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SAN JUAN AND SECESSION

Possible Relation to the War of the Rebellion — Did
General Harney Try to Make Trouble With English
to Aid the Conspiracy? — A Careful Review
of His Orders and the Circumstances
Attending the Disputed Possessions
During the Year 1859.

BY

GRANVILLE O. HALLER,


Colonel U. S. A., Retired.

(Captain and Brevet Major, Commanding I Company, Fourth
Infantry, and Fort Townsend, Wash., in 1859.)

The following interesting paper on the controversy between the English and United States authorities in 1859 for the possession of San Juan island was read by Colonel Granville O. Haller, of Seattle, at the meeting of the Loyal Legion on Thursday evening, Jan. 16, 1896, at the Tacoma hotel:

Reprinted for
R. L. McCORMICK.

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IN 1853, by act of congress, that portion of Oregon territory north of the Columbia river and north of the 46th degree, north latitude, to the east of the Columbia river, where that degree crosses said river, was set apart and organized as Washington territory.

In 1853 the autonomy was organized by Isaac I. Stevens, the first governor (an ex-engineer officer of the United States army, highly distinguished in the Mexican war), and en route to the Pacific coast conducted a railroad survey across the continent, but who resigned to accept the offices of governor and superintendent of Indian affairs in Washington territory.

In 1854 the legislature organized counties and defined their boundaries. The Haro archipelago was included in Whatcom county.

When the assessor went the rounds of his county, he found on San Juan island a large flock of sheep, and assessed them as the property of the Hudson Bay company; the chief trader, Mr. Charles John Griffin, notified the assessor that the island belonged to Great Britain. When the tax collector called to collect the taxes, the chief trader ignored him and his credentials, claiming he was on a British isle. The sheriff then visited the island to collect delinquent taxes, when he was informed that the island belonged to her majesty, the queen of Great Britain! Whether the island did or did not belong to the queen was not for him to decide; he had come to collect the delinquent taxes, and, not receiving pay, he levied on a band of sheep, and sold at public auction some thirty head or more to cover the amount assessed and the costs of collecting.

James Douglass, the presiding officer of the Hudson Bay company in British America, and the governor of Vancouver island, in May, 1855, protested to the governor of Washington territory (Stevens), against such proceedings, assuring him that San Juan and all the islands of the Haro archipelago were within his jurisdiction and under the protection of the British laws; that he had the orders of her majesty's ministers to treat these islands as part of the British dominions: all, of course, to little effect.

He then caused an account to be made out, showing the number of rams and ewes seized and sold, and of constructive damages resulting from the removal of their rams and loss thereby of lambs. These he caused to be forwarded to the British minister in Washington City, D. C., to present to the secretary of state of the United States, and demand indemnity for the past and security for the future. These papers were duly presented to Governor Marcy (secretary under President Pierce), who, on referring to the treaty to ascertain if San Juan island was English soil or not, was confounded by the peculiar wording of the first article of the treaty—no channel was named, so the boundary was to follow the middle of a channel undetermined. His broad mind recognized at once that San Juan island was within "fairly disputed limits." The treaty not having disposed of it, the island had not been relieved from the operation of the treaty of 1827, of joint occupation.

On the 14th of July, 1855, Governor Marcy, in that terse English of his, wrote to Governor Stevens that "He (the president) has instructed me to say to you

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that the officers of the territory should abstain from all acts on disputed grounds which are calculated to provoke any conflicts, so far as it can be done without implying the concession to the authority of Great Britain of an exclusive right over the premises.

"The title ought to be settled before either party should exclude the other by force, or exercise complete and exclusive sovereign rights within fairly disputed limits. Application will be made to the British government to interpose with the local authorities on the northern borders of our territory to abstain from like acts of exclusive ownership, with the explicit understanding that any forbearance on either side to assert the rights, respectively, shall not be construed into any concession to the adverse party.

"By a conciliatory and moderate course on both sides, it is sincerely hoped that all difficulties will be avoided until an adjustment of the boundary line can be made in a manner mutually satisfactory. The government of the United States will do what it can to have the line established at an early period."

To understand the sound common sense of Governor Marcy's letter, we must remember that after Lord Aberdeen had intimated to Mr. McLane, our minister in London (May 15, 1846), that he would instruct Mr. Pakenham to offer the 49th parallel to salt water (Birch's bay), then deflect so as to allow England all of Vancouver island; that he would probably name the middle of the Canal de Haro for the boundary line, we find (May 16, 1846), that Sir John Pelly, governor of the Hudson Bay company in London, obtained an interview and effected a change in his lordship's mind, and, in the project of the treaty, Lord Aberdeen aimed at Captain Vancouver's red line (on his, Vancouver's, chart of the Gulf of Georgia, used at the time), showing the track of his vessel from Admiralty inlet northward, which he found navigable, west of Whidby island, as the boundary line he desired. Sir John Pelly wanted that finest of the islands, as he called Whidby island, also, but he admitted that he did not see how that could be included. Lord Russell to Lord Lyons, December 16, 1850, well says:

"Had Lord Aberdeen and Sir John Pelly obtained the consent of the United States government to their views in favor of the channel marked as navigable by Vancouver, or had Mr. McLane and Mr. Senator Benton obtained the assent of Lord Aberdeen and Mr. Pakenham to their opinion that Haro's strait was the channel intended by the treaty, such agreement would have been conclusive. But separate interpretations, not communicated to the other party to a treaty, cannot be taken as decisive in a disputed question."

The utmost harmony was re-established between the local governments; the United States had sent out, as the boundary commissioner, Archibald Campbell, Esq., and Great Britain had sent Captain James Prevoast as first commissioner and Captain George H. Richards as assistant commissioner and hydrographer, both of R. N., to determine the water boundary. When General Harney visited Puget Sound, Mr. Campbell was located near the 49th parallel, engaged in establishing and marking the international boundary line on land; the English commissioners were engaged in hydrographic surveys. The commissioners had held repeated meetings and presented their claims, but the wording of the treaty did not conform to either claim. The English commissioners admitted that they were too far to the east, but their surveys discovered a channel for deep sea-going vessels just east of San Juan island, which conformed more nearly to the wording of the treaty, and they offered to compromise on that. Mr. Campbell insisted the Canal

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de Haro separated Vancouver's island from the continent, and was the line Mr. McLane had assented to, etc. The commissioners had reported to their respective governments as far as they had gone, leaving their superiors to resolve the boundary problem.

Another matter (when General Harney visited the Sound, in 1859), worthy of our serious consideration was the unfortunate state of feeling existing throughout the quasi United States. We were no longer united. The "irrepressible conflict" had arrayed the North against the South, and bitter strife in congress induced several states to prepare for a violent separation. We were, at this time, in a much more perilous condition than we were in President Polk's term, when about to fight England for 54 degrees 40 minutes, and Mexico for Texas. Now, the South, with Texas, was about ready to fight the North, if not allowed to secede, and a war with England, then, would, without doubt, have greatly helped to secure their independence. General Harney's conduct is inexplicable, unless it was "a design and an object with it, the Southern secession from the beginning." The history of Washington territory confutes the assumptions of the general against Governor Douglass and the Hudson Bay company. The evidence, although not connected with the boundary question, is, I think, pertinent to a more thorough understanding of our relations with our neighbors across the line, who stand accused by the general, because it will throw side lights on their actions, which are always more reliable than mere accusations.

It is a part of our history that Governor Stevens, of Washington territory, and General Joel Palmer, of Oregon, were appointed commissioners to negotiate with Indians for lands appropriated to white settlements by acts of congress. These commissioners inaugurated a grand council, at which the Yakima Indians (fourteen tribes), the Nez Perce and the confederate band located on or near the Walla Walla (three tribes), all lying on the east side of the Cascade mountains, in Oregon and Washington, were to meet them at their council ground on the Walla Walla river. This assembly made it possible for Kamiaken, a very intelligent chief of the Yakima Indians, to combine all who were unwilling to part with the homes of their forefathers into a secret association, pledged to exterminate the hated white settlers. The persistent efforts of the commissioners were gaining chief by chief, with the possibility that the unwilling Indians would lose their homes. In this extremity it was proposed to massacre the commissioners and small guard of soldiers, but Kamiaken advised the disaffected chiefs to sign the treaty—the whites had not conformed to their treaty promises to the Indians on the Willamette; it was only to gain time—and it would be a great advantage, while the whites considered the Indians friendly, to have time to procure powder and lead, and, when winter set in, the Columbia would be frozen over and steamers tied up; at the same time the snow on the Cascade mountains would make the crossing impracticable; then, at a signal, their warriors would fall, simultaneously, upon the unsuspecting whites, which could not fail to destroy them, having no escape, and no assistance could reach them in time.

It was my fortune to sound the tocsin of war, before the winter set in, and suddenly Oregon and Washington found a bloody war on their hands. The local Indians on Puget Sound, instigated by the Yakima-Klickitats, made a raid on the unprotected settlers, massacring the pioneers, their wives and children, and setting fire to their dwelling places.

Although Governor Stevens had applied, early in his administration, to the

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secretary of war for 1,000 stands of arms and ammunition, for any emergency. The secretary declined until the militia were enrolled and the allotment determined. Hence, our territory was taken by surprise—the governor was in the Blackfoot country—the people wholly unprepared for war.

Our historian, Judge Elwood Evans, writing of these times, says:

"In this exigency, Governor Mason (acting governor), had been compelled to appeal to a foreign government for that aid which our government had neglected to furnish. * * * to ask of a foreign official for arms and ammunition to defend American homes and firesides. But Sir James Douglass, governor of the colony of Vancouver island, proved a friend in need. Promptly and generously (having made himself personally responsible for the purchases), he embraced the opportunity to assist his fellow beings in their emergency, and also to impart the useful lesson to savagery that, in a war against the white race, they need not expect any sympathy from that great statesman and the company, over the affairs of which he presided."

Acting Governor Mason reported the fact of his applying to Governor Douglass to the territorial legislature, and says: "That application was promptly and cordially responded to to the extent of his power, he, at the same time, regretting that he had at the moment no vessels of war at his disposal, and that his steamers, the Otter and Beaver, were both absent, etc." Soon after the Otter was sent over to assist, which demonstrated the policy of the Hudson Bay company, to-wit: the life of a white person was too sacred for any Indian to raise his hand against him, violently. This occurred in the fall of 1855, and the war lasted several years, so these facts should have been fresh in General Harney's memory in 1859.

In writing an official explanation to the adjutant general, U. S. A., for his assumptions on Puget Sound, General Harney, in his letter, August 29, 1859, says: "Time and again our lighthouses were attacked, and the wives and children of our citizens on that coast were brutally murdered by British Indians. Reports reached me that these Indians had been instigated to these acts by the Hudson Bay company, in order to drive them (Who? the brutally murdered, or the Hudson Bay company?) from the lands, etc." One month and ten days before this, July 19, 1859, the general wrote to the adjutant general, U. S. A.: "* * * Mr. Hubbs informed me that a short time before my arrival, the chief factor of the company at Victoria, Mr. Dallas, son-in-law of Governor Douglass, came to the island in the British sloop-of-war Satellite, and threatened to take one of the Americans by force to Victoria for shooting a pig of the company. The American seized his rifle and told Mr. Dallas if any such attempt was made he would kill him on the spot. The affair then ended. The American offered to pay, etc.

"To prevent a repetition of this outrage, I have ordered the company at Fort Bellingham to be established on San Juan island for the protection of our citizens, etc."

The way we undertake to protect them is proclaimed by Captain Pickett, Ninth infantry, in his post orders, dated San Juan island, W. T., July 27, 1859: "Par. III.—This being United States territory, no laws other than those of the United States, nor courts, except such as are held by virtue of said laws, will be recognized or allowed on this island. By order of Captain Pickett."

General Harney upheld this order, but did not seem to know that it exercised complete and exclusive sovereign rights, for in his letter to the adjutant general, U. S. A., of August 25, 1859, he writes:

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"In a communication to Commissioner Campbell, of the Northwest boundary survey, I have disclaimed any intention of asserting any sovereignty over the island of San Juan beyond that which the necessity of the case has demanded."

This, too, after Mr. Campbell had written to the general that he (Campbell) did not think, "under present circumstances, that we (Americans) should be justified in going to the extent of refusing them (English officers) to land troops for peaceable purposes."

Two months after the general himself had landed on San Juan island, Paul K. Hubbs, jr., deputy inspector for the island, was called on for an affidavit. He stated, June 4, 1892, that Governor Stevens asked for it, but R. D. Gholson was governor at that time. Mr. Hubbs, on oath, deposes that he met the general on the island and mentioned "that there had been some trouble between one of the American settlers and some of the officers of the Hudson Bay company." The general asked the cause. He said that "a short time since Mr. Cutler, one of our citizens, had shot a hog belonging to said company, and immediately went to Mr. Griffin, the superintendent, and offered to pay for the hog. Mr. Griffin became enraged, etc." "In the afternoon of the same day the Hudson Bay company's steamer Beaver arrived from Victoria with Mr. Dallas, a director of the Hudson Bay company; Dr. Tolmie, a chief factor, and some other parties, who, after holding an interview with Mr. Griffin, called on Mr. Cutler and used (Who used?) some very threatening language," and other hearsay on dits.

Mr. Hubbs was, and is still, a great admirer of General Harney.

His affidavit continues: "They said (as if all spoke at once) that they had a posse on board and would take him a prisoner and carry him to Victoria for trial!" He was not present, never heard a word, but told the general as a fact. This same Mr. Hubbs voluntarily contributed to the Post-Intelligencer of Seattle of June 4, 1892, what he saw and knew when the general landed on the 9th of July, 1859, on the island. He stated in the Post-Intelligencer, strangely enough, after making this affidavit, the following: "Here the general dismissed his staff officers, and in private communication the arrangements were made which led to the occupation of the island by United States troops, and hastened the long-delayed question of sovereignty, which took a Jackson or a Harney to consummate." These private oral communications were to be followed up with a promised petition, "signed by every American settler on the island."

The promised petition, although dated July 11, 1859, was not received at the department headquarters until after Pickett had taken possession of the island, when it was of no other use than to refute General Harney's assertions in his letter to the adjutant general, U. S. A., dated August 7, 1859, where he reports as follows:

"On my visit to San Juan island, mentioned in that report (July 19, 1859), the United States inspector of customs on that island, Mr. Hubbs, made an official complaint, on behalf of the American citizens, of the outrages perpetrated upon them by the British authorities of Vancouver island, who are connected with the Hudson Bay company establishments, and who have a sheep farm on the island.

* * * (Here he repeats his version of 'the pig was shot'—which, by the way, was a breeding boar) * * * I was also informed that the Hudson Bay company had threatened, at different times, to send the Northern Indians down upon them and drive them from the island. This statement has since been confirmed to me by some of the most reliable citizens on the Sound."

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The petition referred to enumerates several murders alleged to have been done by, and they ask protection from, "the bands of marauding Northern Indians, who infest these waters in large numbers and are greatly retarding the progress of the settlement of this island." Not one word in the petition praying for protection against "the outrages perpetrated upon them by the British authorities of Vancouver island," nor against the Hudson Bay company, but, on the contrary, it says that in April, 1858, "the house of the United States inspector of customs for this island was attacked and fired into in the night by a party of Indians living on this island, and known as Clallams, and, had it not been for the timely aid of the Hudson Bay company, the inspector would have fallen a victim to their savage designs." Again: Mr. A. J. Dallas, of Victoria, B. C., addressed General Harney, through their minister at Washington City, May 10, 1860, after having seen his (Harney's) letters of the 7th, 8th, 25th and 29th of August, 1859, to the adjutant general, U. S. A.; to Governor Douglass, August 6; to Captain Pickett, July 18, and to General Scott, July 19, 1859, in which he gives the most unqualified contradiction to the part attributed to him, which he gives categorically, by numbers, but which it will take too much of our time to give in full. Let a few sample letters suffice. He says: "4. I never visited the island of San Juan in any man-of-war. My arrival there was purely accidental. I landed from the company's steamer Beaver, used solely for the purposes of trade, accompanied by two friends. The next day, accompanied, in addition, by Chief Trader Griffin, our agent upon the island, we took the opportunity, in passing Cutler's hut or tent, to call upon him. I remonstrated with him in regard to his offense, which he admitted, offering to pay the value of the animal killed, which was not accepted. No demand of one hundred dollars (\$100), or any sum of money, was made upon him, nor did I threaten to apprehend him or take him to Victoria. On the contrary, I stated distinctly that I was a private individual and could not interfere with him. I have, fortunately, an unimpeachable witness to prove this. * * * 5. Cutler did not use any threats to me, and I gave him no cause to do so, etc."

The published correspondence fails to support any assertion of the general, and leaves the reader in doubt as to what was killed. The general says it was a "pig;" both Hubs and Cutler call it a "hog," and Cutler adds: "The animal was so worthless, he (Griffin) would never have troubled himself about it"—hence a writer (Mr. Weir) felt justified in pronouncing it one of the "razor-back" specimens. My own impression, at the time, was that it was a "boar," of good stock for breeding, and the constructive damage could be figured so as to leave \$100 far behind! The general's diplomacy, however, failed to provoke the English into war.

STATUS OF THE SOUND UNDER COLONEL CASEY, U. S. A.

In 1856 the great number of Russian Indians, and from Stickeen river, in the British possessions, who were prowling in our waters without restraint, became a terror to the resident families scattered along the shores of our islands and mainlands. Lieutenant Colonel Casey, commanding Puget Sound district, located Captain Pickett's company, Ninth infantry, near Whatcom, as a rallying point for the women and children, in case of an invasion by hostile Indians; also as a guard over the outlets about Swinimish slough (in case Indians had committed depredations among our settlements and were fleeing from the Sound), to intercept them. Brevet Major Haller's company, Fourth infantry, was located near Port

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Townsend, also an asylum for women and children, and, with a revenue cutter's (Jeff Davis) assistance, to guard Admiralty inlet. The locations were well selected for the special objects in view—they gave confidence to the settlers and caused the foreign Indians to conduct themselves with greater propriety while within possible reach of these companies.

The Haro archipelago, although subject to joint occupation, had but few, if any, settlers then, other than some on Bellevue farm and a United States inspector of customs. There was even here an incidental protection, as when Inspector Hubbs' house had been fired into, I crossed over to the island with a small guard to capture the offenders and protect this officer. Mr. Griffin, who had given timely assistance to Mr. Hubbs to escape, was pleased to see the troops, knowing their object, and would, no doubt, have welcomed Captain Pickett's company had he come, in 1859, simply to protect the American settlements. The Clallams saw soldiers land, quit the island for good, and the trouble ended there.

The old war-rigged steamer Massachusetts, eight 32-pounders, commanded by Captain Swartout, U. S. Navy, came into the Sound waters, and, at the request of the governor and Colonel Casey, Captain Swartout undertook to drive the Northern Indians out of our seas. He found a large number of Russian Indians encamped opposite the Port Gamble sawmills, and ordered them to go home, proposing to tow their canoes for them up north. They refused to go and resolved to fight rather than go against their wills; the trouble was brief; they found shelter in the woods, when their camp and provisions were burned up. Hunger subdued them, and they capitulated after losing a chief and many braves, but their losses stirred up the relatives of the dead, who soon appeared on the Sound to avenge their deaths.

This affair cost Colonel Isaac N. Ebey, ex-collector of customs, a prominent lawyer and highly respected pioneer—regarded by the Indians a great chief—the loss of his head, which they carried back in triumph. How many more suffered is not of record, but the tragic death of Colonel Ebey (like the death of the martyr, General Canby), convinced our authorities in Washington City that there was a quasi war. Thereupon, the navy department turned over the Massachusetts to the quartermaster department, U. S. A., for military duty. On arriving at the port of Steilacoom for duty on the Sound, General Harney and his staff, Captains Pleasonton, acting assistant adjutant general, and Ingalls, assistant quartermaster, having crossed inland, inspected Fort Steilacoom, then embarked on the Massachusetts, called at Fort Townsend, for a few moments only, then hastened to Bellingham bay, where night overtook them. Captains Pleasonton and Ingalls were classmates at West Point with Captain Pickett, and stopped over night with him. General Harney stopped for the night with Judge Fitzhugh. What occurred this night is not of record, but the next day the Massachusetts steamed for Semiahmoo, where General Harney became the guest of Mr. Campbell, while his staff officers were entertained by Mr. Warren, the secretary to the boundary commission. These officers informed Mr. Warren that General Harney intended to order Captain Pickett's company to occupy San Juan island, and he inferred that the general's visit had reference to it. While waiting for his mail at my post (Fort Townsend), I showed General Harney's special orders No. 72 to Mr. Campbell, who expressed surprise that he, Harney, would order Pickett on San Juan without advising him (Mr. Campbell), as the island was still in dispute. Mr. Warren then told him how he knew it, and had taken it for granted that the general had

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informed Mr. Campbell, as commissioner, or he would have mentioned it to him before. The Massachusetts then proceeded to Victoria harbor to get coal, and while there General Harney met Governor Douglass and, by invitation, dined with him. After leaving Victoria he stopped at, and landed on, San Juan island, for a short time, then hastened back to his headquarters, Fort Vancouver.

GENERAL HARNEY'S STRATEGY.

However satisfactory Colonel Casey's arrangements proved to the inhabitants, they were not so to the general, whose strategy is sui generis, and upsets rank of officers and disposition of troops, as we will soon discover.

Captain Pleasonton, acting assistant adjutant general, writes, July 18, 1859. 1107 Fort Vancouver, to Lieutenant Colonel S. Casey, Ninth infantry, commanding Fort Steilacoom, Puget Sound:

"Sir: By special orders No. 72, herewith enclosed, you will perceive the general commanding has withdrawn the garrisons from Bellingham and Townsend, and has placed the Massachusetts under your orders, for better protection and supervision of the waters of Puget Sound.

"To carry out these instructions with more effect, the general commanding desires me to communicate to you the following directions: The steamer Massachusetts will proceed without delay to Bellingham, to be used in establishing company D, Ninth infantry, on San Juan island, after which she will convey company I, Fourth infantry, to Steilacoom, when the company you assign for service on the steamer will be embarked under your supervision.

"After the ship has received the necessary stores and supplies, she will be instructed to cruise in the Sound among the islands frequented by the Northern Indians, who will be warned not to come into any of the waters under the jurisdiction of the United States, which, etc.

"Any opposition by these Indians will be speedily checked, and the requirements of these instructions will be maintained by force, if necessary. The ordinary rendezvous of the steamer Massachusetts, for wood and water, will be San Juan island; and should the commander of that island desire the assistance of any force from the ship for purposes connected with the defense of the island, the officer in command of the ship will be instructed to furnish a force and co-operate with the troops in all measures requiring its safety and protection. At the end of every two months the ship will visit Fort Steilacoom to obtain supplies and for the muster and inspection required by the regulations. The command on the steamer Massachusetts, will be borne on the post return of Fort Steilacoom as a component part of its garrison.

" * * * As the ship is mounted with eight 32-pounders and the proper ammunition has been provided, the crew will be instructed, under the direction of the master of the vessel, in their use, to obtain the most efficient action from all parties in cases requiring it. * * * The general commanding is pleased to communicate his confidence in the zeal, energy and intelligence you exercise in the discharge of your duties in the service, and he rests assured the details transmitted in this communication will be rendered with satisfaction and advantage to such worthy qualities. I am, colonel, etc."

These instructions have been carefully worded to mean much more than is written; for officers on the Sound at that date could read between the lines. For example: The withdrawal of the garrisons of Bellingham and Townsend dissolved

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the Puget Sound district. The communication is addressed to Lieutenant Colonel S. Casey, Ninth infantry, commanding Fort Steilacoom—not commanding Puget Sound district—limiting his authority to his post, literally, placing Captain Pickett above him by his having an independent post, but charged with a position of gravest responsibility, requiring the highest degree of intelligence, discretion and international courtesy, which the customs of service intrust only to superior officers. The Massachusetts is placed nominally under Colonel Casey's command, but actually under Captain Pickett's, because she must rendezvous ordinarily at San Juan island, and get her wood and water there, although there was no wharf nor water and no laborers to cut wood at the island, while at the port of Steilacoom these were convenient and abundant. But if Captain Pickett wanted Colonel Casey's troops aboard the Massachusetts to join his company ashore on San Juan, he has only to say "for defense," and the commander of the company is obliged to supply his requisition, even as, in my case, he should rank Captain Pickett and differ with him as to the necessity for the soldiers; if he does not comply, he disobeys the commanding general's orders and is liable to a general court-martial.

At the end of every two months the ship will visit Fort Steilacoom to obtain supplies and for muster and inspection. The fort being three miles by road from salt water, we will presume it is the crew, whether rain or shine, must visit Fort Steilacoom, fall into line, there to be mustered and inspected, and thereby save Captain Pickett all his trouble and bother of muster rolls. But the queerest thing ordered therein is, when you understand that the soldiers are the crew, inasmuch as engineers and firemen cannot leave their posts, and the master of the vessel is a civilian employe of the quartermaster department, yet the general orders that "the crew will be instructed, under the direction of the master of the vessel, in the use of the cannon." As Northern Indians will not contest against cannon on water, the general must have contemplated a fight with other than Indians, for he says plainly he wants "to obtain the most efficient action from all parties in cases requiring it." But the unkindest cut of all is in the final part of this wonderful letter—it is gilt-edged irony—where the general is pleased to express his confidence, etc., in Colonel Casey, and on the same day, passing over Colonel Casey, gives Captain Pickett an independent command in the front, as if to induce war, charged with: "Second—Another serious and important duty will devolve upon you in the occupation of San Juan island, arising from the conflicting interests of the American citizens and the Hudson Bay company establishment at that point. This duty is to afford adequate protection to the American citizens in their rights as, such, and to resist all attempts at interference by the British authorities residing on Vancouver island, by intimidation or force, in the controversies of the above mentioned parties. * * *

Scarcely had Captain Pickett quit Fort Bellingham in obedience to special orders No. 72, when some eight or ten young Nootsack warriors, painted and fitted out for fight, defiantly entered Whatcom, incensed because their chief had been (and they supposed was then), imprisoned in the county jail, to demand his release. The insolence of one warrior caused a citizen to shoot him, when the others avenged his death by shooting the citizen. The town was fully aroused and the people took to their arms. When the smoke cleared away four warriors lay dead. I was then on the Massachusetts with my company, searching for Northern Indians to remove them. The citizens, seeing the smoke of my steamer, sent an express messenger out to intercept her and request military protection from my command.

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Fortunately when he landed, we found the tribe had descended to the mouth of Nootsack river, to receive their dead relatives, and by rapid marching "to the Nootsack crossing," where the river was narrow and very rapid, I became master of the situation: the Indians could not possibly get by to their lodges with their dead without my permission. I sent a friendly invitation to the tribe to meet me there, which they accepted. I demanded the remainder of their young warriors in that fight as hostages, as a guarantee that there would be no more bloodshed for the past. They gave me the hostages, and I thus rescued not only the people around Whatcom, but Mr. Campbell and his small working parties in the woods, marking a boundary line, from Indian massacres and the effect of General Harney's strategy. Had Pickett not been removed, this would not have happened.

I confess that I cannot see in the general's instructions to Pickett, as far as published, any positive injunction against allowing the English authorities to have an equal force in "the fairly disputed limits" for the like protection of British subjects. Were there any other instructions? Probably none. Mr. Campbell thought and wrote to General Harney, "under present circumstances," it was not considered proper to refuse to allow the English "to land troops for peaceable purposes. I found that Captain Pickett had different views, derived from your instructions, which he confidentially showed me. I perceived that they were susceptible of the interpretation he gave them, though they were not directly mandatory on the subject, etc." Letter to General Harney of August 14, 1859.

I may be doing injustice, but my candid impression has been that on the night spent at Bellingham Bay the matter was orally agreed upon—the hog incident to be seized as the pretext, and the exclusion of British law and British troops from San Juan island to become the *casus belli*. We know that General Harney was a native of Louisiana; Captain Pickett and Judge Fitzhugh of Virginia; Fauntleroy, the master of the Massachusetts, also a Virginian; and these are significant facts, for Colonel Casey and Major Haller were born north of Mason and Dixon's line. General Harney's indulgence to the citizens in St. Louis, Mo., who were known to be disloyal to the administration, until he was removed; and Pickett and Fitzhugh accepting commissions in the Confederate army, are significant factors connected with this subject.

Captain Pickett believed his third paragraph of post orders, which asserted complete and exclusive control over San Juan island, would compel the British authorities to assert their claim with force; he was displeased when I first met him and advised a joint occupation. He assured me that if they attempted to land he would fire on them. He believed they would land, and considered war inevitable. But war then, apart from the political objections, was not a propitious moment to fight England, from a military point of view, inasmuch as we were utterly unprepared, in every sense, for war. Our coast, from Olympia to San Diego, Cal., was helplessly exposed to an enemy in a warship, while England at that moment had in Esquimalt harbor, under Rear Admiral Bayne's royal navy, the commanding fleet:

The flagship *Ganges*, eighty-four guns, 840 men; Captain Slavel commanding.

Tribune, thirty-one guns, 325 men; Captain Hornby commanding; twenty-two 32-pounders, nine 68-pounders.

Pleiades, twenty-one guns, 325 men; Captain DeCourcy commanding; one pivot and twenty 68-pounders.

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Satellite, twenty-one guns, 325 men: Captain Prevost commanding: one pivot and twenty 68-pounders.

Plumper, ten guns, 125 men: Captain Richards commanding: all 32-pounders. Sappers, miners and marines, 200 men.

Total, 167 guns, 2,140 men.

Finding from Captain Pickett's communications that it was probable the British navy would force a landing on San Juan island, General Harney ordered every available soldier in his department to the island, and on the 30th of August, 1859, he reports to General Scott the number of troops forming Colonel Casey's command that day:

Companies A and C, Fourth infantry, and H, Ninth infantry (from Steila-coom)	139
Companies A, B, D and M, of the Third artillery	181
Company D, Ninth infantry	66
Company I, Fourth infantry	44
Detachment of Company A, engineers	11
Aggregate	461

The eight 32-pounders of the Massachusetts had been landed, and besides they had one 6-pounder and five mountain howitzers to contend against over 700 pounds of iron balls from a single broadside of 68-pounders, beyond, if necessary, the range of our 32-pounders. The revenue cutters Joe Lane and Jeff Davis and the lighthouse tender Shubrick, our entire naval force on Puget Sound—for the Massachusetts was disarmed and converted into a beast of burden—could make no show against her majesty's fleet.

The English vessels could, of course, have prevented the landing of any troops to reinforce Pickett, and Colonel Casey fully expected to meet with resistance in attempting to land his command. But it was equally certain to the English officers that the troops on the island could not escape, if the admiral wished, by only preventing boats landing there to get and carry them away. We had violated the military maxim: "Never do what the enemy would like you to do!" for we had concentrated in a place where the enemy could keep us as completely as if we had been corked up in a bottle—a la General Butler on the James river.

With all of General Harney's forces on the island, the English were masters of the situation in the department of Oregon. They knew it, and contented themselves with keeping a single war vessel in San Juan harbor, with springs on her cable to deliver broadsides—a threat far more humiliating than if they had landed, because neither Pickett nor Casey had means to force the Tribune to withdraw from their American harbor, nor from its insulting menace.

HOW SMALL THINGS TURN TO GOOD ACCOUNT IN WAR.

It often happens in war that very simple things produce wonderful results. At Gaines' Mill, Va., on the second of the seven days' fighting, when General Lee had overpowered and exhausted General Fitz John Porter's army and was driving him back, General Meagher's Irish brigade was sent forward to reinforce Porter. Meagher, seeing the masses all around him demoralized and hurrying to the rear, divined Porter's distress, and, for fear that his men might also become demoralized, he called out: "The left wing has taken Richmond!" The effect was electrical: his men rushed forward, hurrahing as loud as they could, which encouraged our

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veterans to hold on, knowing that relief was coming. General Lee, hearing the shouts, halted his men to organize and reform to meet the fresh enemy. This gave General Porter time to withdraw under the gathering darkness, and saved the remnant of his battalions. The timely inspiration of General Meagher no doubt saved the Army of the Potomac from a very serious disaster.

The burning of the great bridge at Wrightsville, in York county, Pennsylvania, seemed to have little credit for its important bearing on the war, but defeated General Lee's plan of campaign, without bloodshed, so far as the crossing of the Susquehanna river was a part. The bridge was one of Lee's objective points, but was set on fire June 28, 1863, just as General Gordon's rebel brigade was approaching to seize it, three days before the fighting of Gettysburg. Lee was approaching leisurely, trusting to his having left Hooker's command thoroughly demoralized away behind him. His inability to cross the Susquehanna was as much of a surprise as the proximity of General Meade's army. It enabled Meade to catch up, and the battle of Gettysburg put an end to his invasion.

But a smaller incident—remote and unconnected with the belligerent operations about San Juan island—did, I believe, exercise a potent influence in staying the contemplated English forcible occupation of the island. I was in the harbor on board the Massachusetts on the morning of the day fixed upon by Captain Pickett to meet the English officers, Captains Hornby, Prevost and Richards, to decide upon joint occupation. Pickett and I had disagreed, and, as I ranked him, he did not wish me to be present.

Before daylight that morning the Plumper arrived, bringing sappers, miners and marines, from Fraser river. At a proper hour, Captain Richards (whose acquaintance I had made at Fort Townsend), made me a social call, and when about to leave expressed a wish to make Colonel Pickett a call and asked if I would accompany him and introduce him, to which I gladly assented. On leaving Pickett's tent, he asked me if he might introduce me to Lieutenant Colonel Moody, of Her Majesty's Royal engineers, the lieutenant governor of British Columbia, then on the island, at Mr. Griffin's, close by. I consented, and on the way I asked if it were possible for me to get Colonel Casey a newspaper containing a detailed account of the recently fought battle of Solferino, from one of their officers. I, however, could not recollect the name (Solferino), and it was difficult for me to assure Captain Richards, and afterwards Colonel Moody, that it was a later battle than Magenta. I learned from Captain Richards that their English mail was more than three weeks behind time, and it dawned upon his mind that possibly the two governments at home might have settled the question and their dispatches on the way were delayed by failure of their steamboats to connect.

After the introduction to Colonel Moody and his staff, conversation was general until Captain Richards announced to Colonel Moody that I brought the news of a later French victory, which took the English by surprise, and many questions were put to me, which were appropriate to Magenta, and so I informed them. Then came an ominous pause, and I stepped into Griffin's yards for a few minutes. On my return, I soon became conscious that Captain Richards had suggested the possibility of a settlement of the boundary question, and their own uncertain position was due to delayed mails. They asked how the president communicated with his army, etc., how many enlisted men in a company, etc., when I answered that the normal number of a company was sixty odd, but the president could increase them in a department threatened with hostilities to 100 men, and our

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companies had not been increased, nor were any defenses being constructed, leaving us totally unprepared for hostilities. Captain Richards' suggestion was to them the only explanation which enabled them to comprehend General Harney's conduct.*

At the afternoon meeting the British officers were conservative, and Major Hawkins, royal engineers, was soon after dispatched as bearer of dispatches to their minister at Washington, D. C. The French war news, I still believe, defeated Captain Pickett's and General Harney's expectations, and stayed hostilities sufficiently long for General Scott to put in an appearance, and he established satisfactory relations between the contending governments in regard to San Juan island.

After General Scott returned to Washington City, leaving General Harney once more in command, the latter attempted to undo what General Scott had done, on the alleged ground that General Scott had left no orders to grant a joint military occupation with British troops; neither has the United States government delegated any authority to the lieutenant general to offer or accept such occupation, etc. That San Juan island was attached to Whatcom county by act of the territorial legislature which was duly submitted to congress and has not been disproved; it is, therefore, the law of the land. Pickett must respect on the island the civil jurisdiction of Washington territory—"that any attempt on the part of the British commander to ignore this right will be followed by deplorable results out of his (Harney's) power to prevent or control," etc.

The garrison at Fort Townsend re-established by General Scott was again withdrawn by General Harney. Captain Hunt's company, Fourth infantry, was relieved from duty on San Juan island and Captain Pickett, reinstated, breaking up Fort Bellingham. The general seemed to be playing the bull in the china shop—breaking things up generally!

General Scott, referring to General Harney's order to Captain Pickett "to acknowledge and respect the civil jurisdiction," says: "If this does not lead to a collision of arms it will again be due to the forbearance of the British authorities; for I found both Brigadier General Harney and Captain Pickett proud of their conquest of the island and quite jealous of any interference therewith on the part of higher authority," etc.

The secretary of war, John B. Floyd, on whom General Harney relied for support for favors performed for the former at Fort Snelling, would no longer favor him, and on the 8th of June, 1860, directed: "The adjutant general will order Brigadier General Harney to repair to Washington City without delay." With the departure of General Harney all discord went with him. The island fell to us by the decision of Emperor Wilhelm I. of Germany, as arbitrator.

*Major Haller sailed at noon, August 3, 1859, two hours before the meeting of the officers was held, having orders to land Lieutenant Shaaff, Fourth infantry, with twenty men, at Semiahmoo, as a personal guard for Mr. Campbell.

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PERSISTENT FALSE HISTORY.

There are many statements published as history of Washington that are wholly groundless; there are two of them so often asserted that they are accepted as reliable and likely to crystallize into history. One persistently states that Dr. Marcus Whitman, by riding through midwinter's storms and snow, 1842-43, to Washington City, saved Oregon from the British, while the fact remains that nearly 1,000 emigrants had arrived in the country (1842) before the doctor had started. The other is even more persistently affirmed, to the effect that General Harney had saved to the United States the island of San Juan from the grasp of Great Britain by his timely occupation, and the gallant conduct of Captain Pickett.

The military occupation, as a matter of course, would be distasteful to Great Britain, and her minister in Washington City, immediately on hearing "that report had reached the city that troops of the United States had actually taken possession of the island of San Juan," demanded a prompt explanation. And we learn from his answer to the explanation:

"It is satisfactory to her majesty's government to learn as to the past, that General Harney did not act upon that occasion upon any order from the United States government, but entirely upon his own responsibility."

On the 20th of October, 1859, General Scott arrived first at Fort Vancouver, W. T., where he found Captain Pickett, judge advocate, and Colonel Casey, a member of the general court-martial in session there—made possible by the Solferino incident.

In concluding, I wish to say, inasmuch as General Harney is dead, and most all the officers connected with the military occupation, that this compilation may be like kicking a dead lion, but in justification of it I may refer to ex-Secretary of State of Washington Hon. Allen Weir, who, twenty years ago or more, published the Argus, in Port Townsend, and published a long article by me expressing the views herein, refuting his article persisting that General Harney had saved San Juan island to us, and President Buchanan and General Scott did a great wrong to the general through jealousy.

Respectfully submitted,

GRANVILLE O. HALLER,

Colonel U. S. A., retired (Captain and Brevet major, Commanding I Company, Fourth Infantry and Fort Townsend, Wash., in 1859.).

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