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

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
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
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
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# COMMENTS

ON THE  
SENATE'S REJECTION  
OF THE  
NAVAL AID BILL

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# COMMENTS

ON THE

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
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## INDEX

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Laurier on Emergency . . . . .	1
Churchill on Emergency . . . . .	3
Lee on Churchill . . . . .	7
Beresford on Emergency . . . . .	10
Selborne on Emergency . . . . .	14
Lansdowne . . . . .	19
Haldane . . . . .	19
Ashby St. Ledgers . . . . .	20
Herbert Samuel . . . . .	21
Haldane . . . . .	23
Lloyd George . . . . .	24
Professor Cappon . . . . .	24
Premier Peake . . . . .	25
Sir Joseph Ward . . . . .	25
Premier Cook . . . . .	26
Australian Navy . . . . .	26
London Times . . . . .	27
Admiral Tripitz . . . . .	27
Sir Charles Tupper . . . . .	27



# COMMENTS

ON THE  
SENATE'S REJECTION  
OF THE  
NAVAL AID BILL

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In discussing the naval bill during the last session of Parliament (1912-13) Sir Wilfrid Laurier was particular to emphasize upon each occasion that there was no emergency. In presenting his amendment for two fleet units (Hansard, 1025) he said:

"This document (the Admiralty Memorandum) shows that there is no emergency, that England is in no danger whether imminent or prospective."

"I insist, once more, upon what is stated in the memorandum; there is no emergency, there is no immediate danger, there is no prospective danger." (Hansard, 1029).

"He (Borden) went to England to ask what England would accept in the case of an emergency, although there was no emergency." (Hansard, 1032).

## **Elsewhere in the Debate.**

"The contribution which we are asked to vote is uncalled for and unnecessary, as professing to give to Great Britain help for which she has no need." (Hansard, 4241).

"It is no use telling us there is an emergency in Great Britain." (Hansard, 4256).

“The reason why, we are told, we should vote this money is that England is in great danger and cannot cope with her enemies as she has done for centuries. We repudiate that.” (Hansard, 4485).

“But there is no question of an emergency; the alleged emergency is simply a pretense and a make-believe.” (Hansard, 7232).

#### **At Teeswater.**

“Where was the emergency?” Sir Wilfrid Laurier asked at Teeswater on Oct. 28, when speaking for the Liberal candidate in South Bruce. “They said this measure was for the relief of the British navy, on account of an emergency. The emergency was heard of only in the speeches of Mr. Borden and Mr. Foster and some of the orators who have been here.” He declared that the British navy was not in need of help. (Globe report of Oct. 29, 1913).

#### **At Hamilton.**

Speaking at Hamilton on November 26, 1913, Sir Wilfrid Laurier said:

“The condition of Europe to-day is a disgrace and a shame to the civilization of the twentieth century. Europe to-day is an armed camp. The leading nations of Europe — England, Germany, France, Austro-Hungary, Russia, Italy — each of these nations is spending upon its armament from one-third to over half of its revenue. Yet there is not at present among these nations any discord. There has been no war among them for the last forty years. They profess to be friendly. There is not one of them that contemplates a policy of aggression against its neighbors. (Hear, hear.)

“They are friendly, I say, but they are distrustful of one another, and it is because they are dis-

trustful that they dare not act as between man and man and say 'let us be friends.' That is what they call the European concert; I would call it a furnace. And there are men who want us as Canadians to step into that furnace."

**Rejection Naval Aid Bill — Churchill Says Immediate Action Necessary.**

In reply to a question in the British House of Commons on June 5, 1913, Mr. Churchill said:

"The situation created by the rejection of the Canadian Naval Aid Bill requires immediate action, in order that the margins of naval strength necessary for the whole world protection of the British Empire may be adequately maintained for the autumn and winter of 1915, and in the spring of 1916. In these circumstances the Government have determined to advance the construction of the three contract ships of this year's programme, and orders have been issued by the Admiralty, which will ensure their being begun at the earliest possible date, instead of in March next."

**Senate Deprived us of Necessary Aid, Says Churchill.**

In the British House of Commons on July 17, 1913, Mr. Churchill said that:

"The rejection of the Canadian Naval Aid Bill by the Senate of Canada has for the time at least deprived us of the aid on which we had counted, and unless that gap were filled by further sacrifices of the British taxpayer, the general defence of the Empire, apart altogether from the defence of the United Kingdom, would be three short of admiralty requirements from the end of 1915 onwards. As soon therefore as the news was received of the rejection of the Canadian Naval Aid Bill, the Government determin-

ed that immediate action was necessary. There were two courses open to us. We could have laid down three extra ships in place of the three Canadians, and made them additional to our existing and prospective programme. We could do so still, but it is not at present clear that this step, which should have meant the addition of £8,500,000 to the naval estimates, spread over the next two or three years, is necessary, and it certainly ought not to be taken unless it is necessary. Although the Canadian Naval Aid Bill has been rejected, the question of Canada taking an effective part in her own defence and in that of the British Empire is by no means dead."

#### **Britain Left to Face Emergencies Unaided.**

After giving his reason for this he went on to say, "that we have no right to assume at the present time that we are to be left to face the emergencies of the future unaided, and left to bear the whole burden alone. That being so, the Admiralty have recommended, and the Cabinet have approved, the adoption of the temporary expedient. We are proceeding, not by increasing the programme of capital ships, but by accelerations in the construction of those which have already been sanctioned in such a way as to secure the requisite strength we require at the periods involved. We have, therefore, accelerated three ships in this year's programme which would not otherwise have been taken till the end of the year. We invited tenders for them last month, action has already been taken, tenders have already been received, and these vessels will be ready, if all goes well, by the third quarter 1915. They will fully maintain, in the absence of new Austrian or Italian construction, those margins of Mediterranean and whole-world strength which I explained were necessary in the second speech I addressed to the Committee on the introduction of the March Estimates. Of course, the relief which is given

to us, the accession of strength which is given to us, by the mere acceleration of ships is only temporary, but the effect of new construction is to raise the margin at our disposal for seven or eight months at the end of 1915 and the beginning of 1916 to the same level which would have been reached if the Canadian Bill had passed into law. After that period has passed away the advantage of the acceleration will be absorbed and the difficulty of shortage with which we are confronted will recur."

#### **Waiting Canada's Decision.**

"By next year it is probable that the Canadian situation will have defined itself and we shall be in a better position to judge whether a further acceleration of next year's ships, or, alternatively, a direct addition to our programme, will be forced upon us. That is the policy which we recommend to the Committee, and which we regard as a wise, sober, and adequate provision. We shall not be drawn from it by any agitation."

#### **If Canada Fails New View Must Be Taken.**

Mr. RAMSAY MACDONALD: You are accelerating three ships. But if the Canadian position remains as it now is what happens?

Mr. CHURCHILL: When the seven or eight months have passed, over which the benefit of the acceleration of the three ships operates, we shall be in the position in which we found ourselves on the day when the three ships were rejected by the Canadian Senate, and we have to resurvey the situation and to take a new view.

#### **Churchill on Naval Holiday.**

Addressing a Liberal meeting at Manchester on Oct. 18, 1913, Mr. Churchill in proposing a naval holiday said:



"The proposal which I put forward in the name of His Majesty's Government is quite simple. Apart from the Canadian ships or their equivalent, apart from anything that may be required by new developments, we should lay down four great ships to Germany's two. Now, we say, while there is plenty of time, in all friendship and sincerity, to our great neighbour, Germany, 'if you postpone beginning your two ships for twelve months, we will postpone beginning our four ships in absolutely good faith, for exactly the same period.' (Cheers.)

"That would mean a complete holiday of one year, this holiday to be as far as big ships are concerned, between Great Britain and Germany.

"That would mean a saving of nearly six millions of pounds to Germany and of nearly twelve millions to Great Britain, while the relative strength of the two countries would be absolutely unchanged."

### **Britain's Crushing Burden Cannot be Lessened in Near Future.**

Mr. Churchill, speaking at the Lord Mayor's banquet in London on November 12, 1913, said:

"You must not suppose that any relaxation in our efforts is possible at the present, nor must we expect that the burden we bear, which would be crushing for any other country, is likely to be diminished in the immediate future.

"The measured and unbroken development of the German navy, and the simultaneous building by many powers great and small all over the world of large modern ships of war, undoubtedly require from us expenditure and exertions greater than those we have ever made in time of peace.

"Next year it will be my duty, if I am responsible for this important department of State, to pre-

sent estimates substantially greater than the enormous sum originally voted in the present year.

“The Government will work for every opportunity of abating that competition in naval and military armaments which is the bane and reproach of modern Europe; but what is necessary has got to be done, and we shall not hesitate for a moment once we are satisfied of the need to go to Parliament boldly for those supplies of men and money which the House of Commons, whatever its party complexion, has never refused to vote in living memory for the vital service of the State.” (Cheers.)

#### **Still Looking With Confidence to Aid From Canada.**

Speaking at the reception of the New Zealand battleship crew on Dec. 16, 1913, Rt. Hon. Winston Churchill said the gift of the ship by the Dominion of New Zealand at a time of serious crisis was one of the greatest acts of far-seeing imagination which any modern state could claim credit for. The Admiralty, to assist Dominions in giving effect to this universal desire to aid the Imperial navy, according to their means, recognized the sacrifices Australia had made, and looked forward with confidence to assistance which Canada would bring.

#### **Necessary for Safety of Empire.**

Mr. Lee, M.P., in the British House, in reply to Mr. Churchill, on July 17, 1913, said:

“Then there were the three Canadian ships to which he referred, and which he told us last March would be absolutely necessary from the end of 1915 onwards. He added that if they failed, the gap would have to be filled by the sacrifices of others...others being presumably ourselves. If that is so, it is quite clear that these ships must be laid down during the present financial year. If they are not

laid down during the present financial year they cannot possibly be available for the service of the Fleet in the early part of 1916, which is the time at which he said they would be absolutely necessary. I quite agree that we cannot say, or that we do not know, what Canada may do in this matter, but the right hon. gentleman has told us what is necessary for the safety of the Empire. He has told us that the Mother Country will discharge its full duties. I say that we have no right—it would be both unsafe and almost an affront to political opinion in Canada—to go on the assumption that the programme will probably be approved. At all events, it is not approved at present, and the matter being rejected, the responsibility does lie upon us to provide those ships and provide them without delay. If the Canadian Government later on offers to take them over, I am sure we shall be very much gratified, but in the meantime the right hon. gentleman must discharge the obligations for which he is responsible. It is clear that in the existing situation he is, first of all, three ships short in 1916, on his own programme.”

#### **Six Ships Short of What is Absolutely Necessary.**

“There are,” continued Mr. Lee, “the three Canadian ships which he said must be ready by that date, and, therefore, on our existing shipbuilding programme we are six ships short of the strength which he has stated is absolutely necessary for the world-wide protection of the British Empire in 1916. The advancing of the three contract ships in his own programme this year really makes no difference at all to the position in 1916. All it does is that we shall have thirty-nine ships in 1916 in the British programme against the next strongest Power with twenty-six. We may get the thirty-nine ships before the next strongest Power has got its twenty-six, but

we shall have no more than thirty-nine ships after the next strongest Power does get its twenty-six."

### **Impossible for Britain to Bear Burden Alone.**

"I recognize," he went on to say, "the extreme delicacy of this question affecting the problem of the world-wide defence, because, whilst the defence of the outer marches does affect us very closely, it affects even more directly the great Dominions, and, despite our willingness and the intention, which we have expressed through the First Lord, to continue to hear single-handed the whole hurden of defence of the Empire, at the same time it must be becoming clear not only to us here but to the Dominions themselves that it is impossible for the Mother Country to continue indefinitely to bear absolutely alone the hurden of the new and sensational competition which has been forced upon us. Whilst, of course, we ought not in any kind of way to attempt to bring any pressure to bear on the Dominions to do anything which they may not really wish to do, at the same time I do think it is essential that the situation as it affects the whole Empire should be clearly explained, and that if the Imperial Admiralty is asked for advice, it should tender that advice and give the advice that it thinks best in the interests of the whole Empire."

### **Defence of Empire Vital Importance.**

"For that reason I, myself, cannot join in the criticisms which have been directed against the right hon. gentleman for the nature and extent of the advice which he has given to Canada. I think he would have failed in his duty if he had refused to give that advice, or, indeed, if he had coloured that advice in order to suit local political conditions,

of which he could have no direct and intimate knowledge. I do not think justice has been done to him in this matter by some party politicians on either side of the Atlantic. I go further and I say that this problem of the world-wide defence of our Empire is of such vital importance, and so grave and so urgent that plain speaking on the part of the Imperial Admiralty is absolutely necessary."

**Lord Beresford Says Our Life Depends on Being Supreme at Sea.**

Lord Beresford, in the British House, on July 17, 1913, said:

"The clever man who understands war always makes allowance for these contingencies, and when you see all this extra shipbuilding going on, and all this overhead warfare, we ought to make allowance for it all, because our very life depends upon being supreme at sea, and being absolutely effective in regard to our naval supplies of all sorts."

Referring to Mr. Churchill's acceleration proposals, Lord Beresford said:

"The position is really this: We are the three Canadian ships short, because the right hon. gentleman knows that his idea of acceleration is all nonsense, and that he will have to build those ships. He is those three ships short, and he is one ship short of his own 60 per cent. That makes four, and he is in danger of having these five ships thrown out of action through being short of oil, because if we had any strained relations with other Powers the oil would not be there."

**Naval Crisis One of Extreme Gravity.**

In conclusion he added:

"I think the naval crisis is one of extreme gravity, and that the First Lord of the Admiralty is doing little or nothing to cope with it."

### **Prompt Action Can Only Avert Disaster.**

Lord Beresford, in the British House of Commons, on July 24 last, in reply to Mr. Churchill, said:

"I think he (Churchill) will do a lot for the men and the officers, but he is not doing enough for the protection of our Empire, and if what he says is true, and I know it is, that there is a very serious time coming for this Empire and this country, let me warn him that if he goes on with his policy of nothing but words and no deeds, we are as certain to meet with disaster as I am standing up in my place in the House of Commons to-day."

### **Beresford on Naval Outlook in Empire Review.**

Lord Beresford, writing in the Empire Review of November, 1913, on the "Naval outlook" says that, "Mr. Churchill's original standard was sixty per cent. over the next strongest European naval Power, of which fifty per cent. was to be utilized for the protection of the United Kingdom, the remaining ten per cent. for the 'world wide defence of the Empire.' Taking heavy armoured ships, building and projected, we have only fifty per cent. for world-wide defence. . . . At the present moment we are six heavy armoured ships short, with their units and auxiliaries to make up the number which he stated was necessary in his standard of sixty per cent....three to make the percentage for 'the minimum of safety' at home, three more to provide for 'world-wide defence.'"

### **Required for World-Wide Defence.**

Lord Beresford goes on to say that the Canadian ships, even if sanctioned, cannot be ready by the date upon which the First Lord stated that they will be "absolutely necessary" for "world-wide defence."

"We are told," said Lord Beresford, "that the three Canadian ships were 'absolutely necessary' for 'world-wide defence,' and that the three British ships were 'absolutely necessary' to supply the 50 per cent. margin. That argument was based on the number of foreign ships built, building and projected, at the date it was made. In what position do we find ourselves now, when the countries in alliance in the Mediterranean have got beyond the stage of projection, and have actually laid down the new vessels, while they are at the same time projecting further increases?"

### **An Emergency to be Dealt With.**

"All these facts point to an emergency. In this emergency, the British Government refuses to hold consultations with the Dominions on questions connected with Imperial defence as a whole, the explanation being that the political situation is troublesome at home. What on earth have party difficulties to do with the Imperial requirements for the safety of the Empire? Australia, New Zealand and Canada at the present moment are all proposing different methods for Imperial naval defence; unless a conference is held, different policies will cause great confusion and enormous expense, without properly effecting the object in view. How can the strength of the Imperial fleet be automatically expanded and assured unless the Mother Country and the Dominions are agreed on some clear and definite programme?"

### **Utterly Impossible for Britain to Bear Burden Unaided.**

"It is recognized by the Dominions that it is utterly impossible for Great Britain unaided to bear the burden of keeping open the seas for the protec-

tion of the Empire's commerce. The Commonwealth Government has recently asked for a consultation, and will hardly be satisfied with the statement that party political pressure is of more importance than problems of Imperial defence. From the cablegrams and press notices that have appeared, there is no doubt that the Dominions are surprised and that they acutely regret the decision. That decision implies that the naval situation, which appeared so menacing in the Admiralty memorandum to the Canadian Government is no longer critical. As a matter of fact, the situation is becoming worse, and the increase in naval construction abroad makes the co-operation of the Dominions more imperative than it was before."

#### **No Thought for the Morrow.**

Lord Beresford goes on to say, "Are we to take no thought for the morrow? Our want of preparation is entirely due to the fault of not looking ahead. At no time in our history has it been more vital to our safety to organize and prepare beforehand. . . . Everybody will be delighted at the improvement of our relations with Germany, but because they have become more friendly, there is no reason why our defences should not be raised to the minimum position for safety which the authority deems necessary. Policy and sentiment may alter in an afternoon; it takes two years to build a battleship."

#### **Naval Supremacy Necessary for Peace of World.**

In conclusion, Lord Charles Beresford said:

"No matter what political opinions people may hold, they are all agreed that the naval supremacy of the Empire is vital to its protection, the safety of its commerce and the peace of the world. . . .

"The statement that the British fleet is stronger than it ever was before is true, but it was never



weaker as compared with other nations. The proof is that there are now 150 'Dreadnoughts' built, building, or projected in the world, of which we own 39.

"When we were supreme at sea we maintained our position with our own right hand. Now, as we are not supreme, we must perforce seek alliances and ententes far more likely to run us into war than to maintain the peace.

"Our supremacy at sea can only be restored by the united efforts of the component parts of the Empire. The Government have refused a conference with the Dominions, which must be the preliminary for restoring our sea supremacy.

"Will our people wake up to facts before it is too late, or are they going to be fooled again?"

#### **Lord Selborne on the Admiralty Memorandum to Canada.**

Lord Selborne, who was First Lord of the Admiralty in a Unionist administration, in an article in the Empire Review of September, 1913, on "The Navy and Capital Ships," says that the building standard of the Government in regard to Dreadnoughts was to be a margin of superiority of 60 per cent. over the next European naval power. But that 60 per cent. was distributed—50 per cent. was to be devoted to securing the safety of the United Kingdom; it was to be stationed in home waters in order to provide absolute security in the opinion of the Government against the expansion of the German fleet; and the other ten per cent. was to be devoted specially to the Mediterranean, and, if necessary, to be used in other seas."

Lord Selborne points out that Mr. Churchill not only justified this standard, but admitted that that proportion of superiority would have to be increased as the older battleships became obsolescent. In his (Churchill's) memorandum to the Canadian Government, he

carefully explained that the coming great increase of Italian and Austrian naval strength in the Mediterranean would necessitate an increase of strength there. Lord Selborne proceeds to say:

"Any Dominion ships built in augmentation of our Empire sea power have always been admitted to be as extra to the Admiralty programme as they are necessary for the protection of Empire interests. I shall therefore say nothing about the three ships which the present Canadian Government propose to build and the fate of which is in some suspense. That matter is one for the people of Canada alone, and in this article I am not going to say anything about it except to ask my readers to note how sorely that help from Canada is needed."

#### **The Critical Years will be 1915 and 1916.**

And after again quoting from the Churchill memorandum to Canada, Lord Selborne said:

"It is not my intention here to discuss at length the Canadian ships. But naturally the suspense of the decision in that case made it necessary for the First Lord to reconsider the policy he had announced earlier in the year, and the result of that reconsideration was that he merely modified his building programme as announced earlier in the year by expediting the construction of three ships. The building programme laid down at the beginning of the year was five capital ships, three of which were to be laid down at the end of this financial year, and as the result of what has passed in Canada the Government have laid down these ships, or are about to lay them down, as soon as they can.

"My first point is this, that when the Government proposed to build only five capital ships this year they were deliberately falling short of the 60 per cent. standard which they themselves had laid

down. At the end of 1915 the German Dreadnought battleships and battle cruisers will number twenty-six. At 60 per cent. margin over twenty-six means forty-two. All that the Government have made provision for is thirty-nine. Therefore they started this year three short of the 'unswerving policy' they were going to pursue. And having had an opportunity later of reconsidering their position, they still remain three short of the standard they themselves have laid down. The critical years will be 1915 and 1916. Let us therefore examine exactly what will be our position in those years. The basis I take for my statement is the assumption that all the ships of this year's programme will have been completed and in commission by the end of 1915—that is quite as much as they possibly can be—and also that the corresponding German ships will have been completed and come into commission. I also take as my basis the correctness of Mr. Churchill's statement that in the year 1915 two members of the Triple Alliance, Austria and Italy, will possess a fleet of ten Dreadnought battleships in the Mediterranean. What will then be our position? Germany will have twenty-six ships of the Dreadnought type in the North Sea. In order to maintain our 50 per cent. margin over that fleet—on the necessity for which Mr. Churchill has insisted again and again, supported, so far as we know, by all the members of the Government—we shall have to station in these home waters every single Dreadnought battleship or battle cruiser built by the Admiralty and paid for by the British taxpayer, and that will give us thirty-nine to Germany's twenty-six, and there will be no 10 per cent. margin, no margin whatever, for the Mediterranean or for any other part of the world of ships of that type built and paid for by the British taxpayer.

### **Forces Will Have to be Reconstructed in 1915.**

“But at that moment the Austrian and Italian fleets will have reached that strength when Mr. Churchill says in his memorandum that the British forces in the Mediterranean must be reconstructed. In 1913 and 1914 he remains content with four battle cruisers and four armoured cruisers as our squadron in the Mediterranean. I do not think, and never have thought, that force sufficient even in the years 1913 and 1914. But he himself lays it down in the most positive manner that in 1915 that force will have to be reconstructed in order to meet the ten Dreadnought battleships of the triple alliance in the Mediterranean, but he will not have one single British-built Dreadnought battleship or battle cruiser stationed there, not one, and he will have to fall back on two ships and two ships only—the Malaya and the New Zealand—the one paid for by the Malay States and the other by the taxpayers of New Zealand. And it should be borne in mind that these Dominions ships have always been considered, as I have already observed, to be extra though necessary. Yet in this critical year 1915 the only ships of the Dreadnought type which the Board of Admiralty will have to put into the Mediterranean will be two of the Dominion ships. They will not have one to spare of the ships built by the British taxpayer. And in the whole of the rest of the Empire, which is not forgotten by the Prime Minister in his statement of last year, and is not forgotten by the First Lord in his statement from which I have quoted—in the whole of the rest of the Empire there will be one solitary ship of the Dreadnought type, the Australia, another Dominion ship, which in time of peace will be tied to Australian waters.”

### **If Critical in 1915, Far More so in 1916.**

The article goes on to show that if the situation is critical in the Mediterranean in 1915 it will be far more

dangerous and critical in 1916. There will be only four ships in 1915 to oppose 13 in the Mediterranean, "and for the whole of the rest of the oversea Dominions of the Crown, in the Atlantic or in the Pacific, we shall have only one, and that tied to Australian waters. Now what is it we want, and by the admission of the Government themselves? We want an adequate fleet in the North Sea; we want an adequate fleet in the Mediterranean; we want something to spare till the Dominions can provide for what Mr. Churchill designates as the 'outer guard'; and in addition there is, of course, the question of commerce protection."

### Selborne's Indictment.

Lord Selborne summarizes as follows:

"My indictment of the Government in their shipbuilding policy may be summarized thus. They said they would give the country an unswerving policy, and they have swerved on the first occasion. They promised the country a 60 per cent. margin of British-paid Dreadnought ships, and they are not building up to that standard. They said that the Dominion ships were to be extra; they have substituted Dominion ships for United Kingdom ships. And they have failed in their duty to the oversea Dominions of the Crown, failed in a pledge solemnly given by the Prime Minister and by the First Lord. I said last year that in my humble judgment we were short of a whole squadron of modern battleships in the Mediterranean. To-day I have proved the fact that at the present moment we are in our preparations literally and absolutely short of a whole squadron of capital ships for service in the Mediterranean."

The article is practically a copy of a speech delivered by Lord Selborne in the House of Lords on Aug. 6, 1913.

### **Lansdowne on the Three Canadian Dreadnoughts.**

Lord Lansdowne, in the House of Lords, on Aug. 5, 1913, after referring to the delay in regard to the three Canadian Dreadnoughts said:

“Even with the Malaya and the New Zealand, unless you have included ships of which we have not heard you will not have that 60 per cent. margin. But for my part I would much sooner that the noble lord should prove me to be wrong than that I should prove myself to be right. We do not wish to make party capital out of these naval questions, but after a careful study of the policy of the Admiralty it appears to us that we are not likely to acquire that preponderance which was distinctly laid down as necessary for the safety of this country, and on the other hand we shall not be able to have this strong fleet for overseas defence.”

### **Lord Haldane Says Serious Action Required.**

The Lord Chancellor in reply said:

“You cannot provide for every possible emergency; no wise man does, for the reason that if you do the only thing you make sure of is the financial embarrassment of your country. In order to keep up navies and armies, your financial position should be a good one. The greatest source of our strength is our financial position. The noble earl (Selborne) who initiated this debate shook his head over the announcement that the Government are going to undertake an educational system which will involve the expenditure of very large sums of money. I am profoundly convinced that unless we take serious action in the matter of education and particularly in the training of those who will be our workmen in the future, in the course of 15 years this country will have dropped behind other countries which have al-

ready taken such action. It is not that we are doing nothing, but that other countries are proceeding more rapidly. I feel that danger is just as perilous as any connected with the fleet, because our industrial supremacy rests on revenue, and unless that revenue is secure our fleet supremacy is imperilled.

#### **Disappointed of Delay in Canada.**

"It is quite true that up to now Canada has not been in a position to give us those assurances on which we hoped we might reckon. Canada will take her own course, and, in the meantime, the Government have taken the only course open to them in the circumstances and have accelerated certain ships which were in the programme, to such an extent that they will be there whether the Canadian ships are or are not. They will be there before the Canadian ships, for the Canadian ships could not be started and finished so quickly. Therefore, there will be four ships ready for the Mediterranean — the Malaya and these three ships — and these, together with the other resources, will make the Mediterranean fleet."

#### **Britain Must Make Up Deficiency.**

Lord Ashby St. Ledgers, replying to Lord Selborne in the House of Lords on Aug. 5, 1913, said:

"The First Lord of the Admiralty had distinctly stated that if Canadian ships were not forthcoming it would be necessary for him to reconsider the whole ship-building programme with a view to making up the deficiency which clearly would then arise. He claimed that they had not only maintained but had improved upon the standard of 60 per cent. superiority, and that the balance available for Imperial work was sufficient in any conceivable circumstances."

### **Samuel Says There Must Be Imperial Defence.**

Hon. Herbert Samuel, in an address before the Canadian Club of Toronto, as reported in the Toronto Star of Oct. 4, 1913, said:

“There must be a system of Imperial Defence. Just how that is to be designed I am not here to discuss. Whatever its form it must be adequate for its purpose. It must be on a scale commensurate with object in view. Our defences should not be exaggerated. We don't say that the bigger our navy the better. We regard armaments not as good things, but as bad, a necessary evil; necessary but evil, evil but still necessary. We don't want armaments swelled beyond our needs. We don't want to make the burden greater than the people who are already greatly burdened can bear. But we realize to the fullest, that we should be doing less than our duty if we fail to provide less than enough, to defend ourselves successfully. Friendships between nations are not always enduring. Try as we may to make them so our efforts may be defeated.

“The Imperial Government harbors no aggressive design against any of the nations on the face of the habitable globe. Our only object is to maintain peace on the face of the globe. Our Empire, heaven knows, is vast enough without our seeking to increase our responsibility.

### **Quarrels Between States Come Swiftly.**

“But we can never be sure that quarrels will not arise. History shows that quarrels between states may come as swiftly as a storm from a summer sky, too late to provide for defences. Though we may work for permanent peace it would be folly to act in practice, as though the permanent reign of peace had already been securely attained. So



the first principle we must go upon is to make secure the command of the seas. That we in the Old Country hold to be vital. We bear an enormous debt, a debt incurred largely through the very wars which won for us the Empire we now have. We need money also to ease the burden of social conditions with which you are happily unacquainted here. But in spite of all these considerations, even if we are left quite alone, you may be quite sure the British people would spend their last penny rather than run the risk of losing to the Empire the command of the seas.

#### **Too Heavy Burden For One Pair Shoulders.**

"As for the manner in which the Dominion might render aid, I shall say nothing. That is a matter which is still under discussion in your House of Parliament. I only state my belief that the present provision for the defence of the Empire, that the present organization of the Empire cannot be regarded as in its final form. It cannot be right that a burden which is necessary for the common advantage should press upon one pair of shoulders alone. But what action the Dominions should take, or whether they should take any action whatever, is, we feel, a matter for them and for them alone. Vitaly important as the subject is to them and to the Empire, nevertheless the difficulties to be solved lead us to be reticent and to wait patiently till the parts of the Empire can decide what their position shall be.

"One thing is certain: In everything I see manifestation of an underlying will—the will to be one."  
(Loud applause.)

#### **Must Maintain Security of Empire.**

Hon. Herbert Samuel, in his parting address before the Canadian Club at Montreal, said:

"The greater the power of the British Empire,

the greater its duty to be pacific. The present policy of the Imperial cabinet is one of amity toward every nation of the world. But, though we may work for a reign of permanent peace, we cannot act as though it had been already secured. In the words of George Meredith, 'England cannot invest her all in the millenium and be ruined if it delays to come.' We cannot treat fleets and armies as though they were unnecessary.

"We, who are charged with the duty of Imperial Government, sincere lovers of peace though we are, feel that we would be doing less than our duty if we failed to maintain at whatever point may be necessary such guarantees of the security of the Empire as may be demanded.

"I draw no conclusions as to what the Canadian policy should be. That is a matter for you to decide. I cannot suggest to what extent or in what manner Canada should participate in bearing the burdons of the empire, as this is a matter of party controversy here, and I cannot say one word of approval of any of the policies that may be advanced."

#### **Canada's Assistance Would Be Great Relief.**

Lord Haldane, in an interview in Montreal on Aug. 30, 1913, said in reference to the naval situation:

"It would be a great relief to the United Kingdom if you decide to assist us, and would be a source of great strength to the Empire. The burden is very heavy for the little islands of the United Kingdom to bear, but we are willing to go on bearing it alone as long as you desire us to. Any assistance Canada would be willing to give would be gratefully received, as it would greatly enhance the forces now working to preserve peace. The more Canadians come to take part in the councils of the Empire, the more

we shall be pleased. This, of course, holds true with other Dominions, Australia, South Africa, etc."

### **May End in a Terrible Disaster.**

Lloyd George, speaking in the British House of Commons on the 13th August, 1913, said:

"I do not see how it is to be stopped. One country dare not stop it. I would never assent to the doctrine that one country can stop it to the point of danger. It cannot. It would be much too perilous a thing to do, because once you stop it to the point of danger and something happens, disaster is inevitable. We cannot run the risk."

Further on in the same speech, Mr. George said that the whole thing may end in a terrible disaster. "Few people realize," he added, "how very near we have been to it within the twelve months."

### **The Peril Defined With Candour and Precision.**

Professor Cappon, of Queen's, in the Queen's Quarterly, says that one of Sir Wilfrid Laurier's great points in opposing the Naval Aid Bill was his denial of the existence of any emergency. In regard to this Professor Cappon says:

"It was a clever piece of tactics in debate, but one may well doubt its solid worth or serious meaning.

"For what does 'emergency' in such a slow and laborious work as naval construction on a great scale mean?

"It means anticipating and preparing at once for a peril four or five years ahead of us.

"And that quiet-toned document from the British Government (the memorandum of the Admiralty) stated and defined the peril with a candour and precision which strike me as new and almost start-

ling in a public document of that kind, and it did so, moreover, with a perfectly plain and equally unusual reference to the growth of Germany's naval power.

"Is that document not meant to show the sure and speedy approach of a time when the balance of naval power on which the security of the Empire rests will be definitely threatened?"

#### **Proud of Bold Action of Canadian Premier.**

Premier Peake, of South Australia, at the annual meeting of the Colonial Institute in London on May 23, 1913, said:

"The Dominions are alive to the requirements of Empire defence and are ready to share the burden. What true Britisher was not proud of the bold action and magnificent speech of the Prime Minister of Canada? (Prolonged cheers.) Statesmen of New Zealand had always been to the fore in giving expression to a strong sentiment of the people with regard to the Empire. Australia had provided a navy and a citizen army. They prayed that England might ever be in the right, but in times of trouble the people of Australia would not stop to consider who is in the right. Their help would be proffered in men and substance. The question of who was in the right would hold over for further consideration."

Lord Emmett, Colonial Under-Secretary, referring to naval defence, said:

"We await the decision of Canada on this important issue, confident in the patriotism of every section of the people there."

#### **Empire's Greatness Can Be Achieved By Unity.**

Sir Joseph Ward, ex-Premier of New Zealand, sent to the London Express the following Empire Day message:

"All classes will agree that the Empire's greatness can best be achieved by unity. They are not all agreed whether the present system can in future maintain that unity which is so essential for its preservation and protection. Let us agree to differ upon minor points and make a supreme effort upon the greater ones. It is worth working for. That there must be a vast change in the present system of Empire government and defence is self-evident to every practical man."

—C. A. P. Cable, London, May 24, 1913.

### **One Flag, One Fleet, One Throne.**

In regard to the arrival of the Australian fleet at Sydney, Premier Cook sent the following cable to the Morning Post:

"The event shows that we are grown up and propose to take our full share in the development of the family estate and assume active responsibility for the preservation of the Imperial patrimony. Our motto on this occasion is 'One Flag, One Fleet, One Throne; Britons' hold your own' "

—C. A. P. Cable, Oct. 3, 1913.

### **No Separatist or Party Considerations in Naval Affairs in Australia.**

Lord Denman, the Australian Commonwealth Governor-General, welcoming the Australian fleet and replying to the toast of his health, said that it was a "splendid contribution to the naval strength of the Empire."

Premier Cook declared that the naval policy was above politics. The ships were no less the King's because they were Australia's, and no less Australia's because they were the King's.

Ex-Premier Fisher fully endorsed Mr. Cook's statement that the fleet was above party considerations. — Reuter's Report, Oct. 18, 1913.

### **The Emergency Apparent.**

The London Times of Aug. 6, 1913, says: "The emergency demanding it is demonstrable to audiences which would soon be lost amid the intricacies of 60 and 100 per cent. Mr. Churchill's own memorandum, written at Mr. Borden's request, is there to enforce it without further need of proof. Let the memorandum be quoted, and the moral will point itself."

### **No Holiday There.**

Admiral Tirpitz, in reply to the latest suggestion of Mr. Churchill for a "naval holiday," says:

"As for Germany the Navy law will be carried on to its conclusion without hesitation."

### **Contribution to Peace of World.**

Sir Charles Tupper, in an interview in the Winnipeg Tribune of April 12, 1913, says: "I entirely approve of the policy proposed by Mr. Borden. The \$35,000,000 to build three Dreadnoughts I regard as a great contribution to the peace of the world."

