would not be the first occasion on which Col. Drew, for purely partisan reason has gone out of his way to harry the feelings of the people over alleged military inefficiencies.

After thinking the matter over, I examined Maj. Smythe's charges more carefully and I invite you to examine them more carefully. Here is an officer of the Canadian army who was in France. He charges that "green," "inexperienced" and "untrained" troops were sent into action with the result that many of them were needlessly killed or wounded. We are to suppose that he learned of this while in France. Then, why did Maj. Smythe not protest to the army high command when he supposedly learnt of this happening? Why did he not tell the reporters who interviewed him in France about this alleged crime? He was a senior officer right there on the spot. Why did he remain silent about this supposed outrage of all military common sense for many weeks and months? No man can throw out such grave charges without stating when and where he is supposed to have learned for the first time of this alleged crime.

I followed this line of thought a step further. What about specific facts? These charges concern the life or death of our men overseas. It is hard to conceive of any charges that could be made of a more serious nature in time of war. If a serious man had knowledge of the lives of our soldiers being needlessly thrown away on the field of battle, he would state when, where and how this crime occurred. Maj. Smythe carefully avoids giving us one single fact to back up his charges. Not one single fact!

Asks Full Details

I read through his statement again and was even more forcibly impressed with that point. Is it possible that a responsible man can make charges of this sort without offering even one fact to support them?

On what date were "green" troops thrown into action? Maj. Smythe doesn't say.

On what sector of the front were "untrained" men put up against the

Major Conn Smythe Tuesday night issued the following as "an answer to the reported statement by Hon. J. L. Ralston, minister of national defence, that a few may have been untrained."

To suggest there are political motives in my statements is untrue. My statement of Sept. 19 is correct.

To make up the pool of reinforcements prior to and after "D" Day required for the infantry, thousands of men were needed. These were practically all obtained from two sources:

1. Large numbers of young lads just overseas, who a few months ago were civilians, and

2. Thousands of men from other arms, such as the artillery, armored corps., etc., with varying lengths of service.

Anyone anywhere in Canada checking the casualty lists and noting the dates of enlistment can prove for themselves the truth of Item I. Col. Ralston, by releasing the figures showing the numbers of other arms transferred to the infantry in the last few months will prove item 2.

The officers who stated to me that the reinforcements were untrained were all of a company commander level or lower—the officers who actually lead the men into battle. They came from the following battalions:

North Nova Scotias, 3rd Div.; North Shore Regiment, N.B., 3rd Div.; Reg. de Maisoneuve, Que., 2nd Div.; Reg. de Chaudiere, Que., 3rd Div.; Royal Regiment of Canada, Ont., 2nd Div.; Queen's Own Rifles, Ont., 3rd Div.; Essex Scottish, Ont., 2nd Div.; Royal Winnipeg Rifles, Man., 3rd Div.; South Saskatchewan Rifles, Sask., 2nd Div.; Calgary Highlanders, Alberta, 2nd Div.; Canadian Scottish, B.C., 3rd Div.

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PRESS CLIPPINGS C272838 Office of The Prime Minister

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enemy to be needlessly killed? Maj. Smythe doesn't say.

In what regiments and battalions were these "green" and "untrained" men taken out to have their lives wasted and destroyed? Again Maj. Smyth doesn't say.

What officers were directly responsible for sending these "green" troops to their death? Maj. Smythe doesn't answer.

When you begin to examine Maj. Smythe's charges in this way, you begin to understand what a terrible thing he has done. He has made charges which cast the most damaging suspicion upon those who are responsible for the conduct of Canada's military effort without offering one single fact. He has charged the most serious crime against the responsible men who are leading our forces against the enemy without committing himself to a single piece of evidence.

You cannot go about Toronto charging anyone you don't like with vague but horrible crimes. Everyone, including the officers of the law, would recognize that you were merely trying to damage another's character and you would be dealt with accordingly. Maj. Smythe is doing something much more serious. He is casting suspicion upon our military command; he is undermining public confidence in our military and war leaders by charges unsupported by a single fact that he is prepared to vouch for. And he is doing this from the hospital bed of a wounded officer, thus placing those against whom he makes the charge in a most unfair position.

Belonging to a military family, it is only natural that army life should be a subject of conversation in our home. My husband felt keenly his responsibility to the men whom he would one day lead in battle. His mother has often recalled her husband's observations from the last war and many hours were spent talking of the necessity for perfection in physical fitness, mental alertness and precision training which he and his men underwent daily to fit them for the big job which lay ahead.

While in England, my husband wrote many times of meeting officers who had returned to England from the Italian campaign and who invariably in conversation with him would proudly state that there were no better trained, equipped or braver fighters anywhere than those Canadian boys fighting in Italy.

Shortly before his death my husband wrote from France of his genuine confidence in an early victory. I quote, "There is no doubt that we have one of the finest trained armies in the world. To see our men in action—our soldiers and airmen, convinces me it won't be long before we will call the tune of peace. We are sleeping in slit trenches, it is pouring rain, we are wet and muddy but morale has never been higher. We are ready for our job and one and all are confident that we have been fitted to contribute our best in the days ahead."

A few days ago our Toronto papers carried statements made by servicemen on their return to Canada. Their impressions only serve further to convince me that my husband's observations were correct. Let me quote a few of these statements:

"Put on Good Show"

Lieut. Cecil Bennett of Vancouver, says: "The officers on board ship coming back felt very warm about the statements made by Major Connie Smythe that reinforcements were 'green' and 'poorly trained.' I don't think that Major Smythe has the authority to quote the boys as to whether they were well trained. He wasn't in England very long and he wasn't in France very long. He didn't fight with the infantry or with the paratroops. If they were 'green' they put on a very good show and are continuing to do so. Reinforcements may have lacked battle experience but I was in the army five years and all the experience I lacked was battle experience. There is only one way to get it and that is in the field. The reinforcements were good fighters—the results are proving that."

Airman George MacKay: "All the soldiers I saw go into action in Normandy were well trained and itching for a fight—I noticed no green troops among them."

Stoker Tune of Toronto who served on an L.C.I. on the Normandy beaches said: "Canadian soldiers are the best I have ever seen—they can take it and give it back."

Others interviewed stressed the intensive training and preparation which they received in various parts of the British Isles before they moved into France. Surely their words are of as great value as Maj. Smythe whose battle experience was much more limited.

I cite all these statements only to confirm what you and I already know and are deeply convinced of, that is, that our Canadian army leaders and officers are men of the highest skill and integrity, the equal of any in the world.

It is against those men that Maj. Smythe's charges really strike. His statement was aimed against the war government, against the political war leaders of Canada. The campaign around his charges was intended to discredit the government. But, to me, that reveals the hollowness and dishonesty of the whole affair. You know and we all know perfectly well that if "green," "inexperienced" and "untrained" troops were thrown into battle and suffered high casualties due to their lack of training, that is the responsibility of the high command of the Canadian army. If such a thing happened it would be the duty of the government to remove Gen. Stuart, chief of staff of the Canadian Army and also Gen. Crerar, the direct commander of the army in the field of action.

The government does not command the army or decide what troops go into action. The government could only be held responsible for having entrusted the army to the command of incompetent men; and be called upon to remove them.

Maj. Smythe's charges, therefore, raise only one issue, namely, should Gens. Stuart and Crerar be removed? Are they guilty of the crime of throwing unprepared troops into action? Are they incompetent commanders? Is the Canadian public to believe that our army is led by irresponsible and utterly untrustworthy men? That is the question and there is no getting away from it. It is either Gen. Stuart and Gen. Crerar and the other responsible general officers of the Canadian army or Maj. Smythe.

Has Confidence in Crerar

As a test of confidence, Maj. Smythe's charges are not an issue of politics. It is not a case of Maj. Smythe versus the government. The government comes into the matter only indirectly, to remove the commanders if Maj. Smythe's charges are true. The test of confidence is between Maj. Smythe and Gen. Crerar, who commands the Canadian army and who decides what, when and where our troops go into action. I have no hesitation as to where I stand in this test. My confidence is with the commander of the Canadian army who has the confidence of Gen. Eisenhower and whose brilliant record and outstanding military skill is recognized to Canada's renown throughout the world.

"I refuse to believe such questionable charges that would cause me to lose faith in the integrity and trustworthiness of our Canadian army command. I reject utterly any evil design to cast suspicion and doubt

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upon Canada's military general staff. I regard as contemptible and despicable the spreading of terrible charges against the men leading our army in battle by one who does not give a single fact to support such charges; and I regard it as still more contemptible that such charges should find support in the press and should be used to promote a political game which makes the life-and-death of our soldiers into a political football. We have seen many serious matters made into just that same thing, but when it comes to making a political football out of the casualties of our loved ones in the war, I say the time has come to cry stop.

Now the question arises in my mind whether every officer is permitted to come home and make statements which hold the command of the Canadian army up as being incompetent. Are army officers politicians engaged in spreading political propaganda against the army commanders or are they military men bound by military discipline?

What would happen if a junior army officer expressed in a public statement every hostile impression, momentary and personal, which he might hold on one phase or another of army life? He would be made to face a court martial, would he not? The citizens of Canada would expect it. No political party making use of such charges against the army command for its partisan warfare against the government should be able to override military discipline. If political protection can make it possible to attack the army command with impunity, then military discipline will cease to exist in the Canadian army. I think this can be the only result of the partisan campaign around Major Smythe's charges.

It is a therat to the unity and cohesion of our military force, engaged in battle wit hthe enemy. As the widow of a Canadian officer, who, in loyalty to his country and in strictest obedience to military discipline, gave his life in France, I raise my voice in protest.

That is my opinion of Maj. Smythe's charges. They caused me anxiety and alarm only until I started to think through them clearly and honestly. Now I am quite clear as to their meaning. My confidence in our Canadian army command is not only unshaken, it is stronger and firmer than before. My confidence in the complete victory of our cause in the war is now stronger than ever. I know more surely than before that every Canadian soldier who has given his life in this war has done so as a well-trained and highly skilled soldier under competent and most trustworthy command and that his sacrifice has weighed heavily in the glorious victory over the enemy which now is certain.

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PRESS CLIPPINGS 272840 Office of The Prime Minister

Name of Publication London Free Press

Date Nov 1/44

Subject

Bracken Denies Split; Asks Policy on Zo[illegible]

MONTREAL, Oct. 31 — (CP) — [illegible]

[illegible]

The Liberal Party divided at [illegible]

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PRESS CLIPPINGS 272840 Office of The Prime Minister

Name of Publication London Free Press

Date Nov 1, 44

Subject

Bracken Denies Split; Asks Policy on Zombies, Reds

MONTREAL, Oct. 31 — (CP) — Progressive Conservative Leader John Bracken tonight issued a statement denying disunity existed in the Progressive Conservative Party and said the main point "all fair-minded people are anxious about right now is where does the Liberal Party stand on their home conscript army and Communist co-operation?"

He issued a 250-word statement arising from a dispatch to a Toronto newspaper from its Ottawa correspondent, H. R. Armstrong.

Mr. Bracken's statement follows:

My attention has just been called to an article by a Liberal Party propagandist named H. R. Armstrong, datelined Ottawa, Oct. 30, and with the headline: Bracken-Drew Split Widens.

This is just another spurt in the stream of venomous and contemplated propaganda which has been emanating from this section of the press.

Certainly I am not in accord with any hate campaign against the Province of Quebec. I have made that clear on more than one occasion. Contrary to the misrepresentations carried on by the Liberal section of the press, I have seen no evidence of Premier Drew indulging in any hate Quebec campaign. Such a construction is a figment of a warped imagination and a jaundiced eye. No one has been more eloquent in his praise of the French-Canadian battalions overseas. In common with George Drew, I have been outspoken in my criticism of Quebec's Liberal leaders.

The Liberal Party divided at this very moment in its innermost councils on the really urgent question of providing reinforcements for our boys overseas and still playing politics with it, is sadly in need of other issues — and also some able apologists. Its policy of co-operation with the Communists needs considerable explaining as well.

Mr. Armstrong's effort this time has overstepped the mark in clumsiness and drawing red herrings. The game is as clear as it is clumsy.

There is no lack of unity in the Progressive Conservative Party and everyone knows that. What all fair-minded people are anxious about right now is where does the Liberal Party stand on their home conscript army and Communist co-operation.

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
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CANADA

POOR PRINT
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PRESS CLIPPINGS C 272841

Office of
The Prime Minister

Name of Publication

Date NOV 3 1944

Subject

Should Give Truth About Reinforcements

John Bracken, National Progressive Conservative leader, said last night in a statement that there was a "clear obligation" on Hon. J. L. Ralston or Prime Minister King to "tell the Canadian people the truth about the reinforcement situation".

Commenting on Col. Ralston's resignation as defence minister, Mr. Bracken said:—

"Following the trip (overseas) which Mr. Ralston took for the purpose of getting all the facts, there is a clear obligation on one or other of these men to tell the Canadian people the truth about the reinforcement situation.

"The urgency for giving the information has only been emphasized by Mr. Ralston's resignation. . . .

"The people of Canada are deeply concerned and desire to be told the truth—be it good or bad—in the frankest possible terms by one or other or both of these men."

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PRESS CLIPPINGS 272842

Office of
The Prime Minister

Name of Publication .....

Date NOV 6th

Subject .....

Delay in Clarifying Statement Is Inexcusable, Says Bracken

Ottawa, Nov. 6 (CP). — John Bracken, National Progressive Conservative Leader, in a statement tonight called again for a statement from the Government on the reinforcements situation and the reason for the resignation of Defense Minister Ralston.

Mr. Bracken's statement follows:

"The Canadian people are becoming restive at the Government-'s inexcusable delay in giving a statement on the vital question of reinforcements for our fighting men. The delay is causing mounting concern on all sides. Since Government Ministers now are making public references to Government policy the least the Prime Minister can do is give the Canadian people the simple truth devoid of all propaganda chaff.

"The issue is justice to our men overseas. The Cabinet shuffle has not added one man to their reinforcements. The people in ever-increasing numbers are coming to feel that the vital question is to remain a matter of political expedience.

"I repeat what I said four days ago. Mr. King or Col. Ralston or both of them owe the Canadian people a frank and complete statement on the conditions of affairs that prompted the resignation of the senior Minister of National Defense.

"In a matter in which the flower of our manhood is at stake, the Government should delay no longer in letting the people know the substance of Col. Ralston's report."

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
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Name of Publication .....

King Betrayed His Trust Says Bracken

'Has Deceived Army Overseas and People at Home'

John Bracken, Progressive Conservative leader, said in a statement last night that Prime Minister King "has betrayed his trust and deceived both the army overseas and the people at home".

In his statement following the address in which the Prime Minister on Wednesday night supported voluntary overseas service, Mr. Bracken said it was "more than evident now" that Mr. King never did intend to implement his undertakings given to Parliament.

The overseas army was in dire need of trained reinforcements and of rest and help. Men must be sent overseas to the entire extent available in Canada, Mr. Bracken said.

"This is an immediate national duty."

Since he assumed leadership of the Progressive Conservative party, "we have repeatedly urged that these men be sent overseas to fill the gap which now is so tragically revealed. The past is past. The situation now far transcends any partisan politics. It is of the deepest concern to every Canadian man and woman regardless of political creed."

In the gravest hour of the nation's history the people awaited the release of information given to Mr. King by Defence Minister Ralston, who resigned last week after recommending conscription for overseas.

"Mr. King has refused to release the information that Col. Ralston must have anticipated he would", said Mr. Bracken.

Instead of taking the advice of Col. Ralston the Prime Minister had preferred the advice of "one who but a few days ago admitted that he knew nothing about the situation".

(Mr. King said last night that he had sought the advice of Gen. McNaughton, who succeeded Col. Ralston as Defence Minister, when the latter's recommendation for conscription for overseas was made.)

Text of Mr. Bracken's statement follows:

Since the resignation of Col. Ralston and the appointment of Gen. McNaughton as Minister of National Defence, I have on two occasions demanded that the Prime Minister frankly and fully disclose to the Canadian people the facts and reasons behind the move.

After many days of waiting, this has not yet been done. The Prime Minister's radio speech took care to make no disclosure of Col. Ralston's report of conditions overseas and reasons for his resignation at this supremely critical time.

All the pleasant words the Prime Minister could proffer to his former colleague mean nothing at all in the light of the big truth that he rejected Col. Ralston's recommendation to send trained draftees overseas. He rejected the advice of the man who had lived intimately with the situation for almost five years and who had just returned from the scene of the struggle and contact with our fighting men.

He preferred to take the advice of one who but a few days ago admitted that he knew nothing about the situation. Even Mr. King now, at last, admits the imminent need of reinforcements but is going to rely on the methods that his late minister says, and that the country knows, are inadequate and exhausted.

He is going to see now, in the sixth year of war, that the men in the draftee army are told that they are needed. He indulged in the revolting sophistry that volunteers would not welcome draftees, although he knew thoroughly well that in what is called the First Canadian Army there are draftees comprising British, American, Czech, Polish, Belgian, and Netherland forces, fighting along with our men and making up by far the largest portion of the numerical strength of what the Canadian field commander, Lt. Gen. Crerar, has today referred to as "an international force".

His speech will certainly provide cold comfort to the men in the lines and their parents and relatives in Canada. What can be thought of it by the tremendous majority who voted "yes" in the 1942 plebiscite?

What is needed, and needed now, is not rhetoric but trained reinforcements. The business of "remustering" has been overdone. Are we to be told at this hour that the new Minister of National Defence must take another trip overseas to find out what everybody knows and then have the Cabinet give further "anxious consideration" to the problem for "many days"? The attitude of the Government is now disclosed as wholly cynical and unrealistic.

It is crystal clear that Mr. King has betrayed his trust and deceived both the army overseas and the people at home. It is more than evident now that he never did intend to implement his undertaking given to Parliament. The whole question is reduceable to one simple proposition: Our army overseas is in dire need of trained reinforcements, in dire need of rest and help, and men must be sent to the entire extent available in Canada. This is an immediate national duty.

Having recognized the amenities of the situation, Col. Ralston gave the Prime Minister the first opportunity to inform the Canadian people. Mr. King has refused to release the information that Col. Ralston must have anticipated he would. In this, the gravest hour of the nation's history, the people will be eagerly awaiting Col. Ralston's statement.

I need not restate the strong stand that the Progressive Conservative party has taken in regard to overseas reinforcements. Since I assumed leadership, we have repeatedly urged that these men be sent overseas to fill the gap which now is so tragically revealed. The past is past. The situation now far transcends any partisan politics. It is of deepest concern to every Canadian man and woman regardless of political creed.

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MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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SECTION 3

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PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

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Name of Publication .....

Date OCT 27 1944

Subject .....

Keeping 'Zombies' In Canada Held Too High 'Price'

VERDUN, Que., Oct. 27 — If keeping the home defence troops in Canada is the price of unity in the Dominion, then "the price of unity is too high," Alex Walker, president of the Canadian Legion, said tonight.

In an address prepared for delivery at the 25th anniversary dinner of the Verdun branch of the Legion, Mr. Walker said: "We are told that, although there is no possible danger of attack, it is in the interests of unity in Canada that this drafted army is kept at home.

"I want to tell you that this is not so. There is more disunity in Canada today over theis question than we have seen in many a year."

Mr. Walker said he anxiously awaited the statement Defence Minister Ralston, who recently returned from a tour of the battlefronts, is expected to make on the reinforcements situation overseas.

"Only One Place"

"Whether Col. Ralston reports that reinforcements are adequate or otherwise, we of the Legion maintain that there is only one place for fully trained soldiers, and that is in the firing line, fighting the enemy," Mr. Walker said.

"If it should be that Col. Ralston reports that reinforcements are not needed to replace our killed and wounded, then at least these Zombies can be used to replace some of our boys who have been away from Canada for five years so that they may come back home and enjoy some leave with their loved ones.

"We were told in the early days of the war that a home defence army was needed in Canada because of the fear of attack. We believed then, and we still believe, that at that time there was need of such an army. But now that time has passed."

Keeping the home defence troops in Canada was not merely a political question.

"It is a moral question that stirs a deep feeling of injustice and resentment in the hearts of our men on the battlefields; their wives and mothers left at home; their fathers who fought so gloriously in the last war; and the millions of Canadians who, in the plebiscite of 1941, voted to free the government from any pledge that would keep the zombies at home," said Mr. Walker.

"At this very moment youngsters of 18, 19 and 20 are dying on the battefields of Europe, while a fully trained army remains at home.

"I tell you that if this is the price of unity, then the price is too high."

Col. Ralston had intimated to the troops overseas that the home defence tropps might be demobilized before the active service men returned to the Dominion.

"We of the Legion see in this proposal a trend of though that we must and will most vigorously oppose," said Mr. Walker.

"The ho medefence army has done nothing to warrant priority of discharge and the opportunity to grab off 70,000 civilian jobs—jobs that should rightly go to those men who are doing ths fighting for them and all of us today."

Outstanding Year

The present year, Mr. Walker continued, had been one of the most outstanding in the Legion's history. The establishment of the Department of Veterans' Affairs, a proposal made by the Legion in the first instance, had been more than gratifying. The raising of the clothing allowance and the passing of the War Service Grants Act were other legislative accomplishments of which the Legion was proud.

However, he continued, the part of the new act that appeared to give men of the R.C.A.F. and the Navy operating out of east coast ports, service in Canada only was not satisfactory. The Legion, he promised, would press for revision.

The Legion would also do everything in its power to see that members of the merchant navy, the auxiliary services and the overseas firefighters were made eligible for the gratuity and other benefits of the act.

"It is inconceivable that the services of these men, who have endured the same dangers and hardships as members of the armed forces, should go unrewarded," he said.

"But with these exceptions, the War Service Grants Act is one of the most encouraging pieces of legislation ever passed by the Canadian Parliament. No other nation is doing better than this for its fighting men by way of monetary reward."

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MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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Canadian Legion

PRESS CLIPPINGS

Office of The Prime Minister

C 272845

Name of Publication Ottawa E Citizen

Date Nov 9/44

Subject

Text of Canadian Legion Memorandum On Conscription to Prime Minister

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
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Text of Canadian Legion Memorandum On Conscription to Prime Minister

Following is the text of the memorandum presented this afternoon by the Canadian Legion, Dominion Command, to Prime Minister King on the question of immediate conscription:

"It has long been the considered conviction of the Canadian Legion that this war demands the total mobilization of our nation's resources and that any thought that it could be fought on a purely voluntary basis is pure romanticism. All recognize the inadequacy of attempting to finance the war by volunteer subscription and it would be so obviously unjust that it could not even be considered feasible. The volunteer method of using our manpower is no less inadequate and even more unjust. Four years ago the government recognized the necessity of compulsory military service but refused to apply that principle to service overseas because of previous election commitments. Two years ago the Legion cooperated with the government in a plebiscite designed to release the government from that pledge. Two-thirds of the people who voted across Canada voted yes, and in eight out of nine provinces the percentage was overwhelmingly higher. At the time the responsible government heads, including the Prime Minister, gave us assurance that if the situation demanded it conscription for overseas service would be imposed. We come now asking that that promise be implemented because all information available to us indicates that it has become necessary.

Casualties Are Growing.

"The battle casualties, exclusive of normal wastage, are according to the latest figures about twice the rate of recruitments. Artillery, R.C.A.F., and other specialized branches of the service are being stripped to provide reinforcements for the infantry, and only a few days ago one of the responsible overseas officers in charge of reinforcements announced that we were scraping the bottom of the manpower barrel.

"There are also reports coming back from the front that troops with inadequate infantry training are being sent to the front and that troops in the front line have abnormally long periods of service without corresponding days of rest, and that the dangers of battle fatigue are mounting.

Emergency Has Arisen

"All this is taking place despite the fact that we have some 70,000 fully trained and equipped soldiers in Canada who are performing no useful service. What were these men called up for, and why were they trained if it were not to meet an emergency such as has now arisen?

"The fact that Col. Ralston after a personal survey of conditions at the front and with a full knowledge of all the facts regarding recruiting and casualties has felt it necessary to resign rather than longer consent to this tragic and unjust situation is an eloquent commentary on the need, and in itself justifies us in asking that now is the time for the government to implement its pledges given at the time of the plebiscite.

Bitterness in Canada

"There is bitterness in Canada today. Bitterness because of avoidable inequalities of burdens and of sacrifice—bitterness because of a tragic waste of manpower when the issues of civilization are at stake—bitterness because the courage and sacrifice of our men overseas are not being matched with corresponding sacrifice, courage and self-forgetfulness at home. This bitterness is not confined to the people in Canada, but is also found among fighting men of all services overseas. We would lose all claim to represent the veterans and fighting men of Canada if under these circumstances we did not use all the power and influence at our disposal to see that the courage and devotion of our armies were matched by the full-souled support of the government and people of Canada.

"And so, in the light of these circumstances, we would urge that the government of Canada now act on the mandate of the plebiscite and invoke the provisions of the N.R.M.A., and send all fully trained personnel called up under that act overseas immediately as essential reinforcements."

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MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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PRESS CLIPPINGS C272846

Office of
The Prime Minister

Name of Publication Toronto Globe and Mail

Date November 17, 1944

Subject

To Arouse Public Opinion

Ottawa, Nov. 16 (CP). — Alex Walker, president of the Canadian Legion, has asked all Provincial commands of the Legion to arouse "public opinion . . . to demand full implementation of a total war policy" and to see that members of Parliament were approached before the House of Commons meets next Wednesday, it was announced today.

Mr. Walker said calling of the Commons to discuss the reinforcement situation presented "a challenge to the Legion to again arouse public opinion as in 1942 to demand full implementation of a total war policy."

"What is needed now is the strongest possible public backing of a demand for the replacement of voluntary enlistments by conscription by immediate use of draftees *for* overseas reinforcements."

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PRESS CLIPPINGS C 272847 Office of The Prime Minister

Name of Publication Ottawa M Citizen

Date Nov 13/44

Subject

May Beat Hun In 6 Months Says Churchill

PARIS, Nov. 12.—(AP)—Britain wants a powerful and well-equipped French army as soon as possible to aid in re-establishing the stability of Europe and hopes that the French will maintain internal solidarity and stability under Gen. de Gaulle's government, Prime Minister Churchill told a cheering assemblage in the Hotel de Ville today.

Speaks in French.

Speaking in French at a reception in his honor by the Paris and Seine departmental liberation committees, Mr. Churchill said the German enemy, disheartened and under relentless Allied pounding, might be beaten within the next six months.

"We don't want to prolong the war merely to give your army the opportunities it desires, but we hope as much of the French army as possible will be able to engage in the final battles," he said.

"Unity! Unity!" was Mr. Churchill's parting advice in commenting that France could not afford anything which would upset her national life at the moment when all the nation's force must be thrown into the post-war reconstruction period.

"Fortunately you have at this moment at your head an incontestably able chief," Mr. Churchill said, adding with a grin that he had had "some slight differences" with him from time to time.

"But rally to him so that France remains united, indivisible."

This advice was given, he said, so that France might not only help defeat Germany but help "protect us from a repetition of German aggression."

Concerning the eventual victory, "it is possible that six months hence the enemy will have been beaten."

He obviously was referring to Germany.

"This is the moment for France to take her place among the other great powers," he told the assemblage of notables, and as he again emphasized the necessity of unity he looked squarely at the leader of the National Resistance Council.

Recalling tragic events in France in 1940 he declared "I always had the certitude that France would retake her place among the nations of the world and exert her influence on its economic, social and political developments."

Fresh from morning-long conferences with Gen. de Gaulle and other French leaders at the Quai d'Orsay, Mr. Churchill said he never had lost faith in the French army, which had had to fight on unequal terms in 1940.

The entire membership of the Committee of Liberation, in their best uniforms or wearing blue and red sashes—colors of the city of Paris—awaited the Prime Minister and his party in the resplendent reception room, while thousands outside strained at police lines.

Freedom of City.

Mr. Churchill was presented with the freedom of the city, after which Andre Tollet, chairman of the Paris Liberation Committee, presented the Prime Minister with a German Swastika flag captured by the F.F.I. from police headquarters during the insurrection last August.

Prior to the reception, Mr. Churchill had been the guest of honor at a luncheon at the Quai d'Orsai and following the ceremonies at the Hotel de Ville the Prime Minister, Foreign Secretary Eden and the rest of their party were guests at a dinner at the British embassy given by the ambassador to France, Alfred Duff Cooper.

Mr. Eden, French Foreign Minister Georges Bidault and their staffs had a long conversation during the morning.

Before lunch Mr. Churchill and his party visited the Allied Servicemen's Club at the Grand Hotel where the Prime Minister shook hands with several soldiers of various nationalities.

The entire party seemed in high spirits when they arrived at the city hall lending basis to reports in French parliamentary circles that the Franco-British talks were proceeding well.

From Mr. Churchill's remarks it was evident that Gen. de Gaulle succeeded in one of his main points—the urgency of sending equipment for a larger French army.

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REPEAT
REPETER

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MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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CANADA

POOR PRINT
Epreuve illisible

Name of Publication Toronto Globe and Mail

Date November 13, 1944

Subject

Strong French Army Essential—Churchill

By HAROLD CALLENDER

New York Times Special to The Globe and Mail. Copyright

PARIS, Nov. 12.—After four hours of diplomatic discussion with Gen. Charles de Gaulle and his Foreign Affairs advisers, Prime Minister Churchill in a speech today said the British Government felt that the "establishment of a strong French army as soon as possible is absolutely necessary to balance and sanity in Europe." The Prime Minister also said France "must resume her place with the other great nations," and he urged the French to "rally round" Gen. de Gaulle who, he said, was the "undisputed chief" in a time when all the forces of the nation should be directed to the support of stability and authority."

Mr. Churchill said he understood the French desire to play the greatest possible part in the war with as much help as possible from the Allies. But, he added, "of course we cannot prolong the war just for this, as Germany may be beaten in six months; but we shall do all we can to enable France to make the greatest possible effort in the war."

Speaking of Gen. de Gaulle, the Prime Minister said: "We have had differences in the recent troubled years, but I am sure you should all rally round him."

Praise for Parisians

Mr. Churchill spoke in French at a reception at the Hotel de Ville given by the temporary Government of Paris, the Parisian Committee of Liberation. The Prime Minister paid tribute to the Paris revolt which aided the city's liberation.

It is known that armament of additional French troops has been one of the main topics of discussion in the talks here yesterday and today, and that Allied military authorities have hesitated to make extensive promises in view of the needs of the existing Allied forces and the lack of traininf or the French Forces of the Interior whom Gen. de Gaulle wants to arm.

The French have spoken of five to eight divisions which they desire to create, and one of Gen. de Gaulle's advisers said the general would like an army of at least 30 divisions by the time the war ends, as a sign of France's role as a great power.

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CANADA

POOR PRINT
Epreuve illisible

PRESS CLIPPINGS C272849 Office of The Prime Minister

Name of Publication Montreal Star

Date Nov 2/44

Coldwell Says Troops Must Be Reinforced

C.C.F. Leader Favors All-Out Conscription

"Whatever is necessary to keep the boys reinforced overseas, that thing we have got to do. Whatever that involves we have got to accept the responsibility for it," was the answer that M. J. Coldwell, national leader of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation, gave last night at the Montreal High School to a questioner who asked "Should we not send reinforcements overseas even if it means conscription?"

Mr. Coldwell added: "As to whether reinforcements are adequate or not, I do not propose to enter into a political controversy. All I can do is to report what I had been told overseas and what I have been told was, at that time, the reinforcements that have been received were satisfactory. Since then, of course, there have been very heavy casualties. They are very heavy and whatever is necessary to reinforce the men overseas will have to be done."

Mr. Coldwell said that the C.C.F. had always said: "If we are going to have conscription then let us have all-out conscription, conscription not only of our sons' lives and bodies but conscription of every last bit of industry and wealth in this country. If the time comes when it is necessary to consider whether we shall conscript for overseas service and send overseas conscripted men, we shall continue to make that simple demand of the Government—but at the same time you may be assured of this: We shall see to it that the men overseas in any event are given the reinforcements that they need."

Favors Jobs for Wounded

Mr. Coldwell was asked whether private industry should be compelled to employ returned wounded men when a Government-controlled concern refused to employ them as medically unfit. He replied that there should be statutory power to compel both private and Government industries to accept a certain proportion of disabled men.

Questioned as to whether there was a possibility of a united front with the Labor-Progressives, Mr. Coldwell said there was no such possibility — no more possibility than there was of a coalition with the Liberal or Progressive Conservative parties. "The C.C.F. is a democratic socialist movement. It believes neither in the capitalistic society supported by Liberals and Conservatives, nor the totalitarian single party state which is the ideal of the Labor Progressive or Communist party," he said.

Answering another question regarding public health and salaried doctors, Mr. Coldwell admitted that some doctors would require persuasion and they might have to compromise with them "at least at the outset," but he believed there were enough public spirited doctors and particularly young doctors who were ready to co-operate in a properly organized public health scheme. "There is no reason why the State itself, if any group will not co-operate with it, cannot, in the long run produce its own doctors at its own expense in its own state-aided schools, and remember, many of our schools are state-aided and state-equipped institutions," he said, adding, "I don't mean that to be a threat. I don't think it necessary. I believe there are enough young doctors to meet requirements."

State Monopoly No Danger

Mr. Coldwell insisted that there would be no danger in a Government monopoly in industry, as the Government was in the hands of the people. If there was to be a monopoly he would prefer a publicly owned monopoly to one owned by some profit-making business men.

He advocated that subversive Japanese should be held in concentration camps and sent back to Japan after the war, but "young Canadians of Japanese origin and Japanese color should be treated as Canadians."

In his general address Mr. Coldwell dealt with his visit to England, France and Belgium, and declared that from what he had seen the people in the British Isles during this war had suffered privation even greater than had been suffered by some of the people who had been in occupied countries. He declared that the robot bombing had done even greater damage to London and the southern counties than was done by the great air raids of three years ago. The people of England had endured it because they believed the war was in very truth a people's struggle for democratic freedom and a better world. "The temper of the common man is that he who dares to betray them in this postwar period will be dealt with in the harshest possible manner," he said.

Mr. Coldwell urged his hearers to deprive themselves of something to invest in Victory Bonds, so as to send a message to the men who were fighting their battles that they were prepared to back them up to the limit, and also urged every person able to donate blood, the value of which he had seen on the battlefields.

Wants Planning For Peace

Outlining his general policy, Mr. Coldwell insisted that all-out production for war must give place to all-out production for peace. Rehabilitation plans had a false bottom so long as men were deprived of a chance to do productive work. Unemployment insurance, which had its place in any scheme of things, was no substitute for employment. Plans must be made now for all-out peacetime production, and if temporary unemployment was unavoidable during the switch-over, war workers should be given layoff pay, as unemployment insurance benefit was inadequate to tide workers over the transition period. He said the C.C.F. took the stand that service personnel should be continued on full pay and allowance until they were able to secure steady remunerative employment. Gratuities, good in themselves, were not enough. Decent jobs must be the goal.

He demanded a nation-wide survey of industry to be undertaken at once because only through over-all planning could jobs for all become a reality after the war. "The war plants into which the Canadian people have put $900,000,000 should be converted to peacetime production wherever possible and must be operated under social ownership or control," said Mr. Coldwell. "Turn them over to monopolistic interests and some of those industries will be shut down while others will be operated on part time. Remember, monopoly thrives on low output and high prices, and where is there a country more monopoly-ridden than Canada? If we turn our war plants over to private interests as the present Liberal Government suggests, we are back at 1939. Even the Conservative-dominated British Government balks at that. Over there the government plans to lease, not sell, its war plants, on the condition that they are used for peacetime production."

Frank Scott, chairman of the National C.C.F. Council, presided, with R. J. Lamoureux, provincial president for Quebec. Dr. Stanley Allen made an appeal for funds and $213.52 was collected. Harry Wilks, C.C.F. candidate in St. Lawrence-St. George, and Guy Merrill Desaulniers also spoke.

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MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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CANADA

POOR PRINT
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PRESS CLIPPINGS C272849 Office of The Prime Minister

Name of Publication Montreal Star

Date Nov 2/44

Coldwell Says Troops Must Be Reinforced

C.C.F. Leader Favors All-Out Conscription

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Frank Scott, chairman of the Montreal C.C.F. Council, presided, while J. Lamoureux, provincial president for Quebec, Dr. Stanley Allen made an appeal for funds and $313.52 was collected. Harry Wilks, C.C.F. candidate in St. Lawrence-St. George, and Gus Merrill Desaulniers also spoke.

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MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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PRESS CLIPPINGS C 272850 Office of The Prime Minister

Name of Publication Ottawa E Citizen

Date Nov 2/44

Subject

Coldwell, Bracken Both in Ottawa

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John Bracken, National Progressive Conservative leader, also is in the Capital.

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PRESS CLIPPINGS C 272851

Office of
The Prime Minister

Name of Publication Ottawa Journal

Date Nov 2/44

Subject

Means Election Declares Coldwell

MONTREAL, Nov. 2.—(BUP)—National C.C.F. Leader M. J. Coldwell told the British United Press here that he preferred not to make any official statement on the reported resignation of Senior Defence Minister Ralston and the report that Gen. McNaughton would succeed him in the post.

He intimated that he would do so, however, when "the new policy of the Government is stated".

Coldwell also said that "this is big news and likely means an election".

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PRESS CLIPPINGS C 272852

Office of The Prime Minister

Name of Publication

Date

Subject

Subject

Coldwell Calls For Full Statement On Ralston Case

C.C.F. Leader Coldwell said last night in a statement the appointment of Gen. McNaughton as Defence Minister "seems to be a good choice", and added that his party would support "every measure shown to be necessary to assist and reinforce our armies in the field".

"The general's intimate knowledge of military affairs and of the needs of the army will enable him to do a worthy job in his new post", Mr. Coldwell added.

Expressing belief there had been "far too much rumor and loose talk based on inadequate information", Mr. Coldwell said:

"The Government should end the uneasiness and rumors in the country by placing the precise situation frankly before Parliament or by making a complete statement to the Canadian people immediately."

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PRESS CLIPPINGS C272853

Office of
The Prime Minister

Name of Publication MONTREAL GAZETTE

Date NOV 6 1944

Subject

Coldwell Wants Statement

Toronto, November 5.—(C)—M. J. Coldwell, National leader of the C.C.F., said in an interview Saturday that "to quell rumors" regarding Canadian Army overseas reinforcements Prime Minister Mackenzie King should make a statement to Parliament and "he shouldn't wait until January to do it."

(The next session of Parliament is scheduled to open January 31.)

Mr. Coldwell declined further comment on the reinforcements situation pending a statement either by the Prime Minister or Col. J. L. Ralston, who resigned this week as Defence Minister and was succeeded by Gen. McNaughton.

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PRESS CLIPPINGS C272854 Office of The Prime Minister

Name of Publication .....

Date NOV 7 1944

Subject .....

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Mr. Coldwell said also that Col. Ralston should be allowed to make a statement.

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C 272855

The Ottawa Morning Citizen

October 25, 1944

[redacted]

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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C 272855

The Ottawa Morning Citizen

October 25, 1944

Douglas Warns On Conscription

REGINA, Oct. 24.—(CP)—In a statement of policy before adoption of the throne speech last night, Premier Douglas told the Saskatchewan legislature that winning of the war was the first concern of the C.C.F. but, he warned the party would oppose any federal move to conscript men for service if Ottawa failed to conscript at the same time the resources of corporations and big interests.

During a lively debate in which he took issue with W. J. Patterson, Liberal leader of the opposition, Mr. Douglas said the C.C.F. government wanted legislation to prevent the exploitation of workers and was "not prepared to wait for Ottawa to give it." He said also the provincial government intended to devote its efforts to assist in the development and expansion of the co-operative movement.

Mr. Patterson had claimed the proposed provincial labor laws were not needed because of labor problems in Saskatchewan but rather to give the C.C.F. a "talking point" in other provinces and to satisfy the C.I.O. "Hence," he said, "we have a bill prepared in Toronto and fussed up a bit in Regina."

The premier replied that the speech mentioned farm security, crop failure legislation, seed grain, health, social welfare and the department of co-operatives, "all vital to farmers."

The speech was adopted by a vote of 41 to five.

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PRESS CLIPPINGS

Office of The Prime Minister

C 272856

Name of Publication Toronto Telegram

Date Oct. 6/44

Subject

Heaviest Load Of Guilt For Untrained In Battle On Ralston, Drew Says

Men Chopping Trees Sent in as Infantry, Premier Asserts, Backing Smythe Charges

Supporting charges made recently by Major Connie Smythe that untrained reinforcements were being sent into battle, Premier George Drew, speaking before the United Services Branch of the Canadian Corps Association at the Canadian Military Institute last night, emphatically stated that the man who bears the heaviest load of guilt for this shameful situation is James Layton Ralston.

Premier Drew described recent statements made by the Department of National Defense as "the most contemptible excuses invented by guilty men to hide their guilt."

"The Canadian Divisions which went to France on D-Day were magnificently trained and fully equipped," he said. "No finer men have ever gone into battle. I notice that some attempt has been made to create the impression that Major Smythe was referring to those original units which landed in France in June. His statement was open to no such interpretation.

"The reinforcements came in the heavy fighting inland, particularly around Caen, along the Falaise road, near the Seine and in the attacks on the Channel ports. A desperate effort was made to supply reinforcements for the infantry. Men who had been chopping trees with the Forestry Corps in Scotland, gunners from the artillery training centres, men from armored units, and so on, were asked to volunteer to fight as infantry and naturally, they did so in large numbers.

RUSHED FROM CANADA

"Reinforcements were also rushed from Canada without the required battle training in Britain before they reached the front. . . . To-day the rifle is the least important weapon of the infantry. Every infantryman is supposed to be well trained in the use of the grenade, the mortar, PIAT anti-tank gun, and the Bren gun. Many men have gone into action during the last two months against a desperate, highly-trained enemy never having thrown a live grenade, or fired a PIAT gun, a Bren gun or a mortar.

"Nor was it the infantry alone who were receiving untrained men. Tank units received tank gunners who had only been trained with 6-pounders, and these men went into action on 75-mm. guns although they had never operated a 75-mm. gun before. To realize how serious this is, it is only necessary to remind you that the 6-pounder is aimed with a direct telescope while the 75-mm. is aimed with a periscope. The breech-blocks on the two weapons are also different. Tank units received tank drivers at the front who had been trained on Ram tanks and had never been in a Sherman tank until they went into action."

Premier Drew also drew attention to the fact that men had gone into action with no training in field craft, which is of vital importance in the infantry.

LACKED REINFORCEMENTS

"Not only is it a question of adequacy of training," he said. "There is a serious shortage of reinforcements, and during the past two months many units have come into action time and again far below their strength because reinforcements could not be supplied."

In this respect the Premier quoted two letters from overseas soldiers, who had subsequently died, in which they mentioned the lack of reinforcements.

"I have heard the same story from the mouths of scores of officers in England and France—men who had been in battle and knew what they were talking about."

Col. Drew retold an old story of a happening in the last war, when General Carey was ordered to get up every man he could find to help the jap at any cost. He called upon engineers, scouts, chauffeurs, road workmen, anybody he could find, rushed them up to the job and held it.

"Some of these men are living in Toronto to-day," he said. "These untrained men saved the day. Under such circumstances the use of untrained men is justified. But that is not the situation we face.

"Canada has 50,000 reinforcements available in the home army, many of whom have been in training for four years. Most of these men, whom Colonel Ralston described a few days ago as 'Zombies', have been trained as infantry. Infantry reinforcements are so desperately needed that highly trained gunners, engineers, armored car drivers, and members of the RCAF are being transferred for that purpose.

DRAFTEES STILL HERE

"And yet we have all these thousands of infantrymen here in Canada, trained for years at a cost to the people of Canada of hundreds of millions of dollars, who are being employed to-day at no useful military task. In the House of Commons on July 10 last, Colonel Ralston gave his undertaking that if draftees were needed overseas as reinforcements, they would be sent [illegible]. That is the clear and unqualified undertaking of the Dominion Government, of the Canadian Government. Is going to live up to its undertaking, or is it not?

"Just think of men being called upon to go back into battle after being wounded two and three times, without opportunity for a full period of convalescence, while [illegible] men wearing the same uniform are kept here in Canada in the sixth year of war, performing no real military duty of any kind.

"The man who bears the heaviest load of guilt for this shameful situation is James Layton Ralston. His word has been accepted because of his record in the last war. He was a very gallant soldier who did not hesitate to expose his body to [illegible] days that men who were not to fight should be compelled to bear arms in battle. Because of his bravery in action, and because of the stand he took at that time, he has been trusted. He has betrayed that trust."

NO MORE EXCUSES

The Premier said: "The undertaking of the Government is clear and unequivocal. We were told, and the men at the front were told, that if

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PRESS CLIPPINGS

C 272856

Office of
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In this respect the Premier quoted two letters from overseas soldiers, who had subsequently died, in which they mentioned the lack of reinforcements.

"I have heard the same story from the mouths of scores of officers in England and France—men who had been in battle and ksew what they were talking about."

Col. Drew retold an old story of a happening in the last war, when General Carey was ordered to gather up every man he could find to hold the gap at any cost. He called upon engineers, cooks, chauffeurs, road workmen, anybody he could find, rushed them up to the gap and held it.

"Some of those men are living in Toronto to-day," he said. "Those untrained men saved the day. Under such circumstances the use of untrained men is justified. But that is not the situation we face.

"Canada has 80,000 reinforcements available in the home army, many of whom have been in training for four years. Most of these men, whom Colonel Ralston described a few days ago as 'Zombies', have been trained as infantry. Infantry reinforcements are so desperately needed that highly trained gunners, engineers, armored car drivers, and members of the RCAF are being transferred for that purpose.

DRAFTEES STILL HERE

"And yet we have all these thousands of infantrymen here in Canada, trained for years at a cost to the people of Canada of hundreds of millions of dollars, who are being employed to-day at no useful military task. In the House of Commons on July 10 last, Colonel Ralston gave his undertaking that if draftees were needed overseas as reinforcements, they would be sent abroad. That is the clear and unqualified undertaking of the Dominion Government. Is the Canadian Government going to live up to its undertaking, or is it not?

"Just think of men being called upon to go back into action after being wounded two and three times, without opportunity for a full period of convalescence, while 80,000 men wearing the same uniform are kept here in Canada in the sixth year of war, performing no real military duty of any kind.

The man who bears the heaviest load of guilt for this shameful situation is James Layton Ralston. His word has been accepted because of his record in the last war. He was a very gallant soldier who did not hesitate to express his belief in those days that men who were fit to fight should be compelled to bear arms in battle. Because of his bravery in action, and because of the stand he took at that time, he has been trusted. He has betrayed that trust."

NO MORE EXCUSES

The Premier said: "The undertaking of the Government is clear and unequivocal. We were told, and the men at the front were told, that if

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Name of Publication .....

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Subject .....

reinforcements were needed those 80,000 men would be made available for overseas service. For our national honor, for the fulfillment of the Government's pledged word, and above all for the sake of those now locked in deadly battle with the German armies, the time has come to accept no more excuses, and to demand in a voice which must be heard that the expressed wish of the vast majority of Canadians be carried out by sending every trained man in uniform to the battle areas immediately.

"For the sake of our future, I urge every one of you to make your voices heard, and no matter what embarrassment it may cause you personally to keep on demanding, until the demand is answered, that as a nation we show we are worthy of those splendid young men and women who in every part of the world are proud to carry on their shoulders the name 'Canada.'"

Captain Howard Julian Sale, an artillery officer who had recently been discharged from the army because of serious head wound received in action, also substantiated Major Smythe's charges.

"I saw a lot of that first hand," he said. "Some time ago when the First Canadian Corps went into action in Italy, talk became prevalent in Britain about what was going to be done with the Second Canadian Corps—what they would do to provide reinforcements. But there were none."

Captain Sale also spoke of the shortage of training officers, and added that there were men here in Canada with much more training than those volunteers, and who could be put into action as trained soldiers. He referred to untrained men as being useless as a team. "Unless a man can pull his full weight it is terrible and ghastly that he must be thrown into battle and risk his own life, and through this, the lives of his comrades," he said.

He concluded that he was glad there were a few men with spunk enough to come out and expose the situation.

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PRESS CLIPPINGS C 272858 Office of The Prime Minister

Name of Publication Hamilton Spectator

Date Oct. 7/44

Subject

CHARGES CANADIAN ARMY REQUIRES REINFORCEMENTS

Premier G. A. Drew Refers to R.H.L.I. Members in Course of Address Here Last Night

Charging that Canadian Army units in France and Italy need trained reinforcements badly "and they need them now," Col. the Hon. George Drew, Premier of Ontario, declared in an address to the West Centre District Progressive Conservative Association here last night that "if Mr. King wants to know where I got my information I can tell him. It was from officers and men of the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry and other units."

Needed at Once

Premier Drew lashed out at the Federal Government in a banquet address in the Royal Connaught Hotel. Hon. Charles P. McTague, national chairman of the Progressive Conservative party, charged the Minister of National Defence was making an effort to "whitewash" charges of the lack of adequate and proper reinforcements.

"I was visited to-day by a number of young officers and men who are determined to tell their own story of the ghastly need of reinforcements," Premier Drew said.

"If Mr. King wants to know where I got my information I can tell him. It was from officers and men of the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry and other units. I can give the names of the units and the places where they were short. But Mr. King knows the terrible need of reinforcements in France and Italy. He has had reports and I know it.

"James Leighton Ralston didn't need to go to Italy to find it out. And the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation didn't need to play its constant game of presenting the Government's side by broadcasting a speech by Ralston from Italy to the whole of Canada, aimed at showing there was no need of reinforcements.

"By all means let there be an investigation, but let there be no delay in sending reinforcements to the front. They need them now and they need them badly, not only as to numbers, but as to trained men. And it doesn't have to wait for Mr. Ralston's return."

Premier Drew said he was prepared to take full responsibility for his statements and that the young men who had come to him during the day would be telling their full stories shortly.

Describes Trip

Early in his address he described his visit to Britain and France and paid tribute to the spirit of the British people. While 1,000,000 homes had been destroyed in London, he said, he had heard less complaint about the housing situation in all the time he was over there than he has heard since his return to Canada.

He described the Ontario Service Club which was opened three weeks ago, and said thousands of Canadians were being served there each week. He told also of the opening of an Ontario office in Paris during his visit to France.

Declaring that Canada had not reached the limit of her growth and urging courage, vision and vigour in the days of opportunity ahead, he compared Ontario to Britain in size, population, arable land acreage. An average of 600 persons a day were making inquiries in Britain about getting out to Canada, he said, and 100,000 could be absorbed a year.

In criticizing a recent address of E. B. Jolliffe, provincial C.C.F. leader, he said: "The Socialists are slipping back in the province and the confidence of the people in Jolliffe is slipping, too." He said there would be no "snap" election in Ontario.

Mr. Jolliffe had charged that he was opposed to family allowances, he said, but this was untrue. The legislation drawn up by the Federal Government would require perhaps $20,000,000 from Ontario, he said, "but until the people of the province of Quebec are prepared to do their share in this war, we are not prepared to spend $20,000,000 on them."

Continuing, he said: "We want to do the full job together. But don't let any one tell me after what I saw overseas that Quebec is doing its full share.

"I want to say this for the Sifton press and some others: Those young French-Canadians overseas, men of the Royal 22nd and the Fusiliers Mount Royal, who fought side by side with our boys and who lie side by side with them in graves along the line of the Canadian advance, are doing a full share. But their sacrifice is no answer to the disproportionate share which Quebec carries of the burden of war.

Must Accept Obligations

"What nonsense it is to talk of national unity when there can be none until equality of security and opportunity go hand in hand with the obligation to preserve the safety of the state."

Returning to the subject of family allowances, he said that the federal law drafted for this purpose was "legislative blackmail" and that by this method all provincial rights could be usurped.

"I am not prepared to look upon the British North America Act as a scrap of paper to be torn up at the whims of Mackenzie King."

Describing the Government's rehabilitation program, he announced the Nipigon forest settlement plan, under which those settling in the community will work a forest lot under the best forestry practice, so that the forest stand will be maintained in perpetuity and a permanent, high standard of livelihood will be supplied for many families. Another purpose, he said, was to prove what could be done in the north to assure prosperous, comfortable settlements which will increase in size and number as tourist traffic resumes on an increased scale.

Mr. McTague charged that Prime Minister King was "nurturing the prejudices of Quebec to get a solid block of votes in that province." He said he was not condemning the people of Quebec, but critizing the Federal Government. "The people of Quebec too, are critical of the Liberal party, which has badly fooled them and us for a long time."

He attacked the campaign to show that the party would in the end be dominated by St. James street in Montreal and Bay street in Toronto. "We are mainly a party of progressive farmers and that's as it should be."

Praises Major Smythe

While admitting he had no first-hand information on the reinforcement situation, he said he did know Major Connie Smythe and that what he said would be prompted by the dictates of his conscience. He said he couldn't accept the

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POOR PRINT
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PRESS CLIPPINGS C 272858 Office of The Prime Minister

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"I was visited to-day by a number of young officers and men who are determined to tell their own story of the ghastly need of reinforcements," Premier Drew said.

"If Mr. King wants to know where I got my information I can tell him. [illegible] officers and men of the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry and other units."

[illegible] Mr. Jolliffe had charged that he was deported to family allowances, he said but this was untrue. The population drawn up by the National Government would require payments [illegible] from Ontario, he said. "But until the people of the province of Quebec are prepared to do their share in this war, we are not prepared to spend $30,000,000 on [illegible]."

Continuing, he said: "We want to [illegible]

[illegible] Mr. King [illegible] paid tribute to the work of the [illegible] in all the time he was away from [illegible] he had heard since his return to Canada.

He described the Ontario Section [illegible] which was opened three years [illegible] and said [illegible] of Canada [illegible] of the province [illegible] in Paris during [illegible]

[illegible] the Premier had not [illegible] the field of his speech and [illegible] to the [illegible] Mr. Jolliffe [illegible] would be no "snap" election in Ontario.

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C 272859

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things said against Major Smythe or the explanation of the Government.

He deplored the pressure which he said was being brought to bear "on the young men of the country and on the Zombies themselves," and criticized the Government for taking all the credit for the production record during war. Most of the credit belonged to industry, labour and the farmer, he said.

He concluded with a review of the campaign of the Canadian Tribune for a coalition against Premier Drew. "It looks as if Mr. Jolliffe and the C.C.F. are not falling for it, but that the Liberals might. We will know more about that on Tuesday. The Liberals of Quebec and Ontario are going to find themselves with strange bedfellows through their policy of political expediency."

A. L. Brooks, K.C., of Welland, past president of the district organization, was chairman. Mrs. J. M. Hughton, of Hamilton, first vice-president of the organization, spoke briefly.

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CANADA

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PRESS CLIPPINGS C272860 Office of the Prime Minister

Name of Publication Montreal Gazette

Date Oct. 31/44

Subject

'I'm Not Antagonistic to Quebec, But Want Equal Sacrifice'—Drew

Col. George Drew, Premier of Ontario, does not approach questions as to inter-provincial and racial relations in Canada from any basically antagonistic point of view, but rather from a feeling that obligations and opportunities must go hand in hand. This is the inference to be grasped from what the Ontario premier said last night in an interview with a Gazette reporter, who raised the question with a reference to some speeches by Col. Drew in the matter of child allowances out of the federal treasury.

"The position I took, reduced to its very simplest form, was this, that all security, domestic and otherwise, depended upon the winning of this war,, and our attitude is that obligations and opportunities must go hand in hand," said Mr. Drew. "That obligation to maintain the state of military service, if necessary, must be shared equally if equality of privilege is going to be claimed. The figures show that the province of Quebec has not contributed its proportionate share of manpower, and my statements were based on the claim made by Mr. Godbout (the former Quebec premier) and others, that it was because of Quebec that trained men in the defence army were not being made available. But I did emphasize our desire for friendly relations with Quebec, and pointed out that the solution of that problem rested within Quebec itself. I pointed out that we want national unity based upon equality of service which will justify full cooperation in extending advantages equally throughout the whole country."

Mention was made of the interview which the Ontario premier had given in Ottawa last September in regard to development of the power sites in the Ottawa river from which some confusion has arisen. Col. Drew said he had then expressed the opinion that he did not anticipate any difficulty in reaching an agreement with Quebec. He did not suggest in that Ottawa statement, he pointed out, that negotiations are proceeding with the present government of Quebec. His view that no difficulty would be encountered with Quebec when the matter was taken up was due to the fact that in conversation with Mr. Godbout, the latter, then premier of Quebec, had indicated his complete willingness to arrange for a new agreement on the Ottawa river sites, he explained.

"I was under the impression that Mr. Duplessis had criticized the agreements passed by the previous Ontario government with Quebec," said Col. Drew. "Mr. Godbout took the position that it had not been at Quebec's instance that the agreements were made, but that the suggestion had come from the Ontario government, and that there would be no objection to a new agreement. That being so, I had no reason to doubt that the new government (of Quebec) would be ready to discuss agreements that would be mutually satisfactory."

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PRESS CLIPPINGS C272861 Office of The Prime Minister

Name of Publication Toronto Globe and Mail

Date Wednesday, November 22, 1944

Eisenhower Asks Men, Supplies for Big Push

PARIS, Nov. 21 (CP). — Gen. Eisenhower, Allied Supreme Commander, asserted today that "to get peace we've got to fight like hell for it" and expressed a want for more men and more supplies for the last mighty effort. Gen. Eisenhower declared there had been some reason to believe Germany might have cried quits after the Battle of France, but that Adolf Hitler and his Gestapo had managed to maintain their pistol-in-the-back control of Germany, and that the war had become a fight to the death for the German people.

"To get peace we've got to fight like hell for it," Gen. Eisenhower told a press conference. "Now let's do it."

Gen. Eisenhower implied strongly that he expected the German Command to try to fight out the present battle west of the Rhine rather than retreat voluntarily to the east bank.

Any soldier probably would be forced to that decision once he had so much of his force west of the river, Gen. Eisenhower said, pointing out that Allied air power was so great that any full-scale withdrawal across the river was bound to prove costly even in bad weather.

Avoids Canadian Issue

Asked by a Canadian correspondent for his opinion on the Canadian draft issue, Gen. Eisenhower said he was not going to get involved in Canadian or any other kind of politics, but added:

"There is a job here for every man fit for battle we can bring, and those at home should give him everything he needs to fight with," the general said. "That's my prescription for victory."

He gave high praise of the work of the 1st Canadian and British 2nd Armies at the northern end of the Allied line which preceded the present new offensive.

These operations covered the clearing of the Scheldt Estuary to open the great port of Antwerp for Allied shipping.

"Walcheren Island (in the Scheldt Estuary) was one of the most gallant actions of this war," he said. "The navy really deserves great kudos. The Canadian and British Armies did a splendid and aggressive piece of work in clearing up the areas at that end of the line."

Success of the British amphibious operation on Walcheren, which resulted in final elimination of the Germans from the north side of the estuary, was achieved with "relatively heavy casualties" of 307 Royal Naval and Commando personnel killed or missing and 482 wounded, A. V. Alexander, British First Lord of the Admiralty, announced last Wednesday.

Hun Deprived of Choice

The Germans have not much more choice than they had in Normandy, he indicated. There they might have been able to delay the Allies longer by falling back from one defensive line to another, but could not do so because the bomb-shattered roads and bridges made it almost impossible to extricate any great percentage of the forces already committed to the battle.

Returning from a tour that took him to all sectors of the front, Gen. Eisenhower said with quiet determination that the great power of Allied armies had been thrown into the present campaign to force Germany to surrender or be destroyed. His plan, he said, was to hammer the Germans with increasing force until the highest pressure was reached on the day they finally surrendered.

"Unless every one all the way through the nation — those at the front and those at home — keeps on the job everlastingly and with mounting intensity, we are only postponing the day of victory," he asserted.

For this last great effort, he said, he wanted, and was confident that he would get, more men and—most of all—more supplies.

More Men, Supplies Needed

"I want more supplies than we are getting and I think the soldier wants more than he is getting, both now and in the future," the general stated.

He made plain that he intended no criticism of previous or present home-front efforts, but was simply making a forthright appraisal of the needs of the intensifying Allied effort.

"There is a job here for every man fit for battle that we can bring in, and it's up to every man back home to give him everything he needs—that is my prescription for victory," Gen. Eisenhower said.

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MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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While he declined even to make a guess as to how soon victory would come, he said that even the Germans were human enough to break under sufficient pressure and in the face of enough defeats, and that it was his intention to run the pressure up to that point without a single lull from now on.

"I am optimistic, myself," he said, but added with a chuckle, "I do hope to prevent myself from becoming complacent."

In response to an inquiry whether the situation was brighter at present than had been anticipated for this distance from D-Day, he said it was decidedly brighter in one respect, as no one on D-Day would have believed that the Allies by November would have been massed before the Siegfried Line in such strength as they are.

He conceded, however, that on D-Day most persons would have doubted the German ability to keep fighting after such defeats as they have suffered.

Gives Gestapo Credit

By last August, he said, it became apparent that the German leaders, who have nothing to lose by continuing the war, possessed in the Gestapo a weapon powerful enough to compel the German people to fight on.

Germany is being stripped bare to continue the fight, he said, and the people's army is capable for every effective combat when put behind fortifications or in trenches, despite poor equipment and lack of training.

Such troops, when put into trenches with the knowledge that they will be shot in the back if they try to leave, can be formidable opponents, Gen. Eisenhower warned.

Cabled Washington for Supplies

Washington, Nov. 21 (AP).—Terming 28 per cent of the munitions program "critical," J. A. Krug today said Gen. Eisenhower has notified Washington that his progress against Germany will be paced by delivery of arms.

"The big push now on against the West Wall is entirely dependent upon the flow of materials to those six armies," Krug, chairman of the War Production Board, told the National Press Club in an address.

"Not long ago Gen. Eisenhower laid it flat on the table," Krug said. "He cabled us saying: 'You tell us what you can deliver and we'll tell you when the war will end.'

"We have tried to tell him. He has used the information to plan his attack. It is up to us to make good."

This is the "most critical phase" of the war, Krug observed, with the European drive coinciding with progress in the Pacific running several months ahead of schedule. It finds 60 per cent of the munitions program on schedule or ahead, he said, the other 40 per cent lagging.

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POOR PRINT
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PRESS CLIPPINGS C 272863

Office of
The Prime Minister

Name of Publication Montreal Gazette

Date November 20, 1944

Subject

Munition Shortage Held Up Allies At Aachen, Eisenhower Reveals

Allied Supreme Headquarters, Paris, November 19. — (AP) — The reduction of the German fortress city of Aachen was delayed by a shortage of ammuniton, Gen. D. Eisenhower said today.

Gen. Eisenhower declared also that "Allied fighting men have achieved in Europe since June 6 one of the remarkable military victories of all time. They have eliminated more than a million German soldiers."

The Allied Supreme Commanders appealed to munitions workers in the United States to turn out ammunition, especially artillery shells, at top speed. In an address on the army hour program, broadcast in the United States over NBC, Gen. Eisenhower emphasized the enormous drain on ammunition resulting from the stepped-up tempo of the war.

"Today we are firing ammunition that we would not have used until next February or March if we had been content with slower advance, with less crushing victories, or if we had been ready to sacrifice soldiers to save materials," he said.

In the capture of Aachen, he reported, the 1st Army used 300,000 rounds of 105-millimetre ammunition in a two-weeks' period "and even the reduction of that place was delayed because of shortage of ammunition."

"Now we are hammering at the massive crust of armor surrounding the German fortress," Gen. Eisenhower added. "Appalling conditions of rain, fog, snow and mud make difficult the employment of our air forces and the manoeuvre of our tanks, even of our foot soldiers. But wretched weather cannot stop artillery shells. More than ever before we need ammunition."

Expenditure of ammunition has "raced ahead of our receipts from home, but I know that you do not want us to give the enemy one second's rest," he said.

The supreme commander said 5,000 pounds of ammunition are being poured into German defences every minute. Six million rounds of artillery fire and 2,000,000 rounds of mortar fire are being hurled at the Germans each month.

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C 272863

PRESS CLIPPINGS

Office of
The Prime Minister

Name of Publication Montreal Gazette

Date November 20, 1944

Subject

Munition Shortage Held Up Allies At Aachen, Eisenhower Reveals

Allied Supreme Headquarters, Paris, November 19. — (AP) — The reduction of the German fortress city of Aachen was delayed by a shortage of ammuniton, Gen. D. Eisenhower said today.

Gen. Eisenhower declared also that "Allied fighting men have achieved in Europe since June 6 one of the remarkable military victories of all time. They have eliminated more than a million German soldiers."

The Allied Supreme Commanders appealed to munitions workers in the United States to turn out ammunition, especially artillery shells, at top speed. In an address on the army hour program, broadcast in the United States over NBC, Gen. Eisenhower emphasized the enormous drain on ammunition resulting from the stepped-up tempo of the war.

"Today we are firing ammunition that we would not have used until next February or March if we had been content with slower advance, with less crushing victories, or if we had been ready to sacrifice soldiers to save materials," he said.

In the capture of Aachen, he reported, the 1st Army used 300,000 rounds of 105-millimetre ammunition in a two-weeks' period "and even the reduction of that place was delayed because of shortage of ammunition."

"Now we are hammering at the massive crust of armor surrounding the German fortress," Gen. Eisenhower added. "Appalling conditions of rain, fog, snow and mud make difficult the employment of our air forces and the manoeuvre of our tanks, even of our foot soldiers. But wretched weather cannot stop artillery shells. More than ever before we need ammunition."

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REPEAT
REPETER

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PRESS CLIPPINGS C 272864 Office of The Prime Minister

Name of Publication Toronto Globe and Mail

Date November 17, 1944

Subject

Faith in McNaughton

Port Elgin, Nov. 16 (CP).—In an address at Port Elgin this afternoon, Revenue Minister Colin Gibson said: "The people are worried about the reinforcement situation. Col. Ralston has recommended conscription for overseas service. Gen. McNaughton believes in the voluntary system."

He asked if any one could possibly imagine that McNaughton would recommend any course of action that would not be to the benefit of the men in the armies overseas whose training had been most of his responsibility. Col. Gibson refused to comment further on this subject in view of the session called for Ottawa next week.

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SECTION 7

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PRESS CLIPPINGS C 272865 Office of The Prime Minister

Name of Publication .....

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Subject .....

Statement On The Conscription Issue

By Hon. W. D. Herridge, D.S.O., M.C. and Bar.

I will begin with two established facts. The Canadian forces fighting in Europe are in need of large-scale, well-trained reinforcements. Inadequate, ill-trained reinforcements means not only loss of battle efficiency. It may mean needless and excessive casualties. Face these facts and you face a national problem of the greatest urgency. How can we get reinforcements to the battle-front without delay?

What is the solution to this problem? There is only one solution. Conscription. We have 75,000 well-trained troops in Canada called "zombies." Send them overseas. Send them today.

The case for conscription is overwhelming. Here it is. In total war, there is only one just and effective law of service—total conscription. The warring nations of the world have by their acts acknowledged this to be the fact. The voluntary system is inoperative and unjust. In Canada it has failed hopelessly at the first test.

* * *

For more than five years, the government has supported the voluntary system. Every effort has been made to make that system work. The present situation in France has proved that the voluntary system cannot work. The resignation of Colonel Ralston proves that fact twice over. Colonel Ralston did not resign for fun. He loved his party but he loved justice more.

Some may say that the situation in France today is abnormal. It is not. It is normal. It is routine. When soldiers go to war, we must expect that they will have to fight. Had Canada fought in the first year of war—it was no fault of our soldiers that they did not—we would have had the same crisis in that first year as we have now. And make no mistake about it, it is a terrible crisis.

General McNaughton, when he commanded the Canadian troops in England, had a fashion of comparing his command to a dagger pointing straight at the heart of Berlin. General McNaughton would be less dependent on imagery and more in step with fact if he now compared the issue of conscription to a dagger pointing straight at the heart of Canada.

For conscription is both a military need and a moral right. Failure of conscription penalizes patriotism and rewards the slacker. In total war, conscription is the only democratic way to fight. Therefore, conscription is an issue which goes to the very root of our national capacity to endure, of our national right to survive.

How can we get conscription? By the overwhelming demand of the public for it. For the government will never enforce conscription except upon compulsion by the people.

Here is the proof of that:

1. Some months before this war began, the government pledged itself against conscription. It did so to placate Quebec. It needs that support today. Therefore, the pledge continues.

2. This means that for more than five years, the government has been running away from conscription. It has never considered conscription on its merits. More than two years ago, the people gave the government a clear mandate for conscription. The government ignored that mandate. A week ago, Colonel Ralston demanded conscription. The government rejected that demand.

On this issue of conscription, the government has delivered itself into the hands of General McNaughton. But in his hands the government is safe. For General McNaughton will never try to enforce conscription except upon compulsion by the people.

It may be said that while the battle experience of the members of the government is, to put it politely, somewhat limited, General McNaughton on the other hand is an experienced soldier of the First World War. It may be said that on that account, General McNaughton is better able to realize the need for conscription and will, accordingly, be far more likely to support conscription. I am afraid that that assumption is unwarranted.

* * *

I have no desire to wantonly indict the government in this time of crisis. Rather, it should be the aim of every citizen to support the government. Most certainly, I have no desire to indict General McNaughton. For Andy McNaughton was perhaps the dearest friend I ever had. I say what I must about him with most genuine regret.

But facts are facts. Facts must control our actions, if the fighting men of Canada are to have justice.

What are the facts about General McNaughton?

1. As a scientific soldier, McNaughton always must have known that total war requires conscription. Yet he has never publicly demanded conscription, though on several occasions he could have done so with conclusive results. He could do so, today.

2. Having regard to our other manpower commitments — air, naval, industrial — the creation of so great a formation as an army was, even on the basis of conscription, wholly indefensible. Without conscription, it was a crime. Yet has General McNaughton ever opposed the creation of this army? He may even have proposed it. It would be interesting to know.

3. Colonel Ralston resigned because the government would not enforce conscription for overseas. Yet General McNaughton stepped into Colonel Ralston's place. Is it likely that McNaughton would have been invited to do so unless he had declared himself an anti-conscriptionist?

4. In recent public statements, General McNaughton extols the virtues of the voluntary system and professes his ancient faith in it. Yet no one can know better than McNaughton what nonsense McNaughton has been talking.

* * *

But if the government will not enforce conscription, how can it

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PRESS CLIPPINGS C 272866 Office of The Prime Minister

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Date .....

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meet this reinforcement crisis? It can't. But it may try to do so in these ways:

1. The government may withdraw our troops from the line, reduce the number of existing divisions and reorganize these formations on a lower unit strength. To do so, would be to commit Canada to something less than its potential best. To do so, would be to ask Canada to step down in power and prestige from its high place among the nations. To do so, would be to ask our soldiers to curtail their purpose, to abridge their zeal, to surrender their glory. I would not like to be the man who asked our soldiers to do that. Even should they agree to do so—and they never would—that would not solve the problem of reinforcements or give our soldiers assured and continuing support.

2. The other way is to step up the bally-hoo for voluntary enlistment, and coax and bully into uniform the last thin line of relatively enfeebled citizens. Then take six months to train these grade two troops. While all the time, 75,000 fully-trained zombies stand idly by.

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It is all so stupid and silly and wrong. Then let us put a stop to it. Everyone knows that conscription is imperative. Everyone must know that only by compulsion can we get conscription.

To compel the government to adopt conscription will need the resolute insistence of the public—a nation-wide and irrepressible demand. To give this demand its maximum effectiveness, it must be organized. The people must have leadership. Where is that leadership?

I think that we will find it among the veterans of the two world wars. The veterans of Canada have never functioned as a unit. They have never had one mind upon the graver problems of the state.

Here is their great chance. The legion, as the strongest body, should go ahead and mobilize the rest. Then set out upon a great campaign of propaganda. Put fire into it. The legion must forget its cosy wartime association with government. There is no need for hostility to government but there is urgent need for independence and determination. The legion must stop asking and begin telling. The veterans should realize that they must democratically force the government. And they must do it now, without delay. That is the point—now, without delay.

We must not be content with a provisional assurance of conscription at some later date if the voluntary system by then has proved its ineffectiveness. Its ineffectiveness is proved today. The voluntary system will not work in any circumstances in total war. So, therefore, we must not be party to more evasion and more terrible delay. Don't let soft words beguile us. Officialdom may think that if it sits tight, this present flutter of protest will die out. We have often fluttered before. And we have always died out.

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This is not a hard job if we have the nerve to go after it. Build up the public demand to a point where it spells compulsion. Then the government, which prides itself on its democracy, will give in. Let us be friendly and say that the government will give in gladly when it is denied a possible alternative.

They say that to enforce conscription will divide our country. I say that if the price of unity is the betrayal of our soldiers, then let us have disunity. But there will be no disunity. Drive through conscription and its essential justice will unite us in a lasting accord. Fail to drive through conscription and you will blast this country out of its democracy into the chaos of bitterness and hate.

That is why I think that General McNaughton would be right to say that the issue of conscription is indeed a dagger pointing straight at the heart of Canada.

EDITOR'S NOTE. *While The Citizen may not be in full agreement with all the conclusions in the following statement, it nevertheless feels that at this time publication of Mr. Herridge's authoritative point of view is in the public interest.*

When war was declared, Mr. Herridge, then leader of the New Democracy Movement and of the New Democracy-Social Credit Members in the House of Commons, declared for total conscription and thereafter campaigned in its cause. In the election of 1940, Mr. Herridge was the sole candidate who stood for total conscription. He was, of course, defeated. Mr. Herridge's action in the early stages of the war was in striking contrast to that of other leaders in Parliament, business and the press who remained silent on the issue of conscription. So far as can be ascertained, The Citizen was the only newspaper in Canada which from the outset supported Mr. Herridge on the issue of conscription.

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PRESS CLIPPINGS C 272867 Office of The Prime Minister

Name of Publication Ottawa Citizen

Date November 8, 1944

Statement On The Conscription Issue

By Hon. W. D. Herridge, D.S.O., M.C. and Bar.

I will begin with two established facts. The Canadian forces fighting in Europe are in need of large-scale, well-trained reinforcements. Inadequate, ill-trained reinforcements means not only loss of battle efficiency. It may mean needless and excessive casualties. Face these facts and you face a national problem of the greatest urgency. How can we get reinforcements to the battle-front without delay?

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The case for conscription is overwhelming. Here it is. In total war, there is only one just and effective law of service—total conscription. The warring nations of the world have by their acts acknowledged this to be the fact. The voluntary system is inoperative and unjust. In Canada it has failed hopelessly at the first test.

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For more than five years, the government has supported the voluntary system. Every effort has been made to make that system work. The present situation in France has proved that the voluntary system cannot work. The resignation of Colonel Ralston proves that fact twice over. Colonel Ralston did not resign for fun. He loved his party but he loved justice more.

Some may say that the situation in France today is abnormal. It is not. It is normal. It is routine. When soldiers go to war, we must expect that they will have to fight. Had Canada fought in the first year of war—it was no fault of our soldiers that they did not—we would have had the same crisis in that first year as we have now. And make no mistake about it, it is a terrible crisis.

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(Concluded on Page 5, Column 3.)

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PRESS CLIPPINGS C 272867 Office of The Prime Minister

Name of Publication Ottawa Citizen

Date November 8, 1944

Statement On The Conscription Issue

By Hon. W. D. Hamilton, D.S.O., M.C. and Bar.

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POOR PRINT
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PRESS CLIPPINGS C272868 Office of The Prime Minister

Name of Publication.....

Date.....

Subject.....

2. Having regard to our under-manpower commitments — air, naval, industrial — the question of conscription as an army unit, over and the heads of conscripted wholly indefensible. Without conscription, it was a union. Did Sir General McNaughton ever oppose the creation of this army? He may even have proposed it. It would be interesting to know.

3. Colonel Ralston resigned because the government would not enforce conscription for overseas. Yet General McNaughton stepped into Colonel Ralston's place. Is it likely that McNaughton would have been invited to do so unless he had declared himself an anti-conscriptionist?

4. In recent public statements, General McNaughton extols the virtues of the volunteer system and professes his support for it. Yet no one can know better than McNaughton what weakness McNaughton has been talking.

But if the government will not enforce conscription, how can it meet this manpower crisis? It can't. But there are two ways to do so in these days:

1. The government may withdraw our troops from the line, reduce the number of existing divisions and reconstitute these formations on a lower unit strength. To do so, would be to admit defeat to something we have repeatedly beat. To do so would be to ask Canada to step down in power and prestige from its high place among the nations. To do so, would be to ask our soldiers to sacrifice their purpose. To abridge its pledge to surrender their allies. I would not like to be the man who asked our soldiers to do that. When should they agree to do so—and they never would—that would not solve the problem of reinforcements or give our soldiers inspired and continuing support.

2. The other way is to step up the hullabaloo for voluntary enlistment, and coax and bully into uniform the last thin line of relatively unfretted citizens. There isn't six months to train these people into troops. While all this is done, Hitler's well-trained armies would idly by.

It is all so stupid and silly and wrong. Then let us put a stop to it. Everyone knows that conscription is imperative. Everyone must know that only by compulsion can we get conscription.

To compel the government to adopt conscription will need the resolute insistence of the public—a nation-wide and irrepressible demand. To give this demand its maximum effectiveness, it must be organized. The people must have leadership. Where is that leadership?

I think that we will find it among the veterans of the two world wars. The veterans of Canada have never functioned as a unit. They have never had one mind upon the graver problems of the state.

Here is their great chance. The legion, as the strongest body, should go ahead and mobilize the rest. Then set out upon a great campaign of propaganda. Put life into it. The legion must forget its petty political association with governments. There is no need for hostility to government but there is urgent need for independence and determination. The legion must stop talking and begin telling. The veterans should announce that they must democratically force the government. And they must do it now, without delay. That is the point—now, without delay.

We must not be content with a provisional acceptance of conscription as some later date if the voluntary system by then has proved its ineffectiveness. Its ineffectiveness is proved today. The voluntary system will not work in any circumstances in total war. So, therefore, we must not be party to more evasion and more terrible delay. Don't let soft words bewilder. Conscription may prove that it is vital, this present flutter of protest will die out. We have given ourselves orders, and we have always died out.

General McNaughton may step aside upon a stalling trip to Europe. There is no need for him to go to Europe. All the dead are here. The mounting dead are red with shining steel, always bearing the whole story of the battlefront. In Ottawa, there is every pre-requisite for action. Let us have action. If the citizens of Canada are resolute, we will get action—we will have conscription—without delay.

This is not a hard job if we have the nerve to go after it. Build up the public demand to a point where it spells compulsion. Then the government, which prides itself on its democracy, will give in. Let us be honest and say that the government will give in gladly when it is decided a possible alternative.

They say that to enforce conscription will divide our country. I say that if the principal entity is the betrayal of our soldiers, then let us have disunity. But there will be no disunity. Drive through conscription and its essential justice will unite us in a burning accord. Fail to drive through conscription and you will blast this country out of its democracy into the chaos of bitterness and hate.

That is why I think that General McNaughton would be right to say that the issue of conscription is indeed a dagger pointing straight at the heart of Canada.

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PRESS CLIPPINGS

c272869 Office of The Prime Minister

Name of Publication Toronto Globe and Mail

Date November 16, 1944

Subject

CONSCRIPTION MERE POLITICS, HOWE ASSERTS

By FRANK FLAHERTY

Chicago, Nov. 15 (CP).—Conscription for overseas service in Canada is "rather a political question than a question of meeting an urgent need," Reconstruction Minister C. D. Howe said today in a luncheon address before the Canadian Club of Chicago.

The Minister, who heads the Canadian delegation at the International Civil Aviation conference, spoke without notes and said he had seen all the relevant reports and figures on army reinforcements but, for security reasons, could not give them.

He said he was not expressing any personal opinion on the issue, but on the basis of the full information, he did "not believe it is a question of meeting an overwhelming need." He spoke, he said, for the purpose of giving former Canadians now living in Chicago some of the background on the situation.

The speech was notable as one of the first utterances by a Minister, other than Prime Minister Mackenzie King, Defense Minister McNaughton and former Defense Minister Ralston since Col. Ralston's resignation from the Cabinet.

Standing Per Capita

Canada, said Mr. Howe, had as high a proportion of its population enlisted in the forces as practically any Allied country with the exception of the United Kingdom.

The Government at the start of the war followed the traditional voluntary system, but in 1940 supplemented it with compulsory service within Canada. Under compulsory service some 200,000 men had been drafted into the forces and at various times men had been drafted to the coal mines and other activities.

Of the 200,000 men called up for the army all but about 60,000 had volunteered for service anywhere.

"These 60,000 men, however, have become a great political issue in Canada and an issue that will likely become greater as time goes on."

There had been a difference of opinion in the Government about it and there was a great division of opinion in the country which would likely become more marked. Those in "the seat of government" had to take account of what happened in the first Great War.

Then conscription was introduced late in the war, was followed by bloodshed and "the number of members secured for the armed forces was exceedingly small in comparison to the commotion in Canada."

The Government had also to consider other aspects of the war effort, including the munitions program. There was an over-all shortage of ammunition and Canadian industry played a great role in keeping the stream of munitions going forward.

"The Government must weigh any probable interruption of production which would follow the enforcement of conscription," he said.

Nothing in Lease-Lend

In Chicago, said Mr. Howe, he had met an old friend and a prominent business man who thought Canada was a recipient of Lease-Lend. Canada has never taken a dollar in Lease-Lend from the United States or any other country. Canada had its own Lease-Lend system under which two gifts of $1,000,000,000 each had been made and a third of $800,000,000 now was being expended.

Considering the relative populations and economic resources of the two countries it would be found that Canada's aid to co-belligerents was on a par with that of the United States.

During the five years of war Canada had been fairly successful in maintaining a stable economy. The cost of living had been controlled.

"I am confident," he said, "that we will emerge from the war with an economy not too greatly inflated, with an expanded industry and with a people who have all shared in the war effort, either in the forces or in production.

"I must admit the people are getting a bit tired. The strain and the pressure is beginning to tell but I can tell you that as long as there is war the war effort of Canada will not slacken."

Canadian effort would continue to be concentrated on the European theatre until the job was done there but "when the European war is finished our, troops our Navy and our Air Force will transfer to the Pacific to finish up that job."

Ottawa Surprised

Ottawa, Nov. 15 (Staff).—The blunt denial of former Defense Minister Ralston's estimation of reinforcement requirements by Reconstruction Minister Howe in today's Chicago speech was received tonight in Ottawa with expressions of frank disbelief and admitted consternation.

Government members refused to comment on the report that Mr. Howe said the issue was "rather a political question than a question of meeting an urgent need." They refused on the ground that the report must be verified; they suggested that Mr. Howe must have been misquoted.

In discussion of the Howe reference, it was pointed out that Prime Minister King himself, in his radio broadcast a week ago tonight, announced there was an urgency when he said that Col. Ralston's report to the Government "disclosed an immediate problem which had to be faced."

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MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
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CANADA

POOR PRINT
Epreuve illisible

Name of Publication Toronto Globe and Mail

Date November 17, 1944

Subject

A Deplorable Speech

Seldom has a politician staged a more reprehensible performance than did Hon. C. D. Howe in his address to the Canadian Club of Chicago on Wednesday. For one thing, its bad taste is almost unpardonable. Here he was in a foregin land representing his country in the role of a diplomatic negotiator at an important conference, and he suddenly abandoned this role to deliver a partisan harangue. Many of his audience must have regarded it as a grave abuse of the privilege accorded to him, and there is nothing to wonder at in the report that when the contents of the speech reached Ottawa they aroused consternation in Ministerial circles and expressions of disbelief in the accuracy of the press despatch.

The speech was, in the main, a eulogistic exposition of the Canadian war effort as managed by the King Government, and upon most of it any comment would be superfluous. But it contained certain statements of a most misleading character. Mr. Howe told his audience that the issue of conscription for overseas service in Canada was "rather a political question than a question of meeting an urgent need"; and also that on the basis of the information which he had received he did "not believe it is a question of meeting an overwhelming need."

Here was a thinly veiled attack upon the administrative ability and the public integrity of his late colleague, Col. Ralston, an accusation levelled at him that he was playing politics with this grave issue. But Col. Ralston was not the only person who stated that there was a question of meeting an urgent need. Did not Prime Minister King in his broadcast of Nov. 8 agree that there was an urgency when he said that Col. Ralston's report to the Cabinet "disclosed an immediate problem, which had to be faced"? Did not Gen. McNaughton, the newly fledged Minister of National Defense, make a similar admission? All these three have knowledge about the reinforcement problem, and none of them shares Mr. Howe's view that it is a purely political question.

The avowed object of Mr. Howe's speech was to give Canadian-born residents of Chicago some background about the situation in Canada. But [illegible] such a task it was incumbent upon him, if he had any respect for his position, to be scrupulously careful about his account of the "background," and not to give, as he did, misleading information about it.

Mr. Howe, in common with the other Ministers who have stood by Mr. King, is obviously displeased that Col. Ralston has forced the issue about the army and set the interests of our fighting men overseas above the claims of partisan loyalty. Apparently Mr. Howe has conveniently forgotten that there was a time when he shared Col. Ralston's views about recruiting policy, and that he joined him about two years ago in tendering his resignation through dissatisfaction with his Leader's attitude. Both Ministers were induced to withdraw their resignations. But, whereas Col. Ralston has come to the end of his patience with Mr. King's manoeuvres and backslidings, Mr. Howe has relapsed into an attitude of obsequious complacency. He might at least have the decency not to use a foreign audience as a forum for attacking by implication a former colleague who happened to have a greater fund of courage and public honesty.

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POOR PRINT
Epreuve illisible

PRESS CLIPPINGS C272871 Office of The Prime Minister

Name of Publication Montreal Gazette

Date Nov. 14/44

Subject

LaFleche Takes Onus of Raising French-Canadian Reinforcements

Maj.-Gen. LaFleche, Minister of National War Services, in a statement issued in Montreal last night said that he, as a Quebec minister, "has assumed the responsibility of arranging to find the men needed for French-Canadian units now in action."

He added that over the weekend he had obtained formal offers from the commanding officers of four province of Quebec regiments that they would reinforce French-speaking regiments now on the battlefronts and he confidently awaited a similar response from another regiment. "There will be others as soon as I have the opportunity to put the matter up to the regiments."

Maj.-Gen. LaFleche, a native of Sorel, who was himself seriously wounded while serving with the French-speaking Royal 22nd Regiment in the Great War and who was decorated with the D.S.O. and French Legion of Honor, said that it was only three weeks ago that he learned "for the first time," of the reinforcement situation.

Text of his statement:

Reports having been made to the Government that, in the future, there may be a shortage of reinforcements for Canadian infantry regiments overseas, I, as a Quebec minister, have assumed the responsibility of arranging to find the men needed for French-Canadian units now in action.

Over the week-end, I have obtained formal offers from the commanding officers of four Quebec regiments that they will reinforce French-speaking regiments now on the battlefronts; and I confidently await a similar response from another regiment. There will be others as soon as I have the opportunity to put the matter up to the regiments.

It was only three weeks ago that I learned, for the first time, of the reinforcement situation. I was convinced that men of Quebec would, if the situation were placed before them with complete frankness and on the basis of equal privilege for equal sacrifice make it their patriotic duty to insure that never would their compatriots overseas be threatened with a shortage of reinforcements. Accordingly, I volunteered to take the affair in hand and virtually to guarantee the Province of Quebec's answer to the call for more men for French-Canadian regiments.

My proposal was not taken up.

A change in the Ministry of National Defence followed and I was then asked to find the volunteers.

I am now in receipt of an official offer from the commanding officer of the Fusiliers Mont-Royal to raise a reinforcing battalion for the 1st Battalion of that regiment at present in action against the Germans on the Western Front.

I hold a similar offer from the commanding officers of the Regiment de Maisonneuve, the first regiment in Canada to reach full mobilization after war broke out in 1939.

The commanding officers of Le Regiment de Joliette and of Le Regiment de Chateauguay have given me similar assurances.

I await offers of reinforcements from a fifth Quebec regiment.

In each case, the home regiment offering a reinforcing battalion will have the privilege of selecting the unit it will reinforce. The first appeal to "go active" will be made to N.R.M.A. men.

As I always been, I am extremely proud of my compatriots and have every confidence in them. I thank them for their never failing readiness to come forward when a situation has been properly presented to them.

I have been very happy to inform the Rt. Hon. W. L. Mackenzie King, Prime Minister of Canada, of these offers. He also in the hour of crisis had faith in his fellow Canadians.

In addition to regiments mentioned by Gén. LaFleche, French-Canadian units serving overseas are Royal 22nd Regiment, Three Rivers Regiment, Le Regiment de la Chaudiere and the Sherbrooke Regiment.

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SECTION 8

DOMINION

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PRESS CLIPPINGS C 272872 Office of The Prime Minister

Name of Publication Ottawa Citizen

Date December 27, 1943

Subject Gen. A.G.L.McNaughton (Prime Minister's Statement re)





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PRESS CLIPPINGS C 272872 Office of The Prime Minister

Name of Publication Ottawa Citizen

Date December 27, 1943

Subject Gen. A.G.L.McNaughton (Prime Minister's Statement re)

Gen. McNaughton's Work For Canada Wins High Praise

Prime Minister Mackenzie King said in a statement last night that word that Lt.-Gen. A. G. L. McNaughton has found it necessary to relinquish command of the 1st Canadian Army "will be received throughout Canada with feelings of the deepest regret."

During Gen. McNaughton's command the training and organization of Canada's army overseas has been brought "to a very high level," Mr. King said.

Text of the Prime Minister's statement follows:

"The word that Gen. McNaughton has found it necessary to relinquish the command of the 1st Canadian Army will be received throughout Canada with feelings of the deepest regret. Especially will this be the case because of the present condition of his health.

"Gen. McNaughton's exceptional abilities as a scientist, coupled with his record as a soldier, marked him out as one particularly suited to plan a modern mechanized military force. With this part of Canada's war effort, he has been most intimately connected from day to day through the whole course of the war.

Skill and Devotion.

"All Canada will recall the confidence which Gen. McNaughton helped to inspire in the dark days of 1940. After the withdrawal from Dunkirk, the 1st Canadian Division was one of the few formations available in Britain equipped with weapons to fight. As Gen. McNaughton's division grew to a corps, and then to an army of two corps, he accepted growing responsibilities and faced the new problems with the utmost skill and devotion.

"Weeks and months and years of waiting made heavy demands upon all the Canadian forces in Britain. They made especially heavy the burden of responsibility upon the army commander. Until now few will have realized the great strain under which Gen. McNaughton has worked through years of unremitting tension. It is a strain which has been the greater for him through the loss in action of a gallant son.

"During Gen. McNaughton's command, the training and organization of Canada's army overseas has been brought to a very high level. The Canadian units who went into action with the 8th Army in Sicily last July, and who are today fighting with such determination in Italy, have won the highest praise for gallantry in action and for stubborn courage and resolution under fire. Some of this praise belongs to Gen. McNaughton. It reflects the fighting spirit which will always be associated with him as commander of Canada's army overseas.

"Gen. McNaughton's health has prevented him from carrying on, as he would have wished, until the end of the war. He has, however, the satisfaction of knowing that his work has been a large foctor in contributing to the successes thus far achieved by Canada's army, and that it will have its part in the supreme effort needed to attain ultimate victory.

"All Canada will wish for Gen. McNaughton a speedy restoration of his health, and that his exceptional abilities and wide experience may long continue to be at the service of our country."

REPEAT
REPETER

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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Name of Publication Montreal Star

Date Dec.27/43

Subject

Premier Lauds McNaughton

Service in Building Army Stressed

OTTAWA, Dec. 26—(C. P.) — Premier King said in a statement last night that word that Lt.-Gen. A. G. L. McNaughton has found it necessary to relinquish command of the 1st Canadian Army "will be received throughout Canada with feelings of the deepest regret."

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Text of the Prime Minister's statement follows:

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Gen. McNaughton's exceptional abilities as a scientist, coupled with his record as a soldier, marked him out as one particularly suited to plan a modern mechanized military force. With this part of Canada's war effort, he has been most intimately connected from day to day through the whole course of the war.

Gave Confidence

All Canada will recall the confidence which Gen. McNaughton helped to inspire in the dark days of 1940. After the withdrawal from Dunkirk, the 1st Canadian Division was one of the few formations available in Britain equipped with weapons to fight. As Gen. McNaughton's division grew to a Corps, and then to an Army of two Corps, he accepted the growing responsibilities and faced the new problems with the utmost skill and devotion.

Weeks and months and years of waiting made heavy demands upon all the Canadian forces in Britain. They made especially heavy the burden of responsibility upon the Army commander. Until now few will have realized the great strain under which Gen. McNaughton has worked through years of unremitting tension. It is a strain which has been the greater for him through the loss in action of a gallant son.

During Gen. McNaughton's command, the training and organization of Canada's Army overseas has been brought to a very high level. The Canadian units who went into action with the 8th Army in Sicily last July, and who are today fighting with such determination in Italy, have won the highest praise for gallantry in action and for stubborn courage and resolution under fire. Some of this praise belongs to Gen. McNaughton. It reflects the fighting spirit which will always be associated with him as commander of Canada's Army overseas.

Health Affected

Gen. McNaughton's health has prevented him from carrying on, as he would have wished, until the end of the war. He has, however, the satisfaction of knowing that his work has been a large factor in contributing to the successes thus far achieved by Canada's Army, and that it will have its part in the supreme effort needed to attain ultimate victory.

All Canada will wish for Gen. McNaughton a speedy restoration of his health, and that his exceptional abilities and wide experience may long continue to be at the service of our country.

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PRESS CLIPPINGS C 272873 Office of The Prime Minister

Name of Publication Montreal Star

Date Dec.27/43

Subject

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C O P Y

C272874

Gen. McNaughton to Col. Ralston, Sept. 23:

On my return to Canada I was given leave of absence to recover my reserves of health, but I remained in the army in order to be available should any situation develop in which my services might be required.

I am thankful to say that I now feel entirely fit again.

With the encouraging march of events abroad I do not believe that any useful purpose will be served by my continuing to hold myself available for return to the army, and I think that the time has come when I should be free to give my attention to other matters. I hope, therefore, that you will arrange that I may be released as soon as may be convenient.

We have not always been of the same opinion as to the course to be followed, but I have never doubted your sincerity of purpose nor, I believe, have you doubted mine. Any differences of view belong to the past. The whole energy of every Canadian must now be devoted to winning the war - and to ensuring, as far as we may, that the peace is safely confirmed.

May I say that I deeply appreciate the courtesies and consideration that have been extended to me by you and by the officers of the department since my return to Canada. I wish you and them every success in bringing to an early conclusion the great task to which our men are contributing so much on the battlefields of Europe.

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COPY

Col. Ralston to Gen. McNaughton, Sept. 23: 1944

I acknowledge your letter of today. I entirely understand your desire to be relieved of further army responsibilities in order to be able to devote your attention to other matters. You recognize that at this stage of the war it is hard to foresee likelihood of army activities which could command your very exceptional qualities and your experience and seniority. Accordingly, in view of your letter and so that you can make plans for the future, I will very regretfully authorize retirement in due course, with pre-retirement leave in the interim.

Now that is the business part of the matter. But I want you to know that Canada cannot let you leave the army without some distinction to mark this country's recognition of your fidelity to duty and your superb accomplishments as as a military leader. And so I have the pleasure and honor of advising you that the government has approved of your immediate promotion to the rank of general.

While your elevation in rank is an outward token of achievement, it tells nothing of the onerous tasks you have undertaken or the ability you have shown in meeting constantly changing conditions which the different phases of the war have produced. In a public statement last January the Prime Minister told something of your great services, and of the record already made in battle by the men you had organized and trained.

Since the Prime Minister spoke, Ortona, the Liri Valley and the Gothic line have been fought in Italy, D-Day has come in France, and the rolling back of German occupation in Europe is proceeding relentlessly.

You, I know, are proud, as we all are, of the achievements of the Canadian Army in all these battles, but you have the additional satisfaction of knowing that your planning and initiative and capacity, shown through four years of hard exacting work, were vital factors in these successes.

Canada will be forever grateful for your inspiring efforts in training and planning and striving unsparingly to make this amazing progress possible. No words of mine can

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assess the value of your contribution. History will, I am sure, rate it truly high.

Speaking for the Department of National Defence, I want to thank you most sincerely for all you have wrought for the service, and, speaking personally, to express my deepest appreciation for your stalwart co-operation as my senior fellow-worker on the military side. As you say, we have not always seen eye to eye as to the course to be followed, but I fully agree with you that any differences of view relate to the past.

It is a great satisfaction to me, not only to have the assurance in your letter of your fine "comeback" in health, but to note in our talks your fitness and your eagerness to make plans for active work again.

Knowing you, I am sure of this, that in or out of the army your objective will be to do what will render the best service to Canada.

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PRESS CLIPPINGS

C 272877

Office of
The Prime Minister

Name of Publication Ottawa M. Citizen

Date September 29, 1944

Subject

Text of exchange of letters between Gen. McNaughton and Defence Minister Ralston, follows:

Gen. McNaughton to Col. Ralston, Sept. 23:

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With the encouraging march of events abroad I do not believe that any useful purpose will be served by my continuing to hold myself available for return to the army, and I think that the time has come when I should be free to give my attention to other matters. I hope, therefore, that you will arrange that I may be released as soon as may be convenient.

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Col. Ralston's Reply.

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Now that is the business part of the matter. But I want you to know that Canada cannot let you leave the army without some distinction to mark this country's recognition of your fidelity to duty and your superb accomplishments as a military leader. And so I have the pleasure and honor of advising you that the government has approved of your immediate promotion to the rank of general.

While your elevation in rank is an outward token of achievement, it tells nothing of the onerous tasks you have undertaken or the ability you have shown in meeting constantly changing conditions which the different phases of the war have produced. In a public statement last January the Prime Minister told something of you great services, and of the record already made in battle by the men you had organized and trained.

Since the Prime Minister spoke, Ortona, the Liri Valley and the Gothic line have been fought in Italy. D-Day has come in France, and the rolling back of German occupation in Europe is proceeding relentlessly.

You, I know, are proud, as we all are, of the achievements of the Canadian Army in all these battles, but you have the additional satisfaction of knowing that your planning and initiative and capacity, shown through four years of hard exacting work, were vital factors in these successes.

Canada will be forever grateful for your inspiring efforts in training and planning and striving unsparingly to make this amazing progress possible. No words of mine can assess the value of your contribution. History will, I am sure, rate it truly high.

Speaking for the Department of National Defence, I want to thank you most sincerely for all you have wrought for the service, and, speaking personally, to express my deepest appreciation for your stalwart co-operation as my senior fellow-worker on the military side. As you say, we have not always seen eye to eye as to the course to be followed, but I fully agree with you that any differences of view relate to the past.

It is a great satisfaction to me, not only to have the assurance in your letter of your fine "comeback" in health, but to note in our talks your fitness and your eagerness to make plans for active work again.

Knowing you, I am sure of this, that in or out of the army your objective will be to do what will render the best service to Canada.

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MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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ARNPRIOR

PRESS CLIPPINGS

Office of
The Prime Minister
C 272878

Name of Publication Ottawa Journal

Date November 6, 1944

Subject

Need for Men Is Vital Says Gen. McNaughton But—

ARNPRIOR, Ont., Nov. 5. — (CP) — Gen. McNaughton, who became Defence Minister on the resignation of Col. Ralston, said in his first public speech here today that despite the "vital need" for reinforcements he favored continuance of the voluntary system of enlistment in Canada.

Indicating he opposed conscripting home defence troops for overseas, the general said he was "firmly convinced that the best hope lies in the maintenance of our long traditions of voluntary service".

"We have had this from the earliest days of this war", he said. "We had it in the last war until we changed and then we gained no benefit in time to be of any use."

First Great War.

(Conscription was introduced in the First Great War in August, 1917, and the first conscripts arrived in France in the dying months of the war.)

"The figures of the reinforcements now available show that we can safely count on some short period yet before there is danger of the situation becoming acute. I think that there is time to tell our public of the great need as I now do.. I know their deep interest, and I am confident that, now the need is known, our men and women will come forward to serve—that they will take up this honorable obligation and rally to the support of our gallant comrades overseas. I hope that the public of Canada, knowing the urgency, will give them every support and encouragement, Gen. McNaughton declared.

"We have a foul enemy to contend with. We must finish him off quickly. We can only do this if we base our efforts on the united purpose of all Canada—united spiritually in thought and in action."

His speech was received with close attention by a Victory bond rally audience of about 1,000 which included veterans of both the First Great War and the present conflict.

The audience gave him a hearty cheer when he entered, when he was introduced, when he finished, and the veterans gave him three cheers and a tiger after a brief after-meeting personal address urging their support for his voluntary program.

His formal speech was interrupted by applause and cheering once. That was when he made his first reference to the urgent need for reinforcements.

When he finished he thanked the audience "from the bottom of my heart" for their warm welcome and he told them their "kind reception" of his remarks would be an encouragement "that you and I can see this thing through to a successful conclusion in a matter of days".

Later he explained to reporters he meant there was an urgency for his voluntary recruiting campaign to get started and it was this early start he was referring to when he said "in a matter of days".

After he stepped from the platform he leaned over the front row of seats where Canadian Legion members were grouped. He scanned the veterans with a serious intentness and asked them to support him in getting the younger generation to take up "this honorable obligation" and volunteer for active service.

Later, as he was preparing to leave he felt his coat tugged and wheeled around to face Legionaire Jimmy Geddes, a 32-year-old discharged gunner with three years' overseas experience in this war. **He wanted to know why the general didn't "take the bull by the horns" and inaugurate a program of full conscription.**

The General, speaking mildly, told the native Scot now living in this Ottawa Valley town that it was a national issue on which there were two sides and he had no doubt that Jimmy's opinion was "an honest one, honestly expressed".

Geddes insisted that conscription was the only answer and he wanted the General "to give the zombies short shrift". The General said he hadn't been able to deal with all phases of the topic today, but he would have something more to say at the veterans' meeting in Ottawa Monday.

The two grinned at each other —the former gunner enjoying the situation of being able to talk up to his old field commander and the General obviously enjoying getting a quick, forthright reaction to his first speech.

Geddes explained to reporters he had just asked the question to let the General know "the strong feeling of the boys overseas". "The General had already given me an answer when he asked for continuance of the volunteer system, but I just wanted him to know that we all don't agree with him", he added.

Before making his speech the General had reviewed troops from the nearby Petawawa Military Camp—25 percent. of whom were home defence draftees.

Text of Speech.

Following is a partial text of General McNaughton's speech:

". . . . Until quite recently in Italy and in North West Europe our forces were advancing very rapidly. They were driving the Germans before them in great disorder and great victories followed one another in rapid succession.

"We were reaping to the full the great advantages which lay with us in this mobile type of war, where the superior initiative, the high intelligence and the individual skills of our men are assets which could be given full scope.

"We reaped to the full the fruits of the carefully prepared mobility of our wonderfully effective mechanical transport and armored fighting vehicles and other gear, much of which is the product of our own Canadian factories.

"In all these great advances in North West Europe and in Italy our men have given a marvellous account of themselves. Their gallantry in action, their skill in tactics, their hard endurance has carried their fame throughout the whole known world, nad we may well take pride in what they have accomplished for the cause.

"Perhaps in these months of Summer we have become accus-

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PRESS CLIPPINGS C 272879

Office of
The Prime Minister

Name of Publication

Date

Subject

tomed to victory. Perhaps we have been unduly optimistic that the forward progress would continue with unabated speed. Perhaps we have thought that the end for Germany was nearer than it is.

"Now we are coming up against the heavy zone of fortifications which the Nazi has prepared close in to Germany itself and to which he is clinging with desperation for he well knows that when we pass these he is done. The form of war is changing. We are nearly through the mobile phase in which the advantages lay with us. And now we must conduct siege warfare of the most intense character to crush the enemy's defences out of existence and free the way for our infantry to advance.

"We must not ease our pressure. We must not let him check the rate of our advance, for if he does, then he gains the time he seeks to make his preparation for the different kind of war he plans —to organize his forces underground for sabotage and murder, to complete new weapons and devices of vast power to use against us.

"For siege warfare we need lavish supplies of guns and shells, and these we must provide as a first priority. We have learned that the price of victory can be paid either in lives of men or shells, and so we must see to it that guns and shells go forward in the great quantities that are required.

"I have visited many of our munition plants and I have seen the great effort which is being made. I have watched our men and women working long hours day after day and month after month—running into years. The need continues and this effort now must be increased. More men and more women are required in the factories.

"And I do appeal that all who can will volunteer their services to this task. Women are particularly required for their slim dextrous fingers can do the delicate operations in assembly plants and factories that no man can well accomplish. . .

"And now I would say a few words to you about our men and units in the field and the vital need that must be met that our forces are maintained as is required in the last phase in which they seek to finally destroy the Nazi—and to assure that the peace we gain will be safely confirmed.

"I believe that they and we are fully determined that we will maintain our just part in the great Allied effort that is still required.

"For this two things are needed—munitions, and men for reinforcements. Munitions, I am certain, are in sight on the lavish scale required, and the only question is the men who are needed to keep our units engaged in battle up to strength. This is the vital matter that rightly engages the earnest thoughts of everyone in Canada today, and it is a question for which an answer must be found —and promptly.

"Two methods of solution are open, either of which we might take. One is to continue the voluntary system for service overseas. The other is to resort to compulsion.

"I know full well that there is an honest difference of opinion as to the respective merits of these systems, and I am going to tell you very frankly what I think about the matter.

"First, let me say that all through the war and even when I have not been directly concerned with this problem I have continued to give it the closest attention, and during the last few days since again I have responsibility I have explored every possibility with the utmost care. **I have read and studied the reports from our officers in the field—I have read and studied the suggestions and proposals made by our officers here—and I am firmly convinced that the best hope lies in the maintenance of our long traditions of voluntary service.** We have had this from the earliest days of this war. We had it in the last war until we changed, and then we gained no benefit in time to be of use. We have had it long before in other wars in which we had to fight in the defence of our homes and kith and kin.

"We have built the system of discipline in our army on the principle of an honorable obligation voluntarily assumed. That army went through the very difficult and anxious time of waiting for the proper time to strike. It was the high purpose of the men—their devotion to the great cause that they themselves had taken up which gave us the strength to carry through.

"That army has now gone through with the greatest credit the stern test of battle, and its morale stands high in the estimation of all the world.

"You will I know forgive me if I stress to you the importance of these great advantages which we now have and understand I am sure the anxious thought I have that they should not be lost in any way. . . ."

The figures on reinforcements showed Canada could safely count "on some short period yet before there is danger of the situation becoming acute". And now the need was known he was confident "our men and women will come forward to serve—that they will take up this honorable obligation and rally to the support of our gallant comrades overseas".

Before an audience that completely filled the O'Brien Theatre and stood outside in hundreds before amplifiers, General McNaughton was introduced by Major A. B. C. Throop, of Renfrew, Renfrew county Victory Loan chairman, as "a D.S.O., D. S.C., a very distinguished soldier, indeed and one of the busiest men in Canada at this moment".

He was thanked for his address by R. A. Jeffery, of Arnprior, honorary chairman for Renfrew county, and following the latters remarks, General McNaughton rose again to express the emotion he felt for the kindly sentiments expressed and for the hospitable welcome accorded him on his first visit to Arnprior.

Deputy Reeve J. P. Mulvihill, acting mayor, extended a civic welcome, in the absence of Mayor A. H. Reid. The Victory Loan prayer was offered by Rev. J. T. Warnock, the declaration of pupose was read by Rev. S. S. O'Brien and seated on the platform, besides those mentioned, were Dr. J. J. McCann, M.P., Brigadier W. C. Thackeray, commandant of Petawawa Military Camp; J. J. Southern, of Pembroke; E. J. Stewart, of Renfrew; R. C. Comford, of Pembroke, and Lieut. Cockburn, Pembroke; Col. Crossley, Petawawa; Col. E. A. Wiggs, Petawawa, and Messrs D.L.

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PRESS CLIPPINGS

Office of
The Prime Minister

C 272880

Name of Publication .....

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McKerracher, chairman Arnprior Victory Loan committee; A. D. F. Campbell, D. A. Gillies, H. A. Short, R. M. Simpson, and W. H. McFarlane, all of Arnprior.

A feature of the meeting was a presentation of new colors to President Don Hamel of the local Legion, to replace the colors recently destroyed by fire.

Guests Entertained.

There was a luncheon at the New Byrne for the many visitors to town for the occasion. Presiding was R. A. Jeffery, who welcomed the military and civilian guests. Among the speakers were Deputy Reeve Mulvihill, acting mayor; Brigadier Thackray, Col. E. A. Wiggs and Col. Crossley; Lt. J. A. Cockburn and R. C. Coxford, Pembroke; J. A. Maloney, Renfrew, and Walter F. Wilson, of Toronto, Victory Loan organizer for Eastern Ontario, who stated the Renfrew County Victory Loan campaign was well ahead of schedule both in the matter of individual subscriptions and in the total to date.

General McNaughton and Mrs. McNaughton were entertained privately to luncheon at the home of Mr. and Mrs. R. M. Simpson.

At 2.30 o'clock a parade formed on the high school campus and marched through the streets of the town, in the following order: Provincial Police, Lanark and Renfrew Scottish Band, Legion, Pembroke Sea Cadets, R.C.A. Band, R.C.A. Petawawa detachments, R.C.E. Band and detachment, Arnprior Air Cadets and band, Miss Canada Girls, Boy Scouts and Cubs. The salute was taken at the corner of John and Elgin streets by General McNaughton, accompanied by Major Throop, Brigadier Thackray and J. J. Southern.

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PRESS CLIPPINGS

Office of
The Prime Minister

Name of Publication

Date

Subject

C 272881

General Repeats Stand Against Conscription

By KENNETH C. CRAGG

Arnprior, Nov. 5 (Staff).—An immediate army recruiting campaign to meet admitted reinforcement shortages was foreshadowed today by Defense Minister McNaughton in his first public address since he succeeded Col. J. L. Ralston Thursday.

Gen. McNaughton declared himself to veterans of this and the last war, at a Victory Loan rally, as standing squarely behind the voluntary service system. He did more: he in effect launched a campaign by directly asking veterans who have had battle experience to do their part "to bring the younger generation to a sense of their obligation in support of their comrades overseas."

He told them: "There is no other way of getting supporting troops to be of use in time."

Indicating that he opposed conscripting Home Defense troops for overseas, the Minister said he was "firmly convinced that the best hope lies in the maintenance of our long traditions of voluntary service."

"We have had this from the earliest days of this way," he said. "We had it in the last war until we changed and then we gained no benefit in time to be of any use."

(Conscription was introduced in the First Great War in August, 1917, and the first conscripts arrived in France in the dying months of the war.)

Need Great, But Not Acute

Reinforcements now available show that "we can safely count on some short period yet before there is danger of the situation becoming acute," said the Defense Minister. "I think there is time to tell our public of the great need as I now do."

He was confident that "now the need is known" our men and women will come forward to serve, "that they will take up this honorable obligation and rally to the support of our gallant comrades overseas."

He hoped that the public would give them every support and encouragement. He predicted that the enemy could be finished off quickly "only if we base our efforts on the united purpose of all Canada, united spiritually in thought and in action."

At the conclusion of his main address and before he spoke informally to the rows of veterans, Gen. McNaughton thanked the rally for the reception given to him. "It is an encouragement," he added, "that you and I can see this thing through to a conclusion in a matter of days."

Must Act Quickly

Asked afterward for an interpretation of the time reference, the Defense Minister said: "It is most important that we get the voluntary effort under way and moving forward in a matter of days. While there is no cause for immediate anxiety, we must look forward to the months ahead."

The Minister was warmly received before and after his address, and the veteran body, the men whom he addressed as "Comrades" cheered him when he concluded his separate address to them.

There was evident, nevertheless, sharp division in their ranks on the Government's policy. As they started to break away from their reserved seats at the front of the O'Brien Theatre, a voice said clearly,("Another yes-man."

Three rows up, a group surged up to the Defense Minister. Jimmy Geddes, 32, formerly with the 51st Field Regiment R.C.A., boarded out as medically unfit in September, 1943, bluntly his former commander:

"What are you going to do about Zombies?"

"Good boy Jimmy," said one of the men.

"Where Do You Stand?"

"Where do you stand on conscription?"

Gen. McNaughton briefly referred him to his statement of belief in the voluntary service principle, said he would make a policy statement on the Home Defense draftees Monday night in his address to the Canadian Legion meeting in Ottawa.

The Minister told Geddes on the Zombie question: "Well, we've got to bring men to a sense of duty."

After the general and his party moved toward the exists, Geddes declared: "I voted for King the last time and I am certainly not going to vote for him again."

Geddes explained to reporters he had just asked the question to let the general know "the strong feeling of the boys overseas." "The general had already given me an answed when he asked for continuance of the volunteer system, but I just wanted him to know that we all don't agree with him," he added.

Partial Text

Following is a partial text of Defense Minister McNaughton's address:

. . . Until quite recently in Italy and in Northwest Europe our forces were advancing very rapidly. They were driving the Germans before them in great disorder, and great victories followed one another in rapid succession.

We were reaping to the full the great advantages which lay with us in this mobile type of war, where the superior initiative, the high intelligence and the individual skills of our men are assets which could be given full scope.

We reaped to the full the fruits of the carefully prepared mobility of our wonderfully effective mechanical transport and armored fighting vehicles and other gear, much of which is the product of our own Canadian factories.

In all these great advances in Northwest Europe and in Italy our men have given a marvellous account of themselves. Their gallantry in action, their skill in tactics, their hard endurance has carried their fame throughout the whole known world and we may well take pride in what they have accomplished for the cause.

Perhaps in these months of summer we have become accustomed to victory. Perhaps we have been unduly optimistic that the forward progress would continue with unabated speed. Perhaps we have thought that the end for Germany was nearer than it is.

Form of War Changing

Now we are coming up against the heavy zone of fortifications which the Nazi has prepared close in to Germany itself and to which he is clinging with desperation for he well knows that when we pass these he is done. The form of war is changing. We are nearly through the mobile phase in which the advantages lay with us. And now we must conduct siege warfare of the most intense character to crush the enemy's defenses out of existence and free the way for our infantry to advance.

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MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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We must not ease our pressure. We must not let him check the rate of our advance, for if he does, then he gains the time he seeks to make his preparation for the different kind of war he plans—to organize his forces underground for sabotage and murder, to complete new weapons and devices of vast power to use against us.

For siege warfare we need lavish supplies of guns and shells, and these we must provide as a first priority. We have learned that the price of victory can be paid either in lives of men or shells, and so we must see to it that guns and shells go forward in thegreat quantities that are required.

I have visited many of our munition plants and I have seen the great effort which is being made. I have watched our men and women working long hours day after day and month after month—running into years. The need continues and this effort now must be increased. More men and women are required in the factories.

And I do appeal that all who can will volunteer their services to this task. Women are particularly required for their slim dextrous fingers can do the delicate operations in assembly plants and factories that no man can well accomplish. . . .

Must Meet "Vital Need"

And now I would say a few words to you about our men and units in the field and the vital need that must be met that our forces are maintained as is required in the last phase in which they seek finally to destroy the Nazi—and to assure that the peace we gain will be safely confirmed.

I believe that they and we are fully determined that we will maintain our just part in the great Allied efort that is still required.

For this two things are needed—munitions, and men for reinforcements. Munitions, I am certain, are in sight on the lavish scale required, and the only question is the men who are needed to keep our units engaged in battle up to stregth.

This is the vital matter that rightly engages the earnest thoughts of every one in Canada today, and it is a question for which an answer must be found—and promptly.

Two methods of solution are open, either of whcih we might take. One is to continue the voluntary system for service overseas; the other is to resort to compulsion.

I know full well that there is an honest difference of opinion as to the respective merits of these systems, and I am going to tell you very frankly what I think about the matter.

Cites Field Reports

First, let me say that all through the war and even when I have not ben directly concerned with this problem, I have continued to give it the closest attention, and during the last few days since again I have responsibility I have explored every possibility with the utmost care. I have read and studied the reports from our officers in the field—I have read and studied the suggestions and proposals made by our officers here—and I am firmly convinced that the best hope lies in the maintenance of our long traditions of voluntary service. We have had this from the earliest days of the war. We had it in the last war until we changed, and then we gained no benefit in time to be of use. We have had it long before in other wars in which we had to fight in the defense of our homes and kith and kin.

We have built the system of discipline in our army on the principle of an honorable obligation voluntarily assumed. That army went through the very difficult and anxious time of waiting for the proper time to strike. It was the high purpose of the men—their devotion to the great cause that they themselves had taken up which gave us the strength to carry through.

Army Morale High

That army has now gone through with the greatest credit the stern test of battle, and its morale stands high in the estimation of all the world.

You will, I know, forgive me if I stress to you the importance of these great advantages which we now have and understand I am sure the anxious thought I have that they should not be lost in any way.

The figures of the reinforcements now available show that we can safely count on some short period yet before there is danger of the situation becoming acute. I think that there is time to tell our public of the great need as I now do. I know their deep interest, and I am confident that, now the need is known, our men and women will come forward to serve — that they will take up this honorable obligation and rally to the support of our gallant comrades overseas. I hope that the public of Canada, knowing the urgency, will give them every support and encouragement.

We have a foul enemy to contend with. We must finish him off quickly. We can only do this if we base our efforts on the United purpose of all Canada—united spiritually in thought and in action.

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PRESS CLIPPINGS C 272883

Office of
The Prime Minister

Name of Publication Montreal Gazette

Date November 7, 1944

Subject Speech at Ottawa, Nov 6/44 Gen McNaughton

Voluntary Basis of Army Decided On His Advice, States McNaughton

Ottawa, November 6.—(CP)—The basis on which the Canadian Army was raised "was decided by the government on my advice," Defence Minister McNaughton tonight told a Canadian Legion meeting here.

Gen. McNaughton made the statement when asked by a veteran in the audience if Prime Minister Mackenzie King was continuing the voluntary enlistment system for the sake of "political expediency." The veteran, seated in the balcony of the National Museum lecture hall, identified himself as Mr. Taylor.

The general said the very fact that he had the responsibility he had today was because the Prime Minister had stuck to the advice "I had given him."

"I would not have been here today if the fundamental basis which I believe with every atom of my being was not present," said the General.

Earlier, an unidentified veteran asked if the General's decision to continue the voluntary enlistment system was a popular decision in the eight English speaking provinces of Canada.

The Defence Minister said he had never been one who rested decision on popularity one way or the other.

He said that in October, 1939, he had resigned himself to the improbability of seeing service in the field and had turned his attention to getting munition production underway.

Shortly after, he was summoned by the government to form and lead the Canadian Army overseas. He was asked by the government to outline how the fundamental basis of organization should proceed.

"I made it clear that we could carry our effort to success if we based it on a voluntary system," said Gen. McNaughton.

He said he had had experience on which to base his observations.

When he returned from the Great War Sir Arthur Currie, commander of the Canadian Army, "commanded me" to study the basis for the raising forces of the future.

"That was early in 1919 and from that day to this I have never ceased to study the problem," he said.

During the peace years he had tried to keep alive, despite ridicule from many sides, a militia in Canada. He had tried to keep alive something that could be rekindled and rebuilt in time of danger when defence was needed.

Now Canada had a voluntary army overseas.

"I say if that army had of been raised otherwise than by the voluntary method we would have had no army worthy of the name," Gen. McNaughton said.

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CANADA

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OTTAWA PRESS CLIPPINGS MG 272884 Office of The Prime Minister

Name of Publication Ottawa M Citizen

Date Nov 7/44

7/No 1

Subject

Facing Hostile Meeting's Demands That Zombies Be Sent Overseas, Gen. McNaughton Stands By His Guns

Partial Text.

A partial text of General McNaughton's speech, omitting the lengthy quotations he made from his Arnprior speech follows:

Mr. President,

Comrades of Past Wars:

This is the first opportunity which I have had to thank you personally for the action which you took some eighteen months ago when you elected me an honorary life member of your branch of the Canadian Legion of the British Empire Service

Your letter to me was written

Your yetter to me was written in May, 1943, and I received it in June, at which time we were in the midst of the planning, the special training and the moves of the troops of the First Canadian Division into place to launch the attack on Sicily.

Those were very anxious days and I can tell you now that your message and your good wishes and the confidence which you expressed in your comrades in the Canadian Army overseas was very much appreciated indeed.

Tonight, you have done me this great honor of presenting me with the badge of this honorary membership and I will always treasure it and I hope I may from time to time be privileged to attend your meetings and to take some part in your discussions, for there are many matters concerning the welfare of those who have served Canada in this and other wars on which I would like to talk with you.

I say to you that I believe the Legion and the great organizations which have been set up in Canada by the veterans of past wars have a very important part to play in all that must be done. You are men who have had experience of battle. You have gone through the days of bitter struggle when success hung in narrow balance. You have seen that success and victory achieved and then, when the fighting ceased, you came back to Canada to go through this difficult experience of demobilization and re-establishment in civil life.

First Hand Knowledge.

From all this you have acquired a first-hand knowledge which should be turned to full account as we grapple with the problems which will present themselves to the younger generation of Canadian soldiers. There are many things which were done after the first world war which should not have been done. There were many things which would have helped which were not done, and it is only by drawing wisdom from past experience that we can hope to make things right for the future.

However, it is not of post war problems that I would talk to you tonight. We have yet to bring this titanic struggle, in which we are now engaged, to a satisfactory conclusion and meanwhile we must concentrate our full attention on what is required to support our forces in the field in the battles they yet must fight before we pass this last hard stretch.

In numerous talks which I have given to the public in the last few weeks, I have tried to point out the nature of the task which has yet to be completed. We now, both in Italy and in northwest Europe, are up against fortified zones of great depth and strength, with every obstacle and device to hamper our advance which the German mind has been able to conceive. Hundreds of thousands of slave labor have been employed for years to create these fixed defences. They have been carefully sited by the skilled engineers of the German army to give them every advantage of terrain. They are provided with all the accessories to make life easy for those in garrison—land or water—communications, bomb proof shelters —concrete machinegun and anti-tank posts—anti-aircraft guns—roads and railways — everything which could be thought of which could be of use. To pass these lines we must turn to the practice of siege warfare of the most intense character and above all else, we must have guns and shells in lavish quantities.

You have heard me say many times that the price of victory must be paid either in shells or in

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the lives of our men and every shell which can be produced and shipped and delivered at the front is a contribution to preserving the lives of those who are very dear to us.

I have spoken in many of our munition plants to bring the importance of this matter to the attention of the workers engaged on this vital task—to ask them to increase their efforts on behalf of our men overseas—to ask them to beg their friends to volunteer their services to increase the numbers engaged. I feel the importance of this matter so keenly that I will not neglect any occasion which offers to bring it constantly before the attention of the people of Canada. And I have faith in those people of ours that once they know and recognize a need they will see to it that the proper answer is given.

Much of the work in the filling and assembly plants, and even in the factories where the shells are produced, can best be done by women. They handle the delicate gear with great precision and they have a natural aptitude for many of the operations. We men must admit that in this they are superior to us.

So what is now required is that more women come forward to undertake this vital work and I appeal to all who can to do so. To those who do I would say you can take the utmost satisfaction in the work you do and its contribution to saving the lives of our men.

For Reinforcements.

There is another great need of which I also would like to speak to you, and that is men for reinforcements. Yesterday afternoon I spoke of this at a dedication service in Arnprior, and no doubt many of you know what I said but the importance of the matter is so great that I would ask you to let me read to you the exact words which I used:

(Here he read extensively from his Arnprior speech, the text of which was published in The Citizen yesterday.)

"Declaration of Faith."

That statement, old comrades, is my declaration of faith in the system of voluntary enlistment for services overseas.

I know full well and I have said that here and elsewhere there is an honest difference of opinion, but we cannot proceed two ways at once and I earnestly plead with you—you who are veterans in past wars who know—to accept the assurance that I give that there is no other way to correct this situation to be in time to be of use.

In the last few days since I have had the opportunity I have been investigating the situation of the N.R.M.A., men and recruits, and there are many steps which can and must be taken to bring this situation into order.

First, I find that this group of men has been held together for a multiplicity of purposes. Some of them have been trained as soldiers. Others, being fully trained as soldiers, have been used from time to time as a sort of reserve of workers to move about and undertake construction and other tasks—others have been similarly used to gather crops—to work in the mines and in the woods.

No doubt all these works are of national importance but I do not think that they should be done by soldiers to the prejudice of their proceeding overseas.

"Quite Fantastic."

I find that many of these men have been able to obtain remuneration on a scale which is quite fantastic and I do not wonder that those who seek their personal advantage and who have their chance to make large sums in cash would fail to come forward to volunteer for service overseas.

I have issued instruction that this practice is to cease—no more men are to be supplied and the officers of the department will at the earliest recall any now out who are fit for military duty.

I feel, and I know our comrades overseas feel, too, that this large group of men is a danger to their prospects of remunerative employment after demobilization—that they being on the spot will have the first call on the best jobs. They and you can be assured that this will not be allowed to happen. I have promised fair play to our comrades overseas and they most certainly shall have it, even if it means delaying the demobilization of the N.R.M.A. men who do not volunteer and so remain in Canada.

Now this—you will agree—is all negative, but I have positive proposals as well to correct abuses and unfortunate procedure and attitudes which seem to have developed or crept in.

These N.R.M.A. men were placed under the direction of the Department of National Defence to be trained as soldiers, and trained as soldiers they will be.

They will not be subject to the abuse of which I have had instances reported to me. They will be given the best officers and instructors that I can find. They will be given training on the same fine basis that we gave to our troops in England preparing for the assault. They will be encouraged to play their part as soldiers and to accept the honorable obligation of service overseas and I have confidence that with these new conditions and new background the problem will largely disappear, provided—and this is most important—that I can have the support of you men who know what a little sympathy and help will do for men who have been driven. I want to give them a new deal and I beg your aid in this. You cannot drive men of spirit but you can encourage and lead.

Leave to Canada.

From the information which I have I am so convinced that this project will give us the reinforcements that we need when we require them that I have already taken another step which otherwise I could not have done. I have ordered that arrangements should be made forthwith to open leave to Canada for those of very long service overseas and I hope the first of these will be home with us for Christmas.

Shipping is a difficulty and so the number wil lbe small at first —I cannot yet give details.

And so now my friends and comrades, I ask your help. I have sent a message to our army pledging myself to them. I ask you to join me in this pledge.

Message to Army.

To all ranks of the Canadian army overseas.

"Through all the long months since I had to leave you I have followed your progress with the deepest interest. Your performance on the field of battle has been magnificent and all at home

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PRESS CLIPPINGS C 272886 Office of The Prime Minister

Name of Publication .....

Date .....

Subject .....

in Canada have thrilled with pride in your gallantry and your mastery of arms.

"In a steady succession of hard-fought actions, in Italy and northwest Europe, you have driven the enemy before you in disorder and you have played your full part in bringing victory nearer.

"Your great successes have given the deepest satisfaction and from my heart I congratulate you all.

"Now, I have been called again to a position of responsibility in your affairs. It is my concern to see to it that you will have the support you need; and we will maintain our just part in the great Allied effort to bring the enemy to final defeat. It is my concern to watch over your every interest now; and when peace shall again be established.

"Then, we will enter a new and changing era of great promise for Canada and my concern and duty will be to ensure that you who have borne the heavy burden in the heat of battle shall have fair play."

New Defence Minister Adheres to Voluntary Method; Recalling Draftees to Army; Giving Some Men Overseas Canada Leave

By J. A. Hume

Facing a meeting noisily hostile to the government's policy of no conscription for overseas service, General A. G. L. McNaughton, C.B., new defence minister, had heavy going in addressing the Ottawa branch of the Canadian Legion at the National Museum auditorium last night. About 800 veterans and service men attended the angry but fairly orderly meeting at which the minister was accorded an occasional burst of approving applause.

Advised Voluntary Method.

General McNaughton, with a calm smile, stoutly avowed his adherence to the voluntary enlistment method, which he said he advised the government to follow when first he was summoned to organize and command the 1st Canadian Division at the outbreak of the war. But his avowals were greeted by frequent derisive interjections, such as "Send the Zombies over," "Give the Zombies guts!" "Political expediency," "65 Votes (Quebec) for Mackenzie King," "What about the British and the United States draft?"

Described as "Draw."

The meeting might accurately be described as a draw. General McNaughton did not break down the almost unanimous hard core of the meeting in favor of conscripting the zombies and, on the other hand, the meeting did not fluster nor shake General McNaughton in his personal faith and adherence to the voluntary system as the best to be continued in the interests of sustaining Canada's war effort to the highest level of efficiency.

General McNaughton persisted in addressing the gathering as "Old Comrades" and the meeting, in turn, showed an obvious respect for the minister personally and for his great record of service to his country, closing with three cheers.

Principal Points.

In his main 25-minute prepared speech, which he read quietly, in the midst of many interruptions, General McNaughton made the following points:

1. N.R.M.A. men will be trained as soldiers on the same fine basis as the first volunteer divisions were trained for so long in Britain while awaiting service on the fighting fronts and the draftees will be "encouraged to play their part as soldiers."

2. Arrangements have been initiated for leave to Canada for those volunteers who have given long service overseas and he hoped the first of such men will be home for Christmas, but, because of shipping difficulties, he could not give details as to the number to be given home leave in the immediate future.

3. Many steps can and must be taken to bring the draftee army situation into order and all such men now off military duty on varied projects at "quite fantastic" wages, even though the projects are more or less essential, will be recalled for military duty. They will not be allowed to endanger the prospects of volunteers as to remunerative employment after demobilization, even if it means delaying the demobilization of the draftees.

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MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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PRESS CLIPPINGS 272887 Office of The Prime Minister

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Presents Badge.

R. B. Halpenny, branch president, presenting General McNaughton with the badge of honorary life membership in the legion, remarked, "This is the highest honor of the legion and we are happy in offering it to you at this time."

Before General McNaughton's arrival, as the first item of business, Mr. Halpenny, holding high in his hand a 5 o'clock edition of The Evening Citizen with the headline "Legion Urges Zombies Be Sent Overseas," called for a motion from the floor placing the meeting on record endorsing the action of the council of the Canadian Legion in making this demand of the government. O. F. Howe and Lawrence Button quickly moved the motion and it was as promptly adopted by a standing vote, apparently unanimous.

The text of General McNaughton's formal speech is carried later on so some attention is now paid to the 25-minute question period which followed, after Mr. Halpenny observed, "I will accept any question that is not embarrassing to our guest."

First question was, "Is the policy advocated by the minister popular in the eight English speaking provinces?"

General McNaughton: "That is a fair question. I have never been one who rested decisions in great matters on popularity, one way or another. When I was first summoned to organize the 1st Canadian Division, I made it clear to the government, beyond peradventure of a doubt, that Canada could only carry the war to success if based on the voluntary enlistment system. When I came back from overseas in the last war, I was commanded by Sir Arthur Currie (Canadian commander in the Great War) to give study to the basis on which our forces of the future might be organized and from then on I have never ceased to study the problem. I have given my life to that particular kind of work and I sought to carry the little nucleus of militia we had through the hard days (between wars) when we were scorned by all and sundry. I sought to keep it alive as a spark which could be rekindled and rebuilt in time of danger as a means of Canada's defence.

"I have seen what voluntary effort did and I say if we had not had that system we would have had no army today worthy of the name. There was a score of years when everybody, including Parliament, drove us underground so we hardly knew what to do to hold together the militia as a defiance to keep the enemy from our shores when war came again. Popularity has nothing to do with the situation today, as far as I am concerned; it rests on merit itself."

Frank Williams, admidst cheers and cries of "Hear, Hear," asked what the minister would say to young boys coming of age who had lost brothers overseas. "To send such boys overseas would be heartless and utterly bad when you have 70,000 Zombies you don't know what to do with," Mr. Williams averred.

General McNaughton: "This is no way to debate one of the most serious questions in front of us today. There never was a time when we should approach matters with open minds and take our conclusion on the basis of cold, considered reason."

There were some cries, "You haven't answered the question."

"Political Expediency."

Mr. Taylor—"Giving the minister credit for his personal sincerity in setting forth the policy he has here tonight, will General McNaughton say, in his conscience, that also he is satisfied the Prime Minister is not looking to political expediency only?" There were cheers and applause and cries, "65 (Quebec) Votes," "Answer 'Yes' or 'No' ."

General McNaughton—"Our army in 1939 was raised on the basis of advice I then gave to the government in favor of voluntary enlistment. The very fact I have accepted the responsibilities of defence minister which I have today shows conclusively, I think, that the Prime Minister of Canada has stuck to the advice given him by myself and those who made a special study of the position. I would not have been here today under any circumstances whatever if the fundamental basis of voluntary enlistment, which I believe with every atom of my being, were not acceptable to the government of Canada."

A voice from the audience, "What about what is acceptable to the people of Canada, not the government?"

John Young, observing that "everything has been done to evade conscription," asked "Why does the government not give conscription a try?"

Test in 1917.

General McNaughton—"I have the most lively recollection of the test made of conscription in 1917 and I know what that test cost in the battlefield then. It cost us one of the finest divisions we ever had, the 5th Division under Garnet Hughes, which had to be broken up for reinforcements while the public mind was upset about conscription and while the whole flow of volunteers stopped. That was the cost then to us when we were changing the fundamental basis of army service in mid-stream. I for one do not want ever to be associated with anything like the heart-break we suffered at that time."

Somebody asked a question whether, with new forms of battle in this war, new methods of recruitment for the forces were not needed as well.

General McNaughton—"I don't think the new forms of battle have anything to do with the problem here. I think the man who comes forward voluntarily and shoulders the obligation of honor to fight for his country is a better man and better able to fight than the conscript."

There were cries, "The Germans are doing pretty well otherwise" and "What about the U.S. draft?"

"Zombies at M.D.H.Q."

Another veteran then asked, "I would like to know what the minister is going to do with the zombies at M.D.H.Q. here in Ottawa and other zombies in No. 8 Building, who are from one regiment around Quebec city?" Cheers followed this question, and someone called out, "Now you have put your finger on it."

General McNaughton—"I may say that engaging the very earnest attention of the adjutant general are the very men of whom you speak and what he is going to do about them I will probably know in one or two days."

A voice—"And the zombies are put out on subsistence."

General McNaughton—"Don't forget, however, I did not put them out on subsistence."

Another question was, "Why did Great Britain follow the compulsory system of enlistment instead of depending on the good old voluntary system?"

General McNaughton—"I believe we have our own problems and that we have to solve them in our own way. We must give our problems consideration, take a decision, and then, as in all military matters, stick to it."

Mr. Halpenny, though there were some members of the audience still obviously desirous of asking the minister further question, observed —"I think General McNaughton has

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been more than generous in coming here and answering questions. (Applause). General McNaughton knew the attitude of the Legion before he came to this meeting and I think we should conclude our questions now because we did not bring the minister here to embarrass him."

General McNaughton read the first part of his prepared speech without much interruption. However, when he spoke of two plans of enlistment, the voluntary one and the other "the resort to conscription," the meeting broke out into wild cheering, and cries of "Exactly." He continued "I know full well . . ." "You don't," somebody shouted. "I know there are honest differences of opinion about this matter," the minister went on. "Not a bit of it," called sombeody.

An Angry Chorus.

When General McNaughton went on to say he is firmly convinced the best hope for Canada lies in continuing the long tradition of voluntary enlistment, there was an angry chorus of "No, No," "Send the Zombies," "Don't listen to expediency," "What about men who have been over there fighting for four years?"

When General McNaughton spoke about the morale of the Canadian army being the highest of any in the war, a voice shouted, "And the Zombies stand the lowest."

Then the miniter, reiterating part of his Sunday speech at Arnprior about there being a short period yet before there is danger of reinforcements becoming acute, somebody called, "How long?" and another, "Wait till winter comes."

The minister referred to his confident belief that, now the need is known, "our men and women will come forward to serve." "Yes, the women will come," somebody agreed, and there was laughter and ridicule.

"I hope the public will give every support and encouragement to men to enlist voluntarily and that is my declaration of faith in the voluntary system," General McNaughton continued.

"Dictated by Mackenzie King," and "Get a Boy Scout," voices shouted.

"I ask you to accept by assurance and belief that no other way than continuance of the voluntary system will be in time to be of use in this war," the minister went on. This was greeted by a murmur and a chorus of "No, No."

Laughter greeted the minister's reference to the home defence army men carrying on a multiplicity of purposes. Applause followed his assertion that N.R.M.A. men would not be permitted to carry on other than military duty. When he added no more men would be supplied by the army for such work, granted it was more or less essential, a voice cried, "What does King say to that?"

Pledge to Men Overseas.

When the minister gave his pledge to volunteers overseas that the draftees would not get an earlier chance at remunerative jobs ahead of the volunteers, a voice shouted, "It has happened already."

Unbelieving shouts of "Oh, Oh" followed the minister's expressed belief that with draftees being "encouraged" to play their part as soldiers the reinforcement problem would largely disappear. "Providing I have your support and I want to give them (draftees) a new deal," the General added. "Give them guts," a voice replied.

Outburst of Applause.

The General's announcement about leave in Canada for volunteers with long service was accorded a great outburst of applause.

Concluding, the General read his message to the army overseas on assuming the portfolio of defence. "I have sent a message to our army pledging myself to them; I ask you to join me in this pledge."

"We do, but not the Zombies," someone shouted and then the General had finished his formal speech.

Earlier in the meeting 45 of 82 new members were welcomed into the branch. Of the 82, it was stated, 57 are veterans of this war. The branch now has about 1,282 members of whom about 300 are veterans of this war.

Lady Byng, widow of Lord Byng, one time commander of the Canadian army in the last war and later governor-general of Canada, occupied a seat on the platform as an honorary life member of the Legion.

Mrs. Bernard M. Alexandor spoke briefly on behalf of the Legion Poppy Day on Nov. 11, Armistice Day for the Great War.

About seven members of the R.C.M.P. were on duty in the building during the evening, but their services were not required as Mr. Halpenny was able to keep the meeting under control at all times.

The meeting was held in the Museum auditorium which served to house the House of Commons for four years after the disastrous fire which swept the Parliament Buildings in 1916.

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MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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C272889

PRESS CLIPPINGS

Name of Publication Toronto Globe and Mail

Date November 16 1944

Hint McNaughton Favors Sending Draftees Overseas

By KENNETH C. CRAGG

OTTAWA, Nov. 15 (Staff).—Defense Minister McNaughton, committed to the voluntary enlistment plan when he entered Cabinet two weeks ago, according to authoritative sources, has been forced by the hard facts of the army reinforcement position to reverse his policy and has advised Prime Minister King the draftees are needed overseas.

The reported development stands revealed in Mr. King's sudden decision to call Parliament, and there is a strongly held belief that members will be advised in detail of the situation in secret session and on the floor of Commons later will be directed into an independent vote.

The sudden call issued by the Prime Minister on Monday night, after a brief Cabinet meeting in which his Ministers were not advised of his plan, immediately raised a storm of rumor in the capital from which in time has emerged a fairly clear picture.

Magic Wand

As pieced together in responsible quarters here, it is believed that both the Prime Minister and Gen. McNaughton thought that the latter's appointment would be the magic wand that would still the waters of criticism raised by the Government's refusal to act on Col. J. L. Ralston's recommendation to send draftees by compulsion overseas according to the Government's pledge.

But, as the last two weeks has shown, it failed to stem the tide of public indignation. It is stressed repeatedly that Gen. McNaughton, who blamed the former Minister for his retirement, was talked into accepting the job without assessing the task he has to do and without taking into consideration the mood of the public.

The hostile reaction of servicemen, veterans, and of the public generally, to the Arnprior speech was his first indication of the public feeling on the question.

The second eye-opener came yesterday when Gen. McNaughton met the district officers commanding the 13 military districts in Canada to survey the reinforcement problem with them. He met them not as a superior officer, but as a civilian. He is said to have asked them for their candid opinions on the situation, and he got them.

Couldnt Be Hopeful

The meeting, it has been advised, was not acrimonious, but the DOC's told him frankly that he did not stand a chance of getting the needed reinforcements by the voluntary method.

Defense Minister McNaughton announced tonight:

"TThe purpose of the conference was to obtain from these commanders the latest views and to get the best picture of the situation generally in respect to the provision of reinforcements for overseas. Valuable information has been obtained and is being analyzed and studied. The results are a definite step forward toward the clarification of the situation.

"A careful review was made of home establishments with a view to the disbandment of those no longer required for training or for home defense in the light of the progress of the war.

"Progress in voluntary enlistments for the army from the public and from NRMA was considered, and the special difficulties in respect to the latter were under review.

"The conference now is concluded and the commanders are en route to their respective commands."

It is reported that the information Gen. McNaughton has had from overseas since he took office has substantiated Col. Ralston's stand in Cabinet, and more.

All of these things, it is believed, Gen. McNaughton has reported to the Prime Minister and, in so doing, has reversed himself to the point that he has advised he does not think that the voluntary plan can meet the urgency and that there is no other way but the way of compulsion.

It is believed, therefore, that the House will meet in secret session, and that the Defense Minister will be called in to make a report. It is believed he will claim that he had thought the voluntary system could have been speeded up, but that from information he now has, he knows that he is wrong.

As a result of this report, Prime Minister King will release the Liberal members from their party obligation and will give them the right of a free and independent vote.

Showing Strain

One thing is certain: Gen. McNaughton, according to those who have been in close touch with him, is definitely showing the strain of office and his appearance reflects the situation in which he has been placed.

Support for the belief that Mr. King will follow the procedure with Parliament that is indicated above is seen in the sudden turn of the C.C.F. as indicated by the statement given yesterday in Edmonton by Mr. Coldwell.

Mr. Coldwell is said to have been kept informed by the powers that be, and yesterday he advocated a secret session and advised, "if it is shown that the need is there, we must use all means in our power to reinforce our men overseas." The statement was the first that the C.C.F. Leader has given which did not predicate compulsion with the conscription of wealth.

It is asserted that, having freed his group, Mr. King, who is in the tightest political spot he has ever been in, will then appeal to Quebec members to fall in line because of the extreme gravity of the situation.

Confusion in Capital

The confusion that has snarled the capital over the coming House meeting has increased rather than lessened, and has given rise to such quaint pastimes as Parliamentarians interviewing correspondents to find out what is going on, and Cabinet Ministers admitting they know nothing about Mr. King's plans.

Among theories advanced overnight, culled from reports heard by the doorman, the official winder of the Peace Tower clock, a member of the Board of Trade, Toronto, three Liberals and a lone Progressive Conservative from an unidentified riding, were:

Mr. King will resign and ask Col. Ralston to form a Government; Col. Ralston will cross the floor of the House; Col. Ralston will not cross the floor of the House; the Government will pass the Order-in-Council to send draftees overseas, and Commons will be asked to endorse that action.

Members of Parliament began to arrive today for the session.

There was a stir of increased activity about the centre block with the arrival of Speaker J. A. Glen, by plane, and some eight or 10 private members. It is expected a majority of the members will reach Ottawa during the week-end.

Three Cabinet Ministers are absent from the city. Air Minister Power who recently underwent an operation in Quebec City is expected back Monday. Munitions Minister Howe, attending the international air conference in Chicago, is expected back within a few days. Labor Minister Mitchell is in Edmonton on a western speaking tour, but it is presumed he will cut his trip short to arrive back in Ottawa in time for the session.

Uncertainty as to how long the session will last complicates arrangements which have to be made for accommodation of the members. It is not expected the Parliamentary restaurant will be opened, but consideration is being given to opening the cafeteria.

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MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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PRESS CLIPPINGS C272890 Office of The Prime Minister

Name of Publication Ottawa E Citizen (5 O'clock)

Date Nov 16/44

Subject

Prime Minister Says Report Wholly Untrue

Indicates Policy on Draftees Unchanged.

By Charles Bishop

Prompt and emphatic denial came this morning from the Prime Minister's office of a statement published in newspapers that Gen. A. G. L. McNaughton has come around to the policy of general conscription for overseas service and that the purpose of calling back the House of Commons in special session is to give effect to that policy.

Statement Issued

The Prime Minister's office issued the following statement:

"When asked if the Prime Minister had any comment to make on the press statement that Gen. McNaughton 'committed to the voluntary enlistment plan when he entered the cabinet two weeks ago, according to authoritative sources, has been forced by the hard facts of the army reinforcement position to reverse his policy and has advised Prime Minister King the draftees are needed overseas,' the Prime Minister's principal secretary informed the press that he was authorized by the Prime Minister to say that the statement that Gen. McNaughton had given any such advice was wholly untrue.

"It is the Prime Minister's well-known belief that Parliament is the proper place to deliberate upon matters of national concern. In the light of the existing controversy, the decision to reconvene the House of Commons is obviously in the public interest."

Said Factor in Change

Linked up with the published story was one that the meeting of district officers commanding here this week and their attitude towards voluntary service had been a factor in the alleged change of government policy.

When he took over the position of minister of national defence, Gen. McNaughton came out with a declaration in favor of a continuance of voluntary service. There is nothing to indicate that he has changed his mind on the subject and, certainly, according to the Prime Minister's statement, he has given no such indication to him.

To what extent the situation will be changed by the discussions in the House next week it is impossible to forecast.

Between now and the opening and during the sitting of the House all sorts of reports and rumors may be expected. Probably they will include reports of a complete "bust-up" in the cabinet, wholesale insurgency on the part of the Liberal members, a move to form a union government on the lines of the one which operated in the last war, the immediate dissolution of Parliament and a red-hot election largely on the racial and religious lines of the last war. Such was the nature of the reports in the 1917 situation in which the conditions were almost identical with the present and the political agitation was similarly wide.

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POOR PRINT
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PRESS CLIPPINGS 272891 Office of The Prime Minister

Name of Publication Ottawa E Journal (5 O'clock]

Date Nov 16/44

Subject

King Denies McNaughton Changes Mind

Both Prime Minister King in a general press release and Defence Minister McNaughton in a statement to The Journal today denied Ottawa reports to Toronto and Montreal newspapers that the General had reversed his policy for voluntary reinforcements for the army overseas.

Mr. King branded as "wholly untrue" the out of town press statements that General McNaughton, "committed to the voluntary enlistment plan when he entered the Cabinet two weeks ago, has been forced by the hard facts of Army reinforcement position to reverse his policy and has advised the Prime Minister that draftees are needed overseas".

Discussion for House.

The Prime Minister's office added that Mr. King believed Parliament was the proper place to deliberate such matters of "national concern" and for that reason the session had been called for next Wednesday.

Earlier, the General told The Journal that reports of his reversal of policy were "wholly without foundation".

He had taken his stand "categorically", in his Arnprior and Ottawa speeches.

"Since then", The Journal suggested, "you have met with the officers commanding the 13 military districts, and they are reported to have told you the Army overseas could not be reinforced voluntarily and that the Draftees must be used."

"Entirely false", replied the General, "the information given me by the O.C.'s confirmed my belief more than ever that continuation of the voluntary policy will provide the reinforcements."

McNaughton's Attitude.

Later in a general press release, the General said:

"The principal matter dealt with (at the conference with the O.C.'s of the military districts) was the provision of reinforcements and particularly the question of trained reinforcements for the Infantry, which is part of the problem in which the situation may become acute. This whole matter was examined objectively and with the utmost frankness with the purpose of providing the Army overseas with its requirements.

"I have drawn from the minds and the great experience of these officers their considered views as to the steps which are open to be taken and the results which would follow.

"Measures to bring the conclusions into operation were decided, and these will be put into effect for the O.C.'s on their arrival at their headquarters to which they now are en route. The results will be reported to me by telegram. Meanwhile, further information and detailed analysis of the composition of the N.R.M.A. are being prepared by the statistical branches. These will be issued promptly on completion for information of the public."

Legion Urges Action.

In Ottawa this morning, Alex Walker, president of the Canadian Legion, asked his provincial commands to "arouse public opinion . . . to demand full inplementation of a total war policy, and see that members of Parliament are approached before the House opens next Wednesday".

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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CANADA

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PRESS CLIPPINGS 272892

Name of Publication Toronto Globe and Mail

Date November 17. 1944

Office of

MR. KING DENIES M'NAUGHTON ADVISED CHANGE

By KENNETH C. CRAGG

Ottawa, Nov. 16 (Staff).—Uncertainty and confusion that has marked nearly every development in the Government crisis over the army reinforcement position was increased here today when Prime Minister King had a statement issued which denied today's report in The Globe and Mail that Defense Minister McNaughton had advised him "the draftees are needed overseas."

Mr. King issued the denial through his secretary.

Mr. King's secretary said:

"When asked if the Prime Minister had any comment to make on the press statement that Gen. McNaughton 'committed to the voluntary enlistment plan when he entered the Cabinet two weeks ago, according to authoritative sources, has been forced by the hard facts of the army reinforcement position to reverse his policy and has advised Prime Minister King the draftees are needed overseas,' the Prime Minister's principal secretary informed the press that he was authorized by the Prime Minister to say that the statement that Gen. McNaughton had given any such advice was wholly untrue.

"It is the Prime Minister's well-known belief that Parliament is the proper place to deliberate upon matters of national concern. In the light of the existing controversy, the decision to reconvene the House is obviously in the public interest."

Evidence that the statement was open to misinterpretation and was misinterpreted, was reflected in the Capital press with such headlines as "Denies McNaughton has reversed views," and "King denies McNaughton changes his mind."

During the day, it was learned one news organization here was advised by a member of Mr. King's staff that its summary had misinterpreted the statement and that the statement said simply that "the statement that Gen. McNaughton had given any such advice was wholly untrue."

The statement said "the Prime Minister's principal secretary informed the press that he was authorized by the Prime Minister to say that the statement that Gen. McNaughton had given any such advice was wholly untrue."

Gen. McNaughton said The Globe and Mail report that he had been forced to reverse his position on voluntary enlistments was "wholly without foundation."

Explains His Stand

Gen. McNaughton said today he had taken his stand "categorically" in recent speeches in which he urged support for continuation of the voluntary system of recruiting.

He added the Tuesday meeting of commanding officers from across Canada "confirmed my belief more than ever that continuation of a voluntary policy will provide the reinforcements."

As the fog of mystery on Mr. King's intentions deepens, an increasing tendency is seen among his own followers to blame the outcry against the Government's adherence to the voluntary plan rather than of accepting former Defense Minister Ralston's recommendation to send draftees by compulsion, on the secrecy that has bound every move.

The first hard-bound fact to emerge from the crisis was Mr. King's press conference admission on Nov. 2 that Col. Ralston had resigned and that Gen. McNaughton had been sworn in as his successor.

He declined to say why he had resigned.

Details of Letters

Liberals do maintain that a frank statement then with the disclosure of the correspondence which passed between Mr. King and Col. Ralston, within the limits of security, would have done much to clear the air, and probably would have averted public outcry.

Last week persons within the party in a position to know said that there was no outcry from Liberals against Col. Ralston precipitating the issue as his conscience dictated in respect of his public pledges to send draftees into the fighting when there was the need.

They said his views were respected, and that he was well thought of in the party generally.

In recent days a suspicion has been growing that party spirits have begun a whispering campaign against the former Defense Minister. It is found in suggestions that the issue was not important enough to smear or cause to have discounted the Administration's general war effort in the public mind.

Motive Implied

Attempts are being made to impute Col's Ralston's loyalty to the Liberal Party by suggesting that behind his stand on Government pledges was a plan to oust Mr. King and to place himself as leader of all those in Parliament who believed as he did on the need of reinforcing overseas units by compulsion.

No one has been able to explain it yet, in view of both Prime Minister King's and Gen. McNaughton's statements of the need of getting trained infantrymen to the overseas reinforcement pool, but Reconstruction Minister Howe's Chicago speech yesterday, in which he is quoted that conscription is "rather a political question than a question of meeting an urgent need," has caused more heartburning within the party than anything since Justice Minister St. Laurent told a Quebec audience on Nov. 5 that the majority in Quebec would have "deemed themselves deceived by their English compatriots" if compulsion had been ordered."

Ten-Day Debate Seen

Ministerial circles today expressed the view the House of Commons will require 10 days to decide its stand on reinforcements for overseas.

The Cabinet held a 3½-hour meeting today and at its conclusion officials said no statement was expected.

Ministers who agree with Mr. King's stand continued to express the view that the Government would be prepared to hold secret sittings and give the members all the information available on the reinforcement situation.

The Progressive Conservative leaders have been in Winnipeg, but Gordon Graydon, House leader, is expected back tomorrow. M. J. Coldwell, CCF leader, will be back Sunday and John Blackmore, head of the Social Credit Party, will likely be here well in advance of the opening.

The Opposition leaders are expected to keep their plans secret until the Government has produced the information it has on the reinforcement situation.

Will Report on Recruiting

The haste, if not anxiety, of the Government to obtain some showing of volunteers from infantry-trained draftees before members are called into caucus on the eve of next Wednesday's meeeting of the Commons was indicated when Defense Minister McNaughton said today the results of recruiting efforts "will be reported to me by telegram."

In his second statement on Tuesday's meeting of commanding officers of commands and districts, Gen. McNaughton said reinforcement measures outlined at the conference will be put into effect by the officers when they reach their posts.

The Minister also said that further information and analysis of the composition of home defense draftees are being prepared by the statistical branches of the army and will be issued soon.

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MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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PRESS CLIPPINGS C 272893 Office of The Prime Minister

Name of Publication .....

Date .....

Subject .....

Text of Statement

Text of today's statement:

"Yesterday I issued to the press a brief statement summarizing the matters which were under consideration at my conference the previous day with the general officer commanding Pacific Command and officers commanding all military districts in Canada.

"The principal matter dealt with was the provision of reinforcements for overseas and particularly the question of trained reinforcements for the infantry, which is the part of the problem in which the situation may become acute. This whole matter was examined objectively and with the utmost frankness, with the purpose of providing the army overseas with its requirements.

"I have drawn from the minds of great experience of these officers their considered views as to the steps which are open to be taken and the results which would follow.

"Measures to bring the conclusions reached into operation were decided and these will be put into effect by the commanding officers on their arrival at their headquarters, to which they are now en route. The results will be reported to me by telegram. Meanwhile, further information and detailed analysis of the composition of the N.R.M.A. are being prepared by the statistical branches. These will be issued promptly on completion for the information of the public."

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PRESS CLIPPINGS C 272894 Office of the Prime Minister

Name of Publication Toronto Globe and Mail

Date November 21, 1944

Subject

Voluntary Enlistment Should Solve Problem, McNaughton's Opinion

Ottawa, Nov. 20 (CP).—Defense Minister McNaughton asked in a statement today that the method of voluntary enlistment to provide reinforcements for Canadian forces overseas "be given a fair trial," and expressed belief that the problem "will be solved."

Text of Gen. McNaughton's statement follows:

"I refer to the statement to the press which I issued on Nov. 16 reporting the results of the conference which I had on Tuesday, Nov. 14, with the general officer commanding Pacific command and the officers commanding all military districts."

(The Minister said then that the principal matter dealt with at the conference was the provision of reinforcements, and particularly the question of trained reinforcements for the infantry, and added that measures to bring the conclusions reached into operation were decided.)

"I refer also," his statement continued, "to a reply which I gave to a question asked me by a newspaper reporter the previous evening in which, after repeating a rumor which had become current to the effect that I had altered my views as to the method which should be followed in providing reinforcements for our forces overseas, he went on to ask if, in fact, this was the case.

Belief Confirmed

"I replied that this was not the case, that I had set forth my views in recent public speeches in Arnprior and before the Canadian Legion in Ottawa, and that information given me at the conference just concluded had 'confirmed my belief more than ever that continuation of a voluntary policy would provide the reinforcements.'

"These statements have been quoted and requoted, sometimes in whole and sometimes in part, and given various interpretations by various pepole. This had resulted in great confusion. I therefore take this opportunity to clarify the situation.

"At the conference referred to, the G.O.C. Pacific Command and the district officers commanding were invited to report the situation and to give 'their considered views as to the steps which are open to be taken and the results which would follow.'

"From their completely frank statement, given from their intimate contact with the problem, I was able to confirm the existence of a number of factors which had operated to deter or prevent men in the NRMA from coming forward to volunteer for overseas service. I informed the officers gathered at the conference of the action already initiated to correct these adverse factors.

Assured of Endeavor

"I was given assurance that the officers concerned would, on return to their stations, make every endeavor to provide the numbers of men required by voluntary conversion from the NRMA or by enlistments, or by freeing men from Home Defense and other local establishments who had already undertaken the obligation of General Service Overseas.

"Despite the very serious difficulties which were frankly stated, but having this assurance of full support in another endeavor to solve the problem, I express my own belief that the problem will be solved.

"What I now ask is that this method of voluntary enlistment be given a fair trial."

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Unrevised Hansard
November 23, 1944

C 272895

REINFORCEMENTS—STATEMENT OF THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

HON. A. G. L. McNAUGHTON (Minister of National Defence): Mr. Speaker, the reason for my being here to-day is to report to the House of Commons the facts concerning reinforcements for the Canadian Army overseas; to give the house whatever assistance I can in the interpretation of the facts; to state the problems which now exist; to indicate the action which has been taken and the further measures which are being instituted.

The problem is complicated because time is required to translate action taken in Canada into numbers of fully trained men in the reinforcement pools in the theatres of operations and immediately available for posting to units in the field.

In what I am to say to-day I have had to remember that the information I shall give goes out to all the world. I have to be very careful indeed that no word of mine will carry new information of value to the enemy. For if this should come about it would bring hazard to our troops in action and prejudice their further operations, which is the last thing any of us here would wish to do. I need not, I think, emphasize this grave responsibility. I recognize that this inhibition will result in there being important gaps in the full information I seek to give. I am completely at the disposal of the house should hon. members wish to examine me under circumstances in which I shall be free to give precise answers to questions relating to the Canadian Army. If this is arranged, I shall endeavour to give as complete information as possible.

It is perhaps needless to say that I am not at liberty, in any circumstances, to disclose information affecting allied armies which we have received under an undertaking that it should be kept strictly secret. Some of this would be interesting for comparison and to develop the basis on which our own figures have been estimated, but I do not think it is really necessary for an understanding of our own position.

Right at the start I would like to say that there is no difference of opinion as to purpose between my predecessor in the office of Minister of National Defence and myself. We, both of us, are determined with all the strength we have that our troops in action will not lack for reinforcements to carry forward our part in the war in northwest Europe and in Italy. We intend to march forward with our allies to crush Germany finally into defeat and to confirm the safety of the peace which follows. There is no doubt about this intent. That has been stated by the Prime Minister on behalf of all in clear, explicit terms.

There is agreement on the establishments of our army overseas which should be kept up in present circumstances. We are agreed as to where our several formations should operate and under which higher command and as to how our command should be organized. I have made no change in any of the arrangements overseas which were made by Colonel Ralston.

Where my predecessor and I differed was on the methods which should be used to provide the reinforcements needed. In October last he took his stand on the basis that we had outrun the possibilities of maintaining our forces overseas by voluntary enlistment. At that time I took the stand that our traditional system which we had used throughout this war and long before, was capable of producing the results we sought and of producing them in time, provided always that it was given the full public support which was requisite.

I submit that it would have been very dangerous indeed to hazard a change until all measures proper to the existing method had been developed to the full and it had become clear and evident to all that they would not suffice. To do so might well not have increased the rate of flow of reinforcements but might instead have reduced it most seriously. This is what I think would have happened if voluntary service had been abandoned for compulsory service in the late days of last month when the question had first come up. Since then, conditions have altered, public attention has been riveted on these matters. The paramount need of reinforcements in adequate supply has been recognized throughout our land from coast to coast. For myself I frankly state I prefer our present system in its application to the conditions we have in Canada, but I have not excluded the other method in circumstances in which it is absolutely necessary.

Since I took office early in November, I have pressed the application of the voluntary system by every means. At the same time I pressed forward the completion of the organization and training of the men in the N.R.M.A.

In my first public address as Minister of National Defence at Arnprior on Sunday, 5th November, I spoke of the last hard stretch we had to pass before victory was achieved—that there must be no relaxation of effort here at home or in the field. I told of the principles I had followed in the organization of our army in England. I stressed the advantages I thought we had. I hoped that the urgent need for support to the army being known, the public would support and encourage our young men to take up voluntarily the honourable obligation of service overseas to meet this need. The following day, to give greater emphasis to my appeal, I repeated these views before an audience in Ottawa. At the same time I drew attention to factors which were deterring N.R.M.A. men from converting to general service. I undertook that these difficulties would be removed.

I told the men in the N.R.M.A. that fair play required that, in demobilization, our troops overseas would have the first call on all

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gainful employment and that those who did not convert to general service would have to wait their turn.

Then followed the radio address made by the Prime Minister on Wednesday, 8th November. He covered again the points I had previously been authorized to make. I thought that this appeal addressed to the men and the other measures we were taking would have the effect desired and that, as well, we would have the united support of all our people, and that shortly our difficulties in finding men trained as infantry would be largely over.

I drew the policy defined in the Prime Minister's speech to the attention of all our senior commanders in Canada. I directed that it be adopted forthwith, and I asked their help in every way.

Later these officers met me in Ottawa and I was able to explain to them personally the objectives which we should reach if the numbers of reinforcements for overseas were to be adequate to meet the army's needs. I was able to hear at first hand their views on the problem and discussed with them the means of removing the difficulties which had operated to deter N.R.M.A. men from converting to general service. I undertook that these matters would be corrected and this has in large part been done. The district commanders told me quite frankly they had not much hope that our requirements would be met, but they loyally undertook to make another effort. This they have now done, and I must admit that the results have not been adequate. I am advised that there are very many N.R.M.A. men who will not volunteer under present circumstances but who are quite willing to be sent overseas.

I think that I should now state our problem in terms of numbers and times.

First, let me say that in total for all arms and services overseas there is no present shortage. Moreover, no overall shortage is expected in the period for which the figures have already been forecast which extends well on into next summer. Unfortunately, however, it is not in totals that our present problem can be expressed, for men are not quickly transferable from one arm of the service to another, and even with time, there is a limit beyond which remustering cannot be carried out.

The difficulty we have arises in the infantry, for it is in this arm that we have unfortunately experienced heavy casualties in Italy and in northwest Europe since D-day. In total for all arms the casualties have been very close to the estimates, but in infantry they have been heavier than the forecasts on which our plans for reinforcements were based. Should casualties continue at the higher rates, there is a possible prospective shortage of fully trained infantry, which may come late in January or early in February next. Against this there will be, at that time, large numbers of infantry in the depots whose training has approached completion and who will be available for posting to the units shortly thereafter in the following month. We must remember that our figures are forecasts and estimates and so we cannot expect a high order of precision. There are many uncertainties one way or another, such as sailing dates delayed by adverse weather, quarantine for minor contagions, etc., which may affect particular groups of the men concerned and for which allowance must be made. The figures I am using to assess the situation are very definitely on the safe side and I think it well that this should be so, for if there is any error it should be on the safe side. In all the figures which are used the rates of wastage and the scales of future activity are those which have been arrived at by our own officers in the field and confirmed by the theatre commanders.

Later on in the spring or early summer the forecasts show another period when the infantry reserves behind the troops might become low. In this period the intake into the pools of trained infantry reinforcements depends on the numbers now in the training stream and on the conversions to general service from the fully or partially trained infantry in the N.R.M.A. The number of volunteers in the training stream is known. The number of conversions from the N.R.M.A. to general service has been estimated at the average rate of recent months.

The forecasts have not as yet been carried through the summer, and all I can now say is that the situation then will depend on the rate of recruiting for general service in December and in the following months.

I look forward to placing before you the actual figures up to the end of May inclusive under conditions in which they can be disclosed.

Within the general infantry situation there is another which I frankly admit is giving great concern. I refer to reinforcements for our French-speaking infantry units. These, like our English-speaking ones, have had very heavy fighting for prolonged periods and our reserves are low. Special measures have been and are being taken to correct this situation and already there are some promising results for which we are indebted to our colleagues from the province of Quebec and others.

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We need all the help we can be given in this matter and I look forward to placing the full details before you for consideration.

To summarize the situation in respect to reinforcements: I would say that the actual dispatches during this calendar year in total will be very much greater than originally planned. Shipping is completely arranged till the end of December and while there may be some delays in sailings, I do not believe that the effect would be serious. Some additional shipping can be obtained in December if we should be in a position to make use of it.

I want to say, quite definitely, that all anxiety would be removed if we were able to find in December a total, above the numbers now arranged, of 5,000 infantry fully trained or in an advanced state of training, a similar number in January and a further 6,000 in the succeeding months.

Every possible economy in the employment of fit general service personnel in home establishments has now been made or is in process, and the men so made available are included in the figures of planned dispatches.

In consequence the only source from which this additional 16,000 can be secured is from the N.R.M.A.

If we are to dispatch any considerable body of these men in time to ease the anxieties in the situation, arrangements for shipping must be initiated forthwith.

To be realistic, our plans for the future must be strictly related to the nature of the task which remains to be completed and so I shall, if I may, give the house an appreciation of the nature of the battles which lie before the allied armies of which our Canadian troops now form an important part.

We now, both in Italy and in northwest Europe, are up against fortified zones of great depth and strength with every obstacle and device to hamper our advance which the German mind has been able to conceive. In northwest Europe hundreds of thousands of slave labour have been employed for years to create the fixed defences of the west wall. They have been carefully sited by the skilled engineers of the German army to give them every advantage of terrain. They are provided with all the accessories to make life easy for those in garrison: heavy concrete emplacements for machine and anti-tank guns, bomb-proof shelters for resting personnel, elaborate roads and railways for rapid transfer of reserves from place to place, deeply buried cables to maintain certain intercommunication, huge dumps of food and ammunition and spares and replacements for guns and tanks and other gear. We can take it that these defences are provided with everything which could be thought of which would be of use and every day they are being strengthened by the forced labour of the German people.

To break through these lines we must turn to siege warfare of the most intense character and above all else we must have guns and shells in lavish quantities.

We learned in the last war and again in this that in siege wafare there is little opportunity for manoeuvre. When we attack we must use vast quantities of shells to crush out of existence wide sections of the enemy's defence and to paralyse his garrisons and so free the way for the advances of our infantry closely supported by the fire of mobile guns. By reason of the immensity of the volume of fire required and the time taken to get the ammunition forward, these battles go in phases marked by short periods of intense activity and longer periods of quiet in between.

The conditions in northwest Europe will, I think, approximate very closely to those we experienced in France and Flanders in the later phases of the first world war. We will have to turn back to this period for guidance on the wastage rates to be expected in the various arms and services. It is probable that these rates will be more uniform throughout all troops in the forward areas. We must be very careful that the remustering from other arms which we have been carrying out to make up for the higher rates in the infantry in the mobile war since D-day is not carried too far. Fortunately, as I have said, we have no present anxiety as to the adequacy of the reserves in arms other than infantry, but the situation must be closely watched.

So with the business of siege warfare in front of us, it becomes most important to remember that the supply of shells and munitions is a vital necessity which must be met. The call has gone out to multiply the rate of production several fold and this must be done as a first priority on our industrial effort. I believe that the effort which is required can be made without diversion of men needed for reinforcements. We can divert men from less essential industries. We can use many more women. We can use some of the personnel in the armed forces who are not in the categories fit for service overseas. I have proposals in this connection which I hope to raise in later discussions to arrive at an effective use for large numbers of men who have come into the army in Canada, both general service and N.R.M.A., who never can be employed in battle.

The only other observation I would like to make in connection with this vital industrial

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effort in the production of shells and guns and certain other gear is that we in Canada are now a great source of supply for all our allies engaged with us in battle in Europe. In some things we are the only source and it is therefore most important that this industry be not disturbed for any reason, or otherwise there will be most serious consequences for all. In siege warfare you have to pay for victory either in shells or the lives of men, and very great quantities of shells must be expended if there is to be any progress at all.

Now may I turn to the N.R.M.A. Since I was called to office I have been investigating the situation in this department of the army. First, I find that this group of men has been held together for a multiplicity of purposes. Some of them have been trained as soldiers; others fully or partially trained as soldiers have been used from time to time as a sort of reserve of workers to move about and undertake construction and other tasks. Others have been similarly used to gather crops, to work in the mines, and in the woods.

I do not doubt that all these works are of national importance, but I do not think that they should be done by soldiers to the prejudice of their proceeding overseas.

I find that some of these men have been able to obtain remuneration on a scale which is extravagant, and I do not wonder that those who seek their personal advantage and who have had the chance to make large sums in cash would fail to come forward to volunteer for service overseas.

The policies which are to govern the N.R.M.A. in future are given in the statements made by the Prime Minister when he addressed the people of Canada by radio on 8th November. The particular points which it is my duty to develop now are in relation to the employment of that force in Canada.

In fair play to our men who have long served overseas and carried the heat and burden of the battle, it has been decided that they will have first claim on employment opportunities when the war ends. This means that the N.R.M.A. remaining who have not volunteered will be held until they can be demobilized without prejudice to the interests of our men returning from overseas.

These are all most important matters on which you will wish to be fully informed, and I shall do my best to give this information as briefly and as clearly as I can and to report progress as to the measures which have been adopted.

The position of those who volunteer for service overseas is straightforward. They cease at once to be members of the N.R.M.A. and pass to the depots and holding units to be given the final training and instruction which they require. They become in all respects an integral part of that great band who serve Canada by their own free will and whose pride it is to go where duty calls and needs dictate.

The position of N.R.M.A. personnel who do not convert to general service is not so simple. It had been my hope that once our vital need had been made clear—as it has been—and once opportunities had been given for considerate explanation—as they have been—that their number would have been very materially reduced.

The first business is to ensure that all who are physically fit and likely to become efficient soldiers are brought into units in balanced composition to act as a reserve to meet possible future requirements for combat operations. The arrangements for this require few changes in the existing organization and these can be effected quickly.

The elimination of units, formations, headquarters and local establishments which, in an earlier phase of the war, were required for strictly home defence, and the transfer of the personnel thus freed to other duties in keeping with our present need; the freeing of personnel in appropriate medical categories from home establishments, from extraneous employment, or their recall from leave are other matters to be attended to. This is being done as rapidly as individual cases can be reviewed and replacements provided wherever this is necessary in the public interest for the prosecution of the war.

For example, some hundreds of men were detailed some weeks ago to assist in the construction of the new hospital at Sunnybrook. These could have been ordered back to their units, but then this work, which is most urgent in the interests of our returned soldiers who have suffered wounds, would have been delayed. Therefore we have chosen to keep them on the job for the moment and replace all who are physically fit for combat duties by men in a lower category.

There are other tasks of national importance in the shell factories and in construction which are being dealt with in like manner.

The purpose is to concentrate in N.R.M.A. units for potential combat duties all men who are physically fit and deemed likely to make efficient combat soldiers. This is a first priority and it is being dealt with as such. The standard of training will be brought to the high level we insisted on in England.

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There are a considerable number of men in the N.R.M.A. whose physical fitness is below the standard required for first-line combatant duties but who are, in all other respects, capable of rendering useful service in the field, in base installations, on the line of communications and in the forward area behind the battle fronts.

In the British Army these men are grouped into the corps of pioneers to act as a reserve of labour for the engineers for the construction of roads and railways and aerodromes and field fortifications and similar works; to man the base depots, to load the supplies of food and ammunition; to help in the repair establishments and generally to do unskilled labour wherever required to set free the combat troops from these ancillary tasks.

Canadian employment companies are also being organized. The military side of this training is not extensive. It is from this employment corps that we propose to discharge any requirements for help on works of national importance to the prosecution of the war which we are required to undertake.

In this arrangement you will, I know, agree that two safeguards are very necessary. The first that the tasks requested are really of national importance; the second that by undertaking to do them with our employment companies we are not depriving anyone in Canada of gainful employment they otherwise would have.

I am in no position in the defence department to give the consideration which is required to the application of these important safeguards to tasks other than those which are carried out under the defence department for strictly military purposes, and so we are asking the Minister of Reconstruction to undertake the first responsibility, and the Minister of Labour the second. Until we have certificates from these departments, the work will not be undertaken.

These certificates may be revoked at any time by the ministers concerned to meet the changing requirements and conditions and to open opportunities for gainful employment to men outside the N.R.M.A. as they may become available.

Since we must hold a considerable number of men in the N.R.M.A. in order to ensure that men returning from overseas shall have first claim on remunerative employment, I intend to give the men who are retained in the employment companies useful work to do which will be of benefit in their training and which will make a considerable contribution to our war effort. It is perhaps needless to repeat that only the pay and allowances provided for in military regulations will be allowed, and leave will not be on any more generous scale than is given our troops overseas.

There are a number of other categories of men in the N.R.M.A. who are neither suitable for combat units nor for the employment companies. I refer to those who have become physically unfit, and these I propose should be considered individually and that those who are below the category for military duty should be discharged.

There are others in the lower physical categories who, by reason of their technical or other qualifications, should be placed in industry to aid in this great effort which is required. These we propose to place in a reserve, which can be released from military duties subject to recall.

I have dealt with the N.R.M.A. in some considerable detail because it presents a problem of great difficulty which cannot be resolved by any single measure.

Now may I return to the great question which brings anxiety to all of us to-day. I mean the provision of the additional reinforcements required to ensure the effective support of our units and formations overseas in the field and to give them the reserves which they will need to carry forward the great battles which lie ahead.

It is absolutely necessary to the confidence of our fighting forces in the European theatres that there be a substantial reserve of reinforcements made available overseas. The absence of such a reserve might mean casualties that would not otherwise be incurred.

The lives of our men in the fighting lines must be guarded in every way that is dependent upon action which can be taken from here. The numbers required to make up the reserve that is necessary are larger than could be provided in time by the volunteer conversion of trained and fit personnel of our N.R.M.A. men to general service.

I have said that except for some 16,000 men we are able to meet all requirements from men who have come forward voluntarily. I have said that it is our purpose to maintain the voluntary system to the limit. I have stated that 5,000 additional trained infantry must be available early in December to safeguard the position at the end of January; that another 5 000 must be found in January, and some 6,000 in the succeeding months.

I have brought these facts before my colleagues in the cabinet. An order in council has been passed extending the service of this number of men to the European theatres of operations.

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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This power will be used only to the extent necessary to make up the numbers of reinforcements required.

Mr. Speaker, in closing I would just like to express my appreciation to my predecessor in office. He left me the most of his personal staff, without whose loyal aid I could not possibly have carried through the tasks and duties of these last three weeks. I am deeply obliged to him and to them for all that they have done to serve the public interest in this matter.

Mr. Speaker, I have taken the situation as I found it. I have tried with all my strength to work forward from there. I hope I am in some measure making some contribution to the purpose we all must serve—the effective support of our army overseas in the great task they still must do to discharge our just part in bringing the war in Europe to a successful conclusion, and to safeguard the peace which follows.

If we enter this new era united, we will be strong and we have all that is required to carry the happiness and welfare of our people to heights as yet undreamed.

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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PRESS CLIPPINGS C 272901 Office of The Prime Minister

Name of Publication Toronto Globe and Mail

Date November 17, 1944

Subject

McTague Forsees Election

Winnipeg, Nov. 16 (CP). — C. P. McTague, national Progressive Conservative Party chairman, in an interview here last night, said it is his personal opinion Prime Minister King will call an election during the session of the House of Commons which starts Nov. 22.

"Mr. King will not ask for a vote of confidence when the House meets, he will go to the country on the conscription issue," he said, adding that the Opposition would goad Mr. King to a vote of confidence.

"Under that goading, he will swing to the proposition of conscription, indicating that the desire of the Canadian people is what he will adopt regardless of his personal views. It's all tactics and in line with his past moves."

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REPEAT
REPETER

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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CANADA

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Name of Publication Ottawa Journal

Date November 17, 1944

Text of Official Statement Ending Air Training Plan March 31

Following is the text of the official R.C.A.F. statement today.

Air Minister Power today announced that, with the agreement of all parties concerned, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan will be wound up and the plan, as such, completed on March 31, 1945, which in any event was the normal expiry date.

This does not necessarily mean that all air training in Canada will come to an end. The Canadian Government has informed the Air Ministry that it will be willing to continue training of Royal Air Force and Allied Nations' personnel in Canada should it be found desirable to do so. In any event, a shadow training scheme of small dimensions will be retained in a high state of readiness. In addition, certain operational training units will be kept mainly for Canadian purposes. However, after March 31, 1945, these will not form part of the B.C.A.T.P. but will carry on as R.C.A.F. Schools.

The partners in the plan have been represented in Canada by the following officers:

United Kingdom—High Commissioners Sir Gerald Campbell, K.C.M.G., and Rt. Hon. Malcolm MacDonald; liaison officers in chief, Air Chief Marshal Brooke-Popham, Air Vice-Marshal Dalzell-McKean.

Australia—High Commissioner Sir William Glasgow; liaison officer, Air Vice-Marshal Goble.

New Zealand—High Commissioner Hon. Frank Langstone; High Commissioner (Acting) R. M. Firth; High Commissioner Hon. David Wilson; liaison officer and New Zealand representative, Air Vice-Marshal L. Isitt; liaison officer, Group Capt. T. W. White.

Praises Cordial Relations.

Mr. Power wishes to emphasize the very cordial relations that have existed, at all times, between the representatives of the other partners of the plan and Canada and these cordial relations have had much to do with the successful operation and the completion of the plan.

Mr. Power also wishes to emphasize the loyal and conscientious service given by those employed as staff of the B.C.A.T.P. by the four nations concerned, in many instances when they would have much preferred to have been serving their country in a theatre of war.

During the progress of the plan discussions from time to time took place between the Minister and Sir Archibald Sinclair, Minister for Air, Great Britain, and Captain Harold Balfour, Under Secretary of State for Great Britain. These discussions, altering or modifying where necessary, the original B.C.A.T.P. agreements, were carried out in the spirit of cordiality and co-operation.

Aims and Object of Plan.

The aims and object of the plan were to provide the personnel to secure and maintain air superiority and air supremacy in every theatre of war.

This purpose has been accomplished.

United Nations aircrew supply:

The United Nations are amply supplied with aircrew.

United States of America:

The A.A.F. has announced that with many thousands still in some stage of the training program, 453,069 have won wings. Of these 163,147 were commissioned as pilots; 31,293 became bombardiers; 31,906 qualified as navigators, and 226,723 graduated as aerial gunners.

United Kingdom:

The figures are not known but the United Kingdom no longer requires any more aircrew from the Royal Canadian Air Force, nor from Australia and New Zealand. **They have in fact made heavy cancellations of sailings schedules even of personnel already at Embarkation Depots.**

Australia:

Australia has ceased sending any more pupils to Canada for training and information is that all squadrons are filled with ample reserves of aircrew for the future.

New Zealand:

In New Zealand a similar situation exists.

Canada:

Canada has filled all commitments to supply aircrew to the Royal Air Force. It has ample supply for its own R.C.A.F. squadrons overseas and for squadrons in Western Hemisphere operations. Canada has many thousands overseas undergoing their tour of operations or in advanced stages of training prior to operations.

There are thousands still in training in Canada, all of whom will be graduated before March 31, 1945, and will be placed on R.C.A.F. aircrew reserve.

Canada now has sufficient aircrew on hand to man and support its own squadrons both at home and abroad for a war of the same intensity as the present war with Germany and for a period as long as this war has lasted. All that will in the future be required is refresher training for the Reserves.

Reason for Surplus.

Present aircrew production in Canada is the result of plans made and requirements outlined by Air Ministry as much as two years ago.

To have avoided the present situation, which, in point of fact, is a healthy and satisfactory one —the Air Ministry would have had to forecast the course of the war at a time when the invasion of Europe was still only on paper.

It will be obvious that those charged with the responsibility of supplying trained personnel against the invasion of Europe (the date of which could not be disclosed until the last moment) would ensure that their commitment was fully met and that if anything they would err on the side of having rather more trained personnel than called for by the plan and to provide for any unforeseen contingency.

Further, provision had to be made for casualties at the most intense rate, which thank God did not occur.

Provision had also to be made for personnel in the Japanese war.

By March 31, 1945, the overall training production will be:

	A'crew	G'crew	Total
Canadian (R.C.A.F)	70,619	93,178	163,797
Others ...	58,222	2,277	60,499
			224,296

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MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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C272903

PRESS CLIPPINGS

Schools Close March 31, 1945.

All B.C.A.T.P. establishments will be closed by March 31, 1945, except certain operational training units which are to be retained for Canadian purposes. However, after March 31, 1945, these will not form part of the B.C.A.T.P. but will carry on under R.C.A.F. auspices.

To provide for any emergency or unexpected unfavorable developments of the air war, a shadow training organization will be kept in being. A number of schools will be kept with skeleton training staffs, with aerodromes under care and maintenance, ready to operate at full strength at short notice.

Post-War Stations:

The extent, character and composition of the post-war R.C.A.F. will not be definitely decided upon for at least a year and will depend largely on the conditions of the peace and Canada's participation in post-war world security.

No definite choice of stations to be allotted for post-war use can be made until the size of the post-war R.C.A.F. is decided upon.

Again I repeat, the post-war permanent Royal Canadian Air Force will not be definitely formed until after the war and personnel now released and particularly those with overseas experience will not be precluded from making application to join the post-war permanent R.C.A.F. Such applications will be considered on their merits at such time as the permanent post-war R.C.A.F. is formed.

Disposal of Stations and Aerodromes:

Stations surplus to B.C.A.T.P. will be used for storage of surplus equipment or transferred to War Assets Corporation for disposal. The R.C.A.F. will not of its own initiative dispose of all or any part of its surplus assets as it is well understood that all surplus assets of the Armed Services pass automatically into the custody of War Surplus Assets Corporation.

Personnel.

R.C.A.F. (Home and Overseas):

Strength, September, 1939	3,048
Peak Strength	215,173
Present Strength	205,300

Overseas: The present strength overseas is about 70,000 all ranks, all categories, aircrew and groundcrew.

Under the first conception of the B.C.A.T.P. Canada was to send overseas only aircrew, these to be incorporated into R.A.F. units.

Article XV of the Agreement, however, provided for national identification and with this as a starting point Canada built up her own squadrons. At first groundcrews could not be supplied because as fast as they were trained in Canada they were required to staff the rapidly expanding B.C.A.T.P.

In 1941, however, groundcrew began to go overseas to our squadrons. These now number many thousands. In addition to these groundcrew there were approximately 5,000 specialists, Radar mechanics, sent over to be attached to the R.A.F.

Home War Establishment:

Home War Establishment as distinct from the B.C.A.T.P. also expanded rapidly:

1. Due to the necessity of fighting submarines in the Atlantic from the East Coast;

2. Convoy patrol and protection taken over by Canada, Navy and Air in 1942 for almost whole of Northwest Atlantic;

3. Japanese threat after Pearl Harbor; increased anti-submarine patrol; increased numbers of defensive aerodromes; participation in Aleutian campaign.

At one time Western Hemisphere operations stretched from the Aleutians to Iceland with Canadian Home Defence squadrons in both places and the number of squadrons equalled those overseas. A number of these squadrons must still be maintained on both coasts.

Northwest Staging Route:

The Northwest Staging Route called for tremendous expense in construction of aerodromes, and now that all stations and aerodromes built by United States or Canada are taken over, controlled and maintained by the R.C.A.F., a considerable establishment of personnel, largely groundcrew, maintenance units, some service flying personnel will be required for a long time to come. **This Staging Route may yet be of vital importance in the next phase of the war.**

Staff of the B.C.A.T.P.:

The staff of the B.C.A.T.P. utilized in training at the peak of activities was:

(a) R.C.A.F.:		
Aircrew	6,923	
Groundcrew ...	62,830	69,753
(b) Other than R.C.A.F.:		
R.A.F., R.A.A.F., R.N.Z.A.F. ...	19,310	
Civilians	12,355	31,665
Total		101,418

It is evident that this staff must be drastically curtailed as soon as training ceases.

Disposal of Personnel.

The steps to be taken to provide for the disposal of personnel are:

1. Aircrew Graduates:

(a) All recent and future aircrew graduates who have not received operational training in Canada will be given a month's notice, released from active service and transferred to the R.C.A.F. Reserve.

(b) While on the Reserve, they will remain officers and airmen, and during hostilities will be liable for recall by the R.C.A.F. They will not normally be recalled for active service for a period of six months from the date of release, but thereafter will be subject to recall on three months' notice. These graduates will constitute a Reserve of trained personnel available to the R.C.A.F. and if recalled will be given any necessary refresher training. **Personnel so transferred will be entitled to all release and rehabilitation benefits.**

(c) To supply intakes to O.T.U.'s in Canada for the next six months, a sufficient number will be retained and posted progressively as required. In the main, this group will comprise experienced aircrew personnel who have been employed on instructional duties in the Plan.

2. Aircrew Trainees:

(a) As previously announced, the 4,200 recruits who had not entered any phase of flying training have been released.

(b) All pupils under training, as at Nov. 7, will graduate on or before March 31, 1945.

(c) **On graduation, these personnel will be promoted to N.C.O. rank and those who obtain the requisite marks will be commissioned.**

3. Aircrew Staff:

(a) Flying instructors and other aircrew who have not had overseas service and who, because of age or limited medical category, cannot be employed on operations overseas, will be released and transferred to the Reserve. The age limits referred to are:

T/S/L—over 35 years.

T/F/L and below — over 32 years.

(b) Aircrew who have completed a tour of operations will be given the option of returning to civilian life. Those desiring to remain in the service and who are not required or not medically fit for operational or flying training duties will, after a period of administrative training, replace, as far as practicable, non-flying list officers. Such aircrew officers and other ranks who do not demonstrate an aptitute for administrative duties and who can not be employed on flying duties will be released.

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MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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PRESS CLIPPINGS C 272904

Office of
The Prime Minister

Name of Publication .....

Date .....

Subject .....

4. Non-Flying List Officers:
Non-flying list officers may submit applications for return to civil life. Such applications will be acted upon if the personnel concerned are surplus to requirements, or in other cases when replacements from overseas become available.

5. Groundcrew:
(a) Release on a voluntary basis will be offered to groundcrew personnel in the following priorities:

1st priority—those who have served overseas and have been repatriated to Canada.

2nd priority—those with over three years' service.

3rd priority—those with over two years' service.

4th priority—those with under two years' service.

(b) These releases will be controlled by monthly quotas and, as indicated, personnel with the least service will not be released unless insufficient applications are received from the top priorities.

(6) This program will apply to both overseas and Canada, but insofar as overseas personnel are concerned, the following special conditions will govern:

(a) All personnel with at least three years' service overseas will be repatriated unless for personal reasons they wish to remain in the U. K. and suitable employment is available overseas.

(b) If operational demands so require, aircrew will complete a tour of operations before becoming eligible for repatriation.

(c) Groundcrew and Non-Flying List Officers with less than three years' service overseas will not be repatriated unless they become surplus to overseas requirements or request their release from the Service.

(d) Radar personnel employed with the R.A.F. will be eligible for release or repatriation on the same terms as other R.C.A.F. personnel.

7. Women's Division:
(a) Married personnel of the Women's Division will be released as soon as suitable replacements from within the Force are available.

(b) Any W.D. officer or airwoman may return to civil life on application. In certain restricted trades, it will be necessary to postpone release until a suitable replacement is available.

8. Civilian Employes:
In the B.C.A.T.P. there are many civilian employes who will necessarily be released with the closing of the establishments to which they are attached.

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C272905

TWO MILLION MEN ENGAGED ON BOTH SIDES
IN POSSIBLY LAST GREAT BATTLE IN WEST.

Head line - Ottawa Evening Citizen - Final
November 17, 1944

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
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SECTION 9

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Name of Publication [illegible]

Date NOV 3 '44

Col. Ralston on Reinforcements

(As it may possibly give some light on the Cabinet crisis in Ottawa on the question of reinforcements for Canadian troops overseas, the following extracts from Col. Ralston's last official speech on the subject, given in the House of Commons on July 10 of this year, are herewith reproduced.)

Recruitment is not for the purpose of providing immediate reinforcements. Recruiting would be no good to provide immediate reinforcements. Men have to be trained for reinforcement purposes for at least six months; and recruiting is for the purpose of replenishing and keeping up our flow of reinforcements six months from now. What we are doing from day to day is to get these men in and train them.

Now, with regard to the matter of reinforcements. I have spoken of this many times, but I am afraid I have not yet made it plain, apparently there is an idea that the only way we can replace casualties is by dispatching men direct from Canada. That is not so. On the contrary, we have overseas a large reinforcement pool, and that pool is calculated on a scale to provide reinforcements for a certain number of months of intense operations.

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Where do we get men to dispatch overseas? I am not talking about men enlisting. I am talking about men we actually have in hand. Well, we have general service personnel in training centres all over Canada, and we have general service men in operational and non-operational units who are being made available as reinforcements by orderly withdrawal and replacement and, in some cases, retraining. I said in February that we had about 60,000 of these. The number now stands at probably 50,000 or better. Then, as I said in February, we have in addition about 50,000 of these N.R.M.A. personnel of whom I spoke a little while ago, who would be of suitable age and category to be drawn on for overseas service if necessity should arise and appropriate action were taken under N.R.M.A. As I have indicated, those in the brigade groups who are fit could be sent quickly, and how many of the others could be sent would depend on the comparative need. Of course we must go short in Canada if the need is over there. . . .

That brings me to this matter of activity about recruiting. People may ask, "Why all this activity Why do we not stand on what we have?" The answer is that we want to protect the position six months from now, and I am not content to rely on protecting that position by using draftees if we can reinforce our army with volunteers. Our recruiting activities are for the purpose of keeping up enlistments from now on so as to be able to maintain the stream of reinforcements from month to month. We want to get, if we can, an average of 4,000 a month or better from those not now in the army, and that figure may have to be reviewed, depending on the developments of the present operations.

From January to May, inclusive, the average number volunteering for general service was just about 3,800 general service men a month. Included in that average is about 600 N.R.M.A. personnel who enlisted for general service.

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For June, according to the daily returns we have, the number volunteering will be over 6,000, and that includes between 2,500 and 3,000 N.R.M.A. personnel who have enlisted for general service. I pause to ask if that is not a better way to utilize those N.R.M.A. men for reinforcements? . .

Some of these former N.R.M.A. men would have to be retrained in another arm of the service, but many of them are ready now for overseas service. But the civilians who are enlisting — who are just coming into the army for the first time — all have to be trained, and that takes six months at least if they are to get all the training we should like. That means that a man enlisting today from civilian life, and put into training would not, in all probablity, come out at the other end of the training stream and be ready to go overseas at the earliest before the first of January, 1945. So that the short answer to the question, "Why are we recruiting?" is that we are recruiting so that the flow of reinforcements six months from now will keep right on. . . .

If we cannot maintain the army overseas with volunteers and it is necessary to send N.R.M.A. men, there can be no alternative for me but to recommend action under the act, and I shall do so. I simply want to point out that nearly two and a half years ago, when this same question was up in the House, I said:

I have faith in the success of the voluntary method if we all do our part. With the background and traditions which this country possess, and which it would be folly to ignore. I prefer the voluntary method if it works, and I shall do all I can to make it work.

That was in February, 1942. I think I can say that I have faithfully tried to raise and administer the Canadian army under the voluntary system. Since that time when I spoke, 198,000 men have enlisted voluntarily in the army. That is an average of over 6,000 per month since February, 1942. The total voluntary enlistment in the three services in Canada since the time I spoke was 378,000 men. Those figures would seem to show that my faith in the voluntary system was justified then. I intend to try to see that it does not fail in this last long strong pull.

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PRESS CLIPPINGS

Office of
The Prime Minister

C 272907

Name of Publication .....

Date .....

Subject .....

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Up to King To Give Facts Says Ralston

Hon. J. L. Ralston, in his first public statement since resignation as Defence Minister after a Cabinet crisis over the reinforcement situation, said last night he had been pressed from many quarters for an explanatory statement but he felt "that responsibility for informing the public belongs primarily to the Prime Minister".

He said he recognized that in this matter the public and the armed forces were entitled to full information consistent with military security. He had made his report to the Government and his letter of resignation was addressed to the Prime Minister.

"I would assume", said Col. Ralston in his statement, "that the Prime Minister would inform the public of the circumstances by making available my letter of resignation and any further correspondence between us in the matter. The correspondence will speak for itself. I therefore refrain from making any statement at present."

The statement was issued on a typewritten sheet from Col. Ralston's temporary office in Commons where he stayed late preparing a speech to be delivered at a noon luncheon gathering in Montreal today.

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PRESS CLIPPINGS

Office of
The Prime Minister

C 272907

Name of Publication OTTAWA MORNING JOURNAL

Date NOV 7 1944

Subject

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PRESS CLIPPINGS

Office of The Prime Minister

C 272908

Name of Publication OTTAWA MORNING CITIZEN

Date NOV 10 1944

Subject

Farewell Message By Col. Ralston To Defence Dept.

In a farewell message to military and civilian personnel of the Defence Department, Col. J. L. Ralston has asked them to give his "distinguished successor" the "unflagging help and the intelligent industry that have meant so much to me and to Canada during my 41-2 years of office."

The message, released by the Defence Department, said:

"On relinquishing the duties of Minister of National Defence, I want to express to all ranks of the Canadian Army and to the members of the civilian staffs my most sincere appreciation of their wholehearted devotion to duty during the arduous time of preparation and through the fiery tests of battle.

"To our fighting troops, I pay highest tribute and send humble admiration for their endurance, their courage and their amazing achievements in the face of unprecedented difficulties.

"With them I remember also the skilful and self sacrificing labors of medical officers and nurses and the devotion of the padres and the members of the auxiliary services.

"To those who have toiled without reserve in the less spectacular but highly important tasks of organization and training and supply, I express deepest appreciation. Their work has been to fortify Canada's men and women on the battle lines.

"As my distinguished successor, Gen. McNaughton, takes over the responsibilities of the department, I confidently ask every man and woman to give him the unflagging help and the intelligent industry that have meant so much to me and to Canada during my 41-2 years of office.

"There may be many long days and many rough places before the enemy is completely overcome. The Canadian Army will never falter until the task is done

"I am proud indeed to have been associated with this grand company of fighters and workers for victory. Good luck, great success and my warmest thanks to you all."

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
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CANADA

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Epreuve illisible

PRESS CLIPPINGS

C 272908

Office of
The Prime Minister

Name of Publication

Date

Subject

Farewell Message By Col. Ralston To Defence Dept.

In a farewell message to military and civilian personnel of the Defence Department, Col. J. L. Ralston has asked them to give his "distinguished successor" the "unflagging help and the intelligent industry that have meant so much to me and to Canada during my 4 1-2 years of office."

The message, released by the Defence Department, said:

"On relinquishing the duties of Minister of National Defence, I want to express to all ranks of the Canadian Army and to the members of the civilian staffs my most sincere appreciation of their wholehearted devotion to duty during the arduous time of preparation and through the fiery tests of battle.

"To our fighting troops, I pay highest tribute and send humble admiration for their endurance, their courage and their amazing achievements in the face of unprecedented difficulties.

"With them I remember also the skilful and self sacrificing labors of medical officers and nurses and the devotion of the padres and the members of the auxiliary services.

"To those who have toiled without reserve in the less spectacular but highly important tasks of organization and training and supply, I express deepest appreciation. Their work has been to fortify Canada's men and women on the battle lines.

"As my distinguished successor, Gen. McNaughton, takes over the responsibilities of the department, I confidently ask every man and woman to give him the unflagging help and the intelligent industry that have meant so much to me and to Canada during my 4 1-2 years of office.

"There may be many long days and many rough places before the enemy is completely overcome. The Canadian Army will never falter until the task is done

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POOR PRINT
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Ottawa Journal
November 9, 1944

C272909



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C272909

Ottawa Journal
November 9, 1944

King Not Releasing Ralston's Letter

5 O'Clock Edition Service.

Prime Minister King's office said today that correspondence between Mr. King and former Defence Minister Ralston was not available for release at the moment. No indication was given as to whether it would eventually be released for publication.

The correspondence includes Col. Ralston's letter of resignation, written last week when he left the Cabinet, after setting forth his view that conscription for overseas should be placed in effect.

In a statement issued Monday evening, Col. Ralston said he assumed Mr. King would inform the public of the circumstances of his resignation by making available his letter of resignation and "any further correspondence between us in the matter". The correspondence would "speak for itself".

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PRESS CLIPPINGS C 272910 Office of The Prime Minister

Name of Publication

Date

Subject

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Epreuve illisible

PRESS CLIPPINGS

C 272911

Office of the Prime Minister

Name of Publication .....

Date .....

Subject .....

Toronto Globe and Mail, November 10, 1944

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Mr. King, in his broadcast speech last night, made only a brief reference to Col. Ralston's views and with no indication that the correspondence would be released.

Col. Ralston is in the Maritimes for a visit with his constituents and his secretary indicated he would not be available for comment until Friday or Saturday.

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PRESS CLIPPINGS

C 272912

Office of the Prime Minister

Name of Publication Toronto Globe & Mail

Date November 11, 1944

Subject

Mr. Ralston Must Speak

The Canadian public now must rely upon Col. Ralston to function as the faithful guardian of democratic principles and practices by making public his correspondence with the Prime Minister about his resignation and the matters leading up to it. The tradition about such publication is well established. In this century there have been six notable cases of resignations of Ministers from Canadian Federal Cabinets—of Mr. Israel Tarte in 1902, of Sir Clifford Sifton in 1905, of Sir Sam Hughes in 1916, of Mr. H. H. Stevens in 1934, of Mr. Charles Dunning in 1939, and of Mr. P. J. A. Cardin in 1942. In every one of these cases the Prime Minister of the day gave to the public the relevant correspondence within a few hours of the resignation.

More than a week has elapsed since Col. Ralston tendered his resignation. But the Prime Minister has failed to perform his elementary duty in this matter, and, since nothing can be gained by delaying publication, the assumption must be that he proposes to defy an established convention which has a sound basis. So in fairness to the country Col. Ralston must assume without further delay the responsibility for publication.

An Ottawa despatch of The Canadian Press yesterday brought the information from the Prime Minister's office that the correspondence was not available for release, and no indication was given that it would be released for publication.

It has become all the more incumbent upon Col Ralston since Mr. King made his explanatory speech. In it he acknowledged that Col. Ralston had resigned when his recommendations, based upon his own personal investigations and the reports of high military authorities, had been rejected by himself. He then suggested that his decision to reject was based upon the conclusions of the high military authorities. In other words, he was asking the public to believe that these high military authorities supplied Col. Ralston with one kind of report and himself with another. It is inconceivable that Canadian soldiers of high rank would be guilty of "double talk" to please politicians; but some of them will lie under this imputation until Col. Ralston eases the present angry bewilderment of the mass of the Canadian people by the publication of his correspondence with Mr. King.

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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PRESS CLIPPINGS

Office of
The Prime Minister

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C272913

Name of Publication MONTREAL GAZETTE

Date NOV 13 1944

Text of Ralston's Statement

Ottawa, November 12.(CP)—Following is the text of a statement issued tonight by Hon. J. L. Ralston, former Defence Minister, on the reinforcement situation:

On Friday afternoon last, on my return from Prince Edward Island, I had my first opportunity to hear or to see the full text of the radio speech made by the Prime Minister last Wednesday evening on the subject of support for our army overseas. One paragraph of the text, as printed in the press, was as follows:

"Col. Ralston's report to the Government disclosed an immediate problem which has to be faced. That problem is to find the means of speeding up the flow of fully trained infantry reinforcements to meet, not an actual shortage of reinforcements now, but a possible shortage in the next few months."

The Prime Minister in this paragraph purports to be summing up my report to the Government of the problem. My report extended through the days of deliberation which the Prime Minister mentions.

While I recognize that it is difficult to summarize such discussions, I feel that the Prime Minister's summary is not sufficiently complete to convey the substance of my report on the problem; and reluctant as I have been and am to engage in any public controversy in this matter at this time, I am obliged in fairness to the public as well as myself not to permit any possible misconception of what I reported.

What is particularly important is that the summary gives no indication of the necessity of sending additional infantry reinforcements at the earliest possible date. The phrase "to find the means of speeding up the flow of fully trained infantry reinforcements to meet not an actual shortage of reinforcements now, but a possible shortage in the next few months," might leave the impression that while the problem was "immediate,' the actual sending of reinforcements could be delayed for some time. That was not my report. There are one or two other matters in the Prime Ministers summary of which I should speak.

1. As to there being "no actual shortage of reinforcements now:"

It is true that there were just about enough trained infantry reinforcements in the areas, or being sent forward, to bring the units up to strength, but there was not a sufficient backlog or pool from which to meet any unexpected increase in casualties in a particular engagement.

Such pools supplement the current flow of reinforcements which come periodically from the United Kingdom and ensure that casualties are replaced promptly as they occur from time to time in the emergencies of battle. In the earlier stages of these pools had been maintained, but during my inspection of the battle areas I found that they had been so depleted as not to ensure the prompt replacement of casualties. On the advice of the commanders in the battle areas, I considered that such pools should be reestablished at adequate strength. There were not infantry reinforcements available for that purpose.

2. Now I come to the future—the possible shortage in the next few months."

By way of explanation I should say that in estimating the future position forecasts have to be made of the anticipated casualties. In arriving at these forecasts, the anticipated casualties were estimated on the basis of experience already gained and on the probable intensity of activity up to January, 1945, as indicated by our commanders in the field and concurred in by the British higher command in each theatre.

The probable intensity of activity from January 1 onwards was estimated by our own officers. In estimating for the future, full allowance was made for all volunteer infantry reinforcements which could be counted on as likely to be available.

3. The forecast was that by the end of December a considerable aggregate shortage in infantry would have developed.

4. For the following months the forecast was that the aggregate infantry shortage would progressively increase month by month in the new year.

5. I realized that the need which had arisen could not be met by enlisting untrained men. In the ordinary course, an untrained man enlisted now would not be ready for battle before next June.

What were needed were trained infantry soldiers. The most thorough examination was made to find these men from the volunteers who are now in the Army. Allowance was made for all these who could be counted on for that purpose.

It appeared clear to me that enough volunteer personnel could not be made available to meet the need.

6. An alternative was to reduce our commitments or break up units or formations.

I could not concur in this when trained N.R.M.A. men were available. I considered that at this crucial period Canada's duty was to support our men in the line and not to relax but to go on with the task to help shorten the war.

7. I came to the conclusion that the only practical relief for the urgent situation which faced us was to recommend that we draw on the trained N.R.M.A. Infantry men whom we are maintaining as potential reinforcements, and to have them on hand in the battle areas at the earliest possible moment.

8. That brings me to the time factor. The Prime Minister does say that I disclosed an "immediate problem" which had to be faced, but the phrase "a possible shortage in the next few months" might lead to the inference that I did not stress the urgency of action. That inference would be wholly incorrect.

9. The best estimate was that at least two months would elapse from the time the Government decided to send them until men could reach the battle areas. That is, that if the decision were made on November 1, the first 8,000 N.R.M.A. men (mentioned by the Prime Minister as being "sufficiently trained so that they can be ready for combat at an early date") would not be available in the battle areas until January 1-15.

10. This delay might seem excessive, but it is required for the pre-embarkation procedure; the administrative and training arrangements in the United Kingdom and the dispatch to the battle areas; it includes embarkation leave, voyage, usual refresher training in the United Kingdom, and transport to the particular theatre of war.

11. This first 8,000 would not have assisted during November and December in providing the pools I have spoken of, but it would have reassured our infantry units in the field that we were determined to back them up; it would have made up the December shortage soon after January 1; it would have reestablished the pools in the battle areas.

The remaining 8,000 mentioned by the Prime Minister could have reached the battle areas early in February. These, with the volunteers which would become available during February and the following month, would, it was calculated, see us through until June 1, with some margin. That would take up the 16,000 N.R.M.A. personnel mentioned by the Prime Minister as being trained as infantry.

12. The Prime Minister mentions that in all, 42,000 N.R.M.A. men are considered suitable material as infantry reinforcements. While dispatching the 16,000 trained N.R.M.A. infantry men in two groups of 8,000 each, as I have mentioned, we could be remustering and training as infantry the remaining 26,000 to be available if required.

13 .Let me make it clear that the need for these additional infantry reinforcements does not arise from having suffered more casualties in the aggregate than had been forecasted.

Our aggregate casualties, that is, for all arms of the service, have been somewhat less than estimated. The need arises because the casualties incurred by the infantry have been a very much higher proportion

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MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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of the aggregate casualties than had been estimated, and the estimates for the future are based on that experience.

As the Prime Minister showed in his statement, these estimates were made most carefully. The simple fact is that the basis of those estimates has proved in actual experience to be in error so far as infantry casualties are concerned.

14. It should be understood that the sending of these N.R.M.A. men would be in addition to the supply of volunteers which we would be continuing to send each month as usual.

15. The number of men required was not large compared with the size of our army. But without them our staunch and effective striking force, the infantry units, would not be supported as they should be.

16. There were two unknown quantities in the problem. One was the possibility of the war ending suddenly and the other was that the casualties may be less than forecasted.

But I considered that if we were to be fair to our fighting men we could not afford to take chances on either of these uncertainties; but that we must base our plans on the carefully prepared estimates of our own and other high military authorities and act accordingly. Time was all-important.

Regarding my resignation, since the Prime Minister has referred to the circumstances but has not yet released the correspondence, I want to make a very brief statement in that regard.

The Prime Minister in his radio speech said, "when I realized that unless Col. Ralston's recommendation were accepted by the Cabinet, his resignation would follow. . ."

On this point, it is quite true that I had stated that I would have to resign if my recommendation were not accepted. I had understood government policy to be that if there were need for reinforcements overseas and volunteers were not available, N.R.M.A. personnel would be sent. This was what I had taken from the Prime Minister's speeches in 1942. It was in effect what I, as minister, had repeatedly said in the House since.

In view of the conditions which I found overseas, some of which I have outlined, and after full consideration, I felt that I had no alternative but to recommend that N.R.M.A. personnel be sent overseas as reinforcements. I felt that this was necessary to fulfil our pledges to our fighting men.

My recommendation was not accepted nor could I get any assurance that the Government as a whole considered that the Prime Minister's speeches committed the Government to this course.

Under these conditions, and as requested by the Prime Minister, I at once tendered my resignation as Minister of National Defence.

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PRESS CLIPPINGS C 272915

Office of
The Prime Minister

Name of Publication Montreal Gazette

Date November 13, 1944

Subject

Text of Ralston's Statement

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The Prime Minister in this paragraph purports to be summing up my report to the Government of the problem. My report extended through the days of deliberation which the Prime Minister mentions.

While I recognize that it is difficult to summarize such discussions, I feel that the Prime Minister's summary is not sufficiently complete to convey the substance of my report on the problem; and reluctant as I have been and am to engage in any public controversy in this matter at this time, I am obliged in fairness to the public as well as myself not to permit any possible misconception of what I reported.

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13 .Let me make it clear that the need for these additional infantry reinforcements does not arise from having suffered more casualties in the aggregate than had been forecasted.

Our aggregate casualties, that is, for all arms of the service, have been somewhat less than estimated. The need arises because the casualties incurred by the infantry have been a very much higher proportion of the aggregate casualties than had been estimated, and the estimates for the future are based on that experience.

As the Prime Minister showed in his statement, these estimates were made most carefully. The simple fact is that the basis of those estimates has proved in actual experience to be in error so far as infantry casualties are concerned.

14. It should be understood that the sending of these N.R.M.A. men would be in addition to the supply of volunteers which we would be continuing to send each month as usual.

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16. There were two unknown quantities in the problem. One was the possibility of the war ending suddenly and the other was that the casualties may be less than forecasted.

But I considered that if we were to be fair to our fighting men we could not afford to take chances on either of these uncertainties; but that we must base our plans on the carefully prepared estimates of our own and other high military authorities and act accordingly. Time was all-important.

Regarding my resignation, since the Prime Minister has referred to the circumstances but has not yet released the correspondence, I want to make a very brief statement in that regard.

The Prime Minister in his radio speech said, "when I realized that unless Col. Ralston's recommendation were accepted by the Cabinet, his resignation would follow. . ."

On this point, it is quite true that I had stated that I would have to resign if my recommendation were not accepted. I had understood government policy to be that if there were need for reinforcements overseas and volunteers were not available, N.R.M.A. personnel would be sent. This was what I had taken from the Prime Minister's speeches in 1942. It was in effect what I, as minister, had repeatedly said in the House since.

In view of the conditions which I found overseas, some of which I have outlined, and after full consideration, I felt that I had no alternative but to recommend that N.R.M.A. personnel be sent overseas as reinforcements. I felt that this was necessary to fulfil our pledges to our fighting men.

My recommendation was not accepted nor could I get any assurance that the Government as a whole considered that the Prime Minister's speeches committed the Government to this course.

Under these conditions, and as requested by the Prime Minister, I at once tendered my resignation as Minister of National Defence.

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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SECTION 10

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MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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CANADA

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PRESS CLIPPINGS

Office of
The Prime Minister

St L C272917

Name of Publication OTTAWA MORNING JOURNAL

Date

'A Disaster' If Zombies Sent Over

QUEBEC, Nov. 5.—(CP)—Justice Minister St. Laurent said in an address Saturday that if members of the Federal Cabinet during the meetings preceding Col. Ralston's resignation as Defence Minister held different views they "all were anxious to serve Canadian interests and those of all the United Nations fighting the evil powers".

"If one line of action had been adopted, national unity would have received a destructive blow in such a way that it might have taken decades to rebuild it", he added in an address before the Lapointe-Drouin Liberal Club which also was addressed by Provincial Opposition Leader Adelard Godbout.

Mr. St. Laurent said that if the Federal Government would have decided to send draftees as reinforcements overseas "the majority of people in Quebec would have deemed themselves deceived by their English-speaking compatriots".

"It would have been a disaster, something extremely serious for the Canadian nation", he added.

Speaking of Mr. Ralston, who was succeeded as Defence Minister last week by General McNaughton, former commander of the Canadian Army overseas, Mr. St. Laurent said:

"Mr. Ralston, a great Canadian who is worthy of the admiration of all Canadians, has visited the battlefields overseas and upon his return has communicated to his Cabinet colleagues reports of an extremely serious nature.

"During 15 days, I had the satisfacttion to confirm my opinion that the Federal Cabinet members were sincere and honest Canadians, anxious to serve the country and humanity.

(Mr. St. Laurent apparently was referring to the almost uninterrupted meetings held by the Federal Cabinet during the two weeks that preceded Col. Ralston's resignation.)

"But even between honest persons, it is permissible to hold different views. It is the duty of everyone to look at the facts as he feels they are, to ponder over them to the best of his ability and to base his opinion on what he construes necessary.

"That is what has been done. Hence resulted a situation extremely serious for Canada, the United Nations and even for humanity. Every one in the Cabinet was aware of the seriousness of the situation.

"Long and tiresome Cabinet meetings were the results of the situation and every one scrutinized his own conscience.

"It was vital to the Canadian nation that its unity be maintained, that the mutual confidence of the people in one another be also maintained.

"If one line of action had been adopted, national unity would have received a destructive blow in such a way that it might have taken decades to rebuild it."

Mr. St. Laurent said that members of the Cabinet held different views but that "all were anxious to serve Canadian interests and those of all the United Nations fighting the evil powers."

"During long hours", he added, "each of us sought the solution to the problem. Our leader (Prime Minister King) succeeded in finding it.

"Somebody was needed to replace a colleague who, in conscience could no longer cooperate with us while we, also in conscience, could not accept what he had recommended for us to do.

"Somebody also was needed who could back our forces. The Prime Minister has succeeded in finding that man who, because he built up our Canadian Army, was worthy of the confidence of its leaders and its soldiers, that man who can not be suspected of acting otherwise than in the interest of the nation."

Mr. St. Laurent said that Gen. McNaughton "has had the magnanimity of accepting a task he could have declined. He did not want to decline the mission which was offered him, for the good of the country.

"At this time, we of Quebec province have the right to have confidence in a group of Canadians who are not of the same racial origin as we are but who, like us, are Canadians before anything else."

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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SECTION 11

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MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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CANADA

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PRESS CLIPPINGS

Office of
The Prime Minister
C272918

Name of Publication .....

Date .....

Subject .....

Asserts Onus For Reinforcements Is On McNaughton

TORONTO, Nov. 3.—(CP)—The onus of providing reinforcements for Canada's overseas forces now rests on Defence Minister McNaughton, Maj. Conny Smythe, whose charges regarding the training of reinforcements gave rise to a controversy believed to have led to the resignation of Col. J. L. Ralston from the defence ministry, said tonight in a statement.

The statement:

In answer to the questions the newspapers have asked me, as far as I am concerned the issue is not the merits or demerits of McNaughton or Ralston. The issue is still the sending of trained reinforcements to the fighting Canadian forces in Italy and one the Continent. The appointment of Gen. McNaughton has not added one man to the fighting forces.

Prime Minister Churchill in Parliament last week stated that no mention of bringing back the five-year men should be allowed, as it was only raising false hopes, and that we were now facing the grimest part of the war. Gen. Alexander under Rome, Nov. 2 dateline stated that the Allied forces in Italy have been numerically inferior to the Germans throughout most of the campaign. Our troops are fighting for you and me under these conditions, and they are short of trained reinforcements.

It is up to you and me to see that every available trained fit Canadian be sent overseas at once. We voted the government the necessary authority in the plebiscite to send draftees overseas. If they aren't sent, the onus is on McNaughton.

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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CANADA

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PRESS CLIPPINGS

Office of
The Prime Minister
C272919

Name of Publication Toronto Globe and Mail

Date November 24, 1944

Subject

Send Draftees Now, Smythe Says

Major Conn Smythe, whose fearless criticism of the reinforcement situation jolted the Canadian people into a realization that a military crisis was at hand last night said that "If the home defense draftees are not sent now, then it will be a body blow to the boys overseas who believe in democracy."

Text of Major Smythe's brief statement reads:

"If they are going to send the draftees over, then the victory is a great one for the boys over there. But if the home defense draftees are not sent now, then it will be a body blow to the boys overseas who believe in democracy, and I expect that it will work at home to give them the help they need."

Major Smythe took the 30th Anti-Aircraft Battery overseas more than two years ago and was seriously wounded near Caen.

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
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REPEAT
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MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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W.C.

PRESS CLIPPINGS

Office of
The Prime Minister
C272920

Name of Publication Ottawa Citizen

Date November 11, 1944

Subject

W.C.

Says War Fought For Vindication Of Human Rights

LONDON, Nov. 9.—(CP Cable)—Cardinal Villeneuve, Roman Catholic archbishop of Quebec, today declared that "this war is a fight to the bitter end for the vindication of human rights and the preservation of Christian civilization."

The prelate, who recently has visited Canadians in Britain, on the western front and in Italy, addressed his message to members of the Canadian army, navy and air force overseas.

Following is the text of his message:

"My dear friends. I have come from Canada to bring you the homage of my own admiration, that of my church and in fact of all Canada for the magnificent work you have done and are doing for the defeat of the barbarous enemy.

"I am now more convinced than ever that, notwithstanding other motives involved, this war is a fight to the bitter end for the vindication of human rights and the preservation of Christian civilization.

"That conviction has increased by what I have seen in Italy, in Belgium and in Holland of Nazi barbarism, and by the tales I have heard from unimpeachable witnesses—tales that shock and anger. The people of Canada will continue, as in the past, to follow your exploits with the keenest pride and appreciation.

Expresses Thanks.

"I came secondly to thank you. You, at the risk of your lives, have taken our place. We are deeply grateful to you for having joined with our other allies in waging a war overseas against the forces of evil.

"Finally, I came to bring you a word of encouragement. The road to victory has been long, but I think we may say without undue optimism that the end is now in view. Carry on as you have done, magnificently and courageously. We in Canada are watching you with the deepest affection.

"We are also praying and working so that you may be sustained in this final hour before the overthrow forever of the Nazi threat of world domination, and that while so doing you remain ever faithful in the service of God and the observance of His holy law. Spur yourselves further to the final effort, and God be with you always."

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W.C.

PRESS CLIPPINGS

Office of
C272920

Name of Publication Ottawa Citizen

Date November 11, 1944

Subject

CWC

Says War Fought For Vindication Of Human Rights

[illegible]

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[illegible] is the [illegible] of his [illegible]

"My [illegible] friends. I have come [illegible] to bring you the [illegible] of my own admiration, that of my [illegible] and in fact of all Canada [illegible] work you [illegible] for the [illegible].

"I am now more convinced than ever that, notwithstanding other [illegible], this war is a fight [illegible] the vindication of [illegible] and the preservation of [illegible] civilization.

"That [illegible] has increased by what I [illegible] in Belgium and [illegible] of Nazi barbarism, and by the tales I have heard from [illegible] witnesses—tales that shook and anger. The people of Canada will continue, as in the past, to follow your exploits with the keenest pride and appreciation.

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REPEAT
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PRESS CLIPPINGS

Office of
The Prime Minister

C 272921

Name of Publication Toronto Globe and Mail

Date November 20, 1944

Subject



W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
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CANADA

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PRESS CLIPPINGS

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The Prime Minister
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Date November 11, 1944

Subject

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PRESS CLIPPINGS

Office of
The Prime Minister
C 272921

Name of Publication Toronto Globe and Mail

Date November 20, 1944

Subject

CLAIM CARDINAL STANDS BEHIND CONSCRIPTION

Ottawa, Nov. 19 (Staff).—A stand for compulsion [illegible] overseas army service is reported here today to have been taken by Cardinal Villeneuve at a private luncheon Saturday in Windsor Hotel, Montreal.

The Cardinal late last week returned from a two months' fact-finding tour of the Western and Mediterranean fronts.

It is stated here that Cardinal Villeneuve spoke with the utmost candor and flatly advised his listeners that grave things were in the offing before the war is over, and that Canada must stand by the British and United States forces to the point of conscription for overseas.

Must Stand Together

He is reported to have key-pointed his views on compulsory service with a frank and insistent claim that the tolerant nations on race and religion must, at this time, for their own salvation and protection of their liberties, stand together to the limit.

War Services Minister L. R. LaFleche took the Cardinal to the meeting, even as he was in attendance on his Eminence at a meeting of military men on Friday, a few hours after he had flown in from the United Kingdom. At that meeting Cardinal Villeneuve advised that he had gone to the fronts to see for himself what was happening.

He was quoted: "I am not taking any attitude pro or con, but you cannot fight this war by condensing the horizo non this continent. The Nazi has got to be completely defeated or there will be no peace for our way of life."

Cardinal Villeneuve's attitude toward conscription was reflected in a sermon in Westminster Cathedral on Sept. 24 to a congregation of Canadian servicemen. He said:

"That spirit of sacrifice and devotion finds its highest expression in those who courageously have entered active service on land, on sea and in the air. We owe a tremendous debt of gratitude to you who are bravely rendering such admirable service to their country and to humanity in general."

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PRESS CLIPPINGS

Office of
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Name of Publication Toronto Globe and Mail

C 272921

Date November 20, 1944

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CANADA

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PRESS CLIPPINGS C 272923 Office of The Prime Minister

Name of Publication Ottawa E Journal

Date Nov 2/44

Subject

[redacted]

[redacted] Army overseas, left, photographed at [redacted] with Prime Minister King, when he attended his [redacted] this morning, shortly after he had been sworn in to his newspost in a ceremony at Rideau Hall. — (Photo by C. W. [redacted]). (See also Pages 15 and 22.)

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MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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PRESS CLIPPINGS

C 272923

Office of
The Prime Minister

Name of Publication Ottawa E Journal

Date No 2/44

Subject



NEW DEFENCE MINISTER AT FIRST CABINET MEETING—Defence Minister A. G. L. McNaughton, former commander of the Canadian Army overseas, left, photographed at noon with Prime Minister King, when he attended his first meeting of Cabinet council this morning, shortly after he had been sworn in to his new post in a ceremony at Rideau Hall.—(Photo by T. V. Little). (See also pages 12 and 22.)

REPEAT
REPETER

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PRESS CLIPPINGS C 272923

Name of Publication

Date

Subject

REPEAT
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NEW DEFENCE MINISTER AT FIRST CABINET MEETING. Defence Minister [illegible] G. L. McNaughton, former commander of the Canadian Army overseas, left, photographed at [illegible] with Prime Minister King [illegible] his first meeting of Cabinet council this morning, shortly after he had been sworn [illegible] Photo by T. V. Little. (See also pages 12 and 22.)

[illegible] Tapers, [illegible]

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES
CANADA

POOR PRINT
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PRESS CLIPPINGS C272924

Office of The Prime Minister

Name of Publication Ottawa E Citizen

Date Nov 2/44

Subject



NEW DEFENCE MINISTER—Pictured above are Gen. A. G. L. McNaughton (left), sworn in this morning as minister of national defence to succeed Hon. J. L. Ralston, who resigned last night, and Prime Minister King. The picture was taken at a press conference in the Prime Minister's office in the East Block at noon when Mr. King announced Gen. McNaughton's appointment.—(Photo by Newton.)

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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[redacted]

PRESS CLIPPINGS C272924

Name of Publication

Date

Subject



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PRESS CLIPPINGS C272924 Office of The Prime Minister

Name of Publication Ottawa E Citizen

Date Nov 2/44

REPEAT
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Subject

[redacted]

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MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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CANADA

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PRESS CLIPPINGS

C 272925

Office of The Prime Minister

Name of Publication OTTAWA JOURNAL-PRESS

Date NOV 3

Subject



NEW DEFENCE MINISTER—Pictured above are Gen. A. G. L. McNaughton (left), sworn in yesterday as minister of national defence to succeed Hon. J. L. Ralston, who resigned Wednesday, and Prime Minister King. The picture was taken at a press conference in the Prime Minister's office in the East Block at noon when Mr. King announced Gen. McNaughton's appointment.—(Photo by Newton.)

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PUBLIC ARCHIVES
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PRESS CLIPPINGS C 272925

Name of Publication

Date

Subject



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

C 272926

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
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CANADA

[illegible] Daily Star - November 6, 1941

GENERAL McNAUGHTON JOINS CANADA'S CABINET



PREMIER KING AND HIS MINISTER OF DEFENCE

C 272926

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Toronto Daily Star - November 3, 1944

GENERAL McNAUGHTON JOINS CANADA'S CABINET



PREMIER KING AND HIS MINISTER OF DEFENCE

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PRESS CLIPPINGS

C272927

Office of the Prime Minister

Name of Publication .....

Date .....

Pictorial Record of Events Preceding Cabinet Changes





Pledge to direct Home Defense forces into overseas service, if and when it was deemed necessary, is voiced by Hon. J. L. Ralston, then Minister of National Defense, seen at left above. Into the rising criticism of the Government for maintaining two armies arrives Gen. A. G. L. McNaughton from his post overseas, creating fresh confusion by casting doubt on the Government's announcement that ill health brought him home. At right, Major Conn Smythe, M.C., invalided back from France, charges from his hospital bed that untrained and inadequately trained troops are being sent into battle. His charges arouse storm of discussion, are followed by quick departure of Col. Ralston for overseas inspection trip.

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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PRESS CLIPPINGS

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Name of Publication

Date

Pictorial Record of Events Preceding Cabinet Changes





Pledge to direct Home Defense forces into overseas service, if and when it was deemed necessary, is voiced by Hon. J. L. Ralston, then Minister of National Defense, seen at left above. Into the rising criticism of the Government for maintaining two armies arrives Gen. A. G. L. McNaughton from his post overseas, creating fresh confusion by casting doubt on the Government's announcement that ill health brought him home. At right, Major Conn Smythe, M.C., invalided back from France, charges from his hospital bed that untrained and inadequately trained troops are being sent into battle. His charges arouse storm of discussion, are followed by quick departure of Col. Ralston for overseas inspection trip.

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W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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PRESS CLIPPINGS

C272928

Office of the Prime Minister

Name of Publication .....

Date .....

Subject .....





In Belgium, Col. Ralston visits forces, is asked questions about postwar plans, are zombies to be demobilized before veterans of foreign service. Meantime (right) trained Home Defense forces work in Ontario tobacco fields.

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
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PRESS CLIPPINGS 272929

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In Italy he meets more Canadians who ask questions, among them, left to right above: Corp. A. Tykeriz of Welland, Pte. N. Alexander, Toronto, and Corp. D. Renwick, Merritton, all with the 48th Highlanders.



While Ralston confers with colleagues in Ottawa, Gen. McNaughton visits Toronto fuse plant, receives gift from (left) Major E. Flexman, manager, and (right) Don McNeill, employees chairman, states he has "no knowledge of facts or circumstances of reinforcement conditions overseas."



Looking worried and carrying a bulging despatch case, Col. Ralston arrives back from overseas by plane, declines to talk about reinforcement situation "until after reaching Ottawa."

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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Statement respecting Government Policy on Conscription

Vancouver, B.C. - June 30, 1941:
This was repeated in House of Commons January 26, 1942
Unrevised Hansard p. 55.
Revised Hansard p. 48

The policy of the Government regarding conscription has been made abundantly clear. We have taken the position that every young man who is physically fit should be liable for military training and service in Canada for the defence of Canada. This policy is designed to provide our country with a second line of defence should the country be subject to direct attack. In the same way, Parliament has put at the disposal of the nation all the material resources of the country.

My colleagues and I have made it equally clear that service outside Canada in the armed forces of Canada at sea, on land, and in the air - service which is undertaken in the cause of freedom - shall be freely undertaken.

Before war came, the Government gave a solemn pledge, in the event of war, we would follow that policy. When war came, the pledge was solemnly reaffirmed. At the general elections, during the war itself, it received the overwhelming approval of the people of Canada. Indeed, no political party ventured to advocate conscription for overseas service.

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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C272931

Revised Hansard
P. 4321

Unrevised Hansard
November 12, 1941
p. 4672.

"So far as conscription stands for compulsory selective national service, that is a principle which this Government has embodied in its National Resources Mobilization Act passed at a previous session of this Parliament. As to how rapidly that principle should be applied and how far it should be extended is a matter which the Government must decide and will decide in the light of all the knowledge which it has with respect to the needs of our war effort and the position of the country in meeting them."

Note This was repeated in H. of C. Jan. 26, 1942 Unrevised Hansard, page 51; also Jan. 27, 1942 p. 68

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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Revised Hansard
pp. 46, 48, 50.

Revised Hansard
January 26, 1942
pp. 53, 55, 57.

"While the government, in its policies, has sought a total effort, it has never ceased to believe that only by a united effort could total effort be achieved. In every step the government has taken from the moment the threat of war appeared on the European horizon, we have sought so to direct our policies and the course of public affairs that the country would remain united in its support of the national effort.

"Every hon. member of this house knows that, except for the assurance that, in the event of a European war, there would be no conscription for service overseas, this parliament would never have decided, in the immediate and unanimous manner in which it did, to stand at the side of Britain in the resistance of aggression, and the defence of freedom.

"If the issue of conscription for service overseas is to be fought out, the place for it to be fought out is on the floor of this parliament. If, however, members of the government and, indeed, members of thie House of Commons generally, are to be free to express their views irrespective of any previous commitments, it is necessary that all members be released from any obligation arising out of any past commitments restricting the methods of raising men for military service.

"Quite apart from the controversy which has arisen, there are the strongest of reasons why the government should, at this time of gravest crisis in the world's history, possess complete freedom to act in accordance with its judgment of the needs of the situation as they may arise, subject only to its responsibility to parliament.

"The strongest of reasons why the government should be given a free hand to take, subject to its responsibility to parliament, any ccourse of action which it may believe to be necessary at a time of war is that the government itself alone can know all the circumstances and reasons which necessitate a particular course of action. These reasons cannot all be made public, linked as they are with the combined plans of other countries, with questions of military strategy, and the necessity of such matters being carefully concealed from the enemy."

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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Revised Hansard
pp. 831-32

Unrevised Hansard
February 25, 1942
Pages 913-914

(Illustration of the difference between the possession of unlimited powers of conscription by the government and the exercise of these powers in the manner deemed "necessary or expedient" at a particular stage of the war.)

With respect to the men that are being raised at the present time, we have two methods. They are not ends in themselves but methods, and we are taking the methods which we believe will be most effective and serviceable to Canada's war effort when we resort to the one or to the other. We have two methods of raising men for the army. Some of them are raised by compulsion; they are serving within the territorial limits of Canada. Others are being raised by voluntary enlistment, some of them also are serving in Canada. But all that are going overseas are being raised by the voluntary enlistment system, which has proved effective up to the present.

. . . . .

I wish to have this parallel kept in mind. What the government is going to do when the voluntary method fails in the matter of loans it will decide when the time comes; and it will do exactly the same thing as respects the matter of raising men. . . . And may I say this: I think the people of the country will see to it that both things are linked pretty closely together if one or the other becomes necessary.

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
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Revised Hansard
June 10, 1942
P. 3254
3227

Note re: "Necessary or Expedient"

"While full and complete powers for the exercise of compulsion are given to the Governor in Council by the (National Resources Mobilization) Act, under its provisions, it is left to the governor in council to decide when, and to what extent, it may be necessary or expedient to exercise the powers thus conferred. This will be equally true of the powers of the governor in council under the act as amended. The discretion of the government will remain precisely what it is at the present time."

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3233

Page 3515

"The government does not believe that, to serve that end (to defeat the enemy overseas) conscription for overseas service is necessary at the present time. Moreover, it may never become necessary. But, in case it should ever become necessary, it is surely the part of wisdom that there should be no doubt whatever of the power of the government to take the necessary action the moment the necessity to do so may arise. There should equally be no doubt that this power is derived from the present parliament rather than from a statute enacted in 1914."

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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Re: Duration of the War and Manpower Policy

Unrevised Hansard
February 25, 1942
Page 908

Revised Hansard
Ft. 25, 1942 - p. 826

"For our program this year (1942), and up to March 1943, there is an honest belief on the part of the government that we will be able to get the men by voluntary enlistment for service overseas, and will not have to resort to conscription. But no one can say how long this war is going to last. No one can say what particular turn it is going to take."

June 10, 1942
Page 3516

Revised Hansard
P. 3234

"Nothing, I think, could be plainer than that. It was made perfectly clear that the government had no thought of resorting to conscription for overseas service so long as the voluntary system continued to produce the necessary recruits; also, that we honestly believed the voluntary system would suffice to secure the necessary enlistments for the 1942-43 programme. The government, however, wished to be free, without any breach of faith, to resort to conscription for overseas service should that become necessary to our national security and to the effectiveness of our war effort.

If the bill is amended as proposed, it is not the intention of the government to resort to conscription for service overseas unless circumstances should arise which would render the use of compulsion imperative, such, for example, as the maintenance of the necessary reinforcements for Canada's army overseas."

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
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Re: Necessity of Conscription in times of National Unity

Revised Hansard p. 3236.

Unrevised Hansard
June 10, 1942
Page 3518

"There is, fortunately, a third view -- a view which I believe, accords with the opinion most generally held throughout the dominion. It is that conscription for service overseas should be inaugurated only if and when, in the opinion of the government, it becomes necessary to the security of our country and to the maintenance of its war effort. That view is the one which is held by the government. It represents the government's policy with respect to conscription for service overseas. In a word, that policy may be described as not necessarily conscription but conscription if necessary. Considering all relevant circumstances, I submit that no other policy will serve to keep Canada united, or to further Canada's war effort in the manner which, at this time of war, will best serve the interests of Canada, the interests of the British Commonwealth of nations, and of the other united nations which are linked together in the common cause of freedom.

Knowing the disastrous effect upon Canada's war effort which a controversy concerning conscription for service overseas would occasion in Canada, to say nothing of the problems to which the enforcement of such a policy might give rise, the government, I need hardly say, has done all in its power to prevent our country from becoming divided over the conscription issue. It has done so without sacrifice in the slightest particular, of any step essential to an all-out effort. It would have been fatal to the unity of Canada for the government to have done otherwise. It lies beyond the power of the government to prevent an issue from arising. But it would be equally fatal for the government not to continue to do all in its power to prevent the issue becoming one which could ever impair the efficiency of our war effort and the magnificent record our country has already achieved, and which every citizen of the dominion is justified in viewing with the utmost pride.

Task of Parliament to safeguard unity

I cannot believe this parliament is going to permit that unity to be destroyed by a political quarrel over a question of the method by which men are to be raised for overseas service. Canada, and Canada's future, is far more vital than any question of conscription.

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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Will Compulsion Strengthen the War Effort? C 272937

Unrevised Hansard
June 10, 1942
Page 3521

Revised Hansard
P. 3240

"..... the government has the power to conscript any property, any wealth, or the services of any individual in Canada, whenever they are needed to make Canada stronger to resist attack, and to help Canada to do its full share to defeat the enemy.

Compulsion, in any form, should be used in the war effort only if it will make Canada stronger, and add to Canada's part in winning the war. Here let me repeat that compulsion is regarded by the government, not as an end in itself, but as a means to an end. That end is a total war effort."

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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C 272938

Revised Hansard
p. 4006-4007

Unrevised Hansard
July 7, 1942
p. 4319-4320

"In the present debate (July 7, 1942) there are two things which have been proven beyond all shadow of doubt. The first is that the use of the method of compulsion for raising men at any time up to the present, has not been necessary to obtain the men required for overseas service in any of the armed forces of Canada; in the air force, in the navy or in the army. The second is that the totality of Canada's war effort would not have been, in any particular, increased, through an extension of the principle of compulsion to service overseas. Indeed, by resulting dissension, it might have been considerably reduced.

"I mention these facts first of all to make perfectly clear that the government has meant what it has said when it has stated, as up to the present it consistently has, that conscription for overseas service was not necessary, either on the ground of obtaining the necessary recruits, or to enable the government to meet its objective of a properly balanced total war effort.

"I mention these facts, also, to make perfectly clear that in asking, as is being done by the present bill, that, subject only to its responsibility to parliament, the government should possess complete freedom to act in accordance with its judgment of the needs of the situation as they may arise, the government is doing so not in response to political pressure or popular clamour in any part of the country..."

"I have no doubt whatever that the events of the war will more than justify the course which the government has thus far pursued, and is pursuing today. I know that the government's present course is already justified in the eyes of the very large majority of the citizens of Canada who have expressed the view that the government should have complete freedom in meeting the different situations of the war as they may arise. I believe that the wisdom of the government's course will become equally apparent to most, if not to all, of those who have been unwilling, or still hesitate to trust the administration with so wide a measure of discretion."

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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Unrevised Hansard
July 7, 1942
p. 4324

Revised Hansard
P. 4011

"If, in reference to the very difficult question of service overseas, anyone can conceive of a policy which is better calculated to serve the national interest than the one the government has formulated, and which is clearly and concisely expressed in the worlds: 'Not necessarily conscription, but c nscription if necessary', I shall be first to advocate its acceptance. I can only say that nothing of the kind has been proposed by any hon. member in the course of the debate. Nor do I believe that anything better can be suggested. Indeed, the events of the war, as well as all that has been said in the course of the debate, should have made it wholly apparent that, all circumstances, taken into account, it is the only sound policy."

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
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C 272940

Unrevised Hansard
July 7, 1942
p.4326

Revised Hansard
p. 4012

"If, at some future time, it became necessary in the judgment of the administration to apply conscription for service overseas, that step, it is to be presumed, would be to meet a situation which would permit of little, if anything, in the way of debate. Debate would involve delays at a moment when time had become a vital factor. Knowing that this is likely to be the case, had the government sought to postpone debate on overseas conscription until the hour of an emergency, hon. members might well have complained that on so controversial a question they were not being treated with the consideration to which the representatives of the people were entitled. It might have been said that their hands were being forced.

There is an additional reason why the debate on conscription for service overseas should take place upon the present bill rather than at a time - should the situation so demand - that the government may have reached the decision that the application of the compulsory method to military service overseas has become necessary. That reason is that the need would almost certainly arise in circumstances in which military considerations would prevent the disclosure in open debate of the factors on which the decision of the government was based. The government's judgment in the matter will necessarily depend, in very large part, on military information of the highest degree of secrecy. There is nothing more important in the movement of troops at a time of war than that all matters pertaining thereto should be surrounded with the utmost secrecy. Moreover it is not only Canada's position, and considerations of special interest to Canada, that have to be taken into account. Very careful account has to be taken of the hostile use the enemy may make of information disclosed, and of how far any disclosures on military matters may affect the position of every one of the united nations.

It has, I thin, been made abundantly clear that, so far at least as the present administration is concerned, any decision respecting conscription for overseas service will not rest solely with the military authorities, but that any action taken under the present bill must and will be authorized by the Governor in Council. In other words, the decision will be the decision of the cabinet, subject always to its responsibility to parliament.

I have also already given to hon. members an assurance that all relevant factors would be taken into account by the cabinet in reaching a decision."

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272941
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Revised Hansard
p. 4013

Unrevised Hansard
July 7, 1942
p. 4327

"As to the right thing being done by the government at the right time, and in the right way, that, it seems to me, as I said in opening this debate, necessarily comes to be a matter of the degree of confidence which parliament and the people have in the administration charged with the responsibilities of carrying on the war. This does not constitute a reason for a second debate on the conscription issue. It is, however, the strongest of reasons why a government, once it has reached a decision that the needs of a situation demand a certain course of action on which opinion may be divided, should take the earliest possible opportunity of making perfectly sure that it enjoys the confidence of parliament, and that it may rely with certainty upon the support of parliament in giving effect to the decision reached. Especially is this the case where widely divergent views have previously been expressed in the country, and also in parliament, on the wisdom of any discretionary power being given the administration; and where it is to be expected that differences will still exist concerning the wisdom of the decision.

A second debate on conscription is one thing. A vote of confidence in a government before it undertakes to enforce a particular course of action is quite another and wholly different thing.

If an administration is to begin to carry out its duties in the prosecution of a war, it cannot afford to be left in any doubt, at any time, as to the adequacy of its support by parliament, and least of all in a time of peril. The assurance of the confidence of parliament is particularly necessary to the leader of a government where there is the slightest reason for him to doubt the extent to which he may be able to rely upon the support he will receive in the House of Commons."

Also used June 10, 1942
Unrevised Hansard
p. 3517-18

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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C 272942
Revised Hansard
P. 4014

Extract from Unrevised Hansard
July 7, 1942
p. 4328

"I intend, therefore, if the time should come when the government decides that it has become necessary to send overseas men who have not volunteered for general service, and I should be in office at the time, to ask my colleagues to join me in seeing that parliament is immediately informed of the government's decision. If parliament is not in session, I would do whatever lies within my power, to see that parliament is informed as soon as possible after the decision has been reached.

"I intend, at the same time, to see that, before the administration assumes the additional responsibility of enforcing its decision, hon. members are given an opportunity, not for any second debate on the question of conscription, but of showing their confidence or want of confidence in the administration.

"In following this course, I hope it will be agreed that I am fulfilling the spirit of an earlier undertaking given to parliament on February 25, that 'when we find that we cannot raise the required numbers of men for enlistment overseas by the voluntary method, and it is absolutely necessary to raise more men by other methods, then we will make our decision, present it to parliament, and have it discussed on its merits.' The debate on the merits of conscription has, of necessity, come on the present bill. What really is important hereafter is that the

government's decision should immediately be presented to parliament, and that the government should be prepared to stand or fall on its decision.

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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C 272943

Revised Hansard
P. 4015

Unrevised Hansard
July 7, 1942
p. 4329

"I am unable to indicate, at present, which procedure will be followed in the event of the government reaching the decision that it should have recourse to conscription for service overseas. That must depend upon the circumstances at the time. In a matter which relates to a future decision of the cabinet, and so immediately to the confidence which others may have in my judgment and my fidelity, I obviously can speak only for myself. No one can say what the course of the war will be, or what, at any time, conditions may be in our own or other countries. In seeking to free the government from one commitment, I do not wish to be drawn into making another. I wish, however, to leave no doubt in the mind of any hon. member that, if I am at the head of the administration when such a decision is reached, I shall ask to be assured of the confidence of the House of Commons before the government proceeds to enforce the decision.

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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C 272944

Revised Hansard
P. 4627

Unrevised Hansard
July 23, 1942
p. 4986

.."when this bill passes both houses, as I believe it will pass, and is assented to, the government will have been given by parliament power to conscript men for service overseas. That power will rest in the government. It will be there. The policy of the government is to exercise that power when it believes it necessary to do so, when it is necessary to resort to conscription to make Canada's war effort more effective. When the decision is made by the government - if and when it is made - that settles the matter as far as conscription is concerned. Conscription will have been enacted; the government will have declared that it is necessary for the carrying on of the war. There will be no question of referring that matter to parliament at all. And may I add this, that if that should happen between now and the end of this year there could not be a debate on it, even if some hon members might wish to have one...."

....

.."according to my policy already stated the decision will be settled by the administration under the power given to it by this legislation.

But, Mr. Speaker, it is a very different thing when a decision has been reached which places additional responsibilities on the ministry, responsibilities which must be viewed by any wise ministry in the light of all that has gone before; in the light of all that has taken place during this debate in this House of Commons; in the light, as my hon. friend the former minister said this afternoon, of what is going to be the result of the enforcement of that policy not only in the immediate future but for all time to come; I say when all that responsibility is added to the responsibility already on the shoulders of the ministry, I think it very desirable that this House of Commons should say whether it is prepared to give its support to the administration to carry on with that extra responsibility, or whether it is going to withhold its support just at the time it is most needed."

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
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C 272945

Revised Hansard
P. 4628

Unrevised Hansard
July 23, 1942
p. 4987

"I want to make perfectly sure at the present time that, so far as I am concerned, coming to this house for an expression of confidence at any time, undue time will not be consumed in debate. Hon. members will be given within a certain period of time, a chance to show where they stand and that will be a period of time which the people of this country will deem reasonable and sufficient for the purpose. I hope that is clear so that the country and hon. members will see there are not any delays whatsoever. Once the decision of the government is reached the government is going to proceed immediately and rapidly with the question of confidence and in carrying out to the full the intent and purpose of its decision."

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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Revised Hansard
P. 4628

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July 23, 1942
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REPEAT
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W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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C272946

Revised Hansard
PP. 4564-5

Unrevised Hansard
July 22, 1942
p. 4919

"When the government decides that it is necessary and advisable to resort to conscription as a method of raising men for service overseas, an order in coundil will be passed dealing with members of the forces as a whole. It will not be a matter of passing a series of orders in council, but one order in council will cover the entire force.

As to further legislation of this session of parliament the introduction of an act which will amount to a military service act or something equivalent to it. My hon. friend will realize that that would mean a second debate, which would resolve itself into going over, time and time again, very much the ground already covered, notwithstanding that at the present time we have the existing regulations in reference to the calling up of men under the mobilization act. Any regulations that will be passed with respect to service overseas, I should say, broadly speaking, would be similar if not wholly identical. I cannot see wherein it is necessary to embody all these regulations in the form of an act. To introduce further legislation at this session would help to defeat one of the main purposes of this legislation, namely to get into the hands of the government, as soon as possible, the power which it is desirable it should have at this particular time."

.....

"Well, it is because of hon. members like my hon. friend who has just spoken that I have felt it absolutely necessary to have an expression of the confidence of this house before I undertake to put any conscription act into force with respect to service overseas."

.....

"There is no submission to parliament with regard to conscription. Let me make it perfectly clear that, so far as coming back to parliament for any purpose is concerned, there will be no coming back to parliament for a second debate on conscription, nor will there be any coming back to get the approval of parliament of the decision made. When the government makes its decision that decision is made, and it will be carried out either by this government or by some other government. It will not have to be approved by parliament first. The question whether or not a ministry, headed by myself will enjoy sufficient confidence in the minds of hon. members of this House of Commons and of the people of this country to administer conscription, once it has been decided that conscription for service overseas shall be enforced, is a separate matter, and it is a matter on which I shall wish to have an expression of confidence."

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C 272947

Revised Hansard
P. 4625

Unrevised Hansard
July 23, 1942
p. 4983

"In the matter of putting conscription for service overseas into force, should that become necessary, there will be no delay in conscripting or training men. Exactly the same number will be called up by exactly the same method, regardless of geographical sphere of service. If the supply of volunteers fails there will be no question of starting a new system; all that will be required will be to extend the scope of service of men already called up and trained. That is the answer to the question as to the effect of delay in putting this system into force."

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C 272948
Revised Hansard
P. 4625

Unrevised Hansard
July 23, 1942
p. 4984

...."I do not wish to assume any obligation that hon. members of this house have not full faith in my carrying out to the letter. May I say this to my fellow-members of the House of Commons: I have shirked no responsibility of any kind since this war came on that I believed to be in the national interest. I have not hesitated to ask this House of Commons for any measure that I thought was essential in the national interest."

111...

"I was taking a very grave responsibility when I came into this chamber and asked this House of Commons to support a policy which would carry Canada into the war. I had taken the greatest responsibility that any human being on earth can take, that of bringing his own country into the war. I did not shirk that responsibility because I believed it was in the interest of our country that we should take that step. And after three years of war I ask my friends in this house tonight whether they think I was wrong in taking that step at that time.

I feel exactly the same about this matter of conscription for overseas service. Up to the present time I have not felt it necessary to conscript men for service overseas because our Canadians were doing honour to themselves and to their country by enlisting for training for service anywhere in larger numbers than we could prepare them. But I say tonight that, with the world situation what it is ..... I would be derelict to the responsibility which I bear to the country and to my fellow-members if I did not say to them that I believed it was absolutely in the interest of the country that the government should have power to take any step at any time that it deems necessary, so long as it takes that step in the light of its responsibility to parliament."

.....

"If I am persuaded that it is necessary and desirable to resort to conscription of men for overseas service, I am going to support that view. But the minute I support that view, if it is the view of the cabinet, I wish to be able to come to this House of Commons and say: The cabinet has reached this decision; the next step will be to enforce it. Before that next step is taken I want this House of Commons to declare whether it has confidence in me as the head of the administration that is to carry out this policy of conscription or whether hon. members prefer to have another government in the place of the administration now in office. That is my conception of carrying out my responsibility to parliament."

.....

.."the people of this country will want to know two things: first, whether the head of the government that is carrying on this war has the confidence of the majority in this House of Commons, and second, where the members of this House of Commons stand, each one of them, not by their words but by their vote, on the question of the course that may be thought necessary by the administration in the winning of the war. And I intend, if it lies in my power, to see that this House of Commons gets that opportunity, so that the people will know exactly where each and every one of us stands."

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C 272949

Revised 17.
p 832

Unrevised Hansard
February 25, 1941
p. 914

"When we find that we cannot raise the required numbers of men for enlistment overseas by the voluntary method, and it is absolutely necessary to raise more men by other methods, then we will make our decision, present it to parliament and have it discussed on its merits."

Unrevised Hansard
March 2, 1942
p. 1036

"If release from those commitments is given by the electorate of Canada, the government will feel itself entirely free to consider the question of conscription on its merits in the light of all the circumstances existing at the time, to recommend its course to parliament, and to have parliament deal with the matter as it does with any other matter brought before it. There is no different attitude assumed with respect to this one question from that with regard to any other."

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C 272950

Re: Government Decision based on necessity and advisability in certain eventualities

Unrevised Hansard
February 25, 1942
Page 918

Revised Hansard
P. 830

"The government is asking the people for a free hand in order that it may do in the circumstances as they may arise what is most in the interests of the people of Canada. We wish to make Canada's war effort as effective as it can possibly be made. What we shall do at any particular time will depend upon the course which we think at the time is necessary and advisable and most effective in Canada's war effort. That decision is not going to be made in the light of any one factor. It is going to be made in the light of all conditions as they exist and as they are known to the government at the time. . . .

The government is going to do the thing that it believes is going to further to the uttermost Canada's war effort, all circumstances considered. May I say that when I say "all circumstances considered," I have inmind the conditions as they may exist in respect to the war in different theatres and the conditions that may exist in Canada itself.

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C272951
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p. 970

Unrevised Hansard
March 2, 1942
p. 1063

..."if tomorrow it became necessary to exercise compulsion in the matter of protecting our shores to the extent of our armed forces going out in the Pacific beyond Queen Charlotte island, or to Alaska, or to Labrador or Newfoundland, I would not hesitate one moment in using the War Measures Act to see that conscription was enforced for that purpose were such a step necessary. That would not be violating the commitment made. The commitment was not made with respect to the protection of our own shores; it was made with respect to sending men overseas; everyone so understood it, and it was to that extent that the law and the fact was limited and that the government at the present time is limited."

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Extract from broadcast
April 7, 1942

"The question of conscription, properly viewed, is a military question. The place to discuss it is in parliament. What the government now seeks for itself and for parliament is freedom to consider and debate and decide this question, like all other questions connected with the war, unrestricted by any pledge and in the light only of the needs of national security."

"The people of Canada are not going to hesitate to take any step which they believe to be necessary for the preservation of their freedom. They are certainly not going to hesitate to adopt any measure needed to preserve their national existence, but they will wish to know, and they have a right to know, that before any step is taken, that step is necessary. This is particularly true in the case of a measure which has been the subject of bitter controversy and the source of disunity in the past.

"The only place it can satisfactorily be decided whether a particular step is necessary or a particular measure needed, is in parliament. In parliament, the government can state its case and provide the information on which a wise decision can alone be made.

"In the greatest of all emergencies, I ask you, are you not prepared to trust the government and your own parliament to see that only those things are done which are wholly in the interest of the country? If there are any who are not, who or what are they prepared to trust? This is the question I should like every citizen of Canada to ask himself, and herself as he or she proceeds to answer 'yes' or 'no' to the question being asked on the 27th of this month."

(See also: Unrevised Hansard
July 7, 1942
p. 4328)

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Unrevised Hansard
June 10, 1942
Page 3509

Revised Hansard
June 10, 1942
Page 3227

Government policy has always to be decided in the light of all relevant circumstances.

The administration, subject only to its responsibility to parliament, should possess complete freedom to act in accordance with its judgment of the needs of the situation as they may arise in the prosecution of the war.

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Re: Government Decision based on
necessity and advisability
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	Enrolments	Conversion to gen. service	Conversions to other services	Discharges	Total	Strength at end of year
1941*	31,500	7,500	4,200	3,300	15,000	16,500
1942	69,500	18,000	1,300	8,200	27,500	
Total including 1942	101,000	25,500	5,000	11,500	42,500	58,500
1943	34,000	6,500	300	11,000	17,800	
Total including 1943	135,000	32,000	5,800	22,500	60,300	74,700
1944†	15,000	10,000	200	11,000	21,200	
Grand Total	150,000	42,000	6,000	33,500	81,500	‡68,500

*Commencing March †To end of September ‡At end of September

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Enrolments under N.R.M.A.	Voluntary enlistments from N.R.M.A.	Excess of voluntary enlistments over enrolment
1,500	2,975	1,475
1,350	1,350	
1,225	1,350	125
1,050	1,350	300
1,075	850	225
6,200	7,875	1,675

June .....
July .....
August .....
September ...
October .....
Total .....

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C 272961

CANADA AND THE WAR

CANADA'S SUPPORT OF THE ARMY OVERSEAS

BROADCAST

by

Right Hon. W. L. MACKENZIE KING, M.P.
Prime Minister of Canada

OTTAWA, NOVEMBER 8, 1944

OTTAWA
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PRINTER TO THE KING'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY
1944

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CANADA AND THE WAR

CANADA'S SUPPORT OF THE ARMY OVERSEAS

Broadcast by

Right Hon. W. L. MACKENZIE KING, M.P.
Prime Minister of Canada

Wednesday, November 8, 1944

I am going to speak to you tonight of Canada's support of our army overseas.

The government has been giving the closest attention to all the available facts. We have been examining the probabilities of the unknown future course of the war. We have been considering particularly the methods of supplying reinforcements required by the army. At the risk of increasing temporary anxiety we have taken the time needed to look at all the facts. In war time conditions change very rapidly. Five years' experience has taught us all that nothing is more uncertain than war.

I emphasize the question of reinforcements because no other question is more important to our fighting men. The government is fully aware of the public concern about reinforcements.

The Problem of Reinforcements as Related to Canada's Total Military Effort

Let me begin by placing the question in its true perspective in the picture of Canada's total military effort. Since 1939, nearly a million men have served in Canada's three armed forces. The present strength of the three services is about three-quarters of a million. All but 68,000 are volunteers. These figures represent a stupendous achievement in raising fighting men for a nation of less than twelve millions, particularly when account is taken of the manpower required for war production and vital civilian services.

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The problem of reinforcements concerns only one of the three armed services. The navy and the air force have no such problem. The navy, with 85,000 men in the service, has reached the peak of its manpower needs. The air force, with 190,000 men in its ranks, has passed the peak of its manpower requirements. For that, we should all be thankful. The reason is that air force casualties, though costly, have been very much lighter than were anticipated.

The present strength of the army including the draftees is over 455,000 men. Of this number, about 390,000 are volunteers. Over 45,000 men have volunteered for general service since January 1st of the present year. Most of the men now in the army have been in its ranks for one, two, three or four years. All but recent recruits have received long, rigorous and varied training.

Concerning the Training of Reinforcements

It is against this background that we should examine the statement that reinforcements without adequate training are being sent into action. The Canadian army is a huge organization. At one time or another, more than 650,000 men have served in its ranks during this war. Of that great number a few may have failed to receive all the training prescribed. Competent officers have made the most careful review. They find that the number of these exceptional cases is exceedingly small. The highest military advisers of the government are satisfied that reinforcements sent into action have been well trained.

The record of Canada's army in Italy, France, Belgium and Holland is not the record of an army of which any part lacked adequate training. On the contrary, the military achievements of our army are the best possible evidence of the efficiency of its training. Since they went into action in July, 1943, our troops have received a steady stream of reinforcements to replace casualties. The recent victories on the Scheldt are the answer to those who say that, because of insufficiently trained reinforcements, the army is not being adequately supported.

The need for reinforcements is, of course, based upon the number of casualties. When we speak of the number of casualties, this does not mean the number killed. It means the number killed, wounded, missing and prisoners of war, and also those who because of sickness or other incapacity are not available for immediate combat.

The probable number of casualties has to be estimated in advance. Before D-Day, no one could possibly know how great the casualties would be in northwestern Europe. The military experts of all the forces which landed in France made the most

careful estimates of probable casualties. These estimates were based on experience in other theatres, on the probable nature of the operations in France and the Low Countries, and on the most careful appreciation of the strength of enemy resistance.

In the actual fighting, the total casualties in our army have not been as great as the number estimated and provided for. Infantry casualties were lower than expected in the actual landings and higher than estimated in the heavy fighting since the beachheads were established in June. The army has been obliged to transfer some of the men originally trained for other arms into the pool of infantry reinforcements. This procedure is known as "remustering". Such transfers are bound to be a disappointment for men who have been highly trained in a particular arm of the service and find themselves obliged, by the circumstances of war, to transfer to another arm. But such troops are not untrained. All "re-mustered" troops have had basic infantry training. In addition to basic training and the training they have received in their particular arm, they are given further specialized infantry training before being sent into combat.

Concerning the Reserve of Reinforcements

I now come to the question: Is there an adequate reserve of reinforcements for the army? In the opinion of the military authorities, no difficulty is likely to arise except in relation to reinforcements for the infantry. Infantry reinforcements have been adequate to meet requirements to date. But, during his recent visit to the army overseas, Colonel Ralston learned that to provide replacements for future casualties at present rates, the flow of infantry reinforcements from Canada should be accelerated. One fact needs to be emphasized. There is not an overall shortage of potential reinforcements. Many thousands of men are in training now and enlistments are continuing at an encouraging rate. Because we cannot tell how long the war may last, we must, as long as a possible need may arise, continue to recruit men for the army to keep up the supply of reinforcements. But recent recruits and those who enlist from now on will not be available until they are trained.

Colonel Ralston's report to the government disclosed an immediate problem which had to be faced. That problem is to find the means of speeding up the flow of fully trained infantry reinforcements to meet, not an actual shortage of reinforcements now, but a possible shortage in the next few months.

The question many of you will ask at once, is: why not send overseas some of the draftees who are fully trained in Canada under the National Resources Mobilization Act?

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That will seem to many of you the easiest way of meeting the problem. It is not, however, in accord with the policy of keeping our army overseas a 100 per cent voluntary army if we possibly can. The voluntary system of raising our overseas forces has produced splendid results during five years of war. We have always believed that Canada's forces, having begun as voluntary forces, would be more effective, and that the country would be more united in their support, if we continued to rely upon the voluntary system for reinforcements as long as the voluntary system continued to be effective.

Concerning the Change of Minister of the Department of National Defence

Colonel Ralston had grave doubts of our ability to keep up the flow of reinforcements in the next few months by voluntary means. He considered, therefore, that he had no alternative but to recommend that draftees should be sent overseas as reinforcements. The acceptance of this recommendation would have required agreement by the government that no alternative existed to a resort to conscription for overseas service. I do not need to stress the gravity of the decision the government was then obliged to face. Days of anxious deliberation were devoted to an exploration of all possible alternatives.

When I realized that unless Colonel Ralston's recommendation were accepted by the Cabinet, his resignation would follow, I felt it to be my duty, as Prime Minister, to seek the most expert advice I believed to be available. I accordingly consulted General McNaughton. As the builder and first Commander of the Canadian Army, no man, I knew, had the interests of the Army and the men overseas closer to his heart. General McNaughton expressed the belief that the possibilities of securing the required reinforcements by voluntary means had not been exhausted.

The recommendation made by Colonel Ralston was not accepted. Following his resignation, General McNaughton assumed the duties of Minister of National Defence.

I regret deeply the difference which led to Colonel Ralston's resignation. No man in Canada has given more selfless and devoted service to his country throughout the war. In this matter Colonel Ralston has followed the dictates of his conscience in what he feels he owes to his pledged word.

I need not give assurances of General McNaughton's devotion to his country, or of his determination to see that full support is given to the army.

C 272966

It is important to remember that the former Minister of National Defence and the present Minister have precisely the same objective in view: they differ only as to the means of reaching that goal.

Continuance of Voluntary Enlistment Preferable to Resort to Conscription

Let me give you some facts and figures which were before the government in reaching its decision.

There is a widespread impression that 60 or 70 or even 80 thousand draftees have been sitting around in military camps in Canada since 1941 or 1942 drawing good pay, and doing little or nothing to help win the war. That picture is almost totally incorrect. The facts are quite different.

In March, 1941, we began to call up men for compulsory service in Canada for the duration of the war. Up to September 30, 1944, the army had accepted about 150,000 draftees. The present total number of men enrolled as draftees is about 68,000. Of these some 9,000 are on extended leave, on compassionate or other grounds. Many of them are unsuited for military duties. Of the so-called "home defence" force the effective total strength, therefore, is under 60,000.

Here I pause to correct one widespread false impression about the draftees. Of the 60,000 only 23,000 are from the Province of Quebec, and only 25,000 from all Canada are French speaking.

You will ask what has happened to the other 82,000 draftees accepted by the Army since 1941. There has been a wastage of about 33,000 including men discharged for medical or other reasons which unfitted them to be soldiers. About 6,000 draftees have enlisted as volunteers in the Navy or the Air Force. The largest group, about 43,000 have enlisted as volunteers for General Service in the army. General Service includes service overseas. In the army overseas fighting today are many thousands of men who were once draftees.

The "home defence" army is not a static force. Its composition is constantly changing. This year, nearly 15,000 men have been called up and enrolled as draftees, and more than 10,000 draftees have volunteered for General Service. Since the landing in France in June voluntary enlistments for overseas from the "home defence" troops have been higher than the numbers called up and accepted as draftees.

From a purely military standpoint, there is no argument that it is preferable to reinforce a voluntary army with volunteers. The military authorities report that enlisting gives the draftees a new

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outlook, new self-respect, and a determination that comes from having made a great decision. That is bound to make them better soldiers. This is very important, because we are as much concerned with the quality, as with the numbers, of men sent overseas as reinforcements.

We must remember that if draftees are sent overseas before they volunteer, they will not be going to reinforce an army of drafted men. Over and over again it has been said that conscripted men would be received without enthusiasm by the volunteers they were sent overseas to join. It is also said that the presence of conscripts would constitute a source of division, and possible dissension, in the fighting units. That is nevertheless a risk the government would have to take, if it were necessary to enable Canada to bear her just share of the load in the winning of the war.

Concerning Numbers of Trained Men Available and Effect thereon of Resort to Conscription

But that is not the situation. There are some thousands of trained volunteers already overseas or about to be despatched overseas as reinforcements. Others are being re-mustered. There are, in addition, many thousands of volunteers in training in the army in Canada. Every day draftees are volunteering for overseas service. We believe their number can be increased by emphasizing anew the need and the opportunity for overseas service.

We had to ask ourselves one other question: How many additional men would be immediately available if compulsion were resorted to in order to send draftees overseas? I have told you that the present effective total of draftees in the army is under 60,000. Of that number only about 42,000 are considered suitable material for infantry reinforcements. Some 16,000 of these men are trained as infantry. It is estimated that about 8,000 of them are sufficiently trained so that they could be ready for combat at an early date.

Without any compulsion or any intensification of present methods a considerable number of these draftees would volunteer. We believe many more can be secured by a special appeal. The actual difference in numbers secured by the two methods might be very small indeed. The voluntary system has not broken down. At the moment, it is subject to an added strain which calls for an intensified effort at home, in the period immediately ahead, particularly to provide personnel in an advanced stage of training.

How great the difficulties would be in substituting conscription for overseas service for the voluntary system no one knows. But everyone who is honest with himself knows that there would be

genuine difficulties and that they might be very grave. Instead, we are redoubling our efforts to meet the existing situation by the voluntary method. In these efforts, I appeal for the patriotic co-operation of all Canadians.

Concerning the Position of Men Drafted for National Service in Canada

Many of you will ask why, if they are not to be sent overseas, the draftees are not disbanded? There are several reasons. One is that ever since early in 1942 draftees have been enlisting and going overseas in thousands. Many more are trained, and will wish to volunteer for service overseas now that it is clear that the need for "home defence" has passed. Another reason is that while the war is not yet advanced to the stage where the government can announce a detailed plan of demobilization, it has been decided to follow the principle that those men who have given the longest and the hardest service will be given the first opportunity of demobilization. Obviously that means a first preference in discharge and in employment opportunities for those with overseas service.

But this does not mean that draftees will be maintained in idleness. As long as we have an army overseas, Canada remains the ultimate base of its operations. We must maintain a considerable military establishment for the training of reinforcements, the provision of supply and certain other non-operational duties. Military garrisons in Newfoundland and on the coasts cannot be entirely abandoned. Many of these duties can be and are being performed by volunteers who are not fit for combat service. Some of these duties will necessarily continue to be discharged by draftees.

While we prefer the voluntary system for overseas service, compulsion where necessary will continue to be used to ensure that fit men of military age perform national service required by our war effort. Draftees employed in national service will remain in the army under discipline at army rates of pay. Obviously, it would not be fair to allow draftees preferential treatment by giving them civilian work at civilian rates of pay.

Another reason why draftees, except those who for physical or other reasons have ceased to be useful as soldiers, should not be disbanded, is that so long as they are in the army and adequately trained, they will continue to be a potential ultimate reserve of reinforcements whose compulsory employment in any theatre may, in the light of developing circumstances, have to be reconsidered.

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Means to be Employed to Increase the Flow of Infantry Reinforcements

To increase the flow of infantry reinforcements for the army we shall intensify our effort to encourage voluntary enlistment. The existing establishment of the army in Canada and in England will be reviewed with the object of freeing every volunteer who is fit for combat duty. We shall continue to draft men reaching military age for compulsory training and service.

We shall make every effort to have all draftees told individually of the need for their services. We shall also make every effort to have each draftee told individually of the practical benefits to his own future of becoming a volunteer and enjoying the full opportunities for successful re-establishment in civil life. In this we shall follow the principle set forth by General McNaughton: "You cannot drive men of spirit but you can encourage and lead them."

The glory of Canada's fight for freedom is the imperishable fact that every Canadian in uniform at sea, in the air and on every fighting front is there by his own choice. In this world conflict Canada has produced a race of noble warriors. The light in their eyes is the light of liberty, and the fire in their hearts is the fire of spirits dedicated to the service of their fellow-men.

This is not the hour to destroy that magnificent record. It is the hour to kindle the fire of free service in the hearts of all our young men, in the army and outside its ranks.

Appeal for Full Support to Canada's Army Overseas

I would ask my fellow Canadians, without distinction of race or creed or party to join with me in the appeal which I now make for full support to Canada's army overseas. I ask all to join no less unitedly than we have joined in the appeal for the Victory Loan. This is a higher call, and it should bring forth an even greater response.

No pride could be greater than our pride in what our armed forces are doing to help win the war, and to give Canada a foremost place among the free nations of the world.

The future of our country will belong to the men who are fighting Canada's battles today and to those men and women who are giving them full support. They will be the leaders of our country through years to come.

To you, young men, who are serving in Canada's "home defence" forces, I should like to make a special appeal. Because of the training you have already received, you are in an exceptional position

to give service which is particularly needed at this time. I have told you of the need. Let me emphasize the opportunity—the greatest you will ever have—to further serve your country and to bring honour to yourselves and your families. You will never regret the decision to do all you possibly can to support Canada's fighting army. In doing that, you will be helping to destroy the enemy of mankind and to provide security and opportunity for yourselves, your children and your fellow-men. You will be doing more than that. You will be helping to remove a source of misunderstanding, bitterness and division in our own country and to preserve its strength through years to come. You will be helping to lay the foundations of a better world.

A Victorious Canada, Free, United and Strong

I appeal no less earnestly to the friends and families of our young men to help and encourage them in a decision which will mean everything to them through the rest of their lives.

It is the government's responsibility to make the decision as to the best methods of supporting Canada's army overseas. No decision could possibly please everyone. We have made the decision which we believe will best support the army and contribute most effectively to an utmost national effort in the winning of the war. But to achieve these ends, we shall need the help and co-operation of the people as a whole. Partisan controversy and division at this time will weaken, not strengthen Canada's war effort. If we all do our part, Canada will emerge on the day of victory, free, united and strong. That is the Canada we want to welcome the return of our victorious fighting men.

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C X R

Secret

C 272971

Memorandum for the Prime Minister.

re Army Re-inforcements.

In case something might be required, I have prepared a draft of a statement which might be broadcast. It is in the form of answers to the questions most generally raised on this subject and might be useful as a foundation.

In whatever is said on this subject, it seems to me to be of the utmost importance psychologically to avoid any suggestion that a certain line of action will not be taken because "Canada has already done enough." No attitude is more infuriating to the average person who has close relatives in the armed forces, which is the condition of about half the people of Canada.

The opposite approach, namely, that a certain line of action would, despite appearances, weaken rather than strengthen Canada's total war effort, will, if properly presented, appeal to many who emotionally are inclined to oppose the present position of the government.

I have tried, therefore, to keep that point uppermost throughout the attached draft. I feel that, whatever the outcome of the present discussions and whatever may be said by others, the public will not be re-assured by a statement from anyone except the Prime Minister.

J. L. I.

26th October, 1944.

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O

MEMORANDUM
Office of the Prime Minister

CXR
C272972

Ottawa,.....

Note re there shall be no election in war-time.

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You will have seen from the press that the Cabinet has been giving long and earnest consideration to the policy with respect to conscription which, at this time, it is wisest to adopt. It would be strange indeed if such a surmise were not correct. No single question could possibly be so dangerous, so many sided, its possibilities, etc. It is bound up with discussions which arose prior to the war, again in the middle of the war, and now to have it revived at the end of the war makes it a more dangerous question than ever.

A word about the plebiscite not being discussion for conscription but to give government power to apply it free from any moral obligation if they thought that necessary and advisable. You will recall I stated that I would not hesitate, etc. to call Par iament and ask this if I thought conscription were necessary and advisable. You will recall at the same time Colonel Ralston, Minister of Defence, stated (take in his own words) would not hesitate, etc. to maintain the army at full strength....

There is no doubt that Colonel Ralston, Minister of Defence, had in mind maintenance of Canada's army at full strength. I had in mind what was necessary for the winning of the war. No one would contend today that conscription in Canada was necessary for the winning of the war. The question then comes to be whether application of conscription to maintain the army at full strength would first of all accomplish that end,

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or whether the conditions to which it would give rise might not lessen considerably Canada's total war effort, to say nothing of the legacy to which in other directions it would give rise. Having made the statement he did, the Minister of Defence naturally feels that he owes it to himself and to his integrity that not to carry it out might reflect seriously on his own integrity. As Minister of Defence, the Minister has an obligation to the army which is to do what will count for most in the army's interests in the long run. What, in the end, will serve to secure for the army reinforcements in largest amount, not knowing how long the war may run on.

The Cabinet has become convinced that taking all possible situations into account, the highest interests will in the end be served by

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JAG
27.10.44

C 272975

Memorandum for Prime Minister:

Statements on Duration of War in Europe

Attached are the following:	Exhibit
Mr. Churchill in Normandy (July 21)	1
Editorial Comment on above (Toronto Daily Star July 24)	2
London Times account of Prime Minister's statement in Canadian House of Commons August 4	3
General Eisenhower's Order of The Day (Normandy) (August 14)	A
General Montgomery : "The end of the war is in sight" (France) (August 21)	B
Mr. Churchill:"the end of the war much nearer" (Italy) (August 21)	C
Field Marshal Montgomery:"The war with Germany will end this year" (Belgium) (Sept. 19)	D
Mr. Churchill: "No guess as to when the end will come" (London, Sept. 28)	E
Mr. Churchill:"We believe we are in the last lap" (London, Oct. 27)	F

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PRESS CLIPPINGS 272976

Office of
The Prime Minister

Name of Publication Ottawa E Citizen

Date Oct 27/44

Subject

Gives Indication Of Canada's Help In Pacific Fight

Size and nature of Canada's participation in the Pacific war theater is believed to be under detailed study by the government, but so far a clear official picture of what is in store for the Dominion's armed services has not been made public.

However, as a result of isolated announcements and speculation based on ministerial statements it is understood the government is planning along these lines:

1. No general concentration on the Pacific until the war in Europe is ended.

2. All services taking part on a voluntary basis and no home defence army men going.

Will Be Given Leave.

3. Most servicemen returning to Canada for leave before continuing to the Pacific theater.

4. Canadian forces co-operating closely with British forces with both coming under general over-all United States command.

5. Canadian forces entering the conflict from across the North Pacific rather than through the Mediterranean and Red Sea.

6. One-third of the Navy's sea-going strength of 39,000 men and possibly about 350 or fewer of its 700 ships, including a pair of cruisers, and carriers and a fleet of Tribal class destroyers.

7. An army division—possibly a reconstituted 1st division now fighting in Italy. This division might draw reinforcements, if any were needed, from other divisions.

8. One-third of the R.C.A.F.'s 45 squadrons, made up of bomber, fighter and transport units.

9. Continuation of the supply of mutual aid to Allies with special emphasis on the Pacific.

Cabinet members stress the fact the war in Europe now is taking the undivided attention of all three services and until the decisive stage is reached the machinery to shift the weight of Canadian war power to the Pacific will reman idle.

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REPEAT
REPETER

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C 272977

C

National Resources Mobilization Act
(Bill 43)

3rd reading - June 20, 1940
Royal Assent - June 21, 1940

Bill 80 - Amendment to N.R.M.A.

3rd reading - July 23, 1942
Royal Assent - August 1, 1942

C

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L'EVENEMENT-JOURNAL, Quebec, Tuesday, November 21, 1944.

BETWEEN CANADIANS OF GOOD WILL

The articles under this heading are published under the moral responsibility of l'Opinion Libre, editorial service directed by Eugène L'Heureux, 55 de Salaberry Avenue, Quebec.

Are We Canadians, Yes or NO?

(By Eugène L'Heureux)

No Canadian with a head and a heart can be indifferent to the sittings which the House of Commons will hold tomorrow and the following days. As a matter of fact, there will emerge for our country from the success or the failure of these sittings, a better era or a very painful phase.

Confronted with such a portentous outlook, one must not be afraid to acknowledge the weakness of men and call the Almighty to our help, while promising Him that we ourselves will accomplish a great effort of good will.

x x x

Grave as it is in its consequences - and precisely because its consequences are very grave - one must face with more reason than passion the problem at issue, that is to say, the application of conscription for service overseas.

At the present time, we have five misfortunes to avoid: defeat, the prolongation of the war, national disunion, the unjustified death and sufferings of a single Canadian soldier, then collective contempt.

Of all the misfortunes that could befall us, none is comparable to defeat and national disunion carried to a paroxysm. One has but to ponder a little the consequences of these two catastrophes to be terrified by them.

Those who apply themselves to cultivate among our compatriots a feeling of indifference towards victory and defeat do an extraordinary disservice to our people, even though they pose and believe themselves better patriots than the others.

By the same token, those who scoff at appeals in favour of Canadian unity and who sow discord under some pretext or another should understand at last that by dint of embittering the one against the other, the majority and the minority, they do great harm to both.

National unity is in this country the main condition not only of strength and progress, but also of the spirit of justice and tolerance. And if there is an element more interested than the others in the generalization of the spirit of justice and tolerance in this country, it is obviously the element constituting the minority. That is as self-evident as two and two make four; theory and experience teach us that as much to one as to the other. Every seed of national discord is a sacrilege against the French-Canadian race even more so than it is against the Canadian homeland.

Prolongation of the war would imply the prolongation of a quite painful state of suffering and anxiety as well as the addition of other dead and disabled servicemen to those we already number. Canadians who are fighting on the battlefields and those who have near of kin at the front know what that means. It is in the interest of the Canadian people to travel courageously the last lap of the road leading to victory. Any defeatism could prove quite costly at this time.

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Our politicians convinced that a people can show an utter disregard for what may be thought of it have a queer conception of relations between nations and groups within a same nation. One would think that such people go through life their eyes hermetically closed. The least that can be said of them is that their national pride departs from universally acknowledged concepts in this matter; all the better if it is of a higher order, but one may well doubt that it is.

L' "Opinion Libre" wants to see Canada win the war under the volunteer system, because it is more glorious and more in keeping with the true democratic spirit. It rejoices at noting that the nation's leader and the organizer of our army, faithful to the ideal of the volunteer system, also want and hope to win the war without applying conscription for overseas.

x x x

When one is sincerely against conscription in this war, one avoids doing things liable to make the volunteer system a failure. One refrains from every word and every action capable of diminishing the number of voluntary enlistments, one lets a courageous youth respond to the call of the Country, Civilization and Liberty.

When one is not indifferent to the victory and the defeat of one's own country, one does more than not be a hindrance to its cause; one serves it by preparing one's fellow-citizens for the generous acceptance of sacrifices without which all hope in victory would be vain. Then, in respect of military service, without imposing on any person in particular the duty of joining the army, one applies one's self to foster about one a climate where the persons who can do so with a minimum of inconveniences, who possess the required physical strength and who have the specific courage thereof will want to rush to the defence of Canada where her first line of defence stands today: overseas.

Under the volunteer system, it is generosity that begets soldiers for the Homeland. Consequently, all those who apply themselves to dry up the sources of popular generosity in the face of the exigencies of Victory do a grievous disservice to the interests of their country.

More than that, in spite of the airs of great defenders of our country they give themselves, these extinguishers of generosity assume in advance the responsibility of conscription that will be imposed with a spirit easy to conceive, if their propaganda succeeds in causing the volunteer system to fail. As a matter of fact, apart from them, everybody wants with a firm will to avoid defeat and emerge from the war by way of the single door of victory. Now, to avert defeat, there is required a number of soldiers which the extinguishers of generosity are unable to determine but which Authority will find by way of conscription, should the volunteer system not yield them.

The political situation, let us not forget, today boils down to this: just like the population of Quebec, King wishes to finish winning the war with the volunteer system, while his political opponents wish to achieve the same result by the imposition of all-out conscription. One still is at a loss to know if the balance of conscriptionist and anti-conscriptionist forces will be favorable or unfavorable to the prime minister. But there is this certainty that should the volunteer system not yield the soldiers required, conscription will be imposed without reservation.

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And what is almost equally certain is that the fiasco of the volunteer system would involve the overthrow of the King cabinet, then the accession of a coalition government - that is to say of an anti-Quebec bloc - which would apply conscription with a vindicative spirit from which we, French-Canadians can expect no good.

Thus, the reckless builders of little Quebec blocs would have provoked the formation of a big and powerful anti-Quebec bloc satisfied to end the war by ill-treating Quebec. If trouble-makers and negative minds rejoice at seeing in this outlook an exceptional chance of setting in motionmany protests as noisy as they will be futile, this does not hold for those who seek less, in politics, verbalism and discord than they seek peace, order, justice, respect, national constructiveness and progress all along the the line.

x x x

This is the time to test more than ever our clearsightedness and our sense of realities. Let us generously support the policy of the volunteer service , which saves us from conscription. Let us be loyal citizens of a confederative country which expects from its sons services of a federal character as well as services of a provincial character.

The measure of our clearsightedness and of our sense of realities at this psychological moment of Canadian life will surely be, tomorrow, the measure of the respect we shall enjoy at home and abroad, the measure of our freedom, not only in law, but also in fact.

is Let us be genuine Canadians. That is not only our <u>duty</u>, it/also our <u>interest</u>.

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The Humiliation Handicap

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

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PLEBISCITE IN CANADA

THE Canadian plebiscite of April 27, in which the voters were asked to release the Government from its pledge not to introduce conscription for overseas service, resulted in a 65-35 division in favour of the "ayes." On the surface, at least, it would appear that the Government had achieved a very considerable triumph. "The vote means," said Prime Minister Mackenzie King, "that the people generally recognise that the war has taken a course which was altogether unforeseen. . . . There can be no doubt about the significance of the vote."

Despite such unavoidable political blandishments, no one is better aware than Mr. King that there exists in fact a whole host of doubts about the true significance of the vote. Those unfamiliar with the complexities of Canadian politics might interpret the vote as a prelude to the introduction of conscription. The matter, however, is not quite so simple.

The eternal problem which confronts every Canadian administration is that of reconciling or at least maintaining a semblance of harmony between the English majority and the French minority. If it fails in this task, no Government can hope to survive. This consideration had much to do with Mr. King's decision to stage the plebiscite. On the one hand, he could not afford indefinitely to ignore the growing demand from English Canada for the introduction of unlimited national service; in recent months even the staunchly Liberal Vancouver *Sun* and Winnipeg *Free Press* had joined the chorus of demanders. On the other hand, he could no more afford to ignore his oft-repeated pledge to French Canada nor the violent recrudescence of nationalist sentiment in the Province of Quebec. The plebiscite was an attempt at a compromise solution.

Did the plebiscite achieve its purpose? The French Canadians constitute 31 per cent. of the Dominion's population. An analysis of the election returns would indicate that approximately 90 per cent. of English Canada voted "Aye" and 90 per cent. of French Canada voted "No." English Canada and French Canada stood ranged solidly against each other; what was hitherto implicit has now become a matter of statistics.

Encouraged by the knowledge of its own solidarity, it is doubtful whether French Canada would submit passively to the will of the English majority—and it is equally doubtful whether Mr. King, whose chief electoral strength has always been in Quebec, would venture to impose this will. But "agin-ness" is as much an attribute of the majority as it is of the minority; having voted overwhelmingly to release the Government from its "no conscription" pledge, English Canada will expect Mr. King to do something about it—nor will it help matters if it feels that he is kowtowing to the French Canadian minority. In short, the result of the plebiscite would tend to bear out the initial fears that the plebiscite, even if successful, would complicate matters rather than simplify them.

Mr. King's position is not an enviable one. His critics are perhaps right in suggesting that he might have done more to lead the country instead of submitting passively to the admitted difficulties of the situation. John MacCormac of the New York *Times*, in his book *Canada, America's Problem*, speaks of him scathingly as "Mr. King, that cautious man." Yet it is precisely those qualities which agitate his critics most—his "fence-sitting," his "ordinariness," his "lack-lustre politics," his "talent for always saying nothing at the appropriate moment"—that have made Mr. King such an unprecedented success in Canadian politics. (When he completes his present term, Mr. King will have been Prime Minister for 20 out of 24 years.) Indeed, his supporters are probably correct in asserting that, had it not been for Mr. King's genius for compromise, Canada would be a less united nation to-day.

The critics fail to appreciate French Canadian nationalism. It is questionable whether even the most aggressive and intelligent leadership could have done much to change the attitude of French Canada to conscription. It is necessary to remember that even the great Sir Wilfred Laurier, whose influence over the *québecqoix* had been strong enough to obtain their electoral support against the pastoral directives of their clergy, went down to defeat in 1911 at the hands of his own compatriots when his Government had proposed the creating of an auxiliary to the British Navy.

The failure of English Canada to comprehend the psychology of French Canada—and vice versa—puts one in mind of G. K. Chesterton's little ditty:

O, how I love humanity,
With a love so pure and pringlish.
But how I hate the horrid French,
Who never will be English.

Logically or illogically, the French Canadians still remember that they are a conquered people. They consider it wrong that the wealth of the province should be monopolised by the English minority, whilst they, the descendants of the original *habitants*, should be confined to the most menial occupations. To conscription they are unalterably opposed—partly because of their minority psychology, mostly because they remember the bitter anti-conscription conflict of 1917.

What will be done it is still difficult to say. Off and on there has been talk of applying conscription to English Canada and leaving French Canada out of it. But it is highly doubtful whether this would be feasible. In the last war the enforcement of conscription encountered such difficulties in Quebec that the authorities decided that it would be the better part of prudence to "go easy": the result was a *de facto* suspension of the conscription act in the province for the balance of the war. Mr. King may conceivably attempt to duplicate this arrangement by introducing conscription, but enforcing its application in Quebec only so rigidly as the situation permits.

It may be that Quebec's manifest isolation from the rest of Canada will have a sobering effect upon the French Canadians. The more optimistic point out that after having voted themselves into a similar position of isolation in the war election of 1917, and after their provincial legislature had debated the question of secession from the Dominion, the *Canadiens* wound up by resigning themselves to the inevitable and almost overnight the agitation in the province subsided. Mass movements, however, have a rhythm and logic of their own: like the waves of the ocean, they grow, achieve a climax—successful or unsuccessful—and then, having exhausted their dynamic potential, they collapse. French Canadian nationalism achieved one such apogee in the 1917 war election and in the riots that preceded it. That the new wave has yet spent its energy, is very far from certain.

DAVID MARTIN

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"KNOWLEDGE TO THEIR EYES"

THE House of Lords, the Protestant Churches and the Minister of Education have united to speak in favour of religion in schools, though history suggests that Archbishop Lang is optimistic when he equates good conduct so closely with the results of religious instruction. The two first want two forty-minute periods a week of the school time-table given to the inculcation of Morality and Goodness.

It is arguable that such teaching will have just about as much result as if the same forty-minute periods were given to teaching a child "Happiness" or "Abstract Beauty." Friar Roger Bacon held that a pursuit of the knowledge of what leads to satisfactory human behaviour is the most important, practical, and urgent of all sciences. Agreeing emphatically with him, I still do not believe that direct exhortation is the way to apply such knowledge as we have; I believe that knowledge to have increased since Friar Bacon's day.

What about the often suspect view that a school is a place to which children go in order to learn, to acquire information and various sorts of skill? Modern child-psychologists, concerned as they are chiefly with behaviour, agree that this intellectual "getting on" means a great deal to children and that they crave for intellectual food just as they crave for bodily food. No one who has to do with evacuated or any other children can have failed to notice that there has been a silent and important revolution. As schools have improved, the attitude of the children has changed. They no longer creep to school like snails or at all unwillingly. By and large, the nation's children enjoy school and discuss their lessons, and the better they are taught the more they enjoy it.

Good schools do teach morality, goodness, social conduct—whatever you like to call it, but by a kind of contagious experience, not by the imparting of maxims. *Per contra* anyone who has been in contact with the problems of evacuation and reception, and with current family life here, knows very well where to look for the causes of the increase in Juvenile Delinquency. Few of us who have had that experience are likely to seek a remedy along the lines of exhortation.

What, then, is the present state and immediate outlook of our schools? Practically every school in the country has been more or less affected, first, by evacuation, and now by the drift-back. No up-to-date national figures are available at the moment, but the figures for London are that, out of a pre-war school population of 420,000, there are now about 167,000 school-children in London, and a further 50,000 to 80,000 who have been, as it were, "lost" through unofficial evacuation, migration, and the evasion of school attendance by children who have almost reached the school-leaving age. (This business of leaving school six or eight months before the legal time is widespread.) Nominally all children are now getting full-time education either in a reception or evacuation area, but the quality of this education has often dropped: because parts of many school buildings are still being used for other purposes—(civil defence, and, apparently, for military purposes.) Laboratories and workshops have suffered most because of the "wastage" of staff. Rest and Feeding Centres are no longer staffed by teachers, but owing to the "uneconomic" scattering of children in Reception Areas, there is a shortage of teachers in most big towns, and, consequently, a deplorable increase in the size of classes. The L.C.C. declares that it has no classes in London of over 40, but in some cities to which children have drifted back, a teacher may be struggling with as many as 60 children.

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The Humiliation Handicap 272982



REPEAT
REPETER

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A LONDON DIARY

Sir Stafford Cripps has the most musical of voices; it was a pleasure to listen to his post-script. In substance he preached a sermon, a good sermon full of hope with some home truths thrown in. Like Ernest Bevin and Oliver Lyttelton before him, he talked about economic security and a better social order after the war. So far, in general terms, this Cabinet has decided to commit itself; if only because morale demands it, reconstruction, which must follow, as Sir Stafford reminded us, from changes occurring during the war, has become an unavoidable topic. The significance of such remarks from Sir Stafford lies in his reputation as an uncompromising Socialist. If Sir Stafford stakes his reputation, as an honest Socialist and as the second personality in the Government, on such an announcement, then, people say, there must be something in it. It cannot be just another piece of "pie-in-the-sky," "homes for heroes" stuff. So "we" listen with renewed attention, hoping that the vague will this time turn into the concrete. But "we" are very sceptical and disillusioned, and we note that Sir Stafford's attack on vested interests is still of a very general character. We shall wait a bit for some concrete proof of Sir Stafford's ability to carry out some item of structural change during the war. Our rulers have not yet surrendered one strategic point in the fortress of tradition. A broadcast that did not aspire or promise, but actually announced a single victory for "the people" whose war Sir Stafford again assures us it is, would transform the whole national outlook. Without such a change the people will soon be saying that Sir Stafford is being used by the Conservatives just as the Labour leaders were in 1931. That would be a disaster.

* * *

The people who went to the polls at Wallasey and Rugby and elected Independent candidates have drawn plenty of attention. It seems to me that a great deal more attention will now have to be paid to the very large number of people who wanted to go to the polls and found to their simple astonishment that they were ineligible as voters. I know that at least one of the election Committee Rooms at Rugby—and I daresay both—received on some days as many as a hundred men and women, first eager, then incredulous, then angry, who came to declare their support of the particular candidate and had to be told that in the present state of the register their support or their opposition were matters of indifference. In the nature of things, a majority of these people were either young men and women who had recently become formally enfranchised, or soldiers temporarily stationed in the constituency. And it stands to reason that people who take the trouble to go to the Committee Rooms and argue about whether they may vote or not are likely to be keen, politically active citizens—just the type, in fact, whose views the by-election surprises are supposed to be expressing.

* * *

On at least two recent occasions there have been circulated stories—more or less ostensibly confidential—to the effect that the Government was considering seriously what steps could be taken to alter our electoral registration methods so as to make it possible for a General Election to be held on terms not patently fraudulent or farcical. Because the circulation of these stories on each occasion happened to coincide with difficult moments for Mr. Churchill, it was understandable that some people should have dismissed them as a bluff intended to "scare up" extra support from Transport House and the Conservative Central Office, as an alternative to an election which could hardly be otherwise than shattering at least to the nerves of the old Party machine-minders. However that may be, it seems to me that facts have now forced upon us the need for a new electoral method. So long as the political truce worked, the parlous state of the Register did not matter very much. Now, for good or ill, the political truce has stopped working, and the state of the Register does matter. I believe Mr. Francis Williams, in his useful and at times brilliantly written book *Ten Angels Swearing* (Routledge, 5s.), was among the first political observers to foresee the situation that is now developing. Although I see great difficulties in the way of the method he proposes, I do advise anyone who realises the existence of this problem to read his suggestions for revivifying Parliament under wartime conditions. I think that he is wrong in suggesting that the National Register should be employed to make possible elections "through somewhat the same machinery as operates at present for the University seats, and to have voting by post." I think the thing to aim at is rather a system under which people can vote in the constituency where they happen to live or be stationed at the time of the election, and like "Observer," whose letter in this issue is worth careful reading, I cannot see why ration cards, and soldiers' papers, cannot solve this problem.

* * *

The old town of Lübeck which our bombs have battered flat was a place that breathed dignity and a restrained Protestant grace in all its quiet streets and ancient buildings. The tradition of the Hanseatic League lived on in it. These merchants sought wealth, but they cared even more for freedom and for the beauty of cunningly ordered bricks and carved stones. The friend who so describes it, saw it many years ago, as the guest of the German Social-Democratic party, then sitting in conference in Hamburg, which staged a performance of *Fidelio* and a visit to the churches and guildhall of Lübeck by way of entertaining their foreign comrades. And now, by the act of our bombers, this can never happen again. This old city was not Nazi property. It belonged to all civilised men, to you and me and to those Germans—they are not Nazis—who still have a disinterested love of beauty. It is our joint heritage we are destroying when we bomb such places. I am inconsolable over the Temple Church, but it does not comfort me to reflect that Münster Cathedral is also in ruins.

* * *

The worst evil of war is the state of mind in which we lose our sense of the enduring values of life. This issue has been raised in an even graver form by a letter which an anonymous officer on active service contributed to Tuesday's *Times*. He states that a deliberate effort is now made to arouse in men under training not merely hatred of the enemy but blood-lust. It is arranged that they shall be spattered with blood while doing bayonet practice, and they are then taken to watch killing in a slaughter-house. These antics of some Fat Boy in a Brass Hat will arouse only disgust in healthy adults, but a minority may be infected. A man suffering from blood-lust may show fury in attack. But he is unbalanced, perverted, neurotic. Will he be steady in defence and will he observe discipline? A minority on both sides in the last war acquired this disease of blood-lust—among us the Black and Tans, among the Germans the Free Corps, early Nazis, who carried out a long series of political murders. This encouragement of the ugliest tendency latent in the human animal will make war even more beastly than it need be. What is worse, it will smirch the peace with horror. When once blood-lust is kindled, it does not automatically die down at the "cease-fire."

* * *

The attack that is being worked up on the fuel rationing scheme is a reactionary affair. It is not an honest solution of the difficulties of rationing to suggest that only coal should be rationed; people with electric and gas heating and the money to pay for it unrestricted will do well enough, while the poor who have more than their share of coal fires will suffer. More astonishing still is the argument against coal rationing, advanced, I think, by some coal distributors who say that there will not be enough coal to provide the ration. Are we supposed to draw the inference that since there will not be enough to go round, the few with the greatest pull should get it?

I want heartily to congratulate the B.B.C. on the opening of its series of Indian discussions. This was the real stuff: controversial and useful because not propagandist. Sir Frederick Whyte is a sensible chairman and Carl Heath, the other Englishman on the panel, speaks with the persuasive power of a Quaker who has for long years worked for conciliation. Dr. Ghose, an Indian liberal, held with Carl Heath that the Cripps's mission might yet be found to have opened a door and not to have been, as the Indian Congress representative, Mr. Tamenkar, thought, a failure leaving our relations more bitter and hopeless. Sirdar Ikbal Ali Shah is a Moslem who has written on Islam in this journal from time to time; he championed the Pakistan conception; his explanation of the action of the Moslem League in rejecting the Cripps proposals unconsciously confirmed the view I had formed from reading the White Paper that the Moslem League would have accepted the proposals had they thought it politic to accept what Congress rejected. But the great value of this discussion was its honesty: Mr. Tamenkar pulled no punches and the discussion was real discussion.

* * *

This is belated, but I am assured that it is true. It relates to a Belgian charwoman who escaped with other refugees to this country in 1940. Her *carte d'identité* classified her occupation as *journalière* and the poor thing, who knew practically no English, had been coached to repeat *journalière*—daily worker. The result was lamentable. To the harassed port control a foreign journalist claiming affiliations with the *Daily Worker* was an obvious gift and she was unceremoniously corralled as a fifth columnist suspect. She was in prison five months before the matter was cleared up.

CRITIC

THE NEW BOY

"Labour members . . . preserved an eloquent silence when Mr. Brown was introduced. . . . After he had taken the oath he pushed out his hand in a Dr.-Livingstone-I-presume manner to Sir Stafford Cripps. Sir Stafford shook hands with the new Member."—*Evening Standard*, May 5.

When Brown came to St. Stephen's the big boys did not cheer,
The prefects were exceptionally cool
Floreat Westminster!
And house masters in attendance made it absolutely clear
He was not the type they wanted at the school
Floreat Westminster!

The new boy seemed undaunted by the silent reprimand,
Though it was plain his classmates wouldn't speak,
But on entering the School Hall shook the head boy by the hand,
Which was definitely most colossal cheek.

In the studies and the common-room the comment was widespread
That Brown appeared too confident by half,
And while it was admitted he was sound about the Head,
He had made some rotten cracks about the staff.

St. Stephen's Board of Governors deplore all kinds of noise,
The upper forms are getting old for rags,
And they fear that independent and disruptive sorts of boys
Might easily demoralise the fags.

Team-spirit is the spirit that pervades St. Stephen's School,
Outsiders, getting in, must be kept down;
Floreat Westminster!
And though united cheering for some terms has been the rule,
St. Stephen's would not raise a cheer for Brown.
Floreat Westminster!

SAGITTARIUS

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PLEBISCITE IN CANADA

THE Canadian plebiscite of April 27, in which the voters were asked to release the Government from its pledge not to introduce conscription for overseas service, resulted in a 65-35 division in favour of the "ayes." On the surface, at least, it would appear that the Government had achieved a very considerable triumph. "The vote means," said Prime Minister Mackenzie King, "that the people generally recognise that the war has taken a course which was altogether unforeseen. . . . There can be no doubt about the significance of the vote."

Despite such unavoidable political blandishments, no one is better aware than Mr. King that there exists in fact a whole host of doubts about the true significance of the vote. Those unfamiliar with the complexities of Canadian politics might interpret the vote as a prelude to the introduction of conscription. The matter, however, is not quite so simple.

The eternal problem which confronts every Canadian administration is that of reconciling or at least maintaining a semblance of harmony between the English majority and the French minority. If it fails in this task, no Government can hope to survive. This consideration had much to do with Mr. King's decision to stage the plebiscite. On the one hand, he could not afford indefinitely to ignore the growing demand from English Canada for the introduction of unlimited national service; in recent months even the staunchly Liberal Vancouver *Sun* and Winnipeg *Free Press* had joined the chorus of demanders. On the other hand, he could no more afford to ignore his oft-repeated pledge to French Canada nor the violent recrudescence of nationalist sentiment in the Province of Quebec. The plebiscite was an attempt at a compromise solution.

Did the plebiscite achieve its purpose? The French Canadians constitute 31 per cent. of the Dominion's population. An analysis of the election returns would indicate that approximately 90 per cent. of English Canada voted "Aye" and 90 per cent. of French Canada voted "No." English Canada and French Canada stood ranged solidly against each other; what was hitherto implicit has now become a matter of statistics.

Encouraged by the knowledge of its own solidarity, it is doubtful whether French Canada would submit passively to the will of the English majority—and it is equally doubtful whether Mr. King, whose chief electoral strength has always been in Quebec, would venture to impose this will. But "agin-ness" is as much an attribute of the majority as it is of the minority; having voted overwhelmingly to release the Government from its "no conscription" pledge, English Canada will expect Mr. King to do something about it—nor will it help matters if it feels that he is kowtowing to the French Canadian minority. In short, the result of the plebiscite would tend to bear out the initial fears that the plebiscite, even if successful, would complicate matters rather than simplify them.

Mr. King's position is not an enviable one. His critics are perhaps right in suggesting that he might have done more to lead the country instead of submitting passively to the admitted difficulties of the situation. John MacCormac of the New York *Times*, in his book *Canada, America's Problem*, speaks of him scathingly as "Mr. King, that cautious man." Yet it is precisely those qualities which agitate his critics most—his "fence-sitting," his "ordinariness," his "lack-lustre politics," his "talent for always saying nothing at the appropriate moment"—that have made Mr. King such an unprecedented success in Canadian politics. (When he completes his present term, Mr. King will have been Prime Minister for 20 out of 24 years.) Indeed, his supporters are probably correct in asserting that, had it not been for Mr. King's genius for compromise, Canada would be a less united nation to-day.

The critics fail to appreciate French Canadian nationalism. It is questionable whether even the most aggressive and intelligent leadership could have done much to change the attitude of French Canada to conscription. It is necessary to remember that even the great Sir Wilfred Laurier, whose influence over the *québecqoix* had been strong enough to obtain their electoral support against the pastoral directives of their clergy, went down to defeat in 1911 at the hands of his own compatriots when his Government had proposed the creating of an auxiliary to the British Navy.

The failure of English Canada to comprehend the psychology of French Canada—and vice versa—puts one in mind of G. K. Chesterton's little ditty:

> O, how I love humanity,
> With a love so pure and pringlish.
> But how I hate the horrid French,
> Who never will be English.

Logically or illogically, the French Canadians still remember that they are a conquered people. They consider it wrong that the wealth of the province should be monopolised by the English minority, whilst they, the descendants of the original *habitants*, should be confined to the most menial occupations. To conscription they are unalterably opposed—partly because of their minority psychology, mostly because they remember the bitter anti-conscription conflict of 1917.

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PRESS CLIPPINGS

Office of
The Prime Minister

C 272985

Name of Publication Ottawa Journal

Date Tues., Nov. 14, 1944

Subject

THE OTTAWA JOURNAL
The Journal Publishing Company of Ottawa, Limited.

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 14, 1944.

Col. Ralston to Mr. King.

Before considering Col. RALSTON'S statement on the question of reinforcements—a reply to Prime Minister KING'S radio broadcast that has brought a summoning of the House of Commons—it is well to look again at what Col. RALSTON says. Thus:

1. He accuses Mr. KING of misrepresenting his (RALSTON'S) presentation to the Cabinet, says of a part of the Prime Minister's version: *"That was not in my report."*

2. He replies to Mr. KING'S statement that sending of the Home Army draftees overseas would be "not in accord with the policy of keeping our army overseas a 100 percent. voluntary army, says acidly: *"I had understood Government policy to be that if there were need for reinforcements overseas and volunteers were not available, N.R.M.A. personnel would be sent. This was what I had taken from the Prime Minister's speeches in 1942."*

3. He states that Mr. KING withheld or blurred over the truth of the "necessity of sending additional infantry reinforcements at the earliest possible date", risking the wrong impression that the actual sending of reinforcements "could be delayed for some time".

4. He says there does not now exist a sufficient backlog or pool to ensure that casualties are replaced promptly as they may occur from time to time; that he was advised by the "commanders in the battle areas that such pools should be re-established at adequate strength"; and that *there are no infantry reinforcements available for that purpose.*

5. He states that the reinforcement need which has arisen *cannot be met by enlisting untrained men*—"in the ordinary course, an untrained man enlisted now would not be ready for battle before next June"; that the need is for trained infantry soldiers; that enough volunteer personnel *"could not be made available to meet the need".*

6. He declares bluntly that without enough volunteers, and with refusal to send trained draftees, the alternative is to *"reduce our commitments or break up units or formations"*; and he scorns the idea of gambling on the situation being saved by the war ending suddenly or by lighter casualties. "I considered that if we were to be fair to our fighting men we could not afford to take chances on either of these uncertainties."

7. He concludes with the revelation that, having presented to the Cabinet the truth as it was brought home to him by a visit to the battlefields, and having urged that it be met by the one possible method of sending the Home Army overseas, he was in effect dismissed from the Government. "Under these conditions, and as *requested by the Prime Minister,* I at once tendered my resignation as Minister of National Defence."

* * *

Shocking are these revelations—shocking, certainly, if there be in Canada a heart for this war!

Some may say: "This is but the word of one man against the word of another." True—but which of these men have we a right to believe? Mr. KING, who has not been to the front? Or Col. RALSTON, just returned from the front? There is, of course, General MCNAUGHTON, the man behind whom Mr. KING now shields his policy; but the answer to that is that less than one month ago General MCNAUGHTON declared publicly he knew nothing about reinforcements. If there be such things as laws of evidence, such a thing as common sense, it is RALSTON we must believe.

* * *

If we believe him, if the Canadian people conclude, as they must conclude, that the reinforcement position is desperate, that our armies overseas are in danger of being betrayed and deserted, and if it be found that Mr. KING still refuses to act in the one way that he can act effectively, namely, by sending overseas trained draftees—what then? Will the Canadian people and Parliament submit tamely, shrug their shoulders in frustration or indifference, put the political fortunes of a party and a Ministry before their duty to our Allies—before the lives of our sons overseas?

That is the issue—the only issue.

* * *

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2. He replies to Mr. King's statement that sending of the Home Army draftees overseas would be "not in accord with the policy of keeping our army overseas a 100 percent. voluntary army, says acidly: "I had understood Government policy to be that if there were need for reinforcements overseas and volunteers were not available, N.R.M.A. personnel should be sent. *This was what I had taken from the Prime Minister's speeches in 1942.*"

3. He states that Mr. King withheld or blurred over the truth of the "necessity of sending additional infantry reinforcements at the earliest possible date", risking the wrong impression that the actual sending of reinforcements "could be delayed for some time".

4. He says there does not now exist a sufficient backlog or pool to ensure that casualties are replaced promptly as they may occur from time to time; that he was advised by the "commanders in the battle areas that such pools should be re-established at adequate strength", and that there are no infantry reinforcements available for that purpose.

5. He states that the reinforcement need which has arisen cannot be met by sending untrained men—"in the ordinary course, an untrained man enlisted now would not be ready for battle before next June"; that the need is for trained infantry soldiers; that enough volunteer personnel "could not be made available to meet the need".

6. He declares bluntly that reinforcements cannot be found from the Home Army draftees, and with reference to the alternative to "reduce overseas military forces by taking up some of the trained men" now serving in the field of operations, says: "This course was considered by the war committee of the Cabinet or by the Chiefs of Staff committee. It was rejected because we were to be fair to our fighting men we could not afford to take chances on either of these contingencies."

7. He concludes with the revelation that, having presented to the Cabinet the opinion that it was brought home to him by a visit to the battlefields, and having urged that it be met by the one possible method of sending Home Army reinforcements, he was "in effect dismissed from the Government" "under these conditions, and as requested by the Prime Minister, I at once tendered my resignation as Minister of National Defence."

* * *

Shocking are these revelations—shocking certainly, if there be in Canada a fixed purpose to win the war!

Some may say: "This is but the word of one man against the word of another." True. But which of these men have we a right to believe? Mr. King, who has not been to the front? Or Col. Ralston, just returned from the front? There is, of course, General McNaughton, this man behind whom Mr. King now shields his policy; but the answer to that is that less than one month ago General McNaughton declared publicly he knew nothing about reinforcements. If there be such things as layers of evidence, such a thing as contempt proof, it is Ralston we must believe.

* * *

If we believe him, if the Canadian people conclude, as they must conclude, that the reinforcement position is desperate, that our armies overseas are in danger of being bled white and decimated, and if it be found that Mr. King still refused to act in the one way that he can act effectively, namely, by sending overseas trained draftees—what then? Will the Canadian people and Parliament quietly, supinely shrug their shoulders in resignation at the thought that the political fortunes of Mackenzie King are more important than the lives of our fighting men overseas?

That is the issue—the only issue.

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PRESS CLIPPINGS

C 272986

Office of
The Prime Minister

Name of Publication Ottawa Journal

Date Tues., Nov. 14, 1944

Subject

Let us go to the truth. The truth in the simple question: If Quebec had voted "Yes" in the conscription plebiscite, would Mr. KING be hesitating and sidestepping and juggling figures, and firing his Defence Minister, to avoid conscription?

All of us know the answer. Mr. KING leaves the Canadian Army overseas without reinforcements because Quebec voted "No" in the plebiscite. That is the heart of this trouble. Mr. KING's eye is on Quebec; his ear attuned to Quebec. From that part of Canada alone, with 65 potential Liberal votes in Parliament, he takes his inspiration.

* * *

Mr. KING will say: "I strive for national unity." There are two answers. The first is that, in truth, Mr. KING shatters national unity. The second is that if the price of national unity be unnecessary blood of our sons overseas, their desertion and betrayal, then the price is too high. This country is a nation or it is not a nation; a democracy or not a democracy. If it be a nation, one part of it cannot dictate to or dominate the other parts. If it be a democracy, one minority group within it cannot override the majority. The contrary is abdication of nationhood, betrayal of democracy, appeasement, cowardice, minority dictation.

* * *

That truth understood, right appeal can be made to three or four men in Mr. KING's Ministry. Where stand today, in the light of Col. RALSTON's statement, Mr. ILSLEY, Mr. MACDONALD, Mr. CRERAR? These men know the truth. They pledged themselves to send draftees overseas (THE JOURNAL yesterday quoted their pledges) when the need arose. They supported Col. RALSTON in the Cabinet. Are they prepared now to go before the bar of history as the men who, when Col. RALSTON walked the plank for his principles, drew back? To dishonor their pledges? To be with Col. RALSTON in private and against him in public?

Believing them of stouter heart, of sharper honor, THE JOURNAL must conclude they will do one of two things: Compel the Prime Minister to put the lives of Canadians overseas and the honor of Canada before party support from Quebec, or failing that, quit themselves like men and prove that there still lives in public life some vestige of integrity.

* * *

As for the House of Commons, summoned now by Mr. KING as a desperate tactic of delay, the case before it will be clear. From the thinning lines of our battle-scarred, weary, heroic troops across the seas comes a signal for help. That help is here. It is for the House to say that that help will be sent, that not party fortunes, nor political manoeuvring, nor the prestige of personalities, can stand athwart a sacred duty of this land. Not since the birth of this nation has the Commons been given greater opportunity to vindicate its independence and power—to show that it is the voice and heart of our people.

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PRESS CLIPPINGS

Office of
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Name of Publication Ottawa Journal

Date November 7, 1944

General McNaughton's Position.

General McNAUGHTON, making his first public pronouncement since becoming Minister of Defence, told an Arnprior audience that he—

1. Regards the maintenance of our units in the field as a "vital need that must be met as is required in the last phase";

2. Considers reinforcements now available sufficient only for "some short period", after which there will be "danger of the situation becoming acute".

3. Believes our best hope lies in maintenance of the voluntary system;

4. Hopes our young men will rally to the support of "our comrades overseas".

With regard to the first, basic proposition, that maintenance of armies in the field is "a vital need that must be met", General McNAUGHTON but repeats what has been said all along by the man he succeeds, Col. RALSTON. As long ago as February, 1942, Col. RALSTON told Parliament:

> "I have faith in the success of the voluntary method (of recruiting) if we all do our part. With the background and traditions which this country possesses, and which it would be folly to ignore, I prefer the voluntary method if it works, and I shall do all I can to make it work.
>
> "At the same time we cannot know what is ahead and I feel impelled to say—here I can speak only for myself—that if the voluntary system does not meet the needs of the fateful days before us, then I shall feel it my duty as part of my responsibility to advocate the adoption of the other method."

Col. RALSTON went to the fighting fronts in France and Italy a few weeks ago to discover the needs of fateful days—to investigate charges about the number and type of reinforcements supplied—came back to tell his colleagues they involved conscription. He was forced from the Cabinet. In the light of that, what sense exists in General McNAUGHTON repeating at this zero hour, without effective methods to meet it, what Col. RALSTON said two years ago and has said all along?

Consider questions raised by General McNAUGHTON's other propositions. The question first of all of what will happen if our "best hope" in the voluntary system should fail? In that event, a not remote possibility in the light of diminishing recruits now, will General McNAUGHTON be prepared to try something else? Or will he, his face and the face of his Prime Minister set against conscription, leave our "comrades overseas" to whatever may be their fate?

These are not questions to embarrass General McNAUGHTON; they are desperately pressing questions—things the people of this country have a right to know. We embarked on this war with high purpose and all our strength, vowed that come weal or woe we would press it to the end. If our Government has now decided that, under certain circumstances, we shall retreat from that position, abandon those we sent to fight for us, fall out of the line, leave the defeat of HITLER to the blood of others, we have a right to know it—and why.

There is a further question. If existing reinforcements can be counted on only for "some short period yet", how does General McNAUGHTON expect that men recruited from this hour on can be trained in time? If, even now, as there is all too much reason to believe, untrained or poorly trained reinforcements are being rushed into the line, what will be the position two or three months hence, or when, in General McNAUGHTON'S words, the situation "becomes acute"?

* * *

These thoughts, at this time, vex the hearts of our people. Ignored, bewildered, frustrated, they ask themselves why Col. RALSTON, urging a policy for which Canada voted overwhelmingly, was in effect thrown from the battlements. They ask themselves, too, what it means when a member of the Cabinet, Mr. ST. LAURENT, tells a Quebec audience that if the Government had sent the Home Army overseas it would have been a disaster—"something extremely serious for the Canadian nation".

The people of Canada suspect the answers. They feel that the Government, ignoring a national mandate and violating cynically its own pledges, has embarked upon this course for a single reason—the reason that it puts what it imagines to be the voice of Quebec before the known voice of the rest of Canada; that it is willing to purchase what it calls "Canadian unity", but what in reality can be only the unity of the Liberal party, at the price of a "softer war".

* * *

This is no time for "weasel" or ambiguous words. If adequate reinforcements are to be denied our armies on the battlefields, we may as well know why—be not afraid to face the truth. The truth of the present Government's concern with the Province of Quebec.

And, speaking of ambiguous and "weasel" words, there was one line in General McNAUGH-

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"At the same time [illegible] ahead and I feel [illegible] speak only for [illegible] system does not [illegible] days before us, [illegible] part of my [illegible] tion of the other [illegible]."

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TON'S Arnprior pronouncement to challenge thought. He said—and he himself underlined it in the text of his address—that we would maintain our *just part* in the conflict. Not our utmost part, nor our all-out part, but our "*just*" part.

We don't know how carefully General MC-NAUGHTON chooses words; we are permitting ourselves hope that he uses them loosely—that this underlined word "Just" was not spoken deliberately. For it is a word that could be used, and likely would be used, by Mr. JEAN FRANCOIS POULIOT, or Mr. DUPLESSIS, or by any other champion of a "soft" war.

* * *

Finally, we would like to think there is enough public opinion in this country, enough heart for the war, to force the Government to give all the facts of Col. RALSTON'S retirement. For his displacement at this time involves things too grave to be the secret of a few men, and also too grave to be withheld on the possible plea that the facts might endanger public security. The real peril to public security is in a Government taking the wrong war course, the while stifling facts to evade the consequences.

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PRESS CLIPPINGS C 272989 Office of The Prime Minister

Name of Publication Ottawa Journal

Date November 6, 1944

Subject

McNaughton Against Conscription

Confident Voluntary System Will Supply Army Needs

ARNPRIOR, Ont., Nov. 5. — (CP) — Gen. McNaughton, who became Defence Minister on the resignation of Col. Ralston, said in his first public speech here today he favored continuance of the voluntary system of enlistment in Canada.

Indicating he opposed conscripting home defence troops for overseas, the general said he was "firmly convinced that the best hope lies in the maintenance of our long traditions of voluntary service".

"We have had this from the earliest days of this war", he said. "We had it in the last war until we changed and then we gained no benefit in time to be of any use."

(Conscription was introduced in the First Great War in August, 1917, and the first conscripts arrived in France in the dying months of the war.)

The figures on reinforcements showed Canada could safely count "on some short period yet before there is danger of the situation becoming acute". And now the need was known he was confident "our men and women will come forward to serve—that they will take up this honorable obligation and rally to the support of our gallant comrades overseas".

His speech was received with close attention by a Victory bond rally audience of about 1,000 which included veterans of both the First Great War and the present conflict.

The audience gave him a hearty cheer when he entered, when he was introduced, when he finished, and the veterans gave him three cheers and a tiger after a brief after-meeting personal address urging their support for his voluntary program.

His formal speech was interrupted by applause and cheering once. That was when he made his first reference to the urgent need for reinforcements.

When he finished he thanked the audience "from the bottom of my heart" for their warm welcome and he told them their "kind reception" of his remarks would be an encouragement "that you and I can see this thing through to a successful conclusion in a matter of days".

Later he explained to reporters he meant there was an urgency for his voluntary recruiting campaign to get started and it was this early start he was referring to when he said "in a matter of days".

After he stepped from the platform he leaned over the front row of seats where Canadian Legion members were grouped. He scanned the veterans with a serious intentness and asked them to support him in getting the younger generation to take up "this honorable obligation" and volunteer for active service.

Later, as he was preparing to leave he felt his coat tugged and wheeled around to face Legionaire Jimmy Geddes, a 32-year-old discharged gunner with three years' overseas experience in this war. He wanted to know why the general didn't "take the bull by the horns" and inaugurate a program of full conscription.

The General, speaking mildly, told the native Scot now living in this Ottawa Valley town that it was a national issue on which there were two sides and he had no doubt that Jimmy's opinion was "an honest one, honestly expressed".

Geddes insisted that conscription was the only answer and he wanted the General "to give the zombies short shrift".

The General said he hadn't been able to deal with all phases of the topic today, but he would have something more to say at the veterans' meeting in Ottawa Monday.

The two grinned at each other —the former gunner enjoying the situation of being able to talk up to his old field commander and the General obviously enjoying getting a quick, forthright reaction to his first speech.

Geddes explained to reporters he had just asked the question to let the General know "the strong feeling of the boys overseas".

"The General had already given me an answer when he asked for continuance of the volunteer system, but I just wanted him to know that we all don't agree with him", he added.

Before making his speech the General had reviewed troops from the nearby Petawawa Military Camp—25 percent. of whom were home defence draftees.

Text of Speech.

Following is a partial text of General McNaughton's speech:

". . . Until quite recently in Italy and in North West Europe our forces were advancing very rapidly. They were driving the Germans before them in great disorder and great victories followed one another in rapid succession.

"We were reaping to the full the great advantages which lay with us in this mobile type of war, where the superior initiative, the high intelligence and the individual skills of our men are assets which could be given full scope.

"We reaped to the full the fruits of the carefully prepared mobility of our wonderfully effective mechanical transport and armored fighting vehicles and other gear, much of which is the product of our own Canadian factories.

"In all these great advances in North West Europe and in Italy our men have given a marvellous account of themselves. Their gallantry in action, their skill in tactics, their hard endurance has carried their fame throughout the whole know world and we may well take pride in what they have accomplished for the cause.

"Perhaps in these months of Summer we have become accustomed to victory. Perhaps we have been unduly optimistic that

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Indicating his support conscripting [illegible] for overseas [illegible] said he was "firmly convinced that the best way in the maintenance [illegible] conditions of voluntary service."

"We have had this issue from the earliest days of the war," he said. "We had it in 1917. This issue with we changed and there was almost no benefit in time to be of any use."

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[illegible] "in a [illegible]

[illegible] sirs Prime Minister [illegible] war. He [illegible] by the [illegible]

[illegible] told the [illegible] in this Ottawa Valley [illegible] it will [illegible] there [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

The General said he hadn't been able to deal with all phases of the task today, but he would have something more to say at the veterans' meeting in Ottawa Monday.

The two greeted each other —the former saluting the General and shaking hands with his old field commander when the General cordially extended a hand, forgetting for the moment in his first speech.

Gordon explained to reporters he had just asked the General to let the General know "the strong feeling of the boys overseas". "The General had already given me an answer when he asked for continuance of the voluntary system, but I just wanted him to know that we all don't agree with him", he added.

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"In all these great advances in North West Europe and in Italy our men have given a magnificent account of themselves. Their bravery in action, their skill in tactics, their high endurance and [illegible] have [illegible] the admiration of the whole world and we may well take pride in what they have accomplished on the [illegible]

"Perhaps in these months of success we have become accustomed to victory. Perhaps we have been unduly optimistic that

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the forward progress would continue with unabated speed. Perhaps we have thought that the end for Germany was nearer than it is.

"Now we are coming up against the heavy zone of fortifications which the Nazi has prepared close in to Germany itself and to which he is clinging with desperation for he well knows that when we pass these he is done. The form of war is changing. We are nearly through the mobile phase in which the advantages lay with us. And now we must conduct siege warfare of the most intense character to crush the enemy's defences out of existence and free the way for our infantry to advance.

"We must not ease our pressure. We must not let him check the rate of our advance, for if he does, then he gains the time he seeks to make his preparation for the different kind of war he plans —to organize his forces underground for sabotage and murder, to complete new weapons and devices of vast power to use against us.

"For siege warfare we need lavish supplies of guns and shells, and these we must provide as a first priority. We have learned that the price of victory can be paid either in lives of men or shells, and so we must see to it that guns and shells go forward in the great quantities that are required.

"I have visited many of our munition plants and I have seen the great effort which is being made. I have watched our men and women working long hours day after day and month after month—running into years. The need continues and this effort now must be increased. More men and more women are required in the factories.

"And I do appeal that all who can will volunteer their services to this task. Women are particularly required for their slim dextrous fingers can do the delicate operations in assembly plants and factories that no man can well accomplish. . .

"And now I would say a few words to you about our men and units in the field and the vital need that must be met that our forces are maintained as is required in the last phase in which they seek to finally destroy the Nazi—and to assure that the peace we gain will be safely confirmed.

"I believe that they and we are fully determined that we will maintain our just part in the great Allied effort that is still required.

"For this two things are needed—munitions, and men for reinforcements. Munitions, I am certain, are in sight on the lavish scale required, and the only question is the men who are needed to keep our units engaged in battle up to strength. This is the vital matter that rightly engages the earnest thoughts of everyone in Canada today, and it is a question for which an answer must be found —and promptly.

"Two methods of solution are open, either of which we might take. One is to continue the voluntary system for service overseas. The other is to resort to compulsion.

"I know full well that there is an honest difference of opinion as to the respective merits of these systems, and I am going to tell you very frankly what I think about the matter.

"First, let me say that all through the war and even when I have not been directly concerned with this problem I have have continued to give it the closest attention, and during the last few days since again I have responsibility I have explored every possibility with the utmost care. **I have read and studied the reports from our officers in the field—I have read and studied the suggestions and proposals made by our officers here—and I am firmly convinced that the best hope lies in the maintenance of our long traditions of voluntary service.** We have had this from the earliest days of this war. We had it in the last war until we changed, and then we gained no benefit in time to be of use. We have had it long before in other wars in which we had to fight in the defence of our homes and kith and kin.

"We have built the system of discipline in our army on the principle of an honorable obligation voluntarily assumed. That army went through the very difficult and anxious time of waiting for the proper time to strike. It was the high purpose of the men—their devotion to the great cause that they themselves had taken up which gave us the strength to carry through.

"That army has now gone through with the greatest credit the stern test of battle, and its morale stands high in the estimation of all the world.

"You will I know forgive me if I stress to you the importance of these great advantages which we now have and understand I am sure the anxious thought I have that they should not be lost in any way.

"The figures of the reinforcements now available show that we can safely count on some short period yet before there is danger of the situation becoming acute. I think that there is time to tell our public of the great need as I now do. I know their deep interest, and I am confident that, now the need is known, our men and women will come forward to serve—that they will take up this honorable obligation and rally to the support of our gallant comrades overseas. I hope that the public of Canada, knowing the urgency, will give them every support and encouragement.

"We have a foul enemy to contend with. We must finish him off quickly. We can only do this if we base our efforts on the united purpose of all Canada—united spiritually in thought and in action."

Before an audience that completely filled the O'Brien Theatre and stood outside in hundreds before amplifiers, General McNaughton was introduced by Major A. B. C. Throop, of Renfrew, Renfrew county Victory Loan chairman, as "a D.S.O., D. S.C., a very distinguished soldier, indeed and one of the busiest men in Canada at this moment".

He was thanked for his address by R. A. Jeffery, of Arnprior, honorary chairman for Renfrew county, and following the latters remarks, General McNaughton rose again to express the emotion he felt for the kindly sentiments expressed and for the hospitable welcome accorded him on his first visit to Arnprior.

Deputy Reeve J. P. Mulvihill, acting mayor, extended a civic welcome, in the absence of Mayor A. H. Reid. The Victory Loan prayer was offered by Rev. J. T. Warnock, the declaration of pupose was read by Rev. S. S.

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MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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O'Brien and seated on the platform, besides those mentioned, were Dr. J. J. McCann, M.P., Brigadier W. C. Thackeray, commandant of Petawawa Military Camp; J. J. Southern, of Pembroke; E. J. Stewart, of Renfrew; R. C. Coxford, of Pembroke, and Lieut. Cockburn, Pembroke; Col. Crossley, Petawawa; Col. E. A. Wiggs, Petawawa; R. C. Coxford, of Pembroke; and Messrs. D. L. McKerracher, chairman Arnprior Victory Loan committee; A. D. F. Campbell, D. A. Gillies, H. A. Short, R. M. Simpson, and W. H. McFarlane, all of Arnprior.

A feature of the meeting was a presentation of new colors to President Don Hamel of the local Legion, to replace the colors recently destroyed by fire.

There was a luncheon at the New Byrne for the many visitors to town for the occasion. Presiding was R. A. Jeffery, who welcomed the military and civilian guests. Among the speakers were Deputy Reeve Mulvihill, acting mayor; Brigadier Thackray, Col. E. A. Wiggs and Col. Crossley; Lt. J. A. Cockburn and R. C. Coxford, Pembroke; J. A. Maloney, Renfrew, and Walter F. Wilson, of Toronto, Victory Loan organizer for Eastern Ontario, who stated the Renfrew County Victory Loan campaign was well ahead of schedule both in the matter of individual subscriptions and in the total to date.

General McNaughton and Mrs. McNaughton were entertained privately to luncheon at the home of Mr. and Mrs. R. M. Simpson.

At 2.30 o'clock a parade formed on the high school campus and marched through the streets of the town, in the following order: Provincial Police, Lanark and Renfrew Scottish Band, Legion, Pembroke Sea Cadets, R.C.A. Band, R.C.A. Petawawa detachments, R.C.E. Band and detachment, Arnprior Air Cadets and band, Miss Canada Girls, Boy Scouts and Cubs. The salute was taken at the corner of John and Elgin streets by General McNaughton, accompanied by Major Throop, Brigadier Thackray and J. J. Southern.

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PRESS CLIPPINGS

272992

Office of The Prime Minister

Name of Publication Ottawa E. Citizen C

Date November 14, 1944

Commons Called To Meet Nov. 22; To Deal With Recent Developments in War Policy of Govt.

By Charles Bishop

The House of Commons has been called back to Ottawa to meet on Wednesday, November 22, it was announced last night by Prime Minister King. The House will deal with the question of war policy as it has developed in recent days and as it then stands. The matter has become one of exceptional magnitude in the light of the high controversy which has developed in sequence to the resignation of Hon. J. L. Ralston, minister of national defence, and his replacement in that portfolio by General A. G. L. McNaughton, former head of the Canadian army.

To Present "All The Facts."

It is the stated intention of the government "to place all the facts before the House" and be governed by its decision in the light of the information which is given and the discussion which takes place.

For Full Discussion.

The House is not being recalled for the specific purpose of asking a vote of confidence in the government's policy, as it has been outlined. It is not being called, either, to endorse a policy of conscription. Rather, it is being brought back so that the situation, as it exists at the time that the members are here, may be fully revealed, and discussed. Whatever action is taken will be in the light of these discussions.

The understanding is that the door is not shut against any policy which Parliament, when it has the facts, may deem it wise to take.

This, it is learned on high authority, is the reason for reconvening the Commons next week in what, in a sense, is an extraordinary session.

A week ago the Prime Minister, on the occasion of the swearing in of General McNaughton as Minister of National Defence was asked if Parliament would be summoned. On that occasion he stated that he saw no reason for a special session.

In the meantime, there have been developments deemed sufficient to have the House summoned. The Prime Minister last week made a broadcast explaining the situation as it had developed up to then. The government's policy was one of reliance, for the present at least, on the voluntary system.

On Sunday Col. Ralston issued a lengthy statement of his position and, incidentally, took exception to some of the statements or implications in the broadcast of the Prime Minister.

In turn a statement was expected from Mr. King. The statement came last night in the form of the announcement that the House had been re-summoned. It is understood that the view of the Prime Minister is that in place of replying to the former minister of national defence or to the voluminous criticisms of the press, it is preferable to summon the Commons and place before it the situation as it deemed it to exist.

Col. Ralston To Be There.

There will be every opportunity to discuss the matter from all angles. The former minister, Col. Ralston, although he is out of the cabinet, retains, of course, his seat as a member of Parliament and he will be present to give his version of what has happened and his ideas of the policy which it is proper to pursue.

For whatever policy the government decides to pursue, in sequence to the discussions in Parliament it will, presumably, seek the endorsement of that body. There is every reason to think that it is not the intention finally to decide, beforehand, a policy and to ask for it the sanction of the House, but, rather, that the policy should be determined from what is the best judgment of Parliament.

This is not to say that there is any abandonment of the line which already has been taken and instead to adopt a policy of conscription. What a spokesman of exceptional reliability says about the special session is in effect an intention by the government to "lay all the cards on the table" and abide by its decision as to what line is best to pursue.

Submitted to Cabinet.

Mr. King's announcement calling the Commons was submitted to the cabinet at a meeting late yesterday afternoon and it is understood it had the support of all ministers present.

Defence Minister McNaughton attended the brief cabinet sitting and like Mr. King, he supports the voluntary service policy.

Gen. McNaughton will not have a seat in the House when it opens, but it is learned Mr. King will offer to give members an opportunity of calling the defence minister before a secret session. Gen. McNaughton will be in a position to place before members his complete plans for continuing the support of the overseas forces on a voluntary basis.

No Formalities.

The meeting of the Commons will be a continuation of the present session so there will be no formalities at the opening and no speech from the throne.

Government supporters may meet in caucus before the House opens and private members then will have an opportunity to present their views.

The cabinet meeting yesterday lasted about an hour and the very brevity of the session indicated the ministers were in agreement with the Prime Minister's announcement that the House should meet.

Speaker Glen was not in the city last night, but there was sufficient time for all members to be informed and be in Ottawa for the opening sitting.

When the Prime Minister announced the resignation of Col. Ralston and the appointment of Gen. McNaughton on Nov. 2 he said he could see no reason for calling parliament before Jan. 31.

Since then there have been recurring reports that other ministers might leave the cabinet in protest against continuance of the voluntary service policy, but it was evident that a majority support Mr. King's position.

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The understanding is that the door is not shut against any policy which Parliament, when it has the facts, may deem it wise to take.

This, it is learned on high authority, is the reason for re-convening the Commons next week in what, in a sense, is an extraordinary session.

A week ago the Prime Minister, on the occasion of the swearing in of General McNaughton as Minister of National Defence was asked if Parliament would be summoned. On that occasion he stated that he saw no reason for a special session.

In the meantime, there have been developments deemed pertinent to have the House summoned. The Prime Minister has since made a broadcast address and a statement as it had previously been announced it was his intention to make.

On Sunday Col. Ralston issued a lengthy statement of his position and incidentally took occasion to [illegible] the statements of Premier [illegible] in the resignation of the Defence minister.

[illegible] a statement was issued from Mr. King which is also made of this [illegible] the House and been re-summoned. It is understood that this view of the Prime Minister is that in view of statements by the former minister of national defence or to the government's policy [illegible] the House [illegible] Commons and [illegible] if any member [illegible] to make.

The decision to call the House [illegible] to debate the matter from all angles. The former minister, Col. Ralston, although he is not in the cabinet, retains a seat in the House and as a member of parliament will be present to state his version of what has happened and the views of the policy which he is proper to pursue.

For whatever policy the government decides to pursue, in response to the discussion in Parliament it will, presumably, seek the endorsement of that body. There is every reason to think that if it is not the intention finally to consult Parliament, a motion of censure and no confidence in the government will be moved by [illegible] opposition parties.

This is not to say that there is any abandonment of the line which already has been taken and instead to adopt a policy of conscription. What a spokesman of exceptional reliability says about the special session is in effect an invitation by the government to lay all the cards on the table and abide by its decision as to what line is best to pursue.

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Gen. McNaughton will not have a seat in the House when it opens, but it is learned Mr. King will offer to give the minister an opportunity of calling the defence minister before a select [illegible]. Gen. McNaughton will be in a position to place before the House his complete plans for continuing the support of the overseas army on a voluntary basis.

No Resolution.

The meeting of the Commons will be a continuation of the present session so there will be no formal opening of the session and no speech from the throne.

Government supporters may start the session before the House opens but private members then will have an opportunity to present their views.

The cabinet meeting yesterday lasted about an hour and the very details of the session involved [illegible] were in agreement with the Prime Minister's announcement that the House should meet.

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PRESS CLIPPINGS 272993 Office of The Prime Minister

Name of Publication .....

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Subject .....

Large House Majority.

The Liberals have a large House majority—161 members against 73 for all other parties and independents. Eleven seats are vacant.

The House met in special session in September, 1939, when members were called prior to the Canadian dclaration of war on Germany, which was approved by parliament.

Official Announcement.

This was the text of the official announcement last night:

"After a brief meeting of the cabinet this afternoon, the Prime Minister issued the following statement:

"When, on August 15th, the House of Commons adjourned, on completion of current business, it was adjourned until Wednesday, January 31, 1945, with the proviso set forth in the resolution that "if it appears to the satisfaction of Mr. Speaker, after consultation with His Majesty's government, that the public interest requires that the House should meet at an earlier time during the adjournment, the Speaker may give notice that he is so satisfied, and thereupon the House shall meet at the time stated in such notice, and shall trahsact its business as if it had been duly adjourned at that time."

"I have, on behalf of the government, communicated with His Honor the Speaker, who is satisfied that it is in the public interest that the House should meet at this time.

"The Speaker has informed me that he is notifying the members to meet on Wednesday, the 22nd instant, at three o'clock."

Events Leading To House Recall

By The Canadian Press.

Oct. 14—Defence Minister Ralston returned from tour of battlefronts.

Oct. 24—Col. Ralston reported to cabinet on reinforcement position and recommended that compulsory overseas service be imposed.

Nov. 1—Col. Ralston resigned as defence minister after cabinet turned down his proposals.

Nov. 2—Gen. McNaughton appointed defence minister.

Nov. 5—Gen. McNaughton in a speech at Arnprior, Ont., declared his faith in voluntary enlistment for overseas.

Nov. 6—At a noisy meeting of a Canadian Legion branch in Ottawa, Gen. McNaughton faced vigorous questioning from an audience who indicated support for conscription.

Nov. 8—Prime Minister Mackenzie King in a broadcast address set forth his support of the voluntary policy, with encouragement to draftees to enlist for service anywhere.

Nov. 9—The Dominion council of the Canadian Legion presented a brief to Mr. King asking for conscription.

Nov. 12—Col. Ralston, explaining his demand for conscription, said he had found the reinforcement pools "so depleted as not to ensure the prompt replacement of casualties."

Nov. 13—Mr. King announced the Commons would assemble Nov. 22.

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C 272994

PRESS CLIPPINGS

Office of
The Prime Minister

Name of Publication Ottawa M. Citizen

Date November 14, 1944

Subject

"Calling Of House Said Not To Imply Quick Dissolution

Meeting Summoned Merely To Learn And Discuss "The Facts" of War Situation.

By Charles Bishop

Unless, in the course of its meeting, the government should encounter some adverse vote, there is no implication of dissolution and an election in the sudden summoning for next week of the House of Commons.

Should the plans of the government, however, not be sanctioned by the House, there could be no other recourse save an appeal to the country.

The meeting, as has been revealed, is to learn and discuss "the facts" of the war situation in relation to the Canadian Army and to decide what to do about it. That "what" does not exclude any of the possible courses which have been suggested. The precise procedure has not been outlined so far.

Quite possibly, some stage of the sittings may be behind closed doors for reasons of security.

Only the one subject will be before the House. No bill will be introduced or legislation initiated. The two houses of parliament would be needed in that case. In this instance, only the House of Commons is called back. The Senate will not be here at all.

Various rules can be invoked to regularize the intended discussion. This is not a new session. The coming meeting will proceed as if the House had not adjourned on Aug. 15th but had gone ahead on Aug. 16th.

Will Be a Vote

Whatever the course, length, and nature of the discussion, it is agreed that the situation will need to be "finalized," to use a term of much vogue in wartime administration. Somewhere in the picture there will need to be a vote, either approving or disapproving whatever policy is to be evolved in the solution of the situation.

The government seemingly is not going before the House at the opening stage with any specific proposition and a "take it or leave it" frame of mind. The Prime Minister will make a statement, the ex-minister of national defence, as a private member, will make another and a free-for-all discussion, from all angles and all parties, will be invited.

Could Be Resolution

At the end, in some way or other, it will come to a head. It could be in a resolution voicing reliance in the voluntary system or in one favoring resort to compulsion. If, by any chance, it should be the latter, it would mean conscription not only for draftees now in training, but for all others who enter the category by subsequent call-ups as the age of military service is attained. Conscription of draftees clearly suggests conscription in the broad sense.

Eager Expectancy

An atmosphere of eager expectancy has developed from the call to the House, whose deliberations will be of clarifying consequence. Members have all been notified. The call bells were being tested today. The speaker will be here at the end of the week. The sessional indemnity being exhausted, it is presumed a per diem allowance and expenses may be voted.

One of the promised features is a statement showing the number of draftees who will have "gone active" since Gen. McNaughton took over.

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Could Be Resolution

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Name of Publication Ottawa Citizen

Date November 14, 1944

Subject

Election Before the End of the War

Prime Minister Mackenzie King has called the House of Commons to deal with the overseas reinforcement situation. He has legitimately tried to carry on the government without another general election before the end of the war. The signs are, however, that another election is inevitable.

Mr. Churchill told the people of France last Saturday that it is possible the enemy will have been beaten six months hence. It could possibly take longer. It would be unwarranted complacency to figure on an earlier end of the war in Europe.

Preparations for the campaign next spring across the Rhine are doubtless already under way. German statements have lately been given out to lead the people of the United Nations to expect a winter offensive by the Allied forces, but Canadian readers are better advised to rely on the British prime minister's statement.

There will, of course, be fighting everywhere on the Rhine front through the winter months, but it would be vain to expect that the German army can be forced to fight in a final knock-out battle until the whole power of the Allied forces is brought to bear simultaneously from every direction on the Hitlerite stronghold.

* * *

The life of the parliament of Canada will expire next April. The government of Canada cannot long be carried on without money voted by parliament. Another session of this parliament could perhaps vote money to keep the government in office even after the mandate of the electorate had expired, but the Canadian prime minister is loyal to the constitution. He would never try to hold on to office by such an expediency.

A general election this winter has to be considered. Unless there is more confidence in the government than is at present being manifested throughout the country, the Liberal majority is liable to be wiped out. But there is no more confidence in the negative politick of the Conservative party; nor are many people likely to be imposed upon by the "Progressive" label attached to Conservatives. Where Conservative candidates take an honest stand for conscription, they should win some seats; but nowhere in provincial elections, nor in federal by-elections, has there been anything to warrant the expectation of a Progressive Conservative majority in the next general election.

Many people will vote C.C.F.—as much in protest against the negative politics of the other parties as for any other reason. Alberta is strongly behind the Social Credit provincial administration.

* * *

Presumably the impetus of the Canadian war effort will carry the nation on through the next six months or more, irrespective of a confused political situation. It would be healthier for Canadian nationhood, however, to have definite, forward leadership than confusion at the seat of government while the Canadian forces overseas are fighting in the knock-out battles of the sixth year of war with Germany.

Prime Minister King's government declared war in the autumn of 1939. The government's war record has been meritorious—excepting on the failure to lead the nation unitedly along the path of collective national service, as in the other great democracies.

There is little doubt that the nation-wide demand for the selective draft to back the Canadian army overseas will crystallize into a national movement to form a national government. It could better be a national government formed before the next general election than in an aftermath of political confusion.

Even after the election, however, it is probable that the governor-general will again have to call upon the present prime minister to form the next government. Hon. J. L. Ralston is reported to be determined to retire from politics. He came back to be minister of finance at the beginning of the war only under the strong urge of patriotic duty. A similar urge could perhaps prevail again, but the necessary action to assure reinforcements to the Canadian army overseas will have to be taken soon to be most effective.

It is within the power of the prime minister to initiate this action. The whole of Canada's trained manpower must be employed to back the attack in the decisive battles of the war within the next six months.

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W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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CANADA

POOR PRINT
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PRESS CLIPPINGS C 272996 Office of The Prime Minister

Name of Publication Montreal Gazette

Date Nov. 15, 1944

RUMORS FLYING ON COURSE LAID FOR COMMONS

Gazette - Nov 15th

King Silent: May Ask Vote of Confidence on a Refusal to Change Present Policy

(Gazette Resident Correspondent.)

Ottawa, November 14.—A flood of rumors has been loosed by the apparent attempt to shift the conscription crisis from government to the House of Commons, and only rumors are possible, for present indications are that the Prime Minister has not confided in his cabinet colleagues what he intends to do when the legislators re-assemble here a week from tomorrow.

One story is that Premier King will seek a vote of confidence from the House even though it is part of a moribund Parliament—a vote of confidence, not on a decision to adopt conscription but on a refusal to change the present policy. Another is the suggestion that a vote won't be sought but rather the Prime Minister has simply called Commoners to get here to tell them something.

It was made plain this afternoon by Hon. Thomas Vien, speaker of the Senate, that there was no present need for summoning the Senate, but that if necessity arose a call would be issued. This is taken to mean there is not now any intention to have Parliament transact any legislative business.

But the hint that Premier King intends only to tell the members something may be taken to suggest there is no desire on the part of the administration to precipitate a debate in the House on the military manpower muddle.

Premier King told the House in 1942 that should the government decide to invoke the legislation empowering it to adopt conscription and an Order-in-Council, calling it into effect, were passed he would submit that order to the House and ask for a vote of confidence.

But when he was asked how he planned to prevent another protracted and acrimonious debate he said he did not think such a debate would be necessary, that it would be possible to confine it within reasonable limits. This time, though, public feeling has been so roused that it will probably be impossible to curb debate short of closure, and the traditional opposition of the Prime Minister to closure is well known.

HEATED DEBATE AHEAD

Whatever course the Prime Minister decides to pursue there is bound to be plenty of heat in the coming meeting of the House members, and there will also be some light shed on the overseas reinforcement situation, for Col. J. L. Ralston, former Defence Minister, will be present in the capacity of a private member.

Then members of the official opposition, the Progressive Conservatives, can be counted on to press for action, to dismiss any further attempts to halt debate and to confuse the issue. The attitude of the Social Credit members from Alberta is well known. They have consistently throughout the war supported every move aimed at an all-out war effort. But their neighbors, the Socialists, are expected to back the Prime Minister in his fight against conscription.

One other rumor is that the government even at this late stage might see the light, notice the storm clouds on the horizon and come round to sending the draftees overseas to back the attacks of the valiant Canadian infantry, but this story is scouted by those who have noticed the many and irrevocable commitments made by the Prime Minister and some of his colleagues to the people of Quebec province.

That there will be a fight in the House seems almost inevitable, and even a collapse of strict party lines may be possible. Certainly, an occasion will be made to divide the House on the single issue of conscription, and such a division will serve to smoke out the pros and cons in the Liberal party, as well as amongst the smaller independent groups.

It will depend greatly on the temper and the outcome of next week's meetings of the members how soon the people will again be able to mark their ballots, but present indications are that dissolution will be delayed as long as possible. It cannot, however, be deferred much beyond the middle of March for the life of the nineteenth Parliament will end about that time, and voting must be held not later than the early part of June.

May Leave Decision to House

Ottawa, November 14.—(CP)—The Ottawa Citizen and Ottawa Journal in newspage stories on the assembling of the House of Commons on November 22, today said Prime Minister Mackenzie King, instead of insisting on a vote of con-

(Continued on Page 12, Col. 3)

fidence on the voluntary system of reinforcements, will place the facts before the House and be governed by whatever decision the House makes.

The Journal said:

"When the House resumes, Mr. King will state his position in support of continuation of the voluntary system of reinforcing the army.

"But having long underlined his belief in the sovereignty of Parliament, Mr. King will qualify his position by making it clear at the outset that if the House wants conscription he will accept it.

"Then should the House decide that the 'zombies' must be sent overseas to immediately rectify the army's reinforcement shortage, the decision would be Parliament's, not Mr. King's.

"And the vote would not be one involving 'confidence'."

The Citizen said:

"It is the stated intention of the government "to place all the facts before the House" and be governed by its decision in the light of information which is given and the discussion which takes place.

"The House is not being recalled for the specific purpose of asking a vote of confidence in the government's policy, as it has been outlined. It is not being called, either, to endorse a policy of conscription. Rather, it is being brought back so that the situation, as it exists at the time that the members are here, may be fully revealed, and discussed. Whatever action is taken will be in the light of these discussions.

"The understanding is that the door is not shut against any policy which parliament, when it has the facts, may deem it wise to take."

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Name of Publication Ottawa Citizen

Date November 10, 1944

The Prime Minister's Advisers

Prime Minister Mackenzie King is largely dependent upon the advice of military experts when decisions on army strength have to be made. General A. G. L. McNaughton has made it clear that he advised the government to rely on voluntary recruiting for the Canadian army from the beginning of the war. It is only fair to the prime minister to remember at this time that the Canadian military authorities were unanimously behind the government's policy.

The political parties were also unanimously against conscription. When the people were consulted in the 1940 general election, no Conservative candidate campaigned for conscription, nor any Conservative newspaper in Canada. Hon. W. D. Herridge stood alone as the only candidate in the general election to call for the total mobilization of Canadian manpower by the democratic method of conscription. The Citizen alone among Canadian newspapers supported Mr. Herridge.

The Canadian electorate gave the Liberal party a nationwide vote of confidence. The will of the parties has been reflected by the elected representatives in parliament.

In The Citizen's opinion, reliance on voluntary enlistment has been a mistaken policy. It has probably contributed more to disunity than straight forward leadership to enforce national selective service would have done.

* * *

Many Canadian people have come to see that the government's policy is inadequate. Even though the necessary reinforcements should be forthcoming without the national selective draft for overseas service, the results of reliance on volunteering are unjust and disruptive. An undue burden is being placed upon the loyal element of the Canadian populace.

The men on active service overseas are giving undivided allegiance to Canada and the cause of human freedom. But fit men are allowed to stay at home in Canada where they have a divided allegiance. They serve factional interests against the interests of the Canadian people and the national interests of Canada. They are left free to profit at the expense of the lives of Canadian young men on active service overseas.

* * *

The prime minister's broadcast last Wednesday night included figures with reference to the strength of the present conscript army in Canada, drafted only for service where there is no likelihood of encountering the enemy. According to the figures supplied for the broadcast, there are at present 59,000 drafted men in uniform. The total of fit men drafted from Quebec is 23,000. The total French-speaking draftees from all provinces is 25,000. Statistics have shown, however, that the percentage of enlisted men from the province of Quebec is substantially below any other province's percentage. The prime minister's figures fail to account for the missing legion of fit men, neither enlisted voluntarily nor drafted.

There are thousands of Quebec's loyal sons serving valiantly in the Canadian armed forces. They deserve every credit for putting allegiance to Canada first; but the percentage of fit men whose allegiance has been subverted is to be seen in Quebec's position at the bottom of the list of Canadian provinces in the honor roll of enlisted manpower. It is greatly to be regretted that this discussion of Quebec's unenlisted manpower should have been revived again, but the figures in the prime minister's broadcast were bound to raise the question of the missing percentage—the tens of thousands of unenlisted young men.

* * *

The government is apparently being advised to apply a new form of pressure on the drafted men, conscripted at present only for home service: presumably they are to be implored or goaded individually to enlist by intensified "training." It is hard to believe that Prime Minister Mackenzie King could be persuaded that this method is more honorable than to bring in conscription for overseas by democratic process voluntarily enacted into law—as it has been in the United Kingdom and the United States.

The prime minister's broadcast last Wednesday night brought it out that he has taken the advice of the new minister of national defence, General McNaughton. It is becoming daily more apparent, however, that the Canadian people will hold the head of the government accountable for results in the months of supreme trial before the war in Europe is ended.

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PRESS CLIPPINGS

272998 Office of The Prime Minister

Name of Publication.....

Date.....

Subject.....

Prime Minister Churchill told the British parliament last week that it is likely to be early summer before Germany is defeated. Yesterday he warned that the full exertions of the United Kingdom, the United States and Russia would be needed. He spoke of the "frightful slaughter and devastation" in Europe where, within the last month, the hard fought battle to open the port of Antwerp for Allied use has cost heavy British and Canadian casualties.

Nothing could be more dangerous than to gamble on an early collapse of German resistance. Mr. Churchill left no doubt about the task ahead when he said:

> Now we stand on the threshold of Germany and it will take the full exertions of the three great powers, every scrap of strength they can give, to crush down the desperate resistance which we must expect from this minatory antagonist at last beaten back to his own lair.

The Canadian army is heavily committed. It is the army so eloquently described in former years by General McNaughton as the dagger pointing at the heart of Germany. It is the army destined to thrust on through the enemy's lair to Berlin. No responsible Canadian would be so blind as to imagine that Berlin will be reached without hard fighting, perhaps more ferocious than any hitherto encountered.

The former minister of national defence, Col. J. L. Ralston, with at least equal capacity to gauge the extent of Canada's military responsibilities in the months ahead, returned from a survey of the Canadian reinforcement situation to advise the government to bring in conscription for service overseas. The government has rejected Col. Ralston's advice. There are disturbing signs that the prime minister has accepted advice from a less reliable source.

The consequences are liable to be grave for Canada, but more especially for the Canadian fighting men in the Low Countries and in Italy. Whatever scrap of strength this nation can give will be needed to back the attack.

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PRESS CLIPPINGS

272999

Office of
The Prime Minister

Name of Publication Ottawa Citizen

Date November 11, 1944

Subject

Wednesday, November 8

VERY EARLY UP and hard at my task and later to meet my wife at the post office and then to see Bernard Flynn's and Virginia Coghlan's paintings, which I thought most praiseworthy, and so I at work again and one I know well comes in and tells me he is sorry Mr. Roosevelt hath been re-elected, saying he is a Big Bluff, which fell strangely upon my ears, for it is the first time I remember a Canadian expounding such a view, and whether it is rational or a personal complex I know not, but it minded me of another otherwise estimable fellow who drops in every now and again to tell me that Mr. Churchill is not what he is made out to be. So for a sandwich and coffee and met with S. Checkland, who tells me none hath spoken against his candidature as controller, and I was for telling him that those who take the other view do not speak, but did not, and so finished and home at 6 and waited impatiently to hear the Prime Minister talk at 9.30, and at last he spoke, and he said some interesting things, and from what I am able to make out the plan is to use pressure, constraint, coercion, goading, threats, urgency, exigency, harassment, heat, argument, exhortation, incitement and anything but compulsion on the unhappy draftees in order to make them go to war "voluntarily."

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Name of Publication.....

Date.....

Subject.....

O Valiant Hearts

By Kathleen Blanchard

On the first anniversary of the ending of the Great War, thousands of people lined the London streets by Whitehall, standing bareheaded to honor the fallen. Afterwards there was a service in Westminster Abbey.

On the 3rd anniversary of the Abbey service, this inspired hymn was heard for the first time, and it immediately stood apart as a symbol of remembrance for this day throughout the world.

It was written by John Stanhope Arkwright (now Sir John) who was for twelve years the conservative member for Hereford. He was born in 1872, and was educated at Christ Church, Oxford, graduating in law.

While at Oxford he had the distinction of winning the coveted Newdigate prize (1895) and before he was 30, he was elected to the British parliament.

Towards the end of the First Great War a little book of poems was published under his signature, entitled "The Supreme Sacrifice and Other Poems in Times of War."

O Valiant Hearts was taken from the book and set to music, and so was heard at the crowded service at the Abbey in 1921. From thence it was carried to every war shrine in England and to all parts of the world.

The fair youth of the Empire have again entered the lists—in a world at war—and have accomplished marvellous deeds of chivalry. Their names are engraved with a golden pen in the land of their birth.

He sleeps not in his native land—
But neath some foreign skies—
Far from those who loved him well,
In a Hero's grave he lies.

O Valiant Hearts, who to your glory came
Through dust of conflict and through battle-flames,
Tranquil you lie, your knightly virtue proved,
Your memory hallowed in the land you loved.

Proudly you gathered, rank on rank to her,
As who had heard God's message from afar;
All you had hoped for, all you had, you gave,
To serve mankind — yourselves you scorned to save.

Splendid you passed, the great surrender made,
Into light that never more shall fade;
Deep your contentment in that blest abode
Who wait the last clear trumpet call of God.

Long years ago, as earth lay dark and still,
Rose a loud cry up on a lonely hill,
While in the frailty of our human clay
Christ, our Redeemer, passed the self-same way.

Still stands His cross from that dread day to this,
Like some bright star, above the dark abyss;
Still through the veil, the victor's pitying eyes,
Look down to bless our lesser calvaries.

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PRESS CLIPPINGS

Office of
The Prime Minister

C 273000

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PRESS CLIPPINGS C 273001 Office of The Prime Minister

Name of Publication The Ottawa Journal

Date November 11, 1944

Subject

Something for Somebody's Memoirs?

Said Prime Minister KING in his radio address of Wednesday night:

> "When I realized that unless Col. Ralston's recommendations were accepted by the Cabinet his resignation would follow, I felt it to be my duty as Prime Minister to seek the most expert advice I believed to be available. I accordingly consulted General McNaughton."

In the light of this it would be interesting to have answers to the following:

1. Did Mr. KING tell his Cabinet colleagues, including Col. RALSTON, that he intended consulting General MCNAUGHTON?
2. Did he, consulting him, ask him at the same time whether, in certain eventualities, he would be prepared to take Col. RALSTON'S place?
3. At what stage of the Cabinet discussions did Mr. KING disclose to the Cabinet—and to Col. RALSTON—that he had sought General MCNAUGHTON'S advice, and that the General was ready to become Minister of Defence?
4. Was Col. RALSTON'S decision to retire from the Cabinet reached *before* Mr. KING'S disclosure that he had seen General MCNAUGHTON, and that the General stood ready to take over the Defence Department, or *after* the disclosure?

There are rumors that Col. RALSTON did not really resign in the ordinary way, but that Mr. KING, by pulling General MCNAUGHTON from up his sleeve, in effect handed RALSTON his hat. Perhaps they are only rumors; but seeing that they are persistent and leave a nasty taste in the mouth, wouldn't it be well to deal with them by giving the country the correspondence to which it is entitled?

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House of Commons,
June 10, 1942

NATIONAL RESOURCES MOBILIZATION ACT
AMENDMENT ACT (1942)

Section to be omitted

C 273002

AMENDMENT OF THE NATIONAL RESOURCES MOBILIZATION ACT

(1)

HOUSE OF COMMONS ON WEDNESDAY, JUNE 10, 1942*

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE AMENDMENT RESPECTING OVERSEAS SERVICE

Rt. Hon. W.L. Mackenzie King

On Monday, May 11, I moved for leave to introduce the bill which is now before the house. Leave being granted, it was introduced and read the first time. As then explained, the bill seeks to amend the National Resources Mobilization Act, which was assented to on the 21st of June, 1940. There is but one amendment of significance. It is to repeal section 3 of the Act. Such further amendments as are sought are consequential upon the striking out of section 3. They do not go beyond deleting from section 2 of the Act, the words "subject to the provisions of section 3 hereof" in the first line of the section as it stands at present, and the renumbering of the sections affected.

Section 2 of the National Resources Mobilization Act reads as follows:

2. Subject to the provisions of section three hereof, the governor in council may do and authorize such acts and things, and make from time to time such orders and regulations, requiring persons to place themselves, their services and their property at the disposal of His Majesty in the right of Canada, as may be deemed necessary or expedient for securing the public safety, the defence of Canada, the maintenance of public order, or the efficient prosecution of the war, or for maintaining supplies or services essential to the life of the community.

Section 3 of the Act reads:

3. The powers conferred by the next preceding section may not be exercised for the purpose of requiring persons to serve in the military, naval or air forces outside of Canada and the territorial waters thereof.

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273003

C

Canada's War Effort - Methods most effective and serviceable

Rt. Hon. W. L. Mackenzie King

Enabling legislation

I come now to a most important fact with respect to the powers conferred upon the governor in council under the National Resources Mobilisation Act. The act itself is enabling legislation. It does not necessarily contemplate the immediate, and certainly does not contemplate the total exercise of the powers conferred. Were those powers to be immediately and totally exercised we should have established at once a communist state. What the act does contemplate, as is expressed in the statute itself, is the exercise "from time to time" of such of the powers conferred as may be deemed "necessary or expedient". While full and complete powers for the exercise of compulsion are given to the governor in council by the act, under its provisions, it is left to the governor in council to decide when, and to what extent, it may be necessary or expedient to exercise the powers thus conferred. This will be equally true of the powers of the governor in council under the act as amended. The discretion of the government will remain precisely what it is at the present time.

Perhaps I cannot do better, by way of illustration of the difference between the possession of unlimited powers of conscription by the government and the exercise of these powers in the manner deemed "necessary or expedient" at a particular stage of the war, than by quoting what I said in this house on February 25 last, 1942

In *Hansard* at pages 913, 914, I am reported as follows:

In order to carry on war, men are necessary, money is necessary. Both have to be raised, one in large numbers and the other in large quantities. With respect to the men that are being raised at the present time, we have two methods. They are not ends in themselves but methods, and we are using the methods which [illegible] to Canada's war effort when we resort to the one or to the other. We have two methods of raising men for the army. Some of them are raised by compulsion; they are serving within the territorial limits of Canada. Others are being raised by voluntary enlistment, some of them also are serving in Canada. But all that are going overseas are being raised by the voluntary enlistment system, which has proved effective up to the present.

Now with respect to the raising of money, we are using the same two methods. We are raising money by compulsion, under taxation in its different forms; and we are raising money voluntarily by the loan system which is in progress at the present time, and which the people of the country are supporting splendidly and, I believe, will continue to support. Supposing my hon. friend were to ask me: "What are you going to do if the voluntary system fails in the matter of the loan? Will you tell the people that now?" Could I tell them that? Would it be wise to tell them that? But a decision will have to be made if the voluntary system in the matter of loans should fail to produce the results which it is necessary should be produced in the securing of an amount of money requisite for the purposes. Under such circumstances, I think probably there would be resort to the conscription of wealth. I do not see any other alternative than for the government just to come along and take the wealth that exists, if the required sums cannot be raised voluntarily.

. . . I wish to have that parallel kept in mind. What the government is going to do when the voluntary method fails in the matter of loans it will decide when the time comes; and it will do exactly the same thing as regards the man-power [illegible] I may say this: I think the people of the country will see to it that both things are linked pretty closely together if one or the other becomes necessary.

I hope I have made it quite clear that the National Resources Mobilisation Act as it stands is not mandatory but enabling legislation; and that, if amended as proposed, it will continue to be enabling legislation.

The extent of the use of the powers conferred upon the government by the provisions of the National Resources Mobilisation Act is, and has been from the outset, a matter of government policy. Government policy has always to be decided in the light of all relevant circumstances. This will remain true of the unrestricted powers which the amendment, if enacted, will afford.

* NOTE

NOTE hold

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273003

Canada's War Effort - Methods most effective and serviceable

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. . . I wish to have that parallel kept in mind. What the government is going to do when the voluntary method fails in the matter of loans it will decide when the time comes: and it will do exactly the same thing as respects the matter of raising men. . . . And may I say this: I think the people of the country will see to it that both things are linked pretty closely together if one or the other becomes necessary.

I hope I have made it quite clear that the National Resources Mobilization Act, as it stands, is not mandatory but enabling legislation; and that, if amended as proposed, it will continue to be enabling legislation.

The extent of the use of the powers conferred upon the government by the provisions of the National Resources Mobilization Act is, and has been from the outset, a matter of government policy. Government policy has always to be decided in the light of all relevant circumstances. This will remain true of the unrestricted powers which the amendment, if enacted, will afford.

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W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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C 273004

5.

Government Policy on Overseas Service
Ralston February 10, 1942
Prime Minister February 25, 1942

Rt.Hon.W.L.Mackenzie King

Policy regarding overseas service announced before plebiscite

The government's policy with respect to the method of enlisting men for service in the army overseas was set forth clearly and unequivocally, on February 10, by my colleague the Minister of National Defence, in discussing the 1942-43 army programme. The minister of defence said that he wanted to see voluntary enlistments kept up, and that he believed it was better for our voluntary army if the men coming to reinforce it were also volunteers. After giving figures which clearly showed that, up to that time, the voluntary system had not failed, the minister added these words:

Ralston

I have faith in the success of the voluntary method if we all do our part. With the background and tradition which this country possesses and which it would be folly to ignore, I prefer the voluntary method if it works, and I shall do all I can to make it work.

This statement is by no means the only statement of the position of the government with respect to the method of enlistment for service overseas. I desire particularly to draw attention to and to repeat the words I used in this house on February 25, in the debate on the second reading of the Plebiscite Bill. After setting out the reasons why the government believed the request for a release from any commitments should be submitted to the people, I explained the position the government was then in with respect to the adoption of conscription for overseas service and, in plain and unequivocal language, why it was the government desired to have that position changed and to be given a free hand to act in accordance with its judgment of the needs of the situation as they might arise. Here are my words—and I am quoting from what I said on February 25:

Prime Minister

[illegible] that the government has full power with respect to everything, excepting one thing; and that one thing is that commitment, that obligation, with respect to the enlisting of men for overseas service. There the government is not free. You may ask why the government should come forward at the present time and ask to be made free. First of all, may I make it clear that it is not because of any situation that exists at the moment. The Minister of National Defence has made it perfectly clear that with respect to voluntary enlistment, we are obtaining men for overseas service at the present time as rapidly as we can train them.

And these are my words:

For our programme this year, and up to March, 1943, there is an honest belief on the part of the government that we will be able to get the men by voluntary enlistment for service overseas, and will not have to resort to conscription. But no one can say how long this war is going to last. No one can say what particular turn it is going to take. None of us knows what the conditions are going to be in a few months hence, or several months hence, or a year or two hence. . . .

Nothing, I think, could be plainer than that. It was made perfectly clear that the government had no thought of resorting to conscription for overseas service so long as the voluntary system continued to produce the necessary recruits; also, that we honestly believed the voluntary system would suffice to secure the necessary enlistments for the 1942-43 programme. The government, however, wished to be free, without any breach of faith, to resort to conscription for overseas service should that become necessary to our national security and to the effectiveness of our war effort.

If the bill is amended as proposed, it is not the intention of the government to resort to conscription for service overseas unless circumstances should arise which would render the use of compulsion imperative, such, for example, as the maintenance of the necessary reinforcements for Canada's army overseas.

NOTE

In saying this, let me make it equally clear that, having regard to the stage the war has reached, the government is asking parliament now, just as it did at the time of the enactment of the National Resources Mobilization Act, in June, 1940, to give to it the powers it believes it should possess, quite independently of any powers the governor in council may possess under the War Measures Act. The power to which I refer is the power to decide if, when, and to what extent the use of compulsion may be necessary for military service outside Canada and to exercise that power accordingly.

With reference to the specific question of enlistment for service overseas I said on February 25:

When we find that we cannot raise the required numbers of men for enlistment overseas by the voluntary method, and it is absolutely necessary to raise more men by other methods, then we will make our decision, present it to parliament and give it to the country.

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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With reference to the specific question of enlistment for service overseas, I said, on February 25:

When we find that we cannot raise the required numbers of men for enlistment overseas by the voluntary method, and it is absolutely necessary to raise more men by other methods, then we will make our decision, present it to parliament and have it discussed on its merits.

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Rt. Hon. W. L. Mackenzie King

C 273005

6.

Government Decision based on necessity and advisability

[redacted] powers.

There remains the question as to how, should the necessity of resorting to compulsion for service overseas arise, the government proposes to proceed in exercising the powers which parliament may confer. Here, again, the government intends to continue the practice which it has followed under the powers it at present possesses under the National Resources Mobilization Act.

The decision of the governor in council will be communicated to parliament in exactly the same manner as orders and regulations are communicated to parliament under the act as it stands. The procedure, in this particular, is set forth in section 5 of the act, which reads:

5. Every order or regulation passed under the authority of this Act shall be tabled in parliament forthwith if parliament is in session and a copy thereof sent to every member of the House of Commons and of the Senate; and if parliament is not in session, that every such order or regulation shall be forthwith published in the *Canada Gazette* and copies thereof sent to every member of the House of Commons and of the Senate forthwith; provided that any of the steps specified in this section may be omitted or deferred if the governor in council considers such omission or deferment necessary in the national interest having regard to the special circumstances.

Clause 5 was inserted in the mobilization act only after very careful consideration of the situation as it existed at the time the act was passed. It must be apparent that the reasons which governed at that time, as to the procedure to be followed by the administration in exercising the powers given to the governor in council under its provisions, would obtain with equal, if not greater force as the war situation becomes more critical.

I notice that it has been said, that once the amendment is adopted, the decision respecting conscription for overseas service will rest solely with the military authorities. I wish, therefore, to make it wholly clear

NOTE

that action taken under the act as amended, must be authorized by order of the governor in council. In other words the decision will be the decision of the politicians.

On February 25 I gave to parliament a very clear statement of the factors of which account would be taken by the government in reaching a decision. These were known to the people of Canada at the time they were being asked to give the government a free hand.

Replying to a question of the leader of the opposition as to what the government was going to do in certain eventualities, I said, as reported on page 918 of *Hansard* of February 25, 1942:

Let me answer the question first of all in a broad way. [redacted]

[redacted] do at any particular time will depend upon the [redacted]

NOTE

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June 10, 1942

And later:

[redacted]

As to the right thing being done at the right time and in the right way, it seems to me that necessarily comes to be a matter of the degree of confidence which parliament and the people have in the administration charged with the responsibilities of carrying on the war.

See

NOTE

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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Rt. Hon. W. L. Mackenzie King

Government Decision based on necessity and advisability

Method of exercising extending powers

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I notice that it has been said, that once the amendment is adopted, the decision respecting conscription for overseas service will rest solely with the military authorities. I wish, therefore, to make it wholly clear that action taken under the act as amended, must be authorized by order of the governor in council. In other words the decision will be the decision of the cabinet.

On February 25 I gave to parliament a very clear statement of the factors of which account would be taken by the government in reaching a decision. These were known to the people of Canada at the time they were being asked to give the government a free hand.

Replying to a question of the leader of the opposition as to what the government was going to do in certain eventualities, I said, as reported on page 918 of *Hansard* of February 25, 1942:

Let me answer the question first of all in a broad way. The government is asking the people for a free hand in order that it may do in the circumstances as they may arise what is most in the interests of the people of Canada. We wish to make Canada's war effort as effective as it can possibly be made. What we shall do at any particular time will depend upon the course which we think at the time is necessary and advisable and most effective in Canada's war effort. That decision is not going to be made in the light of any one factor. It is going to be made in the light of all conditions as they exist and as they are known to the government at the time. . . .

And later:

The government is going to do the thing that it believes is going to further to the uttermost Canada's war effort, all circumstances considered. May I say that when I say "all circumstances considered," I have in mind the conditions as they may exist in respect to the war in different theatres and the conditions that may exist in Canada itself.

As to the right thing being done at the right time and in the right way, it seems to me that necessarily comes to be a matter of the degree of confidence which parliament and the people have in the administration charged with the responsibilities of carrying on the war.

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NATIONAL UNITY AND THE CONSCRIPTION ISSUE

Surveying the field of public controversy on the issue of conscription for service overseas, as it has been reflected in the press, and as doubtless it will find expression in this House of Commons, there would appear to be three general views, two of them diametrically opposed. The first is that conscription for service overseas should be inaugurated at once, that nothing less will suffice; the second is that conscription for service overseas should not be inaugurated under any circumstances. In other words, there are some who want conscription for overseas service, and this at once even if it is not necessary, and some who say they won't support conscription for overseas service at any time no matter how necessary it might be to help to save our own country. Each of these is a very extreme view and attitude. Neither extreme, I believe, should be permitted to prevail.

There is, fortunately, a third view—a view which I believe, accords with the opinion more generally held throughout the dominion. It is that conscription for service overseas should be inaugurated only if and when it is the opinion of the government [illegible] that such a measure is necessary to the successful prosecution of our war effort, and the maintenance of its vital services. That view is the one which is held by this government. It represents the government's policy with respect to conscription for service overseas. In a word, that policy may be summed up as not necessarily conscription if conscription is necessary. Conscription, in other words, I submit is not an issue; it is a means to an end. The issue is what policy will serve to keep Canada united, or to further Canada's war effort in the manner which, at this time of war, will best serve the interests of Canada, the interests of the British commonwealth of nations, and of the other united nations whose arms are linked together in the common cause of freedom.

Knowing the disastrous effect upon Canada's war effort which a controversy concerning conscription for service overseas would occasion, it is [illegible] recognizing of the problems in which the enforcement of such a policy might give rise, the government, I need hardly say, has done all in its power to prevent our country from becoming divided over the conscription issue. It has done so without swerving in the slightest particular, of any step essential to an utmost effort. It would have been fatal to the unity of Canada for the government to have done otherwise. It lies beyond the power of the government to prevent all ills from arising. But it would be equally fatal for the government not to continue to do all in its power to prevent the issue becoming one which could ever impair the efficiency of our war effort and the magnificent record our country has already achieved, and which every citizen of the dominion is justified in viewing with the utmost pride.

Task of Parliament to safeguard unity

I cannot believe this parliament is going to permit that unity to be destroyed by a political quarrel over a question of the method by which men are to be raised for overseas service. Canada, and Canada's future, is far more vital than any question of conscription.

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
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There is, fortunately, a third view—a view which I believe, accords with the opinion most generally held throughout the dominion. It is that conscription for service overseas should be inaugurated only if and when, in the opinion of the government, it becomes necessary to the security of our country and to the maintenance of its war effort. That view is the one which is held by the government. It represents the government's policy with respect to conscription for service overseas. In a word, that policy may be described as not necessarily conscription but conscription if necessary. Considering all relevant circumstances, I submit that no other policy will serve to keep Canada united, or to further Canada's war effort in the manner which, at this time of war, will best serve the interests of Canada, the interests of the British commonwealth of nations, and of the other united nations which are linked together in the common cause of freedom.

Knowing the disastrous effect upon Canada's war effort which a controversy concerning conscription for service overseas would occasion in Canada, to say nothing of the problems to which the enforcement of such a policy might give rise, the government, I need hardly say, has done all in its power to prevent our country from becoming divided over the conscription issue. It has done so without sacrifice in the slightest particular, of any step essential to an all-out effort. It would have been fatal to the unity of Canada for the government to have done otherwise. It lies beyond the power of the government to prevent an issue from arising. But it would be equally fatal for the government not to continue to do all in its power to prevent the issue becoming one which could ever impair the efficiency of our war effort and the magnificent record our country has already achieved, and which every citizen of the dominion is justified in viewing with the utmost pride.

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C 273007

Compulsion and an all-out war effort

Rt.Hon.W.L.Mackenzie King

Compulsion not an end in itself

In a war for the preservation of freedom, it might well be asked how can the use of compulsion be justified in any aspects of the war effort

The reason for resorting to compulsion of any kind in the prosecution of the war is set out in formal language in section 2 of the National Resources Mobilization Act which empowers the governor in council to require "persons to place themselves, their services and their property at the disposal of His Majesty in the right of Canada, as may be deemed necessary and expedient for securing the public safety, the defence of Canada, the maintenance of public order, or the efficient prosecution of the war, or for maintaining supplies or services essential to the life of the community."

Translated into the language of the man in the street, that means that the government has the power to conscript any property, any wealth, or the services of any individual in Canada, whenever they are needed to make Canada stronger to resist attack, and to help Canada to do its full share to defeat the enemy.

Compulsion, in any form, should be used in the war effort only if it will make Canada stronger, and add to Canada's part in winning the war. Here let me repeat that compulsion is regarded by the government, not as an end in itself, but as a means to an end. That end is a total war effort.

NOTE

As I pointed out to the house in my statement on national selective service:

In those aspects of our war effort in which voluntary methods are working satisfactorily, voluntary selection, including a measure of choice by the individual of the appropriate field of service, has been and will be continued. The more expensive and complicated methods of compulsion have been employed, only where it is felt that compulsory selection is necessary in order to increase efficiency in the prosecution of the war. Compulsion, however, will be applied without fear or favour wherever in the opinion of the government its use will aid in the achievement of a maximum war effort.

The application of conscription to service in the army overseas is only one aspect of the far wider question of the use of compulsion to secure an all-out war effort.

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
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PRESS CLIPPINGS

Office of
The Prime Minister

C 273008

Name of Publication Ottawa Journal

Date November 16, 1944

Subject

Keep the Issue Clear.

This controversy over reinforcements is being bedevilled by loose use of the word "conscription".

The question of conscription, of its merits or demerits, of whether we should have it or shouldn't have it, is at this stage irrelevant.

The real question before the country, the only question, can be summed up in four sentences:

1. Our armies overseas desperately need trained reinforcements; need 15,000 trained men between now and the end of December.
2. These trained reinforcements are here in Canada; are in our Home Army.
3. Are we going to send them, or not?
4. If we are not going to send them, why?

That is all there is to this controversy; a single question of whether we shall send to our overseas armies reinforcements which we have and they need. To muddy that clear issue with talk about the good or evil of conscription, or with sets of figures that can be juggled to buttress any view, is just stupidity—or, what may be worse, duplicity playing on stupidity.

Whether we have general conscription in this country now, or don't have it, doesn't matter a tinker's clay dam; the time when conscription might have mattered is past. What our armies on the fighting fronts need are not untrained men recruited or conscripted from now on, and who could not be used in battle for six months or more. What they need are trained reinforcements—men who can be used in battle within three or four months.

We have those trained men—at least 8,000 of them, Mr. KING admits—the men our armies call for. Are we going to send them, or not?

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
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PRESS CLIPPINGS

Office of The Prime Minister

Name of Publication Ottawa E Citizen C 273009

Date Nov 17/44

Subject

House Of David Head Visions Hitler Dead

BENTON HARBOR, Mich., Nov. 17 — (AP) — "Queen" Mary Purnell, founder with the late "King" Benjamin Purnell of the House of David, and now leader of the City of David, an offshoot of the original colony here, says she has experienced two distinct visions convincing her that Adolf Hitler is dead.

Francis Thorpe, Mary's chief of staff at the City of David and a pioneer member of the cult, revealed the reported visions today.

On both occasions, according to "King" Benjamin's widow, Hitler himself appeared to her from the grave with a plea to stop the war.

Mary's first vision, Thorpe said, occurred about July 20, when she told him and other trusted advisers that while she was alone she had felt a presence "which she could not see with the natural eye, but she knew instinctively it was Hitler who she said spoke as follows: 'Don't worry, no harm shall come to you. . . the war will soon be over.'"

In the evening of the same day, Mary told Thorpe and others that the vision returned, repeating an entreaty to "stop the war." She said the Hitler of her vision appeared humble and remorseful.

"She now feels certain that her experiencse indicates Hitler is really dead," Thorpe said.

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PRESS CLIPPINGS C273010 Office of The Prime Minister

Name of Publication Toronto Globe and Mail

Date November 17, 1944

Subject

Australia Cuts Army By 57,000; Other Shifts

Canberra, Nov. 16 (CP).—Ninety-five per cent of the Australian Volunteer Defense Corps will be placed on a reserve basis, Acting Prime Minister Forde told the House of Representatives today. Allied victories, he said have removed a Japanese threat to Australia.

Mr. Forde told the House that Australia's postwar immigration plans must be brought to the blueprint stage before the war ends or the country would be left behind in the quest for suitable immigrants.

A Cabinet sub-committee now is considering an extensive report submitted by an inter-departmental committee on the question of white immigration, he said, and in view of the importance the Government attached to child immigration the inter-departmental committee was instructed to give detailed consideration to a larger scheme.

Mr. Forde added that many thousands of war orphans in Britain and Europe would be available for postwar immigration.

Adjusting to rebalance the Commonwealth's manpower position will involve 51,650 men and 15,600 women from direct war effort into new civilian employment, chiefly rural industries and housing, he already had told Parliament.

Army Loses 57,000 Net

"There will be a net transfer of 57,000 men from military to civilian status," said Mr. Forde. "This comprises 45,000 special releases and 48,000 normal discharges offset by the intake of 36,000. It is expected that 44,700 will become available as a net addition to the manpower resources of essential industry."

The Acting Prime Minister disclosed that in June, 1944, rural industries had less than 75 per cent of their prewar labor force despite the restoration of some 18,000 to 20,000 men since October, 1943. During 1944-45, 21,000 additional men and 500 women would be restored to food production and special directions had been given that this allocation should include 3,000 men for dairying.

"After provision has been made for rural industry and building, only 30,250 men and 13,400 women remain for all allocation against all other requirements" said Mr. Forde. "Aircraft production and ship repair will receive 3,200 men and 500 women but no new labor can be provided for shipbuilding. For the relief of shortages in a wide range of civilian supplies, 9,000 men and 5,000 women are to be provided.

Can't Relax War Effort

"These measures for re-balancing the manpower position make it clear that there can be no relaxation of the total war effort in the present circumstances," said Mr. Forde. "In all cases essential industries are being required to continue under the burden of economy in manpower."

"That we have been able to meet the requirements of essential industry to the extent I have indicated is due almost entirely to the diversion of manpower from direct war activities," continued Mr. Forde. "No further reduction of the direct war effort is possible at the present time, therefore no further relief can be given to other industries."

The Acting Prime Minister said he had no reason to believe that the Australian people were dissatisfied with the Commonwealth's war effort. While it was true some of the Australian forces were not as actively engaged as some might wish, that was because Gen. MacArthur's had plans for their future use. These plans would soon unfold, he predicted.

"It is imperative to keep our grip on the length and difficulties of the task of defeating Japan in which Australia must play its full part, rather than let wishfulness and imagination conjure up an easier and more pleasant view of the still difficult road that leads to final and absolute victory," Mr. Forde declared.

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

PUBLIC ARCHIVES
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CANADA

POOR PRINT
Epreuve illisible

PRESS CLIPPINGS C273010 Office of The Prime Minister

Name of Publication Toronto Globe and Mail

Date November 17, 1944

Subject

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Mr. Forde added that many thousands of war orphans in Britain and Europe would be available for post-war immigration.

Steps to rebalance the Commonwealth's manpower position will remove 81,650 men and 15,600 women from direct war effort into new civilian employment, chiefly rural industries and housing, he already had told Parliament.

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PRESS CLIPPINGS C273011

Office of
The Prime Minister

Name of Publication Ottawa Journal

Date November 7, 1944

Subject

Coldwell Wants Parliament Called

FORT WILLIAM, Ont., Nov. 6.—(CP)—National Leader M. J. Coldwell of the C.C.F. said tonight that in view of the "unrest caused by the resignation of Col. Ralston as Defence Minister", Prime Minister King should summon Parliament and make a statement on the question.

Mr. Coldwell said also that Col. Ralston should be allowed to make a statement.

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PRESS CLIPPINGS 273012 Office of The Prime Minister

Name of Publication Ottawa Journal

Date November 9, 1944

Subject

Facts and Figures On Armed Forces Revealed by Mr. King

Here is a statistical picture of the Canadian armed forces compiled from figures given last night by Prime Minister King:

Total intake	1,000,000
Total strength	750,000
Navy	85,000
R.C.A.F.	190,000
Army intake	650,000
Army total strength	455,000
Army volunteers	390,000
Volunteers in army since January 1	45,000
Draftee intake to Sept. 30	150,000
Present draftee enrollment	68,000
Draftees on leave, etc.	9,000
Present draftee strength	59,000
Quebec draftee total	23,000
Total French-speaking draftees all provinces	25,000
Draftee wastage on medical grounds, etc.	33,000
Draftee enlistment into R.C.N. and R.C.A.F.	6,000
Draftee enlistment for general service in army	43,000
Draftee enrollment so far this year	15,000
Draftee volunteers for general service this year	10,000
Draftees suitable as infantrymen	42,000
Draftees trained as infantrymen	16,000
Draftees with sufficient combat training	8,000

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PRESS CLIPPINGS

C 273013

Office of
The Prime Minister

Name of Publication Ottawa Citizen

Date November 11, 1944

Subject

Ask Resignation Of Mr. King if No Action Taken

TORONTO, Nov. 10—(CP) — Ontario command of the Canadian Corps Association, on motion of Maj. G. F. Davies, Dominion president, tonight passed a resolution asking that Prime Minister Mackenzie King cause the immediate enactment of an order-in-council making the home defence army available anywhere.

Failing that, the resolution said, Mr. King should resign and "permit his government to appoint a new Prime Minister who will carry out the wishes of the people," or, alternatively, "dissolve Parliament forthwith and permit a newly-elected government to assume office which will enact and put into effect the clearly expressed desires of the people."

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Name of Publication Ottawa Journal

Date November 10, 1944

Subject

Cardinal Villeneuve Lauds Canadians In Overseas Address

LONDON, Nov. 9.—(CP)—Cardinal Villeneuve, Roman Catholic Archbishop of Quebec, today declared that "this war is a fight to the bitter end for the vindication of human rights and the preservation of Christian civilization".

The prelate, who recently has visited Canadians in Britain, on the Western Front and in Italy, addressed his message to members of the Canadian Army, Navy and Air Force overseas.

Following is the text of his message:

My dear friends. I have come from Canada to bring you the homage of my own admiration, that of my church and in fact of all Canada for the magnificent work you have done and are doing for the defeat of the barbarous enemy.

I am now more convinced than ever that, notwithstanding other motives involved, this war is a fight to the bitter end for the vindication of human rights and the preservation of Christian civilization.

That conviction has increased by what I have seen in Italy, in Belgium and in Holland of Nazi barbarism, and by the tales I have heard from unimpeachable witnesses—tales that shock and anger. The people of Canada will continue, as in the past, to follow your exploits with the keenest pride and appreciation.

I came secondly to thank you. You, at the risk of your lives, have taken our place. We are deeply grateful to you for having joined with our other Allies in waging a war overseas against the forces of evil.

Finally, I came to bring you a word of encouragement. The road to victory has been long, but I think we may say without undue optimism that the end is now in view. Carry on as you have done, magnificently and courageously. We in Canada are watching you with the deepest affection.

We are also praying and working so that you may be sustained in this final hour before the overthrow forever of the Nazi threat of world domination, and that while so doing you remain ever faithful in the service of God and the observance of his holy law. Spur yourselves further to the final effort, and God be with you always.

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PRESS CLIPPINGS

C 273014

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Name of Publication Ottawa Journal

Date November 10, 1944

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PRESS CLIPPINGS C273015 Office of The Prime Minister

Name of Publication Ottawa Journal

Date November 7, 1944

Subject

Up to Premier King To Give Facts Col. Ralston Declares

Hon. J. L. Ralston, in his first public statement since resignation as Defence Minister after a Cabinet crisis over the reinforcement situation, said last night he had been pressed from many quarters for an explanatory statement but he felt "that responsibility for informing the public belongs primarily to the Prime Minister".

He said he recognized that in this matter the public and the armed forces were entitled to full information consistent with military security. He had made his report to the Government and his letter of resignation was addressed to the Prime Minister.

"I would assume", said Col. Ralston in his statement, "that the Prime Minister would inform the public of the circumstances by making available my letter of resignation and any further correspondence between us in the matter. The correspondence will speak for itself. I therefore refrain from making any statement at present."

The statement was issued on a typewritten sheet from Col. Ralston's temporary office in Commons where he stayed late preparing a speech delivered at a noon luncheon gathering in Montreal today.

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PRESS CLIPPINGS C 273016 Office of The Prime Minister

Name of Publication Ottawa Journal

Date November 7, 1944

Subject

Ralston Says Reinforcements Difficult Problem

MONTREAL, Nov. 7.—(CP)—Col. J. L. Ralston in his first public speech since he resigned as Defence Minister, today described his recent battlefront tour and said "the problems of supply and reinforcements . . . have been extremely difficult", but ignored the Cabinet crisis which saw him succeeded by Gen. McNaughton.

He did not elaborate on his reference to reinforcements, the subject which precipitated the Cabinet crisis.

Tribute to Fighting Men.

At a luncheon of the Rotary Club, of which he is a member, Col. Ralston paid tribute to Canadian fighting men, spoke of their hopes and aspirations, pictured his visit to the graves of fallen warriors and described the fighting.

It was a Remembrance Day meeting and taking this as his theme, Col. Ralston spoke of ground hard won and victory paid for in casualties.

He had worked on the speech for several hours in Ottawa yesterday and only interrupted his work to draft a short statement to the press which said he would leave it to Prime Minister Mackenzie King to release details of the Cabinet crisis. On his arrival in Montreal this morning he said he was "sticking to my statement of last night" that "responsibility for informing the public belongs primarily to the Prime Minister".

Speaking of the difficulties facing the troops overseas, Col. Ralston said miracles had been worked. "In England I saw men in hospital who had been wounded only 36 hours before on the Leopold Canal."

He had talked to the wounded.

Boche Stubborn Fighter.

"Don't try to tell those men who were in hospital that the Boche is licked. They have had experience. They know that he fights harder and more stubbornly than ever. That is why they are in hospital, in a plaster cast or with a face burned to a crisp or with a leg or an arm—or both—missing.

"Don't try to talk to these men about the war being over. They know that there is bitter fighting ahead."

At another point he referred to the fighting in Italy and said. "It has taken five weeks since I was there to advance the line 18 miles".

He told of a flight over the Vimy Ridge Memorial. ". . . It looked so firm and substantial and self-reliant, towering there in the half light of the late afternoon. It seemed to say that while men might fight around and beyond it, while old hatred might kindle and burn again, it would remain forever untouched by the worldly troubles of humanity."

He had visited the graves of men who had fallen in this war, "the men who lived and fought—the men who fought and died—in order that the world might know the joy of peace, and our own land grow in strength of heart and mind and hand and purpose, for the sake of all the children of men. That's what these men believed in. To us comes the terrific challenge to make that belief come true".

Small Sacrifices at Home.

The small sacrifices being endured on the home front were nothing.

"On this Remembrance Day we must remind ourselves that all these things put together won't put out of business a single German, won't regain one foot of conquered territory, won't lessen one iota the menace of Hitler and Tojo to our world, unless sailors, soldiers and airmen were ready to give our efforts a cutting edge by risking their lives in the battle line", he said. "We are just the handle, our fighting services are the blade. They have the supreme task—and without them all we do would be in vain."

The battlefront and home front were interdependent and would continue so when the war was over. "They must keep each other constantly in their minds and hearts."

Home to the soldier meant "something tangible, invisible, and as far as they can make it so, indestructible. It means a spirit—it means a way of life, the way of life their pioneer ancestors toiled for and established. . . . To preserve it, our boys have gone to war. They realize they had a job to do and they want to do it quickly and get back."

But they were sticking it out until the job was done. Those on the home front must answer by not relaxing until the job was done.

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PRESS CLIPPINGS C 273016 Office of The Prime Minister

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W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
MG 26 J 4, Volume 388, pages C272340-C273026

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Ottawa M Journal
Nov 15/44

Office of
The Prime Minister
1C 273017

2

McNaughton Gives Facts on N.R.M.A.

(Column references: (1) enrolments; (2), conversion to general service; (33, conversions to other services; (4), discharges; (5), total; (6), strength at end of year.)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
1941*	31,500	7,500	4,200	3,300	15,000	16,500
1942	69,500	18,000	1,300	8,200	27,500	
Total including						
1942	101,000	25,500	5,000	11,500	42,500	58,500
1943	34,000	6,500	300	11,000	17,800	
Total including						
1943	135,000	32,000	5,800	22,500	60,300	74,700
1944†	15,000	10,000	200	11,000	21,200	
Grand Total	150,000	42,000	6,000	33,500	81,500	‡68,500

*Commencing March. †To end of September. ‡At end of September.

On extended leave or duty from depots, 8,500; net effective strength (at end of September), 60,000.

Of these 60,000 it is estimated that 42,000 are of an age and medical category suitable for combat service in the infantry. Some 16,000 are already trained as infantry, about 8,000 of whom are sufficiently trained to be ready for combat at an early date.

The remaining 26,000, who are of an age and category suitable for infantry, are presently on the strength of the units of the other arms and services where they are undergoing training or engaged in duties related to the continuing but diminishing requirements for the defence of Canada and certain outlying territories for which Canada has assumed certain responsibilities.

The year of enrolment of those men still on strength as N.R.M.A. men at the end of September, 1944, was as follows by military districts:

Military Districts— Where enrolled:	1941	1942	1943	1944	Total
Nov. 1, 2, 3 (Ontario)	900	6,800	4,900	2,400	15,000
Nov. 4, 5 (Quebec)	2,900	8,800	6,100	5,000	22,800
Nov. 6, 7 (Maritimes)	400	1,800	1,500	600	4,300
Nov. 10, 12, 13 (Prairies)	1,700	6,200	4,200	1,700	13,800
Pacific Command (B.C.)	300	1,800	1,200	800	4,100
Total	6,200	25,400	17,900	10,500	*60,000

*Figures not adjusted for part of Quebec included in M.M. 3 and part of Ontario included in M.D. 10.

The 42,000 suitable for employment as infantry are by district of enrolment as follows:

Military districts where enroled:	
No. 1, 2 and 3 (Ontario)	10,250
No. 4 and 5 (Quebec)	16,300
No. 6 and 7 (Maritimes)	2,600
No. 10, 12 and 13 (Prairies)	10,000
Pacific Command (British Columbia)	2,850
Total	x42,000

xFigures not adjusted for part of Quebec included in M.D. 3 and part of Ontario included in M.D. 10.

The 8,500 on extended leave or duty from depots were engaged as follows: Farm duty, 200; farm leave—compassionate, 5,400; harvest, 500; industry, 400; logging, 100; mining, 500; other similar leaves, 1,400; total, 8,500.

Languages of the 60,000 N.R.M.A. men now on strength are as follows: English only, 17,800; French only, 12,100; English and French, 14,400; foreign languages, x15,700; total, 60,000.

xGenerally able to speak either English or French also.

(In all tabulations figures are given in round numbers.)

The statement follows:

All members of Canada's navy and air force and of its army overseas are volunteers. Of the more than 459,000 men on service with the army, either overseas or in Canada, more than 390,000 have volunteered for general service anywhere in the world. The remaining 60,000 are men who have been enrolled under the National Resources Mobilization Act for compulsory military training and service in Canada and in certain adjacent territories such as Newfoundland and Jamaica, which have been designated by order-in-council. Such men may be dispatched to other areas only by further orders-in-council. In addition to this 60,000, there are about 8,500 N.R.M.A. soldiers who although on army strength, are on extended leave or duty from depots.

The total number of men enrolled under the N.R.M.A. between March, 1941, and October, 1944, was 150,000. This compares with more than 300,000 men who volunteered for general service in the same period. Of the total of 150,000 enrolled men, 42,000 enlisted for general service after enrolment, and 6,000 transferred as volunteers to the navy or air force. Discharges, etc., accounted for 33,500.

In 1944 to the end of September, nearly 15,000 men were enrolled under the N.R.M.A. In the same period 10,000 enrolled men volunteered for general service. Since the invasion of western Europe began on June 6, 1944, voluntary enlistments for overseas service on the part of N.R.M.A. men have been greater in number than the enrolments of compulsory service men during the same period, as shown in the following table:

(Column references: 1—enrolments under N.R.M.A.; 2—voluntary enlistments from N.R.M.A.; 3—excess of voluntary enlistments over enrolment.)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
June	1,500	2,975	1,475
July	1,350	1,350	
August	1,225	1,350	125
September	1,050	1,350	300
October	1,075	850	225
Total	6,200	7,875	1,675

Nearly 975,000 men have entered all three fighting services during the war. The number of N.R.M.A. men still on the strength of the army who have failed to volunteer for service anywhere in the world is about 7 percent. of this total.

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McNaughton Gives Facts On N.R.M.A.

Draftees Volunteering Greater Than Draftee Intake Since D-Day

Canada's home defence army, with a total strength of 68,500, includes 42,000 men of age and medical category suitable for infantry combat service, it was revealed in a statement released last night by Defence Minister McNaughton.

There are 16,000 now trained as infantry of whom 8,000 are sufficiently advanced to be ready for combat within a short time. Figures showed that the number of home defence soldiers volunteering for active service since D-Day was greater than the number of new draftees called up in the same period.

It disclosed that 6,200 draftees of the 31,500 enrolled in 1941 when the National Resources Mobilization Act was passed are still in the home defence army of 60,000.

Gen. McNaughton had promised a statement on the disposition of N.R.M.A. troops when he took over the Defence Ministry on the resignation of Col. Ralston. He also indicated he would try to issue weekly figures showing the number of drafted men who volunteer for service in answer to his voluntary recruiting stand.

The first statement, completed with tables, was issued last night. It showed that besides the 6,200 "originals" still in the home defence army there were 25,400 who had been enrolled in 1942; 17,900 enrolled in 1943 and 10,500 enrolled to Sept. 30 this year.

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PRESS SURVEY - U.S.

October 31 to November 7, 1944

Government and Politics

The news of the resignation of Mr Ralston and the appointment of General McNaughton came after several days of editorial speculation on the meaning of the cabinet meetings which had been taking place. It was undoubtedly a surprise, and editors took some time to adjust themselves to the new situation, partly because of the absence of any official statement on the reasons for the change or on the government's proposed enlistment policy. The latter was at least partially clarified on November 4 by General McNaughton's Arnprior speech.

Though it would be inaccurate to say that all English-language dailies in Canada advocate conscription for overseas service, it is probable that none of them are hostile to it. This includes papers which support the present government; and the first reaction of these papers was not that compulsory overseas service had been definitely rejected, but that General McNaughton had been called in as an expert to investigate the reinforcement situation further. These papers called for a suspension of judgment on the part of the public and the press, and for a full statement from the government. The WINNIPEG FREE PRESS, in its first editorial on the subject, said:

> The departure of one minister of defence and the appointment of another does not add one man to our striking force. The problem today therefore is exactly what it was yesterday. Are there, or are there not, sufficient reinforcements available to keep our army at fighting strength for as long as the war may last? . . .
>
> The easy way out, administratively, of course, would be to implement Bill 80 without delay. This would give, in a large sense, the flexibility needed to make effective use of all our soldiers, volunteer and N.R.M.A. alike. But it is a fact which must be intelligently faced by everyone that such a solution would involve Canada in political difficulties which it would not be easy to overcome, that it would raise questions of national unity of the most serious kind, and that it is a solution which should be employed only if there is no other course open to us to attain the end desired which is, and must be, the adequate support of our overseas army.
>
> The situation is complicated too by our knowledge that the figures on the shortage of reinforcements come from the same source--the general staff--which has had the whole handling of our army during the war, has in the past by clear inference expressed the utmost confidence in the nation's ability to man and to maintain an army of the present scale,

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and has been successful . . . in convincing the late minister of defence that its judgment is impeccable. Now it appears that the general staff and Col. Ralston may have gravely erred, thus precipitating a crisis which, for all any member of the public knows, could have been avoided by better management. It was obviously necessary to have an independent audit, and the appointment of General McNaughton should provide just that. . . .

But, when all this is said, two inescapable facts remain. The first of these . . . is that Canada is obligated to maintain a steady and adequate stream of reinforcements to the front. The other is that the solution now sought must not be a stop-gap, temporary solution, but one which will see us through the end of the war and its bloodshed. . . .

What the public is interested in is not either General McNaughton or Col. Ralston. It is not whether reinforcements come from the N.R.M.A. recruits or from the large number of volunteers now in uniform. But the public is keenly and vitally concerned in keeping our army adequately supported with trained men. The Government's job is to see that this is done promptly and efficiently.

The next day, the FREE PRESS repeated more strongly its demand for a statement of policy:

What is needed, and needed now, is confirmation by the prime minister of his past declarations, that he will apply bill 80 if necessary. And as for General McNaughton, it surely is self-evident that the very circumstances which have resulted in his taking office require from him a declaration, first that the Canadian army will be maintained, for all practical purposes, at full strength, and second, that if this result cannot be achieved by the voluntary system, he will recommend compulsion.

Opposition papers were equally loud in their demand for a statement, but were more inclined to demand it from the ex-minister.

MONTREAL GAZETTE: Col. Ralston came home with a conviction, and he has shown that he has the courage of his convictions. Even in their lack of knowledge of the situation the Canadian people, we firmly believe, will judge that he has chosen aright. But if the matter is to be left at that, the people will know no more than they do this morning. They have a democratic right to hear the truth; it is their war, it is they who are fighting it. Col. Ralston should now state the case frankly, within the limitations imposed by military security, so that the people can judge for themselves.

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GLOBE AND MAIL: Col. Ralston has discharged the proprieties of his office. He waited for the Prime Minister to speak and make known the facts of his resignation. The Prime Minister chose to suppress the facts and blindfold the people. Col. Ralston is no longer bound by the niceties of Ministerial courtesy. But he is bound by the responsibilities of his trust to the people, in whose interests, presumably, he acted. He is the only man outside the headquarters staff who knows the complete truth of the reinforcement situation, the gravity of which his resignation so heavily underlines. It is from Col. Ralston that the people should know the facts.

A few called for an election if the government continued the voluntary policy. The TORONTO EVENING TELEGRAM said:

> If the Government now continues its policy of holding the conscripts in Canada, the Progressive Conservative party ought to insist that there be an appeal to the people.
>
> Ordinarily, elections should be avoided in wartime if possible, but if it comes down to an issue of full-out prosecution of the war and the support of our fighting men overseas, or letting them down, then a test of public opinion may be not only advisable, but absolutely necessary.

As for the reaction to the choice of General McNaughton, it was at first one of astonishment more than anything else. It was considered an astute political move on the Prime Minister's part. It was also described as "window-dressing". Generally, it may be said that opposition papers were courteously disapproving of the General's acceptance of the portfolio. The fears expressed by the WINNIPEG FREE PRESS and in the following appeal by the VANCOUVER SUN have not so far been fully borne out:

> General McNaughton is today Canada's No. 1 candidate for a medal for moral courage. He calmly stepped into the hottest spot in the nation. He did so with the full knowledge that the air would soon be full of dead cats, all of them hurled in his direction. Nothing will be too low and no innuendo too sly for the baffled foes of the present government who had expected an immediate collapse. . . .
>
> This is not to say that many Canadians do not sincerely believe that the Zombies should be sent overseas even at the risk of smashing Confederation. . . . but they do not translate their opposition into a campaign of personal vilification against those who espouse different principles.

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After General McNaughton's Arnprior speech, any doubt of his stand seemed to be removed, and the Montreal GAZETTE said:

C273021

> Colonel Ralston is on record as stating that draftees should and would be despatched overseas whenever such a step became necessary because of an insufficient flow of volunteers to maintain Canadian battle units at strength. The fact of his resignation because of apparent rejection of a demand for implementing of that pledge now, and General McNaughton's readiness to take his place under the circumstances, inferentially pointed to sharing of the view of the majority of the Cabinet by the General.
>
> But now General McNaughton, with complete candor and no double talk, has made it perfectly clear where he, and obviously the Government, stand in the matter. There is no denial that the need is acute for men or that the situation may become acute in a "short period". But on the ground that conscription came too late in the last war to be of any use and because it has been avoided so far in this war, they are going to stick to it, come what may.
>
> It is a help for Canadians now to know definitely how the Government and its new Defence Minister view the problem, but there will be many who will hardly be reassured to learn it. If trained draftees will get overseas too late to be of any use, how much longer will it take to recruit and train the volunteers who, it is admitted, are now urgently required?

The OTTAWA CITIZEN, however, suggested, as others had suggested before the Arnprior speech, that General McNaughton might still change his policy after an overseas tour:

> It is reported that the new minister is planning an early visit overseas to study the Canadian military situation at first hand. He has given hostages to the political forces in favor of voluntary recruiting, but it is possible that General McNaughton, as the responsible builder of the Canadian army, will feel impelled to recommend that the available trained Canadian men, fit to be used as reinforcements, shall be drafted for overseas service.

French-language papers were decidedly favourable to the new development, and took it for granted that it meant that the government would continue its present policy. LE CANADA gives an opinion representative of the papers which support the government:

> Il est peu de figures publiques au Canada qui rallient aussi universellement les suffrages populaires que le général McNaughton. Le chef du gouvernement a fait preuve d'un discernement peu commun en appelant comme son collaborateur immédiat dans les tâches militaires à ces heures décisives, l'artisan de notre glorieuse armée de volontaires.

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L'ACTION CATHOLIQUE also expresses admiration for the political shrewdness of the Prime Minister:

> Le général McNaughton, un conservateur notoire, n'aurait pas accepté la succession du colonel Ralston s'il n'approuvait pas la politique de M. King. On ne pourra pas dire que le chef du gouvernement a sacrifié les besoins militaires aux exigences de la politique. Les anticonscriptionnistes gagnent donc une autre manche.

LE DROIT, though it strongly disapproves of the present system as "indirect conscription", nevertheless expresses pleasure:

> La division s'est faite non entre tenants de la conscription et ceux du volontariat, mais entre tenants de la conscription directe et ceux de la conscription indirecte pour service militaire outre-mer. La conscription est depuis longtemps la loi du pays. Le cabinet King l'a adoptée. Il a également approuvé la conscription indirecte pour service outre-mer. Jusqu'ici, cependant, il ne s'est pas encore servi de la conscription directe pour outre-mer. La défaite des tenants de la conscription directe, toutefois, rejouira les Canadiens de langue française. Le triomphe de M. Ralston aurait été une fort malheureuse affaire pour le pays. Rien de bon pour l'union nationale ne serait sorti de cette victoire.

LE DEVOIR simply remarks that all these troubles arise out of "the state of war", for which it holds the Prime Minister chiefly responsible.

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PRESS CLIPPINGS

C 273023 Office of The Prime Minister

Name of Publication Ottawa M. Citizen

Date November 11, 1944

Subject

Laurier's Better Way

Sir Wilfrid Laurier opposed conscription in 1917, as everyone knows. But, in so doing, he suggested a method of resolving the difficulties which he raised. It was to hold a plebiscite or referendum. He pledged himself to abide by such an appeal to the people. More, he said he and his compatriots would loyally observe the law if it were enacted, plebiscite or no plebiscite.

Prime Minister King opposes conscription. But if the situation in Canada today had faced Sir Wilfrid Laurier in 1917, he would, on his own word, have given the weight of his approval to a conscription measure. For a plebiscite has already been held in Canada and the people by about 2,700,000 votes to 1,600,000 voted to release the government from obligation as a result of any past commitments to restrict the method of raising men for military service.

Laurier in 1917 said that no one regretted more than he Quebec's slowness in recruiting, but he felt the only way out was to appeal to the whole country. He believed that when the country had spoken, the question would be settled and all must submit to the law.

The present government leader has in many respects followed in Sir Wilfrid's footsteps. He could still do a supreme service to Canada by taking Sir Wilfrid Laurier's position as guidance in the present crisis. Sir Wilfrid would have carried out the will of the people as expressed by plebiscite.

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PRESS CLIPPINGS C 273024

Office of
The Prime Minister

Name of Publication Toronto Globe and Mail

Date November 2, 1944

Subject

Canadian Naval Force Will Serve in Pacific On a Voluntary Basis

Ottawa, Nov. 1 (CP).—The possibility of Canadian forces serving under over-all United States command in the Pacific was seen here tonight following disclosure of naval plans which indicate launching of the Japanese expedition from the Dominion, rather than from overseas.

The Navy's announcement today disclosed the Canadian naval contingent would be raised on a voluntary basis expect in the case of key men, while men not needtd will be demobilized on a "first-in, first-out" plan similar to the one already adopted by the RCAF.

The navy emphasized its demobilization plan would be general in application, although "exceptions will have to be made in the case of certain key personnel hwo cannot be relieved, but every endeavor wil be made to operate the scheme in fairness to all."

The announcement added: "where a man's services are required he may be retained regardless of his wishes."

Outlining the purpose o fthe plan, the statement said:

"It is hoped that the naval service plan, when it is finally crystalized and put into practice, will provide for smooth and equitable reallocation of personnel, due consideration being given to the interests of the individual and of the nation as a whole both from the economic points of view."

Will Get Homeless

The volunteers wil be given leave in Canada before entering the Pacific conflict and it seems logical they would go by way of the North Pacific possibly to Phillippine bases and come under United States command.

If the naval forces were going to be under Brjtish command they likely would forgo home leave in order to start from overseas with British forces moving to Indian bases after the defeat of Germany.

Reports from Washington, following the recall of Gen Stilwell from China, have been that each of the big Allied powers art to be given clearly-defined spheres of responsibility in the Pacific.

Originally, it was believed Canadian forces would co-operate closely with British forces under overall American command, but that speculation was offered at a time when it was generally thought Allied commands would be interlocking such as is the case in the war against Germany.

A reliable source has said that if the Canadians entered the war across the North Pacific, a logical base for them would be the Philippines where Gen MacArthur is consolidating his position.

This would be a good point from which to launch Canadian night bomber squadrons for attacks on Formosa and Japan itself.

It also would be a good point for Canadian troops to join in any Allied thrust and it was recalled Canadians already have co-operated with Americans in the Aleutians. It was suggested members of the Canadian military mission—already southwest Pacific—may have participated in the American Philippine landings as they did recently at Saipan.

No Hint as to Size

The Navy statement of future plans gave no indication on the size of the naval force which would be sent to the Pacific, but it previously has been estimated that the senior service would use a third of its 39,000 sea personnel with perhaps fewer than 250 ships, including cruisers, carriers, dtstroyers and escorts. The Navy by that time possibly will have at least a second cruiser and its own carriers in addition to Royal Navy carriers for which it provides sea-crews.

Naval Headquarters said it was stressing the advantages which would accrue to those who serve in the Japanese campaign. In the first place, as the length of service increased so would their war gratuities. bonuses and rehabilitation grants. Also those who are proceeding into the actual theatre of war in the Far East will be granted leave before they go.

"It is hoped that the Naval service plan when it is finally crystallized and put into practice will provide for smooth and equitable reallocation of personnel, due consideration being given to the interests of the individual and of the nation as a whole, both from the military and economic points of view," said the statement.

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PRESS CLIPPINGS

C 273025

Office of
The Prime Minister

Name of Publication MONTREAL

Date NOV 2 '44

Subject

Subject

Canadians May Serve in Pacific Under United States Command

Ottawa, November 1. — (CP) — The possibility of Canadian forces serving under over-all United States command in the Pacific was seen here tonight following disclosure of naval plans which indicate launching of the Japanese expedition from the Dominion, rather than from overseas.

The Navy's announcement today disclosed the Canadian naval contingent would be raised on a re-voluntary basis except in the case of key men, with unneeded men demobilized on a "first-in, first-out" plan similar to the one already adopted by the R.C.A.F.

The navy emphasized its demobilization plan would be general in application for "exceptions will have to be made in the case of certain key personnel who cannot be relieved, but every endeavor will be made to operate the scheme in fairness to all."

The announcement added: "Where a man's services are required he may be retained regardless of his wishes."

Outlining the purpose of the plan, the statement said:

"It is hoped that the naval service plan, when it is finally crystalized and put into practice, will provide for smooth and equitable reallocation of personnel, due consideration being given to the interests of the individual and of the nation as a whole both from the military and economic points of view."

The re-volunteers will be given leave in Canada before entering the Pacific conflict and it seems logical they would go by way of the North Pacific possibly to Philippine bases and come under United States command.

If the naval forces were going to be under British command they likely would forgo home leave in order to start from overseas with British forces moving to Indian bases after the defeat of Germany.

Reports from Washington, following the recall of Gen. Stilwell from China, have been that each of the big Allied powers is to be given clearly-defined spheres of responsibility in the Pacific.

Originally, it was believed Canadian forces would cooperate closely with British forces under over-all American command, but that speculation was offered at a time when it was generally thought Allied commands would be inter-locking such as is the case in the war against Germany.

A reliable source has said that if the Canadians entered the war across the North Pacific, a logical base for them would be the Philippines where Gen. MacArthur is consolidating his position.

This would be a good point from which to launch Canadian night bomber squadrons for attacks on Formosa and Japan itself.

It also would be a good point for Canadian troops to join in any Allied thrust and it was recalled Canucks already have cooperated with Americans in the Aleutians. It was suggested members of the Canadian Military Mission—already scouting ground in the southwest Pacific—may have participated in the American Philippine landings as they did recently at Saipan.

The navy statement of future plans gave no indication on the size of the naval force which would be sent to the Pacific, but it previously has been estimated that the senior service would use a third of its 39,000 sea personnel with perhaps fewer than 250 ships, including cruisers, carriers, destroyers and escorts. The navy by that time possibly will have at least a second cruiser and its own carriers in addition to Royal Navy carriers for which it provides seacrews.

It also was understood the R.C.A.F. was planning to use a third of its 45 bomber, fighter and transport squadrons — also on a re-voluntary basis.

The army, said to be contemplating the use of a division, has not yet announced its plans. An announcement may come, however, when the cabinet concludes its present prolonged discussions on military matters.

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PRESS CLIPPINGS C 273026

Office of
The Prime Minister

Name of Publication Ottawa M. Citizen

Date November 1, 1944

Subject

One-Third Of Navy And R.C.A.F. May Go To Pacific

Report Canada to Send One Division Of Army as Well

An outline of Canada's Pacific effort and a kindred program of partial demobilization may be announced shortly.

Usually well-informed sources said last night the announcement might disclose that a third of the navy and air force and a division of the army would be enlisted for Pacific service on a revoluntary basis after leave in Canada and with campaign pay on a basis similar to that being offered British troops.

Expected Soon.

One source, who indicated the announcement might be made within 48 hours by Prime Minister Mackenzie King, said he understood it would contain no reference to home defence troops.

If, as has been moved in some Washington reports, the division of command in the Pacific war is split to give British, American and Chinese commanders separate spheres of responsibility, it is possible Canadian contingents will fight under British overall command.

This might mean Canadians would forego home leave in order to accompany British forces through the Mediterranean to Indian bases. It would not seem logical that the Canadians be brought home on leave only to re-cross the Atlantic for the long journey to Pacific service.

Service demobilizers and planners have long been waiting word on the definite size and nature of Canada's Pacific effort so they could start the job of planning for the switch-over and the partial demobilization that is likely to follow.

As for adapting the British plan of providing special campaign pay for Pacific forces, it has been pointed out that Canadian service pay is on the highest scale among Allied fighting powers whereas British pay is among the lowest.

It is believed Canada's partial demobilization would be based on a "first-in-first-out" system with some sort of a compassionate court ruling on exceptional cases. To date the [illegible] already has endorsed such a plan.

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It is believed Canada's partial demobilization would be based on a "first-in-first-out" system with some sort of a compassionate court ruling of exceptional cases. In fact, the R.C.A.F. already has embraced such a plan.

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Extract from Prime Minister's speech at Vancouver, B.C., June 30, 1941.

Re: CONSCRIPTION

In Calgary on Friday I was given a circular - an anonymous circular. Is it not curious that so many of those who sow the seeds of dissention prefer to conceal their identity. That circular was broadcast throughout the city and it asked one question which I answered that same day. The question is: How can we fight a total war without conscription? Let me repeat the answer I gave in Calgary. Here it is: If every man does his own duty first, before he concerns himself about the duty of his neighbour; if, having done his own duty, every man tries to help his neighbour to reach a personal conviction of his duty, instead of urging compulsion, Canada will have no need of conscription for overseas service, and Canada will not be divided on any conscription issue.

The policy of the Government regarding conscription has been made abundantly clear. We have taken the position that every young man who is physically fit should be liable for military training and service in Canada for the defence of Canada. This policy is designed to provide our country with a second line of defence should the country be subject

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to direct attack. In the same way, Parliament has put at the disposal of the nation all the material resources of the country.

My colleagues and I have made it equally clear that service outside Canada in the armed forces of Canada at sea, on land, and in the air - service which is undertaken in the cause of freedom - shall be freely undertaken.

Before war came, the Government gave a solemn pledge, in the event of war, we would follow that policy. When war came, the pledge was solemnly reaffirmed. At the general elections, during the war itself, it received the overwhelming approval of the people of Canada. Indeed, no political party ventured to advocate conscription for overseas service.

The present unhappy state of the world is in large part the result of broken pledges. Nazi Germany has erected bad faith and the broken pledge into a principle of action. Bad faith, broken pledges, and disregard of the popular will, are the very forces against which Canada is fighting today. If a situation should develop where the people's representatives in Parliament should demand a reversal of policy, I would consider that demand as one on which, before action was taken, the people themselves would be entitled to have their voice heard. I wish most

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emphatically to affirm the intention of the Government to keep the pledge repeatedly given to the people of Canada.

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Secret

C 273031

The Government's Pledge regarding Concription
(to supplement P.M.'s statement at Vancouver)

At the end of June in a speech delivered in Vancouver, I stated that the present unhappy state of the world was in large part the result of broken pledges. I re-affirmed the determination of the government to keep its pledge regarding conscription for service overseas.

I have already explained that the sole reason for giving the pledge was the vital importance to a maximum effort of national unity.

I realize that we are not living in a static world. The swift change of circumstances may conceivably change the attitude of Parliament and of the people in all parts of Canada to the question of conscription, just as their attitude has changed in other respects. That was why I used these words:

"How best the voice of the people may again be heard, should a situation develop where the people's representatives in Parliament believe there should be a reversal of policy, there will be time enough to consider when Parliament itself has declared its views."

Obviously no administration would seek to thwart the will of the elected representatives of the people in Parliament, although on a question so likely to provoke discord and dissention, it may be doubted whether any administration would be justified in acting without taking means to ascertain the will of the people themselves.

I can think of no more certain means of creating disunity and weakness in Canada than an attempt, even by Parliament, to carry out a policy which almost every member was pledged to oppose. It would sap the faith of our people in democratic processes and in Parliamentary institutions.

There is a tendency in certain sections of the press and among certain self-designated leaders in some quarters which are not traditionally friendly to French Canada to speak for the French Canadians and to distort the speeches of French Canadian leaders so as to make it appear that conscription would be acceptable to them.

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C273032

I suggest that such statements are wholly mischievous. So far as I am aware, not a single reputable spokesman of French Canada has uttered a word in support of a change of policy. Unless and until they do, it can only be misleading to misrepresent their attitude. The one consequence of such statements is misunderstanding.

I yield to no man in my conviction that the patriotism of French Canada is just as deep and just as wide as the patriotism of the rest of Canada. I am sure that if the French Canadians were convinced that conscription for overseas service was essential to the safety and welfare of Canada there would be a spontaneous demand for its adoption.

But, as I have already indicated, there are, in the judgment of the government, no grounds in the course and character of the war so far to ~~give us~~ justify the view that conscription for overseas service in the army is essential, whatever differences of view there may be as to its desirability. So long as that situation persists, it would surely be the height of folly to embark upon a course which would divide and weaken the country, when it affects but one single aspect of our total effort. There are so many vital tasks which can be unitedly undertaken and which will strengthen both our unity and our war effort. Let us put first things first and concentrate on the effort which all are agreed is necessary. If we do, I am convinced that no one in Canada will lack the opportunity to do his full share and to contribute ~~to~~ what will then become a maximum effort.

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Name of Publication Ottawa Journal

Date November 13, 1941

Subject Conscription

People Must Be Consulted On Issue

Won't Take Responsibility of Supporting Policy For Overseas Service

Prime Minister King late Wednesday told the House of Commons he stood by his Government's policy of compulsory service for home defence, but that the decision against conscription for overseas services had been made by the Canadian people at the last general election.

"So far as I am concerned, without any consultation of the people on that subject, I do not intend to take the responsibility of supporting any policy of conscription for service overseas", the Prime Minister told the House.

Mr. King said the policy of compulsory selective service was embodied in the National Resources Mobilization Act approved by his Government.

The Prime Minister's statement came near the close of the afternoon sitting.

It followed expressions during the past two days by private members of the opposition in favor of selective service.

Text of Statement.

Text of Mr. King's statement is as follows:

"Mr. Chairman, I believe a question of privilege is in order at any time. I have just seen in the evening edition of The Ottawa Journal an article headed: 'Conscription Under Mr. King, caucus told. Premier discussed problem with Winston Churchill'.

"This is a communication of the British United Press and the first paragraph reads as follows:

"'Prime Minister Mackenzie King told a Liberal caucus last week that so long as he was head of the Government there would be no conscription in Canada, it was learned on highly reliable authority today.'

"Another paragraph further on reads:

"'Informants said that Mr. King had told his followers that he discussed the problem of conscription with Prime Minister Winston Churchill during his visit to Great Britain. The effect of his conversation with the British Prime Minister was to confirm his own view that Canada, a country of less than 12,000,000 people, was consequently limited in its available manpower for military purposes, the Prime Minister was quoted as telling Liberals.'

"Statement Is False."

"While it is not customary to disclose matters that are discussed in caucus, speaking in the presence of members of the party who were present at that Liberal caucus, I wish to say at once that I never mentioned the name of Mr. Churchill in connection with any discussion on conscription at any party caucus held at any time. This statement is false and what is more I believe it has been inserted with a view not to helping Canada's war effort but to make the war effort of Canada as embarrassing as it can be made at this time. I think an apology is due from the British United Press for publishing a statement of that kind before inquiring of the Prime Minister whether or not the statement was correct. I cannot protest too strongly against a misrepresentation that could not be greater than the one appearing here.

"There has been a great deal of talk lately about conscription. I want to make perfectly clear what is in my mind when I speak of conscription so that there will be no misunderstanding as to my attitude in relation to it.

Matter for Government.

"So far as conscription extends for compulsory selective national service, that is a principle which this Government has embodied in its National Resources Mobilization Act passed at a previous session of this Parliament. As to how rapidly that principle should be applied and how far it should be extended is a matter which the Government must decide and will decide in the light of all the knowledge which it has with respect to the needs of our war effort and the position of the country in meeting them.

"I want it to be clearly understood so far as this principle of compulsory selective national service is concerned, for service in Canada, I stand [illegible]

I have never taken [illegible] stand. It is the position that I held all along. It has been applied in connection with military training and applied in a number of other directions I might mention. How much further it will be applied the House will learn as the Government takes its decisions in that matter.

"But so far as service overseas is concerned, for the armed forces of Canada, the question was submitted to the people of Canada at the last general election on a clear-cut issue which was held in unmistakable terms. It is the judgment of all [illegible] made that [illegible] necessary and the people [illegible] who decided against conscription for overseas service. So far as I am concerned, without any consultation of the people on that subject, I do not intend to take the responsibility of supporting any policy of conscription for service overseas."

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"I want it to be distinctly understood so far as the principle of compulsory selective national service is concerned for Canada, in Canada, I stand for that principle.

I have never taken any other stand. It is the position that I have held all along. It has been applied in connection with military training and applied in a number of other directions I might mention. How much further it will be applied the House will learn as the Government takes its decisions on that matter.

"But so far as conscription for service overseas is concerned in the armed forces of Canada, that question was submitted to the people of Canada at the last general election, an election which was held in wartime, and in which the leaders of all political parties made their statements to the electorate, and the people of Canada decided against conscription for overseas service. So far as I am concerned, without any consultation of the people on that subject, I do not intend to take the responsibility of supporting any policy of conscription for service overseas."

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PRESS CLIPPINGS C273034 Office of The Prime Minister

Name of Publication Ottawa Journal

Date November 13, 1941

Subject Conscription

Premier King On Conscription

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Mr. King further said he believed the false statement "had been inserted to make the war effort of Canada as embarrassing as it could be made at this time". This may be classed as one of those unfortunate remarks men make in the heat of the moment.

The B.U.P. story said Mr. King had told a Liberal caucus "so long as he was head of the Government there would be no conscription in Canada". From the words used yesterday by Mr. King in the House may be gathered the tenor of his remarks to the caucus.

Mr. King said he stood for the "principle of compulsory selective national service in Canada", but as to conscription for service overseas in the armed forces of Canada "so far as I am concerned without any consultation of the people on that subject I do not intend to take the responsibility of supporting any policy of conscription for service overseas".

Mr. King did not define what advice he and his Government would give if the people were "consulted" — presumably by referendum or in a general election — on the question of conscription for overseas service.

The text of Mr. King's statement is printed elsewhere in this issue.

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Note re New Zealand attached

C273035 3.12.41
Dictated by the Prime Minister

PERSONAL VIEW WITH RESPECT TO 1942-43 PROPOSED PROGRAMME OF THE ARMY

1. Government policy prior to the war - equally policy of all parts - was that if Canada entered the war, there would be no conscription for overseas service.

2. Government policy after declaration of war was the the same.

British government stated that Canada's best contribution, one which would probably prove decisive was to inaugurate the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan. The Plan itself has been expanded; millions have been spent upon it in accordance with view as expressed by the British authorities.

Through recognition of highest service that could be rendered, Canada's Navy has also been rapidly expanded, and the time has now been reached where what has been done by Canada in the air and at sea will be equivalent in manpower to perhaps 8 army divisions[x] - all for overseas service.

3. In general elections of 1940, all parts took the position that there would be no conscription for overseas service. As Prime Minister, and with consent of all my colleagues, and in announcing policy of liberal party while war was on, the undertaking was given that the Liberal administration, as headed by myself, would not enact any measure of conscription for overseas. That position has been asserted time and again in Parliament and

x excluding reinforcements

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in Liberal caucus, and unanimously approved by the party.

In determining the divisions which should go overseas, Mr. Rogers, as Minister, and subsequent Ministers of Defence, have kept constantly in mind the government's policy with respect to no conscription for overseas and have so framed their programme as to keep within the government's policy in that regard.

The matter was fully discussed at the time, and it was decided to form an Army Corps out of the divisions overseas. It was considered each time an effort has been made to send further contingents and ancillary units overseas and to meet such requests as those for foresters, firemen, railway construction workers, etc.

The latest assurance given was that the sending of Canadian battalions to Hong Kong would not prejudice the position as respects troops necessary for overseas service being provided without resort to conscription. The government's policy with respect to an all out effort was based on the understanding that compulsory selective national service should be adopted with respect to Canada to be made applicable in every direction where it might prove most effective. The only direction in which it was not to be applied was with respect to conscription for overseas.

It was recognized that conscription for overseas was not necessary as respects either the Air Force or the Navy; that

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in those branches of the service Canada's contribution would be limited only by the training and equipment necessary for effective service overseas.

Up to the present, therefore, no programme has been based on a policy which necessitates conscription for overseas service.

Before the present programme was presented, Council had already begun to consider how army forces overseas might be enlarged and reinforcements secured by extending the application of the National Resources Mobilization Act, so as to include service in boundary waters and in Newfoundland and Labrador, thereby releasing for overseas service men at present on duty there who would be prepared to serve overseas.

The programme proposed for 1942 - 43 would appear, in reality, to establish a Canadian Army overseas, as against one or more Army Corps, carried out to the extent to which the same can be extended short of the necessity of resorting to conscription for overseas service.

(It must be remembered that conscription for service within Canada, which means providing men properly trained for service overseas who may wish to enlist voluntarily.)

Concretely, the programme appears to provide for a Canadian Army to be commanded by General McNaughton; two army corps of two divisions each, to be commanded respectively by General Crerar and General Pearkes, and all the ancillary troops

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necessary for the army. This in addition to (?) men already provided for, or commitments made for, service in forestry battalions, railroad construction, fire-fighting, etc. It provides, of course, for the reinforcements necessary to meet all normal and battle casualties.

If the military authorities can give reasonable assurance that, by any plans that can be devised, or arrangements made short of conscription for overseas service, and the Minister of Finance is prepared, along with other commitments, to assure the War Committee that in his opinion it would be possible to have the armed forces overseas so increased without creating in itself a situation which will make impossible the raising, by taxation, war loans or other means, the revenues necessary for the purpose, I shall be prepared - subject to approval of the steps to be worked out for the purpose - to support the programme otherwise until Parliament itself has decided to adopt conscription for overseas service, or the people, by a referendum, or a general election, have approved the policy of conscription, to limit my support of the proposed programme to the extent that may be necessary to bring it within the limits of what it may reasonably be assured, can be secured without resort to conscription.

In other words, it would be impossible for me, and I believe it should be equally impossible for other members of the government, without first obtaining the views of Parliament on

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of the people, to sanction in advance any programme which would be in the nature of committing the country by the government itself to a policy of conscription for overseas service.

My objections to conscription for overseas service in the army are based on two grounds:

(1) a strict observance of the letter of the constitution and those constitutional practices and conventions intended to ensure the carrying out of the will of the people, and keeping the executive responsible to parliament, and through parliament to the people, and

(2) the very strong conviction that the adoption of conscription for overseas service, regardless of how secured would, in the circumstances of the present war, weaken rather than strengthen Canada's war effort. I do not regard conscription for overseas service as necessary to effect a maximum war effort. It would, in my opinion, most certainly militate against that end,

(a) in the division of opinion which it would create,

(b) in the action needed for its enforcement, etc.

Canada's experience in the last war should be a sufficient guide in the present against repeating a policy which at the time created a wound at the side of of the country which the past 20 years have been insufficient to heal.

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C 273040

New Zealand:

Emergency Regulations Amendment (May 30/40).

The powers conferred upon the Governor General by the Principal Act shall, notwithstanding anything in that Act, include powers by order in council to make such emergency regulations making provision requiring persons to place themselves, their services and their properties at the disposal of His Majesty as may appear to the Governor General to be necessary or expedient for securing public safety, the defence of New Zealand, the maintenance of public order, or efficient prosecution of any war in which His Majesty may be engaged, or for maintaining supplies or services essential to the life of the community.

In the New Zealand House of Representatives on August 6, 1941, a Government supporter asked whether the Acting Prime Minister were aware that distinctions between volunteers and conscripts had caused much resentment in New Zealand, where the opportunity for volunteering for military service, except in certain specified branches, had been taken away by Act of Parliament. (No record of any reply).

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I believe such resistance in different parts of the country would be offered to a policy of conscription for overseas service as to make its enforcement impossible, save in a manner which played directly into Hitler's hands, by having it appear that already there was the existence of civil strife in one of the Dominions.

I am opposed to conscription in Canada for the same reasons as have led South Africa to avoid conscription, Northern Ireland and Australia, both in the last war and in the present war. Additional reasons are the prejudicial effect which I believe its adoption in Canada would have on the United States' war effort. In that country it would serve as a deterrent for overseas action on the part of the United States.

The President himself has advised me that he feels the proper way to proceed in the United States is along the lines in which Canada has been proceeding, of compulsory national selective service, but voluntary service with respect to service in the army overseas.

If Canada can maintain her present methods of securing, for overseas service, men by voluntary enlistment, that will help materially to bring the United States into a world war effort which will result in active service of the Americans abroad.

Moreover, with the situation as it has now developed in the Orient and the war as developing, new questions arise as to the additional needs there may be in Canada itself to protect Canadian shores, and to meet situation that may

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develop in Canada. It has always been a part of British policy to keep in mind the possible transference, to this side of the Atlantic, of the British fleet.

Finally, any policy of conscripting men for overseas which does not take full account of the demands for manpower in the construction of ships, planes, guns, munitions, etc., also agricultural production, would be a mistaken policy.

How all these ends are to be most effectively attained should be worked out for full presentation to Parliament, when it meets, of the pros. and cons. of conscription for overseas service.

W. L. M. K.

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C 273043

THE MONTREAL STAR

Office of the
President

November 22nd, 1944

Dear Mr. King-

Knowing your own conscientious feeling with respect to sending men overseas who have not volunteered for that service, I have been thinking a great deal during the past few weeks about your position in the present crisis. The immense burden now resting upon you: the seriousness of the decision called for, and the responsibilities attached to that decision.

My own conscientious conviction is that the unexpected emergency of reinforcing our infantry wholly justifies the sending of trained draftees.

The emergency is not in the Navy: it is not in the Air Force. In these two gallant services, which have borne the stress and strain of the most terrific struggle in history, there has ever been a surplus of volunteers. A heavy waiting list standing by: more than were needed for the two services which exposed the volunteers to the greatest dangers, and which called for the most heroic efforts and the greatest sacrifices.

Despite all that it was thought necessary to have a plebiscite to let the people say whether or not men should be drafted for service anywhere.

The answer was yes; with an overwhelming majority. The draft was accordingly put into effect, and you then took the position that draftees would not be sent overseas unless an emergency arose; and then not without the approval of Parliament.

Now, because of the unparalleled success of the European invasion: because of the might with which was has been waged on this so-called "impregnable front" demanding the employment of infantry to a degree never dreamed of: an emergency arises which calls for trained infantry reinforcements in numbers wholly unanticipated.

The Navy and the Air Force, which have borne the burden and engaged the enemy in deadly combat for the past four years, have still a surplus of volunteers. That is good: it is more than good, it is magnificent.

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But these men cannot be turned to reinforce infantry for which they have no training whatsoever. But from the draftees, trained infantry reinforcements are ready for immediate despatch overseas: there to be available to reinforce and relieve our tired and hard-pressed troops.

That the emergency will shortly exist no one has even attempted to deny. Those against sending draftees argue that a sufficient number of these to meet the nearby emergency will volunteer.

The answer to that argument no one is qualified to give.

On the contrary, we hear reports from various districts that draftees are saying "we are ready, it is the Government's responsibility to sned us, but why should we now volunteer if our Government is not yet convinced that the emergency has arisen?"

My dear Mr. King, if trained draftees are now sent because of the admitted emergency for infantry reinforcements no one, not even in Quebec, can say that you have failed them: that you have not fully lived up to the understanding clearly set forth by you - stated and re-stated on many occasions.

But our boys in the fighting lines might have very good reason to feel that they have been let down.

Your Government has done a magnificent job, and The Star has never failed to say so. At all times we have endeavoured sincerely to give you support and praise for fine achievements, and now regret having to take a position opposite to your attitude on the question of reinforcements.

With kind personal regards,

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd) J. W. McConnell.

The Rt. Hon. W. L. Mackenzie King,
Prime Minister,
Ottawa, Ont.

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Unrevised Hansard
January 26, 1942

Re CONSCRIPTION

C 273045

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In recent months, the manufacture of non-essential goods has been curtailed or eliminated entirely. The compulsory mobilization of material resources has been progressively and selectively effected by a highly efficient though exceedingly complex system of economic controls. I might cite the curtailment in the production of motor vehicles and a great variety of other articles in which metals are used, as for example, stoves, vacuum cleaners, washing machines, refrigerators and radios. I might also mention the drastic limitations placed upon the use of silk and rubber.

These and many other measures have been taken progressively, in order to make materials available to our war industries as they have been expanded. Already, the rationing of some commodities for civilian use has begun. If we are to achieve a total effort, far more drastic curtailments will follow.

The whole business of mobilizing material resources is not spectacular; it is far from pleasant; but it is the real foundation of a total war effort. The government has never hesitated to take any of the necessary steps at the moment it was believed they were essential.

I turn now to the question of the mobilizing of "man-power", which term, by the way, when it is used without definite restriction, is intended to comprehend "woman-power" as well. I wish to speak more particularly of the means of mobilizing the additional man-power and woman-power required to maintain the existing effort, and to develop the enlarged programme.

National selective service is the method by which the government proposes to accomplish the mobilization of man-power on an extended scale. Let me define national service as it is understood by the government. By national service is meant any form of service, either voluntary or compulsory, which contributes directly to Canada's war effort. By national selective service is meant the selection of men and women for the various forms of national service according to the method or methods calculated to produce the most satisfactory results. In order to be selective, national service does not necessarily need to be compulsory. Voluntary service is also selective. The army, for example, does not accept every man who offers to enlist. In finding the right place for a man, no quality is likely to count for more than willingness to serve. Compulsion is only of value where it serves to ensure a greater total effort. Wherever necessary and of value in increasing Canada's war effort, the government is prepared to employ compulsion. It would, however, be a waste of effort to engage a small army of officials to compel people to do what they are perfectly ready and willing to do without compulsion.

In announcing that national selective service is the method by which the government proposes to accomplish the mobilization of man-power on an extended scale, the government is not announcing a new policy. What we propose to do is to extend what, in fact, we have been doing right along, that is, to apply the principle progressively. In other words, we intend to continue to extend the application of national selective service to meet new needs as they arise.

As I have already said, this policy, too, is not new, nor is it being advanced to-day for the first time, or as a consequence of high-pressure methods employed to influence the independence of members of parliament. The principle itself, as I have already explained, was approved by this parliament in June, 1940. It has already been applied to some extent. On November 12 last, I made it very plain to parliament that, with respect to the mobilization of man-power, the government's policy was one of national selective service; and, also, that an extension of the application of compulsory selective service—conscription, if you will—was a part of that policy. Let me repeat my exact words:

> So far as conscription stands for compulsory selective national service, that is a principle which this government has embodied in its National Resources Mobilization Act passed at a previous session of this parliament. As to how rapidly that principle should be applied, and how far it should be extended, is a matter which the government must decide and will decide in the light of all the knowledge which it has with respect to the needs of our war effort and the position of the country in meeting them.
>
> I want it to be distinctly understood that so far as the principle of compulsory selective national service is concerned for Canada, in Canada, I stand for that principle. I have never taken any other stand. It is the position that I have held all along. It has been applied in connection with military training, and applied in a number of other directions I might mention. How much further it will be applied the house will learn as the government takes its decisions on that matter.

I did not, at that time, announce any decisions as to its further application. Such announcement would hardly have been appropriate at the close of a session which had already completed all its major business. I felt that, in fairness to parliament, announcements on such an important matter should be reserved for a new session, when members would have adequate opportunity for the fullest consideration and debate.

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The extended application of compulsion to national selective service is a highly complicated matter. It is, in itself, a selective process. The use of compulsion selectively is no less complicated in the mobilization of man-power than in the mobilization of material resources. However, the fact that further decisions were not announced in November has not delayed the further application of the principle. Indeed, it has rather facilitated the very careful planning and organization which is so essential before the extended application of selective service, whether on a voluntary or a compulsory basis, can be brought into effective operation.

Everyone will recognize that the effective use of the man-power—and the woman-power—of a nation is essential to the achievement of a total war effort. But it is not the total. It is, as I have already stated, only one factor in the total. In considering any extension of the application of selective service as a means of promoting a total war effort, it is important to remember that national selective service is not an end in itself, but is only a means to an end, that end being a total war effort.

The problems of mobilizing resources, and mobilizing man-power, are inseparable from one another and like all other aspects of our war effort must be kept in proper balance. Material resources cannot be mobilized without man-power to mobilize them, and no good purpose is served by mobilizing men unless they are provided with the necessary materials and tools to work with, and the necessary equipment and arms to fight with.

Under the authority of the National Resources Mobilization Act, a limited measure of national selective service on a compulsory basis has been applied since October, 1940, in the selection of young men for military training. The principles of selection have been age and marital status, with adequate safeguards, through postponements, for other essential forms of national service.

The government now proposes to apply the compulsory powers of national selective service to other aspects of the war effort as well as to military service. These powers will be applied selectively and progressively to those activities where it is considered by the government that their application will contribute to the goal of a total effort. It has not been necessary, nor would it, indeed, have been helpful at an earlier stage to make demands upon the nation such as the government has in contemplation, and as will be set forth as the session proceeds. In this connection I invite your attention particularly to what I am now about to say.

These demands will intimately affect the lives of many men and women. They will also effect the life of the nation in the following way: there will be a further very definite curtailment of the amenities we have hitherto been able to preserve. These demands will not affect physical health or that contentment of spirit that comes from serving great causes, but they will make further inroads upon the comfort and convenience of very large numbers, and upon the character and aspect of our daily life.

It must not be supposed that there are large reserves of idle people leading a leisurely existence who can now be called to the national ranks. The entire adult Canadian population, with very few exceptions, gets up in the morning, works all day, and goes to bed tired out at night. In our form of society people have been accustomed to find their own jobs to a very large extent, thus saving vast government machinery.

If all the efforts of everyone were really devoted solely to making war, there would be no food, or fuel, no transport, or clothes. We have to recognize the fact that a very large proportion of the population, particularly women, is occupied in ministering to the needs of the more actively engaged population, and that that number has increased since the last war with the increase of population who have to be ministered to.

The process which is now to be applied—and has, indeed, been continuously applied—much more vigorously, is not the calling of idle people to work, but the sharpening and shifting forward of a proportion of their effort into work which is more directly related to the war.

Here I end the portion of the remarks to which I invited special attention.

It may surprise hon. members to learn that the words I have just used are not my own words. With the exception of the two words "Canadian population", which I have substituted for the words "British race", the statement is not mine. It is a statement by the Prime Minister of Great Britain. After all that has been said in Canada in recent months about all-out conscription in Britain, and its application to women as well as to men, it may occasion still more surprise that this statement was made, not at the beginning of the war, nor at the end of the first year of war, nor even of the second year of war, but as recently as December 2 last.

The explanation of the timing is simple. In war, correct timing is vital. Some steps must be completed, before others can be taken. The time of application of measures is quite as important as the extent of their application. No mechanical rule or order can be followed. The appropriate measures for one country will

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never exactly suit another country. In the case of each, local conditions must be considered; the nature of the tasks undertaken by each country, and their relative importance in the total effort of all, must be the decisive factor.

To achieve a total national effort everyone must contribute to the effort either directly or indirectly. All cannot do the same work. As far as possible, each must be fitted into the appropriate task. Many, perhaps the majority, can find the appropriate place for themselves, and, as Mr. Churchill said, save "vast government machinery". Certainly no government is wise enough to decide the appropriate task for every individual in the nation. And, even if governments were all-knowing, the war would not wait while this stupendous job was being performed. What the government can do, and what we propose to undertake to do, is to meet the urgent needs by the best means we can devise.

I shall not attempt at this time to outline the measures which are contemplated in order to extend the scope of national selective service. I shall confine myself to saying that the extended policy of selective service will comprehend measures to increase the supply of man-power available for war industry and for the armed forces; also measures to safeguard and, where necessary, to assist in providing agricultural labour required to expand war production on the farm. These objects it is proposed to achieve by positive action to increase the mobility of available man-power, to add to the number of women available for employment, and to facilitate the transfer of labour from non-essential occupations to direct employment in the furtherance of the war effort. The policy also envisages improvements in the method of selecting men for compulsory military training and service.

The administrative machinery required to carry out the proposed measures equitably and efficiently will necessarily be intricate and complicated. The capacities of men and women cannot be weighed and measured and graded with the same certainty as the qualities of wheat or cement or steel can be determined. To perform the complicated task of selection with success will demand both time and skill.

The government, moreover, has no desire to add unduly—which means wastefully—to governmental machinery. It is imperative that we avoid using men and women for unnecessary tasks. In those aspects of our war effort in which voluntary methods are working satisfactorily, voluntary selection, including a measure of choice by the individual of the appropriate field of service, will be continued. The use of the more expensive and complicated methods of compulsion will be confined to those branches of our war effort where it is felt that compulsory selection will increase its efficiency.

While the government, in its policies, has sought a total effort, it has never ceased to believe that only by a united effort could total effort be achieved. In every step the government has taken from the moment the threat of war appeared on the European horizon, we have sought so to direct our policies and the course of public affairs that the country would remain united in its support of the national effort.

Every hon. member of this house knows that, except for the assurance that, in the event of a European war, there would be no conscription for service overseas, this parliament would never have decided, in the immediate and unanimous manner in which it did, to stand at the side of Britain in the resistance of aggression, and the defence of freedom.

Hon. members are also aware that if, at the time when Canada's participation in the war was challenged in an election in the province of Quebec by a government professing a different political faith, a like assurance with respect to service overseas had not been given in the name of the present government by the late Right Hon. Ernest Lapointe, by the Minister of Public Works (Mr. Cardin), and other Liberal leaders and members of this House of Commons from the province of Quebec, the verdict of the people of that province might have been wholly different.

At that time, the people of the province of Quebec turned out of office the government that had sought to thwart Canada's war effort, and placed in office under the leadership of Hon. Mr. Godbout, a government which was prepared to cooperate with the federal administration in furthering the national effort. I doubt if any service at the time meant more to the allied cause than that rendered by the people of the province of Quebec in thus demonstrating the unity of Canada in its war effort.

When, three months later, the direction of the war effort of Canada by the present administration was challenged—though from an opposite extreme—by a resolution of the legislature of the province of Ontario, and the administration appealed to the people of Canada in a general election, the government gave the assurance that, if returned to power, it would continue to maintain the policy of no conscription for service overseas. Not only the government, but the then leader of the Conservative party—a party disguised it is true, for the time being, as the National Government party—took an equally strong stand in opposition to conscription for overseas service. The candidates, not

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of one political party only, but the vast majority of candidates in the general election gave their constituents to understand that they were opposed to a policy of conscription for overseas service. In so doing, reference was continually made to the effect of the adoption of conscription in the last war, and the serious wound which, at the time, its application had inflicted in the side of our country.

As I look at the membership of this house which represents the will of the nation as expressed in the general elections, held during this very war, I say there are not a dozen members,—if, indeed, there are that many—regardless of party, who could rise in their places and truthfully say that, in the last general election, they had advocated a policy of conscription for military service overseas.

Time and again it has been said by hon. members opposite—and I think my hon. friend the leader of the opposition has said it oftener than anyone else—that the present government would not have had the enormous majority it has in this present parliament if it had not given the explicit assurance that, if returned to power, it would not adopt conscription for military service overseas. Others have held that it is unfair to say that any one issue should be singled out as the decisive issue in a general election. They maintain that many factors were in the minds of the people. It is said, for example, and I believe it to be true, that the present administration owes its vast majority to the belief so generally held that at this time of war no better administration could be found to administer Canada's war effort and to conduct the country's affairs. Not the least of the reasons for this belief was the view that the present administration might be expected to harmonize differences more effectively and thereby to avoid disunity at a time of war when, above all else, unity is vital.

In accordance with the general consensus of view as respects the mandate given by the people themselves, the government, throughout 1940 and 1941, proceeded to develop an all-out war effort. Might I pause here to say a word in reference to what my hon. friend the leader of the opposition said this afternoon with respect to mandates. If I recall aright, he said that this government took immediate action when Japan declared war, though we had no mandate from the people. He referred to a number of other acts performed by the government for which he said the government had no special mandate. He referred to Abraham Lincoln and some of his actions at the time of the civil war, for which my hon. friend said Lincoln had no mandate. That is all perfectly true; but of all the instances mentioned by my hon. friend there was not one in which, when the possibility of action of the kind mentioned had been placed before the people themselves, any subsequent action on the part of the government was restricted by a specific pledge or commitment with respect thereto. Of all the instances he mentioned there was not one in which the people themselves had been given the assurance, before the event itself took place, that if it did take place the government, while it would do all in its power to meet the situation, would not in one particular go counter to what it believed at the time to be the will of the people, and had expressly set forth the limitation that was to be respected. Therefore there is a great difference between what my hon. friend has put forward with respect to actions where there were no commitments in advance and the action of this government respecting a commitment that was definitely made with regard to a definite situation.

In this connection might I commend to my hon. friend, as I continue with what I have to say, the words by Abraham Lincoln which he quoted, that government was or ought to be "of the people, by the people and for the people." I hope my hon. friend will keep that thought in mind in reference to the criticism he has been offering with respect to myself, that I have been paying too much attention to the people and not enough attention to some of the things that at the present time are being said by a vociferous press.

As I was saying, in accord with the general consensus of view as respects the mandate given by the people themselves, the government, throughout 1940 and 1941, proceeded to develop an all-out war effort. Until parliament was in session in November last, the government continued to carry on that effort, not without criticism, but certainly without the issue of conscription for overseas service being raised, in any authoritative manner, by any party or party leader in this house.

At the time of my tour of western Canada, prior to my visit to Britain, an attempt was made to raise the issue of conscription. A cloud no larger than a man's hand appeared in the political sky at Calgary and in some other of the western cities. I at once recognized that this was not due to a spontaneous movement on the part of the people themselves, but was rather the manifestation of a political movement carefully organized by opponents of the government, to force conscription to the fore as a political issue. I accordingly sought to meet this threat to our national unity in the only way in which I believed it could and should be met, if unity throughout Canada was to be maintained.

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Speaking in the city of Vancouver before a very large audience, I said:

The policy of the government regarding conscription has been made abundantly clear. We have taken the position that every young man who is physically fit should be liable for military training and service in Canada for the defence of Canada. This policy is designed to provide our country with a second line of defence should the country be subject to direct attack. In the same way, parliament has put at the disposal of the nation, all the material resources of the country.

My colleagues and I, expressing, as we believe, the will of the Canadian people as expressed by themselves in a war-time election, have made it equally clear that service outside Canada in the armed forces of Canada at sea, on land and in the air—service undertaken in the cause of freedom—shall be freely undertaken.

Before war came, the government gave a solemn pledge that in the event of war, we would follow that policy. When war came the pledge was solemnly reaffirmed. At the general elections during the war itself, that policy received the overwhelming approval of the people of Canada. Indeed, no political party can be said to have advocated conscription for overseas service. The leader of the official opposition could scarcely have been more emphatic than he was in declaring that conscription was not an issue; that, having regard to the memories of the past, and experiences in the last war, anyone who might raise that issue was not true to the highest interest of his country.

The present unhappy state of the world is in large part the result of broken pledges. Nazi Germany has erected bad faith and the broken pledge into a principle of action. Bad faith, broken pledges, and disregard of the popular will are the very forces against which Canada is fighting to-day. That being so, I wish the more emphatically to affirm the government's intention to keep the pledge repeatedly given to the people of Canada.

This statement is representative of the views I everywhere expressed in the course of my western tour, and which everywhere met, if not with unanimous, certainly with general approval. With the people of Canada thus reassured, there was little, if any, agitation on the matter during my absence in Britain and immediately after my return. In parliament there was little or no question or discussion raised concerning conscription until, while parliament was in session in November, it was announced that the leader of the Conservative party in the senate was to replace the present leader of the opposition in the leadership of his party, and would also replace him in the leadership of the official opposition in this House of Commons.

Prior to this announcement, I had restated in this House of Commons the government's position with respect to national selective service, as I have already quoted it to the house. At the same time, as leader of the government, I made clear by own position with respect to the application of conscription to service in the armed forces overseas, in the following words:

But so far as conscription for service overseas is concerned in the armed forces of Canada, that question was submitted to the people of Canada at the last general election, an election which was held in war time, and in which the leaders of all political parties made their statements to the electorate, and the people of Canada decided against conscription for overseas service. So far as I am concerned, without any consultation of the people on that subject, I do not intend to take the responsibility of supporting any policy of conscription for service overseas.

These words are to be found in *Hansard* for November 12, 1941, at page 4672. This statement was made during the afternoon of November 12. On the evening of that day, the new leader of the Conservative party, without any previous attempt at consultation or conference with myself, or any member of the government, and before he himself had become a member of this House of Commons, issued a statement announcing his acceptance of the leadership of the Conservative party, in which he set forth as his policy "compulsory selective service over the whole field of war". In view of the position of the government with respect to national selective service, this statement narrows down simply to a demand for conscription for overseas service. It thereby made the single question of the application of conscription for military service overseas into a political issue of the first magnitude.

Outside parliament altogether, the political skies have now become so overcast with controversy, promoted by high-pressure methods and highly financed publicity, that the nature and extent of Canada's war effort is not only being obscured, but is in danger of being seriously impaired.

If the issue of conscription for service overseas is to be fought out, the place for it to be fought out is on the floor of this parliament. If, however, members of the government and, indeed, members of this House of Commons generally, are to be free to express their views irrespective of any previous commitments, it is necessary that all members be released from any obligation arising out of any past commitments restricting the methods of raising men for military service.

Quite apart from the controversy which has arisen, there are the strongest of reasons why the government should, at this time of gravest crisis in the world's history, possess complete freedom to act in accordance with its judgment of the needs of the situation as they may arise, subject only to its responsibility to parliament.

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When, prior to its outbreak, the possibility of war in Europe was discussed in Canada, it was thought of in terms of another European war, the scene of which would be confined for the most part to Europe. The last war was still much in mind. The incidents connected with conscription and the results which flowed from its application remained vivid memories. The mere thought of the repetition of anything of the kind was abhorrent to the minds of most people in Canada. Few, if any, even dreamed at the time that war might so spread as to bring into the orbit of actual hostilities, any part of the western hemisphere. When people on this side of the Atlantic thought of war during the autumn and winter months of 1938 and the early spring of 1939, they thought first of the protecting power of the British fleet. The war between Japan and China, though it had been in existence for some years, seemed so remote as to have little or no bearing upon the security of the Pacific coast of this continent.

When the general elections were held during the month of March in 1940, the recollections of 1917 were still vividly in mind. Also in the mind of the people were commitments made in and out of parliament respecting no conscription for service in the armed forces overseas. The relatively greater part which the air and naval forces would play in the present war, in comparison with the last; the obligation which Canada had assumed with respect to the commonwealth air training plan; the need for the immediate development of the navy, the importance of developing the manufacture of munitions on a large scale, all pointed to the unwisdom of raising any issue with respect to conscription.

It was not until the intent and might of nazi aggression had become apparent by the subjugation of Denmark, Norway, The Netherlands, Belgium and France, that its danger to all free countries began to be appreciated. When Italy entered the war, concern was still mostly with what might happen around the shores of the Mediterranean and in Africa. It was difficult for many to believe that the enemy might, some day, be battering our own shores on the Atlantic, and even on the Pacific.

During the past year, however, the bombardment of Britain from the air, the varying fortunes of her armies in a continuously increasing number of areas; the vast additions in resources and man-power gained by Germany through the countries she had overrun; the unrest in the far east; all this, and much else, helped, during the past year, to change the picture vastly as viewed from this side.

On the other hand, Russia's entry into the war on the side of the allies served to lessen anxiety with respect to the need for men needed for the army.

Japan's declaration of war against the United States and the British commonwealth, the consequences flowing from her treacherous attack upon United States' possessions in the Pacific, and upon British and Dutch possessions in Asia and the Indies; the present menace of her armed forces to the island dominions of Australia and New Zealand; all these have given rise to fresh anxiety throughout Canada.

The declaration of war by Germany and Italy, as well as Japan, against the United States has brought the United States into the conflict against the combined axis powers. This, in turn, has given rise to problems which the government is facing in meeting its obligations with respect to the joint defence of the two countries. The declaration signed at Washington on January 1 by 26 nations to combine their efforts against the axis powers, has still further emphasized Canada's responsibilities.

In a world situation so involved, with enemies on every front, with no one able to say what the outcome of battle in other parts of the world may bring of immediate and increased danger to our own land, the government feels strongly that it should be perfectly free to recommend to parliament whatever course of action it deems essential to the security of our own country, and to the preservation of freedom in our own and other lands.

Such freedom the government does not possess at the present time, not because of any limitations upon the powers of parliament —parliament is at all times supreme—but because of past commitments made by the government and, regardless of party, by most members of this house.

If, then, it is desirable that the government subject only to its responsibility to parliament, should possess complete freedom to act in accordance with its judgment, irrespective of any previous commitments, it is clear that means must be found of releasing the government from any obligation arising out of any past commitments restricting the methods of raising men for military service.

There are, as I see it, three means by which this release could be obtained:

The first would be by means of a general election. In a general election at this time the issue of conscription for service overseas would become one of the issues and, in existing circumstances, would almost certainly be the main issue.

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The second would be by means of a referendum solely with reference to the question of conscription for service overseas.

The third would be by means of a plebiscite, not to obtain a decision with respect to conscription, but solely with the object of releasing the government from any obligation arising out of any past commitments restricting the methods of raising men for military service.

These three means have been considered by the government with relation particularly to which of the three would occasion the least interference with the war effort of the country.

The government is of the opinion that neither a general election nor a referendum on the question of conscription is either advisable or necessary.

As for a general election, apart from the fact that the government has every reason to believe it continues to possess the confidence of the country, it would not, we believe, be in the interest of the people themselves, in the existing crisis, to leave the country without a parliament for the time which it would take to hold a general election. Moreover, other issues entering in, it would not be possible to say that the verdict of the people, whatever it might be, had related solely to the issue of the application of conscription for overseas service.

The objection to a referendum on conscription is that far from freeing the hands of the government it would be a specific request to the people to make a decision with respect to conscription. As I have already said, the proper place to debate the question as to the extent to which conscription should be applied is on the floor of parliament.

The strongest of reasons why the government should be given a free hand to take, subject to its responsibility to parliament, any course of action which it may believe to be necessary at a time of war is that the government itself alone can know all the circumstances and reasons which necessitate a particular course of action. These reasons cannot all be made public, linked as they are with the combined plans of other countries, with questions of military strategy, and the necessity of such matters being carefully concealed from the enemy.

A plebiscite differs from a referendum in that a plebiscite is taken to ascertain the views of the people, whereas a referendum is a request for a decision by the people on a specific plan or project. The government does not believe that it would be fair to the people to ask them to make military decisions.

It is, as I already have said, not possible, in war time, to make public adequate information on which wise judgments can be made.

In consulting the people by plebiscite, the government is not throwing on the people the responsibility of making a military decision. It is asking the people to give the government full power and full responsibility to take whatever military decisions the government, in the light of all its knowledge, believes to be necessary. In consulting the people, therefore, we are not shirking responsibility, we are asking for full responsibility.

A course completely different from any one of the three I have mentioned has been suggested. It is that the government should ignore commitments altogether, refrain from any consultation with or reference to the people, and here and now immediately put in force conscription for service overseas.

I am perfectly sure that were any government to proceed in any such arbitrary manner, completely disregarding the will of the people as expressed in the past, or as it might be expressed in the present, it would find any such attempt effectively thwarted by the people's representatives in parliament.

Personally, I reject as unworthy of consideration, any course of action by this or any parliament which ignores the authority from which parliament and the government alike derive their power. I reject as still more unworthy the suggestion that the government should break the solemn pledges given and repeated time and again to the electorate. Let me repeat what I said at Vancouver:

> The present unhappy state of the world is, in large part, the result of broken pledges. Nazi Germany has erected bad faith and the broken pledge into a principle of action. Bad faith, broken pledges, and disregard of the popular will, are the forces against which Canada is fighting to-day.

I do not propose to erect bad faith and the broken pledge into a principle of action. I propose at all times to do all in my power to see that the will of the people, not that of any particular section or group or interest, however powerful or vociferous, shall prevail in the government of this country.

Perhaps I should add that yet another course of action has been suggested. It is that I should resign and advise His Excellency the Governor General—

Some hon. MEMBERS: Hear, hear.

Mr. MACKENZIE KING: Yes, I hear some of them opposite; I hope they listen to what I am going to say. It is that I should resign and advise His Excellency the Governor General to call on some other person to form a government which would ignore all past

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commitments and undertake to enforce conscription without any prior consultation with the people. In other words, I am being asked to "sell my birthright for their mess of pottage", and to destroy whatever confidence the people of Canada may possess in my honour as a public man, and, in doing so, also to destroy the confidence the people possess in the honour and integrity of the government.

Those who speak and write in that way might be prepared so to act, but I am not. If we wish to destroy, not at this time of war alone, but for all time, the last vestige of confidence which the people of Canada have in their free political institutions and in their public men, that would be the most effective way to go about it.

The government, having, for the reasons I have mentioned, decided to seek from the people, by means of a plebiscite, release from any obligation arising out of any past commitments, proposes, without delay, to introduce legislation to set up the required machinery for conducting the plebiscite at the earliest possible date. The plebiscite will be taken with the minimum of expense consistent with equitable and efficient provision for a full and honest expression of the views of the people.

I need scarcely say that in the machinery which may be necessary for the conduct of the plebiscite, special provision will be made for ascertaining the views of the men on active service in the armed forces.

I shall not go into detail regarding the procedure to be followed in holding the proposed plebiscite. The question which the government proposes to submit to the people is the simple and straightforward question:

Are you in favour of releasing the government from any obligation arising out of any past commitments restricting the methods of raising men for military service?

It will be seen that in seeking freedom for itself to act on all matters pertaining to war in accordance with its judgment, the government is taking a course which will remove all legitimate excuse for controversy, and the course best calculated to maintain the unity of the country in this time of war.

Mr. HOMUTH: Then what will they do?

Mr. MACKENZIE KING: That will depend in part upon what my hon. friend and those who are round him will do.

Mr. HOMUTH: Do not worry about us.

Mr. MACKENZIE KING: I am quite prepared to trust the people; my hon. friend certainly is not. Just here may I pause to say that if my hon. friend is afraid that the people will pronounce against conscription, for that is what he has in his mind, and he is still prepared to have conscription put into force without any reference to the people, then I should like to know how he expects that the unity of this country is going to be maintained.

In the presentation of the plebiscite to the electorate the desire of the administration to possess complete freedom of action will, of course, receive the vigorous and whole-hearted support of all members of the government. It will, I hope, receive the support of every member of parliament, and will, I believe, receive the support of the Canadian people.

Mr. M. J. COLDWELL (Rosetown-Biggar): Mr. Speaker, I could not begin my remarks this evening without first congratulating the mover and the seconder of the address in reply to the speech from the throne, who were our good companions on a recent trip to Great Britain. They acquitted themselves in a manner which, I believe, won the congratulations of hon. members on all sides of the house. I thought that perhaps at times their praise of the government was a bit extravagant; shorn of these superlatives, their speeches were admirable.

I want to take this opportunity of expressing my own appreciation for the extensive tour of Great Britain so generously provided by the British branch of the Empire Parliamentary Association, and to express particularly my thanks to Sir Howard d'Egville, who supervised the arrangements on this side, to Sir Drummond Shiels, to Mr. Spencer-Hess, and to the British Ministry of Information, who combined to pilot us around Great Britain. Nor must we forget to thank, too, the Hon. Vincent Massey and Mrs. Massey and our splendid staff in the city of London. Every one of them did everything possible so that we might see all those things which visiting parliamentarians ought to see, and to make our stay in Great Britain as pleasant as it could possibly be under the grim circumstances of war. And Britain was grim. I knew from past experiences the British seashore and countryside. I would scarcely have recognized some of the places that I had known in my boyhood days. But in spite of the grimness we found a cool, courageous people engaged in a people's war and determined that when this conflict ended, there would be a people's peace and that the British people would build a new Britain in which the people might find security and peace.

But I should like to say more about those things at another time. To-day we are at the beginning of a new session of parliament. We

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Unrevised Hansard
January 27, 1942
Pages 68-69

C 273053

COMPULSORY MILITARY SERVICE

STATEMENT OF MR. GODBOUT IN MONTREAL ON JANUARY 26

On the orders of the day:

Hon. R. B. HANSON (Leader of the Opposition): I desire to direct a question to the Prime Minister, based upon a report of an important and significant speech delivered last night by the Premier of Quebec at Montreal, in which he is reported to have said:

We have Mr. King, who has always been against conscription.

And again

We have at the head of the Liberal party Mr. King, who is an anti-conscriptionist.

And again

Mr. King is against conscription.

Is the statement of Mr. Godbout correct? Is there any undertaking, understanding or commitment, express or implied, existing between himself and Mr. Godbout, or between himself and any other person, to the effect that no action will be taken to provide for compulsory military service overseas, even if the plebiscite is answered in the affirmative and he is released from his commitment?

Right Hon. W. L. MACKENZIE KING (Prime Minister): May I say to my hon. friend, in the first place, that I have nothing before me and he has nothing before him with respect to what Mr. Godbout is alleged to have said last night. I am therefore not in a position to say whether or not any remarks attributed to the Premier of Quebec have been correctly reported.

That, however, is not as important as a direct answer to the question with respect to my position in regard to conscription both within Canada and for service overseas, in relation to the past, to the present and to the future.

I tried yesterday to make that position quite plain in my remarks, which now appear in *Hansard*. I then repeated what, in part, I had previously said in this house on those matters. I now give to my hon. friend as reply to the question which he has asked what I said yesterday, which appears in *Hansard* at page 51, restating what I said in this house on November 12 last:

So far as conscription stands for compulsory selective national service, that is a principle which this government has embodied in its National Resources Mobilization Act passed at a previous session of this parliament. As to how rapidly that principle should be applied, and how far it should be extended, is a matter which the government must decide and will decide in the light of all the knowledge which it has with respect to the needs of our war effort and the position of the country in meeting them.

I want it to be distinctly understood that so far as the principle of compulsory selective national service is concerned for Canada, in Canada, I stand for that principle. I have never taken any other stand. It is the position that I have held all along. It has been applied in connection with military training, and applied in a number of other directions I might mention. How much further it will be applied the house will learn as the government takes its decisions on that matter.

And the further quotation also from what I said on November 12 last which appears on page 55 of yesterday's *Hansard:*

But so far as conscription for service overseas is concerned in the armed forces of Canada, that question was submitted to the people of Canada at the last general election, an election which was held in war time, and in which the leaders of all political parties made their statements to the electorate, and the people of Canada decided against conscription for overseas service. So far as I am concerned, without any consultation of the people on that subject, I do not intend to take the responsibility of supporting any policy of conscription for service overseas.

That is my position—as stated, I might say, repeatedly in this house, but certainly most clearly and emphatically on November 12 last and again yesterday in this house.

(Replying further to my hon. friend's question as to what I intend to do as a result of the plebiscite, I thought I had also anticipated the answer to that question in my remarks yesterday afternoon, which will be found on page 39 of yesterday's *Hansard*, when I said:

When my hon. friend goes on to ask me what I am going to do with respect to any expression of view which may be made by the people in connection with any reference which will be made to them, may I say to him that in seeking to get relief from past commitments I am not going to begin by making new and fresh commitments. In seeking freedom on the part of the ministry I am not going to start in by seeking to tie my own hands.

That is the answer to that part of the question.

My hon. friend asked a further question, whether there was any understanding between myself and Mr. Godbout, express or implied, as to the position which I would take as a result of any plebiscite that would be presented to the people. May I say to him that there is no understanding, express or implied, with Mr. Godbout or with any other person on earth with respect to the attitude that I propose to take after the people have expressed their views with regard to giving the government a free hand.

May I add that such attitude as I shall take at the time will be taken in the light of all the circumstances as I may know them as a member of the government, and of all conditions as I know them in regard to this country and, as far as I am able to know something about them, conditions in other countries as well.

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C 273054

Reprinted from The Montreal Daily Star,

Monday, November 13, 1944

PUT IT UP TO PARLIAMENT

COLONEL RALSTON'S statement of his position in the Cabinet discussions which gave rise to his resignation throws new light on the controversy that has been waged across the country about reinforcements. It does not, however, solve the problem nor determine for the public just how critical is the reinforcement situation. It does, nevertheless, join all the issues and make it imperative that the whole question be submitted to Parliament for a decision. Premier King is committed to go to Parliament before sending draftees overseas and if, as Colonel Ralston says, the issue between him and the Prime Minister relates to sending the draftees overseas, then the decision can be approved in one place only—Parliament.

In the Mobilization Act debate, on July 7, 1942, the Prime Minister made himself unequivocally clear as to what he would do in the event of its being necessary to send drafted men overseas. Here is what he said:

> "If the need should arise for sending overseas as reinforcements men called up under the National Resources Mobilization Act, the procedure should be as open and above board as it can possibly be made. Unless it is understood that Parliament will be informed in advance, all kinds of suspicions will be aroused and all sorts of rumours will be in circulation from day to day. . . I intend, therefore, if the time should come when the Government decides that it has become necessary to send overseas men who have not volunteered for general service, and I should be in office at the time, to ask my colleagues to join me in seeing that Parliament is immediately informed of the Government's decision. If Parliament is not in session, I would do whatever lies within my power to see that Parliament is informed as soon as possible after the decision has been reached."

As to the time that would take, Mr. King thought it need take little time. He said:

> "If the Government decides that it is necessary to apply conscription for overseas service, there need be no delay in enforcing that decision. And unless it became apparent that the Ministry had ceased to enjoy the confidence of this House of Commons, there would be no delay. Even if Parliament is not actually sitting, it can be brought together in a few days. Under our wartime practice of adjourning rather than proroguing the Session there would be no opening formalities. There would be no need of further legislation, merely an expression of confidence in some form. It is virtually impossible to conceive of a situation in which the lapse of a week will affect sending reinforcements overseas, since arrangements to that end could proceed concurrently with the reassembling of Parliament."

The former Minister of National Defence discovers a serious difference between what he said to the Cabinet and what the Prime Minister told the people in his radio address. And that difference clinches the issues. The Prime Minister said that the problem was "to find the means of speeding up the flow of fully trained infantry reinforcements to meet, not an actual shortage, but a possible shortage within the next few months." Colonel Ralston insists that this statement conveys the impression that the sending of reinforcements can be delayed for some time, and that, he adds, was not what he told the Cabinet.

This controversy cannot be settled by public speeches designed to interpret what Colonel Ralston said or did not say. It can be decided only by giving the country a true and clear picture of our military situation and its needs, and a decision taken as to whether or not the available infantry draftees shall be sent overseas to fill the gap Colonel Ralston believes will exist early in the new year. Colonel Ralston himself declares that even if a decision had been taken on November 1st to send these men overseas, they could not have reached the battle areas until the middle of January, and if they were sent immediately they would not be available until early in February. If it is agreed, then, that the emergency will arise by February 1st, we must then be in a position to reinforce the troops overseas. They will not be reinforced if the available men are 3,000 miles away, as they are now.

Dare we wait until the emergency is actually upon us? It is unthinkable that a delay of six to eight months should be permitted for training fresh volunteers whilst well-trained troops drafted for emergency purposes stand idly by. That necessary reinforcements be provided in good time to meet any emergency is the clear duty of the Government. Since Colonel Ralston's findings and recommendations resulting from his visit to the battlefronts have been rejected, by what means now will the emergency be determined?

The Prime Minister's decision to seek a vote of confidence from Parliament was made after the people, in the plebiscite of April, 1942, had released him and the Government from "any obligation arising out of past commitments restricting the methods of raising men for military service," and the subsequent passage of an amendment to the National Resources Mobilization Act lifting the barrier to drafting men for overseas.

Mr. King stated further that there would be no need of debate, and that, while the House was being called together, the Government could put in motion the machinery for sending drafted men overseas. There need be no delay, therefore, once the Government has decided that an emergency exists.

The Prime Minister says that an emergency does not exist, but may arise.

It is, of course, up to the Prime Minister and his new Minister of National Defence to demonstrate that there is no emergency. That is imperative now that Colonel Ralston, the responsible Minister who investigated the overseas situation, has declared that the emergency is in fact upon us. But, additionally, if Mr. King still considers himself bound to consult Parliament, that consultation should take place without delay so that the emergency can be met with the Government in possession of every authority required to meet it.

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Reprinted from The Montreal Daily Star,

Tuesday, Nov. 14, 1944

QUEBEC WILL ACCEPT A MAJORITY DECISION

MUCH of the discussion about reinforcements for the Canadian Army overseas has centred on the attitude Quebec might adopt if the Government decided to send trained draftees overseas. Memories of the last war intervene to colour the picture, but in considering the attitude which Quebec might adopt it is too frequently forgotten that both in the last war and this, leaders of French-Canadian thought and action have declared their faith in the province's willingness to abide by the will of the majority.

Sir Wilfrid Laurier, than whom there has been no finer or more trusted leader of his people, took this view, and so did his political opposite, Henri Bourassa, during the great conscription debate of 1917. There is no reason to suppose that far-sighted French-Canadians, or the mass of the people themselves, would take any other view in the emergency that now confronts the country.

It is worthwhile to recall just what views these two French-Canadian leaders held in 1917, when the country faced a situation comparable to that being discussed today. In a letter to the Hon. Newton Rowell, written June 5th, 1917, Sir Wilfrid said:

> "The only solution seems to me this: Have an appeal to the people, have it right away, either in the form of a referendum or an election. Let the people decide, and if they decide in favour of conscription, as it seems to me they will, under present circumstances, from the attitude of our friends in Ontario, whatever influence I may have will be employed in pleading to the Quebec people that the question is settled by the verdict of the majority, and that all must loyally accept the issue and submit to the law: and this will be no light task, but a task to which I will devote myself with all my energy."

Sir Wilfrid followed up this statement by moving for a referendum when the Military Service Act was introduced to Parliament in the following month. His amendment was defeated but had it carried and a referendum been held, Sir Wilfrid would loyally have implemented his promise to persuade Quebec that the majority should rule.

During the conscription debate itself, Sir Wilfrid repeated these views in the following terms:

> "When the people have been consulted and have given a decision, everyone, I can say upon my honour, has a duty to submit—and I believe that I am authorized in this particular to be the spokesman for my province. Do I not demonstrate my impartiality in this regard, and is not my request a legitimate one? Who can say of my proposition that it does not conform to true democratic principles?"

In the same debate, Mr. Bourassa took a comparable view. He said:

> "Following the example of my chief, the Leader of the Opposition (Sir Wilfrid Laurier), I recognize but one master in the country, that is he who pays, he who suffers, prays, he who furnishes blood and flesh to the cannon. I wish to consult him, and I will bow before his supreme will."

These two speeches exemplify the highest form of democratic thought, whether French or English. They were uttered in circumstances quite similar, except in one important respect, to those which now exist in Canada. The dissimilarity lies in the fact that a referendum had not yet been taken, although both Laurier and Bourassa wanted one held. Today, a referendum has been taken. The plebiscite of 1942, however the question may have been worded, was in fact a referendum on conscription for overseas service, and by an overwhelming majority the Canadian people decided that it should be imposed if the need arose. The need is upon us, and the only question remaining in the minds of some is, whether or not French Canada would accept a decision to enforce the law.

We submit, in the light of the statements quoted, in the light of Cardinal Villeneuve's declaration of "unswerving loyalty" in London the other day, and in the light of Quebec's tenacious adherence to the democratic principle Sir Wilfrid Laurier upheld so courageously, that Quebec would not only obey the law but willingly do its full share. Any scruples, therefore, based upon an assumed Quebec hesitancy to accept compulsion, should not stand in the way of sending overseas as soon as possible those men already trained to serve in just such an emergency as now confronts the country.

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Vol. LXXX.—No. 22

CANADA

House of Commons Debates

OFFICIAL REPORT—DAILY EDITION

Friday, February 20, 1942

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C 273057

HOUSE OF COMMONS

Speaker: The Honourable JAMES ALLISON GLEN

FRIDAY, February 20, 1942.

The house met at three o'clock.

HOUSE OF COMMONS

READING OF SPEECHES—FORTY MINUTE RULE—STATEMENT OF MR. SPEAKER

Mr. SPEAKER: I have a statement I should like to make to the house. Now that the debate on the address has been completed, I have been concerned with what I am sure has been evident to all members of the house, namely, the breach of the rule which deals with the reading of speeches. I would refer hon. members to Beauchesne's Parliamentary Rules and Forms, at page 95, citation 293, which states:

> Besides the prohibitions contained in this standing order, it has been sanctioned by usage both in England and in Canada, that a member, while speaking, must not:
>
> (o) read from a written, previously prepared speech.

As long ago as April 19, 1886, a resolution was adopted by the house, which reads:

> That the growing practice in the Canadian House of Commons of delivering speeches of great length, having the character of carefully and elaborately prepared written essays, and indulging in voluminous and often irrelevant extracts, is destructive of legitimate and pertinent debate upon public questions, is a waste of valuable time, unreasonably lengthens the sessions of parliament, threatens by increased bulk and cost to lead to the abolition of the official report of the debates, encourages a discursive and diffuse, rather than an incisive and concise style of public speaking, is a marked contrast to the practice in regard to debate that prevails in the British House of Commons, and tends to repel the public from a careful and intelligent consideration of the proceedings of parliament.

During the course of the debate members have been reading from manuscripts without regard to the rule, and all sides of the house have practised it. I think that I express the general sense of the house when I say that this practice is to be deplored. It is true that the debate just completed was very important, as hon. members are likely to be quoted thereafter for their attitude now, and in consequence they wish to have the written word before them rather than rely on the inspiration of the moment to find the proper expressions. I wish to intimate to the house that I shall have to insist upon members observing the rule. I realize the difficulty of enforcing it and the chair can only do so with the positive support of all members.

On a former occasion I agreed, and the house consented, that when important statements involving government policy are made by ministers on behalf of the government, such statements could be read rather than expressed extemporaneously. This practice is, I understand, being followed in the British House of Commons and it has been extended here to include statements made by the official leader of the opposition, whose status is regulated by section 42 of the Senate and House of Commons Act, chapter 147.

There is another matter to which I wish to refer. That is standing order 37, which reads:

> No member except the Prime Minister and the leader of the opposition, or a minister moving a government order and the member speaking in reply immediately after such minister or a member making a motion of "no confidence" in the government and a minister replying thereto, shall speak for more than forty minutes at a time in any debate.

The house in generous mood usually consents to an extension of this rule beyond the forty minutes. But I feel that hon. members rely upon the indulgence of the house to obtain extra time. It may be that some ministerial statements require a longer period than forty minutes, and it would be inappropriate and perhaps inadvisable that the rule should be applied to them. Here, again, however, I think all such ministerial statements should be prepared in view of and be in conformity with the rules of the house. I must, therefore, point out that the Chair should not be placed in a position where discrimination is necessary and hon. members must realize that with every right to be heard in the house, such hearing must be subject to the rules of the house.

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
MG 26 J 4, Volume 389, pages C273027-C274022

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MAIN ESTIMATES 1942-43

A message from His Excellency the Governor General transmitting estimates for the financial year ending March 31, 1943, was presented by Hon. J. L. Ilsley (Minister of Finance), read by Mr. Speaker to the house, and referred to the committee of supply.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE

PRECEDENCE FOR GOVERNMENT BUSINESS ON AND AFTER MONDAY, FEBRUARY 23

Right Hon. W. L. MACKENZIE KING (Prime Minister): Mr. Speaker, with the consent of the house I should like to move the following motion:

That on and after Monday, the twenty-third of February, 1942, to the end of the present session government notices of motion and government orders shall have precedence at every sitting over all other business except the introduction of bills, questions by members, and notices of motions for the production of papers.

Hon. R. B. HANSON (Leader of the Opposition): Mr. Speaker, I had rather assumed that in the absence of this notice the government would have been disposed to give a few days to the discussion of private members' motions. I know the practice we followed in the previous sessions of this parliament. At the first session we were all very much obsessed and upset by the course of the war and I agreed to the waiving of the rule at that time. At the second session the Prime Minister urged the same reasons for such a motion, and now after almost a month or four weeks of this session, private members, in the absence of any notice to the contrary, had assumed, I think, that some provision would be made for discussion of their motions. My hon. friend the member for Qu'Appelle (Mr. Perley) has a motion on the order paper which he is prepared to discuss on Monday, and which in the absence of this notice he had the right to assume he would be within his rights in presenting to the house. I do think that the Prime Minister should not press this motion to-day but leave at least one day open for the discussion of private members' motions. It is not very much to ask for. I do not see how otherwise we could get consent to this motion being brought down at such a late date. I would ask the Prime Minister to let private members have at least one Monday.

Mr. MACKENZIE KING: May I say to my hon. friend that this matter was raised at an early stage of the session and at the time I replied, as I recall it, to the effect that the arguments which had weighed with the Commons in previous years were even stronger this year, and I assumed that the house would so regard them. I must say that the government does so regard them. We believe that the international situation is more critical at this time than it has been at any other time since the commencement of the war and that government business ought to be proceeded with as rapidly as possible, particularly that part of it which relates directly to the war.

Much has been said in the debate on the address about the time that must elapse before the plebiscite can be held. A month has been taken in debate on the address, in which private members have had the opportunity to speak on different matters, and if I were to meet my hon. friend's wish and have Monday next devoted to private members' resolutions, that would again delay the progress of the legislation with respect to the plebiscite.

I expect to announce a little later this afternoon that a secret sitting of the house will be held on Tuesday afternoon. I must say that I think hon. members will upon reflection see that there are strong reasons why the time of the house should not be taken up with a discussion of private members' resolutions until at least very considerable headway has been made with government business.

As to the particular request which my hon. friend has made in respect to one of the members of his party who had expected to speak to his motion on Monday, it will be recognized at once that were I to meet his wish, much as I might desire to, I would be discriminating against other hon. members who may equally wish to speak on their motions, some of which may even appear on the order paper before that of my hon. friend.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): No, his is No. 1.

Mr. MACKENZIE KING: Well, if we allow No. 1 to proceed, No. 2 will wish to have his say as well. I would ask the house to consent to the passing of this motion to-day so that on Monday we may continue with government business.

Mr. M. J. COLDWELL (Rosetown-Biggar): Mr. Speaker, if I may say a word, I think I can agree with the Prime Minister that the house has had a very long debate in which a number of matters have been discussed thoroughly. I think now the country would expect us to get on with government business connected with the war. I think we should proceed with that. But I do say this to the Prime Minister, that opportunity should be given to the private members to move their resolutions on the order paper, and I would

suggest that, either by consent or by a change in the rules, time be allowed towards the end of the session for private members to present and debate their motions. There are occasions during the session, too, when government business is not always ready for presentation to the house, and it might be possible on such occasions, if sufficient notice were given to members who have resolutions on the order paper, to allow them to be proceeded with then. But I would urge that all of us forego the particular matters which we wish to discuss that are not related to the war effort and that we make every effort to speed up the business of the house, which, I take it, at the present session will be devoted mainly to the war. So far as we are concerned we shall be glad to support the government in speeding up its efforts in that regard.

So far as resolution No. 1 on the order paper is concerned, we are very much interested in that motion, but I understand that a statement will be made regarding its subject matter, and may I suggest to the Minister of Trade and Commerce (Mr. MacKinnon) that it be made as soon as possible.

With these qualifications we agree to what the Prime Minister has suggested.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): Mr. Speaker, I find that the hon. member for Rosetown-biggar (Mr. Coldwell) does not give me any support, and I certainly do not want to be the hold-out. I am not usually that type. I have just conferred with my colleague, the hon. member for Qu'Appelle (Mr. Perley), and while he is anxious to debate his resolution he advises me that the Minister of Trade and Commerce has given an undertaking that the wheat question will be the subject of a bill which will be brought down and debated in due course and referred, I understand, to the committee on agriculture. At that time he will have the opportunity which the moving of his resolution would have afforded him in the house. On that theory he is quite content to waive any rights he has. Of course, if notice of this motion had been given yesterday, we would not be having this debate at the moment. Rather reluctantly I am going to give my consent to the motion of the Prime Minister.

Motion agreed to.

PARLIAMENTARY RESTAURANT

Right Hon. W. L. MACKENZIE KING (Prime Minister) moved:

That a message be sent to the Senate to acquaint their Honours that this house has appointed the Honourable the Speaker and Messrs. Black (Yukon), Dupuis, Edwards, Farquhar, Furniss, Goulet, Howden, Jaques, Laflamme, Lafontaine, Macdonald (Brantford City), MacInnis, McGregor, McIvor, Mayhew, Pinard, Purdy, Rhéaume, Thauvette, Tucker and Tustin, a committee to assist His Honour the Speaker in the direction of the restaurant, so far as the interests of the Commons are concerned, and to act as members of a joint committee of both houses on the restaurant.

Motion agreed to.

PRINTING OF PARLIAMENT

Right Hon. W. L. MACKENZIE KING (Prime Minister) moved:

That a message be sent to the Senate to acquaint their honours that this house will unite with them in the formation of a joint committee of both houses on the subject of the printing of parliament, and that the members of the standing committee on printing, viz., Messieurs Bercovitch, Bertrand (Terrebonne), Blanchette, Bourget, Casselman (Grenville-Dundas), Castleden, Chambers, Chevrier, Claxton, Corman, Denis, Dubois, Dupuis, Durocher, Edwards, Emmerson, Esling, Evans, Ferland, Fleming, Fraser (Peterborough West), Furniss, Goulet, Grant, Green, Hallé, Healy, Hlynka, Hoblitzell, Hurtubise, Kuhl, Leader, MacDiarmid, MacKinnon (Kootenay East), MacLean (Cape Breton North-Victoria), McGregor, McNevin (Victoria, Ont.), Mills, Moore, Mulock, Nicholson, Purdy, Rhéaume, Ross (St. Paul's), Sinclair, Sissons, Soper, Tucker, Tustin, Weir, White, Whitman, Winkler and Wood, will act as members on the part of this house, on the said joint committee on the printing of parliament.

Motion agreed to.

LIBRARY OF PARLIAMENT

Right Hon. W. L. MACKENZIE KING (Prime Minister) moved:

That a message be sent to the Senate to acquaint their honours that this house has appointed the honourable the Speaker and Messieurs Adamson, Aylesworth, Black (Chateauguay-Huntingdon), Bruce, Cardiff, Casselman (Grenville-Dundas), Castleden, Emmerson, Eudes, Farquhar, Fontaine, Fournier (Maisonneuve-Rosemont), Gershaw, Goulet, Graham, Green, Henderson, Howden, Hurtubise, Jaques, Jean, Lizotte, Macdonald (Halifax), MacKenzie (Neepawa), MacKenzie (Lambton-Kent), Macmillan, Marier, Martin, Mayhew, Moore, Poirier, Pouliot, Purdy, Raymond, Reid, Rickard, Ross (St. Paul's), Shaw, Telford, Thauvette, Warren, Winkler, Wood and Woodsworth a committee to assist his honour the Speaker in the direction of the library of parliament, so far as the interests of the Commons are concerned, and to act on behalf of the House of Commons as members of a joint committee of both houses on the library.

Motion agreed to.

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
MG 26 J 4, Volume 389, pages C273027-C274022

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SECRET SESSION OF THE HOUSE

ANNOUNCEMENT OF DATE—PROHIBITION OF UNAUTHORIZED REPORTS

Right Hon. W. L. MACKENZIE KING (Prime Minister) moved:

That on any day set aside for that purpose by the house without notice having been previously given, the sitting of the house shall be a secret session until the house shall then otherwise order, and that all strangers be ordered to withdraw during such secret session; provided however, that this order shall not affect the privilege enjoyed by members of the Senate of being present at debates in this house.

He said: This resolution is similar to one which was passed by this house during the war, in 1918, when a secret session of the House of Commons was held. The motion at that time fixed a definite day. The present motion, as hon. members will see, leaves the date to be arranged by agreement.

In the British House of Commons, in order to protect secrecy, there has been passed under the authority of the Emergency Power (Defence) Act, 1939, the following regulation:

His Majesty, in pursuance of section one of the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 1939, and of all other powers enabling him in that behalf, is pleased, by and with the advice of his privy council, to order, and it is hereby ordered that regulation three of the Defence (General) Regulations, 1939 (a), shall have effect as if at the end thereof there were inserted the following paragraphs:—

(2) If either house of parliament in pursuance of a resolution passed by that house holds a secret session, it shall not be lawful for any person in any newspaper, periodical, circular or other publication, or in any public speech, to publish any report of, or to purport to describe, the proceedings at that session, except such report or description thereof as may be officially communicated through the press and censorship bureau.

The government has thought it advisable to enact a similar regulation, adding it to the defence of Canada regulations, in the following terms:

39AA. If the Senate or House of Commons, in pursuance of a resolution, holds a secret session, no person shall in any newspaper, periodical, circular or other publication, or in any public speech, publish any report or description of the proceedings at that session, except such report or description thereof as may be officially communicated through the Speaker of the House.

As to the time of the secret session, I have had a conference with the leader of the opposition (Mr. Hanson) and also with the leader of the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation group (Mr. Coldwell) and the leader of the Social Credit group (Mr. Blackmore), and we have agreed that Tuesday afternoon would be the most convenient time at which to hold the secret session. I might say there is a special reason for selecting Tuesday, inasmuch as the Senate has been adjourned until Tuesday next, and as senators will have the privilege of being present in the gallery when the secret session is held, it would obviously be desirable to have the sitting held on a day that senators were likely to be here. I have nothing else to add at the moment.

Hon. R. B. HANSON (Leader of the Opposition): I do not rise for the purpose of either debating or opposing the resolution to which the Prime Minister (Mr. Mackenzie King) has referred. I note that the terms of the resolution are quite general; it does not limit the action of the house to any one particular secret session, but it contemplates other secret sessions if they are found necessary or desirable or are asked for. I did not understand that such would be in the motion; however, I am not objecting to that, because it may become necessary to hold further secret sessions.

I am not at all optimistic that a secret session will be of great value, because it seems to me that we cannot possibly use any information which we get there—especially in view of the amendment to the defence of Canada regulations to which the Prime Minister has alluded. At the same time, it will afford to hon. members an opportunity of putting questions to the ministers, and I hope that some useful purpose will be served.

I am curious to know who will prepare the official report which is to be given to the public.

Mr. MACKENZIE KING: The Speaker.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): It says that?

Mr. MACKENZIE KING: Not in the resolution; in the order in council.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): Oh, the order in council? I have not had that before me. It, of course, will be official, coming from that source. I am content to leave the matter at that for the moment.

Mr. T. L. CHURCH (Broadview): I am opposed to the passage of this proposed motion for the reason that it upsets the whole constitutional practice of the British empire since we have been an empire. What does the motion say? I quote:

That on any day set aside for that purpose by the house without notice having been previously given. . . .

You will observe those words, Mr. Speaker, "without notice." In the parliament of Great Britain notice is given, sometimes a week or

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ten days ahead. Yesterday notice was given for a two-day session, grand assize to inquire into the whole war, to be held in the open House of Commons but not in secret session. The resolution goes on to say:

. . . the sitting of the house shall be a secret session.

Matters of the utmost importance will be discussed in that session. Talk about having a judge inquire into Hong Kong and Singapore! I have in my hand here volume 377 of the Parliamentary Debates of Great Britain, 173 pages, dealing with all phases of the war in the Pacific and all other theatres. All these questions are discussed in public with pages of criticism. The same is true of Australia.

My first objection to this motion is that the functions of parliament are being taken away from us with all these secret bodies that have been appointed. In fact, parliament is looked upon by the government as a nuisance—here to-day and gone to-morrow. They have closed the doors upon us. The last clause of the resolution declares that the privilege enjoyed by members of the Senate, of being present at debates in this house, shall not be affected—a sop to the senators. Well, the senate have been here for four hours since last June, without duties to perform. Three sessions ago I asked the government so to arrange matters as to provide more work for the other house of parliament. That other house is composed of men of ability and they should be given more to do.

My main objection to the resolution is that no secret committee or private caucus should decide these questions, because we are simply turning over the whole military work of the nation to a political body. Military problems should be dealt with by the military authorities and the army council. Of course, there are certain state secrets that should not be given away even to this parliament. That holds true in the old land. There are state secrets of such importance to the safety of the realm that they should not be divulged even to members of parliament. My objection, however, is taken on this ground, that this is more or less a political body, and we are supposed to meet in public and not in secret. We should not ask the heads of the services to come into this chamber, with the doors locked, in a sort of star chamber, to answer questions. We are only wasting the time of the heads of the departments. Military strategy is for military experts, not for us.

Under responsible government there are ministers who are answerable to parliament, and they are the ones who should answer here any questions that are to be asked. We have had only a political administration of the war, as I have mentioned before. As regards the troops in England, we were told at the fall session that it would be the government of Canada who in the last resort would say where they should be dispatched. I have the exact words on record here in *Hansard* of November 6 and 7 last.

The ordinary member of parliament is in a critical position in this war. There are ministers in the government who have the direction of affairs relating to his majesty's forces, and perhaps they cannot always, for reasons of state, give a direct reply to questions. But I do not like to have criticisms of his majesty's forces. There are three splendid soldiers who are in charge of departments having to do with affairs relating to the military forces, and who served their country well in the last war. Criticism is the function of this house, and it should be made in public. Moreover, the opposition has a duty to perform publicly. We should know the facts. That is what is wrong with our war effort. For five years before the war the people were in the dark; they were not given any facts even in this house. They were given just so much information, so much of the facts, as their rulers wanted them to know.

In a war like this, criticism is necessary, and it is the duty of every member of parliament, if he is sincere and considers the issues well, to do what he can to give constructive criticism. This should not be regarded as being necessarily an attack on the Prime Minister (Mr. Mackenzie King) or on any member of the government or on the government itself, because no member of any government is infallible. We all make mistakes, even the greatest leaders. Napoleon and Nelson both made their mistakes, and Great Britain has never had a greater leader than its present Prime Minister, no man comparable as a leader except, perhaps, the great Pitt, and yet he made mistakes in the long war with Napoleon.

The question of tactics is one that should be the responsibility of our military commanders and military council. The trouble is that we have been disregarding this principle; that is the reason for most of the mistakes that have been made in the war by the allies. Mistakes have occurred in consequence of political interference with army, naval and air force commanders. That is so in the Pacific and it was so in Libya, Greece and Singapore. The direction of the war, and all questions of strategy, should rest with the militia council, the purely civilian function of administration being the direct responsibility of a war cabinet. And here let me

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
MG 26 J 4, Volume 389, pages C273027-C274022

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say that we should have had a war cabinet long ago and an all allied war council also.

I have already said that in my opinion this motion is not in order. If it passes, the rules of the house will be changed.

Mr. SPEAKER: Order. I call attention to the fact that the hon. member is committing a breach of the rule to which I referred this afternoon. He is reading his speech.

Mr. CHURCH: I am referring to the present system and the changes which are being made in our parliamentary practice, and quoting *Hansard*. I am pointing out, Mr. Speaker, that under our present parliamentary system this motion is not in order, but will be if it passes. There are permanent officials who are able to look into these problems. It should be the duty of the militia council to consider the questions which it is proposed to bring before us. What do I know about military matters? I have never been a military man, and I know nothing whatever about military tactics and strategy. I am only a common or garden variety member of parliament. What does the combined membership of this house know about military problems, except for those hon. members who have served overseas? As I say, there are three ministers of the government who have had considerable war experience, and in my opinion we should be very reluctant to take out of their hands and out of the hands of the army council the administration of a war like this. We do not know where it will end.

I do not wish to reflect on our parliamentary system, but even in the old country the Prime Minister there has said that the present political system is not sufficient to cope with all the changes that are taking place. In the old days wars lasted for a few weeks, now they last for years. The enemy is coming pretty close now; we must prepare to meet him at the gate. If we are to change the procedure of parliament, let us do it in a lawful way. I wish to commend you, Mr. Speaker, for the fair way you have presided, because I think not only have you added to the dignity of parliament, but in the last weeks you and your splendid clerk of the house have almost saved parliament itself.

If the government have some new method by which they want to conduct the business of the house, well and good. I contend there should be an empire war cabinet, and we should have an allied war cabinet with the United States and the Netherlands in it, so as to have a united effort in this war. The war has now lasted for two and a half years, and what has been done in reference to the houses of parliament? Nothing has been done. In the past two and a half years we have failed to achieve production sufficient for a total war effort. It is too late to change that system now or the methods which are being used in a parliamentary way. We have staked all the assets of this country on this war to defeat Germany and Japan; we should exert ourselves to get a system and machinery of government which would be more efficient than a proposal to sit in caucus or private session and have questions asked. The enemy I believe are superior in their strategy in these matters.

The method I would propose would be, instead of our meeting in secret, to have an army council and the three ministers meeting with them to decide all these matters of strategy in military affairs. We have made mistakes in the past; I believe they have all made mistakes. The government should not be afraid to tell the people of Canada that they have made mistakes, because the people do not expect their leaders and governments to be gods. They all make mistakes. But I say if we are to be efficient and achieve our ends in this war, we shall have to be more active. The parliament of Canada too often forgets that we are part of an empire—the British empire. Meeting in secret in this way we forget that we have a duty to the other dominions and the mother country. We should not allow secret meetings to interfere with that duty.

It is contended by some that by having this secret session, members of parliament will be enabled to get some news to reach the public and give members an opportunity to question the government. The effect of the whole thing will, in my opinion, be bad. The other dominions, whose efforts are as great as ours, have been left out of consideration in this motion. In my judgment Canada's parliament should not meet in secret; Canada can afford to state her case and her policy before the court of public opinion of the world. We have a strong case, and the case has been made clear by this parliament. We cannot conduct a grand inquest or assize into this war behind closed doors. I am opposed to the motion.

What about the press? The press of this country has been doing a magnificent work and giving leadership in this war all over Canada. Some journals have raised great war funds, such as the *Evening Telegram's* British war victims' fund in Toronto; yet the press is being left out in the cold. The press was the main factor in England before the war when all the leaders over there were pacifists and the people listened to the babble of pacifists and tossed away all their defences;

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it was the press that opened their eyes and brought them around. They made us realize that the enemy is at our gates.

We have no mandate from the people to upset these constitutional practices by secret meetings in a great war like this. In the last war only one secret meeting was held. The people want to know the facts, the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth about our war effort. No one wants any military or state secrets revealed; they should not be revealed even at a secret meeting. Some of these secrets should be known only to the king and his military advisers and relate to the defence of the realm.

I shall oppose the motion. The people have not been given sufficient information either before or since the war began. They are totally ignorant of the main problems. On March 21, 1939, on a motion to go into supply I urged the government to give the people the facts, and I quoted what Prime Minister Chamberlain said in England that if the people are not allowed to know the facts concerning the danger at their gates, if they are allowed to know only what their leaders want them to know, that course leads to danger. Within five or six months of that time war was declared, and the people did not know the facts even then.

The motion has connection also with the bureaucrats and boards and commissions, numbering, with employees, some 3,500 to 4,000, who have been appointed and are taking away the functions of this parliament whether we meet in public or in private. They have taken our functions; they have upset the rules and regulations and changed the whole purpose and intent of parliament, with their press agents, radio spokesmen and these other officers that have been appointed. About the only intimations and information given to the public that are not under the control of this magnificent information bureau are the *Votes and Proceedings* and orders of the day. Everything you read has to be stamped with a badge showing it to be issued under the authority, advice and consent of this wonderful department and its minister, this information bureau and the minister thereof, and even at that the public are not getting much information. Then you have a secret service, unnamed spokesmen on the radio almost every night. I call them the ghosts behind the scenes, dealing with all these matters.

Sometimes the information given by this standing army of officials is only half the truth. All kinds of bureaucratic orders are issued by them, involving fines and gaol penalties over the head of parliament. Gradually the functions of this parliament are being taken away altogether. A civil war was fought in England for nearly one hundred years over just this question of the control of the public expenditure and to have their representatives in parliament made responsible to the people. Now the principle fought for in that war has been altogether upset. Are we just to act the part of yes-men and nodders of approval of everything the bureaucratic dollar-a-year men pass? Goodness knows they are passing enough. One czar announces he is going to take the cuffs off the trousers of members of parliament, they are going to abolish ties, they are not going to let the well-groomed Minister of Pensions and National Health (Mr. Mackenzie) wear vests any more, and all that kind of thing, and in the women's column and the society column there are pages of what is to be cut out. Who is paying for it over the head of this parliament and we know nothing about it? This is absolutely illegal, and has been done without the consent of the houses of parliament. We have never heard a word about it, yet penalties and fines up to $5,000 are announced every day by these people, who form what is almost a separate parliament by themselves as czars and dictators. The rules and regulations they pass have the force of statutes, without the knowledge and authority of this parliament, but now we are going to impose more secret government upon the people in the way indicated of a secret session of this house. These boards, commissions and so on are usurping the powers of parliament; they even exercise control over members of the cabinet by the orders they issue secretly. Some of this may be and is necessary to a limited extent. The radio is another secret institution. The Department of External Affairs, as I have contended for some years has been conducted as though its business was its own, without parliament being given all the facts.

That is not the way in which things are done in England. There they publicly debated the whole Pacific question, the collapse of Singapore and everything else. The British *Hansard* contains sixty-five pages of questions and answers and statements made in the house by responsible ministers. Some of the questions were asked in the house by government supporters, admirals, major-generals, some of the finest soldiers to serve in the last war and many of whom are serving in this war as well. All these matters were discussed in public there; and no questions were asked, and no information given, which would reveal any particular military secrets. We are in

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the very darkest hour of the war, and this is no time to withold anything from either the public or the press. The real facts and the real picture should be given. As I have said, I believe the press has a great function and duty to perform. It is a connecting link between the government and the electors, as members of parliament are; and the censorship over the press, instead of being further extended, should be abolished altogether. In my opinion the opposition have been led into a trap by supporting this move to meet in secret. In Australia the prime minister, Mr. Curtin, and the leader of the opposition, Mr. Hughes, who was in Canada many times during the last war, have spoken strongly on the whole question of publicity and criticism of our war effort and the danger ahead. They have done splendid work in asserting the rights of Australia as a dominion. Sometimes, when I see what little information we are given compared with the information given in the Australian parliament and when I see the dictators at their doors I think we have let Australia down in not making greater efforts to help her by the Singapore base in 1937-38. The very life of the British commonwealth is at stake, yet we go ahead holding secret meetings, plebiscites, and all that sort of thing.

It is my belief, Mr. Speaker, that anything that might be accomplished in secret, with reference to the Pacific question, could be better accomplished publicly in this house. We have met intermittently; on again, off again, on again; and one branch is here very seldom. Its members have been sent home, with no war work to do. Instead of having this secret meeting of the house, we should have a reallocation of duties as between the two houses of parliament, in connection with the war. It may be too late now to do very much about the Pacific coast. Our belated air bases and the proposed road through British Columbia will get us nowhere without the most important thing of all, supremacy on the sea. Information in this connection should be given the house publicly, not in secret.

I have a great deal of respect for the Prime Minister. I believe he has worked hard, and in many ways I think the government have done a good job, except in regard to manpower. But I believe the government misjudged the whole European situation, as well as the Pacific question. I believe it would be far better for the Prime Minister to make a statement in this house, similar to that made in the British house with regard to the Pacific, Singapore, Hong Kong, and all the other places, and have a two-day debate. This is a story that goes back twenty years.

[Mr. Church.]

Canada, as a part of the British empire, has no divine right to expect victory, or that victory may be attained by secret meetings. The path is going to be more difficult from now on. As I said in this house four years ago, on February 12, 1938, we were shortsighted in not backing the Singapore base as New Zealand and Australia did; and now it is too late. The government seems to think there is a royal road to victory, and as a result we have neglected to prepare for war on land, sea or in the air. Victory will come only with resolute leadership, a total war effort, service and real sacrifice. There is no use in talking about victory, as though it would be ours by divine law; we can gain victory only by telling the people the truth, by facing the real facts and building upon the worst of them.

The time has come when Canada must decide whether or not she will do her duty, when the government must speak to the people and let them know the facts. Man-power is the main issue, whether it is discussed in public or in secret. By proposing to hold this secret caucus we are upsetting the practice that has existed for the last two or three hundred years. Up to the present all our meetings have been held in public. I often feel that they have not been adequately reported by the press, but often you cannot blame the press because in many ways parliament has simply effaced itself by allowing its functions, privileges and powers to be taken away and given to these bureaucratic boards, with a resulting lack of information. It seems to me the government is always very glad to see the House of Commons go home, to get rid of it, in order to have a breathing spell and conduct the war itself.

I am afraid of this secret meeting; I am afraid we are falling into a trap. I do not want this motion to pass without a protest, because as soon as the motion passes we create a precedent for the separatists and isolationists of the future, for those only too eager and anxious in the future to initiate the methods of Hitler and Mussolini. I believe I represent a large body of public opinion which is opposed to any such principle. I do not want to see the House of Commons dealt with in this way. So far as I know, there is nothing to meet about in private. The question of the security of the Malay peninsula was dealt with in public in the British house, where they have also discussed Libya, Greece, Crete, Singapore, and all the other places. Only the other day Prime Minister Churchill discussed the very thing about which we are to meet in private; and what did he say to the British house? He said we had to send

to Russia tanks, aeroplanes and other equipment that had been destined for Libya and various other places. Then he went on to say that the fall of Singapore had very gravely affected command of the sea; and, after all, it is Britain's command of the sea that enables Russia to obtain supplies of all kinds from the United Kingdom and the United States. At the present time that command is seriously threatened. That was what he told the British House of Commons in public, and that is the very thing about which we are to meet in secret. Unfortunately Japan has obtained temporary command of the sea in the Pacific. You can meet in secret all you like; Japan has that command, and that is a terrible thing for the British empire.

For the first time in many years we find Great Britain committed to an important campaign in the Pacific at a time when she has commitments in other places. The United States cannot now get a fleet across the Pacific because she has no bases and Singapore has fallen. This is the kind of information we may get, and it has all been given publicly in the British *Hansard* and by the British Prime Minister. Great Britain and the United States have not full command of the seas because their lines of communication will be broken by raiders. Japan is even in a position to land forces. This is what is happening while we are sitting here.

This is not the time for us to embark upon this new secret course. The losses sustained yesterday in our own navy amounted to 55 men. We have a duty to the rest of the dominions and the rest of the empire. Nothing should be done to change our constitution because we are entering the darkest hour of the war. Great Britain had to do everything alone up until the end of last June. We now have two active allies. Russia has been a revelation and her military strength has saved Great Britain. Otherwise, the mechanized hordes might be now in Great Britain. We are going to have dark days ahead, and I was hoping that some information would be given to the people. I believe the proposed secret session is a retrograde step.

The press has been eliminated by this motion. The press has been a great factor in giving information to the public of this country, and we owe a great deal to it. Were it not for the press and the money it has spent, the people would not know anything. The establishment of the information bureau was a reflection upon our press. During the last war there was no censorship of the press in effect. Mr. Chambers, the Gentleman Usher of the Black Rod was the censor. We should follow the lead of England where there is no censorship. The editors of the papers are directly responsible. This will be the first time in the history of this House of Commons where the press has not been present, except the one meeting which was held in the days of Sir Robert Borden.

Mr. D. G. ROSS (St. Paul's): Mr. Speaker, I think we are all anxious to get more information, but after we do get the information in the secret session which is to be held, how are we going to impart that to our constituents? The people of the country are the ones who really want information. I know that we as members of parliament will be satisfied, but if the information which we hope to get is given to us then, a tremendous responsibility will be thrown upon us. We will be laying ourselves open to criticism or suspicion if any information given in this secret session should get out. It is a detriment to the freedom of parliament. Of course I am willing to take that chance, as are other members. I have made up my mind that I shall see what comes forth in this secret session, but if I do not think sufficient information is being given, I shall not attend further sessions as a result of which I might lay myself open to criticism.

I should like to ask the Prime Minister if every Tuesday is to be set aside for a secret session. The wording of the motion is:

That on any day set aside for that purpose by the house without notice having been previously given—

Mr. MACKENZIE KING: I propose to move a resolution in a moment, fixing Tuesday, February 24, as the day.

Mr. ROSS (St. Paul's): Will that be every Tuesday?

Mr. MACKENZIE KING: No.

Mr. ROSS (St. Paul's): I do not quite understand how you are going to do it.

Mr. M. J. COLDWELL (Rosetown-Biggar): Mr. Speaker, before the discussion closes I should like to say a few words because I am very strongly in favour of the holding of a secret session. The hon. member for Broadview (Mr. Church) always interests me because he is so typically Conservative. He does not like a change except when it suits his own convenience. As for the argument that this upsets the whole procedure of the British empire for the past several centuries, if we accept this view then perhaps we should regret very much that this same procedure has been upset about once a week during the last year at Westminster itself. We are

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following good British precedents in holding a session of this description when it is thought necessary.

We want to know something of the government's difficulties. There is information which we cannot get in public because the questions we might ask would give information to the enemy. We are not holding this secret session, as the hon. member for Broadview seems to suggest, in order to badger officials of the Department of National Defence or any other department. I imagine that the only people who will be present at the session will be the responsible ministers, the officials of the house, members of parliament and members of the other place if they care to occupy seats in the gallery. Consequently there will be no opportunity, nor will there be any desire, to pillory anyone in connection with our war effort.

I feel sure that after members of parliament have had the opportunity of asking questions of an intimate nature and receiving replies, they will be in a much better position to decide what questions it is in the public interest to ask the government in the public sessions of parliament. In war time there are matters which we dare not raise on the floor of this house. Several times during the debate on the address some hon. members came very close to asking for information that ought not to have been asked for. On one or two occasions ministers themselves, in placing publicly before the house details regarding equipment and so on, divulged information that might be of interest to the enemy. Of course that was because members of the house sought the information in the only way in which it could be sought.

The object of this secret session, from my own point of view at least, is not to pillory the government, not to indulge in criticism of the government in secret—I shall do that in public—but to gain all the information we possibly can so that we may be able to discuss matters intelligently on the floor of this house.

May I say that I am sorry the government has decided that the inquiry into the Hong Kong affair shall also be held in camera.

Mr. MACKENZIE KING: The government did not decide that. The chief justice made his own decision.

Mr. COLDWELL: I am sorry that the commissioner so decided. I cannot think that any of the facts upon which a judgment could be based in connection with that episode ought to be withheld from the public. It is thoroughly in the public interest that the facts in connection with it should be given.

[Mr. Coldwell.]

So far as the secret session of the house is concerned, let us understand among ourselves that—as in Great Britain and as, I believe, in Australia and New Zealand, where secret sessions have been held—it is not being held in order that members may pillory, criticize or do anything else of the kind to the government, but rather that we may obtain information which because of the war situation could not be given publicly and upon which we may base judgment and comment afterward.

Mr. J. H. HARRIS (Danforth): Mr. Speaker, I am one of those who during the last twelve months have found it necessary on a score of occasions to withdraw from secret sessions which have been held on matters of great concern and of like nature to the one now under consideration. I realize and recognize the gravity of the present situation and am anxious that everything that can be done shall be done, and accordingly I shall revise my conduct and sit in at this secret session of the house.

An hon. MEMBER: Hear, hear.

Mr. HARRIS (Danforth): When I say that, Mr. Speaker, may I add, in reply to the "hear, hear" which came from the rear, that the basis of my conduct in this matter is a little different from that which obtained on a previous occasion. The previous occasion to which I refer, sir, had to do with the conduct of the war expenditures committee. There will be a time and place when we can debate that matter, but in the meantime I address myself to this particular question.

One other observation I should like to make, and it is that the report of this session is in very able hands, being in the hands of the Speaker. I recognize that we are not now in committee of the whole and that we cannot by question and answer get information from the Prime Minister as to the wisdom of having you alone, sir, assume that great responsibility. The thought ran through my mind that you might wish to have someone, the leaders of the parties perhaps, associated with you in the task of drawing up that report, but on reflection I am of the opinion that it might better be left to Mr. Speaker to draft the report of the secret session. All hon. members of goodwill in this house in the one task which is predominant in our minds will, I hope, be satisfied with that report. Nevertheless, in a democratic institution, we must reserve our right not necessarily to concur in the report which after careful consideration emanates from Your Honour. I felt that I ought to make a statement of this kind, Mr. Speaker, so that you would have in mind the feeling of some of the members in this very difficult time. I am confident that the report may well rest in your hands.

Mr. E. G. HANSELL (Macleod): Mr. Speaker, I have on one or two occasions been a member of committees which were supposed to hold their sittings in camera. I quite understand that there may be a slight difference in interpretation as to committees holding their sittings in camera and committees holding their sittings in secret. But whether it be in camera or in secret, the result of information getting out from those committess is just as serious as the result of information getting out from a secret session of this house. Yet to my amazement I have discovered that not only has information gone forth from committees that have been held in camera, but it has actually been printed in the press and blazed before the public. I objected to that on one occasion, and perhaps I shall do so again. Because of that I believe that when a secret session is held it should be regarded as secret by every member, and not one word should be breathed outside of what has gone on inside the chamber during the secret session.

May I add that I am a strong believer in the administration of law and justice. I do not suppose that I shall ever be a judge. I hope I never am, because I am afraid that I would be a little hard upon those who break the law. When people go out deliberately and utter words of a subversive nature they should be punished. Yet, though I say that, I am rather inclined to think that to put members of parliament under the defence of Canada regulations because of this secret session is perhaps not just the best thing. Personally I find difficulty in thinking my way through the question who is to determine whether or not some utterance made on a public platform was made on the basis of what the speaker might have heard at a secret session of this house.

I would also ask the Prime Minister whether a *Hansard* report will be kept of the secret session. If such a report is kept I do not see that it could be a secret session. If it is not kept, who is to know whether this or that member has revealed something secret after the session is over? I am wondering whether a better method of dealing with any such betrayal of information would not be to bring the member before the bar of this house. I offer that as a suggestion.

One further question. During the secret session are we to understand that the house will go into committee of the whole in order that questions may be asked? I am one of those who have in the past advocated a secret session every once in a while. I agree with the hon. member who leads our friends of the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation; I have no desire whatsoever to badger the government or put forth any political arguments or put the government on the spot in any particular, but there are some things which I believe the members of the House of Commons should know in order to be able better to serve this country. That is my attitude. At present we are in the dark on many matters of public concern. I have had people ask me things about which they have obtained information somewhere but about which I have not known a thing; I am in the dark about them, and I am certain that all members feel as I do in that respect. I think the secret session will serve a good purpose if the government will be absolutely open and free to say, "Gentlemen, this is the situation; there it is; now, what can we do to benefit that particular thing?" If the government will be absolutely open and frank I am sure that it will receive the cooperation, and not the opposition, of members of this house in a secret session.

Mr. MACKENZIE KING: Mr. Speaker, I should like to say a word in reference to some of the remarks that have been made.

First of all, the hon. member for St. Paul's (Mr. Ross) drew attention to the wording of the resolution itself. I agree with him that it is a little ambiguous. The explanation is that at the time the resolution was placed on the order paper it was impossible to say what day could be fixed for the secret session; I knew that hon. members desired to be assured that a secret session would be held very soon. I accordingly had the notice placed on the order paper to provide for an early date. In order to remove ambiguity and to place the matter in a shape which I think would be preferable, I would ask the house to allow me to amend the resolution before it is put to the house by Mr. Speaker so that it may read:

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Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): That is what I thought it would be.

Mr. MACKENZIE KING: Yes; my hon. friend says he thought it would be that. The intention of the government was simply to make the resolution broad enough to fix a day, but it was not intended that there should be a series of secret sittings of the house.

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how long it will last. We will see what time is necessary when the sitting actually takes place.

May I say this with respect to the secret session, particularly in view of what has been said this afternoon? At the previous session a request was made for a secret session of the house. The government has not met that request up to the present time. We thought it was inadvisable for many reasons to have secret sessions if they could possibly be avoided. But when the hon. member for Rosetown-Biggar (Mr. Coldwell) asked at the beginning of this session if a day could be fixed for a secret session, I felt, and my colleagues agreed with me, that to refuse that request would cause the government to appear to be unwilling to give information to hon. members which they ought to have and which they could not obtain in any other way. We agreed to the secret session in order that we might not be misunderstood with respect to our wish not to withhold anything that hon. members desired to have in the way of information and which we of the government were in a position to give.

But may I say to hon. members that there is great force in much that has been said this afternoon by some hon. members who have evidently been giving this matter a great deal of thought. If the session related to a matter which concerned Canada only and to giving information which would concern Canada alone, I should feel that the responsibility upon the ministry was much less than it is in the light of a situation such as exists in the world to-day. Canada's war effort is bound up with the war efforts of all parts of the British empire. It is also linked now not only with the war effort of the United States but also with those of the united nations, some twenty-six in number; and our plans, as I think is generally known, are related to the combined plans, in so far as they have thus far been combined, of all the nations which are allied with us in the war. It is going to be exceedingly difficult for the government to disclose much information with respect to questions which will arise in the minds of many hon. members, without giving information which, if it were ever publicly disclosed, would react, not against the government of Canada, but against the war effort of the combined nations; and I want to make it perfectly clear that when the secret session is held the government will have to keep constantly in mind that great and very grave responsibility.

I do not mind saying that time and again we have received communications from England regretting that we had found it necessary to make certain statements in this parliament with respect to some phases of our war effort, particularly in answering questions as to the extent of equipment and production in certain directions, and the like. These things may not appear to us to have the significance which others attach to them. But in relation to a war effort so closely knit as this is, between many nations, and directed against a foe who stops at nothing to obtain information on every single point about which it is possible to acquire information, the responsibility of giving any information other than that which can be communicated in open parliament is very grave indeed.

Now, I have confidence in the honour and integrity of all hon. members; but when I acknowledge that personally I repeatedly find it very difficult, while in conversation with different persons, quite unconsciously not to tell something which is in the nature of a state secret, I can imagine how difficult it is going to be for many hon. members who, perhaps, have not to reserve their words with the same caution that I have to apply to my own, to avoid, in the course of conversations with friends or on occasions when some particular point is raised, not to unwittingly give out information which has been obtained at a secret session, never thinking it to be of the significance which in fact it may have. I had thought that when the session was being held I might say a word of caution in this connection, but perhaps it is as well that it should be said now. What I wish, however, to make clear, and I would like the country to understand it, is that the government is not asking the house to meet in secret session in order that it may disclose something which it regards as critical or as otherwise necessitating a secret session. It is seeking, rather, to meet the wish of some hon. members to get information which otherwise they might not be in a position to secure.

My understanding with regard to the secret sessions held in Britain—and I have taken occasion to make careful inquiries—is that such sessions are usually held at the instance of the government itself, where the Prime Minister has some statement which he thinks it is desirable to impart to the members but which he would not wish to impart openly. Secret sessions are for that purpose rather than for the purpose of giving an amount of detailed information.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): Would the Prime Minister allow me? I am surprised to hear him make that statement, because my understanding was entirely the reverse—that it is very rarely the government asked to have

a secret session for the purpose of making statements, but that it usually came from the demands of private members.

Mr. MACKENZIE KING: I had not finished what I was going on to say. My information as I have given it to the house is exactly as I have received it in a communication which I shall be glad to show my hon. friend later, but the communication goes on to state that in the secret session opportunity is afforded members of the opposition, or members of parliament generally, to make to the government suggestions and criticisms which they would hesitate to make in open session. The one point I wish to stress is that facts in regard to such matters as equipment, disposition of troops, questions of strategy, and the like, which might assist the enemy, are not disclosed at all at secret sessions in Britain; those sessions are as limited, in the matter of disclosure of detailed information, as it is possible for sessions to be, and usually, as hon. members know, the sessions themselves are few and far between and do not last for any length of time.

As regards the question which an hon. member has raised as to the use of *Hansard*, of course no record of any kind will be kept. The purpose of the session is that discussions may be off the record and that nothing shall go out, nothing shall be retained of the record, with respect to questions that have been raised or answers given.

As to procedure, whether the house will proceed in committee of the whole, I understand that in Britain the Speaker is usually in the chair when the minister concerned or the Prime Minister is making his statement. The house then resolves itself into committee of the whole so as to permit of question and answer on the statement which has been made. That may be found to be the most convenient way to proceed when we meet on Tuesday, but that the house can decide for itself when in secret session. That is all I wish to say, but I should like to have the motion put in the form amended as indicated.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): A question arose, from the hon. member for Lethbridge (Mr. Blackmore), about the record.

Mr. MACKENZIE KING: I answered that. There is none to be kept.

Mr. McIVOR: One question. When two know a thing it is a secret, and when three know it it is not. Is any penalty attached to anyone who is known to be giving out news, apart from yourself, Mr. Speaker?

Mr. MACKENZIE KING: I have mentioned the order in council that provides penalties for a disclosure on the part of anyone with respect to what takes place at a secret session.

Motion as amended agreed to.

PRIVILEGE—HON. MR. HANSON

CENSORSHIP OF MAIL ADDRESSED TO OR DISPATCHED BY MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT

On the orders of the day:

Hon. R. B. HANSON (Leader of the Opposition): I desire to refer at this stage to the question of privilege which I raised on Monday last regarding the censorship of mail addressed to or dispatched by members of parliament. I had anticipated that an additional reply would be forthcoming either from the Prime Minister of from the Postmaster General before this. It will be recalled that I requested that the rules and regulations governing this practice be laid before the house, and the Prime Minister promised to endeavour to secure information. I now wish to renew that request and to seek from the Prime Minister or the Postmaster General an unequivocal assurance that the practice of which I complained will be abandoned.

Since I spoke on Monday last I have been doing a little investigating myself and I find that every telegram that I send, or any other member sends, is censored, whether it is within or without the country. I find also that so far, in Ottawa, our long distance telephone messages have not been tapped but that telephone messages from certain defence areas are tapped and recordings made of them.

I do not want to use too strong language about this. I can quite appreciate that telephone messages from a defence area, and telegrams from a defence area—perhaps letters from a defence area, if that is the right technical term to use—addressed to certain people, especially outside Canada, may and in certain instances should be censored. But a telephone message to me from Halifax surely ought not to be censored. A telegram from myself to somebody in Winnipeg ought not to be copied and censored.

This thing has gone beyond all reason. I do not think hon. members are aware how far it has gone.

Mr. REID: In British Columbia they warn you before you telephone outside the country.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): The only warning I ever had over the telephone was not to talk about the weather. I talked to my daughter in Halifax.

Mr. RALSTON: And other things too—ships and so on.

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Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): You are not to talk about that, or things of that sort. That is quite all right. But we have reached the stage where any telegram I send to any of my political friends is copied, and the contents may be submitted to some minister across the way. Surely this sort of thing cannot go on. I am not disloyal; I am not dealing in treason. I may be at times engaged in political warfare, but I am certainly not dealing in treason. Nobody will for a moment think I am. If I were, I would be unworthy to occupy not only this position but a seat in this house.

I do appeal to the Prime Minister to have some review made of this whole position. I sent for an official of the company the other day and he was good enough to come and see me. I had been warned that my conversations were being tapped—I think that is the word—and I know from investigations I have made in New Brunswick that it is quite possible to do that. Anybody can listen in. In operating the telephone they can listen in and they do listen in. I made it my business as director of the New Brunswick Telephone Company to inquire once pretty thoroughly into the question, because complaint had been made to me, and the party making the complaint had just cause for doing so. I found out what the *modus operandi* was. I did not think it was right, and that was in peace time. I certainly raised cain so far as I was able to in connection with it.

Mr. POWER: Who does the tapping, the telephone company or some employee of the government?

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): I found out that, so far as anything transmitted out of this building is concerned, there is no tapping. I was therefore reassured and I was very much relieved. The minute you take down your telephone you are automatically put in touch with central in Ottawa and there is no intervention. I am assured that there is no opportunity for intervention in this building. That of course is a relief. At the other end of the wire there may be opportunity for intervention.

Mr. POWER: By the telephone company?

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): It must be with the cooperation of the telephone company. Out of Halifax, there is no doubt about it that the officers were sitting right in. We have had the spectacle of a prosecution of one of the leading citizens of Halifax on the basis of a telephone conversation. I do not know much about the merits of that case, but this gentleman was prosecuted and he was found not guilty. The government has appealed that decision. There may be sound grounds for that; I do not know, but I am informed that that was a case which should never have been brought up. Of course opinions may differ about that. Counsel may have been asked to give an opinion, or the Royal Canadian Mounted Police may have felt strongly, or it may even have come up to the government itself. I do not know. However, the situation exists. That is what I am referring to and I think we should know something more about it.

On the point of censoring letters to or from members of parliament let us have an end of that. On the question of telegrams, it is well to be forewarned. I suppose we shall have to get a secret code. I do not want every member of the government to know what I am sending out to Mr. Meighen, we will say. I just mention that in passing. It would be terrible if we were to have this espionage go the extent of including long distance telephone messages. Liberty in this country will be gone. Surely we are confined enough now; we are regimented enough. I am willing to take my share with anyone in that regard on my personal prerogatives and freedom of action. But this is spying; this is espionage, and I object to it. I want it to end if I can possibly have it ended.

I renew my request with added force to-day for the production of the regulations in regard to this matter so that we may know under just what system we are living.

Right Hon. W. L. MACKENZIE KING (Prime Minister): May I say to my hon. friend that when he brought this subject up the other day I immediately spoke to one of my colleagues in reference to having the whole situation carefully reviewed. It was pointed out at the time that it concerned different departments of the government, and in order to have a complete review I have waited until inquiry could be made sufficiently comprehensive to give my hon. friend a reply. I will try to see that the review is expedited and an answer given to him in a day or two. But I would say to my hon. friend that I do think he is unduly concerned about the extent to which others are interested in his mail or his conversations.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): I would hope nobody is. But apparently they are.

Mr. MACKENZIE KING: I mean so far as the government is concerned. The last thing I should wish, and I am sure any of my colleagues or any members on this side of the house, would be to have the slightest knowledge of any matter which my hon. friend regarded as confidential.

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Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): That is a fair statement, of course.

Mr. MACKENZIE KING: I would say first that as far as the safety of the state will permit all his confidential correspondence should be kept so. I agree that every precaution must be taken to preserve the absolute right of every citizen to have his mail kept free from censorship as far as possible, but there are certain military obligations that have to be observed at this time. I suppose that by degrees we shall overcome the difficulties that arise in that connection. I would say, however, that spying or espionage is not a part of what the government is seeking in this connection.

Mr. M. J. COLDWELL (Rosetown-Biggar): I should like to support the leader of the opposition (Mr. Hanson) in this matter, and I should like the Prime Minister to make a much more definite statement than that he will give the leader of the opposition a copy of the regulations or even make further inquiry and give further consideration to the matter. Under the circumstances I do not think that is good enough.

I can see a reason why letters, telegrams and so on from certain defence areas should be censored, but I cannot see why letters addressed to members of parliament should be censored even when they come from those particular areas. We are here representing the Canadian people. If there are those among us who are suspect, they should be dealt with in another way. May I add that I do not think there is any such member in the house. But for my own part, for example, a soldier who has written to me on matters concerning himself would hesitate to write to me at all if he knew that the letter was going to be opened and a paragraph from it forwarded say to the Minister of National Defence, who in turn might forward it to the soldier's commanding officer, and the man would then undoubtedly receive some penalty or reprimand for having written to a member of parliament. We are fighting for democratic rights, and surely one of the democratic rights a citizen possesses, whether he is in uniform or out of uniform, is the right to approach his elected representative in this house without let or hindrance.

I strongly support the leader of the opposition in the protest he has made. I regret that the Prime Minister has not given a more categorical assurance that this interference with mail, at least mail addressed to members of the House of Commons, will cease immediately. The situation is much too serious to be allowed to rest simply with a promise of consideration. In saying what he did I am sure the leader of the opposition, as I did, was speaking not merely on behalf of opposition members of this house; I have heard expressions of opinion from members on the government side which coincide very closely with the opinions we are expressing. Let us not in this struggle for liberty and democracy allow these elementary rights of citizenship and parliamentary representation to be taken from us or interfered with.

I strongly urge upon the Prime Minister that he give a categorical assurance to this house that at least so far as members of this house are concerned this interference with the right of the citizen to approach his member unhampered and unhindered and unsupervised will cease immediately.

Mr. MACKENZIE KING: I do not think my hon. friend can have quite caught the purport of my reply to the leader of the opposition. I did not say the matter was receiving consideration; I replied that I intended to make a full statement when the review which is now being made of the situation is completed. May I add that I did express to the Postmaster General the personal view that I thought all letters addressed to members of parliament should go without censorship altogether and that I should like him to have that aspect of the situation inquired into particularly and let me know if there is any reason why that rule should not prevail.

My hon. friend spoke of the tapping of telephones. I do not mean to pose as an authority, but some years ago I, along with another gentleman, was appointed a commissioner to inquire into certain conditions of employment obtaining among telephone operatives. The commission learned at that time that one aspect of telephone operations as conducted by the company itself was to have as part of a regular procedure what was known as a listening board, at which operators sat and took down parts of conversations. It was considered part of the regular business of the telephone company.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): I do not think that is true to-day.

Mr. MACKENZIE KING: Let me finish, because it may serve my hon. friend's purpose as well as my own. I have kept it in mind ever since. The explanation which was given was that the company was interested in knowing whether telephones were being used for private purposes or for purposes of business, there being a higher rate charged on telephones used for business purposes than on those for domestic use. Upon the report

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made by the commission this parliament subsequently passed an enactment making it an offence to disclose any information obtained over a telephone in that way. Parliament did not do away with the listening boards. I do not know whether they are still used, but I know that at that time it came as a surprise to everyone—this was some thirty or more years ago—to discover that while there was such a law with respect to disclosing contents of telegrams, it did not apply to disclosure of telephone conversations. It may be that conversations over the telephone are listened to still, but I would certainly not countenance the government listening in on telephone conversations unless for very exceptional reasons.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): The fact is they do. Recordings are made of conversations in Canada to-day in certain areas. I am not unreasonable about that. There may be sound reasons for it, because this country is full of spies. I have no doubt of it. And they are not hiding up in this gallery listening to the twaddle that goes on in this house. They are down where there is business going on that might interest their nation. I agree with that. But so far as we are concerned here why should there be any attempt to censor our telegrams or our telephone conversations?

WAR APPROPRIATIONS

INQUIRY AS TO INTRODUCTION OF BILLS FOR PRESENT AND ENSUING FISCAL YEARS

On the orders of the day:

Hon. R. B. HANSON (Leader of the Opposition): I should like to ask the Minister of Finance when it is expected that the war appropriation bill for the next fiscal year will be introduced. Will there be a supplementary war appropriation bill for the present fiscal year, and if so when will it be brought down?

Hon. J. L. ILSLEY: (Minister of Finance): Well, Mr. Speaker, I have not completed my plans with respect to the introduction of these bills. What I have in mind is the introduction of a bill relating to the financial arrangements with Great Britain, as the first of the financial bills; then, probably shortly after that, the introduction of both the supplementary appropriation bills for the present fiscal year and the war appropriation bill for the next fiscal year, bringing them in at the same time.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): There will be a supplementary bill as well?

[Mr. Mackenzie King.]

Mr. ILSLEY: It would appear that a supplementary appropriation bill will be necessary.

HONG KONG COMMISSION

REPORTED APPOINTMENT OF COLONEL GEORGE DREW AS COUNSEL

On the orders of the day:

Mr. G. T. FULFORD (Leeds): Is it true that Colonel George Drew has been appointed by the opposition as counsel to the royal commission investigating the Hong Kong affair; and, if so, could that be the real reason the Ontario legislature has been adjourned?

[*Later*]

Mr. FULFORD: When may I expect an answer to my question?

Mr. SPEAKER: The leader of the opposition (Mr. Hanson) is not bound to reply.

CANADIAN NATIONAL RAILWAYS

INQUIRY AS TO ANNUAL REPORT AND REPORT OF THE AUDITORS

On the orders of the day:

Hon. R. B. HANSON (Leader of the Opposition): May I ask the Prime Minister, in the absence of the Minister of Transport, when it is anticipated that the annual report of the Canadian National Railways and the report of the auditors of the Canadian National Railways will be laid on the table? I should think we ought to have this information before Bill No. 9, respecting the appointment of auditors, is proceeded with. It will be recalled that last year these reports were delayed and it was not until late in the session that they were received and the committee set up. I can understand that with the present tremendous volume of work there may be some delay on the part of the Canadian National in getting out these reports, but perhaps this would be timely notice to the minister, if we could have the reports later. My suggestion is that this bill be not proceeded with in the meantime.

Right Hon. W. L. MACKENZIE KING (Prime Minister): I shall draw the attention of the minister to my hon. friend's remarks.

WAR INSURANCE

CONTRIBUTORY INSURANCE FOR MEN IN SERVICE—WAR RISK PROPERTY DAMAGE

On the orders of the day:

Mr. D. G. ROSS (St. Paul's): I should like to direct a question to the Minister of Finance. Would the government advise us as to whether they have in view making available to the

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general list of airmen, pilots and officers on active service, officers and other ranks of the active army in hazardous jobs, the personnel of the naval services and the merchant marine, some sort of contributory scheme of life insurance, such as that in force in the United States? Would it be possible for the government to make available to the insurance companies of Canada the statistics with respect to the mortality in these services, from time to time, so that the life insurance companies would be able to set rates which would be available to the members of the forces? At the present time no such statistics are available, and the making of rates is more or less of a gamble.

Some hon. MEMBERS: Order.

Mr. ROSS (St. Paul's): Would the government advise the house and the country as to what war risk property damage insurance is available to the public in such places as Halifax and Vancouver, and other vulnerable points? Some months ago I inquired by letter of the Minister of Trade and Commerce, under whose jurisdiction I understood this came, as to what had been done in this matter. I was advised—

Some hon. MEMBERS: Order.

Mr. ROSS (St. Paul's): —that the whole question was being considered. It seems to me that we should follow the example of Great Britain and act in this matter without delay.

Mr. SPEAKER: Order. The hon. gentleman should ask his question without making a speech.

Mr. ROSS (St. Paul's): I should like to just finish my question.

Some hon. MEMBERS: No.

Mr. ROSS (St. Paul's): I should like to say further that in certain circumstances it is delaying our war effort. Shippers who in all probability have bank commitments are diffident about shipping their goods—

Some hon. MEMBERS: Order.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): Let the Speaker call the hon. gentleman to order.

Mr. MACKENZIE (Vancouver Centre): That is not a question at all for the orders of the day. It is definitely out of order.

Mr. MACDONALD (Kingston City): It is not a question; it is a statement.

Mr. ROSS (St. Paul's): I think this is a question that should be answered at once.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): The Minister of National Defence for Naval Affairs (Mr. Macdonald) has no right to lecture either the hon. member or myself across the floor of this house.

Mr. MACKENZIE (Vancouver Centre): I raised a point of order, and I had every right to raise it.

Mr. SPEAKER: The hon. gentleman should have asked his question. He proceeded to make a statement. He should address his question to the government.

Hon. J. L. ILSLEY (Minister of Finance): As to the first two questions, I submit that they should be placed on the order paper, because they are not the sort of question which the rules permit on the orders of the day. As to the third question, there may be a slightly greater element of urgency in that, because it relates to war risk insurance. I can say to my hon. friend that some time ago I instructed an eminent member of the legal profession in whom I have confidence to make a report to me on the type of war risk insurance scheme that would be appropiate to this country. He has not yet done so, though I understand that he is just about ready to do it. When that report is received the government will take such action as is appropriate in the circumstances.

Mr. ROSS (St. Paul's): It is three months since I first inquired. This matter should be dealt with.

DEFENCE OF CANADA REGULATIONS

EXTENSION OF POWER OF REQUISITION TO MINISTER OF MUNITIONS AND SUPPLY

On the orders of the day:

Hon. R. B. HANSON (Leader of the Opposition): I should like to direct one more question, this time to the Minister of Munitions and Supply, who is not here. Perhaps it might be addressed instead to our new friend the Minister of Justice, who has just come to us. My attention has been called to order in council P.C. 995, passed on the 9th instant under the authority of the War Measures Act, on the recommendation of the acting Minister of Justice. This order in council amends the defence of Canada regulations, as consolidated in 1941, by rescinding the present regulation No. 48 and substituting a new regulation No. 48, whereby the Minister of Munitions and Supply is given power—a power heretofore reserved to the ministers of defence, air and navy—to requisition, among other things (a) any chattel in Canada; and (b) any British ship or aircraft registered in Canada.

If it is not convenient for the ministry to answer my questions to-day it will be all right to have them answered later. But I should

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like to ask, first, the reason for this amendment to the regulations. Why is this power now sought to be vested in the Minister of Munitions and Supply rather than in the defence ministry, and what is the reason for this extension of the power of requisition—because I think in substance there is an extension of that power. Then I wish to know if the owner of such chattel, ship or aircraft, as the case may be, is to be compensated therefor, or is it to be conscripted, if that is a proper word to use in this house? And will members of parliament be provided with copies of the order in council? I think everyone ought to know about this; that is why I am drawing attention to it.

These are wide powers which are given to the ministers, I have no doubt quite properly. I am not criticizing the policy at all, but I want to get before the public the fact that there already exist very wide powers, and that now the Minister of Munitions and Supply, in addition to the defence ministers, can come in and take anything I have. They are welcome, as far as I am concerned, but the public ought to know about it and the reasons for the extension of that power to the fourth minister.

Hon. L. S. St. LAURENT (Minister of Justice): Mr. Speaker, this order in council was published in the Canada *Gazette* of February 14, 1942.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): How many people read it?

Mr. St. LAURENT: If it is desired, copies can be made available for the information of hon. members. As to the other information requested, might that stand over until the beginning of the week, so that an appropriate answer may be prepared?

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): Surely.

UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE

TRANSFER OF UNEMPLOYED WORKERS—UNEMPLOYED EMPLOYABLES

On the orders of the day:

Mr. J. G. DIEFENBAKER (Lake Centre): Mr. Speaker, I gave notice of a question or rather a series of questions that I intended to ask to-day of the Acting Minister of Labour (Mr. McLarty). My questions arise out of a picture which appeared some days ago in the Winnipeg *Tribune* depicting the delivery of an unemployment insurance cheque to a young man, twenty years of age, unmarried and living at home. Since unemployment insurance is denied to those who can secure employment or who have been given an opportunity for employment, I should like to ask the minister the following questions.

[Mr. Hanson (York-Sunbury).]

Why was this young man, who is apparently able-bodied and intelligent, not transferred to some work or occupation suitable to him where his services might be utilized instead of paying out unemployment insurance to him? And arising out of that question: Have the national employment or regional committeees transferred unemployed men to such positions as are vacant and available within or without the province where such persons were living at the time they became unemployed? If so, how many persons who would otherwise be entitled to unemployment insurance benefits have been transferred in that manner? Finally, how many unemployed employables are there in Canada to-day?

Mr. SPEAKER: The questions asked by the hon. member really should not be asked on the orders of the day.

Hon. N. A. McLARTY (Acting Minister of Labour): I have no objection to answering the hon. member for Lake Centre (Mr. Diefenbaker) with such information as I have. The case to which he refers has perhaps received some publicity because it was the first cheque paid out for benefits under the unemployment insurance fund. The young man in question was an usher in a theatre, and the employment service has been and is still endeavouring to secure him work. Not being a robust young man, he could not join the forces and cannot take on heavy work. In other words, he is pretty much limited to the class of work he was doing or work of a clerical nature.

With reference to the second question about the transfer of unemployed workers, I am advised that the employment offices are endeavouring to secure employment for any unemployed by every possible means, by transfer if necessary, provided they are willing to be transferred.

I am sorry that I have not had sufficient time to get the figures as to the unemployed employables, but I shall be glad to furnish my hon. friend with that information.

INQUIRY FOR RETURN

KIRKLAND LAKE LABOUR DISPUTE

On the orders of the day:

Mr. ANGUS MacINNIS (Vancouver East): On February 2, two motions for the production of papers which stood in my name were passed. I should like to ask the Acting Minister of Labour (Mr. McLarty) when these will be brought down.

Hon. N. A. McLARTY (Acting Minister of Labour): I do not recall offhand the motions referred to by the hon. member, and I shall have to make inquiry in connection with them.

PLEBISCITE ACT

PROVISION FOR TAKING OF VOTES ON ANY QUESTION SUBMITTED BY WAY OF PLEBISCITE

Hon. N. A. McLARTY (Secretary of State) moved that the house go into committee to consider the following resolution:

That it is expedient to introduce a measure respecting the taking of the votes of the qualified voters on any question submitted by way of plebiscite and for such purposes to make provision for the printing and publication of a Plebiscite Act and instructions issued thereunder, the preparation of voters' lists and other plebiscite documents, including forms and ballot papers, to provide for the fees, allowances, expenses or other remuneration of certain officials and employees.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): Do I understand that the minister does not intend to make a statement?

Mr. McLARTY: My intention was to make a statement.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): Now is the time to make it, before Mr. Speaker leaves the chair.

Mr. MACKENZIE KING: It could be made in committee of the whole.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): I think the minister ought to make a statement now because there are certain members who want to speak on this resolution.

Mr. McLARTY: There is no objection to following that procedure. I thought possibly the statement could have been made in committee of the whole, but it does not make any difference, certainly as far as I am concerned. In rising to move this resolution standing in my name, I realize that in some respects it is unique. A resolution of this kind is usually moved to accord the house and the committee an opportunity of considering the legislation which will be based upon it and of dealing with the matter in a general and not a detailed way. In the case of this resolution, however, the situation is somewhat changed. Ever since the debate on the address in reply to the speech from the throne commenced, most, if not all, of the attention of the house has been directed to the particular subject matter of the resolution which I am now moving. There were other important matters mentioned in the speech from the throne, but they were more or less neglected, or at least not extensively referred to. For that reason, I feel that I can best occupy the time of this house if I do not traverse the ordinary course which would ordinarily be traversed with a resolution of this kind, but deal with the particular features of the enactment which it is proposed to have follow the passing of this resolution.

Now that the holding of the plebiscite has been decided upon, I believe it will be the wish of this house that it be proceeded with in the fairest manner possible, in the speediest manner possible and in the most inexpensive manner possible. That being the situation, I think I can best use the time of the house in dealing with certain particular features of the enactment.

May I say, Mr. Speaker reference to the remarks which you made earlier in the day about hon. members not reading statements, that in the statement which I propose to give this afternoon there is nothing argumentative; I trust it is largely expository and explanatory. If I refer to my notes somewhat extensively, it will be only for the purpose of contracting the time that otherwise it would be necessary to take to deal with this resolution and perhaps of not overlooking some of the more important features. I shall endeavour, however, to trespass upon your injunction to the smallest possible degree.

This will not be the first plebiscite bill to be enacted in Canada. Hon. members are aware that the prohibition plebiscite act was passed by the parliament of Canada in 1898. One of the outstanding features of that act—it was not a lengthy one—was that it did not reenact any election act; it enacted the specific legislative features that were necessary to found the legislation upon and then left to directions the creation of the appropriate machinery and the procedure that would be followed. In the case of this enactment, it is suggested that a similar course be followed, that we do not try to reenact the whole election act, as we did in 1938, but that we enact essential legislative features, leaving to regulations, which regulations will be modeled as closely as possible upon the provisions of the election act, to provide the machinery which will be necessary to give force and effect to the plebiscite bill.

There will be another difference between the present bill and the act enacted in 1898. It is not proposed to put in this measure the exact wording of the plebiscite or the date upon which the plebiscite will be held. The wording has already been given by the Prime Minister (Mr. Mackenzie King), and that wording, together with the date, will be incorporated in a proclamation, provision for which is made in the bill itself.

It is proposed also that after the bill has received its second reading, it will be submitted to a special committee of the house for consideration. To that committee

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will be submitted, not only the bill itself but the regulations and the forms which will be promulgated after the passage of the bill.

This course appears to have a number of advantages. In the first place, the regulations must necessarily be lengthy. They will consist of two major divisions—those dealing with the Canadian service voters and those dealing with the ordinary voters in Canada. When combined, these regulations will comprise something like one hundred and thirty sections, and, when printed, cover about one hundred and twenty-five pages; and it is thought, bearing in mind the opportunity possessed by a special committee of receiving submissions and taking evidence, that they would receive a more thorough and, as well, a more expeditious consideration if, in the first instance, they were discussed in the special committee rather than in committee of the whole house.

As a safeguard, the bill will provide that the regulations shall, as near as may be, conform to the provisions of the Dominion Elections Act, 1938, and, in the matter of taking the vote of Canadian service voters, to the method employed at the last general election.

The bill consequently, Mr. Speaker, will not be a lengthy one. It will have but ten sections. Of these, several are of a nature which will require very little discussion, and for that reason I shall not deal with them at this time.

Perhaps the most important sections of the bill are those which provide for qualifications and disqualifications of voters. But before dealing in a general way with those sections, might I make one or two preliminary observations on the general principles which have been considered in the framing of the bill.

In the first place, it is the desire of the government and will, I believe, be the desire of parliament that the fullest possible opportunity shall be accorded to the people of Canada to express their views upon the particular question which will be submitted. On the other hand, it is equally desired that this expression will not be stifled by any undue restriction on those who will be permitted to vote.

In the second place, it is recognized that while the pledge was given to the qualified voters of Canada, there are certain classes of voters who, because of war-time conditions, must necessarily be excluded from voting, and others who, on account of their religious beliefs, would not in any event be affected by the giving of the pledge. Bearing in mind these observations, there are two classes

of voters for whom the bill provides: (1) the Canadian service voter; and (2) the ordinary voter.

(1) The definition of a Canadian service voter is an extremely wide one and is made as ample and complete as could be devised. This provision in the act has only two restrictions, namely, that he or she be a British subject and at the time he or she became a member of such forces or corps, was ordinarily resident in Canada.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): Is there any age limit?

Mr. McLARTY: I was just coming to that. Service may be performed within Canada or any other part of the world, but their right to vote is definitely ensured. Whether they are or are not over twenty-one years of age is not a restriction.

(2) But in the case of the ordinary voter, different considerations apply and the explanation cannot be as brief.

The general qualifications applying to electors under the election act apply in the plebiscite. Any voter must be a British subject, must be twenty-one years of age at the date of polling, must have been ordinarily a resident of Canada for twelve months prior to the polling date and ordinarily resident in the polling division on the twenty-eighth day before polling day.

There are necessarily some disqualifications, and with these I should now like to deal.

(a) In the first place, I would point out that those who are disqualified from voting under the provisions of the Dominion Elections Act, 1938, will be disqualified from voting at the plebiscite.

(b) In addition, every interned person will be disqualified.

(c) In addition, too, every person resident in Canada whose racial origin is that of a country at war with Canada, if such person would be disqualified by reason of race in any one of the provinces of Canada while residing therein from voting at an election of a member of the legislative assembly of that province, and who did not serve in the naval, military or air forces of Canada in the great war, as defined in the Pension Act, or in the war declared by His Majesty on the tenth day of September, 1939, against the German Reich and subsequently other powers.

The purpose of this section can be best illustrated by a concrete example. Suppose a citizen of Japanese origin were permitted to vote, the fact that he was permitted to do so would be resented. It would quite possibly result in some measure of public disorder.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): Is that an extension of the present principle, or is it the same principle?

Mr. McLARTY: It is the same to this extent. The present principle, under section 14(2) of the Dominion Elections Act excludes from voting in a dominion election any person who is excluded from voting in any province. This is an exception to this extent, that if they are excluded in any particular province and are of enemy origin, they are excluded from voting on the plebiscite. By a country of enemy origin I mean if they originate from a country with which Canada is at war. The only limitation is to the extent to which any particular race may be excluded by provincial legislation.

Mr. STIRLING: Does that apply only to that province or to all Canada?

Mr. McLARTY: If a person is excluded from voting in any one province and the person comes from a country with which we are at war, that person is excluded throughout Canada generally.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): That is clear enough.

Mr. MacINNIS: That applies to only one particular race, but we are at war with a number of different countries.

Mr. McLARTY: Perhaps we might better deal with these questions in committee. Careful consideration would have to be given before a reply was made to the question of the hon. member.

Mr. MacINNIS: I did not ask a question. I followed the precedents given me by other members of the house, and I do not think certain members of the house have privileges over those accorded to other members.

Mr. SPEAKER: We are not in committee on the resolution now, and questions can be permitted only with the consent of the minister to interruptions.

Mr. McLARTY: I have now dealt with the exclusions from voting on the plebiscite under the terms of the proposed bill. I do not apprehend, Mr. Speaker, that criticism will be directed to or exception taken of those who have been excluded from the vote. I rather surmise that any criticism which may develop will be that certain classes have not been excluded.

Canada is a country which, while not as great in population as many other countries in the world, is composed of many nationalities and of many creeds. Until the beginning of the present century the population of this country was largely of British and French stock. But at the turn of the century, Sir Wilfrid Laurier announced that the twentieth century belonged to Canada and that we had a vast and largely undeveloped area which, if populated, would result in this country becoming the granary of the empire. A broad, liberal and expansive immigration policy was instituted and, as a result, a great many immigrants came to Canada from European countries and from the United States. They brought their families with them and intended to make this country their permanent home. In due course a vast majority of them became Canadian citizens under the terms of the Naturalization Act. They took the naturalization oath, which is as follows:

I, ... , swear by Almighty God that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to His Majesty King George the Sixth, his heirs and successors, according to law. So help me God.

What does naturalization involve? It involves this: I quote the terms of the Naturalization Act:

A person to whom a certificate of naturalization is granted by the minister shall, subject to the provisions of this act, be entitled to all political and other rights, powers and privileges, be subject to all obligations, duties and liabilities, to which a natural-born British subject is entitled or subject, and as from the date of his naturalization have to all intents and purposes the status of a natural-born British subject.

I am fully aware, Mr. Speaker, that the judicial committee of the privy council has dealt with this particular section of the act. It has decided that the right to exercise the franchise is not inherent in those who enjoy by virtue of this naturalization the "political and other rights". I might also point out that those citizens who enjoy these rights are subject to "all obligations, duties and liabilities" which are conditions precedent to their enjoyment.

It is not the intention of the government to take away lightly either the privileges or the responsibilities which arise from citizenship. Neither is being done under this legislation which is now proposed. The right to do so would require to be clear and imperative; and the fairness in doing so would require to be immediately apparent.

This is not, however, a general election. Such an election would necessarily involve a number of considerations, and—important as any one might be—the overriding consideration would be the particular government which would exercise power in Canada, at least until a subsequent government was elected to give direction and maintain control.

In this plebiscite the electors of Canada are asked to answer one question and one alone:

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Are you in favour of releasing the government from any obligation arising out of any past commitments restricting the methods of raising men for military service?

The question is one which seeks relief from commitments. But the one especial commitment referred to is the matter of military service.

May I go one further step? While no further disfranchisement is envisaged, it is provided that anyone who holds the views of conscientious objection to military service and who votes on the plebiscite, shall, after so voting, be disqualified from applying for postponement of military service under sections 18 and 19 of the national war services regulations.

I should now like, Mr. Speaker, to deal with some of the more mechanical phases of the bill.

In the first place, there is the preparation of voters' lists. A great deal of consideration has been given to the most appropriate method of compiling the voters' lists to be used in the plebiscite.

It was first suggested that the lists prepared and printed in connection with the last general election might be sufficient for the purpose. But the objections to this course, bearing in mind the events of the last two years, seemed to make this extremely undesirable.

In the first place, in the larger cities and towns many changes of residence occur every year, but more changes than usual have occurred in the last two years. In the second place, a great many have changed their residence by reason of their enlistment in the military forces of Canada. In the third place, it is estimated that in the neighbourhood of 400,000 young Canadians have attained voting age since the last general election. Their names, of course, would not appear on such voters' lists.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): Four hundred thousand?

Mr. McLARTY: That is the figure which has been given to me. That would of course, include both sexes.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): That is larger than I got from the bureau.

Mr. McLARTY: Well, those are the figures which were supplied to me by the chief electoral officer, and I understood he obtained them from the bureau of statistics.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): Well, there may be some explanation.

Mr. McLARTY: In the fourth place, there are many places now in Canada where large industrial plants have been established since 1940 in districts which at that time were sparsely settled but which now have populations running into thousands, and where the 1940 lists would prove of no value whatever.

Another suggestion received was to the effect that no lists of any kind be used but that every voter take an oath in the polling station before being allowed to vote.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): I should like to know who made that.

Mr. McLARTY: Mr. Speaker, I personally received a number of such suggestions. I cannot recall at the present moment from whom they came.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): Perhaps that is an embarrassing question.

Mr. McLARTY: Not at all.

Mr. MacINNIS: Is the resolution now open to questions, or do we have to wait until we go into committee?

Mr. DEPUTY SPEAKER: The house is not in committee, and the minister has the floor. Unless he consents to any questions being put, as he has the floor, questions are not in order.

Mr. McLARTY: If it were a situation where questions could not be asked later on, I would have not the slightest hesitation in replying to them now. I should like, however, if possible to complete my remarks on the resolution by six o'clock to-night. I think I can do so without any difficulty; and while I have no objection to answering questions, perhaps, with the opportunity which will be accorded later on, it would be better to postpone them.

Mr. MacINNIS: If they are awkward questions!

Mr. DEPUTY SPEAKER: Order. It is the privilege of the minister to make his statement uninterrupted.

Mr. McLARTY: As I have said, another suggestion received was to the effect that no lists of any kind be used but that every voter take an oath in the polling station before being allowed to vote. It was felt that there were two serious objections to this course.

In the first place, it was believed that a procedure of that kind would be strongly resented by very many voters who by this method would consider themselves as challenged at the poll.

In the second place, such a procedure would very materially slow up the taking of the

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vote and would probably necessitate almost doubling the number of polling stations to be used. The increased cost of these additional polling stations would amount to almost as much as the preparation of the lists themselves.

After consideration, therefore, it has been decided to prepare a complete new list of voters in each polling division. These lists will be compiled by enumerators who will secure the necessary information. When prepared by the enumerators, these lists will neither be revised nor printed, and will constitute the official lists of voters to be used at the polls.

But in order to avoid the revision of the list and so that each qualified voter has an opportunity of exercising his franchise at the plebiscite, the vouching provisions of the elections act, restricted under the act to rural polling divisions, will be made applicable to both urban and rural polling divisions.

This will mean that where the name of a qualified voter has been inadvertently omitted by the enumerator from his list, such voter will be allowed to vote on polling day upon taking the required oath and upon being vouched for by a voter of the same polling division, whose name appears on the official list of voters as prepared by the enumerator.

In order that this vouching provision will not be made use of illegally, penalties will be specially provided in the bill.

In recommending the use of what are known as open lists, three considerations have been given weight.

In the first place, it was felt that this method would provide the best opportunity for every person entitled to vote to do so.

In the second place, by avoiding the delay ordinarily necessitated by revision, it is estimated that there will be a saving of at least one week and possibly more in the taking of the vote.

In the third place, it will prove to be less expensive, and it is estimated that a saving of about $200,000 will be effected by the use of the open lists in preference to the closed ones.

Might I state that this provision, as any other provision in the bill, will not be as immutable as the laws of the Medes and the Persians, but will be capable of such changes and amendments as the committee to which it is submitted may deem desirable.

I should now like to deal with the time required for taking the vote.

The chief electoral officer has prepared a memorandum setting out the minimum time required for the taking of the plebiscite, and since it is somewhat detailed, I believe it would be of advantage to read the memorandum prepared on that subject:

The minimum time required for the taking of a plebiscite, from the day that I am authorized to proceed with the printing of the necessary material to polling day, is ten weeks. This period may be divided into two sections.

For the first section, a period of six weeks is required for the preparatory work and I find it difficult to break down this section step by step as it consists of the period required for the printing of the necessary material, the shipping of this material to the various returning officers and its distribution by the returning officers to the enumerators appointed to prepare the lists of voters in each polling division.

I do not see how it could be possible to get the necessary enumeration material printed and transmit the same to every returning officer in a shorter period than five weeks. This would allow one week to the returning officers to make their distribution to the enumerators.

To obtain this result it would be necessary that my requisitions be given priority by the king's printer.

For the second section, a period of four weeks has been fixed in the proposed regulations; the day fixed for the commencement of enumeration in urban and rural polling divisions being the 28th day before polling day. As at the last general election the enumerators are allowed six days to complete their house-to-house visitations and three days to make the necessary number of copies of their list of voters, which in most cases must be written by hand. The lists are then transmitted to the returning officer who must in turn divide the lists for polling divisions containing more than 350 names, certify each part of the list so divided, and affix to each sheet of the enumerators' lists an impression with a rubber stamp designating that it is the official list to be used at the poll, then transmit the official list to the deputy returning officers with the ballot papers and other documents.

It is felt, especially in sparsely settled districts, that this preparation of the list by the enumerators, the sending of such list to the returning officer, the preparation of the list for the poll by the returning officer and its transmission to the deputy returning officer in the ballot box could not be accomplished in a shorter period than four weeks. It is true that the period between the date of the issue of the writs and polling day at the last general election was approximately eight weeks, but in that connection I wish to point out that on the day of the issue of the writs every rural enumerator had already received from the returning officer a complete set of enumerator's supplies with his instructions. After the writs had been issued all that was necessary for the returning officer to do was to complete the official appointments of the enumerators and transmit same to them with advice stating the days upon which the various operations had to be performed. Moreover, the remainder of the material required for a general election, consisting of some 300 printing jobs, was completed at the date of the issue of the writs and ready to be sent forward.

Furthermore, consideration must be given to the time required to prepare ballot papers, regulations and instructions for the special returning officers, and other officials who will conduct the taking of the vote by Canadian service voters in Canada, in the United Kingdom, in Newfoundland, et cetera. The printing of this material and its transmission to the United Kingdom et cetera will take quite a

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period of time. This material should be received by the special returning officer in London at least three weeks before polling day, since the voting starts twelve days before that day.

I should like now to deal with the estimated cost of the plebiscite. It is estimated that the cost of the plebiscite will be $1,500,000. It is not anticipated that this figure will be in any way exceeded, and it is possible that it will be somewhat reduced.

The suggestion has been made that we should endeavour to use voluntary workers in this connection. It would, however, be unwise to assume that the plebiscite could be carried on in all districts on a voluntary basis and, for this reason, in budgeting the cost it is necessary to assume that payment will be required for all services to be rendered.

The amount so stated will be required if everyone necessary for taking the plebiscite requires to be paid for his or her services.

On the other hand, it is the hope of the government that a large number will undertake the work without remuneration, and, if this hope is realized, it will result in a considerable reduction in the amount of this expenditure.

I have endeavoured to place before this committee the general principles which have been followed in the framing of the measure, and the general procedure which will be followed in the taking of the vote. I believe that the bill itself is the best guarantee of the desire of the government that people in every electoral district of Canada and those enrolled in military service will have that opportunity, which only a democratic form of government provides, of expressing freely his or her wish upon the issue which is involved.

The bill is one which is so just and fair that, bearing in mind the fact that the holding of a plebiscite has been already decided by this house, and irrespective of opinion held as to the desirability of holding one, all parties and groups can agree upon it.

Might I point out, however, that the measure is not unchangeable in form and immutable in its terms. If, in the course of its consideration, it can be shown, on the one hand, that the bill is too broad or, on the other, too narrow, every consideration will be given to the suggestions thus made.

The important point for this committee to remember is that this bill, when finally passed, will be evidence—and conclusive evidence—that the parliament of Canada, notwithstanding that the clouds may be threatening and the skies black, has kept faith with the people of this country.

[Mr. McLarty.]

At a time when we are fighting to maintain the democratic way of life throughout the world, let us endeavour in every way to maintain it in our own country.

Hon. R. B. HANSON (Leader of the Opposition): This is not a very good time to start an extended debate on a matter of this kind. I do not propose to debate the measure at length, but, there are some observations which I desire to make with respect to this resolution. The proposal to which the resolution seeks to give effect has already of course been the subject of a lengthy debate in this house, and personally I see no great advantage to be gained by entering into a long discussion of the principle involved.

I have not changed my view with respect to this plebiscite. To me it is just as objectionable as when it was first announced. I am still convinced that it is an unworthy evasion of a responsibility which properly belongs to this house. I am still convinced that the importation of this practice into our parliamentary system is inconsistent with the principles of responsible government. The Secretary of State said that it was unique in the history of parliamentary institutions, or rather that the legislation proposed was unique in the history—

Mr. McLARTY: I wonder if my hon. friend will allow me to correct him on that. When I began my remarks I said that the position was unique in one respect, namely, that the general resolution which would ordinarily be discussed on this motion had already been discussed in the debate on the speech from the throne.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): Then I misapprehended the purport of the minister's statement. I stand corrected, and I am obliged to him for the correction, but I would say this, that a government asking to be released from a position which it voluntarily took, without being asked to do so by the people of the country, is unique in the history of Canada—absolutely unique. In this connection I want to quote a paragraph that has come to my attention in a periodical with which I think all hon. members are familiar. I am quoting from *Maclean's* magazine of February 15 under the caption "Backstage at Ottawa, by the Man with a Notebook." I think most of us have read these articles from time to time. This is what he says:

In the whole long history of British government, in all the story of democratic government, there has been nothing like this.

Democratic governments—though not British governments—have taken both plebiscites and referendums; plebiscites to give them direction before legislation was passed—with the verdict not binding—referendums to approve or reject

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legislation already passed. Nowhere in democratic government has there been a case where the leader of a government, whether in peace or war, has taken a plebiscite to release himself from a pledge.

That is true. Never in the whole history of parliamentary government have the people of the country been confronted with a proposal to release a leader of a government from a pledge of this or any other kind, a pledge which, as I stated on a previous occasion, was self-imposed and which I assert was not an issue in the last general election.

In the course of his remarks the Secretary of State made the assertion that this was not the first plebiscite bill to be found upon the statute books of this country. I recall that some forty-three years ago the then leader of the government, Right Hon. Sir Wilfrid Laurier, in order to stall off a proposal which was then being pressed upon him by the temperance and prohibition forces, did hold a plebiscite on the question of the sale of intoxicating liquor in Canada. I was a boy in 1898 but I remember the occasion well, and I remember the anxiety everyone felt as to what would be the result of the plebiscite. I recall, too, that the temperance people fathered the affirmative, and the brewers and distillers fathered the negative—fathered it pretty well, I think.

Mr. POWER: Look at the results—not the brewers and distillers; but there were a great many wet votes.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): In your province, yes. The liquor interests were pretty well out opposing the plebiscite. That was their right; I am not questioning it, nor am I making any attack on the liquor interests of this country. I am merely reciting a matter of history. But this is the point: on that plebiscite the people voted by a substantial majority to prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquor.

Mr. POWER: Thirteen thousand.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): Yes, the people of my hon. friend's province voted overwhelmingly against it, but the great mass of the electorate in every other province, I think, voted for the principle. Sir Wilfrid refused to act, on the theory that the majority was not sufficiently decisive. That is my recollection. I have not looked up the debates; I did not think it necessary. I should not have referred to it at all had not the Secretary of State himself said that there was a precedent for a plebiscite. But Sir Wilfrid did not act, on the theory, as I recall it, that there was too nice a balance among the electorate. I think that is a fair statement of the position.

An hon. MEMBER: A great number did not vote.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): Many did not vote, and there will be many who will not vote in this plebiscite; make no mistake about that.

That brings me to the consideration of this question: if upon this plebiscite the result is inconclusive, what will the Prime Minister do?

An hon. MEMBER: Stall a while.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): "Stall" is not a nice word to use; it is a slang word and I am not going to use it. But I have no doubt that if the result is indecisive the Prime Minister will do nothing unless the ministers who sit around him and beside him and who want to do something compel him to do something. If the exhibition we had from the Minister of Finance (Mr. Ilsley) the other day is an indication, I am not at all sure that party loyalty and partisan considerations will not outweigh principle with hon. members on the treasury benches. I am afraid it will.

Why is this plebiscite being taken? Perhaps I should not rehash that whole story again, especially when it is so near six o'clock. But without doubt this plebiscite is being taken to save the face of the ministry. Has it a single element of courage about it? Silence gives consent.

Mr. MACKENZIE (Vancouver Centre): We are just being courteous.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): Well, the minister usually is very courteous. I should thank him. But I am not quite so sure that that is the reason for his silence. If the result is indecisive, I ask, what is the ministry to do? Will they tell the house and the country? That is one of the first considerations. Someone should answer that question before this debate closes.

Mr. KIRK: You should go out and make it decisive.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): Does the hon. member say that it is any responsibility of mine to go out and ask the people to vote for this plebiscite?

An hon. MEMBER: It is everybody's.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): It is not my baby. On a matter of principle I prefer the direct approach rather than the indirect approach of hon. gentlemen opposite. I am prepared to stake my political life on any matter of principle, while hon. gentlemen opposite are seeking to hide and save their political skins behind a subterfuge, to do by the backdoor method something they do not

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dare to do at the front door. On the one hand their followers, like the Premier of Quebec—I am not so sure about the Minister of Justice (Mr. St. Laurent); but at all events his political godfather the Premier of Quebec—told the people of Quebec in the recent by-elections that the Prime Minister of this country had always been against conscription and always would be and there would be no compulsory military service—

Mr. MACKENZIE (Vancouver Centre): He did not say that.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): —while the Sifton press that supports this government is assuring people in the west, to keep the boys in line, that if the plebiscite carries of course there will be compulsory military service. Heads I win, tails you lose; that is what this is.

On the question of the plebiscite itself, I was astonished to hear the Secretary of State say that the question to be asked would not be in the bill but would be a matter of proclamation. As to the time, it is of course obvious that you could not, if you want to hold this plebiscite within a reasonable time, fix a definite date, because nobody knows when the bill, if passed, will become law. But certainly the Prime Minister gave the categorical undertaking that a certain question would be put to the people of this country. Why should it be left to a proclamation which may be twiddled around by the government and we may not have that question put to the people? You might have something entirely different, or something which will have a shaded meaning, or something which will be different in principle, even, from what was stated not only in the speech from the throne but by the Prime Minister himself.

Mr. MACKENZIE KING: May I say to my hon. friend that I made the statement very clearly as to what the question would be. If my hon. friend has any doubt about my word in the matter certainly I would have no objection, as I do not think any of my colleagues would, to the question being inserted in the bill. I rather gathered from what the minister has said that it was assumed no one would question the word of the Prime Minister on a specific statement which related to a measure of this kind, and that the insertion of the question in the bill would therefore be superfluous.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): I am glad to have the Prime Minister make that statement, because I want some certainty. When I hear the Secretary of State say that it will be the subject of proclamation, over which parliament will have no control but over which the government will have full control—

Mr. MACKENZIE KING: No, no.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): —I may be pardoned if I appear a little suspicious that there is some change in plan, or that there may be some change. Of course the Prime Minister now has pledged his word that the question will not be altered—

Mr. MACKENZIE KING: Absolutely not.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): —and that, if necessary the question will be put in the bill. So that we have learned something this afternoon.

Mr. CRERAR: You had that statement before.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): We had the statement, but that was all washed out when the Secretary of State said it would not be in the bill but would be in the proclamation.

Mr. McLARTY: But I stated that it would be identical with what the Prime Minister told this house.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): I understood that the general scope of the question would be the same, but the Prime Minister categorically placed upon the records of this house the exact question that would be asked.

Mr. MACKENZIE KING: That is the one that will be given to the people.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): All right; now we certainly have got something definite on that point. I am glad I raised the question, because it left me, at all events, somewhat up in the air, if I might use the expression, as to what we could expect. Of course I had not seen the prepared statement of the Secretary of State. Hon. gentlemen opposite knew exactly what he was going to say.

Mr. MACKENZIE KING: I had never heard a word of it until this afternoon.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): I had to gather what I could as it went along. But I do not recall that the Secretary of State used the word "identical", or said that the question would be identical with what the Prime Minister had stated.

Mr. McLARTY: Just to clear that up, what I said was this: "The Prime Minister has already announced in this house the question that will be submitted to the people." I do not know that I used the word "identical";

I assumed that the question he announced in the house was the one that was going to the people, and stated so.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): I do not desire to get into any discussion, and I have never questioned the honour of the Prime Minister, as he knows. But I should just like to make this observation, that the Prime Minister's statement in the House of Commons cannot be read into a statute. I found that out in the course of some litigation; a statement made by Mr. Fielding, when he was Minister of Finance, did not receive much attention from the judges of the Supreme Court of Canada. One would like to remind courts of law what legislators had in mind when they passed legislation, in order to ascertain the meaning of that legislation; but the judges of this country, the judges of Britain and for aught I know the judges of the neighbouring republic, treat very cavalierly statements made by legislators during the passing of legislation. Certainly I had no intention of questioning the Prime Minister's bona fides. I am glad I raised the question, however, because it is now certain.

I do not want to say anything more on the question of the general principle. Apparently the government are adamant in their decision to proceed, adamant even though the enemy may be knocking at our door. That would seem to be a difficult thing to comprehend. We will hold a plebiscite to ascertain whether the Prime Minister is to be relieved from an election pledge, when Vancouver may be under assault by Japanese forces. Is that not a ridiculous position in which to place the people of this country, and for the government of this country to be placed in, during war time? I do not think I shall say anything more about it, but as the opportunity offers, while now registering my disapproval of the whole procedure, I shall seek to analyse the detailed proposals as judicially as possible, with a view to improving them if that can be done.

It is now almost six o'clock, Mr. Speaker. I really do not think I can finish this afternoon; therefore I move the adjournment of the debate.

Motion agreed to and debate adjourned.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE

Mr. MACKENZIE KING moved the adjournment of the house.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): What will be the business on Monday?

Mr. MACKENZIE KING: We shall continue with the resolution that we have been discussing this afternoon, and, I hope, may be able to make some progress with the bill itself. I should think we ought to be prepared to take up other government notices of motion or government orders on the order paper.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): In what order, please?

Mr. MACKENZIE KING: In the order in which they appear, I should think.

Motion agreed to and the house adjourned at 5.58 p.m.

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Vol. LXXX.—No. 25

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CANADA

House of Commons Debates

OFFICIAL REPORT—DAILY EDITION

Wednesday, February 25, 1942

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HOUSE OF COMMONS

Speaker: The Honourable JAMES ALLISON GLEN

WEDNESDAY, February 25, 1942.

The house met at three o'clock.

DEFENCE OF CANADA REGULATIONS

PROTECTED AREAS—JAPANESE NATIONALS IN BRITISH COLUMBIA—MEASURES FOR SECURITY

Right Hon. W. L. MACKENZIE KING (Prime Minister): I wish to lay on the table a copy of an order in council which was passed yesterday amending the defence of Canada regulations and giving the Minister of Justice increased powers to require persons to leave "protected areas." It might be of service to the house if I were to table at this time a number of orders in council that have been passed which have a special relation to conditions as they exist in the province of British Columbia as a result of situations arising out of Japan's declaration of war.

The order in council which I have just tabled, P.C. 1486, amends the defence of Canada regulations so as to provide authority for the Minister of Justice to require any or all persons to leave a protected area as defined by order of the Minister of National Defence and to impose restrictions in respect of their employment, business, movement or places of residence. Under this authority the Minister of Justice may also prohibit or restrict the possession or use by any or all persons in the protected area of any specified articles and require their delivery to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. In short, the defence of Canada regulations as now amended give the Minister of Justice full power to take any required security measures with regard to any person if in the protected area. The protected area in British Columbia has already been defined by the Minister of National Defence as the coastal area between the Cascade mountains and the sea, including all the islands off the coast of British Columbia.

In addition to the above mentioned order in council, the following orders have previously been passed relating to security on the Pacific coast:

P.C. 9591, December 7, 1941 and P.C. 9760, December 16, 1941, respecting compulsory registration of all persons of Japanese race. That has already been tabled.

P.C. 9761, December 16, 1941, providing for control of vessels used or operated by persons of Japanese race.

P.C. 251 of January 13, 1942, prohibiting the issuance of fishing licences to persons of Japanese race, and prohibiting such persons from serving on fishing vessels. That has also been tabled.

P.C. 365, January 16, 1942, amending the Defence of Canada regulations so as to authorize the Minister of National Defence, with the concurrence of the Minister of Justice to declare any area in Canada a protected area, or if it appears necessary or expedient so to do, and in the public interest, and in respect of such areas conferring certain powers with regard to the persons and property of any enemy aliens.

P.C. 1271, February 17, 1942, providing for the establishment of a Canadian-Japanese construction corps, to be formed by Canadian nationals of Japanese racial origin, and establishing conditions of enrolment and terms of service for the said corps.

P.C. 1348, February 19, 1942, authorizing the establishment of work camps for male enemy aliens including Japanese nationals, on projects outside protected areas.

P.C. 1365 of February 19, 1942, prohibiting the possession of fire-arms or explosives by persons of Japanese race.

P.C. 1457 of February 24, 1942, regulating the acquisition of land or any interest therein, or the growing of crops in Canada by persons of Japanese race and by Japanese controlled companies.

In order to complete the record of the principal orders in council in this connection, copies of the following orders in council (in addition to P.C. 1486 of February 24, 1942), are tabled herewith:

P.C. 365 of January 16, 1942; P.C. 1271 of February 17, 1942; P.C. 1348 of February 19, 1942; P.C. 1365 of February 19, 1942; and P.C. 1457 of February 24, 1942.

Mr. NEILL: Would it be possible to have these orders in council included in *Votes and Proceedings*? It would save a good deal of copying, and we should like to have access to them.

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Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): It would be very convenient.

Mr. MACKENZIE KING: I see no reason why they should not be included in the *Votes and Proceedings* if the house is agreeable. The clerk might be so instructed.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): If I appreciated aright what the Prime Minister said, that this order in council, which was passed on February 24, probably at the time we were in secret session yesterday—

Mr. MACKENZIE KING: No, it was passed before the session.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): Well, I am just suggesting that we did observe three cabinet ministers hurry to leave the chamber last night and come back again, and I have a right to draw some conclusions.

Mr. CRERAR: Three cabinet ministers cannot pass an order in council.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): Well, I may be wrong in my deduction. If I apprehended aright what the Prime Minister said, the order is not mandatory on the Minister of Justice; it is merely enabling, is it not?

Mr. MACKENZIE KING: If it were made mandatory in its broad terms, I am afraid the Minister of Justice would have a very large order because it gives him power over any person in a protected area to take any step that the security of the people of British Columbia would seem to necessitate.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): The answer is, it is merely enabling.

Mr. MACKENZIE KING: Well, it is an all-enabling order.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): Well, that is a good way to put it.

Mr. MACKENZIE KING: Perhaps I should give to the house a statement I gave to the press this morning. I would have made it to the house first but I thought it was in the interest of law and order out on the Pacific coast that this communication should reach British Columbia without delay.

The statement was to the effect that power had been given to the Minister of Justice (Mr. St. Laurent) to exclude any or all persons, regardless of their citizenship, from protected areas as defined under the defence of Canada regulations.

The new regulation corresponds very closely to the proclamation issued by the President of the United States on Friday.

Under the amended order the Minister of Justice may require any or all persons, whether British subjects or not, to leave a protected area. He is further authorized to impose such restrictions as he may specify in respect of their employment, business, movements or places of residence. He can prohibit or restrict the possession or use by any or all persons in the protected area of any specified articles and can require the delivery of such articles to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. In short, the defence of Canada regulations as now amended give the Minister of Justice full power to take any required security measure within the protected area with regard to any person within that area.

The protected area in British Columbia in which the new order will apply has been defined by the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Ralston) as the coastal belt between the Cascade mountains and the sea, including all the islands off the coast of British Columbia.

It is the policy of the government to use the powers of this order to take all necessary security measures to safeguard the defences of the Pacific coast of Canada.

QUESTIONS

(Questions answered orally are indicated by an asterisk).

COASTAL MOTOR BOATS

Mr. BRUCE:

1. How many coastal motor boats have been ordered?
2. How many were completed by October 31, 1941?
3. What was the total cost?
4. How many of these boats reached Halifax before the close of navigation?
5. How many of these boats are now in commission?
6. In what state of completion are the balance of the boats?
7. At what points are any boats, which did not reach Halifax before the close of navigation, tied up?

Mr. MACDONALD (Kingston City): This question was brought up the other day, and I answered it to my hon. friend privately. I hope he will be ready to drop it from the order paper.

Mr. BRUCE: That is satisfactory to me, Mr. Speaker.

Mr. SPEAKER: Dropped.

C273089

JAPANESE NATIONALS IN BRITISH COLUMBIA

Mr. NEILL:

1. Did the government, on January 14, last, issue a statement of policy regarding Japanese in British Columbia?
2. Did one of the items state that Japanese nationals will be forbidden to possess or use shore wave radio receiving sets, radio transmitters and cameras?
3. Was such prohibition enforced by order in council, and, if so, what was the number of such order?
4. Were instructions given to any military or police authorities to enforce the said order in council?
5. If so, when and to whom?
6. How many of the receiving sets, transmitters and cameras have been surrendered or seized up to date?
7. Why was the restriction confined to Japanese nationals and not extended to those born in Japan and since 1922 naturalized in Canada?

Mr. ST. LAURENT:

1. Yes.
2. Yes.
3. Order-in-council P.C. 365 January 15, 1942, gives the minister the power to make such prohibition from time to time, and he has made an order dated February 5, 1942.
4. Yes.
5. February 5, 1942. Commissioner, R.C.M. Police.
6. No information as yet.
7. The restriction is not now confined to Japanese nationals.

PENITENTIARIES COMMISSION

Mr. CHURCH:

1. When was the royal commission on prisons appointed, and who were its members?
2. What was the total cost of this commission, including fees, salaries, travelling expenses and all other emoluments?
3. When was the report received?
4. Have any of its recommendations been carried out?
5. When will the penitentiary commission be appointed?
6. What is the reason for the delay?
7. Who are the present chief heads operating this branch of the service, and what training have they for work of this nature?
8. Will consideration be given to giving effect to the Borstal system?

Mr. ST. LAURENT:

1. February 27, 1936. Hon. Mr. Justice Joseph Archambault, R. W. Craig, K.C., J. C. McRuer, K.C.
2. $108,719.70.
3. Tabled June 14, 1938.
4. Yes.
5. This involves a question of policy.
6. See answer to question 5.

7. (a) P. M. Anderson, K.C., senior advisory counsel, acting for the deputy minister of justice with respect to penitentiary matters. Mr. Anderson has been so acting for the last four years.

(b) Acting Superintendent G. L. Sauvant, Bachelor of Arts, university of Montreal; translator and proof reader, 1915, clerk of the crown in chancery; war service with French forces, graduate of St. Cyr Military Academy, wounded, 1917, served as interpreter during convalescence, instructor in bayonet fighting and grenade throwing; appointed second lieutenant in March, 1919; decorations, Croix de Guerre, Verdun medal; agent for Dominion Publishing Company; contributor to Revue Jeanne d'Arc of Ottawa; appointed instructor in French at Royal Military College, Kingston, Ontario, 1924; appointed librarian school teacher, St. Vincent de Paul penitentiary, March 5, 1928, to November 19, 1929; promoted warden's clerk, 1st August, 1929; promoted inspector of penitentiaries, July 16, 1934; sent to St. Vincent de Paul penitentiary as acting warden, October 1, 1937; appointed acting superintendent of penitentiaries, July 27, 1938; (Coronation medal).

(c) Inspector E. L. O'Leary, O.A.S.: education received at Richibucto, N.B., and St. Dunstan's college, Charlottetown (commercial course); 1910-13, Royal Bank of Canada; 1914, bookkeeper, R. Sullivan & Co., St. John, N.B.; 1914-19, with C.E.F. and R.A.F.; granted commission C.F.A., 1916, awarded military cross, 1918; 1920-23, with Soldier Settlement Board in Edmonton; 1923-27, accountant with Abitibi Power and Paper Co.; 1927, assistant paymaster with Lake St. John Power and Paper Co. Ltd.; 1928, office manager, power plant, with P. Lyall and Sons Construction Co. Ltd.; 1930-32, chief accountant, Seigniory Club, Quebec; 1933, accountant, Watson Jack & Co. Ltd.; 1934, accountant, Benzolene Corp. Ltd.; 1935, appointed inspector of penitentiaries; 1940, granted leave of absence, without pay, for purpose of enlistment in Royal Canadian Air Force.

(d) Inspector G. E. Shortt: Bachelor of Arts (Queen's); B.L.S. (McGill); Ph.D. (university of Michigan, Ann Arbor); 1915-17, service with C.E.F. conducting officer, troop transports, north Atlantic; 1917-18 English civil service (seed oat control, England and Wales); three years business administration, including two years as executive General Motors Acceptance Corporation; five and one-half years, investigator under Combines Investigation Act; one year with royal commission to investigate the penal system of

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Canada (conferences with leading prison administrators and investigation of foreign prisons); appointed inspector and auditor of penitentiaries, July 13, 1938; Canadian civil service employment 15 years.

8. This involves a question of policy.

Mr. MAYHEW:

Which, if any, of the recommendations of the royal commission on the penal system of Canada in its report of April, 1938, have already been, or are about to be, acted upon?

Mr. ST. LAURENT:

1. (a) A convict at present earns remission as from the date of admission instead of the seventh month of sentence as was the case previously.

(b) Remission is now allowed for holidays and also for periods of sickness.

(c) For purposes of remission, overlapping terms are considered as one.

2. A thorough inspection of penitentiary industries has been made.

3. Shaving and bathing of convicts have been made more frequent.

4. In each case recommended by wardens, convicts who are to be rearrested on discharge, or deported, have been allowed their remuneration earned during their sentences.

5. Arrangements are being made to have some penitentiary farm vegetables canned commercially for own use.

6. Wardens are now more fully consulted with regard to the advisability of improvements in connection with their work.

7. More liberal visiting and writing privileges have been accorded to deserving convicts.

8. Improved cell lighting has been installed wherever possible.

9. Kitchens have been renovated and special ranges installed in practically every institution. Cleanliness and preparation of food are receiving careful attention.

10. Contributions of convicts to the radio entertainment fund have been discontinued.

11. In several penitentiaries, young convicts are now trained in the motor mechanic trade, notwithstanding that they are still segregated from adult class. In one institution, a new shoe shop has been opened and young convicts only are employed therein.

12. Practically all vegetables required in the penitentiary service are now produced on the penitentiary farms. Surpluses of over one million pounds were diverted to army and other government departments in 1941.

13. A dairy herd has been established in one of the penitentiaries not previously so equipped.

14. Wardens were authorized to use waste material for demonstrational purposes in convict training.

15. Many more officers have been made permanent within the limitations placed by the treasury board:

	1938-39	1939-40	1940-41	1941-42	Total
Kingston	30	20	Nil	Nil	50
St. Vincent de Paul	39	15	Nil	Nil	54
Dorchester	26	11	Nil	Nil	37
Manitoba	15	15	Nil	Nil	30
British Columbia	27	13	Nil	Nil	40
Saskatchewan	10	20	Nil	Nil	30
Collin's Bay	24	15	Nil	Nil	39
	171	109			280

16. Certain officers were selected to proceed to the training school, Wakefield, England, for a course of instruction. The first draft proceeded in 1939, but subsequent drafts were cancelled in September of the same year on account of the war.

17. Poultry raising has been started in one penitentiary.

18. Convicts are provided with lighters; convicts pay for flints only.

19. More convicts are being employed in industrial labour.

20. Officers' private cars now may be repaired by convict labour.

21. More schooling is provided for young convicts at St. Vincent de Paul penitentiary.

22. Recommendations regarding the keeping of stores have been followed as far as possible and are the general practice to be observed in the future.

23. Authority for expenditures by wardens has been increased, thereby reducing the number of requests and correspondence for minor expenditures of maintenance and other routine matters.

24. In several penitentiaries, showers have been installed in the cell blocks.

INCOME WAR TAX ACT—APPEALS

Mr. STOKES:

1. How many appeals from assessment under the Income War Tax Act were made (a) by corporations, (b) by individuals, during each of the fiscal years ending March 31, 1939, 1940 and 1941?

2. How many of such appeals were determined personally by the Minister of National Revenue?

3. How many of such appeals were determined by the commissioner of income tax or by other official pursuant to authority purported to be vested in such official by the minister?

4. How many of such appeals are still pending?

5. How many of such appeals were determined in favour of (a) the appellant, (b) the crown?

6. In how many cases did the appellant serve notice of dissatisfaction with the decision and appeal to the exchequer court?

7. How many of such cases were determined by the exchequer court in favour of (a) the appellant, (b) the crown?

Mr. GIBSON:

1. (a) 1939, 163; 1940, 176; 1941, 137. (b) 1939, 175; 1940, 146; 1941, 149.

2. No records available.

3. No records available.

4. (a) 1939, 7; 1940, 18; 1941, 43. (b) 1939, 15; 1940, 15; 1941, 49.

5. (a) Corporations: 1939, 65; 1940, 43; 1941, 26. Individuals: 1939, 70; 1940, 40; 1941, 31. (b) Corporations: 1939, 91; 1940, 115; 1941, 68. Individuals: 1939, 90; 1940, 91; 1941, 69.

6. Corporations: 1939, 5.

7. (a) 1; (b) 4.

DEFENCE OF CANADA REGULATIONS—INTERNMENTS

Mr. STOKES:

1. How many advisory committees have been appointed under regulation 22 of the defence of Canada regulations?

2. What are the names of the members of each such committee?

3. When was each such committee appointed?

4. How many objections to internment have been heard by each such committee?

5. In how many cases has each committee recommended (a) the release of an internee, (b) the continued detention of an internee?

Mr. ST. LAURENT:

1. Under regulation 22 of the defence of Canada regulations (consolidation), 1941—two.

2. (1) Daniel O'Connell, K.C., former county court judge; Robert Taschereau, K.C., William M. Dickson.

(2) His Honour Judge J. C. A. Cameron, Arthur Gagne, K.C., Robert Forsyth, K.C.

3. (1) June 26, 1941. (2) July 14, 1941.

4. (1) 83. (2) 136.

5. (1) (a) 43 releases; (b) 40 continued detention.

(2) (a) 76 releases; (b) 60 continued detention.

BUREAU OF PUBLIC INFORMATION—TOURIST AND TRAVEL BUREAUX

Mr. ISNOR:

1. What salary, remuneration or allowance do members of the tourist development committee receive from any department of the government?

2. What members of the tourist development committee, bureau of public information or Canadian travel bureau hail from the maritime provinces?

3. What is the scope of authority of the bureau of public information?

4. Does the said bureau deal with naval and military matters?

5. If so, in what manner?

6. How does the bureau distribute its material?

Mr. THORSON:

1. None.

2. (a) None; largely an interdepartmental committee. We have no record of the birthplace of members of the committee; representation thereon is not on a geographical basis.

(b) Miss Muriel Ann Mosley, secretary to the director of public information; Mr. E. A. Corbett, speakers' division, public information.

(c) Mr. D. Leo Dolan, chief, Canadian travel bureau. Mr. H. A. McCallum, assistant chief, Canadian travel bureau.

3. To collect and disseminate to the public, information concerning the various phases of the war effort of the Canadian people and the activities of the government in relation thereto, and generally to coordinate the existing public information services of the government and originate or employ other means in order that the same may be used in the most efficient way for the obtaining of the utmost aid from the people of Canada in the national emergency which has arisen.

4. Only to the extent of distributing material provided by those departments and the printing of booklets and posters specifically requested by them.

5. See answer to No. 4.

6. Through the news services; photographic services; press gallery; by direct mail; through clubs, societies and other organizations; members of parliament; by radio and on the motion picture screen. Poster material is distributed through factories, firms, government offices and individuals, et cetera.

*LANCASTER MILITARY HOSPITAL—WEST ST. JOHN

Mr. HATFIELD:

1. What were the names of all employees, including medical and clerical staff, of Lancaster hospital, West Saint John, from the year 1919 to the year 1941?

2. What were their salaries per year and what were their pensions per year from 1919 to 1941?

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3. Were any of these employees supplied with automobiles by the government? If so, how many and what are their names?
4. What were the prices of these automobiles?
5. What year were such automobiles purchased?
6. What was the cost of operating these cars from the date of purchase to the year 1941?
7. What year was Lancaster hospital opened as a military hospital?
8. What was the total cost of the Lancaster hospital since its opening as a military hospital to the year 1941?
9. What was the cost of all repairs to Lancaster hospital since its opening as a military hospital to the year 1941?

Mr. MACKENZIE (Vancouver Centre): The other day I informed my hon. friend that some of this information was not available. If he will consult me or some of my officers, we shall be glad to make available what information we have.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): It was a question of lessening the time. I undertook to see the hon. member but did not. The question can stand in the meantime.

Mr. SPEAKER: Stand.

SUCCESSION DUTY

Mr. DIEFENBAKER:

1. What is the total amount of succession duty under the Dominion Succession Duty Act that has been (a) assessed, (b) collected since the said act was assented to on the 14th of June, 1941?
2. How many persons deceased since the said date have left estates with a gross valuation of $500,000 or over?
3. (a) What were the names and addresses of such persons; (b) what was the aggregate value of, and amount of succession duty assessed or levied against each of said estates?

Mr. GIBSON:

1. (a) $477,218.40. (b) $3,836,890.64 as at January 31, 1942.
2. Records not available because of six months period for filing after the death of deceased; however, the number filed is 17.
3. It is not deemed in the public interest to give the individual particulars requested in this question.

EAST AND WEST BLOCKS, OTTAWA—FIRE PROTECTION

Mr. WINKLER:

1. Are precautions contemplated or have they been taken, to prevent destruction by fire of the historic east and west blocks in the group of government buildings at Ottawa?
2. Has an estimate been made of the cost of installing a sprinkler system in those buildings?
3. If so, what is the amount?

[Mr. Hatfield.]

Mr. CARDIN:

1. The east and west blocks are protected by the May-Oatway fire detector system which is connected to the city fire alarm system. In addition there are stand pipes with hose racks, fire pumps and also portable chemical fire extinguishers.
2. No.
3. Answered by No. 2.

1941 VICTORY LOAN

Mr. QUELCH:

1. What amount was loaned by the chartered banks to individuals and corporations for the purchase of victory bonds in 1941?
2. What amount has been loaned to individuals and corporations on the security of Victory bonds purchased in 1941?
3. What rate of interest was charged on these loans?

Mr. ILSLEY:

1. It is understood that loans made by the chartered banks to finance the purchase of victory loan bonds by individuals, corporations and other bodies, totalled $135,978,539 on June 30, 1941.
2. No information other than given in No. 1.
3. For a period of six months subsequent to June 15, 1941, the rate of interest charged on such loans was equal to the coupon rate received in the victory bonds.

ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE—ANNUAL REPORT

Mr. McGREGOR:

1. On what date did the Commissioner of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police complete the annual report of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police for the year ended March 31 1941?
2. On what date was the said report transmitted by the Minister of Justice to His Excellency the Governor General?
3. On what date was the said report sent to the king's printer for printing?
4. On what date was the printing and binding of the said report completed?
5. On what date was the said report laid on the table of the House of Commons?

Mr. St. LAURENT:

1. On account of pressure of other work, the report was not completed until August 16, 1941.
2. This action is not usually taken.
3. English edition, August 18, 1941. French edition, October 20, 1941.
4. English edition, October 16, 1941. French edition, December 19, 1941.
5. February 12, 1942, both editions.

QUESTIONS PASSED AS ORDERS FOR RETURNS

NATIONAL RESOURCES MOBILIZATION ACT—MEDICAL BOARDS

Mr. PARENT:

What is the number of young men of 21, 22, 23 and 24 years of age who were called before a medical board under the provisions of the National Resources Mobilization Act, 1940, in the following districts: (a) London, (b) Toronto, (c) Kingston, (d) head of the lakes, (e) Montreal, (f) Quebec, (g) Halifax, (h) New Brunswick, (i) Prince Edward Island, (j) Manitoba, (k) British Columbia, (l) Saskatchewan, (m) Alberta?

WEYBURN, SASK., AIRPORT

Mr. DOUGLAS (Weyburn):

1. What is the total amount for which commitments have been made in respect to the construction of the airport at Weyburn, Saskatchewan?
2. What is the total estimated cost of this project?
3. From what person or persons was the land purchased as a site for said airport?
4. What is the legal description of each piece of land purchased or leased and how much was paid for each parcel of land?

MOTIONS FOR PAPERS

1941 VICTORY LOAN

Mr. CHURCH:

For a return showing a breakdown of the details given in a return, November 12, 1941, in connection with the sale of the 1941 victory loan, as follows:—

Preparation and distribution of bonds		$ 363,921 86
Administration expenses:		
Salaries	$149,881 67	
Travelling expenses	285,038 37	
Stationery and office supplies	160,673 25	
Rental of office space	29,006 77	
Sundry expenses, including postage, telephone, telegraph, etc.	145,226 24	
		769,826 30
Publicity expenses:		
Newspaper and magazine advertising	476,677 00	
Posters, including billboard posters and posting	79,565 83	
Radio advertising	86,618 17	
Local advertising	160,888 13	
Other publicity	254,319 85	
		1,058,068 98
Commissions to individual canvassers on general subscriptions		1,551,713 80
Remuneration to banks, trust and loan companies—service fee for handling and delivering bonds		1,750,000 00
Remuneration to investment dealers and stockbrokers re pooled subscriptions		3,293,040 00
Total		$8,786,570 94

The said return to show the details of each of the main items set out aforesaid.

Mr. ILSLEY: The hon. gentleman has written me about this notice and has kindly consented to allow me some discretion as to the items which will be broken down. I am quite content to have it passed on the understanding that information which it has never been considered in accord with the public interest to disclose shall not be disclosed. That applies to some of the items.

Mr. CHURCH: I have no idea of interfering with anything. This motion was called three times when I was away. Perhaps I might say a few words about it.

My idea in bringing this up last November was in regard to past loans. I thought the chartered banks, the Bank of Canada, the post offices and other departments could effect a great economy. I think the government might well pass it, and break it down after, if that is satisfactory. If not, it can be dropped, and I will bring it up again after the present loan is over.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): I assume that the hon. member for Broadview (Mr. Church) did not hear the statement of the Minister of Finance. Could not a return be brought down subject to the reservation stated by the minister? I have an idea that the hon. member thinks the introduction of this question at the moment, and the bringing down of a return based thereon, might be detrimental to the present loan, and of course he would like to avoid that. However, I should like to see some of this information brought down, though certainly I would not want it done at the expense of the present loan, if the minister thinks it might have that effect. But could it not be passed, with the understanding that the minister will use his own discretion as to what he shall bring down?

Mr. ILSLEY: It seemed to be the feeling of some of my colleagues at least that it would be undesirable to pass this motion now, and the hon. gentleman offered to let it drop. If he wants to put it on the order paper again, however, I can give him some of this information. Some of it I cannot give; some it would be most undesirable to give. For instance, there were some seventeen thousand canvassers in the last loan, and it would be an impossible task, and undesirable, to say what each one of them received.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): I agree.

Mr. ILSLEY: I think it would be desirable to let the motion drop now. In the meantime I will confer with the hon. member, and perhaps he and I can frame a motion that will bring down the information he desires.

Mr. SPEAKER: Dropped.

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DEFENCE OF CANADA REGULATIONS—AIR RAID PRECAUTIONS

Mr. CHURCH:

For a copy of all orders in council, reports and other documents in the possession of the government relative to the defence of Canada regulations. Also a copy of all correspondence exchanged with the provinces relative to the enforcement of blackouts, covered by section 35 of the defence of Canada rules and regulations, as well as a copy of the order in council delegating this authority to provincial attorneys general instead of to the district military authorities.

Mr. MACKENZIE (Vancouver Centre): This motion refers to an order in council delegating authority to provincial attorneys general instead of to district military authorities. There is no such order in council. There is an instrument of delegation which I can table immediately. The correspondence will be somewhat voluminous, and to produce it may take some time.

Motion agreed to.

PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND FERRY

INQUIRY AS TO SERVICE BETWEEN ISLAND AND MAINLAND

On the orders of the day:

Hon. R. B. HANSON (Leader of the Opposition): I desire to call the attention of the Prime Minister and of the Minister of Transport, who I am sorry is not in his seat, to the situation which has arisen in connection with the car ferry service between Prince Edward Island and the mainland. I ask the house to bear with me while I give a brief recital of the present position as I see it.

On the 23rd instant, the day before yesterday, the ferry *Prince Edward Island* was held up at Borden with a leaky boiler, and there is now no conveyance by boat between the mainland and the island. All freight and passenger movement are held up, and the only chance to get on and off the island is by air. Just how long it will take to repair the boiler is not known. I am advised that last week there were over one hundred carloads of freight at Tormentine awaiting shipment to the island, and in addition to the ordinary shipments of live stock moving off the island, over two hundred reefer cars were required to ship potatoes to the United States. These potatoes represent a value to the farmers of approximately $1,000 per car, and if the situation does not improve very shortly a very severe loss will be sustained. I understand that the transportation committee of the Charlottetown board of trade met on the 23rd instant and passed a resolution, which was telegraphed to the Prime Minister, but so far as I know no answer has yet been received.

[Mr. Speaker.]

I placed some questions about this matter on the order paper for the purpose of eliciting some information, but the answers brought down on Monday last indicate that nothing is being done to improve the situation. Of course, when these questions were placed on the order paper the present ferry was not out of commission. I am also advised that if an order had been given in the United States for a new ferry within a reasonable time after the *Charlottetown* was lost, that order could have been filled, since they are filling orders over there for icebreakers and so on for the great lakes.

Will the Prime Minister, or the Minister of Transport, or in his absence the Minister of Munitions and Supply, who has had perhaps more to do with this matter than anyone else, indicate what is intended to be done to cope with the present situation, which is rapidly going from bad to worse, perhaps through no fault on the part of anyone in particular but because of delay in dealing with the situation.

Hon. C. D. HOWE (Minister of Munitions and Supply): This matter has been giving the government a great deal of concern. I presume that the Department of Munitions and Supply is the bottleneck. The position is that in order to rebuild this ferry we would have to give up a berth in one of our shipyards for a period of some fifteen months. We would have to divert sufficient steel to build probably two or three twin screw corvettes, which are badly needed; and considering the urgency of our naval requirements and of shipbuilding generally, we have not thought it advisable to do this.

My hon. friend is quite mistaken as to the possibility of having the ferry built in the United States. That possibility was explored immediately after the sinking. We scoured the second-hand market there, and looked into the position of the shipyards. At that time every shipyard was controlled by the government, and it was quite impossible to get a berth.

The service is carried on at the moment by a car ferry which handled the service until 1929, I think, and which is a perfectly good ferry. There are two car ferries on the run, but at present only one operates; and it is not unusual for the present ferry to carry on the service for six weeks or two months at this time of year. That ferry is operating. There was a short delay while a boiler was overhauled or repaired, but these things do occur when there is only one boat in operation, causing a temporary tie-up of cars. But unless this service has changed tremendously since earlier years the present car ferry should be able to handle the traffic with reasonable satisfaction to the people on the island. At this time of year, when the floe ice is heavy, the service always has been subject to short interruptions. It is not unusual to have a ferry go out to sea and be away for thirty-six hours before being able to dock on the other side; at least that has occurred more than once. In the meantime I would remind hon. members that a second service has been inaugurated between Wood island and Pictou, which I believe will relieve the situation considerably during the summer months.

I can assure every hon. member that the government is exceedingly anxious to rectify this situation, but at the moment that could be done only at great cost to our war effort. We are organized in one set of yards to build cargo boats, which we are launching every two months from every berth. It would perhaps mean losing eight or ten cargo vessels if we built a new ferry or, alternatively, losing two or three corvettes. In this period of war we must weigh the relative urgency of the needs in both directions, and that we have been doing. The moment we think we can spare a berth of any sort that can build a successor to the *Charlottetown*, the boat will be built. In the meantime a ferry has been found, I think in San Francisco or Los Angeles, which may be of some service as a stand-by boat. This is being examined very closely, and if it is found at all satisfactory it will be brought around and put on the service for such assistance as it is able to render.

C273095

CANADIAN ARMED FORCES

LEAVE FOR FARMERS' SONS—LENGTH OF DEFERMENT OF SERVICE

On the orders of the day:

Mr. J. G. DIEFENBAKER (Lake Centre): Mr. Speaker, I should like to ask a question of the Minister of National Defence, arising out of a very large number of communications I have been receiving from farmers located all across Canada, asking whether or not in view of the pronounced labour shortage which now exists on the farms it is the intention of the government to enable farmers' sons or others qualified to do farm work to go on leave, so that the spring work may be properly completed.

Hon. J. L. RALSTON (Minister of National Defence): Mr. Speaker, I can say that just at this instant I have not in mind any special or new policy with regard to that matter. It has each year been taken into consideration, having regard to the requirements of various units, and where they were placed. I may say that with respect to certain units in certain locations it was impossible to make any substantial break in the ranks by the granting of leave. In other locations, and with respect to other units that was possible, and it has been done.

As I say, I have not at present in mind any general principle which could govern uniformly across Canada. But I assure my hon. friend the matter will have every study, and the very best possible will be done in order to make men available where they can be made available for the important work to which the hon. member has referred.

Mr. N. J. M. LOCKHART (Lincoln): Mr. Speaker, further to the question asked by the hon. member for Lake Centre (Mr. Diefenbaker), I will not attempt to read or to refer to the many communications I have received, but I should like to ask a further question of the minister, indicated in several of the communications I have received. Is there any possibility of the extension of the term of exemption to, say, one year, in connection with farmers' sons? I have some very urgent cases I could show the minister, and I shall be glad to do so. But could that term be extended so that it will cover the whole year?

An hon. MEMBER: What about conscription?

Mr. RALSTON: My hon. friend is referring to regulations made by the Department of National War Services rather than by the Department of National Defence. Furthermore, he will realize that what he is asking for is, in effect, direct exemption for one year for a certain class. That does not fit in very well with all that has been said with respect to the necessity for the utilization of man-power, and the effort for total war.

In so far as my department can be of service in working out any more equitable situation with respect to those on the farm, I shall be glad to see that its services are available, and that conferences and consultations are held. But I cannot say anything further than that. One cannot offhand and without due consideration indicate a new policy or draft a new regulation.

Mr. LOCKHART: I am not asking that extended exemption be given in general; that is not my point at all. But there are extreme cases. For instance, may farmers about to do their spring work be assured that they will have a continuance of at least a short exemption?

Mr. RALSTON: That is a matter, first, of regulation. The regulations provide that the period of exemption shall be six months. There

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is only one deferment granted at one time, but there is nothing which makes it positive that another deferment will not be granted. Secondly, it is a matter for the board to decide whether or not the case is one of emergency, and of the kind my hon. friend has in mind.

Mr. CHURCH: What about those in the cities who want exemptions?

Mr. T. C. DOUGLAS (Weyburn): Mr. Speaker, following up the questions already asked with reference to farmers' sons in training being given leave to help with spring seeding, I would ask the Minister of National Defence this question. Such cases as I have had come to my attention I have referred to the Deputy Minister of National Defence, who has been very considerate and suggested that if the men will make application to their commanding officer consideration will be given to such applications. But most of these men do not know that, and the result is that scores of letters on the subject are coming to almost every member representing a rural constituency. Would the minister give consideration to having a statement printed in army orders to the effect that where men are needed at home on the farm and can be spared, leave can be had by applying to the commanding officer?

Mr. RALSTON: I would not want to have a statement made in quite that way, but I will see if some statement can be prepared with regard to the procedure in cases of the kind. Very recently we have made a rule which I think will be made uniform, that where men are actually in the army—not just those who have been called up and have not yet actually reported—we are referring such cases of men actually in the army, at least in the early stages of their training, to these boards. We are asking the Minister of National War Services to request his boards to look into these cases so that they may be dealt with on a uniform basis, and not on the basis of what one commanding officer may think in one place and another may think in another. This will help to get a set of principles laid down with respect to these men being entitled to deferment if deferment seems to be required.

DEFERMENT OF SERVICE OF FOURTH SON FOR BUSINESS REASONS

Mr. T. L. CHURCH (Broadview): I should like to ask a question of the Minister of National Defence which arises out of the question asked by the hon. member for Lincoln. A widow has three sons who have enlisted voluntarily for service in England and she wants to have a fourth son kept home for business reasons, but the tribunal ruled against her. There should not be conscription in some homes and not in others. Are any instructions issued to the tribunals in these matters?

Hon. J. L. RALSTON (Minister of National Defence): If I understand my hon. friend aright his question is: are any instructions issued with regard to business men?

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): To the tribunals.

Mr. RALSTON: That question is really one which ought to be referred to my colleague, the Minister of National War Services. No instructions are issued to tribunals by my department in that respect.

[*Later:*]

Mr. CHURCH: Can the Minister of National War Services give me an answer to the question I asked a few moments ago?

POSTPONEMENT FOR FIFTH SON

Mr. JEAN-FRANÇOIS POULIOT (Témiscouata): I should like to ask any of the war ministers or the Minister of National War Services if a man who has four sons who have enlisted voluntarily in the army can secure an indefinite postponement of training for the fifth son?

Hon. J. T. THORSON (Minister of National War Services): The matter is covered by the national war services regulations which are administered by divisional boards. It is within the discretion of the board to grant a postponement, but each postponement is confined to a limit of six months. There is nothing to prevent a board from granting either one or more extensions of such postponement.

SECOND VICTORY LOAN

RETURNS FROM ONTARIO—VILLAGE OF OMEMEE AND TOWNSHIP OF EMILY

On the orders of the day:

Mr. BRUCE McNEVIN (Victoria, Ont.): Mr. Speaker, I rise to a question of privilege. I note in this morning's *Globe and Mail* a report with regard to those Ontario municipalities which were first in reaching their allotments in connection with the victory loan. I have not the slightest desire in any way to detract from the splendid record of these municipalities. However, in order that the record may be clear, may I say that the village of Omemee and the township of Emily exceeded their objective of $65,000, by six and one-half per cent within fifteen minutes after the victory loan offices opened on the morning of Monday, February 16. I believe there should be a word of commendation for the

joint chairmen of these municipalities, Rev. R. M. Patterson of Omemee and Rev. Father McFadden of Downeyville. The canvassers Messrs. D. Weir, A. Carroll and A. McQuade are still going strong and have exceeded the sum of $100,000.

Some hon. MEMBERS: Order.

Mr. SPEAKER: I believe that is not a question of privilege.

RETURNS FROM QUEBEC—MEGANTIC COUNTY

On the orders of the day:

Mr. JOSEPH LAFONTAINE (Megantic-Frontenac): I should like to read a telegram which I received yesterday, reading as follows:

We take pleasure in advising you that Megantic county has to-day obtained and passed its objective of one million and four hundred thousand dollars. We understand this is the first county in the province of Quebec to reach its objective.

A. S. Johnson,
J. A. Forand,
Joint Chairmen, victory loan committee, county Megantic

PRIVILEGE—Mr. KINLEY

OTTAWA HOUSING CONDITIONS—COMMENT OF MAYOR LEWIS

On the orders of the day:

Mr. J. J. KINLEY (Queens-Lunenburg): Mr. Speaker, I desire to bring to the attention of the house an article appearing in to-day's issue of the Ottawa *Morning Journal*. It stands as the chief item of news on the front page, and refers to a statement made by his worship the Mayor of Ottawa. The news item is as follows:

Mayor Tells M.P's to Go Home
Make Room for War Workers

"Some of these M.P.'s who are wasting their time around Ottawa should go home so that their offices could be used by war workers," Mayor Lewis declared at Board of Control on Tuesday.

Then what appears to be the motive follows:

Mr. Lewis made his remarks after the board had endorsed the stand taken by G. Russell Boucher, M.P. for Carleton county, in the House of Commons on Monday night for an upward revision of the $100,000 granted annually to the city in lieu of taxes.

Then the article goes on to say:

Controllers Geldert and Pickering agreed with Mayor Lewis that the government had created the serious housing situation in the capital and was doing nothing to relieve the shortage of accommodation.

May I bring to the attention of the Prime Minister certain press dispatches which indicate that in Washington, where there is a similar condition, some departments of government are being moved to other cities. It might be a splendid idea, for instance, to remove the naval department to the coast.

Some hon. MEMBERS: East coast.

Some hon. MEMBERS: West coast.

Mr. KINLEY: And the Department of Agriculture to Winnipeg. Then, with respect to the personal affront indicated in the article, may I point out that most members of parliament are proud of the national capital, and naturally we are chagrined by the discourteous remark of the chief magistrate of the city of Ottawa.

Mr. HOMUTH: He knows only the Liberal members.

Mr. KINLEY: Most of us would be busy at home. But that is one of the tests people usually apply before sending us here.

It seems to me that the criticisms about members of parliament are hard to understand, especially in war time. If a debate continues for a long time in the house, we are accused of wasting the country's time. On the other hand, if hon. members do not speak, it is said that they are dumb. So far as I am concerned, practical business is usually run in a harmonious and quiet manner. To my mind that is the most effective kind of business. But it seems that sections of the press and some people across the country want us to put on a show.

Mr. PINARD: On a point of order, my hon. friend is complaining about the city of Ottawa.

Mr. KINLEY: I have the floor.

Mr. PINARD: Sit down, please. The hon. member says that he is speaking to a point of privilege. I am speaking to a point of order..

Mr. SPEAKER: The hon. member for Queens-Lunenburg (Mr. Kinley) has introduced a question of privilege concerning an item appearing in a newspaper. He has extended his observations as far as he should, in the circumstances.

Mr. KINLEY: I should like to say just a word more, because this article is an affront to members of the house.

Some hon. MEMBERS: Hear, hear.

Mr. SPEAKER: The hon. member should confine his remarks to the question of privilege.

Mr. KINLEY: Most of the criticism of members of parliament seems to be by people who do not understand just what we do. Some seem to think that the whole performance of a member is spread upon *Hansard*.

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MG 26 J 4, Volume 389, pages C273027-C274022

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That is contrary to the fact and contrary to responsible government. Hon. members, especially those supporting the government, do their work most effectively and use their influence before the legislation ever comes into the House of Commons.

Some hon. MEMBERS: Oh, oh.

Mr. KINLEY: I subscribe to the sentiment expressed in the Scripture:

Should a wise man utter vain knowledge, and fill his belly with the east wind?

NATIONAL HEALTH

QUESTION AS TO INTRODUCTION THIS SESSION OF HEALTH INSURANCE SCHEME

On the orders of the day:

Mr. GORDON GRAYDON (Peel): I should like to direct a question to the Minister of Pensions and National Health. Would the minister care to comment on the prevalent rumour that the government proposes this session to introduce legislation designed to provide a national scheme of health insurance?

Hon. IAN A. MACKENZIE (Minister of Pensions and National Health): The answer to the question is in the negative. However, there were certain discussions departmentally last June on the question of national health, as a result of which certain departmental proposals have been canvassed thoroughly with the Canadian Medical Association, the dental profession, the nursing association and the hospitals of Canada. On the outcome of this canvassing the departmental policy will be determined.

AGRICULTURE COMMITTEE

PROBLEMS OF THE FARMER—SUBMISSION OF CANADIAN FEDERATION OF AGRICULTURE

On the orders of the day:

Mr. GORDON GRAYDON (Peel): I should like to direct a question to the Minister of Agriculture. Is it proposed to convene at once the standing committee on agriculture and, if so, will an opportunity be afforded in that committee, or in a special committee, for a comprehensive consideration and exhaustive review of the more pressing problems facing the Canadian farmer at the moment?

Hon. J. G. GARDINER (Minister of Agriculture): It is intended to have the committee on agriculture convene just as soon as possible and there are certain matters which I, as Minister of Agriculture, intend to refer to that committee. These do not necessarily include the matters referred to. If there is no other opportunity provided during the session, there is always opportunity when the estimates are being discussed of obtaining whatever information can be given by the department with regard to different matters.

Mr. GRAYDON: I was wondering if the minister had in mind referring to the committee any of the problems which were raised in the submission of the Canadian Federation of Agriculture which met the Prime Minister and members of the government in January?

Mr. GARDINER: I have not given consideration to that, but I shall give consideration to it.

LABOUR CONDITIONS

KIRKLAND LAKE STRIKE—PROTECTION OF TRADE UNIONISTS

On the orders of the day:

Mrs. DORISE W. NIELSEN (North Battleford): I should like to ask a question of the Minister of Labour, of which I have given him notice. It arises from a telegram received this morning from Sudbury, which reads as follows:

Forest Emmerson, international representative, and Jack Whelehan, international organizer, have been brutally and viciously assaulted in union office. Organizers in hospital. Union office completely demolished. Thugs demanded list of union membership. We believe this direct reaction of government policy in Kirkland Lake strike. Incessant anti-union campaign conducted by Sudbury *Star*. A committee of Sudbury miners request this to the attention of our government.

A. K. Smith,
J. McCool,
W. Cavanough,
J. Navalkoski.

Has the minister any information in regard to this matter and, if so, would he please make a statement to the house?

Hon. HUMPHREY MITCHELL (Minister of Labour): My answer to the first question is no. My answer to the second question is that, as no doubt my hon. friend knows, the responsibility for the maintenance of law and order is primarily that of the municipalities and provincial governments.

Mr. CLARENCE GILLIS (Cape Breton South): I should like to address a question to the Minister of Justice which arises out of a telegram similar to the one just read by the hon. member for North Battleford. One of the organizers who is now in hospital, due to the assault described in the telegram read by the hon. member, is a United States cititzen legally admitted to this country as a representative of organized labour. I should like to ask what protection the Royal Canadian Mounted Police gives to officials who are endeavouring to

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carry out instructions issued by the government as contained in order in council P.C. 2685. Can the minister give the house an assurance that there will be a thorough investigation into the complaint contained in the telegram read by the hon. member for North Battleford?

Hon. L. S. St. LAURENT (Minister of Justice): The only answer I could give to the hon. member would be similar to that given already by the Minister of Labour. The hon. member was good enough to address a letter to me containing a copy of the telegram, and I made inquiries from the Commissioner of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. He told me that he had no information and wished to point out that the responsibility for maintaining order there was upon the municipal police of Sudbury and the provincial police of Ontario.

Mr. ANGUS MacINNIS (Vancouver East): Mr. Speaker, I should like to put a supplementary question to the Minister of Justice following the question raised by the hon. member for Cape Breton South. This is a very serious situation, and I do not think it should be passed over as lightly as it was by both the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Labour. If labour causes any disturbance in any area—

Some hon. MEMBERS: Order.

Other hon. MEMBERS: Put the question.

Mr. MacINNIS: Just a moment, now. Parliament cannot afford to ignore this matter. I am saying that if labour causes any disturbance in any area the government would very soon send in the mounted police, and I think that at the present moment the government should give every assurance that these people will be protected. What protection are trade unionists going to have in this matter?

Mr. HOMUTH: The marriage is not so happy after all.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): It seems to be dissolved already.

Mr. SPEAKER: Order. I should like to point out that the practice is becoming prevalent of putting supplementary questions following original questions submitted to the ministry. That means almost a general debate on questions that have been put to the ministry, who have given an answer to the original question. Furthermore, in the asking of questions, expressions of opinion are being given and statements of fact made. These are not questions addressed to the ministry, and I would ask hon. members to remember that on questions put to the ministry on the orders of the day there can be no general debate, and supplementary questions should be prohibited.

Mr. MacINNIS: Mr. Speaker, I have been very careful not to make speeches in asking questions, but we cannot afford to leave this matter to the gorillas who are at the present time running the province of Ontario.

Mr. HOMUTH: I rise to a point of order. While I have no brief for the Premier of Ontario, and I do not think he particularly needs any defence, I submit that hon. members of this house ought to show respect for the premier of any province of the Dominion of Canada, and under the rules of the house, the hon. member for Vancouver East (Mr. MacInnis) had no right, I submit, to use the term he did with reference to Premier Hepburn, when he called him a gorilla. I think he ought to withdraw that remark.

I should like a ruling on my point of order, Mr. Speaker.

Mr. SPEAKER: I did not understand that the hon. member had asked for a ruling. An hon. member must take responsibility for any statement he makes with respect to somebody who is not a member of the house. If it were a member of the house it would be a different matter.

[*Later:*]

Mr. SPEAKER: With reference to the point raised by the hon. member for Waterloo South (Mr. Homuth), citation 294 of Beauchesne's Parliamentary Rules and Forms reads:

If a member should say nothing disrespectful to the house or the chair, or personally opprobrious to other members, or in violation of other rules of the house he may state whatever he thinks fit in debate, however offensive it may be to the feelings, or injurious to the character, of individuals; and he is protected by his privilege from any action for libel, as well as from any other question or molestation.

WHEAT

LEGISLATION RESPECTING 1942 CROP—RECOMMENDATIONS OF POOL DELEGATION

On the orders of the day:

Mr. E. E. PERLEY (Qu'Appelle): I wish to ask the Minister of Trade and Commerce two questions. This question follows one asked by the hon. member for Lake Centre. The farmers of the west are anxious to know just what will be required of them this spring, whether there is to be any reduction in seeding, and so on, and what is going to happen with respect to price and marketing. Would the minister inform the house, first, when he will be prepared to bring down legislation dealing with the price for the 1942 crop and its marketing? My second question is prompted by the statement of the hon. member for Queens-Lunenburg (Mr. Kinley)

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that government members of the house do their best work, not on the floor of the house, but, consulting with the cabinet before they ever come into the house. I would ask what success the minister is having with the western Liberals, what suggestions he is getting from them, and what assistance in framing the wheat legislation and carrying out the recommendations of the pool delegation?

Hon. J. A. MacKINNON (Minister of Trade and Commerce): In reply to the first question asked by the hon. member for Qu'Appelle, I wish to say that those advising the cabinet on matters of wheat and farm policy, and those members of the cabinet who are particularly responsible for policy along that line, and the cabinet generally, have been holding practically continuous meetings on this question for a long time. In the last few days, for instance, we spent all Saturday afternoon, Sunday afternoon, Monday and last night until twelve o'clock, considering this subject and endeavouring to arrive at unanimity on a question of such great importance to western Canada and Canada at large. Most sympathetic and anxious attention is being given to the problem, and I can assure the hon. member that a decision will be brought down at the earliest possible moment.

I do not think the hon. member really expects an answer to his second question.

Mr. PERLEY: I think it would be very interesting to have one.

STANDING ORDERS

ENFORCEMENT OF RULE WITH RESPECT TO READING OF SPEECHES

On the orders of the day:

Mr. J. K. BLAIR (Wellington North): Now that the speech from the throne is disposed of, I would like to ask you, Mr. Speaker, if the rule that prohibits members from reading their speeches will be enforced from now until the end of the session?

Mr. SPEAKER: The rules of the house are there and will have to be enforced.

HONG KONG

STATEMENT WITH RESPECT TO CANADIAN CASUALTIES

On the orders of the day:

Hon. J. L. RALSTON (Minister of National Defence): Mr. Speaker, to-day the government has received the first official information from which any definite conclusion can be arrived at with respect to the number of casualties at Hong Kong. A message has been received from the Canadian Minister at Buenos Aires transmitting a message which was received from the Argentine embassy—I take it to be the Argentine embassy at Tokyo. The message is very meagre. It gives figures, and that is all. The statement is that "Japanese government officially communicate figures for prisoners of war Hong Kong, Canadians, 1,689." Hon. members will remember that the number who embarked was 1,985. That means, on the basis of those figures, I most sincerely regret to say, that, at least without further information, 296 would be regarded as either dead or missing.

SUGAR

INQUIRY AS TO RATIONING AND CONSERVATION OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE

On the orders of the day:

Mr. J. S. ROY (Gaspé): Will the Minister of Finance inform the house whether the government's policy with respect to the conservation of foreign exchange has anything to do with the rationing of sugar?

Hon. J. L. ILSLEY (Minister of Finance): Mr. Speaker, the reason for the rationing of sugar was the action taken by the United States and the fact that there was a possible prospective shortage of sugar. It had no relation whatever to the conservation of exchange.

PLEBISCITE ACT

PROVISION FOR TAKING OF VOTES ON ANY QUESTION SUBMITTED BY WAY OF PLEBISCITE

Hon. N. A. McLARTY (Secretary of State) moved the second reading of Bill No. 10, respecting the taking of a plebiscite in every electoral district in Canada and the taking of the votes of such plebiscite of Canadian service voters stationed within and without Canada.

Right Hon. W. L. MACKENZIE KING (Prime Minister): The bill which is now before the house for its second reading is, as the Secretary of State (Mr. McLarty), who introduced it, announced a few days ago, in the nature of a general plebiscite act; that is to say, it makes provision for the taking of a plebiscite which ordinarily would be as applicable to a plebiscite on one subject as another. The intention, however, is that the bill should be for one plebiscite only, and that the plebiscite when taken, shall have reference to only one question. That question has already been made clear to the members of the house and the public, but I will take occasion at once to bring again to the attention of the house its exact wording.

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It will be recalled that in the speech from the throne it was announced, as part of government policy, that a plebiscite would be taken on the question of removing a certain limitation which now is imposed upon the government with respect to the enlistment of men for service overseas. The question which it is intended to ask the public in the plebiscite is the following:

Are you in favour of releasing the government from any obligation arising out of any past commitments restricting the methods of raising men for military service?

As I said, at the time of speaking on the address, the question is very simple in its language and meaning and is a straightforward one. I do not think it is capable of any more than one interpretation. It asks the people of Canada whether they are willing to release the government from a certain limitation which arises out of past commitments with respect to the enlistment of men for overseas. If the answer is in the affirmative it will mean that the government, according to the opinion expressed by the people, has been released from commitments that have been made; if it is in the negative it will mean that the majority of the electors are of the opinion that the government should continue to be governed by the commitment that was made at the time of the last general election and on previous occasions, and on subsequent occasions as well.

The subject of the plebiscite has been debated at such length that it would perhaps seem unnecessary to discuss it further. My purpose this afternoon is not so much to attempt to add to what has been said but rather, if possible, to clear away some of the confusion that has arisen out of the discussion that has already taken place.

To that end, let me first of all make quite clear the purpose of the plebiscite. As I have said, the purpose is to give the government—I put it in general terms—a perfectly free hand to deal with all matters affecting the war in the manner which, in its judgment, is most in the national interest.

There is a distinction to be made between the legal powers which the government has and the moral authority which it possesses. With respect to the legal power, there can be no question whatever that this parliament has full power to do whatever it may decide to do with respect to the management of matters pertaining to the war. The one limitation which exists on that power so far as this parliament is concerned is not a legal limitation but a moral obligation.

There may be some who take the view that, in matters of government, in time of war, moral obligations count for nothing. May I say that, in my opinion, moral obligations, especially where they relate to a specific measure, a concrete matter related to the war on which the government of the country itself has given a pledge, are as binding as any obligation could possibly be. To say that the parliament of Canada, which derives its powers from the people, after a solemn pledge has been given to the people on a matter which is of deep concern to them, is released from this pledge the moment the people have elected it, is simply for parliament itself to create a precedent which would be subversive of parliamentary institutions.

Let me ask first of all how this limitation arose. It arose out of a situation that existed several years ago in this country. That of itself is significant as indicating how long the public memory is with respect to matters which affect the people themselves. I would pause here to say that the public memory is going to be long in the matter of how this parliament views its moral obligations as well as its legal powers. It is because I feel very strongly that the people of Canada will wish to have their present and their future governments pay the utmost regard to pledges given to the electorate that I feel it all important that this matter of past commitments should be presented to the people in the form of a question which will secure their opinion, before the time comes when the government may be called upon to consider whether further action than it is empowered now to take, should or should not become necessary later on.

During the last war the question of conscription came up near the end of the conflict. I will not go into what took place at the time except to remind hon. members of the fact that nothing in the political history of Canada since Confederation has given rise to so much bitterness, so much ill feeling, or has done so much in the way of dividing the peoples of this country, setting one lot against another, as did the conscription issue at that particular time, and the manner in which it was dealt with by the government of the day. Now it was because of that fact that, when the government of the day saw looming on the horizon the possibility of a future war, it was recognized that this question of conscription would present itself immediately. It was of importance therefore to national unity that a position should be taken and stated by the administration which would prevent any of the kind of controversy and bitterness which had previously arisen, and would maintain the unity of the country at a time when the situation might be most critical. Having that in mind, the government of the day—this was before the present war began—and, not merely

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the government, but members of the opposition and members of all parties in this House of Commons, expressed very frankly and emphatically on the floor of this parliament their view that, if another war came, and it became necessary to consider the sending of men overseas to participate in what was then thought might be a war confined to Europe alone, the only method that would be resorted to for overseas would be the one of voluntary enlistment—there would be no compulsion, no conscription. I think I am right when I say that that was the view which was generally expressed before the war by all parties in this house. It was expressed for the one reason that it was felt that it was absolutely necessary to maintain, as far as that might be possible, the unity of the country at a time when it might be faced with the great crisis of war.

But let me go a step further. When the war came in Europe and this parliament met to decide whether Canada would enter the war or not, a declaration was made by the government of the day that, if Canada did enter the war, there would not be compulsory service for overseas, but that service for overseas would be by voluntary enlistment. That declaration was made when this house was deciding whether Canada should go into the war or not. And that statement was made not by the government to hon. members of parliament only but by members of parliament of all parties speaking to the people of the country, and assuring them of the position that would be taken. I submit that no more solemn undertaking could possibly have been given to the people of Canada than that which was given to them by their representatives in the House of Commons at that time.

What was the effect of giving that declaration? The effect was that, when Canada decided to go into the war, this House of Commons, I think to a man—there may have been an exception, but practically to a man—decided that Canada should participate in the war at Britain's side. We were told beforehand that it was all nonsense to ask parliament to decide whether the country should go into the war, we were told—I am speaking now of what the government was told by its opponents—that the government should decide that question; not leave it to the people's representatives in parliament to decide what they should do. I took the position very strongly at the time that parliament would decide, and I suppose no one received more abuse and criticism from certain sections of the press and public speakers than I did for taking that stand; I took the position that Canada would not go automatically into war just because one part of the empire might be at war, but that we would decide on the merits of the case as the situation was known, and would take our own action by the vote of the people's representatives in parliament.

Having given the assurance that conscription would not be resorted to in connection with enlistment for service overseas, this parliament voted practically unanimously to enter the war. But that was not the only occasion on which the position was asserted.

We also had a general election in 1940 to decide what administration was to carry on the affairs of the country during the period of war. At that time from one end of Canada to the other members of the government renewed to the people of Canada the undertaking which I have just cited, as the one which would be followed in time of war. Hon. members opposite have been referring to this pledge or commitment as "Mr. King's commitment", "to relieve Mr. King of his commitment", "relieve the Prime Minister of his commitment". May I say that the commitment was not a commitment of myself alone. To begin with, it was a commitment on the part of all my colleagues in the government, it had been made in this House of Commons in the presence of every one of them; it was a commitment made in the name of the entire party which supports the administration; and, may I say, a commitment quite as broad, quite as emphatic, was made by the leader of the opposition of that day on behalf of the Conservative party in this house. The very same commitment was made on behalf of the Conservative party of Canada in this House of Commons by its then leader, it was made also on the platforms of this country by its leader in terms just as emphatic as anyone on this side of the house could have made it.

So that there will be no misunderstanding of this, let me give hon. members exactly what the then leader of the Conservative party, and of the official opposition, Doctor Manion said, speaking in this House of Commons on March 30, 1939; as reported in *Hansard* at page 2440:

> In the last war the conscription of men to go to the front caused violent racial antagonisms, much disharmony, bitterness and misunderstanding—conditions from which as yet we have not wholly recovered, and on top of that I believe I am expressing the opinion of authorities when I say that it was of no real military value so far as the empire was concerned.

He stated that as far as he could ascertain only some ten thousand men at the most got into the fighting line as a result of conscription. Then he went on to say:

> The policy that I suggest is the one which I gave three days ago in an interview: first, that there should be no conscription of Canadians to serve outside the borders of Canada; second, that we should have full cooperation with the British empire short of the conscription of men to serve outside our borders.

That was the statement Doctor Manion as leader of the official opposition, and of the Conservative party, made to parliament. But he also made similar statements on the public platforms during the campaign of 1940. Here is what Doctor Manion said at Quebec, speaking in the name of his party:

> I stated on March 30, 1939, just about a year ago, in the House of Commons, that I was opposed to conscription because of its failure in the last war, and because it had stirred up misunderstanding and strife in our country, when the duty of our public men is to hold this country together, rather than to break it up. I have not waited until I came to the province of Quebec to make this statement. I made it a month ago at Brockville in the opening speech of my campaign. I have made it more than twenty times, since then, in almost every speech which I have delivered as far west as Victoria, B.C. Thus I have set forth my attitude in five provinces of Canada before coming to Quebec, and I state here again to-night that I am against conscription and that a national government such as I propose will not put in conscription.

Now there is the statement made by the leader of the Conservative party who was asking the country to support his party—not, it is true, under its old name of the Conservative party, but under the new name which it was taking for the purpose of the election—national government party—a pledge that if a national government party were returned they would not put conscription into force.

Now let me assume for a moment that a national government party had been returned. I ask my hon. friend the leader of the opposition, if he had been a member of that government, or Doctor Manion's successor in that government, whether he would have felt that he had no obligation whatever to see that that particular undertaking was lived up to? Would he have taken the position that although he had been returned to power on a specific pledge solemnly given to the people in the different provinces at a time of war, in a general election when they were being asked to return his administration rather than another, that having been returned to this parliament would he then immediately thereafter have turned around and said, "I recognize no obligation in this matter to those who elected the administration, I am going to proceed without any reference to the people at all?" I do not believe my hon. friend would have done that, and I am surprised that he criticizes me for wishing to have the people pass on this question in order that the government may be freed of all limitations upon its authority to act, except its responsibility to parliament, and through parliament to the people.

It is true that my hon. friend has said to me, "I think what you should have done was come to the House of Commons and ask the house to release you, and I am sure the house would have done so readily." But may I say to my hon. friend that my undertaking in this matter, as Prime Minister of the country, was not given to this House of Commons; it was given to the people of Canada. It was given, just as the pledge of his leader of that day was given, not to the House of Commons but to the people. It is true that a statement to the same effect was made to the house before the recent general elections, and before the war, but it was not a statement to the members of the house so much as a statement of what we and our parties and followers would do if we were faced with a situation which demanded the question being decided one way or the other. The pledge was given later direct to the people, to the electorate themselves; it was a pledge made between the leaders of two great political parties in Canada and the electorate of this country in regard to the most solemn question that could have been put before them at that particular time.

Now, Mr. Speaker, as I see it either we are going to destroy the faith of the people of Canada in their public men and in the responsibility of parliament to the people themselves, if we ignore these pledges, or we are going to maintain that faith by making it perfectly clear to the people that we regard such power as we have as coming from the people themselves and that we intend to be ever mindful of this, and that if we have given a solemn pledge to them we intend to carry out that pledge. If, after situations have arisen which did not exist at the time a pledge was made, we believe in their own interests we should be released from that pledge and we take the necessary steps to that end, by consulting the people first, then I say we are helping to keep the faith of the people in their public men and in their parliament.

That is why to my mind this question is fundamental. It goes to the very roots of government itself, the very source from which power is derived by a parliament. Has my hon. friend any authority other than that which comes from the people? Have I any power except that which comes from the people? Is that power changed the moment I get into parliament? Being returned by the votes of the people themselves, I have constantly to keep in mind, as I think every

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member of parliament must, that obligation, which is an abiding obligation with respect to membership in any House of Commons worthy of the name.

Well, now, that being the purpose of the plebiscite, let me state the present position. The position is that the government has full power with respect to everything, excepting one thing; and that one thing is that commitment, that obligation, with respect to the enlisting of men for overseas service. There the government is not free. You may ask why the government should come forward at the present time and ask to be made free. First of all may I make it clear that it is not because of any situation that exists at the moment. The Minister of National Defence (Mr. Ralston) has made it perfectly clear that with respect to voluntary enlistment we are obtaining men for overseas service at the present time as rapidly as we can train them. For our programme this year, and up to March, 1943, there is an honest belief on the part of the government that we will be able to get the men by voluntary enlistment for service overseas, and will not have to resort to conscription. But no one can say how long this war is going to last. No one can say what particular turn it is going to take. None of us knows what the conditions are going to be a few months hence, or several months hence, or a year or two hence. What we all know is this, that every month of this war has made it apparent to every member of this House of Commons, and I think should have made it apparent to every citizen of Canada, that a government cannot be too free to take the course that may be demanded in the national interest at a time like the present. It is because of this we want to have perfect freedom of action as an administration, to have all the right to do what is in the public interest at the time the situation may demand it, and we feel we ought to be given this freedom as quickly as possible. The reason we want it, as I have stated already, is to be free to act in the manner which will best serve the interests of the people of Canada to serve in the manner that will make Canada's war effort the most effective. That is the sole reason, and that is all that is involved in this plebiscite. Hon. members have been talking about conscription, about no conscription and the like. That is not the issue in this plebiscite. This is the issue: Is the government of Canada, in time of war, to have freedom to take whatever action it thinks most advisable with respect to the furtherance of Canada's war effort?

That is the only question, and I am amazed that any person who has to do with the making of public opinion in Canada, with the making of its laws or to do with any political institutions, could for a moment hesitate to give immediate support to a demand of that kind. What argument can be urged against giving to a ministry the right to have full power in time of war to deal with any question, just as in time of peace it has full power to deal with any question that may come before it?

But there is another point I wish to bring out in connection with the special need for the plebiscite at this time, and it is this. First of all, the government is being put in an entirely wrong position before the people of this country and before the world just because we have not that full power. I ask hon. members to reflect upon that. I have said that the public has a long memory. Other countries, other nations have memories as well. To-day we are in a great partnership with a large number of nations, who are helping us as we are helping them. It is important that our position should be perfectly clear. It is being represented to the people of this country, as it is being represented to the people of Britain, the people of the United States and the people of all the allied nations, that this government is not seeking to have an all out war effort. Why? Because it is precluded, under a commitment which it has given and to which it is adhering, from resorting to conscription for men for service overseas. In other words the all out war effort is being identified with that one single thing, namely the commitment against having conscription for overseas service whether that should ever become necessary or not.

That is putting the government in an entirely false position. Let us take the position as it is to-day. Would anyone say that we have not been working as hard as we possibly could toward a full out war effort? Will anyone say that at the present time, if we had that full power, we would be resorting to conscription for overseas service? No one will say that, because it is not necessary, has not become necessary, and may never become necessary. Nevertheless as long as that commitment is there we are being represented to the people of our own and other countries as a government unwilling to go the lengths other countries are willing to go, even should necessity for it become manifest in every way. That is a false position and a very wrong one in which to put the government.

Moreover, the present position in regard to that one commitment places the parliament of Canada, as well, in a false position. Suppose the question of conscription were urgent at this time, and we wished to discuss it on the

floor of the house, could we have a free discussion of conscription on its merits, with that commitment binding many hon. members at the present time? The very minute the subject were brought up, one hon. member after another, if it suited his purpose, would rise in his place in the house and say, "I cannot discuss this question, because the government is committed not even to raise it." So long as that commitment is there, no matter how the war may develop, there can be no discussion of the merits of the question of compulsory service for overseas. I say that that is putting parliament in a wrong position before the people of Canada.

I have not any fear, personally, that parliament will not take the right course with respect to any phase of the war effort, once it is debated on its merits. I have faith in the judgment of the House of Commons to do what is the wisest and the right thing, having respect to the merits of the case. But in existing circumstances I do not want to see this parliament placed longer in a position where it cannot even discuss the merits of an all-important question with regard to Canada's war effort. And so I say to those who are taking exception to the course which the government is pursuing that they are helping only to place their own parliament in a position in which no parliament should be placed in a time of war.

I would say further, that not only is it putting the government in a false position to have its hands tied at this time, in the manner indicated, and that it is putting parliament in a false position, but it is also putting Canada in a false position, before all countries of the world, including her allies in the war.

We have seen in communciations which have appeared from time to time, and we have heard in the public addresses, what has been said recently about the position of the United States vis-a-vis Canada. Notwithstanding the fact that for over two years Canada has been sending thousands of men across the seas, we have in the last month or two heard it said that Canada's war effort is not as fine as that of the United States, and why, forsooth, not that they have sent large numbers of men overseas, not that the United States have thousands of men, men who have been in the war for two years, but solely because there are alleged limitations on our war effort since we are not able to send a man overseas under compulsion, regardless of the fact that up to the present we have been and may continue to be able to get all we require under the voluntary system.

I do not believe Canada should be placed in that false position. We should not be placed in that position before the United States. We should not be placed in that false position before Great Britain and, not only before our allies, but also before the enemy. It must be remembered that, as some are only too anxious to do in this country, the enemy will construe this commitment as a limitation on the war effort of Canada.

I say on these grounds, Mr. Speaker, I feel very strongly the time has come when that limitation should be removed, and when the government should be given the utmost freedom to deal with any phase of the war effort as it thinks best subject always to its responsibility to parliament.

I have said that this is not a question of conscription. Hon. members opposite have been saying, "Why do you not have a referendum, and refer the question of conscription itself to the people?"

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): Who said that?

Mr. MACKENZIE KING: You never said that?

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): No.

Mr. MACKENZIE KING: I am delighted to hear it.

Some hon. MEMBERS: No, no!

Mr. MACKENZIE KING: You never have said it?

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): Who said it?

Mr. MACKENZIE KING: Well, I can show my hon. friend several papers supporting his opposition—

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): Oh, well—

Mr. MACKENZIE KING: May I say this, then—

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): I did not say it.

Mr. MACKENZIE KING: Then I understand that my hon. friend now says they are not in favour of a referendum.

Mr. MacNICOL: They never said anything else.

Mr. MACKENZIE KING: What are they in favour of, then? They are in favour simply of calling parliament and enforcing conscription without reference to the people, either by plebiscite or referendum! There we have the difference between the two parties. Notwithstanding their position in the House of Commons, and the solemn undertaking given by their leader at the time of the last general election—which they did not denounce, but which they supported—they say to the people of Canada to-day, "We

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will not give you even a referendum. We will not give you a plebiscite; but we will take it into our own hands to do the very thing which our leader said he would not do, or we would not do if our party were returned to power."

Mr. STIRLING: On a question of privilege, may I interrupt the Prime Minister? I have stated in the house this session that the course I consider should be adopted by the government is that of submitting a resolution to the elected members of the House of Commons as to whether they should be freed from the commitments under which they placed themselves.

Mr. MACKENZIE KING: In other words, if I understand my hon. friend correctly he suggests that we ought to decide among ourselves, without any reference to the people at all.

Mr. STIRLING: The 245 representatives of the people, elected at an election at which this was not an issue.

Mr. MACKENZIE KING: And that is where I entirely disagree with my hon. friend. If it was not an issue it was because the leaders of all parties took similar positions, and the position so adopted was that there would be no question of conscription. But that makes the obligation all the greater on every hon. member sitting in the house to see that, before that question is so much as discussed, he should be released from any commitment which may have been made.

Then, in reference to whether the plebiscite is to be in reality a referendum, there is a question which is being asked now which changes the plebiscite into a referendum—and I believe my hon. friend asked this question only a day or two ago—it is, "What are you going to do if the decision is such-and-such?" He wishes me to say that I am going to do so-and-so. If I were to give him an undertaking at this time, and that undertaking is before the people when the question is put before them, is that not a referendum? That is, I commit myself to one course or to the other, and the people then are being asked to decide whether the government should take it or not. In other words I throw on the people of this country the onus of making a political and military decision, when the only body by which such decision should be taken on a question of this kind is the government which is responsible for such decision, advised by its military advisers, and debating its decisions on the floor of parliament, thereby making itself responsible to parliament for the decisions it makes.

That brings me to the question of evading responsibility. The leader of the opposition (Mr. Hanson) used some language the other day to which I thought I might take objection when he spoke. I decided, however, to refer to it later on. He described as a subterfuge the course the government is taking. I believe the term "subterfuge" as applied to government policy in a matter of this kind is one which you, Mr. Speaker, might properly have ruled out of order.

He also said the government lacked courage, and stated later in his remarks that the course we were adopting was an evasive one. Let us see how far it has been evasive. What are we doing in the matter of responsible government? With respect to responsible government, at the present time we have not full powers. Our powers are limited. We cannot have fully responsible government until there are no limitations upon our powers. What we are asking the people in this plebiscite is to give us perfect freedom, to give us full responsibility. We are not asking the people to relieve us of responsibility, we are not asking the people to make a decision for us, we are asking them to give us full responsibility. We will take it and we will exercise it in the light of our responsibility to their representatives in the House of Commons. Where is the evasion of responsible government in that?

Let me go back to the course my hon. friends propose to adopt, if I understand them aright. They say, "ignore the people; we are here now, we will decide this thing in this House of Commons without reference to the people at all". Well, I say that that is irresponsible government. Because we are here with a mandate which the people have given us, which is full in all particulars but one. They say with regard to that one particular, "we will ignore it altogether, we will pay no attention to it one way or another". Talk about being courageous, I do not see anything courageous about that. Courage comes when you face the people, not when you run away from them. That run-away course is the one my hon. friends opposite have been advocating right along.

When this government decided during the course of the war that it was going to hold to the constitution of this country by appealing to the people before the end of a five-year term to elect a new House of Commons, we were told we were doing the wrong thing, that we ought to stay here, that we ought to extend our term and theirs as members at the same time. "Don't face the people, that is wrong." I think the people showed that they were not ready to give such support to those who were not prepared to trust them

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but who wanted to have power without recognizing the source from which political power comes. I hope I have made it clear that the government is not seeking to evade any responsibility. It wants full responsibility. When it has that responsibility, it will come here, not sheltering behind commitments, but with full authority to inform this house of the course it feels should be taken. It will stand and fall by the decision which it makes.

My hon. friend has said that the taking of this plebiscite means that it will delay matters in a time of war. What is it going to delay? Is it going to delay the production of munitions or equipment of war, or of ships? Is it going to delay the sending of airmen overseas? Is it going to delay the enlistment of men in the navy? Is it going to delay the enlistment of men in the army, either for service in Canada or overseas? I say it is not, not by one minute. More men are offering themselves for training to-day than the administration is able to train, and that will be so for some time to come. Is it delaying the production of food? Is it delaying contributions to the war loan? Some people recently said they ought to cut out contributions altogether because the government was seeking to recognize its obligations to the people. There is no delay anywhere. But there is a pause sufficiently long to allow the people to express their own views with respect to the future freedom of action that the government of this country should have the right to take.

Something has been said about the cost. I assume that it will cost something to take the plebiscite and I regret that it will be as long as it will be before the vote itself can be taken. But we are spending a good many billions of dollars at the present time and those billions of dollars are coming from the people. When this house undertakes to put through estimates amounting to something like three billion dollars in a year, I think the people of this country will be relieved to know that the government submitting those estimates wants to be perfectly sure of their confidence in everything that it does; that it is prepared to trust them by going before them for increased powers when it feels that these increased powers are necessary in the public interest. I do not think that the plebiscite should cost very much. I believe that many of those who will serve as enumerators or who will perform other duties in connection with the taking of the plebiscite will be patriotic enough to realize that in this time of war this is one method whereby they can render a war service that will be a real contribution to the country at the present time. I should be surprised if many of them do not return to the public treasury the small amounts that will be paid to them for the discharge of their important duties. I do not think the additional amount that will be required will be very great.

The taking of this plebiscite will not be using up war materials except perhaps the paper that will be necessary for the instructions, the ballots and the like. That is the only material that I can see that is going to be used. Such other incidental expenses as may be necessary will I hope be met to a considerable extent in the way I have indicated. May I say that I feel very strongly that as this expense is one which the government is asking the people to incur at this time in the people's own interest, the people themselves will be quite willing that it should be incurred.

The last day upon which we discussed this question my hon. friend said that he was going to ask his party to vote "yes" on the plebiscite, that he was going to ask the country to vote "yes." Why did he not do that during the debate on the address? Why did he not come out when we were debating the address and say that he thought that every good Conservative in this country ought to support the government's proposal for a plebiscite? There is only one reason I can think of, and that is the one that was in the minds of newspaper editors, public speakers and others who came out so violently against the suggestion made in the speech from the throne. Four by-elections were due in this country and these patriotic gentlemen were going to have an issue at all costs. They were going to make an issue of something that had created all sorts of division in this country before. They were going to do this notwithstanding that it was war time and notwithstanding the fact that this government needed the services of the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Labour perhaps as they had never been needed before since the war commenced. They were prepared to create this issue, they were determined to have these by-elections carried on in the manner of elections of past years when the question of conscription was the most controversial thing which had been raised in the history of Canada.

Where it suited them in Welland South, and where they thought it was going to suit them in Toronto, the ground was put forward that the people were for conscription but that the present administration was opposed to conscription. Their candidate came out for conscription first and foremost. If we are going to judge from what took place, it is pretty clear that so far as Welland South and Toronto are concerned, the people were in favour of the plebiscite.

Mr. MacNICOL: There was no vote in Toronto.

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Mr. MACKENZIE KING: York South. The vote may not have been in Toronto, but most of the ammunition came from there. Quite the opposite campaign was waged against the government in another province in Canada. I have no complaint to make about the results. I think that so far as they signify anything with reference to the plebiscite itself, it is that so far as it has been possible for the people to speak on this matter we have had an expression favourable to our consulting them on this particular question.

During these campaigns every effort was made to becloud the war record of the government. That is one of the reasons this issue was raised. In every possible way it was sought to confuse the public mind rather than to clear it with respect to the issues themselves and with respect to the government's record in prosecuting the war. As I have said, the outcome has shown already the unwisdom of the course which was followed, by the government's opponents, the unwisdom of those tactics and the wisdom of the course which the government itself is taking at this time.

My hon. friend the other day asked me a number of questions with respect to the plebiscite. He said that he would like to know before the question was put to the people what the government was going to do in certain eventualities. Let me answer the question first of all in a broad way. The government is asking the people for a free hand in order that it may do in the circumstances as they may arise what is most in the interests of the people of Canada. We wish to make Canada's war effort as effective as it can possibly be made. What we shall do at any particular time will depend upon the course which we think at that time is necessary and advisable and most effective in Canada's war effort. That decision is not going to be made in the light of any one factor. It is going to be made in the light of all conditions as they exist and as they are known to the government at the time that it has to assume responsibility for any policy or any change of policy which it may deem advisable. Surely that is the only right position for an administration to have or to take.

My hon. friend says: Will you tell us, first of all, if the plebiscite is decided in the affirmative by a large majority, what you are going to do? Then he asks: If it is decided by a very small majority, what are you going to do? Then next: If it is decided by say only thirty-seven per cent in favour, and the rest against, what are you going to do? Then I think his next query was: If several provinces are in favour, and one or two others are not in favour, what are you going to do? I think he had one other question: Yes, it was, if the vote is indecisive, what are you going to do?

Why did he not go on and ask several other questions? Why did he confine himself to thirty-seven per cent? Why did he not ask what we would do if only twenty-seven per cent or thirty-eight or thirty-nine per cent was in favour?

He submits to me a sort of political catechism and expects me to give an answer to every hypothetical question he can imagine. Why did he not ask: What are you going to do if the United States take such and such a course? Why did he not ask several other hypothetical questions? He asked enough to reveal his intention to embarrass the government, but I can assure him that he has not embarrassed me nor the administration in the least. The government will do in this matter as it has done, and as he himself would be doing to-day if he were in office. He would be saying this same thing to me if asked a similar question. The government will make its policy known at the time when it is essential to have it made known—and not before. All government policies should be made known at the right and proper time. This is not the right or the proper time to make any pronouncement as to what the government is going to do as a result of this vote, other than the pronouncement which I have already made, and made very clearly, that the government is going to do the thing that it believes is going to further to the uttermost Canada's war effort, all circumstances considered. May I say that when I say "all circumstances considered" I have in mind the conditions as they may exist in respect to the war in different theatres and the conditions that may exist in Canada itself.

We have heard on the floor of the house within the last few days suggestions made that we should send more men overseas to Britain. We have had other suggestions made that we should not send more men over to Britain but send men over to the Orient in larger numbers.

Mr. HOMUTH: Secret session.

Mr. MACKENZIE KING: Who said: "secret session"? My hon. friend may be giving away some facts which I can assure him, if he thinks they are secret, he should not give away. But what I am stating now has been said here in this parliament in open session since parliament opened. My hon. friend the leader of the opposition (Mr. Hanson) suggested that we should send an expedition to Australia. I have understood the hon. member who has just interrupted is in

favour of sending more men to Britain. We also have had suggested in this house in open session that we ought to be keeping our men here and not sending them across either the Atlantic or the Pacific. May I recall the words my hon. friend the leader of the opposition addressed to me when he was waxing eloquent over this matter? He said: With the enemy knocking at our very doors you are going to take this plebiscite. If the enemy is knocking at our very doors, I do not think there will be very much demand in this country to send men overseas. We shall in that eventuality be keeping all the men we can put at our very doors where they can do the most effective work. I believe myself that the most effective way to defeat the enemy is to defeat him away from our shores altogether so that he will never get near our shores. But I do say that if he ever comes battering on the shores of this country, public feeling in this country will be so strong that any government, no matter what its view might be, will have to think twice before it adds to the number of men that are being sent out of Canada.

I mention these things because they help to illustrate how impossible it is for the government to give a decision here and now as to what it is going to do next September or October or November or December, or in 1943 or 1944. We cannot make any decision at the present time as to what we are going to do then, and we would be foolish if we led anyone to believe that we were going to be governed other than by all the facts that exist at the time this matter is under further consideration.

There is another matter. My hon. friend says that I ought to tell the people this and that. And yet he—perhaps not he, but several of those who sit around him hope that I shall not be here very long. The one thing they wish above everything else is that I should be out of office instead of in office.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): I thought the right hon. gentleman was going to say that we wished him dead. We have never gone that far.

Mr. MACKENZIE KING: My hon. friend and I are too good friends for that. I say that, politically speaking, most hon. gentlemen opposite would be thoroughly pleased, and their friends as well, if I were not in the position I am in at the present time.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): Is there anything wrong about that?

Mr. MACKENZIE KING: The only thing that is wrong about it is that they won't tell us who they are going to put in my place.

Mr. SLAGHT: Thirty-eight Barkises, and they are all willing.

Mr. MACKENZIE KING: My hon. friend the leader of the opposition ought to have a very kindly feeling towards myself on that particular question because he has seen efforts that have been made to have someone else take his place. They have not succeeded, and may I say to him sincerely that I think the country is much better off having him there to-day. I can tell him I am saying that not only on behalf of my own supporters but on behalf of a good many of his supporters as well. But I wish to make this clear. The present government, as I think my colleagues will bear me out, is not a one-man government. We are not imitating dictators; we are trying to remain the government of a democracy and to get as far away from dictatorship as we possibly can in all our actions. Any decision that is going to be made with respect to what will be done in a matter of future policy is not going to be made by any one member of the government or any two members; it is going to be made by all the members that sit in the government. Every member in the government will have his voice in the shaping of policy, and those who cannot accept the policy of the majority will find it convenient to retire, and a government will remain in office which will stand as one with respect to policy.

I could not if I wished, therefore, undertake to tell the people of Canada to-day what was going to be done some months hence by a government of which I might not be a member, or with respect to which different views might be entertained from those which I have, or which some of the present members of the administration may have. These facts are elementary. They should appeal to everyone who has to do with parliamentary procedure and government. Perhaps I can give an illustration that will help to make clear the wisdom of not indicating at the present time just what decision may be reached a little later on in certain circumstances.

In order to carry on war men are necessary, money is necessary. Both have to be raised, one in large numbers and the other in large quantities. With respect to the men that are being raised at the present time we have two methods. They are not ends in themselves but methods, and we are taking methods which we believe will be most effective and serviceable to Canada's war effort when we resort to the one or to the other. We have two methods of raising men for the army. Some of them are raised by compulsion; they are serving within the territorial limits of

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Canada. Others are being raised by voluntary enlistment, some of them also are serving in Canada. But all that are going overseas are being raised by the voluntary enlistment system, which has proved effective up to the present.

Now with respect to the raising of money, we are using the same two methods. We are raising money by compulsion, under taxation in its different forms; and we are raising money voluntarily by the loan system which is in progress at the present time, and which the people of the country are supporting splendidly, and, I believe, will continue to support. Supposing my hon. friend were to ask me, "What are you going to do if the voluntary system fails in the matter of the loan? Will you tell the people that now?" Could I tell them that? Would it be wise to tell them that? But a decision will have to be made if the voluntary system in the matter of loans should fail to produce the results which it is necessary should be produced in the securing of an amount of money requisite for the purpose. Under such circumstances I think probably there would be resort to the conscription of wealth. I do not see any other alternative than for the government just to come along and take the wealth that exists, if the required sums cannot be raised voluntarily.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): What about the ideas of our friends down below—to make money by the bank?

Mr. MACKENZIE KING: That might not be found sufficiently effective. However, I do not wish to be diverted from what I am saying because it is wholly pertinent. I wish to make it very clear, because through the next couple of weeks or months the people will be saying, "Why did not the Prime Minister state his position as to what he would do if this plebiscite did not carry or if it did carry?" I wish to have that parallel kept in mind. What the government is going to do when the voluntary method fails in the matter of loans it will decide when the time comes; and it will do exactly the same thing as respects the matter of raising men. When we find that we cannot raise the required numbers of men for enlistment overseas by the voluntary method, and it is absolutely necessary to raise more men by other methods, then we will make our decision, present it to parliament and have it discussed on its merits. I am putting this forward now so that the public may understand quite clearly why it is impossible to give any immediate decision. And may I say this: I think the people of the country will see to it that both things are linked pretty closely together if one or the other becomes necessary.

My hon. friend says we are asking that the government be given a blank cheque. What does he mean by a blank cheque? A blank cheque for what? Not a blank cheque to ignore parliament. The blank cheque is simply the cheque the government has with respect to all matters excepting this one thing, of the choice of method for raising men for overseas service. With respect to all other matters the government to-day has full power and authority. That may be the blank cheque If that is what he means by blank cheque, I say, let us have a complete blank cheque so that we can take whatever action we wish. But when he speaks of a blank cheque, what he is trying to infer is that the government is seeking to exercise some power independent of parliament. That is not what we are asking for in this plebiscite. We are simply asking to be given freedom to make an untrammelled decision and to come to parliament with that decision. Let my hon. friends keep that in mind, that before any measure can be passed in this parliament, no matter what it relates to, conscription or anything else, it has to get the support of a majority of the House of Commons, and the ministry has to consider very carefully every aspect of the question which will bear upon the situation in presenting any measure to parliament.

As to the conduct of the campaign, my hon. friend asked a word or two about that. I should hope that the campaign would be made an educational campaign which would help to impress upon the people the necessity of giving the government full power in time of war. I think it can be made that. My hon. friend and I are to-day agreed that the government ought to have this power and we are agreed for the same reason. And the leaders of the other parties are agreed. I know that the Social Credit party feels that something ought to be added, but at least I take it that they are not unwilling to give the government the freedom that is needed to act in such a way as will best serve the interests of the country. So that we are all pretty well agreed in this parliament that the government ought to have that power. But could we do anything better to serve the national interests of this country than, as representatives of all shades of opinion in this House of Commons, to go out to the people of Canada and tell them that this is a time when the war situation is so serious that no power should be withheld from the government in the administration of public affairs? I hope that course will be taken.

My hon. friend asks me what the government's attitude on the plebiscite will be. I took care to state that at the time I was speaking on the address, and I should like to read this one word in conclusion, from page 58 of *Hansard* of January 26:

> In the presentation of the plebiscite to the electorate the desire of the administration to possess complete freedom of action will of course, receive the vigorous and wholehearted support of all members of the government. It will, I hope receive the support of every member of parliament, and will, I believe, receive the support of the Canadian people.

There is nothing half-hearted about our purpose in this. I do not believe it will be possible for an administration to carry on, in a time like this, with the sense it ought to have of complete authority without being given complete power. It should not be put perpetually in a false position just because of some obligation necessary at an earlier time, but which, as I explained in the debate on the address, is having an effect quite different from that originally intended in its relation to the state of affairs that exists at the present moment. I have not gone into that this afternoon, because I spoke on it at length in the debate on the address. The reasons which to-day would actuate the people in respect of the powers being given to a government when we have war all over the world, on every continent and every ocean, are surely vastly different from what they were when we were contemplating a war which was expected to be limited to the confines of Europe. I think that almost all the people realize that it is in their interest to give to the government, in time of world-wide war the utmost powers that can possibly be given, realizing of course, that these powers can only be exercised in the light of its responsibility to parliament and that the government must receive the support of the majority in parliament before any measures can be given effect to.

Mr. STIRLING: Will the Prime Minister permit a question?

Mr. MACKENZIE KING: Yes.

Mr. STIRLING: Would he care to say a word in regard to the grave difficulty I foresee in respect of getting the vote out?

Mr. MACKENZIE KING: In regard to that I have this feeling. The people themselves will realize that the government would not ask for this full power unless it was in the interest of the people themselves that it should be given to the government. This matter is one that affects their lives. The situation is different from a general election; it is not a general election to decide between one party and another, but it is a matter that affects the home of every individual, that may affect the life of every individual in the country, certainly will affect the future of every individual, and will determine to what extent every man, woman and child in this country is to be half slave or half free or wholly slave or wholly free. If the people understand that and if hon. members will present the case to their constituents, pointing out the seriousness of the war and the state of the world at the present time and how it is to the people's own interests that they give the government full power, I think the people will come out and vote.

Also there is no reason why voluntary organizations should not be furthered to the utmost. Those who feel deeply—and I think that includes most of the people in this country—should organize themselves into voluntary groups to bring the people out. Let me make this perfectly clear so that there can be no mistake about it; if the vote should be overwhelmingly in support of the administration I shall not for one moment claim that it is a vote of confidence in this particular government in the carrying on of the war, but that it is a vote by the people of this country to give to any government the right to have and to feel it has the full power and authority which a government should have under conditions such as exist at this time of war.

Let me make this very clear, because it has been said that the government will claim a large majority as a great victory for itself, we are past the time when anyone can afford to talk in terms of party politics. We have in the recent by-elections had one illustration of the folly and baneful effect of doing that sort of thing through the amount of controversy to which they gave rise. Let us seek to unite ourselves, and here is the ground on which we can be united, to tell the people the situation, a situation so serious that they must show to the country at large that they are prepared to give to the government all the possible power needed to deal with it.

One other point. A great deal has been said in different parts of the world, and in our own country, about the New Order that is to come when this war is over. I have said on two or three occasions, I feel it very deeply, that unless that New Order emerges and asserts itself before the war is over we shall see very little of New Order when the war is over.

What is the old order that is to give place to something new? The old order, the order which has brought on this war through gaining control, is an order which attaches no value whatever to any treaty, to any contract, to any pledge, to any obligation, to anything that is honourable, but which says that no matter how deceitful, how crooked, how wrong,

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whatever will get results through might and force, is the order that should be followed in the world. In other words, its supporters seek to build a totalitarian world on deceit, and betrayal, doing away with free institutions, doing away with democratic government, doing away altogether with any real relationship between the people and their governing institutions. Does anyone in this assembly believe that Hitler would ever have been permitted or able to go to war if a free parliament had been maintained in Germany? Does anyone believe that Mussolini if he had not worked into the position that he did of complete control himself over his people and above them would ever have had the freedom to bring that country into the war? The thing the people are going to demand in the new order is that all relationships, so far as it is possible to have them so, between a government and a people shall be maintained on the highest grounds on which they can be maintained. They will insist on public honour in the transaction of public business, and they will insist above everything else that the government that is carrying on the affairs of their country shall be responsive to the will of the people and see that it is administering that will and no other.

A good deal has been said about leadership and lack of leadership. The question of individual leadership is a small matter, men come and men go and they are soon forgotten. But the history of nations continues to be remembered through generations. Canada has taken a great place in this war. Canada's war effort, I believe, is something that when the war is over and we get through with political controversy the people of this country will be more proud of than any other thing in the history of this Dominion; because it has been, in Mr. Churchill's own words, a magnificent effort and all of us should seek to have it known as such. And as I have said over and over again, it is not the effort of the government, it is the effort of the people of Canada. What the government has been able to do has been done only by virtue of what the people have been prepared to allow them to do. In connection with the new order of things which is to control the future, I say that this country apart from its war effort and the aspects we have been discussing here has in some other particulars set a noble example to every nation. And they are particulars which relate to the future of democracy, and to the question of whether democracy is possible or not. We were told that it was not possible for a people to decide in their own free parliament whether they should go to war or not; that that decision had to be made for them by some government before they were assembled together. Well, this country has proved the opposite, Canada has shown the world that the representatives of the people brought together from all parts of the dominion in a free parliament are able to decide, and to decide promptly the position which they will take with regard to participation in war. That is a great gain for democracy.

Another thing which Canada has done has been to show the world that it is possible for a democracy to see that the people's voice continues to govern in its affairs even in a time of war; that those clauses in its constitution which have been framed for the purpose of preserving the rights of the people in their own affairs of government can be exercised in times of war as well as in times of peace. Some of us were told that we could not have an election in war time, that it was all wrong, would create confusion and the like. Well, the government did not view it in that way, the people of Canada did not view it in that way. We had our election in war time; and we are able to say, as Lincoln said at the time of the civil war, "The whole purpose of the war itself would have been lost, if the people had to be deprived of the fundamental rights which were reserved to them by their constitution." We have not usurped the constitution of this country. We have held to it; and I view with a good deal of concern this business of assemblies perpetuating their own existence for indefinite periods of time without allowing the people to have any voice in the matter, regardless of what their constitution may be. I think the people are able to look after themselves in these matters if they are given an opportunity to do so.

There are two outstanding achievements, in the nature of a national example. I put third, although perhaps most important of all, that the government of a country should have a sense of its moral obligation as well as a sense of its legal obligations. There has been very little said in the recent past about moral obligations on the part of nations, but unless I am greatly mistaken there is nothing that is going to mean as much in the future of mankind. If we are going to rule out of our public life the honour of public men and of parliament; if we are going to rule out those things which above all else we have been taught all our lives to regard as most sacred, namely the promise, the word that is better than the bond, the contract expressed or implied that has been made between a government and its people, the treaties between nations—if these things are to be ruled out of our public life then public life will become chaos indeed. But if we allow the people to

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see that when we do give a pledge, when we do assume power at their instance, we are continually reminded of the source from which that power comes; that we are going to honour their rights as we seek to honour our own conscience, so we will be laying the foundation of the kind of order that will be enduring through the years to come.

Mr. J. G. DIEFENBAKER (Lake Centre): Naturally, Mr. Speaker, I cannot begin to follow the Prime Minister (Mr. Mackenzie King) in all the arguments that he has advanced. As I listened to the termination of his speech and the plea for a new order, I could not but agree with his words. If only that plea had been made in the beginning of his address, for a new order in Canada at this time, a new order free from political partisanship and with only one thing in mind —the desire to be guided in what we do by the opportunity and the challenge that is ours —it would have been something to inspire this country at this time.

The Prime Minister says, "Trust the people." Yet, Mr. Speaker, does he trust the people when he fails to place before them the question they will be required to answer? They are not told what is going to happen after this question is answered. I thought, as the right hon. gentleman spoke, that he would have told the people of Canada, in language that would be unmistakable, of the challenge to this country at this time; of the need for action; of the necessity, if you will, that he be relieved of his responsibilities incident to this commitment, and of what he would do, and the leadership he would give, if Canada should release him from that commitment. Five or six weeks have gone by in this session; the question has been asked over and over again of the government and the Prime Minister: What are you going to do? That is what the people of Canada want to know to-day.

Mr. SLAGHT: You have been told.

Mr. DIEFENBAKER: The hon. gentleman says we have been told.

Mr. SLAGHT: Of course you have.

Mr. DIEFENBAKER: In one province we have been told that there will be nothing done; in other parts of Canada we have been told that selective service will be brought into effect. We do not know.

Mr. MACKENZIE KING: My hon. friend says the people have been told these things. Will he tell us by what authoritative source that has been said? Will he cite one case of anyone with any authority to speak in the matter who has made any such statement?

Mr. DIEFENBAKER: Well, Mr. Speaker, the by-election campaigns just concluded were characterized in one province by the stand taken by the premier of that province that no action is contemplated, which was clear and unequivocal, and in other parts of Canada the stand taken was that there would be action. Yet to-day, when events are taking place the like of which this empire has never seen; with Java being attacked, with the Malay states overrun and with Singapore fallen, the Prime Minister of Canada says things are not yet serious enough to demand further action in the matter of man-power. Singapore, it is said, fell partly because of the lack of man-power. But the answer by the Prime Minister as to what action will be taken is that he cannot tell the people at this time and that it will remain his secret, a secret that time and circumstance alone may reveal.

I have in my hand a copy of the bill. Why does it not incorporate the question to be asked of the people? This bill as placed before parliament will have but one result. It will change the constitutional history of this dominion, in that it will permit the Prime Minister at any time from this day on to submit a plebiscite on any matter whatsoever to the people of Canada, with the authority of this parliament. It is so worded, Mr. Speaker, that it is operative beyond the war. It is so worded that the Prime Minister can continue to submit plebiscites at any time and without restriction. Let me ask this question. Why was not the method followed this time similar to that adopted in submitting the plebiscite of 1898? In my opinion this bill represents a milestone along the way that will destroy responsible government. The Prime Minister has said in effect that a great harm was done to the principle of responsible government in 1940 when he promised that there would never be conscription for overseas service, and now in effect wishes to undo the harm so that responsible government may be restored again.

I am not dealing to-day with the arguments that have been advanced against the taking of a plebiscite containing these words: "Are you in favour of releasing the government from any obligations arising out of any past commitments restricting the methods of raising men for overseas service?" I repeat, and this epitomizes my viewpoint on this subject, that the submission of this plebiscite in those words without the people of Canada knowing in advance what the government intends to do, or without even a suggestion as to what the government intends to do, is going to divide the people of this country as never before; that it is the repudiation of governmental

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responsibility, and just one more step along the road that leads to derision of parliament and of parliamentary institutions generally.

The Prime Minister for years—in fact during all his political life—has stood for the principle of the supremacy of parliament, and he has stressed that position since 1935. But what is the record? This legislation falls in line with his attitude toward parliament since 1935. I realize that during war time there is a necessity for orders in council incident to the carrying on of the war, but that does not excuse the issuing of orders in council in ever-increasing manner with respect to peace-time measures as well. There is no justification for that at all.

Only yesterday it was revealed that since the outbreak of war 20,677 orders in council had been issued, and that of that number 5,470 had been passed while parliament was in session. Yes, even since parliament has been in session in the last five weeks 412 orders in council have been passed. So general has this situation become that when I asked a question in the house as to how many statutes of parliament had been changed or suspended by orders in council the Prime Minister of Canada could give me no particulars. He said in effect that there were too many of them, and that it would be difficult if not impossible to give the information. The answer he made on May 19, 1941, is reported at page 2912 of *Hansard,* in reply to the question whether any orders in council purporting to change or suspend the operation of the provisions of any dominion statute, either in whole or in part, had been passed since the outbreak of war. He said:

I might reply orally to this question. To the first part the answer is yes.

Then the Prime Minister continued:

As to the second—

A question, by the way, which asked for details—and surely the people of Canada have a right to know what statutes passed by parliament have been suspended or amended by order in council—

—I am informed by the clerk of the council that there is no separate index of orders in council which amend statutes, and that it would require a great deal of research to discover the different orders which might have that effect and also to reply to the question as to the operative effect of the respective orders so passed.

That answer means that while this parliament is supreme, the government is unable to tell what statutes have been amended or suspended by order in council.

What of the supremacy of parliament now? Almost every day, regulations with all the force of law are passed by the governor in council, by ministers of the crown, by heads of departments and by government agencies and boards, until we have reached the position where seventy-five per cent, if not more, of the laws put into effect since the war began, and which affect the lives of every citizen in Canada, have been passed not by this parliament but by this indirect method. Parliament is constantly receding in importance as the trend continues unabated.

We have before us in this bill the latest step. This measure was drafted by exceptionally able legal draftsmen, and in my opinion the omissions are not unintentional.

I am not now opposing the plebiscite to release the government from its pledge. I am not here for the purpose of adopting an attitude of obstruction and I may point out that while this parliament has been in session for more than five weeks at the most serious time in the history of the British empire, any delays which have arisen have not been caused by the official opposition. Less than one-fifth of the time in debate has been taken up by us. We placed our views before parliament, in opposition to the submission of this plebiscite, but the majority in this house have decided that a plebiscite should be submitted to the people of Canada, and we must abide by that decision. A plebiscite is to be taken regardless of the fact that in the long history of Great Britain, with all the constitutional changes which have taken place, no government has ever submitted any matter to the people by way of plebiscite. In Canada such procedure is a departure, excepting, as was mentioned by the Secrétary of State (Mr. McLarty), in the case of the liquor plebiscite submitted to the people in 1898.

To illustrate the difference I should point out that under the measure as it now appears before parliament the Prime Minister and his government do not have to submit any questions to the people, whereas under the plebiscite of 1898 the question to be asked was in the statute. The other major difference is that the government may submit as many questions as they choose when they choose. They may place a plebiscite on any question before the people at any time in the future. There is no control whatsoever—and I intend to refer to those sections which have particular reference to that situation. The statute of 1898 allowed for only one submission. Mr. Speaker, while the empire fights, Canada plebiscites.

When the statute was passed in 1898 there was nothing evasive in the attitude of the government. The question was put in the statute. The regulations as to voting were contained in the statute. The elections act,

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with the necessary changes, was incorporated in that statute. The act is chapter 51 of the statutes for 1898. Section 3 is as follows:

There shall be submitted to vote of electors hereinafter declared entitled to vote thereon the following question:

Are you in favour of an act prohibiting the importation and manufacture or sale of spirits, wine, ale, beer, cider and all other alcoholic liquors for use as beverages?

It even states how the ballot paper is to be worded, and what question is to be placed on it.

What about the measure now before us? If I am correct—and I believe anyone reading the bill will conclude that I am—this bill is plebiscite legislation, and by the authority of this parliament if passed it will establish in Canada the right to govern by way of plebiscite. Unless the bill is restricted in its scope, from now on the government of Canada may continue to submit questions, without any control whatsoever.

The Prime Minister has spoken about responsible government. Is it not the principle of responsible government that the elected representatives of the people shall legislate for the safety and welfare of the state, and that the government shall continue in office so long as it has the support of the majority in parliament? When that support is lost, an election follows where no person or group can command the support of the majority.

As I listened to the Prime Minister terminate his remarks to-day I wondered whether they were not in fact a prelude to an election regardless of the outcome of the plebiscite. His speech indicated that possibility to me. Here is the bill as it has been submitted to this house, and I am going to refer to it in some detail. Section 1 reads:

This act may be cited as the Dominion Plebiscite Act, 1942.

That is general enough. Then the bill goes on to define the various persons who are entitled to vote, and it defines plebiscite as follows:

(d) "plebiscite" or "dominion plebiscite" means the taking of a vote on the question set out in a proclamation of the governor in council issued under section three of this act.

If the Prime Minister, under section 3 of the bill, had set out the question to be asked, then there would be no doubt that this bill contemplated only one plebiscite for a definite purpose.

Mr. MACKENZIE KING: I do not wish to interrupt my hon. friend, but may I say that I did make it quite clear to the leader of the opposition (Mr. Hanson) when he referred to the same matter that I could see no reason whatever why the question itself should not be inserted in the bill. I hope it will be by the committee.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): Why not make this a special bill?

Mr. MACKENZIE KING: That is all it was intended to be.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): Apparently the Prime Minister did not get his ideas across to the draftsman of the bill. If this bill becomes law, if it is passed in its present form, we are going to have in Canada government by plebiscite, not by responsible government.

Mr. McLARTY: The insertion of the particular question would avoid any possibility of that.

Mr. DIEFENBAKER: But this is the bill upon which we are asked to vote. If we pass this bill we allow the government to submit a plebiscite at its will, at any time and on any matter whatsoever, and against that I protest. Let me read section 3:

3. (1) The governor in council may by proclamation order the taking of a plebiscite under the provisions of this act.

(2) The proclamation shall state fully the question to be submitted to the voters at the plebiscite in the same words and form as it will appear on the ballot papers to be used at the plebiscite.

It becomes perfectly clear that unless the members of this house, representing as we do the people of Canada, demand that the question to be asked be embodied in the bill, we are giving to the government, not a blank cheque but the right to submit any matter they choose to the people of Canada at any time. There is nowhere any limitation on so doing. Section 5 reads:

Any person who shall have voted at a plebiscite taken under the provisions of this act during the present war shall thereafter be ineligible—

"During the present war." Why the insertion of the provision that these people shall be ineligible when they have voted at a plebiscite during the present war if only one plebiscite is to be submitted? These significant words reveal the situation exactly. The statute will continue in effect beyond the termination of this war, but the only disqualification of exemption from military service of conscientious objectors would be in connection with anyone who had voted during the period of the war. This shows the danger of legislation such as this unless it is strictly limited within the ambit of the question that the Prime Minister says will be submitted to the people of Canada.

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The leader of the opposition gave the government warning on Friday last of what our attitude would be in this regard and of our wish to have the question included in the bill, but it has persisted in placing this bill before parliament in this form. Therefore, we feel that we have the duty to move an amendment to ensure the inclusion of the question in clear and unmistakable language. I move, seconded by the hon. member for Waterloo South (Mr. Homuth):

That the bill be not now read a second time but that this house is of the opinion that the use of the powers conferred thereby be restricted to the submission thereunder of one plebiscite only.

I intend now to make a few suggestions with regard to the bill. I repeat that I think the government should have told the country what it is going to do after the vote has been taken. To-day it is Janus-faced; in one part of Canada it looks one way, in another part it looks another way. The Prime Minister says that he thinks the people will give an all-out vote. I hope they do, because there would be nothing more tragic if this plebiscite were defeated. We on this side of the house have asked the Prime Minister to tell the people of Canada just how serious he regards the situation, but without avail and the only conclusion that can be taken from the speech of the Prime Minister is that conditions are not serious, for he has stated clearly that he would not think of asking for more man-power under the selective system as conditions are at this time.

I should like to see a one hundred per cent vote on this matter. I do not believe in a compulsory system of getting out votes, but I do ask the Prime Minister and the government to shake themselves out of the lethargy they are in and tell the people of the gravity of the empire's position and of the imperative need of action. Many people are going to fail to vote because they believe that this is a vote of confidence in the government. The Prime Minister has said that he would not interpret a favourable vote as a vote of confidence. I do not care how it is interpreted. Time is running against us and he should act. "Wait and see" is apparently to be the policy of this government, even to-day as we listened to the casualties in Hong Kong.

I repeat that the people have a right to know at this time what the government intends to do. I am not one to advocate a sit-down strike as far as voting on this matter is concerned for such action would be reprehensible. The government asks us over here to be Willkies, but I ask the Prime Minister to be a Roosevelt from now on, and to refer to the war effort of this nation not as the governments' war effort but as the war effort of Canada.

Mr. SLAGHT: You did hear him say that, my friend.

Mr. DIEFENBAKER: That was after he had referred several times with exultation to the results of the campaign that recently took place. In the last paragraph of his address he did ask the Canadian people to regard this as a Canadian war effort. Why wait ten weeks for a vote on this matter? The ordinary routine peace-time election procedure should not apply to-day. We should shorten up that period. Where shall we be in ten weeks? Only on Thursday last we read in the press that if Java falls and Australia be attacked, the next places on the Japanese time-table to be attacked is Hawaii and Alaska in April.

Voluntary workers should be asked for over the radio. Why were not great patriotic organizations in this country asked to take over this work? But they will not do it enthusiastically, Mr. Speaker, unless they know that in getting out and working to the end that this government may be empowered to do something, the government, when it gets the power is actually going to act and without delay.

I have had complaint after complaint over the suggestion that men are going to be sent overseas for the purpose of taking the vote. In my opinion such a course is unnecessary. Send the ballots over to Canadian general headquarters in Great Britain, have them distributed to the divisions and battalions, and set out in military orders the date of the voting, have the voting take place at battalion headquarters. What does the government intend to do in regard to the counting of the soldiers' votes?

I commend the government and am glad that it has stood firm against those who would have had all the votes in Canada thrown into one common container. That would have done away with initiative in every province and every constituency of this dominion. I commend the Prime Minister for the course he has adopted of letting each province and each constituency know just how it stands on this question.

But so far as the voting overseas is concerned I do think this, that the men who to-day are serving this country know what they want, and I would not divide their votes among the constituencies. I suggest that their votes be counted without regard to constituency so that

we can have the message of the men overseas in a united voice as to what they think the government should be doing at this time.

I have nothing more to say, Mr. Speaker, except again to point out the necessity of having the bill as it now stands amended at once as I have suggested, and with that in mind I have moved an amendment. To do otherwise would be for us to pass another milestone in this dominion beyond the point we have reached to-day in the decline of responsible government. Parliament is being emasculated as a result of the creation of administrative boards of all kinds and order in council government. This act unless amended may well be just another milestone towards the destruction of that which we are fighting to preserve in these days of war—our free parliamentary institutions characterized by the principle of responsible government.

Mr. MACKENZIE KING: May I raise a point of order, Mr. Speaker. I submit that the amendment is out of order, and I raise the point now in order that your honour may have an opportunity to consider the matter. The amendment tends to amend the bill, which I do not think is right, and the amendment does not object to the principle of the bill.

On motion of Mr. Veniot the debate was adjourned.

On motion of Mr. Mackenzie King the house adjourned at 5.55 p.m.

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HOWARD SMITH
BELL-FAST BOND

Unrevised Hansard
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PLEBISCITE ACT

Mr. MACKENZIE KING: I do not think there is any mystery about the government's position in the matter. At the present time the government is restricted with respect to recommending to the house, should it so desire, a course of action with regard to conscription, in virtue of commitments which have been previously made. If release from those commitments is given by the electorate of Canada, the government will feel itself entirely free to consider the question of conscription on its merits in the light of all the circumstatnces existing at the time, to recommend its course to parliament, and to have parliament deal with the matter as it does with any other matter brought before it. There is no different attitude assumed with respect to this one question from that with regard to any other.

Mr. HANSELL: Shall we need another plebiscite then to find out whether we are to have conscription?

Mr. MACKENZIE KING: I hope to heaven not.

Mr. HANSELL: I did not hear the Prime Minister's answer.

Mr. MACKENZIE KING: I say I hope not. And I say that I cannot imagine any circumstances under which it would be thought of.

Mr. HANSELL: My contention is that the present bill does not ask the people whether they want conscription for overseas service.

Mr. MACKENZIE KING: There are a lot of things which the present bill does not ask the people, because we want to ask them one question and one question only. If we had wished to ask twenty questions, we would have inserted twenty questions.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): Is it not a fact that under the terms of the War Measures Act the government can bring in total conscription at any time if it so desires?

Mr. MACKENZIE KING: Yes, it is a fact. I made that very clear the other day. The legal power is there, but the government in this matter feels, and feels rightly, that it is under a moral obligation because of certain pledges which were made in the past and during the last general election not to use its legal power to enlist men compulsorily for service overseas.

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Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): I appeal with great respect from your ruling, sir.

Mr. POULIOT: The leader of the opposition said it with flowers, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MACKENZIE KING: I think it is customary in matters of the kind to ask *Hansard* to give the exact words.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): May I ask a question? Has the Chairman ruled that the words "fooling the people" or "seeking to fool the people"—I think those were my words—charged the Prime Minister with deceit? If that is his construction, I certainly never intended to do that.

The CHAIRMAN: The words I have to report are: "The leader of the opposition having stated that the question contained in the ballot form in section 3 of the bill was another attempt of the Prime Minister deliberately to fool the people, as he has done so many times in the past. . . ." Those are the words as I heard them.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): If that is out of order, I am quite willing to withdraw. I have no intention of being out of order.

The CHAIRMAN: Those words are withdrawn, are they?

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): You heard what I said—if they are out of order.

Mr. MACKENZIE KING: May I say first of all to the leader of the opposition that unless my memory fails me entirely, he was the one, the first one in the house, to express his approval of my having given a straightforward question.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): Having asked the question. I never approved it.

Mr. MACKENZIE KING: I am coming back to what was said in the course of the debate on the address. Great emphasis was laid on the importance of having the question that was to be asked before the house when we were discussing the matter, and in speaking on the address I used the following language, as reported in *Hansard* at page 58:

> I shall not go into detail regarding the procedure to be followed in holding the proposed plebiscite. The question which the government proposes to submit to the people is the simple and straightforward question:
>
> Are you in favour of releasing the government from any obligation arising out of any past commitments restricting the methods of raising men for military service?

That was informing the house at the earliest possible moment of what the question would be. At a later stage in the debate, and in the debate on this present bill, some question was raised as to the exact wording of the question, and I had occasion then to refer the house or the committee to what I had said on the address. This question has been before the house since the house opened, and until to-night the language of it has not been questioned, with respect to any ulterior motive, at least, that may have been in the mind, or as alleged to-night to have been in the mind, of the ministry in the drafting of it. I submit that there is nothing ulterior about the question at all. It is a straightforward question, and inasmuch as the discussion has taken place up to the present in reference to the question in the form in which it is, I hope that hon. members will not suggest the necessity of making any amendments to it.

May I say further that the reason why the question is before us as a part of the bill is largely due to the fact that my hon. friend the leader of the opposition asked that it should be inserted in the bill in the exact words in which it is. If he thought that the question was wrong, or that there was anything ulterior about it, or that there was any duplicity in the wording of it, and so forth, he should not have been the first to suggest that that identical question should be made a part of the bill. It was on my hon. friend's suggestion, that the question as he understood it should be a part of the bill, that I asked that instructions be given to the special committee to see that the question should be so inserted in the bill. I think that ought to be a sufficient reason why at this stage of the debate at any rate the question should not be altered one way or the other.

As to the question, the leader of the opposition now says that the government has the power under the War Measures Act—that it has the power in law and in fact to send men overseas, and that therefore there is no necessity for the question. I have said from the beginning that parliament is all-powerful. As a matter of fact parliament can at the present time pass any enactment it pleases regardless of any commitment that has been made in the past, or any pledge that has been given; but whether parliament would be prepared to do that or not depends a good deal upon what value a man attaches to his word, or what value parliament attaches to its action, or what value a government attaches to its pledge. As to the power, no one has ever denied that parliament has power to do whatever it pleases. With regard to the actual power it possesses to-day to conscript men to send overseas, we have that power under the War Measures Act.

But what was the nature of the pledge that was given, the pledge given on every platform, not by myself alone? I quoted and placed on *Hansard* on Wednesday last the

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strong and emphatic language used by the leader of the Conservative party pledging all his party in exactly the same way as I was pledging mine. It was not as I say in reference to not possessing the power that any pledge was given, but having the power, that the power would not be exercised in one particular; that commitment was made. The pledge admitted the power, if you wish, but the commitment was that that power would not be exercised in one form or particular, namely, raising men for military service overseas by conscription. The commitment was a commitment restricting the methods of raising men for military service. The restriction was as to raising men by conscription for military service overseas.

Now the hon. leader of the opposition seeks to-night to make out that the question as it is worded here is related to the law or to the fact. It is not related to the law or to the fact at all; it is related to a commitment that was made with respect to whatever law there might be or whatever the fact might be. A commitment that no matter whatever power the government had, it would not exercise that power with respect to men to be sent overseas if the method to be employed was to be the method of conscription. In other words, that as far as service overseas was concerned that was to be by voluntary enlistment, not by enlistment under coercion or conscription. That was a commitment. That is the commitment. It is that commitment that the government is asking to be freed from. That commitment does not apply to the use of conscription generally; we have conscription with respect to the raising of men for service in Canada; this parliament itself has enacted a measure which contains the power of the use of compulsion for military service. No exception was taken by the government to that; in fact the government brought forward the measure. The commitment that was made at the time of the general election was not against applying compulsory service for the defence of Canada within Canada; it was only in relation to service overseas. That is why I said the other night that if to-morrow it became necessary to exercise compulsion in the matter of protecting our shores to the extent of our armed forces going out in the Pacific beyond Queen Charlotte island, or to Alaska, or to Labrador or Newfoundland, I would not hesitate one moment in using the War Measures Act to see that conscription was enforced for that purpose were such a step necessary. That would not be violating the commitment made. The commitment was not made with respect to the protection of our own shores; it was made with respect to sending men overseas; everyone so understood it, and it was to that extent that the law and the fact was limited and that the government at the present time is limited.

If we attached no importance whatsoever to a solemn pledge given in relation to this particular war, as respects one aspect and one phase of our war effort, then I might join as my hon. friend is prepared to do now, but was not prepared to do at the time he asked the people to return him to parliament; we might say, as he does, discount all that and pay no further attention to it. But we are not prepared so to do; we are going to stand by the pledge we have made until the people themselves release us from it. But we are going to tell the people that we believe it is in their own interest that the government should be released from that pledge or commitment. That is the simple question we are putting before them, the one and only question:

Are you in favour of releasing the government from any obligation arising out of—

Not the law, not the fact, but—

—any past commitments—

—and "any past commitments" and "any" covers everything that can be construed as a commitment.

—restricting the methods of raising men for military service.

Some hon. MEMBERS: Overseas; that is the point.

An hon. MEMBER: Put the word "overseas" in.

Mr. MACKENZIE KING: "arising out of any past commitments restricting the methods of raising men for military service." "Any" covers everything, overseas, and all else. What more could any one wish for? That is the whole purpose. So that there can be no doubt whatsoever with respect to any commitment that has been made, whether it relates to any theatre of war or any part of the world, or any aspect of the war service, it covers everything. That is as clear as it possibly can be, and I am saying it as emphatically as I can.

I agree with those who have spoken to-night as to the form of the ballot and who have said that the simpler it can be made the better. I so expressed myself to the minister when I saw what the committee had recommended, but when I heard that the special committee, composed of members of all parties in the house, were unanimously of the view, after having heard the chief electoral officer, that this form of ballot which is now on the order paper was preferable, I said nothing further about it. And for the same reason I thought I would refrain from saying anything on the matter in the debate to-night. However I think what has been

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Vol. LXXX.—No. 45

CANADA

House of Commons Debates

OFFICIAL REPORT—DAILY EDITION

Wednesday, March 25, 1942

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HOUSE OF COMMONS

Speaker: The Honourable JAMES ALLISON GLEN

WEDNESDAY, March 25, 1942.

The house met at three o'clock.

TAXATION

AGREEMENT WITH BRITISH COLUMBIA RESPECTING VACATION OF TAX FIELDS

On the order for motions:

Hon. J. L. ILSLEY (Minister of Finance): I desire to lay on the table copy of the agreement between the dominion government and the government of British Columbia relating to vacation of tax fields.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): Are printed copies available, or are they not to be distributed?

Mr. ILSLEY: No, it was not intended that copies be distributed.

PRIVATE BILLS

PETITION OF SAGUENAY TRANSMISSION COMPANY, SAGUENAY ELECTRIC COMPANY, AND ALUMINUM POWER COMPANY

Mr. J. E. A. DUBUC (Chicoutimi) moved:

That the petition of the Saguenay Transmission Company, Limited, Saguenay Electric Company, and Aluminum Power Company, Limited, presented on the 24th instant; praying for the passing of an act to approve of the site and plans of their electrical transmission lines crossing certain navigable rivers, together with the report of the Clerk of Petitions thereon, be referred to the standing committee on standing orders to consider the suspension of standing orders 92 and 93 (3) (a) and (c) in relation thereto.

Hon. R. B. HANSON (Leader of the Opposition): I cannot understand why special legislation is required for this application. We have a Navigable Waters Protection Act. It may be that a situation has arisen which is not covered by the act, but we ought to have some explanation by the mover as to why this legislation is required.

Mr. SPEAKER: This motion is presented only in order to cover delays which have taken place in connection with the petition. It is purely a formal matter.

Motion agreed to.

ALBERTA NATURAL RESOURCES

AMENDMENT OF TRANSFER AGREEMENT RESPECTING ROYALTIES ON OIL PRODUCTION

Hon. T. A. CRERAR (Minister of Mines and Resources) moved for leave to introduce Bill No. 18, to amend the Alberta Natural Resources Acts.

He said: In 1929, by agreement between the federal government and the province of Alberta, the natural resources in that province were transferred to the Alberta government. At that time there were certain licences outstanding for oil rights and timber rights. These licences had been issued by the federal government, and of course the Alberta government accepted the responsibilities which attached to the licences. Under the terms of the transfer agreement it was held that their conditions could not be varied. In 1938 it was necessary to amend the transfer agreement to enable the Alberta government to put into effect certain conservation measures in respect of the oil development in the Turner valley. The present amendment to the transfer agreement also relates to oil produced in Alberta. The Alberta government have been desirous for some time to secure the power to vary the royalties which may be charged. Certain wells were capable of paying higher royalties than other wells, but the government was limited to similar treatment for all wells covered by dominion licence. The matter has been the subject of discussion between the provincial authorities and the majority of those interested in the oil industry, and the amendment to the transfer agreement which is here proposed is to give effect to certain understandings which have been reached between the provincial government and these oil interests.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): Would the minister say that the matter referred to has been the subject of correspondence which could be laid on the table for the information of members of parliament?

Mr. CRERAR: I should be glad to bring down any correspondence which relates to the matter, but my recollection at the moment is

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that there is very little. I recall that over a year ago the matter was first broached to me by the minister of resources for the province of Alberta, and the suggestion was made then that, since certain oil interests were concerned, the provincial authorities should discuss the matter with them before we would be warranted in giving authority to vary the terms of the licences which had been issued. Subsequently that was done, and we were advised several weeks ago by representatives of the oil interests and by the province that they wished to have the agreement amended to give effect to certain understandings they had reached.

Motion agreed to and bill read the first time.

QUESTIONS

(Questions answered orally are indicated by an asterisk.)

PRICE CEILING—POTATOES

Mr. HATFIELD:

1. Did the wartime prices and trade board release a statement to the newspapers regarding the establishing of a price ceiling on potatoes in which there was mention of speculative buying?

2. If so, what evidence is there of speculative buying?

Mr. ILSLEY:

1. Yes.

2. Potato price quotations collected by the wartime prices and trade board indicate that in many cases the spread between prices received by the grower and prices paid by the consumer widened appreciably in the period immediately prior to the application of the ceiling on potato prices. These facts were accepted by the board as evidence of speculative buying.

ESTEVAN-BIENFAIT LIGNITE COAL AREA—POWER

Mr. TRIPP:

In view of the increased demand for electrical energy for manufacturing purposes, will the government favourably consider developing a head of power in the Estevan, Bienfait lignite coal area?

Mr. HOWE: The federal government does not assume financial responsibility for developing power projects. However, the information is that the supply of power in the Moose Jaw-Regina area at the present exceeds the demand, and, until such time as this is taken up, it is unlikely that any additional power development will be undertaken in this area.

[Mr. Crerár.]

*SMALL MACHINE SHOPS IN WAR PRODUCTION

Mr. CASTLEDEN:

1. What steps have been taken to utilize the smaller machine shops throughout the dominion in war production?

2. How many of these shops capable of some war production are still not utilized in such work?

Mr. HOWE:

1. As a result of approximately 1,800 surveys of machine shops alone, every effort has been made and is being made to bring all of the machine shops in Canada into war production, consistent with the efficiency required to make as much war material as possible, as soon as possible.

We are still in the position, partly due to shortages in raw materials, of being able to select first those machine shops which can be used most efficiently. This efficiency depends upon:

(i) A combination of good management and skilled labour with machine tools which are in shape to do the precision work required in to-day's war machines;

(ii) Reasonable proximity to the prime contractor's plant, so that supervision of quality and deliveries can be maintained and a minimum of time lost in transportation;

(iii) A reasonably sound financial condition, which enables the shop to finance its expanded operations.

2. A considerable number, particularly those located at a long distance from a prime contractor. This condition may continue until the raw material shortage becomes less acute.

There is a substantial surplus of certain types of machine tools, and these are, generally speaking, of the types found in the smaller shops. The machine tools of which there is an acute shortage are of types found only in the larger shops.

AIDS TO NAVIGATION

Mr. HANSON (Skeena):

1. What was the cost of aids to navigation (lighthouse service) for 1941, (a) Atlantic coast, (b) Pacific coast, (c) inland?

2. What was the total cost?

Mr. MICHAUD:

1. Cost of aids to navigation (lighthouse service), including operation of dominion steamers for same for the fiscal year 1940-41: (a) Atlantic coast, $1,143,962.10; (b) Pacific coast, $387,528.53; (c) Inland waters, $1,379,344.22.

2. Total cost, $2,910,834.85.

PRICE CEILING—FRUIT AND VEGETABLES

Mr. HATFIELD:

1. Are any rebates or other payments in connection with price levels being paid to importers of orange juice, oranges, bananas, lettuce, and celery?

2. If so, what amounts have been paid to date?

Mr. ILSLEY:

1. Under the import policy of the wartime prices and trade board orange juice is eligible for subsidy, but oranges, bananas, lettuce and celery are not subject to the price ceiling and consequently do not qualify for subsidy.

2. None.

ANTI-TANK SHELLS

Mr. ROY:

1. Were any anti-tank shells No. 1, 1956, B.S., shipped as scrap from St. Paul l'Ermite or Sorel, in the province of Quebec?

2. If so, (a) for what reason was this ammunition rejected, (b) where was it manufactured, (c) was it made under contract, and by whom, (d) what was the quantity and total cost, (e) who is responsible for the defective nature of such ammunition?

Mr. HOWE:

1. No.

2. Answered by 1.

*SHIPBUILDING

Mr. BLACK (Cumberland):

1. What is the number, the total tonnage and the estimated cost of all ships ordered built by the government of Canada or by any other government to be built in Canada of 100 tons capacity or more for commercial purposes, since September 10, 1939, in each of the following provinces, (1) Nova Scotia, (2) New Brunswick, (3) Prince Edward Island, (4) Quebec, (5) Ontario, (6) British Columbia?

2. What is the number and the total tonnage of all ships launched in each province to March 14, 1942?

Mr. HOWE: This question asks for total production in a certain line of war effort. I have no objection personally to giving the information, but we have been asked specifically by the British government, and an agreement has been entered into on the part of the British government, the United States government and the government of Canada, not to give total production figures of war materials. I notice that in the discussion last evening, the hon. member for Vancouver East (Mr. MacInnis) raised the point, and I must say the same to him. He stated that figures were given in periodicals. We cannot help that.

Mr. MacINNIS: Where did they get the information?

Mr. HOWE: They can probably collect it from the shipyards. It is not hard to get. But publishing unofficial information is different from giving out official information; at least that is the view of the allied governments, and until the allied governments change their position in that regard I do not intend to give figures on total production.

Mr. SPEAKER: Answered.

*BARRAGE BALLOONS

Mr. FRASER (Peterborough West):

1. Has a committee been set up to arrange for barrage balloon protection for cities on Canada's coasts?

2. Have we any barrage balloons in Canada?

Mr. POWER: I would ask the hon. member to withdraw this question as not being in the public interest.

Mr. FRASER (Peterborough West): Would the minister give the information privately?

Mr. POWER: Yes.

Mr. SPEAKER: Dropped.

GOVERNMENT FILM COMMISSIONER

Mr. McGREGOR:

1. What is the total amount that has been paid to John Grierson in salary, fees and/or allowances as government film commissioner?

2. What is the total amount of money that has been paid to John Grierson since he has been employed by the government in any capacity whatsoever, including travelling expenses?

Mr. THORSON:

1.

Fiscal year	Salary
1939-40	$ 1,987 10
1940-41	5,703 43
1941-42	6,899 99
Total	$14,590 52

No fees or allowances.

2.

Fiscal year	Fee	Salary	Travelling expenses
1938-39	$3,650	None	None
1939-40	None	$ 1,987 10	$ 612 34
1940-41	"	5,703 43	1,105 99
1941-42	"	6,899 99	5,948 58
	$3,650	$14,590 52	$7,666 91

Total amount paid—$25,907.43.

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*PRICES OF HOGS

Mr. SENN:

1. Did the dominion government take action at any time during 1941 to stabilize the price of hogs by means of bonus or subsidy?

2. If so, by how much per hog?

3. What was the total amount expended in this manner?

Mr. GARDINER:

1. Yes, through subsidizing the price of export bacon to bring hog prices in Canada more in line with a rising United States hog market and thereby retain hogs in Canada for processing and export to Great Britain.

2. By $2.50 per one hundred pounds of export bacon in three successive advances:

June 2 by 75 cents per 100 pounds
June 24 by 75 cents per 100 pounds
July 23 by $1 per 100 pounds.

3. $2,281,264.99.

*WESTERN WHEAT ACREAGE

Mr. PURDY:

What is the estimated percentage of wheat acreage under crop in 1941 in the three western provinces represented by self-contained farm units of 320 acres or less?

Mr. MacKINNON (Edmonton West): On March 16 I tabled an answer to a similar question. At that time I said that information was not available at present in view of the fact that the compilation of agricultural statistics as taken in the 1941 census had not been sufficiently advanced to afford the information. On receipt of the second question, which asks for an estimate rather than a definite figure, I consulted the officials of the dominion bureau of statistics, and they advised me that any estimate they might give at the present time would be purely a guess. I regret I cannot give the information.

Mr. SPEAKER: Answered.

QUESTIONS PASSED AS ORDERS FOR RETURNS

UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE—PERSONS HAVING SERVED IN H.M. FORCES

Mr. DIEFENBAKER:

1. Since the inception of the Unemployment Insurance Act how many persons have received payments thereunder?

2. What are the numbers and occupations by provinces of such persons?

3. How many of the said recipients have been on service in His Majesty's forces during the present war and of those how many are in receipt of payment under the said act as of this date?

Mr. McLARTY: Return tabled.

[Mr. Thorson.]

BRITISH AEROPLANE ENGINES LIMITED

Mr. CASTLEDEN:

1. What amount of money was paid to British Aeroplane Engines Limited of Montreal, Quebec, during 1941?

2. What was the average cost per engine for the overhauling work done by this company?

3. Were the Royal Canadian Air Force repair depots in Ontario and Quebec overhauling similar engines during 1941?

IRON FROM CANADIAN ORES

Mr. CASTLEDEN:

What steps have been taken to develop or increase the supplies of iron from Canadian ore deposits?

COAL FOR ONTARIO TRAINING CAMPS

Mr. FRASER (Peterborough West):

1. What companies have the contract to supply coal to Camp Borden, Trenton, Petawawa and each of the training camps in Ontario?

2. How much coal is supplied to each camp?

3. What grade of coal is supplied to each camp?

4. What is the price of the coal delivered to each camp?

Mr. HOWE: Return tabled.

CANADIAN FORCES—SALVATION ARMY

Mr. FRASER (Peterborough West):

How many Salvation Army men are enlisted in (a) the army, (b) the air force, (c) the navy?

Mr. RALSTON: This had better be made an order for return. I wish to correct a statement I made the other day. I find that we have, as far as the army is concerned, a record showing, generally speaking, those men who are members of the Salvation Army who have enlisted in the forces.

Mr. SPEAKER: Order for return.

AIR RAID PRECAUTIONS—BRITISH COLUMBIA

Mr. CRUICKSHANK:

1. Who is in charge of air raid precaution work in British Columbia?

2. What authority has he?

3. Has any air raid precaution equipment been supplied by the dominion government to British Columbia and if so, what, and how much?

4. Has any money been granted British Columbia for air raid precaution work, and if so, how much?

5. Who allots this money within the province of British Columbia?

Mr. THORSON: Return tabled.

WAR OF 1914-18—REPARATIONS

Mr. HANSELL:

1. What reparations, in terms of money, were imposed upon Germany, as a result of the last war?

2. What reparations were imposed upon the allies of Germany, as a result of the last war?

3. What was Canada's share of these reparations?

4. How much did Canada receive from Germany in payment of these reparations?

5. How was this paid, in goods, gold or securities?

6. How was this money disbursed?

7. How much of this was specifically earmarked as recompense to Canadian war prisoners in Germany?

JAPANESE NATIONALS—PERMITS FOR EXPLOSIVES

Mr. CRUICKSHANK:

1. Were any permits for powder or other explosives issued to Japanese since December 7, 1941?

2. If so, how many and on what authority?

3. Have such licences been cancelled? If so, when?

4. Have any Japanese or partially owned Japanese logging or lumber companies been given licences for powder magazines since December 7, 1941?

5. If so, on what authority?

6. Have such licences been cancelled? If so, when?

7. Have all such explosives been confiscated?

Mr. CRERAR: Return tabled.

LIFE INSURANCE—SALE OF PENSION BONDS TO SOLDIERS

Mr. COLDWELL:

1. Has the government authorized life insurance companies to canvass men in the armed forces for policies or so-called pension bonds, etc?

2. If so, has the government examined the provisions and alleged benefits payable under such policies or bonds?

3. Has the government authorized the payment of premiums on such policies or bonds, by the assignment of pay of men in the Canadian Active Service Force?

4. If so, will the government authorize a careful inquiry to be made into the terms and conditions of these contracts, including commissions paid to agents, cash surrender values in one-year, three-year, five-year and ten-year periods, comparing these amounts with total premiums paid?

EXPORT OF CATTLE TO THE UNITED STATES

Mr. LEADER:

1. How many cattle have been exported to the United States since the United States-Canada agreement was consummated in 1936?

2. What number for each category and the number shipped in each quarter of the years from 1936 to 1941 inclusive?

Mr. MacKINNON (Edmonton West): Return tabled.

REQUISITIONING OF SHIPS ENGAGED IN GRAIN TRADE

Mr. LEADER:

1. How many ships formerly employed in the grain trade have been requisitioned by the government since the war began?

2. What are the names of the firms or individuals from whom these ships were requisitioned, and what number from each firm or individual?

3. Have these ships been purchased, and at what price?

4. If not, what are the terms of rental or lease?

5. Were any of these ships reconditioned or repaired by the government?

6. If so, at what total cost?

MOTOR TRANSPORT OF GOODS IN BOND THROUGH CANADIAN TERRITORY

Mr. ROSS (St. Paul's):

1. Has the government of the United States or any official thereof requested either formally or informally that permission be granted by the Canadian government for United States motor transport carriers to operate in transit in bond between United States points through Canadian territory?

2. If so, what was the nature of such request?

3. Has any recommendation been made by any joint Canadian-United States committee with reference to this question?

4. If so, what is the nature of such recommendation?

5. Has this question been considered by a subcommittee of the cabinet?

6. If so, when, and who are the members of such committee?

7. Has any report been made by such subcommittee and what is the nature of the report?

MOTIONS FOR PAPERS

COMMODITY PRICES STABILIZATION CORPORATION

Mr. CHURCH:

For a return showing—1. A list of the price ceiling subsidies issued, the estimated amount of same and on what articles, or in what trade and commerce.

2. A list of the members of the Commodity Prices Stabilization Corporation, a list of their chief officers, servants and agents, showing where they are located, the number thereof, together with their salaries and other allowances.

3. Estimated cost of one year of maintaining the ceiling prices staff herein, and the aggregate number of officials and total payroll.

4. The estimated cost per annum of the operation of this corporation.

5. The walks of business life that are not yet supervised or directed by any departments of state.

6. What training the members of this corporation and their chief officials have had in actual trade or commerce, or in a competitive business.

7. What minister of the crown is responsible to parliament for the work of this corporation.

Mr. ILSLEY: I am willing to have this motion passed with the qualifications which

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I stated the other day; but if the hon. member would like to let it stand so that I can make a statement to the house as to the principles upon which information should be given or withheld regarding price ceiling subsidies, I am willing to take that course. The question of principle was raised last night sharply by the hon. member for Vancouver East (Mr. MacInnis) to the effect that the amounts of these individual payments should be given to the House of Commons. Generally speaking, the objection I have to doing that is that the principles upon which subsidies are made public, and the giving of the amounts that are paid to individual companies, would give competitors a fairly precise knowledge of the volume and kind of business which their rivals were doing.

There may be other objections as well. Perhaps that is not a sufficient objection, but I should like to get my position formulated, whatever position is eventually adopted by the house, and give my reasons to the house, because this is a very important matter. These subsidies will be large in amount; they are virtually consumers' subsidies, and I do not want to take a course which will be at variance with the proper practice or in conflict with the rights of the House of Commons. On the other hand I certainly do not want to take a course which will prejudice the successful operation of this subsidy system. If the mover of this motion would like to have it go through with the qualifications and exceptions mentioned the other day, I am content. If on the other hand he would like to have it stand until I have opportunity of giving further consideration to the principles that should apply, and of making a statement of those principles to the house, I am content to have it stand.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): Would the minister be able to make his statement prior to the Easter recess?

Mr. ILSLEY: I do not know about that.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): Because this is now becoming a very important matter. We are even subsidizing the packers of Canada on the beef we eat in the restaurant, which is going pretty far. I think the public need this information. I should like to have it as soon as possible, because this thing is getting out of hand.

Mr. ILSLEY: I would point out that if this motion passes to-day without any qualification, the information will not be available until after the Easter recess.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): But we would have a start on it.

Mr. ILSLEY: I should like to give that a little consideration, because it is most important to get this on a proper basis.

Mr. CHURCH: May I suggest that I be allowed to see the minister and have the motion redrafted? I do not object to part 6 being struck out, but if the minister is going to make a statement I might have to discuss it with the minister and the leader of the opposition.

Motion stands.

Mr. ILSLEY: That is agreeable to me.

TRANSPORT OF GOODS IN BOND THROUGH CANADIAN TERRITORY

Mr. ROSS (St. Paul's):

For a copy of all letters, telegrams, reports, resolutions, memoranda, or any other documents:

(1) Exchanged between the government of Ontario or any official thereof and any minister or official of the dominion government;

(2) Exchanged between the Minister of National Revenue, the Commissioner of Customs, the Minister of Transport, the Deputy Minister of Transport, the Minister of Munitions and Supply, the Deputy Minister of Munitions and Supply or any other official of these departments and the Railway Association of Canada, the Canadian Pacific Railway, the Canadian National Railways, the Michigan Central Railway, the Toronto-Hamilton and Buffalo Railway, the Wabash Railways or the Pere Marquette Railroad or any official of any of these companies;

(3) Exchanged between any minister or official of the government and any municipal council in the province of Ontario or official thereof with reference to any request of International Highway Forwarders Limited or any motor transport carriers in the United States for permission to operate any transport in bond between United States points through Canadian territory.

Mr. CRERAR: May I direct the attention of the hon. member to the wording of the motion? As I read it, parts 1 and 2 would cover almost everything that has happened. So far as part 2 is concerned, it does not relate to any particular matter, and the same is true of part 1. Part 3 is more specific. If the information asked for in parts 1 and 2 relates to the information asked for in part 3, then there is no objection to bringing it down. Perhaps that is what the hon. member had in mind.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): I think that would be satisfactory. The motion is rather badly drafted; I do not know who is responsible for it. I suggest that the interpretation which the minister seeks to place upon it is correct, and if the return could be brought down on that understanding it would be all right.

Mr. CRERAR: With that understanding there is no objection to its passing.

Motion as amended agreed to.

CANADIAN FORCES—SERVICE OUTSIDE CANADA—CASUALTY LISTS

Mr. ROSS (St. Paul's):

For a return showing the names and addresses of all persons who were serving outside of Canada who have appeared on the casualty lists of (a) the army, (b) the navy, (c) the air force.

Mr. RALSTON: I want to ask my hon. friend if he will omit, unless it is important, the request for the addresses of the casualties. We have on the casualty lists the names and addresses of the next of kin, but to get the addresses of the casualties themselves we would have to go to the attestation papers, and there are about 2,000 of them.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): The order could be amended to read "names and addresses of the next of kin of all persons..."

Mr. RALSTON: That is quite all right.

Mr. POWER: I might point out to produce this information would take a very long time. I should like to know if any useful purpose is to be served.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): I think so.

Mr. POWER: Frankly I doubt it so far as the air force is concerned. If the house passes the order I will have to obey it, but I shall do it with considerable reluctance.

Motion as amended agreed to.

WAR RISK INSURANCE

PROVISION FOR COMPENSATION FOR WAR DAMAGE TO PROPERTY

Hon. J. L. ILSLEY (Minister of Finance) moved that the house go into committee at the next sitting to consider the following resolution:

That it is expedient to introduce a measure to provide for the insurance of property against war risk and for the payment of compensation for war damage out of a special account of the consolidated revenue fund, and to provide further in connection therewith for the employment of such officers, clerks and other employees and agents necessary for the administration of the act.

He said: His Excellency the Governor General, having been made acquainted with the subject matter of this resolution, recommends it to the consideration of the house.

Hon. R. B. HANSON (Leader of the Opposition): This is one of the matters which the minister informed me he would like to have advanced a stage. I assume nothing further will be done in regard to it until after the Easter recess. But it might be of some interest, having regard to questions asked across the floor, if the minister could make any statement concerning it before the Easter recess.

Mr. ILSLEY: If I can get to the stage at which I can introduce the bill I will introduce it, but if I cannot, then I shall have to make a statement either in this house or afterwards, depending upon the time that I can get.

Mr. D. G. ROSS (St. Paul's): I suggest to the minister that it is desirable that this bill be introduced before the recess. I happen to know that in certain circumstances people are reluctant to ship essential war goods to either coast for export overseas when they cannot obtain war risk insurance. There are people on both coasts, in Halifax and Vancouver, who are vitally interested in a measure of this kind.

Motion agreed to.

POSTAL SERVICE

FREE POSTAGE ON LETTERS FROM SOLDIERS—MONTREAL-QUEBEC AIR MAIL SERVICE

On the orders of the day:

Hon. W. P. MULOCK (Postmaster General): I should like to advise hon. members that steps are being taken to facilitate the exchange of correspondence between soldiers and their homes in Canada at all times. Letters from Canadian troops in England and Newfoundland have been accepted free of postage for some time past, and arrangements have now been completed under which letters posted in Jamaica by Canadian troops stationed there will pass free of postage to their homes in Canada. This concession takes effect on April 1 next.

The regular Jamaican postage will be required on all other items.

I should also like to say to the house, in response to numerous questions that have been asked in regard to the establishment of air mail service between Montreal and Quebec, that the business value of an air mail service between these cities has been carefully investigated, and in the light of the facts disclosed steps are being taken to inaugurate a regular daily-except-Sunday air mail schedule between these two important points on or about April 15 next. The proposed schedule of service will link the city of Quebec with main line air services at Montreal, operating to and from maritime provinces, the Canadian west, and all points in the United States. The postal advantages of this service should prove to be of definite value, especially at this time when speed in the transmission of the written word is of such great importance.

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Mr. GILLIS: Is the Postmaster General's department still considering the extension of the air mail service to Cape Breton island?

Mr. MULOCK: The hon. member's representations will be carefully considered. That is a matter of policy about which no doubt the house will be advised in due course.

Mr. GILLIS: It was definitely promised a year ago.

INQUIRY FOR RETURN

SYDNEY, N.S., WARTIME HOUSING

On the orders of the day:

Mr. CLARENCE GILLIS (Cape Breton South): Some weeks ago a motion was passed for the return of correspondence between the Department of Munitions and Supply and the city of Sydney in regard to Wartime Housing. I should like to ask the minister when I may expect that return to be tabled.

Hon. C. D. HOWE (Minister of Munitions and Supply): I know of no reason why it should not have been brought down before this, but I shall make inquiries and see what is the reason for the delay.

WAR APPROPRIATION

SUPPLEMENTARY PROVISION FOR GRANTING TO HIS MAJESTY AID FOR NATIONAL DEFENCE AND SECURITY

The house resumed from Tuesday, March 24, consideration of the motion of Mr. Ilsley that the house go into committee to consider the following resolution:

That it is expedient to introduce a measure to be called the Supplementary 1941 War Appropriation Act to provide *inter alia*,

1. That sums not exceeding $135,000,000 be granted to his majesty in addition to the sums granted by the War Appropriation Act, 1941, towards defraying any expenses or making any advances or loans that may be incurred or granted by or under the authority of the governor in council during the year ending March 31, 1942, for:—

(a) the security, defence, peace, order and welfare of Canada;

(b) the conduct of naval, military and air operations in or beyond Canada;

(c) promoting the continuance of trade, industry and business communications, whether by means of insurance or indemnity against war risk or in any other manner whatsoever; and

(d) the carrying out of any measure deemed necessary or advisable by the governor in council in consequence of the existence of a state of war.

2. That the governor in council be empowered to reexpend, advance or loan moneys that may be received by way of refund or repayment of advances, loans or expenditures under the War Appropriation Act, 1939, the War Appropriation Act, 1940, the War Appropriation Act, 1941, and the Supplementary 1941 War Appropriation Act.

Mr. A. M. NICHOLSON (Mackenzie): Mr. Speaker, before eleven o'clock last evening I was discussing a question which would have been left until after the Easter recess had it not been for the fact that unless something is done immediately in this connection the effect upon our production programme will be very serious indeed. I am referring, of course, to the question of wartime housing. Hon. members no doubt are aware of the fact that during the past year we have had two departments engaged in trying to provide more adequate housing in key centres in Canada. I refer to the activities of the national housing administration and to Wartime Housing Limited.

Last year I expressed the opinion that the entire programme of providing housing in war time should have been administered by the government owned and controlled agency, the national housing administration. The government, however, decided otherwise; and a number of dollar a year men were entrusted with the responsibility of administering Wartime Housing Limited. I do not plan to discuss their activities at this time, but after careful consideration and comparison of costs it would appear to me that we are getting permanent construction under national housing for less than we are getting temporary housing under Wartime Housing Limited. Last night I referred to a return which was tabled some time ago, giving the cost of wartime houses built in North Vancouver. It showed a striking discrepancy between the costs of wartime houses and those built under national housing in that city. I have before me a return brought down on February 3 of this year, giving the average costs of these temporary houses in various cities, as follows:

Fort William	$2,860
Halifax	3,742
Hamilton	2,818
Welland	2,886
Peterborough	3,018
Wrightville	3,379

Let me remind hon. members that these houses are of temporary construction, without basements and without furnaces. The fuel is stored in a box, attached to the back of the house, capable of holding half a ton of coal. Some of the occupants of these houses in Hamilton spoke of the difficulties they experienced in securing fuel deliveries, since the box has to be empty before half a ton of coal can be put in, and there is an extra charge of fifty cents for making these small

deliveries. In view of the fact that permanent houses have been built in many of these centres at much lower cost it does seem to me that it would be a great mistake to terminate the activities of the national housing administration. I understand that since the commencement of the war that agency has assisted in the construction of over 12,854 houses, at a cost to the treasury of Canada of approximately $9,700,000. I should like hon. members to remember these figures. According to the information given by the Minister of Munitions and Supply, we are committed to a spending programme of over $20,000,000 for something like six thousand houses, under the wartime housing programme. I know the answer will be given that these houses have to be built in a hurry, and that necessarily the cost is higher.

Mr. HOWE: Just to keep the record straight, I should say the fact that they are built in a hurry has nothing to do with it, but I would point out that under the housing act the services are furnished by the city, and a tax is put on the property to cover the cost of those services. On the other hand Wartime Housing build their own services, the cost of which is distributed among the houses, and there is no tax against the buildings of Wartime Housing.

Mr. NICHOLSON: I am aware of that, but still it does not explain the cost of $3,379 for houses of this type across the river in Hull. I would urge hon. members to go and see those houses, and then draw their own conclusions as to whether or not the taxpayers of Canada have received good value for the money that has been spent. What the minister says is true with regard to arrangements under the national housing administration; but in Canada there are a great many cities which would be quite prepared to encourage the administration to undertake a building programme. Of course it must be remembered also that the figures I gave represented only the government's investment, not the total cost of those houses. The average cost of the permanent houses is given as $3,250. I think hon. members will agree that if permanent houses can be built for anything like the cost of the temporary houses, we should encourage the construction of permanent dwellings as far as possible at this time.

I realize that the whole question of supplies must be taken into consideration. It is quite conceivable that we may have to use very different methods of construction; that we may have to abandon the installation of bath tubs, and that houses may not be wired for electricity if the shortage of copper becomes more acute. We might even be required to get along without central heating. But I submit that the government should take into consideration the raw materials and manpower that will be available for the construction of permanent houses, so that the promise given by the Minister of Finance (Mr. Ilsley) some time ago that we are not going to be governed by dollars and cents but that whatever is physically possible will be made financially possible, may be implemented. That policy should be carried out in connection with housing. It will be a great calamity if the national housing administration is compelled to fold up, with the personnel obliged to go into private industry or leave the country, so that the only building activity will be carried on by Wartime Housing Limited.

I should like to remind hon. members that it is estimated that ninety per cent of the 12,000 houses which have been built since the beginning of the war by the national housing administration have been constructed in centres where we consider there is a definite war-time housing shortage. According to the order in council which was passed when Wartime Housing was established, the places in which construction should be carried on were centres where the production of munitions of war and supplies, or defence projects, would be affected by the lack of housing. There are a great many places in Canada where training centres and military establishments are located to which men of the armed forces bring their families, and if it is physically possible we should be prepared to provide them with housing accommodation. I make this final plea to the government that it give the most careful consideration to providing an appropriation for national housing and that national housing be given consideration in the matter of priorities. It would be unfortunate if all the bathtubs, heating appliances and wiring were directed exclusively into wartime housing so that the national housing administration would find it impossible to carry on. I hope the government will give careful consideration to the argument I have presented, so that our munitions production may not be seriously handicapped in the months to come because of adequate housing not being available.

Mr. J. G. DIEFENBAKER (Lake Centre): Mr. Speaker, I had not intended to participate in this debate until the hon. member for Vancouver East (Mr. MacInnis) last evening brought out a circumstance which, I think, demands reiteration of the rights of parliament. Some time ago an address was delivered in this house by the hon. member for Ontario (Mr. Moore) in reference to the like matter, in which he stressed the situation to-day prevailing in the parliament generally speaking,

W.L.M. King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, 1940-1950,
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indicated the trend away from democratic practices. I find it hard to understand why so important a measure as the war appropriation should have been delayed in being brought down to the house until a day or so before the Easter recess. This is not the first time this has occurred. This is one measure that gives us as members an opportunity of placing our viewpoint before the house and the country and of obtaining information with regard to the position of our war effort. I cannot understand why a measure such as this should not have been introduced earlier in the session. Various explanations may be given, but the fact remains that in the last two or three days before the Easter recess we are asked to deal with an expenditure of many millions of dollars and to vote supply to enable the government to continue during the period of the Easter recess.

Mr. ILSLEY: If the hon. gentleman would permit a question, does he think we should have deferred the discussion on the address and the discussion on the plebiscite until after this discussion was completed?

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): No; but it should have been run on a different basis.

Mr. DIEFENBAKER: What I do think is this, that it is strange that each year and each session millions and millions of dollars of estimates are brought before the house toward the very end of the session without giving the members an opportunity to debate or consider them fully.

Mr. ILSLEY: This is not the end of the session.

Mr. DIEFENBAKER: The same thing happens year after year. That course may have been all right during the routine days of peace; but my submission is that with a war on—I reiterate what I have said before— committees of the private members of this house should be set up along the lines of the committees which the Minister of Pensions and National Health (Mr. Mackenzie) is having set up at the present time, to enable members to recommend to the government the cutting down of unnecessary expenditures because, Mr. Speaker, the thing the government should do to-day—and it would thereby secure the unanimous support of the country is to reduce non-war expenditures to the limit.

Donald Gordon, chairman of the wartime prices and trade board, speaking in the city of Montreal, outlined the position of Canada to-day and emphasized the necessity for action. He stressed the terrible urgency of the situation to-day and said:

Selfish or private interests must be ruled out completely. The competitive system must go, to be replaced with one which is based entirely upon the criterion of maximum production, with the most efficient use of labour, machinery and materials to operate steadily without cease except for necessary rest or maintenance.

Then he used these words:

Regimentation and more regimentation was coming for Canada, he continued, but "let us develop it without the ugly meaning which it has been given in gestapo land and by the Japanese imitators."

He points out that regimentation is coming in ever-increasing measure. I realize, as all of us must, that during a period of war it is necessary that the freedoms, which are ordinarily accepted as inherent in democracy be controlled in the greater interest of the safety of the state—the freedom of the press, freedom of speech, freedom of association and the like. As Lord Baldwin said:

The price of liberty is eternal vigilance, eternal knowledge, eternal sympathy and eternal understanding.

In Great Britain the rights of parliament have been restricted as have the rights of individuals, the rights of the whole people throughout the nation; but, Mr. Speaker, they are doing it with the consent and under the control of parliament, and wherever there is an invasion of the rights normally enjoyed by the citizens of Great Britain the matter first comes before parliament and is debated. I point this out because the hon. member for Vancouver East last evening in his address showed that information, whatever its source may be, which is not being furnished to parliament, is being or has been furnished to private corporations. That is a flouting of the rights of the members of this house, but it is what has been going on in ever-increasing measure ever since the war began. I point out first the fact that until recently it was impossible for the members of any party other than the government party to go on the national radio network; yet day after day members of the government and members of its various boards are making speeches, many of them tinged by political considerations. It is through the instrumentality of the radio—and it is at least one of the main methods—that public opinion can be created to-day. The other method is through the press, and the government is trying to control the press. Prosecutions are taking place from time to time; and while up to date none of them has been successful, the fact remains that the taking of the prosecution, unjustified though it was proven subsequently by the finding of the court, has a tendency to restrict the freedom of the press.

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I am not going into any detail, but I would point out the tendency on the part of this government to do that which has been condemned by the Prime Minister (Mr. Mackenzie King) over a period of years. I refer to the almost universal ruling by decree, by order in council. This has been so to such an extent that in May, 1941, the Prime Minister stated that statutes had been changed or suspended in their operations since the outbreak of the war, but that the government had no record of the statutes that had been so changed. So general has this trend become that statutes passed by this parliament, such as the War Exchange Conservation Act and the excess profits tax, now allow the governor in council to discriminate in favour of one individual as against another. In other words, the rule of law that provides for equality before the law and allows each and every citizen of this country an opportunity to take his case to establish that equality before the courts is denied, when in statutes we allow the government to suspend or amend them by order in council.

If we as a parliament continue to receive the answers that we have received during the last few days—this practice is ever-widening in its scope—we shall find ourselves, unless we protest, where the government will proceed to say to us, regardless of what the matter is about which we ask about, that it is not in the public interest that information should be given. If our right to secure information is denied, we are meeting here as a parliament for one purpose only, to vote supply. Other than that there would be very little justification for our being here. Everything that we pass by way of law could be passed by the instrumentality of orders in council, and even the few bills that do come before parliament appear to be merely fillers in between votes of supply and supply.

From time to time the Minister of Munitions and Supply (Mr. Howe) has replied to questions about production in a way that I suggest is not considerate of the rights of parliament. It would appear that the answers were prepared by a bureaucracy, by the rule of desk, instead of by a responsible minister answerable to parliament. On February 6 I asked how many licences had been granted for the erection of buildings other than those required for war industry since construction control had been adopted. In other words, I wanted to find out whether, during a time when all materials were required for war purposes, certain materials were being allocated for civilian or domestic purposes. The answer I received is a revelation of the attitude of certain bureaucrats to this parliament, the representatives of the people. The answer was as follows:

There have been issued up to February 5, 1942, a total of 3,150 licences for the erection of buildings. Records covering these do not differentiate between war and non-war industries. A clear line of demarcation is not possible.

That means one of two things. Either the answer is evasive to conceal that permits are being given for non-essential purposes, or permits are being issued by the board in charge without regard to whether or not they are for war purposes.

I would direct attention to the answer given to-day by the Minister of Munitions and Supply to the effect that the British government does not want information given out. I realize that in connection with particulars of quantities and details of that kind, it might be dangerous to give out information—not one of us wants any such information. In a recent speech the minister said that we now can equip a division in six weeks, but when we want to cross-examine him and find out the production in order to ascertain whether that is a statement of fact or merely a statement to make us all feel good, we receive the answer that it would not be in the public interest to give the information.

True, it would not be in the public interest to give out information that might be helpful to the enemy, but I think that is an excuse which is being used by this government to an ever-increasing extent as a latch-key to shut the door against information. That is the attitude they are taking. We want information; we want particulars. If the particulars and information cannot be given to us in the house, then let it be given in a secret session. We are asked to look into the expenditures of millions of dollars, and yet no information is given to us except in general terms. We are asked to vote millions and billions of dollars when we realize, as do the people of Canada, that it is not expenditures of themselves that will preserve freedom; it is the result that follows that will achieve its preservation.

What is being done with the money? Only a few short months ago the system that was followed previously of issuing monthly lists of contracts awarded was done away with. To-day no member of this house, unless he is a member of the government, has any idea of what contracts have been let since the issue of this information was discontinued. What expenditures have been made? Who have been the recipients of contracts in the different provinces? All we know is that

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MG 26 J 4, Volume 389, pages C273027-C274022

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money has been spent and no information has been given as to the nature and the particulars thereof or the results. The people are willing to sacrifice, but they want to know what use is being made of the money being expended.

Within the last few days a number of articles have appeared in the western press by Mr. Dexter, one of which was referred to the other evening by the hon. member for Vancouver South (Mr. Green). In one of these articles Mr. Dexter discussed the whole production situation. We have had no information on this. No information is being brought before parliament. No information is being made available to parliament. This series of articles points out that we have not yet achieved all-out production in Canada, that we have not to-day a nearly all-out production. All we have in fact is promises of future action, of what will happen in 1943. This parliament representing the people of Canada is concerned with what is going to happen in 1942 and have the right to know the present position.

I think we have a right to know where we are going and what is the plan in reference to production. Can time run forever in our favour? The record in the far east in the last four or five months has been terrible in its implications. Defeats, glorious defeats; retreats, glorious retreats, all because of the fact that there has been a need, not of manpower with courage but of sufficient manpower; a need, not of proper machinery but of sufficient amounts of proper machinery.

To-day in this country there should be a stop to the construction of buildings for civilian purposes. It is not being stopped: the answer to which I referred a while ago shows this. Is it not about time that the increase of man-power in industry due to enlarged demands for civilian requirements should be restricted? Since the beginning of this war there has been an additional employment of one million men, of whom the increased demand for consumer goods accounts for 339,000. Why has this flow of consumer goods production not been stopped? The people are willing to accept a reduced standard of living; yet to-day we have more men producing goods for civilian and domestic uses than in 1939, and I would point out that one of the orders in council which the Prime Minister placed before parliament yesterday starts with the admission that there is a shortage of man-power in the country for war and industrial purposes. I shall allude to that again in a moment. In the meanwhile let us see what this increased employment has, in large measure, done. Here are the comparative index figures showing the increases:

Trade	September, 1939	December, 1941
Furniture	84·2	118·4
Musical instruments	59·9	86·1
Beverages	181·8	235·2
Heating appliances	135·1	163·8
Street railways and cartage	130·6	149·5
Hotels and restaurants	151·7	162·7
Retail trade	139·0	177·8
Wholesale trade	124·1	138·5

There must be a reduction in civilian demand, and the services of many men who to-day are engaged in industries of this kind must be diverted to war purposes.

I suggested a while ago that we reduce this year to the very limit both public and domestic expenditures for the ordinary ways of life. It can be done. Place our estimates before members of this parliament who are business men; give them the authority of the government to pare down and reduce, and they will do it. I notice that Saskatchewan, which in this respect is no different from any other province, is expending to-day several million dollars more than ever before in its history, and twice the amount expended twelve years ago, although it has no relief bill to speak of. To-day too many of us are trying to take advantage of the war situation to ask the government for this and that. I suggest that a message be given by the Prime Minister to the people of Canada, who are willing to listen to it, to desist from being what I choose to call "gimmes" until the war is over: "'Gimme' appropriations for my province or my city or my constituency, for industry; 'gimme' patronage, 'gimme' shorter hours, higher profits, more business, and higher prices." Away with that for the period of the war. Once you have established, as regards agriculture as with all other war industries, a fair and reasonable return, that can be done.

We remember what happened two years ago, prior to the fall of France. We little thought then what would occur in the next two or three months. France had her "gimmes" then. They were fighting among themselves; they were asking for appropriations; they were doing all the things which we are doing all over this dominion to-day. They did it until the French army was forced to retreat toward Paris. Then, everybody got to work on production. But the determination to work and to do was too late. To-day France has her "gimmes" too, but the "gimme" to-day is not the "gimme" of two

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years ago. To-day it is "'Gimme' my lost liberty; 'gimme' even death rather than what I am passing through."

The challenge comes to us to-day. It is a challenge to this parliament, the institution in which resides the hope, the aspiration and the determination of the Canadian people. I speak without sentimentalism; I sincerely believe what I say. The Canadian people are asking us to give them that leadership without which they can do nothing; they want us to do our part regardless of any lesser considerations.

Last week I had the honour to be one of a party which went to Hamilton, upon the invitation of the hon. member for Hamilton East (Mr. Ross). We had an opportunity of seeing something of the munitions factories, those great industries which have sprung up or been greatly enlarged during the past two years. Having been there a year ago to a day, I could realize something of the development which has taken place there, as I did in certain other industrial centres which I have had an opportunity of visiting recently. But I would be remiss in my duty as a member if I did not say that, while great advances have been made, they are far below what they should be having regard to the fact that almost two years have gone since their establishment.

I believe that a committee of this parliament should be set up to look into production. There are among our members manufacturers and business men who would willingly serve on a committee which was empowered to look into the whole situation, go to the root of to-day's problems, and offer solutions or suggestions. I believe that the Minister of Munitions and Supply has done a very great work, but he has not been able to coordinate all the various production agencies under his control. It is too large a job for a man to come before parliament as a minister and at the same time put into effect a complete organization and correlation of the war industry of this dominion. The time has come when this government, instead of having different heads of the various departments of munitions production, should appoint one supreme head, a czar if you will, a man who will be able to coordinate production.

I have in mind production in one particular line, wherein I think the people should know what the turn-out is and what deliveries overseas have been. I realize, however, that to furnish that information by making a statement in parliament might be of service to the enemy. The people do not believe the government in everything it says. The government issues statements that all is well, everything is fine, no major mistakes are being made—only one minister has ever risen in his place in this chamber and admitted a mistake—and the people, looking at the situation in the east, realizing that Japan is at our gates in the west and that submarines are attacking on the east coast, are asking whether the information they have received has been unreal. These things were believed to be impossible a few months ago. The time has come for the Prime Minister, with the tremendous influence and prestige which his position commands, and which his service in public life demands, to tell the people of Canada the true story, what it is we have to face, what sacrifices have to be made, in a particular way and not by generalizations promising total war—often generalizations with regard to future action.

In the United States a committee of the senate was set up one year ago. The other place, so far as parliament is concerned, is not being used. Many of these problems could be submitted to that house and an opportunity given to the people of Canada to take advantage of their experience, business acumen and ability. The United States' senate set up a committee for the purpose of looking into the whole position of production. They were not satisfied that everything was being done. They had been told the same stories that we in Canada had been told. The committee set up was not partisan; it was composed of Democrats and Republicans, and I believe there was a farm labour representative and functioned under the chairmanship of Senator Truman. It met off and on for the period of a year, and its recommendations changed the picture in regard to production in the United States. It placed the United States in the position where the United States is producing 2,000 war planes a month, a little less than the axis is producing to-day.

The same committee brought out the fact, in regard to production of certain lines, that though there were potential possibilities in the united nations of a three to one advantage over the axis nations, that is not so to-day; to-day the percentage is the other way about. The advantage is a potential situation. For this reason that committee considered whether it could mobilize the industry of the United States. It found, first, that too many civilian requirements were being manufactured at the present time. The report pointed out that in 1941 the automobile output was higher than in any year except 1929. Second, it found that the production programme was behind schedule

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because of departmental red tape and lack of organization, and they recommended that the dollar-a-year men should be given an opportunity to dissociate themselves from the industries from which they had been loaned. It was pointed out that in the United States there were 255 dollar-a-year men and 631 who worked without compensation. That committee, composed of business men, came to the conclusion that dollar-a-year men from industry, however patriotic and desirous to serve they might be, might be considered still to have the business point of view of the organizations to which they originally belonged. It showed that comparing the war effort of the United States now to the last war effort was aimless and purposeless. I believe the fact to be that the expenditure of $22 to-day gets the same results as the expendture of $1 in the great war.

There was one piece of information which I do not think has ever been given to this parliament. I will ask the minister to tell me whether it is true that the Reconstruction Finance Corporation of the United States advanced $50,000,000 to the aluminium industry in Canada in order to permit of the development of that industry here, repayment of the amount to be made as deliveries occur. That is what the United States *News* of December 5, 1941 says—that there was that advance given the Canadian aluminium industry in order to build up the necessary industry in this dominion.

It was found, too, that as late as January, 1942, 75 per cent of the industry of the United States was still producing civilian needs, 50 per cent in Great Britain and 40 per cent in Germany. The committee pointed out that there was only one way in which there could be a reduction in civilian demand and that was for the government to act promptly and ruthlessly and place in charge a man who had power to act regardless of any influences or any consideration.

I have already suggested that we should set up a committee with powers similar to those of the United States committee, not for the purpose of criticizing the government—I think the government is too prone to think that every suggestion from this side of the house is made from political motives, but to help in the war effort. I offer that suggestion to the government, but I say this: Do not set up a committee like the war expenditures committee which is overloaded with government members. Give the opposition equality. Set up a committee reasonably equal, the chairman and vice-chairman from the government, to assure a majority, and let the proceedings be in the open. As far as the war expenditures committee is concerned, while I was not here all summer, I know of the results achieved. We sat on that committee and everyone was desirous of doing something; but measured in actual performance, if honestly admitted, we did little or nothing—and I am rather overstating the case when I say "little". The committee met behind closed doors. The information that was given to us should, I submit, be known to the people of Canada. There was no question of production or of details of that kind. If you want to ensure honest production on the part of all in production in Canada, you must have them realize—certainly some of them—that what they do is subject to investigation by parliament, or subject to being brought to the light of day.

When that committee is set up again—and I am speaking only for myself—I would say if it is going into details in regard to contracts, it should be open to the public, so that the information shall become public, for what information we did get is hidden and concealed. Such a committee could do a great deal of work. It cannot perform an impossible task. There are those who say that if we set up that committee we should be able to investigate all contracts. My answer is that no private member of the house knows what contracts have been awarded since August; but we do know that if the committee dealt only with current contracts that were being awarded when we were sitting, 1,500 a week, we would have been able to devote only eight seconds to each contract—and there were eighteen or nineteen lawyers out of twenty-three members of the committee. I need say no more as to the possibility of investigating all contracts.

I pass on to one other matter before I conclude, and will make a passing reference to the orders in council that were tabled yesterday regarding man-power. It should be noted that what opposition members have been saying for the last year is now admitted by the government, in the very first paragraph of P.C. 2250:

> Whereas the Minister of National War Services and the Acting Minister of Labour report that there is a growing scarcity of men available for service in His Majesty's armed forces and for the employment in the war industries. . . .

All that these orders in council do is to set up a scheme for service in Canada, far removed from the sanguine hopes expressed by the Minister of National Defence for Air (Mr. Power) or by the Minister of Labour (Mr. Mitchell) in the advance statements that both of them made. Why was the raising of the age limit stopped at thirty? With the threat by the Japanese to the Aleutian

islands, only seven hundred miles from their nearest naval base, why the thirty-year age limit when there is an admitted shortage of men to-day?

I suggest that the men who have already been called up and medically examined and rejected should be rechecked. I realize that there may be some cases where advantage was taken by a prospective recruit of the opportunity of the examination by the physician of his choice—they were very few in number—who granted a lower category than the person properly belonged in. I mention Saskatchewan in that connection, and according to a member of the board there, there were three rechecks, and in one it was found that out of nineteen turned down seven, on recheck, passed as A-1.

The whole foundation of these orders in council seems to be based on what has been found insufficient in the United States, namely that only the age limits should be chosen in which men could be expected to continue in military service for ten years. The United States started off in that way, taking only the highest physical class, and those who normally could be expected to continue in service for ten years. But to-day it has been found necessary to extend the age limits. If we are to have men in Canada for Canadian defence, why not train more than those of ages up to thirty? Even all of them are not subject to call, because the choice is going to be made by lot. It strikes me as passing strange that, facing the spring offensive of 1942, the government is not able to tell us what scheme it has for choosing the men who will be taken into the non-active force. In the rehabilitation of those men who have been turned down, the government is taking a step in the right direction, but that rehabilitation should cover not only those who might be made A-1 by slight operations and the like, but also those other men of B, C or D categories who might be used in Canada for home defence.

Right Hon. W. L. MACKENZIE KING (Prime Minister): Yesterday as the house was debating the resolution to appoint a committee to deal with matters of reconstruction and reestablishment that may arise at the close of the present war, I debated in my own mind whether or not, for a reason that seemed to me a most important one, I should intervene in that discussion. I did not intervene because I was anxious to see the committee appointed; I was also anxious that no one should have reason to feel I was in any way unsympathetic with the purpose for which it was being appointed. I doubt if too much thought and study can be given to questions of reconstruction as they are likely to arise at the close of the war. But in thinking the matter over I have since regretted that I did not say a word at the time, because of a possible false emphasis that might be given in the public mind from the discussion which took place in the house and from the fact that the resolution was presented from the government side of the house. It is just conceivable that a large part of the public, reading that the House of Commons has appointed a committee to deal with post-war reconstruction, may gather the impression that the government has in its possession information which would lead it to assume that the war may terminate at an early date and that we should be prepared immediately to deal with questions of reconstruction.

One of the reasons why I rise to-day is to say that I would wish emphatically to dispel any possible impression of that kind. One does not like to dwell unduly upon the seriousness of the existing situation, or unnecessarily to alarm the country; but I think it is only right that the people of Canada should understand that at no time since the commencement of the war was the international situation as serious for the free countries of the world at it is at present. Far from seeing ahead a moment at which it may be expected that the war will terminate, I must confess that I am unable to see any time that could be specifically mentioned, and that it would be little short of a miracle if the war were to terminate within what some would describe as a short time. One has only to face the facts as they are known and try to realize their significance to see what a tremendous and terrible course this world will have to run before anything in the nature of reconstruction of an order even such as existed in the past is going to be possible for any country or any group of countries to undertake.

When the war started there was a Europe composed of free nations. To-day the whole of Europe practically has ceased to be free and lies prostrate at the feet of the conqueror, whose country occupies a large part of central Europe. There was at the commencement of this war a great French empire; to-day there is no France that can call itself its own, and the French empire, as such, has virtually disappeared. So far as it exists, it exists in large part to carry out the wishes of Germany in different parts of the world.

Mr. DOUGLAS (Weyburn): And yet we have the Vichy ambassador here.

Mr. MACKENZIE KING: Well, I will give my friend an answer in regard to that later. When the war commenced all the strategy of the war was planned on the understanding and belief that the close alliance

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then existing between France and Britain would be maintained throughout. The dispositions of armed forces and of naval forces were made in accordance with a plan of joint cooperation. France being defeated at an early stage of the war has altered all that situation, and altered it very, very much for the worse.

Not only has France ceased to be an ally, but as I have pointed out her possessions in other parts of the world have come to serve the purposes of the enemy rather than the purposes which they would have served under the alliance between those two countries. Indeed, as I have said, there has virtually ceased to be a French empire. There was also at the beginning of the war another empire of considerable importance and significance, the empire which Holland had in the far east. That Dutch empire has been overrun. The Netherlands themselves are overrun by the enemy and their possessions have been taken from them. The United States had its possessions in the far east, and in part those possessions have become the possessions of the enemy. The British empire existed in part as an empire in the far east. To-day part of that empire has been taken by the enemy while other parts of it are threatened as they have never been threatened before. In Africa, where there were large and important French possessions, Britain at the commencement of the war had hoped and expected to find the bases from which operations might take place which would serve effectively to meet any enemy whose forces had to be met on the Atlantic ocean or on the African mainland. There again the enemy has possession in large measure to-day, and one cannot say what the outcome of subsequent conflicts may be. No one can say what the word may be twenty-four hours hence of the increasing gravity of the situation in any part of the world. It is known that Britain has had to move many of her forces from one part of the empire to other parts of the empire and of the world in order to meet the situations that exist there. All along the way there has been to some extent a thinning of the defence forces of the vast British empire.

I mention and bring together these facts, just in the way one would gather them from the press of the day, in order to illustrate how wrong it would be that anyone should get the impression that the government, or this parliament, has in mind the possibility of an early termination of this war. The war has to be won before there can be any thought of reconstruction; and if the winning of the war is to include, as we hope it must, the restoration of freedom to those parts of the world from which freedom has been taken away by aggressor nations, there is yet a vast task that lies ahead of the free nations of the world.

I stress this because I should like to remove altogether any impression that in constituting a committee of this house to study the problems of reconstruction, the government or anyone on this side of the house—or for that matter I hope I may say anyone in this House of Commons—entertains the illusion that at the present time we are anywhere within sight of the termination of the present war, or by any means certain as to its course, at least for the immediate present. I have not any doubt that if this year goes by successfully, as I believe it will, with the increased production of munitions and the increased power that will be brought together from the different united nations, ultimately the free nations will triumph. I believe they will; but before that moment is reached there is going to be a vastly different world from what we have ever known in the past, and, I believe, a world even vastly different from the world as we know it at the moment. That being the case I hope no impression will exist anywhere, either in this house or in this country, that the government entertains other than the most serious views of the very critical situation that exists in the world to-day.

I had another reason for rising this afternoon, Mr. Speaker. The night before last, when the present resolution was introduced, my hon. friend the leader of the opposition (Mr. Hanson) said that he thought the ministry should make some statement with respect to its war policy, particularly in relation to the territorial defence of Canada; the necessity for that defence has manifested itself in lrager measure since the outbreak of the war with Japan. The hon. member for Vancouver South (Mr. Green) has spoken particularly of the situation as it has changed since the entry of Japan into the war. Since the opposition have stated their feeling that this particular resolution should not be allowed to pass until some further statement is made by the ministry, I thought it might facilitate the progress of the debate if I were, on behalf of the government, to make a statement this afternoon. But may I say at once to the hon. member for Lake Centre (Mr. Diefenbaker), who has just spoken, that I do not think the government should be taken to task for having brought down the war appropriation measure, and begun to discuss it immediately before the Easter recess. As a matter of fact, I think, had we

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brought the measure down at an earlier stage and then attempted to crowd the measure through before the Easter recess, we might have been open to some degree of censure for failing to give the house more time and opportunity for full discussion on the most important measure the government has brought before the house. As matters stand, it seems to me that we have pretty well taken the right ground in the circumstances. We have brought to the attention of the house all the large financial measures of which the house will have to take cognizance during the session. Hon. members are in a position to know the entire programme; and they will have the benefit of the time afforded by the Easter recess to familiarize themselves with the various features of the proposed legislation, and also to consider the points which they think should be further discussed when we reassemble after Easter.

Speaking in the debate on the address, I outlined, I thought very fully, the war policy of the government, going into considerable detail with respect to the armed forces overseas—indeed, all forces on land, in the air and at sea. I outlined the progress that has been made in the production of munitions and supplies, as well as the government's programme with respect to the supply of food. In fact, as I recall it, I covered the entire field fairly comprehensively. I had thought that what was said at that time, and what was subsequently said by my colleagues, might have furnsihed sufficient information to have justified the passing of these interim supply resolutions without at this time any further detailed discussion. However, the request that the government should, if possible, give members before the Easter recess further information in regard to the development of its war policy is I think a reasonable one, particularly in so far as it relates to the defence of Canada itself, as the need of that defence has become more evident within the recent past. I shall accordingly now make a brief statement to the house of the further progress made by the government in the carrying out of its programme. May I say, however, that I did this in part yesterday when I spoke on the government's policy in respect to national selective service. I also at that time answered some of the questions which had previously been asked and I anticipated others. I hope that with what was said yesterday and what I may now say, hon. members of the house will have a fairly comprehensive understanding in their minds of the programme which the government has under way at this time.

The phenomenal successes of the Japanese in the southwestern Pacific have done more than all the nazi successes in Europe to bring home to the people of Canada the reality of the danger to our own country in the present war. No one should seek to minimize that danger or the new sense of urgency it has brought with it. At the same time, it should not be permitted to destroy a true perspective. In actual geographical distance, in thousands of miles, the Japanese menace is much farther from Canada than the nazi menace. In strategic terms, the probability of attacks upon our Atlantic coast and upon Newfoundland is as great as it is upon our Pacific coast. But for the shield which Britain constitutes, the danger to Canada from Europe would be far greater than the danger to Canada from the far east.

One of the most difficult decisions in waging war is the decision which must be made as to the disposition of fighting strength. Over and over again it is necessary to decide what proportion of total fighting strength should be sent to the front line to engage the enemy, and what proportion should be held in reserve to secure the base of operations and protect the lines of communication.

From the outset of the war the government has been attacked on this score from opposite extremes. At one extreme are those who would send every trained man and every available weapon overseas, without regard to the risk thereby incurred of exposing our own country to direct attack which nothing could be done to repel. At the other extreme are those who would keep every able-bodied man and every available weapon in Canada, without regard to the risk of allowing our allies and friends to be defeated, and thus exposing ourselves to the full fury of a triumphant enemy.

Both extremes are perilous. To adopt either might be fatal to the very existence of our country. Unless we take every reasonable precaution to maintain the territorial security of Canada, the enemy might, by sudden surprise attacks, do incalculable damage to the country. On the other hand, unless we take our full share of the combat and do our full part to defeat the enemy before he reaches our shores, we may be left practically alone to face his onslaughts.

Before the Japanese attacks were made on British and American territories in the Pacific, the insistence of the government upon the maintenance of a foundation for the actual physical defence of Canadian territory aroused in some quarters a good deal of impatience. The opposite tendency has been more in evidence since December 7. Canada will never enjoy permanent security until the axis powers

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are defeated, and the spirit of aggression is uprooted and destroyed. That can never be achieved by keeping at home all our men and resources in an attempt to build an iron wall of defence on our coasts. That, indeed, would be the best way of making sure we should have to fight the war on Canadian soil.

So long as the international gangsters are plundering and marauding at large in the world, we can never make Canada so secure that there will not be somewhere some danger of attack. But, as I have repeatedly pointed out, we cannot on that account afford to neglect reasonable precautions. In certain strategic areas we must be prepared to meet sudden raids from sea and air. The maintenance of the security of the base of operations is the most elementary rule of warfare.

To meet the increasing menace of attack on both coasts, the government has taken many important steps to strengthen Canada's capacity to resist attack. For obvious reasons I cannot give to our own people precise information concerning these measures without giving the same information to the enemy.

I am prepared, however, without being so precise as to reveal specific details which might assist the enemy, to give some indication of the steps being taken to strengthen our territorial and coastal defences. What I am about to say on this subject refers mainly to land and air defences. Concerning naval defence, I can add but little, if anything, to what I said on January 26 last. However, there is something that I can add.

Since that date, attacks by many submarines have been made in coastal waters of Canada and the United States. In many cases these attacks have occurred within sight of the shores of this continent. There is no reason to believe that these attacks will not continue and probably become more intensive. Officers of the Canadian naval service have expressed the view that within a few months submarines may well be found operating within the gulf, and even in the St. Lawrence river. It is known that enemy submarines can leave their bases on the European continent, voyage to the shores of this continent, seek their prey for some days or weeks and return to their bases without the necessity of refueling. If enemy submarines do operate in the gulf and river St. Lawrence, an additional burden will be thrown on the Canadian navy. Not only will our navy have the duty of assisting in escorting Atlantic convoys, but it will also have to assume the task of escorting convoys in the river St. Lawrence and in the gulf as well as along our coasts.

The Canadian navy has a share in the primary responsibility for our territorial defence. In the midst of world-wide conflict, warfare on the seas is indivisible. Any Canadian ship of war, wherever it may be operating, is engaged in defending Canada. How or where our ships are employed cannot, of course, be disclosed with exactness. It is, however, common knowledge that the major strength of the Canadian navy is in the Atlantic, sharing in the burden—and bearing a large share—of escorting convoys. This does not mean that the naval defence of the Pacific is being neglected. Inevitably the naval tasks of the united nations are so apportioned as to secure the maximum advantage from their total naval strength.

As I said on January 26, save in so far as the number of available ships necessarily sets the limit to the number of men who can be enlisted for training, no limitation so far as our navy is concerned has been placed upon the number, either of ships or of men.

There is no lack of recruits for the naval service. Indeed there is a considerable waiting list. But in addition to the limitations which have been mentioned as to the number of available ships, there is the further limitation imposed by the difficulty of training men, particularly officers and petty officers. In the nature of things, naval training takes a longer time than the training necessary for either of the other two services. After men have been given all the instruction in the art of naval warfare that can be given on shore, there still remains the long path of varied experience over which they must pass before they are thoroughly equipped for positions of responsibility at sea.

Up to the present the building of naval craft and the training of men to man these craft have proceeded at an almost equal pace. Most of the ships of Canada's navy have been built in Canada, and they are, of course, manned by Canadians. The achievements of Canadian corvettes, named after Canadian cities and towns, have captured the admiration of Canadians generally and have won the praise of naval authorities in other countries. What is true of Canadian corvettes is true also of every other type of craft in the Canadian navy. Officers and men of the Royal Canadian Navy, of the Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve, and of the Royal Canadian Naval Reserve, manning armed merchant cruisers, destroyers, minesweepers, patrol boats and other naval vessels have acquitted themselves ably and honourably over wide expanses of ocean. It can be truly said that with every month that passes, Canada's contribution to naval warfare is growing in extent and effectiveness. As that contribution grows, our security increases.

The programme for the army overseas, announced on January 26, is already under

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way. At that time, I also gave a résumé of what had been done with regard to the territorial defence of Canada, following the outbreak of war with Japan. I stated that new units were being mobilized in accordance with anticipated deliveries of equipment. I can now say that, in accordance with that policy, nearly a dozen new battalions have already been mobilized, together with a considerable number of additional anti-aircraft and coast defence batteries. These formations are being given an active role in connection with territorial defence.

I also indicated that the organization of additional formations would depend on developments in the war situation, and mentioned particularly the mobilization of another division. Since that time the war situation has further deteriorated, particularly in the far east. In consequence of this fact the government has authorized the mobilization of two additional divisions, the 7th and the 8th. The additional formations will add depth to our existing and contemplated defences. They will be given the role of mobile reserves, with special reference to the east and west coasts.

I will not repeat what I said in January as to the special steps and special dispositions which had then been made to meet the conditions resulting from the outbreak of war with Japan. Those measures have been implemented. The new mobilizations which I have just indicated are by way of additional security. Our coast defences and anti-aircraft defences are being strengthened week by week as new equipment becomes available, and as new units already authorized complete their mobilization.

The house will understand that, for reasons of security, I cannot give the disposition of these new formations. It has, of course, to be recognized that the ultimate disposition of all troops necessarily depends upon circumstances which determine the course of the war. I can say, however, that both the troops and the equipment available will be disposed of to the very best advantage to meet any anticipated forms or scales of attack.

In the outline I gave of the war programme for the present year, I referred to the fact that the air force, like the navy and the army, had its part in the territorial and coastal defence of Canada and Newfoundland. I added that the responsibilities of the air force on the Pacific coast had been increased by the outbreak of war with Japan. I stated that, in consequence of the increased responsibilities of the air force for territorial and coastal defence, some increase in the home war establishment of the Royal Canadian Air Force must be anticipated. While there are obvious reasons why precise details of the expansion of our air defences cannot be made public, it can be said that this expansion will involve marked increases in the number of combat squadrons, for reconnaissance, anti-submarine, striking, and fighter operations.

Some indication of the scale of expansion of the home war establishment of the R.C.A.F. is revealed by the rise in expenditures on air defences in Canada. These expenditures are exclusive of the cost of air training. The expenditures were:

In 1939-40 over $28,000,000.
In 1940-41 over $50,000,000.
In 1941-42 approximately $115,000,000.

The estimates for 1942-43 were originally fixed at $233,000,000. Events since December 7 have led to a new survey, as a result of which this estimate has been raised to $315,000,000. Long range commitments have been made of an additional $120,000,000.

I might indicate some of the factors which have made this substantial increase possible. More aircraft are becoming available. Canadian production of combat aircraft is reaching its zenith. Orders placed some time ago in the United States are now being filled. It might be of interest for me to point out that by far the largest proportion of the aircraft will be provided by Canadian plants. The air crew and ground crew required for the expanded programme will be readily available. The British commonwealth air training plan is training pilots, observers and gunners in numbers sufficient to meet all our commitments to our partners in the plan, and, in addition, to provide fully for our home war establishment. Our requirements of ground crew are readily filled by voluntary recruitment. The technical ground crew training facilities are easily able to meet the additional demands placed upon them.

The construction of air fields and other defences presents no difficulties. The experience acquired during the years 1940 and 1941, in the construction of home war establishments, as well as air training schools and establishments, has made of the departments of transport and munitions and supply highly efficient and highly expeditious construction agencies. Most of the essential developments connected with the basic defence of our coasts are either completed or in process of completion. The projects this year will provide mainly for defence in greater depth, and for the development of satellite and auxiliary aerodromes.

The last thought or desire of the government would be to lull the people of our country into any false sense of security. No matter how complete our defences may be, we can never be sure of preventing the enemy from attempting some form of attack. To defeat

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The house will understand that, for reasons of security, I cannot give the disposition of these new formations. It has, of course, to be recognized that the ultimate disposition of all troops necessarily depends upon circumstances which determine the course of the war. I can say, however, that both the troops and the equipment available will be disposed of to the very best advantage to meet any anticipated forms or scales of attack.

In the outline I gave of the war programme for the present year, I referred to the fact that the air force, like the navy and the army, had its part in the territorial and coastal defence of Canada and Newfoundland. I added that the responsibilities of the air force on the Pacific coast had been increased by the outbreak of war with Japan. I stated that, in consequence of the increased responsibilities of the air force for territorial and coastal defence, some increase in the home war establishment of the Royal Canadian Air Force must be anticipated. While there are obvious reasons why precise details of the expansion of our air defences cannot be made public, it can be said that this expansion will involve marked increases in the number of combat squadrons, for reconnaissance, anti-submarine, striking, and fighter operations.

Some indication of the scale of expansion of the home war establishment of the R.C.A.F. is revealed by the rise in expenditures on air defences in Canada. These expenditures are exclusive of the cost of air training. The expenditures were:

In 1939-40 over $28,000,000.
In 1940-41 over $50,000,000.
In 1941-42 approximately $115,000,000.

The estimates for 1942-43 were originally fixed at $233,000,000. Events since December 7 have led to a new survey, as a result of which this estimate has been raised to $315,000,000. Long range commitments have been made of an additional $120,000,000.

I might indicate some of the factors which have made this substantial increase possible. More aircraft are becoming available. Canadian production of combat aircraft is reaching its zenith. Orders placed some time ago in the United States are now being filled. It might be of interest for me to point out that by far the largest proportion of the aircraft will be provided by Canadian plants. The air crew and ground crew required for the expanded programme will be readily available. The British commonwealth air training plan is training pilots, observers and gunners in numbers sufficient to meet all our commitments to our partners in the plan, and, in addition, to provide fully for our home war establishment. Our requirements of ground crew are readily filled by voluntary recruitment. The technical ground crew training facilities are easily able to meet the additional demands placed upon them.

The construction of air fields and other defences presents no difficulties. The experience acquired during the years 1940 and 1941, in the construction of home war establishments, as well as air training schools and establishments, has made of the departments of transport and munitions and supply highly efficient and highly expeditious construction agencies. Most of the essential developments connected with the basic defence of our coasts are either completed or in process of completion. The projects this year will provide mainly for defence in greater depth, and for the development of satellite and auxiliary aerodromes.

The last thought or desire of the government would be to lull the people of our country into any false sense of security. No matter how complete our defences may be, we can never be sure of preventing the enemy from attempting some form of attack. To defeat

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such attempts we must utilize to the best advantage possible the men and equipment we have and are able to obtain.

It goes without saying that in any attempted attack on the North American continent, the joint United States-Canadian plans for defence would come into immediate operation. What I have said is, I trust, a sufficient indication that the security of our Canadian coasts is not only not being neglected but is being constantly increased and strengthened. I can assure the house that, keeping in mind strategic conditions elsewhere, the government is endeavouring, practically and vigorously, to strengthen Canada's defences by sea, land and air to meet any situation which is likely to arise.

Something has been said during the course of the present debate about the possibility of Canada sending a force to Australia. In connection with the utilization of the Canadian army there has been one principle which the government has invariably held to, and that is that our troops should serve where and in whatever way they can do the most good to the common cause.

We consulted with those with whom we are associated in the war effort as to how best we could help, and we undertook a programme accordingly, which I announced in January. We had full consultation with our military advisers, and in view of the obligations to which we had committed ourselves overseas, and having regard to the other factors involved, it did not appear to be in the interests of the combined war effort that Canada should undertake at this time the sending of an expeditionary force to Australia. There was the further important circumstance that such dispositions were properly the subject of consideration, not by Canada alone but by the combined chiefs of staff committee of the united nations. It goes without saying that we are most anxious to cooperate with our sister dominion in every practicable way at this time of danger, and we have examined and have communicated with Australia, respecting other forms of assistance.

What I have said does not mean that Canada, as far as the army is concerned, withdraws one iota from the attitude we have taken, namely, that Canada wants its troops to be used in whatever way and in whatever theatre it is considered they can make the most useful contribution. That has been and will continue to be our position. In addition to other statements on the subject, I, myself, have personally made that purpose abundantly clear to the United Kingdom government.

[Mr. Mackenzie King.]

Mr. GREEN: May I ask the Prime Minister a question with regard to the latter part of his statement? He did not say anything about the Pacific council for which Australia has been pressing so strongly. Is the Prime Minister in a position to state whether Canada will ask that such a Pacific council be set up, and will ask for representation on that council?

Mr. MACKENZIE KING: The subject to which my hon. friend has just referred is a part of a larger subject, which is, the most effective kind of cooperation that can be arranged between the united nations, and in particular, between the governments of the United Kingdom and the United States.

As the house is well aware, the foundation of that cooperative effort was laid at the time of the visit of Mr. Churchill to Washington. Since then, very careful consideration has been given to what is likely in the long run to be best in the way of boards or councils on which the different parts of the empire, the United States, and the other united nations may be represented. There are advantages and disadvantages with respect to having all these boards or councils located in the United Kingdom; advantages and disadvantages in having them all located in the United States. What the countries concerned have been seeking to do is to weigh carefully, in the light of all considerations which should be taken into account, the best arrangement for furthering a common, cooperative effort.

In regard to the Pacific council, it was felt for some time that, having regard to strategic considerations in particular, the area which was immediately concerned was the southern Pacific and the far east, and that the nations which should be called into consultation in reference to matters likely to arise there, should be the nations that were more immediately concerned with that particular area.

May I say this, in a general way, that sometimes an individual achieves most, not by asserting himself too much, but by effacing himself, by taking into account the difficulties which others have and which have to be met, and by seeking as far as possible not to emphasize and increase those difficulties, but rather to minimize and lessen them and, as far as it is possible, overcome them. In that regard it is much the same with a nation as with an individual. One of the difficulties which presents itself respecting the appointment of a board or council which relates to any part of the British commonwealth is, that the commonwealth is composed of several self-governing nations and, where one part seeks representation on a particular board or council, unless it is possible to give the

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best of reasons why every other part of the commonwealth should not be similarly represented, a difficulty immediately presents itself.

I give that as an illustration of the kind of thing which has presented itself to the Prime Minister of Britain and his colleagues in deciding upon representation of certain nations of the commonwealth in Britain and the kind of thing of which we here have had to take account in considering whether we should be represented on a board or council in Washington rather than in London. Hon. members will see at once that, the minute Washington is preferred to London in the matter of representation on some board or council that has to do with war strategy and war policy, a question arises in the public mind, as to why Washington was chosen in preference to London.

Up to the present, and may I say, right along, we have taken the position as a government that, where we saw that Canada's interests were likely to be prejudiced in any particular, we have made strong protest and strong representations as to why we should be given representation which up to that time we had not had. But where we have had reason to believe that our position was such that it in no way was being prejudiced or impaired, we have sought, as I have said, not to raise or press matters which were likely to make a difficult situation more difficult, but rather to watch the situation and at the right moment gain the representation we wished.

That is, I think, pretty much the situation with regard to the matter of Canada's representation on a council at Washington at the present time, that the final arrangements in respect to that council have not yet been made as between Britain and the United States; but both know that Canada expects to have full representation, and we have no reason to believe that we shall not have the needed representation at the moment that it may be best to bring it into being.

Mr. GREEN: I raise the point because the Australian minister who is now visiting in the United States is reported as having expressed the wish that Canada should have representation on that council; and for a Pacific coast Canadian it is of vital importance that we should be on that council. The situation has changed so much now, with the Malay States and Java gone, that I think Canada comes fairly into the Pacific picture and should be represented on that council.

Mr. MACKENZIE KING: Yes. But may I say to my hon. friend that I hope it will not be assumed, because we are not actually represented on any council, that we are not kept very fully informed with respect to all that is taking place and that Canada's interests in every particular are not being closely watched. We have our liaison officers at Washington; we have there the representatives of the different departments; we have our minister. We have similar representation in London. We are, I can say, kept informed day by day as to any matters of vital concern. The matter of the formal representation, in the long run, is something which relates only to the question of the right moment.

Mr. GREEN: Is it not a fact that Australia and New Zealand, in addition to Great Britain, are already represented on the Pacific council?

Mr. MACKENZIE KING: At the moment I cannot answer my hon. friend's question, because I am not sure whether both countries are being represented. I know that both expect to be represented, and they may be.

Hon. R. B. HANSON (Leader of the Opposition): The position in relation to the Pacific council as explained by the Prime Minister may be described as one of watchful waiting. I gather that so far Canada has not been asked to become a member of this council; and with that, I think, at the moment we shall have to be content. But there is no doubt that a large body of public opinion, especially in western Canada and of British Columbia—which opinion the hon. member for Vancouver South (Mr. Green) has presented in this house—thinks Canada as a Pacific power should be represented on that council. Whether or not that is possible at the moment, I do not know, and I do not propose to explore the position any further this afternoon.

Mr. MACKENZIE KING: May I say to my hon. friend that I hardly think the expression "watchful waiting" describes it, because our position has been strongly presented to the United Kingdom and the United States governments. They both are informed of our attitude and of our desires. Governments do not all move as rapidly as some people would like, and it is just a matter of the right moment of adjustment.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): Have we asked to be represented on the Pacific council, or how far has Canada gone? I will make that inquiry.

Mr. MACKENZIE KING: I will say we have, yes.

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Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): The Prime Minister did not make that clear in the statement he made. I am not saying it to be critical. I know that anyone in his position must speak with great care. Now I think we have had some clarification of the position.

Mr. MACKENZIE KING: When I say we have, I do not say we have pressed for it at this very moment, because we realize that there have been situations in England which require our point of view to be given there rather than in the United States. But we have made it sure that we expect to be represented on the council in the United States if it is finally decided that the council is to continue there.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): I would expect that to be about as frank a statement as the Prime Minister could make at the moment, and I have no doubt that in due course, if, as and when it is set up in Washington, Canada will be represented. I should be astonished if it were otherwise, notwithstanding what other people in other countries might say. So much for that. I refer to it in opening because it is the last topic to which the Prime Minister referred.

I hope the people of Canada will give heed to the earlier part of the Prime Minister's address, because I am afraid that even right down to this minute the people of Canada are not awake to the perils of the international situation. I have never felt, all through these two and a half years of war, that the people of Canada realized the immense gravity of this whole terrible situation. As somebody said the other day, the great mass of our people are still movie-minded; and if what the Prime Minister has said, if whatever small amount of power I can get behind whatever I have to say to-day, will bring to the minds of the Canadian people the intense gravity of the situation, then the time spent this afternoon in holding up the item of the Minister of Finance, which I know he is so anxious to get through, will be well worth while.

I will say this. If the speech which the hon. member for Vancouver South (Mr. Green) made on Monday evening, and if the request which I made just at the close had the effect of bringing forth the latter part of the Prime Minister's statement, that was worth while too.

I do not have to be convinced about the gravity of the situation. I have tried to urge, with all the power at my command, upon all the Canadian people how grave the situation is. Hon. gentlemen on this side do not have to be sold the idea. I do not think hon. gentlemen on the other side have to be sold the idea of the gravity of the situation. There may be some exceptions; I will not make them this afternoon. But a great many of the Canadian people do not know that there is a war on in the true sense of that term, and if what the Prime Minister said in the early part of his remarks brings home to them just how serious the whole situation is, it is all to the good.

What is the position? Ever since the fall of France the international position has steadily deteriorated until day by day, week by week, month by month the war has been brought nearer to our doors. To-day we are witnessing the spectacle of submarines on the Atlantic coast within sight of land. I am glad the Prime Minister made the statement he did with regard to that—submarines within sight of our own nations blowing up merchant ships. And that might well have happened on the banks of the St. Lawrence. If that be so, I wonder if the hon. member for Témiscouata (Mr. Pouliot) and other hon. gentlemen I could name will continue in the attitude which they have adopted from time to time in this house. While the actual theatres of war are still far from our shores, the fact of the matter is that the war is coming day by day, week by week, month by month, nearer and nearer to us. That is a truth which I should like to see instilled into the Canadian people this afternoon. I welcome that part of the statement of the Prime Minister if it will have the effect of bringing home to the people that we must have, in truth and in fact, total war preparation in this country, which we have not got to-day.

I am not going to jibe the Prime Minister at this moment, and say that while this is so and while we are all agreed about it, we are pausing to hold a plebiscite. I have said all I want to say about that. Let me add this about the plebiscite, however. If it fails to carry, then a crisis will be precipitated in this country, and God help this country!

I welcome the announcement of the establishment of two new mobile divisions. I welcome and the country will welcome the announcement of the extension of the home war establishment of the air force, because we who have studied the situation have known for a long time of the tragic trend of events in the various theatres of war. We have known for a long time that you cannot win, you cannot defend, you cannot do anything with success unless you have air equipment to fight with. This has been demonstrated so many times. Singapore! Oh, if they had had air defence at Singapore the story might have been different. The more we can get, whether of domestic manufacture or imported it matters not, so long as we can get them, the better. They

must be had. I am wondering if the production of aircraft in Canada is what it ought to be. I should like to see the director of aircraft production in Canada brought before, I will not say the whole parliament, in secret session, but before a select committee of members of this house, and asked to give us the true picture about aeroplane production in the dominion, without let or hindrance. I do not know what he would say. But I do know that certain factories in this country have not been operating on full time, or anything like full time, in aeroplane production. I do not know whose fault it is. I do not know where the lack of coordination is. I have heard stories, and as a lawyer I must characterize them as hearsay, that there is lack of coordination in those corporations which have been set up to supply certain essential parts for our aeroplane production; that there has not been coordination in production in order that the assembly plants may operate on full time. I do not know how much truth there is in it—members of the ministry will know much better than I do—but that is the nasty story that is going around the country and reaches me. I merely mention it in order that the Prime Minister and those around him may give it consideration. I do know that some aeroplane factories in this country are not running full time. They ought to be running twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, because I believe that is the best source of defence material for the allied nations and for Canada as well.

The Prime Minister said a word on reconstruction. He issued a solemn warning to the people of Canada about the conduct of the war. I suspect that the topic of reconstruction was, I will not say an excuse, but an opportunity for him to make the important statement he has made this afternoon. Be that as it may, the question of reconstruction has occupied the attention of this house in recent days, and there are people in this country who are devoting to it a good deal of time and thought. It is a popular topic among the intelligentsia; I understand the hon. member for St. Lawrence-St. George (Mr. Claxton) journeyed away down to Williamstown the other day, and he gave us some results of his trip down there relating to this matter. I do not want to throw cold water on the enthusiasm of those who are talking of post-war reconstruction; I do not think it is too soon to begin to talk about reconstruction. But what type of blueprint for reconstruction, either at this time or in the immediate future, can this country set up when we do not even know whether we are going to have a country or a constitution to operate?

Mr. RALSTON: Or a post-war period.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): Or even a post-war period. After all, when you come down to the final analysis of this whole situation the winning of the war is the only thing that matters now. It is popular among certain classes in this country to cry out, "Oh, you must plan for a new world order." We have all given lip-service to that theory, but what kind of world are we going to have if we do not win this war?

Mr. BRUCE: Slavery.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): If we do not win this war, if Britain falls, if we cannot defend ourselves, if the United States cannot defend us, what kind of order are we going to have in Canada? There is only one answer to that; the Canadian people, irrespective of class, race or creed, must get right behind any and every effort that it is possible to make to win this war. And the government must give the leadership. I think the government is trying to give some leadership. I do not want anyone to believe that I am indulging in carping criticism. But I am glad to have the opportunity to unbosom my soul this afternoon on this matter, because it is borne in upon my conscience that this war situation as it affects Canada, as it affects the united nations certainly, has grown steadily worse. I was almost going to use the language used by the Minister of Labour (Mr. Mitchell) the other day, that only a miracle can win this war. I do not say that, I say that the united will and purpose of the united nations can win this war if they and we will face the situation realistically. It would be all very well to set up committees on rehabilitation and talk about planned economies for the future if you knew that there was to be a future. But from the bottom of my heart I say to hon. members all over this house, let us win the war, and then see what kind of blueprint the best minds of this country can produce for the post-war period. Let us not be too sure that our opinions of to-day are the best opinions. We may all have to change our views. No nation, none of the united nations, were ever confronted with a situation which seems to change so rapidly, almost overnight. Economic changes will come, but who can say what they will be when the time comes that we can give practical effect to our ideas based on conditions that may then obtain?

When I came into the chamber this afternoon I had no idea of making the statements I have just uttered. I intended to rise to call the attention of the Minister of National War Services (Mr. Thorson) to some changes which I think should be made in the national war regulations. But I have no apology to make to this house or to the Canadian people

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for what I have said. I should like to commend to this house and to the people of Canada the thoughtful, able and challenging address made here earlier to-day by the hon. member for Lake Centre (Mr. Diefenbaker). I agree 100 per cent with nearly everything he has said. I know that there has been a sense of frustration in connection with the examination of the war expenditures of bygone days. I think it would be wise if these committees are to be reestablished, that they be open to the public, and that the whip should be taken off. I am told that the whips are there and that when the danger point is approached the lid is closed. That ought not to be, in the present situation.

Mr. GOLDING: That is not true.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): All right; I have not first-hand information. I was not present, but that is the report given to me by those who represented us on those committees. I am not going to say anything more about it now.

Mr. McILRAITH: Mr. Speaker—

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): I wish to go on with my speech.

Mr. McILRAITH: On a question of privilege in that connection, some hon. members here, and I was one, sat on that committee. No such pressure was exerted in any manner whatsoever on me as a member of the committee. I wish to make that perfectly clear. In saying what he has said I feel that the leader of the opposition tends to cast a reflection on the members who sat on the committee.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): Well, if the hon. member takes it that way I cannot help it, but does he say there was free wide-open discussion?

Mr. McILRAITH: Yes, he does say so.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): That is not my information. I am content to leave it there.

My intention was to rise to-day in connection with what I am informed and believe are certain anomalies in the national war service regulations. I regret that the minister in charge of that department is not at the moment in his seat, because my remarks will be largely directed to him. He was here earlier in the afternoon, but is not here now.

It will be recalled by members of this house that the National Resources Mobilization Act was passed in June, 1940, after the fall of France; and that upon that act being passed a national registration was held, in August of that year. In my understanding, that was predicated upon the theory of a national stock-taking of the man and woman power of Canada at that time, and their availability for service. The cost of that registration was upwards of $900,000; and I am bound to say that so far the evidence of the results flowing from that registration has not been anything like commensurate with the expenditure involved and the effort expended, much of which was given to the country gratuitously. So far as I have been able to ascertain, practically speaking the only use that was made of the national registration was to draw out the cards of the men of military age. There may have been other uses; if there were, they have not been brought to my attention.

I pause here to direct the attention of the Prime Minister (Mr. Mackenzie King), the members of the government and the Minister of National War Services (Mr. Thorson) himself, to what to me is a rather astonishing answer to a question placed on the order paper by the hon. member for Jasper-Edson (Mr. Kuhl) and answered in this house by the minister on March 9. If hon. members will turn to page 1223 of *Hansard*, they will see exactly what I mean. On that occasion the hon. member asked the government these questions:

1. Has the government used the information obtained in the national registration to compile statistics which will show, (a) the number of skilled man-hours of work which are available; (b) the extent to which these hours of work are being utilized; (c) the manner in which they are being utilized; (d) the number of unskilled man-hours of work available; (e) the manner in which and the extent to which they are being utilized; (f) the extent to which the unskilled labour is being trained?

2. If so, what statistics are available?

The answer brought down by the minister was "no", repeated seven times. Not only have they not used the information available; they have no statistics about anything. There is one thing to be said about that answer; it is frank; I assume that it is true, and there is no ambiguity about it. But it is an astonishing answer.

Mr. THORSON: It deals with the matter of man-hours.

Mr. HANSON: I understand that; I read what it meant—man-hours, based on a statistical review of the registration, and nothing has been done with respect to that. It asks what is the available man and woman power in this country, in terms of hours, and nothing has been done about it. To me that is just an astonishing situation.

At the same time that the mobilization act was passed the Department of National War Services was created and set up; and on August 27, 1940, the national war services

regulations were established. Later on they were consolidated and further amended and approved by order in council P.C. 1822 of March 18, 1941, and I think they have been further amended from time to time. As originally set up, the regulations provided for the military training of unmarried men within certain age groups for a period of only thirty days, which, as we all know, was later increased to four months. I shall refer only briefly to the reasons given at that time by the then chief of the general staff as to why the training was limited to only thirty days. Several reasons were given. The two important reasons were, first, that there was no equipment available for further training and, second, that the young men of Canada had to be taught a sense of their national obligation. The only observation I desire to make with respect to that is that to me it was a very strange reason to advance. I have made other observations in that connection, but I am not going to pause to repeat them to-day.

The set-up adopted in August, 1940, had to take into account the existing methods of military service in Canada, such as those furnished by the reserve militia units for the men and the training given at various institutions under the officers' training corps. I am assuming, without being a student of military matters, that the regulations as then set up were appropriate to the conditions as they existed then, qua the thirty-day training period. Men carried on the strength of the reserve militia units were considered as receiving the equivalent of thirty days of training at the different centres to which the age groups from twenty-one to twenty-four were to be called up.

Then came the extension of the war in practically every theatre and on almost every continent which, of course, as conditions in the Department of National Defence expanded and improved, led to the replacement of the thirty-day training plan by the four months plan, which, as everyone knows, was subsequently extended to training and service for the duration of the war, but within Canada. As I stated before, the national war services regulations, first established in 1940, have been amended on several occasions, in particular on February 24, 1941, as approved by order in council I think in March of the same year. The dates are not very important. They were amended to deal with the additional service required.

This is the first point I want to make to the minister, and I hope what I have to say will be constructive and will receive the attention of himself and his officers. It has been represented to me that many of the rules and regulations which were reasonable at the time they were adopted in August, 1940, have no place under the existing system as it is now extended. The suggestion that is made to me in this connection is that many of these out-of-date regulations, if that is a proper term to apply to them, are now being used as loopholes which it is alleged encourage or enable persons to evade their responsibilities.

Mr. THORSON: I do not think that is true.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): That is the allegation that I get. In support of that allegation I received the other day a communication from a gentleman whose patriotism and knowledge of military affairs are of the highest order. He was a soldier in the last war; he comes from a family which is perhaps noted for its patriotism. He served, and I believe is still serving, as the head of the citizens' recruiting committee for military district No. 4, which is Montreal. Recently he wrote a letter to the Montreal *Star*, a copy of which I hold in my hand and which I have no doubt has been brought to the attention of the minister. In this letter he points out that at present there are no less than seven training centres in military district No. 4, and that at these camps the young trainees called out for service in Canada are urged from time to time to join one of the active service units of their own selection. We know that is so, and we have heard on several occasions in this house of some of the methods used to attain that objective, but it is not my intention to pursue that topic at the moment.

It is alleged that the esprit de corps and spirit of sacrifice among these trainees would be immeasurably strengthened if the Department of National War Services were to rescind all those portions of the 1940 regulations which permit a way out for dodgers and slackers.

This gentleman goes on to point out some of the most important weaknesses in the regulations, and I am going to deal with them seriatim. I am not doing it in any spirit of criticism. I think this may be helpful to the minister.

Mr. THORSON: I should like to assure the hon. leader of the opposition (Mr. Hanson) that any constructive suggestions which will make the regulations more workable, more adaptable, for the purposes for which they were framed will be cordially welcomed.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): So far so good—we are met on common ground. This is the first suggestion made.

1. That men of the trainee ages who were on the strength of a reserve unit on August 15,

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1940, have not been made liable for service in Canada for the duration if they have been attending parades of their reserve units.

I understand—the minister may correct me—that this position is still recognized; and if this excuse still obtains, the position should be changed. It is not good enough.

2. As I understand it, the exemption and postponement provisions of regulation 17, headed "University and College Students," enables students attending a university Canadian officers' training corps to avoid full-time compulsory military service in Canada. In fact, subsection 4 of regulation 17 goes so far as to give complete exemption from service to a student who is qualified by training in this corps to be a commissioned officer in the naval, military or air forces of Canada; that is, unless he has agreed to go on active service in consideration for the special training he has received at the country's expense. It is represented that young men are now taking these courses at the expense of the public without undertaking to serve Canada either here or anywhere the authorities may need them. That is the allegation. That would seem to me to be a wrong position, and if it is the situation it should be corrected. I want to follow that a little further.

In addition, it is represented that the existing regulations permit a partial student in a special course—after all, that may be only colour—or a post-graduate student in a profession not connected with any war activities to be taken on the strength of a university officers' training corps and claim similar exemption privileges. I believe that is true. Why? I ask that question. I suggest that that position is capable of great abuse.

All this, I am told, tends to cause resentment among those called out for the duration who are not able to bring themselves within these special provisions, and it is suggested to me that these rules permit those who are better off financially and who are indifferent to their obligations to escape from doing their duty at this time of national peril. I suggest to the minister, therefore, that the time has passed when this country should go to the expense of further qualifying young men as officers unless they are prepared to join up in the active service forces. This would appear to be just to those in the ranks of the Canadian active army in Canada and abroad which is full of men who have earned the right to be selected and trained for commissioned rank.

It is further suggested that the presence of potential officer material in the ranks of the various training centres would act as a stimulus to the morale of the men.

I suggest to the minister that regulation 17 can be and has been abused. It should be tightened up, for otherwise, as time goes on, it will be more and more abused. I am not going to fathom the whole depth of the abuses. We can use a little of our imaginations. The appropriate department should take the necessary steps to correct this position and make the thing airtight.

3. I suggest to the minister that it is a recognized principle that in all compulsory war regulations, in so far as humanly possible, everyone affected by an order should be treated alike, and in calling out men for service in the armed forces the medical category into which a trainee is put is a matter of the first-rate importance.

Under regulation 12, which deals with medical examination, the decision is left in the first place to the judgment of a single civilian medical practitioner. We have heard of abuses in certain parts of the country where treatments have been handed out so as to lower the categories of those called up. I do not know whether that is true or not.

Mr. THORSON: Will the hon. gentleman give any instance of that in respect of trainees?

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): I only know what I read in the papers and what the minister himself and his department must have read. I simply state that there are reports to that effect, but I have no specific instance and I am making no charge.

Mr. THORSON: There is no truth in the report.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): I hope there is no truth in the report; but how did it get abroad? The Canadian Press is a reliable organization and it gives credence to this report. I suggest to the minister that where there is smoke there is some fire. I am going to leave it at that. The minister gives the report a flat denial. I wonder just how he knows there is no truth in the report. He cannot possibly know. He can only say what somebody else has told him.

I am dealing with the first examination of a trainee. He goes to a single civilian medical practitioner of his own choice. I am afraid that in certain and, I hope, isolated cases that power has been abused.

Mr. THORSON: If there has been any abuse on the part of doctors, I, as minister of the department, would welcome any particulars. Charges have been made with regard to some practising physicians, and these charges have invariably been investigated. I am glad to be able to say that the investigations of these charges show that there is no foundation for them and that the physicians of this country are discharging their duties in an honest manner.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): The minister can make his statement when I am finished. I am going on with my statement and I do not care what the minister says. This is a charge made by a responsible civilian recruiting agent who had probably more first-hand information than the minister can possibly have.

An hon. MEMBER: Who is he?

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): I have not mentioned his name, but he is well known to the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Ralston) who could vouch for his character. It is true that if the registrar is not satisfied he may order a reexamination. In the days of the thirty-day training period, the regulation was of no particular consequence because of the short period of training; but now that the period of training and service has been extended for the whole duration of the war, and the men are retained in the service, I suggest to the minister that the regulation puts too much power and responsibility in the hands of one civilian physician. I think it would be a good thing to abolish this practice and appoint medical boards made up of three full-time army officers to decide whether these men fall within categories A, B, C, D or E. That is a specific recommendation I make. I suggest to him that as things get tighter and more men are required, if we are to follow up the present practice of recruiting, they will have to come to that. Why not face the situation now?

Mr. RALSTON: So far as I know, this comes under my colleague's department, but I have inquired about the same thing. I think the only reason given—and here I may be wrong—was that men are located in individual communities all over the place. If they had to come to a training centre and then were turned down and had to go back, it would be a lot of trouble for nothing. This principle was adopted, as is said, under the thirty-day plan.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): I do not think there could have been so much objection under the thirty-day plan; but I heard over the radio the other night an announcement made in connection with recruiting for the Royal Canadian Air Force, and it was stated that they were carrying along with them an army doctor. The man is examined right on the spot.

Mr. RALSTON: That is different.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): There may be some difference, but the principle is just the same.

Mr. RALSTON: For the men called up for training you would have to have the boards acting all at once.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): I know it is not quite the same. I was suggesting that the theory upon which this was set up no longer serves, and that proper medical boards should be appointed.

Mr. RALSTON: You will find no objection from the army.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): You mean to say, if that recommendation is carried out?

Mr. RALSTON: Yes.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): The minister ought to back me up. He is not doing it very strongly. Apparently he supports the theory I am advocating.

Mr. RALSTON: It is really a matter of practical ability to carry it out.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): I know, but what is money between friends in this war effort? Money does not mean a thing in this war effort. I do not mean to say that we approve extravagant expenditures; we do not. We stand for the principle of equality of service. A man should not be put in a lower category when he ought to be in a higher category. We should see that he is put in the right category.

My fourth question is in reference to the interpretation section, or that part having to do with key men, training period and war industry. I have often wondered how a man between the ages of twenty to twenty-five years could be considered a key man in industry. He may be a key man on the farm, but I doubt very much if any twenty-year-old man can be a key man in industry. I suggest that consideration ought to be given to this. Then "training period" is defined to be such period as may be ordained by such proclamation. That may have been all right when the period was thirty days, or even when it was four months, but it does not fit the facts to-day when we are dealing with service for the duration. I am going to omit some of the comments I had intended to make.

The next definition is that of students. I suggest that a new definition to cover bona fide students is required. In drafting this new definition regard should be had to those students proceeding to take medical degrees as opposed to those taking other professional courses. The announcement of the Minister of National Defence of aid to medical students who will go into the army indicates that the

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department is alive to the necessity of more doctors for national service, but I do not suggest that we need more lawyers or architects or engineers or preachers. I do not know whether I should include other professions, but we certainly do not need any more lawyers in this country.

To sum up, it is represented that because of some of the anomalies to which I have referred in the present regulations, and certain deficiencies in the rules, inequality of service results, and that acts as a deterrent to enlistment in the three fighting forces. I call upon the minister at this time of grave national emergency and necessity to remove all existing anomalies, inequalities and loopholes. These reforms are long overdue.

I should like to say a word or two about the regulations generally. There does not seem to be any elasticity in the regulations. There is no flexibility and I think the whole position should be reviewed. I know there are grave dangers, but if the proper boards are set up I think the advantage of flexibility will outweigh any other disadvantages.

I had intended to say something about the statement made yesterday by the Prime Minister on man-power mobilization. This is a huge subject matter which requires a great deal of thought and much more knowledge than I possess at the moment. I have not even been able to read the Prime Minister's statement, let alone study the orders in council. But I will say this: what I understand of the announcement does not nearly measure up to the advance press notices. I am convinced now that government propaganda is not factual, but is propaganda pure and simple. The statement made by the Prime Minister, as opposed to the advance notices, indicates that the policy has been whittled down to a degree. Considerable teeth have been taken out. That is the first observation I want to make.

My second observation is that it is apparent that the government is approaching the problem of man-power for the army and other services by the indirect route rather than by the direct approach. According to the Prime Minister, we are to have an extended national selective service plan, designed to accelerate Canada's war effort through application of what he terms the "negative compulsion of restriction". I am not going to pause to analyse what that high-sounding phrase means, but it is opposed to the positive compulsion of allocation. The young men of this country between the ages of nineteen and thirty-five are in effect told definitely that they are to join the army or starve.

[Mr. Hanson (York-Sunbury).]

Then there is a policy with respect to farmers, which I have not quite analysed yet. But I shall say this, that the steps announced by the Prime Minister yesterday fall far short of complete national selective service. They are steps in the right direction, and good steps, but they do not go the whole way. Food production is being taken care of, and of course that is very important, not only to sustain the morale of our civilian population but also the armed forces, and to feed our gallant defenders overseas.

Employment in a restricted list of non-essential occupations is to be curbed—what the Minister of Labour is reported to have termed the "golden slipper" jobs—a striking phrase, and one which sounds well, though I do not know how much it means; nobody knows. Authority is given to the Minister of Labour to obtain skilled technicians for war work. But this I say, in criticism of the plan, and in the hope that it will stimulate the government to go further: the plan appears to fall short of making provision certain that every job which has to be filled will be filled by the most competent man. Without this, any plan fails.

Mr. DEPUTY SPEAKER: Is it the pleasure of the house to adopt the motion? Carried.

Mr. CHURCH: I move the adjournment of the debate.

(The house in committee on the resolution, Mr. Vien in the chair.)

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): No, it is not carried. The debate was adjourned by the hon. member for Broadview (Mr. Church). He has been waiting to speak.

An hon. MEMBER: No.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): Or by one hon. member. The motion is not carried. I object.

Mr. MACKENZIE KING: As hon. members are aware, these particular resolutions are to be followed by bills which will have to pass another house as well as this. All the bills which will be before the house between now and the Easter recess will relate to the war effort or supply; and I was going to suggest, unless it appeared to limit or restrict in any way what hon. members might wish to say, that the speeches on the war effort could take place on any one or other of the resolutions. As regards the resolution with respect to the war appropriation of two billion dollars, there will be no effort to put that through before Easter, but there may be time on Friday for debating it, and in that event speeches could be made at that time on the war effort. I think it might suit

the convenience of hon. members generally if we got into committee on one or two of these resolutions, and such speeches as may be of very brief duration could be made in committee instead of on the resolution with the Speaker in the chair. Speeches at greater length with the Speaker in the chair could be made on the resolution with respect to the war appropriation bill. I believe that if my hon. friend understood that he would join with us in this matter.

Mr. MacINNIS: Will not the two billion dollar resolution also have to go into committee if we are to make an interim appropriation of $500,000,000?

Mr. MACKENZIE KING: No.

Mr. MacINNIS: That will put all the resolutions in the same category?

Mr. MACKENZIE KING: No, that is not necessary. It is necessary that the resolution should be before the house. It has been before the house and is before the house on the order paper for consideration in committee of the whole. We could not have got the proportion voted if the resolution itself had not been introduced and a motion made to have it discussed in committee.

Mr. CHURCH: I cannot make my speech in committee. I gave way this afternoon to two or three other speakers, to let them go on.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): I suggest to you that there was in the hands of Mr. Speaker a whole list of speakers. The balance has been upset by the intervention of the Prime Minister this afternoon—which was quite right; he should speak—and perhaps I spoke longer than I should; but I do not think that we should rush through this debate. We shall get through on Friday by six o'clock.

Mr. ILSLEY: Yes. But there is the senate.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): Oh! Well, I should not laugh at that. The hon. gentleman is concerned for the senate!

Mr. ILSLEY: I am not concerned with the senate, but I am concerned with the money to carry on the war, and I cannot get it unless I get a bill through this house and a bill through the senate. What I would suggest—if this would meet the convenience of the house—is that this $135,000,000 measure be carried through all stages to-morrow, and also that the $500,000,000 interim supply, which is No. 12 on the order paper, and the supplementary estimates which are before the committee of the whole, and the interim one-sixth of the main estimates, go through all stages to-morrow. If those are all through by to-morrow night they can go to the senate and the senate can pass those bills on Friday. Meanwhile no one will be prejudiced in the slightest degree, because there will still be the two billion dollar resolution, which is in committee, and discussion can go on upon that all day, every day. I am not asking the house to do anything which prejudices any single hon. member or prevents any hon. member from making a speech which he desires to make. But I suggest that that would be a businesslike way of dealing with this matter, and I am merely asking the house to carry out the programme which I suggested a little over a week ago it would be necessary for us to carry through before Easter.

Mr. HANSON (York-Sunbury): So far as I am concerned, I promised the minister a week ago that I would help him to get these measures through before the house adjourned. I am in honour bound to help him do that; and if the government wants to do it this way, why, I am content. I cannot, I should not, do anything else.

Mr. GREEN: Is there not to be any statement made by the Minister of National Defence? We can sit in committee to-morrow on this resolution.

Mr. RALSTON: I am prepared to make the statement at any time, but really I may be pardoned if I suggest that the Minister of National Defence will endeavour to make a statement at such time as may be opportune. I do not think that it is up to any hon. member to bid him at any time to make a statement. The leader of the opposition suggested the other evening that a statement be made by the ministry. The statement has been made by the Prime Minister. As the Minister of Finance has indicated, there will be ample opportunity in connection with the two billion dollar resolution to make any statement and to discuss in full the matter of the carrying on of the war; but I do suggest that it seems to be a waste of valuable time to do that twice—on this resolution and on the other one too.

I have talked to my hon. friend a good many times and he has heard me make a good many statements. I do not know that my voice is so pleasing to him that I should get up just for the purpose of making a statement; if I made one, there are three ministers of national defence, and all of them should make statements if one did. But we thought that in connection with this war appropriation bill we

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would endeavour to proceed in some order, for the convenience of hon. members and of the ministers, too. Last year, you will remember, the three ministers sat here day after day. Questions were asked one minute with regard to air, another minute with regard to the navy, and another minute regarding the army. It meant that we could not have our officers here at any particular time, and we had to be prepared for almost anything, and I must admit that, so far as the army was concerned, I felt that the matter was not presented in the form which was most satisfactory either to the house or myself. This year I did hope that we would arrange in connection with the two billion dollar appropriation resolution to have one department taken at a time and exhaust the subject as nearly as possible, in the manner which would be adopted if departmental estimates were under consideration. That would apply to the minister of munitions also. If we have to get into a general discussion of the three departments in connection with the supplementary bill with regard to last year, and have to do it all over again on the new bill, we do not have the same order nor do we get an opportunity of presenting the matter in as logical and orderly a fashion as otherwise, and I do not think it would be as convenient for the members. If the citizens read the reports, it would not be as satisfactory to them either. My hon. friend suggested that I might make a statement at the moment. I do not see the need of making a statement on this resolution. I have heard two speeches, the speech delivered by my hon. friend, and the speech made by the hon. member for Hastings-Peterborough, and certain suggestions have been made with regard to reserve units, home guards and some other matters. I shall deal with those at the proper time, but is there any hurry about dealing with them before Friday?

Mr. GREEN: Will the minister deal with them before the house adjourns on the 27th?

Mr. RALSTON: It depends what the questions are.

Mr. GREEN: The minister knows what suggestions have been made in the house in this debate and I want to know whether or not it will be possible for him or some other minister to deal with them before we adjourn on the 27th.

Mr. RALSTON: I shall endeavour to deal with matters that I think should be dealt with before the 27th. I say this with all due respect to my hon. friend, who made a very constructive speech indeed, that most of these things he spoke of are being dealt with in one shape or another. He talks about home guard; we talk about coast guards. It is the same thing. If it is necessary that I make a statement with regard to a matter of that kind I shall be glad to do so, but I shall have to reserve the right to decide what I think is important enough to be dealt with at this time, particularly in view of the fact that we shall be coming back shortly to be engaged in a discussion in connection with the whole matter all over again.

Mr. GREEN: Will there be an opportunity for discussion to-morrow?

Mr. RALSTON: The Minister of Finance will answer that question.

Mr. ILSLEY: If the three ministers of defence make statements to-morrow I shall never get these interim supply bills through. I suggested a week ago that they should go through quickly by consent and that we could go into the two billion dollar bill and the ministers could make their statements, so that we could have an orderly discussion. The hon. member for Vancouver South would not agree to that course because he wanted to make a speech with the Speaker in the chair on this supplementary appropriation. I had no power to dissent from that. He made his speech and a great number of other speeches were made with the Speaker in the chair, and I had no power to prevent their being made, nor did I desire to prevent these speeches being made.

Mr. CASSELMAN: And they were all within the rules.

Mr. ILSLEY: Yes. But I asked the house —and I gave ample notice—to have these important supplementary and interim measures go through parliament before the recess, and that means that they will have to be through before to-morrow night. I do not think my hon. friend can get the advantage of both courses of procedure which he is asking. He has insisted on making his speech with the Speaker in the chair, rather than follow my suggestion of putting these interim supplementary measures through by consent. If he had agreed to that course we could have gone on with the two billion dollar measure and the ministers could have made their statements and have been questioned if that were desired. But if the ministers are to make their statements on this, then we shall not get through. I am asking the house to let me get this through to-morrow night, and when the two billion dollar bill comes on such statements can be made as there is time in which to make them.

Mr. GREEN: Is it the intention of the Minister of Finance that his resolutions and bills shall go through by consent to-morrow

and following that, and for the rest of the sitting until we adjourn on Friday, the two billion dollar resolution will be under discussion with the house in committee of the whole? Is that the intention?

Mr. ILSLEY: Yes.

Mr. RALSTON: Perhaps we could make some arrangement about one minister coming on at a time.

Mr. CHURCH: Why were these war items not given precedence by the Minister of Finance, instead of taking up grain and the plebiscite? War is primary; these others are domestic and secondary.

Progress reported.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE

Mr. ILSLEY: The order to-morrow will be the $135,000,000 bill, then the $500,000,000 interim bill and then the supplementary estimates for the present year, then the interim supply for the coming year, being one-sixth of the main estimates for the year. They will be taken in that order.

Mr. GREEN: And then the two billion dollar resolution?

Mr. ILSLEY: Yes.

It being twenty minutes after six o'clock the house adjourned, without question put, pursuant to standing order.

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