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HOUSE OF COMMONS

First Session—Twenty-seventh Parliament

1966-67

STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. DAVID W. GROOS

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 21

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 16, 1967

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 17, 1967

Respecting

Bill C-243, An Act to amend the National Defence Act and other Acts in consequence thereof.

WITNESSES:

General Charles Foulkes, C.B., and Mr. K. R. Patrick, O.B.E., C.D., D. ENG.

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY
OTTAWA, 1967

25770—1

STANDING COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. David W. Groos

Vice-Chairman: Hon. Marcel Lambert

Mr. Andras,
Mr. Brewin,
Mr. Churchill,
Mr. Deachman,
Mr. Ethier,
Mr. Forrestall,
Mr. Foy,
Mr. Harkness,
Mr. Langlois, (*Chicoutimi*),
Mr. Laniel,
Mr. Latulippe,
Mr. Lessard,
Mr. Loiselle,
Mr. Macaluso,
Mr. MacLean (*Queens*),
Mr. MacRae,
Mr. McIntosh,
Mr. McNulty,
Mr. Nugent,
Mr. Rochon,
Mr. Stafford,
Mr. Winch—(24).

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

THURSDAY, February 16, 1967
(36)

The Standing Committee on National Defence met at 8:10 p.m. this day, the Chairman, Mr. Groos, presiding.

Members present: Messrs. Andras, Churchill, Deachman, Éthier, Fane, Forrestall, Foy, Groos, Harkness, Langlois (*Chicoutimi*), Laniel, Lessard, Loiselle, Macaluso, McIntosh, McNulty, Nugent, Rochon, Stafford, and Mr. Winch (20).

Also present: Messrs. Herridge, Hopkins, Kindt, MacRae, Moore (*Wetaskiwin*), Pugh, Rock and Mr. Stanbury.

In attendance: General Charles Foulkes; *From the Department of National Defence:* Honourable Paul Hellyer, Minister; Honourable Léo Cadieux, Associate Minister.

The Chairman introduced General Charles Foulkes who read a prepared statement, copies of which were distributed to the members. General Foulkes was questioned concerning subjects referred to in his brief, his military career and on other defence matters.

At 10:10 p.m., with the questioning continuing, the Committee adjourned until Friday, February 17, 1967 at 9:30 a.m.

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

FRIDAY, February 17, 1967.
(37)

The Standing Committee on National Defence met at 9:40 a.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Groos, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Andras, Churchill, Deachman, Éthier, Foy, Groos, Langlois (*Chicoutimi*), Laniel, Lessard, Loiselle, Macaluso, MacLean (*Queens*), MacRae, McIntosh, McNulty, Nugent, Rochon, and Mr. Stafford (18).

Also present: Mr. Johnston.

In attendance: General Charles Foulkes; *From the Department of National Defence*: Honourable Paul Hellyer, Minister; Air Marshal F. R. Sharp, Vice-Chief Defence Staff; Major General M. R. Dare, Deputy Chief Reserves.

General Charles Foulkes continued to be questioned during this sitting of the Committee. The questioning concerned his presentation to the Committee at the previous sitting, his views on the implications of *Bill C-243*, and related defence matters.

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The Committee agreed to table a letter from Admiral Welland, dated February 17, 1967, which the Chairman read (Exhibit 1). The letter referred to the *question of privilege* raised by Mr. Deachman at the morning sitting on Thursday, February 16, 1967. Mr. Deachman stated that the point had been clarified to his satisfaction and the question of privilege was withdrawn.

The Chairman announced that a meeting of the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure would be held at 12:30 p.m. this day.

With the questioning of General Foulkes to be continued at the next sitting, the Committee adjourned until 2:30 p.m. this day.

AFTERNOON SITTING
(38)

The Standing Committee on National Defence met at 2:35 p.m. this day, the Chairman, Mr. Groos, presiding.

Members present: Messrs. Andras, Churchill, Deachman, Éthier, Foy, Groos, Langlois (*Chicoutimi*), Laniel, Lessard, Loiselle, MacLean (*Queens*), MacRae, McIntosh, McNulty, Nugent, Rochon, Stafford, and Mr. Winch (18).

Also present: Mr. Pugh and Mr. Woolliams.

In attendance: General Charles Foulkes; Mr. K. R. Patrick; *From the Department of National Defence*: Honourable Paul Hellyer, Minister; Honourable Léo Cadieux, Associate Minister; Air Marshal F. R. Sharp, Vice-Chief Defence Staff; Air Marshal E. M. Reyno, Chief of Personnel.

The Committee completed its questioning of General Charles Foulkes as the first order of business at this sitting. At approximately 3:35 p.m., the Chairman thanked General Foulkes for his testimony and the witness retired. The Committee recessed for five minutes.

The Committee resumed at 3:40 p.m. and the Chairman introduced the next witness, Mr. K. R. Patrick of Montreal. Mr. Patrick read a prepared statement, copies of which were distributed, along with the witness's biography.

Mr. Patrick was questioned by the members concerning his brief, his Service and business background and related defence matters.

The Chairman announced that the witness appearing on Monday, February 20, 1967, will be Lieutenant-General R. W. Moncel, and that the witnesses on Tuesday, February 21, 1967, will be Air Marshal C. Annis and Air Vice-Marshal M. Hendrick.

The Committee adjourned at 4:35 p.m., until February 20, 1967 at 3:30 p.m.

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

THURSDAY, February 16, 1967.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, we have a quorum

As you know, we have with us today General Foulkes, former chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. I do not think General Foulkes needs any introduction to anyone on this Committee. He is my former boss as chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, and he is now a neighbour of mine in Victoria.

I will ask General Foulkes if he will be kind enough to present his brief, but before he does so I would like to make my apologies to him for delaying his appearance before us. The fault was entirely mine, General Foulkes, and I am very glad to see you here this evening.

General C. FOULKES (C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., C.D.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman,

First of all, I want to apologize for the miserable piece of paper that you have before you I did not intend to provide this, but I was talking with your clerk and he said that you would appreciate any piece of paper to save you taking notes, even though it had a lot of mistakes in spelling, and in English, and so on.

The truth of the matter is that I did not expect to be called as a witness before this Committee. My written and spoken views on integration have been quoted and misquoted on both sides of this controversy, and I had come to the conclusion that nobody wanted to hear anything more from me on the subject. As a result, I was able to read myself into the picture only when I arrived from Victoria and was able to get the relevant documents. I have had to work around the clock to make these few observations. Since I have no secretary, or stenographer, I had to pump these out on a very old-fashioned portable typewriter that does not even know how to spell! I hope you will excuse these remarks, and I hope I did not make any rude remarks in pencil on the sides of this, which I did not intend you to see.

As you all well know, I appeared before this Committee three years ago. At that time I put forward my views on some of the current defence problems. At that meeting on October 22, 1963, as the result of a question put to me by Mr. Winch, I put forward an outline plan for the integration of the armed services. I am therefore gratified that you have given me the opportunity to comment on the final stages of this enterprise.

I thought it might be of interest to you to know that the outline I presented three years ago was based on a paper I was asked to produce for the RCAF Staff College Journal. I was down there giving a lecture and they asked me to produce a paper. This paper was rejected and returned to me as being too revolutionary for the RCAF Journal to take the risk of publishing. However, that plan did not visualize penetrating as deeply into the combat elements as does the plan before you.

Furthermore, the method of implementing the plan visualized a much slower pace and a less rugged approach. When this integration scheme was first introduced I was quite surprised that it was accepted so readily. However, perhaps this was only too obvious. The choice was between an increase in defence spending or the streamlining of the military machine; and of course, the choice for the government, as well as for the taxpayer was very easy.

After a very enthusiastic start, however, there arose a spate of rumours in the press and elsewhere about the slipping of morale and frustration and confusion in the officer corps. The confusion and frustration may have been the result of the over-emphasis on the forcible retirement scheme, but in my view the absence of an outline plan indicating the extent and ramifications of this scheme was also a prime factor.

It is my view that a lot of the frustration, confusion and criticism could have been avoided if more time had been spent in planning and producing at least a tentative outline plan, showing the various stages of the operation prior to commencing its implementation.

To illustrate what I mean, I was in Ottawa during the early stages of the implementation of this scheme. I naturally asked a question about an outline plan. I was interested because I was aware that a copy of my outline plan, in some detail, was available in the headquarters. I was told that there was no blueprint, there was no phased plan, and that the details would be hammered out as they arose. It appeared to me that with such a complex problem, affecting the future of a lot of Canadians, more suitable implements would have been a sharp pencil and a big, big, big eraser. Mistakes made with a hammer are quite permanent, and they can sometimes, be quite painful.

Another issue which has come in for a lot of criticism has been the lack of authentic information. Information was replaced by rumour and conjecture, which no doubt disturbed the morale of the forces. A feeling has grown up that it is the system that is all-important, that everything else must give way to the adoption of complete uniformity. In this frenzy for uniformity it seems to me that we have forgotten that the services are made up of individuals, of Canadians with likes and dislikes, who do not like to be pushed about or treated as numbers or as punch holes in a computer card. This, Mr. Chairman, in my view, is the surest way of breaking down the morale of any force.

So much has been said about this question of morale, some of it by those who have neither knowledge of, nor experience in, combat. That I hesitate to add any views of mine. However, I would like to quote from an unquestionable source, and a real expert in this field of morale. One of the foremost exponents in the development of high morale is Field Marshal Montgomery. As you are all aware he took over the command of the Eighth Army at a time when morale was at a very low ebb as the result of the retreat back to the borders of Egypt. Within a few weeks of close personal relationship between "Monty" and his troops, a better morale was established. After a terrific battle at El Alamein, Rommel's forces were defeated, the tide of the war in the Middle East was changed, and the morale of the Eighth Army was never higher.

As many of you know, "Monty" used to visit his troops and explain his battle plans in this kind of a vein—he used to say: "Battles, battles; I love battles. Let us talk about this big battle." He would say to the troops:

> There are only two people important in this battle, I, Monty, who make the big plan, and you Joe Snooks who carry it out; in between there are a lot of other people, you know, generals and staff officers, but they do not count for much; it is you and I who are the important people in this battle.

He would go to no end to explain the general outline of his battle, and what he wanted the troops to do. Then he would say: "You know what I want. I am sure you will provide it." He knew the psychology of the soldier, and he got the best results.

I am just beginning to wonder if we are not forgetting about this question of understanding the psychology of the fighting soldiers. In his memoirs, "Monty" says this about morale of the serviceman:

> He can think, he can appreciate, and he is definitely prepared to criticize. He wants to know what is going on, and what you want him to do, and why and when. He wants to know, in doing it that his best interests will be absolutely secure in your hands.

Mr. Chairman, I strongly urge that those responsible for implementing unification ponder over these remarks, especially over the last sentence:

> He wants to know, in doing it, that his best interests will be absolutely secure in your hands.

Another factor contribiting to the deterioration of morale is the lack of authentic information on the extent and the implications of this scheme and of its effect on the career and livelihood of every serviceman. Both Field Marshals Montgomery and Slim, in their discussions on the maintenance of high morale, stress the constant need for authentic statements by the man at the top in order to combat rumours and conjectures that breed uncertainty, fear and resentment.

This question of keeping men fully informed is not just an army morale problem. Admiral Arleigh Burke, former Chief of Naval operations in the U.S., and a man who had a very distinguished career during World War II, writes about the sad effect of the lack of information. Actually, Mr. Chairman, this appears in the appendix of the procedures of this Committee. This is what Admiral Burke says:

> In every case of a breakdown in discipline or morale, four major factors have been present:
>
> 1. Lack of information. Subordinates were not kept informed of the problems or of the reasons why organization was required to take the action it did.

It is my view that this integration scheme could have been sold to the troops, and their worst fears would have been removed, if clear and precise briefings had been given. But who could do this? The Chiefs of Staff had been removed; the new Chief of the Defence Staff was immersed in the re-organization of the headquarters; and the commanders at the various commands were as much in the dark as the troops. There is no doubt that a titular head of each service should have been maintained, even in a temporary capacity, to give some

assurance to the troops that their interests were being looked after. He could have badgered the top for enough information to combat rumours and conjectures.

I believe that the steps taken last August, after the spate of criticism about the lack of information, which was discussed this afternoon, though a bit late, were in the right direction. It is hoped that through the Canadian Forces Council the field commanders will be kept thoroughly informed and will be encouraged to put forward their views and criticize any new proposals before they become policy.

Mr. Chairman, I want to stress this particular point, that the proposals should be put to the commanders and that they should be allowed to discuss the proposals and criticize them for all they are worth. If they can find fault with them, what will the enemy do? Then, when they become policy, everybody gets behind it and pushes it. If that is not done, and somebody says something about policy that they have not heard of before, they are accused of being disloyal. The way to avoid that is to make sure that all the proposals are put to these commanders beforehand and that their criticism and views are wanted. You then will have a policy that everybody will support.

I am sure, in this way, the views of those who have to carry out these policies can be heard, and a closer touch maintained between the combat elements and the staff.

Another point that has distressed me, and, I believe, many other former officers, has been the comparatively large number of experienced senior officers who have severed their connections with the services at a time when experience, knowledge and insight are of such importance in solving the vast number of problems which will continue to arise before unification is completed.

I am well aware that the emphasis today is on youth, but senior officers with command experience are becoming scarce. Although there are many brilliant young officers coming forward with briefcases full of theoretical answers, the successful completion of this experiment requires the levelling influence of those who know the exacting demands of active operations and the steps that are necessary to prepare the troops to meet hostilities. I am aware that senior officers are classed as "Blimps" and are accused of always preparing to fight the last war. However, I would remind you that some of the most brilliant leaders in the last war, such as, MacArthur, Marshall, Alexander, Montgomery and Slim all had distinguished careers in World War I.

It is hoped that very soon this question of unification will be finalized in Parliament and that the acute differences between the politicians and the military will disappear. Then perhaps the politician will regain confidence in his military advisors. I can assure you, gentlemen, that nothing has disturbed me more, having been a chief of staff for 15 years, than seeing this deterioration of the close relation that should exist between the military advisor and the politician.

It is not implied that the politician should always agree and not probe very deeply into the military advice he is given, and, indeed, overrule this advice if, in his opinion, the political considerations are paramount and the government is prepared to take the military risk. On the other hand, the politician must not become his own advisor, or discount, or downgrade, responsible advice, on the grounds of conjecture and opinion, arising from other sources. Even the great

Churchill, who had an abundance of military knowledge and practical experience, and who gave his advisors a very tough time, never overruled them on military grounds. Field Marshal Alanbrooke, who was his chief of staff throughout the war, says this in his memoirs:

> At Whitehall, because power rested with the defence minister, who, though not in awe of his service advisors and ready to harry them mercilessly, would never in their own sphere override them, or allow them to be overridden.

As I mentioned earlier, Mr. Chairman, I sincerely hope that the difficult days between the politician and his military advisors are over.

I would now like to make a few observations about the bill and its supporting papers. I would remind you that I had very little time to give these the scrutiny that I would have wished.

After studying the bill, the explanation in *Hansard* and the papers submitted by the staff I have been left with the impression—and I want to emphasize that this is an impression—that modern techniques, efficiency and tidy administration seem to be the predominant features. I am allergic to the expression and the meaning of "tidy administration", because of my own experience with it in the war.

Perhaps I should explain this. In Italy, because of the shortage of reinforcements, and to save the staff a lot of trouble, it was proposed to me that we should have a tidy system of reinforcing, and that we should abandon the other system we had whereby units were reinforced only through men from their own units—from the 2nd battalion, or the 3rd battalion, or people from the base, or at least from their own province. Now, I refused to accept this tidy scheme that they proposed to me, where they would keep them in a general pool and send up to the units anybody they liked. I did this on the ground that such action would place new recruits, who had never beeen under fire, among strangers—with men with whom they had few common contacts—and that this would not build up the men's morale.

Perhaps this is not the right thing for me to say to a federal body, but from my experience in war we are still a very provincial country. To have placed a Cape Bretoner with the Queen's Own would have caused a riot in both camps. Combat operations have made it quite clear to me that men fight much better if they are beside people who have the same characteristics, the same likes and dislikes and who talk the same language. We cannot get away from this human element in combat. I believe the aims of tidy administration often mean that men are being pushed about to make it easier for staff officers. I suggest that this Committee should look extremely carefully at the idea of tidy administration and having everybody working on rule-of-thumb, without bearing in mind that they are individuals.

Mr. Chairman, after reading the supporting papers I find myself a bit puzzled about just what our military roles are today. I may be a bit behind the times, but it seems to me that you cannot decide on the organization and the management until you have crystal clear what you are going to do; what the tasks are that you are going to carry out. Some years ago we used to say that all our defence resources, both in being and potential, were for the defence of the NATO area. Actually, we used to show all our defence appropriation as expenditures for NATO and, perhaps we still do; it does look good in NATO circles. But

on participation in collective defence arrangements our role is limited to raising, training and equipping force contributions. Strategic planning for NATO is done by the NATO military authorities in line with strategical guidance given by the Council. The operational planning is done by the supreme allied commanders. Even in peace-keeping activities the Secretary General provides the strategic and operational guidance for the forces.

As I said earlier, I hope this is just an error and not a notice of an intention.

I am somewhat concerned also by the vague statements in the White Paper, and in some recent publicity about the mobile force, regarding the provision of air ground support, which appears on page 22 of the White Paper and is also reflected in other papers.

In the White Paper, at page 22, it says this:

> The plan calls for the squadrons stationed in Europe to be associated-...more directly with the army brigade group. It is recognized, however, that this kind of association on a national basis may not be practical without some adjustment in the present NATO military organization in Europe.

I would have liked to have seen a period after the word "practical".

> Such an adjustment, if necessary, will be the subject of consultation with NATO. Squadrons in Canada would be available for training in close association with ground forces. Thus, ground and air forces would complement each other in a manner which has not been possible in the past.

This is perhaps a very laudable national slogan, but it constitutes a considerable waste of air support, and it would create the most chaotic air situation if every brigade in Europe decided to have its own private air support.

Anyone who has exercised higher command in war, or who has been engaged in planning at SHAPE, or who has even been exposed to SHAPE exercises, will be aware that the cardinal principle dealing with the operation of air forces is that of maintaining the maximum centralization of these forces. Parcelling them out in penny packages is most wasteful and creates complete chaos in the air over a battlefield and a grave risk that many of our aircraft will be shot down by the neighbouring forces.

During the last war, when close support was developed to a very high degree, air force groups were never centralized below army. If the corps, or division wanted air support they were alloted a certain number of sorties over a fixed time, and an air controller would arrive at the headquarters and he would control the air strike as dictated by the ground commander. On certain occasions, under ideal conditions—that is, where the weather was excellent and where we knew exactly where our forward troops were and where they were going to move—they sometimes would set up what is known as a cab rank—five or six aircraft immediately above the area where you were fighting—and these could be called down for strikes in front of our own troops; but this was an exception, and had to be done extremely carefully, because what you wanted to do was to kill the enemy, not your own troops. But control of the air forces would immediately go back to army as soon as that operation was finished.

Those who have not had experience, and who aspire to be pseudo-experts, would benefit by reading Lord Tedder's recent book, "With Prejudice". This most distinguished air commander outlines the problems of dealing with air

forces, both large and small, and he continually emphasizes throughout his book the necessity for centralized control of the air elements.

Some recent publicity indicates that Mobile Command visualizes the use of close aircraft support for ground troops in flank protection, similar to the exercise which was carried out in Norway by the Black Watch. This appeared to be a feasible operation, provided a rough air field had been smoothed off, and also defended, and that arrangements were made with the Norwegians that they would be allowed to use it.

Here, again, I think the principle of collective balanced forces should be exercised, and that we should ascertain whether we could not make arrangements with the Norwegians who could much easier have air forces available than to take them from Canada to do this kind of a task.

We know a lot about conditions in northern Norway. It may surprise the Committee to know that the Canadians were committed to Norway on two occasions during the last war and that on both occasions they were withdrawn because the conditions were such that General McNaughton felt that we would be tied there for the whole war. Anyone who has been in northern Norway will know just how difficult the conditions are for the operation of troops, especially with air support.

Therefore, I think we should realize that even though it looks all right to say, "We will support them with air support," there may be days when, because of flying conditions they will not get any support. Therefore, an alternative type of ground support may have to be provided in any case.

I think it might be helpful to this Committee if one of these cost effectiveness studies that we hear about were carried out to show the relative costs of providing ground support for a force going to Norway, by missiles, and then by aircraft.

There is no doubt that if close support is to be provided by the air force a training squadron is necessary, but it is equally important that our forces should stick to the established NATO system of using ground support, so that any of our forces could accept ground support from any of the Allied force elements.

I would remind you that when we start training on air support ourselves we are apt to think we can do it better than somebody else and develop a system of our own, but that is not very good if you are going to have to operate with other troops. It is far better to have a less efficient system which is understood and known by all the Allies.

On page 23 of the White Paper the use of ground support in air defence was suggested. It says this:

> Some of the squadrons stationed in Canada would also contribute to air defence as required, thereby eliminating the necessity of acquiring special aircraft for this purpose.

I presume that this suggestion will now be cancelled because the high performance aircraft mentioned in the White Paper have been replaced by the CF-5.

Mr. Chairman, I have a few more comments of the matters in *Hansard* in the explanation of the bill.

On page 10828, it states as follows:

> The force structure is comprised of force units which may be used individually or in combination, depending upon the military task undertaken. The force units are the infantry companies...

To say that the basic infantry ground force unit is an infantry company, that it may operate separately from its battalion with not only a variety of supporting arms but can be expected to operate with support from other force media, is to say the least, a very novel idea, and looks to me to be unification with a vengeance.

Most company commanders whom I have contacted find they have enough to do in keeping their platoons moving forward and keeping the battalion informed of their position so that our own artillery will not shoot them up without suggesting that they should be able to accept and control close ground support.

The only situation which I have been able to dream up where a company may operate with other media would be in the nature of a commando operation where a certain group of infantry soldiers would be put on a ship, perhaps to be landed on a beach, or to carry out some remote operational task; but these are specialized operations and not the normal operations of ground troops.

Here again, in spite of the suggested change in emphasis put forward in Air Marshal Sharp's paper, our main ground force effort is still in NATO. We have a whole division's worth committed to NATO, but in a rather confused circumstance. We cannot glibly go around and abandon the accepted and well-proven principle of using the infantry division as the basic ground element. Brigade groups were used, as I well know, in 1939, in the United Kingdom, in a scheme to repel invasion. This was done because communications were scarce and extremely vulnerable.

Similar use of small groups was tried in the desert in 1943, with rather disastrous results. One of the first things that "Monty" did when he went to Egypt was to forbid any operation of brigade groups, or of columns, or any of these other fancy things that they had put into effect. He laid down the dictum that from then on we would fight with divisions; and that stuck. He wanted it made quite clear to everybody that in his view, and there is no doubt it is not an isolated view, the division is the smallest ground element that can fight a sustained battle. You can add to it but you cannot split it up.

I am well aware of the difficulty in Canada because we have not got a division, and therefore we do try to make our brigade groups look like little divisions. Now we are going to try to make our battalions and companies look like—well, I do not know what.

I think this needs a great deal of looking at, because it breaks down all the principles which have been used over the many years in fighting battles.

I would like to make an observation now on this "Career Serviceman Concept" which was mentioned this afternoon. This concept calls for an initial engagement for 5 years, followed by an indefinite period of enrolment. While this concept is very satisfactory for the sedative positions in the force, it fails to appreciate the military necessity of keeping the combat elements youthful, alert, virile and efficient. These categories include combat pilots, platoon commanders and other close support offices, as well as NCO's and men.

Our experience in the last conflict showed that very few front line combat officers could stand the strain beyond the age of 27 or 30. Judging by the reports from Viet Nam combat is still a young man's business.

Therefore, a requirement exists for short-term commissions and for enhanced retirement schemes for those who become too old for combat and cannot be placed in sedative employment.

For men and NCO's the five-year engagement would look to be ideal from an age standpoint, but would create quite a training problem. To re-engage junior NCO's and men for an indefinite period would tend to worsen the problem. A short engagement requires the Commanding Officer to make a reassessment of the man's capabilities for continuing in combat training for another period. The man's age is always considered carefully, and if there is any doubt the man is not re-engaged.

By this proposed system, once a man is re-engaged he would have to be dismissed if he starts to slip at the start of his new engagement. I do not think this is very fair because if a man is dismissed it will place upon him a stigma which would not be an asset when seeking civil employment.

This problem of keeping the combat element of a voluntary force youthful has never been solved. It is solved in other countries where they have compulsory military training because you get your recruits and your junior officers all coming up very, very young and all leaving after their term is up. In a voluntary force you do not get that, and therefore we have to look at the situation as it exists and not try to deal with it, as you would through a computer, that everybody should be able to do his task up to his age limit.

It seems to me, in looking over these papers and plans, that this idea of looking after the combat element has been almost completely forgotten. I was amazed, in reading Air Marshal Reyno's paper, that I could not find the word "combat" at all, and not a word about what is going to be done with the combat officer who gets to be a little too old.

As I pointed out at the beginning of my testimony, I feel some responsibility in this field because I have been recommending integration for a good many years. I am rather concerned that, in the urge to create the most economical and efficient and ubiquitous system, the primary purpose of military management has been overlooked. It has been forgotten that the main purpose of the system is to assist in every way the serviceman to do his front line task where and when he is required to do it.

Mr. Chairman, with your indulgence, this "Blimp" would like to conclude his remarks with a few words to those who are responsible for implementing the final stages of unification and for translating the agreed policy, whatever it is, and the import of this bill into regulations and guidance for the commanders of the unified force. Here they are.

There will be many new and difficult problems, many unusual situations, and a host of unseen difficulties to be overcome. There will be an incessant urge in this mechanical age for uniformity because it looks better on a graph; fits better in the computer system and provides for tidy administration. But you must ensure that the human element is considered and that the regulations serve as well as restrict the servicemen.

The staff officer must continue to remind himself that he is the servant and not the master of the combat forces. It is they who will win or lose the battle.

These combat troops are all volunteers who think for themselves, abhor being treated as numbers and holes in a punch card, to be pushed about and kept in the dark, and then expected to do their damnedest when they go on the battlefield.

Experience in three wars shows that the Canadian will rise to the occasion and commit himself well if he is properly trained, properly equipped, well led, and has confidence in himself and those who lead him; but if any of these criteria are neglected he is confused, dejected and disinterested in fighting the battle.

If this unified force is to be the success its sponsors hope, if it is to satisfy the Canadian defence requirements of the next decade, it must not only meet the wishes and ambitions of those serving today but must be able to attract the youth of tomorrow. Therefore, the image of the new force must have appeal, plenty of advantages and the fewest possible restrictions, if it is expected to attract the youth of tomorrow to serve in the ranks, and the college student to seek a career in this new force.

This will be the first test of the unification scheme. I sincerely hope that the ultimate test of battle is never made necessary.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN: I am looking around for questioners now. I have Mr. Andras, and Mr. Laniel and Mr. McIntosh.

Are you ready to answer questions, sir.

Mr. FOULKES: Any time.

Mr. ANDRAS: General Foulkes, may I congratulate you most sincerely on your very comprehensive, sound and down-to-earth presentation. I think it is one of the ones with the most meat on policy issues that we have had. There is a little nostalgia in reading it when you refer to cab ranks and air support to infantry, and so forth. It rather takes me back to my days as platoon commander, when I was most appreciative of bringing in Typhoons and so forth, but a little worried that they were coming awfully close to us, too.

Sir, as I would interpret your general thought behind this, you are in favour of the reorganization of the forces but are a little concerned, perhaps, about the method that has developed and the controversy that has developed; that you have a great desire to see the military and the civilian authorities forget their bruised feelings; and a certain apprehension about the role.

I go back, sir, to your conviction, as expressed on October 14, 1961, which starts off with something that certainly I, in my brief study of the situation, would agree with, which is that drastic changes are needed, or I would say, were needed, in the organization of the Canadian defence forces.

Later on you explain some of the frustrations, perhaps, and the problems that you encountered as the chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee in seeing this program furthered; because I understand that at that time, sir, you did draw up a plan yourself, or in consultation with other officers. When you were with the Chiefs of Staff Committee you did draw up a plan to integrate Canada's armed forces in 1961; is that correct?

Mr. FOULKES: That is correct. There is a paper.

Mr. ANDRAS: I beg your pardon.

Mr. FOULKES: That is the paper I referred to. It was in the possession of National Defence when they started this.

Mr. ANDRAS: What was the reaction in 1961 to the proposals that you must have made at that stage?

Mr. FOULKES: Well, let me make this quite clear. By 1961 I had retired and the paper I mentioned was one that I prepared for the RCAF Staff College Journal. The Staff College Journal rejected this paper as being too revolutionary—I had spent several months preparing this comprehensive paper, including the various stages, and so on, and one day, in a very loose moment, I gave it to a journalist who said that he would like to publish a popular edition. That is what you are referring to, I presume.

Mr. ANDRAS: Yes.

Mr. FOULKES: The popular edition appeared in the Toronto *Star Weekly*.

Mr. ANDRAS: Yes, in the *Star Weekly*; that is the extract that I have. In that article you go into the problem that lead to the statement that drastic reorganizations were needed and you say: "The problem can only be solved by the complete unification of the three services, with one Chief of Staff, one chain of command, one ladder of promotion and one uniform". Basically, as a principle, do you still feel that that is a sound approach to it?

Mr. FOULKES: Yes; I have not changed my mind on the necessity for change. I think that there has been too much stress on the last item, but I agree that there needed to be a change.

There are various versions of how far that change is necessary, on which you can question me.

Mr. ANDRAS: Further on you mentioned that it seemed—and I presume that you were referring to that time when you made certain recommendations—that one single Canadian armed service was about to be born at any time, and then suddenly it was dropped. You also indicate that certain obstacles were encountered from then on.

Could you give us some information on the type of obstacle that at that stage seemed to be preventing the furtherance of this program that you say that you believe in?

Mr. FOULKES: I went into this subject very thoroughly on October 22, when I gave the history of this problem. I will go over it again, if you wish.

Mr. ANDRAS: I would appreciate it if you would, sir.

Mr. FOULKES: As I pointed out at that time, when Mr. Brooke Claxton took over as Minister of National Defence he decided to push the three services together. At that time the army was separate—the army and the navy had been under one minister before that—and the air force had its own minister. Mr. Claxton was appointed as the first minister, and he decided that he was going to have organization of the services into one.

He set about and reorganized the administration. As you know, formerly there were these deputy ministers. He put the whole thing together and he had one administration on a functional basis.

At the same time he suggested to me that he would like to do the same thing with the services, and at that time we drew up a plan for one service.

I do not know the real background of this—I can only suspect it—but when I did talk to Brooke Claxton one day about how far he was going to go with it he

told me then that he would have to drop it; that he had expected to come into the department for a short time, knock the chiefs of staff's heads together to get them thinking alike and then he was going to be moved to another department. The story had it that Mr. King told him that he had made a very good bed and that he had better sleep in it. Mr. Claxton found that he would have to wait a bit. He said that he had enough troubles on his hands, and that he was not going any farther with integration.

That started the set-up of a whole series of committees. That is when the committee fever started; in other words, integration by committee, and the start of committee hearings.

Mr. ANDRAS: When was that?

Mr. FOULKES: That was in 1946 and 1947.

Mr. ANDRAS: General Foulkes, with radical or drastic change, and people being human, would it not be natural to run into the resistance of a very sincere affection for tradition, and so forth? If I correctly read the tone of your article in 1961, it is one of recognition of the fact that anyone attempting to make this novel, radical and, as you said, revolutionary recommendation would naturally run into some considerable resistance; that it was just almost inevitable that there would have to be some upsets and possible effect on morale and so forth; that the ultimate goal that you were espousing would make it worthwhile, but one that would have to be prepared for a rought time in the middle?

Mr. FOULKES: I think you will have to realize that there was a lot of groundwork done on integration. As you all well know, in the National Defence Act discipline was all put on one basis. A great deal of work was done long before this integration, in the expectation that some day or other we would reach this goal.

Actually, while I was still chairman of the chiefs of staff I set up a committee on the staff level, headed by then Brigadier Rothschild, and he held a series of meetings with the services over a period of three or four months to discuss an outline plan for integration not too different from the one we are talking about. This was discussed at the chiefs of staff level on many, many occasions.

In 1963 when I was here, I think I remarked that the attitude of the chiefs was: "Yes; we believe in integration, but please do not do it while I am here. I do not want to be known as the chief of staff who ruined these services." This was the natural attitude of an officer who had come all the way up through the service, who was responsible for the welfare of this service, and not only to those in the service but to the institutions which supported it. Although they all supported it they were not so keen to go ahead with it during their tenure of office.

When Mr. Pearkes became Minister this plan was put to him and it received favourable consideration, but again it was felt that it was a bit too revolutionary, and Mr. Pearkes decided to start at the bottom and see what he could do about getting common services. This led to the amalgamation of the medical service and the chaplain service. It did not do much good. All we did in the chaplain service was to create two new brigadiers.

Mr. HARKNESS: That was a religious problem rather than a military problem.

Mr. FOULKES: There are two ways to Heaven!

Mr. ANDRAS: I have taken the view, sir—and I would not presume to suggest that I have anywhere near the knowledge of others—that in order for it to work an integrated process of command almost had to start from the top and work down, rather than work up. I just do not see how it would be practical for it to work the other way. Would you agree, or disagree, with that?

Mr. FOULKES: I entirely agree; and this plan shows that.

Mr. ANDRAS: In your presentation of 1961 you said:

> After my nine years as Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff, trying to co-ordinate the rival services, I am convinced that we can't achieve much more by the present road. Attempts to integrate the three services by persuasion have been going on ever since 1945. They have woven a huge spider's web of committees, which are rather like foreign ministers' meetings where rival powers try to reach a compromise.

You then go on to say:

> The problem can only be solved by complete unification of the three services, with one chief of staff, one chain of command, one ladder of promotion and one uniform.

I know this is a leading question but, generally speaking, I presume you would still agree with that statement of policy-conviction, at least?

Mr. FOULKES: That is correct; and I do not think in my statement tonight I refuted anything of that.

Mr. ANDRAS: Thank you very much.

Mr. FOY: If I could ask a supplementary question you could take me off the list. It arises from Mr. Andras' questions of the General and I do not propose to be repetitious.

Referring to the *Star Weekly* article about the single unified Canadian armed service general, could you tell us if there is any difference between your thoughts then, and the single unified Canadian armed forces in this present bill?

Mr. FOULKES: I think there are degrees to unification, as I tried to point out tonight. I must say that I am very, very alarmed when unification goes down to the company. This, to me, does not make any military sense whatever. Bring the forces together, by all means, but when you get down into an organization like a battalion and they are suggesting that you break up battalions, and you have companies running around—this does not make too much sense. Even in the army's ground forces theory, we did not break up battalions; we fought in divisions. I must say that the view that I had on integration, which appeared in this paper, was that we would form task forces. For instance, for air defence there would be task forces of air forces, and of ground troops if we were going to do rocketry or something like that; from Maritime forces there would be air forces and naval forces; but it did not visualize getting down to saying that we were going to mix them all completely so that you would have companies trying to be unified. This, I think, is a completely new concept to me.

Mr. FOY: I appreciate that. Thank you very much, General.

Mr. LANIEL: General, I think that you have made a very fatherly approach to this problem of unification and integration. You have given us your advice and recommendations and you have also told us of your worries about possible

mistakes. Do you feel that up until now there have been very, very great mistakes made at the level of integration of command by the elimination of the chiefs of staff of the three services and by the changes in the composition of the chiefs of staff defence council?

Mr. FOULKES: As far as the organization is concerned, of course, I am entirely in agreement that there should be one chief of staff this is the only way you could make it work.

The comment I made tonight and, again, they are mainly on the way to implement this—and in the plan that I proposed was to keep the chiefs of staff in being, along with the chairman, because I foresaw all kinds of difficulties and service problems which would have to be solved by someone who has really an expert in the particular service. I also foresaw that we had to keep up the morale; and, furthermore, if we got into difficulties that we ought to get down on our knees and thank the Almighty God that we did not get into war while this confusion was going on, because we would be completely useless, having no one at the top.

It is my view that you could have accomplished this by keeping the chiefs of staff there and making them responsible for implementing these changes and then having the chairman take over at the last part of it.

The first thing that I foresaw to be done was to reorganize and get all the personnel into a personnel command and to get all the administration unified; and when the administration was unified and you had the logistics in shape you would then abolish the chiefs of staff and have one chairman.

Mr. LANIEL: Yes, but—

Mr. FOULKES: So any organization that I know of if you cut its head off you are going to have trouble.

Mr. LANIEL: The concept of one single chief of staff does not exclude his getting advice from the commanders of the different commands?

Mr. FOULKES: But there are no heads. The head of the service can get all the advice he likes, but when you have the air force, or the army and you take away the top, the man whom the troops look up to as the man who is going to look after their interests, then, as I say, who is going to inform the troops of those decisions? You cannot get along in an organization without a head of some kind, and until you are ready to move them all into one you must keep the organization which can control it.

Mr. LANIEL: How could you really integrate and unify and keep three chiefs of staff, one for each service, if the services are unified?

Mr. FOULKES: It takes some time to unify. The plan unification is not settled yet, and we have had no heads of the services for two or three years.

Mr. LANIEL: But you must admit that integration is a first step towards unification. That is what was said and what was meant to be. However, I will leave that topic for the moment.

My next question relates to your last remark that there was a lack of authentic information at different levels. Do you not agree that for a project of this size and magnitude everything could not have been planned in detail, and because the Minister stated in the White Paper that the project was not an

immutable one—that it could be altered or adapted to meet the requirements of the changing circumstances—is it not re-assuring that nothing will be done to upset everything before the right solution is discovered step by step.

Mr. FOULKES: You made a remark that it is not possible to make an outlined plan. Let me suggest to you that I was able to do it—an outlined plan in three stages. I am sure that if the staff had been given the job they could have sat down and made an outlined plan. I am not suggesting that the outlined plan would reflect the final solution, but it would be at least a design. When you start to build a house you insist on the contractor bringing you a fairly detailed plan, and it is rather costly. You can make changes on it—you can put a verandah on and make the cellar smaller, but you must start out knowing exactly where you are going. If you want to have the confidence of people you do not say that you are just going to make changes; you explain what the changes are and what you have in mind. I think this is what has caused some of the trouble. You may say that it is better to keep flexible and not reveal what you have in your mind, but that is very upsetting for the people in the organization.

Mr. LANIEL: Yes, sir, but I imagine even your plan was quite general and it would not have satisfied all the levels of our military forces because each level would want to know what effect it will have on them.

Mr. FOULKES: This is it. Mind you, the final plan is not so very greatly different than what you have today; the broad concept is pretty much the same.

Mr. LANIEL: The reason you seem to still give, maybe with reservation—I do not know; I did not get that impression—support to integration and unification after all that has been said, I imagine, is influenced by the fact that you must still have confidence in those men who are there to implement it and you must have confidence that they will take into consideration the advice of experienced military people like yourself and others on military matters. In your brief you also put emphasis on the personal feeling of the combat men.

Mr. FOULKES: Let us get this quite clear: I am still an ardent advocate of integration—I always have been and I always will be—but the issues I am raising today relate to the questions of implementations, not the question of unification or integration at all. Some of these changes are quite radical and I want to make sure that they are not implemented without giving adequate consideration to those whom it effects. This is my concern, and mind you, I certainly have had plenty of correspondence on this matter over the last three or four years. I am sometimes held as the one responsible for introducing this scheme. As a matter of fact, one newspaper published an article saying that I was in the pay of the Liberals. If I am I just want to remind Mr. Hellyer that he is five years behind in his credit.

Mr. LANIEL: To go into another area of questioning, you said that you had reservations about our future military policies, as set out in the White Paper in different priorities. I think that you look at this in the concept of a big general war or an emergency that might happen. Do you believe that such an emergency could happen in this world of today?

Mr. FOULKES: I was not looking for an emergency; I was just quoting what is in the White Paper and trying to interpret it, and to point out that in my view it is not definite enough. I would like to see a clear and

concise statement as to where we are going to stand in regard to our commitments in Europe. We have one brigade in the forward role, as I pointed out, committed with heavy equipment; we have two brigades that are going to be re-equipped and retrained on a mobile basis, yet we still have a commitment to provide a division to NATO. How are we going to do it? Is the government proposing to change the role of that brigade forward and make it a completely mobile brigade so that we can have a mobile division, as I have suggested, or what is going to happen? There has been no indication of what the situation is going to be there, and certainly I am concerned about this concept that we are going to have a couple of brigades ready to go anywhere in the world to settle disputes. We have not really thought about or, if we have, we have not really said how this is going to be accomplished. This is what worries me—the indefiniteness.

Mr. LANIEL: I see your point, but do you think that a country the size of Canada could have an army that we as Canadians would be proud of in peacetime? I am thinking of a force that could be made available for different purposes. In this way we could show to the rest of the world that we want to assume our small share of responsibility by providing either a deterrent or peacekeeping force with the defence of Canada and things like that in mind. Is it possible for Canada to have such a force?

Mr. FOULKES: I am not one of these people who believes that Canada should be trying to show the world how good we are. I am talking purely about defence. What we should do is to try and make the best possible contribution that we can to keeping the peace; that is our greatest aim in the military field. We have tried to do that by making contributions to NATO, and I think we have done a very, very good job. What I am worried about is the suggestion that we are going to change our emphasis and that we are going to slacken up on our support of NATO and put that support somewhere else. I do not know about this kind of vague talk, but it is up to the Minister to change the emphasis and so on. I think we want to be quite sure what we are going to do or our staff officers cannot interpret that into plans. I think it is just a bit too indefinite.

Mr. LANIEL: But do you not think that even NATO itself is changing—

Mr. FOULKES: Yes, it is changing.

Mr. LANIEL:—because of political situations in Europe?

Mr. FOULKES: But should we not be changing our views on NATO too? Should we not withdraw that brigade from the forward role, where it is not very good? And I do not want to argue this case here because we would be getting into security problems. We would have made more sense, if we had our whole mobile division, providing a mobile brigade in Europe with two mobile brigades here. That seems to me to be a pretty sensible military order but today it is mixed up. We have two brigades and we do not know what they are going to do in Europe. You may know but I do not know because I have never been told.

Mr. LANIEL: May I ask one more question, please. When you spoke of our air support you said that we want to cut it down to the lowest level. How can we do it when we have a good part of our air component assigned to NORAD, some assigned to anti-submarine warfare, and whatever we have left at this time earmarked to NATO unless we change and try to build up a fourth component of

the air force—a big component. How could we completely support an army, if our brigade was back in Canada? If we brought our brigade back to Canada would we have to bring also our air force?

Mr. FOULKES: I think you misunderstood me completely. I was suggesting that our brigade in Europe should stay there but in a mobile role, not in a forward heavy role; and that the two brigades here should be equally equipped and so on so that we could make them into a mobile division. As it is now, we still have a commitment to send a division to NATO and we cannot meet that commitment.

Mr. LANIEL: I see your point.

Mr. FOULKES: As far as the air force is concerned, it is the last thing I want to do. All I am suggesting is that we do not break them up into penny packages. If we are going to make a support to NATO make it a support to collective forces. When we went into this NATO business I recall the instructions I received from the Prime Minister at the time, Mr. St. Laurent, and they were to provide NATO with the best kind of contribution that Canada could make to the NATO forces, and to make quite sure that this was what NATO wanted—a contribution as a nation, not necessarily the kind that would make Canada look better, but the kind of thing that would help the alliance. I think our thinking has moved away from interdependence; we are trying to think what we can do by ourselves. Canada has never been able to do anything by herself. I heard a discussion this afternoon as to whether the air materiel command could support it. Let us get this clear: In operations we cannot support ourselves anywhere. In World War I the British supported us; in World War II the British supported us again; in Korea we had to get support from the United States. We cannot support our forces overseas with anything like the kind of economy that is necessary. We have to depend on our allies. If war was declared tomorrow our brigade in Europe is still supported by the British; our air division is supported by the United States. We in Canada, with defence expenditures of about $1½ billion, cannot support forces overseas; we have to depend on our allies.

Mr. MCINTOSH: General, I was going to begin my remarks by telling you how much I appreciate the information that you have given to us but I see my time is limited so I will just endorse the opening remarks of my colleague, Mr. Andras.

I would like to make this comment: You said that some of the press has accused you of being in the pay of the Liberals. I just might say that although you would be politically opposite to what my beliefs are I wish that you still were in the pay of the Liberals.

During the opening part of your statement and practically all through it, you seemed to be dealing with the term "integration" and, did so with a great deal of confidence. However, you became very vague toward the latter part of your brief when you started dealing with the word "unification". I think perhaps one of the problems that has confronted this Committee has to do with the difference between "integration" and "unification".

Could you give us your definition or understanding of what you think unification means.

Mr. FOULKES: It is completely beyond me. I thought I knew what integration meant when we used to talk about it but I am beginning to have some doubts,

after visiting this Committee, where integration stops and unification begins. I think I made myself abundantly clear when I said that I am greatly alarmed when a suggestion is made that we start to unify or integrate, or whatever you like to call it, down inside an infantly battalion. I just shudder to think how you ever would control a battle if that ever happened. I do not know how this crept in; it is something completely new to me. I think that this needs to be looked at very, very, very carefully. I know that it is quite easy when you start to look at a problem like this, to let the problem get away from you. I think you ought to come back to the fundamental principles that if we have to go to war we will have to fight with allies who have divisions. Therefore, we have to be able to fit in with divisions; we have to fit in with air groups of other countries; we have to fit in with navies of other countries because we are not going to do it—at least I hope that we are not ever going to try and fight by ourselves. Perhaps it is a laudable idea but it does not make any military sense to me. As I have said, we cannot support ourselves.

Mr. McINTOSH: In defence of a paper which you wrote for one of the defence books—in answer to a question of my colleague—you said: "That is virtually what we have today", and I think that you were talking about integration as you had defined it. What is your definition of unification, and could you tell the Committee what we would have once unification is complete, as the government seems to understand it.

Mr. FOULKES: I will be quite frank with you. I do not understand it, so I could not explain it. My concept of this game was that you would have a unified staff and under that staff you would have task forces to do certain tasks. Those task forces could be varied, but there would still be brigades of infantry, as far as Canada is concerned, because we have no divisions, squadrons of aircraft, flotillas of ships, and so on. This is my view, but I am not up to date enough on this, as I pointed out, to know what it means to unify, or even to pretend to do so.

Mr. McINTOSH: Well sir, you were chief of the general staff, and I presume that you got that position because of your capabilities, and particularly your ability of seeing things that possibly were more difficult for junior officers to see. What is your impression of the position of the junior officers still in the force when you say, as a former chief of the general staff, that you cannot understand unification?

Mr. FOULKES: I was saying I cannot understand what it means by unifying down to companies, and I imagine that he will have some difficulties too. Remember, a company commander has only a few years experience, and to suggest that he can or should start to deal with the control of air support, just does not make military sense.

Mr. McINTOSH: I did not intend for you to go down that low in the officer class. How could the officers in formation headquarters and above understand it if you, as a former chief of the general staff, do not understand it. Do you think that they will have difficulties?

Mr. FOULKES: Oh, I imagine that they will have difficulties. My view of this all along has been that one should make as little change in the operations units of our forces as possible—make as little change. They function well as they are; we ought to be justly proud of them, and I do not think that we can improve too

much on striving to make them any more refined. Our brigades function well in Europe; our Navy people function well in the North Atlantic and the Pacific, and I do not think that we can improve on this.

Mr. McINTOSH: You have mentioned the Minister's speech in the House, as well as the presentation made by Air Marshal Sharp, and then in spite of that—I assume that you have read both and studied them—at the top of page 2 some of your criticism is directed forward a lack of authentic information. Do you feel that we, as politicians, have not sufficient information to make a decision on this bill yet?

Mr. FOULKES: I was referring to the lack of information given out in the first two years before they had this armed services council, and I imagine you have heard enough about that from Admiral Landymore. There was a distinct lack of information at that time. Mind you, there might be good reason for it because everybody was busy doing something else. However, I think that it had a very disastrous effect on the acceptance by the troops of integration. I was only trying to point out that in my view some of this could have been avoided if they had had a titular chief of staff for at least the first two years. Then, when they were ready, the whole thing had to be sold to the services. Then, when the administration and other plans were worked out, phase out the chief of staff and let the boss boy take over, when he was in a position to control.

Mr. McINTOSH: Do you agree with this concept of phasing out—which actually has taken place now—the defence council, as it were, the three heads of the different services?

Mr. FOULKES: That was inevitable. The timing of it is the only thing with which I was in disagreement.

Mr. McINTOSH: You mentioned that two years ago there was a lack of information. Might I suggest to you now, because of your reply to my question asking you to define unification, that there is still a lack of information —because you, as a former chief of the general staff, apparently do not understand what unification means either. Is that a fair assumption? You spoke also about morale, and I was just wondering how high on the list you would consider the morale of the forces. How important is it to the forces?

Mr. FOULKES: Well, if they are going to fight it is all important—all important; there is nothing more important. If you have not a high degree of morale in your forces you might as well not put them in the field.

Mr. McINTOSH: You also spoke about the experience of senior officers. I think that you had reference to senior officers we have lost before their period of service had, shall I say, expired unnecessarily. Can you convey to the Committee in a little more detail than you have in your talk, how essential this experience, rather than theory, is to a fighting force. Can you give any instances where because of experience Commanders saved lives of troops?

Mr. FOULKES: I do not think that I can go into the details of saving troops and so on. I would point out that there are a lot of things about exercising the art of command that you cannot get out of a book. You have to have somebody with at least a levelling of experience. As I pointed out, even in the last war—although we put an emphasis on youth—some of our most brilliant commanders

were fellows who had had pretty good records in the first world war. There are some things that you cannot learn from a book; you have to learn from experience. As we all know, some people never reach a position of high command because there is something in their makeup or experience that does not fit into it; it is something you cannot really put your finger on. What I am really concerned about is that we have only a small force, and if we start and eliminate most of the top, which we have been doing pretty rapidly, we are going to get down where we have all theoretical soldiers and nobody with practical experience who could look at these problems—who can look, for instance, at the problem I raised with you about recruits, about the need to have some consideration given to keeping the battalions and the combat units young. Now it is only somebody who has had experience in operations that understands that kind of thing. Now I found, some two or three years ago when I went to visit my own regiment, being Colonel of the regiment, that we had Company Sergeant Majors of 42; we had subalterns of 36, and I almost blew a fuse, because if we went to war those fellows would not last one or two days.

Mr. PUGH: The 36 year old's?

Mr. MCINTOSH: I think this has been proven. I mean I do not think that, the average age of our generals in World War II was over 36, if it was that.

Mr. FOULKES: That is not the way I see it because I was not a Corps Commander until I was 43.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I am not going to argue with you.

On page 6, you said that you were puzzled about just what our military roles are today—and you said that you were concerned about something else too—and I would ask you to elaborate on that. Do you agree with our system of collective defence—continental defence, for Canada? Do you see some ulterior motive, if I may put it that way, in the Minister's speech which would do away with our role today and then our forces would be used for some other purpose?

Mr. FOULKES: No, I do not think that anyone who really has the interests of Canadian defence at heart is going to do away with our NATO commitment or selective defence arrangements. What I suspect has happened is that they have been trying to find some kind of a role that looks a little more attractive—something that will get the "eager beavers" working. It is a rather nice concept; the planners will have a wonderful time, searching all over the world to ascertain how to use two mobile brigades. However, I think that we want to be careful when we say that we are lessening the emphasis on the commitments that we have accepted; I think that that is one of the things that does wear. Perhaps there is not too much harm in letting the staff officer play with the free-wheeling around the world, but I am a bit concerned, if we are going to lessen our NATO commitments, unless it is agreed in the NATO organization that everybody slims down. The amount of military value, training and operational value that we get out of being a member of NATO is enormous. We draw all our best information, for instance, in Maritime warfare from the United States. We have a wonderful opportunity; the advantages that we reap from interdependence is enormous.

Mr. MCINTOSH: You mentioned that we could not sustain our force as it is right now and that we had to have help from, say, one of the other larger

powers. In regard to our commitments to these alliances that we have now, do you believe that Canada has the manpower to form another force capable of keeping the peace any place else in the world and still live up to commitments that we already have?

Mr. FOULKES: No; as a matter of fact, I am one of the people that said we have one brigade too many.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Why have we one too many?

Mr. FOULKES: As you remember, we formed an extra brigade to go to Korea.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Right.

Mr. FOULKES: After the Korea show was over, I proposed to the then Minister that we get rid of that brigade because it was not necessary—it was arranged especially for Korea. However, the chief of the general staff at that time did not want to be the one to say that he was cutting down the army; I think we had an election coming on and, therefore, the Minister was a bit worried about disbanding it, and we have a brigade that we really have not a job for. We have four brigades, and to meet our commitments we only have to have one brigade in Europe in peacetime and two at home. We could have well got rid of this, but we have not. It would have saved a lot of money. This is the point I am trying to make: If we look at our commitments, as well as develop an efficient system, we might be able to save some more money. We would save some more money if we could get out of this forward role. For instance, we would not have to be training on heavy tanks.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Then you would not agree with the statement made by Air Marshal Sharp, in his appreciation, when he said that there were only two courses open to the government: to increase the expenditure, or cut down on operations and maintenance. If we followed your suggestion, we would not cut down on operations nor maintenance, although there would be a drop in maintenance, and we would not have to increase the vote of the department.

Mr. FOULKES: I do not think I quite said that.

Mr. MCINTOSH: No, but Air Marshal Sharp said there were only these two courses open to the government. I asked a former witness if he agreed with the statement that there were only two courses; he said no, and he agreed with me that it was a false premise and that if the appreciation was based on a false premise, then the conclusion was false. Do you agree with that?

Mr. FOULKES: Of course I have not studied Air Marshal Sharp's brief well enough to say. What I was trying to say was that there are other ways of saving money. It is pretty hard to make a case for keeping four brigades, and if you could get rid of one brigade it would save a lot of money. As I mentioned earlier, we want to get more specific as to what our commitments are, and once we know what our commitments are you can make a much better plan as to how to manage it.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. McIntosh, I will have to cut you off. Mr. Harkness is the next questioner. You had more than fifteen minutes.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Let me finish one question.

The CHAIRMAN: All right.

Mr. McINTOSH: What you are trying to say, General, is that there are more ways to save money or defence expenditures than by implementing unification.

Mr. FOULKES: There are other ways.

Mr. McINTOSH: Do you think that they are better ways?

Mr. FOULKES: No; I will come back to my original statement, that I have always been in support of integration.

Mr. McINTOSH: We are not talking about integration General; we are talking about unification. I understand what you mean by integration. I agree with most of it.

Mr. MACALUSO: It means the same thing.

Mr. McINTOSH: Integration and unification? The Minister has not said so. This whole Committee is about the definition of unification and what the Minister means by it. I would like to go back to the Minister's speech in the House where I say that he says one thing one time and he always ends off the paragraph by contradicting himself.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. McIntosh I will put you down for the next round. Mr. Harkness is next.

Mr. HARKNESS: Just on this last point, General Foulkes: If we are going to continue a peacekeeping role for the United Nations and put at their disposal available troops for various operations such as the Congo, Cyprus and God knows what else, would you not agree then that there is a case for this fourth brigade?

Mr. FOULKES: Well, you still have two brigades in Canada.

Mr. HARKNESS: Yes, but those two brigades, as you stated, are committed really to NATO.

Mr. FOULKES: They are committed to NATO but they do not have to go until a major war breaks out. As a matter of fact, they are only committed after D-day, and surely if we are doing peacekeeping, the peacekeeping would just stop if a major war started.

Mr. HARKNESS: If your two brigades were committed to some peacekeeping task I do not think that you would be able to get them back to put them into Europe or to carry on with their NATO role.

Mr. FOULKES: Let me suggest to you that we have never had anything like two brigades on peacekeeping. We have never had even three battalions. We have had a small detachment in Egypt which are not combat troops. As you know, they would not let us send combat troops to Egypt. And, we have somebody in Cyprus.

Mr. HARKNESS: In Cyprus and in the Gaza Strip we now have a combined total of two battalions actually.

Mr. FOULKES: That is a long way from six.

Mr. HARKNESS: It is a long way from six, but I think there is also the matter of protecting Canada itself which I do not thing you would envisage leaving without any troops at all?

Mr. FOULKES: We would be entirely safe.

Mr. HARKNESS: Would you?

Mr. FOULKES: As long as we were putting our forces where the fighting was going on, we would not have to worry about what was happening here.

Mr. HARKNESS: Well, I do not know. I think a considerable number of people would think that you need some troops for the local protection of the country, maintenance of order and God knows what else. However, this is not the line of questioning that I had in mind; I just followed this up because of the remarks that you had made to Mr. McIntosh.

I think that nearly everybody believes that a certain amount of integration, particularly as far as the administrative and supply services are concerned—the integration of staffs, a unified command, particulary in any specific operation of war—is a desirable objective. They are aims toward which, as you have indicated, we have been working for a good many years. However, when you come to this final step, which you said that you advocated in this paper that you produced, the formation of a single service, which is what I at least take as being what is meant by unification, do you think that that will save any money? Of course savings can be made in respect of manpower and otherwise in the various integration processes which have gone on, but do you think the formation of a single service rather than a separate navy, army and air force will result in any financial savings?

Mr. FOULKES: Well, I am not being very good on this question of how much could be saved. I gather, from reading the proceedings of this Committee that you can make figures talk several different ways. The big saving we have always talked about would be accomplished by streamlining headquarters and streamlining administration.

Mr. HARKNESS: Yes, what is generally referred to as the "integration process", but not from this process of forming a single service rather than the three that we have had.

In what way do you think a more effective force would be produced if we had the sea element, the land element and the air element in one single force rather than in three separate forces, each operating in its own environment?

Mr. FOULKES: Well, of course, some of these are mixed up now. They are mixed up in Maritime Command; they are going to be mixed up in the mobile command. You will have to wait and see whether or not you are going to get any spectacular results from this.

Mr. HARKNESS: Well, I think you would agree that there is still in effect going to be a navy or the equivalent of it; there is going to be an army or the equivalent of it; there is going to be an air force or the equivalent of it—no matter what you call it. Is there any advantage whatever in putting these people into a single force and calling it a defence force rather than having them in the three separate components in which they have been accustomed to operating?

Mr. FOULKES: Administratively, there might be decided advantages; I do not think, technically, that you will get any decided advantage.

Mr. HARKNESS: You are coming back then to what you decried in your paper as "tidy administration". I would agree with you that there is no tactical advantage, but I would also ask you if you do not think that there would be, from this step, considerable disadvantages, particularly from the point of view of morale?

Mr. FOULKES: I think one has to weigh very carefully the disadvantages, especially in certain fields. No doubt, there is no need for me to add anything to what you have already heard about the disadvantages in the naval field. One of the things that always has worried me is that our Navy does operate in a medium almost by itself with the Air Force, which they have been doing for the last 10 years. We set up operation control which really meant that they were working as a team 10 years ago—this is not something new—and it has always worked out extremely well.

Mr. HARKNESS: Yes.

Mr. FOULKES: It was opposed at the time we put it up but that was easily settled by telling the Navy that if they did not agree, we would put an air force man in command. This has worked wonderfully well and I do not think you can improve too much on it.

Mr. HARKNESS: This is the very point I would like to make: I do not think you can improve very much on the present situation.

Mr. FOULKES: I am not talking about administration; I know precious little about it. However, I know an awful lot about operations in the field.

Mr. HARKNESS: That is right.

Mr. FOULKES: And I know a lot about operations under SACLANT in which our Navy takes an important part. I think that we have to be very careful that we do not lose something with the Navy in this role because they work much more closely with the United States Navy in this role than they work with the Army. With the Air Force, of course, they are together as a team. I can well see some decided difficulties in respect of the Navy in this particular role, and I would have preferred to have gone very cautiously with this step.

Mr. HARKNESS: The bill provides for a single service. Do you think that the components of that service will be able to work as satisfactorily with our allies in NATO or in any other operation which, as you said, is really the only way that we can work? We are not going to go to war by ourselves; we are always going to be working with allies of some sort—presumably, as far as you can see at the moment and in the foreseeable future, with the people who are presently associated with NATO, or with most of them at least. I think one of the critcisms which has been made of this concept of a single force is that under that form of organization, our forces will not be able to work as effectively with the forces of our allies, and they will not be able to integrate or co-operate with them nearly as well.

Mr. FOULKES: Well I think one can make a statement on that, but when you look at it specifically, I do not see any trouble with our ground forces operating in Europe with the ground forces because there is to be no change; in any event, we operate as an integral part of a British division now and I presume we will continue to do that, and there is to be no change in the Army. The Air Force has a separate role at the present time but it works very, very closely with the United States Air Force and 4 ATAF. However, I gather, from reading discussions in the House, that it is more or less considered that when these aircraft wear out the present role they are being given will disappear and they will be given another role, which is hinted here as ground support.

Now I can foresee a great deal of difficulty if we try to impose a small Canadian Air Force, no matter what you call it, to support our own troops and then try to stick those in the middle of the British Tactical Air Force which is now giving us support. This will really create a lot of difficulties and I think we should be awfully clear before we go far. I am not aware, of course, what discussions the Minister had with General Lemnitzer, but the White Paper suggested that he was going to have some. Knowing the situation in Europe, and knowing General Lemnitzer, I am just surprised he did not have a stroke because the one thing that we have tried to do in NATO, the whole time NATO has been there, is to try and get the forces to work together in the best location to suit the whole thing, not just to suit a particular nation. We are being used as an example, that "Canada will do the task we give it"—and we have been used as a startling example. I certainly would have some qualms about a suggestion that we should stick our support in there so that we could be supported by our own forces. It sounds well but it does not do too well in the Alliance because it makes everybody feel that we do not think that we will be properly supported, and on the Minister's side of it, at least, it would be extremely upsetting.

Mr. HARKNESS: To come back to what you said a few minutes ago, that you believe, in effect, we will continue to have much the same sea, land and air forces that we have, what is the value to be gained by putting them all into one single force?

Mr. FOULKES: As far as the fighting elements are concerned, I never visualized this, as I pointed out before. I visualized that we would have task forces made up of brigades, air force troops and so on, with as little change in those fighting elements as possible, and I have never ever given any serious thoughts to the idea of breaking up battalions and this kind of thing and making us ambidextrous.

Mr. HARKNESS: I personally do not think that it is a practical proposition, and I think that most people would agree on that.

Along this same line, you were mentioning particularly that you could foresee considerable difficulties as far as the Navy is concerned. What do you think of the proposition in this bill to change the navy's rank structure and to make one single rank structure for the navy, army and air force. Do you foresee difficulties in that regard?

Mr. FOULKES: Well I can see the difficulties—and mind you these are not new ones. As I pointed out before, when I used to discuss integration with the Chiefs of Staff, they all suspected, and did not mind saying so, that what I particularly had in mind was the army taking over the other two services. One of the former Chiefs of Staff reminded me of that the other day and said it has just happened. I think that this is one of the things that will cause a lot of trouble because it looks as if the ground forces—and I was with the ground forces so I can talk this way—had more or less taken over and pushed their ranks onto the Navy—more or less the rank structure. This is another area where I suggest that the reaction on the troops has not been given as much consideration as it should have been in order to achieve a tidy administration.

Mr. HARKNESS: Would you agree that it would be better to leave the navy as it is, with its present rank structure, rather than trying to impose the army rank structure on them?

Mr. FOULKES: I have to be careful about this because I am batting on a very difficult wicket, especially with the Chairman being a naval type.

Mr. HARKNESS: Oh, he will not bother you.

Mr. FOULKES: In my discussions with the Navy about rank structure when I was Chairman of the Rank Structure Committee, they used to impress upon me that the one thing that I did not understand was that to fight a naval battle you had to have what is called a "happy" ship. Is that not it?

The CHAIRMAN: I have heard that expression before.

Mr. FOULKES: Meaning that everybody on the ship, because of close confinement and so on, has to be of such a type and temperament that they can get along with each other, because, when they get into an emergency, the doctor, and the man who stokes the fire, and so on, have to do all kinds of jobs. I believe it is a problem that does not affect the other two services as much as it does the navy. That theory of a happy ship, I think, has some substance; they have a specialized problem that ought to be given very careful consideration.

Mr. HARKNESS: Now I come back to the direct question: Do you think it would be advisable to leave the navy rank structure as it is, rather than to impose the army rank structure on the navy.

Mr. FOULKES: You are talking about names of ranks.

Mr. HARKNESS: Yes.

Mr. FOULKES: Certainly I would not have done this because I would have foreseen that this kind of thing would bring forth irritation—in other words—it would be doing more harm than good.

Mr. HARKNESS: I do not know whether you can see any good that it would do, but I certainly cannot see that it would do any good.

Mr. FOULKES: I know that I would abhor it if I was now called an admiral.

Mr. HARKNESS: Yes.

An hon MEMBER: That would be asking to lower the morale.

The CHAIRMAN: Well, he has already said that. Mr. Harkness—

Mr. HARKNESS: Mr. Chairman, I have only this one question. What do you think is the effect of the present re-organization that has taken place, and what is the likely effect of this further step toward a single service, as far as leaving us with a mobilization base upon which we could expand our forces in the event of the worst happening?

Mr. FOULKES: Of course, we have to be a bit careful about this. We can talk about the necessity of a mobilized base, but if we are really realistic one wonders, if we get into another conflict, whether we are going to have time to form a base, or have a need for a base. Certainly, if it is a nuclear conflict, we will be doing everything else but forming a base. In the last few years I have never given much consideration as to how we are going to expand the forces. I think what we want to make sure of is that the forces we have at the time can provide the greatest possible contribution to the deterrent; that is our only hope. If this thing ever breaks out, we will not have time to mobilize on any kind of a base.

Mr. HARKNESS: You are speaking now of a full scale nuclear war, and I agree with you. Actually under those circumstances, the chief job of the armed forces—at any rate, those in Canada—is going to be a salvage operation, which will occupy their entire energies, attention and so forth. However, would you not admit that it is quite conceivable, if we get into another type of war—

Mr. FOULKES: I do not know. If you are talking about the major powers, I think you just have to put yourself in this position: If war breaks out—and suppose we get an agreement that we will not use nuclear weapons—you start to fight with the conventional weapons you have; you start to lose, and you have the nuclear bombs just behind you—what are you going to do? Pull them out and use them. Where the vital interest of a nation is concerned, it is going to use everything in its power not to be over-run. You may start with the idea that you are going to keep war clean—I do not know how you do that—but once you have started to use force, there is no way of preventing that force from being accelerated until one side or the other quits.

Mr. HARKNESS: You have an example at the present time of a very considerable war going on in Viet Nam, which we, of course, are not engaged in. However, it is quite conceivable that we might be engaged in a war of that nature, which would require a very considerable number of troops and as far as we are concerned, a mobilization base. In this particular case there has been no escalation to nuclear weapons, and it does not look as though there is going to be.

Mr. FOULKES: I certainly would think that you would have an awful time convincing the Canadian people to go into that kind of a battle. We only fight when our vital interests are affected. I do not think you would get Canadians to support the United States in their anti-Communist crusade.

Mr. HARKNESS: We fought in Korea; what vital interest was affected then?

An hon. MEMBER: Did we fight alone?

Mr. FOULKES: We fought with the U.N.

Mr. HARKNESS: I know we fought with the U.N., but it is just as conceivable that we might be fighting with some of our allies in—

Mr. FOULKES: In the U.N.?

Mr. HARKNESS: No, not in the U.N., with NATO in another conflict of the same nature.

Mr. FOULKES: In NATO?

Mr. HARKNESS: Yes.

Mr. FOULKES: If war breaks out in NATO, and we want to keep it conventional, our conventional forces will last 24 hours—a 24 hour battle, and that is all. You are not going to have any time to reinforce or mobilize for that, if that is the premise.

Mr. HARKNESS: We are now getting into the various theories in respect to the war that we might have, and I think it is a profitless exercise for us at this time.

The CHAIRMAN: Do you want to leave it, Mr. Harkness?

Mr. HARKNESS: I notice the witness is looking at his watch.

Mr. FOULKES: Oh, I do not mind; my time is yours.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Is the witness appearing before the Committee tomorrow?

The CHAIRMAN: The witness is prepared to come before the Committee tomorrow morning. We have the room available at 9.30 in the morning. We seem to be only half way through the questioners. What is the wish of the Committee?

Mr. MACALUSO: Do you have another witness on tomorrow?

The CHAIRMAN: We have someone who is available, yes, but General Foulkes, who has been waiting to appear before us at our request, says that he is able to remain for further questioning tomorrow morning.

We will adjourn until 9.30 tomorrow morning.

Mr. MACALUSO: Is my name first on your list for tomorrow morning?

The CHAIRMAN: It is, Mr. Macaluso.

Mr. MACALUSO: Thank you.

EVIDENCE

(*Recorded by Electronic Apparatus*)

FRIDAY, February 17, 1967.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, when we adjourned last night at 10 o'clock, Mr. Harkness had just finished questioning General Foulkes. Mr. Macaluso is the next on my list.

Mr. MACALUSO: General, do you agree with Admiral Brock's statement in his Defence Policy Proposals, and I quote:

> Possession of nuclear arms in any form does not enhance the flexibility of our armed forces, but, on the contrary, diminishes their usefulness in fulfilling their primary objective in support of Canadian external policy.

You will recall Admiral Landymore rejected this view and I am interested in the other side of the pcture as far as the Army is concerned and also as far as your experience in the field is concerned.

General FOULKES: Of course, none of us had any experience in nuclear weapons.

Mr. MACALUSO: Yes, I realize that, sir.

Mr. FOULKES: I do not think there is any question there. The position I have always taken with regard to nuclear weapons has been, and is, well known; that if the Canadian government accepts tasks which are required to be carried out by nuclear weapons, there is no alternative but to provide those nuclear weapons. Now, as I pointed out yesterday, with a country like Canada, which is only providing contributions to the collective defence organization, there is a lot of leeway in those contributions. If it is government policy that it does not want to be involved in nuclear weapons they can select, fairly well, tasks that are still to be done which do not involve the use of nuclear weapons. My objection before about nuclear weapons was that we had tasks which had been accepted and which required the support of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, I would suggest to you that in Europe, for instance, in a forward role where we

are likely to be attacked by superior forces, you need every kind of support you can get.

Mr. MACALUSO: My point concerns the flexibility or inflexibility of the statement. Admiral Brock says:

> Possession of nuclear arms in any form does not enhance the flexibility of our armed forces . . .

This is what I am concerned with. Does it enhance flexibility? Does it make our forces inflexible or more flexible?

Mr. FOULKES: I really do not understand this statement because when you talk about flexibility it is not necessarily a discussion about the type of weapons which you are carrying. For instance, whether the navy have depth charges with nuclear warheads or not, does not, I think, affect the flexibility of that particular ship.

Mr. MACALUSO: Thank you, General.

Now, General, you prepared your own plan. Could you tell us fundamentally what is the difference, if any, between your plan and the present plan.

Mr. FOULKES: As I pointed out yesterday, in the final analysis there is very little difference; that is, in the setup. The difference in the plan that I proposed some years ago was more in implementation.

Mr. MACALUSO: More in the mechanics of using the single force. Is that it?

Mr. FOULKES: No, not at all, because the plan I proposed was in three stages and the final stage looks very much the same as the diagram that you have. In other words, you have a completely integrated headquarters at the top, and then underneath you have task forces and those task forces will be made up of the forces that are required to do that particular job. Now, mine were not exactly the same names. I had: Maritime Transport, Air Defence Transport, and the one which is now called Mobile Command I had as a Strategic Reserve, but its functions were exactly the same. The difference was mainly in the way that I foresaw the implementation of this scheme. May I take five minutes to quote this?

The CHAIRMAN: Please do, sir.

Mr. FOULKES: I would just like to read this, because there has been a great deal of loose talk about what I intended because it all has been from that popular article that appeared in the *Star Weekly*. I will read exactly from the document. In describing it I said:

> There are three stages. The first stage deals with the development of a single administration, the amalgamation of all common administrative functions including standardization of all administrative procedures, records, special services, and the unification of all service establishments to create a single list of all service personnel. In order to ensure the wholehearted co-operation, especially in the initial steps of amalgamation, and to be able to deal expeditiously with the unexpected problems which are bound to arise, it is considered prudent to involve the whole of the Chief of Staff Committee as a policy and co-ordinating group during the first two stages of integration. The Chiefs of Staff would turn over their day to

day business to the Vice Chiefs in order to be able to devote as much time as necessary in dealing with the problems of the first stage of integration.

I foresaw that you would have serious morale problems arising from even the announcement of integration. The best way, I felt, to go and satisfy the services that they were not going to be disbanded or replaced by somebody else was to do it by their present titular head. And also there was another view. I thought that the Service Chiefs would work as a team because none of them would know whether they were the fellow to be selected for the top job, so we were bound to get full co-operation.

The first thing which I foresaw should happen would be the appointment of a Chief of Personnel and a Chief of Logistics and they would take up the positions of a co-ordinating group. In the matter of policy, the co-ordinating group—that is the Chiefs of Staff sitting in permanent session—would be the co-ordinating group, and the day to day business would be done by the Vice Chiefs.

The present collection of administrative committees would be abolished as soon as practical but the committees involving outside representation—that is, outside of Canada—working with the United States and with NATO, would be left as a policy group to take action.

During the implementation of the first stage, the operational and training functions would remain with the services. The Deputy Chiefs of Personnel would continue to function as a Deputy Chief of Naval Personnel, the Adjutant General and the Deputy Air Member for Personnel until the beginning of Phase II. This precaution I felt was necessry in order to make provision for a quick switch back to service control if we got into difficulties.

Now, as a military planner I could not put forward a plan which did not make provision for us immediately going to war. A politician could take the risk of saying: Well, we are not going to have a war for two or three years and therefore we can go along with a disturbed condition. A military man could not make any such recommendations, so I had to work out a plan whereby, if we got into difficulties we could immediately switch back. We still would have the Chiefs there and all we had been doing was getting the organization amalgamated which would break into three pieces very easily.

The second stage would be to appoint what I would call the Commanders in Chief; commanders of the various task forces. My concept of this is a little bit different. I call them Commanders in Chief:

> responsible for all operations and training above wing or individual standard. They would be responsible for all operation of forces at home and abroad. The Commanders in Chief would be the advisers to the Chiefs of Staff and the Minister on all aspects and functions of their respective command, such as, maritime, ground and air defence.

In other words, we would not have between the Minister and the Commanders in the field anybody else except the Chiefs of Staff. In other words, he would not have any need to meet his staff. They would do all the planning, all the advising and everything else. This means that you would have contact with

them almost all the time. I think this is one of the essentials in a close-knit organization.

> They would receive operational direction from the Chiefs of Staff and would deal directly with the Chief of Personnel and Logistics on day to day administration. However, on policy of manpower, provision of equipment and composition of task forces, that would be dealt with by higher authority. The task forces would be a functional group composed of elements required to accomplish a particular task accepted by the government.

Now, the final stage: After—and only after—the administration and the logistics were completely set up and working, you would abolish the Chiefs of Staff Committee and then appoint the Chief of Staff of the Armed Services. I was not very good, and I did not feel I could dream up the type of headquarters I would require to handle the task forces until the task forces were set up and I could see how they were working and what was required, beyond the Commanders of those task forces, to control in Ottawa. That is the reason that I started this way. Then the Chiefs of Staff would be abolished and what was left, after the Commander in Chief's organization was set up and working satisfactorily, would have to be grouped together under what I called the General Staff; in other words, exactly the same as what is now the Vice Chief's department in the present setup. Then you would select your Chief and the show would run, but I would not put the Chief in charge until the show was running.

Now, that is the plan which I have been talking about. It is different only in approach to the plan you are bound to here.

Mr. MACALUSO: As I say, the difference is a matter of approach. This is my last remark, General. The final results of your plan and the present plan outlined in Bill No. C-243 are the same.

Mr. FOULKES: Yes, with this reservation: I foresaw no interference with the combat forces at all. I would keep the combat forces with as little change as possible. I could not see how you could very much improve on our combat forces and certainly, until the show was running fairly well, I would want to leave them with the assurance that they were still going to fight the way they were fighting before, and I did not see there was any need to do any unifying or integrating in the combat element.

Mr. MACALUSO: General, in the matter of your last remark, you mentioned last night the interference in combat elements, but I re-read *Hansard* last evening—I do not know whether you had the opportunity—where the Minister stated there was no such interference in those elements. I am just wondering whether you had the opportunity to read that also.

Mr. FOULKES: I re-read it and re-read it again this morning, and outside of not understanding the fourth paragraph on page 1834, I find myself in complete agreement. But I just do not understand that paragraph; if anybody else understands it and can explain it to me I would be very grateful.

Mr. MACALUSO: Thank you, General.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Mr. Chairman, I have just one question to address to the General about something that arose yesterday. General Foulkes, towards the top of page 11 of your brief you say:

> On page 10828 of *Hansard* it states as follows: The force structure is composed of force units.

And it is at this point that you go on to expand the idea that unification would break a military component down below the level of a battalion and we would find ourselves pulling apart the battalion formation. I was worried about this because it was the first time I had heard his idea put forward, and I looked up *Hansard* last night and have it before me this morning. There is one short paragraph which contains this quote and I want to read it. I am not sure it wholly clears it up, but I think it should be on the record.

> The force structure is comprised of force units which may be used individually or in combination depending on the military tasks to be undertaken. These force units are the infantry companies, the armoured squadrons, the artillery batteries, the engineering squadrons, field ambulances, the air squadrons, warships and the support ships, to mention a few. None of these will be changed in moving to a single service from three separate services. They will continue to be trained and equipped for their particular roles. Moreover, a single service will involve no change in the organization of these force units into formations such as brigades, air wings, or squadrons of ships. On the other hand, the deployment of these units and formations is directed by a single command chain in accordance with the missions assigned, and under a single command responsible for these missions.

Now, I think I could interpret that to mean that there would be no breaking up of the organization below the level of brigades, air wings or squadrons, but I can also see room for the interpretation which you put on it. I wonder whether you have had any opportunity between last night and today to clarify that point or think about it, because if it cannot be cleared while you are before us, I certainly think it is a question that ought to be raised when the Minister and his departmental people return. That is the substance of my only question this morning.

Mr. FOULKES: Mr. Deachman, this is the subject which we were just talking about. I entirely agree that certainly I can live with the latter part of that paragraph. The part that upsets me—that I cannot understand—is the first two sentences. The reason I raised this is that if I do not understand it, having considerable experience, I am afraid a lot of other people who have not had my experience will not understand it as well. I was just concerned because you can read into this that the battalions are going to be broken up and operated as individual companies, and I am sure that would disturb the morale of any battalion.

Again, I may be wrong in that, but if I am wrong I do not understand what it is there for. As I pointed out yesterday, you can see a situation where you might send a few troops off in a ship to do a commando raid or something like that, but that is not the normal. I take this statement of the Minister as a directive of the normal procedure that is going to be followed, and that was the issue I was raising. I entirely agree that these forces will be made up of brigades,

and air wings, and squadrons, but it was just these first two sentences that were puzzling me.

Mr. DEACHMAN: They still continue to puzzle me, sir, and I will raise it when the Minister is before us again.

Mr. FOULKES: May I add one word regarding the purpose of raising these issues. They may appear to be small, but I am sure that you did not bring me here just to have me talk about all the wonderful things that have been done. There are many, like the trade structure, and so on, but those are being said with much more emphasis in other places. I was quite sure what you wanted me to do was to take a critical look at this from the standpoint of the people that have to carry it out, and that is exactly what I am doing. If things are not clear to me I am sure that those a little farther down are going to have the same trouble in understanding it, and it is much easier now to clear it up than after it has become regulation. As I pointed out earlier, the next stage is for the staff to turn this directive into regulations, and once it goes in regulations anybody that does not follow them or disagrees with them is subject to military law. I think we want to be careful that we have the right kind of context and it is fully understood, so that when these are turned into regulations and directions and there is no recourse but to obey them, the matter is quite clear.

Mr. DEACHMAN: I have just one other short question. At the top of page 10 of your brief is a reference to the possibility of a chaotic situation if we developed a force in which every brigade had its own private air to ground support. In reading some background material about these matters I ran across an idea that the Australians are putting forward. In the Viet Nam theatre they find the American operation so big and they are so willing to take risks and to use masses of equipment that the Australians are rather overwhelmed by the whole thing. They are conceiving the idea that they would be far better off if they were to operate a sector of their own with their own complete forces and put in a task force, and make themselves responsible for that area and go it alone.

I just wonder whether or not we, as a much smaller nation than the major powers, if engaged in a major operation would not find ourselves looking at the same problem as the Australians now face with their 5,000-man force in Viet Nam, vis-à-vis the massive forces of the United States.

Mr. FOULKES: There are two things I would like to say about that. One is this: You are talking about Viet Nam where a very small force is working with a very large one. It is rather similar to the Korean operation and there were similar situations in the Korean operation and, as you all know by reading the history, we were not too happy on certain occasions about what the big partner was doing. But I think in a partnership like that where you have to depend on your support—like we did in Korea—on forces all from the United States, there are certain things you have to put up with.

Mind you, I think representations can always be made to the Americans who do not look at things in exactly the same way as we do. I did not like the way the Americans who operated with me in Europe handled their divisions, but they were given to me for a particular operation. They have a different approach to things than we do. In NATO it is quite different. There you have a group of nations but one is not dominating the whole situation; you are partners and we

always talk about equal partnership in NATO. Therefore, I think the tendency, as I mentioned yesterday, should be towards making contributions to the whole.

I realize that this paragraph on air forces might mean something different from my interpretation and certainly, if I had been writing this paragraph, I would have said something like this: "It is the intention of the government, as and when the strike role is no longer suitable to go into the role of ground support and to that end we intend to form a ground support unit to support the NATO forces. We hope that it can be placed in such a position where it will, besides supporting some of the other al'ies, support the Canadian brigade." If that is the context I have no objection to it, but from the way it is worded the particular thing that struck me was this mass flying.

An hon. MEMBER: What page is it on?

Mr. FOULKES: It is on page 22 of the White Paper. It is particularly the last sentence that made me feel we were going to do something else. It states:

> —Thus, ground and air forces would complement each other in a manner which has not been possible in the past.

Now, while that is nice to say, the troops on the ground do not know whether Canadian aircraft are flying over and supporting them, or U.K. aircraft or something else. All they know is that they are getting air support. I would hate to see us even suggest that we are going to put in air support just for the Canadian brigade. Mind you, when you want air support you want a whole lot; you do not want to have just one squadron. When you need it you want a whole lot—all there is—if you have a serious situation. At other times you do not need any and it should be available to go to support another part of the area.

That is what I was trying to get at in this question of air support; to try to give the full support to the man who is fighting the battle. It might be Canadians doing it one time or somebody else, but that is the air force's function. This gave me the impression that we were trying to say we were going to make sure our Canadians were supported by Canadians but, of course, that may not have been the intention. But again, I suggest that when it gives me that impression it might also give it to somebody else.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Thank you very much, sir.

The CHAIRMAN: Before we move on, may I just say personally how very nice it is—and I am sure the rest of the members of the Committee will agree—to see two old members of the Committee back again—Mr. MacLean and Mr. MacRae. The next questioner is Mr. Churchill.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Do you mean by that you would prefer to have them here rather than some of the new members?

The CHAIRMAN: Never!

Mr. CHURCHILL: General Foulkes, I was very much impressed with your presentation last night and your emphasis on the end result of our defence forces; namely, the combat part. With your experience, your remarks on morale and the combat essentials, I think, carry a great deal of weight with the Committee. The importance of hearing from a person like yourself, sir, is that—as you, I think, mentioned—we are soon going to be running short of men in the services who have had active war experience, and full advantage should

be taken at this stage of massive re-organization of those who have had active war experience, and you are in that category.

Would you mind, for the permanent record, giving us a rundown of your career? The reason I ask is that while we know it ourselves, people will be reading the Committee reports now and in the future and they may wonder who General Foulkes is and whether he is speaking with the voice of authority, or whether he is a sort of an honorary general who had no experience of any weight. Would you mind just giving us a brief outline of your career?

Mr. FOULKES: This is a little bit embarrassing.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I know, but it is important for the record.

Mr. FOULKES: Perhaps I can put it this way: I had the opportunity of commanding 1st Canadian Corps in the latter stages of the fight in Italy and the final stages of the battles in Europe, including the surrender of the 20th German Army to the 1st Canadian Corps in Holland. Immediately after the war I was brought back to be Chief of the General Staff. I was Chief of the General Staff from 1945 until 1951. During that period I had to deal with the demobilization of the overseas forces and the setting up of the new army and also the setting up of the Defence Research Board. Actually, if you read the history of the Defence Research Board you will find that it was the army that did most of the work on organizing the Defence Research Board.

I became Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff as well as CGS in 1947. In 1951, which was the time of the Korean war and the setting up of the forces in NATO, it became apparent that there was room for a full-time job as the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff. The government took the decision that the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff would be a separate job and I was relieved of the responsibilities of commanding the army. I remained as Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff until 1959, when I asked to retire. I asked to retire because I had completed 35 years service and I felt if I stayed on any longer it would interfere with other peoples' promotion.

Now that you have given me this opportunity—perhaps you did not realize what you were doing, but you opened the way for me to say anything—I do want to point out at this particular time that I had the opportunity of serving under three prime ministers and five defence ministers and, while we never always agreed, during that whole period of time I was never asked to resign or did I ever feel like putting in my resignation. I feel quite strongly on the point that there is a great need for a genuine—I do not quite know what the right word is—but a co-operative working between the military and the politician. Unless we can do that in a small country like Canada I think we are going to get into a great many difficulties. I see no reason why it should not be possible. It has been possible in the past and I am quite sure were there to be give and take on both sides that we should be able to establish the closest possible relationship between the military and the political leaders.

I do not agree with some of the statements that were made yesterday on this matter. The military give advice; they do not make decisions—they give advice. The government can take as much of that advice as it likes as long as it understands at the same time, that it is taking the military risk. I think a point we have to bear in mind is where one begins and the other ends. Quite often I have found in my career that the military are apt to put a proposition to the Minister or to the government in a very direct military way. They say: "Here is

the problem; here is the military solution." I have found in my career that if I wanted to get something accepted I never just put up one proposition for a "Yes" or "No" answer—because you get "No" so quickly. But if you put up a proposition and you have one, two, or three difficult answers, I have yet to see the politician who will not show how good a chooser he is by picking one of those. So, you kept your scheme in—you may not have got exactly what you were trying to get—but you at least got one of the ones that would suit your purpose. The military are really to blame for a lot of their difficulties by putting things up in that way and not giving enough scope for consideration of the political factors that enter into every Minister's decision. I went much further than you asked me to go.

Mr. CHURCHILL: While we are on that topic, you always conceived it to be your duty to put frankly before the political leaders your views from the military point of view?

Mr. FOULKES: I did not, by any means, always get concurrence. I do recall one time, when I came into a Cabinet Defence meeting, that Mr. St. Laurent —who was, perhaps, the easiest man I have ever worked with—looked down to the other end of the table where I was sitting. He pointed his finger at me and said: "General, how many times do I have to say, No?" So I do not think one should get the impression that—

Mr. CHURCHILL: I will not be able to exhaust my questions in 10 minutes but I would like to concentrate on just one matter at this moment. In some respects, sir, you represent the chief witness for the government on the process of unification and you know we are involved in a little political controversy over this. I gained the impression last night, when you were questioned by Mr. McIntosh, that you did not understand the unification as proposed in the White Paper or in the Minister's speech and yet the press report which I read this morning states that General Foulkes approves of unification. This, of course, is the achievement of the object that the government has in mind, because with your support of unification and the weight of your authority, then the rest of us obviously will have to give ground. Is the report that you approve of unification correct, when you told us last night that you did not understand what the Minister meant by unification.

Mr. FOULKES: First of all, Mr. Churchill, let me correct one thing. I am not a witness for the government.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I know you are not, but the government is relying on you, sir, as I will point out in a moment.

Mr. FOULKES: I do not know anything about that, but I did not want the Minutes to show that I was a witness for the government. I have had no correspondence with the government on this at all; the invitation came from the Chairman of your Committee.

Now with regard to what appeared in the newspaper, I have not studied the newspaper so I do not know what it is, but I can make this quite clear, as I thought I did last night. I am not too clear myself on what is unification and what is integration, but I have no qualms at all in saying, categorically, that I agree with the integration as I understand it, and the integration as I read it in *Hansard;* that is, the forming of a top headquarters and command. But I have raised issues here, the things I did not understand and did not agree with, and

they appear to be only rather minor interpretations of what is meant, for instance, by company groups, how they are going to use the air force and so on. Those are the only reservations I make. I do not think there is any question about the fact that I have supported integration from the beginning; talked about it since 1945, and I have not changed my views on it at all. I have been critical about the way it is being implemented, but that has nothing to do with the principle of integration as I see it today.

Mr. CHURCHILL: When you appeared before our Committee in 1963 you dwelt at some length on integration and I have been reading it over again. At that time you said nothing to us—and yet there was ample opportunity—about a single unified force wth everyone in the same uniform and an amalgamation of the three forces. In fact, your submission then, like your submission last night, emphasized the need for maintaining the combat forces in the role in which they now operate. You made no suggestion to us that the identity of the navy should be destroyed. In fact, in 1963 you put considerable emphasis on increasing the activity of the anti-submarine role. You said nothing to us about destroying the identity of the air force. On the contrary, you were suggesting a modified role for it, and you said nothing to us about destroying the identity of the army.

But the unification proposal that we have in front of us now is precisely the destruction of the identity of the navy, the army and the air force, and everything you said to us last night with regard to morale and from your own war experience—we realize the importance of that—puts greater emphasis, I would think, on retaining the identity of these three services. My understanding of your position has been: integration, yes—but retention of the combat functions of the three services with their identity sustained. Is that a fair summary of your position?

Mr. FOULKES: Not quite. The question of the identity of the forces is one which has never given me too much concern because, as I have repeatedly said, I foresaw the construction of the forces remaining as it is. In other words, I foresaw brigades of infantry, flotillas of ships, and so on. You may be taking away the name of the force, but there are still going to be infantry battalions, and there are still going to be infantry brigades. You would have some difficulties, I think, if you tried to maintain the complete identity in that regard.

I did say, in a glib moment, something about uniforms, but again I suggest to you that in any scheme like this, you may have to change your mind. I feel at this particular stage, where there is a great deal of opposition being raised, perhaps it is not the time to bring in questions of a common uniform, nor do I think a common uniform has any significance whatever. We do not wear a uniform when we fight; we fight in combat clothing and, as I understand it, that is not going to change, and if it is I do not know why. We do not fight any more in uniform, we fight in combat clothing, and that is all that really interests me. What a man walks out in really does not matter.

I know you will remember that during the war the Highlander always wanted to wear his kilt, and when we turned a former Highland Regiment into an anti-aircraft unit, they still wanted to wear the kilt, and Harry Crerar almost had a cat fit—fancy a gunner in a kilt! In order to maintain its morale it still kept its kilt—it liked its kilt. Now, if a highlander will fight better in a kilt, as far as I am concerned give him a kilt or give him anything else. It seems to me

that these are the kinds of thngs that do not add to our efficiency but annoy people a bit, and I think we should try to avoid them at this particular time.

Now, you might reach a stage 20 years from now when everyone would say that they wanted to have a common uniform, but for my money it is not an issue that is worth while upsetting people about, because it does not affect their fighting efficiency one iota.

Mr. CHURCHILL: When you say that it is not an issue that is worth while, it is not an issue that is worth while from the standpoint of higher command or government, but it is an issue that is recognized as being important to the individual—the man that you so emphasized last night, the individual soldier, sailor or the airman—for his morale. Let the highlander have his kilt; it satisfies him. Let the airman have his light blue uniform.

Mr. FOULKES: That is what I said, but apparently I did not get it across.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I was saying, sir, that without your support the people who are propounding this idea of a single unified service would not have much to go on. Your words, which you said in a loose moment you permitted the Toronto *Star* to write up, have been imperishably recorded in *Hansard*, sir, on January 31, 1967 and you must give full credit to Mr. Jim McNulty. If he were serving in the forces you could mention him in despatches, because he has recorded on almost three pages of *Hansard* the complete record of the Toronto *Star* weekly of October 14, 1961. His supporters got a great deal of satisfaction out of this paragraph and I quote:

> The problem can only be solved by complete unification of the three services, with one chief of staff, one chain of command, one ladder of promotion and one uniform.

So, I take it that you are not quite so impressed at this moment with that statement which was extracted, I suppose, from your document of 1961?

Mr. FOULKES: I just want to read to you what I said about uniforms in the document of 1961. I said:

> There is one aspect of this problem which remains unsolved and that is the question of a single service uniform. However, this omission is perhaps in line with other matters of national identity such as the national flag and so on and I presume will be decided some time.

I did not make any strong recommendations. As I have pointed out, this is not a matter of grave import in the integration scheme and it has always been my concept that if it were going to upset someone, I certainly would not put it into effect. I think one has to look at these schemes. One makes an outline plan—the general policy statement—and then you start to work it out and if something becomes a bit difficult, then surely you can adjust your plan. And certainly, under the present conditions, I would not have recommended a change in uniform or anything else at this stage.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Let us say that with the benefit of your long experience, sir, as a serving soldier, a commander and staff man at headquarters, you have shown flexibility. I have many other questions, Mr. Chairman, but I will have to defer to someone else.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. McIntosh, you are next.

Mr. McINTOSH: General, I want to pursue Mr. Churchill's interpretation of what was in the paper this morning. I took it for granted last night that you made an admission that you were somewhat confused between the two terms, integration and unification, and I would like to get it perfectly clear. There may be reason for this confusion; it may be the Minister's paper, or it may be that the term "unification" is used in the British forces and other forces where we have been using it as "integration." I think that we in the opposition have made it clear that we agree to a certain amount of integration, but this word "unification" is a mysterious word to us. We do not know what it means and actually I would say that you are making an assumption that there is going to be no change in the combat forces and all your remarks are based on that premise. Now, I would agree with you but, as you said yourself, we are politicians, and we have to be very careful what is put into these acts.

Now, I would refer you to the Minister's speech under the heading; Continuation of Units and Elements. He goes on at great length here to tell you that there will be no change in this, and no change in that, just perhaps a little change in the name. But the very last sentence is what concerns us and this is of deep concern to us. We do not know what it means and it makes us very suspicious. The last sentence reads that there be no change whatsoever, and I paraphrase the rest of the paragraph:

—until the force structure within the unified force is developed.

What does he mean by that? That is what we are afraid of in unification. Have you got that sentence there?

Mr. FOULKES: Yes, but I am afraid, Mr. McIntosh, that I am not one who can interpret what the Minister means. I think this is a question that you should put to him when he comes on the stand. I took it that this paragraph meant that we were going to have little change in—as you say—the combat element of the forces.

Mr. McINTOSH: We put this question to the Minister and to everyone we could think of and we have not had a satisfactory answer, and that is what leads us to believe that the Minister has dreamed up this term "unification" and he is going to try to fit the forces into something afterwards. We are concerned about our combat troops.

I will leave that and give you an idea of what our concern is about this, even with regard to what you say about integration and unification. I would say that perhaps the press is giving a wrong impression of your evidence, because I do not personally believe that you are in favour of unification. You state that time and time again. You are in favour of integration.

In a Canadian press release you made reference to the discharge of 500 newly trained pilots. You said that this was a grave error and it was a waste of $100 million. Would you care to elaborate on that statement?

Mr. FOULKES: I think, perhaps, while you read that statement you also should have read the retraction I made of that statement. I had wrong information about these pilots and I should have checked it. I did not take the trouble to check it—being in Victoria I had no way of checking it—and I published a retraction and an apology two days later.

Mr. McINTOSH: All right, that is a fair answer to that.

Also in your statement you said on page 7:

> As you are all aware Canada's offer to provide combat troops in Egypt was turned down.

Now could you tell us whether you have any information of why these combat troops were turned down in Egypt?

Mr. FOULKES: If you remember the circumstances of the Suez difficulty, Mr. Pearson at that time, as you know, worked out a plan to put in a force with the UN. It was the first real experiment with the UN and at the time we had a stand-by battalion ready to go. However, the stand-by battalion was not accepted. I have no information as to why the Egyptian government would not accept it. I think I stated publicly that my own view was we selected the wrong unit. Here the Egyptians and the British were having a tangle and we were not smart enough: we selected a unit with the name "Queen's Own" which is pretty hard to swallow. I think this had just about as much to do with it as anything else.

Mr. MCINTOSH: It was the name "Queen's Own?"

Mr. FOULKES: Yes, if we had used the Royal 22nd or something—perhaps the RCR—I do not think we would have had the same problem. However, you can imagine the reaction in Egypt, having trouble with the British and then having to accept the mediation forces, one of them known as the Queen's Own.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Would it have anything to do with flying the Red Ensign at that time?

Mr. FOULKES: Oh, I would not think so.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Would it have anything to do with the colour of the uniform at that time which was khaki?

Mr. FOULKES: Well, the troops we did send still wore khaki. We sent administrative troops. What happened, as you know, was that they said they did not want a battalion but they would like us to send administrative troops, so we organized an administrative force and, as you know, we sent it, complete with its equipment, in the *Magnificent*.

Mr. MCINTOSH: You said you thought the reason was because the name of the unit was the Queen's Own.

Mr. FOULKES: They said they did not want combat troops so we did not, therefore, send any combat troops.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Would it not also follow, then, that because the British had khaki uniforms and the Canadia forces had khaki uniforms, they did not want that likeness in the area?

Mr. FOULKES: Let me suggest, Mr. McIntosh, that I do not know of a country, except perhaps in South America, where the ground forces do not wear a khaki uniform. It is almost universal. I do not think that had anything to do with it.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Well the people you fought against in the Second World War did not wear khaki?

Mr. FOULKES: No, no; they had grey.

Mr. MCINTOSH: You said this morning, also, that all combat uniforms were the same. I just want to point out they are not actually all the same.

Mr. FOULKES: I was referring to the combat clothing the forces have now in which I understand there is to be no change. That is what I meant. Perhaps I used to wrong word when I said the "same".

Mr. MCINTOSH: Where do you get the understanding, General, that there is going to be no change in that uniform? Is that laid down any place as what the Minister has said?

Mr. FOULKES: I am sure the Minister has made a reference to the fact that the operational uniforms are not to be changed. As a matter of fact, I think it is in his speech somewhere. But I do have a definite recollection of reading it.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I would like to point out to you again, General, that the Minister has said a great deal in his speech but our interpretation of it is, apparently, different from someone else's interpretation, and we can point out, as well as the other side can point out, the Minister has said this and we can point out in his speech where he contradicted what is brought up. It is a yes and no speech. He can point to any part of his speech and say: Yes, I did say that and I did say this.

In the paragraph I just referred to he said there is going to be no change in the forces whatsoever, but again I say he ends up: "until the force structure within the unified force is developed," which would lead you to believe there is going to be a change sometime; or this would lead me to believe so.

Mr. FOULKES:-Again, I say that is a matter you should put to the Minister.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Right, I agree with you. Now, at the top of page eight, you make this statement:

> This proposal regarding the change of emphasis away from NATO, gives the impression that we are departing from a policy of interdependence inclining towards a policy of self-conained national forces.

Further down on the same page after referring to a statement contained on page 10835 of *Hansard* you say:

> If this statement really means what it says—

You are having the same difficulty we are having with the minister's speech.

> —it would take away from the Supreme Commanders, NORAD and the UN the responsibilities of strategic and operational planning of the various Canadian contributions to their respective commands. How the unified headquarters could do this is completely beyond me.

Would these two statements indicate to you that it is Canada's intention to opt out of any of our alliances?

Mr. FOULKES: No. Perhaps I am a bit allergic to military people using phrases like, change of emphasis. That may be all right on the political side but military people do not do things in half measures. If we are going to provide forces in Europe then we provide forces in Europe. There is no question of how much emphasis. You are not going to do just half of your job. The statement I was referring to was made by Air Marshal Sharp; that there was a change of emphasis. To me, that means a slowing down or not doing the job so well. Now if it does happen that the position in NATO is such it is agreed among the partners that the forces there can be whittled down, well and good. But that is a decision which is normally taken as an alliance decision. But a military suggestion that

we are not going to put as much emphasis on it as we did before, that we are going to let it slip a bit, is not, it seems to me, a thing the military should do. Surely we should fulfil this commitment, whatever it is, or cut the commitment down in agreement with our NATO partners. But, whatever we do, do it well. This seems to me to be suggesting we are going to let it slip a bit and put more emphasis, as he says, on this other role which I must say I do not understand.

Mr. McINTOSH: You are saying, then, that Air Marshal Sharp's presentation to this Committee is not clear as far as you are concerned?

Mr. FOULKES: Not this particular bit of it.

Mr. McINTOSH: Is that what led you to say further down on that page:

I hope this is only an error and not notice of an intention.

Mr. FOULKES: No, that is not referring to Air Marshal Sharp's statement; that refers to a statement which appeared in *Hansard*. It appeared in *Hansard* on page 10835 at the bottom of the page. It has to do with management and strategical planning. Again, I emphasize that I was looking at the NATO problem here. This is strategic and operational planning; it is not a Canadian function with regard to the forces that are placed under NATO which are the bulk of our forces. I was hoping that this was not some kind of an idea that we were going to try to tell the people in NATO how to do their strategic and operational planning. I hope that was not the case. We are part of the alliance and contribute towards the strategic concept. We extend our views on it but we do not do it. That is done collectively. I was just wondering, since there has been emphasis on a tendency to have national organized forces, whether this was some other kind of it. It can be read that we participate in the strategic and operational planning. It was not quite clear to me. But, as long as there is no intention of our not accepting strategic and operational planning from the Supreme Allied Commanders I am quite happy. But again, this is a matter I am sure the Minister will explain when he makes his speech because I have raised it.

Mr. McINTOSH: From your remarks I would take it that you had some doubt when you used the words "I was hoping" and "I was wondering". Now, has the situation been clarified since your recent visit to Ottawa, listening in on the Committee proceedings, and so on? Do you still have that doubt? Are you still hoping, are you still wondering?

Mr. FOULKES: You mean about strategic and operational—

Mr. McINTOSH: Well there are two points there that we raised. You said: "I hope this is only an error" and then you also said, "If this statement really means what it says" and two different points were brought out in the brief that you had doubts about. Now, have they been clarified since you have been down here?

Mr. FOULKES: Yes, I am quite prepared to look at it this way; that this strategic and operational planning put in here was really more rhetoric than anything else.

Mr. McINTOSH: Could I ask you what convinced you, because this is what we are looking for ourselves. A great deal of weight is going to be put on your testimony by the public of Canada and we are going to take a second look at all the remarks you have made here because we want to be convinced. We want

the assurances that you apparently have received now, and how are we going to get them? What convinced you?

Mr. FOULKES: First of all let me say that I feel you over-emphasize my importance to this Committee.

Mr. MCINTOSH: This is my opinion, General, so I do not over-emphasize that.

Mr. FOULKES: What I am trying to do is to point out things that are not clear to me with the purpose of making sure that this Committee comes up with the best possible solution to this problem. As I pointed out in my opening remarks, I did not expect to be called before the Committee. I had about 24 hours after I got these papers to prepare a critique on them. Therefore, I have not been able to take every phrase and examine it with great care. But, I pointed out to the Committee the things that have not been clear to me, because they may not be clear to you and I am sure that when you question the Minister you can get clarification of what is meant by this because this is the Minister's statement. I do not think anybody else but the Minister can interpret this.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I did not want an excuse, General, I wanted something concrete that I could work on when I fulfil my responsibility as a member of parliament who is charged with the responsibility of voting for or against this bill. You, as a military expert for whom I have a regard, are going to throw a lot of weight on what I do, regardless of what my colleague over here says.

Mr. FOULKES: I am still unclear on the question you want to put to me.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Let me put the first question, then. Do you think unification is good for the armed forces?

Mr. FOULKES: Yes, that is, on the understanding, as I have explained my view, that I cannot tell the difference between unification and integration.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I will not pursue that. On page 9, General, you say:

> Parcelling out the air facilities in penny packets is most wasteful and creates complete chaos in the air over the battle field...

I think it is a maxim of military training that no commander, regardless of what level, is to dissipate his forces in small packets. My thought on this is: Is Canada trying to opt out of the alliances it already has, for another purpose, or are we spreading our forces too thin over what we intend to do?

Mr. FOULKES: Well, I have already spoken about that particular paragraph in answer to a question by Mr. Deachman, but I can repeat it. You will recall that I emphasized the fact that Canada makes contributions to NATO. I am repeating it because I am dead sure that we should continue this kind of support for NATO. Our recent contribution was an air division. That air division, originally, was an air defence division. When these troops were put into NATO, I do recall the direction we got from the government of the day was that we should make our contribution to this appear to be defensive and not offensive.

When the air defence role became redundant and General Norstadt suggested a strike role, this was not accepted with very much enthusiasm by the St. Laurent administration. They did not like the idea that we were leaving what we had said we would do—defence of Europe. We were looking now as if we were going to strike. They were making quite a difference of it. Therefore, there was

no great enthusiasm to take over the strike role, I can assure you. But, as this was what the Supreme Allied Commander wanted, both governments—the Conservative government and the Liberal government—agreed to provide it. Now, this role is going to be phased out and the government has made a decision to change the role. This does not say that in words, but surely a decision must have been made or we would not have ordered the aircraft. So the decision has been made—let us put it this way—to replace the strike role with a ground support role which is a very worthy thing to do. It suits our purpose because we get out of the nuclear business which is not fully supported in Canada.

Mr. MACALUSO: Was that Mr. St. Laurent or Mr. Diefenbaker?

Mr. FOULKES: Who?

Mr. MACALUSO: You just mentioned Mr. St. Laurent.

Mr. FOULKES: You see, this question of changing the role came up before the Liberal government was defeated. It was under study but no decision was taken. I am just pointing out that it was not received at that time with great enthusiasm. The idea of a strike role with nuclear weapons was not considered the kind of thing the government had in mind in supporting the alliance. The alliance was always put up, as you know, as a defensive organization and it looked pretty hard to explain being defensive when you are going to throw atomic bombs on them. That is the point I was trying to make.

Now I see no difficulty in this. The difficulty I saw in using words like "squadrons will be stationed" and so on, which gave me the impression that we were not going to just transfer the air division from the role of strike to the role of ground support and station it in Europe wherever it could be arranged with Supreme Allied Commander. This looked to me as if there were some idea of doing it in a different way of just spacing a couple of squadrons. Now, that again may be a wrong interpretation of this paragraph. If the interpretation of the facts you put to the Minister is that we are going to form a close support air division and that it is going to be put into Europe—and we hope it is going to be put in a position where it can support our own forces—well and good. But, this gave me the impression, especially the last sentence, that our concern was not in continuing to put as much support behind NATO as possible, but to get Canadian aircraft supporting Canadian troops, which I thought was not as worthy an object as putting the best possible contribution from Canada to Europe for aiding the deterrent.

Mr. MCINTOSH: General, when you started you said the purpose of NATO and Canadian national defence policy then was a defensive one. Is that not the basis of all national defence policies of all countries?

Mr. FOULKES: That is right.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Were you suggesting, then, that there is an inference here that the role of Canada could be changed to an offensive one?

Mr. FOULKES: No, I was just raising the issue that on the political side they did not like the idea. Before, we had an air defence role and now it is a strike role. It did not fit too well—politically, not militarily. It is a political question.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I have one last question. On page 12 you speak of an evil genius of administration. Do you feel that Bill No. C-243 is putting too much emphasis on administration at the sacrifice of the combat troops?

Mr. FOULKES: I raised this issue because, in going through the papers, reading *Hansard* and what Air Marshal Reyno said to you, I did not find much —or any—reference to the steps being taken for the combat troops. There is a great deal in there on trade structure, and so on, which is all well. But I was wondering whether, in this business of trying to make sure we have the best trade structure and best arrangements for specialists, and so on, we were not forgetting about the man that really counts—the man who fights the battle. This is the reason I was raising this issue. It is a thing that happens all the time, if you do not watch it, especially in a big headquarters, because you get absorbed in the particular problem of looking after tradesmen specialists, creating careers, and so on, but there still is no use having the best headquarters in the world unless you have the fighting troops able to fight. This was the point I was trying to make.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Thank you general, that is what we were wondering about.

Mr. MACLEAN (*Queens*): General, it seems to me that one of the difficulties of the Committee, and one of the difficulties of understanding this whole problem all the way through, is the need for definition of the terms, unification and integration. You will have to excuse me; I am not as familiar as I should be with your proposed reorganization that you term unification. Bud did I understand you correctly when you said that in your plan you visualized the combat troops of the three forces could continue to exist pretty much as they are now, and that the question of uniforms and rank structure—whether you call a man a colonel or a group captain or a captain—is not the important matter? Have I understood you correctly?

Mr. FOULKES: Yes. Again, let me use an example. In Maritime Command, for instance, which is the easiest one to look at, I foresaw the commander of Maritime Command having under his command all the navy forces and a part of the present air forces. They would become a Maritime Command and the commander would be responsible for everything that goes on in that command —everything.

Mr. MACLEAN (*Queens*): Exactly.

Mr. FOULKES: In other words, the navy may have lost its CNS at the top but it still has a father in Maritime Command because it has all the navy there, and so on. What you call them is, in my view, rather academic. The changing of names of ranks, I do not think is important. If it upsets somebody, then let us not do it, because the rank of a fellow or what he has on his shoulders or his sleeves has nothing to do with his efficiency in battle. Therefore, in my view, it is not a matter that is urgent or really affects carrying out our job. I certainly would relegate those kinds of things down to a pretty, low priority. If it disturbs somebody I certainly would not have gone ahead with it.

Mr. MACLEAN (*Queens*): Mr. Chairman, on the basis of that your plan, in the terminology we have been exposed to, is not unification but integration and we have already passed that stage pretty well. The act that was passed some time ago brought into existence a plan roughly comparable to that which you propose. But what we are concerned with now, it seems to me, is a further step which has been called unification as delineated in Bill No. C-243. It is this matter

that I am chiefly concerned with at the present time. For example, Bill No. C-243, page 2, clause 2, reads:

> The Canadian forces are the armed forces of Her Majesty raised by Canada and consist of one Service called the Canadian Armed Forces.

I visualize this as the complete obliteration of the three arms of the services as we knew them in the past and the substitution therefor of one force, presumably wearing the same uniform if it is going to be one force, and having one rank structure throughout although there may be specialists in various branches of it who, because of their special training, may have to remain in that special branch. Now, I am concerned with the implications of this. I will ask you a hypothetical question: If you were still the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff, how could you interpret that clause? How would you interpret the implications of this bill to the armed services?

Mr. FOULKES: I do not know how much more I can say on this particular subject. My reading of the paragraph you were referring to meant that there was going to be no change in the groupings of what we now call the army, navy and air force and that they would be formed into task forces and perform their jobs as they had been doing before. I can well see that you do not want to leave them under the names of army, navy and air force or you are going to have the same old problems that induced us to go into integration, and that was, we wanted to have enough flexibility to move people from one sector to another if this was necessary.

I think I gave you an example of where we had radar specialists in 1963 who were surplus in the army and we could not move them into the air force, who were training people for this same purpose, because the services could not agree. Now, I think you have to have flexibility to move specialists and so on, and so give them better career opportunities and also save on training expenses. Now, if you are going to do that you cannot stick to a rigid service structure. This concerns specialists and people of that type.

But when it comes to infantry battalions, and so on, I must insist that I see no sense in it, and I do not think the paper intends that these are to be changed at all. We will have brigades of infantry still commanded by a brigadier, and so on. Their functions and operations will be exactly the same.

Mr. MACLEAN *(Queens)*: I wish that I could have the same faith in the results of the bill as you have. My mind would be much more at ease if that were the case. Up to this time when there where three separate services, the ceilings and strengths of these services were usually considered separately. In other words, there was a mix of the defence dollar with respect to the three services and how much was going to be expended on each. But now, quoting page 2 of the bill, under "Organization", it says:

> The Canadian Forces shall consist of such units and other elements as are from time to time organized by or under the authority of the Minister.

Under this bill, if it becomes an act, it would seem to me that the Minister would have the authority, on his own to vary the balance or even to completely phase out what we now consider to be one of the three services.

Mr. FOULKES: Well, the Minister may have the authority but as long as he has to carry out the tasks which are laid down in this paper, he could not

possibly do it. For instance, you could not phase out the air force and still keep up the maritime role. You could not phase out the air force and still carry on the air defence role. Now, as far as I recall, the Minister or Governor in Council has always had the authority to raise or disband units. As I pointed out yesterday, I was very anxious to get a minister to disband an infantry brigade which was quite within his authority. I see no real concern there, because you have the task that has to be fulfilled and a minister responsible for fulfilling those tasks agreed to by the government, and to provide the forces to do it. I do not see any concern there.

Mr. ANDRAS: Mr. Chairman, I have a quick supplementary question.

The CHAIRMAN: Well, Mr. Andras, we have not got to the end of our list.

Mr. ANDRAS: Well, it is related to this. Would Mr. MacLean permit me?

General, I have the feeling that some slight confusion may have been created this morning with regard to your position. Is it correct to say that you have for many years favoured the unification—or amalgamation, if you prefer the word—of the three services into a single service with a single chief?

Mr. FOULKES: In that broad outline, yes.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Well Mr. Chairman—

The CHAIRMAN: Yes, Mr. Churchill?

Mr. ANDRAS: You still believe in that concept of a single service?

The CHAIRMAN: Order, please.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Mr. Chairman, I raise a point of order here. This is really a loaded question. Combining the two terms, unification and integration, and getting the General to say, yes, is to my mind a propaganda effort. Let us restrict these terms.

The CHAIRMAN: In view of the fact that the bells are ringing and this opens up a matter which probably could not be clarified in the time that is available to us, I ask that we temporarily end the questioning now. Mr. MacLean still has some questions and, no doubt others, and also Mr. Nugent. This is the situation, gentlemen, and perhaps we could clarify it before we return to the House. Mr. Patrick, who has been asked to attend, is waiting and he has a paper which I understand from his secretary will take about half an hour. We have nothing on Monday; we have nothing this afternoon; we have a meeting of the Steering Committee today. What is your pleasure? General Foulkes has a wish to return to Victoria this evening, one which I can understand, and he is available for further questioning this afternoon. Is that not correct, sir?

Mr. FOULKES: Until four o'clock.

The CHAIRMAN: Would you agree to meeting some time after lunch to continue with this? There is one further matter. Since I came in this morning I received a letter from Admiral Welland addressed to the Chairman of the Standing Committee on National Defence dated 17 February, and I would like to have it tabled.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Mr. Chairman, on a point of privilege. If I understand you correctly, you have a letter from Admiral Welland with respect to the matters raised yesterday. Is that correct?

The CHAIRMAN: That is, in fact, what it is.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Well if this is going to be tabled, I think it would be my—

The CHAIRMAN: Well, I can read it.

Mr. DEACHMAN: —privilege to have it read before there is a motion to table it.

The CHAIRMAN: Well, it is fairly short and I will read it to you. It is addressed to the Chairman, dated 17 February:

> Dear Sir,
>
> The Secretary of your Committee telephoned me yesterday forenoon, asking if I would attend the session then sitting. I was not aware until that time that I would be invited, and declined.
>
> I am now aware that my presence was considered desirable by some members, owing to a discussion that developed around a statement made on page 17 of Admiral Landymore brief to your Committee: "Mr. Deachman, of your Committee also knew of the retirements for he and Mr. Groos called on Admiral Welland to get confirmation of what I had told them." The following may help to clarify the matter.
>
> It is correct that Mr. Deachman and Mr. Groos called on me on the evening of the 12th of July. I recall the gist of the conversation well, because at that time it was not entirely clear to me whether I would be retired or not. Because of this I volunteered no information on my private affairs, nor on those of any other person. Neither of my visitors asked me about myself or my intentions. The subject of retirements did not come up.
>
> Yours truly,
> Robert Welland,
> Rear Admiral.

Have I your permission to table this?

Mr. DEACHMAN: That satisfies my point of privilege and on the questions raised yesterday. I am prepared to drop the point of privilege which could have been settled yesterday had Admiral Landymore been willing to phone Admiral Welland when I gave him the opportunity. Thank you for your efforts.

The CHAIRMAN: Well, Admiral Landymore was being questioned at the time.

Gentlemen, we shall adjourn until two-thirty this afternoon.

AFTERNOON SITTING

FRIDAY, February 17, 1967.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, I see a quorum.

When we adjourned this morning Mr. MacLean was asking some questions of the witness, General Foulkes, so I will continue now with Mr. MacLean.

Mr. MACLEAN (*Queens*): As I recall, the last question I asked was a question concerning the keeping of a proper balance between the various armed forces functions. I have a very high regard for the general's professional experience in

this field and I do not think there is any substitute for experience, but he may consider this outside his field and if it is an unfair question I will not pursue it.

At the present time, sir, do you consider that we are fulfilling all our commitments or that we have the facilities to fulfil all our commitments? I am thinking especially with regard to our contribution to NATO and SACLANT and also whether we have the capability to establish, from the military point of view, our sovereignty properly over our coastal waters, taking into consideration that it is the policy of the government to declare large bodies of water such as, the Gulf of St. Lawrence, Hecate Strait, Dixon Entrance and some others as national waters.

Mr. FOULKES: As far as I can see, we are fulfilling out NATO commitments. As I pointed out before, NATO commitments vary and there is a procedure in NATO whereby governments can vary their commitments by agreement. As I mentioned this morning, we changed over from a role of air defence to a strike role and the indications are that we are going from a strike role into a role of ground support. In NATO that is the accepted business of negotiating with the supreme allied commanders when you want to make changes, and normally the council are told and that is the way it is worked. As I pointed out, in Canada's position we have plenty of room for flexibility because we are only making contributions. Unlike the Belgians, the Dutch or the Germans, we do not have a border to defend and therefore, it seems to me, we are living up to our commitments there.

As to the other point you raised with regard to the maritime field, if you ask a military man whether he has enough he will always say he has not; we always could get along with a great deal more than we have. I have never seen a military man yet who has ever been satisfied. What we want to make sure of is that within the funds that parliament provides we are making the best possible use of them. Whether we should be doing more in the maritime field and less somewhere else is a question on which I think only the maritime commander could make representations; I certainly could not because I have not been in touch with that matter for the last five or six years.

I have always felt, however, that the maritime role is a very important and good one for Canada because we operate from our own coast, we do not have to go overseas to do it. We are able to operate from our own ports and we are not only contributing to the deterrent, we are also defending our own coast line. Furthermore, it is perhaps one of the closest associations with our bigger ally, the United States, and with that close affiliation with the United States we have access to a great deal of the work being done by the United States in the maritime field and the research field, and so on, and I think this is a very, very important field. I have felt—not because I have been living in British Columbia—that very shortly we are going to have to take another look at how much we are doing on that coast because that again, depending on what happens in China, is going to be quite a problem. Let me give you an example. If it so happens that we get a détente in Europe and we are able to withdraw some of our forces, or do it a little differently so that we are saving money there, there is still lots of room for putting more into the maritime role. I am sure that any of you who have been briefed by SACLANT are aware of the fact that they think they need a great deal more than they have at the present time.

Mr. MACLEAN (*Queens*): Naturally in deciding in which field you are going to expend your resources you have to weigh the various propositions that are advocated by those military experts who perhaps naturally tend to put forward the aspects of it in which they are most interested. Now, do you feel there will be in the new organization an adequate channel for presenting the demands of Maritime Command, for example, to the decision-making level, whereas they may not be an expert or a specialist in that field directly in the policy-making role?

Mr. FOULKES: Mr. MacLean, you remember this morning when I was talking about how I would like to see these organized I said that the Maritime commander would be the adviser to the Chief of the Defence Staff and to the Minister on all Maritime matters, and I am fairly sure that this is what is going to happen. In that way he would put his case forward, which would be considered along with the case put by Mobile Command, Air Defence Command, and so on, to be weighed in the picture. It seems to me that he is the one to put forward those views and if we give him the proper status so that he can really put forward his views strongly, then I see no difficulty there at all. As a matter of fact, I see a decided improvement because you would have the man right on the spot putting the case instead of the man on the spot having to put a case to his own boss, and then he having to put it to the chiefs of staff. I think this should be an improvement.

Mr. MACLEAN (*Queens*): At the present time there is only one link between the services and the Minister.

Mr. FOULKES: Yes, but the head of that link has also just arranged to have what we call an armed forces council, into which these people are going to be brought. I view this armed forces council—I may not be right about this—not only as a means of getting information but as a means of giving information to the Chief of Staff and the Minister on the conditions and requirements of the Maritime Command.

Mr. MACLEAN (*Queens*): This leads me to another question. This morning you were speaking of the advice given to the civilian head of the Department of National Defence, and that naturally you could not expect acceptance of your recommendation at that time there was a lack of civilian control of the armed services. There has been loose talk to the effect that the taxpayers have built an automatic juggernaut over which they no longer have sufficient control, and that the senior officers have set up their own empire and are chiefly concerned with continuing it. Now, knowing a large number of senior officers in the services, I consider that kind of criticism very unfair and not at all consistent with the facts.

Mr. FOULKES: Certainly not in my experience. As I mentioned this morning, I worked under five defence ministers and I never found one that I could push around, I can tell you that—not that there was any desire to push them around—but certainly they were determined characters who could look after themselves. I never saw any suggestion whatever that the Canadian officer corps was not completely loyal throughout. As you know, this idea of a revolt was tried out at the end of the war by Mr. King when he was having a little trouble with his conscription issue. He rather gathered up this idea that there was a generals' revolt. If you read what Professor McGregor has written about this you

will find that in his research into this problem there was no such thing as a revolt of the generals and this does not sit well in our Canadian life at all. I am sure you will all agree that Canada is in no way a banana republic that is in any real danger of the military ever taking it over.

Mr. MacLEAN (*Queens*): I agree with that point of view entirely. During the period that you were chairman of the Chiefs of Staff, or at any other time as far as that is concerned, did you feel that there was a likelihood that certain decisions would be so unpalatable to senior officers that they would accept retirement in considerable numbers rather than continue, if they had this choice. In effect, would you consider it a normal situation where this would happen?

Mr. FOULKES: As you know and as I pointed out before, we had real differences at the time of the Arrow. I do not know of any experience I have gone through in my career that was more exasperating than the Arrow situation because there was no really good answer to the problem. Certainly there were many views expressed on both the political side and the military side that were miles apart. Cool heads were kept, and it was realized that this was a tough decision not only for the military, but a tough decision for the government. We had to accept that fact. We knew very well that if we insisted on going ahead with the Arrow there would be no funds for anything else unless the defence budget was pushed up and in a situation such as this question of whether the military decided to quit or not it always seemed to me that the place of the chief was to sit there, because they had to sell this to their troops and get this thing understood. I remember we had a bit of a time with the Chief of the Air Staff at that time, but that was to be expected because this again was something that was hurting his service.

Mr. MacLEAN (*Queens*): I just have one more question. On the other side of the coin, do you think, sir, there is a danger that a political head in the Department of Defence—which, of course, is normal in our system—can be in a position where he is too vulnerable to perhaps completely invalid but popular notions of public opinion and where the popular thing for him to do would be to insist on some course of action that might be, from a military point of view, completely unsound. Do you think that there would be any validity in perhaps doing something to protect the Minister from these winds that blow—political winds, if you like, in the broader sense of the term—that might force him, in a case of self-preservation, to press something that is not, from a military standpoint, particularly sound? Might it be advantageous to recruit the Minister of National Defence from a more protected area where he would not be dependent on getting elected in the next election, for example, and would it perhaps be advisable to recruit the Minister of National Defence from the Senate rather than from the House of Commons?

Mr. FOULKES: Of course, what you are really suggesting is that in Canada there should be a system similar to what they have in the United States, where the ministers who are appointed are not members of the legislative body. However, this is a matter that I suggest is out of my province. I am sure any suggestion from me about re-organizing the government of Canada would not be too acceptable.

Mr. MacLEAN (*Queens*): I would not go that far. My suggestion would be perfectly possible under present conditions. I am finished.

Mr. NUGENT: General I do not pretend to be a military expert and perhaps I am a little slow in understanding some of these finer distinctions, but I wonder if you would see if I am right in my understanding of the military situation. The Minister has said, and I believe you also said the same thing, that even in a unified force the naval people would be fighting as naval units and the army as army units and the air force as air units, and I wonder if you could tell me what economy will be achieved for the Canadian taxpayer by having them as one unified force although fighting in the same way, as distinct from having them as separate forces with unified command?

Mr. FOULKES: I am not in a position to comment on savings because that can only be done by the people who plan this. I could not give you an answer to whether you are going to save any money or not; that is really outside my province. I have not been in touch with it that closely.

Mr. NUGENT: Then, sir, could you give me some illustrations of how this might result in increased efficiency?

Mr. FOULKES: That is, increased efficiency with regard to the forces being under one—

Mr. NUGENT: Being a unified force rather than having a unified command structure. This is what I understand by integration.

Mr. FOULKES: Where the forces would be more efficient.

Mr. NUGENT: Yes, some illustration of the way in which we would get more efficiency, because we now have one force instead of three separate forces.

Mr. FOULKES: I did not think that this was based on the question of making our combat forces more efficient. I think I said this morning that I thought our combat forces were just about as efficient as you could make them, and no matter where they have operated, whether it was in Korea or whether it was in the Gaza Strip or whether it was in Cyprus, or anywhere else, their conduct in operations has been pretty well beyond reproach. As I said earlier I have always looked at this integration business as a system of finding more money, and not necessarily that our forces will be more efficient if they did this. I will admit there will be a greater flexibility in regard to tradesmen and specialists, and so on, who can be moved from one service to the other on promotion, or something like that, or if there is a shortage, and I suppose you can say that will add to the efficiency because it will mean that your training stream will be much less, but I would not say that our combat forces are going to be altered at all by either one or the other.

Mr. NUGENT: This is getting down to where Admiral Landymore had some difficulty with this problem of unification. As I understood his argument, it was simply that he was principally opposed to unification, because of the effect on morale and that the Navy, of course, would take serious objection to the Navy disappearing as a service and to the uniform disappearing. I believe your position on the uniform was—and correct me if I received the wrong impression from your testimony—that it should not matter what uniform they fight in, and as it is not an essential part, why bother to do it if it is going to upset people. Is that about right?

Mr. FOULKES: I think that is pretty well what I said.

Mr. NUGENT: So far there is no real difference between your approach and that of Admiral Landymore. It has been a few years since you were out so that you would not be able to comment as to how effective some of the major integration steps have been, but would you agree with Admiral Landymore's general stand that he cannot approve of unification because he can find neither increased economy, nor increased efficiency in unification as distinct from unified command with separate fighting forces.

Mr. FOULKES: I think that is Admiral Landymore's opinion and, as I have not sat through his evidence and heard the arguments, I am not really in a position to challenge his statements at all. I was not here.

Mr. NUGENT: General, would you comment on this statement of his, which is the general argument that usually results when you are trying to discuss some of the monetary or other advantages of the question of unification. He said:

> Under questioning, the proponents of unification invariably fall back on the advantages of integration to support their stand.

Would you agree that that is a fair summary of the situation that exists today?

Mr. FOULKES: As I said before, I am not too clear on where integration stops and unification begins. It has always been a bit of a puzzle to me.

Mr. NUGENT: So, that probably gives a little strength to the convention that in trying to decide the pure question of unification we first find it too hard to get that concept strained of the impurity of integration.

Mr. FOULKES: You can have it that way if you like.

Mr. NUGENT: I wonder if you would care to comment on Admiral Landymore's concern over the fairness to the officers and men presently serving in our three armed forces. It is the admiral's contention that as Bill No. C-243 creates one new force and abolishes the three existing ones, that it would be unfair to those who have joined that new service for parliament to wipe out that service and put a new one in without giving them the option of going or staying.

Mr. FOULKES: Well, as I read this anybody can go or stay within six months.

Mr. NUGENT: I think that is fair enough.

Mr. FOULKES: Well, you could argue that perhaps it should be two months or three months or four months, but I would not consider it a grave hardship if a man has to wait six months. Usually he would require that time anyway to search around for employment.

Mr. NUGENT: I think that is all I have at the moment.

Mr. WINCH: Mr. Chairman, a number of questions which I intended to ask have now been asked by Mr. Nugent, but as I have not as yet asked any questions, I would like at this time to make mine a little more specific. I do so recognizing that the general and I have been friends for a great many years—I hope I can put it that way—sometimes as antagonists and sometimes as protagonists. The general has been kind enough to tell me more than once that it was because of my questioning when he appeared before our committee in 1963 that he presented a position to the effect that he was then and always had been in favour of integration, unification and a single service. I listened most carefully to the general's presentation last evening and I gathered from his presentation that

he has not in any way whatsoever changed his mind from what he told us in 1963, that he was wholeheartedly in support of integration, unification and a single service.

Mr. CHURCHILL: On what page does that appear?

Mr. WINCH: It appears on three different pages. This is what it says:

> All these tasks could be carried out from Canadian territory with no Canadian troops stationed permanently abroad. These tasks would allow the services to work together as a team in all activities. There is no doubt that Canada could render a more adequate contribution to maintaining the peace by concentrating on two major activities instead of trying to emulate the big powers and attempting to carry out the whole panoply of military endeavour but in miniature.
>
> The concentration and simplification of Canadian defence aims and contributions would allow for a greater integration of the services and a streamlining of the staffs, schools, training establishments and administration with a considerable resultant reduction in manpower and expenditure. This trend should lead to the eventual complete integration of the services into one service with one chief, one staff, one administration and integrated flexible task forces to carry out the agreed contributions, and what I mean by "integrated flexible task forces", would be forces to deal with the naval and air force group in relation to the potential threat, a mobile reserve of the army, air force and navy.

Then the following question was put by Mr. Chester MacRae:

> I have one or two questions to ask mainly for the purposes of clarification, and I should like to reserve my right to ask further questions at a later stage.
>
> On the first page of your submission, General, you used the expression: "Through an abortive attempt to amalgamate the services".
>
> Do you mean by "amalgamate" the type of integration as you use that expression later on in your brief? When was this attempt made, and would you be so kind as to pinpoint the difficulties that were encountered?

And so on. Then he asked, also at page 508:

> Mr. MacRae: I understand from what you have said later on in the brief that you feel very strongly in favour of integration of the services?
>
> Mr. Foulkes: I feel very strongly in favour of integration of the forces, and I have felt this way for a number of years.

You will find that this is also mentioned in another place, at the moment I cannot place it.

General Foulkes, did you not state when you appeared before us in 1963 that you were completely in favour of integration, unification and a single service?

Mr. FOULKES: Correct.

Mr. WINCH: I am certain, sir, that you said that and it is on the record. I also understood from your presentation last night that you have not changed the view you expressed to the Committee in 1963, but you do have very reasonable and serious complaint to make about the methods used in approaching complete

integration, unification and the establishment of a single force. Also, that you stress a lack of information to the public in general and to the armed forces in particular—and I would like you to note this because I am going to be very careful on it—and you feel that in approaching this objective the department, the Minister and the government are proceeding too fast and perhaps making decisions which raise misunderstandings and objections, such as including in the bill before us, changes in the rank structure as between the services and in the matter of a common uniform and these are matters which should not be in legislation and which would normally evolve in the process of evolution. In other words, sir, you stay by the original principal?

Mr. FOULKES: Where did I say this?

Mr. WINCH: I said my impression was that the implementation towards the objective was proceeding too fast and that there was not enough information given to the public and in particular to the armed forces, and there may have been something in the legislation—the way I interpret it—such as uniforms or rank structure which may have caused a disturbance and which should be left to the evolutionary process. Now, have I put the picture honestly and clearly? If you disagree with what I have said, will you tell me in what way?

Mr. FOULKES: This was your impression; what is the question?

Mr. WINCH: All right, I will put it in three direct questions. One, you completely agree with integration, unification and the single service, as you did in 1963?

Mr. FOULKES: The answer is yes.

Mr. WINCH: Right. Two, did your presentation last night basically mean that in the implementation of these three objectives certain procedures have perhaps been carried out, too fast, and matters not requiring a decision at the moment be left to the evolutionary process?

Mr. FOULKES: I made some observations on the way the plan was implemented. I do not think I mentioned the word "legislation" at all.

Mr. WINCH: No, but you did bring up the matter of uniform and rank—

Mr. FOULKES: On uniform I did express the view—and I will express it again—that as this question of uniform is causing considerable difficulty at a time when it seems to me we should be minimizing the difficulties, I would certainly want to be one of the first people to say we should drop it. I think we want to get a good view of this question of uniform because it is a walking-out dress. Now, my impression of the young recruit of today is that he is not like the people in the Victorian era when they dressed up like peacocks and went out in Hyde Park to attract the girls. His off-duty activities can be much better carried out in a pair of flannels and a blazer than in a uniform.

Mr. WINCH: My point is that it is not required in legislation now in order to reach the ultimate objective.

Mr. FOULKES: Well, what goes into legislation, of course, is something which I have no right to speak about. All I am saying is that I do not think it is an issue that is vital to the integration of the services.

Mr. WINCH: Do you feel that we might have progressed a lot further on the general principal if we had not brought in this question of rank as between the services?

Mr. FOULKES: Do you mean that they—

Mr. WINCH: Was it necessary to bring it in?

Mr. FOULKES: The designation of ranks?

Mr. WINCH: The designation of ranks.

Mr. FOULKES: You do not mean the rank structure, how many you have, your are talking about the titles of them?

Mr. WINCH: That is right.

Mr. FOULKES: Well, here again I am perhaps a strange kind of a military man, I am a bit of a pacifist, so that if I found that it was upsetting people I would not put it into effect, and I think it is upsetting certain people, especially those in the Navy.

Mr. WINCH: Well, my final question is this. As your opinion is exactly the same in principal as you told this Committee it was in 1963, do you feel that the mistakes which are made in achieving an objective are incidental matters that could far better be postponed, and that it is better to proceed slowly and without antagonism toward your objective than to try to do it to quickly?

Mr. FOULKES: Well, I notice I was quoted to the press as saying that I had said the matter was going too fast, and I looked through the papers and could not find where I had made any reference to speed.

Mr. WINCH: This was no doubt my impression.

Mr. FOULKES: This is a very complicated and intricate operation, and I feel you certainly cannot rush it. I could not; at least. It will take a long time and I think when you are dealing with an emotional question like integration that you have to get the reactions to certain things you do before you do the next thing. However, that is only my opinion.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. MacRae?

Mr. MACRAE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have one or two question. I apologize if I should ask questions that have been asked before but, as you know, I have merely been in and out of the Committee as an observer. I am pleased to see General Foulkes again. Our acquaintanceship and relationship goes back 21 years, to when we both served in the same division very early in the war. My first question is this: The idea of an international police force has been expounded over the years, and very recently by the Prime Minister of Canada and the Secretary of State for External Affairs, and it would appear that it is not too acceptable to the United Nations at this moment and it has not got off the ground recently. I would like to ask General Foulkes if it should happen that we found ourselves being asked to take part in an international police force role, does he feel that as our forces are constituted at this moment with our separate services, and so on, that we could fulfil a satisfactory, efficient and honourable role?

Mr. FOULKES: Well, I pointed out yesterday, and perhaps you were not here, that in my view we have a surplus of a battalion of infantry in our force today, and I do not think would upset the department the least little bit if we provided one battalion to an international police force. I am sure that they could find a battalion fairly quickly for this.

Mr. MACRAE: Or more than that?

Mr. FOULKES: Well, perhaps two battalions, or something like that, but if you are going to have an international police force it has to be international and not too much from one country. However, I would think that if Canada provided a battalion, in any international police force under the sponsorship of the United Nations, that it would be a fairly good contribution. I do not say that an international police force will not fight; it will take on things like Cyprus, that sort of task. There are tasks which the Canadian soldier carries out extremely well. He has turned out to be a much quieter and passive policeman than some of us expected he would be. I think it is a good task for the military. It is certainly a change of atmosphere and one they do extremely well, but I have no hopes that you will ever have an international police force in the UN.

Mr. MACRAE: Thank you. The second question is one that I ask from your experience. As a member of this Committee over a number of years I have noticed, especially in the United States, that we seem to be over-ranked. I will explain that. It seems to me we had a major general or a brigadier there where normally I felt, with regard to what we were doing there, a major or lieutenant colonel would have been adequate. The explanation which I received for this—I read about it and then I tried to observe it—was that especially in our dealings with the Americans—and this may sound a little touchy at the moment—we had to have a brigadier there because if he were going to be talking to an American brigadier general there was no point in sending a colonel or a lieutenant colonel, and for that reason we seemed to have officers far above the rank required for the task that was being performed. I thought that as you are here today I would like to get a confirmation or a denial of that from your own personal experience.

Mr. FOULKES: Well this, of course, is very touchy because I became the first active force general in the Canadian force, but even when I was a lieutenant general I found no difficulties whatever in negotiating with my opposite numbers in the United States who were sometimes one or two steps above me. I do not think it is necessary to always have rank for rank. Most Canadians can hold their end up without any artificial backing such as rank.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, I think I should point out that the General is looking at his watch. He has fifteen minutes before he has to leave to catch a plane.

Mr. WINCH: I have a supplementary question.

The CHAIRMAN: Well, Mr. McIntosh is ahead of you, Mr. Winch.

Mr. MCINTOSH: My question is very short. I have eliminated a lot I was going to ask and I think that the answer to the question I am going to ask now will clarify my opinion of the General's contribution to this Committee.

Some time ago when we were debating second reading in the house, General, on this one particular bill we objected to giving second reading to it before we heard these witnesses. One member got up in the house and said he agreed in principle with the bill but did not understand what it was. I am confused when I compare your answers yesterday with the answer you just gave Mr. Winch. Yesterday there was some misunderstanding of your use of the term "unification", but the record will reveal that you said you believed in unification, and afterwards, when I asked you, you said you did not understand what the Minister meant by it but you had an understanding yourself and you believed in

this. Now, in answer to Mr. Winch, when he put some questions blankly to you, you said you believed in unification. Is that right?

Mr. FOULKES: Mr. Winch asked me a question regarding a statement I made before the Committee when I presented the plan.

Mr. McINTOSH: It was after that, General.

He read the statement and there was no mention of unification in the statement he read, but he asked you if you believed in unification and you said yes.

Mr. FOULKES: But there was a statement that he read where I said the forces should be unified, and I was answering his question with regard to the plan that I presented at that time and which used the word "unified". In that context I certainly agree with it.

Mr. McINTOSH: Well, do you believe in unification in the context that the Minister tried to portray in his speech? Could you just answer "yes" or "no", and then I would understand?

Mr. FOULKES: Well, as I said before, I made some reservations before the Committee in regard to the extent of unification, as laid down in the paper, and those were the reservations that I had. Those reservations were not terribly big. I did not understand the paragraph dealing with the question of infantry companies being used separately, and things like that.

Mr. McINTOSH: Well, you have just finished saying to Mr. Nugent, too, that you are not clear where integration stops and unification starts. Well, if you do not know what unification is, certainly you would not know where it started.

This is what puzzles me. The press comes out and says that you believe in unification. I would say from the testimony you gave us yesterday that you did not believe in unification. You have a term that you use, but we all seem to have different definitions of the term. I am trying to get an understanding of the Minister's intention to see if any two of us can agree on what he means, because he will not give us the answer.

Mr. FOULKES: But surely this is a question that you should put to the Minister when he appears before you.

Mr. McINTOSH: I will, but I just want to see if I can get two people who will agree.

Mr. FOULKES: I am sure I cannot in any way forecast what the Minister is going to say about his views on this particular subject. I feel that we are playing around with words here more than we are with reality.

Mr. McINTOSH: I agree, but we as politicians have to vote for this bill as it is presently worded and we are to get our direction from military experts like yourself. I ask you, do you believe in unification? You are accustomed to deciphering orders, and so on, from ministers and you said you worked under five different ministers, surely you can say whether you understand the Minister's explanation of unification in this case. Do you or do you not? You do not have to answer if you do not want to. I do not care. You are getting directions from the other side there.

Mr. FOULKES: I do not yet quite understand what you are driving at.

Mr. McINTOSH: Do you understand what the Minister means by unification? Yes or no?

Mr. FOULKES: I understand what is in the paper with certain reservations, which I have raised, which I understand the Minister is going to clarify when he talks to you later on in the week. At least, I presume he will.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WINCH: I would like to get an answer if I can.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Is the General going to be here any longer? Mr. Winch has had his turn.

Mr. WINCH: The only time—

The CHAIRMAN: Order. I put Mr. Winch down on a supplementary and I put you down on a supplementary also, Mr. Churchill.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I do not want to delay the General, but how much more time does he have?

The CHAIRMAN: I believe he has about ten minutes.

Mr. FOULKES: I have about ten or fifteen minutes. I have to get out of here by a quarter to four.

Mr. WINCH: I have just one question and I am going to put it this way, Mr. Chairman. I hope you will accept it.

General you are a Canadian and a good Canadian. You served Canada for many years in the armed services; you were Chief of Staff for nine years if my memory is correct. With all your experience do you now believe that Admiral Landymore was correct in his admonition to the members of parliament that if we support the government policy on defence that a minister of defence and the commander of the mobile forces could overthrow our democratic institutions and establish a military dictatorship? What is your impression now, sir, as a good Canadian and as a member of the armed forces?

Mr. FOULKES: Are you asking me whether they have the ability to do it or whether they would have the intention of doing it?

Mr. WINCH: Well, if I can I am going to say, intent and ability.

Mr. FOULKES: There is no doubt the Minister of National Defence has the forces behind him to take any military action, but I do not think that really matters. It is a question of whether you think that any Canadian officer or politician is ever going to move against the democratic government of Canada. In my view it is absolutely absurd. I have seen nothing to support any such contention whatsoever.

Mr. WINCH: Thank you.

Mr. CHURCHILL: My question is not just a supplementary, Mr. Chairman. I thought I would have an opportunity for a second round.

The CHAIRMAN: No. It is the second round. I did not mean to convey otherwise.

Mr. CHURCHILL: General Foulkes, when Admiral Brock appeared before us and gave evidence my temporary friends across the way went to great pains to point out to the Committee that Admiral Brock on leaving the services had aligned himself with the Conservative party. To balance the record, I trust you will not object if I indicate that when you left the services you aligned yourself with the Liberal party. It is the right of any citizen to align himself with a party. You do not object to my balancing the record in that way, do you?

Mr. FOULKES: No. All I want to say is that the Liberal party would not have me, so that—

Mr. CHURCHILL: They treated you rather shabbily; otherwise you might have been sitting in the seat of the chairman.

The CHAIRMAN: Heaven forbid!

Mr. FOULKES: Well, I do not think we want to go into conjecture.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I noticed that you were very critical in the paper last night of the policy of the government and also in the articles which were published in the Ottawa *Journal* on October 11, 12 and 13 of 1966, and yet you are being a bit kind today with respect to this question of unification. I raised with some other witnesses what I once again call the ruthless purge of senior officers by the Minister of National Defence, and I judge that this disturbed you quite a bit because in your article which was published on October 12, 1966, the following words occur, and I quote:

> Never before in Canada or in any other democratic country has a minister changed his whole staff at the same time and in less than two years of their appointments. The only other record of wholesale changes in the military occurred in the Hitler regime. He dismissed every general who dared to tell him what he should know and not what he liked to hear.

I presume that your opinion of this rapid change of battle—experienced senior officers is that it is not really a very good thing for the defence forces of Canada?

Mr. FOULKES: Well, I thought I covered that when I said last night that I was concerned about it because I feel there are still a lot of problems to be solved, and what I actually said was that I am well aware that senior officers with command experience are becoming scarce and while there are brilliant young officers coming forward with brief cases full of theoretical answers, the successful conclusion of this experiment needs the levelling influence of those who know the exacting demands of active operations and the steps that are necessary to prepare troops to go out and meet hostilities. I do not think I can say it any clearer than that. There is a great deal to be said, it seems to me, when setting up a new force, for having experienced people who had something to do with it before in action. That is the reason I made this remark.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I was wondering whether you could help us a little bit further on this line. I think when we examine the evidence we will discover that you are really suggesting a pause in order to settle down for a while. I notice that in your article of October 12 in the *Journal* you said, and I quote:

> Evidence given at the Committee on Defence shows that integrated logistic support will not be fully ready for three to five years. A risk of this magnitude should not be undertaken unless there are more compelling reasons than political expediency or, as some commentators have mentioned, the personal ambitions of the present Minister.

I judge that at that time you were thinking that there should be a lapse of time for these new command organizations to settle into the job before the next step was taken. Are you still of that opinion?

Mr. FOULKES: Well, this is based on the fact that I have always felt that you do not want to get in a position to go into operations until your supply

organization is ready, because you cannot maintain your forces unless your supply organization is ready. In reading the minutes of the previous meetings I believe it was General Fleury who pointed out that the integrated supply organization would not be ready for some three years.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Also on October 13 you mentioned this fact, and I quote again:

> Integration of the headquarters, the direction, control, administration and logistic support has been accepted by the services and the public.

You are setting out that integration can only succeed if it is accepted by all members of the forces, but there are many indications that this is not the case. Then you say what should be done and you list three reasons, and this is number two. I had better read it again so that it will fit in properly.

> Integration of the headquarters, the direction, control, administration and logistic support has been accepted by the services and the public. However, if further integration of the combat echelons is attempted there is a grave risk of chaos if an emergency arises before the training and logistic organization is completely ready for operations. No savings will be made and only the gravest risks will be taken by rushing ahead with further integration of the various combat forces.

That is similar to the reply you gave me just a moment ago, that from the military point of view it is unwise to rush ahead too rapidly until you are sure of your support lines and logistic control. Is that right?

Mr. FOULKES: That is right.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I will conclude with this. Are you prepared, sir, to recommend to the Committee and to the Minister that the present bill be postponed, with regard to operation, until a period of time has elapsed, perhaps three to five years, and until the integration up to this moment has been sorted out and has become effective and that then, and only then, might the next step be taken of attempting to proceed with what the Minister calls unification? In other words, a pause to reorganize.

Mr. FOULKES: I doubt that I am in a position to make a recommendation to this Committee. As I have pointed out, I have only studied this bill for the last twenty-four hours and one would have to study it very carefully to see what the impact of the further moves would be. If the impact is that there is going to be no change in the combat forces—and this has been indicated—I do not think it is perhaps necessary to say that there has to be a delay.

At the present time there are three different systems of supply, and those are being maintained until the integrated system is ready. If there was any change now in the composition of the forces so that they could not operate on their single system then it would be very difficult; but I understand that there is to be no change in the composition of the fighting element of the forces. Therefore, it is really of no worry to me now so long as that is the case.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Your information appears to be different from what has reached us.

I wonder, General Foulkes, if you would examine a compromise solution which I presented to the Minister in the House of Commons with regard to fulfilling some of our foreign commitments under the United Nations. The Prime

Minister, the Minister of External Affairs and the Minister of National Defence seem to be rather keen on fulfilling certain United Nations' obligations and they have had the support of Parliament as, for that purpose, the same support was given by an earlier government. I suggested to the Minister that a reasonable compromise to fulfill those engagements would be to form a special force in a special uniform with a special title—an elite force—to do police duties such as are being done now by our forces overseas.

We have about 2,000 men overseas in any given year, and they are not engaged in fighting; they are not on a punitive expedition; they have not engaged in the suppression of revolts of armed conflicts; they are performing peacekeeping operations. We could have the best of both worlds, I think, if we had that type of special force, trained, disciplined, drawn from volunteers in the services and posted overseas for a specified time. At the same time we would maintain our navy, our army and our air force as they are now, in co-operation with our allies. As you so wisely pointed out last night, we cannot operate on our own as an independent nation, but in co-operation with our allies we can provide naval and army and air forces to assist them.

That is the compromise solution that I put forward and I think it would satisfy all the people who are involved in this present controversy. I was wondering if you had had the time to examine that concept, and, if so, whether or not it had merit?

Mr. FOULKES: I have not heard of this concept before, but at first look one would hope, from the standpoint of the services, that we would not set up a special force. It is a good thing to be able to rotate the forces to do these various tasks; in other words, to do a stint in Cyprus, a stint in, perhaps, Germany and a stint at home. It seems to me that if this is done so that you always have trained forces; and the soldier who is trained to fight is also an excellent policeman.

I do not think there is too much advantage in it. It might make a spiteful force, if a fellow just thought that he was a policeman, unless you are going to raise that force somewhere else. There have been suggestions that we should raise a force somewhat like the RCMP and use it; but if it is to be a military force—I always like to think of a military force as one in which every man is a fighting man, and which may be used for different tasks.

Mr. CHURCHILL: They would be seconded, in my opinion, for this purpose and they would not be representing the aggressive combat forces of Canada abroad. You mentioned to us the difficulty of Suez—just a little while ago—using a combat force for that purpose and we ended up with administrative troops. That is what was in my mind when I was saying it would be a special force—separate and apart in nomenclature—from the fighting forces of Canada.

Mr. Chairman, that is the end of my questioning.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, that seems to complete the questioning of General Foulkes.

General, I think the extent of the questioning and the interest which has been shown in your presentation and in your answers are as good an indication as any of the great interest we have in this problem and of our appreciation for your coming here. Thank you very much indeed.

Mr. FOULKES: Thank you, gentlemen; I have enjoyed it.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, would you care for a five-minute recess? We will resume at 20 minutes to four o'clock.

—After recess

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, could we please come to order again?

Group Captain Patrick has been waiting since yesterday to present his short brief and he now has a deadline of 4.30. He has asked if he can have a taxi to take him to a train that he must catch at 4.30; so without further ado I will hand down a small paper showing Group Captain Patrick's background of experience and I will ask him to deliver the brief which we have invited him to present.

Mr. K. R. PATRICK, O.B.E., C.D., D.Eng.: Mr. Chairman, gentlemen, may I sit down to deliver it?

The CHAIRMAN: Please do.

Mr. PATRICK: I say "gentlemen", there are not many left but all who are left are gentlemen.

I welcome the opportunity to speak before this very important group on a matter vital to the well being of Canada. I am honoured as a private citizen, and as a businessman, to be permitted to express my views before such a distinguished group of Canada's elected representatives.

The Chairman has said that he is circulating some of the things that I am; but I would like to point out that what I am not is a professional soldier; and I am not an official. I am one of that breed of hundreds of thousands of Canadians who, when the defence of Canada requires it, make ourselves available. In many respects I think I speak for a large percentage of this group.

My remarks today are based on a long association with, and a very deep interest in, the problems of the "Defence of Canada" (both official and unofficial). My paper today *supports* the unification programme as *essential, timely,* and *logical.* To me it is evidence of political responsibility of the highest order.

The logic behind the decision to unify the armed forces is, in my view, incontestable in the face of the economic and military facts.

It is unrealistic to confuse the "Glories of the Past" with the inevitable, and in some places "agonizing", fact that our Canadian Armed Forces must be re-orientated to meet the domestic and international military needs of 1967 and beyond.

Interservice rivalry may have at times been a good thing but surely not if it prevents national military policy from being properly co-ordinated and managed, or if it results in duplication in installations and equipment.

Military manpower and equipment is so expensive to-day that both resources must be managed with extreme care. While our military equipment inventory is measured in billions fo dollars, these great resources are the men and the women in the armed forces.

The unification policy will result in a kind of management which will make these people more effective, more competent, more stimulated. Our fighting men will be better equipped, tougher and more respected than at any other time in history.

New policies of management of personnel have, for the first time in history of the armed forces, resulted in a rational relationship between the pay of the serviceman compared to civilian employment and the recognition and elimina-

tion of many inequalities that existed; not to mention the elimination of the traditionally rigid pay and promotional structures!

Some of the great minds, still respected, were outspoken advocates of unified defence forces. These are people to whom I have spoken personally: Admiral Louis Mountbatten, for one, and that the distinguished Canadian, General A. G. L. McNaughton, and there are others. You might be surprised to learn that most of the ex-service personnel I know from costs to coast agree with this.

Unification, after all, is not a new idea—a large number of service personnel have been advocating this idea for many years.

Before the end of the war in 1945 while I was still serving in the RCAF I prepared a paper which I delivered in the "War Room", right here in Ottawa, before a tri-service meeting of senior officers, advocating unification as an urgent post-war program. This was on the basis of what we were then learning about military hardware. Frankly, some of the "brass" reacted against the idea, but almost half of the younger officers conceded that the proposition was logical. That was 22 years ago!

Most of us in the armed forces were not career officers, and very few had their ideas set in concrete. When most of us joined the armed forces, if we couldn't get into one service we tried another. We have seen the pressure of war produce a direction towards unification. In any event, regardless of our preference for uniform, we always ended up in a "battle dress" and some of us became part of a unified command.

If you think for a moment that the men and women of the armed forces have low morale because of the "integration" "unification", I think you are wrong. The morale question, if any, has been related to the inequalities in the armed forces rank and pay structure, especially in these days when the considerable skills of the individual members of the armed forces are in such demand by the civilian economy. Although I must not discount the unsettling effect of some of the criticism that members of the armed forces read in the press.

The reduction from 346 trades in the three services to 97, which came about only because of the unification process, is nothing less than a masterpiece of personnel management. I think it happened just in time! Frankly, in another year it would have been too late and the armed forces would have suffered irreplaceable losses of many of their *best* people. The armed forces would have then found it possible to attract only those recruits who were, in effect, the rejects of "civvy street".

Almost all of the jobs in the armed forces call for technical expertise, in addition to the traditional fighting qualities. Today Canadian servicemen, for example, in Cyprus, Gaza, and other places, must also be something of a diplomat. Violence was once the principal skill but today he also has to add the task of *preventing* violence between others.

The armed forces management techniques must change and are changing. It is a vastly different world in which we live and while there must be a hard core of discipline, morale can be enormously strengthened if the concept and the organization are based on logic. The leaders have to have more than the officer and NCO stripes to earn the respect of their subordinates. Blind obedience has long since past. It is a glorious opportunity for military management and leadership and the key people in today's defence forces are leaping to it.

Defence is big business and a big piece of the taxpayer's dollar, yet for the first time the application of modern management techniques is being applied to the management of this "business".

It is an age of computers in management with amazingly rapid communications devices and techniques. The results can be the elimination of an enormous waste of manpower. Unification produces a single organization with enough "size" to make the best use of these new management tools.

We know that the era is significant in terms of rapid changes and that these factors are changing the traditional way of doing things. Political, economic and social changes throughout the world are having a profound effect on the nature and the location of confrontations that might lead to war. It is just not radar, guided missiles and atom bombs that are new. There are, for example, satellite observations and computer manipulations that enable the Armed Forces to keep track of all surface vessels throughout the world at any instant and when necessary to instantly attack this shipping through the use of this data. There are many similar examples.

Who would have thought that our main concern in a period of tension between the two great powers would be centered in the events of Cyprus or central Africa, or that this would be a sufficient threat to world peace to call for United Nations troops?

I am convinced that the men and women in the armed forces accept the changes and regard them as progress. There are opponents, to be sure, but I have yet to see any opposition based on anything other than *emotional* factors.

We are talking about reaction to change. Human beings react against change; change removes the comfort people enjoy and the stability in which they like to bask. Often people who are most against change are those who are afraid their weaknesses will be discovered.

Reaction to change, in my view, is the root of the criticism of unification of the Canadian armed forces.

Bill No. C-90 passed by Parliament, April 1st, 1964 (and passed without a single dissenting vote) abolished the Chairman of Chiefs of Staff Committee and the heads of the navy, army and air force.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Mr. Chairman, I am sorry I have a point or order.

The CHAIRMAN: Yes.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I cannot allow the record to stand like that—passed without a single dissenting vote. It was passed on division, which means that it was not unanimous; and the record so shows.

The CHAIRMAN: The record will show that, and the record of this meeting will also show it.

Mr. PATRICK: That is fair enough.

Integration, I think—

Mr. MCINTOSH: On a point of order, Mr. Chairman. I also do not see why there should be allowed to be read into the record reflections on former soldiers to the effect that anyone opposing this does so because of emotional factors, or because their weaknesses will be discovered, and so on. The soldiers who fought in the war in Korea in 1939-40 were not—

The CHAIRMAN: I think, Mr. McIntosh, that this—

Mr. McINTOSH: Well, may I ask a question before he continues? I have not seen the piece of paper on which is written the name of the firm this man is supposed to represent, but I will ask him this: Has he, or his firm, ever sold anything to the present government?

An hon. MEMBER: Oh, come now on this is—

Mr. McINTOSH: Just a minute; he sounds to me like a salesman who has come here with the idea of getting a contract from the government. I would like hom to answer that question now.

Mr. LANIEL: On a point of order—

Mr. WINCH: Do you propose to shorten this?

Mr. McINTOSH: Not necessarily.

Mr. LANIEL: On a point of order, Mr. Chairman. I do not seek to prevent the member from saying whatever he wishes to say, but I think the least he could have been polite, as we have been with all other witnesses even though we may have disagreed with their statements. He should wait until the witness has finished his statement and make his remarks then.

I would ask the witness to carry on with his presentation.

Mr. McINTOSH: In no other brief have we had statements like this.

An hon. MEMBER: I think Mr. Landymore's—

Mr. McINTOSH: Landymore's statement—

The CHAIRMAN: Order, order. I think we should do the witness the courtesy of hearing his brief, having asked him to come here.

An hon. MEMBER: Was he invited here?

The CHAIRMAN: Yes, he was invited here. He was invited by the Committee.

Mr. McINTOSH: By the Steering Committee?

The CHAIRMAN: He was invited by the Chairman. I set up the arrangements in accordance with the lists that were handed to me.

Mr. McINTOSH: Continue, then.

Mr. PATRICK: May I continue?

The CHAIRMAN: Yes, you may.

Mr. PATRICK: I would like to repeat my last point, that the first huge step had already been taken in the unification process.

I believe that "integration" and "unification" are terms that are kicked around glibly. I think they mean the same thing. It is unfortunate that the White Paper tabled in March 1964 before Parliament used the two expressions. Again, in my view, I think they mean the same thing.

For more than 20 years, in my own knowledge, governments have been endeavouring to integrate and unify Canada's armed forces. The first timid steps were taken with the dental and medical corps, and later with the transport department, chaplain services and so on. It did not work, because you do not integrate the armed forces from the bottom up; you first establish a policy and work from the top down. I think that is what is being done today.

We are told by some of the critics that this unification is all a great surprise. Perhaps members of the armed forces may not read government White Papers, but they are certainly compelled to read Daily Routine Orders! I saw at the

Officers Mess in St. Hubert on April 2, 1964, the Chief of the Air Staff's long statement which said:

> "I believe the proposed organization changes and the ultimate unification of the three armed services are sound in principle and will result in maximum military effectiveness".

On April 2, 1964, Lieutenant General Walsh, Chief of the General Staff also sent out a notice. I quote from this:—

> "The integration is aimed at reducing the overhead taken up in the administration of the three services. The unified defence planning will emphasize the *national entity of our* defence force, eliminate the duplication of services and ensure that there is no vacuum in overall defence policy planning".

Admiral H. S. Rayner, Chief of the Naval Staff on April 3, 1964, published a four page statement from which I quote:—

> "The third and final step will be the unification of the three Services. It is reasonable to expect that it will be three or four years before it will be possible to take this action. However, the end objective of a single Service is firm".

So much for the critics who say "they didn't know it was going to happen."

If we try to arrive at whether the unification process is a good or bad thing surely we must begin at the beginning and ask ourselves what policy parliament has set for the armed forces. What is the role of the armed forces? Once this is clear it should not be difficult to arrive at the appropriate means of fulfilling this role.

I have heard that Modern military operations are classified as follows:—

General thermonuclear war
General non-nuclear war
Limited War
Brush fires
Peace restoring
Peace keeping

I see Canadian policy in unification one of extreme flexibility in which we effectively support our alliances to prevent the general wars and at the same time develop an organization related to limited war brush fires, peace restoring and peacekeeping.

Again speaking as a civilian a question frequently asked is why does Canada have any defence force? (In fact, a substantial body of opinion does not accept defence as a rational occupation for Canadians). Some of the reasons might be: to put down civil rebellion (very unlikely need in Canada); to defend ourselves against attack by an aggressor. (This is equally unlikely in view of the massive defence of this continent by the United States); to seize and hold territory of other nations—Canada has no wish to be an aggressor.

Canada can use her unique position and size and relationship to other countries to try to build a better world to prevent war.

A major part of Canadian policy appears to be the prevention of the big war, somewhat along the lines of what has been done in the case of Egypt versus Israel and in Cyprus.

If the present policy continues to develop, Vietnam's in the future—and there may be many—can be prevented. Canada's role in international affairs thus puts us in a unique position without doubt, the most valuable contribution a defence force of our size has been in a position to make in world history.

Canadians want to be proud. They want to stand up and be counted. We honour and respect our NATO and NORAD alliances. I believe we are contributing our share to the "Nuclear Deterrent". I think it has been shown too that Canada's armed forces have more fire power now than at any time in her history. Her forces are tough and competitive and stand second to none.

Canadians now know that the army, air force and navy of the past were totally separate and unrelated components of the defence force. They lacked cohesion and inter-relationship. They were physically and organizationally separate. The air force had no relationship to the army's role. The army had no relationship to the navy's role. Each pursued certain individual tasks. I am not criticizing whether this *past* defence policy was wrong. What I am really saying is that today unification really makes sense.

You have been given several examples of problems arising out of a tri-service concept. I recall a few myself. For example, the RCAF did not believe in air support for the army!—and as a result, for all practical purposes, the army did not get any—an incredible situation in this day and age. I recall when the RCAF ceased to need heavy helicopters on completing the mid-Canada air-lift, the RCAF retrained these men to jet fighters, and at the same time the navy was in urgent need of helicopter pilots. They had to start from scratch.

One of the most serious and I think nearly disastrous events in recent history and this was referred to by your previous witness, was the RCAF program to build the CF-105, the Arrow. If this program had not been cancelled by the government in power, the total implications could have reached $4 billion. This would have left nothing for land and sea forces. The equipment 'tail' was really wagging the dog. In this case the equipment that may not have worked and may not have fitted into our national defence policy.

I make these remarks about my previous relationship with the RCAF in spite of a strong personal and even an emotional connection with the air force.

The critics say you can't have army personnel run a ship or naval personnel run an airplane. I do not think the question should be raised. As far as I can read the defence policy has never in any way implied this. It does not mean that a tank driver has to fly a supersonic jet!

In the past each of these services itself was "unified". Each had its own trade structure. In the future it will be possible for specialized groups to do specialized jobs that they always have done. Today in the technical trades especially there are hundreds of common positions which, grouped in a single force, can advance technical skills and efficiency.

One of the fears expressed about integration which does have a certain amount of popular appeal has to do with tradition—and tradition is symbolized by one word, "uniform".

We do not have a Canadian uniform, just as we did not have a Canadian flag. Many of the same kind of people who raised such a fuss about getting a new flag now do so over the uniform and for the same reasons.

The Canadian navy uniform is a copy of that of the British navy; the Canadian army uniform is a British army uniform; and the Royal Canadian Air Force uniform is a British Air Force uniform.

There is nothing distinctively Canadian about any of our uniforms and I think this has caused problems especially in our peace keeping tasks.

During the last war and during the years since Canadian servicemen have had a problem to identify themselves as Canadians and I am speaking first-hand. We want to be identified for good and practical reasons as Canadians. One way of doing this is with a distinctive Canadian uniform.

There are critics who say the morale of the armed forces will suffer if the uniform is changed. This is a story that goes way back in history. I would like to quote from Barbara Tuchman's famous and authorative book "The Guns of August".

> Messimy did his best, as War Minister, to equip the army to fight a successful offensive but was in his turn frustrated in his most cherished prospect—the need to reform the French uniform. The British had adopted khaki after the Boer War, and the Germans were about to make the change from Prussian blue to field-grey. But in 1912 French soldiers still wore the same blue coats, red kepi, and red trousers they had worn in 1830 when the rifle fired carried only two hundred paces. Visiting the Balkan front in 1912, Messimy saw the advantages gained by the dull-colored Bulgarians and came home determined to make the French soldier less visible. Army pride was intransigent about giving up its red trousers. Army prestige was once again felt to be at stake. To banish "all that is colourful, all that gives the soldier his vivid aspect", wrote the ECHO de PARIS, "Is to go contrary both to French taste and military functions". At a parliamentary hearing a former War Minister, M. Etienne, spoke for France.
>
> "Eliminate the red trousers? He cried. "Never! Les pantalons rouges, c'est la France!".

It is well known that that blind and imbecile attachment to the most visible of all colours was to have cruel consequences.

There is talk about the new uniform colour and what the style should be. I don't think most people really care, so long as it is sensible and functional.

As General Foulkes has just said, uniforms, as we know them, are not worn in battle.

"Vive les Pantalons Rouges".

The problem of Canadian identification has extended to our equipment as well. The RCAF airplane had the RAF Roundel, and after many years the RCAF placed a maple leaf in the centre of the Roundel, which is not easy to distinguish at any distance. Airplanes and tanks and other equipment had the Red Ensign painted on the equipment, but this did not help much either. The navy flew the White Ensign, the traditional symbol of British naval power and imperialism.

Critics often say that if integration is so good, why don't the Americans try it? I have seen at least two issues of the United States Armed Forces Management magazine and other armed forces publications, dealing with the Canadian unification plans in the most laudatory manner.

Back in 1959 Senator Clair Engle tried to unify the Armed Forces of the United States, declaring that re-organization on the basis of mission and function as an obsolute pre-requisite to meeting the challenge of modern warfare. This was followed up by the House Government Operations Committee, which sought a merger of the army and the air force to eliminate duplication and waste in the missile field, short of which it said: "the nation will be exposed to the vitiating effects of interservice jealousies, rivalries and wars for many years to come".

That was seven years ago. The proposals were stampeded and Congress decided that prudence was a better part of valour. Please, do not let us have this happen in Canada.

The economics of unification are impressive. To hold to the current defence budget and below to make the substantial and necessary improvements in wages and to provide for re-equipment is quite an accomplishment in this day and age. As a businessman I share with the majority of the business people in Canada a very healthy respect for what has been done and what the emerging policy holds for the future. Unification makes for maximum flexibility at minimum cost.

In his book "Change and Habit" the world-renowned historian, Toynbee, makes two pertinent points:

(1) That the advances of technology will not be stopped and
(2) Technology is a unifying force.

They may have been made in a somewhat different context, but they most assuredly apply to the military today.

I believe Canada is creating a national force with an international task.

Unification means unification of function so that Canadian policy, for the first time, can be implemented by a Canadian force. This may very well break with tradition, but the tradition of not being able to act nationally, in the national interest. The national interest, mind you, for Canada means taking up international responsibility. To be able to take up this responsibility in the interest of not only our own but the survival of the rest of humanity, may mean the founding of a tradition which is Canadian, truly Canadian and not taken over second-hand.

Soldiering is a highly honourable, but no longer a "romantic," job. It is a profession, to be performed efficiently, intelligently and perhaps matter of factly. It has been said that the soldiers of the First World War entered it with a romantic feeling. Those of the Second with the simple certainty of a job to be done.

To do a worthwhile job—to keep the peace—and to be able to do so is the task unification has set itself to do.

Tradition must have meaning and a meaning related to the present and not just to the past. Otherwise it is moribund, a dead hand, and that is why unification can become a living tradition for Canada, something we have shaped for ourselves—something which gives meaning to our defence efforts.

The CHAIRMAN: Would you be prepared to answer some questions?

Mr. PATRICK: Yes, certainly.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I will give this brief the consideration I think it deserves. I had an article here about the "Whiz Kids". I am just wondering if this witness is one of them.

First of all, I would like to ask the witness of what company he is the president, and whether it sells anything to the Department of National Defence or to any of the government departments?

Mr. PATRICK: Sir, my connection as an active vendor to the Canadian government—and I was an active vendor to the government—is that I founded the company called Canadian Aviation Electronics. Previous to that I was general manager of RCA Victor in Canada, and was privileged to be a contractor both so far as this government and Canada are concerned.

I sold my interest, I think, six years ago and I am now directly concerned with many, many companies—

Mr. WINCH: You sold it six years ago?

Mr. PATRICK: Yes, six years ago.

Mr. WINCH: Then you were dealing with the Conservative government.

Mr. PATRICK: I cannot think of the exact date, but the last time was about five years ago, and I was dealing with the Conservative government. I sold them a great deal of products. I also sold the Liberal government a great deal of products. I think I am damn proud of what we did. I sold my company and invested in a number of enterprises, none of which is in the market as far as the government is concerned. To my knowledge, I have no share-interest in any company that is doing business with the Canadian government.

Mr. WINCH: Not in the last four years?

Mr. MCINTOSH: I am questioning the witness, Mr. Winch.

Mr. WINCH: Well, be honest in your questioning.

An hon. MEMBER: Oh, hear me!

Mr. MCINTOSH: What do you mean by "be honest in your questioning"? All I have to say to you is what Dave Walker said to you.

The CHAIRMAN: Order.

Mr. MCINTOSH: How long did you have this company, Mr. Patrick?

Mr. PATRICK: My recent company, on—

Mr. MCINTOSH: Your own company; not when you were working for RCA or anybody else. I am talking about your own company.

Mr. PATRICK: I founded my company in 1950, I believe it was, and I sold it, as a matter of fact, not very long after the Conservatives came to power. I was a contractor, among other things. I was the contractor—

Mr. MCINTOSH: I asked you how long you had the company—from 1950 until what year? That is all I want.

Mr. PATRICK: I had it until 1959 or 1960. I might be out a year or two.

Mr. MCINTOSH: During that time what was the dollar volume of contracts that you sold to the government?

Mr. PATRICK: Well, we started out as a little company, doing about $50,000 a year; and during the last year we probably did about $4 or $5 million.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Yes. Are you in the selling business at the present time?

Mr. PATRICK: No, I am in the investment business in the Caribbean.

Mr. MCINTOSH: All right; I have no further questions.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I would like to ask the witness this. He said he served in Canada and overseas during the war, at least it states on the paper here,

including several command positions. Would you just indicate what they were; what type of service?

Mr. PATRICK: Yes. Well, when I joined the air force I was put into the radar business and my positions were very often related to night fighters. I was a radar engineer. I left the air force—

Mr. CHURCHILL: You were not a night fighter?

Mr. PATRICK: I was in the back seat of what was a night fighter, but I was in the radar end of it, reading the tube, rather than in the front end driving the airplane. The last time I was shot at, frankly, was in Korea, where I had seven operational missions. I came back for this particular task.

I joined the reserves—believe me, I was never a career officer—and left the air force at the end of the war and went into business. I think I ended up as the senior RCAF reserve officer in Canada for 15 or so years after the war. I was CO of two or three units.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I was thinking of World War II? Where did you serve, and what positions did you occupy?

Mr. PATRICK: Among other things, I was CO of the base at Trenton. I was assigned to the Americans on their submarine and carrier effort, again on a technical basis, as a technical officer, and I had the same kind of assignment with Fighter Command in the United Kingdom. In other words, I was one of the few people who had some fairly senior responsibility in the introducing of radar systems and VHF control and so on for both the Americans and the Canadians during the last war.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Did you serve in England or on the continent of Europe?

Mr. PATRICK: Not on the continent of Europe; in the U.K.

Mr. CHURCHILL: As a fighter—

Mr. PATRICK: When we first put in night fighter airplanes I was sent over on liaison duty both to learn and to teach the use of this kind of equipment.

Mr. CHURCHILL: You were not actually a combat officer?

Mr. PATRICK: I was never a combat officer. I was shot at, but I was never a combat officer in the sense that you are getting at.

Mr. CHURCHILL: You speak with quite a bit of assumed authority with regard to morale. I would like to know on what you base that?

Mr. PATRICK: My opinions—as I tried to tell you at the beginning—are based on my contact with a large number of ex-service people and the average man on the street. I travel from coast to coast. I have been down in the Maritimes, for example, three or four times this year, and I have been to the west coast two or three times. The nature of my existence puts me in contact with a large number of people. I have been associated with defence ideas for a very long while, and I have been invited to speak to reserve organizations. I have been an honorary colonel in a mess, and we talk there. I am a member of an air force mess, and we also talk there. Frankly, I am rather impressed by what the average fellow thinks.

My feeling is that the armed forces people, as a rule, disagree with what anyone in "brass" or government has to say and I think this is normal. But I have found that they have been less opposed to what seems to them to be a fresh and logical idea.

I had an experience when the Grenadier Guards asked me to be a speaker at a mess dinner before Christmas. The CO was very much opposed to unification, and in introducing me he practically instructed all the members to disagree with what I was going to say. There must have been 200 or 300 NCO's and officers there. At the end they all got up and asked very pertinent questions on why I thought it was a good idea. I would say that 90 per cent of them said that it made sense.

At the end of it, one of the warrant officers was so incensed at the fact that the CO had taken what he thought was a discourteous attitude toward the speaker that he tore up his lifetime membership in the mess. There are strong views and strong opinions. That is the kind of contact that I have, strictly as a civilian.

Mr. CHURCHILL: That is one man's opinion. There are others who have had long years with the militia or the active forces. In my case it extends 27 years, and I still have contacts with the militia. My opinion can be balanced against his.

Mr. PATRICK: Exactly.

Mr. CHURCHILL: At page 6 you state:

> —There are opponents to be sure, but I have yet to see any opposition based on anything other than *emotional* factors.

Are you prepared to substantiate that you have not met anyone whose opposition is based on other than emotional factors?

Mr. PATRICK: I must say that all the people that I have talked to, who were opposed, were frankly opposed, and even admitted they were opposed, for emotional reasons. They were willing to admit the logic, but emotionally they could not connect themselves with this new idea.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I submit that your reaction to this is based on emotion.

Mr. PATRICK: I think this is true of all of us.

Mr. CHURCHILL: At the top of page 7 you say:

> Reaction to change is the root of the criticism of unification of the Canadian armed forces.

Would you substantiate that?

Mr. PATRICK: Documenting this is not easy. I am again referring to my own experience. I think the nature of a military organization tends to produce a certain rigidity, especially when there are long periods of peace. Frankly, I think the armed forces really only make a rapid change under conditions of great stress, and as a result of the input of some hundreds of thousands of people who are not regular force people.

Perhaps that is not a very good explanation of my point, but I find that people do not like to change. They do not want to change their rank structure; they do not like to change their jobs; it is a nice comfortable situation.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I do not think you have substantiated your general remark very well. There are quite a number of people in this country, with much more experience than you, whose reaction to the proposal is not based simply on reaction and change, but on logic and reason.

On page 7 you went so far as to say that:

> Bill C-90 passed by Parliament, April 1st, 1964 (and passed without a single dissenting vote)—

You have endeavoured to present to us your great knowledge on these matters. Why did you put that statement in there and have you repeated this across the country? Is this part of your propaganda effort? If it is, it is false.

On the same page you say:

> Integration and unification are terms that are kicked around glibly as though they meant different things—, when they really mean the same thing.

We have spent two weeks endeavouring to settle this issue and now you put the two together. Do you really think that they both mean exactly the same thing?

Mr. PATRICK: I certainly do.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Thank you very much.

On page 8 you quote examples from Daily Routine Orders issued on April 2 and April 3, respectively, by the air staff, the general staff and the naval staff. You create the impression that the general officers issued this because of their enthusiasm for something that was happening. Has it occurred to you that this might have all come down from the ministerial office for transmission to the troops?

Mr. PATRICK: Well, I must say that I knew Admiral Rayner—I had met him a few times—and although his statement was not full of enthusiasm, as you undoubtedly know, I think the other officers made statements which were quite categorical and were intended to leave the servicemen who read them with the idea that this was a good thing. Now, whether they were beaten over the head by the Minister and forced to say this, is pure conjecture. I do not know this; but perhaps you do. I knew the CAS at the time and I do not think he would have said this if he did not mean it.

Mr. CHURCHILL: On page 12 you say:

> Many of the same kind of people who raised such a fuss about getting a new flag now do so over the uniform and for the same reasons.

I submit to you that that is an insulting remark.

There was a long controversy in Parliament, and a large percentage of the population did not accept the new flag. Here you are saying that the fuss and the objection that are being raised now to the proposals for national defence are put forward for the same reasons.

There are certain members of this Committee who opposed the flag in the form in which it was presented to us, and for very sound reasons. Now you are suggesting that we are objecting to the proposed defence changes for similar reasons, and these, of course, you dimiss. I suggest to you that you are insulting members of this Committee, and I would hope that you would withdraw that statement.

Mr. LOISELLE: I do not consider myself insulted.

Mr. PATRICK: May I point out that General Foulkes has just finished saying the same thing. You did not consider that an insult.

Mr. CHURCHILL: On page 17 you say:

> It has been said that the soldiers of the First World War entered it with a romantic feeling.

Where did you get that idea? Were you in the First World War?

Mr. PATRICK: I certainly was not. I know you were.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I can tell you emphatically that the men who enlisted in 1915, 1916, 1917 and 1918, with the full knowledge that their lives might be sacrificed, did not enter that war with any romantic feeling. You are casting a slur on the men of the First World War.

Mr. LANIEL: Mr. Chairman, on a point of order—

Mr. CHURCHILL: It is an insulting document.

Mr. LANIEL: Mr. Chairman, I want to point out that even in official documents I have seen First World War posters—they were on streetcars—advertising for enlistment, and inviting people on a trip to Europe.

Mr. CHURCHILL: It does not matter what you have seen or read. I happen to have been there. I am talking from experience.

Mr. LANIEL: It is still one man's opinion, though. It was a free trip to Europe.

Mr. CHURCHILL: There was no romantic feeling; there was no free trip to Europe. That is an insult to the men of the First Canadian Corps in Europe who lost their lives.

The CHAIRMAN: Order, please, gentlemen. I think probably various members of the Committee have different interpretations of the word "romantic".

This is a personal brief and we have almost come to the end of our time. Mr. Laniel, do you have a question?

Mr. LANIEL: I have three very short questions.

Sir, do you classify yourself as a sincere, respectable Canadian who has done his share for the defence of this country, and as a taxpayer who has the right, and even the duty, to be concerned about military policy?

Mr. PATRICK: I certainly do. I happen to represent a point of view different from a number of the people, in that I joined the air force and was commissioned on September 6, 1939 and served every day of the war and served in the reserve or in auxiliary capacity up until I retired. I had 20 years' service after the war, or something of that order. I naturally have an opinion and I was anxious to offer it.

I am also a businessman, fundamentally, and my willingness to come before this Committee was to give you not just my views but the views of a very wide segment of the business community on this emerging defence policy.

Mr. MCINTOSH: On a point of order. The witness was asked whether he was a taxpayer.

Mr. Patrick, as a member of the Caribbean Investment Company do you pay Canadian income tax?

Mr. PATRICK: I certainly do. All of my income is declared in Canada.

Mr. LANIEL: Your last remark partly answered my next question, in the sense that this is not only your own personal opinion but the consensus of the people around you?

Mr. PATRICK: I am speaking for the group of people with whom I am normally in contact. Presumably this was the opinion that you wanted or I would not have been invited to appear.

Mr. LANIEL: Do you believe that Canadians are concerned about the project of unification and the accomplishments of our armed forces?

Mr. PATRICK: I think they are not nearly as interested in it as you may think they are. My contacts with the Canadian public suggest that they are attracted by any idea that is going to do a job better for less money.

Mr. LANIEL: This will be my last question. When you were asked in 1945 to prepare a paper to deliver here in Ottawa before a triservice meeting of senior officers, advocating unification as an urgent post-war program, did you get the impression that you were asked to do so because these people considered you competent to put forward ideas that could be implemented?

Mr. PATRICK: Yes. Perhaps I might explain that. I happened to have spent the last year or so of the war working very closely with the Americans on a whole new concept of guided missiles. Guided missiles had really not been part of the experience of our side during the last war, although the V-1 and the V-2 certainly were nuisances. My job called for me to have a fairly wide knowledge of these things at that time.

When I talk about military hardware, I was trying to analyse the impact of these new weapons. I had a story to tell; I had slides; and I even had an airplane with a television camera in it—something unheard of in those days—to demonstrate that things had to change.

Mr. LANIEL: And that paper was in favour of unification?

Mr. PATRICK: It specifically said that we had to look toward the time when there would be unification.

Mr. LANIEL: Was it based on emotion?

Mr. PATRICK: No; I think it was based on the new gadgets that were beginning to emerge.

Mr. LANIEL: Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, I am afraid that time is going to dictate the extent of the questioning of Group Captain Patrick on his brief. I again apologize to him for keeping him waitng so long. The fault was almost entirely mine.

I very much appreciate your coming down here, and I am sure this is also true of the members of this Committee.

Mr. WINCH: Some of us appreciate your comments. Do not be disturbed by insulting remarks.

The CHAIRMAN: Our next meeting will be at 3.30 on Monday afternoon, when General Moncel will be present. On Tuesday we will have Air Marshal Annis at 10 a.m. and Air Vice Marshal Hendrick in the afternoon. Thank you.

HOUSE OF COMMONS

First Session—Twenty-seventh Parliament

1966-67

STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. DAVID W. GROOS

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 22

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 20, 1967

Respecting

Bill C-243, An Act to amend the National Defence Act and other Acts in consequence thereof.

WITNESS:

Lieutenant-General R. W. Moncel, D.S.O., O.B.E., C.D.

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.
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OTTAWA, 1967

25812—1

STANDING COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. David W. Groos

Vice-Chairman: Hon. Marcel Lambert

Mr. Andras,
Mr. Brewin,
Mr. Deachman,
Mr. Forrestall,
Mr. Foy,
Mr. Harkness,
[1]Mr. Hopkins,
Mr. Langlois (*Chicoutimi*),
Mr. Laniel,
Mr. Latulippe,
[1]Mr. Legault,
Mr. Lessard,
Mr. Loiselle,
Mr. Macaluso,
Mr. MacLean (*Queens*),
Mr. MacRae,
Mr. McIntosh,
Mr. McNulty,
Mr. Nugent,
[1]Mr. Ormiston,
Mr. Rochon,
Mr. Winch—(24).

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

[1] Replaced Messrs. Churchill, Éthier and Stafford on February 20, 1967.

ORDER OF REFERENCE

HOUSE OF COMMONS

MONDAY, February 20, 1967.

Ordered,—That the names of Messrs. Ormiston, Hopkins and Legault be substituted for those of Messrs. Churchill, Ethier and Stafford on the Standing Committee on National Defence.

Attest.

LÉON-J. RAYMOND,
The Clerk of the House of Commons.

25812—1½

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

MONDAY, February 20, 1967.
(39)

The Standing Committee on National Defence met at 3:40 p.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. David W. Groos, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Andras, Brewin, Deachman, Ethier, Forrestall, Foy, Groos, Harkness, Lambert, Langlois (*Chicoutimi*), Laniel, Lessard, Loiselle, Macaluso, MacLean (*Queens*), MacRae, McIntosh, McNulty, Nugent, Ormiston, Rochon, Stafford and Mr. Winch—(23).

In attendance: Lieutenant-General R. W. Moncel; *From the Department of National Defence:* Honourable Léo Cadieux, Associate Minister; Air Marshal F. R. Sharp, Vice Chief Defence Staff.

The Chairman read the Ninth Report of the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure which is as follows:

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AGENDA AND PROCEDURE

FRIDAY, February 17, 1967.

NINTH REPORT

Your Subcommittee met to consider the calling of additional witnesses in connection with Bill C-243. Your Subcommittee recommends as follows:

1. That Lt. Gen. R. W. Moncel; Lt. Gen. F. J. Fleury; Lt. Gen. G. Walsh; A/M C. Annis and A/V/M M. Hendrick, should be invited to appear, on a voluntary basis to answer the Committee's questions during the week of February 20, 1967.
2. That one of the following, Lt. Gen. Moncel; Lt. Gen. Fleury or Lt. Gen. Walsh, should be invited to appear on Monday, February 20, 1957.
3. That A/M Annis and A/V/M Hendrick should be invited to appear on Tuesday, February 21, 1967.
4. That the remaining two witnesses, if available, should appear on Wednesday, February 22, 1967.

Your Subcommittee also noted a general agreement that the Committee should try to complete the questioning of witnesses, including the Minister and members of the Defence Staff, in time to commence clause by clause discussion of Bill C-243 on Monday, February 27, 1967.

Following a discussion of the recommendation contained in the Ninth Report of the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure, the Committee agreed to receive the Report.

The Chairman introduced the witness, Lieutenant-General R. W. Moncel, who was asked to outline his military career. The witness then proceeded to answer questions from the members of the Committee concerning military planning and organization, and his views on the implications of *Bill C-243*.

At 6:05 p.m., with the questioning continuing, the Committee adjourned until 8:00 p.m. this day.

EVENING SITTING
(40)

The Standing Committee on National Defence met at 8:15 p.m. this day, the Chairman, Mr. Groos, presiding.

Members present: Messrs. Andras, Deachman, Forrestall, Foy, Groos, Harkness, Hopkins, Lambert, Langlois (*Chicoutimi*), Laniel, Legault, Lessard, Loiselle, Macaluso, MacLean (*Queens*), MacRae, McIntosh, McNulty, Nugent, Ormiston, Rochon, and Mr. Winch—(22).

Also present: Messrs. Berger, Chatterton, Mackasey, McCleave, Prud'homme, Régimbal, Stanbury, Tolmie, Watson (*Assiniboia*).

In attendance: Same as at the afternoon sitting.

Lieutenant-General Moncel continued to answer questions posed by the members of the Committee during the evening sitting, on a variety of defence matters related to subjects dealt with in *Bill C-243*.

The questioning was concluded at approximately 10:30 p.m. The Chairman thanked the witness for his appearance before the Committee. The Committee adjourned until 10:00 a.m. on Tuesday, February 21, 1967 when the witness will be Air Marshal C. L. Annis.

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

MONDAY, February 20, 1967.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen before we begin the business of the day I would like to present the ninth report of the steering committee on agenda and procedure which met on Friday. The report is as follows. (*See Minutes of Proceedings*).

Mr. LAMBERT: This requires the questioning of witnesses.

Mr. MACLEAN (*Queens*): I want to make one observation. I thought that here was a reservation at that time with regard to making definitive recommendations as to when the committee might be prepared to start the detailed examination of the bill. I thought that it was left fluid to some extent.

The CHAIRMAN: There was nothing nailed down in this connection; it was brought up, discussed, and it seemed to the chairman and the secretary that there was general agreement.

Mr. WINCH: It set forward an impossible goal—

A hon. MEMBER: —which we hoped we could achieve; that was my understanding of it, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LAMBERT: Well, it is whistling "Dixie".

Mr. NUGENT: Mr. Chairman, there is only one point I want to make in connection with the report. I was wondering why "on a voluntary basis" was accented. Perhaps some of these gentlemen may have some hesitation in getting embroiled. I hope that the invitation from the committee, although politely worded, is couched in such terms that it will be understood by these gentlemen that an option is not open to them, no matter what their personal feelings are. It is the feeling of this committee that we must have their advice and, therefore, they are required.

The CHAIRMAN: I think, Mr. Nugent, that one of the very first things that we adopted in this committee as a whole, was the principle that witnesses who attended were attending as voluntary witnesses and that there was no question of their being required. If the men now are being required, it is something new to this committee. Is there anything further that we should say about that?

Are you suggesting now that anybody we call is really required to come.

Mr. NUGENT: I should think that if any witnesses have been asked in that manner—that is, that it is purely voluntary whether or not they want to come—and should decline, then we will have to reconsider immediately the terms in which the invitation is put. This committee is interested in getting information; these gentlemen have information; it is our duty to get it, and no matter how

politely we express it, I think it should be understood by all that we have the power to call them, and require them.

The CHAIRMAN: I do not think that there is any doubt that the committee, if it wished to actually put a motion and take a vote, would have the power; whether they would want to exercise this power, is another matter.

Mr. MCNULTY: Mr. Chairman, this was discussed in the steering committee, as you will recall. Some of the witnesses who had been asked earlier declined to come and then they were asked again at the request of two members of the steering committee, at which time it was emphasized that we would like to hear their testimony. However, I think that it was decided that we should not bring any one here under duress.

The CHAIRMAN: "Compulsion" I think, was the word. The reason that "In a voluntary basis" was emphasized was that there was some question whether a person who is still on retirement leave would want to come on a voluntary basis inasmuch as, technically, he is still in the service, and might have some reservation about this.

Mr. LAMBERT: I think most of the people that might be invited to attend would take a responsible position in this regard. I agree with Mr. Nugent that this might be something that might be considered at some time if the case should arise.

The CHAIRMAN: If the case arises, but not otherwise.

Mr. MACLEAN (*Queens*): Mr. Chairman, I think that everyone here is familiar with the fact that in the case of many committees, organizations, and even individuals write, asking for the privilege to appear before the committee. However, as I understand it, in this case the initiative in respect of most of the witnesses, must come from the committee rather than from the witness, and as long as that is understood, I think that meets our requirement.

The CHAIRMAN: I think that is so. Although people have indicated to the committee that they would like to appear, in actual fact the initiative has come from the committee itself.

Mr. HARKNESS: Mr. Chairman, I trust that the report you read does not indicate that the steering committee came to any decision that no other witnesses would be called in addition to the ones which you outlined. To begin with, Mr. Deachman, I think was insistant that one other witness be called, and I think that there are some other witnesses whom we probably should hear also. I was not able to be here on Friday but I read in the newspapers that Admiral Rayner had asked to be heard. I would hope that there is no thought that this would exhaust, say, witnesses that the committee would hear.

The CHAIRMAN: That is something, of course, that the committee itself will have to decide upon.

Mr. ANDRAS: Mr. Chairman, being a member of that steering commitee, it was agreed on two or three occasions at the meeting Monday that our objective would be to deal and finish with the witnesses this week, including the return of the Minister and the senior members of the serving defence staff and then start on clause by clause consideration of the bill a week from today. I believe that was established quite emphatically.

Mr. NUGENT: That is not even in the report. I do not know how you can say it is established.

Mr. ANDRAS: It certainly was discussed.

Mr. MACLEAN (*Queens*): My understanding is that the steering committee decided that would be an objective, but that no firm decision could be taken until the next meeting of the steering committee.

The CHAIRMAN: We did not nail it down to the floor but the secretary and I felt that this was the general feeling of the committee and that is the reason it was put in the report. I think we should now hear and question the present witness and then perhaps we could get together and establish something more definite in regard to our routine from here on.

Mr. LAMBERT: I will repeat again, Mr. Chairman, that in my book this committee has responsibilities within the ambit of the work of other committees and of the House and that it is sheer utter nonsense to try to say that you are going to work from Monday afternoon right through Friday afternoon attempting to ram these witnesses through, and I certainly will not have any part of that.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Lambert, you did bring this matter up and I appreciate your concern; we had a general agreement among the committee last week that we would try to cut down on this five day a week series of meetings. This is what we try to do but unfortunately, we were caught up by events of the committee's own wishes. I would like to do something about it this week and perhaps if we get together on this, we might be able to do something by Wednesday.

Mr. LAMBERT: Last week, it was a scheduling by the chairman and the secretary, not the steering committee or anybody else. Let us have that clear.

The CHAIRMAN: No; I accept that.

Mr. LAMBERT: That is all I am going to say about it. I categorically refuse to ram witnesses through on this basis.

Mr. MACALUSO: Mr. Chairman, Mr. Lambert was not here last week as he does not know whether or not witnesses were rammed through. I suggest the opposite was the case. I just want that clarified on the record.

The CHAIRMAN: It is a matter of interpretation.

Mr. MACALUSO: However, I would suggest Mr. Chairman—if I still have the floor—that perhaps you can get together with the steering committee at our adjournment at 6 o'clock and discuss this so that we can come to some decision on this matter by this evening.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Let us get the record straight. Mr. Macaluso said that the witnesses were not rushed through. The record will reveal that I had other questions to ask Admiral Landymore, which I did not have the opportunity to ask because of certain circumstances, and I am not saying that we had anything to do with those. However, I will deal with this subject in a different manner. I want assurance now from you, as chairman, that the witnesses, whoever they are or however few they are, are not going to be rushed, and that we are going to be given the opportunity to ask them all questions to our satisfaction, whether the other side wants it or not.

The CHAIRMAN: I hope you will agree that I am doing my best.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I agree, but I want the assurance that we can question these witnesses as much as we want, with no restrictions on our questions.

The CHAIRMAN: I think the record will show that there has been pretty generous, opportunity for questioning.

Mr. MCINTOSH: In connection with what was said about Admiral Landymore, Mr. Macaluso was not here at the time.

Mr. MACALUSO: You must not have been here because I was here throughout the whole meeting. Do not make remarks like that in my presence.

An hon. MEMBER: That remark was pretty strong there, Mr. Macaluso.

The CHAIRMAN: Order. Mr. Macaluso, gentlemen, Mr. Brewin has a question.

Mr. BREWIN: I can understand Mr. Lambert's point, that we do not want to ram any witnesses through, but I wondered if we had some degree of clarity or unanimity as to witnesses we were going to call. It seems to me that before we do any planning, we should hear fairly soon from the members of this committee as a whole, whether there are other witnesses, in addition to those that you named, that they believe we ought to call. I do not mean that we then shut the door if some new person appears whose evidence is absolutely essential, but I think it would be helpful if we knew how many witnesses, quite apart from the question of how long they are going to be examined, will be coming.

The CHAIRMAN: It seemed to me from discussions in the steering committee and from conversations that I have had directly with some members from all sides, that there are a number of questions that have been raised by witnesses already to which we need answers which can be given only by the Minister, and when the Minister gives these answers, it may cut down on the amount of questioning that has to take place before the committee as a whole.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Mr. Chairman, if you are finished with the report of the steering committee could I ask whether or not my understanding is correct, that a telegram was directed to the committee from Rear Admiral Landymore dealing with certain statements that he made based on information he allegedly received from Admiral Welland. I have a copy of this telegram in my office.

The CHAIRMAN: I have not received one. Have you?

Mr. FORRESTALL: Apparently I received the copy before you received the original telegram.

An hon. MEMBER: That sounds logical.

The CHAIRMAN: No, I do not have this.

Mr. FORRESTALL: I thought it could be tabled and included as part of the record.

The CHAIRMAN: Of course it can. I just left my office a moment ago and I had not received it, and the secretary tells me he has not received it.

Mr. FORRESTALL: My copy arrived an hour ago, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN: What is your wish in respect of this report of the subcommittee on agenda and procedure. You have heard the comments that have been made by the committee on the report.

Mr. LAMBERT: I move that we receive the report of the committee.

The CHAIRMAN: There does not seem to be anything in here that requires specific adoption. What we have agreed to recommend in respect to inviting witnesses to attend is now in the process of being done, so until such time as we are able to get together we will just receive it.

I would now like to ask General Moncel, who has been invited to appear before us, to join me at the table.

It was the wish of the committee, General Moncel, that you should be invited to appear here before us to answer questions and we are pleased that you were able to accept. Do you have a brief that you wish to present. If not—

Mr. WINCH: Is there some statement you would like to make prior to questioning?

Lieutenant General R. W. MONCEL: No.

Mr. HARKNESS: Mr. Chairman, possibly General Moncel might briefly outline his past service to us because it has been customary to do that.

The CHAIRMAN: That is agreeable. A number of witnesses have done this.

Mr. MONCEL: Very well, if you like. I joined the Militia as a private soldier in 1934, was granted my commission as a second lieutenant and went through all the officer ranks to my present rank. I commanded at platoon, company, battalion, brigade, division, army command level; I held staff appointments at the third grade level in an armoured brigade. I was Brigade Major, First Armoured Brigade, G2, Fifth Armoured Division; GSO 1 (operations) at 2 Canadian Corps; Director of the Armoured Corps, Director of Military Training, Deputy Chief of the General Staff in those days, Quartermaster General and Commander, Eastern Command. I served as Senior Canadian Army Liaison officer in London and Military Adviser to the High Commissioner. I headed the military component of the International Control Commission in Viet Nam; I was Controller General to the Forces and, finally, Vice Chief of Defence Forces.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. McIntosh?

Mr. MCINTOSH: Mr. Chairman, since there is no brief presented by the General, I would like to question him on evidence that already been given to the Committee. As he was very close to the Minister in his position as Vice Chief, I have several lists of questions on different evidence and I was wondering if you were restricting us to a period of time in our questions and if you say "yes". If so, and you give me my time, that will determine which evidence I start on.

The CHAIRMAN: Well, I do not have a long list of questioners at the moment before me and I think that if you care to start off, I will play it by ear. I certainly will not limit you to less than 15 minutes.

Mr. MCINTOSH: The first question, General, is on Admiral Landymore's testimony. Then, Mr. Chairman, I will pause and ask if I am being too long.

General, in Admiral Landymore's testimony he suggested to the Committee that we endeavour to obtain further evidence as to the results and futility of the unification program. As a former member of the General Staff, could you first tell us anything about the present emergency defence and mobilization plan of the departments or the plans, as they were, when you left.

Mr. MONCEL: Is that in Viet Nam?

Mr. MCINTOSH: Yes.

Mr. MONCEL: I can, but I do not think I should.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Were you satisfied with the emergency defence plans and the mobilization plan as they were when you were Vice Chief.

The CHAIRMAN: Could you tell us when you retired?

Mr. MONCEL: July. No; I do not think that anybody is ever satisfied with a plan. Obviously they are constantly being updated and new factors constantly come to light. I do not think anybody at any time can ever say that he is truly satisfied with any plan?

Mr. MCINTOSH: I agree with you; you cannot at any time say that you are truly satisfied. However, at the time when you left could you say if the services were able to respond effectively to the demands placed on them?

Mr. MONCEL: It depends on the demands. We were meeting the daily demands. Whether we could have met all the demands that might have been made on us is of course a very different thing and I simply do not know. I would have to know what the demands were.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Did you agree with the mobilization plans and the emergency defence plans at that time?

Mr. MONCEL: I wrote them.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Under the direction of the Minister or of your own accord?

Mr. MONCEL: It was my job to produce these.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Did the mobilization plans at that time entertain the idea of compulsory military service or conscription?

Mr. MONCEL: No.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Did you contemplate that they would in the near future?

Mr. MONCEL: I never did.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Since you left the position as Vice Chief, General, the information that we have is that recruiting has been gradually falling off. Knowing the problems that you had with recruiting when you were Vice Chief, would you say that it would be necessary for Canada, if this plan of unification was implemented, to resort to compulsory military service or conscription to get recruits?

Mr. MONCEL: I would genuinely hope not.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Admiral Landymore suggested that we get information from the official report on the result of FALLEX, I think he said it was, and he further suggested that it would give us "a shock or two". What was the exercise FALLEX?

Mr. MONCEL: I could but I think it would be much more appropriate if somebody who was actually in the business these days told you about that. I had a lot to do with it at the time but because I was not there when the exercise took place, I am not an expert witness.

Mr. McINTOSH: You may not be an expert witness on this, but I understand that this took place when you were Vice Chief—

Mr. MONCEL: No; after I left.

Mr. McINTOSH: It was after you left. Did you plan it?

Mr. MONCEL: I had to do with it, yes.

Mr. McINTOSH: Did you at any time see the official report on this exercise?

Mr. MONCEL: No.

Mr. McINTOSH: So then, you can contribute nothing to what Admiral Landymore was getting at when he said that "this Committee would be shocked as a result of that report"?

Mr. MONCEL: I am afraid I was not here when he got at whatever he was getting at. All I read in the newspaper was one paragraph and it did not seem that he could have said what was stated.

Mr. McINTOSH: Well, this was part of his brief to the Committee and it was clearly stated in his report.

He further suggested that we call Admiral Burchell and, "Ask him for his findings in relation to the failures of the materiel organization". Vice Chief, can you give us any information as to what these failures were?

Mr. MONCEL: I could possibly give you some information on what I think the potential failures might be, but I think for a specific word you would be far better off to ask Burchell, who was indeed involved in a much more direct way than I was.

Mr. McINTOSH: You heard the Chairman's remarks; it is doubtful whether we are going to have him as a witness before us. I think it would be valuable to the Committee if we get all the information we can on this particular subject. If you have any information that you can give us, we would appreciate it.

Mr. MONCEL: In my time, Materiel Command was in a very embryonic stage and essentially the old system was operating. We had just made the first faltering steps of putting this thing together and from the point of view of where I sat, Materiel Command did not fail.

Mr. McINTOSH: You would say that there were no evident failures, as far as you are concerned?

Mr. MONCEL: No.

Mr. McINTOSH: Admiral Landymore further stated, "Our country's defence is more important than partisan politics." He also said, "Our defence must not be prejudiced by stubborn, blind adherence to a party line, and our servicemen must not become fodder for political cannon." Do you agree with those statements of Admiral Landymore?

Mr. MONCEL: Could I have them again a little more slowly?

Mr. McINTOSH: He said first,

Our country's defence is more important than partisan politics.

Mr. MONCEL: I would think this was a fair statement.

Mr. McINTOSH: The second statement he made is,

> Our defence must not be prejudiced by stubborn, blind adherence to a party line,—

Mr. MONCEL: This is like motherhood in early spring, I suppose.

Mr. McINTOSH: He also said,

> —and our servicemen must not become fodder for political cannon.

Mr. MONCEL: Amen.

Mr. McINTOSH: I take it you agree with those statements.

Was it because you subscribe to such principles as outlined here that you left your position as Vice Chief of Defence Staff?

Mr. MONCEL: No.

Mr. McINTOSH: It had nothing to do with it?

Mr. MONCEL: I never thought of those three things.

Mr. McINTOSH: Would you tell the Committee, General, why then you made the decision to leave your position as Vice Chief?

Mr. MONCEL: Yes. I left essentially because I did not feel that under the then conditions and the conditions which I suspected were about to materialize that I could continue loyally to carry out my instructions.

Mr. McINTOSH: And what were those conditions, General?

Mr. MONCEL: The conditions, which I specifically refer to are as follows. At this stage of the operation, the lines were pretty well drawn and it was abundantly clear to me that we were going to force ahead with this process of unification which, to me, appeared to be moving on an uncharted course at a very, very high speed toward a very, very dim destination, and I did not think that I could produce the staff work necessary at that speed to keep the thing on the rails.

Mr. McINTOSH: You said, this "appeared" to you. Could you give us a definition of what your interpretation of the word "unification" means?

Mr. MONCEL: I understand it to mean a single Canadian defence force with a name and a title and a disappearance of these three services as we know them today.

Mr. McINTOSH: Might I also ask you, General, if you had not been retired at that time, how much longer could you have served before the regular retirement age?

Mr. MONCEL: I was not retired. I retired. I could have gone on, I suppose, another six years.

Mr. McINTOSH: Now I refer back to Admiral Landymore's evidence: He said:

> Unification has very little, if any, merit. It is a change for the sake of change. It is unnecessary and expensive. It is oriented politically and not militarily. It is, and will continue to be destructive of morale. It is riddled with inconsistencies and with impractical and unrealistic promises.

Are you in disagreement with any of those statements?

Mr. MONCEL: Oh, I think I would have put them in slightly different terms. Again, if you want me to comment on them, I would like to know a little more of the context in which he said those things.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Well I will pick out an example. He said,

It is, and will continue to be destructive of morale.

Do you feel that this policy of unification or this plan of unification will be destructive to morale?

Mr. MONCEL: Not with a change of commitments.

Mr. MCINTOSH: And what do you mean by "a change of commitments"?

Mr. MONCEL: In the light of the commitments that are undertaken and which indeed are spelled for us in the White Paper, a unified force has no place. Now if you want to change the commitments to a commitment—I could write one for you if you want—which would call for a unified force then unification per se is obviously a good thing, if you change your commitments; but if you do change your commitments and produce a unified force to meet these much reduced commitments, then you should bear in mind that you are never again going to have a commitment that might call for something other than a unified force. I think this is the key to the whole thing.

Mr. MCINTOSH: By "commitments", do you mean our commitments to such alliances as NATO, NORAD and so on?

Mr. MONCEL: Precisely.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I also have some questions to ask you on General Foulkes evidence, when I come to it. I think that he said that an airborne brigade, as explained by the Minister, was useless. Do you believe that—with its own aircraft and so on?

Mr. MONCEL: I do not know in what context General Foulkes said this. I can write you a scenario which would show that it was useless. I wrote one which I thought showed that it was essential.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Well, I will continue on with Admiral Landymore, and we will come to that in a moment.

Admiral Landymore also said in his evidence that in Bill No. C-243 which is now before the Committee, the powers of the Minister of National Defence are far too sweeping; that he is given a blank cheque.

Did you get that impression from looking over the bill?

Mr. MONCEL: I must confess that I did not really look over the bill. All I read were the explanatory notes, as I believe they are called, on the first page which says that the object of this exercise is to introduce this bill and that the time is now considered appropriate so to do. I presume that this is what we are here for—to discuss whether this is the appropriate time to do this. I know some of the details of the bill, obviously, because I have worked on a lot of them—bits and pieces of them—but I have not gone through the complete bill.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Did the Minister ever convey to you why he felt it necessary to have these sweeping powers that have been referred to?

Mr. MONCEL: About a thousand times.

Mr. McINTOSH: And what were his reasons, General?

Mr. MONCEL: All genuine in his mind, I am certain; but, I think, founded on a basic belief that this was the right thing, and if you did not believe that this was the right thing, well, then you were stupid.

Mr. McINTOSH: Did you ever agree with him, or encourage him, in any way that this is what should take place within the Department of National Defence?

Mr. MONCEL: In the early stages I most certainly did.

Mr. McINTOSH: And when did you disagree with him, then?

Mr. MONCEL: When it became apparent to me that this bill on unification was going to be brought forward at this time.

Mr. McINTOSH: Under the authority granted to the Minister in Bill No. C-243, could the Minister, in your opinion, commit the Canadian forces anywhere without consulting Parliament?

Mr. MONCEL: I cannot believe this.

Mr. McINTOSH: Do you feel that that was the intention at any time?

Mr. MONCEL: Certainly not to my knowledge, sir.

Mr. McINTOSH: Do you feel that the Minister's or anyone else's having complete unrestricted powers over the military is desirable in a country such as ours?

I think your answer to that would be obvious.

Mr. MONCEL: Well, if that is so perhaps you would let me answer it.

Obviously, as the responsible minister he must have very sweeping powers in his department, as in any other department. He is charged, as I understand it, by the Cabinet and by the government with responsibility for it. He is directly and personally responsible for it. Patently, if you are going to be responsible you have got to have authority and power. I do feel that there should be some restraints built in.

Mr. McINTOSH: More sweeping powers than any previous minister has had, General?

Mr. MONCEL: It is not a question of having more. It is a question of exercising it.

Mr. McINTOSH: Admiral Landymore further stated that the Committee should call the commander of Materiel Command and seek from him satisfaction on whether his command can support the armed forces under emergency conditions. The Admiral said that we would be seriously perturbed at the answer that we would receive.

Is it your opinion that Materiel Command could, or could not, support the Canadian armed forces under emergency conditions at the present time?

Mr. MONCEL: At the present time?

Mr. McINTOSH: Yes; or at the time you left office?

Mr. MONCEL: Well, as I said before, when I left, Materiel Command existed really in name only. We had put a nominal head in, but the three separate systems that supported the forces were still intact. At that time I think that we could have performed. What state they have them in now, I do not know.

Mr. McINTOSH: He also suggested that we call the commander of Maritime Command and ask the following questions: What he considered were acceptable limits of unification? How his command will be more efficient and more economical? Whether administration has increased or decreased with unification? How our ships are being manned?

Can you offer any suggestion about what answers we would get if those questions were asked?

Mr. MONCEL: No; I could not begin to guess at what he might say.

Mr. McINTOSH: Well, I understand that you were closely connected with Maritime Command at one time, General. Could you not give us some indication of whether you were perturbed about the conditions either while you were commander or after you came to Ottawa on the Defence Staff?

Mr. MONCEL: You must be clear about my connection. I think we are talking of two different commands. I commanded the army, Eastern Command, which happened to have its headquarters in Halifax, next door to Maritime Command, which was commanded in my day by Jeffrey Brock, and before that by Kenneth Dyer.

Mr. McINTOSH: What has been your experience, since you came to Ottawa as part of the Defence Committee, of any problems that were arising there, or that would arise, in your opinion, if unification were put into effect.

Mr. MONCEL: Problems in Maritime Command?

Mr. McINTOSH: Yes; about whether the suggestions put forward under unification, as you understand it, and as you discussed it with the Minister, would create any further problems to Maritime Command? Would it be efficient? Would it be economical?

Mr. MONCEL: Well, of course, there are all kinds of problems that we envisaged could materialize. I suppose the most serious, in my mind, was the very, very real lack of supervision of the Maritime Commander at headquarters level.

What you have to understand is that we took a "chap"—the fellow in Halifax now, whatever his name is—and we put him in charge of both coasts, which is the entire navy, as we used to know it, and to his responsibilities we added Maritime Air Command. We gave to this one man—one man now—the same responsibilities that at one time were handled by two Admirals, one on the east coast and one on the west coast, backed by a naval board. It was the job of the commanders to command, and the job of the naval board to supervise, to inspire, to instruct, and, if necessary to restrain these men. Now you have given this wretched "chap" all these responsibilities. You are asking him to run the thing, to train it, and, if necessary, to fight it, and he is not backed by any real knowledgeable deepsea-going body. You have one sailor of any rank in the headquarters, who at the moment is Controller General. He happens to be a seagoing type, but he could just as easily be a paymaster. From a ministerial point of view this is where your naval control is. It is possible.

Mr. McINTOSH: This is my last question on Admiral Landymore's testimony, General. He made this statement: "Unification is a mistake". Do you agree with that?

Mr. MONCEL: I would say that it would be a mistake. You have not done it yet, I hope.

Mr. MCINTOSH: It would be a mistake?

Mr. MONCEL: Yes.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Do you wish me to continue, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN: Well, not if this is a convenient time to stop. You have had 12 minutes.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Put me down for the second round.

The CHAIRMAN: I will put you down again. Next we have Mr. MacRae.

Mr. MACRAE: General Moncel, would you be so kind as to explain to me again, because I did not quite catch all of it the first time, just exactly what you understand unification to mean in our armed forces today.

Mr. MONCELL: I do not know if I am going to say precisely what I said last time, but, as I understand it, unification means the disbanding of the three services as they exist today and the creation of a single Canadian armed forces, if that is the term.

Mr. MACRAE: Would it be correct for me to say that you agreed with the principle of a certain amount of integration, certainly as far as it had gone when you were there, or up until just before you left?

Mr. MONCEL: Oh, one hundred per cent; wholeheartedly, yes.

Mr. MACRAE: But as I understood your testimony, one of the things that disturbed you was that the unification process was proceeding far too rapidly as far as you were concerned, from your experience as an officer of the forces.

This is a matter of economics. Is it your opinion that for an equivalent expenditure in the National Defence budget we will have a more efficient, better-equipped force after we have become unified, as you understand it, than we had with the three services? What is your feeling? Have I made myself clear there?

Mr. MONCEL: I think so. Within the context of what you are asking the forces to do, of the White Paper and of the roles and commitments you have given to them, my answer is no.

Mr. MACRAE: How much value, General Moncel, do you put on morale and esprit de corps in private units and private service in the matter of ability and willingness to do a job in this disturbed world?

Mr. MONCEL: It obviously is a very, very real factor. In a voluntary force such as ours it is of very real importance.

Mr. MACRAE: Do you feel that if the Canadian forces are unified morale will be as high, as you know it in the forces today and as you knew it in the forces when you left, or will morale suffer under unification?

Mr. MONCEL: If you change your commitments and are unified properly there is no reason at all why the morale should drop. If you leave the commitments as they are and proceed with this bill and you attempt to unify under the system which, as I understand it, they are trying to, I think you are in for very serious trouble.

Mr. MacRae: Thank you.

Mr. Nugent: General, it is the circumstances of your leaving that I find most interesting. Naturally, it must be of considerable concern to the nation that so many like you, with many valuable years left—perhaps the most valuable years—have been compulsorily retired so early. Perhaps you will not mind my probing a little more deeply into your reasons for leaving.

I believe you said that the essence of the reason for your leaving was that you felt that you could not do your best to carry out the policies as you understood them at that time, and that therefore the only honourable course was to resign?

Mr. Moncel: That is right, yes.

Mr. Nugent: If my notes are correct you summarized it by saying that we were moving on an uncharted course at a very high speed towards an unknown destination.

Mr. Moncel: That is rather good. Did I say that?

Mr. Nugent: I thought it was, too. I thought it was very neat. I believe that my note is correct. Is it an accurate reflection of your feelings about the whole situation?

Mr. Moncel: Yes, I think so.

Mr. Nugent: If I deal with the last part first, the unknown destination, can I relate that to our commitments, as expressed, however vaguely, in the White Paper, and to the question of the apparent design of the forces and what they would be useful for? Was there a conflict, in your mind, therefore, between what the Minister said in the White Paper and the manner in which he was trying to redesign our forces?

Mr. Moncel: A conflict?

Mr. Nugent: Yes.

Mr. Moncel: Yes, I think there was. First of all, the White Paper was a really splendid document, a courageous document, and one that I wish I had written. It was the first decent sign that I had seen in some thirty odd years that the role of the forces might be organized in the light of what we had committed ourselves to.

I wrote, I suppose, three or four parts of other White Papers but they always came out, after the event, as a neat catalogue of the splendid things we had done, and really were not worth the paper they were written on.

This was the first time that a White Paper had been produced in advance, saying "This is what we are going to do". It was very good.

It is an excellent paper provided people do not try to interpret it as a Holy Book. The intent was there and I think it was very good—splendid. It was wrong in about two, principal things, I suppose. First, to translate the White Paper into the force that it called for required, by all my calculations, a force of 150,000 at a budget of $2,000,000,064 accruing at 5 per cent. I could never do for less than that what the White Paper said could be done. Secondly, it grossly over-estimated the amount of fat that allegedly was there to be trimmed.

We have not been completely stupid for the last 25 years. There are some very, very able people in both the civil and military side who are very much aware of the need for economy in the forces. I think this was the fundamental flaw in the Paper. You can do all the kinds of fancy footwork you want to and jump around and say: We will do this and with the same forces we can do this and that. That is fine, providing nobody calls your bluff and asks you to do two things at the same time. Then you are in trouble.

Mr. NUGENT: Perhaps this would be the appropriate time to deal with your second point of very high speed. In this search for any fat that might exist and to trim it off, I imagine that at times are going to make a real effort it requires a certain amount of imagination and a certain amount of appraisal of the anticipated results, and that when it is being done, there must be a careful plan and a careful appraisal afterwards. Would it be a fair commentary on your statement about very high speed that there was not sufficient planning, not sufficient care, or that some or all of these steps were being proceeded with a little too recklessly?

Mr. MONCEL: I could see my way through the need and the requirement to move quite quickly into phase one of this the process of integration, where we had to pull the staff together and get the thing launched. I was quite prepared for it and quite confident that the staff we had could cope with this. The first eight months' work that we did from about 1964 on was really splendid. Spirit was very high and we had a very, very strong and very, very able staff. In that eight months we brought off a near-miracle.

What we needed was about five years to digest it. Changing policy is a cinch. It takes about three "chaps" with pencils to change it. My job always was to translate that policy into reality. My experience has been that with a force of about 150,000 odd strong to run a major change through the machine, to get the result back, and to polish it and refine it and to get it in reasonable shape, takes about three to four years.

This may seem ponderous, and sound as though we were rather stupid, but it took about that long to introduce something, particularly if it was geared to the commitments involved.

I was well aware of the fact that the White Paper said that unification was the ultimate end. That was fine. There was nothing wrong with it as an aim. There was nothing wrong with it all; and it may be that had they been given the time it might not have taken five years; it ought have taken three or four years in which a plot could have been evolved and the commitments altered to make unification fit like a glove without all this nonsense and trouble that we have had.

One-third of the way through the process of trying to straighten out this traumatic experience of the rebuilding we suddenly were told, "You have now got to unify by the end of centennial year,", or whenever it was. I thought it was wrong, and did the only thing I could do, having exhausted every other possibility.

Mr. NUGENT: I have a point on which I would like clarification. Many have left. You told us that when this started you had a very good staff, and that the spirit was high and that morale was high, even in the top echelons. Would you

say that they were completely loyal and pulling as hard as they could to try to make the policy work to the best of their ability?

Mr. MONCEL: Certainly, certainly; they could not have accomplished the results they did without this spirit.

What you must understand is that you have a splendid, highly-trained organization. In fact, if it has a weakness, it is that it is too highly trained and too obedient. It can, if necessary, write and carry out a plan to destroy itself.

Mr. NUGENT: General, it is that splendid organization that now, for all practical purposes, has disappeared, is it not?

Mr. MONCEL: I did not say that.

Mr. NUGENT: Most of the key personnel that were there at that time have been displaced and are now out of the services completely or shifted around into less responsible positions, are they not?

Mr. MONCEL: Not most; some may have been. There is still a very, very able staff who say in public that they can carry this out, and my constant prayer and hope is that, if they are going to do it, they can.

Mr. NUGENT: Would the members of that staff feel it to be their duty, as you did, to advise the Minister, or to make sure that those responsible are aware, of their misgivings, or to make known what, boom their own military skill and judgment, was a basic failure and bring it forward with the hope that it would be corrected?

Mr. MONCEL: You would have to ask them. I do not know.

Mr. NUGENT: Well, were you aware at any time among the people you were dealing with, of any dragging of the feet, or reluctance to discuss the practical realities of trying to bring this about?

Mr. MONCEL: There was no dragging of feet and no reluctance on anybody's part.

Mr. NUGENT: Did these people talk quite frankly to you and to the Defence Staff generally about some of the practical difficulties and day-to-day problems as they arose?

Mr. MONCEL: Of course they did; this is the essence of their business.

Mr. NUGENT: I am also interested in your remark about moving on an uncharted course. To me, that has a connotation of not sufficient planning. Would it be fair to say that?

Mr. MONCEL: Yes. As I tried to explain previously, I think we went off into the first phase of integration with the idea that we were going to produce a single staff. This I thought we could make work, and I think we did. Then we were going to look at every conceivable element of the force, and where it made sense, in the light of our commitments, to combine them into one we were going to do it. In many cases we did this and these were good things.

The internal communication system in Canada, for example, needed a thorough overhaul. We had been trying to overhaul it for 15 years. We suddenly had our opportunity. We made that into one. This is a good thing. It did not affect our commitments; in fact, it tied in with our commitments. We were

progressing quite merrily down this line of approach which I think was sound and which I thoroughly supported.

Mr. NUGENT: In this attempt to integrate command where you could, and where there would be an advantage, would there not be some instances where an integrated command, after a careful review and weighing of all the circumstances, would decide, "No, this is one place where we cannot have a unified command"?

Mr. MONCEL: Oh, certainly. With whom, for example, are you going to integrate Air Transport Command? There is nobody to integrate it with.

Mr. NUGENT: I know that question sounded silly but it bore some relation to the Minister's statement that the end result of integration is unification. I wanted to try to indicate that although integration is a progressive performance, and you can find many places where it operates, that does not necessarily mean that integration works everywhere or that it has no other logical end but unification?

Mr. MONCEL: Precisely; and as I tried to explain to one of the other inquisitors this depends entirely on your commitments. Give me a pencil and a scratch pad and I will write you a commitment for the country which will generate the need for a unified force. It is very simple. But with your current commitments you do not want one. In fact, it is better that you do not have one.

Mr. NUGENT: The reason for the high morale, the enthusiasm and the tremendous amount of work done by the staff when you started this was simply that you were doing those things which you thought made the Canadian armed forces more suitable for, and better able to carry out, our commitments and because you were making strides towards reducing costs?

Mr. MONCEL: Precisely.

Mr. NUGENT: Your disillusionment began—and correct me if I am wrong—when you found that the end goal of unification was going to mean that Canada's policies or commitments must necessarily be changed to fit the Minister's idea of unification.

Mr. MONCEL: No, no, no; that is wrong.

Mr. NUGENT: Or could only work, then, if the commitments were changed.

Mr. MONCEL: I became distressed because we were moving too quickly, without an adequate plan, into the final phase of unification.

Mr. NUGENT: Did you ever hear of a plan of unification?

Mr. MONCEL: I wrote them.

Mr. NUGENT: When?

Mr. MONCEL: I wrote at least four, I suppose, one of which I liked; and the one they selected was the one I rejected out of hand.

Mr. NUGENT: I think it was Admiral Landymore—or maybe it was Admiral Brock,—who said that he got the feeling that the tail was wagging the dog; that, in other words, you must consider your foreign policy, and therefore, your defence policy to fit in with it, and then reorganize your forces to carry out that policy.

I gather from your testimony, and from the way you have stressed it, that if you change the commitment you can do it. Are you not saying, in effect, what Brock has said, that the action of the Minister in moving so precipitously towards unification is going to necessitate a change in defence policy to make any sense at all?

Mr. MONCEL: I do not know what Brock said; and I am not a dog. I do not know how it feels to be wagged by one's tail.

If you press this thing forward your commitments must obviously vary with what the force is capable of doing. If you press a unified force through to its conclusion, you are going to have to drop some commitments, or change them.

Mr. NUGENT: Well, General, I guess you disagreed with my wording. You have just agreed with me in principle, anyhow.

Mr. MONCEL: I am sorry if I seem to be nit-picking.

Mr. NUGENT: You said that if they unified the force properly there would be no trouble. When you say "unify properly", do you mean you should change your commitment to make sure that your unification fits your commitment, and that that is the only way to go about it?

Mr. MONCEL: Yes, essentially that is it; and, having done that, for goodness' sake do it properly. Do not waltz in with this "wishy-washy" idea, a sort of Oscar Wildean approach where you are Jack in the country and Ernest in town, and wear an admiral's uniform at night and are called a colonel at sea, and this sort of nonsense.

There are only two ways in which you can possibly do it. You either build the thing in the form of the army, namely, a system of corps—and this is possible, providing you change the commitments—or you do it the way the navy and the air force are organized, where you have a single service which is built into a series of branches.

The two are really very much alike, except that within the army corps system you have much more formal recognition of the corps approach. For example, it would be quite possible to take the Canadian Medical Services and form them into the Royal Canadian Medical Corps. Dentists have been serving aboard carriers for years, just as do soldiers. Nobody ever worried about it; nobody ever liked him any better because of the fact that he was a dentist; but he was there. This kind of thing you can do.

The alternative is to form a new force—a Canadian force—provided your commitments will permit of this. Then what you should do, if you are sensible, is to hitch up with some organization. We cannot go this alone. We have had help and advice and support, worth millions and millions of dollars to the Canadian taxpayer, from the British army, the British navy, the British air force, and from their opposite numbers in the United States. We have lent on these people, far, far, far more than most people seem to realize; we are a very, very small organization. In the U.S. they spend more on their retirement pensions for senior officers than we do in our whole national defence budget. This is a very big organization, and the amount of assistance, advice, and help, in every sense that we get from these people is something that you do not want to throw overboard.

Likewise, from our close association with these people—and this may not sound very Canadian, but I think it is a fact that we should face up to—we have

drawn a tremendous amount of strength—strength that has sustained us in battle, and sustained us in organization. These were good things.

I say that if you want to form a wholly Canadian force, that is all right, but try to link it with something whereby we can continue this extremely useful and fruitful series discussions on a service-to-service basis with our friends in other countries.

Mr. NUGENT: General, in view of your remark about how much we have been leaning on them, would you care to make a comment on the Minister's suggestion that now that we are the world leaders they will all get behind and follow our marvellous system?

Mr. MONCEL: He keeps saying this. I kept telling them that this was not so; but he persists in it.

Mr. NUGENT: I will finish in the next round, Mr. Chairman; thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Lambert?

Mr. LAMBERT: Mr. Chairman, I want to go back to 1964, to the organization of the planning staff and your original staff following the passage of Bill No. C-90. It has been suggested by a number of critics who have commented on the military situation that the organization at that time was not the proper one; that the framework of a Commander in Chief vis-à-vis the Minister was the only contact, and that anyone below, either with a service interest or a branch interest, had to pass through the Commander in Chief; that, in other words, there was no Defence Council. No serving officers at the time were asked to testify how they felt about this organization.

Mr. MONCEL: If they said this it is quite wrong. I sat on the Defence Council, and we heard lots of "chaps" giving vent to their views on it.

Mr. LAMBERT: In the light of your experience of the framework, have you any comments to make about it?

Mr. MONCEL: The staff here at headquarters?

Mr. LAMBERT: Yes?

Mr. MONCEL: I think the basic structure is about right. You cannot do much better than have the three basic branches of operations, or general staff, or whatever you want to call it, and the personnel and the technical sides. I think any organization you dream up is going to end up with those sort of three pillars.

The comptroller side of it is relatively new, and I will possibly say something about that later.

I think that the weakness of the system—and I think you have to start at the top in this—is Defence Council itself. It is not a council. It may be called that, but it really is not. At the moment it is chaired by the Minister, as chief, with the vice-chief on the military side, as Associate Minister, the Deputy Minister and the Chairman of the Defence Research Board, essentially, as members, plus a representative from External Affairs, and whatever experts you want to bring into it.

The weakness of it at the moment is that it is not a real council, and thousands and thousands of hours are buried. The best possible military argu-

ments that we can produce are buried in the minutes of that organization under the phrase: "After some considerable discussion the Minister directed..."

Mr. LAMBERT: May I interrupt? Am I right that the Defence Council does not have the power of decision; that it is merely an advisory body?

Mr. MONCEL: The Defence Council, as such, is in name only. It is the Minister. Defence council decisions are signed out in the Minister's name.

Now, if I were going to do it, and I am not—it is wonderful when you are not really responsible; you can come forthwith all kinds of wild ideas—but if I were going to do it, I think that I would increase the military advice on the Defence Council. I would have a Defence Council; that would be essential. I would organize it along this line: I would have a chief, as they have now, and a vice-chief; and then I would produce three—and you can invent any name you want for them—absolute environmental experts—a sailor, a soldier and an airman.

I would make the Defence Council directly responsible to the cabinet defence committee. I realize that this is not done in any other government department, but this is not an ordinary department. I would make this Defence Council collectively responsible for the well-being and effectiveness of the Canadian armed forces.

When this Defence Council ran into a problem involving a severe clash between various elements of it the Council would be instructed to bring its differences to the cabinet defence committee. Then, if the people who were dissenting had a chance to say their piece they would then have the same option as I had—either of coming out of the room smiling, saying "That is the greatest decision that has ever been made", or of resigning. But at least they would have had an opportunity to speak out on these major issues without having to resign, or before they resigned. That is the first change I would make.

The next change I would make is that I would disband the comptroller general's organization. This is a military anachronism. I would put a civilian in charge; in fact, I would put the deputy minister in charge of this. As comptroller general you have all the controls of money and manpower that you possibly need. At the moment there is complete duplication between the deputy minister's office and the comptroller general's office. All the deputy minister's office did in my day, when I was Comptroller General, was to generate work for me. It was not productive. We maintained two sets of books, and two sets of everything. We were administrated out of our wits. You have an awful lot of soldiers, sailors and airmen—highly trained "chaps"—wasting their time on this business.

That is roughly what I would do.

Mr. LAMBERT: To continue, there followed the planning of, bringing in and setting up of the different branches—that is, the functional command—and then there were the changes in command. From your experience, where did the machine tend to go out of step? I use that phrase advisedly, because both you and your successor in office as comptroller general, General Fleury, have told us that integration would require three, perhaps five years really to shake down into the efficient type of machine that you wanted. Where did any of these parts of the machine start to get get out of step?

Mr. MONCEL: It got out of step in the one critical and vital area. The way you run the military is that you tell the chief what you want; the chief in turn

tells his staff to crank it out; and the staff and the chief in turn tell the commanders. The key to telling people is that you must know what you are talking about and you must never lie to them. There has to be, and there always has been, complete confidence between the commanders in the field and the staff and officers. Nobody wants to come to Ottawa; I think one would much rather be out in the field; but it has to be done.

Where it broke down was, when communication with our commanders was taken out of our hands. We began to read policy in the newspapers. We had a fellow called a defence spokesman—I do not know whether he is called that or not—who did information services—a fellow called Bourgeois, a first class chap. I suppose on 50 occasions I called him as a result of some statement in the newspapers about what we were going to do. I would say: "Bourgeois, who said it?, and he said "I do not know". We were then put in the position that you would speak to a commander one day and tell him something with the best possible intention, and you would be denied in print the next. After a few months of this we became gun-shy. The result was that you did not speak to the commanders; you did not dare tell them anything because you did not know. When Landymore, as somebody told me, said that communications broke down and he thought the Defence Staff had lost their heads, I do not blame him. Had I been a commander in the field at that time I would have quit long ago.

They destroyed this fundamental piece of communication. They destroyed the confidence of the commanders in their staffs, and, God knows, we lost confidence in ourselves. That is where it went wrong.

Mr. LAMBERT: You had been comptroller general. Were you satisfied, as a result of the planning, that you were saving in personnel, and that you were saving in cost with your new command structures? You have far more expert knowledge in this matter than any of us. Can you tell us where you feel that there was saving or where there was not?

Mr. MONCEL: There are obvious savings as you reduce personnel. The combination of personnel and overhead constitutes your principal costs. Obviously, if you reduce personnel you save money. All the savings we made, really, were because the personnel ran out too fast; hence, we had money to burn.

Mr. LAMBERT: When you say the personnel ran out too fast, do you mean that they left or that they transferred out to the field?

Mr. MONCEL: No; I mean that they left the service.

Mr. LAMBERT: I see.

Mr. MONCEL: We were supposed to drop 10,000, I believe, and we dropped 20,000.

Mr. LAMBERT: And that is how you saved money?

Mr. MONCEL: Yes; it is as simple as that.

Mr. LAMBERT: It has been said—and this may be right or it may be wrong, but I want to see whether you were aware of it, or of any similar type thing—that with a field commander such as Maritime Command, dealing with, say, Training Command, there was a great deal of excessive running back and forth and no direct line of communication. As an example, prior to integration some 17 people were in charge of naval training at headquarters, and now, under

Training Command, there are 65, and there are still some people at headquarters. Is this an unfair assessment, or are you aware of other things of this kind having crept into this type of organization?

Mr. MONCEL: You have got to be careful with this. The navy was a very different organization from the other two, and there is no doubt that it did things in an extraordinarily economic way. It was likened by some people—and the sailors would shoot me for this—to sort of a corner grocery store compared to Steinberg's. They did a tremendous amount of things with one "chap". You wore about 17 hats. It was extraordinarily effective, and very efficient. I think they were more upset by this sort of a switch than were the other people.

I think they had the right idea in Training Command, but here again, as with so many other things, it got out of hand. The original plot was that there was probably a very, very good case to be made for taking the raw input from civilian street and having some form of a joint, unified, training system for his *ab initio,* or basic, training. This is probably a very good thing, and there are demonstrable economies that could be effected this way.

I think that for the next few years it should have stayed just like that. But suddenly—boom—off it went, and generated into what is apt to become a monster if you are not careful, in that you lose the intimate supervision of the training class by the people who are going to receive the output.

I do not think that there is any lack of communication between the two commands at all, but I think that there are bound to be a certain number of growing pains, and I think this ought to be taken into consideration.

Mr. LAMBERT: To come down to my last question: Looking at the forces as they stand today, and accepting our commitments as they are, what, in your considered opinion, is the time that we should take to test this framework that we now have before going further?

Mr. MONCEL: I do not think it would be fair to put a time limit on it. It depends entirely on your commitments. As your commitments change so will your force; and, of course, force-requirements are going to change.

The planning heads have got to keep their wits about them and stay on top of this. It must be a progressive thing all the time, towards the most effective Canadian defence force. This is the object of the exercise; it is not unification. Surely the object must be to have the most effective Canadian defence force.

If, in the process of this system, you can prove—and I do not think that—we can at the moment—that the most effective way is to unify in relation to your commitments, then that is the time; so long as you understand that you are not going to be able to destroy the independent ability of the force to operate, and so long as you understand at that stage that you are not going to suddenly generate a requirement for an un-integrated force, or an un-unified force; because once you have unified it you are not going to un-unify it.

Mr. LAMBERT: Is it fair to say that a unified force, with that limited objective, in the end becomes more rigid—

Mr. MONCEL: Of course they must.

Mr. LAMBERT:—than what we now have?

Mr. MONCEL: Absolutely; it must.

Mr. LAMBERT: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. MacLean?

Mr. MACLEAN (*Queens*): Some of the questions that I propose to ask have been asked in part. I will try to avoid repetition, but I am afraid I will not be able to do that entirely.

In your opinion, sir, up to the point at which you left the service do you think that there was sufficient advance planning of the desired end in each case of the stages of integration so that the services were able to retain a posture which would allow them to react to an emergency if one arose—some unexpected thing? Or was there, in your judgment, a military risk involved, whether great or small, which was perhaps unacceptable from a military point of view, if such a situation suddenly arose?

Mr. MONCEL: I do not think it is fair to suggest that these risks were taken or were tolerated. We were obviously very, very conscious of this possibility, and took elaborate steps, to make sure that we did not expose ourselves to this. We were equally conscious of the fact that the climate, internationally, and so on, did not look too bad from the point of view that if you were going to do it this was a good time. But the risks we took were very, very marginal indeed, and I think they were quite justified.

Mr. MACLEAN (*Queens*): Whether or not the climate at the present time is a safe time to take the risk—if I can use that contradiction, and so phrase it—would be a political decision rather than a military one, would it not?

Mr. MONCEL: Ultimately, they all are; I think that this was a considered, military thing.

Mr. MACLEAN (*Queens*): With regard to Materiel Command, the unified supply system, I understood you to say that the three old supply systems were still functioning up to at least some point in time. How long will it take for the combined Materiel Command to reach the point at which it will be completely dependable for the purposes of the services generally?

Mr. MONCEL: I do not think that as it is currently set up and currently organized you will ever get it to that stage.

Mr. MACLEAN (*Queens*): Well, to an acceptable stage?

Mr. MONCEL: I do not think that you will ever get it to an acceptable stage. I will tell you why. It sounds great, when you say it quickly, to have one co-ordinated logistics system. If you look at the quantitative side of the holdings, numerically there are a great number of common items. When you analyse what these common items are, they are boots, shoelaces, socks, underwear and nonsense like that. If you take a look at the dollar value, very little is common. They have nothing in common with ships' turbines, aircraft engines, and tanks. Numerically these are relatively small in your holdings, but in a dollar value these are the bulk of your holdings. What you have got to ensure, all through the piece, is that you do not lose the expert management of the environmental items.

Now, as I understand it, at the moment you have a soldier in charge of technical services. I know him well—and he is a dear "chap"; and you have a soldier in charge of Material Command—also a dear "chap". They are both

splendid soldiers, with splendid records, but they know as much about ships as I know about being an astronaut. You do not have a high enough level of specialized technical advice built into it to give you decent advice. Your technical advice used to be there in very strong technical branches. Now they are destroying this.

This is why I say that under the current system, it will not work.

We went through exactly the same thing—fortunately we saw it quickly enough to stop it—on my side of the house, the operational side. We went through a most agonizing period of about four months when the whole theme of the thing—and it looked great, too; in any room you went into there were three people—you had a soldier, a sailor, and an airman, and everybody shouting together—and this looked splendid; but I suddenly found, to my horror, that soldier staff officers, who knew a great deal about the army, were staying awake hours at night trying to learn something about an air force problem to brief me on it. We had sailors trying to brief me on army problems, and we had airmen trying to brief me on some other problems. This became patent nonsense.

I am always reminded of when we took over from the British a military academy in one of these newly-emergent countries some years ago. The commandant of this academy was to be a member of the newly emergent nation. This was a good thing. He had watched his British forerunner very very closely for years, and he knew that every morning at a quarter to nine this chap used to arrive at the office, immaculately dressed, with a stick under his left arm. He went into the office, and at a quarter past twelve sharp, every day, he came out of the office, went into the mess and had a pink gin. He had lunch, read the newspaper, and at a quarter past two he went back to the office; and at half past four he left.

Now, this new chap, from this newly emergent nation, had this drill down absolutely cold. He arrived precisely at a quarter to nine, with a stick under his arm, and he walked into the office. He came out at a quarter past twelve, went into the mess, and had a pink gin, and so on. He followed that ritual perfectly, but he did not know what to do inside the office. He never saw what the "chap" did when he got the door closed. He was lost.

In precisely the same way we wasted hours, so we finally changed it and put it on the much more rational basis where a soldier dealt with military problems in the army sense; when you wanted some naval advice you got hold of a sailor. Everybody was much relieved, got some sleep, and were back on ground that they understood.

Now, I am saying that roughly the same thing can happen in a mixed materiel service if you are not careful.

Mr. MacLean (*Queens*): This leads me to another brief question. What is your opinion on whether or not there has been a waste of energy in manpower in the way that the re-organization, which has been required up until now has been done? Was the optimum time allotted for it with a view to doing it as efficiently as possible, or were there cases where the time allotted was too short, and in the end there was wasted effort because of a crash program?

Mr. Moncel: No, I do not think it would be fair to say that, up to the time I left. Of course, all planners would like to have more time, and I think it is necessary for the people in charge occasionally to apply the lash and say, "Get on

with it", and get it done. Up to the stage that I left, essentially we were given time to do what we were doing.

Mr. MacLEAN (*Queens*): In your judgment do you believe that a unified force, compared to three forces each in their own element, can as readily meet our commitments, working with our allies in NATO and NORAD, and so on? With a unified force will the meshing of the Canadian contribution be done as easily as if the organization were on the same basis as are our allies?

Mr. MONCEL: Actually, it is much easier if it is on the same basis as that of our allies, if you have these commitments to work with them.

Mr. MacLEAN (*Queens*): Yes.

Mr. MONCEL: If you do not have commitments to work with them then there is no need to set up that kind of a force. If you want a unified force that somehow is going to call up a need for a seagoing element that is essentially a transport element, that it fine—write your commitments accordingly; but do not then turn around and say that you want a fighting, deep-sea navy next week because you will not get it.

What people have got to understand is that in the fighting portion of the force—and this is the core of the thing—you cannot hire commanders off the street. You cannot put an ad in the *Financial Post* and say "I would like somebody to command a destroyer squadron", no matter how much money you put out. You have got to grow these people; you have got to train them; and it takes a very long time. We have very slim resources in this regard—very slim indeed. The thought of Brock and Landymore mucking around with cows and lobster traps down in Mahone Bay, Nova Scotia, just fills me with despair. You have spent millions of dollars on these men—millions—and you cannot buy them. There are too few resources. You can hire doctors, lawyers, dentists, architects—you can get them off the street—but you cannot hire fighting officers. You have to grow them; and grow them to that stage and then lob them off—well...

Mr. MacLEAN (*Queens*): Do you believe that our opportunity to gain from the experience and resources of our allies, which you mentioned some time ago in reply to a previous question—chiefly, Great Britain and the United States—will be lessened if we have an entirely different organization in the form of a unified force?

Mr. MONCEL: Of course, it will. I will give you an example. When I was vice-chief there was a large and important conference down in the United States, which the vice-chief of the air staff would normally have attended. I went off and I was greeted extremely politely by the U.S. Air Force. I knew a lot of them by name, but we could not talk business.

Now, if I had not gone myself, as the vice-chief, who was I going to send? My next available senior air force officer was an air commodore and he would not have cut much ice in that league.

There is an association that has been built up between the Defence Staff and between Navy here, the RN, and the USN—and the same applies in all three services—where you have grown up with these people all your lives; you know them all on a first-name basis. You are going to lose that very quickly.

Another meeting that I did not go to—and I deliberately did not go—was an army conference in the United Kingdom, which, again, the vice chief of the

general staff would normally have gone to. I said that I would not go, because I might have been an airman and it would be stupid to send an airman or the vice chief might be an airman—and indeed the vice chief was an airman. Therefore, we had to look for somebody senior enough to go. We had to go out into the commands where we found a general, and sent him—a very able fellow—but he was the wrong man. He was a "chap" who was busy training troops in the field. He was not au fait with the policy work that was being done here.

We had to drag him in and give him forced briefings sort of over night, and we sent him off, looking a little harried, to go and represent us at an army conference.

You see, it becomes silly. If you carry on this way you are bound to lose these contacts, because you no longer go to school together and you no longer attend exercises together; and you cannot get the level up unless you produce some form of environmental expertise. This is what I mentioned previously to Mr. Lambert: Get three environmental experts on the defence staff and then you have people who you can hope will maintain this contact for you.

Mr. MacLEAN (*Queens*): I have a question related to this, which I jotted down, with special reference to Maritime Command. Do you believe that the Maritime forces under unification will have an opportunity to have their needs, and their experience and their resources adequately expressed and considered at command headquarters?

Mr. MONCEL: I would like to have that again. I am sure you have a point but I am not getting it.

Mr. MacLEAN (*Queens*): Is there a sufficiently clear channel of communication from what would be Maritime Command—in effect, the entire Navy plus part of the Air Force—on the experience they gain as they go along, from new developments and so forth, and with regard to their needs and their general requirements for equipment and so on? Can communication be sufficient between Maritime Command and Defence Headquarters if you do not have in Defence Headquarters a senior officer who is an expert in that environment?

Mr. MONCEL: Yes; the communication could not be simpler. It is straight forward. The Commander of Maritime Command talks directly to the Defence Staff. The problem at the other end is to interpret what he is saying.

Mr. MacLEAN (*Queens*): Well, that is my question.

Mr. MONCEL: You have not got this under the present system. I do not think that you have sufficient talent to really interpret what he is trying to say. If you want to get expert advice you have to go away down, and you are putting "chaps" of the major level against "chaps" of the general level. It is very difficult.

Mr. MacLEAN (*Queens*): This is my final question, sir. I, as you, do not agree that integration has only one possible place to end, which is complete unification—I do not go along with that at all—but if complete unification comes about, and it is then found to be completely, or partially, unsuited to our commitments, is this process of unification easily reversed?

Mr. MONCEL: No, sir. You are in dire troub'e if you start this. I have tried to make this point on three occasions now. If you want a unified force you tailor your commitments to fit it, and, having done so, do not then go and change your

commitments in a hurry, because you cannot do it. It is a very long process, and during this unifying period—and I do not know how long it is going to last, if it does—you are not going to be training anybody for the other roles. There is no need to train people. In a time like this, when the military are working under these conditions it is not good for the military at all, and when you are so conscious of trying to save everything you are inclined to lose sight of what you are training for and you tend to organize towards efficient peacetime administration. This is a most extravagant and uneconomical business. There is no profit in it. If there was, General Motors would run it.

This is not a profit-making organization, believe me. It is a very extravagant organization. What you have to constantly bear in mind is that you organize and train to fight—nothing else. If you train for anything else you are finished.

We very nearly ruined the army about six or ten years ago when we had this rush of blood to the head on national survival. The whole object of this exercise was a type of role where we were going to go and dig my Aunt Millie out of the Nova Scotia Hotel. We very nearly ruined the force because we started to train for something other than to fight. Fortunately, we caught it in time and we did not.

This is what you have to be careful of. If you start to train for some highly specialized role you become quite expert in it, but you cannot do anything else. You should never overlook this basic principle: The forces are there to fight—nothing else.

Now, if you do not want forces, that is fine, and this whole argument becomes useless. If you want forces, and if you have them for anything else but to fight, you are making a mistake. They must be trained this way and organized this way, and they must be commanded, not managed.

Mr. BREWIN: General Moncel, I wanted to ask you to elaborate a little on the White Paper. I think you said that it had two major defects, as you saw it, and I wonder if I understood at least one of them, correctly. The White Paper contemplated the maintenance of the existing commitments that Canada was involved in, or, the existing roles—I think that is a better word than "commitments". "Commitments" implies that you have agreed to do it indefinitely; a "role" is something that you are doing. Now, as I understand it, the White Paper proposed the maintenance of a series of existing commitments—the brigade, the air division, the anti-submarine forces, the air defence, and so on; and it proposed continuing those without any apparent change and certainly with no early, or definite change. It also proposed, as I understand it, the creation of a mobile force, this intervention force, or whatever you want to call it.

Do I correctly understand you to say that if we are going to do all of these things this would involve a budget in excess of two billion dollars a year?

Mr. MONCEL: Yes, sir.

Mr. BREWIN: So that if you are going to accept a ceiling on the budget of, say, what we have now, which is approximately $1.5 billion, something has to give?

Mr. MONCEL: Precisely.

Mr. BREWIN: You have to make a choice on whether you are going to expand your mobile role or cut out some of the other roles. Is that correct?

Mr. MONCEL: Yes. This is the alternative.

Mr. BREWIN: Am I not right in my assumption from what you have said so far that this White Paper policy is still being continued by the Minister, or by the government, namely, the maintenance of existing roles plus the development of this intervention force?

Mr. MONCEL: I am not up to date now. I am six or seven months out of date. I think this is something that you had better ask the Minister. These roles, as I understood them at the time the White Paper was written, were the sum-total of the commitments plus this new and desired role. In short, we were going to do everything that we had been doing before, plus. This is why I say, you require more forces rather than fewer.

Whether or not the government is continuing with these commitments, or is not negotiating, is not for me to say. I do not know.

Mr. BREWIN: No; I appreciate that.

May I put it to you this way: As I understand it, it is your view that unification of the services makes no sense as long as we continue with the roles that we have at the present time.

Mr. MONCEL: That is right.

Mr. BREWIN: For example, if I may draw you out with a few examples, if you have an army brigade group in Europe as it is now integration is meaningless, or, indeed, harmful, because it creates disturbance in that it does not make any useful contribution to what we are doing in our brigade group now?

Mr. MONCEL: Not "integration".

Mr. BREWIN: I meant to say "unification". I am sorry.

Mr. MONCEL: Yes. Who are you going to unify it with?

Mr. BREWIN: Precisely; and is not the same true of the air division?

Mr. MONCEL: Precisely.

Mr. BREWIN: I suppose one could go through some of the other roles. The anti-submarine role of the Navy—how are you going to integrate that when it is basically a naval role?

Mr. MONCEL: That is right. I just do not know the answer to it. This is why I fault it here.

Mr. BREWIN: But I understand you also to say that if for various reasons, partly political and partly military, you decide that it is necessary to concentrate on this sort of intervention force then unification begins to make some sense?

Mr. MONCEL: Yes.

Mr. BREWIN: Therefore, the real choice that we have to make, as a nation, and that we are responsible for making in Parliament, in the matter of making sense out of unification, is whether we are going to continue the roles that we have or concentrate on this mobile intervention force?

Mr. MONCEL: Yes.

Mr. BREWIN: I understand you to say that you think there is a great risk involved in concentrating on the mobile force because you contemplate the

possibility that at some later date we might want to switch back to do some of the things we have done previously, and this would be virtually impossible.

Mr. MONCEL: Yes. My job used to be to try and hedge the bets, and every time I was told we were not going to have any commitments for the next five years, as I think my book shows, almost invariably, within six months, I was sort of just sent somewhere else. This is what you have to be careful of. You have to be careful of this peacekeeping role, *per se*. The types whom you are possibly going to have to go and intervene between are a far cry from the bare-bottomed "chaps" that we used to go and chase around. These new, emerging countries are equipped on a scale that makes us toe the line.

Mr. BREWIN: We would have to be prepared, I presume—

Mr. MONCEL: That is right. Do not look at it from the point of view of having an easy run.

Mr. BREWIN: —to use pretty vigorous methods. It would not be just a case of waving a flag in their faces.

Mr. MONCEL: That is right.

Mr. LANIEL: Could I ask a supplementary question?

Mr. BREWIN: Yes; although, I hope you do not interfere with my line of thought.

Mr. LANIEL: General, from what you have just said I imagine that you do not agree with Admiral Brock...

Mr. MONCEL: It would not be the first time.

Mr. LANIEL: ...that the Canadian soldiers in Gaza, Cyprus and other troubled spots in the world have not done a good job in quelling insurrections, or things like that.

Mr. MONCEL: I cannot believe that he said that.

Mr. LANIEL: He is dealing with the merits of the peacekeeping role, and on page 3 of this document that he prepared for some group he says that:

> The past performance of the United Nations in reducing world tensions, in confining areas of world conflict or in quel'ing national insurrections of potential danger has not been too distinguished.

Mr. MONCEL: I would agree 100 percent with him. I do not think this suggests for a moment that our soldiers have not been doing their job.

Mr. BREWIN: May I go back to this question of the different roles? Would you agree, General Moncel—in fact, I think you already have—that this is partly a political consideration.

Mr. MONCEL: Entirely a political consideration.

Mr. BREWIN: It necessitates, for example, trying to assess what sort of wars or disturbances are most likely to occur.

Mr. MONCEL: Yes.

Mr. BREWIN: It also involves, I suggest to you, consideration of what our allies are equipped to do and are likely to do. Do you agree that there is not

much point in our re-enforcing something that they can do very well already? Is this not part of the consideration?

Mr. MONCEL: Of course it must be. I have been told that you have a lovely line of questioning that runs on and on and when you come to the climax, and after I have said yes to everything, you ask me another question. I would like to know what you are after?

Mr. BREWIN: I am afraid I am not in a position to tell you what I am after. I will go back once again to this question of the role. Do you not have to look across the whole defence spectrum, if I may use that expression, and find out what a country in Canada's position is most likely to be required to do and what it can most usefully do within its resources.

Mr. MONCEL: This is the constant job of the planners. We have this under constant review.

Mr. BREWIN: It is a job, I suggest, that has to take into account political considerations as well as Canada's resources.

Mr. MONCEL: And very elaborate machinery exists to ensure that this is done.

Mr. BREWIN: I am afraid that perhaps I have not asked the question that you anticipated.

Mr. MONCEL: I am disappointed; I was wondering what it was going to be.

Mr. DEACHMAN: General Moncel, I brought along a copy of the Canadian Army Staff College Journal called *Snow Owl*—not a bad name for a day like this—1965-66, which has in it an article by you entitled "Integration". Do you remember this article?

Mr. MONCEL: They published it, did they?

Mr. DEACHMAN: I might say that they not only published it but they have it as the first article in the book and it is accompanied by a very fine picture of yourself.

Mr. MONCEL: Thank you. I wish they had sent me a copy of it.

Mr. DEACHMAN: I want to ask some questions and review with you some of the things that you said in this article in the light of the circumstances as we find them today.

Early in the article you said:

> It is important that we understand the significance of what has occurred and acknowledge the unpalatable truth that until recently the military have lagged dangerously behind. We allowed ourselves to be overtaken by industry in all fields of data handling and effective management controls. Had we not awoken to this situation we would have been in danger of becoming a museum piece. Our problem now is to bridge the gap between what was essentially a late Victorian organization and the space age.

I presume that this article would have been written in the spring of 1966. Is that correct?

Mr. MONCEL: Yes.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Your view at that time was that the armed forces organization of pre-White Paper days was a Victorian organization in the space age.

Mr. MONCEL: Of course it was.

Mr. DEACHMAN: You had no quarrel then with the steps that the department were attempting to take to bring it into the 20th century.

Mr. MONCEL: No; I welcomed them. As I say, I was the architect for most of them.

Mr. DEACHMAN: On the next page, you go on to say:

> —I am pleased to be able to say that for the first time in Canadian military history the Defence Department, which is the largest business in this country, has the means to achieve a comprehensive national defence plan, which extends as a unified program, more than one year into the future. Not only have we accepted integration as a philosophy but we have introduced the modern management techniques which unification has permitted us to use.

I find the words "unification" and "integration" in the same sentence and used in the same sense. Is it not correct that you really were talking in terms of ultimate unification when you made that statement?

Mr. MONCEL: I was talking in that statement as I will talk now: that given time, through the processes that we were going, integration or unification—if you want to use that term, might well be the answer—might well—provided you change the role and the role is fitted. There is no point in unifying for the sake of unification. We unified, if that is the term—we use the term integrated, as I mentioned before—the internal communication system. This makes sense. We integrated the recruiting system, and this made sense—or we unified them, if you like. This made inherent good sense—good sense.

Mr. DEACHMAN: You saw the whole thing as the desirable goal at that time.

Mr. MONCEL: No. I saw it as a possible goal. It was desirable because it had been stated as a goal, but it was going to take some time.

Mr. DEACHMAN: You go on a little later to say:

> Our future projections are capable of change to meet changing conditions because all our needs are expressed as portions of one program and it is a relatively simple matter to make offsetting alterations which keep the whole in balance. In the past this was not possible without lengthy interservice negotiations which could seldom prove fruitful as the various negotiating parties were unaware of the overall balance being sought—and indeed, as I have mentioned earlier, there was no such balance.

I just wonder, in respect of what you have been telling us about flexibility, if you were not here advocating that integration and unification were leading us toward a much higher degree of flexibility than we had heretofore known.

Mr. MONCEL: Integration, certainly.

Mr. DEACHMAN: But you use the word "unification" in exactly the same sense.

Mr. MONCEL: If you want to believe this, obviously I cannot convince you that I did not. I will say again that where it makes sense to put things together, this is what we were attempting to do—bit by bit. It makes no sense in the

current commitments to try and put the whole thing together. Now, later it might; at the moment it does not.

Mr. DEACHMAN: I am trying to believe you, but I want to go on a little with what is being said here:

> Our current program can now be both realistic and responsible because it is able for the first time to encompass not only the shape of the various forces that we need but also to stipulate the men, equipment, supplies, installations and budget dollars to support them.

Is this not the very definition of flexibility and is this not the flexibility that you have been telling us we cannot achieve by this method?

Mr. MONCEL: Well it is flexibility in a different way. I still say everything I said there. The system of planning, force development, and equipment acquisition was indeed long in need of an overhaul—and it got a good one, and I think we came out with a system which is quite capable of doing all that I hoped it would do. This does not necessarily mean that the more you continue to put things together the more flexible you become. What I am saying is that the more you continue to put things together, when you get into the fighting environment the less flexible you become.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Yet in this article you said that modern techniques—the use of the computer, and integration and unification—used to mean the same thing in the same sentence—has led us toward flexibility.

I want to go on to another sentence a couple of paragraphs on in which you said:

> —integration has conferred upon us a degree of flexibility and an ability to effect changes which collectively the three individual Services did not possess in the past.

And further down you said:

> A more practical course, and one which is being actively followed, is to improve the conditions of service and offer the widest possible scope of employment. The means to accomplish this are to be found in integration.

Mr. MONCEL: Absolutely.

Mr. DEACHMAN: So that the entire tenor of the piece is that what we have been doing and the plans that you were engaged in were for the development of the utmost flexibility and not a retreat from flexibility as some of your arguments before us today has led us to believe, sir.

Mr. MONCEL: I would say that I have not got my point across.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Well, let me go on to this sentence, and perhaps we can pin it down a little closer. You say:

> Its early influences were already making themselves felt when integration commenced. That they have been held so well in check over the past two years may be attributed to the fact that now, with greater flexibility at the management level, we are better able to adjust to changing conditions.

Mr. MONCEL: That is still true. I am sure it is true.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Finally, you end up, again on the theme that unification and integration are the same thing, and that really what we are talking about here today is a unified force, when we speak of flexibility. You said:

> In the final analysis perhaps integration is the wrong word altogether and it is "unification" of which we should speak—one force with many facets operating at the will of one commander in the fulfilment of one national defence policy.

Mr. MONCEL: That is right and I still say it. I said "perhaps", and I meant it.

Mr. DEACHMAN: There is no "perhaps" in here. This is very final.

Mr. MONCEL: I believe you read it out.

Mr. DEACHMAN: I am sorry. You say:

> —perhaps integration is the wrong word altogether and it is "unification" of which we should speak.

Mr. MONCEL: That is right.

Mr. DEACHMAN: What you were doing was integrating the two words "integration" and "unification".

Mr. MONCEL: Obviously, I cannot change your mind if you want to think that.

Mr. DEACHMAN: I can only think what I read, sir.

Mr. MONCEL: That is what I wrote.

Mr. DEACHMAN: It is an article in favour of carrying unification to its ultimate conclusion and nowhere in here is there a suggestion that we are moving too fast; in fact, if I can interpret the sense of urgency in this article, you were whooping it up to get on with unification—

Mr. MONCEL: No, get on with integration.

Mr. DEACHMAN: —with a view to achieving flexibility.

Mr. MONCEL: Of course, I was; this was my job. This was what I was paid to do and this was what I believed in doing. This article was written for an annual staff college publication. The government policy was that we were going to integrate and possibly we were going to unify. As long as I was a serving officer it was my job to make jolly sure that happened. That was part of what I was doing, and I believed what I wrote. When I finally got to the stage where I could not believe what I was writing, I left.

Mr. DEACHMAN: You told us earlier, sir, that you believed this, and apparently this was the doctrine that you were following and that you wrote about as short a time ago as the spring of 1966. Now, what has happened in the meantime? You have told us today that the sense of urgency has gone; the need for unification is passed; we need to be taking a slower pace. What has happened that you should be putting on the mental brakes.

Mr. MONCEL: I thought that I had spent the better part of an hour trying to explain why. Do you want me to try and rehash what I have said? The integration process—integrating the staffs to produce a single staff was a right decision. I went along with it. I was invited to join the staff to bring it about. Unification was a long-term goal. I think it perhaps still is; obviously, it is going to be to pass

this Bill. My worry is that if you make it a short-term goal and you make it a goal without relation to your commitment, you are apt to stumble and fall. When I wrote that article—I have forgotten the exact date—I do not think that I had been told that we were going to get this unification bill through in 6 months time. I have forgotten when I wrote that article but it was not at the same time as it was published.

Mr. DEACHMAN: When did you write it?

Mr. MONCEL: I cannot remember. When was it published?

Mr. DEACHMAN: This came up last summer. I presume that your story, for publication in this magazine, must have been written in the spring.

Mr. MONCEL: I believe they like about six months advance notice, so it would be about six months ahead of when it was published, I think.

Mr. DEACHMAN: So that the latest date on which you could have written this would be late 1965 or early 1966. Would that be about right?

Mr. MONCEL: Yes—and I believe what I said; I still do.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Well, I can only come back to your final conclusion here: one force. You speak of one force; surely that is unification?

Mr. MONCEL: Of course it is.

Mr. DEACHMAN: And what you were looking for at that time was unification?

Mr. MONCEL: I was not looking for it. I said perhaps this might lead to it, and perhaps it might—perhaps, someday.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Thank you very much.

Mr. HARKNESS: General Moncel, you have stated here now three or four times, that with the aims and objectives of defence policy as laid down in the White Paper and in consequence of those, of course, the roles which the defence forces have to carry out, that those roles cannot be carried out by the projected single unified force provided for by this bill which we are considering. Are you in a position to tell us which of those roles we would not be able to carry out with the type of force which would come into existence with the passage of this bill?

Mr. MONCEL: I do not think I quite said that, Mr. Harkness. May I relate to you where I think you will have trouble in carrying out the roles that we have at the moment, under a unified program. You are bound to lose the expert supervision of the forces required to carry out the roles. If you tend to make Maritime Command essentially a transport organization, and you do not continue to treat it as a sea-going fighting identity, you soon will be unable to carry out that role. From a soldier's point of view all you need know about the Navy—and this is true, I would say, of 98 per cent of the soldiers—is that the ships are well found, that they are well manned, and that they are commanded by chaps who will get you there, safely, both through hell and high water. In all my service, and I am not ashamed of it at all, I have spent exactly 2½ hours with the Navy in action—and this was going into the beaches. I had a glass of gin, read the Illustrated London News, somebody put me over the side and said "Good luck". That is all I ever saw of the Navy, and it is all I ever needed to see of it, because

I knew jolly well that they were a first-class organization. And, within it, the same is true of the air force. You want to make absolutely sure that the aircraft are well maintained and well founded, flown by chaps who are dedicated to this, and driven by somebody who knows what he is talking about. You are going to end up in this thing with five air forces: you will have a Maritime air force commanded by a sailor; you will have a tactical air force commanded by a soldier; a transport command and air defence command commanded by airmen; and an air division—five separate air forces. These fellows need to be driven, restrained, encouraged and worked. Who is going to do this? You are going to develop five separate things. Now, if you are lucky—terribly lucky—and you get five paragons, you will develop five jolly good air forces. These things are very much the victim of their commanders, you know, and they are the results of their commanders. On the other hand, the odds are that you cannot raise five paragons—you have to have one good one and four terrible ones. It takes you a long time to undo these problems. This is the area where I would see the roles starting to fall off—the specialized role for which you cannot possibly unify. You know, you cannot unify anybody into the sub-marine service; it is a pretty highly specialized business for quite a special type of chap. I think anybody has to be slightly nuts to do it, but then this is his affair.

Mr. HARKNESS: In other words, we still require, in effect, a navy, an army and an air force, whether you call them by those names or not?

Mr. MONCEL: As long as you have your current commitments, you do.

Mr. HARKNESS: Yes.

Mr. MONCEL: Of course you do.

Mr. HARKNESS: And I say it does not matter whether you call them by those names or not, in effect, you still have to have those three services.

Mr. MONCEL: This is right, and there is no pay-off for calling them anything else.

Mr. HARKNESS: No.

Mr. MONCEL: None at all.

Mr. HARKNESS: On the other hand, would you say that there are very serious disadvantages in calling them something else?

Mr. MONCEL: Of course yes; there is no point in it. We asked ourselves this question a thousand times: "What are you going to save by taking the sailor out of his brass-bound suit and his bell-bottomed trousers?" What are you really going to save with this—if it makes him happy? I think this is a pretty important thing. This period that is coming up now, the late sixties, is a very, very critical period in the armed forces. And the reason that it is a critical period is this: In 1946-47, when we formed the post-war forces, we inherited from the war a tremendous amount of talent. And the weakness with the talent was that you had a very small age span in relation to the rank structure. That is to say, you had Brigadiers, who were very much of the same age level as the Lieutenant Colonels, who were at the same age level as the Majors, who were at the same age level as the Captains. You produced a block, right through the rank structure, all of the same age. Now, it does not take too much imagination to build a mathematical model and run this through on the basis of their age as against

their retirement time, to see that around 1968 it starts, and by 1972 it is finished—the whole lot goes at one fell swoop. The whole fighting experience, the training and so on, all leaves at once because they all reach retirement age at that time. I produced this mathematical model and I went to the then Adjutant General—Bunny Weekes, God rest his soul—and Weekes threw me out of the office. He said, "Are you crazy? It is now 1946. You are projecting this thing into 1967, and that is an awful long way away. Get out." So I got out. Well, at that time 1967 seemed a long way away, but it is here now. And just when integration started, we suddenly got personnel people who realized that this thing we projected for so long was going to happen in their service, and somebody had to do something about it. Well, it is too late to do anything about it because the chaps have all gotten older by 20 years or more, and they were going to go. And what was foremost in my mind—and I think in my colleagues' minds—was that if we do nothing else, we have to leave the new generation—the new military generation—with a sound and solid organization, which incorporates the best of everything we know, so that they can inherit this plant and progress it forward slowly. Evolution takes a long while in the military, we are all stupid and slow and, you know, it takes a little while. But this was the intention. What I am concerned about now is that unless we tidy this up—my 1970 critical date still stands, and I doubt whether you are going to be able to tidy it up in three years—you are going to leave the new breed, the youngsters—I call them youngsters though they are not young any more—with something that is unmanageable, when they have no experience—there are no books on how to do this. At least we were able to lay back on our experience. And the danger or trap that they will fall into, is that they will confuse peacetime administrative necessity with fighting requirements. I have seen this hundreds of times. Let us take, as an example, Petawawa, where you have five or six units—the number is of no consequence. Each one of these units is a fighting unit and they are designed, equipped and organized to fight seven days a week, 24 hours a day, 365 days a year—they are scaled for this. They have a great number of cooks, for example. Well now, it is a very tender and easy trap to fall into to say, "Surely you have a surplus of cooks—you have far too many cooks. Why not put all the cook houses in one kitchen in Camp Petawawa and save 50 cooks?" Sure you can—sure; your computer will show you this. It is much better to do it this way. But what happens when you have to go to war—and you may have to go tomorrow. They lose sight of these things. This is the type of thing I am referring to. We had hoped to leave them firm, solid establishments, based on everything we knew—make a decent tidy handover to them and then pat them on the heads and say good luck to them. I am concerned that we are not going to leave them this tidy thing, and they are going to flounder. Now when they flounder they have got to turn to something, and in desperation they will have to turn to the people who know, and continue to know, the United Kingdom, the United States; and if these contacts disappear you are in serious trouble—you are apt to end up with something like the person who arrives at the office at quarter to nine but really does not know what happens when he gets there, you know.

Mr. HARKNESS: Well I would agree with you thoroughly, because I know from my own experience that there is a terrific difference between actual combat and what you learn as a result of fighting, and what you learn from text books and, let us say, the ordinary barracks life. Now, in view of that, I take it that

your position would be that at the present time what is most essential is a pause, in order to consolidate before going any further in regard to doing away with the navy, the army and the air force and forming this single unified force?

Mr. MONCEL: I suppose so. I honestly do not know what to do because the thing is in such a distressing state in my mind. I think it is possible to conceive of an organization which would give the people the breathing space I believe they all urgently need before this not very clever solution is forced down their throats. For example, if you want a Canadian defence force, in that case, call it that. And if you organize it on a corps basis, there is no earthly reason why you cannot have the Royal Canadian Corps of infantry, as you have now; why you cannot have the Royal Canadian Armoured corps as you have now, and the Canadian Medical corps as I have described. And if you have these, is there any reason why you cannot have a Royal Canadian Navy as one of the corps—and indeed a Royal Canadian Air Force. You need every ounce of goodwill among the professional fighting officers that you can possibly muster. Why make enemies of them? Make allies of them. You need this talent—you really do. If you can get through the next few years with something that will ensure this co-operation, I think you might be able to pull it out of the fire. I suppose a pause is the answer, but I think a progressive pause, if there is such a thing—something like that.

Mr. HARKNESS: To revert to my first question, but to get at it from the opposite direction: what roles do you think the single unified force, as envisaged by this act, would be able to perform?

Mr. MONCEL: I think if you want some form of intervention and peace-keeping on a minor scale, if you are satisfied with that and do it in conjunction with other countries, that you could have a unified force and do this thing. But, bear in mind the size of it.

I read in the press somewhere the other day that we might be interfering in something like the Santo Domingo situation. The kind of force that Canada can sustain alone, abroad, on a protracted basis, on a decent battlefield day, fighting at what we called FFC rates, is about a battalion. This is what you could support by yourself—about a battalion, and keep it fed, supplied, housed, maintained, build your air strips and do everything else with it. A force of this size is about what you can support by yourself. If you do it in conjunction with other people—and everything we have done has been in conjunction with other people; our forces in Cyprus and Gaza are supported by other people—you can obviously make a greater contribution. I do not know if that answers your question.

Mr. HARKNESS: Yes. It really leads to the next point that I wanted to ask you about, the ability or otherwise of this projected unified force to co-operate effectively with our allies. I think everybody accepts the fact that you have just stated really, that Canada cannot defend by itself; it has to have allies—and the two allies in particular that we have worked with principally in the past are the United Kingdom and the United States. In your view, would this projected single unified force be able to co-operate and work with all of our allies in NATO, but particularly with these two with which we might be working more closely than any others. Could the projected force co-operate and work with them nearly as effectively as the type of force that we have had?

Mr. MONCEL: No, and for a few very simple reasons. Sailors within the alliance spoke a common language which sailors understood—I never understood it, but they did; and their communications and procedures were geared to work inter-navy. Now, we complain that the Canadian navy overlooked the Canadian army and that they were not able to operate properly with them. That is perhaps a valid argument, and we were taking little steps to try to improve this situation. What is happening now is that we are inventing a new Canadian vocabulary. When my old friends who I occasionally talk to tell me what is going on, I cannot understand them now. Unless Canada can bring the world along with this, they are going to have invented a vocabulary which is going to cause everyone else to have to react to them. I just do not think we are big enough to get away with this. This communication in a special sense is going to be lost, the tighter the force gets. The more the navy is forced into carrying the soldiers up and down the coast of Nova Scotia to the exclusion of everything else, the exclusion of going to sea; the more their equipment is rationalized with the army equipment; the more out of phase they get with allied navies because the other allied navies are too big, perhaps you are going to be at a disadvantage.

Mr. HARKNESS: Well, I must say that I thoroughly agree with you. I asked the question particularly because I asked the same question of the minister and the present vice chief of staff, and their answers of course were that the ability to co-operate would not be impaired at all, which I disagreed with and still disagree with.

Mr. MONCEL: This is their opinion and I hope they are right.

The CHAIRMAN: Well, gentlemen, it is after six o'clock. I think that it is the wish of the Committee to continue this evening. If so, we will adjourn until 8 p.m.

EVENING SITTING

MONDAY, February 20, 1967.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, when we recessed just after six o'clock, Mr. Harkness had the floor and was in the middle of his questioning. Mr. Harkness?

Mr. HARKNESS: I am afraid that I have forgotten the thread I was following. However, there was a point which came out this afternoon with regard to flexibility about which I wanted to ask you something, General. I think you made the statement that as far as the fighting end of our defence force is concerned, the proposed unification process would result in a great deal less flexibility than we have possessed up to the present time. Mr. Deachman was questioning this particularly and, as far as I could see attempting to prove some disparity between what you said here this afternoon and what you wrote in an article he was dealing with. Now, does this not basically come down to the difference between flexibility from what you might call the administrative and the command points of view on the one hand, versus the ability of the fighting elements of your defence force on the other, to perform the functions which may be required of them?

Mr. MONCEL: I suppose you would really have to have an agreed definition of flexibility. This is a much abused and over-used term and it depends in which

context you are using the term, I suppose. In the sense that I am using it, I think what I am trying to say is that if you train the force basically to fight to the exclusion of everything else, inherent in the business of training to fight is the discipline, equipment and training that enables you to do almost anything from running the Governor General's tea party to fighting a battle. The more that you specialize this and the more you get away from the simple-minded approach of training it only to fight, the less flexible you become. For example, you do not need to have a fully trained fighting officer or fighting man on Cyprus at this moment. You could recruit a much less highly trained person to do that specific job. In fact, many countries do it this way in their UN contributions. The trained fighting officer takes this kind of work in his stride, but he can do other things. I think this is really what is in my mind as the basis of flexibility.

Mr. HARKNESS: I had thought that probably also in your mind was the fact that with the type of organization we have had of a navy, army and air force, you were in a position to meet a very considerable number of roles, but if you came to a unified force which, as you said earlier this afternoon, would be adapted specifically to carry on a sort of police role, you would be in a position where you could not carry on a lot of the other roles. Therefore, your flexibility from the fighting point of view would be very considerably reduced.

Mr. MONCEL: I think this is so. I think this is the intention of what I was trying to say. If you train your navy as a deep-sea fighting navy, the function of carrying chaps from a to b in a transport role is something they can take in their stride, but if you start to specialize more and more in the transport role you will suddenly find that they have lost their fighting capabilities. This would be my worry.

Mr. HARKNESS: On the other hand, what you have said is that the integration process which is taking place has improved flexibility from the administrative point of view.

Mr. MONCEL: Yes, indeed it has.

Mr. HARKNESS: This is one of the points I want to get clear, because I think there was a considerable amount of confusion in Mr. Deachman's mind and probably in the minds of other members of the Committee with regard to what you said as far as flexibility is concerned. One of the things I think both you and I have found as a result of past experience is that there is a terrific difference between the administrative end of things on the one hand and the actual fighting operation on the other.

Mr. MONCEL: I will not argue with that.

Mr. HARKNESS: In speaking of the present plan of unification, you stated that you rejected the present plan out-of-hand. Could you tell us why? In fact, I think you mentioned that it was one of three or four or more possible plans. As I put down your words, you said: The present plan I reject out of hand.

Mr. MONCEL: Yes, because if you are going to do it—if you are determined to unify and are prepared to accept the consequences—you might as well unify it properly and not skulk around the edges of the thing and just do a little bit. If you are going to do away with the navy, well, then, for goodness sake do away with it properly and do not have chaps dressed in one uniform at one time of the day and another one in the evening, and do not give them options about whether

they are going to be colonels, captains or commodores, or anything like this. And do the same thing right through the piece. When you are prepared to do this, you have to be prepared at the same time to rekit right throughout the whole bit, and not just change one uniform at one time.

You can do it, as I see it, in two possible ways. You can either form a single force made up with a series of branches, rather like the air force or the navy is built up today, or you can organize it on a corps basis—one way or the other. Either way will probably work, but in either event I suggest that whoever does it should try to ensure that they link in with somebody, preferably the United States, who talks their language. The only force in the United States that anywhere near approaches this unified force is the United States marines. If you want to form a band of Canadian marines, I suppose it could be done, but this should bear a striking resemblance to the marines which everyone knows, who have taken 150 years to build up a very real tradition, and we need this. We need someone with far, far more experience than we have to lean on, and I am not attempting to be un-Canadian or anything else.

In the army our fighting experience, despite a spendid effort in two world wars, is very limited indeed. We did no major withdrawals. We did no desert fighting, other than a few individuals. We did practically no fighting in the jungles. We did very, very little, if any, combined operations. We really came into the war, insofar as Europe is concerned, when the thing was running, as you well know, and it was not too difficult to command under those conditions. We have not had the breadth of fighting in the army in a sufficient number of fields and under a sufficient number of conditions that we can really say we can stand on our own without a lot of advice from a lot of other people.

Mr. HARKNESS: To a considerable extent, too, of course, this comes back to what you said earlier today, that without the logistics support of allies it would be very difficult for us. In fact, I think you said we could not keep more than one battalion group operating indefinitely.

Mr. MONCEL: About that size, I think. I am talking now about some place further removed than from here to Rivière du Loup, or something like that. I mean "X" country, where we have to transport the supplies. On the long basis, this would just about exhaust us, I think.

Mr. HARKNESS: In effect, in order to produce any reasonable defence effort commensurate with our population, our manufacturing ability and our general economic situation, we have to operate with allies.

Mr. MONCEL: Yes, unless you want to spend a great deal more money. You have got to be able to invent some roles—that is the big problem, trying to find an enemy. You sit down for hours with a blunt pencil and a piece of paper and say, who am I going to fight? The only kind of work planners can do specifically, with the chance of the thing coming off, is offensive planning. Even this has it drawbacks, as some offensive planners learned to their dismay in 1945.

Mr. HARKNESS: Well, as far as our planning during recent years is concerned, has it really all been predicated on the basis of our acting in conjunction and in co-operation with other people?

Mr. MONCEL: Yes, entirely, I would say.

Mr. HARKNESS: And not acting on our own under any circumstances?

Mr. MONCEL: I cannot recall any thoughts that I was involved in that suggested we were going to do something by ourselves.

Mr. HARKNESS: In other words, all the probabilities are that if we are engaged in any war-like operations it will be in conjunction with somebody else.

Mr. MONCEL: This, I think, it is fair to say.

Mr. HARKNESS: Now, I would like to ask you about one or two specific things as far as this bill is concerned. One is a matter which you have just touched on, and that is the universal or common rank structure proposed. Do you see any need for that as far as the navy or the people who are engaged in naval operations are concerned?

Mr. MONCEL: No.

Mr. HARKNESS: Do you think anything would be gained by it in any way whatever?

Mr. MONCEL: Not the slightest bit. I think a great deal would be lost. The only justification that I have ever read in the past on this was that it would make things administratively more simple. I suppose the logical extension of that is that it would be a hell of a lot more simple if they were all the same size, wore the same size hats, the same size boots and same went to the same church, if any.

An hon. MEMBER: May I ask a supplementary question here?

Mr. HARKNESS: Well, just let me finish. There would be no administrative advantage, really, that you know of in having the ranks in the navy the same as the ranks in the army and the air force?

Mr. MONCEL: No, it is the same numbers. It is no different from having Anglicans and the rest of them.

Mr. HARKNESS: In other words, it is an example of unification for unification's sake, essentially.

Mr. MONCEL: I am not quite sure what the object of the exercise is—why you begin to even want to do it. You have to be terribly careful about these things; they sound good when you say them quickly. Could I give you an example of that? Somebody handed me a piece of paper—

The CHAIRMAN: By all means.

Mr. MONCEL: I am told that you had a chap here called Patrick and this is allegedly from page 4 of what he said—I do not know if he said it or not.

Mr. HARKNESS: Well, I do not know either. I was not here either on Friday.

Mr. MONCEL: Well, perhaps if he did not say it somebody will tell me. He said that the reduction from 346 trades in the three services to 97, which came about only because of the unification process, is nothing less than a masterpiece of personnel management. Did he say this?

An hon. MEMBER: Yes.

Mr. HARKNESS: I see it printed here in a copy of his brief.

Mr. MONCEL: Could I take about three minutes to discuss this masterpiece for you?

We have 346 trades in the three services. Now, each of these trades is backed by a specification, and they are called by different things, but essentially it is a

job analysis of what a person with this trade is supposed to be able to do. It is a very useful document. It tells the trainers to what standard they should train this particular type of fellow. When you are demanding reinforcements or replacements you can demand by this specific trade. If you want a loader or wireless operator, you get this chap; it is a job specification. Now, it is extremely useful at all times during the course of a decade or so—or perhaps more often—to review these things; to make certain that you are not over-training. There is a tremendous tendency in peacetime to over-train. You have got more time and you tend to embellish the thing. You make the chap really far better than he need be for his actual job. In a sense I suppose this is a good thing—it is a peacetime hazard.

When we came along with integration we had a splendid opportunity to take a look at the whole trade structure right across the piece, so we started this exercise in training. We found that on the 346 trades, a great number had things in common and somewhere in the course of one of the briefings these magic figures of 346 to 96 came out. I thought the figures were 312 and 106, but this is of no consequence in this magnitude. Everybody starting scribbling furiously—346 to 97; is this not wonderful? And before long the whole object of the exercise changed; a masterpiece—we have reduced 346 to 97.

Let us look at what happened. Let us take one element out of that. You had some 20-odd bandsmen of different types—euphonium player, base drummer, kettle drummer, triangle player, and so on. We did away with all the 20-odd bandsmen and we produced one—a musician. That is all. Here is a reduction from 20 trades to one trade, is that not right? Well, the first thing you have got to do, of course, is take the one musician and put 20 different little dots beside him to distinguish between a triangle player and a euphonium player. Otherwise, when you demand musicians you are apt to get a band of brass drummers. So, you take the 97 and put the required number of dots beside them and add them up, and you get 346. This is a miraculous piece of personnel administration. All I am saying is for goodness sake be careful of these ruddy charts. They are dangerous as hell, you know.

Mr. HARKNESS: I think you illustrate that point very well, indeed, General Moncel.

Mr. WINCH: I have one supplementary question. I thought the right time to ask it was when you were mentioning the ranks, because when General Foulkes was here the other day he said he would not like to be called an admiral, and I noticed the other day you made mention of a captain of a ship being called a colonel. In case I have some misconception here I would like to get it cleared, and I am certain that you feel the same way. In the Minister's speech on December 7 he had this to say with regard to ranks, as reported at page 10834 of *Hansard:*

> The bill would enable the minister to prescribe alternative titles of rank to those used officially for documentation, pay, etc., and state the circumstances under which they might be used. It is my intention to authorize members of the Canadian Armed Forces to use rank titles traditional to their former service.

Have I got it wrong? Does this not actually mean that a captain on a ship is still the captain, or the colonel of a regiment is still a colonel, or have I got some

misconception of this? That is the way it was stated and that is the way it is printed.

Mr. MONCEL: As I understand it, that is what they mean. We had one wild-eyed discussion one afternoon where everybody with a Scotch name could wear a kilt, regardless of what service he was in. Fortunately, it never came to anything. As I understand this, if a fellow is promoted to a rank, he is promoted to one of the ranks or equivalents that are listed in that book.

Mr. WINCH: Well, I do not see that in the statement of the Minister; that is the reason I asked.

Mr. MONCEL: Well, if you read it again you will see what it says.

Mr. WINCH: There is just one paragraph which is headed "Military Ranks" and I read all but a couple of sentences of it.

Mr. MONCEL: It is in one of the sentences that you read.

Mr. WINCH: It says:

> The bill would enable the minister to prescribe alternative titles of rank to those used officially for documentation, pay, etc...

Mr. MONCEL: That is right. The ranks that are used officially for documentation are army ranks.

Mr. WINCH: Yes, but it does say then—and this is actually the sentence I was after:

> It is my intention to authorize members of the Canadian Armed Forces to use rank titles traditional to their former service.

Does former service, in your estimation, mean that if you were a captain you are changed to something else, or does a service mean the Royal Canadian Navy? Perhaps that is where the misconception comes in.

Mr. MONCEL: It means you are promoted to captain in the navy, your documents show that you are promoted to colonel—which is the official thing—but you can continue to call yourself a captain.

Mr. WINCH: Because you are in a service.

Mr. MONCEL: Yes, I presume this is what it means. Presumably, if you are a really keen integrationist or unificationist, you could call yourself a colonel. I think Landymore brought this out—at least, I gather he did. You could get the astonishing position where a ship is commanded by a colonel with nine captains, or whatever number they have on board, and yet some chaps will hold out, calling themselves lieutenant commanders. How on earth would you make a signal? I would not know. In short, either do it or do not, but do not leave these little frills hanging. If you are determined to call them colonels well, for goodness sake call them colonels. Do not hedge around it.

Mr. HARKNESS: On that very point, my reading of the bill is that if a man is a commander in the navy and, after the bill comes into effect—if it does in this form, and I certainly hope it will not—he were promoted to colonel on the official designation, he would have to call himself a colonel. If he remains a commander he could continue to call himself a commander, but if he is promoted then he has lost that option and he becomes a colonel whether he wants to be or not.

Mr. MONCEL: This may be another interpretation.

Mr. HARKNESS: This is certainly my interpretation of the way it would work out.

Mr. MONCEL: I cannot interpret it; somebody no doubt can. This seems to be sloppy administration.

Mr. HARKNESS: As you said, I think it would result in an absolutely chaotic situation and one in which everybody would be confused most of the time.

Now, one other point. The bill we have before us provides that enlistment for other ranks will be for a five-year period and that re-enlistment will be for an indefinite period, and may be terminated at any time on six months' notice. Admiral Landymore pointed out in his brief that this could result in a group of tradesmen, or several groups of tradesmen, who perhaps had the opportunity of getting more money on civvy street, or because they had some particular grievance, all giving their six months' notice together. Then you would be faced with an extremely awkward situation in which, possibly, you could not put any ships to sea. If these people all left at the same time you would naturally not have enough replacements under training to take their places. What is your view with regard to this particular type of re-enlistment provision?

Mr. MONCEL: I would be against it. I just cannot imagine what Landymore is alleged to have said coming true in the service I knew, but it is a possibility, I suppose, but it is hard to imagine.

Your great problem is that if you make it possible for people to go too easily you are apt to find yourself in very serious trouble. We have no guaranteed intake on a voluntary basis. It is extremely difficult to plan when you do not have the slightest idea how many troops you are going to have six months from now. In the United States it is relatively easy. You are invited by the government to come and serve, and it is not too difficult to sit down and estimate how many you are going to have in the force at a given date.

From our point of view we keep them, in large measure, by goodwill, but we also have a contract. The chap is signed up. Now, in the course of our business you have to do a number of unpleasant things. This is part of the business, and you do unpleasant things because you are told to do them, and if you do not do them the penalties are very, very severe indeed. By design, if everyone has the option of saying on six months' notice, "I will soldier no more," you are apt to get into trouble because every time you get an unpleasant posting you say, "Thanks very much, I will not take this one," and off you go. I am a bad one to be stating this case, because I suppose I did just what I say should not be able to happen. We were brought up to believe that in the officer corps you served at the Queen's pleasure, and if the Queen is displeased with you, you go, but not until then.

We went through this argument in great detail when we had the difficulties with the pilots and the rest of them and we had to buy their services. This is wrong. Most of us felt that the real solution to this problem was to say, "congratulations, you have a contract which says five years. Now, get in the aeroplane and fly it. If you do not fly, you are in the bastille. Apparently this is not to be the case. I do not know how you can maintain discipline when a chap can say, in the midst of a contract, "I quit,"—on a voluntary basis; with conscription, of course, it is very different from that.

Mr. HARKNESS: In other words, it poses the threat at all times that you may lose sufficient of your perosnnel that you can no longer carry on effectively.

Mr. MONCEL: Indeed, and there is a lot to be said for not doing it. It is a terribly difficult question. I have the greatest sympathy with you in this sense, on the basis that the chap who is dragooned into staying to fulfil his contract is really an unwilling operator. He spreads alarm and despondency and you are far better off to get rid of him. In certain cases this is probably true, but you must remember that forces of tremendous size like the United States forces operate quite satisfactorily on the basis that everybody is to go. Nobody wants to go and do this wretched business, but is has to be done, and this is where you have to generate questions of pride and questions of loyalty. So far, in my experience, you have never had to resort to these punitive measures that I suggest, because a chap in the Black Watch, by tradition, would not do it. They have not done it for 300 years and he is not going to be the first one to do it. These are some things that sustain, and these are the things which I am terrified we are apt to throw away just a little lightly, and we have too few of them.

Mr. HARKNESS: Thank you.

Mr. ANDRAS: General Moncel, when did you choose to retire from the forces? What is the exact date?

Mr. MONCEL: I think July 16 was the official date.

Mr. ANDRAS: What year?

Mr. MONCEL: Last year.

Mr. ANDRAS: Yes, 1966. Now, sir, today and on previous occasions when witnesses have been called before us, we heard a considerable amount about inadequate internal communications from the headquarters staff to the people in the field, and I think you got on this subject again this afternoon. Would you agree that the people in the command did not know what was going on or what the objectives were, and if so, what did you do, for instance, when you were Vice Chief of Staff about that situation?

Mr. MONCEL: If they did not know it was my fault, in some large measure.

Mr. ANDRAS: Then you would—

Mr. MONCEL: And they did not know.

Mr. ANDRAS: They did not know? There was considerable newspaper publicity, the White Paper was widely distributed, and I ask you this question: Did you see the statement put out on April 2, 1964, by the Minister of National Defence, Mr. Hellyer, and the Associate Minister of National Defence, Mr. Cardin, to all the armed forces personnel and Department of National Defence civil service?

Mr. MONCEL: I cannot recall what the document said.

Mr. ANDRAS: I would just like to read to you a couple of excerpts. First, from paragraph 6 of that document:

> The third and final step will be the unification of the three services.

then it goes on to say later,

> It is reasonable to expect that it will be three or four years before it will be possible to take this action.

and that three or four years dates, of course, from the date of this which was April 2, 1964. And again in paragraph 7 of that communication it says, quite plainly:

...the end objective of a single service is firm.

Knowing this, sir, from this declaration of April 2, 1964, knowing what the ministers intended, knowing the approximate time they expected to take, and considering the bitterness with which you now attack the plan, why did you actively take part in it?

Mr. MONCEL: I took part in it for the time I did in the mistaken belief that possibly I could have some influence and attempt to slow it down so that I could begin to compete with it. On no less than six occasions I went to my chief and said "I can go on no longer", and in each case he told me, "Wait it out, you have simply got to stay", and I was gullible and I said, "All right, I will wait it out", and I hung on for another month, and another month, and another—the same type of intervention, and we felt that surely somebody must listen to what we were trying to say. Finally, it was apparent that the lines were really gone and then there was no point; so I went to my chief and said, "I am out".

Mr. ANDRAS: Switching a little bit now, you have probably read or heard that Admiral Landymore said before us he felt the establishment of Mobile Command cou'd lead to—as I think he described it—an overnight military coup and the establishment of a military dictatorship. My first question on that is: did you, as Vice Chief, have anything to do with the creation of Mobile Command?

Mr. MONCEL: Of course I did.

Mr. ANDRAS: Secondly, would you agree with Admiral Landymore's contention and warning?

Mr. MONCEL: I did not hear him say this. I cannot believe he said just that.

Mr. ANDRAS: Well then, you would disagree with it, sir? He did say it.

Mr. NUGENT: On a point of order, Mr. Chairman, I get a little tired of this. All Mr. Andras has to do to be fair to the witness is to read from Admiral Landymore's brief the words he said—not this man's interpretation of it—and then ask the General. I think that is the only fair way to proceed. Certainly, asking him whether he agrees or disagrees with Mr. Andras' conception of what Landymore meant is most unfair, and I do not think it should be indulged.

The CHAIRMAN: It might clarify matters if you do read this.

Mr. ANDRAS: Well I will simply put the question. I do not have the brief here, and I am quite aware that I am paraphrasing. The implication was that this Committee should look into the matter because there was a danger of a military coup overnight by either the Commander or Mobile Command—

Mr. MONCEL: There was a danger of a military coup?

Mr. ANDRAS: —or the Commander of Mobile Command in collusion with the defence Minister.

Mr. NUGENT: Unexaggerated, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN: If you have it before you, will you read it?

Mr. NUGENT: All right; it starts at the bottom on page 10—

> Mobile Command is too large and so is Maritime Command—Mobile Command should be given a three way split into East, West and Central Commands.

> Mobile Command is not only too big. It is dangerous to our democracy. If ever a Commander of that Command decided to set himself up to control this country of ours, he has a ready made organization to achieve it. If a Minister of National Defence and a Commander Mobile Command got together, we could have a dictatorship overnight. As Members of Parliament you should contemplate this organization with some alarm.

That is the brief.

Mr. ANDRAS: I appreciate the exactness of Mr. Nugent's intervention. I just simply ask you: Do you think this is a—

Mr. MONCEL: I think what Landymore says is probably correct. If you have a chap who wants to do this, he has the resources. But, "if"—I cannot conceive of this.

Mr. ANDRAS: It is an "if" that exists with any military force, in the country, before or after Mobile Command, reorganization, or anything else? Is that not the case? It is a very big "if".

Mr. MONCEL: No. I think I see what Landymore was after. Now, there is this slight difference: The old organization was so truncated and split that one man could really not have done anything. He would have to bring along about seven others with him.

Mr. ANDRAS: You, sir, were active in the planning and formation of Mobile Command while you were Vice Chief?

Mr. MONCEL: Oh, indeed I was, yes.

Mr. ANDRAS: Now, sir, with the knowledge of the objectives stated in the White Paper and the Minister's statement of April 2, 1964, would you have accepted the position of Chief of Defence Staff if it had been offered to you?

Mr. MONCEL: It was never offered; so it was never a thought in my mind.

Mr. ANDRAS: Would you have accepted it, though, knowing the plan that was described in the White Paper and the statement of April 2, 1964?

Mr. MONCEL: I do not think I can answer that.

The CHAIRMAN: I think that is what we call a hypothetical question.

Mr. MACALUSO: Mr. Chairman, a lot of hypothetical questions were put here tonight which were alone.

Mr. ANDRAS: Well sir, I have to state the confusion between the position you take today and the position you placed before the staff college in you article that appeared in the Canadian Army Staff College Journal to which my colleague, Mr. Deachman, referred this afternoon. You have also indicated today that you were one of the architects of the plan that we are examining—

Mr. MONCEL: Let us be clear on this thing. As I understand it, what we are examining today is a statement that appears in the preamble to Bill No. C-243, or whatever the number is, which says, that the time is now ripe, or something like that—

Mr. NUGENT: What is that, I wonder?

Mr. MONCEL: This is a copy of my article, which I am delighted to see.

Mr. MACALUSO: Perhaps we could have it tabled, Mr. Chairman, and copies run off for all members of the Committee.

Mr. HARKNESS: This is the first time you have seen it in print?

Mr. MONCEL: I wrote this out somewhere; it says in the explanatory notes to the White Paper that

> Since that time the planning required for the integration process has continued and it is now considered appropriate to proceed to the final goal—

This is, as I understand it, the object of the exercise. All I am trying to say is I do not think it is appropriate to proceed to the final goal at this stage.

Mr. ANDRAS: And yet, this article appeared within the last year. It must have represented your views at that time. I submit to you sir, that no matter what your qualifications or reservations are today in the evidence you have given us, at that time you presented it as Vice Chief of the General Staff to the Staff College which was attended by many of the future senior officers of the armed forces of Canada who could only have interpreted this as your point of view. I have read it quite thoroughly—and I am a layman, I admit—but I can only take out of it an enthusiastic endorsement of the principle of integration and unification.

Your last closing remark in there—

Mr. NUGENT: What sort of unification was specified?

Mr. ANDRAS:

> In the final analysis perhaps integration is the wrong word altogether and it is "unification" of which we should speak—one force with many facets operating at the will of one commander in the fulfilment of one national defence policy.

That is what you described in principle. The staff officer who read that would most certainly respect your opinion and, I would think, take it as an enthusiastic endorsement of the general plan that is before this Committee and the bill that has been presented. My question is—

Mr. MONCEL: Just clarify this, please. It is "an enthusiastic endorsement of the process of integration"—"enthusiastic"—I meant it; I wrote it that way.

Mr. ANDRAS: The word "integration", you go on to say, should have been called "unification" which is "one force with many facets operating at the will of one commander in the fulfilment of one national defence policy", which is basically what we are delaing with now.

Mr. MONCEL: I did not say "should"; I said "perhaps".

Mr. ANDRAS: Well sir, we can argue about whether the "perhaps" applies to the phrase: perhaps it should have been unification used instead of integration. I am being quite sincere when I say, in the light of further comments throughout your whole document, that it is an enthusiastic statement of the principle of unification—"one force with many facets operating at the will of one commander in the fulfilment of one national defence policy". I cannot see how you can turn against that now.

Mr. MONCEL: Well, this is what any author has to go through when his work is being interpreted. I meant what I said and I stand by it.

Mr. ANDRAS: Well sir, with the greatest respect to you, I just cannot understand this. I must ask you, because this is such a serious matter before us, what really has happened during this last eight months to cause you to repudiate

the enthusiastic endorsement of this program which appears in your article of last year?

Mr. NUGENT: On a point of order, Mr. Chairman, I want to know wherein what has been read as this gentleman's writing of what he calls unification is a program now before us in the White Paper. I can see nothing there and I think it is very unfair to the witness to suggest it, since he has already told us four different plans of unification. If you want to proceed with the concept, I want to know where Mr. Andras gets the idea that it is an enthusiastic endorsation of the plan presently before us. First of all, when he wrote that, did he have in mind the plan of unification now before us and if so, was that what he was endorsing so enthusiastically?

Mr. WINCH: The General is more competent than you are. This is the same party that thought I interrupted too much.

Mr. ANDRAS: Well, Mr. Chairman, you must deal with the point of order, of course, but I suggest that General Moncel is quite capable of answering my question as put to him, based on what I tell you is my interpretation of this article that he wrote in 1965-66. I am just asking what really happened during this last eight months to have you turn against this to the degree that you have—a complete turn around; a complete flip-flop of your ideas and views on this question of leading to a single unified defence force?

The CHAIRMAN: On the point of order that has been raised by Mr. Nugent, it would appear to me, in the interest of answering and clarifying Mr. Andras' question, that perhaps the witness would like to answer Mr. Nugent's question first of all and then proceed to—

Mr. MACALUSO: I submit, with all due respect, that there is no point of order and the questioning by Mr. Andras certainly is in order, and I suggest that you must let the General decide about answering it. He is more than competent, as he has shown today, to answer questions.

The CHAIRMAN: I am sure Mr. Andras' question is in order.

Mr. MACALUSO: That is the only point at issue, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN: I thought perhaps he might like to take Mr. Nugent's suggestion into account.

Mr. MONCEL: I will answer whatever way he wants; I do not mind.

The CHAIRMAN: Then will you proceed with the answer to Mr. Andras' question?

Mr. MONCEL: Ask me your question again so that I can understand.

Mr. ANDRAS: I am saying sir, that this document—and I could go into page after page, quotation after quotation—certainly leads one to believe that you were very much in favour of the plan which was written after the White Paper, and after the April, 1964, statement that it was going to be a single defence force. But now, in your statements today, you have completely reversed your position; you flip-flop back to a position that you do not endorse this program. You have attacked it on the basis of it being a distressing state of affairs; you said it will prevent us from being able to co-operate with our allies; you have used many phrases to describe your dissatisfaction with what, generally speaking is the same plan that you endorsed in this issue. Now, I am asking you sir, what really happened in this past eight months to have you change your mind—

Mr. NUGENT: On a point of order, Mr. Chairman, I object to this suggestion "the same plan he endorsed"; there is nothing to indicate that in what Mr. Andras has read. If something in the article indicates that what General Moncel apparently endorsed at that time is the same plan that we are considering now, then it is fair to ask that question, but I do object most strenuously to this suggestion of trying to mislead the witness into saying he took this position.

Mr. ANDRAS: Mr. Chairman, I think the calibre of the witness are questioning, would make it impossible to mislead him. I think he is more capable of answering the question than anybody else here.

Mr. NUGENT: It does not make any difference—it is the quality of the question asked and the tactics used.

Mr. MONCEL: I am not misled.

The CHAIRMAN: On this point of order, I think when the witness is answering this question he will cover the points that have been raised by you, Mr. Nugent.

Mr. MONCEL: This was written as, and was meant to be, an article expressing enthusiastic support for the program as I knew it, and I still stand by it. I could not possibly have supported the unification plans as of today, because I have not written it yet. Nobody knew the plan for unification at the date this was written. There was not one, except in certain people's minds. There was no military plan for unification on that date.

Mr. ANDRAS: If you had continued as Vice Chief or as Chief of Defence Staff, then you would have written a detailed plan for unification which you would have expected to carry out in that capacity?

Mr. MONCEL: The reason I left is because I could not write such a plan.

Mr. ANDRAS: Well sir, I simply cannot understand the change. I know there is a lack of communication here—a lack of understanding—and I am being quite sincere. I think it is entirely pertinent to the decision that we in the Committee must take to try to clarify it, even if it simply is to remove any doubts that might be there about your motives in changing your mind about this.

Mr. MONCEL: Perhaps I can help you. In my experience we had two—I think it was two—formal meetings with the Minister to discuss unification as such, the next step in this bill. At the first meeting, when my chief was away and I was acting chief, the defence staff were summoned and we were summoned with our subordinates, like a band of schoolboys. And the Minister asked each one of us in turn, subordinates first: "Are you, or are you not in favour of integration?" And they all stood up and said their piece. When he came to me, I said no.

An hon. MEMBER: Are you referring to unification?

Mr. MONCEL: Yes, to unification. Two of my subordinates were at this meeting, and afterwards I called them in and said: "Now, you spoke up and said you were in favour of unification, did you not?" They answered, "Yes, sir." I then said, "All right, you now have the power, here is the pen, what are you going to do? Write me the plan." And they all said: "We do not know what we are going to do, but we are in favour of it." I said: "Well, that is fine, that is great, but it is damned irresponsible, and some day you are going to have responsibility; some day you are going to find out what it is like to have it. Because it is a very different aspect when you hold the pencil that can sign it. Someday you are going to own this pencil." That was the first meeting.

The second meeting took place some weeks later, again when my chief was away, and I was summoned and told to produce the defence staff and my subordinates again to discuss unification. I spent a very long time with the Minister at that stage, on a Friday night, telling him that with the greatest respect this was the wrong way to do business. You do not call your subordinates in to defence meetings, and prime or pump or question their superiors in front of them. It is never done, it breaks down the system. And he agreed that perhaps we would try it once more, but this time we would just have the members of the defence staff—the principals, the chaps who were responsible, the four branch heads. So we met and had a useful, free and frank discussion, and for the first time, out of all this maze of paper and the rest of it, some of us began to get a glimmer of what he wanted—for the first time. And that was the last meeting we ever had.

I tried on at least 20 occasions to provoke another meeting, and the defence staff of my generation never met again on the question of unification not ever, as a defence staff. Yet, during all that period, my subordinates were being dealt with directly. Now, is there anything more you want?

Mr. ANDRAS: Can you give us the dates of those meetings, General Moncel?

Mr. MONCEL: I am sure somebody can get them; I have not got them.

Mr. ANDRAS: You have not got them at hand now, then? Well sir, I still cannot understand the change. I have not been able to grasp the specific reasons for your change.

An hon. MEMBER: What change?

Mr. ANDRAS: The change from his paper in 1965 to the criticisms of the plan that have been given today. It has raised many questions and, simply because I cannot understand it, I am going to raise the matter and question the Minister of National Defence and the Chief of the Defence Staff when they appear before us. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MACALUSO: In some of the answers you gave earlier you stated that a single force with one commander could work if there were a change in commitments. I think I am paraphrasing, but that is the gist of your answers, and of our present commitments. And yet, referring again to the paper that I tabled which is before you, you state at page 6, in referring to a national defence policy:

> As my readers will know, this policy was set out quite plainly in the Government White Paper on Defence 1964. We must understand that this statement of policy is not an outcome of integration, nor is integration an outcome of this policy. As I have attempted to explain, integration is merely a means to achieve and end—a way to fulfil defence policy in the most efficient manner.

You keep referring to defence policy, and I assume you are referring back to the defence policy set out in the Government White Paper of 1964.

Mr. MONCEL: I would think so, yes.

Mr. MACALUSO: Again I must come back to what Mr. Andras came to, which is the last paragraph on page 9. And I also question this because I think you will agree with me—this paper shows it, and what you have said here confirms it—that you are using integration and unification as the same term. In your mind it is the same term, if I might read your mind that way.

Mr. MONCEL: What I really should get for you, you know, is the chap who wrote the paper.

Mr. MACALUSO: Well, you said that you wrote the paper, sir. It has all been very humorous, but I am afraid I am getting a little more serious at it. You have explained to us that you have been the architect of many of the plans—four plans. You explained to us that this is your paper, that you accepted it at that time, you believed in it when you presented it, and you still stand by every word that you said in it today.

Mr. MONCEL: That is right.

Mr. MACALUSO: So, I come back to that last paragraph again:

> In the final analysis perhaps integration is the wrong word altogether and it is "unification" of which we should speak.

That is one sense; that is why I am saying you are interchanging it. And then:

> —one force with many facets operating at the will of one commander in the fulfilment of one national defence policy.

And every time you refer to a defence policy in this paper, you are referring to the words which you used:

> —this policy was set out quite plainly in the Government White Paper on Defence 1964.

Is that correct?

Mr. MONCEL: I believe it was, sir.

Mr. MACALUSO: Well, then, in this paper, unless I read it wrongly—and I do not think I have been reading it wrongly because I have been going over it quite thoroughly today—you state to this Committee that we cannot fulfil our present commitments with one single force. This is what you have agreed with. And yet, in this paper, you state that you cannot fulfil those present commitments as outlined in the White Paper, which are the same commitments that we have today and which we had in the past. Therefore, in my mind, sir—and correct me in this—it is a contradiction. You are going full circle. You say we cannot keep our present commitments with one force, and yet you say in here we can keep those commitments and you are referring to commitments in the White Paper which have not changed. Is that not correct?

Mr. MONCEL: That is correct. With an integrated force of the right size and shape, I think you can fulfil the commitments. This is the essence in which I was writing. Then I went on to say—and I think you read it out five times for me—it may be that integration is the wrong term, and what we are really saying is unification.

Mr. MACALUSO: What you are saying, sir—those are your words. I want to get to page 9 again and I suggest, sir, with all due respect, that perhaps you are a little guilty of what you were preaching to the young officers at the time. You say:

> I must stress, however, that we must not allow integration to become our whipping boy. Far from being the cause of our troubles, it is their best cure.

And as I say, with all due respect, I believe from what I have heard today that you have been coming full circle, around and around and, in view of this paper,

that you are using the interplay of the term integration and unification as, perhaps, your own whipping boy. I agree with what Mr. Andras says; I also believe that there has been a complete flip-flop; a complete turn-around from your view when you gave this paper. Now, if you believed in these matters, as you state, at the time you presented them, and today you state that you still believe and stand by every word here, I also am at a complete loss to understand your change of mind. I feel that perhaps there is more behind it than what we have heard, and I would like to know whether this is or is not so. I, for one, am at a loss to understand that position.

Mr. HARKNESS: Churchill said, only God can give understanding.

Mr. MACALUSO: Well, Mr. Chairman, perhaps few of us are lacking in that regard. But certainly I am here to be able to understand and I hope the witness can clarify the situation, because certainly I do not believe it has been clarified to date. With due respect, General, I might say that a doubt has been left in this matter of the complete turn-around.

Mr. MONCEL: I see. Well, let me see whether I can clarify the doubts; that is really what I am here for. There has not been a complete turn-around. I have been accused of a lot of things in my life but never before of flip-flopping, whatever that means; it sounds very undignified.

Mr. MACALUSO: I do not mean to be undignified. Let us say you are on a merry-go-round in that regard. Is that all right? That is a more dignified term.

Mr. MONCEL: I will not levy that for a moment. I say it now, and I will say it again—what I wrote here, I believe. And in the particular sentence on page 9, if that is it, I am not using integration as a whipping boy. There was a tendency amongst a lot of people to do so, probably due to inability on my part to get the message across properly. You see what difficulty I am having with you; you can imagine doing it to a hundred thousand.

Mr. MACALUSO: I would say, with a few of us, General.

Mr. MONCEL: There was a tendency for a lot of chaps to blame all of our problems of the day on the advent of integration. What I was trying to say was that integration in itself was not to blame. The problems that we faced at that moment—and they were very real ones—were with us, in any event. They were problems that arose. We were much better able—much better able—under the integrated staff system, to solve these problems than we otherwise would have been.

Let me explain to you what I am trying to get at. We used to have a thing called the tri-services pay committee. We wanted to develop a modern pay system, a decent one. We still had chaps in the army, literally on high stools, scribing away with pens—five hundred of them, sitting here. As a soldier it disgusted me. I wanted to modernize the pay system, and we tried—I do not know for how long, I suppose it was 10 years—and every time I got up as far as the Minister or the Deputy Minister, with a solution, he would say: "Robert it looks great, go back now and sell it to the Navy and the Air Force." So, back we would go and we would start. They had ideas about pay too, and anybody would integrate their pay system with anybody else, provided they integrated with you. And it just was not going to happen. And when I say it was 10 years, I think it was longer than that—I think it must be 15 years—and we got nowhere. We had no decent equipment simply because we could not come to an agreed solution.

When I became Comptroller General, we formed one pay organization, and we sent the team around the world listening, and examining all the best pay systems in the world, and within 6 months we produced a pay system for the force which, I believe, is unchanged to this day, and the computer, I believe, has now been ordered and is coming in. And this is great, and this is what I was trying to say: our problems are with us, in any event, but with the integrated system in certain conditions, you are much, much, better able to solve them. We undid more tangles in this regard in a matter of weeks than we had done, or had been able to do, for months.

Mr. MACALUSO: I say in your example, sir, that you could have used the words "unified system" instead of "integrated system", just as easily.

Mr. MONCEL: With no problem at all.

Mr. MACALAUSO: I say that you are using both as the same term because on page 5 you state again:

> Not only have we accepted integration as a philosophy but we have introduced the modern management techniques which unification has permitted us to use.

Therefore, you can understand why I keep saying that you are using the terms integration and unification to mean the same thing.

Mr. MONCEL: Possibly in this context they could have been.

Mr. MACALUSO: Yes, possibly, as you wrote it. Now, may I ask on a further—

Mr. MONCEL: Did I clear your mind on what I tried to mean by the whipping boy?

Mr. MACALUSO: Well, to a certain degree, but it is not quite what I am referring to—

Mr. MONCEL: You are not satisfied?

Mr. MACALUSO: No, I am not, General. Let us get back to Mobile Command. Perhaps this has been stated before, but whose concept was Mobile Command in this system?

Mr. MONCEL: The original responsibility for it is mine.

Mr. MACALUSO: It is yours? We can say that you are the architect of it?

Mr. MONCEL: Yes.

Mr. MACALUSO: And being the architect of it, were you ever offered command of Mobile Command?

Mr. MONCEL: Yes.

Mr. MACALUSO: By whom?

Mr. MONCEL: By the Minister.

Mr. MACALUSO: When was that?

Mr. MONCEL: I cannot remember.

Mr. MACALUSO: Did you refuse to accept it, or did you agree to accept it? I gather you resigned, so you refused to accept it. Is there any particular reason that you could tell this Committee why you refused to accept the command of Mobile Command?

Mr. MONCEL: I have told the Committee that I had decided to leave the force.

Mr. MACALUSO: That is the only reason you refused to accept command of Mobile Command?

Mr. MONCEL: It was not a question; I was out of the force.

Mr. MACALUSO: Was this offered to you after you resigned, sir, or before?

Mr. MONCEL: No, you have got the wrong point. I left the force, as I told you, because I felt I could no longer loyally continue to do my duty.

Mr. MACALUSO: When was the offer made to you, before or after you put in your resignation, sir?

Mr. MONCEL: I think it was before.

Mr. MACALUSO: Before I am going to quote from a document which I will identify. I will ask you if you will agree with this, and I quote:

> The existence of three or more separate services in modern national defence forces is an illogical relic of the past perpetuated by inflexible thinking, vested interests and individual service fear of extinction.

And then it goes on:

> —modern conditions call for a single service.
>
> A clear distinction of roles for each service is no longer possible—the navy uses aircraft to support its surface and sub-surface operations, the army uses aircraft for transportation, observation and close support, and the air force requires both land and sea protection of its bases and supply routes.
>
> As time passes this overlapping of function continues to increase with resulting waste in research and development programs, manpower and time. New weapons and ideas which do not fit into old concepts of service functions increase this problem daily.
>
> The development of a single, unified service would lead to increased efficiency both in logistics and operations.

Did I read it too fast, or would you agree?

An hon. MEMBER: What are you quoting from?

Mr. MACALUSO: I will identify it. Would you agree or disagree?

Mr. NUGENT: It was identified before.

Mr. MACALUSO: Mr. Chairman, I would ask your protection from this inane badgering from the member opposite.

Mr. MONCEL: I think he went too fast for me to absorb it. I do not recognize this one at all.

Mr. MACALUSO: This comes from a document prepared by Captain J. G. Forth and which is also in the Canadian Army Staff College Journal (1959-1961) on the topic "Unification—Why, How, When".

Mr. MONCEL: By whom?

Mr. MACALUSO: Captain J. G. Forth.

Mr. NUGENT: Mr. Chairman, on a point of order. I thought from the way this question was put, and I am sure the witness did also—Mr. Macaluso very carefully laid the ground that way—that he was indicating to this witness, until he revealed the author, that this is something that he wrote—

Mr. MACALUSO: I will not even answer such a stupid remark.

Mr. NUGENT: I think it is only fair, when he is going to quote from a document, that we know the source so that we may all follow and understand it.

The CHAIRMAN: On that point of order; I cannot really accept that, inasmuch as he was asking whether the witness would comment on that statement that was made, and this is not unusual in this committee. We have had a number of such occasions before. He has identified the document—

Mr. MONCEL: I did not think that those were my words.

Mr. MACALUSO: I did not ask whether they were yours, sir; I asked if you agreed or disagreed with those words.

Mr. MONCEL: I would like to have it read again, now that I can put my mind to what you are saying.

Mr. MACALUSO: Does it make any difference whether they are your words or someone else's in order to agree or disagree with them?

Mr. MONCEL: It makes a tremendous difference.

Mr. MACALUSO: I think that is a complete answer in itself, sir. I will give you another quotation, this time from Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery, and I quote:

> If the United Kingdom were today a recently created state organizing her fighting forces it is inconceivable that they would be separated into three services.

Would you agree or disagree with that remark, sir?

Mr. MONCEL: I would disagree.

Mr. MACALUSO: You would disagree?

Mr. MONCEL: Sure. This is the same chap who said we should have all bachelors in the Army.

Mr. MACALUSO: It might be more fun, who knows? I would not know.

Mr. MONCEL: One of the cute little things they used to bring out all the time was the remark by this famous airman who said there should be one service. This was quoted ad nauseam until I tipped somebody off and said, "For God's sake be careful what you are saying, because what this chap is saying is there should only be one service and it should be the Air Force".

Mr. MACALUSO: I am only concerned with your answer to the Viscount's statement. I am only going to ask one last question. Getting back to your own paper, sir, you state:

> Integration means different things to different people.

Mr. MONCEL: That is very apparent.

Mr. MACALUSO:

> Clearly, the meaning we in the Canadian Forces ascribe to the word is something quite different.
>
> —in practical terms the process of integration can be but a means to an end and not an end in itself.

And you say further down:

> What, then, is this end that we seek? Expressed in the simplest terms it may be described as the ultimate in military efficiency in terms of Canada's Defence Policy—

Do you still stand by that remark?

Mr. MONCEL: Yes, sir.

Mr. MACALUSO: That is all I have, thank you.

Mr. LANIEL: General, many of my questions have already been asked. I do not say they have been answered but they have been put. I am neither a military expert nor a strategist, but I have been asking myself some questions on the end result of all this so far as military operations are concerned. I will start by referring to the White Paper where the priorities are laid down as to defence policies for Canada. Do you think from a military standpoint—not politically—that these priorities are of the type that could be met by a force the size of Canada? Are they met with the present set-up or were they met even before this time?

Mr. MONCEL: No, not really, because if I recall correctly we were invited to do everything we had been doing and, in addition, do these other things.

Mr. LANIEL: Do you mean that we should drop some of these commitments or some of these priorities?

Mr. MONCEL: I am not saying we should, I suggest you may have to. This is supposed to be a living document, you know; these priorities vary with the year, with conditions and with time, and what was valid two and a half or three years ago when this was written needs to be under constant review. This is where you must have the resources to adapt to these changing circumstances and, of course, the circumstances to which you can adapt are prescribed by the size of the forces you are prepared to support. If you have a fantastically large defence force, then obviously you can indulge in and enjoy a wide range of commitments. As your force shrinks in size, you become limited, politically, by the size of the force you have.

Mr. LANIEL: Did I hear you say that with a force of 150,000, we could then think of unification and the maintenance of our commitments?

Mr. MONCEL: No, I did not say that. I said to fulfil the roles as prescribed in the White Paper, by my estimate it would require a force of about 150,000 and a budget of $2 billion.

Mr. LANIEL: Even with the present set-up?

Mr. MONCEL: Yes.

Mr. LANIEL: But taking into account the fact that politically, this country is committing itself more and more to police force work, peace keeping, peace restoring and all that, and also taking into account the fact that the defence budget is a quarter of our annual budget and there is no tendency to increase that, how can we do this?

Mr. MONCEL: We cannot.

Mr. LANIEL: So, we cannot fulfil the commitments that we have put forward in the White Paper with the present force?

Mr. MONCEL: Strictly speaking, today it is down to what, 104,000.

Mr. LANIEL: From this I conclude that unification will not be the thing that will prevent us from fulfilling these commitments and reaching the—

Mr. MONCEL: Oh, it might well be. It might well be the kiss of death that will just make it absolutely impossible to do it.

Mr. LANIEL: I have never been in the field. I was in the Air Force during the war and then I went into anti aircraft after the war in the militia, so I did not get

very close to what was happening below, but I have been asking myself some questions and wondering what difference to our commitments will it make if we make our force more mobile and if we equip our Air Force with tactical planes?

Mr. MONCEL: Highly desirable.

Mr. LANIEL: And if we provide some available air and sea lift.

Mr. MONCEL: Highly desirable, but you do not have to unify forces to do these things.

Mr. ANDRAS: Mr. Chairman, would Mr. Laniel permit a supplementary question on this direct point at this stage?

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Andras on a supplementary.

Mr. ANDRAS: General Moncel, your recommendation that we have more tactical aircraft; your recommendation that the budget for defence be $2 billion versus the planned budget of one and one half billion and with the two percent escalation; your recommendation that the force be approximately 150,000 versus what the limits are now; how do you reconcile that again with this statement in your document, and I read from page 2 of the recommendations that you made:

> I have done this to stress the limitations which govern our capabilities and within which we must operate. Without these constraints my definition would be meaningless, for it would lead us into a never-ending effort to increase the size of the forces ad infinitum on the grounds that the more we have of everything the more capable we must become. I have no doubt that we would: but such an irresponsible approach can scarcely be regarded as a rational one. Unlimited expansion is simply not open to us; nor is it desirable. On the contrary, we must work within the quite finite limits which the Government sets from time to time both upon the manpower of the forces and upon the expenditures which they may make for materiel.

And yet your recommendations are to go up to 150,000 and $2 billion.

Mr. MONCEL: No, no, I did not recommend it, I said if you want to do what you say you are going to do, it takes a force of this size. This is a far different thing than recommending it.

Mr. ANDRAS: Then you go on to say, knowing that this is probably not possible:

> It is within the confines of these constraints and ceilings that we must bring the problem into focus and seek our solution.

And this leads into your paper on unification.

Mr. MONCEL: Sure. I suppose what I am trying to say here is that the government has given us a whole lot of things to do. We have been given a ceiling on manpower and we have been given a ceiling on money and what we have to put every effort into is in finding the most effective and best system to operate within these constraints. There is no point in saying, "If we only had this much more how much easier it would be". This is no solution. I believe I used the word irresponsible; I think it is an irresponsible solution.

Mr. ANDRAS: Yes.

Mr. MONCEL: I do not really see the connection between this and that.

M. ANDRAS: I simply say that you go on; that is the problem which you must meet.

Mr. MONCEL: It is.

Mr. ANDRAS: You say that this is the problem we must meet, we must confine ourselves within the limits.

Mr. MONCEL: That is right.

Mr. ANDRAS: Dollars and people, and we have to find a plan that is going to be the most efficient within it, and then you go on with what in my opinion is a recommendation for the program we have before us.

Mr. MONCEL: As a means of approach at that stage, it was.

Mr. ANDRAS: This is just a year ago.

Mr. MONCEL: Indeed, and it was valid, I would say, up until about seven months ago. The technique of doing it is a very different thing from weighing the commitments. Some day—and I have said this several times—you are going to have to face up to the fact that when you do a thorough analysis of this you are going to find that you do not have a sufficiently large force. The answer I got every time was, "Oh yes you are, go back and work it out again". Some day you are going to have to face up to reality. This is really your problem rather than mine; it is the government that commits us to these things, not the military.

Mr. LANIEL: I still ask myself questions about the point that I was trying to make earlier. We have our air division in Europe and it is committed to the role of strike reconnaissance. We also have a brigade which is part of a big force. Even if our brigade goes into an operation, it is going to be tactically supported by someone.

Mr. MONCEL: Yes.

Mr. LANIEL: I do not know anything as far as commitments and arrangements in NATO are concerned, but let us for the moment say that tomorrow Canada develops a tendency to drop out of the strike-reconnaissance role and uses its Air Force to give tactical support to the brigade. Someone else will do the strike-reconnaissance and we will take the place of someone else in the tactical support role. Is that not true?

Mr. MONCEL: I do not know if it is quite that simple.

Mr. LANIEL: Well, I do not know, I am asking you.

Mr. MONCEL: You see, it is a complicated question. We made a commitment to provide strike-reconnaissance forces and maintain them at a certain level and we have fulfilled this commitment. As far as I know, we are still fulfilling this commitment. If you want to change that commitment then we have a new set of factors. I do not think I would want to discuss whether or not you should change that commitment.

Mr. LANIEL: I do not want you to discuss that.

Mr. MONCEL: This is government policy which only those in authority can really sensibly discuss. As long as you have that commitment you obviously have to stick by it. If you want to change the commitment, then we have a new set of factors.

Mr. LANIEL: Yes, but, you see, according to the White Paper we seem to be trying to build up a small sized but a more flexible force in Canada, and to me this means that the Air Force can do more than strike-reconnaissance and the Navy can work more closely with some kind of a mobile force in its operations. I

see all three services working at some kind of a rotation basis. If we have two brigades out here and they are being trained to become more mobile, I assume that the men of that brigade, when they are rotated to either our main brigade in Europe or even to mobile command, will have a better general basic knowledge than someone who is just trained to be idle in Europe and is being used as a deterrent and waiting for the enemy.

Mr. MONCEL: I would not admit for a moment that the forces in Europe are idle, they do rotate. Every year about one third of that force is brought home and replaced by another part of what you described as the idle force here. This rotation takes place. If you follow the ten year pattern of an infantry battalion you will find that a chap will do about two years in Germany, he might do two years in Gagetown, a year out in Cyprus, right around the course. He gets a bit of everything.

Mr. LANIEL: Then what harm will unification do as far as that man is concerned?

Mr. MONCEL: This, I suppose, is one of my points. You cannot unify this chap. He is doing a specific military job and he does not need sailors or airmen to do this job.

Mr. LANIEL: You said that we have to stand by our commitments, but do you think the government should define or establish its priorities or its long-term defence policies only on the commitments? May it not also take into consideration the possibility of an alternation or a change in these commitments?

Mr. MONCEL: Oh, indeed, and I think the White Paper did this very, very adequately. It is probably the best statement of the Canadian commitments and undertakings that has ever been published. It says it very, very clearly and it also says that it is not immutable; this will be under constant review and it will change as it goes along. I think this is a good thing, as long as you do not try and interpret it too literally, you know. It is like everything else, if you want to take a legalistic approach to the thing.

I had a commander once during the war who did not last very long and this was his approach. Every time you gave him an order he wanted it all written down so he would know precisely what to do. The great problem with trying to write everything down, is that it is not what you write, it is what you do not write that matters. We are essentially trained, having been told the object of the exercise, to use our heads in an attempt to achieve it. The White Paper essentially states what the object is and essentially what we are trying to do in our own stumbling way, I suppose, is to produce the most effective and best defence force for Canada. We had no other object; there never has been one.

Mr. LANIEL: I conclude from what you have said that you are not against unification. You might have different feelings, but that is what comes to my mind. I am wondering what part of the challenge scared you that much? Was it personal feelings?

Mr. MONCEL: None whatsoever.

Mr. LANIEL: Or individuals?

Mr. MONCEL: I have no emotions. What I have attempted to say is that I was convinced if you were to press forward with this thing in the time frame that was required, a matter of six to seven months, that we simply could not do the staff work to bring it about. Besides this, there was still a great deal to be done

to think it through. We did not have a plan. As far as I can see, we still do not have one. It has become unification for unification's sake, I think.

Mr. LANIEL: Yes, but you must admit that there is a political problem involved because of the fact that two words were used, unification and integration.

Mr. MONCEL: I am terribly aware of it and I am terribly sympathetic.

Mr. LANIEL: There was a problem that came up which was plainly political; everybody was scared of unification, as the term was used—

Mr. MONCEL: I trust you are using that term loosely. No one was scared.

Mr. LANIEL: Well, they insisted there be an act of government before any further steps could be taken. This does not mean that the services will wear a new uniform tomorrow and everything will be very nice from then on and all the problems will be solved. The Minister said, as you did, that this plan is not immutable and it is not a blueprint; it should be used as a guide, not as a final blueprint.

Mr. MONCEL: It is the only way you can approach it. If you start to govern your entire life by attempting to interpret the full meaning of every sentence in this thing you can drive yourself up the wall and you will never get anything done.

Mr. LANIEL: The only thing I do not understand is that with your decisiveness, your experience, the way you express yourself and the leadership you evince, I ask myself why did you not stay in and implement this program?

Mr. MONCEL: Because I could not. As I tried to explain, I do not believe in it.

Mr. LANIEL: I am not sure about that. You have not made that clear. That is all.

Mr. ORMISTON: General, in your role as Vice-Chief of Staff, when you were supposed to escalate this unification, did you find yourself in the position where you asked yourself what would happen if you had to commit this unified force and how you would support it? We have always relied on our reserves in the past and would they not be placed in a very new invidious position if a force of this nature was committed without having tried and without having laid down any program for training reserve specialists to occupy the positions which would be knocked out? Did this not bother you to some extent?

Mr. MONCEL: Not really, no. I would not admit for a moment there was not a plan to train the reserves. I think the training of the reserves is in very, very good hands. The difference between the reserves in this context and the way that perhaps you and I used to know them is that when I joined up, if I remember rightly, the force was 2,476. Our whole being was motivated toward raising the reserves up to a fighting standard. This changed when we went into what was then popularly called the "forces in being" concept, and the government made a tremendous step when it went from the post-war force—just prior to Korea we were down to about three battalions, I suppose—and we literally doubled the force almost overnight and since then we have kept it up. The Army was around 40,000, 45,000, and at one stage it was 50,000 odd plus.

The whole purpose of this "force in being" was that so far as we could see—and who can really see—we could meet most of the foreseeable commitments with the professional soldiers and would not have to call on the reserves. This was the object of having standing forces. This is a fairly complicated

business, which everybody should know if they do not know. The fact is that we raised an expeditionary force and went off to fight and did relatively well. You must remember that we had a long waiting period during which that force really was built.

I do not know if any of you were in the abortive run into France in 1940. I was, and we came out of that with a great rush. This was a far different force than we brought back three and a half years later, believe me. I suppose what I am trying to say is that from the way things appeared it looked, with the standing forces which we had in peacetime, as if, along with the professional forces, we could meet, full-time all of the foreseeable commitments. Now, against the possibility of not being able to foresee everything and against the possibility of an expansion of the forces being required, I think we had laid adequate plans to bring the reserves into it. There is one trick, though; you have to make sure that you have sufficient equipment. There is no point in just raising the chaps and not having the gear with which to arm them. We simply did not have, and do not have, this kind of equipment.

Mr. ORMISTON: In these days of what you might call "instant war" can we depend on, say, 49 days training of a reservist to take the place of a fully-trained soldier in the event that he is required?

Mr. MONCEL: If that is what you want to do, you can take many, many civilian trades which are comparable to ours and replace soldiers within a matter of a couple of hours, in very large measure, and free soldiers to get on and do it, and I think this must be your first approach to it. Every soldier driver that we have in Canada could be replaced by a woman at once, pending the building up of more to go and this would free all those chaps to go off. We are a modern country and we do not have to start from scratch with a lot of these trades. We have a relatively highly sophisticated industry behind us. The problem, really, is the equipment rather than the men; equipment and time.

Now, what you and everybody else has to judge is whether you are going to have a conflict in which Canada's commitment would be greater than she could meet with her standing forces. The standing forces have been scaled to prevent this from happening. That is to say, that in conjunction with others we have sufficient forces in being and reasonably well equipped—although it is never properly equipped, we always like more—to meet this. But we were far short of being able to do a full-scale mobilization up to five or six divisions. This would still require a great deal of time and a great deal of equipment. I do not think you could ever make a case for having this kind of an immediate back-up. It would be terribly expensive and there have to be the restraints that I have tried to mention. You have to try to live within these things and do the best you can. It is a very difficult problem.

Mr. ORMISTON: I have an entirely different question, General. At the present time, under this unification scheme, how do you see the role of the conference of defence associations?

Mr. MONCEL: I would hope it would continue to play a very, very real and important part. Here again, the difficulty is going to be one of communications, and it occurs in exactly the same way as the more unified you get the more problems you are going to have in dealing with your allies and the more problems you are going to have in communicating with the defence associations, unless they also come into this scheme as a unified force.

Mr. ORMISTON: Are there any plans along those lines at the present time?

Mr. MONCEL: I do not know. You had better ask somebody who is doing them now.

Mr. ORMISTON: When you were in a position to know?

Mr. MONCEL: When I was there we had done the last major re-organization of the militia, and this was going to be it for a while.

Mr. ORMISTON: Thank you.

Mr. FORRESTALL: I just have one or two questions, General, because most of the ground has been covered. I wonder if I could ask a question which, in a sense, is supplementary to an area you got into earlier in the day when you were dealing with dollars and cents. I am rather curious about the fact that we are tied to what is known as a frozen budget with reference to our armed services. I gather, inasmuch as you were released on July 16, that you have now finished your sabbatical leave?

Mr. MONCEL: No, I have not.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Do you have much longer to go?

Mr. MONCEL: Yes. At the moment I am seconded to the Prime Minister's office, so my leave has been postponed. I do not finish my sabbatical until, I would think, about a year and half from now.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Then perhaps I should not ask you this question, and if you do not wish to answer it I will quite understand. I was wondering if, as an individual you believe first of all that this principle of a frozen budget is a viable one in terms of Canada's posture in the world today? Secondly, if you believe it should be frozen, should it be frozen in terms of its dollar content or in relation to our budget or to our gross national income, or some other such measuring device?

Mr. MONCEL: This is a very, very difficult question to answer. I certainly do not necessarily favour this idea of tying a defence budget to a gross national product. I think you have to tie your defence budget to your requirements. Despite what your gross national product is doing if, in the government's wisdom, they decide that their defence requirement is falling, well then, their defence budget should fall. By the same token, if in their wisdom they decide they need more defences, regardless of what the gross national product is doing, the defence expenditure must rise. Now, that is one side of it.

On the other side of it, the danger with the frozen budget is the present one, and when I left I think it was $1.5 billion in 1964, accruing at 2 per cent. The great difficulty with this was that the cost of most of the military hardware and our personnel costs, and everything like that, were rising annually anywhere from 10 to 15 per cent. Hence your $1.5 billion was depreciating at a rate that you could not afford. So, rather than being able to be progressive you were constantly, as you made your projection along the line of a fixed budget and you weighed the projection against the program, you are back to square one, they crossed over. What do you do when they cross over? You either cut the commitments or you increase the funds. This is nothing new. My goodness, we have been doing this every year for 25 years. Does that answer your question?

Mr. FORRESTALL: Yes, it does. Thank you. I did not mean to get you into an area, perhaps, that was a little touchy, because it is another area of decision. However, this leads me to one other question. Do you feel that it is just possible

in our deliberations in consideration of the bill as it is now before us that we have the cart before the horse and that possibly we should be considering in the open forum of the house or in the open forum of the country whether or not what unification would accomplish is—in terms of the military aspects of foreign affairs—what Canada should be doing or, indeed, what the people of Canada want our military to do or, conversely, is this basically a military opinion? Should the military advise the body politic on generally what our military role should be, or does it work the other way around? I recognize the ambiguity of that question.

Mr. MONCEL: I am not an expert on government procedure and who should do what to whom in this particular matter, but the traditional role of the military is to be responsive to the wishes of the government. This is the rule. Obviously they have a very real role to play in offering professional advice to those members of the government who are charged with the responsibility of that particular aspect of it and they do this in a very able fashion.

Mr. FORRESTALL: I gathered this, and the second part of it then is that you have expressed the feeling that possibly the White Paper, as a statement of current objectives is well written and well stated. It is one with which I agree. Are you suggesting to us—because this is the inference I have drawn—that possibly those objectives are out of date or out of tune with what is contemplated by the bill or what you believe in your professional capacity unification would permit us to do? Are our present commitments too extensive in terms of unification? I am just trying to put it the other way around.

Mr. MONCEL: I think our present commitments are too extensive, in terms of the effort we are prepared to put into the defence force, to fulfil the commitments properly. Like everything else, I think these commitments must be kept under constant review. I am certain the military are doing this and no doubt they are advising the people responsible for this of the problems involved. There is a limit to what you can do with so much. The great trick, I suppose, is to realize just how far you can stretch this.

Mr. FORRESTALL: But do you believe that we are doing enough?

Mr. MONCEL: In the defence field?

Mr. FORRESTALL: Yes?

Mr. MONCEL: I suppose it depends on what you want to do. I think if you can fulfil the roles that are stated in that paper that you will have made a very real contribution to our part in the world. This is a pretty ambitious program.

Mr. FORRESTALL: This is where I have conflict as well. I agree with the objectives set out in the White Paper but, like yourself, I am not at all certain about the capability of the—

Mr. MONCEL: Yes, this is a very real worry. Somebody has to face up to the reality.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Thank you very much, General.

Mr. MCINTOSH: General, I was very much interested in a statement you made a few moments ago. You were speaking of the second meeting you had with the Minister on unification and you said that it was at that time you got a glimmer of what he wanted. I am not being facetious in asking this question, but has that glimmer ever burst into a bright light? Did it dawn on you just what he wanted? Was that one of the reasons that you decided to retire?

Mr. MONCEL: No, it came more as a faint flicker rather than a bright light, and I waited impatiently for weeks to attempt to bet the light turned on so I could get on with it and find out what was required.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I think that is one of the problems we are having at the present time and it was one problem that we had with the Minister's speech. He went on at great length to assure us that our fears were unfounded. We thought there would be a change in the services and he said that this system will not be changed by reason of unification; we will certainly continue to have the infantry regiments, and so on. This was quite an assurance to me that there would be no change in our three forces as we know them. However, he ended that whole paragraph with these words, "Until the force structure within the united forces is developed". I cannot understand what he is trying to get at by unification, and so far I have not been enlightened. Now, to continue with what you said a few moment ago, you also said that the purpose of the White Paper is essentially to produce the best defence for Canada.

Mr. MONCEL: This was my interpretation of it.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Yes, and it is my interpretation as well. I was wondering about the formation of this new peace-keeping force. What role would this force have in the defence of Canada? Was it ever intended that it have a role in the defence of Canada or was it a force that we could dissipate for some other reason?

Mr. MONCEL: I think the word "dissipate" is possibly the wrong term. It was not so much a question of creating a force that would be used specifically for this purpose, I think it was mainly a question of attempting to equip a force so that we could be more quickly responsive to this type of demand, and at the same time have a force which could usefully fulfil our North American commitments, which are very real commitments.

Mr. ORMISTON: You also refer to commitments but maybe we should call it roles; the commitments or roles that we have now in *Nato, Norad,* and so on. Did you at any time discuss with the Minister the fact that we could opt out of any of these commitments that we have at the present time?

Mr. MONCEL: I will not discuss this.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Could I ask you if you now believe that the only defence that we then have for Canada is on a continental basis?

Mr. MONCEL: Do I believe this?

Mr. MCINTOSH: Yes?

Mr. MONCEL: Oh, goodness, no.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Do you believe that Canada could defend herself

Mr. MONCEL: No, no, no. I thought you meant by that that the North American continent, looked at as a continant, could defend itself and hence should withdraw to the continent.

Mr. MCINTOSH: No, the only possible defence for Canada now is on a continental basis, in alliance with some other country like the United States.

Mr. MONCEL: I think it goes much further than a continental, it goes on an international alliance basis.

Mr. MCINTOSH: But I was referring back to your statement, and you said the purpose of the White Paper is for the best defence for Canada and we are talking about our defence forces.

Mr. MONCEL: Yes, but defence, of course, takes many guises. I would say even the ill-fated international commission in Viet Nam, of which I was a part at one time, was in some way contributing to the stability and hence the defence of Canada.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Did you ever envisage at any time Canada opting out of these alliances

Mr. MONCEL: This would not be for me to decide; this would be for somebody else to decide after a great deal of thought. This type of thought is constantly being generated in the military, whether this is good or that is good, and it is reflected to the responsible people who can and indeed should make these decisions. I do not think I am competent to talk about it.

Mr. MCINTOSH: You would not care to suggest whether you would advise such an action or not.

Mr. MONCEL: No, I would prefer not to comment on that.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I had a lot of questions based on other testimony but most of them have been answered. General Foulkes in his testimony stated, "I cannot tell the difference between integration and unification." Now that has been the problem, I think, with a lot of the members as well as a lot of the witnesses.

Mr. MONCEL: Yes.

Mr. MCINTOSH: You mentioned in one part of your testimony today that integration was the first phase.

Mr. MONCEL: This was my understanding of it, yes.

Mr. MCINTOSH: The first phase into unification?

Mr. MONCEL: Into perhaps unification, but surely unification weighed against the commitments. You have to take a look at everything you do, every role or every commitment. You have to ask yourself if I unify this—if that is the term—will it make our participation in this particular role more effective? Now, if the answer is yes, then you probably have a good case to integrate or unify that particular function. If the answer is no, then you have to think seriously about it before you can say, "Well, let us unify it anyway." This is what I am trying to say.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I think we all have a different definition or understanding of the term unification. I will go back to the first question I asked you about that glimmer of what the minister wanted. Could you tell us briefly what you thought the Minister wanted by unification?

Mr. MONCEL: What I essentially got out of the meeting was that we did not want a system based on the army corps, we did not want a single uniform right throughout the piece, we did not want to lose any of the colour and we wanted a new name. That was about it, I suppose, boiled down to its essence. Obviously I had to go back to the drawing board. In my own silly way I thought that we wanted a unified force in the best sense and I suddenly find that you do not quite want that, you want to preserve the colour and traditions of the mess dress, Jack in the country, that sort of thing. So, as I say, back to the drawing board. So, to me it could not really bring the scheme to fruition in the organizational sense. Then when I was told that we were going to do it in a matter of months I simply said, "I cannot and, indeed, will not", and I did not.

Mr. McINTOSH: A former witness said that there was too much emphasis in Bill No. C-243 on tidy administration and not enough emphasis on the combat troops, do you agree?

Mr. MONCEL: Yes, indeed.

Mr. McINTOSH: That is the end of my questioning.

Mr. MONCEL: This is a terribly tender trap, and one which it is very easy to fall into in peacetime. It is terribly difficult to measure fighting efficiency, terribly difficult. You tend, if you are not careful, to lay too much stress on administration. I had a brigade down in Gagetown and in 365 days I was inspected administratively for 389 administrative days. This means there were two different types inspecting me at the same time on everything from the stamp account to the number of bootlaces I had. Not once in 18 months did anybody come down to see how I could fight. You know, you have to watch it; you can get off the track.

Mr. McINTOSH: This I think is what we are doing.

Mr. MONCEL: Well sure, terribly carefully.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. McIntosh has finished his questioning. It is 10 o'clock. Mr. Nugent and Mr. Macaluso are the final questioners.

Mr. NUGENT: I only have one question. I would prefer to wait until tomorrow, Mr. Chairman, for the very simple reason that I have traveled all night from the west and I really do not feel very sharp. I would hate to think that we have a good witness like this and—

Mr. MACALUSO: I am sure with your knowledge and understanding and comprehension—

The CHAIRMAN: Are you sure, out of consideration for the witness, that you would not like to question him now? He has appeared here voluntarily and he has given up his day so far. I do not know—

Mr. MONCEL: I have things to do. I would prefer to stay on and knock it off.

Mr. MACALUSO: Perhaps Mr. Nugent, as a courtesy to the witness, would finish his questioning this evening.

Mr. NUGENT: I want to clarify a few things, if I may. I know we have had much to say about the meaning of words, etc., but I have thought many times that we have not been precise enough or concise enough in our understanding. For instance, Mr. Laniel, in a question to you just a few minutes ago, mentioned that our present plans are not immutable. He was talking about the White Paper, but I would think that if you were talking about the present bill before this committee that that plan is immutable. Is there not a difference? What we have under this new bill is a firm stand committing us to one course of action, but the same cannot be said about the White Paper.

Mr. MONCEL: I cannot really answer that. I presume that the drafters of the bill had something in mind; whether it is immutable or not, I could not say.

Mr. NUGENT: I wonder if we can discuss this term unification for a little while. Certainly from some of the things you wrote and from your statement it appeared that it was at the last meeting of the defence staff with the Minister that you got a glimmer of what he meant by unification. Is it fair for me to conclude from your remarks that up until that time any use you made of the word unification was not likely to be what the present bill indicates as unification?

Mr. MONCEL: Oh no, I would not think that is fair at all. I foresaw the possibility, given time, that we might well be able, quite honestly and effectively, to bring into being what I understood to be the long range ultimate aim of the White Paper which was a unified force, and this could be done without any rancor, without any problems and when the situation would have been right and the definition and the design of the force that we were aiming for would have matched it, and it would have been just as easy as falling off a log. I was using the term unification in the sense of a single force. I go back to what I said previously, that if your commitments are such that it is proper to have a unified force, then unification is a good thing. However, you have to know what kind of a plan you want, and by drifting into it bit by bit defence staffs and the people concerned are now going to be faced with all kinds of the same problems that I was faced with in the initial days of the White Paper. A chap is going to catch you on one of your visits and say "What does it mean?", and somebody is going to be jolly hard put to explain it to him.

Mr. NUGENT: Even when we have the bill before us, General, with one unified force, and depending on the form and shape that the force will take, how it is drawn up, etc., when you look at that bill the word "unification" means several different things. Is that right?

Mr. MONCEL: From what we have gone through tonight I can see how it could, yes.

Mr. NUGENT: You have already told us that you were responsible for four different plans of unification. Is that correct?

Mr. MONCEL: Outline plans, draft ideas of how you could build a unified force, an architectural sketch, a rough idea.

Mr. NUGENT: Depending on which plan was followed, if any of them were, would you not end up with a different type of force for each plan?

Mr. MONCEL: Yes.

Mr. NUGENT: So that it would be fair to say, then, that even on the plans you drew each one had a different meaning for unification?

Mr. MONCEL: Yes, very likely.

Mr. NUGENT: And each one of these meanings received a different amount of support from you or your colleagues in defence staff?

Mr. MONCEL: Very much, yes.

Mr. NUGENT: You have told us, when it came to these plans, that they were yours, but I would like to delve into that just a little, if I might. Were each one of these drawn by yourself personally and are they all your own work?

Mr. MONCEL: In the major ones the essential drafting, yes. You have to do it yourself. The way not to do it is to haul in your wretched staff and say, "Give me some ideas". I think if you are going to run the thing you have to get the basic idea and then by all means turn it over to them to scratch it out and fill it out and put some flesh on the bones. If you do not do this you can never defend the ruddy plan.

Mr. NUGENT: You are responsible at least for each one of the plans?

Mr. MONCEL: I certainly do not deny responsibility for them.

Mr. NUGENT: How is it that you started out to draft these plans? Was it your idea that we should come up with some plans for unification or did you feel that

it was your duty to present this bearing in mind the sort of policy that was being pursued or that was being aimed at in the future?

Mr. MONCEL: It was really on the basis that there was so much talk that unification was coming much more quickly than we thought and this planning was within my purview, that it seemed to me I had bloody well better get at it and see what we can do to make these statements come true.

Mr. NUGENT: General, let me put it this way. As you were responsible for planning and it appeared that policy was going this way, then it was your duty to draft some plans to meet the foreseeable policy whether you believed in it or not?

Mr. MONCEL: This is right.

Mr. NUGENT: So, the fact that you drew up plans does not mean that you conceived the idea and presented it as the way we should go?

Mr. MONCEL: No.

Mr. NUGENT: I think you told us that of the four plans, apparently the one now being—and I say apparently—followed by the government is a plan that you rejected out of hand?

Mr. MONCEL: Yes.

Mr. NUGENT: Then a fair inference to draw from that is that of all the plans this one is the least suitable?

Me. MONCEL: I think so. It is in my opinion.

Mr. NUGENT: Can we follow this up a little bit, then. Among those people who were assisting you to draft it or whom you consulted and who played a part in it and who, like yourself, would be, shall we say, privy to all the considerations in weighing these plans, did you find yourself standing alone in that opinion?

Mr. MONCEL: No.

Mr. NUGENT: Did you have general support as to the possibilities of these plans?

Mr. MONCEL: Well, "general" is a pretty odd term. This thing never got really loose, this was an in-house plot that we were trying to work out. This never got published in the form of, "This is Plan A. This is Plan B". This is planning in its most elementary stage. It is simply to get the feel of what you are trying to do.

Mr. NUGENT: This is planning in its most elementary stage which takes place just a few months before we have a bill that commits us to setting up a force, General. Do you mean that that is the greatest extent of the planning that was produced before we presented this bill?

Mr. MONCEL: No, I cannot say that, because they have had six months since I left. I know that they have been working hard at it.

Mr. NUGENT: But so far as you are concerned, your opinion now is that the plan that they have been working on since you left, which is a plan that contained the best opinion you could get from all the help you had in your position of responsibility for planning, that of all the plans, if you wanted to do it, this was the worst.

Mr. MONCEL: Yes.

Mr. NUGENT: Have you had any reason to change your mind since?

Mr. MONCEL: No.

Mr. LANIEL: May I be permitted to ask a supplementary question? Did you read the bill ?

Mr. MONCEL: No, I only read the explanatory notes. The bill is not the plan, if you see what I mean.

Mr. NUGENT: If I might, I want to reiterate a couple of points for just a few minutes.

Because unification means different things depending on which plan you follow, any time that you used that term when you were talking about unification, integration, etc., was the term ever used with any conciseness?

Mr. MONCEL: No.

Mr. NUGENT: Was there any reason why Mr. Andras, for instance, referring to something you said a year ago where you used the term unification, should say that unification, as the Minister now envisages it, is what you recommended a year ago?

Mr. MONCEL: I did not recommend it.

Mr. NUGENT: A year ago you were not in favour of what he now envisages?

Mr. MONCEL: I never said this anywhere.

Mr. NUGENT: There has been no change in your attitude?

Mr. MONCEL: None, no.

Mr. NUGENT: Admiral Landymore said a few things and some of them have been referred to, but I thought by way of preface I would simply say that in the committee day after day we have run into this same difficulty, that not only are the terms integration and unification being very confused, it is obvious now that even when we use the term unification—and this applied at least until the bill came out, and even from the time of the bill it is not clear what unification means—we must be very careful to define the term each time we use it. Could I now use the term unification—as I think Admiral Landymore used it—as meaning a single unified force as you have described it and doing away with the three separate services, and would you then agree with this statement near the bottom of page one of his brief:

> Under questioning, the proponents of unification invariably fall back on the advantages of integration to support their stand. As far as I can determine, not one single argument indicates that unification will provide either economy or increased efficiency.

Mr. MONCEL: Do you want me to comment on this?

Mr. NUGENT: Yes.

Mr. MONCEL: You have to have a definition of unification. If you mean the unification of the internal communication systems, the signal systems—

Mr. NUGENT: Let me start with that, if I might.

Mr. MONCEL: If you mean that then Admiral Landymore is wrong, there were real economies effected in that.

Mr. NUGENT: Those are what he referred to as integration.

Mr. MONCEL: Yes, well, in that sense—

Mr. NUGENT: Unifying command, unifying the pay system; this was integration as he was using it.

Mr. MONCEL: Real savings.

Mr. NUGENT: A little later on he goes further in defining unification, and he deals with some of the steps of integration. The concept of unification that he used and which I think is accurate is that concept of unification, not as a step to integration but the necessity of wiping away three separate forces and having only one force as a necessary step in itself. Could you then agree with this argument?

Mr. MONCEL: Yes, if you take it in the context of our present roles and commitments. If you want to change the roles and commitments, I can design you a unified force that will do the job.

Mr. NUGENT: He presented one other argument on the urgency of adopting the Minister's present plan, and on page 10 of his brief he deals with several criticisms of integration:

> First:—Materiel Command is not living up to expectations.
> Second:—Training Command is a luxury we cannot afford.

And his last sentence in that respect reads:

> —has not been a success and should be reduced to functioning in relation to basic training and common training outside the purview of operational Commanders.

And then he details several cases where integration is not working up to expectations. My question is simply this. In relation to the steps toward integration that were taken and which you are aware of and which you so enthusiastically supported, do you have any reason to believe that all the planning was faultless and that all the refinements are in—

Mr. MONCEL: No. Goodness no.

Mr. NUGENT: Can you see any advantage that could be gained—even considering implementing some scheme of unification—or that we might get great benefit out of by stopping and studying integration steps for a while to see where we could proceed further?

Mr. MONCEL: Oh, I think there is a very real advantage in this, yes.

Mr. NUGENT: Do you agree with Admiral Landymore that in trying to implement unification—as presently envisaged—before we have worked out some of the bugs in the integration steps that have already been taken, that it will necessarily slow up the correction of some of the faults in some of the integration steps that have been taken?

Mr. MONCEL: Yes.

Mr. MACALUSO: Where does it state that?

Mr. NUGENT: It states that on page 10 of his brief. Would you say if it does slow up an existing fault that this is necessarily going to cost more money?

Mr. MONCEL: It is not going to cost any less.

Mr. NUGENT: Can you find any reason why any of the planners or proponents of unification, as envisaged in this bill, should feel that any possible benefits would not be so great if we wait a year or two, or even five years, to implement them?

Mr. MONCEL: I do not know why they are in such a rush. I think the greatest possible argument for not rushing the thing, and unfortunately it is getting late

now because there has been so much fuss made about it, but you may recall this afternoon I was speaking about this critical period between now and the 1970's. Had you shelved any talk of unification and the doing away with the three services as such, you could have—and we tried to do this, I suppose—salvaged the people who had been brought up under the old system and mined all these people out that you needed and kept their best output going until such time—they will all be gone in another five years—as the plan might have been stable enough, without this threat of unification hanging over their heads, to have pulled the thing through. I think this is the real thing. In my time, as long as you could produce the integration plans without even mentioning reception. As soon as you started to talk about unification,—if you did not have the answers to it—that is when you got yourself into deep, deep trouble with the troops. At least, I did. Perhaps that is why I was not very successful at it.

Mr. NUGENT: Do you feel that the present state of morale under this threat of unification is going to have an adverse effect so that even the attempts to repair some of the faults of integration this far are not going to be as successful as they would have been or go forward as quickly and smoothly as they could have?

Mr. MONCEL: It is terribly hard to say. All my wishes, all my hopes and all my prayers are that none of my fears will be realized. They have very, very able people doing this and I am hopeful, if they go through with it, that they can bring it off. From my point of view they will get every support I can give them.

Mr. NUGENT: One last question, sir. Do you think, from your knowledge of men and how they react and the confidence they have in their superiors, that it might be a general assist to morale and help the men to enthusiastically do what must be done in this program if the plan were to be delayed for a little while so they would have time to get used to it, to adjust to it, and to present it in a way they would have more confidence in it?

Mr. MONCEL: I do not know. It is a very, very difficult question. We have gone so far with this that it may be that if there were any indication now that they were going to stop it that it would just cause another schism in this whole business. If a number of senior officers have been saying that this is the answer, and if the government rules that this is not the answer and they are going to delay it, then presumably they would have to retire. Where do you stop? I really do not know the answer to that question.

Mr. NUGENT: Just for clarification of that, if I may, do you think it is quite possible that there are a number of officers who have refrained from retiring in the hope that it might be held up and they would not find it necessary to leave, as you did?

Mr. MONCEL: There might well be, I do not know. I cannot give you an answer.

Mr. NUGENT: Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Macaluso you have one question?

Mr. MACALUSO: Yes. I have added another one.

In each one of these four plans which you evolved, General, the end result ended up in a single force with a single commander, is that true?

Mr. MONCEL: A single Chief of Defence Staff, yes.

Mr. MACALUSO: Well, that is what we have now. But the end result was a single force with one commander?

Mr. MONCEL: Yes.

Mr. MACALUSO: I was very interested in your last remark about your hope that the present defence staff can pull off the plan that is put before them now and you seem to express a great deal of confidence in them, if I understand you correctly, and you give them every bit of support. I find in another statement that if it is not proceeded with it will cause a schism in morale, and everything else. So, I will ask you this. If you were the Chief of Defence Staff at this time and you had—

Mr. MONCEL: I would not have lasted this long!

Mr. MACALUSO: Well, let me finish my question, sir. If you were appointed to the position of Chief of Defence Staff at this time, in General Allard's place and you had a staff that was energetic and had drive and they came to you and said, "We have a plan—and we will assume that this is the plan—we want to go ahead with it, we are enthusiastic about it and it is government policy that this plan be put into effect", from what you have said now would you give thm the authority to go ahead with it?

Mr. MONCEL: I just do not know.

Mr. MACALUSO: It may be difficult for you to understand that you would make that answer, sir.

Mr. MONCEL: It is terribly difficult.

Mr. MACALUSO: Why would it be? You state that here is a plan and they come to you as their chief. It is your yes or no that puts this ahead.

Mr. MONCEL: Which plan?

Mr. MACALUSO: This present plan that we have in the bill. This present plan that is before them. They come to you and say that they are enthusiastic about it. You know they have the drive and you seem to have the confidence in the men there. They want to go ahead and they say, "We have a plan, let us go ahead with it." Would you "Yes, go ahead with it," or, "No?"

Mr. MONCEL: I cannot answer the question.

Mr. MACALUSO: That is very hard to understand.

Mr. MONCEL: You see, by the time you get a plan up to the chief in this business you do not suddenly surface one morning and say, "I have a plan." You talk this over—

Mr. MACALUSO: Well, let us assume that every step was taken, sir, but this plan is the one that came forward. It went through all the steps of screening, and so on, every step that has to be taken, and it came to you and your men wanted your final decision, would say, "Yes, go ahead", or, "No"?

Mr. MONCEL: I would want some more details, I think.

Mr. MACALUSO: I am saying assuming you had all the details, sir, and this was the plan that came forward.

Mr. MONCEL: Which plan?

Mr. MACALUSO: The one we are now discussing in the bill.

Mr. MONCEL: This is not a plan, this is simply a bill to amend a couple of acts.

Mr. MACALUSO: All right, then, the plan that has been forward by Air Marshal Sharp—

Mr. MONCEL: I did not see it.

Mr. MACALUSO: You did not see it?

Mr. MONCEL: No.

Mr. MACALUSO: You did not see the brief presented by Air Marshal Sharp or the brief presented by Air Marshal Reyno? You did not see the plan they set out before us at all? Then how could you come here and make statements on something you have not seen or heard?

Mr. MONCEL: I read Air Marshal Sharp's evidence.

Mr. MACALUSO: Where, sir?

Mr. MONCEL: In the minutes that were published.

Mr. MACALUSO: Well, the minutes had the brief that he presented to this committee printed as an appendix.

Mr. MONCEL: I did not hear it, I read it.

Mr. MACALUSO: Well, it is the same thing.

Mr. MONCEL: Yes. I wrote a good part of it, if I remember correctly.

Mr. MACALUSO: Fine, that even helps me. If that plan that he presented to us came to you as Chief of Staff would you give these men who want to go ahead with it the authority to do so or not?

Mr. MONCEL: If this situation had six months ago, which it did not, I would not have, no.

Mr. MACALUSO: Assuming you had been made Chief of Defence staff you would not have given the go ahead, is that correct? Is that what you are saying?

Mr. MONCEL: No. If I had been made Chief of Defence Staff and I was still Chief of Defence Staff, presumably things would be taking a different turn.

Mr. MACALUSO: In which way, sir?

Mr. MONCEL: In that if I was still Chief of Defence Staff we might not be presenting this plan.

Mr. MACALUSO: Let us not talk around it, sir. I am putting the factual point to you that this is what came up. These men are all enthusiastic about the plan as set out by Air Marshal Sharp and Air Marshal Reyno, and it was your decision, they come to you say, "Now, we want to go ahead with it, we are enthusiastic". They want to drive on to it and the decision is yours.

Mr. MONCEL: Yes.

Mr. MACALUSO: Then I assume that you would say, "No, do not go ahead with this plan".

Mr. MONCEL: No, I think the now vice chief and I have gone through this many times. I would have said, "Much of it looks good; back to the drawing board".

Mr. MACALUSO: So, I can assume you would say, "No", sir. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank you very much, General Moncel, for coming and also for staying so late. The committee is adjourned.

OFFICIAL REPORT OF MINUTES
OF
PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

This edition contains the English deliberations and/or a translation into English of the French.

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Translated by the General Bureau for Translation, Secretary of State.

LÉON-J. RAYMOND,
The Clerk of the House.

HOUSE OF COMMONS

First Session—Twenty-seventh Parliament

1966-67

STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. DAVID W. GROOS

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 23

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 21, 1967

Respecting

Bill C-243, An Act to amend the National Defence Act and other Acts in consequence thereof.

WITNESSES:

Air Marshal Clare L. Annis, O.B.E., C.D. and Air Vice-Marshal M. M. Hendrick, O.B.E., C.D.

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY
OTTAWA, 1967

25814—1

STANDING COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. David W. Groos

Vice-Chairman: Hon. Marcel Lambert

Mr. Andras,	Mr. Hopkins,	Mr. Macaluso,
Mr. Brewin,	Mr. Langlois	Mr. MacRae,
[1]Mr. Churchill,	(*Chicoutimi*),	Mr. McIntosh,
Mr. Deachman,	Mr. Laniel,	Mr. McNulty,
[1]Mr. Fane,	Mr. Latulippe,	Mr. Nugent,
Mr. Forrestall,	Mr. Legault,	Mr. Rochon,
Mr. Foy,	Mr. Lessard,	Mr. Winch—(24).
Mr. Harkness,	Mr. Loiselle,	

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

[1] Replaced Messrs. MacLean (*Queens*) and Ormiston on February 21, 1967.

ORDER OF REFERENCE

HOUSE OF COMMONS,

TUESDAY, February 21, 1967.

Ordered,—That the names of Messrs. Churchill and Fane be substituted for those of Messrs. MacLean (*Queens*) and Ormiston on the Standing Committee on National Defence.

Attest.

LÉON-J. RAYMOND
The Clerk of the House of Commons.

25814—1½

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

TUESDAY, February 21, 1967.

(41)

The Standing Committee on National Defence met at 10:05 a.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Groos, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Andras, Brewin, Deachman, Forrestall, Foy, Groos, Harkness, Hopkins, Lambert, Langlois (*Chicoutimi*), Laniel, Legault, Lessard, Loiselle, Macaluso, MacRae, McIntosh, McNulty, Nugent, Rochon and Mr. Winch—(21).

Also present: Messrs. Bell (*Carleton*), Churchill, Fane, McCleave and Mr. Richard.

In attendance: Air Marshal Clare L. Annis; *From the Department of National Defence*: Air Marshal F. R. Sharp, Vice Chief Defence Staff.

The Chairman introduced the witness, Air Marshal Clare L. Annis. Air Marshal Annis outlined his Service career for the Committee and made an opening statement. The witness answered questions during the remainder of the sitting, with particular reference to such subjects as the integration of the Technical Services Headquarters Organization, logistics support and procurement policy.

The questioning of the witness continuing, the Committee adjourned at 12:30 p.m., until 2:30 p.m. this day.

AFTERNOON SITTING

(42)

The Standing Committee on National Defence met at 3:35 p.m. this day, the Chairman, Mr. Groos, presiding.

Members present: Messrs. Andras, Churchill, Deachman, Fane, Forrestall, Foy, Groos, Harkness, Hopkins, Lambert, Langlois (*Chicoutimi*), Laniel, Legault, Lessard, Loiselle Macaluso, MacRae, McIntosh, McNulty, Nugent, Rochon and Mr. Winch—(22).

Also present: Messrs. Chétien, Kindt, Mackasey, and Mr. Régimbal.

In attendance: Air Marshal Clare L. Annis; *From the Department of National Defence*: Honourable Léo Cadieux, Associate Minister; Air Marshal E. M. Reyno, Chief of Personnel.

The members continued the questioning of the witness, Air Marshal Annis, throughout this afternoon sitting.

At approximately 5:55 p.m., the Committee completed its questioning of the witness. The Chairman, on behalf of the members, thanked Air Marshal Annis for his appearance before the Committee in connection with *Bill C-243*.

The Chairman read a telegram dated February 20, 1967, addressed to the Clerk, from Rear-Admiral W. M. Landymore. The Committee agreed to table the telegram (*Exhibit 2*).

The Committee adjourned at 6:00 p.m., until 8:00 p.m. this day, when the witness will be Air Vice-Marshal Hendrick.

EVENING SITTING
(43)

The Standing Committee on National Defence met at 8:10 p.m. this day with the Chairman, Mr. Groos, presiding.

Members present: Messrs. Andras, Churchill, Deachman, Fane, Forrestall, Foy, Groos, Harkness, Hopking, Lambert, Langlois (*Chicoutimi*), Laniel, Legault, Lessard, Loiselle, Macaluso, McIntosh, McNulty, Nugent, Rochon and Mr. Winch (21).

Also present: Messrs. Chatterton, MacInnis and Nasserden.

In attendance: Air Vice-Marshal M. M. Hendrick; *From the Department of National Defence*: Honourable Paul Hellyer, Minister; Honourable Léo Cadieux, Associate Minister; Air Marshal E. M. Reyno, Chief of Personnel.

The Chairman introduced Air Vice-Marshal M. M. Hendrick, who outlined his Service background and then made an opening statement.

The Committee questioned Air Vice-Marshal Hendrick for the remainder of this evening sitting, on a variety of defence matters in relation to Bill C-243, under consideration.

The Clerk was instructed to obtain copies for the past month of a daily communiqué for serving personnel, issued by the Directorate of Information Services, Canadian Forces Headquarters. The Clerk was also instructed to obtain copies for the members of a Ministerial letter dated Apri 2, 1964 entitled *To All Members of The Armed Forces and Employees of The Department of National Defence.*

The questioning of the witness was completed at 10.30 p.m. and the Chairman thanked Air Vice-Marshal Hendrick for his appearance before the Committee. The Committee adjourned until 3:30 p.m. on Wednesday, February 22, 1967, when the witness will be Lieutenant-General F. J. Fleury.

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

EVIDENCE

(*Recorded by Electronic Apparatus*)

TUESDAY, February 21, 1967.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, we have a quorum. Our witness this morning, Air Marshal Annis, has responded to our invitation to appear. He will answer any question members of the Committee wish to put.

Mr. WINCH: May I ask, Mr. Chairman, if the Air Marshal has a brief or if he has any comments to make before questioning.

Air Marshal C. L. ANNIS: No, Mr. Winch. I have never been to such a hearing before and I do not quite know how you start. I understood that it was proposed that I give a résumé of my career, and it has been suggested that if I made a short statement at the begining it might simplify or provide a basis for further questioning. Would that be satisfactory. I am at the disposal of your Committee.

Mr. WINCH: If there is no brief perhaps a statement by the witness would be helpful. I always have felt this way.

The CHAIRMAN: Other witnesses who have appeared before us have given a summary of their experience and career, and I know this would be helpful to the Committee. Air Marshal Annis, you may begin.

Mr. ANNIS: Mr. Chairman, I would like to begin by saying that I was invited. I have no thundering great desire to air my views. I did not ask to come, but having been invited I am delighted to be of whatever service I can be to the Committee.

In so far as service history is concerned, I am a mechanical engineer from the University of Toronto. I trained to be a pilot, starting in 1936. During the second World War I served rather extensively on anti-submarine operations and for a period I was Director of anti-submarine warfare at Air Force Headquarters. I then went to Bomber Command, did a tour there, and then returned to Toronto where I was the first chief instructor of the RCAF Staff College. I set it up on its postwar six months and one-year long courses. Then I went to Air Force Headquarters as Director of Operations, and up to the Director of the Joint Staff.

I worked under Mr. Claxton for two years, acting as secretary to the Chiefs of Staff and Director of the Joint Staffs at that period. Then a year at the Imperial Defence College; acting Air Officer commanding, Air Defence Command, for a year; Chief of Telecommunications at Air Force Headquarters for two years; Air Officer Commanding Air Materiel Command, until 1962. I returned to Air Force Headquarters as Vice Chief of the Air Staff, and on the first of August, 1964 I was appointed Chief of Technical Services for the Canadian Defence Forces.

I retired on May 28, 1966 because of having reached compulsory retirement age.

As Chief of Technical Services the major areas over which I exerted my management covered the fields of development, engineering, procurement, supply, maintenance, transportation, communications, electronics and construction engineering for the Canadian forces.

I would like to suggest to the Committee that this technical services area is perhaps the most fundamental of all in importance in answering the question of whether or not integration and eventually unification can be achieved.

I took this job as Chief of Technical Services when it was offered, and I would like to base most of my opinions on the experience acquired during that period, if I may. When offered the job I accepted it because, like a great many other officers in all of the services, we had for a long time been very conscious that there was much duplication among the three services in the matter of the supporting services—the supporting career field, supply, medical services, public relations, and all that type of thing having to do with the non-combat field. The great debate among chiefs of staff and would-be chiefs of staff was whether or not a service chief could yield up direct control over his supporting services and still have an efficient service. Each chief tended to claim that unless he had direct control of his own supporting services, he would not get the professionalism peculiar to the environment, the devotion or the rapidity of response. This has been the argument all along against integration.

I, along with many others, as I said, was conscious of this and felt that there was a need to experiment and see as best we could what was the truth. The case was put up, more or less, that Canada was in an ideal situation for conducting such an experiment, being, as we were, large enough in our forces and in our commitments that our experiences would be of real interest to the larger other powers, yet we were small enough and our commitments in defence of the western world were not so important that if our experiment failed, it would not be disastrous.

I was led to believe that the approach would be a relatively cautious one, akin to how a normal experiment would be conducted, step by step, consolidating each step as a success was achieved—and if there was success, then move forward, with unification the ultimate possible goal, but not necessarily the goal, with a willingness to turn back or to halt when it seemed apparent that a safe distance had been reached.

In case you ask me what I felt when I left, I left in a sense of frustration. I felt that we were going too far too fast and were not taking the necessary precautions of examining and consolidating as we went. Also, the task of integration had proven an immense extra commitment. We were in effect, being asked to try to stick a size 11 foot into a size 7 shoe in a very short period of time without breaking the boot. It was in a sense an exercise in the impossible within the framework of the commitments at the time and the manpower and other factors.

To disgress a little bit, I said earlier I felt that the ability to integrate and perhaps to unify the supporting services in one area in which success had to be achieved in order to make unification possible. The other, I think, is at the very

top of the services—the question of integration or unification of the top command.

There are just about two comments I would like to make, and perhaps that is all I am qualified to make in this connection. I think there is in the present structure a real weakness; that is to say, the Defence Council at the moment comprises a minister and an associate minister sitting at the head of the table, a chief of defence staff and a vice chief of defence staff and usually a third three-star officer of the missing service. I think it is important to recognize that the Vice Chief of Staff is at Defence Council not because he is Vice Chief but because he wears a uniform of different colour to the Chief, and the third officer is there because he wears a still different uniform, representing a different professional background. The purpose ostensibly, it is said, is to enable the Minister to get direct advice on the three environments. This is true, but it produces a very awkward situation. You will recognize that all major matters are first discussed in committee presided over by the Chief of Defence Staff. The same officers have the opportunity there to put forward their views in order to reach a military decision on what will be recommended to Defence Council. There those same officers have put forward their views as heads of the particular branches of Canadian Forces Headquarters, and the Chief has made a decision in his mind eventually what recommendation he will make to the Minister at Defence Council.

In meetings of the Defence Staff on many occasions—perhaps most—there is rather sharp differences of views among the officers giving advice to the Chief of Defence Staff. Nevertheless, when the Chief has made a decision that binds all. When we reappear in Defence Council, the lid is lifted off again. An officer who has failed in his advice to the Chief of Defence Staff is invited literally to give his views independently of what the Chief's views are. This puts the Chief in an extremely difficult position and certainly complicates his relations with his senior officers. It is rather saddening for a branch chief, as I was, to see the difficulties into which the Chief of Defence Staff is put by this situation. I do not know what a Minister would think if the Prime Minister had a meeting on a subject and had, along with the Minister, his two other principals, and by-passed the Minister and put all of them on equal status in giving opinions when the final decision was made. It is analogous to that sort of situation. You can judge the embarrassment in which it places a Chief of Defence Staff and his principal officers.

Another matter that has troubled me for a long time is what seems to be the principal accusation that has been made by politicians in general, if you will forgive me, against the utility of the Chiefs of Staff organization, in that, it produced unacceptable amounts of service rivalry. I think this accusation is unfair and rather specious.

As I mentioned, I served for two years as director of the Joint Staffs; working under Mr. Claxton. I have always felt that the Chiefs of Staff did not want to fight over roles and slices of the defence budget, but by its own action the government forced them to compete. In effect, each year the government flung onto the table an allocation for defence, a billion and a half dollars, $1.8 billion and this sort of thing, normally with only very limited guidelines to policies, and thus put the Chiefs in the inescapable position of having to compete. The rules were more or less: May all three chiefs get a share but the man with

the best case gets the biggest. I think it very much within the capability of government to set defence policy much more completely than was ever the case when there were three chiefs of staff, and thus spare the chiefs from having to engage in sharp rivalry. I believe our governmental performance was the basic shortfall, not the chiefs of staff organization per se.

To give a summary of my views, just what they are without necessarily explaining why, I would be willing to answer and give examples as to why. I believe that on the empirical evidence thus far available, as the result of our integration experiment, does not let justify that a jump now into unification would be a successful venture unless we are satisfied to accept a lot of limitations. I think that one of the limitations would be that the viability of any unified defence force would depend on the continuing existence in the United States of three separate services. I really think the same thing holds true of the United States marines. It is only the existence of the United States navy, United States army, and the United States air force as separate entities that makes possible the basic technologies and professionalisms in weapons and tactics in the environments of sea, land and air which makes the United States marine corps possible as a meaningful triphibious force. I think that statement is pretty well incontestible.

I think that unification, certainly at this stage, without a lot more preparation, could be achieved but it would mean destroying most of the combat capabilities and versatilities now, or at least until recently, existing or inherent in the Royal Canadian Navy. I think it would mean destroying in the longer term the ability of the unified force to retain a meaningful air combat capability or, in fact, any significant combat capability except for ground attack.

I had some beliefs as to what is the better course of action but I do not think this is the place or time to air them.

The CHAIRMAN: This is something that may be brought out later on.

Mr. ANNIS: Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. While I do not think there is yet sufficient favourable evidence to justify totally abolishing the three services, I do believe integration is the right direction in which the service should be moving and pressing their research to move further.

In the matter of opinion within the services—there has been quite a lot of it—I think if a free vote was taken among just those now serving in the actual combat career fields—I mean the actual weapons operators, the hard core of the military; in the navy the deck officers and men who fight; in the army, the infantry, the artillery and the armour, and in the air force the combat air crew, not the transport air crew who have a somewhat softer life—plus those career fields which actually put their hands on the weapons design and maintain war ships, battlefield weapons and combat aircraft—let us say, if we took a free vote among the teeth, I think that it would be very much against unification.

These people are the true professionals of the environment in which each is trained to do combat. They are the fish, the birds, and the beasts. The colour of the uniform worn in each case is the traditional colour of the environment to which he is emotionally and professionally attached and to which the colour of the uniform signifies his profession.

On the other hand, a free vote among all those engaged in the remainder of the supporting career fields, that is to say, supply, accounting, medical, transpor-

tation, public relations and so on, would I believe result in a strong majority in favour of unification. For a variety of reasons, which I will not go into, these supporting services or tail would gain a great deal in many ways. In any over-all vote among all service personnel, I suspect the majority might even favour unification. This is because in our present forces the tail tends to outnumber the teeth.

Thus, I believe our Minister may be correct when he suggests that unification has large popularity within the Canadian forces. However, I believe this popularity is to be found predominantly among the tail. It has been argued that very great amounts of integration are possible among the career fields which support the teeth—that is to say, among the non-combat career fields—which great savings in manpower without loss of efficiency, quality and promise of support to the various types of combat units and formations. I agree that there is very considerable potential in this direction, indeed. But based on my experience, as Chief of Technical Services, it is very much less than any casual examination would lead one to suspect. In general, it is these various supporting services themselves who give the optimistic estimate of it. In my opinion, they tend to be substantially over-optimistic. The basic reason is, of course, that it is very much in their self-interest to do so—and I can give you examples. I think it is important that you should insist on examples as a result of a statement like that.

As a sort of summary of summary of my views, I believe it would have been quite possible to go down the road toward unification a long way, perhaps eventually even to unification itself, without all the internal turmoil and hardship which the services have had to endure over the last two years, if we had been allowed to handle the immense additional burden which has descended on the services as a result of this integration exercise at a pace and, with the resources compatible with what has been demanded. The result has been severe over-loading to the point that great hardships have been imposed on most of those in the services, the great majority of which I believe were not really necessary. Word of this has of course, spread widely and I am saddened to think that other nations which might have embarked on integration programs of their own may now recoil from doing so because of the rather bad reputation I fear our Canadian conduct of this experiment has acquired. If so, it is a pity because as I said at the start, integration is certainly the right direction for the services to be moving and they should be kept pressing to carry it as far as they can sensibly go. I would be happy to go on to unification if only we could follow a relatively safe path into it and be fairly sure before we jumped that we will land safely. That, Mr. Chairman, is all I have to say on my own initiative.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Lambert is the first on my list.

Mr. LAMBERT: Air Marshal Annis, starting back with the date of Bill C-90, with its effective date of August of 1964, the getting together of the new branch heads and the planning for integration, then the getting together of the functional commands, could you tell us in your estimation whether integration kept on at an even keel and proceeded properly and if not, where did it get out of step? Is there any particular sector where you feel that integration as such has gotten out of step, bearing in mind what you have just now said too about the speed with which integration went forward.

Mr. ANNIS: Mr. Lambert, if I may, I will reply strictly on my experience as Chief of Technical Services, the impact there and where we broke down. Essentially, as I interpret matters, the Minister promised the public that he would lop off one third of the headquarters staff at Canadian Forces Headquarters first. At the same time he would increase the procument of capital equipment by a substantial amount. I think it was 20 per cent—that sort of figure which was mooted.

For us in the technical services, it meant that we had to be prepared to increase our activities in the design, development, procurement, supply and what not field, in order to bring this new equipment in—this proportional increase of staff, and at the same time reduce our manpower, and especially our senior most experienced manpower by 30 per cent, and in addition, accept the enormous task of reorganizing the technical services. I believe the technical services was around 60 per cent of the total Canadian forces—a mixture very heavily infused with the civilian element as well. We organized at that stage—in the beginning—in a totally different way. Our first problem was to find the manpower to be set aside to do the studies because it was very complex: there were numerous studies required and these were of a nature that demanded our best minds. At the same time we were being confronted with the task, as I have said, of increasing our technical activity very substantially and keeping going, like we had, the existing people who were deployed all over the world—continuing our support of them, and finally doing it with less men by quite a margin. This is where our problem began. We just did not have the manpower to carry us over the reorganizational hump onto the other side.

Mr. LAMBERT: As a result of these problems in integration, what is your opinion of Canada's capability today in the event that a crunch were to come off—that we had to move into gear because of some crisis. Would our supply services be in a position to equip and maintain, shall we say, the fighting team?

Mr. ANNIS: In a crunch?

Mr. LAMBERT: Without, say, almost a year's notice or something like that. What would be the response or the degree of response of our technical services to an emergency?

Mr. ANNIS: It is sort of hard to estimate. They would work like thieves to accomplish it; they would break themselves, if necessary, to do it. How much they could do—they are in a very awkward position now. It is very awkward posture to pick up a surge type of load and digest it, certainly without reverting back to full-scale operations—abandonment for the time being of their studies and those people employed on studies of a new posture, and reversion to the three single service system which are, in fact, still in being and will have to remain in being, I would judge for another four or five years yet. The new system is not yet designed; it is a monstrous task that they have taken on—a monstrous task. Believe me, it is a monstrous organizational and programming task for computer systems. The existing service systems are continuing—they are carrying the supply to the existing forces, which a study group is working on a new system to be introduced, which will be common to all three services. The real problem for them is going to come when they try to introduce that system. If you take away a great proportion of those who are running the existing three systems to train them, and then introduce the new system, and

at the same time not permit our forces in the field to starve for lack of supply and maintenance materials—

Mr. LAMBERT: On the basis too of, shall we say, the government's intention of having unification, in the narrow sense, come off, this would be an added burden.

Mr. ANNIS: It would greatly exacerbate the situation undoubtedly, yes. It is another organizational jump of sort of quantum size.

Mr. LAMBERT: In your opinion, can the forces stand this.

Mr. ANNIS: Mr. Lambert, I think they can stand anything. They are trying their best. It was my experience, up until I left, that they were trying their best to achieve as much integration as possible. They are conscientiously trying. They regard it as an experiment and at the moment they are, in a sense, disorganized because they are organized to conduct an experiment.

Mr. LAMBERT: What I am concerned about is that degree within integration. But then, are they in a position to stand unification on top of this.

Mr. ANNIS: Not without further disruption. It is, itself, an additional problem, yes.

Mr. LAMBERT: What effect will this additional disruption have on the efficiency and viability of our Canadian defence forces.

Mr. ANNIS: I can only guess. I know no better than anyone else, but it would be a very difficult position. What men can do in an emergency is remarkable. If we had a real emergency appear on the horizon I guess we would reorganize quickly in some direction and posture deemed most applicable to the situation and probably accomplish a great deal. But it would probably be a lot less than we would have been able to accomplish had we not been in this disarray at the beginning of a hypothetical crisis.

Mr. LAMBERT: May I briefly turn to one other point which you have made, namely in connection with your criticism of what I felt was an over-emphasis on the competition between services for equipment, men and their positions. You definitely stated that it was because, shall we say, the procedure which was adopted, that the government merely deposited on the table the pie. They indicated the size of it, and then it was up to the services to sort it out because there was very little in the way of guidelines or determination of defence policy.

Mr. ANNIS: Yes.

Mr. LAMBERT: You have diagnosed the trouble. This is a point which has concerned me a great deal. I do not think myself that it has been cured under this reorganization, and I would like to have the benefit of your views in this regard—you having experienced it, being at the top.

Mr. ANNIS: I witnessed this for quite a few years because I was at air force headquarters for an astonishing proportion of my career, and I was acting as Chief of Air Staff during the period of the autumn of 1963. By this time a lot of the guidelines of the White Paper which had not yet been published were available to the chiefs. It was one occasion when we had a lot of guides. I was impressed with the ease with which the other two chiefs and myself as acting chief, were able to arrive at a program without having a fight, without having to

compete with each other, without having to rush into a closed room and work on a scheme that would give us the best presentation to the Minister or to the chiefs in order to win a bigger slice. We had had opportunity on occasion to work from a set of guidelines given to us. I had not seen this quality of guidance given ever before—dating back to 1949-1950, the Korean war days. I felt that the Chiefs of Staff Committee, had they been in existence still, certainly that year would have escaped criticism of having competed with each other and had the word of their competition flow back down the line to the midst of their respective services.

Mr. LAMBERT: Outside of the provision of an annual white paper which, in essence, is produced also by the services, do you think one could set up an organization to give you these guidelines—and this is coming from the top, from the civilian side.

Mr. ANNIS: Mr. Lambert, I think the answer is Yes. A great deal of the chiefs' competition was over the supporting services—the money for them and their activities. To move over to sort of a positive approach, rather than criticisms.

I would feel that, first, we should take in the integrated commands—they make excellent sense, each with a mission or group of missions: mobile, maritime, air defence, materiel.

Secondly, I would feel that we should re-establish the chiefs with just the hard core forces—the actual combat personnel, and give them a clear field and those who actually design, develop and maintain those weapons and, perhaps, a very limited number of additional type of supporting devices—a very intimate type.

Third, I think we should limit their roles and responsibilities very much like the Americans have done. I have lamented that the work of the Americans who have done so much study of integration, so much work on it and are so far ahead of us in this, has still been ignored up here in Canada. First of all, all American commands are integrated—every one, and no chief of any United States force has any command or control over any combat force. His role is strictly to procure, equip, train and furnish to the integrated command personnel and equipment ready to be trained into combat and carried on in. I think that is the sort of responsibility our chiefs should have, to procure, equip and train and hand over to our integrated command—our own or international integrated commands—such personnel and equipment in such a state and I think this is very logical. In fact, this is what we do in air division—in the brigade. As a nation, we furnish to SACEUR forces which are properly equipped and then they go on into integrated training as an integrated team there. It is somewhat similar in NORAD.

Fourth, I would suggest that we experiment thoroughly with integration of the supporting forces including performance tests—and I could talk about that for quite a while because it is very important. And having experimented thoroughly with how far one can go with integration of the supporting forces and whether or not in an integrated form they can give adequate response to the chief of naval, army or air, in their combat roles, then make a decision of whether to go on to unification. I still think unification might be possible—it could very well be—but we do not know.

Mr. LAMBERT: Sir, where would you envisage the position of the chief of each of the services within the present framework? I know what you are getting at and what some other witnesses have said. There is nobody to speak for the army; there is nobody to speak for the air force, and there is nobody to speak for the navy.

Mr. ANNIS: That is true.

Mr. LAMBERT: No senior officer as such.

Mr. ANNIS: As a chap who is responsible for combat, which is all the services exist for. That is all they exist for really. One hopes not to use them that way but that is what they exist for.

Mr. LAMBERT: Well, somewhere along the line there is some difficulty in respect of fitting them in but I do not think it is here. Really what I was getting at was the organization which would give the chief of defence staff and the chiefs of branches their guidelines. I am speaking really now of policy set down by government.

Mr. ANNIS: Yes.

Mr. LAMBERT: Is it through a fully-fledged defence council on the pattern of the British? Is it perhaps a much stronger component of civilians completely detached, in the minister's office, or is it a beefing up of the facilities available to the cabinet defence committee, or just at what level?

Mr. ANNIS: I am only worried, as a military officer, about the quality of military advice given to the cabinet. That is our task. We give our best military advice and we know that external affairs and other departments will put in theirs, that the cabinet will meld it and make a policy decision which will come back and which we will obey. This is our training; this is our belief.

In so far as the military organization is concerned within the Department of National Defence, I visualize still a defence council with a minister, of course, as president or chairman, chairman chiefs of staff and three chiefs, in this limited way I have described. One of the criticisms of the chairman, chiefs of staff, erstwhile, was that he lacked power. He lacked adequate authority. One of the ways, I think, is to give him control of the supporting services. That sure is giving him power because the capabilities of the combat forces depend almost totally, so enormously, on the availability and capabilities of the supporting force. I think it is a very useful role for the chairman, chiefs of staff to perform. The wide allocation of supporting forces in combat or against future postures to the respective services or environment is a matter of very, very senior judgment. But essentially, to answer your question, again very briefly, it is a minister, a chairman, chiefs of staff and three chiefs as the basic body advising cabinet, or cabinet defence committee or the like.

Mr. LAMBERT: But where is the authority? Is it the minister, as it stands today, or is it a defence council that has authority. This is the point.

Mr. ANNIS: In national defence, the minister in council. The minister is always our authority. All we are worried about is getting good advice to him. It hurts a military man to give lousy advice. It comes back on you for years. All we would care about in national defence is making sure that the minister got the best advice, and to the best of my knowledge every chief of staff has given to his

minister the best advice he knew how, and then he sat back waiting for a decision by the minister or minister in council or those who guided our minister.

Mr. LAMBERT: All right, Mr. Chairman, I have used quite a bit of time so I will yield now.

Mr. WINCH: Mr. Chairman, my first question may seem a little bit long but I will try to boil it down. I will read it very slowly because I wrote it out here. Are you opposed to unification as set forth in the bill which is now before this committee and the House because of the principle or the timing and a lack of sufficient period to consolidate and correct integration changes and the introduction by legislation of policies such as the common uniform and rank structure that might better be left to a natural evolutionary process?

Mr. ANNIS: My answer is simply that I am not opposed to unification in principle. I am opposed—perhaps that is not the right word—I am unhappy with—that would be a better way of saying it—the pace which I consider indiscreet, rash, not really good management.

Mr. WINCH: Thank you. From your lengthy experience, would you say that a single service is not applicable and cannot be made to work in view of the present Canadian government commitments, whether it be NATO, NORAD, Cyprus or elsewhere?

Mr. ANNIS: I think a single service could be made to work if the commitments were small enough—narrow enough. But, again, do you recognize that we have additional commitments in this country beyond what we ever had before. You recognize that back in the days when NATO was coming into being the policy adopted by the middle powers, including Canada, was that we would deliberately unbalance our forces in order to be interdependent, in order that NATO would have a balanced force as a whole. This is the purpose and we contributed to that. We unbalanced our national forces and have proceeded in the intervening years until about 1962 or 1963, when peacekeeping began to emerge. I suppose it emerged officially when Mr. Pearson went down to visit Mr. Kennedy at Hyannisport. I guess that is where peacekeeping talk began to solidify.

Mr. WINCH: May I put it a different way then.

Mr. ANNIS: Peacekeeping for Canadians is based on go-it-alone, as I understand it because if we accept assistance from a larger power it would compromise, in the world's view, our independence of action. So we move over to a posture which in this particular field causes us to be totally independent rather than interdependent. Secondly, our NATO commitment in North America was the Atlantic community—that was the scope. The White Paper, when it talks about air play, said anywhere in the world. There is a brand new set of theatres. Most of it took us away, not only in length—great over water jumps—but it took us from the northern hemisphere, where the climate and what not is akin to our own, to peacekeeping activities in these spots where the people are greatly underprivileged—the hotter zones. So we had a different type of burden descend on us. In other words, we had an enlargement not only in size but in variety and in the scope of our commitments. At about this same time the additional burden of reorganizing ourselves into an integrated posture, at a pace beyond our ability to digest it, was thrust upon us.

Now, to bring all this back as to what could be done with a unified force, I suspect if we were willing to reduce our commitments or are able to, a unified force might eventually be successful. There is bound to be a long period of adjustment. I would estimate it running into 1973 or 1974. It is a long time.

Mr. WINCH: You are now coming to what I am hoping you can, perhaps, give us a more direct comment on. You have read and you know the White Paper?

Mr. ANNIS: Yes.

Mr. WINCH: In the White Paper there was set forth the commitments of the Canadian armed forces and to the best of my knowledge—and I think I can say "our" knowledge—there is no change in the commitments at the present time by the introduction of this bill. Would you say that the maintenance of those commitments in the White Paper still in effect would not be possible under a single unified force and that if we had that there is a required adjustment in the role of our Canadian forces in order to achieve the purport of this bill?

Mr. ANNIS: That is quite a question. If we could be sure—again we are gambling with our allies—that they were not going to be confronted with a crisis, or if we felt that it would not be unfair to them to ungird ourselves very substantially, we might get by with at least keeping up a facade of maintaining our commitments both to NATO and those about which we have published our willingness to do peacekeeping operations. This is a national type of decision; this is out of my realm. I am not suggesting what the government should do about its commitments; that is your business. But, if the government felt that it was bound to maintain a high degree of readiness posture throughout then I do not think we could carry on this unification exercise at the same time. I do not.

Mr. WINCH: Just one more question. Would you tell us, sir, just when you were chief of a technical service?

Mr. ANNIS: I was appointed officially August 1, 1964 and I retired officially, May 28, 1966.

Mr. WINCH: That leads to my question then, which I think will be in order. You mentioned in your opening remarks that when you were in that position you were in charge of procurement.

Mr. ANNIS: Yes, until now—to the extent that DND—

Mr. WINCH: Yes, I know, but I would like to get some information and perhaps other members feel the same way. Policy on procurement is laid down by the Department of National Defence. You were in charge of procurement but my understanding is that the actual procurement was done by the Department of Defence Production. Now would you please tell us how these three were correlated and what your experience was?

Mr. ANNIS: All sorts of people have asked that question, including people who come in to do studies on our organization—I mean to advise us on how to organize better.

Mr. WINCH: Am I right on those three phases?

Mr. ANNIS: You are.

Mr. WINCH: How did they operate, and how did you find them?

Mr. ANNIS: Procurement of new major equipment is a job all by itself because one is dealing with the future. One makes a decision today to take the actual step that commits you to procurement and it will be, perhaps, five years before the first of the items enter your inventory. So it is a long-time business; it does not happen in a minute. The statement of the requirement comes from the vice chief side of the House—the operations side of the house. They decide the operational characteristics they want and, to a degree, the timing. We, on technical services, had the responsibility—

Mr. WINCH: First of all, does the government decide that then after the chief of staffs and tells him what he can do and what type he can purchase?

Mr. ANNIS: Well there is sort of a rolling situation in which a policy has been partially developed of what a future posture will be. Then, based on either estimates, hard facts, or guesstimates—any one—the vice chiefs branch do study possible combinations of requirements because they have to make provision for various situations—they do not know what the government will finally decide—and in this they name operational characteristics that they wish. Speaking of an airplane, for example, they will name range, performance, load carrying capability and so on and so forth. It is the role of the technical services in National Defence to give technical advice on capabilities and so on and to go to Defence Production and get advice from them on manufacturing capabilities and the like—and we are the follow through in which this data flows to the defence staff or defence council. A recommendation to procure will eventually go forward to government, and a decision to procure will be initiated. We in the technical services are then confronted with the task of writing out the buying specifications, and this is indeed a very complex task. One talks about farming out contracts to industry but one of the most difficult tasks is writing out the technical specifications that form the basis for the contract. This is our task. When it is completed it is passed over to defence production who then ask for bids against that contract and the procurement process begins.

We in the meantime, maintain watch over the manufacturer to see that his quality of production and manufacture meets the specifications which have been set, and eventually we accept it into inventory, having examined it to see it does meet the specifications, and only then do we pay for it. Once it is in inventory a different cycle altogether begins, that of using it. Some year or two before the materiel enters the inventory, the Materiel Command has computed the rate at which spares for this equipment will be consumed in operation. They start their cycle of provision of spares to operate the equipment and to repair it.

Mr. WINCH: I have only one short question now on the same matter and then I am through, Mr. Chairman. As chief of technical services, having consulted with all your experts and subordinates, you reach the conclusion that a certain type of aircraft would best meet the need?

Mr. ANNIS: Yes.

Mr. Winch: You recommend that to the minister. If the minister does not accept your recommendation are you told why, or is there any further discussion? Or, were you told why? In other words, it was a political decision, not a military one. I am just trying to find this out.

Mr. ANNIS: It is part of military advice. The actual channel of recommendation is this. As Chief of technical services, the statement of the operational

characteristics came from the vice chief. My task at that stage was to advise him, and he and I, as a team, went to our chief of defence staff at defence staff and we made our recommendations to him with other people around as well—the chairman, defence research board and what not, the deputy minister and so on, present. It was a chief's decision as to what to recommend to the minister—a chief of defence staff decision, of course because there is only one chief. There should only be one chief of a service or force. It was his decision in council or in his staff meeting as to what would be recommended to the minister to buy. He goes forward to the minister in defence council and makes his recommendation. Therefore the discussion widens.

Mr. WINCH: But would you know, on the chief's recommendation, whether or not he was going on the recommendation that you made on the advice of your staff?

Mr. ANNIS: No. The chief could very well turn it down and say: "Go back to your drawing board and work some more. It does not meet the requirements." But eventually, if there is a need for some sort of equipment, for example, a new airplane to fit a certain type of role, he will be satisfied that this is the best proposal he could make from a military viewpoint, and he will carry it forward as an item of defence council at which the minister presides. I do not think the minister is under any obligation to tell the chief, or me, or the vice chief, why he turned something down. At times he has and at times he has not. If he accepts it, we figure we have done a pretty good job and, if not, we figure there is something wrong with our work or there is some other good reason on the part of government.

Mr. MACALUSO: Air Marshal Annis, I noticed a recurrent theme in your answers to questions. As I have it—and correct me if I am wrong—you stated: "I believe it is possible to go down the road to unification a long way, perhaps to unification itself, if allowed to handle the immense additional burdens first,"—the severe overloading. And then you go on: "Integation is the right direction for the services to be moving and should be kept pressing on".

Mr. ANNIS: Yes.

Mr. MACALUSO: "I am happy to go to unification." Again, you say: "I think unification may still be possible; A am not opposed to unification in principle: I am unhappy with the pace". That really summarizes your whole context of this problem that we face.

Mr. ANNIS: Yes, I think that is a fair statement.

Mr. MACALUSO: The pace of moving from—and these are interchangeable words—

Mr. ANNIS: It is not entirely pace. The pace plus constant examination of where we are, and moving onwards only when we feel we have a firm foothold where we are.

Mr. MACALUSO: Yes, I realize that. You say you are not opposed to the end result,—

Mr. ANNIS: No.

Mr. MACALUSO:—integration into one single force, one rank, one uniform. This is the way we seem to be looking at unification.

Mr. ANNIS: Yes.

Mr. MACALUSO: May I ask you, first, are these alternating terms. How do you differentiate between these words.

Mr. ANNIS: We still have no definition for unification. Each person has his own visualization of it. I visualize it as a service in which anyone, when asked: "To what do you belong," replies: "I belong to the Canadian Defence Force" in the same way a person would say that he belongs to the Royal Canadian Navy or the Royal Canadian Air Force.

Mr. MACALUSO: I take it in principle you are not opposed to this concept?

Mr. ANNIS: No, no. If it can be shown that we can, by hook or by crook, demonstrate at all satisfactorily, before the event, that it probably can be made to work, I am all for it.

Mr. MACALUSO: Then you said that you think that it can be made to work provided certain steps of integration are followed through and pressed onward —certain aspects that you have outlined.

Mr. ANNIS: Yes.

Mr. MACALUSO: Now, I understand that it is your belief that integration is the right thing in the supporting services and that this has to be achieved first before you can move onto the single force concept. Is that correct?

Mr. ANNIS: Not quite. Let me illustrate in a slightly lengthy answer what I think.

Mr. MACALUSO: I asked you that because you state: "I feel the ability to integrate and unify the supporting services has to be achieved in order to make unification possible."

Mr. ANNIS: I beg your pardon?

Mr. MACALUSO: Your words were: "I feel the ability to integrate and unify the supporting services has to be achieved in order to make unification possible".

Mr. ANNIS: Yes.

Mr. MACALUSO: That is why I asked you the previous question.

Mr. ANNIS: I do, yes. Let me give an example. I mentioned the technical services. Most of them are supporting services; some of them are indirect. I will use the construction engineering career field as an example because it has the least complications. The navy's idea of a construction engineering officer is a chap trained and qualified to construct docks, jetties, wharves, cradles, underwater caissons, and accommodation aboard ships. He is, in a sense, a partial ship constructor and also responsible for constructing offices and quarters.

The army's idea of an RCE sapper is that he should be able to lay down minefields, pick them up again, build kennel-type bridges by the book, quickly assembled under fire, do demolitions, build roadways, be able to take tanks through forests or over obstacles, water purification and the like, and also to build offices and quarters.

The air force's idea of a construction engineer is a chap who is able to build cantilever arch hangars, runways which are about 4 feet deep, ballasted and straight as string—whether a bump gets in the way or not, radar stations, big

holes in the ground like at North Bay and offices and quarters. The common factor in here seems to be offices and quarters. Now, in respect of utilization by each service, the approach was quite different. The navy tended to use the ship constructor and as a sort of an adjunct to him was the construction engineer—and they had relatively few construction engineering people in their service. In general, the career opportunities of these people are either as civilians or, if they are military, they are very limited. They stayed and they served almost totally in construction engineering employment.

In the air force a very similar situation prevailed. The air force had for many years by far the largest construction program. Their construction engineering corps or career field was modest in size and the officers in it almost invariably served virtually their whole career in actual construction engineering. As such they tended to be very comparable to the civilian professional construction engineer.

The army had a very different approach for a very good reason. In general, the senior officer can learn all there is to know of the sapper field in a few years—one or two tours in the field. What is more, it is done in the battlefield, where they are trained primarily to be operative. Thereafter they are free for a much wider employment in their service. As of February 1964 or thereabouts, if I remember my figures correctly and I am not entirely sure, the ratio in the army, navy and air force of officers serving in the air force construction engineering, the navy construction engineering and the RCE field were 15 army, 2 navy, and 4 RCAF. I think that is about the ratio. By and large the navy and the air force construction people were much more professional as constructors. The army officer, by virtue of his much wider tours of postings, tended to be a much more experienced military officer, especially with qualifications for higher rank because he had seen his service from many more angles than from the sort of parochial station of construction engineering. So here we have the problem of how do you produce an integrated organization. How do you do it? This is the question. I do not know the answer yet, and I do not think you do. At least, I do not, and this is what we have to find out. The object of the course is that we bring a boy in—I am talking about our officer element first—from somewhere, university maybe or R.M.C., and if so, we have to establish the minimum qualifications he should have. Then the next thing is what sort of course should we give him? Should he go through a navy constructor course and then into an entirely different field of army construction engineering training and then off into air force? Then when he is finished that, how shall we employ him? Is it wasteful—to do what? Then when it comes to career progression, should we use the army approach which allowed their RCE officers to compete for senior rank in any branch? Or, should we use the air force and navy approach, which was very suitable to their service, of keeping a small career field and virtually all the officers which they had in that career field employed in that function. Now, the question is, if we have such an integrated service the only thing common being building offices and quarters, what sort of support could they give a Canadian operation, or integrated with some other country, in navy, army or air or all three? How prompt and how efficient would we be? Are we wiser to go ahead with an integrated structure, with people who are sort of jack-of-all trades, or are we better off to train and instruct our construction engineers specifically for support of a function or role? We do not know yet what the syllabus should be.

We do not know quite what the answer is. When we do decide, we will not know how efficient they are until after they have had some trials—it will take a while. And yet the Navy and the Army and the Air Force are all very dependent upon quality and good support in the construction and engineering field. It is an essential supporting service, and there are lots more of them—I mean the simple ones. The other ones more complicated.

Mr. MACALUSO: This is where you say that integration is the right step but it should be pressed on with. Is this an example of a field where you feel it should be pressed on and tested.

Mr. ANNIS: Pressed on and tested. We are just working out plans of how to integrate the like people from the three services into a single supporting package. The doctors were easy by comparison.

Mr. MACALUSO: I am very pleased with the information you provided as far as the United States experience is concerned. It bears repeating. Perhaps we are not too well aware of how far they have gone. You say they have gone even further than we have as far as integration is concerned.

Mr. ANNIS: Exploration of the problems, I meant to say, or should have said. That is what I meant to say. And in some respects the actual work itself.

Mr. MACALUSO: Well you said that all US. commands are integrated and that no chief has any command or control over any combat force.

Mr. ANNIS: That is right.

Mr. MACALUSO: His role is strictly to procure, equip, train and furnish to the integrated command personnel and equipment.

Mr. ANNIS: Ready for battle training.

Mr. MACALUSO: I only have one last question, Air Marshal. You mentioned something in your statement of balanced forces in NATO. Are you prepared to let us know what your views are as to whether Canada did the right thing in contributing to a balanced force within the alliance or whether it was not the right thing.

Mr. ANNIS: Do you means to unbalance our forces.

Mr. MACALUSO: Yes.

Mr. ANNIS: Well, it is a generalization. I never would like to argue with success. I think NATO has been a success. Perhaps it has achieved its purpose; I do not know. Perhaps it is finished achieving its purpose; I do not know. I think it was a success.

Mr. MACALUSO: Admiral Brock stated that Canada was the only country naive enough to swallow hook, line and sinker, the American philosophy of balanced forces within the alliance. I gather from your statement, since it was a success that this would not exactly be so.

Mr. ANNIS: Other nations unbalance their forces too. The low countries did, I think, and Britain to a degree.

Mr. MACALUSO: We are not alone in that then.

Mr. ANNIS: No.

Mr. MACALUSO: Thank you very much, Air Marshal.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Air Marshal Annis, I was very interested in a statement you made a moment ago about the specialization of professional personnel and so on. Let us take the case of any big city construction company which is accustomed to bidding and contracting for the construction of houses, factories, hospitals, bridges, roads and the like. Is this not a unified organization whose personnel are ready to adapt themselves to a very wide variety of tasks and so on, and is this so much different than the cases you are referring to here.

Mr. ANNIS: Canadian defence policy has for a long time been to utilize our civilian capability as best we can. The in-house—the in-service role is pretty well limited to the setting of specifications, the supervision of performance and the acceptance into inventory of work done by civilian contractor, by and large. That is not true of the battle field, of course, nor in many cases, in respect of the very distant points, or in some cases where things are relatively small and have a high degree of security. In general, the services contract the actual work out, but they have the task of writing the specifications and having an intimate knowledge of the performance of the contractor, the language and the trade, and so on.

Mr. DEACHMAN: I really wanted to question you for a moment or two in connection with some remarks you made about going too far, too fast—and other people have mentioned the same subject. You have some hesitancy about this because in some of your statements your are saying: We should be pressing on with integration and into unification as far as it is feasibly possible. I think I am quoting you correctly.

Mr. ANNIS: Yes.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Earlier, in your remarks, you expressed the view that we were going too far too fast, so I can only assume from this that while your are prepared to press on, you believe we have pressed on beyond what are considered to be reasonable limits, in your estimation.

Mr. ANNIS: Pressing too hard. I have meant an inexorable sort of strained pressure, but not a crushing pressure, which I feel is what has been exerted thus far.

Mr. DEACHMAN: I want to discuss this in terms of readiness. Although maybe the word "readiness" was not used, I think you indicated that if we found ourselves dealing with a surge, we would have to regroup in other ways, would not be able to carry forward with the existing integrated or unified forces, and so there is a lack of readiness in certain areas. Can you amplify where there is a lack of readiness whereby we would not be able to respond to a surge?

Mr. ANNIS: Yes, I think I did describe them. It was the fact that the services have been and still are confronted with the additional commitments, the commitment of being unbalanced and interdependent, and dependent—that is a new one, world wide—and taking on this huge re-organization and adjustment task. All these studies—the sort of study that I described in the supply service, for example, which will take years—will have to be abandoned, and the people who have been set aside doing these put back into the immediate problem of reacting to the emergency. As I mentioned in supply, for example, air force materiel is being demanded and supplied through an air force system still, and will be for some years. The army materiel, peculiar to land, is being demanded and supplied through that system, and the same way with the navy. Those systems would

have to spring back into a larger scale operation. This is the sort of thing. In the meantime, we have serious shortages in manpower, not primarily on account of integration and unification, but because of this wartime age group that you know are retiring.

Mr. DEACHMAN: In this logistical area, if we have understood previous witnesses, very complex building of completely computerized inventory and logistics system is taking place, and an old system or a standby system is going to have to pretty well remain in operation, or at least some aspect of it, until we get to the end of the trail; and if we also understood correctly, this is one aspect of integration which is going to take a long time before it is in full operation.

Mr. ANNIS: Oh, yes. It will cost a lot too, to bring it into being. I think it may be worth while. It will pay for itself after ten years of operation, I suppose. I do not think Treasury Board will accept it until they have a pretty good guarantee that the investment in new techniques, equipment, training, and the like, will be recovered by future savings.

Mr. DEACHMAN: You do not disagree with the target, then?

Mr. ANNIS: No. It is a very desirable target—it is very desirable but, to a degree, it is like hanging a bell on a cat. Can you get it hung on?

Mr. DEACHMAN: Do you see dangers in the capability of the standby system to maintain readiness until we reach that target, or is that functional?

Mr. ANNIS: Well, as a Chief of Technical Services, looking as impartially as I could—and I think quite impartially—at navy, army and air force organizations in the technical field, each was tailored to the existing navy, army and air force structure. I thought they were basically very good systems and quite economical. The navy, especially, was packaged astonishingly well. They had men wearing two and three hats to do a job and had trained themselves so well that they were astonishingly proficient in this form. They have been torn to pieces now and sort of extended. I do not know how they would reassemble themselves in this very intricate structure that they had, which was working surprisingly well. I think they could probably do it if they could find the trained manpower to fit back into the slots to do this type of work. How long it would take, I do not know.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Do I understand then, that there is not a logistics capability now in the navy as a result of this. In fact, are you saying that the logistics capabilities of the navy have been damaged by the process of integration?

Mr. ANNIS: I think they are accomplishing the essentials. You started off by asking about the problems of a surge-load.

Mr. DEACHMAN: This is right.

Mr. ANNIS: Their operating forces have been reduced somewhat insofar as I know I am the wrong person to answer this question. You should, I think, really get the Chief of Supply or someone else up here to answer that question. But as far as I know, navy is receiving its essential supplies pretty well on time. I cannot give a knowledgeable answer beyond that because I do not know.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Well, as a kind of a summary question to this point, are you prepared to say that, logistically, we are less capable of bearing a surge-load

now than we were, let us say, in 1964, at the time the White Paper was promulgated.

Mr. ANNIS: Oh yes, but this was part of the calculated risk that we would discommode ourselves in order to conduct an experiment. I think this was a calculated risk. We have lost a lot of manpower; we have done a lot of reorganization; we have decoyed a lot of people away from their normal tasks and left the stages vacant while they did studies on how to solve these new problems. For this reason, the erstwhile systems are not manned, do not have nearly as large a capacity, and because of the double training and what not, have lost a good deal of their old-time efficiency. This is all true. But it is not unnatural; it is just how things are. It is part of the price of conducting a very large deal experiment.

The CHAIRMAN: A necessary experiment.

Mr. ANNIS: Yes.

Mr. DEACHMAN: I had one question here on the Defence Council. If I understood you correctly, I think you sadi that the Defence Council had lacked all-round representation. I think that was the tenor of your statement.

Mr. ANNIS: No, that was not what I meant. I meant that it did have all-round representation. It had the chief coming from one service, a vice chief from another service, and a third officer, who was not the vice chief but wore a third colour uniform, and this is how the three service representation was achieved. But the price of having it was to put the Chief of the Defence Staff in a position where he found himself being bypassed in that the Chairman considered all three as sort of equal in their advice, whereas, by his terms of reference, the Chief of the Defence Staff should be the one and the only speaker who advises the Minister because each of these officers had previously had an opportunity to air his views before his chief, in a closed session, with others present. The Chief offers his advice, and when that is finished the chief normally goes forward and says, "This is my recommendation to you arrived at in council with my officers." Our whole training is that in council you argue your case as best you can and the chap at the head of the table listens to everything, and finally says, "Having heard everything, this is our decision. Agreed?" And those who argued against it, agree, and thereafter they are part of the team. This is what happens. But then you go up to Defence Council; the lid is taken right off and the chief is exposed. When the Minister asks one of the vice chiefs or the officer what they think, this officer is bound by duty to say exactly what he thinks, and it may be the same again—the arguments which he expressed unsuccessfully to his chief in the previous session. It puts the chief in a very difficult position and it puts the officer who is asked in a very difficult position, and it does not help make a team of the chief and his senior. They are forced into strained positions in this sort of situation. I do not like it.

Mr. DEACHMAN: One of the arguments that has been put forward to us is that when you have a single chief then the minister is only hearing the word from one chief whereas, previously, he had three chiefs to whom he could listen, and he could draw his judgment from what the three service chiefs said. It was my opinion, listening to witnesses here and reading what the minister has said about this, that the function of the Defence Council, and the reinstitution of the Defence Council as a body which met regularly was to provide the Minister with

the opportunity of tapping in on the system in a more general way and I just wonder whether or not—

Mr. ANNIS: He did. It put the Minister in an excellent position but it put him in the position of being Chief of the Defence Staff, because really there is no difference in the views of the three officers perhaps most involved, or in what they say to their own Chief or the Minister. The same discussion takes place all over again, but this time the Minister is in the chair, and it is the deciding council as far as national defence is concerned. The Minister gets excellent advice but he gets it as though he were the Chief of the Defence Staff. He gets the same advice, but then there is a bit extra thrown in from other visitors.

Mr. DEACHMAN: This would depend on at what stage something is aired. If a matter was coming up for decision and if it were aired at the Defence Council level before decision is taken, then all arguments could be heard in respect of this matter and I cannot see how this would work against a viable system.

Mr. ANNIS: It is disruptive. This arrangement is disruptive of harmony within the Defence Staff and it is true if the Minister wishes to attend the Chiefs meeting—and we have had this through once—then I suppose it would be workable. But you have to recognize the situation that the procurement of a new ship, or a new battlefield weapon, is a subject and the effect of it is disruptive on a budget—something else has to go—and environmental views are starting to come out and the Chief of Defence Staff sits at the head of the table and each one is asked to say his piece, including the Chairman of the Defence Research Board who is there, and the Deputy Minister, and so on, and the people give their views as best they can on military factors. A decision is reached because the Chief is in the chair and he says at the end of the discussion of that subject: well, this is what I think, and it goes down in the minutes as a decision and the people, all having had a chance to say their piece, abide by it.

Then the Chief's responsibility is to make a recommendation to the Minister in a Defence Council meeting, so another group assembles and this time the Minister is at the head of the table. The Chief of the Defence Staff is there, the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff is there, because he is wearing another coloured uniform, and a third officer—during my day, Admiral Dyer, because he was Navy and Chief of Personnel—always was present, in order to get a third view.

Discussion starts off on this subject as though it had never taken place before. The Chief says: I recommend this to the Minister. The Minister says: all right, then what do you think, brown uniform, and what do you think, blue uniform? And the blue uniform chap is compelled to say what he thinks because his duty is to give the best advice he can. Perhaps you are then found arguing against your Chief in front of the Minister. It is kind of hard when you get up and leave if there has been a strained subject, and the feelings among the Defence Staff can be exacerbated by the situation.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Let us go back to the Minister's address on second reading in which he said:

> It has become the practice to have the branch heads attend meetings of defence council regularly as well as some assistant deputy ministers. The deliberations, therefore, of members and those in attendance provide a valuable blending of military, scientific and financial advice. The elements for a more co-ordinated interdepartmental approach to defence

problems exist in the defence council and consequently arrangements have been made for participation by representatives of other government departments on issues of interest to them. A senior officer of the Department of External Affairs attends regularly and this has proved to be a valuable link with that department. It is also a clear indication of our determination to ensure that Canadian defence policy is based upon and is designed to support Canadian foreign policy.

If, in the consideration of objectives and commitments and goals, and political advice and financial advice, and so on, the Minister must thread his way through this maze, what better way is there to do it than through a Defence Council or some committee such as this? In other words, if the Defence Council were not there, would you not have to invent it?

Mr. ANNIS: I am not criticizing and if I sound as though I am, forgive me. I have no intention of criticizing the quality of discussion in Defence Council. In fact, all these views have been put in and it has been very good discussion. I really have not criticized the great majority of decisions taken at meetings of the Defence Council that I have attended. But, I do say that this arrangement is very, very hard on the Defence Staff. It is a good way to break up a Defence Staff some day. It is hard on the Chief of the Defence Staff suddenly to be reduced a rank and put as a co-equal in front of the Minister with his Vice Chief and his Chief of Personnel. It is very hard on him and I think that if one wants to have a viable Defence Staff some other way should be searched out.

Mr. DEACHMAN: I think that is a question we can very well explore a little further with General Allard and the Minister when we have them back before us soon, and I thank you very much, sir.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Air Marshal, I think I should say that I was very pleased to hear you make one statement, at least, when you said—and I believe these were your words—that "the defence structure exists for combat service."

Mr. ANNIS: Yes.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I think if we go on that premise we are thinking along the same lines.

Mr. ANNIS: Yes, indeed, sir.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I think possibly that is the feeling of most of the members on this Committee. However, when you were giving a definition of what unification meant to you it sounded very simple, and I think you used those words—it was very simple. If I may paraphrase again, you said that it just meant that a man said: I now belong to the Canadian forces rather than to the Army, or the Navy or the Air Force. Where did you get your definition from? I could accept that if that was the official definition of the word "unification." I say this because there has been so much confusion in this Committee over the definition of the two terms "integration" and "unification". In fact, General Foulkes said: "I cannot tell the difference between integration and unification." If they both mean the same thing, then perhaps we are having too many meetings on this, but I would like to find out where you got your definition.

Mr. ANNIS: Out of my head, I suppose; just as a result of being compelled to contrive one for myself. I do not think I am telling tales out of school when I say

that the same bewilderment has persisted in the Defence Staff, the Defence Council, and probably elsewhere. I think each person has been compelled to contrive his own interpretation of what the words mean.

Mr. McINTOSH: Did you at any time get that definition from the Minister or the impression that was what unification meant?

Mr. ANNIS: Not consciously, no.

Mr. McINTOSH: We have been trying to find out what he meant by his definition of the term, and I will repeat it again. He said:

Unification is the end objective of a logical and evolutionary progression.

That seems much more complicated than your definition.

Mr. ANNIS: Yes, it is. The question is when to make the jump. You see, I keep on feeling that integration is best exemplified in the commands where Mobile Command, I suppose, is the best example. It has officers wearing different coloured uniforms, filling various appointments on the staff, and looked at from an organizational viewpoint it is an entity; it is a viable staff organization made up of officers performing their duties as Chief of Personnel, or Chief of Communications, or what not, irrespective of his uniform or his background. To me, that is integration. Successful integration presupposes that the previous training of the incumbents of each and every position on such staffs has been adequate.

Mr. McINTOSH: I think there is a quite a lot of agreement in the Committee on the definition of the term integration. I think we all agree that some of that is needed.

Mr. ANNIS: Yes.

Mr. McINTOSH: But with your definition I would ask you, Air Marshal, what was the reason for so many senior officers resigning over this term if it is a simple as you say it is—just changing a name?

Mr. ANNIS: I think frustration—all around. First of all, there was this impossibly large task to be done in this impossibly short time. I think every chap in uniform was doing his best to make integration a success. It was put up to us as an experiment and we felt that other nations were watching and every one in uniform was most anxious that if it failed, no one—no one—would be able to say that it failed because the military did not do their best to make it succeed.

This is how people in the branch over which I presided approached it. Their efforts to make integration work as best they could were universal. I was inspired by the quality of performance and the sincerity. The tasks for us of the technical services were huge. We saw a continuing uncertainty, unrest, and unhappiness among our people with no real solutions in sight and we were powerless to help because of the pace.

I was not invited to stay, but I would have left the service anyhow when the time came to retire, because I feel that I have been a senior officer for a long while and it was time for promotion. But, nevertheless, I have to confess I was glad to leave, in a sense. I had never expected I would be, but I was because of a sense of frustration in achievement of something we were most anxious to achieve. We accomplished a great deal. I am proud of what we accomplished, but it was nothing compared with what had to be done to prevent all this unhappiness within the team.

Mr. McINTOSH: Was there general agreement amongst all your friends—I suppose I can call them that—in the senior officers on the general definition of unification, or were they frustrated because they did not know what it was, or what was meant by it? I ask you that because in the Minister's speech which has been referred to before, he said:

> This system will not be changed by reason of unification. Certainly we will continue to have—

the Army, Navy and so on, and he goes on at great length. He makes many statements in his speech that there will be no change but, at the end of it, each time he says this, or words to this effect:

> —until the force structure within the unified force is developed.

Now, this is where we get frustrated. This is what we do not understand. What does he mean? If he means, as you say, just the simple matter of changing the name, then I think we can go along with it.

Mr. ANNIS: My estimate has always been that he has meant something modeled on the United States Marine Corps; just that. That has been my idea. This is what I visualized when I thought: well, what would it look like? It would look like the United States Marine Corps.

Mr. McINTOSH: Reference was made to the White Paper, Air Marshal, and you referred to Canada's policy prior to, say, 1963 or 1964, and you said it was an interdependent policy.

Mr. ANNIS: Yes.

Mr. McINTOSH: Dependent on our allies?

Mr. ANNIS: Yes. They, in part, depended on us too, of course.

Mr. McINTOSH: And you subscribed to that policy?

Mr. ANNIS: If you are part of a team, yes; that is the definition of a team.

Mr. McINTOSH: Do you believe that the only defence possible for Canada is some form of collective defence?

Mr. ANNIS: Yes, indeed.

Mr. McINTOSH: I am all for that. Then a little later on, in referring to the peacekeeping forces, I got the idea from what you said that there was a suggested change in our policy; you used the words, "go it alone".

Mr. ANNIS: Yes, this has been done. I do not think I have ever seen this in an official document, but there has been a tacit understanding in our department among the military and, I suppose the civilians—all the elements—that if Canada is to play a peacekeeping part meaningfully, it is essential that she be able to do it independently; to arrive at some location on her own, sustain her forces there and, if necessary, come out of there. In other words, to accept help from some outside power—for example, the United States—in the form of the loan of forces and equipment to get you there and sustain you, would compromise the regard in which we were held. Therefore, if we are going to perform on behalf of the United Nations, or in some other peacekeeping role, we have to be able to be self-sustaining.

Mr. McINTOSH: In other words, it was suggested to you then, sir, that Canada would now, or in the future, have a dual role.

Mr. ANNIS: It would amount to that, yes.

Mr. McINTOSH: Or was it suggested that we opt out of these collective alliances and just perform a single role?

Mr. ANNIS: No, this has not been suggested to us; this is strictly a political and technical matter. We, in the military, all have views on it, but we are trained not to have views that are meaningful.

Mr. BREWIN: May I ask a supplementary question? In the past, certainly all our peacekeeping roles have not been "go it alone"; they have been supported by other nations. I just wonder, sir, where you get this idea that a peacekeeping or an intervention role would necessarily be independent of support from other countries? I can understand that an intervention force can be committed by the decision of the Canadian government if the circumstances arose, rather than its being a static commitment. But I just have not been able to follow from where you deduce this idea.

Mr. ANNIS: To be more specific, I suppose, it suggests that we could not accept help from the United States.

Mr. BREWIN: Why not?

Mr. ANNIS: Because this is our basic source of supply. To have our forces airlifted, for example, by United States aircraft to somewhere in Africa, or the Middle East, or the Pacific Archipelago, would not, I think, help to maintain the regard in which we are held; it would look as though we were, perhaps, a pawn. I do not know; I speculate here.

Mr. BREWIN: Then I ask you this question: Would it not seem a little difficult, if not completely unfeasible, for Canada to be dispatching troops without at least the tacit support, if not the active support, of some of the great powers including the United States in particular.

Mr. ANNIS: I am out of my depth here, really, sir. This is more of a political question. I have been aware that our departmental planning has been postured towards a capability to get there ourselves, sustain ourselves with a balanced force of sea, land, and air and, if necessary, extricate ourselves.

Mr. BREWIN: Thank you very much. I am sorry to have interrupted your line of questioning.

Mr. McINTOSH: To get back to my previous question, Air Marshal, I take it from you that there was no suggestion, then, that we opt out of the collective defence that we are now in, or our alliances; but the suggestion was made that we have a dual role?

Mr. ANNIS: It has not been suggested to the military to my knowledge. It has been apparent, in Defence Staff and elsewhere, that we have had to deal with two quite separate problems; one of maintaining the sort of forces necessary for our NATO commitment, and a quite different problem for the peacekeeping role.

Mr. McINTOSH: Could I say, then, that in effect you did have two roles.

Mr. ANNIS: Oh, yes, indeed.

Mr. McINTOSH: Now, in order to carry out these dual roles, we were told yesterday by General Moncel that he felt we had to have a force of 150,000 men. Do you agree that to carry out these dual roles we would have to have that many?

Mr. ANNIS: I would suspect it would be of that order; certainly larger than the 90,000-odd that we have now—certainly much larger. These roles are quite different in their nature. The combat role in which one is centred on a European theatre is sophisticated—probably General Moncel has said it already—and one that requires a type of weaponry for all the services that is highly sophisticated and damned expensive. The peacekeeping role tends to be an observing role, where one uses light-weight equipment designed to impress those would-be belligerents that they are being watched.

Mr. McINTOSH: What you are trying to tell me is that in order for Canada to carry out the roles that she has now committed herself to, she is roughly 50,000 below the requirement to make those roles effective?

Mr. ANNIS: I would not know whether the figure of 50,000 is correct but I would say that it is a significant additional commitment that could not be managed well with our existing numbers.

Mr. McINTOSH: We will forget the numbers. Were you aware of any problems that existed in recruiting while you were at headquarters here in Ottawa?

Mr. ANNIS: Oh, yes; they were well known to us and to the public.

Mr. McINTOSH: Had you tried every possible means to accelerate the recruitment?

Mr. ANNIS: Yes, the Department had taken a considerable number of steps to increase the appeal; actually going out and saying they were increasing pay, or promising it first a long while ahead and then going ahead and increasing it, and the like.

Mr. McINTOSH: If Canada is effectively to carry out this dual role that we have been talking about—although you may not agree with this term "dual role" —bearing in mind the problems that you had in recruiting when you were on the General Staff, and I suppose you implemented every inducement that you possibly could, would you agree that we have to resort to compulsory military service, or to conscription?

Mr. ANNIS: I would not know; but I would say this: essentially the problem lies in ability to recruit the combat officer, the infantryman, the gunner, the artilleryman, the pilot, and the deck officer in the navy. They are the ones who take the brunt. For those who are in the supporting services, an altogether different inducement exists. If I join the services, it is a very good way to get excellent training enroute to civilian life, and all sorts of things; it is a different story.

Mr. McINTOSH: We agreed when I started my questioning that the defence structure exists for the combat services; in other words, the very people that you are saying we are having difficulty in getting. Is that right?

Mr. ANNIS: Yes.

Mr. McINTOSH: Then the defence structure as we have it now, or under unification, is more or less not going to be capable of doing the job it was set up to do.

Mr. ANNIS: I think the unified structure would experience its greatest difficulty in recruiting people in the combat career fields, because it is the uniform and name of service that designates them as unique. The person who is a construction engineer, the doctor, the accountant, and so on, all have an opposite number in civilian life. There is no opposite number to a combat pilot, nor to a gunner, nor to an infantryman, nor to a deck officer in a warship. A warship and a submarine are not cargo vessels, nor are they the *Queen Mary*; it is quite different. These people who are going to operate these weapons—not transport aircraft, but weapons—have got to fight to master an element in the first place, and then master some other professional warrior in that element. You have got to win, or you get killed in this racket, and you have got to be prepared for it. This is what every person who takes an oath has to be prepared to do. He hopes to God it will never happen, he hopes he will never have to fight, he hopes his presence will prevent war; but there it stands, and this is his badge of professionalism. He is part of that environment. He is going to live, or maybe die; maybe his father died or his kids may die in it. These are the people that are the hard core of the military; they are what the military is.

The supporting services, God knows, are extremely valuable. I am not deprecating them in any way; their value is tremendous. But they are supporting services, and they do have opposite numbers in civilian life, and their service training has a much more applicable value to them in civilian life, and so on. This is the problem area of getting people to come in and become infantrymen. After an infantryman is about 30 years of age, he cannot run up and down hills fast enough to compete with kids who are 22 years of age. He goes to look for a job and they say, "Well, what did you do?" He says, "I was trained as an infantryman". The employer says, "Well, how can I ever employ an infantryman in my plant?". This is your problem. Yet, they are people who are willing to pay, if necessary, something that you cannot value—their lives.

We have the problem of paying them; inducing them; rewarding them; giving them status, including a uniform and a colour that says they are professionals in something; this is the group to which the colour of uniform really matters. The doctors are vital to our services, but they are not necessarily attached to the sky or under the sea.

Mr. MCINTOSH: To sum up your remarks, do I take it that you feel it is necessary for the combat fighting troops in the submarines, in the airplanes, in the infantry, in the armour, and so on, to be identified in some manner?

Mr. ANNIS: These people already have their uniform; but if you take the construction engineers out of the navy, army, and air force and put them together, they do not have a uniform yet. They came: from navy, army, and air force, and they are dedicated to support all three, but those fellows do not have a uniform yet. So, they are looking for one; they are all for a new uniform. But the fellows who live and die on the sea who are inextricably attached to the war ship—they built it, they designed it, and they operate it, and so on—and the airplane, have a uniform and it is being taken away from them.

Also, to get into the inside of it, the military is a pecking order as well, like everything else in life. The military is a microcosm of life at large. It has a flock of career people, and there are different feelings among pilots and accountants, just as there are among doctors and accountants. Certainly they have different

slants of view and attitudes towards the same thing. In the military, the top of the pecking order is the combat man. He is what the service is; he is the hard core. He has had taken away from him his control over supporting services, which he knows were brought into being to support him in his hour of need in combat. The control of these people has been taken from him, making them stronger.

Unification of doctors made them a much more powerful organization than when they were fragmented into three services, believe me. They became a guild; a trade union. They became a power and a different type of chap to deal with, and much more difficult for the Minister to deal with, in rank structure and pay and so on. They were a guild and they were backed up by the medical organization of the nation; they had some support.

So, here is the man who is the hard core at the top of the pecking order in navy, army, and air force, losing his uniform, losing his control over his supporting services, and losing his inducement ever to come in the service. This is his problem and this is our national problem in recruiting men today, and it will continue so until some way of getting the hard core of men in, and keeping them in, and keeping them happy, is achieved.

Mr. McINTOSH: I do not think, Air Marshal, that we can group personnel of the defence structure into which are the most important, and so on, but we can establish a list of priorities, and I take it from what you have said that the person we should consider most at this time under this bill, under any change, is the combat man.

Mr. ANNIS: Oh, yes, this makes them different from anything else there is.

Mr. McINTOSH: Do you think that unification does this?

Mr. ANNIS: I think the loyalty of Canadian officers entering the services probably could overcome even this handicap, if they were given time and if a system of recognition and reward could be worked out. I think it might happen, but to jump right into it with this little bit of preparation is incredibly hard on the combat career fields in the three services.

Mr. McINTOSH: General Foulkes said that tidy administration—

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. McIntosh, do you have a lot more questions?

Mr. McINTOSH: No, I think I can finish up in three questions. I may want to go on again. General Foulkes said that tidy administration seemed to be the predominant feature of the unification bill and that combat troops should not be pushed around or treated like punch holes in a computer card just to make it easier for the administrative officers. Do you feel too much emphasis is put on administration in this bill, and not enough emphasis on the combat troops?

Mr. ANNIS: As you said, sir, in a sense, despite what I said about pecking orders, they are all equal. As a member of the technical services whose role was support, may I say we got our satisfaction out of giving good support to the combat services. This was our satisfaction for the period I was serving there; this was it. We felt that by introducing some of these computerized techniques and other things, we could give better support. Provided the rate and scale of adoption of these techniques is within our capabilities, I am all for it. Again, it is a matter of a sensible rate. I rather feel that, considering the expansion of other

commitments that the Canadian defence forces voluntarily and involuntarily took on, the additional task of integration limited our ability to adopt a lot of these techniques as rapidly as we are trying to do right now.

Mr. McINTOSH: Mr. Chairman, Admiral Landymore's brief expressed some concern, and he felt the commanders had some concern, about the operation of Materiel Command—

Mr. ANNIS: Oh, yes.

Mr. McINTOSH: —and about the Maritime Command. I will not go into that right now, but if I have a chance to ask you some other questions later on I will do so. I would like to bring out these concerns that Admiral Landymore had.

Mr. ANNIS: May I just say one thing? His concerns are really legitimate, and until the supply system can satisfy the commanders that it is going to give a good performance, the field commander will always worry, and justifiably.

Mr. McINTOSH: I agree with you. Mention was also made of the exercise Fallex. Can you tell us what this exercise was, and can you tell us anything about the official report on the exercise, whether it was satisfactory, or unsatisfactory?

Mr. ANNIS: I do not know, sir. I expect you are referring to Fallex 66. My total experience with Fallex was in 1962, and the Cuban crisis appeared right afterwards, so even what we learned, I rather forgot.

Mr. McINTOSH: If I had time, I would go into the one I referred to. I do not know what it means and we are trying to find out.

Mr. ANNIS: I do not think it bears too greatly on the subject we are discussing today sir, if you will forgive the opinion.

Mr. McINTOSH: I will not press it, then.

Mr. HARKNESS: The Technical Services Branch which you headed up, I presume was formed originally by just taking the technical services from navy, army, and air force, and putting them in together and, from there on, starting to try to weld them into one organization. Had that really been done to any extent by the time you left, or were you still really operating the three services in one organization? In effect, were they still operating to a large extent on the old system?

Mr. ANNIS: We were about half way. It was a huge task, and I do not know whether the Committee would like a description of its nature. I do not know quite how to answer. I do not want to propel you into an inescapably rather lengthy description of what the situation was. It was fascinating to me, but it might not be to the Committee. I think I can limit it to about three or four minutes, but it would be that sort of thing.

Mr. HARKNESS: Could you just answer the question in as short a way as possible as to what extent integration of these technical services had actually taken place?

Mr. ANNIS: It had gone quite a piece, sir, and had at that stage produced perhaps more disruption than a smooth-working new system. It was because everybody was having to learn something quite new and very different, and operate in a very different organization, and had not yet had time to do it. The

framework of the organization had been spelled out, but the procedures, in other words, had not yet been completed, and certainly the training of the people in them was just a little way along.

Mr. HARKNESS: You stated, of course, that the logistics organization of the navy, particularly, had been disrupted, and the same thing would be true of the other two services. As a result the whole logistics back-up for the services is less effective than was the case before this experiment started. How long do you think it would take to build an effective integrated system which effectively could look after the logistics needs of a unified service?

Mr. ANNIS: I do not know, sir. The Americans have been trying to do it for a long time, and they have not licked it. I think industry has done it to some degree. Essentially what is being sought is a utopian sort of thing. I think it is within the state of the art of computers to do it, provided we are going to buy the computers, pay for the communications lease line, train a lot of people, and pay them enough to keep them, because they are the very sort of people that industry wants to pry out of the services, and who keep on flowing out. So, it is an imponderable. But essentially, the system that exists in the air force today is a central computer at Rockcliffe, tied to the air force's depots at Edmonton, Toronto, and Moncton.

Mr. HARKNESS: This is for supply?

Mr. ANNIS: This is for supply, but logistics is supply, maintenance and transportation. These depots are wholesale or bulk depots. A person who wants to get a piece of air materiel and who is in Zweibrucken, Germany, sends a message on a certain form that goes straight into the computer at Rockcliffe. He says, "I want seven of so-and-so". The computer searches through the total inventory, because it has on its tapes a record of what is held at all those three depot complexes including certain of the repair depots, and it picks out the best located depot and ships the oldest piece of equipment that will satisfy the user. Then, having picked it out, it sends a message to the appropriate depot saying, "ship it", and the unit gets it.

This is a centralized inventory control at wholesale level. However, it is quite possible today with the existing system that a station at Uplands could demand something that is not in stock in any depot. The computer would say, "It is not in stock" and put an order in to industry to get a re-supply whereas, in reality, there may be quite a few at Rockcliffe which is just a few miles away, and some more at some other base such as Bagotville, and the computer did not know that they were anywhere in the system. Usually the things that are in shortest supply are the newest things and, therefore, the most precious, and so it is important to know this sort of thing.

The hope is to produce a centralized inventory that reaches from the wholesale level down to the retail level, which is what the stations are; they amount to big retail outlets, and the units that sit on the stations are akin to householders. It is hoped that in future the computer will have a record so that whne a demand comes in from Zweibrucken for an item, it will even know that it has to go to a station to pry it out and send a shipping order. That is a very complex thing to arrange. It requires a lot of reporting by stations of what they have; it requires installing on the stations very complex equipment to automate that sort of thing. This can be done, but the question is: Do we have enough

money, enough manpower, and enough time to do it? If we have all, I presume a suitable system can be devised, the equipment bought, the people trained —because it is all brand new—and cut in bit by bit by about 1972, about five or six years.

Mr. HARKNESS: In other words, you think it would take five or six years to develop an effective supply and general logistics system?

Mr. ANNIS: It took us from 1956 until January, 1961, I believe it was, to start the beginning of automatic operation of the RCAF system which is confined to the wholesale level only, with one service. That is about the only basic figure I can quote. It is a much more complicated thing when we have three services putting their hands to the wheel. Perhaps they could do it in the same space, but I doubt it. I think it would take until 1972 or 1973 if they are lucky, sir.

Mr. HARKNESS: If you abolish the three services as they exist to form this single service, how much more time would they require to be able to meet the requirements of this new force which you visualized as being a force something like the United States marines?

Mr. ANNIS: I cannot answer directly, because you are asking me terribly complicated technical questions; I suppose you recognize that. The inventory of materiel of the Canadian defence forces today includes four types: peculiar to ships and the equipment aboard ships—deck suits and what not; peculiar to ground environment; peculiar to air, and common materiel. About 20 per cent of the materiel in the Canadian defence forces industry today is common to the three services—about 20 per cent by volume and about 10 per cent by value. The other 80 per cent is peculiar to one or another of the three environments.

Just having a big airplane accounts for perhaps 40,000 catalogue items in itself. So, even in an integrated force you still have to maintain an inventory tailored to the environment in which the equipment is operated and a fourth inventory for common equipment. I do not think it would change the nature of the problem very much The problem is that to issue and dispose of, replenish, and so on, peculiar to air materiel, requires a technician who is familiar with it by sight. I do not think one can afford the luxury of training a person to be really adept in the identification of air force materiel, and then call him off and have him try to identify ship materiel; it slows things down.

So, it is not the technical problem so much as the problem of what would you gain by putting people all into one uniform? You would still have to tailor the people peculiar to sea, peculiar to land, and peculiar to air, and then you would have this common area. If a person from any one service learned to identify common materiel, he would be in the same position in any other service, because they all use it, if you follow me.

Mr. HARKNESS: In effect, you are saying that you still really have to have a navy or its equivalent, an army or its equivalent, and an air force or its equivalent.

Mr. ANNIS: The point is that you have to have inventories that are the same thing, yes, sir.

Mr. HARKNESS: Therefore, what advantage is there in doing away with the three separate services, and throwing them into one?

Mr. ANNIS: There are a lot of advantages in integration. I suppose Mr. Hellyer—

Mr. HARKNESS: I am not talking about integration; I am talking about unification and of forming a single unified force, I think it is called, rather than having three services as we have at the present time.

Mr. ANNIS: Well, integration and unification will produce the same answer. The things we have not had, and do not have totally yet, is a common language for the same thing. You can call a thing an annulus, a washer, a shim, a spacer—in three different services or five different services—and it is the same thing; it is a flat disc with a hole in the middle. You can catalogue it differently in three services, and you buy a lot more of that item than you need when you put them all together in one heap. So, through a common language for material, common words for demanding—the air force says demand, the army says requisition or the navy says requisition—common indicators for urgency, these are the benefits of integration or unification. I think it can be done under integration without going into unification.

Mr. HARKNESS: This is the point I am getting at. The advantages that could accrue from an integrated logistic system have nothing to do with throwing the three combat elements into one organization.

Mr. ANNIS: I guess not. There are other imponderables, and these are peculiar to the airmen. For a long time it has been an imponderable whether a pilot and navigator—air crew—effectively and economically could serve aboard ship, over the sea, and in the air type of roles. Back in 1946, or so, we tried an experiment called the paragon. We tried to see if we could get an air crew and train them to be a paragon—a master of all trades—that is to say, the bomber field, air defence, transport, reconnaissance and the like. It broke down; it was uneconomical to untrain so that we could start them off in a brand new field.

A moot question still remains of whether the navy should have pilots of its own. This I do not know. At the moment the integration has pulled all the pilots out of the navy and the army, and put them together under one package where they are a professional group. In many ways they are a much more powerful and better organized group than ever before, as witness what happened in the pay business a little while ago. But, whether this is the right answer or the most economical one, I do not know. And to a degree, regarding the question you asked, the answer to it depends on the solution to the problem I have raised. I do not know whether I have helped you or not; I think probably I have confused you.

Mr. HARKNESS: I would take it from what you say that it is going to take 5 years or more to build up an effective logistics system. Do you believe there should be a pause at the present time to consolidate before further experiments are carried on?

Mr. ANNIS: Yes sir. I still feel there is need for more experimentation, perhaps at the very top—at the top departmental and general policy making level—and of the ability of the supporting forces to identify their opposite numbers in each of the career fields and to unify themselves into viable packages which are able to give satisfactory support to the combat forces in each of the environments; sea, land and air. You feel the sorting out of what are the supporting services is not yet accomplished, and there is some very, very tricky regrouping throughout career fields to achieve this.

Mr. HARKNESS: Let us take a specific example: When you were head of the Technical Services Branch we will say the army—your background was entirely in the Air Force—wanted a new anti-tank gun of some sort. Who would you depend on for your advice in putting up this requirement to the Chief of Defence Staff?

Mr. ANNIS: Oh, I would say an army officer, of course.

Mr. HARKNESS: At what level would this army officer be on your staff?

Mr. ANNIS: The highest one available. He would be a one star—a brigadier.

Mr. HARKNESS: And he might or might not be an artillery expert, and might be almost in the same position as yourself with regard to knowing what would be the best type of anti-tank weapon to secure.

Mr. ANNIS: He had quite a variety on his staff. We are now talking of the engineering sub-branch of the technical services. It was organized, as you will recall from the charts, perhaps, into peculiar to sea, peculiar to land and peculiar to air engineering divisions, headed by a one-star officer in each case from each service, wearing that colour of uniform, and within his division he had specialists, probably at lieutenant-colonel level at the very lowest. At full colonel level he would get the technical experience that he sought. It was done on my side of the house if the problem existed, or perhaps the vice chiefs. It was the person who advised the Minister; the senior officer was still the same rank.

Mr. HARKNESS: In your own shop did you have anybody in most cases, such as the one I mentioned, who was sufficiently expert really to give the proper advice with regard to what should be bought?

Mr. ANNIS: From a purely technical view point, yes sir. I believe that at one-star rank a person probably reaches the apex of his technical experience. Thereafter, at two-star, three, and so on, employment is primarily in administration in a broad sense—the management of groups, and resolution of strategic type problems. In fact I think, perhaps, colonel level may be the apex of technical proficiency. I got adequate technical advice, but it is the other side of the house, I think, that I laboured.

Mr. HARKNESS: From the operational point of view?

Mr. ANNIS: Yes, the operational side.

Mr. HARKNESS: Now, would the force that you visualize we are aiming toward which, in your view, would be something similar to the United States Marines, be able to carry on the present roles which the defence forces have to discharge?

Mr. ANNIS: No, sir. I think they would depend on the existence in the United States of an independent navy, army and air force, as I have already said. This is where the professional and technical know-how would have to come from. It would not come from anywhere in Canada; we would not have the base to produce it. Even today a very great deal of our technical weapons and combat know-how comes straight from the operations and experiences of those three services. They tend to be—

Mr. HARKNESS: With the type of forces which you visualize we are moving toward, do you think we would be much more dependent on the experience and developments, and so on, in the United States and other countries than we are at the present time?

Mr. ANNIS: Oh, undoubtedly—very much. Our environmental know-how would be so diffused that I think the problem of gathering it together and consolidating it would be much more difficult and it would be much less meaningful.

Mr. HARKNESS: Another way of stating it would be that the degree of our expertise in the sea, land and air environments would be reduced.

Mr. ANNIS: Oh, yes sir; it would be suppressed.

Mr. HARKNESS: So that, in effect, really we would have a much less effective force.

Mr. ANNIS: I believe I volunteered earlier that a unified force probably is limited to a simpler type of role than is possible with individual services existing.

Mr. HARKNESS: If we are going to have a force such as this, do you think that it could operate without logistic support from other countries?

Mr. ANNIS: This is why I assume the experiment in integration of the supporting services is being conducted—to find out. I do not know sir.

Mr. HARKNESS: Well, on the basis of your experience I think you must have some reasonable idea. If a force we will say it is a combined naval, army and air force—were sent off to take part in a war such as the Korean war, or something along that line, consisting of 20,000 people, would we be able to support that force?

Mr. ANNIS: Logistically, probably yes, but in a combat way less and less; I think the navy especially would lose its capabilities. It suffers, and it endures a hardship as a service, far more than the other two. I think the air force probably would have its roles and opportunities to gain a widespread meaningful combat experience limited more. The army, perhaps, is the service in this unification that would gain the most and probably they would retain their capability. They would have better opportunity to retain a fairly broad span of a ground force capability, compared with—

Mr. HARKNESS: But my question is this: Could we, from a logistics point of view, maintain an operation and a force of that kind, for more than a week or two?

Mr. ANNIS: Oh, I think yes, sir; from a logistics viewpoint, I think so. I cannot answer definitely, because we would have to describe the scenerio of what the deployment involves before I could answer that. We have had a lot of trouble within the Department of National Defence in visualizing what the scenarios would be at the far end in a peace-keeping operation. We have had very little experience; Cyprus is one, and it was extremely simple. It is an observing peace-keeping mission. It is the same as the administrative one in the Congo, so we do not know.

Mr. HARKNESS: Our forces in all these places really are being supported by other people, to a large extent. In Cyprus we are drawing our support from the British bases which are situated there.

Mr. ANNIS: Yes.

Mr. HARKNESS: In other words, we are not supporting that force ourselves from a logistics point of view.

Mr. ANNIS: Do you ask the question, could we? I think, perhaps we could, but it is more convenient not to. I judge sir, you are thinking of a more complex and perhaps more combatant type of peace-keeping or overseas operation.

Mr. HARKNESS: Yes.

Mr. ANNIS: That is where one would need a much better description of the theatre and the nature of operations in intensity and distances before I could even begin to give you an answer.

Mr. HARKNESS: General Moncel told us yesterday that in his view, without any assistance from allies and entirely on our own, that we could support indefinitely not much more than a battalion group.

Mr. ANNIS: I guess that is about right. If you had a battalion group in a fighting posture I would say that is about it. I think he is about right.

Mr. HARKNESS: Therefore, the question I asked first, whether we could send this force of, say 20,000 men which you visualize to some place overseas and support them—

Mr. ANNIS: It is out of the question sir; 20,000 men is miles beyond our capabilities. We would do very well if we took over a battalion group with some supporting services; we would be hard pressed to get them there and keep them there.

An hon. MEMBER: Oh, no.

Mr. ANNIS: Oh, yes. That is a pretty big test.

Mr. HARKNESS: All right, thank you. I see it is 12.30.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, with your permission we shall adjourn until 3.30 this afternoon.

AFTERNOON SITTING

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, when we adjourned at 12.30 I believe Mr. Harkness had just finished his questioning and Mr Andras was the next on my list.

Mr. ANDRAS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Air Marshal Annis, setting aside for the moment the question of timing in this matter of unification, and recognizing that it has been stated that this is an end objective, it would be helpful to me, sir, and perhaps to other members of the Committee, if you would permit me to express my understanding of some of the salient features of unification and then you can correct me or confirm if my understanding agrees with yours. Secondly, at the same time, in this general area of questioning, you would indicate on each point whether or not you agreed in principle with the matter. I am just going to express what I feel are my understandings and you can correct me—I would much appreciate it—and secondly perhaps you could indicate whether you agree or disagree with them as principles.

Air Marshal C. A. ANNIS: I hope you understand that it will be my impression of what unification is. I do not declare myself as an authority.

Mr. ANDRAS: Certainly I am not either. I am much more recently involved in this than you, believe me. But if you will follow me now, I think we can probably go along together a bit on this.

It is my understanding that unification boils down generally to these points: The existing three separate forces—navy, army and air force—would be absorbed into one single force to be known as the Canadian Armed Services. There will be a single walking out uniform, but on this uniform there will be identification of the particular branch of the service to which the serviceman belongs, through lapel badges, or shoulder flashes, and unit and branch identification, and that sort of thing—a single walking out uniform common to all.

Mr. ANNIS: I would like to interject here. I am unable to answer that question because I do not know. Uniforms were not in the area for which I was responsible while serving. A good deal has happened since last May. Definitive decisions have been taken. I am sorry, I cannot answer that bcause I do not know.

Mr. ANDRAS: I just wanted to say that this is now my understanding from the information that has been given out or second reading of the bill—

Mr. ANNIS: This is what I understand; but it is from the press and the general media which are reaching the public.

Mr. ANDRAS: But from those areas of communication or information, you would agree that that seems to be what is meant?

Mr. ANNIS: Yes.

Mr. ANDRAS: Further, on this question of uniform, that the environmental clothing will not necessarily be changed. The fighter pilot will still wear a particular type of equipment—

Mr. ANNIS: I believe that is very true. It will remain as is.

Mr. ANDRAS: That is one feature.

The next one which I understand is involved is that there will be interchangeability of supporting forces personnel where the commonality of trades is great enough to make this practical and desirable.

Mr. ANNIS: I believe this is the objective. If it is not, it would be a very good one. I am quite sure that it is the objective.

Mr. ANDRAS: It is, in fact, one of the more pertinent arguments in favour of unification, is it not?

Mr. ANNIS: Yes.

Mr. ANDRAS: Furthermore, it is my understanding that at least combat people will not be transferred from a unit in one branch to a unit in another branch. For instance, the sonar man—if that is the proper nomenclature for this new job—in the navy, highly trained in a specialist field, would not be transferred to a tank regiment or to an air force operation; a fighter pilot would not be transferred to the infantry; an infantryman to ship duties, nor a tank driver to the air force. In the sense of what we call the combat trades themselves these men would not be transferred from one branch to another. That is my understanding.

Mr. ANNIS: I believe it would be the intention not to do that. It would not make much economic sense to "untrain" a man nor do I think it is the intention in the civilian trades to transfer doctors to being accountants or accountants to being in supply. There are 20 odd carreer fields in the service. Each of them is pretty well—

Mr. ANDRAS: Although doctors in the practice of their profession would perhaps be part of this interchangeable group that might move from the air force to the navy or the army.

Mr. ANNIS: The doctors are already in a single service, as are the dentists and they look after the medical needs of all three services at the moment.

Mr. ANDRAS: Therefore, that type of man would be classfied as in a supporting service, but the combat man, or the sonor man, or the figther pilot, would stay within his environment unless he were so talented that he became a senior commadern, or something of that sort.

Mr. ANNIS: I think perhaps you want to use the words "career field." Would that be a more descriptive term?

Mr. ANDRAS: Yes.

The CHAIRMAN: Do you have a supplementary, Mr. Lambert?

Mr. LAMBERT: Air Marshal, could you tell me how you can take a regimental medical officer who has been trained in infantry or artillery and convert him into an air force medical officer, or vice-versa, take a medical officer who has been in an air force hospital and make him a regimental medical officer?

Mr. ANNIS: I am not a doctor I think it would involve considerable additional training, but I think it could be done. The question is whether the extra training is worthwhile. I do not know that.

Mr. LAMBERT: Let me put it to you this way, that it would take over a year of tactical training, because the regimental medical officer has to be as good on tactics as his commanding officer.

Mr. ANNIS: If I may explain my interjection, when it was mentioned that there would not be a planned interchangeability among the career fields of the combat trades, I think the same plan—and for the same reasoning—would inhibit a large scale interchange among other career fields. One would not take someone who had enlisted as a lawyer and employ him as an accountant.

Mr. ANDRAS: I think I qualified that by saying that my understanding was that the interchange would take place in supporting personnel where the commonality of trade is great enough to make this practical and desirable. That is the reservation I made.

Mr. ANNIS: Yes; I agree.

Mr. ANDRAS: If I may continue, then, I further understand that fighting units will not lose their identities as battalions, squadrons, regiments, ships, and so on. I will quote this directly, if I may:

> Moreover, a single service will involve no change in the organization of these force units into formations such as brigades, air wings, or squadrons of ships.

This is again my understanding. Does it generally conform to your knowledge of the situation, or the plan?

Mr. ANNIS: You see, this presupposes that a ship, for example, is just people of the combat career field. A ship is different. A ship goes to sea and becomes a sort of floating base and it takes its own support personnel with it and willy-nilly for lack of space on the ship and whatnot, the ship people do double duties. You see, one finds cooks manning anti-aircraft therefore, you are partly right; it is applicable to the extent that it can be. But a ship is different from an air squadron. An air squadron is basically just air crew and a little wee bit of what they call "first line maintenance"—these people who fill the gas tanks, inflate the tires, wash the airplanes and do simple maintenance. A ship is a different matter. When you say a ship retains its identity, the people in the ship are different from those—

Mr. ANDRAS: Quite so. What I am really getting at is that the Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders—if you will forgive me for plugging my own former battalion—will stay the Queen's own Cameron Highlanders; The Royal 22nd; The royal Canadian Regiment; The Princess Patricias will stay with those names. The HMCS *Ontario* and so forth will stay with their names. In other words, the fighting unit itself will retain its identity.

Mr. ANNIS: We are in trouble with definitions now. I understand that from an army viewpoint a fighting unit is a little more than a battalion; there are certain supporting arms. A brigade is about the beginning of a unit, and there, one has a beginning of the mix of the combat end and some of the supporting troops of the formation as well. We are saying Yes in so far as the combat personnel are concerned; they will retain their identity as an environmentally trained group in their unit—ship, squadron or brigade, which I guess, is the smallest unit.

Mr. ANDRAS: Yes. Thank you.

Mr. ANNIS: But only the air force unit is composed almost totally of combat personnel. The brigade is a mix, has trades which are capable of being integrated, and so has a ship—even more. The infantryman in the infantry brigade or the armour man in the armoured brigade are pure fighting men. I agree with what you are saying; it is generally true. There are some few people involved to whom it is not entirely accurate. I would go back to saying you are partly right, or mostly right.

Mr. ANDRAS: And those exceptions would be going back again more to the supporting units which are far forward in terms of combat units?

Mr. ANNIS: Yes.

Mr. ANDRAS: There is a degree of commonality there, too, so they might be interchangeable?

Mr. ANNIS: Oh, very much so.

Mr. ANDRAS: The next stage, as I understand the salient features of the unification program, is the single rank structure, again with some modifications which the Minister has expressed?

Mr. ANNIS: Yes; the modifications, I think, deserve a term a little more complex than "some." They tend to be profound in their effect on, I think, the navy. They will have a different impact altogether on the air force. But certainly a common basic designation and a comparability of ranks has been established, and will, I think, be refined.

Mr. ANDRAS: One of the final salient features, as I understand it, would, of course, be the single chief of defence?

Mr. ANNIS: Yes, indeed; it is perhaps the most significant single feature of all.

Mr. ANDRAS: Generally speaking, as a layman, I have covered what I feel are the salient features of the unification plan, and we are not far apart in our understanding of it. You have expressed some reservations, I think, about certain aspects of it, but, generally, there it is.

Mr. ANNIS: Yes. We are always in trouble with definitions here but in general you have expressed it as I understand it, yes.

Mr. ANDRAS: Now, sir, I move on to an area that has been cleared up a bit, but I would like, at the risk of repetition, to talk about the timing on this. You have, as has been brought out, given some indication that, on the one hand, we should press on with integration, yet you object to the speed, on the other hand. You say—this may not be exact, and I am not attempting to put words in your mouth but more to paraphrase it—"I am not opposed to unification but the pace is too fast".

Now, may I present this thought—

Mr. ANNIS: Not quite; really what I am objecting to is that the proposal to jump to unification is too soon. I do not think we have enough experience, or enough empirical data, from results of integration thus far to risk the great big hop into a unified state.

Mr. ANDRAS: May I present three points of view on that one aspect and get your considered reaction to them? First of all, Mr. Lambert this morning expressed concern about the ability to support combat troops if a sudden emergency were thrust upon us during the re-organizing and what we might call the transitional stage of integration. It just occurs to me that perhaps any major re-organization carries with it this time danger. There is a danger point during that re-organization. One must go back and say, "Is re-organization necessary at all"? But once it is decided that it is there is a period there, an hiatus, in which there is some danger of a sudden emergency arising where we might be vulnerable.

Now, I present to you the thought that the longer that transitional stage takes the longer that danger will exist, and that therefore, having decided to make a major change—again with a reasonable, considered approach to it—should it not be pressed vigorously through to conclusion to reduce that time risk?

Mr. ANNIS: I think the alternative, and perhaps more foreboding, situation is that the faster you go the deeper the abyss into which you sink and the steeper the wall when it comes to climb out. It might be too tall ever to climb out.

Mr. ANDRAS: But the closer to the end of the road you get, in the sense of coming back again to an efficient operation—in other words, if you are starting down the path you had better get to the end.

Mr. ANNIS: There is an optimum. It is like two curves crossing. There is an optimum rate, I agree. Too slow would prolong, and too fast would exascerbate

to perhaps an undesirable degree. I feel, balancing these two considerations side by side, that at this stage the pace is too fast, because it engenders an unacceptable danger of falling right into the chasm.

Mr. ANDRAS: But on a parallel danger, accepting that re-organization does cause disruption, the sooner this disruption is overcome and it settles down again, the sooner this risk is reduced?

Mr. ANNIS: With the qualifications I made, yes, indeed.

Mr. ANDRAS: Then I would suggest to you that this bill before us now, which is a follow-on to Bill No. C-90, which was the first on the integration authority, seeks legislative authority to proceed with the next stage of unification.

Now, Air Marshal Sharp in his presentation to us at the beginning of our deliberations here—and other witnesses have confirmed this—has said that it will take several years to complete this unification stage. In fact, I remember the mention of target dates as far forward as 1972 in some segments of the program.

Now, without the bill before us, Bill No. C-243, there is no authority whatsoever to begin the next stage, because Bill No. C-90 applied only to command integration. Therefore, it seems to me that seeking this legislative authority does not necessarily imply that the crash program follows right on the heels of that, on the day the bill is passed in Parliament—if, as and when—and that we suddenly shoot everything in the air and get into total unification. Air Marshal Sharp presented what was to me the very valid thought: All right, integration still has to be smoothed out yet, but we are approaching that rather vague area where the integration crosses into the single force, single uniform concept, and so on, and so we have to stop now right in our tracks. Although the total plan was obvious from 1964 that we were going to go—the end objective was firm, it was said—we need the legislative authority now, but this does not necessarily mean that it is just going to be proceeded and done without planning. We are seeking legislative authority to take the next step.

Mr. ANNIS: I think I would agree that the experiment, or the exercise, of integration towards unification is at a crisis stage. Either one moves back—we have run, I think, too far, too fast—to where one can plan on retaining the identity of the three services, whether under a single chief of staff or three chiefs of staff, long enough to acquire substantial and practical data on the capability to produce efficient supporting services, or one is going to plunge ahead recklessly without that data. This, it seems to me, is the position at which the exercise is now. Either they go ahead willy-nilly and assert an implacable objective to reach full unification, even though it may take five to seven years to do it, or they back off and study the capabilities of acquiring a viable, integrated, or perhaps even unified, set of supporting services.

Mr. LANIEL: May I ask a supplementary question on this?

Mr. ANDRAS: Yes; if I may continue after the supplementary question, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LANIEL: Do you agree with what General Moncel said last night that at this stage turning back, or stopping, or even pausing, may have just as bad an effect as would carrying on?

Mr. ANNIS: I do not know in what context General Moncel said that; but if I—

Mr. LANIEL: He was relating it to the people involved.

Mr. NUGENT: He was talking about morale.

Mr. LANIEL: Yes; he was talking about the senior officers.

Mr. NUGENT: He was talking about morale, in reply to my question about whether it would pick up if we stopped now. He thinks the damage has been done to morale in the pause. I think it was in that context only that he made that remark.

Mr. LANIEL: Yes; well, it is in that context that I want to ask the question.

Mr. ANNIS: I will refer to a remark I made earlier this morning, if I may, at which time I said that it was of great importance to the military to learn whether a chief of staff of a navy, army or air force could get an adequate degree of supporting services from integrated services. This was the question. I went on and said that I believed it necessary to press onward with this experimentation in the re-organization of supporting services. I consider it necessary to press on with that. This, I believe, is integration in this direction.

In that way I agree with General Moncel. We should not stop. This, in my opinion, is a very valuable experiment. There is need to do something about integrating our supporting services, or seeing how much we can do.

We are just at the start of the exercise, but it seems to me at this stage a decision may have been taken that the integrated supporting services are going to be so efficient that we can safely conclude that we will have a viable type of support. I do not think that stage has been reached at all. We have not had any impirical data yet on the performance of construction engineers, for example, in an integrated structure. We do not know. This is the point.

I certainly agree with pressing on with the experiment.

Mr. ANDRAS: Mr. Chairman, if I may continue—

The CHAIRMAN: Another five minutes is all I can give you.

Mr. ANDRAS: Well, sir, I think considerably more than five minutes has been taken up by others.

The CHAIRMAN: Yes, I know; it has been deducted.

Mr. ANDRAS: I will do my best to conclude.

First of all, along that same line, then, I am suggesting that the sooner we press on with integration itself then the sooner we will get over this risk of being caught in the middle of a major re-organization.

Secondly, the bill is seeking legislative authority to proceed now, but that does not necessarily mean that it is going to happen the next day.

My third point, which was brought out by the supplementary question and Mr. Nugent's comments—and I think by other witnesses who were not unfavourably disposed, suggested that there is a need to clear the airnow,; that there has been too much discussion about this and that the people in the forces, and those who might be going to join the forces now, should have a clear-cut vision of what the shape is going to be.

I suggest that this is another reason, looking to the morale factor; for making the decision now even though it is legislative, and that a very orderly process can take place after that in the sense of actually implementing these plans.

Mr. ANNIS: If you will forgive me, I do not think the boy joining the forces thinks that way at all. I think the boy joining the services thinks: What is in it for me in my career field? "I am going to join the air force to be a construction engineer", is what he thinks. Where will it take me? What will be my career prospects in that career field? What will I be responsible for? What training will I get? What will be my status relative to the accountants, to the gunners? This is what he worries about. He does not take the profound approach at all. At the moment our personnel people are not even able to answer these questions.

Mr. ANDRAS: That is exactly my point, sir. The fact is that the re-organization is in the air, and it should be—

Mr. ANNIS: It has nothing to do with unification at all. Integration of the medicals is nearly finished now. They have produced an organization—not necessarily very satisfactory to the combat commanders—which we can say is integrated, or unified, whichever you like. A person entering the Canadian medical career field has a pretty good idea now of what sort of entry qualifications he has to have, and what sort of career prospects there are. This, by and large, is about as far as the entrant thinks, in my opinion.

Mr. ANDRAS: Sir, you retired in May of 1966, which would be just under a year ago?

Mr. ANNIS: Yes.

Mr. ANDRAS: You retired after a very distinguished career.

Air Marshal Sharp in his testimony referred to what seemed to me to be some rather comprehensive planning that has been done and is under way. For instance, we are now in the middle of a pilot study assisted by a Canadian firm of consultants on financial management; a comprehensive job analysis program has been initiated by a full-time staff of service experts; an increasing number of management engineering studies have been performed. The total in 1965 and 1966 was some 530 different studies. I will not bore you with repetitive detail, but this is chock-full of what, to me, are reassuring indications of a very, very rofessional management approach to and analysis of the problems, and that it has been well thought out. Prior to your retirement, did you have access to these studies, or have you seen any which have been done since?

Mr. ANNIS: I was party to the initiation of a substantial number of them.

Mr. ANDRAS: But many would have been continuing and have reached completion since?

Mr. ANNIS: Oh, yes, indeed.

Mr. ANDRAS: Thank you very much.

Mr. NUGENT: Sir, perhaps I might first clear up what appears me to be a very grave misapprehension in Mr. Andras' approach to this problem. I thought it was underlined by one of the first statements you made, sir, when you talked of the integration "experiment". I believe your words were that it does not justify the belief that the jump into unification would be a successful venture. I believe that is the way you expressed it.

Mr. ANNIS: Yes, I think that is right.

Mr. NUGENT: In other words, this is not a move from the integration methods that have been used and studied into a continuation of unification, nor is it legislation necessary to finish that, but it is a new jump, and a different departure, is it not?

Mr. ANNIS: Yes, I think it is. I am wallowing in this field, too. It is in the semi-legal world that I do not understand too well.

Mr. NUGENT: Well, sir, it seems to me that in this Committee we have, perhaps, been concentrating on unification and what it means, and therefore we have a good deal to learn about integration and about what has been going on.

Perhaps if I asked you a few questions on integration it might give us a better understanding. For instance, we have heard of this "experiment" in integration. As I understand it, to begin with, integration—and I am certainly no expert—is really a series of experiments, and the various supply services such as medical, pay, food, clothing and supplies, have been looked at and studied with the objective in mind of saving money and to see whether duplication can be avoided—whether they can be integrated as a service in order to cut down on duplication and therefore save some money in administration expense.

Mr. ANNIS: Very much so, yes.

Mr. NUGENT: Now, this is the general plan of integration that has been pursued?

Mr. ANNIS: I think that is why, too.

Mr. NUGENT: So that for each service there has to be a survey made to see how it works, what sort of personnel it has, the environment and so on, and then at least a theoretical plan drawn up of a new sort of structure to see how it might be done in all the armed forces; and then a comparison made of the new and existing structures, to see how far it would apply and whether, in theory, it would result in a saving in personnel or money? Is that the process?

Mr. ANNIS: Yes. The stage at which the exercise is now has retained the identity of the three services; that is to say, of the people in them. It has established integrated command and integrated headquarters. The key feature is that it has retained the uniform identity and the professional identity of the combat troops of each of the services. That is what it has done. Unification promises to eliminate this group, whose morale, as I say, is particularly associated with the environment in which they are inextricably involved and whose uniform and badges denote their professionalism in it.

As I see it, the chief problem in unification is the removal of the uniform and the professional badges of those groups. I do not think it affects the supporting troops at all, or seriously.

Mr. NUGENT: This is why I wanted to clarify "integration" in my own mind, and to establish, first of all, that integration is not necessarily a complete over-all plan; that, in other words, there are various pieces of integration and each is a separate experiment in itself to see how it would work. Is that not true?

Mr. ANNIS: There are, as I have said, some 20-odd career fields. I guess that sort of number will work out when you take infantrymen, armourers, gunners, sappers, pilots, doctors, and so on. Each of the three services has, as its hard core

its combat people and before integration each of them had its own array of supporting services. The unease existed because each of the combat environment supporting services was quite similar to the others. One hoped that one could eliminate the duplication in the supporting element, and this is a very worthwhile hope.

Mr. NUGENT: Yes, sir.

Mr. ANNIS: Whether there is unification or integration, one is going to do the same sort of experimentation with the amalgamation of these career fields which comprise the supporting forces. That is the key point.

Mr. NUGENT: Right, sir. Now, the point I wanted to clarify is that each one of these career fields or supporting services presents a different problem?

Mr. ANNIS: Yes, it does.

Mr. NUGENT: It necessitates its own study.

Mr. ANNIS: Yes.

Mr. NUGENT: And would perhaps have, in many ways, a different sort of solution, with a different organizational structure to take care of the differences in the problems met?

Mr. ANNIS: I agree.

Mr. NUGENT: And some of these planning studies, would perhaps take longer than others. Some would run into more technical difficulties and some, it would be found, would give greater economies than others?

Mr. ANNIS: It might help if I gave an illustration. May I Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN: Please do.

Mr. ANNIS: Let us take, for example, the technical services field and the problem of emerging with a supply career field. The word itself meant different things to the three services before integration.

The air force had a list of supplies. Supply meant those things which had to do with provisioning, procurement, warehousing and the like. However, it defined only material, and it did not apply to food. That was the air force. It entered the integration in that part.

The navy had a career field which was supply and accountancy. A person was trained in both fields. If the decision is taken to establish in the integrated or unified service a single career field called "supply" then all the naval officers will have to decide which way to fall, because they obviously cannot be both in the integrated services.

In the army there was a corps called the Ordnance Corps, which looked after a great deal of the supply activities. But, in addition, there was another one, supply and transport,—the RCASC—who were responsible for the supply function in quite a range of materiel, and, in addition, had a good deal of responsibility for food. Part of this responsibility for food lay in the procurement, warehousing and distribution and accounting. Another part lay in the preparation of food, in what you might call the dietetic aspects of it.

Therefore, if we want an integrated supply field the air force is set. It has this field. The navy has to split their officers down the middle somehow and fall off into one field or the other. The army ordnance corps can go in as a package,

but the supply people have to split first of all horizontally, and those who do the food preparation will disappear off into the medical branch; those who were in the supply business would have to be cut vertically and some of them would go off into the food supply and others into the materiel supply. Therefore, we have quite an assembly problem in establishing a new career field in one.

Then we have the problems of standardization of techniques and language. What will be the training syllabus when a person in the supply field suddenly is responsible for supply to ships at sea, air bases and army deployments, rear and forward areas and the like? One has to do quite a bit of pondering about what kind of syllabus to establish, and what sort of a career they may follow. This is the problem in the supply field.

When one moves over into the communications and electronics field it is perhaps more complex. I described to you earlier this morning a bit of a problem in construction engineering. This is the sort of thing that has to be done; and it is independent of whether there is a unification exercise or an integration exercise going on.

Mr. NUGENT: The reason for my question is that I think the government has approached this problem of unification by suggesting, or at least the public seems to have the idea, that integration has proven to be such a big success and has gone along so well and has proven itself so well that we could now have unification as the end result and that we should tidy it up and finish it up.

Perhaps we should just examine it and see if that is so. I found it rather surprising this morning how far we had yet to go to finish the experiment in integration, and the purpose of my questioning, sir, is to underline the point that, far from being a complete and proven success, ready for the next step, we are—would it be fair to say—only really now beginning the actual work in integration? The theoretical plans may have been drawn up in some areas but in others the plans have not been evolved to carry it through. Therefore we are far from being finished with the integration experiment; we are in the middle of experiments and some are in a very, very embroiled stage.

Mr. ANNIS: In my opinion that is true; that is a fair statement.

Mr. NUGENT: Yes; and you have said that in the technical services, for instance, the integration process will take three of four or five years. In other words, I imagine that, in some of the technical services supplied, although there might have been a preliminary plan some tentative probing has revealed that even new plans need to be devised, or new arrangements made, if they are going to be integrated? They have not started to implement any of them yet in some fields.

Mr. ANNIS: It is a little further along than that.

Mr. NUGENT: I want to put it this way, if I may, that the providing of a medical service for all three services was a comparatively simple integration problem compared to what you are now running into in the technical services?

Mr. ANNIS: It was not easy. They spent some years getting their trades and what not sorted out. What they ended up with was something that was a surprise to me. It was not quite what I thought we wanted in the military.

Mr. NUGENT: They started with an idea and it took them years of experiment. Would it be fair to say that in the technical service field you might have four or five branches that would create the same number of problems and require the same amount of experimenting?

Mr. ANNIS: Oh, yes; each of these major career fields, when established, will be a problem in itself.

Mr. NUGENT: I have had the feeling that this Committee has been concentrating too much on the question of unification and that it might be wise to look at some of the problems, and understand the status, of integration.

I will put it this way. It seems to me that the government has said: "Well, we laid the foundation and built the base and integration has proved itself. Now let us put the building of unification on it". I have the feeling that we have planned the footings and have started some of them, but that it is a little early to start putting a building on what we have now? Is that a fair analogy?

Mr. ANNIS: It is rather like that, yes; it is that sort of uneasiness I have.

Mr. NUGENT: I was intrigued by what General Moncel said yesterday when he mentioned that in some of the planning, or studies of personnel, in trying to eliminate some of the fat and avoid duplication, he found when he came to the navy that some fellows were wearing about 17 hats. I think you said this morning that they were wearing three or four hats.

Mr. ANNIS: I think that about four is the maximum I have ever seen and that was unusual.

Mr. NUGENT: Now, the problem would appear to be this, sir, in integration, that if you are going to eliminate some of the fat and you find in your integration scheme to set up a combined operation in this service for all three that the personnel in the navy are already doing two or three jobs, it would seem that there is very little fat that has to be eliminated in the naval part of it.

Mr. ANNIS: The navy is a small service of 20,000 compared to roughly 50,000 in each of the army and air force. They were compelled to extemporize in their supporting services and they, of course, have a quite different structure in the proportion of civilians. The navy had to be different because it operates differently. It is different.

Without giving a lecture I cannot convey to you just what the differences were. They were quite unique and quite different. The only way to put the navy on what you might call a standardized footing with air force and army in some of these supporting services was to tear it apart and have them wearing just one hat and put the other two or three hats aside, so that some of their jobs went unfilled. It was that sort of problem.

Mr. NUGENT: Therefore in some of the fields in the navy where you had a man wearing two or three hats, standardization of the service meant that they were going to have to separate the functions and have two or three men doing this one job if they were going to fit in with the integrated supply service?

Mr. ANNIS: We were not quite as inefficient as that, but we certainly had to change their career fields and their employment dramatically, and sometimes it created consternation when it was imposed on them.

Mr. NUGENT: When this new integrated scheme came along it would have a considerable effect, on them, I suppose. General Moncel said that he was amazed at the efficiency, and I think you said they were very efficient. There was great disruption. The purpose was to cut the fat out of the services generally, and yet we find that there was no fat, comparatively speaking, to be cut out of the navy. So that there was disruption for very little effect? Is that the sort of attitude—

Mr. ANNIS: I think, to do them justice, that they were very well organized in the technical services—very efficiently and very compactly. They had just gone through a 4 or 5 per cent trimming the year before in their service and in their civilian personnel. They certainly had no fat with which to go over this organizational hump.

Mr. NUGENT: The purpose of this exercise, of course, is to cut out fat or to cut down on administrative costs. As our Minister says, the scheme is to cut down the administrative costs to make more money available for equipment.

Mr. ANNIS: Excuse me, may I qualify what I said a little bit? That would be unfair to integration. There was still duplication in what the navy was doing in each of these fields, to some degree. Although there was a reduction in the naval efficiency I suppose it was partly offset by the fact that certain duplications among the three services were eliminated. I think it would only be proper to record that.

Mr. NUGENT: But in the eyes of a naval commander the re-organization would be justified only if the reduction in the duplication did not result in an increase in other administrative costs. Therefore he could see a net gain of sufficient worth to justify this disruption of what they were already so skilled at doing.

Mr. ANNIS: It is rather difficult to totalize. There were some losses and some gains. I think, in the navy's case, the penalties imposed on them outweighed the advantages that the navy, as a function, acquired. I think that is true. They were penalized. I think the air force was—

Mr. NUGENT: Perhaps because of some of the minister's statements about a revolt of the admirals and because of some of the misconceptions I thought it was time to be fair to the navy. There is a certain understandable difference in the approach, perhaps, of a naval commander from what there would be in the army, because the advantages of some of these integration schemes would certainly be less evident to a naval commander than to an army colonel?

Mr. ANNIS: Yes; his international language is so different. He has a much wider psychological and technical jump to make to consolidate even the supporting services with army and air force.

Mr. NUGENT: I believe we have had some testimony that, as well as the supporting services, such things as the new integrated training command have not yet worked out satisfactorily. In other words, though the idea may be right it takes a certain length of time to establish this and iron out the bumps. Is that correct?

Mr. ANNIS: I am unable to say how far advanced training command is now in its organization. It was in a pretty embryonic state as of last May. I believe they have made some substantial progress at least in their planning.

I would say this, too, that the objective of training command is, by and large, to do the very basic training that is common right across the board, and also to do some of the peculiar to sea, peculiar to air and peculiar to land training that is semi-basic. The actual operational stage, both technical and combat, will be done in the combat or functional command.

Mr. NUGENT: So that here it seemed to be a good idea, because everybody does training. The theory of having one command doing all the training sounds like a marvellous opportunity to save money and avoid duplication. Then when you start to implement it you find that only a very small percentage of the actual training of personnel is similar, or identical, so that it can be handled by one training organization.

Mr. ANNIS: Yes, sir; but, if you will forgive me, there is some. The objective of the navy is not to do more than that some that is common; but for the remainder they have a very difficult problem because the troops are out at sea so much. They have the cyclical problem of ships coming and going.

Mr. NUGENT: The problem then, sir, becomes this: You go to the trouble and expense of planning, setting up and manning a new general training command that is going to attack only a small part of the training problem. The savings in that small part have to make up for the cost of setting up that command and the cost of the organization and the disruption, etc., before it can justify itself. That is dealing with only a small part of the training command.

Mr. ANNIS: If you will forgive me, I think you are under somewhat of a misapprehension in your understanding. I do not think there is an intention to do this common basic training of naval inductees very far away from the existing schools, and there will not really be much of an investment imposed on the navy in this. It will be something that they may get gratis, so to speak.

Mr. NUGENT: The point is that Admiral Brock said that it has not been a success because they have tried to go too far. He suggests that it should be reduced to functioning in relation to basic training, and to common training outside the purview of operational commanders.

Mr. ANNIS: I think that is what is happening, but I stand to be corrected. I am not an authority in this field. That question really should be put to officers who are really up to date on that. On the more technical training I can give you the answers I have given you, but not much more than that.

Mr. NUGENT: The main purpose of my questioning this afternoon, sir, is to try to clarify, and put into perspective, the situation of integration. You have given us some examples, in your technical services field, of the length of time it has taken, and so on. We have discussed the ease with which it was done in the medical services even though that was complicated. In every field where integration has been applied we have found problems, have we not?

Mr. ANNIS: We have found problems and we have found dangers. I think the product of integration, or unification, of the career field sometimes turns out differently from what one expected. From a military viewpoint one of the main reasons for having a medical service is to deal with those medical problems peculiar to air medicine, underwater medicine and combat medicine. Clinical medicine is, to a degree, not an over-riding consideration from a combat commander's viewpoint. Certainly I think the medical people already know of this view, and do not like it.

The result of integrating our medical services has been to produce a medical organization which is almost totally clinical. This is medicine for medicine's sake. This is what doctors like. They like clinical medicine. This is their field and it has widened out and produced an interesting career, to the point where they not only look after healthy people who have been screened and enter the services and who, when they become unhealthy around age 55—like me!—are tossed out, but they are taking up pediatrics and geriatrics and so on at the other extreme. This has become a clinical service. So that in the integration business one is apt to end up with a product a little different from what you expect.

Mr. NUGENT: I did not want to get into the technicalities of any service. I wanted to clear away some of these misconceptions on integration and the idea that because integration works here we just take it and put it in another place. There is no such thing as: We have integration and it is going to solve all our problems. Each part or each application of the idea of re-organization is a different problem in itself. Am I substantially accurate in that?

Mr. ANNIS: Yes, each career field has to sort out things which are common and concentrate on getting common handling of those, and find those things which are different and take care of the problems there.

Mr. NUGENT: Have I run out of my time? I have only one or two questions.

I think you said this morning—and General Moncel said it yesterday—that you were very, very proud of what has been done in this field; that the senior officers, the planners and their assistants carrying out the services had conducted themselves very well and had done their utmost to make these schemes of integration work?

Mr. ANNIS: Oh, yes.

Mr. NUGENT: And you are satisfied in your own mind that they have done everything that could reasonably be expected of men who want to be proud of the way in which they do their duty?

Mr. ANNIS: I do indeed; yes, sir.

Mr. NUGENT: I suppose that when you were planning there would be honest differences of opinion on whether it would work here or there?

Mr. ANNIS: Oh, goodness, yes. It was difference of opinion without rancour. It was a good type of difference of opinion.

Mr. NUGENT: The resistance, then, is not a case of officers digging in their heels but of co-operating once they have put forward what their objections are, or their view on the dangers in it. It is a case, pretty generally, of co-operating once the plan is accepted?

Mr. ANNIS: I will say again what I said this morning, sir, that each career field in the services, even as each career field in civilian life, has different attitudes towards a similar problem. Within the services the various career fields have a great many opinions. I think each person in civilian life, or in the services, tends to approach a career from a selfish viewpoint, saying: "What is in this career for me"? This has been the approach all the way through.

Mr. NUGENT: One last question, if I may, sir.

There has been a suggestion, even before this Committee, that part of the reason for our not having proceeded further is that some of the officers started to

make a fuss about unification and were fighting the Minister and fighting progress. Is there any justification for that sort of attitude, that you saw?

Mr. ANNIS: Well, as the exercise continued people worked very hard. They worked as hard as they could; but as I said this morning there was an overload; there was frustration through inability to handle all these commitments which were on the plate at the same time. Considering the number of people available and the guidance I think they did astonishingly well; but in an absolute sense it was far short of the ideal. There is much yet to be done. I can say, yes, they worked very hard and did wonders, but they were still unhappy.

Mr. NUGENT: Thank you, sir.

Mr. ANDRAS: Mr. Chairman, could I ask one supplementary question arising from Mr. Nugent's question?

The CHAIRMAN: Yes, do.

Mr. ANDRAS: Air Marshal Annis, General Foulkes published an article in 1961, and I would just like to ask you for your comments on this statement that he made. On the question of service rivalry he said:

> After my nine years as chairman of the Chiefs of Staff, trying to co-ordinate the rival services, I am convinced that we can't achieve much more by the present road. Attempts to integrate the three services by persuasion have been going on ever since 1945. They have woven a huge spider's web of committees, which are rather like foreign ministers' meetings where rival powers try to reach a compromise.

The implication was that there definitely had been a detrimental effect brought about by the rivalry between the services.

Mr. ANNIS: I can remember when I was secretary to the chiefs of staff back about 1950 being tossed out by the chiefs so that they could fight. They did not want me to be hurt. There was a great deal of freedom among them, and they could. They had, by and large, substantial sums of money, a big war just behind them, and the like. The metamorphosis in 10 years among chiefs, their attitude towards each other and their willingness to co-operate, was remarkable. I think what General Foulkes said might have been true 15 years ago. From my knowledge of many chiefs in recent years, here and elsewhere, I think it is quite untrue today. The modern chief of staff is trained in team work. In fact, he is pretty well judged on how good a team player he is with his brother services.

Mr. ANDRAS: Thank you.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Air Marshal, I just want to thank Mr. Andras for his interpretation of "unification" and for the reassurance to the Navy that indeed they are not going to lose anything and are going to remain as they are. I am afraid that is not quite the way I or the RCN interpret it. They have some fears, too.

I want to ask just one question, Air Marshal, on something which has been referred to but has never really been dealt with, I hope the other members of the Committee will bear with you, because I am asking you to use what time I have available to let your mind ramble a little and tell us about the United States' experiment, from your own understanding of it, from reading and, I am sure, from having had some direct dealings with the American forces.

What has been their experience in the terms of what we may be trying to accomplish? Have there been lessons that have been brought to the fore in the United States' experience that we have looked at and discarded, or accepted and adopted? Is there a tremendous fund of information and knowledge and results from various types of studies that we could be using? Are we tending to ignore it? On the problem that we have before us can we gain in the future from the United States' experience?

I do not want to put you in the position of having to make a 10 or 15 minute speech, but perhaps there might be some questions that will arise out of it.

Mr. ANNIS: Well, thank you for the compliment. I could not really make a 10 or 15 minute speech.

Militarily, the United States, of course, is almost a different world from us. Their size, their budget, their complexity, their abilities, their areas and spans of activity, in each of the services are of total orders of magnitude beyond anything that we in Canada have. However, they, too, have been worried about duplication in their supporting services.

As I mentioned, some 10 years ago they did organize all of their combat commands into integrated commands, and the commanders of these commands report directly to their joint chiefs of staff, which is what they call their chiefs of staff committee. The chiefs of the individual services, including their Marine Corps, are able to participate in decisions to employ the integrated commands by way of the joint chiefs, but only as a member of a corporate body.

Additionally, they have spent a good deal of time identifying these commonalities among the supporting services, on the commonalities within the supporting services which exist among all services. I think they have nine agencies altogether which have been extracted and operate, but they belong to a fourth service sort of thing in each of these fields. To take supply as an example, the United States Air Force has a supply organization of its own, and handles only those things which are peculiar to air. The navy and the army are very similar. Then there is a defence agency which looks after the bulk-buying of commonalities and does a good deal of the distribution. A very similar sort of thing exists in communication, in transportation, and the like.

The other feature which is significant in the United States' structure is one I mentioned this morning, the limitations imposed on the responsibilities or the powers of the chiefs of staff, and the changing of their responsibilities to the acquiring of personnel and equipment and furnishing them to the commands. I think that, in a nut shell, is a summary.

There is a great deal of duplication in the United States forces still and of which they are very conscious, but I have been told by very senior officers in their services, including the senior civilian officer, that they have refrained, as a result of deliberate decision, from further integration. They have, in other words, retained such duplication as there is in the belief that it enables a degree of responsiveness to the environmental components of these integrated commands that would not be possible otherwise.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Do I draw the right conclusion the various environmental components are sustained in order properly to service the integrated functional unit?

Mr. ANNIS: Well, to take a command, of course, by far their most active command now is in Viet Nam. It is a command under an army commander and he is in an integrated headquarters and has control over all the forces there. The forces comprise various combinations of air units, ground forces and combat units, navy units and marine units. The defence supply agency has certain responsibilities for overall supply to the individual services, but the individual services supply organizations have, by and large, the responsibility for supplying the naval, ground force, and air components respectively.

Mr. FORRESTALL: In any of your planning, for example, in those areas with which you are most familiar, did you draw on any of the United States' experience to assist you?

Mr. ANNIS: By far and away the main one has been in the field of cataloguing identifying and handling their material. There they have been of enormous assistance to us.

Of course, they began this operation back in 1948 in a casual sort of way; Congress gave them a real boost from behind in 1951, and they worked like beavers and finished it in 1959. We are not finished yet in Canada, by quite a piece, although we have made a lot of progress.

Mr. FORRESTALL: In reference to this particular field of cataloguing, did some of your people actually go down, on did you yourself go down to the States, or did people come up here with actual direct—

Mr. ANNIS: What is called the United States Federal Cataloguing System, was adopted by NATO and then became known as the NATO Cataloguing System. All the countries of NATO have now adopted it and all of them have benefited enormously from United States' help which has been very freely given. Of course, we had people go down to take the course there, as did a lot of other nations.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Then there is not too much that the United States' experience could perhaps teach us, that we have not put ourselves in the position of taking advantage of?

Mr. ANNIS: Not really; it is a quite different arrangement there, just in magnitude. But they are as conscious as we of duplication. They have investigated this throughly and the decision that they have made to retain single services are deliberate and as a result of study and re-study.

Mr. FORRESTALL: That is fine. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Lambert, I do not know whether you had finished when you—

Mr. LAMBERT: Yes. I had.

Mr. MCINTOSH: May I say to the witness, Mr. Chairman, that I am very grateful for his testimony because it has given me the key to many puzzles. It has given me the key to this mysterious word "unification". I think it is a red herring.

Before I go into this and tell you what the key is, could I ask you if you had any experience similar to that of General Moncel with the Minister when they were called into the Minister's office on, I think he said, two occasions, and when he was very embarrassed that the Minister asked his subordinates whether they

agreed with unification? He wanted the subordinates to answer first before he asked the Commanding Officer.

Mr. ANNIS: No; I was exposed by the Minister to no embarrassing situations.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Well, the key that I am referring to is the point you brought out that there is a dual role for Canada, one to fulfil the commitments that we already have with the alliances, and the other one of having peacekeeping forces. This, I say, is the key, because now I understand what the Minister meant in his speech where he seemed to contradict himself so many times. As I mentioned this morning, he said: "The system will not be changed; we will continue to have armoured regiments and everything else," but as I said he always ended up with something like this: "Until a force structure within the unified forces develops." To me that means that he is going to opt out of something. I would say that in the alliances that we have at the present time we have only one role. He did not seem to be too concerned about requiring 150,000 men to fulfil both these roles.

At any time when you were on his staff did he indicate to you that Canada should have only one role—the role of peacekeeping?

Mr. ANNIS: If so, it would be a privileged communication, and I would be unable to answer it; but I think it is not unfair to say that he did not make such a statement sir. I think it is quite proper to answer that.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Would you suggest, then, after reading the Minister's speech and hearing everything that you have heard about unification, although no one seems to have the same definition of it, that this is what he had in mind, after he contradicted himself in his brief on numerous occasions. In fact, to many of us he seems to have said yes and no at the same time. However, he always ends up with saying that until the force structure within the unified force is developed, we will have all the services as we understand them now; but when we come down to this one role of peacekeeping, we will have no navy, we will have no army, and we will have no air force as such. Would you agree with such a role as that?

Mr. ANNIS: I am going to say I do not know. In so far as to whether I agree, as a private citizen it is my impression that the extent of need in Europe is waning, and whether it will disappear altogether, I cannot say. So if we are going to maintain a modest military force in Canada, the possibility of us having a larger amount of resources for application to peacekeeping would be not illogical. Whether this is a good plan, I do not know. For so long as we have responsibilities to perform in NATO, I judge the government's intention is to continue them. I have no reason to believe otherwise.

Mr. MCINTOSH: With that I will agree. But if the premise is as I concluded from what you said today in testimony, that Canada in the future, six or seven years hence, by 1972 or whatever the target date is, is only going to fill the one role, the only role that we can fulfil without compulsory military service or conscription, then perhaps we should be debating now these various roles rather than this mysterious term "unification". I would ask you, sir, if it does come to pass that this is the only role for Canada, if we are going to leave the defence of our country to the Americans, what would happen to your pride as a past officer and ours as civilians as to the sovereignty of our country? Do you think it would be good?

Mr. ANNIS: I find it a very difficult question even to grasp, if you will forgive me for saying so. I said earlier that I felt a unified force would be unlikely to handle a wide variety of roles. It would be much more difficult for it to handle a wide variety of roles, than it would be with the retention of three distinct forces, navy, army and air force, in the emasculated form that I described. But what the future will be in the way of military threats, I do not want to predict, I think it would be proper for me to say that I am a Canadian and I believe, as a Canadian, that I am anxious to see our country do its part, whatever that part is. I come to a halt there. I cannot say much else.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Mr. Chairman, I will come to a halt there. I had a lot more questions to ask the witness, as I told you this morning, about Materiel Command, Maritime Command and so on but it is possible we can bring those out at some other date. I do not think Mr. Churchill has had an opportunity.

The CHAIRMAN: No. I have him on my list now, followed by Mr. Fane.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I would like to say something also about computers. Which button on the computer do you push—and I am not ridiculing computers; they have a useful purpose—if you want a pipe band for your unit. If you push a certain button do you get all drummers or saxophone players or a pipe band. This was referred to yesterday by General Moncel. He said the classification was reduced from 346 to 97; that you have one classification for bandsmen now instead of the 20 classifications you had before, but you also had to have some other designation to say what type they were. I could go on and mention cooks, like General Moncel did. However, I will withhold those questions, Mr. Chairman, until another witness appears.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Mr. Chairman, from what I have heard from the witness today, along with what I heard of the testimony given by General Moncel and General Foulkes, the three of them together have shot so many holes in the structure erected by the Minister that it is getting to be pretty shaky. I would like to ask this question of the witness. When were you launched on the unchartered sea of integration? When did this start?

Mr. ANNIS: I was given advance warning about the first of June, 1964 that I would be assuming the appointment of Chief of Technical Services on the first of August, 1964.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Was that prior to the publication of the White Paper?

Mr. ANNIS: No. The White Paper was published about the 30th or the end of March, 1964.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Oh yes. Other than the Minister and the Associate Minister have you had the opportunity of discussing the proposed reorganization with other Ministers of the Crown or with the Prime Minister? In other words, have you met with the Cabinet committee on defence at any time?

Mr. ANNIS: No, sir.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Did you expect that unification would be pressed forward at this time, or was there any advance notice that that would happen?

Mr. ANNIS: No, there was no advance notice. I suppose there were straws in the wind perhaps but one would have had to interpret them accurately to guess correctly.

Mr. CHURCHILL: You did not foresee that unification was likely to be proceeded with in the Fall of 1966.

Mr. ANNIS: No.

Mr. CHURCHILL: And pressed to a conclusion in 1967?

Mr. ANNIS: No. It was possible. It was obvious that it depended on how the Minister weighed the progress that had been made thus far.

Mr. CHURCHILL: During your term of office, did you have several opportunities to indicate to the Minister the difficulties that you were facing in integration.

Mr. ANNIS: Yes, indeed. Yes, indeed, and I asserted them.

Mr. CHURCHILL: And did you suggest to the Minister that it might take several years in order—

Mr. ANNIS: Yes, sir.

Mr. CHURCHILL: —to bring the thing to a conclusion?

Mr. ANNIS: Yes, sir. I pointed out the magnitude of the task we had in technical services and the limited resources to accomplish so much in so little a time, and that we had really acquired very little empirical data as yet.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Were you kept fully informed of the various changes that have already been instituted or were you taken by surprise by various statements of policy issued by spokesmen for the Minister?

Mr. ANNIS: No. I was kept adequately informed, I believe, sir, consistent with my duties at Canadian Forces Headquarters.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Do you see an increase in the fighting efficiency of the armed forces through unification?

Mr. ANNIS: No, I do not, sir.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I was pleased that you and other witnesses have pointed out that the object that is being aimed at is to provide combat forces. If unification in your opinion and in the opinion of other experienced senior officers does not increase the fighting efficiency of our forces, what purpose then will be served by unification?

Mr. ANNIS: By unification—

Mr. CHURCHILL: A single service, a single uniform.

Mr. ANNIS: As compared with integration in the form I described, for example, do you mean?

Mr. CHURCHILL: No, unification—single service, a single uniform. If you see no improvement in the fighting efficiency of our forces by that step, what purpose do you see in unification, if any?

Mr. ANNIS: I do not see a great deal provided one is successful with integrating fully the supporting services and the top command structure.

Mr. CHURCHILL: You talked this morning about the construction engineers in the three services and pointed out to us the great differences among those three. Do you seriously think that it is possible to unify that rank of the service? It would seem to me that supermen would be required in order to have the technical knowledge available.

Mr. ANNIS: Paragons.

Mr. CHURCHILL: A paragon. There may be people like this in the services; we do not notice them in parliament. If they are in the services, will they emerge from your study of this?

Mr. ANNIS: They would be hard to get and hard to keep, I think, sir. There would be quite an investment in training them.

Mr. CHURCHILL: What is the length of training for a construction engineer, for example, for the army, after he has completed his university work, and so on?

Mr. ANNIS: I should know the answer to that but I do not, I am afraid, sir. I do not know.

Mr. CHURCHILL: If you then have a trained construction engineer in the army and you expose him to the training for such a work with the navy, that would take a fair amount of time, would it?

Mr. ANNIS: I would believe so from what I have seen of the navy constructors. They are quite professional in a specialized field. I do not see any point in retraining a chap who is experienced in the sapper work to be a navy constructor, and I doubt somehow if it would happen. However, I do not see how the career fields can be managed without interchange. I do not know the answer to that question. This is one that troubles me still, Mr. Churchill.

Mr. CHURCHILL: That is perhaps one of the reasons that you are suggesting a pause—

Mr. ANNIS: Yes.

Mr. CHURCHILL: —of five years—in order to consolidate and plan ahead which is essential.

Mr. ANNIS: I think we have to bring in some inductees into that integrated field because there is now an integrated construction engineering career field in the Canadian defence forces. We have taken the people from the navy, the army and the air force and rolled them into a bundle. We have had just a few who have come in new. We have had very little retraining, very little cross-training of the erstwhile air force personnel in army or in navy roles and so on. We have never had them tested under pressure yet. We do not know how they are going to perform. Their work at organizing themselves into a structure looks very good, but we have not had this machine running. We do not know whether it fits or not.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Other people have pointed out that there seems to be a great emphasis now on training for careers with the sole exception of training for fighting. Is that about what is going on?

Mr. ANNIS: Well, I admit, sir, that those in the supporting fields have a much more attractive prospect when they retire. They do have a comparable career field in civilian life with which they can maintain professional contact and the like, on whose resources they can draw and with whom they can participate as a part of a large entity. It is an identification problem.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Is information going out to the officers in the three services with regard to the careers that are open to them? Is there a certain amount of publicity in that connection in order to encourage applicants?

Mr. ANNIS: I think Air Marshal Reyno was before you last week and he could have given you the up-to-date answers on how firmly the career fields have been identified and spelled out—specified, and what progress has been made in introducing training in those fields—both the training of new inductees and the cross-training of people who have been taken from somewhere and put into those fields. I do not know.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Somewhere along the line junior officers would have information put in front of them with regard to future careers.

Mr. ANNIS: Yes. This, of course, has been a bugaboo—it was until I left—in the recruiting program. A young chap would go up to the recruiting office and say that he was interested in being a construction engineer, for example. He would ask, "What is the career field? What is the career progression. What are my initial courses which I will be taking and so on?" The recruiting officer could not answer those questions. As a result, many a young man turns away and says he will go somewhere where they know the answers. I do not know whether the recruiting officers know the answers yet or not.

Mr. CHURCHILL: It would be interesting to have some recruiting officer inform the Committee as to whether attention is drawn to the actual fighting that the men might be called upon to perform. Is that posted as a career?

Mr. ANNIS: No. I think, for example, that the infantry man's role in the career field has been pretty well defined and will not change. The weapons that he is given and the tactics that he will be taught I suppose will change, but the general purpose of infantrymen will remain. I do not think that the infantryman today or the infantry officer is able to be too confident of just what his career progression will be—nor the artillery man, nor the armoured chap. Even I think the air force pilot, for example, can recognize that his career is shrinking quite rapidly—the amplitude of it. The span of choice is shrinking, although, of course, I think it is in the minds of most pilots eventually to end up in Transport Command. It is not a combat command; it is a support command and has a very powerful comparable organization in the civilian field.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I have just one final question, Mr. Chairman. Are you familiar with section 17 of the act which deals with the formation of a special force? It indicates that under the proper authority—that is the Governor in Council—there may be established and authorized the maintenance of a component of the Canadian forces, referred to in this act as a special force, consisting of officers and men of the regular force who are placed in the special force being conditions described in the regulations. I take that to mean that once unification has been brought about, officers and men may be shifted into a special force and not necessarily retained in the units that the Minister has talked about retaining—that is, the navy, air force and army personnel could all be shoved into that special force and lose their identity? Have you studied that section of the act?

Mr. ANNIS: No, sir. I am unable to answer that. I do not know.

Mr. CHURCHILL: That is all for now, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FANE: Air Marshal Annis, I will preface my question by saying that I noticed that several times you talked about one, two and three star generals. Is that because of your association with the American forces, or has that become a *fait accompli* in the Canadian forces?

Mr. ANNIS: The quickest way, sir, to describe the general ranks, including Canadian ranks, is to use a handle, as the Americans do. One star is a Brigadier General or equivalent; two stars, a Major General; three stars, a Lieutenant General, and four stars a full General and the equivalent. To say that he is a two star means that is either a Rear Admiral or Air Vice Marshal. We just say it that way because it is quicker.

Mr. FANE: Several of the other witnesses have also used that nomenclature, and I was wondering when it became effective in the Canadian forces, or whether it was in preparation for handing your forces over to—

Mr. ANNIS: Just a handy term—a quick way of using a term to apply a rank to the three services.

Mr. FANE: I am very glad to hear that. Did I understand you to infer that Materiel Command, as it is now constituted, was not able to handle the supply business for the navy, the army and the air force.

Mr. ANNIS: No, sir. In the question that was put to me, I think by Mr. Harkness, I believe he used the word "Crunch".

Mr. FANE: Yes.

Mr. ANNIS: It was a crunch game. And I think I used the words "surge loading". I explained that at the moment there are three separate systems operating within Materiel Command. It is still using the navy system to supply navy material, the army system to supply ground force material and the air force system to supply air force and the common material. Those systems exist, and they are able to handle, I believe quite well, the standard average load at these times of rather low rate of activity. They are in addition being called upon to perform these studies and other matters or reorganization. My qualms arose in their ability to handle the surge load or the crunch.

Mr. FANE: I see. I keep wondering how hard it is going to be to backtrack to get back on the track again, if and when it is found that the unification experiment is not going to pan out. If it fails, how much difficulty will be experienced and how much extra confusion will there be, if we have to back track?

Mr. ANNIS: This morning, sir, I believe I described my understanding at the beginning, that it was an experiment, that it might even fail, but we were conducting an experiment because we Canadians were in a particularly fortunate position of being able to do so. If we succeeded it would be of value to our friends, and if we failed it would not be disastrous to them. I guess if this is the mood, it was a calculated risk. I suppose if our experiment failed it would not be disastrous to the western world. It would be kind of hard on our ego. But even so, I feel that as a matter of personal philosophy, a failure is not such a terrible thing if people all around see that the person who failed learned the proper lessons from it. Maybe even the difficulties we have had, and the successes too, will be of value to other countries. I think we are contributing something even if we fail. I am not suggesting we will.

Mr. FANE: I am very glad to have that answer. I think you remarked that the real weakness in the whole unification process comes from the top because of the inadequacy, if I understand you correctly, of the defence council? I do not mean that they were not able to do their jobs. I mean that it is not set up properly now.

Mr. ANNIS: In my comments on the Chiefs of Staff, I said two things. I felt that the comment that is so often levelled against the chiefs, that they quarrel too much, was really unfair to them, that they were compelled to quarrel; and I also commented on the existing Defence Council and said that a weakness of its constitution was that it put the Chief of Defence Staff and his senior officers in a difficult position. I tried to clear the impression that had got about, that I was criticizing the decisions made by Defence Council. I feel that from the Minister's viewpoint he is getting very good advice. but the way he gets it is very hard on the Chief of Defence Staff.

Mr. FANE: I agree with you. I just wanted to bring that out again.

I must say, Mr. Chairman, that I have learned a lot from Air Marshal Annis' presentation today, and I know that I am safe in telling you that I felt a great deal the same way as he does. Thank you.

Mr. NUGENT: Air Marshal Annis, there are two problems that I think affect us generally: First, is unification a good move in any event and, second, if we were going to do it—if it is a good idea to bring it in—is now the time that we should do it? I would like to address myself to that second part. You have already indicated that you feel that we are moving too far too fast. Can you think of any reason—perhaps we should start in that way—that unification should now proceed? Is there anything that unification could give now that we could not gain the benefit from five years from now, if there was going to be a benefit?

Mr. ANNIS: I do not think it is necessary now, no. It is not necessary now.

Mr. NUGENT: Bearing in mind Mr. Andras' questions—

Mr. ANNIS: I think, in other words, that the essentials of the experiment can continue without having to go over to the unification posture.

Mr. NUGENT: Right. So unification is in itself not going to suffer by waiting to be brought in, and the integration experiments are not held up because we do not have unification?

Mr. ANNIS: That is my belief.

Mr. NUGENT: I wonder if you would agree—

Mr. ANNIS: Not impossibly held up. I grant that unification would simplify some administrative things a bit but I think that the penalties of adopting that posture would be too severe.

Mr. NUGENT: Would you agree that one reason for not going ahead with unification now is that we do not have enough information yet from the integration experiment to have confidence that unification would be a success?

Mr. ANNIS: You mean that the Committee does not have enough information?

Mr. NUGENT: Well—

Mr. ANNIS: I think, whether or not the Committee has the ability to get this information, if you went to the director generals of these career fields, the director general of supply, the director general of construction engineering, and question them as to just how far they have gone along you would get those answers. I do not know.

Mr. NUGENT: So far as you know, have we gone far enough with integration that you have confidence that unification would be a success?

Mr. ANNIS: My opinion is the sum of the opinions of the directors general who were presiding over the endeavour to integrate these various functional fields; supply, construction engineering, transportation, maintenance, communications and electronics. Each of them was confronted with his own particular task of trying to identify in the three services the people who belonged in that functional field, of finding a way of getting them transferred into it somehow, and of establishing a basic syllabi, criteria and the like.

Mr. NUGENT: Would you agree that adding unification to the present load of the planners and so on at this time would cause more organizational turmoil and would seriously retard the correction process—of correcting those things that we now need to fix up in integration?

Mr. ANNIS: I do not think that it would create much additional administrative load—I cannot see that it would, but it would create a lot of dismay.

Mr. NUGENT: "Organizational turmoil" are the words Admiral Landymore used.

Mr. ANNIS: It would create a good deal because it would involve the uniform question, badging and a lot of that type of thing.

Mr. NUGENT: It was Admiral Landymore's opinion—

Mr. ANNIS: I am not sure of this answer.

Mr. NUGENT: —that it would retard the correction process in integration.

Mr. ANNIS: Undoubtedly it would produce in the combat career fields a lot of dismay because it would take away their professionalism for the time being, and I guess they are not ready for it yet. It would abolish all hope of the three services, and if one wanted to undo again, it would be a much more difficult process to undo in case of lack of success. As I said, I do not think we Canadians are going to fail at this, but we might.

Mr. NUGENT: That is perhaps another reason that we should not do it now—a lack of clear proof or further evidence, should we say, in respect of the integration process. It is simply going to be so hard to reverse, it would seem more prudent to wait until we have more evidence before taking such an irreversible step.

Mr. ANNIS: I have said this fairly often, and perhaps to the point of ad nauseam today, sir.

Mr. NUGENT: Would unification now, in your opinion, throw doubt on our ability to carry out all our commitments in the White Paper, or would it necessarily mean that our role would have to be confined to one concept?

Mr. ANNIS: No, I do not think that unification per se would change the picture much, provided that we continue with our experiment in integration, which I heartily support. I heartily support the direction we are moving in. As I said at the beginning, I think that we, in the military, must eliminate this duplication and see how far we can go in integrating these supporting services, and see if the individual services can operate successfully and get the quality of support that they need from integrated supporting career fields. I believe in this.

Mr. NUGENT: You believe in continuing the integration experiment?

Mr. ANNIS: I do in continuing the integrated commands—retaining them, and a lot of these things. I believe in this heartily.

Mr. NUGENT: You have mentioned the tremendous load put on and the excess speed making the load even more difficult to bear. Would not adding unification to our present integration experiment throw an even heavier load for a longer time on these overworked people who have to cope with this?

Mr. ANNIS: I said before, sir, that I cannot see that. All I really can see is a heavy impact on the morale problem of the combat career fields themselves, and that is all.

Mr. NUGENT: I wonder if your comment would be substantially different than a field commander such as Admiral Landymore, who told us that in his opinion—and I quote:

> Mobile Command is too large and so is Maritime Command. They have been created due to the adoption of a functional organization. The resultant large commands with vast geography to contend with makes them both unwieldy and uneconomical. Maritime Command should revert to its former East and West Coast Commands.

Do you see a reason for that?

Mr. ANNIS: Actually *de facto* Maritime Command operates largely in sort of two commands, with the major headquarters in Halifax and then the west coast. Mobile Command is a large command, but based on American standards, for example, it is tiny. I think the alternative to a single functional mobile command would be a flock of area commands, such as the army have just abandoned—and I think that is a much more expensive alternative. I think the best alternative has been chosen.

Mr. NUGENT: You experience largely has been at headquarters, has it not?

Mr. ANNIS: Oh yes. I have been there more than I cared to, but that is the way the cookie crumbles.

Mr. NUGENT: Would you find it quite often the case that those whose background has mostly been in the command area—away from headquarters, have quite a different viewpoint on organization than those who have spent many years in headquarters.

Mr. ANNIS: A headquarters man, I assure you, can leave national headquarters, go to a command and change his attitude overnight. I think anyone who has done that will bear out what I say.

Mr. NUGENT: That is all, sir.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Laniel, you are next.

Mr. LANIEL: Air Marshal, you said that some of the aims or objectives of unification, as they are regarded now, could be reached and are being reached by integration alone.

Mr. ANNIS: It is a path too toward unification, and one might even get that far.

Mr. LANIEL: Do you feel that in the process of integration, at certain stages or levels, the rivalries between services can be an obstacle?

Mr. ANNIS: I do not think service rivalries now are a problem at all, sir—not in the face of a government directive to do what we could in integration and to get as far as we can toward unification. My basic qualm is whether it is safe to make that sort of jump now—Why do we need to? I do not believe in doing things that we do not have to until we are sure that we can do them—or surer that we can, at any rate.

Mr. LANIEL: You have put emphasis on the difficulty that might arise in the transferring of personnel into an equivalent category in another service or environment of another service, because of the differences that might exist in the real operation of the work.

Mr. ANNIS: If you will forgive me, I will repeat that my chief concern is with those in the combat career field—the deck officers and the ratings who are the armament and that type of rating in the navy, the infantry, artillery and armour of the army, and the air crew of the air force. These are the people who are the hard core—they and those who do the maintenance—in each of the services. They are the people who would suffer most by unification. They would lose their uniform and their other sort of identity, and they are the people whose morale problem is most difficult because, as I said, a uniform is being taken away from them and nothing to replace it that is meaningful. This is the area of recruiting; one can offer them a career, but it is rather short and these fellows, especially the soldiers, have to be healthy because at age 23 or 24 they are finished as combat people. They are too old to fight, to run up and down hills, crawl under fences and what not in combat, with 20 year olds competing. Therefore it is the worry about the morale and the difficulty of acquiring into the services and retaining the hard core people that I worry about. Unification, in my opinion, would have a very difficult psychological impact on them. I think given more time, more confidence, that the supporting services in integrated form can give them the support they need and this sort of thing—given time, their morale could perhaps stand the buffet that would come by unification. It might even happen that the time would come when we could safely say. "We are going to unify", and a gasp of dismay through these trades would just not occur.

Mr. LANIEL: I do not think you have tried to pinpoint any strong points at combat level where unification would be an advantage. I have two examples that have been put forward by General Foulkes in his paper of 1961. I am wondering if these things happen in our services—I will mention these two cases—even these days, and if unification would not be the solution to these problems. He says:

> In 1958 we had to disband the anti-aircraft artillery regiment... The regiment included many technicians with tradesmen's skills in radar and electronics who had several years' service ahead of them before they went on pension. The Air Force was busy at the same time recruiting people to man its new radar stations... Air Marshal Hugh Campbell, chief of the air staff, fully agreed with Lieutenant-General Finn Clark, chief of the general staff, that the surplus army men, who had been trained in the same skills, should be taken into the Air Force jobs. The "brass" pushed the idea, but it still foundered on the basic rivalries and vested interests of the different services.

That is one example. There is another one in the case of our pilots in Europe who are flying the F-86s and the CF-100s. When we turn over to these F-104s for the strike reconnaissance role, we reduce the number of our squadrons to 8 from 12. General Foulkes says here:

> It looks as though the RCAF's switch to this new role in NATO will leave at least one-third of the pilots and ground crews of the present air division without a job.
>
> At the same time both the Navy and the Army need men of just these skills. They are now advertising for new recruits whom they will have to train. Will they save the expense of training and absorb the RCAF men who already have the necessary skills?

At that time it was an actual question. We were also told by a witness here that from the time a would be pilot joins the service, until he is sitting above a nuclear warhead he has cost this country $500,000.

Mr. ANNIS: The price has gone up a bit since I last heard it, but it is still a very great deal. That part I admit.

Mr. LANIEL: Do you see situations like this happening?

Mr. ANNIS: There is no question that if integration were in the services—

Mr. LANIEL: This could not be corrected by integration alone?

Mr. ANNIS: No; this is a very different type of problem. I do not think integration or unification bear particularly on this. They perhaps could have assisted, but one has always the problem—you have it between departments here in government—of a person of a certain wage group moving across and trying to find a job in another department. He displaces and it complicates the problem there. It is this sort of thing that exists of course in the three services. Integration and unification would be palliatives toward reducing the frequency of this, but they would not be a panacea in my opinion.

Mr. LANIEL: This morning and this afternoon, you accepted from Mr. McIntosh the term "dual role for our forces"—

Mr. ANNIS: Yes.

Mr. LANIEL: —in the sense of our commitments in Europe, within NATO, and I imagine even in Canada and NORAD and the other part of it which is our contribution to peacekeeping, peace restoring and police force operation within the United Nations. How far back has Canadian government policy been oriented in the direction of that dual role?

Mr. ANNIS: The dual role?

Mr. LANIEL: Yes.

Mr. ANNIS: I have only become conscious of a substantial government interest in peacekeeping as such since about 1962. There is no question that the Canadian forces participated in peacekeeping operations before that—and very well. They have kept a standby battalion and other forces available for such situations. But in respect of orienting the forces, equipping and supporting them with means of rapid transport, this sort of emphasis was not developed prior to about 1962, as I recall.

Mr. LANIEL: But it was before the White Paper?

Mr. ANNIS: Oh yes, to some degree.

Mr. LANIEL: Is there anything else in the priorities put forward in the White Paper, as far as our defence policies are concerned, that we were not committed to—let us say, the protection of Canada?

Mr. ANNIS: Our roles have been three. They have been the defence of Canada; our commitments to NATO, which includes NORAD in our Canadian interpretation, and support of the United Nations. The peacekeeping role has sort of crystallized and hardened in support of the United Nations. In my opinion, it has been a more definitive effort to demonstrate our support of the United Nations.

Mr. LANIEL: You said that to jump to unification would weaken our forces.

Mr. ANNIS: The morale, I think—do you mean at this time?

Mr. LANIEL: Yes.

Mr. ANNIS: We are worried about the combat career field?

Mr. LANIEL: Yes.

Mr. ANNIS: Therefore, it would tend to weaken us over all.

Mr. LANIEL: To make a general review, what is committed now to NATO is actually one brigade in Europe, two brigades in Canada in reserve, one batallion to Mobile Command, one air division, and also our contribution to the ASW role—SACLANT. What is committed to NORAD besides that?

Mr. ANNIS: Our support of radar stations plus three squadrons of aircraft and two of bomarc, I believe.

Mr. LANIEL: Do we have, at this stage, anything definitely committed or earmarked for peacekeeping participation?

Mr. ANNIS: There is an earmarked group—batallion size, I believe.

Mr. LANIEL: There is no catch to my question.

Mr. ANNIS: No, no; I am not certain of the figures, but I believe there is.

Mr. LANIEL: The reason I was asking you these details is that I do not see how the fact of earmarking a brigade or batallion group to peacekeeping operations would really disorganize our forces' commitments. My views are that peacekeeping and the deterrent in which we participate are two different things, and I do not see how at one moment or another we will be confronted with our forces being in the process of peacekeeping at the same time as they are confronted with a major war.

Mr. ANNIS: In this connection I am in a bit of difficulty with security and I do not know how freely I may speak—not very freely, I think. Our NATO commitments involve more than just the forces we have in Europe; it involves certain assignment of forces which we have to maintain in a specified state of readiness to be available for active employment. Whether or not this is liable to happen, is one matter; but the other one is that from a legalistic viewpoint this is a commitment to which Canada has subscribed. It does inhibit the freedom of deployment elsewhere of this number and types of forces that have to be held in reserve for the NATO commitments, if you follow me. It is what is left that is available for employment elsewhere—and that is also a commitment of sorts. In regard to both things happening at once, I agree there is a great deal of room for debate, but that is outside of my purview to discuss.

Mr. LANIEL: I am no expert myself, but I personally do not think—especially these days with the political and military evolution that we see throughout the world—that our commitments should stay inflexible. There have been changes in NATO in the past few years. Look at the attitude that France has taken, let us say—its decision to take over control of its troops and its territory. Also, it stated in a newspaper yesterday:

> A British official said today it would be only a matter of months before a substantial portion of the 50,000-man British Army of the Rhine was withdrawn—

from NATO.

I think there is an evolution and I am wondering why Canada should sit and say: "Well, nine years ago we committed ourselves and we will wait and see what decision the British and the Americans will take and what they will ask from us". Why not look forward and be ready to say that we will keep a brigade up there but that brigade will be supported or partly supported by our air division and you put someone else in the striking role.

Mr. ANNIS: Sir, I admit the validity of the questions you are raising, but you have manoeuvred me into the political field. I am not competent to discuss what I think Canada should be doing in political undertakings. My role, I think, is to describe, as best I can, my opinions of military capabilities in certain organizational arrangements of our forces. I regret it, but I should not.

Mr. LANIEL: You are in a bad position—I know that—because of the fact that your comments have to be related to the situation as it is now. But you are also giving the impression, and you are also stating, that if we unify today or take any similar action that would disorganize the present setup, we are weakening our forces and we will not be in a position to fulfil our commitments the way they were accepted nine years ago.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. McIntosh has a supplementary question.

Mr. LANIEL: It is all right.

Mr. MCINTOSH: The analogy my colleague used, Air Marshal, I would suggest is not a fair one; I think it is generally understood that in a conventional war Great Britain or the United Kingdom can defend themselves. However, I think it has been established here in your evidence today that Canada is not in the same position. Therefore, the action of Great Britain in withdrawing their forces to defend themselves at home is not the same as Canada withdrawing their forces. We must belong to a collective system of defence, and I suggest perhaps so must Great Britain, but not in the same degree.

Mr. LANIEL: In a case like that I would say that we could forget about the rest of the world; if we cannot adjust our engagements or commitments to make our forces more flexible, then at least we will be able to fulfil an open spectrum of uses. In the White Paper we refer to the defence of Canada. I know that we will not be able to defend Canada alone, and Canada will not be attacked without someone coming to our rescue, but the political situation might change. In past wars, the United States were late coming in; they did not want to get involved for all kinds of reasons. We might have frontier trouble in the north—we do not know. We have China, nobody knows what is happening over there. We might have to support a troop somewhere.

Mr. ANNIS: I think though, earlier on, we recognized that the integration toward unification exercise has added an additional commitment on the Canadian defence forces and that our lessened manpower for one reason or another has reduced our ability to do all these things. We have had to spread our resources thinner, and this is a calculated risk. I do not think it is an unexpected development; I believe our government has caculated that the risk we take is perhaps worthwhile in the value that the result of this exercise might contribute to our allies. This is their decision, I am not prepared to quarrel with that. It am merely saying that the integration exercise has added a great deal of additional workload on the military, and their military capability for now and quite a period, I suspect.

Mr. LANIEL: Thank you.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): Air Marshal Annis, you said that on defence council the three services should be represented. Do you still maintained that.

Mr. ANNIS: I think it would be desirable in order that the minister get military advice on as broad a basis as possible.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): Let us say that the naval representative on that council is a naval engineer; he is promoted to rear admiral or admiral of the fleet, and then he is on the defence council. Suppose one day the minister needs advice on naval gunnery; do you think that the minister then should ask that engineer about naval gunnery, or should he go lower down in the echelon and find a gunnery expert in naval affairs who could really tell him the score.

Mr. ANNIS: No. The Minister, I would think would ask the senior officer and depend on the senior officer to get hold of the expert gunner and either give a very accurate communication of what the gunner expert has said or else bring the gunnery expert along. Senior officers are supposed to become senior because they have enough sense, when someone senior to them, such as ministers, ask their advice, they gather together the authorities and get the advice from them.

Mr. LANGLOIS: I realize that, but at that time he has to seek this information for the minister from the lower echelon.

Mr. ANNIS: I would doubt that a senior officer would be competent to give the answer on a highly technical question. In general, it is the chap in his thirties or forties today, who is the real expert on technology; it is the man in his forties and fifties who is experienced in weaving together the advice from a lot of expert sources. In general, the senior officers, in the presence of the minister in council, come in carrying with them a compendium of technical advice which they have gathered, summarized and distilled, and they give that to the minister. If the minister wants a particular answer to a particular technical question, usually the expert himself is brought in or the expert's answer is brought in—either one or the other.

Mr. LANGLOIS: But you do not deny the right of the Minister to go and get the information wherever he think he should get it in the service.

Mr. ANNIS: Oh no, but in any hierarchial structure it is exceedingly hard on a person part way up the structure to have the senior bypass him, go right by him and ask someone else—this is the problem—because it produces a morale problem for the officer who has been bypassed.

Mr. LANGLOIS: Somewhere along the line you spoke of uniforms, Air Marshal—correct me if I am wrong—and you said that you were for one uniform for all non-combat forces: support, supply, administration information services and so on. Is that correct?

Mr. ANNIS: I do not think that I said—because I do not believe it—necessarily the same uniform for all these support career fields—although it is probably more economical to have one. All doctors, for example, I think should wear one uniform, one style; all engineers should wear one colour, and so on.

Mr. LANIEL: How many uniforms would that represent?

Mr. ANNIS: That would represent 20 different uniforms, which I think is too many. Perhaps a single uniform with an appropriate badge would be a better way.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): But you said that the three services should retain their uniform as far as the combat people are concerned, that infantrymen should retain their uniforms as well as the sailors who are on ships.

Mr. ANNIS: My private opinion—and it is an emotional one now—is that the air crew and the people who are directly associated with airplanes should wear a colour that to them is meaningful—their professional badge, which is light blue; and the sailors, dark blue and white. I think that the gunners, the infantrymen and the artillerymen might each wear a different uniform but they might finally get together and settle on one. That is the sort of thing they have been bothered with for years.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): But when they are in combat they do not wear those uniforms.

Mr. ANNIS: No.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): In combat they wear coveralls or overalls or whatever you call them, so when do they use those uniforms.

Mr. ANNIS: The walking out uniforms? If so, they wear them for walking out. It has been my experience that the public wants to see the variety of uniforms. All my friends, especially the ladies—no; that is the wrong way of saying it—have been fascinated. I think perhaps one of the major appeals of the military has been the variety of uniforms. I would rather suspect that a single uniform right across the board for walking out is something that they would consider drab.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): Am I to understand that you want to distinguish, for the public, between the ones who perhaps are going to be killed and the ones who are behind a desk? Is that the reason and, if so, do you think the people behind the desk would like that?

Mr. ANNIS: I said earlier, there is a pecking order in the military; the combatant is the top dead centre. But we also said that in a sense all of the people in uniform are equal in their importance. It is true that each of these career fields is there because it performs an essential service, so in a sense they are all equal.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): Then they should not have a different uniform.

Mr. ANNIS: Except that the combatant, in general, is exposed in a way—he is trained to be exposed; he is expected to be exposed—which is different. I mentioned that in a ship the non-combat trades get carried into battle. In the army the non-combat career fields operate in the battle fields and do deeds of great heroism, but they are sort of above the normal course of duty. For the infantrymen, getting killed or wounded or taking great risks is in the course of duty, so there is a difference. Within the services it is recognized that anyone in the combat career field is in fact deliberately exposing himself to other risks, although his comrades who are called upon are often as brave or braver. I am not in any sense derogating the supporting services; they are very precious.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): Air Marshal, yesterday we had, as a witness, General Moncel, who said that there is too much management in the forces and not enough leadership. Because you, yourself, have had a lot to do with management, research and programming, would you please comment on this?

Mr. ANNIS: Yes, I think perhaps we have our eye off the ball somewhat. It is easy to get fascinated by technology, neat and tidy figures and cost effectiveness, but the fundamental purpose of the military has to be recognized. The role of the military is really, you know, to kill, destroy, devastate. This is what they are called upon to do in the darkest hour. It is what one tries to avoid saying and hopes will never happen. But a military who are not trained that way will never be able to keep the peace. I do not think Stalin, who is reputed to have said: "How many battalions has the Pope?" would say, speaking of an army, "How many people are there in their accounting career field?" So the role of the military is to destroy; it is combat. War, itself, is an emotional business. It is emotion so deep that people have lost control of their emotions. That is what war is. It is emotion that creates heroism—it is leadership that does it, and it is young people who do it—kids by and large, 18 to 25 years of age, who are in the fighting lines and exposing themselves. It is they who are looking for the leadership and for those things that inspire them—examples and the like. I do not think that a fighting force is going to be efficient and in the hour of need, if called upon, do the things the country is hoping they would be able to do—I do not think they will be inspired by computers, management and the like. A lot of these other things are fundamental but you have to put first things first. If the combat forces, troops and the like, are good enough the supporting forces get tremendous satisfaction out of supporting them and the whole question of morale rises on this leadership. It is exerted by individuals and it is also exerted by the combat people as a whole—your phalanx of infantrymen, your gunners, your pilots and your deck officers doing these things that inspire everybody. I agree with General Moncel.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): Do you not think that the people we have now on the defence staff, if willing to do the job of unification, should be given the green light to go ahead, and that we should encourage them in their delicate task?

Mr. ANNIS: Yes; I am all for encouragement, but I do not want to be party to encouraging them to doing something rash which I suspect later they might be sorry for—in other words, going faster than is prudent; going farther than is prudent.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): I am not referring to going fast or slow. Do you not think that they should go along with the program?

Mr. ANNIS: Yes. I have all along supported this and I believe in my heart there is need to see how much integration we can do, and unification if possible—if possible. I am not at all sure that unification is possible, but if possible, yes.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): Sir, I have one last question. This afternoon and, I think, also this morning, you referred to one star, two star, three star, and four star generals. In replying to a question of Mr. Fane's not very long ago you said one star was a brigadier general; two star was a major general; three star was a lieutenant general and four star a full general or their equivalent. Is that not unification?

Mr. ANNIS: No. The words "or equivalent" in itself, I think recognize the fact that there are other ranks which mean the same thing.

The CHAIRMAN: That seems to conclude the questioning of Air Marshal Annis. I know that all members of the Committee want me to thank you very much for taking so much of your time.

Mr. ANNIS: Thank you, sir. It has been a privilege, gentlemen, to appear. I sincerely hope that I have been some help. I have been as honest and impartial as I know how.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, the Clerk has given me a six page telegram from Admiral Landymore. I would like to have your permission to table it or, if you would like me to read it, I would be glad to do so.

As hon. MEMBER: Mr. Chairman, how long will it take to read it?

The CHAIRMAN: It will take about three minutes. It is addressed the Clerk of the Standing Committee on National Defence. It states:

> Sir I would be grateful if you would invite the Chairman of the Standing Committee on National Defence to read this telegram into the record Stop Referring to a point raised in the Defence Committee Hearings on the sixteenth of February 1967 by Mr. Deachman with reference to my statement that in addition to the Chief of Defence Staff and the Chief of Personnel two members of the Defence Committee knew of my compulsory retirement on the twelfth of July 1966 that is before I answered questions of the press on the fifteenth of July 1966 I would like to assure the Committee that the statement I made was truthful and accurate as far as I know and that I had received assurance from Admiral Welland on the ninth of November 1966 that he would testify to this effect if necessary Stop In the early evening of the twelfth of July 1966 in a brief meeting at my request in my hotel room in the presence of my wife I told Mr. Groos of my compulsory retirement and the early retirement of three other admirals and of the censorship of my brief to the Parliamentary Defence Committee in June 1966 Stop I thought these matters so serious that I asked him to arrange for me to see the Prime Minister Stop When I was in Ottawa for two nights in September 1966 Admiral Welland came to my hotel room and volunteered the information that Mr. Groos and Mr. Deachman had come unannounced to his house late on the evening of the twelfth of July 1966 and got him out of bed in order to confirm the news about the early retirements of the admirals Stop When I arrived in Ottawa by plane on the morning of the twelfth of July 1966 I met Admiral

Welland in National Defence Headquarters and he told me that his retirement had been arranged over lunch with the Minister on the eleventh of July 1966 the date of his leaving the service to be not later than January 1967 Stop On the afternoon of the same day before my own appointment with the Minister Admiral Stirling told both Admiral Welland and myself that he was to be retired early the date to be arranged in due course Stop Before leaving headquarters for my hotel room I told Admiral Welland that I had been compulsorily retired the date to be announced by the Minister when he returned from a trip to Paris Stop At the same time I told Admiral Welland that I had learned of Admiral Burchell's request for early retirement from the Chief of Defence Staff when I reported my own compulsory retirement to him Stop I am prepared to testify on oath to the above Stop If there has been any misunderstanding I regret any inconvenience to the Committee members Stop I have no desire or intention of attacking the reputation of any of the principals concerned Stop My reason for referring to the matter was in order to clear my name of the accusation that I had called a press conference and been fired for so doing when in fact this was not the reason for my compulsorily retirement.

It is signed "Rear Admiral Landymore." May I have your permission, gentlemen, to table this?

Some hon. MEMBERS: Agreed.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, it is almost six o'clock. Our next witness will be Air Vice Marshal Hendrick and I would like him to appear, if he can, at eight o'clock.

EVENING SITTING

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, I see a quorum.

We completed questioning the last witness at 6 o'clock. Another witness here tonight who has been waiting is Air Vice-Marshal Hendrick. If Air Vice-Marshal Hendrick would be kind enough to join me up here, I will ask him to start by giving us a summary of his experience, which I think has been customary in the case of other service witnesses. I understand he has no brief, but is prepared to answer any questions the Committee wishes to put to him.

Mr. FOY: Mr. Chairman, if I may interrupt, we have already been given the Air Vice-Marshal's brief; it was passed around this afternoon.

The CHAIRMAN: Was it? I did not realize that.

An hon. MEMBER: I did not see one.

Mr. FOY: I do not know where it came from.

Air Vice-Marshal M. M. HENDRICK: Mr. Chairman, and gentlemen, I thank you for the privilege of attending here. I presume the reason I am here is because I have been connected with the armed forces since 1927; in the early times with the militia, the C.O.T.C., and since 1934 with the permanent air force.

My career has included specialization in electronics; being in charge of the technical services in the air force; a couple of duties of a diplomatic nature in Washington; and finally as the commander of our air defences.

Since September, 1964, I have been retired and, therefore, I will speak to you from the point of view of someone whose intimate knowledge of what has been going on ceased as of September 1964, but who has maintained contact, through his friends in the service, with the feelings and sentiments of my colleagues that were who are still in uniform.

I would like to comment on the subject at hand under two main categories: first of all, on the plan itself and the errors, or questions, which it raised in my mind as a serving officer at the time it was issued, and, secondly, the impact of the last two and one-half years, as I understand them, on the men in uniform.

When the White Paper was issued in 1964, I was in charge of air defence and I read it with a certain amount of amazement. Because of the background of a serving officer at that time and the way that things had been done, I did not, in my innocence, imagine that it would survive as a plan beyond the first technical scrutiny which it might have been given by the staffs concerned, because it was quite self-evident that it was written backwards.

It made an assumption that a unified force was all right and a good thing, and then it proceeded to work out the way to get there. There is some justification for that assumption on my part, if you read page 32 of the speech of December 7, where it says:

> The White Paper...would not have recommended integration as a first step...if we had not been certain of the improved capacity of a unified force to meet the demands of modern warfare.

No serving officer in my day would have accepted that as axiomatic under any circumstances, and I would be, and still am, quite uncertain of what studies were made to arrive at that conclusion. I think I would be interested, to know as a citizen, and I am sure many other people also would be, who did the studies, where they came from, and how that conclusion was arrived at, because it is the fundamental cornerstone upon which the whole argument rests. When you start with an assumption that is false, then the whole structure becomes slightly wobbly. But apparently my innocence was too great at the time, because what I had assumed would have been examined in the normal manner was not actually carried out.

I think it is important for you to try to understand, in this respect, the viewpoint of a serving officer. I do not believe many people on the Committee, or in the public either, really understand the relationships between a serving officer and his civilian masters. We are, by tradition and by direction, an anonymous group. We are non-political; through all my career it has been my indoctrination that we carried out the mandates of the then government to the best of our ability, in a technical manner, having regard to all the facts as we knew them, and doing the best we could. It was not our business to worry about the politics; we left that to our Minister, and to our civilian heads. But, in my view, there was a reciprocal responsibility; if we made this division of duties, we also had a feeling in those days—a very strong feeling—of confidence that our judgments, our advice, and our technical know-how would be given due consideration by our political masters. The machinery was there for this purpose, and there was

consultation. Any of the times I was in the headquarters prior to the present regimes, as far as I can remember, the technical advice and the military opinion, of the Chiefs of Staff was given fair consideration. If it was overruled, as far as I understand it, it was for reasons of economy, economics, politics, strategy, or some other overriding reason for which the military factors had to be subordinated. Of course, none of us would take any quarrel with this whatever.

It is my feeling, from the observations I have made since September, 1964, that the military opinions have not been quite so thoroughly viewed, or given quite the consideration they have been given in the past, and this is a worrisome thing, because there are some very distinct fallacies, I believe, in the proposals we have. I refer not only to unification, but also to integration.

The first fallacy, which should have been almost self-evident to anyone working in the services at that time, was that there was enough waste and duplication to make substantial monetary savings by their elimination. I had just gone through a number of years of observing us attempt to maintain our defence effort with a constant number of dollars in a condition of inflation, and the only way this was done was by imposing economies and efficiencies to the maximum possible degree. This was a continuing process, and had been going on since the 1950's; it was not by any means novel.

The result was that we were squeezed fairly dry, and I could not see, as a commander, how I could carry out my particular role of the air defence to meet the commitment as I understood the commitment to be with very much economy, and do the job. I was reasonably certain that the same conditions applied to the other operating commands.

Also I had observed the effects of integration on the subsidiary formations. I observed an attempt in 1947 to put the motor transport together which lasted six months, and failed for technical reasons. I had observed the padres being integrated; the net result, of course, being more padres than we had before. I had observed the medical corps in the throes of integration, in which aviation medicine ceased to be recognized as a specialty, and the response of this supporting arm to the operational element became less effective.

I knew of the concern of my colleagues in uniform who were doctors about this change in their careers. I know a number who, as a result of their concern, are now working for the space agency instead of working for Canada. So, I did not think the integration of medicals was too effective a program at that time.

I had a hearty suspicion of integration as a means of economizing. It was not a new idea at all. Then, when I looked at the common support arms, which are the ones where everybody agrees that integration is most effective, I found about 20 per cent of our effort is in support arms which are common to all the forces. You have common food to some degre, and you have some common clothing; you have some common stores, like screwdrivers and so on, but most of your technical support and logistics support is specialized to the fighting arm. If you have a store full of spares that suit the tanks, they are no good for the submarine and certainly they will not fix the airplane. Therefore, the logic of putting all this in a common pot did not appeal to me as a serving officer who had to handle this logistics; it did not make any sense at all, and I failed to see where economies would result from it. I think the fact that the waste is not there to be squeezed out is probably proven by the observations that two years later the defence budget is still at the level it was before, in spite of the fact that we are 17,000 or 18,000 men less than we were at that time.

There is a second fallacy that worried me as a serving officer at that time, and still does, and that is the basic assumption that expertise can be dispensed with. If you put people in a common pot, you are deciding that they are of a common character and you are by implication, denying the necessity of specialization. That argument was made quite strongly a couple of years ago, and it is interesting to note now that it is intended that specialists will be recognized at certain levels. In fact, if you look at the list of special trades, you find in the back of this book that not only are they specialists to their discip'ine, such as engineering or supply, but they are specialists to the fighting arm within that. I notice that we have a number of types of electronics people labelled "sea", labelled "air", and labelled "army". They are specialists within the role of electronics. Of great interest to me this afternoon was the reference to this business of transferring the artillery radar man to the air force radar man. The training required to do this certainly would be a year or more. These people are not interchangeable at the drop of a hat, and even your career fields, as now specified in your group plan, bear this out very strongly.

I even believe that expertise as it applies in the combat arms between the sea, land, and air, is not interchangeable. It is a career in itself to learn to be a fighting man in any one of these media—to handle properly the technical weapons and learn the organization necessary to achieve the military objective in any one of these fields; you cannot make a jack-of-all-trades. Apparently it is not the intention in the short run now to do this.

In my view, this expertise also is essential at the top level. I would support Air Marshal Annis, if I understood him correctly this afternoon, that the expertise is necessary at the very top policy-making level to which it can get. This was provided by the Chiefs of Staff, and so I saw their disappearance with great regret; I believe that it was a backward move and diluted the competence of the advice which could be given to the government.

It is one thing to take the word of a technical expert who is four levels down, but that expertise which is quite finite in its application has to be filtered through the judgment and experience of a Chief of Staff if it is to be of meaningful value at the policy level. Otherwise, you could say that it is the captain and the major expert who establish the policy. The expert's view is quite different from the leader's view—from the head man's view—and if you have a Chief of Staff who has come up through the services he can interpret his own experts in a far more rational and sensible manner and he can frame his advice, with their help, in a more accurate and proper fashion than can be done by anyone who has not had this background. I believe, therefore, this expertise is essential at the top and the bottom. Any attempt, as this appears to be, to dilute that expertise is bound to have a bad effect on the efficiency and competence of our forces.

There is a third fallacy behind this. That is the belief, as is evidenced by the concept of a Mobile Command, that you can have a universal weapon. I suppose the best example of a universal weapon, or an attempt to get one, is the CF-5 airplane. The CF-5 airplane, as far as I am told and believe, was not chosen by the military; it was chosen for other reasons. It is a cheap airplane, as airplanes go; that is probably one reason for its choice. It is a good flying machine, but I have yet to find a competent airman who believes it has a good weapon system,

and that is what it was purchased for. It is interesting to me to note that among the plans laid down here—I think it is even in the White Paper—it is suggested that these airplanes could be used, if necessary, to support the air defence back home, in spite of the fact that they are designed to give close support, I believe, to the army in Europe. A statement like that is so obviously ridiculous to any airman that he cannot believe it. If an airplane is designed to do one military role well it will not do another one, and if you make it do all military roles it will do none of them properly. This is a matter of physics; this is a matter of design; this is a matter of weapon systems, and so on, and you cannot talk around it. So, what we are doing by this concept of a universal weapon system—an airplane which can be used everywhere—is leading ourselves up the garden path, and we are hoping that the enemy does not have a good airplane to oppose us, because all we have is a flying platform that had better be protected by somebody else.

This concept of a universal weapon system, in my view, is a dangerous one. It set the basis, apparently, for this desire to form a force which will be compact, be universally applicable anywhere in the world, and do any task it is called upon to do. I do not believe that this can be done in a military sense in any adequate way, unless the task you propose to do is a very simple one.

If you are talking about a police force, then you do not need an elaborate force like Mobile Command; you just will need some jeeps, some whistles, and your presence. But if you want to fight your way somewhere, I suggest you have to have the weapons that are designed for the theatre where you are going. That seems to be the evidence of military operations thus far and I suggest, therefore, that our concept that we can have a cheap and universal armed force of any kind is military nonsense.

There is a final fallacy which appears in this concept of where we are heading, and that is that we can operate by ourselves. We can operate by ourselves only if what we do is very, very simple indeed, as I have implied before. It has been our tradition, because of our size and our capability, that our strength and our safety heretofore has lain in our alliances; in our co-operation with a larger, richer and stronger ally. That is the basis of the NORAD agreement, of course, and the NATO alliance. When we get out of this and try to do things by ourselves, either we have to shoulder a terrific bill or we have to do something very simple, indeed, and we leave the real defence of the country to somebody else. As an ex-officer and as a citizen, I do not like the idea that we, as Canadians, with our technical ability and our wealth relative to the rest of the world, should let someone else defend us. I think we should do as best we can to hold our heads up on the international scene.

These fallacies, of course, have all been mentioned before, and I would like to confirm that I have read the TRIO brief and the brief of the Maritime Command, and I agree with them both. I have read what the press says, and I agree with what General Moncel told you. I have read public statements by Brigadier Malone of the Winnipeg Free Press, in which he has produced, I believe, an excellent argument in favour of expertise at both the top and the bottom, and I bring that pamphlet to your attention. So, I will not say any more about these things because they have probably been said too often.

But I would like to say one thing to try to give to you some feeling for what I believe to be is in the minds of the officer in the fighting forces today—the manager, the intermediate lad, the man whose career is half way through—who

is subject to these policy changes and is confused. The first thing that we must remember about these people is that they are volunteers. If you are a volunteer it means that you do it because you believe in serving your country and you have certain ideals and you like to be treated as an intelligent person.

As such an officer you look around yourself and you see this argument going on and you sense the military inconsistencies in it, and you wonder what has happened to your leaders. At the same time your unit is subjected to a considerable amount of administrative confusion. You find that you have trouble getting the simple things done that you used to do and you get the distinct impression that the boys in Ottawa are pretty busy at something because they cannot seem to pay too much attention to you, and things are even worse than they usually are. Then you see that a lot of your senior people, for whom you have some considerable respect and whose shoes you might hope to fill some day, are leaving under rather unusual conditions in large numbers. You have respected their judgment and you wonder why they have to be suddenly dispensed with, short of the normal term. It may help promotion, but certainly it is an unusual situation and it does not help your morale much or your career possibilities to think that for some reason that is a little bit uncertain to you all these people suddenly have to quit.

Then you find that the system of promotion is being changed. Once upon a time there was a promotion board at the command level and then there was one at the headquarters level and you knew that your fate—your career—was in the hands of a board of seven or eight officers in your area, one or two ranks senior to you who knew you, and their decision was validated by a higher board. That system worked very well for a number of years, as far as you could tell. People who were promoted, as far as you could see, held your esteem; you very seldom saw a fellow promoted that you did not believe should be promoted. You did not get promoted yourself fast enough, of course, but that was incidental. But you had faith in the system and you felt that it could not be dominated by any outside factors.

And now you wonder; it is all centralized in Ottawa, and it becomes noised abroad in the officers mess, and there is a feeling in the air that you had better keep quiet and not say anything. If you open your mouth and indicate you do not like what is going on, you had better watch your career. Now, this feeling is well held by people. I have heard it from a number of my people in no uncertain terms. There is a feeling of repression; there is a feeling of concern that unless you toe the line you have had it. Now, that is a very unhealthy situation for any young man to feel he is in. Free speech is supposed to be proper in this country.

Then we find an official bulletin coming out that begins to tell us what is going on. It comes out every day now: It comes to the station; it tells me what is happening in this business; it keeps me informed. But it starts out by telling me in the first issue: "Do not pay any attention to the radio, the television and the news, the papers and all this commotion that is going on. We will keep you informed about what is really happening." That is the official word. So, now I am going to be given the word officially—I cannot even look at the newspaper. I am not supposed to give it any weight; I am to stop thinking for myself.

I was told this, now, and I think perhaps, the Committee should find out for itself and should ask the question, because the Committee is the only one that really can. I cannot. But, I am led to believe that on one occasion, at least, when

a very senior officer was sent to a conference to tell the boys what was going on—to help allay their concern and to tell them what the policy was and help them with their problems—that the order came out that no questions were to be asked and there would be no discussion of the subject after the briefing was given. I cannot believe that that would be done, and I would invite the Committee to find out, because it is a fantastic thing that this attempt would be made on a free, democratic, volunteer force.

Some of my colleagues who are retiring, I find, show me their dismissal orders. They come in a mimeographed letter, signed by some junior person. "Thank you for your services, old boy; what are twenty years?"—you know. Not even, as it used to be one day, a nice letter from someone senior with a crest on it saying, "Thank you very much for twenty years' service. Sorry you have to go, but at least you did a good job while you were here". No, sir. It comes on the flimsiest, blue mimeographed paper. This is the thanks I get for my twenty years service. I say to myself, "This is a funny way to treat a volunteer force".

I do not know whether this means anything or not, but I am getting suspicious by now; I have a feeling that someone is trying to brainwash we. I find, by golly, not longer ago than last month we formed a Directorate of Information Services for Internal Information. Now, by golly, if that does not sound like Mr. Goebbles' outfit or Mr. Stalin's—we have got to put a commissar with every member of the force to make sure he behaves himself, to make sure the guys get the right word. Information Services for Internal Information—this, I am told, is what happened. I have not seen it, but I suspect the Committee could find out the facts. It really shakes me as an ex-serving officer.

And so, what do we find? I find my colleagues are quitting, and I am beginning to think I should quit too. I am in a volunteer force and I do not like to be kicked around, and I do not like to have my conditions of service changed without at least having a chance to say something about it, or to learn why, and have it make sense to me. All along, up to this point, I have always understood what the service was doing because I needed to understand to be a good officer. Now I am baffled, and I think it is time that I was unbaffled.

Some of my colleagues are not going to quit right away—they cannot; they have grocery bills to meet. They have an investment in their pension and they will wait until they can get out with a minimum financial burden. But I would suspect that there is going to be a continuing exodus, and it will be from the boys that are the smart ones, the boys that are experienced, the boys that are the real volunteer corps of our services, and you will be left with the people who do not think for themselves and cannot get a job anywhere else. I deplore the way it appears a volunteer force appears is being treated. It is very, very discouraging in this democracy.

So, I look at the situation and I see a trend to disarm the country, because it is obvious that NATO commitments and the NORAD commitments are dying. The reason is there has been no replacements for their weapons, and you have to replace the weapons in a continuing manner; otherwise, the commitment dies. So, even though it is not said, even though it is simplied we are going to keep these things up, you can see the straws in the wind. The weapons are not being replaced; the alliance comes up for renegotiation in two years; there are press releases suggesting that we are going to pull out, so if you are a clever young

man, then you say, well, I guess, we are going to end up with just this Mobile Command. I do not know whether I like that or not because I do not know whether I can see it doing a real job to protect the country.

For these technical reasons and for this particular concern I feel that the lad in uniform has, I am very sorry that this program is so full of question marks, and I would hope that they could be resolved before any irretrievable steps are taken in a formal manner. You see, the serving officers train to solve a problem by analysing all the facts first; putting all the alternatives down, putting a dollar sign opposite them and recommending what appears to be the most sensible, expedient and economical solution that meets the military need. He is not used to having the target and the goal determined first and the background filled in later, and it baffles him.

I would hope, therefore, that after lengthy discussions of this kind a couple of things might happen. I would hope the Committee might, in some way, get the opinions of the serving officer in the middle of this commotion—the man who is going to have to make it work. This has never been done before and it is a very difficult thing to do. But is it really fair for this group to be allowed to remain anonymous, to have no say whatever about what is happening to their services and to their careers, when they have experience and knowledge and can bring to bear upon the subject really significant facts which can make the plan work or not make it work?

It would be a wonderful thing if the Committee, in some ingenious way, could get some kind of sampling of what these lads really think about what is going on. I think you owe it to them, instead of imposing it upon them under conditions of great uncertainty and saying they have to make it work. Of course, I would hope also that the expertise could be re-established at the Chiefs of Staff level, so that the type of military judgment which could be given for the consideration of the government would be of a complete, allround and thorough character.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Winch is first, followed by Mr. Harkness and Mr. Forrestall.

Mr. WINCH: Mr. Chairman, I think my question has been partly answered, but I will put it specifically.

Air Vice Marshal, you will remember that you and Rear Admiral Landymore were questioned by Mr. Lynch on the program known as *Twenty Million Questions* on November 2 last year. You made one comment there which interests me considerably, and I would like to ask you to explain it a bit. This, by the way, is a verbatim report of that program. In answer to a question that was put by Mr. Lynch you had this to say and I quote:

> Instead, we are being confused by the smoke-screen of re-organization, of integration, which nobody understands; and of unification, which people understand even less. This is the smoke-screen, and behind this is this very important policy change in our defences, which I believe should be properly aired so the people understand what is going on.

Now, there is the definite statement that the plan of integration and unification and, therefore, the bill before us is a deliberate smoke screen to hide important policy changes. Would you tell us what, in your estimation, are the policy changes going on for which the smoke screen is being spread?

Mr. HENDRICK: The policy changes, in my view, are there by implication; by the withdrawal from NORAD, the withdrawal from NATO, and the concentration of our efforts in the support of the United Nations. This seems to be inevitable from the events that are taking place and the equipment policies that are going on.

Mr. WINCH: That is bringing it to a head. You say, "seems to be inevitable". You do not, therefore, accept the statement in the White Paper nor the Minister's speech on second reading that even with the changes of integration and unification, Canada is going to maintain its commitments to NORAD, to NATO and elsewhere. You do not accept those statements as a fact.

Mr. HENDRICK: I do not see how they can be done at the same level that they are being done now, by any means. Our commitments are specified at the present moment in terms of force levels, as I understand it, and I do not understand how they can be maintained with the organizational changes which appear to be in the wind.

Mr. WINCH: So you take it, therefore, from what you said now and what you said on this program, that all we have before us now is a smoke screen to hide the fact that although they say they are not going to do certain things, actually they are going to do them. Can I take any other implication from this, and what you are saying now.

Mr. HENDRICK: I am afraid I am suspicious about it. Yes, I am afraid I am. Naturally, I cannot speak about what people have in mind because that is impossible, but when you see a situation presented which is full of inconsistencies and difficulties you are worried about it, I must say. I cannot see how we can continue to do everything we have done before and form a new force, which we are going to do with the Mobile Command; cut 10,000 people out of the environment; save $100 million and do all this together. I cannot understand how this can be accomplished. This is my worry.

Mr. WINCH: Is it your opinion, if integration is followed through to its conclusion and then followed by unification, that for those procedures of policy to give us national defence forces a change in role for our national defence forces will be required?

Mr. HENDRICK: Ultimately, I believe so. I do not see how it can be avoided.

Mr. WINCH: Thank you.

Mr. HARKNESS: On this same matter of roles, the roles laid down in the Defence Paper more or less have been the general aims and objectives of defence policy for quite a number of years. Do you think that they can possibly be met by the projected single unified force which the bill before us would bring into operation and the disappearance, concomitant with that, of the present navy, army and air force?

Mr. HENDRICK: I share the problem of most people; I do not see what the pattern of the integrated force is going to look like because really it has not been spelled out in enough detail for me to get a feel for it. Certainly it is going to be very awkward to work with our allies if our force structures are different from theirs and, apart from that, until I see the pattern of the forces and what they look like in detail it is very hard to say whether this can be done or not. What this integrated force is going to be like is much too nebulous, in my view.

We hear that the soldiers, sailors and airmen are going to be preserved in their units and have their working uniforms and dress uniforms as they do today. Some common support services may or may not be in common uniform. I am not sure how they are going to be acted on. I have no idea how the support forces which serve the fighting arm are going to relate; whether they are going to be preserved as part of the fighting arm, or whether they are going to be integrated as part of the support. The whole thing is extremely confusing in my mind, I must say, and luckily I am a little far away from it, but from what I have read and what I have seen, I am baffled as to how it is going to be done.

Mr. HARKNESS: Would you agree that in order to carry out the roles at present laid down for our defence forces, a navy, an army and an air force of some sort is required, whether you call these forces by that name or not?

Mr. HENDRICK: I do, indeed, I believe that the existence of fighting forces in the media of the army, navy and air force, by any name, which are unique and trained and not interchangeable with the others, will always be necessary in a military force.

Mr. HARKNESS: Do you see any advantage in doing away with our present three forces and putting them into one force called just a defence force?

Mr. HENDRICK: Not the slightest bit; it baffles me completely. I think the economies could be achieved by much more simple means and I do not understand the advantages of this proposal at all.

Mr. HARKNESS: What are some of the disadvantages that you see in it?

Mr. HENDRICK: First of all, if you preserve the fighting forces in the shape it is suggested you are going to, I do not see why you should change their identifications, their appearances and their symbols. There is a lot to be said for loyalties and traditions and the things which motivate men to go and take hazard. This is a long, historic thing and everybody, I think, will accept it and there is no reason to change these motivating things.

I think it is also essential for the fighting man to have a leader—someone he can look up to—a leader whom he knows has been through the mill; somebody who he can identify as part of his team. That is why the Chiefs of Staff being done away with for an army, a navy and an air force is such a sad thing, in my view. The junior officer, the airman, the soldier or the sailor does not have his outfit that he can look up to and, if he is an officer, even aspired to succeed. All this is part of having a viable force that has an esprit de corps and a purpose. It has been done this way for many, many years and there are very good reasons for it and I do not see what we gain by upsetting it.

Mr. HARKNESS: In the matter of the Defence Council which you just mentioned, which used to be the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff and the three Chiefs of Staff, its present composition in practice, as we have now heard in evidence during the last two or three days as far as the military end of it is concerned, is the present Chief of the Defence Staff, and the Vice Chief, because he comes from another service. And then they bring in another officer who may be head of personnel, or head of technical services, or something else, who is from the third service. I think this is a patent attempt to try to substitute for the old organization we had when we had three chiefs. What would you think of its effectiveness in comparison with the previous system where you did have three chiefs, each the head of one of the three services?

Mr. HENDRICK: I certainly believe the organization with the three Chiefs of Staff as the certain heads of each service was the right way to do it. At the present moment you have a functional headquarters, I believe, in which you have heads of personnel, technical services, operations, and so on, and it is inevitable that those particular gentlemen will be one-third effective, in my view, because two-thirds of the subject matter with which they deal has not been in their background. They cannot help it; that is the way they have been trained. Therefore, if they want the expertise for the other two-thirds of their responsibilities they have to go down the line to get it, and they do not bring to bear a meaningful experience upon the advice they get.

I think it is fair to say that the soldier, the sailor and the airman are different individuals. They are trained differently from very early youth, they think differently, they are all essential to a good armed force and they work together, but they are not the same people and they do not bring the same sense of judgment on a given military problem as their colleagues will. If you want to get the best answer I think you have to meld the three views in the best possible way and you only do that by having the very senior people do it for you. I do not consider that interservice rivalry or squabbling about a thing like that is as serious as trying to find the best military answer, which is a very difficult thing to get at the best of times. So, you put three people with the very best experience you can get together, and have them produce the best compromise or the best solution to a difficult situation.

When you substitute the Chief of Personnel sitting alongside, or the Chief of Technical Services, he is expert in one-third of the problem, but in the other two-thirds he is not nearly so competent. Specialization, I believe, is important right down the line from the very top to the bottom, and when you forget that all you are doing is producing the jack-of-all-trades concept and diluting the competence of your staffs.

Mr. HARKNESS: I was very interested in what you had to say about the CF-5 aircraft. You stated that it was not chosen by the military. I think the decision to secure this aircraft probably was taken while you were still head of Air Defence Command. Were you consulted with regard to this air craft, or was your advice sought?

Mr. HENDRICK: No, sir.

Mr. HARKNESS: Do you know of any other RCAF officers whose advice was sought with regard to choosing this aircraft?

Mr. HENDRICK: From my knowledge, I cannot answer yes or no to that, because I do not know enough about what was going on in Ottawa at that time. I am sorry.

Mr. HARKNESS: But not to your knowledge?

Mr. HENDRICK: Not to my knowledge.

Mr. HARKNESS: Can you tell us anything further, from your own knowledge, about the basis on which this aircraft was chosen?

Mr. HENDRICK: Not from my own specific knowledge. I would only be what I have been told by my colleagues. I know that preference from the operational requirements people was for a Phantom at the time which cost three times as much, and I would presume that the combination of circumstances of price and

the ability to have a joint production-sharing deal were probably the dominating factors. Of course, there is nothing the matter with either of those requirements, particularly production sharing. It is a very, very wonderful thing to do and I believe very highly in it, but it would have been much better if the airplane had been militarily more sophisticated.

The airplane is supposed to be sent overseas to support our army, and yet it takes a tanker force to get it there. If you add the price of the tanker force and if you keep the tanker force in training, which you have to do to meet in the middle of the ocean two or three times in the middle of the night—two airplanes per tanker—this is not done easily, and you end up with a very sophisticated system to get those airplanes across the ocean. It may not be so cheap after all.

Mr. HARKNESS: A very expensive one.

Mr. HENDRICK: A very expensive one, yes.

Mr. HARKNESS: What function or role, if any, can this aircraft carry out satisfactorily?

Mr. HENDRICK: I cannot tell you. I am told it is a very excellent airplane for flying practice. Beyond that I am not sure. I do not think it carries enough in the way of conventional armament to make a sufficiently loud bang to justify taking it anywhere. It will not carry atomic weapons. It may be a good gun platform—it probably is—but that is a pretty sophisticated and expensive way to carry a machine gun around the sky.

Mr. HARKNESS: In other words, under modern air conditions you do not look upon it as being effective?

Mr. HENDRICK: I am informed it does not have the room or the weight-carrying capability to take all the sophisticated equipment that is necessary for a modern airplane. A modern airplane has to have an awful lot of black boxes in it if it is going to be any good against a sophisticated enemy, and I am informed that this will not go in this airplane. It will not take the combination of weights and quantities that are necessary to make it a really modern airplane. You do not fly these airplanes today by the seat of your pants. You cannot put a man and some gasoline in an airplane and have an effective fighting machine anymore. It is a much more sophisticated and complicated method. That is why I mentioned I am quite sure the airplane would be no good for air defence because of the gadgetry that must go inside it in order to do the job. This involves a matter of space, weight and many other technical factors.

Mr. HARKNESS: You mentioned the officer in the—

Mr. DEACHMAN: Mr. Chairman, I wonder if Mr. Harkness would permit me to ask one supplementary question? I noticed this aircraft has been used in Viet Nam and I also noticed the Dutch have just bought 105 of them, I think it is, from Canada. In the light of what the Air Marshal has said with regard to this, I wonder if he would comment on these two facts? It is not as if we were making this mistake alone. Apparently we are plunging off into idiocy in the company of some pretty classy friends.

Mr. HENDRICK: You are right, our NATO Allies have great confidence in us, too. They might easily follow our mistake because we did it. Also the airplane happens to be closer to home when it is with them and its range is not so important.

Mr. HARKNESS: In your remarks about the officers in the intermediate slots today, you said you thought it would be desirable for the Committee to get the views of some people of this kind. Do you know any way in which that could be done by the Committee without the officers concerned being in serious danger of being fired or otherwise summarily got rid of?

Mr. HENDRICK: It would be a very difficult thing, indeed. I do not know whether the Committee has the power to give them some assurance of this kind. They would have to be brought in and put under oath, I would think, and required to do something which has never been done in Canada before, which is to comment on policy. This has never been done before and it is, generally speaking, not a desirable thing to do. But this is an unusual circumstance, possibly, and some way of sounding them out should, I think, be attempted.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Mr. Chairman, might I interject here? This might be a good time to read into the minutes Beauchesne's paragraph 314 and 315.

The CHAIRMAN: I do not happen to know them from memory.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Neither do I but I have them here. I could paraphrase but I do not know what the words are.

The CHAIRMAN: Perhaps we could do this some other time, having made a note of the fact there is such a thing.

Mr. MCINTOSH: It might assure them they will not be fired or should not be fired because of the information they give to the Committee.

Mr. NUGENT: That is the assurance in Beauchesne that witnesses before this Committee are under the protection of Parliament.

Mr. HARKNESS: As far as that is concerned there is also consideration of their future promotion possibilities which, in most cases, would be just as important.

Mr. HENDRICK: It would be a difficult thing.

Mr. HARKNESS: I was wondering whether you had any idea at all of how this evidence might be secured and, at the same time, these people protected both from their promotion and job security point of view.

Mr. HENDRICK: The only way I can think of is there might be some, as I have mentioned, who have already decided to leave and the extra foreshortening of a few months might not be too significant for them.

Mr. HARKNESS: Otherwise, people who have just left in the last month or two might serve the purpose just as well if we could secure some of them?

Mr. HENDRICK: Oh yes, certainly.

Mr. HARKNESS: You mentioned something about the promotion system having been changed and that it is now centralized in Ottawa. I presume it is worked to a large extent on a computer system, or it is hoped it will be worked on a computer system, from what we have heard. Do you think it is really possible to select the best officers for promotion on any basis other than assessment by the people who have been in immediate command of them over the years?

Mr. HENDRICK: There is no perfect promotion system in the world, but the best one must include the opinions of immediate superiors as one of the inputs, certainly.

Mr. HARKNESS: You mentioned that an official bulletin comes out every day now to give the undiluted and pure truth to the troops. How long has that been going on?

Mr. HENDRICK: I do not know how long it has been going on. I have seen a copy and I know it exists, but that is all. I think it is a daily communique of some kind. It is very good from what I have seen of it.

Mr. HARKNESS: Mr. Chairman, I think, members of the Committee should have copies of this for the last month. I would make a request at the present time that they be filed with us.

The CHAIRMAN: If we could get some idea of what it is called—

Mr. HENDRICK: I am sure the Directorate of Information Services for Internal Information would know about it.

The CHAIRMAN: We will ask the Clerk to try to get hold of a copy of it.

Mr. HARKNESS: I presume this is put out by the Directorate of Information Services for Internal Information which you have mentioned?

Mr. HENDRICK: I do not know whether that is so or not, Mr. Harkness. I do not know who puts it out. It comes from Ottawa, I believe.

Mr. HARKNESS: How long ago did you hear of this Directorate of Information Services for internal information?

Mr. HENDRICK: Oh, within the last couple of weeks.

Mr. HARKNESS: Has it actually been formed yet, or is it just projected?

Mr. HENDRICK: I cannot tell you that specifically, with accuracy. I believe. it has been formed, though. I believe there is a man actually in the post at this point.

Mr. HARKNESS: Those are all the questions I have at the moment.

Mr. MACALUSO: Supplementary to that, if I may, Mr. Chairman; Air Vice Marshal, where did you get your copy?

Mr. HENDRICK: I did not have a copy.

Mr. MACALUSO: Well, where did you see it?

Mr. HENDRICK: I was shown it by one of my friends.

Mr. MACALUSO: Where did he get it?

Mr. HENDRICK: I guess he got it from one of his friends.

Mr. MACALUSO: But no one knows the heading on it?

Mr. HENDRICK: I did not look at it with that accuracy, I am afraid.

Mr. MACALUSO: Was there a stamp indicating where it came from?

Mr. HENDRICK: I was told that it came from Ottawa and that it was standard issue which told people what was going on.

Mr. MACALUSO: It would be interesting, if it exists.

An hon. MEMBER: What do you mean?

Mr. MACALUSO: I say if it exists as a daily communique. I am sorry; this is what I am referring to. Not whether the document he saw exists; I mean if it exists as a daily communique.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Air Vice Marshal, I would like to ask if you would mind reviewing for us your military career as other witnesses before us have done? Could you tell us when you enlisted, and so on?

Mr. HENDRICK: I did, very briefly, when I came in. Does the Committee wish more detail?

Mr. FORRESTALL: I must have been way off. Either that or you did it very briefly because I did not hear it at all. I am sorry. I want to thank you then, for one or two points you did make quite frankly and quite publicly because of the hundreds and hundreds of letters I received which have been marked confidential and there has, indeed, been an awareness or concern on the part of the authors of the letters, whether they came from the husband or the wife. Generally speaking, they are from middle ranking people both at the commissioned level and the non-commissioned level. I refer to navy ranks of the petty officer section, the third class leading seamen, lieutenants and lieutenant-commanders and so on.

In your remarks you attempted to explain what is in the minds of these men. There was a lot of concern about why their superiors were leaving the services. Could you elaborate on that just a bit? I am rather concerned about the effect on a middle ranking man when he sees that someone he may have been serving with for a year or two, and in whom he has a lot of confidence and trust, finds it necessary to leave. What kind of effect does this have on his day-to-day ability to conduct his responsibilities?

Mr. HENDRICK: I do not think it affects the day-to-day carrying out of his duties in any way. I think it just worries him with regard to the possibilities of his own career. It gives him concern about his views, I suppose, on the senior management of the system. The scuttlebut says, these lads are fired. So you ask yourself, why? If it can happen to them, maybe it can happen to me.

Mr. FORRESTALL: You suggest this has had some effect on them. Has it affected their moral? You say it has not affected their work.

Mr. HENDRICK: Yes, I think it affects their morale. It is all part of having confidence in the system of which you are a part; that it appears to work in a manner which you understand, and that equity is preserved.

Mr. FORRESTALL: This is as real as it is at once intangible?

Mr. HENDRICK: That is right.

Mr. FORRESTALL: You went on to talk about their promotional opportunities and what appeared to be their acceptance of and confidence in the old system where promotions were somewhat related to the capacity of the immediate superior to make a valid judgment, and the muddling of that and the removal of this type of decision to an impartial or mechanical rubber stamp somewhere distantly removed from them. How does this affect them? Would you again say it has the same effect? Would it affect their morale? Would it have the effect of their perhaps losing a little bit of confidence in themselves by having no tangible target to please, if that is the way of expressing it?

Mr. HENDRICK: No, I think it is a hope the system will be as foolproof, and as fair as possible and that they will get a reasonable evaluation along with their fellow officers. I think they would have more confidence if this were done by a committee of their peers, or next up the line, at least.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Something they remain in touch with?

Mr. HENDRICK: Yes.

Mr. FORRESTALL: This also has been removed; I was not aware of this.

Mr. HENDRICK: I am not aware of the automation you speak of. All I believe is that the promotion procedure has been centralized as part of the integration program.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Did you feel, as a serving officer—I am curious about this; it has been raised by many people with me—that when you joined the air force you entered into some kind of a moral contract with the RCAF as opposed to some broad defence force?

Mr. HENDRICK: Oh, definitely. I joined the RCAF because it was the air force and not for any other reason. I was not interested in anything else. I had served with the artillery and I did not like the artillery that much. You had to groom horses, among other things. I much preferred the air force. I went into the air force because it was an air force. When you got a permanent commission, my understanding was that as long as you minded your business you had a contract to serve till you reached your retirement age, barring catastrophe or something of that sort. It was a firm commitment as part of your service, that they would use you for this length of time.

Mr. FORRESTALL: What would your reaction be if you were back down the ranks a little bit and found yourself faced with a very real possibility of being transferred to another force, or to another element, without any consent on your part, other than your desire to remain active. The Act says that your commission is deemed to continue in what they call the Canadian force. How would you have reacted to that a few years ago?

Mr. HENDRICK: I would have been quite annoyed if I had not been given a choice.

Mr. FORRESTALL: What about the men? Have you ever heard any of them or some of them say anything to indicate this might rankle a little bit?

Mr. HENDRICK: No, I do not think I have. I honestly cannot say that phrase, the way you put it, has been put that way precisely.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Have you heard them discuss it?

Mr. HENDRICK: No.

Mr. FORRESTALL: It is a meaningful thing for you to have joined the air force.

Mr. HENDRICK: That is right.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Now you are going to be asked to join something else. You spoke once about what you believe might be some kind of a continuing exodus. Indeed, I agree with you; I have great fears for what might happen, at least in the navy. This is one of the reasons. Is that a fair statement?

Mr. HENDRICK: I think it is, yes indeed. I would not be at all happy to be transferred to another service. I do not think that I would worry too much about changing my suit particularly, but I would want to feel that I was still part of this viable entity—an air force that had the personality, entity and integrity of itself, that had its own leader and had its own roles and was manned by people who understood it and its problems.

I would not like to have to go into some kind of composite organization where somebody was telling me to do something who did not know what he was talking about. I give you an example: I asked to have my airplane, which was to fly through all the civil aerodromes of North America if necessary—Dakota, shall we say—I fitted out with VOR so that it can fly properly in bad weather in all the aerodromes. So I sent in my little chit to Ottawa saying this was my operational requirement, this was my aeroplane, please could I have some of this stuff. Back came an answer saying: "You cannot have that stuff, but we will give you something else; we will give you TACAN, because it is just as good and besides we are standardizing on TACAN." Now, I know perfectly well the fellow that told me that does not know one end of himself from the other, because TACAN just will not do what I want it to do. But, I got this answer back and thought: "what is the matter with the staff up there, for goodness sake? What they are giving me will not do what I want it to do, and the fellow ought to know it, he is the expert." This does not help your morale either, when you feel you are mixed up with a group that do not know the details of what they are supposed to be handling.

Mr. FORRESTALL: The interchangeability is just not there; you just cannot get into the retraining. You continued, and with this interchangeability you suggested it was true, certainly at many of the technical levels which, in one sense of our discussions, are support levels, I suppose; they are supporting services. This is equally true at an operational level. Is this your—

Mr. HENDRICK: I am sorry, I missed you there.

Mr. FORRESTALL: You mentioned the inability of achieving an acceptable degree of interchangeability at technical, and some of the other levels. You cited the loss of our air medicine career field people, and one or two others. But this is also true, is it not, at the pure operational level?

Mr. HENDRICK: It certainly is, yes indeed.

Mr. FORRESTALL: The commander of a ship has got no business on an airfield, and vice versa.

Mr. HENDRICK: No, I think that is right. The services are unique, as I have said before, in their fighting capability, their ability to do it, their point of view which makes them a good fighting man, and everything else. The army thinks in terms of miles, the air force thinks in terms of thousands of miles, the sailors think in terms of ups and downs and getting sea sick and so on—it is quite a different business.

Mr. FORRESTALL: This would hold true too, I suppose, with those delightful people who fly on and off ships. There is relatively little that is interchangeable between the skills achieved by a man flying a tracker off the decks of *Bonaventure* and a man climbing into the seat of one of these CF-5's.

Mr. HENDRICK: It would take a fair bit of re-training.

Mr. FORRESTALL: It would be rather costly, would it not?

Mr. HENDRICK: Yes it would. Landing on a carrier is quite a specialist procedure, and the average aviator cannot do it.

Mr. FORRESTALL: My time is running out, but I have just one last question, which Mr. Harkness touched and on which you started to elaborate on a bit.

What, in your opinion, are the shortcomings—because we have not been able to get any details or extensive answers to this question—of the CF-5 as a piece of equipment? Have you ever flown one?

Mr. HENDRICK: No, I cannot give you chapter and verse on that with adequate accuracy, because this calls for intimate engineering knowledge of the airplane which I do not have.

Mr. FORRESTALL: You just do not have any knowledge of them?

Mr. HENDRICK: No.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Were you serving when the decision was made to—

Mr. HENDRICK: I am not quite sure when it was. I went out in September, 1964, and it was done in Ottawa and I was not party to what was going on at all in Ottawa. So I cannot tell you whether I was or whether I was not.

Mr. FORRESTALL: That is fine. Thank you for now.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): I have a supplementary question Mr. Chairman. You are sure it is no good?

Mr. HENDRICK: I have been told by people who I believe know properly, that its range is limited and that its weight-carrying capability and ability to carry sophisticated equipment is limited. So, therefore, its adaptability for many roles is limited. It is not "no good", no.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): It was not meant for that, so it is good.

Mr. HENDRICK: Well, it is not an either or thing, you know.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): Well, is it not good, or good, or what?

Mr. HENDRICK: Well, if you want to put it that way, but I would not put it that way.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): Thank you.

Mr. ANDRAS: Air Vice Marshal Hendrick, there was some discussion a few minutes ago about the possible weaknesses in the promotion system, I think more applied to officers, but I assume the same general principles or objections would, in your mind, apply to other than officers. You said there is no perfect system, but you emphasized that there should always be the personal assessment by a senior officer one rank or two up. Where, in the present program that we are looking at, is there any suggestion—even in spite of the fact that personnel records will be computerized—that the element of personal recommendation or consideration will not be given by one senior in rank?

Mr. HENDRICK: I think the essence, as I understand it, is not that your commander recommends you—that is part of it, certainly—but that a board of officers at your intermediate level deals with you. It is the multiple personal opinion that is a rather good thing in this respect, I believe.

Mr. ANDRAS: Then you would not subscribe that this, as was suggested, is simply reduced to a computerized, very impersonal kind of operation?

Mr. HENDRICK: No, I did not say anything about computerizing it. I merely understand that the Board, or whatever the machinery is that does it, or the judgments of the people is at the senior level now, and removed from the field where the man, in fact, was serving. In the old days there were two of these echelons you went through; two filters, if you like.

Mr. ANDRAS: I am not arguing; I am simply seeking information. It is your impression, then, that now the field commander of any particular person is not consulted.

Mr. HENDRICK: No, it is not that the field commander is not consulted; I am sure he is. It is that there is no board of officers at that level to support him, if you like, or to help him in his assessments.

Mr. ANDRAS: Again, there was some discussion a few minutes ago about the use of carrier plane pilots versus fighter pilots flying other aircraft, and so forth. The implication I got, and certainly I am imperfect at these things, is that carrier plane pilots might be interchanged with fighter pilots in the air force. Again, this is not my understanding. Do you have any accurate information to indicate that there would be that kind of interchange?

Mr. HENDRICK: No, I do not think I intended to give you an impression of such interchange. I said, I believe, that landing on a carrier was very difficult and special training was necessary for it. It was not a matter of interchangeability at all.

Mr. ANDRAS: If there is not any indication of interchangeability in that area then the fear that there would be a lot of money wasted in training a carrier pilot and then having him switch to a fighter pilot is not really relevant.

Mr. HENDRICK: No; I do not believe I brought up a matter of that kind at all.

Mr. ANDRAS: There was some in the cross-exchange, that is all. Now, sir, you mentioned—and I sensed a great deal of national pride in this, which I certainly share—a frustrated feeling about the idea that we should let someone else defend us. We would all share in this as a matter of national pride but again, as a matter of degree, with 20 million people and a very vast geographic territory, can we really defend ourselves by ourselves in this country?

Mr. HENDRICK: By no means. We must have allies, and how much we contribute to the joint effort is entirely a matter of government policy. I have no views on this, save to feel that we should as much as we properly can, as you would in any club; you would want to pay your dues.

Mr. ANDRAS: Would you recommend, sir, as an alternative to any plan that is before us—integration or unification—carrying on the same general pattern that existed before 1964, which I think we all accept would require perhaps a substantial increase in defence spending in this country? Would you recommend consideration by parliament of a substantial increase in our defence spending in Canada?

Mr. HENDRICK: I am not in a position to recommend anything of that nature. It is a matter, I think, of a requirement to defend ourselves, and what military resources are needed to do this. And then it is up to you gentlemen to decide, on behalf of the country, how much of the tab you want to pick up.

Mr. ANDRAS: Well, there is a question of precedent there; which comes first?

Mr. HENDRICK: Historically, it is not the limitation money because, after all, we have not got a bottomless pit. If the limitation is the money, then you have to reduce the roles if you have not got the money to go round.

Mr. ANDRAS: And fit the force and everything else into a compromise negotiated approach to a defence budget with some relevance to our ability to stand that gaff. Do you think we spend too little in this country expressed as a percentage of our gross national product, or any other yard stick you want to use? You mentioned that we are a wealthy country, which implies that we could stand more.

Mr. HENDRICK: I suppose if you compare our efforts with the rest of our NATO allies, we do not stand out too remarkably at the top of the pile. We are somewhere between Italy and Greece, I think—somewhere down there.

Mr. ANDRAS: Then you would say we should spend more money on that basis?

Mr. HENDRICK: Yes, I believe we should do more in our own defence per capita.

Mr. ANDRAS: You believe that a billion and a half, with the escalating clause for inflationary measures, is not sufficient?

Mr. HENDRICK: You have choices, of course. I believe we should defend ourselves with our American allies in a way which is mutually agreed. If the defence of North America is top priority and the defence of NATO is second, perhaps you want to taper down on the defence of NATO. I am not in a position to assess the strategic alternatives at this point. If you make a choice that you must limit the amount of money that you spend, I submit, under the conditions today as you have suggested, that you have to trim your force or trim your roles.

Mr. ANDRAS: But you do say that in your opinion, without going into the method that would be used, generally speaking and as a principle you would support a higher expenditure on defence in this country?

Mr. HENDRICK: At the present moment, I believe so, considering the effort of our NATO Allies with which we are partners.

Mr. ANDRAS: Have you any idea, sir, how far you would want to go, in ball park figures, in increasing our military budget?

Mr. HENDRICK: No, I am not qualified as this point on such short notice to give you an opinion on that. That is a very complicated and difficult thing.

Mr. ANDRAS: And for instance, which is directly relevant, how many people we should have in our forces?

Mr. HENDRICK: That will flow automatically from the tasks that we pick up.

Mr. ANDRAS: Sir, again, in my opinion—one man's opinion—it appears to me from the evidence you have given and the statements you have made that of the witnesses we have heard, certainly you would be one, along with perhaps one or two others—I almost go so far as to say, more so than others—who holds an opinion that is actually critical of integration; that is, the process of combining field commands and defence headquarters command. To a degree greater than, perhaps, any other witness we have heard, you seem to be against even the stage of it, let alone the further stage that is before us now in the question of unification. Have I interpreted you correctly?

Mr. HENDRICK: Not completely, no. The thing that I would prefer to see changed is the disappearance of the Chiefs of Staff themselves. There is nothing

the matter at all with integrated headquarters and integrated functional commands and that sort of thing which has been going on. This has been a standard military pattern for a long time in many parts of the world. The putting together of common support services also is sensible, but I think the point where I would take issue with the the general understanding is that the percentage of total support which is truly common is relatively low. I got the impression today that we were talking about most of the support services being integrated. The implication being that most of them were common.

I do not believe that is true. An awful lot of the support services, particularly in the logistics part, are very peculiar and particular to the force; they have to be responsive to the force and they are almost part of the force. It is a very difficult thing to draw the line, as you know. You have first line maintenance; the fellow who fills a gas tank on the field has got to be part of the force because he does it even under fire. If you work back you would get to a point where, perhaps, it can be common, or not part of the combat force, but most of the support forces of a technical nature are peculiar to the force they support. I do not know the percentage of the common element, but I suggest that perhaps 10 to 20 per cent of our total support forces would be truly subject to integration in the sense that they are common; supplying the food; the construction of a building, provided you have a section you can take out to do construction of bridges under fire and a few things like this. It is not a simple business so I would not hold against that at all.

Mr. ANDRAS: You made the remark—I have not made exact notes and I certainly stand to be corrected if I make any paraphrasing error—that the expertise at the staff level should be re-established. This could leave a big question hanging in the air. Does it, by any chance, imply that you lack confidence in the present serving staff officers?

Mr. HENDRICK: I have no knowledge to give me reason to do that.

Mr. ANDRAS: That was not what you meant by that, then?

Mr. HENDRICK: No, no; not in their ability; not in their competence as individuals, but I would have concern about their ability by virtue of their training and background. If you are trained in a certain specialty, you just do not know as much about the other specialties, no matter how good you are. It is not at all a function of the individual's incompetence or anything of that sort—it is the individual's background. If you want an expert he has to go through a certain amount of years of indoctrination.

Mr. ANDRAS: Let us go back to this problem of budgets, costs and so on. When you were a serving officer—I believe you retired in 1964 or 1965?

Mr. HENDRICK: Late in 1964.

Mr. ANDRAS: At that time, sir, did you feel that some fairly drastic measures for reorganization of the total defence forces were required, considering the costs—one can argue about the degree or the exact dollar figures—and recognizing the trend of an ever increasing portion of our budget being spent on pay and allowances, operating expenses and maintenance as opposed to capital equipment? Did you feel that some answer had to be found that might be of a rather drastic nature?

Mr. HENDRICK: Yes, I would agree that, as you say, the percentage of money available for equipment was slowly going down and down, and there had to be some answer.

Mr. ANDRAS: There had to be some answer?

Mr. HENDRICK: Yes, and my answer would have been to reduce the role that we were doing or reduce the forces somewhere, not to change their organization or their nature, but to reduce the effort so that it matched our dollars; not change the nature of it, but to reduce its extent.

Mr. ANDRAS: And reduce the number of people in the force?

Mr. HENDRICK: That would probably follow, yes. It would have to. The only way you can save money is to reduce men, really, when you get down to it.

Mr. ANDRAS: General Foulkes appeared before us the other day, and I cannot remember the date to which he was referring, but he did indicate that some fairly drastic plans for unification or integration—and I do not want to fool around with these words—but a general single force concept had been presented. It is not that new a thing. I think he mentioned that at the time Mr. Pearkes was the defence minister he had presented a program with that principle. I do not the country, the services and so forth.

What I am really getting at in a roundabout way is that any such major comment, the minister then said, "Well, it is a pretty fascinating idea; it is a pretty courageous idea; it is a pretty drastic idea; I do not think we will try it". The implication I got was that it was just a little too radical to be accepted by know the great detail but he had that principle in mind and, as I remember his reorganization would run into resistance to change, resistance by virtue of built-in and quite understandable traditional reaction, the pride of service—all these sorts of things—but is it not very natural that such a major overhaul would run into quite a bit of opposition? It apparently did because the minister at that time anticipated that it would be too much and, as I understood it from General Foulkes' remarks, he dropped it.

Mr. HENDRICK: Of course, it is natural that any drastic change will be subject to some concern, and the more so if the people concerned believe that there may be another answer which is not quite so drastic. It does not necessarily follow that in order to keep our budget within a certain figure in our defence effort, this was the way to do it. There are other ways as well that might be less drastic and it would be interesting to know how many alternatives were looked at and discarded for good and sufficient reasons, leading to this rather unusual solution being adopted. It does not necessarily follow that it is the only solution to get the answer.

Mr. ANDRAS: But almost any drastic change—

Mr. HENDRICK: It does not have to be drastic.

Mr. ANDRAS: This does not relate just to the military.

Mr. HENDRICK: No, of course. Philosophically speaking, I certainly agree.

Mr. ANDRAS: When a corporation or any organization that is used to going along a certain way, and so forth, suddenly or even on a gradual basis considers a change, there is just resistance to the *status quo*, is there not?

Mr. HENDRICK: Of course, you must not forget that the services themselves have a long history of continuous change. They are never static. There is always a reorganization of some kind going on to meet the circumstances of the day. Every year or two some change or other comes into effect, and they are trained to accept change for this reason. This is not novel. Change in itself is nothing to bother a service man. He lives with it. It is only when the change does not seem to make as much sense to him as it might, or he does not quite understand it, that he gets concerned.

I do not know how many reorganizations I have lived through in my service career. The pattern is never the same for any three years in a row. It is seeking to get the best solution for the situation at the time but none of the changes are drastic; they are evolutionary. You have something wrong and you try to fix it with a minimum of comotion. You just make a change that will fix that problem and hope it will not create more problems than it fixes.

A military organization is a very sensitive thing. So many things are interrelated and it is a terribly complicated thing to deal with, and I do not think humans are smart enough to start in from square one and put up a perfect organization. The only way you can get a good organization in a sophisticated and complicated human endeavour is to take it the way it is and change it as little as possible, letting experience work its way along slowly. If you start in with a master plan and turn things upside down, you are not smart enough to do it.

Mr. ANDRAS: The program, as we have heard, on unification—integration was announced formally so that all the forces knew. There was an all-member of the armed forces letter sent out on April 2, 1964: there was the White Paper; there was a great deal of newspaper coverage based on the White Paper and on this communication, and so forth and that probably would be the more public official notice of it. It indicated that three or four years hence probably there would be a further move toward unification to a single force. It was quite definitely stated that there would be change and adjustments, but the end objective was a single force and, generally speaking, in that sense it seems to be on target.

That was in 1964; this is now 1967. The plans presented to us these last several days and speeches before that would indicate that the unification, if I may use that word—which I am quite sure you do not like, having read some of your articles—is planned to take place over the next five years or so. There even is a target date of 1972 for some of the end objectives, and so on. That it adds up to eight or nine years. You suggest that it should be even more gradual than that.

Mr. HENDRICK: No, I think I would suggest that it should be less drastic than that.

The CHAIRMAN: You are getting to the end of your time, Mr. Andras.

Mr. ANDRAS: May I ask just one more question?

The CHAIRMAN: Yes.

Mr. ANDRAS: You have mentioned that really there has not been a great deal of service rivalry. Is there not a great deal of historical evidence of service rivalry, not only in our country but in other countries! For instance, recently I

believe the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force had a pretty terrific battle between themselves about whether they would get carriers of aircraft. The end result was that the navy minister resigned and the First Sea Lord resigned. General Foulkes made the point the other day that there was quite a hell of a job in getting co-ordination between the three service heads, so it really seems to be a fact that there has been quite a bit of service rivalry and this must thave been a real problem.

Mr. HENDRICK: I think it is an inevitable problem, but I do not think you do away with it by doing away with the protagonists because each represents an alternative military solution to a given problem, and the essence of your problem is to find the best of these three, or what combination is the best. The only way you can do it in any human endeavour where a situation like this occurs is to allow for this exchange, which you call rivalry—this debate or this healthy interchange of views and measurements—to come up with the best answer. You can call it rivalry if you like but how else, in human endeavour, can you solve a complicated problem? You cannot solve it by taking two of the protagonists and throwing them away and having one answer only because you have not considered the other two. That is an arbitrary way of doing it. That does not necessarily mean you will get the best answer.

Mr. ANDRAS: One of the disadvantages of this most interesting conversation is the Chairman glaring at me for time, so please mark me down again, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Macaluso, did you have your hand up before or were you just pointing out that Mr. Andras wanted to speak?

Mr. MACALUSO: No, I was not asking to speak.

Mr. LANIEL: From what I have gathered up to now, I have the impression that you even believe in integration in the sense that it has been envisaged as a means to save money and to improve our administration, and better to co-ordinate the support element of our forces, and so on. Am I right in expressing it this way?

Mr. HENDRICK: Not completely, no. Integration is such a complicated subject. I said I did not believe in the elimination of the three Chiefs of Staff, but there are other elements of integration which are acceptable and sensible in the common support services, and I made the point that the percentage of support which was common was relatively small and, therefore, the amount of integration which I would consider appropriate probably is not as much as is considered necessary by this proposal. I differ in degree, shall we say.

Mr. LANIEL: Do you feel that many of the improvements that have been started could have been done even without integration of commands?

Mr. HENDRICK: Yes, many of them could, I believe. To me the business of having one service look after the interests of another as we did in the case of common purchasing of food and common purchasing of medical supplies; having one service run a hospital in place of the other two; having the MT pool in Ottawa—it used to be run by the army—for everybody, was a very simple way of avoiding duplication without touching the basic organization.

Mr. LANIEL: You said that these improvements started years ago.

Mr. HENDRICK: Yes.

Mr. LANIEL: But do you feel they went fast enough or that perhaps integration would be a definite step towards acceleration?

Mr. HENDRICK: I think they could have been accelerated but I am not sure that integration was necessarily the way to do it in every case. In many cases you could do it and get the economies you are after without the integration procedure. But each one has to be looked at on its merits.

Mr. LANIEL: Did you participate personally in the preparation or planning of integration?

Mr. HENDRICK: No, sir, I was in the field at this time and knew very little about it.

Mr. LANIEL: You said that you made up your mind because you did not feel that you—I am trying to put in my words what you said—could carry on in your duties and your responsibilities with the set-up that was brought forward through integration concerning, let us say, the relationship between senior officers and the civil authorities. You complained that since this government has been in office the situation has deteriorated in connection with the acceptance by civil authorities of military advice, because you did say at one point that miltary opinions were given fair consideration before this government came to office.

Mr. HENDRICK: My experience in Ottawa, when I was in Ottawa, was that this was so; that is to say, that military considerations seemed to receive their fair weight. I have no personal experience in Ottawa with the latest regime. I have only to go on the feeling which I have picked up in the services from my contacts, that people's advice was not given quite as much consideration as they had hoped it would be.

Mr. LANIEL: You give me the impression that you think it is better to do things the soft way; as you said—to seek to get the best solution with the minimum of commotion.

Mr. HENDRICK: Yes.

Mr. LANIEL: Is your feeling influenced by the close date of your retirement age? You were born in 1910, were you not?

Mr. HENDRICK: That is correct.

Mr. LANIEL: When you were retired in 1964 you were 54 years and five months old.

Mr. HENDRICK: That is right.

Mr. LANIEL: Did you feel the challenge was for the younger generation? You spoke of an exodus of senior officers but you did not relate that exodus to the fact that many of our senior officers had served in the last war and were coming close to retirement age.

Mr. HENDRICK: I was referring to those who retired before their date. I was one of those who retired when my proper calendar date came along. In this respect, I suppose I was fortunate in not having to make this decision because time helped me out of the service before I had concern. I was in the field and I had merely to keep my troops' morale up and my command working well and that was my only problem. I was not involved in the Ottawa reorganization at all.

Mr. LANIEL: You were at St. Hubert?

Mr. HENDRICK: Yes, I was at St. Hubert.

Mr. MACALUSO: May I ask a supplementary here, Mr. Laniel?

Mr. LANIEL: Yes.

Mr. MACALUSO: Do I understand, Air Vice Marshal, that you had nothing to do with integration planning at all, as you just said?

Mr. HENDRICK: That is right.

Mr. MACALUSO: In fact, everything you have is second hand information, rather than direct information from Ottawa.

Mr. HENDRICK: It is not first hand experience about the planning of integration. That is true.

Mr. MACALUSO: Thank you.

Mr. LANIEL: Because of the time I will skip some of my questions. They might be questions that have been asked before of other witnesses we would arrive at about the same answer. But I want to come back to one point: In your opinion, how much does it cost to train a pilot from the time he joins the service until he reaches the air division?

Mr. HENDRICK: I cannot tell you from my experience. I know that the timing is something of the order of two years.

Mr. LANIEL: You see, what I am concerned about is you seem to give the impression that taking a pilot coming off a role like a strike reconnaissance role, or anywhere else, and transferring him to the navy, or to a naval air operation on a carrier, does not mean too much of an economy of money. How much does it cost to take a pilot and bring him to an operational training unit? It must cost a few thousand dollars.

Mr. WINCH: Five hundred and seven thousand dollars.

Mr. LANIEL: That is not what I mean. I mean up to OTU where he is oriented in one direction or another because—

The CHAIRMAN: About $175,000.

Mr. LANIEL: Well, I do not know; I am not taking these figures, the record will show them, but I believe this might be a place where, on some occasions, money could be saved.

Mr. HENDRICK: In common training? Is that the point you are making? Training people up to a certain point in one school or by one service?

Mr. LANIEL: Yes, but I am asking is the navy spending more money in taking a recruit and bringing him up to either ASW role or right on a carrier, in comparison to the navy taking an experienced pilot that was doing another role?

Mr. HENDRICK: Certainly it is easier to convert an experienced pilot, but he still has to be converted.

Mr. LANIEL: It does not take too many weeks.

Mr. HENDRICK: Well, I do not know how long it takes to train a man to work on a carrier, but I do know that it took over a year to train a man for the air division and the man that you put into the pipe line was a man who was already a qualified jet pilot.

Mr. LANIEL: Yes, but this is with very, very sophisticated equipment.

Mr. HENDRICK: Well, the navy has sophisticated equipment too.

Mr. LANIEL: Do we have that kind of equipment on a carrier?

Mr. HENDRICK: I think we do. The Tracker airplane is full of all sorts of sophisticated equipment. Landing on a carrier itself is not easy, especially under operational conditions with heavy seas, and so on. It takes a great deal of training.

Mr. LANIEL: Well, during the war it took three months.

The CHAIRMAN: It is a lot different now.

Mr. HENDRICK: But the conditions under which they operate are far more rugged now than they used to be.

Mr. LANIEL: From your wings to flying a seaplane?

Mr. HENDRICK: Yes.

Mr. LANIEL: Catalinas and so on.

Mr. HENDRICK: Oh, yes. The art has become a lot more sophisticated by virtue of the tasks we have and the devices needed to fly.

Mr. LANIEL: Well, I will stop there.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Air Marshal Hendrick, I was very interested when you were discussing the Director of Information Services for Internal Information, and your suggestion that we might possibly have a Dr. Goebbels in our midst. I went out into the hall to see if I could get a telephone book and find out whether Dr. Goebbels had got to that level in the staff organization where he had a telephone, and while I was there I ran into the man himself, standing in the hall. He is a tall young fellow and was drinking coffee out of a plastic cup. He said he is the Director of Information Services for Internal Information, so you are quite right—he does exist, and he was right here in the room with us.

He was recently appointed by the Director of Information Services to hasten and improve the dissemination of information within the services as a result of criticisms made directly to this Committee and criticisms made in the House of Commons that insufficient information is getting out through the services, and so on. In view of those criticisms, some of them levelled at the government by witnesses here, I wonder whether you still think this is a dangerous trend and we really have a Dr. Goebbels in our midst, or whether this might not prove to be a very useful young man in the information services who will improve something that was lacking and which we really want?

Mr. HENDRICK: I think it all depends on the quality of the information he issues and I am much reassured that his name is not Goebbels and that he looks like a good young man.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Thank you very much.

Mr. LAMBERT: May I interject a supplementary question? Did any of the witnesses who appeared here and commented about this seek to have a Director of Information for Internal Dissemination, or whatever it is?

Mr. DEACHMAN: Well, I do not know whether they had got that far advanced with their planning, but certainly the Department had.

I want to ask you one question about healthy competition. Air Marshal, a subject which has arisen again and again is the question of whether having three services engaged in healthy competition and rivalry with each other is a desirable thing. I want to ask you: If you were putting an all-star team on the ice to compete against Russia, would you put them in their original club sweaters or would you put them in an all-star sweater and train them as one team?

Mr. HENDRICK: I have never found that the three club sweaters in any way stopped the most efficient co-operation among the services when it came to fighting a war.

Mr. DEACHMAN: That was not the question I asked you. It was not an answer to the question I asked, but it was an analogy. It was a neat piece of dodging. I want to refer to some remarks made at the very beginning of your talk here tonight. You said that you read the White Paper with amazement—I think you even said "innocent amazement"—and then you went on to ask what studies were made on which the White Paper itself was based, and I wonder whether or not you have read some of the papers of General Foulkes from 1961 and 1962 in which he discusses this whole subject thoroughly and, in fact, on which he produced a paper which is filed as one of the appendices to the reports of this Committee?

Mr. HENDRICK: No, sir, I have not seen those papers.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Had you heard nothing of discussions within the armed forces at the time you were there centring around discussions which General Foulkes and others had on the subject of integration?

Mr. HENDRICK: In what period of time was this, Mr. Deachman?

Mr. DEACHMAN: This was in 1961 and 1962. He was then out of the armed forces but he was very prominent as a writer on the subject of integration and unification. Were you familiar with those papers at all?

Mr. HENDRICK: Only very vaguely.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Have you read much with regard to McNamara's studies on integration and computerization, and so on, of organization within the armed forces of the United States?

Mr. HENDRICK: I am aware of a number of those, yes.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Have these not lead you to some conclusions that possibly we might be thinking in the same direction?

Mr. HENDRICK: That is true.

Mr. DEACHMAN: So really, having given some thought to it and the possibility of it, it really did not fall upon you with all that much amazement when you saw the White Paper of 1964?

Mr. HENDRICK: I did not relate the White Paper of 1964 to the studies to which you refer. There did not quite seem to be a parallel.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentleman, I asked Air Vice Marshal Hendrick if he could come back tomorrow and he said he would prefer not to. After Mr. Deachman we have three questioners, Mr. McIntosh, Mr. Churchill and Mr. Nugent. Mr. Andras said he would like to have his name taken off because his question has been answered. So now, what is—

An hon. MEMBER: I think he should come back.

The CHAIRMAN: Well, he said he would prefer not to.

Mr. FOY: Well, let us carry on with the hope that we can accommodate him.

The CHAIRMAN: Do you have a long series of questions, Mr. Nugent?

Mr. NUGENT: Like most of the questions, it depends on the answers.

The CHAIRMAN: Shall we just try it for another twenty minutes and see how it goes? It would rather depend, I suppose, on how long Mr. Deachman is going to take.

Mr. DEACHMAN: I will not be very long, Mr. Chairman. I have just a few more questions to ask.

On the subject of establishing the discussion that was going on at that period with regard to integration and unification, I wonder whether you would glance to *Hansard*; for instance, the *Hansard* of May 8, 1964, where Mr. Lambert said:

> I fully agree with the fact that there should be unification. I understand that as a logical step.

Had you studied Mr. Lambert on the subject of unification and his desire to bring it about as a logical step?

Mr. LAMBERT: That is unification of command.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Unification, period.

Mr. LAMBERT: No, no; it is unification of command; look at the context.

Mr. HENDRICK: I have read some of the *Hansards*, in particular the important ones, I believe, when the matter was before the House. In most cases I have had trouble in finding out what really was meant by unification and integration and this was one of the difficulties, I think, in making up your mind about the arguments.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Making up your mind what was meant by unification and integration?

Mr. HENDRICK: Yes.

Mr. DEACHMAN: I think you had left by the time the directive came out which was April 2, 1964. Is that correct?

Mr. HENDRICK: No.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Were you still there at that time?

Mr. HENDRICK: I believe so, yes.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Do you recall the directive to all members of the armed forces and employees of the Department of National Defence, signed by Mr. Cardin and Mr. Hellyer, in which they discussed the steps which would ensue from integration and in which they went on to note that:

> The process outlined above is not immutable,

they said

> as the lessons of the reorganization are learned, changes in the plan or in the timing may result. However, the end objective of a single Service is firm.

Do you recall that?

Mr. HENDRICK: I have read that statement a number of times.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Well, that is encouraging. We have found senior officers who have not seen it although they were in the services at the time. It certainly points up the need for that young Dr. Goebbels that I met out in the hall, does it not? The only conclusion I can come to, coming back to my original question on the subject of your amazement at the White Paper, is that integration was the subject of considerable discussion through 1961 and 1962. I certainly recall General Foulkes' article; I recall them very well. I had them in my own files to read, although I was not as interested as you would have been at that time, and I just cannot accept the idea, sir, that it came to you as a matter of amazement. I think at that time it must have been a subject of common discussion amongst people such as yourself.

Mr. HENDRICK: I am afraid not. We will have to agree to differ on that, I guess.

Mr. DEACHMAN: I am ending my questions here, but I sincerely hope we will be back to the examination of the Minister and his staff very, very shortly because you and other witnesses who have been before us in this last couple of days have opened up many questions which now need answering by the Minister before we can proceed with what we are doing here.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Mr. Chairman, I think the simplest way to answer my questions would be for the Air Marshal to repeat his introductory remarks. I was very pleased with them. In fact, I agree wholeheartedly with them, but they do raise a point which I do not think has been brought out yet and I will come to that in a moment.

First of all, I want to refer to a statement made by Mr. Deachman about the study of unification, and so on, in the American forces and he asked whether you were aware of this. Could I ask you this: If we had the forces of the United States, would our problem of unification be a problem to us in relation to the roles that we have now?

Mr. HENDRICK: If we had the forces of the United States, I do not think we would even consider unification.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Also I should refer at this time to two statements that I think Mr. Andras made. You were talking about the economics and the expenditures, and so on, of the Department of National Defence and the number of men that we have and I think he tried to get you to reach the conclusion that there was no alternative.

I have mentioned in the Committee before that France found a solution. They had a problem similar to ours. They still have as much fire power as they ever had; it is not costing them any more money. They are on a fixed budget, the same as Canada, but they increased their weapons and reduced their personnel which is what you have suggested on several occasions this evening. I think, possibly, that is something we should have gone into. Also in your opening remarks—and I go back to the key which I thought I had found this afternoon—

An hon. MEMBER: Do you mean you have lost it?

Mr. MCINTOSH: No, no; I have not lost it; I want to relate it to something that the Air Marshal said and I think it needs an explanation that has not been brought out this evening. It is the key to the puzzle or many puzzles, I would say,

and one of the puzzles and the most puzzling is the Minister's statement and I have referred to this time and time again. I still will; I cannot get his inference when he says that the system will not be changed and we will continue to have all these forces. This has been brought up by our colleagues time and time again to witnesses—we still have these forces; the Minister is not saying that; there has been no change at all; they still have their badges and so on, but he always ends:

—until the force structure within the unified force is developed,

and this is what has puzzled me all along until this afternoon. We come to that question of the role. What is the defence role of Canada? Is it an independent role based on collective defence or is it the go alone policy? Are we going to drop the interdependent role? As you said, and Mr. Andras said, a few moments ago, we must have allies.

I suggest there is one other solution and perhaps this is the solution that the Minister is looking at. We could have somebody else defend us because they are going to defend us whether we want them to or not. It is essential that Canada be defended for the sake of their own defence. You said that if you base an appreciation on a false premise, then you must reach a false conclusion. Well, my premise is based on the key that I found this afternoon, that it is the intention of the Minister to change the role from interdependence to a go-it-alone policy, and that go-it-alone policy is the only thing that makes sense to everything that we have had put in front of us by the government and by the Minister.

You said you "read with amazement the White Paper. It was self-evident it was written backwards", or words to that effect. Now, would you explain just what you meant by that?

Mr. HENDRICK: The White Paper starts with the assumption that integration and unification have been proven to be right, and then proceeds to lay down how they are going to be achieved. Usually the services are taught to appreciate the arguments, and lead up at the end of the argument to the conclusion that we will have to do something to solve the problem, but what I get out of the White Paper is that we are going to do something without any evidence as to why. It seems to start with a *fait accompli* and it is supported by the December 7 statements that this assumption was the basis of the White Paper, that a unified force was the right answer. So, I read into this that we have made up our minds that the unified force is the right answer and all we are doing from now on is just dealing with the details which we have not figured out ahead of time.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I think that General Moncel said the purpose of the White Paper essentially was to produce the best defence policy for Canada; that is the purpose of the White Paper. Do you agree, then, if we have a go-it-alone policy and we have this new peacekeeping force that it will be capable of defending Canada?

Mr. HENDRICK: The peacekeeping force is not capable of defending Canada, no.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Well, what does it mean in the White Paper where it says under "Objectives",

> The objectives of Canadian defence policy, which cannot be disassociated from foreign policy, are to preserve the peace by supporting collective defence measures to deter military aggression;—

and so on. My interpretation of the White Paper is that we are going to support these collective defence alliances and we are not going to go into a go-it-alone policy. Is that your interpretation of the White Paper?

Mr. HENDRICK: Yes, that is what I read in it; that we were going to do all the things that we had been doing before, and create a mobile force, which is a brand new one, in addition to which we were going to save $100 million and fire 10,000 people, and I thought it was a pretty wonderful trick. That is why I was baffled.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Do you see any manner in which we can carry out this dual role with the personnel that we have at the moment?

Mr. HENDRICK: I cannot answer that unless I look at the establishments that the planners have decided are necessary at this point.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I think you said that in 1964 the recruitment figures showed 150,000 on strength; now, I understand, they are down below 100,000. Do you think we can carry out these two roles with that number of men and still live up to our commitments?

Mr. HENDRICK: I believe the establishment is alleged to be 109,000, or something of the sort at the moment, and the strength is 101,000. We are short that many men, so obviously we cannot do the job with that deficiency.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I am sorry I did not hear your programs on TV. I believe someone said you appeared on November 2. I have been in possession of that key I was looking for for so long that now I am not so sure I have the right key. But I have the right key to solve the problem with regard to the White Paper. I am quite sure I have the key to what was in the Minister's mind or perhaps someone higher than the Minister. If that is the role—a peacekeeping force—I understand it had been rejected by the United Nations. Is that not correct? I could ask a lot of questions on this that were brought up by others. General Foulkes, for example said that type of force would not be accepted by the United Nations. I wonder whether that television appearance you made with Charles Lynch prompted him to write in one his articles that:

> Many of Mr. Hellyer's arguments in support of unification have an improvised air about them, as though he had dreamed up unification first and then devised the evidence in support of it afterwards.

Is that the way unification appears to you? It does to me.

Mr. HENDRICK: I think it does to me, too.

An hon. MEMBER: Have you got the key?

Mr. MCINTOSH: Oh, I think we have the key all right, and we will show you what is in the hidden room before too long. It could be conscription; it could be compulsory military service, and maybe my friends from across the table might like to hear more about that. Maybe I should leave my questions until a little later on.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Mr. Chairman, first I would like to ask you a question. Could the other members of the Committee, in addition to Mr. Deachman, be provided with a copy of that notorious April order issued by the Minister's office? Is this document now public?

Mr. DEACHMAN: I can get it and see that Mr. Churchill is provided with one and that all his friends have one, also. I will send him two.

The CHAIRMAN: Well, perhaps, you would hand them to the Chairman and the Clerk will see they are distributed.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Surely that is not the classified document which was put out some weeks before the White Paper.

Mr. CHURCHILL: When I go out into the hall I do not meet people from the Department who recognize me and pass me any information, so I just wondered if we could get copies.

The CHAIRMAN: I am pretty sure there are very few people around this building who do not recognize you, Mr. Churchill.

Mr. CHURCHILL: But they do not give me the information; not that I want any of their questions, I can think up my own. I would like to ask the witness one or two questions. First, I would compliment him on the excellent presentation he made. I do not wonder that Mr. Deachman is anxious to get the Minister here to answer, because he is getting pretty worried with the evidence that has been brought forward. But, may I ask the witness this question: During the term that you were in command in the field, prior to your retirement, two events occurred; the issuance of the White Paper and the passage of Bill No. C-190 through the House. Were you consulted about the proposed reorganization?

Mr. HENDRICK: No, sir.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Was your advice sought?

Mr. HENDRICK: No, sir.

Mr. CHURCHILL: And yet you were field commander of the air force. On any occasion during that period did you have an opportunity of meeting with the Minister or the Associate Minister of the Defence Committee of the Cabinet to discuss this proposal?

Mr. HENDRICK: No, sir.

Mr. CHURCHILL: May I ask you a question with regard to the White Paper? When you read the White Paper and came across that now famous sentence: "This will be the first step toward a single unified defence force for Canada", did you at that time consider that meant a single service in one uniform with everybody all put together?

Mr. HENDRICK: No sir, I did not.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Do you know of anobody who did?

Mr. HENDRICK: I do not think that was the first implication. Most military men would consider it such a novel solution, shall I say, that they would not read that into it at all.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I notice the White Paper in the same paragraph uses the word "unification" again and says this:

> Sufficient savings should accrue from unification to permit a goal of 25 per cent of the budget to be devoted to capital equipment being realized in the years ahead.

Do you foresee any savings from unification, other than the reduction of personnel that has already occurred?

Mr. HENDRICK: I do not know. By unification are you speaking of the common uniform and things like that?

Mr. CHURCHILL: The common uniform and the single service.

Mr. HENDRICK: No, I cannot. From the details, as they appear to me, now outside the service, I cannot see anything that would cause a saving. As I said earlier, I do not even believe the savings are substantial in eliminating waste. I believe the only way you can save money in substantial amount is to cut the manpower. That really is the only basic way you can save money in substantial quantities.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I judge that the writer of the White Paper was mixed up with regard to integration and unification or that sentence I just read would not have appeared in the form that it did. When you were giving evidence earlier today you said that on one occasion it had come to your attention—and you admit your information is secondhand, just like Mr. Macaluso's information with regard to combat experience is secondhand—that senior officers were at a conference with regard to policy and the order was given that there would be no questions and no discussions. You criticized this as happening in a free and democratic country with a volunteer force. Do you know whether that conference was held in Ottawa or where, and was it attended by members of the three services?

Mr. HENDRICK: I do not know enough about it. I think the Committee would have to discover that for themselves.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Could you give us any lead to how we could effect that discovery?

Mr. HENDRICK: Oh, I am sure headquarters could tell you. There were not that many conferences. I am sure if all the orders along this line were tabled with the Committee it would appear.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Yes, like the order for April, 1964, that I was just talking about. May I ask you this question: Do you consider there has been such a major change in modern warfare that the proposed reorganization of the Canadian defence set-up is required? If there has been a major change, what is it, exclusive of nuclear warfare?

Mr. HENDRICK: I am not aware of any major change which would require this reorganization at all.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Do you consider that Canada would have a more effective fighting force if the three forces were unified, or amalgamated into one?

Mr. HENDRICK: I do not see how.

Mr. CHURCHILL: This is a statement which is frequently made and I was wondering whether, from your long experience, you could see that would happen?

Mr. HENDRICK: I do not believe so.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I take from you evidence that you consider the three fighting services should retain their present identity?

Mr. HENDRICK: They should retain their present identity and they should retain their present chiefs, or what were their present chiefs—their ex-chiefs; in other words, their titular heads, their symbol of existence and their spokesmen in high places and their representative of their expertise.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Are you of the opinion that those concerned with the emphasis on integration and the reorganization that is going on have rather lost sight of the purpose of having defence forces; namely, to provide fighting forces?

Mr. HENDRICK: I think this is so. The combat forces always had the feeling we were too concerned with organization and administration and not enough with fighting. It is normal in peacetime, I think. It is very difficult to keep aggressive in peacetime.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Your judgment of the changes that are going on leads you to the conclusion—which I reached myself some time ago—that the defence department is aiming at a peacekeeping role for Canada's forces and a gradual withdrawal from our military alliances? Is that a correct statement of your feeling?

Mr. HENDRICK: Yes, this is my feeling of what is intended.

Mr. CHURCHILL: With the adoption of the CF-5 airplane, it would appear that the strike reconnaissance role in Europe would be phased out. Is that right?

Mr. HENDRICK: I believe the intention was not to replace the CF-104 and therefore it must be phased out.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Has anyone suggested, or do you foresee, the utilization of the CF-5 with the NATO forces in Europe? Would they mesh with any of the air formations under NATO command?

Mr. HENDRICK: If the airplane is designed, as I understand it to be, as a close support airplane, then it would have to be used in a close support role, which means support of the army, and it would have to depend on the other air forces of the area for its protection.

Mr. CHURCHILL: If a force is devised for United Nations purposes and is comprised of the three arms and its field of operation is some thousands of miles away from this country, how would the CF-5 be utilized under those circumstances? Would it only be by the use of a tanker refueling operation?

Mr. HENDRICK: I am led to believe that its range is such that it takes two or three refuelings to get to Europe and so either it has to stage through Greenland, Iceland and the Faroes, or something of that sort, or else it has to be refueled in the air, one or the other. If it is staged through those places, of course, you have to wait for the weather and you cannot go there right away; you have to take your time. It is practical to do it as long as you have the time to do it.

Mr. CHURCHILL: You would not get the instant response that is being talked about, then?

Mr. HENDRICK: If you had good weather you might, but it is a gamble, and in the North Atlantic it is frequently a gamble. We ferried our planes to Europe many times, as you know, and we allowed weeks to get them over.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I think I will stop at that point, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Nugent—I am not looking at the clock.

Mr. NUGENT: I have 11 minutes to 10.30 and I would like to thank the Air Vice-Marshal for pointing out one thing today that people seem to have lost sight of, and that is in the search for economy—trying to cut down on administration costs when they seem to be rising—integration is not the only solution; that

there are in fact co-operative ways which were described which did have an effect this way. I gathered much comfort from your reminding us that the percentage of the common support service is really very low, and that if integration is to work it is only in such fields as common support or common training ground that it can be helpful.

Mr. HENDRICK: Right.

Mr. NUGENT: I want to apologize for rushing through this, but the Minister has done such a snow job on the public in convincing them that integration and unification are so great, that you realize this Committee must hurry through before the snow melts. I will not keep you any longer.

Mr. HENDRICK: I appreciate your courtesy in taking me off the hook on time.

The CHAIRMAN: Air Vice-Marshal Hendrick, you heard me say earlier today to Air Marshal Annis how grateful we were to him for coming here, and we are equally grateful to you, sir.

Mr. LANIEL: Mr. Chairman, in order to give Mr. McIntosh an opportunity to get his answer, perhaps we should think of asking the Minister to appear very soon.

The CHAIRMAN: We will adjourn until tomorrow afternoon at 3.30.

HOUSE OF COMMONS

First Session—Twenty-seventh Parliament

1966-67

STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. DAVID W. GROOS

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 24

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 22, 1967

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 23, 1967

Respecting

Bill C-243, An Act to amend the National Defence Act and other Acts in consequence thereof.

WITNESS:

Lieutenant-General F. J. Fleury

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY
OTTAWA, 1967

25816—1

STANDING COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. David W. Groos

Vice-Chairman: Hon. Marcel Lambert

Mr. Andras,	Mr. Hopkins,	Mr. Loiselle,
Mr. Brewin,	Mr. Langlois	Mr. MacRae,
Mr. Churchill,	(*Chicoutimi*),	Mr. McIntosh,
[1] Mr. Crossman,	Mr. Laniel,	Mr. McNulty,
Mr. Fane,	Mr. Latulippe,	Mr. Nugent,
Mr. Forrestall,	Mr. LeBlanc (Rimouski),	[2] Mr. Rochon,
Mr. Foy,	[2] Mr. Legault,	Mr. Winch—(24).
Mr. Harkness,	Mr. Lessard,	

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

[1] Replaced Mr. Macaluso on February 22, 1967.

[2] Replaced Messrs. Deachman and Matte on February 23, 1967.

ORDERS OF REFERENCE

HOUSE OF COMMONS

WEDNESDAY, February 22, 1967.

Ordered,—That the names of Messrs. Crossman and Matte be substituted for those of Messrs. Macaluso and Rochon on the Standing Committee on National Defence.

HOUSE OF COMMONS

THURSDAY, February 23, 1967.

Ordered,—That the names of Messrs. Rochon, LeBlanc (*Rimouski*), and Byrne be substituted for those of Messrs. Matte, Deachman and McNulty on the Standing Committee on National Defence.

Attest.

LÉON-J. RAYMOND,
The Clerk of the House of Commons.

25816—1½

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

WEDNESDAY, February 22, 1967.
(44)

The Standing Committee on National Defence met at 3:35 p.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Groos, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Andras, Churchill, Crossman, Deachman, Fane, Forrestall, Foy, Groos, Harkness, Hopkins, Lambert, Langlois (*Chicoutimi*), Laniel, Legault, Lessard, Loiselle, MacRae, Matte, McIntosh, McNulty, Nugent, and Mr. Winch (22).

Also present: Mr. Cameron (*High Park*).

In attendance: Lieutenant-General F. J. Fleury; *From the Department of National Defence*: Honourable Léo Cadieux, Associate Minister.

The Chairman read a telegram dated February 22, 1967, which he had received from Admiral H. S. Rayner. It was agreed to table the telegram (*Exhibit 3*).

The Chairman introduced the witness, Lieutenant-General F. J. Fleury, who described his military background and Service experience. Following his opening remarks to the Committee, Lieutenant-General Fleury answered questions from the members on a variety of defence subjects in relation to *BILL C-243*.

At 6:05 p.m., with the questioning continuing, the Committee adjourned until 10:00 a.m., Thursday, February 23, 1967.

THURSDAY, February 23, 1967.
(45)

The Standing Committee on National Defence met at 10:10 a.m. this day with the Chairman, Mr. Groos, presiding.

Members present: Messrs. Andras, Brewin, Churchill, Crossman, Deachman, Fane, Forrestall, Foy, Groos, Harkness, Hopkins, Lambert, Langlois (*Chicoutimi*), Laniel, Legault, Lessard, Loiselle, MacRae, Matte, McIntosh, McNulty, Nugent, and Mr. Winch (23).

Also present: Mr. Chatterton and Mr. Pugh.

In attendance: Lieutenant-General F. J. Fleury; *From the Department of National Defence*: Honourable Paul Hellyer, Minister; Honourable Léo Cadieux, Associate Minister.

The Committee continued its questioning of the witness, Lieutenant-General F. J. Fleury, which began at the previous sitting. When the questioning was completed, the Chairman thanked General Fleury on behalf of the Committee, for his testimony in connection with *Bill C-243*.

At 1:15 p.m., the Committee adjourned until 3:30 p.m. this day, when the witness will be the Honourable Paul Hellyer, Minister of National Defence.

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

Wednesday, February 22, 1967.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, I see a quorum. I have a telegram which has been sent to me, as Chairman, from Admiral Rayner, which I will read:

> The following telegram has been sent to the Honourable Paul T. Hellyer. Quote In our conversation on evening of Friday 17th February you suggested I appear before the Standing Committee on National Defence stop the Chairman has not yet seen fit to invite me but I wish it to be placed on record that I am available and prepared at 24 hours notice unquote

As I said, this was sent to the Chairman and, with your permission, I will table it.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I presume you are going to call Admiral Rayner.

The CHAIRMAN: His name is one of a series of names that has been submitted to the steering committee but in view of what has happened I would imagine the committee itself would like to see him.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Mr. Chairman, while we have considerations under way at this time I want to return to something I said on a couple of other occasions toward the latter part of this week. We have accumulated a great many questions in our minds from what witnesses have said here over the past week or more. At some point before the echo of their words leaves us I think we should be returning to hear what the minister says and what the staff says, without prejudice to any other steps we may take. I just wonder whether or not we are giving consideration to when that can be fitted in. Perhaps there are some ideas about what we should do about recalling the minister and his staff at an appropriate time to hear what they have to say on these points.

The CHAIRMAN: Well, perhaps it would be of interest to the committee to know that I have asked the various groups represented on the steering committee if they would let me have an idea of the number of witnesses they feel should be called, and I have these replies in now. I had been intending to have a steering committee meeting in a very short time in order to arrive at the recommendations that we could place before you.

As I sense the feelings of the committee, quite apart from a wish, which I think is universal, that we should make progress, we have also three other things which are on our minds. One of them is that there have very definitely been suggestions put to me that it is time that we did see the minister, and there are a lot of questions which, I am sure the minister would like to answer. There is also the very natural suggestion that we should see some more witnesses, and we have invited one here today. There is yet another wish, that we should in some

way try to relax our schedule. These are matters which concern us all, and perhaps you would like to help me on this?

Mr. McINTOSH: Based on personal opinion, I have not heard any members on this side say that we felt we should have the minister at this time. We feel we have questioned the minister and that we have all the information we can get from him. However, if it would be of help to his own party to have him recalled again, they may have second thoughts on what he said. I do not think we would go against it, if you want to recall him.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Lambert, you are the vice chairman of this committee.

Mr. LAMBERT: I think it is a question of the relative decibel level of propaganda at the present time, and I think one has to consider this aspect. I realize that the public image is being considered, but it will be remembered that the minister repeated, I do not know many times, that there would be no obstacle placed in the way of this committee to hear witnesses, and that we could hear the witnesses we wanted.

The CHAIRMAN: This is not an obstacle. I would like to put this straight right now.

Mr. LAMBERT: I want to make it clear. There have been names suggested and other names are likely to be suggested to us some, because of the comments that have been made by witnesses on the defectiveness of integration, and others, who appeared before this committee in 1964, at the time of the consideration of Bill No. C-190, who were most enthusiastic about it. I know that some of them have not exactly changed their minds but they have observed what has happened, and I think if their evidence was of any value to the committee in 1964 it is of equal value now to assess because once we get through Bill No. C-243 there is no point of recall on integration. This is so vitally important to the whole structure of our forces that I feel we would be derogating from our duty if we did not call one or two of these men.

Mr. LANIEL: Mr Chairman, I personally believe that we have had ample opportunity to get information and hear views from witnesses, and to question them. I am wondering if at this stage there is not a danger of becoming repetitive—unless we hear the minister, which might give us a different line of questioning.

Mr. McINTOSH: I have the same fear of it becoming repetitive, too, if we have the minister back. We have heard him time and time again. He has not changed his position. He will not answer questions we want answered.

Mr. LANIEL: I would go further than ask the minister; I would want some of his senior officers, like the chief of staff, also to appear. Maybe after that it would not hurt us to call in two or more witnesses.

Mr. McINTOSH: I agree that we should have the chief of the general staff.

Mr. LANIEL: I think this should be done this week.

Mr. LAMBERT: One or two?

Mr. LANIEL: Well, I say two or more; I am not to insist on that. But there is one thing for sure, we are not interested in hearing everyone who is against and everyone who is for unification who wants to appear before the committee. I do

not think we want that. We want people who will bring something to the work of the committee.

Mr. LAMBERT: Some people who have experience with this.

Mr. LANIEL: I believe so.

Mr. LAMBERT: This has been the unfortunate part of it.

Mr. LANIEL: You mean we have not had experienced witnesses so far?

Mr. LAMBERT: You have had them; this is the unfortunate part of it.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Mr. McIntosh, if it would help members on this side of the table and if they would raise no objection, personally; I think it would help me at this time, having listened to a good deal of discussion which has raised questions in my mind—which I do not think can be answered except by the Minister, the staff and the people who are professionally involved; in other words, by the government—if we had the Minister and his staff back in order to obtain the facts the government can present to us. Mr. Lambert suggested that this is a question of the decibel level. I am not so interested really in the decibel level. I think by that he means the degree to which supporters of the opposition and we are bringing evidence against or for it. I think we have to consider right now whether or not we are getting enough solid facts to proceed in an orderly manner with what we have to do next week. It is for this reason that I would appeal to members to take a pause, have the Minister and his staff in and spend a couple of days with him, then look at the situation and figure out where we are going to the end of the examination of this bill. Surely that would be a reasonable way to proceed, and I think Mr. McIntosh and members opposite would not disagree with that as an orderly way to proceed.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I can only speak for myself, Mr. Chairman, but I can see the need for a re-briefing of the people on the other side. There must have been many doubts raised in their minds in the last three or four days.

The CHAIRMAN: I am not quite sure how helpful that is.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Mr. Chairman, if he will call—

Mr. MCINTOSH: I am quite happy with the findings—

The CHAIRMAN: Order, order.

Mr. HARKNESS: Mr. Chairman, I would have no objection whatever to hearing the minister and members of his staff at any time, as long as it is thoroughly understood that it is not going to end the proceedings as far as hearing witnesses are concerned. There are a considerable number of other witnesses who I think we should hear and whose evidence would be valuable and, in fact, very necessary to us. As long as these witnesses are heard and called, as far as I am concerned I do not care in the slightest at what time the minister and his staff come back to answer questions and deal with some of the matters which have been raised.

Mr. WINCH: Mr. Chairman, after the expressions that have now been put forward, could I suggest that you call a meeting of the steering committee tomorrow morning to go over the views expressed and to prepare a recommendation for the next meeting of the committee on our procedures, and that we now proceed to hear the witness before us.

Mr. LOISELLE: Mr. Chairman, I join with my colleagues, Mr. Deachman and Mr. Harkness, who have proposed having the Minister and his officers appear before us.

Mr. HARKNESS: I did not propose it; I said I had no objection.

Mr. LOISELLE: You collaborate with us; you have no objections. These last two weeks we have heard some witnesses expressing their own opinions on what could happen with integration and so on. Now we should hear from the Minister and his officials in order to hear the opinions of the men who have the task of putting integration in force on some questions and answers that have been given in the last two weeks. After that the committee will be ready to decide whether they should continue with witnesses.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Should we then have the witnesses, back to answer the minister?

Mr. LOISELLE: I am entitled to my opinion; that is all.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Mr. Chairman, I raise a very serious matter in connection with this. We have not available to us the printed minutes of the meetings that we have held with the sole exception of the very first meeting. If we are going to call the minister and his staff in, I for one, would like to have the printed record of the meetings we have had, or if that is not available, photostats of the minutes that have been kept so that we are in a position to know what the questions and answers were. Otherwise there will be a conflict in the committee as to who said what and when, and we will not have the actual information.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Churchill, may I speak to this point. I have been in touch with the Clerk, who has been in touch with those responsible for producing the transcript and the printing of the evidence of this committee. The situation now is that we have four issues at the printers. It is my understanding that we have the highest priority there and that these issues should be available within the next day or so. I am told that the hold-up is not in the printing bureau but in the transcribing section. The mechanical process involves a stenographer typing what she thinks she hears from a tape recorder. When what she has typed has been compared with what has been recorded the transcript is then sent over to the printing office, where it should not really take much more than 24 hours to print. So I am left with a considerable doubt as to whether we would save anything by trying to get photostats of the transcripts. I gather this would be a precedent, which I would be unwilling to accept without being pushed into it by the committee as a whole.

Mr. LAMBERT: May I point out that for the debate on deposit insurance, the committees branch provided me with a copy of the transcript of the day's meeting immediately before on deposit insurance.

The CHAIRMAN: Well, at the moment, our transcripts are running behind. We hope to catch up some time over the week end.

Mr. MACRAE: Mr. Chairman, when you mentioned four issues, did you mean four days or four sittings?

The CHAIRMAN: They have gone out now to Tuesday, February 14.

Mr. MACRAE: February 14.

The CHAIRMAN: That would be the Minister, TRIO, Admiral Brock and Admiral Dillon.

Mr. LAMBERT: The statement we want to question the Minister about are those made by General Moncel, Air Marshal Annis and Air Vice Marshal Hendrick.

The CHAIRMAN: This, as you know, is not unusual in committees.

Mr. LAMBERT: The only thing, though, is that there have been notes taken of points by ministerial staff for preparation of replies. There is not only the one transcription service working here; there is a very efficient—almost 100 per cent perhaps—staff provided not only to assist the Minister in his replies but to inspire questioning by government members.

The CHAIRMAN: I also, on my own, have been trying to take down the points as fast as I can. If I have not looked as though I have been attentive to what has been going on in the Committee it is because I have been trying to do this myself.

Mr. LAMBERT: Not in shorthand?

Mr. NUGENT: Mr. Chairman, may I speak to the point that Mr. Deachman has raised. He said that the evidence has raised certain points and now he would like to have the minister and his staff in to answer or comment on them. Certainly, the evidence has raised certain points, and the remainder of the witnesses coming will raise more points. Then, I suppose, he would want to have the minister back again after the next few witnesses. I do not really object to whenever they want to bring the minister. If they just want to answer the points that have been raised, may I say that points, will continue to be raised, which sort of takes away from his argument as to the urgency of the minister's appearance.

The CHAIRMAN: Well, there is some merit in that. As I told you, yesterday I asked the representatives on the steering committee if they would let me have a list of the names of persons they thought should yet appear. This list does not appear to be very extensive and I may say, without betraying any confidences, that there are names of senior officers of the army and navy on it. I heard Mr. Lambert just say that it would be our wish to call one or two of these men, and I am sure that the committee would want to do this. I do not want to impose any limitation on the numbers that are called, but perhaps you could help me so that we do not run into a problem in this connection. I have these other matters I have been speaking of, one of which is the effort to relax the schedule. Before I offer what you might consider an agreeable suggestion, Mr. Fane would like to say something.

Mr. FANE: I would like to ask you, Mr. Chairman, if it would be possible to have evidence from some less senior officers than we have had so far. Could we possibly arrange to have the odd major, squadron leader or the equivalent to give evidence?

The CHAIRMAN: Retired or serving?

Mr. FANE: Oh God, not serving; we had better protect them.

The CHAIRMAN: That is something we could certainly consider.

Mr. FANE: I think it would be a good thing to have some evidence from people in the lower echelons of the commissioned ranks.

Mr. ANDRAS: Mr. Chairman, if I may interject, it seems to me that apart from the very natural political suggestions that surface from time to time, one of the functions of this committee is to provide orderly process to our main objective, which is to get as much information and as many answers as possible. I think the time is now ripe. Many questions have been posed. Many suggestions have been made—some very valid, some perhaps invalid, we do not know. I think it is very natural now and a very fair thing that we call upon the minister and the senior members of the defence staff as soon as possible. I would like to suggest that we see them here before us tomorrow.

The CHAIRMAN: There has not been any great objection made to this suggestion that we do hear the minister, but I was really trying to see if the committee could help me in deciding in what order and approximately how many more witnesses should appear. At the same time there are still these other matters I mentioned earlier on.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Mr. Chairman, if we cannot get the records, it might help the committee if the minister would submit a list of the questions he is going to answer beforehand.

Mr. ANDRAS: There is no restriction on the questions that can be asked by members of the committee when he appears.

The CHAIRMAN: I think the questions are mostly in the minds of the members of the committee.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Oh, I understood he had a record of the questions he wanted to answer.

The CHAIRMAN: I did not mean to convey that. I wonder if—

Mr. WINCH: I come back to my suggestion, sir, that you call a meeting of the steering committee tomorrow to go into these problems.

The CHAIRMAN: We have a witness available.

Mr. ANDRAS: Mr. Chairman, could we not now agree to have the minister and his staff appear tomorrow and the steering committee meet to decide what further progress should be made or what form it will take from there on. We are now committed to hear a witness this afternoon. We have heard of other witnesses suggested but the commitment right now is for one. We would like to settle this matter of the minister and the senior officials of the defence staff appearing before us tomorrow, and then we could have the steering committee meet, as Mr. Winch suggests, to deal with what happens after that.

The CHAIRMAN: Would that be agreeable to the members of the committee?

Mr. HARKNESS: I do not know if that is agreeable or not. It is now 4 o'clock and we have to adjourn today at 6 o'clock. I would be very doubtful if we would be finished hearing the evidence and questioning General Fleury by the time this meeting finishes. I think that we should complete the evidence of General Fleury before we do anything else.

Mr. MCNULTY: Mr. Chairman, if what Mr. Harkness says is true, I hope General Fleury will be available tomorrow morning. I know I would like to hear the minister and his staff. There have been a great many statements made directly concerning policy, suggesting that there should be a slowdown and that

the planning is not adequate and so on, and I would like to question the minister and the senior staff members.

Mr. LAMBERT: How about General Allard tomorrow afternoon and tomorrow night? The minister is going to be rather long, let us face it.

An hon. MEMBER: Maybe General Allard too.

Mr. LAMBERT: Yes, but I would think that it would take about the same time as the others, two sittings.

An hon. MEMBER: There is no reason to interrupt the hearing of General Fleury's testimony.

Mr. NUGENT: I have no objection if they want to bring the minister on after that, or whatever they arrange, but I do think that it is showing an unbelievable haste to suggest that we fix a time now. They can come on as soon as we have finished with General Fleury; I think that would be wiser than saying at 2 o'clock, 10 o'clock, or 8 o'clock.

The CHAIRMAN: Do I read the members of the committee correctly, that we will complete the questioning of General Fleury tomorrow and then carry on with the minister and his staff, and that we will have a steering committee meeting tomorrow to decide on the direction we should take afterward.

Mr. NUGENT: And the number of witnesses after that.

The CHAIRMAN: Could I ask General Fleury to join me at the rostrum.

General Fleury is an old friend of this committee; he appeared before us as a witness once before and we have invited him again to present a brief, if he wishes to do so, or to answer questions.

General Fleury says he has no brief. I think it would be a good thing, for the benefit of some of the newer members, if you could give us a summary of your experience and background, as has been done by other witnesses.

Lieut.-General F. J. FLEURY: Mr. Chairman, gentlemen, I took my first faltering step in the military service when I joined the Canadian Officers Training Corps in 1929. I stayed with the COTC for some five years; then I returned to it a couple of years later, early 1937, and I was still an officer in COTC when war broke out. At this point I held the rank of captain. I was adjutant of a training centre at Farnham, Quebec. I went overseas in 1941 where I took up the appointment of adjutant in a reinforcements unit. The following year I was posted to the Canadian Military Headquarters in London, where I stayed on the staff until November 1943, then I went on staff to Italy in the rank of major. I was returned to London as the Military Secretary of CMHQ in the spring of 1944. I returned from overseas after V.E. Day in 1945 with the rank of colonel.

Since the war I have been Director of Personnel, Director of Organization and Vice Quartermaster General at Army Headquarters Ottawa for various periods. I was also the Chief of Staff, Prairie Command, Winnipeg; Commander Canadian Military Mission Far East, 1950-51; Commander Eastern Quebec area 1951-56; General Officer commanding Quebec Command 1961-65. In the fall of 1965 I was ordered to Ottawa, promoted to Lieutenant-General, and appointed Comptroller General of the new integrated Canadian Forces Headquarters.

I retired a few months ago and my legal status at the moment is that of an officer on leave pending retirement.

Mr. WINCH: Do you have any statements or remarks, General, before we question you on the matter before us?

Mr. FLEURY: I do not think anything that might really forward the work of the committee, except that the Chairman and some others may know that I came here with apparent reluctance—and the reluctance was more than apparent. It was not that I expected other than a good reception. I have had good receptions from the committee before, but I think that now that I am in a position to say a word to you, gentlemen, in this field, my reluctance stems largely, if not exclusively, from the feeling that I have had for many a long year, that there was great danger in calling serving officers before any parliamentary committee. Many of you may be aware that this was not done until very recent times and although I made no mention of this when I was here last, I came here very reluctantly under orders from my chief, because I honestly feel that the questioning of serving officers by this committee, whilst it may be most helpful to the committee, is very unfair and embarrassing to the serving officer. Obviously he is like the ham in the sandwich. If he follows the party line he does not really add anything to your knowledge; if he does not follow the party line, he is bound to be in trouble when he gets back to his desk in headquarters.

Mr. WINCH: Are you prepared now, though, in your present position, Lieutenant-General to assist in the most important work of understanding, and the decision that this committee has to reach on the bill which is now before us.

Mr. FLEURY: Indeed, sir; that is why I am here.

Mr. WINCH: If you can, could I ask if you could comment on the position of integration and perhaps what you knew about it when you were in your latest position of Comptroller-General at headquarters.

Mr. FLEURY: I myself held an integrated position in headquarters for just under a year, from the fall of 1965 to the summer of 1966. There had been over the years a good deal of consideration—possibly more consideration than action—toward integration. I had always felt that the armed forces would benefit by a much greater degree of integration than was the situation in 1964. I think it would not be unfair to say that I was a supporter, maybe even an enthusiastic supporter, of the principle of integration. I have noticed, particularly in recent months, that the terms "integration" and "unification" seem to get confused and indeed, sometimes—have been treated as synonyms, which of course they are not, in my lexicon. Does that answer your question?

Mr. WINCH: It is a nice start, sir. To your latest knowledge, has integration been successful, with its faults, and should it be pursued per se?

Mr. FLEURY: I can speak from personal and more or less official knowledge only up until the 15th day of July last, when I relinquished my appointment as Quartermaster General.

Mr. HARKNESS: You mean Comptroller-General.

Mr. FLEURY: I am sorry, what did I say?

Mr. HARKNESS: Quartermaster General.

Mr. FLEURY: I meant to say Comptroller-General. Up to a point shortly before the 15th of July, I thought we were on the right road. I thought that the integration of the three services headquarters in Ottawa was a good thing be-

cause it would increase the efficiency of the armed forces, because it should save money, and because it would bring the three services closer together.

I began to have considerable misgivings about the direction and speed of integration some weeks at least, if not months, before my retirement. The integration process had been going on, in Ottawa particularly, for about a year before my arrival and I had heard stories about people burning the midnight oil several nights a week and week-ends trying to keep up with the pressure of producing the many plans and papers which would be required to integrate fully and in an orderly fashion the headquarters in Ottawa. When I arrived here in September 1965 this processs was, it seemed to me, reasonably well in hand, to the point that integration of the field commands was being planned and progressively put into practice. I came to realize, or I thought I came to realize, that things were being done under the cloak of integration which really were not part of the integration process at all. I discovered to my surprise, because this was not my first tour in Ottawa—it was my fourth—that communications were very bad within the headquarters, and between the headquarters and the commanders in the field. I found that the tried and true channels of communication which had been the warp and woof of navy, army and air force procedures in chain of command for decades had largely been discarded. I found that officers working for me knew more, or said they knew more, or thought they knew more, about what was in the mind of the Minister than I did. I found that security information as I knew it, was practically non-existent. The whole headquarters reminded me of a giant sieve. I saw evidence of disloyalty, and near disloyalty, in some people to the point literally that on one, two or three occasions a week, I would sit at my desk and feel like vomiting. I decided after all these years that this was an atmosphere, that these were conditions under which I could no longer conscientiously serve, and I asked for my retirement.

Mr. WINCH: This is my last question. When you became apprehensive about these matters, and particularly about the speed at which integration was going on, although you agreed with it in principle, did you register your views to anyone with authority to do anything about it and, if so, what was the result?

Mr. FLEURY: I did register my views on many occasions to my immediate superiors. I expressed my misgiving and I, throughout, got a courteous hearing but little, if anything, ever resulted.

Mr. WINCH: Were you ever able to meet the Minister, or did you make any endeavour to meet the Minister himself, to convey your misgivings?

Mr. FLEURY: I met the Minister on may occasions at meetings of Defence Council to which normally I was invited, although I was not a member, but until a very few days before my retirement, I had no direct personal contact with the Minister ever.

Mr. WINCH: Unfortunately, sir, I have to leave in a few minutes. May I be permitted to ask one further question because we have heard considerable about it? You know the change which is made between what used to be and what is now the Defence Council. Have you anything to say regarding the present set-up compared with the previous set-up in respect to a chain of communication and information between the military and the civilian authority?

Mr. FLEURY: Well, as you undoubtedly know, the Defence Council at the moment consists of the Minister, the Associate Minister, the Parliamentary

Secretary, if any, the Deputy Minister and the Chairman of the Defence Research Board—a total of four or five, and two military officers, the Chief of the Defence Staff and the Vice Chief of Defence Staff. In addition, other people can be, and are very frequently, called in, usually for specific items, or for specific meetings. I, myself, favour a more even balance of membership in the Defence Council as between military experts and civilians. Traditionally, until recent years, I think we had this. There was some military expertise available to the Defence Council and more then two voices, maximum, which, in my humble opinion made for better decisions.

You must remember that the two military members are not always in Ottawa for every meeting of Defence Council so Defence Council may very well end up meeting with one military man, Navy, Army or Air Force, whereas if one of the civilian members is not present there are still three or four left.

Now I am not suggesting for one minute that you must have a balance so that there is a fight to a saw-off on these matters, but I do suggest—and this brings me back, I suppose, full circle to my short opening remarks—that one of the effects, I am sure unintended, of changes that have taken place, is that there is a tendency more and more for military officers to skate pretty close to the political line which, in my opinion, is a very bad thing indeed. It is just as bad as politicians or civil servants who insist on acting as if they were military officers.

Mr. WINCH: Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Nugent?

Mr. NUGENT: General, I appreciated your opening remarks about your reluctance to appear here today. I have, before in this Committee, thought that we should, in asking people to appear, make it somewhat peremptory so that officers would realize that while the request is lightly couched they are not asked to volunteer to come, and I do not suppose that you came here as a volunteer. Or, did you?

Mr. FLEURY: I was invited to come. I think that is the best construction that I can put upon it.

Mr. NUGENT: Now I am very interested in the feeling around headquarters, because I am sure that there is nothing more important that this Committee can look into than the matter of officers, like yourself, asking for early retirement. By the way, how early was your retirement?

Mr. FLEURY: I was 52 years of age when I retired and the normal retirement age is 55.

Mr. NUGENT: So that when the process was going on you were a very experienced officer in the very key position of Comptroller General, working hard, and you said "with enthusiasm" about the general idea of trying to get more integration into the forces because you felt it would aid efficiency and save money. That is the position you were in when you came to headquarters and were trying to do your work. You said that your early retirement was because of the changed conditions—and I think that you described it as those things that were going on around headquarters under the cloak of integration. Is that right?

Mr. FLEURY: Yes.

Mr. NUGENT: When you said the communications were bad between headquarters staff, I presume you meant in headquarters itself between various groups, and then between headquarters and the field commanders. These "communications" did not refer to physical equipment deteriorating?

Mr. FLEURY: No. This was excellent.

Mr. NUGENT: Was this lack or failure of communication because there were some rules laid down; was it an atmosphere created by any direction or the manner in which people were acting—just exactly what sort of cause did you detect for this lack of communication?

Mr. FLEURY: I think there were many causes, sir, the first cause—not necessarily the most important cause—was that almost everybody at headquarters was suddenly pitch-forked into a new job, and even if he retained the title that he had previously, he now had responsibilities to different people and for different things. One of the standing jokes told around headquarters for quite some time was about the colonel or navy captain—I do not know which he was—who went out of the office for a moment and said to his stenographer, "Now if my boss calls while I am away please get his name."—and there was more truth than poetry in that. People were moving so quickly into new environments with new responsibilities that there was a general feeling of people scurrying about in the headquarters trying to fit into new offices and new jobs with new telephone numbers and new stenographers, with new staffs, and so on. This in itself was a considerable upset in the headquarters.

At the same time as these people were trying to settle down themselves, they were pushed into reorganizing the field commands. This bears on the point I made earlier, of the pace with which the integration process was carried out. And then there was a feeling that grew up, faint at first, and then to near certainty, that somebody was doing a sort of strip-tease with integration; they would only let you see a bit at a time.

It was in the back of people's minds that we would integrate on a progressive basis with this headquarters, that headquarters and the other headquarters; that we were not going to worry about this, and we were not going to worry about that, and we were not going to worry about something else; nobody's rank was going to be touched; nobody's uniform was going to be touched, and in the background somewhere, unification maybe in 5, 10, 15 or 25 years. But then one started to read in the newspapers, reports by the Minister or an unnamed defence spokesman, or somebody, that we were going to unify by July 1, 1967 and then we went through a painful charade under the guise of Defence Council one day, when all senior officers in headquarters were called in and asked what they thought about unification now, and I think that this was most embarrassing all around. The Vice Chief of Defence Staff had two or three of his subordinates there; I had one of mine; the Chief of Technical Services had three or four of his subordinates there, and the Chief of Personnel had one of his subordinates, and each in turn was asked what his reaction was to unification and what needed to be done, and so on.

This brings me back to the point I made earlier, about channels of communication. I found the whole process quite painful. I said at that time that the Comptroller General would require not less than two years just to catch up with

the paper work which had resulted from the integration process to that date. In retrospect, I think my estimate was a very modest one.

Mr. NUGENT: Sir, just so we understand this change of communications, I think you said that the tried and true channels had been discarded. We have heard some mention from other witnesses here—and I want to be sure it is on the record and that we understand it—that serving officers have a great deal of loyalty. There is a feeling among the senior officers that you protect your Minister and your Minister protects you. Has this not been the traditional feeling?

Mr. FLEURY: I think something of that nature, sir. I think that most of us who have served as long as I have, have dealt with quite a succession of Ministers. I suppose I myself have had personal dealings with eight or ten of them. On the whole, we said our piece and if it were not accepted we came out of the meeting putting the best possible faith on it, and going on and doing what we were told to do. If we were not prepared to do that, of course, we had the obvious alternative of turning in our papers.

Mr. NUGENT: Would this not also go from the chiefs down through to your subordinates? If you would protect a man under you and take the responsibility for him, he in turn would make any complaints he has, which would go, through you, to higher authority. Is this not the usual tried and true channels of communications?

Mr. FLEURY: And I think, if I may say so, the tried and true channels of loyalty. Certainly, in my book loyalty has always been a two-way street. If I get loyalty from my subordinates, they certainly get protection from me.

Mr. NUGENT: You have told us that these were abandoned, that you had officers working under you who knew more about what was in the Minister's mind or, at least, they said they did, and that this feeling was general throughout headquarters. Was this the case?

We had some evidence, I think it was from Air Marshal Annis, to the effect that it happened to everybody in headquarters, that this sort of thing was going on, that those who had the responsibility for the junior officers did not know as much as the junior officers as to what was going on.

Mr. FLEURY: In some cases I think this was so.

Mr. NUGENT: Can you tell us how this came about? Where were they getting the information? Was the Minister having them all in or was the Minister's propaganda agent advising them, rather than yourself, what was going on?

Mr. FLEURY: I do not know if I can answer that as precisely as I would like to. To begin with, you must understand that this process had been going on before my arrival. It was something that I found out about after I arrived or, at least, the extent of which I found out after I arrived.

Initially I was a very busy man as Comptroller-General. I had an entirely new job with an entirely new staff and in the re-organization period, for which the Comptroller-General's branch was largely responsible, we had plenty on our plate and in the early stages I think I tended to sort of brush aside any of these little contretemps that arose and put it down to growing pains, to different procedures, policies and ideas that maybe Naval and Air Force officers had

opposed to Army officers, and the reverse, but it got to the point where the Minister was dealing directly with subordinate officers. It got to the point where the best advice that his principal advisers could give him was often not followed. I never did find out whether the decisions taken were decisions which were arrived at by the Minister himself or on the advice of others, people who were not his principal military advisers. I do not think it matters very much to me at this stage.

Mr. NUGENT: Well, sir, is it possible—

Mr. FLEURY: To give you an example, as recently as ten days or two weeks before my retirement, I was called by my chief and told to go and see the Minister at such and such a time and on such and such a date two or three days ahead, and this was the first time I had been privately closeted with the Minister since I arrived in Ottawa, apart from shaking his hand when I reported in. Not unnaturally I knew that my chief was going to be in Paris at a NATO meeting on the day in question, and not unnaturally I said, "What is this meeting all about?" My chief said, "I do not know," and he did not say any more. You can draw only one of two conclusions from this; either he was not privy to the Minister's plan or he was not telling me the truth. In either case, it was about that time that I came to the end of my rope.

Mr. NUGENT: Is it possible for any senior officer to carry on when the normal channels of communication are discarded in that manner, sir?

Mr. FLEURY: It was not possible for me, that is all I can say.

Mr. NUGENT: We have had a brief from Admiral Landymore describing some of his difficulties, and you will remember that the Minister had not been very charitable about Landymore and some of his activities. In his brief Admiral Landymore describes the unrest among his officers, I understand, because of press statements emanating from the Minister's office that he did not know anything about. Do you think it likely that this sort of communication would add to the commander's difficulties in that area?

Mr. FLEURY: I cannot state from personal knowledge of Admiral Landymore's problems but I can tell you about a problem which I had myself. I tell it not really to prove a point but to show you that there is always the lighter side to this business.

I was invited to chair a seminar on senior management some time, I think, early in June of last year, and the people who attended this seminar were generals, admirals, brigadiers, and the equivalent, some senior civil servants, an assistant secretary of war from Washington, an American three star general and various people of that ilk. I had prepared what I thought was a reasoned presentation. You will also understand that this was a closed meeting. I proved to my satisfaction that in the field of research and development we were in exactly and entirely the wrong league. I used such examples as the Arrow and the Bobcat and the Hydrofoil, so that no service would feel left out in the cold, and I pointed out that with the very limited amount of money that we had after we had paid for operations and maintenance that we could no longer under any circumstances afford to go on our own into any major research or development program.

In line with the technique which is not ususual at this sort of seminar, I expected that this would provoke quite a violent reaction and that we would probably get a lot out of a round table discussion. Rather to my surprise it fell flat as I could not work up an argument with anybody. All the people around the table, there were about eighteen or twenty of them, agreed entirely. I went on to say that, of course, this did not mean that we ought to get out of the research and development business, but what we ought to do—as we had done in the past in some instances—was to get together with the U.S. or the U.K., or others, by agreement on a research or development item of interest to both of us, pay a reasonable share of the development cost and carry out an agreed proportion of the development work compatible with our technical and financial resources.

So, I left the meeting after a few hours and went to Montreal for the weekend. When I got back to my office on Monday I found out by sheer accident that the Minister had given a speech at the commencement exercises of some college in the States, saying that obviously the Canadian armed forces were going to have to spend more and more money on research and development and get into new development programs. I am sure that what I said did not bother the Minister in the slightest because he probably never heard of it, but what he said bothered me because this was the first I had heard of it.

Mr. NUGENT: Mr. Chairman, I think I have spent enough time on the atmosphere. Thank you, General. I hope to get back on later, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DEACHMAN: General Fleury, when you opened your remarks you said that you did not feel it was right that serving officers should be called before the Committee and that this is a relatively recent practice. Is that a fair interpretation of your remarks?

Mr. FLEURY: That is correct.

Mr. DEACHMAN: This is a committee that looks at the biggest spending department of the government. This is a department that spends anywhere from 20 per cent to 25 per cent of the taxpayer's dollar. Incidentally, this is an area of discretionary spending; it is an area in which you can spend a lot of money or a little money. It is one of the few. It is not like the Post Office, where there is not too much you can do about it one way or the other. This is a big area of discretionary spending and consequently this committee is one of the most important committees in the house because it looks at a major area of discretionary government spending.

What I am coming to is how are we going to properly assess what goes on in the Department of National Defence and, as members of parliament, how are we to get any comprehension if we cannot have serving officers before us so that we can question them about the operation and get an illustration of their work in their departments? It would seem to me that if you are properly protected from making political declarations or security declarations surely we, as members of parliament in this committee, ought to have access to your knowledge to see whether we can interpret to the people the policies and the intentions of the government in this important field. I wonder if you would go along with me that it really does not serve the national purpose to draw a veil between this committee and the serving officers.

Mr. FLEURY: I was just voicing a personal opinion on how I felt and still feel. I was not suggesting for one minute how this committee should or should not go about its business. I thought that I ought to draw to the committee's attention the view of one officer who has been through the mill, namely myself, and what his reaction to it is.

I almost said there are, but I should say there were, up until July 15 last, no ground rules whatever laid down for the appearance of officers before this Committee. When I appeared on a couple of occasions before this Committee last June I was told to come to the Committee and give a brief and answer questions, period. Now, never having been in this position before, I could not help but wonder what would happen if I gave the wrong answer to the wrong question.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Sir, I wonder if this is not something that also crosses the minds of many civil servants that come before committees. Over the course of this last year we have had 21 standing committees of the house, and we are charged with the examination of the estimates of departments. Surely you are not very much different from any departmental officer who must be loyal to his minister and loyal to the policy of the government which he administers through his minister.

Mr. FLEURY: I think with respect, sir, the difference is a very great one.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Where does it lie?

Mr. FLEURY: To begin with, there should never be any political advice given to the Minister by any serving officer. This is the school in which I was brought up and it is the school in which everybody in my generation was brought up in the armed forces. Civil servants, and particularly the deputy minister and assistant deputy ministers, are much closer to the political scene than serving officers. Do not forget that the civil servant, by and large, spends his whole life being a senior civil servant in Ottawa, whereas serving officers such as myself, for example, find that they are away from the Ottawa scene for nine years running and then suddenly they are pitch-forked into a military job at headquarters. The last distinction I think is a very valid one. The civil service is not the authoritarian, totalitarian organization that the armed forces are, and which the armed forces must be if you are to train, maintain and improve discipline with the one end in view of instant obedience to orders in action. I think there is a very grave difference, very grave, and it is not just a question of tradition.

Mr. HARKNESS: May I just interject a question at this point.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Yes, certainly.

Mr. HARKNESS: Is there not another very great difference in that the civil servant as a whole is completely protected in his employment, and whether he gives answers which are pleasing to the government of the day or not, his employment is still completely safe and secure, whereas the serving officer is not in that position, he can be dismissed immediately, which makes a very big difference.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Well, I just wonder whether in application this difference is actually as broad as Mr. Harkness puts it. I wonder whether or not the veil must be drawn between this Committee and senior officers who are operating, let us say, and responsible for major commands. I think of the commanders of Mobile

Command, Materiel Command, Training Command, and so on, who have been given by the Minister a major area of the armed forces to administer, and to administer those in a way which reflects government policy. Now, surely if we as a Committee of 24 members drawn from all sides of the house are to intelligently assess what is being done in regard to policy we must have some access to the people who know the facts, and I ask you to assist the Committee in telling us how this can be done. Must we forever have the veil drawn between us the way they do with Crown corporations. I wonder if you understand, sir, when you come to examine, for instance, the President of the C.N.R. as far as the member of parliament is concerned you are up against a real mystery. He shows you nothing but his slippers poking out from underneath the Pullman curtain. We get little more than that when we examine him.

Mr. FLEURY: All right. I begin to regret that I expressed this view at the beginning, because I certainly did not expect to be questioned on it. However, it is my view and it remains my view. Now, how you are to go about your business is something on which I do not feel I should be asked to comment. I can only ask how these committees went about their business prior to two years ago.

Mr. DEACHMAN: We are trying to improve our organization. We are in a process of a massive re-organization of the committee structure and there has been a great deal of discussion in Parliament about it and a great deal of confusion within the committee structure, but gradually by staying with it and tussling with it we are finding new ways.

Mr. NUGENT: What he said was they have got just as bad in Parliament as they have got here.

Mr. DEACHMAN: We are making progress, too. I am finished.

Mr. MCINTOSH: General, just to add a word to what Mr. Harkness has said, I would suggest to you also that in your position as a combat officer it would be very difficult for you to get a job with some other firm or some other country in the profession that you have selected as your lifetime service. It is not as easy as it is, say, in my province of Saskatchewan where there was a change of government not too long ago and where many of the senior civil servants left or were retired and then were immediately picked up by either the federal government or one of the other provinces. The same does not apply, I do not think, to the combat officer, does it?

Mr. FLEURY: I would not like you to push this one too far, sir. You are more than kind. The fact of the matter is that I was trained as a combat officer up to the time that I acquired the rank of captain, and I used to think I was good one. That was over twenty-five years ago, and since then my appointments have varied from command staff, and the question of employment outside the armed forces is, in my case and in the case of most other officers that I know, no problem whatever. Indeed, I am gainfully and happily employed, and this I do not think is really a factor. It has certainly not been in recent years. It may be that if we did not have an unemployment rate of about 3 per cent it might be different if we went back to the "dirty 30s". But it is a fact, if it is of any interest to the Committee, that I know of no officer at any level who has retired in recent years who wanted a job that has not immediately found one, and a good one.

Mr. McINTOSH: Right. But I also realize that many of our senior officers have another profession, which is not soldiering. They may be graduate engineers, and so on, and could find employment in that field. However, I brought that up because in my opinion the analogy was not a fair one.

Mr. Deachman also mentioned something about the intention of the government. How could we find out the intention of the government if we did not bring these officers before us. What we want to find out from you as a witness, if we can, is what is the intention of the government in regard to our defence policy? I wonder, if you were writing an appreciation of this situation at the present time, how you would fill in the heading "intention"? What is the intention of the present defence policy of the government, as you know it?

Mr. FLEURY: I do not have the faintest idea how to answer that question.

Mr. McINTOSH: You realize the position that we are in. When General Moncel was before us said the following:

> I refer now to the White Paper where I feel a policy should be laid down. In fact, it is very plain here that most of the basic principles that govern Canada's defence policy are constant because they are determined by factors such as geography and history...

And it goes on. He then states:

> The principles remain constant and that is why it is desirable to keep the public informed of the nature of and the reasons for any changes. Some of us feel that has not been done.

Now, in regard to the White Paper, General Moncel said:

> The purpose of the White Paper is essentially to produce the best defence policy for Canada.

Now, is the present defence policy of this government directed to the fulfillment of the objectives as laid out in the White Paper, and I presume that you are familiar with those or would you like me to read the objectives, so that you can consider your answer?

Mr. FLEURY: No. I am reasonably familiar with the objectives. I think that they were valid objectives when the White Paper was written. You must bear in mind that the White Paper was written nearly three years ago, and it is quite an interesting exercise to read it again in 1967. I did it last night. I think that government policy obviously can be announced in many ways. If it is to be a regular thing that this should be announced through the medium of the White Paper—of course there are other ways—well then, no White Paper is likely to be valid for more than twelve months, it seems to me, because situations and commitments change and the forces themselves change. I can only say in all honesty that it has been a never-ending struggle within the armed forces since 1945 to keep up with and meet Canada's defence commitments.

I cannot think of one period in time where the armed forces and those responsible in command in the armed forces really felt that they had enough men or money to meet the government's commitments. It seemed to me that we were almost always robbing Peter to pay Paul. We almost always had to give individual units or formations more than one task and, by and large, I suspect we were lucky. It was like the old business of kiting cheques that used to be so

prevalent before the age of magnetic inks and computers. If you get caught out once you are in bad trouble. If you have a battalion, for instance, or a brigade which is earmarked for NATO and is preparing to go to NATO and you suddenly find that you have to pull all or most of that brigade out for some United Nations emergency, such as the Cyprus operation, you are in trouble. So, I think with our eyes wide open we have taken a series of risks over the years, so I suppose I have become a bit blase about whether we are in fact able to meet our commitments.

I am bound to say that I have wondered for twenty-odd years whether we really were able to meet our commitments, whether they were expressed in the White Paper or in policies enunciated in the house, or elsewhere. I think that many studies have gone on, certainly in recent years, as to what it would really cost us to meet the commitments set forth in the White Paper of March 1964, and I would think it would take considerably more men and considerably more money than we have.

Mr. McINTOSH: Well, in the White Paper it says that we are to preserve the peace by supporting collective defence. I presume that you agree with that system of defence for Canada, collective defence?

Mr. FLEURY: Indeed.

Mr. McINTOSH: Then it goes on to say that it is to provide the protection and surveillance of our territory, our air space and our coastal waters. Did you ever have any indication while you were still serving, General, that there would be any change in these roles or that any of these roles would be dropped?

Mr. FLEURY: Not during my service, no. There has been a lot of talk, speculation and suggestions about withdrawing all or part of our NATO force from Europe. I have heard this put forward on many sides, but as far as I am aware no decision has been taken to do anything along this line.

Mr. McINTOSH: Could you give us any indication why so many senior officers such as yourself and others like you, with the experience that you have had and which would be very valuable to any re-organization of our forces and which may be lacking in some of the younger officers who may have to take over through no fault of their own, all left in such a short time? I know you gave your individual reason, but collectively was there anything that you disagreed with in regard to policy?

Mr. FLEURY: Well, if under the heading of "policy" you would include the speed and direction of unification and the decision to jump from integration into unification, I would say this must have loomed quite large in the minds of a number of my colleagues.

Mr. McINTOSH: Well, I have tried to stay away from the term "unification" because I do not understand what it means. Could you give us your definition of it?

Mr. FLEURY: No, sir, I cannot. I think I know what the Minister means now. I think he means a single unified defence force, if I understood him correctly, with an integrated headquarters and staff and command structure, with a command set of ranks, a common pay structure, a common trade structure and a single walking-out uniform.

Mr. McINTOSH: Well, with the explanation that you have given and if it was carried out to the fullest, in your opinion could Canada still contribute to these collective defences that we have?

Mr. FLEURY: I do not see how. If I could have seen how I do not suppose I would be here this morning.

Mr. McINTOSH: Did you ever have a discussion with the Minister or with your chief in this respect where you voiced your opinion?

Mr. FLEURY: Yes, certainly with my chief and my colleagues, the other branch heads, and I certainly voiced my misgivings to the Minister on more than one occasion.

Mr. McINTOSH: Then what would—

Mr. FLEURY: My difficulty as Comptroller-General was largely that there were so many loose ends from integration, things which had been foreseen and many things which had not been foreseen which needed tidying up, but it seemed to me that we were just going from one administrative organizational mess into a worse one.

Mr. McINTOSH: While we are talking about your chief and your Minister, I think you said in one of your previous remarks you could only arrive at two conclusions; either your chief did not know or he was not telling you the truth, or words to that effect. Could you tell us whether you had confidence in your chief at that time?

Mr. FLEURY: Yes.

Mr. McINTOSH: I did not ask the name. Would you care to give us the name of the person to whom you are referring?

Mr. FLEURY: Air Chief Marshal Frank Miller.

Mr. McINTOSH: You did not feel that he was keeping anything from you at that time?

Mr. FLEURY: No.

Mr. McINTOSH: You had a feeling that he did not understand what was taking place?

Mr. FLEURY: Correct.

Mr. McINTOSH: Did he ever voice the opinion to you directly that he could not make head or tail of it, or could not understand this program of unification or the purpose of it?

Mr. FLEURY: I really do not think I should answer that question.

Mr. McINTOSH: Right. That is fine. It has been brought out and suggested by former witnesses, General, that we now have a dual role; one is of interdependence on our allies and the other is a go-it-alone policy in regard to this peace-keeping force—I will call it that for the lack of a better name—and I believe that you said that you always had difficulty in getting recruits for your commitments in the defence of Canada?

Mr. FLEURY: No, I do not think I said that, sir.

Mr. McINTOSH: Since 1945.

Mr. FLEURY: I said that I did not think that we ever had enough men or money to carry out all the commitments which had been given to us. This did not mean to say that at various times we could not have gotten the recruits if we had had the authority to go and get them. There were times when you could have gotten all the recruits you wanted.

Mr. MCINTOSH: You had the applications?

Mr. FLEURY: Oh, yes.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Did this same situation exist just prior to your retirement, sir?

Mr. FLEURY: No.

Mr. MCINTOSH: When did it cease to exist?

Mr. FLEURY: Well, I think recruiting turned very difficult, really, in round figures, about a year and a half or two years ago.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Can you give the Committee any indication of your opinion why the situation changed about that time?

Mr. FLEURY: I could venture some suggestions. I do not know how valid they would be. To begin with, of course, the economy was in very good shape, almost everybody who was able to work could get jobs. This was certainly a factor. I am reasonably sure that a second factor was the uncertainty within the armed forces themselves as to where they were headed. I think almost anyone with experience that you talk to in the armed forces will say that the best recruiters were always our own people; the people in the infantry battalions, the artillery regiments, the tank regiments and even in the support corps. If I use Army terms it is simply that they come easier to my lips. These were the people who brought in most of your best recruits. They were sort of living and walking examples of life in the Army, the Navy or the Air Force, as the case may be, and to the extent that they were happy, satisfied and knew what they were doing, they obviously exerted some influence on their relatives, friends and acquaintances, former school chums, and so on. This is how we got a great many of our recruits.

Pay undoubtedly had a dampening effect on recruiting. In my opinion, our pay levels at no time in recent years compared favourably with unskilled labor on the civilian market, speaking in terms of unskilled recruits. There was also a heavy wastage within the armed forces, and specifically within the Army, because I had more to do with the Army at that time, in the skilled trades. There was such a demand for skilled trades outside that once we had trained a chap to any degree of proficiency in a particular trade he had no difficulty whatever in going out into civvy street and getting substantially more money for doing more or less the same job. Undoubtedly there were other factors as well.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Well, General, in regard to the pay level that you refer to, has that not always been a problem with the Army, that they have never at any time given equivalent pay to that which was available on civvy street, as you said, even in your own capacity?

Mr. FLEURY: I think this is true enough.

Mr. MCINTOSH: But did it become more acute in the last year and a half prior to your retirement?

Mr. FLEURY: I think it did.

Mr. MCINTOSH: In what level? Were you talking about O.R.'s or officer class?

Mr. FLEURY: Well, in numbers it showed up amongst the other ranks, but in inhibiting our plans and the carrying out of those plans it probably was worse for us at the officer level. It was pretty devastating to see youngish captains and senior lieutenants, and even a few majors and lieutenant colonels, going out before their time.

Now, why did they go out at that particular time? Why did they not go out before? Well I think that some of the security, some of the glamour, possibly, has worn off. I think there has been a tendency recently, and I do not mean to imply that this is necessarily a product of integration or unification, to try and equate more closely service personnel to civilian people for pay purposes, for purposes of providing accommodation, for purposes of providing transportation allowances and there has been a great tendency to de-glamourize the services, if this is the right term, and make them more and more like their civilian counterparts. There may be good reasons for this, you know. I do not say that there are not. The fact of the matter is that they always used to say over the years that you did not have to be crazy to be in the Army, but it helped. I am sure the same thing was said in the Navy and in the Air Force. I do not think that the average soldier or the average officer minds being considered crazy, but he does not like to be considered stupid.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Well, General, I would like to pursue this just a little bit further but I see that the Chairman is shaking his head at me. I hope that someone will take up this point of incentive, why the serving members of the forces do not continue to recruit their friends, and so on. I also want to go back to this go-it-alone policy of Canada's that we are apparently getting into. In fact, as I said, this is the key to the whole thing as far as I am concerned, once I came to the conclusion that this is what was in the mind of the Minister. Do you believe that Canada can go it alone? Will Canada be protected if she adopts this go-it-alone policy, and by whom?

Mr. FLEURY: I cannot see it myself. In my experience, plus my reading, it is obvious that at no time has Canada ever fielded a military force on its own completely supported by Canada. Take the most recent example with which I was concerned. We sent a brigade group to Korea in 1950. We were supported and supplied almost exclusively through British, American and Australian channels of supply. It was even more marked in World War II, where we literally tied on to British sources of supply and we provided from Canada for the Canadian forces only those items which were peculiar or particular to the Canadian armed forces and everything else, which included weapons, ammunition, tanks, all kinds of things, was provided from a common pool through British channels of communication. I am not suggesting that Canada did not contribute some of this equipment to the general pool, but the physical business of getting these things from the factory through tortuous channels up to the front line was largely a matter which the British or the Americans or the Australians, in different context, looked after. We made a token contribution in manpower to these lines of troops but we never, never came close to bearing our full share of the burden. In Korea, for example, I do not think that at any time did we have 100 people in

the supply lines, which provided all the supplies and equipment required by the Canadian brigade group over there. This must have taken, in one form or another, the efforts of thousands of people but, except for a very small number, they were not Canadians.

Now in addition to the question of supply there is also the question of training. We have training facilities in Canada, and very good ones, but we have never tried to do all the training that the Canadian troops or sailors or airmen required in Canada. We have always had substantial numbers who went to training courses of various kinds, some of them lasting for years, in the United States and in the United Kingdom and, in some cases, elsewhere, but mainly U.S. and U.K. Both the British and the Americans have welcomed us in this way over the years and in this way we have at very reasonable expense—on the cheap, if you will—gathered a great deal of knowledge, training and experience from our British and American allies. I think we have been, in all three services on a friendly, first name basis with thousands and thousands of Canadian and British servicemen. Are we going to maintain this connection in a unified force and how are we going to maintain this connection? The British have not unified, the Americans have not unified, and they show small sign of doing so. I do not see how it can work.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. McIntosh, I will put you down for the second round but you have already had—

Mr. MCINTOSH: Is there going to be a second round?

The CHAIRMAN: Oh, I think so.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Thank you.

Mr. FLEURY: That comment fills me with despair!

Mr. HARKNESS: General, you made the statement—and it was made by another witness and I meant to ask about it at that time and forgot—that the normal retirement age for you as a lieutenant general is 55. Is it not a fact that at least up until recently there has been no laid down retirement age for lieutenant generals and above? Certainly there was none during the time I was minister. In fact, I think General Graham was appointed to CGS at the age of 57 and Air Marshal Slemon served until he was about 60 as Deputy Commander of NORAD. Has there been a change in this regard? Has there been a regulation made that lieutenant generals and above retire at age 55?

Mr. FLEURY: Well, I speak from memory. In the pre-integration dispensation each of the three services had its own Queen's regulations, as you know, and each of the three services was entitled to only one lieutenant general or equivalent.

Mr. HARKNESS: Yes.

Mr. FLEURY: And he was the Chief of Naval Staff, the Chief of the General Staff and the Chief of the Air Staff. In tables of retirement ages, pay tables, and all kinds of other things the Chief of Staff never appeared because there was only one of them and he was treated on a separate basis, but whether it was set out in the regulations or not, certainly even lieutenant generals before integration normally expected to retire at 55. Whether they were specifically covered by the regulation or not, I would not be prepared to say, but 55 was always the

reputed retirement age in the Army for all officers of the rank of brigadier and above. There were some variations in the Air Force for air crew, and so on.

Now, as you know, the regulations also provided that the Minister could waive the age limit at his discretion in individual cases. This was true in General Graham's case. There was a special circumstance there which a great many people knew about for twenty years or more. I do not suppose there is any secret about it. When we formed the post-war Army on October 1, 1946 there was a very small number of officers that the authorities in their wisdom—and I think they were very wise—wanted to keep on, but they were in such an age group that if they retired at age 55 they would not be eligible for a pension. Very few—I can think of a handful, including General Graham—were brought in with the distinct understanding that they would be allowed to serve long enough to qualify for pension, which meant that they might serve until 1956 or 1957 or 1958.

Mr. HARKNESS: Well, the reason I asked the question was that in my recollection, as I say, there was actually nothing in the regulations or anything else in regard to the retirement of anybody above the rank of major general.

Mr. FLEURY: I think at the moment the regulations say brigadier and above, or the equivalent.

Mr. HARKNESS: This has been changed.

Mr. FLEURY: I believe so.

Mr. HARKNESS: Did your retirement have anything to do with your appearance before this Committee last summer?

Mr. FLEURY: You mean cause and effect?

Mr. HARKNESS: Yes.

Mr. FLEURY: Oh, none whatever, to my knowledge.

Mr. HARKNESS: Not as far as you are aware. Up to the time that you arrived at National Defence Headquarters as Comptroller-General, was your advice asked or were you consulted at all in regard to the proposed integration scheme and the one that was going forward?

Mr. FLEURY: There were two meetings of senior commanders in Ottawa before integration was introduced. The first one, as I recall it, took the form of a series of briefings and there was a provision for a question period. If my memory serves me correctly, we were subsequently invited to comment on certain proposals, which some of us certainly did, and then some months later there was a further similar meeting and again a series of briefings, and so on.

Mr. HARKNESS: This would all be prior to 1964, would it?

Mr. FLEURY: No. I do not think so. Subject to correction—

Mr. HARKNESS: This was subsequent to the issue of the White Paper, was it?

Mr. FLEURY: Subsequent to the issue of the White Paper but prior to the integration of Canadian Forces Headquarters, Ottawa, which I think dates from July 1, 1965. You have raised a doubt in my mind, now, but I think the start point for integration was July 1, 1965, or maybe it was July 1, 1964.

Mr. HARKNESS: Yes, after the bill.

Mr. FLEURY: Yes. It would have to be July 1, 1964, I beg your pardon.

Mr. HARKNESS: Did you gain the impression that any comments which you and other commanders may have made in regard to these proposals received any serious consideration and any changes in the proposed plan were made as a result of them?

Mr. FLEURY: Well, I know that the letter which I sent in at the time was considered but, as I recall it, we were not really asked to comment qua integration but on the proposed plan to implement the decision on integration. In other words, once you decided to integrate and this decision was taken then, of course, many things flow from that, including what you are going to integrate, how you are going to integrate it and at what speed. Specifically, I think the comments that were sought were in relation to a plan to implement integration in field commands. This changed from one meeting to the next; most plans do. That in itself was in no way unusual. But I am not aware, and I was not aware up until the time I left the service, that any of the input from the senior commanders from the field had resulted in this change. I think that the planners and the people in authority in Ottawa had a second look at plan A and decided to produce plan B. In fact, as far as I am aware, plan B might have been plan C, D, E or F.

Mr. HARKNESS: Were you at any time, either when you were in command of a command or after you became Comptroller-General, asked to give your views in regard to what is stated in the White Paper as the ultimate objective, that is, a single unified force?

Mr. FLEURY: Yes, I was, on two occasions at least.

Mr. HARKNESS: Would it be in order for me to ask what your views were in regard to this and what advice did you give?

Mr. FLEURY: Well, if you would be satisfied with the answer that I was less than enthusiastic, I would be prepared to go that far.

Mr. HARKNESS: Yes. Well, I think that is fine. As Comptroller-General you were of course, particularly concerned with the financial end of things, and in your view and in the light of the experience that you had in that position, do you consider that there are any financial advantages to be gained by doing away with the Navy, Army and Air Force as separate services and combining them into one single unified force?

Mr. FLEURY: I cannot see it.

Mr. HARKNESS: In other words, any financial advantages that could be gained would come entirely from the integration process which has been going forward?

Mr. FLEURY: This is the way I saw it.

Mr. HARKNESS: Do you think there are any military advantages to be gained by the formation of this single unified force?

Mr. FLEURY: Not with the defence roles being what they are now.

Mr. HARKNESS: Do you think there are military disadvantages in the formation of such a force?

Mr. FLEURY: I do indeed, and I think I have already outlined some of them. How we are going to operate in conjunction with our allies in the future is certainly one that looms very large in my mind. I do not know that this is going to have nearly the impact, in this and other areas, on the Army and the Air Force as it will on the Navy. I cannot for the life of me see how the Navy, which has traditionally and of necessity worked much more closely with allied navies than it has with either of the other Canadian services, will be greeted when they put into port A or port B or port C. I cannot help but wonder if, at the first flip remark from some officer or rating in the Royal Navy, there will not be a donnybrook on the dock at this or that place. I think that the naval union is certainly a world wide one. They have common traditions, common problems and there is a commonalty of methods of solving these problems. They all wear blue suits with brass buttons if they are officers and you can identify them as naval officers from 100 paces. You can certainly identify them much more easily as naval officers than you can what navy they belong to. I can see nothing but grief the first time a Canadian ship, post-unification, finds itself in company with a flotilla of RN or USN ships. I just hope I am not there to see what goes on at the time.

Mr. HARKNESS: I must say that I agree with you. You consider that there would be a decline in the specialized military expertise of people in the sea environment, the land environment and the air environment once you had this unified force?

Mr. FLEURY: Well, this is one of the areas I cannot see my way through at all. We have not yet recruited into the armed forces, as I see it, the calibre of genius who can command a squadron of fighter-bombers, a flotilla of destroyers and a regiment of tanks. Obviously, you are going to have to have a great deal of specialization, therefore what do you accomplish by insisting that everybody sort of looks alike and belongs to one force? Even in the army, I need hardly remind you, we never insisted that everybody be called "private". We had privates and we had drivers and we had gunners and we had sappers. They were all paid as privates and they all looked like privates, but they carried a variety of titles and names. If this works in a single service I cannot for the life of me see why it should not work with three services.

I am bound to give you examples, I think. I found to my surprise one day that there was a great to do going on in my shop, as comptroller general, about the gentleman who rejoiced in the magnificent title of the Queen's Harbour Master in Halifax. I have to admit that I am scared to death of the water, that I know nothing about the navy and that I had never heard of the Queen's Harbour Master in Halifax. It turned out that he was what we might call, in army terms, a WO1, or perhaps even a commissioned warrant officer; I am not too sure. Some misguided air force officer, who happened to be working for me at the time, was absolutely convinced that under the guise of integration this fellow's title had to go. It just would not do. It did not fit into a neat and tidy pattern.

I had to read him a small lecture when I found out how important the Queen's Harbour Master in Halifax was, and how important it was to him and to his colleagues that he continue to be called the Queen's Harbour Master, and had to tell him to just leave the poor fellow alone. For the sake of one man to abolish a title in an integrated command seemed to me to make no sense at all.

Mr. HARKNESS: I presume then that you would be quite strongly of the opinion that these corps or regimental differences, or quiffs as they are frequently called, to say nothing of the differences between the navy, army and air force as services, have served a very useful purpose. They have helped to build up morale, to increase the man's pride in his service, and in his sense of individuality and of belonging to something a little bit different from what a lot of other people belong to?

Mr. FLEURY: Unquestionably; and I would go a step further, that I do not fancy myself as a prophet but I do not mind going on record as saying that once you have completely unified the three services into a single unified defence force the first immediate step will be to bring back, in one way or another, precisely these differences and rank designations and uniforms and everything else that we have just legislated out of existence.

Mr. HARKNESS: The difficulty would be, would it not, that once you have legislated them out of existence it would be extremely difficult to restore them? To do that you would have to change the legislation again.

I have just one other question in connection with that. It has been represented to us that because of the introduction of computers, and the necessity of the same pay structure and everything else along this line, it is necessary to have a universal and common rank structure. From the management point of view, with which you are particularly familiar, is there any validity in that argument?

Mr. FLEURY: I do not pretend to be an expert in the computer field but I am on fairly sound ground, I think, when I say the computer does not speak English or French or any other language that I know of. It speaks in computer language. If you are going to call somebody a private, or a guardsman, or whatever, to get him on to a computer you have to punch a card in some way, or put a code on a card which the computer can understand. I do not think any computer yet can differentiate between an aircraftsman and a private soldier and an able seamen. There is no sense to it. We all know there is such a thing as the language of computers. The language of computers is not the language which you and I are speaking. It is our language or any other language translated into a series of punch holes or colour codes on cards. Somebody has got to do this. It would not seem to me to be beyond the genius of the lowliest computer operator to understand that aircraftsmen and privates and able seamen or ordinary seamen are all the same thing and that they punch the same hole in the same place.

Mr. HARKNESS: In other words, from the management point of view there is no necessity for this whatever.

Mr. FLEURY: Well, I have not said that, but—

Mr. HARKNESS: You have stated that things were being done under the cloud of integration which were not really integration matters at all. Could you give us some examples of those?

Mr. FLEURY: The Queen's Harbour Master in Halifax.

An hon. MEMBER: Stop picking on him, General. He is a fine fellow!

Mr. HARKNESS: Well, are there any others that you could give us to illustrate this point. This is one of the things I have complained about myself. I thought that there were many things being done merely for integration's sake,

or just for the name, or something along that line, in order to say that integration had taken place here, there or the other place.

Mr. FLEURY: Yes; I think that some people were desperately anxious, to sort of take away as quickly as possible anything that had a navy, army or air force special flavour on the grounds that it was not within the spirit of integration. If you found somebody like the Queen's Harbour Master you had surely better get rid of him because he stuck out like a sore thumb and you could not ever say that he was integrated and it was pretty obvious to everybody that he belonged to the Royal Canadian Navy.

The same was true of the so-called stone ships or frigates, the shore-based establishments. There was tremendous pressure put on, very early in the game, to do away with HMCS *Nonesuch* on the grounds that HMCS *Nonesuch* was a nonsense, you see, and it had a navy flavour. Well, if HMCS *Nonesuch* was going to continue to perform a function for the Canadian Armed Forces, or for the Royal Canadian Navy, I honestly could not for the life of me see why we could not let it continue to be called HMCS *Nonesuch* instead of insisting that it be called number "umpty-ump" Canadian Forces unit, or base.

Mr. HARKNESS: It would be much more difficult to identify, really, after the change to number 47 Canadian Forces base, or something.

Mr. FLEURY: Well, it is not only that, you see. We did eventually decide that bases, as opposed to units, would be put on a common footing and given the common name of Canadian Forces bases. Now, this was fine. The decision was taken and the comptroller general did his best to implement it.

Then the fun started. I would write a letter, or somebody would write a letter, to Colonel L.F. Trudeau, Commander, Canadian Forces Base, Valcartier, c/o Camp Valcartier, Quebec, because, if you did not do that the post office would not deliver it. After all, this is the name. This is a place. It is not just an army organization. It appears on a map. To get "Camp Valcartier" changed to "Canadian Forces Base, Valcartier" in every respect is going to take years. There is something called the Geographical Place Names Commission. Some of you may know a great deal more about it than I do. They have not changed a place name for several years, I believe, and when all this hits them and they are politely told to change the names of all these places they will be just as confused as was the post office when we started sending mail to Canadian Forces Base, Valcartier. This is the sort of fall-out that, in my opinion, you get from being pushed into something before you have really studied it and understood all the aspects and all the implications.

Mr. HARKNESS: You say that a good deal of this sort of thing is due to the desire to give a great appearance of complete integration having taken place and to give a great appearance of very tidy administration, but that the total result is a much more confused administration, from the practical point of view.

Mr. FLEURY: Well, the poor commander, Canadian Forces Base, Valcartier—I keep coming back to him because I spent so long in Quebec Command, in one way or another—having for years—he and his predecessors—commanded a nice, tidy little unit in a geographical area called "Valcartier", with three battalions of Van Doos, a detachment of signallers and sappers and army service corps and ordnance and so on, all within a stone's throw of his headquarters,

suddenly found that he had to support all the militia units in the eastern Quebec area because there was no longer a headquarters eastern Quebec area to support them. Not only that but he has to support air force stations and naval reserve divisions and all kinds of things. Well, this put a little on his shoulders, and he obviously had a few questions to ask: How do I deal with these people? What channels of communication do I use? Do they do what I tell them, or do they have a right of appeal to somebody else? Who is going to help me decipher the peculiarities of the naval pay system? —because it was still the naval pay system; who is going to provide the naval uniforms for the few navy types that I am going to have on the base? Who is going to minister to the support of the air force clerks who are posted to me? I could go on, I think, for the rest of the evening. These are all questions that had to be faced up to and answered. I think we would have obtained answers to most of them if we had had the time really to look at this in a logical way.

Mr. HARKNESS: I suppose his immediate reaction to this would be to demand a considerable increase in his staff?

Mr. FLEURY: Of course; and in rank. This is not a supposition; this is a fact. The first thing he was told to do was to produce an establishment of what he thought he would need under the new dispensation, and he quickly put in for one brigadier instead of for one colonel, and I do not blame him.

The CHAIRMAN: I will have to stop you now, Mr. Harkness, but I will put your name down again.

Mr. HARKNESS: All right.

Mr. FORRESTALL: General, I had three or four questions on one area that Mr. Harkness got into, but he has asked two of them.

You did deal, in reply to his question, with benefits that might accrue to the Canadian forces under total integration or unification, or whatever the word is. I gather from what you have said that quite possibly you would not be in total agreement with the section in the Minister's speech of December 7 at page 10,831 of *Hansard* in which he says, under the heading, "The Demands of Modern Warfare":

> The White Paper of 1964 would not have recommended integration as a first step toward a single service if we had not been certain of the improved capacity of a unified force to meet the demands of modern warfare. The pattern of warfare in which armies fought armies, navies fought navies, and air forces fought air forces is not likely to be repeated...

Do I draw the proper inference, particularly from the first part of that, that in terms of what we understand war to be today the present system is just not capable. Would you agree with that?

Mr. FLEURY: Well, what present system? That is the only immediate reply I can give. There is no doubt whatever that air forces do not fight exclusively against air forces, or armies against armies, or navies against navies. If read the quotation correctly—and I am not familiar with it—it does not follow logically that you must have unification. This situation was true in World War II and it was certainly true in Korea and we had a measure of integration even then. It

may be a good argument for integration, but not necessarily a good argument for unification.

Mr. FORRESTALL: But not necessarily a good argument for unification.

Could I ask you, general, if it is proper for you to express yourself—I understand you are still on your sabbatical—whether, from your professional background and your understanding now of the proposal which is before us, you could suggest any type of time schedule, or a rate of speed, by which you feel we might effectively achieve a useful degree of integration?

Mr. FLEURY: I must always remind you that I am several months out of date. I think I said to this Committee last June that it would take in the order of three to five years to shake down Materiel Command into an integrated posture. I have spent some time on research in coming up with this figure and still could not come up with anything sooner than from three to five years. If anything, that is conservative. I am talking only of Materiel Command.

I also am on record as saying a year ago this month that at that point in time the comptroller general had not less than two years' hard work before him just to deal with the backlog of problems which then existed as a result of integration.

Integration in the chief of technical services branch—as I said to this Committee as recently as last June—was not nearly as far advanced as it was in the other three branches, because of its size and complexity, and I think I am on record as saying that at that time that we had not even managed to get to the Minister for approval of an establishment for the chief of technical services. One would think that in the normal course of events this would be step one.

There are certain areas, of course, where integration is not being attempted at all—at least, I see no evidence of it. Air transport Command is one; the brigade group in Germany is another; and the air division in Germany is a third; and there may be others which will occur to you. It will not take very long to integrate them because there is nothing to integrate.

Mobile Command is a very special case. It is the most important operational command we will have. It started off, in effect, with all the army combat troops in Canada, with certain less-immediate responsibilities for army troops overseas; but it is to have its own air element. The timing for the real ultimate integration of mobile command is obviously dependent on how long it takes for us to get the airplanes that the government has decided to buy, work them in, train the pilots and integrate the personnel and the equipment into Mobile Command. I honestly do not know how long this will take, but even if the aircraft were available within 12 months—and I doubt very much that they would be—I do not see how Mobile Command could call itself a fully integrated organization in less than three years.

I really do not know, but I would say that anything less than three years would, in my view, be indecent haste, and it may take 10 years or 15 or 20 years because we have not uncovered—or we had not up until July 15—all the problems, let alone found solutions to them.

Mr. FORRESTALL: This concerns me very much because what we are considering, as I understand it, is not really integration but unification. We have been told that unification is the logical step, and what you are suggesting is that if it is

the logical step then this is not the time for it; that there might be some reason to look at it but not until we have ironed out these problems.

If you do not accept that proposition then you must accept the proposition that we have some cart before some horse. Would that be—

Mr. FLEURY: I would rather accept the first phrase.

Mr. FORRESTALL: I am not even sure what the horse looks like. We are looking at the cart. Now we have to see the horse. Sometimes I think we are looking at the wrong end of it.

In your reply to another question which Mr. Harkness put to you with regard to hard dollars and cents savings that might accrue from integration, did I understand you to say, General, that you could not see any additional savings accruing to the country by pursuing to its final end the proposal for unification?

Mr. FLEURY: That is what I said.

Mr. FORRESTALL: That any savings we might make—

Mr. FLEURY: —could well be made under integration.

Mr. FORRESTALL: They could be made under integration itself.

I think that is all for now, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ANDRAS: General Fleury, if time permits I would like to get to the specifics of the bill itself. Many witnesses give us a sort of attitude-feeling about this whole situation and some criticism—specific in some cases, vague in others —about the method by which this has been approached. Many witnesses in that context have indicated that they did not know what was going on. Admiral Brock indicated this the other day. You have mentioned during your testimony today that Air Marshal Miller, around the time you left—I think the expression was—"did not know what was going on".

Mr. FLEURY: In a particular context; only in the context of an appointment which he told me to keep with the Minister.

Mr. ANDRAS: I am sorry. I thought it was on the general plan. Anyhow, other witnesses have indicated that there was a lack of clarity in the end objectives, and so on.

Sir, I want to present to you certain things and then I will ask you whether or not you feel that they represent a fairly comprehensive dissemination of information. This is documentation, I might say, that I, as a layman, brand new to this Committee three weeks ago, have been able to dig out in that period of time.

I start, sir, with the White Paper, dated March of 1964. I am certainly not going to take time to read it all but on page 19 it states:

> It is the integration of the Armed Forces of Canada under a single Chief of Defence Staff and a single Defence Staff. This will he the first step toward a single unified defence force for Canada.

I have before me also a letter dated April 2, 1964, to all members of the armed forces and employees of the Department of National Defence, which goes

through a step-by-step enunciation of the stages, leading in paragraph 6 on page 2, to the following:

> 6. The third and final steps will be the unification of the three Services...It is reasonable to expect that it will be three or four years before it will be possible to take this action.

I have before me a statement purported to be made by the Chief of the General Staff to all army personnel dated March 26 which refers to the White Paper.

I have before me a signal that went out from the Chief of the Naval Staff referring to the letter from the Minister and quoting it at great length.

I have before me a statement by Vice-Admiral Rayner dated April 3, referring to the White Paper.

I have before me a statement by the Chief of the Air Staff to all RCAF personnel, referring to the White Paper; it is three pages long and it is dated April 2.

Now, sir, in addition to that there were special committee meetings—

Mr. HARKNESS: May I ask Mr. Andras where he got all those signals?

Mr. ANDRAS: I have been able to dig them up and I am quite prepared to table them, Mr. Harkness.

Mr. HARKNESS: I did not ask that. I asked where you got them from?

Mr. ANDRAS: I have been interested in the question of whether information was given to the senior officers and services personnel, so I went to the defence department and got these statements. I am quite sure any other member of this Committee would have been able to get them had they been interested in taking the same approach to it.

Mr. HARKNESS: They were given to you.

Mr. ANDRAS: Whether they were given to me or I dug them out I do not think is pertinent. The fact of the matter is you can argue whether they are valid statements or whether they are not valid statements—

Mr. HARKNESS: Is it not a fact that these were produced for you by somebody on the Minister's staff and given to you?

An hon. MEMBER: That is not what he said.

Mr. DEACHMAN: I listened to Mr. Churchill quote from that statement of April 2, 1964, and then yesterday he asked me where I got mine. I got it long after I heard Mr. Churchill talking about it.

The CHAIRMAN: Order.

Mr. ANDRAS: Mr. Chairman, on a point of order, may I suggest to you that the only valid question that can be raised is whether or not these statements are, in fact, correct?

The CHAIRMAN: The Committee is more interested in hearing what your question is, Mr. Andras.

Mr. ANDRAS: I have stated my question. I want to know whether this does not, in the general's opinion, indicate that there was a fair attempt made to make quite clear what the objectives were.

I would like to carry on, if I may? The Special committee met on 30 different occasions in 1963 and heard from 28 different witnesses, some on two or three different occasions, all pertaining to this general subject that we have before us. After the publication of the White Paper in 1964, the special committee met on 36 additional occasions, made 5 reports to the House and heard 41 different witnesses.

In 1966 the Standing Committee on National Defence met on 15 different occasions and heard from 34 different witnesses. Since 1963, there have been 2,355 pages of Committee evidence and since 1963 the Committee has met 81 times and heard 103 witnesses. The Minister and the Associate Minister have met with the Committee on 63 different occasions. The Canadian Forces produce 45,000 copies in English and 4,500 copies in French monthly of an integrated magazine known as *The Sentinel*. The Canadian Forces bulletin is another monthly publication containing unclassified information of general interest, and there are 30 base station newspapers operated by the servicemen containing news of local interest to the forces at large, and so on and so on.

I also refer to the evidence given to us by Air Marshal Sharp and I go back to page 22 of his brief which was presented to this Committee, where it says:

> In determining the trade specifications and trade structure, some *6,000* people at *21* different bases were involved in the revision of the trade specifications and structure . . .
>
> In the pay *procedures* study, some 5,500 people at fourteen different locations were interviewed during the study which lasted from February to mid-August 1966 . . .
>
> Two studies were conducted on service conditions . . .
>
> The MacFadden Study in Training Command . . .
>
> In addition to these examples, the Minister's two manpower studies interviewed hundreds of personnel.

All, or most, of these communications certainly end up stating the end objective is a single unified defence force for Canada. I suggest that it must inevitably, have led, particularly to professionals, to the consideration that a single defence force for Canada would have to involve, perhaps, such things as a single uniform, a single rank structure, one name for the forces, the degree of interchangeability of common trades between the services, and so on and so forth.

I just wanted to try, in the interests of proceeding with the study of this bill, to establish that in my opinion—and I ask you if I am not justified in this opinion—in the face of all this; senior officers, retired or otherwise, could not continue to claim that they did not know what the intention was?

Mr. FLEURY: Do you really expect an answer to that question?

Mr. ANDRAS: Well, am I justified in my opinion that there was a great deal of information put out on this?

Mr. FLEURY: To begin with, obviously I cannot think as fast as you can read. I know that there was a great deal of information put about. I know that at least

the first four or five things that you quoted from were notifications that we were moving toward integration.

Mr. ANDRAS: And unification, sir?

Mr. FLEURY: This was not clear.

Mr. ANDRAS: The single defence force; the end objective is firm—a single defence force. It was stated in many of the—

Mr. FLEURY: This was not clear. It was not clear to me, and it was not clear to the vast majority of the people in the armed forces, what was meant. It is all very well to talk in terms of unification, of a single unified defence force, but what the fellow down the line wants to know, obviously, is: How is this going to affect me? This is where communication broke down and where information could not be provided.

It is pretty obvious that the private soldier does not read the White Paper, and he may or may not read a broadcast communication from the Minister of National Defence. Traditionally, and properly, the private soldier, the aircraftsman or the ordinary seaman gets the word from his corporal, sergeant or lieutenant, who in turn gets it from his company commander, and so on up the line. This is the type of communication that I am talking about.

Mr. ANDRAS: I have one final question about whether it was unification or not. May I quote from the Committee on National Defence of June 9, 1966 where you say, in reply to a question from Mr. McLean:

> I can only refer you really, sir, to the White Paper which I think stated clearly that integration was a step towards the final goal of unification—

This is General Fleury's statement as reported in the Committee proceedings.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, it is after 6 o'clock. We mentioned earlier on to Mr. McIntosh that there might be a second round of questioning, and the witness showed some reluctance.

On my list I have Mr. McIntosh, Mr. Nugent, Mr. Lambert, Mr. Churchill and Mr. Forrestall.

Mr. HARKNESS: Would you please put me down for the second round?

The CHAIRMAN: We will now adjourn.

The witness has consented to return tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock.

Mr. ANDRAS: Mr. Chairman, on a point of order. I have many more questions, and I did not use all my time.

The CHAIRMAN: You have used only six minutes of your time.

Mr. ANDRAS: May I then continue in the morning?

The CHAIRMAN: You will be first on tomorrow morning.

The meeting is adjourned.

THURSDAY, February 23, 1967.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, I see a quorum. When we adjourned at six o'clock last night, the witness, General Fleury, was present, I have asked the General if he would be kind enough to join me up here and we will continue with the questioning.

Mr. Andras was questioning the witness when we adjourned.

Mr. ANDRAS: I will pass for now, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Churchill?

Mr. CHURCHILL: General Fleury, I would like to compliment you on your presentation yesterday. You, along with General Moncel and the other gentlemen who have appeared from the air force, have clearly demonstrated that the unrest and the dissatisfaction in the Defence Department was certainly not to be found solely in the navy, which was a popular impression over a number of months. The same situation, obviously, from the testimony we have heard, has prevailed with army and air force personnel. I think you have made a real contribution to the discussion of our problem.

In answer to a question yesterday, when you were discussing the situation at headquarters, you said that there was a tendency more and more for military officers to skate close to the political line. What did you mean by that statement?

General F. J. FLEURY: I think that I was referring specifically to the program, which has been gradually introduced in recent years, of having serving officers appear before this Committee. I think it is fair to say also that since integration and, subsequently, unification, has become a very hot political issue, that it is rather difficult for serving officers in headquarters not to be drawn into the battle.

Mr. CHURCHILL: You mentioned that the Minister was dealing directly with subordinate officers at one point and that 10 days before your retirement you were called by the chief to see the Minister. I understand that was your first private conference with the Minister. What was the purpose of that meeting?

Mr. FLEURY: I do not know that I said it was 10 days before my retirement, but this is certainly not too far off the actual time. I am not at all sure, Mr. Chairman, that I should go into what was said in a private and confidential discussion with the Minister.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I will take that up with the Minister when he appears. Did you volunteer your retirement, or were you asked to retire?

Mr. FLEURY: I asked to retire.

Mr. CHURCHILL: The reason I asked that question is that on July 16, 1966, in the Toronto *Daily Star*, there was a report of a statement that the Minister made in Edmonton. The newspaper report reads as follows, and I quote:

> He said—

and this is the Minister.

> —integration policy was made clear at several commanders' conferences, and they were told that if they could not support it they could retire with the usual benefits.

Did you attend any of those conferences where that was said?

Mr. FLEURY: I did, sir.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Is that an accurate report? Was it suggested to officers that they could retire if they could not support the program?

Mr. FLEURY: I think that this is an accurate statement.

Mr. CHURCHILL: The Minister goes on to say, and these are in quotes—they are his direct words:

> "No one did, of course, . . . Instead they chose to remain and take part in a campaign of tacit resistance. This is reprehensible conduct and I will not tolerate it."

How accurate is that statement? The information that I have is that a great many officers did not choose to remain. This is an accusation by the Minister that people remained in the service and conducted a campaign of tacit resistance. Were you any part of that?

Mr. FLEURY: I hope not, sir.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Do you know of any officers who were?

Mr. FLEURY: No.

Mr. CHURCHILL: In *Hansard* of October 12, 1966 an answer was supplied by the department to a series of questions put forward by Mr. Harkness dealing with the retirement of senior armed forces personnel. Mr. Harkness asked that they be named with their rank and age, the title of their appointment, the length of time to normal retirement age, and the category of their release. The return occupies a page and a half. It shows that 80 officers, in the three services, retired between the dates January 1, 1965 and the date of this return, which is October 12, 1966. These officers are all the rank of brigadier and above, or the equivalent in the other services. Of those 80 officers, 22 retired from the navy, 28 from the army, and 30 from the air force, a total of 80. Of that grand total of 80, my calculation indicates that 39 of them retired by reason of age, having reached the age of 55 and 41 retired prior to reaching the age limit.

The question was this, as stated at page 8559 of *Hansard*:

> In each of the above cases indicate whether the officer retired on reaching normal retirement age, whether he put in his resignation of his own volition, or whether he was asked to retire.

The departmental return simply answers that question by what they call "category of release", which they show under headings such as 4(a), 5(c). Of course, this requires to be interpreted; it is a typical return from the ministerial office, in which the actual question is dodged.

What is the meaning of "category of release" after your name "5(c)"? It obviously is not normal retirement age because you were not at retirement age. Does it mean that you put in your resignation of your volition, or were you asked to retire?

Mr. FLEURY: Well, sir, I could only answer the general question precisely if I had a copy of the regulations before me, which I have not. As you know, the Queen's Regulations for Canada, over several pages, give many categories and subcategories under which an officer or a man can be retired from the forces.

One general category is medical grounds; one general category is having been convicted by the civil power; another is voluntary release; another, compulsory release, and so it goes through five or six categories, each of which has quite a number of sub-categories.

Under compulsory retirement there are any number of sub-categories. There is compulsory retirement by reason of age; there is compulsory retirement by reason of health or medical grounds; there is compulsory retirement which stems from reduction in establishments; there is compulsory retirement when service is no longer required, and so on. I could not begin to read the whole category.

In my particular case, I was compulsorily retired, in so far as the Queen's Regulations are concerned, I think, as honourably released, services no longer required, or some such form of words.

Mr. CHURCHILL: You are listed in the same category as Admiral Landymore, who was fired. There are 24 people listed here under that category 5(c), which we will have to have cleared up, perhaps when the Minister appears. I wanted to inquire about this tremendous alteration in the higher ranks over a very short period, from January 1, 1965 to October 12, 1966. There was a change-over of 80 senior people, and of that number it appears that 41 of them left before they had completed their length of service according to the age category.

In your opinion, was this rapid change-over of senior officers a disturbing element in the reorganization program?

Mr. FLEURY: Yes.

Mr. CHURCHILL: It caused a great deal of upset and confusion?

Mr. FLEURY: That is inevitable, I would say.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Have you any idea how many senior officers have left since the bulk of October, 1966?

Mr. FLEURY: I have no idea, sir.

Mr. CHURCHILL: We will have to have the record brought up to date to see where we stand.

I think that is all I will ask at the moment, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Lambert?

Mr. LAMBERT: Mr. Chairman, perhaps you could inform me whether any members of the Committee have been able to question General Fleury, in my absence, on the relationship between the Comptroller General's department or branch and that of the Deputy Minister? I think General Moncel had something to say about that. I was wondering what General Fleury's impression had been, within the framework of integration, as to whether he felt there was a modest degree or a high degree of duplication of function between the Comptroller General's branch and the Deputy Minister's branch?

The CHAIRMAN: I do not believe that has been the subject of a question to General Fleury.

Mr. FLEURY: From a practical pragmatic's point of view, I think it is fair to say that the Comptroller General's branch works very closely, literally hand in glove, with the branch and departments of the Deputy Minister. It would not be

unfair to say, I do not think, that functions overlapped. It was, therefore, only by the closest collaboration at all levels that we could get on with the business at hand. Fortunately, for me and my people, we had excellent relations with the Deputy Minister's office. By good luck, I had been doing business with Mr. Elgin Armstrong in various capacities for well over 20 years, and where the lines did not seem to be clearly drawn and where there was obvious danger of stepping on each other's toes, we very readily managed to resolve amicably, by consultation, any problems which arose in these categories.

I think that an outsider looking into the set-up, and examining it objectively, would be bound to say that there was a great deal of taking in of each other's washing; that there was duplication; that there was checking and double checking; that there was a requirement for close liaison and consultation on a day to day basis between the Deputy Minister and myself, and between a great number of my subordinates and a great number of the Deputy Minister's subordinates. It could have been a very difficult and sticky operation. That it was not, I think is a great tribute to the Deputy Minister and his people—and I mean this quite sincerely.

I thought, at several times, that it might be possible to save a substantial number of people and a good deal of money, if many of the functions—not all—could be combined either under the Deputy Minister or under the Comptroller General. Obviously, in the budgetary field, in the field of organization, in the field of manpower control, with particular emphasis on civilian manpower control, in the fields of automation, management engineering, and quite a number of our functions, there was, in my view, room for improvement.

I toyed with the idea of suggesting that many of these functions should be taken over by the Deputy Minister, and if the Deputy Minister were not of the opinion that this would be a good idea, then to let me take over his functions. The difficulty was, I think—and I was not there very long—that there were so many other things to worry about, and last, but not least, that these areas were being worked on and matters were being pushed forward, largely because of personal relationships. I do not think it is a tidy organization at all. I do not know what the Deputy Minister's feelings are, but there is room for improvement. I suppose, not unnaturally, I as a soldier was dealing with a great many things which were not in the main stream of soldiering, even soldiering from a staff officer's point of view, and I think, in retrospect, that if I had stayed very much longer, I certainly would have made some serious attempts to get the two organizations more closely integrated and I certainly would not have been unwilling to see a lot of these functions go to the Deputy Minister's office. I think I would have been less inclined to do the alternative: take over some of the functions performed by the Deputy Minister.

Mr. LAMBERT: I do not know whether you were here when General Moncel made his general comment, in reply to a question by someone. Did you have the opportunity of discussing some of these views with him at the time you succeeded him as Comptroller General?

Mr. FLEURY: Either at that time, subsequently, or both, we certainly discussed almost every aspect of our business together almost every day.

Mr. LAMBERT: Therefore, if there was any disagreement by you with what the general remarks were, they would be a matter of degree rather than of substance?

Mr. FLEURY: I believe so.

Mr. LAMBERT: How long do you think it would take to sort this out. I remember you testified here in June, and repeated again, that in many sectors of the branches integration in your mind would only be complete and working satisfactorily in a period of three to five years. What about the comptroller general's branch. Would you place the same estimate on that branch as on some of the others, in respect of it being a smoothly working integrated machine?

Mr. FLEURY: No. I think this could be done in a lesser time period, provided there was not a great backlog of work to catch up with. I think I made the point earlier that at a point in time almost exactly 12 months ago, I expressed the view that the Comptroller general at that point in time had at least two years work ahead of him to sort out and firm up on all the decisions, plans, programs, schedules and paper work generally that had been generated as a result of integration.

Let me make two other observations that might help to clarify the matter. The easiest branch at Canadian Forces Headquarters to integrate by far, in my opinion, was the comptroller general's branch, because it did not impinge directly or heavily on the fighting units and formations.

Secondly, the comptroller general's branch, as a form of organization, was unknown to the army until two, three or four years ago. Traditionally, the army worked on a different organization. Both the navy and the air force had comptroller general's organizations at the time of integration and had had, for quite a number of years. The army had too, but only as of quite recent date. Therefore, we were not sort of brought up, as it were, in an organization which included a comptroller general. Mind you, many of the functions under the comptroller general had been performed in the army under different branches, the general staff and the adjutant general branches in particular.

Mr. LAMBERT: Therefore, the easiest branch, in your estimation, to complete integration would be the comptroller general's?

Mr. FLEURY: Indeed sir.

Mr. LAMBERT: And that requires, in your estimation, a minimum of two years?

Mr. FLEURY: Not to integrate the branch. I am of the opinion that the branch was as integrated as it could ever be. When I left there was a lot of work on the desk of the comptroller general's branch and a backlog of work I am trying to distinguish, and I think it is a proper distinction, between the branch as a branch and what the branch had to do as a result of integrating other branches of the headquarters and the field command.

Mr. LAMBERT: Air Marshal Annis, in his testimony, indicated that in the supply side, which he was concerned with, that one of the chief difficulties he faced was having to detach so many key people to perform studies so that they were not available for the actual work of his branch, and that this really complicated the situation, with the net result that that branch—if I judge his remarks correctly—has had some great difficulties and, at the present time, is still functioning on a three service basis. Did you also have the difficulty in the comptroller general's branch of having to detach key people for study groups

or for studies either within the comptroller general's branch or the other branches, whatever they may be?

Mr. FLEURY: It was almost a constant problem. I think you must understand clearly that when you have put before you a policy or a goal such as integration, this is only the beginning of the problem from the working point of view. Policy has to be translated into programs, organizations and establishments. Your programs have to be scheduled; you have to look at the implications from a personnel point of view, a budgetary point of view, a staffing point of view, and you can name almost any field of endeavour, in business or in the armed forces, that this new organization, this new goal or this new policy impinges upon.

Most of this paper work—the getting out of hundreds and hundreds of new establishments, new names, new regulations and so on—fell on the comptroller general's branch, so it was a mass of dog's body work, if you will, that had to be done at different levels up and down the branch. At the same time, all kinds of studies were going on with a view to integrating the commands in the field. How should the organization of Maritime Command be set up? Integration did not give you the answer to that. You had to decide what the size and shape of this was going to be under a policy of integration. Should it be headed up by a Rear Admiral or a Vice Admiral? Should he have a deputy who was an Air Commodore or a Group Captain? Should he have four staff branches such as Canadian Forces Headquarters, or should he have three staff branches, and who should head them up? At what level? How many people should be allocated to the headquarters, and so on. This is a tedious, detailed job which had to be repeated scores of time before you could say that integration, or the outfall of integration, had really become completed staff work, with all the backup papers and so on, in the comptroller general's organization.

Mr. LAMBERT: This is my last question, Mr. Chairman. What is your opinion as to the effective unification on this already stretched machinery. Would this be an unnecessary complication at this time?

Mr. FLEURY: I would not call it unnecessary, sir. It seems to me that it is inevitable. I mean you still have to do your day to day business. The troops still have to be trained, fed, paid, clothed and so on. You still have to rotate your troops overseas and support the brigade group in Europe and the air division. All these things still have to go on, and all this outfall—as I call it for want of a better term coming to my mind—from integration, produced a lot of studies, a great many papers, many discussions and meetings, study groups, working groups and so on, but this had to come out of an organization which was being squeezed downward in so far as personnel was concerned because we were under instructions not only to integrate the headquarters, but to reduce the headquarters at the same time. I think it is no exaggeration at all to say that we were told to do a great deal more with less people, at this particular phase. Now we all accepted this, I think, as an inevitable concomitant of integration. And it was a hump in our work which would last X months or years and in due course, when things got sorted out, we could go back to some sort of normal operation, whatever that is.

Mr. LAMBERT: I have a question in respect of the next move of unification—in other words, a single service concept—being talked into the works at this time. Is that an unnecessary and uncalled for complication being imposed

upon a machinery that is still coping under grave difficulties with the normal problems of integration.

Mr. FLEURY: Well, it was too much for me, sir.

Mr. LAMBERT: I see. Thank you.

Mr. NUGENT: General, I would like to go back to the general scene again. It seems to me that one of the prime purposes of this Committee is to view this problem with a sense of perspective. I have asked this same question in the same way of other witnesses, but it seems that the public generally has been sold this bill of goods by the Minister. There seems to be a feeling that integration was a great wonderful innovation, never heard of before, was the brainchild of this Minister who has accomplished marvellous things, and now that it has proven itself so wonderful, we are now going to cap it with unification, the logical result, and this should complete the whole picture. I wonder if you would mind reviewing integration and establishing or reaffirming a few things that I believe to be the case. First, integration is not a new idea with this Minister, that for many, many years and in many ways various processes of integration have been evolved, tried or adopted in the forces. Is this question correct?

Mr. FLEURY: I think there is a good deal of truth in that. There were quite a number of steps which seemed to me logically to lead to some form of integration over a great many years and when I appeared before this Committee last June, I suggested that it could be said that the earliest step toward integration took place 20 years ago when a single Minister of National Defence was appointed, instead of three service ministers. I think I used the introduction of the chiefs of staff committee system as a step toward integration, the organization of the Canadian services colleges on a tri-service basis, the installation of the chaplain services, the medical services and so on. But again, there is the matter of perspective here. This was sort of, in my humble opinion, a nibbling around the periphery of the problem rather than really coming to grips with it as one single, all-embracing problem. Up until the time that integration was announced as a matter of government policy in the White Paper of March, 1964, in my opinion, we had not gone far enough. If integration is a good thing, and I leave the discretion of how far or how fast, and a precise definition, aside for now, well then, further measures of integration might well be warranted. If the Minister, under our system of government is going to be blamed if his particular view of integration does not work out, then it is only reasonable to give him the credit if it does work out.

Mr. NUGENT: That brings us to the next point, of course, that you have mentioned, that it had not gone far enough. There is a difference between theory and practice, as I have always found, and you were a supporter of integration when it started. I believe you told us that you had the feeling that it should go further and you were willing to do what you could to see if you could get these benefits. Was there any thought in your mind that integration, as a theory, should apply to everything, integrate every part of supply service and so on, or was it a feeling that integration was one of those things that had to be tried to see where it would be of benefit?

Mr. FLEURY: I think definitely the latter. I certainly never considered myself as a supporter or proponent of integration for integration's sake. This would be, to me, an utter nonsense. I think that the purpose of the exercise was never

integration; the purpose of the exercise was to save money and to increase the efficiency of the forces, and to the extent that integration would accomplish the purpose of the exercise I was in favour of it, wholeheartedly, and I still am.

Mr. NUGENT: Would you expect that in applying this theory, there would be some areas where you would evolve a well planned integration scheme and put it into practice? And would you expect, in some places, no matter how far ahead you had thought, that after a time you might look it all over and say this was wrong, and perhaps we have to go back again, that integration just could not fit into that spot?

Mr. FLEURY: Indeed, sir, and this was our actual experience prior to the time that I left the service. Indeed, I think I said to this Committee last June that we had an open mind in the Comptroller General's branch on the extent to which we would have to integrate. I pointed out, for instance, that in the branch of the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff at that time there were areas which, in my opinion, could never be integrated. You may recall a cyclical circular chart that I showed you at one time, with different colours in, and some of these hard colour areas were areas that we felt integration did not apply to at all, and probably never could apply to, because they commanded expertise in a particular environment of navy, army or air force. To use a very plebeian example, I come back to my poor Queen's harbour master in Halifax. I did carry out what was a normal manœuvre in minor tactics; I just left him there and went on to something else.

Mr. NUGENT: You will pardon me for labouring the point, sir, but there have been statements made in this Committee, as well as the general propaganda spread from the Minister's office, indicating that integration was one great scheme, that it was working wonderfully, and I thought that we should just take it apart a little bit.

You have already told me that integration applies one place and perhaps not in another, that there is no such thing as being able to foretell whether it will succeed or not, that the plan of integration for each place you put it in is not exactly the same. For instance, to integrate the padre service requires a different plan than the pay service.

Mr. FLEURY: We have not been able to computerize the padres yet.

Mr. NUGENT: So that instead of calling it integration, we should call it the schemes of integration, the plans of integration, the steps of integration which are still going on. Is that accurate?

Mr. FLEURY: Well, you must remember that I have had nothing to do with this since the 15th of July last year.

Mr. NUGENT: Which were still going on at the time you left?

Mr. FLEURY: That is correct.

Mr. NUGENT: Was there any thought in your mind that there might be a difference between theory and practice, that the best laid plans might go astray or might have to be abandoned? Did you have that experience?

Mr. FLEURY: Indeed. I think it is the story of my life.

Mr. NUGENT: Is there any reason that you can think of that there should be any thought in anybody's mind that integration is a *fait accompli*, that it is all finished, that it has proven itself or done the job?

Mr. FLEURY: Oh, I do not think so. I certainly never felt that way up until the 15th of July; otherwise I would never have said that I needed at least another two years to cope with all the bits and pieces. I think that the role of integration had been pretty firmly established. I think that integration had been put into practice in a great many areas rather faster than many of us expected, but having created the machine, I think it is obvious that a run-in period was required, and also, there were bits of sand that seemed to tie into some of the wheels and cogs that had to be worked out or oiled out.

Mr. NUGENT: Is it possible that this run-in period might reveal that there is more than a bit of sand in there—and that is why testing proves more than theory—and that there may be some places where you just cannot iron out the wrinkles and they have to reverse some of the process.

Mr. FLEURY: I think that whether we realized it consciously or unconsciously, yes. It was quite conceivable, I think, or is quite conceivable that we may have rushed into integration in a particular area, unit, formation, and we might find that it did not work and we would have to put on the brakes, and probably put the machine into reverse. As far as I was concerned, I was quite prepared to do this at any time.

Mr. NUGENT: General, as one of those who could be deemed, I suppose, to have been aimed at or whose reputation might have been touched by the contemptible practice, I may say, of the Minister of suggesting that it was the footdragging or the resistance within the military to his scheme, if there were any difficulties at all, would you reiterate the story about how hard the people worked, and tell me if my impression is correct, that it was the extra hours of work done by everybody, trying to put this in, that was responsible for integration making the progress that it did—and I think Air Vice Marshal Annis told us that it was surprisingly much more than they had even hoped. Would you tell us that this is the situation?

Mr. FLEURY: I do not think that there is any doubt at all that everybody at the newly integrated Canadian forces headquarters, certainly most everybody, worked very hard and very long hours to make this thing work, particularly in the first year after July 1964, when I was not at the headquarters. But even after I arrived in September, 1965 there was still a great deal of work to be done, and it was quite common for people to work overtime and on week-ends to try and keep up with the many questions and problems which arose, not only within the headquarters itself, but more particularly in the headquarters in the field because, after all, this was our real job. The headquarters is no end in itself either; its job is to support in every way the troops in the field, and as these many local problems, questions, queries, suggestions sort of welled up out of the integration process, there was a great deal of soul searching, thinking and production of orders that had to go on in headquarters. I do not want to give the impression that we were all tired and greatly over-worked. I think in the past, under other conditions, we have worked just as hard or harder, but this was a problem. There were a lot of people in the headquarters and particularly some colleagues of mine, friends of mine, if you will, who had been there right from the beginning, who literally I could see going down hill physically—and I take this as a direct result of the pressures to which they had freely subjected themselves. There is no law that says that you cannot leave the office at five o'clock or four o'clock or any time you want to, particularly if you are a senior officer.

Mr. NUGENT: I just wanted to make sure the record was clear on this, that whether they were particularly enthusiastic about the idea or not, everybody worked at it with a will, as they usually accept policy changes, policy directions, to do their best to make sure it worked.

Mr. FLEURY: I think this was generally true.

Mr. NUGENT: I hope that we will not have any more suggestions from some of my friends from the other side, that unification is the logical outcome of integration, since integration itself was a series of experiments really, which no one knows how far it should go. Perhaps we could go to this next point, that the Minister has sold the country such a bill of goods about the tremendous savings in money accomplished. Sir, as Comptroller-General, and bearing in mind that integration is only in the workings to a great extent in the limited field in which it can come in, are you in a position to tell us how much in dollars was saved by integration in the last year that you were there?

Mr. FLEURY: I have not the vaguest idea.

Mr. NUGENT: Do you think anyone could tell us whether or not, for sure, that there has been a savings at this early stage in that experiment of integration?

Mr. FLEURY: It would have been possible to produce some figures, but I do not know how meaningful they would have been. Perhaps a "for instance" would be helpful.

Mr. NUGENT: Yes.

Mr. FLEURY: The three service headquarters, pre-integration, between them had so many people. If you take a start point, say, of the 30th of June 1964. This was the strength of the three service headquarters, military and civilian. The purpose of the exercise, as inherited by me from my predecessor, was to cut the strength of these headquarters which had now become headquarters by roughly 30 per cent. Even in the military, we know how to play the numbers game. It is the easiest thing in the world to set up a new headquarters in Ottawa, close to Ottawa, or even in Vancouver, and transfer to that headquarters some of the functions previously performed by one or all of the three service headquarters, and send 30 per cent of your people out there and say, "Look, I am a good boy, I cut the headquarters strength down by 30 per cent." I do not suggest that that was done, but we did set up Materiel Command on an integrated basis; we did set up Training Command on an integrated basis; we did set up Mobile Command on an integrated basis, and we set up an integrated telecommunications system. These were all quite apart from CFHQ. The only meaningful figure that can be produced on personnel costs is by saying well, we kept 99 functions of one kind or another away from the headquarters and we parcelled them out between Materiel Command, Training Command, Mobile Command, tri-service telecommunications network, or whatever the term is, and reduce the start point of the 30th of June, 1964 by that number of people.

Another factor, again on the personnel side, is that if you are losing people anyhow because they are going out on age, voluntarily, on medical grounds or anything else and you are not getting the replacements in the bottom, you are surely reducing the headquarters but it is certainly not as a result of integration.

I would have been hard put, prior to the 15th of July, to put any sort of a

dollar value on the personnel figures. I could have said yes, we have cut down this many people and therefore, this means it is so many dollars, but this would not be the whole story and would certainly not stand up under examination. I think it is very dangerous to get yourself into any *post hoc ergo propter hoc* argument. It cost us so much prior to the first of July, 1964. It has cost us so much after the first of July 1964. Therefore, what we saved as a result of integration —you know, there are damn lies in statistics.

Mr. NUGENT: But what I was wanting to make clear is that anyone who attempts to suggest integration has saved so much money just does not have much regard for accuracy or the truth because you just cannot tell for sure yet.

Mr. FLEURY: I could not tell. Maybe somebody else can tell.

Mr. NUGENT: But only after these experiments in integration have been tried and completed, and only after they have ironed out the wrinkles and so on, would it be possible to tell whether it has been a success, whether you are achieving more efficiency and, thereby, saving money. Would that be the right way to judge it?

Mr. FLEURY: Well, let me put it this way, in the hope that it may be helpful. At the very root of the decision to integrate was a realization that we were not spending, and would not be able to spend, a sufficiently high percentage of the defence budget on new equipment, on capital budgeting, that as personnel, operating and maintenance cost were going up against a fixed or relatively fixed budget ceiling, the amount of money left over for capital was diminishing. I would not pretend to have all the facts and figures in my mind, but it seemed that we were running down, a year or so ago, to about 13 per cent or so of our budget being devoted to equipment and plant. The very root of the integration process, and I think this has been stated time and time again, was to try and get that up to somewhere in the 20 to 25 per cent range. It would seem to me, sir, that the day we spend 20 to 25 per cent of our budget on capital equipment and plant, then somebody can honestly and truthfully say integration has been a success—provided you have not cut the strength of the force by X per cent, which more than makes up for this difference in cost. For instance, if you cut the force in half, it is not too difficult to get up to 20 or 25 per cent capital cost because you have reduced your costs in respect of pay allowances, rations, quarters and so on, by a considerable margin.

Mr. NUGENT: What I was trying to seek was some way that we could effectively weigh the facts. The Minister, and I say it as bluntly as this, has been selling very hard this idea of what tremendous savings he has done. We had an unfortunate experience in this Committee regarding a chart that was purporting to show the levelling off and, in proportion, an increase in spending on equipment but, unfortunately, we were able to reveal the facts and show that there had not been. I agree that when we get up to a substantial increase in the amounts spent on equipment as compared with administrative costs with a steady size force, only then will we know whether integration is a success. This is the only real test.

Mr. FLEURY: This would be my approach to it, as a practical man.

Mr. NUGENT: Would you say, being fair to the integration process, that it is much too early yet, to judge it now, bearing in mind how long it will take for

some steps of integration to take effect or even to be completed, and that one should give it some time yet to settle down to see whether it is working or not?

Mr. FLEURY: I think I agree with that.

Mr. NUGENT: One other point has been pushed by some in this Committee: that it only makes sense, as a logical end of integration, that we push on to unification, because integration will not really work unless we do. What is your opinion of the logic of that position? Is there anything in that argument whatsoever?

Mr. FLEURY: Well, I do not know whether there is anything in it or not, sir, but if it had appealed to me, as I mentioned, I would still be serving.

Mr. NUGENT: Is there anything about integration that would fail because we did not push on to unification?

Mr. FLEURY: Well, I think it might be argued that if you allow too long a stretch-out you lose some of your drive and momentum. Not to put a too fine a point on it, I heard the remark made, half in fun and half in earnest, that if you do not press on fast with this that the rats will get at it; everybody will start to have second thoughts and people will find 69 different reasons for not pushing on with it. I make no judgment on the validity of that approach but it is understandable.

Mr. NUGENT: That is about the only one you can think of?

Mr. FLEURY: At the moment. Maybe if I had a little more time I could think of some others.

Mr. NUGENT: Would you not agree that that is the fairest approach that one who is opposed the unification could take? If, as is argued, the beneficial results of integration are the best argument in favour of unification, do you not think it would be fair to say, approaching the subject right now, that it is too early to judge?

Mr. FLEURY: In my view, it is. Perhaps I should make it perfectly clear that I was not, up to the 15th of July last year, unalterably opposed to some form of further step beyond integration, if it proved the thing to do. I could foresee circumstances. I can foresee circumstances today where unification, again depending on the definition, might be the answer to a great many military problems, but I had not reached that point by the 15th of July and I have not reached it yet.

Mr. NUGENT: We have had expressed by other witnesses here too, that they are not opposed to unification up to a certain point, but after that they just say, "I'm from Missouri. Show me." Is that generally your idea too.

Mr. FLEURY: I think so.

Mr. NUGENT: Mr. Chairman, do I have much time?

The CHAIRMAN: Carry on, if you will—

—unless Mr. McIntosh would like to come on now.

Mr. NUGENT: I was going to go into a different field. I can stop here.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I am in your hands, Mr. Chairman. I do not want to interrupt Mr. Nugent's line of thought at all.

Mr. PUGH: The numbers game was mentioned, and the suggestion was made that transfers might be made in the service from one area to another. In your opinion, have the steps taken as far toward integration cut down on the number of services required for an efficient tri-service?

Mr. FLEURY: I am not sure that I understand the question. Do you mean are the troops getting less or more support as a result of integration?

Mr. PUGH: In respect of integration, has any cutting down of the necessary services been made which would take away from an efficient force?

Mr. FLEURY: I do not think I can answer that honestly. I do not know.

Mr. PUGH: Why would you not be able to answer?

Mr. FLEURY: Because I think that up to the time I left, we were in a turmoil. There were so many things going on and so many things to do that you did not always know and appreciate what service was not being performed, say, in Germany, in the Gaza Strip, Cyprus, Vancouver or Oshkosh Junction. All the service backlash, if you will, of all the action which had been taken had not yet all been seriously considered—had not, as it were, welled up on the desks of those responsible at Canadian Forces Headquarters.

Mr. PUGH: This follows out what you previously said, that it is possibly too early to judge that integration, per se, must have time to work in.

Mr. FLEURY: This is my opinion.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Nugent?

Mr. NUGENT: Put me on the next round, will you?

Mr. CHURCHILL: Put me on the next round too, please.

Mr. MCINTOSH: General, what I would like to do at the moment is to try to pinpoint the period when all this trouble started, or its cause, if I can possibly do so. We can call it trouble, or whatever you want to call it, but what caused all these senior officers to resign at almost the same time? It would seem from the evidence you gave yesterday that your reasons for resigning were not exactly the same reasons that other witnesses have given us that took the same action you did, and in your 37 years of experience it would seem to me that you would have run into circumstances similar to those you gave as reasons for quitting, or putting in your resignation, and had overcome them. Yesterday I think you said that there were three reasons—or I took it that you gave three reasons—for your resigning. One was that security of information was practically non-existent. The second reason was because there was evidence of disloyalty and near disloyalty in the forces. The third reason—and this may be, if we can uncover it, the main reason why you resigned—is that you came to realize that things were being done under the cloak of integration which were not part of the integration process at all. You also stated that you had a great deal of confidence in your chief, Air Chief Marshal Miller and I would like to revert to the first two causes you gave. With regard to your statement that the security of information was practically nonexistent, did you at any time discuss with your chief, Air Chief Marshal Miller, the fact that you had uncovered this thing that you cannot tolerate within the services?

Mr. FLEURY: I would not care to say that at any particular time I went into the chief's office and discussed this point specifically with him. I do not think it would have been necessary. I must believe that he was just aware of the situation as I was. I can—

Mr. MCINTOSH: Did he ever indicate that to you?

Mr. FLEURY: I can say, if I can go on, that I certainly discussed this with certain of my colleagues and associates on the same level, and I found myself in the very embarrassing position one day of having all my own senior people in to a monthly conference and reading them a lecture on security of information which, at that level—I am talking about colonels and brigadiers or equivalent—I had never before in my service found myself doing.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Was this situation ever brought to the knowledge of the Minister?

Mr. FLEURY: I could not answer that question, but I think I made the statement yesterday that the whole place reminded me of a sieve. To me it is inconceivable that anybody from the Minister down to the last joined person at headquarters could not have been aware that what was going on was a great deal more than, what some military personnel have called over the years, scuttle but—you know, this question of passing the word from person to person. There was a great deal of unnecessary talk inside the headquarters and outside the headquarters; a great deal more than, in my humble opinion, was justified by the work at hand, or was compatible with the stern directives on security which have been part and parcel of the military regulations for many years.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Did I understand you to say yesterday, that you had served, during your 36 years, under five or eight different ministers of National Defence?

Mr. FLEURY: Something like that; eight or ten.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Had you ever had problems like this before under the former ministers? Was there any evidence that such a thing was taking place before?

Mr. FLEURY: I cannot recall so. If it did happen it was not to the same extent.

Mr. MCINTOSH: You may not have been in a position to realize it.

Mr. FLEURY: That is possibly correct.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Going on to the second point, you said, "because there was evidence of disloyalty and near disloyalty". Now, would you not, as a senior officer, take action in that regard if there were near disloyalty or disloyalty? I would assume that it would be your responsibility to stop this?

Mr. FLEURY: This is a very dicy area. Loyalty is a very delicate thing—

Mr. MCINTOSH: "A two-way street" you said.

Mr. FLEURY: —and it is a two-way street in my view. One might find it even difficult to define loyalty. Perhaps an example: given a junior officer in an infantry battalion, he has taken an oath of allegiance to the Crown and that oath of allegiance says, in words of one syllable, I believe, that he will bear true and loyal allegiance to Her Majesty and will obey the lawful commands of his

superior officers. Now, to a lieutenant or captain in an infantry battalion, he gets the word, as the saying goes, from his company commander and there is no doubt whatever in this mind that his immediate loyalty is focused on his commanding officer and that this works both ways. Now, he knows quite well that his commanding officer has a formation commander who stands in the same relationship as he does to his commanding officer, and higher up the line he moves until he gets a commander-in-chief or chief of defence staff or chief of general staff. But he has to have a focus for his loyalty and that focus is the unit or the sub-unit or the formation and it is epitomized by the commanding officer or the commander.

Now, if he talks to his commanding officer today and is told something and then the brigade commander or divisional commander or chief of defence staff tells him the next day something quite different, he is in a bit of a pickle, is he not? And if that very same night he goes home and reads the newspaper and finds out that a defence spokesman or some unnamed person, or even some named person, says something which is at variance with what he has already got from the other two superiors, he is in trouble from a loyalty point of view.

Now, the same thing works downwards. To take another hypothetical example, if I pass the word on some legitimate matter of policy or procedure direction to my immediate subordinate and then I find, as it goes down the line, that it gets twisted and turned and does not come out the way I started it off, either verbally, or writing, then I have to find out whether I have expressed myself clearly in the first instance, or whether something has happened down the line that should not have happened, and this is what I am talking about in terms of loyalty, disloyalty or near disloyalty.

I found an atmosphere—you must remember that I only brought this point up because I was asked why I left the service—

Mr. McINTOSH: Right.

Mr. FLEURY: —and this was one of the reasons. I said the place was like a sieve, I did not like the atmosphere and I was trying to illustrate one of the ingredients of that atmosphere.

Now, you may question me, I think, until doomsday without really getting any further clarification on the point. I named no names; I do not think I pointed a finger at anybody; I described the situation which, in my view, was intolerable and which I could no longer live in.

Mr. McINTOSH: I do not think we want you to name any names, but in the explanation that you have just given to me I took it that you were dealing with comparatively junior officers; officers who are in the process of learning. I would think on your staff there would be very few of these junior officers. I would think on your staff you would have very senior personnel to deal with and it seems unreasonable to me that these senior people, that had been all through the process you just described to me in the process of learning what loyalty was and how essential it was, would be involved in such a thing in a headquarters such as yours. Am I mistaken in that idea?

Mr. FLEURY: I think the very nature of a headquarters tends to obscure the whole direction of loyalty. You see, first of all you have a very considerable number of people working at headquarters and unlike most units they are

working cheek by jowl with a very great number of civilians, and if you do not cross lines between branches and you do not cross lines between the military and the civilian, as I pointed out in talking about the deputy minister's organization, you very often do not get things done.

For instance, if one of my relatively junior officers—say, at the captain or major level or equivalent—has a problem, I take it as a matter of course if it impinges on something that is within the purview of the Deputy Minister that he will go and see somebody at his level in the deputy minister's office, and similarly the deputy minister would not hesitate at all to come to see somebody on his level in my shop. I have no objection to that; this is just as natural and necessary as can be, but that junior officer should know within fairly well prescribed limits what his superior in his department feels, or is likely to feel, or knows, about a certain problem. Now if, knowing that I have categorically stated this is not to be done, he then goes and tries to get somebody in the deputy minister's office to do it for him, then I would take a reasonably dim view of this, would I not? And this can be done in CBHQ in a way that it could never be done in a unit because of the size and complexity of the organization and the number of channels and people through whom one can deal.

I do not know whether this other example might be particularly valid or not but if I, for instance, as a senior officer at the headquarters wanted to get something done through the Chief of Defence Staff and could not get him to see reason, as I saw it, and then I went to the deputy minister, or the minister, or somebody in the Minister's office, or to a member of parliament, and got him to put pressure on my chief, I would think I had no business in the Canadian forces. And there was a certain amount of this going on; a great deal more than I could stomach.

Mr. McINTOSH: I would ask you again, sir: Did you bring this topic up with your chief? Was he aware of your feeling that there was evidence of disloyalty or near disloyalty?

Mr. FLEURY: I would not like to be specific on that. I think he knew. I am not prepared to say that I ever discussed it with him.

Mr. McINTOSH: You think he knew? In other words you said, on the first two reasons you gave for resigning, that with regard to security which you said was practically non-existent you are quite sure your chief, Air Chief Marshal Miller, knew about this, and that there was evidence of disloyalty and near disloyalty within the headquarters and he has aware of this.

Mr. FLEURY: I refer to politicking in the worse sense—you know, real cutting around corners; short-circuiting channels of communication; how to get the word from some other higher level to check on what one's immediate superior had told him.

Mr. McINTOSH: And to your knowledge this never existed before under any other minister of National Defence? To your knowledge, I ask.

Mr. FLEURY: Well, putting it that way, I do not know that—

Mr. McINTOSH: Well, I am trying to pinpoint when this started. This is what I said when I started questioning you; I am trying to get the period when this trouble started.

Mr. FLEURY: I cannot pinpoint it because I arrived on September 1, 1965, and it was a condition which I found. Now, I could certainly say that it was not a condition which I found to any extent when I had previously been at Canadian Forces Headquarters.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Well, to your knowledge, there was never an exodus of so many senior experienced officers as there was just about the period of 1965 when they all started to resign?

Mr. FLEURY: That is so.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Now I want to get to your third reason. You said that you came to realize that things were being done under the cloak of integration, which were not part of the integration process at all.

You may not agree with me, but there is a cloak here in the Minister's speech, one that you have heard so often referred to, the one he gave on December 7 in the House. I repeat and will keep repeating what he said: The system will not be changed, but will continue to have all the navy, the air force and the army until—and these are the words that get me, because there seems to be a limitation on how long these formations will exist; he says:

> . . .until the force structure within the unified force is developed.

This is what puzzles me. When is that period when it is going to be developed and what is it when it is developed. Is this what you mean when you say that you came to realize that things were being done under the cloak of integration which were not part of the integration process at all?

Mr. FLEURY: I am sorry, I am not sure that I follow you.

Mr. MCINTOSH: What I am trying to get at is, what is the policy of the present Minister of National Defence? What is he trying to do? It does not seem to me that he is following what we are led to believe in the White Paper, first of all in the objectives, where he says we have certain roles that we are committed to and must carry out; one is supporting collective defence measures and the another is protection and surveillance of the territory over our air space and our coastal waters. We have an objective there, but also in the White Paper, which has been referred to time and time again, there is a suggestion that another force will be developed, a force that some of the previous witnesses said we cannot maintain and cannot service. In the conclusion of the White Paper it says:

> Nevertheless, and regrettably, it is essential to maintain force on our side as a deterrent against attack from potential foes who are themselves heavily armed; as a means of removing the greatest temptation to an aggressor, the assurance of easy victory.

Here it seems to me—and I go back to this dual role dual policy that the Minister seems to be trying to put into force—we must maintain the collective defence, but we are also going to form another force which, with our resources, cannot be done, according to previous witnesses. I ask you: Do you think we can have this dual role and that we can provide an additional force for peacekeeping and, in so doing, do away with our army, navy and our air force?

Mr. FLEURY: I think I said yesterday afternoon that I did not think we could meet the government's commitments with any degree of assurance within the

framework of the personnel and money that was being provided. I think I went on to say that this was nothing new and that we had been, in effect, taking risks, calculated or otherwise, for many, many years and that most military people since the war were, I think, of the opinion that we never had enough to carry out the commitments that we might have been called upon to perform. It was largely by good luck that we had never been called upon to do all these things at one time.

If you are going to have a Canadian defence force, or whatever it is going to be called, for peacekeeping duties, and peacekeeping duties only, then I think perhaps you ought to have another favourable look at unification, because this might be the one circumstance that I can see where unification might be a real boon. But if you are going to do peacekeeping, NATO and NORAD and all the other things that are set forth as solemn commitments on the part of the government, then I say you cannot do it within the manpower and money that is allocated, unless you can do it seriatim. If you can do a peacekeeping job with this group this year and the NATO job with the same group next year well, you are home free, but if you get called upon to reinforce the brigade group in Germany and to provide a substantial peacekeeping force for some place unknown at the moment, and get called upon at the same time to provide forces in conjunction with the Americans for the defence of the continent—if you have to do all these things at once, in my view, you just cannot do them.

Mr. McINTOSH: Yes, but it seems to me that the Minister is trying to tell the people of Canada that all these things can be done with unification. The only trouble, if it can be done, is that he has not told the people of Canada, and has not told me, to my satisfaction, what unification is. Now, I do not know what it means and I do not think you know what it means from your answers yesterday. I am not quite sure that anyone else knows what it means. When General Moncel was on the stand—and this term "unification" is the whole cause of it, I think, when it first cropped up—he told us he was asked to write four papers, I believe it was, on unification. When he finished the four papers, he did not agree with any of them, but he fulfilled his duty and wrote them. Now were you ever asked to write a paper on unification?

Mr. FLEURY: No, sir.

Mr. McINTOSH: If you had been asked, could you have written one?

Mr. FLEURY: I might have been able to write one, but I do not think I would have liked it very much after I had finished, though.

Mr. McINTOSH: Would you have understood it?

Mr. FLEURY: Probably not.

Mr. McINTOSH: Now General Moncel said that unification may be the kiss of death for Canada's defence commitments and he also said that unification will work only if defence commitments are reduced or changed, because unification was an uncharted course with a dim destination. Do you agree with those statements?

Mr. FLEURY: I might not have used the same words, but I think I agree with them generally.

Mr. McINTOSH: He also said that unification has become unification for unifications's sake.

Mr. FLEURY: This seems to me a very present danger and to me, of course, is a very sad state of affairs. I am bound to say that I think we have reached a point where I made reference to my reluctance to appear before this Committee and I gave some reasons for it. Of course, another reason is I honestly feel that not one word I said here yesterday or today will have the slightest effect on what is ultimately carried out, because so many people have taken up such entrenched positions on the subject that it is very difficult for anyone to back away.

The things that I said yesterday and the things that I have said today, or will say today, could have been said at many opportunities by me over the past six months. I chose not to do that, for reasons which I considered good and sufficient, and I do not think that my saying them now is going to have the slightest effect on the ultimate result. I am not so naive as to believe that any answer that I will give to any question today, will make the slightest difference to the end result, and I think this is a very sad state of affairs. I really feel, in all conscience, that if all concerned in some way could have gathered around a table quietly and sorted out these matters to the general satisfaction of the country and parliament and the armed services, we would all, and our country, be much farther ahead today.

Mr. McINTOSH: General Moncel also stated wich regard to these dual roles, that it would be possible to adhere to our commitments in the collective defence and also set up this special force provided—and he referred to the White Paper and he called them flaws in the White Paper. He said one was the commitment set out in the paper which would require a force of between 148,000 and 150,000 men and an annual spending of more than $2.6 billion which apparently, under the present defence policy, was out of the question. Do you agree that these two roles could be carried out if you were given $2.5 billion and a force of 150,000 men?

Mr. FLEURY: I have never done any sums on the subject myself. All I am prepared to say is that I do not think, if we were called on tomorrow to carry out all these roles simultaneously, we could begin to cope with them all with the men and money we now have. Now, whether we would need another 50,000 men or another $500 million, I am not prepared to say.

Mr. McINTOSH: If it could have been done and if you had the right figures, and so on—we will take for granted that General Moncel's figure of 150,000 men is correct, because he said he worked on it—under what conditions and in what manner could we raise our force from the 105,000 that we now have, to a force of 150,000? Do you think it could be done by voluntary enlistment, or would we have to resort to compulsory military service?

Mr. FLEURY: I do not think, if the pattern of the last couple of years is projected into the future, that we could begin to raise 45,000 or 50,000 additional troops on a voluntary basis. They are not coming forward and have not been coming forward for some considerable time in sufficient numbers just to replace our wastage. The strength of the force, as you know, has gone down quite substantially and fairly steadily for the last 18 months or 2 years, and I think I referred to what I consider to be some of the reasons for this yesterday.

Mr. McINTOSH: Do you feel that the Minister, by outlining his policy to you and telling you to make the arrangements to follow that policy, had given you an impossible task to follow and if so, did you tell him this or tell your chief this?

Mr. FLEURY: Well, I was never given this task as Comptroller General...

Mr. McINTOSH: What part of the task were you given?

Mr. FLEURY: This would be in the field of the Chief of Defence Staff and/or the Vice Chief of Defence Staff. I think if he had told me to do this, I would probably have said: "Well sir, these are the difficulties, but I will go out and do my best," which I had done on many occasions in the past under similar circumstances. I do not think that the military ever feels that it has enough men and/or money to carry out all its commitments. It is bound, I think, in conscience to draw this to attention, but then it is also bound in conscience to go out and do the best it can with what it is given. I think this has been the whole pattern of our military history.

Mr. McINTOSH: The lack of money or lack of personnel—

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. McIntosh, do you have a long—

Mr. McINTOSH: I would like to pursue this point.

The CHAIRMAN: All right. I do not want to cut you off in the middle of your questioning.

Mr. McINTOSH: You can do as you wish; you can let me continue later or you can let me continue now. This lack of personnel or this lack of money, General, in no way had anything to do with the security information that was non-existent in headquarters or the evidence of disloyalty or near disloyalty in headquarters?

Mr. FLEURY: I do not think so.

Mr. McINTOSH: Did it have anything to do with your third cause? You said that you came to realize that things were being done under a cloak of integration which was not part of the integration process at all.

Mr. FLEURY: I do not think so.

Mr. McINTOSH: It had nothing to do with either of those. I want to go to this "go it alone" policy, or this third role, that was devised under the present Minister with regard to the peacekeeping force. I understand that the Defence Minister's plan was for two airborne brigades designed for world trouble shooting and General Foulkes had quite a bit to say about this. He said that he could not imagine where such a force would go or under what circumstances. He said such a force with its own attack planes could not participate in the United Nations peacekeeping operations; that the United Nations did not employ such a force. In your opinion, can Canada maintain a peacekeeping force of two airborne brigades designed for world trouble shooting?

Mr. FLEURY: Yes, I think it can.

Mr. McINTOSH: And keep up with their other commitments?

Mr. FLEURY: Maybe—I do not know.

Mr. McINTOSH: Did you read any of Air Marshal Annis' evidence in the newspapers where he said that the biggest force that Canada could maintain was a force of around battalion strength of 1,000?

Mr. FLEURY: I did not read anything that Air Marshal Annis said. I was in the Committee room for about 15 minutes at the tail end of his testimony the day before yesterday.

Mr. McINTOSH: How many men would be involved in two airborne brigades, general?

Mr. FLEURY: I would think from 6,000 to 8,000 troops. But here again you get into the numbers game. I presume an airborne brigade would be, in fact, a skeleton brigage. It would not be anything like the size and shape of the brigade group in Europe. The brigade group in Europe, to give you a basis for comparaison, is in the order of 6,000 strong. I think an airborne brigade group would probably be something in the order of half that size. But, again, I would have to know how the brigade groups were to be set up and what sort of task they were to be given; whether they were to have artillery support, tank support and engineer support, and all these types of things.

Mr. McINTOSH: Mr. Chairman, you can put me down for the next round. I want to discuss a different subject.

Mr. FORRESTALL: General, I just have one question. Mr. Chairman, I hope I will not be too long. Perhaps this could be directed to both the Chairman and the General. I am becoming concerned about the relationship between our apparent defence policy and our foreign policy. Mr. McIntosh started this line of questioning from one point of view. I am wondering if you would care to say whether or not you feel that this matter which is now before us might properly be referred to an enlargement of this Committee, or a joint committee and the committee responsible for our foreign affairs matters? Is the matter something which is now transcending in your own mind the immediate, direct responsibility to the field of defence? Is another area coming into it?

Mr. FLEURY: I would be very happy if the Chairman would field that question.

The CHAIRMAN: I would suggest that inasmuch as this is the only matter that has been referred to us by the House—this bill—this is something which will have to come up and be a directive from the House. I will have to discuss with the Clerk whether this could be a recommendation from this Committee. At the moment I do not believe it could be, inasmuch as we are expected to address ourselves to this bill.

Mr. FORRESTALL: I will pass because this is one matter that the general did not want to get involved in. May I ask if this matter can be placed on the agenda of your steering committee, as I am becoming very concerned about certain evidence we have had from two or three people concerning our capability to meet certain roles that we have undertaken. I think this should be a matter of extensive consideration by others than those directly concerned with defence.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I wanted to ask another question or two about National Defence Headquarters during the time that General Fleury was there. I was drawing attention a few minutes ago to the number of senior officers who have

left over a period of a year and a half. There is another question in *Hansard* of February 13, 1967, on page 12,938. Mr. Forrestall asked a question with regard to resignations by National Defence Headquarters officers and the answer that was given indicated that during the period of two years—from January 1, 1965 to January 1, 1967—3,000 officers served at National Defence Headquarters. As of February 13, there were 1,649 officers present there. The answer does not say how many of that 1,649 had been present throughout the two-year period. Assuming that number had been present throughout, there is a changeover of 1,351 and would guess that the 1,649 were not there throughout the two-year period. Therefore, you might assume that perhaps 2,000 officers passed through National Defence Headquarters during the two-year period.

General, you mentioned the turmoil at National Defence Headquarters and the shifting around of officers, and so on. Were you conscious, during your term there, of a very rapid coming and going, posting and reposting of officer personnel?

Mr. FLEURY: Yes.

Mr. CHURCHILL: It was a bit like Grand Central Station, then. They must have been coming and going at the rate of 30 a week on the average, or more.

Mr. FLEURY: I would not be surprised.

Mr. CHURCHILL: The answer to the same question indicates that during that period—the period of two years—264 officers submitted their resignations. This indicates—although I was talking earlier about the 80 senior officers who had disappeared from the services—that a large number of officers below the rank of brigadier or equivalent must have left. The answer goes on to say that of the 264 officers 56 had a minimum of 25 years' service and were eligible for voluntary retirement, but it does not say whether they retired voluntarily or not. I will quote this directly. It states:

> —most of the remaining 208 were in their last three years of service, a period where many officers negotiate for, and accept, civilian employment.

It is the typical answer you get from the artful dodgers in the Minister's office. Is it normal for officers, during their last three years of service, to depart from the service and sacrifice their pension rights during that period?

Mr. FLEURY: It certainly is not unknown for officers to leave within the last two or three years prior to their intended date of release on the grounds of age. I think it is very understandable. If an officer who is reaching the age of 50, for instance, and thinking about a new career receives a good offer, he asks to get out a bit early. A lot of people in the service consider, rightly or wrongly, that 50 is a sort of magic age. It is relatively easier for them to become re-established, or to become established for the first time, in civilian life if they have not passed the magic age of 50. But whether it is a trend which has accelerated considerably in recent months or not I would not be in a position to say. It did seem to me that a great many more officers were going out in the period of 1965-1966 under the circumstances that had been normal in the past.

Mr. CHURCHILL: The point that I wanted to direct attention to is that it has been not only senior officers—the rank of brigadier and equivalent and upwards —who have been leaving the service, but the junior officers in rather large

numbers. This applies only to National Defence Headquarters—264 officers in the two-year period submitted their resignations, for one reason or another, and it does not state why. While I am on this, I might just indicate to the Committee that there still rests in *Hansard* on page 8,562 of October 12, 1966, an answer to a question by Mr. Forrestall which reads as follows and I quote:

> Question No. 1,895—Mr. Forrestall: What are the forecast expenditures for capital equipment for the armed services for 1966-67 and 1967-68 as a percentage of the defence budget?
>
> Hon. Paul Hellyer (Minister of National Defence): 1966-67, 17.1 per cent.

It continues to rest there as a public statement and we had this corrected during the course of Committee hearings when a notorious chart was put in front of us. Here you have more information going out to the public that can be classed as inaccurate.

I want to ask the witness one question about the services. The statement has been made to us that in this modern world warfare has changed so remarkably that we have to alter our force structure and introduce integration and unification to keep up with developments. From your long experience in the services and during wartime, do you see such a major change, exclusive of nuclear weapons, that would necessitate eliminating the present roles of the navy, army and air force?

Mr. FLEURY: No, I do not, sir.

Mr. CHURCHILL: From your observations of the warfare that has gone on around the world since the close of world war II and that is taking place at present in Viet Nam, do you see any urgent reason for materially altering our fighting components—navy, army and air force?

Mr. FLEURY: Not on military grounds.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Mr. Chairman, that is the end of my questioning, but may I raise a point of order? I asked, two days ago, for the letter of April 2, 1964, which was sent out to the various commands. It is in the possession of Mr. Deachman, but could I as a member of the Committee, also have a copy of it and could other members of the Committee have copies?

The CHAIRMAN: We can deal with this right now. Some copies have been run off by the clerk and he was just seeking an opportunity to distribute them. I will ask him to do that now.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Mr. Churchill must be delighted to know that I gave a copy to the Clerk immediately so he could run off a few copies for Mr. Churchill. Is that not the same letter Mr. Churchill was quoting from a few days ago before he found out that I had a copy?

Mr. CHURCHILL: I quoted the letter. This, of course, is a complete misstatement of fact. I quoted from the evidence—the ridiculous evidence given here by Mr. Patrick who incorporated part of that document in his evidence. I had no knowledge of it before, nor had I a copy in my possession. Mr. Harkness asked yesterday for a copy of the production called "Internal Information". Could that be made available to the Committee, or should we rush down to national headquarters and ask for it?

The CHAIRMAN: No. If you will leave it to the Chairman and the Clerk, we will get hold of copies for you.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Could we not get this material within a day? Has there not been quite a commuter system operating between national headquarters and this Committee, day after day?

The CHAIRMAN: I am not too sure about the difficulty that the Clerk is experiencing in this, but I hope you will leave it to me to get hold of them as we have got hold of this last copy and we will try to get them by this afternoon.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I have a third question with regard to this. It will soon be three weeks since I asked for some other information. I am very patient, but when you are dealing with National Defence Headquarters, naturally you have to be excessively patient. But I think I asked at our second sitting for the establishment of our forces in order that we could see whether or not the present recruitment was falling far short of the establishment. I thought that information might be made readily available to the Committee; or should I go to the Russian Embassy for it?

The CHAIRMAN: Could you leave it to me to find out what the situation is with respect to this in conversation with the Clerk? I will bring it up again this afternoon.

Mr. FANE: Could you go further in what Mr. Churchill was asking for? Could we be supplied with a whole handful of the papers that Mr. Andras mentioned in his talk yesterday, as he turned them over one at a time? There were about a dozen or so of those things that we have not had access to. Could we get them?

The CHAIRMAN: Yes, if they are available. I will ask Mr. Andras to produce them so we can have copies made.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Many of them are such things as the reports of the Committee over the last three years and the White Paper, and so on.

The CHAIRMAN: Well, this would be helpful to the members of the Committee. I see no reason why they should not be produced through the Clerk for everyone, and I will deal with that.

Mr. ANDRAS: I would be simply delighted, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FANE: Most of my questions already have been asked, and they did confirm the subject of disloyalty and security. Mr. McIntosh and Mr. Nugent, I think, got very full answers to those subjects this morning, for which I am very grateful. I do want to ask General Fleury whether a great deal of the difficulty in putting the programs into effect is not a direct result of a faulty or inadequate appreciation of the situation by the people who have ordered the program of integration and unification, in that it was put into effect before the appreciation was firm and, perhaps, trying to run before we could walk?

Mr. FLEURY: I think I would be inclined to agree with that.

Mr. FANE: I understand from what you said that, perhaps, was one of the biggest initial troubles. More troubles have developed through lack of information, and, as you suggested, perhaps lack of communication and intercommunication.

Mr. FLEURY: I think that is so. In all honest conscience I think one must admit that the military machine is a pretty peculiar machine. It does not really operate in the same way as a political machine or a business machine except in certain specific areas. I do not happen to know anything about motor car engines; I do not know nearly as much as I ought to and if my car stops I call a garage, if I do not want to get my fingers burnt or make the situation worse by tinkering with my automobile engine. I think that it is the nature of the beast that the military machine, in its detailed operations, has to be run by people who understand it. There is no question whatever that the machine must get its direction and its policy and its control from outside the machine, that is, from the government through the Minister. But, if you put someone without military background and experience anywhere into the military machine, and tell him to try to make it run, I think he will end up by fouling the machine and getting hurt himself.

Mr. FANE: That is exactly what I said myself. Thank you very much.

Mr. HARKNESS: You stated yesterday that communications in National Defence Headquarters had broken down, and you gave an instance of that which was quoted in the morning paper:

> "Officers working for me knew more or said they knew more or thought they knew more about what was in the mind of the Minister than I did."

Now, the effect of that, I would take it, would be a breakdown in the essential and necessary mutual trust existing in your branch or any other branch. Would another effect be duplication of effort; a lack of co-ordination in what people were doing or attempting to do?

Mr. FLEURY: I believe so.

Mr. HARKNESS: The total result, then, would be a less efficient and effective machine.

Mr. FLEURY: To put it mildly.

Mr. HARKNESS: Can you give us what to your mind were the basic reasons for this breakdown in communications?

Mr. FLEURY: No, I really cannot, because as I said before, it was a situation which I found existing on arrival. Naturally, I thought a good deal about it before and since my retirement; it is something that worried me greatly, but I cannot explain how it happened, why it happened, or anything, to be perfectly honest. I certainly would be away out in left field if I ventured into the field of trying to impute motives to anybody.

Mr. HARKNESS: Have you any suggestions to give us as to how this situation could be corrected?

Mr. FLEURY: I might try. I think that what was needed more than anything else in the period prior to July 15, 1966, was clear-cut statements of government policy, clearly translated through the Chief of the Defence Staff, to the armed forces, and I emphasize—through the Chief of the Defence Staff. Every organization has its own methods, its own language, its own *modus operandi*. If the military machine—a rather distastful term in some respects—is not run in the

way that over the years it has been built and designed to run, then you get misunderstanding and you get confusion.

It may be all quite honest. Everybody who mucked in on this may have done so from the most laudable motives. But, I do not think I have to explain to you, Mr. Harkness, that it is no use having somebody, no matter who he may be—a politician or a civil servant or anybody else—trying to go down to Camp Valcartier and teach the Van Doos how to suck eggs. It has got to be done by somebody from the Van Doos who gets his word from an area or brigade commander who, in turn, pushes it down and interprets it, because when the Chief of Defence Staff sends out a program it is for the armed forces as a whole, and obviously it has to be broken down and flesh put on it at almost every level down the way, and this has to be done in terms that the fellow on the receiving line, whoever he may be, understands unquestionably.

We used to have a rule of thumb for many years, and it was only half-joking, that anybody who wrote a letter, or directive or instruction that could not be understood by the least educated corporal in the army, did not write a good letter, or instruction or directive. You have to be understood by these people, in a way and a language that they understand. I think, I began to touch on this yesterday; when I get into a political climate, obviously I am ill at ease. This is not my dish of tea; this is not what I was trained for, for the last 30 years. But put me in an army environment and, within reason, in a military environment which is not necessarily confined to the army, and I understand the language; I understand the procedures; I think I can get my ideas across to my subordinates, and I believe and expect that they can get the ideas across to their subordinates. And so the thing goes down the line, and action is taken. It does not work otherwise, or it works badly otherwise.

Mr. HARKNESS: I take from what you have just said that probably the basic reason for this communication breakdown was that the normal channel of communications frequently was not followed as far as instructions, orders, and so on, to commands, formations and units are concerned.

Mr. FLEURY: Up and down.

Mr. HARKNESS: Yes, up and down. In other words, it was being short circuited in various ways.

Mr. FLEURY: This is correct.

Mr. HARKNESS: What should have been coming from the Chief of the Defence Staff would be coming from the Minister's office or some other source.

Mr. FLEURY: I did not say that.

Mr. HARKNESS: No, but I say it. Would you agree to this?

Mr. FLEURY: No comment.

Mr. HARKNESS: You also stated that the security of information was practically non-existent. Could you give us the reasons for that?

Mr. FLEURY: I think that people were confused and that loyalties had become divided and diluted; that factions were starting to grow up in the headquarters. One heard comments around the place such as, "Whose side are you on?" This sort of approach. I think that is about all I need to say on the subject.

Mr. HARKNESS: In other words, this is another phase or example of diminution or decrease in morale?

Mr. FLEURY: Well, it certainly must have had an effect on morale. I can assure you that it had a great effect on my morale.

Mr. HARKNESS: Yes. I would think there is no question about it that if there was a breakdown as fas as security of information is concerned that the basic reason for that was a breakdown in morale.

You have stated that it would take two years to catch up on the paper work in the Comptroller General's branch. We have had evidence that it would take some five years, as far as Materiel Command is concerned, to get the supply situation working really effectively, and I think you stated that in your view it would take even longer as far as the technical services were concerned. Under these circumstances do you think that further steps in regard to integration, and particularly as far as unification is concerned, can effectively be taken until there has been a period for consolidation and for getting the present organization situations whipped into shape.

Mr. FLEURY: No, I do not.

Mr. HARKNESS: In other words, you believe that at the present time a pause is essential in order to, we will say, pick up the pieces?

Mr. FLEURY: A working pause, if I may use the term. Not a period in which nothing will be done.

Mr. HARKNESS: No, no, no. A pause in order to consolidate or, as I say, pick up the pieces. I take it you would think that pause should be one of several years' duration?

Mr. FLEURY: I do not know how long it should be but it would seem to me that it could not be less than two or three years.

Mr. HARKNESS: Now, we have had the statement made by the Minister and others on various occasions that our defence forces and organization, and so forth, are more efficient and effective at the present time than has been the case at any time more or less in the past. What would be your comment on that?

Mr. FLEURY: Well, I would be the last person to downgrade or denigrate the efficiency of our armed forces. I think it is beyond question that in their size and weight class, they are second to none. The people we have in today are, by and large, the people we had in last year and five years ago and ten years ago, because we have done so relatively little recruiting in the last few years that most of the people you have are reasonably long term professionals, who have had a great deal of training in a wide variety of subjects and in my view are literally capable of doing anything in the military field.

In the midst of the early stages of integration, for example, I had a not unexpected telephone call one Friday afternoon about four o'clock to send a battalion from Camp Valcartier to Cyprus. I issued a few instructions and I went home about six o'clock. At about eleven o'clock I started to shake and shiver it was obvious I had a very bad case of the flu. The next day my temperature was up and my wife called the doctor and he wanted to send me to the hospital. I said I did not think that was really necessary; I was prepared to be a good boy and lie quietly in bed at home for a couple of days. He said, "That is fine, provided you

do what you are told", and I did. Once a day somebody called me up from the headquarters and gave me a short progress report on how the battalion was moving to Cyprus. When I got back to my office a week later the whole battalion was in Cyprus and there was not a problem which had not been properly and professionally dealt with by the staff, and it would not have mattered a damn whether it was Fleury who was G.O.C. of Quebec Command or whether it was Joe Blow. They were a lot of people who knew their business and knew what they were about and they got on with it and it was, in effect, no sweat. In that context I certainly believe that the armed forces today are as effective or efficient as they ever were, but there are fewer of them and if you are talking in terms of all our commitments, then you get into an entirely different area.

Mr. HARKNESS: This is really the point I am getting at, that with the numbers that exist at the present time and with the state of disorganization which you and other witnesses have indicated exists in the various staffs at the present time, is it possible for the forces to act as effectively as was the case, say, three years ago?

Mr. FLEURY: I really do not know and I hope they will not be put to the test.

Mr. NUGENT: General, I was a little dismayed at your comment that you had the feeling that whatever you say will not have any effect. I can understand your feeling that people have taken an entrenched position, but it is really only at this session of the Committee that I feel that officers such as yourself have been able to speak freely and that we are starting to get the unvarnished facts. I really feel it is much too pessimistic an attitude to take that we are such small men that we cannot re-assess the situation in the light of the facts. I sincerely trust that you are quite wrong in that, and I hope the feeling that you have is not so all-pervasive that it is really a dreadful bore being here, because I am quite sure that you are just a little too sanguine in appearance. However, I realize that your experience, the method of your leaving the forces, etc., must have left you quite pessimistic. I know that you would not run out on a job just because it was getting to be a tough job or even because part of it was distasteful. You must have had the feeling that the job was impossible, that you could not loyally carry it out and therefore had to leave. Was that your feeling?

Mr. FLEURY: That is roughly correct. Perhaps I should add, you know, that after all these years in the service there are literally thousands of people still in who have been colleagues of mine, and many of them have been personal friends of mine and remain personal friends of mine, and in the context of Mr. Harkness' earlier question I have the highest respect for them, for their ability and for their opinions. I think that the service is professional enough on every phase that the leaving of one or two or a dozen senior officers is of relatively little consequence, because there are always people in behind ready and able to fill in. If these people whom I respect can make the new deal work, nobody will applaud more loudly than I because I like them, I think they have all kinds of ability and experience and I think they are faced with a task which I found impossible and I hope they will not.

Mr. NUGENT: Referring to your comments, sir, on not having spoken out before until this time and your willingness to appear before the Committee, I suppose that each officer on leaving has that thought in mind and I will just ask you this. Was it really a decision that you believe each officer would have to

make on leaving, whether he would speak out now and find it distasteful, perhaps, but which he felt was necessary, as Admiral Landymore did, or run the risk of doing what you have done, wait until you are called, and in this way he may find the situation too late to be effective. You had that choice, did you?

Mr. FLEURY: Yes. I think I had that choice and I think every officer who left about the same time had that very difficult choice. I think each officer unquestionably made the choice he made because he believed in it. I would not presume to sit in judgment either on myself or on others for whatever action they took.

Mr. NUGENT: Actually, you are still in the forces and—

Mr. FLEURY: Legally but not practically.

Mr. NUGENT: —except for the fact that you are before this Committee and required to speak, and you are under the protection of parliament, if you were to make statements publicly in criticism, this could be a court martial offence, could it not?

Mr. FLEURY: I suppose that is so, although I am bound to admit that the thought never crossed my mind until this moment.

Mr. NUGENT: There was some suggestion made that somebody thought that Admiral Landymore should be courtmartialed.

Mr. CHURCHILL: It was a spokesman for the Minister.

Mr. NUGENT: I think that Admiral Landymore rather regretted that they did not take that step. He would have liked to have had such a hearing. However, I was interested and dismayed a little at the atmosphere around the headquarters; the lines of communication seemed to be gone, there was a feeling almost of disloyalty, people did not know where the information was coming from, etc. Would it be fair to describe it as a sort of Alice in Wonderland feeling after a while?

Mr. FLEURY: I do not know whether it would be fair or not, but it was so described. As a matter of fact, I had put before me at one time on a scratch pad, in the allocation of all the characters in Alice in Wonderland, the various people in the Canadian Forces Headquarters.

Mr. NUGENT: Well, Admiral Landymore gives us a description of this sort of thing on page 6 of the first brief he prepared for us. He was talking about trying to find out what was in the Minister's mind about unification, and at the bottom of the page he said:

> The Minister himself gave us a clue at a meeting held in Ottawa in June 1965. At an assembly of a very large number of senior officers who had been invited to Ottawa to learn something of the organization plans for integration, the minister in his opening remarks announced there would be a single walking out dress and a single rank structure by July 1967. I immediately asked the Chief of Personnel for more details of this as he, normally, is responsible for dress and rank structure. He told me he had had no pre-knowledge of the announcement or any knowledge of any such plan.

Now, is Admiral Landymore right that the Chief of Personnel is responsible for dress and rank structure and would normally have this knowledge?

Mr. FLEURY: Certainly the Chief of Personnel is responsible for dress.

Mr. NUGENT: Do you find it a bit incredible that a minister would announce this to such a large assembly of senior officers, and the Chief of Personnel have no pre-knowledge of it at all?

Mr. FLEURY: I do not find it incredible; I find it very unusual.

Mr. NUGENT: It is a hell of a way to run an army.

Admiral Landymore tells us about another incident that I would like you to comment on. After some of the talk about unification and finding the disruption in his command and trying to seek it out, and I am sure he must have used the proper channel of communication. He describes it this way:

> I reported conscientiously my actions and my observations on matters causing bad morale, but to no avail.

It is the duty, I suppose, of the commander of that area to report to the chief on the state of morale in his unit and to try and trace it down?

Mr. FLEURY: Yes.

Mr. NUGENT: He said:

> Then occurred a new way to destroy morale. On the 14th April of this year,

I guess it is 1966 he is talking about.

> There appeared in the Toronto *Globe and Mail* a news item concerning re-engagement rates in the three Services. At the end of this release appeared the following statement—I quote—"Another factor is the geneneraly acknowledged difference in officer man relationships in the Navy. Defence officials say that naval officers still retain to some extent an above decks, below decks mentality where personnel are concerned. They've got to realize that this is now a highly technical service, a spokesman said. Sailors don't just scrub decks and set the sails now, they're skilled men and the old attitudes of officers just don't fit. We're trying to change that.—unquote. The spokesman was Mr. Lee.

Canada's answer to Goebbels.

The CHAIRMAN: Is that in the statement?

Mr. NUGENT: No, I added it.

The CHAIRMAN: I sometimes wonder if this sort of thing is helpful to the work of the Committee.

Mr. NUGENT: I thought a little amusement now and then—you do not find it amusing?

The CHAIRMAN: It is time consuming. I might also say that mention of Joe Blow being in command down at Quebec Command might call for him attending as a witness. I do not know if you meant that.

Mr. FLEURY: We could probably find one.

Mr. NUGENT: Admiral Landymore sums it up this way:

> We had reached the stage where an influential person on the Minister's personal staff had publicly criticized the whole officer corps of the navy.

Would you agree with Admiral Landymore that this is certainly a new way to destroy morale?

Mr. FLEURY: Well, I do not really feel that Bill Landymore needs a pongo named Fleury to back him up. I read this article at the time and I was appalled.

Mr. NUGENT: Well, this sort of thing was going on, though, was it not?

Mr. FLEURY: Well, the evidence is there.

Mr. NUGENT: I just want to clear it up because I feel that Admiral Landymore has been very shabbily treated by this minister and I wanted to bring out the point and see if you, as one used to a position of command, would not agree that it was his duty, if he found and believed that morale was being badly shaken, to get rather excited about it and really try to trace it down and try to do something about it. Is that not accurate?

Mr. FLEURY: One of the first duties of any and every commander or commanding officer is to keep a very close eye on the morale in his unit or command, and if he sees signs and portends that it is not what it should be, he should correct it. If the correction is not within his capacity because of extraneous influences, then he must report higher up what he believes them to be. Now, whether he is right or not is usually a matter for higher military authority to judge. But if, in the course of my career, I found that something was being done by a higher headquarters which was adversely affecting the morale of the troops under my command, I would scream like a stuck pig, but within military channels, of course.

Mr. NUGENT: How late do you plan to sit, Mr. Chairman?

I want to start a new line of questioning.

The CHAIRMAN: I notice that after you, Mr. Nugent, there is Mr. McIntosh and Mr. Laniel and it is now just after 12.30. I got the impression from the witness yesterday that he did not have unlimited time at his disposal, but if we could persuade him to stay until one o'clock I have the feeling we might be able to conclude.

Mr. NUGENT: I thought we usually ended at 12.30.

The CHAIRMAN: Well, we have gone on until one o'clock.

Mr. NUGENT: We went on last night until 10.30, and we go on and on.

I have not had any lunch and I would prefer to go on at 3.30. I want to start a new line of questioning.

The CHAIRMAN: May I just talk to the witness for a moment. He indicates that it would suit him better if we could perhaps continue and see how it goes.

Mr. NUGENT: All right. Now, Admiral Landymore presented a brief, General, and I wonder if you would care to comment on some of the criticisms he makes about the manner in which integration is now working out. I ask this for the simple reason that I feel that whether integration generally is a good idea or not, we cannot emphasize too much the fact that, like every other scheme, it requires planning and sometimes the actual operation does not work exactly as planned, and there does not seem to be a realization in some quarters of how much time and how much work is involved. There are some faults which may or may not be corrected, and perhaps your comments would throw a little more

light on this. On page 10 of Admiral Landymore's brief, under the general heading of Untimeliness of Unification and Faults of Integration, this appears:

> First:—Materiel Command is not living up to expectations. Because fiscal control rests with the Headquarters and because manpower controls rest with the Headquarters organization, in many ways Materiel Command becomes a post office between the Headquarters and the Operational Commands. Adm. Burchell has been studying the supply organization since last August. I think he would be able to give your Committee a very clear picture of the deficiencies and the necessary corrective measures. Since this will lead ultimately to a very serious personnel upheaval and is vital to effective operations, it cannot be delayed.

Now, is Materiel Command living up to expectations or, to put it another way, were there any greater difficulties encountered in establishing Materiel Command and getting it running than you had expected?

Mr. FLEURY: Well, this is a matter of judgment, it seems to me, sir, and I do not think I am in a position to make any judgment. What were our expectatons for Materiel Command? What are our expectations for Material Command? My expectation prior to July 15 last was that it was going to take three to five years before it really would be able to perform at peak efficiency. Now, did anybody draw up a timetable as to how much more efficient it should get every month, quarter, six months or a year? I do not know. So, I am really not in a position to be helpful.

Mr. NUGENT: Perhaps this letter that went out over the Minister and Associate Minister's signature on April 2 is a timetable. This is one that we have just received and it is dated April 2, 1964, and paragraph 5 reads:

> The second step will be the reorganization of the field command structure. Planning for this will be undertaken by the National Defence Headquarters staff after it is established.

Paragraph 4 deals with the National Defence Headquarters staff reorganization:

> It is estimated that the integration of the field commands will take approximately one year.

Now, is that an estimate that would justify Admiral Landymore saying that Materiel Command is not living up to expectations? On the basis of what the Minister has said that it would take one year, would Admiral Landymore be correct?

Mr. FLEURY: I suppose one would have to distinguish between the timing when you say it is estimated that the integration of the field commands will take approximately one year. There was a point in time, I do not remember exactly when it was, I think it was on April 1, 1966, when I said over my signature that Materiel Command is hereby integrated. I just waved the wand and signed a piece of paper. This meant, in effect, that Materiel Command would be expected to undertake an integrated function from that date and that all matters of supply and material and maintenance would be controlled and channelled through Materiel Command, but surely this is just the beginning of the operation. Then some X-thousand poor characters from major general on down to a lowly clerk grade I have to start making this thing work. I suppose it is a fair statement that

the integration of field commands will take approximately one year, from an organizational point of view as looked at from the Minister's office or CFHQ but certainly not from the point of view of the people working in them. In point of fact, I would not like to pretend that I have total recall, but it seems to me that Materiel Command, Training Command and most other integrated commands really legally came into existence on April 1, 1966, or thereabouts. I know I was busy signing organization orders in March 1966. I was under no illusion that the piece of paper that I was signing was going to do anything except establish tasks to be done and channels to be followed and establishments to be worked toward.

Mr. NUGENT: And once they do get established, then there is the task of looking it over, seeing how it is working and taking any corrective measures?

Mr. FLEURY: That is right.

Mr. NUGENT: Which is the three to five years process you mentioned.

Admiral Landymore goes on to say:

> Unification added to this will seriously delay progress.

That is, corrective progress. Do you think that unification would seriously delay the corrective process in according integration steps?

Mr. FLEURY: I would not be prepared to say that it would in so far as Materiel Command is concerned because this is a support function, and there are many people who feel that integration and unification, in so far as support commands are concerned, are not too far apart in content and context and intentions. However, I distinguish very clearly, at least in my own mind, between the integration of fighting or field combat commands and supporting services such as Materiel Command. One can argue, I think that if it is possible to integrate the dentists, the doctors, the padres, the lawyers, and so on, that it might be possible to integrate the supply types, but this is a much different business from trying to integrate fighting formations, operational formations.

Mr. NUGENT: Even when you are integrating, I suppose there is a difference of opinion as to the best way to integrate, is there?

Mr. FLEURY: Oh, indeed.

Mr. NUGENT: I was interested in this remark:

> Because fiscal control rests with the Headquarters and because manpower controls rest with the Headquarters organization, in many ways Materiel Command becomes a post office between the Headquarters and the Operational Commands.

Is that something that will have to be looked at and perhaps revised?

Mr. FLEURY: I think you are touching on a very important subject. At least, I used to consider it a very important subject. On more than one occasion I said that if we were really serious in giving commands in the field the means of carrying out the responsibilities that were given them we would have to give them more financial authority. I said that was not talking about adding another $1,000 or $2,000 to the upper limits of what they could spend within their own authority, I was talking of at least an order of magnitude. In other words, if a senior commander—let us say a major general or a vice admiral, or something —out in the field was given the responsibility of X-thousands of troops and

hundreds of millions of dollars worth of equipment, and so on and so forth, that it was pretty damn ridiculous to say that you could not spend a dollar to buy a few pencils or that you could not spend more than $1,000 to build a building or that you could not spend more than $5,000 on an individual maintenance program or more than $50,000 on snow clearing, or some such thing. That if all the items—and there are thousands of them—would have to go all the way through the tortuous channels to Ottawa for approval, then we were just kidding ourselves. I said, in effect, that unless we were prepared to multiply by 10 the fiscal and financial authorities of the field commanders they would never be able to operate, in part at least, as other than post offices. Does this answer your question?

Mr. NUGENT: Yes, it does. If I have understood you correctly, then; (a), it limits the effectiveness of the field command and, (b), it increases the amount of communication back and forth and makes it more cumbersome to deal with even simple financial problems. I suppose, because fiscal control still rests with headquarters, there must have been arguments on the other side. No matter how much your present argument appeals to me, I gather that your point of view did not prevail, at least up to the time you left. Do you agree?

Mr. FLEURY: No, I guess it had not prevailed up to the time I left. I do not know what has happened since.

Mr. NUGENT: Is this a good example of the sort of difficulty one encounters in bringing about the integration process; an honest difference of opinion and then trial and error, perhaps, or put in one system and then perhaps take it out and revise it? Is it possible that this may be revised in the next year or so?

Mr. FLEURY: I think it is quite possible, and I think it is not just an honest difference of opinion, it is a question of impinging on areas which are quite outside military control. When you are talking about what I prefer to call financial authority, as compared to fiscal authority, which I understand is really a different thing, this is very closely controlled by people outside the armed forces. For example, the Treasury Board. If you decide to set up an organization which is going to require approval of a whole new set of financial rules by the Treasury Board, then obviously you cannot go any faster than the Treasury Board is prepared to go. The same thing may be true of the Department of Public Works. If you have decided to close out certain installations and go into other installations which could be controlled by the Department of Public Works, well, with all the best will in the world you have to go outside your own organization and try to bring these people along.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Nugent, perhaps at this point we could move on to Mr. McIntosh.

Mr. NUGENT: I just wanted to make one observation here. Then the bringing of integration into effect in order to overcome this may not even be possible, it may not be within the capabilities of the Department of National Defence?

Mr FLEURY: You can produce a plan to integrate such and such an organization, and as a vital part of that plan you say you have to get this or that financial regulation changed. Well then, if those responsible will not change the financial regulation you have to make the plan all over again.

Mr. NUGENT: This might have to be undone, then?

Mr. FLEURY: That is right.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. McIntosh?

Mr. MCINTOSH: Mr. Chairman, I will try to make my questions as brief as possible and I will try to phrase them so that the General can answer them yes or no.

General, one newspaper editorial suggested that the Committee should bring out two points. The first point they refer to is this: "The Committee might well look into the powers of the Defence Minister under the new act and examine whether or not they are excessive." Would you care to comment on that? In your opinion are they excessive under the new act or are they not?

Mr. FLEURY: I have not really studied them, I do not know.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Right. The next point they ask be brought out is this: "One of the frustrating parts of the whole debate is that while the onus is clearly on the Minister and his planners to prove how a single service concept will save money, improve efficiency and maintain morale in the armed forces, the facts have to be squeezed out." Could you give us any more facts, in addition to those which have already been given, on how it will save money and how it will affect the morale and improve the efficiency?

Mr. FLEURY: I do not think so, sir.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Right. Now, reference has been made in previous testimony to the effect that under this new policy of the Minister there might be too much emphasis placed on tidy administration rather than on combat troops. Would you generally agree with that statement?

Mr. FLEURY: I do not know about the phrase "under the policy or direction of the Minister." There is a tendency in peacetime to look at administration as the be all and end all of the military operation. Obviously administration takes second place when the country is in danger and troops are fighting. In peacetime, when there is no war or operation going on, you tend more and more to look closer and closer at tidy administration as one indication of the efficiency of a unit or a commander. I have no doubt in my mind that the services want to latch on to and put into effect the most recent proven techniques and means of saving money. For instance, if it is more efficient and more economical to keep our pay records, inventory controls and personnel records on computers, then surely this is the way to do it. But if you start to lose sight of the main purpose of the exercise, which is to train and maintain an efficient fighting force, then you are not seeing the woods for the trees. We send people off in considerable numbers to take all kinds of management courses and techniques of this and techniques of that, and this is a good thing. These newly created experts come back and try to put their new found knowledge into practice and they even develop a vocabulary all of their own. This is fine within limits. The fact remains that a fighting force in the field, certainly from an army point of view, is largely a matter of command and leadership, not a question of modern management techniques or answers that come out of any computer which has been developed to date.

It is natural and not necessarily a bad thing that those who are charged with the responsibility for the management, as distinct from the leadership in the armed forces, should concern themselves with all these matters. But do not talk management to a private soldier in the Royal Canadian Regiment because he

does not know anything about management; he expects his commander to know something about management and he expects his commander to command him and to lead him.

Mr. McINTOSH: Do you feel under this new policy there has been a tendency to over-stress the problem of administration and in this way lose sight of the combat troops?

Mr. FLEURY: I think this is a real danger.

Mr. McINTOSH: One witness said he was amazed that there was not a single mention of combat servicemen in the brief presented to the Committee by Air Marshal E. M. Reyno, Chief of Personnel. That is the reason I brought that up.

Another witness asked this Committee how could people be unified into a submarine survice? Have you any suggestion that might help us to answer that question?

Mr. FLEURY: You could not unify me into a submarine service, I will tell you that. I would be scared to death.

Mr. McINTOSH: Another statement that we have on record is that unification was never proposed by the Chiefs of Staff Committee. Is that statement correct?

Mr. FLEURY: Unification?

Mr. McINTOSH: Yes, those were the words.

Mr. FLEURY: Well, the Chiefs of Staff Committee has not existed of course, since July 1, 1964. I was never a member of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, so I really cannot answer that question.

Mr. McINTOSH: When I first started questioning you I was trying to pinpoint the period and the cause. I hoped that perhaps your answer would help to define the time when this word "unification" came into being, or when it became a concern to these many senior officers that resigned. Do you know or would you have any idea who proposed unification to the Minister?

Mr. FLEURY: I do not have the vaguest idea.

Mr. McINTOSH: The statement was also made that unification is a political mirage which has produced astonishment among our allies and deluded our fellow countrymen. Do you agree that unification is a political mirage and has produced astonishment among our allies?

Mr. FLEURY: I am afraid I could not have even produced a phrase such as that, sir. I wish I could, even though I do not necessarily believe in it.

Mr. McINTOSH: That is the end of my questioning, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Laniel, you are next.

Mr. LANIEL: I will try to be brief.

(*Translation*)

General Fleury, some time ago you answered Mr. Harkness that you did not feel that the role of our Armed Forces should be changed. However, I do wonder why Canada should continue or perpetuate undertakings entered into some eight years ago and not provide certain modifications in this respect? Under our commitments we have become part of a nuclear deterrent force in Europe,

within NATO. We have a brigade on the spot and another in reserve, whereas our air force has a strike reconnaissance role.

Mr. FLEURY: Within NORAD?

Mr. LANIEL: No, no; in Europe. I have reference here to our Air Division in Europe. In any event we know that there will be changes in the near future.

(*English*)

The CHAIRMAN: Excuse me, Mr. Laniel, but the translation service does not appear to be operating.

Mr. LANIEL: I will carry on in English, then.

What I am concerned about is that we committed ourselves eight years ago and now we will be coming back to a renewal of our committments, or changes in our commitments, in two years and I do not see why we cannot look into the possibility of a change in these commitments. Changes have occurred since 1959 in France, as an example. The other day I quoted a newspaper article where it said that even the 50,000 men of the British army of the Rhine might be repatriated because of an economical misunderstanding between England and Germany.

Looking at all these things, I do not see why Canada could not end up in 1969 with other commitments within the deterrent force, and I do not see why our air division could not be made a tactical support air force. It might not be able to support our brigade by itself, but it could still assume that role while somebody else took the strike reconnaissance role. In the meantime we could try to reach the goal which has been put forward in the White Paper, which is to make our forces more capable of working together and more homogeneous.

Mr. FLEURY: Sir, I do not believe I said that we could not or should not change our commitments. You, as a member of parliament, can certainly say that we could or should change our commitments. I think I said—and I certainly intended to say—that this was outside the purview of anybody in the military service such as myself. Commitments are not our business in the sense of accepting or rejecting commitments; this is the government's business. When a commitment is given to us we have no alternative but to accept the commitment or to persuade our political masters that we are unable to meet the commitment with the resources we have in hand. It is quite true that the NORAD agreement is coming up for renewal, I think, in 1968 or 1969. The NATO agreements are going to be reviewed in the very near future.

There is nothing to prevent me from saying as a Canadian that we should renegotiate these commitments on a different basis or, indeed, that we should get out of the commitments completely, so that it would be quite wrong for me as a serving officer to say this prior to last July. I might privately hope one way or the other, but this is not my business.

(*Translation*)

Have I expressed myself well enough?

Mr. LANIEL: Yes, I understand that.

(*English*)

Mr. LANIEL: But what I am concerned about is whether the military are so well disciplined that they do not even try to project suggestions or recommendations to the government as far as policy is concerned.

Mr. FLEURY: Indeed, I do not think we spend too much time, in fact, doing just this thing. I think it is almost a matter of routine for the senior officers in the armed forces, either at chiefs of staff committee meetings or at defence council meetings, to say that if we could get out of this commitment we might be able to take on that commitment—to play the juggling game—or if we could cut down on our NATO contribution then we could do much more in this field. We are at this business all the time, but this is internal and this is advice to the government through the Minister. We would not be doing our job if we did not make suggestion, but we can have all kinds of differences of opinions among ourselves. If the organization is working correctly, once the chief says, "This is what I am going to recommend to the Minister", then the rest of us, by training and tradition, fall in line and say, "Yes, sir", and on we go.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, I do not wish to cut you off but it is getting late.

Mr. LANIEL: I am very sorry. I had a doctor's appointment this morning.

I will try to make this question short. I do not know if you saw the article in the newspaper *La Presse* last night which commented on a speech which was given by General Allard to the Chamber of Commerce in Montreal.

Mr. FLEURY: No, I have not read that.

Mr. LANIEL: In his speech he said he did not agree with those who preach the doctrine that nuclear war is a possibility. He also added that because of this, in this atomic era in which we now live, terrorism, guerillas and semi-regular war of all different forms are the wars that we will meet. He sees, when looking at unification in Canada, a means for the contribution of our forces as a whole to closer co-operation between them. It might be impossible for use to take part in a semi-regular war and supply our tactical support or even our ordinary supplies without the aid of other people. What is wrong, actually, with trying to make our forces a more compact unit, which would be used to co-operate with other nations, because there is no longer a single service doing one job. Tomorrow the Air Force will be using intercontinental missiles. It is currently using medium range missiles and later on they may be using robot planes, or things like that. Helicopters are being used more and more and they are working closer with the Army. I am sure the Navy cannot do its job alone, whatever they may think. I believe that everything that has been said to this Committee might be good from a military standpoint, looking at our commitments as they are right now, but looking further than that, I do not think this is the answer because I believe that Canada could play the part of its choice.

Mr. FLEURY: The only comment I might make that would be helpful is this. If you are talking in terms of a guerrilla operation or a brush fire war or a small scale operation such as, for instance, Korea started out to be, I can see in a so-called peacekeeping role that a unified force for Canada would possibly make very good sense if Canada were the only contributing country. For instance, if we sent a battalion of the Van Doos to Cyprus, as we did, and if that battalion had come under attack and had to fight to defend itself, and if it were alone it might

make good sense to have integrated or unified into it its own air tactical support, landing craft and a lot of other things. The fact of the matter is that Canada has never undertaken such an operation alone and many never undertake such an operation alone. So, you have to work with the Americans or the British or the Australians or the Turks or the New Zealanders, you name them, and they are not unified. How, then, does the Canadian-projected unified force fit in with these allies? This is what I am unable to see.

Mr. LANIEL: We could give tactical support in co-operation with our allies instead of fulfilling a strike reconnaissance role in co-operation with our allies. If it is in the minds of Canadians to Canadianize our forces further, and even make them flexible enough so that they can lay the part that they choose—

The CHAIRMAN: I am sorry Mr. Laniel. I gave an undertaking to the Committee to remain here until one o'clock and they have very kindly gone along with staying a little longer. If you wish to continue this questioning much longer—

Mr. LANIEL: Mr. Chairman, I will stop. I did have another question about loyalty.

The CHAIRMAN: I would like to thank you, General Fleury, for coming before us as a witness. I am sure it is no exaggeration to say that your testimony has certainly added to the substance of our deliberations. Thank you very much for coming.

Mr. FLEURY: Thank you, sir.

The meeting is adjourned.

HOUSE OF COMMONS

First Session—Twenty-seventh Parliament

1966-67

STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. DAVID W. GROOS

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 25

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 23, 1967

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 24, 1967

Respecting

Bill C-243, An Act to amend the National Defence Act and other Acts in consequence thereof.

WITNESS:

The Honourable Paul Hellyer, Minister of National Defence

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY
OTTAWA, 1967

25835—1

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Vice-Chairman: Hon. Marcel Lambert

Mr. Andras,	Mr. Harkness,	Mr. Legault,
Mr. Brewin,	Mr. Hopkins,	Mr. Lessard,
Mr. Byrne,	Mr. Langlois,	Mr. Loiselle,
Mr. Churchill,	(*Chicoutimi*),	Mr. MacRae,
Mr. Crossman,	Mr. Laniel,	Mr. McIntosh,
Mr. Fane,	Mr. Latulippe,	Mr. Nugent,
Mr. Forrestall,	Mr. LeBlanc,	Mr. Rochon,
Mr. Foy,	(*Rimouski*),	Mr. Winch—(24).

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

ORDER OF REFERENCE

HOUSE OF COMMONS
FRIDAY, February 24, 1967.

Ordered,—That the name of Mr. Macaluso be substituted for that of Mr. Crossman on the Standing Committee on National Defence.

Attest.

LÉON-J. RAYMOND,
The Clerk of the House of Commons.

25835—1½

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

THURSDAY February 23, 1967.
(46)

The Standing Committee on National Defence met at 3:35 p.m. this day, the Chairman, Mr. Groos, presiding.

Members present: Messrs. Andras, Brewin, Churchill, Crossman, Fane, Forrestall, Foy, Groos, Harkness, Hopkins, Lambert, Langlois (*Chicoutimi*), Laniel, LeBlanc (*Rimouski*), Legault, Lessard, Loiselle, MacRae, McIntosh, McNulty, Rochon and Mr. Winch (22).

Also present: Mr. Alkenbrack and Mr. Deachman.

In attendance: From the Department of National Defence: Honourable Paul Hellyer, Minister; Honourable Léo Cadieux, Associate Minister; Mr. E. B. Armstrong, Deputy Minister; General J. V. Allard, Chief Defence Staff and other members of the Defence Staff.

The Chairman introduced the Minister of National Defence, Honourable Paul Hellyer, who read a prepared statement, copies of which were distributed to the members. The Minister's statement dealt with defence subjects, in relation to *Bill C-243*, under the following headings:

Definition of Unification
Political versus Military Rationale for Unification
Recruiting
Re-engagements
Conscription
Officers were unaware of intention to Unify
Defence Council
Co-operation with Allies
Professional Training
U.N. Peace-keeping Only
Early Retirement or Resignation of Senior Officers
Unification in Other Countries
Uniforms and the Combat Trades
Jacks-of-All-Trades
Speed of the Program
Adjustment to New Roles
Rank Designations
Operational Readiness
Why Not Integration Only?
Finale

Following the presentation of his statement, the Minister was questioned by the members until the time of adjournment. At approximately 6:00 p.m., the Committee adjourned until 8:00 p.m. this day.

EVENING SITTING
(47)

The Standing Committee on National Defence met at 8:10 p.m. this day with the Chairman, Mr. Groos, presiding.

Members present: Messrs. Andras, Brewin, Churchill, Crossman, Fane, Forrestall, Foy, Groos, Harkness, Hopkins, Lambert, Langlois (*Chicoutimi*), Laniel, LeBlanc (*Rimouski*), Legault, Lessard, Loiselle, MacRae, McIntosh, McNulty, Nugent, Rochon and Mr. Winch (23).

Also present: Messrs. Chatterton, Macaluso, McCleave, McLelland, Moore (*Wetaskiwin*), Southam and Mr. Watson (*Assiniboia*).

In attendance: Same as the afternoon sitting.

The members continued to question the Minister of National Defence throughout this evening sitting, on subjects referred to in his opening statement at the previous sittings, and in relation to the implications of *Bill C-243*.

At 10:10 p.m., with the questioning of the Minister continuing, the Committee adjourned until 9:30 a.m. on Friday, February 24, 1967.

FRIDAY, February 24, 1967.
(48)

The Standing Committee on National Defence met at 9:45 a.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Groos, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Andras, Byrne, Churchill, Crossman, Fane, Forrestall, Foy, Groos, Harkness, Hopkins, Lambert, Langlois (*Chicoutimi*), Laniel, LeBlanc (*Rimouski*), Legault, Lessard, Loiselle, MacRae, McIntosh, Rochon and Mr. Winch (21).

Also present: Messrs. Asselin (*Richmond-Wolfe*), Macaluso, McCleave, McLelland, Nowlan and Mr. Stefanson.

In attendance: Same as the previous sitting.

The members continued to question the Minister of National Defence throughout this sitting of the Committee on a variety of subjects related to defence policy and organization.

At 11:00 a.m., with the questioning of the Minister continuing, the Committee adjourned until 3:30 p.m. on Monday, February 27, 1967.

Hugh R. Steward,
Clerk of the Committee.

EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

THURSDAY, February, 23, 1967.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, the witness this afternoon is the Minister of National Defence.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Mr. Chairman, I would like to raise a matter before you introduce the witness. This Committee, as I understand it, has been charged by Parliament with the duty of making a complete investigation of matters pertaining to defence, and an intensive study of the bill which is to be returned to the House later on.

The Committee has invited witnesses who otherwise would not have appeared before us, and they have given their statements and have answered questions freely and frankly. We now find that the witnesses are being attacked outside the Committee by the Minister of National Defence.

I draw your attention sir, to an article in the Ottawa *Journal* of February 23, which is today, and it is headed: "Hellyer Hits Back", and the second heading is: "Fleury blamed for 'The Situation' ". I will read three paragraphs. The dateline is London, Ontario, and it is by Canadian Press. I quote:

> Defence Minister Hellyer said Wednesday night that Lt. Gen. Frank Fleury was responsible for "the situation" that the former comptroller-general of the armed forces described in testimony before the Commons defence committee.
>
> The defence minister said in an airport interview that Gen. Fleury was the one primarily responsible for the situation as it existed at that time "and he, Fleury, must share the responsibility for any shortcomings that existed."
>
> Mr. Hellyer said that since Gen. Fleury's departure from defence staff communications became "quite good...but there is always room for improvement."

I deplore, sir, the attack on witnesses by the Minister outside of this room where statements can be made and replied to. But to attempt to harass and destroy the value of witnesses appearing before us, by ministerial statements elsewhere in the country, will make ineffective the work of this Committee. By this statement the Minister has clearly indicated to the public in general, and now to this Committee, because I have read the statement out, that General Fleury was not a competent witness, and that he was the man responsible for the chaotic conditions that he described as pertaining at national headquarters when General Fleury was there.

This is a very bad state of affairs, and I think that unless there is a cessation of the harassment of witnesses this Committee might just as well discontinue its work.

If the Minister is prepared to deny that he made this statement, that will clear the matter up. If he is prepared to state that General Fleury is a competent and reliable servant of the public, and was during his term of office, that might be of some assistance. But how in the world this Committee, or the Minister, can correct this terrible publicity that has now gone across the country is beyond me at the moment.

I think it is an affront to this Committee, and that the Minister should be sharply condemned for such activity.

The CHAIRMAN: Well, Mr. Churchill, as you know, and as I am sure you will agree, the rules of the House apply in Committee here, and these rules state very clearly that you cannot ask for comments on statements appearing in the press and made outside the House.

I am afraid I will have to rule against this question of privilege.

Mr. CHURCHILL: On the contrary, Mr. Chairman, statements made outside may be drawn to the attention of the House of Commons, and motions may be founded on them.

The CHAIRMAN: Well, you may wish to make a motion on this; but, on the other hand, you have made this statement which will appear, I am sure, in the records of this Committee—

Mr. CHURCHILL: I refrained from making a motion only because this Committee has been involved for so long in hearings. It still has a great deal of work to do. I do not want to take up time by making a motion and pursuing it to its logical conclusion, which, under other circumstances, I would prefer to do.

The CHAIRMAN: I will now ask the Minister if he would care to reply.

Hon. PAUL THEODORE HELLYER (*Minister of National Defence*): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Copies of my brief this afternoon, are available, Mr. Chairman, and with your permission perhaps we could distribute them before I begin my remarks. Mr. Chairman, Gentlemen:

Over the past three weeks, a number of witnesses have appeared before you to present briefs and deliver their opinions in answer to questions on the ramifications of Bill C-243, the Canadian Forces Re-organization Act.

I was very pleased that you were able to get such a large number and variety of witnesses. I think it is important that you should hear from these individuals and organizations before considering the clauses of the legislation.

My purpose in appearing before you today is to answer as frankly and fully as possible the points raised by these gentlemen. You will also have an opportunity to question me, along with the Associate Minister and the Defence Staff, on any matters which may still be causing difficulty.

I assure you, gentlemen, of my concern that you be satisfied that this re-organization act is in the best interests of our country and our forces.

Perhaps the most apparent difficulty to date in these hearings has been that concerned with the attempt to establish a rigid definition for the term "Unification", or to distinguish between "Integration" and "Unification". The problem is really one of semantics.

It boils down to this: from the outset the intention, as set out in the White Paper, 1964, was the creation of a single unified defence force. However, in deciding to begin from the top-down, rather than from the bottom-up, an initial stage was made possible through Bill C-90. This stage removed the individual service chiefs and the co-ordinating chairman, and replaced them with a single Chief of Defence Staff. For want of a better word to describe this preliminary stage, the word "integration" was used. But—and there never has been any doubt about this—the final intent was a single service—Unification.

Thus, the entire process has been to create a single, unified defence force for Canada.

The whole program is part of the same cycle. It is impossible to state that "this is integration" and "that is unification". There are too many areas of adjustment. Rather, one can say only "this is a phase in the integration-unification cycle." It is a continuing evolution that will not be completed until 1970-72, as has been stated by many serving officers, including the heads of Training Command, Materiel Command, the Vice-Chief and myself.

There is no way you can bring about "instant unification". Nor is there any intention to do so. It will all be done in a step-by-step, carefully calculated manner, with full regard for our operational effectiveness and the best interests of our servicemen.

With something as complex as a fundamental reorganization of defence it should be no surprise that there has been difficulty in understanding the nuances of the process. Recognizing the difficulty, I attempted to give your committee at an earlier meeting a working definition of the term "Unification". It appears on page 440 of the Minutes and Proceedings and I would like to repeat it:

"When I refer to a unified force, I refer to a single integrated service encompassing the naval, land, air, and support units necessary to carry out its assigned roles and missions, and operating under unified management and control."

One of the most important criticisms raised in Admiral Landymore's brief to the Committee was the suggestion that political science rather than military science had been the basis of the current defence re-organization. Nothing could be more incorrect. Because of the seriousness of the suggestion, however, I would like to deal with the question at some length as I consider it to be fundamental.

The objects of the re-organization have been stated many times. They are, first, to produce the most responsive and effective military organization possible, and secondly, to get the maximum capability for the money being spent. But we must be aware that military technology has changed and as the overlapping—the "grey areas" between the three traditional services, Army, Navy and Air Force —has expanded, the necessity for co-operation in achieving both of the above goals has increased. Specifically, when combined operations of any kind are involved, the closest, most harmonious relationships, dedicated to a common cause, are essential. Secondly, to keep duplication and triplication of facilities and non-essential use of resources at a minimum, problems must be analyzed with a minimum of bias and a maximum of co-operation.

The overlapping of the three traditional services has given rise to many documented cases where inter-service rivalry has occurred to the detriment of

the national interest of the country. There have been extremely important problems which have been approached from a single service point of view to preserve the traditions of a particular service rather than contributing to the total defence posture.

Despite the assistance they would provide in allowing the people to assess properly the merits and demerits of the traditional three-service system, it is not possible to give detailed examples with names, dates and places of the effect of inter-service rivalry in Canada as many of the people involved are still living. Department files and documents are still privileged. At the same time, however, I think it would be useful to remind members of this Committee of some of the better-known occurrences that shed some light on the consequences of inter-service rivalry.

Therefore, I have decided to review some of these actions, many of which may be known to members of the Committee. At the same time, I, of course, must preserve and protect both the anonymity of those who were involved and the privilege of the documents.

My first example is an illustration of the inter-service dispute over the control of the development and procurement of the Caribou aircraft for Army use. In the mid-50's, the Army was given the responsibility to develop "military characteristics for an aircraft for logistic supply within the Army field forces." Notwithstanding this direct responsibility assigned to the Army, the Air Force firmly considered that this was an Air Force function. Over the next four years the Army sought to retain control over the development and procurement of the Caribou aircraft for Army use. Throughout that same period the Air Force consistently maintained that they had no use in their inventory for an aircraft of this type, and displayed little interest in supporting the Army replacement yet the Air Force arranged to produce the specifications for it. All the while, of course, the Air Force contended that, if such an aircraft should be produced, it must be flown by the Air Force and thus meet Air Force requirements.

By the time the Air Force had produced its specifications, the Army finally decided that the aircraft was unsuitable for its needs, first because the strategic environment had changed, and secondly because the original simple aircraft design had been altered by the Air Force to the extent that it was a far too costly, sophisticated vehicle for its original purpose. Consequently, in April 1960 the project as an Army endeavour was cancelled.

Another example, perhaps even more striking, deals with the purchase and distribution of the FN 7.62 rifle. In 1954 the Army obtained 2,000 FN's, and after a year of extensive user-trials adopted it as a standard weapon for Canadian Army use, subject to some essential modifications. The Air Force and the Navy were informed of the Army findings, and in 1955, it was recommended that both the Air Force and the Navy adopt the FN for operational use. Two years later, the RCAF decided against the FN after issuing three "not now" replies.

When the Navy, however, learned that the Army was offering to supply FN's to the Navy and the Air Force free of charge, it decided to take advantage of the offer and to adopt the FN. This took place in 1958. At a tri-service meeting, the other two services informed the Army that they would indicate the numbers required "as early as possible". Not until 1960, five years after the original Army proposal, and three refusals later, did the Air Force request the Army to supply them with FN's. At this point, the Army reviewed the outstand-

ing contract for the FN production and decided that the request could not be supported.

This is a long and complicated problem, but this was the long-complicated-and-sometimes-frustrating factor of having three separate services make up their individual minds on what was essentially a collective problem.

My final illustration is one which points out a typical instance in which one service develops a proposal that has been tried previously and discarded as operationally unsound by another service.

Despite the previous effort and expense, the service reviving the proposal doggedly pursues it, resulting in large amounts of correspondence, on-the-spot investigations, meetings and staff studies at considerable cost to the taxpayer.

Such was the case in the consideration of a possible development of an air strip on Sable Island. At the start of World War II the RCAF had attempted to use Sable Island as a base from which to operate. This was later abandoned because the problems of logistics outweighed the advantages gained and, in general, the weather was found to be unsuitable for flying. Yet as late as August 1960 the Naval Atlantic Command put this forward as a new proposal. The RCAF, commenting on the suggestion related their unsatisfactory experience on Sable Island. Despite these detailed reports, this matter was still subjected to considerable staff study and correspondence extending into 1961, and it was not until the end of that year that a decision was reached by the Navy that they would take no further action on the proposal. By that time, of course, incalculable man-hours had been lost in the pursuit of a proposal that had previously been thoroughly examined at considerable cost.

There are, of course, many more examples I could give but I think the point has been clearly made. Three services operating in their own manner for their own particular purposes with their own particular backgrounds will invariably lead to inter-service rivalry, conflict and suspicion—to say nothing of duplication and waste of resources.

Now I know that a great deal has been made of the fact that competition between the services is healthy, and there will continue to be competition. As I have stated before, sailors will press for more ships, the Army will press for more tanks, and the pilots will press for more planes. The basic difference between this new concept and the old traditional concept is that they will press in concert for the good of the whole and not for their particular service advancement.

I have given some examples of inter-Service problems which arise both from technological change and from the demands of combined operations. This kind of problem has been recognized by many military analysts.

Liddell Hart in his book "DETERRENT OR DEFENCE", published in 1960, made the following observation:

"It has come to be recognized that the old distinction between land and sea operations is no longer suitable. But the recent three-fold division into land, sea and air operations fits no better and is already out of date. While operational problems are different, their differences cannot be solved on three separate lines. Problems need to be tackled in a more integrated way, blending the functions of the three services. The U.S. Marine Corps is a three-in-one Service in embryo. It has gained so much experience in combining land, sea and air action that it forms

a nucleus and a pattern for further development. Logically it should be the basis for further progress in integration. Any reduction of its scale and function would be a retrograde step. For it is the most important advance in military organization since the divisional system."

General Curtis E. LeMay, in his "MISSION WITH LeMAY" had this to say at page 530, 531, 532. It shouldn't surprise anyone to learn that there are bound to be essential differences of opinion between the Chiefs of Staff of the various Services, with regard to an approach which should be made toward almost any problem in the world.

"For more than a century and a half the Navy was the first line of defense for our Country. It had to be, due to the weapons systems of the time, and due to our geographical position.

"The John Paul Joneses became accustomed to receiving the bulk of the military budget, to having the most important spot in the councils of the land. They were used to having the most important commands.

"It is not astonishing that they still fight for those same advantages.

"For instance, the Navy even today has succeeded in arranging the world-wide command situation so that no Naval units serve under anyone except Naval officers.

"The top man in the Pacific, where there is a joint command of the Services, was (during my term as Chief of Staff) a Naval officer: Admiral Harry D. Felt. He came up for reappointment a while back, and the JCS recommended someone else for the job. But Secretary McNamara felt that he had to appoint a Navy man.

"Actually is seemed to some of the rest of us that the Yo-Heave-Ho tradition in the Pacific was a little faded and weed-grown. We now have other considerations, particularly Air. In fact, we are certain that Air has become the predominant factor.

"In Europe its arranged that we have a small fleet in the Mediterranean. But they only report in time of war. And in their normal capacity they are under a Naval commander: CINC-SOUTH. That's true all over the world.

"The bulk of our Atlantic forces? CINC-LANT. Navy Commander.

"They are always perfectly willing to join the team in a national effort if they can be captain. Any other way, they appear uninterested, or else willing to fight it down to the last notch. When I say this, I intend no criticism of certain U.S. Navy officers whom personally I admire and respect, and with whom I have had every sort of profitable contact—all the way from working together to having a swell time socially. I refer to the Naval policy: their creed and attitude toward the non-Naval Services."

The recent British White Paper on Defence recognized some of the problems in the organizational field and I quote in part: *Ministerial Functions*—The need to apply the necessary priority and momentum to questions of support and organization and to the management and equipment field generally, was one important reason for the changes recently made in the roles of Ministers and for the creation of two new senior posts for personnel and logistics and for projects.

"The growing interdependence of the three Services has not only blurred the frontiers between the traditional areas of separate Service management, but also imposed on the Ministry of Defence additional tasks of control and co-ordi-

nation. Moreover, the Defence Review decisions have required the rapid preparation of plans for the large-scale redeployment of forces and the detailed planning and implementation of new equipment programs. The work of direction and supervision has been heavy; and it will continue to be so for some years to come. The Secretary of State must be free to concentrate on the wider aspects of defence policy and planning, while retaining direct responsibility for operations and maintaining effective political supervision over the remainder of the defence over the defence field."

Moreover, the Royal Commission on Government Organization in Canada (1961) referred to the problem of costs and its observations were one of the supporting factors to the reorganization as outlined in the White Paper, March 1964. One relevant reference was the quote used in that paper (White Paper—Page 17)

"Not only is the relative size of the 'administrative tail' growing steadily in all military forces—for budgeting, accounting, supply, construction and general administration; in addition, among the operational elements themselves there is a rapid increase in the technical content of the work, a large element being common to all three Services. Consequently, there is a growing range of activities of common concern to the Services, for which the traditional basis of organization is unsuited. It is increasingly recognized that to maintain three separate organizations for such functions is uneconomic. Moreover, the chronic scarcity of many of the skills involved cannot be ignored.

"The traditional pattern also aggravates the rigidities in the defence establishment resulting from collective arrangements. It has meant, for example, that in finding signallers for the Congo at short notice, the Canadian Army could look only to its own resources in the Royal Canadian Corps of Signals, having no access to the large reservoir of communications personnel in the other two Services."

Although the problem has been widely recognized and discussed, the solutions recommended differ considerably, ranging from some modest integration of support functions under single service management, to the fourth service concept, through to complete unification, that is, the single, unified service concept being adopted by Canada. We had already tried the modest integration proposal in Canada prior to 1964 and found it inadequate.

The fourth service concept was examined before the publication of the White Paper in 1964, and rejected as being too cumbersome and too expensive. Moreover, it condemns a large part, that is, the support facilities and personnel to what amounts to "second-class citizenship". The single service concept, although not yet universally accepted, has many proponents, both civil and military.

The idea itself is very old, going back at least to World War II, and the problems that arose at that time in making unified commands work. In 1948, British Lieutenant-General Sir Ronald M. Weeks delivered a series of Lees Knowles Lectures at Cambridge University on "ORGANISATION AND EQUIPMENT FOR WAR". The lectures were subsequently published in book form and I would like to read one of them in full, entitled: "UNIFICATION OF THE SERVICES". Incidentally, General Weeks was Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff during the last three years of the war.

"Lord Tedder in his Lees Knowles Lectures last year said:

> 'We must finally admit after World War I we as a nation completely failed to see war as a single problem in which the strategy, the tactics and the technique of sea, land and air respectively are inevitably and closely interlocked. There were a few voices crying in the wilderness, but generally speaking the unities of land, sea and air of which I have spoken here maintained in the narrowest and most exclusive sense, and not—as I feel they should—as parts of a greater and comprehensive unified national defence.'

"The War brought the Services together at many points, and it is worth while examining or speculating on whether more cannot be done towards unification of the three Services.

"The quality which the nation must demand of its defence organisation is professional skill. This must take two forms. First, tactical and technical skill. Sailors must be first-rate both in the handling of their ships and in the use of their weapons. Soldiers and airmen must be similarly adept at their respective trades. Secondly, strategical skill. This consists in the ability to look at warfare as a whole and to apply tactical and technical skill in the most effective way. What we want, therefore, is a system which will allow both forms of skill to develop to the full. If you examine the Services as they are now constituted you will find just what we need within each Service, but not in the relationship between them. Let us take two examples.

"A ship has a complement which consists very largely of specialists. Among the junior ratings and ranks there are a few who perform general duties, the majority are assigned to particular tasks, for which they receive special training superimposed on the basic training which all sailors are given. But when you reach the top of the hierarchy on board the ship you find the captain, a man who may earlier in his career have been a specialist in gunnery, or navigation, or air, but who now takes a general view and seeks to apply the power of his ship and the various skills of all on board to the best advantage.

"Similarly, in the Army the 'other ranks', after basic training, join one of the arms, cavalry, artillery, infantry, etc., and stay there for their whole service. The officers, after a general education at a military college, also join their selected arm of the Service. There they normally remain, except when they join officers from other arms on courses, at staff colleges, etc., until they reach the rank of lieutenant-colonel.

Then, those who are promoted to colonel go on to one list. This does not mean that when a senior job requiring specialized knowledge and training has to be filled it is given to anyone on this list regardless of his previous career. As a general rule an officer who has spent his regimental career in the Royal Engineers would be selected to fill the post of Chief Engineer of a corps, and so on. But all the commands and higher staff posts are filled impartially by taking the best men. The only proviso usually made is that the men selected must have had training at a staff college. If you want to fill the post of Director of Plans at the War Office, or Chief of Staff of a corps, you do not consider whether it should be filled by a gunner or an infantryman; you choose from the list the man whose qualities and experience best fit him for the job.

"These two examples are sufficient to show that each Service has developed within itself a system which provides for specialization where it is wanted, and

yet ensures overall unity in direction. The specialists are free to give their enthusiams full rein and to press their own point of view. But they are all part of one Service, and are guided and governed by men who have graduated from the ranks of specialists into a broader company.

"If we look back before the 1914-18 war, there were only two Services, and only on rare occasions did their operations impinge upon each other. The Navy put the Army ashore where it wanted to go, and looked after its communications, but thereafter the two services fought apart. This fact reflected right through to the highest levels of direction. The Admiralty and the War Office had few dealings with each other, and their plans for 1914 were prepared quite independently. It was only when war was imminent that there was some discussion in the Committee of Imperial Defence about the general plan for a war against Germany. The situation did not materially improve before the end of the war, and it was only the creation of the third service, the R.A.F., that led 25 years ago to the formation of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. Since then, co-operation between the Services has slowly improved under the pressure of 1939-45 and real advances were made. But the fact remains that we have not yet achieved for the three Services in combination a system which is comparable to that which each Service has evolved for itself. The specialization is there, it is true, but there is not that junction in the higher ranks that alone can give the strategical skill we are after. We had glimpses of the possibilities during the war when Supreme Commanders were appointed, but these have faded out, and we are back with our triumvirate of specialists wherever inter-service affairs have to be dealt with. It is rather as if a ship were commanded by a committee consisting of the gunnery officer, the major of marines and the engineer officer, each of whom had under him one-third of the crew, and each wearing a different uniform.

"There are several reasons why we should not allow this situation to persist. In th efirst place, the tasks of the three Services are not nearly so clearly differentiated as they used to be. The Navy flies, the Air Force devotes much of its efforts to crippling the enemy's army and transporting our own, and all three Services are equally committed in an invasion. Secondly, the advance of scientific discovery has produced ideas and weapons which do not fit neatly into the picture of three separate Services. They tend to unify wartime operations, and it is more important than ever before that objective minds should examine the application of science to war. Thirdly, the nation is very hard up, and can no longer afford the luxury of duplication and the waste which comes from adding together the demands of the three Services.

"Certainly preliminary steps have already been taken which might be regarded as a prelude to some form of unification:

(a) The Chief of Staff organization itself and the Joint Staff system.

(b) The Imperial Defence College.

(c) A Joint Staff College.

(d) A certain degree of common development and supply.

(e) An examination whether certain administrative services, e.g. medical, could be unified.

(f) The help that the Army already gives the Royal Air Force in certain technical and administrative services, e.g. communications, supply and transport, engineering services, and movement.

"(g) The Combined Operations Service, which now comes under the Ministry of Defence.

(h) The link between Fighter Command and Anti-Aircraft Command.

(i) The link between the Army and the R.A.F. in relation to airborne forces.

"The next phase in the process of unification might be, assuming that it is the policy that the three Services should become one Service by stages:

(a) The creation of a Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces.

(b) The gradual evolution of the Ministry of Defence as a unification of the three Service Ministers.

(c) The abolition of, wherever they exist, triumvirate commands and their replacement by single commanders with unified staff.

(d) The creation of a General List for senior officers.

"Some sort of target must be visualized as the final lay-out, which would be:

(a) A single Defence Ministry and a single Service.

(b) A Defence Council replacing the three existing Councils.

(c) A common uniform for the General List.

(d) Fully specialized branches—Sea, Land and Air—in which officers would remain up to the equivalent of Captain Royal Navy.

(e) A Defence University to train the officer entry.

(f) A Staff College structure somewhat modified, but substantially as at present, with a more closely integrated system of schools.

(g) A common system of administration.

I admit that I am flying a kite, and many of these views may be shot at and riddled with sharpened words, but there is no doubt that we shall progress slowly and, I am sure, safely in the direction I have indicated."

There was a distinguished officer of real vision. I might add that if you look closely at what he is suggesting, it is almost precisely the form that the single service is taking in Canada.

Now I would like to quote some Canadian proponents. The conference of Defence Associations' prize essay in 1957 was written by Major W. H. Pope, M.C., now retired and, I believe, one of the Military Advisers to the New Democratic Party. Major Pope in his article outlined the history of Combined Operations leading logically to a single Service, and the organization chart he produced was not too different from the present one. It is interesting to note that when this article was produced in the Canadian Army Journal in 1953, the following note appeared: "Readers will appreciate, of course, that the opinions expressed in this essay do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of National Defence.—Editor".

In another article in the Canadian Army Staff College Journal 1959-1961 edition, Captain J. G. Forth, Royal Canadian Engineers, discusses unification—WHY, HOW, WHEN. He begins his article with a quotation from Field Marshal The Viscount Montgomery of Alamein: "If the United Kingdom were today a recently created State organizing her fighting forces it is inconceivable that they would be separated into three services."

Captain Forth then goes on to begin his essay as follows:

"The Existence of three or more separate services in modern national defence forces is an illogical relic of the part perpetuated by inflexible thinking, vested interests and individual fear of extinction. Historical study would readily show how and why armed forces developed as triplets. But comparative analysis would show just as readily that modern conditions call for a single service."

Some senior Canadian officers have come to the same conclusion, including the late Major General W. H. Macklin who wrote extensively about unification in *Weekend* Magazine of September 22, 1956, and General Charles Foulkes, former Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee. General Foulkes has had more experience than any of the other officers who have appeared before you and, therefore, is well qualified to speak on the single Service concept. The memorandum he wrote in 1961 makes very interesting reading. The conclusion was reported in *Star Weekly* Magazine, October 14, 1961, as follows:

"We need one single armed service, under one supreme Chief of Staff, in one uniform." As General Foulkes told Committee, he still believes in this principle although he has some fault to find with the method of implementation. He states in his testimony, however, that the end result proposed by his paper of 1961 and that which will be achieved by the present Defence Staff is not too different.

Resistance to change in Military organization is not a new phenomenon. In Henry Sidgwick's "Outlines of The History of Ethics" page 21, you will find the following, and I quote: "...old-fashioned soldiers were grumbling at the new pedantries of 'tactics' and 'hoplitics'." (circ. 450 B.C.)

In the book "Franklin Delano Roosevelt" you will find the following:

"Roosevelt was discussing his problems in bringing about changes in the U.S. treasury and state department. He went on: "But the treasury and the state department put together are nothing compared with the navy. The admirals are really something to cope with—and I should know.

"To change something in the navy is like punching a feather bed. You punch it with your right and you punch it with your left until you are finally exhausted, and then you find the damn bed just as it was before you started punching."

During the current testimony, Mr. Churchill said in effect, that Ministers should not question senior military technical advice. While there is some justification for this approach, I think there are times when a Minister must ask questions and seek all possible information before making a decision. Often military advice is not unanimous and a Minister must listen to the best evidence available and then make a decision. There have also been cases in History where military advice was unanimous—and was wrong. An item from a book by the other Mr. Churchill (Winston)—

Mr. CHURCHILL: I wonder if it is more important.

Mr. HELLYER: That is a question that we will have to consider later, Mr. Churchill—... may be of interest. In his book "Thoughts and Adventures" he says this: "No story of the Great War is more remarkable or more full of guidance for the future than this. It was a long, intense, violent struggle between the amateur politicians, thrown by democratic Parliamentary institutions to the head of affairs, on the one hand, and the competent, trained, experienced

experts on the other. The astonishing fact is that the politicians were right, and that the Admiralty authorities were wrong. The politicians were right upon a technical, professional question ostensibly quite outside their sphere, and the Admiralty authorities were wrong upon what was, after all, the heart and centre of their own peculiar job.

A second fact is not less noteworthy. The politicians representing Civil Power at bay and fighting for the life of the state, overcame and pierced the mountains of prejudice and false argument which the Admiralty raised and backed with the highest naval authority. In no other country could such a thing have happened. In Germany, for instance, the Kaiser and his Ministers had to accept the facts, figures, and opinions of the naval experts as final. When Admiral Holtzendorff declared that unrestricted warfare would sink 600,000 tons of British shipping a month, and that five months would ruin England's war-making power; when he put that forward on his honour and conscience as the head of the German Naval Staff, there was no means of gainsaying him. Hindenburg and Ludendorff endorsed in professional loyalty the opinions of their naval colleagues, and the Civil Power, dumb before mysterious assertion, saw itself, if it did not adopt the technical advice, accused of timidity or weakness which might deprive Germany of victory and even life. Naturally they yielded, and all went forward to disaster.

"But the British politicians—we apologize for their existence—were powerful people, feeling they owed their positions to no man's favour. They asked all kinds of questions. They did not always take 'no' for an answer. They did not accept the facts and figures put before them by their experts as necessarily unshakable. They were not under moral awe of professional authority, if it did not seem reasonable to the lay mind. They were not above obtaining secretly the opinions of the junior naval officers concerned with the problem, and of using these views to cross-examine and confute the naval chiefs. The sleuth-hound of the politicians was Sir Maurice Hankey, Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence and Secretary to the War Cabinet. He had a lawful foot in every camp—naval, military, professional, political—and while observing every form of official correctitude he sought ruthlessly 'the way out' ".

And later on Winston Churchill tells another related incident:

"Earlier in May, 1917, the Admiralty, having accepted the War Cabinet's decision in favour of convoy, asked the Navy Department at Washington to adopt it also. But the American naval authorities knew from Admiral Sim's reports that the convoy system had been forced upon the British sailors against their better judgement by political interference. They therefore refused to risk their ships upon what they knew was inexpert and unprofessional advice. It was some months before the vast and patent triumph of convoy removed their deep misgivings."

I believe therefore that the lay Minister not only has a right, but a responsibility to the people he serves, to make himself as familiar as possible with all

aspects of his department, seek out the best and widest range of advice, and to base his judgement on the totality of information available to him.

With respect to the present reorganization of the Armed Forces and the single Service concept, I have talked to literally thousands of people, including hundreds of Service officers ranging in rank from officer cadet to general, and from these discussions I have concluded that the single Service concept is not only feasible but is the best military organization for Canada in the years ahead.

The major question before the Defence Committee is the principle of the single Service concept. The question is whether an integrated service, encompassing land, sea and air components and support units operating under single management and control, is the best military organization for the future. During the debate a number of points have been raised and although some of them have no direct connection with the Bill before you, I would like to take this opportunity to discuss some of these points briefly.

It has been suggested that recruiting has been and will be affected by the introduction of a unified Service. There is little, if any, evidence to support this contention. Recruiting for the calendar year 1966 was the highest it has been since 1963. I have been advised by the officers in charge of recruiting that they expect a modest increase once the unification bill has been passed. Previous experience, and my own judgment, leads me to believe, that recruiting is very closely related to economic conditions. The Armed Forces have to compete for manpower. It may not be easy to obtain all of the recruits desired during the next few years, but an effort will be made to increase the flow to a satisfactory level. To the extent that recruiting has been affected by unification, it seems to be more directly related to the controversy that has arisen and the negative statements by a number of retired officers. The following is a table showing recruiting for the period 1956 to 1966 inclusive, the Regular Force Recruiting Statistics. In 1956—and I am reading from the bottom up—17281. In 1957—19739. In 1958—15252. In 1959—12047. In 1960—12690. Then during the recession of 1961/62 and the Berlin crisis, the increases were slight at that time. In 1961—16092. In 1963—11804. In 1964—10539. In 1965—9883. In 1966—10822.

Re-engagements

The suggestion has also been made that re-engagements have been affected by the unification proposal. Again, there is very little evidence to support this contention. Re-engagement rates for the last three months of 1966 were very gratifying and quite acceptable. Naval re-engagement rates in Canada are considerably higher than those in the United States or the United Kingdom, but this does not lead us to suggest that the reason the American and British naval rates are lower is the *absence* of a plan for total unification.

Considering the much larger proportion of our forces who are technically trained in trades in great demand, at high salaries, on the civilian market, the Defence Staff and I feel that our re-engagement rates are encouraging, although, of course, we would always like to see them higher.

A table of re-engagement rates for the period 1956 to 1966 inclusive follows:

Year	Royal Canadian Navy	Canadian Army (Regular) No figures available until 1962	Royal Canadian Air Force
1956	58.1	—	82.2
1957	54.1	—	73.7
1958	60.3	—	84.2
1959	61.4	—	87.0
1960	N/A	—	81.9
1961	N/A	—	93.8
1962	60.4	84.1	90.3
1963	56.4	84.5	89.3
1964	61.0	75.9	89.5
1965	56.0	74.2	82.9
1966	66.4	84.4	84.9

Note: Information for RCN and RCAF rates is not available for years prior to 1956; CA(R) Canadian Army (Regular) data is available only for 1962 and subsequent years.
Re-engagement rates shown are percentages of men who were offered re-engagement and who in fact re-engaged.

Conscription

It has been suggested that unification will necessitate conscription in Canada. I can only conclude that this suggestion is being put forward for emotional reasons. In view of the history of the conscription issue in this country, not to mention the previous recruiting figures, it should not be necessary to state that there is no intention on the part of this government to introduce compulsory military service.

It has long been recognized by the people of Canada that the advantages inherent in a voluntary service far outweigh the recruiting difficulties experienced during periods of economic boom. Canadian servicemen and women enjoy an unparalleled reputation throughout the world for their competence, professionalism, and adherence to duty. This is primarily because Canadian servicemen and women are in the forces because they *want* a service career.

It is the intention of this government to continue to do everything in its power to sustain and improve the professional qualities which have earned us such respect, and to continue to recruit personnel for the Canadian Armed Forces on a voluntary basis.

The idea that officers serving in 1964 were unaware of the single service policy of the Department of National Defence is scarcely credible when, on April 2, 1964, a latter was issued to all personnel by Mr. Cardin, then Associate Minister, and myself which stated as follows:

"The White Paper enunciated the policy that the Armed Forces of Canada should be integrated under a single Chief of Defence Staff and a single Defence

Staff. It further stated that this would be the first step towards a single unified defence force for Canada".

It goes on, until:

"The third and final step will be the unification of the three Services. . . .It is reasonable to expect that it will be three or four years before it will be possible to take this action. . .However, the end objective of a single Service is firm".

That was three years ago. In those three years, the planning necessary to the program's success has been moving ahead at a rate which can only bring praise for the men involved, not questions as to their competence.

A number of references have been made to the representation on Defence Council. In the TRIO brief, for example on page 2, paragraph 3, it states, and I quote: "At the present time, therefore, the council would be deprived of experts' opinion from at least one of the environments, sea, land or air."

This matter was dealt with at some length in my speech on second reading. I said that the practice is to have the branch heads attend meetings of Defence Council regularly to give advice, not only within their own areas of responsibility but also on any other matters, including environmental, in which they are competent. Branch heads have been given the status of associate members of Defence Council and in practice attend, or are represented by their deputies, at all meetings.

In addition, the practice is to have the expert staffs at the working level, including those from the functional commands, brief Defence Council. This means that Defence Council has the benefit of the advice and knowledge of a wide band of officers in those matters in which they have an up-to-date, day-to-day knowledge. The system of frequent Defence Council meetings with all this environmental and other counsel available, has broadened considerably the base on which defence decisions are reached.

As Committee members have been informed, this advice includes, as necessary, contributions from the Departments of External Affairs and Defence Production to ensure that foreign affairs and industrial considerations are attuned.

Another suggestion is that Defence Council should report directly to the Cabinet Committee on Defence. In practice, this does happen with respect to matters that are referred to the Cabinet Committee. The extent to which views are expressed at Cabinet Defence meetings, however, will always depend to a certain extent on the individuals involved. I have always taken my senior military and civil staff advisers to Cabinet Defence Committee meetings, I should say, where staff from the various departments were invited, and when their views differ from the departmental recommendation I have always insisted that they state their views to the Committee before it made its decision. This is in my opinion only prudence, because it is far better to know all the arguments, both for and against any particular proposal, before a decision is made, and to make a decision only after having heard all points of view.

I was surprised that the TRIO organization used the General Motors analogy as an argument against the single service concept. Actually, it is an argument in

favour of what we are doing—a unique blending of centralized policy making and decentralized execution. It is further stated that all General Motors key decisions are collective judgments made in committee. The same is true in Defence. All the day-to-day policy decisions are taken in Defence Council, with the major items being referred to the Cabinet Committee on Defence and then to the Cabinet—a committee of the Privy Council.

Co-operation with Allies

The TRIO organization goes on to contend that a single service in Canada will not be able to work properly in co-operation with the United States. It is suggested that NORAD requires a separate capability for the Air Force, and the extensive territorial waters around Canada require a separate capability peculier to Naval forces.

As far as NORAD is concerned, this is simply not true. Aero-space defence of this continent is *NOT* simply a function performed by one of the environmental services. Although our contribution is largely Air Force, NORAD itself is an integrated command with contributions from at least four Defence services. In addition to the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force elements co-operating with the RCAF in NORAD, there is liaison with Civil Defence authorities in both countries, including the Canadian Army and the Emergency Measures Organization.

In respect to maritime operations, it too is an integrated force. Maritime Command consists roughly of two-thirds Navy and one-third RCAF personnel. The maritime operation is an argument in *favour* of the unified service concept rather than *against* it. After all, the object of the operations is the same regardless of the element—sea, undersea, land, air or space (reconnaissance)—from which they are conducted.

A matter of concern to everyone is the maintenance of a high degree of professionalism. There is no reason why a unified service cannot maintain and even enhance the present standards. Training Command will be responsible for ab initio and trades training, including flight training, but operational commands will continue, as at present, to provide operational training to the degree required for the specialized operation. This means that the combat sailors, soldiers and airmen will continue to receive the same high standard of training that they now receive.

The next question that has been raised often is the suggestion that we are going to develop a peace-keeping force only. This question was answered first in the White Paper, where we say at page 15, and I quote:

"Canada's own experience in this field points to the need for a high degree of versatility in preparing for possible United Nations service. In the past requests from the Secretary-General for assistance have been for specialists of various kinds, mainly from the Canadian Army and the RCAF. The fact that Canada is one of a small number of powers capable of and eligible for United Nations service, with a highly trained and diversified military establishment, qualifies it for varied roles in United Nations operations". I may add at this point that the Secretary of State for External Affairs made a very eloquent reply to this same question when it was raised in the House of Commons today by Mr. Churchill."

I dealt with the subject when I spoke to the Canadian Club in Toronto on October 3, 1966, when I said: "It is being suggested, of course, that we are going to convert the Canadian Forces into one giant peacekeeping organization with no capability beyond U.N. peacekeeping missions. This suggestion is tommyrot. If that were the objective, why on earth would we have launched a 1.5 billion dollar, 5-year re-equipment program? Why would we be acquiring self-propelled howitzers, armoured personnel carriers, armoured reconnaissance vehicles, anti-tank guns, anti-tank missiles, helicopter-equipped destroyers, ship-to-air missiles, modern submarines and fighter-bombers—if the role was to be limited to peace-keeping? For that role alone, an order of blue berets and billy-sticks might suffice".

On the other hand, this does not mean in any way that we are giving up our capability to meet future demands in the peace-keeping field. On the contrary, as I said in my speech on second reading:

"Our capability to provide such forces for United Nations-type operations is not only being maintained, but with the emphasis we are placing on increased mobility and flexibility it is steadily being increased."

I would like to remind Committee members that Canada has participated in every United Nations peace-keeping operation since the organization was formed. And, contrary to some statements that have been made to this Committee, Canadian Forces have indeed contributed to the dampening of hostilities and the prevention of escalation into much more serious conflict. I think it is a disservice to the thousands of Canadian Navy, Army and Air Force personnel who have participated in these operations to demean the contribution they have made and are making to world order.

An indication of Canada's reputation in the field of U.N. peace-keeping was the reaction to the Canadian initiative to hold a large symposium in the Fall of 1964 on the problems and techniques of such operations. It turned out to be, according to all international reports, the most successful and broadly attended (23 nations) such meeting in U.N. history.

Our record of success in this field does not mean that the Government intends now, or in the foreseeable future to devote its military force to peace-keeping only.

It is obvious to anyone who will analyze our forces, their re-equipment programs, and our force projection for the early 1970's that we are maintaining and developing a capability of performing a wide variety of tasks, from contributing to the deterrence of nuclear war at one end of the scale, to peace-restoring and peace-keeping measures at the other end.

It has been suggested numerous times that there has been a very large number of senior officers who have retired early or resigned in the last year or two over unification. This contention is simply not borne out by the facts. Confusion has resulted from the fact that it has been the custom in the services to permit officers to leave at the beginning or during their final year of service. Certainly, some officers did request early retirement, but not all were due strictly to disagreement with unification and, even with those in this category, the number was not unduly large, considering the emotional and other aspects of such a fundamental re-organization. No one regrets the loss of some of these

officers more than the Associate Minister and myself. On the other hand, we have not suffered as far as experience, knowledge and ability are concerned with those who currently fill the senior positions in the services.

The question has been raised, who else is doing it? The answer is no one—not yet—but considerable interest is being shown all around the world. No one in the Defence Department, to my knowledge, has said that two countries would have followed suit by now. What we have said and will continue to say is that other countries will follow in the future. Proving that the principle is a sound one—and I have stated that I believe it is—many countries have asked for information and to be kept informed on the progress that we are making. In a recent article in the Sunday *Times*, January 8, 1967, David Devine concludes that "...even the recent changes in the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence will not solve their problems," and concludes as he did in his recent book entitled "The Broken Wing" that Britain must adopt the single service concept: "The simple fact is that we can no longer afford on the vast budget of 2,000,000,000 pounds a year divergent interests of three rival services, nor can we afford a mini-pentagon."

Recently, a well known New Zealand civil servant, in reviewing our most recent Defence White Paper, has suggested that they should take another look and give more serious consideration to the Canadian solution of the single service. Many countries are interested and I have no doubt that in due course many will follow the Canadian lead.

But, in any case, to my mind the essential point is not whether other nations have followed or will follow Canada. It is the reverse. I see no reason why a young, progressive country like Canada must always follow other nations. The key question is: is it right for Canada? We are convinced it is.

To dispel the confusion regarding the use of uniforms by the Force, it would appear that a three-category explanation would be useful:

The proposed walking out dress will be common to all elements of the Force. It is, in effect, the business suit for military personnel. As such, it must be of the finest quality and style possible to give both Armed Forces personnel and the Canadian people the pride in appearance the Service deserves.

There will be no change imposed for the wearing of ceremonial or mess dress. In addition, even after the new service dress or walking out uniforms are introduced, servicemen may continue to wear their traditional service dress or walking out uniforms on appropriate occasions. Naval and air force personnel may continue to wear mess kit, and army personnel may continue to wear regimental dress when appropriate. I should point out here that army personnel are not excluded from the mess kit either. I should correct that before any misapprehension arises. There has been no change in this policy.

Service personnel will wear clothing appropriate to their fighting function. The most useful and effective combat clothing and work dress will continue to be used in the field, at sea and in the air.

Thus, I reiterate, the only change in uniform contemplated is the walking out dress, and this change will require at least four to five years to complete even after user trials have been successfully terminated.

It has been suggested that a single walking out or service dress will be detrimental to the combat arms. This is an important point and one that must be taken into account. There is no question but that the combat arms are the raison d'etre of the fighting force. They are the sharp end—the cutting edge. There is equally no doubt that they cannot fight effectively without the men and women who support them. They must fight as a team, those up front and those in support. Actually, the introduction of guided missiles and other weapons of mass destruction has tended to blend the lines between front and rear echelons. Nevertheless, for the sake of argument, both the combat arms and their supporting services must be taken into consideration.

I would like to comment on the two main classes of occupation separately. First in respect of the fighting services—the men who operate the ships and their weapons systems, the fighting arms of the Army, and the combat aircrew of the Air Force—these operations are unique to the military and to a particular environment.

Personnel in these occupations will specialize through most of the early years of their careers as is the case at the present. If at the appropriate time they show promise of being able to accept the broader responsibilities of senior rank, they will receive the staff training and broadening experience necessary to qualify them for senior rank. This does not mean that they will be trained as a specialist in another environment, that is infantry officers for example will not be trained as specialized ship personnel or required to undertake aircrew training, but they will be exposed to a sufficiently broad spectrum of military experience so that they can exercise unified command of the various elements as required, but with the support and technical advice of subordinates who are specialists in the other arms. This is merely an extension to all arms of a principle which has already stood the test of time within a single service. It does not require any change in the organization of combat units and, therefore, combat expertise and esprit de corps can be fully maintained.

The second class of occupation concerns the non-combat, the support occupations; the engineering, logistics, administrative, medical and other specialist functions. Most of these functions are performed in each of the three services. The extent to which these can be unified depends on the extent that the skill and knowledge are common between services. Let me use two examples to explain.

Consider first the logistics, or supply, trades. Because a single supply system is being developed, the skill and knowledge requirements will be the same for logistics personnel throughout the three services. Some additional environmental skills and knowledge may be required for logistics personnel serving with a land, sea or air unit. Even so, maximum flexibility and efficient use of logistics personnel will be realized if they can be employed in any environment. Such universal employment will also produce more interesting and challenging assignments and better career opportunities for logistics personnel.

As a second example, consider the electronics trades. These tradesmen are employed in all three services. In general the theoretical and basic knowledge requirements are common to all three services. The equipment, however, is different, not only between services but between specialties within present services, (e.g. F-104 squadrons as compared with the C-130E squadrons) so that

part of the total skill and knowledge requirements associated with equipment is unique to each service. Personnel in trades such as this, where part of the total skill and knowledge requirements are common and part unique, will be given the common training in one school. They will then be given, probably at the same school, the equipment training appropriate to the environment for which they have been selected. Whether such personnel will be later posted to a different environment, depends on the requirement and on the amount of additional training required. It would, however, be clearly advantageous to be able to make this kind of a transfer without discharging individuals from one service when they are required in another.

From the above examples it can be seen that the individual service affiliations will disappear for all personnel in all trades except the purely combat trades. Even officers in the combat arms will be required to take additional staff training at a certain level to enable them to exercise command over arms in addition to the one in which they were trained—as is now the case in the army and in the navy. The fundamental question is this: should separate services be retained for the sake of other ranks and junior officers employed in the combat trades only? In our judgment the answer is no, even though the combat trades are the most important and their existence is the raison d'etre for all other trades. Aside from the problems associated with making a purely arbitrary decision when allocating recruits in the non-combat trades to services, there is a more fundamental reason why a single service is required. It is basically a question of whether the defence interests of the country will be better served by having service personnel, particularly officers, identifying themselves primarily with the total Canadian Armed Forces aims or with the narrower desires of one service and a single environment.

Clearly, in my opinion, the overall national interest must predominate. That interest will best be served by people of all arms working together to produce logical solutions to the defence problems facing our nation—without regard to the colour of uniform or the prolonging—for prolonging's sake of outdated service functions.

Jacks-of-All-Trades

Many of the arguments against unification presented to this Committee seem to have been based on a false premise. One witness, for example, made reference to the impossibility of unifying Air Defence Command or personnel in submarines. He made reference in this connection to a paragon.

If we were indeed intending to create a paragon, whereby personnel in the fighting functions of the now different services were to be interchangeable, then the claim that unification means a loss of expertise unless we change our roles, is indeed valid. However, as I have previously stated and as was also explained by the Vice Chief of Defence Staff, there is no intention of making a jack-of-all-trades out of our servicemen in the fighting trades. Their expertise will be maintained and enhanced. Once one recognizes the premise as false, most of the arguments put up against unification disappear. The arguments are invalid, because there never has been any intention of "hybridizing" the combat serviceman.

Speed of the Program

One criticism which has been made of unification several times during the last few days is that we are proceeding too quickly—that there is too much haste.

This is not a valid criticism. As was explained on a number of occasions, the planning began in 1964 and the final implementation won't be completed until about 1972. The whole process of integration and unification then is taking about 8 years. This is not an unreasonable length of time, even for such a major reorganization.

There is one additional point that should be made, however, as to why the permissive legislation we are asking for in Bill C-243 is required now to give legal authority and the impetus to complete the job. Following the establishment of the new functional commands, and later the integration of bases, a much larger number of servicemen from the three services were required to work together—often in the same or similar employment. Working together they became much more aware of the differences in career opportunities and working conditions between the three services than had been previously the case.

I began to receive a number of justifiable complaints from the other ranks in respect of differences and treatment for men engaged in the same employment. If the staff at the very outset of the integration process had made a special effort to resolve these problems arising out of conditions of employment, it is possible that an acceptable interim solution could have been worked out and consequently a good case could have been made for delaying the introduction of a single service for some period of time. As this was not done, however, we concluded, and we believe correctly, that the best way to overcome these legitimate grievances would be to form the single service at a steady pace. Once the single service is created, it is inevitable that, although pay and conditions for different employment will vary, as they always have, pay and conditions for people in the same employment must be standardized.

One of the great long-range advantages of the unified service is the removal of the unfair treatment that has been accorded many groups of service people. As our servicemen and women are the most important asset we have in the field of defence, it is the firm determination of the Associate Minister and myself to remove the previously existing anomalies and inequities and improve substantially the lot of our service personnel.

We also came to the conclusion that the introduction of a common service dress would accelerate rather than retard the adjustment process and that, if it was going to be done, there was no reason to postpone it beyond the 4 or 5 year-period considered necessary after the user-trials are completed. The number of servicemen interested in wearing the new uniform is quite large and will increase naturally in the months ahead once a decision has been taken on the acceptability of a particular uniform and a plan approved for making it available.

It is our determination to make the new uniform the best procurable in cut, style and material. We want our servicemen and women to have a uniform of which they will be proud. Consequently, there will indeed be extensive user-trials of the proposed uniform and no final decisions will be reached until our

service personnel themselves have had a sufficient opportunity to see the uniform and comment on its suitability from all aspects. In this regard, arrangements will be made to have personnel of all ranks participate in the user-trial program.

Adjustment to New Roles

The other point that has been made by a number of witnesses is that unification would be fine if you were going to have a single mission, but that it is not a valid concept if Canada is to continue with its present or similar commitments. This argument is not only fallacious, it is directly contrary to the whole purpose of a single service. Of course, you would have a single service for a single mission. That would be true if your forces were involved entirely in the maritime anti-submarine role, or entirely in air defence, or entirely in a land/air intervention force, or entirely in peace-keeping. Canada, however, has commitments involving a number of roles and it is the intention of the Government to continue to accept our responsibilities in these several areas.

Unification, or the single service in the Canadian context, will permit us more easily in the years ahead to shift the emphasis in any direction dictated by changes in technology, national policy, or international affairs.

A single service makes it easier to adjust to new roles and missions, because establishments, rank structure (not to be confused with rank designation) and seniority are on a single service basis rather than divided into three services. A single service undoubtedly will result in a better, more objective, strategical appraisal of the defence needs of our nation without undue regard for jealously guarding old service interests, regardless of their continuing validity. This will be facilitated, as Lieutenant-General Weeks so well described in his excellent lecture, by applying to the unified service the same well-proven and tested system which each service had developed for itself.

Rank Designations

Much has been made over the need to establish uniform ranks for the modernized, computer-based pay and accounting, personnel records system being introduced. This is understandable. All innovations are usually greeted with exaggerated fun-making, some in jest; some serious.

Actually, the policy in regards to rank designations was spelled out in my Second Reading speech. I stated on page 10834 of *Hansard*, dated 7 December, 1966:

> It is my intention to authorize members of the Canadian Armed Forces to use rank titles traditional to their former service.

That is the general policy. The details of the implementation of that policy will be worked out in consultation with the Defence Staff and the Armed Forces Council.

The Associate Minister and I are very cognizant of the desires of the service people themselves. The only wish that we would have in this regard is that the best interests of the men and women of our forces should be a prime consideration.

Operational Readiness

Suggestions have been made that our forces are not as operationally ready at the present time as they were prior to the inauguration of this program. This is utter nonsense.

Let us look at the situation that existed in 1961-63. We had spent $\$\frac{3}{4}$ billion acquiring weapons systems that could only be fully effective if provided with nuclear arms under American control. Furthermore, we had undertaken obligations to fulfill roles for their use under our NATO and NORAD agreements. But the weapons had been left unarmed. The Bomarcs had no warheads; the Starfighters were grounded without armament; the Voodoos were restricted to less-effective conventional ammunition; our Honest John rockets to protect our Brigade in Europe literally were filled with sand to keep them upright.

Moreover, $\frac{3}{4}$ of our Army was equipped only to training scales. Even our front-line Brigade in Europe had no armoured personnel carriers, no armoured reconnaissance vehicles—they had to engage in exercises with our Allies in open trucks.

Worse still, even if our land force in Canada had been operationally equipped, it did not have the airlift or sealift to get it anywhere in any reasonable length of time. Our Militia was demoralized under the burden of an ill-conceived, poorly-programmed civil defence program.

Our Navy was still caught up in the "Ships-numbers" game of steaming aged World War II vessels of dubious operational value. Today, our anti-submarine capability is at an all-time high.

Now, we are introducing a wide range of modern equipment for our servicemen at home and abroad. Our mobility has been immeasurably increased. Our highly-trained professionals are now receiving the equipment they deserve.

Many statements have been made over the past few years by senior military commanders on the subject of operational readiness. Here are a few:

From General Jean V. Allard (then Commander, Mobile Command) before Standing Committee on Defence #11, June 21, 1966.

> We believe that we have built an organization which will be ideally suited for its task of directing Canada's integrated tactical forces. The organization of the command headquarters, the units and bases permits a high degree of operational and administrative readiness and flexibility in our combat units.

From Air Commodore A. C. Hull (then Acting Commander, Air Defence Command) quoted in testimony before Standing Committee on Defence #13, June 28, 1966.

> We met or exceeded all assigned objectives of operational effectiveness by a progressive schedule of inspections and evaluations, tactical evaluations, alert force capability tests, nuclear capability tests and the emergency defence plan tests. In addition to our own command evaluations, we were tested by NORAD, by teams from CFHQ and the United

States Air Force Air Defence Command who share with us the responsibility for nuclear safety standards. In all these evaluations we successfully met the required standards.

From an article entitled "The Decisive Years" by Air Chief Marshal F. R. Miller (then Chief of the Defence Staff) as it appeared in the Armed Forces *Sentinel* Magazine, June 1966.

> But let me stress one vital point: throughout the period of reorganization we have maintained our operational capability. There has been no loss of efficiency, no cutting of commitments. Indeed, we have accepted new responsibilities and taken them in our stride.

Why Not Integration Only?

It would be impossible to maintain an "integrated force" over a long period of time. Integration is not a stable position; it is, in fact, only one point in the cycle between the existence of services with distinct identities and a totally unified force. The first point, of course, is that the so-called "integration" that everyone seems to favour gives you the spectre of three, legally independent services existing in perpetuity, each without an independent head, all reporting to the Chief of Defence Staff, for that is what Bill C-90, the integration legislation, provided.

The advantages of the single service were set out in my speech on second reading. I have amplified those reasons today and believe them to be valid.

Finale

Finally, may I say that in recommending the changes consequent on this Bill I do not wish to reflect in any way, on individual members of the Armed Forces. They are wonderful people and I am proud of my association with them. I have stated repeatedly, and I mean it with all my heart, that the men and women of the Canadian Armed Forces are without peer anywhere in this world. They have served Canada well, in war and peace, and they deserve the deepest gratitude of the Canadian people.

The problems I have discussed were inherent in a system which grew up over decades. It is the responsibility of the Minister and of Parliament to consider whether institutions change in consonance with a changing world. It is for this reason that I have recommended to Parliament the enactment of the Bill you have before you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN: Now is the time for questions to start. On my list I have Mr. Churchill and Mr. Winch.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to ask the Minister, first, why he has brought over to the Committee room so many members of the national defence headquarters? There are about 14 of the senior officers here. Is there some purpose behind this, which I have not been able to discern?

Mr. HELLYER: I thought, Mr. Churchill, that the proceedings of this Committee might be of interest to them. I also thought that later in the course of our

deliberations it might be of interest and advantage to the Committee to call one or more of them to discuss certain areas of their particular knowledge, if there should remain any questions that members of the Committee may wish to have answered in greater detail.

Mr. CHURCHILL: It just seems a little odd that their appearance here in such large numbers should coincide with the ministerial statement. Would they not have the opportunity of reading this when it is published in a red cover?

If so many senior officers could be spared for four hours this afternoon, may I ask the Minister if he is contemplating a further reduction in the staff of national defence headquarters?

Mr. HELLYER: I think, Mr. Churchill, it is a great tribute to the efficiency of the organization that it runs so smoothly that they can come and listen to the deliberations of this Committee.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Similarly, I think it has been observed that the Minister can be spared on many occasions, thanks to a very efficient Associate Minister, who stays to hold the fort.

Mr. HELLYER: I agree with that wholeheartedly, Mr. Churchill. I am glad you have given me the opportunity to endorse some of your remarks without any reservation whatsoever.

Mr. CHURCHILL: We now have, Mr. Chairman, a third document to which reference will be made from time to time. We have had the White Paper for almost three years, then we had the December 7th pronouncement, the Minister's speech on second reading, and now we have the third statement of February 23, 1967. I wonder whether this is going to be the last of these compendious documents, or has the Minister any further information to give the Committee based on his reading and quotes from foreign authorities?

Mr. HELLYER: Well, if my hon. friend is now satisfied that the bill is a good one and is willing to support it in the House of Commons I can assume that it will be the last. If, on the other hand, there are further questions that you feel should be answered, why, then, you may have another volume.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Volume 4 will emerge. Well, we will be looking forward to Volume 4—

Mr. HELLYER: Yes.

Mr. CHURCHILL: —because there are still some other questions to be asked and to be answered.

I notice that on page 2 the Minister has now unified and integrated the two words "integration" and "unification". Why did he leave out "amalgamation" which he used in a speech on December 7th? Where does that fit into this general picture. Is that just another question of semantics? I take it that the Minister has now attempted to confuse the public and the Committee to the final degree by saying that "integration" and "unification" mean exactly the same thing. Yet on December 7th the Minister said this in introducing the bill:

> This bill is divided into two parts. Part I, relating to the structure of the Canadian forces, contains all of the important provisions necessary for unification.

Our understanding up to this point has been that integration was one factor in the process of reorganization and that unification was somewhat distinct from that. Now we have the two put together. I suggest to the Minister that this adds to the confusion of the Committee and of the general public.

Mr. HELLYER: Mr. Churchill, you can use either of the words, or you can use some other word, but it does not change the meaning of what we are attempting to do.

Personally, I regret that we ever used the word "unification". It has been so widely misinterpreted that it has created a great deal of, I think, unnecessary concern. However, the purpose of the bill is to create a single service containing specialists in the fighting arms and the support forces necessary to back them up in carrying out the roles and missions assigned from time to time by the government of Canada. I do not like to see the purpose being confused, or diffused, by some misunderstanding over the difference between "integration", "unification" or "amalgamation". It is a single service concept that we are talking about, as defined earlier in the Committee when I first appeared before you, and again today.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I wonder if the Minister also regrets that in 1964, when we were debating Bill No. C-90, he did not explain then, in answer to many questions asked both by Mr. Harkness and myself on the subject of unification, that his object was a single unified force in the same uniform. It might have helped. That was away back in 1964.

I have reviewed the debates of that period and I find that these questions remained unanswered. We saw the problem. We were debating at greater length the command structure, but we saw the problem contained in that notorious sentence in the White Paper about the single unified defence force. Does the Minister not now regret that he did not explain the objective at that time?

I note that the Minister has given us 15 quotations in the course of his volume 3, which is the present speech, and he has drawn on experience from Britain, the United States, New Zealand, the National Democratic Party and various other sources. I wonder if these quotations could not be matched quite readily by people of equal authority from these various countries and from Canada. I have been a follower of Liddel Hart for many, many years and I pay a great deal of attention to what he writes. Some of these other people that are quoted have not made quite the same impression on me. General Lemay was a specialist officer with the Air Force. Lord Tedder was an air force officer, and he admits in his article that he was just flying a kite; and I expect that there are competent people to answer him. Major Pope and Captain Forth, I regret, have not impressed me quite as much as some of the witnesses that we have heard here. I may be doing those two gentlemen an injustice, but perhaps they should come and be recognized.

I suggest, Mr. Hellyer, that you might have had an equal number of quotations to bolster up your weak argument by drawing from other sources and an equal number of quotations to destroy your argument, which we will provide in due course. May I ask the Minister specifically whether he could identify the well known New Zealand civil servant? He is not known to me but he may be known to the Minister.

Mr. HELLYER: I will send you his name, Mr. Churchill.

Mr. CHURCHILL: His opinion outbalances that of the defence committee in the New Zealand house?

Mr. HELLYER: I would not want to make any such statement, but I think it is fair to say that thoughtful people in other countries are interested in the single service concept because they, too, recognize the problems that have developed as a result of the maintenance of individual services and the interfaces which arise between them.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Despite the value of his opinion the New Zealand White Paper did not propose the system of reorganization that is being brought about here.

Mr. HELLYER: That is quite right, Mr. Churchill.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Now, Mr. Chairman, I have only one or two other questions. These are simply introductory. I would like to be placed on the second and third round when the time comes.

I would like to ask the Minister one or two questions about what he says on page 50 where he attempts to point out that everything that happened before 1963 was ineffective. I will quote his words:

> the Starfighters were grounded without armament.

I ask the Minister this question: Did he visit the Starfighter squadron in Europe in February 1963?

Mr. HELLYER: I do not think I did in February 1963, Mr. Churchill. I think it was in April.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I visited them in February 1963. There were 12 planes there then and most of them were undergoing modification. There was no armament available for them because the storage for nuclear weapons had not been built.

May I ask the Minister when the storage facilities in Europe for the Starfighters were completed?

Mr. HELLYER: Subsequent to the change in government, Mr. Churchill.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Several years subsequent, too. Would you give me the date?

Mr. HELLYER: I could not give you the date and I do not know that I would be at liberty to if I knew it, but I can say that it required, as you know now, I think, but denied at that time, a bilateral agreement with the United States, technical agreements between the Forces of our two countries and then a certain amount of construction before the armaments were made available for those very expensive weapon systems which had been purchased by the previous government of Canada.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Let us not become martinets. I was simply asking about the availability of armaments at that particular time. They were not available. The Minister might tell us when the Starfighters were armed.

I also wish to ask him a specific question. There was an entire period of 12 months when we had no fighting air division in Europe under the Minister's jurisdiction because he had disbanded the Sabre jets and he had not armed the Starfighters. This appears in the report of the Defence Committee of 1963. May I put this question to the Minister: Would he not like to amend his statement on

page 50 that the Starfighters were grounded without armament? It casts an unfair reflection on his predecessors.

Mr. HELLYER: I think it is a fair statement, Mr. Churchill. I do not think it is too relevant now, but at the same time I do not think it is fair for some critics of the proposed single service concept to give the impression that our armed forces are not doing a very effective job on behalf of this country in our alliances at the present time, because they are. If one wishes to make a comparison between now and the spring of 1963, they are very much more effective now than they were then. If you are willing to concede that point—

Mr. CHURCHILL: I will just ask two more questions, Mr. Chairman, and then pass to someone else.

The Minister says our Honest John rockets to protect our brigade in Europe literally were filled with sand to keep them upright. What are they filled with now, Mr. Hellyer?

Mr. HELLYER: The warheads required for them are available now, Mr. Churchill, as you well know, if they are required in an emergency.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Just as they were available in February 1963; but is the Honest John rocket that is being exercised equipped with a nuclear warhead, or is it equipped with a warhead filled with sand?

Mr. HELLYER: They were not equipped with warheads at that time because they were not available. They could not possibly have been made available without the agreements which were subsequently signed. My honourable friend is well aware of this. I do not really see the relevance of that to the bill—

Mr. CHURCHILL: I am just asking one or two questions about your statement in the paper, and you have not given me an answer.

You say later on:

> Even our front-line brigade in Europe had no armoured personnel carriers and no armoured reconnaissance vehicles—they had to engage in exercises with our allies in open trucks.

I will conclude this with just a statement. Under the Liberal government of 1939 the regiment I was with had to engage in exercises using flags for machine guns and trucks for armoured vehicles.

I will pass to the next member.

Mr. HELLYER: Some of us are resolved to see that that does not recur if we can prevent it, Mr.Churchill.

Mr. CHURCHILL: You will put the ships in commission again, then, and man them with personnel, will you?

Mr. HELLYER: To the best of our ability.

Mr. WINCH: Mr. Chairman, in one way I am in agreement with Mr. Churchill in that I will ask only some introductory questions, and I also ask to be placed on the second round.

In another way I completely disagree with Mr. Churchill. I appreciate the fact, Mr. Hellyer, that you have your senior military staff here. There has been some criticism in the past of their not being present. Now that they are there

perhaps we can direct questions to them if we so desire. It is my belief now, as I said in the House of Commons, that I think mistakes were made in, shall we say, public relations and in the introduction in the bill of legislation of matters that could have perhaps evolved; and perhaps had certain attitudes been taken they would not have caused the same concern that they do now.

This leads me to my first question. Even in your vision of the integrated service you will have to have a navy, an army and an air force. Why can you not retain in an integrated service—a single service—a Royal Canadian Navy, a Royal Canadian Air Force and a Canadian Army? Why not? To me it is a small matter and yet it is so important. Why can it not be done?

Mr. HELLYER: Mr. Winch, one of the problems is of identity, which we raised at the time the debate on second reading began. It is to try to transfer some of the loyalty which has previously been attached to the traditional services to the concept of a single service, or to the force as a whole. It is our judgment that having a single service with a single name is best likely to achieve this.

Mr. WINCH: I personally, Mr. Hellyer, cannot accept the view that because you are in the Royal Canadian Navy, or the air force or the army you are less loyal to Canada, or to its service, or to a single service. Why are you so insistent that these designations should go? Why is it so necessary, from the broad concept of principle that you have of the traditions and loyalties of a service?

Mr. HELLYER: Mr. Winch, may I ask you one or two questions? Do you believe in the integration of force functions?

Mr. WINCH: I believe in integration.

Mr. HELLYER: All right. Do you believe in integration as far as we have gone at the present time?

Mr. WINCH: Personally?

Mr. HELLYER: Yes?

Mr. WINCH: Yes, I do.

Mr. HELLYER: You then have the problem, for example, of which service you would recruit doctors into in future. Would you divide the recruited doctors between army, navy and air force?

Mr. WINCH: There are differences between doctors which are basically functional in all services, as compared to a person whose expertise is the navy or air force.

Mr. HELLYER: There is indeed. As I stated in my opening remarks today, the fighting arms are, and will remain, environmentally oriented, but there is a large band of the supporting forces, including doctors and lawyers and many different technicians, who can perform duties for units of what have been previously known as the navy, the army and the air force. Therefore, which of the forces would you have them identify with? Which would you recruit them into? Which one would be on their attestation papers? The uniform of which one would they wear, and how would their loyalty be oriented?

Mr. WINCH: When I was overseas a couple of years ago with this committee at an air force base in Germany the medical officer was in a navy uniform and I did not see anything wrong with it.

Mr. HELLYER: I think you can make a case for a considerable amount of integration, and there has been, but at the same time I do not think you can say, particularly with the senior officers, as I point out in my statement, that you can have them oriented to one service—as members of what was traditionally one service—without having some of the emotional problems of being involved in maintaining the proportion of the total defence employment for that service; its proportion of rank structure; its proportion of funds; and all of the things associated with it; that you cannot really have them direct their energies to the total force as effectively as I am convinced you can if they are identified with the force as a whole.

That, I think, is really fundamental to the proposal now before us.

Mr. WINCH: Mr. Chairman, I am very interested in what the Minister has just said. In view of what I will call his vision of what he wants, it is still my impression that he has raised unnecessary antagonisms and opposition because of unnecessarily detailed legislation.

I will take it one step further. Why raise what I consider to be this unnecessary antagonism and opposition on rank and designation, namely, that a captain of a ship may be a colonel? Why do you feel that a matter of this nature is so important, in view of the broad principle of the major re-organization which you are suggesting?

Mr. HELLYER: Well, I do not feel that it is as important as, perhaps, you may have been led to believe, Mr. Winch. It is for that reason that in the proposed law now before you, there is a provision which will permit regulations for people serving at sea, for example, to continue to use the rank designations which are best known for—

Mr. WINCH: If they are promoted can they still hold the naval title?

Mr. HELLYER: This is not a factor. Promotion would not affect the right to do that at all.

Mr. WINCH: They could still hold it in the new navy rank structure?

Mr. HELLYER: Yes.

Mr. WINCH: But why should there be these incidentals which cause so much antagonism and opposition? Why do you feel it necessary to press forward with them?

Mr. HELLYER: First of all, the rank designations were put in on what I am told are legal grounds. The Department of Justice insisted they be in, where they had not been in before, for technical reasons. I am not competent to explain them to you, but the Judge Advocate General can explain at a later time. There are many sections in the law that relate to particular rank designation and the bill is drafted that way.

It is also my belief that if this re-organization proves as successful as I think it will, some years from now, when other countries follow suit, that uniformity will arise—the consensus will arise.

As I indicated in my second reading speech, we have made provision for flexibility which will enable us to get over this period of transition until that happens and complete authority is given to permit us the flexibility which I think is required for a transitional period.

Mr. WINCH: We have been told, Mr. Chairman, by a number of witnesses in the last two weeks—and I agree with them—that Canada cannot stand alone on defence matters; that we have to work with allies. It has been suggested by more than one that a policy of a single service will make it most diffcult for us to co-operate, and work, with allies, be it in peace or war. What comment have you to make on that?

Mr. HELLYER: I think this is quite wrong. We have said there will be no change in the basic structure of our fighting units. Therefore, they can be assigned to allied operations either as units or as part of task forces, as required. You could, therefore, contribute a battalion, or a brigade; you could contribute a squadron of ships; you could contribute a squadron of airplanes, or a wing, or an air division; or you could contribute some combination; and they will be trained to work either as units or as task forces as the circumstances require. There is no reason in the world why they cannot fit into the situation as effectively and as efficiently as units from any other country. I think this is quite an erroneous suggestion. If the requirement was a battalion, we could provide it. If the requirement was a battalion and some air support, for a larger formation, if we had it in our inventory we would be able to provide that.

Mr. WINCH: Mr. Chairman, just one more question before the second round. As the Minister, probably knows, we have been told by a witness in this Committee that if Canada is to carry out its commitments in full we will require 150,000 personnel and a budget of just over $2 billion.

Would you comment on our situation for meeting commitments, and whether, under the single service force as you visualize it, we can fulfil commitments with a force of 104,000 or 110,000 and $1,500 million, or do you foresee a change in roles? Do you agree with the statement that has been made that this bill is a smokescreen to hide a change of commitments that you have in mind? In other words, do you foresee a necessary change of role for unification?

Mr. HELLYER: It definitely is not a smokescreen Mr. Winch. That is a conclusion which can be drawn only from someone's imagination. There is no such intention.

Mr. WINCH: That statement was made by someone when he was on our headquarters staff.

Mr. HELLYER: The present structure was set out in my second reading speech. Our future commitments to NORAD and NATO have yet to be negotiated and there is absolutely no justification whatsoever for a suggestion of this kind.

I do not know where this figure of 150,000 came from. I think it was just picked right out of the air. It comes from no study that I know of or have ever seen. I know that we could fulfil our present commitments very effectively with fewer than 109,000. What the ultimate figure will be I cannot say, and I do not think anyone on the staff could say precisely, because we are still in the process of refining the establishments for our new organization, and this will take some time. However, I can assure you that with something less than 109,000 people we could very effectively perform all of the commitments we presently have.

Mr. WINCH: And do you visualize no change of role so far as you are concerned now?

Mr. HELLYER: Well, Mr. Winch, when you talk about no change of role, we have already indicated that there may be some, but beyond those that you know about none is planned at the moment.

Mr. WINCH: Please put me down for the second round, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BREWIN: There are many from our party but—

The CHAIRMAN: I have Mr. Brewin next on my list, but I will recognize Mr. Harkness.

Mr. HARKNESS: No; let Mr. Brewin carry on.

Mr. BREWIN: I will proceed, then. If I am on the list I may as well go on now because some of the things I have to say arise out of Mr. Winch's questions.

You dealt with the number of troops that would be required to carry out all the existing roles and, in addition, to maintain a mobile force. I would like to deal with the same question from the point of view of money. General Moncel who is in a position to know, and who was an impressive and credible witness, told us that in his view, after reviewing the White Paper, the cost of re-equipping this mobile command and maintaining all the other roles—the brigade, the air division, the anti-submarine pool, the air defence and so forth—at the present level would mean an increase to well over $2 billion. Is he wrong in that? Are we to accept what you say rather than what he says?

Mr. HELLYER: There is no study that I have seen that would substantiate that contention. I think you have to add, however, that it depends at what rate all of these things are done. It depends on the rate at which you acquire new equipment, and this involves some unknowns. For example, we have just recently been determining the fatigue life of our maritime command airplanes. A small variation in the fatigue life can make quite a difference in the phasing of new expenditures. Very substantial amounts of money are involved, and if the airplanes last an extra two years this makes a very real difference in the amount of money required during a certain time period.

I think the other unknown is the purchasing power of the dollar. If you are talking about constant dollars—

Mr. BREWIN: Mr. Hellyer, I do not want you to evade the very clear question that was put before this Committee by General Moncel.

Mr. HELLYER: You have to have a starting point. If you are talking about today's dollar we do not need that much money to carry on our commitment.

Mr. BREWIN: I am not talking about the precise figure of $2 billion. I put it to you that what he said makes perfectly good sense, that if you are going to equip efficiently—and I not sure whether one or two brigades are contemplated, but I understand it is two—a transportable mobile force then you need a great deal of additional equipment which you have not go and that you have considerable additional expense. Am I right?

Mr. HELLYER: Correct.

Mr. BREWIN: This is what I understood General Moncel to say. Whether or not that is the precise figure there is not likely to be an appreciable decrease in the amounts that you are having to pay for your present commitments is there?

Mr. HELLYER: No; but I think it depends to a very large extent on degree. For example, we have not yet decided precisely how much airlift we want. By doubling your airlift you can increase your costs very greatly. If you are contemplating an increase of an order of magnitude then you can run the costs up very substantially; but before you can say precisely what amount of money you need you have to know not just the broad guidelines of the roles and missions that you are going to carry out but the time frame in which you are going to be able to do them, or the period of time in which you are going to be able to move a force, and, therefore, the amount of equipment required to do it.

Mr. BREWIN: You say that you have to put it in a time frame and that you can put things off—I think it is fairly obvious—but was not General Moncel's point a sound one? If you are going to move into the provision of a mobile force, which, I think you have said several times, would be available for any part of the world, it is going to cost quite a lot of additional money is it not, to carry that out? I do not care about time space. Is it not going to cost a lot of extra money?

Mr. HELLYER: Yes, it is going to cost money Mr. Brewin. It depends, again, on what capacity you are talking about.

Mr. BREWIN: I wonder what capacity you are talking about?

Mr. HELLYER: Well I would like to know what capacity General Moncel was talking about, because he was not referring to any paper that I know of on which these figures could be based.

Mr. BREWIN: Do you suggest that in this Committee we do not need to take too seriously his statement that we are faced in Canada with the choice of whether to maintain existing commitments or to move into a new role which would involve the maintenance of what I would think would be a fairly expensive mobile force that would be available to move into intervention roles in various parts of the world?

Mr. HELLYER: There are always choices available. For example the cost of airlift depends entirely on the capability. If you wanted a very great capability then either you would have to have an increase in expenditures or provide that money from some other function which is now being carried out.

Mr. WINCH: May I ask a supplementary question here? You have now started a mobile force. You have appointed a commander. It is now starting to function. Do you intend to equip the mobile force?

Mr. HELLYER: Yes.

Mr. WINCH: All right; what is the cost? What is the cost of the equipping? What is the use of training unless you equip?

Mr. HELLYER: I cannot give you precise figures for the cost because there are many areas in which decisions have yet to be taken.

For example, the number of helicopters for the force is a matter of current study. These are very expensive vehicles, both in the cost of acquiring them and in operating them. Until the studies are complete and we know how many of those are to be in the force it is impossible to cost them.

Mr. BREWIN: There is an old-fashioned biblical saying that when you have to build something you count the cost before you start building. In general

terms—and I am sure there are variables—have you not counted the added cost to the Canadian taxpayer of developing a highly mobile force of the type that I thought you had described to us.

Mr. HELLYER: Mr. Brewin, I think your generality has to be refined a little. You can have a mobile force with or without helicopters and the difference in the cost between the two would be astronomical.

Mr. BREWIN: Do you not know whether or not you are going to have helicopters?

Mr. HELLYER: We know we are going to have some, but we do not know how many.

Mr. BREWIN: I see; so that you have not counted the cost.

Mr. HELLYER: We have not counted the cost of helicopters because we have not yet made a study in sufficient detail to be able to make a decision.

Mr. WINCH: What about air transport?

Mr. BREWIN: I have just one other item and then, perhaps, my time will be up. I would like to go on the second round, too, of course.

I forget which of the witnesses told us about this, but he reminded us that as long ago as 1960 it was proposed, and agreed to by the NATO commander in Paris, and, I think, accepted by the military council there, that it would be appropriate for Canada to move out of the forward role into one of mobile reserve. This was agreed. I think it was added at one time, by General Foulkes, that this was dropped for some political reason. The question I want to ask is: Have you, or has your government, given consideration recently, or since you have been in office, to whether that suggestion might not be a proper one to be carried out at this stage of history?

Mr. HELLYER: We considered it when the White Paper was written and decided not to do it at that time for the reasons that were stated in the White Paper.

Mr. BREWIN: That was for political reasons? You did not state any military reason, did you?

Mr. HELLYER: Not just political; I am not sure that it would be right for Canada to abandon capability in mechanized forces. I am certainly not prepared to make that decision at the present time.

Mr. BREWIN: Do you think the position in Europe, the degree of gravity of the threat of war there, has changed in the last few years?

Mr. HELLYER: Yes, I think it has, Mr. Brewin.

Mr. BREWIN: Do you also think that the capability of our allies in Europe has changed considerably since we contracted these so-called commitments?

Me. HELLYER: It has changed somewhat, yes.

Mr. BREWIN: I want to put this to you: There is a lot of talk about commitments. Are we committed in NATO to any particular form of contribution?

Mr. HELLYER: Yes, at the present time we are.

Mr. BREWIN: What is the duration of this commitment? Is it perpetual, or for as long as NATO lasts, or is it subject to review and change?

Mr. HELLYER: I hesitate to answer this question from memory, but I think that starting at the end of 1958, or perhaps at the beginning of 1958, the future commitments are to be made a year at a time. The plans are given to the NATO commanders for a five year period. In other words, we indicate what we intend to do for a longer period, and then commit the actual forces for a year at a time. I could not say for sure when this starts but I think it is next year.

Mr. WINCH: Will not the NATO agreement come up for re-signing in 1969?

Mr. HELLYER: Mr. Winch, this question was raised earlier on in the deliberations of the Committee. As I recall the treaty it is not necessary to re-sign it. Any nation can give a year's notice if they intend to withdraw from the treaty. If no nation gives notice they remain signatories to the treaty. I think that is the way it is drawn.

Mr. BREWIN: Mr. Hellyer, I do not believe you have answered my question—although you may have indirectly—about the duration of the commitment to a particular role, such as the maintenance of our brigade in the forward role.

Mr. HELLYER: I intended to answer, Mr. Brewin. In technical terms the present commitment will end when the new commitment on a yearly basis starts, which I think is some time next year. Therefore, subject to the limitations of the equipment and other problems which face you, you are not really required to fulfil a particular role beyond the time for which you contract to do it.

Mr. BREWIN: I do not know whether you can tell us—it may be that it is classified—but I would like to know if you, or the Canadian government, have intimated to our allies in NATO at any time, or in any way, that we may be seeking to vary our commitments as represented by the air division and the brigade group?

Mr. HELLYER: The modest reduction that is taking place this year has already been agreed. In so far as the future is concerned, we will have to indicate this to NATO, if my memory serves me correctly, in December of this year, assuming that all of the other nations agree to this procedure.

Mr. BREWIN: But you have not as yet taken any steps to alter these commitments?

Mr. HELLYER: We are not required to reveal our intentions or to discuss our future plans and commitments except at that time.

Mr. BREWIN: Is the government giving consideration to this question, or is it a closed question?

Mr. HELLYER: I think that during the course of the year, Mr. Brewin, we will have to decide what we plan to do for the following five-year period and indicate to our NATO partners what they can count on.

Mr. BREWIN: I will pass.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, it is nearly six o'clock. Next on my list is Mr. Harkness.

I suggest that we adjourn until 8 o'clock.

EVENING SITTING

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen when we adjourned Mr. Harkness was about to commence his questioning. Mr. Harkness?

Mr. HARKNESS: Mr. Chairman, this long brief the Minister produced for us this afternoon is, I think, typical of the other long papers and long speeches which he has been giving to us for the past three years and which, I think, can be characterized—really as nothing else than a snow job, designed to obscure rather than to illuminate the important questions and matters which we have under consideration in this Committee. It is, in effect, a considerable number of assertions made by the Minister without any evidence to back them up and, in fact, contrary to the evidence which we have received in this Committee, together with some carefully selected passages, chiefly from military theoreticians, designed to try to convince the members of the Committee and the general public that his concept of a single unified service is the correct one.

Now, I think the lack of credibility in this whole brief can be demonstrated by one point alone, though I intend to bring up a considerable number of others. But this point that I would like to mention is the statement on page 51, a statement which the Minister has made on several occasions before and which he has seen fit to repeat here.

Today, our anti-submarine capability is at an all-time high.

Now, this is in spite of the evidence we have received from Admiral Brock and from Admiral Landymore that this is just not the situation. These officers are the two preceding commanders of Maritime Command who, I submit, are in a much better position to know our anti-submarine capabilities than the Minister. But in spite of that, he repeats this statement which, as I said, he has made several times before, and in which he produces no proof whatever to substantiate and which is in direct contradiction to the evidence we have received from perhaps the two best qualified men from whom we could get evidence on this matter who have already appeared before the Committee.

Now, I would like to ask the Minister why does he continue to repeat this statement which is contrary to the only expert opinion that we have heard?

Mr. HELLYER: Because, Mr. Harkness, I believe it. It do not know whether you were a member of the Committee last year when Admiral Landymore gave his in camera briefing or not, but if you were, you must have been impressed by the improvement in techniques in anti-submarine detection and with the very much enhanced capability of our present systems to survey that part of the ocean area which has been assigned to us, and notwithstanding the decrease in the numbers of ships we have a very capable and effective force at the present time.

Mr. HARKNESS: Well, this again, Mr. Chairman, is the sort of general statement that the Minister continues to make, but we have the hard evidence of the only two fully qualified men in this field who have been brought before the Committee, which is the direct opposite of this statement.

Mr. HELLYER: Well, Mr. Harkness, on that, you say that they are the two most qualified—

Mr. HARKNESS: I said that they are the two most qualified that we have had before this Committee.

Mr. HELLYER: That may be true. Admiral Brock has not been in Maritime Command now for some time. There have been some improvements since he left the Command. These have not started abruptly but, as has been stated many times before are a continuation of the systems which are being adopted by the navy and by the air force working together in Maritime Command to carry out their particular mission. As I said previously, I think it is unfortunate that some of the information which was made available to the Committee in camera last year cannot be made public because it would give the public, and those members of the Committee who have not had the opportunity of seeing it, a much better appreciation of what the capability really is. Certainly, compared to any time in the past that I know of, it represents some very significant improvements.

We have with us tonight a number of officers who can give more detailed information if you wish. We have the Director General of Maritime Forces here and if you would like to know from him the present state of the fleet and its manning and what we are able to do, I would be quite prepared to ask him to give testimony and to give you an up to date report.

Mr. HARKNESS: I certainly would be very interested in hearing his evidence and questioning him, but I do not think that we should do it at the present moment. I think we should continue with the questioning of the Minister on a number of these points.

Mr. HELLYER: I am quite agreeable to that, Mr. Harkness, as long as you do not make any carte blanche statements in the meantime that the contentions are incorrect; that you reserve your judgment until you have the evidence, including up to date evidence, and not just second-hand evidence and evidence four or five years old.

Mr. HARKNESS: This evidence we had was not four or five years old; it was not second-hand evidence; it was the direct evidence of the two previous commanders of Maritime Command.

Mr. WINCH: Mr. Chairman on a point of order; I say it is a point of order. If our colleague, Mr. Harkness, is going to make these statements then I think he should allow now for us to hear the immediate situation; otherwise it is a little bit unfair.

Mr. HARKNESS: Mr. Chairman, I have not only made this statement, I referred to the evidence that has been given, and I take this as one outstanding example of the lack of credibility that we can give to this brief because, as I say, here is a non-supported statement which is directly contrary to the evidence which we have received from the most qualified people who have been made available to us.

Mr. HELLYER: Mr. Harkness, I think you should review the evidence that Admiral Landymore gave last year.

Mr. NUGENT: Which version; expurgated or unexpurgated?

Mr. HELLYER: Either one. This evidence would give you a better appreciation of the situation than you are now portraying.

Mr. HARKNESS: In addition, as the Minister well knows through the evidence which has been given, as a result of some years as Minister of National Defence I have a considerable amount of other information and background on this matter, so I think I am in a pretty fair position to judge for myself what the situation is. That is the first matter. Now, I am very anxious to hear the evidence of—who was it the Minister said?

Mr. HELLYER: The Director General of Maritime Forces, Commodore Porter.

Mr. HARKNESS: Well, sir, I would be very glad to hear his evidence. My understanding is that the greatest anti-submarine expert left in the Navy is Admiral Burchell and I would be very interested in hearing his evidence with regard to this matter.

Mr. HELLYER: I do not think Admiral Burchell would make that claim at the moment. He is a very fine officer but at present he is involved in areas of slightly different responsibility where they are undertaking great things.

The CHAIRMAN: He is just the best looking one, then.

Mr. HARKNESS: Well, be that as it may. The next statement here that I would like to say something about is this:

> Now, we are introducing a wide range of modern equipment for our servicemen at home and abroad. Our mobility has been immeasurably increased. Our highly-trained professionals are now receiving the equipment they deserve.

The whole implication of this, the only thing that anybody can read out of it, is that up to the time the present Minister assumed his responsibilities of Minister of Defence, no modern equipment was being secured for the forces; that they were very badly equipped, and that the general situation from the equipment point of view was quite hopeless. I would like to ask the Minister whether he has spent more money for equipment during the period that he has been Minister of Defence than was being expended in the several years immediately prior to his becoming Minister of National Defence?

Mr. HELLYER: No, Mr. Harkness, but I think I spent it more wisely.

Mr. HARKNESS: That is a matter of your unsupported opinion again, upon which I hope we can get some more expert evidence.

Mr. HELLYER: Well, I am sure we will have, but I think the point you have raised is a valid one and I believe, for example, that the decision taken in 1959 only to equip the Canadian army at home—three brigades to training scales—is one of the worst decisions from a military standpoint that I know of.

Mr. HARKNESS: I even dispute that this was the fact, and I will come to that later.

Mr. HELLYER: I think some of the decisions that have been taken since have gone a long way towards correcting the situation which, if I may say so, we inherited.

Mr. HARKNESS: Mr. Chairman, I repeat that the whole purpose of this paragraph—the whole implication of it—is that prior to the Minister assuming office no equipment was being purchased, or very little equipment was being purchased, and it is only in the last three years that our servicemen are being

equipped with any reasonable amount of modern equipment. I would like to refer again to the actual figures of the amount of money spent for equipment for the three services during the past few years.

I put some of these figures on the record here before; they are from the public accounts. They are the audited expenditures, not the estimated ones or the ones that are hoped for; they are not "hoper" figures. These are the actual figures of what money was spent and in 1961-62 we spent $306.7 million for equipment. In 1962-63 we spent $233.5 million for equipment. Now, these are the two years immediately before the Minister took over. In 1963-64 there was $251.9 million spent; in 1964-65 there was $213 million spent, and in 1965-66, the last date for which we have the Auditor General's figures, $192 million was spent. The Minister referred earlier to the kind of dollars you are talking about. Well, of course, there has been a depreciation in the value of the dollar—a very considerable depreciation—I would think at least 10 per cent during the period that the present government has been in office. So the $192 million spent in 1965-66, in terms of the 1961-62 dollars of $306.7 million, is probably down to about $170 million to $174 million spent on equipment. But in spite of these figures which show definitely that the amount of equipment purchased has been reduced, and has been reduced regularly in the last two years, the Minister puts in a statement of this kind trying to convey to this Committee and to the general public that it is only in the last two or three years that our servicemen are getting any reasonable amount of modern equipment.

Mr. HELLYER: Mr. Harkness, I would make no claim that the purchase of equipment has just started in the last three or four years; this would not be correct. But I do think it is fair to say that with our present five-year integrated defence plan we are getting a better balance of equipment—better thought-out—and, perhaps, better priority in providing the equipment for our forces than sometimes has been the case in the past. I think that is a fair statement.

Mr. HARKNESS: Well, I think that is the type of general statement the Minister makes continuously when he is faced with some hard figures which he cannot controvert. The actual definite figures which can be proven show that the equipment purchases have been considerably less than they were and, therefore, I would ask him again: Why did he put this statement in his brief, the sole purpose of which was to try and denigrate what has been done by previous ministers of National Defence, and what has been done as far as supplying equipment to our forces is concerned?

Mr. HELLYER: I do not think that was the intention, Mr. Harkness, but I do think the program as it existed previously would have produced a continuing imbalance and would have left three-quarters of the Canadian army without the equipment it needed to fight; it would have left it without the transport required to move it, and I believe we are moving in a direction which will give us an enhanced capability.

Mr. HARKNESS: What you are saying now, then, is that in your view the considered opinion of the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff, the Service Chiefs of Staff, the Deputy Minister, the Chairman of the Defence Research Board and the other members of Defence Council, prior to your having taken over did not know what they were doing.

Mr. HELLYER: Well, Mr. Harkness, I would not—

Mr. HARKNESS: This is the only conclusion one can draw from what you have just said; there was a very bad imbalance, and it would have continued.

Mr. HELLYER: I did not know until now, on your admission, that it had been on their recommendation that some of these things had been done. I think, regardless of what the advice is, the minister has to accept the responsibility and I do not think any minister, either past or present, can escape the responsibility for the decisions he makes.

Mr. HARKNESS: I agree with you; the minister has to accept the responsibility, and I accept full responsibility for everything that was done whilst I was Minister of National Defence, but I think I, and every other minister prior to yourself, did give very serious consideration to the advice that was offered by his senior military advisers, but from the evidence that we have had I do not think you have done that. I think this is one of your great troubles.

Mr. HELLYER: Well, if one of my military advisers said I should equip only a quarter of my army, I do not think I would accept it.

Mr. HARKNESS: I will come back to this point which, again, I dispute as being wrong. That statement of yours is incorrect.

The next thing is on page 50. You state under "Operational Readiness":

> Suggestions have been made that our forces are not as operationally ready at the present time as they were prior to the inauguration of this program. This is utter nonsense.

Now, the evidence we have had here from generals Moncel and Fleury, from admirals Brock and Landymore, from Air Marshal Annis and from Air Vice Marshal Hendrick is just the reverse of what you state. In other words, what you are stating here is that everything they said is nonsense. Their evidence was that our forces are not as operationally effective as they were at that time.

Mr. HELLYER: At what time?

Mr. HARKNESS: Before this program was started.

Mr. HELLYER: If that was their contention, I disagree.

Mr. HARKNESS: Well, all right. Once more you are setting yourself up as knowing far more about these matters than these six senior officials, all recently retired, have given as their opinion.

Mr. HELLYER: Mr. Harkness, I think in reply to that we would be prepared tomorrow or Monday to have the Chief of Defence Staff give evidence, regarding the present state of operational readiness and to give you more up to date evidence than that which you have received from some of these retired gentlemen with respect to the operational capabilities.

Mr. HARKNESS: I am quite prepared to have the Chief of Defence Staff give his evidence, but one of the chief difficulties here, as we know, is that any presently serving officer who gives evidence which does not jibe with your ideas does not last long. In other words, he is not a free agent.

Mr. HELLYER: Mr. Harkness, I cannot accept that contention. It is an insult to every serving officer of the armed forces. It is so counter to all standards of decency that, as far as I am concerned, it is beneath contempt. There is not an

officer in this room who would say anything he did not believe to this Committee, and I would never ask an officer to say anything he did not believe because it would be wrong, and I would have no respect for an officer who did say something he did not believe. I think that suggestion should be withdrawn and I think you have a responsibility to the people that you have served with, and the people that served with you when you were Minister, to withdraw it.

Mr. HARKNESS: Well, my responsibility is to the people of Canada and my responsibility is as a member of the House of Commons, and the—

Mr. HELLYER: Surely you, as a former minister, would not want to leave on the record the suggestion that you have just made.

Mr. HARKNESS: Certainly the situation is this; every senior serving officer who has disagreed with your views either has been fired or has had to resign.

Mr. HELLYER: This is not so; absolutely not.

Mr. HARKNESS: The evidence that we have seen or have had before us shows this to be the situation.

Mr. HELLYER: You have had very inadequate evidence if that is your conclusion.

Mr. HARKNESS: Well, so much for that. The next thing you say:

> Let us look at the situation that existed in 1961-1963. We had spent $\$\frac{3}{4}$ billion acquiring weapon systems that could only be fully effective if provided with nuclear arms under American control.

And so on. This, I think, is a complete red herring which has been introduced to try to establish the contention made in the previous paragraph that, "At the present time the operational readiness is better than it has ever been before", and so forth.

There is no question whatever that until the weapon systems that required nuclear warheads had been supplied with those nuclear warheads, they were of no value; there is no question in that connection whatever. But to introduce this to try to maintain that the general effectiveness, and so on, of the forces is now much better than it has ever been before, I say is a red herring, because these warheads had been acquired prior to the integration program being started, and really have nothing to do with it.

Mr. HELLYER: Not completely; I agree that they have nothing in particular to do with the integration program at all, but I do think if you are going to make such wild contentions you have to have a starting base, and the starting base was the time that I assumed responsibility as Minister, and I say that the operational capability of our forces in almost all respects is very much greater now than it was then; in some respects in some areas, infinitely greater.

Mr. HARKNESS: As I say, the evidence we have had—and I repeat again—is that it is not greater as from the time this program started in the middle of 1964.

Mr. HELLYER: Most of those were unsupported contentions that were put before you as well, without evidence to back them up. You accepted them, apparently, without the supporting evidence you now require.

Mr. HARKNESS: They were the evidence of people with many, many years of military service, and people who were looked upon as being sufficiently good in

their fields to have been promoted to the top jobs—the very top jobs—in the Canadian defence organization.

Mr. HELLYER: Quite so, and we are prepared to provide witnesses with equal experience who have more up to date knowledge, and who can provide you with the information you require.

Mr. HARKNESS: The point I am making, Mr. Chairman, is that the introduction of this particular paragraph is a straight red herring as far as the matters we are considering are concerned.

Now, next you get on to this matter you have brought up two or three times: "Three-quarters of our army was equipped only to training scales". This is not correct. What about our tank regiments; were they only on training scales when you took over?

Mr. HELLYER: Have they have been acquired since the change in policy?

Mr. HARKNESS: I said: were our tank regiments on training scales of equipment only, when you became Minister?

Mr. HELLYER: My contention, Mr. Harkness, was that this is a policy adopted in 1959; it might not apply to—

Mr. HARKNESS: I am asking you a specific question, and I do not want a general answer on the general line you give which does not come down to specifics.

Mr. HELLYER: I think we had quite a surplus of tanks.

Mr. HARKNESS: Yes. In other words, then, as far as our armoured corps was concerned, it was not on training scales; it had full war equipment. What about our artillery regiments? Were they on a training scale only?

Mr. HELLYER: Again, Mr. Harkness, if you are talking about towed guns, I think we have had a surplus of those. This, I think, is more or less irrelevant to the decision you took that this policy would not be continued after 1959.

Mr. HARKNESS: What do you mean, the decision I took, and what policy?

Mr. HELLYER: That in future you would provide only training scales.

Mr. HARKNESS: My contention is that the forces were not equipped on training scales; that the statement that they were on training scales is completely incorrect. I am going over them arm by arm, in order of their seniority, and you have admitted that the armour was up to war establishment. I think you have admitted, at least indirectly, that the artillery was up to war establishment, and, in fact, that we had a surplus of guns. Is that not correct?

Mr. HELLYER: Speaking from memory with respect to the tanks and the towed guns themselves, I suspect that it is so.

Mr. HARKNESS: Yes.

Mr. HELLYER: I think we should extend this into other fields, including ammunition and new equipments that were being programmed, where the more current policy applied.

Mr. HARKNESS: Naturally, Mr. Chairman, I think it is evident to everyone in this Committee that an army cannot be equipped with equipment and actu-

ally in possession of equipment, which has been ordered but not yet delivered, but as far as the equipment laid down for the army is concerned, my contention is that this statement the Minister has made that three-quarters of our army was equipped only to training scale is completely and utterly false.

Mr. HELLYER: With respect to those two equipments, Mr. Harkness, were they acquired during your time as Minister?

Mr. HARKNESS: No, they were there when I became Minister.

Now, as far as the infantry is concerned, was the infantry not fully equipped with rifles, machine guns, anti-tank weapons, trucks, mortars, and so forth?

Mr. HELLYER: I would say: with ancient trucks, with ancient wireless, and with no armoured personnel carriers at all. As you well know, in the appreciation of our capability in Europe these were chronic deficiencies which were reported and about which nothing was done for a considerable period of time.

Mr. HARKNESS: You say, ancient rifles; how old were the rifles?

Mr. HELLYER: I did not say ancient rifles.

Mr. HARKNESS: You said, ancient equipment, generally. How ancient were the rifles?

Mr. HELLYER: If I said rifles—and I do not think I did—I did not mean to. I said, wireless and trucks.

Mr. HARKNESS: All right, how ancient were the trucks?

Mr. HELLYER: Oh, ancient enough that it is time they were replaced.

Mr. HARKNESS: Well, how ancient were they? You make another general statement; I want you to get down to specifics. How ancient were they?

Mr. HELLYER: Which truck are you talking about?

Mr. HARKNESS: I am talking about the general issue of trucks. As a matter of fact—

Mr. HELLYER: Yes, Mr. Harkness, but general issue trucks are divided into categories too. If you could be more specific on that, I could get the answer for you.

Mr. HARKNESS: We will take jeeps; how ancient were the jeeps?

Mr. HELLYER: I will have to get that answer for you.

Mr. HARKNESS: I will tell you; I think you will find that a considerable number of them had just been bought and the same thing applies to a large number of the other trucks. There was a constant stream of new trucks and equipment coming into the army during the period prior to when I was Minister of National Defence and during the period that I was Minister of National Defence. As I say, I do not think you can point to any specific arm of the army to which this statement truthfully can be applied: Three-quarters of our army was equipped only to training scales. You have not been able to mention one single instance yet where it applied.

Mr. HELLYER: I think the infantry were not adequately equipped anywhere, and that certainly applies to three-quarters in Canada, and probably to a very considerable extent to the units in Europe as well.

Mr. HARKNESS: There is no question that the infantry required armoured personnel carriers and we had a program to supply them, but they had not yet been supplied at this time. Every military force of any kind naturally has to continue to get new equipment every year if it is going to keep up to date. You started in to say that three or four years ago the army did not have armoured trucks, and it did not have certain other things which developed in the meantime, but this is a completely different thing than saying it was only equipped to training scales. This statement, as I have said before, is completely false. I think you should withdraw it.

Mr. HELLYER: I do not think so. I think any caveats that you have entered are on the record.

Mr. HARKNESS: This is one of the troubles of dealing with the Minister, Mr. Chairman. He makes these general statements; he cannot back them up, and then he refuses to withdraw them. As a matter of fact, he will probably go out tomorrow and make a speech to the Rotary Club in Halifax, or some place, and repeat it again. This is the difficulty that we are faced with.

Mr. HELLYER: There was a requirement for a considerable period of time for self-propelled guns, and this was not met. I do not think, Mr. Harkness, that just by going back to those items of equipment which were surplus from a previous government, and which you inherited, really can absolve your government from the policy decision it took in 1959.

Mr. HARKNESS: I do not know what policy in 1959 you are referring to. What policy are you referring to?

Mr. HELLYER: The policy of equipping three brigades in Canada only to training scales.

Mr. HARKNESS: There was no policy along that line. As I have just shown and indicated, they were not equipped to training scale; they were equipped up to their war establishment as it existed at that time. I do not think you can produce any evidence to show anything except that.

Mr. HELLYER: I think I can, Mr. Harkness.

Mr. HARKNESS: You have not so far and as I say, in matters I have mentioned you admit they were equipped.

Mr. HELLYER: I know there were some pretty desperate shortage; and some of them remained; some of them will take a number of years to overcome.

An hon. MEMBER: There is a shortage of men right now, too.

Mr. HARKNESS: Following that, you say:

> Worse still, even if our land force in Canada had been operationally equipped, it did not have the airlift or sealift to get it anywhere in any reasonable length of time.

What sea lift does it have now that it did not have then?

Mr. HELLYER: At this moment, the *Provider*.

Mr. HARKNESS: Who ordered the *Provider*?

Mr. HELLYER: You did.

Mr. HARKNESS: Yes, I did.

Mr. HELLYER: And two other support ships are now on tender.

Mr. HARKNESS: Yes, but they are not there yet; they have not been produced.

Mr. HELLYER: That is right.

Mr. HARKNESS: So I say, what sea lift have the forces got now that they did not have then, except for the *Provider* which I ordered?

Mr. HELLYER: Except for the *Provider* none.

Mr. HARKNESS: None; once more, this statement is not correct. You say "the airlift"; what airlift have the forces got now except for the continuation of the purchase of C-130's which was started during the time I was there? We bought four of them, as I recall, to try out to see how they worked, and if they were satisfactory the plan was to increase the number, which you have done.

Mr. HELLYER: Mr. Harkness, there was no plan that I know of to increase the number. I am very familiar with this particular acquisition and the present Hercules fleet, with the exception of those four, was initiated entirely since I became Minister.

Mr. HARKNESS: Did you never learn that the purchase of these four was in the form of an experiment to see what extent they met our requirements; to find out what, particularly, they could do as far as the arctic air lift was concerned?

Mr. HELLYER: Not only did I not learn, that Mr. Harkness, but no requirement was given to me for these particular airplanes, and it required a considerable amount of persuasion on my part that we should acquire them and, I think, just in time because the C-119's were just about worn out when we did acquire the Hercules.

Mr. HARKNESS: Why do you think four were bought if there was no idea of purchasing more?

Mr. HELLYER: I really could not say, Mr. Harkness; that is a question you should answer.

Mr. HARKNESS: I do answer it right now. As I say, they were bought to find out to what extent we could make use of them, and with the purpose in mind of increasing the number if we found they were satisfactory.

Mr. HELLYER: Certainly there was no record left for your successor that would indicate that, Mr. Harkness, and nothing on the file that I have every seen that could, by any stretch of the imagination, be so interpreted.

Mr. HARKNESS: The next statement that you go on to, is:

> Our Militia was demoralized under the burden of an ill-conceived, poorly-programmed civil defence program.

What were the numbers of the militia at that time, compared with the numbers now?

Mr. HELLYER: They were considerably larger, Mr. Harkness, but you will recall that a deliberate policy decision was taken about two years ago to reduce

the numbers and, at the same time, try to increase the effectiveness by a number of steps; if this was a basic policy decision—

Mr. HARKNESS: If they were considerably larger, which they were, does that indicate demoralization on their part?

Mr. HELLYER: Not necessarily.

Mr. HARKNESS: No; as a matter of fact, there was no demoralization.

Mr. HELLYER: There was considerable dissatisfaction with the roles which had been assigned, and the fact that corps training had been discontinued.

Mr. HARKNESS: This is another statement which is completely incorrect, and which cannot be substantiated. As I say, the very fact of the numbers that existed in the militia at that time compared to the present, is an indication.

Mr. HELLYER: I think you would be incorrect in equating numbers, either just with morale or with efficiency; you have to add in all of the other factors which are relevant.

Mr. HARKNESS: I fully agree that you have to add all of the other factors in, but I say the numbers alone indicate that this statement was not correct. Actually, I think if you go out and make an intensive investigation of the state of the militia at the present time, you will find the state of demoralization is very, very much greater than it was at the time you mentioned.

Mr. HELLYER: I think morale is improving very rapidly in the militia now, particularly in the last short while since the new proposal of the Deputy Chief of Reserves has been made known to them, and there is every promise of a very substantial improvement relating primarily to a greater precision in the definition of their roles, and the things that are expected of them.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Harkness, I think I should put you down for round number two.

Mr. HARKNESS: All right. I would just like to say, in connection with that, I certainly hope these hopes will be fulfilled, because I have been concerned about the reduction in the numbers of the militia and what I hear about the difficulties they have in trying to maintain their units at all.

Mr. HELLYER: I hope it will, too, Mr. Harkness but, as you know, it is extremely difficult to do so, particularly with the changes in our society where now there is so much competition from other activities.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Mr. Minister, I can agree with one statement that you made before dinner. I do not think it is in your speech at all; you said you regretted the term "unification" was used because it would cause so much confusion.

Mr. HELLYER: Yes, I am glad you agree with that, and I think it is a fair statement.

Mr. MCINTOSH: We asked you in the House time and time again to change the term, or tell us what it meant. Could I ask you, Mr. Minister, with your regret that you used this term "unification", what other term would you substitute?

Mr. HELLYER: If I were doing it over again, I would just say "a single integrated service".

Mr. McINTOSH: Just "a single integrated service".

Mr. HELLYER: That is correct.

Mr. McINTOSH: I wonder if you were—

Mr. HELLYER: And if you would like me to do so, I am willing to drop it now and just call it a single integrated service.

Mr. McINTOSH: I am quite willing to drop the term "unification", but—

An hon. MEMBER: It would be a lot easier in Halifax.

Mr. McINTOSH: Mr. Minister, certain statements are attributed to you by the press. In one of them I think they reported you as saying: "Unification is probably the boldest plan of military reorganization ever tried by a modern nation". Did you make that statement?

Mr. HELLYER: I do not know, but I think it is a fair statement so far as recent times are concerned.

Mr. McINTOSH: Could we substitute "single service" as probably the boldest plan of military organization ever tried by a modern nation?

Mr. HELLYER: Where is the quote from?

Mr. McINTOSH: I have the paper, but I do not happen to have it with me.

Mr. HELLYER: Oh, yes.

Mr. McINTOSH: Oh, I will get it for you.

Mr. HELLYER: Right now?

Mr. McINTOSH: Not right now; I want to finish my questioning, but I can produce it—do not worry. I think you said that you had said it; I took that as sufficient evidence that it was a fact. I could go on and tell you a lot more things that you have said, and I do not think "single service" would fit into many of them.

First of all, the daily press came out with such editorials as:

> Tell us what unification means, Mr. Hellyer. What is required is an official comprehensive public statement on unification, Mr. Hellyer. The services and the people must be told why integration is not enough and why unification is necessary, Mr. Hellyer. We must be told what we have to give up, and what we stand to gain. The services and the people have a right to an explanation for the necessity of this dangerous political experiment that you have mentioned. Mr. Hellyer has not handled this matter well. He must reveal more facts. Unification is untried, untested and undefined.

Mr. HELLYER: What was the question, Mr. McIntosh?

Mr. McINTOSH: I question you on this term "unification" and whether "single service" means the same thing. I think that perhaps there is some justification in what Mr. Lynch has said in one of his articles, and maybe you will agree with me. He said this:

> Many of Mr. Hellyer's arguments in support of unification have an improvised air about them, as though he had dreamed up unification first and then devised the evidence in support of it afterwards.

Is that true?

Mr. HELLYER: No, Mr. McIntosh. I thought I covered that point very clearly and at some length in my opening statement when I said to the Committee that this is an old idea which has been written about by literally dozens, or perhaps hundreds, of officers when they were at staff college; which has been talked about by some of the great military leaders of our generation; and which, we believe, is a good concept, and which we are now implementing in this country.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Did any of your military staff suggest to you that you use the term "unification" in your speeches?

Mr. HELLYER: I really could not answer that question, Mr. McIntosh. My memory, I am afraid, is fallible, and I just would not know.

Mr. MCINTOSH: You have told us time and time again that there is an indication in the White Paper that you were going to use this term "unification", although we could never find it. You talked about united forces.

Mr. HELLYER: I said: A single unified force.

Mr. MCINTOSH: You also said "unification".

Mr. HELLYER: My advisers tell me that is exactly the same as a single service; there is no difference.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I also feel regret because, if you had not used the term "unification", maybe we would have retained the services of a great number of these senior officers who took early retirement because they could not agree with you on this term. I was a little bit horrified to hear you say this evening that it was inadequate evidence—I think you said that to Mr. Harkness—inadequate evidence, when we have heard from admirals of the navy, generals of the army, and air marshals of the air force—not just one service, not just the navy, and not just Admiral Landymore or Admiral Brock to whom you have referred. Do you not think this same felling is through all the services? This mystery, or puzzle with regard to the term "unification"—could you not have cleared that up with them before you forced their retirement?

Mr. HELLYER: No, I do not, Mr. McIntosh, and if it were, it would be absolutely impossible to implement.

Mr. MCINTOSH: What would be absolutely impossible to implement?

Mr. HELLYER: The whole single service concept. If all military officers and men were opposed to the single service concept it could not be implemented; it would be impossible.

Mr. MCINTOSH: They were not opposed to a single service concept. I think General Moncel told us here that he was in favour of it. I think practically all the witnesses that we have had before us—of course I would have to have the transcript of evidence and go through it—told us they were in favour of a single service concept.

Mr. HELLYER: It is a surprise to me, and I must say that I am delighted if that is the case.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Possibly you would not have had the Committee sitting as long as it has been sitting if you had been a little more flexible in your answers

to the members in the House, and so on. But you were silent, you would not tell us, you reveled in the fact that you were getting the publicity, and so on. You would not answer any of our questions.

Mr. HELLYER: Mr. McIntosh, I think that is unfair. I have been quite anxious to answer, and quite anxious to get the bill introduced and considered in the normal way so that we could, in fact, answer your questions in the manner which I hope would satisfy you.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Mr. Minister, I think you were in the House when I made my speech. I asked you to tell us what the word "unification" meant. I referred to it as a mysterious word; we did not know what it was. You made no effort to explain it to us.

Mr. HELLYER: Mr. McIntosh I think, it was probably as a result of your very forcible representations that I felt it necessary to define it in my opening statement to this Committee.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I thank you for that, but I still do not think you have cleared up all the problems connected with it. I hope that I can convince you a little later on. In fact, I said in the House that we did not understand the ultimate intent of unification because the Minister had never explained the meaning of the term in a manner that related to the services, except as he was reported to have said in various newspapers. You would not say these things in the House; you said them in newspapers and this is where we had to get our information.

Mr. HELLYER: I do not think that is fair, Mr. McIntosh. I made a speech in the house on December 7, which took a considerable period of time—actually more time than some of my hon. colleagues thought I might have taken—and it was, regrettably, not very widely reported in the newspapers. Sometimes they have seemed, more inclined to report the controversial aspects rather than the meat and the answers to the questions which would be of more benefit to the people who are interested.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Let us just refer to that speech for a few moments. I said to you in the House that in the speech you gave it seemed to me you were giving an answer, yes and an auswer no to everything that we had been asking. It was a very puzzling speech to anyone who tried to understand it. It was a very mysterious speech. All I have to do is to refer you to one part of it; you said:

> The system will not be changed by reason of unification. Certainly, we will continue to have infantry regiments as well as a Royal Canadian Armoured Corps and the Royal Regiment of Canadian Artillery. Although a unified personnel management system will be introduced, the separate units and elements of naval, field, and air force will continue to exist. Personnel in the combat forces will continue to be identified as sailors, soldiers and airmen.

I could go on and tell you of many more things that you have said, but at the end of it you said this:

> Until the force structure within the unified force is developed.

Now, you tell me that they will be continued. Is there a limitation on the period during which they will be continued? Do you intend to do away with the navy, air force, and the army by 1972? This is what I read into what you said in

the House. You did not give us any answers; you said yes and no at the same time. You have left this mystery, and I would not be surprised if it was on purpose to confuse the opposition.

Mr. HELLYER: Mr. McIntosh, you have no idea how delighted I am that you raised that question, because I have been wanting to deal with it for the last week—

Mr. MCINTOSH: Well, I hope that you will deal with it.

Mr. HELLYER: —and have not been able to. That particular paragraph was put in the speech at the request of the Armed Forces Council. It could have been clearer, I think, but it means that the members of the armed forces will continue to wear their present uniforms and be identified in that way until, in the cases of the support arms, for example, new lists are formed and new uniforms are issued, whatever length of time that may be. That is all it means.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Do you mean to say that is all that this last sentence means; "until the force structure within the unified force is developed"?

Mr. HELLYER: That is all it means, Mr. McIntosh.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Just a walking out dress.

Mr. HELLYER: I am sorry to disillusion you in that way.

Mr. MCINTOSH: You did not disillusion me. I said in my speech, again that from what I could understand of unification, it seemed ridiculous that you had to bring in a bill and everything else just to change the uniform and a couple of ranks.

Mr. HELLYER: I am sorry that this was a little misleading. I must admit that I can understand why it would be, but that is all it meant.

Mr. MCINTOSH: This article that appeared in the Toronto *Star* of Thursday, February 23, may be a little bit misleading, Mr. Minister. I would ask you to deny or confirm that you made these statements as reported:

> Defence Minister, Mr. Hellyer, said last night—

Mr. HELLYER: Is it a newspaper?

Mr. MCINTOSH: It is in the Toronto *Star*, and if you deny it, I will be very pleased:

> —that Lieutenant General Frank Fleury was responsible for the situation, as the former Comptroller General of the Armed Forces described in testimony before the Commons Defence Committee.

To go on again, it says:

> Hellyer said in an interview here that Fleury was the one primarily responsible for the situation as it existed at that time and he, Fleury, must share the responsibility for any shortcomings that existed. Hellyer said that since Fleury's departure from the Defence Staff communications became quite good but there is always room for improvement.

Did you make that statement, Mr. Minister?

Mr. HELLYER: Mr. McIntosh, in the form it appears there, no; I must admit that I said that he would have been partially responsible. By some juxtaposition,

someone put "primarily" instead of "partially". I really regret that I said anything; if I had it to do over again, I would not. I apologize to General Fleury for having said anything, but certainly I did not use the word "primarily"; the word that I actually used was "partially". In so far as the improvement in communications is concerned, I did not attribute it directly to the General, but rather the General's statement that since last summer internal communications had improved very markedly and that there was still—as there is in all areas, I am sure—some room for additional improvement.

Mr. McINTOSH: When did General Fleury go on your staff, Mr. Minister?

Mr. HELLYER: At headquarters?

Mr. McINTOSH: Yes, at headquarters?

Mr. HELLYER: I really could not recall off-hand.

Mr. McINTOSH: Was he in at the beginning of the formation of the single service?

Mr. HELLYER: I do not recall exactly when he came to headquarters; I believe it was September, 1965.

Mr. McINTOSH: Did he oppose the formation of the single service?

Mr. HELLYER: Well, you have heard his testimony.

Mr. McINTOSH: Yes, this is why I am asking the question.

Mr. HELLYER: I think it would be quite wrong for me to say what other people's views are. I think I should tell you what my views are.

Mr. McINTOSH: We will go on to what you were supposed to have said in London, that unification will be considered natural and normal by a younger generation despite the fact that very conservative people like Opposition Leader John Diefenbaker, former defence minister Douglas Harkness and Gordon Churchill, Conservative member of parliament for Winnipeg South Centre, object to change and kindle controversy to political advantage. Did you say that?

Mr. HELLYER: I said that they are very conservative people.

Mr. McINTOSH: You deny the rest of it?

Did you say it is not unnatural for these three to support the status quo?

Mr. HELLYER: I think I said that.

Mr. McINTOSH: Was there anything else that you said, Mr. Hellyer?

Mr. HELLYER: I really cannot recall, but I wish I had a tape recording of it.

Mr. McINTOSH: You mentioned something in your speech this afternoon with regard to conscription. I take it that you do not agree with the publisher of the Winnipeg *Free Press* in the article that he published on this?

Mr. HELLYER: No, I do not.

Mr. McINTOSH: You also do not agree with General Moncel when he said to fulfil the policy you have laid down would take a force of from 148,000 to 150,000 personnel?

Mr. HELLYER: No, I suspect that figure was picked right out of the air.

Mr. McINTOSH: Right out of the air? Just like the figure over $2.6 billion?

Mr. HELLYER: I would think they both were.

Mr. McINTOSH: Was General Moncel in the habit of picking things right out of the air to give you advice, or when you asked questions about how much it would cost?

Mr. HELLYER: I do not think I would want to say it was a habit.

Mr. McINTOSH: Had he done it on former occasions?

Mr. HELLYER: Well, I do not really think that is relevant. We are really considering these two questions at the moment and I think it is a fair statement with respect to those.

Mr. McINTOSH: I do not think you gave the proper answer to Mr. Brewin when he asked about that, but we will go on with General Moncel's testimony. He said that unification may be the kiss of death to the Canadian defence commitment. Do you agree with that?

Mr. HELLYER: No, I deny it categorically.

Mr. McINTOSH: He also said that unification will work only if defence commitments are reduced or changed. Do you agree with that?

Mr. HELLYER: I deny that categorically.

Mr. McINTOSH: He said unification was an uncharted course with a dim destination. Do you agree with that?

Mr. HELLYER: I certainly do not.

Mr. McINTOSH: He also said unification has become unification for unification sake. Do you agree with that.

Mr. HELLYER: Positively not.

Mr. McINTOSH: Getting back to the commitments that we have one of the witnesses suggested—I think it was Air Marshal Annis—that there was a dual role or policy now for the defence of Canada and he referred to our collective defences, the alliances that we have, and the new concept of a peace keeping force. Is that correct?

Mr. HELLYER: I am afraid I do not understand what the Air Marshal is saying.

Mr. McINTOSH: He referred to the White Paper and said that you also mentioned it in your speech. You understood then that there was a role you were going to implement for peacekeeping, which was a role additional to those that we had already been committed to.

Mr. HELLYER: I have said this is a role that we have performed very effectively in the past and can continue to perform very effectively in the future. Our servicemen have done yeoman service to this country in performing various United Nations roles which can best be performed by the maintenance in Canada of well-equipped, well-trained conventional forces, from which can be drawn at any time the specific requirements for United Nations' operations.

Mr. McINTOSH: Would that be a force of two airborne brigades, Mr. Minister?

Mr. HELLYER: Mr. McIntosh, we have never known in advance what the particular United Nations requirement would be. That is the reason I believe the suggestion made by Mr. Churchill that we should have a separate United Nations force is not really very practical, and that we can best perform United Nations' roles by making available to the United Nations from our forces those units, sub-units, or specialists, that are required at any time to perform the tasks the government agrees to.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Could you give us some indication of what type of force you feel the United Nations would accept? I ask you this question because you have made glowing remarks about General Foulkes in some of your statements, but he asked this question. He asked, would Canada want to use the two airborne brigades to force acceptance of a decision in a dispute between two countries anywhere in the world.

Mr. HELLYER: Mr. McIntosh, it is not my responsibility to second guess what this government or any other government might decide to do in the future. It is my responsibility to see that within the framework laid down by the White Paper we develop the maximum military capability possible. It is then the responsibility of the government of the day to decide where, or under what circumstances, it might be used.

Mr. MCINTOSH: You would not want to second guess what forces the United Nations would require either, would you?

Mr. HELLYER: I would not.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Did you or any member of your government make an offer to the United Nations to provide a force for such a task as this?

Mr. HELLYER: Well, I think you know the position. We have had a battalion on standby for some time which we could make available if there was requirement and if the circumstances existing at the time were such that it was in the interest of Canada to use part or all of that unit. Beyond that I think it is well known that the United Nations are not in a position to accept permanent standby forces or of take any responsibility for them, and that is the reason we announced the policy that we did in the White Paper, and why I think it is still a valid policy.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Mr. Minister, an editorial in the Montreal *Gazette* of February 18 suggests that the Committee might well look into the powers of the defence minister under the new act, and examine whether or not they are excessive. Do you think they are excessive, or can you give us any reason why you need additional power?

Mr. HELLYER: I do not think they are excessive, Mr. McIntosh, and I do not think any additional powers are required. The only change, as I recall, between the present act and the one that will exist if this bill is passed, is the power to make rank designation substitutions. Beyond that, I think they are identical.

I think it is important to point out, though, that there are very real limitations to the exercise of power and it may be quite correct to say that theoretically the Minister could send a battalion to some part of the world, either for exercises or for some other reason, but unless the decision is one which would meet with the approval of the Canadian people and the government of the day, it

just could not be done; otherwise, the Minister either would have to resign or be dismissed forthwith.

There are very real circumscriptions to the Minister's power. No Minister of National Defence can exercise this power in an indiscriminate manner nor could any Chief of Defence Staff exercise power in an indiscriminate manner. It just would not be accepted. I think you would appreciate this and realize that it is true. Under our system I think the Minister has to have quite broad powers but he has to be very careful in the way in which he exercises them and, at all times, he has to be sure that his decisions are decisions which can be substantiated and which would carry the judgment of his cabinet colleagues and of the Canadian people.

Mr. McINTOSH: Any broader powers, Mr. Minister, than any other democracy in the world?

Mr. HELLYER: I am really not competent to answer that question because I have not studied in detail the defence acts of other countries. I am just not competent to say whether they are greater or less than the powers of ministers of this country.

Mr. McINTOSH: Mr. Minister, you say you have not studied the other acts in detail, and you brought this up before, I think, in answer to a question that Mr. Harkness asked you. It seems odd that with the staff you have you do not pay a little bit more attention to details. When asked about this $2.6 billion it did not seem that anyone in your Department had presented a budget to show what the commitments you were making would cost the people of Canada, or the number of personnel that would be required to fulfil those commitments. Is that not what you have a staff for; to give you the details?

Mr. HELLYER: Absolutely; and I would not want you, by any stretch of the imagination, to get the impression that the staff are not actively engaged in this on a day to day basis. They are, in fact, at this very moment—not tonight, but at this particular time—engaged in working out a new integrated defence plan for the next five years. I think we have to have it ready within a few months and it will do just exactly what you are suggesting, that is, relate our money, manpower and equipment in a way which will let us know precisely what we have undertaken to do and can do in the years ahead; to refine the establishments in a way that we can relate them to the resources available, both in manpower and money.

Mr. McINTOSH: You put your finger right on one of my fears, Mr. Minister. My fear is that with the change in the defence structure which you have carried out so far, and by your other actions since you have been Minister, you are not getting the details you should be getting as Minister in order to make your decision. I suggest that before any decision is made with regard to a man's life—and I am talking about the combat forces right now—a great many details should be considered right down to the finest detail before any man is committed to combat, including whether he can be sustained in that combat; whether he has enough ammunition; whether he is going to have any support, and there are a great many other details. That is what the staff is for.

Mr. HELLYER: Mr. McIntosh, I think it is a fair statement to say that I have more information available to me on which to make decisions than any previous minister.

Mr. McINTOSH: More, or the right information?

Mr. HELLYER: I would say both.

Mr. McINTOSH: But you just said that you did not have the information about the number of personnel you are going to require, the amount of money you are going to require—

Mr. HELLYER: As we implement the improved techniques of management which were referred to first of all in principle in the White Paper, and which have been referred to in detail in the briefings of this Committee last year and which are very comprehensive and very impressive, I think within a year or two the information available to management will be even better than it is today.

Mr. McINTOSH: Well, I am afraid I cannot agree with you but I will go on.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. McIntosh, your time is coming to an end.

Mr. McINTOSH: Can I ask the other question this editorial suggests we ask the Minister?

The CHAIRMAN: Yes.

Mr. McINTOSH: It says that one of the frustrating parts of the whole debate is that while the onus is clearly on the Minister and his planners to prove how the single service concept will save money, improve efficiency, and maintain morale in the armed forces, the facts have to be squeezed out, and this is what I am going to try to do, Mr. Minister. Can you tell us how your new plan is going to increase the morale in the forces, how it is going to improve efficiency, and how it is going to save money?

Mr. HELLYER: I think morale will be improved for at least two reasons. The wider career opportunities available both to the other ranks and officers will provide additional incentives, and this will be an important factor as far as morale is concerned. Then I think the challenge of developing and implementing the first single service concept in a sophisticated nation is one which, in itself, will excite the imagination and, attract the loyalty of the people involved in it. In so far as efficiency is concerned, a single service concept will make it easier for us to change establishments and roles as I indicated earlier today.

Mr. McINTOSH: Not just change for change sake?

Mr. HELLYER: No, not change for change sake. But when these are dictated by changes in technology, or changes in national policy or international relations, the single service approach to communications and just the fact that the services will be speaking the same service language will, I think, result in an improvement in so far as efficiency is concerned.

Mr. McINTOSH: On that one point, Mr. Minister, we had evidence that the navies would not be speaking the same language; the navies that we have in our alliances for the collective defence of our country would not be speaking the same language.

Mr. HELLYER: Their communications are very good and I do not think—

Mr. McINTOSH: Now they are good but will they be good?

Mr. HELLYER: Absolutely, so I think you will have improvements in morale ultimately, and I do not think it will take too long before you will have

improvements in efficiency. In so far as costs are concerned there just is no question that, as the process continues and we are able to consolidate more facilities, there will be additional savings.

Mr. McINTOSH: In what manner?

Mr. HELLYER: For example, where now you have different depots to provide logistic support, if you can consolidate those into one, you can reduce the overhead; where you presently have three schools, if you can consolidate those into one, you can reduce the overhead; where you have had so many communication systems, if you can consolidate those, you decrease the overhead; when servicemen want to transfer from one occupation to another in the future, and there is no longer any requirement for them to be re-documented and take their basic training over again, this is a saving. I think, if my memory serves me correctly—and Air Marshal Reyno can correct me if I am wrong—there are over 5,000 people in the air force today who have served in one of the other services.

Mr. REYNO: Seventy five hundred.

Mr. HELLYER: There are over 4,000 ex sailors. Considerable gains in efficiency are possible and, consequently, reductions in cost. I think, on all of those three points, we can meet the test that you have set.

Mr. McINTOSH: I would like to go into those three points as part of my next round. Would you put me down, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. LANIEL: Mr. Minister, at page 22 you refer to Mr. Churchill's—the less well know of the Churchills—saying that:

> Ministers should not question senior military technical advice.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I raise a point of order. Is that a direct quote from the evidence?

Mr. LANIEL: This is a quote from page 22.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I know, but is the quote on page 22 directly from the evidence given before this Committee?

Mr. LANIEL: On the question of privilege, Mr. Chairman, could I ask Mr. Churchill whether he did or did not say that senior military technical advice should not be questioned?

Mr. CHURCHILL: I will have to go by what the printed record shows, but I think my statement was that ministers should get senior military technical advice before going off on their own. I do not think I said they should not question, but I will have to accept whatever the printed record shows.

Mr. HELLYER: I was startled when you said that, Mr. Churchill; that is the reason I made a note of it. I hope I have not done you an injustice.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I have some more things to say that will startle you later on, I have no doubt.

Mr. LANIEL: Mr. Minister, you remarked there was some justification for this approach and what puzzled me is that at page 23 you say military advice is not unanimous. I do not see how you could agree with or give any justification to that approach if it is so. I do not want to hurt Mr. Churchill, he is touchy in this committee, but how do you reconcile the two? If the advice is not unanimous

someone must be wrong, and if there is a lack of unanimity, what should we do? Who will take the decision, or should the decision be postponed?

Mr. HELLYER: I think one of the most serious problems of living in a technological age and of our system of government is the necessity for people who are primarily laymen having to take decisions in respect to technical matters. There is no doubt that any minister or chief executive of any major organization has to rely to a very great extent on the technical advice which is given him by his staff. At the same time, it is often true that advice is not unanimous. It does not necessarily have to be conflicting, although sometimes it is; there can be different degrees of advice. When this happens the executive—in this case the Minister—has to make a judgment.

I think you could recall many times when there has been a conflict of technical evidence. One that comes to my mind is when the building of the Mid Canada Line was proposed, and it was built. You may recall an article which appeared in one of the popular magazines subsequently by an air force expert who questioned it on technical grounds. Obviously, here was a difference in opinion by technical people. I think one should take advantage of all sources of information which are available through reasonable recognized channels, but then there is no escaping the necessity of the chief executive—or, in our parliamentary system, of the minister—taking the responsibility for the decision, no matter what it is.

Mr. LANIEL: At page 26 you say that you have consulted

> ...hundreds of Service officers ranging in rank from officer cadet to general,...

on this matter of unification and single service. If you did so, and having had to take a decision at one moment or another, you might be in a position to reply to this question: Do you believe that at this moment the great majority of your senior officers support unification?

Mr. HELLYER: Yes, I believe they do.

Mr. LANIEL: Do you think that integration, if there had never been any mention of unification, could have been carried at a very low level without being forced to introduce at least some kind of one uniform at either level, so to facilitate and to aid in the cooperation of capable officers?

Mr. HELLYER: Would you mind repeating that question, Mr. Laniel, because I want to—

Mr. LANIEL: What I have in my mind is this: I am wondering, exclusive of one single service and the keeping of the three services concept, whether we could have integrated completely the higher level of command without arriving at a fourth uniform, so as to eliminate the rivalry between the services and make the senior levels of command something over and above these services.

Mr. HELLYER: I think the uniform would not be so important if it were not for the identification of existing uniforms with existing services. Therefore, if you were to go into integration as far as we have gone, for example, you get many of the benefits, but you still have many of the psychological problems related to the connection of a uniform with a service which exists in law, but not in its previous form, with the head and its own council. I think there are certain

psychological problems because of this association of a particular uniform with a particular service which can best be overcome by the introduction of a different uniform.

I do not want to overemphasize this problem but, at the same time, in the experience of the last few months quite a few real cases have come to my attention. Could I give you perhaps one or two? When we formed the School of Instructional Techniques at Clinton last year, middle ranking officers of the three services went there, and I am informed that after a couple of days working on the curriculum they decided by agreement not to meet in uniform again until the curriculum was worked out. An officer who was being posted to a base, being given a bit of a rough time by the base personnel officer in charge of housing, concluded it was because this officer was from a different service than the majority of the servicemen on the base. The facts become irrelevant in a circumstance like that because this officer had convinced himself it was because he was from a different service that he was, in fact, being discriminated against. The situation was amicably worked out ultimately, but there are very many cases of psychological problems that arise which I think are unnecessary and which, I am afraid, would persist if we did not introduce, over a period of time, some change.

Mr. LANIEL: This morning General Fleury spoke of loyalty which he felt was divided and diluted at the time he decided to retire. I had some questions to ask him then, but I could not ask them of you because they are not related to your function. In your capacity as Minister of National Defance, did you do anything to destroy the loyalty among the senior and subaltern officers at headquarters, or feel that you did?

An hon. MEMBER: You expect a "yes" on that, of course.

Mr. LANIEL: No; because there have been all kinds of implications, and everyone seems to try to leave the impression that it is because of the attitude of the Minister; that he has more or less destroyed some of the channels of communication.

Mr. HELLYER: Mr. Laniel, the mere introduction of the single service concept created that kind of internal conflict which inevitably, in some cases, made it difficult for people to know where their real loyalty lay. I do not think it is a reflection on anyone, really, because this is a very significant change in organization. It is historic, in a sense, and I think it would be unnatural for people who have served in the service for 25 or 30, or 35 years, not to feel an intense pride and loyalty to that service. If they did not, I do not think they would be good officers or men.

When a change of this magnitude is proposed they really have to go through a process of adjustment starting I think, with the intellectual process—looking at the reasons for it, the changes in technology and the changes in the world that exists—but then, even after doing that, they have to face squarely the emotional problems which arise from transferring a loyalty which has been so deeply rooted and developed over such a long period of time to a new concept which, up until that time, has been perhaps nothing more than something that they might have thought about, or heard about at school.

I think the answer to your question is that by taking a policy decision and making a recommendation to the government that the single service concept should be adopted in Canada, inevitably there was a problem which some officers and men easily have been able—or I should not say easily, because I do not think it easy for anyone, really—to overcome and have been able to accept, some with great enthusiasm, but some with greater enthusiasm after they had time really to think about it and to come to terms with it. But for some it just was not possible to make that adjustment, and this in itself, I think, created some of the problem you are referring to, and which reference has been made to.

Mr. LANIEL: For my own satisfaction, could you tell the Committee the processes followed for the appointment of senior officers at headquarters?

Mr. HELLYER: Yes; I cannot give you the whole mechanics—this is something the staff would have to do—but boards are held by officers, I think, two ranks above the officers being considered for promotion. Officers are selected for promotion and recommendations are then forwarded, depending on the rank, by the Chief of Personnel to the Chief of Defence Staff who, if he concurs in them, forwards them to the Minister for approval.

Mr. LANIEL: The fact that an officer would bring forward advice to the Minister that would not meet the Minister's opinion would have no effect on his promotion?

Mr. HELLYER: That is an extremely difficult question. In making a decision of that kind, I think all aspects of an officer's capabilities have to be taken into account and I think, for example—and I really do not apologise for saying this—if someone was recommended for a particular very high position where there was a policy that had to be carried out and where—

Mr. LANIEL: I did not say policy; I said advice. I am sorry, carry on.

Mr. HELLYER: —he felt he could not support that policy, this would be a poor appointment. Now, I do not want to give you the impression that this is an overriding factor in appointments because it is not. But I think it would be wrong to give responsibility to someone that they did not feel they could loyally carry out.

Mr. CHATTERTON: May I say something supplementary to this? Does this mean that if the person was recommended to the Minister for appointment or promotion and the Minister felt that person did not agree with his policy, then it would be unlikely that his recommendation would be approved?

Mr. HELLYER: No, it does not mean that, because there have been I do not know how many appointments and promotions of people who do not agree with the policy. I do not ask them individually whether they do or whether they do not. My interest is in their capability to carry out the job. But I think if someone at the very senior level was being appointed—you can take any case that you like—if they were being appointed to a joint command, for example, and they said "I do not believe in a joint command; I think it is a wrong role or wrong mission; I disagree with it completely", I think it would be wrong to send an officer into a command under those circumstances.

Mr. LANIEL: This is my last question. Do you agree with General Moncel when he said that to stop at this stage would be disastrous? He seemed to have

meant that it might bring discontent to and exodus of officers that have faith in unification and are working to these limitations.

Mr. HELLYER: Mr. Laniel, I do not want to attribute this to General Moncel because I do not know what he said. But if you are asking me the question, I would not recommend stopping now. On the contrary, I think it is essential to the plans which have already been worked out by the Department that they be given a clear authority to carry out the plan as it has been developed. One of the reasons that the decision must be made now, rather than some years from now, is that with respect to the personnel planning, you have to know now whether officers and men are going to be recruited into a single service or in three; you have to know what the relationship will be in so far as lists of officers working together in the same employment is concerned, and you have to know, in so far as the future is concerned, whether establishments and promotions and career planning will be managed on a single service or a tri-service basis.

As you will recall, when the Chief of Personnel appeared before you—it may have been the vice chief—he showed the difference in the plan which would prevail between these two different possibilities. The one which we recommend—the one which we believe is best—is the single service concept and that decision has to be taken now, so that all of the planning consequent on it can continue, and the implementation can take place over this period of time, but with the legal authority to do so.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Mr. Minister, to straighten out one or two things, I wonder whether I could refer you to page 27 of your remarks this afternoon? We had some misunderstanding about this earlier in the Committee, and I gather you promised you would straighten this out, and you now have it straightened out. This has to do with regular force recruiting statistics and you take the last 10 years. Without going through them again—because you read them well into the record—just dealing with 1966 as proud of that record as you may be—I think it indicates an increase, for example, over 1965 of less than 1,000 and about 300 over 1964, and about a 1000 below 1963; there is some constancy to it in any event—I would like to draw your attention to figures that were supplied and ask you if you would care to comment on them, and tell us whether or not you feel that this is a grevious situation, or whether it is just part, as you suggest, of the continuing problem that you do not think is very real, the fact that your net loss in your armed services was some 5,703 men comprised of fair balance throughout. None of this and on the other hand, if you care to comment on this —gives us any idea, really, of what these recruitments are, whether we are getting a balanced recruitment, whether there are more people going in for certain trades than others or whether or not there is any critical shortage. I think it is important that we have some clarification of this.

Mr. HELLYER: If there are any particular statistics you would like to have, we can provide them. I think, by and large, they are being applied; the selection process is quite balanced. Naturally, we would like to see more recruits come in. We hope that there will be some modest increase in recruiting during the months or years ahead. But the releases have been declining, and if we were to plot out the curves, the situation is beginning to stabilize.

Mr. FORRESTALL: What about the 16,525 men in 1966? Were all 16,525 due to go out?

Mr. HELLYER: Oh, no. We do have and have to have a fairly high turnover in the combat arms, as you will appreciate; otherwise you could not maintain effective combat forces. That is something in the order of 15 per cent. This is not high, you know, when you consider turnover compared, say, to industrial turnover. What it should be, I think, is a matter of argument, but somewhere between 10 and 15 per cent, in order to maintain effective combat forces.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Perhaps what we should have, then, is a breakdown of this 16,500 into combat people and support people who were highly trained and who, in fact, left after their first engagement. This is what concerns me; are our armed forces tending to become a training ground?

Mr. HELLYER: If you would give us the specifics of what you would like, we would be glad to do it for you. On the following pages—

Mr. FORRESTALL: That is not what I am concerned about. I am not a military man and I am not interested in learning the skills and trades of military people. What I am interested in learning, is whether or not we lost people. Let us get on to it, then. You say that in 1966 the RCN had a 66.4 per cent re-engaged rate, and you describe these rates shown as percentages of men who were offered re-engagement and who, in fact, re-engaged. Let us take that last figure—1966—I can show you statistics and charts prepared by national defence headquarters that say that 26 per cent re-engaged. Now, obviously there is conflict—not necessarily conflict; I can see the explanation. But to say that 66 per cent re-engaged is an across-the-board statement that does not in any way tell me whether or not first re-engagements, for example—

Mr. HELLYER: This is a composite figure, and the reason they have been given here in a consistent manner, is so you could get some indication of the quite significant improvement of re-engagements in 1966 over 1965.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Well, in 1965, for example, first re-engagements in the RCN were 25 per cent; in 1964 they were 24 per cent. Second re-engagements—we use the same figures—go up to 77 per cent in 1964, they drop off to 75 per cent in 1965, and they drop down to 74 per cent. These are fairly consistent; there is no great difference between 1964 and 1966 in that particular sense—2 per cent. But what we are talking about at the end of a second engagement is a fairly competent individual.

Mr. HELLYER: Correct, and as you indicate—

Mr. FORRESTALL: Where does the 66.4 per cent come from; what is it, the average of those two?

Mr. HELLYER: The average of all the re-engagements.

Mr. FORRESTALL: How long is the first re-engagement period?

Mr. HELLYER: I think we would have to get expert advice on this. One of the problems here is that the navy changed the term of its initial engagement, and the experience varies considerably in relation to the term of the initial engagement. Therefore, you cannot compare the re-engagement rates at the end of the first term for people whose initial engagement was three years with the re-engagement rate at the end of the first term for people whose initial engagement was five years, you can compare them but the experience is considerably

different and this has to be ground into the equation, otherwise you can get quite a misleading result.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Obviously, I am misled by this and I am misled by the bulletin. I would like, if it is possible, Mr. Chairman, to have it clarified. What I am concerned about is whether or not we are spending millions of dollars to train people and they are looking around saying: "Fine, there is no hurry."

Mr. HELLYER: I do not know how far back we have comparative statistics on this, but I will certainly inquire, Mr. Forrestall.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Say within the last four or five years. For example, in statistics, again which come from your office, we find—it does not matter—I will just take the navy because I am "at sea" as you suggest to me sometimes and I will stay there. Officers including cadets enlisting in the RCN—1966—these are enrolments. In January there were 5; in February there were 2, March none; April 3. Let us take the same month and compare people who are getting out. January, 40 officers and cadets, and we took in 5. In February the releases were 51, and this is constant through the three armed services. It is not until you get down to, for example, October and November—and in this month it would obviously be the enrolment of universities where you get up to 186. To find some balance, I would like to know, for example, what percentage of people who go through—what I recall as being the university naval training program—say in the last two or three years—unless the program has been discontinued, and it may have been—have stayed on beyond a sort of moral engagement period where they felt obliged? It is this type of statistic I am concerned about and I am concerned whether or not the proposal now has had any effect. Are we suffering from—I do not know what you would call it—a reluctance on the part of the students in universities to follow through with this type of program, which is excellent I think, until they see how the proposals and programs settle down. I am very concerned about that type of information. If it could be made available to us I would appreciate it.

Mr. HELLYER: I think we can provide you with the information. I will certainly inquire about it, but I would not want you to reach the conclusion without further evidence that there is some direct correlation between that—our experience there—and the reorganization of the armed forces. The correlation, if any, would be more directly associated with economic conditions in the country. We give these young men a very fine education and after they have gone through the service colleges or university and have spent some time in the services they are very competent young people. There have been cases where the employment in the armed forces is considered by some of them to not reflect adequately their training. In other words, if they were being underemployed in a sense of using their full capabilities. This is a factor in the experience.

Mr. FORRESTALL: I realize there are intelligent people in the services but this does not answer the question.

Mr. HELLYER: I would be glad to see what information is available but I do not want you to jump to any conclusions just on the basis of—

Mr. FORRESTALL: Then, all I can suggest to you, Mr. Hellyer, is do not mislead us by saying that recruitment is healthy when we have lost 16,525 people and took in only 10,822.

Mr. HELLYER: First of all, I did not say recruiting was healthy. I put the statistics down so you could—

Mr. FORRESTALL: You said you were happy with it.

Mr. HELLYER: I think even then you are paraphrasing a little bit. I really would appreciate it if you would quote me correctly.

Mr. FORRESTALL: I am sorry. I will withdraw my paraphrasing. I would not let the record stand. You said there were 10,822 that came in and 16,525 who went out. Mr. Hellyer, I would be grateful if we could get some more clarifying statistics and I will arrive at some conclusion once we have those.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Mr. Forrestall, before you leave that may I ask the Minister a supplementary question?

I am very surprised that you have so much detail in regard to recruiting which has been discussed for the last five or 10 minutes. And yet you say that you had no details of what the cost would be to bring your forces up to strength and to fulfil your commitments or the number of men that you would require. It seems odd to me that you have so much detail, in fact, the figures are overlapping and you have us confused on that on one side, but not on the other. Do you have any explanation for that?

Mr. HELLYER: Yes; in the case of the recruiting statistics we are reporting something which is known and which has already happened. In so far as our establishments are concerned they are subject to changes brought about by base consolidation and the consolidation of schools and other activities which are now taking place as a result of the integration process, and where the new establishments are currently being worked out. You have to have those new establishments before you know how many people you need to fill them.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I will comment later on this.

Mr. FORRESTALL: This is based on the supplementary but I will get it on the second round when we get into it.

I want to move to another area now, Mr. Hellyer, and I raised it earlier today and the Chairman has not advised me of the outcome. I asked if the steering committee could consider the advisability or the legality or the position that the Defence Committee is in with regard to an expansion and getting away from this so we might consider what has been borne out by many of your own statements and the witnesses before us with regard to the external aspect and the external responsibilities that Canada has in terms of our defence posture. I will ask the Chairman afterwards what was the outcome of that. But I would like to ask you whether you would think that before we make a final commitment in the house or a decision it would not be wise for the Committee to recommend to the house and, perhaps to yourself, that the matter be referred to a joint committee of this Committee and the External Affairs Committee to consider some of the ramifications because it does have a tremendous—at least as near as I can gather from the evidence which has been given us—external effect.

Mr. HELLYER: Since you have directed the question to me, Mr. Forrestall, I would say that I really do not think so. The reason I do not think so is that there is no additional information which could be made available to you beyond that

which you already have. The present force structure is set out in some detail at the end of—

Mr. FORRESTALL: Yes, but Mr. Hellyer, this is your interpretation of external affairs and you are not the minister of external affairs.

Mr. HELLYER: The Secretary of State for External Affairs today gave exactly the same reply to you in the house that I have given you. So far as our present responsibilities are concerned, they are known and the future ones—there are no skeletons in the closet; there is nothing planned which you do not know about in principle; therefore, I think this would not be productive.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Whether it is productive or not, do you see any merit in it?

Mr. HELLYER: I really do not, Mr. Forrestall. I wish I could and if I did I would say so. But I really do not.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Then, could I direct a question to the Chairman? Was the matter considered in the steering committee today at noon?

The CHAIRMAN: No.

Mr. FORRESTALL: It was not considered? That is fine.

An hon. MEMBER: You are always getting someone to carry the ball for you.

Mr. FORRESTALL: I did not ask anybody to carry the ball for me. I asked the Chairman if he would raise it and he decided not to. I presume he had his reasons.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Forrestall, there was nothing sinister in not raising it, I assure you; it was just overlooked.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Well, that is fine. What difference does it make? It is the same end. I apparently seem to be the only one concerned about our responsibilities externally.

I would like to go to one other area, Mr. Hellyer, before my time is up. I do not mean to keep jumping but it is one remaining area that has concerned me quite a lot.

The CHAIRMAN: Your time is not up, Mr. Forrestall.

Mr. FORRESTALL: I beg your pardon?

The CHAIRMAN: Your time is not up.

Mr. FORRESTALL: During the so-called Admiral Landymore controversy last year there were certain allegations and charges and statements made. Among these was the suggestion that quite possibly Admiral Landymore should have been court martialled for the posture he took. You regretted a number of statements that you have made or that have been made either on your behalf or for which you have at some point accepted responsibility. Do you accept responsibility for that remark?

Mr. HELLYER: No. I made no such statement at the time.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Did you agree with the remark?

Mr. HELLYER: In the context of the single service policy, no.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Would you agree—because this is a matter of record—or would you state for matter of clarification whether or not Admiral Landymore

was fired because he spoke publicly to the press prior to your asking for his resignation or your arriving at an understanding about his position? Would you agree that that was not the reason?

Mr. HELLYER: Mr. Forrestall, I presume in asking this question you take the responsibility for asking it?

Mr. FORRESTALL: Yes, of course I do. I asked it.

Mr. HELLYER: Admiral Landymore was fired for 18 months consistent disloyalty to the policies of the people he was paid to serve.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Would you explain that in some detail. You have made a very serious allegation against a great Canadian's record.

Mr. HELLYER: Yes, I think I could. I would say that following a meeting of commanders in Ottawa, as I recall, on November 19, 1964, Admiral Landymore fully understood what we had in mind. We planned to develop in this country a single service concept and that he was unalterably opposed to it at that stage, and that he went back to Halifax to do everything he possibly could to prepare for an ultimate confrontation on the issue.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Does this include public utterances?

Mr. HELLYER: Public in the sense of making utterances in front of junior officers and civilian population, yes. In the sense of making speeches, no.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Can you verify that? I gather what you are driving at, Mr. Hellyer, that indeed you agree that he should have been court martialled? Why was he not court martialled if he had been disloyal for 18 months?

Mr. HELLYER: If the issue had been anything less serious and less comprehensive than unification, or the single service concept, then I would have to give you a different answer.

Mr. FORRESTALL: I am sorry, I fail to follow that. If it had been on another issue it would not have been serious. Because he was in opposition to you, you choose to call him disloyal.

Mr. HELLYER: No. I said if the issue involved had been anything less serious or less comprehensive than the single service concept and he had displayed the disloyalty which he did throughout that period, then I would have had to insist that he be court martialled.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Would you be specific? You said he spoke to junior officers and in so doing was disloyal. What did he say to junior officers, and on what occasion, that would give rise to your making this serious charge?

Mr. HELLYER: He spoke in front of them on numerous occasions.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Numerous? How many?

Mr. HELLYER: I really do not know—too many I would say.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Where did you get your information to base your statement on?

Mr. HELLYER: He called his officers together—when I say his officers, I think you have to differentiate here between the naval officers and the air force officers in his command. He was the commander of an integrated command; a third of

this command was air force, yet at no time during his command were the air force officers ever in a position to feel that they were part of the team, that they were considered as equals with their naval brethren. He called his naval officers together; he has already alluded to this in his evidence, and said to them something like this: "Who will support me in my fight against unification and who will support me as your Admiral? Those who are with me stand up, and those who are against me, remain seated."

Mr. FORRESTALL: I hope you do not live to choke on those words. It is a serious paraphrase of what—

Mr. HELLYER: I do not think that he had any right to call that kind of a meeting. I do not think he had any right to demand personal loyalty from his officers, and now that you have raised the question I want to make this statement. I have never asked a military officer his politics, his religion, or for his personal loyalty. Yet Admiral Landymore in giving testimony before this Committee said that he had extracted a promise from his officers.

Mr. FORRESTALL: What type of a promise?

Mr. HELLYER: The promise was not to resign.

Mr. FORRESTALL: That was an act of disloyalty?

Mr. HELLYER: In the context, I have some doubts about it. It was for this reason then, and if I made a mistake, it was in not relieving him of his command sooner. I had planned to do it in the spring of 1966. I had planned to visit his command and verify at first hand the many allegations and the considerable information which had come to me directly and indirectly, and, if the allegations were as I expected, to relieve him of his command. The week that I planned to go there, he had to be in Europe on government business; I had not been advised of this previously, and it was not possible. Then when the time came for witnesses to appear before this Committee, although the steering committee decided the areas of activity that they would like to discuss, it had been my suggestion that the commanders be called and that no exception be made in respect of Admiral Landymore, although I fully realized that in inviting him to come here he would make some effort, or might make some effort, to embarrass me in the policies that had been laid down by the government.

Under those circumstances, when he came I did not care what he said, because he was going to be relieved of his command, in any event.

Mr. FORRESTALL: You went to great pains to make sure that there were certain things he did not say.

Mr. HELLYER: I did not. I wish to deny that categorically.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Do you deny that somebody on your staff or within your scope of responsibility did not?

Mr. HELLYER: I do not know and I am not willing to say what changes—well the changes were reported to the house, but the mechanics by which these came about is irrelevant. I made certain suggestions which I felt were in the interest of the government of Canada, first of all, in so far as the references to foreign powers were concerned, and in so far as the navy was concerned, there were one or two things missing from the briefing. One was the reference to the cyclical

system and the second one was the comparison of the re-engagement rates for the Navy and the Air Force which really did not make the Navy look very good.

Now, frankly I did not care what he put in because I knew—

Mr. FORRESTALL: You did not care about the Navy; is that what you are saying?

Mr. HELLYER: I did care about the Navy but I did not care what he said because I had already decided that he would be relieved of his command.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Mr. Minister, on October 5 I had a reply from your parliamentary returns office in response to two questions and the questions were: "Was the Minister of National Defence advised through proper channels at any time by the Commander of Maritime Command during 1965 and 1966 that there were morale problems in his command? If so what action was taken by the Minister in this regard or by his staff?

The answer to number one was, yes. The answer to number two was: "Cognizance was taken of all points raised and appropriate remedial action was initiated." I will ask you two questions: What was the remedial action and did you, at any time, discuss your feelings as a Minister of the crown, and I divorce it from your personal feelings—I am not imputing anything in that, to make it clear—with Admiral Landymore in his capacity as Commander of Maritime Command?

Mr. HELLYER: May I see the reference that you have there from *Hansard*? I would not wish to—the answers given here are correct.

Mr. FORRESTALL: What was the remedial action that was taken, Mr. Minister.

Mr. HELLYER: Removing the commander from his command.

Mr. FORRESTALL: This was October 5.

Mr. HELLYER: Nineteen hundred and sixty six.

Mr. FORRESTALL: That was the result of your 18 months of doubts and suspicions of his perspicacity to act as Maritime Commander?

Mr. HELLYER: It was not just that. The situation had been brought to my attention officially through channels that the Maritime Commander and his Air Deputy were incompatible.

Mr. FORRESTALL: You felt that his removal was the remedial action with regard to morale problems; or, in other words, that he was the morale problem?

Mr. HELLYER: I think that he was a contributing factor to the morale problem in Halifax.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Mr. Minister, did you ever find occasion in those 18 months to talk to Admiral Landymore?

Mr. HELLYER: I think that question was asked in the House of Commons and the answer was given.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Well, I ask it again. I did not ask it in the house except in the context of that question which was on the Order Paper.

Mr. HELLYER: I was not able to visit the command. No invitation was extended, in the first place, and when I did plan to go it did not work out.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Was there a phone on your desk, Mr. Minister.

Mr. HELLYER: Yes, but it is customary to visit commands on the invitation of the commander, and I think all of the other commanders have invited me at one time or another to go and visit them.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Did Admiral Landymore—

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Forrestall, we are beyond the ten o'clock adjournment period.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Can I put my name down again?

The CHAIRMAN: Yes, indeed.

The meeting is adjourned until 9.30 tomorrow morning.

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 24, 1967.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, we have a quorum. I would like to make a few remarks at this point. I am a bit disturbed by the line of questioning that now appears to have been taken. Because of the general interest in this bill and the circumstances surrounding it, I have as your Chairman, in fact, allowed—in fact, I think the public interest has demanded—a fairly free-wheeling, far-reaching line of questioning up until now. At this point, however, I, and I think you, are beginning to regret having taken this step, although as I say I think it was inevitable. We have before us a bill, and only a bill, and I must remind you that that is what the house has asked us to report on—on its merits and demerits, and to suggest changes in the bill. I would most strongly urge you now to try to keep your questioning confined to the bill and away from personalities.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Mr. Chairman, I realize that I went well over my time last night, but I wonder whether you would elaborate on your opening statement. I would gather, from what you said, that it might not be proper to pursue the area of discussion at the close of the hearing last night. I would like, for example, to ask now that the chief of the defence staff and all those who were directly concerned with and superior to Admiral Landymore be summoned before this Committee.

The CHAIRMAN: I am not trying to limit the persons to be called before us as witnesses, nor am I trying to limit the names which will be drawn into this questioning; I am just trying to keep away, if I can, from developing a line of questioning which is going to be damaging to personalities involved in this case.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I fully appreciate your difficulty, but when one attempts to interpret what you are saying, it becomes rather difficult. The minister has introduced personalities and has made certain statements, which have to be followed up. I am not quite clear as to how far you think we should go. As I understood it, we were to make a full and complete investigation of the circumstances surrounding the proposed unification, and then deal section by section with the bill at the appropriate time. What are you warning us against? I do not think that you can set now any limitation on what we are doing.

The CHAIRMAN: Well, I am really warning you that in this area—I am not warning; I am just giving notice that there are certain lines of questioning that I am not sure I would be able to allow. If you do take up a certain line of questioning, I may reserve judgment on whether I should allow it, while I take it under advisement.

Mr. LAMBERT: May I point out that if general sweeping assertions are made as to character and actions, then I am sure the Committee wants to get at the truth.

The CHAIRMAN: I am sure the Committee wants to do that.

Mr. LAMBERT: We will behave on that basis.

The CHAIRMAN: I think that you understand, Mr. Lambert, as a chairman with much experience, what I am driving at.

Mr. LAMBERT: I fully agree, but I do not see any reason there should not be the deepest and fullest examination of a character assassination attempt in respect of 18 months disloyalty, and to ascertain just what that means.

The CHAIRMAN: Whether or not that is to be done in this Committee is a matter with which I am not quite certain.

Mr. FORRESTALL: I am rather curious, Mr. Chairman, who would clarify that matter. Is that not within our purview?

The CHAIRMAN: Do not ask me at this point.

Mr. ANDRAS: Mr. Minister, I do not have many questions this morning, but those I do have arise from questions, comments and criticisms inherent in the evidence of several of the witnesses who have appeared before us during the past week or two. One of the criticisms that has been made is the speed with which integration-unification is going ahead. Air Vice Marshal Hendricks and some others have indicated or implied that the integration-unification program is being rushed to, frankly, sir, enhance your own image. Would you comment on that, please.

Mr. HELLYER: Mr. Andras, I cannot think of any legal act which I could have undertaken during the last few months which would have done more—as Mr. Fane just interjected—to destroy an image and to develop political antagonism toward me personally than the introduction of this bill.

The opposition is not unexpected. I had a decision to make last summer. I could have basked in the glory of something called integration, which was at that time accepted by the vast majority of Canadians from coast to coast, which is almost universally upheld by everyone—newspapers, service people, the public at large, or proceed with the final stage of the reorganization.

I must admit that there was some temptation to leave the final stage, and the emotional upheaval that would inevitably be connected with it, for some future minister. It was not really much of a decision, however, because I really felt that to leave the most difficult part of the whole reorganization would be irresponsible, that I had no choice but to proceed with something which I believed to be in the best interests of Canada. Having begun the process, having been intimately connected with it throughout the last three years; knowing the issues involved and the personalities involved, I felt that I had a responsibility to the Canadian

people to complete the task and to undertake what, inevitably, would be, and has been, the most difficult phase of the whole reorganization.

Mr. ANDRAS: My next question arises from certain comments that General Foulkes made and, I think it is fair to say perhaps, his criticism of certain aspects of the way this program has unfolded. He suggested, as I interpreted his remarks, that it might have been smoother, in the sense of morale and other similar related aspects, if you had retained, during the process of integration and through unification, the position of the three service chiefs: the air force, the army and the chief of naval staff. I got the impression that the existence of these three service chiefs would have been, to the men in those respective separate services, an indication of confidence, an indication of saying, "Well, boys, I am still here; this is all right." Now you chose not to retain the three service chiefs, and General Foulkes suggested that it would have been a good idea. Could you give us your opinion on that?

Mr. HELLYER: Yes. This was another alternative procedure which the General proposed in his paper. I do not think it would have had the results that he indicated. In fact, I do not think it would have worked at all. When a man becomes head of his service, his personal views are then encompassed by all of the interests of the people in the service that he heads. I think it would be too much to ask of almost any human being, who had risen to be the head of his service, to preside at the dissolution of that service. I do not think many men would do it; I do not think it would be right to ask them to do it, and in so far as that procedure is concerned we concluded, and I think rightly, that it would not be one which would bring the desired result and that the first step would have to be a new superstructure, organized on a functional basis, consisting largely of people who had not been heads of their respective services.

Mr. ANDRAS: I am moving to another subject. I am quoting from the remarks you made yesterday at page 43 of your brief, the last paragraph:

> Even officers in the combat arms will be required to take additional staff training at a certain level to enable them to exercise command over arms in addition to the one in which they were trained—as is now the case in the army.

First, could you give us an indication, as is now the case in the army, how combat officers get staff training in other arms, I presume.

Mr. HELLYER: Well, as you probably know, Mr. Andras, the staff training is given at a certain level in an officer's career, when he may be considered suitable for higher rank and for staff duties of various kinds. This is merely extending this principle, which has been well established within a single service, through the services as a whole, in order to get that board cross-section of opinion and experience from all arms directed toward the strategic problems and the options of weapons systems which will face the force in the years ahead.

Mr. ANDRAS: Air Vice Marshall Hendricks disagreed with you and particularly, applying to officers I presume, he questioned this on the basis of destroying environmental expertise obtainable under integration-unification. He said—and this is as close to his remarks as I was able to note—that no man with the best will in the world can become an expert in three services when it now

takes one man his entire career to become and remain proficient in one service. Does this not indicate disagreement with you in this connection?

Mr. HELLYER: I do not know whether it does or not. First of all, the expertise remains, as it is now, at the combat level. In addition to that, people who are trained in a specialty will always have some extra knowledge of their specialty regardless of the staff duties that they might be undertaking. In so far as the suggestion is concerned, that no man can have sufficient breadth of knowledge to be expert in all things, this is quite right; no one can. But that is exactly the same situation as exists now in any service, where senior positions may be occupied by officers who have come from various specialties within the service.

I do not think there is any new principle involved, and I really do not disagree with that part of the Air Vice Marshal's statement. The expertise remains where it is required; there will still be, as I said in my opening statement yesterday, specific positions that require specific expertise. However, there are other staff positions which well-skilled, well-trained men, with broad backgrounds, could fill, regardless of the specialties that they had come from originally.

Mr. ANDRAS: Moving to another witness who appeared before us, Admiral Landymore on pages 4 and 5 of his brief, was talking about one of the integral parts of the unification process being to try and do something about the inequities that exist between the three services. He says, for instance, that the policy in respect of the different terms of service, the different trade structure, the different promotion opportunities, the different commissioning from the ranks, and the different retirement ages, is not new. He goes on to say that the only thing new is that our service personnel are becoming very much aware of them. I am not attempting to pick things out of context, because we want to get the point here, but he criticizes the idea that these inequities can be removed. He said that differences which have been made to look like serious faults are, in effect, essential differences, and the minister has promised to correct them—to remove the differences. It is this promise that is so startling for if it is kept the services will be much more expensive to operate and less effective. Would you comment on that criticism?

Mr. HELLYER: Yes, I do not know that we are really talking about different things, but I think perhaps the Admiral was suggesting that there would be equality between all employments. This has never been suggested, and again as I said in my opening statement yesterday, there will be different terms and conditions of work for people involved in different employment, as there has always been. To some extent, these are affected by environment; but it is for people involved in the same employment that the inequalities should be removed, and I do not see any reason why this cannot be done—in fact, I am convinced it can be done.

Mr. ANDRAS: Mr. Minister, there is one other comment on that same page of Admiral Landymore's brief which disturbed me, and if the situation does exist that he describes I would like to go on record as saying that I would like to see it corrected. It is a peculiar thing. He talks about a captain in the navy retiring as opposed to a lieutenant commander in the navy retiring, and the difference between their respective pensions. This certainly does not seem to have been handled in a fair way. I am quite sure this is not directly related to the

unification-integration process. However, I am sure that you are aware of that incident that he described, where a captain ends up on retirement with a lower pension than a lieutenant commander. I certainly would like to put in a bid that in the process of this whole thing this situation should be corrected.

Mr. HELLYER: The present Act contains many inequities and, perhaps, some iniquities. The Deputy Minister, I think, has undertaken a study of the whole retirement scheme in order to look at these problems and to see if we should not consider at some future date new legislation which, in many cases, would be more appropriate.

Mr. ANDRAS: Sir, I see my time is nearly up. There was another comment in here, and I want to be very careful with this. In Admiral Landymore's remarks, under the heading of promotion opportunity, on page 5 of his brief, he deals with the application of promotion opportunity in the Royal Canadian Air Force, and he says:

> The Royal Canadian Air Force has almost no requirement to use their men in a fighting capacity.

He ends up in the last sentence of that paragraph:

> Administrative leadership, therefore, is a requirement—fighting leadership is not a requirement.

He is referring to the Air Force.

Mr. HELLYER: Can you not just imagine what General LeMay would say in answer to that question?

I think he would say something that might not be appropriate for the record. But, in fact, I think the same high qualities of leadership are necessary for all of the combat arms. I do not think that is fair, nor I do not think that it is right, to differentiate between them in that respect.

Mr. ANDRAS: Thank you, Mr. Minister. Would you put me down for another round, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN: Your time has not expired.

Mr. ANDRAS: That is all right. Those are all the questions I want to ask for now.

Mr. LEGAULT: Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask the Minister one question about unification, in respect of the language and the possible terms that are going to be used, which I think will be of great importance. I will refer to a little incident that I was made aware of. It concerned a message that was sent out to an Air Force base, asking to confirm receipt of wire, and the message was referred to the supply depot. Will there be a universal language of common terms used in order to eliminate any mistakes, which could prove very costly, especially during a time of war.

Mr. HELLYER: There is a move in the direction of a more universal language. I do not know whether or not this is being undertaken formally. There has been some differences in the usage of language. You find "billets" and "heads" creeping into usage more and more all the time. I think that we will be able to work out, in those cases where there is a different meaning in words be-

tween the services, some accepted standard which would be recognized by all servicemen.

Mr. LEGAULT: Considering the voluntary basis of enlistment, what to you, Mr. Minister, would be the main concern of the personnel of the armed forces?

Mr. HELLYER: The main concern of those presently in or those who are enrolling?

Mr. LEGAULT: Of those presently in and those who are enrolling.

Mr. HELLYER: I think that their main concern is to be able to perform in the best possible manner the tasks that are assigned to them on behalf of their country. This is the reason that they are in the forces. They want to do a job for Canada; they do a very effective job, and they are always seeking means of improving it. I think this is really the thing that everyone wants to do most.

Mr. LEGAULT: Mr. Minister, I was referring perhaps in terms of the morale that does exist. Also, in my inquiries, I tried to obtain information on the reflections that were made. Those to whom I was speaking in the armed forces brought to my attention that, it being on a voluntary basis, their position would compare with any equivalent position on civvy street, and that they would like to be evaluated, from a financial, point of view on a basis comparable to those on civvy street. Would that be right?

Mr. HELLYER: Mr. Legault, money is not everything, but at the same time, I think, the government, like any other employer, has to treat its servants justly. The changes in our pay structure last October went a long way to provide some equity between our servicemen and people in civil life. There is still room for improvement in many areas of working conditions. There is a chronic shortage of housing. We need more housing. There are many areas where I think we can take steps which will improve the living conditions and thereby affect the morale of the armed forces. These are the employer-employee relations that apply universally. I think we have to always be aware of them because if we want a happy force and an effective force, we have to be cognizant also of their needs and problems.

Mr. LEGAULT: Thank you. Apparently we are trying to establish too, the state of morale, where and when it existed, and the ball is being tossed from one side to the other. Perhaps my question will merely toss the ball right back, when I ask what level of morale existed early in 1963, when warheads were not supplied to some of the combat forces, and no decision could be obtained to allow them?

Mr. HELLYER: You lived in North Bay at that time, Mr. Legault, so I think you would be as familiar with it as I am. When the Chief of the Defence Staff appears before the Defence Committee, I hope some time early next week, he will be giving some views in respect to the current situation.

Mr. LEGAULT: Then of what value in efficiency were those arms?

Mr. HELLYER: Well, at that time, none, until they were armed.

Mr. LEGAULT: Could I be permitted a little remark here. Mr. Churchill is in his usual humorous mood, and he has made a few quips along the line. I am a little disturbed by Mr. McIntosh, who says he has the key. It is all in the spirit of

things. I am a little reluctant to hear you define too often the question of unified forces because they might see the light and apply it to their own party.

Mr. CHURCHILL: We have some suggestions for your party too.

Mr. MCINTOSH: May I ask my colleague a question?

The CHAIRMAN: Yes, indeed.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Can you inform the Committee when the warheads for these Bomarcs were available?

Mr. LEGAULT: They were not because no decision could be obtained.

Mr. MCINTOSH: No, no. When was the soonest possible date that they were available?

Mr. LEGAULT: Very shortly a decision was made, and very shortly afterward they were obtained.

Mr. MCINTOSH: You are just repeating something that you were told. You tell us when they were available.

Mr. LEGAULT: No. I lived in the area, Mr. McIntosh. It was certainly well publicized when they arrived.

Mr. MCINTOSH: When what arrived?

Mr. LEGAULT: When the warheads arrived.

Mr. MCINTOSH: When did the warheads arrive?

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. McIntosh—

Mr. MCINTOSH: Well, I would like to end off my remark by saying that I do not think he knows what he is talking about.

Mr. LAMBERT: Mr. Chairman, I want to revert to some of the things that were said last night for clarification.

The Minister indicated that he had no opportunity to visit Maritime Command and that he was not invited.

He also said that there seemed to be some incompatibility between the Deputy Commander and the Commander of Maritime Command. Who were the two deputy commanders during Admiral Landymore's term as Commander of Maritime Command?

Mr. HELLYER: I think the first one would have been, at that time, Air Commodore Carpenter, and later Air Commodore Gordon.

Mr. LAMBERT: During this eighteen month period did you see either of those two officers?

Mr. HELLYER: Not in the sense of—

Mr. LAMBERT: Well I am asking you. Did you see them?

Mr. HELLYER: If you mean to see them at any time under any circumstances the answer is yes, and this applies to Admiral Landymore as well, of course.

Mr. LAMBERT: I mean in confidence. It would have to be either here in Ottawa or at the subsequent appointments of Air Commodore Carpenter and Air Commodore Gordon?

Mr. HELLYER: I think I saw them both at some time or other during that period. I could not recall the place, the time and the circumstances.

Mr. LAMBERT: Did you discuss with them the state of morale and conditions in Maritime Command?

Mr. HELLYER: I do not think so. I cannot recall.

Mr. LAMBERT: It would be rather important, though, would it not?

Mr. HELLYER: The question of that aspect of the morale down there was brought to my attention officially through common channels.

Mr. LAMBERT: Official channels.

Mr. HELLYER: Yes, official channels.

Mr. LAMBERT: But it did not seem to bother you enough to call Rear Admiral Landymore, when he was called on other occasions, the same way that Admiral Brock was called up. There was no bother in calling people up to Ottawa.

Mr. HELLYER: It bothered me considerably and it was a factor in my judgment of the total situation.

Mr. LAMBERT: But, when you had these reports, did you not feel it necessary to either call the Admiral, the easiest way being by telephone, if necessary, or to call him up to Ottawa to examine what was happening in his command?

Mr. HELLYER: You are raising there, again Mr. Lambert, the question of channels. It is not customary for a minister to call the Commander directly under those circumstances, it would be through the normal channels.

Mr. LAMBERT: Well, you could have done it through normal channels if you felt that directly was not the right way.

Mr. HELLYER: As I said last night, I made plans to visit the command but it did not work out.

Mr. LAMBERT: In eighteen months? What I am getting at is this lack of communication. Admiral Landymore is not the only one who has mentioned this. General Moncel mentioned it. You also have said in your brief that you read to us last night, in quoting with approval, I believe, Lieutenant General Weeks, that included talking to junior officers literally behind the backs of their commanders.

Mr. HELLYER: Not at all, Mr. Lambert, but I was invited to most commands. During the visits to those commands I was entertained informally at luncheons, and receptions, and on every occasion I asked and answered questions for anyone who was about, which included a very wide cross-section of the armed forces. This is, as you probably know—and I think you would probably do the same yourself—a very good way to get information.

Mr. LAMBERT: What I am talking about is you, as the minister responsible for all the commands. There was this new command of Maritime Command, with its new organization, one of the key ones, in which there was indicated sore spots, and nothing was done about it by you.

Mr. HELLYER: By the time the indication was brought to my attention, in a manner which required some action, it was the spring of last year and, as I said, I planned to make an earlier trip to Halifax. I was not advised that the Commander would not be there that week, and when detailed arrangements were being made I found that he was unavailable because he was going to be in Europe for a NATO conference.

Mr. LAMBERT: Just prior to the briefings of this Committee?

Mr. HELLYER: This was in the spring that I planned to go down.

Mr. LAMBERT: But there was nothing else done by you in regard to that.

Mr. HELLYER: That was what I planned to do.

Mr. LAMBERT: But you had discussions though, Mr. Minister, as you have said, with junior officers from that command.

Mr. HELLYER: Not on any other basis than the one I just described a few moments ago, where you run into people of all kinds, informally and socially.

Mr. LAMBERT: Here in Ottawa? It could not have been in Halifax because you never went near it.

Mr. HELLYER: I was in Halifax to address, I think it was, the Navy League Annual Dinner, there were many naval officers there that night and the Admiral did not appear.

Mr. LAMBERT: It is conceivable he might have been elsewhere.

Mr. HELLYER: He might have been elsewhere. He obviously was elsewhere. Where he was I do not know.

Mr. LAMBERT: I do not want to have you leave the inference that he ducked an appearance.

Mr. HELLYER: I did not make any suggestion of that sort. I just point out that he was not there, and that some other officers were. Other than this, there was nothing either unusual or—

Mr. LAMBERT: Did you know the Admiral was invited at that time?

Mr. HELLYER: I suspect that he would be invited to that kind of function.

An hon. MEMBER: I suspect you know different from that, Mr. Minister.

Mr. HELLYER: I do not know whether he was or not. I suspect he could have obtained an invitation if he had wanted one.

Mr. LAMBERT: I am concerned about this in that both General Moncel and Air Marshall Annis said that one of the greatest frustrations they, as branch heads, and that other senior officers experienced, was to have junior officers consulted over the heads of their superiors.

My purpose of asking questions in respect of Admiral Landymore—is to get at this business of where you got your knowledge of what was going wrong in Maritime Command.

Mr. HELLYER: I got it from many sources, including the newspapers, Mr. Lambert. Would you like me to read one of the articles?

Mr. LAMBERT: There are many articles. We also have some very interesting articles.

Mr. HELLYER: I get information from any source that I can, as long as, in doing so, I am not breaking any particular rules of the game.

Mr. LAMBERT: But it is a fact though that junior officers were consulted over the heads of their superiors.

Mr. HELLYER: No. I would say that is not a fact.

Mr. LAMBERT: Are you suggesting that both General Moncel and Air Marshal Annis were misleading the Committee when they said that.

Mr. HELLYER: No, I was not. They probably know of cases within their own sections. I really do not know what they were referring to specifically.

Mr. LAMBERT: Well, General Moncel spelled it out, and certainly you had enough staff here to take down all he said.

Mr. MACALUSO: He also said, "If there is a lack of communication, I am to blame."

Mr. LAMBERT: Not General Moncel.

Mr. MACALUSO: Yes, he did.

Mr. LAMBERT: What I am talking about is going back to the point where junior officers were consulted in front of their seniors, or even behind the backs of their seniors, for dissenting opinions.

Mr. HELLYER: Mr. Lambert, I do not know of cases where junior officers were consulted in front of their seniors and behind the backs of their seniors. I do know that there was the division, I referred to yesterday, in respect to this major reorganization, where some people were able to adjust to the idea and others were not, and this created some of the problems which were referred to by General Moncel and Air Marshal Annis.

Mr. LAMBERT: Experienced officers of this kind do not toss a remark or an observation out just like that. It is because it did exist, and I personally know of other officers who have said the same sort of thing privately.

Mr. HELLYER: Well, you say it is becauses it did exist, but I have no documentation of this. I know some instances where members of the opposition have been in direct communication with junior officers. Would you deny that?

Mr. LAMBERT: This may be; this may be.

Mr. HELLYER: So, within our open society, it is, as I think General Fleury said, very difficult to keep people from expressing opinions if they feel them very strongly.

One of the problems that existed was communications, in getting, if I may say so, the policy of the government, as interpreted and laid down by the minister, communicated to all ranks through normal channels. I think the internal communications were quite inadequate, but I am very pleased with the improvement that has taken place since last summer in respect to this very important area.

Mr. LAMBERT: But that goes to suggest to you, Mr. Minister, that this is one of the problems with your senior officers, your own man-management, in dealing with your senior officers. This is one of the gut problems.

Mr. HELLYER: I forget which one of your witnesses it was who said to you, that if they made an order or gave some information and it went down through the lines and was twisted or distorted or misinterpreted below, that they would want to find out why that happened. That was a problem and I am now very happy to say that the problem has been, I think, completely overcome—it certainly shows a very substantial improvement.

Mr. LAMBERT: That does not answer the point that I am discussing with you, this man-management of your senior officers, because the situation is completely abnormal to have had so many capable men retire or be fired. They cannot be all out of step. It is not a case that you are the only one in step and they are all out of step.

Mr. HELLYER: No one would make such a suggestion, Mr. Lambert, but I think it is pretty obvious to you, from the deliberations of this Committee, and it will be even more obvious as we go along, that there are opposite points of view in respect to the single service concept. Some officers believe that it is not the correct solution and other officers believe it is the correct solution. Some laymen believe it is the correct solution; others believe that it is not the correct solution. Under those circumstances it depends entirely on the views of an individual as to what his reaction might be under certain circumstances.

Mr. LAMBERT: I am putting it to you that all the information this Committee or this House has had has been your information, your views. Now there have been very many senior men who have disagreed with you in this very fundamental thing in which we are not the experts, but we want to know from them why they disagreed with you. What were the things that went wrong?

Mr. HELLYER: They have told you, Mr. Lambert, when appearing before you, why they disagreed; and I might say that if this was trial by jury, any counsel worth his salt would not have allowed most of them to be chosen for a jury.

Mr. LAMBERT: Now, just a minute; what does this mean? Who is the jury? This is the jury and the country is the jury.

Mr. HELLYER: I think you will admit though, that officers who have left the service, either voluntarily or otherwise on their own statement because they disagreed diametrically with a policy, would have a pretty direct opinion which would give only one side ofthe argument.

Mr. LAMBERT: Are they poor witnesses? Mr. Minister, you are on the other side.

Mr. HELLYER: That is correct.

Mr. LAMBERT: You are just as biased on the other side.

Mr. HELLYER: I have, I would say, equally strong views on the other side, correct.

Mr. LAMBERT: All right then. This Committee and the country has the right to hear the opinions from both sides. This is too important to just take the word of one man.

Mr. HELLYER: We will be very pleased during the next two or three days to have some senior officers, who are responsible for the plan for the single service, describe to you whether or not they think it will work.

Mr. LAMBERT: Yes, I know, and under what circumstances, too.

Mr. HELLYER: Mr. Lambert, I do not wish you to cast aspersions against dedicated officers. You refuse to have them cast against retired officers. You have to have as much concern for those who are serving in our forces at the present time.

Mr. LAMBERT: Mr. Hellyer, I am not casting one aspersion on those officers. But I have been connected with the military just as long as you have, and I also know all about the question of influence on career and position. There is no serving officer today, unless he wanted to put his job and promotion prospects in the basket, who would dare sit along side you and contradict one thing you said—that is, before this Committee. They might in conference in your department. I will agree with you. This is their job, but they would not do it here.

Mr. HELLYER: I would not expect them to contradict me here before this Committee but I certainly would not expect them to say anything in reply to a question that they did not sincerely believe.

Mr. LAMBERT: Some of them were relieved after they were asked questions, and indicated here. Last summer we had that experience.

Mr. HELLYER: Not because of the questions before this Committee, Mr. Lambert, that was not so.

Mr. LAMBERT: Well, I would like to find out when the decision was made to ask General Fleury to go.

Mr. HELLYER: No decision was made to ask him to go. I think he made that clear when he appeared before you.

Mr. LAMBERT: Well, I am concerned about the Minister's insistence on man-management. There is a great deal being said, and all sorts of experts have come up here and put forward ideas on peacetime management of men. I am concerned about the Minister's own management of his senior officers.

Mr. HELLYER: Mr. Lambert, we have in command of the armed forces today a very happy, efficient group of officers. I would say that they are doing their job capably, efficiently and in a manner which should be a pride to them and to all Canadians.

Mr. LAMBERT: With this I will agree, but I do not want to see a bleed-out, again, during the next year, of a similar number of men. This is what concerns me, because we cannot afford that. We cannot afford the men we lost, and doubly more, we cannot afford any more.

Mr. HELLYER: I do not think you should be too pessimistic, Mr. Lambert. You should be an optimist.

Mr. LAMBERT: Let us make a little bet, shall we? Don't bet too high. Well, I will allow someone else to have a turn.

Mr. MACRAE: There is just one area in which I would like to question, Mr. Chairman, and I understand that Mr. Brewin touched on this last evening, when I was unavoidably absent on other parliamentary business.

Mr. Hellyer, from the evidence of several senior officers that we have had here, it would appear, in respect of our present international commitments in this world, that the force that we have is spread just about as thing as it could be

with the exception that we might provide one more battalion for elsewhere in the world. One of the senior officers made this point, and I thought very well: that we have been very fortunate in never being called upon to fulfill all our commitments at once. Do you agree that that is a fair statement?

Mr. HELLYER: Yes, I certainly do. If we had to fulfill all commitments at once, including the backup of our land force for Europe, we would not be able to do it. We would not have been able to do it four years ago; we could not do it now, and we will not be able to do it in a year or two. Maybe in three or four years, depending on what our commitments are at that time, we might be in a position to do it, but this is because we have not the equipment, the logistics, to provide that kind of support, and this has been the case for a long period of time.

Mr. MACRAE: Thank you. I think the point was very forcefully made by General Foulkes, and also, I believe, by General Moncel—specifically by General Foulkes, because I questioned him on it—that as far as he can see, with the force unified as planned now in the bill and as planned by the department and by the government, it will be extremely difficult to fulfil our present commitments. If we can just assume for a moment that that is so, where do you foresee a lessening of tensions, or where do you see a lessening of our commitments in this troubled world?

Mr. HELLYER: Well, I do not assume it is so because is is not so.

Mr. MACRAE: That is, that the unified force could not fulfil them?

Mr. HELLYER: Correct.

Mr. MACRAE: Therefore, you are assuming that if the present world tensions continue the force as it will be constituted in the future will be adequate? Then that is a point on which you disagree very strongly with General Foulkes.

Mr. HELLYER: I do not recall his exact observations and therefore I cannot say how strongly I would disagree, but I can say that the way our forces are, and will be, organized we can provide units or sub-units as required to fulfil our commitments. Whether they work as units or as part of task forces is something that would be determined at the time, and I am convinced that they could perform superbly under either circumstance.

Mr. MACRAE: Well, as I said earlier, unfortunately the transcript of the evidence is not available and that is understandable, but I assure you, Mr. Hellyer, that he made that point very strongly.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. CHURCHILL: This is just a preliminary skirmish. I will not have time to exhaust all my questions in just a ten-minute period, Mr. Chairman.

When the minister in his paper the other day offered criticism of the former government on the adequacy of the arming of our forces—most of his statements having been proved wrong by Mr. Harkness and myself—he once again drew attention to the value of the armoured personnel carrier. The Minister looks upon that as a worthwhile modern development within the army; is that right?

Mr. HELLYER: Yes, I do.

Mr. CHURCHILL: It is forward-looking; it provides mobility; it is in keeping with the general activity of advancing with technology; is that right?

Mr. HELLYER: For mechanized forces I would say yes.

Mr. CHURCHILL: It is essential?

Mr. HELLYER: This depends on the kind of force, as you know. Not all forces travel on wheels or tracks. Some of them travel on foot. Whether or not it is essential depends on what the task is.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Generally, the Minister looks upon this as quite an achievement and a forward-looking policy?

Mr. HELLYER: I think it is an integral part of mechanized forces, yes.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Is the Minister aware of the origin of the armoured personnel carrier?

Mr. HELLYER: No; I am not that much of a military historian.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Well, you have been reading very extensively from General LeMay and from Sir Winston Churchill and others. Are you not aware that it was a Canadian invention?

Mr. HELLYER: I am aware that we began to develop the Bobcat and that through a series of problems, to use a convenient word, other countries that began development of their carriers subsequently overtook us and had theirs developed and proven and standardized before we had completed our development and that consequently we had to adopt their equipment rather than being in a position to allow them to adopt ours.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I know that the Minister does not want to go too far back in history, because he wants to be abreast of the present, but he is aware that General Simmonds conceived the idea of the armoured personnel carrier and put it into operation at the battle of Falaise?

Mr. HELLYER: I could not say, Mr. Churchill. I am not that—

An hon. MEMBER: Old?

Mr. CHURCHILL: I was just wondering whether the minister would recognize that perhaps some of these things were developed before his time and by people who were, of course, not as capable as the Minister, but who had some ideas of modern development?

Mr. HELLYER: Mr. Churchill a lot of things were developed before my time, and if I am any judge of historical progression I would say that there are going to be even more developed after my time.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I would hope so. Is the minister aware, in connection with the armoured personnel carrier, that a Canadian regiment was formed during the Second World War and that it carried 54 battalions of infantry into action?

Mr. HELLYER: I am very interested in any lesson in history that the hon. gentleman who has studied this subject can give me. It will add to my understanding.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Would you agree that a person who advocated mobility for our armed forces and the utilization of the armoured personnel carrier was forward-looking?

Mr. HELLYER: I think it could be so construed.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Well, thank you very much; because I advocated that in 1951 and 1952 in the House of Commons.

Having commanded the armoured personnel carrier regiment in the Second World War I was somewhat familiar with it would you now like to withdraw the remarks you made in a speech outside the House that I was just a maintainer of the *status quo*?

Mr. HELLYER: Well, I can only say that I like your earlier self when you were more progressive and open-minded and forward-looking than perhaps you may have become.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I have not changed at all. You are the one that is beginning to grow old. As I said, Mr. Chairman, this is just a preliminary.

In the course of the Ministers address the other day he drew attention to statements by Winston Churchill about the conflict between politicians and military authorities, which was the great controversy of the First World War. The minister might have even more effectively quoted Lloyd George on this, but perhaps he does not have time to read history. Although this is an effective example, showing that the military people may sometimes be wrong—and I think they were wrong in the First World War—are there not other examples where the politicians are wrong and the military are right?

Mr. HELLYER: Yes.

Mr. CHURCHILL: And is this not an outstanding example right now of experienced military authorities being right and the ministerial side being wrong?

Mr. HELLYER: I would have to know what question you are referring to.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I am referring to the proposition you have been putting forward against the advice of senior military advisers. There is some doubt in my mind whether the politician is right on this occasion, and I base that on the experience of the First World War where the military happened to be wrong and the politicians right. In the Second World War is the minister aware that in 1944 the politicians were dead wrong and the military dead right about the need for reinforcements for the Canadian army in northwest Europe and in Italy?

Mr. HELLYER: Well this is a subject with which my hon. friend is more conversant than I. I am sure there are cases in history on both sides. This is inevitable. As long as judgments are made by human beings there will be no 100 per cent batting average.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Not even by the Minister himself?

Mr. HELLYER: Not even by any minister that I have ever known.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Good. May I then just suggest to the minister that he should study the situation in 1944 and he will that find the military were right and the politicians were absolutely wrong. I happened to be in charge of reinforcements for awhile for the armoured corps in northwest Europe and I know of the situation there and I have heard about the Italian situation. I happened to be working in action with the Lake Superior regiment in, I think, February or March 1945, when because of the lack of reinforcements that regiment had to fight in the Hochwald Forest with approximately 120 men insteady of 600. The

whole reason for that with its terrible effect on our fighting men, was a decision of the Liberal government here in Canada, under Mackenzie King, which resulted in the failure to supply troops. I say that the politicians were wrong and the military were right.

Mr. HELLYER: Would you believe, Mr. Churchill, that at the same time there was in the Royal Canadian Air Force a surplus of young Canadians awaiting air crew training who would have been more than willing to serve as reinforcements for those units that required them? Because the system was operated on a tri-service basis, with each service doing its own recruiting and storing its own manpower, and jealously guarding it, without perhaps considering the real needs and priorities of the national interest as a whole, those men who were available for reinforcements were unavailable as reinforcements even if they had volunteered? This is one problem which we think will be largely overcome with the single service system. In an emergency it will be possible to use the manpower to meet the real needs of the force as a whole in any particular situation.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I hope we all learn from experience. In your document you are attempting to show that the military can be wrong, and fatally wrong, and the implication is that they are nearly always wrong. I am pointing out to you that the politician is just as frequently wrong and just as fatally wrong, as was the Mackenzie King government in 1944, at the expense of Canadian lives overseas.

Mr. HELLYER: Mr. Churchill, I think it is fair to say that in the great majority of cases there is a meeting of minds between the military and the civilians. Even then there are sometimes errors in judgment. I think you could equally find cases where the politicians are wrong and where the military are wrong.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Then why did you not put that fact in your document instead of attempting to slant it towards the opinion that the military are always wrong and the politicians are always right.

Mr. HELLYER: I made no such statement, nor would I. The purpose of my hon. friend in his choice of witnesses for the committee and so on has been to present the other side of the case to his satisfaction and I feel now that it is really necessary to make the case for the single service and to try to make my hon. friend as cognizant of current, contemporary and future thinking as he is of the problems of the 1940's.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Well, I base my judgments on experience rather than or merely theoretical knowledge.

Mr. HELLYER: I think that some of each is a good blend.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Most of the eighty senior officers who were either fired or permitted to retire in the 18 month or two year period that I was speaking of yesterday were men who had battle experience and knowledge of man-management and knowledge of the three services, and yet you carelessly dispensed with their services and advice. That is one of the reasons for our objecting. Then in the case of the witnesses who have appeared before us an attempt has been made to reject their advice by certain statements you have made outside this

committee chamber, trying to imply to the public that they are out of touch, inexperienced, unfamiliar, and even disloyal to their country.

Mr. HELLYER: I made no such suggestion, Mr. Churchill. And I think you have to be just as careful with the broad brush as you have suggested others should be when you mention in the same breath that 80 officers were dismissed or dispensed with on this isue. I do not think that is a fair statement. In fact, I know that it is not.

The variety of the reasons for officers having left the service is very great. I think it is unfortunate that the act is worded in such a way that there is, or has been, no differentiation between officers who have gone out for various reasons, and that you can come to this erroneous conclusion. I have asked the staff to look at the act to see if we cannot propose some legislative amendments which would prevent this kind of misunderstanding and categorize more precisely the reasons for different officers leaving the force.

Mr. CHURCHILL: When a person such as General Moncel, Vice Chief of Staff, retires six years before his normal retirement time it raises grave doubts in the minds of members of this Committee and of the public.

That is all for now, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Winch?

Mr. WINCH: Mr. Chairman, I have three questions. In order to save time, I have been busy now writing them down.

My first question to the Minister is this: How many senior officers of the rank of Lieutenant General and higher, Rear Admiral and higher and Air Vice Marshal and higher have been released from the service since the filing of the White Paper, and who (a) have been fired; (b) have retired at the normal time; and (c) have retired prematurely voluntarily?

Mr. HELLYER: I would have to take that question as notice, Mr. Winch, and give you a written reply. I do not think it has been answered in those terms. If you will write it out and it to me I would be glad to take it as notice.

Mr. WINCH: You cannot do it now?

Mr. HELLYER: Not from memory.

Mr. WINCH: My second question is this: Two, if not three, witnesses have said that twice you summoned your senior officers with their subordinate officers to meet with you and that you embarrassed your senior officers by asking questions of, and for comments from, subordinate officers. The evidence before us is that senior officers object to this procedure on the basis that the Minister should not place them in the invidious position of discussing policy before their subordinate officers.

Have you any comment on this?

Mr. HELLYER: First of all, I have no idea to what cases they are referring, so I am not in a position to comment. But before Defence Council, for example—I think I made this clear in my statement—the senior officers are in attendence because they are members, or associate members, of council. Any briefing on a particular subject may be given by an officer of any rank, often at the rank of brigadier or equivalent, colonel, lieutenant colonel or equivalent, or major and

so on. I think it is the responsibility of members of council including myself, to ask questions of any one who has expertise in those areas so that we know what the issues are before making decisions.

I have never found any objection to that. No senior member of my staff has ever said, "You must not ask questions of the briefers when they come in to go over these important propositions". On the other hand, they have always encouraged free and open discussion so that we could get the kind of background information, the whole range of information, and the pros and cons of any alternatives or options that might have been put forward, in a way which would make the best decision likely. I have never had any complaints about that. I think it is a safeguard of the system.

I do not think you can have it both ways. I do not think you can take the point of view that with the single service you have a single chief and, therefore, must rely on one man's advice, whether it is right or wrong, and that this is a terribly dangerous situation which is unprecedented, and at that same time complain about the normal processes by which corporate decisions are made in our modern world, of having a council and having appear before that council briefers and witnesses who make their knowledge and their expertise available to all members of council, so that you can then have discussion and come to an intelligent conclusion. I think that is perfectly reasonable and natural and normal. It is a good system and it works well. I have not had a word of complaint about it and I really would not expect any.

Mr. WINCH: Would you expand on that just a little? I remember distinctly two witnesses before this Committee saying, I believe, that twice in the past two years you had called your senior officers with their subordinate officers to meet with you. I am not sure if it was two, but I know that one witness said that your senior officers were treated at both these meetings as school boys, and that in view of the chain of command it was wrong for you as Minister to call a meeting of that nature and subject senior officers to the points of view of their subordinates who would have to follow through on the orders of senior command.

Mr. HELLYER: I do not know the instances to which you are referring, Mr. Winch, so I cannot comment. There have been numerous occasions when matters of some importance have been discussed and where there was a blending of officers of different ranks and they have all put forward their points of view. As I indicated before, I think this is something of a safeguard.

I could give some pretty important examples of where I think it would have been advisable to have obtained more information from people currently expert in a field and where the advice of the most senior officer may or may not have been the best advice. I do not think you can have it both ways. You cannot suggest that a kind of organizational structure is wrong and at the same time say that there cannot be full and free discussion before a decision is made.

Now, once a decision is made, it is different. The rule of the game is that it must be carried out. That is when everyone should close ranks and have precisely the same point of view all the way down the line.

Mr. WINCH: Mr. Chairman, my last question is, to me, the most important one, and I hope that we can get an unequivocal reply from the Minister, with no skating around it.

It is this: Will the Minister state his position on the bill before us? Do you, Mr. Hellyer, consider the bill such that any amendments moved and agreed to by this Committee, or by the House of Commons in Committee, would be an indication of want of confidence in yourself as Minister, or want of confidence in the government? Are you prepared democratically to accept a majority decision by this Committee, or of the House of Commons, without maintaining that any change is a challenge or indicates a lack of confidence in yourself or in the government?

Mr. CHURCHILL: Are you afraid of an election, Mr. Winch?

Mr. WINCH: No, sir; not in my riding. You always lose your deposits, and have done for 34 years.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Make him minister of defence.

Mr. HELLYER: Mr. Winch, I have an open mind. If you can persuade me that any amendment is advisable to bring about the objectives that I think are in the interest of my country, I will support it.

Mr. WINCH: I am sorry, you are skating—I asked you not to skate. You said if we can persuade you, it is advisable. My question is if the Committee or the House of Commons says that a change should be made will you accept it in the democratic spirit in this Committee or the House of Commons?

Mr. HELLYER: Mr. Winch, you did not let me finish, and I thought I was being just about as direct as possible. I said if you could persuade me that a change was advisable to achieve the purpose that we have in mind I would support it. Naturally, because I believe in our system, having studied it and having been involved in it throughout my whole adult life, I must abide by a majority decision either in Committee or Committee of the whole of the House of Commons. That is fundamental to the democratic system.

Mr. WINCH: Will you now please answer without any equivocation about changes being made? Would you regard it as a want of confidence in yourself or in the government, or do we have to accept this as a fait accompli?

Mr. HELLYER: You were talking about changes in Committee. I do not think these are considered to be indications of want of confidence. Certainly, I think the constitutional rules are pretty clear that a vote on third reading which turned it down would be a want of confidence vote in the government.

Mr. WINCH: I beg your pardon? Would you repeat that?

Mr. HELLYER: I said that a negative vote on third reading, I think, under our constitutional practices would be a want of confidence.

Mr. WINCH: Oh, I am thinking about an amendment.

Mr. HELLYER: In Committee, I do not think these are considered want of confidence.

Mr. WINCH: Thank you.

Mr. HELLYER: I do not want to give the wrong impression there, though. It, perhaps, depends on whether the degree of the change made was such that the principle was, in fact, altered to the point that it would be so considered. I would want to consult my constitutional advisers before being too precise on that.

Mr. WINCH: Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, I have Mr. Brewin next, Mr. Harkness, Mr. McIntosh, Mr. Forrestall and Mr. Lambert. In view of the hour, though, I suggest, since the bells are about to ring, that we adjourn now until Monday afternoon at 3.30.

Mr. HARKNESS: Mr. Chairman, there are two or three minutes left and I am next on the list. There is one matter which should be dealt with at this time.

Last night the Minister made a very, very serious charge against Admiral Landymore—in fact, I would say the most serious charge that can be made against any officer, and particularly a senior officer. Although I do not have the *Gazette* before me, it was reported in the *Gazette* this morning in somewhat these terms, that Admiral Landymore had been guilty of disloyalty over a period of eighteen months to the people who employed him. Now, I think that the people who employ any officer are the people of Canada, and I would like the Minister to clarify whether he is accusing Admiral Landymore of disloyalty to Canada and to the people of Canada or is accusing him of disloyalty to the Minister himself?

Mr. HELLYER: It was the policy of the Government and people of Canada, that I was referring to—the policy as determined by the duly elected representatives of the people of Canada in their legislative capacity.

Mr. HARKNESS: Well, I ask the Minister: Is your accusation one of disloyalty to Canada and to the people of Canada?

Mr. HELLYER: Well, Mr. Harkness, I think the statement is clear enough as it stands.

Mr. HARKNESS: If that is the accusation, Mr. Chairman, then I would say that the Minister himself is in the position of having condemned himself out of his own mouth, in that, still occupying the position of Minister, he failed in his responsibility as Minister of Defence if in fact what he says is true, that Admiral Landymore was guilty of disloyalty to Canada for eighteen months and he maintained him in that position. The Minister himself has really condemned himself and shown himself to be unfit to hold his present position if in fact his charge against Admiral Landymore is correct.

I think there is no question that we should call before this Committee the people who would be able to give us evidence on whether they knew of any grounds for making a case of disloyalty against Admiral Landymore. In other words, we should call the then Chief of Defence Staff, Air Chief Marshal Miller, and the Chief of Personnel, Admiral Dyer, who was the senior naval officer on headquarters at the time; and, of course, I think also that the Committee is now in the position that we have to have Admiral Landymore back to give him an opportunity to answer this charge.

Mr. HELLYER: Mr. Harkness, I was not aware of the situation for the whole eighteen months and I acted soon after I became aware of it in sufficient detail to know what was involved.

As far as Admiral Landymore is concerned, he can clear his name very simply. If he will say, on his honour, that there was no meeting such as I described last night and that he said nothing similar to the contentions that I made last night; then I will accept his word as an officer and I will be happy to apologize.

Mr. FORRESTALL: You made the charge, It is up to you to prove it, and not for him to prove that he is an honourable man.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, we will now adjourn.

HOUSE OF COMMONS

First Session—Twenty-seventh Parliament

1966-67

STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. GRANT DEACHMAN

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 26

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 27, 1967
TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 1967

Respecting

Bill C-243, An Act to amend the National Defence Act and other Acts in consequence thereof.

WITNESSES:

The Honourable Paul Hellyer, Minister of National Defence and Rear-Admiral W. M. Landymore, O.B.E., C.D., RCN.

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY
OTTAWA, 1967

25837—1

STANDING COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. Grant Deachman

Vice-Chairman: Hon. Marcel Lambert

and

Mr. Andras,	Mr. Hopkins,	[1] Mr. Matte,
Mr. Brewin,	Mr. Latulippe,	Mr. McIntosh,
Mr. Byrne,	Mr. Legault,	[1] Mr. McNulty,
Mr. Churchill,	Mr. Lessard,	Mr. Nugent,
[1] Mr. Crossman,	Mr. Loiselle,	[2] Mr. Pugh,
Mr. Fane,	Mr. Macaluso,	Mr. Rochon,
Mr. Foy,	Mr. MacRae,	Mr. Winch—(24).
Mr. Harkness,		

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

[1] Replaced Messrs. Langlois (*Chicoutimi*), Laniel, LeBlanc (*Rimouski*) and Groos on February 27, 1967.
[2] Replaced Mr. Forrestall on February 28, 1967.

ORDERS OF REFERENCE

HOUSE OF COMMONS

MONDAY, February 27, 1967.

Ordered,—That the names of Messrs. Matte, McNulty, Deachman and Crossman be substituted for those of Messrs. Langlois (*Chicoutimi*), Laniel, LeBlanc (*Rimouski*) and Groos on the Standing Committee on National Defence.

TUESDAY, February 28, 1967.

Ordered,—That the name of Mr. Pugh be substituted for that of Mr. Forrestall on the Standing Committee on National Defence.

Ordered,—That the names of Messrs. Forrestall and Smith be substituted for those of Messrs. Pugh and MacRae on the Standing Committee on National Defence.

Attest.

LÉON-J. RAYMOND,
The Clerk of the House of Commons.

25837—1½

ORDERS OF REFERENCE

HOUSE OF COMMONS

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TUESDAY, February 28, 1967.

Ordered,—That the name of Mr. Pugh be substituted for that of Mr. Forrestall on the Standing Committee on National Defence.

Ordered,—That the names of Messrs. Forrestall and Smith be substituted for those of Messrs. Pugh and MacRae on the Standing Committee on National Defence.

Attest.

LEON-J. RAYMOND,
The Clerk of the House of Commons.

STANDING COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENCE

Mr. Andras,	Mr. Hopkins,	Mr. Mattè,
Mr. Brewin,	Mr. Latulippe,	Mr. McIntosh,
Mr. Byrne,	Mr. Lewis,	*Mr. McNulty,
Mr. Chatterton,	Mr. Lloyd,	Mr. Nugent,
*Mr. Crossman,	Mr. Loiselle,	*Mr. Pugh,
Mr. Fane,	Mr. Macaluso,	Mr. Rochon,
Mr. Foy,	Mr. MacRae,	Mr. Winch—(24).
Mr. Harkness,		

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

*Replaced Messrs. Langlois (Chicoutimi), Laniel, LaBlanc (Rimouski) and Groos on February 27, 1967.
*Replaced Mr. Forrestall on February 28, 1967.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

MONDAY, February 27, 1967.
(49)

The Standing Committee on National Defence met at 3:40 p.m. this day.

Members present: Messrs. Andras, Brewin, Byrne, Churchill, Crossman, Deachman, Fane, Forrestall, Foy, Harkness, Hopkins, Lambert, Legault, Lessard, Loiselle, Macaluso, MacRae, Matte, McIntosh, McNulty, Nugent, Rochon—(22).

Also present: Mr. Horner (*Acadia*), and Mr. McCleave.

In attendance: From the Department of National Defence: Honourable Paul Hellyer, Minister, Mr. E. B. Armstrong, Deputy Minister; General J. V. Allard, Chief Defence Staff and members of the Defence Staff.

In the absence of the Chairman, the Clerk of the Committee advised the Committee that he had received a letter of resignation from Mr. David Groos, The Clerk read the letter and invited nominations for Chairman of the Committee. Some members protested that as there already was a Vice-Chairman, he should take the Chair and, if necessary, preside over the election of a Chairman.

The Committee agreed that Mr. Lambert should assume the Chair as Vice-Chairman.

On motion of Mr. McIntosh, seconded by Mr. Loiselle,

Resolved,—That a letter be sent to Mr. Groos, regretting the fact that he has had to resign for health reasons but that the Committee wishes him a speedy and full recovery.

Mr. Lambert invited nominations for the election of a Chairman. Mr. Andras, seconded by Mr. Foy, proposed that Mr. Deachman be elected as Chairman. Mr. McIntosh, seconded by Mr. Forrestall, proposed that Mr. Lambert be elected as Chairman.

On motion of Mr. Macaluso, seconded by Mr. Hopkins nominations were closed. Mr. Lambert stated that the only way to conduct the election of a Chairman was by secret ballot and instructed that members prepare slips of paper and indicate thereon their preference. The slips were collected and counted, and Mr. Lambert announced that Mr. Grant Deachman was duly elected Chairman of the Committee and asked him to take the Chair.

After continued discussion concerning the Minister's statements involving Admiral Landymore at the sittings of the Committee on Thursday evening, February 23, 1967 and Friday morning, February 24, 1967, it was moved by Mr. Nugent, seconded by Mr. Churchill,

That no further proceedings be taken by this Committee until the Minister's allegations against Admiral Landymore have been dealt with.

The question being put on the motion, it was negatived, on the following division: YEAS—9; NAYS—13.

Later on in the discussion, on motion of Mr. Brewin, seconded by Mr. Forrestall,

Resolved,—That the Minister be permitted to make a statement on the question of the alleged disloyalty of Admiral Landymore and that the question of the Minister's statement be referred to the Steering Committee to consider as soon as possible how the matter may be appropriately dealt with by the Committee having in mind the right of Admiral Landymore if he so desires to meet any charges against him by the Minister.

The question being put on the motion, it was adopted, on the following division: YEAS-19; NAYS-1.

The Minister then read a prepared statement concerning the subject under discussion, copies of which were distributed to the members. The members questioned the Minister regarding his statement, during the remainder of the sitting.

The Chairman announced that the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure would meet at 7:15 p.m. this day.

The questioning of the Minister continuing, at 6:00 p.m. the Committee adjourned until 8:00 p.m. this day.

EVENING SITTING
(50)

The Standing Committee on National Defence met at 8:05 p.m., this day. The Chairman, Mr. Grant Deachman, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Andras, Brewin, Byrne, Churchill, Crossman, Deachman, Fane, Forrestall, Foy, Harkness, Hopkins, Lambert, Legault, Lessard, Loiselle, Macaluso, MacRae, Matte, McIntosh, McNulty, Nugent, Rochon and Mr. Winch—(23).

Also present: Messrs. Chatterton, Horner (*Acadia*), McCleave, O'Keefe, Pugh and Mr. Tolmie.

In attendance: Same as the afternoon sitting.

The Chairman presented the Tenth Report of the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure, which is as follows:

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AGENDA AND PROCEDURE

MONDAY, February 27, 1967.
(12)

TENTH REPORT

Your Subcommittee met to consider the scheduling of future meetings and the witnesses who should be invited to appear. Your Subcommittee recommends as follows:

1. That the Committee should continue this evening, February 27, 1967, with the questioning of the Minister.
2. That the Subcommittee has telephoned Rear-Admiral Landymore and he has expressed a desire to appear before the Committee.
3. That Rear-Admiral Landymore has been asked to be in attendance when the Committee meets, tomorrow morning, February 28, 1967.
4. That the Committee should meet on Tuesday, February 28, 1967 at 10:00 a.m.,
5. That the Subcommittee will meet again after the morning sitting on February 28, 1967, to consider future business.
6. That the Committee should call upon General J. V. Allard, Chief of Defence Staff, to describe the status of the Armed Forces, immediately following the questioning of the Minister and Rear-Admiral Landymore.

On motion of Mr. Winch, seconded by Mr. Foy, the Tenth Report of the Subcommittee was adopted, as presented.

The members of the Committee continued their questioning of the Minister of National Defence, concerning certain allegations with respect to Rear-Admiral W. M. Landymore.

The questioning of the Minister having been completed, at 10:10 p.m. the Committee adjourned until Tuesday, February 28, 1967 at 10:00 a.m., when the witness will be Rear-Admiral Landymore.

TUESDAY, February 28, 1967.

The Standing Committee on National Defence met at 10:10 a.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Grant Deachman, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Andras, Byrne, Churchill, Crossman, Deachman, Fane, Foy, Harkness, Hopkins, Lambert, Legault, Lessard, Loiselle, Macaluso, MacRae, Matte, McIntosh, McNulty, Nugent, Rochon and Mr. Winch—(21).

Also present: Messrs. Aiken, Johnston and Pugh.

In attendance: Rear-Admiral W. M. Landymore; *From the Department of National Defence*: Honourable Paul Hellyer, Minister; Honourable Léo Cadieux, Associate Minister; Mr. E. B. Armstrong, Deputy Minister and members of the Defence Staff.

The Chairman introduced Rear-Admiral Landymore, explaining the circumstances of his appearance before the Committee. Rear-Admiral Landymore made a brief statement and was questioned by the members of the Committee.

At 11:15 a.m., the Committee recessed for five minutes.

At 11.20 a.m., the questioning of the witness resumed.

The Chairman announced that the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure would meet immediately after this morning sitting.

The Chairman made a statement to the Committee concerning the recent related testimony of the Minister and Rear-Admiral Landymore. Thereupon the Minister of National Defence made a statement to the members of the Committee.

The Committee adjourned at 12:05 p.m., until 3:30 p.m. this day when the witness will be General J. V. Allard, Chief Defence Staff.

Hugh R. Stewart
Clerk of the Committee.

EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

MONDAY, February 27, 1967.

The CLERK OF THE COMMITTEE: Gentlemen, we now have a quorum. As your Clerk, I have an announcement to make. Mr. David Groos has forwarded to me the following letter addressed to the Standing Committee on National Defence.

Gentlemen:

I very much regret that my doctors have directed me to hospital, and I expect to be in the National Defence Medical Centre here for at least the next two weeks.

In the circumstances, I must regretfully submit my resignation herewith as Chairman of the Standing Committee on National Defence.

In these circumstances, I must declare the Chairmanship of this Committee vacant and invite nominations to fill that vacancy.

Mr. ANDRAS: I nominate Mr. Grant Deachman to take over as Chairman of the Standing Committee on National Defence.

Mr. CHURCHILL: On a point of order, why are you calling this meeting. Is there not a Vice-Chairman? I think you are out of order.

Mr. NUGENT: The Clerk has no authority to call a meeting, there is a deputy chairman who acts when the Chairman is not here.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I submit Mr. Clerk that you have no authority to call this meeting to order, nor to preside. The Vice-Chairman is the one who should preside at this stage, whatever other things happen are within the competence of the Committee, but there is no authority resting with the Clerk any more than there is with the Clerk of the House of Commons.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Could I ask what authority you do call this meeting, and who gave you the instructions to call it?

The CLERK OF THE COMMITTEE: The Chair has been vacated.

An hon. MEMBER: And the Vice-Chairman acts when he is not here.

The CLERK OF THE COMMITTEE: We are following the rule of the House.

Mr. MCINTOSH: What is that rule?

The CLERK OF THE COMMITTEE: When the speakership is vacated, we proceed to the election of a new Speaker. The Chairmanship of this Committee has been vacated and we must proceed to the election of a new Chairman.

Mr. MCINTOSH: But we are instructed are we not by the Governor General to proceed with certain procedure to nominate a new Speaker? I was wondering on what authority and who gave you the instructions to call this meeting?

Mr. MACALUSO: I would assume Mr. Stewart that the meeting was called by the Chairman himself, and not anyone else, so we are duly in session at this time.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Oh no we are not.

Mr. MACALUSO: Just let me finish please. If you want to say something just put up your hand.

From what I have been able to check from the experts outside of this chamber on House rules, we are to operate as the Committee operates under the rules and procedures of the House, and I am informed that when the Chair is vacant, then the Vice-Chairman takes over as Chairman only in the situation where the Chairman is temporarily away from the Chair.

But when he is permanently out of the Chair and there is a vacancy as there is now by the resignation of the Chairman, due to illness then the Chair is vacant and you call for nominations of a new Chairman. In the House when a Speaker is ill, or has to resign, or be away, then there is a new Speaker elected by the House or appointed on the approval of the House as a whole. Therefore, we follow the same procedure here, and as a result Mr. Stewart, I think your motion to nominate a new Chairman at this time is quite in order?

Mr. MCINTOSH: Could we have that rule read to us?

Mr. MACALUSO: All you have to do is ask the Speaker, Mr. McIntosh.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I want the rule read to us.

Mr. NUGENT: The rule is very simple, in the absence of the Chairman, the Vice Chairman takes over. The Vice Chairman can receive the resignation of the Chairman of the Committee and then there would be a motion to appoint a new Chairman. We would then be doing it properly.

Mr. MACALUSO: I am not arguing about that particular motion Mr. Nugent, but I am arguing against the argument that we are not duly sitting at this time.

Mr. NUGENT: I would suggest that the Vice Chairman take over to oversee the first order of business on the election of a new Chairman. I am sure we want that and then it would be regularized. Does anyone object to the Vice Chairman taking over?

Mr. FORRESTALL: If the procedure is such that the Vice Chairman sit and call for the nomination of a new Chairman, no one is arguing about the procedure.

Mr. NUGENT: It is the only way it can be done properly and I am just suggesting that we do it properly.

The CLERK of the COMMITTEE: It is not regularly constituted due to the vacancy in the Chair.

Mr. NUGENT: That is why we have a deputy chairman so it shall be regularly constituted; so there is somebody to receive the Chairman's resignation—if it happens—otherwise why do we have a deputy chairman?

Mr. BREWIN: Mr. Stewart, there seems to be no problem here. We have a vice chairman who is present and ready to take over and says that he will then submit the letter of resignation and the request for the election of a chairman.

It seems to me that we can all agree that that is a sensible procedure if we want to get on with our business as far as I am concerned.

The CLERK OF THE COMMITTEE: Is it agreed gentlemen that the motion is withdrawn?

The VICE-CHAIRMAN: This meeting now has a quorum and we are duly constituted. I suppose it is anti-climatic to say that we have received with some regret and disappointment the letter from Mr. Groos that has been forwarded to the members of the Committee regretting that he has had to put in his resignation because of illness.

Gentlemen, I do not suppose it is necessary to have a motion to accept the resignation but I think it would be quite improper to let the occasion pass without a direction from this Committee through its Clerk or through any other designated person to address a letter in the usual form. Someone has suggested thanks and appreciation for services but that maybe suggests a firing. Frankly we would like to see our Chairman recover quickly and fully restored to good health. May I have a motion?

Mr. MACALUSO: What is the motion?

The VICE-CHAIRMAN: To send a letter to Mr. Groos regretting the fact that he has had to resign for health reasons but that we wish him a speedy and full recovery.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I so move.

Mr. LOISELLE: I second the motion.

Motion agreed to.

Mr HARKNESS: Mr. Chairman, I would like to observe at this point that I think this is the first serious result of an almost continuous session which this Committee has been holding over the past three weeks or more. I would hope that the majority on the Committee will realize it and recognize that to attempt to meet as frequently as we have been meeting is not a reasonable proposition.

The VICE-CHAIRMAN: The first item of business. Is the Minister present?

Mr. ANDRAS: I move for the nomination of—

The VICE-CHAIRMAN: Are you raising a point of order?

Mr. ANDRAS: Yes. On a point of order, Mr. Chairman, I believe the position of Chairman of this Committee is now vacated by the acceptance of resignation by Mr. Groos and I would, therefore, move the nomination of Mr. Deachman as Chairman of the Committee to replace him.

The VICE-CHAIRMAN: You have heard the motion. Is there a seconder? Mr. Foy? Are there any questions?

Mr. BREWIN: Mr. Chairman, do you not listen for other nominations? I do not have any but just as a matter of procedure.

The VICE-CHAIRMAN: All right. Are there any other nominations for the position of Chairman?

Mr. MCINTOSH: I nominate the vice chairman, yourself, Mr. Lambert.

The VICE-CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, I am going to suggest to you that under the circumstances that I think I would prefer not to act as Chairman on this Committee at this time. Therefore, I would ask you, Mr. McIntosh, to kindly withdraw your nomination.

Mr. McINTOSH: I have a lot of respect for your remarks, Mr. Lambert, but I think the common procedure in any organization when a vacancy occurs such as this that the Vice-Chairman automatically steps up as a matter of courtesy. In order that this procedure is not done away by a precedent in this Committee I still would like to leave my motion.

Mr. NUGENT: Mr. Chairman, I think there is a custom in this Committee that except for the Public Accounts Committee.

Mr. MACALUSO: Is this open for debate?

Mr. NUGENT: Where there is a Chairman from the Opposition the usual practice is that a member of the government is the Chairman of the Committee. I think we ought to take that into consideration here.

Mr. MACALUSO: Mr. Chairman, on a point of order.

The VICE-CHAIRMAN: Mr. Macaluso, I would think that a motion, nomination and so forth is debatable.

Mr. MACALUSO: It is?

The VICE-CHAIRMAN: It is debatable.

Mr. MACALUSO: I cannot disagree with you openly here because there is no point in it but—

The VICE-CHAIRMAN: I think under the circumstances and I will quite frankly say so—Mr. McIntosh, I agree with the point you have made—but under the circumstances it is not the appropriate time for that ecumenical spirit to apply and that it would not in any event. There is no point in delaying our proceedings by an exercise in futility. Therefore, if you will permit me I will not allow my name to stand.

Mr. McINTOSH: Mr. Chairman, I still say it is a matter of principle as far as I am concerned and I regret that I cannot withdraw the motion.

Mr. MACALUSO: I move the nominations be closed, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HOPKINS: I second the motion.

The VICE-CHAIRMAN: It is moved by Mr. Macaluso and seconded by Mr. Hopkins that the nominations cease.

We find ourselves in this situation. We have a very reluctant candidate for office.

You all have paper and under the circumstances this nomination will not be by a motion of yea or nay but these will be in the normal form of polling by secret ballot. The Clerk will gather up the ballots.

Mr. MACALUSO: Mr. Chairman, on a point of order. Perhaps I could be clarified on this. It has never been—during my short period of four years—to ever have a ballot for a chairman of a committee. This has never been the practice and I do not see anywhere where it has been the practice. It is always yeas or nays. In my four years in parliament it has never been done by ballot.

The VICE-CHAIRMAN: Mr. Macaluso, in my 10 years experience here I have seen it many times. It is the only way. That is my ruling.

Mr. McINTOSH: Mr. Chairman, will it be a recorded ballot, will we sign our names?

Mr. MACALUSO: Mr. Chairman, there is a doubt in my mind about the legality of this procedure and this is why I raised it.

The VICE-CHAIRMAN: Mr. Macaluso, may I say that the first chairman on this committee of defence—prior to your time—was elected on the basis of a ballot. I was the first elected vice chairman to this committee on the basis of a ballot. I base it on this and many other precedents.

Mr. MACALUSO: Mr. Chairman, will this be a recorded vote?

The VICE-CHAIRMAN: As to the results.

Mr. MACALUSO: Fine, thank you.

Mr. CHURCHILL: If there had been a secret ballot in the Transport Committee you would not have missed it.

Mr. MACALUSO: Mr. Chairman, any time Mr. Churchill would like to run against me I welcome his intervention.

Mr. ANDRAS: Mr. Chairman, on a point of order and for clarification, the procedure for voting then is simply that we record the nominee—the name of the nominee of our choice—on a piece of paper which will be collected by the Clerk of the committee. I just want to make sure that there are no unkown factors which might arise which would raise the question of spoiled ballots.

The VICE-CHAIRMAN: The clerk advises me that the count is 14 to 8 in favour of Mr. Deachman. I will now declare Mr. Deachman duly elected as Chairman of this Committee and yield the Chair to him with pleasure.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, thank you very much for your confidence. I think my first words as Chairman of this Committee should be to express the deepest regrets of this Committee that David Groos is in hospital. I think it would have been the wish of every one of us that he should have continued in the Chair. I think all of us had come to appreciate the fairness and the good humour and spirit of David Groos while he acted as Chairman and all of us are sincerely regretful that he is not here today.

Gentlemen, on Friday we were examining the Minister and if it is your pleasure I shall recall the Minister now to continue that examination. I have no list before me and will recognize the hands of members as they appear.

Mr. HARKNESS: Mr. Chairman, I had started questioning actually at the end of the period on Friday.

The CHAIRMAN: You had just—allright then we will recognize you and then we will recognize you right after that then.

Mr. HARKNESS: Mr. Chairman first of all I would like to express my regret at the illness of Mr. Groos. I think that he demonstrated to all of us his fairness and his high qualifications as chairman of this committee and I know that I speak for everyone when I say that I hope that he will soon be recovered and be able to return to this Committee.

Now, just before we adjourned on Friady, I had raised the matter of the very grave charge of disloyalty which the Minister had alleged against Admiral Landymore and we only had some three or four minutes at that time on this particular point.

I had pointed out in, that morning's press, that the Minister was reported and correctly reported as saying that Admiral Landymore was fired for, and in quotation marks "eighteen months of consistent disloyalty to the policies of the people he was paid to serve"

I had asked the Minister to explain just what he meant by this charge of disloyalty and in fact I pointed out that in my opinion, and I thought that of most other people, when you spoke of the people, an officer was paid to serve, you meant the people of Canada and I ask the Minister this specific question as to whether he was charging Admiral Landymore with disloyalty to Canada or disloyalty to himself, and he replied, really that he was charging him with disloyalty to Canada.

Now, subsequently, the Minister went on the TV that afternoon and he was apparently, I think, back-pedaling to some extent from this charge, and I read the brief that he stated on his TV interview that he was charging the Admiral with disloyalty to himself.

I wonder if the Minister could now read into the record what he said on this TV interview so we know what the situation is?

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Harkness and Members, I think this is a subject which was being dealt with on Friday. I was not with the Committee on Friday but I understand from the papers it was a subject that was being dealt with then and personally, I believe the subject should be finished before this Committee, but I think it begins to stray from the bill and as we go along this afternoon I hope we will be able to return to the discussion of the bill. I invite Members, as we go along, to come back as soon as we can to the subject matter of the bill in the hope that we can address ourselves to this problem and perhaps move away from some of the surrounding problems that are not as germane to the topic and I will ask the Minister to speak now on that remark on this first question.

Hon. PAUL HELLYER (*Minister of National Defence*): I do not think, Mr. Chairman, there is anything I can usefully add to what has already been said. If the Committee wishes me to table later today the statement that I made to the television Friday evening I will be pleased to do that.

Mr. HARKNESS: Do I understand from that that you do not have it available at the moment?

Mr. HELLYER: I do not think I have it with me at the moment, Mr. Harkness.

Mr. HARKNESS: Well, I think, with a charge so serious as this, Mr. Chairman, that we cannot just leave the thing at this stage and I think that the Minister has to prove his charge of disloyalty or it has to be disproved. I feel quite cetrain that it can be disproved.

Now, I think that the evidence, or the brief, that Admiral Landymore circulated to all Members of the Committee outlines in detail the actions he has taken and the meeting of officers which he has held on the basis of which, if I understand it correctly, the Minister made his charges of disloyalty and I would like to know if it is because of this meeting that the Minister made these charges of disloyalty?

Mr. HELLYER: Pardon me, Mr. Chairman, but I do not really think this is relevant to the bill before us.

An hon. MEMBER: A man's reputation.

Mr. HELLYER: I think both statements, Admiral Landymore's statement and mine, are both on the record and I am willing to put on the record the clarifiying statement subsequently today and I really think that would be a good place to let the matter rest and that the balance should be left to the historians.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, I understand there is a statement forthcoming from the Minister on the subject.

I wonder whether this could conclude this aspect of the topic for the moment and whether we could move along.

Mr. Forrestall, I have you down here to speak in a moment but I wonder if we could let Mr. Harkness finish up his questions and then we can come to the matters which you have? Mr. Harkness?

Mr. HARKNESS: Well, Mr. Chairman, with a charge of such gravity as this which reflects so seriously on a highly respected senior officer of our Canadian forces, I do not think for a minute we, in this Committee, can leave the thing in the position that the Minister suggests and leave to the historians to determine the right and wrong of it. I think that it is owed to this Committee and, particularly it is owed to Admiral Landymore, to have this matter very definitely settled and it is up to the Minister to prove his charge.

He has made the charge and it is up to him to prove that charge. If he is not able to prove the charge then, of course, I submit that he has acted in a wholly irresponsible manner which in fact unfits him to continue to hold the position of Minister of National Defence.

The CHAIRMAN: Well, Mr. Harkness, we have the word of the Minister, now, that he has a statement on his position to place before the Committee and copies of that can be produced the moment it is tabled and will be available to members, and I wonder if you would agree with me that until we have that statement and have an opportunity to look at it and assess its value, whether it would not be advisable to go along to other topics and to return to this without prejudice when we have the appropiate time and have had an opportunity to look at that.

Mr. BREWIN: Mr. Chairman, on a point of order, it is not only a question, it seems to me, as to what the Minister may now be proposing to say, but is it not important to this Committee that what Admiral Landymore might have to say about these accusations made against him should be considered by the Committee.

I do not know whether he has been communicated with, or has communicated with the Chairman, owing to his unfortunate illness, we do not know about that.

I do not know whether the Steering Committee has met, but it strikes me that the making of any statements about this matter now, should possibly be made with the opportunity of Admiral Ladymore to be present and if he sees fit that we should give him the opportunity to reply to this serious accusation.

The CHAIRMAN: I have the gravest doubts myself that it is within the competence of this Committee to deal with a matter of this kind in any great depth.

Our instructions are to deal with the bill that is before us, and this is an issue which begins to wander far from the subject of the bill and begins to become a personal issue outside that, and I wonder if we might have a pause to consider just how far we are going to go in the handling of this and whether, rather than getting headlong into this subject this afternoon, we can receive the Minister's statement.

We can give consideration to this topic a little later and determine what course of action we are going to take in respect of this as a Committee. I share your anxiety that it be dealt with fairly, both relative to the statements that he Minister might make and the statements that Admiral Landymore might make, but I do not want to pitch this committee into a headlong debate on the subject on which at the moment we really have not ourselves studied carefully.

Mr. McINTOSH: On that point of order, Mr. Chairman, might I say that besides what Mr. Brewin has said, referring to Admiral Landymore, I think that the Canadian public are very interested in the same thing and as to the relativeness of this to the bill. I think the whole thing started with the bill, and it has a relation to it, it has grown out of this Committee meeting and it—

The CHAIRMAN: Well, I can assure you, Mr. McIntosh, that this is a public committee and what we say here is known to the public. There is no question of the public getting to know what we want but our problem is to set up a proper procedure dealing fairly with a matter that is beginning to expand beyond our immediate capabilities to deal with it in a logical and parliamentary way.

Mr. BREWIN: Mr. Chairman, may I just expand on my point very briefly. What I wanted to say was in the course of inquiries such as this, it is inevitable that some things come up that may or may not be closely relevant. In a hearing of this sort which is widely open to the public, when a serious accusation is made by a responsible Minister against someone who has held a very high rank in our armed services, my only point is that this should be cleared up with an opportunity for the person concerned to be heard as well as the accuser.

I am not saying that we should do this now, but I am suggesting at a later stage your Steering Committee should consider appropriate procedures to deal with this matter.

Mr. NUGENT: Mr. Chairman, every Committee has its rules and is able to enforce its rules, the rules of procedure, and the privileges of the Members of the Committee, and the points of order raised there.

In this case, the Minister has seen fit to use this Committee as a sounding board to make a very serious accusation against one who is still a serving officer and one who has presented evidence before this Committee and as a witness before this Committee, is entitled to the protection of Parliament and this Committee against his present Defence boss who has made this accusation.

Mr. HELLYER: Mr. Chairman, I do not know if I have any rights here or not, but I must object to this kind of insinuation by a Member of the Committee.

The question was raised by Mr. Forrestall another Member of the Committee—I was very sorry he raised it, but I do not think it is within the rights of the Committee to cast aspersions particularly at the moment that they are discussing this very principle.

The CHAIRMAN: Order gentlemen, we are attempting here to get an expression, not—

Mr. NUGENT: I am making a point of order I thought I had the chair to speak to it, Mr. Chairman—

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Nugent, one moment please, you do have the floor and we will return to it in just a moment but I just want to make the point that we are here to find a proper way to deal with this situation and not to discuss the accusations on either side at the moment.

The proposition before us at the moment, under the point of order, is how do we deal with this matter, Mr. Nugent. I wonder whether you would direct yourself to that particular point.

Mr. NUGENT: If I may continue with the point of order as I was dealing with it, Mr. Chairman, as I have a right to, since it is the privilege of members of this Committee, and since we have been used as a sounding board by the Minister as a forum for making this accusation.

As I was continuing, since Admiral Landymore is a witness before this Committee and is entitled to the protection of parliament and of this Committee, then certainly the procedure is as plain and straightforward as any honest man can see it. As the Minister himself said in the House once, when Mr. Forrestall raised a point: If you have a charge to make, make it; and I did make a charge against him on that point. If the Minister wants to make accusations, then certainly he should be the first to understand if he has a charge to make, make it. It is sheer effrontery for the Minister to come before this Committee now, having made these very serious accusations against a still serving officer who has been asked questions on it, and knows he is going to be pressed further on a matter that it cannot be allowed to stand, is a very serious charge against this honourable gentlemen.

To suggest that this Committee should push it aside, that he has gone too far, or that he is not now prepared to carry on and give us the details of exactly what is his charge against Admiral Landymore, to give us the proof, and I think that it would be contrary to every basic tenet of justice and of fair play if this Committee were to allow that to stand in its present state for one minute longer than necessary.

I think, it is a matter of privilege, affecting every member of this Committee, that no one in this Committee can be put in the position of standing aside for one moment and allowing that to happen where our duty is so placed that every witness before this Committee is entitled to the protection of this house.

I ask you, Mr. Chairman, to now proceed to ask the Minister to justify his charges; to detail exactly what charge he brings; what is this disloyalty? If he is not prepared to do so, then to withdraw and clear Admiral Landymore's name and make an apology to this Committee for using us as a sounding board for this kind of an attack.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Macaluso has his hand up.

Mr. MACALUSO: Mr. Chairman, I agree with what Mr. Brewin has stated, and I will give you my reasons. I do not think this Committee, at this time, is competent to deal with this matter; there is no doubt that personalities have

cropped into this on both sides of this table and by all members of this Committee; probably by the Minister and by other witnesses before this Committee who have also entered into personalities.

I think we should return to the subject matter that is before us—the bill—but at the same time, as Mr. Brewin has stated, I do think we should deal with this matter at a later stage. I would suggest that the Steering Committee meet on it to determine what procedure they will follow in dealing with the matter.

I recall, when Mr. Forrestall pressed this question, that the Minister did state that he would accept responsibility for the question, which he did and Mr. Forrestall did accept responsibility for the question, which is his right. Whether or not the matter should have been gone into, I think, the fault lies on all sides.

As far as the procedure of handling this matter is concerned, I think, it should be dealt with later on, and perhaps discussed by the Steering Committee later today.

Mr. Chairman, I feel that we have reached the stage, with such an emotional issue, where personalities that thave been dragged into it, by all of us—we are all guilty—has reached the stage where we should get off this subject now; go into the purpose of why we are convened, as to the merits or non-merits of the bill before us.

If I recall, again, correctly, the Minister did state that if Admiral Landymore, on his honour, said he was not disloyal, or swore to it—and I understand from reading the papers that Admiral Landymore is prepared to swear to it—that the Minister would apologize. So, I think the matter should end there, and the Steering Committee should deal with it.

We should move on with the business before us, beacuse we are not doing a service, I feel, Mr. Chairman—any of us—in prolonging this particular subject as far as personalities are concerned. As I say, the guilt is on all sides, and perhaps we should all recognize it.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much. I want to wind this subject up; I have had some good advice from members here, and I do not think we need prolong the discussion any further, Mr. Fane?

Mr. FANE: I want to say these few words, Mr. Chairman, I would think that the Minister having made a charge against Admiral Landymore, and having 15 of his most senior officers in the Department of National Defence here, he would want to make everything perfectly clear to them, and right away, that they are not going to be the next to have a charge made against them that the Minister will not substantiate.

I would think the Minister would want to clear himself immediately so that he could expect loyalty from his senior serving officers. His statement about one of his former senior officers, who is still in the service, would seem to indicate that no one is without suspect.

It would raise doubts in the minds of these very senior officers, whether they would not be the next to be charged in this manner. I think, for the Minister's own sake, that he should clear this up and make his statement and get it over

with in order to keep his own image clear to his senior serving officers. Thank you.

Mr. HARKNESS: Mr. Chairman, on a point of order, and particularly in regard to a point that Mr. Macaluso raised, that the business of this Committee is to consider the bill, and that we should get on with that and leave this aside.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Harkness, I have no intention of leaving it aside; I want only to move, after we have had the best advice and are able to proceed on this serious matter, in the most parliamentary way. This is the thing, I feel, as Chairman, that I should do, and think you would agree with that.

Mr. HARKNESS: Yes, I agree with that; but on this point, the thing is that the charge was made here in this Committee.

The CHAIRMAN: I understand there were some exchanges, but no real charges laid. We are not dealing with a point of order, and we are not dealing with a point of privilege in this Committee. We are dealing with a serious matter raised by the Minister in an exchange between himself and a former officer. But there is not a point of order, or a point of privilege before the Committee. What I am seeking now, is the good advice of members of the Committee as to how to proceed on this serious matter, Mr. Harkness.

Mr. HARKNESS: If I might continue with my point of order, the charge, having been made in this Committee, I think the Committee must deal with this. I do not think there can be any question of brushing it aside, and I am glad to hear you say that you do not think there can be any question of that either.

As far as I am concerned, I think, there is, perhaps, a good deal of merit in what Mr. Brewin said, that Admiral Landymore should be here to hear the Minister elaborate on his charge of disloyalty.

Actually, I have been informed that Admiral Landymore is in Ottawa at this time. I do not know whether that is so or not. If he is here at this time, then I think that you, or the clerk of the Committee, Mr. Chairman should endeavour the matter could proceeded with then.

Mr. BREWIN: Would a motion be in order?

The CHAIRMAN: I wonder whether we can solve this at the moment, Mr. Brewin, without a motion. What I think I should do, on the good advice of members here, is to see that the Steering Committee is called this evening. I would suggest that the Steering Committee could meet, perhaps, at 7.30 p.m.—a half an hour before we would meet for this evening—and that would provide us with time to deal with this matter.

In the meantime I believe I certainly should seek the advice of Mr. Speaker, and officials of the House who can guide me in the proper way to approach a matter of this nature.

I think if the Committee would bear with me, without making motions on this subject at the moment, until I can have an opportunity to consult with the Steering Committee and talking to them, and until I can seek the advice of Mr. Speaker and the officials of the House on what seems to be a very, very serious matter, that this should be the way to proceed. I would hope to have the agreement of the Committee to work along with me in that way.

Mr. NUGENT: On a question of privilege, Mr. Chairman. I think that it is a serious matter that these allegations should be allowed to stand for even one minute. I think it is a reflection on the sense of fairness and justice of every member of this Committee that we should allow Admiral Landymore to remain in the position that these serious allegations have been made where the Minister has had lots of time preparing himself, and where the Minister, in any sense of fairness and justice, should be prepared to proceed now that I, for one, take it as a personal affront that any member of this Committee should put any other member in the position that we would be so unfair to Admiral Landymore as to allow this to stay.

I would move, if necessary, on a question of privilege, that the allegations made by the Minister against Admiral Landymore be proceeded with and cleared up by this Committee before we proceed to any other item of business.

The CHAIRMAN: Is this a motion that you are moving now?

Mr. NUGENT: Yes.

Mr. MACALUSO: On a question of privilege—

The CHAIRMAN: Just a moment, Mr. Macaluso, there is a motion here, and we will have to determine whether there is a question of privilege or not. Hon. members are allowed to make motions in this Committee, and we will receive a motion.

Mr. MACALUSO: Not on a question of privilege which does not exist.

The CHAIRMAN: I cannot persuade you not to make a motion. I am faced with a motion here which I would prefer Mr. Nugent not to make, but after hearing me Mr. Nugent has decided otherwise.

Mr. BREWIN: Mr. Chairman, may I just make the point that if this motion is not carried, I will move—if I get the chance—along the lines that you suggested, that we hear the Minister's statement. Apparently he is ready to make it—he has made it already—and I would like to hear it. That then the matter by referred to the Steering Committee to arrange an opportunity for Admiral Landymore to meet this man if he wants to just as soon as possible, perhaps this evening if he is available. I just want to notify you that I would like to make that motion, if we do have some motions.

Mr. NUGENT: I would point out, Mr. Chairman, that the rules in the Committee are the same as the rules in the House; there is no place for a Steering Committee in this sort of thing.

My question of privilege is based on the position that it puts every member of this Committee in. That any delay is contrary to any sense of justice and fairplay, that it is, a relection on any member and, therefore, a breach of his privileges, and that I, for one, cannot be placed, and will not be placed in the position that these serious allegations can be made and not proceeded with by the Minister either going ahead to prove them, or else withdrawing and apologizing. We cannot allow that to stand on the name of Admiral Landymore in this manner.

The CHAIRMAN: Now, may we have the motion read?

Mr. FORRESTALL: I have been trying, Mr. Chairman—

The CHAIRMAN: I realize, Mr. Forrestall, and I have your name down here to call on you next. I have a motion before me from Mr. Nugent, and as soon as that is recorded I will be in a position to entertain to members to speak.

While Mr. Nugent is perfecting his motion, gentlemen, I think I should remind you of that old riddle which asks "how do porcupines make love", and the answer to that, of course, is "gently". I would just hope that in a prickly situation such as this we would follow that kind of advice.

Mr. FANE: Do you mean it is prickly to Admiral Landymore too?

The CHAIRMAN: What is that?

Mr. FANE: Is it only you and the Minister who find it prickly?

The CHAIRMAN: The motion now reads:

> That no further proceedings be taken by this Committee until the Minister's allegations against Admiral Landymore have been dealt with.

I think this is a motion, not necessarily of privilege, but it is a motion on how we should proceed before this Committee; and I will entertain this as being a valid motion. If there is anything to be said on this motion before we proceed to vote on it, I think Mr. Forrestall had his hand up and wants to speak, Mr. Forrestall?

Mr. FORRESTALL: I wanted to make two points earlier on the point of order, and I am not sure whether you accepted this as a point of privilege or not.

The CHAIRMAN: I am accepting it as a motion before the Committee, Mr. Forrestall. I think it is a valid motion, suggesting a way of proceeding with the Committee's work.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It would appear to me that this is, and must be—and I stand corrected by you on this—the continuing recorded record with regard to our review of the subject matter of the bill before us, that indeed, the motion is not only valid, but one that might, by its very nature, demand total, and immediate approval of this Committee. I am very deeply concerned. The Minister asked me, before he made his charges the other evening, or alleged charges, whether I accepted the responsibility for my questions; I, indeed, did. I, in no way, pressed, or prompted, or dredged dirt up out of the sewers as has been suggested in some of the press media over the week end. I was endeavouring only to clear a man's name.

There are two or three points here, and I am not familiar with how they should be dealt with. I agree with the speakers who have made points that, indeed, while it has no direct bearing on the subject matter of the bill, I think it has more pertinent bearing in as much as it deals with credibility and used as the vehicle of getting at credibility, the question of loyalty. The Minister—and I will get into this later on—was not completely accurate in everything he said the other night, and I think he realizes that, to the technical points.

To proceed now with the subject matter of this bill, without having first dealt with this matter, is, indeed, going to raise repercussions in Halifax. If you want a motion based on privilege, I certainly have three or four of them that would come very quickly. Communications that I have had with my constituency—and this seems to be the area that is the centre of the controversy—are

sufficiently serious that, again, this Committee would be making a great mistake, if, indeed, we do anything else. If this motion is accepted and it is not possible to proceed immediately, I hope that you will adjourn until such time as we are prepared to proceed with these charges. As the matter now stands, the credibility of procedure is of such a serious nature that if, indeed, as the Minister suggests, there have never been morale problems in Halifax, there certainly will be for the remainder of whatever work we have to do on this bill. That is all for the time being.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Lambert.

Mr. LAMBERT: Briefly, my only comment is—in connection with what you, Mr. Chairman, and I think someone else on the other side said, that statements appeared in the press as to what the Minister said when he appeared on television. Since when has that which appears in any other media been evidence before this Committee? It is my strong suggestion to you, sir, that the Minister produce the statement he read on television and that we carry on from there. If it clears the air, so much the better, but this thing is slaning over the proceedings of this Committee and it planed over the proceedings of the house on another occasion, and both the Minister and the Prime Minister indicated that those people who were directly implicated would have every opportunity of explaining the situation and expressing their views. I hope we are not going to have any suggestion now that this be curtailed.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Mr. Chairman, as a seconder to the motion I suggest that we clear up this matter right away and then proceed with the hearing of other witnesses and further questioning. There is not a shadow of a doubt but that the Minister on Thursday night and again on Friday here in Committee made very serious charges or allegations against Admiral Landymore and then apparently subsequently pursued the matter elsewhere, which I think is an affront to the Committee. We should deal with the matter here.

Admiral Landymore was a witness before this Committee and at that time I had the opportunity of raising certain questions with him. I read to Admiral Landymore from page 12464 of *Hansard* the statements that were made in the House of Commons on January 31, when the Minister intervened when Mr. McIntosh was speaking and said that the issue involved civil control over the military. I intervened myself with regard to that and said that he was casting a very serious reflection upon officers and men in our services and Mr. McIntosh said that it does cast a reflection upon all officers now serving in the armed forces and in particular upon those who left under a cloud then the Minister said that it was directed to one. Mr. McIntosh then asked:

Tell us who that one is.

Mr. Hellyer said:

You know who it is.

When Admiral Landymore was on the stand I read this out and I asked him if he considered that this statement was directed against him and I think his answer was—I do not have the printed record—"yes". I then specifically asked him two or three questions. As I recall it, I asked him if he had at any time been disloyal to his oath to the Queen and to Canada and he said no. I asked him if at

any time he had conspired with others to attempt to supersede a civilian control and his answer was, no. No member of the Committee intervened. There were no further questions along that line, and we took the word of a man of honour.

However, despite that evidence which was given by Admiral Landymore, on Thursday and again on Friday the Minister repeated the charge. I am told that he is now suggesting that the Admiral must return to re-affirm his innocence. How often do you have to do that? Consequently, I think that this matter should be cleared up right now; that the Minister owes it to this Committee to lay his charge in specific terms or withdraw it entirely. As I see it, we cannot carry on with a statement made in Committee affecting the integrity of a witness before this Committee without having it cleared up, because if the Minister's statement is accurate and can be proven, then it affects the entire testimony given by the Admiral, not only on this occasion but on the occasion when he appeared before this Committee last May or June. That is how serious it is. Furthermore, sir, that unless this matter is dealt with now, future witnesses before this Committee will be under the threat of intimidation; they may be charged with disloyal acts or that their statements are unfounded without giving them an opportunity to refute it.

We had an instance just the other day when the statements made before us by General Fleury were characterized by the Minister outside this Committee as not being accurate, and the charge was made against General Fleury that he was primarily responsible for the situation which he had described at national headquarters. How far does this go? What further witness is going to be harassed, denigrated and down-graded by statements of the Minister? Unless we clear this up I do not see how we can usefully proceed with the work of this Committee. We owe it to a citizen of this country who has been accused in this manner to have his name cleared.

He cleared his name when he was on the stand. He stated in the brief he presented to this Committee, and which was circulated to the members, everything that he did during the course of 1965 and 1966. He stated in the brief that all the information he had received and the conversations he had with his officers were reported through the normal channels. Surely this must have been brought to the Minister's attention, and to have the accusation against this man that for eighteen months he was disloyal to his country is a matter that cannot stand without being substantiated by the Minister and substantiated right at this very moment.

All this talk about appearing later before the Committee with information from the Minister is just a bit of nonsense. He should have been prepared right now to make a further statement to this Committee and he should be prepared right now to answer further questions along this line. This is why I support this motion that we cannot go further with our deliberations unless we settle this particular matter. It has every bearing on the work of the Committee.

Mr. Chairman, you cannot divert us now to the bill itself in its narrower limits when we have been hearing witnesses on both sides with regard to the main issue which is before us, and if the witnesses are challenged in Committee or outside the Committee, and if their reputations are damaged by statements that are made here, the matter should be cleared up and cleared up immediately. Consequently, I support the motion on those grounds.

Mr. NUGENT: One further point, Mr. Chairman, and I base this on a question of privilege. I note you said at the beginning that the motion was not on a question of privilege, but this is a motion following my question of privilege. My question of privilege is based on the fact that it goes against any sense of justice or fairness that any honourable member of this Committee should be put in the position of being party to a situation whereby such serious allegations can be made against a witness whom it is our duty to protect, and that we should not allow that to continue for any length of time whatsoever when it is so unfair. This is a breach of the privilege of each and every member of this Committee.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Nugent, your statement will be noted in the record, and I think we have heard sufficient representation now in respect of this motion. Are we ready for the question?

Mr. NUGENT: First, Mr. Chairman, do we have a ruling from the chair whether I have a valid question of privilege? I believe that is the procedure. I thought we had completed the argument to establish whether I have a valid question of privilege, and if I have a valid question of privilege, there are a considerable number of arguments and it is a debatable motion as to the merits of the question of privilege on the motion.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Nugent, I accepted the motion as a valid motion before this Committee to guide us in our way of proceeding with our business, and we have heard your statements in regard to this motion. They are on the record. Now, having accepted this as a valid motion before this Committee and having listened to the argument of members of the Committee in regard to it, I think we are in a position to decide. We all know what kind of a motion we have before this Committee, and for me now to rule that it is some kind of motion other than simply a valid motion before the Committee to proceed with business is, I think, more than I can do.

Mr. NUGENT: When you bring up a question of privilege in the house you usually have a motion on how to deal with it. What I asked the chair was whether I had raised a valid question of privilege. I take it from the chair's attitude that it was a valid motion, that it is a valid question of privilege and the motion is properly before us. What is your ruling, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Nugent, in my limited knowledge of parliamentary procedure I do not know whether I am in a position to rule properly on whether this is a valid motion of privilege or a valid motion for proceeding before the Committee, but I think by the time we have carried it that it will come to the same thing and I suggest that we can vote on it now. All in favour of the motion that no further proceedings be taken by this Committee until the Minister's allegations against Admiral Landymore have been dealt with? Will the Clerk please count the votes? Opposed? Yeas: 9; Nays: 13. I declare the motion lost.

Gentlemen, we still have before us the question of how to deal with this matter and I wonder if this would appeal to members as a method of proceeding. General Allard is here this afternoon and I think he has a prepared statement to read as a part of the proceedings which would come in due course, and I wonder if the honourable gentlemen would bear with me in giving me time to consult with the Steering Committee later today on how we should proceed in this whole matter and to get advise from Mr. Speaker. I suggest for the moment, and for the

balance of the afternoon and until we reconvene this evening, that we hear General Allard and have his statement presented and proceed along those lines. This would give us a little breather and a little change of pace while we consider the seriousness of this matter at our Steering Committee meeting and we can then come back here prepared to handle this matter in a parliamentary way. Mr. Brewin?

Mr. BREWIN: Mr. Chairman, I want to move a motion which I think may help us to deal with this matter, for all I know although it may not even be seconded. I would move that the Minister be permitted to make a statement on the question of the alleged disloyalty of Admiral Landymore. May I put in parenthesis—this is not part of the motion—that I hope you will either withdraw the charges or clarify them, and that the question of the Minister's statement be referred to the Steering Committee as soon as possible to consider how the matter may be appropriately dealt with by the Committee, having in mind the right of Admiral Landymore, if he so desires, to meet any charges made against him by the Minister.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Brewin, I wonder if by asking the Minister now to enter into the submission of a statement in regard to this before the Steering Committee has had any opportunity to consider how it really wants to proceed, this advances the whole subject one more step, and whether or not we want to ask Admiral Landymore to have a statement ready at the same time as the Minister—

Some hon. MEMBERS: No, no.

The CHAIRMAN: —and submit them together or just what we want to do.

An hon. MEMBER: Mr. Chairman, that does not prove anything.

Mr. BREWIN: Mr. Chairman, my—

The CHAIRMAN: I am merely asking for advice now, Mr. Brewin.

Mr. BREWIN: My motion may be voted down but I want it to be put. Perhaps no one will second it. First of all, I understand the Minister has a statement and, as I say, I hope this statement will completely withdraw the allegations he has made, but I know nothing of the contents. If it does, the problem may be solved. On the other hand, he may want to make clear precisely what charges he is making and I think in fairness to the Committee and Admiral Landymore that should be done, if that is the way he chooses to proceed. Then I think we need the time that is available for the Steering Committee to look into the statement that is made, get in touch with Admiral Landymore—I am not saying that he has to come and repeat denials but there may be something new in the Minister's statement—and work out a procedure which will enable this Committee to both deal with this matter and get on with its work. I so move.

Mr. FOY: I second that.

The CHAIRMAN: Just a moment, please, until we have a seconder for Mr. Brewin's motion.

Mr. FOY: I would like to second it.

The CHAIRMAN: I think Mr. Forrestall had his hand up. I will recognize Mr. Forrestall. Did you have something to say on this point?

Mr. FOY: I was going to be the seconder for Mr. Brewin's motion because I think this is a very sensible way of dealing with it and I hope the Committee will consider it.

The CHAIRMAN: I think Mr. Nugent had his hand up first. I will recognize Mr. Nugent.

Mr. NUGENT: I have no particular brief for or against the motion, Mr. Chairman, but as you asked for advice I want to point out that it does not go very far towards clearing away this whole picture. It may towards that one particular allegation, but there are questions of privilege concerning the manner in which the Minister has proceeded that are pertinent here that could be brought up. There is nothing in our procedure whereby a steering committee is of any use whatsoever in dealing with a question of privilege before a Committee, that is business to be ruled on by the Chair and taken care of here. Even considering that we lost the vote on whether we should proceed with business other than the allegations, there are other statements of the Minister dealing with other matters on which we wish to question him. There is certainly no reason why we cannot proceed to examine the Minister on some of these other statements, some of which are almost as regrettable as these allegations. We have only disposed of that part so far as the motion helping us out of our difficulty this afternoon is concerned, it is only going to do one thing, allow the Minister to make a statement. We still have the rest of the problems before us, and certainly on the question of procedure I believe we should continue on with our examination of the Minister rather than interposing somebody else to help shield him from these rash statements he has been making.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Nugent, your motion was that no further proceedings be taken by this Committee until the Minister's allegations against Admiral Landymore have been dealt with and, as you will remember this motion was defeated.

Mr. NUGENT: That only takes care of that one thing.

The CHAIRMAN: Yes.

Mr. NUGENT: Other proceedings are still open, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN: Other proceedings are still open but I am looking for the support of this Committee in having an opportunity to review the matters that have taken place here with the Steering Committee and to seek advice before we proceed deeper into this. I just want to make sure that in proceeding through these motions we do not hear the Minister and then proceed to an examination on what the Minister has said, which would defeat the very purpose of the vote which we had a moment ago. I think you will appreciate my concern.

Mr. NUGENT: I am not suggesting that we continue to examine him against that allegation. There are other parts in his statement and in his testimony which I say are perfectly properly before the Committee and on which we can proceed without prejudicing that one bit.

The CHAIRMAN: I am going to read Mr. Brewin's motion and we will vote on it.

Mr. Brewin, seconded by Mr. Foy, moved: That the Minister be permitted to make a statement on the question of alleged disloyalty of

Admiral Landymore, and that the question of the Minister's statement be referred to the Steering Committee to consider as soon as possible how the matter may be appropriately dealt with by the Committee, having in mind the right of Admiral Landymore, if he so desires, to meet any charges against him by the Minister.

That is the motion and I will call for—

Mr. HARKNESS: Mr. Chairman, I indicated a minute ago that I wanted to speak to the motion. I am in agreement with the motion except for one thing. As I understand it, it would preclude any questions or comments to the Minister by members of the Committee in connection with it until some indefinite time in the future. I would not be agreeable to the Minister merely making a statement which the members of the Committee would have no opportunity of questioning him on.

An hon. MEMBER: I think we should vote on the motion.

The CHAIRMAN: You have heard the—

Mr. NUGENT: On a point of order, Mr. Chairman, I think that this motion is out of order because of the previous ruling which was just made. We are dealing with the Minister's allegations and this motion is contrary to what we have just said, that we are not proceeding.

Mr. FORRESTALL I wonder if the Chairman would mind reading the motion again. That was not the understanding.

The CHAIRMAN: Reading the motion before us or—

Mr. FORRESTALL: In his remarks in support of the motion I understood Mr. Brewin to clearly indicate that he expected that this would be something that would happen almost immediately.

The CHAIRMAN: Well, I think it does. I will read Mr. Brewin's motion again, bearing in mind the motion that we have just now defeated.

Mr. Brewin, seconded by Mr. Forrestall, moved: That the Minister be permitted to make a statement on the question of the alleged disloyalty of Admiral Landymore, and that the question of the Minister's statement be referred to the Steering Committee to consider as soon as possible how the matter may be appropriately dealt with by the Committee, having in mind the right of Admiral Landymore, if he so desires, to meet any charges against him by the Minister.

All in favour of the motion?

Mr. FORESTALL: Mr. Chairman, before you put that question, I am not sure whether I seconded the motion or Mr. Foy did, but if Mr. Foy is anxious to and if there is some doubt as to—

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Forrestall, you seconded the motion.

Mr. FORRESTALL: —the sequence of events, I had understood that the Minister would make a statement this evening and that the Steering Committee would meet and consider it. We would have an opportunity to question the Minister, and if Admiral Landymore is in town he would be invited to attend.

If not, he would be communicated with. I will withdraw my seconding the motion unless this matter can be resolved, because that was my very clear understanding.

The CHAIRMAN: Let me give you my interpretation of it, Mr. Forrestall, and perhaps between you and Mr. Brewin we can decide whether this meets the interpretation of all of us. I would think that what this means is that the Minister's statement be read now and then, if there is any time left between now and six o'clock, we would go on with some other matter. That the Steering Committee meet between six and eight o'clock, and then that we come back here this evening prepared to discuss the recommendations of the Steering Committee in respect of what the Minister says in his statement and in respect of the whole matter of the Minister and Admiral Landymore. Am I correct in this interpretation?

Mr. BREWIN: Mr. Chairman, I am afraid I did not make it as clear as I should because this point, perhaps, was not in my mind. My thought was that the Minister could make his statement and then this could be followed by any questions which the members wanted to ask to clarify his statement. Then the Steering Committee could meet as soon as possible thereafter, and I did not imply that we were necessarily going on for an hour or half an hour. I understood you to say that the Steering Committee could meet at dinner time to find out what it was necessary to have done and presumably report back to us at eight o'clock. That is what I had in mind.

The CHAIRMAN: Does that meet with your understanding?

Mr. FORRESTALL: As long as there is no cutting off.

The CHAIRMAN: That meets with your understanding.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Yes it does, as long as there is no cutting off.

The CHAIRMAN: We will follow the reading—

Mr. FORRESTALL: As long as there is no misunderstanding about our opportunities to speak to the statement.

The CHAIRMAN: Then we will follow the reading of the Minister's statement with questions put to the Minister regarding that statement.

Mr. BREWIN: His statement.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Yes.

Mr. ANDRAS: Mr. Chairman, on a point of order, and with the clarification given by Mr. Brewin that there would be questioning of the Minister on his statement immediately after he gave it, this would simply go back to the motion that was defeated a few minutes ago.

The CHAIRMAN: This is what troubles me, that this comes back to the motion that—

Mr. ANDRAS: I fully understood from the wording of the motion that the statement was to be made and then the whole question; including the consideration of Admiral Landymore's position in returning, was to be referred to the Steering Committee, perhaps this evening, to be dealt with and reported back on, but this clarification makes it just about the same motion as Mr. Nugent's, which was defeated.

Mr. BREWIN: I certainly think it would be very strange if the Minister should make a statement and the members of the Committee would not be entitled to ask any questions to clarify something that was said.

Mr. ANDRAS: Well, it is my understanding that that clarification might or might not come as a result of the deliberations at the Steering Committee after they report back.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, to settle this, and in order to move the proceedings of this Committee, I think I can now fairly say that what we should do is put Mr. Brewin's motion at this time, which would simply mean that following the motion, if the motion carries, that the Minister would proceed to read his statement and following that I would hear questions on that statement. At six o'clock we would adjourn and the Steering Committee would meet. I would then seek the advice of Mr. Speaker, and so on, and when we come back this evening we would report the findings and recommendations of the Steering Committee. That is the way we should proceed. This is what we would be voting on if we vote on Mr. Brewin's motion.

Mr. MCINTOSH: One further point of clarification, Mr. Chairman, on the motion. I think I have that privilege. In the event that the Steering Committee comes back with a report that may not be favourable to those who think that the Minister should be questioned further, does that prevent us from questioning on this one particular topic in the future?

The CHAIRMAN: Oh, now, this is getting hypothetical. I think we should deal with one thing at a time. We have a motion before us and I am simply trying to clarify what that motion means and how it influences the course of this Committee over the next half hour or so.

Mr. MACALUSO: Mr. Chairman, do I understand that the statement will be made, the questioning will go on until six o'clock—

The CHAIRMAN: Yes.

Mr. MACALUSO: —and then it will be referred to the Committee, period. What do we then go on to this evening after eight o'clock?

The CHAIRMAN: This evening after eight o'clock we will hear what the Steering Committee has to say to this Committee, and we will then take up the matters referred to us by the Steering Committee. There may be resolutions which arise out of that, I do not know.

Mr. MACALUSO: But is the questioning—

The CHAIRMAN: We cannot assume what the Steering Committee is going to do.

Mr. MACALUSO: Mr. Chairman, if I may still have the floor, is the questioning of the Minister on his statement to be finished at six and then we go on to something new afterwards, whatever is the recommendation of the Steering Committee?

The CHAIRMAN: We are going on to question the Minister on his statement. Questions may be put on his statement.

Mr. MACALUSO: But we will be cut off at six o'clock. That is my point.

The CHAIRMAN: We are cutting off at six o'clock.

Mr. MACALUSO: That is the questioning.

Mr. BREWIN: A time limit?

The CHAIRMAN: I just wanted to get—

Mr. MACALUSO: I was hoping that—

An hon. MEMBER: The procedure will be recommended by the Steering Committee at 8 o'clock.

The CHAIRMAN: We have been discussing this on the basis that we would rise at six o'clock to give myself and the Steering Committee time to meet and deal with these matters.

Gentlemen, I think we all know what we are dealing with now and I am going to call for—

Mr. MCINTOSH: Well, I am still not clear, Mr. Chairman. I want to know if the Minister is going to be back in the witness stand at eight o'clock, and we can continue with other questioning?

The CHAIRMAN: If I understand this correctly, the Minister will be available at eight o'clock. Is it the desire of the Committee to hear the Minister at eight o'clock or, after having heard the report of the Steering Committee and decided how to act on the Steering Committee's recommendations, that we should then hear the Minister?

Mr. MCINTOSH: Well, I have many questions I want to ask the Minister. It has nothing to do with this.

The CHAIRMAN: I hope we will be able to clear this matter up and get to your questions this evening. We will be able to.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Some of them are on conscription, too.

The CHAIRMAN: Question. All in favour of the motion of Mr. Brewin? Yeas: 19; Nays: 1. I declare the motion carried, and I will call on the Minister to read his statement.

Hon. PAUL HELLYER (*Minister of National Defence*): Mr. Chairman and gentlemen,

What I was conveying last week in answer to questions from Mr. Forrestall and Mr. Harkness regarding Admiral Landymore was this: According to Admiral Landymore's own words, as quoted in the press, together with more direct information that came to me, the Admiral engaged in a campaign to rally naval officers, within his Command, to join him in opposing government policy.

However, if Admiral Landymore was not quoted correctly and did not do these things, then, I, of course, would be pleased to apologize to him.

In a parliamentary democracy, the time-honoured custom is for a military officer to resign or ask for early retirement if he honestly feels he cannot support the government policy. I do not believe that Admiral Landymore had in mind any disloyalty to his country. Any disloyalty was to the policy I had introduced.

In deciding not to consider any disciplinary action, I accepted the fact that Admiral Landymore was, in his own conscience, acting for what he believed to be the interests of his service and the country he had served so well.

I fully realize that this reorganization is a great emotional upheaval for many people, particularly those who have given dedicated service, and risen to a place of leadership in their service.

My own view—when I reached the decision to simply retire him without penalty—and now—is that, regardless of whether Admiral Landymore actually carried out the acts in question, regardless of whether the newspaper statements are correct, I do not think he had any conscious disloyalty to his country in mind. If I have conveyed any other suggestion to the Committee or to the people of our country, I deeply regret it.

Mr. Chairman, I have made reference to quotations from the press. If I may, I would like to quote from two or three of them.

The first one is from the Toronto *Telegram* of Monday, July 25, 1966, where the report reads as follows, and I quote:

> Halifax (Special)—Admiral William Landymore fired in a dispute over unification of the armed services, said today almost 100 per cent of the officers in his command supported his views.
>
> But the support came only after the officers had been briefed on Admiral Landymore's views by the Admiral himself. They were then asked to stand at mass meetings if they supported him. Only three officers—two lieutenant-commanders and one commander—stayed seated out of 367 polled.
>
> Admiral Landymore said today a record was kept of the meetings.
>
> He said the commander had disagreed with the way the poll was conducted. The two lieutenant-commanders favoured unification of the services.

This next sentence is in quotes.

> "It might have been an unusual procedure but this was an unusual case." he said today.

Then in another story from the Toronto *Star* on August 13, 1966, by Tom Hazlitt, *Star* staff writer. I shall just quote part of it.

> Landymore said it was quite true that he called a meeting of the 367 officers in his command of the rank of lieutenant-commander and above.

Then again this is attributed to him in quotes.

> "During my service I spoke to just about every officer in the navy." "I knew they were concerned about vague reports about unification," Landymore said.

And in quotation marks:

> "Many officers had indicated a desire to get out and I was fearful of a mass exodus. This was the last thing I wanted so I did what any sensible Commander would. I called the senior officers together but I did not ask them to swear allegiance to me. I told them what I knew about unification and what my views on it were. Then I asked them to stand and be counted on the unification issue. Of the 367 officers, 364 were opposed to the navy losing its identity. The Admiral said that he did not ask for any loyalty pledge but the officers gave him a pledge anyhow."

Then in the Montreal *Gazette* of August 15, 1966, and again under dateline Halifax. This time it is from the Canadian Press.

> Admiral Landymore said he spoke about the problems of unification at three meetings last year in Halifax, and 364 of the 367 officers supported his stand. But, he said, the support was for his battle against unification not allegiance to him.

Mr. NUGENT: On point of order, Mr. Chairman, if I may. I understood the purpose of the Minister's remarks was to clarify his allegations, not for an opportunity to bring out all of the arguments in an attempt to prove what was going on. I had thought, after he made his statement clarifying what he meant by the allegations, that we would then be able to question him on his statement and that is why we were allowed until six o'clock for that purpose.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Nugent, I think we will let the Minister make his statement in his own way, and I am sure when the time comes to deal with this subject that you will be prepared to make your own statement. I will ask the Minister to continue.

Mr. HELLYER: Well, I have no way of knowing, Mr. Chairman, whether those are accurate newspaper reports or whether the quotations attributed to the Admiral are correct or not, but I do not know that the substance of them is very similar to reports that I had received from within the service.

Finally, may I quote from an article by Peter C. Newman which appeared in the Montreal *Star* of January 19, 1967. Again I cannot vouch for the accuracy of this quotation, but if it is accurate I think it gives some cause for concern as to the attitude of the Admiral toward civil authority in respect to the military. I quote from this article, and the part that I read is in quotation marks, being attributed to the Admiral:

> "The danger internationally," he says, "is that some politician in Norway, for example, will say to himself if it's all right for Paul Hellyer to make political gains by challenging the military establishment, maybe it's all right for me" and if this kind of thing happens, western defence will eventually be weakened.

Mr. Chairman, I said, and I want to be precise, that if the Admiral will state on his honour—no oath is required, I am quite willing to accept his honour—that no meetings were held at which he invited naval officers to support him in his opposition to government policy, then I will apologize and my apology will be automatic.

That is the end of my statement, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LAMBERT: May I simply ask for clarification of what the Minister has said?

The CHAIRMAN: Yes, sir.

Mr. LAMBERT: Is this tied in with the Minister's statement about eighteen months of consistent disloyalty?

Mr. HELLYER: It is indeed, Mr. Lambert.

The CHAIRMAN: I want to remind you, gentlemen, that the resolution, and what we have been given to do under the resolution of Mr. Brewin that we

passed a moment ago, is to put questions in respect of clarification of the Minister's statement or amplification of it, and I hope your remarks will be held to that and that you will speak in the spirit of the resolution which we passed almost unanimously a moment ago.

Mr. NUGENT: One point for clarification and one point for an answer, if I might. The Minister said the one reason that he did not take any disciplinary action was that he was satisfied that there was no conscious disloyalty to his country in his mind. What did you mean by "no conscious disloyalty"? Was there some kind of disloyalty to his country in his actions?

Mr. HELLYER: I stated that I felt he was certainly disloyal to the policy of the government, but that I was sure there was no conscious disloyalty either to his service or to his country, and I think this is quite understandable under the circumstances.

Mr. NUGENT: I just want to clarify that conscious disloyalty to his country. In other words, do you think it was disloyalty to his country to be against your policies?

Mr. HELLYER: Mr. Nugent, my statement stands and I think it is perfectly simple English.

Mr. NUGENT: I have one more question, then. I presume—although it would seem incredible if you did not—that you could have seen the brief by Admiral Landymore, a copy of which we all received and in which this meeting was set out in detail on pages 8, 9 and 10. There is also on page 10 a copy of a letter which he wrote to the chief of personnel reporting on what he had done in detail, giving facts and figures which were substantially the same, I may say, as many of those quotations. I just want to ask the Minister if this is more direct information that came to you? Do I gather that while you were interested in gathering information about Admiral Landymore and what he had been doing, you paid no attention whatsoever to the official report he sent in of that meeting to the chief of personnel, and are now pretending to this committee that you knew nothing about it and therefore had to quote from newspaper articles what is supposed to have been said and done by him.

Mr. HELLYER: No, it was brought to my attention, Mr. Nugent.

Mr. NUGENT: Then, may I ask the purpose of all this quoting of newspaper articles when Admiral Landymore has given us a complete report of everything he did. Is this the only meeting where there was what you refer to as "plotting with senior officers against you"? Is this the meeting you refer to that constituted this plotting?

Mr. HELLYER: Mr. Nugent, I have no recollection of the quote you use and I would hope that honourable members of the committee would be very careful not to attempt to put words in my mouth on such a sensitive subject.

Mr. NUGENT: You did not use the word "plotting"? I believe you did. We do not have the record of the committee but it will show there. You want to withdraw it now if you did use it, is that accurate?

Mr. HELLYER: As I said, Mr. Nugent, anything that is on the record will stand on the record.

Mr. NUGENT: All I want to know is that if you made an allegation of plotting it would be at this meeting to which you are referring. I want to be sure that you are not referring to something other than the meeting that is covered in this brief and, I presume, in those reports that you read.

Mr. HELLYER: The words you use, Mr. Nugent, are your own.

Mr. NUGENT: I just want to ask one more question, Mr. Chairman, and then I will be finished. I want to ask the Minister, as this is supposed to be a statement of his, if he is adopting the words of all those press reports as his?

Mr. HELLYER: No, I am not, Mr. Nugent. If I did, then I would not make the offer that I have made in respect to—

Mr. NUGENT: You make them the basis of your allegation.

Mr. HELLYER: I think they are relevant. If they are not, then I am quite prepared to accept Admiral Landymore's word for it.

Mr. NUGENT: We have his word here.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Mr. Chairman, in parts of his own statements, in the process of quoting from the newspapers—I believe it was in the article from the Toronto *Star* of August 13—the Minister indicated that in his own estimation it substantiated reports he had received from within the services. I wonder if the Minister would elaborate on that a little as a point of clarification.

Mr. HELLYER: I do not think so, Mr. Chairman. That is a correct statement.

Mr. FORRESTALL: When was this meeting held, Mr. Minister? Do you remember the dates of these meetings?

Mr. HELLYER: I do not have them before me. Did Admiral Landymore put that on the record?

Mr. FORRESTALL: I believe he may have.

Mr. NUGENT: It was in July of last year.

Mr. FORRESTALL: I do not think that is last year, Mr. Nugent.

Mr. NUGENT: No, this is the 1966 brief and on page 9 he describes it as "July of last year".

Mr. FORRESTALL: That would be what you are referring to when you say that reports came to your attention from within the services, and those reports would refer back to those meetings?

Mr. HELLYER: That is correct.

Mr. FORRESTALL: That is not totally what I was getting at. Could I ask whether or not these were reports that were brought back by people who personally attended the meeting, or would that be in order?

Mr. HELLYER: Yes, there were some reports from officers who had attended the meeting.

Mr. FORRESTALL: First hand reports?

Mr. HELLYER: First hand.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Did these reports come to you in July, August or September of 1965?

Mr. HELLYER: No, they did not, Mr. Forrestall.

Mr. FORRESTALL: They came to you sometime when, in 1966 or so?

Mr. HELLYER: I cannot recall correctly, but some months after the event.

Mr. FORRESTALL: I see. To go back to your very opening statement of what it was that you were saying, I am rather curious why you asked me the other night—and I take it, Mr. Chairman, in the context of the remarks that were made in the Minister's statement today—if I would accept the responsibility for my question?

Mr. HELLYER: Because, Mr. Forrestall, I really do not believe that at this moment these things are relevant to the consideration of the bill before us. They must be considered in the context of a reorganization so fundamental that it arouses deep emotions, and that discussion of personalities is neither fair nor fruitful.

Mr. FORRESTALL: There is one further question, in this connection, Mr. Chairman, which may be a parallel matter. There was some suggestion that the Minister might have available the next of his CBC program. Could that be tabled?

Mr. HELLYER: This was in effect what I read, Mr. Forrestall, with just the first line changed.

Mr. FORRESTALL: That indeed was the statement.

Mr. HELLYER: Oh, absolutely.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Could copies of that be made available to us before the supper hour so that those of us who are not on the steering committee might have a chance to see it?

The CHAIRMAN: We will make copies of this just as fast as we can. I think we can probably have copies back in front of us before we leave this meeting.

Mr. FORRESTALL: I appreciate your indulgence, Mr. Chairman, I wonder if in this context it would be possible as well to ask of the committee transcription group whether or not we could have photostats of at least that portion of last Thursday's committee session. I was wondering if it might be humanly possible—it may be out of the question—to have photostats of the transcription of at least the last 10 or 15 minutes of last Thursday's meeting.

The CHAIRMAN: This is a very hard thing to do. Possibly I could have these ready for tomorrow. I do not know that we would have those ready—in my experience of getting these things out of the transcription branch—much before the afternoon session tomorrow. This would be about the earliest we would have photostats of these to hand. I will do my very best. It just depends on what state they are in. I wonder if you would leave that to me, Mr. Forrestall, and we will try. You are speaking now about last Thursday's transcription?

Mr. FORRESTALL: Not the total transcription, Mr. Chairman. I was primarily concerned with that period, say, from 10 minutes to 10 until twenty minutes after ten. It may even be later than that. Perhaps we could have it from the point where I asked the Minister what the purpose was. I did not ask him why he was fired, I asked him if indeed he was fired for making public statements. Perhaps we could have it from that point on; it is only fifteen or twenty minutes.

The CHAIRMAN: Let me see what can be done about that. Are you finished with your questioning now?

Mr. FORRESTALL: I have not even started questioning on points of clarification.

The CHAIRMAN: That is what we are looking for now, and I have a number of other people who have questions on points of clarification. I wonder if I might move on with those. The next ones I have down are Mr. Lambert and Mr. Harkness, followed by Mr. Brewin, and I will take them in that order.

Mr. LAMBERT: I will ask my one question on clarification. What I have is actually questions in regard to it. However, may I put it this way. Mr. Minister, the other night you indicated—and you did so again this afternoon—that Admiral Landymore was dismissed because of 18 months of consistent disloyalty. Then this afternoon you are basing your statement on three or four newspaper reports which had not yet appeared at the time he was dismissed. Then on Thursday night you told us that you no longer cared about Admiral Landymore when he appeared before the defence committee in June because you had already made up your mind.

Mr. HELLYER: You are paraphrasing, Mr. Lambert.

Mr. LAMBERT: You had already made up your mind that you were going to dismiss him from his command. If you had no knowledge of the newspaper articles in June of 1966, as they had not yet appeared, how can you be in a position to assert that Admiral Landymore had been guilty of 18 months of consistent disloyalty for one or possibly two meetings.

Mr. HELLYER: Mr. Lambert, this is what I said in the statement that I read to you this afternoon:

> According to Admiral Landymore's own words, as quoted in the press, together with more direct information that came to me, the Admiral engaged in a campaign to rally naval officers, within his Command, to join him in opposing government policy

Mr. LAMBERT: Since the newspaper articles had not appeared in June of 1966 and therefore you could not be aware of Admiral Landymore's words —these words were only quoted in those newspaper articles—you were relying entirely upon the direct information that you had received?

Mr. HELLYER: That is correct.

Mr. LAMBERT: I take it this information was related to the meeting. You just told Mr. Forrestall you heard about it from some officers who attended the meeting, but some months after its occurrence?

Mr. HELLYER: That is correct.

Mr. LAMBERT: Do you have any other evidence of acts during the 18 months of his command, which would indicate that he was consistently disloyal?

Mr. HELLYER: The answer is yes.

Mr. LAMBERT: What is that evidence?

Mr. HELLYER: Well, I do not think it is really relevant.

Mr. LAMBERT: Mr. Minister, you made a charge, one of the most serious charges that can be levelled against any officer of any rank, before this Com-

mittee, and I put it to you that it is highly pertinent and highly relevant to this Committee that that evidence be put before the Committee.

Mr. HELLYER: Mr. Lambert, the reports that I am referring to in my statement are privileged to me and there is nothing that can be usefully added to what I have already said with respect to them.

Mr. LAMBERT: Maybe you feel that way, but with regard to what you have said in your statement, this afternoon, in your answers to Mr. Forrestall and in your answers to me, there is still a gap. There is further evidence, you now claim.

Mr. HELLYER: The direct reports that I referred to in my statement covered the meetings in particular, but also the attitude, which I think was personified by the meetings.

Mr. LAMBERT: If you were aware of this evidence prior to June 1966, and if this led you to be dissatisfied with Admiral Landymore's attitude toward you or the government's policy, in view of the importance of the command, why did you not relieve him earlier?

Mr. HELLYER: Well, I think the timing was my responsibility and who should replace him. There are many factors that have to be taken into consideration in matters of this kind.

Mr. LAMBERT: Do you feel, as a minister charged with the responsibility of reorganizing the armed services, that this line of conduct was consistent with the proper discharge of your duties?

Mr. HELLYER: Completely.

Mr. LAMBERT: All right; I will leave it at that.

Mr. HARKNESS: In your statement, Mr. Minister, you said that you did not believe Admiral Landymore had in mind any disloyalty to his country—at least you repeated something along the same line in somewhat different words. If this is the case, why, at 11 o'clock on Friday, when I asked you the direct question as to whether you meant disloyalty to Canada or disloyalty to yourself, did you reply to me that it was disloyalty to Canada that you were talking about?

Mr. HELLYER: I would have to see the transcript of that before commenting, Mr. Harkness, because I am not sure at the moment what the words were. If there was any problem of misinterpretation at that time, this is one of the reasons that I felt a clarifying statement would be wise. What I really meant, and what I really believe, is that it was the policy of the government that I was talking about.

Mr. HARKNESS: Well,—

Mr. HELLYER: I suppose you can say the policy of the duly elected government is the policy of Canada at the time, but I think it is then important to say, as I have said in the statement, that I am sure Admiral Landymore and other officers—because there have been some other officers who have found the emotional readjustment too great to surmount—would, by no stretch of the imagination, be guilty of any disloyalty to their country. What they really believe is that their point of view is in the best interests of their country, and I think one must put it in that context.

Mr. HARKNESS: Well, do I understand then that you are withdrawing the statement you made at 11 o'clock on Friday?

Mr. HELLYER: If I said anything at that time which is inconsistent with the statement I made this afternoon, then the answer is yes.

Mr. HARKNESS: I think there is no question that you answered that simple and direct question by saying that it was disloyalty to Canada that you were talking about.

Mr. HELLYER: I do not think I said that, Mr. Harkness, but I would want to see the transcript before—

Mr. HARKNESS: Yes. Well, I think it is essential that the Committee do have the transcript in order to demonstrate exactly what was said. I have no question in my mind as to what was said.

Now, you gave us several quotations from newspapers, and then said, "I have no way of knowing whether these were accurate reports." The general information given in those newspaper excerpts was really what Admiral Landymore said in his brief, of which all members of the Committee received a copy and of which you received a copy. Why did you not take what he said himself directly here rather than take these newspaper reports?

Mr. HELLYER: I think perhaps it is a matter of interpretation to some extent.

Mr. HARKNESS: I do not think there is any question of interpretation there. It was a choice of taking either some newspaper reports, which said, partially, what Admiral Landymore had said, or taking what he had put down definitely in his brief to this Committee.

Mr. HELLYER: You know the problem, I think, in preparing briefs, and even under the very best of conditions, errors can creep in in terminology or emphasis—and often this is quite inadvertent. I do not say that—

Mr. HARKNESS: You have read this brief and the points that Admiral Landymore states that he made to this meeting of his officers, and the points that he asked them to signify agreement with. Do you consider that any of those points show disloyalty of any kind?

Mr. HELLYER: I would want to re-read the brief before commenting on that.

Mr. HARKNESS: As this is for clarification, we will go on with this. I would like to take each one of them up in detail, and establish whether there was any disloyalty in any one of these statements made. However, I think the main point is, to be at all fair in connection with this thing, you should have stated what Admiral Landymore stated he definitely said in his brief rather than taking newspaper reports which gave only a partial account, and a somewhat garbled one, of what he had actually said, as put in his own brief to the Committee.

You state that Admiral Landymore said, or was reported as having said by Peter Newman, that this gives some pause for concern, civil control over the military. Admiral Landymore has indicated very strongly to Mr. Churchill, in his direct testimony and evidence to the Committee, that there was never in his mind at any time the matter of the military trying to control the civil side of the thing, and so forth. Once more, I ask, why do you not go to Admiral Landymore's direct testimony, rather than taking, again, a newspaper report?

Mr. HELLYER: Mr. Harkness, I think that you have to examine the record there yourself. If you believe that opposition to government policy, and an attempt thereby to alter a policy which has been laid down by the government, does not involve any question of civil authority, then this is your interpretation.

Mr. HARKNESS: Well, I think there is considerable room for argument as to whether there was a government policy with regard to unification which has been laid down sufficiently, clearly and definitely that you could state that Admiral Landymore or any other officer was opposing government policy in doing any of the things which Admiral Landymore himself outlines that he did do.

Mr. HELLYER: There certainly was a government policy, Mr. Harkness, which had been sent to the commands under the signature of the two ministers responsible.

Mr. HARKNESS: I think what government policy there was, was so unclear, and has been right up to the meetings of this Committee, as has been indicated by the evidence that has been put before the Committee, that that statement would be pretty difficult to justify or hold up. That is all I have at this moment for clarification, although I have plenty of questions otherwise.

Mr. BREWIN: Mr. Hellyer, I understood you to say that you learned about these meetings at which Admiral Landymore invited opposition to unification, and that you heard directly from other sources to the same sort of effect, that he was opposing unification. Is that not what you said?

Mr. HELLYER: Yes, I think that is a fair interpretation.

Mr. BREWIN: Yes, I have not been here all the time and I may have missed some of the evidence. Did you, at any time, think that in a matter of this importance it would be fair to Admiral Landymore to somehow or other get in touch with him directly to discuss the question of unification and consequences of disagreement with the formal policy of the government?

Mr. HELLYER: Yes. I had planned to visit the command, as I stated the other night. However, there had been some informal discussion between us—not in the sense of an admonition, but we had of course discussed—

Mr. BREWIN: Did you make clear to him your reasons for unification, when he indicated to you his doubts and difficulties?

Mr. HELLYER: Oh, I do not know that you could go that far. Again, you are getting into the subjective, when people start talking about their reasons and someone else's reasons for not accepting it, as you have heard before this Committee.

Mr. BREWIN: All I am trying to suggest to you is that with a very senior officer with a highly responsible command, a completely new sort of policy, that perhaps you owed it to him and to the government to make some direct contact with him before you fired him.

Mr. HELLYER: In respect of the chain of command, under the National Defence Act there is a nuance which has to be observed in so far as the channels of communication are concerned. The directions are through the chief of defence staff, and I had through the chief of defence staff begun to set up the meeting that I was referring to, but—

Mr. BREWIN: Did you give him any sort of warning that perhaps his activities in opposing unification might end the necessity of your firing him —directly or indirectly. I take it you did not do it directly. Did you do it indirectly?

Mr. HELLYER: I would find it very difficult to answer that question, Mr. Brewin, with the kind of precision that I would prefer.

Mr. BREWIN: Well, in the absence of your answering, I am going to take it that you did not, Mr. Hellyer; but if you want to correct that, by all means do.

Mr. HELLYER: I do not think there was any doubt in the Admiral's mind that there would have to be some decision made as to which policy would prevail.

Mr. BREWIN: I want to suggest to you that the use of the word "disloyal", to put it mildly, was very unfortunate because of its ambiguity and because it might well relate to disloyalty to his country, or be so interpreted.

Mr. HELLYER: This is the unfortunate aspect of the use of such a word.

Mr. BREWIN: May I suggest to you that even at this stage it would be better. if you withdrew the use of the word "disloyal" and merely say that Admiral Landymore differed from you in his views about the virtues of unification?

Mr. HELLYER: Well, that is certainly true, Mr. Brewin.

Mr. BREWIN: If the last part is true, what about the first part? Are you prepared to withdraw the accusation of disloyalty?

Mr. HELLYER: Certainly in so far as disloyalty to the country is concerned, as I said, it was never intended. But disloyalty, is the sense of the carrying out of the policy of integration and unification which had been laid down by the government, I think is different. Perhaps there is some other word that could describe opposition to a policy which has been laid down which would be a better choice of words.

Mr. BREWIN: Do you not think because of the ambiguity in the use of the word "disloyal" that it would be appropriate for it to be withdrawn altogether, in the application to Admiral Landymore?

Mr. HELLYER: Well, I think I almost went that far in suggesting that if he would merely say, at the meetings which had been held—I think it is a fact they were held, from his own evidence—that under these circumstances there had been no invitation to join him in his opposition to government policy, then there is no problem.

Mr. BREWIN: Well, I am not quite sure what you are saying. You almost go that far. Do you go so far as to say that the use of the word "disloyalty" is unfortunate and that you withdraw it?

Mr. HELLYER: Mr. Brewin, I do not have a tape recording of what was said at that meeting. If I did have, it would be very easy for me to make up my mind about withdrawing the word or not.

Mr. BREWIN: Yes—

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, unless there are any more questions to put at this time—

Mr. CHURCHILL: Well, I rise on a point of order. What is this document?

The CHAIRMAN: This is the document that was requested by Mr. Forrestall.

An hon. MEMBER: Mr. Forrestall provided photostatic copies.

The CHAIRMAN: Yes. It was discussed at the meeting here a moment ago.

Mr. NUGENT: It is only a small part of the statement the minister made. It is only a very small part of it.

The CHAIRMAN: This was explained at the moment. I think it was agreed that we would get this much of it in front of us. I have sent for the photostats. However, if there is more to bring forward and table, I am sure the minister will provide it to us.

Mr. CHURCHILL: This is only sort of the introduction to his statement.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, have we now completed the questions for clarification of the minister's statement?

Some hon. MEMBERS: No.

The CHAIRMAN: There are a couple of items of business that I want to deal with before we rise. However, Mr. Nugent, you have a further question to put or comment to make.

Mr. NUGENT: I just wanted to clarify a couple of things. Mr. Brewin could not get too far with the question on disloyalty. I want to ask the minister if I have been mistaken, in my belief at least, this last couple of years, and that this policy of unification is not his policy.

Mr. HELLYER: It was certainly not "my policy", Mr. Nugent, if you mean by that it was not the policy of the government. It has been the policy of the government and as a member of the government, it has been my policy as well.

Mr. NUGENT: Well, you have been taking the credit or the blame for it all this time and I thought there was not much argument as to whether it was your policy. You are the one who persuaded the government on this policy.

Mr. HELLYER: I recommended it to the government.

Mr. NUGENT: That is why I wanted to get back to Mr. Harkness' very simple question to you, when he asked, "...disloyalty to Canada or disloyalty to you?" "to you" meant your policy, of course, because this is the only way in which disloyalty would affect you. Is that right?

Mr. HELLYER: Yes, I think so.

Mr. NUGENT: Therefore, your answer to him was clear and unequivocal at that time, that it was not a question of disloyalty to policy; what you answered to Mr. Harkness' question at that time was that he was disloyal to his country, and you meant it that way.

Mr. HELLYER: No, to the policy of the government as it was known at the time. This is, I think, the third time the question has been asked.

Mr. NUGENT: Well, we have not clarified that point, that you were synonymous with your policy, so that you ruled that out in your answer to Mr. Harkness. On page 7 of Admiral Landymore's brief he says:

> There has been reference to the Royal 22nd Regiment retaining their identity—but there has been no document defining unification in terms of

a single service with a single identity. At the time I was relieved of my command, there was no such definition...

In other words, there was no definition of unification at the time that he was relieved of his command. Which policy was he disloyal to then?

Mr. HELLYER: Mr. Nugent, you are quibbling to the extent that the policy in respect to unit designations and names is the same as the policy of a single service. They are not the same. The policy of the single service was discussed and indicated to the members of the armed forces in the letter which has been referred to now many times, signed by the associate minister and myself. The policy of the retention of unit designations is something quite different and within the format of the single service.

Mr. NUGENT: A single service then is different than a single force.

Mr. HELLYER: No; according to my legal advice, if you are talking about the difference between a single service and a single force, they are identical.

Mr. NUGENT: You have told us before, I think, and this is just to clarify it, that there was a plan of unification at the time you fired Admiral Landymore, which has been made known and, therefore, they would know what unification stood for?

Mr. HELLYER: The policy of the single service was known quite widely, and certainly by the Admiral.

Mr. NUGENT: But it had not been defined. He said there was no document defining unification in terms of a single service, with a single identity. You say that it was known to him, and that he is not telling us the truth in his document.

Mr. HELLYER: Oh, I think he is. If you read on, he indicates that at a meeting in Ottawa it had been made quite clear as to what we had in mind.

Mr. NUGENT: Well, I have read on. How far?

Mr. HELLYER: I think you can find it where he reported on a meeting of officers in Ottawa.

Mr. NUGENT: Now, I am not sure that this is exactly on the same thing, but it is dealing with disloyalty. There was a story in the *Globe and Mail* on the 14th—that is at the bottom of page 12 which states:

> "Another factor is the generally acknowledged difference in officer man relationships in the Navy. Defence officials say that naval officers still retain to some extent an above decks, below decks mentality where personnel are concerned. They've got to realize that this is now a highly technical service, a spokesman said. Sailors don't just scrub decks and set the sail now, they're skilled men and the old attitudes of officers—

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Nugent, we are beginning to wander pretty far afield from the purpose of the questioning at this point, the clarification of Mr. Hellyer's statement. We are now beginning to read into the testimony sections of the brief which Admiral Landymore submitted to the Committee. You now have had a second chance to question Mr. Hellyer—

Mr. NUGENT: I wanted to clarify this question of the meaning of disloyalty, and I think this question will help do that.

The CHAIRMAN: I invite you now to return to the subject at hand, under the amendment of Mr. Brewin, which we all agreed to carry unanimously, and to direct your attention to the statement of Mr. Hellyer. It is nearly six o'clock. We have had this subject aired pretty well. We have had many statements made, questions for clarification put and replied to, and there are a couple of matters of business that I want to deal with before six o'clock. I hope that you are about to conclude your questions.

Mr. NUGENT: Yes, I am.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

Mr. NUGENT: This statement was objected to by Admiral Landymore and he asked for a public apology. This is an insult to naval personnel. He says, "to prevent a complete break-down of confidence between naval officers and the government". Now, Mr. Minister, I want to ask you whether Admiral Landymore's attempts to keep your Mr. Lee from creating a complete break-down of confidence between naval officers and the government by this sort of communication to the press, insulting every officer in the navy, was an example of Admiral Landymore's disloyalty to his country? Is that the sort of thing—one of consistent behaviour over 18 months—for which you fired him for disloyalty?

Mr. HELLYER: Mr. Nugent, I do not know what press clipping you are reading from, and I do not agree with—

Mr. NUGENT: I am reading from page 13 of the Admiral's brief.

Mr. HELLYER: I do not really think the question is one which could be answered in a manner which would be the least bit helpful to anyone.

Mr. NUGENT: We are trying to discover what disloyalty is. Mr. Minister, and it seems when I read from another page you said, read on. I find it strange that you are so familiar with this brief in one way, and so unfamiliar with it in another. You just did some selective reading. Should I gather that?

Mr. HELLYER: No. Perhaps, like my hon. friend, I have a selective memory.

Mr. NUGENT: I see.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, I have—

Mr. NUGENT: Very enlightening.

Mr. MCCLEAVE: I know we have to wait until the regular members of the Committee are through, but I have just one question for clarification, if you will permit me.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. McCleave, I hope it is going to be a very, very short one, with a short short answer following.

Mr. MCCLEAVE: It will be a short question, and I will leave it up to the minister to provide the short answer.

In paragraph 1, reference is made to "together with more direct information that came to me"; in paragraph 2 there is a suggestion, "if Admiral Landymore did not do these things," and I presume that they are the point and counterpoint

of the argument, and that the more direct information that came to the minister, came from officers who are probably still serving. Is he saying that if Admiral Landymore says those officers did not give the correct information to the minister, then he, the minister, withdraws the allegation?

Mr. HELLYER: That is correct.

Mr. MCCLEAVE: And all the Admiral has to do is to make that statement, that those officers were wrong.

Mr. HELLYER: That is right.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, there were some remarks made and some questions put regarding the proceedings of the Committee. I have had a report made, which is before me now. All the proceedings of the Committee to February 16, I think it is, are now in the hands of the printer, and that includes all those proceedings at which Admiral Landymore was present. Our experience has been that they come back from the printer relatively quickly—that is, within a couple of days, and I should be able to let you know by this evening precisely how fast the printed copy will be flowing back to us. Beyond that date, there are the transcripts which have not yet been sent to the printer, which include the testimony of General Foulkes, Patrick, Moncel and so on before the Committee. Actually, the transcripts are running now about ten days behind. I hope the Steering Committee will meet this evening before we reconvene here. I wonder if it is convenient to members of the Steering Committee to meet with me in my room, room 405, on the top floor of this building, at 7.15 this evening. Let us try it, and then we will reconvene in this room tonight at eight o'clock.

EVENING SITTING

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, your Steering Committee met while you were enjoying dinner and we have unanimously agreed upon the following. We will continue this evening with the questioning of the Minister. We called Admiral Landymore, who is in the city, and he expressed a desire to appear before this Committee. We asked him to appear before this Committee tomorrow, and when we have finished with the questioning of the Minister, we will proceed to hear Admiral Landymore. We will meet here tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock. The Steering Committee will meet for a few moments at noon tomorrow when we rise, following the morning session. Finally, we proposed to call General Allard, who is anxiously waiting in the wings and eager to get back to his own job after this Committee has heard him. He is going to talk to us on the status of the armed forces, as soon as we have finished those items of business I mentioned.

I have one other item of business to deal with. Mr. Forrestall asked for a transcript of the record of last Thursday and I am happy to say we have this for you. I have a couple of copies which I will ask the Clerk of the Committee to send to you. These are marked HHH-10 and JJJ-1, and, I understand, are consecutive. The recording staff do not use the letter "I". I have another set which can be used on this side of the table. Perhaps we can share it.

I now will call the Minister. We will proceed immediately to questioning of the Minister on the subject which we had been discussing before dinner, or on any other subject that you may have in mind, while the Minister is before us this evening.

Mr. WINCH: Mr. Chairman, I would like to move the adoption of the report of the Steering Committee.

Mr. FOY: I second the motion.

Motion agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN: You may now proceed to question the Minister.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Mr. Chairman, before I start questioning, I have a point of order. Last week I asked whether or not the Maritime Command was in a position to staff certain ships and the complements for them, and I think it was suggested by Mr. Groos that he would see that this information was made available. It has not been made available yet, but I now have gleaned that information from the daily newspapers. I think that when we ask for information, it would be nice to have it at least about the same time as it is released to the press.

Mr. Hellyer, if I could, I would like to go back over the events of last Thursday night. You asked me whether or not I accepted any responsibility for asking whether or not Rear Admiral Landymore was fired. The purpose of my asking it was to clarify whether or not he was fired because he had made public statements to the press. This was the general bit of news that was getting about, which was pursued with some degree of vigour by spokesmen in your office. You asked me if I would accept the responsibility, and you said this, according to the photostatic copy which, I gather, is fairly accurate:

> Mr. Hellyer: Admiral Landymore was fired for 18 months consistent disloyalty to the policies of the people he was paid to serve.

Does that fit in with the clarification you gave us this afternoon, that he was disloyal to you and your policies and not to the people of Canada?

Mr. HELLYER: Yes, that is fair.

Mr. FORRESTALL: It does not make much sense to me, because I thought that you represent the people of Canada as Minister of National Defence. How do you envision your responsibilities to the people of Canada?

Mr. HELLYER: I am directly responsible to Parliament, which is responsible to the people of Canada.

Mr. FORRESTALL: How do you reconcile that. You say that he was consistently disloyal to policy that you were putting forward and are continuing to put forward in the form of your bill. You say that being disloyal to you then is not being disloyal to the people of this country?

Mr. HELLYER: That was long before the bill was introduced, Mr. Forrestall.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Long before the bill was introduced. I thought you made this charge on Thursday night last. I am quoting from a photostat of the Committee hearings.

Mr. HELLYER: You are saying the reference that I made the other night was in reference to a point of time before the Admiral was relieved of his command and, therefore, before the bill was introduced.

Mr. FORRESTALL: The impression that your CBC-TV statement on Friday—which you have dealt with and clarified for us earlier this evening, and which you indicated was, with the exception of the first sentence, your statement of Friday night—leaves me with, and I am sure the rest of the country, because this has been the reaction, is that the Admiral was indeed disloyal to the people—and in your own words—"who pay him". It leaves me with the impression that you now have attempted to change indeed, if not the words and the facts, at least the spirit of what it was you said Thursday night. Why is this? Did you reconsider what it was you had to say?

Mr. HELLYER: No, I have nothing to add to the record, Mr. Forrestall.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Nothing you can add to it, or nothing you want to add to it?

Mr. HELLYER: Nothing that I can add to it that is useful.

Mr. FORRESTALL: When we got into this the other night, you indicated to us that you had not had an opportunity in the 18 months that you were talking about, to speak with the Admiral. You did not say you had not found it necessary to speak to him, but I think you did indicate that you had not spoken to him, and you confirmed that since.

Mr. HELLYER: I think there was a slight misunderstanding in reference to that. The intention was not that I had not spoken to him, but that I had not either visited his command or had him summoned here to Ottawa to speak to directly in respect to this issue. I had indeed spoken to him during that period.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Let us clarify this: Did Admiral Landymore and yourself at any time during this 18 month period discuss any aspect of the morale problem in Maritime Command?

Mr. HELLYER: This is very difficult—

Mr. FORRESTALL: Formally or socially?

Mr. HELLYER: Formally or informally, socially or otherwise, it is very difficult to say. We rode back across the ocean with each other; we had dinner together, and we talked about defence matters for most of that time. I cannot remember exactly what we said, but we certainly discussed many aspects of this.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Was all of this prior to or after you learned of what you consider his disloyal acts?

Mr. HELLYER: I would say prior to.

Mr. FORRESTALL: And this would have been some time in late 1964 or early 1965?

Mr. HELLYER: This was in the fall of 1965.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Then up until the fall of 1965, the acts of disloyalty had not come to your attention?

Mr. HELLYER: I think that is correct. It is very difficult because I do not keep a daily diary; I do not have time. It is very difficult to recall all of the people you have seen, and under what circumstances, let alone what you have said to them.

Mr. FORRESTALL: It was sometime subsequent to that. When was it then that you first learned of this. This seems to be a point of contention.

Mr. HELLYER: I do not recall exactly, but—

Mr. FORRESTALL: In other words, at the first suggestion you did not make any decision; you waited until there was other confirming evidence?

Mr. HELLYER: I cannot recall my first knowledge of it.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Do you recall who first brought it to your attention?

Mr. HELLYER: Yes, I know.

Mr. FORRESTALL: I am not interested in who it was, but I am interested in the manner in which it was brought to your attention. Was it brought formally, in the form of a casual comment, or was it deliberate?

Mr. HELLYER: My first indication was a casual reference by someone who was familiar with the circumstances.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Did you initiate any inquiries?

Mr. HELLYER: I discussed the matter subsequently with the senior staff, when it came through official channels as well.

Mr. FORRESTALL: There were reports that subsequently came—official reports of acts of disloyalty that came up through the ranks, through the normal channels—

Mr. HELLYER: Do not put words in anyone's mouth.

Mr. FORRESTALL: I am not trying to put words in anyone's mouth.

Mr. HELLYER: You said "acts of disloyalty"; this is—

Mr. FORRESTALL: You will not give me any information, so I have to try and drag it out of you somehow or another, and I am trying to be polite about it. It came up through the proper channels to you then?

Mr. HELLYER: The incidents referred to were reported to me through proper channels as well.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Would this have been in 1965 or early 1966?

Mr. HELLYER: I do not recall the dates exactly.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Mr. Minister, among the other comments you made the other night—and you made quite a point of this—you said there were occasions when you could have perhaps spoken to the Admiral, one of which you cited as an annual dinner of the Navy League of Canada held in Halifax. I think the effect of the words you used where that he just did not show. I think that was perhaps a mistake on your part. Perhaps having thought about it, you would like to correct it, because, indeed, the Admiral was there, and I think he saw you off from Shearwater. I think the reason he was not there was because he had to greet you when you arrived.

Mr. HELLYER: It is possible that I may have had a lapse of memory about that. I do not know; I could not say.

Mr. FORRESTALL: It is just for the sake of clarifying the record—

Mr. HELLYER: If I had to swear under oath whether he was there or not, I am afraid I could not.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Is it not customary for a senior commander to see you off and greet you to an area?

Mr. HELLYER: Yes.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Would it not have stuck in your mind if, indeed, he had not been there? I accept the lapse of memory. I am sure you would not attempt to mislead us like that.

Mr. HELLYER: I certainly would not, and I wish I could recall the details of that visit more vividly.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Mr. Hellyer, when you were considering these acts of, as you term them, consistent disloyalty, could you tell us exactly at what point it was in time—not the day, the moment or the hour, but was it in the winter of 1966 or the late spring that you made some decision that indeed you must take some, what you termed in your mind, disciplinary action against Admiral Landymore.

Mr. HELLYER: If you do not confine the interpretation too closely, it would have been in the late winter or early spring.

Mr. FORRESTALL: The late winter or early spring?

Mr. HELLYER: Yes.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Forrestall, I hope your questions are drawing to a close very shortly. We have a considerable list of other persons who want to question the Minister on this subject.

Mr. FORRESTALL: My questions would probably take two or three rounds. I am trying to establish some background.

The CHAIRMAN: If it will take two or three rounds—

Mr. FORRESTALL: How much time are you allowing?

The CHAIRMAN: I am allowing you all about 15 minutes at a time, in order to cover the members who are on my sheet at the moment, which numbers five. I think I will move along and hear the others and then put you down for a second round, Mr. Forrestall.

Mr. WINCH: Mr. Chairman, at the end of last week I asked the Minister if I could be supplied information relative to firing and resignations. Is this information now available?

Mr. HELLYER: Mr. Winch, it is in the process of preparation.

Mr. WINCH: When can we expect to receive it?

Mr. HELLYER: I hope I will have it ready for you tomorrow.

Mr. WINCH: Mr. Chairman, I would now like to ask the Minister if he will comment on the present Canadian relationship with the United States on continental defence as a result of the policy of integration and unification.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Mr. Chairman, on a point of order, the steering committee's report, which has been adopted, was to the effect that we would continue to question the Minister on the incident that we were discussing at six o'clock, and if those questions are finished, then we will go on to question the Minister on other aspects that he brought to our attention last Thursday and Friday. The questioning now has shifted to entirely different grounds.

Mr. ANDRAS: Mr. Chairman, on a point of order, and with great respect to Mr. Churchill, my understanding of the steering committee's discussion was that the Minister would be questioned on that matter, the question of his statement, or any other matter relating to the bill. I really honestly did understand that, Mr. Churchill.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Then it shows the weakness of not actually taking down word for word what is said at meetings because that certainly was not the way I expressed it. I thought that we would finish with the Minister's statement today concerning the Admiral Landymore incident. Twice I said that there were colleagues of mine who had questions to ask on other aspects of the Minister's presentation to us last week.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Churchill, I think in fairness to your point of view, I understood from the meeting, that we would proceed with the questioning of the Minister on this matter and then we would proceed to other matters; that Admiral Landymore would be here tomorrow morning and available to us for questioning and to make his statement as soon as we had questioned the Minister on this subject. For this round, anyway, Mr. Winch, I wonder, whether we could hold the discussion to this subject and maybe a bit later this evening we can get on to other matters. I think we should keep this sequential and that we should follow that procedure.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Will you put me down for other matters?

Mr. WINCH: Mr. Chairman, I was asking a question and I thought I was in order. In view of your decision—because I personally have no intention of asking any question about Admiral Landymore until he is here tomorrow—I hope, sir, that I will have priority as soon as the questioning with respect to the Landymore incident is concluded tonight.

The CHAIRMAN: Does that end your questioning on this subject at the moment, Mr. Winch?

Mr. WINCH: No. I was not asking any question about Admiral Landymore, but I would like to have priority when we are finished with the questioning regarding Admiral Landymore. I am prepared to wait until I hear Admiral Landymore tomorrow which, to me, is the right thing to do.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Mr. Chairman, you have my name on the list?

The CHAIRMAN: No, sir, I do not at the moment but I will certainly add it.

Mr. BREWIN: Mr. Chairman, I have no questions at the moment. I want to be on the list for the second round.

The CHAIRMAN: You want to be added to the list for the second round of questioning, Mr. Brewin. I have quite a few people for the second round. Mr. Nugent?

Mr. NUGENT: Mr. Chairman, I was intrigued by one remark the Minister made in his testimony, concerning the visit last July, I think it was, to this Committee. I am paraphrasing perhaps, but I thought the Minister's words were that he could not care less what Landymore said because he had already made up his mind to fire him, and whatever he did did not make much difference. To me, this is more than a little strange since I am sure that the Minister will recall,

as well as I do, the charge I made against him in the House, that of tampering with the evidence of this witness who was appearing before this Committee. So we have that charge which was made in the House in respect of the changes in the testimony, which the Minister admits he is responsible for, but which he claims he had the right to make. Now we have this statement that it did not matter. Since this procedure of tampering with the evidence of a witness is so unusual, and since it has gone to such great lengths, I wonder if the Minister would now care to reconcile for this Committee this most unusual method of dealing with evidence, as well as with his statement that the evidence did not matter.

Mr. HELLYER: I do not know what there is further to say.

Mr. NUGENT: It cannot be reconciled?

Mr. HELLYER: I think I indicated that there were some improvements that were suggested with respect to testimony relating to foreign powers and some other suggestions as to how the draft might be improved. But I was not really too concerned with what it looked like except in the broad sense of not embarrassing Canada, for the reasons I indicated the other day. I think you should keep in mind, too, in so far as drafts are concerned, that often they are changed for many reasons right down to the time they are delivered. I think, Mr. Manchee, when he appeared before you, said his presentation had been amended something like 15 times in the process of preparation before being presented to your Committee by various individuals who thought it could be improved by one means or another. This is not an unusual process. But as far as my interest or my concern in having certain facts included or not included in the Admiral's prepared statement, it really is not a matter of too great consequence, as I indicated the other day.

Mr. NUGENT: The Minister has just told us about that part which perhaps was not of great consequence. However, the part that was of great consequence, of course, was the very serious situation in so far as personnel was concerned, which the Minister was responsible for having deleted.

Mr. HELLYER: Mr. Chairman, I do not think members of the Committee should be allowed to make statements which they cannot support. I did not delete anything from the—

Mr. NUGENT: My wording was very simple. I said, "was responsible for having deleted," which was the essence of the charge which I formally made and which the Minister declined the opportunity to clear himself of. I am just proceeding on that, and I am trying to give the Minister an opportunity to reconcile that course of conduct for which he was responsible. Perhaps I am wrong, but I get the impression that the Minister is saying now that Landymore's testimony could not matter less—and I may be paraphrasing. I am trying to reconcile why there should have been such great pains with that evidence, giving the impression that the Minister was apparently concerned about it, and this statement now that it did not matter.

Mr. HELLYER: I do not think there were great pains, and I am afraid, Mr. Nugent, you will have to do your own reconciliation.

Mr. NUGENT: Since we cannot, and on your invitation, the only reconciliation that I can make is that it is consistent with the viewpoint of the Minister, who is

anxious that this Committee get his side of the picture, and is careful to keep the other side hidden.

Mr. HELLYER: That is—I cannot use the words which came into my mind.

Mr. NUGENT: I guess "accurate" is the one you did not want to use.

Mr. HELLYER: That is not correct. The Committee can draw its own conclusion.

Mr. NUGENT: I will pass on to another aspect of this whole matter. The committee has not been sitting in a vacuum. We have your charges—or perhaps I should say charge—of disloyalty against Mr. Landymore and we must weigh that, along with the evidence that has been presented to this Committee by the the most responsible senior officers, most of whom left very recently; the evidence of the breakdown of the normal channels of communication; the evidence of the serious morale problem existing in the forces, partly resulting because of this; then the Minister's own testimony on his sources of information on Landymore; the fact that we are left with his apparent ignorance of what Landymore had been doing in his meetings out at the coast in an attempt to repair some of the breakdown in morale, when on the August 23, 1965 this had been reported through the usual channels of communications to the chief of personnel; and the Minister's apparent ignorance of this when he fired Landymore the next June. All I am trying to suggest to the Minister is this: Would it not now, in the light of all this, be appropriate for the Minister to tell us what are these mysterious channels of communication about which he has so far been so diffident about telling us?

Mr. HELLYER: I have not been the least bit diffident, Mr. Nugent.

Mr. NUGENT: You have not been?

Mr. HELLYER: I do not think so.

Mr. NUGENT: Would our source of information about Admiral Landymore's conduct of his duties as chief of Maritime Command have been someone other than naval officers, Mr. Hellyer?

Mr. HELLYER: No; it came from Naval officers.

Mr. NUGENT: Alone?

Mr. HELLYER: With the exception of the report through channels, alone.

Mr. NUGENT: I am going to be very careful on this because it is just a recollection that I have. The Minister made a comment about the role of the Air force in Maritime Command having been downgraded, or about their not having a proper voice. I wondered if this was part of the channels of communication that the Minister has referred to?

Mr. HELLYER: No; that information came through official channels.

Mr. NUGENT: But I was correct in my recollection that the Minister did say that the Air force had not been given a proper voice, or had been downgraded in a manner in which it should not have been in the Maritime Command?

Mr. HELLYER: I do not think that is exactly what I said, but there certainly was some problem in the relationship between the senior air force commanders and the Maritime commander.

Mr. NUGENT: Now, I am glad that the Minister has said that it came through the official channels, because I believe that at the time that Landymore was chief of Maritime Command his second in command was an air force man by the name of Carpenter. Is that accurate?

Mr. HELLYER: I am not sure what the change-over date was, but certainly Air Commodore Carpenter was the deputy for part of the time that Admiral Landymore was Flag Officer, Atlantic Coast, and Air Commodore Gordon subsequently. Where the dividing line came in the appointments of the two officers and their relationship to the establishment of Maritime Command I would not know without checking the records.

Mr. NUGENT: Could the Minister tell this Committee whether Carpenter was a source of his information on how Landymore was conducting his Command?

Mr. HELLYER: No, I would say not; not that I recall. As I indicated the other day, I have seen a number of these people socially. I think that Air Commodore Gordon was at the dinner in Halifax that I mentioned. I recall having seen him there that night, but I am sure there was no discussion of matters pertaining to the Command.

Mr. NUGENT: Well, perhaps the Minister would answer this question: I have nothing personally against Mr. Carpenter, but would the Minister tell us whether Carpenter's subsequent promotion was recommended through the Chiefs of Staff in the usual manner?

Mr. HELLYER: Well, I think it is irrelevant, Mr. Chairman. Air Vice Marshal Carpenter is a very talented officer who chaired a Committee some years ago that did a study of defence problems of the future. That study had only one fault, and that was it was 10 years ahead of its time. The times have now pretty well caught up with it, and Air Vice Marshal Carpenter fits into the present dynamic, forward-looking defence staff arrangement very satisfactorily.

Mr. NUGENT: I gather from that that the Minister is saying that Carpenter agreed with him.

Could the Minister tell us whether those who, through the usual channels of communication, recommend promotions agreed with the Minister that this officer deserved promotion and was so talented?

Mr. HELLYER: I do not think that it really matters, Mr. Nugent—

Mr. NUGENT: May this have had some bearing on the breakdown in the usual channels of communication?

Mr. HELLYER: I do not think so. The Air Vice Marshal was not promoted at the time that he was in Marritime Command, and therefore there is no relevancy to the line of questioning that you have been following.

Mr. NUGENT: Except to this respect, that if, as we are to judge, the Minister takes loyalty to the Minister or to his policy above all else, and as he has already revealed to us that this particular person was apparently quite devoted to the Minister's policy, being so forward-looking, can we take it that despite the failure of the usual advisers to recommend any such promotion the Minister rewarded him for being his particular line of communication in keeping "tabs" on Landymore, or for other particular services rendered—

The CHAIRMAN: Order, order.

Mr. HELLYER: Not only would you be incorrect, but Air Commodore Carpenter was recommended for promotion by his commander.

Mr. NUGENT: At what time was that, Mr. Hellyer?

Mr. HELLYER: Prior to his promotion.

The CHAIRMAN: Order, order. Mr. Nugent, I think you are embarking on a fishing expedition here. I invite you to return a little closer to the topic in hand. You have got about 2 minutes—

Mr. FORRESTALL: I would like to hear the answers to some of these questions.

The CHAIRMAN: I think this is going far beyond the terms that are before us and that we are embarking on fishing expeditions. You have got 2 minutes left. Let us have—

Mr. NUGENT: Could we have the date of that recommendation for promotion from the senior who should have given it.

Mr. HELLYER: No, I do not think we could give you the date, but I would say that it was many months after he had left Maritime Command and had proven himself in his duties to be a competent, progressive and co-operative officer.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr.—

Mr. NUGENT: Just a minute, Mr. Chairman; you allowed me 2 or 3 minutes. I have only one question to complete this line, but I have another question or two, if I may. I hope my time will not be wasted. I am on the same point—

The CHAIRMAN: Let us keep a little closer to the subject in hand, Mr. Nugent. I respectfully suggest that we are beginning to wander away from the subject.

Mr. NUGENT: To get back to Landymore—

The CHAIRMAN: That is a good idea.

Mr. NUGENT: —and the channels of communication, specifically, we have here the Minister who has shown us his devotion for his channels of communication; we have the report by Landymore on August 23 1965, through the Chief of Personnel, on exactly what he had been doing, and the serious morale problem that he had been trying to give some attention to—and we had the Minister's testimony that he did not know, until after Landymore had been fired really, that Landymore had been holding these meetings, etcetera—I would like to ask the Minister—

Mr. HELLYER: Mr. Nugent, I did not say that I knew nothing about the morale problem—

Mr. NUGENT: No; but you knew nothing about—

Mr. HELLYER: There were a number of other problems which were in the process of being attended to, including housing—

Mr. NUGENT: I will cut it short Mr. Hellyer—

Mr. HELLYER: —sea allowance, and other things.

Mr. NUGENT: You apparently knew nothing about these reports on this most serious situation in Maritime Command, which Landymore had been making since last August, and the actions that he had been taking, and the efforts that he had been making, through his superiors and through the usual channels of communication. The Minister has told us that during this time he had his lines of communication.

Can we take it, sir, from your ignorance of this report and of the other reports through the usual lines of communication, that you were relying entirely on your own personal pipe line in there and ignoring the usual lines of communication?

Mr. HELLYER: Absolutely not; but I am fascinated by your lines of communication.

Mr. NUGENT: You certainly ignored this report of the August 23, outlining what Landymore had done in a serious situation. From August until after you had fired him the next year you were not aware of his having been dealing with a most important aspect. Or does not morale, and the complete demoralization of it, including the action of Mr. Lee—

Mr. HELLYER: That is your statement not mine.

Mr. NUGENT: —have anything to do with it?

Mr. Chairman, if the Minister refuses to deal with this, I am sure that the members of the Committee will take cognizance of the fact that this report was made through the channels of communication; that the Minister said he knew nothing of it; and that it deals with a most serious aspect. The Minister has told us that he had his own channels. We wonder whether loyalty is only one way?

The CHAIRMAN: Before you start, Mr. Lambert, I think Mr. Harkness wanted to speak on this same topic; and then I think, Mr. Forrestall would like to be on the second round on the same topic. Is that correct?

Mr. HARKNESS: Correct.

The CHAIRMAN: I will call you in that order. Mr. Lambert.

Mr. LAMBERT: I am referring to the first paragraph of the Minister's statement which he read this afternoon. The reference is to opposition to Government policy in 1965 being the question of unification. I think it is common ground that in 1964, Admiral Landymore, at a commanders conference, had indicated that he was not in favour of unification, and had said so to the Minister.

Mr. HELLYER: He has made this statement, but I have no recollection of it. Whether or not he did I could not say. I would not want to give the impression that he did not; but certainly it is not within my conscious memory.

Mr. LAMBERT: How is it that it can be said that the Admiral was opposing government policy on unification when that policy had not yet been formulated in 1965 and early 1966, in the light of the answers that the Minister made to members in the House and elsewhere that no decision had yet been reached on unification?

Mr. HELLYER: So far as the single service concept was concerned, there was no question. I think that the question that you are referring to is one of when a bill to establish the single service might be introduced into the House of

Commons. I think that I was quite correct in saying at the time I answered those questions that no formal decision had been taken to present the bill.

Mr. HORNER (*Acadia*): Which came first?

Mr. LAMBERT: No decision about unification had been taken by the government in 1965.

Mr. HELLYER: The single service concept was really accepted by the government at the time the White Paper was tabled.

Mr. LAMBERT: But this was not communicated to the members, as such, because there were many occasions on which it was stated that no decision had been taken.

Mr. HELLYER: I think you yourself recognized it, if I recall *Hansard* correctly, Mr. Lambert, in statements that you made about that time.

Mr. LAMBERT: Not unification in the sense that it is now accepted, in the single-service concept.

What fascinates me is the use of the language that Admiral Landymore was being disloyal in opposing the policy of unification. Even General Moncel in his testimony the other day indicated that it was only some weeks, or a few months, before his retirement that he was advised that the government had decided, or the Minister had decided, to proceed with unification.

Under those circumstances, how is it that Admiral Landymore can be deemed to be opposing government policy if the government policy decision has not yet been reached.

Mr. HELLYER: The question outstanding at that time was really the timing of the introduction of the bill to bring about the single service.

Mr. LAMBERT: Unless it is announced, how can it be policy?

Mr. HELLYER: It was announced in the White Paper, Mr. Lambert.

Mr. LAMBERT: Now, surely the Minister is not going to indulge in those semantics, that the one short sentence in the White Paper is a clear indication of a single-service organization.

Mr. HELLYER: I can tell you unequivocally that that is the reason that the sentence was put in there.

Mr. LAMBERT: Many senior officers have testified that that is not their interpretation of it.

Mr. HELLYER: I can tell you unequivocally that it was so; and it was followed up by the letter to all commands spelling out the fact that the end objective was a single service.

Mr. LAMBERT: Well, I think that there will be some testimony, and that there has been some testimony, to the contrary.

I believe that the Minister, in answer to Mr. Forrestall the other night, said:

> The situation had been brought to my attention officially through channels that the Maritime Commander and his air deputy were incompatible.

Were there any meetings with Admiral Landymore about this?

Mr. HELLYER: I do not know.

Mr. LAMBERT: Does the Minister recall at all a meeting of the Chief of the Defence Staff and Admiral Landymore and himself about this incompatibility?

Mr. HELLYER: I remember discussing it with the Chief of Defence Staff. I do not recall a meeting with—

Mr. LAMBERT: Was there a meeting about this some time in late 1965?

Mr. HELLYER: I really could not say, Mr. Lambert.

Mr. LAMBERT: I find this a little difficult to understand, Mr. Hellyer. I would think that this would be one of those areas in which matters were not running smoothly, that a situation of that kind would not be common in the forces and, therefore, that is should, under normal circumstances, be easily recallable.

Mr. HELLYER: Mr. Lambert, I do not think you were in the Defence Department on in the minister's chair long enough to realize the volume of material that is dealt with in a week or in a month; the complexity of the problems that have to be coped with; and the impossibility it would be to remember all of the detail in respect to every item.

Mr. LAMBERT: Well, I am interested because the Minister has indicated to me that he had not had any official discussions with Admiral Landymore about morale and the situation at Maritime Command. He did say that he had, shall we say, spoken to him on social occasions and possibly through other occasions; There had not been a complete silence between the two of you in the eighteen months that Admiral Landymore was in his command. Is it possible that there was a conference between the Minister, the Chief of Defence Staff of the day and Admiral Landymore about this situation between himself (Landymore) and, I think it was, Air Commodore Carpenter?

Mr. HELLYER: It is possible, Mr. Lambert; I really do not recall.

Mr. LAMBERT: All right. I will leave it at that.

Mr. HARKNESS: Mr. Hellyer, you stated on Thursday night that Admiral Landymore was fired for eighteen months of consistent disloyalty to the policies of the people he was paid to serve.

What do you mean by "the people he was paid to serve"? What is your interpretation of that phrase which you used on Thursday night?

Mr. HELLYER: I think the best interpretation would be "the Government of Canada".

Mr. HARKNESS: Your interpretation would not be "the people of Canada"?

Mr. HELLYER: No; we have gone through that today. I know that there is a fine difference in semantics here, but there is an important difference in meaning which I think we must keep clearly established.

Mr. HARKNESS: Do you consider that any officer in the armed forces is not constantly and consistently serving the people of Canada during the period that he is in the armed forces?

Mr. HELLYER: I think he is.

Mr. HARKNESS: Are they not the people who are providing the money to pay him?

Mr. HELLYER: Yes, of course. My statement this afternoon set out what I believe to be the essential difference in meaning here, and I really do not think I can improve on it.

Mr. HARKNESS: Well, the thing is that you made this statement. Now you are trying to withdraw from it, I recognize that—

Mr. HELLYER: I only clarified it for the reason that I did not wish to create the impression that I felt that there had been any conscious disloyalty either to the Royal Canadian Navy or to the Canadian people, because I'm sure there was none.

Mr. HARKNESS: I do not think there are many people in Canada that will not agree that the people that any officer is paid to serve are the people of Canada and not the government of the day, whatever it happens to be.

Now, I find this matter of the eighteen month period that you put on the alleged disloyalty of Admiral Landymore rather interesting.

Admiral Landymore was fired on July 12, 1966, so that this would take us back to January 12, 1965. What happened at that time that led you to say "eighteen months of consistent disloyalty"?

Mr. HELLYER: I do not think it really adds anything to the discussion, Mr. Harkness, to go into any more detail.

Mr. HARKNESS: You must have had some reason for saying "eighteen months of consistent disloyalty". What I want to know is what happened eighteen months before July 12, 1966, which is January 12, 1965, that caused you to make this statement.

Mr. HELLYER: I really do not think it would add any light to the present discussion to—

Mr. HARKNESS: Are you unable to pinpoint anything that happened in January 1965 that led you to make this statement?

Mr. HELLYER: I do not really think that a catalogue of events sheds any real light on the problem that we are now considering. It was focused in the meetings to which reference has been made.

Mr. HARKNESS: You made the statement, though, "eighteen months of consistent disloyalty". It is your responsibility to establish that there were eighteen months of consistent disloyalty, I ask you what happened eighteen months before July 12 which caused you to make this statement? Why did you say "eighteen months", instead of twenty months, or seventeen months, or fifteen months, or any other period of time?

Mr. HELLYER: Because to my recollection eighteen months was the figure which would most nearly cover the series of events which caused me to make the statement in the first place.

Mr. HARKNESS: In other words, you have no specific instance that you can put your finger on that caused you to say "eighteen months"?

Mr. HELLYER: Mr. Harkness, I do not wish to add any more fuel to the situation which I regret began the other evening and which I would like to see ended at the earliest possible moment.

Mr. HARKNESS: I can realize your feelings in that regard, but it is the responsibility of this Committee to get at the facts. This is one of the facts which I think we are entitled to know. Why did you say "eighteen months"? What happened in January 1965, which led you to make this statement?

Mr. HELLYER: It may not have been January; it may have been December; and it would not really make any difference to the argument whether it was one or the other.

Mr. HARKNESS: You are now saying, then, that you are not sure of the eighteen months; that you pulled this out of the hat?

Mr. HELLYER: It was an approximate figure, but quite accurate.

Mr. HARKNESS: I do not think approximate figures can be called quite accurate. I do not think any auditor would accept approximate figures as being quite accurate.

Mr. HELLYER: This is not a mathematical equation, Mr. Harkness, and this is not a court of law.

Mr. HARKNESS: Well, I think that what is comes down to is that you refuse to state or are unable to state, why you said "eighteen months", and I think the Committee is therefore justified in having considerable suspicion over the eighteen months.

We will now go on to another point.

In Admiral Landymore's brief, which he entitles "Prepared for the Standing Committee on National Defence", he states:

> The announcement by the Minister in June 1965 that the service would have a single walking out dress and a common rank structure by July 1967 struck the officers in my Command like a bombshell. The announcement caused a most serious setback in morale. Officers and men were deeply distressed by it. I was personally so concerned about its effects that I ordered an informal poll to be carried out in HMCS Stadacona, the barracks in Halifax, and at HMCS Shearwater, the naval air station. I left it to the respective commanding officers to conduct the poll in their own way. My purpose in doing this was to be able to report to Ottawa the true effect of the announcement. The result of the poll indicated there was precious little desire for the changes. In fact, there was considerable resentment the changes should even be considered. On 21st June I reported, in writing, to the Chief of the Defence Staff the results of these inquiries.

Did you receive the report on these inquiries at that time?

Mr. HELLYER: Not that I recall, Mr. Harkness. I would say that it would have been some months later before I was made aware of it. Once again I must caution you on whether that report was based on the meetings that we are referring to, or on some other poll.

Mr. HARKNESS: These are the first meetings that Admiral Landymore mentions. I have brought them up because you have referred to meetings that he held.

Mr. HELLYER: As I can recall, it was some months later before it came to my attention, either officially or unofficially.

Mr. HARKNESS: All right. Do you consider that there was any disloyalty of any kind involved in this course of action which Admiral Landymore took and which he reported to the Chief of Defence Staff?

Mr. HELLYER: To answer that question I must know what was said at the meetings.

Mr. HARKNESS: Well, Admiral Landymore was not present at the meetings. He says:

> I left it to the respective Commanding Officers to conduct the poll in their own way.

Mr. HELLYER: He was present at the meetings that I am referring to.

Mr. HARKNESS: I am talking about these meetings now.

Mr. HELLYER: Well, we just went into this a minute ago and you said that they were the same meetings.

Mr. HARKNESS: No, I did not say any such thing. I said the first meetings, and any that were held, as far as I can make out, were these particular meetings.

Mr. HELLYER: I have no information about any meetings other than the ones we have been discussing, at which Admiral Landymore directed the officers.

Mr. HARKNESS: All right; I will come back to the question I asked you: Do you consider that there was anything disloyal in any way in this course of action which Admiral Landymore pursued at this time, in June of 1965?

Mr. HELLYER: I would have to know precisely what was said at the meetings in order to be able to—

Mr. HARKNESS: Yes; but Admiral Landymore, I repeat, was not present at the meetings. He says:

> I left it to the respective commanding officers to conduct the poll in their own way.

He was not at the meetings.

Mr. HELLYER: Then you are talking about different meetings.

Mr. HARKNESS: I am talking about these first meetings which were held, the holding of which and the results of which Admiral Landymore reported to the Chief of Defence Staff. I repeat my question: Do you consider that there was anything disloyal in that course of action?

Mr. HELLYER: Not the way you report it and the way it—

Mr. HARKNESS: This is the way Admiral Landymore reports it; not the way I report it. I am reading from Admiral Landymore's brief. I am not reporting it.

I take it that you consider that there was nothing disloyal in that; and that was apparently the first of these instances of any kind.

Following that, on the next page, Admiral Landymore says:

> In the first three weeks after the announcement more than twenty officers told me this was the "last straw" and that they would try to get

out, and would if they could do so without a pension penalty. It was a new experience for me to find officers demoralized in this way. I was concerned that the navy would lose key officers in the organization, officers who had years of training and experience in the realm of maritime warfare.

I decided to act, to check this deterioration of morale amongst my officers. The way I acted, and it was this that caused the Minister's "spokesman" to hint that I had intimidated my officers and men, was to call to a meeting all officers of my Command of the rank of Commodore, Captain and Commander. This meeting occurred in July last year (1965).

This is the meeting to which you have referred, is it not?

Mr. HELLYER: Yes, I presume so.

Mr. HARKNESS:

At the meeting I made these points clearly, emphatically and with conviction.

First, that unification...

Mr. HELLYER: Would you read that again? Did you say, "At this meeting"?

Mr. HARKNESS: "At the meeting..." yes, "...I made these points..."

Mr. HELLYER: Does he say that the commodores, captains, commanders and lieutenant-commanders were all at the same meeting?

Mr. HARKNESS: I will read it again for you.

The way I acted, and it was this that caused the Minister's "spokesman" to hint that I had intimidated my officers and men, was to call to a meeting all officers of my Command of the rank of Commodore, Captain and Commander. This meeting occurred in July last year.

Mr. HELLYER: It was my understanding that there were two meetings.

Mr. HARKNESS: He goes on to another meeting after this, but I am dealing with this meeting at the moment.

At the meeting I made these points clearly, emphatically and with conviction. First, that unification had not been defined so we were allowing ourselves to be demoralized by an unknown quantity.

Do you consider that that is a disloyal statement, in any sense of the word?

Mr. HELLYER: No, I would not.

Mr. HARKNESS: All right; that is fine. Neither would I.

Second, the National Defence Act called for three services which could not be changed to a single service without an amendment to the Act in Parliament and I was certain that good sense would prevail in this important matter.

Do you consider that a disloyal statement?

Mr. HELLYER: No, I would not.

Mr. HARKNESS: Right; neither do I.

Third, I traced the events concerning unification up to that time in precisely the same way as I have traced them for you today.

Do you consider that a disloyal statement?

Mr. HELLYER: No.

Mr. HARKNESS: Right.

> Fourth, I have told them I could see no merit in forcing the navy to lose its identity and referred to our dress, our traditions, our rank structure and the designators for our ships. Finally, I told them regardless of my personal views I would represent their viewpoint and that they would have an opportunity to indicate to me what their point of view was.

Do you consider that that is a disloyal statement?

Mr. HELLYER: No.

Mr. HARKNESS: Good. Then none of these statements made by Admiral Landymore at this meeting, as he reports them himself, and which I think he said, when he was before the Committee here a couple of weeks ago, he could confirm by a record, do you consider to be disloyal. I agree with you. I do not think there is a single disloyal thing about any one of them.

Mr. HELLYER: That is correct; and if that is the full, fair and complete report of the meetings I would have to agree with you completely.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Harkness, I note that your time is up.

Mr. HARKNESS: Perhaps I could just finish this point, please?

The CHAIRMAN: Yes.

Mr. HARKNESS: The brief goes on:

> I then asked them to stand to signify agreement with the following points. First, that they wished me to represent their viewpoint.

Do you consider there is anything disloyal in that?

Mr. HELLYER: Not if that is the way the question was put.

Mr. HARKNESS: All right; we can go into whether that was the way in which the question was put.

> Second, that they would not feel they could not speak openly and frankly about their views on unification in the service and outside. I pointed out that this would be the state of affairs until the law was changed in Parliament. I told them not only was it quite proper to talk about it but that I encouraged them to do so.

Do you consider there is anything disloyal in that?

Mr. HELLYER: To talk about it outside?

Mr. HARKNESS: Yes.

Mr. HELLYER: If it was accepted government policy?

Mr. HARKNESS: The Admiral points out:

> I pointed out that this would be the state of affairs until the law was changed in Parliament.

Mr. HELLYER: I think you had better read the whole section again, Mr. Harkness.

Mr. HARKNESS: All right.

Mr. LEGAULT: Mr. Chairman, may I ask a supplementary on this very point?

Mr. HARKNESS: Would you just let me finish, please.

Mr. LEGAULT: It is relevant to the point.

Mr. HARKNESS: All right.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Legault, I would like to see members who are questioning the Minister given the opportunity to carry through sequentially and not have their trend of thought broken by supplementaries.

Mr. LEGAULT: Yes; but the purpose of this meeting at the moment—

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Legault, I will be very happy to put you down for a series of questions if you so desire, but I would ask you please not to break the trend of thought—

Mr. LEGAULT: It is misleading, because—

The CHAIRMAN: It may be misleading, but when the time comes you will have an opportunity to question the Minister and you can bring up what it is that you say is misleading.

Would you carry on, please, Mr. Harkness?

Mr. HARKNESS: Second, then, and I repeat.

Mr. LEGAULT: Stop.

The CHAIRMAN: We have ruled on this question. The opportunity is here for members to question the Minister and I will put your name down to question the Minister very shortly and you can carry on.

Mr. LEGAULT: Would Mr. Harkness permit the question, then—?

Mr. HARKNESS: Not until I finish the point I am on now.

The CHAIRMAN: When he has finished. I will defend the right of every member here to carry out his questioning sequentially.

Mr. HARKNESS:

> That they would not feel they could not speak openly and frankly about their views on unification in the service and outside.

Mr. HELLYER: I do not understand that. Would you go back and put it in context for me? I would like to know is whether or not it was decided that they should be able to speak about their views externally.

Mr. HARKNESS: The context is this:

> I then asked them to stand to signify agreement with the following points.

I read the first point, and you agreed there was nothing disloyal about it. The second point is this one which I have now read twice.

Mr. HELLYER: I am still not sure what it means as you read it.

Mr. HARKNESS: All right, but I think the language is quite clear, simple and definite

> That they—

the officers, in other words—

> would not feel that they could not speak openly and frankly about their views on unification in the service and outside. I pointed out that this would be the state of affairs until the law was changed in parliament.

In other words, that there was no rule against their saying quite freely and openly what their views were on unification until parliament had provided for unification.

Mr. HELLYER: I do not think this is in accordance with the Queen's Regulations, Mr. Harkness. I do not think that serving officers do have the right to speak openly and freely outside contrary to government policy until such time as Parliament has acted.

Mr. HARKNESS: If that is the case—

Mr. LEGAULT: On a point of order, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Legault, I do not think there is a point of order here. Mr. Harkness has—

Mr. LEGAULT: There is a point of order because Mr. Harkness is attempting to—

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Legault, Mr. Harkness is finishing his line of questioning. He is just about. He is now over his time. When he has finished we will ask Mr. Forrestall if he will give you the privilege of raising your point.

Surely the Minister is quite capable of defending himself in this situation? He is not leaning on my shoulder to save him from points of order at the moment. I will ask Mr. Harkness to finish and, please, will you restrain yourself?

Mr. HARKNESS: The Minister has just brought up another point, and I would ask him: If it is the case, in his view that officers were not free to speak openly and frankly about unification as parliament had not provided for unification yet, what is the situation of the considerable number of officers whom he has sent around the country to speak on, and in favour of, unification to all and sundry on the various defence bases in this country?

Mr. HELLYER: I will have to bring for my honourable friend the best known rules on this question.

Mr. HARKNESS: Surely, Mr. Chairman, if an officer is not allowed to speak on unification at all then the Minister was very badly at fault in authorizing and sending senior officers about the country to speak in favour of unification.

Mr. HELLYER: Mr. Harkness, I will have to get you the regulations and the precedents so that you can set your mind at rest.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Forrestall, I wonder if—

Mr. HARKNESS: I have not quite finished this point. Now, the Minister—

The CHAIRMAN: You are well over your time, sir. There is a second round, and other people are waiting—

Mr. HARKNESS: I think it would save time if I could finish this in half a minute.

The CHAIRMAN: So long as it is only half a minute.

Mr. HARKNESS: The Minister does not state that this was an act of disloyalty, in his opinion, but he questions it. Is that correct?

Mr. HELLYER: I question it.

Mr. HARKNESS: All right. I will return to these points afterwards.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Forrestall, Mr. Legault is very anxious to raise a question here. I wonder if I could prevail upon you to let him ask his question, which I think has a bearing upon what Mr. Harkness has been saying, and then we will carry on with you?

Mr. FORRESTALL: Charity begins at home, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much.

Mr. LEGAULT: Mr. Chairman, what I was trying to bring out was very pertinent to the questions asked by Mr. Harkness. It deals with the Queen's Regulations and Orders a copy of which I have here. I was intrigued and I called for it. This is subject to article 19.375:

> No officer or man shall without permission obtained under article 19.37...

and I am quoting article (f):

> ...publish his opinions on any military question that is under consideration by superior authorities; or
>
> (g) take part in public in a discussion relating to orders, regulations or instructions issued by his superiors;
>
> (j) publish in writing or deliver any lecture, address or broadcast in any way dealing with a subject of a controversial nature affecting other departments of the public service or pertaining to public policy.

Is that not exactly what we are dealing with at the moment?

Mr. HARKNESS: No.

Mr. LEGAULT: You were referring to his liberty to express himself.

Mr. HARKNESS: Yes.

Mr. LEGAULT: Then I say that he should have resigned as the Minister has said forwardly. While he was under these conditions he had no right whatsoever to express himself.

Mr. HARKNESS: Can you give me any instance where Admiral Landymore, or any of these other officers, published any of their views at this time?

Mr. LEGAULT: Is that not a lecture that was referred to this afternoon?

Mr. HARKNESS: No.

Mr. LEGAULT: Was that not a lecture?

Mr. HARKNESS: No; as he notes, this was a private meeting, and people—

Mr. LEGAULT: No, no; I am not referring to those notes, Mr. Harkness; I am referring to public articles that have come out wherein the Admiral has expressed his views and asked for support against the policies that were set out. This is the point I was getting at.

Mr. HARKNESS: This was after he was fired.

Mr. LEGAULT: Did you have in your employ, while you were minister, Mr. Harkness—

The CHAIRMAN: Order. Come, now; we cannot talk back and forth across the table like this. You have raised your point and it is on the record, Mr. Legault. The opportunity is there for other members to study Queen's Regulations and Orders and to gather opinions from all barrack room lawyers.

Mr. LEGAULT: I have one question, Mr. Chairman. Was not the Admiral aware of the Queen's Regulations and Orders when he did this?

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Legault, whether or not he was aware of them is a question you cannot direct to this Chair, I can tell you that. Mr. Forrestall.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Let us just continue with this because it was part of what I had intended to ask. I will get back to what it was I had started earlier. There are other points. I will start with the third one and ask the Minister the same question as did Mr. Harkness after I have quoted it to him.

> Third, that they should not consider a loss of identity for the navy inevitable and so become apathetic about it.

Was that an act of disloyalty?

Mr. HELLYER: I think you would have to interpret whether or not this was related to resistance to the policy or was just within the policy as laid down by the government.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Mr. Hellyer, in the context of this statement, he called his naval officers together—and he has already alluded to this in his evidence—and said something to them like this and I will ask you if this is disloyalty.

Mr. HELLYER: Yes, all right; let me answer your question directly.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Wait until I quote it to you so that you will know what it is. I doubt very much if you can remember verbatim what you said. I just want to refresh your memory. He said something to them like this: "Who will support me in my fight against unification? Who will support me as your Admiral? Those who are with me stand up and those who are not with me remain seated".

An hon. MEMBER: Whose words are those?

Mr. FORRESTALL: They are the minister's words, spoken to us last Thursday and taken from a photostat of the evidence before the Committee.

I am asking you if, in the context of that remark, you consider that to be an act of disloyalty?

Mr. HELLYER: If you had been to a commanders' conference at which the Minister had told you that the policy of the government was a single service with a single uniform and you then went back to your command and called your

officers together and said: "You do not really need to take this too seriously; you do not need to take it as being definite"—you have to read it in that context.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Why do I have to read it in that context?

Mr. HELLYER: Because that is the context in which you have to put it.

Mr. FORRESTALL: He said that they should not consider a loss of identity inevitable?

Mr. HELLYER: After he really had been told that the policy of the Government was a single service with a single uniform.

Mr. FORRESTALL: But you said in your White Paper that this was not mutable and that it was subject to change.

Mr. HELLYER: Yes; but he had subsequently been told that this was the policy. What he is saying there is, "You do not need to consider the policy as necessarily going to come about."

Mr. FORRESTALL: Now, let us go on to the fourth point. This is most important. I will quote:

> . . . that they wouldn't ask to be retired because they couldn't accept the theory of unification. I pledged that if their viewpoint was ignored that it would be I alone who would take the appropriate action in protest.

Is that an act of disloyalty?

Mr. HELLYER: No, it is not.

Mr. FORRESTALL: The fifth one is:

> . . . that for the information of people outside the room the purpose of our meeting was to discuss morale.

"For the purpose of people outside the room". This was presumably a room located in either the dockyard or *Stadacona,* which is highly difficult to get into; I can attest to that. Is what he was saying there, an act of disloyalty? How would you interpret it, Mr. Hellyer?

Mr. HELLYER: I really do not know.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Well, it reads pretty straight.

Mr. HELLYER: There is probably nothing objectionable to it.

Mr. FORRESTALL: No; I do not think there is either.

Mr. CHURCHILL: It is not only not objectionable, but highly desirable.

Mr. FORRESTALL: I would have thought it most desirable. We might just as well go on. There were, indeed, not two but three meetings in August; I quote again from page 10:

> In August I had two further meetings. They were conducted similarly to the first meeting. By 17th August I had spoken to 230 officers of the rank of Lieutenant Commander and above. Of this number three had not signified their agreement to the five points but of these only one believed in full unification. That is, one in 230. I wrote a letter to the Chief of Personnel on the 23rd August—

This is a subsequent letter. This did not come to your attention either?

Mr. HELLYER: What was the date?

Mr. FORRESTALL: Did this letter of August 23, dealing with the results of the two subsequent meetings, come to your attention?

Mr. HELLYER: Not that I recall.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Perhaps we had better go on because it is pertinent. This letter of August 23 ended with this paragraph:

> Surely it is time then, to put the case to the Chief of the Defence Staff and the Minister, to encourage the pursuit of progress in integration, to abandon the attempt to force the single service concept down the throats of unwilling recipients and to restore the loss of confidence of officers and men by standing up for individual service identity.

I would first ask you, Mr. Hellyer, whether or not you consider those strong words?

Mr. HELLYER: I am sorry, I would have to hear them again in order to realize how strong they are.

Mr. FORRESTALL: This is a letter written to the Chief of Personnel and, this is subsequent to the three meetings. In the earlier body of the letter he implies that he has set forth the result, numerically speaking:

> Surely it is time then, to put the case to the Chief of the Defence Staff and the Minister, to encourage the pursuit of progress in integration, to abandon the attempt to force the single service concept down the throats of unwilling recipients and to restore the loss of confidence of officers and men by standing up for individual service identity.

I would ask you whether or not that is strong language?

Mr. HELLYER: That is strong language, yes.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Is it so strong that possibly the Chief of Personnel should have done something with it? Would he not have normally taken it to his superior officer, in as much as you are identified in it? It was not brought to your attention?

Mr. HELLYER: Subsequently the question was raised with me, yes.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Subsequently; how subsequently?

Mr. HELLYER: I cannot recall exactly.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Well, we are going back to the summer of 1965. Would this have come to your attention in the fall of 1965?

Mr. HELLYER: I think, as I indicated earlier, it was the following late winter—sometime in the late winter. This is from memory and my memory is fallible.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Yes. That is charity beginning at home, too, Mr. Hellyer.

Mr. HELLYER: Well, at least I admit it.

Mr. FORRESTALL: When you spoke to us last Thursday you kept blaming me for raising this, but all I was attempting to do was to clarify whether or not he was fired for speaking to the press. You said this:

> I do not think that he had any right to call that kind of a meeting. I do not think he had any right to demand personal loyalty from his officers

and now that you have raised the question I want to make this statement. I have never asked a military officer his politics, religion or for his personal loyalty. Yet Admiral Landymore in giving testimony before this Committee said that he had extracted a promise from his officers.

I will ask you two questions about that, Mr. Hellyer. On what do you base the statement that you do not think that he had any right to demand personal loyalty? This implies that you knew that he had demanded personal loyalty.

Mr. HELLYER: Because the loyalty of any serving officer is to the Crown.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Where in those nine points did he demand personal loyalty?

Mr. HELLYER: Not in those; but I think you will find in the testimony somewhere that he extracted from them the promise not to resign.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Is that an act of disloyalty?

Mr. HELLYER: No, this is a—

Mr. FORRESTALL: I am sorry; perhaps I am a little dense, but how do you reconcile that? Is it an act of disloyalty? You say no, not necessarily, and yet your thought is very positively stated that he had demanded pledges of loyalty from these people.

Mr. HELLYER: I was reporting in the context in which the meetings were reported to me, or in the context in which they are—

Mr. FORRESTALL: Well, then, Mr. Minister and Mr. Chairman, this is why it is important—

Mr. HELLYER: That is the reason for my saying that if the Admiral would be willing to reassure me that he did not ask his officers to support him in opposition to Government policy, I would accept that and apologize to him.

Mr. PUGH: That is what he was fired for.

Mr. HELLYER: It was that in the context of an established Government policy the meetings were held and that the officers were asked to support policies which were diametrically opposed to the Government policy as he understood it.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Mr. Minister and Mr. Chairman, this gets us to the point that I at least continue to be concerned about, which is the credibility of the evidence upon which the Minister based his decision that Admiral Landymore was disloyal. Again I would ask the Minister if he could possibly be more specific, I do not particularly want to embarrass anybody, but I would like him to be able to reassure the Committee about the credibility of the evidence—

Mr. HELLYER: I think that it is perfectly credible; but the problem here, as in all of these areas, Mr. Forrestall, is human fallibility. Five people can witness an accident and every one of them will give a different account of how it happened. Similarly, five people can go to a meeting and give five different verbatim accounts of what was said. This is the problem that faces us and that I think we can overcome with the Admiral's statement.

Mr. FORRESTALL: On cross-examination when he appeared earlier, Mr. Minister, I asked him if he had been in any way disloyal. His answer was, "No". I am perfectly satisfied that he is probably one of the most loyal Canadians living.

What I am concerned about is on what you based your evidence? You have said that this did not constitute disloyalty; that you knew he was concerned about it; and that you had known for some considerable time. I am concerned, as Mr. Nugent was, I believe, about just who talked to you. Who told you, "There is a miserable son-of-a-gun down there making a lot of noise"? Quite frankly, if there were any morale problems I think they were created elsewhere and not by Admiral Landymore. This is why it is important that we be completely satisfied.

Mr. HELLYER: You think the morale problems were created by people who stated Government policy publicly; is that correct?

Mr. NUGENT: I quoted you one by Mr. Lee.

Mr. FORRESTALL: There were a fair number of them.

No; I think that it was just the dropping of the bombshell, along with the whole series of events that followed, that created the problems in morale.

The point which concerns me is the credibility of the evidence on which you based your decision that culminated, first, in your firing him, and, secondly, some months later, charging him with consistent disloyalty.

Mr. HELLYER: Yes, I think they were very credible people, and well-intentioned; and the point was that I was satisfied—

Mr. FORRESTALL: Was Air Commodore Carpenter one of those?

Mr. HELLYER: No, he was not.

However, I had to satisfy myself on one point in respect to a command of that kind, and that is on the matter of confidence. I was completely satisfied as far as confidence is concerned. This is the criterion on which a judgment is made in respect to a command.

Mr. FORRESTALL: I do not think I have any other questions, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN: Yes; I think you have almost exhausted that line of questioning, Mr. Forrestall. If you have no further questions I will call on Mr. Churchill who was on the list of questioners, if I am not mistaken.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I am surprised that the Minister did not earlier today accept the diplomatic suggestion of Mr. Brewin that the word "disloyalty" is ambiguous and that it would be helpful if it were withdrawn completely. Mr. Brewin asked the Minister if he would not withdraw the accusation of disloyalty, having phrased his question in that way to show that there could be a misunderstanding by people on whether it meant disloyalty to the people, to the country, or to policy.

Is the Minister now prepared, having thought that over, to accept the suggestion that he make a withdrawal of the accusation of disloyalty? This, I think, would bring the matter to an end.

Mr. HELLYER: It is an ambiguous word, Mr. Churchill, and I have been looking for another word. Someone was looking it up in a dictionary at suppertime and found, amongst many, the meaning "unfriendly to the government".

Mr. CHURCHILL: Well, you can call me disloyal every day, if you wish.

Mr. HELLYER: It underlines the ambiguity to which you referred.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Would you care to bring this to a conclusion by withdrawing the accusation of consistent disloyalty for a period of eighteen months, and settle the matter? You have the opportunity again, and—

Mr. HELLYER: Mr. Churchill, I would like to find a word which is not ambiguous, I agree with you; because I think the word creates an impression which I did not intend to create.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Well, it is too bad that you did not look up the dictionary earlier, because in the statement that you made today you used the word "disloyalty" three or four times.

I have extended the olive branch now, and if you are not going to accept it—

Mr. HELLYER: Well, I am sort of fluttering around in orbit to see if I can get the right word to land on.

Mr. WINCH: Why not "unfriendly to the government," and call it quits?

Mr. CHURCHILL: I thought that we were going to get a complete mimeographed copy of the statement that the Minister has made here today. We have only about five paragraphs. For one thing, I wanted to read the press comments again. I was particularly interested in what he had said and his exact words. I tried to copy them down but I cannot write fast enough and perhaps the Minister will help me out, but what I copied down was this: "If Admiral Landymore will, on his honor, state that no meetings were held"—and then something else—"I will apologize". Is that substantially what you said earlier today?

Mr. HELLYER: If I may fill in the missing part of the quote, it was this: —"and Admiral Landymore will state on his honour that no meetings were held at which he invited naval officers to support him in opposition to government policy, then I will apologize."

Mr. CHURCHILL: And otherwise you stay with your accusation of disloyalty?

Mr. HELLYER: Or some other less ambiguous word, meaning that he opposed government policy as a serving officer when this is not acceptable conduct.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Yet, you have been compelled to admit tonight that government policy is not firm, and is not fully known until it appears in public on the order paper of the House of Commons, or appears in the Speech from the Throne, or something of that nature. Nothing that has transpired in the last three years in the House of Commons until December 7—or until the bill appeared on the order paper and was read the first time—indicated a firm government policy with regard to unification and if the Minister wants to pursue the subject I will find ever so many instances in *Hansard* where he was asked by myself and by others to define unification and he brushed it aside. There was no pronouncement of government policy that was precise and clear. Now, is the Minister prepared to say there was, at any time up until the introduction of that bill?

Mr. HELLYER: Certainly, in so far as the services were concerned. The original letter was handed out, which said that the policy of a single service was firm. I hate to read this letter into the record again—I do not know how many times it has been read. If you would like me to read it—

Mr. CHURCHILL: I have read the letter half a dozen times.

Mr. HELLYER:

> The third and final step will be the unification of the three services. This will not be initiated until the various staffs outlined above have been established and are working effectively. It is reasonable to expect that it will be three or four years before it will be possible to take this action.
>
> The process outlined above is not immutable. As the lessons of the re-organization are learned, changes in the plans or in the timing may result. However, the end objective of a single Service is firm.

I do not see how you can be more specific than that. Then this instruction was followed up subsequently at commanders' conferences where, as the Admiral says, it was spelled out that it was to be a single service with a single uniform and there was no ambiguity about it.

Mr. CHURCHILL: There is nothing there to indicate that the identity of the navy, the army and the air force would be abolished.

Mr. HELLYER: I think it is implicit.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I suggest to the Minister a single service meant to a great many people a unified command and integrated operation like combined operations in world war II, and I asked questions in the House with regard to whether or not the identity of the Royal Canadian Navy would be maintained, and I got evasive answers. This letter, I submit, does not indicate clearly what the Minister now claims he had in mind.

Mr. HELLYER: I do not know how much clearer you could make it, Mr. Churchill, but I certainly would be pleased to have your recommendation for draftsman the next time, I wish to embark—

Mr. CHURCHILL: I think you would benefit very, very much indeed. Now, I will ask the Minister this question. The Minister is now saying that the identity of the Royal Canadian Navy is to be destroyed.

Mr. HELLYER: Are you referring to the bill before you?

Mr. CHURCHILL: I am asking this question.

Mr. HELLYER: The bill before you provides for the amalgamation of the Royal Canadian Navy, the Canadian Army and the Royal Canadian Air Force into one service to be known as the Canadian Armed Forces.

Mr. CHURCHILL: And that means that the identity of the Royal Canadian Navy will be destroyed.

Mr. HELLYER: It means that one service will be formed in place of the existing three.

Mr. CHURCHILL: And that means, therefore, that the Royal Canadian Navy as now known will be destroyed. It will be no longer the Royal Canadian Navy. Therefore, its identity will be destroyed.

Mr. HELLYER: In so far as that designation is concerned, the designation changes. This is obvious to my hon. friend.

Mr. CHURCHILL: You did not say that in your celebrated letter of April 4, nor did you ever tell it to us in the House. Let me come back now to this statement; this "if". "If Admiral Landymore will, on his honour, state that no meet-

ings were held at which he invited naval officers to support him in opposition to government policy," then you are going to apologize and withdraw, I judge, the accusation of disloyalty?

Mr. HELLYER: Gladly, yes.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Twice Admiral Landymore has, on his honour as a witness before this Committee, stated that he never did undertake any disloyal act. You will not accept that and yet it is a man of honour speaking. Mr. Forrestall asked him the question. I asked him, I think, three questions based on that. And Admiral Landymore said no, at no time had he undertaken any act of disloyalty to his country, nor had he broken his oath of allegiance to the Queen and to his country. What more are you now to ask?

Mr. HELLYER: This is merely a clarification I have asked for. I have clarified what I have said and I think it is only fair that the Admiral clarify his position.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Prove your innocence half a dozen times? Is that what it is? I think this is a shocking exhibition of autocracy on the part of the Minister, and I think that the Minister should remove the blot on the name of Admiral Landymore that he placed there by his statement on Thursday night and on Friday, and which he is dodging around now in his statement today. What does the Minister mean by saying, I do not think he had any conscious disloyalty to his country in mind? Are you suggesting that unconsciously he was disloyal to his country?

Mr. HELLYER: Mr. Churchill, the statement will have to stand on its own merit.

Mr. CHURCHILL: If you like these incomplete statements to stand, as yours is, that is up to you, but I would think you would want to clear it. In other words then, the Minister holds fast to his shocking accusation that Admiral Landymore was guilty of disloyalty. That is the way it stands.

Mr. HELLYER: Mr. Churchill, I have paved the way in the statement I made earlier for complete reconciliation on this point and it is a very simple process, as I indicated.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Does the Minister not accept the brief of Admiral Landymore of the fall of 1966, which has been quoted rather extensively tonight? Does he not accept that as the statement of a man of honour?

Mr. HELLYER: Yes, indeed, but I would like to have this point clarified to my satisfaction because I think it is relevant, and I think it would make everyone feel better at this point.

Mr. CHURCHILL: What kind of clarification, may I ask?

Mr. HELLYER: The statement; the question I raised.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Is the Minister of the opinion that this brief of Admiral Landymore of the fall of 1966 is not complete with regard to the nature of the meetings he held with his officers?

Mr. HELLYER: It is always possible that there might be some bit of information or some minor interpretation which might be clarified. It is very difficult, as you know, to write a brief and ever have it in a state in which it would not be subject to some improvement.

Mr. CHURCHILL: You are thinking now of the brief that you prepared to present to us and to the House, I suppose.

Mr. HELLYER: Yes, and to others; from my hon. friend and lots of other people.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Why are you not prepared, Mr. Minister, to make a formal charge and back it up with evidence with regard to what you said on Thursday night?

Mr. HELLYER: For the reasons stated in my statement, that I do not believe there was any conscious disloyalty to service or country involved here; this was an honest difference of opinion by people who passionately believe different things. It is perfectly understandable and I think it has to be accepted on that basis on an issue as fundamental and important as this is. I do not think you can fault anyone on either side of the argument for their passion, for the vigor and determination with which they pursue in one case the passage of the bill, or, in the other case, its opposition, because in each case the people involved believe what they are doing is in the best interest of their country.

Mr. CHURCHILL: You would be inclined to compliment Admiral Landymore on the action he took to prevent an exodus of officers from the Navy?

Mr. HELLYER: I have considerable respect for the Admiral, even if at the moment I am not able to condone everything that he did. I admire any man his determination and passion for what he believes in.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Just one final question; you are speaking of passion, which is beyond my field. You mention a grave emotional upheaval for many people and this is not the first time you have used that expression; you have altered it a little bit tonight. Are you intending to leave an impression that there is not some logic and reason behind the opposition to your plans?

Mr. HELLYER: I think the opposition can be described quite precisely as loss of identity. I did not believe Admiral Landymore's testimony to the Committee last summer bore this out, where he said that unification would not affect operations. I believe he was right when he said that. I do not believe it will affect operations at all. I think we have very efficient operations, but I do believe that the opposition largely has centered around the traditions of the forces and the attachments that have grown up with them through the years and this is a perfectly understandable thing.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Put me down if there is a second round, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Forrestall, are you still on the same inexhaustible train?

Mr. FORRESTALL: It is not inexhaustible, Mr. Chairman, just two or three little matters.

The CHAIRMAN: We are coming around to you for the third time, Mr. Forrestall, and I wonder whether there is somebody else who wants to put in questions. Mr. McIntosh, are you on this subject?

Mr. MCINTOSH: Yes, I have two questions.

The CHAIRMAN: I think I will take Mr. McIntosh first. Mr. Forrestall, you have considerable opportunity to put your questions. We will come to you in a moment if there is time left and then Mr. Harkness—in that order.

Mr. McINTOSH: Mr. Minister while Mr. Churchill was questioning you about doing away with the navy, I do not think a clear answer was given; whether it is going to be, or whether it is not going to be. On the clarification of your unification policy, you admitted yourself that you wished you had never used the term unification, You said that you would like to have substituted the term "single service concept". It seems to me, listening to this debate tonight, that there was some misunderstanding about whether Admiral Landymore understood what your unification policy was and I would suggest to you, Mr. Minister, that if there was doubt there it was in the manner in which you spoke about this policy and the way you introduced it into the House. Could I ask you if you made these two statements? First you were supposed to have said:

> There is no clearly divided line between integration and unification.

Did you make that statement?

Mr. HELLYER: It sounds familiar, Mr. McIntosh.

Mr. McINTOSH: The next statement is:

> It is quite difficult to determine any clear break between them because there was never intended to be any—

Mr. HELLYER: That sounds quite familiar, too.

Mr. McINTOSH: On the other hand, your Air Vice Marshal, on page 502 of the evidence, says this when asked about the dividing line:

> —in the case of integration, you must maintain three separate services, even though they are headless, because the present act does not permit you to unify into a single service. In the case of unification, which will be permitted by the amendment before you, you can create a single service and one does not need to maintain the three separate services.

Now, to me that is a direct contradiction of the two statements that you made.

Mr. HELLYER: Not at all, Mr. McIntosh; I think he said that the difference was legislative. That is precisely correct in the sense that it was all intended to be one cycle. We never intended to stop at integration; we intended to go to the single service, but we indicated at the outset that further legislation would be required in order to permit this.

Mr. McINTOSH: The question he was referring to was something about the logistic system and so on, and a statement was made:

> Well, is that not just integration?

The Air Vice Marshal answered: "No".

Then the question was asked:

> Then, where is the dividing line?

And he gave me the statement which I just read out to you, which is absolutely contradictory to what you have said in some of your statements.

Mr. HELLYER: I do not think so, Mr. McIntosh, but it does underline the complexity of the words that are used in this context.

Mr. McINTOSH: Well, is there any wonder then, that the naval officers or any other officer of the military could not understand what you meant by unification policy?

Mr. HELLYER: I think one could say it is not surprising that some people did not understand completely, but I think Admiral Landymore understood very well precisely what was involved. He was a very intelligent officer and knew exactly what we proposed to do.

Mr. McINTOSH: Well, could I get an answer directly from you now with regard to whether the navy is going to be destroyed, whether the army is going to be destroyed, or whether the air force is going to be destroyed, within a certain time?

Mr. HELLYER: I would say, Mr. McIntosh, it would be the reincarnation and revitalization of the navy. But, it is like any other of the life cycles; their change is in form, but the substance goes on in renewed strength. And, I think, you will find in the new single service the strengths of the three existing services—

Mr. McINTOSH: I am not talking about the strengths, Mr. Minister.

Mr. HELLYER: —the effectiveness that they have developed, the techniques that they know so well—and that these will be combined into an even more effective fighting force than we presently have.

Mr. McINTOSH: Well, Mr. Minister, that will force me to go on a repetition of something I have said before, and related to what you said today, to see if I can make any sense out of it. You said in the House in your speech on December 7:

> This system will not be changed by reason of unification. Certainly, we will continue to have the separate units and elements of naval, field and air force. They will continue to exist; they will continue to be identified as sailors, soldiers and airmen.

Then, on page 501, your Vice Chief of Air Staff says this:

> —then people in it should be able to be employed anywhere and not keep them segregated as navy, army and air force,—

Now, which one of you is right?

Mr. HELLYER: Both, Mr. McIntosh. In one case you are talking about the fighting units which will continue to be ships and squadrons of ships, squadrons of aeroplanes, wings of aeroplanes, battalions and brigades, and the other is in personnel management. They are two different things, so both statements are correct.

Mr. McINTOSH: I have no further questions on that point, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FORRESTALL: I want to go back again to the Minister's evidence of last Thursday night. I have just two areas of further questions and I will keep them brief in case somebody else might want to go further. You said, among other things, Mr. Minister, and I quote:

> —I think you have to differentiate here between the naval officers and the air force officers in his command—

You were referring to his bringing together the naval officers for an act that you later described as an act of disloyalty. You go on to say:

> He was the commander of an integrated command; a third of this command was air force, yet at no time during his command were the air force officers ever in a position to feel that they were part of the team, that they were considered as equals with their naval brethren—

I am mildly curious about what you base that statement on?

Mr. HELLYER: I think the meetings, in particular, were a basis for this statement. The language there may be a little forceful, but when it came to the question of morale, which allegedly was the reason for these meetings, the naval officers were included but the air force officers were excluded. Presumably they would all have problems of morale; they were all engaged in the same basic mission. It would seem to me that there should have been no differentiation between them in so far as their problems were concerned and that, therefore, there were two classes of citizens ipso facto they were segregated for this purpose.

Mr. FORRESTALL: So that I understand it properly, what you are saying is that Landymore ignored the air force and did not bring them into his confidence in this matter.

Mr. HELLYER: I do not think he made the same effort to be the father confessor to the airmen that he did to the sailors, including naval fliers, and that this is a tiny bit inconsistent from an operational standpoint because most groups of fliers, for example, reported to him to fulfil his missions and had to have high morale and esprit de corps and the desire really to back the chief and do his bidding in order to have a happy, well-run ship.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Was there somebody in charge of the air force at this time?

Mr. HELLYER: Yes, the Admiral was.

Mr. FORRESTALL: He was in charge in the same sense I would think, though, that you are in charge of all of them yourself. He was not directly responsible in that sense.

Mr. HELLYER: Slightly different; it was not as in an integrated command, as someone pointed out earlier.

Mr. FORRESTALL: I should ask you that. Was it a fully integrated command in 1965?

Mr. HELLYER: It was an integrated command. I have a longer answer here if you would like to have it in respect of the nuances of the change when Maritime Command was formed.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Did we establish earlier that it was Air Commodore Gordon who was his deputy at this particular time, or was it—

Mr. HELLYER: I do not think we established that.

Mr. FORRESTALL: We did not? Would you know who it might have been then, in your recollection?

Mr. HELLYER: I cannot recall; I would have to look that up.

Mr. FORRESTALL: You are suggesting then, by this statement, that in fact, he was derelict in his duty for not having paid a little bit more attention to it.

Mr. HELLYER: I did not say that, Mr. Forrestall, nor would I. I do think, though, that the question was raised by segregating the naval officers to discuss these morale problems—

Mr. FORRESTALL: Well, Mr. Minister, here you say, and I quote:

> ...yet at no time during his command were the air force officers ever in a position to feel that they were part of a team...

This suggests to me that Landymore ignored them, and I am curious about the credibility of the evidence upon which you base that. I do not know, and it will be interesting to ask Admiral Landymore if he ever had morale discussions and discussions of unification with whoever his deputy happened to be. I gather there might have been two of them; it will be interesting to ask him this. It seems to me that it is the same point here as it is, indeed, with your later statements where you alleged that he demanded personal loyalty. We have a suggestion from you that you are satisfied. Am I to take it that indeed we are to accept the whole act because you happen to personally be satisfied with it, because the parallel is identical.

Mr. HELLYER: I do not follow you; I am sorry.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Well, you have told us that you accept the credibility of the evidence before you with regard to his acts of disloyalty. I must suggest, Mr. Minister, that I am little curious about that credibility. I cannot quite accept, I am sure you do not really accept the proposition that Admiral Landymore never consulted with the Royal Canadian Air Force personnel under his command with regard to the question of unification and integration.

Mr. HELLYER: I did not say that.

Mr. FORRESTALL: You certainly implied it.

Mr. HELLYER: Just take your own—

Mr. FORRESTALL: Yes, but I am taking your words. You said that:

> ...yet at no time during his command were the air force officers ever in a position to feel that they were part of the team...

Mr. HELLYER: I do not see by what wild stretch of the imagination you could say that indicated there was no consultation with air force officers in respect of unification. You would have to have a pretty wild imagination—

Mr. FORRESTALL: Oh, then you say he did consult—

Mr. HELLYER: I do not know whether he did not; I do not know.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Well, why do you make the statement so precisely if you do not know?

Mr. HELLYER: I said that they did not feel part of the team, and I base this on the evidence that was brought to me through official channels.

Mr. FORRESTALL: And you will not let us in on that part of the information. I have just one other question; then I will stop because time is running out.

A little earlier you gave us a definition which drew a little humour on the question of disloyalty, and I would ask you which of these definitions you would accept. They are from the two standard dictionaries, the Oxford and the Webster Standard or, in short, the English and the American. One says. "not loyal; false to one's allegiance or obligation." Perhaps that was what you meant, was it? Allegiance, or obligation? "Unfaithful, faithless, perfidis, treacherous." The other one says: "faithless, not true: not true to a trust as of friendship or allegiance." That is all. But which of those two—

Mr. HELLYER: I think if you send me up that first list I could find something in it I like.

Mr. FORRESTALL: I will will read it to you again from the Oxford, the English dictionary—we do not have a Canadian one—"not loyal: false to ones allegiance or obligation."

Mr. HELLYER: I think in respect to this there was a question of obligation, and this would be a sense that I could accept.

Mr. FORRESTALL: You said you never extracted anybody's personal loyalty.

Mr. HELLYER: No; the obligation to the policy of the government, not to me as an individual.

Mr. FORRESTALL: An obligation to the people of Canada.

Mr. HELLYER: The first thing I was taught when I joined the air force was that it is not the Minister or a superior officer, it is just the fellow that is wearing the Queen's commission at the moment, and the officers all the way up the line, including the Minister, have commissions. The Minister's is of a different kind, but it is still the Queen's commission, and it is his obligation to carry out the policies as laid down by the government and as interpreted by the gentlemen down the line with the Queen's commission.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Not that I regret that you ever made these statements, Mr. Minister. I would yield to anybody else who may have question before it is too late.

The CHAIRMAN: I have the name of Mr. Harkness, and I will call on him.

Mr. HARKNESS: When we were going over the nine points which Admiral Landymore brought up at this meeting with his officers—and I must remind you that the Minister hinged his allegation of disloyalty on these meetings—as far as seven of them are concerned the Minister agreed that there was nothing in those points which was disloyal. As far as two of them are concerned, he said it might depend on the circumstances, or something like that, but he did not say that either one of them showed any disloyalty, but that they were something that had to be looked at in some other context perhaps or something along this line. Now, that being the situation, there is nothing, as far as any of these points are concerned, on which the Minister has been prepared to state that Admiral Landymore was disloyal in any way. The Admiral went on in his brief after that, and said:

> On the 29th December I reported my views on ill-considered semi-official press releases to the Chief of the Defence Staff.

Is there anything disloyal in that?

Mr. HELLYER: No, I would say not, except I think the objections that were raised were to statements on behalf of the Department which reflected government policy.

Mr. HARKNESS: Well, the Admiral went through normal and proper channels in reporting his views and what he thought was the bad effect on morale resulting from them, to the Chief of the Defence Staff. Is there any disloyalty in that whatever?

Mr. HELLYER: I would say, no.

Mr. HARKNESS: No. And, then he goes on farther down:

> In spite of my strong statements on morale I was not visited in my Command by the Minister, the Associate Minister or Chief of the Defence Staff. In fact, I was not visited by any of them during my twenty months in command. Presumably I was supposed to look on bad morale as an acceptable condition and to ignore the causes of it.

Mr. HELLYER: This is not correct because, following one of his reports in respect to morale, there were a number of steps taken by the Department on an official basis to rectify the situation. As I recall, there were some changes in kit which had been recommended, some improvements in housing and a change in sea duty allowance.

Mr. WINCH: After meeting with this Committee.

Mr. HELLYER: These were all intended to cope with morale problems as reported to Defence Council.

Mr. HARKNESS: This was long before this, though. The Admiral makes the point that in spite of the strong statements he have made on decreasing morale neither you, the Associate Minister nor the Chief of the Defence Staff went down to see him to look into this matter, or anything else.

Mr. HELLYER: The Chief of Personnel went down to see him about it, as I recall, and later reported to the Chief of the Defence Staff.

Mr. HARKNESS: That is the first we have heard of that.

He then goes on:

> I wrote my own appreciation and discussed all appropriate factors—interchangeability of personnel. . . I forwarded the appreciation to the Chief of Personnel and advised the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff it had been forwarded and that I hoped he would read it.

Is there anything disloyal in that?

Mr. HELLYER: No.

Mr. HARKNESS: As a matter of fact, all of these things, I think you would probably agree, that Admiral Landymore did and reported to the Chief of Personnel, the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff or the Chief of the Defence Staff were cases in which he followed the regular channels of communication. He states here, and I would ask you whether you agree with this:

> I believe that the sequence of events can leave little doubt in anyone's mind that the channels of communication open to me were used and used properly.

Would you agree with that?

Mr. HELLYER: I would not disagree with it.

Mr. HARKNESS: Good.

Mr. HELLYER: I do not know whether the Admiral invited other people to visit his command or not; whether he invited the Chief of the Defence Staff to go down. There is nothing to prevent the Minister or the Chief of the Defence Staff from going down, I suppose, but as I indicated the other day, in nearly every case invitations have been extended to visit commands and these have usually been accepted at an early date at a mutually convenient time in order to see first hand what the command is doing, how it is functioning and how the forces are getting along.

Mr. HARKNESS: I would say this is really beside the point, but I would just say in connection with it that during the time I was minister I never waited for an invitation from any command or unit to go and visit them. If I felt like going to visit them, I had my executive assistant phone them up and say I would be there on a certain day at a certain time, and that was it. I have never heard before—

Mr. HELLYER: You did not bother going through channels?

Mr. HARKNESS: —of a Minister waiting for an invitation from a command or a unit before he went to visit it. This is the first time that I have ever heard of such a situation.

Mr. HELLYER: Perhaps I am shy, Mr. Harkness; I was not a colonel and that makes a difference.

Mr. HARKNESS: However, as I say, this is irrelevant really. We come down to this position and I would ask you this question: Have you as yet, before this Committee, produced any evidence of disloyalty on the part of Admiral Landymore?

Mr. HELLYER: I have not attempted to produce any evidence, because there is no formal charge. I made the suggestion the other night in answer to a direct question. As I indicated earlier, I am sorry the question was raised, and I am equally sorry that I answered it when it was raised.

Mr. HARKNESS: I am sure that is probably correct, but the situation is this: A charge was made—an extremely serious charge—and surely anyone making a charge of disloyalty against a senior military officer of this country must produce the evidence to back that charge up. The Minister has just admitted that he has produced no evidence in spite of the fact that we have now been on this for two meetings of this Committee—in fact, more than that—he has produced no evidence whatever to support the charge that he made. Under these circumstances, I do not see how he can feel that he has not done a most severe and grievous injustice to a distinguished officer of this country.

Mr. HELLYER: As I indicated, Mr. Harkness, I certainly hope not, and I made a statement which I think clarifies this situation to the satisfaction of everyone.

Mr. HARKNESS: You cannot clarify a situation of that kind. You make a statement and you produce no proof whatever, although you have had plenty of opportunity to prove the statement. As a matter of fact, it is exactly the same

thing as a man who runs through a red light in his automobile and knocks down a pedestrian, does him grievous damage, and then says he did not mean to hurt him. As far as the law is concerned, this is no excuse for him whatever. He still gets the punishment of the law for whatever damage he has done, both civilly and criminally in a case of that kind. This is exactly the same sort of situation. You have done a grievous damage to a distinguished officer and you just, in effect, say: "I did not intend to." I say this is just not good enough. I have finished, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, it is now a few minutes past 10 o'clock. We will meet here again tomorrow morning. Today we have heard, I think, most of the permutations and combinations of questions on this subject. Tomorrow morning we will have an opportunity to hear Admiral Landymore and to question him. I would like to suggest to the Committee that we are charged with the examination of a bill and the returning of that bill to the House, and I would hope by the time we have heard Admiral Landymore tomorrow we will have reached toward an amicable solution of this question, and that we will be returning to an objective examination of the bill.

I might say, and I think hon. members on both sides will agree with me, that this Committee has long had a very excellent esprit de corps and has done a great deal of work since it was constituted in 1963. I hope that we can see our way through this by tomorrow and return to the objective examination of the bill. I aspire to recapture some of that esprit de corps which, perhaps, we have lost over this last few days in this incident and I enjoin you all to come tomorrow looking for a happy solution to this and prepared to get on with the subject at hand.

Mr. HARKNESS: May I ask, Mr. Chairman, how many meetings you are planning on tomorrow, or was there any determination of this by the Steering Committee?

The CHAIRMAN: We will start at 10 o'clock in the morning with the examination of the witness and we have reserved space for operating throughout the day with a meeting in the afternoon and a meeting in the evening, but I am always in the hands of the Committee should you wish to change those meetings.

Mr. HARKNESS: I would just like to reiterate what I have said here on several previous occasions. I think two meetings a day of this Committee are all that members really can handle conveniently.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Harkness, this is tough and I concur with you. I just wondered whether we could sail along with what we have to do for a day or so, in the hope that we can work our way out of the present log jam and into a little easier schedule.

The Steering Committee will be meeting tomorrow at noon and perhaps we can thrash that matter out together.

Mr. HARKNESS: I would suggest that we start on that easier schedule tomorrow.

Mr. CHURCHILL: The former chairman said that three weeks ago.

The CHAIRMAN: Did he? Well, look what happened to him, Mr. Churchill. The meeting is adjourned.

TUESDAY, February 28, 1967.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, Admiral Landymore is appearing voluntarily before the Committee this morning in regard to the matters which we were discussing yesterday. The Admiral is here of his own wish.

At the outset I want to make very clear what our position is. We are a parliamentary committee. We are not a court; we are not a military inquiry and we are not attempting to act in such a role. We are attempting to resolve a dispute which arose between a minister of the Crown and a public servant, both of whom felt that they were doing their duty in respect of a matter of public policy in which they certainly could not see eye to eye. I simply want to warn members of the Committee on both sides of this table that we are not here to attempt to destroy the reputation of officers and men of the armed forces or people who have given their lives to the public service of this country, and this room is not to be turned into a kangaroo court for that purpose. I hope that we will quickly resolve what has become an unfortunate incident in this Committee and that we will very quickly get on with the business of addressing ourselves objectively to the bill.

I would ask you to bear that statement in mind. Admiral Landymore, will you come forward.

Mr. WINCH: Mr. Chairman, may I say that I completely agree with the thought that you have just expressed. However, in order that this matter can be resolved, could I make the suggestion that the Minister, who is involved in this, move from the sidelines to the table so that if there are questions they can be directed to both.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Winch, I think perhaps the best way to proceed, and the way the Chair would prefer to proceed, would be to not attempt at this time to see whether we can bring about a species of debate but, rather, to hear the statement of Admiral Landymore and to proceed to deal with this as quietly as we can. I think if we need at some later time to call the Minister, he is here and will be available to us. Mr. Churchill, I think you had a question.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Mr. Chairman, yo ustated, quite accurately, that the Admiral is here of his own wish. The CBC news report this morning, just after eight o'clock, said that the Admiral was being summoned to appear before the Committee. I think it should be made quite clear that the Admiral has not been summoned to appear before this Committee.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Churchill, I would be very happy to make it clear to the CBC—which I frequently find is not wholly accurate—that the Admiral was not summoned and is here of his own volition to appear before this Committee.

Mr. MACALUSO: Mr. Chairman, before we proceed into our regular business I want to raise a question of privilege. Yesterday, when we were dealing with the election of a chairman, I questioned the practice of using a secret ballot. It had been my understanding that we come here to be counted and not to hide behind the secrecy of any ballot. This practice is against all parliamentary rules, and

democracy, as I understand it. I only bring this to the attention of the Chair, the Committee and the Clerk so that perhaps the practice can be of assistance in the future. Mr. Chairman, I would like to read a memorandum dated April 4, 1964, from the Clerk's office to the Chief of Committees and Private Legislation Branch, Mr. Antonio Plouffe. If I may read it, it states:

> I thank you for your memorandum of 28th April re election of the Chairman at the organization meeting of the Standing Committee on Miscellaneous Private Bills.
>
> I deplore the procedure which was followed on that occasion when ballots were used in the election of the chairman. This, as stated in your letter is contrary to our practice and should be discouraged. I am pleased, however, to hear that our Committee Clerks are doing all they can to advise as to the proper procedure.
>
> Léon-J. Raymond.

Mr. Chairman, members of this Committee, and the Clerk, I bring this to your attention because I do understand the practice.

The CHAIRMAN: This matter was dealt with yesterday when the Vice Chairman was in the Chair. The procedure was carried out; there was no further point of privilege taken up at that time and, as you know, Mr. Macaluso, you cannot pursue a point of privilege.

Mr. MACALUSO: Mr. Chairman, I do not intend to pursue it here. I bring it to the attention of the Committee solely because the practice is not such.

The CHAIRMAN: We recognize it as a curiously interesting observation.

An hon. MEMBER: Mr. Chairman, it is not curious, it happens to be a fact.

The CHAIRMAN: All right. It is on the record and we accept that. However, beyond the point of being a point of privilege. I will now call on Admiral Landymore.

Rear Admiral W. M. LANDYMORE, O.B.E., C.D.: Mr. Chairman, gentlemen—

Mr. LAMBERT: Mr. Chairman, with respect to the remark made by Mr. Macaluso, I remember quite clearly—because I was involved—that in 1963, at the time that Mr. Sauve was elected Chairman, I was elected Vice Chairman, and there was a ballot. There were a number of others nominated. While the observations of the Clerk of the House are interesting, there are others who shared different opinions. This procedure has been carried out in a number of committees and it is for that reason that I proceeded on the basis that I did.

Mr. LANDYMORE: Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, it is correct that I have come here at my own request.

The Minister of National Defence has made a terrible charge of disloyalty. As I understand it, he claims that I have been disloyal over a period of sixteen months—or eighteen months. I have not been present at those hearings and perhaps some of the things I have read in the newspaper have not appeared to me to be all that easy to follow through accurately. I have come here to testify under oath, if necessary, that not at any time in my service have I been disloyal, and I hope that steps will be taken by this Committee to see that this is erased, if it is possible to erase such a thing, from my record.

I produce for your Committee, and for every Member of Parliament, a brief which contains all the information of the circumstances attending all the incidents up until the time I was compulsorily retired last year. I am prepared also to read that brief under oath and put it in the record, for every word of it, as far as I know, is accurate and truthful.

In my opinion, the Minister of National Defence has done something to me that is the most terrible thing that can be done to any serving officer. I hope that this Committee will see its way clear to making absolutely certain, and within its powers, that any inference of disloyalty has been erased.

Mr. ANDRAS: Mr. Chairman, Admiral Landymore, I think that most members of the Committee feel that we are dealing with an unhappy situation. My questions will be designed to establish certain facts and give you the opportunity to confirm them or deny them.

My first question, sir, is this. At what time did you become aware that the plan of the government was to proceed with re-organization of the Canadian armed forces through integration to unification, with the end objective being a single unified defence force?

Mr. LANDYMORE: When it appeared in the White Paper, I believe was the first time that I became aware of the intention to move in this direction, although I assumed that there was some general talk of this prior to the White Paper actually being tabled in the House of Commons.

Mr. ANDRAS: The White Paper was dated March of 1964?

Mr. LANDYMORE: Yes, sir.

Mr. ANDRAS: When did you make up your mind that this plan was not the right approach to the reorganization of the forces?

Mr. LANDYMORE: I did not make up my mind that this plan was not the right thing for the armed forces. I was unable to determine by the word "unification" what it meant, or to what extent the reorganization in connection with that was to be carried.

I did determine, however, that if it was carried to the ultimate end, where the navy would lose its identity in all matters, that this would create such a serious morale problem that it would be damaging to the ability of the maritime forces to discharge their duty of giving defence for this country.

Mr. ANDRAS: Having come to the thought that it would be damaging under those circumstances, did you then decide to resist the implementation of the plan, if that were the plan, or to oppose the plan. Did you then decide to do that, sir?

Mr. LANDYMORE: I do not think "resist" is the right word.

Mr. ANDRAS: To oppose it.

Mr. LANDYMORE: I had no way of opposing anything or resisting anything.

Mr. ANDRAS: Did you disagree with it.

Mr. LANDYMORE: It was not clear what was actually taking place.

Mr. NUGENT: Was there a plan established?

Mr. ANDRAS: I am talking about the statement of the end objective of a single unified defence force, as Admiral Landymore of a single unified defence

force, as Admiral Landymore has himself said was contained in the White Paper and of which he was aware as an objective.

Mr. NUGENT: On a point of order Mr. Chairman, I think it is only fair to the witness that the question be put fairly. If Mr. Andras is going to talk about a plan he should identify the plan instead of asking him in this way, because certainly there is no suggestion of a plan at all.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Nugent, you had ample time yesterday to place your questions, and you made full use of that. Yesterday was Nugent's day, and you will have ample opportunity to express your views today.

Mr. NUGENT: Mr. Chairman, I am expressing a view that must be reiterated every time that question is asked. That question should be clearly.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Nugent, yesterday I went to extreme length to protect you and other members in placing a sequential argument and trend of thought before the Committee and I would like to do likewise in respect of members here. Your opportunity will arise to question the witness. Let us have good behaviour in the Committee; let us move in an orderly fashion.

Mr. NUGENT: I will behave. So long as the question is fair, you will hear nothing from me, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN: Let us move ahead.

Mr. ANDRAS: Mr. Chairman, to verify that point I am using my own terminology, if that is satisfactory—I say that this was indeed a plan, and I quote in part from page 19 of the White Paper, which says:

> Following the most careful and thoughtful consideration, the government has decided that there is only one adequate solution. It is the integration of the Armed Forces of Canada under a single Chief of Defence and a single Defence Staff. This will be the first step toward a single unified defence force for Canada.

That was followed, sir, by a letter to all members of the armed forces and employees of the Department of National Defence dated 2nd of April 1964, which I can read in detail, if you wish. If you will accept certain extracts from it, with no desire to take it out of context, I will read certain paragraphs.

This is paragraph 2 on page 1.

> The White Paper enunciated the policy that the armed forces of Canada should be integrated under a single Chief of Defence Staff and a single Defence Staff. It further stated that this would be the first step towards a single unified defence force for Canada. It said this would be a step-by-step process. This process will take place in the manner outlined below.

Paragraph 3 starts off:

> The first step is to establish a single defence staff at National Defence Headquarters.

Paragraph 4 goes on:

> The replacement of the three service staffs by a single defence staff...

Paragraph 5 says:

> The second step will be the re-organization of the field command structure.

It goes on to say:

> It is estimated that the integration of the field commands will take approximately one year.

Paragraph 6 says:

> The third and final step will be the unification of the three services.

It goes on to say:

> It is reasonable to expect that it will be three or four years before it will be possible to take this action.

Paragraph 7 says:

> The process outlined above is not immutable. As the lessons of re-organization are learned, changes in the plan or the timing may result.
>
> However, then end objective of a single Service is firm.

There are two more paragraphs which I do not think are pertinent but which I would read, if you wish. This is signed by Lucien Cardin, Associate Minister of National Defence, and Paul T. Hellyer, Minister of National Defence, and was circulated to all members of the armed forces. So I suggest that this plus other documents would indicate that the government had announced a plan.

Now, sir, going back to this, did you then decide to resist or oppose or disagree with the plan that you saw then?

Mr. LANDYMORE: I just answered that question sir. I say that there was no way of knowing what was meant by unification then and so there was no way of either resisting or opposing something that one could not define or knew to what degree it was going to be carried out.

Mr. ANDRAS: You have also indicated, sir, that you had some misgivings about it, if it were going to, in your words I believe, do away with the identity of the navy as a separate force.

Mr. LANDYMORE: That is correct.

Mr. ANDRAS: So in that process you had come to some conclusions and you were not favourably disposed toward this program as it was outlined, if that is what it means.

Mr. LANDYMORE: If it was carried to the nth degree, then I was not favourably disposed toward it unless it could be shown that such a move was to make the armed forces, and in particular the navy, more efficient under unification and more economically operated.

Mr. ANDRAS: In view of your concern about the wisdom of embarking on this plan, under those circumstances, what action did you then take other than informing officers senior to you of your disagreement?

Mr. LANDYMORE: At what particular point of time are you referring? At the time of the White Paper?

Mr. ANDRAS: Any time forward from the time that you had read the White Paper and, I presume, read this letter from the Minister.

Mr. LANDYMORE: Well I can think of no specific action that I took until I was called to a Commanders Conference, which has been fully described in relation to your question, in the brief which I presented.

Mr. ANDRAS: On page 7 of the brief which you presented, sir—and I am referring to the brief that you circulated to members of parliament.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Andras, would you wait a moment please. The Admiral has some notes in his brief case and I will give him a moment to get his papers in front of him.

Mr. LANDYMORE: Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to have the brief in front of me so that this could be read into the record, if that was desired.

The CHAIRMAN: Go ahead, Mr. Andras.

Mr. ANDRAS: Very well, sir. On page 7 of your brief—and I presume we are both referring to the same brief, Admiral Landymore; I am talking about the brief that was prepared for the Standing Committee on National Defence. I do not think there is a date on your first page.

Mr. LANDYMORE: Yes, that is correct.

Mr. CHURCHILL: It just says 1966. Could we put a month on that?

Mr. LANDYMORE: Well it was received by members of the Committee about the end of the first week of December.

Mr. ANDRAS: Just to identify it, the first page starts off: Address For The Parliamentary Committee On Defence 1966—By Rear Admiral W. M. Landymore, OBE, CD, RCN, and the heading is "Unification". The first sentence is:

> My last appearance before you took place on 23rd June.

Are we talking about the same brief?

Mr. LANDYMORE: Yes, we are.

Mr. ANDRAS: Fine, thank you. This is related to my question as to what action you took subsequent to knowing of the intentions stated in the White Paper and his letter from the Ministers. On page 7, about three quarters of the way down, you say:

> The announcement by the Minister in June 1965 that the service would have a single walking out dress and a common rank structure by July 1967 struck the officers in my Command like a bombshell.

It goes on to say:

> I was personally so concerned about its effects that I ordered an informal poll to be carried out . . .

In that sense, that was one action that you took as a result of your personal concern.

Mr. LANDYMORE: Well, I think one would have to go back earlier than that, to where I first was told by the Minister, as all commanders were told, to go along with integration or unification or resign, and on that occasion I asked him

how unification would be carried out and over what time phase, and I said that I could not go back to my command and support the policy of unification without having this information. This appears earlier in the brief and I think that should be read.

Mr. ANDRAS: Then you are referring to your comments on page 5 of your brief in relation to your attendance at the Commanders Conference in Ottawa which, I presume, was on or about November 1964.

Mr. LANDYMORE: That is correct.

Mr. ANDRAS: You set forth your feelings there, and you say:

> At this time I told the Minister that unification would destroy the spirit of the navy,

and you go on to say:

> unless he would provide the details of the unification programme

and so on,

> I could not support the policy.

Mr. LANDYMORE: That is correct.

Mr. ANDRAS: So at this stage you had decided that you were in disagreement with the policy.

Mr. LANDYMORE: No, I had not decided that I was in disagreement with the policy. I could not agree or disagree with what was not defined. I asked him to do this. What was I going to go back to my command and say to my officers and men in relation to unification if I did not know what it involved or the time span over which it was to be carried out.

Mr. ANDRAS: Well sir, you knew from the letter of the 2nd of April 1964, that it would be a single unified defence force, that that end objective was firm, and you knew from that same letter that it would be reasonable to expect that it would take three or four years before it would be possible to take this action. So, there was a statement of the end objective and a statement of the time span.

Mr. LANDYMORE: You have made an assumption, sir. If you will take the brief, which is called "The Navy's Place in Unification", which was February 1966, you will find at the end of that brief that I gave a possible definition of unification, which has no necessity to change the armed forces to the extent which you are implying was in that White Paper statement.

Mr. ANDRAS: I am simply saying, sir, that this paper, whether you agreed with it or not, set forth the plan that the government had decided to implement, and that further—

Mr. LANDYMORE: It was no plan, sir. I am sure that must be clear from the question I asked the Minister.

Mr. ANDRAS: Well, this will have to be a matter of, perhaps, a difference of opinion between us, Admiral Landymore, I am suggesting that this letter of the Minister, which went to all members of the armed forces, does outline a plan.

Mr. LANDYMORE: It says the ultimate objective will be a unified force, but what does that mean?

Mr. ANDRAS: All right then. In 1965, on page 6 of your brief, you say:

> The Minister himself gave us a clue at a meeting held in Ottawa in June 1965.
>
> —the Minister in his opening remarks announced there would be a single walking out dress and a single rank structure by July 1967.

which would most certainly be further elaboration of the single unified defence force theme than appeared in this earlier letter. So at least, by 1965, you had heard the minister express a further elaboration, to the effect that there would be a single walking out dress and a single rank structure by July 1967. So at this stage and time you had those details, that it was a single force, that it would be a single uniform, and that there would be a single rank designation.

Mr. LANDYMORE: That is correct.

Mr. ANDRAS: And in connection with these, you have since indicated—and I presume at that time—that you felt that was not a wise course for Canada to follow.

Mr. LANDYMORE: I do not think that one can make a statement like that so emphatically or so definitely. This was one very small aspect, and if I decided anything at that time, I decided that without knowing more about this thing that such a statement could only cause a breakdown of morale, that nobody had been prepared to understand that this was what the unified force was going to be like. This just came out of a clear blue sky—a single walking out dress, a single rank structure, with no explanation as to what it meant to the armed forces, or what unification meant to the armed forces.

Mr. ANDRAS: Well sir, did you agree or disagree that a single walking out uniform or a single rank structure, as announced at that time, would be a good idea.

Mr. LANDYMORE: Well, of course not. I said in my brief to you that such a single rank structure, if we did not retain the naval rank structure, would be an embarrassment to naval officers and naval men.

Mr. ANDRAS: Was that the first you heard of it or was there another occasion? At that time you disagreed with a single walking out uniform and a single rank structure.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Andras, I would like you to give a little more time for the Admiral to reply. I do not think he had an opportunity to reply fully to your previous question. Let us pace this just a little slower.

Mr. LANDYMORE: I said that automatically when I heard that statement, I realized that a single rank structure, if it was to be a departure from the normal rank structure used by seafare, that it would be an embarrassment to naval officers, and that when this was heard by the officers and men of my command that this would upset them. I also thought, in my own mind, that it would be very difficult to find a uniform which would suit the image of soldiers, sailors and airmen. So that the talk of a single walking out dress was also going to cause concern to my officers and men. I was supposed to be going back to Halifax to face my officers and men, and have them ask me questions about the rank structure and the uniform, and this is what I knew, and all I knew. I attempted to find out more about it by going to the Chief of Personnel, whose job it is to

look after uniform and rank structure, and Admiral Dyer told me on that same morning the statement was made that he knew nothing whatsoever prior to hearing the minister speak, of our having a single rank structure and a single walking out uniform. He did not know what it looked like, or what the rank structure was to be, and that there had been no consideration of this point within the defence staff or within the headquarters, to his knowledge.

Mr. ANDRAS: Admiral Landymore, having indicated at least a distaste, if not a disagreement with the single rank structure, the single rank designation and, perhaps, the single unified defence force as it was defined by the minister, did you then speak to any officers or other servicemen of rank junior to yours, expressing in any way your distaste for this plan or your disagreement with this plan?

Mr. LANDYMORE: I have put in the brief what I said. You know, I read this into the record. That same question was asked the other day when I was here in Committee, and I actually read that portion of my brief into the record.

Mr. ANDRAS: Am I right in my interpretation that you did indicate some distaste for the plan to your officers?

Mr. LANDYMORE: I indicated that I was deeply concerned that the officers of my command were becoming or allowing themselves to become upset over unification which, at that stage, was largely conjecture. My concern was that under my responsibilities as the Maritime Commander, I had to have an officers corps with the very best morale and esprit de corps, and it was perfectly obvious to me that all the conjecture—the news releases that had sneaked out, which I referred to in this brief—was causing a breakdown of the confidence of my officers in the direction or management, if you like, of the armed forces, and that this had to be put right because it was a serious matter. So I called my officers toghether, as I told you in this brief, and I told them not to allow themselves to become disturbed and upset by something which was just gossip and conjecture.

Mr. ANDRAS: May I quote from your brief, again on page 9. This is the reference you are making in respect of what you told your officers.

Mr. LANDYMORE: I have already read this into the record, Mr. Andras, for your Committee.

Mr. ANDRAS: I am sorry, sir, but I would prefer to go on with the reestablishment of it for clarification purposes.

In the second paragraph on page 9, you say:

The National Defence—

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Andras, let Admiral Landymore continue.

Mr. LANDYMORE: I am disturbed that the very thing that you said this morning was not to happen, that this was not to become a court, is happening.

Mr. ANDRAS: I regret, sir, that you feel that way about it. I am simply trying to establish a sequence of events here which will clarify this unhappy situation for members of the Committee.

Mr. LANDYMORE: But, I have just said, Mr. Andras, that I have already put into the record the sequence of events.

Mr. ANDRAS: I am not imputing motives nor commenting on motives, I am simply attempting to get in my own mind, or in the minds of other members of the Committee, a clear picture of what did happen. Althought we have read the brief, it was not covered in detail. So, with your indulgence, may I continue.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Andras, you have been going on now for twenty minutes, and yesterday we were allowing approximately fifteen minutes at a time.

Mr. ANDRAS: On a point of order, Mr. Chairman, some of that time was taken, and quite properly so, for other matters, such as enabling Admiral Landymore to bring documents to the table and so forth—and I think it is quite proper that he should have those documents.

The CHAIRMAN: I am sorry, Mr. Andras. I can put you down for the second round. I think you have gone a long way towards establishing your point.

Mr. ANDRAS: Would you put me down for the second round.

The CHAIRMAN: I will. The next name is Mr. Macaluso.

Mr. MACALUSO: Admiral, I am going to continue with page 9 of the brief. Mr. Andras asked you if you spoke to any officers or other servicemen of rank junior to yours, expressing in any way your disagreement with the plan, as you knew it at that time. I understand from your answer to Mr. Andras that you knew at that time the end objective to be one single service, one rank structure, and one walking out uniform. I believe you answered yes to that question.

Mr. LANDYMORE: That is correct.

Mr. MACALUSO: On page 9 of your brief, which was circulated, you refer to a meeting which occurred in July last year and then, at your first appearance here, you said that that was 1965. At that meeting you made certain points clear. The fourth point you stated was:

> I told them I could see no merit in forcing the navy to lose its identity and referred to our dress, our traditions, our rank structure, and the designators for our ships.

Would you not say that that would be a statement in opposition to government policy at that time, as you knew it—the end objective of one single service, one rank structure, one uniform?

Mr. LANDYMORE: No sir, because it was in the White Paper that there was going to be no interference with tradition.

Mr. MACALUSO: Where does it say that in the White Paper, sir?

Mr. LANDYMORE: You will have to look it up because I have not a copy of the White Paper. It was quite clearly stated in the White Paper that there was going to be no interference with tradition.

Mr. MACALUSO: Let me refer to page 7 of your brief, sir. You state:

> The announcement by the Minister in June 1965 that the services would have a single walking out dress and a common rank structure by July 1967 struck the officers in my Command like a bombshell.

So you were aware of that particular end objective. I come back then to page 9, and your fourth point. Is that not discussing with your men in rank junior to

yourself, only one problem—and one problem only? I refer you to pages 17, 19 and 23 of that same brief, wherein you have discussed continually, consistently and repeatedly your main concern and your main point of difference. On page 19, bottom paragraph, you say:

> My main difference with the Minister is in the matter of identity, that is, tradition, dress, rank structure and service designators. In other words, I believe it is necessary to have a navy, identifiable as such, an army or mobile force identified as an army and for the foreseeable future an air force. It would be an easy matter to say now—is all this fuss just over the matter of identity.

At page 17, again you say:

> Since my difference with the Minister was only in the matter of identity and as there are, to my certain knowledge, a large number of officers with the same vested rights, who have the same difference with the minister, I would not establish a precedent which could adversely affect my officers and men.

Is it not your first duty, sir, to carry out proposed government policy?

Mr. LANDYMORE: I am sorry I did not get the last part of that question; there was too much noise here.

Mr. MACALUSO: On page 17 you say that the main difference with the minister is the matter of identity, and you went on to say that to your knowledge, "a large number of officers with the same vested rights, who have the same difference with the Minister," then you go on to say, "I would not establish a precedent which could adversely affect my officers and men." My question was: Would this not be a statement against proposed government policy as you understood it at that time, of the one single service?

Mr. LANDYMORE: No, I do not think so. I think if this was dealt with in isolation and there was no indication that this particular move was going to improve the efficiency of the forces, then there is some justification for saying that my difference with the minister was over identity. As late as July of last year, I said this very thing to the minister again. I said our problem is one of identity, that this thought of identity is destroying the fibre of the navy. Now, if I could go along with you, all you would need to do is to give me something to hang my case on, that this is going to make the services more efficient and more economical. If you will do that, then perhaps we can straighten this whole thing out and correct the morale. The minister, on that occasion, simply said that every country in the world would follow our example, and I did not think that was a very adequate explanation.

Mr. MACALUSO: Did you state that to your men at the four meetings that you had?

Mr. LANDYMORE: I did not say anything of that sort at the meetings. I said, of course, that I believed unification would have to show clear promise of increased efficiency.

Mr. MACALUSO: But without the proof that it would show clear promise of efficiency in the service, sir, was this not a disservice to the members who were still—

Mr. LANDYMORE: There was no—

Mr. MACALUSO: —serving in your ranks, men who were going to be there after you left, whether they were under normal compulsory retirement age or not? Without proof of this, is it not a disservice that you would make such a statement to your men?

Mr. LANDYMORE: I tried to make it quite clear earlier, Mr. Macaluso, that my whole purpose was one of trying to re-establish the morale of the officers.

Mr. MACALUSO: I am not criticizing or trying to bring disparity into this thing—

Mr. LANDYMORE: The reason morale was breaking down was because of the thought of unification carried to the nth degree.

Mr. MACALUSO: I want you to understand one thing in respect of the questioning by myself and Mr. Andras. We are not trying to cloud your sincerity in what you believed in, sir. The questioning is going to matters that have arisen here from which, perhaps in our naïvete, we see a somewhat different result because of your particular action. It is not a matter of your sincerity—and I hope you will understand this—in what you believed.

Mr. LANDYMORE: This is a matter of my concern more than anything else because I told my officers and men that no matter what I believed in, I intended to represent what they believed in.

Mr. MACALUSO: But you were critical of the plan, as you understood it then, in front of your men, in the four meetings you held.

Mr. LANDYMORE: Only to the extent that we were supposed to accept this bland statement of unification without seeing a plan and without really knowing where we were going.

Mr. MACALUSO: Would it not have been wiser to tell your men to make no decision until such time as more details were brought forward to you?

Mr. LANDYMORE: Well, of course, that is exactly what I did. If you go back to the undertaking, you will find that that is what I said to my officers, that you are not to allow yourselves to become disturbed by an undefined situation.

Mr. MACALUSO: You also said that good sense would prevail. Would that not infer to your men that the plan did not make good sense at all, even—

Mr. LANDYMORE: It would not make any inference of the sort, no.

Mr. MACALUSO: In your second point, on page 9, you say:

> The National Defence Act called for three services which couldn't be changed to a single service without an amendment to the Act in Parliament and I was certain that good sense would prevail in this important matter.

Again, you brought in a single service. What do you mean by that?

Mr. LANDYMORE: I said the same thing in this Committee, in reading a brief to you, that I hoped that good sense would prevail in this Committee and that this act—

Mr. MACALUSO: But you are saying this to men junior to your rank, sir, which I suggest would contribute to a lessening of morale. This is the point I am trying to make.

Mr. LANDYMORE: Well, you can suggest anything you like, but that is exactly what the National Defence Act says, that there are three services. I was saying to my officers that there are three services, an army, a navy and an air force—Royal Canadian Navy. Now, that navy cannot disppear until legislation passes before parliament, so why start to anticipate—

Mr. MACALUSO: What does this statement mean, sir—

An hon. MEMBER: Let him finish.

Mr. MACALUSO: Oh, I am sorry; are you finished sir?

Mr. LANDYMORE: Sir?

Mr. MACALUSO: You were going on to say, "so why start to anticipate".

Mr. LANDYMORE: I said that I did not want them to anticipate that the service and its identity were gone until the act was passed by parliament.

Mr. MACALUSO: What do you mean by these words at the end of that sentence:

> —and I was certain that good sense would prevail in this important matter.

Mr. LANDYMORE: Why, it merely shows that I have the greatest confidence in the parliament of this country to act prudently in all matters.

Mr. MACALUSO: But that does not answer the question as to what you meant.

Mr. LANDYMORE: That is exactly what I meant.

Mr. MACALUSO: What do you mean by "to act prudently in all matters," regarding this particular matter?

Mr. LANDYMORE: In this particular matter I hoped the government of this country would act—make certain before the legislation was passed that all the details of unification would be known and made clear to the officers and the men.

Mr. MACALUSO: But that is not what this second point is, sir. You state:

> The National Defence Act called for three services which couldn't be changed to a single service without an amendment to the Act in Parliament and I was certain that good sense would prevail in this important matter.

In other words, in your opinion, the good sense would be that there would not be an act passed to unify the three services into a single service.

Mr. LANDYMORE: Not quite.

Mr. MACALUSO: This is what you said there. Is that correct?

Mr. LANDYMORE: I said that there, but the way you have interpreted what I said is not correct.

Mr. MACALUSO: Well, I am asking you to clarify it, sir.

Mr. LANDYMORE: Well, I have just amplified it for you: that here the officers were making up their minds that there was something wrong with unification and it was disturbing to them. Now, it was, in my opinion, a long way from the time when unification would come before parliament, when the members of parliament would examine this whole thing and seize a plan, and would know exactly what was happening. At that time then the officers would have a full opportunity to study it, to understand it, and then, if they made up their minds as to whether they liked it or did not like it, that was their business, but it was too early to do that.

Mr. MACALUSO: Would you not say, sir, that you, as a serving officer, the officer in command at that time, were criticizing a stated government policy, a policy of the minister as you understood it at that time?

Mr. LANDYMORE: No. I was saying that I was hopeful that we would get to learn something about this matter.

Mr. MACALUSO: But you were still being critical, were you not, sir?

Mr. LANDYMORE: No, I am not prepared to say I was critical of anything. I have said already two or three times this morning that I was concerned.

Mr. MACALUSO: Did you indicate to any officers of rank junior to yours that you intended to actively oppose the carrying out of the plan as you knew it at that time?

Mr. LANDYMORE: I told the officers that I would represent their point of view to my seniors.

Mr. MACALUSO: What was that?

Mr. LANDYMORE: They indicated to me, as I said in the five points that were made, with which they agreed.

Mr. MACALUSO: Did you invite any officers or other servicemen of rank junior to yours to join you actively or passively in opposing the plan as you described it to them at that time?

Mr. LANDYMORE: No. I invited the officers to not resign or make attempts to retire or get out of the armed forces until the legislation was passed.

Mr. MACALUSO: I understand that when you were last here you had a record of these meetings. Did you have tape recordings of all these meetings that you had?

Mr. LANDYMORE: No. Those meetings were not taped.

Mr. MACALUSO: Were shorthand notes taken?

Mr. LANDYMORE: No shorthand notes were taken.

Mr. MACALUSO: Well, what kind of record was kept, sir? You mentioned a record to this Committee, in your first appearance?

Mr. LANDYMORE: Well, as far as the numbers of people attending were concerned and their names, a record was kept by my secretary.

Mr. MACALUSO: I see. At page 9 of your brief you state that you asked them to signify disagreement, I believe. Is that true? Excuse me, signify agreement with the points that you had made?

Mr. LANDYMORE: Which points are you referring to, Mr. Macaluso?

Mr. MACALUSO: Were they to signify agreement with all your points at one vote, or were they to vote on them individually?

Mr. LANDYMORE: All at once.

Mr. MACALUSO: All at once. Did you ever—

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Macaluso, you are drawing very close to the end.

Mr. MACALUSO: My last question, sir. I have two articles before me which I should like to bring to your attention, sir. One is dated August 1, 1966, a paper which is not too laudatory of the government at times, the *Victoria Times*. Under the heading "Insufficiently Silent Service" it discussed, at that time, Rear Admiral Stirling's last address to his command, while he was still in command of the maritime command, Pacific region. It says:

> It is to be regretted that Rear Admiral Stirling closed out a distinguished career in Canada's navy with an unfortunate indiscretion. While still in command of the Pacific establishment he told his assembled officers and men last Friday that he was at odds with the policy of the government of his country, that he was leaving because he believed the policy to be wrong, and that "it is you, and you alone, who can decide what is best for the services and for yourselves."
>
> That is strange advice for a ranking officer to be giving his men. Many a man on the parade ground must have wondered if he were being invited to insist on his own ideas of how the service is to be run, or to ignore policies and orders with which he disagreed, or to tell the government or his officers that his own preference must prevail.
>
> One can sympathize with a career officer who finds his secure world crumbling about him as the impact of the nuclear age makes itself felt in every department of our lives, national defence included.
>
> At an admiral's level, it is his duty, if he disagrees with government policy, to advise the minister privately or in committee of his beliefs and reasoning. Then, if his advice is not taken, he may honorably resign.
>
> But until he is out of the service he should not take public issue with the civil government and, in particular, he should not address the men of his command on the subject of his dispute with authority. He may be leaving—but they are staying, and must be subject to the regulations and commitments of the service.
>
> Thus Rear-Admiral Stirling was in error in using the final review of his command to provide an audience for his personal dispute with the government of this country; he was in error in using a naval reviewing stand as the platform from which to criticize the policies of the minister who is in civil command of the armed forces.

would you agree or disagree with those comments, sir?

Some hon. MEMBERS: Oh.

Mr. MACALUSO: What is so funny about it? I do not think it is funny at all. Would you agree or disagree with those comments in that editorial, sir?

Mr. CHURCHILL: Do you wish to call Rear-Admiral Stirling here?

Mr. MACALUSO: I draw this article to your attention, sir, because this was a final review of command. I am not referring to Rear-Admiral Stirling; I am referring, sir, to your own particular action in addressing your men in the same vein—

Some hon. MEMBERS: Oh.

Mr. MACALUSO: —while you were still in command. I want to be fair. Would you agree or disagree with the general comments or the procedure as outlined in this editorial?

Mr. CHURCHILL: You are out of order.

Mr. MACALUSO: Do I understand you to say no, sir? Are you shaking your head, or do you refuse to answer?

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Macaluso, I think you are stretching the patience of the Chair when you make arguments of that kind.

Mr. MACALUSO: Mr. Chairman, a member has every right to refer to an editorial and ask the witness for this comment. It has been done in every Committee, time and time again, and I ask, sir, that it be done in this one. It has been done in this one. The same privilege has been allowed every member of this Committee. Now, if the Admiral does not wish to answer, I—

Mr. CHURCHILL: I raise a point of order.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Churchill, I think you have raised your point of order too late—

Mr. CHURCHILL: I have not. You have not heard me.

The CHAIRMAN: I am going to disallow that. I do not think that the Admiral has to answer that question. Mr. Macaluso's time is over, and I am going to call on Mr.—

Mr. MACALUSO: Mr. Chairman, I disagree with your ruling, sir, because you are discriminating in a particular case.

The CHAIRMAN: Order, order. Mr. Nugent.

Mr. MACALUSO: Well, I just want to have it on the record that the Admiral did not wish to answer.

The CHAIRMAN: Order, order.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Mr. Chairman, I raise a point of order on the disrespect for the Chair shown by this member. If he objected to the ruling of the Speaker in the House, he would immediately have been called to order and might have been named. I think he should withdraw his criticism of the Chair's ruling.

The CHAIRMAN: I think—

Mr. MACALUSO: I shall not withdraw my criticism of the Chair's ruling. I am opposed to the ruling, but that does not mean that I have criticized the Chair. I do not agree with the ruling—

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Macaluso—

Mr. MACALUSO: —and I know of many times, Mr. Chairman, when the hon. member who has just spoken has stood up and pretended anger about a ruling made by the Chair or announced by the Speaker?

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Churchill, I lived through 36 hearings of the Transportation Committee, with Mr. Macaluso in the Chair—

Mr. CHURCHILL: I pity you.

The CHAIRMAN: —and his words just bounce off me like hail. I would not be able to hold this job otherwise.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I was paying too much attention to his remarks. Now I am reassured that I should pay no attention to them.

Mr. NUGENT: Admiral, having listened to Mr. Macaluso just now, perhaps you understand why some of us felt that you were being a bit optimistic when you talked about common sense prevailing around here.

The CHAIRMAN: Now Mr. Nugent; I am hoping for the best from you.

Mr. MACALUSO: Mr. Chairman, would you put me down again, please.

The CHAIRMAN: Yes.

Mr. NUGENT: Admiral, I think that there is a common misconception around here in respect of the word "plan". Mr. Andras used it somewhat loosely. General Moncel, for instance, told us that there were at least four separate plans that he himself drew up for unification, the minister taking the one that he had rejected out of hand. I want to clear that one point. When Mr. Andras was talking about a plan for unification, had you ever seen or did you know anything about any plan in that sense—a plan rather than just an idea?

Mr. LANDYMORE: No, sir; there was not a plan at any time shown to me. In fact, it was categorically stated by senior officers that there was no plan. In fact, the chief of the defence staff actually said to me that they were not doing anything about unification, the problem was integration and they were going to get that straightened out. There was no discussion taking place.

Mr. NUGENT: There has been a consistent line of questioning here, and remarks by the minister—in fact, in his brief—which have attempted to tell this Committee that integration and unification was the one package deal, as though there was a plan from the start, that the only reason steps in integration were taken was that they were the first steps in a general plan to put in unification —sort of a master plan. Did you hear or know anything about that?

Mr. LANDYMORE: No, sir. There was no master plan shown to any serving officer.

Mr. NUGENT: Before this Minister of National Defence took over, were you aware of any planning or experiments within the armed services that could be taken as steps to integrate one part or unify one part of, say the supply service?

Mr. LANDYMORE: I know of no steps toward unification. There were many steps being taken toward integration. Any number of training establishments were operating in an integrated or joint form. There were, of course, some matters of support for the armed forces that were carried out exclusively by one service for the three services, but there was no integration involved. There were, for example, the dental corps, postal corps and one aspect of feeding the armed forces, and these were all handled by the army for all three services. It was not integration, but an organizational step toward more economical operation of the forces.

Mr. NUGENT: Somewhere in your brief, and I cannot find the page at the moment, you said that you were in favour of integration or had worked hard for integration, I believe.

Mr. LANDYMORE: That is correct.

Mr. NUGENT: So that the idea of integrating, in certain cases, that is, one handling it exclusively for all three, as another method of carrying it out—was not repulsive to you, sir?

Mr. LANDYMORE: In relation to integration?

Mr. NUGENT: Yes.

Mr. LANDYMORE: No, there was nothing repulsive about integration. I had already served in two commands which had fully integrated operations long before the White Paper. I had no aversion to integration.

Mr. NUGENT: You will pardon me for pressing this point, but it seems, particularly since the minister's brief to this Committee, that we must spend a great deal of effort trying to disabuse the minds of my friends, particularly opposite, that integration and unification is a package deal. Were there separate experiments as described by Air Vice Marshal Annis, in respect of integration that you are aware of?

Mr. LANDYMORE: I think I should answer your question a different way and say that all through the period, while I was still serving actively, I could think of no one who considered integration and unification as a package deal. The very fact that the chief of the defence staff said to me, "We are getting on with integration, but we are not going to do anything about unification until integration is straightened out, so forget about it. "It must have been clear to him that they were two separate things which could be dealt with and put into effect separately. That is how I looked upon it, at any rate.

Mr. NUGENT: Who was the chief at that time?

Mr. LANDYMORE: Air Chief Marshal Miller.

Mr. NUGENT: We have had the procedure outlined by Air Vice Marshal Annis and General Moncel. If there is an experiment in integration in any particular aspect, I presume—and you can correct me if I am wrong—that you would expect a plan to be drawn up of how it was intended to proceed; then the plan generally would be kicked around, perhaps revised, then you would implement the plan and revise it, where required, until you had finally worked out that integration experiment. Would that be generally how you would expect to proceed?

Mr. LANDYMORE: Well, of course.

Mr. NUGENT: Do you think that any plan of unification would require a considerable amount of drawing up and discussion in order to arrive at a feasible working solution?

Mr. LANDYMORE: Very much so, but there is something more fundamental than that. There must be a study as to the implications of such a program to decide whether it is a sensible program to introduce.

Mr. NUGENT: Thank you for correcting me, Admiral. In other words, before you spend all the time working out a plan, you make a study as to the implications first, to see whether it is worthwhile.

Mr. LANDYMORE: In parliamentary or in ordinary layman's language, you would work out the pros and cons of the ideas to see whether or not you could draw a conclusion that this was a sensible reorganization.

Mr. NUGENT: Did you have any knowledge of a study on it, or take part in one?

Mr. LANDYMORE: I have the knowledge that there was not a study.

Mr. NUGENT: That there was not a study?

Mr. LANDYMORE: Not according to anyone in authority on the military side of National Defence that I know of, and I have of course spoken to all the members of the defence staff on this very subject.

Mr. NUGENT: So that what was disturbing morale in your command was the use of the word "unification" that was undefined, that was not backed up by a plan and which had not even been studied. Is that correct?

Mr. LANDYMORE: I hope I understood you rightly, although there was another conversation here.

The CHAIRMAN: You can inquire, if you wish.

Mr. LANDYMORE: I did not want to misunderstand Mr. Nugent's question. I think, if I understand your question correctly, you asked me if, to my knowledge, there was any study made, and the answer to that is that I have no knowledge of any study having been conducted on the pros and cons of unification.

Mr. NUGENT: Unification, as the minister represents it, is a new brilliant, idea, with which we are going to lead the world. If it means doing away with the services as we know them, is it not apt to be quite a shocking idea to serving officers and men, unless they fully understand—

Mr. LANDYMORE: Well, with respect to the officers who I have had dealings with, I think generally one can say that no one—that is, the people with whom I have spoken—is very convinced that there is any merit at all in this idea.

Mr. NUGENT: I get the impression, from you brief and from talking to you, that it is simply a case of panic, almost, that has set in among your career service people, that somebody had taken leave of their senses and that there was going to be a wholesale change for the sake of change without anybody understanding it; that nothing is so fearsome as ignorance, shall we say, and that this lack of knowledge, even more than the word "unification" was the one thing that was causing the disruption of morale in your command.

Mr. LANDYMORE: I think the way to answer you, sir, is to say that there was a great deal of unwise speculation as to what was taking place, and there were no answers for anybody as to what was taking place. Therefore, people, quite naturally—your career people, wanted to know what was happening to them and what was going to take place, and they were upset, seriously upset—so seriously upset that they came in numbers to speak to me, wherever I was, to say, "I have

had the course; I cannot go along with it." These were responsible officers. Indeed, there was deep distress over this.

Mr. NUGENT: Part of your duty, I suppose, is to keep morale up in your command.

Mr. LANDYMORE: I was certainly responsible for the discipline and morale of my command, yes.

Mr. NUGENT: I am trying to find, in the questioning of my friends opposite anything, any deep dark plot in your taking the action you took to try to dispel the fears of your men, which were so upsetting morale. Looking at it now —looking back, do you think if you had it to do over again, there could have been a more effective way to lift their morale, or could you have done anything further?

Mr. LANDYMORE: I would have thought, under those circumstances, that there were any number of courses of action that could be taken. This just happened to be the course I took. Naturally, I thought about this very carefully to determine what courses of action were available. In fact, I discussed this very matter with a retired officer who had formerly been a chief of naval personnel, to try to determine what, under these same circumstances, he would do. He agreed that the course of action I had chosen was quite a proper one. Moreover, I had nothing to hide. There was no plotting; there was nothing peculiar about this. When I had done what I had done, I wrote a letter to Admiral Dyer, who was chief of personnel and was responsible in an indirect way in these same matters, and told him what I had done. I had nothing to hide. It has been made now to look rather as though there was something terribly underhanded about this. There was nothing underhanded. I admit that I took very emphatic action but, under the circumstances, emphatic action was necessary.

Mr. NUGENT: Admiral, did you report the state of morale in your command to your superiors?

Mr. LANDYMORE: Frequently.

Mr. NUGENT: Did you get any direction from your superiors, any guidance from the minister or from your superiors as to what course of action should be taken to straighten out the morale?

Mr. LANDYMORE: No, sir, because it was just as nebulous a problem for them. They knew people were becoming upset over something that no one could explain. There was no explanation.

Mr. NUGENT: You were reporting to the superiors in defence headquarters and you found that the same situation existed in the defence headquarters—they did not know what was going on either, or what was in the minister's mind?

Mr. LANDYMORE: In relation to unification, that is so. In fact, they said there is nothing going on, go back and tell your officers and men that there is nothing going on.

Mr. NUGENT: Thank you, Admiral.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, let us take five minutes. This will give you time to have coffee; it will give the Admiral a breather, and will give you all an opportunity for solemn reflection and prayer.

(*After Recess*)

The CHAIRMAN: Would you take your places, gentlemen please, and we will continue.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Well, Admiral, once again I must say that you and I seem to have the same problem understanding this word "unification". The Minister when he was in your chair the other day said that he wished he had never used the word "unification", and I asked him what he would substitute instead of the word "unification". He said a single service concept. If these words had been used instead of unification prior to what has happened, would that have clarified the picture to you in any way at all?

Mr. LANDYMORE: I think the use of the word concept might have indicated that this was not a fixed and decided plan but something that might be subject to a useful examination as a plan.

Mr. MCINTOSH: When Mr. Nugent was questioning you he asked if you had discussed this matter at all with your superiors, and in particular Air Chief Marshal Miller, and you said that you did not get a satisfactory answer from him when you asked what unification meant. Did you at any time discuss with him the single service concept?

Mr. LANDYMORE: Are you referring to the Minister?

Mr. MCINTOSH: No. The Air Chief Marshal.

Mr. LANDYMORE: No, I had no heard it discussed as a concept until now.

Mr. MCINTOSH: This is the first time that you have heard about it. Could I ask you then at the time or times which you discussed the term unification with the Air Chief Marshal, what was the answer he gave you, or with what understanding did you leave his presence, of what you were supposed to do when you had to go back and report to your office and explain to them what this was?

Mr. LANDYMORE: Let me make it clear that I did not have very many conversations on this subject with the Chief of the Defence Staff but in those conversations which I did have with him, he invariably emphasized the fact that we were not doing anything about unification, that we were dealing with integration. This was the matter at hand, to forget about unification. My main discussions on unification were with Admiral Dyer because this was a personnel matter largely. Most of my discussions occurred with him, not with the Chief of the Defence Staff.

Mr. MCINTOSH: In your discussions with Admiral Dyer did you get the impression from him that unification was something that was undefined, untried and untested?

Mr. LANDYMORE: I got the impression from him as I did from the Chief of the Defence Staff that nothing was being done about unification, that nobody was attempting to define it or nobody was attempting to envisage where it was leading or any of the implications of it. It was just something that was not being done.

Mr. MCINTOSH: And that was what you were to go back to your command and tell your officers?

Mr. LANDYMORE: Precisely.

Mr. McINTOSH: And that is what you did?

Mr. LANDYMORE: Invariably, when the question arose.

Mr. McINTOSH: You did try to determine what the term unification was, did you not? I have in front of me a paper prepared by yourself, I think,—"The navy's place in Unification". When was this written and under what circumstances and who was it given to?

Mr. LANDYMORE: Well, I had been in Ottawa in January of 1966, just over a year ago, in other words, and Admiral Dyer pointed out that there had been some informal meetings which were just starting to take place with the Minister and that it appeared that this was now going to come under study.

I felt that from what I had heard of the lack of a study that it would be appropriate for me to do at least for my own benefit, an appreciation as to how this might affect the navy on the basis of assumption that it might be carried to the nth degree.

As a result of that I wrote this particular paper, and I forwarded the paper to Admiral Dyer and I wrote a separate letter to General Moncel telling him of the existence of the paper and asking him if he would take the time and trouble to read it. If there were discussions in the Defence Staff, they would have at least, my opinion as to how this might affect the navy.

In the absence of a definition I tried to find a suitable definition which would allow the word "unification" as it had appeared in the White Paper to stand without carrying unification to the extremes which I felt would be harmful as is indicated by the appreciation itself to the armed forces and the navy in particular. That definition claimed that I felt that there was sufficient flexibility that if we decided that unification meant a single Chief of the Defence Staff, a single defence staff, a single budget and a single program to spend the budget and unified administrative procedures where they would provide economy that we had a definition of unification which was practicable and workable and which would be wholeheartedly accepted by the navy and this, of course, allowed us to get on with unification under those terms without having to destroy the identity of the naval service.

Mr. McINTOSH: Admiral, did you ever have the opportunity to discuss with either General Moncel or I will say any of your senior officers on the Defence Staff, their opinions of this appreciation that you did?

Mr. LANDYMORE: No, sir. There was no discussion of the appreciation. It was simply sent up and I heard no more about it.

Mr. McINTOSH: In making this appreciation did you discuss the point that you have put in the brief here with any of your staff at all under your command.

Mr. LANDYMORE: No, sir. I wrote the brief personally and the only person on my staff who had anything to do with it was my secretary who edited it and had it published.

Mr. McINTOSH: I think you have already said that you were very concerned, and you used this word "concerned" time and time again, as to the attitude of the members of your staff. At any time did they ever give you an appreciation of what they thought the term "unification" meant, other than verbal?

Mr. LANDYMORE: Oh, I think in social conversation there was a good deal of speculation, but I do not think that anyone on my staff attempted a full appreciation.

By this time, of course, in January they knew from our meetings that I was going to represent their point of view so I think this probably reduced the amount of effort by individuals to try and figure out what was happening. They left it to me to do the job.

Mr. MCINTOSH: It is normal procedure in any military organization for the junior officers to go to their superiors—or to resolve any of their difficulties—something that they cannot understand. I presume that you had many come to you, and, you in turn, when you could not answer, you went to your superiors to get an explanation of say this one term—what was taking place in the armed forces.

What other alternative was open to you to get answers if you were not satisfied with the answers that you received from your immediate superiors? Was there any other alternative that you could have taken?

Mr. LANDYMORE: Only to persist in reporting to them the effects on morale.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Then you went back on several occasions to try and clarify this situation?

Mr. LANDYMORE: I had numerous conversations on this very subject, yes.

Mr. MCINTOSH: You are quite definite in your understanding that unification and integration are two separate things all together.

Mr. LANDYMORE: Yes, sir.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Even in spite of the Minister's statement that they are one and the same thing.

Mr. LANDYMORE: I do not think, perhaps, I should be so definite about that. It has not been defined so I do not know—at least I do not have a definition. If I was given a definition which would be indicative—if it was defined that way it would be acceptable, in my opinion, to most people. But it has not been defined this way. As far as I can determine we are still speculating as to what the definition is.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I am still trying to find out what the meaning of unification is or what the meaning of single service concept is. I was wondering if you could help me in this. We will forget the term "unification" and we will call it the single service concept. Is this something new in the military vocabulary or has it been tried before?

Mr. LANDYMORE: I think there is some evidence that it has been tried before but I do not think that the circumstances would be similar to circumstances today. If it had not been tried in Canada before whether—which perhaps has a different requirement for armed forces than in other countries—as there obviously is—it would be an unfair comparison to say that it was tried in other places unsuccessfully or that it was tried in other places successfully. I think you have to apply a change of organization to the specific requirements of our own country. I have seen a good deal of writing on the subject and people arguing

that this had been tried in other places before and commenting on the success of it. But I do not think that is altogether relevant in relation to what is happening here.

Mr. McINTOSH: Admiral, it has been suggested to the Committee by a former witness that the single service concept is something like the American Marines.

Mr. LANDYMORE: I think that particular thing was very much in the mind of someone in the Minister's office at a specific time because an article was produced and published which indicated that something of the idea of a marine corps was what was being driven at as far as unification was concerned.

The officers and men who read that particular article, I think, thought it was a sort of semi-official stab at getting reaction within the armed forces as to what would happen if unification was defined eventually in terms of a marine corps.

I described the effects of that particular article in this brief. That is what led me to say to the chief of the defence staff—to really point out in the strongest terms—how these ill-considered press releases were also destroying morale by causing even further speculation within the armed forces.

Mr. McINTOSH: When you were seeking your definition of unification from your superiors was there a suggestion that maybe a formation like the American Marines was what the Minister had in mind? Was that connected in any way.

Mr. LANDYMORE: I cannot say really what the Minister had in mind. It was somebody in his office who wrote the article but I do not know if that was specifically the Minister or not. My superiors were unable to define unification. I do not know if any attempt had been made to define it. They made it quite clear that they were not dealing with unification.

Mr. McINTOSH: I would like to refer to three paragraphs in this brief that was an appreciation you prepared with respect to the navy's place in unification. The first paragraph is paragraph 7 on page 2. You stated:

> If we now attempt to define unification in relation to officers, it would come out something like this—"Unification is a single organization which allows officers up to and including the rank of Lieutenant-Commander in the Navy to be sea specialists with interchangeability commencing generally at the Commander's rank for management duties but not for operational duties."

Admiral, is that not integration.

Mr. LANDYMORE: Beyond the stage where I have shown the line of demarcation between professionalism then in fact it does become unification. I beg your pardon—it becomes integration. Likewise my definition that I ended up with can be termed a definition of integration as well.

Mr. McINTOSH: This is referring to officers. Now you are referring to men and you say:

> Unification, as applied to men, could be defined as follows —Unification is an organization which makes provision for men of all ranks of the Navy to be sea specialists while allowing them to take shore employment through the whole organization where their trade skills and/or general knowledge can be effectively utilized.

I presume you were talking about the service part of your organization, I presume, were you?

Mr. LANDYMORE: Yes; very much so.

Mr. MCINTOSH: In the next paragraph you say:

> Thus far, the conclusion which stands out is that the degree to which unification is feasible can be measured in terms of interchangeability of officers and men between functional commands.

Mr. LANDYMORE: Yes.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Then in your conclusion or rather recommendation you say this:

> I recommend that since we have the freedom to define unification, this definition should confine itself to unification at the top. The definition should encompass the concept of a single Chief, a single Defence Staff, a single budget, a single program, and single administrative procedures. To go beyond this will indeed split the Navy down the middle and cause an exodus of many of our best people. The consequences from these are obvious.

You wrote this while you were still in command did you not?

Mr. LANDYMORE: Yes, sir.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Is this the appreciation that you intended to give first to your officers and men other you and second to your superiors?

Mr. LANDYMORE: I had not made this appreciation for my officers. This was not released within the command at all. This went straight to headquarters where the defence staff could utilize the appreciation.

Mr. MCINTOSH: What I am trying to get at is what effort did you make to try to explain unification to your officers and men?

Mr. LANDYMORE: I tried to answer their questions in relation to unification but I had no explanation for them, sir. All I could say was that the only official information I can get on unification is that nobody is doing anything about it.

Mr. MCINTOSH: You told your officers and men that you would try and find out the definition of the term and what it meant did you not?

Mr. LANDYMORE: I think they were fairly confident that each time I made a visit to Ottawa or anywhere where I came in contact with people who might know something about it that I would determine as much information as I could and bring it back to them.

Mr. MCINTOSH: The people on the other side of the table have tried to leave the impression that you made no effort to explain to your officers what the Minister's plans were. I take it from what you have said that your answer was that you did not know what his plans were and that you did not know what the meaning of unification was. Therefore, you could not explain to them but you would try to get the answer which you could not get. Is that correct?

Mr. LANDYMORE: That is correct.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Thank you.

Mr. WINCH: Mr. Chairman, I can put it this way. I, and I think many others, are heart broken that the Committee had to face and discuss the present unfortunate situation. I know I speak for myself and I think there are others who would like to see it brought to a satisfactory conclusion. Therefore, Mr. Chairman, I have only one question. My question is this: The Minister of National Defence told this Committee the other evening that Admiral Landymore if you, speaking on your honour, would state you were not in any way disloyal as a serving officer that he would accept your affirmation and would apologize. So I am asking you Admiral will you make such affirmation now even although it may be repetition and reiteration of what we have seen in the press so that the ball is then thrown directly to the Minister of National Defence.

Then, perhaps, we can bring this unhappy incident to a close. This is the only question I have to put.

Mr. LANDYMORE: Mr. Winch, I hope that no serving officer would ever speak without being on his honour. This is part of the honourable profession to which we are attached.

I am prepared to state on my honour that I have not under any circumstances been disloyal. I am prepared to say this under oath if one's word is not satisfactory in this regard. The answer to your question is that I do say on my honour that I have not been disloyal.

Mr. WINCH: It is now up to the Minister. Perhaps he can bring this unfortunate incident to a close?

Mr. LAMBERT: Mr. Chairman, Admiral when you were appointed in November of 1964 as Flag Officer Atlantic Coast, Maritime Commander Atlantic, that command was not integrated I take it.

Mr. LANDYMORE: No, sir; just the operations part of the command.

Mr. LAMBERT: You had operational control over an air component provided by the RCAF. Is that not correct?

Mr. LANDYMORE: Yes, sir. That is correct.

Mr. LAMBERT: When was the Maritime Command officially designated as an integrated command?

Mr. LANDYMORE: The organization went into effect in mid January of 1966.

Mr. LAMBERT: Therefore, in 1965 when you held meetings involving naval officers you did not have command of the air force officers in Maritime Command.

Mr. LANDYMORE: No, sir. I had no responsibility for the officers or men of the air force. This was the air force. This was the responsibility of the AOC Maritime Air Command at that time.

Mr. LAMBERT: You merely had operational control.

Mr. LANDYMORE: I had operational control of the forces assigned to me by the chief of the defence staff.

Mr. LAMBERT: Therefore, you would have no right or jurisdiction to call metings of air force officers and personnel in Maritime Command to discuss those questions which you discussed with the officers of the navy in your command.

Mr. LANDYMORE: I had the right to call meetings in respect of operations only.

Mr. LAMBERT: The reason I ask that is reference was made by the Minister the other night—again last night—that you had neglected the air force officers in so far as taking them into your confidence or seeking their opinions. I want to establish that clearly that air force officers in 1965 were not under your command.

Mr. LANDYMORE: That is correct.

Mr. LAMBERT: On a number of occasions it has been stated by yourself that you had passed on a number of communications through normal channels to higher echelons expressing concern about the morale in your command.

I believe also that you indicated that either you did not get a reply to your letters or certainly you did not hear from the Minister in this regard. Did you hear from the Minister at all with regard to morale in your command prior to January 1966, when you took over an integrated command?

Mr. LANDYMORE: No, sir.

Mr. LAMBERT: Subsequently, in 1966, to the time of your retirement, did you have any formal discussions with the Minister with regard to the state of morale in your command?

Mr. LANDYMORE: Not until June 24.

Mr. LAMBERT: That was after you had appeared before the defence committee?

Mr. LANDYMORE: The day following, yes.

Mr. LAMBERT: Had you expected that you would get a call from higher echelon, and I include in that—right up to the Minister, with regard to the problems you had expressed?

Mr. LANDYMORE: I would have normally expected these matters to be dealt with by the Chief of the Defence Staff, and it would be he who would consult with the Minister, because I had no official access to the Minister.

The only time that I thought that the Minister would be personally interested in a point of view, was when I officially put on record a complaint about a statement made by our official spokesman in the Globe and Mail, when officer/man relationships were criticised, and I felt at that time that this had been taken out of the hands of the military, and that virtually the officers, of not just the Atlantic part of the Command, but of the whole of the navy, had been insulted, and that this should be either denied or an apology made to them. And I hoped, to be perfectly truthful, that the Minister would at that time send for me to hear me out on that particular subject, but it did not occur. I talked to the Chief of the Defence Staff, however, on that particular subject.

Mr. LAMBERT: Now, I asked the Minister whether he had any discussions with you, and you would not confirm that there were no discussions with the Minister outside of occasional social contact—during the time that you were in command.

Is this so, or did you have any other occasions—it was a matter raised last night—did you have a meeting with the Minister, the Chief of the Defence Staff

and yourself regarding what the Minister has stated, that they have come through his knowledge through official channels, about incompatibility with your deputy commander?

Mr. LANDYMORE: Yes, I had one visit to the Minister's office with the Chief of the Defence Staff, to indicate that an officer acting as my deputy was not, in my opinion, carrying out his assigned duties, and I asked that he be removed.

Mr. LAMBERT: I see. Was the state of morale in the command discussed at that time, or was it merely limited to the narrow question of this officer's capability?

Mr. LANDYMORE: I felt that he was personally upsetting the morale of the air force officers under his own command, and this was reflecting back in the operations which I had charge of.

Mr. LAMBERT: Could you tell us at about what time this meeting took place? Was it in 1965 that the air force was under your operational control, or was it after—

Mr. LANDYMORE: It was, of course, before I had any jurisdiction over air force personnel.

Mr. LAMBERT: Would this be in late 1965?

Mr. LANDYMORE: I think I could give you an approximate date if I looked it up. I do not think I have the actual date of that in my diaries,—

Mr. LAMBERT: Just a general indication, was it in the last quarter of 1965?

Mr. LANDYMORE: Oh, yes, it would be in the fall of 1965.

Mr. LAMBERT: And at that time was the state of the morale in the maritime component of your command discussed?

Mr. LANDYMORE: I thought that the state of morale in the air force part of the maritime component was not satisfactory.

Mr. LAMBERT: You had recommended the change?

Mr. LANDYMORE: I had recommended that the person whom I held responsible be removed from the command.

Mr. LAMBERT: Was he?

Mr. LANDYMORE: Yes sir.

Mr. LAMBERT: Was he promoted?

Mr. LANDYMORE: Yes sir.

Mr. LAMBERT: That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, I have several names on both sides of the room who have asked for questions.

I just want to make the point at this moment that when the Steering Committee met yesterday, some members expressed a desire to get away from here as soon after 12 o'clock as possible, because they had important engagements to keep. I would like to provide that opportunity.

The Steering Committee also has to have about 2 or 3 minutes to meet at noon time—we agreed upon this yesterday.

I want to remind you again that this is not a court of inquiry, we do not have a case before us, we are attempting more or less to resolve a difference.

Now, Admiral Landymore has made his statements this morning, and there has been one good round of questioning, and I doubt very much how much more can be done by opening up a second line of questioning. I want to just put these propositions to you before 12 'clock.

Last night, and in the press this morning, the Minister had already modified his original statement on this subject, and this morning you have had an opportunity to hear Admiral Landymore's statement, and to question him.

While I certainly can find no evidence of disloyalty in anything that has been revealed here this morning, I think it is probably fair to say that if I were looking for a man to help me support the idea of unification, the name of Admiral Landymore would probably come slow to mind.

Now, we in this room are accustomed to see men take up strong positions, and to say some very strong things about public policy, and about each other in the discussions of public policy. We do not deplore that. In fact, we admire it. So we do not have any trouble in understanding this situation as politicians in this room. I do not want to see motions raised here to resolve this matter, and have members divide on this subject.

I think that would be tragic in these circumstances, and I hope the Minister, in the light of what has been said, and in the light of his previous statements, and Admiral Landymore's statement here today, would be prepared now to state that his references to loyalty are withdrawn. And, I would hope that the Committee would now unanimously agree with me without putting this to motion, that however we may view the rights of this bill, or however we may see the arguments of these two men, there is no question of loyalty in what Admiral Landymore has done, and that he leaves here with no stigma upon his record, or upon his reputation.

I think, as a Committee, in fairness to him, that is what we should do. I hope that the subject can close and that we can move on to the objective consideration of the Bill, and that members will join me in addressing themselves to that proposition this afternoon.

Mr. MACALUSO: Were you raising a point of order, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN: No, I am not raising a point of order. I am asking for some assistance now from members present, on the statement that I have made. I see Mr. Churchill's hand is up.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I quite agree with your statement, Mr. Chairman. All that is required—this was suggested yesterday on two occasions—is for the Minister to withdraw, unequivocally, his statement that Admiral Landymore, for 18 months, was consistently disloyal. Withdraw that and the thing is over.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Macaluso?

Mr. MACALUSO: Mr. Andras will answer for me.

Mr. ANDRAS: Mr. Chairman, I subscribe, and I think the Steering Committee stated yesterday, that it was very desirable not to prolong this, but I think, as

with many other witnesses, the questions have begged other questions, and I do believe that it would be less than satisfactory to conclude this questioning at this stage. I think there are more questions to be asked. We did seek the objective of not prolonging it, but I for one would think that we would have to continue with a certain amount of questioning beyond this point. I do not see how we can close this off at this stage.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Andras, I point out to you that the witnesses came here voluntarily this morning to be questioned on this matter. I point out to you that there is not any charge here, that this is a matter of strong difference simply, between two men who do not see eye to eye on a proposition, and in which some harsh things have been said that have to be erased from the record.

He has no counsel, we as a Committee must certainly give him the assurances that he leaves here with no charges of disloyalty against him, and no stigma against his reputation, unless some question of disloyalty can be raised. In the course of this morning, certainly nothing of that kind could be raised yet, and I doubt that it is going to be forthcoming. In the circumstances. I suggest to you, and I respectfully suggest to members again, that to pursue this issue beyond this point is to turn this Committee into a court of inquiry, which it is not.

It is a Committee of the Standing Committee of the House, to examine the bill. Now, Mr. Winch, you have something to say.

Mr. WINCH: Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I could revert then at this stage, if that was the wish of the Committee—

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Winch, would you let the Minister speak?

Mr. WINCH: Yes, most certainly.

Mr. HELLYER: Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, I accept completely Admiral Landymore's statement that he was at no time disloyal. I believe that it is absolutely correct, that there was never at any time any disloyalty intended to his service or his country. This does not mean that I condone all of his actions, during the period in question, because I could not.

At the same time, I accept, without any reservation, his statement that there was no disloyalty to his Service or his country, and I believe that this is a fact. I would like to say that I withdraw without reservation any inference that there may have been to the contrary.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, with the permission of the Committee, we will rise and I will thank Admiral Landymore for coming here this morning and the Minister for his statement. The Steering Committee will meet with me in a moment or two, and we will resume our sitting this afternoon after the Orders of the Day.

The meeting is adjourned.

OFFICIAL REPORT OF MINUTES

OF

PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

This edition contains the English deliberations and/or a translation into English of the French.

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LÉON-J. RAYMOND,
The Clerk of the House.

HOUSE OF COMMONS

First Session—Twenty-seventh Parliament

1966-67

STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. GRANT DEACHMAN

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 27

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 1967

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 1, 1967

Respecting

Bill C-243, An Act to amend the National Defence Act and other Acts in consequence thereof.

WITNESS:

General J. V. Allard, Chief of the Defence Staff, Canadian Forces Headquarters.

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY
OTTAWA, 1967

25839—1

STANDING COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. Grant Deachman

Vice-Chairman: Hon. Marcel Lambert

Mr. Andras,	Mr. Foy,	Mr. Macaluso,
Mr. Brewin,	Mr. Harkness,	Mr. Matte,
Mr. Byrne,	Mr. Hopkins,	Mr. McIntosh,
Mr. Churchill,	Mr. Latulippe,	Mr. McNulty,
Mr. Crossman,	Mr. Legault,	Mr. Nugent,
Mr. Fane,	Mr. Lessard,	Mr. Rochon,
Mr. Forrestall,	Mr. Loiselle,	Mr. Smith,
		Mr. Winch—(24).

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

TUESDAY, February 28, 1967.
(52)

The Standing Committee on National Defence met at 3:35 p.m. this day, the Chairman, Mr. Deachman, presiding.

Members present: Messrs. Andras, Brewin, Byrne, Churchill, Crossman, Deachman, Fane, Foy, Harkness, Hopkins, Lambert, Latulippe, Legault, Lessard, Loiselle, Macaluso, MacRae, Matte, McNulty, Nugent, Rochon, and Mr. Winch (22).

Also present: Messrs. Goyer, Matheson, Mongrain and Smith.

In attendance: From the Department of National Defence: Honourable Paul Hellyer, Minister; Honourable Léo Cadieux, Associate Minister; Mr. E. B. Armstrong, Deputy Minister; General J. V. Allard, Chief Defence Staff and members of the Defence Staff.

The Chairman introduced General J. V. Allard, Chief Defence Staff who read a prepared statement, copies of which were distributed to the members. The members questioned General Allard concerning his military career, the various subjects mentioned in his prepared statement, and the implications of *Bill C-243* under consideration.

The division bells having rung, the Committee adjourned at 5:10 p.m., until 8:00 p.m. this day, when the questioning of the witness will resume.

EVENING SITTING
(53)

The Standing Committee on National Defence met at 8:05 p.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Deachman, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Andras, Brewin, Byrne, Churchill, Crossman, Deachman, Fane, Foy, Harkness, Hopkins, Lambert, Legault, Lessard, Loiselle, Macaluso, MacRae, Matte, McIntosh, McNulty, Nugent, Rochon and Mr. Winch (22).

Also present: Messrs. Addison, Mongrain and Mr. Smith.

In attendance: Same as the afternoon sitting.

The Committee continued to question General J. V. Allard, Chief Defence Staff, on subjects referred to in his prepared statement delivered at the afternoon sitting, and on a number of other defence matters.

With the questioning continuing, at 10:00 p.m. the Committee adjourned until Wednesday, March 1, 1967 at 3:30 p.m.

25839—1½

WEDNESDAY, March 1, 1967.
(54)

The Standing Committee on National Defence met at 3:50 p.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Deachman, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Andras, Bryne, Churchill, Crossman, Deachman, Fane, Forrestall, Foy, Harkness, Hopkins, Lambert, Legault, Lessard, Loiselle, Macaluso, Matte, McIntosh, McNulty, Nugent, Rochon, Smith and Mr. Winch (22).

Also present: Mr. Choquette.

In attendance: *From the Department of National Defence:* Honourable Paul Hellyer, Minister; Honourable Léo Cadieux, Associate Minister; Mr. E. B. Armstrong, Deputy Minister; General J. V. Allard, Chief Defence Staff and members of the Defence Staff.

The Chairman read a letter dated March 1, 1967 (*Exhibit 4*) which he had received from the Minister of National Defence. The Minister invited members and their wives to attend the Concert Party "Canada Entertains", at the Canadian Forces Base Uplands, this evening. The letter was circulated and the members indicated if they wished to attend.

The members continued their questioning of General J. V. Allard, Chief Defence Staff, on defence subjects referred to in his statement to the Committee on Tuesday, February 28, 1967.

At 4.35 p.m. the division bells rang and the Committee adjourned to permit the members to attend the House of Commons.

A quorum having re-assembled, the Committee resumed at 5:30 p.m. General Allard made a short statement concerning a newspaper report appearing this day.

The Chairman announced that a telegram dated March 1, 1967, had been received from TRIO, Toronto. The Clerk was instructed to read the telegram (*Exhibit 5*) to the Committee and it was referred to the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure.

At 5:45 p.m. with the questioning of the witness continuing, the division bells rang again and the Committee adjourned until Thursday, March 2, 1967 at 10:00 a.m.

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

TUESDAY, February 28, 1967.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, General Allard has a brief that he will deliver to us now. I think everyone has a copy of it.

General J. V. ALLARD *(Chief of the Defence Staff)*: Mr. Chairman, I would like to start with a word or two in French.

(Translation)

As I said when I was Commander of Mobile Force last year, I would like, at this point, to let you have my memo in English, but if you want to put questions in French, of course I will be pleased to answer in that language.

Mr. Chairman and gentlemen: When I took over this job in July last year, I came into a bit of a storm. Had I known that it was going to last so long I would have done as did Noah, and bought an ark!

It is with mixed feelings that I appear before you today. I say this because, although I know this will make no difference to the prerogatives and privileges of this Committee—nor should it—I personally think that some of the practices and methods of operation are paradoxical. On the one hand, there are called before you officers of the forces, like myself, who are responsible for the organization, efficiency and morale of the forces for your defence, and who can speak only within the bounds of these responsibilities under the policies set forth by the Government. On the other hand, other people are called before you, who have no responsibilities to anybody but themselves, and therefore can make statements on matters for which they bear no responsibility.

I would like to make it clear, therefore, that in making my presentation before you I do so as the man responsible for carrying out the policy of the Government through the Minister of National Defence, for ensuring that the defence forces we have today are organized, equipped, and trained and possess the morale to accept any task they have or are likely to be given. Since the passing of Bill C.90 and my appointment as Chief of Operational Readiness, then as Commander Mobile Command and latterly as Chief of the Defence Staff, I feel absolutely confident that this task can be carried out best by the reorganization of the forces as set out in Bill C.243.

In my presentation I am going to talk mainly on the following point: The strategic considerations under which you are operating; the process of keeping people informed; the equipment situation; morale and leadership; and the combat effectiveness of the Canadian Armed Forces.

With regard to keeping people informed, the equipment situation and morale, as these subjects have already been raised in the Committee, I felt that in order to give a true perspective of the situation I should go back to the time when I was appointed Chief of Operational Readiness, and later as Commander

Mobile Command, and as far as the equipment situation is concerned, to when I was Vice Chief of the General Staff.

With regard to the combat effectiveness of the Canadian Armed Forces, this will deal with the Canadian Armed Forces as they are today and as we see them developing in to the seventies.

Now it is important when discussing the structure of the Canadian Armed Forces to have an idea of the time frame in which they will be operating. Are we operating in the same circumstances as in 1914 or 1939? The answer is obvious. Is it the same as it was in 1955? We are only too aware of the evolutionary changes in the political and economic aspects of the European nations and in the rest of the world, resulting in changing conditions and trends in international affairs. Canada now wants, while remaining faithful to its existing commitments, to decide itself on the part it wishes to play in the new international society. This is not only its right; it is also its duty. It is its duty to participate to the best of its ability in peace keeping by supporting the organization which has made itself the champion of the smaller nations—the United Nations Organization.

In short, that is the transformation proposed by the White Paper. That is what we are trying to do. My duty is to organize the military forces in accordance with Government policy.

We have no lack of admiration for the organizations to which we owe our victories. There is a great deal of value in traditions, whether or not they are based on the traditions of others, and we respect them; but we must nevertheless make allowances for the effect scientific progress may have on the balance of power throughout the world. After Hiroshima we all thought that atomic power alone would protect us against all forms of attack, but we have learned since that there are other types of conflict that cannot be settled by the atomic bomb; Korea, Algeria and Vietnam are striking examples.

Perhaps you will say that these are not real wars. It all depends on your point of view and on what you mean by "war". For war is of varying intensity. It may be limited, or total, and it may be partial. Everything depends on the end you have in view. You may be trying to conquer the world, but if, by using the highest degree of intensity, you destroy everything, you will gain nothing; while if you use lesser means you may achieve your aim, but it will take time.

One of the biggest problems we still have to solve is perhaps the difficulty of getting the people—and especially certain analyists—to understand that there can be no security without balance. For when you think of war you are apt to think of the fronts continued on a world scale. And then you talk about nuclear armaments, as though the military men were always ready to recommend the use of nuclear weapons to their governments as a possible solution.

Serious thought must be given to this matter and it must be realized that an atomic or suicidal war is unthinkable. I believe that our adversaries have understood this question well. The atomic threat with which we confronted them after Hiroshima, and their counter-threat with overwhelming conventional forces, prompted us to set up NATO. This established a certain balance of power. It must be remembered, however, that this balance was at a total war level when the other side achieved nuclear weapons. Have we, on that account, obtained "total peace"? The answer in plain, for fighting has been taking place in all corners of the globe since the end of the Second World War.

Have we forgotten that Greece was at war with Communism from the sanctuary of a neighbour until 1948? This was the first of the so-called subversive wars. But it wasn't peace; and even in the midst of the atomic age men are still fighting without the assistance of nuclear weapons and using a quite different strategy—the strategy of limited or subversive warfare.

We are not looking for wars. On the contrary, we are trying to promote peace; but does peace seem possible with a purely atomic strategy?

As I mentioned just now, peace is not possible without balance. We need a force for intervention and a force for deterrence.

Since 1950 we have taken part in the forces of deterrence by becoming integrated within NATO, and in particular with the forces of our two principal Allies, the United States and Britain. So we must attain our balance within the limits of our economic means.

So far as the forces of deterrence are concerned we know what this strategy is, but it must be noted that it is now evolving more and more towards intercontinental missiles—"Polaris" submarines—weapons which are beyond our means and have become the almost exclusive prerogative of the big powers such as the United States and the Soviet Union.

Missiles are rapidly replacing bombers, and air defence is no longer the exclusive concern of aircraft. Anti-submarine defence is no longer the exclusive concern of ships, and the land forces need aerial mobility. And we are asked why the forces have to be united? It is modern reality—it is the reality of tomorrow. So our role is to establish a balance of forces for the level of wars which we think are most likely.

This leads me to examine the balance required for participation at the lower end of the scale.

First we must ask ourselves what form such conflicts take:

(1) *Terrorism*: Begun by patriots with the assistance of experts from abroad or trained abroad and finally directed by them.

(2) *Guerrilla Warfare*: Having achieved a certain measure of success, they go on to the more active phase of quasi-military operations, taking over thinly populated areas, terrorizing the inhabitants, assassinating enemies and acquiring territory from village to village.

(3) *Limited Wars:* Such as Korea.

What this means to Canada is that we must, on the one hand, continue to contribute to the deterrence of an all-out war with our contribution to NATO, while, on the other hand, preparing ourselves to meet a wide variety of conflicts short of all-out war. At the same time we must be capable of defending our national territory and participating in the defence of this continent. As all these roles require a flexible response; they are entirely compatible with one another and no one role is detrimental to the other.

The complexity of modern strategy and the size of forces we can afford to maintain makes it essential that our forces be made up of mutually-supporting, flexible and mobile forces. This type of force dictates that in the planning, management and command aspects the whole emphasis must be on unified thinking among all its elements. So much for the changing circumstances under which we are operating.

Much has been said about the process of communication in the Armed Forces, implying that it leaves a lot to be desired. I would like to go back a bit and start at the time it was decided to form the Mobile Command and I was given this responsibility. This was a challenge. Of course I am sure you will appreciate that it was a brand new organization and therefore we had to find the officer and other rank personnel from outside resources to complete the staff, as compared to the re-staffing of existing commands such as Maritime, Air Defence and Air Transport Commands. When I was charged with this task I was given a simple directive from the Chief of the Defence Staff, allowing me complete freedom of action to get this new command on the road. Among the immediate problems I faced were those concerning personnel who needed to be moved—along with their dependents—plus finding the right persons for the right jobs. Then of course there was the question of where we would locate this Headquarters and what accommodation was readily available that would take a headquarters of the size contemplated.

I was told to get on with the task and not to refer to Canadian Forces Headquarters unless I was faced with an insurmountable problem. I therefore took it upon myself to call an informal meeting with the commanders of the existing commands to discuss the various problems involved. At this meeting a basic plan was drawn up, not only to phase personnel into the new command but also in relation to phasing out the then existing Canadian Army command structure. This was done quite rapidly and, I can assure you, in an orderly fashion. There was complete communication, and this communication took the form of face-to-face consultations.

I would not for one moment like to leave you with the impression that there were no problems. There were several. The main one that comes readily to mind was the difficulty in obtaining decisions on some points from Canadian Forces Headquarters. I am not giving away any secrets when I say that a certain state of flux existed here at that time. However I did not find it necessary, and therefore did not meet with the Minister of National Defence in the course of organizing the Mobile Command. Furthermore, as a Commander of a Command, I had no direct access to the Minister, nor should I—except through the Chief of the Defence Staff; and in my case I got in touch with the CDS on several occasions and received complete satisfaction. The difficulties in communications, however, existed in lower levels, between my staff and their opposite numbers at CFHQ. This indicated to me the necessity of more frequent meetings between the commanders and the main staff at CFHQ on a formal basis. I therefore determined that if I ever rose to a position of greater authority I would certainly make it one of my first tasks to improve the means of communication from top to bottom. And by this I mean from Canadian Forces Headquarters to the various commanders, and, through them, to their men.

Following from this, last July, when I became Chief of the Defence Staff, the first thing I did was to organize the Canadian Forces Council, which brings the top commanders into consultation with the top military officials at Canadian Forces Headquarters, in order that they can appreciate and understand the problem in relation to the overall picture. That took care of that aspect.

It was also necessary to see that up-to-date information got to the troops, and as a partial solution to this problem I created—and I repeat, I created—the "Canadian Forces Bulletin" to get out to the troops in reasonable, readable form

official news on what we are doing. This publication is issued in both French and English; and I have sample copies here with me today and if you would like to see it, it is there. I can tell you that the troops love it.

To render a more personal touch to the communications problem, I embarked on a vigorous program of visiting units and talking to the troops, and, gentlemen, I can assure you that I did talk to the troops and did not spend my time solely in the commander's office. In my many years as an Army Officer I gained a detailed knowledge of the Army installations, and therefore in implementing this program of visits I concentrated on those installations of the other two services, namely, the Royal Canadian Navy and the Royal Canadian Air Force. I have visited naval establishments, both sea and air, on both coasts. I have also been to Air Force stations and to the Training and Air Transport Commond Headquarters. Furthermore, I have encouraged visits by my branch chiefs to our bases and units at home and abroad and by other officers of the defence staff so that they can get out and see things for themselves on their own particular level.

I have also met with honorary colonel associations in Toronto and Vancouver, not only to explain what our intentions were as regards future employment of reserve units, but also to seek their opinion and advice. We have our new reserve program which has been approved and will now be implemented.

I am happy to report to you that I have received many letters thanking me for such efforts and supporting the steps we have taken. This policy of timely and frequent communication will be continued.

Now, I would like to devote a few moments to equipment as this appears to be a lively subject. When I was appointed Chief of Operational Readiness in the early days of integration I was given specific instructions to ensure, in making my plans during the transitional period, that the Headquarters staff would be able to implement the existing emergency plans involving the three Services as and when they might be required for any particular situation. This was done by putting together a small but competent staff of officers representing each of the three Services and by organizing an operations room, in the true sense of the word, where all available up-to-the-minute plans and data were kept so that we could function on a businesslike basis. To complete my own education I took it upon myself to visit the Air Division, and, in preparation for this, started with the Operational Training Unit at Cold Lake. I then visited the Division in order to acquaint myself at first hand with their problems. During my stay with the Air Division I was particularly impressed with the high degree of professionalism which our men possess. While there was a certain amount of anxiety about the future, which my visit helped to dissipate, I found that not only was there nothing wrong with their morale but it was of the highest level, and this includes those pilots who spend many tedious hours in a state of readiness to participate in any quick alert. My education even included piloting the CF104 aircraft, and the fact that I am present here today proves that I knew what I was doing. I then went off to visit the Navy at Halifax and participated in a joint Naval/Army exercise in the Newfoundland area in order to acquaint myself with this specific environment so that I would become—not an expert—but at least familiar with this aspect of military life.

My own experience in dealing with equipment goes back considerably before integration. I did not intend to speak on this subject at all, but as the question was raised I thought you would like to have my views.

The priorities for equipment established for the Canadian Armed Forces in 1959 resulted in the Air Force receiving all the equipment it needed to meet its Quick Reaction role, and the Navy was modernized and its anti-submarine warfare capability was enhanced. However, during that same period the Army received very little new equipment, which was based on the following policy for the Army units in Canada:

(a) Retention and maintenance of present conventional equipment.

(b) Training scales of new types of equipment such as guided missiles and tracked vehicles, to permit the training of the units and sub-units earmarked for rotation to Europe.

It was as a consequence of one of my trips to the Brigade in Germany, while serving as Vice Chief of the General Staff, that I found that the Brigade did not have sufficient mobility to effectively carry out its emergency defence role. In order to provide an immediate, temporary solution I authorized the use of ¾-ton trucks as personnel carriers.

Although we now have 828 M.113 Armoured Personnel Carriers, these were obtained, I can assure you, in a considerably shorter period of time than was spent in our attempts to get the now-defunct BOBCAT of which you have all heard so much. If you want a good summary of this program and the reasons for its cancellation I would refer you to the report of the Special Committee on Defence of 19 November, 1964. However, to illustrate the frustrations that the military had to contend with all I need to say is that after eleven years the Army still did not have its BOBCAT. Under the new system of analysis and priorities this will not happen again.

Now, a word about helicopters. As the result of our original study of this question the Canadian Army came up with a requirement for some sixty-two light and cargo helicopters. In 1961 we received nineteen CH. 112 HILLER/NOMAD light observation helicopters. Then, after much discussion we finally got twelve of the medium cargo type. The reason for this was that the Army share of the dollar pie would give only enough funds to buy this number. It was as simple as that. It was our objective at the time to get the most modern cargo helicopter available and eventually the CH. 113A VOYAGEUR was selected. However, one must not lose sight of the fact that in trying to get helicopters, the Army was competing with the Air Division and Air Defence Command, who at that time had a large stake in the CF.104 and CF.101 programs, to say nothing about the ARROW program.

When I was appointed Commander of Mobile Command, one of the first things I did was to make a tour of the units, and at that time I discovered equipment shortages were so critical that I directed my Deputy, Major General Rowley, to make a thorough investigation of this problem. You will appreciate that this was a lengthy process. His report revealed critical shortages which hampered operational exercises and training. Some of the towed guns in one of the artillery regiments were so worn out that we had to swap them with the Militia for some of their better guns. All the time this was going on millions of

dollars had been spent on programs that were eventually scrapped, and in establishing a National Survival System.

This, then, in very broad terms, is the equipment situation I experienced personally during the time I was Vice Chief of the General Staff, up to the formation of Mobile Command. I would not like to leave you with the impression that I was not then, and am not now, fully aware that the other services also had a legitimate requirement for up-to-date equipment. Their needs were certainly valid from their point of view. One must remember, however, that since World War Two it has been the Army mainly that has been involved in one shooting war and in numerous peacekeeping missions.

A while ago I spoke about morale in the Air Division being excellent. I should also tell you that even at that time the morale in the Army was equally as good. I think we can attribute this to good leadership and a very deep sense of professional devotion to duty by all our military personnel. The morale of the Army today is as good as it ever was, and as our soldiers get new equipment and, through time, develop a greater confidence in our new organizational structure I have no doubt that morale will rise even higher. I am also certain that the morale of the Navy, if given half a chance, will eventually be no less than that of the other two services. Despite all the nonsense you have heard about sailors in jolly green jumpers, the demand from Halifax for a share of the new trial uniforms is for ten times the number available—and they haven't even seen it!

An hon. MEMBER: Perhaps that is the reason.

Mr. ALLARD: I could wear mine tonight, if you wish.

Much has been said about morale in this Committee. I won't attempt a definition of morale, but in my opinion, based on long service with troops, morale is primarily a function of command. In other words, it depends upon leadership. It also depends on conditions of service, about which we have done a good deal in the past two years. We are paying the man better, feeding him better and always studying ways and means of improving his living conditions. We are reorganizing the force to provide a better future for the professional serviceman and providing him with the equipment and tasks to challenge his mind and body, and the men know it. If he has to go into battle he will be trained, equipped—and ready to maintain the high reputation of those Canadians who went before him.

A great deal has been said and written on leadership, but in practice no two commanders lead in precisely the same way. It may be a combination of showmanship, discipline, devotion to duty and an appreciation of what one's subordinates are doing. At any rate the first step is to establish communication with the men under you command. When communication is established the most important factor becomes integrity. The good leader is honest with his superiors and honest with his men. If he questions the orders of his superiors he must communicate his doubt to his superiors only. If the doubt persists, he must resign. At no time should he communicate his worries to his subordinates. If he indicates in any way that he is in doubt about the direction he is getting he stands a good chance of wrecking the morale of his organization.

Morale, then, is a function of command. The morale of the forces must be directly related to those exercising command.

It is my intention to make it quite clear—and in fact I hope I have already done this through the commanders at the Canadian Forces Council—to our

sailors, soldiers and airmen that they will still perform their functions within their own particular environments. My ultimate aim is to give these men a structure in which they can build a happy and productive career.

I believe you have had enough detail on organization, management, command structures and the like, and therefore I feel it might be useful if I discussed the combat effectiveness of the Canadian Armed Forces and what it is likely to be under unification, in order to carry out our combat roles.

The combat roles assigned to us have not changed since 1963, and, as the Minister has stated, they are not likely to change significantly by 1970.

How do you measure our effectiveness in these roles? You can begin by adding up men and equipment and comparing the sum to the roles assigned. You can conduct detailed operational and tactical evaluations, such as we do in Air Defence Command and in the Air Division, and you can conduct exercises under realistic conditions. Then you can attempt to measure morale and the will to fight. We have done all of these.

Adding up the men and machines is fairly easy. It is well known that we now have fewer men in the forces than in 1963. It is not so well known that we are far better equipped now than we were then. We know we will continue to improve our equipment situation through to 1970. We expect—in fact we are confident—that, even while competing with a booming economy, we can attract enough recruits to maintain or increase our present personnel levels.

What do we learn from tests and exercises? Quite a bit. Those of you who have had wartime service will be interested in the realistic conditions that are worked into today's exercises.

Our soldiers and airmen met the high standards we expected when we deployed a battalion group of the Black Watch to Northern Norway last winter. In fact I would suggest to you that they were second to none. This was due largely to the high quality of the regiment involved, to its high state of morale, to its excellent leadership and to its new equipment. It was also of great interest to the other nations concerned to observe the Canadian battalion being supplied from the HMCS *Provider*.

We have just completed participation in a joint Canada-US Exercise in Alaska. Our forces consisted of a Battalion Group of the Royal 22nd—Number 1 Transport Helicopter Platoon—408 Squadron—flying T33's on reconnaissance and photographic missions—a detachment from the 1st Canadian Signals Regiment—and the necessary heavy airlift supplied by 435, 436 and 437 squadrons from Air Transport Command. Preliminary reports indicate no major problems.

By putting men and equipment under the greatest stress and strain, short of actual combat, we test both men and equipment.

For these same reasons we are now taking part in the annual large-scale maritime exercise in the Caribbean called "Maple Spring". This is the Canadian portion of a joint Canada-US Exercise involving twelve Canadian ships, 28 Canadian aircraft and some 3,000 Canadian officers and men.

This year for the first time we have included in "Maple Spring" Bombardment Liaison Officers from the 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade Group at Petawawa, and as a direct result of this exercise we will shortly deploy a reinforced company of the Canadian Guards from Picton to an island off Puerto

Rico for sub-tropical training. Air Transport Command is also involved in moving men and equipment to and from the exercise area.

The Company going to Puerto Rico might be considered a fringe benefit to the reorganization. The Army has discovered from the Navy that there are better places to train in the winter than in Alaska, the Arctic, or Northern Norway.

Air Defence Command carries out constant operations and extensive exercises under all conditions, and the Air Division does likewise. The Brigade Group in Germany also carries out exercises the year round, and the Brigade Groups in Canada follow a rigorous exercise program. From all these we not only learn but we also assess our effectiveness.

In order to outline the present combat effectiveness of the Canadian Armed Forces I will break it down into operations in the three environments. In the case of the sea and land environments I will be talking about the operational force as a whole, which includes air elements.

Maritime Forces: these include air, surface and submarine operations. After careful study and consideration my maritime experts have reported that in regard to the direct defence of Canada and the related contribution to NATO mission it is estimated that the effectiveness of Maritime Command has increased since 1963 in spite of the reduction of ships in commission. This is due to the following factors: Commissioning of the operational support ship: The commissioning of two helicopter-destroyers—and the conversion program of seven destroyer escorts to the helicopter-destroyer configuration; the introduction of variable depth sonar; commissioning of our first Canadian-owned submarine; introduction of the MK44 Torpedo; improvements in long-range detection systems in some aircraft and ships; improved helicopters; a significant improvement in the undersea detection and tracking system; antishipping rockets for the tracker aircraft; and the introduction of the cyclic system of ship/shore rotation.

The outlook for 1970 shows further improvement within the roles stated, plus an improved sea-lift capability for possible peacekeeping/peacerestoring missions. We will achieve this considerable improvement by the addition of two operational support ships, four helicopter destroyers and submarines, for a total of three submarines; improvements in detection equipment; and improvement in armament and improved techniques. Our manpower needs have not yet been fully defined; we are, as you know, short in certain areas, but present indications are that we can meet this problem. The manning situation should improve when we get off the front pages of newspapers and back to the business of defending Canada.

Land Forces: In general the state of effectiveness of our land forces has improved since 1963 and will continue to improve in the 1967-1970 period. Once again this is contingent on recruiting, and this has always been the case. In 1963 we had well trained units in the land forces but these were seriously hampered by lack of up-to-date equipment, as I have already mentioned. However, in spite of this situation, by 1966 we had closed the gap appreciably by acquiring a family of armoured personnel carriers, improved anti-tank weapons, improved battlefield surveillance devices, and a better supply of combat clothing. It seems to me that for a northern country such as Canada there should never be a shortage of winter clothing for the forces. After all, it has been cold in the winter

for a very long time. This situation is now being corrected—(the clothing—not the weather).

By 1970 we will have further improved our effectiveness by taking delivery of new self-propelled artillery weapons; light observation and cargo helicopters; armoured reconnaissance vehicles; oversnow vehicles; utility helicopters; tactical surveillance drones; improved radios; airportable artillery; and close support fighter aircraft. We are studying other items which could be added during this period. A final factor in the consideration of the land force effectiveness is improved command and control equipment now being considered.

I would now like to discuss the air forces assigned to the air defence—the strike/reconnaissance—and the transport roles. Since 1963 the effectiveness of Air Defence Command has increased through the supply of nuclear weapons for the interceptors and warheads for the BOMARCs, through the introduction of semi-automatic ground environment for Northern NORAD and improved heavy radars. We can expect this Command to continue its high state of effectiveness through 1970 with some marginal improvement due to the introduction of BUIC (Back Up Interceptor Control), and completion of the consolidation of Air Defence Command Headquarters with the Northern NORAD Sector at North Bay.

In 1963-66 period, operational effectiveness of the Air Division in Europe increased due to the improvement in aircraft equipment, logistics, availability of trained aircrew and acquisition of combat weapons. Some slight reduction in over-all capability will result when the number of squadrons is reduced from eight to six, but we should remember what I said earlier about the missile gradually taking over.

Air Transport Command increased its operational effectiveness significantly during the 1963-66 period. This was due mainly to the acquisition of twenty additional C.130E Hercules aircraft. It will further increase during the 1967-70 period with the addition of seven FALCON and fifteen BUFFALO aircraft. We are currently studying the problem of increasing our long-range airlift capability.

Before I leave the subject of air forces, I must say a few words about close-support aircraft for the land forces. This opens up a new and exciting field of military aviation not seriously practised in Canada since the end of the Second World War. The interest shown by pilots now in the Service indicates that we will have little trouble manning these squadrons and units. For a young pilot this is perhaps the most interesting and challenging type of military flying.

This has been a broad treatment of this important subject of combat effectiveness, but I wish to point out that this is not one man's opinion but the result of detailed studies and careful evaluation.

Now, I want to turn to establishments, and explain the difference between war establishments and peace establishments—the basic difference being what is required to fight a war and what we can live with in peacetime for economic or other reasons. Insofar as the troops committed to a specific quick-reaction task are concerned, our peacetime establishments are kept as close to one hundred per cent war complement as is practicable. On the other hand, the important factor in peacetime establishments is to have a functional unit that can be quickly brought up to full strength.

It is well known to all of those who have served in the post-war Army that we have never, since World War Two, had a full division; in fact some divisional units were never formed at all. Today our policy is to form all types of units required for war, even if we have to maintain some at cadre strength. In addition, our plan for a Ready Reserve is designed where necessary to bring headquarters and units to full wartime establishment for the various levels of national emergency.

In this respect, then, the formation of what we call a Mobile Base will enhance our capabilities of establishing the necessary administrative and logistic back-up for any troops that might be sent to a theatre of war. I consider this a major improvement. And this does not apply only to the land forces, because the Mobile Base is also designed to supply facilities for a forward airhead for Air Transport Command. As we did in Norway,—HMCS *Provider* and other ships can be used for this purpose. If the situation requires we fully intend to use them. As a result of unified thinking we have incorporated in the two new supply ships certain features to carry out this mission, which were not included in the original specifications of the HMCS *Provider*.

To show how it will be possible for an individual to serve in an organization which provides non-environmental and common-user functions in the Canadian Armed Forces, I thought I should say a few words about the Canadian Armed Forces Communications System. In 1964 we decided to amalgamate into one the three separate force communications systems, which provided essentially the same service. This complex problem, you will realize, required a lot of study and consultant assistance. Many attempts have been made before, but a satisfactory solution had never been realized. Now the systems have been integrated, and it is working efficiently. However, there are still two areas in which further improvements are required. The first is equipment—and I need not dwell on this any further. The second problem area is the equalization of treatment for the members of the three Services who are now members of the communications system. At the moment we are reluctant to place side by side, sailors, soldiers and airmen, because of the disparity in management and administrative policies between the Services—resulting in inequalities between men of equal skill, experience and calibre, doing the same job. Furthermore the sooner we remove the psychological effect of being in different uniforms, and the sooner the individual becomes a straightforward Canadian Forces communicator, the better it will be. This will not prevent individuals who have added qualifications in their particular environment from serving in their own environmental tactical communications system outside the common communications system, but it will certainly remove the psychological, administrative and functional barriers that now exist. For example, this will improve the lot of the Naval communicator who at this time suffers from a very poor sea-to-shore ratio of employment.

Finally, I would refer to the question regarding any suspension or delay in proceeding with the final stage of the reorganization, and that is unification. I sincerely believe a postponement or delay in starting—and I insist on this word—starting this final stage would have a most serious effect on all of us now serving and on our recruiting prospects. What the serviceman is saying to us today is, "Get on with it." And in my opinion any delay—one year, two years, five years, or even a few months—would seriously impair morale.

This proposal is not designed to cope with the past. It is for the present and the future. Although youth today is prone to disregard the past we intend to retain those things that are worthwhile and at the same time to build for the future. This, then, is not for people of my age and older, but I hope that I at least can be part of those who helped to design the organization. I am convinced that not only is it right but that it will appeal to the youth of today and tomorrow.

In summary, then gentlemen, the situation is this: The idea of a single force, in a single, distinctively-Canadian uniform, working, living, training, and —most important—thinking together as one entity is an exciting and challenging idea. After all it is designed to meet the problems of a modern world—a scientific world—which is growing away beyond the barriers of the past at a speed that cannot stand the slow pace of yesterday. For all this, you know that we do not intend to proceed in haste—I said it was a starting point—but rather in a carefully planned manner which will extend over a number of years. All that is required now is the authority to do so.

The CHAIRMAN: Now, perhaps we could just have a moment or two while General Allard has a breather from delivering his brief. Would you care to come and sit down now, sir?

Mr. ALLARD: No; I prefer standing up.

The CHAIRMAN: All right.

Mr. NUGENT: I have a preliminary point of order, Mr. Chairman. I will try to be brief. I think it is of the essence of our deliberations.

It has to do with the opening statement of the General on page 1 on the manner in which he appears before us and how he may speak. He says this:

> On the one hand, there are called before you officers of the forces, like myself, who are responsible for the organization, efficiency and morale of the forces for your defence and can speak only within the bounds of these responsibilities under the policies set forth by the Government.

Then he contrasts this with other people, and I presume by this, he is referring to people like Moncel, who are now free to speak their own minds.

My point of order is very simple, Mr. Chairman. I do not think that the witness before us comes as a representative of the Minister or of the government policy, despite his position and that he is here by consent of the Minister. Once he is before this Committee he is under the protection of parliament and is called by this Committee to give his opinions as an expert in his field, and not as an echo of government policy. Therefore, when he points out, as he says here, that

> On the other hand, other people are called before you who have no responsibilities to anybody but themselves and therefore can make statements on matters for which they bear no responsibility.

this points up what I am saying. I am sure that General Allard would like to change that. Instead of saying

> ...for which they bear no responsibility...

—out of deference to these honourable gentlemen it could read: "...for which they bear responsibility only for their own integrity, honour and reputation". There is not this clear distinction, sir, between the two. The difference between

General Allard and General Moncel is simply that General Allard now has a responsibility and is serving today and has more up-to-date knowledge; but the bounds of his ability to speak are the same as those applying to General Moncel, that he must honestly give his concise opinion as he himself sees it, and not the concise opinions contained in our present government policy, or what the Minister of National Defence, or his staff, wants.

I realize, sir, that this concept does lead to a difficulty which I am sure was considered when we decided whether or not we would call serving officers before us, in that it puts them in an invidious position. We ran into this same thing on Landymore's testimony. When I charged the Minister with tampering with evidence he said he had a right to do so. The Minister's conception was that witnesses appearing before this Committee were here as his representatives, whom he allowed to come, and that they should represent his point of view. I do not think that anybody in this Committee is going to get adequate evidence from this officer until we have solved this. I regret that the Minister has never seen fit to allow this to go to a Committee where perhaps we could have had the opinion of the House on the exact status of these people.

I have done considerable research on this and am quite convinced in my own mind that the General's statement and clear warning—and I appreciate his honesty in setting out what his position is here today—is completely wrong; that, therefore, his brief represents government policy; and that when he speaks of his opinion he is giving his opinion as a military man interpreting government policy as he is duty bound to interpret it for us. Sir, I suggest that this is not his function, and that the fairest thing we could do is to suggest to the General that he go back and re-write this—

Some hon. MEMBERS: Oh.

Mr. NUGENT: —so that he himself can honestly sustain it, without regard to whether or not the Minister would approve.

I mean no slur, and if I have made a slur I certainly want to apologize, because this is an honest difference of contention. The Minister says he has this right, and the officers, I am sure are, confused about exactly how they should be in this. This question of whether we should bring serving officers before us is a very serious one and a very difficult one for them. I certainly mean no slur or allegation against General Allard whatsoever. It is a case of how do you carry out your duty. This, as you see your duty, is the way you must do it, and this is what an honest officer does. I am suggesting that his statement to us says, "This is how I see my duty", and I am suggesting that the way he sees his duty is not the way that the eyes of members of this parliamentary Committee see it; and that he has a different function from that which the Minister sets out and that he sets out here. Perhaps I am wrong, but it is certainly something that we should look into and take into consideration, because otherwise this officer has to consider every time he opens his mouth, whether this is his own honest opinion, or is his duty dictating it. There must be a clear distinction, and you cannot do it sometimes; the lines are very fine. It puts him in a dreadful position. I repeat and I hope that the Committee will pardon me for being so long, that he says that he can speak only within the bounds of his responsibilities under the policy set forth by the government, and that is a fair warning to us, gentlemen, and I

suggest that this is not the way in which a witness should appear before this Committee.

Mr. FOY: Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I could ask a question that might help to clarify this? I would ask General Allard: To your knowledge has the Minister seen your brief?

Mr. ALLARD: No!

Mr. NUGENT: Until this is cleared up that would not be a fair question.

Mr. MACALUSO: Mr. Chairman, perhaps you might rule on this point of order?

Mr. FOY: I think there is some point in what Mr. Nugent was saying that it may not be Mr. Allard's brief but he has just assured the Committee that the Minister has never seen it.

Mr. NUGENT: May I have clarification of that again, sir?

Mr. ALLARD: No such suggestion.

Mr. NUGENT: A General should have assistance in preparing a brief—there is no quarrel with that—and I am not saying that it is not his brief. I am saying that it is the brief of a General who is carrying out his duties and presenting his views, as described, as he felt them. I am suggesting that in my opinion this is not the way he should do it; that he should give his own opinion, whether or not it agrees with government policy; but as he sees his duty he cannot do that. I am suggesting that he must be corrected in that.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Nugent, I am not going to rule on whether or not you have a point of order or a point of privilege. This is too complicated a procedure for a novice like myself in the chair.

However, I have a pretty good idea of the circumstances under which any witness comes before this Committee. First of all he comes here with the protection of the Chair, as does every witness who comes before parliament, whether he is a civil servant, or an officer of the crown; he comes here with responsibilities and we, as parliamentarians, are quite accustomed to seeing officers of the crown and civil servants come before us with responsibilities to their minister and to the positions which they hold.

I think that General Allard, as any other witness who has appeared before us, knows what the position is and is fully able to assess it. I do not think that we will be in any trouble here this afternoon by letting General Allard continue. I do not think that General Allard needs any explanation from me on what his position is, or how he should handle himself before this Committee. I think he can handle himself as well as any deputy minister, or any senior civil servant who comes before us to advise us on the policy of his department. He has the protection of this Chair, and the minister is in the room if we need him. For my purposes that is adequate, and I will now take the questions of anybody who now wants to proceed to question General Allard.

An hon. MEMBER: On a point of privilege, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN: There is no question of privilege here. The witness has the protection of the Chair. We have outlined what the position is.

I think that we should be getting on with the examination of this very important and interesting brief which is directed to the objects of this bill.

Mr. Andras, will you proceed with your questions.

Mr. NUGENT: Mr. Chairman would you rule, please, on whether the witness is correct in his statement that he can speak only as he sets it out, or can he speak freely?

The CHAIRMAN: He speaks under the protection of this chair. Mr. Andras, if you will put your questions I will decide whether or not he needs that protection.

Mr. ANDRAS: General Allard, are you, personally, sincerely convinced that a single unified force is the best organization for the future, for our country and for our forces?

Mr. ALLARD: Yes.

Mr. ANDRAS: Are you and your staff convinced that you can successfully implement the program of a single unified force?

Mr. ALLARD: Yes.

Mr. ANDRAS: Many people have suggested, General, that there should be a pause—some go so far as to say a permanent postponement—in proceeding with the final stage of this integration/unification program. Would you elaborate on what your opinion would be in the event that that was the policy adopted?

Mr. ALLARD: I suggested in my brief that it was a starting point. Now, much has been said on this subject, but since I have been in this job I have stopped anything that might be considered as unification. This is an important point. If I have stopped anything that may sound like unification it was because I respect the Canadian House of Commons and because I wanted to get approval before I went ahead. Therefore, if you halt, and if you do not give me the authority to go ahead, then I can not do very much more than we are doing now.

The question of the implementation of the bill is another matter. The implementation of the bill may be postponed, and my Minister assures me that he will postpone it, or at least he will hold up the proclamation of the bill, until we are good and ready.

I must add, in all sincerity, that we have worked on unification, but we have worked on planning for the unification, and this has definitely been going on. I have never stopped that, because after all some plans have to be made in order to get on with it once we have the authority.

Mr. ANDRAS: Mr. Chairman, it has been customary with other witnesses, who have been retired or serving officers, to get some indication of their record of service. With apologies to the General for embarrassing him by such personal questions, I wonder if we could get an indication of the pertinent details of his career today?

Mr. ALLARD: You know, the other day I was accused of being a FINK, which means a Flying Infantryman with Naval Knowledge. I think my record of service is quite easy.

I had a fairly good record in the Second World War, I think, and since then I have done quite a lot of work at Army Headquarters as Vice-Quartermaster

General and as Vice-Chief of the General Staff. I command a British division; I commanded the brigade in Korea; I reorganized the brigade after the war finished to keep peace; and I spent one year studying organization. I was the Major General Survival for one year; and I am a yachtsman and I fly.

Mr. ANDRAS: I see by your wings that you are qualified—

Mr. ALLARD: I am an army pilot.

Mr. ANDRAS: When did you join the services, General Allard?

Mr. ALLARD: I joined as a reservist in the militia and I was commissioned in 1933. In 1939—in fact, on August 26, to be exact—I reported to my unit. Later I was instructor at the Staff College; and then I was a staff officer at 1st Corps Headquarters. I was a staff officer on 5th Division. I commanded the Royal 22nd. I commanded the Brigade; and there were all sorts of—

Mr. ANDRAS: Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Churchill.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I just want to ask a few preliminary questions for clarification of the brief that has been presented to us—the type of thing we ask Paul Martin, now and again.

What do you mean, General, when you say on page 2, half-way down:

> In short, that is the transformation proposed by the "White Paper".

I was struck with that word "transformation" proposed by the White Paper.

Mr. ALLARD: Mr. Churchill, if you will refer to the brief that I gave as Commander Mobile Command last year you will find all the answers to that question.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I was just reading your evidence of last June and I did not find that.

Is there a transformation of Canada's role in the White Paper, and, if so, where is it stated? That is what surprised me.

I ask you that because I have here another valuable document—almost as valuable as the White Paper—a speech given by the Minister of External Affairs on September 15, 1964, in which he deals with defence policy, and on page 3 he says:

> In the field of defence, Canada has begun the process of reshaping its armed services to meet the tasks they are likely to be called upon to perform in the next ten to twenty years. The Canadian White Paper on Defence, which was issued in March of this year is the basic document for the Canadian defence review.

Then he goes on to draw attention to two aspects of it, and I continue:

> First, it recognizes the vital need for co-ordination between our foreign and defence policies. Second, while the White Paper involves no change in our basic commitments to NATO, to North American defence or to international peace-keeping, it reflects our intention by means of reorganization and integration in the armed forces and by improvements in air-transportability and mobility, to have in addition a small highly trained force for effective deployment at short notice in circumstances

ranging from service within the NATO area of western Europe to U.N. peace-keeping operations.

The Minister for External Affairs does not say that there is any transformation effected by the White Paper. He says that we are to maintain our present commitments.

Mr. ALLARD: Mr. Churchill, this is probably his interpretation. I made it quite clear. When I received a directive to organize the force structure of Mobile Command I appreciated fully the problems that I set out in the strategic considerations in today's paper, so if you matched the two together you would find the complete answer to your question.

Mr. CHURCHILL: On page 4, you say, in the third paragraph:

We need a force for intervention and a force for deterrence.

Is this over and above the forces which we now maintain?

Mr. ALLARD: No, Mr. Churchill; it is the same force. The only thing I differentiate is an existing fact, and if you will read the strategic considerations again you will realize the reason why, when I explain that there is an even balance, this is what we have created.

Mr. CHURCHILL: On page 11, you mention that you were appointed Commander of Mobile Command and that was effective 1 October 1965. At that time you discovered—and these are your words:

...equipment shortages were so critical...

This is interesting information because the Minister keept informing us in 1964, and throughout the spring of 1965, that he had made such vast improvements in equipping the forces that there had been a tremendous change from the horrible past. Yet in October of 1965 you found the equipment shortages so critical that you had to do something about it immediately. Obviously things were not in very good shape in October 1965.

Mr. ALLARD: Mr. Churchill, the answer is they were not. My statement is correct. Now, the minister did not know, because I charged General Rowley, and I have here a report from General Rowley of which the minister was unaware.

Mr. CHURCHILL: On page 15, you mention the use of HMCS *Provider* in the very worthwhile exercise that was carried on in northern Norway. Having been subjected to it, I see the value of sea transportation for troops. While the *Provider* was absent in Norway was there a substitute ship of the same class available for the Navy?

Mr. ALLARD: While it was absent to Norway?

Mr. CHURCHILL: Yes.

Mr. ALLARD: No; it carried out both tasks. It refuelled on the way and carried out both tasks. In fact the ship was assigned directly to that task so that it did not need to be replaced. It is a calculated risk that operations can take.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Had the navy been called upon to perform some war exercise *Provider* would not have been available for it?

Mr. ALLARD: It would have been available as quickly as it would have been made available from Halifax.

Mr. CHURCHILL: On page 16 you mention an exercise which you call "Maple Spring," by which a reinforced company of the Canadian Guards will get sub-tropical training on an island off Puerto Rico. Sub-tropical training, of course, is just as essential as is Arctic training. What is the name of the island?

Mr. ALLARD: It is called Vieques.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Who controls that island?

Mr. ALLARD: I think it is the United States.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Are we leasing the land from them for this purpose?

Mr. ALLARD: We are not leasing it. We are participating in a joint exercise. Our arrangements under SACLANT provide for all this.

Mr. CHURCHILL: On page 17 where you are talking about the maritime forces and you estimate that the effectiveness of the command has increased in spite of the reduction of ships in commission, you do not deal at any great length, although you mention it, with the serious shortage in personnel to man the ships. You express a hope that things will improve, but we have had that hope before.

I can understand the Minister's saying this because he does not understand some of these problems, but how can you as a military man say that the effectiveness of Maritime Command has increased, in spite of the reduction of ships in commission, and continue to say that when there is a shortage of personnel to command them?

Mr. ALLARD: I go on and explain, Mr. Churchill, why this is so.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Would it not have been better to have told us that at the present time the effectiveness of Maritime Command is not as high as it was some years ago when there were approximately 4,000 more naval personnel available to man the ships that were afloat.

Mr. ALLARD: On the contrary, Mr. Churchill. I say "even in spite of this." I deplore the fact that we are short of men in our Maritime Command—I do deplore it; but the fact of the improved effectiveness of the equipment we have counterbalanced the shortage of men at the moment. I hope to be able to increase it during the course of the next year.

That brings me to the point that the navy always had a high turnover because it is hard to be at sea. Let us not forget that these men are sometimes months away from home, and they have families, too. Many of them retire earlier because of a poor sea-to-shore ratio. What we are intending to do—and I explain it a little further when talking of the communications system—is to improve the navy lot by their being able to switch from one to the other.

Mr. CHURCHILL: You also deplore the front pages of the newspapers. You say:

> The manning situation should improve when we get off the front pages of newspapers and back to the business of defending Canada.

I would like to see our getting back to the business of defending Canada, but how can you stay off the front pages of newspapers when it is our obligation as

Members of Parliament to get information from the Minister of National Defence with regard to the effectiveness of our forces? If we ask questions which indicate that there is a shortage of men in the army or the navy and the newspapers pick that up there is nothing much that can be done about it. You would not want to deprive the Canadian people of full information, would you?

Mr. ALLARD: No, Mr. Churchill; on the contrary. My policy has been to tell the public of the good things that are going on. The trouble has been in the past that the morale of not only the rank and file, but of everybody, was a bit shaken by the organization; there was a certain amount of uncertainty, and the people did not know exactly where they would fit in the organization.

I started doing a tour of those installations that seemed to have a problem, and I can assure you that I have never had in my career a more rewarding day than when I went to Esquimalt.

Mr. CHURCHILL: You mention clothing, and you talk about the green uniform and so on. For soldiers engaged in battle are you prepared to recommend a different colour of clothing from the khaki?

Mr. ALLARD: No, Mr. Churchill. It is quite obvious that the environmental clothing which is necessary for concealment and camouflage must be compatible with the environment in which people serve. This has been made quite clear to many people. The walking-out uniform is a different matter. I do not call it a walking-out uniform. I call it the "service dress". The service dress has nothing to do with combat duty.

Mr. CHURCHILL: If the men were sent overseas to engage in activities such as in Korea, or if they happen to get involved in Viet Nam, would they be carrying that walking-out uniform with them?

Mr. ALLARD: Yes, if it is possible; in the same way that we carried them in World War II. We had them in England and we left them there when we went to the continent, and when we returned we put on our good uniforms to go to the palace and so on. In Korea I had men in service dress—officers in service dress.

The CHAIRMAN: May I interject with a question here? Is that the Hammersmith Palais you are talking about?

Mr. ALLARD: No.

Mr. CHURCHILL: My tour of duty did not carry me along your route, Mr. Chairman.

I am talking now about the men, not the officers. Even as an officer I do not recall having my dress uniform with me in Europe.

Mr. ALLARD: You had it in England.

Mr. CHURCHILL: It was left in England. I recovered it after the war was over.

Would this walking-out dress be carried by the troops into a theatre of action?

Mr. ALLARD: No, Mr. Churchill.

Mr. CHURCHILL: They still continue to wear khaki—

Mr. ALLARD: It is not khaki, sir; it is olive green.

Mr. CHURCHILL: But I mean in a theatre of war they would continue to khaki, because—

Mr. ALLARD: It is olive green.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Pardon?

Mr. ALLARD: The new combat clothing is olive green; it is not khaki.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I am sorry; I thought you said earlier that khaki would be continued...

Mr. ALLARD: I said that the uniforms will conform with the environment, that is, the requirements for camouflage.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Yes.

Mr. ALLARD: Now, Mr. Churchill, I would like to suggest something else. Combat dress is certainly not what I want my men to appear in when they go on leave; we want them to look smart; but not in combat dress. You are not in the battledress any more. If you will remember, during World War II as soon as officers were issued with the battledress we all went to a theatre, you know, with open necks and with all kinds of things on them. All of us did this. In fact, I still wear mine. You did not, Mr. Harkness?

Mr. HARKNESS: I never did it. I was very careful never to do it. I thought it was a poor thing to do.

Mr. ALLARD: We must admit, Mr. Harkness, that the great majority of officers did it.

Mr. HARKNESS: A considerable proportion did, yes.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Let me come back to this, because either I misinterpreted your answer or I asked the wrong question. What is the nature, and what will be the colour, of the uniform that our troops will be wearing in a theatre of war?

Mr. ALLARD: It will be the combat dress; the same as they are wearing today.

Mr. CHURCHILL: That is khaki.

Mr. ALLARD: It is not khaki; it is olive drab—olive green.

Mr. CHURCHILL: It is not the battledress, then?

Mr. ALLARD: Oh, no. The battledress has been scrapped.

Mr. CHURCHILL: That is scrapped and finished with.

Mr. ALLARD: It used to be a battledress too.

Mr. CHURCHILL: That is correct. So that olive green, from now on, is—

Mr. ALLARD: Olive green is the combat suit because it is designed specifically for the ground forces' environment in battle.

Mr. CHURCHILL: That is now the equipment of the army, of course.

Mr. ALLARD: It is the equipment of the army.

Mr. CHURCHILL: And the new suggested walking-out dress is of a different style and a different colour.

Mr. ALLARD: If you like I will wear it. I have one.

Mr. CHURCHILL: It would not be carried by the troops in a theatre of war?

Mr. ALLARD: It depends on what you mean by "theatre of war", Mr. Churchill.

The CHAIRMAN: May I ask a supplementary question here?

On a couple of occasions this afternoon General Allard has said that he would be glad to wear the new walking-out uniform. None of us has seen it and I think the Committee certainly ought to see this uniform. Perhaps General Allard could come tonight in his new uniform, if he has one, and we could get a chance to look at it. We would have solved one of the great mysteries involved in unification. Mr. McIntosh might finally understand what unification is.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I am much more interested in the effectiveness of our fighting forces, but if your interest is sartorial perhaps this might be done.

The CHAIRMAN: I am getting to that stage where the sartorial interest is paramount.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Should not the propaganda agents from the ministerial office—the spokesmen—appear in the new uniform.

The CHAIRMAN: I think we should ask the General if he is in a position to do that for us. General, what do you say on the subject?

Mr. ALLARD: I will think about it.

The CHAIRMAN: You will think about it.

Mr. HARKNESS: I think you would put on an excellent fashion show for us, General.

Mr. ALLARD: I would be quite happy to do so.

An hon. MEMBER: Put the Minister into one, too!

Mr. CHURCHILL: Just to conclude that particular phase of it, the walking-out dress is just for purposes here in Canada, or in some non-theatre of war, and has nothing to do with war service?

Mr. ALLARD: No, Mr. Churchill. In Germany everybody would be dressed in it.

Mr. CHURCHILL: The troops who are there now with the present forces.

Mr. ALLARD: Oh, yes.

Mr. CHURCHILL: But it is not intended for war purposes at all?

Mr. ALLARD: Oh, no; except in headquarters. We will wear this uniform in headquarters. You know, it is not too comfortable to wear combat clothing. I do not know if you have ever worn it, but it is not comfortable for working in an office. The new uniform provides this, and it has a lot of good features. We have done away with a lot of things that are no longer necessary.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I am not too worried about some of those factors.

I am just cleaning out the underbrush here, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Churchill, you are doing a very good job.

Mr. CHURCHILL: The main task of this Committee is to investigate the value of the bill which is before us, which concerns unification. I would like to ask you one or two questions about it.

As a serving soldier, what changes in warfare, exclusive of the use of nuclear weapons and of some of the improved heavier weapons, do you see at the present time.

Mr. ALLARD: There are a great many changes, Mr. Churchill.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Would you please elaborate then.

Mr. ALLARD: First of all, I mentioned aerial mobility. When you are talking about being mobile and having great forces with tanks and so on—and we all agree with this—today, with the advance of the new anti-tank weapons, the tank is quickly being replaced by an aircraft. The new organization of mobile command is designed specifically to give this new mobility. This mobility is required because no longer will you be on continuous fronts, except in some cases of the linear type where you had to do this temporarily. In fact, I explained this quite clearly in my brief last year so I do not need to change this very much.

The aerial mobility and the reconnaissance mobility, or what we call today the aerial cavalry, or whatever you want to call it—depending on how traditional you are—is the fact of the future. It is not a fact of the immediate present, but it is the fact of the future. We are making a modest effort towards this while conserving the forces that are necessary to be compatible with those of our allies in Germany.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Well, General Allard, I happen to be an advocate of mobility, and have been for years. I am surprised that we have not gone a little bit further on mobility but that is not precisely what I was after.

Granted the mobility, what difference in actual fighting is there now from what there was, say, in Korea or is presently in Viet Nam? What do you see in the future?

Mr. ALLARD: If I may explain that again, there are various phases. If you read General Giap's book, which is based on Mao Tse-tung's theory, you will discover exactly what we are up against. General Giap was on television last night, as a matter of fact, to explain what his theory is. This is what we are confronted with, or could be confronted with, at any time, and I said that you needed the forces, that you needed the balance. I do not think I should waste the time of this Committee by giving a course on tactics, or on new strategy, but I can assure you that I am an expert in this field.

The forces that we have today, as I explained last year, are specifically designed to have a flexible response, so that you can go from one thing to the other. After all, escalation becomes the prerogative of the aggressor, does it not? If we are to defend ourselves we have to have the flexibility of gradual response so that we do not meet disaster. This is the main purpose of the reorganization of the land forces.

I showed last year as many charts and graphs as I could and I thought that people had understood it. Of course, you were not there when I gave my presentation.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I have read it all. I do quite a bit of military reading, and I understand mobility and flexibility. But my question was: What is the major

change in actual fighting that you see now, or in the immediate future, that would require a single unified force? This is what I do not understand. The fighting that is going on in Viet Nam, from the pictures that I see of it, corresponds very much with what infantry men have been doing for hundreds of years. No matter how they are transported they end on their flat feet, and they do patrol work, and they do sentry-go at night, and they make night attacks, and things like that, and they are supported by artillery. Now, what is the major difference that you see in the future?

Mr. ALLARD: There are a number of things, Mr. Churchill, that I cannot mention. This is not because I do not know but because I cannot answer, period.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Do you think that an end has come to maritime forces operating at sea alone?

Mr. ALLARD: No, Mr. Churchill, I did not say that.

Mr. CHURCHILL: No, I know you did not. I am asking about it, though because other people have propounded this theory.

Mr. ALLARD: Nobody has ever dreamed of having a limited war carried out in the middle of some place with ships on land—nobody has ever suggested that. In war at sea, of course, we need the navy to support some of the forces in many instances, as was the fact in Korea in the early stages. Admiral Brock was there when he commanded the squadron. They supported a limited type of war. Now, it is supported differently, and I do not think all the contingencies that we are planning for can be expressed here quickly, and some of the new things that are appearing I do not wish to discuss.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Some of the statements that the—

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Churchill, we now have about 25 minutes left. You have opened up a very interesting course of questioning and I do not particularly want to interrupt you, but I have before me the names of Mr. Lambert and Mr. Harkness. I have no names from this side yet. Perhaps members would allow Mr. Churchill to continue on this line for another five minutes so that we do not break his train of thought. We can come to the others, if that is agreeable?

Mr. CHURCHILL: I regret having taken so long.

The CHAIRMAN: That is all right.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I will just finish with one question.

In his speech of December 7, which we have read over so often now that we have almost memorized it, the Minister said this at page 10831, under the heading "The Demands of Modern Warfare": says as follows:

> —the improved capacity of a unified force to meet the demands of modern warfare. The pattern of warfare in which armies fought armies, navies fought navies, and air force fought air forces is not likely to be repeated.

He then goes on elsewhere to indicate that everything is going to be changed and therefore you have to have a unified force to meet the demands of modern warfare.

I am still unconvinced that modern warfare, if Korea and Viet Nam can be called modern, has yet shown the necessity for a single unified force. I was

wondering if you could explain some of the unexplainable things in the Minister's speech.

Mr. ALLARD: First of all, Mr. Churchill, I assisted the Minister in making that particular statement. His speech was discussed fully with us, and in fact I recognize my own words there.

The point here is that when I talked about modern warfare I tried to explain, in the strategic consideration, the balance that was required, and I also said that nuclear war was unthinkable. Do not forget that. I said this. Therefore we were attempting to prepare for the wars that were still possible.

Now the tactics of the new wars I do not think I have to dwell upon, but the point is that air defence is no longer the sole prerogative of aircraft. "Aircraft are needed to support ships in their present deterrent forces, and the land forces require aerial mobility and tactical support and must be entirely integrated—entirely integrated." This is what I said. Therefore, I am afraid that I cannot give you any more. In fact, if you look at the back pages of the Minister's speech, in the explanation given we made differences between the command structure, the personnel structure and the forces structure. If you look at the back pages you will discover that there are sea, land and air environments.

Now, call it what you will; it is not up to me. Although I have a good idea what we would call it. This is to cope with this exact problem, but the thing that is important in this is the integrated planning, and, particularly, integrated thinking. We must be together. We must be in the same organization. I must feel at home when I go to an establishment, whether it belongs to the air, to the sea or to the land environment. This is what we have been trying to explain; and I have tried in here, in the strategic consideration, to explain that.

Mr. CHURCHILL: It appears to me to be integration, a unified command structure, but not necessarily a single unified service, to meet the demands of modern warfare.

Mr. ALLARD: I would like to ask you one question, Mr. Churchill: what do you mean by integration of the top structures? Do you mean the integration of officers? The main problem we have is at the lower level?

Mr. CHURCHILL: The support level, yes.

Mr. ALLARD: Not the support level; I am talking about the lower level.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, I hear the division bell ringing. We will have to adjourn the meeting now. I doubt very much that we could get back to be effective before six. I will call the meeting for 8 o'clock and we will resume with the list that I have before me. Mr. Lambert you will be up at 8 o'clock.

EVENING SITTING

The CHAIRMAN: I now call the meeting to order. You may proceed, Mr. Lambert.

Mr. LAMBERT: Mr. Chairman, my assessment of the General's presentation this afternoon has been that it is a strong plea for the more flexible response. It is a point that was made by his Vice-Chief earlier on in the hearings, but I would put it to General Allard that all the arguments he has advanced with regard to

flexible response—I do not think that there would be any to gainsay it—are for the integrated command, the integrated command structures and integrated supply services, using the word "integrated" as it has become interpreted in this Committee and I think the General, who has attended a number of our sessions, is aware of the meaning that has been applied to "integrated" and I do not think that there has been too much argument in this regard.

There have been some criticisms of some aspects of integration but perhaps they are more of the working out of integration. I think the General has adverted to some of the problems that have arisen and I think this is fair, but then all of the arguments come down to this requirement for a more flexible response of the command structure and so there must be this integration of the three components. But why unification? Is the man who is going to be assisting you, General, whether he is a soldier, a sailor, or an airman, going to be any less capable because he wears the distinctive uniform of his service?

Mr. ALLARD: Is that your question?

Mr. LAMBERT: Yes; why is he going to be any less capable?

Mr. ALLARD: I do not think the colour of the uniform matters too much except, as I explained, for the psychological approach of being one or the other. Let us take this for a start. There is something much deeper than this. I am not going to worry about the colour of the uniform, but I do not think you meant that either. What you meant by the colour of the uniform was the training of the man inside that uniform. Am I correct?

Mr. LAMBERT: I am going to come to the question of the training of the man because I do not think you can take that away from him, whether he is in a unified service or whether he is in a service or defence force composed of the three distinct services. You are going to have your specialists—your environmental specialists—and when I say the colour of his uniform and I say that he is going to be a sailor, or he is going to be a soldier, or an airman, I mean that he belongs to a distinct service, because the purpose of this bill is to bring everybody into a single service, a single uniform, and a single rank structure, and I ask you, under those circumstances where you are going to require those specialists, are they going to be less effective if they belong to their respective services?

Mr. ALLARD: If they belong to and are trained by that service alone, they will be less effective; the answer is yes. But if, on the other hand, they are trained in particular specialties, if they are trained in a broader environment—and our intention is to give those who are capable and those who are necessary two environments—then they will be more effective than if they belong to a single service. I would like to give you an example. We have a great number of sailors who have taken their release and have re-enlisted, particularly in the air force. Why?

First of all, the air force wanted them because they were trained as radar operators, we will say. Secondly, if this same man had been trained only in the navy he would have been less useful to the air force in his environment. In other words, they had to retrain him. Now, our position in this regard is that it is important that the men from the navy do not get out because they have a poor ratio of sea to shore duties. What we intend to do, in fact, is to increase the

number of people who have naval training in order to give them a better period ashore. I took the radar operator because a man from the navy who is, in fact, very well trained and can do his job effectively with the navy and who transfers to the air force—he takes the risk and then he transfers to the air force—he is retrained and then he is brought into the Air Force stream and he stays there. That man who has had sea training before can no longer get back to the sea because he would have to get out of the air force and re-enlist into the navy.

I would like to extend this. I would like to extend this to a number of engine room people, for example. There are a number of those too, and there is no particular shore establishment that can employ these men ashore. Now, we have a great number of installations ashore that do not belong to the navy where they could be employed and we are studying this question in order to give them a better life and to give a better life to his wife and to his children. This is the important side.

I do not disagree with you, Mr. Lambert, about the integration of the headquarters, with one exception—another exception. I am not going to talk about training because I presume you are going to ask me another question, but when you talk about the integration of headquarters, do you know that the air traffic control over the battle field today is such that helicopter operations over the army areas are hampered by the fact that another command runs the fighters, and you do not mix fighter aircraft—jet aircraft—with helicopters because you do not live to be very old in the helicopters. The problem of command and control of these organizations is very important.

In Canada we have created the form of fire control elements that Mr. Harkness would understand very well, being a gunner. The fire control element is exactly the same as it was in the army before and I will tell you how this came about. I did not order it; in fact, Air Commodore Carr who is here was the combat development man at Mobile Command. He come up with this conclusion by himself because of his work. So, when you talk about separate commands and separate services this man is not a liaison officer, he is a fire controller.

I would like to add something more to this, too. You may not realize it, but in the very near future much of the artillery support is going to be given from the air—much of it. It does not mean that you are going to mount a field gun in an aircraft; that is not the point at all. But there are new methods, new discoveries and new things, particularly with regard to control, that become very important. So, why should we have two separate organizations—and I have seen it—fully staffed and fully organized to do the same job with a commander who has to take advice from two people? This concentrated organization is very important. I said that I had not spoken about the training and I hope you ask me.

Mr. LAMBERT: But General, you have distinctly missed the point of my question. I have put it—

Mr. ALLARD: I have not missed the point.

Mr. LAMBERT: I was talking about integrated command and all you have done is reinforced, in your last example, the question of integrated command. What I am talking about are the men within that command.

Mr. ALLARD: I spent enough time Mr. Lambert to explain about the lower level.

Mr. LAMBERT: The lower level—I can come to some questions about that, that will make it sound a little funny, too. In so far as the command arguments that you have used are concerned I would agree with you, but I do not agree that a case has been made to put every officer in that integrated command in the same uniform and on the same rank because you still have to have your armoured adviser, your gunner and you are going to have your aerial specialist who may direct this fire that you are talking about, as an example. You are going to have all these specialists advising, say, your mobile commander—your field commander—because the purpose of this whole exercise is to develop that hard fighting point.

Mr. ALLARD: Mr. Lambert, as a commander in the field I did not need much advice. The point is very simple; if you want, I will continue and I will touch on the training, which I think may explain what I was saying.

Mr. LAMBERT: I want to keep it at the command level. This is the framework that has been done so far.

Mr. ALLARD: Well, if you agree with this I have no explanation—

Mr. LAMBERT: With the framework—but you are using arguments to justify unification that are arguments for integration and this is the distinction that I am drawing.

Mr. ALLARD: But, Mr. Lambert, if you agree with the unification of the headquarters, what is the argument about?

Mr. LAMBERT: What I am arguing about is why is Bill No. C-243 necessary for that?

Mr. ALLARD: Right. Now, if you want, I will go into the lower echelons.

Mr. LAMBERT: If you have a naval captain, or a sea specialist at the captain level, why do you have to put him in a common uniform? He is a sailor; he has been trained from his earliest days as a sailor and subsequently, when he comes up beyond the fighting formation level and, perhaps, at an earlier stage takes staff courses, you do get this cross knowledge—of course you do. One expects that, but you can get that in an integrated command; you have it now in many instances.

Mr. ALLARD: If you do not want to understand the difficulties of doing this "cross" that you are talking about, I am afraid I cannot help you.

Mr. LAMBERT: I am not the only one. I mean, if I get smart answers, I can ask some smart questions too. I have asked questions of some of your former colleagues and they are people who have worked with you. Now, this is their bona fide and intelligent impression and what concerns me is that there is a change proposed here—a very drastic change proposed here—and I want to see the value of that change, that it will make our fighting formations more effective soldiers; that our defence forces will be more efficient and operated more economically. I say "economically"; in other words, you are getting more for the moneys that are being spent, and the burden of showing the value of that change is on those who propose the change, and I am sorry I cannot buy just assertions and beliefs.

Mr. ALLARD: Well, I do not know exactly what you want—

Mr. LAMBERT: All right then, I will agree that you and I differ.

Mr. ALLARD: —Mr. Lambert, because I have said that if you agree with the integration of the headquarters I cannot answer that question. But I have tried to explain that at the lower level the cross posting of people is also important and it is important because the men know that they will have a better chance to serve. I have said this about the Navy and, in fact, I have said this with a view to augmenting the people trained for the sea trades so that they have a better ratio, but we cannot afford to duplicate these jobs and have people doing nothing and, therefore, this is one of the reasons.

Mr. LAMBERT: Well, I will take the example you showed of communicators. You have communicators at sea and in order to even out that sea to shore-duty ratio it is proposed that you will have men ashore on duty for longer periods.

Mr. ALLARD: Right.

Mr. LAMBERT: Those are sailors ashore. They are going to be replaced by somebody, are they not?

Mr. ALLARD: Yes.

Mr. LAMBERT: From an air component?

Mr. ALLARD: From people who have been trained to go to sea.

Mr. LAMBERT: Well, does this boil down to the fact that we then have communicators who will also be trained in the Army—in the ground environment—too?

Mr. ALLARD: Yes.

Mr. LAMBERT: In other words, they are going to have common training. They will be sufficiently trained?

Mr. ALLARD: Yes, Mr. Lambert.

Mr. LAMBERT: And the man who is a soldier communicator, or a ground environment communicator, will also be a fit man at sea?

Mr. ALLARD: Yes, Mr. Lambert. Already we have two airmen and two soldiers at sea as a test, and they went quite voluntarily.

Mr. SMITH: What are they doing at sea?

Mr. ALLARD: At the moment they happen to be in a trade which is quite compatible with their ability.

Mr. SMITH: Which trade?

Mr. ALLARD: Two of them are stewards.

Mr. LAMBERT: Well, stewards at sea are ammunition detail, are they not?

Mr. ALLARD: Yes, they could be trained.

Mr. LAMBERT: This is the usual purpose, I think, for a steward at sea?

Mr. ALLARD: It could be.

Mr. LAMBERT: Yes, since they all have to fight. Now, you made a good strong case for combat effectiveness and said the combat effectiveness of our troops was being increased, but is it not desirable and essential to have this under any

system of organization? The combat effectiveness by the supply of arms, and so forth, and good training is essential to any organization, so it is not a distinctive feature of a unified service. It is not a distinctive feature. It belongs to the air force; a high degree of combat effectiveness is a prime requisite of a good air force.

Mr. ALLARD: Yes.

Mr. LAMBERT: So, what I am concerned about is that you do not necessarily have to have that as a result of unification only.

Now, you spoke of the priorities on page 11 of your brief and the sad history of the Bobcat. Now, it says:

> Under the new system of analysis and priorities, this will not happen again.

But is this necessarily from unification? This is a budgetary procedure, not a unification procedure.

Mr. ALLARD: This goes much beyond budgetary—budgetary comes much later in the process.

Mr. LAMBERT: You may be familiar with an article written in a recent publication called *Air Force Magazine,* an American publication of February, 1967, by Air Vice-Marshal R. A. Cameron.

Mr. ALLARD: Yes.

Mr. LAMBERT: Have you had the opportunity of reading this article?

Mr. ALLARD: Yes.

Mr. LAMBERT: One of the assertions made by the Minister on many an occasion in that the three services in the past has resulted in wasteful competition and the other night the Minister recited a number of incidents over past years where he felt there had been wasteful competition. Is that not really only the result of poor budgetary procedures? It can and will undoubtedly happen in a unified organization, because you still will have sailors, you still will have soldiers, and you still will have airmen with the respective abilities to put forward their ideas.

Mr. ALLARD: Of course, our new budgetary system of priorities will prevent this from happening. In the past, Mr. Lambert, when I was Vice Chief of the General Staff, I sat on the Chiefs of Staff Committee very often and, of course, it was at that time the question of getting the biggest share of the pie, and this is what I said then. Therefore, the strategic considerations were not really the prime factors in deciding. Also, you had three advisers to the Minister who went off and sold their bill of goods and the result of this was a certain amount of imbalance. I am not saying total imbalance, because I lived with this system and I was quite happy because I understood, and quite clearly, that there was a preponderance of certain things at the time, and this is the reason I talked so much about balance of forces tonight.

Now, if our new system operates the way that we are prepared to operate it, it will prevent this from happening again because our priority system is not based on navy, army, air and the rest; it is based on a system of priorities which

are spelled out in complete tasks. Unfortunately, this whole study is not complete as yet, but at the moment we are operating on an interim system which also effects a fair amount of savings in at least a fair appreciation of the problems that we have.

Do not forget that when we think of a problem we have to think about six or seven years ahead because you never have a piece of equipment in your hands the day that you decide on it, so it does not come into the budgetary consideration for at least two and a half years after it is basically conceived. So this, as the method of analysis that we now have in the present organization, provides for this and do not forget another very important point: many important decisions have been made by rationalization of our tasks in the last two years. So, the system itself is designed first of all to cope with the tasks that we may be given and the task is based on the policy. We have to assess this task and give advice to our political masters on what we have at present because the decisions that one makes, if it takes up to ten years, then you may end up by a change of policy in the process. So, what we have to do instead of going straight for: the army needs this, and the air force needs that, and the navy needs some other piece of equipment; is to consider very carefully through our strategic studies and through our information system the possibilities of ten years hence, and then try to adapt ourselves to the role that we might be called upon to play in that particular field and adapt our program to it. It is no longer a question of replacing one thing and continuing in the same vein for a long period. In other words, we are thinking together and I insisted on this throughout—thinking together is very important.

Mr. LAMBERT: This is a feature of integrated command.

Mr. ALLARD: No, it is not—it is not. Well, if you want to have it that way, you may say it and I will never convince you, but it is not. It goes much deeper than an integrated command.

Mr. LAMBERT: My final question, Mr. Chairman, is this: Does it go down to the necessity of having a single service, single rank structure, single uniform?

Mr. ALLARD: I have already answered, yes to that earlier today, and the answer is, yes, and I could give you some other examples of great importance inside the forces in regard to the training of the professionals.

Mr. LAMBERT: Well, I am sorry; we differ on that.

(Translation)

Mr. MATTE: I know that you are a very competent officer as your present position indicates. You would like Canada to have the best possible defence with the means it has at its disposal at the present time. You have always attempted to improve your working environment. With your experience, and basing yourself on your studies, have you often given thought to integration before the White Paper was put out.

Mr. ALLARD: For a long time, Mr. Matte. In the realities of today we must recognize the fact, more particularly, that there was an absolute requirement for us to join the three services together because in certain areas they were already superimposed. Moreover I would like to add this. Near the end of the Second World War we understood that it would have been far better even then to have a

unified system rather than to have a non-unified system. In other words, it has been for a very long time that we have been thinking of the possibility of doing what we are doing at the moment.

(*English*)

Mr. HARKNESS: General Allard, on page 9 of your brief, you state:

> —that the Headquarters staff would be able to implement the existing emergency plans involving the three Services—

What are these emergency plans?

Mr. ALLARD: Mr. Harkness, this is secret.

Mr. HARKNESS: When Admiral Landymore presented his brief this is one of the points he mentioned, and one of the recommendations he made was to call the Chief of the Defence Staff and ask him in camera to describe the current emergency defence and mobilization plans. Now, would you be prepared to do that in camera?

Mr. ALLARD: Yes.

Mr. HARKNESS: Well, I think perhaps this is one of the things, Mr. Chairman, that we should have done. I am just picking a few things out of this brief as I go along, General Allard. Mr. Lambert has already said something about the Bobcat personnel carriers, and this is a long, sad story and I think there is no percentage in the world in our going into it again at the present time. However, after speaking of that you say:

> —to illustrate the frustrations that the military had to contend with, all I need to say is that after eleven years the Army still did not have its Bobcat. Under the new system of analysis and priorities, this will not happen again.

In essence, are you not saying that if you just go out and purchase a piece of equipment there are not going to be many delays in securing it if it is a piece of equipment that somebody has already developed and has in operational use but, if you are going to try to develop it yourself, it is going to take many years to do so?

Mr. ALLARD: This is perfectly true except, Mr. Harkness, you know very well that the story of the Bobcat—

Mr. HARKNESS: Yes, I know it all too well. But, is this not the situation: In attempting to develop an armoured personnel carrier on our own we ran into all kinds of unexpected difficulties because the development went through the periods of 6 different ministers, actually, and if you are going to develop military equipment in Canada in order to provide opportunities for manufacture, and so on, for Canadian industry, a large amount of time and delay is one of the necessary concomitants of that?

Mr. ALLARD: Yes, Mr. Harkness, and you will remember that the financial effort behind the Bobcat was one of its main faults.

Mr. HARKNESS: Therefore, is it not a fact that what you have stated:

> Under the new system of analysis and priorities, this will not happen again.

has no relationship to the Bobcat matter; none whatever. The only reason that the Bobcat took so long and was not finally successful was because we were trying to develop something here in Canada, and we did not manage to do it successfully in a reasonable length of time.

Mr. ALLARD: We have a lot of other development items that we will endeavour to develop to keep Canadian industry—

Mr. HARKNESS: But as I say, the Bobcat situation had nothing to do with any new system of analysis or priorities, did it?

Mr. ALLARD: It did not then.

Mr. HARKNESS: No—

Mr. ALLARD: But today it would.

Mr. HARKNESS: It would not now. As a matter of fact, if you are going to start to develop something you know to begin with that it is going to take you many years to do that. As a matter of fact, the hydrofoil at the present time—the Canadian hydrofoil—is an example of this which has also been under development for many years.

Mr. ALLARD: Part of the answer I gave here was the fact that we did not have the financial efforts to develop it fully. We were by for the first in army personnel carrier development.

Mr. HARKNESS: That is right.

Mr. ALLARD: But, the difficulty came when the program was postponed—you know how many times—

Mr. HARKNESS: As I say, I do not think there is any profit in our going into the troubles of the Bobcat, but I put it to you that you are tying the Bobcat into this statement "under the new system of analysis and priorities", and this has no validity.

Mr. ALLARD: I am sorry?

Mr. HARKNESS: I say the Bobcat story has no relationship to this statement which you have tied into it.

> Under the new system of analysis and priorities, this will not happen again.

Mr. ALLARD: Because if we have to develop a new piece of equipment, with this system of priority we will put the necessary financial effort behind it to make it a viable contract.

An hon. MEMBER: Assuming the government votes the money.

Mr. HARKNESS: That may or may not be the case. My point is that I think there was no excuse for you tying the Bobcat to this statement:

> Under the new system of analysis and priorities, this will not happen again.

Mr. ALLARD: I have it only as an example.

Mr. HARKNESS: Yes, but I think it is a very bad example; this is the point I am making.

Now, next you get on to helicopters, and you state:

> In 1961 we received nineteen CH. 112 HILLER/NOMAD light observation helicopters. Then, after much discussion—we finally got twelve of the medium cargo type.

and this is the sentence, that I want to draw to your attention particularly:

> The reason for this was that the Army share of the dollar pie would give only enough funds to buy this number.

Why did you put that in there?

Mr. ALLARD: Because it is true.

Mr. HARKNESS: Who told you it was true?

Mr. ALLARD: Because I was there.

Mr. HARKNESS: You were there?

Mr. ALLARD: Yes, Mr. Harkness.

Mr. HARKNESS: When was the decision made to buy these twelve medium cargo helicopters?

Mr. ALLARD: You made it.

Mr. HARKNESS: Certainly I made it. At the time I made it, had you not left to go to command the British division?

Mr. ALLARD: I was just in the process of being—

Mr. HARKNESS: Before the decision was made, I think you had left, had you not?

Mr. ALLARD: Possibly.

Mr. HARKNESS: Yes; then you had no personal knowledge of how this decision was arrived at?

Mr. ALLARD: Yes I did.

Mr. HARKNESS: No, you did not. I state on my own knowledge that you did not because you were not even there when the final decision was arrived at.

Mr. ALLARD: That is your opinion, Mr. Harkness.

Mr. HARKNESS: Apart from whether you had been there or not, you still would not have had any personal knowledge except on a hearsay basis as to how that decision was arrived at. Is that not a fact?

Mr. ALLARD: I do not believe so.

Mr. HARKNESS: Mr. Armstrong was there and can bear me out in this; I made the decision personally after a great deal of discussion, arguments and so forth with the Chiefs of Staff of the army, navy and air force, the chairman of the Chiefs of Staff, the Deputy Minister, and so on. None of these discussions were you in on.

Mr. ALLARD: No, but Mr. Harkness—

Mr. HARKNESS: None of them—just let me finish. I say none of these decisions were you in on. And, as I say, I finally made the decision personally because there was a considerable amount of disagreement about it. In other words, this statement I say is completely wrong:

> The reason for this was that the Army share of the dollar pie would give only enough funds to buy this number.

This was not right. As a matter of fact, the decision was made on the basis of weighing up the priorities for equipment for the navy, the army and the air force respectively, and after a great deal, as I say, of discussion and exercise of judgment as to what equipment should be secured in that particular budget, I finally made the decision personally that we would at that time secure twelve cargo helicopters.

Mr. ALLARD: Mr. Harkness, may I defend this statement?

Mr. HARKNESS: Go ahead.

Mr. ALLARD: First of all, the helicopter program was prepared by myself long before you were Minister of National Defence. Secondly, the choice of the helicopter in question was made by myself with the advice of my friends of the air force, and also all the advice I could get from the technical people. The third point I want to make is that at that time I went to great lengths to arrange through PJBD for a production-sharing program. I had also very intimate friends in the United States who supported our program, and the CH. 113 was an extremely good buy because we had approximately 18 per cent, and a little more, content of the total production of the CH. 113 which went up to some eight or nine hundred. We purchased 12 out of this.

Now, the decision, when I left for overseas was pending, and it was in your basket, and the officer in charge of army aviation kept me fully informed as to what happened. In fact, on one of his trips to Germany he came up to tell me what had happened. In fact, we were extremely happy to get 12, because as far as I had gone, we had nothing. I quite agree with you that I was not there. Yet, I was kept completely informed throughout this deal because I am the one that arranged it from the very beginning long before you became Minister of National Defence.

Mr. HARKNESS: However, I put it to you, General, that this statement is completely incorrect:

> The reason for this was that the Army share of the dollar pie would give only enough funds to buy this number.

You had no knowledge of the reasons for this decision.

Mr. ALLARD: Well, you are telling me your reasons, Mr. Harkness.

Mr. HARKNESS: Yes, and I was the one who made the decision.

Mr. ALLARD: But, I tell you the recommendation for 12 had been arrived at before you became Minister, too.

Mr. HARKNESS: This was the recommendation. But are you aware of the fact that these 12 were not for the army? They were for all three services.

Mr. ALLARD: Oh sure, I know that.

Mr. HARKNESS: Yes, they were not for the army at all; they were for use of all three services.

Mr. ALLARD: That is right. It shows the difficulty we had in arranging for the helicopter purchase.

Mr. HARKNESS: It shows that this statement is incorrect; that is what it shows.

Mr. ALLARD: I do not withdraw it, anyway. This is the way I felt; I am sorry.

Mr. HARKNESS: I put it to you, in view of what I said, that the statement is not correct and if you are not prepared to accept that it is not correct, all I can say is that you are proceeding on a basis of really not knowing what you are talking about.

Some hon. MEMBERS: Oh, oh.

Mr. HARKNESS: In this particular case this is the situation.

An hon. MEMBER: It is the other way around and I think an apology should be required.

Some hon. MEMBERS: Oh, oh.

Mr. HARKNESS: This, Mr. Chairman, happens to be something which is in my personal knowledge, and very much within that and, as I say, the only other two people who could give any reasonable evidence on this are the Deputy Minister and the then Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff, Air Chief Marshal Miller, and the final decision I made in company with those two people. As I say, the basis upon which it was made was not the basis which appears in this statement.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Harkness, I think it is apparent to every member of the Committee that both you and General Allard have considerable knowledge of this question. We have been sitting here in amazement and admiration of you both, but I should point out at this time that your time is slipping away, and if you have any other questions to put you should do so.

Mr. HARKNESS: I think the situation with regard to that is quite clear.

On the next page, General Allard, you state:

> All the time this was going on—millions of dollars had been spent on programs that were eventually scrapped—

What are these programs that were eventually scrapped?

Mr. ALLARD: The Arrow.

Mr. HARKNESS: You are talking at this time about 1961-62-63. The Arrow had been scrapped years before that.

Mr. ALLARD: Not years.

Mr. HARKNESS: Yes, years.

Mr. ALLARD: No, no.

Mr. HARKNESS: It was 1959; as I say, years before this.

Mr. ALLARD: Not years.

Mr. HARKNESS: Yes, years.

Mr. ALLARD: I will settle for one year.

Mr. HARKNESS: I think this is one of the difficulties; you will settle for one year, but the Arrow program was scrapped about 1½ years before I became Minister of National Defence. I became Minister of National Defence in 1960 and you are talking about 1961 and 1962, and you have just said it was a year.

An hon. MEMBER: He is not blaming you.

Mr. ALLARD: I am not blaming you. I have used these as examples of the difficulties that we had which do not exist any more; that is all I did.

Mr. HARKNESS: In the period you are talking about—and this is the period you have been dealing with, 1961 and 1962 and so on—you say that millions of dollars have been spent on programs, and I asked you what these programs were. You stated the Arrow, and I said that this was several years before then. What other programs?

Mr. ALLARD: The Bobcat.

Mr. HARKNESS: All right the Bobcat is one. Then what other programs?

Mr. ALLARD: I do not have them in mind at the moment, but I can list them in a letter to you if you wish.

Mr. HARKNESS: I would submit that there were no other programs on which millions of dollars have been spent, and the program then was eventually wasted.

Mr. ALLARD: Those two are there, at any rate.

Mr. HARKNESS: One of them was years before the time that you are talking about.

Mr. ALLARD: Not years.

Mr. HARKNESS: And the other one had been started nearly 10 years before that time, so there you are.

On the same page you go on to say that the morale of the army today is as good as it ever was, and so forth. Now, this is your opinion and I am not going to get into any argument in connection with the morale of the forces generally, but if this is the case, why do you think that several highly qualified witnesses, who just a few months ago ceased occupying the highest positions in our armed forces, have given us evidence to the country?

Mr. ALLARD: I am responsible for morale now, and I have verified it since last July. I have constantly been at it, plus all my staff, and the answer to this is that in my judgment of the morale of the forces is good.

Mr. HARKNESS: If that is the case, how do you explain that I am still getting several letters a week from serving people or their wives which state just the opposite? I think other members of parliament also have been getting this type of letter. I never got letters like this before.

Mr. ALLARD: I get letters too, on the other side. Some people write to me directly—and I have invited this—to tell me what their griefs are, and I have taken action immediately. This is a good indication of the attention that we are giving to these problems. I know that in an upheaval such as the one we are going through, of complete re-organization, it was difficult and I admit it. It was difficult for a lot of people; difficult to see the things that they were doing in the past were not being done in the same way any more. Also, when you start changing all the titles of people in the forces, you really do not know exactly who to talk to. This has happened, and it will be corrected. It is in the process now of being corrected, but I say—and I have spoken to a lot of troops—that the morale of the forces is good.

If you set yourself to ruin it, that is quite easy too. We have tried to keep the forces together and we have told them what would happen and I was fairly clear in what I told the troops. Several things that I have told them will happen. Another thing, Mr. Harkness, is the fact that any time a rumour started or any time there was a report which was just speculative, I sent a telegram immediately to all the commands and all the bases to advise the troops that this rumour or report was not the truth, or was not exactly what was going to happen. So, for this reason, I say the morale of the forces is good today.

Mr. HARKNESS: You have just finished stating that there was a diminution in morale due to uncertainty and confusion—

Mr. ALLARD: Of course there was.

Mr. HARKNESS: —and various other things along this line, and I think the evidence we have had from these other witnesses and the evidence that I have personally from hundreds of serving men bears it out. I do not think there is any doubt that there was a diminution of morale.

Mr. ALLARD: Mr. Harkness, I would be very interested in finding out who these men are, because we are very interested in this.

Mr. HARKNESS: I might say, General, that most of them are very interested in your not knowing their names, because they fear what the results might be.

Some hon. MEMBERS: Oh, oh.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, order please.

Mr. ALLARD: Throughout my career, I feel I have treaed people fairly well.

The CHAIRMAN: I have the following people on my list in this order: Mr. Macaluso, Mr. Nugent, Mr. Brewin and Mr. McIntosh. I now call on Mr. Macaluso.

Mr. MACALUSO: General, many charges and criticisms from retired military personnel who appeared before this Committee as witnesses are to the effect that by unification of the three services into one single force you are trying to make the serviceman a jack-of-all-trades and a master of none, and many members of this Committee have said the same thing. I am interested in hearing your view on this particular charge that the serviceman is becoming a jack-of-all-trades and master of none in his particular specialty and his particular environment.

Mr. ALLARD: There is nothing further from the truth, because there have been no indications of this—in fact, quite the contrary. I went a long way to explain to the troops what would happen. In fact, I am the one who made the statement that the regimental system would be kept and that all the things that had that kind of connotation would remain inact. So, there is no question even in my mind, or in the minds of my staff, that we are going to make the man a jack-of-all-trades. There has never been that question.

Moreover, we have also said that if the men like it, if they wish to learn more and be more useable in a broader base, they will be permitted to do so, provided they are qualified. We are geared up to qualify them and they will earn more pay in many cases for doing this. Therefore, in this particular context, there is no question of making him a jack-of-all-trades and a master of none. There is a question of training people for the job that they wish to qualify for

and they may serve in the environment that they desire, and this will never change and there was never a suggestion that it would, except through some speculation that appeared in the press.

Mr. MACALUSO: Certain witnesses before this Committee have stated that they were all for integration and even happy to move to unification to a single force, but they said things were moving too fast without first solving the problems of integration of the commands, and at the higher level. Evidence has been given before us by members of your staff, but refuted by other witnesses, about this moving too fast. I would like to know. Do you feel that carrying out the present program with the end objective of a single force has been carried out without due thought and consideration and, if so, how far back would you go with regard to the due thought and consideration that has been given to it?

Mr. ALLARD: There has been a lot of thought and consideration given to the planning that we are doing. Do not forget that I said this afternoon we have not taken any step, except in planning, to effect unification. No steps were taken to effect unification. But a lot of planning has been going on, a lot of studies have been made and a number of these studies prove that we should go a little faster in some areas, and slower in others. I hope that when you discuss, for example, our integreted logistic system, you will dscover here how long it is going to take. After all, where there is no change to take place, unification is only an act of Parliament. Where there needs be change, first of all the planning has been made and has advanced sufficiently to begin the process. This process may take quite a long time in some cases, and be quite rapid in others.

There is one point—I was trying to answer Mr. Lambert earlier—I have made the statement that it might take a military generation before the full benefit of unification can be felt completely. By this I mean that the army itself is a unified service. Men get into the army and stay in their environment for a long time. Some of them qualify and move. As far as the officers are concerned, they stay in their environment until such time as they reach the staff college where they learn to unify and to blend. This is the process, in fact, that will happen in this particular plan that we are putting into effect. I hope I have answered your question.

Mr. MACALUSO: I take it, then, that you do not agree with a statement made before this Committee. One retired officer stated that he felt he left in a sense of frustration because we were going too far too fast, and we were not taking the necessary precautions of examining and consolidating as we went along?

Mr. ALLARD: This is not the case. I have an intimate knowledge of Mobile Command, and I have been in this particular post for seven months, and so far we are not going too far and too fast, because we are not going anywhere. The point is that we are going to start from the time we get the authority and we will proceed in accordance with the planning and the requirements that are necessary. This is why I do not quite understand the point of view that was put the other way.

Mr. MACALUSO: Well, General, if a poll were taken in the armed services could you, from the discussions you have had and the visits you have made, advise us what the vote would be, say, in the combat field and in the support field for or against the single service concept?

Mr. ALLARD: In fact, in the combat field, because people are not going to be changed in any way except to improve their lot, if you put the thing properly to them they will say, "Yes, this is for me", but if you go and tell them the opposite, or if you do not understand what you are telling them, then obviously you get a negative answer and I do not blame the servicemen for saying that. I would have said the same myself.

Mr. MACALUSO: It has been stated that by unification into one single force we are going to commit the Canadian forces into one giant peacekeeping organization with no capability beyond UN peacekeeping missions. Will the government be able to achieve the objectives set forth in its White Paper of March 1964 with respect to our present commitments as the UN peacekeeping and as to the commitments we have made to NORAD and NATO?

Mr. ALLARD: In fact, they are going to be considerably better. I will first of all talk about the ground forces because these are the only contentious ones in so far as the commitments are concerned. The air division is in Europe. It is there and it is going to stay there. You cannot increase it because it takes too long to make an airplane. Speaking of the Maritime Command, the ships are at sea, they are there and they are going to stay there, so we cannot really change this much because it takes a long time to convert a ship. If you sink one, then you are going to be short one ship too. But the land forces are a different matter. Under the new concept we are reinforcing our NATO commitments considerably. In addition to this, we can reinforce a much stronger force in Europe, which is something we could not do before.

Mr. MACALUSO: What do you think of the balanced force concept that we now have in NATO, General? Is it good or bad for our forces?

Mr. ALLARD: I am afraid that I am not allowed to discuss this question.

Mr. MACALUSO: Do you believe that the Canadian forces have no need for nuclear arms either now or in the foreseeable future?

Mr. ALLARD: I said, when I spoke about the balance of forces, that we needed a force as a deterrent and a force for intervention. The deterrent forces in NATO are entirely based today on nuclear weapons and therefore as long as we participate in this, and as long as we stay in this, we have a need for nuclear weapons.

Mr. MACALUSO: Some retired officers have stated that possession of nuclear arms does not enhance the flexibility of our armed forces but diminishes their usefulness in fulfilling their primary objective in support of Canadian external policy.

Mr. ALLARD: We are capable of doing both. If you look at my brief of last May you will notice that the composition of the forces for that particular role is completely fulfilled. If Canada wants to commit itself for more than we have, then, of course, we will have to start on a recruiting campaign and mobilize, in other words. Even there our plan for our ready reserve system is going to assist us in filling more roles should the government—

Mr. MACALUSO: I gather you do not agree that it restricts our flexibility?

Mr. ALLARD: It certainly does not. It enhances our flexibility.

Mr. MACALUSO: Evidence was given to this Committee that as far as the CF-5 is concerned that it is a very fine plane to fly, it is manoeuvrable, but it is

no good as a weapons carrier and that some pilots are praying every time they go up in it. In your experience, what is your opinion of the CF-5 as a weapons carrier and as a fighting plane, and the opinion of the pilots who are fighting in it?

Mr. ALLARD: First of all, very few pilots have flown it. I have flown it.

Mr. MACALUSO: What is your experience, then?

Mr. ALLARD: It is a magnificent machine. This machine is not designed to replace the 104 or to fulfil the role of the Phantom. The purpose of that machine is quite different, and if a man makes a statement and does not say what the intended role of that machine is, then I am afraid he is leading you astray. We know exactly what we are going to do with the CF-5. We know it is the best aircraft to play the particular role that we are assigning to it.

Mr. MACALUSO: That was my next question. It is the right plane for our role. What is our role with respect to that plane?

Mr. ALLARD: First of all, I would like to say to you that the advent of the missile is pushing the fighter airplane out of the air over enemy territory. If you look at what is happening in Viet Nam today you will discover that the Americans have lost over 1,000 aircraft with an unsophisticated but effective anti-aircraft system. Our intention is to use this aircraft for surveillance, to interdict in some cases and for the control of the battlefield over unsophisticated areas. This is a very important factor. There are studies, which unfortunately I cannot quote, that prove that this concept is the concept of today. When you phase out a number of bomber aircraft this will be the principal role the CF-5 will play, which is the role of ground defence in close proximity over our own territory. The concept of war has changed considerably and this aircraft is specially designed for this purpose. As a weapons carrier it will not carry loads of weapons, it will carry other things, and I am not going to say what they are.

Mr. MACALUSO: General, a suggestion has been made to this Committee that the Navy, under the proposed form of unification, is being torn apart, that its whole personnel structure has been seriously weakened and that as a consequence our maritime defence has been weakened. In your estimation, has our maritime defence been weakened?

Mr. ALLARD: No. It has been improved, as I said in this brief. Of course, tearing the structure apart—and all structures have been torn apart—it is the method of adapting ourselves to the new structure that comes about. I can say to you now that there is a requirement for naval forces and there is a requirement for anti-submarine forces and those engaged in this activity will continue to be engaged in this activity for a very long time to come and their structures will not be changed. I am quite sure that Admiral O'Brien is a very capable man, a good leader, and he is doing an excellent job in commanding the forces under him, forces which are integrated with the air component, and the air component in that force is very happy now.

Mr. MACALUSO: One of the critics of this plan, General, has stated that the critics of unification have had little to examine because the only authoritative explanations are those that were provided by the Minister on May 12, 1966, to

this Committee and on his second reading speech on December 7 last. He states that the critic is left in the position of being unable to come to grips with the situation because he does not even have a definition of unification. The criticism of a great many witnesses who appeared before this Committee has been that there has not been an explanation of this. Evidence has been placed before this Committee, expecially by Mr. Andras, that there has, in fact, been a great deal of communication relating back to the April 2, 1964 letter of the Minister and the Associate Minister. To your knowledge, how has the communication been right from the very beginning to the commands and to the men in those commands?

Mr. ALLARD: It was difficult in the beginning. As chief of operational readiness I was charged with keeping the forces together and I went to great lengths to make sure that we had communications—not with the army commanders because I knew who they were and how they were working—particularly with the air and maritime. When I became the commander of Mobile Command I did not know what the communications were with the other commands, but as far as I was concerned I was quite satisfied and it was my responsibility as commander of mobile command to make sure that the troops knew where we were going. I went around and told them what was happening to them, and it is in that capacity that I made the statement that the regimental system was going to remain, there was nothing to worry about. It was in that capacity that I made this statement.

Mr. MACALUSO: How was this received by the men under your command?

Mr. ALLARD: They were quite happy; they were very happy.

Mr. MACALUSO: The statement was made to this Committee—which would seem pretty incredible—that mobile command is not only too big, it is dangerous to our democracy and there could be a military coup overnight. I asked this question of one other witness who said he was the architect of mobile command and he said that he could not believe that this statement was made. As the commander of Mobile Command, how could this happen or could it happen?

Mr. ALLARD: I wonder who said he was the architect of Mobile Command?

Mr. MACALUSO: I will not mention names.

Mr. ALLARD: I created Mobile Command from the start.

Mr. MACALUSO: Well, General Moncel and yourself seem to be the two architects of mobile command, in his terms.

Mr. ALLARD: The command structure was General Moncel's, but Mobile Command was my business.

Mr. MACALUSO: As you were directly responsible for creation of Mobile Command, how would this set up be able to take over a military coup overnight in a conspiracy between the Minister and yourself, say, as commander of Mobile Command?

Mr. ALLARD: I would not worry about this and I would not even answer this question.

Mr. MACALUSO: Fine.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Macaluso, you are drawing toward the end of your time. You are on your last question now.

Mr. MACALUSO: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will abide by your decision.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr. Macaluso; I am astonished!

Mr. MACALUSO: General, as far as career opportunity is concerned, the Minister claimed to this Committee that there will be a greater career opportunity for highly motivated officers and men. There have been witnesses before this Committee who have stated that no one in the armed forces believes the claim made by the Minister. There was evidence given to this Committee by Air Marshal Sharp, your deputy, that career opportunities are one of the main reasons for unification into a single force. I would ask you in connection with this statement that no one in the armed forces believes the claim made by the Minister—and I would assume by the presentation made by the deputy here—will career opportunities be more available to the men, and how will this come about?

Mr. ALLARD: If you give broader qualifications to officers at the proper time and at the proper level, his opportunities will be enhanced. This will happen with the other ranks as well because our schooling system will be so designed that he can get broader knowledge. Today it is fairly discouraging for an engineer officer in the Army, for example, who spends a lot of time commanding field squadrons. In peacetime it is rather difficult for him. It is not much of a challenge to him. Many of the engineer officers were upset by it. Now, with unification they can work almost anywhere and the engineering structure is only one example of this. There are many others. The real opportunities for those who have a broader base, those who are staff qualified on a broader base, those who are better qualified, or those who have more possibility of advancement because they are more capable, will certainly have more opportunities. There is no question about it.

Mr. MACALUSO: Did you say that one of the complaints—and this has to do with the same part, Mr. Chairman—and why many men left before this process came about was because of the lack of career opportunity and advancement in the ranks?

Mr. ALLARD: This is perfectly true.

Mr. MACALUSO: I ask you this because I have some personal knowledge from discussions with men who had left, particularly with the Air Force, because of this restriction on their advancement.

Mr. ALLARD: This is perfectly true.

Mr. MACALUSO: Put me down again, Mr. Chairman, please.

The CHAIRMAN: I have a growing list here. We will now have Mr. Nugent followed by Mr. Brewin.

Mr. NUGENT: General, you told us you visited Cold Lake and found morale very high. You told us you went to Esquimalt and it was a very happy visit. You told us you went to Halifax but you did not say what was there. How was the morale in Halifax when you visited?

Mr. ALLARD: The morale in Halifax was loaded with emotion when I was there. Do not forget, at the time I went there it was my third visit after I took over and it was rather sad to see so many men in that state. I spoke to them and

I think I helped to set a pace, at least, and that the new commander would be able to sort out the problems that seemed to exist in Halifax.

Mr. NUGENT: I understood that they treated you in such a way that you appreciated the morale position in Halifax very clearly; that they were annoyed and despondent and that it was a very sad situation from the morale viewpoint.

Mr. ALLARD: I did not say that.

Mr. NUGENT: Well, was that the situation that existed or was it not?

Mr. ALLARD: I said it was loaded with emotion.

Mr. NUGENT: I gather that morale was low?

Mr. ALLARD: Not particularly.

Mr. NUGENT: At the bottom of page 12 of your brief you say:

> I am also certain that the morale of the Navy—if given half a chance—will eventually be no less than that of the other two services.

I take it from this that it is lower and that it is necessary to bring it up, and if it is given a chance it could be brought up?

Mr. ALLARD: Certainly.

Mr. NUGENT: Then it must be low.

Mr. ALLARD: It is not low. You go from one extreme to the other, Mr. Nugent.

Mr. NUGENT: Well, the evidence we have had is that it is very low.

You visited the Army brigade in Europe. How long were you there?

Mr. ALLARD: I was there 24 hours.

Mr. NUGENT: You state here:

> ...I found that the Brigade did not have sufficient mobility to effectively carry out its emergency defence role.

Mr. ALLARD: Mr. Nugent, I am not talking about the same time. I thought you were asking me about the time since I took over. At the time I am referring to I spent quite a lot of time with the brigade. In fact, it was a brigade that I had trained in Canada, so I knew it very well. This was later confirmed, because I commanded the division in which they were serving.

Mr. NUGENT: Surely as Vice-Chief of the General Staff you would have access to the reports of responsible officers as to their mobile capability, would you not?

Mr. ALLARD: First of all, these troops were working under one British corps and until the time I went to Germany the emergency defence plan was not known by the General Staff. This is one of the reasons I went. As soon as I was briefed—and there was good reason for this because these plans are secret; in fact, they are more than secret, they are top secret—I went there and visited the field with the then commander, Brigadier Cameron, and I discovered that they could not fulfil their role. Therefore I came back here and took out of the war reserves the three-quarter ton vehicles and in addition to this I gave them 4.2 inch mortars as well as the heavy machine gun that we already had in stock in order to make their role more creditable.

Mr. NUGENT: When was that, General?

Mr. ALLARD: This was in 1959.

Mr. NUGENT: I wonder if you will comment on how naval personnel under a unified force are going to be able to get along with, say, United States allies who are naval officers, or British allies who are naval officers, while ours are unified force officers? Is this going to have a jarring effect or impair their ability to get along and work with the others?

Mr. ALLARD: I can guarantee you that it will not impair their ability.

Mr. NUGENT: It will not make any difference despite the fact that naval people throughout the world have a uniform much the same and their language is much the same and their positions are much the same?

Mr. ALLARD: It would be the same people, Mr. Nugent.

Mr. NUGENT: I see. Our naval people who have had experience in co-operating think it will make a real difference.

Mr. ALLARD: I have a staff there who say that it will not.

Mr. NUGENT: I see.

Mr. ALLARD: Naval officers, I mean.

Mr. NUGENT: Tell me, General, what is it that unification will permit you to to do that you cannot do under integration?

Mr. ALLARD: I have answered that question before, Mr. Nugent.

Mr. NUGENT: Perhaps I missed it. Would you mind repeating it for me, please?

Mr. ALLARD: I would have to read the transcript to give you exactly the same thing. I regret that I do not remember exactly what I said.

Mr. NUGENT: Is it in this brief of yours?

Mr. ALLARD: No, not the brief; the transcript.

The CHAIRMAN: I think this question, Mr. Nugent, was in the record, and at quite some considerable length, under the questioning of Mr. Churchill, if I am not mistaken, and rather than duplicating the record I wonder if we could move along.

Mr. NUGENT: I am just a little puzzled, that is all. Perhaps I would not understand it too well anyway, not knowing exactly what goes on under integration. Maybe I can use some of the testimony of Air Marshal Annis, then.

In talking about the plans for integration, I think he is the gentleman who described integration as a series of experiments. Would you agree with that?

Mr. ALLARD: Not entirely.

Mr. NUGENT: Let me put it this way, then; was each step in integration planned or put into effect as a separate step or were all the steps planned at once and then put in one at a time?

Mr. ALLARD: The way the thing was done was that first of all it was broken down into the integration of the headquarters, CFHQ, and this was put together. I became part of the second phase, too, because I went off to organize that part of

the command structure for which I was responsible, and this was carefully planned and put into effect.

Mr. NUGENT: But each part required a separate plan—

Mr. ALLARD: Yes.

Mr. NUGENT: —and in some cases it would require several plans, I suppose, before you arrived at the right one?

Mr. ALLARD: It did happen on some occasions that we had to change. CFHQ is one that effected some changes. After the command structure came about, the post of the Chief of Operational Readiness became redundant and it was unnecessary to continue it, because by then we were getting a grip on it. You see, Maritime Command was never changed substantially, except by the integration of the air force within it. Air Transport was not changed. Air Training was changed to Training Command, and that took some doing. However, Mobile Command was quite different because it started from nothing. The way I planned Mobile Command was quite simple. I got the best brains that I could find in the services. General Fleury was on it and also Air Marshal Sharp. There were quite a number. We went off and discussed the basic structure. I had worked out a proposal before. We put it together and then we discovered there were some fields which we had not considered carefully enough, so we reconsidered that portion and then put it into effect. It was only six months later that I advised the chief that I was ready to accept some responsibilities, and I was given the responsibilities in steps. I started by taking the responsibility for Eastern Command—

Mr. NUGENT: Just a minute, if I may break in here, General. The point I am trying to get at is: that these are not necessarily interrelated. For instance—and I want to make sure I get this straight on integration—on the new change brought about in Training Command, let us say for the sake of argument we found that it was not giving the economies we had hoped for and that in fact it was not working out as well as we had anticipated, is there anything that would prevent you from reversing it if you wanted to?

Mr. ALLARD: I would not hesitate one minute, Mr. Nugent.

Mr. NUGENT: That is the point that I wanted to get, that each of these experiments in integration can stand on its own and that there are some, as you have said, that you do not experiment with, that you have not tried to integrate?

Mr. ALLARD: That is right.

Mr. NUGENT: The purpose of unification is not to cure or to change that position where you have not tried to integrate; it would not change anything.

Mr. ALLARD: No.

Mr. NUGENT: I wanted to get that straight. Would you agree with General Fleury that, for instance, on Materiel Command while theory is fine and you do some good planning and careful planning, that once you start to implement it you may find that there are actual difficulties that must be overcome and the plan has to be changed. His estimate, I believe, was three to five years before Materiel Command would shake down into what it is supposed to be.

Mr. ALLARD: I entirely agree with him. I think this is a fair statement, because we have a lot of things to do, Mr. Nugent. For example, we have to get a

certain amount of hardware in order to effect the eventual economies that we will make. We have to put everything on a computer, and this is hard work. In fact you are going to get a briefing on this tomorrow, I think.

Mr. NUGENT: Would there be a certain number of difficulties in Mobile Command that it is going to take some time to shake out in the same way?

Mr. ALLARD: I do not think so. I think Mobile Command is in pretty good shape now. We handed over to them from CFHQ quite recently the responsibilities for the brigade in Germany. We have also handed over the troops to Cyprus and the Middle East. They have a few problems. For example, there were some discussions about who should be responsible for combat development, and when I came here I decided it should go to Mobile Command.

Mr. NUGENT: Without getting into the details of it, I think General Fleury indicated that before they would find Mobile Command working the way they hoped that it might take as long as three years, or it would take a minimum of three years, and it could take much longer.

Mr. ALLARD: I think this has proven to be a little bit wrong now because they are now doing the job. There will be some problems come up. First of all, some of them are our own fault at CFHQ because we have not produced all the policy guidance which they should receive. Sometimes when they operate on two policies it becomes rather difficult. But there was no way of planning all these policies beforehand, because if one bit had fallen apart the rest of it would have fallen, too. The difficulty was that we had to move along the road of re-organization by making our plans and testing them as we went along. After all, we have had a lot of experience in military organization and I think we hit it pretty squarely. I think we did fairly well in the over-all picture.

Mr. NUGENT: I understood you to say that you were now working on plans for unification. Did I hear you correctly on that?

Mr. ALLARD: Yes, I did.

Mr. NUGENT: Unification plans are proceeding now. Would it be a fair observation to make that unification is not just a case of definition, but the form and manner in which it is brought about and what plan you use would define unification, would it not? There might be four or five different meanings to unification, depending on the plans.

Mr. ALLARD: No. You see, one of the things I did which clarified the situation a bit was that I said to them when I considered the problem of the forces at the lower level. "There will be no changes in those particular areas". This eliminated a great number of problems that existed in the minds of many people. The difficulty—

Mr. NUGENT: Could someone not devise a plan of unification that would have changes in those areas? That would be a different plan of unification.

Mr. ALLARD: I suppose so, yes. It could be.

Mr. NUGENT: General Moncel told us, and I think he was in charge of planning then, that he himself had drawn up four different plans of unification.

Mr. ALLARD: In fact, when I heard that, Mr. Nugent, I started looking to find out where those plans were and I could not.

Mr. NUGENT: You could not locate them?

Mr. ALLARD: No.

Mr. NUGENT: I think he said that the one the Minister is now apparently working on is the one he rejected out of hand. You are not familiar with these four plans?

Mr. ALLARD: I am not familiar with the four plans he is talking about.

Mr. NUGENT: Well, I just wanted to clarify the point that unification —depending on how you want to carry it—could be quite different, depending on the plan on which you are proceeding?

Mr. ALLARD: Of course, Mr. Nugent, if you went about it saying that you were going to make jacks of all trades and masters of none, that would be one plan, but my plan was much simpler than this. My plan was to leave things as they were and to readjust in the middle as we went along. For example, there has been a great change in the old army system by the abolishment of the four old army commands. This is done and finished with; it is complete. We left enough staff for the reserves to be handled properly in the various areas. That plan is finished.

Mr. NUGENT: But, sir, that is a plan that could properly be categorized as one of the experiments in integration; a change in the command structure?

Mr. ALLARD: I would not differentiate between the two. In fact, at the moment we are considering using the commander of the naval division in an area to take over the responsibilities for the reserves. This is a plan that is there to stay, and the changes will take place as an evolutionary process in many areas.

Mr. NUGENT: As you are still working on the plans for unification, am I right in my conjecture, then, that the exact form which unification will take has not yet been decided?

Mr. ALLARD: At least the basic framework has been decided. In fact, the Minister made the statement in broad terms in his speech in that little red book there.

Mr. NUGENT: We are familiar with this, are we not, that once a plan is made and once you start to implement it, it is possible that there will be some hitches and it might have to be changed?

Mr. ALLARD: Oh sure, I do not disagree with that. No plan is perfect.

Mr. NUGENT: Well, speaking of morale—

The CHAIRMAN: Are you coming to the end?

Mr. NUGENT: Yes, I am. I will just put this morale question. It has always been my understanding that the most upsetting thing in life is ignorance. If you do not know what is coming you fear it more. That is true of the armed forces, too. I think you mentioned this in the newsletter you send out in order to keep them informed.

Mr. ALLARD: Yes, that is right.

Mr. NUGENT: Would it not then be fair to say that despite the best efforts of the best naval commanders there were, that information about unification coming out as a word undefined, knowing that unification could have so many

ramifications, it was bound to have a very upsetting effect on the morale, and especially of naval people?

Mr. ALLARD: I suppose this is true. I do not know. In the army, Mr. Nugent, I think while there was a lack of knowledge of unification people were uncertain and there was a fair amount of unrest, but when I took the trouble of going around and telling them what was going to happen, being the man responsible for part of the planning—after all, I was a very senior officer in the organization—I went off and explained to them what was going to happen, and then the morale came up quite quickly.

Mr. NUGENT: Would I be fair if I suggested, on the question of unification, if it had been brought out exactly what it means and with a plan in existence that the commanders could check, it would have had a far less unsettling effect on the personnel?

Mr. ALLARD: I would not disagree with you, Mr. Nugent. As responsible officers, I think we have to take most of the responsibility for the difficulties under which our men have to serve.

Mr. NUGENT: Thank you, General.

Mr. BREWIN: General Allard, I want to ask you a few questions about the strategic ideas—I think you called them strategic—that are expressed in the brief that you have given to us. At page 2 you state that it must be realized that an atomic or suicidal war is unthinkable. I would like to ask you whether atomic and nuclear are exchangeable terms here?

Mr. ALLARD: Yes, they are the same.

Mr. BREWIN: That is what I meant, they are the same thing.

Mr. ALLARD: They are interchangeable.

Mr. BREWIN: They are interchangeable. When you say "atomic or suicidal war" are you not really stating that nuclear war would be suicidal and therefore it is unthinkable?

Mr. ALLARD: It is unthinkable, that is right.

Mr. BREWIN: I want to divide that into the two types of nuclear weapons. Somewhat later in your brief you refer to strategic nuclear weapons, which you say are beyond our means. They are almost the exclusive prerogative of the great powers.

Mr. ALLARD: I was talking, Mr. Brewin, about the intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Mr. BREWIN: Yes, that is what I understood, Now, I want to ask you whether or not in your opinion a tactical nuclear war in Europe is not also suicidal and therefore, to a degree, unthinkable?

Mr. ALLARD: I agree with you.

Mr. BREWIN: You agree with that. I suppose, however, despite the fact that this is, as you say, unthinkable, it is necessary—it is not impossible in order to deter the other side from possibly using such weapons—to have such weapons?

Mr. ALLARD: This is what I imply in that statement. I was talking about the balance of the deterrent. If one side gives way then the other one can be

submitted to pressures that are unacceptable, and therefore I said that as long as the deterrent remains at its present strength there is no danger of a nuclear exchange.

Mr. BREWIN: Yes. We are not particularly directly concerned in Canada with the strategic nuclear balance.

Mr. ALLARD: No.

Mr. BREWIN: We do have some part in the tactical nuclear balance because our troops, although they do not control them, have such tactical nuclear weapons.

Mr. ALLARD: Well, indirectly we are connected with strategic nuclear weapons in the sense that the manned bomber still exists and therefore the air defence command with its aircraft is capable of making the balance far enough forward so that you would not be subjected to a nuclear bombardment. In other words, we are directly connected with it on the defensive side but we are not connected with it on the offensive side.

Mr. BREWIN: But in regard to the tactical nuclear weapons, as long as we maintain a brigade and an air division we are connected with it?

Mr. ALLARD: Yes, we are not committed to the strategic, we are committed to the tactical, and both the air division and the tactical nuclear weapons used by the brigades are part of that deterrent.

Mr. BREWIN: Yes. Some time ago it was brought to our attention, I think, in a statement by Secretary of Defence MacNamara that there was a very substantial preponderance of tactical nuclear weapons under U.S. control, if you want to put it that way, in Europe. Is that still the situation?

Mr. ALLARD: I cannot divulge that information, Mr. Brewin.

Mr. BREWIN: Thank you. Would it be pressing you too far to ask if you know of any substantial alteration in the balance because he found it quite proper to state what the balance was a year or two ago.

Mr. ALLARD: Well, of course, this is really a U.S. prerogative. The information that I have on this subject is, of course, U.S. property.

Mr. BREWIN: I see. Well then I come to another point. I think you have suggested somewhere here that our air division consists of bombers with tactical nuclear weapons and a strike reconnaissance role. Am I right in suggesting that while you have not perhaps stated the time element, this role is rapidly being eliminated by missiles?

Mr. ALLARD: I did not say rapidly, but I—

Mr. BREWIN: Well, did you not?

Mr. ALLARD: Well, perhaps I did say rapidly, yes, but rapidly in terms of a number of years. It is not rapidly in terms of the immediate future. I also do not think that we will phase out these machines until such time as they have served their usefulness. In other words, we will reduce gradually.

Mr. SMITH: You will not phase them out until they wear out.

Mr. ALLARD: Well, it depends on government policy.

Mr. BREWIN: I am interested in discussing with you their usefulness, not whether they are just going to be kept because they are not phased out. In the air divisions our CF-104's are highly vulnerable to IRBM's, are they not?

Mr. ALLARD: Yes, they are.

Mr. BREWIN: And I suppose one of the advantages of missiles to perform the same role is that either they could be in submarines or in silos, and they are not as vulnerable?

Mr. ALLARD: Correct.

Mr. BREWIN: Now, I want to come to another point. This has already been called to our attention by Mr. Harkness, I think. At page 2 you deal with the transformation proposed by the White Paper. Do you mean by that that the White Paper contemplated—as is understood—the creation of a new force for intervention?

Mr. ALLARD: Correct.

Mr. BREWIN: We were still to provide the deterrent—so far as it is a deterrent—of previous NATO commitments, and we are also going to develop an intervention force?

Mr. ALLARD: Correct.

Mr. BREWIN: Now, in that connection I would like to ask you what answer you can give to the point made by General Moncel which was that the creation of this new role would need all sorts of new equipment, increased transportability, and so on, and that this would create an additional expense—I think he used the figure of over $2 billion—and that if you were going to keep it within a lower limit such as we have now, which is roughly $1.6 billion, you would have to have the element of choice between whether you were going to emphasize the intervention force or the deterrent force to use the division you have made. What do you say about that?

Mr. ALLARD: I think, Mr. Brewin, that first of all I do not think General Moncel was aware of the organization that we have proposed. I think he had left by the time it came out. I think his figure for equipment is grossly exaggerated. However, it costs money to re-equip those forces, but we have very little choice. We either equip them or we disband them.

An hon. MEMBER: Or cut back somewhere else.

Mr. ALLARD: Well, you could, yes. This is the arrangement that has been made. So, in phasing in this new equipment we intend to do it over a period of years and our capability will continue to increase as we produce this new equipment.

Mr. BREWIN: General Allard, is it not a fact that if you were in a position to get out of some of the other roles, that you would have the means to move more quickly, at least, into this intervention role?

Mr. ALLARD: I quite agree with you. I think if it becomes government policy to change our roles obviously the choice will be easier to make. Our plan is designed for this because we anticipate changes will take place in the next few years because the scientific application to weapons is becoming so rapid that when this role is changed, if it is changed, then obviously we are going to have a

better choice. In this choice the forces of intervention could be increased. We could also at the same time increase their strategic mobility, which is important.

Mr. BREWIN: I think I understand what you are saying. This raises another point, and perhaps you may not wish to answer because it seems to me that it is partly political. I would like to ask you very directly whether any advice has been given by you, as Chief of the General Staff, as to the military value of the NATO commitments. I know they may have political value, but when I say commitments I really mean roles, because "commitments" is an ambiguous word. Have you been asked to give or have you given—or is it a proper question to ask you—what military utility you see under present conditions of the brigade group A and air division B?

Mr. ALLARD: We are constantly working on these plans, Mr. Brewin, and if there is a decision to be made with regard to those troops, I am quite certain that the Minister will ask our advice. In fact, we will give him some advice as to the methods of implementation of any reduction that may be effected, and we will give him some alternatives and a number of choices.

Mr. BREWIN: Well, may I ask you this question. I think I asked the Minister or one of the other witnesses the same thing. In 1960, I think it was, we were informed that there was a proposal approved by the military authorities of NATO to withdraw from the brigade and concentrate on a mobile force. Has this matter been raised again or were you given advice on—

Mr. ALLARD: I do not think you have the thing correct, Mr. Brewin.

Mr. BREWIN: I quote General Foulkes, I think.

Mr. ALLARD: Yes. My recollection of what General Foulkes said—and I do not want to put words in his mouth—was that the brigade in Germany could be withdrawn from its present EDP position and put into reserve in Europe. When I went to Europe I advised against this because the ground forces of NATO were so weak that we were in great danger of being committed within the first few hours to any possible excursions without a plan. At least the position they are in now is considerably better; at least they now know what they are going to do. This is the position. I differ in opinion with General Foulkes. Having been commander on the ground in Europe, I advised against this proposal, and as Chief of Operational Readiness I confirmed that this would be so.

Mr. BREWIN: Was this recently, General Allard?

Mr. ALLARD: I was in Europe in 1961 and during the period of 1961 I was very acquainted with it, but even earlier than this, in 1959 when the proposal was made, I studied the question. This is one of the questions I studied when I went to Europe to visit the EDP position of the brigade—

Mr. SMITH: What is EDP, if you do not mind?

Mr. ALLARD: Emergency defence plan. I recommended then that we should not change the role.

Mr. BREWIN: I see. Well, you have not given any recent advice on the problem, I take it?

Mr. ALLARD: Well, now I do not have to give the military any advice, but—

Mr. BREWIN: No, I meant the Minister.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Brewin, you are very close to the end of your time. Have you just about finished?

Mr. BREWIN: I have one more question.

The CHAIRMAN: All right.

Mr. BREWIN: This is on a rather different point. I am not sure whether I rightly followed what you said earlier, General Allard, about the necessity for speed. You said something about the proclamation of the legislation, if it were passed, awaiting word that something had to be done. I wonder if you could clarify that because I am interested in finding out the need for speed. I think this is a matter that we have to consider carefully, and I wondered why you were pressing us, it seemed to me, a little bit in your brief to go so fast. I want to consider this matter carefully.

Mr. ALLARD: The reason why I said this is because of a statement I also made that I had halted anything that was beyond the authority of parliament, and therefore the passing of the bill will be giving the authority, but the proclamation of the bill can be delayed until we are prepared to take appropriate action. Do you understand this?

Some hon. MEMBERS: No.

Mr. ALLARD: The proclamation of the bill need not follow immediately afterwards.

Mr. BREWIN: You say the passing of the bill enables you to take certain steps?

Mr. ALLARD: Yes.

Mr. BREWIN: The bill, of course, does not formally become law until it is proclaimed.

Mr. ALLARD: That is right, but at least we will know where we are going. At the moment we do not.

Mr. BREWIN: Well, I follow what you are saying. Is this a matter of weeks or months that you are talking about?

Mr. ALLARD: No. In fact, I feel we are late now. We would like to have the approval of the bill so that we will know, because the date of proclamation can be set by the Minister and we will advise him as to the proper time to put the proclamation through. In the meantime we have a lot of things to do, but we do not do any of these things because—it has nothing to do with moving people, or anything—first of all we have to get certain policies ready. For example, we have to complete the final amendments to the National Defence Act. We have a lot of internal orders to prepare to get this ready. This is all administrative work which—

Mr. BREWIN: But you are doing that.

Mr. ALLARD: We are not doing it, no. Well, we are working at some of it, but there is such a mass of material to get out that we cannot get it out quickly. For this reason, when the bill is passed, if the proclamation is delayed we will have time to finish the planning of the orders that we have to issue to get it into effect.

Mr. BREWIN: One last supplementary to my question.

The CHAIRMAN: A very sharp and pointed one, with a sharp and pointed answer!

Mr. BREWIN: It is quite frightening to have to be sharp and pointed all at once.

I understood you, in referring to this matter, to speak about this being important for morale. Are you serious when you say that some further delay, while parliament gives a little longer consideration to this, or this Committee does, would seriously affect morale?

Mr. ALLARD: Well, uncertainty, Mr. Brewin, is one of our worst enemies. As soon as the troops know where they stand, then it will become evident to them that things are going to go on from tomorrow as they were, and we will be able to settle down. At the moment we live in an unsettled state, and as long as this matter exists we will continue to have difficulties. That is why I plead that we should go ahead as soon as possible.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, on my list I have Mr. McIntosh, Mr. Churchill, Mr. Hopkins, Mr. Smith and Mr. Andras. It seems apparent at this point that we are going to have to recall General Allard in order to clean up the questions which members of the Committee wish to ask. I also understand that General Allard has a presentation on the changes made in the logistics force under integration and unification, which he would like to show us as part of his presentation. For these reasons, despite the workload I know you are all under, I urge that we meet tomorrow in order to clean this up. The Steering Committee is to meet at two o'clock to firm up the business which we discussed very briefly today, and to finalize business for the balance of the week. We have about five minutes left at this point and we have Mr. McIntosh at the top of the list. Taking these points up one by one, first of all there is my point in regard to business and then the point as to whether or not Mr. McIntosh wants to head the list when we resume with General Allard or whether he wants to go ahead now for a while.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Well, I will head the list if I can ask a supplementary question to Mr. Brewin's question.

The CHAIRMAN: Certainly.

Mr. MCINTOSH: General Allard, when Mr. Brewin referred to the speed with which you think we should act to get this bill through the house, you said it was on account of morale. I thought you said, in answer to Mr. Nugent, that morale was high?

Mr. ALLARD: Sure, but if you do not pass the bill it might deteriorate.

Mr. MCINTOSH: On what grounds?

Mr. ALLARD: Well, because of uncertainty. I have answered that.

The CHAIRMAN: We shall now adjourn.

WEDNESDAY, March 1, 1967.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, I see a quorum. Before we begin with today's proceedings I have a letter given to me by Mr. Paul Hellyer which I would like to read to you.

He says the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation is presenting a preview of the concert party *Canada Entertains* which it intends to present to members of our Canadian armed forces serving in different parts of the world. This program will be presented this evening at 8 p.m. at the Canadian forces base, Uplands. I would like to take this opportunity, on behalf of the Associate Minister and myself to extend a cordial invitation to all members of the Standing Committee on National Defence, and their wives, to attend this concert. I think it would be an excellent opportunity to see some of the programs which the Canadian armed forces, in conjunction with the CBC, present to the members of our forces overseas.

Transportation will be provided for those members wishing to attend by means of a bus which will leave the centre door of the centre block at 7.15 p.m. this evening, and will return the members to the centre block at the conclusion of the concert.

In order that arrangements can be made to accommodate those members of the committee who wish to attend, I would ask the committee members to indicate their wishes to the secretary of the Committee as soon as possible. Now, so that you can review this, I will have the Clerk of the Committee pass it around. If you intend to attend, would you just endorse the letter so that we know how many are going, and pass it on to the person next to you.

Mr. CHURCHILL: If protection is offered to members of the Commitee!

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Churchill, protection from the CBC or from the members of the armed forces?

We have General Allard, who is continuing his brief this afternoon. And as from yesterday, I have a list in front of me beginning with Mr. McIntosh, followed by Mr. Churchill, Mr. Hopkins, Mr. Smith and Mr. Andras.

Now, I understand General Allard has a briefing with him dealing with the reorganization of logistics, and I would like if possible to keep questioning down to as limited a period as possible so that we may have an opportunity of seeing the logistics briefing.

Mr. HARKNESS: Have you not got my name down, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN: All right, Mr. Harkness, Mr. Macaluso. Now, we will start with Mr. McIntosh.

Mr. MCINTOSH: General Allard, my first question to you is: how long have you to go before regular retirement?

Gen. J. V. ALLARD (*Chief of the Defence Staff*): I am fifty-three and a half.

Mr. MCINTOSH: And you go on until you are fifty five, is that right?

Mr. ALLARD: Normally, but it has been known for people to stay longer. Air Marshal Miller was fifty-seven when he retired.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Now, referring to your statement that you gave to the committee, I am very much interested in one statement you made at the very bottom of the first page. You say:

> ...I feel absolutely confident that this task can be carried out best by the reorganization of the forces as set out in Bill C.243.

By the word "task" do you mean the Government defence policy?

Mr. ALLARD: I spoke about the defence, the task of defending Canada.

Mr. MCINTOSH: By defence policy, do you mean, as on page 4—

Mr. ALLARD: I did not say defence policy; I said the task of defending Canada.

Mr. MCINTOSH: The task of defending Canada—does that have reference to the statement on page 4?

We need a force for intervention and a force for deterrence.

Is that right?

Mr. ALLARD: That is correct.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Could I ask you, General, at what cost to Canadian taxpayers?

Mr. ALLARD: We have maintained our budget at the same level for almost ten years, and we are endeavouring to do it within that cost.

Mr. MCINTOSH: You would say, then that with the new single force concept, as I believe you call it, it is not going to cost the Canadian taxpayer any more money than at present?

Mr. ALLARD: The budget for this year will be presented to the house at the same level, and I hope it will stay that way.

Mr. MCINTOSH: But have you no studies, General, that would forecast the cost when your new force is complete—the commitments we have now and the formation of this new task force?

Mr. ALLARD: There is no additional cost except, as you know, everything is rising in Canada? Salaries are going up, and the armed forces have to be paid more. I would like to suggest to you that within the last ten years, the defence budget has decreased on account of increased costs. In fact, my answer to your question is: we are endeavouring to keep within this level of budget to the best of our ability, and to provide the thing that we said we would provide by purchasing our equipment in a phased program which is kept to the plan, to last for a number of years.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I understand that, General, but we have had evidence before the committee from previous witnesses that—I think it was General Moncel—he forecast that to carry out this complete plan of the present government would cost in the neighbourhood of $2.6 billon, in his opinion. I have no comments to make.

Mr. ALLARD: No, but...

Mr. MCINTOSH: Have you any studies which say this is right or wrong?

Mr. ALLARD: All the studies I have indicate that we will endeavour, as I said, to keep it within the budget, providing that the costs do not rise too much. As you know, the cost of equipment is getting higher and higher, and you know that the cost of manpower is getting more and more. So within this level, of the dollar of the time, we are trying to keep it at the same level.

Mr. MCINTOSH: But you cannot guarantee to the people of Canada that the cost will not rise; that it will not double what the present budget is?

Mr. ALLARD: I think it is a matter for the government, to guarantee the people of Canada, not for me.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Yes, but we are a part of parliament here, and these are some of the questions we have to answer to the people of Canada. You said you have studies, but you do not forecast an estimate, say five years from now, that the cost will be such-and-such?

Mr. ALLARD: Should the value of the dollar remain the same, the monetary unit remain the same as it is today, I forecast that the next five years will be the same.

Mr. MCINTOSH: You say then that General Moncel was wrong in his figure of $2.6 billion?

Mr. ALLARD: I did not say that, because I did not hear his testimony, but I do not know where he could have got that figure. He was not on the staff when we made the calculations.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Mr. Harkness put on record here in this Committee that the amount of money spent for capital expenditures has been going down each year. I think it was something less than $192 million, and it has been the lowest for some years; this is for equipment.

How are you going to equip this force, then, if the funds available for capital, or for equipment, are going down each year, if you are on this fixed budget?

Mr. ALLARD: To a carefully phased program; but I did not say it was going to be frozen at that level. I said if the monetary costs remained at the same level, that we will phase it so that we can meet our commitments with the money we have.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Have you no studies, no plans, can you not give us something we can take back and say: General Allard said this was what was going to take place; they have forecast this; the estimates of how much they are going to spend next year, and the following year?

Mr. ALLARD: Well, we have studies. Of course we have studies; we have a first class staff keeping an eye on this. It is a very complex subject, and I am quite sure that if you asked the Chairman, if you want a briefing on the subject, we can provide it.

Mr. MCINTOSH: We have already asked the Minister; he said you did not have any studies, that he had no estimates.

Mr. ALLARD: I do not know what you asked the Minister, and I do not know what the Minister answered.

Mr. MCINTOSH: But you say that you have studies on this?

Mr. ALLARD: Of course we have studies. We have continuous forecasts, always.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Right. Fine.

Now, my second question on the same point is the personnel required to fulfil your commitments; the present commitments of Canada plus this extra force. Where are the personnel coming from?

Mr. ALLARD: From the civilian population of Canada. We are recruiting to meet our commitments.

Mr. MCINTOSH: What are your commitments in numbers, General?

Mr. ALLARD: We have approximately 105,000 now, as of today.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I am actually more interested in the number of personnel you require when you have completed this single service concept.

Mr. ALLARD: I have explained in my brief the method of meeting this by suggesting the difference between a war establishment and a peace establishment. I explained this in my brief.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I read the brief. I was just wondering, how many more people would this give you to handle?

Mr. ALLARD: Our establishments have always been considerably higher than the manpower we have had, since the end of World War II.

Mr. MCINTOSH: You are having no trouble, no problem at the present time in recruiting?

Mr. ALLARD: We have some problems, yes; I have explained that too.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Yes, but previous witnesses, and I think including the Minister, said that they were going to drop 10,000 and the drop amounted to something over 20,000. Therefore, I would take from that statement that you are 10,000 short as of now, and recruitment figures that we have before us show that we are losing more men than we are recruiting in the last year.

Mr. ALLARD: Our recruiting is better than it was.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Do you believe, General, that you could recruit for your requirements without going into compulsory national service for Canada?

Mr. ALLARD: I never advocated national service for Canada.

Mr. MCINTOSH: That is not the question I asked you. I asked did you think that you could meet your manpower requirements without going into compulsory national service.

Mr. ALLARD: It depends on the response we get on recruiting, but I never advocated national service. I think we can meet our commitments.

Mr. MCINTOSH: No, but the publisher of the Winnipeg *Fress Press* did. I do not know whether you read this article or not? He says this:

> If Defence Minister Hellyer persists in going ahead with his program to unify Canada's armed forces, recruitment will drop off to the point where conscription will become necessary to keep our armed services up to strength.

Mr. ALLARD: That is entirely his own opinion.

Mr. BYRNE: I wonder who wrote that.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Well, it was not Mr. Byrne I will tell you.

Mr. BYRNE: Who was it?

Mr. MCINTOSH: I said it was the publisher of the Winnipeg *Free Press.*

An hon. MEMBER: It is a one-man opinion.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I am trying to get the General's opinion. Would you like to answer for him. Can I take their answer for your General?

An hon. MEMBER: The experts will answer.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Oh, I thought you were experts. I suppose Mr. Byrne is an expert? Would you answer my question, please, General.

Mr. ALLARD: That is his opinion.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Yes, but what is your opinion?

Mr. ALLARD: My opinion is that we can meet our commitments providing we can recruit.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Providing? But that is a proviso on that. If you can't recruit what is going to happen?

Mr. ALLARD: Can you tell me, Mr. McIntosh, if I can recruit or not?

Mr. MCINTOSH: I do not believe that you can recruit. This is why I am asking you the question and this is why it is our responsibility to the Canadian people. We have to tell them that if we vote for this act then we are voting for conscription.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. McIntosh, I think you and I know, and I think everyone in the room knows, that conscription in Canada is something that has always been dealt with by Parliament when the need arises. I think you are asking the witness what action Parliament will take and I think that is beyond the terms of the witness.

I suggest that you return to the question of manpower and contain it within manpower and let us leave the political speculation alone. That does not belong to the witness.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I read his brief and I may not agree with you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN: You may not but let us stay on the subject of manpower which is the subject we are dealing with.

Mr. MCINTOSH: All right. General, supposing it does take place—as former witnesses have said—they do not think that you can recruit. What would be the action then you would take to get the manpower to fulfil your commitments.

Mr. ALLARD: You are putting a lot of ifs and buts in here—

Mr. MCINTOSH: That is correct.

Mr. ALLARD: I cannot answer that question.

Mr. MCINTOSH: You cannot answer it?

Mr. ALLARD: No.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Last night the last supplementary question I asked was in regard to morale. I thought at least that you said in answer to questions by Mr. Nugent that the morale of the services was high. That you had made a personal survey of all the bases and in your conclusion it was high. But when Mr. Brewin asked you why the necessity for all this speed to get this bill through the house, you said because you thought the morale of the services would go down.

Would you explain this?

How would it go down after the services have contended with all the newspaper reports on this unification problem for months and for years now. How do you relate what you said to Mr. Nugent to what you said to Mr. Brewin?

Mr. ALLARD: Last night I explained to Mr. Brewin that the uncertainty that a delay would cause would certainly affect morale but again as I said in my brief morale is a function of leadership and we will have to work very hard to convince people—to talk to people—to maintain their morale.

This is one of the reasons why I asked—at least to get an answer one way or the other—that is what the troops want.

Mr. MCINTOSH: To sum up just what you said about morale, about costs and about personnel, General, and I take the statement you made here in your brief—you say you are absolutely confident.

We are all politicians here and we have to go back to the house and either support this bill or reject it. I am talking about the methods here—I am summing up.

You said that you are confident that there is sufficient money; you are confident you will get the recruits; you are confident that the morale is either going to go down if we do not put this through in a hurry and if we put it through it will go up.

The only thing is that we have only your absolute confidence—no statements—no studies—no figures from you—and we have to balance what you have said against the figures we have had from your former superiors who have studied this maybe in greater detail than you have.

Mr. ALLARD: Could you name who my former superiors were?

Mr. MCINTOSH: I believe General Moncel.

Mr. ALLARD: He was not I am afraid.

Mr. MCINTOSH: He was not your superior—Chief of the General Staff?

Mr. ALLARD: He was not Chief of General Staff at any time.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Vice Chief of General Staff then.

Mr. ALLARD: He was never my superior.

Mr. MCINTOSH: He was never your superior?

Mr. ALLARD: I was two years senior to him.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I do not want to get off on a tangent on this.

Mr. LAMBERT: Mr. Chairman, for the General's clarification, the figures come from returns in *Hansard* which come from the Minister's office.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I am concerned about figures that the General and statistics that the General wants to put before us on which we can base our decision when we go into the house. We are responsible to the Canadian people.

You are supposed to give us this information and all I have from you is a great deal of confidence. But when I weigh that up against the evidence we have had before I feel that we cannot hurry this bill through.

If Mr. Byrne is the expert, Mr. Chairman, I would like to question him also.

Mr. BYRNE: I would be delighted to answer.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Like the Crowsnest Pass.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. McIntosh in the interest of hearing as many as we can from the long list I have I want to pass on to the next member, Mr. Churchill.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Will you put me down for the next round because I have not finished my questioning.

Mr. CHURCHILL: General Allard, on page 2 of the presentation you made to us yesterday you mention—and these are your words:

—There is a great deal of value in traditions—and we respect them.

In the White Paper—which we always have to quote—on page 19—the third paragraph on that page it says:

—There is no thought of eliminating worthwhile traditions—

I known the word "tradition" is becoming an unpopular word nowadays but I am interested to find that you recognize some value in it. That phrase from the White Paper:

—There is no thought of eliminating worthwhile traditions—

I took that to mean an assurance to the men in the services that their traditions would not be interfered with.

For example, the traditional ranks, traditional uniform—unless it required some modern modification—I suppose you did not have any responsibility for writing the White Paper but is my conclusion from that correct? Was that an assurance to the men in the services?

Mr. ALLARD: I suppose so and to the people of Canada who respect their armed forces. I have maintained throughout this and I have told everybody, when I have had occasion, that our tradition is very important to all of us.

I used to watch the effect of tradition—I served with the British army you know—and in some cases tradition was a hindrance and those are the traditions I say must disappear.

Mr. CHURCHILL: In the famous speech of December 7, I regretted to hear that you had accepted some responsibility for phrasing it. I thought it was the Minister's own production. On page 10834 of *Hansard* these words appear:

> The regimental framework of the land element is, in fact, groupings of officers and men with common professional interests. This system will not be changed by reason of unification. Certainly, we will continue to have infantry regiments as well as the Royal Canadian Armoured Corps and the Royal Regiment of Canadian Artillery.

That is the end of the quotation. I think, yesterday, you told us that you had reassured some of the regiments when you visited them that their regimental names would not be altered. In fact, I based a question in the house on reading a statement of yours to that effect. I took it from you that that gave reassurance to the men in the army that their regimental affiliation—their regimental names —would not be altered. Is that correct?

Mr. ALLARD: Yes, that is correct.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Do you not think that a similar assurance to the Royal Canadian Navy would be very helpful; that their uniform and their rank structure and so on would not be changed. Why discriminate against the navy? Why should they not have the same assurances that were given to the army?

Mr. ALLARD: I am sorry, I was interrupted. I did not understand your question.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I was wondering if an assurance was given to the army—which apparently according to your words yesterday—it settled them down a bit. Could not a similar assurance be given to the navy in accordance with the White Paper that their traditions would be maintained? Should not some assurance be given to them that they would retain the uniform to which they have been accustomed all these years and their rank structure and naval traditions?

Mr. ALLARD: I never told any infantry regiment that their uniform would be kept. Never, anywhere, have we ever said that for a very good reason. But one of the things we said—and one of the things we are trying to do—is to maintain complete identification.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I simply suggest to you that the White Paper when it said:

—There is no thought of eliminating worthwhile traditions—

—has been largely responsible for causing unrest in the services when some of those traditions are being changed.

Mr. ALLARD: They are not being changed, Mr. Churchill. I reassured everybody that there have been a lot of suggestions that they would be changed but not from official channels.

Mr. CHURCHILL: According to the bill the title "Royal Canadian Navy" will be non-existent after the bill is passed.

Mr. ALLARD: If you make a single service, Mr. Churchill. Whatever you call the components after the main components would have to have royal assent would it not to reconstitute a name of any kind. I think it is the prerogative of the Queen to—

Mr. CHURCHILL: Wiping out the title "Royal Canadian Navy" seems to me to be eliminating worthwhile tradition.

Mr. ALLARD: It depends on the level. When you talk about the regimental system you cannot compare the Royal Canadian Navy, which is one entity in its own—and, of course, the great difficulty that you have is the rules set by the Royal Canadian Navy—these various organizations which are very large as opposed to the regimental system we refer to. Those we were certain would remain. I am quite certain too that there will be a naval service—I am very certain of it.

Mr. CHURCHILL: We have been assured over and over again that there will be a naval service and I cannot see why it is essential then to change the name or to put them all in the same uniform as other people. This is what I was getting at.

I would like to go on because the Chairman has been cutting me off just as I get warmed up.

On page 1—Mr. McIntosh has already mentioned your statement of confidence. You state:

> —this task can be carried out best by the reorganization of the forces as set out in Bill C-243.

and on page 23, you deal with the subject of unification.

The rest of your presentation to us, which I have gone over very carefully since, is weighted heavily in favour of other matters; integration, the command structure, morale, equipment, and things of that nature. Yet the main purpose of our study in this Committee now, is on the subject of unification, and the bill determines that.

I thought that you would be able to give some reasons for unification, rather than just a page—page 23, with what the Minister has characterized, with regard to other presentations, as being emotionally coloured, or I think he used the word "passion" the other night, which I had to reject. He talked about it being an exciting and challenging idea—that is an emotional response—and the problems of a modern world, a scientific world; a speed that cannot stand the slow pace of yesterday. These are not really reasons. What I want to get at specifically is this—and we were on the subject briefly yesterday, and this is what I think the Committee has to know—in what way will a single unified service give better protection for Canada, give a better response to our commitments to NATO and NORAD, and a better response to our United Nations peace keeping operations? In what way will a single unified force do that better than the three services under a unified staff, or command structure?

Mr. ALLARD: There are two things, Mr. Churchill, that I think you have missed here.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I have not missed a thing; I am a real student of military matters.

Mr. ALLARD: I do not disagree with that, but there are two things that you have missed. In one part I said in my brief that anti-submarine warfare was no longer the prerogative of ships, that air defence was no longer the prerogative of airplanes, and that the land forces needed aerial mobility. This is an explanation which I think is stronger than any matters of small details that you can get into.

I also said, "the slow pace of yesterday". Who can deny the fact that communications today are done by satellites? Who can deny the fact that electronics has taken the place of many things? Who can deny the fact that we have computers with us?

I think these are the problems that we are confronted with, and our modernization is to bring us up to date which includes all these overlaps that we are talking about, and I have mentioned them. Therefore, I do not think I can add anything to answer your question.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Well, I did not list those things that you mentioned.

An hon. MEMBER: At page 39.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Yes, so many of those things were done in World War II. There was aerial assistance, and anti-submarine work, and these other matters. I am fully aware of the great progress in electronics; but that is integration, it is not unification. I do not see how a single unified force is essential in place of

three forces working under a unified command. I would think that the very fact that you mention the technological improvements is an added reason for keeping the three services separate because you can operate the command structure much more readily than, say, was the case 25 years ago, or was the case in Korea.

Mr. ALLARD: I think, Mr. Churchill, this is your opinion. I have stated the case here; I think I have stated it clearly, and therefore, I do not think I have much to add to it. Except, I might say this, that if you have all these unified commands. Who is going to manage the different services that you will have on top of it? Would you have a naval headquarters, an army headquarters, and an air force headquarters, on top of the present management organization that we have? How would you keep the organization? Who would make the organization? Who would be responsible for those that had to be managed separately?

The answer to this is that when you talk about the integrated headquarters, as you refer to it all the time, you are talking about a single organization; and a single organization can only have one master, it can only have one policy, it can only have one system of supply, and it can have only one system of personnel management. What you are suggesting to me, at the moment, is single management—and I am not too sure what they would be doing—with three separate headquarters under it to manage the forces separately.

In other words, you would have a co-ordinating headquarters on top, and go back to the committee system that we had before.

Now, I have made a very careful study of the committee system, in which the army alone spent 50,000 hours—man hours—per year on co-ordination between the three services; this was the committee system.

Therefore, when I finished my study, I was convinced that we had to have an organization that would deal with this centrally.

Fifty thousand hours, and this is saying nothing of the people who were supporting these hours behind them.

Mr. CHURCHILL: You are not suggesting that there is no committee work going on now, because the Minister has been telling us for three years all about his study groups, and study groups are committees, in my opinion. I will bet you there are more than 50,000 hours spent on some of these activities.

Mr. ALLARD: Well, of course, now you are suggesting, Mr. Churchill, that we make the plans without study.

Mr. CHURCHILL: No, but you are condemning the former system, on the basis of the fact that it was a committee system; I submit that you have been operating under a committee system according to the Minister's statement.

Mr. ALLARD: I do not think the Minister said this, because there are very few committees in headquarters.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Well, study groups, he calls them—seminars.

An hon. MEMBER: You are out of date.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I am away ahead of you.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Hopkins?

Mr. HOPKINS: General Allard, this is possibly a question that should have been asked at the beginning of your testimony, but you are probably in a better position to answer it now.

A previous witness before this Committee, stated that it was embarrassing to serving officers to appear before this House's Committee on defence. Does it embarrass you to appear before this Committee?

Mr. ALLARD: No, it does not, because this is my responsibility to appear before this Committee. As I am the Chief of Defence Staff, I feel that I have to inform you, and I am very pleased to do it.

There is one slight difference—and I made a statement myself on the first page of my brief—we are under a different code; we are under military law. Whereas, other people who appear here, are not under military law. It makes a slight difference in our approach to Committees such as this. We are not, by our code, to question policies, or criticize them; we are here to advise. Therefore, this is the reason why it is sometimes a bit embarrassing for members of the regular armed forces—those on the active list of the armed forces—to answer some of the questions that are asked.

Mr. HOPKINS: Thank you. At the bottom of page 7, and at the top of page 8 of your brief, you have this to say, concerning the improvement of communications difficulties:

> —last July—when I became Chief of the Defence Staff, the first thing I did was to organize the Canadian Forces Council—which brings the top commanders into consultation with the top military officials at Canadian Forces Headquarters—in order that they can appreciate and understand the problem in relation to the over-all picture.
>
> It was also necessary to see that up-to-date information got to the troops—and as a partial solution to this problem, I created the "Canadian Forces Bulletin" to get out to the troops in reasonable—readable form —official news on what we are doing. This publication is issued in both French and English; and I have sample copies here with me today.

On the basis of this statement, and any other action that you may have taken, have problems of communication within the armed forces been cleared up?

Mr. ALLARD: Yes, it has.

Mr. HOPKINS: Are you responsible for getting information out to the armed forces on all matters?

Mr. ALLARD: Yes.

Mr. HOPKINS: Members of this Committee have heard the term "propaganda" used time and time again when reference was made to information going out to the armed forces, as well as that going out to the public.

The term "propaganda" suggests that some of this information might be, possibly, inaccurate and misleading, and I think this should be clarified. What type of information do you send out, and what comments have you to make concerning this term "propaganda"?

Mr. ALLARD: I have nothing to say about propaganda, because this is utter nonsense. I say, that what we send to the troops is the truth.

Mr. HOPKINS: On page 8 of your brief you state the following:

> To render a more personal touch to the communications problem, I embared on a vigorous program of visiting units and talking to the troops—and gentlemen—I can assure you that I did talk to the troops and did not spend my time solely in the commander's office.

Could you give us an idea of the places that you visited?

Mr. ALLARD: I visited Halifax, Greenwood, Summerside, Esquimalt, Comox, and I visited Valcartier on a special invitation. I am on my way to visit the Air Division to Europe next month, and I will be in Cyprus on April 12. I said in there that I had particularly concentrated on air force; I visited Air Transport Command, and a few others too, but for short visits.

On my visits I made it a point, first of all that I did not want any ceremonials of any kind. I wanted to see people at work, and I wanted to talk to them.

In Halifax, I went from ship to ship speaking to the men. In Esquimalt, I met them all in the canteen, some in the dockyards, and some at work. I met the petty officers in their mess, and spent at least two hours with them discussing all kinds of problems.

They passed on a few problems they had, and, in fact, as a result I corrected a few of them. Then I spoke to the officers and told them what was going on, and I have spoken a great deal to the troops since I took over.

Mr. HOPKINS: That answers my next question as well. You stated that the morale in the armed forces was good and that it would be better with the passage of this legislation. You have already given an explanation for this statement, but I wonder if you would state again at this time how the passage of this legislation is going to affect the morale in the armed forces?

Mr. ALLARD: They will at least know where they are; they will know that the bill is passed, and we will be able to tell them—once we have the authority to do so—exactly what the new policies are in writing. They will know what is going to happen; they will know what the new policies are, and what the framework of the new policies are going to be, and this is what they have been waiting for now for a year.

Mr. HOPKINS: One of the other witnesses told us that the paper work at headquarters was two years behind in June or July of 1966. Does this situation exist today?

Mr. ALLARD: We are not really behind. There are some problems in connection with revising all the policies. Do not forget we have to take the three policies and put them into one, in a form that will be readable, legal and comprehensible, and so these things take time. The passing of the bill will not automatically solve all policies. We are continuing on the three at the moment, and it makes it a little bit awkward. In fact, in some cases people are worrying because they advance in age at the same time, and age to us is very important. Therefore, until such time as we have been given complete permission to go ahead, we cannot really go on with the program that we have. This is one of our main problems, and this is what I tried to explain.

Mr. HOPKINS: That is all for this round, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SMITH: General Allard, you mentioned, in answer to Mr. Churchill a few minutes ago that 50,000 man hours were spent in the army on co-ordination. I have never been noted for my mathematics, but that would indicate to me some 25 or 30 men per year.

Mr. ALLARD: It is much more than that.

Mr. SMITH: At 2000 hours per man per year?

Mr. ALLARD: It is much more than that. It you wish, I will read this to you:

> Project ORA which was completed in June, 1964 showed that for Army Headquarters alone there were 702 memberships in 440 Committees, subcommittees, working groups and similar bodies. The total army workload involved in participation in these committees was 52,205 man hours in 1963, equivalent to about the full time employment of 26 persons.

Mr. SMITH: Twenty-six persons. That was my mathematical deduction. On page 11, there is a sentence which reads:

> Under the new system of analysis and priorities, this will not happen again.

I presume systems analysis is a small model, perhaps, of the American system of developing and assessing the value of weapons and programs.

Mr. ALLARD: This is a direct take-off from the RCAF.

Mr. SMITH: And the RCAF is based something on the American system.

Mr. ALLARD: In some ways, perhaps, yes—like all modern nations. After all, the United States are pretty good.

Mr. SMITH: The Americans have been using this system for 3 or 4 years at least, and perhaps more.

Mr. ALLARD: We have been on this for a long time.

Mr. SMITH: Yes, but the American system of systems analysis has not prevented the American army from making some fairly concrete starts and stops, has it?

Mr. ALLARD: In fact, yes, you are right.

Mr. SMITH: So that it is possible even with an improved system of weapons analysis, that we could have another BOBCAT or—

Mr. ALLARD: I was not referring to that, I am sorry, Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH: But the sentence, unfortunately, leads one to believe that you were referring directly to that because it follows:

> —still did not have its BOBCAT. Under the new system of analysis and priorities, this will not happen again.

Mr. ALLARD: Yes, but you are putting analysis and priorities on systems analysis, and they are two different things—completely different.

Mr. SMITH: They are not completely different, are they? Is it not part of any systems analysis to first establish your military need?

Mr. ALLARD: Correct.

Mr. SMITH: And, from that you then do a study of an analysis of the weapons and equipment that are required for that need.

Mr. ALLARD: Correct.

The CHAIRMAN: I hear the division bells. Gentlemen, we will have to adjourn for the division. It is now approximately 25 minutes to 5. I think we could return at 5.30, following the division to finish these questions.

Mr. SMITH: We could use that half an hour, but I would not like to—

The CHAIRMAN: We can use that half hour, but we will not, by any means, be able to complete the list. We will come back here at 5.30. The Gentlemen still on the list, at the moment, are Mr. Smith, Mr. Andras, Mr. Harkness, Mr. Macaluso, Mr. McIntosh, and Mr. Forrestall.

(*Upon resuming*)

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, we have a quorum. Following the vote in the House, a ruling was requested. If it passes, that would mean there would be a debatable motion. It looks as it there might be a division on that motion before the end of the day and, in view of that, I think it would be probably untimely to proceed.

Mr. HOPKINS: Mr. Chairman, I think it has been ruled out of order.

The CHAIRMAN: If that is so, then it is debatable. We are in a position where the division bells are likely to ring at any time. For that reason, I do not think there is time to proceed with the logistics briefing today. We will have to recall General Allard and his team in the morning. I have a considerable list before me and, for the balance of the time available to us, I will allow those on my list, who are still present, to ask general questions. Before turning to further questions, General Allard has a statement that he wishes to make in respect of a newspaper item which appeared today.

Mr. ALLARD: Gentlemen, before I begin, I want to say that I was shocked to read in today's Ottawa *Journal* a statement, attributed to me, which is entirely inacurrate and does nothing to enhance the morale of the troops. In fact, my office has already had a call from a serviceman who was annoyed at me for referring to him as a "FINK". This does not enhance morale. The quotation which appears in the Ottawa *Journal* is as follows:

> General Jean V. Allard, chief of the defence staff, Tuesday gave the Commons defence committee a new definition of armed forces unification: fink. "Flying Infantryman with Naval Knowledge,"...

You know what I said. I said that one man called me a FINK because—and Mr. Drewery in the CBC last night described it very well—said that I was an infantryman with flying wings and I own a yacht, and I am a yachtsman. So I said that I was a flying infantryman with naval knowledge. I want to put this on the record of this Committee because I consider this an irresponsible statement.

Mr. FANE: Gentlemen, may I say that I substantiate General Allard's explanation, and I say that he used that term only in relation to himself.

Mr. ALLARD: Thank you very much.

An hon. MEMBER: I do not think anyone took it serious.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, I have one more piece of business to deal with before we proceed. I have a telegram from TRIO in Toronto addressed to the

Chairman of the Standing Committee on Defence. I will ask the Clerk of the Committee to read the telegram to you.

The CERK OF THE COMMITTEE:

Chairman, standing committee on defence. House of Commons Ottawa Ont.

As your hearing continues on the unification bill C-243 TRIO points out that of twenty persons suggested as competent witnesses on this vital subject only five have been called stop Further we understand some who have volunteered to appear are not being given any notification an opportunity will be made for their attendance stop Even though the overwhelming weight of opinion so far has been against the unified force concept as proposed. The others named should be called along with any others who may have volunteered stop. It is imperative there be no restriction on the extent and scope of the Committees inquiry which would serve to deprive the Canadian people of an opportunity to be fully informed on this issue before parliament is asked to make a decision

TRIO, Toronto

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, have I your permission to refer the telegram to the Steering Committee for whatever consideration it may require and they will report back to you?

Some hon. MEMBERS: Agreed.

The CHAIRMAN: Will you bring that up at the next Steering Committee meeting? We will proceed then with questions, where we left off. Mr. Smith?

Mr. SMITH: The General and I were discussing, when we were interrupted by the bell half an hour ago, the necessity of establishing priorities of responsibility, and then from that, designing a system or having a system of analysing the weapons and the equipment needed to carry it out.

It would seem to me, General Allard, that we have four units or areas within our armed forces that are demanding of personnel and equipment, namely the mobile force, the naval role—in particular the antisubmarine role, the NATO brigade and the air division. I understand that our NORAD role is not making as great demands on us for equipment or men—I may be wrong in that—compared with the other four. Now, has there been any priority designated in connection with those four roles?

Mr. ALLARD: You are asking me if there are priorities?

Mr. SMITH: Yes.

Mr. ALLARD: You are asking me about systems analysis?

Mr. SMITH: No. Before you can do systems analysis, I think you have to establish your military requirements or your obligations.

Mr. ALLARD: I understand. The first thing that we attempted to do was to build up the naval forces, and we did this two years ago—to build up new ships to get all the new equipment required for the naval force at this time. We also built up our air transport to give us strategic mobility. Now we are in the process, first of all, of filling the gaps in the ground forces in order to modernize the mechanized brigades. We have two fully mechanized brigades and two light brigades. These have priorities within themselves.

Mr. SMITH: I would like you to stay with the over-all priorities. I will ask about the mobile force a little later, if I could.

Mr. ALLARD: We also thought the CF-5 would have an order of priority, and we are at the moment in the process of establishing priorities for the mobile forces.

Mr. SMITH: Then your answer, by inference, indicates to me that there is less priority for the needs of the air division and the brigade in Europe than there is for the other forces?

Mr. ALLARD: They are fully equipped at the moment—the air division and our NORAD roles, and at the moment we are not doing any studies on them because the studies come up, I think, sometime next year. It takes a long time.

Mr. SMITH: And there is a fair possibility of their roles running out?

Mr. ALLARD: I did not say that but, as I explained, missiles are taking over gradually, and we are looking to see what the NATO strategy is going to be before we adopt any—

Mr. SMITH: Those polaris missiles are taking over the job and—

Mr. ALLARD: Yes.

Mr. SMITH: What plans are there in the sense of mobilizing the brigade in Europe? I mean making it more mobile?

Mr. ALLARD: In fact, I do not think there is very little to do in respect of the brigade in Europe because they have received most of their APC's. Brigadier Ross is here.

Mr. SMITH: They are ground mobile, I understand that. Is anything being done to make them more portable in the sense of air mobility?

Mr. ALLARD: No, Mr. Smith. There is no question of trying to transport a mechanized brigade by air.

Mr. SMITH: Is there any question of tending to change the NATO brigade in form to a degree so that it would integrate or mesh more easily with your mobile force?

Mr. ALLARD: No, there is no question of doing that.

Mr. SMITH: As I understand it, there was a difference of opinion. I understood, when we were talking about General Moncel, that he was your senior but not your superior.

Mr. ALLARD: He was not my superior—

Mr. SMITH: Was he senior in rank?

Mr. ALLARD: No. He never was.

Mr. SMITH: I understand.

Mr. HARKNESS: General Allard, was he not a brigadier in northwest Europe when you were at that time either a major or a lieutenant colonel?

Mr. ALLARD: Yes, he was for a short while, but that does not relate to seniority because I was a brigadier for thirteen years, Mr. Harkness, and General Moncel was a colonel for part of that time.

Mr. SMITH: I am confused when we get above the rank of major.

Mr. HARKNESS: I thought there was some confusion, and I was just trying to clarify it.

Mr. ALLARD: There has been no confusion.

The CHAIRMAN: Order, gentlemen.

Mr. SMITH: As I say, all these ranks above major confuse me.

He served up until just six months ago and he knew something of the plans. Suppose, now, that his estimate of the force requirements was right. I am not saying that it is right, but just suppose it was right and that we did need instead of 105,000 men, 140,000 or 135,000 men. Which one of our present commitments then would be on the lowest priority? Which would we abandon first? Which one would we discard or which one could we thin out?

Mr. ALLARD: There is no question of abandoning any.

Mr. SMITH: But suppose you did have to have 135,000 men, General, there has to be the question.

Mr. ALLARD: Mr. Smith, there is no question of reducing our commitments any way, shape or form.

Mr. SMITH: Suppose the government does not give you the money to do it?

Mr. ALLARD: Well then, the government makes the decision at the same time to remove a commitment; it is its prerogative, and if I receive that direction I will do so.

Mr. SMITH: There is no present priority or plan as to which one we would discard, assuming that funds were not provided?

Mr. ALLARD: There is no question of this.

Mr. SMITH: Now if the funds are not provided, the same applies to men not provided. If there were not the men, what do we do?

Mr. ALLARD: It is up to the government to decide what priorities they want and what commitments they want to drop?

Mr. SMITH: On a purely military basis have your planners—I am not asking you to tell me which role—not given consideration to which role is least valid?

Mr. ALLARD: No.

Mr. SMITH: They have not?

Mr. ALLARD: No.

Mr. SMITH: When you consider your four roles with equal validity, does that not then make it more difficult, if not impossible, to decide the priorities upon which you are going to acquire weapons and train men?

Mr. ALLARD: Yes, it does.

Mr. SMITH: It does make it more difficult?

Mr. ALLARD: I am sorry. Would you repeat your question?

Mr. SMITH: My question was this: if there is no priority for these four roles that the Canadian forces now have—

Mr. FOY: It is hypothetical.

Mr. SMITH: It is not hypothetical at all, Mr. Foy; it is a very practical question. If there is no priority, then does it not make it difficult for you to assign the new intake of men and money that comes to you in the budget to a particular role?

Mr. ALLARD: Mr. Smith, in the art of manning military units, it is impossible to put men, if you have no equipment—

Mr. SMITH: Yes, that is true.

Mr. ALLARD: —so therefore, the question does not arise if you do not have the equipment.

Mr. SMITH: Well, we have lots of naval equipment, for example.

Mr. ALLARD: Some of it is not worth anything.

Mr. SMITH: Do you not have any system of priority as between them?

Mr. ALLARD: At the moment we are fulfilling our roles as near 100 percent as we can.

Mr. SMITH: Now if I could just turn to the mobile—

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Smith, I think, for clarification, perhaps you and General Allard are discussing two things.

Mr. SMITH: No we are not.

The CHAIRMAN: If I interpret what you are saying correctly, you are talking about us withdrawing from commitments, such as withdrawing from a NATO commitment or a U.N. commitment. On the other hand, there is a question of what would we do in the cutting back of equipment or units in a general retrenchment or belt-tightening if, for instance, we were faced with a recession or something. Is there not a difference?

Mr. SMITH: Not quite. I was trying to not worry about our political commitments, which I understand. I was trying to determine whether or not there was a purely military plan as to the comparative effectiveness of the four areas in which we operate armed forces now, and I understand that there is not. It follows, conversely, from that that there is no military plan as to which is the most effective, or which would then be first abandoned. It is purely a political decision, but there is no army plan—that is to say, "the Starfighters are of very little use; we have not got enough money; let us buy our way out". Sometimes I think we overemphasized the value that NATO puts on that particular role. I just read an article by Mr. John Gellner, who is highly respected in some circles. He is a military commentator with the *Globe and Mail*. This is what he had to say on that very point.

The CHAIRMAN: You have been saved by the bell Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH: Well, I will just finish this paragraph and then I can finish my question.

The CHAIRMAN: You can finish that part.

Mr. SMITH: This is Mr. Gellner's comment:

> It should be realized, and undoubtedly it is realized in Ottawa, that militarily the value of the Canadian contribution is minimal.

That is, the contribution to NATO.

> It was contracted at a time when NATO planning was based on the assumption that a war in Central Europe could be a limited nuclear war and that the enemy could thus be deterred by the weapons of limited nuclear war. This theory could never have withstood serious examination; by now, nobody in a responsible position inside or outside of NATO really believes in its validity.

I want an opportunity to talk about it.

Mr. ALLARD: I could answer you right away, Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH: All right, fine.

Mr. ALLARD: The answer to this is that this is a political question, and the political direction that I will get will certainly serve to generate the necessary plans. As far as Mr. Gellner's article is concerned, I do not disagree with it.

Mr. SMITH: Thank you. Mr. Chairman, when I get a chance I want to discuss the mobile force.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, we will adjourn until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning, when we will continue with the Chief of Defence Staff's briefing. I apologize to those who brought this briefing this afternoon for the way your time has been interrupted.

Mr. ANDRAS: Mr. Chairman, before we leave, is there any chance of deferring the Steering Committee meeting tonight?

The CHAIRMAN: I would think that there would be no Steering Committee meeting tonight. Is that agreeable with you, Mr. Winch?

Mr. WINCH: Yes.

The CHAIRMAN: It is agreed. There will be no meeting.

The meeting is adjourned.

HOUSE OF COMMONS

First Session—Twenty-seventh Parliament

1966-67

STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. GRANT DEACHMAN

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 28

THURSDAY, MARCH 2, 1967

Respecting

Bill C-243, An Act to amend the National Defence Act and other Acts in consequence thereof.

WITNESSES:

General J. V. Allard, Chief of the Defence Staff; Lieutenant-General L. G. C. Lilley, Chief of Technical Services; Rear-Admiral H. G. Burchell, Deputy Chief Logistics; Air Commodore E. D. Armour, Director General Supply; Captain (N) R. C. Willis, Director of Supply Plans; Lieutenant-Colonel R. Ralph, Commander J. B. Tucker, Project Management Team; Commodore H. A. Porter, Director General Maritime Forces, Canadian Forces Headquarters.

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY
OTTAWA, 1967

25900—1

STANDING COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. Grant Deachman

Vice-Chairman: Hon. Marcel Lambert

Mr. Andras,	Mr. Harkness,	Mr. Macaluso,
Mr. Brewin,	Mr. Hopkins,	Mr. McIntosh,
Mr. Byrne,	[1] Mr. Langlois (*Chicoutimi*),	Mr. McNulty,
Mr. Churchill,	Mr. Latulippe,	Mr. Nugent,
Mr. Crossman,	Mr. Legault,	Mr. Rochon,
Mr. Fane,	Mr. Lessard,	Mr. Smith,
Mr. Forrestall,	Mr. Loiselle,	Mr. Winch—(24).
Mr. Foy,		

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

[1] Replaced Mr. Matte on March 2, 1967.

ORDER OF REFERENCE

HOUSE OF COMMONS,

THURSDAY, March 2, 1967.

Ordered,—That the names of Messrs. Langlois (*Chicoutimi*) and MacInnis be substituted for those of Messrs. Matte and Fane on the Standing Committee on National Defence.

Attest.

LÉON-J. RAYMOND,
The Clerk of the House of Commons.

25900—1½

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

THURSDAY, March 2, 1967.
(55)

The Standing Committee on National Defence met at 10:05 a.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Deachman, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Andras, Brewin, Byrne, Churchill, Crossman, Deachman, Fane, Forrestall, Foy, Harkness, Hopkins, Lambert, Legault, Lessard, Loiselle, Macaluso, Matte, McIntosh, McNulty, Nugent, Smith and Mr. Winch—(22).

Also present: Mr. MacRae and Mr. Nesbitt.

In attendance: *From the Department of National Defence*: Honourable Paul Hellyer, Minister; Mr. E. B. Armstrong, Deputy Minister; General J. V. Allard, Chief Defence Staff; Lieutenant-General L. G. C. Lilley, Chief of Technical Services; Rear-Admiral H. G. Burchell, Deputy Chief Logistics; Air Commodore E. D. Armour, Director General Supply; Captain (N) R. C. Willis, Director of Supply Plans; Lieutenant-Colonel R. Ralph, Commander J. B. Tucker, Project Management Team, Canadian Forces Headquarters.

The Chairman made a statement at the beginning of the sitting, concerning the number of meetings held and the witnesses who have been heard in connection with *Bill C-243*.

The Chairman announced that the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure would meet immediately after the Committee is adjourned.

Following some discussion concerning future meetings, the members continued their questioning of General J. V. Allard, Chief Defence Staff.

At 11:15 a.m., General Allard introduced Lieutenant-General L. G. C. Lilley, Chief of Technical Services, who along with other Officers made a presentation on the Devil Program (Development of Integrated Logistics). This is a study being carried out to develop a single integrated logistics system for the support of the operational forces.

The Clerk was instructed to distribute copies of the statement prepared by the Chairman concerning meetings held and witnesses heard to date, as well as copies of the *Canadian Forces Bulletin*, December 1966 and January 1967, supplied by the Department of National Defence.

The Committee adjourned at 12.25 p.m., until 3.30 p.m. this day.

AFTERNOON SITTING
(56)

The Standing Committee on National Defence met at 3:35 p.m. this day, the Chairman, Mr. Deachman, presiding.

Members present: Messrs. Andras, Brewin, Byrne, Churchill, Crossman, Deachman, Fane, Forrestall, Foy, Harkness, Hopkins, Lambert, Langlois (*Chicoutimi*), Legault, Lessard, Loiselle, Macaluso, McIntosh, McNulty, Nugent, Rochon, Smith and Mr. Winch—(23).

Also present: Messrs. Ballard, MacRae and Régimbal.

In attendance: Same as the morning sitting.

It was agreed to table copies of documents submitted by Mr. Andras, to which he had referred at a previous sitting (*Exhibit 6*). This information was especially requested by Mr. Fane.

It was also agreed to table a reply from the Minister dated February 28, 1967, to a question asked by Mr. Winch on February 24, 1967, concerning senior officers released from service (*Exhibit 7*).

The Chairman read a report from the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure, dated March 2, 1967, copies of which were distributed to the members. The subcommittee report is as follows:

"SUBCOMMITTEE ON AGENDA AND PROCEDURE

March 2, 1967.

The Subcommittee met at 2:00 p.m.

We were not able to agree on the question of inviting witnesses, beyond agreement to invite General Simonds to appear for tomorrow only.

The Clerk has phoned General Simonds and has informed us that the General has engagements and cannot appear.

The Committee agrees that the staff briefings end tonight.

A majority of the Committee is prepared to recall the Minister tomorrow morning to wind up the appearance of witnesses

I want it known that any person who has a brief to submit should do so. They will be immediately duplicated in sufficient copies for distribution to the Committee and the Press.

Clause by Clause consideration of the Bill will commence on Monday. In preparation for this task I am asking the Judge Advocate General's staff to distribute the Bill this afternoon. Included with the Bill you will receive a series of amendments which will be dealt with by the Committee.

We will now call on General Allard to continue the afternoon briefing."

The Subcommittee report was discussed and it was agreed that further consideration should be postponed until later this day.

The Chairman appointed Mr. Hopkins and Mr. Smith to investigate the present situation with respect to the Evidence of the Committee which has not yet been printed. Mr. Hopkins and Mr. Smith were instructed to report back to the Committee.

The members began their questioning concerning the DEVIL program briefing which was presented at the morning sitting.

The division bells having rung at 4:50 p.m., to summon the members to the House of Commons, the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

EVENING SITTING
(57)

The Standing Committee on National Defence met at 8:05 p.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Deachman, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Andras, Brewin, Byrne, Churchill, Crossman, Deachman, Fane, Forrestall, Foy, Harkness, Hopkins, Lambert, Langlois (*Chicoutimi*), Legault, Lessard, Loiselle, Macaluso, McIntosh, McNulty, Nugent, Rochon, Smith and Winch—(23).

Also present: Mr. MacRae.

In attendance: Same as the morning sitting.

The members continued their questioning concerning the DEVIL program briefing which was presented during the morning sitting this day.

The Clerk was instructed to distribute copies of *Bill C-243* to the members, containing a number of proposed amendments.

General J. V. Allard, Chief Defence Staff answered a number of questions on defence matters. Commodore H. A. Porter, Director General Maritime Forces, made a statement concerning anti-submarine warfare.

It was moved by Mr. Macaluso, seconded by Mr. Foy,

That the Report of the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure dated March 2, 1967, be *now* adopted.

Debate ensued, then the Chairman declared that this motion should be considered as a *Notice of Motion*, on which he would like to reserve his ruling until the sitting of the Committee, scheduled to be held at 9.30 a.m. on Friday, March 3, 1967.

At 10:00 p.m., the Committee adjourned until Friday, March 3, 1967 at 9:30 a.m.

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

THURSDAY, March 2, 1967.

The CHAIRMAN: Order. I see a quorum. Gentlemen, when we had to leave last night because of the division bell Mr. Smith was questioning General Allard. After Mr. Smith we have Mr. Andras, to complete one full round and then we will be back to a second round of questioning.

General Allard has a special briefing on logistics and I would suggest that we proceed by finishing up—I do not see Mr. Smith here this morning—the first round of questioning by calling on Mr. Andras, and I hope he is not going to be too long. Then we will turn to General Allard's briefing on logistics, but before doing that I want to place in consideration before you the matter of our progress and methods of work, because we are drawing towards the end of the week.

We started here on the subject of the bill on Tuesday, February 7, and we are now in the thirteenth day of sitting on this particular bill. During that time we met 35 times. We have heard 25 people and we have received many briefs. We began, as you will remember, by hearing from the Minister. We heard from the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff and listened to his brief. We heard from the Chief of Personnel with his brief; from the deputy chief of the reserves and then we had the TRIO people here with their briefs. We had the three naval organizations and the briefs which they brought. We heard from Admiral Brock, and then we heard from Admiral Dillon and then, you will remember, that previously we had received the briefs of Admiral Landymore and then we heard Admiral Landymore. Then Mr. Patrick appeared before us and then General Moncel. We heard Air Marshal Annis and we heard Air Vice Marshal Hendrick and General Fleury, and then the Minister came back on the 23rd of the month and you will remember he came back with a 54-page statement. Then, after that, we had Admiral Landymore again briefly and then we have had on these last two days, General Allard and members of his staff who are here to brief us. We had General Foulkes also.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Mr. Chairman, I do not think we have heard from 25 people. You are counting people who appeared with the various organizations, TRIO and so on—

The CHAIRMAN: Yes. That is right.

Mr. CHURCHILL: We have heard from about 15, really.

The CHAIRMAN: In addition to that each of you have received photo copies of dozens of letters and telegrams to study. In fact, we have followed the practice of sending you virtually all the material that has been tabled. I think all the material that has been tabled has been moved along to you in the form of photo copies so that you have had the opportunity to study and review that.

Mr. FANE: Mr. Chairman, in regard to that statement, may I make a remark.

The CHAIRMAN: Yes, sir.

Mr. FANE: I would like to say that so far I have not received copies of the documents Mr. Andras mentioned which it was promised we would receive.

The CHAIRMAN: That would be from Mr. Andras' secret papers. Mr. Andras, tell them about that.

Mr. ANDRAS: Yes, I will have those for the Committee today.

Mr. FANE: Very well.

The CHAIRMAN: I will ask the Clerk of the Committee to follow that up, Mr. Fane, and make sure that you have them.

Mr. FANE: Besides that, we did not get any copies of the information bulletin that we were supposed to receive. I believe we were to receive copies of that, too, so that we see what was going out in that.

The CHAIRMAN: I will ask the Clerk to look into that matter again and to report to me, and to make sure that we get that done, Mr. Fane.

As your Chairman, I am worried about the business of moving forward to the examination of the bill itself and clause by clause consideration of the bill. Reviewing what we have already done leads to the questions here which are becoming increasingly repetitive and turning up nothing really new that I have heard in the last day or two. Watching very competent members of this Committee, some of whom have been studying defence affairs for three years, and hearing nothing very much that is new from them, I think it is fair to say that it is time we moved on to clause by clause consideration of the bill. Just a moment, please. I want to be heard and then we can have a discussion if we need one.

It is my view that further progress along the lines that we have been following the last day or so would be nothing more than over-kill. I want to suggest to you the following procedure. The Steering Committee—

An hon. MEMBER: May I ask one question in clarification—

The CHAIRMAN: Well, wait until I get to the end and then we can have some points of clarification. I will not be very long. The Steering Committee is to meet at noon to decide the course that we are going to follow. Before we begin to hear General Allard I just want you to have firmly in mind what my intentions are and what I feel is the direction in which the Committee should be moving so that you may have ample opportunity to consider this and to come before the Steering Committee prepared to discuss it, because I am going to propose to you that we begin clause by clause examination tomorrow. I sincerely hope that we can wind up our briefings today, get our questions answered from General Allard and his staff and the Minister all of whom will be here with you, and proceed to the examination of the bill.

Now, let me speak for a moment about examination of the bill. The conclusion of briefings here today does not necessarily conclude all the information or new information which you, as members of the Committee, may want from time to time in considering the bill clause by clause. You will have the departmental people here; you will have the Minister here; you will have as many of the staff as are necessary; you have access to all the information you need for a thorough clause by clause consideration of that bill. So, I want to suggest to you as an

expert committee—perhaps one of the most expert committees in the house—that you have done all those things now that are necessary to proceed to the consideration of the bill, and that we move in that direction and do not find ourselves being accused of being dilatory in the duty that we have to perform.

Mr. SMITH: We might also try to avoid the appearance of closure too, Mr. Deachman.

The CHAIRMAN: No, there is no appearance of closure here. The Steering Committee will meet today at noon to consider what we shall do. I make this statement this morning so that you know what is in my mind and what I feel we should be considering.

Mr. WINCH: Could I make a comment?

The CHAIRMAN: Yes.

Mr. WINCH: Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a comment as a member of the Steering Committee; it was unfortunate that we were not able to meet yesterday. With all due respect, Mr. Chairman, I think you are going contrary to a decision at the last meeting of the Steering Committee. I appreciate that we should now, as soon as possible, be getting down to a clause by clause consideration of the bill but I am certain my memory is correct that at our last Steering Committee it was agreed by the Steering Committee and accepted by this Committee that following the hearing and, I am happy to say, the conclusion of Admiral Landymore's second appearance, we would hear General Allard as Chief of Staff. Then we would hear General Rothschild on certain other aspects, following which the decision of the Steering Committee was that we were to approach, invite and hear General Simonds and Air Vice Marshal Curtis, and then the Steering Committee would consider whether or not we would continue with further witnesses. But that was—and I am certain, sir—a unanimous decision of the Steering Committee at our last meeting, but in your presentation you are now going exactly contrary to a unanimous decision of the Steering Committee and I think that I would have been derelict in my duties if I had not drawn this to your attention.

One further point, which I know has just been overlooked, is that because of the procedure which we agreed to at the Steering Committee to proceed immediately after Admiral Landymore and the Minister in reply thereto, the hearing of General Allard and General Rothschild, and the hearings of the other two, that we were doing so with the knowledge that there still are a number of members who are on the record in this Committee, including myself, as having a number of questions still to be put to the Minister himself.

You will remember, Mr. Chairman, that it was Mr. Churchill, I believe, when we were here the day before yesterday and I wanted to ask questions, who drew the attention of the Committee to the fact that the Steering Committee's decision was that we would stay with the Admiral Landymore—I hate to say the word—issue, and I then asked to be placed down because I was giving away on priority on my questions of the Minister.

I am certain, Mr. Chairman, that I am giving a factual report of the Steering Committee's decisions and their Committee's decisions, and I do not think, sir, with all respect, you should change Steering Committee and Committee decisions or recommendations until the Steering Committee has had a further meeting. I

make this comment with all respect, but I do think we have to adhere to a unanimous decision of the Steering Committee.

Mr. ANDRAS: Mr. Chairman, with all respect to Mr. Winch—and I am quite sure that any discrepancy between our assessment of that Steering Committee decision is purely a question of interpretation—I would not go along with the idea that that was a unanimous decision. I distinctly expressed great reservations about the wisdom of continuing with more witnesses at that Steering Committee meeting.

Mr. WINCH: You did not vote against it when we named them.

Mr. ANDRAS: I beg your pardon.

Mr. WINCH: You did not vote against it when the names were suggested.

Mr. ANDRAS: There was not a vote taken on that, Mr. Winch; there were expressions of opinions given.

Mr. WINCH: Well, that is generally acceptance in the Steering Committee.

Mr. ANDRAS: I expressed reservations, so I just simply say that it was not unanimous.

Mr. LAMBERT: Mr. Chairman, may I intervene here briefly? First of all, I have a sneaking suspicion this is a bit of a cold porridge mentality that we saw back last June, and secondly, I think this is quite a disservice, this idea of cutting down as of tomorrow. There are a number of people who have been accepted by your predecessor as people that we should be hearing. We have spent two or three days as a result of an unfortunate incident last Thursday night. Surely that should not be charged up to the Committee, who want to hear witnesses, as their time. Otherwise, it was just pure spoilage; mischievious spoilage of Committee hearings.

The other thing I want to say is that there are a number of questions that can be repeated to different witnesses and surely to goodness, unless one has a closed mind and is not prepared to hear testimony by other persons, there is the absolute right and, I think, a duty on this Committee to hear from not only the senior people, but there are some people at middle rank who also have a lot that might be expressed to this Committee. After all, it must be remembered that there are a number of members on the government side, with all due respect to them, who only come to this Committee for these hearings. Their connection has been tenuous, if at all, prior to this.

I would respectfully suggest to you, sir, that this is closure of the worst kind if you are trying to say we will get on the clause by clause study tomorrow and that any further information will come from the Minister or his officials. We might as well take it straight out of the mouth of the Minister because of the attitude that has existed so far as the hearings of this Committee are concerned.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Byrne and then Mr. McIntosh.

Mr. BYRNE: Mr. Chairman, as one who has come to the Committee recently and referred to by Mr. Lambert, I want to assure the Committee and Mr. Lambert that I have not been unmindful of what has been taking place in this Committee and I have been carefully reading much of the evidence and the reports.

An hon. MEMBER: You cannot have read very much because we have not got most of it.

An hon. MEMBER: Will you listen and just be quiet?

Mr. BYRNE: From the interjections at the moment, Mr. Chairman, it is quite evident that the members of the opposition particularly the Conservative opposition are intending to carry out the pronouncement that was made by Mr. Harkness on Tuesday evening on television, that this Committee was going to be kept in session if at all possible by questioning and by hearing witnesses until this session is over. In other words, to kill the bill. Oh, I may be paraphrasing, Mr. Harkness, but I did listen very carefully to your television interview. It was certainly obvious to me that it was the intention of the official opposition to kill this bill by filibuster or otherwise until the session was prorogued which, of course, would have the effect of killing the bill.

Mr. Chairman, I think I can hear as well as anyone and while my memory may not be as good as some—

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, this is a serious matter of how we are to proceed. Let us not get involved in accusations and whether or not there is a filibuster. I think that is the most difficult thing to prove in the whole of Parliament. The point is, how do we move ahead adequately with the bill? My own feelings, reviewing the amount of work that the Committee has done and looking at this experienced Committee, are that the time is here to examine the bill and I just want that consideration in your minds as we move to the Steering Committee today.

Mr. BYRNE: I withdraw the suggestion of filibuster but—

The CHAIRMAN: Yes?

Mr. BYRNE: —I will have to leave it to some other interpretation for Mr. Harkness to explain what he meant by keeping the Committee in session until it was too late to consider it in the House and cause an election, if necessary—defeat the government.

An hon. MEMBER: What are you afraid of?

Mr. BYRNE: Certainly, I am not afraid of anything—not afraid of anything—

An hon. MEMBER: We do not like your intentions.

Mr. BYRNE: —and I am quite willing to face the electorate on this issue if that becomes necessary. I have no concern whatsoever in that regard but I have this very grave concern. To quote the highest officer in military command he said, on page 23:

> I sincerely believe a postponement or delay in starting this final stage would have a most serious effect on all of us now serving and on our recruiting prospects.

What the service man is saying—not the politician—to us now is "get on with it". And, in my opinion any delay, one year, two years, five years or even a few months would seriously impair morale. I am sure, Mr. Chairman, that this is ample reason for getting on with the bill having regard to the evidence which we have heard outlined by you this morning.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr. Byrne.

Mr. MCINTOSH: To carry on from what Mr. Byrne said, we have also heard witnesses at this Committee who are just as strongly opposed—for God's sake stop this bill, because it will break up your services. I, as a member of this Committee, not being on the Steering Committee, and I think the records will prove it, have felt with the rapidity of the meetings we have had and the short time we have had with the witnesses, that very few witnesses have been dealt with to conclusion.

I know that in the case of Admiral Landymore we were promised he would be brought back to answer all the questions he suggested on the last two pages of his brief to us. That has not been done, and there are many questions there. I admit that there is the possibility of what Mr. Byrne said; the appearance that we want to call an election or overthrow the government or kill the bill. Certainly we are opposed to the bill for reasons—because we think it will destroy the services—but I think we are entitled to hear witnesses who have the same idea as we and not be forced to listen—

An hon. MEMBER: The same ideas?

Mr. MCINTOSH: The same ideas, yes; and I freely admit that I am strongly opposed to the bill because it can have only one motive and one result and that is to destroy our three services and I am opposed to that—strongly opposed to it—for reasons. I would like to hear other witnesses, because I have heard other witnesses now that I did not hear in the first place. In all deference to the senior officers that you have here, they are compelled to put forward one side of the story only and you want us to listen continually to this, but I think that in fairness to us who openly say that we oppose the bill for reasons—we are quite willing to document them—that the other side should hear the arguments too. This is a debate. You do not have to agree with them, but surely you can listen to them. There must be some reason for it.

Every bill is not just political, and I think there is too much politics in this one particular debate but you cannot keep it out; let us face those facts. I think that we should hear all witnesses. This is a very serious matter as far as the people of Canada are concerned because it concerns the pursestrings. It concerns a very sore subject such as compulsory military service, something that I do not think Canada wants but something we feel, if you will let this bill go through, is going to be necessary. These are the points I think should be brought out and we can only do it by hearing witnesses.

Mr. BYRNE: Could I ask a question?

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Byrne, I have several people who wish to speak, and we are attempting here only to get an expression of view before the Steering Committee meets. Mr. Brewin, you had your hand up I think, and then Mr. Harkness.

Mr. BYRNE: Can you tell us the number of witnesses that have been heard who are opposed to this legislation?

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Byrne, I read out a considerable list this morning when I opened my remarks. Mr. Brewin?

Mr. BREWIN: Mr. Chairman, I wonder whether it would be better, for the time being, to leave this matter to the Steering Committee? I do not think we

can discuss it intelligently until the Steering Committee has ascertained what additional witnesses any members of the Committee desire to call, having in mind Mr. Winch's point that the Steering Committee has already, apparently, agreed on two witnesses, Lieutenant-General Simonds and Air Marshal Curtis, I think it was. If the Steering Committee finds that there are other witnesses, it can make the recommendations on whether these winesses likely would be merely repetitive.

I think there must be some happy medium between going on indefinitely, and cutting off the hearings before people who have some new and valuable information for us have been heard. I think if the Steering Committee would go over this and present a plan, whether it is unanimous or not, then we can decide intelligently what we are going to do. I am sure we want to arrive at a situation where we do not do either one of two things—either go on so long as to obstruct decision on the bill or, on the other hand, seem to cut the thing off when there is some important and worthwhile witness that we have not heard.

I would suggest that while we may advance points of view here now, it would be impossible, I think, to go back to General Allard until the Steering Committee has reviewed this matter, then we can have some intelligent discussion on the future course; I thought that was what the Steering Committee was for. I would like the members to meet and make a firm recommendation and decide what they are recommending and what they are not recommending.

The CHAIRMAN: I will hear Mr. Harkness, and then Mr. McNulty is on my list. With respect, gentlemen, I think we have had an excellent hearing of views this morning on the subject, which will certainly help to guide the Steering Committee when they meet. We have some valuable briefings here this morning from General Allard. I will hear Mr. Harkness and Mr. McNulty, and then I hope we will be able to get on with General Allard.

Mr. HARKNESS: Mr. Chairman, the statement that Mr. Byrne has made with regard to what I said on television the other night is, of course, quite incorrect. Actually, in connection with whether the Committee would complete its hearings before the target date for prorogation which the Prime Minister announced, I was asked the question: Did I think this Committee would have it cleaned up and would the bill get through the House, and so forth by that date? I said that in my opinion there was no chance of that; that with the number of witnesses we still had to hear I thought the Committee would be fully occupied up to and beyond March 10. This is what I said in answer to a question which is quite a different thing than the interpretation that Mr. Byrne has tried to place on my remarks. As I say, I was answering a question, and giving my opinion with regard to what the answer should be, or was.

I must say that this idea you have put forward—in effect, trying to impose closure on this Committee—is, in my view, directly contrary to the assurances given by the Prime Minister and by the Minister, in the House and outside the House, that the Committee would have an opportunity to go into the whole question of unification thoroughly and in detail and would be able to call any witnesses whom we wished to call before this Committee and that we would have a complete and full opportunity to question those witnesses. Now, these were assurances by the Prime Minister and by the Minister, and my effort to try to prevent our hearing a number of these witnesses, whose evidence I think is

essential, I consider would be directly against, and in contradiction of, the solemn assurances we have been given in that regard.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. McNulty?

Mr. MCNULTY: Mr. Chairman, I believe I expressed the opinion in the Steering Committee that I thought we had heard a sufficient number of witnesses. We have had quite a variety; we have had a number from all the different services, and about 80 per cent of them have been in opposition to the bill. I think it is about time we got on with the bill itself.

An hon. MEMBER: Mr. Chairman, I would like to make one comment only—

The CHAIRMAN: Now, gentlemen, I have come to the end of the list that I had marked down here; if we open it up further, we are going to spend a whole morning discussing something on which we have had a good expression of views. I have certainly given you my views, and members on both sides of the table have given me their views. The Steering Committee is going to meet at noon, and I think we ought to have General Allard now and continue with the questioning where we left off yesterday. I will call on Mr. Smith. You have a few minutes left, Mr. Smith, from the interruptions of yesterday.

Mr. SMITH: I think you are being over-generous. I have a short series of questions for General Allard later on one specific subject, but I will pass now.

The CHAIRMAN: The only one remaining on my list is Mr. Andras. Mr. Fane, you had your hand up a moment ago. Were you left out of the first run of questioning, or are you on the second time?

Mr. FANE: I never tried to get on, but I would like to get on before we finish with General Allard.

The CHAIRMAN: General Allard is going to be here today, and we have a briefing to see once we have finished with the first round of questioning.

Mr. SMITH: In that case, I would like to finish my few minutes.

The CHAIRMAN: Will you finish then, Mr. Smith? Then Mr. Andras and Mr. Fane, and then we will have the briefing.

Mr. SMITH: The questions I wanted to ask concern the interchangeability of troops in the combat forces, General Allard. I presume a study has been made on this point?

General ALLARD: Yes.

Mr. SMITH: What percentage of troops are considered to be fully interchangeable among the three fighting environments?

General ALLARD: It will depend on those who wish to qualify.

Mr. SMITH: Pardon?

General ALLARD: It will depend largely on those who wish to qualify; there is plenty of opportunity.

Mr. SMITH: What do you mean by "plenty of opportunity"? That is a rather general statement; if I could I would like to get something a little more specific.

General ALLARD: I will not give you any answers because I have not asked each individual. The point is that if you take the tradesmen—those who are

considered as technicians, and there is a greater and greater number of them; I would say about 40 per cent of the ground forces are now tradesmen, and an even greater number in the other two have trades that are quite similar in all environments—

Mr. SMITH: When you say "quite similar" though, this is the study you have done. Has that indicated, for example, how much extra training a communicator in the army would need before he becomes capable of being a communicator in the naval environment?

General ALLARD: I cannot give you a precise answer to this.

Mr. SMITH: Has this study not been done?

General ALLARD: The study is not completed in that particular regard.

Mr. SMITH: Could you give me an example of a trade that is completed? If there is a great advantage to unification, is it not going to be in the interchangeability of personnel?

General ALLARD: Yes, it is.

Mr. SMITH: Assuming it could be told now, in fairly detailed terms, what advantage is there going to be from the interchangeability?

General ALLARD: You can exchange communicators, engine room mechanics, stationary engineers, radar operators, aircraft operators, helicopter pilots, and those represent a large number of people. On top of this, you can allow anyone in the ranks—at least in the trades that are not now technical—if they have the ability, to train for any of these environments that I am talking about, and receive an employment at a higher rate of pay.

Mr. SMITH: Yes, but how much training will the communicator from the army have to have before he can go to a ship? Will it be one month, two months, six months, or six weeks?

General ALLARD: You are asking me a question which is very difficult to answer because—

Mr. SMITH: Do you not think it is an important question?

General ALLARD: Oh, I do not disagree with the importance of your question. But how long does it take for a child to have reached a PhD? In analogy, how much can a man absorb? I would like to say this to you, though, that if you take a man who has a military background, it takes considerably less time to train him in a skill than it takes to train a recruit.

Mr. SMITH: Yes, I realize that.

General ALLARD: I cannot go on in specific detail to the number of man hours required to train an individual to obtain a skill, because it depends on his ability.

Mr. SMITH: Quite so, General Allard. But suppose we come back to a man who is trained in one environment for a trade—a communicator, we will say—and it takes six months to retrain him to be useful to another; in that six months he has to be replaced in his own environment.

General ALLARD: But he does not have to be replaced in his own environment. We normally absorb most of the training from the present establishment, but in peacetime—

Mr. SMITH: Somebody else is doing his job, though.

General ALLARD: Not necessarily, because there is a lot of flexibility in the service.

Mr. SMITH: If I were a signaller with a regiment in your mobile force, and then I go to be a navy signaller-communicator, somebody has to replace me back in squadron "D", or wherever it may be.

General ALLARD: Not necessarily.

Mr. SMITH: Who is going to run the set?

General ALLARD: Nobody.

Mr. SMITH: Oh, sir, if you have a squadron and you need three signallers to operate, and you take me out to train me for the navy, you have got to replace me back there with somebody; are you going to close it down?

General ALLARD: No, Mr. Smith, you just do not use that particular set for a period of time.

Mr. SMITH: The squadron, I presume is operational?

General ALLARD: No, Mr. Smith, I will tell you this: Our establishments are built—and I will give you some very good examples of this—with flexibility so that when you lose people you can carry on. After the first hour of an attack in war, how many men have you got left in your organization? You have suffered a number of casualties; does it mean that you sit down then and say "I am waiting for replacements"? You carry on. This kind of flexibility does exist and, therefore—

Mr. SMITH: General Allard, I have been in one or two occurrences where there were casualties, but surely at the beginning you try to have your establishment up to strength. You would have a signaller for every set, and if you take a signaller away from a squadron, then you have to replace him to operate that squadron. This brings in the question of whether this business of interchangeability of parts has not been badly over-sold. I would have hoped that you could have provided us with the result of some of your studies with some detail of how many hours it is going to take to train. It would have been very useful to the Committee, and it might have convinced some people if we could have had this interchangeability study with the same degree of precision that you were able to supply the hours wasted on inter-departmental committees yesterday. I would like to have heard that such information and examples about the net gain in training you have by having them interchangeable are available.

General ALLARD: Mr. Smith, we do not consider this an important question.

Mr. SMITH: What, interchangeability of people?

General ALLARD: I am sorry, I say that the retraining of people is not considered an important question. I have not wasted my staff's time to study it, because any man in the service, any professional in this business can tell you

today, that this is too easy to do. So I do not need to go into the nth degree because it will not fit in any case.

Mr. SMITH: Well, it would make the case; it makes the case.

General ALLARD: Well, it makes the case, and I have tried to explain to you—

Mr. SMITH: And I have tried to understand.

General ALLARD: May be it is impossible, but the question is quite simple. I say to you, as a professional and as an adviser, that this kind of study is not necessary; it does not affect our establishments.

Mr. SMITH: Then, a final question. Overall, has there been any study made of the savings of the numbers of people in the armed services that will result from this interchangeability of men which is so highly put as one of the keys to why we should accept unification? How many men is this going to save?

General ALLARD: First of all, Mr. Smith, I would like to change the course a bit if you will permit me. When we talk about interchangeability, we are investing in the people that already we have trained. We are also considerably worried about the wife and children and the upsetting elements that exist in the service. We want to give these men better opportunities to grow so that they will stay with us. If you continue forever in moving people or not giving them opportunities, they leave the service and then you have to start from scratch with the recruit. The question I am asking is: is the recruit a better man, or does it cost less to train the recruit, than it does to keep your own men in the service? This is the important factor. This is very important.

Now, to go to the nth degree in studying. What you are trying to make me say is that we have not done a study. I say that you are perfectly right, we have not done a study—

Mr. SMITH: I did not say that.

General ALLARD: —because I did not consider this kind of a study important, because we know that it is possible and advisable to do so. This is the only way that I can answer you.

Mr. SMITH: I will finish on this question. It is true that people have left the navy because of long sea duty, but are you going to get enough army and air force communicators to volunteer to replace them, or are they going to be posted, happily or unhappily, to the navy?

General ALLARD: There has never been a question of unhappiness.

Mr. SMITH: Involuntarily, perhaps is the word.

General ALLARD: Involuntarily—there has never been a question of this, and it has been stated clearly. But men want this; it is a challenge and something they want to do. This is something that is good for them and good for their morale. Therefore, if we can assist this way and there is a necessity to do so, then we will have gained by the interchangeability of personnel.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Andras, you are next.

Mr. ANDRAS: General Allard, one of the retired naval officers who appeared before us as a witness commented on certain faults in the adopted integration organization. He said, and I am quoting:

The matter before us is unification and my departure from the subject is to show how untimely unification is, because of integration problems.

There are five basic faults in the adopted integrated organization. These are urgently in need of repair.

I would like to go over each one of these and, I hope, get your answer to them.

First—Materiel Command is not living up to expectations. Because fiscal control rests with the Headquarters and because manpower controls rest with the Headquarters organization, in many ways Materiel Command becomes a post office between the Headquarters and the Operational Commands.

He goes on to say:

...to give your Committee a very clear picture of the deficiencies and the necessary corrective measures. Since this will lead ultimately to a very serious personnel upheaval and is vital to effective operations, it cannot be delayed. Unification added to this will seriously delay progress.

That is the first of the basic faults that he mentions, that Materiel Command is not living up to expectations.

General ALLARD: Mr. Andras, could I answer this question after I have given you the briefing on the work that is going on in Materiel Command?

Mr. ANDRAS: Yes, most certainly. Then I will go on with the others. The second basic fault that he suggests is this:

Second—Training Command is a luxury we cannot afford. Far too much expense is involved in this Command, which in essence, like Materiel Command acts as a post office between the Headquarters and the operational commands. When the navy was at its greatest peace time strength, there were 17 officers and men responsible for the direction of training (at Headquarters level) for the entire Navy. There are now 65 in Winnipeg, and in addition, there is still a staff in Ottawa. Training Command has not been a success and should be reduced to functioning in relation to basic training and common training outside the purview of operational commanders.

General ALLARD: Do you want me to answer this right away?

Mr. ANDRAS: If you would, sir.

General ALLARD: First of all, the statement that we have increased the number of naval officers in training is correct, but correspondingly we have reduced the number of other officers and this is opening a new field in the naval set-up. Now, when he says that training is a luxury, he is referring to the old concept of training.

Mr. ANDRAS: He says Training Command is a luxury we cannot afford.

General ALLARD: I know, but he is putting it against the former training system. As for Training Command being a luxury, I do not think it is a luxury.

I think the high standard of flying, for example, in the RCAF is largely due to the constant vigilance, and the constant quality of the instructional staff of Air Training Command.

Training Command has taken over the responsibilities for all army schools and has taken over the responsibilities for the non-operational side of the naval training. Now, to say that it is a luxury—I do not know what he bases his arguments on. It is an expensive command and I do not disagree with this, but training is expensive. Is it more expensive or less expensive than it was before? My suggestion is that it is less. And if we find at a later date that it is even more costly, we can also continue to curtail their activities and hand over some of the activities to other people who can do other kinds of training.

The training system which was invented—and let us not forget this—in the services before was based entirely on the necessity for expansion of the forces in case of hostilities. The training organizations have always been expensive since we organized them at the end of the war. This was part of our system to expand rapidly and, therefore, if you were to follow the suggestion here, you would not only cut out—if you say it is too expensive—but, at the same time, cut your ability to build in case of an emergency, regardless of the size it is—a Korea for example; a type of undertaking like this. Our schools are designed to be able to expand rapidly in order to be able to build up quickly. This is one of the main things that we have today. There is no question that today the reserves cannot readily provide the necessary skills to fit into an organization quickly. It is no longer the same way it was in 1939, and for this reason we have to maintain an organization which we call Training Command.

Training Command has removed from CFHQ the whole of the Director General of Military Training, in the old General Staff branch, completely. Therefore, there have been readjustments. To pick on one command and say that it is bigger than it was—of course it is bigger than it was. But what you have to realize is the over-all reductions we have done. Not only have we changed things, but we have modernized at the same time. Training Command is, therefore, an excellent organization and we can make it as effective and expensive as is necessary. We can make it as efficient as is necessary. This is the important factor. Therefore, this statement to me is a statement from someone who looks at one little corner of the organization and says everything is wrong, without appreciating what it has achieved and what it is doing. This is one of the reasons why I say that unified thinking is so important, and there is a great lack of it here.

Mr. ANDRAS: The third basic fault he outlines and I quote:

> *Third*—The Defence Staff is constituted in such a way as to introduce professional weakness. The present Defence Staff has serious weaknesses in relation to professional matters concerning operations, personnel and support. The Defence Staff needs broadening in environmental professionalism. The advent of the Canadian Forces Council has repaired some of the Defence Staff weaknesses, but not all of them.

I would like your comments on that please.

General ALLARD: There is nothing further from the truth. I am confident in my staff, they are capable, and my staff undertakes any task that we give to

them, and this is not substantiated in any way. It is just a statement, and I do not believe in anything that is said in that statement.

Mr. ANDRAS: Including the comment that "the Defence Staff needs broadening in environmental professionalism."

General ALLARD: We have sufficient environmental knowledge in the staff now to deal with the day to day problems and operations; there is no problem whatever. There is one thing that he loses sight of and that is in addition to the CFHQ staff, which after all, is a policy staff, we also have all the necessary experts in Maritime Command, in Mobile Command, in Air Defence Command, to balance the weaknesses that he may consider present—I do not agree with him. Those are important factors. We have given more responsibilities to the field—this is what we have done—and, therefore, it is very important to consider the question of the Council, and this is the reason why I brought the Council in. I said not only do I want these people to give advice when necessary, but I want them also to appreciate the importance of the other people's point of vew, the other people's priorities, and the other people's needs. These are the reasons I brought them in, not only to give me advice; I get lots of advice.

Mr. ANDRAS: Am I correct in assuming, General, that it is most likely under any circumstances there would be a mix on senior staff, or in the staff of any command as well as CFHQ of environmental expertise? In other words, you would have a mix of combat officers from the three arms who go on to staff responsibilities. You would have a mix of those on any staff, is that correct?

General ALLARD: Yes, we do. in fact, you are bringing up a very interesting point. I said earlier today in answer to a question that the army was a unified service in the sense that you only learn the professional side of your career, armywise, from the time that you pass the staff college.

I have also stated that it might take a military generation to really obtain the full effect of unification.

Mr. CHURCHILL: How long is a military generation?

General ALLARD: Mr. Churchill the answer is from the time they pass staff college until retirement.

Mr. CHURCHILL: How many years?

General ALLARD: It depends on the rank he achieves. By this I mean that it will be difficult for a period of time to give sufficient training to all requirements—to be able to fill all the posts. Last year I was very tempted to give the command of a brigade to an airman—very tempted—because I felt he was capable of doing it.

And why should he not—Field Marshal Kesselring was an airman. But today what is happening in the forces is that by being separated and the fact that we have to work together at some time—the air may play a more important role than the ground forces. Why should we not appoint an airman to do this job—why should we not?

The answer to this is because it is difficult for him to adapt himself to the system of staff duties because he has never had a chance to learn them. He can learn them fairly quickly but it takes a long time to get to know all the difficult gadgetry that goes on.

The same thing applies to the other side. By exposing people early in their career to environments that they do not have to be experts in but to understand the problems of the other environments and to be able to appreciate them; to be able to ask the proper questions to an individual, to the experts, let us say, then he has to be exposed to this early in his career.

I could select a good number of people. I would have selected one very good naval officer who worked for me when I was C. Ops. R. to command a theatre—to command field troops. To command not only field troops but an over-all organization. This is becoming more and more important because these are on a smaller scale today and Canadians have to take more responsibility. I would have been prepared to give it to him with some assistance, with some experts, but the difficulty is that this man does not quite feel the confidence. He has not matched himself up at staff colleges and at discussions on this subject.

For this reason alone it becomes important that we organize our instructional system so that all officers are exposed to the problems of the others. This was not possible before.

Today we will be organizing something that will answer this question. If you want to remain narrow in your field then you can say: "I am an infanteer and I am going to remain an infanteer." This is interesting—most interesting. How far you will go in your career—major—at the most?

The intelligent officer—the fellow who can broaden his knowledge—to the fellow that we qualify at great expense at the Royal Military College—I want to give him better employment by a better choice. This is what we are doing.

Mr. ANDRAS: The fourth basic fault, according to this witness is:

The reserve organizations, coming as they do—

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Andras, are you coming near the end because I want to leave time for General Allard's briefing before lunch time and that is going to cut us off fairly soon.

Mr. ANDRAS: Mr. Chairman, I am very interested in that too but as I was saying there were five basic faults with this that I thought I would try and cover here. One has been reserved for answer later.

General ALLARD: Mr. Andras, I have the brief here to which you are referring and I can answer all the questions in one shot.

Mr. ANDRAS: Fine.

General ALLARD: The fourth one which is the reserve organization. I am sorry, did I say something wrong?

An hon. MEMBER: We are just wondering if this had been pre-arranged.

Mr. ANDRAS: Are you interested in getting the answers to the basic—level?

General ALLARD: Are you suggesting that I am playing with the other side.

An hon. MEMBER: I was just wondering how you happened to have the brief from which Mr. Andras was asking the questions.

General ALLARD: I happen to have an efficient staff.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, if General Allard is quick enough to anticipate Mr. Churchill he is quick enough to anticipate Mr. Andras. Let us all get back to work.

General ALLARD: The reserve organization—I wonder if the gentleman in question has consulted with the members of the Defence Association because it is they that expressed their great vote of confidence in the new organization for the reserves. We have revitalized the reserves.

The question here appears to be that everything that is here should be under one particular command or another. In other words, splitting them all up around the country—We have centralized it in Ottawa because it is here where the policy for the reserves begins. The system that is organized is good and it is going to work. The people in the Defence Association have expressed great satisfaction with the plans that we have put across and after all, I am an old reservist too, I know what I am talking about.

Mobile Command is too large and so is Maritime Command. Well, Mobile Command is too large—what do we mean? I have already said that I would not answer this question. It has nothing to do with organization. Mobile Command has what it needs. I am not too sure—I am going to examine very closely Maritime Command. I was not aware that the Command that he created himself was being made too big. But the one I created is absolutely right.

Mr. ANDRAS: I notice that in No. 5 he says that the Maritime Command is too big yet in No. 4 he states it should be even larger by including naval reserves.

General ALLARD: Mobile Command is absolutely correct at the moment. It may need some readjustments but it is correct to do its tasks. It has been prepared with a great deal of attention with regard to reducing the number of people engaged in that job.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Mr. Chairman, if I might interject I think we are reading something out of context from the brief. If my memory serves me correctly—and I stand to be corrected on this—he said that it was too large to be under one command. There was some merit in a little more economy on the West coast. Is that not correct, General?

General ALLARD: I am prepared to mix in economics but I do not believe it is right?

Mr. FORRESTALL: I said autonomy.

General ALLARD: Autonomy? In fact, it is autonomous now more or less.

Mr. FORRESTALL: It has been suggested that the writer of the brief, who has not been identified yet—and I believe it is Admiral Landymore's brief if my memory serves me correctly—that he said one thing in one paragraph and contradicted it in the next. I am not certain that that is how the brief reads.

Mr. ANDRAS: General, may I read it just so we can have a fair interpretation?

Mr. CHURCHILL: Mr. Chairman, I am wondering if the course of this inquiry conducted by Mr. Andras is perhaps the repetition you were talking about a little while ago.

The CHAIRMAN: Oh, Mr. Churchill,—

Mr. ANDRAS: Mr. Chairman, on a point of order, sir. There were five basic criticisms made and I am trying as a member of this Committee to get an answer to these basic criticisms. I am sure all members regardless of party affiliation would be interested in getting those answers.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, go ahead please. Our time is running along and we must go ahead.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I believe this is special attention you are giving to Mr. Andras with respect to a series of questions—

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Churchill, I want to assure you that I will shower my attentions on all of you.

Mr. ANDRAS: You tempt me, Mr. Churchill, to say that I seem to get cut off faster than you do.

GENERAL ALLARD: If it please Mr. Forrestall I would say that insofar as the unification of the whole of Maritime Command on both coasts is concerned is an interesting idea. In fact, I as the chief of operational readiness in the first days of integration thought that this was a good idea; it is not a bad idea. Except if we were to do this we would have to enlarge the staff at CFHQ in order to handle the problems because their problems are different. I do not disagree their problems are slightly different. But having the expertise on one coast in the hands of the maritime people I thought was a good idea.

Mr. FORRESTALL: General, I appreciate that. It was not that that I was getting at. It was that something had been taken out of context.

Mr. ANDRAS: Mr. Chairman, may I clear up that point. I was not attempting to take anything out of context. It states:

> *Fourth*—The reserve organizations, coming as they do under a common administration, are poorly placed in the organization. The Naval Reserve should be part of Maritime Command. The Militia should be part of Mobile Command. To put them where they belong will create more organizational upheaval.
>
> *Fifth*—Mobile Command is too large and so is Maritime Command.—

and I relate that back to the Naval Reserve—the suggestion that Naval Reserve should be under Maritime Command. It goes on to say:

> —They have been created due to the adoption of a functional organization. The resultant large commands with vast geography to contend with makes them both unwieldy and uneconomical. Maritime Command should revert to its former East and West Coast Commands. Mobile Command should be given a three way split into East, West and Central Commands.

Mr. Chairman, that is the exact quotation. There was no attempt to take it out of context.

Mr. FORRESTALL: That was the only point, Mr. Chairman.

General ALLARD: Mr. Andras, the question is quite simple. If you were to follow this suggestion with regard to the Militia. Let us take the Militia for

example. If you put it all under Mobile Command then there is a large proportion of the Militia that is normally run—in the former days it was normally run under the guidance of the Quartermaster-General and all the technical corps.

Therefore, if you had to do this then you would have to split it into two. Then, you would have to have two staffs—you would have to have one at Materiel Command and you would have to have one at Mobile Command so you end up by having a reserve staff at every command and I think this is undesirable. We centralized it—in fact, I have some experts here on the naval reserves and they were very happy.

In fact, a conference of the Defence Association voted a vote of thanks for us for the concept we have shown them and the concept that we have put into effect. This means the centralization through a staff which is not bigger than the staff that existed before for emergency operations—It is a small staff.

General Dare is a very competent man and he has his air force side and his naval side and the naval reserves are well looked after now and they are happy. In fact, we have something even better for them in the future. I think I have answered all the questions except the first and I would like to suggest, Mr. Chairman, if you do not mind that I would like to give the briefing.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Fane, you are always so reasonable with the Chair that I hate to impose on you but I wonder if I could call on you first immediately following the logistics briefing.

Mr. FANE: I agree.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much indeed, gentlemen. General Allard will proced with his briefing.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Are we going to have a chance to ask more questions?

The CHAIRMAN: Most certainly.

General ALLARD: Gentlemen, to introduce this brief I would like to present to you General Lilley, who is the Chief of Technical Services.

Lieutenant-General L. G. C. LILLEY (*Chief of Technical Services*): Mr. Chairman, Gentlemen:

1. Our main purpose this morning is to present to you an outline of a study currently being carried out to develop a single integrated logistics system for the support of the operational forces.

2. Prior to integration each of the three Services had its own supply system and maintenance organization with its associated warehouses, workshops and other facilities right across Canada—and in many cases within a stone's-throw of one another. Although coordination between the three Services was attempted, by tri-Service Committees at the Headquarters level, individual Service interests did not always permit the best solutions being reached. Each supply system carried items common to one to the other—recent studies have revealed that over 20 percent of the 900,000 items in the three supply systems are common to two or more Services.

Each Service used different procedures, different forms, and different management methods. Each system was in need of overhaul and improvement to meet the demands of modern times and the increasing complexity of today's weapons systems.

3. Logistics embraces transportation, supply and maintenance. In many respects, the logistics system is the heart of materiel support to the operational forces, and a briefing on the planning and progress of the Integrated Logistics System was considered appropriate at this time.

4. A two-fold aim has been established to guide this programme. Firstly, that during the planning for and implementation of a new system there shall be no lessening of present levels of support; and it is for this reason that the three existing supply systems, under the management of Materiel Command Headquarters, will continue until the new system can take over. Secondly, the new system shall provide more effective support.

5. The brief is long and somewhat detailed, but it is a good example of the thoroughness with which planning of new systems is carried out. It is also an example of the type of briefing that is given regularly to the Canadian Forces Council to keep members informed.

6. I shall now call upon Rear Admiral Burchell, Deputy Chief of Technical Services (Logistics) under whose direction this study is being carried out, to introduce the briefing.

Rear-Admiral H. G. BURCHELL (*Deputy Chief of Technical Services (Logistics)*):

Mr. Chairman, gentlemen: The work DEVIL is the acronym for Development of Integrated Logistics. The management of the DEVIL program is carried out as follows.

The overall policy direction rests with the Supply System Steering Group the composition of which is shown on that slide.

You will notice the inclusion as members of the Assistant Deputy Minister Logistics, a representative of Treasury Board and the Assistant Deputy Minister (Supply) of the Department of Defence Production.

The composition of the Steering Group was deliberate and it is interdepartmental with the aim of reducing the time span for decision making by bringing all the interested and responsible parties in at the Steering Group.

The Supply System Advisory Group, the membership of which is shown on this slide, is responsible for the close and detailed monitoring of the program and puts forward matters requiring Steering Group consideration.

The real work on this program is vested in the Directorate of Supply Plans under the overall direction of the Director General Supply. This slide will show you where this organization fits in the total Logistics sub-Branch.

This presentation will be broken down into the following main parts, each of which will be handled by the officer with the closest working knowledge of the subject area.

THE SUPPLY SYSTEM STEERING GROUP

CHAIRMAN - Deputy Chief Logistics

MEMBERS - Commander Materiel Command
Deputy Chief Engineering
Deputy Comptroller General
ADM (Logistics), DND
Program Division (Defence) Treasury Board
ADM (Supply) DDP

PERMANENT ADVISOR - Director General Supply

SECRETARY - DEVIL Planning and Control Officer

THE SUPPLY SYSTEM ADVISORY GROUP

CHAIRMAN - Director General Supply

MEMBERS - Chief of Staff, Materiel Command
Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics, Materiel Command
Assistant Deputy Chief Engineering
Director General Maintenance
Director General Transportation
Director Automation
Director General Logistics (ADML)
Director General Accounting and Audit (ADMF)
Representative DDP

PERMANENT ADVISOR - Director Supply Plans

SECRETARY - DEVIL Planning and Control Officer


CTS
D C
LOGISTICS
D G
TRANSPORTATION
D G
SUPPLY
D
SUPPLY PLANS
D G
MAINTENANCE

THE DEVIL PROGRAM

- SCOPE OF THE TASK
- MANAGEMENT
- CONCEPT FOR DEVIL
- THE NATIONAL LEVEL
- THE BASE/UNIT LEVEL

Air Commodore Armour, the Director-General of Supply will give you the overall scope of our task set against the major environmental factors.

Then Captain Willis, the Program Manager will describe how his teams operate and the concept for integrated logistics as it has now evolved.

Then two key section leaders of the Program Manager will give you a summary of their own work and the real benefits which the armed forces will enjoy.

Colonel Ralph will deal with the use of new management techniques as they will be employed at the national level.

Then Commander Tucker will describe the new base and unit procedures placing special emphasis on the improved standard of support to the user.

I will then conclude the presentation by summarizing the work that we have done so far and to provide you with a forecast of events of implementation.

Mr. Chairman, our aim then is to inform you of the objectives, the benefits and progress of the "DEVIL" program.

I will now call on Air Commodore Armour, the Director-General of Supply who will explain the scope of the task.

Mr. NUGENT: Mr. Chairman, I am a little perturbed at the number of people who are going to be called and the number of items that have been taken up by these people and the length of the time.

It seems to me that while it is all very helpful to the Committee to expand their knowledge of the workings of the process that our job here is considering this unification bill and to gain all the information we can on unification and integration and the difference between them but if we are going to spend this amount of time getting into the details of one part of the integration program I really feel that the Committee is committing itself to a very, very long range study of this because we have to then get back to the witnesses who are going to give us information on unification and I just wondered if the Chair has considered how long we should spend on details of one part of the integration program.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Nugent, we have had briefings on the broad aspect of unification and one of those broad aspects is logistics because armies must march on their stomachs as Napoleon said and, it is for this reason and for the reasons Napoleon would give you this same briefing were he unifying his armies, that General Allard is giving this brifing this morning. I think we should agree with experts like Napoleon and General Allard and move forward.

General Allard would you and your staff continue, please.

Mr. NUGENT: Mr. Chairman, if I may say, if this is going to be a briefing on the distinction why unification is necessary in order to make this type of integration work then our time is well spent. But since this is an integration point that if we are only going to get the details of integration without any clarification of why unification is necessary to make it work then we are wasting valuable time of this Committee and I had thought we wanted to proceed a little quicker.

Mr. WINCH: Mr. Chairman, may I just say that I think it is most important, most important to any member of this Committee irrespective of how they stand

on policies that go before us that we should know in detail what is going on, why it is going and what the projection is. I hope that we can proceed.

The CHAIRMAN: Would you proceed without a delay, please.

Air Commodore E. D. ARMOUR (*Director General Supply*): Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen:

I propose very briefly to outline the circumstances and conditions under which the DEVIL Program was conceived, the major influences which bear on it, the objectives set for the project and the parameters established as guidance to the Program Manager. Subsequent speakers on our team will detail the action in hand, the progress achieved and the schedule for completion.

While we have confidence in meeting this schedule and a review indicates that the time span involved compares favorably with those projects of similar size and complexity in government and industry of which we have knowledge, we are still striving to accelerate introduction of the system—although not at the expense of compromising our objective of a fully integrated logistics management system.

Rising costs, the incidence of technological change in Forces equipment and the need for flexibility to permit concentration of Department of National Defence logistic resources for support of the priority needs of any component of the Forces, have for some years past emphasized the requirement to re-organize and modernize the supply service of the Forces.

Today's computer technology provides the means—Economy and efficiency demand that it be done. What is needed is a supply system which provides managers with an accurate up-to-date knowledge of the total materiel assets of Department of National Defence in terms of item, quantity, condition and location. With such a system response to the needs of the Forces can be more efficient, while at the same time the inventory investment can be maintained at the most economic levels consistent with ability to support the Canadian Forces.

The DEVIL Program was initiated in the area of supply activity and the term Canadian Forces Supply System was used to describe the intent of developing one supply system for the Canadian Forces. It was, of course, immediately evident that Supply, Maintenance, Repair and Transportation are so interrelated that they must be considered as complementary activities which together comprise the system of Logistics support of the Forces and necessitate an integrated Technical Services Information system to permit co-ordinated materiel logistics support. The DEVIL Program now comprises this total concept.

The overall project manager or Co-ordinator is the Director of Supply Plans—Captain Willis. Co-ordinated studies in the disciplines of maintenance, transportation and supply are proceeding concurrently to ensure integrated Technical Services data—even though they may not all be concurrently implemented.

In the Fall of 1964 a small planning group commenced examination of the best course of action to improve the Department of National Defence supply system. The requirements were clear:

— to achieve a single supply system

— to reduce costs, both personnel and materiel, without impairing effectiveness

— and the imperative necessity to continue to support the Forces adequately while changes were made—including the capability of adequate supply support response to the changes occurring in all other functional areas.

It was clear that we had to establish our long-run objectives and systematically implement a carefully developed course of action which would preclude, as far as possible, any inability to respond satisfactorily to the materiel needs of our Forces. Under conditions where the "lead-time" for satisfactory support of major capital equipments can involve from, five years, we had to look carefully before leaping.

At the same juncture in time, to add to the intricacy of our task, the results of the Glassco Commission were, by Cabinet directive, posing additional requirements for us in two principal areas. The first was the requirement to move towards financial responsibility accounting which entailed the ability to charge out, in dollar terms, the cost of material and services to the user.

Arising from this is the concept of a Working Capital Advance or Stock Fund for unissued stock assets and you will hear more about this later.

The second was the direction that supply activities in support of all Government departments, other than The Department of National Defence would be consolidated into the Canadian Government Supply Services—a Division of The Department of Defence Production—the department who carry out purchasing for the Department of National Defence.

Thus, there was the need to establish clearly the interface between Department of Defence Production and the Department of National Defence in supply/logistics operations. Through the last year this facet has been actively pursued with the result that, by joint agreement, the DEVIL program will develop the basic supply system to be used by both departments and the Department of Defence Production will develop the purchasing system—but both must and will be compatible.

With this background I will summarize the position and task as the DEVIL team commenced work.

Supply activity in the three services was being performed by three distinctly separate systems, each of which had been developed to suit unique organizational and environmental considerations. I will not detail the differences but do wish to emphasize two factors. Each system provided for carrying out essentially the same functions, albeit in a different manner and each was engaged in trying to modernize its system to rectify recognized shortcomings in its ability to efficiently and economically manage the service materiel inventory and to take advantage of developments in the technology of computerization and communications.

The initial planning group concerned with setting the course for achievement of a single supply system, in addition to the factors already covered, had to consider the size and activity of the materiel inventory of the three systems which was as shown on this slide:

A word of explanation. Terminology number of line items—terminology we use—and the figure 900,000 represents 900,000 distinctly separate items, which must be maintained in the inventory of the Department of National Defence. The

THE THREE SUPPLY SYSTEMS

a.	Number of line items	900,000.
b.	Value of inventory	$1,250,000,000.
c.	Value of annual procurement	$ 250,000,000.
d.	Number of annual issues	4,000,000.
e.	Overhead costs of wholesale operations	$ 11,000,000.

value of the inventory is indicated there as an estimated value. It is to indicate to you the size of the operation we must conduct.

The value of annual procurement. I do not wish to be confused with procurement of capital end items. That value is for operating and maintenance stocks, the kind we must buy year in and year out to keep our operations going.

The number of annual issues reflects the number of issues that go from our bulk stock holdings to retail distribution points such as bases or units. The overhead costs of the wholesale operations reflect the light, heat, power and building maintenance costs of the wholesale depot facilities. It does not include any capital amortization or the operating personnel costs. The value of holdings at base and unit level is estimated to be at least that of these stocks which we describe as being the national level stocks. The Planning Group also had to consider that any new logistics system must function within the parameters dictated by:

1st Legislative acts and government direction.

2nd Department of National Defence organization and direction.

3rd The characteristics of the suppliers.

4th The characteristics and needs of our cutomers.

After full examination of the three extant service suply systems the planning group concluded that none was a suitable base for a single system to meet the requirements of the Canadian Forces in the 1970—early 80s time frame. It was recommended to the chief of technical services that a total integrated supply system be designed and introduced.

This was approved and in October 1965 the DEVIL program formally started. The Steering Group and the Advisory Group described by Admiral Burchell were formed. The DEVIL Program working team personnel were assembled through the cooperation of the command of materiel command, the deputy minister's staff and Department of Defence Production.

The Supply System Steering Group, as the policy guidance authority, specified the following broad parameters for the new system within which the DEVIL project was constrained. These are, as shown on the SUBE

(a) Automated data processing equipment including rapid communication links were to be used to the fullest extent.

(b) Materiel support should be accomplished through a single standardized supply system.

(c) The practices and procedures of our principal allies must be taken into account ensuring compatability of data returns.

(d) A close, working-relationship with the Canadian Government Supply Service must be developed.

(e) The system be manned by professional logisticians.

(f) The system devised should provide the integrated technical services data necessary for satisfactory management of the material resources of the Department of National Defence.

(g) Finally, the system should be capable of providing data in the technical services area as necessary for financial management of the DND activity.

MAIN PARAMETERS
1. ADP AND RAPID COMMUNICATION LINKAGE.
2. SINGLE, STANDARDIZED SUPPLY SYSTEM.
3. FULL ACCOUNT OF PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES STANDARD WITH PRINCIPAL ALLIES.
4. COMPTABILITY AND CROSS-SERVICING BETWEEN DDP & CFSS.
5. CFSS TO BE MANNED BY PROFESSIONAL LOGISTICIANS.
6. TECHNICAL SERVICES MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM.
7. FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT DATA.

I will now hand over to Capt Willis, the Program Manager, who will demonstrate how his Directorate has responded to the board directives given, and the Concept for Integrated Logistics which has been evolved from the detailed analysis of the problems. Capt Willis.

Captain R. C. WILLIS (*Directorate of Supply Plans*): Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen:

I will first outline the management of the program and then describe briefly the options that were available to us and then sketch the concept for the Canadian Forces Supply System as it has evolved.

The Supply System Steering Group, to which reference has already been made, provides the policy direction and is under the chairmanship of the Deputy Chief of Logistics with the Director-General Supply as its permanent advisor. The Director-General Supply is also chairman of the Advisory Group which includes the major interests affected by DEVIL at the level of Director-General. As Program Manager I am the permanent advisor to this body and my Planning and Control Officer is secretary to both Steering and Advisory Groups. This ensures continuity and the passage of information between the three levels.

The Program Management Team, usually refereed to as the DEVIL Team, is comprised of some 36 selected officers from the Navy, Army and Air Force with specialized knowledge in the various disciplines. Some 14 officers are on loan from Commander Materiel Command and six have been borrowed from other headquarters directorates. We also have attached to the team, operations research officers who have been conducting cost effectiveness and scientific management studies.

There are in addition liaison officers designated from the Director-General, Maintenance and Director-General, Transportation and working members from the Department of Defence Production representing the purchasing branch and the Canadian Government Supply Service. Two consultants have also been engaged to conduct a selective inventory management study and to simulate our systems design and develop equipment specifications.

The first management tool developed was a guide book to the country we were to travel which we called The Devil Program System Design Handbook. I have a copy here to give you some indication of the detail. The handbook describes the environment in which the Canadian Forces Supply System would exist, the objectives we wanted to achieve, something about the problems we would encounter in the design, glossaries of terms to standardize the language between the three services, and our documentation standards.

Subsequent action divided the DEVIL program into two main areas: the first of which was assigned to Canadian Forces Headquarters and consists of the system design and equipment acquisition; the second to the Commander Materiel Command for detailed development and implementation.

Like most major National Defence programs, we have elected to use the Program Evaluation Reporting Technique for co-ordination and control. It is computerized and tabulated bimonthly for updating purposes. This chart, which is a highly simplified flow-chart reducing 520 events to 16 critical ones will serve to show you the major work phases and their sequence, without reference to estimated points in time.


CTS
DC LOGS
SUPPLY SYSTEM STEERING GROUP
DGS
DGS
SUPPLY SYSTEM ADVISORY GROUP
D Sup P
DIRECTORATE OF SUPPLY PLANS
SECRETARY
PLANNING AND CONTROL OFFICER

TERMINOLOGY

DND INVENTORY

~~WHOLESALE~~	3rd line	National	Depot and Dispersed Stocks
~~RETAIL~~	2nd line	Base	Base Stocks
~~CUSTOMER~~	1st line	Unit	Mobile and User Owned Stocks

SYSTEM STOCKS

Summarised, these major phases are:

(a) Systems Design, in which we are currently engaged.

(b) Administrative Lead Time, which includes preparation of Treasury Board submission, system approval, the process of tendering and the selection of ADP equipment.

(c) File establishment—consists of the construction of computer tapes containing all the information required for management of the inventory at all levels of supply.

(d) Programming can be simply described as the system design converted to machine language, and

(e) Implementation which is self-explanatory.

The system design area will be explained in some detail by the responsible officers.

Before proceeding to outline the Canadian Forces Supply System concept I feel it will facilitate your understanding of our approach by reviewing terminology.

We will not be using the commercial terms wholesale, retail or customer shown on this slide but rather the related terms 3rd, 2nd and 1st line levels which are used in the organization of the Canadian Forces.

Third line equates to national stocks and includes materiel in supply depots or dispersed to bases. Second line—stocks of materiel positioned at bases in immediate support of attached units. Lastly, first line—stocks of materiel held by units and outside the supply system.

I will now turn to the concept which has evolved for the total integrated supply system.

Given the broad parameters by the Supply System Steering Group, a study was undertaken of the options open to us for the framework of the system. This study concluded that three were available:

(1) Total centralization;

(2) decentralization; *or*

(3) a mix of both.

(a) Total centralization was rejected as being too inflexible, too sensitive to disruption and too costly in the communication workload.

(b) Decentralization to the base level was discarded also as it imposed too large a data correlation task at the central inventory control point. It imposed serious penalties in cost, training of staff and a measure of in-built rigidity.

(c) A combination of centralization/decentralization possessed the most desirable characteristics for the future supply system. It was soon clear that the economics of a limited number of 2nd level computer installations would be justified by operational response and the inherent flexibility. The merits of our concept will be apparent from the details which will be presented to you. The concept as it has evolved is depicted by this slide.


DEVIL PROGRAM - PERT PROJECTION
SYSTEM DESIGN
BASE/UNIT SYSTEMS
BASE/UNIT SIMULATIONS
ICP SIMULATIONS
SYSTEM DESIGN
ICP SYSTEMS
ADMINISTRATIVE LEAD TIME
PREPARE TB SUBMISSION
SYSTEM APPROVAL
TENDERING PROCESS
ADPE SELECTION
FIRST CLASSES TO MASTER FILE
LAST CLASSES TO MASTER FILE
FILE ESTABLISHMENT
BALANCE ESTABLISHMENT
PROGRAMMING
DETAILED DEVELOPMENT
PROGRAMMING
IMPLEMENTATION
FORMS DESIGN
FORMS PROCUREMENT
MANUALS & TRAINING
TRAINING CONTINUED


DEVIL PROGRAM - PERT PROJECTION
SYSTEM DESIGN
DEC 66
BASE/UNIT SYSTEMS
APR 67
BASE/UNIT SIMULATIONS
MAY 67
ICP SIMULATIONS
JUL 67
SYSTEM DESIGN
DEC 67
ICP SYSTEMS
ADMINISTRATIVE LEAD TIME
DEC 67
PREPARE TB SUBMISSION
MAR 68
SYSTEM APPROVAL
APR 68
TENDERING PROCESS
AUG 68
ADPE SELECTION
DEC 68
FILE ESTABLISHMENT
FIRST CLASSES TO MASTER FILE
JAN 70
LAST CLASSES TO MASTER FILE
JUN 70
BALANCE ESTABLISHMENT
PROGRAMMING
APR 68
DETAILED DEVELOPMENT
APR 70
PROGRAMMING
JUN 71
IMPLEMENTATION
UNDER STUDY
FORMS DESIGN
AUG 70
FORMS
PROCUREMENT
MANUALS
& TRAINING
TRAINING CONTINUED

The CFSS is to be a total system vertically integrated by standard procedures and by a comprehensive information system. There will be two levels of management, the National Inventory Control Point level and the Base level. Communication between the two managerial levels will be carried out through the medium of the Logistics Data Centres and communication links. Financial management of the operations and maintenance assets will be exercised through a working capital advance method, a revolving stock fund.

Outside the supply system itself will be the Units who will exercise control over their own assets but their record keeping will be done for them at a higher level. The role of the Logistics Data Centres will be to do all record keeping for the Bases including stock records, financial and Unit distribution accounts. Bases will have the terminal communication equipment to enable them to send and receive transactions to and from the Logistic Data Centres. A demand received at the Inventory Control Point will be matched against the stock file to determine the most appropriate source of supply and issue instructions released. The issue will be made and, on receipt, the base will report to the Logistics Data Centre where the necessary records will be updated. More detailed study may produce variations to this data flow but the principle will apply.

The National Inventory Control Point at HQ Materiel Command will have exclusive control over the total 3rd line or national stocks. It will also exercise control, indirectly, over the base stocks. We will thus possess a combination of unified control over national stocks at the same time possessing a high degree of flexibility and response at the level of distribution.

I will now introduce you to Colonel Ralph who will summarize the work of his own section placing special emphasis on the benefits we intend to derive from the use of the latest techniques in materiel management at the national level. Colonel Ralph.

Lieutenant-Colonel R. RALPH (*Program Management Team, CFHQ*): Mr. Chairman, Gentlemen:

The supply system for the Canadian Forces in the 1970s will, as outlined by previous speakers, combine high speed communications, automatic data processing, and modern techniques for inventory management to provide a fully synchronized, flexible and responsive supply system. During this portion of the presentation I will briefly outline concepts and methodology for major functions at the third line level of operations, that is the National Inventory Control Point and Supply Depots, as listed on this slide.

At the working level we have condensed the development guidelines to the following:

First—to improve supply support with reduction of user supply administration.

That is the supply administration required at shipboard, battalion and regiment level.

Second—to incorporate a capability for the production of reliable, timely supply information by machine for all purposes, using data captured as a by-product of other mandatory processing.

Third—to reduce the costs of overhead and inventory.


CFSS
SCHEMATIC ORGANIZATION
LEGEND
Demands
Information
Instructions
Stores
MATERIEL COMMAND H.Q.
I.C.P.
Third Line Depot
Third Line Depot
STORES
STORES
Data Centre
Data Centre
Base Supply Section
Base Supply Section
Base Supply Section
Base Supply Section

Improved supply support requires that items in continuous use be stocked in the immediate area of troop and equipment concentrations, while economy in inventory requires a complete and current knowledge of total inventory status. To date, lack of equipment to bridge this paradox has resulted in compromise solutions which do not satisfactorily meet either requirement. In the CFSS, the central control required for economy in inventory will be obtained not by restraining stock distribution necessary for effective response, but rather by keeping all records on computer files with all computers linked by high speed communication to form a totally integrated management organization.

Of primary concern is methodology for forecasting needs of dollars and stock, accuracy in this area being fundamental to most of our goals. Traditionally the data used for this purpose has been obtained from the only reasonably available source that is third line Supply Depot issues. This frequently represented movement of stock from one storage location to a lower echelon stock point based on manual forecasts of need, not on issues direct to an end user, thus errors of each forecaster were compounded in quantitative data to be projected over extended periods. In addition, computation was generally a simple mathematical equation with limited, if any, real allowance for reliability or stability of the demand pattern. Again in the CFSS, demand activity generated at the point of handover to a user will be readily available as a by-product of keeping unit records on computers and will be used for all significant items; basic data will be machine evaluated to determine or confirm patterns of demand (for example constant or seasonal); raw data will be adjusted by application of advanced statistical techniques to increase reliability; and then, and only then, this refined high probability data will be projected according to rules defined for each specific pattern. This is a principal area and is now under study by consultant specialists charged with analysis of the DND inventory, definition of the latest scientific techniques, and equally important, formula for practical application of these techniques in the military environment. Two further refinements will be used to reduce inventory while improving the level of service, the first in the method for setting safety stocks and the second for Resupply Lead Times. These are now included as standard allowances applied equally to all items in complete ranges of stores regardless of factors such as immediate availability from trade sources. In the future these unrealistic policies will be replaced on the basis of actual need to be determined by some form of automated look-up tables structured to reflect fundamentals such as military essentiality, computed error probability, or availability of the exact commercial item or usable substitute, or in the case of lead time, based on actual experience in obtaining this ore.

Policies governing stock levels and stock distribution will be centrally controlled by Headquarters Materiel Command within over-all policies laid down by CFHQ. Uniform application and integrity of the system will be provided by central programming of all computers by programmers at the National Inventory Control Point.

This Control Point will also maintain records for all national stocks located at supply depots or, selectively, at lower levels for strategic or for standby considerations. In addition, the national record will contain continuously updated information on total Canadian Forces holdings of a restricted range of items (perhaps up to 1 per cent) as designated by CFHQ or functional commanders,

and will have access through the computer network to static 2nd line stocks. The sum of these is an ability to position any item at any point best suited to meet the operational plan, or as insurance for unpredictable but militarily vital items often in short supply, while retaining the ability to locate quickly any item held anywhere in the Canadian Forces to meet the most urgent need within mission worth priority codes or by direction of operations commanders. This will provide for the first time a truly integrated management facility.

The supply system has traditionally recorded and manipulated data on an item basis only with limited if any capability for translating this information to a weapons system or program as a whole. This is totally inadequate for the future needs of the Canadian Forces. What we must have, based on experience in other countries and our own studies, is an automated capability for producing information, on an item basis which is meaningful for supply managers, and for a weapons system or program as a whole which is meaningful to operational commanders, and to operational, financial and maintenance planners.

Computation and communication of DND needs to the Department of Defence Production and follow up action will be automated to the maximum practical extent. We intend to use full automation where item value does not justify costly controls or where the turnover is continuous and human intervention can be programmed on a selective or exception basis. This will require careful definition of parameters and joint development with DDP; the prize, however, is significant savings in both administrative overhead and lead time and is the type of improvement which will permit the lowering of inventory costs without increased risk of stockout.

Another area which plays an important role in equipment readiness is that of repairables. Precise means of controlling this are now being studied by Operations Research Mathematicians and Management Consultants. Within the DEVIL group of Management Analyst we are convinced that centralized control of repairables in third line is essential so that decisions to repair or not to repair, when and where to repair, will in future be considered in the context of total needs, in other words as an arm of the provisioning function and not as an isolated facet.

Material cataloguing and reference information will be fully automated. As a system rule all items to be nationally procured will be catalogued before purchase. Changes in cataloguing information will be distributed selectively through the computer network with certain knowledge of those with a need to know and to provide control of implementation on a system-wide basis.

Materiel authorizations will be published for each unit or base in a single document thereby eliminating the current time consuming and less certain determination of total entitlement by searching a series of tables of authorization. Records of entitlements will be automated at the ICP for control and to provide a computer capability to establish equipment requirements for various combinations of forces for planning or other purposes.

In addition to the foregoing, the national task involves the operation of a number of third line supply depots, or groupings of these depots. These will operate in the totally automated system as storage activities only, with a single auditable record of their stock accounts maintained on computer at the ICP. They will respond to directions from the ICP with which they will be linked by

direct high speed communication, plus a standby capability to revert to manual operations in emergency conditions. They will be stocked with a composite range of stores based primarily on the demand activity of the Bases they serve, with a capability for commodity storage as necessary. It has been estimated that four to six depots will be required but the actual number has yet to be decided on the basis of the break even point between significant economies from grouping compared to strategic and effective support considerations.

Disposal is the end of the line in a concept of cradle to the grave management of inventory. The ability of the Forces to operate their supply support at lowest cost cannot be achieved without disposal policies which facilitate rapid elimination of materiel for which there is no further need. Arrangements have been made for this to be jointly studied with Crown Assets Disposal Corporation.

Mr. Chairman, the next speaker will outline operating concepts at the unit base level and make some remarks regarding Working Capital Advances.

Commander J. B. TUCKER *(Program Management Team, CFHQ)*: Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen:

When we first hit upon the name for the DEVIL program, we searched Bartlett's Familiar Quotations for some apt phrases but found little that was complimentary—for example in the ritual of the Anglican Church there is promise extracted from all members of that faith to renounce the Devil and all his works. In a slightly kinder vein Shakespeare wrote in Othello—"If thou hast no other name to be known by, let us call thee DEVIL".

A little further research led us to the Concise Oxford Dictionary where we found the quotation that seems most appropriate to what we have been doing. The Dictionary defines a Devil as a "literary hack doing what his employer takes credit and pay for."

It is my purpose this afternoon to outline briefly the highlights of the DEVIL plans for supply operations at Base and Unit levels and to touch on the concepts for financial management within the supply system.

First, I would like to explain to you how we see the total DND inventory of material being stratified for management purposes.

The slide shows at Third Line, National Supply System stock which will be held in Supply Depots; at Second Line, Base Supply Sections will hold primarily Base Stock to meet their customers' needs and in some cases will have custody of Dispersed National Stock; at First Line, Units will have their Unit Holdings.

From a supply point of view First Line customers fall into one of two main groups:

First, are Units, Base sections and individuals supported directly from a Base Supply Section on a face to face basis. These Units, in general, will have no organic supply personnel and will have in their custody only accountable materiel on distribution. They will obtain their materiel needs directly from Base Supply which will operate Shop Stores located as close to the actual user as possible. The Shop Stores will be more or less specialized to meet the needs of the particular workshops or other form of activity which the store has been set up to serve. Full use of such techniques as telephone ordering, delivery to end-user, one-for-one exchange, pre-expended issue of low cost expendables, coupled with a simplified standard, documentation procedure are intended to


DND INVENTORY
CFSS INVENTORY
3rd LINE
SUPPLY DEPOTS
NATIONAL STOCK
2nd LINE
CFBs (Base Supply Section)
DISPERSED NATIONAL STOCK
BASE STOCK
1st LINE
UNIT HOLDINGS

25900—4


DND INVENTORY
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NATIONAL STOCK
2nd LINE
CFBs (Base Supply Section)
DISPERSED NATIONAL STOCK
BASE STOCK
1st LINE
ON SITE UNITS & BASE SECTIONS & INDIVIDUALS
UNIT HOLDINGS
ACCOUNTABLE MATERIEL ON DISTRIBUTION
MOBILE & REMOTE STATIC UNITS
ACCOUNTABLE MATERIEL ON DISTRIBUTION PLUS SELF-SUFFICIENCY STOCKS

bring supply in direct contact with the real customer—the man who actually uses the materiel. On the other hand, there will be mobile Units, such as ships and infantry battalions, and static Units remote from their supporting Base, that will have organic supply personnel and self-sufficiency, or operating stocks, of expendables and repair parts with which to sustain operations for prescribed periods of time. These Units will also have accountable materiel on distribution.

As you have heard, records of National Stock will be kept on the computer at the National Inventory Control Point; records of Base and Unit holdings will be kept on computers at Logistics Data Centres. It is important to recognize that the materiel held by Units is not a part of Supply System stocks and its control, care and custody remains the responsibility of the Unit. Notwithstanding this, Units will be required to comply with standard documentation procedures so that the Logistics Data Centres of the Supply System will be able to provide maximum record-keeping service on their behalf.

As a starting point, the data centres will maintain up-to-date records of Unit entitlements as prescribed by Materiel Authorization Tables. For Units without self-sufficiency stocks the Materiel Authorization Table will be confined to accountable items. For Units with self-sufficiency stock, in other words operational Units, the Materiel Authorization Table will include as well, a recommended range and depth of expendables and repair parts. In both instances, any changes in the allowance of accountable items will require approval. On the other hand, the range and quantities of self-sufficiency stocks of expendables and repair parts will fluctuate based on an analysis of consumption data reported by Unit supply personnel and recorded at the Logistics Data Centre.

One of the main features of the future supply system is that Units with self-sufficiency stocks will be resupplied automatically. With the Materiel Authorization Table quantities as the stockage objective, and using the consumption data reported by the Unit, the Logistics Data Centre will automatically generate demands on Base Supply on behalf of the Unit to replenish the self-sufficiency stock. The Unit will always have the prerogative of overriding the system by demanding extra quantities of authorized items or by demanding other expendable items not included in the Materiel Authorization Table and will also be able to exclude from automatic re-supply any items they wish to reprovision on a manual basis. For accountable items the Logistics Data Centres will keep records of the internal distribution of materiel within Units down to the sub-Unit level and will provide printouts to Units as needed to facilitate internal materiel control. Apart from accountable materiel, the scope of which we hope to reduce considerably, there will be no auditable accounts of expendables and repair parts after they have been issued to First Line.

At the Base Level of operations, all items in stock will be accountable and all transactions will be reported by Base Supply personnel to a Logistics Data Centre after they have occurred. The data centre, after the fact, will update the necessary stock records including consumption history, distribution accounts, equipment records, and the like. When an item's calculated low limit is breached, the stock levels set for the item will be reviewed and a demand will be automatically passed to the National Inventory Control Point, to the Canadian Government Supply Service, or a purchase order generated for resupply of the Base. The Bases will themselves maintain an absolute minimum of records; data

DND INVENTORY
CFSS INVENTORY
3rd LINE
SUPPLY DEPOTS
NATIONAL STOCK
2nd LINE
CFBs (Base Supply Section)
DISPERSED NATIONAL STOCK
BASE STOCK
Records Kept by
NATIONAL INVENTORY CONTROL POINT AT HQ MATCOM.
1st LINE
ON SITE UNITS & BASE SECTIONS & INDIVIDUALS
UNIT HOLDINGS
ACCOUNTABLE MATERIEL ON DISTRIBUTION
MOBILE & REMOTE STATIC UNITS
ACCOUNTABLE MATERIEL ON DISTRIBUTION PLUS SELF-SUFFICIENCY STOCKS
LOGISTICS DATA CENTRES

LOGISTICS DATA CENTRE-SUPPLY OPERATIONS

UNIT MATERIEL RECORDS

1. UNIT MATERIEL AUTHORIZATIONS AND HOLDINGS -
   - Accountable Items.
   - Self-Sufficiency Stock. (if applicable)
2. CONSUMPTION HISTORY.
3. DISTRIBUTION ACCOUNTS.
4. EQUIPMENT STATUS RECORDS.

PRIMARY OUTPUTS

1. RECOMMENDED CHANGES IN SELF-SUFFICIENCY STOCK.
2. AUTOMATIC RE-SUPPLY OF SELF-SUFFICIENCY STOCK.
3. DISTRIBUTION ACCOUNTS.

BASE MATERIEL RECORDS

1. ITEM MANAGEMENT DATA.
2. BASE STOCK RECORDS.
3. TRANSACTION HISTORY.
4. DISTRIBUTION ACCOUNTS.
5. EQUIPMENT STATUS RECORDS.

PRIMARY OUTPUTS

1. RECOMMENDED CHANGES IN BASE STOCK.
2. AUTOMATIC, RE-SUPPLY OF BASE STOCK.
3. ITEM MANAGEMENT DATA.
4. ASSET CONTROL -
   - Distribution Accounts.
   - Operational Availability.

LOGISTICS DATA CENTRE-SUPPLY OPERATIONS

UNIT MATERIEL RECORDS

1. UNIT MATERIEL AUTHORIZATIONS AND HOLDINGS -
   - Accountable Items.
   - Self-Sufficiency Stock. (if applicable)
2. CONSUMPTION HISTORY.
3. DISTRIBUTION ACCOUNTS.
4. EQUIPMENT STATUS RECORDS.

PRIMARY OUTPUTS

1. RECOMMENDED CHANGES IN SELF-SUFFICIENCY STOCK.
2. AUTOMATIC RE-SUPPLY OF SELF-SUFFICIENCY STOCK.
3. DISTRIBUTION ACCOUNTS.

centres will provide them with necessary, current item management information as transactions or changes warrant. If additional data is needed by a Base, a responsive inquiry system will be provided. For example, printouts of distribution accounts will be made available on call for handing-over verification of accountable materiel on distribution. The same distribution account records together with equipment status records. will permit Command Staffs to be provided with up-to-date equipment population information, and in conjunction with maintenance reports, the state of serviceability of equipment held by operational units.

In essence, the DEVIL concept provides that all auditable records be maintained on computers at Logistics Data Centres, thus relieving Bases and Units of a great deal of tedious paperwork and at the same time providing more accurate and timely data on which to base management decisions at all levels.

At this point, we see transactions being recorded by Supply Technicians at Base and Unit on an 80 column card. These cards will be in machinable format and will be fully coded by the originator for entry into the system. By providing transaction originators with decks of cards, prepunched and preprinted with constant data such as stock number and unit of issue, and a simple but precise coding system, we will cut down on clerical work and at the same time increase the accuracy of the input. In an automated system it is imperative that there be a high level of precision in the input documentation—a much higher degree of precision than is necessary in the present manual systems. Items must be precisely identified, user identity, job numbers, equipment identification and other elements of data must be accurately coded if the desired results are to be attained. Experience has proven it can be done, but gone are the days of slip-shod document preparation. The ingredients for success are adequate training, a programmed validation of subsequent input and disciplined operations on the ground.

The basic supply procedures so far devised have evolved after careful study of the needs of the three environments. Moreover, the system is completely flexible in that the man at Unit level can operate either manually or with computer back-up. We are confident that our system will work for field force, static or seagoing operations and have the experience of three ongoing systems to support this belief—the Automatic Resupply Logistics System (ARLS), in support of the BOMARCs, the Army's ROSS System and Navy's Machine Accounting Replenishment System, each of which has one or more of the features of DEVIL. For the long range future we see field and ship-borne operations computers multi-programmed to include supply logistics applications.

In the area of Financial Management, DND has recommended to the Treasury Board that a Working Capital Advance, or revolving fund, be used to fund the Operations and Maintenance part of the inventory. The primary advantages of this method of funding are that non-capital inventory procurement is on a no-year basis and that for the first time the real cost of materiel consumed in operations can be made known to assist in program planning at Command and Departmental levels. The approach is for the use of standard unit prices, with the value of materiel being charged to the appropriations of end-users when issues are made to the First Line. Differences between actual acquisition prices and the standard prices will be absorbed by the Working Capital Advance with revisions to the standard prices being made no more frequently than once a year. This

technique will ensure a measure of price consistency when Commanders are assessing actual operating costs of their units against budgeted operating costs.

The supply system will have to conform with whatever system of Program Budgeting and Responsibility Accounting may be adopted by the Department. The primary effect of this is that the supply system must be able to inform Commanders and financial managers of the kind and cost of materiel supplied, by responsibility centre, by activity, project or job number. In addition, the system must provide reports that split the costs between Operations and Maintenance issues and issues of capital materiel or issues of Working Capital Advance materiel to be used for capital purposes. Provision has been made to code the necessary data in the record of issues for subsequent computer manipulation. While the computer programs associated with financial management tend to be very complex and expensive in terms of machine time, the workload impact at Base and Unit levels should be minimal.

Admiral Burchell will now give you a summary of DEVIL's present status and highlight some of the critical activity that must be undertaken in order to reach our next major milestones.

Admiral Burchell.

Rear Admiral H. G. BURCHELL (*Department of National Defence*): Mr. Chairman and gentlemen.

The DEVIL Program has not been a backroom study, *instead* as concepts, principles and detailed development occurred some significant milestones have been passed and are worthy of noting:—In the initial stages of the program, officers of the three services had great difficulty in conversing with each other. For example, in supply vocabulary, what the Navy calls an "obligation", the Army calls a "back-order" and the Air Force a "due out"; what the Army calls an "obligation", the Navy calls a "planned requirement" or a "reservation", and in the Air Force an "obligation" is something to do with going to church. It was therefor obvious that one of the first tasks of the DEVIL program would be the development of a standard glossary of supply terms. This was done, and I have a copy of it here. It was accepted by the Department of Defence Production and will eventually be adopted by the Canadian Government through the Federal Institute of Management.

The agreements, between DDP/DND to govern essential relationships between the two departments referred to earlier by A/C Armour, evolved from the DEVIL program. Out of these agreements has come acceptance of a common materiel priority system and to the extent possible there has been joint development of an integrated system concept.

A further aspect of the current agrements between DDP and DND concerns the assumption by National Defence of the responsibility as a central cataloguing authority for the Federal government.

DEVIL development of base/unit procedures supports interim changes to current supply procedures with the assurance that the changes are in consonance with the future system. It is anticipated that more significant progress will be made in this area in the near future and will result in a reduction in the supply workload.

Two important programs under the aegis of Commander Materiel Command have been accelerated to accommodate the DEVIL program:—the first, materiel


LANGUAGE PROBLEMS
EXAMPLE #1 - THE WORD OBLIGATION
NAVY - obligation
Reservation of
Planned Requ't
ARMY - Back-order
Obligation
AIR - Due-out
Due-out
EXAMPLE #2 - SHOP STORES
NAVY - Shop Stores
ARMY - Repair Parts Supply Section
AIR - Forward Supply Group

rationalization which introduces a single stock number for like items used by two or more services, and the second, single management of materiel.

Two studies have been carried out on Supply Depots. One by operational research personnel on the past operations of all the Service Depots. The second study on Depots was carried out by the Commander Materiel Command. An excellent report has been recieved at CFHQ and very shortly a specific depot posture will be recommended for adoption. Should these recommendations be accepted duplication and, in some instances, triplication of facilities will be removed and real savings on overhead, operations and maintenance will result.

In conclusion, gentlemen, I would like to project the following target dates for completion of Key events in the DEVIL program:—

(a) Completion of our system design from base/unit to National ICP operations in December of this year.

(b) The preparation of the Treasury Board submission, departmental and Treasury Board approval, the tendering process, evaluation of contractors proposals and the contract awarded for ADP Equipment is scheduled for December, 1968.

(c) Programming of the equipment, estimated as a three year task can be started in mid '68 and when completed the CFSS will be ready for implementation in June, 1971.

We have given only an inkling of a complex and interwoven information system, the success of which will hinge upon the quality of the recording of materiel transactions at Base and Unit levels. Captured once, and only once, the system will manipulate the data for all purposes and provide the tools for more sophisticated and responsive supply management at all levels of the forces, as well as providing financial information required by the Department and by the Treasury Board.

May I assure you, Mr. Chairman, and the members of your Committee that, to my knowledge, there have not been failures in supplying the needs of the Canadian Armed Forces that can in any way be attributed to the process of creating a single Logistic system. I am absolutely convinced that the implementation of the Logistic system we have described will result in a level of support not hitherto enjoyed by any of the three Services while, at the same time, achieving a very significant reduction in the total operating costs of the three present systems.

This, gentlemen, concludes the formal presentation.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, just before you leave the room may I say that there is some material which the clerk will be distributing now, including copies of Canadian Forces Bulletin and a sheet covering some of the points which I raised with you earlier this morning.

On the matter of the continuation of our business throughout the day, perhaps the Steering Committee could meet in this room, at 2.00 o'clock, if that is agreeable; and I would ask that the messenger be on the door at 2.00 o'clock to give us some privacy.

Is that agreeable to members of the Steering Committee?

Some hon. MEMBERS: Agreed.


MAJOR FUNCTIONS -
AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL ...
FORECASTING
STOCK LEVEL POLICY
RECORD KEEPING
TOTAL SYSTEM AND PROGRAM INFORMATION
PROCUREMENT
REPAIRABLES
CATALOGUING
MATERIEL AUTHORIZATIONS
SUPPLY DEPOTS
DISPOSAL

The CHAIRMAN: General Allard has advised me that General Rothschild will be available after lunch for questioning on Materiel Command and on the DEVIL program brief which you have just seen. We can resume the questioning then of General Rothschild on that subject.

I have on my list at the moment Mr. Fane, Mr. Harkness, Mr. Macaluso, Mr. Winch, Mr. Churchill, Mr. McIntosh and Mr. Forrestall. I think that will keep us going for a while. That is where we will start after lunch.

Mr. WINCH: I have just one question. I asked a number of questions last week on hirings and firings in the higher echelon. I have been informed that that information has been put in your hands. Is it now being delivered, or when can I get it?

The CHAIRMAN: I will find out from the Clerk where it is.

Mr. WINCH: And the retirements.

The CHAIRMAN: And the retirements.

Mr. WINCH: I understood that it had been filed.

The CHAIRMAN: If it comes into our hands this afternoon we will have copies of it xeroxed immediately and placed in members' hands.

I think that attends to everything at the moment unless there are questions to be raised at this time.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I would like to have my questions on the establishment answered. I think I asked them on the first day, or thereabouts. I wanted to give plenty of time.

The CHAIRMAN: You wanted a list?

Mr. CHURCHILL: The services, you know. I said that I would not go down to the Russian Embassy for them. I thought I could get them here.

The CHAIRMAN: I understand, Mr. Churchill, that the establishment is secret and that that is not a document which the department is in a position to release.

Mr. CHURCHILL: That is a bit of nonsense, of course.

The CHAIRMAN: Well, I do not know whether it is a piece of nonsense instituted by the present government or is a long standing piece of nonsense, but apparently it is not a document for release.

Gentlemen, I think that is all. Thank you very much.

The meeting is adjourned.

AFTERNOON SITTING

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, we are going to continue this afternoon with the briefings of the defence staff under General Allard, but before doing so I want to—

Mr. ANDRAS: Mr. Chairman, on a point of privilege, and just to do some housekeeping, I was called upon the other day to table certain information which

I have gathered together. Just to tidy up that portion of our proceedings may I have the opportunity to do it now?

The CHAIRMAN: Yes, sir. I am delighted to have all this information brought forward now; it helps us to hurry along.

Mr. ANDRAS: By way of explanation, I listed some information available on the question of unification/integration over the past two or three years from the questioning of General Fleury, and Mr. Fane subsequently requested that I table it; the White Paper of March, 1964; the letter of April 2, 1964 to all members of the armed forces and employees of the defence department, signed by the Minister and the Associate Minister; the statement of the Chief of the Naval Staff to naval personnel of April 3, 1964; the statement by the Chief of the General Staff to all army personnel of March 26, 1964; the statement by the Chief of the Air Staff to all RCAF personnel of April 2, 1964.

I referred to a brief by Air Marshall Sharp which was already tabled in this Committee, and I made specific reference to items contained on pages 22 and 23. I do not think it will be necessary to table that report again, except to make reference to it.

I made reference to the Canadian Armed Forces Bulletin. You will appreciate, sir, that there are very many of these and I am tabling this as a sample of it.

I made reference to special committee on defence meetings, and the minutes of those are, of course, available to the Committee. I made a reference to the 36 additional meetings of the special committee on defence of 1964, and the minutes are available; I made reference to the fifteen meetings of 1966 of the standing committee on national defence and the minutes are, of course, available; I made reference to the Canadian Armed Forces Bulletin, and I have mentioned that.

I mentioned also that there were thirty base and station newspapers operated by servicemen, and I simply have samples of some of them: Canadian forces *Sentinel; The Armed Forces Management;* Gagetown *Gazette;* The *Beaver,* Newspaper of the Canadian Army in Europe; *Dockyard News,* published weekly for and about the people of HMC Dockyard and area, at Esquimalt British Columbia, *Voxair Canadian forces newspaper; der Flugplatz,* which is a paper, or a magazine, published in Germany for Three Wing RCAF; The *Stag,* which is a newspaper published at Shilo. I made reference to the comprehensive news coverage on this subject.

It would be impossible and inappropriate to table all those articles. I have some here just to establish that they do in fact exist.

I made reference to the Minister's speech on second reading, December 7, and I referred to numerous visits and talks by senior defence officials to civilian organisations and military units in Canada and abroad; and that is difficult to table.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr. Andras.

Mr. WINCH: Mr. Chairman, I was told this morning that when we reconvened this afternoon I would receive the answers to the questions I asked last week.

The CHAIRMAN: These are your questions, Mr. Winch: How many senior officers of the rank of lieutenant general and higher, rear admiral and higher,

air vice marshal and higher have been released from service since the filing of the White Paper and so on. I will have copies made for every member of the Committee and these will be distributed. Would you just pass it back to the clerk when you have finished so that we can have copies made this afternoon and have them distributed?

Now, with these little items of business attended to, I want to come to the meeting of the steering committee. The sub-committee met at two o'clock; unfortunately we were unable to agree on the question of the inviting of witnesses beyond an agreement to invite General Simonds to appear for tomorrow only. The clerk of the committee immediately telephoned General Simonds and he was informed that the General has engagements and cannot appear tomorrow.

The Committee did agree that the staff briefings in which we are now engaged, should end tonight; and a majority of the Committee is prepared to recall the Minister tomorrow morning to complete the appearance of witnesses.

I want it known that any person who has a brief to submit to this Committee should do so. They will be immediately duplicated in sufficient copies for distribution to the Committee and to the press.

Clause-by-clause consideration of the bill will start on Monday. In preparation for this task I am asking the Judge Advocate General's staff, who are here with us today, to distribute the bill this afternoon, so that everyone will have a copy of the bill and an opportunity to review it over the weekend. Included in the bill you will receive a series of amendments in mimeograph from which will be dealt with by the Committee. I understand these are non-contentious amendments largely involving part 2 of the bill.

This is the steering committee report, copies of which have been prepared and are available to members. The clerk will distribute those.

We will now call on General Allard to continue—

Mr. McINTOSH: On a point of order, could I ask a question on this?

The CHAIRMAN: Yes, Mr. McIntosh?

Mr. McINTOSH: Is there any assurance from the staff that we can have an up-to-date copy of the evidence before we start going into this bill? A great deal of evidence has been given to this committee and we have not had a chance to review it; we have not had a chance to pick out the points.

What is going to happen to the Minister's promise that Admiral Rayner would appear before us? Is this another promise that is going to be broken?

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. McIntosh, this is a Committee of the House and it elects its own chairman; it makes it own decisions, as you know, on who will be brought before it. We are not bound within the Committee by the promises of ministers—if this promise ever was made—and we act upon our own cognizance in bringing witnesses forward. If it should be the decision of the Committee to bring such witnesses we would do so. I think that is fair.

Mr. McINTOSH: Well, just a moment; talking about fairness, Mr. Chairman, let us not talk about what is within the powers of this Committee without telling the public that you have the majority of members on this committee, that you can run it any way that you want, and that you can impose closure under a different name on the Committee.

Try as we could in the House, we could not get the information from the Minister, and now we are not getting the information here in the Committee. How can we vote intelligently on this bill? Whether it is good or bad is beside the point. We must have this information before we can carry out our responsibilities to our constituents and to the people of Canada. The steering committee, or you, with your preponderance of members on this committee, are denying this information to the public of Canada.

Mr. NUGENT: Mr. Chairman, I wonder if this is a new method of running the Committee that you have introduced since the other chairman resigned? I recall that he followed the usual committee procedure and that when the steering committee brought in some recommendations there were two methods of dealing with them. They can be brought into the committee as a motion for discussion by the Committee, or there can be a general discussion on them. Mr. Groos usually took the attitude that it was better that we should have a free discussion on a point than to have the formality of a vote, a motion and a form of debate on it. I have been trying to understand, since you have taken the chair, just what method you are using to run it, other than just blandly saying, "We have decided." There is a recommendation of the majority of the steering committee; and then you promptly tell us that you have decided what the committee is going to do. I was always under the impression that the order of business was the business of the Committee and was a fit subject for discussion, and that if we could not arrive at some agreement we had to go through the formality of a motion on the order of business, a debate on it and a vote to settle the matter.

Would you mind telling us now how you are running this Committee? What is our method of procedure?

The CHAIRMAN: We are running it in exactly the manner that you have described. The report of the steering committee is before you, and questions are now being raised on it.

If no motion is passed, I would hope that within a few minutes, once questions on clarification of the report have been completed, we would continue this afternoon with the very valuable briefings that we have from the defence staff. And if that is not to be the case then I think that a motion might be put—if members have motions in mind—and that is the way we will proceed; in other words, along the lines that you have suggested.

Mr. NUGENT: The matter is now up for discussion, and we hope we can avoid a formal motion to—

The CHAIRMAN: I would hope that we would not have to engage either in a motion or too long a discussion so that we do not lose the time of this Committee in completing the briefings which we have. First I will recognize Mr. Foy, and then Mr. Smith and Mr. Forrestall.

Mr. FOY: Mr. Chairman, on this subject that you have brought back to the Committee as a result of a steering committee meeting, I would like to say that I believe that the members opposite have made it very clear to everyone, including members on this side and on their own side, and even the people who have been in the audience, and the press, that they are dedicated to destroying this bill. Mr. McIntosh and Mr. Harkness and others have already declared themselves as dedicated to defeating the bill.

Will you please have order so I can continue?

The CHAIRMAN: It is very quiet in here.

Mr. FOY: I sincerely believe that the appearance of further witnesses will not in any way change the minds of those opposite in their decision to destroy the bill, so that to call more witnesses would actually be an exercise in futility.

I firmly believe that we should get down to the clause-by-clause study and allow the bill to get back to the House where all members of the House will have the opportunity to debate it. This is, in my opinion, where this debate that has been going on now for some time should be conducted.

I notice that Mr. Churchill is about to make one of those very remarks that he is very famous for, with sour sense of humour.

Mr. SMITH: What I am going to say does not relate to the immediate discussion but about the printing of the record of the proceedings of this Committee. We were assured at the beginning that priority would be given to the printing of the reports of the proceedings of this Committee and I do not think that has been done. I have seen copies of reports of other committees with a hearing date much later—I do not have the actual copies—than anything we have received for the Defence Committee. I do not think that that undertaking has been pursued with much diligence by the Chairman and the others involved.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Smith, I wonder—

Mr. SMITH: I think I can get the copies for you.

The CHAIRMAN: Some were printed this morning. To get a report before the Committee on this subject I wonder if I could constitute you and Mr. Hopkins as a subcommittee to investigate this question and to report on this to the Committee when we next convene? We have a balance of work and we want to see where we stand and whether or not we are getting adequate priority. Perhaps the two of you would get together and consult with Mr. Innes and bring a report to the Committee. We would then know precisely where we stand and whether or not we are getting adequate priority.

Mr. SMITH: I will get some of the later reports.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Mr. Chairman, I have two points. They arise on the point of order which Mr. Nugent raised and which I gather we are still on because I have not heard it ruled out of order.

I have raised twice in this Committee, and there has been raised twice in the House by Mr. Harkness, the responsible point of view that this matter is indeed so far-reaching that it should be considered in the context of our external affairs position. I had hoped that although the Minister himself has said that he can not see anything to be gained by viewing it in this light, possibly when he did come before us tomorrow he might be prepared to deal with that at some length, or at least make some type of a statement.

It appears to me—and we have had evidence to substantiate this—that a White Paper that is now well into its fourth year since the start of the writing of it must indeed have undergone some change in relationship to our foreign and external policies and, indeed, military positions, and the foreign and external affairs positions of countries who are our neighbours and our allies both in NATO and in the Commonwealth. I must register my disappointment that we

have not, and apparently are not going to, for one reason or another have an opportunity to look at this in that context.

Mr. NUGENT: If I may, Mr. Chairman, I would first like to comment on Mr. Foy's belief that it is an exercise in futility to have more evidence brought before this Committee. I am hoping that some members of this Committee will yet attempt to look at the evidence that has been presented to see what we are doing.

We had the Minister's promise in the House, and the government's assurances day after day, that once second reading was passed it would go to Committee and that there would be no restriction on the amount of evidence to be called; we would be able to get those people we wanted. We put in a list of names and we were proceeding on that list of names and, I thought, getting very valuable evidence on the essence of the point before us which I always thought was to study unification as distinct from integration. On integration there is no quarrel. The only question is whether unification is necessary.

We have been getting very valuable evidence from a series of witnesses who were in the position of speaking their minds freely and who were giving us the benefit of their military advice, as they themselves thought. Then, not by our wish, but somehow or other, some Liberal members of the Committee insisted that the time had been reached when they wanted some of these questions to be answered by the Minister.

I remember making a point of order at the time, and saying that certainly there would be more evidence from other witnesses and that perhaps they would rather have the Minister answer them all at once. They said that they would prefer that he answer them thus far. I thought that was why he was introduced. The Minister then brought in the Chief of Staff who, I thought, made a valuable contribution. In his brief he pointed out the difference between himself and the other witnesses that we had been calling, the essential difference being simply that the people on staff—presently in the Department of National Defence—speak the Minister's mind. Therefore, that is all we are getting when we call a succession of witnesses who are now on the staff. It is only the Minister and his Chief of Staff who can speak anyhow.

The witnesses we seek to call are those who are free to speak and give independent evidence. Certainly I think it should be plain that the ploy used here has been to try to interrupt and then say that we have had enough, although I thought it was understood, before the Minister took the stand that we were getting independent witnesses.

We were getting independent evidence, and valuable evidence, and we should concentrate on that evidence which is necessary to consider the essence of our problem—unification as distinct from integration. There is a great deal of that evidence available and I certainly hope that nobody will seriously follow the suggestion that we should now consider the bill clause by clause when we have just begun to get to the heart of the matter and started to get valuable information on the important question.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Foy, we have now had an exchange of remarks on that subject, which you introduced and Mr. Nugent has replied appropriately. Perhaps I should give an opportunity to others to express their views before we go on to hear General Rothschild, the Commander of Materiel Command, and General Lilley, who are here to complete the briefings of this morning.

I will hear Mr. Churchill, Mr. Andras and Mr. Harkness in that order and then Mr. Winch. We now have Mr. Churchill, Mr. Andras, Mr. Harkness, Mr. Winch and Mr. Fane.

Mr. McINTOSH: Mr. Chairman, do you have two lists now? I thought I was on a list to question the chief.

The CHAIRMAN: You are. I am just hearing remarks on the report of the subcommittee before we proceed.

Mr. Churchill has something to say.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Mr. Chairman, I want to be heard. I want to condemn, in the strongest terms, your method of conducting this Committee, and particularly what you are attempting to do this afternoon. This is no way, in my opinion, to conduct a Committee of the House of Commons.

I am surprised that you would attempt to railroad an opinion of your political friends through this Committee in this way. The purpose of this Committee is not being served by arbitrarily cutting off tomorrow the hearing of other witnesses. We put before the former chairman of this Committee names other than those who have already been summoned to appear. Unfortunately, that chairman is absent and you were appointed in his place. We have also put before you the names of other witnesses whom we think should be heard, and you have now rejected this out of hand. You are attempting to apply the guillotine to this Committee just on your authority as Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Byrne, Mr. Churchill has the floor. Mr. Churchill and I have a deep and abiding understanding of each other, and he is now addressing me. Would you just wait and let him finish?

Mr. CHURCHILL: It is because I have a full understanding of the game that is afoot that I am speaking now.

There have been accusations that our purpose on this side is simply to kill the bill. It is an unfair accusation. We have been making a very diligent study of the bill and of this whole proposition which affects the future of Canada's defence forces. We cannot just carelessly wind-up this Committee without having completed our task, and we should not be asked to do it.

I suggest that there is no great haste. It has been pointed out to us time and time again that some aspects of the integration that has already been started will not be complete for several years. It has been pointed out to us that even on the subject of unification, which is the purpose of the bill before us, it will not be required until the general staff has informed the Minister when it should be proclaimed, which means that it is not required this week or next week or a month from now. Under those circumstances we should make—and it is our duty to make—a very careful study of this bill.

Of course we can debate it when it goes back into the House, but the purpose of referring subjects like to this to a Committee is to have an intensive study made and to give outside witnesses an opportunity to be heard, which cannot be done in the House of Commons itself. Our obvious duty is to hear outside witnesses. We have not made extravagant demands. At the steering committee meeting at two o'clock Mr. Lambert and I suggested, I think, four names—General Simonds, Air Marshal Curtis, Admiral Rayner and a Major

Lee—and that is not the spokesman for the Minister's office; this is a different one.

This is not an extravagant demand at all. We suggested that the Committee might meet tomorrow morning and that if Admiral Rayner is available in town and easily accessible he should be heard on this occasion. We suggested that we should not meet tomorrow afternoon because this Committee is meeting every day, five days a week, twice, sometimes three times a day. It is very burdensome and we have to neglect our other duties. We suggested that General Simonds be summoned, if he could come, for Monday, and Air Marshal Curtis for Tuesday. Then at that stage, we would determine whether or not we would call any further outside witnesses.

This was a compromise as against what has been put before us. A Chairman's duty, as I conceive it, is to get the general sense of a committee and effect a compromise between opposing points of view, and we are entitled to opposing points of view here, of course. In effect, what we were asking for was just another two or three days to hear outside witnesses before we got to the basic factor of the bill itself.

Even as late as this I suggest that the Chairman exercise his good offices and his goodwill and agree to that compromise and not carry the burden of the accusation which I have already made, that he is being a dictator and attempting to railroad something through this Committee on the basis of political support in this Committee. I think that the Chairman, if he will examine the record of last fall in the House of Commons he will find that the Prime Minister of this country and the Minister for National Defence gave us an assurance, as a Committee—or gave a general assurance—not to the Committee, but to the House—that there would be ample opportunity for all points of view to be expressed in this Committee and for our calling as many witnesses as we wished to call. Of course, it is up to the Committee to determine its own course of action.

We accepted that in good faith. I think the Prime Minister made it in good faith because he understands the purport of the legislation. I think the Minister of National Defence made it in good faith because I think he understands the purport of the legislation, as well. Why could we not act on that as a Committee, and, instead of attempting to apply the guillotine, accept this other aspect of it?

As a matter of fact, I pointed out in the steering committee that this was a compromise. I was prepared to accept the suggestion that the staff witnesses and the staff discussion and the questioning of the staff be completed tonight; then on Friday and next week we could go on with outside witnesses and would not bother hearing any more of the staff. Surely that was a compromise. I could have insisted that we continue to question General Allard and call other staff people for tonight and tomorrow, but I did not do that.

Mr. MACALUSO: You are a great compromiser.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Some people, being unaccustomed to compromising, do not recognize a sensible idea when it is produced. Mr. Macaluso, who, I think must have been one of the worst autocratic chairmen that this House has ever seen, obviously does not understand the course of the argument.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Churchill, you and I will not quarrel about Mr. Macaluso.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Mr. Chairman, this, I think is the duty and function of a chairman of committees—a chairman who is as distinguished as you are and is very able in his duties, and who naturally will be reflecting an image back home which I think should be sustained—to act as an arbitrator—as an umpire—between opposing points of view and set a good example to other men here who subsequently may become chairmen of other committees—if any other committees are so foolish as to select any of them for that job. That is the point of view I am suggesting.

The CHAIRMAN: Order, gentlemen, please. We have important briefings to consider this afternoon. We have General Rothschild here from Materiel Command, who, all of us were in agreement, should appear before this Committee to complete the briefing on logistics, and to assist us.

I certainly do not, nor I think do members of the Committee, want to keep these important men tapping their heels all afternoon any more than we want to do so ourselves. It is important that we come to an agreement and an understanding on the progress of this Committee and on the progress of the bill clause-by-clause through each stage. This is the function of Committees. I appeal to you, gentlemen, with the report of the steering committee before you, to consider that important question.

Mr. Andras you are next, then Mr. Harkness, Mr. Winch and Mr. Fane. Will you please keep your remarks as brief as possible. Let us see whether we can rest this question for the moment and go on with the briefing. We, as a Committee, can always come back to it at any time. Let us proceed in an orderly and workmanlike way.

Mr. ANDRAS: Mr. Chairman, I am somewhat chagrined that after a long harangue I come along and you then suggest that I should keep my remarks brief.

The CHAIRMAN: They are not beamed at you. This is a shot-gun approach of mine.

Mr. ANDRAS: I certainly would not want to indulge in an argument about what was or was not said by the Prime Minister and the Minister of National Defence, but it is my understanding that they said that they would not put obstacles in the way of witnesses appearing before this Committee. But I would suggest to you that neither of those two gentlemen are members of this Committee and that we, as Committee members, are in charge of the proceedings here as a group.

Second, gentlemen, I would like to suggest that this bill received approval in principle on second reading in the House of Commons on February 9; and that this Committee is charged with the responsibility of examining the detailed content of the bill and of reporting back to the House.

The Committee has been given ample opportunity, in spite of denials or statements to the contrary, to the critics of the bill to be heard. All services have been represented by outside witnesses. We have heard from TRIO, from the Naval Officers Association, from the Navy League, from the RCN Association; we have heard from three retired rear admirals; from three retired generals; from three retired senior Air Force officers—two of them air marshals or air vice marshals and one a group captain. We have heard from the Minister of Defence and several senior officers and will continue that today.

I must say, in all fairness, that my attitude was somewhat influenced the other night by the fact that, in my mind, some of the validity to the suggestion that the real purpose of hearing more witnesses, as suggested by the Conservative members, was to obtain more information was somewhat destroyed by the statement made by Mr. Harkness on Tuesday evening on the CBC National News, wherein he made it abundantly clear to me, at least, that the Conservatives intended to kill or defeat this bill even if it meant an election.

It would appear, therefore, that the tactic of calling more witnesses certainly could be just that—a tactical move to delay the bill in Committee and to prevent its being returned to the House in time to be dealt with in this Session. I really question in my mind if it was for the purpose of objective consideration of the bill, and I think that the calling of further witnesses would be unnecessary and would in fact simply provide for more delay to talk the bill out.

Now, unnecessary delay by this Committee in bringing this matter to a point of conclusion in dealing with this bill would be irresponsible. The services—we have heard this and it has been made very, very clear to us—are waiting for a decision one way or another. The longer that decision is postponed the greater the danger is to our defence forces, because they simply cannot continue to be held in a state of suspension and uncertainty.

I think that this Committee has a very grave responsibility, indeed, to proceed now with clause-by-clause consideration of the bill.

Mr. HARKNESS: Mr. Chairman, this attempt arbitrarily to cut off the hearing of any more witnesses on this bill is without any question, unreasonable and unacceptable. I referred this morning to the undertakings which were given by the Prime Minister and the Minister of National Defence that we would have full scope in this Committee to call witnesses. Mr. Churchill referred to them again a few minutes ago, and Mr. Andras has tried to skate around the fact that such undertakings were given. I think it is the responsibility of the Liberal members on this Committee to see that those undertakings are honoured rather than the reverse course, which they seem to be following, to see that those undertakings are dishonoured.

In actual fact, Mr. Chairman, we have had representations from what you might call independent witnesses, or, at least—I will put it this way—witnesses who were produced neither by the department nor by the Minister. We have had nine such representations before this Committee. Nine witnesses in connection with this matter is not a very large number, and I do not think that it by any means meets the undertakings given that this Committee would be able to go into this whole matter completely—call any and all witnesses we wanted to—in order to obtain from the best opinion available, their views in regard to the unification bill.

A considerable number of other people, who could give valuable information on this matter and whose evidence we should hear, have offered to come before the Committee. Mr. Churchill indicated the names of a few of those and, at least, I think there is no question that we should hear them. Until we do so this Committee will not have discharged its responsibility in obtaining all of the best evidence available on this bill.

I appeal to you, Mr. Chairman, and to all the members of the Committee, to ensure that we do not do a badly botched job in connection with it.

Mr. Andras has said that a statement I made on TV the other day convinced him that our purpose was to defeat the government on this issue. As a matter of fact, I did not make any mention of defeating the government. The TV interviewer said something about pushing this to the extent of defeating the government. In fact, this did not appear on the TV broadcast at all, because I saw it. But I pointed out the fact that we had no power to defeat the government; that the government, with the support it had secured on second reading of the bill from other parties, was quite safe from defeat. There is no question in my mind, nor do I think in anybody else's mind, that the government could be defeated on this bill. This is just a straight red herring.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Byrne, let Mr. Harkness finish.

Mr. BYRNE: Mr. Chairman, I would like to correct the statement he has made to the Committee.

The CHAIRMAN: I would like to get on with the briefing this afternoon as quickly as we can. I do not want to extend this into a long debate back and forth across the table.

Mr. BYRNE: There is a point of order here.

The CHAIRMAN: I realize that the debate can be extended on points of order and points of privilege, but I just appeal to you gentlemen to conclude your expressions of what you feel about this at the table and to make your views known to the Chair. The Chair is not immutable, to use a word that has been bandied around in here. Perhaps when we have expressed these views we can go on with hearing the briefing this afternoon. We will have an opportunity to discuss it again before the day is out, and I do not think that we need to find ourselves locked in deadly combat here. Let Mr. Harkness finish.

Mr. HARKNESS: Mr. Chairman, I have, in effect, completed what I had to say.

I would hope that there be no effort made to try to force through the Committee and acceptance of this report.

Mr. ANDRAS: Mr. Chairman, on a point of procedure because my name was mentioned: I do have before me what is said to be a verbatim report of the questions by the interviewer to Mr. Harkness:

> Q. How do you feel about the Bill's chances of dying in the Committee?

And the reply from Mr. Harkness:

> Well, that all depends on how long the present Session continues. If the Prime Minister does prorogue the House on March 10th which he stated was the intention of the Government, I don't think there is any question that the Bill will not be through by that time, and under those circumstances of course it would have to be started again in the next Session.
>
> Q. Is the Conservative Party prepared to defeat the government on this matter?
>
> A. We are prepared to fight the thing to the last ditch and if that involves defeating the government—yes.

Mr. HARKNESS: Mr. Chairman, I would just comment on that, because I think that is quite different from the impression that Mr. Andras attempted to give the Committee. I think I must insist on pointing out that I mentioned that the Prime Minister intended to prorogue the House on the 10th March. At that time I fully believed that we were going to hear all of these witnesses whose names were mentioned a little while ago by Mr. Churchill—those four at least—and also that we were going to be given full opportunity to question the Minister. I think all of us here have quite a considerable list of further questions that we wanted to ask the Minister. It was quite apparent that if what seemed to be the future course of the Committee were going to be followed then it would be impossible to finish dealing with the witnesses and with the bill before March 10.

The CHAIRMAN: Order, order.

Mr. FOY: Will the Minister not be here when the clause by clause consideration—

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Foy, the Minister will be present throughout the whole hearings of this Committee.

Mr. HARKNESS: Mr. Chairman, on the last question that Mr. Andras asked: Of course the members of this party are ready and prepared to defeat the government on any issue.

Mr. WINCH: Mr. Chairman, personally I do not give a "hoot" about the political affiliations of the members of this Committee, whether they be Liberals, Conservatives, NDP, or any other. I have had the honour of being a member of this Committee for some four years, ever since it was established. I also have the privilege of being a member of the steering committee. In my estimation, Mr. Chairman, it has been a wonderful Committee, and I want to see its status maintained on a non-political basis in dealing with this most important matter which has been referred to us. I regret that for the first time since I was appointed there seems to be a division on party lines.

May I further say that unfortunately, once in a while, on standing committee, I find myself holding the balance of power. My decision, Mr. Chairman, on all committees, including this one today, is not based on political affiliations, but on the information we have received, the evidence we have received, and the task which we are told to perform.

Mr. Chairman, we have had referred to us the bill which is now before us. We met first on February 7. We are now in our 37th meeting since February 7. In these 37 meetings, we have heard from the Minister, from staff members and from many who object not so much to the principles of integration, but, in particular, to unification.

Nobody knows what I will be doing or how I will vote when we come to clause-by-clause consideration. It is my responsibility. I might just add that perhaps my Conservative friends to my left here may be surprised at the support I will give them on certain changes if they are made in a reasonable manner.

It is my personal belief now, that after 37 meetings—we are now in our 37th—I personally cannot see what additional evidence can be given to us by either the staff, beyond today, or by those opposing unification from outside. I think that is an honest analysis of the last two weeks. There has been a

repetition of opposition, and a repetition of questions almost to a point, to use the statement of one who appeared before us, of becoming nauseating.

If I thought that we could get any additional, new information by any additional, new questioning then I would support hearing it; but this being the 37th meeting, and, I hope, the conclusion of the questioning of the staff, and in view of the fact that we cannot call General Simonds because he is unable to appear, I hope that we can conclude by tonight not later than 10.30 the questioning of the staff, and then the further questioning—which is not yet completed—of the Minister; and that on Monday we can start clause by clause consideration. At that time we can go into not only the detail, but, if required, Mr. Chairman, we can call, as I understand it, either staff members or outside witnesses, if we feel that additional information is required.

Now, this is the position I take, Mr. Chairman: I completely support the recommendation of the Steering Committee, and I hope that it will be accepted, and that we can proceed in an efficient manner to complete the questioning of the staff, who have given us, I think, factual information. We require not only information from those called as witnesses but I certainly maintain that we are entitled to, and should receive, the up-to-date picture as far as the general staff is concerned, which we have received today. Therefore, sir, I hope that we can now proceed. I support the recommendations of the Steering Committee.

The CHAIRMAN: Now, gentlemen, I have one more on the list than when we first opened up the subject, and that is Mr. Fane. Mr. McIntosh you were considerably further down the list, and I also think that you had an opportunity to speak earlier; so that this is a kind of a second round.

I am most grateful to all of you who have spoken on this for your advice to the Chair and for your help. The Chair is not attempting to close its mind to receiving any information that will help us to complete our task. I want to assure you that we are prepared to work daily with the Steering Committee and with this Committee to find the best possible way to advance our work.

On the question of making progress with the bill, I think it is the concensus of the Committee—and we have had no vote here; and we have not found that necessary this afternoon—that we should proceed. In doing so let us attempt to find ways to bridge any gaps in information that may appear. I will call on Mr.—

Mr. MCINTOSH: Mr. Chairman, are you accepting the report of the Steering Committee without any discussion.

The CHAIRMAN: I will call on Mr. Fane, and then I hope we can get on with the briefing by General Allard and the Defence Staff, and that we can return to this subject again a little later, if need be.

Mr. FANE: In what I am going to say, Mr. Chairman, I am speaking for myself.

I am perfectly willing to be co-operative, providing everybody else is. We have had a lot of discussion here and heard a lot of witnesses; but I do believe that we need more, and I object most strenuously to the report that you gave us when we started out this meeting. It seemed to be dictatorial; that we had to finish right away. How can we end these meetings when we have not got the full evidence in the reports of the meetings that we have already held? We have not

been able to get photostat copies of any part of them, and we are only now beginning to get them. We have been sitting for approximately 10 hours every day in this Committee. How could we keep up with them even if we were getting them? We have to have those and check them and find out exactly what were the answers to the questions. I am sure you must realize, Mr. Chairman, that there are many questions to which we did not get adequate answers, and we have to find out. To conclude this we have to be able to question the Minister again.

I realize perfectly well that there are many questions that it would be definitely unfair to ask of General Allard and the serving staff. The Minister is the only one who can answer those questions without getting himself into trouble from higher up—and he might do that, too; but, he is responsible entirely to himself.

I do think that we have to continue these meetings a bit longer to give us a chance to check on the information that is contained in the reports of the Committee meetings, and I personally want to have more time. The Minister definitely has to be recalled to finish his, because if you recollect—or perhaps you were not the Chairman then—I was cut off to make room for a different witness. I have questions to ask of the Minister, but I do not want to see him on the stand tomorrow morning; and I also hope that you do not sit tomorrow afternoon.

The CHAIRMAN: We are going to try not to, Mr. Fane.

As you may have noted here today, we have established this little sub-committee of Mr. Smith and Mr. Hopkins to look into the question of Committee reports and the state of the transcripts. I hope that they will be able to report back to us tomorrow morning. The clerk will assist them.

Again I want to give you my assurances that we are not attempting to close you off from information, but I must be guided also by all those on the Committee who are anxious to make progress.

I wonder whether we can now have General Allard, and whether General Rothschild is here, so that we can proceed with the briefing. Perhaps we can return to this subject a little later.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Mr. Chairman, I would not mind moving on, but I would raise a point of order. I think that after all your statements you must now tell us exactly what you intend to do. Do you intend to issue, under your authority, the order that we will finish with the staff tonight, and complete the witnesses tomorrow and proceed with the bill on Monday? I want to be quite clear what you intend to do so that this Committee will know what is ahead of it. Are you going to issue that order under your authority?

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Churchill, working along step by step, I am not going to issue orders, but I am going to continue to search hour by hour for ways of working with every member of the Committee.

As you know, the one thing that we did agree on today was that we wanted to hear the balance of the Defence briefing. This was something that we all wanted to address ourselves to for the rest of today, and to complete today.

Perhaps we should look at that as a first step, and be prepared to meet with the steering committee, perhaps later today, or first thing tomorrow morning, to

see what our next step will be. Let us see whether we can make progress on that basis.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Mr. Chairman, I regret that this is not going to be satisfactory. If we meet the steering committee later tonight, or sometime tomorrow, and some decision is reached there and an attempt is made to force it through this Committee, where are we? Let us have the decision right here and now, and then I will know the appropriate steps to take.

I am opposed to this method of conducting a committee. If the Chairman is going to use his authority to insist on this, then I want to know under what authority he acts, and I will very soon find out and see what steps are necessary to correct it; because I do not think the committee should be conducted this way at all.

The CHAIRMAN: Well, Mr. Churchill, let us take things a step at a time. You will recall that in the steering committee, in the course of some discussion on this, we could not see very far ahead. One thing we did agree on was to conclude these briefings this afternoon. Let us make some progress with those things that we agreed that we should move on first, and then step by step, let us continue and not bring the Committee to a halt.

I know that you and I together would never agree just to seize up the work of the Committee, and that we would like to see it proceed wherever agreement exists. We do have agreement to proceed with the gentlemen who have the briefing here and who are prepared to deal with it this afternoon. We can do that, and let them return to get on with their work.

Mr. CHURCHILL: You do not have agreement.

Mr. MCINTOSH: You cut me off from discussion on this report. I think I was fully entitled to—

The CHAIRMAN: Oh, no—

Mr. MCINTOSH: You did that in an arbitrary manner.

The CHAIRMAN: Let us move along. We can return to this a little later, if need be. We have had a full discussion on this.

I am calling upon General Allard to please proceed with the briefing for this afternoon.

General ALLARD: Mr. Chairman, we were ready, on this morning's briefing, to answer to Mr. Andras' question, which was number one, but I postponed, and asked to give the briefing on the logistics study.

General Lilley and General Rothschild are both here. General Lilley can answer the questions on logistics and General Rothschild is here to add anything to it, or to answer any other questions that the Committee asks.

The CHAIRMAN: On my list of this morning when we broke off, I had Mr. Winch, followed by Mr. Churchill and Mr. McIntosh. Mr. Byrne I think, is next, and then Mr. Forrestall.

Mr. MACALUSO: Mr. Chairman, on a point of procedure: When I last asked you this morning before we adjourned it was Mr. Fane and then myself. I do not know from where the other names came was it out of the air, or something.

The CHAIRMAN: Now, just a minute—

Mr. MACALUSO: It was not that list.

The CHAIRMAN: Let me go back over this for a moment.

Mr. MACALUSO: Yes; I would appreciate it if you would.

The CHAIRMAN: I had Mr. Fane, and I have a check mark opposite that; I had Mr. Fane, Mr. Harkness, and Mr. Macaluso, and I have put check marks here. You gentlemen were not called this morning; is that right?

Mr. MACALUSO: No.

The CHAIRMAN: You were not.

Mr. FANE: I was going to question General Allard on something in his brief.

The CHAIRMAN: The check marks have appeared here miraculously. We will start with Mr. Fane, followed by Mr. Harkness, Mr. Macaluso and Mr. Winch.

Mr. HARKNESS: My questions are on the brief.

The CHAIRMAN: Well, I think we will take—let us take it this way, that we will hear General Lilley on the briefing this morning, then followed by General Rothschild. Is that the way you would prefer to see it done? Mr. Fane, is your question on the briefing?

Mr. FANE: No, my questions are to General Allard on his brief. But, if you have got to go ahead with the questions on the briefing this morning, I will—

The CHAIRMAN: Let us talk about the briefing this morning first and we will hold you, you can come first again with General Allard.

Mr. FANE: I am agreeable to that.

Mr. HARKNESS: My questions are on General Allard's brief also and not on this brief.

The CHAIRMAN: All right, Mr. Macaluso?

Mr. MACALUSO: They are to General Allard.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Winch?

Mr. WINCH: On the briefing that we have.

The CHAIRMAN: Would you go ahead, Mr. Winch?

Mr. WINCH: On the briefing?

The CHAIRMAN: Yes.

Mr. WINCH: I will try to put them as concisely as I possibly can.

Admiral Burchell, in his presentation this morning, on clause 11, slide 5 said:

> Materiel support should be accomplished through a single standardized supply system.
>
> (c) The practices and procedures of our principal allies must be taken into account ensuring—

I would like to know, on the system that you are following—because there is no mention of it in the briefing—how you have been in contact and what you are doing to ensure that your practices and procedures are taking into account the capabilities of our allies?

Mr. LILLEY: Mr. Winch, I should mention that we have, as part of our support arrangements for our forces, certain agreements with other countries which enable us to draw support from them to complement our own support. The conditions covered in these agreements, of course, had to be taken into account in designing our own supply system.

In addition, the advisory group and the team who are carrying out this study have, in fact, made visits to the United States to study their methods of operation, to obtain any advice that they could, based on their experience of problems or difficulties that may have arisen in their system, and to attempt to incorporate that experience into our system.

Mr. WINCH: Are you in continual contact? Are our allies,—and I think they are basically the United States of America and the United Kingdom—fully conversant with the changes that you have made and are making? Do you have any kind of a co-ordinating body, or advisory body, on this? I am asking this on your clause (c).

Mr. LILLEY: To answer this question on the practices and procedures, we have investigated the systems of the other countries to ensure that we pick the best of the procedures that are available elsewhere, in order to incorporate them.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, the bells are ringing for a division. The time is now twenty minutes to five. We will meet here at a quarter past five, or as soon as possible thereafter, following the division.

EVENING SITTING

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, before the bells rang we were asking questions on the DEVIL presentation. Does anyone have any further questions on the DEVIL presentation before we move on? Mr. Winch, you had just started. Would you like to continue with your questions. Then I think Mr. Forrestall has one question, which will complete the questioning on that subject.

Mr. WINCH: In view of the fact, Mr. Chairman, that we lost an hour and a half, I will try to be very brief.

I believe at the time we adjourned we were about to be told by the witness, in concise terms, just how the practices and procedures of our principal allies are going to be taken into account, ensuring accountability of data returns.

Mr. LILLEY: In this regard, Mr. Winch, I should say, first of all, that under NATO there is a logistics committee which meets quite regularly to exchange views, systems and systems ideas and to agree on common practices amongst all the NATO countries. Out of this has come, of course, one of the basic means of compatability with other countries. This is what is known as the NATO cataloguing system or the NATO numbering system, whereby every country within NATO, within its logistic system, uses the same catalogue number for the same item. So, whenever a demand is placed from one country to another the demand can be identified immediately by a number which is familiar to all countries.

Mr. WINCH: Does this include the 900,000 items I saw on the chart.

Mr. LILLEY: It includes many more than that because many supply systems within NATO have many more items.

Mr. WINCH: When Captain Willis was briefing us under his clause 4, he had this to day:

> The first management tool developed was a guide book to the country we were to travel which we called The DEVIL Program System Design Handbook. This handbook describes in detail:
>
> (1) the environment in which the Canadian Forces Supply System would exist,

In view of this statement, you knew the environment in which the Canadian Forces Supply System would exist would not go into effect until 1971, complete or semi-complete. I would like to ask where you got your information as to the environment. In other words you must have known the future role of the Canadian Armed Forces. We would be tickled to death if you would tell us what it is.

Mr. LILLEY: I think, Mr. Winch, the answer to that is that the environment in which we operate, of course, is dictated by the tasks laid down by the government, and even the present supply systems, the three we have currently, are working on that basis.

Mr. WINCH: This described in detail the environment in which the Canadian Forces Supply System would exist. I presume it is going to take several years. You must know just what that environment was—which means your operation on your combat forces, does it not?

Mr. LILLEY: The term in which environment is used here, I am told, refers to the following criteria—and this is in the book of rules that, I think, Captain Willis showed you when he was doing his briefing: Legislative act and governmental direction, organizational factors external to DND, organization and control within DND, customer characteristics, supply characteristics, inventory characteristics, repair and maintenance characteristics.

Mr. WINCH: Not combat roles.

Mr. LILLEY: Not combat—

Mr. WINCH: Well, you see the reason for my question.

Mr. LILLEY: Administrative environment.

Mr. WINCH: When Lieutenant Colonel Ralph was briefing us under his clause 5, he says:

> Policies governing stock levels and stock distribution will be centrally controlled by headquarters materiel command within CFHQ policy. Uniform application and integrity of the system will be provided by central programming of all computers by programmers at the National Inventory Control Point.

In the event of a war I would presume that the first, or at least one of the first, that an enemy would hit would be our Defence Headquarters Control System. What happens then? What back-up facilities do you have?

Mr. LILLEY: If you will recall sir, during the briefing this morning the briefers mentioned several data centres at which records of unit holdings are

held and also duplicate records of stocks that are in the wholesale system throughout Canada. At the main supply depots within the wholesale systems duplicate records of stocks that they hold also exist. So, in the event of a breakdown of communication, whereby updating cannot occur, the warehouses themselves can, on a regional basis, take over and issue stock.

Mr. WINCH: Have any records been kept up to date, or in any way whatsoever, on this super secret underground system that we were supposed to have a few years ago.

Mr. LILLEY: I am not sure what you are referring to.

Mr. WINCH: A control headquarters out of Ottawa.

Mr. LILLEY: I see what you mean.

Mr. WINCH Is it tied in with that.

Mr. LILLEY: Yes, records can be kept there as well.

Mr. WINCH: Are they being kept—that is my point?

Mr. LILLEY: No, not at the present time.

Mr. WINCH: They are not. I have just one further question then. Number 13:

> Disposal is the end of the line in a concept of cradle to the grave management of inventory. The ability of the Forces to operate their supply support at lowest cost cannot be achieved without disposal policies which facilitate rapid elimination of materiel for which there is no further need. Arrangements have been made for this to be jointly studied with Crown Assets Disposal Corporation.

Since I have been in the House of Commons I have been a member of the Public Accounts Committee, and we have been disturbed at the millions of dollars of disposal of armed forces materiel at infinitesimal prices by Crown Assets? How is this going to correct what I maintain is a fantastic loss of millions of dollars?

Mr. LILLEY: I think we shall overcome this very effectively, sir, by this new system, which will enable us to have a much better control and a more instant response, as far as our over-all holdings are concerned. We will be able to keep our fingers on these, adjust our reprovisioning and provisioning, and take account of this instant information. With this new system, we will have a complete inventory of all holdings throughout the services.

Mr. WINCH: Was one of the big reasons for this new policy and system that stocks will not be destroyed by the Army if they can be used by the Navy and the Air Force?

Mr. LILLEY: Even now when we have surplus stocks, the surplus declarations are sent to the other services and to other government departments.

Mr. WINCH: Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Forrestall, you are next if you are on the DEVIL program. Mr. Forrestall, are you on the subject of the DEVIL Program briefing?

Mr. FORRESTALL: Well, we will see. If I am not, you can rule me out of order. My questions arise from this brief, in any event.

The CHAIRMAN: That is the briefing that is before us. Go ahead, Mr. Forrestall.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Mr. Chairman, I am curious about the 900,000 items. You say at page 1 of the opening statement that was delivered to us, or as contained in the brief:

> Each supply system carried items common to one to the other—recent studies have revealed that over 20 per cent of the 900,000 items in the three supply systems are common to two or more Services.

First of all, did you consider 20 per cent a high figure?

Mr. LILLEY: No, this is normal. On checking with other countries we find that this percentage is about the same.

Mr. FORRESTALL: What would that 20 per cent be comprised of? Are they critical items or are they administrative or maintenance items? Is there any one area that dominates?

Mr. LILLEY: Mostly administrative, I would say. By and large, they would not be critical items; they would be a sort of common run-of-the-mill thing that all services would use.

Mr. FORRESTALL: I do not want the exact figure, but would 5 per cent of them be critical items?

Mr. LILLEY: I could not say, off-hand. The other thing is that a lot of these items would be electronic items that come out of different manufacturers.

Mr. FORRESTALL: They could be tubes, relays, or switches and this type of thing.

Mr. LILLEY: Things that could be used across the three services.

Mr. FORRESTALL: In respect of the approach to your automated program, the updating of supplies and so on, is this a standard procedure which you have adopted or is it one that has been evolved by your own working team. Where have you sought your principles from?

Mr. LILLEY: I think we have evolved most of these principles primarily on the basis of our own experience and demands of our services and worked the approach up pretty well. Of course, there are a number of standard techniques that are used in management that we ourselves use as well for working this up. By and large, it is a system and an approach, taking into account experiences of others, our own experience of the past, our requirements for our future needs and things of this nature, utilizing standard techniques that are used in business and elsewhere today, and carrying it on in that manner.

Mr. FORRESTALL: How is the correlation between ourselves and our neighbors to the south and other countries in NATO? How is the interrelationship of this conducted? Is there a body that is responsible for this?

Mr. LILLEY: Well, I think that, here again, the answer lies in an answer that I gave to Mr. Winch a few minutes ago, that there is a NATO logistics committee, of which the United States is a member, of course, that meets quite regularly to exchange ideas on logistic matters and also to establish common approaches, common principles.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Well this is actually what I was getting at, General. Have we adopted that NATO Committee Report then.

Mr. LILLEY: Yes, indeed. We have adopted the NATO numbering system as well, so that the catalogue numbers that we use for our items are the same as the American, the British and other countries within NATO.

Mr. FORRESTALL: I am sorry. What I was getting at was whether or not Canada could take its hat off because we had suggested to NATO a system of doing it. That is not right.

Mr. LILLEY: No. I think, in fact, the NATO numbering system or cataloguing system is a system that was developed by the United States and adopted by NATO.

Mr. FORRESTALL: There was one other area on which I wanted to question. The pages are not numbered so I could not jot down the number. Under item 4; the section dealing with the scope of the task, which is headed DGS, there are a series of early criteria or courses of action set forth and I will just deal with the first one because I think the same question would be relative to all of them. You say that one of your first purposes was:

—to achieve a single supply system

I would ask you, General, whether of not, in your opinion, the realization of that goal set out by that desired target could be effected through full integration or do we have to go all the way to unification. I am asking this, academically.

Mr. LILLEY: I think that unification most certainly will be of considerable value in this regard. I think that you heard from the CDS yesterday, as well as from other witnesses before, what the values of unification are, and probably no other area do they apply to a greater degree than in the logistics system. The logistics system employs a large number of people. In spite of the high degree of automation that can be incorporated in it, there are still a large number of people employed in the logistics system. From the point of view of management of these people and the work that they can carry out, if they are in fact, one group of people or under a single umbrella, the advantages are tremendous.

Mr. WINCH: Could I ask a supplementary question.

It is my understanding that in the last war the ratio of support men required for one in combat was eight to one. Under this DEVIL Program, have you any estimate as to what this will mean in support of the man in combat, compared with the eight to one ratio in the last war.

Mr. LILLEY: Yes, that eight to one support, of course, Mr. Winch, covered a much broader area of support than just the logistics alone. What the logistics support alone would represent then as compared to now, I do not think I could really say.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Well then, General, to revert to my line of questioning, I appreciated your reply but I was asking you, academically, whether or not you could achieve your goals under integration without going all the way to unification, and whether or not there is anything academic or procedural in this that would necessitate, for example, immediate unification. If you did not have the legislative action would that seriously slow down your program.

Mr. LILLEY: I hesitate to divorce the management of people, who are in fact operating supply systems, from the case of the supply system by itself. As I say, the people in the supply system represent a large part of it and, after all, any system is people. If the people are well managed, if they have the proper career opportunities, if they are not concerned with part of them belonging to one service and part to another service, it makes the job of running a system tremendously better—it is a tremendous improvement.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN: The following still wish to ask questions on the DEVIL Program: Mr. Lambert, Mr. McIntosh, Mr. Macaluso. We will start with Mr. Lambert.

Mr. LAMBERT: Mr. Chairman, this question may be directed either to General Lilley, General Rothschild or General Allard.

The brief that we had presented to us this morning was a blueprint—wholly and entirely a blueprint—in that it provides for the planning, the acquisition of and the placing of orders for the necessary computer systems and what have you in 1968, and the full realization of your program by 1971. We have been told—and I think you will agree with this—that at the present time the forces supply system is on the three services basis. None of us here are equipped with a crystal ball so, therefore, we cannot see what happens between now and 1970-71 when, conceivably, your whole supply system would be functioning. In the event that the pace would accelerate and we would have to shift up several notches, how would our supply system be able to react, knowing that we had had a framework for quicker response at the command level? At the supply level or at the logistic level how would we be able to meet those requirements, if we are sort of halfway between?

Mr. LILLEY: I think, Mr. Lambert, it is fundamental for the support of the forces that we keep the existing three supply systems in operation and capable of reacting to the demands of the forces until the new system has been planned, the equipment ordered system implemented, and it has to be done on an extremely tidy basis. But the crux is that three systems must be kept in operation.

Mr. LAMBERT: Bearing in mind that our command structure and that our field organization system has been re-organized on the integrated basis, are you satisfied that the three-service supply system would be able to react and maintain our fighting forces in a satisfactory manner during this interval.

Mr. LILLEY: Yes, indeed, sir, because we have already arranged procedures for demanding, on this integrated command basis, to the respective supply systems.

Mr. LAMBERT: Is it proper to say that in actual practice you are continuing on the three-supply basis but you have a parallel planned program to come into effect in 1971 on an integrated basis.

Mr. LILLEY: That is correct.

Mr. LAMBERT: If we were to face a crisis tomorrow or six months from now, are you satisfied that we could meet it from a logistics basis?

Mr. LILLEY: I am indeed.

Mr. LAMBERT: As to your framework?

Mr. LILLEY: Yes.

Mr. LAMBERT: I am not talking about the availability of supplies because this is something that may be beyond your control but in so far as your own framework of personnel and procedures.

Mr. LILLEY: I am, indeed. We have achieved increased flexibility in this regard by placing the current three systems under the single management of the Commander of Materiel Command.

Mr. LAMBERT: It is my impression that there are a number of supply situations that are neither on one foot or the other at the present time. Can you or perhaps, General Rothschild, give us an estimation as to when the decisions will be arrived at so that something firm can be looked at?

Mr. LILLEY: Do you mean from the point of view of a new system sir?

Mr. LAMBERT: Yes, or the continuation of certain supply depots or the amalgamation of certain supply depots, or do they have to wait until 1971 until you get everything on the computer.

Mr. LILLEY: No, there is a study currently under way under the Commander of Materiel Command to see what can be done in this regard on an interim basis.

Mr. LAMBERT: When do you feel that the critical date as to implementation of this may arrive?

Mr. LILLEY: Are you referring to the—

Mr. LAMBERT: Well, you are talking about a study at the present time.

Mr. LILLEY: A study for a new supply system.

Mr. LAMBERT: Yes, a study for a new supply system, whether it is on an interim basis or what have you. When is it going to be able to function?

Mr. LILLEY: Well, I think about the date as indicated on the chart in the pert diagram.

The CHAIRMAN: I think you are beginning to get a little away from the DEVIL program.

Mr. LAMBERT: No, I was strictly within the DEVIL program, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN: General Rothschild is here. Perhaps this question should have been directed to him rather than to General Lilley. However both are available to answer this question. I am not attempting to shut off your line of questioning; I am just attempting to see that we get the best advice to you with regard to that question.

Mr. LAMBERT: Mr. Chairman, I will put it this way. Perhaps I was able to better concentrate on the charts than you were, I saw these interim periods, and I am asking for the critical dates, in so far as the progressive steps are concerned. I do not think we are going to operate from, shall we say, 1966 through 1971 in a form of limbo and I think that there will be progressive steps from 1966 through to 1971. Studies are now being made, as you indicated, and I think General Rothschild indicated to us last June that studies were then being initiated. All right, the studies are being made, but can you foresee a date when they can be implemented so that we get out of limbo.

Mr. LILLEY: We have programmed the introduction of the new supply system for, I believe, 1971. Between now and that period there will be certain additional studies made in detail which will, in fact, establish the manner in which we will move from our present three-supply system posture to a single one. We have not yet worked out these matters in detail but, obviously, our primary aim is to insure that the support is kept up to the services, and these steps will have to be planned in a manner that this support is not affected. As to exactly what the various steps and the dates of these various steps will be, we have not quite reached that far.

Mr. LAMBERT: In other words, it is too early to say when you envisage the consolidation of certain of the supply depots and the closing of some of them?

Mr. LILLEY: There are certain supply depots which possibly within the next year we may be able to close by a consolidation of staff within the three existing systems, as the first step. That is the study that I referred to a few minutes ago that had just been completed by the Commander of Materiel Command and is currently being studied as to the advisability of implementing all the recommendations. That may well within the next year or two generate to certain—

Mr. SMITH: The closing of some supply depots.

Mr. LILLEY: Some supply buildings or some depots.

Mr. LAMBERT: But it is still a very uncertain area?

Mr. LILLEY: It would vary, yes and we are not yet sure as to where those areas are or the best way of doing it.

Mr. LAMBERT: I think this is the last area of questioning and I trust that it will not be deemed to be heretical. In view of the fact that you are moving into a highly intensified computer framework, what about the use of civilian employees to handle all this rather than servicemen?

Mr. LILLEY: This is certainly being looked into, and I think it is the Minister's policy that we employ civilians to the best possible degree commensurate with the need for maintenance of operational forces.

Mr. LAMBERT: The reason I ask is that if it is a feasible objective and an advantage to use civilians in this rather more static supply system based upon computers, then there is a much lesser demand on servicemen; therefore, since there is a decreased demand upon, shall we say, the uniform serviceman—in other words, he would be a part of one homogeneous mass in the supply system—why unification within the service system?

Mr. LILLEY: Of course, we must have a number of military personnel in the supply system because these people act as a back-up for the operational forces, for rotational purposes, for augmenting them in certain emergencies and things of this nature; so that while we do and will employ civilians to the best advantage, it becomes a decision as to what is the best balance, considering the need for military personnel as well.

Mr. LAMBERT: But would you not feel—to use a term that I think I saw in the brief this morning—with the contact face between the operational forces and the supply forces that you would require servicemen coming back from the operational unit to contact the supply system, and why the necessity of one uniform, one rank structure within the operational sector of the forces, if this is

going to be the main area of contact. In other words, do you have to have uniformed servicemen all the way down through your supply system among the nuts and bolts?

Mr. LILLEY: No, we do not, and we do not now; we have quite a large percentage of civilians in our supply system. However, we do have to have a percentage of military personnel for the very reasons I mentioned earlier, because they do represent a group of people who can be exchanged with the supply personnel in the operational forces when they are serving overseas for rotational purposes, for meeting increased demands of supply personnel, for emergencies and factors of that nature, and these reasons dictate a certain level of military personnel within the supply system.

Mr. LAMBERT: More or less in the directional and—

Mr. LILLEY: Supervisory?

Mr. LAMBERT: Well, the term "supervisory" is used. I am thinking of directional and command positions rather than in the everyday pipeline of the supply system. I will admit that you cannot eliminate servicemen all the way through but, on the other hand, I have some reservations as to why you need so many servicemen that it becomes then imperative, as one of the reasons for unification, that they shall all be in one uniform, under one rank structure, within the supply service and a reason why we should have unification.

Mr. LILLEY: Well, it is the exact percentage of military in the supply system. We know what they are today. In the new system, of course, this will be one of the factors which we will have to work out as our plans progress. However, supply personnel, by and large, are very widely employable because we will have a single system. The procedures will be the same. All the things that one has to put into the training of an individual will be the same across all three services, so that those people have a wide area of employment, not only in one service, but in the other two services as well. As I mentioned earlier, whatever this number of military personnel in the over-all supply system is, from the management point of view and from the operating point of view, it makes a tremendous difference if you are dealing only with two classes of people rather than four, which we currently have.

Mr. LAMBERT: I must confess that I find a little difficulty in this. If you are going to have an expansion on the operational side and, if you are going to have a feed-out from your supply system to bolster up your supply contacts in the operational field, you are going to have to replace them with either green people or with civilians. I think a very fruitful area for investigation would be why there should not be a much greater concentration on civilians and merely have your service people really at this contact point, with perhaps a slight onverlap, but not all the way down through the system?

Mr. LILLEY: Yes. Well, of course, the back-up to the operational forces is probably a bit larger than one might imagine at first glance. As an individual you only want to give him so many tours overseas, or you only want him to spend so long a period of time, with a certain period of time at home, and unless the back-up is of a proper ratio, he may well find, himself, that he is doing an excessive amount of service outside the country.

Mr. LAMBERT: I am not going to get into the arguments about peacekeeping and the concentration on these roles which are not of a long period. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. McIntosh?

Mr. MCINTOSH: In paragraph 10 under slide 4, there is a sentence which reads:

> It was recommended to the CTS that a total integrated supply system be designed and introduced.

Was that yourself?

Mr. LILLEY: No. At that time, it was my predecessor.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Now on the last page of the brief there is this sentence, which is getting very repetitive as far as I am concerned:

> I am absolutely convinced that the implementation of the Logistic system we have described will result in a level of support not hitherto enjoyed by any of the three Services—

Would not this system of integration of the supply or logistics be as effective, or as good under the three former services as under the contemplated unified force of the present government? It was necessary. What I am trying to get at is that this is integration, actually, and has nothing to do with the bill that we have before us. It was necessary under the three former services, the navy, the army and the air force?

Mr. LILLEY: It was certainly highly desirable.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Well then, on slide 4 you have a., b., c., d., and e., which deals with figures, 900,000, that you referred to a few moments ago, and then dollars and so on. This in no way is going to cut down on what was before. You said that there are more items than the 900,000 now. Have you a comparative table to show what it would have been if this system had not been put into effect. It is impossible?

Mr. LILLEY: I do not think I said that we had more than 900,000 items.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I understand there are more than 900,000 now.

Mr. LILLEY: I think this figure of 900,000 refers to the total number of line items in the three services now. Is that not right? I am informed it is 919,000.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Will the inventory or procurement be reduced or increased under this?

Mr. LILLEY: Under a single system?

Mr. MCINTOSH: Yes.

Mr. LILLEY: We think we will have much better control, of course, with this new system. We will know exactly what is in the system throughout the service completely.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I am not arguing that point.

Mr. LILLEY: This better control, of course, will allow us to manage our inventory. The quicker response of the system will allow us to know in much greater detail and much more quickly exactly what we have, and remove any possibility of stocks being missed or anything of this nature.

Mr. McINTOSH: I believe you are correct in that, but these figures actually do not mean too much?

Mr. LILLEY: Pardon, sir?

Mr. McINTOSH: These figures do not mean too much right now. There is not going to be a reduction or anything. Is that right?

Mr. LILLEY: Yes, I think there will be a reduction in all of them. For instance, I mentioned that there is something in the order of 20 per cent commonality; in other words, 20 per cent of the items of that 900,000 thereabouts, are common to two or more of the services. Each one of the services is holding a range of these items and he is allowing for pipeline stocks or other factors, which sometimes adds as much as 25 per cent of the increased holdings.

Mr. McINTOSH: Yes, but the same number will be used.

Mr. LILLEY: We feel by getting all the stocks together that we can, in fact, reduce our inventories, for one reason. Another reason that we feel that we can reduce our inventories is that the quicker response of the system as a whole will give us better control of it and, hence, we will not have to have as much in inventory, and the better knowledge we will have of our whole system.

Mr. McINTOSH: Will it be more centralized now than it has been? The reason I ask this question is that this brings up a question of whether it is best to have it centralized, or decentralized where it is readily available on short notice?

Mr. LILLEY: The system is designed so that there will be a national inventory control point, and that will be the centre where the inventory, as a whole, is managed. The information affecting issues and demands will find its way back to keep updating the stocks that are in the system. In addition, however, copies of this information will also be held at the various regional depots and at the data centres that I mentioned in the briefing, so that in the event of an emergency all of our knowledge will not be held at the national centres; there will be duplicate knowledge to enable the various regional depots to carry on.

Mr. McINTOSH: You mentioned also, something about a NATO cataloguing. This brings up the question of standardization within the NATO forces. I understand that a number of NATO allies have been advocating this, but it is very difficult because of economic reasons within the different countries; they buy from people who owe them money, to try to balance their purchases and what they sell to these countries. I refer now to Norway, where they have this naval base, and where it was expected that all naval ships from all the allies would go and be repaired, if necessary. The difficulty there, is that they do not all have the same engines, and they do not all have the same armaments. When you catalogue this, are all countries, different types of weapons, and different types of requirements, in this catalogue also?

Mr. LILLEY: Yes, but they would have a different number.

Mr. McINTOSH: They would have a different number.

Mr. LILLEY: If the item is different by the fact that the engine is different or the manufacturer is different, the item would have a different number. It is only an item which is exactly the same that has the same number.

Mr. McINTOSH: This might be off the subject, but what success have you been having on standardization within the NATO countries?

Mr. LILLEY: Very good with our principal allies.

Mr. McINTOSH: Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Nugent?

Mr. NUGENT: General, I am not an expert in these things; I hope I have not been left too far behind, but there are a few items I just want to get clear in my mind. Under the heading, 3 DGS—and I am sorry these pages are not numbered—which is "Scope of the Task", I gather from this sentence,

> . . . we are still striving to accelerate introduction of the system.

—that we should not judge this system by what it has accomplished now because we are at the introduction stage; and the particular problem that you are interested in now, is trying to accelerate the introduction to get it in faster than you had originally planned.

Mr. LILLEY: We would like to move along as quickly as we can, sir, yes.

Mr. NUGENT: But I gather, from the use of the word "accelerate", that you are trying to speed it up even more than you had originally hoped.

Mr. LILLEY: We are trying to speed it up all the time; we would like to get this system into effect because of the extreme advantages of it. At the same time we are not accelerating it beyond the ability to keep the plan under control.

Mr. NUGENT: I imagine that the words "still striving to accelerate" mean—and I am not suggesting that you were not keeping it under control—that you are trying to speed up the original concept.

Mr. LILLEY: We are trying to complete it as quickly as possible, yes.

Mr. NUGENT: On the next page:

> Co-ordinated studies in the disciplines of maintenance, transportation and supply are proceeding concurrently. . .

It is my understanding that in any plan to bring in a new system, studies precede, necessarily, any plan of implementation, so that these disciplines are still, at this stage, under study to determine the best method.

Mr. LILLEY: That is right.

Mr. NUGENT: At about the middle of the next page it says:

> . . . the DEVIL program will develop the basic supply system to be used by both departments. . .

DDP and DND. So that the basic supply system will be developed, although it has not been developed yet, again, this is in the planning and study stage.

Mr. LILLEY: It is well on its way; we have been working at this since October, 1965.

Mr. NUGENT: I am trying to get my thoughts clear on this. When it says "will develop", I gather that it is either in the study stage or in the planning stage.

Mr. LILLEY: We have carried out quite a few studies, and we have resolved a number of the problems in our own minds, yes.

Mr. NUGENT: After the studies, when you bring up a plan, sometimes the plan has to be revised when you start to implement it and so on, so that you are at the stage where you are not quite convinced, I would say, since you used the word "studies", that all the plans are as yet definite.

Mr. LILLEY: I think the studies that we have completed have been complete enough to satisfy ourselves that those steps are the right ones, yes.

Mr. NUGENT: You are now planning how to implement those steps?

Mr. LILLEY: That is part of the over-all plan.

Mr. NUGENT: Yes.

Mr. LILLEY: The best way to put them together into one whole system.

Mr. NUGENT: Under 4, DSupP, slide 6, I am intrigued by this phrase:

> The Program Management Team, usually referred to as the DEVIL Team. . .

In other places here, there is reference to a particular group. Is there any military reason why you should use "team" one time, and "group" the next, or are they the same sort of thing?

Mr. LILLEY: I think it was shown this morning in the briefing on this slide. There is the steering group, an advisory group, the DEVIL team, the DEVIL group, but the DEVIL group actually means the group that is actually planning the system.

Mr. NUGENT: In other words, you have these various groups or various teams, and in this case you call one a team to distinguish it from another group? I have heard references at other times to committees, and I am trying to figure out if each has a distinctive meaning, or are teams and groups, committees of a particular type?

Mr. LILLEY: I think we have, three basic divisions here. We have the supply steering group; we have the advisory group, and we have the actual project group. The first two are basically policy groups.

Mr. NUGENT: But whether it is a team or a group, they consist of various members who could be referred to as a committee then?

Mr. LILLEY: Not a committee, no.

Mr. NUGENT: Well, what does a committee mean?

Mr. LILLEY: A committee, to me, at least in my experience, sir, has been one that very seldom ever reaches a decision because you can never get all the members to agree. These people can reach decisions.

An hon. MEMBER: Do you apply that to us?

Mr. NUGENT: Therefore, you would distinguish between a group and a team, on one hand, and a committee on the other.

Mr. LILLEY: That is right.

Mr. NUGENT: The reason you use "team" and "group" is that you want this Committee to believe that, as distinct from the old term "committees", you have now resolved that they must reach a decision, whereas the old committees never could.

Mr. LILLEY: These people are all under single management.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Nugent, I think what he is trying to tell you is that he has never seen anything like this down at defence headquarters.

Mr. NUGENT: Frankly, Mr. Chairman, since we do not have the term "committee" used throughout this brief, I wondered what it was; and I was sure that our Minister of National Defence had devised a system to fool us even as to whether or not there are committees operating—and it is obvious that he has.

You will pardon me for a moment's delay, but I do not have a page to refer to in my notes here. I refer now to the extreme end of slide 8, logistics data, and so on; the last sentence, before it says slide 9, is:

> More detailed study may produce variations to this data flow but the principle will apply.

So, I gather, in respect of this system, that at the moment we are still at the study stage.

Mr. LILLEY: In certain areas, yes.

Mr. NUGENT: Then, about three or four pages further on, under paragraph 4, concerning "major functions at the national level"—

Mr. LILLEY: Starting at "of primary concern is methodology"?

Mr. NUGENT: Yes, this is under paragraph 4, the last complete sentence on that page:

> This is a principal area and is now under study by consultant specialists charged with analysis of the inventory, definition of the latest scientific techniques, and formula for practical application of these techniques in the military environment.

This is another place where we are still at the study stage.

Mr. LILLEY: We have isolated all our factors here, and we are now in the process of having them put together into a plan.

Mr. NUGENT: Yes; the study precedes the plan.

Mr. LILLEY: In all cases.

Mr. NUGENT: Yes.

Mr. LILLEY: But again I would reiterate that after 15 or 16 months, we are well down our system.

Mr. NUGENT: Yes, but even when your studies are complete, and you have formulated what you hope will be the best and most practical working plan, and start to implement it, you find at that stage that sometimes the plan has to be revised, and as you implement it, further revisions in the plan may occur. This is the evidence we had had from all preceding witnesses; I trust you will not disagree with that, too violently?

Mr. LILLEY: Not at all, sir. However, I hope, and I have every confidence, that our studies are being done so well, that the adjustments will be minimal.

Mr. NUGENT: General, would you suggest to this Committee that other people who did studies, did not have the same competence in the manner in which they carried out their studies, or were lax in their duty in that regard?

Mr. LILLEY: Not at all, sir.

Mr. NUGENT: Thank you. Two pages further on, dealing with repairs, paragraph 9, we find this:

> Another area which plays an important role in equipment readiness is that of repairables. Precise means of controlling this are now being studied by Operations Research Mathematicians and Management Consultants.

So again, in this experiment in integration, we are only at the study stage.

Mr. LILLEY: In this particular phase of it, yes.

Mr. NUGENT: So that in all these cases that I have referred to, where you talk about studies, we mean that study of the program which is necessarily prerequisite to a plan of implementation being formulated—never mind being put into operation. That is what you mean by studies.

Mr. LILLEY: Yes.

Mr. NUGENT: I will end up by saying this. I hope my friend, Mr. Foy, over there will appreciate what has gone on here. We must thank the general for emphasizing the evidence we have had from Air Marshal Annis, General Fleury, and so on. Far from integration being a *fait accompli*, in many cases—and we are dealing now only with Materiel Command and specifically with logistics—we are even in the state of just studying some of the problems, in respect of others, we are in the planning stage, and the whole process is a very, very complex one which is likely to take several years yet before even planning or implementation is complete, apart from trying it out to see whether it is workable, or testing it to see whether it is going to produce those economies that are so deeply desired. Is that a fairly accurate summary of the situation?

Mr. LILLEY: I would not place quite so much emphasis on it, sir; you must admit, to do this job properly that it is going to take proper study, and it is going to take a bit of time. If we do not start it, and get on with it, we will never get it. The advantages are so great that we would push on as rapidly as possible.

Mr. NUGENT: General, you said "if we do not start it". Every word of your brief tells us what you have been doing; is there any study in there that I have not mentioned, that you have not been working on up to this time?

Mr. LILLEY: Would you repeat your question?

Mr. NUGENT: Is there any such study, as mentioned in your brief, that is not being carried on or has not been carried on up to this time?

Mr. LILLEY: With this particular study?

Mr. NUGENT: Yes.

Mr. LILLEY: There are portions of this study that have been completed, yes.

Mr. NUGENT: And other portions of this study are going on at this time, and have been going on for some time?

Mr. LILLEY: Some of them have been going on; others have been started as part of the progressive sequential approach to a complete study of the whole problem.

Mr. NUGENT: Right. And there are others in respect of which the studies were completed some time ago and you are now in the planning stages. Is that not accurate, general?

Mr. LILLEY: The planning stage for the next phase of the complete program.

Mr. NUGENT: Right. So when you say "if we do not get on with it", there is nowhere in your brief any mention that anything here has not been carried forward in a most expeditious manner. Are you not trying to carry this out in a logical order of sequence, and then proceeding as far as you could with the people you have had and the staff you have been able to spare, to carry forward this series of experiments in integration to the best of your ability?

Mr. LILLEY: Yes.

Mr. NUGENT: Thank you very much, sir.

An hon. MEMBER: You have almost persuaded me to vote for the bill.

The CHAIRMAN: Order, please. Gentlemen, I have a list here. I think the following have indicated that they wish to address questions to General Allard: Mr. Fane, Mr. Macaluso, Mr. Harkness, Mr. Byrne, Mr. Churchill, and Mr. McIntosh. Mr. Forrestall was down as No. 2 on the DEVIL program.

Mr. FORRESTALL: I wish you would turn this job over to the secretary; you are just supposing, and I think Mr. Macaluso—

The CHAIRMAN: Order, please. This afternoon, when we started to ask questions on the DEVIL program, it became quite apparent that some people wanted to address their questions to General Allard. So the list was split at that time, and those who indicated that they wanted to address their questions on the DEVIL briefing, were put in that column, and those who had questions to address to General Allard were left in the other column. I find that your name, Mr. Forrestall, is No. 2 on the DEVIL program. Your questions were taken up at 8.15 this evening. I am very glad to put your name down again, if you wish it.

Mr. FORRESTALL: I had no questions to ask on the DEVIL program other than to say, for what it was worth, that it was an excellent brief; I wanted to talk about some of the problems of unification.

The CHAIRMAN: All right; Mr. Fane.

Mr. FANE: General Allard, I have a few questions to ask in order to gather up some of the loose ends. First, I want to question you about the rank structure in the unified force. Did I understand correctly that you said that you had decided to keep the same ranks as they have now in the rank structure in the navy in the part of the unified force that will be navy?

General ALLARD: I think you are referring to the bill here, and the bill reads that ranks may be retained. I do not have the bill here in front of me, but it says that the ranks may be retained by authorization of the Minister.

Mr. FANE: Yes; do you consider that you would advise the Minister to leave the navy ranks as they are?

General ALLARD: You are asking me a question which I think is the subject of a recommendation that should be taken up with the Armed Forces Council before I make a recommendation to the Minister in this regard. We have dis-

cussed this question of rank at the Armed Forces Council already; we have approached it, but we have not finalized yet the structure we wish to recommend. After all, there is no necessity for it now, but when the time comes I will consult with the Armed Forces Council, and make a recommendation to the Minister accordingly.

Mr. FANE: Do you feel that the navy would work better if they retained their present rank designation, or would they work better with the army designation?

General ALLARD: There is a division of opinion among a number of people that I have spoken to. This is the reason why I said that I would consult them fully before I make a recommendation. There are many people who may find themselves better with one set of rank or the other. This, of course, I have told the people of the Committee, and in fact, the Minister knows it; there is no problem in this regard, and we said that we will consult them, and we will.

Personally, I feel, as far as ranks are concerned, the most efficient manner in which to develop the forces is the rank designation that should be used. I think this is a very important factor, and I would certainly not make a recommendation to the Minister without fully consulting all those distinguished officers that we have in the forces belonging to the sea environment—belonging to the navy.

Mr. FANE: Well, that helped some, because it was going to be a pretty terrible thing if the navy part of our proposed unified force were to go with army ranks, when all the other navies in the world have practically the same rank designation.

General ALLARD: This point is well understood, Mr. Fane, and I am quite sure that the exigencies of the service will be respected in every way.

Mr. FANE: I am very happy to hear that. I realize that it is a whole lot easier for the RCAF to use the army ranks, if that is the way it has to be. What badges are these officers of various ranks going to wear?

General ALLARD: You are referring to their rank designation?

Mr. FANE: Yes.

General ALLARD: I have studied this, and questioned a lot of people, and it is very important that we all wear the same rank designation.

Mr. FANE: You mean in the other part of the—

General ALLARD: That we all be the same, yes. It becomes rather difficult afterwards to switch from one to the other, and although we all like brass in the army, and we are referred to as a brassy group, it does not fit in with modern conditions any more. I was very surprised to find, when I asked the army officers, that they are all in favour of changing the present rank designation to accommodate whatever is recommended afterwards.

Mr. FANE: Do you mean that you would have the rest of the service in something like I think the Minister mentioned at one time; they would have bands around their arms and all their rank badges would be on their arms, I believe?

General ALLARD: I do not know what the Minister has said, but we are studying this question now. You see, there are problems connected with this.

For example, the navy wear their ranks on the shoulders of their overcoats and on their summer uniforms, and so on. There are reasons for many of these things. For example, if you wear short sleeves, you cannot carry your rank on your sleeves if you have no sleeves. There are a number of things that we must think about. In fact, it is rather interesting to go into this question, because we have suddenly discovered a number of things that were done for a very good reason.

The army used to wear them on their sleeves mainly for the reason that in the trenches it would be easier to recognize people; there are all kinds of things involved here. I asked the Director of History to dig into history and find out where these designations came from. In fact, we were really amused to see where some of them came from. Therefore, we are putting this in front of the Armed Forces Council, and we are considering every step, and we will make a definite recommendation to the Minister as soon as we find that it is necessary.

Mr. FANE: In your own case, being a full general, how would you have your rank designated on your sleeve that would be a better insignia than what you have on your epaulet?

General ALLARD: I am not really worried about that; I will follow whatever the recommendation is from the majority of the people. Personally, I do not really mind as long as we have a good designation that is meaningful and has the tradition that is needed. Some insignias are over 2,000 years old. We have a few insignias that date back to the ancient Greeks, and we definitely want to maintain some of those. It is a very important thing to do, and we do not want to start off with antlers, or anything of that nature; nothing of this kind. There are many things that we respect, that we love, that we want to maintain at all costs, and we shall do so.

Mr. FANE: I am pleased to see that you are not among those who mention 5, 4, 3, 2, and 1 star generals; I hope you are not considering anything of that nature.

General ALLARD: That is a copy of another nation.

Mr. FANE: Yes.

General ALLARD: I think we have more imagination than that.

Mr. FANE: I would hope so. While I have nothing against our great neighbour to the south, I cannot see why anybody should ever consider giving up the present rank badges and structures to match theirs.

General ALLARD: I rather like the way that the senior naval officers wear their rank, actually.

Mr. FANE: In the American navy?

General ALLARD: No, no, no.

Mr. FANE: In our navy?

General ALLARD: Yes.

Mr. FANE: Oh, yes; well, who would not? As you know, I have been a commissioned officer for something over 51 years.

There are other things now; I am very glad you explained that because I was very worried. You mentioned in your talk about certain traditions that you did not approve of that seemed to be pretty important to units. What would an example of those traditions be?

General ALLARD: I have an example, but I do not want to give it here. There are some things, however, that are really silly that have gone on for years. I do not want to mention them here because of my affiliation with former groups. I can assure you that in Canada we have our own traditions, and we have our own habits—what we do in our own messes and various things of this nature. There are certain things that we wear, and there are certain things that we do. I think these things have helped; for example, our colours—after all, we are not going to change our colours; nothing of the kind will happen.

Those things that are traditional that are keeping the morale of our troops up—keeping up the fighting spirit; the things that they are inspired by—the things that really count will be protected and safeguarded. In fact, this is one of the reasons why it is in so many documents in front of you, and one of the reasons why I said it.

I would like to add to this that I am an ex-Royal 22nd officer, and I like the traditions of my regiment. We are affiliated with the Royal Welsh Fusiliers; we celebrate St. David's Day; we bite into the leek on March 1, and I see no reason whatever why the 22nd should stop eating the leek on March 1, or why we should force the leek onto anybody else.

Mr. FANE: Well, that is very good, but what is going to happen when you come to the age to retire from being the Chief of Staff? The next Chief of Staff may have different ideas from what you have; are we going to be able to make this retention of traditions and these things so that they will stick?

General ALLARD: If my successor wants to break the traditions of the forces that we have left to them at this particular time, he will not be CGS very long.

Mr. FANE: Well, that is the way I feel too. No, I was not referring to you. In the course of many years of service I have made unwise remarks to Generals, but nothing so high as you.

With regard to the efficiency of the various services do you think, for example—well, the navy seems to be the most talked of here—if a man who joined up to serve in the navy were transferred to one of the other parts of the service that he would feel like giving the same loyal, efficient service as he is bound to give to the service that he wanted to join up with?

General ALLARD: This question is rather an interesting one because we have said—and I have told the people—that nobody would be ordered to go anywhere unless he wants to qualify in advance. He will never be changed if he does not want to be. And the devotion to—it is just like in our own regiment. Many people spend their whole career in that regiment and they never change. They never will change because they do not have any desire to get out of there. Therefore, with regard to this question you are asking me—whether a man would be happy in another service—well, he should be happy because I assume that he would have asked for it. I assume that having received the training, he wants to get employment elsewhere to satisfy the needs of his family, the needs

of his children and his wife, and so on, and to bring him to a job where he can, for a while, fulfil his task as a father as well. This is very important.

A few minutes ago we were talking about this on the supply system, where we had the suggestion that we should civilianize the supply system. But if you did, you would end up by having all of your people in the operational troops all the time and they would be away all the time, so we have to have a considerable back-up. This is one of the things we suffered from in the past and, in fact, the navy particularly. The navy, wanting to perform its role the best way it could when it had a manpower difficulty, employed more civilians and put more sailors on ships. Well, of course, the ship to shore ratio became very difficult. I referred to the navy because they are the ones who have the biggest problem in that regard. When we are talking about a man, if you improve his lot he should be happy. There is no reason why he should not. If he does not like it the only thing he has to do to go back is to ask for a transfer and he will go back quite easily. So, there is no problem.

Mr. FANE: You remarked, I believe it was today sometime, that you had considered placing an air force officer in charge of a brigade and you had also considered placing a navy officer in charge of a brigade.

General ALLARD: Not in charge of a brigade in the case of the navy officer, but in the case of the air force officer, yes. I considered this because it became very important for one role. If you have an air mobile group, there is no reason why it should not be commanded by an airman but, unfortunately, the difficulty at the moment is that our staff duties are so different and the methods of employment are so different that he would have had some difficulties had he been deployed in some exercise, and he would have had difficulties in co-ordinating some part.

I think he would have done a good job just the same, but this only highlights the point that we have a great number of officers in the air force today who could have a much broader employment field than they have now. The fact that they are restricted after a certain rank in the air force means they cannot benefit by the possibilities and, in fact, some of them if they were trained are excellent people—good fighters, excellent people—who could do a magnificent job, but this is impossible at the moment. It is impossible, but I considered this very carefully and discussed it with the man concerned. He would have been prepared to accept it, but I think it would have been just a wee bit premature for him, so we think we should take a younger officer, train him through our staff college system and then bring him along; give him a staff job somewhere, because there is such a requirement. The blending of the two is getting to be so great that there is an absolute requirement for it. I see no reason on earth why, in a few years time, these people should not be exchangeable.

Mr. FANE: Even to put a colonel out of the army in charge of a ship?

General ALLARD: No.

Mr. FANE: Not so far as that.

General ALLARD: He is not qualified. If he had chosen a ground environment for his career, obviously he is going to stay in it. There is no question that these people are experts in their field. There is no question of this, but you have to offer them considerably more in order to employ all the talent that we have

in the forces because it becomes more and more difficult to keep people in the service. One of the great problems today is that we educate a man—we give him an engineering degree and then we say to him, "This is the field of employment". He soon finds out that his promotion prospects go by the board. Therefore, if we allow them to measure themselves up at any early stage in their careers, then they will progress the way we have progressed in the past, as far as the army is concerned.

Do not forget that in the army, only those who have the Canadian Army Staff College qualification go up beyond the rank of lieutenant-colonel. So this becomes very important at one point. I think the sooner we put this together the better, and in our training system this is under consideration. I have a great interest in it because I know really what is wanted and this is where we are going to make a good start in getting our people. But there is no question in anybody's mind that a colonel in the army is going to command a ship. This has never come up to my knowledge; it has been suggested by some people that this will happen, but it will not.

Mr. FANE: That is more comforting than the information we have been able to get so far.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Fane, you have had such an interesting exchange going that I have hesitated to interrupt you, and I hope you are—

Mr. FANE: Just hesitate for one more question.

The CHAIRMAN: I will hesitate for one more, Mr. Fane. I will be glad to hesitate.

Mr. FANE: I take up less time in this Committee than almost anybody else, but I have to get at the fundamentals.

The CHAIRMAN: You are doing it very well, Mr. Fane.

Mr. FANE: General, if we were to have somebody of the rank of major or the equivalent from the various services in to talk to us here, what kind of information do you think we would get from a person of that rank—a major or lieutenant-colonel—regarding unification and integration?

General ALLARD: I think you would get his point of view. I do not think you would get the point of view of all the troops because, after all, if he has been limited to the rank of major he has probably had very few jobs. You will get his point of view, that is all. Is he still in the service?

Mr. FANE: It would not be safe for him to be in the service.

General ALLARD: It would certainly be safe for him to say anything he wished.

An hon. MEMBER: The man you fire will testify to that.

General ALLARD: This is one of the things that I asked. Everybody to whom I have spoken, no matter who they were, whether they were warrant officers, or sailors, or petty officers, young lieutenants, I have asked them the question, "How do you feel?" and, in fact, that answer that came—

Mr. FORRESTALL: You are a general officer.

General ALLARD: I beg your pardon?

Mr. FORRESTALL: I am sorry, General, but it seems quite incredible that you would expect any other answer from a petty officer. After all, you are the senior ranking military officer in Canada.

General ALLARD: It depends on the personality of the individual who asked the question.

Some hon. MEMBERS: Hear, hear.

An hon. MEMBER: And whether he is ambitious.

General ALLARD: You seem to say to me here—right now—that I would hold it against anybody who has an adverse opinion.

Mr. NUGENT: I say, sir, that after the performance of the Minister anyone who told you anything different would be an idiot and he knows it, and so do you, sir, if he has any ambition to stay in the service at a high rank or achieve a high rank.

General ALLARD: I wish that you would withdraw that.

Mr. NUGENT: I certainly will not. That is the truth and that is the situation as it exists today and we all know it.

General ALLARD: There is nothing further from the truth.

The CHAIRMAN: Order. I think that goes well beyond the kind of retort that should be put at this meeting. Mr. Fane?

Mr. FANE: I did not say that.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Fane, are you—

Mr. FANE: I am very happy to have been able to have this information from you, General, and it is definitely something we have not had before. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr. Fane. Mr. Macaluso?

Mr. MACALUSO: First of all I just want to tell the General not to pay too much attention to Mr. Nugent. The lights are out most of the time, General. However, back to naval manning.

The CHAIRMAN: Order, please.

Mr. MACALUSO: A great deal of criticism and concern has been expressed by a number of witnesses having to do with naval manning. Some of these witnesses, General, have stated that the Committee on Defence has heard that the naval component of the Maritime Command is short of personnel and grave doubt continues to be expressed as to our capabilities to fully man all ships. Others have stated that they are still not convinced the forces will be able to continue to meet our naval commitments as set out in the White Paper of 1964 and, from the navy point of view, Bill No. C-243 will result in the eventual running down of our maritime combat capability.

Finally, one statement is that we are not manning as many ships as we did and, therefore, our overall effectiveness should be decreasing because we are not manning what we had expected to man. And there has been comment and concern about such things as not enough navy personnel to man ships and that ships that are not being manned and are in dry dock, apart from the ones that

are being refitted. I am just wondering, General, whether you or perhaps, some of your staff could give us any accurate, up to date information and comments on the question of naval manning to answer some of these criticisms, and tell us whether or not they are valid?

General ALLARD: I am not too worried about the question of being ready but if you will allow me, I have here the Director General of Maritime Forces, Commodore Porter, who might answer this question better than I.

Mr. MACALUSO: Fine; I would be very happy to have this important question answered competently.

Mr. NUGENT: Are you going to keep on bringing in new witnesses under this guise, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Nugent, it has been agreed by the Committee that we would hear General Allard and we would hear his briefing team and we are doing exactly that. I do not think any member of the Committee would want to cut off the briefing that we have received. This is the one single point today that was agreed upon in the Steering Committee. This is the only point on which we had unanimity—that we would continue today with these briefings.

Mr. MACALUSO: This was discussed some time ago—

Mr. NUGENT: Mr. Chairman, on a question of privilege, unless I misunderstood, it was agreed that we would hear General Allard and his briefing team. This is not part of the briefing team—

An hon. MEMBER: Oh, well—

Mr. NUGENT: —and I did not understand that any time anybody asked a question they would be able to bring in under this guise any number of officers they wanted to and I would think that when we are considering the number of witnesses to be called they should be counted as witnesses called on behalf of a government member.

Mr. MACALUSO: Mr. Chairman, I do not know if—

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Macaluso— Quiet, please. Order, order.

I think this is the proper way to proceed with the briefing.

An hon. MEMBER: Let us proceed, shall we?

The CHAIRMAN: Commodore Porter, will you proceed please.

Commodore H. A. PORTER (*Director General, Maritime Forces*): Mr. Chairman, before answering questions, with your leave I would like to give a brief statement relating to the effectiveness of our maritime forces in antisubmarine warfare. Some serious doubts have been raised before this Committee on this effectiveness. As a result I believe it is necessary to give you some information which does not represent my judgment alone but which has been prepared with the assistance of competent officers who are specialists in their field and which has been discussed with the maritime commander who is the most competent witness on maritime forces, but, as you are aware, he is in Halifax.

Although I will speak mainly of ships, I wish to emphasize that the antisubmarine warfare capability and effectiveness of our maritime force is made up of ships, aircraft both shore based and carrier borne, submarines, certain fixed

installations, and, probably most important of all the dedicated, hard working, competent officers, men and women who man them and who are drawn from the Royal Canadian Air Force and the Royal Canadian Navy. Antisubmarine warfare is a team effort and will always be such. No one element can do the job itself. The capability we have and its effectiveness is made up of the sum of the particular strengths contributed by each different type of *ASW* system.

It is difficult to derive an absolute comparison of the effectiveness of the larger number of ships in commission in the early 1960's with the smaller number of fully modernized and well equipped ships in commission at present.

However, in examining the relative effectiveness of the Navy in the early 1960's with the present, some background discussion is necessary. The number of ships in commission in the Navy increased significantly between 1955 and 1963 with the reactivation of 17 World War II frigates and the building and commissioning of 18 destroyer escorts. By 1963, the RCN had reached a peak strength of about 55 major war ships and support ships in commission. Although it had been planned to dispose of the older World War II destroyers and to place some frigates in reserve as the new destroyers became available, this plan was postponed for a number of reasons, including the Cuban crisis of late 1962. Thus by mid 1963, the RCN was seriously over-extended in maintaining this large number of ships in commission. In particular, some ships were manned with as little as 70 per cent of the crew required for operational efficiency. In addition, in order to man ships even to that level, crew members from a ship entering regular overhaul and refit periods were transferred to a ship just completing such a period. Changes of 100 per cent in the manning billets in a ship within one year were not unusual.

The effect of undermanning and continuous personnel changes on the operational effectiveness of a complex warship is obvious. As a subsidiary effect, the morale and efficiency of the men were affected owing to the doubling of duties in undermanned ships, the constant changes from ship to ship and the reduction in the normal opportunities for many of them to enjoy home life. Thus, although the number of ships in commission was high, their operational effectiveness was far below potential.

As a further factor, two more destroyer escorts and the operational support ship *Provider* were approaching completion and the men they required could not be found without decreasing the number of ships in commission. And finally, the operating costs of all ships and particularly the rising maintenance expenses of the older ships were combining to exceed budgetary limitations.

Thus, to man the newer ships to full complement, to provide crews for the new construction ships, to provide funds for new ships and equipment, to remain within budgetary limitations and to provide a stable manning situation a program of phasing out the older ships to disposal and reserve was begun in late 1963. In addition, a system of personnel management for ship's personnel, known as the Cyclic System, was introduced.

As previously noted a comparison of effectiveness between the early 1960's and the present is difficult as the only true proof lies in the crucial test of war. One can always postulate particular circumstances in which large numbers of ships whatever their capability can be more effective than a smaller number of highly efficient ships. Complex calculations of sonar swept area, detection ability

and weapon kill potential can be made to substantiate one view or another depending on the assumptions selected. As one example, the commissioning of the operational support ship, HMCS *Provider,* has obviously increased the effectiveness of the maritime force, by increasing the time on station for escorts through elimination of the time lost in transit to and from base for replenishment. But by how much and under what circumstances is the problem. One such calculation shows that with an available force of 18 *ASW* escorts operating 1,000 miles from base, only three can be kept on continuous station. With the addition of HMCS *Provider*, 10 ocean stations can be maintained, a gain of three times the operational effectiveness. Similar considerations are possible for the new helicopter equipped destroyer escorts, submarine detection equipment for ships and aircraft, torpedoes for ships and aircraft, helicopters and the submarines which have entered service since 1963.

It is believed that in spite of the reduction in the number of ships, the effectiveness of the maritime force has not been reduced since the early 1960's but has improved and significantly so in certain areas. It is confidently expected that in the period ahead, the new ships and helicopters under procurement action now, as well as the planned retrofit of new weapon systems in older ships, will provide the maritime force with a greatly increased operational effectiveness when compared with 1963.

It is well known that the maritime force is experiencing a shortage of personnel as indicated by the ships which are undermanned. The ships and aircraft of these forces require a large number of highly skilled men. In competition with the demands of industry, sufficient men with the right potential have not been coming forward, but I can tell you that the recruiting situation has improved considerably and one problem, the new entry training establishment, *Cornwallis*, at the moment is getting enough instructors to train the new entries that are there. They are arriving there each week. This shortage is however the most important factor affecting the operational effectiveness of the maritime forces now and in the future.

In summary then, the choice in 1963 was to attempt to operate a large force of rapidly aging and obsolescent ships or reduce the number and maintain a modern and highly efficient force. I have no doubt that the correct decision was made.

I would like to mention some of the things that have made a significant difference to our *ASW* effectiveness during the period 1963-67. Some of these projects were begun many years ago and have come to fruition in these last four years, others are programs which were initiated during the period:

— Two helicopter destroyers entered service

— *Provider*, the operational support ship, entered service—a significant advance in our capability to support *ASW* forces

— The submarine *Ojibwa* entered service—although she is primarily required for training *ASW* forces, *Ojibwa* is also a significant addition to the *ASW* team. A submarine transiting from its home base to the operational area fears an anti-submarine submarine lying in wait more than any other *AS* weapon, in other words, an ambush. Our second submarine *Onandaga* will enter service in June of this year.

— The *Sea King* helicopters have entered service—initially in *Bonaventure* and during this year in the helicopter destroyers. These helicopters are in my opinion one of the greatest single increases in *ASW* effectiveness we have made in mobile *ASW* systems for many years.

— Tracker aircraft are being modernized. These aircraft which operate from *Bonaventure* with their new equipment will be as up to date in *ASW* systems and techniques as any carrier borne *ASW* aircraft in the world.

— Better torpedoes have been procured for ships and aircraft. This is the mark 44 torpedo.

— Better sonobuoys and sonobuoy techniques have been employed by ships and aircraft.

— Better communications equipment and techniques have been incorporated in ships and aircraft.

— Seven ships of the *Saint Laurent* class have been modernized including the fitting of variable depth sonar and helicopter facilities.

— The capability of using certain facilities to detect and track submarines which cannot be discussed in an open session of this committee has improved significantly.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MACALUSO: Commodore Porter, with that briefing on it, I would ask you—

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Macaluso, your time is almost up.

Mr. MACALUSO: Mr. Chairman, I think Mr. Fane was allowed 35 minutes so I am sure I have plenty of time left.

The CHAIRMAN: I wonder Mr. Macaluso, whether you would let the Chair settle points of this kind because first of all—

Mr. MACALUSO: Well, I do not want you eating into my time, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN: I relish the opportunity of communicating with my friend, Mr. Churchill. Mr. Churchill, in view of the exchange which Mr. Fane had and the interesting information he drew out, I wonder if in this case you and I could spare Mr. Macaluso for a short while to see whether he evinces any interesting information too.

Mr. NUGENT: It is not between the two of you, Mr. Chairman, how much time you are alloting to each questioner. If Mr. Macaluso chooses to have a brief presented as an answer to his question, that is his time.

Mr. MACALUSO: Nonsense.

The CHAIRMAN: He has about five minutes to run here and we will just let him run on.

Mr. MACALUSO: Well, Mr. Chairman, I started at 9.30, I think, and since 35 minutes was allowed another member I think I have a little more time. Commodore Porter, with the information and knowledge you have on this are we

able, at the present time, to keep our naval commitments—or I address it to General Allard, whichever one chooses to answer—which we presently have to NATO and to our own particular home defence?

Mr. PORTER: We are certainly keeping our naval commitments to NATO and I would say we are capable of providing our own home defence.

Mr. MACALUSO: Well, then, in view of the criticism that there has been of undermanning, would you say there is no problem at the present time of manning ships to keep those particular commitments?

Mr. PORTER: Mr. Macaluso, there are problems of manning. We have some ships that are not fully manned. While we can certainly meet our commitments to NATO we would be more capable of meeting our commitments at home if we had these ships up to their full strength, but the men that we need for them could be made available very quickly if an emergency were to loom on the horizon and these ships could be brought up to strength from men who are in the training establishments, at the moment, within less than one month—within 30 days.

Mr. MACALUSO: If there was an emergency within less than one month we could man all our ships. At the present time, is our overall effectiveness decreased; that is, our naval commitments?

Mr. PORTER: I would say it has not decreased. I think from the antisubmarine point of view we are more effective today than we have ever been.

Mr. MACALUSO: Fine; thank you. Mr. Chairman, my last question is on naval manning, but I do have a matter that I want to bring to the attention of the Chair which should be cleaned up and not left hanging. That has to do with the subcommittee's report on agenda which you gave this morning. I would like to move that this report be adopted, Mr. Chairman, at the present time—

An hon. MEMBER: What is going on here?

Mr. MACALUSO: —in order that we know where we are going, as Mr. Churchill wanted to know this morning. I move that this report of the Steering Committee, submitted to us today and circulated, be adopted. Do I have a seconder?

Mr. NUGENT: Will you put me down as the first to debate the motion, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. HARKNESS: On a point of order, Mr. Chairman, I thought we were to complete this briefing rather than get into this agenda debate at the present time.

Mr. MACALUSO: I am not stopping the briefing, Mr. Chairman. The motion is there, Mr. Chairman. It is in order and I think you have to accept it.

The CHAIRMAN: I am faced with the motion from Mr. Macaluso.

An hon. MEMBER: There is nothing wrong with it.

An hon. MEMBER: It is debatable.

The CHAIRMAN: The subcommittee report is indeed before us and I have a seconder of that motion. I do not think the Chair has any course except to accept the motion.

Mr. NUGENT: On the motion, Mr. Chairman, if I have the floor—

Mr. MACALUSO: I will speak to the motion, Mr. Chairman, when you are going to open debate on it.

An hon. MEMBER: We all are going to make speeches.

Mr. NUGENT: Do not worry; there will be lots of speeches on the motion.

Mr. MACALUSO: Oh, I expect it from you.

An hon. MEMBER: And on the amendments thereto.

An hon. MEMBER: I will be one of the hundreds.

The CHAIRMAN: I have a motion before me now. Mr. Nugent?

Mr. NUGENT: Yes, Mr. Chairman. I understand that Mr. Macaluso wanted to speak to it. Perhaps I should have spoken to the point of order, of whether the motion was in order, since he gained the floor on the pretext of examining the witness and—

Mr. MACALUSO: Mr. Chairman, on a point of personal privilege, I object to this member imputing motives to members of this Committee or to imply motives why I brought if forth. I had a particular question, Mr. Chairman, on naval manning which has been raised in many briefs and which many members of this Committee have asked questions on. I asked General Allard about naval manning and he was free, under the rules of this Committee, to call whomever he pleased. I had no knowledge of the fact that there would be a statement made beforehand. I am very pleased there was; it gives further information to this Committee. However, it is within my rights also, as every Committee member should be, to adopt the Steering Committee's report or to reject it, Mr. Chairman. The motion is on the floor, and if you are going to call debate I am prepared to debate the motion.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Macaluso, the only point I have to settle here is whether Mr. Nugent is preparing to debate the question of whether or not this motion is in order, or whether he is proposing to debate whether or not we have a motion. I have already stated, Mr. Nugent, that I do not think I can escape a motion with a seconder about a subcommittee report. Perhaps we might have wanted to proceed in some other way, but—

Mr. NUGENT: May I? You spoke so quickly before we had a chance to raise a point of order and I think it is perfectly proper for us to raise the question of whether a motion can be introduced in this manner when the only—

The CHAIRMAN: I have already ruled on this part, Mr. Nugent.

Mr. NUGENT: —reason he had the floor was to question the witness, when there are others who are going to question the witness, and when it is the usual practice or procedure in a Committee that the report of the Steering Committee is presented, and then the person presenting it moves its adoption, if it is going to be. I am sure the Chairman will agree, the only reason Mr. Macaluso had the floor was for questioning, and that is the business before us, and it is for the Chair to determine whether this rather unusual—and that is a kind way to speak about it—method of introducing a motion—cutting off the questioning, cutting off the rest of those the Chairman indicated had a right to speak—is in order at this time.

I am prepared, of course, to debate—and I am sure most of my colleagues are—at great lengths the motion for the adoption of the Committee report, but I think there is a question before the Chair of whether you can properly receive a motion at this time from Mr. Macaluso in this way.

Mr. MACALUSO: Mr. Chairman, you have already ruled that the motion is in order, and I am prepared to debate the motion.

An hon. MEMBER: I am off, if that is the call.

The CHAIRMAN: Order.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Well, Mr. Chairman, what happens to the rest of us who wish to speak to the point of order?

The CHAIRMAN: I am willing to receive assistance from members on the subject of whether or not—

Mr. FORRESTALL: I am not offering you assistance; I am looking for advice and direction on the point of order.

The CHAIRMAN: —this is in order.

Mr. HARKNESS: Mr. Chairman, on that point I would remind you that you ruled this morning we would postpone debate on the report brought in by the Steering Committee until we had completed the briefing, and that the rest of today would be given over to proceeding with the briefing which has been scheduled for today. That briefing has not been completed and, therefore, I think your ruling in that regard is the one that should be carried forward, rather than doing the opposite, as Mr. Macaluso has asked, and reverting to a matter which you yourself ruled we would not deal with to the detriment of the briefing and the questions on the brief.

Mr. MACALUSO: Mr. Chairman, I want to—

The CHAIRMAN: We will come back to you in a second, Mr. Macaluso. I would like to hear from other gentlemen first.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I would like to answer what Mr. Harkness has just said. When we discussed it this morning I wanted to talk on your ruling, but you said you had already ruled that you would hear General Allard and all his witnesses before you dealt with this, and with that we had to abide. Now you are allowing your ruling to be overruled by a motion—

The CHAIRMAN: I am asking for advice on the ruling as to—

Mr. MCINTOSH: Well, that is what I am telling you, by accepting the motion; I thought you said you had accepted it.

An hon. MEMBER: He could have reconsidered—

The CHAIRMAN: I am asking for the advice of this Committee on this.

Mr. MCINTOSH: To me, if that is not closure of the worst type, then I do not know what is.

An hon. MEMBER: He is asking for advice.

The CHAIRMAN: Are there any other comments?

Mr. CHURCHILL: Mr. Chairman, I think you have to conduct the Committee in the fashion in which the House of Commons is conducted by the Speaker. I

doubt very much whether the Speaker would accept a motion to adopt a committee report when that committee report had not been formally put in front of us by the chairman. It was not called as an order of business at this particular time. Mr. Macaluso intervened with his motion at a time when the Committee was considering questions to General Allard and anyone else who happened to be on the floor.

On those grounds I am quite sure, following House of Commons procedure which we must follow, the motion could not be entertained at this time. Had you, sir, said that the briefing hearings and questioning had come to an end and the subject then for discussion was the subcommittee report, that would have been an entirely different thing—another order of business calling for the consideration of the Committee. But to smuggle in a motion like this in the way in which it was done by a person who has been given the authority of chairing another committee and, therefore, is considered to be an experienced and competent member of the House of Commons is to me very astonishing. I would feel obliged to take this up with the Speaker of the House of Commons as an infraction of the rights and privileges of the members of this House, and entertain with him and the House of Commons the conduct of this Committee if this is to be proceeded with. I suggest to you, sir—and I am trying to be helpful—that you rule the motion out of order.

Mr. FOY: I am wondering whether I could suggest a compromise similar to Mr. Churchill's famous compromises. I wonder whether we could suggest to the Committee, to satisfy everyone, that we continue with the questioning, say, until 10.30, and then take the motion up and deal with it then.

Mr. NUGENT: You do not blackmail us like that.

Mr. FOY: Mr. Nugent, I am surprised at you for talking like that.

An hon. MEMBER: I am not surprised—

Mr. FOY: I think this would be a compromise. There are some questions that some of the members would like to ask, and I see no reason why this should not be done and then—

An hon. MEMBER: It could be done if we applied the rules—

Mr. FOY: —at 10.30 we will deal with the motion.

Mr. BYRNE: On a point of order, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Byrne?

Mr. BYRNE: As I recall the understanding this morning, you asked for the co-operation of the Committee to carry on and hear the witnesses who were before us today, but later today the matter could be raised again, that is, the question of adopting the Committee report. According to Beauchesne's third edition—or fourth; whichever you wish to quote—all that is required for a member to move a motion is that he first have the floor—that he has been recognized by the Chair—and he may then move a motion. By virtue of the fact that you said this morning this matter should be raised before adjournment this evening, I think the member is quite in order, by virtue of the fact that he had the floor, to move that motion. I am sure a ruling by Mr. Speaker would certainly verify that.

An hon. MEMBER: I do not know that rule number; would you mind quoting it?

Mr. BYRNE: Well, I do not have it here, but I am sure the hon. member knows the rules so well he could do so. All I can say is that it is a rule well known.

Mr. FOY: I am sure the suggestion I made is a good compromise and should be considered.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, I think we have heard some very valuable comment and I thank you for your assistance. I think our problem is that there are numbers of us here who perhaps would like to continue tonight with the examination of witnesses. I think Mr. Forrestall, in particular, has some questions that he wants to continue with in examining Commodore Porter. I do not believe for a moment that I am going to be able to postpone for very long the resolution of Mr. Macaluso and I wonder whether or not we could continue with the examination of witnesses for awhile and agree to that. Perhaps, Mr. Macaluso, you could spare us the resolution until a little later this evening or until, perhaps, the first thing tomorrow morning when we can address ourselves to the business of how we will continue conducting ourselves through—

Mr. MACALUSO: I will be very happy to hold the motion until later this evening or first thing in the morning provided we have the agreement of this Committee to do so. Not that I am suspicious, Mr. Chairman—of course not—but I would just like a firm commitment that it will be dealt with by every member of this Committee either later this evening or first thing in the morning and that the motion will be put. There is no intention on my part to cut off—

An hon. MEMBER: Mr. Chairman—

Mr. MACALUSO: Mr. Chairman, there is no purpose on my part to cut off any questioning this evening by any hon. members. I have no reason to do otherwise.

The CHAIRMAN: All right, then.

Mr. MACALUSO: What I was saying, unless I—

The CHAIRMAN: It is settled—

Mr. MACALUSO: Mr. Chairman, please allow me to continue. Unless I have the commitment of the Committee as a whole that the motion will be put later this evening or first thing in the morning—well, later this evening, Mr. Chairman—I will not withdraw it. If not, I say the motion is on the floor, you have ruled it in order, and it should be put.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Macaluso, will you let it stand as a notice of motion? We will deal with it tomorrow morning and, in the meantime, perhaps if hon. members will agree not to see the clock, we will continue with the examination of Commodore Porter.

Mr. NUGENT: Mr. Chairman, if I may; I brought up the point of order and while the Chair said, you have a motion before you, I am sure that what the Chair asked this Committee was to consider the argument; otherwise you would not have asked for it and, therefore, I gather you have not made a ruling. I say, sir, that it is now ten o'clock. If the Chair wishes until tomorrow morning to consider it, fine; but otherwise I would ask for a ruling on the motion. Right

after your ruling—it is ten o'clock anyway—we can consider the motion. If it is good we will have to proceed with it tomorrow, or if it is no good we will proceed with the program you outlined earlier today. But Mr. Chairman, either you call it ten o'clock or give a ruling on the motion, sir.

The CHAIRMAN: Ten o'clock, gentlemen.

Mr. MACALUSO: Mr. Chairman, on a point of order.

An hon. MEMBER: Ten o'clock.

Mr. MACALUSO: On a point of order, Mr. Chairman. I would ask for a ruling on whether this motion is in order or not. You have already ruled that it was. I would like a ruling this evening to judge whether I will have this placed at 9.30 tomorrow morning—

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, we will resume here at 9.30 in the morning. I will have an opportunity tonight and early in the morning to think about this.

Mr. MACALUSO: Will we consider it at 9.30, Mr. Chairman?

Some hon. MEMBERS: No.

The CHAIRMAN: At 9.30 at the opening of business, the matter will be taken up and we will then proceed with tomorrow's business.

Mr. MACALUSO: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN: The meeting is adjourned.

HOUSE OF COMMONS

First Session—Twenty-seventh Parliament

1966-67

STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. GRANT DEACHMAN

PROCEEDINGS

No. 29

FRIDAY, MARCH 3, 1967

Respecting

Bill C-243, An Act to amend the National Defence Act and other Acts in consequence thereof.

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY
OTTAWA, 1967

25908—1

STANDING COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. Grant Deachman

Vice-Chairman: Hon. Marcel Lambert

Mr. Andras,
Mr. Brewin,
Mr. Byrne,
Mr. Churchill,
Mr. Crossman,
Mr. Forrestall,
Mr. Foy,
Mr. Harkness,
Mr. Hopkins,
Mr. Langlois (*Chicoutimi*),
Mr. Latulippe,
Mr. Legault,
Mr. Lessard,
Mr. Loiselle,
Mr. Macaluso,
Mr. MacInnis (*Cape Breton South*),
Mr. McIntosh,
Mr. McNulty,
Mr. Nugent,
Mr. Rochon,
Mr. Smith,
Mr. Winch—(24).

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

FRIDAY, March 3, 1967.
(58)

The Standing Committee on National Defence met at 9.35 a.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Deachman, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Andras, Brewin, Byrne, Churchill, Crossman, Deachman, Forrestall, Foy, Harkness, Hopkins, Lambert, Langlois (*Chicoutimi*), Legault, Lessard, Loiselle, Macaluso, MacInnis (*Cape Breton South*), McIntosh, McNulty, Nugent and Rochon—(21).

Also present: Messrs. Mackasey, Pilon and Régimbal.

In attendance: From the Department of National Defence: Honourable Paul Hellyer, Minister and Honourable Léo Cadieux, Associate Minister.

The Chairman referred to a letter he received from the Minister of National Defence dated March 2, 1967, attaching a chart updating the information contained on page 63 of the Special Studies publication prepared for the Special Committee on Defence, Supplement, 1964-65. The information was requested by the International Information Centre on Peace-Keeping Operations. It was agreed to table this information and distribute copies to the members. (*Exhibit 8*)

After further discussion concerning the Notice of the Motion, moved at the previous meeting by Mr. Macaluso, seconded by Mr. Foy, which reads as follows:

> "That the Report of the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure, dated March 2, 1967, be *now* adopted"

the Chairman ruled against that motion.

Thereupon, Mr. Macaluso moved, seconded by Mr. Foy,

That the Report of the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure, dated March 2, 1967, be now concurred in.

The Chairman then ruled this motion in order at this time, and debate ensued.

The Chairman announced that the Committee would meet at 2:00 p.m. this day when the Minister would be present to answer questions.

At 11:00 a.m., the Committee adjourned until 200 p.m. this day.

AFTERNOON SITTING
(59)

The Standing Committee on National Defence met at 2:05 p.m. this day, the Chairman, Mr. Deachman, presiding.

25908—1½

Members present: Messrs. Brewin, Byrne, Churchill, Crossman, Deachman, Forrestall, Foy, Harkness, Hopkins, Legault, Loiselle, Macaluso, MacInnis (*Cape Breton South*), McNulty, Nugent and Mr. Winch—(16).

Also present: Mr. McLelland and Mr. Régimbal.

In attendance: Honourable Paul Hellyer, Minister of National Defence.

On motion of Mr. Macaluso, seconded by Mr. Legault,

Resolved,—That the Committee adjourn until Monday, February 6, 1967 at 3:30 p.m.

The question being put on the motion, it was agreed to, on division: YEAS—10; NAYS—6.

At 2:10 p.m., the Committee adjourned until Monday, March 6, 1967 at 3:30 p.m.

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

PROCEEDINGS

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

FRIDAY, March 3, 1967.

The CHAIRMAN: Order. I was just noting the presence of Mr. MacInnis, and I want to say that I think Mr. MacInnis is one of the original members of the Defence Committee, and we welcome his presence back on the Committee this morning.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): I hope it continues.

The CHAIRMAN: Well, Mr. MacInnis, I know with your assistance and help on the Committee that things will go well.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): I am always glad to have another calm, orderly voice.

The CHAIRMAN: That is right. I have a couple of pieces of business to deal with, and then we have to address ourselves to the problem of last night, which was a ruling raised on the question of a motion. I have a letter from Mr. Hellyer enclosing a chart which updates information on Canadian military participation in peacekeeping and truce-supervising activities since November 9, 1945. Now, this was published in one of the special studies which we had originally, and a copy of it was requested by somebody. I am not sure who asked for it. The information in the table, which is very interesting, shows the services involved, the period of their participation, the various places in which they serve, the personnel involved and costs have been updated. I am having copies made immediately and distributed to all members of the Committee. I have a telegram that I received this morning, which reads as follows:

> On February twenty second I wired Mr. Stewart on February 28th I wrote Mr. Groos requesting opportunity to present my brief on unification to Committee. To date have received no reply I am repeating my request herewith. Air Marshal W. A. Curtis.

Well, first of all, I will instruct the Clerk of the Committee to write to Air Marshal Curtis immediately acknowledging his wire. Secondly, I want to repeat something I said the day before yesterday, that nothing prevents anyone from filing a brief with the Committee. I understand there are one or two outstanding briefs in the hands of gentlemen who are interested in what this Committee is doing. Nothing prevents the filing of those briefs, and that should be noted by anybody who writes to the Committee or who has such a brief. Whether or not such persons may appear before the Committee for questioning on their brief is a matter for the Committee to deal with, but it is an automatic matter with the Committee for the filing and distribution of briefs.

Mr. CHURCHILL: What answer was given to Air Marshal Curtis in response to his telegram and in response to his letter?

The CHAIRMAN: I will read his telegram again:

> On February twenty second I wired Mr. Stewart on February 28th I wrote Mr. Groos requesting opportunity to present my brief on unification to Committee. To date have received no reply I am repeating my request herewith.

Now, whether or not any communication went to him from this side, I do not have that information. I have only received a telegram.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Can the Clerk tell us?

The CHAIRMAN: I will ask the Clerk now. The telegram apparently came before the Steering Committee for action when it was received.

Mr. FOY: Mr. Chairman, may I just say that I believe the gentleman in question is a member of TRIO, possibly one of the upper echelon in TRIO. Anything that he might have to present to us would be a repetition of what we have heard from TRIO already.

The CHAIRMAN: Well, I think there is only one point to deal with here, gentlemen. I do have a communication addressed to me as chairman, and whatever happened in the days before I took this Chair I do not want to reflect on, but the telegram will be answered by letter immediately by the Clerk of the House. I again repeat that we are prepared to receive briefs, and that the telegram will be referred to the Steering Committee along with all its business. I think Mr. MacInnis is first and then Mr. Lambert.

Mr. LAMBERT: Well, it is in connection with the telegram and the acknowledgment. May I suggest that out of common courtesy to the gentleman, as the Committee failed to acknowledge his first telegram, that instead of answering by letter we might answer by telegram now.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I do not like the expression "The Committee failed" to answer the telegram. The Committee was not formally apprised of this. The Chairman failed to do his duty; put that in the letter.

The CHAIRMAN: Well, gentlemen, I think if you will leave it to the Chair the correspondence will be properly dealt with and it has now been dealt with before the Committee.

Mr. LAMBERT: Mr. Chairman, that is not good enough, just to casually brush it off with a letter after there have been telegrams which have not been acknowledged. I think that if you were at the other end you would feel somewhat burned up about this sort of discourtesy, and I think that some amend might be made—

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Lambert, I am sure the Clerk of the Committee will be happy to send a telegram, and I so instruct him now.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Under the circumstances, do you not think we should now invite Air Marshal Curtis to appear in order to correct this?

The CHAIRMAN: I think this opens up a much wider matter, Mr. Churchill, and one which we have before us this morning in the form of a motion put last night by Mr. Macaluso, and I am going to deal with that matter now.

Last night the motion was put by Mr. Macaluso and I moved, seconded by—may we have a little order? I am sorry, Mr. MacInnis?

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): On the question of the request by the Air Marshal, in your opening remarks you referred to the fact that you had heard from him and that you had instructed the Clerk to reply, and then you followed up by asking if anything been done about it. Well, having instructed the Clerk to reply, does it not follow that you must have checked, or are you sending Air Marshal Curtis a second reply?

The CHAIRMAN: Oh no. I am relatively new to the Chair of this Committee, Mr. MacInnis.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): I am aware of that.

The CHAIRMAN: So I was not aware of the points mentioned in the telegram of Air Marshal Curtis about his previous communications. When I arrived at my office this morning, about 10 minutes before coming to the Committee, this wire was on my desk and I brought it down here to read to the Committee. My instructions to the Clerk of the Committee to send a letter acknowledging the wire were simply made to the Clerk here verbally for the first time when we discussed the question. The suggestion then arose—and a very good suggestion —through Mr. Lambert that if there was any problem in the past, that this might be righted by immediately sending a telegram to Air Marshal Curtis, and that will be done.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Mr. Chairman, does the Chair feel that we are fulfilling the commitments made by the Minister of National Defence and by Prime Minister in answering such a request either by wire or by letter at this late date?

The CHAIRMAN: Well, we discussed this yesterday, Mr. MacInnis. The question was raised by someone—I have forgotten whom at the moment—regarding the commitments of ministers for actions of this Committee, and I think we were agreed that a Committee of the house commits itself; that its business is its own business and that whatever the commitments may be, we review those as part of the Committee business.

Mr. CHURCHILL: And just ignores the Prime Minister, the way his Cabinet does.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Churchill, I think that is the privilege of a Committee of the House of Commons. I would not want to believe that Committees of the House of Commons could indeed by directed by either the Prime Minister or by a cabinet minister or by any member of the house. I think they must be free to handle their own business.

Mr. CHURCHILL: It was not a direction from the Prime Minister to the Committee, it was an assurance to the people of this country that they could be heard on this matter.

Mr. LESSARD: If you have a motion, get on with it.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I will raise a point of order, then, and that will perhaps shut up some of these fellows over here who do not want to have any serious discussion. My point of order, Mr. Chairman, is that the Prime Minister gave

an assurance openly in the House of Commons to the people of this country that on the subject of defence—which is of vital importance to Canada—they would have their opportunity to be heard before this Committee, and this Committee is now rejecting that assurance given by the Prime Minister. I think, sir, that you should—

The CHAIRMAN: Order, order, order. Let us have some order in the room. How can I possibly do anything from this Chair with such a babble of voices. Now, just a moment, please. How can I possibly proceed with a babble of voices back and forth across this room. I will hear one person at a time, and at the moment I will hear Mr. Churchill.

Mr. CHURCHILL: My point is that this Committee should recognize that assurance given by the Prime Minister to the people of Canada. This is the point that I am raising, sir, and I think that you should take this into consideration as chairman of this Committee and make sure that that assurance of the Prime Minister is upheld. Otherwise, what does it mean? Are we as a Committee announcing publicly to the people of Canada that anything that the Prime Minister say need not be attended to or that no attention need be paid to it, that it is not actually a comment or an assurance that is to be believed and you are calling into question the word of the Prime Minister of this country. I do not think any Committee should do that. This is an affront to the Prime Minister of this country and an affront to the people of Canada. This is what I would like you to consider.

Mr. MCINTOSH: On the same point of order, Mr. Chairman—

The CHAIRMAN: Now, I wonder if you could leave this to the Chair—

Mr. MCINTOSH: I want to speak on the same point of order.

The CHAIRMAN: Just a moment, please. I have one point of order which was raised last night, and this is the point of order raised against the resolution of Mr. Macaluso. I am not in a position to deal with two points of order; that is to say, the one raised by Mr. Churchill right now and the one previously raised by Mr. Macaluso. I am also certainly not in a position to deal with the third point of order you have now raised. What I propose to do is this: I propose to address myself to the first point of order, which is the resolution raised by Mr. Macaluso last night, and when that is concluded I am sure it will open the way to other discussions and to the subject raised by Mr. Churchill. I have before me the resolution made by Mr. Macaluso last night, which reads:

> I move seconded by Mr. Foy that the report of the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure dated March 2, 1967, be now adopted.

This was duly seconded by Mr. Foy, and the question was raised as to the validity of this resolution. I listened to expressions of opinion from you gentlemen last night and this morning I am asked to rule on this question.

An hon. MEMBER: That is the point that I would like to talk about.

An hon. MEMBER: I want to speak on that point of order, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN: All right. First of all, are the honourable gentlemen prepared to hear me on the subject now that I have given this matter some thought?

Mr. MCINTOSH: No, I want to speak on a point of order. You said it was a point of order and we are entitled to speak on it.

The CHAIRMAN: All right, just a moment. We will hear Mr. Lambert, Mr. McIntosh and then Mr. Macaluso.

Mr. LAMBERT: First of all, Mr. Chairman, the motion is completely irrelevant to the proceedings that were before us last night. The agreed business was the briefing and the questioning by staff officers. This was agreed upon. The other matter was left in abeyance and tabled. Now, the Chair is in charge of the agenda, as in the House of Commons. If a matter has been put aside and we are discussing another matter, no member may come back and say "All is well, we are discussing this one matter", and suddenly make a motion relating to the previous matter which has been put aside. Otherwise it would be quite proper for anybody at any time to pick up an item that is kicking around on an agenda and say, "Mr. Chairman, I move this with regard to this particular piece of business." Therefore, as we had not concluded with the questioning at the time and a new officer had come in with a frankly prepared brief to a "stooged" question, I would say that it was quite improper for Mr. Macaluso to move his motion after he had received this brief, and on which he then wanted to close any question, without even discussing the qualifications of the officer who had made the observations. It is for that reason, sir, there is no question in my mind that the motion was irrelevant at the time.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Yesterday morning, Mr. Chairman, when General Allard was on the witness stand you gave us your assurance as Chairman that we would have the opportunity of questioning the General. In fact, you made a list and yesterday morning I was fourth on the list. You did not keep your assurance, as Mr. Churchill said, and that you are not going to allow the Prime Minister or the Minister of National Defence to keep his to the house or to the members of this Committee. You ruled, as you have the power to do, that you would stop the General's questioning at that time and allow him to present another brief. We quite agreed with that because you gave us your assurance that we would have that opportunity again. As I say, I was fourth on the list yesterday morning. You broke that assurance by disallowing it, and not only that, when you read the list the last time I was at the bottom of the list. Now, you are making a mockery out of the Committee system and—

Some hon. MEMBERS: Oh, oh.

The CHAIRMAN: Order, order.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Well, we were sent here to investigate the details of this question. I could go into why it came to Committee, why it was necessary and why we could not get the answers in the House of Commons. You are just making a mockery out of it. You are making a closure out of it. Talk about a bureaucratic dictatorship, this is it.

Mr. MACALUSO: Well, Mr. Chairman, I would submit that the statement by Mr. Lambert that the motion is irrelevant to the proceedings is certainly a false premise. There is nothing in the standing committee rules or in the rules of the house that state that there is a certain time when motions in Committee can be put. Last night and before coming here this morning I checked this through thoroughly with the experts on procedure in the house and I am informed, sir. that it is in order to place a motion in Committee at any time. Now, I waited last night until the last possible moment. Earlier in the day you stated that we would

deal with the report of the Sub-committee on Agenda later in the day. I put my motion before you, sir, at ten minutes to ten.

An hon. MEMBER: After you smuggled in a witness. You did not put it in when you started to—

Mr. MACALUSO: Please, Mr. Chairman, if I may be allowed to proceed. I do not know what the argument is about. The agenda said—if you had followed it—that we were to be finished with questioning of the staff at 10 o'clock last evening anyway. Now, the motion is there, Mr. Chairman. I submit that it is in order, according to the experts of this house and of the committees.

Mr. MCINTOSH: What experts?

Mr. MACALUSO: Well, you can find the same information I did, Mr. McIntosh. Now, Mr. Chairman, I submit that the motion is legally before you and is in order. Now, if there is any question as far as the questioning is concerned, the Minister is still here and they can either vote for or against the motion and we can do away with this sham. Right now, Mr. Chairman, I want to discuss the order of the motion and later on discuss the merits of the motion. But I submit, sir, that the motion that is before you is in order.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Well, Mr. Chairman, I am not going to say anything further other than to make the observation that any motion that interferes with the announced agenda by the Chairman will only serve the purpose of making the Chair look ridiculous.

Mr. MACALUSO: Well, maybe you should read the agenda, Mr. MacInnis.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): I do not have to read it, I will answer that question by using your words, the ones you have just repeated, that the agenda permitted questioning of the witnesses up until 10 o'clock last night, and I say that as of 10 o'clock last night this Committee was no longer properly constituted. In other words, you carried on last night for about 10 or 15 minutes when you were not properly constituted. If the Committee had been permitted yesterday to question the witness up until 10 o'clock, then there would have been absolutely no room for your motion.

Mr. MACALUSO: I must correct myself, sir. It says:

—the staff briefings end tonight.

Mr. NUGENT: It was not adopted. What are you talking about, the agenda.

Mr. MACALUSO: Let us not be hypocritical, sir; they just said that you had to follow the agenda.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, order. Following Mr. MacInnis I have Mr. Forrestall. Let us have a little more order here, please.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Mr. Chairman, in the last couple of days I have had my position shifted around in the speaking order. I do not want to speak to the legality of it, I am not an expert on the rules; but I do want to speak to the merit of it, and I wish you would put my name down in some proper order. I wanted to get that word in now.

The CHAIRMAN: Well, I have your name now. Are you discussing this motion?

Mr. FORRESTALL: Yes, but I understand, Mr. Chairman, that you are now talking to the legality of the motion itself, whether or not it is proper. The only comment I would make about it is that it would seem to me—and again I must qualify what I say because I am not a student of the rules of the house, I merely try to follow them as they are set forth before me—that after we have had a prepared brief injected dealing with one of the most important aspects of this entire exercise, and at the conclusion of cross-examination by one witness a motion is introduced which has the effect—whether it is deliberate or otherwise, intentional or not—

Mr. MACALUSO: The argument is on the merits right now, not on the point of order before you.

Mr. FORRESTALL: I am trying to explain, Mr. Macaluso, what it is that I want to say about this. If it is not in order, I will wait.

Mr. MACALUSO: I agree with you on the merits, but not on this point of order.

The CHAIRMAN: Order, please. Order.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Well, this must be out of order.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Churchill has his hand up. Mr. Foy precedes Mr. Churchill. Have you finished your remarks?

Mr. FORRESTALL: I am trying to clarify, Mr. Chairman, where my name is going to stand on the list with regard to the relative merits of this motion.

Mr. MACALUSO: It will not make any difference where it is.

Mr. FORRESTALL: May my name now be put on that list?

The CHAIRMAN: Your name is on the list to discuss the merits of it right at this moment, but I might say, Mr. Forrestall and gentlemen of the Committee, that you have all been very good in helping me toward making up my mind on whether or not this resolution was properly put. I have listened very carefully and my mind is made up on what I should say at this point. I think the time has come for me to tell you what is on my mind regarding this—

Mr. CHURCHILL: Mr. Chairman, are you making a ruling on the point of order? I have had my hand up because I want to speak to the point of order.

The CHAIRMAN: That is right, but I do not think we should use up too much time before I come to the matter of ruling. You have been very good at giving me advice and I do not want to protract the discussion too long. I have Mr. Foy and Mr. Churchill on the list and then we are coming to the end of it.

Mr. FOY: Well, I would like to repeat what I said yesterday. The reason I was the seconder of this motion is that I agreed with it, because of the fact that it has been obvious to everybody in the Committee that the Conservative members are dedicated to killing the bill and it would be an exercise in utter futility to carry on with more witnesses. This is one reason why I was willing to second the motion. Now, the other matter I want to bring up is the fact that the opposition members are blaming the Chair for this motion. The Chairman has nothing to do with anybody bringing up a motion in this Committee, and you cannot blame him for doing it. His job is to rule on it.

Mr. McINTOSH: We can blame him for dealing with it in the proper order. He gave us an assurance that a certain procedure would be carried out, which he broke.

Mr. FOY: He was faced with a motion that he did not know anything about. He then must deal with the motion, that is the rule.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Mr. Chairman, on the question of this motion and its production at the time that it was produced, Mr. Macaluso has assured us that he has consulted with the experts on the rules in the House of Commons and has received from them the information that he was quite in order in intervening his motion at a time when we were on an entirely different order of business. The experts on the rules in the House of Commons are, of course, Mr. Speaker himself and the Clerk of the House, and I would like to have it recorded in the minutes that Mr. Macaluso indicated these are the two men who approved of the method that he pursued last night. If these are not the two men that he refers to, then I think he should tell us who they are. I have every intention of speaking to the Clerk of the House and to Mr. Speaker to verify the information which Mr. Macaluso has brought before us because—

The CHAIRMAN: No, no, no. Gentlemen, let us have a little order, please. I thank you again for your assistance and I am now going to rule on this motion.

I want to say, in ruling on this motion, what I think the position ought to be of this chairman of a committee of the house. First of all, there are about 21 standing committees of this house and then there are a number of special and joint committees, each of which is manned by members of the House of Commons who have little knowledge of or skill in its rules. Some of those chairmen are people who are taking the chairs of important committees and who are acting in their first parliament. So, one could not expect any chairman of a committee to proceed on the basis that the Speaker of the House proceeds, with all the knowledge available at the table and from the experts surrounding him and his long training in the skills of that art. The best that I think any chairman can do in proceeding before a committee is to attempt to proceed on the basis of interpreting what is the intention of the committee, what can be done to preserve the good will of members and to move forward the business of the Committee. That is what I have tried to do in chairing this particular committee. Since addressing myself to the question of the ruling last night, and the time we met here this morning I have not sought expert advice. I have had no advice to guide me other than taking a quick look at the rules, and rule number 44 reads as follows:

> When a question is under debate no motion is received unless to amend it; to postpone it to a day certain; for the previous question; for reading the orders of the day; for proceeding to another order; to adjourn the debate; or for the adjournment of the House.

Now, what is said about the house is not necessarily germane to what is done in committee, but I think I can certainly interpret it that when a question is under debate no motion is received unless to amend it. In the closing moments of Mr. Macaluso's examination of the National Defence witnesses last night—having had the floor for that purpose—he then proceeded to raise a motion. I think in the circumstances, and having regard to that rule, I would be fair to this Committee if I ruled against that motion on those grounds, and I so rule.

Mr. MACALUSO: Mr. Chairman, I submit that your ruling is in error because the question, Mr. Chairman—

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Macaluso, let me make this very clear. There are no appeals to rulings from a committee. A chairman has to make up his mind what he has to do and, having listened to all of you, this is what I have done. We have now dealt with that ruling and I have ruled your motion out of order. We will go on to the next item.

Mr. MACALUSO: If the matter is before us, Mr. Chairman—

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Macaluso, the matter is not before us, it has been dealt with. If you are on a point of order—

Mr. MACALUSO: Mr. Chairman, last evening you mentioned that at 9.30 this morning this Committee would be dealing with the report on agenda and procedure. That matter is now legally before this Committee. I disagree with the grounds of your ruling but I will accept it because I cannot appeal on it, and that is the only reason. Therefore, as it is legally before us, Mr. Chairman, I move, seconded by Mr. Foy, that the report of the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure dated March 2, 1967 be now concurred in.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Mr. Chairman, I have a point of order arising out of this.

The CHAIRMAN: Wait until I have the motion, please. Gentlemen, I have the resolution of Mr. Macaluso. It reads:

> I move, seconded by Mr. Foy, that the Report of the Subcommittee On Agenda and Procedure dated March 2, 1967, be now concurred in.

You have heard the motion—

Mr. MACALUSO: Please put the question, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HARKNESS: Mr. Chairman, on that point, you just ruled that Mr. Macaluso's motion was out of order. He did not have the floor and you started in to say that we would proceed with the next item of business and, in spite of the fact that you had not given him the floor, he put in this motion. I would submit that the motion is illegally and improperly put in and therefore should not be received.

Mr. LAMBERT: The general item of business before us is clause 1. We are hearing witnesses on clause 1 and no motion can be accepted by you, sir, unless there is a specific question that we are then discussing a report of a subcommittee unless it were the motion that clause 1 carry.

We are still discussing the question of calling further witnesses. If you will recall, there were proposals made to the Chair about a continuation of examination and a deadline was given and nothing has been heard in that regard. I would have thought in the main you would have reconvened the steering committee and said, "All right, we have this. How do we go about it?" Or, "Is there some modification of that?" It was a very bona fide and sincere proposition that was made to the Chair to put to the rest of the members. I would like to be able to discuss this with the steering committee and with the members later on, if that is feasible. However, I do feel that this premature attempt at closure is quite irrelevant at this time.

Mr. McINTOSH: Mr. Chairman, I am not going to debate whether the motion is in order or not. I think that with the assurance you gave this Committee it is your decision to make—if it is in order—when the motion will be dealt with. I think that you as Chairman should control the Committee. I think we should take your word for it, and you gave us your word yesterday morning that we would have an opportunity to question the witness. This other motion came in subsequent to your giving your word, and I think it is up to you to say that you are going to carry out your commitment to the Committee first and then you will entertain the motion, or throw it out, whichever you decide to do, but I think we have to rely on your word.

I understand there will be a mix-up between the changing of Chairman, and so on, but this happened yesterday and you gave the Committee your assurance that we would be given the opportunity to question the witness and you made a separate list for us. We listened to this brief, which had no bearing in my mind, to the topic of unification at all, it dealt with integration, but we sat through it with the expectation that we would have the opportunity to continue questioning the witness who was before us and that is what you told us. I repeat that I am not going to question whether this motion is in order or whether it is not in order; it is the order in which you deal with it that I am questioning. When you make your ruling on that motion, that is quite all right, but I think you should carry out your commitment to this Committee.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. McIntosh, I want to deal with whether or not I dealt fairly with you yesterday, because this is a question you have raised with me twice this morning.

Mr. FOY: Before you embark on that, Mr. Chairman I wonder if I could just interject. Mr. Lambert pointed out that we were dealing with clause 1, but I suggest to the Chair and to the members of the Committee that we are not dealing with clause 1. We are dealing with the bill clause by clause. Mr. Lambert's ideas on this do not seem to be in accord with the rules.

The CHAIRMAN: Let me just deal with the point whether you were treated fairly yesterday. You will recall that yesterday we were in the process of examining the members from National Defence. The subcommittee met at noon yesterday and it split on what it considered to be the agenda. We did not pass a resolution by moving the adoption of the subcommittee report at that time, and it certainly was my own feeling that we should move along as far as possible with the business that day while we had those people here, and I think I did everything within my power to see that that was done. The members had every opportunity to do the very thing which you suggest we should have been doing, Mr. McIntosh, that is, listening to the National Defence briefing teams and asking questions of them. It was not until about a quarter to 10 or 10 o'clock last night that I had to face the question of dealing with Mr. Macaluso's motion.

One must remember that anybody can put a motion at any time and when a motion is being put the Chair has to listen to determine whether or not it is a valid motion or whether it is a motion to be ruled on. I listened to the advice of gentlemen last night, and I think you were one of those who was kind enough to advise me. We reached 10 o'clock, the end of the day, and that was that, and I said I would rule on this matter this morning. You say that I throttled the

opportunity of honourable members yesterday to hear the National Defence people when they were before us. Indeed, I did the very opposite. I did everything possible during the course of the day, and with a committee which has diverse ideas, to see that we kept as closely to the subject as possible. We had a very successful day in asking them questions and listening to the briefings.

So, I do not want it put to me by any member of the Committee that as your Chairman I did not do everything in my power to see that this Committee got every opportunity to hear those people, not do I want to put to me that I have been unfair in ruling on these matters. This is disturbing to any Chairman of a Committee where opinion is as widely divided as this, but I hope I can do that job in a manner which will at least do justice to both sides of the room, whatever the outcome of that may be. This morning I have to address myself to a new motion and it is the same motion we had last night. We have no subject before us at the moment other than this motion, and I am going to rule this motion in order.

Having ruled this motion in order we will now proceed to discuss the motion as it is in front of us. There are no points of order in front of us—

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Mr. Chairman, you already had recognized me on a point of order.

The CHAIRMAN: I had not recognized you on a point of order.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): You indicated to me that you had.

The CHAIRMAN: No, I had not recognized you on a point of order.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Mr. Chairman, you referred to my remarks and I think I should say, with respect to your ruling, that until you made that ruling I was under the impression that I should take the assurances of the Chair. I can no longer do that because I no longer have confidence in the Chairman. I took your word. You assured us, and it should be on the record. You had the list and, if you will remember, yesterday morning I was fourth on the list. Last night you read out a list of about eight or nine names and I was at the very bottom of the list. I would like to answer Mr. Foy about this question of what item we are on. On page 439—this deals with it—it states:

> As the first order of business I call clause 1 of Bill No. C-243 and invite the Minister to make his opening remarks before questioning begins.

This is the Chairman's ruling on page 439 of the evidence.

The CHAIRMAN: We have heard the resolution this morning. We have no other matter to deal with at the opening this morning except our order of business. That is the way committees proceed and that is the way we will now proceed. I have a resolution in front of me. I have ruled that resolution to be in order and we will proceed to the discussion of that resolution. I will recognize those who are prepared to speak to that motion. I see Mr. Macaluso.

Mr. LAMBERT: Mr. Chairman, wait a moment; I raised my hand long ago on the merits of the motion.

The CHAIRMAN: The motion has been ruled in order. It is an item of business before the Committee at the opening of the day and it deals with our order of business. There cannot be a more valid motion than this. We dealt with the

question of last night and the validity of raising a motion while other matters were before the Committee while the member was talking on another matter and raising it as an incidental. This morning at the opening of business we are dealing with an item of business, Mr. Lambert, which is the order of business of the Committee. The motion is:

> I move, seconded by Mr. Foy, that the Report of the Subcommittee On Agenda and Procedure dated March 2, 1967, be now concurred in.

Mr. Macaluso's hand is up and I recognize him on the motion. I want to say in the meantime, Mr. Macaluso, that the instructions of the steering committee, which are now before us and which have been concurred in, are pretty clear and I hope if you are going to speak on this matter that you are not going to take very long.

Mr. MACALUSO: No, I will only be a few minutes. Mr. Chairman, it is strange that there should be such an argument in connection with putting this motion. I believe that the Report of the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure of March 2, 1967, should be concurred in. My reasons for this—as stated by Mr. Winch yesterday—are that this Committee has been sitting since February 7, 1967. We have had 14 days of sittings—this is the 15th—up to last evening we have had 38 meetings; we have had a number of witnesses and 11 of the witnesses have been called as a result of discussions in the steering committee. We have had presentations from organizations that are what I shall call "anti" and "semi-anti" the single service force. One of the presentations by the TRIO organization was given on behalf of a number of groups and organizations, so we might be able to say that there have been more than 11 witnesses. We could go on ad infinitum as far as witnesses are concerned. I agree with Mr. Winch's statement that there is really nothing further to be gained in this particular matter but repetition and perhaps stalling tactics by members of the Conservative Party. I see no reason, if they wish to move on with the questioning, why they could not either vote for or against the motion. The Minister is here. The agenda stated that the Minister was to be called today, and we can still do so this morning and this afternoon. Mr. Chairman, why I am so firm in my mind is that I believe this is nothing but a stall. Let us cut away the sham by members of the Conservative Party who say that they are interested. I refer again—as Mr. Andras stated—to the TV interview on the CBC news on Tuesday, February 28, 1967, with Mr. Harkness. The question put to him was this:

> Is the Conservative Party prepared to defeat the government on this matter?

This is the answer from Mr. Harkness:

> We are prepared to fight the thing to the last ditch and if that involves defeating the government—yes.

Mr. Chairman, I submit that there are closed minds on the other side and it is just a matter of stall. If it is not, then I submit, Mr. Chairman, let us vote on the motion which is before you. We can proceed with the Minister this morning and this afternoon, and we can proceed with a clause by clause study on Monday.

Mr. Chairman, this was raised at the last possible moment last night before 10 o'clock, and I am firm in the belief that nothing further can be achieved except a stall. So I say, Mr. Chairman, to the members of the Conservative Party who are opposing this, let us stop this hypocrisy of wanting to hear more

witnesses to get more information. It is strictly a stall. Last night there were threats that if the motion was in order there would be a two week debate on the motion. Well, Mr. Chairman, if that is not a threat of a stall and a filibuster on the matter, then I do not know what is.

As a result, Mr. Chairman, I think the matter has to be resolved now, that is why I have put that motion and I believe that we should vote on it. If they are in good faith in their intention to proceed with the questioning of the Minister, let us vote on it as soon as possible and then we can proceed with the questioning of the Minister this morning and this afternoon.

The CHAIRMAN: I have Mr. Nugent, followed by Mr. MacInnis, followed by Mr. Harkness, followed by Mr. McIntosh and he is followed by Mr. Forrestall.

Mr. LAMBERT: Mr. Chairman, you are either deaf or you are blind this morning.

Some hon. MEMBERS: Oh, oh.

Mr. LAMBERT: I had my hand up even before Mr. Macaluso to speak on this particular motion.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Lambert, you have had your hand up constantly since business opened this morning. This morning we have discussed, as you know, a ruling on the first motion and we have had points of order and of privilege come up, and I have started a new list each time because they have been separate matters. I have put your name down here as fast as I have been able to get to it.

Mr. NUGENT: Speaking to the motion to adopt the report of the steering committee, which is that we should call no further witnesses, I find myself somewhat amazed that anyone should seriously put forward, in front of an intelligent audience, the argument that Mr. Macaluso advances. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that I would be amazed if it were put forward by someone other than Mr. Macaluso. There is no clearer proof of a closed mind than that person who is afraid to hear further evidence. I have always felt that even if I were sure of my ground, that if there were a person on the other side who felt that they had further evidence to present which might be of benefit, that it should be heard because you never know. It might not change my mind, but even if that further evidence should only satisfy the person who wants to present if that there is indeed no further evidence to call, it is a good enough reason to hear further witnesses. However, that is certainly not the case before us today.

In the present hearings of this Committee I have felt, because of being an old member of the Committee or a military expert, that I did not have much to learn. In fact, Mr. Chairman, I have been amazed at the amount of knowledge I have picked up, and I thought perhaps if we went on for another year or two I might be capable of cross-examining some of the military people on some of the details of military problems.

However, the purpose of the hearings that we started was to consider the unification bill. I thought that we were here to get enough background to enable us to study the question of unification. It is true that the house passed the bill on second reading, which decided the question of whether or not we were in favour of the principle. It is also true that a very awkward method of dealing with the question is to bring in evidence as to the principle afterwards, but unfortunately this was the system which was adopted. In order to still the outcries of the

people of this country who felt that it was so improper that Parliament should decide the question of principle on so little knowledge, the government gave solemn promises that this Committee would be able to investigate and bring out evidence on unification, and that is what we have been doing. At the time the Liberal members of this Committee interrupted the orderly procession of informed experts, who were free to speak their mind, we were starting to get what I consider to be the most valuable evidence this Committee could receive.

There has been, I think, a planned and deliberate campaign by the government to confuse the issues of integration and unification, to keep the people of this country from telling the difference between them and to try and influence people into accepting unification because integration was a good thing and therefore do not let anyone find out the difference. I thought that this procession of witnesses, who held some of the most responsible positions in our armed forces, were doing a splendid job of proving that the Minister's statement that integration and unification are one package was the greatest piece of nonsense that had ever been perpetrated on the Canadian people by anyone holding such a responsible position. One after another the witnesses said that integration as a theory or concept is really a series of theories or concepts. That integration is a word used to describe a method of reorganization in the hope of achieving greater administrative efficiency. We have been told that steps of integration have been tried at various times and in various ways long before this Minister ever came to office.

Mr. BYRNE: Take the stand.

Mr. NUGENT: Mr. Byrne is fond of making loud, idiotic noises. It is too bad that he was not here to get a little education. Perhaps he might have learned, along with gaining a little information, such things as—

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, order. Mr. Nugent is putting before the Committee a reasoned appeal why he does not approve of the report of the steering committee, and other honourable members will have equal opportunity to place their reasoned appeals before us in an orderly way. I appeal to you all again for order.

Mr. NUGENT: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Before I was so brilliantly interrupted I was talking about integration as a concept of reorganization to achieve administrative efficiency, which has been known to the armed forces, as it has in business, for a long, long time. Various steps have been taken from time to time. These steps have been described by witnesses here as experiments, because whenever anybody gets an idea of a different sort of reorganization they do a survey of the situation, try to figure out what savings could be achieved and if, after a serious survey, it looks like there is a lot of fat—as it has been described—that could be cut out and it is a worthwhile endeavour to try to do it, then a plan is draw or several plans are drawn, and systems and schemes are devised for what other sort of organization might be created to try to make the system work with less administrative personnel and thereby save some money.

In this present case we have heard a whole succession of schemes of integration. It is true that this Minister can take some credit for pushing harder on various experiments in integration than has been the habit in a long time. One might give him credit for having either more courage or perhaps it is a case

of as the saying goes, "fools rush in where wise men fear to tread", but certainly some of the experiments in integration which this Minister brought in were very far reaching, they were the type of reorganization that no Minister had attempted before, some of them were very, very complex and it would appear that some of them were brought about because the advent of the computer now seemed to make possible what no scheme of reorganization could have achieved before.

I for one have no quarrel with the Minister in his attempts to take advantage of this age of automation and computerization. If there is a way in which greater efficiency can be achieved by reorganization, which will employ the latest and best in automated bookkeeping and record-keeping methods, certainly I do not see that anyone is going to quarrel with it.

Our quarrel, and I think I speak for most of the people in this country who have been alarmed by the term "unification", comes because we have felt that unification as a concept did not fit in with any of the accepted tests on the integration experiments that were tried out. The manner in which the Minister was running the department was such that we felt he was doing so much harm to the senior personnel staff of the armed forces headquarters and commands that the efficiency of our fighting forces could not help but be very drastically hurt by his rash actions.

I was intrigued by General Moncel's evidence.

Mr. BYRNE: Mr. Chairman, on a point of order. I am sure this would make an excellent speech in the House of Commons when we are dealing with this matter in the committee of the whole.

An hon. MEMBER: It is a rehearsal.

Mr. BYRNE: Yes, obviously it is a rehearsal. We are now going to hear what General Moncel said before the Committee. Now, this Committee has heard General Moncel and it is not necessary for us to hear it a second time.

The CHAIRMAN: The resolution before us is for the adoption of the report of the steering committee. The steering committee report is a broad report asking us to move forward to the consideration clause by clause of the whole bill. I cannot think of a better place for a broad discussion of the principles of this bill than on the moving of this resolution.

Mr. BYRNE: You are certainly getting it.

The CHAIRMAN: I will rule at this point that Mr. Nugent is in order and is doing very well. Before you continue, Mr. Nugent, I notice by the clock that you have had about 10 minutes, and I think it would be fair to all members, as I have a considerable list, to put a time limit of 20 minutes apiece on you. Would you continue, Mr. Nugent.

Mr. NUGENT: Mr. Chairman, I want to apologize to Mr. Byrne. I have been going along at such a rate that the informed members of the Committee, and the intelligent ones, I am sure had no difficulty in following me. I will now try to slow down to a pace which Mr. Byrne might be capable of understanding, if the rest of the members will not accuse me of filibustering or going too slowly.

For Mr. Byrne's edification, when we are considering the question of whether we have called enough witnesses, I think that the only sensible way to

consider the question at all is to look at the sort of evidence we have been getting, look at our objectives, see how far we have gone and the type of evidence that is necessary for our deliberations. If that will satisfy Mr. Byrne so that he will be able to listen and perhaps absorb a little, I will attempt to describe what I thought some of the evidence revealed to us.

For instance, General Moncel told us—one peculiar item—that he himself had drawn four plans of unification. He said the one that the minister apparently is proceeding with now, he had rejected out of hand.

The important thing is that not one of the witnesses called before us has objected to integration in principle. Every witness that came, who had been in a responsible position in our armed forces, had enthusiastically endorsed many of these experiments in integration. I am sure that every member of the Committee was impressed by the fact that these officers are not a bunch of old fuddy-duddies who were resisting change because they did not like change. Everyone of them gave us evidence of some of the changes that had been brought about, of the part they had played in helping to bring them about, of the number of extra hours that they and their staff had worked to make sure whatever plans were formulated were well formulated.

It has been freely admitted by all the witnesses, I think, that planning is never perfect. The only test, for many plans, is to see how it works and some of these experiments in integration had to be revised. I thought that the best evidence as to the situation, that there is a difference between integration and unification, was given by General Allard himself, and I am sure that members of this Committee are going to accept his evidence in that connection. I asked him very carefully about it because in the minister's brief on page 2, he tells us if integration and unification is one package, then surely it is obvious to the members of this Committee by now that the only argument in favour of unification is that one—that it is one package, because with all the witnesses we have had and all the hearings we have heard, there has been not one word of evidence that unification itself will do anything for the armed forces. I should correct that. The only argument is, General Allard said, if we bring in unification it will settle the issue and he hopes this will increase morale. But gentlemen, that is the only piece of evidence presented to this Committee of any benefit that unification will bring about, in all the days and days of hearings that we have had. The only reason, I am sure, that we are meeting here is to find out the benefits of unification. As you know, I cross-examined many witnesses, and I am sure the reason for my doing so was noticeable to members on the Committee. With each witness I went very carefully into the question of whether there was, in fact, one package integration-unification, and every word of evidence of that we have heard from any witness before this Committee, even the staff officers presented by the minister himself, made it abundantly clear that they are two separate and distinct things. Not only that, but integration itself, is just a series of experiments—we should say integration schemes rather than the scheme of integration—and every argument that has been advanced by the minister and his staff, saying why we should have unification, is based on some of the benefits now being realized by some scheme of unification. I will refer again to General Allard's testimony, when, to make this abundantly clear, I asked him about various schemes of integration, such as the unification of training command,

putting it all into one. I said now, if any one of these schemes of integration do not work, have you so disrupted things that they cannot be reversed, and he said: Oh, no; it can be. And I said, now while going ahead with the other integration schemes, you could take, for instance, the training unification and having decided that it did not give the benefits you had hoped for, would you be able to reverse it, and he said: Certainly. The same applied to any one of these.

Now, gentlemen, I think that one reason alone justifies us calling further witnesses. Certainly I want to have the minister back on the stand because I think that he should have an opportunity to explain to this Committee why he should say integration-unification is one package, when every bit of evidence presented to the Committee shows that this is pure fabrication. If there is any evidence that he can be called to show that there should be one scheme, integration-unification, it should be heard. But more important than that, of course, is that if we are looking at unification, with the idea of it being speeded up, I am referring to the haste that the minister is asking for and that government members are pressing for—we should in our deliberations or when witnesses are called before us, hear some word from some of them as to why this process should be done hastily. Certainly, we have had lots of evidence why it should not be done too hastily. For instance, General Allard tells us that unification is still only in the planning stage. Here, we want to pass a bill to put it into effect when it is only in the planning stage.

Mr. Chairman, I say you are indicating that my time is up. Will you put me down again, please, because I would like to finish this argument.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Mr. Chairman, as you mentioned, I just rejoined the Committee today. I do not intend to profess to know what has gone on before, like Mr. Byrne has, but I would call your attention to the fact that the use of the word "sham" by Mr. Macaluso, in my opinion, is a reflection on the Chairman.

I say that because Mr. Macaluso, in his own admission, said that this matter came before the Committee last night about ten minutes to ten.

Mr. MACALUSO: That is not a correct statement.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): There seems to be some objection to the fact that I mentioned ten minutes to ten. In any case, at a very late hour last night before the Committee adjourned, the question of the motion was brought before the Committee and you, sir, made a ruling on that this morning. I might say further that Mr. Macaluso said also, in effect, that it was rightfully in order because you had indicated last night, at the close of the meeting, that this business would be before the Committee this morning. Now, on the basis of when you made that statement, Mr. Macaluso would have nothing whatsoever to support his contention, because as of ten o'clock last night—this is my understanding, until somebody corrects me—this Committee was not properly constituted because of a motion in the House of Commons changing the structure. It does not matter how many were changed; the fact remains that the House passed a motion last night changing the structure of this Committee. Therefore, any remarks made by you, Mr. Chairman, cannot be leaned on today by Mr. Macaluso in support of this.

Mr. MACALUSO: Are you speaking to the motion, to the merits of it, or to the point of order, that is in order.

The CHAIRMAN: I think, Mr. Macaluso, that Mr. MacInnis is doing very well, and if I could get a little silence from you I would have the pleasure of listening to his remarks.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Now Mr. Macaluso also referred to a "sham", that this was a sham, and immediately moved the same motion which you had just prior ruled out of order. Now, I do not question the Chair's prerogative to accept the motion when it was put this morning. As I stated, I am not fully aware of the undertakings of this Committee, but the words "utter futility", also used by Mr. Macaluso, is a rather strange choice of words, considering the fact that this Committee has received permission in the House of Commons, from the Prime Minister, from the Minister of National Defence, and then again, as I understand it yesterday, from you, Mr. Chairman, to the effect that they would be allowed to carry on to the full extent of their wishes.

Now, in referring to "utter futility" this, again, is a reflection by Mr. Macaluso on his own Minister of National Defence and of his own Prime Minister. He continues on and refers to what was stated by a former Minister of National Defence on T.V. and he considered this also a sham. For Mr. Macaluso's benefit, I would like to call his attention to a statement made not too long ago by an opposition member, who said, in effect, our job is to defeat the government —our job is to defeat the government. This again, is a further reflection by Mr. Macaluso against another of his own ministers. This statement was made by leaders and cabinet ministers in your own party in the House of Commons, when they sat in opposition. This was what they considered the ultimate job of the opposition, to defeat the government. So, Mr. Macaluso, in his efforts this morning, has cast reflections on his own Prime Minister, has cast reflections on his Minister of National Defence—and with that I agree—and he has cast reflections on the Chair.

Mr. MACALUSO: I will be responsible for my own statements.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Mr. Chairman, I think it has been evident from experience in the House of Commons that interjections do not bother me whatsoever. If Mr. Macaluso or Mr. Byrne, or anybody else on that side of the table, wishes to interrupt me, they are only contributing to what they blame us for, and that is delaying the activities of this Committee. They will not in any way, shape or form bother me. I will say this now, for the benefit of the member that it fits; he says he cannot be shut up, and I would remind him that he has been on another occasion and it can happen very easily again, and the next time you will not get off so easy.

Now, there has been mention made in the Committee Mr. Chairman, as to what General Allard has given in the way of evidence. I do not put this forward as authoritative—it is only hearsay on my part—but General Allard is supposed to have said that he hoped it would be possible to bring about unification in order to help morale—he hoped that the unification bill would go through in order to help morale.

I would wonder if the minister of national defence is in agreement with General Allard on this remark because such a remark as that is very easy to interpret as meaning morale is in the need of help. So if General Allard has made such a statement here, that the prime reason for putting the unification bill

through as quickly as possible is to help morale, this is an admission, on his part, that the morale is in need of help and that it is, in essence, a contradiction of the statement of the minister of national defence. So now, what do we have? We have the Chief of Staff coming before the Committee and denying what already has been stated by the minister of national defence, that morale was never so high. This brings me back to the witness I overheard last night who, it seems, that this Committee is not going to have an opportunity to examine. I do not know Commodore Porter. To me, it is only a name and a person who appeared before the Committee last night, and anything I may say here now is strictly based on what I overheard him say last night. I would say this to the Committee, and I will repeat it later in the House of Commons, that the evidence given by this witness last night is not accurate, absolutely not accurate; and I would think that the minister of national defence, who I hope can understand and hear what I am saying, will take this into consideration and consider what this may mean back in the House of Commons, should this Committee railroad the objections that are entailed in Mr. Macaluso's argument.

Mr. McNULTY: May I ask for clarification, just what he said. Were you implying that Commodore Porter said—

The CHAIRMAN: No, Mr. McNulty, he did not say that. He merely said that the speaker—

Mr. McNULTY: He said he overheard the witness.

The CHAIRMAN: No. He said he listened to Commodore Porter last night, that he did not know Commodore Porter, and that the statements which were made about the Navy were not accurate. I think that a member has a right to say that. At an appropriate time Mr. MacInnis may want to enlarge on his point.

Mr. FOY: Mr. Chairman, it is a reflection on the witness.

The CHAIRMAN: It is not a reflection on the witness. Anybody can say information is not accurate. We say it all the time. That is common practice for all of us.

Mr. McNULTY: Mr. Chairman, my question was not as to that; it was just that I thought that Mr. MacInnis said he overheard the witness, and I took it that he overheard the witness say that his information was inaccurate. Is that right?

The CHAIRMAN: Well I will leave it to Mr. MacInnis, but if I understood Mr. MacInnis correctly, he was quite in order in saying he thought that information was inaccurate.

Order please. Mr. MacInnis, would you continue please.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Mr. Chairman, for the information of the Committee, so that they will fully understand what I said—there is absolutely nothing personal in this because, as I say, I do not know Commodore Porter—I only repeat that last night, on entering the room and taking a seat in the back of the hall here,—I have not been in this Committee too much; probably the entire time that I have spent here, since the Committee was established, is about an hour and a half, and about twenty minutes of that was last night—I overheard the witness give testimony that was inaccurate.

An hon. MEMBER: How do you know?

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): His own words will prove it. When I inquired whether the words of the witness would be available today, I was told it would probably be two to three weeks before the Committee briefings would be printed. What I am saying is that the Committee should be given an opportunity to clarify the statement made by Commodore Porter last night, to the satisfaction of Committee members. I say this in the hope that the Minister of National Defence—who could be taking part in this, but he is not entitled to vote—will consider this, so that Commodore Porter's testimony before this Committee will be clarified, not only to the satisfaction of the Commodore himself, but to the satisfaction of those people in the Committee who do not agree with certain statements made last night.

An hon. MEMBER: Mr. Chairman—

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Mr. Chairman, I would call your attention to the fact that an interjection is not the only type of interference that can be run, and if Mr. Byrne did not get any sleep last night, I suggest he go close his mouth and his eyes and shut up for a while.

I, and I do not think any member, has to stand for the actions of Mr. Byrne, and I remind him again, you were shut up before and you can be shut up again.

Mr. BYRNE: Mr. Chairman, if I have to yawn that should be a personal privilege.

The CHAIRMAN: Order.

Mr. BYRNE: Surely a member is allowed to yawn.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. MacInnis, I wonder if you would address your remarks to the subject. We are attempting to have a reasonable discussion here, and I appeal to you, Mr. MacInnis and gentlemen; let us address ourselves to the question at hand. Mr. MacInnis, would you continue.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As I was saying, Mr. Chairman, there was a commitment given by the Minister of National Defence, given by the Prime Minister, and given again, I understand, by yourself—and again this is only hearsay on my part; I would have to check the record to the effect that the Committee would have the opportunity to examine General Allard and his staff officers who appeared before this Committee. Unless this is done, the testimony given or the statements made by Commodore Porter last night will remain in question, and they will necessarily have to be aired at a later date in another place. As I say, with my knowledge as to what the Committee has been doing over the past fifteen meetings, which has been referred to by Mr. Macaluso, I would hate to go back to my constituency and, on the basis that I had attended fifteen meetings, try to defend my lack of interest if I did not press for further investigation into a matter of this importance. The fact that you have met since February 7th, and you have had fifteen meetings, is no precedent for calling off a Committee. This is rather an idiotic and ridiculous way to approach the closing out of the Committee's activities.

Mr. BYRNE: On a point of order, Mr. Chairman, just for accuracy, and I am sure Mr. MacInnis would want to be accurate, it is my understanding that the number of meetings is thirty-five.

An hon. MEMBER: Thirty-eight.

The CHAIRMAN: Thirty-nine meetings is the figure this morning given by the Clerk of the Committee. Divided by three, you get thirteen, which is an unlucky number.

Mr. MacInnis, would you continue please.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Well, again, I say, Mr. Chairman, any Committee that has been active since February 9th and has only held thirty-nine meetings still has a poor excuse for calling it off when you consider the fact that other Committees in this House have been sitting a lot longer and held a lot more meetings on matters of no greater importance than this particular one that is before this Committee. So, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Macaluso took the bait on the thirty-five meetings when I said fifteen, but he failed to take the bait on February 9th, when I knew the date was the 7th, so he is learning and there is hope.

Mr. Chairman, again I would repeat, an undertaking, I understand, was given by yourself, given by the Prime Minister and the Minister of National Defence, to the effect that we would have the opportunity to examine all witnesses, and I would suggest that it would be a very smart course for this Committee to follow, if the minister expects to meet the date of March 10th, and if he expects to carry out his threat in Cabinet.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, we are within two or three minutes of the bells. I have a long list of persons before me on the subject. We have the minister waiting to be examined. I hope we will be able to reach the minister this afternoon because I know you have many questions for him. I think that we should meet this afternoon. Shall I say two o'clock this afternoon.

Some hon. MEMBERS: No.

Mr. MCINTOSH: On the notice it said 9.30 this morning. I have commitments for this afternoon. We are certainly entitled to notice.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, I have a long list of members who want to address themselves to this subject. There is certainly no more an important subject before us at the moment than this bill. I appeal to honourable members, who are anxious to see that justice is done to this bill, to meet regularly on the subject until we have finished. We have lost time over this motion. I want to give honourable members an opportunity to conclude the debate on the motion and to hear the minister. I think that we would be derelict, gentlemen, if we turned our backs on this bill this afternoon while the House is sitting. Some of you on both sides of the room may have obligations this afternoon but I remind you that our quorum is nine. This is not an onerous quorum for a Committee of this size; this is all we need for a quorum. Surely you can get together amongst yourselves and make up a quorum.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Mr. Chairman, this is a veiled threat.

The CHAIRMAN: I am merely appealing to you, sir, coming from an important military city in Canada.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Yes, a very important one.

The CHAIRMAN: We have an important military bill before us.

Mr. FORRESTALL: That is a very misleading statement—cut off from under our nose last night—

The CHAIRMAN: Now, we must get on with it. We will meet this afternoon at two o'clock. I think that would only be fair.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Mr. Chairman, that is your decision now, autocratically arrived at.

The CHAIRMAN: I am always at the—

Mr. CHURCHILL: No. This is the Chairman's decision. I want that on the record.

The CHAIRMAN: I am always at the disposal of the Committee and I will call for a vote on that from those who will meet here this afternoon.

Mr. CHURCHILL: No, no, you cannot call for a vote, sir. You have to have a motion.

An hon. MEMBER: I move that we adjourn until 2 p.m.

The CHAIRMAN: We have a motion. Now gentlemen, we have business to do. I have no motion in front of me gentlemen—

An hon. MEMBER: You have a motion.

The CHAIRMAN: —and the bells are ringing. We have been meeting regularly at this period and we should be here this afternoon—

Mr. CHURCHILL: That is your decision.

The CHAIRMAN: —at two o'clock to deal with this.

Mr. CHURCHILL: That is your ruling arbitrarily arrived at.

Mr. LAMBERT: It has not been the regular practice to meet Friday afternoon, although there has been the odd meeting. On the other hand, Mr. Chairman, what you are doing is asking those people on this side of the chair to absorb the brunt of what happened yesterday afternoon, the long division bells.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, the House of Commons itself was involved in that. Gentlemen, two o'clock.

AFTERNOON SITTING

FRIDAY, March 3, 1967.

The CHAIRMAN: I see a quorum now and I call the meeting to order. I call for a motion at this time to adjourn until 3.30 on Monday next.

Mr. MCNULTY: Mr. Chairman, on a point of order. I understood that we were going to hear the Minister this afternoon. There are a number of us who wanted to question him. Is that not going to be the order of the agenda?

Mr. FORRESTALL: It is bad enough to be disagreeable, but at least you should reach agreement among yourselves.

Mr. WINCH: Mr. Chairman, can I ask whether you have a motion moved and seconded?

The CHAIRMAN: I have a motion moved, and seconded by Mr. Legault, that we adjourn until 3.30 on Monday next—

An hon. MEMBER: Are we not going to hear the Minister?

The CHAIRMAN: I have a point of order which intervenes. This is not a debatable motion, gentlemen. I can hear a point of order, but I do not think this is debatable.

An hon. MEMBER: I would like to move an amendment, Mr. Chairman, if I may.

The CHAIRMAN: I have a point of order here from Mr. Macaluso and I think—

An hon. MEMBER: I would like to move an amendment to the motion.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Macaluso—excuse me, Mr. McNulty?

Mr. MCNULTY: I understood we were finishing with the Chief of the Defence Staff last night and his staff and that today we would hear the Minister. There are a number, I know, who want to put some questions to the Minister from testimony.

The CHAIRMAN: Well, we have a motion before us, now properly put, to adjourn until 3.30 on Monday next. You have expressed another wish, and I understand that Mr. Winch is prepared to put an amendment to that motion. I will hear Mr. Winch.

Mr. BYRNE: Mr. Chairman, on a point of order. I wonder if an amendment is in order because the member would have to obtain the Chair's attention and have the floor before he could move a motion which is essentially an amendment. If it is not debatable, no one can rise to his feet to debate it. This is just a question—

Mr. WINCH: I have been recognized by the Chair, so what is your objection?

The CHAIRMAN: I think we are going to have a look at the amendment—

Mr. BYRNE: How can the Chair recognize a person wishing to speak when that is not to be—

An hon. MEMBER: Let us try to be compatible, eh fellows?

The CHAIRMAN: I am going to hear the amendment, Mr. Byrne, and then we will determine whether or not he has a valid amendment. May I do that? Mr. Winch.

Mr. WINCH: If I can have a seconder, my amendment to the main motion is that prior to the meeting of the general Committee at 3.30, the Steering Committee meet prior to that time, consider all matters and bring in their recommendation for future procedure.

Mr. MACALUSO: Mr. Chairman, I suggest that matter is out of order for the simple reason that there is a motion before this Committee at the present time.

Mr. WINCH: There is nothing to stop a recommendation of fact for reconsideration.

Mr. MACALUSO: Well, you cannot do it.

Mr. WINCH: Of course I can.

Mr. NUGENT: Mr. Chairman, I think the only motion that is in order when there is a motion to adjourn to a time certain is an amendment to the motion to adjourn to a different time, but I do not think any other type of motion is in order.

The CHAIRMAN: I am inclined to think you are right, Mr. Nugent, but if we now pass the motion to adjourn to a time certain—

An hon. MEMBER: Well, are you ruling a further amendment to the motion—

The CHAIRMAN: No. Now, just a minute. If we adjourn, we adjourn, do we not?

Some hon. MEMBERS: Yes.

The CHAIRMAN: I just want you to understand what we are doing here. If you adjourn now until 3.30 on Monday next to a time certain—

Mr. BREWIN: On a point of information, Mr. Chairman, if we did that it would not include the Steering Committee—

Some hon. MEMBERS: No.

The CHAIRMAN: I think the Steering Committee, quite independent of the Committee of the whole, can meet. I do not think it requires a motion of the whole body—

Mr. HARKNESS: I think, if I may say so, Mr. Chairman, the Steering Committee can meet at the call of the Chair.

The CHAIRMAN: Well, I think if I seek the advice of the Steering Committee—and I might say, gentlemen, that I certainly intend to seek the advice of the Steering Committee immediately—the Steering Committee would meet and I do not think that requires a motion.

An hon. MEMBER: I wonder if I could have a word—

Mr. FOY: I am not debating this at all, but before the motion is dealt with I am just wondering whether we could have a consensus as to whether or not we would like to have the Minister this afternoon. If so, maybe the mover would withdraw the motion.

The CHAIRMAN: Well now, if we want to—

Mr. CHURCHILL: You have a motion to adjourn in front of you and it is not debatable so I do not see why in the world you are carrying on. I would like to ask for information too if you are going to carry on this way, and find out where you are erecting the guillotine for execution.

An hon. MEMBER: Put the motion.

An hon. MEMBER: Oh, cut that out.

An hon. MEMBER: —just a dictator.

The CHAIRMAN: Now, just a moment, gentlemen. If it your decision that you do not want to adjourn, you merely have to defeat the motion to adjourn and we can go on to other things. I am now going to put the motion. It is moved that we adjourn until 3.30 on Monday next.

Motion agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN: We adjourn until Monday.

HOUSE OF COMMONS

First Session—Twenty-seventh Parliament

1966-67

STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. GRANT DEACHMAN

PROCEEDINGS

No. 30

THURSDAY, MARCH 9, 1967

(Evening Meeting)

Respecting

Bill C-243, An Act to amend the National Defence Act and other Acts in consequence thereof.

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY
OTTAWA, 1967

25910—1

STANDING COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. Grant Deachman

Vice-Chairman: Hon. Marcel Lambert

Mr. Andras,	Mr. Harkness,	Mr. MacInnis (*Cape Breton South*),
Mr. Brewin,	Mr. Hopkins,	Mr. McIntosh,
Mr. Byrne,	Mr. Langlois, (*Chicoutimi*),	Mr. McNulty,
Mr. Churchill,	Mr. Latulippe,	Mr. Nugent,
Mr. Crossman,	Mr. Legault,	Mr. Rochon,
Mr. Ethier,[1]	Mr. Lessard,	Mr. Smith,
Mr. Forrestall,	Mr. Macaluso,	Mr. Winch—(24).
Mr. Foy,		

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

[1] Replaced Mr. Loiselle on March 9, 1967.

ORDER OF REFERENCE

HOUSE OF COMMONS,
THURSDAY, March 9, 1967.

Ordered,—That the name of Mr. Éthier be substituted for that of Mr. Loiselle on the Standing Committee on National Defence.

Attest.

LÉON-J. RAYMOND,
The Clerk of the House of Commons.

25910—1½

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

THURSDAY, March 9, 1967.
(60)

The Standing Committee on National Defence met at 8.05 p.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Deachman, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Andras, Byrne, Churchill, Crossman, Deachman, Éthier, Forrestall, Foy, Harkness, Hopkins, Lambert, Langlois (*Chicoutimi*), Legault, Lessard, Macaluso, MacInnis (*Cape Breton South*), McIntosh, McNulty, Nugent, Rochon, Smith, Winch (22).

Also present: Messrs. Fane, Hales and Pugh.

In attendance: From the Department of National Defence: Honourable Paul Hellyer, Minister; and Honourable Léo Cadieux, Associate Minister.

The Chairman referred to the motion which was moved by Mr. Macaluso, seconded by Mr. Foy, at the meeting on Friday morning, March 3, 1967. The motion, which is still before the Committee, reads as follows:

"That the Report of the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure, dated March 2, 1967, be now concurred in."

The Chairman announced that the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure had held two meetings this day and he read the following report to the Committee:

"Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure

THURSDAY, March 9, 1967.

TWELFTH REPORT

The Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure met twice to-day.

It was unanimously recommended that the previous report of the Subcommittee (*March 2, 1967*) be stood.

It was unanimously recommended that questioning of the Minister be completed to-night.

Discussion took place on completing the examination of all witnesses by Tuesday night next (*March 14, 1967*). No recommendation could be reached.

Discussion took place on starting clause-by-clause examination of the Bill (C-243) by Wednesday next (*March 15, 1967*), but no recommendation was reached.

The names of possible witnesses were discussed but no final list could be recommended.

The question of a terminal date for hearings of the Committee was raised but no agreement reached."

Thereupon, Mr. Andras moved, seconded by Mr. Foy,

That the motion be amended by striking out all the words after that and substituting the following therefor:

> The Committee meet to-morrow afternoon, March 10, to hear Admiral Rayner; Monday afternoon, March 13, to hear Air Marshal Curtis; Monday evening, March 13, to hear General Simonds; Tuesday morning, March 14, to hear the Minister of National Defence; that the Committee continue thereafter to consider the Bill clause by clause and that it conclude its consideration of the Bill not later than Thursday evening, March 16, and that it report the Bill back to the House of Commons not later than 11.00 a.m. Friday, March 17.

Following a discussion of the proposed amendment, it was ruled out of order by the Chairman.

Mr. Macaluso, with the consent of the Committee, withdrew his motion of March 3, 1967 which reads as follows:

> "That the Report of the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure, dated March 2, 1967, be now concurred in."

The Chairman re-read the Twelfth Report of the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure, dated March 9, 1967. Then Mr. Andras moved, seconded by Mr. Foy,

> That the report of the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure dated March 9, 1967 be not now concurred in and
>
> That the Committee meet to-morrow afternoon, March 10, to hear Admiral Rayner; Monday afternoon, March 13, to hear Air Marshal Curtis; Monday evening, March 13, to hear General Simonds; Tuesday morning, March 14, to hear the Minister of National Defence; that the Committee continue thereafter to consider the Bill clause by clause and that it conclude its consideration of the Bill not later than Thursday evening, March 16 and that it report the Bill back to the House of Commons not later than 11.00 a.m., Friday, March 17, 1967.

Debate on this motion ensued, and the debate continuing, at 10.00 p.m., the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

THURSDAY, March 9, 1967.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, I see a quorum. When we last rose, we had been discussing the report of your Steering Committee of March 2. In the intervening days there have been a number of conversations, including conversations with the Steering Committee, to ascertain whether or not we could bring about a little more amenable situation than we had at the time we rose.

I have before me a short report of the Steering Committee, which met twice today. I want to read this as a first step in considering what our order of business should be tonight, remembering, of course, that you cannot have two reports of a Steering Committee before you at the same time. However, I think we can discuss what our order of business will be. I will read to you what I have here:

It was unanimously recommended that the previous report of the Subcommittee (March 2, 1967) be stood.

It was unanimously recommended that questioning of the Minister be completed tonight.

Discussion took place on completing the examination of all witnesses by Tuesday night next (March 14, 1967). No recommendation could be reached.

Discussion took place on starting clause by clause examination of the Bill (C-243) by Wednesday next (March 15, 1967), but no recommendation was reached.

The names of possible witnesses were discussed but no final list could be recommended.

The question of a terminal date for hearings of the Committee was raised but no agreement reached.

I return then to the first item of business:

It was unanimously recommended that the previous report of the Subcommittee (March 2, 1967) be stood.

An hon. MEMBER: I move that it be withdrawn.

The CHAIRMAN: Order, please.

Mr. ANDRAS: Mr. Chairman, we have a motion before us emanating from the Steering Committee report of March 2, and I would like to move an amendment to that motion.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Mr. Chairman, could I ask who was at the Steering Committee today?

The CHAIRMAN: We had two meetings of the Steering Committee today.

Mr. ANDRAS: On a point of order. Mr. Chairman, do I have the floor for the purpose of moving an amendment to the motion before us?

The CHAIRMAN: Yes, you have the floor. You, in this Committee, are a very tricky bunch, and the chair wants to reflect on this. You are moving an amendment—

Mr. ANDRAS: I am moving an amendment to the motion before us, related to the Steering Committee report of the date you mentioned.

The CHAIRMAN: Do you have a seconder for this motion?

An hon. MEMBER: I will second it.

An hon. MEMBER: There is no amendment.

Mr. ANDRAS: By way of explanation, Mr. Chairman—

The CHAIRMAN: I wonder if we could have the motion?

Mr. ANDRAS: Mr. Chairman, by way of explanation, I note that over the past five weeks we have thoroughly discussed with numerous witnesses the pros and cons of Bill No. C-243. Prior to the 1967 hearings of this Committee, there were 81 meetings of the Standing Committee on Defence, which heard approximately 103 witnesses. There were 10 days of discussion on this bill in the House on interim supply, and there were five days on second reading.

In this Committee, since February 7, we have now heard from some 33 witnesses, many of them on more than one occasion. By a very rough calculation of mine, so far, more than 660,000 words have been spoken on the subject of unification in this Committee since February 7, 1967. Just about every opinion, pro and con, has been given on the merits of this bill. As a matter of fact, I think it is fair to say that much of the evidence has been repetitious and, in some cases, contradictory.

I really feel, Mr. Chairman, that our Committee should now be prepared to undertake its responsibility to parliament; that is, to discuss the clauses of the bill, and then report back to the House of Commons. Still, as a member of the government's side, I would like to suggest that we lean over backwards to be fair to those opposite who have indicated that they need still more evidence. I would like to propose that we agree to the desire of some members to hear two more witnesses, namely, Air Marshal Curtis, and General Simonds. Also, although he has presented his brief to this Committee and to the press, we would have no objection to Admiral Rayner being called to represent his brief.

However, Mr. Chairman, I do think that we would be doing a great disservice to parliament, the Canadian people and, more specifically, to our Defence Staff, if we went on and on, hearing a restatement of views already heard. As a Committee, we must be prepared to decide—I hope, amicably and reasonably—to come to grips with the matter referred to us by parliament.

We must be prepared to end the unseemly bickering, the quarreling, and the name-calling, that, unfortunately, has characterized this Committee to date, which certainly has brought no credit to it—or to the institution of parliament.

I move, therefore, sir, seconded by Mr. Foy:

> That the motion before us be amended by striking out all the words after "that" and substituting the following therefor;

> The Committee meet tomorrow afternoon March 10 to hear Admiral Rayner; Monday afternoon March 13 to hear Air Marshal Curtis; Monday evening March 13 to hear General Simonds; Tuesday morning March 14 to hear the Minister of National Defence; that the Committee continue thereafter to consider the Bill clause by clause and that it conclude its consideration of the Bill not later than Thursday evening March 16, and that it report the Bill back to the House of Commons not later than 11 a.m. Friday, March 17, 1967.

To my mind, Mr. Chairman, that is the only responsible course of action for this Committee.

The CHAIRMAN: May I have the resolution, please? We have motion before us which has been duly moved and seconded. I have not heard any point of order raised as to the validity of this motion. If there are points of order to be raised in regard to the validity of this motion, I will entertain those now; then we will have Mr. Nugent, Mr. Foy, and Mr. Winch, which is in the order I saw their hands, followed by Mr. McIntosh—

An hon. MEMBER: On a point of order.

The CHAIRMAN: Just a moment, please. Mr. McIntosh will be followed by Mr. Forrestall.

An hon. MEMBER: Do I have a chance to speak now?

The CHAIRMAN: I do not know whether that is an accepted practice; I think there is a point of order here from Mr. Harkness.

Mr. HARKNESS: Yes, Mr. Chairman. You spoke of two meetings of the Steering Committee today, and I am only aware of one.

An hon. MEMBER: That is right.

Mr. HARKNESS: Was there not only one?

The CHAIRMAN: Let me explain what happened. We met, as you recall, at noon, and present at that Steering Committee meeting was yourself, Mr. Lambert, Mr. Andras, Mr. Winch and, at that time, Mr. Foy, I think. The agreement was that we would meet later in the day. I received a phone call somewhat later in the day from Mr. Lambert, asking whether or not we would meet at 5.45 p.m. He suggested that we might not need to meet at 6 o'clock. I said that I would not be able to make a commitment on behalf of other members of the Steering Committee, but that I would try to get that information into their hands as quickly as possible.

The information was late getting into their hands, and in the course of the afternoon the second meeting of the Steering Committee, after we waited in the hall for some time, finally met. An attempt was made to reach you in your room at that time. Admittedly, the Steering Committee had some difficulty in getting together. However, those were the two meetings and the report that I gave you, I think, is a fair summary of what took place at that meeting.

Mr. HARKNESS: First of all, as far as the second meeting is concerned, I was informed by Mr. Lambert that it was not on and, therefore, I had left. So this is the first I have heard of it. However, I presume that you presented your report on the basis of the steering committee meeting which we held at noon. In other

words, it was agreed there that we would hear the Minister tonight and we did not come to an agreement on the other matters.

Mr. ANDRAS: Mr. Chairman, with great respect, may I ask what relevancy this has on the amendment placed before you. Is the amendment in order or not?

The CHAIRMAN: There is a point of order here on the relevancy of bringing an amendment, and I am waiting for Mr. Harkness to come to his point of order.

Mr. HARKNESS: You have now presented this report of the Steering Committee, and Mr. Andras immediately moved an amendment to the motion that we were discussing when we last met on Friday, as I understood it. Is that not correct.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Harkness, I think it is fair to state our position this way. When we rose on Friday we were discussing a report of the Steering Committee; we had disagreed on the report of the Steering Committee and we were in the process of discussing that. In an effort to resolve that situation and make progress, the committee felt today that it should recommend that the previous report of the subcommittee be stood aside and that we take up the questioning of the Minister. This has to be done, not as a new amendment, but discussed as an order of business at the opening of this meeting. The first step I took was to see whether or not there would be agreement to do that. There was not agreement to do that because Mr. Andras intervened to move an amendment on the original subcommittee report. Now I have to entertain that.

Mr. HARKNESS: My point of order is that the business before the committee is the report that you made from the Steering Committee and that, therefore, Mr. Andras' motion, which was a motion in regard to the business we were discussing last Friday, is out of order. What we should do is either adopt or otherwise your report and proceed to hear the Minister. If we do not adopt the Steering Committee's Report, then of course the meeting is open for other business.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Macaluso, are you on the point of order?

Mr. MACALUSO: I am on the point of order. Mr. Winch was before me.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Winch, on the point of order.

Mr. WINCH: I want to support the position taken by Mr. Harkness on this matter. In my estimation, he is completely correct. There was a report of the Steering Committee made last week; we adjourned. Unofficially, you, sir, and others have met with me. We have had two meetings, of the Steering Committee both with quorums, today, one at 2 o'clock and one at 6.15. At our meeting at 6.15, it was the unanimous opinion and report of the Steering Committee that we hold—I used the word "withdraw"—the previous report, and then bring in other recommendations. I say, sir, that as the report of the committee withdraws the previous report and accepts this, Mr. Andras is completely out of order in trying to move an amendment on the report as made last week. May I also say, sir—and I want this to be very much noted, because I try to be very cooperative—that the words used by Mr. Andras in moving this amendment were not the same as he used at our steering committee meeting at 6.15. I say, sir, that I completely agree with Mr. Harkness, that the motion which is now being introduced by Mr. Andras is completely out of order because what is

before us now is the Report of the Steering Committee of 6.15, that the report of the Steering Committee be stood—withdrawn, and that we now proceed with the Steering Committee Report of this afternoon in order to try to resolve our problem.

Mr. ANDRAS: Mr. Chairman, on the point of order, we did discuss many matters in Steering Committee attempting to resolve this. However, I stated my opinion forthrightly, that I felt that we should seek some final date by which time we could report this bill. It was impossible to get agreement on that discussion and, therefore I did not make a motion. I am sorry but I just simply have to disagree with the statement that there was unanimity about the withdrawal of any motion. We discussed many aspects of it, but we could not come to an agreement.

The CHAIRMAN: I will hear Mr. Macaluso on the question of the point of order relating the resolution, and then I will hear Mr. Nugent on the same subject.

Mr. MACALUSO: Mr. Chairman, as the mover of the motion, I tend to disagree with what is put before you by Mr. Harkness and Mr. Winch, on these grounds. The first thing that is before this committee, legally, is the motion that I placed before this Committee on Friday morning, which was found in order by yourself. The committee started to discuss that motion, Mr. Chairman, and I ask tonight that the motion, seconded by Mr. Foy, to adopt the subcommittee's report on agenda and procedure, dated March 2, be now concurred in. There was a legitimate motion, which was in order, before this committee. I suggest that the only business before this committee—and last Friday I moved an adjournment until Monday at 3.30—and the first order of business, Mr. Chairman, is still that motion which I placed before this committee on Friday, when it was ruled in order. The report which you are now placing before us really is not in order, as far as Steering Committee is concerned. You were courteous enough to discuss what happened at Steering Committees, and that is fine and dandy, but as the mover of the motion, I submit that the only way you can move on to other business—you cannot hold back this motion—is if I withdraw the motion, if that is approved by my seconder and then unanimously approved by this committee. Mr. Andras was in order when he raised objection to you, sir, discussing that report. He was completely in order to move an amendment to that motion. I suggest to you that the amendment is in order, and the only business before you is the motion which I placed before this committee Friday—not any Steering Committee report because it cannot take precedence over the motion before this committee.

Mr. NUGENT: Mr. Chairman, I have to agree with Mr. Macaluso. The business that we are discussing in this committee at the moment is the question of the recommendation of the Steering Committee Report, whether or not we adopt their suggestion. In order to be in order, I suggest that the only amendment could be one of recommendation to amend that report.

An hon. MEMBER: The steering committee has filed a recommendation.

Mr. NUGENT: The Steering Committee, as I understand it, has filed a recommendation; the Chairman has brought in a new report, and I suggest, Mr. Chairman, that I can find nothing personally wrong with us now considering a

recommendation of the Steering Committee, as amended, so long as the amendment is in line with the original report. However, the new report of the Steering Committee brings in three names, and suggests that we now call these three people and report by a certain date. Mr. Chairman, I am not certain of the exact wording of the Steering Committee recommendation that we are debating, but it does seem to me that the essence of it was that we had heard sufficient witnesses, that no more should be called, and that we now proceed to a discussion of the bill. The essence, at least, of that recommendation was that we had heard enough witnesses. The committee reports on March 2

> A majority of the committee is prepared to recall the minister tomorrow morning to wind up the appearance of witnesses.

Certainly this can mean nothing other than that the recommendation of the Steering Committee is that no further witnesses be called. Mr. Chairman, the situation is simple: Whether or not I agree with the amendment, the question, on the point of order, is whether an amendment is in order, and obviously any amendment which has the effect of simply reversing the resolution before us, is not in order. The essence of the resolution before us is that no further witnesses be called. The essence of the resolution now is that other witnesses be called. Mr. Chairman, I am very much more in favour of the amendment than I am to the original recommendation of the committee, but as a strict point of order I suggest, sir, that an amendment which simply has the effect of cancelling the resolution before us is not in order.

The CHAIRMAN: I hope that we soon are going to be able to complete this because I am beginning to get the sense of what ought to be done here. I would hope, with the Minister here this evening, that we would be able to move on to the questioning of him, and make some progress. I have, in the point of order, Mr. Forrestall and Mr. McInnis. Do you want to speak on the question of order.

Mr. FOY: No, I was under the impression that I would be speaking as the seconder of the motion.

The CHAIRMAN: The motion has been duly moved and seconded and it is now before us to consider whether or not it is a regular motion, and a ruling has to be made. We have heard Mr. Nugent. I now will call on Mr. Forrestall and then Mr. MacInnis.

Mr. MACALUSO: Mr. Chairman, on the point of order, would you mind telling me what you are debating at this time?

The CHAIRMAN: At this time I am listening to submissions as to whether or not we have a valid motion before us.

Mr. MACALUSO: We have a valid motion.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Macaluso, I listened to Mr. Harkness, Mr. Winch, then yourself, then Mr. Nugent, on the subject of the validity of this motion. I still have on my list, on the subject of the validity of the motion, Mr. Forrestall and Mr. McInnis, and then I hope I will be able to rule on the motion without further debate on it.

Mr. FORRESTALL: The only point that I want to make, Mr. Chairman, is that it seems that the motion and the amendment to the motion are two entirely different things. The amendment substantially changes the motion. Certainly, an

amendment to a motion that substantially changes the motion cannot be a valid amendment; it must be a separate motion. It would seem to me that the only way you are going to resolve this is if Mr. Macaluso, the mover, and the seconder of the motion, get together, I am not necessarily in favour of the entire amendment, but certainly the principle part appeals to me much more than does the original motion. If the mover of the motion and his seconder would withdraw, then perhaps Mr. Andras could place before us, in the form of a motion, his amendment. I reserve my right to be on the next round to talk about the merits of this.

Mr. MACINNIS: Mr. Chairman, as far as the rules and procedures of the House of Commons are concerned, I have never paid too much attention to their meaning, and I would dare say that if the authorities spoke in here, they would know no more about them than I do. However, I think a common sense approach to procedure would be something that could be grasped a little quicker.

This evening, sir, you indicated that the first order of business was discussion of the Steering Committee report of today. I maintain, sir, that there is no legal amendment before this meeting on the simple grounds, as I understand it, that the Steering Committee themselves decided to stand or withdraw their original recommendation to this Committee.

Mr. WINCH: That is right.

Mr. MACINNIS: And as such, this Committee cannot undertake to discuss a Steering Committee report which the Steering Committee themselves had decided to stand. Therefore, any discussion on this Committee report would be entirely out of order, through any logical approach to meeting procedure, because the originators of this report, themselves, in essence, had withdrawn that report. Therefore, we cannot undertake to discuss any matters pertaining to that original report, and certainly we cannot undertake to discuss an amendment to that report. In any case, it is an amendment which does not add to but takes away from the original report. An amendment, necessarily, has to be worded in such a way that it can add to but it cannot take away from the original motion.

Mr. NUGENT: Mr. Chairman, if the Steering Committee moved an amendment to its report, it might clarify it.

Mr. WINCH: Mr. Chairman, the Steering Committee unanimously recommended that the previous report stand, in other words, be withdrawn.

Mr. NUGENT: Are we not in this position, Mr. Chairman: That the Steering Committee having requested that the report we have been debating be stood, we are considering its new report. In other words, rather than an amendment, are we not in the position of considering a new report.

The CHAIRMAN: I am trying to unravel this matter now. I have heard from a good many of you, and I thank you for your advice. We have a motion by Mr. Macaluso before us now; this motion was given to us at the last meeting, and reads as follows:

> I move, seconded by Mr. Foy, that the report of the subcommittee on agenda and procedure dated March 2 be now concurred in.

This is the motion which faced us and which we were still debating when we rose, and that motion had not been disposed of. The next point is this. Subse-

quently, in an attempt to resolve that debate—I think many of you felt it was a debate that was becoming lengthy and that we could withdraw from that position—the Steering Committee met, with a view to seeing whether or not it could make recommendations—I repeat the word "recommendations", not move resolutions to this Committee—to this Committee regarding other courses of action it might take. I have the report of that Steering Committee. It recommended, simply as an order of business that we now take up the business of questioning the Minister tonight and to treat that as a first item of business rather than returning to the debate on the Steering Committee report—that we stand aside that previous report and listen to the Minister. If we stand that report aside, it means that we can move no more resolutions, which would mean that Mr. Andras' motion could not be moved because we still have that one matter in front of us to debate. All we could do in this Committee would be to hear the Minister, and at the conclusion of that, we would have the steering Committee report in front of us again, at which time it might be appropriate for Mr. Andras to move his motion. So something has to happen here. Either Mr. Macaluso, with the unanimous consent of this meeting, must withdraw his motion on the subcommittee on agenda report and clear the way for the introduction of new motions, in which case we could entertain the motion of Mr. Andras, which was put as an amendment. I suppose we could hear an amendment to the original subcommittee report now but what you have to consider, as several members pointed out, is whether that is a valid amendment or whether it is a wholly new report that we are being asked to consider in the form of a resolution or an amendment.

In the circumstances, I am inclined to think that Mr. Andras' resolution or amendment is really suggesting to us a new way of proceeding, a wholly different way of proceeding than the subcommittee on agenda report on March 2 directs which we were asked to pass under Mr. Macaluso's resolution. I do not think we could rule it in order on those grounds. We would have to, as I suggest, have Mr. Macaluso ask the unanimous consent of the Committee to withdraw that report, and then we could entertain the amendment. Alternatively, we could do, as has been suggested by the Steering Committee, accept the recommendation of the Steering Committee to set aside the subcommitee report for this evening while we listen to the Minister.

Mr. NUGENT: Mr. Chairman, your suggestion in this connection is well founded. You have said that the suggestion of the Steering Committee is that we stand the original report. Mr. Macaluso's amendment is not in order since you have reversed the other one. Are you suggesting now that you would like to have now—and I will move it, if necessary—a suggestion that we stand the report that we were debating on Friday until after we have heard the Minister?

The CHAIRMAN: The point Mr. Macaluso makes, and I think I am correct in this, procedurally, is that we cannot make amendments to the report of the Steering Committee; that is to say, we cannot deal with other matters and make resolutions on other matters while we have that report before us.

Mr. MACINNIS: Could I ask a question, Mr. Chairman. Under what circumstances has the Steering Committee been formulated and just exactly what are their duties?

Some hon. MEMBERS: Oh, oh.

The CHAIRMAN: I think I can tell you that very easily. The Steering Committee is formed in the same way as Steering Committees—are formed for any one of some 30 committees of the House. You get about five individuals together to assist in making recommendations to the main body; those are only recommendations to that body and nothing happens until that recommendation has become a resolution in committee of the whole.

Mr. WINCH: Except one thing, Mr. Chairman: This is a Steering Committee, appointed by this Committee, and because of certain circumstances and conditions, after several days consideration, your Steering Committee has seen fit to bring in a report, asking that a previous recommendation stand and that we proceed on a new basis. I know of no recommendation or any procedure whereby, under these circumstances a new report of a Steering Committee, which is the executive body, should not be considered.

Mr. MACINNIS: Mr. Chairman, this leads up to the one point which we are discussing now, which could be clarified very easily if this Committee wants to clarify it. It is this: The Steering Committee have not fulfilled their duties in making this report. The first order of business here this evening was the report of the Steering Committee meetings today. Now, the first order of business must follow that this Committee deal with that report, and we either accept that report or reject it. There is no other way, through rules or regulations, of getting around it.

The CHAIRMAN: Oh, no, Mr. MacInnis. You cannot do that because we have one report before to adopt now.

Mr. MACALUSO: Mr. Chairman, to get this thing moving and to get this ridiculous situation out of the way, again I submit to you that the only piece of business now before this Committee is a motion that I put on Friday. That being so, and you have ruled on that, I would be prepared, from what comments I have heard here, to withdraw the motion I placed on Friday, if my seconder would consent, and there was unanimous agreement on the members of the Committee, provided that this Committee unanimously agrees then that Mr. Andras could place his motion, which he placed as an amendment, forthwith, immediately after I withdraw. If I receive that commitment from the members, I will withdraw that motion immediately.

Mr. NUGENT: I am sure that will happen but, Mr. Chairman, there is no such withdrawal authorized under the rules. If the seconder agrees and if we consent, then we are open to a new motion, and if Mr. Andras wants to move his—I am sure that the time is appropriate—he can. I have no objection whatsoever to that, but I do object to what I consider improper procedure. What Mr. Macaluso has suggested may be very practicable but contrary to the rules.

Mr. MACALUSO: Mr. Chairman, on a point of clarification. If that motion is withdrawn with the consent of this Committee, what then is the next order of business before this Committee?

The CHAIRMAN: The next order of business before the Committee, once that motion is withdrawn, is the recommendation of the Steering Committee which met at six o'clock.

Mr. NUGENT: It must be another one, Mr. Chairman, with all due deference.

The CHAIRMAN: Just a moment, please, until we clarify this point. The question asked by Mr. Macaluso was: If this motion is withdrawn, what is the next piece of business before this Committee?

An hon. MEMBER: His Friday motion.

Mr. MACALUSO: Yes, my Friday motion.

Mr. WINCH: No, the Friday report of the Steering Committee.

An hon. MEMBER: Well, Mr. Chairman, if Mr. Macaluso stopped—

The CHAIRMAN: Order, please. I wonder whether we can take these up one at a time.

Mr. FOY: Well, you have not heard me yet.

The CHAIRMAN: I will hear you in one second, but I want to clear Mr. Macaluso's point, which was raised a moment ago. If Mr. Macaluso's motion is withdrawn, then we simply withdraw the report of the subcommittee dated March 2; then we have before us a recommendation, made by your steering committee, as to how to proceed with tonight's business. I presume that this is what we would move to consider. The only thing I can say, beyond that, is that any member of this Committee is at liberty to make motions, at any time he has the floor, on any subject at all concerned with the business of this Committee.

Mr. FOY: Mr. Chairman, may I have the floor?

I would like to suggest to you, Mr. Chairman, that you have already ruled that the first order of business is Mr. Macaluso's motion of last Friday.

The CHAIRMAN: We have that as a motion before us now.

Mr. FOY: If this is so, then there is no other time more suitable for an amendment to that motion than right now, as Mr. Andras has presented his amendment. Therefore, I believe, because you have ruled that the motion of Mr. Macaluso is the first order of business, that Mr. Andras' amendment is perfectly in order.

Mr. WINCH: If you have so ruled, I challenge that ruling.

Mr. HARKNESS: Mr. Chairman, as I understand your ruling correctly, you have ruled that Mr. Andras' motion was out of order.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Andras' motion presents us with a wholly new set of circumstances.

Mr. HARKNESS: Yes.

The CHAIRMAN: Order, please. Let me read you the report of the subcommittee on procedure of March 2, which is the one that we were debating when we left here on Friday:

> The subcommittee met at 2.00 p.m. March 2. We were not able to agree on the question of inviting witnesses beyond agreement to invite General Simonds to appear for tomorrow only.

So that time is past and that is not a part of our consideration.

> The Clerk has phoned General Simonds and has informed us that the General has engagements and cannot appear. The Committee agrees that

the staff briefings end tonight. The majority of the Committee is prepared to recall the Minister tomorrow morning to wind up the appearance of witnesses.

Then we dealt with the distribution of copies and distribution of the bill.

How can I, as your Chairman, rule that the amendment, as moved by Mr. Andras, amends that report, which deals with those events at that time. What it does is bring in a new report, with new circumstances, and I think we have to entertain that by way of a new resolution, just as we would introduce a new Steering Committee report or a new Order of the Day. I realize that members are anxious to see this matter debated and to have it on the record. I think, in fairness to the Chair, that it has to be brought in in an orderly way.

As I see it, we have a couple of courses open to us. Mr. Macaluso can ask for the withdrawal of his subcommittee report; this can be brought in as a resolution, and then we have this report to debate. Believe me, that does not change things very much because that is precisely what we want to debate in this Committee, if I interpret your wishes correctly, and we might as well have a logical resolution in front of us instead of an outdated one. I just wonder whether or not, as a means of getting out of the present procedural dilemma, members would not be agreeable to the withdrawal of this subcommittee report perhaps and the acceptance of Mr. Andras' resolution as a point of departure for the proceedings tonight.

Mr. McINTOSH: If we withdrew Mr. Macaluso's motion, what would happen?

Mr. MACALUSO: Mr. Chairman, if I might—

Mr. McINTOSH: I think I have the floor.

Mr. MACALUSO: I might help you out Mr. Chairman, by saying that I would like to withdraw the motion.

Mr. McINTOSH: If you did put Mr. Macaluso's motion and it did carry, what position would we be in right now?

The CHAIRMAN: Well, if we put Mr. Macaluso's motion and it carried, we would then be asked to do a number of things which expired last week.

Mr. McINTOSH: Yes, that is right. It is ridiculous.

Mr. NUGENT: Mr. Chairman, you put it correctly. I think you interpreted the rules correctly and have used common sense. I am sure that if Mr. Macaluso wants to withdraw that motion and put a new motion, we could go ahead with it. I am sure there would be no trouble at all about this. Let us get on with it.

The CHAIRMAN: All right.

Mr. MACALUSO: Will I be allowed to move a new motion?

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Macaluso, would you withdraw your motion?

Mr. MACALUSO: Just a moment. Could I seek clarification of that last statement. Did I understand Mr. Nugent to say that I would be allowed to move a new motion?

Mr. NUGENT: Of course.

Mr. MACALUSO: With the consent of my seconder, I am prepared to withdraw the motion I placed before this Committee on Friday, if I have unanimous consent. Do not all jump up at once.

Some hon. MEMBERS: Agreed.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Andras.

Mr. HARKNESS: Mr. Chairman, on a point of order, before any other motions are moved. You have already ruled that once this was dropped the next order of business would be the Steering Committee report which you just presented today.

The CHAIRMAN: The next order of business is the Steering Committee report.

Mr. HARKNESS: That is the order of business now.

Mr. ANDRAS: Mr. Chairman, may I have the floor. The Steering Committee report of March 9, today, is now before us?

The CHAIRMAN: Yes.

Mr. ANDRAS: Therefore, I move, seconded by—

Mr. WINCH: So that we will all know, would you read the report of the Steering Committee.

The CHAIRMAN: It was unanimous.

Mr. ANDRAS: Do I have the floor, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. WINCH: I just asked the chairman to read the report.

The CHAIRMAN: You asked me to read the report.

> It was unanimously recommended that the previous report of the subcommittee be stood.

Well, we disposed of that by having it withdrawn.

> It was unanimously recommended that the questioning of the Minister be completed tonight.

We have not yet attended to that matter of business.

> Discussion took place on completing the examination of all witnesses by Thursday night next. No recommendation could be reached.
>
> Discussion took place on starting clause by clause examination of the bill by Wednesday next but no recommendation was reached.
>
> The names of possible witnesses were discussed but no final list could be recommended.
>
> The question of a terminal date for hearings of the Committee was raised but no agreement reached.

Mr. Andras, do you have a point to raise now?

Mr. ANDRAS: Mr. Chairman, I move that the Steering Committee report, which you have just read to us, be not concurred in and that the Committee meet tomorrow afternoon, March 10, to hear Admiral Rayner; Monday afternoon, March 13, to hear Air Marshal Curtis; Monday evening March 13, to hear

General Simonds; Tuesday morning, March 14, to hear the Minister of National Defence; that the Committee continue thereafter to consider the bill clause by clause; that it conclude its consideration of the bill not later than Thursday evening, March 16, and that it report the bill back to the House of Commons, not later than 11 a.m. Friday, March 17.

Mr. FOY: I would like to second this motion. Mr. Chairman, I would remind the Committee members of the words of the man who is responsible for implementing this bill, and that is General Allard, the Chief of our Defence Staff, who appeared before this Committee on February 28, and stated:

> —regarding any suspension or delay in proceeding with the final stage of reorganization-unification. I sincerely believe a postponement or delay in starting this final stage would have a most serious effect on all of us now serving and on our recruiting prospects. What the serviceman is saying to us now is this—"Get on with it."

Now, surely we have a responsibility to the men and the women of the armed forces to deal with this legislation in a reasonable and sensible manner. I, therefore, second Mr. Andras' motion.

The CHAIRMAN: I have the motion as follows:

> I move, seconded by Mr. Foy that the report of the subcommittee on agenda of March 9 be not concurred in and that the Committee meet tomorrow afternoon, March 10, to hear Admiral Rayner; Monday afternoon, March 13, to hear Air Marshal Curtis; Monday evening, March 13, to hear General Simonds; Tuesday morning, March 14, to hear the Minister of National Defence, and that the Committee continue thereafter to consider the bill clause by clause and that it conclude its consideration of the bill not later than Thursday evening, March 16, and that it report the bill back to the House of Commons not later than 11.00 a.m. Friday, March 17, 1967.

Mr. SMITH: Just on a point of clarification, again on the motion. It says that we are to meet Tuesday morning to question the Minister of National Defence. Suppose we do not finish the questioning of the Minister of National Defence on Tuesday morning, what happens Tuesday afternoon and Tuesday evening.

An hon. MEMBER: We would go on with the next witness.

Mr. SMITH: Are we limited to Tuesday morning with the Minister?

The CHAIRMAN: It says:

> That the Committee meet tomorrow afternoon, March 10, to hear Admiral Rayner; Monday afternoon, March 13, to hear Air Marshal Curtis; Monday evening, March 13, to hear General Simonds; Tuesday morning—

Mr. SMITH: Why only the morning? What are we going to do the rest of Tuesday? We have been meeting three times a day.

An hon. MEMBER: That is allowing the time.

The CHAIRMAN: And that the Committee continue thereafter to consider the bill clause by clause—

Mr. SMITH: But it does not say on Tuesday, though.

The CHAIRMAN: We continue thereafter, after Tuesday morning. Tuesday afternoon we would be on the bill, I guess, if I interpret it correctly.

An hon. MEMBER: Very good.

The CHAIRMAN: I now will entertain discussion as to whether this motion is in order. Are you on this subject, Mr. Lambert?

Mr. LAMBERT: Yes. My problem is this. There is a possibility that from late Thursday night until Friday morning, it is impossible for the staff to get the Minutes prepared and the report of the Committee drafted, translated and in shape for presentation to the House at 11.00 a.m. on Friday morning. This is complete nonsense, when it comes to that. Also I would put it to you that members opposite should be fully aware what happened in the House debate when evidence was not available to members in both languages for the study of a certain bill. The government, on its own accord, moved that the Committee rise and report progress until that was available.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Lambert, I do not think I could rule this motion out of order on those grounds because I see the government making those mistakes every day and the Speaker passes them without any trouble at all.

Mr. LAMBERT: Mr. Chairman, this is in so far as our own actions are concerned, to conclude by Thursday evening and to report back. It must be remembered that that last paragraph is mandatory.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Lambert, I think if we can get the motion discussed, and I think it is a valid motion, then certainly what you say is pertinent to any discussion of the motion and to any amendment that might be made to the motion. If there are no other points of order, I will call those who indicated a wish to speak on it, in the following order: Mr. Nugent, Mr. MacInnis, Mr. Winch, Mr. McIntosh, Mr. Forrestall.

Mr. NUGENT: Mr. Chairman, there is much about this motion in which I concur. To begin with, I am glad to see that the Committee has said that we will recall Admiral Rayner on Monday and that we will not call the next witness until the next day, which indicates to me, of course, that either the Committee will sit morning, afternoon and evening, if necessary, or that perhaps we will have a very short and a very good meeting to hear him, and then the same on Tuesday, with Air Marshal Curtis.

I may say that I am a little perturbed that the name of Admiral Dyer is not included. I do feel that as Chief of Personnel, in a most critical time, that his testimony would be most enlightening. I am not at this point about to quibble on these points. I really do feel that we have come a long way, and I am very happy to see that my friends opposite admit that we do need some more witnesses. However, sir, it is disturbing and distressing to find a time limit put on the hearings. So much of the testimony of the various witnesses who have appeared has been informative and educational to those of us whose minds are not closed. Knowing little about defence, I assure you my mind is very wide open because I am very anxious to learn more. It is very necessary for us to have these very efficient, very able and very capable people come before us. I am sure that most of us must agree that our capacity to understand their testimony is somewhat

limited by our very sketchy knowledge of defence problems, the problems posed by this bill, and this new concept. Once we concede that these people are worth calling, then surely we are going to concede that their evidence is worth considering. I do not for one minute adhere to the concept that having heard something, it is understood, or that once we have heard them we have done our duty. Even those witnesses with whom I did not agree, Mr. Chairman, provided me with considerable detail about the problems of integration. I had some preconceived notions about some of the difficulties of integration, on which some of our witnesses convinced me that I was wrong. I discovered, to my surprise, that there were some problems concerning some experiments in integration that I had thought could be easily resolved. I can only say that if I can find errors in my thinking, on just hearing these gentlemen, then we should be sure that we hear as much evidence as we possibly can. May I say, as one who has never been a worshipper of the brass, that I have been so impressed with the quality of the brass, whether retired or presently serving, who have given evidence in respect of all sides of the problem, that I must say, perhaps grudgingly, that I really cannot find fault with the system that now brings these gentlemen to the forefront.

Mr. Chairman, if I can find, in my own reasoning, so readily and so quickly, some areas where I have learned so much, where I have had to change my mind about some things, it gives me all the more reason to pause and consider how much more I might learn if I had time to pause, to consider, to reflect, and to study, some of this evidence. It is, perhaps, part of my background and training, that on reviewing a case for the court of appeal, looking over the records and the transcript of the trial, that I find the question was not exactly the way I put it, and the answer was not exactly the way I thought I had heard it and sometimes this difference is of monumental importance.

Mr. Chairman, I am sure that we saw last Friday, the difference between your report to the House and mine, as to what went on in this Committee Friday morning. I took the trouble to get the transcript of the evidence because, frankly, I was very incensed at what you said, and I was going to make something of it. Then I looked at the transcript, and it was not quite what I thought it was; in fact, while I am sure that they did the best they could do, I am unconvinced yet that every word appears there. Whatever the situation was, I found, on reading the transcript of those words that appear, that you had ample reason to suggest that you put a motion. The transcript shows that you were cut-off before putting it. I had thought that the transcript would show my question to you, when someone proposed a motion and I said I wanted to speak to it; you said, "there is no motion before the chair". You will remember, Mr. Chairman, that you told the House of Commons that you called for a show of hands on a motion. The transcript shows your reply, "There is no motion"; on the other hand, the transcript also shows that you started to put a motion and were cut-off. I am only using this, Mr. Chairman, to show how important it is for us to pause and consider. I am sure, Mr. Chairman, you will remember that I got up in the house and said, "If you put a motion, I did not hear it; if you called for a show of hands, I did not hear it; and if people put up their hands, I did not see them." This was as far as I could go, because my memory is not faultless. Obviously, Mr. Chairman, from your report in the house that day, your memory is not faultless either.

The transcript shows that you did not, in fact, complete putting a motion. I am only giving this as an illustration of the necessity for this Committee to pause, to consider, and to see what we have obtained. To me, the mere hearing of witnesses, is wonderful and most educational, but I do not pretend to be so brilliant—and I think my mind is as quick as most members of this Committee—that I can accept everything right now and feel that I have gotten the ultimate out of what is there. It is only after study, time to pause, reflect, and consider the evidence, that we can positively achieve all that may be gained thereby, and what is perhaps even more important, Mr. Chairman, to put it in perspective with the rest of the evidence.

I say, sir, that the motion before us is most helpful; it is certainly a great improvement over the other one. I would like to include the name of Admiral Dyer. However, I am opposed to the motion on the question of time limit because I really feel that this Committee may put through three or four witnesses much more quickly, and instead of one on Monday and another on Tuesday, we might put them all through in three sittings. Then we might very easily want to pause and consider for a day or two. Therefore, it is because of the time schedule that, most reluctantly, I must say, that while I appreciate this move toward giving us more witnesses—I think there should be one more—I do not think the time schedule gives us time for appreciation. Therefore, I hope that we can amend this slightly to take more advantage of these most valuable witnesses whose names have been suggested to us.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Nugent, you have run about 10 minutes. I wonder if we could keep our remarks on this down to not more than 10 minutes. We are dealing with fairly specific recommendations—

Mr. NUGENT: Mr. Chairman, if I may. The reason I stopped is that I noticed, shall I say, a certain urgency about your appearance. I do not want to be unruly or take up too much of the time, and I feel that the time limit, when speaking to something here, is governed by the same rules as in the House. I had gone out of my way to make my remarks very brief. Certainly, Mr. Chairman, I do not want any suggestion that you have the right to curtail our remarks at 10 minutes, that we should be limited to 10 minutes, or just because I wanted to make my remarks very brief, that there is any reason why anybody else should be limited to the same time I had. Mr. Chairman, just so long as the fact that I am ceasing to speak within a certain time, is not taken as a precedent, when someone else who, perhaps, because he has something more germane and more important, wants to go into it more thoroughly, I will yield the floor, but only for that reason.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Nugent, all I am attempting to do is to satisfy a list, which now contains the names of Mr. Nugent, Mr. MacInnis, Mr. Winch, Mr. McIntosh, Mr. Forrestall, and Mr. Harkness. The time is now 9.10 p.m. We are discussing a resolution which has some pretty specific recommendations in it. It seems to me that 10 minutes each would give most of those people an opportunity to speak and to make recommendations before 10 o'clock.

I would hope that out of this would come a resolution or concurrence by the Committee in the way to proceed. I will call on Mr. MacInnis.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Mr. Chairman, this is most bewildering, all the more so since the mover of this motion has indicated to the Committee that he is somewhat concerned about the situation developing in the

Committee and in the House, and the reflections it makes on the outside world, if I may use that expression. He is quite concerned about the attitudes of the Committee and the impressions it is leaving outside.

Why it is most bewildering to me is this: We are now dealing with a Steering Committee report unanimously adopted this afternoon by the Steering Committee, of which Mr. Andras was a member, and he now comes into this Committee and moves that this Committee reject something which he unanimously supported this afternoon. Is there any wonder that he is concerned with the impression that is left outside?

Mr. ANDRAS: On a point of privilege.

The CHAIRMAN: There is a point of privilege here, Mr. MacInnis.

Mr. ANDRAS: I am quite prepared to accept that it was a genuine misunderstanding, if that is the proper word, about the use of the word "unanimous" in the Committee report. I want to establish—and there were Steering Committee members there—that when we were talking about the use of the word "unanimous", we were talking about many different things that did not come about. I said at the end, and I said several times toward the end of that Steering Committee report, that I objected to the use of the word "unanimous" because I did not, myself, concur in them.

The CHAIRMAN: That is correct, Mr. Andras. The Steering Committee made two unanimous recommendations: One, that the previous report be stood and, second, that we now hear the Minister.

Mr. ANDRAS: Mr. Chairman, with all due respect, I am accepting that this may have been an error on my part, but I am telling you quite sincerely that I was not party to the use of the word "unanimous", even applying to those two sections.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Mr. Chairman, all I would say to Mr. Andras' point of privilege is—and again we hark back to the rules of the House of Commons which I do not profess to know too much about—that if he objected to the word "unanimous", the time and place for him to raise his point of privilege, or his point of order, would have been when the Committee made the report that it was unanimous this afternoon. He has further bewildered this Committee by now moving against something which he voted in support of this afternoon. There is no other interpretation to be taken from your actions.

Mr. ANDRAS: First of all—

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Furthermore, Mr. Andras—

Mr. ANDRAS: On a point of privilege, Mr. Chairman. Whether there can be doubt as to whether you, or the other members of the Committee, thought the word "unanimous" carried my blessings, there can be no doubt about the fact that there was not a vote taken in Steering Committee either at noon today or this evening at 6 o'clock. The statement that there was a vote taken, is absolutely incorrect.

Mr. WINCH: I moved two votes.

Mr. NUGENT: Mr. Chairman, I think it is time to say something here. As far as I am concerned, I took the report of the chair, that this was unanimously

passed, as the chair said it was. We now have Mr. Andras saying it was not. On Friday afternoon, the chairman explained the position in this House, which was so at variance with what I heard was going on. This chairman told the House of Commons that he called for a vote and asked for a show of hands about a meeting. As I have already said, I could see, here, that he was interrupted when he was calling for a vote. There was a long discussion, and Mr. Churchill made it very pointed that it was the chairman who made that decision, autocratically. In fact, when there was a question to the chair of a motion which was proposed, and I said I wished to speak to the motion, the chairman told me that there was no motion before the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Nugent—

Mr. NUGENT: I will finish this very shortly, Mr. Chairman. It does not show on that; perhaps my memory is in error. However, Mr. Chairman, I must say, and I say it frankly here, and I do not think anybody is going to disagree with me, that we must have more co-operation from the chairman in this regard; that I do not think tonight we had a full and clear explanation from the chairman of exactly where the Steering Committee stood, and Mr. Andras has been forced into the embarrassing situation of explaining his position.

Mr. Chairman, this, sir, is your fault; this, sir, is your duty, and this was your duty on Friday. While I may disagree with the verdict you gave, I still buy it, but we must find fault with your endeavours to give the full and complete picture. Mr. Chairman, I trust, on this question of privilege raised by Mr. Andras, that if you are to continue as Chairman of this committee we may be able to rely on you for full and factual information about what has been going on, no matter what you personal feelings, even though some of these factors which may be so important to individuals do not impress you personally.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Nugent, I thank you for your very kind suggestions as to how the chair should proceed.

Mr. NUGENT: Would you like a motion from me as to whether we approve of how the chair has been proceeding, sir?

The CHAIRMAN: Well, now, Mr. Nugent, I must remind you before you put such a motion that I was not elected unanimously to this chair. The vote, on my election to this chair, was on the ratio of 8 to 14.

Mr. NUGENT: Does that have a bearing on your conduct, sir?

The CHAIRMAN: No, no. What I was about to say, Mr. Nugent, is that if you put the vote my ratio might improve.

Mr. NUGENT: It might, and your conduct might improve if I put the vote, sir.

The CHAIRMAN: All right, Mr. Nugent, I thank you for your remarks. The chair appreciates that there are problems in these matters. If there is a discrepancy in what was understood in the steering committee, there has not been any real protest brought before this committee by any member of the steering committee. Mr. Winch may be bringing it now. I will hear Mr. Winch now. Are you speaking on the question of privilege or on the motion?

Mr. WINCH: I am speaking on the motion.

Mr. MACINNIS: Mr. Chairman, I do not want to deny Mr. Winch has opportunity of giving us a run down on what actually happened at the steering committee meetings today, but I would draw your attention, sir, to the fact that Mr. Andras, interrupting with his question of privilege, was not entirely in order in that his question of privilege arose from something I have just said, and his argument in support of his question of privilege, sir, was directed at the chair, because of the use of the words "unanimous report of the steering committee". These are not my words. These are your words, Mr. Chairman, which Mr. Andras is taking exception to. You spoke of the vote a few minutes ago; I do not know entirely whether this would improve your position or not. It certainly appears that Mr. Andras is on the other side of the fence and has taken exception to your report and your remarks. Further to that, Mr. Andras in support of his motion, referred to the fact this matter was debated in the House of Commons for ten days. I think it is clearly understood by him, and certainly by his minister and the government, that the only reason it only took ten days in the House was that we had the assurance of the Prime Minister and the Minister of National Defence that witnesses before this committee would be fully examined; therefore, he has not only denied you tonight, sir, he has denied his own Prime Minister and his own Minister of National Defence, in trying to place a time limit on something they gave us free access to. Mr. Andras' motion is a complete denial of the government approach to this committee and the government's announced intention in respect of this committee. He has continued to deny the Chair, the Prime Minister and the Minister of National Defence. I wonder, considering the fact he accepted your report that it was unanimous, that he can now live with himself in that he is contradicting what he himself authorized the steering committee to report to this committee tonight.

The CHAIRMAN: I wonder if we could turn to the resolution before us this evening? Let us take a look at a resolution which clearly sets out a timetable to follow. If there is any seriousness this committee at all surely it can address itself to this timetable, comment on that subject, and leave some of these other subjects alone. Would you continue, Mr. MacInnis?

Mr. MACINNIS: Well, sir, we here are certainly in a bewildered state. We have had members from your side of the House, the government side of the House, contradicting the Chair, reflecting on the Chair, and now we have the Chairman reflecting on members of this committee. Mr. Chairman, the point before this committee now is a question of privilege. This is what I am talking about—Mr. Andras' question of privilege, which was raised because of a remark I made. But it was only a repetition of what you yourself said, and he is now denying the Chair; and before we reach the point of speaking on the motion, Mr. Chairman, it is going to be necessary for you to either rule Mr. Andras' question of privilege out of order or non-acceptable.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. MacInnis, I have no ruling. I plead with you to stop editorializing and address yourself to the motion that we have before us. I have no resolution in front of me on a question of privilege. I have a resolution which sets out a timetable, and I would like you to co-operate with the Chair by discussing this subject. The time now has run on another 15 minutes. Other gentlemen want to speak, I hope to the point. I wonder, Mr. MacInnis, if we could return to it.

Mr. MACINNIS: I understand you want me to return to the motion and that you are not entertaining the question of privilege raised by Mr. Andras.

The CHAIRMAN: I have no question of privilege before me, Mr. MacInnis. I wonder if you would proceed.

Mr. MACINNIS: I will go back to the question of the motion and the reasons Mr. Andras advanced for moving this particular motion. We might also consider your own statement to the effect you could not see any reason for ruling this motion out of order. Mr. Chairman, to begin with, I see nothing wrong with a Chairman ruling any motion out of order, when it is clearly indicated to the Chair that it is physically impossible to carry it out. Just because—again, sir I use your own words—you see the government making mistakes every day is no reason why they should be repeated here in this committee, unless the mistakes of the Liberal government are contagious, which I firmly believe. However, the fact that you have indicated to this committee that the government is making these mistakes every day is no reason why this committee should go on and accept a motion, or refuse to rule a motion out of order, when it has been clearly indicated that it is an impossibility for this government to make the necessary reports available for the final report of this committee to the House. That has been clearly indicated. As you understand, and as you have indicated, you have examples of this each and every day from this government. Is this a reason that such a motion cannot be ruled out of order? If so, it is ridiculous.

Now, if I was so inclined, I could go back to the question of the way the Chair is conducting the meeting. The Chair has indicated here this evening what the order of business was. Through the efforts of members on that side of the committee room, the whole thing has been harangued now for almost an hour and a half, without any progress being made whatsoever, simply because the Chairman cannot make a ruling, that he chose to make, stick. Now Mr. Andras' supporting reasons for bringing this motion forward have been ridiculous. He himself has been ridiculous in denying what was done this afternoon.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Winch?

Mr. WINCH: Mr. Chairman, I am not going to use your term "editorialize" but I want to open by saying that no one is going to pull what is, as far as I am concerned, a lousy double-cross on me without it being made clear.

Mr. Chairman, I have had the privilege of being a member of this committee since it was first established, and I have been a member of the steering committee of this committee during all the years since it was established. Never until today have I known a man to go along with a general thought in the steering committee and then come before the committee and deny the position he took in the steering committee. I will go beyond that: that outside the committee, when I was in the corridor, to say he would not have gone along with that, had he known what it meant. In other words, saying in the corridor, something entirely different to what was said in committee. I refer to Mr. Andras.

Mr. ANDRAS: On a question of privilege, Mr. Chairman—

Mr. WINCH: Let me talk now.

Mr. ANDRAS: On a question of privilege, Mr. Chairman, I have very great regard for the member who has just spoken. I am very sorry that he has raised it

in this manner. If he does not agree with the motion I placed before this committee tonight—

Mr. WINCH: I oppose it.

Mr. ANDRAS: —I very much regret that. It may represent a considerable difference of opinion between us. But the suggestion, that in that steering committee I went along with this or that, is quite erroneous.

Mr. NUGENT: On a point of order, I think Mr. Winch should finish.

Mr. WINCH: I did not know my opinion was erroneous until after we had left the steering committee meeting and we were walking down the corridor.

The CHAIRMAN: Order, order.

Mr. WINCH: Mr. Chairman, I oppose the motion—

Mr. ANDRAS: I am on a point of order, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN: I wonder whether we could hear out the question of privilege, Mr. Winch. I wonder if you could state your question of privilege, Mr. Andras.

Mr. ANDRAS: The use of the word "unanimous" in the steering committee this evening—

An hon. MEMBER: Is there a dictionary in the room? Perhaps we should look up that word.

Mr. ANDRAS: It was quite frequently used in that steering committee, and it was used at point by point discussions as to whether more witnesses should be heard or whether they should not be heard, and whether there should be dates and times and a date by which this bill should be reported back to the House. I maintained my position throughout that steering committee meeting that if we could reach the end agreement in the steering committee to have a report come back to this committee that there would, in fact, be witnesses heard and there would in fact be a date placed on the time when we reported back to the House. Most certainly I would join in unanimity. But the fact of the matter is that we discussed it; there were opposite points of view presented, which is quite understandable, and we did not reach that decision to agree on a report to this committee that there would be a date by which the bill would be reported back to the House. Therefore, any idea that, section by section, there was unanimity, without the total agreement, is quite incorrect. I genuinely place that before you. Mr. Winch can present a point of view and say that he understood certain things, Mr. Chairman—

Mr. WINCH: Mr. Chairman. I genuinely put before you that there were some unanimous decisions.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, this is a difference in assessing what took place, and I think both sides can understand. The matter has been aired. I wonder if Mr. Winch—

Mr. NUGENT: Mr. Chairman, on that question of privilege—

Mr. WINCH: I want to continue.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Winch is prepared to—

Mr. NUGENT: On that objection made by Mr. Winch. We have a question of privilege that I would like to speak on because it affects us all. The suggestion made by Mr. Winch that Mr. Andras had reversed his opinion, that there was something he is telling us here now that was different to what he said in committee, is the sort of thing I think should be clarified. Mr. Winch should either apologize and accept Mr. Andras' explanation, or else prove it.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Nugent, I think both parties understand that differences of this kind can occur. The matter has been aired. It is on the record. Mr. Winch, having said what he felt he should say about this matter, and Mr. Andras having made an explanation, I think the matter is settled. If I interpret Mr. Winch's mind correctly, he is waiting to proceed.

Mr. WINCH: I want to oppose the motion moved by Mr. Andras in the words that he used. In so doing, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for your courtesy in seeing me twice over the last few days, once with Mr. Andras. And when I saw you alone and when we saw Mr. Andras, I made it clear to both of you that I thought that after 40 sittings of hearing evidence, we should be able to reach a conclusion. I gave you my ideas personally when you gave me the privilege of meeting with you, and I did the same at 2 o'clock and at 6 o'clock this afternoon. I still feel very strongly that we should be able to map out a program whereby we can bring the meetings of the committee on Bill No. C-243 to a conclusion. I think it must be done in a just manner. I outlined to you personally, and twice in committee now, how I think it could be done. The way Mr. Andras has now presented his motion is, to me, unjust and unfair. I thought it was unanimous; I thought it was agreed in the steering committee, on the only recommendation I made, that one man should be called as just one that I said I wanted called before this committee, Air Marshal Miller, the former Chief of Staff who, I understand, is now back. I understood that was agreed to, Mr. Andras, by yourself, but he is not mentioned in your motion before us now. May I, to make it as concise and as clear as I can, repeat to the Committee, what I told you sir, twice, you and Mr. Andras, when you met with me, and the steering committee at two and the steering committee at three: I think we can bring this matter to a conclusion in a fair and a just manner. Basically—it is a little bit late now—that meant that tonight all general questioning of the Minister be concluded—all general questioning of the Minister be concluded; that tomorrow, Monday and Tuesday, but not later than Tuesday, that we hear two witnesses that, sir, over meetings and meetings of the steering committee, we had agreed to hear—I refer to General Simonds and Air Vice Marshal Curtis, and the former Chief of Staff—and that that may be concluded by Tuesday night, with, I had hoped, the Minister tonight. But those three not later than Tuesday night, but concluded—closure, if you like—by Tuesday night. Then, Wednesday afternoon, start clause by clause, with the objective of trying to conclude by Friday, so that the necessary work will be done to file the bill on the following Monday. That, sir, you know is what I suggested, and I think it was fair and just. What we have from Mr. Andras now, is completely unfair, completely unjust and, I repeat again, not, in my estimation, the feeling, the report of the majority, if not the unanimous opinion of the steering committee.

Mr. Chairman, I oppose the motion, that we have now before us, as being unfair, unjust, and I believe, although it might mean a little bit of drawing back

by some of the others of this committee, in all earnestness, that my original proposal is a good one, fair and just, and will bring this to a satisfactory conclusion, without any charge being laid against this committee of stultification or closure. So, I most certainly oppose the wording of Mr. Andras' motion. To me, it is absolute closure, which I will not vote for.

Mr. McINTOSH: Mr. Chairman, this, to me, is a motion of closure, whether it is supported by Mr. Winch or not. And it is a motion of closure, if you put it to a vote, because it is apparent to all of us here now, that the government members are all going to vote for it. Actually, what it amounts to is a breach of a commitment given to the people of Canada, not just to this Committee or to the House, by the Prime Minister and by the Minister of National Defence, that we would have full opportunity to question these witnesses as they came before us. There was no limitation of time mentioned at that time. I am wondering now why it is so necessary to get this Committee finished by a certain time. Are we getting close to what they actually mean by putting this bill before the House. I do not think for one moment that it has to do entirely with our armed services. I think it goes beyond that. Maybe we are getting too close to this mysterious manoeuvre of the Minister all through this debate, while it was in the House, while he presented the bill, his evasive answers to questions, and his inability to produce statistics to us. The Prime Minister promised the people of Canada that this Committee would have unlimited time to call as many witnesses as we want.

I want to point out to you, Mr. Chairman, that we have not had a chance to question thoroughly the witnesses we have had before us—not any of them, and I object strenuously to the time limit in that motion put on hearing the witnesses, because we have no way of knowing at the present time whether the witnesses will take up the full time that you have allocated to them with briefs, without anyone putting questions. To me, it is a foolish motion, unless it is done for a purpose, which I think it is, and the purpose is closure. If that is your intention, you might as well put your motion of closure right now and take it back into the House.

We have not gone into the fundamentals of this problem. You will remember that when we questioned the Minister, when we questioned the Chief of the General Staff as to the manpower required, as to the dollars required, they said they made no studies on this whatsoever. However, when they got down to picayune questions about studies, they said they had saved 26 men in one headquarters, 5,200 hours or 52,000—I forget what it was. But when they can make studies on such small minor things, why did they not make studies on the number of men that this commitment is going to require. Why did they not make studies and tell the Canadian people how much this is going to cost the Canadian people. I think this is what the Canadian people want to know. I want to refer to what Mr. Foy said a few moments ago about General Allard's testimony. I would remind him, and he can go back and look over the evidence too, that General Moncel said it would take roughly 150,000 men to fulfil this commitment. He said that the Defence budget would almost be doubled.

That is all the information we have been able to get so far. Maybe we will get some more information from the witnesses that are going to appear before us, if we are allowed to question them. Mr. Chairman, if you balance, on one hand, an absolute conviction on the part of the Minister, an absolute conviction

on the part of the Chiefs of the General Staff and, on the other, figures that people have worked on to show that it cannot be done, which are we going to take—even if we were unbiased and neutral? Certainly they would take the figures of people that have worked on it. The Minister has admitted that he has no idea of the number of men that will be required to fulfil these commitments. That he has no idea of the amount of money he is going to require, and it seems very odd and very strange that the Minister or even the Chief of the General Staff, is not able to give this Committee this information.

I would also say, that we, representing the people of Canada, have an obligation to go into this question of compulsory military service. This certainly is a very vital point to all people of Canada, certain parts in particular. We know what happened before. Now, if we are going to have compulsory military service, it is certainly going to cost us an awful lot more money than if we had a voluntary force.

I would think, Mr. Chairman, that you should give us ample opportunity to bring these points out. I abhor any move by those on the other side of the table to force closure on this Committee, after the commitments given by the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence to the people of Canada.

There is a nigger in the woodpile some place, if this is what you are going to use. It is like giving a blank cheque to the Minister.

Mr. FORRESTALL: I have a number of points to raise, Mr. Chairman, regarding the motion. First of all, I would suggest, for example, that if we had not been saddled with this procedure last week, we might very well be in a position to wind up in reasonable time next week, to accommodate what appears to be a time schedule in the House itself.

However, that is not the case, and we find ourselves with what, to me, is a very serious situation, a situation that developed in the latter part of last week. On five occasions I was on a list to question or to further examine witnesses and, for one reason or another, time ran out, and the next day I found myself in exactly the same position on the list. In any event, without dragging it out, I was not able to question any of the witnesses that were before us last week, with the singular exception of one question to General Lilley.

Mr. Chairman, to propose a time limit on this bill, it seems to me—as was pointed out by, I believe, Mr. Lambert, earlier—is somewhat impossible. It is my understanding of procedures of Committees that, indeed, a report is compiled on the evidence that has been heard in connection with the bill, that there is at least one meeting, or possibly more, of the Committee in camera to consider the report of the steering committee, to make necessary amendments, and to at least sanction it, whether by majority or unanimous support. It seems to me that a time factor is just not possible in that connection, no matter which way you slice that particular piece of cake.

I was hopeful, and I still remain hopeful, that we will be able to hear the previous Chief of the Defence Staff, Mr. Millar.

I would like to suggest to you, Mr. Chairman, that the effect of the bill will be to deny the members of the Committee any detailed examination of our role in NATO, as it is going to come before us very shortly; it left out some mundane

things, like base consolidation, which, in my particular case, is a very serious and grevious matter, and one that continues to concern people throughout the Maritimes.

Mr. Chairman, we have had no opportunity to clarify the manning position. I refer to the incident last week of not having been able to at least pursue the very interesting comments of Commodore Porter with regard to our ability to man the ships that we have so that we can meet this very definite role the Minister has set out for us, with regard to ASW. There has been no opportunity for myself, and I know for a good many other members of this Committee, to discuss certain points of view with the Chief of the Defence Staff, General Allard. There has been no indication at all before this Committee, of the thinking in respect of the so-called other ranks, in regard to either integration or unification. There has been no opportunity to question the Maritime Commander; no opportunity to question the air defence chief; no opportunity to question the air transport chief; as I pointed out, no opportunity to question the last chief of Defence Staff; as Mr. Nugent pointed out, the last chief of personnel, Admiral Dyer; no opportunity to get at the real understandings and opinions of the middle ranking officers, which I think is a very important point too. There has been no opportunity at all and absolutely no discussion with regard to the civilian supporting roles of our armed services under the proposed program, and I refer to such establishments, again, parochial if you wish, such as HMC dockyard, and the civilian employees at the several defence establishments on the east coast. Indeed, this is true throughout the land in respect of all the base establishments. We have had no opportunity, Mr. Chairman, and I raised this at either our first or second meeting in early February, to hear from the Adjutant General on the legality of certain clauses of the bill, before we get into its clause by clause study. I was concerned, and I continue to be concerned, about the moral question of transferring men from one service into another without permitting, at least, the opportunity for these officers and men to indicate their desire, without fear of any penalty. We have had no opportunity to review the essence of the effect of this bill, as it appears to those concerned with our external affairs policy. I raised this matter at least three times in this Committee. It has been raised in the house in two or three different ways on at least five occasions. To date there has been no answer, and no suggestion of an answer. I suggest this is indeed serious, and to put it in a context which I think is serious, I question very seriously, and have since the beginning, the credibility of a White Paper that is now nearly four years old. I seriously doubt if any of our partners, either in NATO or to the south, have let three and a half or four years go by without having readjusted or given an extensive and exhaustive review to their White Paper, or whatever it is that passes for a White Paper in the other countries. On these few points alone, Mr. Chairman, to accede to the motion we had before us and to approve it would, in my opinion, be doing a very great disservice to our country. We have been discussing a very serious and grievous matter for the past few weeks. If we are not permitted to go on with it, God forgive us for the position in which we are going to leave our country, if it happens to be wrong. We have had ample evidence from very senior people to suggest that it might not be the best course of action in the world, especially at this particular time and point in our history. It will be our responsibility, if we indeed approve it, lend it our blessing without knowing what it is that we are

getting into. Being a new member of the house, I am not privy, to everything that has gone on, although I have read in *Hansard* the debate on the first bill, Bill C-90, which brought about the integrated command staff. It has been pointed out in the House, and here in Committee, that the members of the House of Commons, when discussing that bill on the floor of the house, were not aware of the full extent that this bill was intending to go, the paths along which it was bound to lead Canada in relation to its defence structure and to its commitments abroad. I cite this as one reason for the motion not being adhered to. I do intend to move an amendment—I will not move it now because I am not sure this is the proper time—unless somebody else does, the effect of which will be to remove the time limit of reporting this bill back to the house. I, for one, am not prepared to go through it clause by clause in one or two days. I have a number of amendments, which I would like to feel would be widely and amply discussed by members of this Committee, especially by members who have more experience in military and external affairs, than I have.

There is a second point that I think is equally as serious. Mr. Chairman, it has to do with what I can only consider the dishonouring of the words of the Prime Minister and, indeed, of the Minister of National Defence himself on the floor of the House of Commons, when every assurance was given of cutting off, members of the House but to the public at large, that any question of cutting off, curtailing or shortening the fullest possible examination of this bill just was not even being considered. We have had the spectacle of last week, which would not only tend to contradict that but would very substantially—I used the word "dishonour" and I shall use it again—dishonour the commitment given to the people of Canada on more than one occasion by, again, both the Prime Minister and the minister on the floor of the House.

Mr. HARKNESS: Mr. Chairman, I had thought at the one meeting of the Steering Committee that I attended today that reasonable progress was being made, and that there was a fair chance in the Steering Committee of arriving at some sort of compromise which might be acceptable to all members of the Committee, and which might enable us to proceed in an orderly and reasonable way to complete our consideration of the matter which is before us.

I regret very much this return to the same type of argument and, to some extent, wrangling which we had on Friday last which, as I understood it, was what the Steering Committee was to try and avoid, so that we would not have a return to this. The total result, as I see it, of this motion introduced by Mr. Andras, is that we will in effect have lost this evening's sitting, and that instead of being able to continue the questioning of the minister, we have been deprived of the opportunity of doing so. Therefore, I think it was an extremely ill-considered move on the part of Mr. Andras to introduce this motion.

Mr. Foy, in seconding the motion, based his support of it entirely on certain remarks made by General Allard to the effect that in his view the thing should be put through immediately or otherwise there would be unfortunate effects on the morale of the forces and so on. I would like to point out that that was just General Allard's opinion, and that the opinion of the other equally experienced and expert witnesses we had was all in the reverse direction. In other words, the great weight of evidence that we have had before this Committee was that to proceed with this bill would be to further impair the morale and efficiency of the

services, and that in any event, what was needed more than anything else, was a pause of at least three years—most of the witnesses thought longer than that—in order to consolidate, as they expressed it, the various integration processes which have been set in motion. Therefore, I do not think the Committee, on the weight of the evidence, can pay too much attention to the basis upon which Mr. Foy made his remarks in seconding this motion. The passing of this motion, to deal with it directly, would have the effect of really imposing two forms of closure on this Committee. The first to place a limit on the number of witnesses, and a very strict limit, on the length of time which each of those witnesses would be allowed before the Committee. The second, type of closure is in regard to the amount of time to be devoted to clause by clause study of the bill. I will deal with each of these in turn. First of all, there is the number of witnesses. The motion proposes that we hear three more witnesses only, but as has been pointed out by several others on this matter, Mr. Winch for one, there remain two witnesses whose evidence I think is essential to this Committee. The first of those is Air Chief Marshal Miller, who was chairman of the chiefs of staff for several years before the first bill was brought in in 1964, and was chief of defence staff from that time on until some six months ago; the other is Admiral Dyer, who was chief of personnel under the new set-up, again until six or seven months ago. I do not think that the Committee will have heard the evidence it should hear and which is available to it until we have heard those witnesses, in addition to the three witnesses provided for in the motion.

The motion also puts a very strict time limit on the length of time the witnesses it does provide for can be heard: One and a half hours for Admiral Rayner; some two and a half hours for General Simonds, and two hours for Air Marshal Curtis. On the basis of our experience so far in this Committee, I think you would agree, Mr. Chairman, that that is not sufficient time for the gentlemen concerned to present their briefs or their views in an oral form and to enable the members of the Committee to question them in regard to those and any other matters which previous witnesses may have brought up, or which members of the Committee may wish to seek their advice on. Therefore, I think the motion is deplorable from this point of view. It seeks to chop off the number of witnesses, and it seeks to very seriously curtail the time to be given to the few witnesses that it does still provide for.

Now, as far as the second point is concerned, I think the closure proposed on the time for clause by clause study of the bill, is completely unrealistic and unreasonable. I think that every person sitting on this Committee knows that there is no means by which you can determine how long it will take to go over a bill of that size, with 62 clauses, some of them very complex in character and many of them with very considerable implications. To hear the views of the Judge Advocate General in regard to a number of these points, of other experts in the department, particularly as far as the pension provisions are concerned, is something which nobody can say can be done in three meetings, six meetings or fifteen meetings, as far as that goes. You just do not know, before you start on clause by clause study of a bill of this kind, how much time you are going to require, and to attempt to say that the clause by clause study should be ended on Friday next, even though we may have only covered ten clauses by that time, means that the Committee will not be doing the job it was set up to do. It will not have had an opportunity to do the job that it was set up to do, and therefore

I think that to attempt to follow any course along that line, makes a mockery of this Committee and of the Committee system generally.

In addition to that, Mr. Chairman, I would submit that no time will be saved by following a course of that kind; in fact, just the reverse will be the situation. It will take considerably longer in the House, on the clause by clause study of the bill there, than would be the case if we did take sufficient time in the Committee to deal with the thing properly clause by clause. Mr. Andras and others seem to think that by trying to force through closure of this kind, they are going to save time, as far as consideration of the bill is concerned. Mr. Chairman, it will have exactly the reverse effect, and the bill will take considerably longer than would be the case otherwise.

For all of these reasons, I would hope very much that the Committee would defeat Mr. Andras' motion.

An hon. MEMBER: It is ten o'clock.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, it is nearly ten o'clock. We now have been two days on the subject of how we should proceed to discuss our business, and we are still at an impasse. I am wondering if the work of the Committee would be furthered if, instead of further meetings of the Steering Committee, we had a meeting of the whole in camera to discuss, perhaps in a more informal way, how we might break the present log jam and get ahead with business. Tomorrow morning a caucus is taking place, which I think makes it impossible for any Committees to meet, and I just wonder whether at some time tomorrow, say from one thirty to two thirty, it would be possible for this group to meet in camera to have a general discussion before the week-end comes as to how we might best proceed.

Mr. WINCH: If six cannot work it out, how can twenty four?

The CHAIRMAN: Well, I do not know. I think perhpas it might change the pace a little if, instead of having a further meeting of the Steering Committee at this time, we had an in camera meeting of the whole. Let us try that once, then have a look at it over the week-end, and see whether or not we cannot begin a new week in a different light. If that appeals to gentlemen here, I will ask now for a motion that we meet in camera tomorrow at 1.30 p.m.

Some hon. MEMBERS: Ten o'clock.

Mr. ANDRAS: Mr. Chairman, I should like clarification, on a point of order. The motion before us now, which has been ruled in order, does specify a meeting of the Committee tomorrow afternoon to hear Admiral Rayner.

An hon. MEMBER: Let us have a decision.

The CHAIRMAN: The motion has not been defeated; it has not been put to a vote. Order, please. I am discussing here an order of business.

An hon. MEMBER: It is after ten o'clock.

The CHAIRMAN: It is ten o'clock, gentlemen.

Mr. FOY: Mr. Chairman, before you call the motion, I wonder if the Committee would allow one from this side of the House to talk on the motion.

An hon. MEMBER: Ten o'clock.

Mr. FOY: You chaps over there watch the clock pretty well. You are experts at it, Heber, but of course you do not know it.

An hon. MEMBER: Are we meeting tomorrow?

The CHAIRMAN: No, there is no meeting tomorrow. The meeting is adjourned.

OFFICIAL REPORT OF MINUTES

OF

PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

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Translated by the General Bureau for Translation, Secretary of State.

LÉON-J. RAYMOND,
The Clerk of the House.

HOUSE OF COMMONS

First Session—Twenty-seventh Parliament

1966-67

STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. GRANT DEACHMAN

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 31

MONDAY, MARCH 13, 1967

Respecting

Bill C-243, An Act to amend the National Defence Act and other Acts in consequence thereof.

WITNESS:

Vice-Admiral H. S. Rayner D.S.C., C.D., RCN (Retired)

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY
OTTAWA, 1967

25912—1

STANDING COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. Grant Deachman

Vice-Chairman: Hon. Marcel Lambert

Mr. Andras,
Mr. Brewin,
Mr. Byrne,
Mr. Churchill,
Mr. Crossman,
Mr. Éthier,
Mr. Forrestall,
Mr. Foy,
Mr. Harkness,
Mr. Langlois (*Chicoutimi*),
Mr. Latulippe,
Mr. Legault,
Mr. Lessard,
[1]Mr. Loiselle,
Mr. Macaluso,
Mr. MacInnis (*Cape Breton South*),
Mr. McIntosh,
Mr. McNulty,
Mr. Nugent,
Mr. Rochon,
Mr. Smith,
Mr. Winch—(24).

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

[1] Replaced Mr. Hopkins on March 13, 1967.

ORDER OF REFERENCE

HOUSE OF COMMONS,
MONDAY, March 13, 1967.

Ordered,—That the name of Mr. Loiselle be substituted for that of Mr. Hopkins on the Standing Committee on National Defence.

Attest.

LÉON-J. RAYMOND,
The Clerk of the House of Commons.

25912—1½

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

MONDAY, March 13, 1967.
(61)

The Standing Committee on National Defence met at 3:45 p.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Deachman, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Andras, Byrne, Churchill, Crossman, Deachman, Éthier, Forrestall, Foy, Harkness, Lambert, Langlois (*Chicoutimi*), Legault, Lessard, Loiselle, Macaluso, MacInnis (*Cape Breton South*), McIntosh, McNulty, Nugent, Rochon, and Winch—(21).

Also present: Mr. MacRae and Mr. O'Keefe.

In attendance: Vice-Admiral H. S. Rayner, RCN (Retired); *From the Department of National Defence:* Honourable Paul Hellyer, Minister and Air Marshal F. R. Sharp, Vice Chief Defence Staff.

The Chairman referred to the motion tabled before the Committee dated March 9, 1967. Moved by Mr. Andras, seconded by Mr. Foy,

"That the report of the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure dated March 9, 1967 be not now concurred in and
That the Committee meet to-morrow afternoon, March 10, to hear Admiral Rayner; Monday afternoon, March 13, to hear Air Marshal Curtis; Monday evening, March 13, to hear General Simonds; Tuesday morning, March 14, to hear the Minister of National Defence; that the Committee continue thereafter to consider the Bill clause by clause and that it conclude its consideration of the Bill not later than Thursday evening, March 16, and that it report the Bill back to the House of Commons not later than 11:00 a.m., Friday, March 17, 1967."

Following discussion, the Committee unanimously agreed to stand this motion.

The Committee also agreed to invite an additional witness to appear at this sitting. Vice-Admiral Rayner was present and the members agreed that he should be called.

At 4:00 p.m., the Committee recessed for fifteen minutes. There being a quorum at 4:15 the Chairman introduced Vice-Admiral H. S. Rayner who described his Service background and read a prepared statement. Copies were distributed to the members.

Admiral Rayner's statement included four main headings as follows:

Unification And The Navy
The State Of The Navy To-Day
The Composition Of The Defence Council
The Need For A Full Inquiry

The members questioned Vice-Admiral Rayner on points raised in his brief and on other defence matters in relation to *Bill C-243*.

The questioning of the witness continuing, at 6:00 p.m. the Committee adjourned until 8:00 p.m. this day.

EVENING SITTING
(62)

The Standing Committee on National Defence met at 8.05 p.m. this day with the Chairman, Mr. Deachman, presiding.

Members present: Messrs. Andras, Byrne, Churchill, Crossman, Deachman, Ethier, Forrestall, Foy, Harkness, Lambert, Langlois (*Chicoutimi*), Legault, Lessard, Loiselle, Macaluso, MacInnis (*Cape Breton South*), McNulty, Nugent, Rochon, Smith, and Winch (21).

Also present: Mr. Pugh.

In attendance: Vice-Admiral H. S. Rayner, RCN (Retired) and Honourable Paul Hellyer, Minister of National Defence.

The members continued their questioning of the witness, Vice-Admiral H. S. Rayner, throughout this evening sitting.

At approximately 9:40 p.m., the Committee concluded its questioning of the witness. The Chairman, on behalf of the members, thanked Admiral Rayner for his appearance before the Committee in connection with *Bill C-243*.

Members made some suggestions concerning the order of business for meetings during the balance of this week and the calling of additional witnesses. The Chairman announced that the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure would meet as soon as the Committee adjourned, to consider these suggestions.

The Committee adjourned at 9:45 p.m., until Tuesday, March 14, 1967, at 10:00 a.m.

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

EVIDENCE

(Recorded By Electronic Apparatus)

MONDAY, March 13, 1967.

The CHAIRMAN: Order. Gentlemen, when we rose on Thursday you will recall we were discussing the motion of Mr. Andras and that is the item of business we have before us today, although I must say as time marches on the motion of Mr. Andras is becoming more academic.

I have in front of me a list left over from Thursday of persons who wish to speak on that motion but before beginning to call names I wonder whether or not there are any members who want to raise any suggestions at this time of how we might proceed. Mr. Lambert?

Mr. LAMBERT: Mr. Chairman, I think everyone has had a chance to reflect on, shall we say, the snail's pace of progress in regard to the deliberations of the Committee. With a view to that I would like to make the suggestion that we leave aside Mr. Andras' motion entirely with the view to getting on to completion of hearing the witnesses and achieving the greatest possible progress in the clause by clause study before House might rise before Easter. I see that Admiral Rayner is here this afternoon. I have not consulted with him but I was wondering whether, perhaps, he would be prepared to answer some questions that members might wish to put as a result of the brief he put forward and, on the basis of the witnesses we suggested to you, whether they could be contacted this afternoon by the Clerk to see whether they could be available—at least some of them—tomorrow, and that we can carry on to firm up the balance of the program as a result of informal discussions.

Mr. ANDRAS: Mr. Chairman, as the mover of the motion I think Mr. Lambert's suggestion has great merit. I would certainly be quite amenable to letting the motion be set aside or stood at the present time and see what progress we could make. We could hear Admiral Rayner either this afternoon or this evening, whichever works out most conveniently for him and permits the Clerk of the Committee to contact the witnesses as Mr. Lambert has suggested. I would say, generally, we would be most interested in proceeding along this line.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, if I am hearing correctly I think we are at the point where we have a moment of amity sweeping across the Committee and I hope we can take advantage of it.

Let me just tidy up a few points between Mr. Lambert and Mr. Andras. Perhaps we can just continue in this vein for a moment and see how things go. When you say leave aside the motion or let the motion be set aside, what are we to understand by that? Is the motion just simply being stood for the moment while we proceed to another piece of business as the first order of the day? Is that the understanding between you?

Mr. LAMBERT: I would put it that way for the time being.

The CHAIRMAN: You put it that way and this is satisfactory. All right. Then there is another point to deal with and that is on the question of whether or not we can hear somebody this afternoon. Am I to understand from both of you that it is satisfactory that we hear a witness this afternoon and proceed along this line?

Mr. LAMBERT: Yes, in order to get on with it.

Mr. WINCH: Mr. Chairman, may I ask one question. Mr. Lambert say "witnesses" and the Clerk is to make the contacts. It is my understanding that the witnesses to be contacted will be General Simonds, Air Vice Marshal Curtis and Air Marshal Miller.

The CHAIRMAN: Let me come to these points one at a time. Mr. Winch; that would be the next point we would tidy up. The first point is that we set aside the motion and the second point I want to make is the calling of a witness this afternoon. Is that an agreeable plan to you?

Mr. ANDRAS: It is agreeable to me that you call Admiral Rayner this afternoon or this evening whichever is convenient. Perhaps this evening, as it is rather short notice to him.

The CHAIRMAN: I notice Admiral Rayner is in the room this afternoon and so we can establish communications with him very quickly. In fact perhaps even more quickly than has been done in some great military battles.

Mr. Lambert, is it agreeable to you that we call Admiral Rayner this afternoon if he is prepared to be questioned?

Mr. LAMBERT: I would hope so.

Mr. ANDRAS: I would like to make the suggestion, and we are completely in the hands of the Committee on this, that it might not be convenient in view of the fact that this decision has just been arrived at and many may not have Admiral Rayner's brief in front of them now—whatever is most convenient; either this afternoon or this evening.

The CHAIRMAN: There seems to be a general consensus, without moving a vote, that we should call him now.

I have one more question to deal with and that is the contacting of other witnesses who might appear before the Committee. This is a little more difficult to settle, and I would like to hear some more suggestions on this.

Mr. LAMBERT: I would suggest to the members present here today that the urgency is for tomorrow. We should get in touch with General Simonds and Air Marshal Curtis. We will leave it at that for now.

Mr. WINCH: For tomorrow, yes, but I will not go beyond tomorrow.

The CHAIRMAN: Is there general agreement, then, that we hear General Simonds and Air Marshal Curtis tomorrow without prejudice to any other steps we may take in respect of all these matters?

Mr. MCINTOSH: Mr. Chairman, can we handle two in one day?

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. McIntosh, a snappy Committee like this could handle three or four.

Admiral Rayner is in the room and if he is prepared to come forward we will now begin the questioning. Gentlemen, I want to thank you for making progress this afternoon. I see spring is coming and the ice is breaking.

Mr. ANDRAS: If Admiral Rayner would prefer this evening it is perfectly acceptable to us.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, Admiral Rayner's remarks will not be on the tape so I will repeat them now. He is in the room and he has said that he would prefer to come at 5 o'clock this afternoon or at 8 o'clock this evening. I think he probably has some material that he wants to gather and I do not think he came to this meeting prepared to find himself in the chair so quickly. Out of respect for Admiral Rayner let us just pause for a minute and make sure of these arrangements.

Admiral Rayner will be prepared to appear in 15 minutes. That will give you a chance for a coffee break, gentlemen. We will be back here at 4.15 to begin the examination of Admiral Rayner.

Recess.

After recess.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, I understand that Admiral Rayner would like to read his brief and he has a couple of remarks to make by way of preface. He is going to take the lectern in a moment and read the brief but before calling on him to do so I will ask him to give us a rundown of his history and background for the purpose of the record as we have in the case of other witnesses who have come before us.

Vice-Admiral H. S. RAYNER, R.C.N. (Retired) (*Former Chief of the Naval Staff*): Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, I appreciate this opportunity of appearing before you. I would like to say that I have no political affiliations but I appear before you as a CCNK—a Canadian Citizen with Naval Knowledge.

The Chairman has asked me to outline my background. There are references to that in the brief, of course, so I will not repeat those.

I entered the Royal Canadian Navy in 1928. We had no naval college in those days so I was sent over to be trained with the Royal Navy. Of my first nine years in the RCN I spent seven under training in various fleets in the Royal Navy. At the beginning of the war I was serving in a Canadian destroyer and during the war I commanded three destroyers. For about a year of that time I was in charge of an escort group. I had two shore jobs during the war; one was Staff Officer of Operations in the Northwestern Approaches Command which is based at Halifax and the second was Director of Plans at Naval Service Headquarters. That was my last wartime appointment.

After the war I commanded a destroyer and then I went in command to the RCN, air section, Dartmouth, which was the predecessor at HMCS *Shearwater*. From there I went to the Services College, Royal Roads, where I was the first Commandant under the tri-services scheme. From there I went to the Imperial Defence College for study of the higher direction of war—the Imperial Defence College in London, of course. After that I was appointed Secretary to the Chiefs of Staff Committee here in Ottawa and I subsequently became the Co-ordinator of the Joint Staff.

From there I went back to sea in command of the aircraft carrier *Magnificent* and as the Senior Canadian Naval Officer Afloat in the Atlantic, and after two years there I became the Chief of Naval Personnel. After two years as CNP I went out to Pacific Command where I was the Flag Officer, Pacific Coast. In my last year there the Maritime Command was established and so I helped set up the Maritime Command, Pacific, and was the first Maritime Commander, Pacific. From there I was selected as Chief of Naval Staff and I served as such from 1960 to 1964. From that position I retired.

This brief, of course, was handed in on Friday, March 3, and I think this may have been the last communication you had from a witness so I believe the brief is still current and I would like to read it. There are some additional copies available and there will be some more coming up.

During the time that I have sat in this room listening to much of the evidence that has been presented to you, since the Committee was re-convened on February 7, after a seven-month recess, my brief has been getting shorter and shorter.

The earlier witnesses have covered the waterfront. However, I would like to hammer home some points, which I suggest should be kept in mind during your detailed study of Bill C-243.

My connection with integration goes back to the discussions which led up to the publication of the White Paper on Defence in 1964. At that time I was Chief of Naval Staff and a member of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. Unlike some others who have appeared before you, I was not retired because of integration or unification. My retirement date as C.N.S., after the customary four years in office, had been mutually agreed upon by the Minister of National Defence and myself, before the Minister informed the Chiefs of Staff that he felt it would be necessary to integrate the services. That was in February 1964. However, as my date was in July I continued in office until a few days before the Chief of the Defence Staff took over on August 1. Thus I was never integrated.

In normal circumstances you would have heard nothing more from me on the subject of defence. However, over the past year it has become increasingly apparent, even to someone outside the services like myself, that things were going badly. The crisis which shook the services last July, resulting in the replacement of the Vice-Chief and two out of three Branch Heads of the Defence Staff, as well as that of three admirals, directly concerned with maritime operations, made it abundantly clear that something had to be done to stop the rot. Otherwise the safety of the country could be endangered. Surely, it would have been wise to have held an inquiry at that time. Most of the evidence that you have heard has been available since last August.

Despite efforts by Members of Parliament and some of their constituents, it has taken over six months for this Committee to be re-convened. In the meantime what should have been a military problem has become intensely political. However we must now get back to the military considerations to work out a satisfactory solution.

You have heard a good deal from naval officers regarding the effects that unification would have on the services, especially on the Navy. This is because the Navy is comparatively small and concentrated but a highly technical serv-

ice. Most of its members carry out their duty on either coast, or at sea; out of sight and out of mind of most Canadians, who have little knowledge of the importance of the sea and ships, because of the vastness of the land.

Unification and the Navy

In 1964, as the Chief of Naval Staff, I urged strongly that all reference to a single unified defence force be deleted from the White Paper, as the subject had not been discussed by the Chiefs of Staff. I appreciated that a single defence force would result in a smaller, less professional Navy than we had then and now. Moreover I did not see how the tasks set out in the White Paper could be carried out by a single force.

The Minister of National Defence, on moving second reading of Bill C-243, re-affirmed the purpose of our defence policy and the tasks of the Armed Forces, to be those stated in the White Paper. So I am still convinced, that the single service proposed in the Bill would be less effective in defending our country and in co-operating with our allies than the three services we have today. Moreover, I can see no point in combining into a single service, at great expense, the three services which have been evolved to operate and fight in three totally different and distinct environments, land, sea and air.

Clearly there are rocks ahead in the case of the Navy. Bill C-243 as written indicates that the single unified service would be basically Army in character. Sooner or later, it would neither attract nor stimulate the professional skills required in a modern navy. Moreover, the Canadian Navy can be expected to lose much of the considerable rapport and close co-operation it enjoys with other navies, notably the U.S. and the British. As General Moncel indicated, the loss of that rapport will cost us millions of dollars and a great deal of goodwill.

Naval support for peace-keeping operations has been successfully provided in the past, whenever required, from a predominantly anti-submarine force. But I am very doubtful, for financial and professional reasons, if we would be able to provide the high quality, anti-submarine force that we now have, from a unified defence force, whose main purpose was to support U.N. peace-keeping operations.

It has been asked, why not concentrate on such a U.N. role and forget about the anti-submarine role? Why are we required to have all this expertise in anti-submarine warfare? Why not turn the maritime forces into supply transport for U.N. peace-keeping?

There are two reasons why we should not do this:

Firstly, because we have a massive submarine threat against us from the sea, a threat which nuclear propulsion in the submarine has magnified in quality many, many times. We know the submarine threat exists in quantity as well. The threat has become graver in recent years with the installation of submarine-launched airborne missiles in nuclear propelled under-sea boats. So long as the Navy is strong, there is the possibility of keeping these boats away from our shores, outside missile range.

The second reason for not withdrawing from the anti-submarine role is because we have agreed to provide anti-submarine forces for N.A.T.O. The White Paper of 1964 makes a strong case for Canadian support for N.A.T.O. and includes maritime forces in being, comprising ships, submarines and aircraft.

Nevertheless, our commitment to N.A.T.O. was reduced from 1 carrier and 43 A/S ships in 1964, to 1 carrier and 28 ships in 1966.

Has our naval contribution to N.A.T.O. been reduced because the threat has decreased, or because we are unable to provide the number of ships we said we would on account of manning difficulties?

I believe that a strong Canada requires a strong Canadian Navy. Although the Minister of National Defence has issued re-assuring statements concerning the Navy's anti-submarine capability, it cannot be denied, that the Navy has been reduced in size and effectiveness since 1964.

The State of the Navy Today

In fact I think that so much damage has been done to the Navy in the last three years, that it will take years to recover from it. I realize the gravity of this statement. I only make it in the hope of preventing a desperate situation from becoming worse. We are confronted by a Minister of National Defence who, in spite of the advice of professional military experts, is determined to re-organize our Armed Forces his way.

The Minister assumed office in April 1963. Here is what has happened to the Navy since that time:

(a) It has been run down by nearly 4,000 men.

(b) The numbers of ships in commission were reduced from 64 in July 1963 to 34 in July 1966. Now, in 1967, we are informed there are only 28 ships left, of which a mere 16 are immediately available.

(c) Several of the best and most experienced officers have been prematurely retired. The top of the naval rank pyramid has been sliced off three or four years early in a youthful service where the retirement age for senior officers is only 55. Canada cannot afford this waste of talent.

(d) After nearly three years, nothing new and substantial seems to have been added to the naval equipment programme except for gas turbine propulsion in the helicopter-destroyers. All the principal items were either under way, or in the planning stage, before the present Minister took office. At least three years have been lost in the ship replacement program and every day that passes without ordering the helicopter-destroyers widens the gap.

The run down of the Navy under integrated command, leads me to conclude that it would continue to diminish in size and effectiveness as part of a unified service. This is largely because there is no one at the top level who really understands maritime warfare and the requirements of the Navy.

The Composition of the Defence Council

The Minister of National Defence, in his speech on December 7, 1966, described the composition of the Defence Council. As now constituted, the Defence Council, in my view, is out of balance and is unlikely to provide the professional military advice needed on behalf of the three services. The Defence Council, a policy-making body, considers proposals and makes decisions on important military matters. As you are aware the Council consists of four

civilians and two military representatives. Thus the senior military policy group is over-loaded with civilians and one service must always be left out.

From the morale point of view, every person in any of the services wants to feel that there is someone at the top level who understands his problems, and to whom he can turn for assistance or guidance as a last appeal. Thus it really is essential to have a professional head of service, designated as such, and holding a senior appointment in the policy-making group. The lack of informed naval representation is a serious deficiency in the present Defence Council.

The foregoing view is also shared by Lord Mountbatten. We discussed the matter in his office in London in June 1964. Mountbatten also considered that in the foreseeable future there should be individual services, in distinctive uniforms. I recently saw a letter from General Eisenhower, in which he wrote of the importance of the services retaining their identities, each with its own uniform.

The Need for a Full Inquiry

The evidence that has been given here, in recent days, clearly indicates that there are some important problems resulting from integration which remain to be solved; for example, in the personnel and logistics fields and also in some of the functional commands.

I realize that it would be extremely difficult to carry out a thorough inquiry at this late date. Nevertheless, I do not see how these problems can be studied properly without such an inquiry. With all due respect to the Committee, I think it will take weeks, perhaps months, and you should have a working group of experts to assist you. Would it be helpful if you were to go to the men who are serving and find out for yourselves what the personnel at major bases in Canada and abroad think about the present situation?

The people of Canada rely on their elected representatives as well as on the military to see to it that the country is adequately defended. This is a matter which affects every man, woman and child and generations yet to come. It has proved difficult to interest the general public in this matter, partly because the Armed Forces are a comparatively small section of the population, who cannot strike or engage in collective bargaining. In addition, the vast majority of the public take their defence for granted in the same way that they take the police force and other protective services for granted. However, thanks to the hearings before this Committee and the reporting of them by the news media, interest is increasing and the public is becoming aware of the facts.

Hitherto the politicians and the military have worked together quietly and effectively to provide for the defence of Canada. In the last three years, however, events show that the politicians have been deciding military matters with little regard for the views of the experts. Unless we can return to a team effort by the politicians and the military, the strength of our country is going to suffer badly. None of us wishes this to happen.

So I suggest that the Committee during its study of Bill C-243 should also arrange to:

1. assess the results of integration to date;
2. review the objectives of Canadian defence policy and the roles of the Armed Forces therein;

3. examine the requirement for unification in the light of the above and make recommendations concerning the Canadian organization for defence.

I am sure that the findings and recommendations resulting from such an inquiry would, no matter how long it takes, be more acceptable to most people concerned with the strength and safety of Canada, than would be recommendations arrived at hastily, under pressure, to meet a parliamentary deadline.

Conclusions

In 1964 I advised the Government that I had found it impossible to estimate the savings that the Minister of National Defence claimed could be made through integration, because there was no plan on which to base an estimate. I also advised that the operational effectiveness of the Navy would suffer as a result of the reorganisation. From the evidence that I have heard here, it seems very doubtful if real savings have been made through integration by itself. Clearly, the operational effectiveness of the Navy has suffered.

In 1966 the Minister of National Defence was advised by his senior military advisers that the time was not right to force on with unification; that the Minister's schedule was much too rapid; and that the existing state of the Forces would be worsened, by the additional burden of another organizational upheaval. Despite these talented and experienced officers maintaining their views at the cost of their careers, the Minister has persisted in his attempt to lead Parliament and the Nation up the garden path to the Utopia of Unification.

Gentlemen in my view this is a shocking and unprecedented state of affairs. I think this is the most serious challenge to national security that has confronted Parliament in recent years. In potential harm, it towers above two previous security incidents; the Spencer and Munsinger cases which rocked Parliament last year.

Previous witnesses have emphasized the great importance of naval identity, naval ranks and naval uniforms. I hold the same view and consider these outward and visible signs are essential to maintaining a high esprit de corps in the sea service. It would cost nothing to retain naval identity and its retention would save a great deal of unnecessary resentment. As it is now written, Bill C-243 adversely affects the Navy and, therefore, the overall security of the country. Surely, the responsibility for doing something positive to remove the doubts and dismay which have resulted from the untimely approval in principle of Bill C-243 now rests with this Committee.

I earnestly hope that you will amend Bill C-243 so as to maintain the separate identities of the Services and enable them to be organized and integrated to provide Canada with the best possible defence posture. Thank you.

Mr. WINCH: Mr. Chairman, I just have one question that I would like to ask the Admiral because we have heard so much about it in the past 40 sittings of this Committee since the bill was referred to us. We have often been told of the reduction in the number of ships in the navy and, in particular, under the control of the Maritime Command. I notice that the Admiral also brings that out on page 5 of his brief. I know it would help me, and I think it would help other members of the Committee too, if you could tell us of any relationship of correlation in

having a certain number of ships at sea or available for active service four and ten years ago; with a lesser number at sea ready for active service now, with the changes of the new equipment; the depth sonar, the helicopter, the change in engines, the change of equipment, the change of munitions, the change of armament. Personally I do not think that just the number of ships is the answer and I am wondering, from all your experience, whether you will go beyond just saying there were so many ships in such and such a year, there are so many ships now; therefore, we are worse off. Could you give us the relationship on the ability to perform now, with all the changes, compared with the number of ships that we have?

Mr. RAYNER: Mr. Winch, I could not give you a mathematical relationship.

Mr. WINCH: There is some bearing; that is what I want to get at.

Mr. RAYNER: This is so. First of all, in answer to your question, I would like to point out that in 1964, 18, of the 20 modern AS ships that we had, were in commission—18 out of 20. One was added in the spring of 1964, and the second was added in the fall of 1964. So, the modern fleet was much the same as it is now, the *Provider* was commissioned—and she has been mentioned to the Committee before —in October, 1963. So all that has been added to the fleet since 1964 are two AS vessels, and these were actually steaming before the end of 1964. In addition, we were manning other ships which were reasonably efficient. We had heard that the frigates were obsolete, but the fact has not come out that these frigates were all modernized between about 1954 and 1959. They were perfectly good AS ships. They are not in the same class as the AS escorts—our *St. Laurents* and *Restigouches*—but they are a great deal better than nothing, and certainly if the Navy had the men to man them, I am sure that both those ships would be manned today.

You see, the whole picture has changed completely since 1963 with regard to commitments. When I came into my last position in 1960, it was, made very clear to me by my predecessor that my job—one of my principle concerns—was to keep the carrier and 43 AS escorts available for NATO, and the Navy split its guts to do this. They did amazingly well. We had a requirement for 23,000 men, and we did this with about 21,000, and this is the reason why men were spending long periods at sea. They were flat out to maintain this commitment.

Now, after 1963, when the present administration came into power, the whole picture changed. I am not clear what happened, but we were just told, more or less, "well, provide what you can." This is why the commitment has slipped in 1966 to a carrier and 26 ships. There is no question about it, if we had a Navy of 21,720 now, as we had in October 1963, we would be manning just about the same number of ships now, provided we were given enough money to keep them seen to. We would be manning about the same number of ships now as we were then, in my view.

Now, there is another point. The ships that are being manned today are not being fully manned, I am told. I have not been looking for information from the services, but the information has been flowing to me, both in Halifax and from Canadian Forces Headquarters here, and I am told that the manning plan for this Summer—and you will be able to verify this with the defence officials or I can tell you what I am told—is to man our new destroyer escorts with 75 per cent of

complement. The operational complement of a destroyer escort equipped with a helicopter is about 230, and the plan is to provide about 175 men for those ships. Now, those ships will not be as effective with a three-quarter complement on board as they would be with a full operational complement.

And what is more, I am also told that the navy is so short of men that very few courses have been scheduled this summer, between May and October, because the men are required to serve on the ships required for centennial visits. All very right and proper, but the result of cutting back the courses for five or six months is certainly going to be felt in the months ahead. Have I answered your question, Mr. Winch?

Mr. WINCH: Yes, thank you. You were Flag Officer, stationed at Esquimalt, and I believe you said you were Flag Officer around the time that integration of Maritime Command came in. Were you in support of the integration policy?

Mr. RAYNER: Oh, very much so.

Mr. WINCH: Do you think it worked out?

Mr. RAYNER: Yes, very well.

Mr. WINCH: Is it unification you oppose, but not integration?

Mr. RAYNER: I oppose unification on the grounds which I mentioned in my brief.

Mr. WINCH: Where do you stand on integration?

Mr. RAYNER: I think a great deal can be said for integration. I think a lot of good will come as a result of it, but I think the top defence structure—the Defence Council—is out of balance, as I have explained.

Mr. WINCH: That is, on the Council, for example?

Mr. RAYNER: Yes, on the Council.

Mr. WINCH: I have just one more question. I note on page 9 you make three suggestions. The second is:

> 2. review the objectives of Canadian defence policy and the roles of the Armed Forces therein;

I ask you, in making that a very positive statement in your presentation, whether from your experience it is your belief that the present plans for the organization and operation of the Canadian armed forces cannot be effective unless the role of the Canadian armed forces is first outlined? Is that what you meant by that?

Mr. RAYNER: Yes, that is so.

Mr. WINCH: You do not think that our present commitments, all told, can be kept unless there is a new outline of our role in the situation, as you see it?

Mr. RAYNER: I do not think our role and tasks as outlined in the White Paper of 1964, can be carried out by a single service. I think, if you are going to have a single service, the role should be redefined.

Mr. WINCH: I am going to say this, sir; I have noticed that you have not missed, I think, one of our 41 meetings so far. Do I take it you agree with

General Moncel that to meet all commitments under this plan would require an expenditure of over $2 billion and a task force of 150,000 in the armed services?

Mr. RAYNER: Well, I have not tried to figure it out, but I would accept General Moncel's figures, yes.

Mr. WINCH: That is all. Thank you, Admiral Rayner.

The CHAIRMAN: I have Mr. Nugent, followed by Mr. Forrestall, followed by Mr. McIntosh. I am delighted to see that Mr. Winch's question ran just a bare ten minutes—a model of conciseness and brevity.

Mr. NUGENT: Mr. Chairman, I am interested in the remarks on page 1 of the brief, and the later remarks on planning. The statement that caught my eye about two-thirds of the way down on page 1 is:

> —before the Minister informed the Chiefs of Staff that he felt it would be necessary to integrate the services.

And later on, at the top of page 3:

> —the subject had not been discussed by the Chiefs of Staff.

Now, I believe the Minister made this statement public in 1964. Do I gather that there had not even been discussions with the Chiefs of Staff—never mind any planning—concerning how it would be brought about or what it meant?

Mr. RAYNER: Mr. Nugent, perhaps I should explain some of the background in answering your question. The Minister and the Chiefs of Staff made a very comprehensive review of the role and task of the armed forces in the fall of 1963. Having reached conclusions on the role and task, the next problem was to work out the kind of equipment program we should go ahead with over the next ten years in order to carry out the role and task.

While this study had been going on, a great deal of time had been spent on the equipment program. There was a financial limitation on this. We were told we could expect about $1.5 billion to be the amount of money that would be available—constant dollars. Having worked out the equipment program, it became obvious—I am just speaking from memory now—that we would need an average expenditure of about $1.7 billion, and the problem was to bridge the gap.

One day the Minister said he felt that the only way to bridge the gap and find that $.2 billion per year over ten years would be to integrate the services. Certainly there was some discussion of integration, but it became apparent very quickly—certainly to me—that the decision had been taken to integrate the services. I could not disagree with this because I had been brought up, more or less, as an integrated officer; I helped to integrate Royal Roads; I served as co-ordinator of the joint staff; I helped to establish the first integrated command in Pacific. Therefore, all this seemed entirely logical, but what disturbed me was the fact that we were going to go into this with no plan whatsoever. Of course, it was indicated in the White Paper that, in fact, there would be no plan; that it would be worked out as we went along. I was disturbed by this, and I was very disturbed by that sentence in the White Paper to the effect that the end objective was a single unified service. I had no doubts of what a single unified service meant; I had always assumed it would be one service with one uniform and a loss of identity to the three services we now have. This question was not

discussed by the Chiefs of Staff. The sentence was put in the White Paper and, as I have explained, I tried to persuade the government to take it out for the reasons I have tried to indicate. I must admit that at the time I thought it was years away, and I think everyone else did too.

Mr. NUGENT: We have had considerable evidence, Admiral, that integration —with which you said you were in agreement—was a series of experiments. General Allard told us they are separate; for example, the Training Command experiment could be reversed without touching any of the others. Was it your understanding that this series of experiments would be tried one by one, or as far as practical and that, in fact, there was no firm decision that everything would have to go as originally planned? In other words, were those plans somewhat flexible?

Mr. RAYNER: My understanding was that the plans were flexible. As stated, the first step would be to set up an integrated staff with one commander—the Chief of the Defence Staff—at headquarters and to integrate the headquarters. The second step would be to establish the functional command, and when these staffs had been established and were fully effective, then—and then only—would we go forward to unification. Now, I may say that this was stated after the White Paper was published, and this is where I feel very strongly and sincerely that the Minister of National Defence is not keeping faith with the services.

In the letter of April 2, which has been quoted a great deal here, it states very clearly that the staffs would have to be established and fully effective before the services moved into the third and final step which would be unification of the services. We had not reached that stage. Although I have not discussed it with the officers who have appeared before you, I am sure in my own mind that is really the reason they resigned. It was too soon, and the undertaking had not been honoured. When those paragraphs from the Minister's letter of April 2 were quoted in the Minister's speech in the House of Commons on December 2, those undertakings were left out. There was a row of dots to indicate that something had been left out and, what is more, those undertakings have been carefully left out in any reference to those paragraphs in this Committee.

Mr. NUGENT: Admiral, I would like to pursue the idea of the experimental aspect of the steps of integration. It is something that has been bothering me. Would I be correct in assuming that everybody felt that some of these steps of integration should be tried, but the extent to which they would go would depend on how well they proved out?

Mr. RAYNER: Yes, absolutely.

Mr. NUGENT: We have had considerable evidence that many of these steps of integration are still very much in the experimental stage—the logistics branch for instance—and that much of it is still being planned. Would it be fair to say that your objections to unification might disappear three, four or five years from now if these experiments in integration were completed and all had worked out as expected, and there were a plan for unification which showed a possibility of success? Would you at that point reconsider your views on unification?

Mr. RAYNER: Yes, indeed I would. I have a feeling that I would be adverse to unification until such time as I saw our allies embarking on the same course, and

also until I saw some common weapons system being used in all three elements. As long as we have distinct weapons systems for the three different environments, I really do not see the point in trying to have a single service. Certainly I would be very much happier if these experiments in integration had worked out. I hate the word "experiment". This word "experiment" was in the White Paper to start with, and I thought it was very wrong that it should be there, because when you blithely say "experiment", the "experiment" concerns 120,000 servicemen and 50,000 civilians and when you add their dependents to that, you are getting close to half a million people. Now, is this right, in a democratic country, to cold-bloodedly experiment with nearly half a million people?

Mr. NUGENT: Well, sir I will not argue that point with you, but the reason I thought it was called an experiment was because while plans can be made, it is only when you start to bring your plans into effect that you find out whether they work; sometimes they have to be revised. I thought the reason it was called an experiment was in the context that it was a new and untried venture which might have to be reversed. I understand further that each one of these plans of integration was a separate experiment.

Mr. RAYNER: No, I would think it was all part of the whole.

Mr. NUGENT: A general reorganization.

Mr. RAYNER: Yes, a general reorganization.

Mr. NUGENT: But each one was separately staged, was it not?

Mr. RAYNER: Well, there were three principal stages. The first was the integration of the staff at headquarters, as I mentioned and the second was the establishment of the functional command. These functional commands have not yet proved out. Admiral Landymore referred to Materiel Command in his brief, and he suggested that the Committee hear from Admiral Burchell. A briefing was given to you by General Lilley and his chief on the Devil program, but this is not the study that Admiral Landymore is talking about. Admiral Burchell is being engaged on another study, so I am told, to ascertain whether Materiel Command is really necessary. There is also a rumour that the conclusions are about to be reached, and it is very doubtful that Materiel Command is necessary. I think this is an important question. Perhaps the Committee should hear from Admiral Burchell, and find out whether or not this is true.

Mr. NUGENT: I think that is what Admiral Landymore referred to as the FALLEX study.

Mr. RAYNER: The FALLEX study is another one. FALLEX was a NATO exercise to test the forces and the organization of the forces for NATO. I think Admiral Landymore was referring to the analysis of the lessons learned during FALLEX.

Mr. NUGENT: We have had so much emphasis on speed here, sir, that that is why I wanted to clarify, if I could, our present position, and Materiel Command seems to be part of it, where the evidence is that we are still in the planning stage of part of the integration scheme. Is that correct?

Mr. RAYNER: Yes, I believe so.

Mr. NUGENT: In your opinion, how long would you have expected it to take to work out that experiment with, or the integration of, Materiel Command, before you could say that it had been given a full test?

Mr. RAYNER: I have no opinion, I am afraid. I would accept Air Marshal Annis's estimate on that.

Mr. NUGENT: At the top of page 6 this sentence appears:

> We are confronted by a Minister of National Defence who, in spite of the advice of professional military experts, is determined to re-organize our Armed Forces his way.

You have told us that the chiefs of staff did not discuss unification with him. Where was the minister getting his advice? Do you know?

Mr. RAYNER: I have no idea.

Mr. NUGENT: When you say:

> —in spite of the advice of professional military experts—

do I gather that you are referring to the top planners who usually advise the Minister, and that when you were there, the consensus among those usual advisers was contrary to what the Minister was determined to do?

Mr. RAYNER: I had in mind here the events of last July, when General Moncel, General Fleury, and Air Marshal Annis, I suppose, before them, and Admiral Dyer differed with the Minister on how the unification program should proceed.

I also had in mind the evidence given by Admiral Landymore when he referred to a meeting of commanders in June, 1965 at NDHQ. At that meeting the Minister announced that there would be a common uniform, a common rank structure and a single service by the 1st of July, 1967. After that meeting Admiral Landymore asked the chief of personnel what he knew about this, and the chief of personnel, who was a member of the defence staff, said that he knew nothing about it. Now, this, to my mind, is an amazing state of affairs, because the chief of personnel is responsible for uniforms, morale and the discipline of the forces.

Mr. NUGENT: There is certainly evidence before us that all these responsible people knew nothing about the planning, or had no part in it; that they did not give that advice, if you if these people were not giving the Minister advice, can tell us, who then would be qualified to do so? Was there anybody left there who was qualified to give him advice on which he could have been acting, or was he acting without any military advice at all?

Mr. RAYNER: I could not say. Those are the people who should be giving the advice.

Mr. NUGENT: Thank you.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Admiral, I am very concerned with two areas, and whether or not I take my ten minutes will depend, I suppose, on your answers.

The first area of my concern is about what you say in your brief about the speed and the necessity, as you term it, for a reassessment of integration. I do not want to put words in your mouth, or to lead you, but you suggest in your second suggestion on page 9 that the Committee in its study should:

review the objectives of Canadian defence policy and the roles of the Armed Froces therein;

Can you foresee Canada substantially changing its ASW commitment, or role, within the framework of NATO within the next two years, in light of what you possibly may know and in light of the very public knowledge about the build-up of the underwater force, which you indeed dealt with briefly in your brief? Can we withdraw?

Mr. RAYNER: I would hope not, because Canada has been making a very important contribution to the AS forces of NATO in both the Atlantic and Pacific oceans.

In the Pacific, when we had the 14 escorts out there—seven modern destroyer escorts and seven frigates—we had the finest anti-submarine escort force of California.

In the Atlantic we are depended upon to patrol and to keep at bay intruders in a large section of the North Atlantic. If we do not have the ships to do this, or withdraw from it because we are going to put the money into other forces, we will leave a gap which will have to be filled. It is a very important gap—our northeast coast and our northwest coast.

Mr. FORRESTALL: In other words, Admiral, you do not think—

Mr. RAYNER: May I just add that I am not thinking of coastlines when I say "coast". I am thinking of ocean areas—that enormous ocean area from the east coast of Canada across to somewhere south of Greenland. All that area is on the great circle route. All shipping from Europe to North America passes through that area. It is a very attractive area for submarines. This is our responsibility to NATO.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Well, this is what I am getting at. My question was based on an article which appears in the 1967 Naval Review of the United States Naval Institute. It was written by Mr. Herrick, and I gather that these figures are quite up to date. He supplements Jane's figures from sources of his own. On page 23 he says, in part, and I shall just read it briefly:

> Of the 375 modern Soviet submarines, 50 are reported to be of the limited-range . . . suitable only for operations in coastal waters and in the Baltic—

and so on—

> —where they are used mostly for training and experimental work. After subtracting the 50 coastal and the 77 missile sumbarines from the 375 figures, there remain 248, and these are believed to be medium-and-long-range torpedo-attack submarines, including 12 with nuclear propulsion. During the nuclear exchange, these 248 boats, along with other suitable forces, would probably be used in efforts to forestall strikes by NATO carrier forces and Polaris submarines. Then, should the war be protracted, whatever number of these 248 submarines was not required for the continuing large defensive tasks against the carriers, the Polaris submarines, the regular torpedo-attack submarines, and the amphibious forces of NATO, could be used against the shipping of the Free World.

He goes on to indicate in this article that about 145 or 150 of these, apart from the few that they keep in a strategic position to move either into the Atlantic or the Pacific, are geared to operation in our northern waters.

That is a substantial number of underwater craft, and inasmuch as Canada certainly lies closest to this potential threat—although there is no indication that there is a threat—I am wondering whether you can conceive in your mind—I certainly cannot in mine—our abandoning furtherance of our ASW capability in the face of this? There is every indication that it is continuing to grow in spite of rumours that there will be a levelling off in Soviet building of submarines.

How could we do it in terms of our commitments to our allies and to NATO countries? Can you foresee how we could do it, or whether, in fact, we could do it?

Mr. RAYNER: Well, briefly, no, I cannot. As long as we are a member of NATO and as long as we are allied with the United States, I think we would be completely irresponsible if we abandoned our commitments.

Mr. FORRESTALL: The United States, in any event, could not and they are not planning, or even remotely thinking of, the abandonment of their commitments, in their own self-interest. They are continuing the development of their ASW capacity in the event that we are, as you suggest, losing a certain amount of our effectiveness. Do you foresee the United States stepping in to fill this gap?

Mr. RAYNER: I think they would have to, because it is a very important strategic area in both the Atlantic and the Pacific. Now, at the time of Cuba, in October 1962, when the President sent that ultimatum to the Russians, the United States had to assume that the Russian submarine force would proceed to war stations. We had to assume that also, and, in fact, speaking from memory, I think we actually sailed about 29 ships from Halifax out to war stations within a few hours. They patrolled there for as long as the crisis lasted.

The fact that we were able to deploy those ships off our northeastern approaches meant that the United States did not have to send ships into that area. But certainly if we had not been able to get our ships there, they would have sent theirs if they had them.

Mr. FORRESTALL: In that type of situation it is quite logical. We are closer to any foreseeable battle ground in the Atlantic. I think Rhode Island, or Connecticut would perhaps be the—

Mr. RAYNER: There is a U.S. submarine base in New London.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Yes; in New London, Connecticut. We would be a day's sailing closer to the North Atlantic than they are. Is that right?

Mr. RAYNER: Yes, we would.

I would just like to follow that up a little. I have talked about our sending our ships, but, of course, of equal importance were our long-range maritime aircraft. They were flying patrols over this area. We were co-operating with the United States navy and their ships in this effort.

Mr. FORRESTALL: What I am concerned about is that in the event—and God forbid that it happens—that what you suggest became an apparent tendency towards the lessening of our responsibility towards this role, perhaps the Americans might go so far as to come up and settle into our bases and structures

here. The question is whether or not you think that this ASW—this underwater potential threat—is serious enough to leave the United States in a position where they had no alternative but seriously to consider such a move, or to stay where they were and remain an extra day's sailing away. Would it not be much cheaper to come back and perhaps reactivate Argentia, or some place like that, and again move back into Canada for at least staging depots and refueling and supplying deposits closer to the potential interception area?

Mr. RAYNER: Of course this was what happened in World War II. The Americans established bases, as you know, at Stephenville in Newfoundland; at Argentia, for the navy, on the south coast of Newfoundland; at Goose Bay on the coast of Labrador. Certainly if we bowed out of this I would think they would certainly ask—I am not going to commit myself to saying what the Americans would do, because obviously I do not know—but as a military person I would be very surprised if they would not be knocking on the door of the Minister of External Affairs and asking for approval to use our bases.

Mr. FORRESTALL: That is all for now, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Admiral, referring to your brief, at the top of page 3, in the last sentence in the first paragraph you say:

> Moreover I did not see how the tasks set out in the White Paper could be carried out by a single force.

When Mr. Winch questioned you on part of this you said that you had hoped that the plan would be redefined; but at the top of page 10, under "Conclusions", your first sentence is:

> In 1964 I advised the Government that I had found it impossible to estimate the savings that the Minister of National Defence claimed could be made through integration, because there was no plan on which to base an estimate.

Now, how can a plan be redefined if there is no plan?

Mr. RAYNER: I am sorry; I did not follow you in the first part of the question, on the definition of the plan.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I am referring to the top of page 3, the last sentence in the first paragraph. You requoted this to Mr. Winch in one of your answers to prove a point. Then you said that you hoped that the plan would be redefined. At the top of page 10 you say there was no plan.

Mr. RAYNER: There is a misunderstanding here. I think I was referring to the task rather than the plan.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Was there a plan prior to the White Paper, or even after the White Paper, on which to develop the plan of unification that you understood?

Mr. RAYNER: There was no plan, prior to the publication of the White Paper, for the integration of the services, to the best of my knowledge. This fact is stated quite clearly in the White Paper.

Again, one was amazed that this did not seem to alarm people at all—the fact we were going into this fundamental reorganization with no plan. But it was, as I say, stated in the White Paper.

After the White Paper was published, well, of course, we immediately started planning the kind of organization we would set up in national defence headquarters.

Mr. McINTOSH: The type of organization you would set up in national defence headquarters. But were any studies made on the man requirements or on the cost requirements of such a plan?

Mr. RAYNER: Not before the White Paper was published.

Mr. McINTOSH: Well, was there after, to your knowledge? This is what we find amazing, that you said that you understood what the single service concept meant, that you understood that the dual role meant that we were going into peace-restoring, but that there were no studies made on what our requirements would be if we continued our present commitments plus the new role.

Now, in a planning stage it seems to me unthinkable that you do not first of all find out how many men you require and what will be the cost to the Canadian taxpayer. Was this not done?

Mr. RAYNER: Well, the planning to which I am referring, which took place after publication of the White Paper, was for the reorganization of national defence headquarters on an integrated basis. That is as far as it went while I was in the service. While I was in the service there was no planning whatsoever for unification. Most people did not think that it would come along for several years.

Mr. McINTOSH: But integration, as I understand it, deals only with our supply and our administrative forces, not with our combat troops at all? That is integration.

Mr. RAYNER: Oh, it deals with the command that controls this—

Mr. McINTOSH: Yes; the command.

Mr. RAYNER: —operation; very much so.

Mr. McINTOSH: But as you understood unification it also meant the combination, or the amalgamation, of the three services?

Mr. RAYNER: This is so.

Mr. McINTOSH: Did you at any time suggest to the Minister that we could not carry out our present commitments with such a service?

Mr. RAYNER: The question never arose as far as I am concerned because the single unified service was just a phrase in the White Paper. It was just a phrase in the White Paper. There had been no planning for it before the White Paper was issued. There was no planning for it after the White Paper was issued, while I was in the service. We were too busy planning the reorganization on an integrated basis.

Mr. McINTOSH: When Air Marshal Sharp gave his paper to the Committee he said that there were only two courses open to the Minister for his planning. You also mentioned a few moments ago that the Minister, during a conversation with you, said—I forget whether you said "to save funds" or "live within the budget"—that the only alternative was to put in this unification program.

Now, I have made reference on several occasions to other plans that were available to the Minister if his staff had put them before him. Did you not, in

your position as Chief of the Naval Staff, suggest to the Minister plans other than this unification, or single service concept, which would still keep within the budget?

Mr. RAYNER: It was obvious what could be done apart from going to integration. As there was only $1.5 billion available, to my mind the honest thing to have done would have been to say to the forces: "You will have to get along with 100,000 men. Now show me how to run the forces with 100,000 men. I would also like to have an integrated staff at headquarters with a single chief of defence staff". If something such as that had been done I am sure that the senior officers at NDHQ would have produced an answer as quickly as they possibly could.

I do want to emphasize that the officers at NDHQ, General's Moncel and Fleury and all their subordinates, worked like blacks to make integration work. They put forward a prodigious effort to make it work. They were achieving fine results until the Minister decided that he was going to go straight ahead with unification regardless. That threw a spanner in the works.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Well, Admiral, I am trying to divorce integration from unification. To me they are two different subjects. Integration has nothing to do with unification.

You said that it was obvious to everyone. Apparently it was not obvious to the Minister, or he would not have gone ahead with his plan.

Was it not your duty, and that of the other military personnel on his staff, to advise him of this? I am trying to find out what his reaction was when that advice was given to him?

Mr. RAYNER: The reaction was to tell me that 90 per cent of the people in the navy were for integration.

Mr. MCINTOSH: For integration?

Mr. RAYNER: Yes.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Do you mean integration in terms of—

Mr. RAYNER: Unification was not discussed. This sounds ridiculous at this point, but the reason that I advised and urged the government to take out that unfortunate phrase in the White Paper "single unified service" was not because I thought we were going to have a single unified service in the next ten years or so. I may sound very naive, but the reason I urged the government to take it out was because I thought it something which would prove of considerable embarrassment to them later on. I had visions, in about two or three years, of someone reading the White Paper and saying: "Oi! Single unified service? What has happened to that? When are we going to have this single unified service?" That is the reason I urged them to take it out.

Mr. MCINTOSH: What was their answer to you, Admiral, on why they did not take it out, on why they left it in?

Mr. RAYNER: Well, the answer was that it was left in.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Did they give any particular reason for leaving it in? Did they convey any reason to you?

Mr. RAYNER: I do not remember a definitive answer.

Mr. McINTOSH: Well, was any suggestion made during your term on the Minister's staff that we opt out of some of our defensive commitments at the present time?

Mr. RAYNER: No.

Mr. McINTOSH: That is end of my questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. RAYNER: I would just like to qualify that. It was agreed that we would dispense with the minesweeping commitment and our minesweepers were laid up because of lack of funds.

Mr. MACINNIS: I have a supplementary question. Did you not state earlier, in answer to a question, that the matter of commitments was left to the navy, or whatever service was involved, to carry them out with the capabilities that they had available; that rather than to meet full commitments they were to do the best they could with what they had? Was this not the understanding?

Mr. RAYNER: It was not stated just in that way. It was made clear that numbers did not matter.

Mr. BYRNE: Admiral Rayner, I think that I am quoting you substantially correctly when I say that your statement was that something happened in 1963 following the advent of the new administration. Is that substantilaly what you said? You were referring, I believe, to your manning problem.

Mr. RAYNER: I was referring to the changed attitude towards NATO commitments.

Mr. BYRNE: Towards NATO commitments?

Mr. RAYNER: Towards NATO commitments.

Mr. BYRNE: You were not referring in any way to the manning problem?

Mr. RAYNER: Well, the manning problems are part of it. As I explained earlier, we had been maintaining 43 ships at sea—at least, ready for sea—and the necessary training programs to keep up that force. The number of men we needed to do that was about 23,000, speaking from memory. When I assumed office in 1960 our strength was 20,720, again speaking from memory.

Mr. BYRNE: Your annual recruitment would be how many?

Mr. RAYNER: Well, to maintain those numbers we would need about 3,600 men a year; about 300 a month. We kept those numbers up. In fact, we had been growing since the middle 'fifties.

Mr. BYRNE: Until 1963?

Mr. RAYNER: No, we actually hit 20,720, again speaking from memory, about 1958; but as the new ships came along—

Mr. HARKNESS: That was your total authorized strength?

Mr. RAYNER: This was our total authorized strength.

Mr. HARNESS: You could not recruit beyond that?

Mr. RAYNER: That is so; thank you, Mr. Harkness.

Mr. BYRNE: But is it your assertion that your recruiting problems began in 1963?

Mr. RAYNER: I would like to get back to this manning problem. As our new destroyer escorts came along to replace older ships in the fleet the manning requirement increased. For instance, a frigate requires a crew of about 160, and a new destroyer escort requires a crew of about 230, so that our manning requirement was increasing. We had asked for more men, but we did not get approval for that until the Berlin crisis in 1961 and the Minister was then able to get approval for another 1,760 men for the navy, to enable us to bring all our ships up to operational strength. Recruiting was stepped up. We got the men; and by October, 1963 we had come up to 21,720. This was with the additional men that we got as a result of the Berlin crisis. But we still needed about 23,000. I had asked for the 23,000-plus from the present Minister. But by June or August of 1963 it was quite clear that there were going to have to be some cuts made in the forces; so that the increase, understandably, was not allowed.

Mr. BYRNE: Do I understand you to say that your basic problem is men? Do you consider that unification is creating your manning difficulties?

Mr. RAYNER: You say "your manning difficulties", Mr. Byrne. You must remember that I left the navy two and a half years ago.

Mr. BYRNE: Well, in 1963, when you were still there, were you having difficulties?

Mr. RAYNER: We were having no difficulties with recruiting.

Mr. BYRNE: When did the difficulty in recruiting begin to develop?

Mr. RAYNER: I would think it was in 1965.

Mr. BYRNE: Not until then?

Mr. RAYNER: We had no difficulty in keeping our numbers up to strength from the early 'fifties onward; certainly until 1964; and this despite the fact that we had the highest sea-shore ratio of any of the larger navies. It was too high. We were asking too much of the troops. The reason for it was in order to keep up our commitment to NATO.

Mr. BYRNE: Are you assuming that those officers who are presently in command consider that unification is hampering their recruiting program?

Mr. RAYNER: Oh, unquestionably. It is not the question of unification; it is the uncertainty about the future of the service. A great many people in the navy today, particularly amongst the officers, see that the navy is going to become considerably smaller and of less importance under unification.

Mr. BYRNE: Do you not think, Admiral Rayner, that there is some relation between recruiting in the navy, army and air force, and to the employment situation today—or, it would be, the unemployment situation in 1962, 1963, and 1964?

Mr. RAYNER: Oh, it makes recruiting more difficult; but all I would point out again is that starting at the time of Korea, when I think the navy had about 10,000 or 11,000 when we were able to expand from that to 21,720 over a ten-year period, and there were good periods of employment ashore during that time, as well as some anxious ones.

Mr. BYRNE: How were the amenities? Were they comfortable?

Mr. RAYNER: The amenities improved as time went on. They have become better since 1964, I am glad to say. Nonetheless, the spirt of the navy was such in those times, as I say, that we expanded despite some of the difficulties.

Mr. BYRNE: You say that the uncertainty prevailing is affecting the recruiting. Do you not think that much of the uncertainty is due to the very situation that we are in today, that nothing is really being done until we have this legislation through so that everyone will know exactly where they stand?

Mr. RAYNER: I think the uncertainty is caused in large measure by changes in plans. To give you an example of what I mean, in the spring of 1964—in April—the Minister of National Defence went to Esquimalt and talked to the sailors there. He was questioned on interchangeability. He explained that he did not see why an army cook could not cook just as well at sea as he could ashore; and similarly, with a radar technician, he did not see why any air force radar technician could not serve just as well at sea in a ship as he could on an RCAF station.

He was asked questions about uniforms and he said: "Well, take the case of the Bonaventure, for example. When you have soldiers and airmen and sailors all on the *Bonaventure* and have them all falling in in these different uniforms . . ."—he did not use the word "'potmess', but that is what we would say in the navy, whatever expression he used—. . . what a horrible looking sight this would be." He said at that point, "I am sure the demand will arise from the services for a common uniform. I will not impose a common uniform on the service. I will wait until the desire comes from the services." Yet, in June 1965 the Minister said to the defence staff: "We will have a common uniform by July 1967". However, it is not in the bill—

Mr. BYRNE: This is the point.

Mr. RAYNER: This just illustrates that when you change the rules men lose confidence.

Mr. BYRNE: It was at this point in 1965 that unification became an issue then?

Mr. RAYNER: I would think so, yes. The only evidence I have on this is what has been presented to the Committee.

Mr. BYRNE: Is it since then that the ships have gone down from, did you say, 48 to 16 because of manning problems?

Mr. RAYNER: No; they started to go down in 1963 because the chiefs of staff were told that the budget had to be cut. We had to make certain reductions. In the navy we laid up ten minesweepers. It was either a case of laying up AS vessels or minesweepers. We needed the minesweepers. There is a mine threat. But the anti-submarine threat was the number one priority. It was a choice between the two, and we laid up the minesweepers.

Mr. BYRNE: Then this shortfall has been caused more by government policy on expenditure than by the proposal of unification,—which only raised its ugly head. . . ?

Mr. RAYNER: Two years later.

Mr. BYRNE: That is all.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Lambert is next, followed by Mr. Churchill and by Mr. Harkness.

Mr. LAMBERT: At page 4 of your brief, Admiral Rayner, you refer to a subject that General Moncel spoke about at some considerable length, in reply to questions by Mr. MacLean, at page 1320 of the reports for February 20th. That is the question of rapport with our allied forces, particularly the British and the Americans. You put in the phrase:

> As General Moncel indicated, the loss of that rapport will cost us millions of dollars and a great deal of goodwill.

Would you elaborate on what you consider to be the necessary rapport between the Canadian forces and their counterparts in Britain and the United States? Perhaps you could limit yourself to the navy, if you wish.

Mr. RAYNER: Well, Mr. Lambert, surely it is essential that the senior officers of our forces are able to speak with authority on professional subjects to the senior officers of the other forces. I will not limit this to senior officers; it goes all the way down when ships and fleets get together. Hitherto, the RCN officers have known their opposite numbers, from admirals down, in the USN and the Royal Navy. This has been a tremendous advantage.

Mr. LAMBERT: In what way?

Mr. RAYNER: Well, for instance, when we acquired the submarine *Grilse* we acquired her on loan from the USN for five years. I think she is still on the west coast. I forget what cost of that was, but we got her for practically the cost of the refit—say $1 million, which is a bargain price for an operational submarine. This was done because the USN are keenly interested in seeing our AS forces develop.

We put something into the pot, too. For example, our Defence Research Board scientists developed variable-depth sonar. This was a breakthrough in terms of hunting submarines. The Americans heard about this, and Admiral Burke told me that the fact that we were going ahead with this—that our government had decided to put this in our ships—was of great help to him in getting his estimates for this through Congress to outfit the American ships. We have been able to contribute. This is the point I am trying to make. And for what we have put in we have received benefits and information many times over in return.

Mr. LAMBERT: Is it your—

Mr. RAYNER: Can I just finish this off? My feeling is that if you send soldiers down to Washington to talk to the navy this, with all due respect to the soldiers—the navy will be polite but they will not talk business to them because they know perfectly well that soldiers do not know what they are talking about when they get into the AS field. This applies across the whole business of naval warfare. That is the reason one had entrée to the chief of naval operations and the ice chief and experimental establishments in the States and so on. One could go anywhere. Admiral Burke asked me to make a list of the places I wanted to go to and said that he would fly me there. I did visit quite a number of establishments. I could not possibly have received an invitation like that as a soldier or an airman. Our soldiers receive invitations to do similar things; they visit army bases.

Mr. MACINNIS: They will not talk to a FINK?

Mr. RAYNER: No, I do not think they will.

Mr. LAMBERT: Do you feel that there is likely to be a lesser contribution made into the pot, to use your phrase, with the developments on the naval side that exist today?

Mr. RAYNER: Oh, unquestionably.

Mr. LAMBERT: I believe someone has said that this will reduce our contact to a need-to-know basis. Have you any observations to make in that regard? Does this mean that our people will be restricted, or possibly restricted, in the information and exchange of information that they would have?

Mr. RAYNER: My experience has been that they would be, yes.

Mr. LAMBERT: Now, my last question is a relatively minor one. You have been commanding officer of a ship in varying circumstances. It is envisaged in this bill that a sailor may keep his present rank designation. I am assuming, for instance, that he might be a lieutenant commander serving in a ship commanded by a captain. What is your estimation of the reaction if either of those two men were to change their rank designation? What would be the possible personal feeling, in the light of your own experience?

Mr. RAYNER: I do not think it would work, quite frankly. As far as the navy is concerned, I have asked naval officers: "If this bill goes through, what are you going to do? Are you going to remain a lieutenant commander, or are you going to become a major?" The answer I have been given is that they really have no choice. You have either got to decide whether you are going to get out, or, if you are going to stay in, you must go with it. And if you stay in and carry on as a lieutenant commander you will obviously be a marked man. The state of services is such—I regret to say—that if you become a marked man your career is heavily prejudiced these days.

Do I make myself clear?

Mr. LAMBERT: This is what I have felt to be the reaction of some people; but on the other hand I would like to get your own reaction. This would not necessarily be the reaction of the soldier, because he is not going to be changed.

At the present time who is the senior naval service officer?

Mr. RAYNER: The senior naval service officer is Vice Admiral Hennessy, the Comptroller General.

Mr. LAMBERT: I see. Well, who is able to speak on the subject of maritime warfare?

Mr. RAYNER: General Allard said that his naval adviser is Rear Admiral O'Brien, who is the maritime commander in Halifax.

Mr. LAMBERT: Is he a member of the defence council?

Mr. RAYNER: No.

Mr. LAMBERT: Therefore, it is Rear Admiral O'Brien, a field commander, who is the senior, shall we say, fighting sailor?

Mr. RAYNER: Yes.

Mr. LAMBERT: As a former chief of the naval staff and a member of the committee of chiefs of staff do you think this is desirable?

Mr. RAYNER: I think it is most undesirable. I think it is absolutely essential that the senior—I will not say fighting sailor, because they are all fighting sailors—naval officer should be in constant touch with the senior officers of the other services. He should also be in constant touch with the Minister and the Deputy Minister of National Defence. There is a constant interchange and interflow of information.

We used to meet frequently. Every week the Minister and the chiefs of staff would sit down together and discuss matters. It is in this interchange of information that ideas are tried out. The ideas flow up and they are tried out and talked about and so on. I do not see how it can possibly run unless you have that interchange, and have the senior naval officer at that level taking part in those conversations.

Mr. LAMBERT: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am sorry if I have taken more time than I should have.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): I have one short supplementary.

Am I to understand from the explanation given to Mr. Lambert's questions that possibly Admiral Hennessy could veto Admiral O'Brien's advice to General Allard?

Mr. RAYNER: If Admiral Hennessy could veto—

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): —could veto Admiral O'Brien's advice to General Allard because he is the senior officer? Or is this a further part of the confusion?

Mr. RAYNER: I do not know how this works. Admiral Dyer, who is the Chief Naval Personnel—he succeeded me as the senior naval officer—was appointed senior naval adviser to the defence council, as well as chief of personnel to the three services. Admiral Dyer told me that he found it impossible to remain current on naval problems with all he had to do as chief of personnel.

The other day, when General Fleury was here, he said that when he left the department he considered that the comptroller general's branch was two years behind in their paper work. Therefore, I do not think that Admiral Hennessy, who is now the comptroller general, is going to have much time to devote to naval problems.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Yes; but you have indicated that General Allard would seek his advice on naval matters from Admiral O'Brien.

Mr. RAYNER: That is so; and General Allard has said that.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): But there is a possible conflict here in that Admiral Hennessy is considered senior to O'Brien in naval matters; is that right?

Mr. RAYNER: Oh, yes; he is senior.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Admiral Rayner, when you were answering questions put to you by Mr. Nugent you drew attention to the fact that in the celebrated speech of December 7, when the Minister outlined the program prior to proceeding with second reading of the bill, he omitted a sentence from the letter of April 2, 1964. I thought this would be an appropriate time to set the record straight. I will

quote from the letter and from the speech and ask you about the omitted sentence.

In the speech on December 7, at page 10827 of *Hansard*, the Minister mentioned the circular letter of April 2, 1964, and he said:

> This letter said, in part:
>
> > The third and final step will be the unification of the three services... It is reasonable to expect that it will be three or four years before it will be possible to take this action.

Now, the letter reads as follows:

> The third and final step will be the unification of the three Services.

The dots in the speech in *Hansard* represent this sentence:

> This will not be initiated until the various staffs outlined above have been established and are working effectively.

Is that the sentence you were referring to, Admiral Rayner, as having been omitted?

Mr. RAYNER: That is right, sir.

Mr. CHURCHILL: And you understood from that that those staffs would be thoroughly established and be able to prove that they were effectively supporting the combat forces before any further step would be taken?

Mr. RAYNER: I regarded that as an undertaking to the forces.

Mr. CHURCHILL: And this is the undertaking that you conceive as not having been met by the Minister?

Mr. RAYNER: Yes.

Mr. CHURCHILL: In *Hansard* the Minister went on:

> we also stated in the next paragraph:
>
> > However, the end objective of a single service is firm.

If you look back at the letter of April 2, 1964, you find that he has omitted two sentences, which I now quote:

> The process outlined above is not immutable. As the lessons of the re-organization are learned, changes in the plan or in the timing may result.

I would ask you this, Admiral Rayner: Did you conclude from that letter that it might be several years before unification was proceeded with, if the integration process was delayed in any way?

Mr. RAYNER: Yes, Mr. Churchill. I read this letter very carefully, because I was asked to forward it and promulgate it to the navy. When I read the two sentences that you have just referred to I said to myself: "This is not going to happen for about 10 years," and I then proceeded to send the letter.

Mr. CHURCHILL: In one of our earlier sessions, Admiral Rayner, the message that you put out over your signature—I am referring to the letter—was given the interpretation here in the Committee of approval by you of the formation of a single unified service. What is your explanation of your signature on that message which was sent out?

Mr. RAYNER: Well, this rumour that I had approved unification as a result of sending this message was, as far as I am able to understand, initiated somewhere in the Department of National Defence last September, after the blow up in July. All three chiefs were sent this letter to promulgate to their services. At that time there was a general rumour going around that the CNS was not behind integration. I did not want to see the navy left behind, particularly when I believed in the principle of integration, and so, as my fellow chiefs did, I sent a covering message with this letter.

This is the message that I put on the top of the letter to commend it to the navy, and I quote:

> By now I hope that all personnel have had an opportunity to read the White Paper on Defence for themselves. The first step towards integration of NDHQ Staffs is underway and there is no doubt that this re-organization will result in greater efficiency.

And I remind you that the first step was the integration of the staffs at NDHG; and that is all.

> The Navy is already organized on functional lines—

We had integrated Maritime Command, the Atlantic and the Pacific; our naval board was organized into a personnel branch, a technical service branch and a naval comptroller; so we were organized on functional lines. I go on:

> —and this, together with our extensive experience in the integrated Maritime Commands in Halifax and Esquimalt, places us in an excellent position to fit into the new defence organization. The changeover from the present to the new organization will not be easy but it can and will be achieved. It will require the active whole-hearted support of all personnel. This I am sure we will give for the good of the country and of the Service.

And this, I am proud to say, is what the navy did. But I can assure you, Mr. Churchill, that if those undertakings had not been in that letter I would never have sent that message. I could not have, believing what I did.

Mr. CHURCHILL: You were obliged, in the normal course of duty, to send a covering letter such as that to explain the message from National Defence Headquarters, were you not?

Mr. RAYNER: I was not told to do it, but, as you say, in the normal course of duty I would. It would have been strange at this time if a message such as this had just come over the wires with nothing from the CNS on it.

Mr. CHURCHILL: And the heads of the other services did the same?

Mr. RAYNER: Yes, they did.

Mr. CHURCHILL: It is normal practice?

Mr. RAYNER: Yes, Mr. Churchill.

Mr. CHURCHILL: It is now 6 o'clock, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, just before you . . .

Mr. ANDRAS: Would Mr. Churchill permit one supplementary question along that line?

The CHAIRMAN: I want to make sure that I can deal with a couple of items of business before we rise. Is it quite short, Mr. Andras?

Mr. ANDRAS: Mr. Churchill has quoted from the letter of April 2, 1964, and mentioned that certain sentences were omitted from the Minister's speech. In his quotation I think there was one sentence omitted. It refers to the timing of this, and it reads, referring to the third and final step of unification:

> It is reasonable to expect that it will be three or four years before it will be possible to take this action.

I would suggest that this implies three or four years from 1964, which brings it to 1967. There was a time suggestion there that was not in the area for 10 years or so.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I had intended reading that. Thank you very much. That was followed immediately by the other sentences which read:

> The process outlined above is not immutable. As the lessons of the reorganization are learned, changes in the plan or in the timing may result.

Thank you very much.

Mr. ANDRAS: And the last sentence, of course, says:

> However, the end objective of a single service is firm.

The CHAIRMAN: Now, gentlemen, if I give you two fellows a couple of bars of music you dance and jig for hours. I still have to get on with a couple of points of business before we rise.

We have Mr. Harkness and Mr. Andras left on the list of those who want to question Admiral Rayner. It may be that others will have questions, and perhaps it would be profitable to suggest that we meet again at 8 o'clock. We have already advertised the meeting. We could continue with the examination of Admiral Rayner.

We have no other witness called for tonight. We have been trying to contact General Simonds and Air Marshal Curtis throughout the afternoon. We have been in touch with General Simonds and he says that he will not be available until Thursday. There will have to be some consultation with the steering committee and with members on how we are to accommodate him.

Air Marshal Curtis has not been contacted as yet, but we will be trying again during the dinner hour and perhaps we can advise you later on what he says.

If it is your wish gentlemen, we will meet tonight at 8 o'clock to continue with Admiral Rayner.

EVENING SITTING

MONDAY, March 13, 1967.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, we will now continue with our meeting. Mr. Churchill, had you completed your questioning when we adjourned?

Mr. CHURCHILL: I will go on the second round.

Mr. HARKNESS: Admiral Rayner, you state at the bottom of page 3 of your brief :

> Bill C-243 as written indicates that the single unified service would be basically Army in character. Sooner or later, it would neither attract nor stimulate the professional skills required in a modern navy.

Could you give us your reasons for that and what you foresee happening?

Mr. RAYNER: Well Bill C-243, Mr. Harkness, as you know, provides for Army ranks for the Navy. At the present time there is a general as Chief of the Defence Staff, there is a general in command of the Technical Services, there is a general in command of Materiel Command and I am sure all these officers will do their utmost for the Navy, but they obviously do not have the knowledge and experience of a naval officer. When people in the Navy see this happening, it is my opinion that we will be regarded very much as the young sister and people will be attracted to the larger components of the forces on which more money is being spent and on which there is more research going on, and so on. This, of course, is not true at the present time but I think it is inevitable if, in fact, our forces are to be controlled by one service.

Mr. HARKNESS: Well, this would not only apply to attracting but also to stimulating professional skills?

Mr. RAYNER: When I speak of stimulating professional skills, I think it is essential to have a program which is moving with the times, which the Navy is doing at present. It is building a hydrofoil, which is something new and untried. It developed the idea of operating helicopters from destroyers. It also developed the variable depth sonar, which I mentioned before. All these are tremendously stimulating and they attract brilliant youngsters from the universities and from the high schools. I foresee that under the unified service, with a swing away from anti-submarine warfare, that the sea service will lose its drive and therefore it will not attract some of the lads at the top of the class. We need people from the top of the class, people from the middle and we are prepared to take our share of those from the bottom, too, but we do need a cross section of the youth of Canada.

Mr. HARKNESS: What you are saying in effect is that the position you see the Navy is going to occupy will mean that it will not provide the challenges and therefore the attraction for the top people that it has provided in the past?

Mr. RAYNER: Yes, precisely.

Mr. HARKNESS: On page 5—and Mr. Winch went into this to some extent —you say:

> I believe that a strong Canada requires a strong Canadian Navy. Although the Minister of National Defence has issued re-assuring statements concerning the Navy's anti-submarine capability, it cannot be denied, that the Navy has been reduced in size and effectiveness since 1964.

We have had a considerable amount of discussion on this very point, evidence from other witnesses, and so on. I think your statement there is quite definite. In replying to Mr. Winch on some questions which he posed on this same subject you noted what the present size of the Navy is in comparison with what

it had been, and you also noted the fact that 18 out of 20 are the same ships that we had in 1963. There have only been two that have come into service since and they were both in 1964. Now, the argument that has been made is that this small remaining number of ships that we have are so much better equipped than was the case in 1963 to 1964 that their total effectiveness is greater than the much larger number of ships we had, in spite of the fact, as you have noted, that they are essentially the same ships. What in effect has been added to the equipment of these ships which would increase their effectiveness, and to what extent has it increased their effectiveness?

Mr. RAYNER: In 1964 we only had two helicopter destroyers. Since that time we have acquired two more and converted five more Restigouches. So, in effect, we have nine helicopter destroyers today as against two in 1964. Moreover, the new helicopters have come along. They were on order, and I think we had probably taken delivery of about three in 1964, but now the Bonaventure is equipped with a squadron of the new Sea Kings and I am told there are Sea Kings for all the helicopter-equipped destroyers. This certainly adds greatly to the effectiveness of those ships but we would have had these helicopters anyway, they were coming, and the fact that we now have twenty AS escorts, of which nine are equipped to carry helicopters in my opinion, does not compensate for the lack of several other ships. In AS warfare one needs many, many ships. One never has enough.

During the last war we actually took yachts and converted them into AS vessels and sent them to sea. This was a dangerous practice, but in order to get on with the war this is what we had to do. In 1940 one found oneself at see with an escort of two ships, and one should have had a dozen in order to protect forty or fifty merchant ships. From a sailor's point of view it seems quite wrong to pay off and to dispose of these modernized frigates, and some of our older destroyers, too. It would be better if they were put in reserve but, of course, that costs money.

Mr. HARKNESS: Can you give us any estimate of the extent or the percentage which in your view the effectiveness of the Navy has declined?

Mr. RAYNER: I do not think I could give you a figure for that. I can only say that the personnel have been reduced by about 20 per cent and in quality I would say that they have been reduced by more than that, much more than that. With all due respect to the serving officers, there are no serving officers at NDHQ today of the calibre and with the knowledge of, say, Landymore and Welland. Welland was the top AS expert in the Navy and, of course, he left last July. No one is indispensable, but the fact remains there is a four or five year gap in the Navy. The senior officers were retired, the top echelon were retired last summer and the officers who are coming along are first class in every way but they just lack three or four years experience in different jobs, and so on, which people like Landymore and Welland and Stirling all have, and there is an irreplacable gap there.

Mr. HARKNESS: Yes. Well, that really gets on to my next question. You mention on page 6 that the best and most experienced officers have been prematurely retired and that Canada cannot afford this waste of talent. Has there been very much more waste of talent at the more junior ranks than at the very top echelon of admirals?

Mr. RAYNER: Well I think there has been. I cannot give you figures on this. Certainly there is a return in *Hansard* which shows that about 40 officers from all three services have retired early, but there have been a considerable number retiring from what I call the middle ranks, lieutenant commanders, and there are some first class chaps amongst them, too. It was this fact which personally caused me great concern. When I heard of bright young chaps wanting to get out in the spring of 1966 I became very concerned about the whole question.

Mr. HARKNESS: What about the leaning off of highly experienced chief petty officers and petty officers, particularly those with a high degree of technical training?

Mr. RAYNER: I think that the Navy has lost a number with ten or fifteen years' service, but we must remember that these men have to think of their pension—they are due for pension with twenty-five years service—and so it is very much worth their while to stay in unless they are offered a first class job on civvy street.

Mr. HARKNESS: I have already gone into most of the questions I had marked to ask here.

The CHAIRMAN: You are running over your ten minutes now, Mr. Harkness. Are you about to conclude?

Mr. HARKNESS: I just have one other matter that I was going to bring up. On page 11 in the second last paragraph you say:

> I hold the same view and consider these outward and visible signs are essential to maintaining a high esprit de corps in the sea service. It would cost nothing to retain naval identity and its retention would save a great deal of unnecessary resentment.

What in your view would be the effect of not having a distinctive naval uniform on, we will say, morale, recruiting and our relations with other navies?

Mr. RAYNER: Well, I think amongst naval personnel it would be catastrophic. Today a Canadian sailor in his blue uniform with "HMCS" on his cap tally and "Canada" on his shoulder, identifying him as a Canadian sailor, can go anywhere in the world and he is highly respected. This is first of all because he is a Canadian and second because he is a professional sailor. I believe that if our men have to go to Cherbourg or Portsmouth or Norfolk, Virginia, in green uniforms that they will find themselves a laughing stock. I am told that this is the one thing which does concern a lot of junior men. They just wonder what is going to happen when they have to go into foreign naval ports dressed in queer uniforms.

Mr. HARKNESS: This resulting embarrassment, of course, would have a very serious effect on their general morale and their ability to recruit?

Mr. RAYNER: I think it does. It will cause some fisticuffs.

Mr. HARKNESS: All right. My time is up.

Mr. ANDRAS: Admiral Rayner, I was a bit puzzled by your comments this afternoon in connection with the statement in the Minister's letter of April 2, 1964, and your statement of April 3, which contained that letter verbatim, you passed it along to the naval forces. When you said you felt that the final stage of

the program would take, in your opinion, some ten years, what was the basis for the ten year period that you felt it would take?

Mr. RAYNER: There was no basis for using the specific figure of ten years, it was just a figure. It was as far as I was prepared to look ahead. In view of those guarantees, I did not see this happening in the foreseeable future.

Mr. ANDRAS: I presume the guarantees you speak of were the wording of the White Paper and also the wording of the Minister's letter of April 2, which was—

Mr. RAYNER: There were no guarantees in the White Paper. There was simply—

Mr. ANDRAS: Well, you just referred to guarantees, sir. Which guarantees did you mean?

Mr. RAYNER: Guarantees in the Minister's letter.

Mr. ANDRAS: In the Minister's letter it also said:

> It is reasonable to expect that it will be three or four years before it will be possible to take this action.

This defines a period of three or four years in which it would be possible to take this action dating from April 2, 1964, which is a far cry from ten years. Did you not give any credence or take seriously the statement by the Minister that the government's program was to set three or four years as the objective by which this plan would move into the third and final stage, which was defined as unification?

Mr. RAYNER: None whatsoever. I regarded this purely as a selling job, particularly knowing what some of my colleagues felt about this.

Mr. ANDRAS: So, the ten year figure that you took was a matter of your opinion versus, in this case, the opinion of the government?

Mr. RAYNER: The stated opinion of the Minister. I cannot accept the point that unification was government policy in 1964 because I do not think it was.

Mr. ANDRAS: Well, that leads me to another question. You urge strongly in your brief that all reference to a single unified defence force be deleted from the White Paper. You must have had some meaning that you applied to the phrase "single unified defence force" to even want to bother to delete it from the White Paper. I know that you said earlier that you just felt it would cause confusion and some embarassment later to the government to sort of get off that statement, but it must have had some meaning for you. What meaning, vague or otherwise, did it really have for you?

Mr. RAYNER: For me it meant what it said, but it was not written there by the military, it was put in there by a politician, and I regarded it as Alice in Wonderland, quite frankly, and I was trying to warn them off it.

Mr. ANDRAS: Yes, but as a definition of words, what did it really bring to your mind as meaning? Did it mean a single force? Well, it says a single unified defence force. For you to bother removing it from the White Paper it must have had some specific meaning?

Mr. RAYNER: Of course it did, yes.

Mr. ANDRAS: What was that?

Mr. RAYNER: Well, as I said, to me it meant a single service with all that goes with it; a common uniform, a common rank structure and just what you are being asked to study in Bill C-243.

Mr. ANDRAS: So at the time you wanted that phrase deleted, which was back at the time of the White Paper in March of 1964, you wanted the words "single unified defence force" deleted which to your mind meant just what we understand it means now, a single service, single uniform, single rank structure, and so on. This is what you wanted deleted?

Mr. RAYNER: This is so, but I would point out that this phrase was not put in at the military level in the Department of National Defence. I do not know to this day whether in fact it was put in in National Defence.

Mr. ANDRAS: No, but it is what it meant to you at that time.

Mr. RAYNER: This was the meaning of it to me at that time, yes.

Mr. ANDRAS: And as subsequent events have shown, this was an accurate assessment of what it meant?

Mr. RAYNER: That is so.

Mr. ANDRAS: Well then, you have agreed that this was a fairly clear statement, or at least the implications were fairly clear that this was what it meant as far back as the White Paper. Certainly this would have been clarified to some extent by the Minister's letter of April 2, 1964, which removed the possibility that a single unified force could only mean integration at the top level because the Minister's letter takes us through various stages and steps, and starts out by saying that the White Paper enunciated the policy that the armed forces in Canada should be integrated under a single Chief of Defence Staff and a single defence staff. It further stated that this would be the first step toward a single unified defence force. So, we now have as stage one that the defence staff would be under a single defence chief. The second step would be the reorganization of the field command structure, so the next layer is then integrated. But it also makes it obvious that there is a third step beyond that, so there could not have been any possible meaning taken out of this letter to indicate that the program simply called for headquarters integration and field command structure integration, but that it had to mean, even as far back as 1964, that the third and final step would be unification as we now understand it. From what you have just told us, you clearly took this interpretation.

Mr. RAYNER: Yes, but I did not regard it as government policy and I did not regard it as a plan. I regarded it as wishful thinking by either the Minister of National Defence or some of his colleagues. It certainly never occurred to me that it was government policy. If you read the White Paper it merely says:

> This will be the first step toward a single unified defence force for Canada.

There is nothing in the White Paper to indicate that the government is going beyond the first step.

Mr. ANDRAS: Sir, may I refer you to page 19 of the same White Paper. I will quote the third paragraph:

> Following the most careful and thoughtful consideration, the government has decided that there is only one adequate solution. It is the

> integration of the Armed Forces of Canada under a single Chief of Defence Staff and a single Defence Staff. This will be the first step toward a single unified defence force for Canada.

The word "government" is clearly stated there.

Mr. RAYNER: That is so, but I never believed the first phrase there, "Following the most careful and thoughtful consideration, the government has decided..." I think that again was eyewash or window dressing.

Mr. ANDRAS: This is the White Paper on Defence—

Mr. RAYNER: Well, I am trying to make it clear what happened. As I already stated this afternoon, the Minister told the chiefs of staff in the first week of February, 1964, that he had come to the conclusion that it was necessary to integrate the services. If you will recall, the White Paper was tabled in the house on March 25, 1964. Now, according to this, in a matter of six or seven weeks the whole question of integration and the possibility of unification was given the most careful and thoughtful consideration. Gentlemen, I do not think that is possible.

Mr. ANDRAS: Without arguing with your opinion about the thoughtful and careful consideration, I honestly fail to understand it. Here is a statement that "the government has decided", and so on. Furthermore, the Minister of the Crown speaks for the government, and if his statement is not denied by the government it seems to be perfectly logical to accept that he is in fact stating government policy. I submit to you, sir, that this statement clearly indicates, whether you agree with the premise or not, that the government had made the statement that this was a matter of government policy.

Mr. RAYNER: I would just like to say one thing in answer to that, Mr. Andras. If I may read these sentences again:

> Following the most careful and thoughtful consideration, the government has decided that there is only one adequate solution. It is the integration of the Armed Forces of Canada under a single Chief of Defence Staff and a single Defence Staff.

The chiefs of staff agreed with that, but for me that was the extent of the government policy. Let me read this sentence again:

> This will be the first step toward a single unified defence force for Canada.

That was a long term objective. It might come about and it might not. It would depend on how he got along with integration. I suggest this is in the minds of a great many people.

Mr. ANDRAS: Well then, within a matter of a very few days thereafter—as you say, this was tabled on March 24, 1964—it was followed by what you yourself describe in this way in the preamble to your statement that you sent to all naval personnel, and I quote the last paragraph before the quotation of the Minister's letter:

> The following letter in amplification of the White Paper has been received from the Minister and the Associate Minister of National Defence.

It goes on in amplification of the statements in the White Paper which were mentioned as being government policy.

Mr. RAYNER: Yes; but I was most careful in that covering letter to refer only to the first step toward integration. I said:

> —The first step towards integration of NDHQ Staffs is underway and there is no doubt that this reorganization will result in greater efficiency.

That is all I said. I did not say anything about the second step or the third step.

Mr. ANDRAS: No, but you quoted verbatim the Ministers'—and I am using that word in the plural—letter of April 2, 1964. I certainly will not take the time to read it.

Mr. RAYNER: At the time I did not consider I had any option. This letter was sent up and I was requested by the Minister to promulgate this to the Navy and I carried out my orders.

Mr. ANDRAS: I am not questioning that, at all sir. I am not implying that you were expressing an opinion in favour or against. Nevertheless, it came from the Chief of Naval Staff, a position you occupied at the time. This went to all naval personnel. It had a preamble that did not say, "I disagree with this", it had a complete verbatim transcript of the Minister's letter of the previous day, and I would suspect it would be taken by any people who received it at the other end as a statement of policy, almost an instruction from the Chief of Naval Staff.

Mr. RAYNER: I suggest that you call other witnesses and find out what they felt about it, because I am sure that those guarantees which are written into that letter would convince them that this is unlikely to happen for a good many years.

Mr. ANDRAS: In spite of the fact that it said that this program would take about three or four years.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Andras, you are now over your time, and I note that this has become a struggle for the last word. I am going to have the last word here. Your time is up. I see that the last person on the first round is Mr. MacInnis and then we go back on the second round to Mr. Winch, Mr. Churchill and Mr. Forrestall.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Admiral, following up on Mr. Andras' question would you agree that subsequent events since the White Paper of 1964 have proven that the progress steps towards integration leading to unification have not been followed?

Mr. RAYNER: Yes, I do.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): This is basically the essence of the questioning that Mr. Andras was trying to get at, that the steps of integration leading to unification have not been followed, as outlined by the Minister in his letter of April 2, 1964?

Mr. RAYNER: Yes. The reason I say that is because the second sentence in the paragraph which Mr. Churchill referred to reads:

> This will not be inititated until the various staffs outlined above have been established and are working effectively.

As I mentioned this afternoon, great damage has been done to the Navy in the last three years, and if the staff at NDHQ and the staff at Maritime Headquarters was working effectively the Navy would not be in this state.

Mr. MacINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): I have a question on another matter. Could you give us a comparison of the time spent by the serving Navy compared to the time spent at sea by the British and U.S. Navy in the manning of their ships?

Mr. RAYNER: In the early 1960s our men spent a greater proportion of time at sea than the other two navies.

Mr. MacINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Does that hold true now?

Mr. RAYNER: I do not know. It was too high a proportion. We were trying to maintain our commitments and we were looking for ways and means of reducing it and for this reason we set up a board of inquiry into the whole question in early 1963 under Admiral Landymore. He went into the whole question, and as a result of his report and his recommendation we adopted the cyclic system, which has led to some amelioration of this.

Mr. MacINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): In other words, just through overworking our sailors we have been able to maintain our commitments up to a point?

Mr. RAYNER: Yes. Not all of them. It was particular branches. The engine room branch had a very difficult time.

Mr. MacINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): With respect to our present day commitments, I think you indicated that 16 or 18 ships are immediately available. Do you feel under these circumstances that we can now meet our NATO commitments from a naval standpoint?

Mr. RAYNER: I would like to ask what our NATO commitments are. In 1966 Admiral Landymore told the Committee that our NATO commitment was one carrier and 26 escorts. We certainly cannot meet those figures today because the Committee was told about three weeks ago that there were only 28 ships, of which only 16 are immediately available.

Mr. MacINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Then it follows that unless our commitments have been changed that we are unable to fulfil them judged by the standards that we undertook several years ago?

Mr. RAYNER: Yes.

Mr. WINCH: Mr. Chairman, I have found the Admiral's statement and answers to questions most interesting. I also find that I can make my questions more concise if I write them out. I would like to ask Admiral Rayner, whether it be under integration or unification—in other words, a single service—that you can contemplate at any time under any government when Canada will not have a Navy, Army and Air Force? Can you contemplate when we will not have those three?

Mr. RAYNER: Yes, I can. I can contemplate that if Bill No. C-243 is passed you will have some ships; it will be a sort of Navy, but it certainly will not be—

Mr. WINCH: We will have an Army, Navy and Air Force?

Mr. RAYNER: I think we will have an Army and I think we will have a good transport Air Force and I think we will have some sea transport, but I think that is about all. I am not talking about next year or so, I am talking about a few years on.

Mr. WINCH: I cannot contemplate any time when we do not have an Army, Navy or Air Force.

Mr. RAYNER: This is what is causing such concern in the Navy.

Mr. WINCH: That then leads to my next question. Admiral Rayner, would you agree or disagree that one—I say one—important dissension on Bill No. C-243 is not necessarily administration or operation under a single service, but a service recognition as to which unit one belongs and serves?

Mr. RAYNER: Yes, I think so.

Mr. WINCH: You agree with that?

Mr. RAYNER: Yes.

Mr. WINCH: This leads me to my next question. I have one question on three points. I would like to ask you, Admiral Rayner, to see if I understood your presentation correctly, if you would personally, in view of your presentation here this afternoon and this evening, feel a lot more satisfied if the following three policies were adopted respecting Bill No. C-243.

1. No unification until integration is completed and tested.

2. No unification without future roles of Canada's armed forces being specified and co-ordinated, with the funds to be made available by parliament on a projected basis.

3. In the event of unification, the retention of the nomenclature of RCN, RCA and RCAF to identify the particular phase of service in a single force.

Mr. RAYNER: Mr. Winch, the answer to No. 1 is yes. The answer to No. 2 is yes. Would you mind repeating No. 3, please?

Mr. WINCH: In the event of unification, that is, the single service, the retention of the nomenclature of RCN, RCA and RCAF to identify the particular phase of service in the single force.

Mr. RAYNER: I think you asked me if I would be satisfied if these three policies were carried out?

Mr. WINCH: Would those three points go a long way towards removing the major objections that you have given us today?

Mr. RAYNER: I answered yes to the first two. On the third point, no. It would help but I feel very strongly that both the naval uniform and naval rank structure should be retained because of the fact that we have to work with allied navies.

Mr. WINCH: If it was not a question of one uniform and the retention of the rank structure, with what I put in there would those three then meet your major objections to Bill No. C-243?

Mr. RAYNER: Oh, absolutely.

Mr. WINCH: They would?

Mr. RAYNER: But then you have integration without unification.

Mr. WINCH: I am most inerested in what you have to say. I want to know if basically those three would meet your objection?

Mr. RAYNER: Yes, indeed.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Following up a question that Mr. Andras asked, I would like to ask the Admiral this question. With regard to the signal which he sent out to the Navy transmitting the message he received from the Minister, Mr. Andras noted that the Admiral in his preliminary sentence had not said that he did not approve of the policy advocated by the Minister. Would it be normal in the services for the head of a service to start a message off that way?

Mr. RAYNER: No, indeed, as you well know, Mr. Churchill. In fact, one could not. One could not send a message like that.

Mr. CHURCHILL: You would be disobeying orders. I wanted to ask you a question or two about the fundamental purpose of our Navy. I refer to the evidence which you gave to the Special Committee on Defence in 1963. You may recall that it was on July 9, 1963. The Chairman was a very diplomatic and co-operative person by the name of Mr. Maurice Sauve. During the course of your evidence on July 9, 1963, you pointed out that it was essential to have a good understanding of the maritime threat that has to be conquered. You mentioned three threats, which are as follows:

1. Soviet submarine force—the dominant maritime threat,
2. Soviet long range aviation as a maritime threat; and
3. Soviet fishing fleet activities in the western Atlantic.

It is not quite four years later, but is it still your opinion that there are the main threats?

Mr. RAYNER: I would think so. I have been out of touch, of course, with military intelligence for two and a half years, but nothing that I have read in service periodicals or in the press has led me to change my opinion on this.

Mr. CHURCHILL: You went on to say that:

> Russia has and is continuing to build and modernize the largest submarine fleet the world has even seen.
>
> It has a capability of: (a) missile attack; (b) torpedo attack (c) mine laying.

At that time you considered that their submarine fleet was over 400 in number. Has anything happened in the interval which would make you revise your opinion downward with regard to that?

Mr. RAYNER: Only this afternoon, Mr. Churchill, I think Mr. Forrestall read from the United States Institute of Naval Proceedings and he quoted a figure of 350 Soviet submarines. This was an estimate in 1963 and I have no doubt that what Mr. Forrestall read was an estimate as well.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Even 350 would make it the largest submarine force in the world.

Mr. RAYNER: Oh, very much so.

Mr. FORRESTALL: I said 478, I think.

Mr. RAYNER: I am sorry.

Mr. CHURCHILL: You said 478?

Mr. RAYNER: Then the numbers have increased. I am sure there are a greater number of nuclear submarines and ballistic missile submarines in the U.S.S.R. submarine fleet today than there were in 1963.

Mr. CHURCHILL: In the Committee hearings of July 9, 1963, I quoted from Mr. McNamara, a person on whom the Minister places considerable reliance, and these are Mr. McNamara's words:

> Second only in importance to defence against ICBM attack is the problem of defence against submarine-launched missiles. The solution to this problem entails three different types of capabilities.
>
> (1) The detection and tracking of enemy submarines.
>
> (2) The destruction of these submarines before they have an opportunity to launch their missiles.
>
> (3) The detection, tracking, and destruction of the missiles once they have been launched.

I take it that the Canadian navy in its anti-submarine activities has been dealing with the first two of those—the detection and tracking of enemy submarines—and that it would be prepared, in the case of war, to destroy these submarines before they had an opportunity to launch their missiles. Does that still remain as the pressing problem for our naval forces.

Mr. RAYNER: Yes, I believe that is correct, Mr. Churchill.

Mr. CHURCHILL: With the very considerable reduction in the number of ships which we have at sea, and with the undermanning of the ships which are going to be at sea, or which may be now, is it possible in 1967 to give as effective attention to the detection and tracking of enemy submarines as was done in 1963?

Mr. RAYNER: No, I do not think it is.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Yet the threat of the Russian submarines is greater, on a numerical basis. It would follow, would it not, that rather than diminishing our naval activities they should be maintained or increased. Would you agree with that?

Mr. RAYNER: Absolutely.

Mr. CHURCHILL: If we fail to maintain our standard of anti-submarine preparations what is the alternative for the protection of the North American continent? Will it then pass to the United States, for their attention?

Mr. RAYNER: That is the only alternative that I can think of, Mr. Churchill.

Mr. CHURCHILL: In the Toronto *Telegram* of March 1, an article appeared, entitled: "Alarm over our anti-sub role" and the article was drawn from writings by Captain P. B. Ryan, United States Navy (Retired). He states—and I quote his words as they appeared in the paper:

> A year from now, Canada may no longer have a navy as we know it today.

> Equally important, Canadian unification may place unlooked-for commitments on the U.S. Navy in meeting the Soviet submarine threat.

That is the view of a United States naval person. Do you consider that that view corresponds with your own?

Mr. RAYNER: Yes, I do. In fairness to Captain Ryan I would like to point out that the Toronto *Telegram* was quoting from an article which Captain Ryan wrote for the United States Institute of Naval Proceedings. In other words, he is not writing for the Canadian press; he is writing for his own service institute.

I agree absolutely with what he says.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Obviously, then, the defence personnel in the United States will be paying some attention to Captain Ryan's viewpoint on the anti-submarine situation in the Canadian navy?

Mr. RAYNER: I think so. I think there will be concern in other NATO navies, too.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I would imagine that with our NATO commitments so seriously depleted there would be some concern with our NATO allies. Has it not been our practice each year to carry out with our allies naval operations in which the Canadian navy played a prominent part in the anti-submarine activities?

Mr. RAYNER: Yes, Mr. Churchill; we have several exercises every year. One was referred to this afternoon—Fallex—which was carried out last autumn. It is a big, periodic NATO naval exercise.

I do not know what the results of the exercise were except from what I heard Admiral Landymore say, and he indicated that the results were not up to scratch. He suggested that the Committee call someone who had seen the analysis of Fallex and look into it.

Mr. CHURCHILL: The same type of work, only on a smaller scale, is carried out on the Pacific coast. That will now be correspondingly reduced.

Mr. RAYNER: Very much so.

Mr. CHURCHILL: The Chairman, I think, should take note of that because his province might be affected.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): Any danger for Winnipeg?

Mr. CHURCHILL: No; we provide the sailors, though.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Admiral, I want to move to another area which Mr. Churchill went into a little before our supper break.

I am wondering a little about the validity of a base consolidation program that would arise out of a desire to integrate basic training. From your experience could you tell us about the effect it will have on naval training and in effectively and substantially closing down establishments such as HMCS *Cornwallis*?

Could you comment, for example, on whether or not there is physical space at *Stadacona* or *Shearwater* to give effect to the next step that would follow from a consolidated or common basic training camp? Is this a valid principle, or will the navy end up by having to provide space and facilities equal, or nearly equal, to *Cornwallis* once it is closed, if they are going to sustain even the present number of men they have today?

Are there any other shortcomings that would occur to you from your experience? Perhaps you could make some general comments. The question was not necessarily specific, except that I am concerned about whether or not the RCN and the other environments will be able effectively to conduct the second stage of basic training once these easily identifiable bases have been lost to us.

Mr. RAYNER: In answer to your question, I would like to start by saying that *Cornwallis* is a magnificent naval recruit training establishment. It has been going for several years. At various times over the last 15 years the navy has been faced with cuts, and pressures—as part of the cuts—to close *Cornwallis*, and we definitely resisted it because *Cornwallis* met our requirements so well. It is convenient to the sea—

Mr. FORRESTALL: Excuse me, Admiral, I do not mean to interject here, but you say that you resisted the closing of *Cornwallis* simply because it ideally suited your immediate needs?

Mr. RAYNER: Our naval needs.

Mr. FORRESTALL: You would not go so far as to say you could not duplicate it anywhere, though? This is what I was concerned about.

Mr. RAYNER: It could be duplicated but it would cost a great deal of money to do so. It would mean building a new training establishment in Halifax; it would mean taking space from some other activity in Esquimalt in order to put it there; and in the event of war, in *Cornwallis* we have a basic training base with almost unlimited facilities for expansion. This is what you need when you are training large numbers of men at the beginning of a war.

In addition to all that, it is handy to the sea. For example, when our captains in the Atlantic Command were dissatisfied with the quality of the recruits coming out of *Cornwallis*—and it happens sometimes that people are not satisfied with the end product—we used to go down to *Cornwallis* and talk things over with the officers who were actually doing the training so that they would be familiar with the requirements. In addition, we could, when necessary, bring men under training from *Cornwallis* to Halifax to show them ships; and we could send ships around without any difficulty at all so that people at *Cornwallis* could gain additional experience.

I would like to go further on this. About two weeks ago, on Sunday night, on the television program "W5" there was a series of interviews with people in Digby and *Cornwallis*, who were very concerned about this question of closing the base at *Cornwallis*. After they had said their piece the Minister of National Defence was interviewed on *Cornwallis* and he said that no decision had been taken about the closing of the bases.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Somebody had better tell the people of *Cornwallis* before they sell all their homes.

Mr. RAYNER: Well, this is it. Within five minutes after the program ended someone was on the telephone to me explaining that people at *Cornwallis*, who were in the "know", had been tipped off that the base would probably shut; and, what is more, that the common recruit training would be carried out at St. Jean, Quebec, and that preparations were being made for this purpose. Two days later I received a letter from Toronto in which I was told that earlier that week a group captain from Training Command had visited certain units in the Toronto

area and had told them that before the end of 1967 common recruit training would be carried out out in one base. That, to my mind, is substantiation of the fact that the plan is to carry out common recruit training at St. Jean.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Admiral, once a naval recruit leaves St. Jean—because this is the only thing that I know a little about—what happens to him? What facilities are required to continue his training? Very obviously he would have some disciplinary training and some basic training; I trust that they still have a little foot drill and basic arms drill, although I do not know, and I am not particularly interested. Certainly there must still be something very basic to his environmental training that is going to require a substantial training atmosphere and some degree of further isolation from the functional operation. What is required?

Mr. RAYNER: What they do at Cornwallis is to take a young man of 18 right off the beach and train him as best they can on shore to live at sea. The best way to train a man to live at sea is, of course, to send him to sea but that is expensive. Seagoing in warships is very, very expensive these days and one has to make the best possible use of sea time; therefore, we do as much training as is possible ashore. So the first thing the man at *Cornwallis* is told, in addition to living a disciplined life in the military service, is to live at sea. This takes about 26 weeks, I think, and then he is sent off to a ship. If a man is trained at St. Johns or another common base—

The CHAIRMAN: Order, please, over there. The witness does not find it easy to work in a soft undercurrent of blather. Order. There is too much going on over there for the witness and members to hear. He does not have your parliamentary training in working uphill against a constant murmur. Go ahead, Mr. Forrestall; excuse me.

Mr. FORRESTALL: If the Admiral would perhaps continue.

Mr. RAYNER: I was saying that if a man is trained at a common recruit base somewhere in the interior of Canada, hundreds of miles from the sea, he will receive the basic training to enable him to live in the military service and to adjust to it, but as soon as he goes to the coast they will have to start to teach him to live at sea. In other words, there will have to be some form of basic training on shore before that man goes to sea. If you send him straight to sea, you are going to need more ships. It is going to cost a great deal of money.

Mr. FORRESTALL: I do not know about the west coast but certainly *Stadacona* has not increased in size for a good many years and from my knowledge of it—its physical plant layout—I cannot conceive where on earth at *Stadacona* you would put these people. If it were your responsibility and they started coming back to you, what on earth would you do with them?

Mr. RAYNER: I think the numbers will be reduced. The overall numbers will be reduced so perhaps there will be—

Mr. FORRESTALL: I am being optimistic.

Mr. RAYNER: You are being optimistic, yes.

Mr. FORRESTALL: I am generally very pessimistic about the future of the navy, Admiral. But assuming everything we have been told is completely accurate and that indeed there will be no reduction, what is the navy at *Stadacona*

going to do with these recruits as they come in? Where are they going to get this further training? You suggest 26 weeks; if they could get six weeks of that at St. Johns where would you physically put them to give them this additional basic sea training on the east coast of Canada if you closed down *Cornwallis*?

Mr. RAYNER: Well, that is a good question. I suggest you ask General Allard.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Well, he is closest to them all; he would know. Then, in your professional opinion—and there is nothing facetious about this at all, I am quite serious—it seems to me that we are going to get ourselves out of a frying pan at *Cornwallis* and into a proverbial fire because we are going to have to provide that space. I have no idea of how many men there are at *Cornwallis* at any given moment but suddenly to transfer them all at once to *Stadacona* or *Shearwater* would I think, if it is not changed since your time, make a substantial strain—

Mr. RAYNER: It could not be done.

Mr. FORRESTALL: —on the facilities. It could not be done? So, something would have to be done. They would either wind up giving beyond the basic training at St. Johns or reopening a mini-Cornwallis down at Cow Bay or Laurenceton or some other place. I do not like to ask you whether this would follow through with the other services, but certainly you must have some knowledge—there must have been common problems; but would this be true, perhaps, of people who were going into Mobile Command once they had left this basic training centre?

Mr. RAYNER: Not to the same extent. I would not expect it to the same extent because I suspect basically it would be an army recruit course. The army will be all right and after all, the air force, although they fight in the air, live on land the same as the army do.

Mr. FORRESTALL: What you are saying, in other words, is that there is no compatibility between the training of somebody for the sea and somebody for a future role that is at least land oriented from the point of view of living and accommodation.

You mentioned earlier that in the past you consistently opposed any motion to close *Cornwallis*. Was it largely for the reasons you have just been discussing —your inability then to cope with them within the functional environment of *Stadacona* or *Shearwater*? I gather this is what you are saying. Were any alternatives put forward? You say you resisted it; somebody must have wanted to do it. What did they offer as an alternative?

Mr. RAYNER: The alternative would have been to move the training to the west coast—

Mr. FORRESTALL: Oh, I see.

Mr. RAYNER: —to Esquimalt or to *Stadacona*. I have always felt it important to keep the recruit training away from the main bases. Questions of leave and so on come up and it is very much easier, I think, to run a recruit training establishment removed from a main base. They have their own routine and get on with it. The young sailors are not influenced at the very beginning of their careers by some of the older sailors.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Then some place is going to have to be found to replace *Cornwallis* if, indeed, this is what is going to happen.

Mr. RAYNER: Yes.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Some physical plan that has the capacity in size and buildings; we are going to duplicate *Cornwallis,* then somewhere else.

Mr. RAYNER: That is so.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Thank you.

Mr. RAYNER: I do not want to dig myself into a hole about the older sailors because on the whole it is very good indeed and it is this influence, this enthusiasm for the service, that I think is at the base of the recruiting problem today because the service men just do not have—certainly in the navy—this feeling about the navy that they used to have. They are not preaching navy to their friends and their friends' sons and so on.

Mr. MACALUSO: Admiral, I have only three short questions. First of all, was FALLEX a paper exercise or an operational exercise?

Mr. RAYNER: I think it was an operational exercise.

Mr. MACALUSO: You are not sure.

Mr. RAYNER: I only heard what you have heard about it.

Mr. MACALUSO: Well, I read only one statement that Admiral Landymore made and I was just curious about whether it was a paper exercise or an operational exercise. I would think that would make some difference in results, would it not?

Mr. RAYNER: Well, it would have to be an operational exercise, I think, to be of any value as a test.

Mr. MACALUSO: Secondly, I would like to get back to this signal of April 3 that Mr. Andras was questioning you about. When you sent this out as Chief of Naval Staff, whom did you send this to?

Mr. RAYNER: I sent it to all ships and establishments in the navy.

Mr. MACALUSO: Do you recall which commanders you would send it to at that time? I am not familiar with who would have been in the service at that time.

Mr. RAYNER: There were a good many, of course. This would go to all the ships and establishments in the navy, the Flag Officer, Atlantic Coast.

Mr. MACALUSO: Who was the commander at that time?

Mr. RAYNER: Admiral Brock.

Mr. MACALUSO: Admiral Brock, yes.

Mr. RAYNER: The Flag Officer, Pacific Coast was Admiral Landymore.

Mr. MACALUSO: Admiral Landymore; yes.

Mr. RAYNER: And the Senior Officer Afloat, I think, was Commodore O'Brien.

Mr. MACALUSO: Commodore O'Brien? Well, in answer to one of Mr. Andras' question you say that you understood unified force to mean a single service with a common uniform and a common rank structure. If you understood that at that time, would not Admiral Brock, Admiral Landymore and Commodore O'Brien have understood the same, or would they have called you if they had not understood what you meant by that term?

Mr. RAYNER: We never discussed the question of a single unified force. It was away off; down below the horizon.

Mr. MACALUSO: I see. The only other thing that came up—and I may have misinterpreted what I heard—but when you were stating the reasons to Mr. Winch, I think, for one of the objections to a single force was the fact of loss of identity of the navy, and you stated that the only reason for the naval uniform —correct me if I am wrong in this—was that we have to work with allied navies. Is the only reason that there would be an objection to the change of a naval uniform of the sailor because he is working with other allied navies?

Mr. RAYNER: That was one of them. Of course, there is the pride in the uniform. When a man enters the navy he is taught from the first day to be proud of his service and of his uniform.

Mr. MACALUSO: Well, what about the pride, Admiral, in being identified in a purely Canadian uniform?

Mr. RAYNER: Well, this is a purely Canadian uniform. It has been handed on from the British navy, certainly, but we have made it our own. There are certain distinctive features about it which are our own.

Mr. MACALUSO: Well, are these distinguishing features not just the fact that it has "Canada" and "H.M.C.S." on it?

Mr. RAYNER: No. For instance, up until a few years ago a man had to pull on the sailor jumper over his head. It was very tight and very uncomfortable to wear and our people designed a jumper which looked like any other sailor's jumper but it happens to have a zipper down the front. They put it on like a coat. This has made this jumper much more acceptable to the sailor and it has actually been adopted by the British navy. When Lord Mountbatten came over here and saw that, he thought this was a wonderful idea. He took it back to England and now all the sailors over there are wearing them.

Mr. MACALUSO: There will not be much to distinguish between the British sailor, then, and the Canadian sailor, will there?

Mr. RAYNER: When I was serving in the Royal Navy, our navy was very small. They had two destroyers on either coast and that was all, but we used to send a few men over to the UK to train, and although you might have one or two Canadians in a battleship or a carrier with a thousand men on board yet, serving in one of those ships as a junior officer, when I came across a Canadian I could identify him immediately. He did not have Canada flashes in those days either, but I could just identify him by the cut of his jib.

Mr. MACALUSO: You could, but could the man on the street identify him?

Mr. RAYNER: Nowadays, they could certainly.

Mr. MACALUSO: Thank you, Admiral. That is all I have.

Mr. McNULTY: Admiral, just leading from Mr. Macaluso's question and a number of others, you seemed to imply earlier in certain answers that seagoing service men would be embarrassed in a distinctively Canadian uniform when visiting other naval forces. Is this a correct assumption?

Mr. RAYNER: No, not if it were navy blue.

Mr. McNULTY: Well, let us suppose it were a common uniform—common to all the three services—and it was not navy blue particularly but some other colour?

Mr. RAYNER: Yes, I think he would and I think he would resent having been told to wear it. These uniforms have evolved over years. The troops—groups of men—take great pride in their dress, and they like to have a say in how it develops, and when some people way off in Ottawa say, you will wear green, they understandably resent it.

Mr. McNULTY: Admiral, are you familiar with the United States marines?

Mr. RAYNER: Yes.

Mr. McNULTY: Well, approximately six months ago I had a wonderful opportunity of spending some time with the marines working up through boot camp and so on, in naval exercises and in military exercises. In your experience with the marines have you found that the personnel of the US marines are embarrassed by wearing a distinguishing US Marine Corps uniform and being called by army ranks, even when associating with naval forces?

Mr. RAYNER: No, but they want to be marines in the first place so they joined the Marine corps. They are very proud of being marines.

Mr. McNULTY: Well, in more or less staying and working with the marines, I gathered the impression that they are actually part of the navy but they have fought all attempts of the navy to absorb them into the navy ranks.

Mr. RAYNER: I was not aware that the navy had tried to absorb the marines.

Mr. McNULTY: Well, this is the impression I gathered from talking to a number of them.

An hon. MEMBER: It makes a difference.

Mr. McNULTY: Also I found out that the marines, despite the fact that they have over twice the number of all our Canadian forces combined, have very excellent morale and esprit de corps. Despite the fact that they are part of the US navy they are excellent soldiers and a number of them, I know from some of the exhibitions they put on, are very excellent fliers in planes that are going over 1500 miles an hour. They are actually a tremendous unified force and yet they seem to get along very, very well.

Mr. RAYNER: They are not a unified force. They are a single service—the US Marine Corps—a very proud, distinguished corps.

Mr. McNULTY: And yet they cover all three services, do they not?

Mr. RAYNER: No, they do not cover all three services. They are marines. They are a single marine service.

Mr. McNULTY: They are a seagoing service?

Mr. RAYNER: They go to sea and they fly, but they do not operate ships. They go as passengers on ships. They do not fight ships.

Mr. MCNULTY: No, that is true.

Mr. RAYNER: And behind them they have the three US services; the navy, army and air force.

Mr. MCNULTY: But they are actually part of the navy.

Mr. RAYNER: They are administratively part of the navy, yes.

Mr. MCNULTY: No, they did not want to come under complete naval domination. They wanted to stay as a marine corps, actually fighting in three different areas or three different spheres.

Mr. RAYNER: But Bill No. C-243 proposes something very different from this. Bill No. C-243 proposes doing away with the navy, army and air force as we know it, and combining it into a single US marine type of force. Is that what you want?

Mr. MCNULTY: Well, what is wrong with it?

Mr. RAYNER: Well, it will be a first class marine corps but it will not be a navy, and it will not be an air force.

Mr. MCNULTY: But it will be one unified force?

Mr. RAYNER: It will be a single service.

Mr. MCNULTY: With a tremendous esprit de corps and morale.

Mr. RAYNER: Yes, but it will not be capable of defending our sea approaches in a few years time and I do not think it will be capable of defending our air space either. It will be first class in peacekeeping operations, and it will be first class on the land.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Pugh, who is not on the Committee, has a question which he wants to ask and then I think Mr. Andras has a further question. Mr. Pugh, go ahead.

Mr. PUGH: Admiral, I was interested in the line that was taken on the US Marine Corps and it seems to me, if I might make a statement, that they are treated more or less as passengers on a ship or ground troops when they are allied with the US air force, and this is their general service. I take it that anybody afloat has a tremendous amount of training and that there is the possibility that a man afloat might have to be capable in at least four or five different jobs. Is that correct?

Mr. RAYNER: This is so in the case of the sailor. The US marine is carried in specialized ships for amphibious landings. They are the experts in the United States in carrying out amphibious landings.

Mr. PUGH: You would not see that at any time, sir, the US marine corps would actually fight the ship?

Mr. RAYNER: No, I would not.

Mr. PUGH: If naval personnel casualties are exceedingly heavy during a fight at sea, the possibility of the US Marine Corps taking over any of their jobs would be very, very small indeed.

Mr. RAYNER: Very small, indeed. They would have to be retrained.

Mr. PUGH: Now, to get back to the actual training which might take place under a unified force. We had a good deal on *Stadacona* and the other bases that were mentioned. I take it that the training in the Canadian navy, ashore before a naval man goes to sea would be very intensive. In what way? On how many jobs?

Mr. RAYNER: Well, his initial training basically, as I have explained, is to teach the man to live in the navy and to live at sea, and after that he does a couple of years at sea doing jobs on the ship and, at the same time, being trained in a specific trade. This is true of most sailors. I am talking about the people who man the guns, and operate the sonar sets, and man the engineroom, and so on.

Mr. PUGH: Then he receives a basic training ashore, but he could not receive those other specialist skills except by being afloat?

Mr. RAYNER: No, he could not.

Mr. PUGH: Thank you.

Mr. ANDRAS: Getting back to this question of naval uniform, Admiral Rayner. You estimate that the naval uniform must be blue?

Mr. RAYNER: Yes, I think so. Why change it? Why do we want to go off on our own and have a green uniform for the navy, when navies throughout the world, not only fighting navies but merchant navies dress in navy blue? It is the colour of the sea. Why do you want to change it?

Mr. ANDRAS: Could you recall, for instance, the five different coloured uniforms that the United States navy has worn since the war? My reading on the subject would indicate that they have worn white, that they have worn grey uniforms, that they have worn blue uniforms, they have worn khaki uniforms and that they have worn green uniforms. Would you feel that the United States navy or sailors would be embarrassed to wear their uniforms because at any given time they did not match the navies of some other major country?

Mr. RAYNER: Their basic uniform is blue but they have to wear white in the tropics.

Mr. ANDRAS: But they have worn several different colours of uniform.

Mr. RAYNER: What is the green? Dungarees?

Mr. ANDRAS: Walking out uniforms.

Mr. RAYNER: The US—walking out in green uniforms?

Mr. ANDRAS: New York naval air force, as a matter of fact, is in green.

Mr. RAYNER: Well, I would have to see this, but I accept it.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, I have come to the end of my list of questioners and if there are no more at the moment, I would like to review our position here for a moment.

Mr. MACINNIS: Mr. Chairman, I have just one more question. Admiral, do you consider it essential that basic naval training bases be as closely adjacent to the operational base as possible?

Mr. RAYNER: I think that is very important.

Mr. MACINNIS: Do you consider St. Johns, Quebec, more adaptable for this type of basic training than would be a base on the west coast or in Nova Scotia as it is now?

Mr. RAYNER: No, I think, any naval training should be carried out either on the east coast or the west coast in close proximity to the ocean.

Mr. MACINNIS: And one more question with regard to the remarks made by Mr. Churchill. Would you consider it even more appropriate to have a naval training base in Winnipeg rather than in St. Johns, Quebec? It is much to my consternation, coming from the east coast, that the majority of our navy does come from the prairie provinces. Would it make more sense, then, to have it in the prairie provinces rather than in St. Johns, Quebec?

Mr. RAYNER: I am afraid I cannot go along with the statement that most of the sailors come from the prairie provinces. We get a lot of first class sailors from the prairie provinces. In fact, we got so many during the war that this is where the story began but I would suspect that if you look at the figures the proportion of men that we get from across Canada corresponds fairly closely to the population of the various provinces, but we get more in proportion to the population from the maritimes and from British-Columbia than we do from the rest of Canada.

Mr. MACINNIS: Well, may I say I am happy to hear that myth exploded.

The CHAIRMAN: I must say I think the Admiral handled that very well and I do not think Mr. Paul Martin would have improved on it.

Mr. MACALUSO: I would just like to ask the Admiral a supplementary to Mr. MacInnis' question about training and where you train. Is not Lake Ontario a good training area for—

Mr. RAYNER: Yes, excellent.

Mr. MACALUSO: Well, what is wrong with Hamilton for a training base?

An hon. MEMBER: We are looking for salt water sailors!

Mr. MACINNIS: I think it is going to be Glace Bay.

The CHAIRMAN: Order. I have Mr. Langlois, and then Mr. Forrestall.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): Admiral Rayner, you said just a little while ago that the seamen were very proud of their uniform and in the same sentence, or maybe the next one, you said you made sure that when they came in to basic training they were going to be proud of their uniform. Do you really believe that the sailors today are very proud and keen on wearing their bell-bottomed trousers?

Mr. RAYNER: I think so, yes.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): You think so?

Mr. RAYNER: Yes.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): You have asked them lately?

Mr. RAYNER: No.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): Oh, no. You referred to some kind of a jumper with a zipper or no zipper.

Mr. RAYNER: Yes.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): Have you asked them lately if they would like to wear shirts and ties like boys in the other services?

Mr. RAYNER: May I tell you something about this?

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): Certainly. I am here for that.

Mr. RAYNER: I am told that about a year ago a couple of civilians from the Department of National Defence went down to visit the fleet and they sent through the ships and they said to the sailors "How do you like your uniform? Is it comfortable?" Oh, no. It is lousy. It tickles me." After a few more questions like this they began to get the impression that the sailors did not like their uniform and then they put the important question: "Well, how would you like it if we produced a nice new uniform, a nice green uniform for you?" And the reaction immediately—

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): Did they say green?

Mr. RAYNER: I think they said green, but this is the story, anyway.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): Oh, oh.

Mr. RAYNER: This was told me quite seriously. Immediately they said they would take away the uniform and give them something else the reaction was immediately, "What"? Take away our uniform? What the blankety-blank are you talking about?"

An hon. MEMBER: What about the Irish sailors?

Mr. FORRESTALL: Admiral, just a short question on this naval training, and where you might locate or re-establish whatever it is that would take the place of *Cornwallis* either on the east coast or the west coast—

An hon. MEMBER: Or Hamilton.

Mr. FORRESTALL: —albeit where it is not important in this context. What I am wondering is what on earth would be the cost? Certainly there would only be room for one. The economies of our operation could only afford one such base. If it were located on the west coast, for example, would there not be a tremendous cost of movement of trainees from the east coast to the west coast?

Mr. RAYNER: Yes, there would.

Mr. WINCH: Whether you move them to the west coast or the east coast, what is the difference?

Mr. FORRESTALL: Well, my understanding of that, Mr. Winch, is that two-thirds of the RCN is on the east coast. Am I incorrect in that, Admiral?

Mr. RAYNER: That was the situation, yes. Two-thirds of the navy was based on the Atlantic coast and one-third on the Pacific coast. This had been the ratio for a number of years.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Would there be any under a continuation of this; and I think this largely was based as the years went by after world war II on the Soviet threat which was much more imminent in the Western Atlantic than it was in the Pacific.

Mr. WINCH: Do not run down our Pacific Ocean and British Columbia or you are going to be in trouble.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Right now I could not care less about the Pacific Ocean. I am very concerned about the Atlantic Ocean.

Mr. WINCH: I know you do not.

The CHAIRMAN: I detect a high note of regional politics creeping into that questioning. I wonder whether we could wind it up—

Mr. FORRESTALL: Just as soon as I finish my question. I am not trying to be facetious, Mr. Chairman. I am very concerned about this.

The CHAIRMAN: Go ahead, Mr. Forrestall.

Mr. FORRESTALL: The economic impact of this on the maritime economy is beyond your comprehension. You have no idea, you make no pretence of caring; but I happen to care.

The CHAIRMAN: Order, Mr. Forrestall.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Admiral, what would be the relationship, for example, between the cost of this type of trainee movement and the continuing operation and maintenance of a base like *Cornwallis*?

Mr. RAYNER: Cost is one of the factors that caused us to retain *Cornwallis*.

It would be very difficult to build additional facilities in Halifax. There is a tremendous concentration of facilities there now, as you know. One also has to think in terms of spreading these things out against the possibility of a war, and Halifax is the major base, so we did not want to put anything more into Halifax by way of training facilities. The alternative would be the west coast where there is lots of room, ideal training conditions and so on, but you have the cost of transporting the majority of personnel from eastern Canada to the west and back again for a 26-week course.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Would hat be rather expensive in relation to the other program? Would there be any natural economy—I am quite serious—in locating such a training establishment on the Great Lakes?

Mr. RAYNER: Not when we already have a base; a first class training base.

Mr. FORRESTALL: The base at *Cornwallis* was built starting late in 1942, I believe, and completed sometime in 1943. While you were CNS and in your other involvements in the RCN, was there a continuous program of—not restoration; but I suppose there is a phrase that would cover the converting of these old military-type huts to more permanent quarters. Was this type of program ever undertaken.

Mr. RAYNER: This is going on the whole time. Yes, a person who has not been to *Cornwallis* since the war would not recognize it today. A great deal has been built there. Millions of dollars have been spent.

Mr. FORRESTALL: You would not recognize my birthplace; there is a massive building sitting on it right now at *Cornwallis*. But was a lot of money spent, after it was closed down, or virtually shut down and re-opened again at the time of the Korean war?

Mr. RAYNER: Yes.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Dating from that time, was there a program of constant—

Mr. RAYNER: Yes I think all the wartime construction was temporary quarters and they largely have been replaced by permanent quarters.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, when we met at 3.30 today, we agreed upon three things. First of all to set aside, or stand, the motion of Mr. Andras in order that we might hear Admiral Rayner today. I think we have now completed that examination and on your behalf I will extend thanks to Admiral Rayner, particularly for his willingness to be ready to serve the Committee this afternoon on such very short notice.

We had also agreed that we would try to bring before us tomorrow General Simonds and Air Marshal Curtis Throught the day the Clerk of the Committee has been trying to get in touch with these two gentlemen; he has been in touch with General Simonds who said he is not available for tomorrow, but would be available for Thursday or for Friday of this week. He has not been able to find Air Marshal Curtis, either at his office or at his home, after repeated calls up until about an hour ago. So we are still looking to clear up that matter.

The way we stand at the moment, unless I receive further instruction from the Committee, is that tomorrow we have no work to do other than to return —God forbid—to the motion of Mr. Andras which now stands. I just wonder—just a second, please, until I come to the end of my wondering and then perhaps the committee can assist me. If we are taking this task seriously at all, we still have before us the job of hearing some witnesses, and I wonder whether that could be left with the Steering Committee to work on between now and tomorrow, until we can get some arrangement to put before you by the time we begin our hearing.

We have called hearings beginning tomorrow, and I wonder whether it would be possible for us to make some progress with the bill at least to the extent of calling the Judge Advocate General and asking him to review the bill with us, so that when we are in a position to move to the bill and we have heard witnesses we can do it with some knowledge and foresight of the bill. There have been some discussions among members present that some of the clauses of the bill can be dealt with rather readily; some clauses are simply editorial changes. There are others which, with a very small explanation, I believe could be passed and which are non-contentious.

Perhaps it would assist all of us before we come to face the bill itself and carry it clause by clause, to have some explanation of how it was drawn up and precisely what it means. Perhaps it would be a profitable exercise for us while waiting for a witness, to go through that with the Judge Advocate General and, on a non-contentious basis and without getting into a discussion of the clauses themselves, get some comprehension of the bill. So, if we do not find a witness for tomorrow morning, I wonder whether that exercise would be suitable to the Committee and whether they would let us go ahead as I suggested with the Steering Committee to see what can be done about bringing these two witnesses before us.

Mr. Nugent has his hand up, and I see the hands of others to assist me in what I have just said.

Mr. NUGENT: I am a little surprised, Mr. Chairman, that although there has been difficulty in locating Air Marshal Curtis or General Simonds, nothing has been done to see if Air Chief Marshal Miller and Vice Admiral Dyer were available. I am sure that at least those four names were suggested as the minimum number of witnesses we thought we would call, and I hope that the Chair has asked the Clerk to see if they are available.

The CHAIRMAN: No, I have not.

Mr. NUGENT: This would be another possibility for tomorrow, because I am sure that either one of those gentlemen would be perfectly suitable for tomorrow.

The CHAIRMAN: Let me clear up that point. The only names that were given to the Chair to look into this morning were the names of General Simonds and Air Marshal Curtis. While other names have been suggested by individuals, I am in the hands of the Committee and guided by the consensus of the Committee as to what names we will approach. I am sure if I were to take the names given to me by individuals as they come to mind, I would have a very long list; that has been the history of this Committee and one of its difficulties in making progress.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Partly on a point of order, it was my understanding when General Allard was before us—not that I particularly want to inconvenience the General again, necessarily—but we did find ourselves left in a very embarrassing position a week ago Thursday night with regard to evidence given by Commodore Porter, which was not in any way open to any member of the committee, other than one member, to ask questions, and I had certainly hoped that there was going to be some interval where we could get back at this. To my mind it is very basically important that evidence like this, or the atmosphere which surrounds evidence left hanging in the air like that, is cleared up. Frankly, I would like to know whether we are going to have an opportunity to talk further with either Commodore Porter or the Commander of Maritime Command.

The CHAIRMAN: I will ask the Clerk of the Committee to make sure he has notes on the recommendations for other witnesses that ought to be called and that have been brought up at this time.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Where will this be decided, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN: The committee, I hope, will instruct the Chair before it leaves here tonight as to how it wants this decided. I would like to suggest that the Steering Committee could possibly meet this evening, once we have finished this, and have a chat on it and see whether we can make some progress.

I recognize Mr. Winch and then Mr. Nugent.

Mr. WINCH: I had asked previously this morning about Air Chief Marshal Miller, but unfortunately I cannot personally proceed on that because of a commitment which I cannot escape on the Penitentiaries Committee, and I will be unable to be here for the next three days. So, I do not feel that I can forward that in view of the fact that I, most regretfully, cannot be here for the next three days on this Committee.

Mr. NUGENT: This was not just my personal suggestion, Mr. Chairman. These two two names have cropped up most frequently as being in key positions at the most appropriate times, and therefore have been alluded to as the best

source of information for what was going on in the planning, and where we were at that stage, by so many of the witnesses here that it had been in my mind that it was the general consensus, by the time we had heard this evidence, that these would have been the two most useful witnesses.

When I heard the discussion of General Simonds and Air Marshal Curtis, I assumed that perhaps Air Chief Marshal Miller and Vice Admiral Dyer were not available and I would certainly hope that the Committee is in agreement with me. I do not know them myself, but I got this impression from the evidence we have heard here. I still think from what we have heard they are the two key people we want to hear and I hope they will be given priority in being brought here.

The CHAIRMAN: Anyone else, before we adjourn?

Mr. ANDRAS: Mr. Chairman, we have had some discussions during Committee and we have made excellent progress today. In the interest of seeing whether we could continue this progress, I would certainly subscribe to your suggestion that we try to deal with the last point in a Steering Committee meeting at the very earliest opportunity, tonight or first thing tomorrow morning, and I am certainly willing to do it tonight.

Secondly, tentatively I think it is also a good suggestion to see if there is any way—tomorrow is going to be most difficult under any circumstances to arrange for witnesses because of the inability to contact Air Marshal Curtis and it seems logical, if we could reach agreement here, to start on the Judge Advocate General's explanation of the legal aspects of the bill, subject to what the Steering Committee is able to decide on this other matter this evening.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, I think we have had a good round of questions here and unless there is anything further anyone has to say—

Mr. MCNULTY: I just wanted to corroborate, with Mr. Andras, that due to the fact Mr. Winch will not be here for another three days, that we do to try to get a Steering Committee meeting in and come to some agreement.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. McNulty, I am going to suggest that the Steering Committee meet tonight; immediately this Committee rises, if that is possible. I think all the members are here and we will meet for the next ten or fifteen minutes to see what progress we can make. I thank you all for assisting in the "spring thaw"; the daffodils are coming up and I look forward to warm weather tomorrow.

The meeting is adjourned.

HOUSE OF COMMONS

First Session—Twenty-seventh Parliament

1966-67

STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. GRANT DEACHMAN

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 32

TUESDAY, MARCH 14, 1967

Respecting

Bill C-243, An Act to amend the National Defence Act and other Acts in consequence thereof.

WITNESSES:

From Canadian Forces Headquarters, Department of National Defence: Brigadier W. J. Lawson, Judge Advocate General; Colonel W. M. W. Shaw and Group Captain H. A. McLearn, Judge Advocate General's Branch; Captain (N) A. O. Solomon, Director of Personnel Legal Services; Commodore H. A. Porter, Director General Maritime Forces.

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY
OTTAWA, 1967

25943—1

STANDING COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. Grant Deachman

Vice-Chairman: Hon. Marcel Lambert

Mr. Andras,
Mr. Brewin,
Mr. Byrne,
Mr. Churchill,
Mr. Crossman,
Mr. Ethier,
Mr. Forrestall,
Mr. Foy,
Mr. Harkness,
Mr. Langlois *(Chicoutimi)*,
Mr. Latulippe,
Mr. Lessard,
Mr. Loiselle,
Mr. Macaluso,
Mr. MacInnis *(Cape Breton South)*,
Mr. McIntosh,
Mr. McNulty,
Mr. Nugent,
[1]Mr. Reid,
Mr. Rochon,
Mr. Smith,
Mr. Winch—(24).

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

[1] Replaced Mr. Legault on March 14, 1967.

ORDER OF REFERENCE

HOUSE OF COMMONS,
TUESDAY, March 14, 1967.

Ordered—That the name of Mr. Reid be substituted for that of Mr. Legault on the Standing Committee on National Defence.

Attest.

LÉON-J. RAYMOND,
The Clerk of the House of Commons.

25943—1½

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

TUESDAY, March 14, 1967.
(63)

The Standing Committee on National Defence met at 10:05 a.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Deachman, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Andras, Brewin, Byrne, Churchill, Crossman, Deachman, Forrestall, Foy, Harkness, Lambert, Langlois (*Chicoutimi*), Legault, Loiselle, **Macaluso, MacInnis** (*Cape Breton South*), McIntosh, McNulty, Nugent, Rochon, Smith, and Mr. Winch (21).

In attendance: From the Department of National Defence: Honourable Paul Hellyer, Minister; Brigadier W. J. Lawson, Judge Advocate General; Colonel W. M. W. Shaw; Group Captain H. A. McLearn, Judge Advocate General's Branch; Captain (N) A. O. Solomon, Director of Personnel Legal Services, Canadian Forces Headquarters.

The Chairman read the Thirteenth Report of the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure, as follows:

"SUBCOMMITTEE ON AGENDA AND PROCEDURE

MONDAY, March 13, 1967.
(15)

THIRTEENTH REPORT

The Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure of the Standing Committee on National Defence met at 9:45 p.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Deachman, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Andras, Deachman, Harkness, Lambert, McNulty and Mr. Winch (6).

Your Subcommittee met to consider the order of business for sittings of the Committee on Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday of this week. The Subcommittee recommends as follows:

1. That the Committee continue to stand the motion of Mr. Andras, dated Thursday, March 9, 1967.
2. That the Committee should hear from the Judge Advocate General on the legal implications of *Bill C-243*, at the morning and afternoon sittings on Tuesday.
3. That the Committee may wish to hear from the Director General of Maritime Forces later on Tuesday, if required, and after consultation with the Committee as a whole.
4. That the Committee should invite Air Marshal Curtis to appear on Wednesday afternoon.

5. That the Committee should invite General Simonds to appear on Thursday morning.

6. That the Subcommittee should consider and report on the question of calling additional witnesses by Wednesday of this week.

The Subcommittee adjourned at 10:00 p.m."

On motion of Mr. Winch, seconded by Mr. Foy, the Thirteenth Report of the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure was adopted.

The Chairman called Brigadier W. J. Lawson, Judge Advocate General, who after a few introductory remarks, proceeded to answer questions concerning the Clauses and Schedules of *Bill C-243*, and the reasons for certain of the proposed amendments.

The members had received copies of the Bill, a series of proposed amendments, and copies of the National Defence Act (Office Consolidation 1964).

During the remainder of this sitting, the Committee reviewed Clauses 1 to 8 inclusive, new Clauses 9, 10 and 11, and renumbered Clauses 12 to 16. Brigadier Lawson, Colonel Shaw and Captain (N) Solomon answered questions.

At 12:30 p.m., with the review of *Bill C-243* continuing, the Committee adjourned until 3:30 p.m. this day.

AFTERNOON SITTING
(64)

The Standing Committee on National Defence met at 4:20 p.m. this day, with the Chairman, Mr. Deachman, presiding.

Members present: Messrs. Andras, Brewin, Byrne, Churchill, Crossman, Deachman, Ethier, Forrestall, Foy, Harkness, Lambert, Langlois (*Chicoutimi*), Lessard, Loiselle, Macaluso, MacInnis (*Cape Breton South*), McIntosh, McNulty, Nugent, Reid, Rochon, and Mr. Smith (22).

In attendance: Honourable Léo Cadieux, Associate Minister of National Defence, and those in attendance at the morning sitting.

The Chairman welcomed Colonel Peter Agbeco of Ghana, as an observer at this meeting. Colonel Agbeco has been visiting in Canada for some time and is attached to the Judge Advocate General's Branch at the present time.

The Committee resumed its consideration of the Clauses and Schedules of *Bill C-243*. Brigadier W. J. Lawson, Judge Advocate General and Staff Officer, Colonel W. M. W. Shaw answered questions as the Committee considered re-numbered Clauses 17 to 56 inclusive.

The Committee adjourned at 6:05 p.m., until 8:00 p.m., this day, when the members will resume their study of *Bill C-243*.

EVENING SITTING
(65)

The Standing Committee on National Defence met at 8:05 p.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Deachman, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Andras, Brewin, Byrne, Churchill, Crossman, Deachman, Ethier, Forrestall, Foy, Harkness, Lambert, Langlois (*Chicoutimi*), Lessard, Loiselle, Macaluso, MacInnis (*Cape Breton South*), McIntosh, McNulty, Reid, and Mr. Rochon (20).

Also present: Mr. Pugh and Mr. Whelan.

In *attendance: From the Department of National Defence:* Honourable Léo Cadieux, Associate Minister; Commodore H. A. Porter, Director General Maritime forces; and those in attendance at the morning sitting.

The Committee proceeded to consider re-numbered Clauses 57 to 64 inclusive, and Schedules A and B as amended, in *Bill C-243*. Brigadier W. J. Lawson and Group Captain H. A. McLearn answered questions on various legal points raised by the members.

The review of the Bill was completed at 9: 15 p.m. The Chairman thanked Brigadier Lawson, on behalf of the Committee, and the witnesses were excused.

The Chairman referred to Item 3 of the Subcommittee's Thirteenth Report, dated March 13, 1967. The Committee agreed to call Commodore H. A. Porter, Director General Maritime Forces, as the next witness.

The members questioned Commodore Porter on various subjects related to his statement delivered to the Committee at the evening sitting on Thursday, March 2, 1967. Copies of the statement had been distributed to the members.

The questioning was completed at 10:00 p.m. and the Chairman thanked Commodore Porter. The Committee then adjourned until 3: 30 p.m. on Wednesday, March 15, 1967 when the witness will be Air Marshal W. A. Curtis.

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

TUESDAY, March 14, 1967.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, the Steering Committee held a meeting last night at 9.45 after we rose. We have a copy of the Steering Committee's report before us and I will read the clauses which the Subcommittee recommended (*See Minutes of Proceedings*).

Now, before discussing the Subcommittee's report, I am able to report that the clerk of the Committee has reached Air Marshal Curtis and General Simonds and can confirm that Air Marshal Curtis will be here on Wednesday afternoon and that General Simonds will be here on Thursday morning.

We have a motion for the adoption of the report. Are there any questions on the subcommittee's report? Shall the Subcommittee's report carry?

Some hon. MEMBERS: Agreed.

The CHAIRMAN: The next motion, in accordance with the subcommittee's report, is to stand the motion of Mr. Andras. Shall the motion of Mr. Andras stand? I will leave that for Mr. Andras and Mr. Churchill to discuss.

Motion of Mr. Andras stood.

The CHAIRMAN: I will now call on the Judge Advocate General. Would you sit here with me, sir?

Gentlemen, we have with us this morning Brigadier Lawson, the Judge Advocate General, to explain the bill in relation to the Defence Act.

Now, I might say that the Defence Department has copies of the Defence Act, consolidated with amendments to 1964, for distribution to the Committee. They should be here within half an hour. They are available to members of the Committee in French and English. You will have those before you very shortly.

In addition to that the Committee has already received the bill, I believe, on a couple of occasions, and has also received amendments to the bill.

I have had a discussion with Brigadier Lawson this morning and it is suggested that our method of procedure might be as follows: that he run through the bill, explaining its relationship to the Defence Act and the purpose of the clauses; that he then point out to us those clauses which are simply consequential upon Part 1 of the bill, or consequential upon the major amendments to the Defence Act; and that he also point out those clauses which are not in any way dependent upon integration or unification but which are clauses for up-dating the Defence Act for various reasons. Then, if it is agreeable to the Committee, we might consider later on, perhaps this afternoon, the possibility of dealing with those clauses which are not dependent upon unification, but which are a part of these amendments and which will have to be carried.

If there are no comments on this as a method or procedure I will ask the—Yes, Mr. McIntosh.

Mr. McINTOSH: While I remember, it seemed to me that one of the witnesses brought out the point that there was some discrepancy in the retirement of senior officers in regard to subordinates who are serving the same time; that if a premature retirement took place the senior officer would have a pension of $3,000 and the subordinate would have a pension of $5,000. Is that covered in the amendment.

Brigadier W. J. LAWSON (*Judge Advocate General, Department of National Defence*): No; that is not covered in the amendment, sir.

Mr. McINTOSH: There was also suggested by one of the witnesses—I do not know whether or not it was Admiral Rayner—amendment of the National Defence Act by which personnel joining one service would not be put into another service without their consent. Is that covered in the amendment?

Mr. LAWSON: That question is dealt with in the proposed amendment.

Mr. McINTOSH: It is in it.

Those are two points that I just wanted to bring up.

The CHAIRMAN: If I understand what has been said from time to time at the meetings, some of you have amendments in mind. We are not attempting in the first instance to carry these clauses, but simply to go through them and have a look at them. If, when a clause is raised, you want to intervene with questons on it, do so, but remember that we are coming back to discuss it clause by clause later and please confine yourselves to questions of clarification. Let us not have any argument because we will come to argument later. This exercise this morning is simply an exercise in clarification and explanation of the bill.

Mr. McINTOSH: Mr. Chairman, could I ask why these two points were not considered in the amendments if we are going to amend the whole thing? Was there any particular reason?

Mr. LAWSON: Well, on the first point, sir, this would require an amendment to the Canadian Forces Superannuation Act, which of course we are not dealing with at all. We are not amending that act, apart from some consequential amendments upon unification. There are no amendments of substance to that act being proposed.

Actually in the department we are considering a number of amendments to that act and no doubt that point would be dealt with when those other amendments are brought forward.

Mr. McINTOSH: And on the second point, there would be no need for that if this bill is passed?

Mr. LAWSON: Well, as I say, the second point is dealt with in the bill, sir.

Mr. Chairman, I think it might be helpful to the Committee if, before we get into the clause-by-clause consideration of the bill, I were to outline briefly its structure.

Now, as printed, the bill is divided into two parts and has two schedules. The first part contains clauses essential for the unification of the forces and nothing else. The first part is entirely confined to the question of unification.

The second part contains clauses proposing consequential amendments to other sections of the act. These are amendments not of substance but consequential upon the amendments proposed in the first part; that is, consequential on unfication.

It also contains amendments of substance to various sections of the act that are not in any way related to unification. These are simply amendments that we think desirable to the disciplinary provisions and other provisions of the act that have nothing whatever to do with the unification of the forces.

The first schedule in the bill is simply a table of relative ranks. The second schedule contains a number of proposed consequential amendments to other acts of Parliament; that is, acts other than the National Defence Act. These, of course, are consequential on unification, but have no substance in themselves.

On a further analysis of the bill, however, you might say that it is actually divided into five parts.

The first part is clauses 2, 3 and 4. These clauses contain amendments to the National Defence Act that are necessary if we are to have a unified force. These proposed amendments abolish the three existing services and replace them with one unified service. They also provide a rank structure for the new service. This, I say, is really the first part of the bill.

The second part of the bill contains transitional provisions required for unification. These transitional provisions are found in clauses 5, 6 and 7. They provide that the new unified force continues, as a single service, the Royal Canadian Navy, the Canadian Army and the Royal Canadian Air Force, and that the units and other elements of those services shall be the units and other elements of the the new unified service. In other words, all the present units—the ships, the regiments, the squadrons, and so on—are continued into the new unified service.

They also provide that the officers and men of the old services shall be the officers and men of the new service, but that they cannot, without their consent, be required to perform any duties they could not have been required to perform as members of their former services.

Mr. WINCH: May I ask a question there? I think there has been some confusion on that. Does the legal interpretation, as you give it, of the bill now before us, if passed, mean that without their permission they can not be transferred to any other service?

Mr. LAWSON: There will only be one service, Mr. Winch.

Mr. WINCH: I mean from the navy to another branch. I am speaking of a transfer from a branch within. They cannot, without their permission, be transferred?

Mr. LAWSON: Yes; that is what it amounts to, Mr. Winch.

An hon. MEMBER: Except in an emergency.

Mr. LAWSON: Except in an emergency.

Mr. WINCH: That was going to be my second question: What is your legal interpretation of an emergency?

Mr. LAMBERT: We will get down to that in the clause.

Mr. WINCH: Oh, I was just asking for the legal interpretation, in his estimation, not in argument at all. I was just seeking information; that is all.

Mr. LAWSON: Mr. Winch, "emergency" is defined in the act as meaning war, invasion, riot, or insurrection real or apprehended. That is the definition in the act.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Did not Bill No. C-90 (1964) take away that privilege from the serving man or officer?

Mr. LAWSON: Of refusing to transfer?

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): No; the necessity to serve in any branch of the service that was required of him. Bill No. C-90 (1964) provided that if he was navy he would have to serve in the army—

Mr. LAWSON: As I recall, there is no such provision in that bill.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Do you recall the Minister's statement on that bill?

Mr. LAWSON: No, I do not recall it now, sir.

Now Parts III and IV of the bill are intermingled in clauses 8 to 59. Part III of the bill I define as those clauses which make amendments to the National Defence Act consequential on the changes proposed in clauses 2, 3 and 4; that is, consequential on unification. These are terminological amendments only and are not of any substance; but they do hinge on clauses 2, 3 and 4 being carried.

Part IV of the bill is those clauses containing proposed amendments to the National Defence Act not in any way connected with unification. These are simply amendments that we consider it would be desirable to make at this time, and they have no connection with unification whatever.

The fifth part of the bill, as I have said, is found in schedule B which contains a number of consequential amendments to other acts of Parliament.

The CHAIRMAN: Now, those are the comments relating to the structure of the bill.

Are there any questions before we proceed?

You are now receiving copies of the National Defence Act with amendments to 1964. Copies are available in French for those who wish them.

Mr. Lambert, do you have a question?

Mr. LAMBERT: I want to draw the particular attention of the Committee to some of the contents of the schedules. Brigadier Lawson may want to give us a full explanation. For instance—

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Lambert, your microphone is behind your library.

Mr. LAMBERT: That was an emergency library. I did not know when we were going to get the office consolidation of the act.

There are some amendments to the Canada Elections Act and they are not connected at all with unification or integration.

Mr. LAWSON: I think they are, sir. They are simply amendments deleting references to the three services and inserting a reference to the unified single service.

Mr. LAMBERT: Are there any amendments of substance to the Canada Elections Act?

Mr. LAWSON: No, sir.

Mr. LAMBERT: In other words, they are all consequential?

Mr. LAWSON: They are all consequential. Nothing in schedule B, sir, contains an amendment of substance to any act.

The CHAIRMAN: It certainly makes one wonder when we are going to get that old antique of an act updated, does it not, Mr. Lambert?

Mr. LAMBERT: I was hoping that some of the more obvious deficiencies had been—

Mr. WINCH: Mr. Chairman: I am not a lawyer, and my question may sound a strange one, but evidence was given to us some time ago that the bill before us now was required largely because it was impossible to proceed any further without legislative changes in parliamentary authority.

Brigadier, is it possible, from a legal point of view, for you to give us a brief general picture on integration that can go only to a certain point and then parliamentary authority is required? Now, I hope that I am not sounding naive here. It is a matter on which I personally would like to have some clarification. How far do you go; why you have not gone a certain distance; and, legally, you now have to stop unless there is parliamentary authority?

Mr. LAWSON: Mr. Winch, you cannot proceed with unification of the forces under the existing act, because it provides very clearly that the Canadian forces consist of three services, the Royal Canadian Navy, the Canadian Army and the Royal Canadian Air Force.

Mr. WINCH: I know that I did not make myself clear. I will try again.

I am asking this from a legal point of view only. How can you integrate, as has been done, Materiel Command, personnel and paymasters, etc. into one service and then say that you cannot follow through without authority? Have you not already, by integration, from a legal point of view, brought about, or are you not bringing about, a single service structure in that aspect? Have I made a bit clearer what is bothering me at the moment?

Mr. LAWSON: Bill No. C-90 (1964) gave us parliamentary authority to proceed with integration, but not with unification. It provided for a single chief of staff, and this is the basis on which all integration hangs. But there is no authority in Bill No. C-90 (1964) to proceed with unification.

Mr. WINCH: Under Bill No. C-90, (1964) did you have the authority for, let us say, the integration of logistics into one service?

Mr. LAWSON: The three services' logistics sides were integrated, but there were still three services; there were still navy, army and air force personnel in the integrated logistics service. You could integrate the three services, but you could not unify them.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): On that point, sir, I have asked about Bill No. C-90 (1964) before. The Minister of National Defence made it quite clear on page 10828 of *Hansard* when he said that it meant that the three services would no longer retain their status as individual entities within the Canadian forces. This is the Minister's interpretation and this is what you said before was not so.

Mr. LAWSON: Well, of course, it turns on the use of words. Under Bill No. C-90 (1964) you could bring together members of the three services and place them in an integrated organization, and in this sense they would lose their identity; but you could not abolish the three services. You still had your sailors, soldiers and airmen serving in this integrated organization that was set up under Bill No. C-90 (1964).

Mr. HARKNESS: In fact, Brigadier, you pursued that to a considerable extent before Bill No. C-90 (1964) was passed?

Mr. LAWSON: That is quite true, sir.

Mr. HARKNESS: And it was, in fact, done.

Mr. LAWSON: Yes, of course. My service has been integrated for 15 years.

Mr. HARKNESS: I was just thinking of your service; and also of the chaplains and the medical people.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): You maintain that this is just a play on words on the part of the Minister.

Some hon. MEMBERS: No, no.

The CHAIRMAN: Just a moment, please.

Gentlemen, we do not have the Minister with us this morning. This is an exercise in clarification. I think we are extending it a little when we ask an officer who is before us to comment on what the Minister has said. I would ask you to remain in the realm of clarification of the bill. I think, in fairness, we would all agree—

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): That is what I was attempting to do on the interpretation. If it was taken in any other way, I am sorry.

The CHAIRMAN: I think we understand that.

Mr. Smith, you had your hand up.

Mr. SMITH: Clause 4 of the new bill—

Mr. LAMBERT: Could we not keep these in order?

Mr. SMITH: All right.

Mr. LAMBERT: Would it not simplify things if we started with clause 1 and had explanations and then questions?

The CHAIRMAN: I think that is probably a more logical way to proceed. Let us start, and I will call for any explanations or questions.

On clause 1—Short title.

On clause 2—*Canadian Forces, Canadian Armed Forces.*

The CHAIRMAN: Have you any special comment to make on the structure of the Canadian forces?

Mr. LAWSON: No, I have not.

Mr. LAMBERT: In 16 (1) you say:

> There shall be a component of the Canadian Forces, referred to in this Act as the regular force, consisting of officers and men who are enrolled for continuing, full-time military service.

What officers and men?

The CHAIRMAN: That is at line 13.

Mr. LAMBERT: Are they the ones who are presently in the forces and those who subsequently will engage in the forces?

Mr. LAWSON: That is right, sir. The bill provides for that in a further clause; that the officers and men now in the present forces will be the officers and men of the new force.

Mr. LAMBERT: They are automatically transferred?

Mr. LAWSON: That is right, sir.

Mr. LAMBERT: This raises the question of whether there is consent. There is no consent in the case of the transfer from the present forces to the future single force?

Mr. LAWSON: No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN: Are there any further questions in relation to section 16?

Mr. LEGAULT: Mr. Chairman, in the explanatory notes on section 16 there is mention of "the regular force, the reserve force and the special force". Could some explanation be given of "the special force"?

Mr. LAWSON: We have always had a provision in the Act for a force that could be set up in an emergency. Under the old Act it was called the Active Service Force but all we have done here is changed the name to Special Force—we thought it was a more appropriate name, but we are not making any change in substance. We have always had provision for this emergency wartime force.

Mr. LAMBERT: There has been some suggestion that this will allow the government, without any further ado, to set up a special force and place it under the authority of anyone. Was it not the case that the statutes or the treaties were spelled out; that it was under United Nations or NATO, that one could do this?

Mr. LAWSON: I would point out Mr. Lambert that the previous section provided that:

> In an emergency, or if considered desirable in consequence of any action undertaken by Canada under the United Nations Charter, the North Atlantic Treaty or any other similar instrument for collective defence—

So, I think it was just as broad as the proposed clause. This was just a matter of tidying up. We thought it was a better and more logical wording and that is the reason we made the change. It was not intended that it should reflect any change in policy.

Mr. LAMBERT: —any international arrangement for collective defence—

Does this take in the provision of a peacekeeping force composed entirely of Canadians which might be sent out to, say, somewhere in South America?

Mr. LAWSON: I should not think an arrangement for a peacekeeping force could be said to be an international arrangement for collective defence.

Mr. LAMBERT: No, it would not be pursuant to an international arrangement. I am concerned about the creation of special peacekeeping forces composed entirely of Canadian troops which has been envisaged by some people in the description of the future role of Canada's forces.

Mr. LAWSON: Well, could I point out, Mr. Lambert, that the government would have no greater control over this so-called special force than it has over the regular forces at any time. This proposed section gives the government no particular additional powers over this force.

Mr. SMITH: In the proposed section 17(1), Brigadier Lawson, it seems to me that there is some difference because the old section said:

—or any other similar instrument for collectivce defence—

An instrument would indicate to me a treaty, while the new clause says:

—any international arrangement—

I am curious about the meaning of the word "arrangement" and the shades of difference between it and "similar instrument". I do not quite follow that the new clause does not broaden the powers of the government to entertain new adventures outside of Canada because the present section reads:

—the North Atlantic Treaty—

which is an international treaty

—or any other similar instrument—

The new wording comes to this:

—pursuant to any international arrangement entered into by Canada—

Perhaps there is a fine shading of meaning but it seems to me that it does broaden the scope.

Mr. LAWSON: I would agree with you, sir, that the new clause is more flexible, but all this clause does is empower the government to create this so-called special force. It does not give the government any additional powers as to the manner in which this force or any other force is to be used. All it does is deal with the creation of a force.

Mr. NUGENT: No; it does. The other one requires a treaty and this one says, arrangement. This could be an arrangement between this government and some banana republic and then we have an international arrangement. There is no definitive. That worries me. You are just limited to that and I suggest to you that it broadens it considerably.

Mr. LAWSON: Oh, I agree with you, sir. I agree that it gives the government more flexibility but only in creating the force—not in the use of the force. This clause deals only with the creation of the force and not with its use.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Lambert and then Mr. Brewin is the order which I have.

Mr. LAMBERT: Well, my point was much the same as Mr. Nugent indicated. There is a world of difference between the wording "or any other similar instrument for collective defence" with "pursuant to any international arrangement for collective defence". We are almost getting into the realm of policy here if we are going to argue the why's and wherefore's of it.

The CHAIRMAN: I was about to say that I think we are beginning to extend the bounds of clarification on this and. . .

Mr. BREWIN: May I just point out one thing in relation to this, though, and that is it has been suggested by Mr. Smith and Mr. Lambert that this broadens the scope and permits the special force to be set up under the new clause where perhaps it was not permissible under the old section. It may also limit it. The other was "in consequence of any action undertaken under the United Nations Charter". That may be a very different thing to "pursuant to any international arrangements for collective defence". There are various sections in the Charter, some of which might be interpreted as being for collective defence; others might not. I, for one, cannot help expressing the view that the cleaning up has obscured rather than aided it. I am much happier about setting up a special force under the United Nations or NATO or a similar instrument than under the rather vaguer language which may both limit or, in some cases, expand what was in there before and I would suggest that this be reconsidered.

Mr. ANDRAS: I have a question relating to this. Perhaps I should know the answer to this but I do not. "Entering into an international arrangement" or, conversely, on the explanation of the old section, "entering into agreement under the United Nations Charter", what is the governmental authority to do that? Can that be done by Governor in Council or does it require parliamentary approval before or after?

Mr. LAWSON: The practice is that the approval of Parliament is always obtained to any arrangement of this nature of importance. I would think, in a strict matter of law,

perhaps this is not required in some cases, but as a matter of policy it is always obtained.

Mr. ANDRAS: Really, what I am getting at is that if there is a difference in the shade of meaning between "any international arrangement" and "any other similar instrument" the entering into any other arrangement would require approval of parliament before so doing. This is really what I am getting at; there is that ultimate control on it.

Mr. LAWSON: Yes, that is true.

Mr. NUGENT: I just noticed, since we are on this, that the Brigadier's comments are that all this does is give the government more flexibility in forming this force but not in how it may be used. I just checked the operative section as to how it may be used—the proposed section 32—and find the same meaning there, so I am afraid I have to reject completely the argument that it does not expand it. In one case it is limited to a treaty but in another under any international arrangement, not only in the way it can be raised but in the way it can be used. It is expanded beyond recognition because we do not even know what an international arrangement can be and it is not limited or defined in the way of an international treaty. I just thought I would mention this now since we will be running into it again when we come to that section.

Mr. LAWSON: I am sorry, Mr. Chairman. I was confining myself strictly to the proposed section 17. I realize later on this point comes up again in another context, but I was confining myself solely to this.

The CHAIRMAN: In fairness to the Brigadier, we are going to go over this ground again and there will be ample opportunity for argument, presumably with the Minister here and whatever number of officials of the Department are necessary to define what they have in mind and to defend policy. So long as these points, such as the one you raised are noted, Mr. Nugent, so that the Department and the Minister can arm themselves with the information necessary to meet your points, this is the purpose of the exercise.

Mr. NUGENT: Mr. Chairman, surely the Minister is not going to help us interpret what this means. I just wanted to be sure that we have from him one correction on that first; that it did not fail to expand.

The CHAIRMAN: The Minister is going to have to be responsible for the policy, Mr. Nugent.

Mr. NUGENT: But they may want to give some consideration to the use of the word "arrangement".

The CHAIRMAN: Are there any further questions on the proposed section 17?

Mr. CHURCHILL: Yes. Earlier this morning we were talking about clause 7 on page 4, where:

> no officer or man who was a member of the Royal Canadian Navy, the Canadian Army or the Royal Canadian Air Force would be required to perform any duty in the Canadian Forces that he could not have been required to perform as a member of such Service.

It was pointed out "except in an emergency", which was then defined. But now in the proposed section 17, that we are just looking at, in addition to an emergency, you have this other situation: "an action undertaken by Canada pursuant to any interna-

tional arrangement", so it would follow that officers and men could be transferred into the special force under that second situation without their consent, the same as in an emergency, so that a man might find himself serving with a land force when he really wanted to be at sea.

Mr. LAWSON: No sir. The other clause would still apply whether he was in the special force or not—clause 7.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Clause 7 limits it to an emergency but the proposed section 17 includes not only an emergency but it has this other international arrangement.

Mr. LAWSON: Yes, but unless there were an emergency, sir, clause 7 would over-ride the proposed section 17. In other words, you could not place a man under the proposed section 17 in a line of work in the new special force that he would not have been required to perform under his original terms of enrolment. Clause 7 would prohibit that unless there were an emergency and, as you say, the special force might be set up when there was not an emergency. Clause 7 would certainly govern in that case.

Mr. CHURCHILL: There would be a distinction, then. In an emergency clause 7 would apply but not necessarily under the special arrangements.

Mr. LAWSON: If there were no emergency clause 7 would apply regardless of whether there was a special force or not.

The CHAIRMAN: If there are no further questions on the proposed section 17, we will move to section 18 which is proposed. Mr. Lambert, have you a question on this?

Mr. LAMBERT: Yes, concerning subsection (1). Now, this means that the Canadian forces in the future would consist of units and other elements simply designated by the Minister. The Minister could set up, shall we say, a force of marines?

Mr. LAWSON: Perhaps I should point out first, Mr. Lambert, there is no change in clause 18. The proposed amendments are purely consequential on unification. There is no change in substance at all. It is what is in the act now.

Mr. LAMBERT: Except that the act as it now stands says that... the Royal Canadian Navy, the Canadian Army and the Royal Canadian Air Force shall consist of such units and other elements as are from time to time..."designated.

Mr. LAWSON: That is right.

Mr. LAMBERT: But that is different from saying that the Canadian Forces shall consist of such units. In other words, under clause 18 all combinations and permutations of servicemen are possible; whereas, under clause 18 as it originally stood it was only within the confines of each of the services.

Mr. LAWSON: Well, you must look at subsection (3) of the present section 18, sir, which was added by Bill No. C-90 (1964) and which did permit the Minister to establish these integrated organizations. It is under this clause that integration up to the present point has been carried out.

Mr. LAMBERT: Under section 18(3).

Mr. LAWSON: Under section 18(3). We are now dropping (3) because it is obviously no longer required if the clauses relating to unification are passed.

Mr. NUGENT: That does not change the fact in what Mr. Lambert has said, that the Minister can organize the marine force under the act now. He may have been able to do it under (3) and nobody noticed it. We have this interpretation that this now makes it possible that the force shall consist in the form the Minister may wish, and there is no limitation in here that even army units shall be of battalion strength or less. It could be just a company from the army, navy and so on.

Mr. LAWSON: That is right, sir.

Mr. NUGENT: Thank you.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): It could have been the same way previously.

Mr. LAWSON: Oh, yes.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): I mean, the Minister could have organized a corps of marines either within the navy or within the army?

Mr. LAWSON: That is right, sir.

Mr. LAMBERT: I beg to differ there. The words are: "may establish organizations to which . . . may . . . be attached". They were not "part of", and now they would be "part of". They would not necessarily be "attached".

Mr. LAWSON: Well, there is that difference sir, in that we only have one service, so that everyone is part of that one service; that is so.

Mr. LAMBERT: This is the distinction. Mr. Lawson's generalization was too great to let go, that you could have organized a new unit, or formation, and that members of the army and air force and navy could have been put into it and have formed part of it. This is not so. They might have been attached.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): Within one service it could have been organized.

Mr. LAMBERT: Oh, it could have been organized within the one service.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): What is the difference?

Mr. LAMBERT: Oh, there is a great deal of difference between that and having it apply to one service.

Mr. LAWSON: Yes; that is quite right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN: If there are no further questions we will pass on to clause 3 which repeals section 21.

On clause 3—*1956, c. 18, s.5.*

Mr. LAWSON: This proposed amendment is purely consequential except for the fact that we are now suggesting that provision be made for enrolling men for indefinite periods of service. Formerly, men could only be enrolled for fixed periods of service.

Mr. LAMBERT: What about the indication that a man may withdraw from the service? Is this on a regulatory six months, or what is the precise regulation that is proposed?

Mr. LAWSON: The law, of course, is quite clear. When a man enrols, say, for five years he is bound to serve for five years. If he leaves he is a deserter.

Mr. LAMBERT: That is right.

Mr. LAWSON: Service policy, as I understand it, is that men will be permitted to leave on six months' notice. But this is policy; this is not law.

Mr. HARKNESS: This does not appear anywhere in the act.

Mr. LAWSON: No, sir.

Mr. LAMBERT: On the other hand, it is now proposed to have men engage for indefinite periods, subject to regulations; but what notice is required? If they were all in there they could give you one month's notice and they are gone.

Mr. LAWSON: This would turn on the regulations, of course, sir—whatever regulations the Governor in Council sees fit to enact under the section, if it is passed.

Mr. LAMBERT: Of course, this is one of the areas in which, I think. Brigadier Lawson, you have been watching the House to notice that time and time again I have objected strenuously to these second acts which are beyond the pale of Parliament and the determination of Parliament. Here is a precise point. I realize that there is a desire for some flexibility, but these regulations give the Governor in Council carte blanche to determine the periods of service and the method. If it is going to be possible for servicemen who are not engaged for fixed periods to give one month's notice or two weeks' notice, as you do in any employment, Her Majesty's Canadian forces might suddenly find themselves extremely short. This is the thing that we must concern ourselves with. There must be no such possibility. Or is it going to be for an indefinite period but fixed by regulation? This is the point I am concerned about.

I want to see these regulations. I will be asking the Minister for a tabling of these regulations and referral back to this Committee on immediate promulgation. Frankly, if I may say so, from Parliament's point of view this is a lot of nonsense.

The CHAIRMAN: I have Mr. Smith, Mr. Andras and Mr. Nugent wishing to speak on this subject.

Mr. SMITH: From a draftman's point of view, or even from a practical point of view, in terms of a service, Brigadier Lawson is the word "indefinite" really necessary? Was it a really essential amendment to the act? Surely under the old section, "... for fixed terms of service, as may be prescribed in regulations ..." they could have enlisted them for a year at a time which could have been terminated on one month's notice. Were not all the real, practical powers already in the old section 21? There seems to me to be no prohibition on the forces' enlisting a man for a year at a time under the old regulations.

Mr. LAWSON: You are quite right, Mr. Smith; under the existing act a man could have been enrolled for 50 years, 25 years, or for any period of time; but it had to be a fixed period, which has proved awkward with personnel.

Mr. SMITH: You used the figure of 25 years, it could be for one year or for six months?

Mr. LAWSON: Exactly.

Mr. SMITH: Any fixed period; so that strictly speaking the "indefinite" is not really very important?

Mr. LAWSON: No, it is not materially increasing the powers of the Governor in Council. It is just making it a little tidier, and easier to draft the regulations, and so on.

Mr. SMITH: It might also be making it a little untidy from certain other non-legal aspects of enlistment, too, which we are not to deal with this morning.

Mr. ANDRAS: I have two questions that I want to ask.

Am I correct in assuming that the real effect of this is simply to extend to the other ranks the same provision for indefinite terms of service as has existed for subordinate officers under the previous act?

Mr. LAWSON: For all officers.

Mr. ANDRAS: Yes; well, I am using the word "subordinate" because I wanted to get clarification of it. Basically it is just extending to the men the same provision for indefinite terms of service as has existed in the past for officers?

Mr. LAWSON: That is right, sir.

Mr. HARKNESS: I am glad you gave that clarification, Brigadier, because as outlined in the Minister's speech, I think, regulations are going to provide that a man can get out by giving six months' notice, but that this is not the case with regard to an officer.

Mr. LAWSON: No; there is nothing in regulations allowing anybody to get out on notice. This has been the policy. I do not know what the regulations are going to be in the future. There might well be some provision for officers getting out; I do not know. Certainly under the law they are bound to serve for the balance of their terms.

Mr. ANDRAS: I was simply pointing out that in the old section 21 it said that they shall be enrolled

(a) as subordinate officers for indefinite or fixed terms of service,

It seems to me that you have just extended that to apply to the men as well as to the officers. Am I correct in that?

Mr. LAWSON: That is right, sir.

Mr. ANDRAS: My other question is on a point that somebody has just raised. Why do you use the word "subordinate" in there? Are all officers except the chief of staff subordinate?

Mr. LAWSON: Pardon?

Mr. ANDRAS: Are all officers except the chief of staff classed as subordinate?

Mr. LAWSON: No; the class "subordinate officers" are people who, really, are going to be officers. They are not yet commissioned.

Mr. ANDRAS: Oh, I see. In other words, this is the officer cadet class.

Mr. LAWSON: Yes.

Mr. SMITH: Should we not have somewhere in the act a definition of "subordinate officer"?

Mr. LAWSON: We do sir.

Mr. SMITH: There is one?

Mr. LAWSON: Yes.

Mr. SMITH: I beg your pardon. Where is it?

Mr. LAWSON: You will find it at the top of page 6 of the bill, sir.

Mr. NUGENT: Now, can we come back to this point? I want to be sure that my interpretation of what this does is correct. The Minister has made much in his speech about this "indefinite" period in his plan—that we would be better off to have people enrolled for indefinite periods and able to resign in six months—and that it is his policy to have more flexibility. However, the way the bill is drafted, and since it provides for either indefinite or fixed periods as may be prescribed by regulations, what we have done here legally is to give the Minister the right to make his policy after the act has passed, to decide policy sometime in the future and to bring in the regulation either for the policy he has announced or for the old policy, whichever suits the purpose after the act is in force. Is that not accurate?

Mr. LAWSON: That is right, sir.

Mr. SMITH: In clause 3 the Governor in Council is given more flexibility in the terms of enlistment by the addition of the words "for indefinite . . . periods". It seems to me, reading clause 4, that they turn in the opposite direction there and tie themselves into a strait-jacket with a very rigid rank structure.

Mr. LAWSON: I must say I agree with you Mr. Smith. I would prefer that the rank structure was not in the bill, but unfortunately we were advised by the law officers of the Crown that we must have it there.

Mr. SMITH: It is strange that it was not in the old act.

Mr. LAWSON: I agree.

Mr. SMITH: It is strange that that went on for all these years.

I think, Mr. Chairman, if this was the advice, that we should have the law officers of the Crown here to explain why we were allowed to go on for 97 years with the old section 22, which seems to me to be very practical and to give the minister more flexibility; and it gives the Governor in Council more flexibility. As I see it, we are tying ourselves into a strait-jacket. If one of these ranks is not satisfactory the only way you can change it is to come back for an amendment. Is that not so?

Mr. LAWSON: That is right.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Smith, this is a mystery I do not understand. Perhaps before we carry this clause we can have an explanation from the law officers of the Crown. I am sure the Judge Advocate General will take a note of it this morning.

The Judge Advocate General says that he can explain it from the point of view of the law officers of the Crown. Perhaps we should listen to that now.

Mr. LAWSON: The reason is this, of course, sir, that throughout the bill, and in numerous other acts of parliament, there are references to ranks. An officer of a certain rank is given certain powers under the Fisheries Act, we will say. If you leave it to the Governor in Council to prescribe the table of ranks the Governor in Council could, in effect, change those acts of parliament. This is why they say that we must have the ranks set out in an act of parliament. It is because other acts refer to ranks.

Mr. SMITH: I am only a country lawyer, Brigadier Lawson, but I find that argument a rather finely drawn one.

Mr. LAWSON: This is the reason, anyhow.

Mr. SMITH: It is interesting.

Mr. MACINNIS: Mr. Smith says he finds it rather finely drawn. This must also be your opinion, because you said that you wish that they were not included?

Mr. LAWSON: As a matter of practicality I think it would be much simpler if we had the old section instead of the new. But as a lawyer I think they are quite right, and that we do have to have them in here.

Mr. LAMBERT: Brigadier Lawson, surely it has been going on for decades. Nobody has suffered under the other acts.

Mr. LAWSON: That is quite right, sir.

Mr. LAMBERT: I could suggest to you, as a reason for it, that it is merely to spell out what the rank structure will be, for information purposes; that it would have been deferred had it been left to the Governor in Council. This is a tactical move, but I think it is buying certain publicity at a very dear price.

The CHAIRMAN: Well, gentlemen, I am sure you will have an opportunity to discuss with the Minister a little later how finely drawn or how broadly pencilled in this may be.

Have we covered the questions? We seem to have slipped along to clause 4. Have we finished with clause 3?

On clause 4—*Use of other designations.*

Mr. LAMBERT: I would like to speak on subclause 3. Here again ". . . the regulations for prescribing other designations for the titles of rank set forth in this section . . ." Just what is meant by that, Mr. Lawson?

Mr. LAWSON: This would empower the Minister to permit, say, the present naval ranks to be used in certain circumstances if he considered it desirable to do so. It would permit, say, privates in the guards to be called guardsmen rather than privates; this sort of thing.

Mr. LAMBERT: Am I right then in saying that the effect of section 22(1) and (2) is to establish a table of substantive rank which would be your official rank on your documents and so forth, but that by regulation you could be called, and could be known for practically the rest of your service life, by another designation? Or would this be similar to the British army where you were a confirmed captain, a temporary major or a brevet lieutenant colonel? Is that what you envisage might happen under this?

Mr. LAWSON: That, of course, could happen, but not necessarily under this clause. You can always have acting ranks, and this sort of thing.

This is to enable the minister, if he considers it desirable, to permit people to use other designations of rank, or designations of rank other than those set out in the clause.

Mr. MACINNIS: It is almost like authorizing nicknames.

Mr. NUGENT: In other words, he can retreat from these designations, for all practical purposes. They may, in law, hold certain ranks, but when the Minister finds out how unpopular they are he may be allowed by regulation to ignore them and continue the system that has proved itself.

Mr. LAWSON: These will always be the official designations; but, as you say, the other designations could be used in nearly all circumstances.

Mr. NUGENT: Just so long as he has a line of retreat left open. I am glad to see so many here, because he is going to need some of them.

Mr. HARKNESS: In other words subclause (1) and subclause (2) take away the flexibility which exists at the present time under the old section 22, and subclause (3) is an attempt to restore that flexibility in some respects.

Mr. LAWSON: To some extent.

The CHAIRMAN: Are we through with questions on Clause 4 for the moment? If so, we will move on to clause 5.

On clause 5—*Continuation.*

The CHAIRMAN: Are there any questions on clause 5?

Mr. LAMBERT: Well, subject to what provisions of the National Defence Act? Subclause (2) reads:

> The units and other elements of the Royal Canadian Navy, the Canadian Army and the Royal Canadian Air Force, existing at the coming into force of this Part shall, subject to the provisions of the *National Defence Act*, continue to be the units and elements of the Canadian Forces.

You indicated to us a few moments ago, in answer to a question I put, that the men and officers presently in the services would constitute the Canadian defence forces. What is the meaning of the proviso "subject to the provisions of the National Defence Act". I thought it was deemed to be automatic.

Mr. LAWSON: Sir, if we did not have those words in, the units and other elements that now exist would be frozen and we could never change them. You could not make any changes if you did not have these words in the clause. Parliament then would have said: These are the units and elements, and this is the end.

Mr. LAMBERT: I see.

Mr. CHURCHILL: In subclause (1) it says:

> The Canadian Forces continue, as a single Service, the Services known before the coming into force of this Part as the Royal Canadian Navy, the Canadian Army and the Royal Canadian Air Force.

Mr. LAWSON: It simply means, sir, that the new force is the legal successor to the previous forces. We have in the existing act section 17 which we are dropping as it is no longer required, which says:

> (2) On and after the 7th day of August, 1950, the Naval Service, including the Naval Forces, shall be designated the Royal Canadian Navy.

In other words, we set up a new thing called the Royal Canadian Navy and embodied in it these other things called naval service and naval forces.

What we are doing here is setting up a new Canadian force and saying that it is the successor in law to the three existing forces.

Mr. CHURCHILL: It seems to imply that the three existing forces are going to be retained; but that is not what is intended.

Mr. LAWSON: May I draw the analogy, sir, of two corporations uniting. The new corporation which is born as a result of the union of the two old corporations is the legal successor; it carries on all the obligations of the old corporations and so on. In the same way the new Canadian forces will be the legal successor to the three existing services.

Mr. NUGENT: Why did you not use that term. Is it not strange to say that you continue something that by act you are discontinuing—chopping off—and then say, "continue as a single service"? Is there a special reason you did not use the term: "It shall be known as, or is the legal successor to, in all matters of law . . ."?

Mr. LAWSON: I do not think that there was any particular reason for that exact form of words, sir. The intention is to provide that Parliament will in effect say that the new Canadian armed forces are the legal continuance of the old forces.

Mr. CHURCHILL: It would have been much clearer had that phraseology been used, because I suggest that as far as the public is concerned this could be construed as really instituting no change at all. That is something that I think we will have to give attention to later on.

The CHAIRMAN: Are there any further questions? If not, we will move to clause 6.

On clause 6: *Officers and men members of Canadian Forces*

Mr. HARKNESS: As I understand it, this clause provides that everyone now serving is transferred from his present service—navy, army or air force, as the case may be—willy-nilly into the new force, and has no option in that regard.

Mr. LAWSON: I would not use the word "transferred", Mr. Harkness; I think this is wrong. It is not a transfer. I would point out that under the existing Act, section 24 provides:

> The enrolment of a person binds that person to serve in the Canadian Forces until he is, in accordance with regulations, lawfully released.

Now, this has always been the law ever since the National Defence Act was first enacted. Then, if you look at subsection (14) of section 2 of the existing Act, it says—

An hon. MEMBER: What section?

Mr. LAWSON: Subsection (14) of section 2, which gives the definition of "enrol":

> "enrol" means to cause any person to become a member of the Canadian Forces;

Mr. NUGENT: Yes, but legally he could only become a member of one force; there was a legal identity to which he enrolled. Anyone who enrolled in the army could, by no stretch of the imagination, be legally termed a member of the air force or of the navy. That is a simple case of referring to wording which sufficed, because once he was legally enrolled, he was legally in a service. To suggest that he is not being trnasferred when he is now forcibly being put into what is a new service—a legal successor, perhaps, to another one, but an entirely different concept—is wrong. I am afraid you cannot rely just on that loose wording to suggest this is not a transfer into another service.

The CHAIRMAN: Are there any other questions on clause 6?

Mr. NUGENT: Just so long as we have it clear, Mr. Chairman, that whatever words we use, the purport of this section is that no matter what the man may have thought his terms of enrolment to be, no matter what we may think of the position, legally he has no choice and no option; that this new force is the legal successor to all three instead of to just one, and a person from any one of the old ones is automatically in the new one with no option. That is the law; take it and put up with it. That is the legal effect of this section, is it not?

Mr. LAWSON: That is the legal effect. I perhaps should point out to the committee the provisions of section (34) of the existing Act, as well. Subsection (34) of section 1, provides:

> The regular forces, all units and other elements thereof and all officers and men thereof are at all times liable to perform any lawful duty.

I think "lawful duty" means any duty within the executive responsibility and authorities of the government of Canada, so that any officer or man, on enrolling, in the past has, in the regular force, subjected himself to this very broad liability:

> to perform any lawful duty.

Mr. LAMBERT: Including the transfer into another force?

Mr. LAWSON: Not a transfer, no. But, to do any type of service. The reason, of course—

Mr. HARKNESS: I do not think it was ever considered that a lawful duty would be to put an infantry battalion commander in the command of a ship.

Mr. LAWSON: It certainly would have been a legal duty. Mr. Harkness, no matter how foolish it might have been.

Mr. HARKNESS: No, but I say, I do not think that to go and command a ship could even have been interpreted as one of that infantry officers lawful duties.

Mr. LAWSON: Oh, yes; I would say it would, sir.

Mr. HARKNESS: Under the naval provisions he is responsible for the safety of the ship, but he has no background, or training, or means of being responsible for the safety of that ship.

Mr. LAWSON: Oh, I agree with you, it would be a very foolish—

Mr. HARKNESS: Well, that is why I do not think it even would be legal.

Mr. LAWSON: Well, no: I think in law, this would be a lawful duty.

Mr. LAMBERT: Surely though, you are not going to argue, Brigadier Lawson, that the performance of a lawful duty consists in the continuation of a commission? That is what we are talking about in clause 6, the continuation of commissions; and that a man, having enrolled or engaged in the Canadian Army and obtained a commission, ipso facto finds himself subject to the same obligations of what commission in a single defence force, without by your leave or kiss my foot on his part.

Mr. LAWSON: Well, I think you are getting into a question of policy. Of course, I would remind you of clause 7.

Mr. LAMBERT: I am very well aware of clause 7, but still it is not, as I say, legally germane to the point that I am making. I will agree that this may switch over into the policy, and I do not want to argue policy with you, but what I am discussing with you is the legal effect of clause 6.

Mr. LAWSON: Mr. Lambert, the legal effect of clause 6 is, of course, clearly to place all officers and men who are now serving in the new force.

Mr. LAMBERT: Automatically?

Mr. LAWSON: Yes.

Mr. NUGENT: Brigadier, you read clause 7, and you said Mr. Lambert should read that, but your interpretation of section 34, which you have attempted, apparently, to give us really required him, technically to be able to carry out any order at all. Clause 7, of course, on your interpretation, does not give any assistance whatsoever. It does not ameliorate the situation he finds himself in by virtue of clause 6, that this is now a new type of force and it may envisage a new type of duty, and he is automatically transferred. And clause 7, as you have interpreted by referring to section 34, does not ease that event.

Mr. LAWSON: As a strict matter of law, I would have to agree with you, sir. It is a very clear statement of the policy of Parliament and of the government.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Are you referring to clause 7, now, Brigadier?

Mr. LAWSON: Yes.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Well, could I say something? In the explanation on the right hand of page—

Mr. NUGENT: We are still on clause 6.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Yes, but I just want to get this clear. It seems to me the purpose as it is outlined here is worded much better than clause 7 itself. If you go down to line 4 in clause 7, you say, right after "Part," "shall—and leave out "without his consent", because that is not necessary—be required to perform any duty". In the explanation you say, "will not be required to perform." Is the word "not" left out of—

An hon. MEMBER: It says, "no officer or man".

Mr. MCINTOSH: Well, it is rather confusing in the clause and it is much clearer in the definition. This is what I am getting at.

Mr. LAWSON: I think that is a matter of drafting sir; certainly the meaning is the same in both, I think.

Mr. McINTOSH: I read the last part of the clause: "shall be required to perform any duty in the Canadian Army," and you say in the definition: "will not be required to perform."

Mr. LAWSON: Yes, but the negative comes before "officer or man." It says: "no officer or man shall be required to perform." It is a matter of drafting, I think.

The CHAIRMAN: It is a double negative, is it not?

Mr. LAWSON: No.

Mr. NUGENT: I wonder whether the Brigadier feels that he can advise us on this point? There may be many enlisted men who will object to being put into this new force, so I will use the argument that they enlisted in the navy so that they would serve with naval personnel and that they had always hated Army personnel and would not be any part of the same unit. The terms of their enlistment applied to just that force, but the law now being passed transfers all into one force so that they are forced by law to be in the same service with those people they had always so heartily disliked. Does the Brigadier not think that the court, looking at this, is going to say; "I do not think this is legal", certainly from the point of view of fairness to the people who enlisted years ago when there was no thought in anyone's mind that this could happen to them? It is not fair to a man to change the entire basis of enlistment, and: "You are transferred by law." Could the Brigadier tell the opinions of law officers of the Crown? I suppose there are some legal opinions on this, are they very strong in this regard? How thoroughly has this been researched?

Mr. LAWSON: Surely this is a policy question, sir, rather than a legal question. If this clause is enacted, the law will be abundantly clear; there will be no doubt of the law. What you are raising, really, is the question of the policy behind the enactment.

Mr. NUGENT: Well, then I am not so clear about the law, Brigadier. It seems to me that the only way a man can be subject to military discipline is because he undertook a certain obligation, and whether we have the legal right now to change the term of that contract on one side, is what I am questioning. I cannot see the difference in this as—

Mr. HARKNESS: In other words, you are saying this is a form of conscription.

Mr. NUGENT: Well, it is.

Mr. HARKNESS: For which there is no provision in our law.

Mr. NUGENT: A particular group of men, once undertook one obligation under a contract which they voluntarily signed with the government.

Mr. McINTOSH: And the original agreement is being arbitrarily cancelled.

Mr. NUGENT: Right.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, one at a time. We are breaking down into talk at the table, and I wonder if you would address your questions one at a time.

Mr. NUGENT: I am trying to get at the legal problems and not just the policy. Of couse, I have not doubt it is a lousy policy, but the question of legality is, also. I can see a complete breakdown of the Minister's scheme if one or more of these people should fight it in the court and the court should rule that we had no such power.

Mr. LAWSON: As a matter of law sir, there is no question in my mind that if this clause is enacted, it will be a perfectly lawful enactment of the parliament of Canada.

The CHAIRMAN: Are there any further questions of clauses 6 and 7?

Mr. HARKNESS: On this same point: If your interpretation is correct, then the real intent of clause 6 is to impose a form of compulsory service on those who are already serving in one of the present three services. This is a form of compulsory service or compulsory continued service for them.

Mr. LAWSON: It will require people who have already committed themselves to a certain term of service, to continue serving for that term in the new unified service.

Mr. HARKNESS: Well, in other words, it is a form of compulsory service enactment?

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, you may make these observations if you like, but I do not think that Brigadier Lawson is required to reply to them. I think that is in the field of politics.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I would like to ask a question on the legality of this: Is there no protection for the officer under the agreement that he had prior to the passing of this act? Can he not retire at the present time under the old agreement that he had, even if he has five years yet to serve? Is there no protection for that man at all? Is he compelled to go along with this?

Mr. LAWSON: As a matter of law, yes. I am not speaking about the policy; I am speaking of the law.

Mr. MCINTOSH: No; I mean the law. He has no protection under his prior agreement?

Mr. LAWSON: Not if this clause is enacted.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Lambert?

Mr. LAMBERT: My question turns on the definition of "emergency" as it applies to clause 7. If we go to the interpretation clause, subsection (12) of Section 2, it means: War, invasion, riot, or insurrection real or apprehended. That is a definition that has existed for a long time, and it has shall we say, a certain defensive complection to it. Within the meaning of the future role of the Canadian forces in peacekeeping is there an interpretation of "emergency" outside of war, invasion, riot or insurrection?

Mr. LAWSON: As a matter of law there cannot be, sir, because that is the definition in an act of parliament; and nobody can change that but parliament.

Mr. LAMBERT: Yes, but what I am thinking of is this: Suppose we do have a special force created, and part of Mobile Command is committed to some operation under the aegis of the United Nations, or is detached and under the control of someone else; there is no war; there is no invasion; there is no riot or insurrection, real or apprehended; but the exigencies of the operation in which they are engaged require that they be transferred into some other form of role, in the case of the individual and the work that he is going to do. Are you not leaving yourself here in a complete strait-jacket? I would have thought it all right to say "except in an emergency", but to me the word "emergency" is back a few generations in its definition.

Mr. LAWSON: Well, you must remember that the words "without their consent", are in there, sir. Presumably, most officers and men would perhaps give their consent—

Mr. LAMBERT: But you do not know that at this point and parliament does not know this.

Mr. LAWSON: But this is the protection we are giving the officers and men who are now in the service.

Mr. LAMBERT: Well, I suggest to you that unless "emergency" and this clause are clarified there is going to be a great deal of uncertainty and that there may be some actual illegal acts performed in the future.

Mr. LAWSON: Well, of course, sir, the clause will have to be clarified by a regulation. Now, I have a draft that was submitted to the Minister—a suggested regulation—that I think the Minister would be prepared to have me read. This is just a suggestion that I have made to the Minister on how we might implement this clause. If you would care for me to do so, I will read it.

Mr. LAMBERT: Well, anything that you have; because with all due respects to you, and to anyone who has had anything to do with it, this is a real owl's nest.

Mr. LAWSON: This is the regulation I have suggested:

"For the purposes of this article,

(1)(a) "crew" means officers and men serving in a ship or employed in the operation of an aircraft, but does not include officers and men taking passage in a ship or aircraft; and

(b) "land force" means a unit or other element whose normal role is combat, or training for combat, on the ground.

(2) Except in an emergency and subject to paragraph (3),

(a) no officer or man who immediately prior to the coming into force of Part I of the Canadian Forces Reorganization Act was enrolled in, or had been transferred to, the Royal Canadian Navy shall without his consent be required to serve as a member of the crew of an aircraft or in a land force;

(b) no officer or man who immediately prior to the coming into force of Part I of the Canadian Forces Reorganization Act was enrolled in, or had been transferred to, the Canadian Army shall without his consent be required to serve as a member of a crew; and

(c) no officer or man who immediately prior to the coming into force of Part I of the Canadian Forces Reorganization Act was enrolled in, or had been transferred to, the Royal Canadian Air Force shall without his consent be required to serve as a member of the crew of a ship or in a land force.

(3) Where an officer or man mentioned in subparagraph (a) or (b) of paragraph (2) was, at any time prior to the coming into force of Part I of the Canadian Forces Reorganization Act, employed in the operation of aircraft of the Royal Canadian Navy or the Canadian Army, or under training to be so employed, his consent to serve as a member of the crew of an aircraft is not required.

Mr. LAMBERT: Now this regulation would be made under the general authority contained in the act to make regulations?

Mr. LAWSON: Yes, sir.

Mr. LAMBERT: I see; because there is nothing in connection with clause 7 that authorizes you to make any regulations.

This again points up the necessity of having the Minister undertake that all regulations made in consequence of the passage of this particular act shall be referred back to this Committee for examination, as we have done, and have had undertakings on from the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Transport. These second and third

acts hidden behind the formal acts can completely negate the intentions and the declarations as expressed to a Committee of parliament or to parliament itself.

The CHAIRMAN: Are there further questions? Mr. McIntosh and then Mr. Nugent.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I have a question on the regulation that you read, Brigadier. You mentioned something about combat troops in the first part of it. Will you read that to me again? I was wondering if that applied to administrative personnel—to supply personnel?

Mr. LAWSON: I will read it sir.

> —"land force" means a unit or other element whose normal role is combat, or training for combat, on the ground.

That would not apply to administrative units or supply units, but only to the actual combat units.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Nugent?

Mr. MCINTOSH: Where do they fit in? Can supply personnel go anywhere at all?

Mr. LAWSON: Supply personnel could be moved, yes.

Mr. NUGENT: I am still a little puzzled about the legality of this; we have been jumping back and forth between (6) and (7). I am much perturbed at the concept that we can pass any law trampling on civil rights, if you like. We have seen the federal government unable to do that on occasion. Brigadier, I wonder if you would help clarify my thinking a little in this regard by supposing for a second that there was another clause in Paragraph (6) by which we said: All those who are now members of the civil service of Canada shall automatically become members of the Canadian forces and their appropriate ranks and wages shall be as prescribed by regulation. Now, from your argument I gather that you believe that that would be legal, too.

Mr. LAWSON: Perfectly lawful, sir, yes.

The CHAIRMAN: Are there further questions on Part I? Mr. McIntosh?

Mr. MCINTOSH: This is for clarification: The supply personnel relative to ships would then automatically become part of the crew? They are covered, then, under "crew"; as administrative personnel?

Mr. LAWSON: Yes; that is true, sir. They could not force people who had not been members of the navy to serve on a ship. That is what it amounts to.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): To get back to the legality of clause 6, if I, as a serviceman, in any one of the three services decided, when this act was about to come into force, that I would dispute the legality of it, under what law could I be proven guilty? How could I be proven guilty if I refused to accept this so-called legalty as you put it.

Mr. LAWSON: Well, I suppose you would desert and you would tried as a deserter.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): A deserter from what?

Mr. LAWSON: From the Canadian forces.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): On what basis could I be considered a deserted, if I had signed to serve in, say, the army?

Mr. LAWSON: Because Parliament has said—

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): The army no longer exists, according to the law. How can I desert something that has been wiped out?

Mr. LAWSON: But parliament has said that you are now a member of the new force; so as a member of the new force you are a deserter.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): But I have not said that, and my attestation papers do not show it. How can the law actually pin me down as having deserted something that parliament has wiped out?

Mr. LAWSON: But Parliament has provided that you are to be a member of the new force; and therefore—

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Arbitrarily?

Mr. LAWSON: You continue serving the term of service that you have agreed to serve.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): With the specific force, the army? I have signed my attestation papers. I have joined the army. The army is wiped out under the bill. What legal method can the government adopt to prosecute me for deserting something that they have done away with?

Mr. LAWSON: The law is there. Parliament has enacted the law. Parliament has said that this is the law and you are bound by that law.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Yes; but my question is: How are they going to apply that law? This is the essence of the whole question. How are they going to apply the law to something that is no longer in existence?

Mr. LAWSON: Simply by the fact that if you leave you are a deserter. You can be charged with desertion and tried for desertion. You can raise the issue at your trial.

Mr. MCINTOSH: How could he be charged with desertion of something that he has not joined?

Mr. LAWSON: Because Parliament has said he is in it.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Well, there is conscription, or compulsory service, or whatever you want to call it.

Some hon. MEMBERS: No, no.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Forrestall, on Part I.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Brigadier, over our history, what has been the form of the contract between the individual and the Queen in the right of the service?

Mr. LAWSON: Well, to begin with, sir, I think, it has been held by a number of courts that enrolment is not a contract; that it is a change of state. It is not a contract, as is a contract of employment. When you join the services you subject yourself to an entirely new code of laws; your whole status is changed. It is more like marriage, we will say. It is a change of state, not a contract.

Mr. FORRESTALL: And this has been constantly true, has it, throughout the history of our acts?

Mr. LAWSON: Yes.

Mr. FORRESTALL: I am thinking about professional people who might be very skilled in a particular science who have been brought in for two years or one year, or three or four years, or six months—actually brought into uniform to fulfil a particular or specific role. When it was finished they returned to their normal duties as civilians. What is the form of that contract?

Mr. LAWSON: They would undoubtedly be given what is called a short service commission. Most officers agree to serve at Her Majesty's pleasure, but we do have,

what is called a short service commission for a definite period of time; four years, five years, ten years, whatever it may happen to be.

Mr. FORRESTALL: And there is no conflict as between the forms of these two types.

Mr. LAWSON: No, sir.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): One more question on the legality of the government or Parliament saying that because they say so it is so. Why was it that transferring from one service to another in the past could not be brought about unless you were written right off the rolls, or discharged completely from one service, before being accepted by another? And it is the same at present, is it not? In other words, you cannot transfer from the army to the air force now without being absolutely discharged and cleared from the army.

Mr. LAWSON: Yes, you can transfer now, I am told.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): You can transfer now, without being discharged by one service, into another service?

Mr. LAWSON: Yes, because, if you remember the sections I read earlier, enrollment means to become a member of the Canadian forces; it does not speak of a particular service, it says "The Canadian Forces".

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): I am talking about the situation as it was. You say you can transfer from army to air force and vice versa now without being discharged by the service you are in at present. How long has that been in effect?

Captain A. O. SOLOMON (*Director of Personnel Legal Services*): It has been in effect for many years; I do not know the exact length of time.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): By many years, are you going back to wartime?

Colonel W. M. W. SHAW (*Deputy Judge Advocate General*): It dates from 1950. Effective in 1950.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Effective in 1950 you could transfer from one service to the other without being discharged from the present service?

An hon. MEMBER: That sounds like an administration problem.

Mr. NUGENT: I was intrigued by your reminder that this is not a contract that he enters into; he assumes a new status. It is a change of status like marriage. Would you not agree that this act automatically changes his status again?

Mr. LAWSON: In a sense, yes.

Mr. NUGENT: That reinforces my belief then, that the court would look very strictly at a change of status which is more profound than the mere entering into a contract, and if his status is going to be changed by an act of Parliament, where his original status was taken on a as a matter of consent, that still does not bother your concept of legality and how the court would look at it?

Mr. LAWSON: I think it was Blackstone who said "Parliament can do anything, but make a man a woman or a woman a man", and this is true.

Mr. NUGENT: No, but in this country we know that Parliament cannot do anything, sir, You are forgetting that certain provisions—civil rights, for instance—come within the exclusive jurisdiction of the provinces, and that even in this country a man has certain rights, even when he is in the forces. Now, the Privy Council has held on many occasions that within the powers given to it by the British

North America Act, the Parliament of Canada has exactly the same wide powers as does the British Parliament in Westminster.

Mr. NUGENT: Except when it tramples on civil rights to the extent that they say, predominantly, you now are dealing with civil rights; for instance the power to pass this act and then, when their consent to transfer everyone, there is no question. I am just thinking of the concept that transferring them arbitrarily, where consent might be obtained quite easily, would make this particular provision predominantly one of civil rights—interfering with the civil rights of a special group of people who have acquired a special status by their own consent and to me it does not seem so strange that a court might interpret this as a particular piece of legislation interfering with the civil rights of a particular group of people, and civil rights is a provincial responsibility.

Mr. LAWSON: The only thing I can say, sir, as a lawyer is that it is my opinion that this clause if enacted by Parliament would be perfectly legal.

Mr. BYRNE: Is this clause not really the crux of the unification question? Can you conceive of unification of the services without a clause such as clause 6?

Mr. LAWSON: It is certainly a very important provision in relation to unification.

Mr. BYRNE: If the officers and men were not required to remain in a comparable rank with unification, what would be the situation?

Mr. LAWSON: This ties in with the provisions of a prior clause that the new service is a continuation of the old services. We continue the units; we continue the elements; we continue the officers and men. This is the whole concept on which the bill is based.

Mr. BYRNE: In other words, we can only accept this clause if we are prepared to accept unification.

Mr. MCINTOSH: And compulsory service.

Mr. LAWSON: Well, if you wish to call it compulsory service.

Mr. FOY: You have a queer definition of compulsory service.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Just one point in clarification. Would one of the gentlemen who are aware of the situation provide me with the act, regulation or stipulation that since 1950 you can transfer from one service to the other without the discharge I spoke of. Can you bring this up in an act, or in regulations showing where this can be brought about?

Mr. LAWSON: Section 26 of the present act, sir, provides that

> Subject to subsection (3) of section 32, no officer or man shall without his consent be transferred from the regular forces to the reserve forces or from the reserve forces to the regular forces or from the Service of the Canadian Forces in which he has been enrolled to another Service of the Canadian Forces.

But of course it is clear from that, that if a man gives his consent he can be transferred without being released, and the regulations provide for that.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, are there any further questions concerning part I of the bill?

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): I want a further clarification of this idea of transferring from one service to the other. If a man were transferring from one service to the other he would necessarily have to be struck off strength. What procedure is followed? Is he completely discharged from his present service before being accepted by the other?

Mr. LAWSON: We have Captain Solomon here, Director of Personnel, Legal Services. He is more familiar with these personnel problems.

Mr. SOLOMON: He is not struck off strength, sir, when he is transferred from one service to the other. There may be occasion when it is administratively convenient to release him from one sevice before he goes into the other but, generally speaking, it is a straight transfer, a paper transfer.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): In the case of a transfer from the army to the air force, he continues his service in the air force but he is continually carried on the rolls of the army which he has left?

Mr. SOLOMON: No, he continues his service in the army until such time as he takes on his service in the air force. He would continue service in the army until the 31st of March, and on April 1 he is a member of the air force. This becomes a paper transaction as of that date; he then becomes a member of that other service at that time.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): How does the army strike him off strength? What becomes of him as far as a name on the roll and Part II Orders are concerned? What is the final processing if a former member of the army transfers to the air force?

Mr. SOLOMON: I cannot give you the actual pieces of paperwork sir, but as a matter of fact, what does happen is that he is struck off strength of the army; marked as a transferee to the air force; the air force accepts him from the army effective that particular day. So, there is no actual break in service, as such.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): There is no break in service, and it means no further attestation.

Mr. SOLOMON: No further attestation is required.

Mr. MACINNIS: From there on he is just—

Mr. SOLOMON: From there on he is a member of the air force and carries on from there.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): What does he do in case he wants to bring up, say, some pension claim in later years? Is there no official document to show a discharge from the army as such?

Mr. SOLOMON: There is an official document which shows that he has been transferred from the army to the air force. This is done by request from him. He initiates a request to transfer. This goes through the normal routine administrative channels, so that his commanding officer puts in his recommendation whether he should be transferred or not transferred. They consider at the headquarters, or at the appropriate level, whether the transfer should be accepted or not.

Mr. MACINNIS: This is a very minor matter, but this would mean that he would not be entitled to a discharge button from the army.

Mr. SOLOMON: That is right; but there are no such things as discharge buttons at this point.

Mr. MACINNIS: Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN: Are there any further questions on part I, gentlemen?

Gentlemen before we proceed to part II I wonder whether we could review our procedure here for a moment. We have completed a dry run of part I. We have not

carried any of the clauses of part I, and what has happened this morning is that this has been a familiarization exercise on part I so that we can work more efficiently when we come to carry those clauses.

In approaching part II we have two kinds of things to deal with. First of all, the consequential amendments, which hang on carrying the clauses of part I. Secondly, we have further amendments which are not related in any way to the subject of unification. I wonder whether we could proceed in regular order to part II and deal with and carry those clauses which are not related to unification and stand, or set aside those clauses that are consequential and which can be dealt with later on. Mr. Lambert has a suggestion.

Mr. LAMBERT: I would suggest, Mr. Chairman, that we carry on with the explanations merely for familiarization and then after that we can see. Some of the clauses may appear to be merely non-related, but I think we could get into trouble. I think, under the circumstances, if we do not try to trip over our feet here we will be better off.

Mr. SMITH: We have been getting along just fine this morning and I think if we proceed in the same manner as we have been proceeding it will speed up the passage of the consequential clauses when we come to them. We would do better by going as we have been going this morning.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Your suggestion, Mr. Chairman, reminds me of a case I heard one time where they tried the accessory first and it was Q.E.D.—if the accessory was guilty, the accused must have been guilty.

The CHAIRMAN: I think that is a pretty good idea.

Mr. SMITH: If you have something going for you, Mr. Chairman, stay with it.

The CHAIRMAN: All right, we will carry on with part II the way we have been going. I will call clause 8.

On clause 8—*Court martial.*

Mr. CHURCHILL: It is 12 o'clock; I want to go now.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, what are your wishes with regard to lunch hour? Shall we go on for another half hour?

Some hon. MEMBERS: Agreed.

Mr. LAMBERT: Why is there a reference to a special general court martial?

Mr. LAWSON: It is really just a matter of tidying up, sir. We have always had a special general court martial and we think it is better to put it in the section defining court martial. It is a separate type of court martial.

Mr. FORRESTALL: What does it cover?

Mr. LAWSON: It is court martial to try civilians; not military personnel.

Mr. SMITH: Out of Canada?

Mr. LAWSON: Yes, out of Canada; people accompanying the forces, dependents and so on. We were required to set this up because of the fact that when we first went into Germany, the German courts had no jurisdiction over our civilians accompanying our force. Somebody had to look after them, so we were required to provide a special type of court martial for this purpose.

Mr. FORRESTALL: What is a disciplinary court martial?

Mr. LAWSON: It is a court martial which has limited powers. It can award up to two years imprisonment only. It used to be called a district court martial.

Mr. FORRESTALL: And a standing court martial?

Mr. LAWSON: A standing court martial is a one-man court that, at the present time, can only be set up in an emergency. We are suggesting further on in the bill that the powers to set up a standing court martial be broadened so that we can have something like a magistrate. A standing court martial is an officer with legal training—one officer with legal training. This comes up in another clause further on.

Mr. FORRESTALL: This is no change then from the old act?

Mr. LAWSON: No real change.

Mr. MCINTOSH: What was that you said about a magistrate? He is not a military person.

Mr. LAWSON: I said, sir, that standing court martial would be similar to a magistrate in civil life, or that is what I meant to say.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Oh.

The CHAIRMAN: Clause 8. We will give you a little time to look at page 5.

Mr. ANDRAS: You have a proposed amendment to this clause.

Mr. LAWSON: Oh, yes. In subclause (8) we have proposed a definition of the word "ship". On further consideration we feel that this definition is not desirable and we propose that it be deleted from the bill.

Mr. SMITH: Why was the definition of "subordinate officer" put in at this particular place rather than in the general definition section of the act?

Mr. LAWSON: This is amending the definition section of the act.

Mr. SMITH: I beg your pardon. I am getting confused.

The CHAIRMAN: Now, are we finished with clause 8? We will refer now to clause 9 as amended. You should each have the piece which was typed inserted in your book giving you clauses 9, 10 and 11, and then we pass on to re-numbered clause 9 which becomes clause 12. Are you all in possession of these books so that you can follow this? Who has not go this? Up to this moment I do not think you have had any amendments pasted into your book. This is the first one at which this appears. We passed out a number of these the other day but may not have caught everybody. You will also find these amendments on the mimeographed sheet which was distributed at the same time. While the Clerk is making those available to the Committee members, I will call amended clause 9 for discussion.

Mr. LAWSON: Perhaps an explanation would be in order here. We are proposing in the amended clause 9 to repeal sections 6 and 6A of the act and substitute a new section which will be numbered as 6. Section 6 of the act provides for the appointment in an emergency of not more than three additional ministers of national defence or not more than three associate ministers of national defence. The concept here when the act was passed was, of course, that we had the three services and it might be desirable in an emergency to have a minister for each service or an associate minister for each service. We are doing away with the three services so there is no need to continue the provision for separate service ministers. This is the reason behind the proposed repeal of section 6.

Section 6A simply provides that the Governor General may at any time appoint one associate minister of national defence. This was put in so that we could have an associate minister in times other than during an emergency. We are simply tidying the whole thing up by proposing a new section 6 that will provide that the Governor General may appoint one associate minister.

Mr. LAMBERT: Yes, but you already had that power under section 6A. In other words, section 6 was considered redundant because the proposal is to eliminate separate services but there was always the power at any time to appoint one associate minister.

Mr. LAWSON: That is right, sir. All we are doing is tidying up. That is all it amounts to, really.

Mr. LAMBERT: Yes.

The CHAIRMAN: Are there any further questions?

Mr. LAMBERT: I also see that there is a continuing in the upgrading of the status of the associate minister in that whereas under section 6, the minister could assign duties to the associate minister. Under section 6A this is only assignable by the Governor in Council and, as proposed, it is also by the Governor in Council.

Mr. LAWSON: No, there is no change there. Section 6A provides that he shall exercise and perform such of the powers, duties and functions of the Minister as may be assigned to him by the Governor in Council. We have not changed that.

Mr. LAMBERT: I agree with you, but under section 6, duties could be assigned by the minister to the associate minister.

Mr. LAWSON: Oh, that is right. But, of course, this is not the provision under which the present associate minister was appointed. He was appointed under section 6A.

Mr. LAMBERT: Yes.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Forrestall?

Mr. FORRESTALL: I am sorry, that covers my questions.

The CHAIRMAN: If there are no further questions under amended clause 9 we will move to amended clause 10. Amended clause 10 reads:

Subsection (2) of section 7 of the said Act is repealed.

Mr. LAWSON: This section deals with the appointment of deputy ministers and subsection (2) dealt with the situation when additional ministers had been appointed under the old section 6, so we obviously have to delete that, having deleted section 6. Section 8 deals with the appointment of associate deputy ministers and again, subsections (2) and (3) refer back to the sections we are deleting, that is, 6 and 6A.

The CHAIRMAN: Are there any further questions on clauses 10 and 11? We will move on to re-numbered clause 9 which now becomes clause 12.

Clause 12—*By Treasury Board.*

The CHAIRMAN: Clause 12 begins:

Section 13 of the said Act is amended by adding thereto the following—

Mr. LAWSON: This clause, Mr. Chairman, has to do with the power to make regulations regarding pay and allowances. Under the existing act only the Governor in Council can make such regulations. This conflicts with the Financial Administration

Act which provides in section 7 that the Treasury Board may make regulations, subject to any other act, prescribing rates of compensation of persons in the Public Service. What we are doing is bringing the National Defence Act into line with the Financial Administration Act by providing that the Treasury Board rather than the Governor in Council may make regulations regarding pay and allowances.

The CHAIRMAN: Are there any further questions regarding clause 12? I will call renumbered clause 13, formerly clause 10.

Clause 13—*Limitation upon Minister's power.*

Mr. LAWSON: This simply arises out of the amendment to the last section; we are inserting "Treasury Board" again. Formerly this section did not contain any reference to the Treasury Board. It was not required; now it is.

Mr. FORRESTALL: I am just curious, Brigadier—probably it has absolutely nothing to do with this at all—but there are certain civilian support services that are very essential. Does this in any way affect their pay levels?

Mr. LAWSON: No, sir. They would be dealt with under the provision I read in the Financial Administration Act. This relates only to military pay and allowances.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Those who are actually serving, and nobody else?

Mr. LAWSON: That is right, sir.

Mr. FORRESTALL: And it does not apply to anybody that the services might happen to hire for any reason whatsoever? Civilians are dealt with somewhere else?

Mr. LAWSON: That is right.

The CHAIRMAN: I will deal with re-numbered clause 14 which was old clause number 11.

Clause 14—*Consent to Transfer.*

Mr. SMITH: When Brigadier Dare was here talking about the reorganization of the reserve forces, he suggested that certain people who were specialists would be assigned to and kept track of and kept together in certain reserve units. The proposed section 26 says:

> No officer or man shall without his consent be transferred from the regular force to the reserve force—

How would that affect a person, for example, who has special skills—perhaps a doctor who knows a great deal about emergency medicine—who wants to get out of the services? Does this section in any way affect the conditions? For example, he is going to practice in Toronto, so they say, "All right, we will let you out provided you will serve with such and such a reserve medical unit".

Mr. LAWSON: This section would have no bearing on that situation, sir. This simply prohibits compulsory transfers from the reserves to the regulars or from the regulars to the reserves. It would have no bearing on the situation.

Mr. SMITH: It would have no bearing at all? There would be nothing in this that would require service with a reserve unit as a condition of discharge?

Mr. LAWSON: Oh, no.

Mr. LAMBERT: Is it your opinion, Brigadier Lawson, that the transfers of men from the regulars to the reserves or vice versa is now more sweeping or more general in its denial or arbitrary action than was provided for under the old section 26 subject to the proviso of section 32(3)?

Mr. LAWSON: Well, the proposed section in one sense gives an officer or man more protection, sir, in that the old section said, "subject to subsection (3) of section 32." Subsection (3) of section 32 provides that there could be compulsory transfers between the components when on active service. We have taken that provision out and simply are saying that there can be no compulsory transfer at any time. This could have been a form of compulsory service. In other words, under the old section you could have said to a man in the reserves "You are compulsorily transferred to the regular force."

Mr. LAMBERT: But that is only during active service under wartime conditions.

Mr. LAWSON: Oh, yes, if they were on active service.

Mr. LAMBERT: That is a wartime condition.

Mr. LAWSON: That is right. But we are on active service at the moment.

Mr. LAMBERT: Are they not more in the regular force, though?

Mr. LAWSON: Technically, we are on active service at the moment.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Everybody?

Mr. LAWSON: Our regular force.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): There is quite a discrepancy in whether you are on active service or not when it comes to a matter of pension claims. I would ask the Minister to take note of that and I will bring it up later with him.

The CHAIRMAN: I wonder whether we could have a definition of what active service is? I find this curious. What is active service? If we have one element involved in a peacekeeping mission, is the whole of the armed forces on active service?

Mr. LAWSON: No. Section 32 of the act is the relevant section, sir. It provides that the Governor in Council may place the forces on active service, but then you go on to section 33 which provides that if the Governor in Council does this, it must summon Parliament if Parliament is not then sitting. So Parliament really has the control of when you are on active service.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Then what you have just stated about being on active service now is not the case.

Mr. LAWSON: Oh, yes, sir.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): It is the case?

Mr. LAWSON: Yes.

Mr. LAMBERT: Arising from where?

Mr. LAWSON: Arising from an Order in Council passed at the time of the Korean war which has never been repealed.

Mr. LAMBERT: And it has never been repealed? Well, is it not the intention to repeal it? Well, I cannot ask you that.

Mr. LAWSON: It was a good try.

The CHAIRMAN: Are there further questions?

Mr. LAMBERT: The Minister shook his head.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I would like to ask the Brigadier if he has any control over the Canadian Pension Commission about active service?

Mr. LAWSON: I am afraid not.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, are we through with renumbered clause 14, old clause 11? If so, we will pass on to clause 15, formerly clause 12.

Clause 15—*Effect of receipt of pay if not enrolled.*

Mr. HARKNESS: On clause 15, would not the effect of this be that a man in the reserve component of the regular forces who was attached to the regular component and received pay from them would then, for all practical purposes under this section, be in the regular component and be so considered?

Mr. LAWSON: Oh, yes, of course, sir. He could claim his release. We are not making any basic change in this section. It is one we have had for many, many years. It simply means that if a man takes his pay and so on, and you charge him with a service offence he can be tried, in spite of the fact that there may have been some technical flaw in his enrolment. But it gives him the right, if there is any error, to claim his release, of course. There is no change of substance in the proposed amendment.

The CHAIRMAN: Are there any further questions on clause 15? We will pass on to clause 16. You are dealing with amended clause 16 and amended section 28.

On clause 16—*Out of Canadian Forces.*

Mr. LAMBERT: The effect of the substituted amendment is to remove the power to second a man to the armed forces of any state. Is that not it? That is the essence.

Mr. LAWSON: That is right.

Mr. LAMBERT: Now that is being withdrawn.

Mr. LAWSON: That is right, sir, because it is in another act. We do not require it in this act.

Mr. LAMBERT: What other act is that?

Mr. LAWSON: I should not have said another act. It is in another bill, the Visting Forces bill, which is now before the house.

Mr. LAMBERT: Oh, yes, that is the one that is sitting up there in deep freeze.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Why are the two separated, Brigadier? What is the reasoning behind the separation?

Mr. LAWSON: The Visiting Forces bill deals with all matters having to do with forces from other countries in Canada and Canadian forces abroad. We just consider it a more appropriate place to have this provision than the National Defence Act.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Yes, I am sorry, Brigadier. I was wondering why it is not one military act. Why do we have so many pieces of paper that we have to look at to find out what is going on legally?

Mr. LAWSON: We do not have many pieces of paper, sir. The Visiting Forces bill deals with a very special subject. As you perhaps remember it was originally passed to implement our obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty. We are now proposing that it be broadened to deal with all visiting forces, not only NATO forces. This proposal is now before Parliament.

Mr. FORRESTALL: What is the relationship between it and this act? What transfers authority from certain sections of this act to that other act. You say certain things can or cannot be done here and then in another act you say, notwithstanding that act.

Mr. LAWSON: There is no transfer of authority, sir. The other bill stands on its own feet. It deals with a specific subject—visiting forces.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Are there any other acts, other than this one and the Visiting Forces, that might in any way have any relationship to this question?

Mr. LAWSON: To this particular question, no, sir.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Absolutely none?

Mr. LAWSON: None.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Might I ask a question on the Visiting Forces bill? You said it applied to our forces when they were some place else. What is the definition of visiting? When are they visiting and when are they on duty?

Mr. LAWSON: The Visiting Forces bill is S-50 and it defines in clause 2 (j):

> "Visiting force" means any of the armed forces of a designated state present in Canada in connection with official duties, and includes civilian personnel designated under section 4 as the civilian component of a visiting force.

Mr. MCINTOSH: If I could just carry this on: I thought you said it applied to our forces when they are visiting some other place also.

Mr. LAWSON: Yes, it does. Certain parts of it apply to our forces in another country as well.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Did you not say that our forces are on active duty at the present time? How could they be visiting and on active duty at the same time?

Mr. LAWSON: There is no conflict there, sir. Whether the forces are on active service or not has no relation to whether they can visit a foreign country.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Does this Visiting Forces bill provide for pay supplements?

Mr. LAWSON: No, sir.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Originally there was a pay supplement for visiting forces. I am thinking now of the Commonwealth Air Training scheme during the war. Did not the Canadian government provide a pay supplement there?

Mr. LAWSON: Oh, yes. And, of course, this can be done under the power to make regulations. You recall we just went over a clause giving the Treasury Board power to make regulations regarding pay and allowances. So under that clause Treasury Board could authorize pay supplements or anything of that nature.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): But at the same time it was not reciprocal. In other words, a Canadian force going, for example, into the United States did not get this reciprocal treatment, did they?

Mr. LAWSON: Well, it would depend entirely on the regulation the Treasury Board might see fit to make.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): May I put it this way: The Canadian regulation provided that the visiting forces were supplemented up to the Canadian standards, whereas the Canadian forces visiting in the United States were refused this supplement by their own government when it was offered by the American government.

Mr. LAWSON: This would be, of course, a matter of policy, not a matter of the act.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): A matter of policy which was running contrary to what everybody else was doing.

The CHAIRMAN: Is there anything further on clause 16, section 28? We will move on, then, to renumbered clause 17, formerly clause 14.

On clause 17—*Placing forces on active service.*

Mr. LAMBERT: Coming back to this active service status that the Brigadier has advised us has been in existence since Korea, why would there still be a continuation?

After all, the power to be on active service is only granted under section 32 and that spells it out. It says:

—by reason of an emergency, for the defence of Canada.

So, therefore, active service is not a matter today or has not been for some considerable time. Is it under subsection (b)

—in consequence of any action undertaken by Canada *pursuant to any international arrangement* for collective defence entered into by Canada.

Mr. LAWSON: It was under that subsection that the forces were placed on active service.

Mr. LAMBERT: But this again is much broader and it brings me back to this term of "any international arrangement", because when we look at section 32 (1) (b) of the present act, it says:

—in consequence of any action undertaken by Canada under the United Nations Charter, the North Atlantic Treaty or any other similar instrument for collective defence—

so, we are back to a policy.

Mr. LAWSON: That is a question of policy. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, it is 12.30 and we will rise to meet again after the Orders of the Day and continue with Brigadier Lawson.

The meeting is adjourned.

AFTERNOON SITTING

TUESDAY, March 14, 1967.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, the long period that we were required in the House today has held us up a little bit, but we have a quorum and we will go ahead where we left off. We had, I think, finished dealing with new clause 17, which is old clause 14 on page 7 of the bill.

Before we begin, I would like to introduce a distinguished visitor. We have here this afternoon Colonel Peter Agbeco of Ghana, who is visiting in Canada for six to eight months. At the moment he is with the Judge Advocate General's branch, observing how they do it—or perhaps observing how they should not do it.

Some hon. MEMBERS: Hear, hear.

The CHAIRMAN: You are welcome, sir.

Some hon. MEMBERS: Hear, hear.

The CHAIRMAN: Are there any questions in regard to section 33 of clause 17 at the foot of page 7?

Mr. HARKNESS: The only difference I see is that "service" has been changed.

Brigadier W. J. LAWSON (*Judge Advocate General, CFHQ*): That is right, sir.

Mr. HARKNESS: The word "service" has been eliminated.

Mr. LAWSON: That is right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN: Are there any further questions in connection with clause 17, section 33 at the foot of page 7?

Mr. SMITH: It still uses the word "arrangement", as it did earlier. I have no question in relation to the word "arrangement". I just wanted to note that.

The CHAIRMAN: Are you looking at section 33?

Mr. SMITH: No, I am looking at section 32.

The CHAIRMAN: Oh, you are looking at section 32, yes. Are we finished with section 33? If so, we will turn to section 34 on page 8.

Mr. LAWSON: Mr. Chairman, the only amendments here are consequential, of course, that is, changing the word "forces" to "force", and so on.

The CHAIRMAN: We are now looking at the top of page 8, section 34 and, on the balance of the page, section 35. Again, the amendments appear to be consequential.

Mr. LAWSON: Yes, Mr. Chairman, these are all consequential amendments.

The CHAIRMAN: Now, are we prepared to go on with page 9?

Mr. NUGENT: I am just wondering whether 34 (b) conflicts with clause 7.

34(b), in part, states:

—may be called out on service to perform any military duty—

as may be prescribed. On page 4, clause 7 says:

> Except in an emergency . . . be required to perform and duty . . . that he could not have been required to perform as a member of such Service.

Does this override the proviso as stated in clause 7? Section 34 (b) says:

—any military duty—

Clause 7 says no duty other than he would:

—be required to perform—

as a member of one of Canada's armed forces, the army, navy or air force.

Mr. LAWSON: Well, as I explained, sir, clause 7 is effective only in that it is a statement of parliamentary and government policy. I do not think any government would ever override that provision under the powers certainly vested in it by section 34.

Mr. NUGENT: Well, I guess we covered that argument anyway, previously, when I mentioned it.

The CHAIRMAN: If there are no further questions on sections 34 and 35, we will turn to page 9, section 36.

Mr. CHURCHILL: This is another one of those changes putting greater power into the hands of the Treasury Board and taking it away from the Governor in Council. What is the reason for this? I think you gave the reason for this earlier.

Mr. LAWSON: It is to bring it into line with the Financial Administration Act, which provides that the Treasury Board shall have the authority to make regulations regarding the pay and allowances of all persons in the public service. This goes a little further, to bring it into line with the Financial Administration Act because, as you will note in the old section 36, subsection (3) said:

> Unless made in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Governor in Council, an assignment of pay and allowances is void.

This conflicted with section 88 of the Financial Administration Act, which provides:

> —any amount due or becoming due by the Crown as or on account of salary, wages, pay or pay and allowances is not assignable—

We have one act saying that these pay and allowances are not assignable, and another act saying they may be assigned in accordance with regulations made by the Governor in Council. This is a matter of tidying up so that we do not have an apparent conflict between two acts of parliament.

Mr. LAMBERT: Perhaps, Mr. Chairman, you want to finish the discussion on this one first, but I came across a rather interesting little matter in section 35, which I was looking up when you called it, and I wonder if we might revert back to it.

The CHAIRMAN: Yes, as soon as we finish with this one. Are there any further questions on section 36?

Mr. NUGENT: I am just wondering whether it causes any further conflict in view of the fact that the periods of service and I presume the terms of service and so on may be fixed by orders in council, whereas the rates of pay and allowances are fixed by the Treasury Board. I notice that, formerly, pay and allowances were subject to the Governor in Council, and it seems to me that there may be a conflict. As I said, in effect, you could have the Treasury Board regulations nullifying the attempt of the Governor in Council trying to fix periods of service. I cannot see why there should be these two separate bodies where the terms of service are fixed by one and the pay and allowances are fixed by the other. Are they not going to run counter?

Mr. LAWSON: Well, I think, Mr. Nugent, we have to remember that Treasury Board is only a committee of the Governor in Council, and certainly if Treasury Board were to do something, counter to something done by the Governor in Council, they would be quickly instructed by the Governor in Council to change what they had done.

Mr. NUGENT: Well, I suppose, but I was just wondering, since pay and allowances are so closely tied in with any regulations that would be made effective to at least keep our forces up to strength and so on. Perhaps it is a matter of policy. Is it the feeling that Treasury Board is a little more flexible in adjusting these purely financial matters? Is that why the difference is made?

Mr. LAWSON: I think it is to relieve the Governor in Council of a lot of very petty work. There are all sorts of submissions going up all the time to correct various small things in pay, individual items, where there is very little money involved —maybe $50, $25—and it does not seem sensible at all that these things should take up the time of the Governor in Council.

Mr. NUGENT: No, but I am sure that the regulations made would be wide enough that it would simply be a case of interpretation by your branch or the pay branch as to whether or not they conform to regulations. What you really have are regulations made by the Governor in Council, and the regulations as to pay and so on by the Treasury Board. Therefore, it is really only a case of making sure that they are not in conflict. I cannot really see that it is getting down to individual petty items.

Mr. LAWSON: Well, I have had a lot of experience in drafting regulations, Mr. Nugent, and I found in the pay field that you just cannot cover every case. There are always execeptional cases which have to be dealt with by individuals—

The CHAIRMAN: We shall now take clause 18, old No. 15.

On clause 18—*Non-public property of unit.*

Mr. HARKNESS: This clause, in effect, allows any non-public funds to be disposed of for the benefit of anybody presently in the services or retired from the services or their dependants, irrespective of where the money came from.

Mr. LAWSON: Yes. The only change there is that formerly these non-public funds had to be used for retired officers and men and so on, of the service of the Canadian forces in which the unit or other element was comprised. When we are doing away with the services, we obviously had to make some change, and we made the change to provide that they may be used:

> —for the benefit of all or any officers and men or former officers and men, or their dependants.

This is the only change.

Mr. NUGENT: Does this take in canteen funds, accumulated officers messes surpluses, and so on?

Mr. LAWSON: Yes, all the funds that belonged to the unit is disbanded.

Mr. HARKNESS: I might say that I felt it was a very unfair provision when it was put in the act to begin with, that it had the effect really of confiscating funds from various officers' messes, mens' canteens and what not which, through good management, they happened to accumulate, whereas the people who had spent everything they got and did not accumulate funds really had the advantage. In other words, it militated against thrift and good management in mess and canteen funds.

The CHAIRMAN: It was the subject of an awful lot of hot discussion in an awful lot of messes.

Mr. HARKNESS: I know that it caused a whole lot of trouble.

The CHAIRMAN: Are we through with questions on clause 18? If so, we shall move to clause 19, which was formerly clause 16.

On claude 19—*Affidavits etc.*

Mr. LAWSON: This is a substantive amendment in that it gives boards of inquiry the power to take evidence under oath, which they do not have at the present time.

The CHAIRMAN: Are there any questions? If not, we shall move to clause 20.

On clause 20—*Formation.*

Mr. LAWSON: This is a fairly consequential amendment. It substitutes "Canadian forces" for the navy, army and air force.

The CHAIRMAN: We shall now move to page 10, clause 21, which was old clause 18.

On clause 21—*By mail.*

Mr. LAWSON: This, again, is a purely consequential amendment. There is no change in substance.

The CHAIRMAN: Are there any questions? We shall now move to clause 22.

On clause 22.

Mr. LAWSON: Again, these are consequential amendments.

The CHAIRMAN: Clause 22 carries along through the whole of page 10—

Mr. LAMBERT: With respect to renumbered clause 22, subclause (4), what is the purport of this amendment concerning a serviceman who is attached to the armed forces of a country where there is an agreement between that country and Canada? Does this, in part, deal with the discipline of a Canadian serviceman who is being seconded to, say, the armed forces of a foreign country where he is part of an instructional cadre.

Mr. LAWSON: No, Mr. Lambert; it is just the opposite to that. This deals with people who come from other countries to be attached to or seconded to the Canadian forces. The only change, as you will notice, is in the underlined words:

> or pursuant to an agreement between Canada and the state in whose armed forces he is serving

Previously we could only attach and second people who, pursuant to law, were made available to us. Now, "pursuant to law" meant pursuant to the Visiting Forces Act, so we could only assume powers of discipline over members of forces of NATO countries who were in Canada. This has proved rather awkward in that we have a number of trainees from various countries, such as Ghana; we have been requested to look after the discipline, but have been unable to do it under the existing act. This is to cover the situation.

Mr. MACINNIS: I have a question on discipline. For example, if a Canadian force was attached to an American outfit, under what procedure could they force discipline on a Canadian, or could it be done?

Mr. LAWSON: At the present time they could not, excepting that the Canadians, before going to the American force, would be ordered by their Canadian superiors to obey the orders given to them by Americans of superior relevant rank. If they failed to obey the American order, they would be disobeying the order of their Canadian superiors.

Mr. MACINNIS: The only disciplinary action that could be assessed then, would have to be assessed by the superiors back in Canada.

Mr. LAWSON: That is right. It would be Canadian discipline. This could be changed under the visiting forces bill, which is before the House.

The CHAIRMAN: If we are finished with subclause (4) we shall go on with subclause (5), which appears to be consequential.

Mr. LAWSON: Yes it is consequential.

The CHAIRMAN: Turning the page, we have subclauses (6) and (7).

Mr. LAWSON: Subclause (6) is consequential, Mr. Chairman. Subclause (7) is all consequential.

The CHAIRMAN: Are there any questions on subclauses (8) and (9)? If not, we shall move on to subclause (10), Spies for the Enemy. There is an interesting topic. Are there any questions on that?

Mr. LAWSON: It is fairly consequential, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN: The next is, Released Persons Serving Sentence, and at the foot of page 11 we have, Persons under Special Engagement, carrying over to page 12.

Mr. LAWSON: This is consequential.

The CHAIRMAN: Then on page 12, Persons under Command of Superior Officer.

Mr. LAWSON: This is all consequential, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN: We shall move on to the new clause 23 on page 12, which was old clause No. 20.

On clause 23—*Definition.*

Mr. LAWSON: A substantial change has been made in the offence of desertion. If the Committee wishes, I shall let Colonel Shaw explain this to you.

Colonel W. M. W. SHAW (*Deputy Judge Advocate General*): I think the basic difficulty, gentlemen, is that traditionally we have regarded absence from place of duty as being absence without leave. The court martial appeal court, in dealing with one of the cases before it, came to the conclusion that the words we had used, the place where his duty requires him to be, did not in their view carry the same meaning as we thought it did. In the net result, we found that when we wanted to charge a man with absence from the place of parade, we could only do so if the place of parade was at some place other than at his unit or formation. Now, this is quite considerably different from what we considered the traditional view to have been, and this is an endeavor merely to restore the position as we thought it stood before the judgment of the appeal court. We consider it necessary to be able to charge a man with being absent from his place of parade and specify this in the charge, because the place of parade may be at some specific place in his unit. If we have to charge him with being absent from his unit, in order to charge him with being absent from his place of parade, we find ourselves in the position then of having to prove that he was absent from his entire unit, including the married quarters area. Of course, in many cases he is not; he has stayed at home and has not appeared on parade.

The CHAIRMAN: He should not have been in married quarters at all.

Mr. SHAW: We have also added the phrase in clause (a) "duty during an emergency". just to make it clear that during an emergency all duty, we feel, is important duty.

Mr. MCINTOSH: May I ask you, Colonel, how difficult it is to prove that it is the intention of the individual to avoid the service or duty.

Mr. SHAW: It is extremely difficult, I would say, sir.

Mr. LAMBERT: Do you think you can get away with this horse and buggy interpretation of "emergency" as in the interpretation clause.

Mr. SHAW: In applying it to desertion or absent without leave, sir?

Mr. LAMBERT: That is right. There is "duty during an emergency", described in sub-paragraph (2) (a). Then we go to the interpretation clause of the Act and, as I indicated this morning, I thought the interpretation of "emergency" goes back a few decades; it is riot, insurrection, war, invasion. Surely that is not the only reason for an emergency today.

What about a call-out in aid of the civilian power, like at the time of the two Winnipeg floods. That is an emergency; there was no insurrection, riot or what have you, during that time.

Mr. SHAW: No. I would say, sir, that is important service, very important service, and I think that you can practically apply a distinction between an emergency as defined in the Act and other important service.

Mr. SMITH: Has the department considered the need for a new definition of emergency—not from a political point of view, but from a technical point of view. Have you considered, Brigadier Lawson, that perhaps we should have a redefinition of the word "emergency" in terms of modern conditions.

Mr. LAWSON: We have certainly looked at it, sir, but really I could not think of any other definition that we could suggest that would seem to me to be acceptable. You cannot make it too broad. It must be narrow. It must be something of really great

importance and I can think of no way of defining it that would be better than the type of definition. I agree it does "smack" a bit of the horse and buggy days still it seems to work.

Mr. SMITH: Of course anything will work if there is good will.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, clause 23 carries over on to page 13. Are there any further questions on that subject? If not, we will go to clause 24, which is old number 21.

On clause 24.

Mr. LAWSON: Here, Mr. Chairman, we have added the words "or suspected" by him to be a deserter. We have found that, of course, it is practically impossible to prove that a person knew that someone else was a deserter. It is hard to prove a man's knowledge but you can easily prove circumstances that make it very clear that he must have suspected that he was a deserter.

Mr. NUGENT: Well does "suspected" not go pretty far? Would you not have kept more the spirit of it if you had said "known or had reason to believe". I think this is the usual clause in most of the provisions of the criminal code. "Suspected" is one of those words. A person can have suspicions but he would feel himself unworthy if he acted upon them.

Mr. LAWSON: I think that is a good suggestion. I think that would be an improvement.

The CHAIRMAN: "Had reason to believe".

Mr. NUGENT: Yes. He could say that he did not know, but all you have to do is say, well, there are certain facts there which gives him reason to believe.

The CHAIRMAN: There are a number of good suggestions that have come out in the course of the day, and I hope that notes are being taken on these. It was my experience, when we were studying the transport bill, when many amendments were made, that a good many ideas flowed from the committee in the course of drafting which made a better looking bill. These changes could undoubtedly be brought along when we go through this bill for the second time to carry it.

Mr. NUGENT: Mr. Chairman, I really think that "suspected" goes a little farther than what they had in mind here.

The CHAIRMAN: Clause 25, which is old number 22, is next.

Clause 25—*Definition.*

Mr. LAWSON: This is simply making the same provisions apply to the offence of absence without leave that we have already dealt with in the case of the offence of desertion.

The CHAIRMAN: Are there any further questions on clause 25.

Mr. LAMBERT: Is this the part that at the present time, in the event that a man is absent without leave for a period of six months, he is automatically struck off strength and posted as a deserter?

Mr. SHAW: Yes, you are quite right sir. A continuous absence for six months or more raises a presumption then of desertion.

There is a slight amendment on that provision in subclause (3) just at the top of page 13.

Mr. LAMBERT: This is "remaining absent from his place of duty". I was just wondering whether it went as far as desertion. The previous subclause (2) at the foot

of page 12 indicates that you have to prove the intention of remaining absent from his place of duty and there is no time limit in so far as desertion. I was wondering whether you raise the presumption of desertion only.

Mr. SHAW: We are legislating for it, sir, in six months. Traditionally, of course, in the Navy if a man is absent for five days after his ship sails he was presumed to be a deserter. But in the militia, this six months period has been in for many, many years.—going back further than I have searched, quite frankly.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Is "place of duty" defined somewhere in the Act?

Mr. SHAW: No, sir.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I notice that you have omitted "absent from his unit or formation or the place where his duty required him to be".

If a man is away and is told to report, say to Camp Borden, and in the interval his unit has moved, would he be entitled to argue that according to his instructions his place of duty was at Camp Borden?

Mr. SHAW: This, I think is the crutch of the thing, sir, that we are trying to get to. It is where the man is informed and where he understands his place of duty to be, that that is where his duty requires him to be. I think it is a factual situation. This is the difficulty in this former judgment of the appeal court. They said that the words "the place where his duty requires him to be" as it presently appears in the Act, means some place other than his unit or formation. This then introduces complications. Our suggestion is it is simpler then merely to say he must be present at his place of duty; this is then a factual matter as to where his place of duty should be. So, if we charge him with being absent from the parade square we have to establish that was where his place of duty was.

Mr. CHURCHILL: In active service, when units move so rapidly and so unexpectedly and such great distances, a man is expected to rejoin his unit, no matter how much effort has to be put forward, and not just some place.

Mr. SHAW: I think the crux of "absent", technically, is of course the moment he goes absent. The length of time he stays is merely an aggravation, and after six months he is presumed to be a deserter. But the crux, I think, of "absent" is the moment at which he goes absent. Where was his place of duty then? If while he is absent his unit moves, this is a chance, in a sense, he takes when he goes absent and does not keep in contact with his place of duty.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Who determines where his place of duty is, the man or his CO?

Mr. SHAW: Well, unquestionably, it is his Commanding Officer, sir.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Well, what if he went to Borden, thinking that is where it was.

Mr. SHAW: If he were told it was Borden, to report there and so on, I think he would have a perfectly good defence to charging him with his being absent from a place of duty at some place other than Borden. It becomes factual.

Mr. NUGENT: Is there any attempt here to get rid of any possible feeling that the place where his duty requires him to be allows him to raise the defence of judging his duty as the way he saw it rather than strictly following his orders, and "place of duty" means just where your orders take you. Is there anything in that?

Mr. SHAW: Well this is what I am saying sir. I think this is what we are getting to, so that the factual matter then becomes the crux on any charge. If his Commanding Officer charges him with being absent without leave, then the Commanding Officer has to prove where he established that man's place of duty to be. Now certainly I think it would be open in defence, unquestionably, for the man to establish that he had orders to be some place else, which would be then quite a complete defence. I think this is getting fairly technical, but I think, unquestionably, that this allows both the man a better deal and allows the services then to precisely charge him with what they see the offence to be.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Why was his place of duty not defined in the Act?

Mr. SHAW: Because we had always agreed, sir, I think traditionally—I can show you the Army Act going back to beyond World War I—that when a man is absent from parade, you just charge him with being absent from parade, and that was enough, but the appeal court said that that was not the meaning that our present Act book bears when we use the words "and where his duty requires him to be".

Mr. MCINTOSH: I am also thinking of the Pension Commission; when they have a ruling from your branch that a person was on duty they do not necessarily have to accept it. It is too bad it is not defined some place in one of these acts.

Mr. LAWSON: Well that would be a matter for the Pension Act, sir, really. That matter is being looked into at the moment.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Why do you not get your Act in line with their Act, as you did with the Financial Act.

Mr. MCINTOSH: They are allowed to interpret their own Act.

The CHAIRMAN: If there are no further questions on clause 25 we will move along to clause 26, which is old No. 23. Are you on clause 25 still, Mr. Lambert?

Mr. LAMBERT: I want to dip in between clause 25 and 26. I want to read Section 87 of the Act. It is a bit of an aside, but since there are suggestions for amendment I felt that I should read Section 87 (b) which states that every person who:

> —when seeking redress under section 30, knowingly makes a false statement affecting the character of an officer or man or knowingly, in respect of the redress so sought, suppresses any material fact.

I wanted to make sure that it is a knowing suppression, not just an accidental one. This is all right.

The CHAIRMAN: Clause 26, section 88, dealing with drunkenness, at the foot of page 13.

On clause 26—*Drunkenness.*

Mr. LAMBERT: It is a pretty rugged definition of drunkenness.

The CHAIRMAN: They take a pretty tough attitude toward it.

Mr. SHAW: This is new, sir. There is nothing in the Act defining drunkenness now, or in the regulations, and it has been a long felt need, I can assure you, for some standard for courts to measure against as to what is drunkenness. Normally, under the old U.K. legislation and so on, and indeed under our present legislation, we operate on the basis that drunkenness bears the same meaning as it does in civil life, and then, of course, to ask any court, or people arguing for a court, to tell them what drunkenness

means in civil life is almost an impossible task. So we felt that if we could establish and suggest things of overriding importance, as far as the military are concerned, then for our purposes that was the standard for the court.

Mr. LAMBERT: Mr. Chairman, surely the definition under (2) (a) is really a definition of impairment.

(a) is unfit to be entrusted with any duty he is or may be required to perform;

The penalty for drunkenness can be so drastic under these circumstances, I am wondering whether anybody will ever be found guilty of drunkenness. It is like when the penalty in the Criminal Code was so rigorous for drunken driving that the courts were leaning over backwards and not finding them guilty, and they were escaping when, in fact, they were impaired.

> It says the offence of drunkenness is committed when a person behaves in a disorderly manner—

Well, some people behave in a disorderly manner when they have not had a drink. Then it continues, "—Or in a manner likely to bring discredit on Her Majestys' service."

The CHAIRMAN: In other words, Mr. Lambert, what you are asking is, would you send a man up in a $5,000,000 aircraft is he had had a couple of shots at the bar. You could not call him drunk but you might not want him flying that aircraft.

Mr. FORRESTALL: No man would ever do it.

Mr. LAMBERT: No, but it says:

> the offence of drunkenness is committed where a person, owing to the influence of alcohol or a drug behaves in a disorderly manner

Well, having proved that a man had one or two drinks and got into an argument, he would be convicted of drunkenness.

Mr. SHAW: That is the civil offence of drunkenness, sir—disorderliness.

Mr. LAMBERT: No; it may be disorderly behaviour but not drunkenness.

Mr. SHAW: Well there is no civil offence of drunkenness except in the context of his behaviour while drunk.

Mr. LAMBERT: Well, I do not know. If I may say no, I think you have a pretty rigorous and what I fear might be an unenforceable provision here for drunkenness.

Mr. NUGENT: How many experiences have there been with that charge in the Army? Has it been frequently used under the old section—that is, drunkenness—without the definition of drunkenness really, other than section 88.

Mr. CROSSMAN: Is drunkenness not difficult to establish unless there is a breathilizer test or something similar.

Mr. SHAW: We do not require it in the services, sir.

It is really the test that has always been applied by knowledge as to his ability to perform or to be entrusted with his duty.

Mr. NUGENT: I am just wondering whether it has not been the practice, most frequently, to charge him with "conduct to the prejudice . . ." or some such blanket clause. Has this drunkenness section been used so much that we should now attempt to put in what seems to me to be rather a vague definition of drunkenness?

Mr. SHAW: I would say, sir, again, as always, we are legislating of course for the worst cases but unquestionably most of the offences of drunkenness now—I say most, I am speaking of 99 odd per cent—I think are dealt with by the commanding officer in a summary fashion and he imposes a small fine, because I think this is traditional. The first offence of drunkenness is a $5 or $10 fine at the most.

Mr. MACALUSO: Mr. Chairman, I would like to know what this term, "for less than two years or to less punishment" means. What is "or to less punishment"? two years or to less punishment means. What is or to less punishment?

Mr. SHAW: There is a scale of punishments in section 121 of the Act and the punishments lower, on the scale are deemed to be less than the one above it, so that when you see the phrase "or less punishment", you check back on the scale.

Mr. MACALUSO: If that is the case, should that not be, "or to less punishment as set out under section 121"?

Mr. SHAW: Well I think the section itself defines that, sir.

Mr. NUGENT: The way those things usually read in the Criminal Code, it would be not more than two years.

Mr. LAWSON: Under this wording you would be able to impose a small fine—it would be less punishment, or maybe give the man a reprimand, which would be a less punishment—any of the other punishments quite apart from imprisonment.

Mr. MACALUSO: Unless I am reading the wrong section, I do not see anything in this subsection which refers to 121.

Mr. SHAW: No. Well, this is the way the whole Act is drafted. The highest punishment that can be awarded for the offence is set out in the offence section. Then if less punishment can be awarded, this is also indicated in the offence section. If that is so, this refers to section 121; and if you will look at subsection (2) of that section, I think you will find the meaning of the words "less punishment".

Mr. MACALUSO: Well I am looking at subsection (2) and I do not see (c). I see (a). You define, for the purposes of subsection (1), what the offence of drunkenness is in (a) and (b).

Mr. SHAW: I am sorry, I was referring to subsection (2) of section 121.

Mr. MACALUSO: Oh, I am sorry.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Is there a description in the Act of minor punishment?

Mr. SHAW: No. That is left to the Governor in Council. Under section 121, the Governor in Council may prescribe the minor punishments.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Have minor punishments been set out before? If so, where would they be found.

Mr. SHAW: In the Queen's regulations.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Would you have them on hand? If so, could you describe for us briefly what minor punishments are?

Mr. SHAW: This is below the punishment set out in the Act, and the minor punishments start with: confinement to barracks, extra work and drill, stoppage of leave, stoppage of grog, extra work and drill not exceeding two hours a day, and caution. That is the descending sclae of severity.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Under section 88, a man could be under the influence of liquor but not qulify under (a) and (b) so, therefore, is it not right that he could not be charged with drunkenness?

Mr. SHAW: I would think, sir, this would depend on the assessment by the court as to whether in all the circumstances they would consider him fit to be entrustedwithhis duty under (a) or, according to the evidence, whieher he was misbehaving or behaving in a disorderly manner.

Mr. FORRESTALL: There is such a thing then as a little bit of pregnancy, as far as drunkeness is concerned.

Mr. SHAW: You are quite right.

The CHAIRMAN: If there are no further questions on section 88, we will go on to clause 27, section 96A.

On clause 27—*Disobedience of captain's orders.*

Mr. LAWSON: This new clause will simply embody in the Act, Mr. Chairman, a principle that is well recognized in maritime law, that the captain of a ship has control over the navigation handling and safety of the ship regardless of the rank of the person who may be passengers on the ship.

Mr. MCINTOSH: There is no captain of a ship any more.

Mr. LAWSON: There is always a captain of a ship, sir.

Mr. NUGENT: How about an aircraft. Have you a similar section for that?

Mr. LAWSON: There is a section dealing with captain of an aircraft already in the Act.

The CHAIRMAN: Are there any further questions in regard to clause 27. We will go on to clause 28, which was old clause 25.

On clause 28.

The CHAIRMAN: Are there any question? If not, we will move on to clause 29.

On clause 29—*Attempt to commit offences.*

Mr. NUGENT: I am puzzled by clause 29, subsection (4) which, in part, reads:

> An attempt to commit any of the offences—

and the explanatory clause says:

> —an attempt to commit a conspiracy—

I know how there can be a conspiracy, but I do not know what "an attempt to commit a conspiracy" means.

Mr. SHAW: I think it is a recognized offence, sir. This is quite a technical amendment in a sense in that it brings this in now because the present section of coure makes, an attempt to commit any of the offences prescribed in sections 64 to 117, an offence, but we added section 117A, which is "conspiracy" a few years ago, and we did not make this attempt to commit that offence an offence under this section, so it is reasonably technical.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Why would it not have been done at the time?

Mr. SHAW: It was just an oversight, I think, sir.

Mr. NUGENT: The change is just to 117A, where there is no provision to make the attempt an offence, and this makes it just an offence "to the conduct of good order".

Mr. SHAW: That is right.

The CHAIRMAN: Now we move to clause 30. Are there any question on clause 30?

On clause 30.

Mr. LAWSON: This is quite an important and necessary amendment, Mr. Chairman. As you know, under the criminal code certain offences carry, particularly motoring offences, a compulsory term of imprisonment. Of course, this is one thing; if a man serves a compulsory term of imprisonment of seven days in civil life, this is quite a serious offence. However, for an officer, this is a much more serious offence in that if he is convicted and sentenced to seven days imprisonment he loses his commission—he is cashiered—which makes it an entirely different thing to the punishment when imposed upon a civilian. Similarly, if a sergeant or staff sergenat is convicted and sentenced to imprisonment, he automatically becomes a private.

Mr. FORRESTALL: I do not think you should make that statement, Brigadier, in respect of a private and a sergeant.

Mr. LAWSON: I think you misunderstand me. I say if a sergeant is tried and convicted and sentenced to imprisonment, he automatically loses his rank and reverts to private.

Mr. FORRESTALL: I do not mean that. It is certainly no less serious to a civilian to spend seven days in jail than it is to an army officer.

Mr. LAWSON: Yes, but the civilian does not lose his job because he spent seven days in jail. The army officer does.

Mr. FORRESTALL: I think, by and large, a good many of them who wind up in that postion do indeed fine themelves faced with a request to resign.

Mr. LAWSON: This may be so in some cases but not on the whole.

Mr. FORRESTALL: That is without question, with regard to the commissioned officer, is it?

Mr. SHAW: That is right, sir.

Mr. NUGENT: What your section signifies then, certainly in so far as anyone holding any rank in the army, is that while the criminal law of Canada would prescribe a minimum penalty, the army law is prescribing a penalty plus loss of rank, as a minimum.

Mr. LAWSON: That is what it amounts to.

The CHAIRMAN: Are there any further questions?

Mr. NUGENT: Is there any leeway in this, rather than charging him with the same offence. I presume it does mean, if it is substantially the same offence, no matter how charged, it still applies.

Mr. LAWSON: You see, the situation is this, sir. Supposing an officer is driving a car and he is drunk. If he is in Canada, he would be tried in the civil court, the way anybody else would, and he would get the same penalty as anyone else. But if he is overseas there are no civil courts; he has to be tried in a military court, and then he is sentenced by court martial to imprisonment, which involves an automatic loss of his commission. If he is sentenced by a civil court, this does not involve that automatic loss. So, in Canada an officer is in the same position as anybody else, but he is in a most unfair position when he is overseas. We are just obviating that unfairness.

Mr. NUGENT: What do you mean by "obviating" it?

Mr. LAWSON: We are providing that the court does not require to impose that penalty of imprisonment; they can impose a fine, or whatever else they think appropriate.

Mr. NUGENT: It says "impose a penalty in accordance with the enactment prescribing that minimum penalty". Therefore, the minimum penalty required by law in Canada is going to apply.

Mr. LAWSON: No; this is only if the offence is committed in Canada.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Under what conditions do the military authorities pass over the prosecution to civilian authorities of service men serving outside the country?

Mr. LAWSON: Serving outside the country, there are no civilian authorities to pass them over to; we must deal with them for all offences.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): You must deal with all offences—

Mr. LAWSON: Yes.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): —in the military court?

Mr. LAWSON: Well, we could let them be tried by civil court, but we have arrangements with most countries in which our troops are stationed, that we will be able to try them ourselves.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Despite the severity of whatever the crime may be? I have in mind that in Germany, very recently, a civilian court tried a Canadian soldier for manslaughter.

Mr. LAWSON: Yes, in the last year; the Germans now have jurisdiction. But in nearly all cases, they waive jurisdiction and let us try the men.

The CHAIRMAN: Clause 31 section 120A is next.

On clause 31—*Offence charged, attempt proved.*

Mr. LAWSON: This is a very technical amendment, Mr. Chairman; it is a straight adoption from the Criminal Code. It is a fairly recent amendment to the Criminal Code, and we have adopted it as an amendment to the National Defence Act.

The CHAIRMAN: Section 120B?

Mr. MCINTOSH: I might ask a further question on in respect of courts martial outside the boundaries of Canada. Is there any appeal, as far as the accused is concerned, from the court martial decision to the higher courts of Canada?

Mr. LAWSON: Oh yes, he can appeal to the Court Martial Appeal Court, and from there to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The CHAIRMAN: Are there any further questions on sections 120A and 120B?

Mr. FORRESTALL: Just one further question. Does he appeal at his own expense?

Mr. LAWSON: Not normally, no.

The CHAIRMAN: We will pass on to clause 32, old clause 29, at page 16.

On clause 32.

Mr. LAWSON: All we are doing here, Mr. Chairman, is doing away with the old naval punishment of dismissal of an officer from his ship. It is a punishment that has very little meaning in the modern context.

The CHAIRMAN: Which section is that?

Mr. LAWSON: That is clause 32 (1), Mr. Chairman, appealing section 121 of the act.

Mr. NUGENT: In the explanatory note it says "The punishment being repealed has ceased to have practical effect". Is that foreshadowing the complete disappearance of the navy?

Mr. LAWSON: No. What that means is this, sir: In the old days, punishment of dismissal from a ship for an officer in the navy had a really serious effect. It meant that they did not have a ship, and went on half-pay; and he might stay on half-pay for years before he got another ship. This is all gone in the modern navy; we do not have this system of half-pay, so the punishment is obsolete.

Mr. NUGENT: Yes, you can read all about that in C. S. Forester's "Admiral Hornblower".

The CHAIRMAN: Are there any further questions regarding clause 32?

If there are no further questions on clause 32, we will pass to clause 33, beginning at the foot of page 16.

Mr. LAWSON: This is purely consequential on the amendments contained in the next clause.

The CHAIRMAN: At the top of page 17, clause 34.

On clause 34—*Presumption of sanity.*

Mr. LAWSON: This, Mr. Chairman, is another adoption from the Criminal Code, bringing our code into line with the Criminal Code on the question of presumption of sanity.

The CHAIRMAN: Are there any questions under subclause 126A of clause 34? If not, we will go on to clause 35.

On clause 35.

Mr. LAMBERT: Mr. Chairman, what is the purpose of this deletion? It seems to me that it eliminates the authority of one officer—shall we say, a superior, in one unit, ordering the arrest of a man of lower rank in any other unit.

Mr. LAWSON: Which clause is this, sir?

Mr. LAMBERT: This is clause 35 which is repealing subsection (3) of section 128.

Mr. LAWSON: This was simply to cover the case, when we have three services, of a command being given by an officer of one service to a man in another service. If we have only one service, we no longer require this.

Mr. LAMBERT: But it says, "component, unit or other element of the Canadian Forces." Surely, what you really want to eliminate there is simply the word "service".

Mr. LAWSON: Well, yes, you are quite right; this goes further. But we considered that the words component, unit or other element", were purely surplusage, and were confusing in the light of section 20 of the act which says:

> The authority and powers of command of officers and men shall be as prescribed in regulations.

I think it was just bad drafting in the section.

Mr. LAMBERT: But this is an authority to arrest; we are dealing with another section of the act, part 6 "authority to arrest", and section 128 gives the power to arrest with regard to a service office. This is not a question of giving an order for the performance of duty. This is the power of arrest, without warrant. I am just wondering whether perhaps in the zeal to eliminate the reference to "service", you have not gone too far, because this, effectively, would bar the officer of a ship from authorizing the arrest of, say, a man on an air base or an air station immediately ashore.

Mr. SHAW: If I may suggest, sir, I think you also have to take into consideration subsections (1) and (2) of section 128, which I think are overriding. I think subsection

(3) is intended merely to be a further assistance in respect of officers and men of different services. But the actual power of arrest, I suggest, is in subsections (1) and (2).

Mr. NUGENT: It seems to me that if, in the act, "component, unit or other element of the Canadian Forces" was necessary, and that all this act is doing is removing the question of another service, I can see that you take out the same service, but if "component, unit or other element" was necessary for any purpose we have not taken away or changed that part of it.

Mr. LAWSON: That is the point, sir, we do not now consider that they ever were necessary, and that they should not have been put in there in the beginning. We are just tidying up, in taking out what we consider to be surplus words.

The CHAIRMAN: Are we satisfied at this point, before we move on?

Mr. FORRESTALL: I do not mean to take this out of context, but I am trying to satisfy myself—and I do not mean to prolong this by going back to clause 126A—that the changes there do not in any way alter, or remove the fact, or the condition of sanity, as a valid defence.

Mr. LAWSON: No, not in any way.

The CHAIRMAN: I will call clause 36.

On clause 36.

Mr. LAWSON: These are consequential amendments.

The CHAIRMAN: Are there any questions on clause 36? If not, we will move to clause 37, section 137(1).

On clause 37—*Jurisdiction.*

Mr. LAWSON: There is an amendment of substance here, Mr. Chairman, in that this would permit officers of the rank of major and the equivalent to be tried summarily by superior commanders for minor offences.

Mr. LAMBERT: What was the purpose behind that?

Mr. LAWSON: Largely because of traffic offences in Europe, to be quite honest with you. We have officers who commit traffic offences; you do not want to have a court martial for some minor traffic offence, and yet the man should be punished, and this is the reason for it.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Would these offences not occur when a lieutenant-colonel, or a colonel, or a brigadier, was driving also?

Mr. LAWSON: Well, you have to draw the line somewhere—

The CHAIRMAN: This is part of civil rights that we were talking about earlier this morning.

Mr. SMITH: Most of them would have sense enough to have a driver.

Mr. FORRESTALL: You become extraprovincial in that regard.

The CHAIRMAN: Clause 38 at the top of page 18, is next.

Clause 38—*Officers of other forces may be appointed.*

Mr. LAWSON: These are fairly consequential amendments, sir.

The CHAIRMAN: Are there any questions there? If not, we will move to clause 39.

On clause 39—*Appointment of president.*

Mr. LAWSON: Again, these are purely consequential amendments.

Mr. McINTOSH: Does that mean that the president now of a court martial has to be a full colonel or above?

Mr. LAWSON: Of a general court martial, yes.

On clause 40.

Mr. LAWSON: This is consequential.

The CHAIRMAN: If there are no questions, I will pass to clause 41.

On clause 41—*Rank of president.*

Mr. LAWSON: Again, it is consequential.

The CHAIRMAN: Clause 42 is at the top of page 19.

On clause 42—*Constitution.*

Mr. LAWSON: This is an amendment of substance, Mr. Chairman, in that the present section provides that standing courts martial can only be set up in an emergency. We are taking out those words "in an emergency".

The CHAIRMAN: Are you satisfied with clause 42?

Mr. NUGENT: In respect of standing courts martial, I do not know how much goes on. Is there that much need for them?

Mr. LAWSON: Not at the present time, I would not think; but it would be useful occasionally where you have a comparatively minor offence committed by someone, we will say, serving in Cyprus, or in Egypt, where it is difficult to set up a court martial—difficult, and expensive—and if the offence is comparatively minor, it might be very convenient to have him tried by a standing court martial.

Mr. NUGENT: You would fly the court in, if necessary?

Mr. LAWSON: We could now, yes, but this is expensive and it might be a very minor offence of some kind.

The CHAIRMAN: Clause 43 is next.

On clause 43—*Special general Court Martial.*

Mr. McINTOSH: It says, "Where a person other than an officer or man is to be tried". I take it that this means a civilian of some type.

Mr. LAWSON: That is right, sir.

Mr. McINTOSH: Under what conditions would a civilian be tried by a military court?

Mr. LAWSON: Persons accompanying the forces outside Canada, our dependents overseas, the school teachers overseas, civilian employees from Canada all these people serving with our forces overseas could be tried by court martial.

Mr. CROSSMAN: Does it not also include the members of the families of the armed forces?

Mr. LAWSON: Yes.

Mr. McINTOSH: Does that mean that all members of the families of the armed forces are subject to military law then?

Mr. LAWSON: Only when living overseas with the forces. This, of course, is essential, Mr. Chairman, because of the fact that in many cases we have exclusive jurisdiction, so that these people would not be subject to any law if they were not subject to military law.

Mr. McINTOSH: I have not read it all, but it does not say just overseas; as you say, it means that any civilian is subject to military law.

Mr. LAWSON: Of course, this is not the section that deals with this question of who is subject to military law. This is section 56 (7) (a)

> For the purposes of this section, but subject to any limitations prescribed by the Governor in Council, a person accompanies a unit or other element of the Canadian Forces that is on service or active service if such person (c) is a dependent out of Canada of an officer or a man serving beyond Canada with that unit or other element—

Now this is the section that describes who are subject to military law. Dependents are only subject when living with the forces out of Canada.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): How would this apply to dependents who left the base, went to another area not being served by the Canadian forces, and were found to be violating the laws? Suppose they went over the border into another country and violated the law there?

Mr. LAWSON: Then they would be subject to the law of that country, and they would be tried by the courts of that country. You see, our people abroad have this special status that we have negotiated for them under the NATO arrangements and so on—they have special exemptions from the local law. But once a dependent moves out and ceases to be with our force, she loses that exemption and becomes just like a tourist in the country and is subject to the law of the country in the way any other tourist is.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Supposing they had crossed over from Germany, where you had Canadian forces serving, into France where there was Canadian forces serving; the elements of the Canadian military in France would not take that person under jurisdiction?

Mr. LAWSON: No; that person would just be a tourist as you or I would be if we were travelling in France.

The CHAIRMAN: Clause 44, at the middle of page 19, is next.

Clause 44—*Questions of law.*

Mr. LAWSON: This is an amendment of some substance, Mr. Chairman. At the present time, the act simply provides that the judge advocate can decide questions of law. I think any lawyers on the Committee will recognize that it is very very difficult to determine what is a question of law. Nearly all legal questions do have elements of facts, so we think it would be much more practical to use the words "questions of mixed law and fact", questions of law or mixed law and fact. This enables the judge advocate to hear such questions as admissibility and confessions. Now, it is obviously most improper for the court martial itself to hear that there has been a confession, and to read the confession, and to know what is in it. So, we will arrange that the judge advocate determines, in the absence of the court, whether a confession is or is not admissible; so that if he decides that it is not admissible, the accused is not placed under the very grave disadvantage of the court having read, or being aware of the inadmissible confession. This is the sort of thing this is designed to deal with.

Mr. McINTOSH: In the case of a civilian, again, being found guilty of any offence, and punishment is given by the court martial, is the punishment covered here in the act, or do you take Canadian law or the law of the country in which the act is performed

Mr. LAWSON: The charge would normally be under the Criminal Code of Canada, and the sentence would be in accordance with the Criminal Code. Remember, this special general court martial that we have just been dealing with, is, in a sense, a civilian court; any we have had have been presided over by high court judges and people of that nature.

Mr. MCINTOSH: And civilian defence counsels are allowed to participate.

Mr. LAWSON: Oh, yes.

The CHAIRMAN: Clause 45, dealing with new trials follows.

On clause 45—*New trial.*

Mr. LAWSON: This is a very technical amendment, Mr. Chairman. It means that if you are going to have a new trial, you can have it on a lesser offence. At the present time, in respect of the new trial, you must charge exactly the same offence as you charged at the original trial.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Why does it have to be the same charge, if there is agreement. Why can it not be a lesser charge?

Mr. LAWSON: That is what we are saying; we are amending the section so that it can be a lesser charge; at present it must be the same charge.

Mr. NUGENT: It would not necessarily have to be a letter charge though?

Mr. LAWSON: No, no.

Mr. SMITH: It could be just another charge.

The CHAIRMAN: There seem to be some unsettled questions in regard to that item. Shall we go to clause 46.

On clause 46—*Rules of penitentiaries and civil prisons to apply.*

Mr. LAWSON: The purpose of this clause, Mr. Chairman, is to give the National Parole Board exclusive jurisdiction over service prisoners when they have been in the prison or penitentiary for more than six months; they then come under the National Parole Board, the same as all other prisoners in the penitentiary.

Mr. SMITH: Does that apply to all offences for which they may be sentenced? There are some offences that have a complete civilian counterpart and some are of a military nature and relate to their military duties. Now, does the Parole Board have the same right to parole over offences which are of a military nature and which, in the eyes of the military, may be a very heinous offence?

Mr. LAWSON: Yes, after six months they do; there is no distinction between civil and military offences.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I am still wondering about a sentence imposed by a court martial on a civilian; if the sentence includes a jail term—say, a short jail term—is that term served back in Canada or in the country in which the court martial took place? A civilian would not likely be subject to discharge from whatever duty they were doing at that time.

Mr. LAWSON: The sentence would be served in Canada. Of course, it would be very inappropriate to award a very short sentence, say, a week or two weeks or something; I do not think any court would do that.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Under the Criminal Code, if there are any penalties, including a short sentence, that are mandatory for certain things, the court would have to impose that on the person.

Mr. LAWSON: This is true; it would be awkward but it could be done. The sentence certainly could not be served in the civil prisons of a foreign country; we have no right to incarcerate a Canadian under a Canadian sentence in a foreign prison.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Nor could you make them serve time in a military prison.

Mr. LAWSON: You could, sir, but I think it would be unlikely that you would.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): What would the situation be in a foreign country where, working in conjunction with the local authorities, somebody was imprisoned; would they then come under the Parole Board for release at a later date if, as I said, this was something being worked out with the local authorities.

Mr. LAWSON: They only come under the Parole Board if they are in a Canadian prison or penitentiary. As long as they are in a service prison, they do not come under the Parole Board.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Suppose they were imprisoned in a civilian penitentiary in a foreign country?

Mr. LAWSON: They would never be imprisoned in a civilian penitentiary in a foreign country unless they were sentenced by a foreign court, and of course our Parole Board would have no control at all over that type of thing.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): What is the extent of your agreeements, say, with Germany now, where service personnel are charged and tried in a civilian court?

An hon. MEMBER: They could not be, could they?

Mr. LAWSON: Yes, they can be in some cases. It is rather complicated. The basic principle is that if the offence is committed on duty, or involves only Canadians—it does not involve local inhabitants—then we have exclusive jurisdiction. If, on the other hand, it involves local inhabitants, the German courts would have jurisdiction. However, they can waive this jurisdiction and, as I said, they most often do waive it and let us deal with the men.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): But in a case where they do not waive but, rather try the case, and he is convicted, what is the position then of a Canadian serviceman.

Mr. LAWSON: Do you mean if he is convicted?

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Yes, in a civilian court.

Mr. LAWSON: Well, he would serve his sentence in the prison of the country which convicted him. However, do have a provision in the National Defence Act that enables us to take these prisoners over and imprison them in Canadian prisons, but this would only be if the authorities of the other country agree.

But if they agreed, we could take them over?

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton-South*): What is the position of the Canadian serviceman in respect of the Canadian service, should he be confined, let us say, in a German prison for a year or two? Is he discharged, left on his own, or what is the situation?

Mr. LAWSON: I would think he would not be discharged until he was released and brought back to Canada. We certainly would not discharge him in Germany and leave him in Germany. I would think he would be kept on until he had served his sentence, but brought back to Canada by the service and then discharged.

Mr. LAMBERT: Let us assume that a Canadian serviceman is convicted of a very grievous service offence that carriees a period of imprisonment, say, of five years. This is for a service offence—he goes into a civilian prison and, after six months, he comes under the jurisdiction of the National Parole Board. For purposes of his superannuation rights with regard to medical treatment and what have you, which have operative dates as of date of discharge, is this man discharged at the time of his release from prison, say by the Parole Board, or is there a discharge while he is serving?

Mr. SHAW: From the services, sir?

Mr. LAMBERT: Yes.

Mr. SHAW: Subject to correction, I think he is normally released before he is committed or at the time he is committed to prison or within a very short time afterwards. He is still subject to military law while he is serving the punishment, but if he is to be released—and this is an administrative decision usually aside from the punishment—it is normally done at that time.

Mr. LAMBERT: This then affects what you might call his rights to medical treatment and so on—his post release medical treatment.

Mr. SHAW: They are determined as from that time, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN: If there are no further questions on clause 46 we will call clause 47.

On clause 47—*Oaths.*

The CHAIRMAN: Clause 47 is at the foot of page 20. If there are no questions on that we will move to clause 48, at the top of page 21. I believe something is slipped in here from the Department of Transport.

On clause 48— *Duties or tolls on roads, bridges, etc.*

Mr. MCINTOSH: Locking charges is not mentioned. This is a new one we should put in.

On clause 49—*When applicable.*

Mr. LAWSON: Mr. Chairman, this is purely consequential.

The CHAIRMAN: If there are no questions we will turn to clause 50.

On clause 50—*Exemption from jury service.*

Mr. LAWSON: This again is purely consequential.

On clause 51—*Offences committed outside Canada.*

Mr. LAWSON: This is a fairly important amendment. It will enable Canadian civil courts in Canada to try offences committed by civilians who are serving with the forces outside of Canada. They can try offences committed oustide of Canda by those civilians. In other words, we would not necessarily have to try the civilian overseas; we could bring him back to Canada and have him tried in an ordinary Canadian civil court. The way the act was drafted previously we were unable to do this. We have had two or three cases where it would have been desirable.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Under clause 48 why was the power transferred to the Minister from the Treasury Board.

Mr. LAWSON: This is a fairly minor thing. Mr. Chairman; it just seemed another matter of reducing the number of submissions going to the Treasury Board. I think really it is a rather unimportant matter.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Is there much money collected under duties and tolls?

Mr. LAWSON: I really would not think there would be very much. There are some bridges where a charge of a quarter is made to drive over them, or this type of thing.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton-South*): Why was it necessary then for the Minister to authorize the payments of duties and tolls if and when they are on duty, the tolls and duties are not to be collected.

Mr. LAWSON: It has been traditional in the act, going right back to Confederation; there was always a section which stated that the military are not required to pay duties and tolls. It goes back to the days of the toll roads. Then we came to the point where it was obviously unfair that we should use certain bridges which were built by private corporations and so on without paying anything, so we put a provision in now that the Minister can make an agreement with a certain bridge authority and perhaps a lump sum would be paid annually, monthly or something like that, for the use of the bridge. As I say, it is very minor.

The CHAIRMAN: Clause 51 and section 217B dealing with offences committed outside Canada. Are there any further questions on that. If not, we shall then turn to clause 52 at the top of page 22.

On clause 52—"*Attorney General*" *defined.*

Mr. LAWSON: This is consequential.

The CHAIRMAN: If there are no questions, clause 53 is next.

On clause 53—*Exception in case of certain reserves.*

Mr. BREWIN: Mr. Chairman, with respect to clause 52, and this may be an inconsequential question, what is consequential about section 218? I thought "consequential" meant following from the other main provisions of this act, and I cannot find any relationship between this section 218 and anything before it. It may be all right but I do not understand it.

Mr. LAWSON: Section 218 now contains a subsection (b) defining officer commanding a command. There are no more officers commanding army commands so we are taking that whole subsection out.

Mr. BREWIN: You are taking that out. This is just something left?

Mr. LAWSON: Yes.

Mr. BREWIN: The consequential part is taking out the section we do not see?

Mr. LAWSON: That is right.

The CHAIRMAN: We are on clause 53.

Mr. LAWSON: These are really all consequential.

Mr. CHURCHILL: We are shifting the responsibility to the Chief of the Defence Staff instead of leaving it with the area commandeer or whoever he was.

Mr. LAWSON: It was the officer commanding the army command, sir. We no longer have army territorial command, so we had to make a change.

Mr. NUGENT: It makes the requesting of aid a little more cumbersome then; they have to go a little higher up.

Mr. LAWSON: The Chief of the Defence Staff could designate somebody at a lower level but of course, with the type of communications we have, it really is not that much more difficult.

Mr. SMITH: We can always count on rapidity in communications.

The CHAIRMAN: Are there any questions on sections 221 and 222? Section 222 is the "Call out of Canadian forces". Section 223 is "Form of requisition".

Mr. LAWSON: Mr. Chairman, these are all consequential.

The CHAIRMAN: Do we have any questions on page 3? If not we will turn to page 24.

On clause 54—*Statement not open to dispute.*

Mr. LAWSON: Mr. Chairman, this is consequential.

On clause 55—*Duration of aid of civil power.*

Mr. LAWSON: These are consequential.

The CHAIRMAN: Clause 56 is new.

On clause 56—*Unlawful use of names, etc.*

Mr. CHURCHILL: How does this come about; what is behind it?

Mr. LAWSON: Mr. Chairman, this is a new clause. It is adopted really from the RCMP Act. They have a very similar provision in that act. We thought is was a useful provision that we should have. We do have trouble sometimes with people implying in their advertisements that their products are used by the Canadian forces and perhaps this is not so. We really do require some control and this would give it to us.

Mr. SMITH: Would this cover the situation you had a few years ago, when there was quite a dispute, and bitterness generated, in respect of a car sales company down around Malton that was incorporated; their name and their advertising implied that they had some sort of official status in the armed services.

Mr. LAWSON: It would cover a case like that, sir, yes. If you notice, under the wording of the proposed clause, it is not automatic; there must be action taken by the Minister before it becomes an offence.

Mr. CHURCHILL: It does not prohibit the cartoonists from using the Minister as a subject does it?

Mr. LAWSON: I do not think so.

Mr. MCINTOSH: What is the meaning of the word "mark" in subsection (c) under 233A? It says in part: "any uniform, mark," What is meant by "mark"?

The CHAIRMAN: A "C-broad arrow " would be a mark, would it not.

Mr. LAWSON: I am trying to think what a mark would be, sir.

Mr. SMITH: Would the word possibly have been inserted there to cover a mark in relation to a trade mark?

Mr. LAWSON: I do not think so in the context. It is, "any uniform, mark, badge or insignia in use in the Canadian forces". It would cover a thing like the broad arrow with the letter "C", That is the government mark on stores. It would cover that type of thing.

The CHAIRMAN: If there are no further questions on this clause we will pass on to clause 57 at the top of page 25.

On clause 57—*Failure to attend parade.*

Mr. ANDRAS: Mr. Chairman, my question does not relate to the clause we are on but I have a general question in connection with legal interpretation that I have wanted to get in for some time. Would it be permissible to ask it now?

The CHAIRMAN: Go ahead, Mr. Andras.

Mr. ANDRAS: Brigadier Lawson, there has been some reference, during our deliberations, to the sweeping powers given to the Minister by Bill No. C-243 and yet I understand, in checking on it, that apparently the only additional legal power given to the Minister really is under clause 4, subclause (3), which is the right to designate rank titles. Is that correct, or what additional legal powers have been given to the Minister by Bill No. C-243, which did not exist before?

Mr. LAWSON: The one you mentioned, sir, is certainly the only one of major importance. There is the one about tolls which we just dealt with, where the Minister is substituted for the Treasury Board to authorize payment of tolls. There is nothing of any significance apart from the one you mentioned.

Mr. CHURCHILL: They are sweeping powers—to form one single force.

Mr. LAWSON: Sir, this is not vested in the Minister; this is done by the act itself.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, it is now six o'clock. We have reached clause 57 at the top of page 25. We have a couple of pages to go to finish the bill and then there are the schedules at the end which, I presume, we would also want to scan. Shall we return at eight o'clock and continue with our work?

Some hon. MEMBERS: Agreed.

EVENING SITTING

TUESDAY, March 14, 1967.

The CHAIRMAN: Order, please, gentlemen.

We were dealing with clause 57. Mr. Lambert, do you have a comment?

Mr. LAMBERT: Yes, Mr. Chairman. I was wondering whether the change in the upper limits of the fine was a reflection on the inflationary trends in this country. I see they have been increased by 500 per cent. I did not know that inflation had gone that high. Is it felt that there should be an additional deterrent?

Mr. LAWSON: Actually, Mr. Lambert, these fines that are now prescribed in the act were originally prescribed in 1904 and they have not been changed since. So, the changes perhaps reflect the inflation from 1904 until today.

Mr. LAMBERT: I was looking in the sections of the act to see whether we had an indication of where this came from and on what date, but it does not appear to go that far back.

Mr. LAWSON: It goes back beyond the National Defence Act, sir. These were taken from the old Militia Act, and they go back to 1904 in the Militia Act.

Mr. LAMBERT: Yes, but this was reviewed in 1950.

Mr. LAWSON: Yes. We made no changes at that time. This applies to all the clauses from 57 to 61.

The CHAIRMAN: Does that take care of that point, Mr. Lambert?

Mr. LAMBERT: Yes. It is interesting to note that in one instance it goes from $10 to $50 and in the other one from $25 to $40. I was wondering whether under section 237 there might be some bargain rates going? I notice, though, in section 238 it comes very steep at $100.

The CHAIRMAN: Well, I think in any event fining officers and men in the reserve force like that for not attending parades is just shocking, Mr. Lambert. Are we finished with clause 57?

On clause 58—*Neglecting personal equipment.*

On clause 59—

The CHAIRMAN: Are there any questions in connection with clause 59, which increases the maximum fine provided from $50 to $100?

On clause 60—*Failure to obey directions respecting property taken over, etc.*

The CHAIRMAN: Section 246, Breach of regulations respecting billeting, etc.

On clause 61—*Failure to comply with convoy orders.*

The CHAIRMAN: I think Mr. Lambert said he wanted to say something on this clause.

Mr. LAMBERT: I am wondering how one invokes the sanctions under this act? For instance, clause 61 in our bill changes section 248, and it deals with failure to comply with convoy orders. If these are out at sea, how do we have extra territorial application? Could you explain the working of the provisions of this section and how they would be applicable to the master of a civilian merchant ship which is out at sea in international waters? How could you get him back here to impose the fine?

Mr. LAWSON: I am afraid we would have to have him back in Canada before we could impose the fine, Mr. Lambert.

Mr. LAMBERT: Or put him in jail.

Mr. LAWSON: Or put him in jail, yes.

Mr. LAMBERT: What is the power of arrest which is necessary, for instance, in order to do this? Is it deemed within the powers of a Canadian naval officer to effect an arrest under these circumstances, or to bring him to heel and bring him back to Canada?

Mr. LAWSON: No, I do not think a naval officer would have any power to do that. If he was in Canada he could then be arrested and charged in the normal way by the civil police. This section creates an offence and the provisions of the *Criminal Code* relating to arrest, and so on, would automatically apply. But as you say, Mr. Lambert, as long as he did not come back to Canada I do not think we could do anything about it.

On clause 62—*References.*

Mr. LAWSON: We are proposing an amendment to clause 62, Mr. Chairman, by adding a new subclause (c). This is a subclause which we should have included in the bill as printed, but it only came to our attention later.

Mr. LAMBERT: May I ask a question. Where will this appear in the act, as a new clause 249? The clause is headed up "References". I do not see any reference to the particular number.

Mr. LAWSON: No, this is transitory provision. It will not be inserted in the act, Mr. Lambert. It is like a number of the other provisions in the early part of the bill that are transitory. Clauses 5, 6 and 7 are not amendments to the act, they are transitory provisions.

Mr. LAMBERT: Well, can I take it that every other section prior to this one is an amendment or an addition to the National Defence Act?

Mr. LAWSON: Apart from clauses 5, 6 and 7 and, of course, the next two clauses as well, 63 and 64.

Mr. LAMBERT: All right, fine.

The CHAIRMAN: There are no further questions on clause 62.

On clause 63—

Mr. LAMBERT: Let us see schedule B before we go on.

The CHAIRMAN: I think we will deal with schedule B, Mr. Lambert, before leaving the bill tonight.

Mr. LAMBERT: Could we perhaps just stand clause 63 for the moment. We can get the explanations in the schedules.

The CHAIRMAN: Are you suggesting that we stand clause 63 and look at schedule B now?

Mr. LAMBERT: Yes.

The CHAIRMAN: All right. Shall we deal with clause 64 first?

On clause 64—*Coming into force.*

The CHAIRMAN: It states:

> This Act or any provision thereof shall come into force on a day or days to be fixed by proclamation of the Governor in Council.

Are there any questions?

Mr. CROSSMAN: What is "This Act"?

The CHAIRMAN: "This Act" refers to the amendments to the National Defence Act, Bill No. C-243, which will then be an act.

We will stand clause 63. We will now turn to Schedule B on page 29. This refers to a schedule of acts which are affected by this act.

Mr. LAWSON: As I said at the beginning, Mr. Chairman, there are no amendments in this schedule of a substantive nature. All of them are terminological only.

The CHAIRMAN: The Canada Elections Act is first. Are there any questions?

The Canada Shipping Act is next. There are several amendments to the Canada Shipping Act on page 30. Any questions? Mr. Lambert.

Mr. LAMBERT: Yes. Referring to item 3, I take it this would have been the equivalent of a naval lieutenant?

Mr. LAWSON: Yes. I could read the present section 122 (1) if you like, Mr. Lambert. It reads:

> A person who has attained the rank of Lieutenant in the executive branch of the Royal Canadian Navy is entitled to receive from the Minister a certificate of service as master of a foreign-going steamship without examination.

Mr. LAMBERT: And the substitution has been the new rank of captain in the Canadian Forces and the holding of an upper deck watch-keeping certificate?

Mr. LAWSON: Yes. The only substitution is the words "rank of Captain in the Canadian Forces", in place of "rank of Lieutenant in the executive branch of the Royal Canadian Navy".

The CHAIRMAN: Are there any further questions?

The Canadian Forces Superannuation Act on page 31 is next. Are there any questions?

Mr. LAMBERT: Yes, in item 2 paragraph (G) reads:

"(G) any continuous period of full-time service of six months or more in the Canadian Forces or in the naval, army or air forces of Her Majesty raised by Canada, other than the forces—

May we get an explanation of this?

Mr. LAWSON: The present section reads as follows, Mr. Lambert:

(G) any continuous period of full-time service of six months or more in the naval, army or air forces of Her Majesty raised by Canada, other than the forces, if he elects, within one year of becoming a contributor under this Act, to pay for that service,

The word "forces" in this act is defined to mean the regular forces.

Mr. LAMBERT: Oh, I see. So that that phrase "other than the forces" means what?

Mr. LAWSON: Other than the regular forces.

Mr. LAMBERT: I see.

The CHAIRMAN: Are there any other questions dealing with the Canadian Forces Superannuation Act?

Mr. LAWSON: We are proposing an amendment to item 5, Mr. Chairman. This is at the top of page 33. Section (B) contains a number of unnecessary words and we are proposing that (B) be further amended to read: "three thousand dollars per annum if his rank is lower than warrant officer, or five thousand dollars per annum if his rank is warrant officer or higher, and"

Mr. HARKNESS: What does that refer to?

Mr. LAWSON: This is a supplementary death benefit. The minimum supplementary death benefit is $3,000 for other ranks and $5,000 for officers. It is really rather meaningless because the supplementary death benefit now is a year's pay of rank and, of course, no other rank has a pay of less than $3,000 a year and no officer has a pay of less than $5,000 a year. Therefore, under the present pay scales it does not really mean very much.

Mr. LAMBERT: Well, under those circumstances may I ask why was the precise description of the death benefit not given If the minimum is one year's pay, why go through this business of putting in $3,000 and $5,000?

G/C H. A. MCLEARN (*Deputy Judge Advocate General*): If I may answer that, this is really more of an exercise than anything. A participant who is a member of the regular forces has a choice of receiving the greater; either the pay of his rank for a year is $3,000 if his rank is lower than chief petty officer or $5,000 if his rank is chief officer or higher. Now, no one of the rank of warrant officer today receives less than $5,000 a year, and Brigadier Lawson spoke earlier of a more comprehensive amendment to the Canadian Forces Superannuation Act. However, in order to bring the rank terminology into line, when this bill was first drafted by the Justice Department all these words that are under the slip were put in to bring the terminology into line. Then it was realized that we had three times as many words in there as we actually needed, so the proposed amendment is to deal with the practical situation and amend the act in so far as terminology is concerned.

Mr. LAMBERT: Did I hear you say that this was a death benefit, Brigadier Lawson?

Mr. LAWSON: Yes, a supplementary death benefit.

Mr. LAMBERT: How does this arise under an option? How can a serviceman exercise an option with regard to his supplementary death benefit?

Mr. LAWSON: As Group Captain McLearn has just said, Mr. Lambert—well, it is an option of his estate, of course,—there really is no option and this will have to be corrected when we come to amend the Canadian Forces Superannuation Act. As I said at the beginning, in this schedule we have not attempted to make anything but consequential amendments, that is, amendments required by unification. We are not making substantive amendments to any of these acts and therefore we have not tried to correct this anomaly in this particular bill. It will be corrected, of course, when we amend the Canadian Forces Superannuation Act.

Mr. LAMBERT: Does this also apply to item 6?

Mr. LAWSON: No, item 6 applies to people who are already out of the service but are still alive. In those cases the pay might have been lower than the $3,000 or the $5,000 at the time they went out, so it does really have a meaning here.

The CHAIRMAN: Are there any further questions on the Canadian Forces Superannuation Act?

We will now move to Civilian War Pensions and Allowances Act at the foot of page 33 and it carries on through page 37. Are there any questions on Schedule B covering those pages concerning the Civilian War Pensions and Allowances Act?

Mr. MCINTOSH: This is just retirement pensions, it is not disability pensions.

Mr. LAWSON: Disability pensions.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I thought the Pension Commission dealt with disability pensions.

Mr. LAWSON: This act, of course, relates to civilians, not to service personnel, and this is the act under which civilians can obtain war pensions. Frankly, I must confess I am not too familiar with the act. I have never really had anything to do with it.

Mr. MCINTOSH: This is a point that I would like clarified. I wonder why the department looks after civilian personnel themselves under disability pensions and they will not look after their own personnel, the armed services? Why do we not transfer that to the Veterans Affairs Committee?

Mr. LAWSON: This act is not administered by the Department of National Defence, sir. We are just tidying up all these other acts, but these acts are not administered by our department. We are simply changing the terminology to comply with the provisions of the bill.

Mr. MCINTOSH: These are amendments to other acts with which we deal?

Mr. LAWSON: Yes, to acts administered by other departments.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Well, is this the right place to put this, under Bill No. C-243, which deals with unification of the services?

Mr. LAWSON: These are all consequential upon unification. That is the justification for putting them in this bill. They make no change in substance in any of these acts. We are not interfering with any other department by changing their act in substance, we are simply changing the terminology.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Well, God forbid, but if this bill passes and we pass all these schedules, and so on, what happens to the other acts then?

Mr. LAWSON: Nothing, they remain just as they are. Their application is identical in the future, as in the past. All we have done is change the terminology. Under this act the rates of pensions paid to civilians are determined under these tables, which relate their positions to certain service ranks. We have changed the names of the service ranks, therefore we have to change the other act to insert these new names of the service ranks.

Mr. MCINTOSH: If this bill passes in to the house this becomes law, right?

Mr. LAWSON: Yes.

Mr. MCINTOSH: And automatically amends those other acts, is that right?

Mr. LAWSON: That is right, the terminology of the other acts.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Well, it amends the acts. The terminology might be changed and this—

Mr. FOY: Rank structure, and so on.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Brigadier, these pensions for personnel of Canadian ships or certified non-Canadian ships, the military rank equivalents, is this new or old?

Mr. LAWSON: This is old, it has always been in the act. All we are doing is changing the name of the rank.

Mr. FORRESTALL: We do not have any right, then, to do anything with this except as it might affect some other section of our own act. In other words, a master has always been a commander, and you are amending that because commanders are going to disappear and they are going to become lieutenant colonels?

Mr. LAWSON: That is exactly right.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Then I suggest you stand clear if you are talking to some old sea dog and you start calling him "colonel."

Mr. LAWSON: We will not be doing that, sir. He will still be whatever he was when he retired, but for pension purposes he will be equated to a lieutenant colonel of the Canadian Forces.

Mr. FORRESTALL: I was just being humorous, and I apologize. Is this, in fact, all we are doing, and nothing else, with this entire section?

Mr. LAWSON: That is right.

Mr. FORRESTALL: In part (v) you have "Surgeon," and this must go back to the sixteenth century, but surely a surgeon is equivalent to at least a second engineer or the chief steward?

Mr. LAWSON: I agree, there are anomalies in these, but we felt that it would be most improper for us to recommend amendments in substance to acts administered by other departments, and therefore we have not done it.

Mr. FORRESTALL: This is the proper legal procedure to follow in doing this. In other words, it would not be proper—or would it—for us to suggest to the department concerned that they accordingly amend their own act in order to fall in line with ours. Are we not saying, in effect here that if Parliament does this then Parliament can do whatever it wants?

Mr. LAWSON: Oh, parliament can do anything, of course, but we thought it would be improper for us as a department to recommend changes.

Mr. FORRESTALL: I think it is idiotic. I do not think you should ever approach business procedure in this manner. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN: I think, gentlemen, we should be satisfied that we are not touching it when we see, as Mr. Forrestall says, a purser and a surgeon equated at the same rates. I think that is marvellous.

Mr. FORRESTALL: It is almost priceless.

The CHAIRMAN: If the appropriate minister who is responsible for this act does not come along and amend that soon, I think he ought to.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Well, it sounds as if it goes back to the days when blood letting was the accepted course for everything.

The CHAIRMAN: Well, gentlemen, this schedule carries on through pages 35, 36 and 37. Is there anything that arises for questioning in those pages? If not, I will call for the Coastal Fisheries Protection Act, which appears on page 37. We do not know what is repealed there, so that is not very informative.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Is it a short subparagraph?

Mr. LAWSON: Yes, very short, sir.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Can it be read out so that we will know what it is?

Mr. LAWSON: I have it here. "Protection Officer" means:

(iii) any commissioned officer of the Royal Canadian Navy,

The CHAIRMAN: No questions. We will go on to Criminal Code.

Mr. MCINTOSH: No substitutes.

Mr. HARKNESS: In this case you are really making a substantive amendment, are you not? You are removing—

Mr. LAWSON: It would appear so, sir, but it is not really so because of this. Although this amendment would repeal the provision I just quoted, power does exist in the act to extend the meaning of "Protection Officer" to include.

any person authorized by the Governor in Council to enforce this Act.

It is presumed, particularly in view of the recent 12 mile fishing limit arrangements, that commissioned officers of the Canadian Forces would be authorized by regulations to act as "Protection Officers." We are leaving it now to regulation.

The CHAIRMAN: Any further questions? We will now go to Criminal Code. Paragraph (4) of section 2 is repealed.

The next one is Defence Production Act.

Mr. LAMBERT: Could we have paragraph (e) of section 2 as it now stands in the Defence Production Act read so we can note the difference?

Mr. LAWSON: Paragraph (e) reads as follows, Mr. Lambert:

"defence projects" means buildings, aerodromes, airports, dockyards, roads, defence fortifications or other naval, army or air force works, or works required for the production, maintenance or storage of defence supplies;

Mr. LAMBERT: So you are using the word "military" instead of "naval, army or air force"?

Mr. LAWSON: Yes.

Mr. LAMBERT: Now, is there a definition of the word "military" in the Defence Production Act as you have it in the National Defence Act?

Mr. LAWSON: I would doubt it, I do not have the act here but I do not think that is necessary, sir. "Military" is a common English word.

Mr. McINTOSH: We are doing away with a lot of them, too.

Mr. LAMBERT: I was concerned about this earlier in amendments to the National Defence Act, and I checked back and noticed that there had been an amendment to paragraph 19 of clause 2 of the National Defence Act, so that the word "military" is one of those consequential amendments, but unless there is a definition in the Defence Production Act there might be some difficulty somewhere.

Mr. LAWSON: In the Interpretation Act which, of course, applies to all other acts, there is a definition of "military." It is now defined in the Interpretation Act as follows:

> "military" shall be construed as relating to all or any of the Services of the Canadian Forces;

There is a bill before parliament now amending the Interpretation Act, which will amend that definition to make it consistent with—

Mr. CHURCHILL: The change here was not really essential, though, was it, because you deal with aerodromes, airports, dockyards, defence fortifications, and so on.

Mr. LAWSON: Not essential, no. It is tidier, that is all.

The CHAIRMAN: Are there any other questions? If not, we will move to Defence Services Pension Continuation Act.

Mr. CHURCHILL: This is an addition. Is it just to get in the wording "member of the Canadian Forces" that it is essential here?

Mr. McLEARN: The problem here, sir, is that the Defence Services Pension Continuation Act is divided into four parts. The first part relates to the Canadian Army. The second part is short and the part that applies has some differences in pension arrangements for members of the Royal Canadian Navy. These are essentially old-timers. Part III applies to the Royal Canadian Air Force. In doing the drafting the Department of Justice realized that it would be hopeless to amend this old act which is dying because ultimately nobody will derive any benefits or qualify under it. So, this was a general regulation making provision which would enable the Governor in Council to do whatever was necessary to preserve all the rights of those who are still serving, and there are approximately 200 of them to whom this act applies, and of the rest who are drawing pensions under this act. So it was really found to be the only practical way of adapting it to what the proposed bill will do.

Mr. CHURCHILL: You are not actually striking out "naval, army or air forces of Canada"?

Mr. McLEARN: No, sir, there is no thought of doing that. It was just to leave the act as it is.

Mr. CHURCHILL: That is good. I am glad to see those words in some act.

The CHAIRMAN: Are there any further questions? We will move to page 38, the Department of Veterans Affairs Act.

Mr. McINTOSH: I wonder what Section 5 said before?

Mr. LAWSON: I will read it:

> "5. The duties, powers and functions of the Minister extend and apply to the administration of statutes enacted by the Parliament of Canada, and of orders of the Governor in Council, as are not by law assigned to any other

department of the Government of Canada or any Minister thereof, relating to the care, treatment, training or re-establishment in civil life, of any person who served in the naval, army or air forces of Her Majesty, any person who has otherwise engaged in pursuits relating to war, and of any other person designated by the Governor in Council, and to the care of the dependants of any such person, and extend and apply as well to all such other matters and such boards and other public bodies, subjects, services and properties of the Crown as may be designated, or assigned to the Minister by the Governor in Council.

Mr. HARKNESS: That is exactly what this says.

Mr. LAWSON: No, "naval, army or air forces".

Mr. MCLEARN: No, it is not, sir. We have added "who served in the Canadian Forces".

Mr. MCINTOSH: I do not know of any act that defines that a man serving in the army is called a soldier or a man serving in the navy is called a sailor, and so on. What do you call a man serving in the Canadian Forces?

Mr. LAWSON: The only thing we have done here is add the words "any person who served in the Canadian Forces".

Mr. MCINTOSH: A serviceman. I was just wondering how you would deal with this under the pensions legislation.

The CHAIRMAN: Are there any further questions on that? Item 2 at the foot of page 38.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I presume that subclause (a) is just the introduction of the words "Canadian Forces"?

Mr. LAWSON: Yes.

Mr. CHURCHILL: And the same in the next item?

The CHAIRMAN: This continues to page 40. Are there any further questions on the Department of Veterans Affairs Act which is dealt with on pages 38, 39 and 40? The Exchequer Court Act. Any further questions? The Family Allowances Act at the foot of page 40. Any questions? The Geneva Conventions Act on page 41. There is an amendment here.

Mr. LAWSON: The purpose of this amendment, Mr. Chairman, is really to remove some unnecessary words from the proposed clause.

Mr. HARKNESS: Have we ever ratified the Geneva Conventions?

Mr. LAWSON: Yes we have, Mr. Harkness, I am glad to say.

Mr. HARKNESS: When did we do that?

Mr. LAWSON: In the 1964-65 session. It took a long time.

Mr. HARKNESS: I know it took a long time.

The CHAIRMAN: Are there any further questions on the Geneva Conventions Act? We will now take the Government Employees Compensation Act. Any questions? The Income Tax Act on page 41. At the foot of page 41 there are two subparagraphs which have been repealed under the North Pacific Fisheries Convention Act and the Northern Pacific Halibut Fishery Convention Act. I will ask for an explanation of those.

Mr. HARKNESS: I thought you would be able to explain those yourself.

The CHAIRMAN: No, I am just a ball boy at this game.

Mr. LAWSON: This provision now defines a protection officer as including any commissioned officer of the Royal Canadian Navy. Although this provision will be repealed by this amendment, the definition of "Protection Officer" in the act includes any other person authorized by the Governor in Council to enforce this act. Again it is presumed that the appropriate Canadian Forces officers would be authorized by order in council to enforce the act as required.

Mr. LAMBERT: May I ask why there has to be so much resort to definition or distinction by order in council?

Mr. LAWSON: We are not really increasing the powers of the Governor in Council, Mr. Lambert. These provisions are already in the act.

Mr. LAMBERT: I know, but more and more resort to the order in council provisions is being used.

Mr. LAWSON: It would require quite an elaborate provision if you were to define the type of Canadian Forces officer who was to be designated as a protection officer under this particular fisheries Convention Act. It seemed much simpler to leave it so that under the circumstances as they appear from time to time the Governor in Council could designate the officers who could act as protection officers.

Mr. LAMBERT: I might just make this observation, Brigadier Lawson. It is all very well for those drafting and preparing these, but it becomes awfully difficult for the man at the other end who has got to go and find who on earth is a protection officer.

Mr. LAWSON: I appreciate that.

Mr. LAMBERT: You can get the orders in council, but it is much more difficult than if you have the revised statutes. Most lawyers do not have all the orders in council that are passed by the federal government. They do not have a library that is big enough. This is why I think that all of this business of resorting to powers under regulations is wrong. What we should do is make the appropriate change in the act here and then we could find it through the revised statutes. This way it leaves you in a complete void of greater ignorance.

Mr. LAWSON: I may say, Mr. Lambert, we did, of course, consult with the Department of Fisheries and this was what they thought would be the most suitable amendment.

The CHAIRMAN: Perhaps I could ask a supplementary here. When the Russian fishing fleet comes to fish off the west coast again, under this amendment, is it going to be easier or harder to find a fisheries protection officer?

Mr. CHURCHILL: Would you mind reading the section again as it now stands?

Mr. LAWSON: The section now defines a protection officer as including:

> any commissioned officer of the Royal Canadian Navy,

Mr. MCINTOSH: Why did you not change that to "Canadian Forces"?

Mr. LAWSON: Well, I suppose it would be inappropriate to have officers engaged in the land or air environment as protection officers under this act. It would only be officers operating in a sea environment who would be able to operate as protection officers under the act.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Well, that is not complete unification, is it?

Mr. LAWSON: I think it would be quite possible to put in "any officer of the Canadian Forces serving on a ship", or something like that, yes. We could certainly draft something.

Mr. LAMBERT: But after all, sir, are you not going to have to designate them sometime in an order in council?

Mr. LAWSON: Oh, yes, but it would be the Department of Fisheries, that would be doing it not the Department of National Defence.

Mr. LAMBERT: You mean the Department of Justice officers who are the legislative draftsmen?

Mr. LAWSON: Yes, at the request of the Department of Fisheries.

The CHAIRMAN: If there are no further questions on this paragraph I will move along to—

Mr. MCINTOSH: The Brigadier said that it would be the Department of Fisheries which would do that. Why do they not amend their own act and leave this alone?

Mr. LAWSON: If we left every one of these acts we would have perhaps a dozen more bills before parliament all making these very minor amendments. Each department has been consulted, of course, on these amendments and have agreed to them.

The CHAIRMAN: The next is the Official Secrets Act, page 42.

Mr. HARKNESS: What is this paragraph (d) which is being repealed, and also the one which is being substituted for it?

Mr. LAWSON: Which act is this, sir?

Mr. HARKNESS: The Official Secrets Act.

Mr. LAWSON: The present act reads:

> "munitions of war" means arms, ammunition, implements or munitions of war, army, naval or air stores, or any articles deemed capable of being converted thereinto, or made useful in the production thereof;

Mr. CHURCHILL: Is there a similar change in the next paragraph?

Mr. LAWSON: Yes. In the next paragraph the words "naval, army or air force establishments or stations" appear.

Mr. CHURCHILL: You have that as "armed forces"?

Mr. LAWSON: We have "armed forces" now.

Mr. CHURCHILL: What is the change in the one at the bottom of the page?

Mr. LAWSON: Is this item 3 you are referring to, sir

Mr. CHURCHILL: Yes.

Mr. LAWSON: Again it refers to "naval, army or air force uniforms".

Mr. CHURCHILL: That is changed to "military" now?

Mr. LAWSON: Yes.

The CHAIRMAN: Are there any further questions there? Page 43, item 4.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Is "official uniform" defined anywhere?

Mr. LAWSON: No, it is not.

Mr. MCNULTY: Not yet.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I was just wondering if what the Department of Public Works has is an official uniform?

Mr. LAWSON: I am afraid I do not understand your question.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I believe what you meant would be a military uniform, but when you say "official uniform" it could be any official uniform of any department of the government.

The CHAIRMAN: Item 3 states:

> —any military, police or other official uniform or any uniform so nearly resembling the same as to be calculated to deceive—

Mr. MCINTOSH: Why did you not use the word "military" rather than "official"? That is what I am getting at. Well, how about the girls from the restaurant, is that an official uniform they wear?

Mr. LAWSON: Any uniform that might be worn by any government service, for example, the protective staff of the House of Commons, they have an official uniform which they wear. The Corps of Commissionaires who are employed by the government as guards on various establishments wear a uniform which would be an official uniform.

Mr. MCINTOSH: So do the elevator operators.

Mr. LAWSON: Yes.

Mr. MCINTOSH: So do the girls in the restaurant upstairs.

Mr. LAWSON: I suppose so.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Well, does this not mean "military" uniforms? You do not mean "official"?

Mr. LAWSON: No, I think it means any uniform if it is being worn to deceive.

Mr. MCINTOSH: What is "official"? This is what I mean.

Mr. LAWSON: Perhaps if I read the whole of the section you would understand it.

The CHAIRMAN: I think what we are dealing with here is that if anybody who is not a commissionaire dresses himself up as a commissionaire for the purpose of obtaining some military secret or secret of government, or uses that deceitfully, then the section applies. That is what it seems to me to mean.

Mr. LAWSON: It refers to wearing an official uniform in order to obtain access to a prohibited place.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I take it that "official uniform" is already in the Official Secrets Act. You are not putting it in?

Mr. LAWSON: Oh, no, this is still there. The only thing we are doing is taking out the words "naval, army or air force uniform" and substituting "military".

Mr. MCINTOSH: The word "official" is already in there?

Mr. LAWSON: Oh, yes.

The CHAIRMAN: We will pass along to items 4 and 5 on page 43. Are there any further questions on these items?

Mr. CHURCHILL: What is the change in item 5?

The CHAIRMAN: Do you want to go back and refer to item 4, Mr. Brewin?

Mr. BREWIN: Yes, I just wondered what the change was there.

Mr. LAWSON: The only change, Mr. Brewin, is to delete "naval, army or air force" and substitute "military".

Mr. BREWIN: Oh, I see.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Bad words.

The CHAIRMAN: Did you have a question on item 5, Mr. Churchill?

Mr. CHURCHILL: What is it there? Does it follow the word "diplomatic" half way down?

Mr. LAWSON: The present section reads, after the word "diplomatic", "or by any diplomatic, naval, army or air force authority". We have changed that to "military authority".

Mr. CHURCHILL: Would an air force officer from another country, who is attached or seconded to the Canadian Forces, be covered by this word "military" if there was any alteration made in his official pass, permit or licence?

Mr. LAWSON: I think he would, Mr. Churchill. Under the Interpretation Act "military" is given a broad interpretation.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I question the alteration of the Official Secrets Act by this process in this particular act. That act is of major importance and if any alteration was needed I think it should have come up separately in the house. I am not certain that the alteration which is proposed is absolutely necessary. I think the expression "naval, army or air forces" will continue to be used, and they are military. Why should we smuggle in this act in a schedule to the defence act?

Mr. LAWSON: I think it is a matter of being consistent, Mr. Churchill. As I said before, there are no amendments of substance.

The CHAIRMAN: If there are no further questions, gentlemen, let us move along to the Pension Act on page 43.

Mr. CHURCHILL: The first paragraph here reads:

> "member of the forces" means a person who has served in the Canadian Forces or in the naval, army or air forces of Canada since the commencement of World War I;

That is up to the present day. So, you will still keep "naval, army or air forces" in there for another 70 years because people tend to live, as you know, they do not just pass away when they leave the forces.

Mr. LAWSON: Mr. Chairman, we are proposing that item 2 be deleted. The reason for this amendment is as follows. When the bill was drafted the Pension Act made a distinction in respect of disability pensions based upon the ranks held by pensioners. These distinctions were removed by Appropriation Act No. 9 of 1966, and hence this amendment is no longer required and we are therefore recommending that it be deleted.

The CHAIRMAN: Are there any further questions on paragraph 2?

Mr. HARKNESS: Why is what used to be item 3 and has now become item 2 here? Why does it appear?

Mr. LAWSON: These are pensions payable on death. There is still a distinction drawn between ranks and we still require it.

Mr. HARKNESS: The other one applies to pensions for disabilities and this is pensions for death?

Mr. LAWSON: Yes.

Mr. HARKNESS: I see.

The CHAIRMAN: Are there any further questions on page 44? Are there any questions on page 45, the Public Service Superannuation Act. Are there any questions on page 46, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Superannuation Act. Mr. Lambert?

Mr. LAMBERT: Do I take it that—and this is merely asked out of idle curiosity —the equivalent of a commissioner is a lieutenant-general, a deputy commissioner is a major general and the assistant commissioners are brigadier-generals. That is at the top of page 47. Opposite "Assistant Commissioner" it says "Brigadier-General and higher ranks".

Mr. LAWSON: As a matter of fact, sir, the commissioner does wear the rank badges of a lieutenant-general, the deputy commissioner wears the rank badges of a major-general, and so on.

The CHAIRMAN: Are there any further questions on the R.C.M.P. Superannuation Act. If not, we will move to the Senate and House of Commons Act.

Mr. HARKNESS: What is the purpose of this? It reads:

> Paragraph (b) of section 12 and section 37 are amended by substituting the words "reserve force" for the words "reserve forces".

What does this paragraph provide for?

Mr. LAWSON: The section now reads as follows, Mr. Harkness:

> Nothing renders ineligible, as aforesaid, any person serving in the naval, army or air forces of Canada, or in any other of the naval, army or air forces of the Crown, while such forces are on active service in consequence of any war, and receiving salary, pay or allowance as a member of such forces while on such active service.

There is an error in my brief. I am sorry, Mr. Harkness, but I do not have that section in front of me at the moment.

The CHAIRMAN: Can we pass on to Technical and Vocational Training Assistance Act.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Item 2, dealing with section 38, states:

> —days which were spent by such member in the Canadian Forces or in any other armed forces of the Crown—

What is meant by "any other armed forces of the Crown"?

Mr. LAWSON: Well, any other forces of Her Majesty; the United Kingdom forces, the Australian forces, and so on.

The CHAIRMAN: Any questions on the Technical and Vocational Training Assistance Act? Any questions on the Trade Marks Act? On page 48 three acts appear; the Veterans Insurance Act, the Yukon Placer Mining Act and the Yukon Quartz Mining Act. The only part we have not covered now is Schedule A. Are there any questions on Schedule A?

Gentlemen, we have had an opportunity to go through the bill once. Are there any questions before we set the bill aside for the evening?

Mr. ANDRAS: Just as a matter of general interest, Brigadier Lawson, is the Judge Advocate General's branch an integrated branch?

Mr. LAWSON: Yes. It was the first of all branches to be integrated. I have been Judge Advocate General for 16 years and it has always been integrated while I have been Judge Advocate General.

Mr. ANDRAS: For about 16 years?

Mr. LAWSON: Well, before that, actually.

Mr. ANDRAS: If this bill passes, how will it affect the Judge Advocate General's branch? In other words, will unification be of benefit to you or otherwise and if so, in what way?

Mr. LAWSON: Yes, I think I can fairly say that unification would make the administration of the branch much simpler than it is now. I now have officers from three services. They are completely integrated and the job they do had no relation to the service they happen to be in. But in having officers from three services you are faced with many problems. You have different promotion policies in each of the three services. You can understand the difficulties. You have different leave policies. You have different retirement ages. You have different postings. You have different requirements for promotion. One service requires passing promotion examinations and another does not. All this causes some friction which would not exist, of course, if all the officers were in one service. Also, there is the inevitable tendency, I think, if an officer in one service requires advice on a legal problem, rather than going to the best qualified legal officer, he goes to an officer of his own service. It does not happen all the time but there is this tendency. There are certain inter-service jealousies. If, for example, you have a number of very capable naval officers and they get promoted perhaps a little faster than officers from the other services, a service jealousy does arise. You have to watch it and try to balance, perhaps more than you should, promotions rather than promoting the best officer. These are illustrations of the sort of difficulty you have in running a purely integrated operation with officers from three separate services.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Service jealousies are not really a vital matter. You might join a political party some day and find that jealousies exist there.

An hon. MEMBER: It never happens.

Mr. LAMBERT: But Brigadier Lawson just amended that, although it has been said that, shall we say, the distribution of positions within the integrated and unified forces shall be on the basis of the strength of the services at the time of change-over. How do you reconcile that with the statement that you have just made, in other words, that those people who are there and who are now making the changes are establishing positions of strength for the future.

Mr. LAWSON: I cannot fully reconcile that statement, Mr. Lambert, but I think of this sort of thing: I had for a long time three different establishments; I had an integrated organization but I had a naval establishment; I had an army establishment and I had an air force establishment. Will there might be a vacancy, we will say, in the army establishment for an officer of the rank of lieutenant colonel, but the most qualified man I had on my staff and even perhaps the most senior man, might happen, we will say, to have been an air force squadron leader; well, I would naturally want to promote that man to wing commander. This meant that I had to go to all the trouble of applying to have my army establishment amended to delete a lieutenant colonel position and my air force establishment amended by creating a wing commander position. It all just adds to the work and adds to the difficulty of getting the right man promoted.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Well, this fits in again with what General Fleury or General Foulkes said, that unification is all right as long as it deals with the tidy administration without any thought of the combat troops; and this is actually what you are saying, that it suits your department very well. But would you care to give us an assessment as to how unification would affect the combat troops?

Mr. LAWSON: I do not think I am in any position to do that accurately.

Mr. MACINNIS: Brigadier, have you had occasion to do just that, to delete a lieutenant colonel's position and make way for a wing commander?

Mr. LAWSON: Oh, many times. Yes, I certainly have.

Mr. MACINNIS: Was the lieutenant colonel aware of it?

Mr. LAWSON: Oh, yes, and there are certain jealousies that arise.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, I refer you to item 3 of the subcommittee report which was distributed to you today. It reads as follows:

> That the Committee may wish to hear from the Director General of Maritime Forces later on Tuesday, if required, and after consultation with the Committee as a whole.

The time is now twenty minutes past nine.

Commodore Porter is here to answer questions put to him by members of the Committee, if it is the desire of the Committee to call on him at this time. Are there any persons who have questions? Mr. Forrestall has some questions. Shall we go ahead with hearing Commodore Porter, gentlemen?

Mr. FORRESTALL: Could we thank the Brigadier?

The CHAIRMAN: Yes. Thank you for bringing up the question, Mr. Forrestall. It has been a long day for Brigadier Lawson and I think he has done a very able job for us.

Commodore Porter, would you come up. You may want to answer your questions from the lectern or, if you have papers, you may want to sit here.

I have on my list, in the order in which I think I saw them: Mr. Forrestall, Mr. MacInnis, Mr. Lambert, and then Mr. Macaluso, the inland sailor over there.

Mr. MACALUSO: I am looking for that training establishment.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Commodore, the other night when you were addressing us, there were a number of questions which some of us wanted to ask arising out of your brief and perhaps going a bit further than your brief. If I might, I would like to start out by asking if you could qualify for us your title. I understand that you are the Director General of Maritime Forces, here in Ottawa.

Commodore H. A. PORTER (*Director General of Maritime Forces*): That is correct, sir.

Mr. FORRESTALL: What does that mean?

Mr. PORTER: This means that I am the senior maritime officer in the operational requirements section of the Vice Chief of Defence Staff's branch and I also am responsible for advising him on maritime operations.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Thank you, Commodore, earlier in the Committee's hearings, because I have been a little bit concerned about some points, which you indeed make quite forcefully yourself. I am concerned about the effectiveness, for example, of ships that are undermanned, which you referred to in your brief. I am just wondering, in your day to day association with maritime affairs, if you could tell us in respect of the current fleet, what the officer complement and other rank complement of these ships are, in terms of numbers?

Mr. PORTER: I could not give you the precise figures for this, Mr. Forrestall.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Well, for example, on a DDH?

Mr. PORTER: I can tell you that we have what we term now as cycle ships. These are ships whose complement is provided under the cyclic system. This means that the ship has a complement that remains with it for the full 16 months of its cycle, and any ship that is cycled is up to full complement. Let us say, on the average, this would be in the vicinity of 210 to 215 men.

Mr. FORRESTALL: How many ships do we have that are presently cycled, if that is the expression?

Mr. PORTER: If you will just excuse me for a moment, I will do a little bit of addition.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Yes, certainly.

Mr. PORTER: When I say "cycled ships" this does not include *Bonaventure, Provider* or *Cape Scott*. This only applies to the destroyer escorts.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Those are the ones with the designated DDE?

Mr. PORTER: DDE or DDH, both. And, of these, there four that are at present uncycled.

Mr. FORRESTALL: That would leave 14 that are cycled?

Mr. PORTER: That would have 16 that are cycled.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Sixteen that are cycled.

Mr. PORTER: I am also not including here the *Algonquin* or the *Crescent*. They are World War II ships and they have a training complement on board at the moment. This is what they are used for, and they at the moment are on passage from the east coast to the west coast.

Mr. FORRESTALL: I thought there were three left. Was there one other one, Commodore?

Mr. PORTER: *Athabascan*, which is in cold reserve. She is the lone remaining ship at the *Shearwater* jetty.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Of these four remaining, are they presently undergoing some type of refit or overhaul?

Mr. PORTER: One of them is doing trials on new equipment and is practically manned to a cycle complement but is about ten men short. The other three are undermanned because we do not have sufficient men to man them up to a full one hundred per cent complement.

Mr. FORRESTALL: That cycle complement then, in that sense, would be operational efficiency level?

Mr. PORTER: Yes.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Of these 16, how many are presently on operation Maple Spring, is it?

Mr. PORTER: Of course, the ships have come and gone from Maple Spring. In other words, they intended to go and come back, but of the remainder of the east coast destroyer escorts, seven have been on Maple Spring.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Were those seven part of that total of 16. Were any of the ships that went on that exercise not at total force.

Mr. PORTER: No. All of them were at total complement.

Mr. FORRESTALL: This accounts for 20 of the ships and then the *Bonaventure*, the *Provider* and the *Cape Scott* would take it up to 23. Which are the other five? Were two of them the ones that you mentioned that are on their way to the west coast now?

Mr. PORTER: How did you get to 23?

Mr. FORRESTALL: Well, I have taken 20 and you mentioned three.

Mr. PORTER: Well, there are two submarines, *Ojibwa* and *Grilse*.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Yes.

Mr. PORTER: And there is another ship on the west coast, the *Beacon Hill*, a frigate, the last of the frigates that also has a training complement.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Commodore, perhaps I had better clarify this too because we have a figure floating around that a lot of us are using and referring to, 28 ships. Where would the additional five be? Which ships would they be?

Mr. PORTER: Well, I think, in talking about the ships that went to Maple Spring, we did not get around to the destroyer escorts on the west coast.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Then the ones on the west coast would bring it up to 28. So then, in effect, 16 of our 28 ships are now presently at full strength.

Mr. PORTER: There are more than that when you take into account those on the west coast. All of the ships on the west coast with the exception of *Beacon Hill* are at full complement.

Mr. FORRESTALL: How many would that be?

Mr. PORTER: Again, it is the same approximate number. They are cycled and they are destroyer escorts.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Yes, I understand they would be cycled, but what I am wondering is, how many ships do we have? That would take us up to 32. How many ships do we have, DDE's and DDH's, on the west coast?

Mr. PORTER: We have five of the post-war DDE's on the west coast. Perhaps it would be better if I summarized them this say: We have a total of 20 post-war built destroyer escorts; in addition to that we have *Bonaventure*, *Provider* and *Cape Scott* which makes 23.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Twentythree.

Mr. PORTER: We have *Ojibwa* and *Grilse*.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Twenty-five.

Mr. PORTER: Twenty-five, and then we have the three old destroyers, making a total of 28.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Now I begin to see it.

Mr. PORTER: Or rather, two old destroyers and *Beacon Hill*. In the total of 28, I do not include *Athabascan*.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Then of the four that are not up, one is on the west coast and three are on the east coast?

Mr. PORTER: If you include *Beacon Hill*, the frigate on the west coast, that makes a total of five that are undermanned.

Mr. FORRESTALL: I see. But excluding that.

Mr. PORTER: Yes.

Mr. FORRESTALL: You mentioned that we had four—and we will exclude the *Beacon Hill* from these—Commodore, that are below full complement for one reason or another. I am wondering what happens this summer in respect of *Bonaventure*. What kind of a load or stress is this going to place upon your manning capability? What, indeed, do you envisage is going to happen?

Mr. PORTER: Well, of course when *Bonaventure* comes out, we have a requirement to man her to her full complement. Now, her full complement includes a number of air trades and a number of air personnel. These people would come from *Shearwater*. The remainder of them will come from men who are under training at the moment, from men who are taking some of the ships around to the west coast. When the ships get to the west coast, *Algonquin* and *Crescent*, will be paid off and placed alongside; *Columbia* will be manned with a west coast crew, and these personnel who are manning those three ships going round to the west coast will then return to the east coast.

Mr. FORRESTALL: What is the complement of the *Bonaventure*, fully manned up to cycle.

Mr. PORTER: Well, the complement of the *Bonaventure*, if you exclude her air squadrons—these, of course, come aboard just before the ship sails, is about 905. of that complement, over 100 of these are air trades—the flight deck party, a number of men who work in the hangars, some of the supervisors of personnel who work in the air workshops, a number of men who work in the operations department of the ship.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Why, at the present time, is not the *Cape Scott* up to full strength? Are there particular trades in which we happen to find serious shortfalls now, or is it a balance of shortfalls.

Mr. PORTER: Of course, there are some trades that are giving more difficulty than others, and if I were to tell you the trades that give difficulty today, it may not be the same trades a month from now, when we re-cycle again; but I think perhaps two of the trades that are giving the Maritime Commander the most trouble in manning his ships are sonar men and radio men.

Mr. FORRESTALL: I am curious. Why sonar men? It is not a trade you can ply outside of the services, is it?

Mr. PORTER: No, this is true. I think one reason that we have difficulty in retaining sonar men is that they have a very poor sea-shore ratio.

The CHAIRMAN: I do not like to cut you off too soon because I know you wanted to complete your series of questions. I think you can go on for a minute or so. I think the members will agree.

Mr. FORRESTALL: I would just as soon let somebody else carry on. The time is running out. I have a lot of questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Commodore, we have been advised in the Committee that one of the first instructions given to the recruit, on his basic training, is in respect of his pride in uniform and pride in service. Do you agree with that?

Mr. PORTER: I do.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): In respect to our commitments both at home and abroad, are we capable of carrying them out?

Mr. PORTER: I would say we are.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): And what are the requirements to carry out these commitments?

Mr. PORTER: The requirements to carry out these commitments are to have ships, aircraft and submarines that are fully effective operationally.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): You could not indicate the number that is necessary?

Mr. PORTER: No; for security reasons I cannot quote numbers.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): You said in your brief that it is difficult to derive an absolute comparison between the effectiveness of the large number of ships in commission in 1963 and the present situation. Is this a fair assessment of the situation?

Mr. PORTER: Well, I think that in deriving a comparison of effectiveness you have to be more specific. You have to narrow the field down. You cannot compare over-all effectiveness; you have to compare effectiveness in certain specific situations.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): You have already indicated that we are capable of carrying out our commitments both at home and abroad. Do you feel that we can do this?

Mr. PORTER: Certainly, I think that you will find that the Canadian ships, aircraft and submarines are held in very high regard by our NATO allies. They have, I think, earned the respect of other maritime forces of the world.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Then we are able to carry out our commitments.

Mr. PORTER: I would say that.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Do you recall, in answering Mr. Andras last Thursday night, making a statement to the effect that we were better able to carry out our capabilities at home?

Mr. PORTER: No, I do not recall that.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): I just bring that to your attention, sir, because this is a statement which can brought out later. There was this statement made and it is not in accord with the statement that you have now made, that we are capable of carrying out equally well in one place or the other.

Mr. MACALUSO: I think you might be confused, Mr. MacInnis. I was the only one who questioned Commodore Porter last Thursday night.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Do you recall the answer to your question?

Mr. MACALUSO: I do not recall that statement. I will have to wait until the record comes out.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Do you pass on advice to the Chief of Staff or are you in contact with his subordinates?

Mr. PORTER: Occasionally he asks my opinion on certain things.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): But does the advice from Maritime Command come up through you?

Mr. PORTER: Sometimes it does; sometimes it does not. The Chief of Defence Staff very frequently gets his advice directly from the Maritime Commander.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Could you indicate who advised General Allard that our effectiveness now has increased since 1963?

Mr. PORTER: I think a lot of people gave him that advice.

Mr. MacINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): And yet it is advice on which you cannot make a comparison?

Mr. PORTER: Well, I think in my brief that I indicated I also hold that view.

Mr. MacINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): I will repeat what is said in your own brief.

> It is difficult to derive an absolute comparison of the effectiveness of the large number of ships in commission in 1963 with the smaller number of fully modernized and well equipped ships in commission at present.

That is a statement from your brief on page 1. On page 17 of General Allard's brief he said:

> It is estimated that the effectiveness of the Maritime Command has increased since 1963 in spite of reduction in ships in commission.

Mr. PORTER: Perhaps I could also refer you to page 4 of my brief, where I said:

> It is believed that in spite of the reduction in the number of ships, the effectiveness of the maritime forces has not been reduced since 1963, but has improved and significantly so in certain areas.

Mr. MacINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Then you suggest that I strike off the last paragraph of the first page of your brief?

Mr. PORTER: No, because there I am merely pointing out that it is very difficult to try to draw an absolute conclusion because you have to analyze ships, aircraft and submarines in specific instances. For example, whether you are using them for detecting submarines, for tracking submarines or ultimately for killing submarines.

Mr. MacINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): And you do not recall the statement to Mr. Macaluso to the effect that you are better able to carry out your capabilities at home?

Mr. PORTER: No. I regret that I do not recall that.

Mr. MacINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): I would ask you, sir, to check the evidence; and would you check that out against General Allard's statement to the effect that the fulfilment of our commitments are not detrimental to one another. There seems to be a bit of confusion in the evidence given between yourself and General Allard.

Commodore, what is the state of the morale in the navy?

Mr. PORTER: I have not personally visited ships, except on the west coast, since the end of July. I have talked to a lot of people from Halifax and from Esquimalt. I have also recently talked to some officers who have just returned from Puerto Rico where they visited the ships and aircraft which were exercising there on Exercise Maple Spring. I think, in speaking of the morale of officers and men in the navy, I should say that under the cyclic system, where you have a ship's company that remains together for 16 months, this is a situation where a great deal of team work, self-respect and confidence is built up. We did not have this in the navy after World War II because we made very frequent changes in the ship's company of our ships. But since the cyclic system has been introduced, certainly the spirit in the ships has increased notably and every report that I have received indicates that the spirit of the ships today is very high indeed.

Mr. MacINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): You would say then that the morale is high?

Mr. PORTER: Yes.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): The question of morale is the obligation or the responsibility of the command?

Mr. PORTER: Yes.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Do you not think that when a crew's ship has gone into refit and they are broken up to bring another ship up to strength, that this would have a detrimental effect on morale?

Mr. PORTER: Well, of course, Mr. MacInnis, under the cyclic system this does not happen because a good proportion of the ship's company is taken over from one cycle to the next. While the ships are in what we call Phase I of the cycle—and this is when they undergo a refit—a number of the men are sent up to the Fleet school, while still living aboard their ship, and qualify for the next higher trade group. They then return to their ship and serve another cycle in that ship. This is particularly true of the younger men.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Well, then we will accept that the morale in the navy is high.

Mr. PORTER: Certainly the indications I have of the morale in the ships of the navy is that it is high.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): The morale in the army is excellent?

Mr. PORTER: I am not qualified to say that.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): The morale in the air force is excellent?

Mr. PORTER: I can only speak there of the maritime air component of the air force, and certainly again, the indications that I have received, and this is not from my own personal experience—I will qualify that because I was at Comox at the beginning of February, and I certainly found the morale to be high there. But all the other reports that I have received from officers who have been to the east coast indicate that the morale of the maritime air part of the maritime force is high also.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Who advised General Allard to the effect that morale in the navy was not too good?

Mr. PORTER: I was not aware that he was so advised.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Did you read General Allard's brief, where he stated that given half a chance, morale in the navy could improve?

Mr. PORTER: Well, I would say that morale is high now; it would be even better, I suppose, under what General Allard was alluding to there.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Just three more short questions, Mr. Chairman. To revert to my original question, on the matter of unification and the matter of new uniforms, would you be proud to wear the new uniform?

Mr. PORTER: I would be proud to wear any uniform that belongs to Canada.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): And you would not mind answering to Brigadier, rather than Commodore?

Mr. PORTER: No.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): How about discarding the old uniform.

Mr. PORTER: I think that a certain amount of tradition is involved here; certainly when the new flag was introduced, I was very sorry to see the White Ensign go, but at the same time I was very proud to serve under a Canadian flag, and changes have to occur.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): From that answer, sir, can I interpret that you do not really mind seeing the old uniform go.

Mr. PORTER: No, I would not say that.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. MacInnis, I think—

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): I would like Commodore Porter to answer the question.

The CHAIRMAN: I think you have tested Commodore Porter enough, and I think he stood up under it very well.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): He has done very, very well, but my question is directed to the point of discarding the old naval uniform. Is he prepared to say he is willing to let that go.

The CHAIRMAN: That is not a question he has to answer, Mr. MacInnis.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): That is all right. If he does not want to answer, that is up to him, Mr. Chairman. Did he say that he did not want to answer it?

The CHAIRMAN: We will let him decide.

Mr. PORTER: Mr. MacInnis, I will still retain ceremonial uniform, which will be patterned after my present uniform. My mess kit will remind me of my old uniform, and certainly I will be proud to wear both uniforms.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Are you going to be allowed to?

Mr. PORTER: I believe, from the way that it has been explained to me, we will retain our mess kit uniforms.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): What about your service ribbons.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. MacInnis, you have gone a long time.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Mr. Chairman, I have watched the time since the question period started and I have not taken half of it yet.

Mr. CHAIRMAN: You have, and I have reminded you several times that we have Mr. Lambert and Mr. Macaluso, whom I would like to get in before 10 o'clock, and in fairness to them, Mr. MacInnis, I will call Mr. Lambert now.

Mr. LAMBERT: Commodore Porter, there has been testimony—I think you have been present when it was given—from two officers who were your seniors, both Vice Admiral Rayner and Rear Admiral Landymore, with respect to the effectiveness of our ASW capabilities. I think it is fair to say that their testimony is diametrically opposite yours.

Mr. PORTER: I would not say that entirely, Mr. Lambert. I think that they were certainly talking about ships; they could not say anything about aircraft and submarines in their testimony.

Mr. LAMBERT: Did you hear Admiral Rayner?

Mr. PORTER: Yes, I did.

Mr. LAMBERT: I put it to you that he did say that certainly the individual ships, by the addition of the helicopters and with the addition of sonar buoys in respect of some of them, certainly improved the effectiveness of the individual ship, but you are down 4,000 ratings or 4,000 in personnel from the time he left to the present day, and that regardless to the number of ships that you have at the present time, it is impossible to say that they are as effective as they were.

Mr. PORTER: Mr. Lambert, I think that you should bear in mind that all of the ships which went, were of world war II vintage, certainly the frigates, and the last one is still in service, were modernized in the early 1960's; but when they were modernized, it was only the operations room part of the ship that was given this modernization treatment. They still had the same world war II sonar; they still had the same world war II guns and the same world war II control systems for those weapons. The frigates were, of course, built in wartime under a mass production effort. They were built with wartime materials, which are not of the best. These ships were built with piston-type engines, the old up-and-down-type engine. I liked these old ships; I had the honour to command a squadron of them, but when we used to go into naval ports, particularly into American ports, there was always quite a number of people who would go down into our engine rooms to look at these engines. They had not seen any engines like these; they had not been in service in the United States navy, certainly since before world war II.

Mr. LAMBERT: Yes, but the point I am making is that you may have retired and paid off most of these ships, but you have not replaced them with new ships since 1963.

Mr. PORTER: No, we have not, Mr. Lambert; we have replaced them in a way, with much improved capabilities in our existing ships.

Mr. LAMBERT: To the limit of adding helicopters on nine of them and there have been the refits on the *Restigouche* class.

Mr. PORTER: There is more than that, sir. There is improved sonar; there is variable depth sonar; there is—

Mr. LAMBERT: But this was all planned. This is nothing new.

Mr. PORTER: Certainly, but this has come into being and all of this equipment costs money; it takes people to man and maintain this equipment, and within the budget that is allowed you have to draw the line somewhere.

Mr. LAMBERT: No new ships have been added, so you have improved the quality of the ships that you have. But if you are down 4,000 officers and men since 1963, just how can it be said that these ships are more effective, that the ASW capability is more effective. We have heard Admiral Landymore who, after all, has just come off this command. His testimony, here, last June, was to the effect that he would require 2,500 men, and the most he could see obtaining was 1,200. You are concerned with maritime forces and maritime operations. This worries you too, I am sure.

Mr. PORTER: Certainly we are short of men and for this reason we have some ships that are undermanned, but all the other ships are up to their full operational level.

Mr. LAMBERT: Is it up as high as 40% of the ships that are undermanned?

Mr. PORTER: No, it is not.

Mr. LAMBERT: Can you give me a figure. Is it 10 or 12 of the 28 ships that are undermanned?

Mr. PORTER: Of the post-war destroyer escorts, there are at the moment 4 that are undermanned out of a total of 20.

Mr. LAMBERT: There are no others undermanned?

Mr. PORTER: There are 2 of the old destroyers, the *Algonquin* and—

Mr. LAMBERT: I am not counting them.

Mr. PORTER: —there is the frigate *Beacon Hill*, and of course, at the present moment, the aircraft carrier *Bonaventure* is not up to her full complement, nor does she need it, because she is in refit.

Mr. LAMBERT: Those are definitive figures?

Mr. PORTER: I am quoting from a chart which I have in front of me which was brought up to date today.

Mr. FORRESTALL: If I might just inject a comment. A short while ago, in trying to determine the number of ships that we list in describing our effectiveness in ASW work, you advised me that there were a total of twelve that are undermanned, and twelve is 42 point some odd per cent. Two ships are going around to the west coast and there is one on the west coast, and unless there are three or four hundred on each ship, Commodore, we are not going to come anywhere near manning the *Bonaventure*, not by the wildest stretch of the imagination. I am sorry, this is what I was after because it is one of the areas that concerns me greatly. It does not matter how you cut the cake, 43 per cent of our effective ASW effort, in terms of ships, are undermanned.

Mr. PORTER: No, you are definitely wrong; I will check it.

Mr. FORRESTALL: I would be pleased to be corrected. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LAMBERT: May I ask a supplementary question on this.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Macaluso is the last one on the list and we are getting very tight for time; perhaps if we can go a few minutes over.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Oh no, just four minutes for him; that is enough.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Macaluso, you had better talk fast; Mr. Churchill is watching the clock.

Mr. MACALUSO: Commodore, we have heard or read something about *FALLEX*. Are you familiar with this exercise?

Mr. PORTER: With certain phases of it, yes.

Mr. MACALUSO: Is it a paper exercise or an operational exercise, to your knowledge?

Mr. PORTER: It is pretty much a paper exercise. In other words, for example, in the maritime forces, in order to carry the exercise out, no forces were actually sailed and no aircraft were put up into the air. Any forces that were sailed were sailed on paper.

Mr. MACALUSO: Can Canada, at the present time, continue to provide a high quality anti-submarine force with a unified defence force as is outlined in the bill before us?

Mr. PORTER: Certainly our ships, I think, are as good as any ASW ships are today, and I would see them being just as good as they are now under a unified force. I would see no difference in the ships at sea.

Mr. MACALUSO: I am sure what you are aware evidence has been presented to this committee that a single defence force will adversely affect the navy and the over-all security of Canada. Would you agree with that statement?

Mr. PORTER: I think it will cause some emotion in the navy, particularly on the part of some people who hold some of these old traditions very dear to them, but I think this is of a temporary nature; certainly in so far as the ships at sea are concerned, I would think that the passing of the unification bill will not even cause a ripple.

Mr. MACALUSO: Would you agree with the latter part of that statement, that the passage of this bill will adversely affect the over-all security of Canada.

Mr. PORTER: Not from the maritime force point of view.

Mr. MACALUSO: Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I see that it is 10 o'clock. I am through with the questioning I had.

Mr. MCINTOSH: May I ask my supplementary now.

The CHAIRMAN: A supplementary from Mr. McIntosh.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Commodore, you mentioned that it might cause some emotion. One writer, Captain P. B. Ryan, writing in the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, had this to say:

> If indeed, the RCN is doomed as an ASW force, we may be sure that the alarm bells are ringing in U.S. naval headquarters in Washington, Norfolk and Pearl Harbour.

Do you know if any queries have been made by United States authorities of our defence department on this ASW role and Canada's ability to carry it out in the future?

Mr. PORTER: Not to my knowledge. I would say that Captain Ryan is misinformed. I do not know where he drew his information from, but certainly at the present time the maritime force is receiving a higher percentage of the budget that has been provided for naval equipment than it has for many years.

Mr. MCINTOSH: How is Captain Ryan misinformed? What do you mean by that statement?

Mr. PORTER: Because I do not think that we are getting out of ASW. I do not think that our ASW capability is going to diminish at all. I think that in the future our capability is going to increase. It is going to become better.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Then you do not know for sure. Are you doubtful?

Mr. PORTER: I am not in the least bit doubtful. I feel quite confident that it is going to improve.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Talking about emotion, I saw you fellows pound the table here tonight. I am just wondering if that is emotion or if the fear of the United States naval personnell—the emotional feeling that they are afraid of what the—

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, I think this would be a good time to end the meeting tonignt. I thank Commodore Porter for attending here tonight. At 3.30 on Wednesday, Air Marshall Curtiss will be here. We are adjourned until then.

HOUSE OF COMMONS

First Session—Twenty-seventh Parliament

1966-67

STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. GRANT DEACHMAN

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 33

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 15, 1967

Respecting

Bill C-243, An Act to amend the National Defence Act and other Acts in consequence thereof.

WITNESS:

Air Marshal W. A. Curtis, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.C. and Bar, L.L.D., D. Mil. Sc., E.M., Hon. Fellow C.A.S.I.

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Mr. McIntosh,
Mr. McNulty,
Mr. Nugent,
Mr. Reid,
Mr. Rochon,
Mr. Smith,
Mr. Winch—(24).

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

WEDNESDAY, March 15, 1967.
(66)

The Standing Committee on National Defence met at 3:50 p.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Deachman, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Andras, Brewin, Byrne, Churchill, Deachman, Forrestall, Foy, Harkness, Lambert, Langlois (*Chicoutimi*), Lessard, Loiselle, Macaluso, MacInnis (*Cape Breton South*), McIntosh, McNulty, Nugent, Rochon, and Mr. Smith—(19).

Also present: Mr. Cameron (*High Park*).

In attendance: Air Marshal W. A. Curtis.

The Chairman referred to the motion dated Thursday, March 9, 1967 which was moved by Mr. Andras, seconded by Mr. Foy. The Committee agreed to stand this motion again.

The Chairman introduced the witness for this sitting, Air Marshal W. A. Curtis. Air Marshal Curtis described his military and civilian careers and then he read a prepared statement. Copies were distributed to the members.

At 4:15 p.m., the division bells having been rung, the Committee adjourned to permit the members to attend the House of Commons.

The Committee resumed at 4:55 p.m. and the members questioned Air Marshal Curtis on points referred to in his brief and on various military subjects related to *Bill C-243*.

The questioning of the witness was completed at approximately 5:55 p.m., and the Chairman thanked Air Marshal Curtis for his appearance before the Committee.

The Chairman announced that the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure will meet at 9:30 a.m. on Thursday, March 16, 1967.

The Committee adjourned at 6:00 p.m., until Thursday, March 16, 1967 at 10:00 a.m., when the witness will be Lieutenant-General G. G. Simonds.

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

25945—1½

EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

WEDNESDAY, March 15, 1967.

The CHAIRMAN: Order, gentlemen.

I asked the Clerk of the Committee if he would provide me with a record of the position of the transcription of the Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, and I understand that everything up to last Thursday has gone to the printing bureau and it should not be more than two or three days until it is returned. So, that is about the position in which we stand.

When I look at the availability of French copy I am just horrified. Everything up to March 11 has been sent to the translating bureau but, as things stand at present, I do not think we have had anything back from the translating bureau. I beg your pardon, we have had two issues back from the translating bureau, so that is where we stand at the moment. Let us pray for an Easter recess, gentlemen, so that the services can catch up with the rate at which we can talk and record evidence.

At the top of today's business we have the ubiquitous motion of Mr. Andras which, with your permission I will stand again. Can the motion of Mr. Andras stand?

Having stood that motion, I understand that Air Marshal Curtis, who was asked to attend the Committee, is present and that he has a brief and the brief is ready for distribution to members of the Committee. He is here to read his brief and to give evidence.

Now, before calling Air Marshal Curtis I would like to mention that according to the report the sub-committee was to meet today. I understand that at least a couple of the members of the steering committee are anxious to get away directly at six o'clock and I wonder if it would be agreeable to members of the steering committee if we meet some time tomorrow morning. Is that agreeable to you, Mr. Lambert, either close to noon or before ten o'clock whichever is most suitable to members of the Committee?

Mr. LAMBERT: Mr. Chairman, might I suggest we meet as early as possible unless we finish at a quarter to six tonight so that whatever action has to be taken—

The CHAIRMAN: Suppose we set a meeting for 9.30 tomorrow morning. Is that too early, gentlemen? I think Mr. Brewin is substituting on the steering committee. Is he available? Nine-thirty is convenient for Mr. Brewin. Mr. McNulty, can you be available at that time?

Mr. MCNULTY: Yes.

The CHAIRMAN: All right, the steering committee meeting will be in my office, Room 405 in the West Block, at 9.30 tomorrow morning.

Gentlemen, Air Marshal Curtis is with us and he has a brief to read, which I think is now being distributed to you, and he will address you from the lectern. I have asked Air Marshal Curtis if he would please give us a little run-down on his biography, as we have done in the case of other witnesses who have been before us. Air Marshal Curtis.

Air Marshal W. A. CURTIS: Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, as a brief run-down, I applied for training as a pilot in the Royal Naval Air Service in 1915. They had no more vacancies at the school at that time so I joined the Army. While I was finishing an officers' training course in London, Ontario, I received advice from the Admiralty to report for training as a pilot. So, I was transferred from the Army to the Royal Naval Air Service. I then went out to the Curtis School at Long Branch, where they guaranteed to teach me to fly in 400 minutes, charging $1 a minute. I graduated in August, I believe it was. I then went overseas; finished my training there; went to France as a fighter pilot; was there for some nine months and received the Distinguished Flying Cross and Bar as a fighter pilot.

After the war was over I joined the RCAF reserve and flew at Camp Borden. When World War II started I was called up on September 1, 1939. I worked for a time in Ottawa and was then in Toronto. I was a wing commander at the time. I came to Ottawa on staff duties and commanded Uplands Air Station in 1941. I was called back to Ottawa to headquarters, and then posted overseas as deputy commander in chief of the Canadian forces overseas. I served there until 1944, when I came home and was appointed air member for air staff and vice chief of the air staff. In 1947 I was promoted to air marshal and chief of the air staff, a position I held until my retirement in 1953.

I have requested that I appear before you because I feel that I would be doing something less than my duty if I allowed the opportunity to pass without putting on record my firm convictions.

I am opposed to the proposed legislation to destroy Canada's three separate military services and the creation of an ill-conceived and inadequately planned hybrid in their stead. I feel it is the duty of persons such as myself, who have chosen to serve Canada in the military forces and who have been assigned positions of responsibility, to put before you, the legislators, our best opinions on this most important matter of unification.

You, gentlemen, have a vital task in this committee; seeking out the truth on what will best serve Canada's armed forces. Indeed you must serve your country now as Canada's military men have always served—with honour and devotion.

I feel particularly well qualified to speak to you on the subject of unification because I am one of the few who has served in all three services; Army, Navy and Air Force. I feel that I respect and know something of the problems faced by each service from my own personal experience.

I now tell you unequivocally that the separate identities of each service must be maintained.

The opposition to unification has been referred to as the "revolt of the admirals". I wish to point out that many experienced and knowledgeable Air Force officers, both in and out of the service, are even more worried than the admirals about the effects of unification.

Past achievements are important to any service. But Canadians took to the air with an enthusiasm and capability far beyond what numbers and background would tend to predict. I know many of you are aware of the many outstanding Canadian airmen of World War I, whose deeds are now legend. For you younger members of this committee I recommend their histories as inspired reading in this Centennial Year.

As a result of our air experience during war, the famous "bush pilot" emerged and Canada today can credit a large part of our north country development to these men.

So it was natural that in World War II our people put up a magnificent contribution in all Air Force areas of activity. We should all be proud of the outstanding results of the Joint Air Training Plan which trained over 131,000 air crew. I need only mention the records established in No. 6 Bomber Group—No. 83 Fighter Group—The Anti-Submarine work of Coastal Command, to say nothing of the thousands of Canadians throughout the RAF.

In time of their country's need, Canadians have twice proved their desire and outstanding abilities in the air. Their pride in the Royal Canadian Air Force is based on honours deservedly earned.

On what logical grounds, then, is this magnificent force to be abandoned?

Is it to save money?

You have heard expert testimony which proves that savings have been minimal and the Minister of National Defence has recently said that unification's financial benefits will be negligible. Efficient separate services are immensely preferable to a homogenized nonentity.

The Minister in his brief dated February 23rd, went to great pains to establish the fact that there had been disagreement and lack of co-operation between senior officers of the Navy and the Army in both World War I and World War II. He considers unification of the Navy and the Air Force with the Army as the answer; unification for the sake of co-operation.

Which one of you gentlemen having three children would place a crippling, debilitating handicap on the three that would prevent them from full development in order to force complete co-operation?

There are other ways of achieving this objective without destroying the services.

The appointment of the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff with command authority was the right way to start. Combined service and staff colleges is another.

The Minister also stated on page 4 of his paper that the objects of the re-organization have been stated many times. They are, first, "to produce the most responsive and effective military organization possible".

The CHAIRMAN: Air Marshal Curtis, I do not like to interrupt you, but I think I hear the division bell ringing. I think we can get to the end of the brief. Go ahead, Air Marshal Curtis, and then we will break up immediately after.

Secondly, "to get the maximum capability for the money being spent". No one objects to this. But it is pretty well agreed that there is no saving of money in the new set-up.

The fact that all the experienced military men who were acclaimed by the Minister, less than two years ago, as the best military brains in the country, have retired years ahead of their normal retirement age, surely proves that the new organization will not produce the most responsible and effective military organization possible.

The fact is that from the start there has been only one man, the Minister of National Defence, who has been enthusiastic about integration and then unification.

A great many senior officers in the service have tried to make this policy work but eventually have given up and either retired or have been fired. This fact alone should convince even the most trusting member of this committee that the policy is dangerously wrong.

I cannot imagine any business where all the top experienced officers had been either fired or retired that would not take a good look at the man in charge and check carefully into his management procedures.

Under pressure the Minister had indicated that the identity of certain regimental units such as the Royal 22nd Regiment, The Royal Canadian Regiment would be maintained. Surely, if these units are to retain their identity then the Royal Canadian Air Force and the Royal Canadian Navy should not be stripped of their identities.

The Minister has stated many times there will always be ships and aircraft squadrons—so why not an RCN and RCAF?

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, I think this is going to take a little longer than we originally thought and I think, in fairness to Air Marshal Curtis and ourselves, we should meet again in 15 or 20 minutes. We should be back by 4.30. If Air Marshal Curtis wants to go back a page to pick up the sequence of his brief, we will do that, and perhaps we can remain a few minutes extra to accommodate him.

An hon. MEMBER: They have told me they will hold until we finish.

The CHAIRMAN: They will hold until we finish. All right. Thank you very much.

I am sorry for the interruption.

Go ahead, Air Marshal Curtis.

I am sure you will all agree that the aircraft is here to stay. The last war proved beyond a shadow of a doubt that aircraft are the deciding factor in any modern war.

The country having preponderant air superiority wins the battles that win the war.

I attended military meetings in North Africa when the landings on Sicily were planned. I also attended with the planning team in London in late 1943 when the Normandy landing was being planned and have some knowledge of the importance of air forces.

To convert our defence forces to a peace-keeping role is nothing short of rank folly. Better we vacate the military field completely in the sure and certain knowledge that the United States will have to shelter us for their own protection.

The Permanent Joint Board of Defence in a Canadian-American Government Agreement, commits the United States to come to our support in the event that Canada is attacked by any foreign power.

Of course, that might also be the end of our independence.

But we have no right to independence if we are not prepared to do that which is necessary to preserve it. Defence expenditures in peacetime have never been welcome, and as a result of unpreparedness the world has suffered two major catastrophes in my lifetime.

Must our political leaders continue to make the same old mistake time and time again?

More recently I point to the lesson after World War II when it was said that never again would we be called upon to take up arms. How many years later was it that we were bitterly forced to change our outlook because of Korea?

I know of no statesman anywhere who will say that it cannot and will not happen again.

This being so, and Canada of necessity being required to mesh its forces closely with its allies, it seems only sound sense to build Canada's forces so that they will readily dovetail with the organization of our allies.

I would like to repeat that little bit. Canada of necessity being required to mesh its forces closely with its allies, it seems only sound sense to build Canada's forces so that they will readily dovetail with the organization of our allies.

All nations have rejected the unified force in favour of separate services for land, sea and air. In any international meetings the odd or ugly duckling is at a real disadvantage, and Canadian forces under the new set-up will be ugly ducklings.

Why place ourselves in that position?

The requirements for aircraft are established by over-all policy. But within that policy surely airmen who fly, together with aeronautical engineers are better fitted to recommend and select the aircraft for a particular role than a committee without the vital technical background.

The same logical reasoning holds for ships for the navy or armoured fighting vehicles for the ground forces. By having specialists equipped to deal with technical requirements we will have better fighting forces. It is impossible for mixed inter-service committees to replace technical skill and expert experience.

This is the age of specialization, of expertise of such magnitude that one man has all he can do to keep up with the rapid changes of his own environment, be it land, sea or air.

How anyone of sound mind and the slightest military knowledge can expect an officer to know the performance capabilities and skills of all three services completely escapes me.

In 1918 the British government decided that air operations were so important a part of war that they should be a separate service, and on April 1 of that year the RAF was created.

In 1924 when the entire defence budget was only a fraction of today's, the Canadian government decided to separate the Canadian Air Force from the Army, and on April 1, 1924, the RCAF was born.

The United States government was convinced during World War II that the United Stated Army Air Corps should be a separate service, and as a result the United States Air Force was formed in 1947.

In my opinion the proposed organization whereby the Canadian Air Force becomes nothing more than a branch of the ground forces, a "hewer of wood and carrier of water" instead of a proud and strategic fighting force, is a fantastic attempt to turn back the clock.

It is fundamentally unsound and unworkable.

Much has been said in this committee about various military authorities who advocate unification. I am sure that it will not have escaped the notice of many of you that none, absolutely none, have undertaken to institute steps in this direction when in a position to do so. Certainly, I will not try to match quote for quote with the "team" who have been sending up the smokescreen of words on this question. But it has been drawn to my attention that one member of parliament in the debate on second reading of this bill quoted General Eisenhower as a proponent of unification.

Let me assure you that this is not so.

It is unfair to quote any foreign military figures on such a purely Canadian matter. They could be accused of interfering in our affairs.

However, I have quite naturally discussed the proposed changes to our military organization with friends in other countries, and the reaction goes all the way from shaking the head in disbelief to asking whether the Minister is out of his mind.

Any contemplated change to our military establishment which raises such strong objections from practically every knowledgeable senior officer must be wrong.

I wonder if you gentlemen in this room realize how strong a protest has been made by those officers who have left the service rather than serve this unworkable organization? Not one senior officer, but dozens.

These men have sacrificed a career—given up the life they love in protest. I appeal to you that this added sacrifice for their country not go unnoticed.

Such definite opposition from so many of Canada's most experienced and able military advisers must have, by now, caused serious misgivings to the members of this committee.

Such overwhelming opposition must certainly have registered as sincere and honest and non-political.

I am equally convinced that as responsible legislators you know that your duty to your country transcends any other including loyalties to party leaders or party. Too much has been said about party politics in the past, when in reality this question should be decided solely on its merits.

You, gentlemen, are required to make the most important recommendation in the history of Canadian military affairs from your deliberations here. If you make the wrong one, you will do our country irreparable harm. If you make the right one, you will have proved your responsibility and the value of our way of government.

I respectfully urge that you recommend to the government that this whole matter be turned down or referred to a royal commission for study.

No possible harm and many advantages can come from delay to investigate merit. Only harm can come from completely needless haste.

Thank you, gentlemen.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen we will convene here after the vote.

After recess

The CHAIRMAN: I will call Mr. Macaluso, the inland sailor.

Mr. MACALUSO: Air Marshal Curtis, throughout your brief, especially on page 5 thereof, I note the words:

> I am sure you will all agree that the aircraft is here to stay. The last war proved beyond a shadow of a doubt that aircraft are the deciding factor in any modern war.
>
> The country having preponderant air superiority wins the battles that win the war.

This is the theme throughout your brief. Is that right, sir?

Mr. CURTIS: Yes.

Mr. MACALUSO: I am very interested in knowing how you would see the relative merit of air power at the present time and in the future, as far as regional wars such as the war in Vietnam, for instance, are concerned. How do you see the relative merit of air power there?

Mr. CURTIS: Air power there really has not been used to its full capacity. They have been fighting the battle with one arm tied behind their back for political reasons, I think; they do not want to risk the ill will of a lot of neutral countries, so they are not really using air power to its full extent. When for a while they stop the bombing of the

roads where the supplies are coming in, they pile up great quantities of supplies. If they really used air power to its full extent, they would cripple that and there would be very little coming in. They knocked out one steel factory; they could enlarge upon it in that way and make it so that they could not carry on.

Mr. MACALUSO: What do you mean by saying that they are not using it to the full capacity and full extent?

Mr. CURTIS: The first time they hit an industry, it was a steel complex.

Mr. MACALUSO: In words, I understand that in your view United States bombing there would be more effective if it were as you state, used to its full capacity. I am interested in the term "full capacity". What do you mean by full capacity?

Mr. CURTIS: I am not thinking of nuclear power; I am thinking of using just normal bombing to prevent supplies from getting in and to destroy more of the routes.

Mr. MACALUSO: In other words you would escalate the bombing by conventional bombing, rather than by nuclear warheads?

Mr. CURTIS: I do not know that I would call it escalating it. Perhaps it would be, but I think that is beside the point. I do not want to get into a discussion of whether we should be supporting the war in Vietnam or whether we should be opposed to it, but I do think if they used air to its full capacity, it would bring a favourable decision more quickly.

Mr. MACALUSO: That answer brings to my mind, if I can use the United States terminology: How would you describe yourself in this regard; as a hawk or as a dove?

An hon. MEMBER: That is out of order.

Mr. CURTIS: I think it is out of order. I am not a fighting man by nature, and yet I would not want to be called a dove because I am not sitting back praying for someone to protect me. I do not believe in: O Canada, I stand on guard for thee.

Mr. MACALUSO: You are a more aggressive type of person.

Mr. CURTIS: I hope to be.

Mr. MACALUSO: Now then, Air Marshal, it is my understanding that during the nuclear debate in this country, and during 1961-62 in the House, you took an active part in convincing many influential Canadians that Canada should acquire nuclear warheads. Is that true?

Mr. CURTIS: That is true.

Mr. MACALUSO: Could you explain why you did undertake such an active role in this regard?

Mr. CURTIS: Yes, because nuclear warheads were of a defensive nature; our range was such that we could not be offensive with them. Yet, if enemy bombers were coming in here, the best way of handling them would be with a small nuclear warhead in our CF-100, which would bring down one, two or more enemy bombers coming in in a formation. We would be more sure of hitting even one than with with ordinary conventional weapons. The effect of a nuclear warhead of that type breaking up at twenty or thirty thousand feet results in no fallout at all. We would hope that all of them would have been north of the line where people are living but, in any event, if there had been fallout over Toronto there would be no damage from a small warhead like that.

Mr. MACALUSO: How would you see the air force's role in Canada's defence and in meeting Canada's international commitments?

Mr. CURTIS: If a war broke out, we should have to co-operate either with the British or the Americans or some NATO country—NATO as a whole—and in order to do that we must have an air force that will mesh in, or fit into theirs. There is no sense in having an air force that is limited to transport or something that could not be of any material use in forming a fighter force. The first thing we must have, if we are going to win a war, is air superiority. That is a very important part of it. We must have a good type of aircraft and a separate type, not just something that is going to do a ground support role only.

Mr. MACALUSO: I would like to get back to the nuclear role, Air Marshal. I want to bring to your attention a brief on defence policy that was prepared by Admiral Brock for the Progressive Conservative Party. Admiral Brock was an earlier witness here, and in his brief he advocates, as a principal, policy the following:

> Canadian forces have no need for nuclear arms either now or in the foreseeable future.
>
> Other means can be found to satisfy the perfectly legitimate demand of the United States that Canada assist in the defence of North America. Similarly, and for so long as we continue to have Canadian forces based in Europe, other roles and weapons can be found for these units that will not in any way diminish the importance of the Canadian "presence" in the European theatre.
>
> Possession of nuclear arms in any form does not enhance the flexibility of our armed forces, but, on the contrary, diminishes their usefulness in fulfilling their primary objective in support of Canadian external policy.

Air Marshal Curtis, would you agree with that contention?

Mr. CURTIS: No, not altogether. I disagree with the first part of it. In the defence of North America, if we had not agreed to have nuclear warheads in our CF-100's—and I do not remember whether there were CF-86's at the time or not—we would not be able properly to defend our country, and the alternative would be to ask the United States air force to send in aircraft equipped with nuclear warheads. I think that would be wrong and it is much better for us to have those warheads for those purposes. I have not studied the European part of his remarks and I would rather not comment on them because I do not hold myself up as a military expert who can discuss all the theories of war at all.

Mr. MACALUSO: As far as nuclear arms are concerned I see your view, but with that statement you believe that nuclear weapons do enhance our capability, rather than diminish it.

Mr. CURTIS: Oh, yes.

Mr. MACALUSO: Concerning your statement about predominant air superiority which is this current theme, a statement was made to this Committee by an earlier witness that the air force have almost no requirement to use their men in a fighting capacity, and that fighting leadership is not a requirement and that air force men are rarely exposed to a fighting environment.

Mr. CURTIS: I would disagree most heartily with that as a fighter pilot in world war I; I was actually a fighter pilot for 9 months. That statement is by someone who apparently has not had the experience, or does not know what he is talking about.

Mr. MACALUSO: That is Admiral Landymore's statement.

Mr. NUGENT: He is only quoting part of it.

An hon. MEMBER: He is quoting something out of context.

Mr. MACALUSO: Not at all.

Mr. CURTIS: It is wrong anyway; and you say that Canadian fighter pilots do not have experience or leadership.

Mr. MACALUSO: I do not say that, sir. I am bringing to your attention a statement that was made in a brief to this Committee by an earlier witness and I would like to have your views on it.

Mr. CURTIS: I disagree with it.

Mr. MACALUSO: Then, there is—

Mr. HARKNESS: I would like—

The CHAIRMAN: Order.

Mr. HARKNESS: I would just like to clarify this. The statement really was—

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Harkness, are you raising a point of order here?

Mr. HARKNESS: I am raising the point of order that Mr. Macaluso is giving a false impression to the witness of what was said—

Mr. MACALUSO: Oh Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HARKNESS: —by a previous witness, and I am attempting to set the record straight in that regard.

Mr. MACALUSO: Mr. Chairman, Mr. Harkness is completely erroneous; all he has to do is look at Admiral Landymore's—

The CHAIRMAN: One at the time please. Mr. Harkness is raising a point of order and I will have to listen to the point of order.

Mr. HARKNESS: What was actually said was that in the navy every man aboard a ship when a war is on, is fighting. He is an actual fighting man in contact with the enemy. In the army, say, 50 per cent are in contact with the enemy and are actually fighting, and in the air force those people manning planes are in contact with the enemy and fighting and the majority of the people in the air force are not actual pilots and are not manning planes.

Mr. CURTIS: I would agree with that.

Mr. HARKNESS: He was talking more particularly about other ranks. His statement was:

> The Royal Canadian Air Force has almost no requirement to use their men in a fighting capacity.

The CHAIRMAN: Order, please. No real point of order has been raised; it is an explanation. Mr. Macaluso, would you go on.

Mr. MACALUSO: Would you mind keeping track of the time that was taken up on that facetious point of order?

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Macaluso, you are coming very near the end of your time, whether or not there has been an interruption, and I hope you are going to conclude very quickly.

Mr. MACALUSO: I might say though, Mr. Chairman, to the point raised, all they have to do is read Admiral Landymore's brief. I do not have to answer that facetious point.

Mr. SMITH: You are going to have to look up the meaning of facetious.

Mr. MACALUSO: You know, you would make a great actor in *Pagliacci*, Mr. Smith.

Mr. CURTIS: I am sorry, may I correct that? In North Africa squadrons were fighting; the men on the ground were involved in fighting. In France the men on the ground were bombed, and that sort of thing, and shelled, but they were not in actual physical combat with the enemy. But the pilots and officers were fighting and were considered a courageous fighting group. Anything else I would disagree with most heartily.

Mr. HARKNESS: That is the statement which was made.

Mr. MACALUSO: It was not. Mr. Chairman, if I might, I am going to read here:

> Administrative leadership is a requirement; fighting leadership is not a requirement.

Just read page 4 dealing with the air force. Air Marshal, I am just going to get to my last question. Throughout your brief you mention:

> The country having preponderant air superiority wins the battles that win the war.

and that there are historical reference to this matter. You put in your brief that younger members of the Committee should read some of these references. Could you refer me, sir, to certain references of official historians with respect to substantiating that remark that air superiority has won wars?

Mr. CURTIS: Yes. Lord Tedder has just finished a book called "With Prejudice". I finished reading it about a month ago and I strongly recommend that. It will give you an insight into the whole thing that you will not get in any other way. It is an 780 page book and I recommend that you read that.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Macaluso, you ought to be able to wrap that up in one evening. Your time is now up and I will call on Mr. Brewin.

Mr. BREWIN: Air Marshal Curtis, I was very much interested in some earlier evidence given to this Committee by General Moncel and I wanted to find out if you agree with him. He stated that in his view unification made no sense as long as we continue with the roles we have at the present time.

Mr. CURTIS: I would agree with that, except that unification of command in field forces makes sense. But that is a different unification from unifying the whole service and having only one service.

Mr. BREWIN: We were discussing at that time the unification bill, so I think he meant unification in that sense.

He said that it made no sense while we continued with the roles we have at the present time, and then he discussed that in relation to our brigade group, our air division, anti-submarine forces and so on. He pointed out that when we maintain these roles, unification is of no value or no help at all in regard to these particular roles.

Mr. CURTIS: That is right; those units by themselves tie in with our allied units and part of our fighting force would be weakened if we changed their uniform and

changed their command. We need the follow-up of a service behind—an air force and an army behind—to keep them properly supported.

Mr. BREWIN: But then I put this question to him:

> But I understand you also to say that if for various reasons, partly political and partly military, you decide that it is necessary to concentrate on this sort of intervention force, then unification begins to make some sense?

and he replied "Yes".

Mr. CURTIS: It is not really necessary; we have done an excellent job on police duties in a number of different parts of the world with the present services the way they are. They have done an outstanding job. You do not need unification to continue doing that.

Mr. BREWIN: Well, then, you do not agree with this question. The real choice that we have to make as a nation, and we have to make in parliament in making sense out of unification, is whether we are going to continue the roles that we have or concentrate on this mobile integration force? Do you agree with that?

Mr. CURTIS: I would agree with that, yes.

Mr. BREWIN: Yes. Then he went on to say that that was a political consideration. May I go back to this question:

> Would you agree, General Moncel—in fact, I think you already have—that this is partly a political consideration?

I was referring to the choice of roles.

He replied:

> Entirely a political consideration.

Mr. CURTIS: If the government decides that the role of the Canadian Forces is to be a police force role, then that is a different question entirely. But we can do that at a much lower expense than having a great defence force. We could make the Mounted Police do that very quickly.

Mr. BREWIN: I want to ask you a little more about that. You refer to converting our defence forces to a peace-keeping role. I would like to suggest to you, Air Marshal, that there is something in between the two. That a highly mobile integration force could be useful for other than what we know as peace-keeping roles in the U.N. It could play a part, could it not, in the defence of Canada?

Mr. CURTIS: It could play a part, in the defence of Canada but other than that it could not blend in with the NATO organization anywhere.

Mr. BREWIN: Well now, I just want to question you on that because I question the accuracy of that statement. Is it not true that NATO now has a mobile reserve force, to which Canada contributes a battalion and might be able to contribute more, which is for the very purpose of using this mobile force on the flank of NATO in order to deal with troubles that are somewhat less than all-out attacks on central Europe?

Mr. CURTIS: Yes, that—

Mr. BREWIN: Is that not a useful role in NATO?

Mr. CURTIS: They may have, but I do not think it necessarily calls for a unified force.

Mr. BREWIN: Do you not think it would be helpful in that particular connection if they have a mobile force that could move quickly to the place of trouble?

Mr. CURTIS: Yes, but it would not necessarily have to be a force of navy, army and air force all in one. They do it with separate groups from each service.

Mr. BREWIN: That might be so, but I would suggest to you that in all probability it would involve all three components?

Mr. CURTIS: Yes, but when General Eisenhower was commanding the war in Europe he had different staffs under him, different officers of different services, but they were not all one service.

Mr. BREWIN: I fully appreciate that it is possible to have a unified operation with elements from the different separate services, but I suppose it is also possible, if you are contemplating a unified operation, that the habit of working together in a single force might make that unified operation more efficient, might it not?

Mr. CURTIS: If Canada could afford to have the regular services, and then have a little group as a fire-fighting unit to help wherever they wanted to, I would say that would be all right, but it could only be after we had enough funds to be able to support a proper navy, army and air force.

Mr. BREWIN: By "proper" I take it you mean carrying out the roles that we are now carrying out?

Mr. CURTIS: Yes. Our commitments to NATO and to NORAD.

Mr. BREWIN: In the light of our discussion, would you agree with me that a mobile integration force would not really be confined to a peace-keeping role? It might be useful in such role, but it would have a wider scope than that?

Mr. CURTIS: I do not know how they would fit in with our commitments to NATO. They would not fit in with our commitments to NORAD at all.

Mr. BREWIN: Thank you very much.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Air Marshal, just following up on a couple of questions that Mr. Macaluso asked you, apparently you have been acquainted with Admiral Brock, Admiral Landymore and General Moncel, that Mr. Brewin referred to. Have you worked with them during the period that you served as an officer?

Mr. CURTIS: Not really. Admiral Brock was senior military officer in London after the war, and I saw a little bit of him when he was over there, but I really could not say that I have worked with them, no.

Mr. MCINTOSH: The point I am getting at is although you know them and they may be friends of yours and you have perhaps agreed on some military matters, there is always the possibility that your likes and dislikes and other factors might be different?

Mr. CURTIS: That is correct, but I have not always agreed with Admiral Brock. In former times he has said that we would never have a nuclear war; that we should not be preparing for it; that we would offset each other and we would carry on fighting normal wars. Well, that could be, but that is the only contact I have had with any of them, and I did not agree with that.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I think it is quite evident that at no time has there been unanimous agreement on the part of any staff as to what could take place.

Mr. CURTIS: There has not, but that is one of the strong points of the staff. You will have an airman come along who thinks he can win the war by air power alone, but the army and the navy soon straighten him out and we get good common sense, a good common recommendation out of it. Therefore, in my opinion, the chiefs of staff in the three different services all the way down gave us a good sound committee to put forward recommendations to the government.

Mr. MCINTOSH: A good analogy of such discussions as that would be the present day cabinet, where there have been little rifts, and so on.

Mr. CURTIS: Yes.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Now, with regard to the question Mr. Brewin put to you respecting NATO commitments and so on, and what a NATO commander would do, he first makes an appreciation of the requirements he needs both in weapons and manpower. Now, if such a force as contemplated here for Canada were in existence and not required by the NATO commander, because he wants elements of the navy, the air force and the army as such, if this were offered to him, do you think the NATO commander would say: Well, you give it to us and we will use it someplace if the need arises? That would not be normal in planning, would it?

Mr. CURTIS: I do not know what he would do in that situation. He would probably break them up and put them where he could use them.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Now, with regard to the questions you were asked about nuclear power and so on, and Canada's participation in this some years ago. At that time Canada could have been subject to two types of attack, could we not—the low level and the missile?

Mr. CURTIS: A bombing attack or a missile attack.

Mr. MCINTOSH: There was a danger?

Mr. CURTIS: Yes, there was.

Mr. MCINTOSH: It was known at that time that the Russians had approximately 1,000 planes. Is that right?

Mr. CURTIS: That is right.

Mr. MCINTOSH: And the Bomarc plan was a continental type of defence; it was not just in Canada. It was stretched right across the continent.

Mr. CURTIS: Yes, with a range of about 200 miles, as I recall.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Right, and it was for attack on low level bombing.

Mr. CURTIS: It was to protect highly developed centres such as large cities.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I wonder whether your reason for advocating that our Bomarcs be equipped with nuclear warheads was the same as mine? I understood that the Bomarc nuclear warhead would neutralize a deadman's fuse in any atomic bomb that these planes could drop. Is that correct?

Mr. CURTIS: I do not know how it was done on the Bomarc. I believe it is correct. All my discussions were based on our aircraft carrying them because they would intercept the nuclear bomber before it came within lethal range of the target. Bomarc had a limited range of a couple of hundred miles but our aircraft could go out 500 or 600 miles and intercept them there.

Mr. McINTOSH: Do you believe in the collective defence of our continent, or do you think Canada can protect herself?

Mr. CURTIS: No, collective defence is the only hope we ever had.

Mr. McINTOSH: Right. Now, could I ask you whether you can give a definition of integration and unification? Do they both mean the same thing to you?

Mr. CURTIS: No, no. Integration means getting some of our services together; having the medicals work together and the supplies and that sort of thing. That is integration.

Mr. McINTOSH: Supplies and administration?

Mr. CURTIS: Yes, and probably engineering and one or two other of those services.

Mr. McINTOSH: Do you think that it is possible to integrate our combat troops or unify our combat troops?

Mr. CURTIS: Do you mean have—

Mr. McINTOSH: A single service concept.

Mr. CURTIS: For the troops?

Mr. McINTOSH: For the combat troops.

Mr. CURTIS: I would not think so, no.

Mr. McINTOSH: Would you care to try to give this Committee your definition of the term "unification"? What does that mean?

Mr. CURTIS: I think you can read into unification a lot of things. I know some of the British and American senior people consider unification a unified command and when they speak of being in favour of unification they mean a command such as we had during the war and that we have on the east and west coast, naval and air force commands working toegther. That is a unified command. But when foreigners say "unified command" they are not thinking of putting our three services into one and making one unit out of it. Anyone I have spoken to in another country has said that is not their idea of unification; that is wrong; that is revolution instead of evolution.

Mr. McINTOSH: From your understanding of Bill No. C-243, do you think from what you have heard that it is the purpose of the present government to put all our three services into one?

Mr. CURTIS: That is what I understand now. I did not know that two years ago. Really it was only last summer that I had evidence that was what was intended. Now I am quite convinced that is what is intended.

Mr. McINTOSH: If that does take place, Air Marshal, do you think it will be detrimental to the defence of the North American continent?

Mr. CURTIS: I do not know that I would say so to the same extent it would be detrimental to working with our other allies.

Mr. McINTOSH: Do you feel if we have a single service concept that we can carry out our present commitments to those allies?

Mr. CURTIS: No, I do not think we can.

Mr. McINTOSH: Would you elaborate on why we cannot?

Mr. CURTIS: Well, because really we would be down, in a few years, to a ground force supported by squadrons of air force and naval ships. I do not know how the naval ships tie in unless they are going to transport them overseas. But that is what I understand we will have in the eventual setup of our defence forces.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Do you feel that if that does take place we will lose our sovereignty or our national pride?

Mr. CURTIS: Oh, I would not say that. We might lose our national pride; certainly a lot of the service people who are retired will feel we have. I would think we would lose a lot of pride but we will not lose our sovereignty unless we cannot defend our country.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Do you think that would be more costly to the Canadian taxpayer than the present system of three separate services? Or would it be less costly?

Mr. CURTIS: Oh, I could not answer that. From all the evidence I have read there is not going to be any lowering of costs of our defence forces by unification.

Mr. MCINTOSH: In your brief you made mention—I forget which page it was—that perhaps it is best that we get out of the defence role.

Mr. CURTIS: If we have decided we are not going to spend money on our defence forces, then why try to save a little bit? Why not save a billion and a half by enlarging the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and letting them do the police force job? They can do it just as well and at probably one third the cost of having all these services.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Thank you, Air Marshal, that is the end of my questioning.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I would like to thank the Air Marshal for the excellent brief he gave to us this afternoon and the seriousness with which he views this situation. I hope that his attitude and his knowledge of these matters will be brought home to the public. You mentioned your career, Air Marshal Curtis, in both world wars; long and very distinguished career. You ranked as one of the outstanding fighting men of Canada although, like the rest of the fighting men of Canada, you abhor war, but you did not tell us anything about what has been happening to you since you retired in 1953. This Committee is composed of people who have had some military experience and some who have just had civilian experience and they might be interested in your civilian experience. Would you mind telling us what has happened since 1953?

Mr. CURTIS: When I retired from the air force I joined the board of Avro aircraft and was concerned with the building of the CF-100 and the Arrow when it started and the Orenda and the Iroquois engines. I was vice chairman of that board until about a year and a half ago when I passed the retirement age and retired. Since then I have invested in a company organized to buy up privately owned Canadian companies where the owner was in his sixties or early seventies and worried about succession duties because, after six months, the business has to be sold at the best offer to pay succession duties. So we formed this company and raised a million dollars. They asked me after a while if I would be a director and then they asked me if I would be chairman of the executive committee.

So we have purchased six companies; the Viking Pump Company in Windsor, and Clare Brothers. These are million dollar companies, or $700,000 or $800,000 companies, and we have purchased six of them. I am chairman of the board of

four and chairman of the executive committee, so I am quite active in the business world in that way. I was chairman of the organizing committee for York University in Toronto and when we got the university going they very kindly asked me to be chancellor and I have been chancellor of York University for the last six years.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Thank you very much. You have continued as distinguished a service in peacetime as you did in wartime. I would like to ask you a question about something the Minister said in the course of his speech on December 7 when he was attempting to promote the idea of unification. He said the need for fast decision-making and quick reaction is synonymous with modern warfare. With your experience in the two world wars, did you find that fast decision-making and quick reaction were essential?

Mr. CURTIS: In the world war I, I was a junior officer and a fighter pilot and I did not know much about decision-making at the higher levels. In fact, we used to read the *Daily Mail* to find out how the war was going. I do not know; things very seldom happen in a major way where you do not have time to weigh them up properly. The commander in the field would have to make quick decisions but in my opinion you have time to consider administrative or organizational decisions properly and you are not rushed where you have to make a snap decision.

Mr. CHURCHILL: You had to make some snap decisions when you were flying in world war I.

Mr. CURTIS: Yes, definitely.

Mr. CHURCHILL: But you do not see any difference between modern warfare and those two wars in that everything has to be done much more rapidly than in the past?

Mr. CURTIS: You cannot take a month to make decisions or two weeks or a week, but I have never run across a situation where, in my senior officer career, a paper decision could not be arrived at in a reasonable time without too much delay.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I noticed in your brief you quite properly pointed out the fact that some attention should be paid to the military history of Canada and the accomplishments of Canadian servicemen in the past. You said that past achievements are important to any service. The Minister has made quite a point, in the course of his remarks in December and on other occasions, that there is a higher loyalty. He has the unfounded impression, like so many of his impressions, that if a man is loyal to his service this interferes with his loyalty to his country. Has this been your experience in a lifetime of service?

Mr. CURTIS: I feel that men primarily are loyal to their unit. I used to say at one time, years ago, that a naval officer was first a naval officer; next he was a Canadian and third he was either a Roman Catholic or a Protestant. I find that men are loyal to the unit they serve with, with their buddies. They will fight and die for the people working with them. They will think it over twice if they are in a larger formation somewhere.

They will not get so many Victoria Crosses standing up like that, but they will be fighting for the unit they are associated with.

Mr. CHURCHILL: The minister used these words:

> One force, with one name, a common uniform, and common rank designations will nurture this total family loyalty.

In other words, he is saying that if everybody is put together with a common uniform and common rank structure their loyalty to the country will be higher than if they are in three separate services.

Mr. CURTIS: I disagree with that entirely. We have a lot of international conferences which officers attend. If a naval officer goes down to attend a naval conference and he is in a green uniform he feels embarrassed; he is not taken in as one of the company there. I know; I sat in on them in London during the war when South African air force officers wore khaki. They were army ranks and army officers. Australians wore blue uniforms and they seemed to be out of it. Now that is a very definite thing, whether you admit it or not. If you go in you are an ugly duckling if you are in a different uniform. And, as far as rank goes, the rank problem would not bother the air force so much, but the uniform would. But imagine the rank structure on a destroyer where there are probably ten or a dozen lieutenants. All those lieutenants are going to be captains. So when you get on a destroyer you are going to have more captains than you have seamen, probably. The captain rank is a junior rank in the army, but it is a senior rank in the navy and the air force—you are a captain or a group captain. You gain nothing but you lose so much by swinging over to that, and it is the same with the uniform. You cannot save five cents by buying 100,000 uniforms over 35,000 or 40,000 uniforms, and as far as having the best and most serviceable uniform is concerned, I am quite certain that can be made in the naval blue or the light air force blue or the khaki for the army with no difference in cost at all.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Your experience, sir, has been with the three services, at one time or another—army, navy and air force. You have observed men in action in both world wars. Did you reach any conclusions to the effect that there was not loyalty to Canada on the part of Canadian servicemen, no matter what service they were in?

Mr. CURTIS: Goodness, no.

Mr. CHURCHILL: It never entered your head, in fact?

Mr. CURTIS: Never, never.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Nor mine, either.

Mr. MACALUSO: Extreme language on many occasions—

Mr. CHURCHILL: Never mind, Mr. Macaluso, you are going to learn and you have a book to read which you have been instructed to look at. I have a final question.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): Have you read the book, Mr. Churchill?

An hon. MEMBER: He lived the book.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Because of the seriousness of this problem and your knowledge of it, and your standing in the community, I was wondering whether you, at any time, have been able to bring this matter to the attention of the Prime Minister?

Mr. CURTIS: No, I have never tried to. I saw the Prime Minister when he came up to York University and his wife opened the new building for us. But I did not attempt to discuss it with him. He jokingly made some reference to me on integration or unification but I have never spoken to him. I did not know whether I should do so or not. I did not want to impose upon a friendship to do that.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Have you had an opportunity to speak to the cabinet as whole or to members of the cabinet with regard to this?

Mr. CURTIS: I have not spoken to anybody. I have not spoken to Conservatives, Liberals or NDP or anybody else about this. I worked entirely by myself on this at home.

Mr. LAMBERT: Air Marshal Curtis, in 1964 when we were considering Bill No. C-190 you appeared before the Committee as a witness at which time you made some initial comments about the White Paper. You were enthusiastic about, shall I say, the promise in the White Paper or its potential for saving money, but you had some reservations about the number of men that would have to be cut from the forces in order to achieve that. Further, in discussing Bill No. C-190, you had some very definite reservations about the proposals for the change in the command structure. Now, seeing you have been a Chief of Air Staff and have an intimate knowledge of the working of the higher echelon of command, can you give the Committee an assessment of what you have felt was involved in the past two years since the passage of that bill and the changes in the command structure in Canada so far as this integrated command is concerned?

Mr. CURTIS: At that time a statement was made which was received across the country with great enthusiasm that they would save $200 million by unifying the forces and reducing the manpower by 10,000. At that time I said it would have to be 20,000 or more to achieve anything like that saving; you would have to cut the force by at least that much. I did state that in my opinion it was a terrible mistake to do away with the three chiefs of staff and thereby lose the leadership that is given to each service by the man at the top. Now the services are like a ship without a rudder. They have no top man to go to. You can say the chairman, but he is far removed and, at the present time, is an army man. Before that he was an air force man. The army and navy, when the air force man was there, did not feel any great desire to speak, or see any advantage in speaking, to him about any of their problems. It is the same now with an army man there. The air force and the navy do not feel that he understands their problems and will go to them. I felt, and I still feel, that eventually we will have to come back to the three chiefs of staff if we are going to have efficiently run services.

Mr. LAMBERT: In other words, it is your feeling the top man must be at the top of the command structure.

Mr. CURTIS: Yes.

Mr. LAMBERT: That is, the top man in each service.

Mr. CURTIS: The top man in each service, yes.

Mr. LAMBERT: And that someone must be responsible.

Mr. CURTIS: Yes, on top of that. You see, we had the chairman plus the three chiefs of staff. Often there would be discussions where one chief would bring up a problem on which probably he was over-enthusiastic for his own force, but the other two service chiefs and the chairman would discuss it with him and show him there were other angles to it. I worry about having one man, and one man only, as the mouthpiece for the services to the Minister or to the cabinet. Now, you might say there are defence committee meetings where other officers sit in, but a junior officer very rarely will disagree with his chief, especially in front of the Minister or on a committee. If he does his career is finished. It is the tendency of all individual single leaders—or all leaders —to get men around them to support them, sort of "yes" men you might say as the extreme, but you are supported and surrounded by men like that. So, if there is only

one leader and one approach to the government, then it is a very dangerous state of affairs. You might not get anything that is going to revolutionize the country, but you will get some bad advice.

Mr. LAMBERT: Recently a good deal has been said by the Minister in his, shall we say, second appearance before this Committee to the effect that the past history of the Canadian forces having three services with three heads resulted in waste by duplication or wrong emphasis, and that the chiefs of staff subordinated the interest in the whole of the defence force for the advantage of their own particular service; in other words, they had an undue bias in favour of their particular service. It is for this reason the Minister feels that the top people should be in one uniform; therefore, they would have a bias for only the one over-all service. This is the thesis of his argument. Going back to your experience—many years of senior experience—do you agree or not with the contention that our forces have been ill-served by any bias toward a service?

Mr. CURTIS: I think probably there has been a small amount of duplication, but not of major importance, and you will get that anyway with the one service. Now, as far as the chiefs being biased is concerned, certainly they are biased. They are there to advance or keep their own service as well equipped as possible. But when we go into a committee meeting to share the amount of money that is going to be allocated to the defence forces, no one chief has an easy job there I can tell you. He has two other chiefs who are just as keen on their service and you get a fair distribution of the funds in that way.

I would say it is very healthy and you will not get around it by this present organization. You will not overcome that if there are going to be navy, army and air force units. They are going to have to have their equipment, their airplanes, their tanks and their ships and they will have to put up just as hard a case in some committee. I do not think you will find any saving at all in that.

The three chiefs of staff exert a great balancing effect on our defence forces in bringing up recommendations to the government for the money they spend and in each competing to have his service the best and most efficient service we have in Canada. Up until a year or so ago I would say the Canadian forces were second to none. I do not know anything about them right now—I do not know as much about them—but up until two years ago I was so proud of our RCAF—particulary the overseas group. We won the fighting in the air shield four or five times in a row with the best squadrons in Europe. We were competing with the Americans, the British, the French, the Belgians, the Norwegians—everybody. I do not think our forces could have been better. How we can obtain that same amount of efficiency without having a leader to do it is beyond me. I do not think it is possible.

Mr. ANDRAS: Air Marshal Curtis, at the top of page 6 of your brief you say:

> To convert our defence forces to a peace-keeping role is nothing short of rank folly.

This implication has come up before with other witnesses. I wanted to mention to you some comments we have had from other authorities and ask you whether this would indicate that there is an intention to do so. General Allard, for instance, in his presentation to us says:

> —that we must—on the one hand—continue to contribute to the deterrence of an all-out war with our contribution to NATO—while on the other hand —preparing ourselves to meet a wide variety of conflicts short of all-out war. At the same time we must be capable of defending our national territory and participating in the defence of this continent.

The White Paper itself lists four major objectives to Canada's defence policy:

(a) Collective Measures for maintenance of peace—

Which is the peacekeeping role but also:

(b) Collective Defence—

—under NATO and:

(c) Partnership with the United States in the defence of North America;

—which would be NORAD co-operation and:

(d) National Measures to discharge responsibility for the security and protection of Canada.

General Allard also makes a point of referring to these kinds of things. He said:

> By 1970 we will have further improved our effectiveness by taking delivery of new self-propelled artillery weapons—light observation and cargo helicopters —armoured reconnaissance vehicles—oversnow vehicles—utility helicopters —tactical surveillance drones—improved radios—airportable artillery—and close support fighter aircraft.

The Minister, too, refers to your criticism or the criticism inherent in it, that we are going to convert the Canadian forces into one giant peacekeeping organization. He says—with due respect in the *Canada Month* of November 1966:

> —This suggestion is nonsensical. If that were the objective, why on earth would we have launched a 1.5 billion dollar, five-year re-equipment program? Why would we be acquiring self-propelled howitzers, armoured personnel carriers, armoured reconnaissance vehicles, antitank guns, anti-tank missiles, helicopter-equipped destroyers, ship-to-air missiles, modern submarines and fighter-bombers—

—why would we be doing that—

> —if the role was limited to peacekeeping?

In the light of this evidence which has been given to us why would you feel that it is the intention of the government to relegate our force role to a peacekeeping one?

Mr. CURTIS: We have been concentrating to a great extent recently on building up the mobile force. At the same time we have been curtailing our squadrons overseas and we have been curtailing our contribution to NORAD. In both cases in the last few years the squadrons have been cut down in number, and in aircraft in the squadron, and it looks to me as though it is gradual fade-out. In another two or three years we will be out of NATO, we will be out of NORAD and our entire effort will be on our mobile striking force.

Mr. ANDRAS: Referring to the air forces General Allard mentioned this and I quote:

> I would like now to discuss the air forces assigned to the air defence—the strike/reconnaissance—and the transport roles. Since 1963 the effectiveness of Air Defence Command has increased through the supply of nuclear weapons for the interceptors and warheads for the BOMARCs—through the introduction of semi-automatic group environment for Northern NORAD—and improved heavy radars. We can expect this Command to continue its high state of effectiveness through 1970 with some marginal improvement due to the introduction of BUIC (Back Up Interceptor Control)—and completion of the consolidation of Air Defence Command Headquarters with the Northern NORAD Sector at North Bay.

My own opinion is that there is no stated intention. There may be disagreement with the method but there is no stated intention on the government's part—

Mr. CURTIS: I do not think they would say so. I would not expect them to say so but they can do it quietly and then say, it is not necessary now; we will not need it. It looks to me as though they are moving in that direction.

Mr. ANDRAS: In spite of the acquirement of all this type of equipment which certainly is not peacekeeping equipment?

Mr. CURTIS: Most of that equipment, though, is ground forces equipment. It is for the mobile strike force.

Mr. ANDRAS: Including close support aircraft, you are saying, too?

Mr. CURTIS: Close support?

Mr. ANDRAS: Yes.

Mr. CURTIS: Close support or coast? C-O-A-S-T?

Mr. ANDRAS: Close.

Mr. CURTIS: Close? That is mobile striking force.

Mr. ANDRAS: You are saying, including that?

Mr. CURTIS: I say that most of that equipment is for the mobile strike force.

Mr. ANDRAS: As I understand it, the forces are—not in place of but, perhaps, in addition to the other roles that the air force could take building up a tactical air force to support ground forces. Do you welcome this or do you agree with the build-up of a tactical air force sector, the CF-5 and so on?

Mr. CURTIS: If we are going to work with the American air force or the British air force in a war they have a terrific tactical air force unit. It is a terrific one and I suppose ours could be fitted into that, but I think one of our roles is to be able to defend ourselves against air attack from a land based force or a sea-based aircraft.

Mr. ANDRAS: I remember from my experience as an infantry officer in world war II, for instance, that the RCAF did operate tactical wings—

Mr. CURTIS: Oh, yes,—

Mr. ANDRAS: In fact, they were very welcome to us. I was thinking of Typhoons and things like that. But it seems to me after that—I think I am right in this—tactical planes just disappeared from the Canadian air force planning. Was that when you were Chief of Air Staff?

Mr. CURTIS: That is right.

Mr. ANDRAS: I take it that was done with your approval or even at your instigation?

Mr. CURTIS: Yes, we had a lot of bombers too. We had 6 Group. We had a wonderful bomber group that did a tremendous job overseas and we owned all the Lancasters, but we could not afford to have all types of aircraft. We can not afford to have close support for ground forces, bomber aircraft and fighters and there was a definite threat from Russian bombers, and in co-operation with the United States air force we built up an air defence system in Canada and that

took all the money we had. If we had tried to do the other there would not have been a dollar left for anything else, so we equipped ourselves for the role that was most urgent. We could not do all the things and this was the most urgent role. Air superiority was in the back of my mind as a necessary form of defence and these aircraft were suitable for that.

Mr. ANDRAS: From your brief—and I do not want to misinterpret it—I take an implication. For instance, on page 8, it reads:

> In my opinion the proposed organization whereby the Canadian Air Force becomes nothing more than a branch of the ground forces, a "hewer of wood and carrier of water" instead of a proud and strategic separate fighting force,—

I take that to mean you still feel today, in the light of present developments, that a strategic air force—and by that you mean—

Mr. CURTIS: I do not mean bombers—no. I mean interdiction such as they have in France. The squadrons in France are for interdiction behind the line—for operating 50 or 100 miles behind the lines. You cannot defend the army on the ground or the navy at sea by flying over them. You have to intercept some distance back to put up the best defence for your troops. Our troops on the ground would not see aircraft fighting off in the distance. It is the same as Dunkirk—when the evacuation took place there the air force was fighting 25 to 50 miles way from Dunkirk in order to keep German bombers and dive bombers from attacking the force. They were criticized by the army that got out for the one or two aircraft that got through. You cannot help it in a three-dimensional war like that. One or two bombers got through and machine-gunned the troops, but that is a small portion of it. If you want to defend ground forces or the navy you must do it not within sight of the people who are being protected, but back far enough where they cannot get at you.

Mr. ANDRAS: Then you do not agree with a tactical—

Mr. CURTIS: I do not think that is the most important air element we should have in our force. If we are going to fight a war by ourselves where we do not work with any other country and we need an army and an air force, then that would be fine. But I think in any future war we will be working with allies and, therefore, in my opinion, we should be able to make our best contribution in a way that will fit in with what they are doing.

Mr. ANDRAS: But is that not likely to be a more major type of war?

Mr. CURTIS: It could start out as a minor war and develop into a major war.

Mr. ANDRAS: Yes, but one of the avowed purposes in the White Paper and in the whole program is to make our forces more flexible and try and enter at a level that would prevent escalation into a major holocaust. There is no such thing as a tactical nuclear weapon; it is going to be the same as a major nuclear weapon. You are not going to have a limited tactical and nuclear war; it is going to escalate very quickly, at least in the opinion of most people.

Mr. CURTIS: The air element that you are building into mobile strike force will not be a strong and useful one in a force working with our allies.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Andras, you are at the end of your time.

Mr. ANDRAS: Mr. Chairman, I have just one more question. You are saying generally, then, that the aircraft we should have should be capable, say, of carrying nuclear warheads and that ground support weapons for brush fire and for the lower level of war really are a useless exercise.

Mr. CURTIS: I am not saying nuclear weapons at all. I am saying we should have the capability of fighting above and beyond our forces that are on the ground. Whether at that time nuclear weapons will be required or not is a decision that can be made at that time. I am not trying to get Canada into a position of being able to fight a nuclear war. We do not have any nuclear weapons. We would have to get them from the United States if we were going to do it and if that time ever arrives why, then, it will be time enough to talk about it.

Mr. ANDRAS: You would not subscribe to Canada being a member of the nuclear club in the sense of being able to make that use itself?

Mr. CURTIS: I would say to defend Canada we should have nuclear weapons that would go into our aircraft, not for dropping on enemy territory, but to defend ourselves as best we know how.

Mr. ANDRAS: Even though this might contribute to proliferation—

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Andras, your time is up.

Mr. ANDRAS: Mr. Chairman, please, I just have one more question. Even if this would contribute to proliferation of the nuclear war?

Mr. CURTIS: I cannot see Canada ever being in a position where we can increase the danger of a nuclear war.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Air Marshal Curtis, your devotion and service to Canada while a serving officer go without question but there has been a slight review of your activities in civilian life. You mentioned you are on the board of directors of several companies and chancellor of York University. I was particularly interested in your reference to the buying up of companies in order to avoid succession duties and so on.

Mr. CURTIS: Not in order to avoid succession duties.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Not for you to avoid succession duties but for—

Mr. CURTIS: No, but for them to be in a position to pay their succession duties without sacrificing their business.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): All right, fine. I am sorry I used the word "avoid."

You mentioned the fact that a million dollars had been raised to establish this company.

Mr. CURTIS: Over a million dollars.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Is this Canadian money?

Mr. CURTIS: Yes. All of it.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): All Canadian money?

Mr. CURTIS: All Canadian money from men in Toronto and Montreal and some in London.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Would there be any intention—

Mr. BREWIN: Mr. Chairman, on a point of order, what subject are we now discussing?

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): The same subject that other members in this Committee have been permitted to follow up.

An hon. MEMBER: Pure science.

Mr. BREWIN: I must say I cannot see this line of questioning relating in any way to the issues involved.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): If you will listen for a moment I will get to the point. It will only take a moment.

Mr. BREWIN: Oh, fine.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Sir, you say this is all Canadian money.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Brewin, there is perhaps a point of relevancy along here somewhere and maybe we could listen for it. Thank you.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): I will arrive at it in a moment—just be patient. All Canadian money? Could I interpret from that approach that possibly it is another way of protecting Canadian businesses from American interests?

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. MacInnis, we seem to be approaching the point of relevancy—

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Mr. Chairman, the point of relevancy is this: Air Marshal Curtis, following up his devoted service to the military in this country, has now proven the same devotion to Canadian welfare and the economy of this country.

An hon. MEMBER: Like Walter Gordon?

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): I would say, when you mention the name Walter Gordon, that his activities in this field seem to be a lot more positive than Mr. Gordon's.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. MacInnis, I think we are all devoted to Canada and I think the sooner we address ourselves to the brief the better.

We will leave that discussion to the finance committee.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Mr. Chairman, I did not think there would be any objection from this Committee to my underlining the activities of a distinguished Canadian in the field of civilian life following a distinguished service career. This is exactly what Air Marshal Curtis has proven to this Committee today and if you do not like to listen to it there are a few other recommendations here that would fit some of the Committee members.

Mr. Chairman, I will get back for the satisfaction of some of the other members of the Committee. Air Marshal Curtis, you made a reference on the second page of your brief to some recommended reading for the younger members of this Committee. I think Air Marshal Lord Tedder's book was mentioned. Sir, you certainly did not imply—as one interjected question implied—that Mr. Churchill would be required to read Lord Tedder's book in order fully to understand the activities of warfare.

The CHAIRMAN: He is not going to be able to get it until Mr. Macaluso is finished with it.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): I think your recommendation was for the younger members of this Committee who have had no experience whatsoever in the field.

Mr. CURTIS: That was what I was talking about but I was not talking about Lord Tedder's book at that time; I was talking about books on the Canadian fight in Europe.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Lord Tedder's books was mentioned specifically.

Mr. CURTIS: No, not then.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Lord Tedder's book was mentioned specifically and the answer was directed specifically to Mr. Macaluso.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. MacInnis, Mr. Macaluso can read the book tonight.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Eight hundred pages? Mr. Macaluso, if there is something you do not understand about the book, may be I can interpret it for you.

Mr. MACALUSO: It is for a higher intellect.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): I would not necessarily say intellect; I would say, experience.

Getting back to the defence of Canada, sir, would you consider any war involving Canadian territory would necessarily be an all-out war?

Mr. CURTIS: I would think so; yes.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Do you find that there is a misconception about what the defence of Canada means? Do you find that people, when speaking of the defence of Canada, refer to the possibility that Canadian forces are capable of defending this end of the continent on their own or do you feel that the rightful position for people to take is full co-operation with our United States allies?

Mr. CURTIS: I think that is the only way we can defend North America if there were an attack on North America. I do not think we, by ourselves and our own military efforts, could do anything against a powerful enemy.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): And it is a joint effort on continental defence?

Mr. CURTIS: Yes, that is right. I was on the permanent joint board on defence for three years and we had a definite agreement with the United States that in the event of an attack on Canada they would come to our aid.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): The only way that such an undertaking could be carried out would be through the full co-operation of army units working with army units; air force working with air force and navy with navy.

Mr. CURTIS: That is correct.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): It is nonsensical for Canada to approach this with any method other than on the basis established by our great ally to the south?

Mr. CURTIS: I agree with you.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, the time is six o'clock and on behalf of all you I would like to thank Air Marshal Curtis for appearing here today.

Our next meeting will be tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock when General Simonds will be here. I remind you again that the subcommittee meeting will be held in my room, 405 in the West Block, at 9.30. The meeting is adjourned.

HOUSE OF COMMONS

First Session—Twenty-seventh Parliament

1966-67

STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. GRANT DEACHMAN

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 34

THURSDAY, MARCH 16, 1967

Respecting

Bill C-243, An Act to amend the National Defence Act and other Acts in consequence thereof.

WITNESS:

Lieutenant-General Guy G. Simonds, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., C.D.

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY
OTTAWA, 1967

25947—1

STANDING COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. Grant Deachman

Vice-Chairman: Hon. Marcel Lambert

Mr. Andras,
Mr. Brewin,
Mr. Byrne,
Mr. Churchill,
Mr. Crossman,
Mr. Éthier,
Mr. Forrestall,
Mr. Foy,
Mr. Harkness,
[1] Mr. Hopkins,
Mr. Langlois (*Chicoutimi*),
Mr. Latulippe,
[1] Mr. Legault,
Mr. Lessard,
Mr. MacInnis (*Cape Breton South*),
Mr. McIntosh,
Mr. McNulty,
Mr. Nugent,
Mr. Reid,
Mr. Rochon,
Mr. Smith,
Mr. Winch—(24).

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

[1] Replaced Messrs. Loiselle and Macaluso on March 16, 1967.

ORDER OF REFERENCE

HOUSE OF COMMONS,

THURSDAY, March 16, 1967.

Ordered,—That the names of Messrs. Legault and Hopkins be substituted for those of Messrs. Loiselle and Macaluso on the Standing Committee on National Defence.

Attest.

LÉON J. RAYMOND,
The Clerk of the House of Commons.

25947—1½

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

THURSDAY, March 16, 1967.
(67)

The Standing Committee on National Defence met at 10:05 a.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Grant Deachman, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Andras, Brewin, Byrne, Churchill, Crossman, Deachman, Foy, Harkness, Lambert, Langlois (*Chicoutimi*), Lessard, Loiselle, MacInnis (*Cape Breton South*), McIntosh, McNulty, Rochon and Mr. Smith (17).

Also present: Mr. Hopkins and Mr. Pugh.

In attendance: Lieutenant-General Guy G. Simonds.

The Chairman announced that the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure met at 9.30 a.m. this day, and will meet again later this day, before reporting to the main Committee.

It was moved by Mr. Loiselle, seconded by Mr. Smith, and agreed, that the Committee continue to stand the motion of Mr. Andras dated March 9, 1967.

The Chairman introduced Lieutenant-General Guy G. Simonds. General Simonds outlined his military career and made an opening statement.

The members proceeded to ask questions of the witness concerning his opening remarks and his views in relation to *Bill C-243*.

The Committee recessed for five minutes at 11:20 a.m. The meeting resumed at 11:25 a.m. and questioning was continued.

At 12.25 p.m., Mr. MacInnis assumed the Chair when the Chairman had to leave because of other commitments.

With the questioning of General Simonds continuing, at 12:35 p.m. the Committee adjourned until 3.30 p.m. this day.

AFTERNOON SITTING
(68)

The Standing Committee on National Defence met at 3:40 p.m. this day with the Chairman, Mr. Deachman, presiding.

Members present: Messrs. Andras, Brewin, Byrne, Churchill, Crossman, Deachman, Ethier, Foy, Harkness, Hopkins, Langlois (*Chicoutimi*), Legault, Lessard, MacInnis (*Cape Breton South*), McIntosh, McNulty, Nugent, Reid, Rochon and Smith (20).

Also present: Mr. Pugh.

In attendance: Lieutenant-General Guy G. Simonds and Honourable Léo Cadieux, Associate Minister of National Defence.

The Committee resumed its questioning of Lieutenant-General Simonds on a variety of defence subjects in relation to the implications of *Bill C-243* under consideration.

At approximately 5:30 p.m., the members concluded their questioning and the Chairman thanked Lieutenant-General Simonds for his appearance before the Committee.

The Chairman noted that the Judge Advocate General has prepared a list of twenty-four Clauses of *Bill C-243* which are not related to unification. The Committee agreed to consider these Clauses during the evening sitting this day.

At 5:35 p.m., the Committee adjourned until 8:00 p.m. this day.

EVENING SITTING
(69)

The Standing Committee on National Defence met at 8:35 p.m. this day, the Chairman, Mr. Deachman, presiding.

Members present: Messrs. Andras, Brewin, Byrne, Churchill, Crossman, Deachman, Éthier, Forrestall, Foy, Hopkins, Langlois (*Chicoutimi*), Legault, Lessard, MacInnis (*Cape Breton South*), McIntosh, McNulty, Nugent, Reid, Rochon and Smith (20).

In attendance: From the Department of National Defence: Brigadier W. J. Lawson, Judge Advocate General.

Clause 1 of *Bill C-243* was allowed to stand.

Clauses 2 to 8 and the proposed new Clauses 9, 10 and 11 were allowed to stand.

The Chairman called re-numbered Clauses 12, 13, 19 and 23 which were severally carried.

Re-numbered Clause 24 was allowed to stand.

The Chairman called re-numbered Clause 25 which was carried.

Re-numbered Clause 26 was allowed to stand.

The Chairman called re-numbered Clauses 27, 28, 30, 31, 33, 34, 42, 43 and 44 which were severally carried.

Re-numbered Clause 45 was allowed to stand.

The Chairman called re-numbered Clauses 46 and 47 which were carried.

Re-numbered Clause 48 was allowed to stand.

The Chairman called re-numbered Clauses 51, 59, 60 and 61 which were severally carried.

The Committee reverted to consideration of re-numbered Clause 24 and after further discussion the Clause was again allowed to stand.

The Committee reverted to consideration of re-numbered Clause 26 which was carried, *on division.*

The Committee reverted to consideration of re-numbered Clauses 45 and 48 which were allowed to stand.

The Chairman announced that the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure will meet on Friday morning, March 17, 1967.

At 9:30 p.m. the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

THURSDAY, March 16, 1967

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, we have more than a quorum at the moment and others will be ready to join us in a minute or two.

We will begin by again standing the motion of Mr. Andras, which seems to be slowly passing into history. The Steering Committee met this morning and held discussions on the further progress of the Committee. It will meet again today and report later.

I will now call for a motion to stand the motion of Mr. Andras.

Mr. LOISELLE: I so move.

Mr. SMITH: I second the motion.

Motion agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN: We have with us this morning, as arranged and agreed upon previously, General Simonds. He has advised me that he has a verbal statement to make, and I have suggested to him that he open by giving us a rundown of his biography and his military connections, as have others who have appeared before us. On behalf of all members, I welcome General Simonds here this morning.

Lieutenant-General Guy SIMONDS: Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, I was educated at the Royal Military College at Kingston and on graduation, was commissioned in the Royal Canadian Artillery in 1925.

I served in the artillery a number of years in various appointments in both eastern and western Canada. I attended the gunnery staff course to qualify as a gunnery instructor in England in 1933-34. I returned as a gunnery instructor at Kingston, and I attended the staff college at Camberley for the two years 1936-37, just preceding the outbreak of war. I returned to Canada and was appointed instructor of international affairs and tactics at the Royal Military College, where I was when the war broke out, and at that time I was a regimental captain. I was posted to the first divisional headquarters on mobilization in 1939 as G-2 operations. I went overseas with the first contingent and served as G-2 until late 1940, when I was appionted to command the first RCHA.

I was re-posted from that position in November, to set up the first Canadian war staff course, which I ran until the middle of the summer of 1941. I was posted as G-1 of the second division and from there to chief of staff at first corps. I then was on special planning operations for a time and then was posted to the command of the First Canadian Infantry Brigade, posted as chief of staff at army headquarters, with General McNaughton again, when army headquarters was formed.

Subsequently I was attached to the 8th Army out in North Africa and was promoted to command the First Canadian Division, its operations and landings in Sicily and its operations in Italy. I was posted to the Fifth Canadian Armoured Division when it came to Italy in the fall of 1943. I was then again back to England to take command of the 2nd Canadian Corps at the end of January, 1944. I commanded the 2nd Canadian Corps throughout the operations in north-west Europe, except during the winter period of the battle of the Scheldt, when General Crerar was taken ill and I commanded the army during those operations.

At the end of hostilities, I was appointed to command the Canadian Forces in the Netherlands, which were the Canadian troops in Europe, during the period of repatriation. Subsequent to that, I was posted as chief instructor at the Imperial Defence College in London for some three years. I was then re-posted to Canada as commandant at the National Defence College and Canadian Army Staff College, and appointed Chief of the General Staff in 1951. I retired in 1956.

Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, I have long been an advocate of a sensible measure of integration of the three services, one reason being that I always felt that for the size of the forces we deployed, we had much too much overhead, and certainly increased efficiency could result from integration of most of the administrative services. But I have never been, and I have never expected that my advocacy of integration would be interpreted in the terms of unification which is now proposed, and I am personally of the opinion that it is not in the national interest. I believe that national defence is primarily an insurance policy protecting national sovereignty, no more and no less; and though the premiums that are paid from time to time have to be adjusted to the disks that are foreseen, a prudent man does not cancel the fire insurance policy on his house because it has not burned down in the past 20 years.

The greatest threat to the maintenance of national sovereignty and self determination is a major war involving the great powers, and the structure of defence organization, in my view, has got to be capable of meeting that emergency. The mere term "peacekeeping" implies the existence of a risk of war. I believe that the proposals and the organization set out in this new defence bill have to be looked at against that background, and my first criticism would be directed against the structure at the top. I believe that a perfect structure at the meeting point between military and political leadership will probably never be attained, because I believe the military leader has got to take the long-term view always, and the political leader usually takes a short-term view. The structure with a Chiefs of Staff Committee formed from the heads of three services has worked effectively, and though it may be imperfect, and it may cause frustrations at times both to a minister to the individual chiefs of staff, I believe that it is the best in the national interest. I think that is necessary because I believe you have got to have at the top, a real expert in each of the environments of sea, land and air, who has the experience of that service, and really understands it, and can give competent advice in relation to that.

We have no precedent, really, to say that the proposals now put forward will not work. One can only go on past experience and historical background. But Napoleon, who was probably one of the greatest of politico-military strategists, never really understod sea power and, in the end, it cost him his empire. Admiral Villeneuve never had the same rapport with Napoleon that he had with

his marshals, such as, Ney, Murat, and his army leaders. In May of 1940 I attended, with General McNaughton, a meeting of the British chiefs of staff at the crisis of the battle of France. He was invited to the meeting, and he took me with him. The political pressures at that time were very strong to do everything possible to save France. My estimate of the sense of the meeting was that the request which had then been made by the French government to dispatch some 10 or 12 additional fighter squadrons to France to try and help stabilize the situation, would have been done if it had not been for the very stong representations of Air Marshal Dowding who was then head of fighter command and was steeped in the problems of the air battle.

It was the first time I ever heard the term "Battle of Britain" used. He pointed out that if these squadrons were sent to France and the armies were unable to protect the airfields, and they were either lost or suffered serious depletion then, he said, "it is doubtful if we can save the Battle of France, and we will probably lose the Battle of Britain too". The decision was taken not to send those fighter squadrons at that time, and I believe if it had gone the other way we might have had a very different story in the outcome of the war. There is an example of where a man who had spent his life studying and was up to date in the expertise of that particular environment was able to give decisive advice.

I do not believe it is within the competence of one individual to be really expert, and have a real intimate understanding of each of the three environments. I believe that any sound organization must ensure the development of this expertise within each of those environments.

In the address of the Minister of National Defence introducing this bill, he points out that within the existing financial allocation for defence, the fixed course of personnel would be such that over the years there would not be enough money to maintain modernized equipment. In effect, therefore, the answer was to cut the personnel. But I have seen no mention of any cut of our commitments. I do not know whether those commitments are the same as they were when I was army Chief of Staff, but if they are, they cannot be met within the present manpower figures.

I have stated publicly on a number of occasions that I thought there had been waste and extravagance in our National Defence Department. I think that was exemplified most in the misguided, and badly judged, equipment program. I do not think any money was wasted on personnel; I think the performance of our personnel of all three services has won the respect and admiration of our allies. Against my own experience, I would say that if I had to make the choice between disciplined, trained, and efficient personnel, and modern equipment, I would choose the disciplined and trained personnel. In the early stages of the war, in 1939, our troops could not even use, effectively, the antiquated equipment they had. By 1944, when they had become highly trained and efficient, all sorts of items of new equipment could be introduced and in no time at all they were able to adapt themselves to its effective use. In this period of an armaments race, whether we like it or not, in the main in an emergency you can buy the equipment off a peg, but you cannot buy trained manpower overnight.

I am of the opinion, in spite of statements to the contrary, that the morale of the services has been seriously affected by the measures that are now proposed. I

have lectured at the various staff colleges, and at time I have been questioned on the subject of unification. I have refused to answer or give any opinions on it, because I have explained to the officers that I am not going to be placed in the position of going to a military establishment and trying to subvert officers from what their duty may be. But one cannot help overhearing conversation, and I would say that the morale of the services has been adversely affected by the uncertainties in regard to their future. I have not heard, in ordinary conversation, anyone who is an advocate of unification. I have heard expressions saying, "well, we have either got to accept it, or get out", but I have never heard anyone say they liked it.

I believe that given time to work it out properly, a very high degree of integration can be successful in the administrative services; but to carry unification further than that, I believe will result in our losing a very great deal and gaining nothing. I refer to my earliest remarks with regard to the ability to meet a major emergency, which is the first requirement of a defence organization. We started the last war in 1939 with one defence minister, but we finished with a minister for each of the services with deputies and assistants and associates to help them. I do not see this present organization standing up to an emergency of that kind.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, I have three names in front of me: Mr. Andras, followed by Mr. Brewin, and then Mr. Smith, I think there is a lively interest in the subject here this morning, and I will try to confine you to 10 minutes each. Mr. Andras?

Mr. ANDRAS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Simonds, on this question of servicemen carrying out different roles, I understand that in a joint memorandum issued by General Vokes and yourself in August of 1966, you stated, and I quote:

> "Nothing can be gained by producing a military hybrid who is a jack-of-oll-trades and a master-of-none ....
>
> What the country pays for, and what she got in the past, are good fighting men, not military hermaphrodites.

Do you still maintain today that unification will produce that military hybridation?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: If he spends his whole service doing nothing but training, it might be possible to train an individual to be moderately effective in all fields; but you would never get a day's work out of him because he would have to spend his whole life training.

Mr. ANDRAS: I want to quote a passage from an article by the Minister, which was published in November of last year in the *Canada Month*, in which he said:

> One of the most mystifying statements—from retired people—is that we are trying to hybridize the serviceman, making him a jack-of-all-trades and master-of-none.

And he goes on to say, with great respect to you, sir:

> That one should be too ridiculous to comment on—but it persists.
>
> I have been saying this "ad nauseam" for three years but let me once again repeat. Airplane pilots will not be required to "pilot" a ship;

infantrymen will not have to repair airplanes; airframe technicians will not have to man an anti-tank battery. The job functions will remain as always to those who are trained for them—just as they are in the separate services. For instance, in the RCAF no one suggests that a trained Flight Lieutenant Supply Officer be one day at his desk, the next day behind the controls of a 1500-MPH Starfighter, and the third day in the Operating Room at a Military Hospital.

The degree of specialization required of the serviceman in the single force will be as great as required in separate forces.

Obviously, and it has been repeated quite often, in the trades there will not be an inter-mixture; they will not be asked to do jobs that they have not been trained for. I simply wonder where the hybridation is coming from in the light of that stated policy?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: As I understand it, in this act, a cross posting between one service and another is allowable in an emergency. What is an emergency?

Mr. ANDRAS: Is that any different than what was possible before, say, Bill No. C-243 was contemplated?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: Previously a man enlisted in one of the services, and he could not be transferred except of his own volition.

Mr. ANDRAS: That gets into the area of consent or non-consent but, in the sense of his training, an infantryman remaining an infantryman, a tank driver remaining a tank driver, a fighter pilot or a pilot remaining a pilot and not being asked to mix those two, I just fail to see this jack-of-all-trades sort of approach.

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: To take an example—and I did not mention it—I do not agree with the set-up of this Training Command; I do not believe it is going to work. Now, the argument I have heard is "well, that is the way we train our officers at the service colleges, so why not for the other ranks too?" The fact is that the training system at our service colleges is a luxury we have never been able to afford in a major emergency or war. In world war I the Royal Military College was practically turned into an officer training unit, and in world war II it was closed. In peacetime they do not even produce enough officers to man the services as they are today. I think the navy benefits in this highly specialized group trained in this way, but it does not meet the requirement. A similar system set up for the training of other ranks is certainly going to collapse in an emergency.

I do not know how many in this room experienced the attitude of commanding officers on the training of reinforcements coming forward to their units. No commanding officer was ever satisfied with the training of a reinforcement until he had been broken into the unit itself, in the latter part of the war, in spite of the fact that most of the commanding officers and trainers of reinforcement units had, themselves, considerable field experience. And to think that in this sort of conglomerate Training Command they are going to be able to effectively train, and expand to meet an emergency—in my opinion the whole thing will break down. By this I think already we have lost in efficiency in the system of the staff colleges, too.

Mr. ANDRAS: Thank you. Switching to another area, were you involved, sir, when you were Chief of Staff, in the concept of a close support tactical flying truck, as it were, for the army? In other words, the concept that became known as the Caribou?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I was the originator of it.

Mr. ANDRAS: Could you tell us what you had in mind? What were the purposes of the application of this concept?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: To give greater flexibility to lines of communication in the field. In other words, not to be tied to a static ribbon road to manoeuvre formations on the ground; to have that fast flexibility given by Air Transport to be free of that static line of communication—that was the basic concept behind this. I think two years were wasted in getting that project started. At one point, through the intervention of the late C. D. Howe, we were put in touch with De Havilland and they agreed to put up half the development money if the army would find the other half. I scrubbed a lot of other what I thought were less important things from our program to find the money, and that is how it started.

Mr. ANDRAS: What happened in the end to that idea of yours which seemed to make so much sense at that stage?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: As far as I know it is still alive; the Americans certainly are using it in Viet Nam.

Mr. ANDRAS: But in so far as the Canadian forces are concerned?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I could not tell you what the present concept is.

Mr. ANDRAS: We did have a statement that referred to it, and I was aware that it was during your regime. For instance:

> In the mid 1950's, the army was given the responsibility to develop "military characteristics for an aircraft for logistic supply within the Army field forces".

And this refers to the Caribou project.

> Notwithstanding this direct responsibility assigned to the Army, the Air Force firmly considered that this was an Air Force function. Over the nelt four years the Army sought to retain control over the development and procurement of the Caribou aircraft for Army use.

I could go on quoting, but the essence of this is that it ran into some disagreements between the army and the air force in the sense of furthering this project.

Mr. SMITH: What page are you reading from, Mr. Andras?

Mr. ANDRAS: This is a statement by the Minister to the Committee on February 23, 1967, on pages 5 and 6, Mr. Smith.

Consequently, and the implication is here, much of the problem was the inter-service rivalry between the air force and the army.

> Consequently, in April 1960 the project as an Army endeavour was cancelled.

That is, the Canadian army. This, I would think, would indicate that some inter-service rivalry factors were there.

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: There was inter-service rivalry; it was eventually overcome, but the air force took the attitude that the army had no business in the airplane business, and yet they were not themselves prepared to put up the money for that kind of aircraft, or the effort to develop it. In the end it was resolved and we got it.

Mr. ANDRAS: But as an army endeavour it was cancelled in 1960; it did not progress during your period in office.

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: Yes, the first version was evolved during my time.

Mr. ANDRAS: When General Foulkes appeared before us he talked about getting co-ordination and co-operation between the services. I am not attempting to take this out of context, but it is quite a long brief so I will not read it all. I will just extract certain things; he said:

> I was expected to rely on my powers of persuasion to 'co-ordinate' the services.

He goes on to say:

> This led almost immediately to a critical dispute about the stationing of our Army brigade group in Germany. We easily reached agreement that our air division in Europe should be stationed in the U.S. zone and supplied by the U.S. supply system. But General Simonds insisted that the Army brigade group should be stationed with the British forces and get its supplies through them. All the rest of us in the Chiefs of Staff Committee believed that the brigade should be near the RCAF contingents and that they should both be supplied through U.S. channels. This would have been more reliable and certainly more economical, but General Simonds took his stand on tradition and sentiment, and his plan was adopted.
>
> General Simonds insisted on going to negotiate himself with the War Office in London. He got an assurance of British support, but there was no written agreement of it and no details were spelled out. Within a few years the U.K.'s financial troubles and shortage of manpower landed us all in difficulties. Its supply system fell below NATO standards; the brigade group was affected; NATO asked Canada to augment the inadequate British supply system. In short, the arrangement never was satisfactory: It still leads to friction and uncertainty.

And this is the point that I am making.

> But it just shows what can happen when one service is allowed to follow its own desires instead of doing what is best for the over-all defence effort.

Would you care to comment on that, General Simonds?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: Yes, I would very much like to comment on that, because it is not a correct statement to begin with. First of all, the decision as to the positioning of the Canadian brigade in Europe the Canadian government has decided to refer to General Eisenhower, and General Eisenhower made the decision. I had visited Washington, and examined the implications of a Canadian brigade serving in the American army zone. Their proposal was to position it

right down in southern Bavaria, where it would have simply been, to all intents and purposes, another US regimental combat team. If we were up in the British zone we would be, first of all, in close touch with France, Belgium, and Holland, who were aware of the Canadian contribution in two world wars, and we could be—and were, in fact—an encouragement for them to make the necessary effort to strengthen NATO. In the matter of the lines of communication, another consideration there, taking the longer term view, was that the American lines of communication ran through France, and I think we are all aware today of the problem of the Canadian air squadrons stationed in France. The British lines of communication ran through the low countries, and from the point of view of setting up an establishment which was going to stick, that was a very strong argument for doing it. But the actual decision as to where the Canadian brigade was to go was on the recommendation of General Eisenhower, who was then supremo, to the Canadian government.

Mr. ANDRAS: There obviously appear to have been some rather substantial disagreement among the Canadian chiefs at that time over that particular policy.

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: There was a disagreement over it.

Mr. ANDRAS: Just one more question, and then I will finish this round, Mr. Chairman. In 1963, General Simonds, before the special committee on defence, in the Minutes and Proceedings and Evidence No. 14 of Thursday, October 17, 1963, you state at page 440 in your final paragraph in answer to some questions:

> In fact it is my personal opinion that in the post war years we have never had a tri-service defence policy. We have had an army defence policy, a navy defence policy, and an air force defence policy, but never have we had a tri-service defence policy.

You would confirm your agreement with that statement you made in 1963?

Lieut.- General SIMONDS: I would, but I would also point out that there was never any matter of policy that was not decided by the Cabinet Defence Committee; the Chiefs of Staff merely represented their points of view. The decision was made by the government in the Cabinet Defence Committee.

Mr. ANDRAS: But there was the divergence of policy—not just the plan or execution of policy—but a divergence of policy to the degree that you have stated there.

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: In my opinion, as I have stated there, the lack of an over-all governmental policy led to the services drifting off in three different directions.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Brewin?

Mr. BREWIN: General Simonds, I was a member of the Defence Committee in October, 1963, when you gave evidence to the committee, and I was very much impressed with the evidence you gave, and I want to remind you of some of the things you said because I think they are inconsistent with what you are saying today. If they are not you will point out that there are not and, perhaps, explain the differences. At page 439 of the Minutes and Proceedings of that time, Mr. Smith put this question:

> I wondered if General Simonds might make a general statement on what his views are on what ought to be the role of the Canadian armed forces and perhaps, in particular, he might deal with the military use-

fulness of maintaining an armed brigade in Europe. Also I would like very much to hear his views on what he would think of unification of the armed services, and if there was to be unification, what his views are as to how it would increase the usefulness of the armed services.

You are reported as replying:

Mr. Chairman, and gentlemen, I will try to deal with these three points. The first is: what should be, in my personal opinion, the role of the Canadian armed forces.

I believe that a role which is suited to a country of our size and having regard to the financial burdens possible to be borne over a lengthy term, would be a tri-service force whose main objective was peace-keeping. I believe its organization should be very much like that of the United States marine corps which is a mobile force complete with all its ancillaries and able to meet what are commonly called brushfire situations.

That is the opinion you expressed then. I think, perhaps, there is some inconsistency with what you are saying today, because that appeared to advocate a unified force for peacekeeping purposes as a main objective on the general lines of the US marine corps.

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: Mr. Brewin, I do not see any inconsistency in that. First of all, I would like to emphasize, as I point there, "tri-service"; is that correct?

Mr. BREWIN: Yes, you use the word "tri-service".

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: It was apparent before that time that there was an easing of tension—NATO had been effective enough—between the great powers. There were two considerations which I think applied then, and apply today. One was, having this commitment to our allies in NATO, what value could we draw in a period of lessening tensions from the investment we had made in it? We were obligated to keep certain forces in being.

Secondly, there was the consideration of a purpose for the forces themselves, because as the situation tended to cool out, the purpose which was so clear at the time of Korea and the formation of NATO tended to become dimmer. It was to the advantage, in my view, of the morale of the services, and to our advantage, to make use of the forces which we were obligated to keep in being; to use them where we could to try to prevent a brushfire situation spreading into a major war. If you would continue on there, I went on to say that I did not see any inconsistency between that role and meeting our NATO obligation.

Mr. BREWIN: I was going to come exactly to that statement, sir—what you have just said. So far as I am concerned, I agree very much with what you said then, and I think you were prescient, because is it not true that today, three or four years later—or three and a half years later—it is more and more apparent that tensions have eased in Europe and that the greater degree of risks are in what is called the escalation of brushfire wars? So, is not the position that you stated then one that has been emphasized by developments, rather than the reverse?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I think that is correct, but I come back to the point I made originally: Governments, and democratic governments in particular, have never been very prescient in foreseeing the possibility of the outbreak of a

major war. I mentioned earlier, when I was giving my own sort of biographical background, that I came back to Canada in the early spring of 1938 and was posted to the Royal Military College. For the two years I was at the Staff College—critical years—it was quite a panic to everyone of us there: We were on the verge of a major war. There was absolutely no indication of that in Canada, of any kind. When I went to the RMC, I asked for the mobilization scheme; there was none. I said "well, we should get one written very quickly", and there still was none when war broke out.

Now, these situations can change very rapidly. All those things can be done—I believe they can be done—without destroying the framework on which we could expand to meet an emergency on a big scale; I do not think there is any inconsistency between the two.

Mr. BREWIN: I wanted to call your attention to one or two other passages and see whether you still agree with them. One is at page 445, and this is what you have already mentioned:

> One of the reasons I commend this idea of an integrated force as the most sensible contribution Canada can make is that it meets a NATO role and it meets our United Nations responsibilities. It enables us to play our part and fulfil any commitments which we can foresee becoming obligations to us.

So, at that stage, you did emphasize that the integrated force, as you described it then, would fit both of these obligations.

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I believe it can too; an integrated force that preserves the basic structure to expand and meet a major emergency.

I would go even further there and I would be less than frank, as I think I have stated earlier, if I did not say that a chiefs of staff system has its difficulties, its limits, and its disadvantages, the same as any other structure at the top, but overall it is probably the best from the national point of view. But, personally, I could never agree with or see the direction in which air force policy was going at that time. They were putting all the emphasis on the fighter role when, to me, it was obvious the fighter role was going to be one of the first to disappear as soon as the intercontinental missile came into being. And the worst, generally—and I have stated it in writing; it is on the record—was neglecting the potentiality of the intercontinental missile and they got a very severe jolt when Sputnik I was first fired. We had every reason to believe the Russians were not neglecting this field and that as soon as the intercontinental missile became a reality the bomber threat was going to diminish and the missile threat was going to increase. All one could foresee was a stalemate because, at that time, there was no effective defence against the missile in sight nor, do I believe, is there one today. Basically, I did not agree with the course that the air force were taking in setting up the air division in Europe in the first place, but that was a decision of the government.

Mr. BREWIN: Then I take it from what you said before—I will not go into detail now—you did not think this Bomarc missile defence against armed bombers was worth anything at all to us. I think you made that point then, did you not?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I am still of the same opinion.

Mr. BREWIN: And you say here, on page 453—and this is a quotation from an interview you had given to a Mr. Harkness of the Toronto *Daily Star*, not Mr. Harkness of this Committee:

> That rules out the possibility of "defending"

and you put that in quotation marks,

> western Europe (or any other place) with nuclear weapons. A nuclear defence means a nuclear war. Thus the probability is that if war should come it will be fought with conventional weapons, and it is for that kind of war Canada should prepare.

I made the comment:

> I think you put that with great clarity. At this time do you still hold to that view?
>
> General Simonds: I do.

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I still hold to that view now. The greatest nuclear power in the world—and I am not referring to the rights or wrongs of the situation, merely the military fact—today has something approaching half a million men deployed in southeast Asia.

Mr. BREWIN: There are just two more items that you said then that I think are relevant and helpful to us now.

> Mr. Brewin: Then I have one or two other questions. There is also here a slightly political passage which I will not read, where you suggested that both former governments had no defence policy, and then you went on to say: In the first place, Canada has been "muddling along" on defence, in the second place, it has been too much influenced by the Pentagon.
>
> Mr. Brewin: Do you mean by that we have not had enough independent thinking of what Canada's role should be?
>
> Mr. Simonds: I would say yes, we have not had enough opinions.

And then I put this further question to you:

> Mr. Brewin: If I might now conclude my questioning: When you say it is your idea we should apply independent thinking, do you think that the main purpose of the tri-service force should be peace keeping and that that would be the role we would be most fitted to play?
>
> Mr. Simonds: Yes.
>
> Mr. Brewin: Within the alliance we are in?
>
> Mr. Simonds: Yes.
>
> Mr. Brewin: And that would be most useful to the alliance as a whole?
>
> Mr. Simonds: Yes. . . .

Are you still of the same opinion?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I am still of the same opinion.

Mr. BREWIN: I think that is all.

The CHAIRMAN: Now, Mr. Smith, you will have an opportunity to comment on the astonishing disclosures of Mr. Brewin.

Mr. SMITH: General Simonds, when you were giving your statement a few minutes ago you suggested, I think, that the shape and the form of the armed services of a country should depend on the military roles that have been assigned or accepted by the country. You also supported one of the former witnesses who said that we did not have the manpower to carry out all the roles that we have now undertaken.

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: Yes; that would be my view.

Mr. SMITH: It seems to me that we now have four roles that occupy a great many of our armed services and a great amount, if not all, of our military equipment, and that is the infantry brigade in Germany; the air division in Germany; our navy, particularly in this anti-submarine role, and our Mobile Command. Are those not the four most consuming roles that we undertake in terms of manpower and equipment?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I think they probably are, yes.

Mr. SMITH: Would it be reasonable to assume that a government, in reorganizing drastically its armed services, should assign priorities to these four roles?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I do not quite follow you on that.

Mr. SMITH: If there is some doubt whether we have the manpower or the money to carry out the four roles, should not there be some priority assigned among the four so that you would know that if you are going to have to drop one or other of the roles you would know which one was considered the least important?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I would not think, at the present time, that it would be wise to drop any one of those roles.

Mr. SMITH: Then an alternative would be a stepup in military expenditure if we are going to carry them completely forward?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: Probably, and may I add a point on that? Certainly I think—and we are talking now, perhaps, on political grounds—we have to bear in mind that something over 50 per cent of the voting population of this country today is in the region of 25 years of age or less—in that bracket. That generation has never known mass adversity. They never experienced the depression in the thirties; they never experienced, or were old enough to experience, world war II, and they are highly idealistic. But, that does not mean it is responsible to neglect our national defence in the light of our knowledge of past history and the uncertainties of the world in which we live. A good deal of the propaganda in favour of present measures is in the terms that we are going to get at least the same, or more, defence for less money.

Now, why anybody should believe that in an age when everything costs more, I just would not know. But that seems to be the theme that by doing this we are going to get at least the same for less money. It is not possible in this day and age. There are a very large number of people that are quite unconscious of what national defence really means, or its need or anything else and they swallow that, but it is not, in my view, a responsible attitude. Can anyone in this room tell me what in this country or in this world you can get for less than you could get five years, ten years, or fifteen years ago? There is not anything.

Mr. SMITH: Assuming, though, that politically the country is not prepared to spend more and there is not enough to go on with in all our roles now, does that not inevitably force us to put a priority on what we are doing?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I think you have to keep the structure sound. I referred earlier to the parallel with an insurance policy and I think a government is perfectly entitled to say: we do not think the risk is so great at the present time; we are going to chance our arm; we are going to shave our commitments, and we are going to accept the fact that we could not meet them if called because we do not tnink we are going to be called. That, in view, is an attitude a government is perfectly justified in taking if they squarely shoulder that responsibility.

Mr. SMITH: To change to another subject for a minute, Mr. Andras was quoting from Mr. Hellyer's interview in *Canada Month* where Mr. Hellyer minimized the effects of interchangeability and suggested that pilots would continue to be pilots. Other witnesses before the Committee, including General Allard, have made a very important point, of the interchangeability of tradesmen as one of the supports of unification. We had some minor skirmishes on stewards and bakers and a great deal was said about signallers—or what I knew in my time in the army as signallers; I think they have some fancy name like "communicators" now—and how they would be very interchangeable. We would be able to bring naval signallers ashore and put them in units of the Mobile Command and other stations ashore—perhaps at air force headquarters—and this would be a comparatively easy thing to do. Do you think there is much gain in terms of utility of manpower in this theory of making a combat tradesman interchangeable?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: Probably I would not say, interchangeable. I think a great deal can be done—and I am speaking particularly of the technical field—in the combination of the service schools doing strictly technical training. If I could give an illustration, I should like to carry that a stage further. Let us suppose there were a trade of radiologist. There is the basic training of a radiologist and the in-job training he gets, and a radiologist could be a man who looks at your insides to see whether or not you have lung cancer, or he could be one who examines metals for metal failure. I would not want to go to the hospital and have a decision made with regard to my insides by someone who, up to the day before yesterday, could only expertize in examining metals.

An hon. MEMBER: He was hard as steel.

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: By the same token, for instance, an artillery signaller or a naval signaller, in their actual in-job training, have a very different operation to do. They can have the basic training in the use of various signalling equipment, I believe, in a common training centre, but that particular usefulness that comes from the in-job knowledge of the task they are doing is something that I think we overlook, and it is very, very important.

Mr. SMITH: This is what we were discussing; the person who had been a naval signaller. We were discussing the wisdom or the utility of how quickly that man could be changed over to an artillery signaller or a tank signaller. I was wondering whether you thought that was a practical proposition.

Lieut-General SIMONDS: I think there is a certain common-to-all-arms training, but I think a sudden cross-posting of a man who has in-job training in

a certain line into a job with which he is not familiar is not going to produce efficiency.

Mr. SMITH: You mentioned common-to-all-arms training. Do you think unification is necessary before that training can be given?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: Certainly not.

Mr. SMITH: That could be accomplished as a result of integrated—

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: As a sensible measure of integration.

Mr. SMITH: Thank you.

Mr. MCINTOSH: General, to start with, there has been a lot of confusion in the Committee about the two terms "integration" and "unification". Before I carry on with my questioning, I wonder whether you would give me your definition of unification. What does it actually mean to you?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: As I understand it, it means the abolition of the three different services and the institution of one common service that is supposed to serve in all three invironments, ground, sea andair. That is how I interpret unification as it is being presented.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Could we call this the single service concept? The Minister has said that he—

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: Yes, a single service concept, I think, would cover it.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I have not asked you whether you are in favour of that, and I take it from your former remarks that you are not. Can you foresee any advantages of a single service structure over the three services that we have at the present time?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: Personally, I cannot. I believe that the useful measures—and I am now applying the term "integration"—of integration can be done within a tri-service context.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Can our present roles such as NATO, SACLANT, NORAD and so on be carried out, in your opinion, with a single service concept?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I would doubt it. I do not know; it has never been tried and nobody else has ever tried it. I would see difficulties in dealing with allies. For instance, if a general turned up to talk naval matters, naval strategy and tactics, I think he would be looked at askance by the allied admirals or naval officers he was talking to. They would wonder what his background really was, and whether he knew what he was talking about.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I think you are the first one about whom I have heard who has suggested that the single service concept would be somewhat similar to that of the American marines. Is that how you picture a single service concept?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I used that analogy at the time and I have regretted it since because that is not—certainly in my mind—the single service concept. I pointed out to Mr. Brewin that I used the term "tri-service", but I believe that instead of this tendency of the three Canadian services to drift apart it was possible, while maintaining the commitments we had, to redirect policy so that you could have an effective integrated force effort.

Mr. MCINTOSH: The suggestion was made yesterday, by the Committee member you just mentioned, to another witness we had before us that, if we did

have this single service concept, we could offer the bodies to a NATO commander and ask him to fit those into his plan of operation. Could that be achieved?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I am sorry; I missed the first part of that.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Well, let us suppose we did go to a single service concept and decided to retain our commitments to NATO, I take it from what you have said already that it just would not fit into either the offensive or defensive plan of NATO. I assume that the NATO commander at the present time has no need for a marine force, or whatever type of force you want to call it, or whatever type of force the single service concept would ultimately develop into. Would a NATO commander welcome a contribution from Canada of a single service, rather than the troops we have there at the present time, the army, navy and air force? Could he make it fit into his plan, or would it disrupt the whole plan?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: Really I do not think I can answer that question because I am not conversant with the current NATO plans. My feeling is that certainly it would require a readjustment of NATO to make effective use of a force of that kind.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Air Vice Marshal Cameron, in the publication *Air Force* of February, 1967, made this statement:

> Yet here is Mr. Hellyer steering us away from an entirely modern concept of interdependence and back to the idea of a unified national force—a concept that surely went out of fashion for Canada with the war of 1812!

Would you support that statement by Air Vice Marshal Cameron?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: No, not entirely. I would put it in this way: I cannot see Canada becoming involved in any major war except as a member of an alliance. We would be working with allies, and to that extent I agree with him. I think, therefore, our organization should be such that we can easily adapt ourselves to working with allies.

Mr. MCINTOSH: When General Allard was before the Committee he made this statement:

> Missiles are rapidly replacing bombers—and air defence is no longer the exclusive concern of aircraft. Anti-submarine defence is no longer the exclusive concern of ships; and the land forces need aerial mobility. And we are asked why the forces have to be united? It is modern reality—it is the reality of tomorrow.

Could you explain that or do you have any idea what the General meant when he made such a statement?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I would think what he was driving at was that as both ships and aircraft are involved in anti-submarine warfare—presumably he means anti-missile forces or ground to air missiles in the defensive system—there is no reason why it is necessary to have these separate forces. For instance, during world war II the Air Defence Command in the United Kingdom was under the air force, and the anti-aircraft units which served in it were deployed and employed by the direction of Air Defence Command as a whole, but they all wore army uniforms and were trained as anti-aircraft gunners.

Mr. MCINTOSH: In the first part of his statement where he says:

> Missiles are rapidly replacing bombers—

it would imply to me that possibly we should neglect the danger of a bomber threat, say, from any enemy. Let us take Russia as an example. A few years ago we knew that they had 1,000 bomber planes available for a low level attack. Should we disregard any low level attack now? Shall we concentrate just on high level attack by missiles?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I would think the missile has so many advantages as an attack weapon and, because of the inadequacies of defence against them, I could not see them. For one thing, if you employ bombers you give something like six hours' warning. If you employ a missile you give practically no warning at all.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Looking at it from the attacker's point of view, if they knew you were well defended against a high level attack and there was little hope of their getting through, but they had the equipment available for a low level attack and you had very little defence against that, you as a general, having varions plans would say, take the plan of the low level attack, would you not?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: There is no defence against it at all but I believe a missile defence could be more effective against a bomber than it would against missiles. In other words, if you have a missile defence you get it both ways. A missile defence could be designed against bombers today; in fact, it already exists.

Mr. MCINTOSH: When we were at NORAD we were told that Russia had to change her whole idea of defence because they could not detect a low level attack with the equipment they had. This put a double burden on the budget of the Russian government, for one thing, to try to guard against it, and NORAD authorities were quite concerned that perhaps we should guard against it also. This is one of the reasons that we had the Bomarc. This is one of the arguments for the Bomarc.

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I think the Russian position is a bit different from ours in North America. By virtue of NATO, we have bases close to Russia in Europe. They do not have any bases as close to us; maybe it was one of the thoughts behind the Cuban adventure. But to operate the modern jet at low altitude for any distance is impractical in terms of fuel consumption. Even if they are going to have a low level attack, they have to come in high and this gives the warning.

Mr. MCINTOSH: There are certain disadvantages I admit, but what I am saying, as was pointed out to us, is that it is much easier for us to defend the North American continent than it would be for Russia to protect her area.

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: Russia would have a much more difficult problem by virtue of NATO.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Yes, but we should still guard against such an attack, I would suggest, if there were a possibility of such an attack being launched against us. You have to guard against all eventualities, do you not, when you are forming a plan for defence?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: As time goes on, I do not believe that even a nation like the United States can do so. In fact, they are faced with this problem as of now and they have decided against further development, I understand, of the bomber because a nation cannot afford to have both a bomber and a missile

offensive potential. They have to decide between A or B; there is an overlap during run down. I do not think any nation is going to be able to afford to have both a missile potential offensive and a modern bomber potential offensive at the same time.

Mr. McINTOSH: I take it that you are in favour of continuing our present collective method of defence—interdependence on our allies—and that it will always be in existence as far as Canada is concerned and there is no question that we can ever opt out of this type of defence.

Lieut-General SIMONDS: I would not think so, I do not know it is realistic to think we could.

Mr. McINTOSH: It has been brought out in previous evidence that Canada is accepting an additional role to what was in effect when you were Chief of the General Staff, and I think you have referred to it as the peacekeeping, peace restoring. To me, peace restoring could develop into a very dangerous role for Canada because of the manpower and the finances that we have available. Do you agree with that?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I agree that we have taken on an additional, it seems to me, obligation with reduced resources to meet it.

Mr. McINTOSH: Can I take it from your statement that we cannot hope to fulfil this additional role, then, with the manpower and resources that we have?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: We certainly cannot fulfil all the roles and, I presume, with eyes wide open they are going to take risks in some fields, but if we are called to meet our obligations, we could not do it.

Mr. McINTOSH: Is there not a great danger in taking on this peace restoring role that we may become committed to such an extent that we would not be able to fulfil our obligation in the peace restoring role? I am thinking of the way the South Viet Nam war started out, and the small number of troops the Americans had in there at that time and the great number they have now. Could Canda possibly fulfil a peace restoring role of that amgnitude?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I would put it this way. Once we accept a peace restoring role or even a peacekeeping role—let us call it that, but either way you like—if the situation deteriorates and becomes a great deal wose than we expected, I do not see how we can then turn around and say: look, we are going to opt out of this now. We undertook the thing oronally, but it has got too hot and we would like somebody else to do it. I do not think a nation could do that.

Mr. McINTOSH: What would happen to our troops that were already committed and we could not supply them?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: They would have to be reinforced.

Mr. McINTOSH: From where?

Lieutenant-General SIMONDS: That is the problem.

Mr. HOPKINS: General Simonds, it is my understanding that at one point this morning you stated you had done a considerable amount of lecturing, and that during the course of overhearing certain discussions you never heard anyone say he was in favour of unification.

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: That has been my experience.

Mr. HOPKINS: How broad would this experience be? How many people would you say you have come in contact with in such experience? How many personnal would you bee operating to on such occasion?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I would say roughly 90 to 100, but I would like to make it absolutely clear again that in any speech or conversation I might have had, I would have nothing to do with this particular subject. I am referring to the casual conversations of the groups afterwards. I cannot go any further than that. I have heard a number say: we have only two choices; we can accept this or get out. I have also heard some quite strong criticism, but I have not heard once a serving officer that I know of say that he thinks this is the cat's whiskers.

Mr. HOPKINS: How long ago would it be since you were involved in these lecturer?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: It would be a matter of two or three months.

Mr. HOPKINS: I find this rather strange because I have been associated with many military personnel over the past few months and I have found many who agree with it. Certainly this one point about either accepting it or getting out has become an overworked term in this Committee because many of the people with whom I have been able to discuss the matter, and many of the people who have discussed the matter with others have stated to me that there are many people who are fully in favour of it. I do not find this attitude prominent at all.

Mr. SMITH: They were talking that way because you were a member of Parliament.

Mr. HOPKINS: Well, Mr. Smith, that is precisely why I said others had mentioned this to me, because when they were talking to them they were not talking to a member of Parliament.

Mr. SMITH: We all hear only what we really want to hear.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, shall we get on with the examination of the witness?

Mr. HOPKINS: General, I just wanted to put those remarks on the record because I cannot buy what you have said. Obviously we are at opposite ends of the pole here. Did you favour the $500 million Arrow development to produce another interceptor for the RCAF?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: No; I was against it from the outset.

Mr. HOPKINS: Why were you against it at that time?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: Because in my thinking, long before it ever became effective it would be obsolete. It was a wrong approach. As I mentioned earlier, I disagreed with several policy lines of the air force, and in my opinion the two roles of manned aircraft that were going to remain for a very long time were reconnaissance and transport. The fighting and bombing roles were going to be superseded by the missile. The air force seemed to be concentrating on the two activities that would be the first to disappear and neglecting the two for which there would likely remain a need—manned airplanes—for about as far ahead as we could see.

Mr. HOPKINS: Did the air force take the attitude that you are anti-air force as a result of your feelings?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: Some of them did.

Mr. HOPKINS: Would you not agree that the old system of each service being able to push its own equipment needs in isolation—such as, in this case, the air

force pushing a certain project that you did not agree with—caused an imbalance or poorly allocated defence expenditure in the three services?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I think, in effect, it did, but I do not think that it need do so. I would make one point here. I do not know how many of you have read or seen reviews of the book called *In the Name of Science* by Professor Niebuhr of the United States, where he documents very carefully the statement made by General Eisenhower in his farewell address when he retired from the presidency, pointing out the danger of the alliance between big industry and the defence services.

An hon. MEMBER: What is the name of the author?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: Professor N-i-e-b-u-h-r. I think this has always been a very disadvantageous factor in the formulation of defence policy. Often the ultimate criticism or wastefulness goes to the services, but the decisions are government.

Given a very early illustration, the British navy was heavily criticized in years past for building battleships. The battleship was obsolete and they should have been building submarines and destroyers. Well, largely battleships were built built because there was a threat of unemployment in the shipyards and the problem of manning small ships is much more difficult than the manning of big ones, and the combination of events undoubtedly led to types of ships being built which were obsolete. I think by the same token there has been very strong evidence—and I think someone made a reference to it earlier—that we are too inclined to follow the Pentagon, and there is not the slightest question that some bad policies have been followed by the United States in its defence developments by a combination of big industry working hand in glove with the services.

I think there is a very real danger and a great disadvantage of this. But when there is a strong argument such as unemployment in a certain regional area—and this will solve the two things, air force over navy or the army wants this and there is unemployment here—it is a pretty potent combination, but it may not be good defence policy.

Mr. SMITH: Will the problems you have just been dealing with be cleared by unification?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: No.

The CHAIRMAN: You are coming near the end of your time, Mr. Hopkins.

Mr. HOPKINS: While you were Chief of the General Staff, did you find the RCAF sympathetic to the tactical transport and ground support needs of the army?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: No.

Mr. HOPKINS: Have you not expressed strong views about this attitude of the air force at one time or another?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: In regard to the lack of interest in—

Mr. HOPKINS: Concerning the last question about the RCAF and whether they were sympathetic to the tactical transport and ground support needs of the army, and your answer to that was "no".

Lieut-General SIMONDS: No, I did not think they were.

Mr. HOPKINS: Have you expressed strong views about the attitude taken by the air force on this at any time?

Lieut-General SIMONDS: I probably have. I certainly have in private, but I cannot recall whether I have in public or not.

Mr. HOPKINS: Under unification, you will not have the same competition among the various services for equipment that you have had in the past, getting back to this comment that was made some time ago. How can you have the same competition under a unified force as you would have with three different forces being involved?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I do not think it is necessarily a matter of competition between the services. It is where a particular defence need is expressed and it happens to fit in with the problems of solving unemployment or giving employment, or creating new industry or things of that kind. There is a very strong tendency to go along with this and I do not think that is going to be cured by unification.

Mr. HOPKINS: But the over-all needs are going to be looked at as a whole, rather than in three different directions, are they not?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: They were always looked at as a whole between the Minister and the Deputy Minister of Defence.

THE CHAIRMAN: Your time is up, Mr. Hopkins.

Mr. HOPKINS: I have just one more question, Mr. Chairman. Were there not examples during world war II of aircraft strafing and bombing our own army units due to the lack of co-ordination?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: There most certainly were and I can speak from personal experience.

An hon. MEMBER: That is a human error.

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: That is not going to be cured by unification, but I could enlarge on that if you like.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Hopkins, you are well beyond your questioning period, but I will put you down for a second round. Mr. Harkness is the next questioner.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): Could I ask a supplementary?

THE CHAIRMAN: I think we have been on this subject long enough now. You can come back to this subject later. We have lots of time and I will gladly put you down Mr. Langlois.

Mr. HARKNESS: In connection with the matters which Mr. Hopkins was dealing with, he stated that the forces, in effect, pursued their own aims and objectives, in isolation and I believe he was thinking particularly of equipment. But was that actually the case? Was it not, rather, the case that the demands of each force as far as equpment was concerned were considered by the Chiefs of Staff as a group and, as you mentioned, the Minister and the Deputy Minister?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: They most certainly were, and the ultimate decision on whether we would get this, that or the other or go into a different program was a Cabinet Defence Committee decision.

Mr. HARKNESS: Yes, so that if an error was made as far as the equipment secured in any particular case was concerned, it was the result of final political decisions, rather than the result of the existence of three services, each one wanting to get certain equipment which it thought would best suit its own needs?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I think basically the decision was a Cabinet Defence Committee decision and, as I pointed out, there were other factors apart from the defence one, which I am convinced influenced that decision and others. I can give you another example and this is a very real issue.

It is certainly desirable within our own country to support the industrial war potential of the country as part of a defence program but this is an argument that may lead to the ordering or purchase of not the most desirable bit of equipment, but a compromise between a great number of various considerations.

Mr. HARKNESS: I must say my personal experience is the same as your own, in that what was most desirable from a military point of view in the way of equipment, particularly, was very frequently in the long run subordinated to economic and political considerations.

Now, to turn to a different phase of things. You stated that the military structure must be capable of meeting major emergency. This really comes down to an adequate mobilization base and on the present or projected organization of the Canadian forces, do you think that we would have a mobilization base which would be adequate to meet a major emergency?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: Having read what I have of this organization, my answer would be, no. That is my principal objection to it.

Mr. HARKNESS: From what points of view, particularly, do you think this present organization would be inadequate to meet the demands of mobilization? I am thinking particularly of the ability of Training Command, Materiel Command and the reserve set-up.

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I must tell you I am not informed on how the organization of Materiel Command is now working, and I would be dependent on those who have given evidence before this Committee on its effectiveness. I can see no reason why Materiel Command, provided it is developed over a period, would not become a workable organization.

The Training Command structure, I believe, would collapse overnight in a real emergency. It would not stand up for five minutes, any more than it was possible to maintain the service college system during an emergency of war.

In dealing with the reserves, it is my feeling that the present role tends to make demands beyond their capabilities. Our reserve system in this country is an extravagant one, but it has to be extravagant as long as we have not got national service. And as long as we do not have national service I think it has to be accepted that the reserve militia will be able to produce, in an emergency, a nucleus of trained officers and NCO's and a few men. That is about all. The expectation that you can train the militia under present circumstances to a war effectiveness role, I do not believe is practical in the time they have.

To hold a militia unit together in any centre you have got to have leading it a man who is respected, know and highly regarded in the community. He may have no tactical sense at all and, as happened in world war II in a number of instances, they had to say: "thank you my good and faithful servant, now your unit is going to be mobilized and someone else is going to take command." This works through the whole structure. In this you have a militia where personnel are fed into it who have had at least a year or two of continuous military training. You are never going to have more than a nucleus on which you can, in the course of time, mobilize and build up.

My interpretation is the present effort is making demands on the militia which they are really not going to be able to meet. They are, for instance, setting age limits where the commanding officers are not going to be able to reach that position where they are well known and respected in the community because they have not had the time, in the process of their ordinary civilian life, to do so. It is very doubtful whether they are going to be able to spare the time at that age from their ordinary civilian jobs, and I think it is going to produce a gradual running down of the militia reserves. That would be my estimates from my knowledge of the militia over many, many years.

Mr. HARKNESS: In summary then, your judgment would be that the mobilization base that would exist, would be inadequate to meet our needs?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: Yes.

Mr. HARKNESS: Another matter which we have had a good deal of discussion about here and which you made a statement in connection with was the necessity, as you put it, a real expert in each service at the top.

The attempt has been made to demonstrate that need will be met by the present Defence Council and introducing to that Council from time to time people from what is now called the sea environment, or the land environment, or the air environment, from time to time when various matters which may effect those environments are under discussion.

Do you think that would be adequate to give the proper type of advice to the Minister or to the Defence Committee at Cabinet on the basis of which decisions could be made?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: No, I do not. I think I referred earlier in my statement to the example of Napoleon.

Under this system you can very well have a situation where all the top people are army or they all might be air force in their background, and their environmental training, and I do not think this is going to produce really good advice at the top.

I think if you refer to the evidence I gave before this Committee some two years ago, I think it was, with all its disadvantages, the system that has stood up best would be a system of the three chiefs or staff with a minister the chairman over that committee, no other chairman, the minister himself.

He can then listen to the military arguments and discussions by his experts and the decision rests with him but the ultimate decision rests with Cabinet. But what he is going to recommend to Cabinet would be the policy of the chiefs.

He himself, in my opinion, should be the arbitrater between the three services and the three service chiefs. But he should be ensured of sound and expert advice from each of the three environments and an individual who has had the background and experience to give that advice.

Mr. HARKNESS: Under the present setup really the sole source of official military advice to the minister and the Cabinet is the Chief of the Defence Staff. What in your opinion is the position of junior officers, maybe in the rank of Major-General, or Brigadier or equivalent, who are brought in to try and fill this obvious gap which has been left by doing away with the chiefs of staff? In other words, what in your view, would be their ability to give effective advice?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I think they would be in an extremely difficult position. If they have to disagree with the advice that the Chief of the Defence

Staff is given they more or less have to repudiate that and their chief in front of the Minister. I do not think it would make a very good future for that individual and yet his advice may be given in all honesty.

Mr. HARKNESS: In other words I would suggest then they would not last very long.

I think the opinions of people who have some expertise in these matters is more valuable than that of some of the people who are shouting out opposite at the present time who have no military experience whatever.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, our eye seems to be wandering from the ball. The history of golfers is when that happens you miss it, and I wonder whether we could just return to the subject at hand.

An hon. MEMBER: A point of order.

The CHAIRMAN: Well there is no point of order really. Mr. Harkness and other members opposite have made some interesting asides this morning and I think you are all capable of taking care of yourselves. Mr. Harkness, would you continue.

Mr. HARKNESS: General, there has been a certain amount of concern I have heard expressed over the present way in which promotions are being carried on in the defence forces and the extent to which the Minister of Defence is now in effect making promotions right down to the rank of major rather than the old system where this was done by each service on the basis of their assessments of the abilities of the officers concerned. Have you heard any complaints in that regard or have you any information regarding the matter?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I have heard stories but I could not give any first hand information. I have heard stories that this is going on but I could not give you anything first hand.

Mr. HARKNESS: What is your view in regard to how promotions should be carried on?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I think the system that used to avail was the head of the service made his recommendations to the Minister.

They would always be very thoroughly discussed, certainly any senior appointment, but I cannot recall an instance during my tenure as CGS where a recommendation that I made for a promotion of those ranks in the army where the Minister himself had to approve, was turned down or where he influenced it.

Mr. HARKNESS: Those were ranks of full Colonel and above.

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: Yes.

Mr. HARKNESS: There has been a considerable number of questions with regard to the roles which the Canadian forces are by virtue of the aims and objectives of defence policy and the commitments we have undertaken required to carry out. I will not go back into what the roles are because you know them. Under this projected new setup in defence, which of those roles do you think we would be unable to carry out?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: If the NATO commitments remain the same as they were when I was CGS—

Mr. HARKNESS: I think it is.

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: With the current manpower, I do not see how they could meet that commitment.

I do not think I am entitled to say here what that commitment would be but I say if it was the same—

Mr. HARKNESS: I was thinking more particularly, General, rather than on the numbers of people in the forces, and I agree with you that the numbers are inadequate to carry out the roles which we are committed to at the present time, and the decrease in the numbers of the forces have put us in a position where it is really an impossibility to carry out all those roles, particularly if you had to carry them out at the same time. This would be an impossibility.

But, I was thinking more particularly of what the ability would be to carry out these roles on the new organization which is projected of a single unified force rather than the three services?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I do not know how they envisage doing it. I have been unable to figure that one out.

Mr. HARKNESS: In other words, no logical answers come to mind as to how it could be done with the new organization.

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: Not to me.

Mr. CHURCHILL: General Simonds the crux of the matter is unification of the services. We have the bill in front of us and we have the basic document of the speech of the Minister of December 7, which I have, just in *Hansard* here.

I have not the production that he issued to the forces that cost him over $5,000. I am just dependent on *Hansard*.

In supporting his bill he spent some considerable time dealing with what he called the advantages of the single service. He said that there are four fundamental reasons why this is considered to be desirable for the service, the serviceman and Canada.

I would like to ask you some questions on those four fundamental reasons. The first one, he calls "identity". This is what the Minister said:

> With the establishment of a common identity; sailors, soldiers and airmen, although loyal to their ships, regiments and squadrons, will have an overriding loyalty to the whole force and its total objectives on behalf of Canada.

He expanded that by the following sentence among others:

> The old recognizable dividing lines between land, sea and air have long since disappeared. Therefore, it has become imperative that there be a higher loyalty beyond that which is given to a particular service.

That, General Simonds, is the first of the four fundamental reasons that the Minister advances for the change that he proposes. Do you consider that under the tri-service system there has been a lack of an overriding loyalty to Canada?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I most certainly was never conscious of any during my service. I think that going back to the war and after, the Canadian serviceman was very proud of his country and very loyal to it. I do not think you could have demanded a higher degree of loyalty.

Mr. CHURCHILL: The second of the fundamental reasons he lists under the heading of "careers".

The minister said this:

> For able and highly motivated individuals, both officers and other ranks, wider, more challenging and rewarding career opportunities will be available.

He expanded that by saying:

> Unification will provide better and fairer employment prospects for service personnel. Under a system of separate services, opportunities are naturally limited to the scope, tasks and requirements of the individual service.

Do you see a substantial improvement in career opportunities that could result only from unification?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I personally cannot. They have raised the top ranks so naturally the people will go a bit higher now, but I do not otherwise see that there will be any wider opportunities.

Mr. CHURCHILL: His third fundamental reason for unification is expressed as follows. He calls it adaptability of change. I quote:

> The unified force will provide much greater flexibility to meet changing requirements in defence organization made necessary by advances in military technology and changes in the international situation.

He gives examples of anti-submarine warfare equipment which can be carried in land based aircraft or carrier based aircraft. The use in all three services of fixed wing aircraft and missiles and then he says:

> Such changes must affect the organization of the forces. It is clear that the influence works in the direction of a single service for reasons of military effectiveness, cost and career considerations.

Do you consider that a unified force is essential to make it adaptable to changes in military technology and in the international situation?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: One of our problems, certainly in the army, and I think it affected people in the other services, was as the services tend to become more and more technical, getting a man of the necessary basic foundation of education to make him even good at one thing, and getting really thoroughly trained in one field.

I think this is very much a concern of the services today with the quipment tending to become more complicated and technical is how long it takes to train a man to use it starting with the basic education you get in a man normally recruited into the services. The basic education in our country I hope is going to improve and continue to improve—certainly there is scope for improvement.

Mr. CHURCHILL: The fourth of his four fundamental reasons, as reported at page 10829 of *Hansard*, is, because of demands of modern warfare:

> The nature of modern warfare has resulted in a compaction of time and distance to the point where decision-making and reaction time must be much swifter than ever before in history. A unified force best meets this demand.

He goes on to explain, and I quote again from page 10832:

> The need for fast decision-making and quick reaction is synonymous with modern warfare.

He concludes with these words:

> I believe it is a fair conclusion that a single organization which works and thinks together day in and day out, with direct lines of communication and a single line of responsibility, eliminates the self-inflicted problems associated with the three service system of co-ordinating combined operations.

Now, I do not know of anyone who has greater experience than yourself in the demands of modern warfare, decision-making, quick reaction and the co-ordination of combined operations. Do you consider that the demands of modern warfare require a single service concept or, in other words, unification?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: No, I do not believe it does. I think it requires more and more combined training and much closer co-operation in all training between the three services, but you still have to have the specialties of the staff in their own environment. They have to be good at that first.

If somebody is going to take troops and show them a landing craft, the first thing you want is efficiency in handling that craft; a man who knows how to do it. The second thing is that you want to know how the troops are going to operate from it. You have a staff with the basic requirement, but you want each to do his own particular job really well.

Certainly, at different stages of the war, there were difficulties in co-operation. I know that in the initial stages of training for Sicily and in setting off for the expedition, I had some violent disagreements with Admiral Vian. He was a determined and stubborn man, and I suppose I was too, but we finished as the greatest friends. We had the finest co-operation—I could not have asked for anybody better to work with.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Well, I take it then that these four fundamental reasons, which the Minister calls, identity, careers, adaptability of change and the demands of modern warfare, in your opinion are not sufficiently substantial to warrant unification of the forces?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: May I give one or two other practical examples too? It was mentioned earlier that we got accidentally bombed once or twice by the air force. In the initial night attack, south of Caen, immediately the bombing was over, which was extremely accurate, in regard to timing and on target, I sent a signal off to bomber Harris thanking him for the precision with which the operation had been carried through.

I received a very nice message back saying it was the first time he had been thanked for doing anything. When we were subsequently operating at Bomber Command, we did have one serious error. Bomber Command and I wanted to have direct communication at Bomber Command Headquarters at the safe level. The attitude was taken that an Army Corps had no business communicating to Bomber Command.

We had this misadventure and subsequently Bert Harris, every time he had an operation with Bomber Command, flew over a small set that sat down, beside my headquarters, in direct communication. For instance, in the channel port operations and subsequently he never had a mishap—they were absolutely dead on target and on time in every single operation.

People are very fond of quoting disagreements and quarrels, but actually I could give you far more examples of good and effective co-operation than many

of the ones who hear about the bad co-operation. Throughout the remainder of the campaign we had the closest and most effective co-operation at Bomber Command.

Mr. MACINNIS: General Simonds, would you say that the United States marines fit into a single service concept?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: Well, there is not too much interchange between the various branches within the marine corps.

Mr. MACINNIS: But as a single service concept there is no way you can make a comparison between the United States marines and the concept that is envisaged now here by unification here in Canada. In other words, the United States marines, although operating as a single service, certainly cannot be considered by the United States as a single service concept.

Lieut. General SIMONDS: No, because they have four services. They have the marine corps and the army, navy and air force as well.

Mr. MACINNIS: As Mr. McNulty said the other day, they have been resisting any attempts by the United States navy to take over the marines. Any further comparison between the unified force in Canada and the United States marines is not a proper comparison to make in respect to the fact that they have four services, and attempts are being made here to establish a unified force. There is no comparison.

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: The marine corps in the United States is a sort of fire brigade, you might say, and any major operation would depend on the three services, as they are doing right now in Viet Nam with the three services.

Mr. MACINNIS: In other words, there is no comparison that can be rightly drawn here.

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I think I certainly regret that I ever used that comparison because it was not a correct one to start with. I used it in trying to emphasize the sort of role I believe we could do in a period of less tension with the forces, when we had them in training, to meet our obligations anyway.

Mr. MACINNIS: Well, I do not think you should regret it too much because a lot of others have also used it. Whether or not you originated it is a matter to be seen. However, an another question put to you this morning the question of competition among the services was brought out. Would you consider competition among the services would help to eliminate bad policy judgments re defence matters? In other words, would the Cabinet Defence Committee be more inclined to make the decisions on merit when faced with the representations from the three services, rather than a unified—

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: Well, as I pointed out earlier, I think inevitably at the Cabinet level factors other than the state defence consideration are bound to have weight.

It comes down to a balance in compromise between the various considerations which the government considers to be in the national interest.

I do not think, regardless of the organization you have, you are going to get away from that conflict. You are going to get some decisions that are not the most advantageous from a defence point of view simply because the government considers, there are other factors, with which that a compromise must be made.

Mr. MacINNIS: What I am trying to arrive at is this. With the three services in this so-called competition placing their demands before the Cabinet Defence Committee, the opportunity of eliminating these political decisions would be there more so from the three representations being made than if it were a single service approach. The Defence Committee would then be listening to one argument rather than three, and their choice would not be influenced as much.

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: It does not quite work that way in actual practice because the consideration is first dealt with by, what used to be the Chiefs of Staff at the ministerial level before it ever goes to the Cabinet members. Sometimes, with a problem of this kind, you might say that the word gets about that it is a waste of time to recommend so and so because the Cabinet just will not have it. It is not as tidy a business as I think is sometimes envisaged.

Mr. MacINNIS: In this competition, the approach by the three services would require the Cabinet Defence Committee to pay more attention to the variance of the different arguments than would be the case under a single service concept approach. In other words, the chances of eliminating a bad political judgment would be greater under a three-service approach than it would under a single service approach.

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: Well, I think you have to have the requirements of each of the services in their own environment represented by someone who knows what he is doing to start with. Whether the money will stretch—and it never will—far enough to meet all those requirements is another different problem.

It then comes down to deciding which requirements should be eliminated and which ones should be met. I believe, in the first instance, they have to be generated by the service that is working in that environment—responsible for the operations in that environment.

Mr. MacINNIS: General, would you consider an attack on Canadian territory or any part of Canada would involve an all-out war?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I cannot envisage a direct attack on Canada. I cannot really consider a general attack being made on Canada by anybody—

Mr. MacINNIS: If there were such an attack on Canada would this involve, in your opinion, not only an attack on Canada, but an attack on the continent of North America and would, therefore, involve American participation?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: Yes, either immediately or in time.

Mr. MacINNIS: This is, of course, part of the Canada-U.S. agreement. Would it follow that any such attack would necessarily come under the over-all command of the United States in respect to continental defence?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: It might not.

Mr. MacINNIS: Well, as it is now set up, do the Americans not have the over-all control of continental defence?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: They have it with regard to air defence, but as far as the other, I would not know. They did not have it previously.

Mr. MacINNIS: With respect to the defence of the North American continent, is it logical to assume that command of over-all defence would come under the Americans?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I think it would depend very much on the services. I think that is a hypothetical question and is very difficult to answer. It is hard to envisage the sort of conditions you would have to have—I do not know. What particular conditions did you have in mind?

Mr. MACINNIS: Well,—

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: If in the process of a major war some direct attack was made on Canada, I would think that it would probably be handled by Canada.

Mr. MACINNIS: I am speaking now of the agreement between Canada and the United States on continental defence. Can we assume the Americans, because of their wealth and their material advantages over Canada, would be in command of the overall defence of the Continent? Eliminating, of course, the possibility of Canada coming up with a military genius that the Americans would accept to command their forces.

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: Do you envisage American forces being involved in Canada from the outset?

Mr. MACINNIS: Not necessarily, no. What I am concerned with here is the defence of the North American continent. For instance, whether it is agreed or not, in some books I have read on the matter with respect to the military capabilities of individuals, it is generally accepted, we would like to think that at times the Americans were the overall command—if Eisenhower was the overall commander in Europe because of the American financial and material strength, and it followed that Eisenhower was Supreme Commander. But, in the same context, in the North American defence, would we—could we assume that once again an American general would be the Supreme Commander in Continental defence?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: Well, I think that it would depend entirely on the circumstances. For instance, if a landing was made on Canadian soil by a hostile force, the first one to deal with it would be a Canadian commander present on the spot, or the nearest spot.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Right.

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: Who would act immediately I would think, if he was on his toes, and what happened after that would depend on how the thing developed. I think if it was obviously a situation to be handled by ourselves, the Americans would be quite prepared to let it go that way.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Yes, but originally we assumed that any attack on Canada would necessarily be an all out attack, an all out war, and the Americans would become immediately involved in the Continental defence.

What I am trying to arrive at is, would this matter of American wealth and American material advantages—could we assume from that that an American would be in command of the defence of North America?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I do not quite know what you mean by an all out attack, because if you are thinking in terms of a direct attack on Canada all out, you are looking at some hostile power who has a colossal armada, to get it here to start with.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Yes, but when we speak of the defence of Canada, certainly in the ultimate we have to go to the possibility of such an all

out attack. What I cannot imagine is any aggressor making any attempt on Canada, that did not intend in the first place, to be an attempt against the North American Continent.

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: Well it has been our tradition of Canadian policy in these matters over the past 100 years, more or less, that Canada is best defended overseas, and not to wait for someone to come knocking on our doorstep. That, I believe, is the philosophy behind our participation in NATO and these alliances.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Well, General, what I was leading up to, and I did not follow a very clear pattern in getting there, is that in order to co-operate with our allies in the defence of North America, is it not reasonable to assume that we should have our forces aligned with that of our greater ally to the South, so as to assimilate our forces and our efforts with theirs. In other words, an army unit to support their army, air force to support their air force, and navy to support their navy.

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I think I said that in relation to allies in general. I think that applies to working with allies in general, and not just the United States, the same thing applies in NATO.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Well, this presents us with a very strong argument into maintaining our three separate services according to the policies followed by our allies.

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I believe it does, yes.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, we have come up to almost twenty-five past twelve. The next person to have his hand up is Mr. Lambert. But, I also remind you I have on my list on the first time round, Mr. Lambert, Mr. Langlois, Mr. Byrne; and on the second time round, Mr. Andras, Mr. McIntosh, Mr. Churchill, so it looks as if we would go into the afternoon on questions, and I would like at this time to find out what the General's availability of time is. Are you available to us this afternoon sir?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I am at your disposal.

The CHAIRMAN: Now, Mr. Lambert has his hand up, do you want to go on at this point, or do you want to wait until after—

Mr. LAMBERT: No, it is quite essential that I do it now.

The CHAIRMAN: The Bank Act is going to seize you later in the day is it?

Mr. LAMBERT: Unfortunately so, yes.

The CHAIRMAN: Well, Mr. Lambert, you go ahead. I think the Committee would be glad to accommodate you.

Mr. LAMBERT: There have been questions and comments by you, General, on the nature of service rivalry and some of the negative effects of that. But, since the Minister, and many others, have been at pains to say that these will continue to be sailors, they will continue to be air men, they will continue to be soldiers, and each will want their own equipment.

Is there any appreciable or no discernible indication that a one service, one uniform concept will diminish the demand of the sailors for their equipment, the air men for theirs, and the soldiers for theirs, and that they will still continue to press their cases within the present integrated command with one defence chief?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: Up to a point I would agree with you, but I think also I believe an even greater danger that, if you took the example I gave earlier within this unified concept, you might have all the people at the top from one service, the army or the air force.

Supposing that situation developed, the navy's need might be completely overlooked, and they may be really the most important of the whole lot, at a particular point. But, you can get the two things.

I do not believe it will diminish the claims of each individual service and its environment for the equipment that it needs, if it has the opportunity of representing its case at the top. And you will still get that same situation, but even worse will be a case if one of the services, one of the environments, does not get the opportunity of representing its case at all.

Mr. LAMBERT: Well, it has been repeated ad nauseam that unification will result in a more objective assessment of the requirements of the services, if everyone is in the same uniform, and in the same rank structure.

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I do not personally believe that to be so.

Mr. LAMBERT: That there is somehow to be a magical transformation into a higher loyalty. That there will be an elimination of what has been termed, a service bias, and that everybody will be transformed into paragons of virtue with regard to the degree of objectivity with which they will approach the assessment of the needs for equipment and the purposes of the forces. This is—I may be using somewhat stronger language, but this is the idea that is expressed, and that unification will cure it. Now, do you feel, as a result of your experience, that this may be the result?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I would think that the service man would have to be a different kind of human animal that has existed in this world up to this point, to achieve that idealistic situation.

Mr. LAMBERT: To translate again is a reason for unification, that right around the commander, shall we say the Commander-in-Chief, that there will be more objective, and more intelligent advice, and co-operation, among those who surround it, because they shall be in one uniform. That the requirements of expertise, of intelligence, of co-operation, of reaction to the emergency or their command reaction, will be better, because they shall be in one uniform.

Do you feel, as one who has been at the top of the tree, that the naval advisers that you have, that the air advisers that you have, and the ground environment advisers that you have, would be better because they would be in one uniform, in the one rank structure?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: Could I answer that question perhaps a little indirectly in another way. Since retired from the service, I sit on a number of business boards. I cannot recall a single board meeting when we all turn up in the same suit or wear the same tie or the same shoes. They may be wearing all kinds of different clothes in a Board meeting, but I do not think it affects the advice or opinions they give in that board meeting. I do not think if we all wore the same kind of suit, it would affect our mental equipment very much in the advice we had to proffer.

Mr. LAMBERT: Well, I think you have likely read the speech of the Minister of December 7th. This is one of the points that is advanced as an advantage of unification.

I find it an incredibly naïve idea, that this one uniform, one rank structure, one service, will eliminate the human element and the human qualities of those people who surround the Commander-in-Chief. These are my own words, I am not asking you to comment on them, but this is something that I find extremely difficult to take.

Now, Mr. Hopkins made a point—I am going to switch a little here—about during the war, there were accidental bombings of ground troops by your own forces, there were mistakes made because of presumably some difficulty in communication, not indicating that there may have been also human error. But I was asking you, I personally was under air communication and air judgment between—and the ground forces and had tanks coming under short fire of artillery.

Now, I am just wondering whether we were in the same uniform, we were in the same uniform.

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: Everybody makes mistakes.

Mr. LAMBERT: But that did not eliminate the error that was made.

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: It does not eliminate human error, if you wear the same coloured suit. I agree, there were instances, and we had—because of human error, where the artillery shot short occasionally, very seldom in the Second World war, I might say, but much more common in the First World war, I believe. But, the fact that they wore the same uniform as the infantry did not make them immune to human error.

Mr. LAMBERT: Well, now my last question Mr. Chairman, concerns the paper you prepared in collaboration with General Vokes last August, on page 3, where you talk about integration and your main causes of misgivings. You mention, that the system of integration at the present time gives no assurance that it will measure up to the strain of a general mobilization, and:

> That the system of integrated functional commands is suitable for a general mobilization, . . .

How long do you estimate it would take to give this integrated functional command structure that we have, the appropriate, shall we say, shakedown to see that it would measure up to the possible demands of general mobilization or any other type of emergency?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I could not estimate that, because I am not working in it, and I would have to depend on consultation with those who are working at it. But judging by the comments of those who have been working in it have made, there is still a great many rough edges and problems to be solved in the integration process even before it can be operated as a smooth machine—even with the existing load on it, quite apart from the possibility of the added load in the event of a general mobilization.

Mr. LAMBERT: I was wondering about that, because it seemed implicit in the wording of your query that you might have some idea of just to what extent it should get a shakedown.

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I am not in a position to estimate that, because I do not know the inner workings of how far they have advanced and how effectively it works.

I know of one instance where the local artillery regiment in Toronto went to fire a salute. Under the previous service system, the vehicles went to a magazine, picked up the ammunition, then picked up the guns and attachments and off they went to fire the salute.

Under the system now all the transport is under what used to be the air force command. The vehicles and guns turned up all right, but no one had gone to the magazine to get the ammunition, and so there they were all deployed and nothing to fire.

Now this is a minor instance, but it shows that these things do not work overnight, they have to have a good running in period and have to be tested.

I made one point—I forget whethe rit was in that particular paper or not—that it is not too difficult to stage a series of fairly realistic exercises on mobilization and various problems can suddenly confront this thing and to test it and see whether it will really work or not, or whether it creaks and is going to make mistakes of that kind. To carry that on a bigger scale, a force could be sent off and find that it had no ammunition when it got there.

Mr. LAMBERT: This is my last question Mr. Chairman. Could I ask a quick comment of General Simonds on the speculation that General Allard made the other night that at one time he considered placing the brigade in Europe under an air commodore.

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I think he qualified that by saying that he could not, because he could not find one with the necessary qualifications. I could see no objection to that, if the man had the qualifications.

I recall even before World War II for instance, the military district out in Winnipeg, where I served for a time, was commanded by an airman. In the integration process—and I have favoured integration, and I have referred to the unnecessary overheads we have, for instance I could never see the necessity for instance in Edmonton why it was necessary to have a big air force headquarters and a big army headquarters sitting side by side duplicating many of the jobs right down to their staff structure.

One headquarters could have done the business there, an integrated headquarters. Now that sort of measure of integration, I think I was one of the first to advocate, but that is a very different step from the unification that is now talked of.

Mr. BYRNE: I would like to ask General Simonds for clarification of his statement this morning, which we do not have a copy of. I want to think about it.

The ACTING CHAIRMAN (*Mr. MacInnis, Cape Breton South*): Mr. Byrne if you want a clarification, perhaps you and General Simonds could find time on the way out to clear it up, because the Chairman told me to adjourn the meeting following Mr. Lambert's questions. Mr. Lambert ran 13 seconds overtime according to this clock.

We will meet again at 3.30 this afternoon and at that time Mr. Langlois will be the first questioner. If it is something that has to go on the record Mr. Byrne, you can put it on the record this afternoon, but if it is a clarification you wish to seek, probably the general could give you the time now.

AFTERNOON SITTING

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, when we left off we had finished with the questions of Mr. Lambert and I have still on my list on the first round now Mr. Langlois and Mr. Byrne.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): Thank you, sir. General, In 1963 when you appeared before the Special Committee you said you felt the army had a policy, the air force had a policy and the navy had a policy but that we had no tri-service policy, is that correct?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I would say that was a fair statement—

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): Okay.

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: —of the situation as it was.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): During what years were you Chief of the General Staff, from what year to what year?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: 1951 to 1956.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): 1951 to 1956. Now, during that period, sir, did you feel the air force got more than its fair share of the defence dollar?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: It was not so much getting more than its fair share of the defence dollars but for instance in the discussions—let me go back even further than that, I came in as Chief of General Staff at the Korean war time. The army had a sizeable commitment in Korea. The air force had none. A few pilots went and served with the U.S. air force on loan or exchange, I believe, but the air force had no commitment in Korea.

When it came to NATO organization in Europe, the air force made it quite plain that they wanted a role independent of the other services, not a role in co-operation with the other Canadian services. That is how the Air Division came into being as an independent formation unrelated to either the Canadian army or the Canadian naval contribution.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): Well in other words were you in accord with the amounts of money that were attributed to the air force?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I was not in accord on certain specific issues, one of which was money that went into the Avro Arrow. I thought that was money wasted from the outset and it is on the record that I expressed that view or it should be.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): You would have liked that money to be spent on other services?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: We could have spent it better on other things and in the end it proved a complete waste.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): You say other things, do you mean other services or in the air force?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: Perhaps in the air force or perhaps in the other services, but at least on something productive.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): Now, sir, you have stated that you felt any air support on the front lines, either tactical, reconnaissance or supply should be under the command of the army. Do you feel that the CF-5 squadron which is

being placed under the Mobile Commander will suit the purpose for the Mobile Commander?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I would think it would, yes.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): In 1963 you said on page 442 and I quote:

> We should not be in the nuclear field at all. The most useful contribution we can make to any coalition or alliance of which we become a partner is in the field of being able to make a contribution to preventing a situation developing which would lead to thermo-nuclear exchange.

Are you still in accord with that?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I am.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): Again on the same day on page 445 you said:

> One of the reasons I commend this idea of an integrated force as the most sensible contribution Canada can make is that it meets a NATO role and it meets our United Nations responsibilities. It enables us to play our part and fulfil any commitments which we can forsee becoming obligations to us.

Are you still in accord with that?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I would still be of that view and I think that was in the context of expressing the opinion that there was no contradiction or there need be no contradiction between fulfilling our NATO obligations and using our forces in a peacekeeping role also.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): Now, finally you said on page 450 and I quote:

> I think we have to co-operate with like minded nations in heading off or preventing the outbreak of a major thermo-nuclear war. We alone are incapable of doing more than making a contribution toward that. It is my belief that the most sensible defence policy for Canada to have is to be able to participate in an alliance in order to deal with these dangerous situations which may arise by our partnership in the United Nations—

And I say again "the United Nations".

> —and things of that kind. I think that is the most sensible sort of defence contribution we can make.

Are you still in accord with that?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I agree with that, yes.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): Now, do you still believe in this today and if so is it not entirely in line with the White Paper, the Minister's second reading on this bill and indeed the whole object of unification which will enable us to meet all of these objectives with the most efficient type of force?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: No, I would not agree with that vast statement because—

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): Of course I am not quoting you there.

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: No, you were not quoting me. As I said earlier I believe all those objectives can be achieved within the framework of a properly integrated tri-service force and at the same time maintain the structure for dealing with an emergency beyond the scale envisaged there.

In other words, a major conflagration. I do not think that this proposed unified force—I think I made this plain earlier—will meet that second contingency adequately. If I could repeat again the mere expression "peacekeeping" implies a risk of war, it must do. If there was no risk to the maintenance of law and order there would be no need to have a civil police force and the mere fact of considering a peacekeeping force necessary, to my mind, obviously implies the risk of war. If there is a risk of war nobody has ever been too accurate in predicting the scale that might lead to.

Again, I took the analogy earlier this morning of the United States. I do not believe they ever dreamed when they first became involved in South Viet Nam it was going to lead to a commitment in the order of half a million men. I also think said that I do not believe a nation can undertake a peacekeeping role and then if the situation turns ugly well say: At this point we want to get out.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): Do you not consider that a risk of war can be of different natures, different sizes, different kinds of risks of war?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: It can be of many different degrees including a major one.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): I mean preventing as a peacekeeping force, let us say in Cyprus, I consider myself less in danger of a major war than if we were asked to go and do some controlling in Russia or near Russia or China or something like that?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I do not envisage us being asked to do that.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): No but I mean just to make the point that there might be different kinds of risk of war.

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: There can be all sorts of varying degrees and the most dangerous situation is where the interests of great powers are in conflict. This is a situation which has arisen and can arise again particularly in the emerging countries and the countries emerging to self-government such as in Africa. It can arise in the Middle East where the local situation may be of one nature but the interests of major powers may be in conflict and backing different sides in an internal conflict.

That can be the most dangerous and also it is one of the most likely where a really serious peacekeeping operation might be needed and might make the difference between stopping a major conflict and allowing it to catch fire.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): One last question, sir, this morning in replying to questions by Mr. Hopkins you said that at one time Britain instead of building destroyers and submarines went into a program and built some battleships. What year was that, roughly?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: Between the two wars there were very strong differences of opinion between the First and Second World wars on the naval building program and the type of ships which the navy should primarily concentrate upon whether the day of the big battleship had come to an end or whether it had not. To some extent this was regulated—I do not think regulated in the best interests of the naval powers—by the Washington treaty limiting the sizes of the different category of ships and of course in every instance every power built to the maximum size that the treaty allowed. Though in some cases it did not provide the most satisfactory form of naval equipment at that time.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): You think for Britain it was a mistake to build battleships in between the two World Wars?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I think from the point of view of our effectiveness subsequently they would have done a lot better to have built other ships. During the emergency of the Battle of the Atlantic, by far, nearly all the concentration was on small ships.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): Which they could get from the United States anyway. Have you read, sir, Sir Winston Churchill's story of the Second World war?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I think I have read everything he ever wrote.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): Well he spends about a book long telling us how troubled he was he could not find battleships. He could not have had them if they would have stopped their building in between the two wars.

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I do not think that everybody would have agreed with him on that.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): Thank you sir.

Mr. BYRNE: Mr. Chairman, I wonder if you would permit me before asking questions to refer to a statement made by Mr. Harkness earlier today that a few of us on this side of the House or the table have military service.

I want, as one on this side, who have not had military service but I offered my services and was required to stay in a hard rock mine where the disability I received became even much greater although it does not appear on the surface to the members I see on the other side of the table.

The CHAIRMAN: I think these are subjects that both sides of the table could leave alone and address themselves to the questioning of the witnesses here.

Mr. BYRNE: I find some difficulty with Mr. Brewin this morning reconciling the General's statement this morning with one which he made to the committee in October of 1963. We do not have a copy of the General's statement this morning so I am speaking strictly from memory. It seems to me that General Simonds felt that it was improper, at least unwise, for Canada to assume a peacekeeping role; only a peacekeeping role for its armed services? Is that entirely what you felt?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: Only a peacekeeping role, yes.

Mr. BYRNE: That is adapt ourselves to a peacekeeping role?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I think if you envisage being involved in a military commitment of any kind then you have got to envisage the possibility of a major war.

Mr. BYRNE: Before the committee on October 17, 1963 you are reported to have said, in discussing the question of a peacekeeping role, the following:

> I believe that a role which is suited to a country of our size and having regard to the financial burdens possible to be borne over a lengthy term, would be a tri-service force whose main objective was peace-keeping. I believe its organization should be very much like that of the United States Marine Corps which is a mobile force complete with all its ancillaries and able to meet what are commonly called brush-fire situations.

Could you explain the structure of the United States Marine Corps please.

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: Well the U.S. Marine Corps has its own landing craft and landing support element and its own direct air support element.

Mr. BYRNE: What about naval?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: Well as I say it has its own landing craft element and its own landing support element.

Mr. BYRNE: Then if we were to establish a force similar to the U.S. Marines what would be the ancillaries or what would be the elements of that force?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: Well, I think we should have included in our naval forces the necessary support elements and included in the air force should be the necessary air support elements for this role.

It was Mr. Brewin who quoted that same paragraph this morning and as I explained then that was in the light of a lessening of east-west tensions which have continued up to this point and had the dual advantages in my opinion of drawing some dividend from the forces which we were bound to maintain because of our treaty obligation and also from the point of view of the armed services giving them a definite task to do in a period where it looked as if there might be a lessening of tension for some time. But not to destroy the structure on which the nation would depend in a major emergency.

Mr. BYRNE: When you say destroy the structure that is rather a strong word. What do you mean by "destroying" the structure?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: Well as I explained earlier I think you have got to have a structure which can ensure a smooth and rapid mobilization of the nation in a major emergency. I do not think that—

Mr. BYRNE: What has caused you to change your mind then from the position that you took in 1963?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I have not changed my mind. May I explain perhaps something that was in the back of my mind at that time and is related to some practical experience. I mentioned earlier that I was at the staff college for a two-year course in 1936 and 1937 during the time of the Abyssinian war and the Spanish Civil War and then the build-up obviously of Hitler's war.

After the First World war the British government had laid down the dictum to the armed services that there would be no major war, that their services would base their planning on there being no major war for a period of ten years. That was sound enough.

Each year they kept on renewing that same mandate and they kept on renewing it in the period when obviously threat of a major war was on the horizon.

In the meantime the services, the army in particular, and a special training pamphlet that was published on the subject devoted its attention entirely and became completely involved in what was then called "Imperial policing" which was the same thing in relation to the then Colonial Empire and overseas commitments as we envisage a NATO commitment.

The upper echelons of the army were completely absorbed in this. They were not stupid men, they became completely involved in this one role. It was only in the lower ranks, the lieutenant-colonels, majors and captains who had

the time to look at and weigh the problems of modern tactics in a major war. The lieutenant-colonels were men like Alexander, Montgomery, and Slim. At that level at the staff college at that time the threat was very clearly seen and the thought of training and operations which we were going to have to carry out was studied and people prepared themselves for it. But not at the higher echelon and the result is the upper echelon were faced with a major war and most of them had to be swept aside. If you concentrate on purely a policing role and the forces become wholly absorbed in that and the ability to deal with a major emergency disappears in my view.

Mr. BYRNE: In 1963 it was your opinion that we should concentrate on establishing a peace keeping force but then you went on to say how we should maintain the reserves, people trained in the reserves, and so on, in order that they would be flexible in the event of an all out war.

What is there basically different about unification and tri-service or integration that would make it now impossible having regard to the fact that we still appear to be putting emphasis on peace keeping? Does unification make it completely inflexible, so that we could not establish ourselves for an all out war having regard to the fact that we are maintaining our militia and reserves?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: If in effect that is carried out unchanged and we continue to maintain a naval reserve, an air force reserve, and an army reserve, in effect this unification is creating a fourth service—a fourth regular service—and our reserves organized on a tri-service basis.

In other words we are going to get into an organization with four services like the United States has at the present time—a marine corps, an army, navy and air force. Unless you are going to unify the reserve as well you are going to have four separate animals on mobilization.

You are going to have the regular element which is a police force and then you are going to have a manned force, or whatever you like to call it a naval force and and air force, four instead of three.

Mr. BYRNE: During your period as Chief of the General Staff you said that the decision with respect to the Arrow was made. Do you not feel that had you more authority through a unified command your position in this regard would have been given more consideration?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: Well supposing I had been alone. Incidentally, at a large meeting which included representatives of the U.S. air force and their scientific defence research, I was the only one that opposed it. I was absolutely alone. The only one that opposed it.

Supposing I had been alone and a single chief of staff and in spite of the fact that everybody else in that room wanted to go ahead with it, I had gone to the Minister and said throw it over board.

Do you think that the rest of the staff, you might say my staff, would have thought it very worth while talking and discussing things with me?

Mr. BYRNE: You said on page 441 of the committee reports which I referred to earlier, you say:

> —but the tendency of the air force.

and I think you are a little reluctant to make this statement because you say:

> so to speak, was to put emphasis—and this was largely following the second world war—on the bomber and fighter role as opposed to transport

and reconnaissance, which would be the main effort in a tri-service organization; and this possibly arose partly by their desire to have a role of their own.

This again seems to me to point out the fact that the lone role has resulted in bad decisions in the past. That is all...

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: If I could just point out that that was a decision of the government not of the services.

Mr. BYRNE: On advice I would hope. On advice from the services.

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: Yes.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, that completes all that I have on my notes for the first round of questioning and I have a second round of questioning beginning with Mr. Andras, then Mr. Churchill, and then Mr. Hopkins.

Are there any others at the moment?

Excuse me, Mr. Andras, Mr. McIntosh, Mr. Churchill and Mr. Hopkins. Any others on the second round of questioning?

I will call Mr. Andras.

Mr. ANDRAS: General Simonds, this morning as I understood your comments, in talking about personnel, the number of people in the forces versus modern equipment, I made a note and it may not be exact but I think you said—if it came to such a choice between having disciplined personnel and modern equipment, that the cost within a controlled budget that certainly Canada, or for that matter any other country, simply cannot have all the funds that everybody would like to have in the way of spending money on military forces.

So, within that choice, I think I interpreted you as saying that you would choose the men rather than the equipment.

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: If I had to make that choice. I think I said trained, disciplined and efficient.

Mr. ANDRAS: Trained, disciplined and efficient, yes, I remember that.

Well now, you went on to say as an example, in World War II the men and in the Canadian forces as in many others, there was a very quick buildup of inexperienced people going into the services and becoming soldiers, sailors and airmen.

You made the comment that they adapted themselves to equipment very quickly and under wartime conditions. Of course, the equipment started to flow after the first year or two or three years. Money was not all the effort.

My point is this, and I ask you this. Do you think that with the modern technology, with the modern conditions of equipment and of sea mobility and the devastating effect of the nuclear weapons and so forth, do you think the conditions are the same and would there be time, in fact, for men, even though they are disciplined, to become accustomed to modern equipment if they did not have it before hand? It is much more sophisticated equipment now than it was in World War II.

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I think that the first part of your questioning was quoting me to some extent but what I pointed out was this was 1944 when they had to come fully trained. This was, you might say, gratuitous, that we were given the time we were to train our forces in World War II.

On the second point, I think you have to differentiate between training scales to familiarize people with the most modern types of equipment, and actually equipping forces over-all. There is a very big gulf between the two.

The other is in the case of the Second World War, as far as the western powers were concerned there was not one that was really industrially organized to quickly produce military equipment in the first part of the war. That developed as the war went on.

Now, today with the armaments race as it has been, and it looks as if it is going to continue for some time, as I said this morning, most of these things you could buy off the rack, at three to six months notice, the way the industrial mobilization is set up.

For instance, the United States with their very considerable commitments in Korea and in South Vietnam, have never for one minute lacked anything in the way of every conceivable type of equipment that could forward that operation; it has been available in quantity. Their operations have never, in any sense, been handicapped by any lack of material of any kind.

Mr. ANDRAS: But do you not believe—I understand one of the principles of our present forces policy is to have forces in being well equipped, well trained, as opposed to the concept, say at the beginning of the last war, where you depended on, as you said, we had a lucky break in the last war, some years of being able to build up the forces, mobilize our civilian population and put them into the forces.

Now, I understand the concept is that because of the speed with which things will develop we better have forces in being well equipped, well trained, and ready to go right now, because we are not going to have time for the two or three years that we had, or two years that we had then, to really build up and train these people in this sophisticated equipment.

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: That is a matter of opinion and I do not think that it is necessarily a sound judgment. I will try to give you another actual example.

In 1914, the British regular army, the expedition force, was as highly trained and skilled, the force in being, as any in the world, but in the first few months of the war, because of lack of data and any sort of provision for a steady buildup it was decimated.

I would say a lot of the tactical errors and cost in life that developed during the First World war was because they never again really attained an adequate degree of training to conduct mobile operations till the very end.

I think that that was partly due to the fact, you might say the professional element, of the British Army, was practically wiped out in the first few weeks of the war and this is the sort of thing we could very well get.

Mr. ANDRAS: Fundamentally, as a matter of your opinion then, do I take it that you feel that even in the case of a major war, and even short of a thermonuclear war, a major war, that there would be that several months that existed in say, World War II, as opposed to me, as a much less experienced person, the feeling that any major war is going to be very quickly fought and possibly very quickly over, because even failing to use thermonuclear weapons, other weapons today are very devastating compared to World War II. The speed

with which they can be applied is very quick indeed. I am suggesting that it is a moot point as to whether there would be that buildup time to equip forces with sophisticated weapons.

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I am not saying that we will have the same buildup time again. We may very well not. That is all the more reason because we are committed from the outset.

In World War II we were not committed from the outset. We only made the decision to go to war in September 1939 and then we took four years to build up.

As far as NATO is concerned, and indeed if we proceed with some of these peace keeping operations, we are committed from the outset. We have forces involved from the drop of a hat. It is unlikely to have that same length of time again.

Therefore, it is all the more important that the machinery for expansion, and a smooth and rapid expansion of our potential, should be properly organized before hand.

Mr. ANDRAS: You would stay with the opinion that if you had to make the choice you would rather have more men in the forces, disciplined, trained and efficient men, and do with less equipment, if that were the financial budgetary problem we were faced with. You would throw your weight on the side of having more people rather than equipment.

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I say I think our best investment that we have made has been in our personnel. In taking the circumstances as they are of today, again I reiterate that you can buy almost any military equipment off the rack, by just ordering it.

Mr. ANDRAS: You cannot buy DDH destroyers, for instance. There is quite a lead time on those.

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: There is a lead time on those instances, but not all. My remarks are not subject to an over-all sweeping arbitrary thing, but I believe that consideration within this light could lead to a better balance.

I think if you consider—and I am referring now strictly to the military effectiveness and nothing else—the rapidity with which Hitler built up the German forces, most of them were disciplined and trained in the labour corps before he had the armament. Then they turned on the armament stream, that is the personnel were trained in the labour corps mainly.

Mr. ANDRAS: So you really do not believe that the pace of technology has changed that basic condition?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I think that you would always have to have or should always have training scales and the most modern equipment. But I do not think it is necessary to constantly equip, re-equip a force every time every new innovation comes along, and especially if it is to be done at the expense of running down the effective manpower of the force.

Mr. ANDRAS: Moving on to another comment your concern, I think you expressed this morning, on our ability to mobilize if required, and I believe there was concern over the way the planning for the reserves was being done. We had

quite a detailed presentation by General Dare on the whole question of the planning for the use and role of reserves. Have you read that briefing that General Dare gave us?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I have read all the highlights of it.

Mr. ANDRAS: You do not feel then that it is a valid plan to best use the reserves under modern 1967 conditions that might develop into war at any time?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: It looks well on paper. Whether it will work out is another question. I would be one of the first to vote in favour of young forces. The question is whether, in an organization such as the militia, where you have to depend upon the volunteer from a community, who is doing a civilian job as well, and earning a living and probably raising a family, whether you can expect that degree of efficiency and readiness at the ages they set down I think is very questionable. I hope it works but I would seriously doubt if it will.

The CHAIRMAN: Are you coming close to the end of your remarks, Mr. Andras?

Mr. ANDRAS: I was embarking into a new theme, Mr. Chairman, and if I am coming close to the end of my time perhaps I better be put down again.

The CHAIRMAN: All right. I will do that.

Mr. MCINTOSH: General Simonds, if Bill C-243 is passed, in your opinion, does it change the structure of our present forces?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: As I understand it, the basis of this bill is to make complete unification the aim. Am I right in that interpretation?

Mr. MCINTOSH: Well I want your interpretation.

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: Well, it very definitely changes the structure of our forces.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Right. You talked about the fourth service that could be created when your former remarks were referred to about the peace restoring role. In a change of structure to what we have at the present time, do you believe that we could keep our commitments to our allies at the present time?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I think I said this morning, from the point of view of the rundown in manpower alone, we could not meet our commitments as I knew them, and understood them to be, when I was the Chief of the General Staff.

Mr. MCINTOSH: We have had evidence from former witnesses when we questioned them about the studies that have been made concerning manpower requirements. For this new role, the fourth service as you call it. It has been called peace keeping, peace restoring by some other witnesses. Those same witnesses have told us that there is no intention of us to opt out of our commitments to the collective defence alliances that we are in.

But when we asked them about the studies, about how many men would be required, about the dollars that would be required, they say that no studies have been made.

Do you not feel that this is a very amazing statement for people charged with this responsibility to not know how many men they will need, or how many

dollars they will need to maintain, as they say is going to be maintained, our alliances and setting up this fourth service. Is not the duties of a staff to do this planning and be able to come up with the figures?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I do not think I can answer that question because I do not know what the duties of the staff are at the present time.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Well, could you answer it as to your duties when you were Chief of the General Staff. If you were planning something new, would you not have the answers?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: When we were planning something we had to put a dollar figure on it.

Mr. MCINTOSH: And a manpower figure, did you not?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: Oh, yes.

Mr. MCINTOSH: If it is the intention of the present staff to maintain these alliances and to also create this fourth service, do you believe it could be done with the manpower that we have today and with the budget that we have today?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: It could not be done with the manpower we have today. There have been claims made of great economies in this measure but as I read it the price is going up and we are getting less. We are getting less for more money. Something that I became very familiar with during my time at headquarters here is what is commonly referred to as slippage.

It can be declared the objective to get a new bit of equipment but then the expenditure can be shoved forward into another financial year and that can go on and on and on. But all the time you are getting in a worse and worse financial position unless you are either going to abandon the intent of carrying through that re-equipment or you are going to find a lot more money at some point.

Mr. MCINTOSH: My concern at the present—this is a personal concern—is that if we are going to carry on the collective roles and set up this new force, where are the men coming from and where are the dollars coming from? This is a question I have been asking and seeking the answer to and I have not received it. With your previous experience I would hope that you, maybe, could enlighten me on that. How could it be done?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: Frankly, I do not know. I do not know and I do not know what their present procedures are or how this is going to be achieved. I have never believed that, contrary to every other thing we know of now-a-days, you are going to get more defence for less money. We will get less defence for less money.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Could you conceive of Canada opting out of her collective commitments then?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I think that is a matter for the government to decide and not the military.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Would you believe if Canada did decide that, and that would be a political decision, there would be much criticism from our United States allies?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: Again that is a political rather than a military matter. I think that from the military point of view we would certainly be criticized.

Mr. McINTOSH: I ask you as a civilian then. You as a Canadian what would you think about the United States defending Canada without Canada participating in that defence.

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I would never subscribe to such an idea. It is a finish of national sovereignty if you ever subscribe to an idea of that kind.

Mr. McINTOSH: I was going to ask you what your reason was for not believing in it.

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: Admittedly we certainly cannot in the thermonuclear field defend ourselves but if we wish to have any say in matters at all we, at least, have to make contributions to forces for our national strength in the world. That gives us the right to a voice. If we do not we have no right to a voice.

Mr. McINTOSH: Vague as our ideas are of what would happen if Bill C-243 was passed by this Parliament, would you say as a former soldier and now as a civilian that Canada's defence would be in jeopardy?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: It would certainly be my estimate that we could not meet the commitments which we have, at least, as they were, when I knew them.

Mr. McINTOSH: There has been a great amount of talk about integration and unification. Although many of us agree with the term integration, and a certain amount of integration was necessary, has always been necessary, and will be necessary, and we may agree with that DEVIL Program that is in the process of being implemented at the present time.

However, integration can only take place down to a certain level. When integration starts interfering with the combat troops you as a military man then would object to any integration of that type. You are not in favour of the integration of the combat troops at all?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: No, definitely not.

Mr. McINTOSH: Except where you say it may take place for a fourth service as a peace keeping role.

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: You will probably recall at a period late in the Second World war we had to retrain elements that had been trained in one arm to serve in another one. That particular scheme worked out reasonably satisfactorily because the individuals concerned were highly trained and disciplined and were receptive to training at this time. That was a most uneconomic way of doing it. In any sort of situation involving an expansion you cannot train a person to do a dozen different jobs. You are lucky if you can train him to do one well.

Mr. McINTOSH: When this feud over the bill started it was written up in the press as an admirals revolt. Now, we have had several generals of the army before us as witnesses and General Moncel said that unification may be the kiss of death for Canada's defence forces. He also said that unification will work only if defence commitments are reduced or changed because unification was an uncharted course with a dim destination.

General Fleury said:

> I honestly feel that not one word I said here yesterday or today will have the slightest effect on what is ultimately carried out, because so many people have taken up such entrenched positions on the subject that it is very difficult for anyone to back away.

I wonder if you could give us a statement as to what your thoughts were on the passage of Bill C-243.

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I happen to know those two officers are very highly competent officers. My own view, I think I said so at the beginning this morning, is that this unification having regard to all the implications of what defence policy should be is not in the national interest.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Have you any suggestions as to how Bill C-243 could be defeated?

The CHAIRMAN: I think that would be a very good point to go on to Mr. Churchill.

Mr. MCINTOSH: You can put me down for the next round, then.

Mr. CHURCHILL: My first question follows along the line of the question of Mr. Andras regarding your answers, General, as to the importance of trained and disciplined men.

In the letter which you and General Foulkes distributed to us on August 31, 1966, you made this statement, which I will read, where you talk of the military expertise that began to flower in the Canadian Armed Forces in World War II, and remained in bloom afterwards, and that our present sailors, soldiers and airmen are professional military men; and then I would like to quote this passage:

> Those who have risen to senior rank, by education and experience, are military experts of a high order, and their advice on matters pertaining to the military service should never be disregarded.
>
> If senior Canadian professional sailors, soldiers and airmen have grave misgivings about accomplished or proposed changes in the structure of the Canadian Armed Forces, the government and the people of Canada should think very long and carefully before overriding their misgivings. It is very easy for a government to impose its will on its senior serving officers by retiring them out-of-hand if they disagree with a policy which, because of their training and experience, they know to be dangerous to the future military welfare of their country.

Those are your words of August 31, 1966; do you hold to them today?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I would.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I drew to the attention of the Committee some time ago about a return published in *Hansard*, asked for by Mr. Harkness, showing the number of senior officers of brigadier rank and above, and the equivalent, who had been retired one way or another from the armed forces as from January 1, 1965 to the time the return was given to us in the house, which was October 12, 1966.

There are 80 senior officers listed there, of whom 39 retired normally because of age, 41 retired for other reasons, either voluntary or compulsory retirement. A loss of 80 senior officers in that period of 20 months; would you consider that to be a rather serious and unprecedented loss to the Armed Forces of Canada?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I would; particularly in relation to the knowledge and experience, and the intellectual ability of some of those officers.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Quite a number of the 41 who left early had from several months to several years to continue their service. I think the outstanding example, from the time element, would be General Moncel who had between five and six years more to go before the age factor caught up with him. Would the services of officers of that claibre not be essential in this transitional period when the men with war experience are gradually leaving the services?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I would think the loss of their services is a serious thing. Actually, these wholesale retirements, at first, raised an alarm as far as I, personally, was concerned in taking an interest in this.

I do not think there was ever a case, in any other department of a government, where the top echelon had turned over at the rate they have in the armed services in the past few months. Can anyone envisage the Department of Finance, the Department of Trade and Commerce, or any of the other departments of government, continuing to operate with any degree of efficiency, with the rate of a turn-over such as that?

Mr. CHURCHILL: I think it would be very serious, with my knowledge of government.

Now I would like to ask a question about integration and the need for a pause. This has been the subject of some discussion in the Committee from time to time, and you dealt with it this morning. You mentioned there was some question in your mind with regard to the adequacy of Training Command.

The Minister issued a letter, which we have mentioned nearly every day here for five weeks, which was published on April 2, 1964. In the course of that letter to all the members of the armed forces, he said:

> The third and final step will be the unification of the three services. This will not be initiated until the various staffs outlined above have been established and are working effectively.

Which was a guarantee given to the people in the services. Then he went on to say:

> It is reasonable to expect that it will be three or four years before it will be possible to take this action.

That letter was issued in 1964, and, of course, three years have elapsed—this is now 1967. Just to complete the picture, on May 12, 1966, the Minister in giving evidence before the Committee spoke about the formation of Training Command on January 1, 1966, at page 20 of the evidence of that period. He said this:

> Although all the advantages of this integrated training program will not be realized fully for approximately three years, there will be substantial savings of resources and manpower in the interim.

Well, three years from January 1, 1966, would take us to 1969. Then on page 21 he went on to say this:

> Completion of this massive re-organization of the three different supply systems of the armed services into one automated system will take three to five years.

Which would carry us to 1971. My question is, in view of this evidence of the Minister, and to your knowledge of the integration that is going on, would you not consider it wise to pause for a period of three to five years from January 1, 1966, in order that the new commands might be shaken down and proved their effectiveness before proceeding to form a single unified service?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: In reply to that, I may say that I do not know what is going on really; that has been half the problem. I do not know what is going on in the services in this regard.

I would say that the first uneasiness that something was wrong was generated in my mind, by this sudden wave of retirements; that was the first thing that made me sit up and take notice, and wonder what was going on.

Naturally, knowing most of the officers—most of the senior officers in all the services—and most of the senior and intermediate officers in the army, I have avoided embarrassing them by trying to probe for information. To my mind, it has been one of the alarming aspects of the past few months, that the ordinary person just cannot find out what is really going on.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Just as a final question at this stage, Mr. Chairman—by combining the two that I have been talking about—with the tremendous loss of senior experienced officers over such a short period of time, and with what the Minister himself calls a "massive re-organization" of the supply systems of the services, would you, from your long experience in military matters, not advise a pause to re-group and sort out before proceeding to a completely new concept: namely, a single unified service?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: Certainly to what extent, as I said earlier, a very high degree of integration can be achieved in the administrative services, how effectively that is being carried out, and what stage it has now reached, I do not know. I always regarded Frank Fleury as being one of the best and soundest administrative officers we had in the army, and I was impressed by his views as to the course in which things were going.

The Training Command concept, I just do not believe will work; I cannot even see that getting off the ground. As regards the rest of it, I do not really know, but it would seem to me, in the light of the opinions expressed by those who have been associated with it, that it certainly has not shaken down to any really good working basis as of the present time.

On this particular thing, it seems to me, we are venturing into unknown waters, and taking big risks with our national security, trying new things just because they are new, and discarding practices which we know work.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Hopkins, followed by Mr. MacInnis, in the second round, and then we move on to the third round.

Mr. CHURCHILL: You can put me down for the third too.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Hopkins?

Mr. HOPKINS: General, I know you answered this question before, but when did you retire?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: 1956.

Mr. HOPKINS: During the last few years that you were in service, what was the cut-off age at which a member of the lower ranks in the army could get a commission?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I could not answer that off-hand.

Mr. HOPKINS: What I am getting at here is—and maybe I can make it more general—was there a different cut-off age for the army, air force, and navy?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: There may well have been; I could not answer that question.

Mr. HOPKINS: Do you think this was a good thing?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I do not know; the question never came up.

Mr. HOPKINS: Is there anything against making it a uniform age for promotion in all the services?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: That depends on exactly what category of promotion you are considering. I would think that in certain posts on a ship you could have a man of a bolder and probably less high physical standard and he could do it quite adequately, than you could, say, from a platoon commander of a company infantry platoon.

Mr. HOPKINS: Did you have many cases that you can recall where you had people moving from one service into another so that they could end up with a commission?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: Frankly, I do not know; I cannot recall any.

Mr. HOPKINS: The reason I am asking this is that under unification this would be more of a common factor than it has been in the past. This has been one comment that has been made to me by many people.

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: There was a practice being introduced, when I was Chief of the Defence Staff, it existed prior to World War II—in fact, it had existed a very long time—of what we call classified officers, and in static posts where the physical demands were not heavy you could have appointments and promotions from the ranks there at ages which would not be suitable, for instance, for a combat officer.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. MacInnis?

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): General, I would like to go back to Mr. Andras' opening questions and his attempt to quote what you had to say this morning in his questioning of your choice as to personnel over equipment.

I would like, if possible, for you to enlarge on your statement as I understood it this morning when you said that disciplined, trained, and efficient troops could adapt themselves very well to the new and more sophisticated equipment; is this not, in essence, what you stated this morning?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: Yes.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Once more, on Mr. Andras' approach: In the case of a national emergency would you agree that an all-out mobilization would be necessary?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: In the case of a national emergency?

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Well, in the case of war.

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I would think if NATO became involved in war, we would have to have total mobilization.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): With reference to his remarks about forces in being, I would interpret that to mean the standing forces, that is, the standing army, the air force, and the navy.

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: The regular full time forces.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): The regular forces, yes. Mr. Andras referred to this as the forces in being. Would you agree that the forces in being in Canada, whether under the three services or under the unified command, could never provide the necessary manpower without a conscription policy?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: What was the question?

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): They could never provide the necessary manpower. That is, our army, navy, and air force, as it now stands, or as it would stand under a unified force, would never have the necessary manpower for a national emergency without a conscription policy along with it.

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I cannot quite follow your line of reasoning there. Do you mean it would be impossible to recruit the size of force envisaged in this unified force voluntarily?

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Yes.

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: And you mean to create that regular element, you would have to have national service?

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): No, the regular element is there now, but under either the forces as they are now, or under unification to provide the necessary manpower for a national emergency.

As it now stands, the manpower necessities could not be provided—not even under a conscription policy—under the forces in being policy in order to build up the strength and expand, a conscription policy would be necessary.

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I would think, in the event of a major war, a national service policy in the national Department of Manpower, would be essential; I have always said so, and I have never varied from that view.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): You cannot envisage a forces in being now, as being anywhere near the requirements we would need in a national emergency?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: In a national emergency? Oh, no, it has always been that way though. No nation can continuously maintain, in being, the size—

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): I am just taking the interpretation I have derived from Mr. Andras' remarks that with the forces in being it would be necessary to have a conscription policy which appears to be in the offing.

One more question, General, and this is more or less of a legal type; you may or may not want to express an opinion on it. On the passage of Bill No. 243, could an army officer, or a service officer, immediately resign his commission without any further obligations to the services?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I do not think he could, no.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): As an army officer—

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I can tender my resignation but there is no absolute obligation for the Minister to accept it.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): What disciplinary action could be taken against a serviceman who, on unification, decided he did not join any such service but had joined the army, and he wanted out?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I would think that some special provision will have to be made for that.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Would this special provision call for a re-attestation of all service personnel to the unified force; would this cover that?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: Well, that is a legal question on a military matter, and I think you should put it to the legal experts.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, we have come to the end of the names I have on the second round of questioning. We are now starting a third round of questioning, and I have before me the names of Mr. Andras, Mr. McIntosh, Mr. Churchill, and Mr. Nugent; I will start with Mr. Andras.

Mr. ANDRAS: General Simonds, in some of the questioning this morning, and, in fact, in the questioning of other witnesses, there has been some definite evidence of inter-service rivalries that have resulted in questionable decisions. The Arrow, perhaps, is one of those, the Caribou, which we discussed this morning, is the other.

Mr. Churchill was talking about the Minister's comments about loyalties, and I think that in all fairness what the Minister meant was that a career officer in a particular service can get pretty wrapped up in his own service, and therefore promote programs for that service that might not be in the national interest. I will give you an example and ask you if you will agree that this was one. The Arrow program, or what happened to the Caribou program by virtue of air force objections to it, is that not a—

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: They can promote programs, but the government does not have to accept them. May I point out that the present tendency, I think, in the ordinary walk of business and commercial life, competition is regarded as its essence.

I can watch a television program and watch five different kinds of beer promoted on the same program; competition is regarded as the essence of our commercial and business life.

It has its wasteful aspects; there is a tremendous amount of waste and money thrown away, which the consumer eventually has to absorb, in advertising for one thing. Competition is regarded as a good thing, it promotes an esprit.

I cannot see any objection to competition between the three services; I think it is good. I think each service, just as each regiment in the army, should take a pride and regard itself as the best. If programs are promoted that may be more in the interests of one service than in the interests of the country as a whole, the final judgment rests with the government. The services only recommend; they do not decide.

Mr. ANDRAS: But there is evidence that this three chiefs of staff—the three heads of services—has resulted in some of these wasteful decisions, such as the Arrow.

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: Is there no waste and no inefficiency in any other department of the government, or any other national activity?

Mr. ANDRAS: Oh, quite so; but I am quite impressed here, for instance, again, with General Foulkes' comments where he has said in an article that he released some years ago:

> After my nine years as Chairman of the Chiefs of Staffs, trying to co-ordinate the rival services, I am convinced that we can't achieve much more by the present road. Attempts to integrate the three services by persuasion have been going on ever since 1945. They have woven a huge spider's web of committees, which are rather like foreign ministers' meetings where rival powers try to reach a compromise.

He goes on to say:

> The problem can only be solved by complete unification of the three services, with one chief of staff, one chain of command, one ladder of promotion and one uniform.

There certainly is a divergence of opinion between yours and this comment too.

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I would not say it is a divergence; it is a complete difference.

Mr. ANDRAS: That is right. Now, sir, going back to your evidence before the Committee in 1963, and to which Mr. Brewin referred this morning as producing the possibility of interpreting it as some apparent inconsistencies where you have stated that: organization should be very much like that of the United States Marine Corps

> —its organization should be very much like that of the United States Marine Corps which is a mobile force complete with all its ancillaries and able to meet what are commonly called brushfire situations.

Later on you state your objection to what would now be recognized as the term "unification", when you say:

> When it comes to the matter of integration, I am not in favour of 100 per cent integration of the three armed services, and I shall try to explain simply why.

And you go through the role of what I interpret as mainly the combat junior officer:

> Take first of all the junior officer in the army, the navy, and the air force. Their roles are in many respects completely different. The junior

naval officer on a ship has a somewhat specific role which he is going to fulfil, but he really has no role in the direction of the ship. The ship is under the control of the commander or the captain, who takes the ship in and out of battle.

You go on later:

In the air force, take the fighter formation; the pilot officer fights the airplane; he takes it off the ground and takes it on its mission.

And further on:

In the case of a junior officer in a battalion, or a platoon commander, he may be commanding from 30 to 35 men, and he must personally lead them into battle.

Now, I think the essence of your objection as stated here to the full integration which is now being called unification, is:

If you are going to train your tri-service junior officers so that everyone is capable of fulfilling these very different roles, you would not have an officer getting into service until he was about 45 years of age, if he must be an expert in doing all these things.

Well, I do not think anybody would argue with that point of view, but it has been very strongly put to us, during the hearings of this Committee, that a junior officer in a combat role—an infantry platoon commander—or a naval officer in a junior officer's rank, or an air force officer—fighter pilot and so forth—will not, in fact, be asked to fill the role of his counterpart in another combat environment. You go on to say:

It is at the higher level that I believe we need the training and co-ordination so that there would be the equivalent of the full colonel's rank in the army, and of the brigadier's and the commodore's, or the air commodore's, so that in due time the officer of every service should be so trained in the roles of the other that he could fulfil a tri-service role and have the maximum command involving all three elements.

I get the implication that at a senior officer's rank, starting with full colonel or about that area, it is very wise to introduce experience and exposure, staff college training, and environmental command experience or training in the other roles; is that correct?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: Yes, that is what I interpret as a sensible measure of integration. I think in this day and age, by the time an officer reaches the rank of full colonel or equivalent he should have a very good understanding of the role and limitations of the other services; and that he should be able, with the advice of an expert from the other service to which he does not himself belong conduct a combined operation involving all three.

That is an ideal, and it may be impossible of achievement, but if this, you might say, quiescent period continues for a long time, it would be attainable and very desirable.

Mr. ANDRAS: The reason I bring this up is because you have described to me here in this evidence of 1963, what I understand essentially the program is: That junior officers will not be diverted from their environmental training until they

reach a fairly senior rank, and then they will go into staffs so that they become more of a combined officer type of qualification.

If that is your fundamental main objection, apart from what might be repugnant to you in the sense of a single uniform or a single rank structure; if the operational objection is that one, then I submit to you that if, in fact, I am accurate in assessing that they are going to do it that way, it seems to me to remove your major objection.

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: If they are going to be a different kind of animal, why make them all look like peas from the same pod to start with? Secondly, that was an effort, you might say, to compress a philosophy into about two short paragraphs. I pointed out earlier this morning that another very essential requirement is that you should have a system which will graduate to top experts, real experts, in each of the three environments.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Andras, you are coming towards the end of your time.

Mr. ANDRAS: All right, the question in this next area is too long then. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, General.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Nugent, I notice you have not had an opportunity to question the witness today; I was wrong in thinking that you were in the third round. I will call on you now; it will be refreshing for the chair to hear a new voice here this afternoon.

Mr. NUGENT: General, the one element in this whole discussion that I think needs a little emphasis is the time element. The government seems very anxious to put this bill through now—get it done now. We have had considerable evidence before this Committee of some of the effects of integration; and a considerable amount of evidence why we should not rush. The only evidence I think that there should be any rush at all came from General Allard who suggested that if it was settled it might give a lift to morale. Can you think of any reason why if this unification is going to be done it should be done in a rush.

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I cannot think of any reason why it should be other than for possibly that reason.

As I mentioned earlier, I have sensed a considerable uneasiness and unhappiness in the services at the present time. As long as a "no decision" hangs on—those who make up their minds to sever their connection with the service or whatever they are going to do will continue in doubt and uncertainty whether they are going to stay, go or whatever it is going to be. From that point of view it probably would be advantageous to settle it once and for all; but you have other factors to consider too. I mentioned that in so far as my hearing has given me any guidance—I have heard no one say that they like this. I have heard some express: "We've got to lump it or not be a soldier no more."

Mr. NUGENT: The advantage then is that there might be some lift in morale—getting it settled but also a good chance that a great many officers perhaps now are staying—and other ranks too—are staying just in the hope that we might stop this somehow. The lift of morale to some may mean the end of a career to many more.

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: This may be.

Mr. NUGENT: There are other reasons why it should wait. We have evidence from Admiral Landymore and others on the question of the reorganization by unification being one more problem put on top of the problems that they are already dealing with in integration. Would your opinion be that this is going to complicate further the work of various staffs in trying to work out some of the problems now in integration?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I think inevitably it must complicate it and I say I am guided here in the opinions expressed by those who have been dealing with these problems in the evidence given before this Committee.

Mr. NUGENT: You would expect General, that massive reorganization such as trying to integrate supply would take a good deal of planning and a good deal of time to implement it would it not?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I would think so, yes.

Mr. NUGENT: We have had evidence of estimates of three years minimum up to five or even ten years. Do those estimates sound reasonable to you to test out an integration scheme or to put it into effect on supply?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I do not think so because I think first of all the organization has to be completed and that then you have to have a whole series, in my view, of test exercises to see how to test the whole machine and discover where the breaking point is, if any.

Mr. NUGENT: Would you say the same for the new command set ups such as Training Command, would it take a few years to put it into effect and to try it out—give it a good try—so you know whether you have something good or not.

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I think I have already expressed an opinion, in Training Command I just cannot see how it is going to work. I do not believe it will work.

Mr. NUGENT: In any event, they say the "proof of a pudding is in the eating." If it will not work it would take—or to be sure that it will not work—it would take a considerable testing period to prove that to everyone's satisfaction would is not?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: It might. May I add, I have spent a very large part of my military lifetime training men, officers—I am very much concerned with training—instructing at militia schools, instructing at Royal Military College—I started at the Canadian Staff College and people are inclined to think you can wave a wand and everything is going to turn out all right.

This Training Command structure, I would say, is fundamentally unsound.

Mr. NUGENT: What about the Mobile Command? Is it sound or unsound?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I think there may be advantages to Mobile Command.

Mr. NUGENT: Would it take a considerable amount of study—operation to prove out?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I think they need a series of very rigorous exercises to start with.

Mr. NUGENT: All of these experiments in integration which are going on now—some of them just in the planning stage—can you see any reason why the Minister should be so anxious to complicate the carrying out of these exercises or experiments of integration by putting unification on top of it at this time?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I cannot see why—no.

Mr. NUGENT: Is it your opinion that Training Command, after the staff has tried it for a while, will revert, that they will abandon this new Training Command idea.

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: It will either be abandoned or modified very, very much from what I understand is planned now.

Mr. NUGENT: Is there likely to be, in your opinion, a great change in any of these experiments in integration once they have tested them.

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I think inevitably there will be major changes—I think even in the ordinary process of the integration of the administrative services. I think it will creak and groan to begin with and it will take a good running in period to get it really going smoothly.

Mr. NUGENT: All of the arguments we have heard here in favour of unification has been based on the advantages of integration. Admiral Landymore put that out in his brief and I have noticed that the witnesses here—whenever they start to talk about unification or what it will do, every benefit they claim arises out of these experiments of integration and the benefits they hope to get from that. Is it your view that many of these experiments of integration are not going to get the benefits that they hope?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I think they may find that a lot of the expected benefits will not materialize.

Mr. NUGENT: Can you think of any benefit of unification itself.

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: Of unification?

Mr. NUGENT: Yes.

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: No. I think we lose a great deal and gain absolutely nothing by unification.

Mr. NUGENT: You can find no reason to rush into it if he wants to do it anyway?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: No. Whether we rush into it or creep into it I would not have any of it.

Mr. NUGENT: Thank you, sir.

Mr. MACINTOSH: General, was unification ever contemplated or studied while you were Chief of the General Staff.

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: No.

Mr. MACINTOSH: The word was not even thought of? It was not thought of or considered at all.

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I think probably a few military peers may have written things about it but I do not think anybody paid very much attention to them.

Mr. MACINTOSH: Was there any consideration of opting out or phasing out of present collective defence commitments given by you while you were Chief of the General Staff or by your staff.

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: No, we were just getting into it up to our necks at that period. We had reached the stage of running down the Korean war. As I mentioned earlier, we just got committed into the Korean war and that, for the time being, was the major army concern and commitment.

Then, on top of that, came the organization of NATO and for the time we had the two; the build-up in NATO and Korea to take care of as well.

Then, with the ultimate settlement of Korea—we ran down the Korean commitment and it became a minor thing and NATO became the all-important one.

At that period there was not any talk of diminishing these commitments in the future. In most cases with the NATO pressures we were doing more than we were already doing or planning to do.

Mr. MACINTOSH: Have you, since your retirement, General, ever attempted to discuss this topic of unification with the present Minister or any of the present Cabinet?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I had expressed my views at the time to some people.

Mr. MACINTOSH: Has your expert advice been sought by any of these people?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I would not say it has been sought by them—no.

Mr. MACINTOSH: But you did make attempts to give it?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I have on occasions given my views.

Mr. MACINTOSH: Earlier this morning you said that Canada's defence—I forget the words that you used—it started, say, some place far from Canada's shores. You were referring to Europe I would imagine at that time. In order to do that we must have co-operation from other forces.

Since your retirement and since this subject of unification of the Canadian forces has come up, have you ever had the opportunity to discuss this with any of your former colleagues in military matters as to what would be Canada's position if unification was passed? What do our allies think about. Could you enlighten us on that?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I can say that certain of the senior officers in the allied countries that I regard as old friends—a good many of them are retired now like myself—they think we are nuts.

Mr. MACINTOSH: Are they alarmed abut what would take place within the present alliances if Canada does adopt this policy or does it concern them.

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I think they realize that there is going to have to be an adjustment.

Mr. MACINTIOSH: Can you tell us from which countries your friends were from?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I would prefer not to say that.

Mr. MACINTOSH: Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions.

Mr. CHURCHILL: General Simonds, in the paper that you and General Vokes submitted on August 31, 1966, on page 3 at the bottom of the page you say this:

> In war, naval, army and air forces do not always act in combination. There are occasions upon which they must fight alone in their own element.

You go on to suggest that certain integration of command and staff is essential for combined operations. With all your experience and with General Vokes' experience in warfare you have made that statement but are you aware that the Minister on December 7, 1966, at page 10831 of *Hansard* informed the House of Commons and I quote:

> The pattern of warfare in which armies fought armies, navies fought navies, and air forces fought air forces is not likely to be repeated.

We are faced now as a Committee with the weight of your opinion and that of General Vokes as against the Minister's. Do you still stand by your statement of August 31, that there are occasions upon which they must fight alone in their own element?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I do. Take for example, the anti-submarine role, the naval anti-submarine role; that involves an air element as well but it does not involve the army at all. The maintenance of sea communications is primarily a naval responsibility. There has been talk, for instance, of abandoning the anti-submarine role of the navy.

What is our position going to be if say, the United States is involved in hostilities and their shipping is being attacked by submarines that are harbouring up in our own waters and they say to us: "Unless you take care of the situation we will come in and take care of it for you." I do not think that is a position where you can claim you have much of your national sovereignty left.

Mr. CHURCHILL: The difficulty that we are faced with, General, is this: The Minister considers that people like myself—I do not know whether he puts you in the same category—having had the misfortune of participating in World War I are considerably out of date. He talks about the demands of modern warfare. He has taken pains to point this out to me in the House that I really do not understand these things. I bow to his superior wisdom of course but I would like to hear from you with regard to these things. With your experience of world war II and Korea and your knowledge of what is going on in South Viet Nam at the present moment, except for greater mobility and some improved weapons, do you see a major change in modern warfare in contrast with Korea and world war II?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I cannot see any revolution developing. There are all sorts of technical changes that make equipment more efficient in certain respects. To take a simple example and I am not 100 per cent up to date now—to what extent, for instance, smoke today will provide a cover for armour in fighting in the light of the use of infra-red detection I just do not know off-hand, but it is bound to have some effect. It will be less effective than it was in world war II by virtue of the development of infra-red fighting equipment and things of that kind. These are all changes in degree but in the light of what is going on

in Viet Nam now, as I mentioned earlier, on the material side there is nothing that the American forces require that they do not have. Ultimately, so far as the man is concerned, it depends on the infantry soldier with the various other elements he has to assist him to get there. The final decisive act is who is the bailiff in possession of the land. This is the issue the United States are now trying to settle in South Viet Nam.

Mr. CHURCHILL: The Minister makes quite a bit about what he called the demands of modern warfare and he says this:

> The White Paper of 1964 would not have recommended integration as a first step toward a single service if we had not been certain of the improved capacity of a unified force to meet the demands of modern warfare.

In other words, he is saying that a single unified service is better fitted to meet the demands of modern warfare than the tri-services under combined operations that we have known in the past. Do you agree with the Minister's statement?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: No, I disagree with it.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I would like to ask one other question with regard to a subject which has come up from time to time—peacekeeping and peace restoring. If you go through the Minister's statement, the White Paper and these other things you find somewhere or other these words used. We have to be very alert. I find that the Minister has used the word "peace-restoring" as well as the word "peacekeeping" on page 10832 of *Hansard*. I would just like to ask a question with regard to that. First, may I say this. My conception of peacekeeping is what we have been doing in the Gaza Strip and in Cyprus. In other words, no shots are being fired, no Canadians are shooting anyone or killing anyone nor are they being shot at, and we hope they will not be. They are operating what I consider to be a police role. But when we come to peace-restoring—and I am sorry that Mr.—oh, Mr. Brewin is here. Mr. Brewin is becoming very aggressive with regard to peace-restoring and I have been getting worried about him. Peace-restoring in my conception is intervention where there is an armed conflict going on and the putting down of that armed conflict by engaging in conflict yourself which would mean shooting and being shot at. Do you make that same distinction between peacekeeping and peace-restoring?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: The term peace-restoring—and I have only heard of it very recently—I think we always used to call that war.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I just have one final question. The purpose of maintaining armed forces is to meet what we all hope we never have to meet—warfare—which involves killing and running the risk of being killed. Primarily, then, would you say that the purpose of all our work with respect to the armed forces is to prepare for fighting efficiency? To prepare the combat troops to perform efficiently on the field of battle or on the sea or in the air? Is that the end purpose of all our efforts?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: Yes; to be able to secure a victory in their favour at the cheapest possible cost in human life.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, I have come to the end of the list I have—

Mr. HARKNESS: Mr. Chairman, I have a question. General Simonds one of the chief arguments made throughout with regard to the advantages of unification is that it will provide a great deal more flexibility. My own view is that it will provide a great deal less flexibility as far as meeting the various contingencies which our forces might have to meet in the future is concerned. Particularly, it will provide considerably less flexibility in meeting the peacekeeping operations it is called on to undertake and which vary in every case. It requires different types of personnel and different types of forces. I was wondering what your views were in regard to this argument as far as flexibility is concerned.

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: The only interpretation I can place on that is that contrary to the assurances given the intention is to transfer people from one environment to another. In other words, if we have to send a battalion off to Cyprus and there are not enough soldiers we will add airmen to it or sailors. If flexibility is interpreted it in that sense, I can understand what they mean. But, on the other hand, that very same thing has been contradicted several times this afternoon; it is not going to be done. So if that is not going to be done I cannot see where the argument for greater flexibility comes in.

Mr. HARKNESS: As a matter of fact, the contention is to provide greater flexibility for carrying out the various roles which result from the defence aims and objectives; in other words, when the defence policy is freshly laid down. As I stated, in my view, just the reverse is the case. If there were three forces you would have a great deal more flexibility than you would with a single unified force. It was really on this point that I was asking your views.

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I would agree with you. I think with three properly specialized forces you have greater flexibility in adopting to the various roles than you would with a single one.

Mr. PUGH: General Simonds, I have attended here fairly faithfully, not as a member of the Committee, but just because I wanted to find out what was going on. You made a remark this morning with regard to morale, the sort of backlash of the talk on unification down through officers and so on in the services. I was wondering what your opinion is with regard to an officer who has a command —say, a senior officer regardless of which force; what is his duty if he feels that there is a question of morale? How should he go about it?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I think he has to report it to his superior.

Mr. PUGH: What would he report?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: He should certainly make a point of seeing him and saying that he thought the morale of his unit was deteriorating for whatever the reasons may be. Regardless of the cause, I think a commanding officer who knows or believes the morale in his unit is deteriorating and does not report it, is not doing his duty.

Mr. PUGH: Well, sir, I do not know whether you read Admiral Landymore's evidence given before this Committee. A question was raised of whether he had a right to do this or not to do this. What is your view on that?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: In so far as reporting to his superior is concerned, as I have said before, I think it is his duty.

Mr. PUGH: His duty?

Mr. MacINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Is it not his duty to try in his own way to correct the problem which brought about the lowering in morale? In other words, if he understands the cause of poor morale and can see his way clear to correct that cause, is this not his first duty?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: I think the morale of a unit or formation is the first consideration of a commander. I saw a reference at one point that the morale of personnel was not within the sphere of command, but it is 90 per cent of it. If you do not have morale in a force you have nothing. I do not know how many of you here would have read many of the late Lord Wavell's writings. He was very strong on this point and he said that officers should not waste their time studying manuals on whether forces are operating on interior or exterior line or things like that, but what was of interest was to try to discover how a comparatively unknown young man led a half-starved, ill-equipped, badly-clothed force—referring to Napoleon—and defeated what was regarded as the most effective army in Europe. The whole thing, of course, hinges on the morale that you generate within your force. If you do not have a force of high morale from a fighting point of view you have absolutely nothing. You may have all the equipment in the world—

Mr. BREWIN: In respect to that I think you said in your previous testimony, General Simonds, that one of the reasons you put emphasis on peacekeeping as being an important role—it is certainly not the only one—was because it gave to those concerned the morale that was built on thinking they were doing something vitally important. Do you agree with that?

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: Yes, I agree with that. There is nothing in that to contradict the statement I just made.

Mr. BREWIN: Oh, no, I appreciate that. I just wanted to get your opinion.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, we have been examining General Simonds for upwards of four hours and certainly this is indicative of his toughness as a General that he was able to withstand it all so well, and your toughness as politicians that you were able to withstand it all so well. I want to thank him on your behalf for being here and giving us so much of his time today.

The time is now 5.30. When the Steering Committee held a meeting this morning they did not conclude with the steering committee report and it was the hope that the Steering Committee would meet later this day. One member of the Steering Committee is absent who I think would like to be present at the second meeting if that can be arranged later today.

An hon. MEMBER: Two are absent.

The CHAIRMAN: Two are absent right now, are they?

There was, I believe, concurrence—I will not say concurrence, but I believe concurrence—that if we finished with General Simonds we would go on to discuss some of the clauses of the bill that are not concerned with unification which would be the clauses dealing with courts martial, fines and the like. To this end, in case we had finished earlier this afternoon, I had asked the members of the Judge Advocate General's branch to stand by. The Judge Advocate General was here this afternoon, and while he has been waiting to see whether

or not he would be called, he has made a list of those clauses which are not related to unification, which I think would be useful to us. I would like to make the suggestion to you that perhaps this would be a good time for us to adjourn for the dinner hour, that we meet this evening, that we ask the Judge Advocate General if he could come back this evening, and that we take a look at this list, mark it on our copies of the bill, and see whether or not we can make progress with some of these clauses not related to unification. We are going to have to deal with them sooner or later in the course of dealing with the bill, so perhaps we can make some progress with that, without prejudice to the clauses which deal with unification.

Before the evening is out perhaps we can meet those members of the Steering Committee who are absent now, and come to some conclusions at the Steering Committee meeting and report back to you. Does that sound like a reasonable way to proceed?

Mr. NUGENT: You are, of course, leaving open the question of the other witnesses?

The CHAIRMAN: I am leaving the whole subject open until we have an opportunity to have a meeting of the Steering Committee—the second one today. Does that sound like a reasonable way of proceeding, gentlemen? Thank you very much.

Lieut.-General SIMONDS: Mr. Chairman, I would like to express my appreciation for the consideration you have shown to me in my testimony here today. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN: We will adjourn until 8 o'clock tonight.

EVENING SITTING

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Brewin and members of the subcommittee, just before I came over I had a talk with Mr. Lambert who wants to remain in the House because of the bank bill in which he is considerably interested. He agreed that if there were a Steering Committee meeting it should be tomorrow. Are you going to be available tomorrow? Mr. Lambert will be available tomorrow. Mr. McNulty will you be available tomorrow in the morning? All right, we will withdraw ourselves from the room for a while or we will meet right after the orders of the day but we will get it done before noon. I do not see Mr. Andras at the moment but that seems to be agreeable.

It was suggested before the dinner hour and before the vote took place in the House that we would proceed tonight to deal with clauses not related to unification and during the afternoon Brigadier Lawson and his staff compiled a list of clauses which, in their estimation, are not related to unification. Now I understand that Mr. Lambert has also produced a similar list. They may not be exact and, in fact, the list of clauses you have before you which are considered not related to unification you may consider related in some way or you may not want to deal with these now. May I suggest that as a means of proceeding we take up these clauses to see whether or not we can deal with them in the order in

which they appear and if they will carry let them carry. If they are not relative to unification and we can carry these tonight let us carry them. If, for any reason, you think a clause should stand, just let us know the clause you want stood for later discussion either when the Minister is here or at a later time. Let us just put it that the word of anyone in the Committee to stand a clause tonight and not to carry it for any reason at all is sufficient to set that aside and we will make progress on those clauses on which we can work. Does that appear to be satisfactory?

Mr. McINTOSH: Mr. Chairman, as far as I am concerned I object to all of them because—

The CHAIRMAN: You object to all of them?

Mr. McINTOSH: —the change is from navy, air force and army to Canadian Forces and if we agree to that we are agreeing in principle to clause 1.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. McIntosh I think if you look at the list we are beginning at renumbered clause 12, old clause 9 on page 6 of the bill. Have you the renumbered list?

Mr. McINTOSH: No, I have not got one. I had the old one.

On Clause 12—*By Treasury Board*

The CHAIRMAN: I wonder is there a copy of that for Mr. McIntosh? He apparantly does not have the bill we have been working with.

Mr. McINTOSH: I have the bill you have been working with but not the amended bill.

The CHAIRMAN: Do you have the one in which the clauses are renumbered, Mr. McIntosh? I believe that on a couple of occasions the bill with the amendments pasted into it and with the clauses renumbered, has been distributed to everybody. Is there anyone here who has not seen this copy of the bill and has not received the copy with the amendments pasted in and renumbered? If you have the old printed bill with you, clause 9 will be renumbered 12 because of amendments which appear earlier before clause 9. So if you would number that one 12 that is the only change made in that clause. If you look at that clause it reads:

> The Treasury Board may make regulations prescribing the rates and conditions of issue of pay and allowances of officers and men and the forfeitures and deductions to which the pay and allowances of officers and men are subject.

This is a typical clause among those which were set out by the Judge Advocate General in the list which you have as clauses not dealing with unification and in which no phrases appear, I believe, that are consequential upon the unification clauses. I just wonder, Mr. McIntosh, in light of that, whether we could not have concurrence to deal with these clauses tonight?

Mr. McINTOSH: As far as I am concerned, if it does not mention Canadian Forces or does not delete army, navy or air force I see nothing wrong in it. Except, as I said the other day, I do not want to condemn or commit the accessory before the accused is tried.

The CHAIRMAN: I am just asking if we can have the concurrence of gentlemen here to deal with these non-contentious ones not dealing with unification on that basis. Shall Clause 12 carry?

Clause 12 agreed to.

Clauses 13, 19 and 23 agreed to.

On Clause 24.

The CHAIRMAN: That is old clause 21 on page 13. The point was raised by Mr. Nugent that the words "or suspected" would be more legal and phrased better if they were to read "reason to believe" and notice of this was sent to the Judge Advocate General. I wonder whether your office is prepared to bring that forward as an amendment or are you studying that?

Brigadier M. J. LAWSON (*Judge Advocate General, CFHQ*): I prefer to let it stand, Mr. Chairman. I think the amendment is a good one but I would like to be sure.

The CHAIRMAN: Shall we stand that clause pending information from the Judge Advocate General's department?

Clause 24 stood.

Clause 25 agreed to.

On Clause 26—*Drunkenness*

The CHAIRMAN: You would like clause 26 stood, Mr. Forrestall?

Mr. FORRESTALL: Yes, please.

The CHAIRMAN: This is the one that deals with the question of drunkenness and whether or not these regulations are too tough, is that right?

Mr. FORRESTALL: That is right.

The CHAIRMAN: This is a subject that came up when we went through it before. I think it might be useful when clauses are being stood if the reasons for their being stood could be expressed so the Judge Advocate General could know what he is dealing with. When they come around again perhaps they would have had a second look.

Mr. FORRESTALL: I would suggest the Judge Advocate General's branch take a second long, hard look at this two years for slipping a little bit once in a while. It seems rather stringent. Simply by using other qualifying words it might be possible to change it so as to make quite clear that while it is there, it might never be imposed.

Mr. LAWSON: I would point out, Mr. Forrestall, there is no change in the offence or in the penalty. The only real change is that we now have a definition which we did not have before. I might say really this is taken from an amendment made to the Army Act a few years ago. It was traditional in the UK Army Act they did not have any definition but they found it necessary to have one and we picked it up and thought it was a very sensible amendment. That is why we are suggesting the amendment be made now.

Mr. FORRESTALL: I do not like to prolong this now because there are others we could get through without any trouble tonight, but it seems to me that there is no penalty that extreme in civilian street for drunkenness, is there?

Mr. LAWSON: Oh no, but drunkenness on duty can be an extremely serious offence. If a man were charged with preparing an aircraft for flight and he was drunk and did not do his job properly this could be a very serious offence.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Yes, of course it is, I am not suggesting it is not. I am just suggesting that you will not find drunken people working on aircraft or flying them.

Mr. LAWSON: We hope not.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Well, you will not. If the Committee wants to vote on it they can vote and pass it. I would ask that they take another look at it. I think it is much much too strong. I think it should be qualified.

The CHAIRMAN: We are in no hurry to pass the clause tonight and I think we could pass it.

Mr. BROWN: I would like to say we are in no position to throw stones.

Mr. LEGAULT: Mr. Chairman, do I understand that it could be less than two years so that the punishment would be decided by the seriousness of the offence?

Mr. LAWSON: Yes.

Mr. LEGAULT: So whether the clause is too severe in this case depends upon the man himself?

Mr. FORRESTALL: A year and 264 days in the hoosegow seems pretty close to two years to me and an awful long time.

Mr. LEGAULT: Yes, but it depends on the seriousness of the offence.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Yes, I agree.

Mr. LEGAULT: Are you ready to say that whoever was judging the act would act accordingly? It might be a question of two or three days.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, we had some discussion on this and our agreement was if a clause was to be stood we would indicate why and then stand it for further discussion. So shall we pass on to clause 27 which deals with disobedience of captain's orders and command in a ship?

Clause 26 stood.

Clauses 27, 28, 30, 31, 33, 34, 42, 43 and 44 agreed to.

On Clause 45—*New trial*

Mr. NUGENT: I would like to stand that.

The CHAIRMAN: Clause 45 stands. Have you anything that you want to say to the Judge Advocate General on that subject at the moment?

Mr. NUGENT: It is that change to "any appropriate charge" that I would just like to consider for a while. I have forgotten what we do in courts, whether this is general or not. It just seems a little odd to me that instead of retrial on the same charge it gives them a second crack at it on a different charge. I am not sure I feel very happy about that change.

Clause 45 stood.

Clauses 46 and 47 agreed to.

On Clause 48—*Duties or tolls on roads, bridges, etc.*

Mr. McINTOSH: I would like to find out how much money is involved in this.

The CHAIRMAN: You want to know how much money is involved and some details with regard to these tolls?

Mr. McINTOSH: Right.

Clause 48 stood.

Clauses 51, 59, 60 and 61 agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN: That brings us to the end of the non-unification clauses.

Mr. NUGENT: Mr. Chairman, on clause 51 I was trying to find a note I had here. We passed it, but I wonder if I could ask a question?

On Clause 51—*Offences committed outside Canada.*

Mr. NUGENT: It seems to me that this amendment, which is for the purpose of clarifying the jurisdiction of the civil courts in Canada, is so wide in its present form that a person could be tried in Canada for an offence in another country which, by the law of that country, would not be an offence there but it might be in Canada. I just wondered whether you had looked at that possibility. Does this make a person coming back into Canada liable to punishment under the laws of Canada for doing something which he could legally do, say, in Germany?

Mr. LAWSON: No, it could not, sir. Indeed, this only can apply to people who are subject to the code of service discipline and they are subject, of course, wherever they are to Canadian law. The only purpose of this section is to enable us to bring a civilian back to Canada and try him rather than trying him overseas; to try him in an ordinary civil court in Canada rather than by court martial.

Mr. NUGENT: That was in my mind and I just want to be reassured on it; thank you.

The CHAIRMAN: Now, gentlemen, we might go on further tonight but I could only do so with the unanimous consent, I think, of those persons here because we still have the matter raised by some of you in regard to—

Mr. SMITH: Are there any stood clauses, Mr. Chairman, that we could deal with tonight?

The CHAIRMAN: Let us take them. Let us go back to Mr. Forrestall's clause, new clause number 24, which would be old clause 21.

Mr. FORRESTALL: That is not mine.

The CHAIRMAN: Oh, excuse me, that is Mr. Nugent's. Now, the Judge Advocate General said he thinks there is merit in this but he wants an opportunity to discuss it with the Justice Department, I think. This should stand; we cannot do anything with that one.

On Clause 26—*Drunkenness*

The CHAIRMAN: This was the one dealing with fines on drunkenness to which Mr. Forrestall raised an objection. Can we make progress with that?

Mr. FORRESTALL: There are two things about this, Mr. Chairman. I am not adamant about it at all but it seems to me that the punishment is severe, particularly in the second part where it says:

> where the offence is committed by a man who is not on active service or on duty *or who has not been warned for duty,* no punishment of imprisonment, and no punishment of detention for a term in excess of ninety days, shall be imposed.

Not even in our civil courts do we go to that extent. If the crime is that serious then, indeed, different information is laid or a more serious charge. It just seems to me, Brigadier—and you will have to take my layman's knowledge of these things—to be wrong from a human rights point of view.

Mr. LAWSON: Well, Mr. Forrestall, you must remember that this is the maximum punishment designed to deal with the worst possible case. There are many charges of drunkenness tried every year in the forces. I would say that the average penalty is about $5 or $10 fine or confinement to barracks for a few days, or something like this. It would have to be a very serious case, indeed, for any detention to be awarded. If there were detention awarded it would be detention for a few days, normally. But, of course, you can get cases that are really bad and you might want to give a man 30 days or 60 days. In fact, I cannot recall ever hearing about a case where the maximum of 90 days was awarded for drunkenness not on duty. In most cases there is a very short period of detention and normally a small fine.

Mr. LEGAULT: Mr. Chairman, how about repeaters or such, is that the maximum fine?

Mr. LAWSON: That is the sort of thing, where the man is a constant repeater and you have to give him heavier and heavier sentences. But even there I do not recall ever seeing a sentence of 90 days for drunkenness.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Nor two years.

The CHAIRMAN: I just wonder if there are comments from other members here with respect to this clause?

Mr. SMITH: I think the periods of 90 days and two years are both maximums. For that reason I do not think as maximum sentences they are excessive. We have in the Criminal Code sentences of 14 years maximum and not one time in 500 is the maximum sentence given. Particularly with regard to the drunkenness on duty, I know our military experience goes a long way back, but I have seen this and had to deal in some aspect with drunkenness of a sufficient quality that deserved very close to the maximum. This is not very often, it is true, but you have to look at this as being the maximum. I do not think that the maximum sentences are really out of line with similar provisions in civil law.

The CHAIRMAN: Are there any further comments on this? Order, order please. Gentlemen, let us have a little order so we can make some progress with this. Are there any others who want to comment on this before we return to Mr. Forrestall?

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): One short question, what would a man get—let us say a sailor—who hits the rear admiral in the face three times in a row?

Mr. LAWSON: He would not be charged with drunkenness?

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): No? Oh. They have a special clause for that.

The CHAIRMAN: Keel hauling is what that is called.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Mr. Chairman, if it can be confirmed, that is fine. But may I ask whether somebody can confirm whether or not the maximum penalty for drunk or disorderly conduct in civilian courts does, indeed, go that far? My recollection of—

Mr. SMITH: If I might be permitted to say so, I believe the maximum sentence for drunkenness, which is purely a civilian offence and its counterpart is the offence of drunkenness while not on duty, is 90 days. The drunk on duty, as I understand it, is a purely military offence. If a man is drunk on duty in your factory you fire him. Therefore, the two years covers a purely military offence. The second part of the amendment is what we call "common drunk" and three months is, I think, the maximum.

Mr. FORRESTALL: All right, Mr. Chairman. It just seems to me—

The CHAIRMAN: Shall clause 26 carry?

Clause 26 agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN: There are two others here, clause 45, that is old clause 42, at the foot of page 19. The Judge Advocate General tells me, Mr. Nugent, that he thinks you have good reason to want to look into this clause again and he asks that it be stood so he can consult with the Justice Department. Would that be agreeable to you for the moment?

Mr. NUGENT: I think so; thank you.

The CHAIRMAN: That gets us down now to clause 48 and that is the one dealing with duties or tolls on roads and bridges. We cannot make progress with this until we get the Judge Advocate General's assessment of what the size of this is for Mr. McIntosh.

Mr. FOY: I think he described it the other day.

Mr. MCINTOSH: No. I told the Clerk it is not necessary for anything under $50 a month. So you do not have to go back for 25 cent and 50 cent payments.

The CHAIRMAN: That brings us to the end of the work we can do tonight without dealing either with the consequential clauses or the main clauses. I am at the disposal of the Committee.

An hon. MEMBER: I think we should adjourn now.

Mr. NUGENT: Unless there is to be a discussion of how we proceed from here, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Nugent, Mr. Lambert who is very much interested in the banking bill would, I think, want to be present at the Steering Committee meeting. We discussed this in the House and he was prepared to let it go until tomorrow morning. If the gentlemen here agree, the Steering Committee will meet before 12 o'clock tomorrow and be in a position to report to you before you rise tomorrow morning. We are really not in a position to meet again until we have a report of the Steering Committee, are we? Having made progress tonight with this we are at rather an impasse now until the meeting of the Steering Committee can take place.

Mr. NUGENT: Let us all sleep in tomorrow so we can get in great shape. It is a great day tomorrow, you know.

An hon. MEMBER: What day is it?

Mr. NUGENT: St. Patrick's Day. If you want to go a long time in the evening we do not want to start too early in the morning.

Mr. ANDRAS: Mr. Chairman, without prejudice to the matter to be dealt with by the Steering Committee, would there be any interest in having the Minister appear? I think, Mr. Brewin mentioned earlier in the week that he wanted to question the Minister.

Mr. BREWIN: Unfortunately, I will not be here tomorrow.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I do not think we should attempt to meet tomorrow morning, Mr. Chairman; we have done pretty well this week.

The CHAIRMAN: The meeting is adjourned to the call of the Chair after a Steering Committee meeting to be held some time tomorrow.

HOUSE OF COMMONS

First Session—Twenty-seventh Parliament

1966-67

STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. GRANT DEACHMAN

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 35

MONDAY, MARCH 20, 1967

TUESDAY, MARCH 21, 1967

Respecting

Bill C-243, An Act to amend the National Defence Act and other Acts in consequence thereof.

WITNESSES:

Air Chief Marshal F. R. Miller; and Brigadier W. J. Lawson, Judge Advocate General.

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY
OTTAWA, 1967

26025—1

STANDING COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. Grant Deachman

Vice-Chairman: Hon. Marcel Lambert

Mr. Brewin,	Mr. Latulippe,	Mr. McIntosh,
Mr. Byrne,	Mr. Legault,	Mr. McNulty,
Mr. Churchill,	Mr. Lessard,	Mr. Nugent,
Mr. Crossman,	[1]Mr. Loiselle,	Mr. Rochon,
[1]Mr. Ethier,	[1]Mr. Macaluso,	Mr. Smith,
Mr. Forrestall,	Mr. MacInnis	[1]Mr. Stafford,
Mr. Foy,	(*Cape Breton South*),	Mr. Winch—(24).
Mr. Hopkins,	[1]Mr. MacRae,	

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

[1] Replaced Messrs. Andras, Ethier, Harkness, Langlois (*Chicoutimi*) and Reid on March 20, 1967.

ORDER OF REFERENCE

HOUSE OF COMMONS,

MONDAY, March 20, 1967.

Ordered,—That the names of Messrs. Loiselle, Macaluso and Stafford be substituted for those of Messrs. Reid, Andras and Ethier on the Standing Committee on National Defence.

Ordered,—That the names of Messrs. Ethier and MacRae be substituted for those of Messrs. Langlois (*Chicoutimi*) and Harkness on the Standing Committee on National Defence.

Attest.

LÉON-J. RAYMOND,
The Clerk of the House of Commons.

26025—1½

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

MONDAY, March 20, 1967.
(70)

The Standing Committee on National Defence met at 4:05 p.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Grant Deachman, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Brewin, Byrne, Churchill, Crossman, Deachman, Forrestall, Foy, Harkness, Hopkins, Legault, Lessard, Loiselle, Macaluso, MacInnis (*Cape Breton South*), McIntosh, McNulty, Nugent, Rochon, Stafford and Mr. Winch (20).

In attendance: From the Department of National Defence: Honourable Paul Hellyer, Minister; Honourable Léo Cadieux, Associate Minister; Mr. E. B. Armstrong, Deputy Minister; Air Marshal F. R. Sharp, Vice Chief Defence Staff; Brigadier W. J. Lawson, Judge Advocate General.

The Chairman read the Fourteenth Report of the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure which is as follows:

"Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure

MONDAY, March 20, 1967.

FOURTEENTH REPORT

Your Subcommittee met to recommend the schedule for meetings of the Committee during the week of March 20, 1967.

The following was the unanimous recommendation of the Subcommittee, subject to final confirmation with the members who were absent:

1. This afternoon (March 20) spent on discussion of amendments to clauses of the Bill.
2. This evening spent on examination of Air Chief Marshal Miller, if available as a witness.
3. Tuesday morning (March 21)—continuation and conclusion of the examination of Air Chief Marshal Miller.
4. Tuesday afternoon—Clause-by-clause consideration of Bill C-243.
5. Tuesday evening—the same as afternoon sitting.
6. Wednesday afternoon (March 22)—final consideration of Bill C-243 and the carrying of all Clauses, and reporting of the Bill out of Committee not later than 5.00 p.m."

It was moved by Mr. Foy, seconded by Mr. McNulty and agreed, that the motion of Mr. Andras dated March 9, 1967 be withdrawn.

Following discussion of the Fourteenth Report of the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure, it was moved by Mr. Byrne, seconded by Mr. Lessard, that the Report be adopted. The Committee agreed unanimously to stand this motion.

Mr. Byrne asked for permission to withdraw his motion but there was no unanimous consent.

Clause 2

It was moved by Mr. McNulty, seconded by Mr. Lessard,

That Bill C-243, an Act to amend the *National Defence Act* and other Acts in consequence thereof, be amended by striking out line 13 on page 2 thereof and substituting therefor the following:

"Canada under the United Nations Charter, the North Atlantic Treaty or any other similar instrument".

Clause 2 was allowed to stand.

Clause 4

It was moved by Mr. McNulty, seconded by Mr. Lessard, That Bill C-243, an Act to amend the *National Defence Act* and other Acts in consequence thereof, be amended by striking out clause 4 on page 3 thereof and substituting therefor the following:

4. Section 22 of the said Act is repealed and the following substituted therefor:

"22. (1) For the purposes of this Act, the ranks of the officers and men of the Canadian Forces shall be as set out in Column I of the Schedule.

(2) The Governor in Council may make regulations prescribing the circumstances in which a person holding a rank set out in Column I of the Schedule shall use, or be referred to by, a designation of rank set out in Column II, III or IV of the Schedule opposite the rank held by him."

Clause 4 was allowed to stand.

Clause 5

It was moved by Mr. McNulty, seconded by Mr. Lessard, That Bill C-243, an Act to amend the *National Defence Act* and other Acts in consequence thereof, be amended by striking out subclause (1) of clause 5 on page 3 thereof and substituting therefor the following:

"5.(1) The Services known before the coming into force of this Part as the Royal Canadian Navy, the Canadian Army and the Royal Canadian Air Force are embodied in the Canadian Forces."

Clause 5 was allowed to stand.

Clause 6

It was moved by Mr. McNulty, seconded by Mr. Lessard, That Bill C-243, an Act to amend the *National Defence Act* and other Acts in consequence thereof, be amended

(a) by striking out lines 20 and 21 on page 4 thereof and substituting therefor the following: "Army or Royal Canadian Air Force set out in Column II, III or IV respectively of Schedule A shall, on the coming into force of"; and

(b) by striking out "Column IV" in line 23 on page 4 thereof and substituting therefor "Column I".

Clause 6 was allowed to stand.

Clause 8

It was moved by Mr. McNulty, seconded by Mr. Lessard, That Bill C-243, an Act to amend the *National Defence Act* and other Acts in consequence thereof, be amended by striking out subclause (8) of clause 8 on pages 5 and 6 thereof and substituting therefor the following:

(8) Section 2 of the said Act is further amended by adding thereto, immediately after paragraph (36) thereof, the following paragraph:

"(36a) "subordinate officer" means a person who holds the rank of officer cadet;"

Clause 8 was allowed to stand.

New Clauses 9, 10 and 11

It was moved by Mr. McNulty, seconded by Mr. Lessard, That Bill C-243, an Act to amend the *National Defence Act* and other Acts in consequence thereof, be amended

(a) by adding thereto, immediately after clause 8 thereof, the following clauses:

9. Section 6 and 6A of the said Act are repealed and the following substituted therefor:

"6. The Governor General may at any time by commission under the Great Seal appoint an Associate Minister of National Defence who shall exercise and perform such of the powers, duties and functions of the Minister as may be assigned to him by the Governor in Council."

10. Subsection (2) of section 7 of the said Act is repealed.

11. Subsection (2) of section 8 of the said Act is repealed; and

(b) by renumbering clauses 9 to 61 as 12 to 64, respectively.

New Clauses 9, 10 and 11 were allowed to stand.

Renumbered Clause 16

It was moved by Mr. McNulty, seconded by Mr. Lessard, that Bill C-243, an Act to amend the *National Defence Act* and other Acts in consequence thereof, be amended by striking out the renumbered clause 16 on page 7 thereof, and substituting therefor the following:

"16. Section 28 of the said Act is repealed and the following substituted therefor:

"28. An officer or man may be attached or seconded to another component of the Canadian Forces or to any department or agency of government, any public or private institution, private industry or any other body in such manner and under such conditions as are prescribed in any other Act or in regulations, but no officer or man of the reserve force who is not serving on active service shall without his consent be attached or seconded pursuant to this section."

Renumbered Clause 16 was allowed to stand.

Renumbered Clause 17

It was moved by Mr. McNulty, seconded by Mr. Lessard, that Bill C-243, an Act to amend the *National Defence Act* and other Acts in consequence thereof, be amended by striking out lines 26, 27, 28 and 29 on page 7 thereof and by substituting therefor the following:

"(b) in consequence of any action undertaken by Canada under the United Nations Charter, the North Atlantic Treaty or any other similar instrument for collective defence that may be entered into by Canada".

Renumbered Clause 17 was allowed to stand.

Renumbered Clause 24

It was moved by Mr. McNulty, seconded by Mr. Lessard, that Bill C-243, an Act to amend the *National Defence Act* and other Acts in consequence thereof, be amended by striking out clause 24 on page 13 thereof and substituting the following:

24. Paragraph (b) of section 80 of the said Act is repealed and the following substituted therefor:

"(b) fails to take any steps in his power to cause the apprehension of a person whom he knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, to be a deserter."

Renumbered Clause 24 was allowed to stand.

New Clause 62

It was moved by Mr. McNulty, seconded by Mr. Lessard, that Bill C-243, an Act to amend the *National Defence Act* and other Acts in consequence thereof, be amended by

(a) adding thereto, immediately after clause 61 thereof, the following clause:

"62. The said Act is further amended by adding thereto the Schedule set out in Schedule A"; and

(b) by renumbering clauses 62 to 64 as 63 to 65 respectively.

New Clause 62 was allowed to stand.

Renumbered Clause 63

It was moved by Mr. McNulty, seconded by Mr. Lessard, that Bill C-243, an Act to amend the *National Defence Act* and other Acts in consequence thereof,

be amended by striking out the word "and" at the end of paragraph (a) of the renumbered clause 63 on page 26 thereof, by adding the word "and" at the end of paragraph (b) thereof and by adding thereto the following paragraph:

(c) any rank set out in Column II, III or IV of Schedule A is mentioned or referred to, such mention or reference shall be construed as including a mention of or reference to the rank set out opposite that rank in Column I of Schedule A.

Renumbered Clause 63 was allowed to stand.

Amended Schedule A

It was moved by Mr. McNulty, seconded by Mr. Lessard,

That Schedule A on page 28 be deleted, and that the following be inserted therefor:

SCHEDULE A.

I	II	III	IV
		OFFICERS	
1. General	Admiral	General	Air Chief Marshal
2. Lieutenant-General	Vice-Admiral	Lieutenant-General	Air Marshal
3. Major-General	Rear-Admiral	Major-General	Air Vice-Marshal
4. Brigadier-General	Commodore	Brigadier	Air Commodore
5. Colonel	Captain	Colonel	Group Captain
6. Lieutenant-Colonel	Commander	Lieutenant-Colonel	Wing Commander
7. Major	Lieutenant-Commander	Major	Squadron Leader
8. Captain	Lieutenant	Captain	Flight Lieutenant
9. Lieutenant	Sub-Lieutenant Commissioned Officer	Lieutenant	Flying Officer
10. Second Lieutenant	Acting Sub-Lieutenant	2nd Lieutenant	Pilot Officer
11. Officer Cadet	Midshipman Naval Cadet	Provisional 2nd Lieutenant Officer Cadet	Officer Cadet
		MEN	
12. Chief Warrant Officer	Chief Petty Officer, 1st Class	Warrant Officer, Class 1	Warrant Officer, Class 1
13. Master Warrant Officer	Chief Petty Officer, 2nd Class	Warrant Officer, Class 2	Warrant Officer, Class 2
14. Warrant Officer	Petty Officer, 1st Class	Squadron-Quarter-master-Sergeant. Battery-Quarter-master-Sergeant. Company-Quarter-master-Sergeant. Staff Sergeant	Flight Sergeant
15. Sergeant	Petty Officer, 2nd Class	Sergeant	Sergeant
16. Corporal	Leading Seaman	Corporal Bombardier	Corporal
17. Private	Able Seaman Ordinary Seaman	Trooper Gunner Sapper Signalman Private Guardsman Fusilier Rifleman Craftsman	Aircraftman

Amended Schedule A was allowed to stand.

Amended Schedule B

It was moved by Mr. McNulty, seconded by Mr. Lessard,

That Schedule be amended by

(a) striking out section 5 on page 33 thereof and by substituting therefor the following:

5. Clause (B) of subparagraph (i) of paragraph (f) of subsection (1) of section 44 is repealed and the following substituted therefor:

"(b) three thousand dollars per annum if his rank is lower than warrant officer, or five thousand dollars per annum if his rank is warrant officer or higher, and"

(b) striking out the amendment to the Geneva Conventions Act on page 41 thereof and by substituting therefor the following:

"(2) A prisoner of war described in subsection (1) shall, for the purposes of the Code of Service Discipline, be deemed to be under the command of the commanding officer of such unit or other element of the Canadian Forces as may be holding him in custody."

(c) striking out section 2 on page 44 thereof and renumbering section 3 as section 2.

Amended Schedule B was allowed to stand.

The Chairman called renumbered Clause 24, as amended, which was carried.

The Chairman called renumbered Clause 45 which was carried.

The Chairman called renumbered Clause 48 which was discussed and allowed to stand.

Following further discussion, it was agreed to stand the motion of Mr. Byrne to adopt the Fourteenth Report of the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure, until the next sitting at 8:00 p.m. this day.

It was also agreed that Air Chief Marshal Miller should be invited to be present as a witness this evening, on a standby basis pending the Committee's decision regarding Mr. Byrne's motion which was allowed to stand.

At 6:00 p.m., the Committee adjourned until 8:00 p.m. this day.

EVENING SITTING
(71)

The Standing Committee on National Defence met at 8:05 p.m. this day with the Chairman, Mr. Deachman, presiding.

Members present: Messrs. Byrne, Churchill, Crossman, Deachman, Forrestall, Foy, Harkness, Hopkins, Lambert, Langlois (*Chicoutimi*), Legault, Lessard, Loiselle, Macaluso, MacInnis (*Cape Breton South*), McIntosh, McNulty, Nugent, Rochon, Smith, Stafford and Winch (22).

The Committee agreed, unanimously, to stand the motion of Mr. Byrne, seconded by Mr. Lessard, that the Fourteenth Report of the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure be adopted (*See Minutes of Proceedings of the afternoon sitting this day*).

The Committee then agreed to hear Air Chief Marshal Miller as the witness for this evening sitting.

The Chairman introduced Air Chief Marshal F. R. Miller who described his most recent appointments in the Department of National Defence.

Members questioned Air Chief Marshal Miller during the remainder of this sitting, on a variety of defence subjects in relation to *Bill C-243*.

At 10:00 p.m., with the questioning of the witness continuing, the Committee adjourned until 10:00 a.m. on Tuesday, March 21, 1967.

TUESDAY, March 21, 1967.
(72)

The Standing Committee on National Defence met at 10:05 a.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Deachman, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Brewin, Byrne, Churchill, Crossman, Deachman, Forrestall, Foy, Hopkins, Lambert, Legault, Lessard, Loiselle, Macaluso, MacInnis (*Cape Breton South*), MacRea, McIntosh, McNulty, Nugent, Rochon, Smith, Stafford and Winch (22).

In attendance: Air Chief Marshal F. R. Miller. *From the Department of National Defence:* Honourable Paul Hellyer, Minister; Mr. E. B. Armstrong, Deputy Minister.

The Committee continued its questioning of the witness, Air Chief Marshal F. R. Miller, during this morning sitting. The members completed their questions at 12:00 noon and the Chairman thanked Air Chief Marshal Miller for his testimony in connection with *Bill C-243*. The witness thanked the Committee and made a closing statement.

At 12:05 p.m., the Committee adjourned until 3:30 p.m. this day, when clause-by-clause consideration of Bill C-243 will be resumed.

Hugh R. Stewart
Clerk of the Committee.

EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

MONDAY, March 20, 1967.

The CHAIRMAN: Order. Gentlemen, since we last met there has been a meeting of the subcommittee on Agenda and procedure and we are agreed, without dissent, that we should follow a schedule as follows, from now until we complete the consideration of the bill.

This agreement was made in your subcommittee in the light of the hopes of everyone as expressed in the House this afternoon that we would be able to get out of here for an Easter recess and that there is some possibility even, as Mr. Martin put it, if I could interpret Mr. Martin at all, that we might rise by tomorrow evening, or failing that hopefully by Wednesday afternoon.

So this is the light in which this schedule was cast. We agreed that this afternoon would be spent on discussions of amendments to the clauses of the bill. There are several amendments and the Judge Advocate General is here to assist with these amendments to the bill.

We agreed that this evening be spent on the examination of Air Chief Marshal Miller if he is available as a witness. I will ask the Clerk about that in a moment.

We hoped on Tuesday morning, March 21, to continue with and conclude the examination of Air Chief Marshal Miller and in the afternoon to proceed to the clause by clause consideration of the bill. We agreed that in the evening we would continue the consideration of the bill if it has not been completed.

We had hoped that on Wednesday afternoon we might be able to give final consideration to the bill, carry all the clauses, and report the bill out of this Committee to the house not later than 5.00 p. m.

Now in the event that we are able to make much quicker progress with the business of getting on towards an Easter recess than late Wednesday, then we would review this schedule and tighten things down to the point where we could report out of here in time to report to the House late on Tuesday evening. That is the report of the subcommittee. Mr. Macaluso.

Mr. MACALUSO: One question, Mr. Chairman. It seems to me it was left kind of loose there as far as a recess before Wednesday, assuming the House recesses late Tuesday evening then do I understand it that is the report of the subcommittee on agenda that the bill will be reported back to the house before we rise Tuesday evening. Is that the understanding?

Mr. WINCH: No.

Mr. MACALUSO: Well, Mr. Chairman, if that is not the understanding which Mr. Winch says, what happens then if the house adjourns late Tuesday evening for an Easter recess?

Mr. WINCH: We have one more day to conclude after. That would be my advice.

Mr. MACALUSO: In other words, you are going to move to sit while the House is in recess, which I do not think will come about anyway. I want to get this clarified, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN: My impression as to how we would proceed if we were able to leave here, if the House was able to rise on Tuesday night, was that we would report the bill Tuesday night in time to have it reported in the House. And I think in—

Mr. MACALUSO: Well, that is the question I asked. Mr. Winch said no. Is that correct? I want this tied down.

The CHAIRMAN: I wish Mr. Lambert were here at the moment because he was involved in these conversations and in this particular point. I think Mr. Lambert would be prepared to confirm my own impression of this. Mr. Harkness.

Mr. HARKNESS: I would be prepared to confirm it, Mr. Chairman, but I think the point is entirely academic. I do not think there is any chance in the world we are going to finish here tomorrow night.

The CHAIRMAN: The point is that if we do, we are agreed that what happens is a legitimate question.

Mr. HARKNESS: Well, as I say, I think the point is entirely academic.

The CHAIRMAN: Well, I—

Mr. CHURCHILL: Well, one other question, Mr. Chairman. I do not know what the definition of an Easter recess is but I know that in 1965 we met on Good Friday morning and we had the rest of the day off and we had Easter Monday off and that was called an Easter recess.

The CHAIRMAN: Yes, I remember that dreadful occasion, Mr. Churchill.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Well, I would like a definition of that before we make a final commitment with regard to that.

The CHAIRMAN: I think by Easter recess all of us are talking about working toward an arrangement in which we would rise here on Tuesday or Wednesday or maybe Thursday at the latest and that would be back April 3rd. I think those are the approximate times, and this is the kind of a recess we are talking about.

There was a question or comment over here and then Mr. Nugent.

Mr. MCNULTY: I was in conversation with Mr. Lambert while the House was sitting this afternoon and I asked him his understanding of agreements in the subcommittee and he told me precisely just what you have told the Committee that the understanding was that it would be carried through as you say and that the bill would be reported at five o'clock on Wednesday afternoon or if the House by some academic chance as Mr. Harkness put it, were to recess late Tuesday evening that the bill would be reported at that time.

Mr. WINCH: It is darn peculiar. I do not know. My understanding was that it was to be Wednesday at five o'clock.

Mr. NUGENT: Well, Mr. Chairman, I am completely puzzled by the importance of reporting before we leave for Easter. This is just an Easter recess,

sittings aside for a few days. I am completely unable to understand what is the significance that our report must be brought back in before then.

Here we are in a position with still one of the most important witnesses to be heard. Those clauses of the bill that the evidence we have heard has the most bearing on have yet to be discussed by this Committee.

I am certain that no one would like to think that the overwhelming evidence showing us this common uniform is pure idiocy is going to be overlooked and not even a subject for discussion.

How can we possibly go through that bill in such a quick time and give any consideration to all the evidence we have been hearing. There seems to be an attitude that the evidence does not matter, it is just a simple case of rubber stamping the bill and getting it back.

If there was anything that had been said or reported to me that there is some significance that the bill had to be reported before Easter, I might begin to get a glimmer of understanding, but this suggestion that there has to be a cut off date in this way, just does not make sense.

I do not care what the general agreement seemed to be in the Steering Committee, it is a report for this Committee and unless there is someone who can explain some reason why we are going to attempt a schedule that is going to pay so little attention to the work we have done; that is going to ignore, in effect, all the evidence we have brought forward, then I cannot see how I could go along with it.

Mr. BREWIN: Mr. Chairman, could I ask a question? Does the Steering Committee contemplate that this Committee will merely report favourably or unfavourably on the bill without attempting to summarize the evidence, or give its reasons to the House as on the conclusions it may arrive at?

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Brewin, this was not a matter that had been discussed by your Steering Committee, and I would think that the Steering Committee would be under the impression that when the bill had been gone through clause by clause, when all the amendments had been heard and had been attached to the bill and the bill had been reported with amendments, then that would conclude the work of the Committee with respect to Bill No. C-243.

Mr. BREWIN: Well I would like to raise the strongest possible protest, even at this stage, against the proposal of the Committee to do just that.

I think this Committee owes it to the House and to the public, on an important matter of this sort, at least in summary if it is going to report either favourably or unfavourably to the bill, to state what reasons in the evidence it is basing that on.

I do not think we are here just to rubber stamp the particular bill, and the question is relevant, because it seems to me that the Steering Committee should have been giving some thought to the preparation of the proper, adequate report on the material that has been before this Committee.

The CHAIRMAN: I have Mr. Foy, Mr. Macaluso, then Mr.—

Mr. FOY: Mr. Chairman, I would like to follow through on what Mr. Nugent and Mr. Brewin have just said. I am rather inclined to agree with what Mr. Nugent said that it is very important that we get on to the clause by clause study of the bill.

Mr. Brewin has referred to contemplating the evidence that we have heard, and we have had a great many witnesses and I am sure every member here has contemplated what they have had to say. I would suggest that, because of the importance of the Committee doing a good job on the clause by clause study.

I understand there are four clauses that really have to be looked at, that we do not call on further witnesses and just get on with the clause by clause study right now.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): There are four controversial clauses you are speaking of, all the rest have been looked at.

Mr. FOY: No, to deal with unification.

The CHAIRMAN: Order please. Mr. Macaluso, you may proceed.

Mr. MACALUSO: Mr. Chairman, I raise this question at the beginning, because I am not too clear on the report which came out of the subcommittee minutes, and my fears have been somewhat corroborated by what I have heard.

As far as Mr. Brewin's suggestion is concerned, I would simply like to state that my understanding is that when a bill is before a Committee and it is amended, you do not make a report as to the reasons why you passed the bill or did not pass it. You send the bill back as amended or not amended and the Committee votes in Committee as far as amendments are concerned, or the passing of each clause. I think there is no question about that. I have never known a report to come back as far as legislation is concerned.

When I first brought up the question, which was first brought out by Mr. Harkness and Mr. Churchill—my understanding was that the time was agreed upon in the subcommittee, and the procedure which you set out in the beginning to report back to the House by five o'clock on Wednesday.

I only raise the other question, because even though it may be academic, Mr. Harkness, the point still is that if this House does rise for an Easter recess as set out in the terms by the Chairman Tuesday evening, then I want to know if there was some agreement arrived at, and I understood there might have been, although it did not seem to come out in your report, that the bill would go through all the steps including the calling of Air Chief Marshal Miller and then report it back. We would be finished with the bill tomorrow evening.

Mr. WINCH: No.

Mr. MACALUSO: Well Mr. Winch you are saying no, but this is the understanding which I have received. Now that is why I asked for that clarification, and I want to get on with it, and I am quite agreeable personally to the five

o'clock time on Wednesday, but my qualm is that if we rise tomorrow evening, then I suggest that we should have some procedure of dealing with that particular situation as to what occurs. I would like to get this tied down, if I might, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. NUGENT: All I asked is what is the reason that it has to be reported before we rise for Easter? Mr. Brewin and I have outlined the importance of careful consideration, whether it is by way of a special report, or to give consideration in this Committee to the evidence so that when we hit some of these particular clauses whether we want unification, if it is to go through to take that form cannot be done without due regard for the great amount of very fine evidence we have accumulated.

Now we know the importance of our duty to the House and to the public and to the services in this, and there has not been one word said yet on the other side why we must do it now. What is there about this bill that must be done before we rise for Easter?

There has not been a single suggestion made to me, and I do not understand why it cannot be done just as well when we come back. In fact, I would like it much better, because everyone can then review all the evidence and have lots of time, and I think it is worth reviewing.

The CHAIRMAN: Are there any other comments on the report of the Steering Committee?

Mr. FOY: Mr. Chairman, could I just follow through for a moment. I am suggesting that we have heard witness after witness and the last few witnesses have been repetitious, the questions have been repetitious and any further witnesses I am sure would be the same and I do not think we can accomplish anything by having more witnesses. Because the bill is so important, we should get on to the clause by clause study of it right away. I think this is the solution.

Mr. NUGENT: Why do we have to report it before Easter, Mr. Foy?

Mr. FOY: You know very well that this is an aim that a responsible Committee attempt to do.

Mr. WINCH: Mr. Chairman, I would like to say a word here in answer to Mr. Foy.

In all the weeks we have been meeting, and as a member of this Committee and as a member of the Steering Committee, I have right from the very beginning only asked personally for one man, and that was Air Chief Marshal Miller.

We have heard from those retired, who held the same position; we have heard from General Allard who holds it now, and there is one man that has not been heard and that is the man who for years held the position until six months ago, and to me it is absolutely ridiculous and stupid not to hear from that one man. I think we should hear from him.

Mr. FOY: Could I ask you this question: Have you not felt the repetitious nature of all the questions that we have had with the witnesses?

Mr. WINCH: There is one man we have not heard from, and that is the man who was the Chief of Staff during this time.

Mr. FOY: I think we have heard you say this.

Mr. WINCH: And I still say it. The Steering Committee agreed that he should be heard, and I want to hear him.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. MacInnis.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Mr. Chairman, reference is made to four clauses yet to be examined, but I would point out to Mr. Foy that these four are supposed to be among the non-controversial which we have already gone over, and I would point out that at least one of these four clauses referred to has already been discussed on two separate days without any satisfactory answers, and I do not think the answer is available in the Department of National Defence.

I personally feel we will have to go outside the Department of National Defence to get the answer to one non-controversial clause. But to put a deadline of Tuesday or Wednesday evening at five o'clock to the other 40 clauses, I think is ridiculous. We still have 40 clauses to deal with.

Mr. FOY: We could have started this responsibly over a week ago. We would have had lots of time for this.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Now are you criticizing me or the Chairman?

Mr. FOY: Well, I will let you guess.

The CHAIRMAN: Order.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): I could reflect back on what went on here long before I joined the Committee then.

In any case, Mr. Chairman, we have 40 clauses which we have to deal with, in addition to one—I refer to as a non-controversial type, that is going to take quite a bit of controversy before—

An hon. MEMBER: Which clause are you referring to?

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): I think it is clause 24 I am referring to.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, we have had considerable discussion now on the report of the Steering Committee and I think we should proceed with the afternoon's work.

I propose to proceed in this way. First of all, we have a motion to withdraw the motion of Mr. Andras which has been before us for considerable time, and to dispose of that. Then to call for a vote on the report of the Subcommittee and

then to proceed upon the decision of that vote. I will now call for a motion to withdraw the motion of Mr. Andras.

Mr. FOY: I so move.

Mr. MCNULTY: I second the motion.

The CHAIRMAN: Is is moved by Mr. Foy and seconded by Mr. McNulty that the motion of Mr. Andras be withdrawn. All in favour?

Motion agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN: I will now call for a motion to adopt the report of the Subcommittee.

Mr. BYRNE: I so move.

Mr. LESSARD: I second the motion.

Mr. NUGENT: Since this is a debatable—

The CHAIRMAN: This is a debatable motion, and I see the hand of Mr. Nugent.

Mr. NUGENT: Rather than debate it all day, since it is not really acceptable, may I suggest that that motion stand, and when we proceed with the clause by clause study, we can see where we are and get some more clarification. I do not want to spend the afternoon debating it, but I certainly do not want to see it come to a vote at the moment.

The CHAIRMAN: Order please. I wonder if I could get order to hear from members one at a time. I want to hear what Mr. Nugent has to say first before I take up the subject of the interruptions of Mr. Macaluso. Mr. Nugent please.

Mr. NUGENT: I just wanted to suggest Mr. Chairman, and I wonder if the mover would allow this to stand and let us proceed along the lines you have outlined, without having to go through a debate or a formal motion on this, because there are some things we want to clarify.

Mr. FOY: I will agree to that.

The CHAIRMAN: You will agree to that?

Mr. FOY: Very much so, let us get on with the bill.

Mr. MCNULTY: Mr. Chairman, I was just wondering if it would be possible, going along with Mr. Nugent's suggestion, that we have a short meeting of the Steering Committee as soon as possible after the session is finished?

The CHAIRMAN: Perhaps the Steering Committee would be willing to meet at 5.45 p.m. Is that agreeable? And that the motion of the subcommittee report be stood at the moment and that we proceed on the amendments to the clauses of the bill.

Mr. WINCH: Could I ask the Chairman whether the Clerk has been able to get in touch with Air Chief Marshal Miller?

The CHAIRMAN: He has not yet been able to get in touch with him, and if he does, it will only be to put him on the stand by a basis because we must have the concurrence of the committee before we can proceed beyond the first order of business this afternoon. But he will continue to do so throughout the afternoon.

Mr. Macaluso, is there anything further before we proceed to the order of business this afternoon?

Mr. MACALUSO: I pass.

The CHAIRMAN: That is good. I wonder if the Judge Advocate General could come forward now and we will proceed to deal with the amendments to the bill.

Mr. FOY: Mr. Chairman, are we going to deal with clauses not related, the ones stood?

Mr. BYRNE: A similar motion has been made at least twice before in this Committee and it has not been acted upon. I would prefer that this motion be in someone else's name. If it is not going to be acted upon I would prefer to withdraw and let someone else move it.

The CHAIRMAN: That is a procedural twist that baffles me. We have a motion that has been duly moved and seconded. It seems to me that motions cannot be withdrawn unless there is unanimous consent to withdraw them. I will ask if there is unanimous consent for you to withdraw your name. Mr. Byrne, if there is no unanimous consent your name will have to stand.

Mr. BYRNE: I would prefer to withdraw it.

An hon. MEMBER: Mr. Chairman, are we going to deal with the three clauses that were stood the other day?

The CHAIRMAN: Just one moment until I see where we stand.

Gentlemen, as a way of proceeding I wonder whether I could have these amendments moved in order as they come along? Perhaps we could have them distributed and then moved and seconded and then stood. We would at least have the amendments out where everybody could see them. Does this appeal to the members as a desirable way of proceeding? We will then go back over them and proceed to deal with them clause by clause. Is that agreeable to everyone?

Some hon. MEMBERS: Agreed.

The CHAIRMAN: Then I will call for a motion to amend clause 2. Mr. McNulty you have that before you.

On clause 2—*Composition.*

Mr. MCNULTY: I move that Bill C-243, an Act to amend the *National Defence Act* and other Acts in consequence thereof, be amended by striking out line 13 on page 2 thereof and substituting therefor the following:

> "Canada under the United Nations Charter, the North Atlantic Treaty or any other similar instrument".

Mr. LESSARD: I second the motion.

The CHAIRMAN: The sheets are being distributed now by the messenger.

Mr. HARKNESS: Mr. Chairman, this in effect is going back to the wording which existed before.

Brigadier W. J. LAWSON (*Judge Advocate General, CFHQ*): It is exactly the same wording.

Mr. HARKNESS: It is exactly the same wording.

Brigadier LAWSON: It is exactly the same wording but what it amounts to is dropping the amendment.

The CHAIRMAN: You have the sheet and you have heard the explanations. We will move on without carrying it.

Clause 2 stands.

The CHAIRMAN: Do you have the next amendment, Brigadier Lawson?

On clause 4—*Ranks of officers and men.*

The CHAIRMAN: I will call for a mover of the amendment to clause 4.

Mr. MCNULTY: I move that Bill C-243, an Act to amend the *National Defence Act* and other Acts in consequence thereof, be amended by striking out clause 4 on page 3 thereof and substituting therefor the following:

> 4. Section 22 of the said Act is repealed and the following substituted therefor:
>
> "22. (1) For the purposes of this Act, the ranks of the officers and men of the Canadian Forces shall be as set out in Column I of the Schedule.
>
> (2) The Governor in Council may make regulations prescribing the circumstances in which a person holding a rank set out in Column I of the Schedule shall use, or be referred to by, a designation of rank set out in Column II, III or IV of the Schedule opposite the rank held by him."

Mr. LESSARD: I second the motion.

The CHAIRMAN: When we have passed out the sheets so everyone may have a look at it I will ask Brigadier Lawson to explain this. I know he has been working with the Department of Justice in the re-writing of this clause and section 22.

Before I ask that the clause be stood are there any other questions to Brigadier Lawson at this time regarding the purpose of this clause?

Mr. BREWIN: The amendment says: "For the purposes of this Act, the ranks" shall be and so forth. What are the purposes of this act from a practical point of

view? Does this mean that the new schedule goes into effect for some accounting purpose or something like that, whereas the ranks as set out in the other parts of the schedule and at present in use, I take it in many cases, will remain subject to be changed only by the governor in council in future as and when he sees fit? Is that the purpose of the amendment?

Brigadier LAWSON: Mr. Brewin, I thought first of all that the way the section was originally put did not meet, perhaps, the desires of the Committee. It started out by saying:

22.(1) The ranks that may be held by officers of the Canadian Forces shall be *as follows*:

This was a direct statement by Parliament that these were to be the ranks. We have changed that and simply said that:

22. (1) For the purposes of this Act—

—these will be the ranks. I would interpret the words: "For the purposes of this Act," really to mean for legal purposes. In other acts or regulations instead of saying that officers to the rank of naval captain, colonel and group captain may do so and so, we will be able to say that officers to the rank of colonel may do so and so, and not use all those other words. Colonel will include people who are called group captain or who are called captains in the navy. As I see it, it does not submit these new titles right on to people for all purposes but only for legal purposes.

Mr. BREWIN: To get away from legal purposes, what about practical purposes in their daily use in the service?

Brigadier LAWSON: This will depend on whatever regulation the governor in council may make as to the use of the present rank designations; that is, the present naval rank designations and the air force rank designations and, of course, alternative army rank designations too. As you know, there are a number of different designations for privates such as guardsmen, craftsmen and all that sort of thing. These will all be retained if the governor in council so orders.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Are you telling us, then, that under the present section dealing with rank structure once it meets approval of this Committee and of the House and the act, in fact, passes—if it does—the legal position is that all of these men would assume the new rank structure, whereas now subsequent regulations would have to be made in order to impose the new rank structure?

Brigadier LAWSON: No, I would not go that far, Mr. Forrestall. This will be a new rank structure for legal purposes. It means that legally where another act of Parliament or regulation requires officers of the rank of colonel to do so and so this also would apply to naval officers who call themselves captains or air force officers who call themselves group captains. As I said, you would not have to repeat all the ranks in your order. But the governor in council by regulation, of course, can permit people in the sea environment, for example, to continue to use the ranks that have always been used in the sea environment.

Mr. FORRESTALL: In order to change that there would have to be a subsequent regulation by governor in council?

Brigadier LAWSON: That is correct.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Bless your heart, then; that lends evidence of faith. Did I read it wrongly then?

The CHAIRMAN: We are just standing it at the present time. The questions that you have to put now are only for clarification and the clause is now to be stood on a motion to stand.

Clause 4 stands.

On clause 5—*Continuation.*

Mr. MCNULTY: I move that Bill C-243, an Act to amend the *National Defence Act* and other Acts in consequence thereof, be amended by striking out subclause (1) of clause 5 on page 3 thereof and substituting therefor the following:

> "5.(1) The Services known before the coming into force of this Part as the Royal Canadian Navy, the Canadian Army and the Royal Canadian Air Force are embodied in the Canadian Forces."

It is considered that the proposed revised clause describes the legal step involved in unification more accurately than does the present clause.

Mr. LESSARD: I second the motion.

The CHAIRMAN: I think it was Mr. Churchill who originally made the point of the obscurity of clause 5 and sitting here in the chair at the time I think I could have agreed with him that it was obscure and this is a better worded clause than it was previously. Are there any questions with regard to this clause? Shall the clause stand? Mr. McIntosh?

Mr. MCINTOSH: It says:

> The Services known before the coming into force of this Part—

Brigadier LAWSON: This part of the bill, Mr. McIntosh. Part I of the bill is the part that effects unification.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Well, should that not be put in Part I?

Brigadier LAWSON: Well, this is the more usual way. The drafting is done by the Department of Justice, you know, and they have their own set terminology that they always use.

Mr. MCINTOSH: So it must be right then?

Brigadier LAWSON: I do not know whether it is right or not.

Mr. WINCH: Mr. Chairman, I suggest that it stand because my legal friend on my right says it is not applicable. To me it is esoteric and legalistic, and I want it to stand.

The CHAIRMAN: Shall clause 5 stand?

Clause 5 stands.

On clause 6—*Officers and men members of Canadian Forces.*

Mr. MCNULTY: I move that Bill C-243, an Act to amend the *National Defence Act* and other Acts in consequence thereof, be amended

(a) by striking out lines 20 and 21 on page 4 thereof and substituting therefor the following: "Army or Royal Canadian Air Force set out in Column II, III or IV respectively of Schedule A shall, on the coming into force of"; and

(b) by striking out "Column IV" in line 23 on page 4 thereof and substituting therefor "Column I".

Mr. LESSARD: I second the motion.

Brigadier LAWSON: All we are doing by this amendment, Mr. Chairman, is changing the schedule. We thought it more appropriate to have the new ranks in Column I and the old ranks in Columns II, III and IV now that we are using them for the purposes of the previous section. It does nothing else.

The CHAIRMAN: Are there any questions in respect of the amendment to clause 6? Shall clause 6 stand?

Clause 6 stands.

On clause 8—"*Ships.*"

Mr. MCNULTY: I move that Bill C-243, an Act to amend the *National Defence Act* and other Acts in consequence thereof, be amended by striking out sub-clause (8) of clause 8 on pages 5 and 6 thereof and substituting therefor the following:

(8) Section 2 of the said Act is further amended by adding thereto, immediately after paragraph (36) thereof, the following paragraph:

"(36a) "subordinate officer" means a person who holds the rank of officer cadet;"

Mr. LESSARD: I second the motion.

Brigadier LAWSON: This is rather odd Mr. Chairman, the only effect of this amendment is to strike out the proposed definition of "ship" at the bottom of page 5 of the bill. We simply decided this was not an appropriate definition to have in the act and we ask that it be taken out.

The CHAIRMAN: Are there any questions in connection with clause 8?

Clause 8 stands.

On new clauses 9, 10 and 11.

Mr. MCNULTY: I move that Bill C-243, an Act to amend the *National Defence Act* and other Acts in consequence thereof, be amended

(a) by adding thereto, immediately after clause 8 thereof, the following clauses:

9. Section 6 and 6A of the Act are repealed and the following substituted therefor:

"6. The Governor General may at any time by commission under the Great Seal appoint an Associate Minister of National Defence who shall exercise and perform such of the powers, duties and functions of the Minister as may be assigned to him by the Governor in Council."

10. Subsection (2) of section 7 of the said Act is repealed.

11. Subsection (2) of section 8 of the said Act is repealed; and

(b) by renumbering clauses 9 to 61 as 12 to 64, respectively.

Mr. LESSARD: I second the motion.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, we are simply at this point moving the amendments contained in the original amendments which you received with your copy of the bill.

Now, gentlemen, Brigadier Lawson answered questions on this when it was before you before. Are there any further questions at this time before we stand the clauses? Shall clauses 9, 10 and 11 stand?

Clauses 9, 10 and 11 stand.

On clause 16—*Out of Canadian Forces.*

Mr. MCNULTY: Clause 16 is the renumbered clause 13. I move that Bill C-243, an Act to amend the *National Defence Act* and other Acts in consequence thereof, be amended by striking out the renumbered clause 16 on page 7 thereof, and substituting therefor the following:

"16. Section 28 of the said Act is repealed and the following substituted therefor:

"28. An officer or man may be attached or seconded to another component of the Canadian Forces or to any department or agency of government, any public or private institution, private industry or any other body in such manner and under such conditions as are prescribed in any other Act or in regulations, but no officer or man of the reserve force

who is not serving on active service shall without his consent be attached or seconded pursuant to this section."

Mr. LESSARD: I second the motion.

Mr. WINCH: Please do not bother reading out the number of the bill and its title every time, because we all know what we are dealing with.

Mr. MCNULTY: All right.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, this is renumbered clause 16 which has already been before you. Are there any explanations on this? Shall clause 16 stand?

Clause 16 stands.

On clause 17—*Placing Forces on active service.*

Mr. MCNULTY: Clause 17 is renumbered Clause 14. I move that Bill C-243, an Act to amend the *National Defence Act* and other Acts in consequence thereof, be amended by striking out lines 26, 27, 28 and 29 on page 7 thereof and by substituting therefor the following:

"(b) in consequence of any action undertaken by Canada under the United Nations Charter, the North Atlantic Treaty or any other similar instrument for collective defence that may be entered into by Canada".

Mr. LESSARD: I second the motion.

Brigadier LAWSON: We are just going back to the old wording that is now in the act, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN: Are there any questions on the amendment to clause 17? Shall clause 17 stand?

Clause 17 stands.

On clause 24.

Mr. MCNULTY: I move that Bill C-243, an Act to amend the *National Defence Act* and other Acts in consequence thereof, be amended by striking out clause 24 on page 13 thereof and substituting the following:

24. Paragraph (b) of section 80 of the said Act is repealed and the following substituted therefor:

"(b) fails to take any steps in his power to cause the apprehension of a person whom he knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, to be a deserter."

Mr. LESSARD: I second the motion.

Brigadier LAWSON: This is a suggestion made by Mr. Nugent, you will recall, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, are there any questions in connection with clause 24? Shall clause 24 stand? Mr. MacInnis?

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Mr. Chairman, I do not know if this is the proper place to bring it up or not, but on this question of desertion I am still not satisfied, if unification becomes a fact, concerning disciplinary action to be taken against any of the servicemen in the three services just because a law has been passed to the effect that they are now Canadian forces or will become Canadian forces; in other words, the question I asked the Brigadier the other day in respect of army, navy or air force personnel who have not been re-documented into the Canadian Forces. Your answer at the time was to the effect that this becomes law, but it does not necessarily mean that somebody who is party to an agreement is subject to that law unless they are documented or some procedure carried out.

Brigadier LAWSON: I think it does, sir, once the act is passed. Anybody now in the army, navy and air force is automatically in the Canadian Forces. It does not require any documentation to effect that. Parliament has said it by passing the appropriate section.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Well, the question arises of whether, in view of the agreement by which the individual joins the Army, the Navy, or Air Force, can arbitrary action be taken against him followed by disciplinary action if the individual concerned does not so wish to serve in the Canadian Forces? This is where I think we need a legal opinion from the Department of Justice because among my inquiries since was a question to General Simonds the other day and he said, with reference to an officer that he could resign his commission. There has been no clarification of what disciplinary action could be taken against an army man who, on unification, decided he was through with this. What disciplinary action could be taken against this man? This has not been made clear to my satisfaction and, in fact it involves quite a question with servicemen today.

Brigadier LAWSON: This is really a question of policy, I think, not a question of why. There is no question of the legal position as I see it. If a man says: I do not like the new service and walks out he would be guilty of desertion.

Mr. MCINTOSH: There is a legal point there. An agreement is a document signed or agreed to between two parties. Now I do not think any action the government takes can break an agreement according to law.

Brigadier LAWSON: As I explained, Mr. McIntosh, in giving evidence before, it is not an agreement. Enrolment is not an agreement.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Well, you have been using the term, agreement. This is why I say it is an agreement; I do not know whether it is or not.

Brigadier LAWSON: It is not. It has been held by the courts that enrolment is not a contract. It is not a contract between the Queen and the man that enrols. It is a change of status. When a man enrols he ceases to be a civilian and becomes a serviceman. The act now, of course, clearly provides in section 24 that the enrolment of a person binds that person to serve in the Candian Forces until he is, in accordance with regulations, lawfully released. That is the present act. It is not an amendment. That is what is in there now.

Mr. McINTOSH: His enrolment is not in the Canadian Forces in the first place.

Brigadier LAWSON: Enrolment is defined to mean, become a member of the Canadian Forces, by the act now.

Mr. McINTOSH: By this act?

Brigadier LAWSON: No, by the existing act; by the National Defence Act.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): There is absolutely no chance of conflict with any other law?

Brigadier LAWSON: Legally I do not see any problem at all. As I said, Mr. MacInnis, to me it is a straight question of policy not a question of law.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Well, Brigadier I do not mean to push this point too much, but are you prepared to state here now that there will be no confliction whatsoever with a person's individual legal rights, under any other act of law?

Brigadier LAWSON: The only statement I can make, Mr. MacInnis, is that if this bill is passed any man who is now in the services will continue to be in the services and continue to be subject to military law. There is no question of that in my mind.

Mr. FOY: That whole section 24 describes that just as you stated.

The CHAIRMAN: Shall clause 24—

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Mr. Chairman, did the Committee take it upon itself to get a ruling on this matter from the Justice Department?

The CHAIRMAN: I think we can get a further note on this if there is anything further to get than what the Brigadier has already given us, Mr. MacInnis. Brigadier Lawson, would you look at this again and, in the event there is something more than can be said on this subject than has already been said, let us know when finally we come to pass this clause?

Brigadier LAWSON: I have looked at this very carefully. This was brought up before, of course. I am firm in my opinion. I do not think any further looking I would do would change my opinion. I suppose we could ask the Department of Justice if they could give us an opinion but I think it would be purely academic.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Your opinion, Brigadier is based on section 24?

Brigadier LAWSON: No, not on 24 as much as it is on the provisions of the Bill No. C-243.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Well, section 24 is the foundation for your decision. For example, it says the enrolment of a person binds that person to serve in the Canadian Forces.

Brigadier LAWSON: Well, really it is more clause 6 of the bill where it says:

> Officers and men who were members of the Royal Canadian Navy, the Canadian Army or the Royal Canadian Air Force immediately prior to the coming into force of this Part are, subject to the provisions of the National Defence Act, members of the Canadian Forces.

That does it; that is it.

Mr. FORRESTALL: What if we amended that?

Brigadier LAWSON: Oh well, I am speaking of this as drafted.

Mr. McINTOSH: The point that I would like to see it pursued on is that I feel many members of the present forces may not want to continue under a unified force, and if this draft act is going to be changed now and amended I feel they should be given some protection. I do not know if there would be many or if there would be any, but they should be given some protection if they do not want to join the unified force.

Brigadier LAWSON: Of course, the present policy is that nobody will be held in against his will. If a man wants to get out he is allowed to get out.

Mr. McINTOSH: That is not so from what you said. He can be forced to stay in.

Brigadier LAWSON: He could be; I am telling you what the legal position is. He could be forced to stay in but policy is not that. The policy is to let him go if he wants to go.

Mr. McINTOSH: I am not too sure of that.

The CHAIRMAN: Order.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Do you mean this is going to be placed before the service people and on unification they are going to have the opportunity to resign as of the date of unification?

Hon. PAUL HELLYER (*Minister of National Defence*): Mr. MacInnis, I do not know whether the Chief of Personnel spoke to this when he appeared before the committee or not but the present policy, as I understand it, is to grant release with six months notice.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): That has always been the policy.

Mr. HELLYER: Well, not always. It certainly would not be the policy in an emergency.

Mr. MACINNIS: All right, all right.

Mr. HELLYER: But this is the policy which presently exists and there is no intention of changing that policy short of a national emergency.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Well, now, what you are saying conflicts with what the Judge Advocate General is saying.

Mr. HELLYER: No, it is precisely the same. He was talking about the law and then said it is more a matter of policy than of law. Under the law, men and women of the armed forces become members of the Canadian Armed Forces and are subject to military law. But the policy is that if they request release, on giving notice that release is granted. There is no intention of changing that policy. Therefore it is really, as the Brigadier said, more a policy matter than a question of law at the present time.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): As I understood the Brigadier's statement unless they are all given the opportunity to withdraw when unification comes into being, the status of all serving officers and men going into a unified force will be nothing less than that of conscripts. Unless they are given the opportunity to withdraw or are re-documented they are being conscripted from one force into another.

Mr. HELLYER: Mr. MacInnis, first of all I do not agree with your definition at all. Secondly, as I indicated, it is the policy and it is intended that it will remain the policy, that officers or men will be able to take their release on notice. Therefore, there is no compulsion whatsoever that they remain in the force. I

might also add this is not the first time there has been a change in name of force when military law has continued to apply. I think the Brigadier can confirm that the Royal Canadian Navy has not always been called the Royal Canadian Navy. It has been changed at least once and maybe two or three times previously during its history. There has been a continuation in service of the officers and men of His Majesty's Naval Service, or whatever it was called before, through into the Royal Canadian Navy. There was no break.

Mr. MacInnis (*Cape Breton South*): This is a ridiculous point you are making because the navy remained the navy as such, the army remained the army as such and the air force remained the air force as such.

Mr. Hellyer: But in so far as the service is concerned exactly the same conditions prevailed and will prevail this time.

Mr. McIntosh: No, you have different roles now.

Mr. Nugent: This is the wrong place for this discussion; I would like to get in on it too.

Mr. McIntosh: The role has been changed to peace restoring which never before applied to any of the services.

The Chairman: I think Mr. Nugent is correct in that this is a point for clarification and not for debating the clauses. There has been enough debate now. We got well into a debate on clause 24. I think we all understand it. I think all have indicated they understand it very well. Shall clause 24 stand?

Mr. Hellyer: Mr. Chairman, before we proceed I think I might make just one clarification, as the Associate Minister has pointed out, that whereas it is policy to grant release on six months' notice there are some exceptions to this where there is an understanding. For example, officers entering the force after taking their training at the Royal Military College are expected to serve for three, and now four years following graduation. Similarly, there will be a requirement to serve for pilots who receive pilot training and this also applies to certain service personnel taking postgraduate and other courses. But these are really gentleman's agreements which are maintained to provide a minimum period of service following some benefit which the individual receives at the taxpayers' expense.

Mr. McIntosh: There is another point too. When you form a different force like the Expeditionary Force or something like that, it is a voluntary enlistment into that force. If this stays as it is it would be compulsory, as Mr. MacInnis pointed out. It is not voluntary any more. There is a change in the role, there is a change in the force and everything else. I think the men of the forces today should have that protection.

Mr. MacInnis (*Cape Breton South*): As long as the Minister is making explanations perhaps he would not mind indicating to the Committee now, in order to avoid any further discussion on this, whether he would be willing to re-document the services or not?

Mr. Hellyer: I do not think it is necessary, Mr. MacInnis, any more than it was previously when the name of a service was changed.

Mr. MacInnis (*Cape Breton South*): That is ridiculous.

Mr. Hellyer: I think the intent of the law is clear. I am convinced that the great majority of the men and women now presently serving in the forces will

want to continue and as long as the present administrative procedures remain there is no impediment placed in the way of those who wish to obtain their release other than that which would presently apply.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Why does not someone come up with the answer to me, and flatly come out and state there will be no confliction in the laws here—military and civilian.

An hon. MEMBER: Well, they have.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): They have not. Nobody has flatly stated this transfer would stick in a civil court and that you could take disciplinary action against any men that wished to leave the army, navy or air force now on unification. There has been nothing proven to me here before this Committee that the civilian law could not uphold a man who wished to leave.

Mr. HELLYER: The Brigadier said the other day in his opinion this legislation is perfectly within the competence of the Parliament of Canada and he has undertaken to obtain any supplementary legal opinion that might be available from the Department of Justice.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Yes, and the Minister said he was quite confident that the majority of the people want to stay in the services. We are not concerned with the ones that want to stay in; we are concerned with the ones that may want to get out because of unification and we feel they should have some protection.

Mr. HELLYER: As I indicated, Mr. McIntosh, under the present administrative practices, with the exception of those who have had some special benefit, on notice they are granted their release.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I wish to point out to the Minister again that an altogether different situation exists now than has ever existed before.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, this has gone on far too long in the direction of argument. We are coming back to the clause. I am sure everybody knows now what is to be expected when we return to the clause. I plead with you gentlemen to come to the next amendment.

Clause 24 stands.

On clause 62—*Schedule.*

Mr. MCNULTY: I move that Bill C-243, an Act to amend the *National Defence Act* and other Acts in consequence thereof, be amended by

(a) adding thereto, immediately after clause 61 thereof, the following clause:

"62. The said Act is further amended by adding thereto the Schedule set out in Schedule A"; and

(b) by renumbering clauses 62 to 64 as 63 to 65 respectively.

Mr. LESSARD: I second the motion.

Mr. HARKNESS: I am not quite clear with regard to these two: the bill as we have it before us and the amendment. Now, do I understand by this that clause 62 as it stands is all struck out?

Brigadier LAWSON: Clause 62 will now become clause 63, Mr. Harkness.

Mr. HARKNESS: Clause 62 becomes clause 63?

Brigadier LAWSON: We have a new clause 62 and the only purpose of the new clause 62 is to add the schedules to the National Defence Act. As we had the

schedule before, it would not have been added to the National Defence Act but would only have been part of this bill. Now we are adding it to the National Defence Act because of the amendment we made the clause on the rank structure. It is a purely technical matter.

The CHAIRMAN: Are there any further questions on clause 62?

Mr. FORRESTALL: I am sorry, I did not quite follow the Brigadier. I had in the back on my non-legal brain the understanding that this was to become the National Defence Act?

Brigadier LAWSON: No, that schedule would not have become part of the National Defence Act the way the bill is printed. The purpose of this amendment is to provide that the schedule will become a part of the National Defence Act. It will be added to the National Defence Act as a schedule.

The CHAIRMAN: Shall Clause 62 stand?

Clause 62 stands.

On Clause 63—*References.*

Mr. MCNULTY: I move that Bill C-243, an Act to amend the *National Defence Act* and other Acts in consequence thereof, be amended by striking out the word "and" at the end of paragraph (a) of the renumbered clause 63 on page 26 thereof, by adding the word "and" at the end of paragraph (b) thereof and by adding thereto the following paragraph:

(c) any rank set out in Column II, III or IV of Schedule A is mentioned or referred to, such mention or reference shall be construed as including a mention of or reference to the rank set out opposite that rank in Column I of Schedule A.

Mr. LESSARD: I second the motion.

The CHAIRMAN: This provides us, Mr. McNulty, with a reworded subclause (c), is that not correct?

Mr. MCNULTY: That is correct, yes.

Brigadier LAWSON: It is simply a matter of changing the column numbers. As I explained before we put the ranks set out in the bill in the first column and the present navy, army and air force ranks in columns II, III and IV.

The CHAIRMAN: Are there any questions on clause 63? Shall clause 63 stand?

Clause 63 stands.

On Schedule A.

The CHAIRMAN: Now we come to Schedule A which has been distributed to you. Are there any questions in connection with Schedule A? Shall Schedule A stand?

Mr. MCINTOSH: Mr. Chairman, might I ask why the heading is off this new Schedule A? Does it mean anything without the heading?

Brigadier LAWSON: These are just lists of ranks which do not apply to any particular service. We do not refer in the bill anywhere to navy, army and air force so it would have been illogical to refer to them in the schedule. It would have no meaning.

Mr. MCNULTY: Be amended by striking out—

Mr. McINTOSH: I am not satisfied—

The CHAIRMAN: Just a moment, Mr. McNulty; we are dealing with Mr. McIntosh's question on Schedule A.

Mr. McINTOSH: To me, this new Schedule A does not mean anything because there are no headings at the top of it and it is just a list of titles. Why are they in columns I, II, III and IV?

Brigadier LAWSON: You have to refer back to clause 4, new section 22; that is what gives it meaning. It is the schedule that implements that clause. Perhaps it would clarify it if I were to read the amended clause. It reads:

> 22. (1) For the purposes of this Act, the ranks of the officers and men of the Canadian Forces shall be as set out in Column I of the Schedule.

This is the schedule we are looking at.

> (2) The Governor in Council may make regulations prescribing the circumstances in which a person holding a rank set out in Column I of the Schedule shall use, or be referred to by, a designation of rank set out in Column II, III or IV of the Schedule opposite the rank held by him.

Mr. McINTOSH: Columns I and II are not identical are they?

Brigadier LAWSON: No, they are not.

The CHAIRMAN: Shall Schedule A stand?

Schedule A stands.

On Schedule B.

Mr. McNULTY: I move that Bill C-243, an Act to amend the *National Defence Act* and other Acts in consequence thereof, be amended by striking out section 5 on page 33 thereof and by substituting therefor the following:

> 5. Clause (B) of subparagraph (i) of paragraph (f) of subsection (1) of section 44 is repealed and the following substituted therefor:
>
> "(b) three thousand dollars per annum if his rank is lower than warrant officer, or five thousand dollars per annum if his rank is warrant officer or higher, and"

Mr. LESSARD: I second the motion.

The CHAIRMAN: Now this is one of the amendments originally distributed and we have had explanations on this. Are there any further explanations? Shall we stand this item of Schedule B?

Mr. McNULTY: I move that Bill C-243, an Act to amend the *National Defence Act* and other Acts in consequence thereof, be amended by striking out the amendment to the Geneva Conventions Act on page 41 thereof and by substituting therefor the following:

> "(2) A prisoner of war described in subsection (1) shall, for the purposes of the Code of Service Discipline, be deemed to be under the command of the commanding officer of such unit or other element of the Canadian Forces as may be holding him in custody."

Mr. LESSARD: I second the motion.

Mr. CHURCHILL: May I just ask the Judge Advocate General if the expression "as may be" is really good English or should it just be the word "who" or

"who may be". If you had to parse that in Grade VIII grammar what would you do with it?

Brigadier LAWSON: You could not say a "unit or other element who".

Mr. CHURCHILL: It is not the unit; it is the commanding officer: "be deemed to be under the command of the commanding officer who may be holding him in custody".

Brigadier LAWSON: But it is the unit that is holding him, not the commanding officer.

Mr. NUGENT: It might be better "under the command of such commanding officer of such unit or other element. . .".

Brigadier LAWSON: We could have a look at it again. We will look at it very carefully.

The CHAIRMAN: It is agreed this will stand and Brigadier Lawson will see whether he can untangle that subordinate clause.

Mr. MCNULTY: I move that Bill C-243, an Act to amend the *National Defence Act* and other Acts in consequence thereof, be amended by striking out section 2 on page 44 thereof and renumbering section 3 as section 2.

Mr. LESSARD: I second the nation.

The CHAIRMAN: Shall it stand?

Schedule B stands.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen that completes the moving of the amendments to date to Bill No. C-243.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Mr. Chairman, before we leave this I would like to ask the Brigadier whether any place in the National Defence Act there is a definition of the terms "duties or tolls"?

Brigadier LAWSON: No, there is not, Mr. McIntosh.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Is there in the Interpretation Act?

Brigadier LAWSON: I would have to look to be positive but I am quite sure there is not.

Mr. MCINTOSH: So we just do not know what that could cover or would cover?

Brigadier LAWSON: The ordinary English meaning of the words, I suppose.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Could it cover fares?

Brigadier LAWSON: I should not think so, no.

Mr. MCINTOSH: If there were a ferry from the North American continent to Bermuda called a ferry, would that be a toll or a fare?

Brigadier LAWSON: A fare, I would say. A toll is the sort of thing they collect on a bridge for using the bridge. A toll for using something; a toll for using a road, or a toll highway. That is just a touch from the old days when we had toll roads throughout the country.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I realize that; I was just wondering.

Brigadier LAWSON: It is intended to refer to that type of toll. But we do have bridges today with tolls and we have to make agreements with the bridge authorities covering what we pay for the use of their bridge. They are privately owned and we think it only fair that they be given some compensation.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, when we were carrying those clauses which were not related to unification there were a couple which were stood for further explanation. One of those was clause 24 which appears on page 13.

Mr. MACALUSO: On a point of order, Mr. Chairman. May I ask if you have done anything further to contact Air Chief Marshal Miller as far as the timetable of—

The CHAIRMAN: This is being done now.

Mr. MACALUSO: At the present time?

The CHAIRMAN: At the present time.

Mr. MACALUSO: Thank you.

On clause 24.

The CHAIRMAN: On page 13 we have clause 24 and an amendment has been introduced today on that which I believe meets the objection raised by Mr. Nugent. I wonder whether clause 24 could not carry? Shall clause 24 carry?

Clause 24 as amended agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN: Now, let us see if there is another one here we can dispose of at the moment.

On clause 45—*New Trial.*

The CHAIRMAN: There was some question raised in respect of this and I think the question was raised by Mr. Nugent. Am I correct? I believe you have had a conversation with the Judge Advocate General about that since. Does your objection still stand or are you ready to let this clause carry, Mr. Nugent?

Mr. NUGENT: I would like to say that I am not exactly happy but I think the number of cases in which it would arise are so very few that now, having done the necessary research, I will take their word on it; there is an explanation why it was necessary. I think the danger I apprehended is somewhat remote and I am content to let it go.

The CHAIRMAN: Shall clause 45 carry?

Clause 45 agreed to.

On Clause 48—*Duties or tolls on roads, bridges, etc.*

The CHAIRMAN: This is the one that deals with tolls, highways, roads and the like and a question was raised by Mr. McIntosh regarding the amounts involved here. I wonder if the Judge Advocate General has a report on that?

Mr. MCINTOSH: He has the report. I would say Mr. Chairman that I asked for a return of any tolls $50 and over a month. It applied only to one bridge in Nova Scotia, between Halifax and Dartmouth. So, I wonder if the Minister would not leave it the way it was before. What is the reason for changing it just because of one toll? Let us just wipe it out altogether.

Brigadier LAWSON: It is just a matter, I think, that the Treasury Board wanted to be relieved of some of these details and suggested an amendment of this nature. There is so little involved I do not think it is too important one way or the other, really.

Mr. FOY: Well it would take care of other bridges built in the future.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Well, let the Treasury Board carry it in the way they have been doing; if there is no immediate need for it just leave it the way it is.

An hon. MEMBER: It is just cutting out the red tape.

Mr. McINTOSH: It is putting in red tape.

The CHAIRMAN: Shall clause 48 carry?

Mr. McINTOSH: No.

Mr. CHURCHILL: If it is not more important than has been shown to us at the present time, why should the clause be changed? Why can it not stay with the Treasury Board? It is all very well to say, perhaps in the future there may be some other pier, wharf, quay, landing-place, highway, road, right of way, bridge or canal, for which there may be a toll. That is exactly what we should guard against. If there is something in the future coming up, let the Treasury Board handle it.

An hon. MEMBER: They are building a second bridge in Halifax; you want to be careful.

Mr. FOY: Mr. Chairman, is this not the same type of thing in any business or corporation where they might have a small amount of petty cash to look after incidental expenses that might otherwise have to appear before the treasurer of any corporation or business, or board of directors, but which is put in as a trust to let them handle it themselves without a lot of red tape?

Mr. McINTOSH: Mr. Foy, we had an example of that in the House not too long ago where the petty cash account was too high.

Mr. FOY: Oh, when was that?

Mr. McINTOSH: Oh, when you found money to pay the civil servants one time.

Mr. FOY: Oh, that was petty cash, was it?

Mr. FORRESTALL: If this act is passed it would be a $25,000 or $30,000 a year proposition.

Mr. FOY: It is still petty cash.

The CHAIRMAN: We have heard the argument. I will put the question. Shall clause 48 carry?

Mr. CHURCHILL: These clauses which are supposed to be non-controversial were gone over the other day and we passed most of them but we stood a certain number, and the explanation for this one has not yet been satisfactory. Therefore, it should join the group of controversial clauses. We are not passing any clauses today, except non-controversial ones.

Mr. WINCH: I think the Adjutant General's explanation was satisfactory.

An hon. MEMBER: Put the question, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN: Shall clause 48 carry?

Mr. CHURCHILL: Mr. Chairman, what are you doing here? We are not here to pass these clauses except by unanimous consent—the non-controversial clauses —and that is what we have done up to the present time and we have passed quite a number, but there are two of us here who are saying that the explanation for this one is not satisfactory. Therefore, it is non-controversial and it should stand.

The CHAIRMAN: I will accept Mr. Churchill's explanation at this time that it should remain with the non-controversial clauses but, Mr. Churchill, this was placed with the non-controversial ones the other day and an explanation, you will remember, was demanded. The explanation has now been given and there

must be some way of disposing of this clause in due course. It certainly is not one of the ones relating to unification, and I think that—

Mr. McINTOSH: I cannot accept it, it is not satisfactory.

The CHAIRMAN: Well, there is dissent, but these things are settled by vote in a parliamentary way and I suggest that the time must come when this clause must be disposed of in a regular way and—

Mr. McINTOSH: Well, this is the first one you have disposed of by a vote, then.

Mr. NUGENT: Mr. Chairman, may I comment on that? As I understood, we put these clauses not related to unification in the hope that the Committee would find them non-controversial and, as quickly as we could, we went through them and those for which an explanation was required, we just stood them. In other words, the feeling was that perhaps they should not have been on the non-controversial list. If we can get them there, fine, It is not necessary to fight about them; if there is an explanation we can get rid of them, with the feeling that the rest of the clauses in the act perhaps would be, and we would go through them as, controversial clauses. I think Mr. Churchill's request is still in keeping with the procedure we are following and that he feels this still belongs in the controversial list after the explanation, and it is simply that it has to be taken in order in the same way as the other clause about which there has been some controversy.

The CHAIRMAN: Well, we want to make—

Mr. HELLYER: Mr. Chairman, may I have a word? I do not think you could consider it controversial as far as the government is concerned. Apparently it was requested on the part of the Treasury Board to relieve them of a certain amount of detail and certainly if the Committee does not think it is a clause that should be included in the bill, the Department of National Defence does not wish to press it and it is entirely up to the Committee what they would like to do with it.

Mr. McINTOSH: The term "Canadian Forces" is used in that clause; whether it means the same thing now as it did before, I do not know. It could be a controversial clause.

Mr. HELLYER: It is certainly not one that is worth arguing about, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FORRESTALL: I would share the feelings of Mr. Churchill, Mr. Nugent and Mr. McIntosh in this but what it involves, of course, is the amount of money which the Maritime Commander may or may not have at this discretionary disposal. This is a $25,000 or $30,000 unit.

Mr. HELLYER: I will not affect the amount of funds made available to him, I do not think, Mr. Forrestall.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Under this, it could very well, and this I think—

Mr. HELLYER: This would be a matter of policy in any event and just whether this clause is included or not; it would not necessarily have any effect.

Mr. FORRESTALL: It would not have any effect on the amount of money that was made available to the various command units for expenditures at their own discretion?

Mr. HELLYER: It would not necessarily.

Mr. McINTOSH: Did I understand the Minister correctly, that he had no objection to withdrawing it?

Mr. HELLYER: I have no objection, Mr. McIntosh, if it is the wish of the Committee.

The CHAIRMAN: Does this remove your objection now, Mr. McIntosh?

Mr. McINTOSH: Well, if he withdraws the clause.

The CHAIRMAN: Shall the clause be withdrawn?

Some hon. MEMBERS: No, no.

Mr. MACALUSO: If you want to table it with the rest go ahead, Mr. Chairman, but just move on to the other clauses.

The CHAIRMAN: We know what the way out of our difficulty is now. Gentlemen, the clause will remain as one of the very controversial matters that we have to settle a little later.

Clause 48 stands.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Mr. Macaluso wanted to get on with this job and now here is a chance to move ahead with the consent of the Minister and you will not do it.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Churchill—

An hon. MEMBER: This is a filibuster.

An hon. MEMBER: This is terrible.

The CHAIRMAN: Mysterious are the ways of Mr. Macaluso.

Gentlemen, the time is now twenty minutes to six. The Steering Committee has a short meeting to hold but before you rise I want to say that the Clerk has now confirmed to me that Air Chief Marshal Miller is prepared to come here this evening and tomorrow. We are to advise him by dinner time, or in about an hour's time, whether or not the Committee will hear him this evening. We come back to his point—and I do not want members to rise until they come back to this question—that this afternoon we had a report of the Steering Committee and I wuld certainly consider that it is the intention of the Steering Committee in submitting this report that the items in this be tied together. We have moved along this afternoon, due to the good offices of Mr. Nugent in not wanting to provoke a controversy.

We have been permitted to make progress here with the introduction of amendments, but now we come down to the question of the items of the Steering Committee report and I just wonder how members are prepared to proceed with that, because we have to give our word to Air Chief Marshal Miller very soon whether or not he is to appear. Together with that goes the subcommittee report which means that he would be here tomorrow morning as well; through Tuesday afternoon we would continue to proceed clause by clause with consideration of Bill No. C-243 and then through Tuesday evening, and that Wednesday afternoon we would give final consideraton to the bill and the carrying of the clauses and the reporting of the bill out of this committee not later than 5.00; if the House of Commons were disposed to rise on Tuesday evening that there would be agreement in this Committee to move the bill out of the Committee on Tuesday evening in time for it to be reported in the House. This is the proposition before us before we call Air Marshal Miller. Out of respect to the gentlemen of the Steering Committee who made that proposal I will have to look on it as a package. Mr. Forrestall?

Mr. FORRESTALL: You have partially answered my question. Are you suggesting to us, Mr. Chairman, that our reluctance to accept the Steering Committee's report in full will be the basis upon whether or not we are given the privilege of hearing Air Marshal Miller?

The CHAIRMAN: This was the basis upon which the Steering Committee report was negotiated, Mr. Forrestall.

Mr. FORRESTALL: I would suggest to you, Mr. Chairman, that is exactly the type of procedure that is causing you all your trouble in this Committee.

Mr. WINCH: On a point of order, Mr. Chairman, if I may, and I think it is a correct point of order. I raise it as a point of order because I do not know now else I can do it. You have read the Steering Committee report, as I understood it. There is nothing in the Steering Committee report which says that if the House closes tomorrow we reduce our time. I cannot remember any decision in the Steering Committee concerning the reduction of time. The Steering Committee report is a period of time to conclude our business up until Wednesday. There is nothing in that report, nor was there any discussion in the Steering Committee, to indicate that if the House closed tomorrow we lose a day in our period of consideration in this Committee.

The CHAIRMAN: Are there any further comments on the report of the Steering Committee?

Mr. NUGENT: Mr. Chairman, I find the procedure rather odd that we should be asked to adopt this report of the Steering Committee en bloc. These reports usually are recommendations to the Committee unless there is a motion to adopt them and then we can debate the motion, but I certainly feel we have made some progress today by standing that report. I would suggest that there is nothing wrong with our standing it until after we have heard Air Marshal Miller. We might finish with him tonight and have that time tomorrow but certainly I can say that any suggestion that makes time limits more important than the proper completion of our duties here is going to be debated very strongly. I do not think we will make real progress on it. I wonder if we cannot stand the report after we have heard Air Marshal Miller, and I hope we can complete that tonight.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Macaluso, then Mr. Langlois, then Mr. Byrne.

Mr. MACALUSO: First of all, Mr. Chairman, was the report of the subcommittee unanimous? It was a unanimous report by all members of all parties that were present. Is that correct? Fine. I wanted to get that clear as far as Mr. Nugent and Mr. Forrestall were concerned. Second, Mr. Chairman, I want to—

Mr. WINCH: It was unanimous as far as the report—

Mr. MACALUSO: Five o'clock, yes. Five o'clock on Wednesday. As I understand it the unanimous report of the Committee was—

The CHAIRMAN: At five o'clock on Wednesday. There was some doubt, Mr. Macaluso, concerning the question of the House rising on Tuesday.

Mr. MACALUSO: Yes, well, that is what I want to clarify at the beginning.

Mr. HARKNESS: We just looked on the House rising on Tuesday as a possibility.

Mr. MACALUSO: That is the clarification I wanted at the beginning, but as far as going through the procedure of clause by clause and hearing Air Chief

Marshal Miller are concerned, the unanimous report is, as I understand it, that the bill be reported to the House no later than 5.00 p.m. on Wednesday.

Mr. WINCH: That we finish our Committee consideration by five o'clock on Wednesday.

The CHAIRMAN: And report the bill out of this Committee by not later than five o'clock of that day, Mr. Macaluso. I want that clearly understood.

Mr. MACALUSO: That is what I was going to say. I understood Mr. Byrne's motion dealt only with that and had nothing to do with closing off Tuesday night. This is the way I understood the motion. Therefore, Mr. Chairman, that being the case I see no reason why, unless some gentlemen opposite have some amendments to the report, we cannot proceed to deal with that motion at the present time. I understand that you were contacting Air Chief Marshal Miller. Do you have any report on that part?

The CHAIRMAN: We have just reported on this Mr. Macaluso, to say that he is available—

Mr. MACALUSO: This evening?

The CHAIRMAN: He is standing by to hear whether or not this Committee is prepared to receive him.

Mr. MACALUSO: He is available this evening?

The CHAIRMAN: Yes. Now, I cannot confirm his appearance here tonight until I have the approval of the Committee.

Mr. MACALUSO: Right.

The CHAIRMAN: The approval of the Committee must be in the form of the subcommittee report.

Mr. MACALUSO: Mr. Chairman, then I submit to you and the gentlemen here that we should move on with the motion that is before us. We have a responsibility. Air Chief Marshal Miller was requested by, I believe, Mr. Winch from the very beginning and by other members opposite and I submit, Mr. Chairman, it would be irresponsible if we did not proceed at this time with the motion to call Air Chief Marshal Miller and to adopt the motion put by Mr. Byrne, or to call the question, so we can have a decision as well as the Air Chief Marshal.

The CHAIRMAN: I have Mr. Langlois.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): Mr. Chairman, we have been going on in this Committee for the past five or six weeks and until today I never heard of a unanimous report from the steering committee.

Mr. HARKNESS: That is because you were on it this time for the first time.

Some hon. MEMBERS: Hear, hear.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): I do not think so, sir. Anyway it happened like that; I was on it today and we have a unanimous report, and what happens in the Committee? We cannot find unanimity in the Committee. If this goes on we might as well close the doors and say that this thing is not going to go out of here. If that is the theory behind it there is no use kidding ourselves any more. I think everybody has gone as far as they could go; that is my opinion. Mr. Lambert and Mr. Harkness were there today at the steering committee and everybody agreed to the report.

Mr. HARKNESS: That is right. We leaned over backwards to try to get an agreement.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): Is that not the way the steering committee usually works? I do not think that anybody invented anything today at that steering committee, so, the only thing further I have to say—

The CHAIRMAN: Order, order.

An hon. MEMBER: You are putting on a great act.

Mr. MACALUSO: It is not a great act at all.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Macaluso, quiet please. I wonder if we could have some order while Mr. Langlois is speaking.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): The only other thing I would like to do is to ask Mr. Harkness, who was present at the meeting, what his opinion is on what is happening now?

Mr. HARKNESS: What is happening now is that various members of the Committee are putting forward their individual views. Of course, any member of the Committee is always at liberty to do this.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Chicoutimi*): Yes, but is not this a party system we have in this House?

Mr. BYRNE: Mr. Chairman, I am bending over backwards and making no further comment except to say that my motion is based on the unanimous report of the steering committee and I would like that motion to be put just as soon as the Committee decides it is appropriate.

The CHAIRMAN: I have Mr. MacInnis, Mr. McNulty and then Mr. Churchill.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Mr. Chairman, you indicated that the calling of Air Chief Marshal Miller would have to be in line with the steering committee's report, but I think it has also been clearly indicated to the Committee on other occasions that the steering committee's report is merely a recmmendation to the Committee. I fail to understand, and nobdy here has clarified the point, why it is necessary that this Committee finalize their report to the House no later than Wednesday evening? It is not as if the House were in a position to deal with it on Thursday or Friday. Whatever this Committee may do with its report, if they do not give it full consideration, they will be rushing something over to the House of Commons and the House of Commons will not deal with it until after the Easter recess. So I fail to see—

Mr. FOY: Mr. MacInnis, you do not understand. Why do you not ask Mr. Lambert?

The CHAIRMAN: Order, order. Mr. MacInnis.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): I was just waiting to hear if Mr. Foy was through with his pearls of wisdom. Are you through, Mr. Foy? Is it all right if I go on, Mr. Foy?

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. MacInnis,—

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): I want a clarification, Mr. Chairman. I want to make sure that Mr. Foy will—

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Foy, I wonder whether you would let the Chair hear what Mr. MacInnis has to say? Mr. MacInnis, would you please continue?

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Mr. Chairman, I would like you to clarify for me why it is necessary that this Committee complete its report and have it before the House of Commons before the assumed Easter recess when we all know that the House is not going to be able to deal with it after Wednesday night if we are racing against an Easter recess deadline? Why is it necessary that we wind up our proceedings here and possibly skip through something to which we should possibly give a lot of attention?

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. MacInnis, I think it is a reasonable expectation of every committee which takes on the business of processing a bill to its end to expect eventually to come to the end of it and return that bill to the House. The House, in turn, expects to get on with its business and to depend on the committee which has a bill in its hands, eventually to return that bill to the House so that it can get on with it. Were we not to come to such an agreement, Mr. MacInnis, and were we not to try to do things in such a way Parliament would be an even sloppier place than Parliament sometimes is.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): That is agreed, Mr. Chairman, but what I fail to see is this: We have arrived at the final stage of our business—the clause by clause examination of the bill. Why is it, for the sake of one day or for the sake of two days, when we know the House is not going to be in a position to deal with it, that suddenly on Wednesday afternoon, for instance, we should rush through the clauses? Why cannot we take our time with the remaining clauses? We have arrived at the final stage of our business and why, to meet an Easter recess deadline, do we have to rush through these clauses? Why cannot we set aside an extra three or four hours or an extra day or so, to give them the examination that the Minister of National Defence and the Prime Minister indicated in the House that we should give to these matters, and that is every consideration? So, what we are arriving at here is a decision.

We have 40 controversial clauses and one non-controversial that has been switched into the controversial bracket, so we have 41 clauses to examine. Why should we spend the hours on Wednesday afternoon—tomorrow or Wednesday—up until 5 o'clock in giving a thorough examination to ten of these clauses and then suddenly rush the other 30 through for want of another few hours in committee? We are not getting ahead; we are not advancing the work of the House; the House is looking towards an Easter recess, and what is the rush in finalizing the examination of the last clauses—the last piece of business that is before us?

I agree that we have reached the final stage of our business but why, in the last few minutes, do we have to rush through 41 clauses? Are we going to give a thorough examination to the first three, four or five and then package the rest of them through without consideration, or are we going to do what the Prime Minister and the Minister of National Defence suggested we do? We have arrived at the final stages. Do we give this the proper consideration or do we rush the last number of clauses through just to meet a deadline? Nobody can explain to me the reasons for it because the House is not going to be in a position to deal with it.

Mr. MCNULTY: Mr. Chairman, I will be brief. Mr. Harkness has, I believe, agreed with the steering committee's report and it is too bad that Mr. Lambert has been detained in the House on House business, because I am sure he would

corroborate the statement that he said his party would definitely agree to or stand by this agreement. That is all I wanted to say.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): I question that very much, Mr. McNulty.

Mr. MCNULTY: You ask Mr. Lambert.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): I question your last statement. You said that Mr. Lambert said his party would agree.

An hon. MEMBER: No.

Mr. MCNULTY: Well, you ask Mr. Lambert then.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Ask Mr. Lambert, but ask him here where it will be on the evidence so that what you have just said will be contradicted.

Mr. MCNULTY: All right, that is fine. You ask him tonight when he comes here.

An hon. MEMBER: Get it on the record. You will be contradicted on that.

Mr. MCNULTY: I am sure he will back it up.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): I have listened to enough of that malarky already around here without you trying to shove that down my throat.

Mr. MCNULTY: You ask him.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): That is a lot of nonsense.

The CHAIRMAN: Order, order. Mr. Churchill?

Mr. CHURCHILL: Mr. Chairman, I think we should call the program for tonight as has already been outlined. Between now and 8 o'clock it is essential that there be consultation with Mr. Lambert and with the House leaders to see what is going on in the House and whether actually there is to be a recess and for what period. By the time we come back here at 8 o'clock, I think we would have the answers to some of these problems. It would also give us a chance to consult with our own members, and so on, which was impossible over the weekend. We are in this situation with the House—and it comes up every year at every period, Easter, Christmas and so on—where House leaders attempt to make certain arrangements affecting the House itself and they try to work with committees to see what the business is with regard to the committees. That is the type of work that has been going on during the last ten days and we are not fully informed here this afternoon at this particular period.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Churchill—if you will pardon me just one moment I will call on you, Mr. Macaluso—I appreciate that negotiations are going on to see whether we can bring about an Easter recess of the kind we described earlier, but I think I would be violating the spirit of the negotiations in the steering committee if I were to go ahead, as your Chairman, with the calling of Air Chief Marshal Miller until there is concurrence within this Committee—and a very broad concurrence, indeed—that this was the working schedule before this Committee, because that was clearly the understanding reached in the steering committee and I would not want to be a party to the breaking of that understanding. Mr. Macaluso?

Mr. MACALUSO: I was going to suggest something along the lines of what Mr. Churchill did. I think his suggestion was a reasonable one. However, in view of

your reply, Mr. Chairman, I certainly was going to state that if we go ahead with what Mr. Churchill has suggested and call Air Chief Marshal Miller, and come to a decision at 8 o'clock on the motion before hearing Air Chief Marshal Miller, it might be wise to allow the discussions with the House leaders to go on between now and 8 o'clock. I think we could call Air Chief Marshal Miller and, before proceeding with his evidence, come to a decision just after 8 o'clock on what has resulted from discussions between 6 and 8 o'clock.

The CHAIRMAN: I would like to have a consultation with the steering committee before that.

Mr. MACALUSO: I see no need for the steering committee to meet, Mr. Chairman. I think what Mr. Churchill outlined is even more sound with regard to what is happening in the House in order that we might still call Air Chief Marshal Miller, with consent here, but to arrive at a decision on our program before we hear his evidence.

Mr. MCNULTY: He would have to come on this understanding.

Mr. NUGENT: I am sure we cannot reach an agreement now, but we might very well at 8 o'clock.

Mr. WINCH: Let us make it definite now, Mr. Chairman, that we are going to hear Air Chief Marshal Miller at 8 o'clock.

An hon. MEMBER: Yes, definitely.

An hon. MEMBER: No, no.

The CHAIRMAN: Order, gentlemen. I do not feel that I am in a position to call Air Chief Marshal Miller tonight unless I am calling him on the understanding of the steering committee's report which is now before you in the form of a motion, and that carries with it Air Chief Marshal Miller's appearance here as a witness as part of a program. The program is a program to return the bill not later than 5 p.m. on Wednesday night.

An hon. MEMBER: Such nonsense.

Mr. NUGENT: It is the first time I have ever heard the Chair suggest that the only way a witness can be called is as part of a program before the Chair. That is absolute nonsense. This Committee can ask witnesses to appear and decide our business and to suggest that there is nothing—

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Nugent, I am talking not about a witness but about a program set out by the steering committee and now before you in the form of a motion. I cannot set aside this motion and say that we are to deal with something else.

Mr. NUGENT: You cannot allow a motion to stand? We are not going to do any business, anyway, until 8 o'clock. When there is no business before this Committee you cannot let it stand until 8 o'clock without calling it for debate?

Mr. MACALUSO: My suggestion, sir, was not to do away with your motion. But Air Chief Marshal Miller is in town and I am sure he will not be opposed to coming here. My suggestion was to allow the negotiations to take place and some facts to be found out by the different House leaders and then deal with the motion at 8 o'clock. I am sure Air Chief Marshal Miller will not object to coming and we can deal with him right after we have dealt with the motion at 8 o'clock.

The CHAIRMAN: Is it agreed, gentlemen, that is how we should proceed?

Mr. CHURCHILL: It is the first time that Mr. Macaluso and I have been in agreement, so I think we should accept this.

The CHAIRMAN: That would be a good reason for me to suspect it, Mr. Churchill.

The meeting is adjourned.

EVENING SITTING

The CHAIRMAN: Order please. Gentlemen, I understand that through the dinner hour good progress is being made regarding the full question of resolving the problems leading to an Easter recess of the kind Mr. Churchill and I were describing to you this afternoon.

With this in mind, I think we could perhaps proceed tonight by standing the motion of the sub-committee and calling as a witness Air Chief Marshal Miller, who is, I see, here in the room.

If that is agreeable to all present we will proceed in that way. Sir, could you come forward.

Air Chief Marshal F. R. MILLER: I have not got a statement.

The CHAIRMAN: Fine. Have you any general statements you want to make?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: I had about two hours notice of this, therefore I have not prepared anything—

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, I am advised that Air Chief Marshal Miller has no statement to begin with, and that he is prepared to proceed on questions from the members of the Committee. I see the hand of Mr. Winch, Mr. Forrestall, then Mr. Macaluso, Mr. Harkness, Mr. Nugent, Mr. Byrne. I will call on Mr. Winch.

Mr. WINCH: Mr. Chairman, may I welcome Air Chief Marshal Miller back to our committee. First of all, Air Chief Marshal—

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Winch, I wonder if I might interrupt for one moment, and say that it has been the custom of the Committee when witnesses have been before us in the past, if we would ask them to give a brief description of their military biography, for purposes of the record, and perhaps this would be a good time to get that on the record before we proceed.

Mr. WINCH: I hope you will not make that part of my question sir.

The CHAIRMAN: No, we will not make that as part of your question time, Mr. Winch, I will make sure of that. Air Chief Marshal Miller?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: As my title would indicate, I am an airman. I joined the air force in 1931 and left it for the first time in 1955 when I was Vice Chief of Staff and at SHAPE headquarters as Vice Air Deputy.

I was Deputy Minister of Defence for five years until 1960 when I became Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff, and in 1965 I became Chief of Defence Staff. I think those are the areas of interest to the Committee.

Mr. WINCH: If I might make that more specific. When did you become Chief of Staff and when did you leave that post—Chief of Defence Staff?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: I became Chief of the Defence Staff when the Defence Staff was formed in July of 1964, and I left it in 1966, two years.

Mr. WINCH: Air Chief Marshal, did you as a senior officer of the Canadian armed services, support the policy of integration? Were you satisfied by the progress being made to remove duplication and triplication.

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: I think, that anybody who has thought about the military scene for a long time in the past, has struggled with the question of how to run three military services at the same time.

There have been various approaches to working and developing an organization that will control the three services. We have had examples of it in the two world wars, and we have examples of it in many of today's activities. So that, I think, anybody who has been in the military, thinks, and has studied the problem of what we have come to call here in the Canadian scene, in the context here, integration. By that I mean the operating of the three services under a single—what I would call—management. A single defence staff, a single planning organization, and a single budgeting arrangement.

So that when we embarked on the problem, when the government made this decision that we would go for integration, we were not too sure what it would be, and we regarded it as a pragmatic operation which we would set up—an organization using three services, that would ensure that there was single direction, single management applied to the three services. We saw the next step, the step which is now called unification, as being a subsequent step sometime later.

I do not think anybody is ever completely satisfied with an organization. We made very many changes in our first integrated organization we set up, I imagine that they are still making changes. However, the large basic organizational frame is there, and I think it is a good one as far as an integrated defence staff is concerned.

Mr. WINCH: That leads me to my second question. Was it your understanding sir, that whilst you were Chief of Staff, that integration would have an end result of unification, with all three services being combined into one single service, with a common uniform, a common rank designation, and a loss of the destination of those who served in the RCN, the RCAF or the Army? Is it your understanding that integration had an end result of unification while you were Chief of Staff?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: I certainly believed what was in the White Paper, which said that integration was the first step. I had never heard, during my tenure, all the implications on unification spelled out. It had been something that was held up as the end result, but in my understanding of it, there was no particular hurry over it, and the important thing was to get the integration organization going, and that we would then have a chance to look at integration in a more leisurely better organized way.

Mr. WINCH: I follow up then, with my next question. While you were Chief of Staff, was the policy of unification a matter of consultation between the military and civilian authorities, or were you obeying an assumption from the Minister of National Defence?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: I would think the best way to phrase it would be that it was an understanding that that was where we were going. I did not have, what I felt, was an instruction from the Minister. It was an agreement to the policies set out in the White Paper. The timing and the method were not spelled out there.

Mr. WINCH: But was there consultation between the military and civilians, or were you under instructions as Chief of Staff to bring up plans for unification?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: To the best of my knowledge and recollection, I have never had any instruction to bring up a unified plan.

Mr. WINCH: When you knew that this was in the mind of the Minister of National Defence, did you have discussions with the Minister on this matter?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Oh yes.

Mr. WINCH: Did you offer advice, and was it accepted?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: This is an area where the Committee has me in some difficulty because as principal military adviser to the Minister, I regarded my advice to him as confidential and I would not wish to say what I had advised him in an open meeting such as this.

Mr. WINCH: I can understand that. Therefore, is it possible or is it permissable for you—I will put it that way—to tell this Committee, who have a grave and great responsibility, from your long experience of command, your considered opinion of Bill N. C-243, which extends integration to unification. Can you give us your comments?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Specifically on the Bill, I am not familiar with it because I have not had an opportunity to really look at it.

On the principle of integration, my own feelings about it are that it might very well be the end result. I do not think it is timely now. I have felt that the problem of integration and getting the organization, if you like, was the area where the biggest return in manpower savings and in effective control of military lay, and it was important to get that right before we had ventured into the areas of unification.

The area of unification is a very sensitive one, as you well know. It strikes at the traditions and the feelings of a lot of people. I did not see, up until the time I left, that the return from pressing the unification sign was commensurate with the disruption and the great concern to the man in uniform that would result from it.

Mr. WINCH: I must ask one more question. Sir, were you, during the time you were Chief of Staff, satisfied that the Canadian armed forces would meet Canadian military commitments, and do you think they can be maintained by a single service of the unification without a major increase in the defence budget.

I ask that question because of your long experience, it is only a few months ago that you left this command, because in a statement that was made before this Committee by General Moncel, that Canada could not meet this commitment without a two billion dollar budget, and 150,000 personnel in the actual armed forces.

From your experience, could you comment. You must be able to comment. One, were you, as Chief of Staff over years, able to meet Canadian armed service commitments according to all our treaties; and do you think under unification that we can do so under the estimate of General Moncel, who was one of your chief advisers, I believe, that it require over two billion dollars, and 150,000 active service personnel. Do you feel you can answer that question because it is important to our Committee?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Well, I think when you get onto the question of military commitments, you get into a rather difficult field. When you list our commitments to the United Nations and to NATO and treat them as firm commitments—they are that, but are only really part of our commitments—

Mr. WINCH: Of course sir, were you able, while you were Chief of Staff —that is my first question—in your estimation able to meet those commitments?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Yes, those specific commitments to the United Nations and to NATO, we met. You can say readiness for war, the requirements to fight a war were worrisome to any of us, I think, because of obsolescence, the rate of obsolescence of equipment, the difficulty of getting personnel into the service, they were all worrisome.

Mr. WINCH: But you are able to tell this Committee sir, when you were Chief of Staff from 1960 until you retired, that in your estimation Canada could meet its commitments, and did meet them.

Now, I come then to the second question. We have been told, as I have already said a couple of times now, under unification with our present commitments which are exactly the same as you had with no change being made, he said they cannot be met under two billion dollars or more, and 150,000 not 104,000. Would you sir, from your experience, give your advice to this Committee on that?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: I do not know where he got those figures, they do not ring any bells with me, and I think they are on the high side for our present commitments.

Mr. WINCH: Which are the same now as they were when you were Chief of Staff? Thank you Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Air Marshal Miller, I would like to ask you one general question, and I gather from one reply to Mr. Winch that there are certain areas that I think some of us would like to get into, but I think perhaps you would prefer we did not, so I will keep mine in the general field.

I would like to ask you whether or not you could comment for a moment or two on what your experience would lead you to believe the relationship is, and might continue to be, in a country like Canada, between its defence policy as set forth in the White Paper that we have for guidance, and its foreign policy?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: I think the inter-relationship between defence policy and foreign policy is almost like the chicken and the egg. The defence policy really carries out, or it supports foreign policy, but at the same time your military preparedness and your ability to eject the forceful element is a pretty large conditioning element in foreign policy. The two are like the opposite sides of a coin almost, in my view.

Mr. FORRESTALL: You cannot have one in a viable and continuing sense without the other geared to meet the demand upon us. I think this in other words was what your were replying in answer to one of Mr. Winch's questions.

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: That is right.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Can I ask you then, again in the context of your experience, to comment on what at least in my opinion Air Marshall, must be the viability of a defence paper that is now nearly four years old in relationship to what you understand our foreign policy to be. Are they still compatible?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: In wide measure, yes. I think no paper stands immutable. I think policy is a living and changing thing in a changing world, but I think the basic premises on which the White Paper was drafted still are good.

Mr. FORRESTALL: But would you not agree that quite possibly the international situation has changed in the last five or six years? Emphasis for example within the context of NATO has changed.

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: NATO is one element of our involvement in the world. The basic philosophy is: are you going to be a participant, or are you going to be an isolationist. I think our basic decision to be a participant and not an isolationist in various forms is basic and continuing—

Mr. FORRESTALL: You think then that we should continue to participate to the extent that we have been in NATO?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: And in the UN, and in the various organizations that form part of our basic political defence policy and posture.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Do you think we are still able and capable of doing that with the strength of the service that we have today?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Yes, I think so.

Mr. FORRESTALL: You are satisfied as to that in all its functions?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: I do not think anybody is ever satisfied with a military force. I think it has to change; it has to be geared to a changing situation.

We were making and are still making a reasonable contribution to the various international organizations to which we belong and to which we are obligated in the way of commitments. As far as I know there is no proposal to change them and I do not see any real difficulty in our meeting our commitments up and until now.

Mr. FORRESTALL: And again, you seee nothing wrong then in the defence paper that is now nearly four years old?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Oh, I can show you things that have changed in emphasis possibly but I think the White Paper is still a pretty good basic policy paper.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Air Marshal, during the period of your ten years as Chief of the Defence Staff I want to go back and if the Minister will beg my intrusion on a sensitive area, just to clarify one or two points. Were there or were there not ever any representations made to you by anybody on the naval side of your advisory staff with regard to a fall-off or the impact of a fall-off in the numbers who are currently serving in the naval branch?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Oh yes, naval recruiting has been worrying the Department for some time.

Mr. FORRESTALL: What specific action was taken about the fears of these requests?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: First of all the diagnosis what was causing this, was basically: the time away from home; pay of the people who were separated from their families; shore sea ratio; all these problems existed and required rectification. We could not do all the things to repair them that we wanted to do,

but quite a bit is being done for the men in the navy now to make his lot a little happier and therefore make it easier to recruit people into the navy.

Mr. FORRESTALL: That in fact did not take place though, did it, in terms of your experience? I am curious as to why this did not happen.

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Why we were not able to recruit? I have never really known why people join the services. They do so for a whole spectrum of reasons—employment, adventure, patriotism, but the one thing we have known and which shows up in cycles is that it is directly related to the economic well-being of the country. Whenever employment is high, recruiting is more difficult.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Is this true of the navy?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Yes, it is true of the three services, and this goes right back as far as I can remember, the cyclical relationship between recruitment, or the interest in being recruited, that is, people coming forward—maybe we did not take them when they came forward because they did not have the necessary requirements—and the economic condition of the country. What other factors enter into it, I have never been able to really isolate.

Mr. FORRESTALL: I am rather concerned as to why there was a constant fall-off—it is a continuing fall-off in the strength of the RCN—and the relationship of the fall-off to our capacity to meet and fulfil this particular commitment we have to NATO, the A.S.W. or the A.S. undertaking we have. Is there an end to this?

Certainly as Chief of Defence Staff you must have been continually concerned about this. It must have been a problem which came before you with some degree of regularity, or is the other situation the case, that you were not particularly concerned about it?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Oh, no. This drop-off was reason for real concern and, therefore, action was taken to make the lot a happier one, it sprung from exactly that worry.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Yes, but it comes back down to this question, why did it now work? In other words—let us put it the other way in that we are talking about playing on words here and pussyfooting—do you think our present strength, which I think is now something under 16,000 or 17,000—I am not sure what the figure is now—is sufficient to meet this commitment which we have now and have had for some years now with NATO?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: I have been out of touch now for about eight months and I am not sure what the figures are myself. Certainly it has been a worry and it is obviously worrying my successors now, the numbers. I do not imagine that all the steps they have taken have rectified the drop-off in the strength which they have experienced. I am sorry that I do not have up to date information on that.

Mr. MACALUSO: Air Chief Marshal, I was interested in your statement in answer to Mr. Winch's question with respect to commitments. I was looking at a quotation from an article of yours, sir, entitled "The Decisive Year" written when you were Chief of Defence Staff. This appeared in the Armed Forces *Sentinel* magazine in June, 1966, and I should like to stress one vital point:

> —throughout the period of reorganization we have maintained our operational capability. There has been no loss of efficiency, no cutting of

commitments. Indeed, we have accepted new responsibilities and taken them in our stride.

This falls into line with your answer to Mr. Winch, that our commitments were being maintained all during the time of integration and reorganization. Is that correct?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Yes.

Mr. MACALUSO: You went on to say that as far as the basic premises of the policies in the White Paper are concerned, they are still sound and good. Do you see within the concept of a single force, that we in any way would not be able to meet our present commitments, the commitments which are set out in the White Paper? Will we be able to meet those commitments, as we said we would in June of 1966?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Not without a crystal ball reader; that is a phenomenon, Mr. Macaluso. The effect of going into unification was one which most of us were worried about. During my time all facets of unification had not been defined, and I do not know whether they are defined yet. People facing it were naturally worried by the unknown, and what effect it has had on them, I do not know.

Mr. MACALUSO: Would you be able to say that we are now meeting all our commitments and then some, according to your statement, during the period of reorganization, as far as the integration aspect of it is concerned? As far back as 1964—perhaps even before that—you realized the end result would be a single force concept. You would not be able to say at this time, I understand, whether a single force concept would be able to meet our present commitments as they are now, and as set out in the White Paper.

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: The reaction now of recruitment to a single force will only be known when it is spelled out, when the men are given a chance to decide whether they will participate and when the recruiters are given a chance to find out whether they can recruit to it, will only be answered at that time.

Mr. MACALUSO: Evidence has been given to this Committee by the present Chief of Defence Staff and his staff to the effect that they would be able to undertake and perform our present commitments as set out in the White Paper.

This is why I wondered whether or not you from your experience—you have not really been out that long—could you corroborate that, but I will not press you. Do you feel that a single force concept would adversely affect the over-all security of this country?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: I really do not know. I am unhappy about the implications of a single force because it has not been spelled out and I do not know what it is going—

Mr. MACALUSO: What are you unhappy about, sir? Can you specify what aspects you are unhappy about?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Unification is just a word and it has come to be associated with the uniform. It has come to be associated with a single uniform, but it is more than that—a lot more than a single uniform.

Are the people of the forces going to be compelled to switch from their present uniforms to this new uniform and, if so, when? Under what conditions are they going to amalgamate the people in the various trades in the various

services? Are there going to be strictures on staying in one force or are the people going to be compelled to go into employment in what used to be the old force? I do not know.

Mr. MACALUSO: Have you been able to keep track of the minutes of the proceedings of this Committee?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: No, I have not.

Mr. MACALUSO: You are not aware of the presentation made by the Chief of Defence Staff.

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: No, I am not.

Mr. MACALUSO: That is all I have, thank you, sir.

Mr. HARKNESS: When Admiral Rayner was giving evidence before the Committee, he stated that he urged the Minister to delete all references in the White Paper to a single unified force.

This was at the time the White Paper was being drafted in 1964, and his reason was that the subject of unification had not been discussed by the chiefs of staff.

Was there any serious discussion of unification by the chiefs of staff either prior to the publication of the White Paper or after it?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Yes, there certainly had been discussion on it, although there was not as much as I would have liked. The chiefs of staff had discussed this and I think at that stage our interest was a little shortened by the need to get on with integration.

Mr. HARKNESS: When was this discussion—after the White Paper had been produced or before?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: I think it was co-incident with the time the White Paper was being drafted and considered by various government agencies.

Mr. HARKNESS: I do not know whether or not this is a fair question, and if it is not, of course, do not answer it. Did you or the other chiefs of staff advise that unification should be proceeded with? I make the distinction here between unification and integration.

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: I do not think there was any advice of that sort given.

Mr. HARKNESS: Have you any knowledge as to any plan that was produced in regard to unification, say, at the time the White Paper was produced or shortly thereafter?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: No, there was no plan.

Mr. HARKNESS: Was there any plan, to your knowledge, produced subsequently?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: I would say that there was no comprehensive plan.

Mr. HARKNESS: Then the present steps being taken toward unification are the steps that were being taken up to the time that you left the post of Chief of Defence Staff, and were proceeding, at least, without any plan whatever, more or less on an ad hoc basis.

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: There was intention there, but as I attempted to outline, I was not aware of what unification was and, therefore, there could be no comprehensive plan on unification, or what was meant by unification.

Mr. HARKNESS: Have you any knowledge where any expert advice on unification, if there was any, came from?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: I think advice and discussion are sometimes two names for the same thing. There was all sorts of discussion, but as far as advice, I do not know.

Mr. HARKNESS: You do not recall any advice.

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: No, when it comes down to advice.

Mr. HARKNESS: Do you, yourself, see any financial advantage accruing from the proposed scheme of unification?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: There are no significant financial advantages whatsoever as far as I can see.

Mr. HARKNESS: Do you see any military advantages flowing from it?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Again, there are no significant military advantages.

Mr. HARKNESS: Do you see any military disadvantages coming out of it?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: The disruption is an unknown factor, and one which I have always rated rather highly. I did not want to have anything occur that would cause disruption in the services. I felt a lot of careful planning was necessary, and that probably time to educate people was required before the next step of unification was taken.

Mr. HARKNESS: We have had a considerable amount of evidence here in regard to the amount of time that will be required to fully integrate materiel commands, the technical services and various others of the functional commands, and it has been raised that this will range from three to five years.

In your view, do you think there should be a period of something like three to five years to consolidate the integration measures before any further steps could logically be taken?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: That is my feeling completely.

Mr. HARKNESS: In other words, there should be a pause at the present time.

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Let us get the integration process further along the road before we rock the boat.

Mr. HARKNESS: Another thing which was brought up by a number of witnesses is that there was a threat that unification would inevitably—when you had a single unified force—result in a considerable loss of expertise in the three different environments of the sea, air and land warfare. What is your view on that?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Well, that is predicated on the people being dissatisfied with the conditions and leaving. If the conditions are made attractive and information is made available to all the people, you might not lose them—I do not know. The big thing is the loss of people. I do not think we can force people to stay on if the government unilaterally tears up their contracts. If they join the navy and the navy disappears, you have to, in my view, give the men an

option as to whether they will continue in the new service or whether they will leave. The decision with which you are facing those men has to be very carefully considered and prepared for.

Mr. HARKNESS: You would contemplate then that there might be a considerable further loss of highly trained personnel as a result of this move if it is made going into effect.

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: That is very well worth consideration. I do not think you will ever know what it is until you spell out what the conditions are and put them up to the men and see what the reaction is.

Mr. HARKNESS: That is one of the possible serious results.

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Yes.

Mr. HARKNESS: What do you consider the effect on the efficiency in effectiveness of the Canadian forces of the loss which has already taken place of very considerable numbers of senior and also more junior personnel.

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: I think it is a very bad thing for the forces. Many of the people who had left had a great deal to contribute to the forces organization in the future if they had stayed on. There were some key men who left.

Mr. HARKNESS: Would you consider then that the loss of considerable numbers of highly trained personnel extending right down into NCOs and so on, and technical trades, has impaired the effectiveness of the forces?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Yes. With the loss of skill and talent from our pool, the pool is bound to be poor thereby.

Mr. HARKNESS: So the forces are bound now to be less effective than they were two or three years ago.

Are there any good men left?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Yes, certainly there are good men left but the forces have lost very good people and the forces are poorer thereby.

Mr. HARKNESS: There was some talk about the roles. Do you think that the projected unified force would be able to carry on the roles which the aims and objectives of defense policy have laid down as effectively as has been possible with the three separate services?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: In time they might be. The loss we may suffer in a changeover is an unknown factor. If we lose a lot of people we may very well have some difficulties in meeting our commitments.

If the changeover can be made sufficiently attractive that we do not lose people then I do not think by changing his uniform will change the effectiveness of the force one way or the other if the people stay on.

Mr. HARKNESS: I was not thinking so much of the change in the uniform. I was thinking of the change in the structure and the general organization of the forces.

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: I would think that your organization and structure is defined really by your integration rather than your unification.

Mr. HARKNESS: The disappearance of the navy, army and air force, and its replacement by a single unified force is a major structural change.

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Yes. In the sense of a broad look at the thing but you will still have the same requirement for the battalions, the ship crews and the air crews, and putting them into one uniform or another. If they will stay on and be attracted by this, will not really affect the efficiency of our forces. I do not think so.

Mr. HARKNESS: And, if their morale remains as good?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: That is right, but I associate staying on and morale.

Mr. HARKNESS: That is not necessarily the case.

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: No there is a possible difference.

Mr. WINCH: May I ask a supplementary?

The CHAIRMAN: A very short one?

Mr. WINCH: Yes. May I ask you, sir, if General Moncel was a member of your staff?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Yes.

Mr. WINCH: Then my question is this. Information was given at this Committee by General Moncel that he had drafted four plans and submitted them to the Minister on unification and he thought one should have been accepted.

Did you, as Chief of Staff, ever see the four plans on unification drafted by General Moncel?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: No.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, this is the kind of question that asks the witness to disclose things about individuals and so on, and this is—

Mr. WINCH: I thought it was a reasonable question.

The CHAIRMAN: Well, it may be a reasonable question but I have the gravest doubts about getting into areas in which you ask one witness, did so and so say or do something, and then you get another witness and ask him, did so and so say or do anything, to try and produce contradictions and I just wonder whether—

Mr. WINCH: All right Mr. Chairman. I realize what you are driving at. May I then change my question and, through you, ask whether or not any plans on unification of any members of your staff went forward without your knowledge of those plans?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: This also causes some difficulty because there may have been some papers presented by the staff while I was not there and there may have been discussions when I was not there. As far as four plans prepared by General Moncel are concerned, I am not aware of four formalized plans put up for comparison.

Mr. MACALUSO: If there were they would have gone through you as Chief of Staff, would they not sir?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Normally, yes.

Mr. NUGENT: I wonder if Air Chief Marshal Miller would mind if I tried to summarize the situation as I see it from his testimony and from others and correct me if I am wrong.

During your period you were in on some of the orginal planning of the latest series of experiments in integration. You saw the plans being drawn up and

understood what they were doing and helped direct the detailed planning to bring them into operations and some of them started to be implemented. Is that correct?

And during this time if I have your testimony correct, unification had been talked about but you had never seen or heard the implications of it spelled out. Is that accurate?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: We never had tentative unification plans submitted and agreed to.

Mr. NUGENT: The testimony from other witnesses is that many of the experiments in integration were different plans. For instance, the plan of a training staff is one in itself, the plan to combine the pay services would be one in itself, and Materiel Command would be a plan in itself. Is it correct that these plans could be separated and some of these steps in integration might work out and others that might not be worked out would not necessarily be kept?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: As I said, the approach that we took towards organization for integration was a pragmatic one. We said it looks like this to start with but as we go down the road of integration and as we integrate if we find something that should be changed we will change it. We did and changes were made in the various organizational structures and we tried them.

Mr. NUGENT: Then it would be fair to say that some of these new ideas or new structure setups contemplated, when tried out, might not work and they might have to be reversed because that plan just would not work. Would that be fair?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: That was the basic premise on which we stood.

Mr. NUGENT: In so far as unification is concerned you said you saw that as a step—however dimly you saw it—as something later, after this integration experiment had been tried out. Is that correct?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Yes, that is correct. That is my view.

Mr. NUGENT: Looking at it now, and you have told us that you are unhappy with the rush going on, would I sum up your attitude accurately if I suggested that the case is simply this. Whether or not unification should ever be brought in and how quickly it would be brought in would be determined by a survey of the results of integration after these experiments had been finished and there had been a chance for an appraisal of their success or failure.

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Certainly the question of taking on unification was predicated on the integration—you call it experiment—the effort working.

Mr. NUGENT: So even in the minds of those who were working hardest and we have had lots of testimony that many good people have been working very hard to make integration work, in the minds of the most dedicated people to integration, there was no such throught in their mind that unification must be a necessary end result of any of these experiments in integration.

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: I think when you say all people, in their minds, I really do not know, I think probably there was a fairly wide view on timing and method.

Mr. NUGENT: In your mind then, sir.

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: In my mind I felt that we had to make integration work and face unification as we got down the road and got a good integrated organization going.

Mr. NUGENT: Did you find substantial agreement on your staff with that thinking that we will take this one step at a time to see how well we succeed. If our plans are right and they are working, then, we can take a close look. That is the time to take a look at unification and in the light of what we have learned about the success or the lack of it, to consider whether unification might then be a logical step.

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: I would think that, while I have never taken a poll on it, but I would think that that was the generally held view.

Mr. NUGENT: Do you think now from the evidence we have heard and the fact that some of the experiments of integration are still in the planning stage, still starting to be implemented, that we are anywhere near the time that we could properly assess whether unification should be brought in?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: I have been out of touch for the last eight months. That was the condition when I left.

Mr. NUGENT: That at the time you left it would be impossible to assess properly whether unification had more to recommend it and should be brought in? Is that correct?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Yes, I think so.

Mr. NUGENT: And at the time you left, it was obvious to you, was it not, sir, that the necessary amount of experimenting or study of integration, bringing it in and studying its results, was still quite a long range problem?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Yes.

Mr. NUGENT: The long range problem in the various steps in integration and planning et cetera, such as in Materiel Command, there is a job big enough in itself that the further complication of trying to get people to bring in a plan of unification might likely slow up, impede or interfere with the proper assessment of integration itself, if you lost people or their morale went down, but you also have only so many for planning, do you not, sir?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: That is right.

Mr. NUGENT: If the problems on integration are as great as anticipated and I gather they are very complicated, it would seem to me a logical inference that the problem of trying to find people to do the necessary planning for unification must leave you short staffed to handle integration problems or unification. Would that be accurate?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Not in a consequential way, I would not think.

Mr. NUGENT: Not in a consequential way? We have heard from General Fleury and General Moncel that people were putting in extra long hours—many, many hours—handling this and if it is as we hear that they are working so hard trying to make a success of it by putting in those extra hours, surely it is not unreasonable to suggest that it is going to be hard to find extra working time from those staffs for the added problem of unification?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: I think the general way of working hard is a way of life with the people around headquarters.

Mr. NUGENT: I was interested in your remark that—if I can find the note I have on it here—in looking at this it was anticipated that the biggest return in savings would come from integration. I believe you said that?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Yes, sir.

Mr. NUGENT: Rather than from unification? In fact, sir—I am going away out on a limb here—was there any thought in your mind or did you have any evidence on which to base an opinion that unification itself had any hope of achieving any sort of substantial savings in itself, at all?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: I think the words I used were "not of any great consequence", in some reply I gave.

Mr. NUGENT: I am not sure whether I have asked you this question, but are you still of the same mind today and would it be accurate to sum up that while you feel we are going too fast, that if given two or three years from now the chance to properly appraise the results of integration, do you think that the examination of the results of that program and how it is working would be a necessary factor for you to consider before making up your mind whether unification itself should ever be brought in or not?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Oh, yes.

Mr. NUGENT: Thank you, sir.

Mr. BYRNE: Air Marshal Miller, is it your understanding that the government policy outlined in the White Paper is one of ultimate unification of the forces? Is that a fair statement?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Yes, that is what the White Paper says.

Mr. BYRNE: Do you differ more as to a matter of timing than in any other respect?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: That is an over simplification, yes, timing is important in making integration work and then following it up with a decision of whether to unify or not.

Mr. BYRNE: Do you consider that the prospects of unification held out to the public has been detrimental to naval or other recruitment, thus far?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: I would be giving a "Blue Sea" opinion on that that I could not back up. I think it has, but there are so many factors involved in what persuades anybody to join the navy, that for me to say that this is a factor or not, is just a matter of opinion and I could not make that.

Mr. BYRNE: Then, do you believe that the implementation of Bill C-243 would result in significant demoralization of the various forces?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: If rushed, I would think so.

Mr. BYRNE: If rushed. Do you consider that Bill C-243 is the exemplification of unification, that is, that it is exemplified in this bill?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Yes, I think it is.

Mr. BYRNE: You said at the outset, I believe it was in answering Mr. Forrestall, that you have not had time to take a look at the bill? Do you know when this bill was given first reading?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Yes, last fall.

Mr. BYRNE: Yes, on November 4th. General Simonds was of the opinion that obsolescence of equipment was not an important factor in preparedness for an all-out war. I believe that is contrary to what you—

An hon. MEMBER: On a point of order.

The CHAIRMAN: Well, Mr. MacInnis—

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Just on a point of order for Mr. Byrne's clarification. General Simonds never made any such statement. He made a statement to the effect that given the choice of equipment and well trained disciplined men, he would prefer to take the men because they would be capable of adjusting themselves to new equipment that became available.

Mr. BYRNE: I thank Mr. MacInnis for his clarification, but I say again that General Simonds—

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Never.

The CHAIRMAN: Order.

Mr. BYRNE: —was of the opinion that obsolescence was not an important factor in preparedness for all-out war. It was not the deciding factor.

Some hon. MEMBERS: No.

The CHAIRMAN: Order.

An hon. MEMBER: That is very unfair.

Mr. BYRNE: There seems to be a little difficulty as to what General Simonds' opinion really was.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, we will place the broadest interpretation on General Simonds' remarks and then, perhaps, we can get ahead.

Mr. BYRNE: I believe your statement was that obsolescence of equipment was not a factor in preparedness for all-out war? This was your statement?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: I trust not. That is the real factor. I do not believe that you can get equipment off the shelf if you ever need it in a hurry.

There is a building time on ships and guns and aircraft which is much longer than most training periods for men. I think one of the problems of obsolescence is the terrible time lag between the decision and getting the equipment.

Mr. BYRNE: Your statement was that obsolescence of equipment is an important factor in preparedness for all-out war?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Yes, it is an important factor.

Mr. BYRNE: That is all I have, thank you.

Mr. SMITH: At the beginning when you were answering questions by Mr. Winch—Air Marshal, you suggested that integration, as you have repeated many times, was important and necessary and at the time of the White Paper you were anxious to get on with certain features of the integration program, but you then, turning to unification, I think you used the expression that at that time unification was just a word or just an idea that had never been clearly defined. Is that so?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Yes, that was the gist of my statement.

Mr. SMITH: As you have given evidence it has the tide, it seems to me and I think I am paraphrasing it fairly, that you seem to feel the unification is being rushed too fast and that Bill C-243, if rushed, could be bad. Do you feel that the

present program having regard to the fact that integration, as I understand it, is now getting into the clear planning stage that it is much too early to be talking about unification? Is that so?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Well, we are fairly well down the road on integration.

Mr. SMITH: Into clear planning now.

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: We are beyond the planning now, we are pretty well into the implementing stage, but still I do not think that—certainly I have not seen plans for unification. Maybe there is one now.

Mr. SMITH: But eight months ago there were no plans for unification?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: That is right.

Mr. SMITH: Another one of the fears you expressed was the disruption of the services. Do you think that part of the possible or potential disruption of the services is because the people are being asked to embark on something that is unknown, that has not been clearly expressed to them as to what will be the result?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Yes, I think that is one of the factors that bear on the present problem.

Mr. SMITH: As far as we know now, is it not so, that it will be some time before any servicemen will really know what the effects of unification are going to be, both of their own personal careers and on the services in which they serve?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: I am afraid that is not within my competence because I do not know what has transpired in the period since I left. Maybe there has been a plan. Maybe the people know now.

Mr. SMITH: In terms of the planning for integration which took some two or three years, it would be rather something if a complete plan of unification were developed within eight months, would it not?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: It might be.

Mr. SMITH: We were talking—you were talking about meeting our various military forces' roles as required. You said that up until the middle of last year when you left that we had enough personnel to carry out the role to which we were committed, but you said that you had some worry in that regard.

I suppose the worry would be, would it. Air Marshal, that if we were called on to undertake any of those commitments that the attribution—the minor acceleration or attrition of troops such as serving in a bad climate or bad conditions, it would be hard to find reinforcements, was that the worry?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: It is the traditional military worry of being spread too thin. You have nothing up your sleeve for anything new or unexpected commitments.

Mr. SMITH: Enough reinforcements?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Not necessarily for reinforcements, but for additional tasks that are thrown at you.

Mr. SMITH: Something like the situation that developed in 1943, I suppose, in Italy and elsewhere where there were not enough people to go around for the role to which we were committed?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: That was one historical example of spreading too thin. If we had to take on another commitment that was clearly to the advantage of Canada as a member of the United Nations or any other international grouping to which we have subscribed, we might not have been able to make it because we were—

Mr. SMITH: It would be more than probable that we would have had to find personnel for it from one of our other commitments, as it were?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Yes.

Mr. SMITH: It seems to me there are four areas in which we are militarily committed in substantial numbers in terms of troops and equipment and that is the brigade in Germany; the air division in Germany; the naval role, chiefly the anti-submarine role in NATO and our Mobile Command.

I know that the roles that a country undertakes are politically determined. In other words, they are determined by the government, but as a military force or as a military commander or the chief of staff, was there ever any appreciation made from a military point of view to ascribe priority to those four roles as to which was considered the most vital and which was the second most vital and which was the least important in a military sense?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: To differentiate here, you have included Mobile Command and that is not a commitment. Mobile command is an organization that we have set up here in Canada to enable us to train and meet some of the commitments.

The business of priorities between Cyprus or the Middle East, or any place else, there has never been any test of priority applied to those; they have come along as requests for us to meet an international requirement, and we have been able to do so, and have done so.

Mr. SMITH: Then, just to conclude, Air Marshal, you were talking about the integration being well along; eight months ago when you left, how far along was the actual integration of the training—and I want to differentiate in this sense —establishments? How far along was their integration as opposed to the Training Command which has been superimposed on all training establishments in Canada? How far along was the integration of the actual training?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: At that time?

Mr. SMITH: Yes, at that time.

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: It was not very far along.

Mr. SMITH: It was not very far along; thank you.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Lambert.

Mr. LAMBERT: Air Chief Marshal Miller, you have been speaking about recruits, and the rate of recruiting. I was a little concerned that perhaps there was a wrong emphasis being placed upon men as numbers, and that one of the big difficulties today is that as a result of changes in personnel over the past few years there is a much less experienced force available at all levels; and that no matter how many recruits you would take in you were still going to be horribly short of experience.

Now, am I right in my assessment that no matter how many recruits you could take in, if you have a very heavy out-flow of experienced men, you are

going to be a force that is not balanced, and is far less able to meet its commitments?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Yes, that is obviously so. On the other hand, Canada probably is better off than any other armed force in the world for experienced people.

We have no national service plan, which makes for a rapid turnover of people in the ranks, the less skilled people, and puts a very heavy load on training of this large mass of people where you have to expect skilled people to train them and not have them in the cutting edge of the force. So we have been well off as far as skill levels are concerned.

This is not to say that we do not hurt when there is an undue bleeding off of our skilled people, and we attempt to keep the right sort of a mixture there. But you must remember that certainly in certain of our formations we want turnover; we want young people, we want people to just come in and put in a short term period with us and then return to civil life. This was especially true in the battalions and the fighting elements of the services.

On the other hand, in the technical trades, the skills there are not necessarily attuned to the youth of that particular group; we can use older men and save having to turn them over and train replacements. So that on our ability to carry on, I would not think that our dilution of skills, at least six or eight months ago, had reached a real danger point.

Mr. LAMBERT: From your experiences as Deputy Minister, and as Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff, and then Chief of the Defence Forces, surely you have seen force goals as to personnel.

On the basis of your experience in the last 18 months to two years, particularly, do you foresee within the next four or five years any particularly critical areas in the mix of our personnel?

Is there any difficulty in the middle range group coming up to positions of senior command, or is there any area that gives you concern; or are you satisfied?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Well, through the natural process of growing older, our forces were largely World War II forces—the officer category, and the NCO category—and there was going to be a bust of releases starting about now but going on for the next four or five years in which there will be a real bleeding off of skilled people through normal retirement.

This was a worrisome thing and one of the things we had to look at to try and string out the younger group coming along, because there was a period there from about 1945 to 1950 where an increase in new people coming into the forces was very very small indeed.

Mr. LAMBERT: As a result of that, though, has this problem been accentuated by this excessive bleed-out of some 15,000 to 16,000 men in the last 18 months?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: I would hesitate to say that it has; it has stretched out the period of this because the people that we have lost there are not necessarily all in that group, they might just be three year men who failed to re-enlist. You would have to really have a look at it to see who these 15,000 people were, and I do not have those figures at the moment.

Mr. LAMBERT: I see. You would likely agree, though, that if a loss of these people with, say, six, nine, or 12 years of experience, that their loss would be felt considerably when they came to replace that high proportion of men who were going out—this bust that you referred to—and that they were not there.

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Oh, yes, that is right; the re-enlistment rate is one of the crucial factors there, the re-enlistment of those second and third return engagement period.

Mr. LAMBERT: Since you were of the air force initially, I want to concern myself with matters of the air branch now. First of all we know that some 15 or 18 months ago there was a very acute shortage of pilots, as a result there was a pay bonus introduced for pilots and air crew.

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: How long ago was this?

Mr. LAMBERT: Was it not about 15 to 18 months ago?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: No, I think it was last fall.

Mr. LAMBERT: All right then 1966, I will take it back a bit. The requirements of pilots in the Air Division in Europe will remain fairly constant, I take it, up till about 1970 to 1972?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: I would think there would be some attrition in this.

Mr. LAMBERT: That is about a target date, I take it, for that portion. I take it that there would be increasing requirements for pilots in Air Transport Command, because we know that there are more aircraft being purchased for Air Transport Command, and, therefore, there will be an expansion of air crew. Certainly, even with the phasing out of some of the older and less efficient aircraft, one would not expect a reduction in the numbers of air crews.

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Air crews?

Mr. LAMBERT: In air crew; and particularly pilots.

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: I think they are fairly static in their requirement.

Mr. LAMBERT: Yes; now, can you tell me from where are going to come the air crew and the support crews—the support people for the CF-5, which is due to go into training and, perhaps, will first be operational sometime late in 1968?

We have some 125 aircraft to put together. Now on the basis of the number of people we have in the air force, the number of people that are occupied and for which we continue to see occupation, where are these people going to come from?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Well, there are some in the process of training now, and there is a fairly good constant training level maintained for pilots. The pilot replacement problem comes ahead of the normal World War II type, it will be strung out more.

Mr. LAMBERT: If the normal strength of the air force was about 50,000 it is now about 45,000?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: I do not have the figures at my fingertips.

Mr. LAMBERT: Well, plus or minus 1,000. Presumably the air force personnel are fully occupied, where are these additional persons going to come from for the CF-5? Is it from a run-down of some other requirement?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: The Starfighters overseas are running down, I am not exactly sure of the number and the phasing, but there is a change-over there. You do not "disappear" all the pilots out of the Starfighters and create a new batch.

Mr. LAMBERT: But the Starfighters are due to remain as an identifiable force and a maintenance of their role until about 1970-1972; is that not a fact?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Not at present; it is going to run-down because you are going to waste airplanes in the meantime.

Mr. LAMBERT: But we started out with 66 aircraft, so we cannot have that many to play with.

An hon. MEMBER: Pilots, most of the time, are a waste of aircraft I think.

Mr. LAMBERT: I am concerned about this, because at the moment no one has indicated just where these people are going to come from, and you are not going to run that force of CF-5's with two men and a boy.

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: I am afraid I am not up on the details of this, but as far as I am aware the pilot problem was a retention problem of highly skilled people. It was not the ability to get people to train. It is expensive to train them. We were under a lot of pressure then because of what is happening in commercial aviation, they were being bought away—service pilots were being hired away from us. The problem was retaining the ones we had.

Mr. LAMBERT: You will agree, though, that a man who is a suitable pilot or crew man for Air Transport Command is not necessarily the right man to put in an attack aircraft?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: But the man in an attack aircraft might be the man to put into Transport Command because he is long in the "tooth" in the attack field.

Mr. LAMBERT: Still; how about the ground environment for all this force. Where is it going to come from, unless there is an expansion in the numbers of the air force. Is this envisaged?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: The role of the air force, the new airplane will take the place, phase in to the Starfighter and not at any stage will one be piled on top of the other. It will be about maintaining the present strength levels.

Mr. LAMBERT: Is this a forecast then of complete discontinuance of the strike-recce role and of the role of the air division in Europe?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: I am not talking of roles; I am talking of airplanes; the build up of the CF-5 and phasing out of the Starfighter is going to be part of the same problem.

Mr. LAMBERT: Is the CF-5 going to replace the Starfighter.

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: You had better ask the Minister on that I think, Mr. Lambert.

Mr. LAMBERT: All right, then; there are some unresolved areas.

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: I have been away for eight months and I am purposely not watching the number—

Mr. LAMBERT: But I think it would be fair to observe though, that the decisions in regard to this were taken while you were Chief of Defence Staff.

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Yes; and there were no red tags anywhere sounding alarm on it.

Mr. LAMBERT: Again, may I say it strikes me that the decision to buy the CF-5 was made and then it was decided afterwards: well, we will look around for the men, and what we are going to do with the planes.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Air Marshal Miller, would there be any reaction to address you as general?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: I have been addressed as many things, and I react to practically all.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Your interpretation, sir, of the White Paper of 1964 was that integration of the forces was the necessary step for unification, and I think in answer to a question you indicated that quite possible, or most probable the plans to put integration into effect are about ready and should be implemented very soon.

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Integration?

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Integration, yes.

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: They are well advanced; I think that we are pretty well down the road in carrying out many of the integration plans. As I said, we took a very pragmatic approach. We said, we are going to integrate and we do away with the three staffs and put them into one, and go on with it, so that we are pretty well established. But down the road of integration there are areas and places where it is going to be slower than others. In some places it is quite easy to do and it is done quite rapidly.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): You have also indicated that it is quite possible that changes could be brought about in the unification or in the integrated plans.

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Yes; there have been and there probably will be.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Integration itself has not proven out necessarily has it?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: I would hazard the view that it is not yet in its final form.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Since integration is not in its final form, you would agree that the Canadian services are not yet prepared for unification?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: That is my feeling.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Air Marshal I would like to ask you if there is any way you can make a comparison between a Canadian unified force and the United States marines.

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: There are; the United States marines have been talked about on many occasions as policy—of a model for our Canadian forces.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): But why?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: The marines are an admirable force, but they are a very highly specialized force and I do not think that the marine organization are the main structure really of what the Canadian forces should be patterned on.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): So actually there is not a good comparison to be made.

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: I do not think so. You sort of turn to them because they have the element of soldier and the airmen together. They are a very specialized force. I do not think they are necessarily the model on which Canadian forces should be patterned.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): And yet you feel that this is the pattern that has been followed in unification?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: The elements of close support—ground elements—are handled by people of the same force, and in that particular sphere they might very well learn some lessons from them, but there are a large number of other roles that Canada may be called on, that do not fit the marine pattern.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Air Marshal, you have indicated in answer to Mr. Harkness that you saw no advantages to unification. Did I understand you correctly when you said you could list several disadvantages.

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: I said I did not see any monetary return for unification, nor did I see any significant military effectiveness. I said I saw some unanswered questions associated with unification that perhaps should be spelled out before you could really get out and attempt to sell it to people.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): But before your retirement, no method or timing of unification was ever discussed.

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Oh yes, it was discussed, but we did not have agreement on a plan.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): No method or timing?

Mr. WINCH: Could any plan go to the Minister on unification unless it went through your hands when you were Chief of Staff.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Could it be cleared before in your absence—some suggestions could be made.

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: I had to be away a fair amount of time, and other people took over; I could not say with any absolute assurance, but normally—

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): But, would it not follow on Mr. Winch's question that any such plans or any such suggestions or discussions would, or at least should have been brought to your attention on your return.

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Oh yes.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): And you were not aware of any such plans, suggestions or discussions.

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Oh, yes, I am aware of discussions.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): But you were not made aware if it happened in your absence.

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Not in a formal way.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): One more question, Air Marshal, in respect to the transferring of the airmen, the sailors and the soldiers to the unified force.

Did I understand you to say that you feel that this should be handled in a different way? It is probably not a fair way to put it, but I am of the firm belief that it would be necessary to redocument these men into the unified force. Is this your interpretation of that?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Not only redocument them, you would have to get their agreement, there is a human individual reaction to this change that is the unknown.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): As Chief of Staff, was it your interpretation that every individual serviceman had an agreement with the service for which he was performing.

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Oh yes.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): And in order to facilitate the establishment of a unified force, it would be necessary to renew that agreement.

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: You would have to tear up that agreement and get him on a new one.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): During your term of office, during your tenure as Chief of Staff, on the matter of commitments, did the navy ever bring it to your attention that they were hard pressed to meet their commitments and that the sailors had to put in extra time in order to keep the ships afloat, the navy at sea.

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Oh yes.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): And did they indicate to you at any time that their commitments one place or the other, in order to be fulfilled, something detrimental in respect to another commitment might take place.

In other words, were they at all times capable of fulfilling all their commitments both at home and abroad at the same time?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: They did, but their ability to meet the unexpected, the ability to cope with a situation other than the normal was very thin; the navy itself; the strength of the navy was reduced very drastically and was a worry to us all.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Prior to your retirement—I know the problem has developed since—did the navy at any time specifically indicate that they were better able to keep their commitments at home than abroad, or has this developed since your retirement?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: I could not identify that as a naval position during that time.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): But you are not aware whether or not this has developed since? The only think we have to fall back on is the brief, or the answers given to questions by Commodore Porter who indicated that this is now the case within the navy. Thank you Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. McIntosh.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Air Chief Marshal, to prevent some confusion on my part, could I ask you to define what you understand by the term unification?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Yes; this is important because only after some time has there been any real recognition of the two terms.

Unification is the formation of a single force, single rank structure, single administrative chain, the wearing of a common uniform and calling trades and ranks by common names. In other words: a single force instead of three forces.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Does it make any difference in the structure of our combat troops at the present time.

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: No; I would not think there is any consequential change as result of this.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Air Chief Marshal, when Admiral Landymore was before us, he said that on several occasions his subordinates came to him and asked him what was meant by unification.

He said he was unable to tell them; he said he came to Ottawa and asked—I presume it was you, as Chief of General Staff—what unification meant, and you were unable to tell him what it meant. Is that correct?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: That, I imagine, as far as I am concerned is right. I did not know, and I do not know now, the whole answer, all the proposals for unification.

Mr. MCINTOSH: You just gave us a definition. Did you give Admiral Landymore that definition when he asked you what unification was?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: The things that I did not answer him were not that sort of definition, of course. He would say, what is the future of the man. Is he going to be forced to leave the navy and go into this new force? All these other questions that are sort of involved with the consequences of forming a new force?

Mr. MCINTOSH: Do you know or have a definition of what this force was?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Or would be?

Mr. MCINTOSH: Did the Minister ever ask you to write a study or paper on what unification was?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Specifically, I do not think he did. We talked a great deal about it, of course, but in answer to your question if he ever asked me to prepare a plan, I do not think he did, to my recollection.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Did you ever go to the Minister and tell him the problem you were having in trying to give a definition.

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Yes indeed.

Mr. MCINTOSH: What was his reaction at that time?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: I was thinking that this was one of the things that I would not want to get into at this time because it gets into the "advice" area. He can answer that better than I can.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Did you then not ever go to or approach the Minister on the injustice that he was imposing on these senior officers by prematurely discharging—

An hon. MEMBER: On a point of order, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Just a moment, this has a bearing on the question and the testimony that Admiral Landymore gave to this Committee. I would think that you, as Chief of the General Staff, would certainly go to the Minister and approach him about the injustice of dismissing people when you, as Chief of the General Staff, could not tell them what their role was supposed to be.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. McIntosh, I think you are getting into an area here where I do not think it is fair to a witness.

I do not really think that we could conclude that this is necessary knowledge we need in order to conclude our deliberations of this bill. I just wonder whether we could spend our time more profitably—

Mr. McINTOSH: Mr. Chairman, I think this was the Chief of the General Staff's responsibility.

The CHAIRMAN: This may be what you think, Mr. McIntosh, but I would just invite you to return a little more to the substance of the bill in addressing your remarks to the witness. I think he would appreciate it as much as the Chair would.

Mr. McINTOSH: So would I appreciate it and I think this has—

The CHAIRMAN: I just invite you to—

Mr. McINTOSH: This has all to do with the bill. I am talking about unification and this is what the bill is. I want to find out what it is and I want to find out if the Chief of the General Staff knows what it is or if he protected those people who resigned because they did not know what it was.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. McIntosh, I invite you to come back to the substance of the bill.

Mr. McINTOSH: I am talking about unification. Now, how do you want me to get back to the substance of the bill?

The CHAIRMAN: Let us leave this kind of area alone. I think that is only fair to the witness.

Mr. McINTOSH: What kind of area do you want me to leave alone?

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. McIntosh, I think that the area of personalities involving what one person said to the Minister, and so on. These are questions which, in due course, you can put to the Minister when the Minister is here.

Mr. McINTOSH: I did not ask him—I asked him if he ever went to the Minister. I did not ask him what he said. I repeat my question.

An hon. MEMBER: On a point of order.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. McIntosh, I want to attend to this point of order, first, and then I will hear you. There is no point of order. It is just that I am inviting Mr. McIntosh to return to the subject and I am quite sure that he will oblige the Chair by doing so. Mr. McIntosh you can go on.

An hon. MEMBER: Are you going to rule there is no point of order when you have not allowed me to put it, yet? This general subject—

The CHAIRMAN: Let us not get involved in this. Gentlemen, we have only a little time left this evening. This is an interesting discussion with the witness, but I am sure we want to make progress. Let us avoid this area and continue. Mr. McIntosh.

Mr. McINTOSH: Air Chief Marshal, have you any idea where the idea of unification of the Canadian armed forces originated?

An hon. MEMBER: The U.S. marines.

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: I think this has been lost in the shadows of history. It is an idea or concept that has been tossed about and argued about for as long as I can remember.

Mr. McINTOSH: Did you ever at any time advise that the Minister proceed or advise the Minister against proceeding with unification?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: I think, Mr. McIntosh, that I covered that sort of point fairly when I said that I did not think that I should be required to

answer questions as to what advice I did or did not give to the Minister. This was a confidential matter and I feel I am bound by that confidence.

Mr. McINTOSH: In reply to a question from Mr. MacInnis you said that the idea of the American marine force was talked about. Would you care to tell the Committee who were the people who talked about a marine service or whether Canada should go into it?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: I think the staff colleges, the planners and a whole spectrum of people who were interested in trying to do the job of the military organization better or tuning it to modern requirements and demands, talk about it and have talked about it for a long time.

Mr. McINTOSH: Did any officials of our allied forces ever suggest or recommend that the Canadian forces be turned into a unified force or a marine force?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Not that I am aware of.

Mr. McINTOSH: Did any of the allied commanders with whom you talked discuss with you at any time whether the single service concept would fit in with our present commitments to our alliances at the present time? Whether they would fit in or whether they would not fit in?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Oh, yes, they were interested. This has been a favourite element of discussion, too. The views are pretty wide. Various people have various views on it.

I do not think there is any unanimity as to whether a unified force was a good contribution to NATO. It will be a difficult one in that it will not have a counterpart with any of the other members, but that is not an insuperable difficulty, I do not think.

Mr. McINTOSH: This new role of restoring peace, which apparently was a government decision or government policy, did it concern you whether Canada would be able to afford it or whether we would have the manpower to man a new force such as this which is required by the peace restoring role?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: I do not think that I would regard this peace keeping force as a new force.

Mr. McINTOSH: I am thinking more of a peace restoring force. That is a fighting force where people are at war and you get into it. Like the Americans did in Viet Nam. They started with 24,000 people and they have now ended up with 400,000. Is this a dangerous role for Canada to get into?

An hon. MEMBER: Air Marshal Curtis said we used to call that war.

Mr. McINTOSH: I just want to know what the Air Chief Marshal would think. The reason I am asking that, sir, is because when the Minister was before us as a witness and when his Chief of the General Staff was here they told us there were no studies made as to additional requirements in manpower or finances.

I feel that this is very odd in planning and if you are taking on a new role there are no studies made as to what the requirements would be. So I ask you if there were any studies made when you were there.

Mr. MACALUSO: Mr. Chairman, if the evidence given was to the contrary and if there is going to be some clarification by other people as to what is said, I want

to give a clarification that the evidence is completely to the contrary according to the defence saff who were here.

Mr. McINTOSH: I am quite prepared to listen to it. I understood there were no studies made. Maybe you should read the minutes.

Mr. MACALUSO: Go ahead, you clarify it.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. McIntosh, are you near the end of your questioning?

Mr. McINTOSH: I would like the Air Chief Marshal rather than Mr. Macaluso to answer my question.

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: I might say that a peace keeping force is not the force to fight a war with if you have to fight it.

Canada cannot have two kinds of forces, in my opinion. What you do is take a fighting force and put it in on the ground equipped with what is necessary to do the job such as they have done in Cyprus or in the middle east, and make up the force to fit or tailor it to fit the task it is faced with by extracting elements or weapons from the normal force which is a fighting force.

Mr. McINTOSH: Was there any intention or could you think of why Canada should opt out of the present collective defence commitments which she had, such as NATO, NORAD, SACLANT and so on? You said that there were two different forces. What I am trying to get at is this; would a new type of force be necessary for this peace restoring role other than what we have at the present time?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Never. Not just because it is a peace restoring role, no. Peace restoring is a fighting force and it should depend on what sort of a war it is trying to restore peace on.

Mr. McINTOSH: Would it be the same type of force that is required by our NATO commitments?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Yes, exactly. It can be made up from the elements of the forces we need for NATO.

Mr. McINTOSH: In order to form a force like that there would be no need to unify our forces as is the intention under this bill?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Well, we are doing it now in a non-unified condition and I do not see that unification will add to or detract from our ability in any way on this.

Mr. McINTOSH: Could I ask, Air Chief Marshal, when you came to the conclusion that you had a definition for the word "unification"?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: I do not know. I do not have a definition yet on that. I know what it means but I do not know what they are going to do about it in the way of providing all these anwers that people who are in one force now want to know before they make a judgment as to whether they want to be part of the new force.

Mr. McINTOSH: Did you know about it prior to the issuing of the White Paper in 1964?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: What the conditions would be?

Mr. McINTOSH: Yes.

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: No, I did not.

Mr. McINTOSH: Was there anything in the White Paper that led you to believe that they would eventually come to this term "unification"?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: I think the term "unification" is used in the White Paper. The statement being that integration is the first step towards unification.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. McIntosh, you have exceeded your time. We are coming up to—

Mr. McINTOSH: Put me down for the next round, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN: We are coming up to 10 o'clock. I still have Mr. Hopkins on the first round, but I wonder, Mr. Hopkins, if you would prefer to wait until tomorrow, if Air Chief Marshal Miller is prepared to be with us tomorrow, so that you can be the first one on the list tomorrow morning?

In the second round I now have Mr. Macaluso, Mr. Lambert, Mr. McIntosh and Mr. Forrestall.

Gentlemen, we will then stand adjourned until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning in this room.

TUESDAY, March 21, 1967.

The CHAIRMAN: Order. Mr. Foy, on a point of privilege.

Mr. FOY: Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I feel that I should make some comments regarding Chairman Groos' resignation. I knew that Dave Groos was ill for about two weeks before he went into hospital; in fact, I drove him to the hospital. I knew that he had pains in his chest and down his left arm and he was being urged by friends and other people to go for a medical check-up.

On this point of privilege I just want to say that I resent very much the unmitigated lie, the dishonesty, of Davie Fulton when he made his speech in Halifax over last week end in which he said that Dave Groos resigned as Chairman of the Defence Committee because he did not believe in the unification policy. I think it is a slander of everyone—all parties—on this Committee for Davie Fulton to do this.

Mr. LAMBERT: Surely to goodness there is no record of what was said. Mr. Foy can think that I am telling an unmitigated lie when I say it is now fogging up over the river because he cannot possibly see the river. I do not know that this is the place to make such comments.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, I do not think I can recognize this as a point of privilege. It has arisen, apparently, out of a newspaper report and newspaper reports cannot be brought into a Committee as points of privilege, and so on. I do not think there is any point of privilege here. I want to go on with—

Mr. McINTOSH: Mr. Chairman, I will raise a point of privilege, then, since this was brought up in the Committee. I feel—and I am only stating this personally—that this is not the place to being up a thing like that. But since it has been brought up I have the point of privilege that the proper place for it to be brought up, if at all, would be in the House of Commons.

I just want to say on behalf of Dave Groos that as far as I am concerned I also knew that he was not feeling well. I sympathize with Dave Groos for the

problem that he encountered when he took on this Chairmanship because he was not in proper health to take it in the first place, and I would endorse part of Mr. Foy's remarks.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, we will proceed with the work of the morning. The first item of business is again to stand yesterday's report of the subcommittee so that we can continue hearing from the witness, Air Chief Marshall Miller. I will ask for a motion to stand the motion on the subcommittee report.

Mr. LESSARD: Mr. Chairman, I think we all agree on that.

The CHAIRMAN: Continuing with the list I had yesterday I have, on the first round, Mr. Hopkins followed in the second round by Messrs. Macaluso, Lambert, McIntosh and Forrestall.

Mr. HOPKINS: Air Chief Marshal, were you concerned as Chief of Defence Staff about the many inequalities in personnel matters that had been brought vividly to light by so-called integration and the bringing together in the same office of personnel of the three services?

Air Chief Marshal F. R. MILLER: Yes, I think one of the areas of criticism has been the divergence between the administrative practices of the three services. They become highlighted, of course, when you move the services into the same jobs. Mind you, the divergences were not very great because we have been undergoing—ever since World War II—a levelling, in effect, of our practices between the three services. But certainly when we went into the integrated mode we had these differences highlighted as between the services, and they were one of the targets we were working at to level by the integration process. They were not associated with unification but were being struck at in the integration process.

Mr. HOPKINS: What was being done or could have been done under integration to correct this problem?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: First of all, you have to determine a common trade structure. I imagine that is the first thing. People doing the same thing in the various services are recognized by the names they call their trades. One may be a writer in one service and a stenographer or clerk in another sevice but they all have a generic name if they are practising the same trade. Then you have to determine the degrees of skill in that particular trade and then move into the common pay structure. Pay systems tend to become fractionated through the years as they adapt to conditions and as there had been no over-all common approach to the pay there were pay differences. But again that was struck at in the integation process—to develop and put into practice a common pay system.

Mr. HOPKINS: Why was this not proceeded with?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Prior to integration?

Mr. HOPKINS: No, during integration.

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: It was, but you cannot do it overnight because it takes a lot of groundwork; a lot of equating of tasks as between the various services to determine a common ground on which to evaluate the trade. I think they thought about a two-year task was involved.

Mr. HOPKINS: My final question is: Do you not think that this can be done or corrected more quickly under a unified force system?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: No, I do not. It is being done and has been under way and accomplished, to a certain extent, in many of the fields under the integration program.

Mr. HOPKINS: Does this include the idea of promotions for people in the same categories? If there were people working in administrative offices in similar work, was there not a difference in age for promotion of people—

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Oh yes, but that is being corrected in the integration process. It is not related, in any way that I can see, to unification.

Mr. HOPKINS: The reason I bring this up is that one particular case was brought to my attention where there seemed to be several questions concerning the fact that this did not seem to be going ahead and that is why I presented the question.

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Perhaps you can point to individual cases where inequity has existed in the past, because it is going to take considerable time to run all those cases down and to work out a common basic trade structure and, therefore, a rank structure as between the three systems that we are amalgamating under the integration program. That is all being done.

Mr. HOPKINS: But this can continue quite smoothly under the unified force system?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: It could if you unified the forces, yes. But unifying the forces is not critical, in my view, to continuing that process.

Mr. HOPKINS: Thank you Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Macaluso?

Mr. MACALUSO: Air Marshal Miller, a great deal has been said in this Committee about operational effectiveness and I entered into a line of questioning with you last night about the operational effectiveness of our forces. I would like to explore this a bit further with you, because I think it is very important in the context of the three services and of a single force concept. I would like you to make some comparisons, if you can, because of the role you played in the defence staff. Could you describe for us the condition as far as operational effectiveness is concerned with respect to our air defence contribution to NORAD in 1962, as opposed to when you left the service in 1966? Am I correct in stating that you left the service in 1966?

I am interested specifically in the armament of the Voodoo and the Bomarc interceptors as far as their operational effectiveness is concerned in those periods.

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: I am not sure exactly when the Voodoo was phased in. I would have to check on that. Your dates may, therefore, be different from what I take your question to mean. That is, if you asked me how the Voodoo was when it was first brought in as compared to when I left, I can give you an answer on that.

Mr. MACALUSO: When was it first brought in?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: I am not quite sure. It was around 1960 or thereabouts.

Mr. MACALUSO: In 1960?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: About that time.

Mr. MACALUSO: Could you give me a comparison of that time as far as the operational effectiveness of our air defence contribution to NORAD was concerned, say in 1960 when the Voodoo came in, and also the time when the Bomarc interceptor was brought in, as opposed to when you retired? I would like a comparison to show the difference.

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Over this period, the phasing in of the Voodoo and the phasing out of the CF-100, there was a very considerable change in the effectiveness of our air defence system. The CF-100 was a comparatively slow, unsophisticated interceptor airplane. The Voodoo was then, and still is, in order of magnitude more effective than the CF-100. There were fewer numbers of them, but I would say that the introduction of the Voodoo at that time probably raised the air defence effectiveness of the Canadian part of the NORAD system to a marked degree. The introduction of the Bomarcs was part of a Canada-U.S. integrated system that went through quite a few changes from the time of its introduction until now. I know of no change in the effectiveness of the Bomarc. It is essentially the same weapon that was installed five years ago.

Mr. MACALUSO: It lacked a warhead five years ago, did it not?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: I do not know—

Mr. MACALUSO: The Bomarc? Would this not affect its operational effectiveness?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: There would be a very marked increase in the effectiveness if we put warheads on them, but the time when it did not have warheads was a fairly short period. The warhead battle went on for quite some time, but the time between the moving of the Bomarc into Canada and the making of warheads available for them was a quite short period.

Mr. MACALUSO: What was the armament of the Voodoo at the time it was brought into the air defence forces as far as NORAD was concerned in 1960?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: It had the Falcon guided missile as its basic armament. It also had a gun armament as an alternative and those are still the basic armaments of the airplane.

Mr. MACALUSO: Was there not a Genie rocket brought in?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Well, that is the missile.

Mr. MACALUSO: When was that brought in?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: It was the original equipment of the Voodoo when it came into service with the Canadian forces. There have been modifications to the weapon, but it is still the same basic weapon.

Mr. MACALUSO: Was it more operationally effective when you left than when it was first phased in in 1960?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Oh, marginally because of the modifications to the same basic weapon.

Mr. MACALUSO: What I am trying to find out is whether the operational effectiveness of the Voodoo and the Bomarc was greater when you left than it was when they were brought in in 1960, as far as the Voodoo is concerned, and later on as far as the Bomarc is concerned?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: In no real significant way; but they were better, yes.

Mr. MACALUSO: I think it is significant if the Bomarc is more effective with a warhead than without.

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Definitely; I would agree to that.

Mr. MACALUSO: As far as our air division in NATO is concerned—and again I would ask you for the same two periods if those periods are correct, 1962 and 1966—can you compare the operational effectiveness of the—I think Mr. Lambert was concerned with the Starfighter last night and this is why I question it—Starfighter force then and how it is currently in the sense of when you left the services?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: I take it you are harking back to the same no weapon problem that you raised about the Bomarc?

Mr. MACALUSO: Yes.

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: I would agree with you that an airplane without a weapon is not as effective as one with a weapon.

Mr. MACALUSO: So it is more operationally effective today than it was at the time it was brought in?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Yes.

Mr. MACALUSO: Fine. I would now like to come to our NATO commitments which I raised last evening and our brigade group in the NATO forces. Again I am going to ask you if you could make some comparison of operational effectiveness, specifically in armaments, of the Honest John rockets, armoured personnel carriers, armoured recce vehicles and other equipment. Again I am going to ask: Are we better off operationally today than we were in 1962?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Yes.

Mr. MACALUSO: Were we making any contribution at all to the allied command in Europe of a mobile force in 1962?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: I do not think the force as such existed in 1962.

Mr. MACALUSO: When did that come into effect sir?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: I would have to get the records for that date.

Mr. MACALUSO: What are we doing now as far as any contribution to that organization is concerned?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: When it was formed we were asked whether we would make a contribution and shortly after that, we agreed to do so.

Mr. MACALUSO: And we are now making a contribution to that?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: That is right.

Mr. MACALUSO: What kind of contribution?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: A standby battalion and the air force to lift it.

Mr. MACALUSO: And the air force to lift it. All right, and that leads me into my last particular question about the back-up brigades in Canada, which I gather are used for this ACE organization. Again, what is the comparative equipment that you issue with respect to our back-up brigade? Again I am using 1962, or a time thereafter, compared with now, and leading into what you asked, has there been any improvement as far as the comparative air lift situation is concerned to get them anywhere where they may be needed for their role?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Oh, yes.

Mr. MACALUSO: Can you tell me what the difference is between 1962 and now?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: It is basically the air lift that has been augmented very considerably in this period by the acquisition of large transport airplanes—the Hercules airplane—which makes mobility of this standby battalion a real and important military factor.

Mr. MACALUSO: How many Hercules did we have in 1962?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: I do not know. I think we started with four.

Mr. MACALUSO: How many do we have now, at least from your knowledge when you left sir, or were on order?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: In the order of 20.

Mr. MACALUSO: We had 20?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Yes, when I left.

Mr. MACALUSO: Were there any others on order when you left?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: In the order of 20. There were some crashes in there and I do not know the exact number, but that is the order of magnitude.

Mr. MACALUSO: Were there any on order when you left to augment this 20?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: No, not any more that I recall.

Mr. MACALUSO: What I am concerned with with respect to the brigade group is that I would like to know if you, in your opinion, would say that the operational effectiveness of our land contribution to NATO has been enhanced from 1962 to 1965?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Oh, yes.

Mr. MACALUSO: In what way; would you say with this air lift capability and mobility?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: More modern equipment in practically every phase of it.

Mr. MACALUSO: Would not this more modern equipment and increase in aircraft make us better able to carry out our assignment to the UN, should they come to us for additional commitments?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: I would be of the opinion that it would, certainly.

Mr. MACALUSO: This is my last question, Mr. Chairman. Keeping in mind that Admiral Landymore and Commodore Porter, who is the Registrar General of the Maritime Forces in charge of naval manning, stated in evidence to this Committee that the addition of helicopters and the development of aerial depth sonar plus other equipment breakthroughs which, I gather, were somewhat classified, have vastly increased our ability to detect and, if necessary, destroy submarines in our anti-submarine role, I would like to know if it is not true, then, as you replied to my questioning, that the operational effectiveness of the forces as a whole today is greatly improved from the situation in 1962?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: You have here contra areas of judgment where you have to do two things; try to equate numbers and quality. Certainly, the weapons that we have now are better—speaking of the anti-submarine forces—than they were then and will be better in the future than they are now; but the numbers have been very significantly reduced. You have to predicate

what kind of a war you are going to fight to say whether or not fewer and better weapons are more effective than a larger number of, some cases—

Mr. MACALUSO: In some cases there is a reduction of personnel because you have greater fire power anyway now, than you had if you had that additional personnel; is that not correct?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: I did not get your question.

Mr. MACALUSO: We would have greater fire power with the new equipment and with reduced personnel. It does mean to say that we are less effective by having reduced personnel.

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: That is right.

Mr. MACALUSO: I am asking in your opinion, sir,—

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Macaluso, this single last question of yours has been blown up to a thesis.

Mr. MACALUSO: No, it is the same thing, Mr. Chairman; I ask your indulgence for this last question. In your particular opinion—in your judgment, sir, is it not true that the operational effectiveness of the forces as a whole is greatly improved over 1962; that is, the complete Canadian service forces as a whole —all three services—as far as their operational effectiveness is concerned? I gather that you would say, yes, in view of the answers that you have given me to previous questioning. Would it be true to say that they are more operationally effective?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: This is one of the questions that is not easily answered by a straight yes or no. You have to predicate the conditions under which their effectiveness is going to be measured.

Mr. MACALUSO: In the terms of our present commitment, sir?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Certainly the quality of weaponry in all three services is better than it has been in the past.

Mr. MACALUSO: That is fine, thank you very much. Thank you for your indulgence, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN: Do you have a supplementary, Mr. MacInnis?

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): I have one short supplementary, and I cannot see where it has much more to do with unification than Mr. Macaluso's question. Air Marshal, my question is: Would not any four or five-year period bring about improved conditions in equipment and improved weapons?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Given the flow of development, yes, certainly.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Then it would follow that the period of improvement referred to by Mr. Macaluso between 1962 and the present time is applicable also to the period between, say, 1957, 1958, and 1962; is that not so? Each and every year brings about some sort of improvement?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: I think I will leave that generality to you and Mr. Macaluso.

The CHAIRMAN: It was a good try. Mr. Lambert?

Mr. LAMBERT: Air Chief Marshal Miller, I do not know whether you are aware of the comments of your former vice-chief with regard to the develop-

ment of integration, so I will read to you a question that I asked him to give you the outline. Perhaps you might like to comment. My question was:

> To continue, there followed the planning of, bringing in and the setting up of the different branches; that is, the functional command. Then there were the changes in the field command. From your experience, where did the machine tend to get out of step? I use that phrase advisedly, because both you and your successor in office as Comptroller General —General Fleury—have told us that integration would require three, and perhaps five years really to shake down into the efficient type of machine that you wanted. Where did any of these parts of the machine start to get out of step?

And he outlined where he felt it had begun. My question to you is: As a result of the experience of integration, did you feel at any time that the process had gotten out of step? If so, where? And where do you, on the basis of your experience, suggest that greater efforts have to be made to get that efficient organization all of you are striving to get?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Getting out of step is a concept that I do not really think applies to the process of integration as we saw it. Some things we can integrate overnight, and have no trouble at all. I am thinking of things like Intelligence, where we are just dealing with people and ideas. When you get into the materiel field, or the hardware field, where you have to have long development of common cataloguing and all the other things before you can throw stores together, it is going to take a long time. I have heard various figures; we talked originally I think about three years, and then some pessimists come along and say five. Certainly it is going to be a time span such as that. So, it is a series of intricate adjustments that are necessary, rather than a great big step, or out of step or in step.

Whether or not the question envisioned something wrong in a large way with the integration process, I do not know. I think we all recognize that the problem is beset with difficulties, but not difficulties we could not overcome. Some would take longer than others to solve, but we would end up with a completely integrated organization in X number of years of time.

Mr. LAMBERT: General Moncel has indicated that he felt one of the difficulties encountered was a breakdown in communications between headquarters and field commanders.

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: I do not agree with that; that is conjuring up a drastic picture that I do not think ever existed. Certainly, we at headquarters did not know exactly where we were going in integration. As I said, it was a pragmatic approach that we took. We did not say to all the field commanders, "now, we are going to try this, and if we do not like it we are going to change it". We told them that this was going to happen, and we would try to keep them advised of switches in our thinking, or our operating methods, as we went along. But I do not think there was ever any breakdown. When we had decided anything, we advised the field as soon as it was possible, and I would not agree that there had been a breakdown.

Mr. LAMBERT: Perhaps it is rather unfair to ask you to comment, but I would commend to your attention pages 1315 and 1316 of the testimony before

this Committee, and perhaps that might throw a different light on the picture of what he meant by the breakdown in communications.

Now, switching to a slightly different area of thinking, a number of witnesses who have appeared before us have questioned the validity of the present Defence Council. They have also insisted upon the necessity for three heads of the services—service chiefs—so that there would be a man responsible at the top for the services. Now, you have gone through these various experiences of Deputy Minister, Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff, and then Chief of National Defence, and I would like you first of all to concentrate on the nature of the Defence Council. I think you may be aware of the criticism that I have made in the past about what I felt was the setup at the top between the service side and the Minister's office, and the concept of a "one chief" who is not a member of the Defence Council—who is not a member, as in Britain, and you know the system they have in Britain. I would like to get the benefit of your thinking on that as a result of your experience until your retirement, and then we get into the question of the separate service chiefs.

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: This opens up a large field that the Committee probably has ventured in, but I find myself in some difficulty in trying to give a thumbnail sketch of the pros and cons of the various forms of organization that were contemplated, and the weaknesses and strengths of them. Let me say this: I do not think—I am sure—that the British system will not work. It will be changed because all the basic contradictions are there and they have not been solved. They have just been glossed over in the usual British way. I think if you talked to Mountbatten about this—and I have talked to him at great length—you would find he recognizes that this is as far as they can go at this particular time in the way of setting up an integrated organization. They retained the chiefs. I have said to anybody who has ever asked me that I felt if you are going to have an integrated organization you will have to have an integrated staff and a single chief of staff, and in that type of organization there is no place for three chiefs of services. They are a power group that will disrupt the workings of an integrated staff.

Now, there are problems with an integrated staff. I am not saying for one moment that there are not things that have to be watched and that you need be careful of. You have raised the question of make up of the Defence Council, where the civilian and military meet and have some melding at that level of military policy in the larger sense, as far as the national policy is concerned. We had a debate on whether or not there should be one member from each of the services there as a service member. It was my feeling, however, that if you perpetuated that then you had then, in effect, chiefs of their own service and you would have just shifted the onus, by a different name, back onto the services. So, I felt, and I still feel, that if you are going for an integrated organization you cannot have chiefs of services in it.

Mr. LAMBERT: It strikes me, though, that there are some very pressing problems as the result of the integrated structure that now is in existence, and that for certain services the senior man happens to be over in the supply side, and all his experience could be in supply. What you want as Chief of the Defence Staff, and what the Minister wants, is advice from the very top with regard to operations, and then you have to go down to levels where there are good men,

but they do not have the experience and their advice is not necessarily of the best.

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: "The top" is a sort of traditional concept brought forward from the existence of an individual service structure. When you create an integrated staff you bring the best operators of the three services together and put them into an operational staff, and that staff gives the operational advice to the Chief of Defence Staff and to the Minister. It is not an individual one except the head of that particular staff. When you want specialist advice, you turn to the staff and on that staff there are the various skills of the various services and interservice specialties that you require to bear on a problem.

Mr. LAMBERT: Has this type of operation been tested? Certainly, I do not think we have, shall we say, "for real" exercises.

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: It has not been tested on a national basis. This is why I say this is an intriguing forward step in military organization. But it has been tested, and it has worked on international staffs. Go to SHAPE, for example, and you will see people in various uniforms in the operational staff—not only interservice uniforms but international uniforms—and this is a follow-on of the wartime staffs that fought the forces of the alliances in two great wars. So, the concept of an interservice staff is not new. It is new on a national basis.

Mr. LAMBERT: Is it one of those reasons why you would feel that perhaps we should go a little more slowly to test it out to see?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Yes. We have a lot to learn about it yet on the national level, chiefly because the past integrated headquarters have been operational headquarters, not financial or procurement or the other national responsibilities that are in the national field, and there are a lot of problems in this particular area.

Mr. LAMBERT: It is your opinion, then, that these should be solved before the complications of unification—the natural disruptions—are piled on to the already existing problems under integration on a national basis?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: You have said it better than I could.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, I have Mr. McIntosh and Mr. Forrestall who questioned the witness yesterday, and Mr. Churchill and Mr. Brewin who have not yet had an opportunity to question the witness. I will take Mr. Churchill and Mr. Brewin first and then Mr. McIntosh and Mr. Forrestall. Mr. Churchill?

Mr. CHURCHILL: I think we are very grateful to Air Chief Marshal Miller for his appearance before us to give us the benefit of his advice acquired over so many long years of service in high positions.

I want to ask one or two questions based on the White Paper and the speech of the Minister on December 7. These are the basic documents which have engaged the attention of the Committee and contain all the law and the prophets until there is another revelation on the mountain top, I suppose.

In the White Paper some stress was placed on savings that would accrue, and I quote from page 19:

> Sufficient savings should accrue from unification to permit a goal of 25 per cent of the budget to be devoted to capital equipment being realized in the years ahead.

I understood you to say yesterday, Air Chief Marshal, that the savings you could see from unification would be rather small. Is that right?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: That is right Mr. Churchill, but I would say further that at the time of writing the White Paper we really had to stylize the terms "unification" and "integration". Sometimes they were used interchangeably.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I reached that same conclusion on reading the White Paper. The Minister encourages me to read it every week and I think I have been doing just about that. That is the only place that I can find the word "unification" and I think it was mixed up with "integration". In that same paragraph, the sentence which has attracted a great deal of attention and emphasis is:

> This will be the first step toward a single unified defence force for Canada.

A great deal of reliance has been placed on this as foreshadowing the single force that is now proposed. At the time the White Paper was produced and that sentence inserted, was it obvious to you and the forces as a whole that a single unified force with a common uniform and a common rank structure was envisaged?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Yes. I think that was visioned. It was a question of the timing, really.

Mr. CHURCHILL: But the emphasis was placed on the integration of the services and the command structure?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Yes.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Did you observe in the White Paper a shift in emphasis on the various roles that Canada now undertakes? In June, 1966, the *Sentinel* carried a very good article of yours called the Decisive Years and I quote from one sentence of that:

> Today the Canadian serviceman is, first and foremost, a man of peace. He is still trained to use his weapons, and use them well, but there has been a subtle change in his prime purpose. Once it was to fight and win. Now he must add the role of preventing or halting bloodshed.

Was it from the White Paper that you perceived there had "been a subtle change in his prime purpose", or some other source?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: No, not from the White Paper—from what they were doing. At that time we were pretty well engaged in various parts of the world in support of the UN, trying to keep the peace. We were to have symposiums with other "like-minded nations" as to how to do it and how to do it better. I think, therefore, that it was not a philosophical change; it was a recognition of things that had happened to us. We were in the middle of this peacekeeping business and we were looking at what sort of force was required and any special requirements associated with this force. We were thinking about it, whereas before that we were pitched into it without any real design or thought about the design of the force.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Do you consider that now the prime purpose of the Canadian defence forces would be employment under United Nations' auspices for the so-called peacekeeping operations?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: This is a crystal ball operation. I do not believe we should ever design forces for peacekeeping only. I believe we should design forces for war as we know it and then adapt them to the peacekeeping role or any other role that happens to fall to them in line with Canada's national policy. By taking weapons away from well-trained forces you can make them light peacekeeping forces, but you cannot take a peacekeeping force, trained only for peacekeeping, and give them the weapons necessary to fight a war with overnight.

Mr. CHURCHILL: In other words, the prime purpose of the Canadian defence forces is to train the combat troops for the role that they would have to fill in wartime?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: This, I believe, is the only sound military policy that any prudent military organization would adopt, because of the fact that it can be done one way; troops trained in a higher form of warfare can be used for peacekeeping but troops trained in peacekeeping without weapons cannot be used in another war. I do not know—I think that everybody who has ever predicted what the next war is going to be like has been generally proven wrong when it happens—so that a prudent military establishment would maintain the maximum flexibility possible to meet national emergencies as they arise.

Mr. FOY: Is that not being done, Air Chief Marshal?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: I hope so; yes indeed.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Yesterday, you talked about the disruption in the services caused by the retirement of quite a number of senior as well as junior officers and other ranks. In the January issue of the *Sentinel* for 1966 and the January issue of the *Sentinel* for 1967, I noted that the headquarters staff organization is shown in both these issues and it is interesting to note that within one year very substantial changes have occurred. I do not question the ability of people who have undertaken new duties, because in a force of 100,000 there must be a great many able persons, but in January, 1966, it shows at the time that you were Chief of the Defence Staff, that Lieutenant General Moncel was Vice Chief of Defence Staff; Vice Admiral Dyer, Chief of Personnel; Air Marshal Annis, Chief of Technical Services; and Lieutenant General Fleury was Comptroller General, From a return that we were given in the House of Commons on retirements, I noted that General Moncel had another five years to go; Admiral Dyer, three years and three months; General Fleury two years to go. Air Marshal Annis, I think, left at normal retirement age. Did you find that the retirement of these four senior people on your headquarters staff was disruptive?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: I cannot answer that because I retired before they went or coincident with their going, so I had no experience with it. But I cannot help but feel that it would be disruptive. You cannot clean out your whole upper echelon in one short period and not have some disruption. People going into the jobs have different approaches, different backgrounds, different sense of parameters to measure things by, and I would think it is not a very easy thing to make changes like that without some disruption, but I cannot document it because I was not there.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Well, while you were there in the period from January 1, 1965, to some time in October, 1966—this covers part of the period when you were in office and part when you were out—a return in the House showed that

79 senior officers of the rank of Brigadier and equivalent up left the services, 38 by normal retirement on account of age, and 41 by voluntary or compulsory retirement. Part of this occurred while you were still Chief of Staff. Did you find that such a large number leaving so quickly was creating a great deal of unrest in the services?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: We were in the middle of tearing things up and certainly this was not a stabilizing factor.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Have I time for another question, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN: Yes, sir.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Did you have an opportunity as Chief of the Defence Staff to discuss with the Defence Committee of the Cabinet, or with the Prime Minister, the proposal with regard to unification?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: As far as I am aware—and I would not absolutely swear to this without checking records—I never discussed the problem of integration with the Cabinet Defence Committee or with the Prime Minister.

Mr. CHURCHILL: And unification? You say integration.

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Integration or unification.

Mr. CHURHILL: Thank you. That is all Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Brewin?

Mr. BREWIN: Air Chief Marshal Miller, I want to ask you a little bit about some of the questions asked by Mr. Macaluso. He asked you a series of questions about the operational efficiency of the Canadian armed forces in various roles. The criticism and doubt being expressed about some of these roles has nothing to do with operational efficiency, has it? The doubts that have been expressed are with regard to whether, having regard to the change in the nature of military threats—the security of Canada and our allies—some of these roles still remain useful. Am I correct?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: That is an element in it; yes, indeed. The definition of what your armed forces might be doing some time in the future is not easy. I do not think anybody would have defined four years ago that the United States would have half a million men in a completely non-atomic operation in Viet Nam. I would think the students of military science and the pundits who give opinions on forces of the future would have written this off as being beyond the bounds, and yet this is what they are in.

Mr. BREWIN: And a lot of people think it is very regrettable, too.

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Yes, but that is where they are.

Mr. BREWIN: Yes. The point I would like to make is that no matter how operationally efficient a particular force may be, that does not in any way get around the question of whether it is being operationally efficient in a useful role.

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: This is exactly the crux of a problem we touched on awhile ago; that is, should you have specialized forces for peacekeeping or should you have well-trained, well-armed forces which can be adapted to the roles as they come along. We did not ask nor foresee, when we went through the various reorganizations, post world war II, that we would be in a peacekeeping role. "Peacekeeping" was an unknown word at that time. When we were required to send people to the Middle East, we just picked them out of well-trained people. There were no bayonets among them—they were drivers, store-

men and all the rest of the things that were contained in this force as it existed.

Mr. BREWIN: If we assume that we cannot do everything, do we not have to pick out those functions or roles which meet, or appear to me to the best of one's judgment, existing threats or probable threats?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Yes, but if they call up different sets of training and weaponry, you have to make a choice of which one you are going to go for, or can you have an ambidextrous force? That is why, when faced with the unknown, I think any military man would want the flexibility with which to meet various types of threats or various roles without prejudicing too much the forces' characteristics.

Mr. BREWIN: I think General Allard, your successor, in answer to a question asked in this Committee by Mr. Smith, said he did not disagree with the quotation from an article by Mr. John Gellner which I should like to read to you and ask your opinion of it. Mr. Gellner, in referring to our infantry brigade group and our air division, said this:

> It should be realized, and undoubtedly it is realized in Ottawa, that militarily the value of the Canadian contribution is minimal. It was contracted at a time when NATO planning was based on the assumption that a war in Central Europe could be a limited nuclear war and. . .thus be deterred by the weapons of limited nuclear war. This theory could never have withstood serious examination; by now, nobody in a responsible position inside or outside of NATO really believes in its validity.

That is a quotation from the *Globe and Mail* written by Mr. Gellner. When General Allard was questioned about it, he said he did not disagree with it. Do you agree with that statement?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: No, I do not agree with it. I think it is too black and white. Certainly, there are a lot of people in NATO who would never admit that an atomic war is not possible. Talk to the Germans; talk to the Americans on this. With the existence of this weapon and the confrontation in Europe, anybody who would hazard his future on there not being an atomic war there is taking a completely unwarranted position, in my view. I do not say that the probability is very great, but I do say that to write it off as not a factor is not on. It is a factor and it is a real factor.

Mr. BREWIN: Do you agree with the proposition that militarily the value of the Canadian contribution is minimal?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Yes, I agree with that because if you compare one brigade group with the 22 divisions there, it is one-third of a division or one sixtieth of the force there and that, by any man's definition, I think is minimal. The presence of the force and the quality of the force is not rated by ordinary factors alone. It is rated by a lot of things.

Mr. BREWIN: There is another statement in this article about which I would like to ask you. It states:

> According to plan, within three years Canada will have a fully mobile intervention force of 15,000, equipped with the best modern weapons. This represents considerable power, especially when it can be applied quickly, and in a preventive role.

Is it a fact that there were plans to have a mobile intervention force of 15,000 within three years? Is that accurately stated?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: To take it that we do not have it now and that we will have it within three years is a complete overstatement. I defy anybody to find very much difference between the force Canada has now and the force Canada will have three years from now. You can go down the line and compare weapons, and all this, but there will not be very much change.

Mr. BREWIN: We have been told in this Committee by Air Vice Marshal Sharp, I think, that greater emphasis is being put on this mobile force. Is there no plan which includes the time within which it will be built up, and the equipment that will be assigned to it, and so on?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: I imagine you have looked at the equipment progress of the forces and you have seen the forecast of expenditures on it. I would say that if this Committee sat around this same table three years from now and compared the force tables of today with those three years from now, you would not find very much difference in them. The Canadian forces are buying heavy equipment so that they will have some flexibility—so that they can be used in various roles.

Mr. BREWIN: I would like to ask you about that. Today we have projected expenditures, and when I asked the Minister about the projected expenditure with regard to this expanded mobile force on which emphasis is being put—page 1591 of the record—he said that he could not give any precise figures. In fact, he did not give any figures of the cost. Has no projection been made of the additional expenditure that the development of this force will require? I appreciate it may be phased out over the course of time and done in two, three of five years, or whatever it may be, but has no projection been made and can this Committee not receive that figure?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Projections are made in furtherance of government fiscal policy to have a five-year plan priced out.

Mr. BREWIN: I am sorry to say that I was not here last night, but I understand you were asked to comment on General Moncel's statement that if we are going to maintain our existing commitments and also expand this, we need a budgetary figure closer to $2 million. I understand you do not agree with that, but what sort of budgetary figure do you think would be necessary if we are to expand an intervention force and do all these other things simultaneously?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Well, I do not know. We are talking about a very nebulous area there. The defence forces are planned in this five-year cycle and budgeted over this period. I think General Moncel was talking about a different force than is contemplated or planned for at the present time. I have not seen nor heard his concept of this force because it has not been within the framework of government policy. We have been given certain diameters to work within, and we have done our planning and budgeting within those areas.

Mr. BREWIN: Is it a fact, then, that within the existing budget limits you are saying that you can put more emphasis on both a mobile intervention force with greater transportability and carry out the existing commitments?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Yes, because you do it with the same force. The people who go to Cyprus—

Mr. BREWIN: And with the same equipment?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: No. When you send people to Cyprus you do not send the guns and tanks with them. But they are the same people—the battalions that will be part of the mobile force.

Mr. BREWIN: If you are going to secure greater transportability so that you can move this force, as the Minister said again and again, to any part of the world, does this not involve a considerable additional expenditure, and does it not follow that you have to cut down other expenditures if you are going to stay within the same budgetary limits?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Oh, yes. The budget now contemplates at least five ships for the navy which will constitute some of this mobility. I do not know where we stand on transport airplanes, but we have spent a lot of money to date to provide this air lift. Whether or not there are more contemplated in the budget, I do not know. I want to stress that there are not two forces. There is not one force meeting our commitments in Germany, Cyprus or the Middle East and another mobile force in Canada. They are in Canada one day as part of the mobile force, and in Germany or the Middle East the next day—

Mr. BREWIN: I cannot understand how the same force is available in two places for two purposes at the same time.

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: I did not say that. I said they were in Canada as a mobile force one day and moved to Germany as part of the brigade group there the next day, and they may be in Cyprus a year from now.

Mr. MCINTOSH: My remarks follow along the same line of questioning. I take it from your previous answer to another question that a different type of training has to be carried out by these forces when they are carrying out a peace-restoring role than when they are attached to, say, an alliance such as NATO.

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: The peacekeeping which we have done to date has been non-fighting. We have not sent heavy equipment to any of the areas where we have sent peacekeeping forces. Therefore, the nature of the armament of the forces in employment is different. If they go to Germany they are on tanks and artillery, and when they go to Cyprus they have rifles and jeeps, but they are the same troops; they have the same personnel.

Mr. MCINTOSH: The same troops carry out two different roles, then.

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: That is right.

Mr. MCINTOSH: If you were going to put a priority on those roles, which would be the first priority?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: The employment at the moment certainly is in the peacekeeping role but you are always on the edge of having to assume another one. We had a very near thing of it in India and Pakistan. I do not know where the next hot spot will develop, so that our thinking at the moment—well, eight months ago—naturally is focussed on the peacekeeping role, but you never want to be mesmerized by just having peacekeeping forces: you may get them, and the next thing you need is a peace restoring force, or a war force.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Did your thinking go as far as what you would do if you had your forces committed to a peacekeeping role and suddenly you were required to have forces to stop something like what happened in India?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Yes, indeed.

Mr. McINTOSH: And what was the decision? Would you pull your peacekeeping forces.

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: The decision was to have the heavily equipped fighting force available, and then when you need a peacekeeping force you extracted the equipment. You leave the tanks, heavy transport, and the artillery behind and take the lightly armed forces and use them in the peacekeeping role. When they are through with that, you take them back and put them on their heavy equipment so that if you ever need it, it is there, and the men know how to use it.

Mr. McINTOSH: But you would pull them out of the peacekeeping role if you were confronted with an all-out war?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: I would certainly forecast that, because I think at that time the priorities would be clearly established, but this is a hypothetical—

Mr. McINTOSH: This is what I am getting at: which, in your opinion, would be the first priority?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: If you are starting to fight, I would think it takes higher priority than peacekeeping.

Mr. McINTOSH: Now, in answer to Mr. Macaluso's question, you said that the Canadian forces have greatly increased their combat effectiveness—all the services—in the last phase since 1962 to 1966, at the time you retired. Did I understand correctly that you felt there was quite an increase in the combat effectiveness of the Canadian troops?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Yes; I had a little joust with Mr. Macaluso on that.

Mr. McINTOSH: Did not the same thing take place in the forces of our allies?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Oh, yes. Well, not the same thing, because I think the Americans had a build-up. There was no reduction in their case. They were all modernized through several difficult stages in which they redeployed and rearmed.

Mr. McINTOSH: What about France? Did they also not improve their combat effectiveness since 1962?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Yes, but they have reduced the numbers. When they got out of their Algerian involvement and brought the troops home there was a considerable drop in the size of the French armed forces.

Mr. McINTOSH: But their combat effectiveness was kept up, if not surpassed?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Oh, they got new equipment all the way through.

Mr. McINTOSH: In the case of Canada, would you say that this increase in our combat effectiveness had anything to do with unification?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: No.

Mr. McINTOSH: And France or any other country?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: France is not unified in any way.

Mr. FOY: What is the point?

Mr. McINTOSH: The point is that this increase has nothing to do with unification. I hope I made it.

Mr. MACALUSO: I did not say it had.

Mr. McINTOSH: I did not say anything about what you said.

An hon. MEMBER: Has it anything to do with integration?

Mr. MACALUSO: Oh, shut him up for a while.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Macaluso, order please. Order, order. Mr. McIntosh, please. Mr. MacInnis, would you please let Mr. McIntosh go on?

Mr. McINTOSH: When Air Marshall Sharp was before the Committee, he implied in his brief that there were only two courses open to the Minister in order to achieve what he wanted: to say within he fixed budget that he had and still keep up this combat effectiveness. He implied also that the only course open to him was to go into unification. Do you agree with that premise?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: I do not know whether I do or not. I would have to see it spelled out. I think there were more than two courses open. I would not know; I would want to lok it over before I gave an opinion.

Mr. McINTOSH: Would you agree that there were courses open to the Minister other than unification?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Oh yes, indeed.

Mr. McINTOSH: Did you so advise the Minister while you were the Chief of the General Staff?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: I think this is where we came in yesterday, where I regretted that I—

Mr. McINTOSH: You do not have to answer if you do not want to.

An hon. MEMBER: That should be obvious.

Mr. McINTOSH: That is all right; let him say it. Did any of your staff advise the Minister that this was the only course open to him, that you know of?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: I think we are getting into an area where I would have some difficulty in giving a meaningful answer. The Minister talked to a lot of people. I do not know what he might have got or heard.

Mr. McINTOSH: This is what I am trying to get at.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. McIntosh, you are very close to being off-side. I must ask you to play a little closer to the centre.

Mr. McINTOSH: I am playing as close to it as I can. I think it was the duty of the Chief of the General Staff to advise the Minister on military matters. I am trying to get at whether he did, or whether he did not. We have evidence before us that he could not give a definition of unification to his subordinates because he did not know what it was, and I think that is on record; he said it. And I would be very surprised if he did not give the same information to the Minister. If he does not want to answer that it is quite all right with me. Did you ever advise the Minister against the plan of unification?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: I have the same restrictions here, and I will give you the answer on that.

Mr. McINTOSH: You said you would rather not answer the question about any of your subordinates giving him information.

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: No, I said I cannot be definitive on it because there are 120,000 subordinates in the services and I do not know what any of them might have told the Minister. The responsible submission of plans to the Minister I can answer for.

Mr. McINTOSH: Did you at any time—and I think Mr. Churchill asked this question—approach the cabinet or the Prime Minister, or any minister of the cabinet, stating that you did not know the definition of the term unification, or what the Minister was trying to achieve?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: No, I did not.

Mr. McINTOSH: Did you not feel it was your duty to do so?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: I felt it was my duty to deal with the Minister as a responsible member of the government.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): As a what?

Mr. McINTOSH: I want to get back to that question I asked last evening. Did you intercede with the Minister at any time on behalf of the officers that were being dismissed?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: I would rather not answer that.

Mr. McINTOSH: That is the end of my questioning, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, I do ask you to keep away from the area of attempting to draw from the witness questions involving other persons in the forces and what they did, or did not do. It is all right to put questions to the witness regarding what he said to the Prime Minister, or what he did not say to the Prime Minister, or to the Minister. He will let you know whether or not he is prepared to answer, but I must object—and I think my point is well taken—that it is not fair to the witness, and it is certainly not fair to other individuals, to attempt to draw from the witness statements regarding what other persons did in controversial and almost political matters. I consider that to be the off-side area, from which we must withdraw in this Committee.

Mr. McINTOSH: Mr. Chairman, just on this one point, I want to point out to you that Mr. Brewin asked him a question on what Mr. Gellner said, or wrote in an article and every member of this Committee has asked a similar question about some other person. Why you should stop me when I am questioning him on the Minister, is beyond me.

The CHAIRMAN: Let me make the point quite clear. Mr. Gellner is not an officer in the armed forces; he is a writer, and we have as much right to involve him as we have to involve our friend Dave McIntosh down here. Mr. Forrestall, you are next.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Air Marshal, I would like to go back to what I started and did not have time to finish yesterday and then go into one other area. You stated that Canada has been able to fulfil, among other things, at least its NATO commitment up to the present or, at least, up to the time you retired. We have had other witnesses who have pointed out to us that our naval commitments have been reduced from one carrier and, I think, 43 A/S escorts to one carrier and 26 escorts over that three-year period between late 1963 and 1966. Also, that there have been parallel reductions in the number of aircraft or squadrons that we have with NATO with the air division in Europe. I am curious whether or not these reductions were made at the request of NATO or at our own initiative. Did we seek ourselves, to your knowledge, to reduce our commitments?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: The determination as to what our commitments are to NATO are not immutable; they change. The nature of the NATO force has changed over the years. The determination of what our commitments are is made

in conjunction with the NATO political and military authorities. We have reduced our forces; there has been a reduction in the number of ships, certainly. We gave the case for it, and got agreement from NATO on it. I admit in some cases probably there is reluctant agreement, but it is a give-and-take argument with them, or a process, and we have changed some of our forces in conjunction with the NATO requirements, the mobile force that they have asked us to contribute to. Various other elements of change are discussed with NATO before they are implemented. Over the years there has been a change in the size and the nature of the forces, but it has been an agreed one with NATO and our so-called force fills are agreed with them.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Would you say that our contribution has been geared largely to our own ability to negotiate with NATO arising out of our ability to contribute, as opposed to NATO saying: Well, look fellows, we do not need quite as many ships; you can cut back.

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: I hesitate to use the term "bargainal", but it is a consultative—

Mr. FORRESTALL: After consultation?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: That is a good way to put it.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Thank you. That is actually all I was leading up to yesterday. I would like to turn to a very strong plea that was made to this committee by Rear Admiral Landymore, and ask you whether or not you might, in general, agree with it. It has to do with the status of the men who will be asked at some point to transfer to the new service—they will not be asked, they will be automatically transferred. Admiral Landymore—page 1051 of evidence before this Committee on, I believe, Thursday, February 16—referred to the problem that will be faced by those who might not want to transfer from what they considered to be their career service. In this particular case he did not specify the navy and I am not sure that he was talking exclusively about it. Perhaps he felt there was equal feeling in the other services. He said, and I quote:

> There is only one course open. Give them an Honourable Release, and for their service, full pensions. Remember, at the outset, our pension plan is a contributory one. You have been told that officers and men released under these circumstances would have their pensions adjusted according to the Superannuation Act. It has been stated that there are no penalties involved. It has been stated that ther is only an actuarial adjustment made to their pensions. It does not really matter what you call it, adjustment or penalty—in actual fact, very substantial reductions in their pensions will be made and in some cases these are penalties.

I would like to ask you what your own personal, private opinion is of the position these men will be in at the moment of changeover. First of all, do you feel that they should be asked whether or not they want to transfer?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: I feel that. Yes, I feel very keenly that in a democratic system supporting voluntary enlistment in a military force, when one side of the contracting arrangement with the government does away with the force to which these people are commissioned or signed up and a new force is formed, the only fair way in our system is to ask the man whether he wants to transfer to the new force or whether he wants some other arrangement. I can-

not see an element of compulsion being practical—making him become a member of a new force. That is my personal opinion. I do not know what—

Mr. FORRESTALL: There is a moral obligation albeit, perhaps, not a legal one to treat these men in some kind of equitable and fair manner in relationship to their own personal wishes or choices. It has been argued that in the case of those men who have served, for example, in excess of 10 or 12 years but not more than, say, 16 or 18 years, it would provide a very stiff penalty for the Canadian taxpayers' shoulders if a full pension up to the level of contributions were granted should these men have the choice either of transferring or resigning at the time of changeover. From your understanding of the pension fund would you say that this is accurate or not?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: I would say that I am not a very good judge of that, Mr. Forrestall. You could get better opinions than mine on that.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Well, could I quote some figures and ask you for your professional competence? The pension fund stands at over $2 billion for the fiscal year 1965-66. The fund paid out about $37 million. In that same year, servicemen put in nearly $55 million. In addition, we value the fund at 4 per cent interest rate. You will see that providing full pensions will not in any way represent an increased financial burden to the taxpayers. Just on those two basic figures, would you agree that would seem to be reasonable? We are paying in more than we are putting out and we have a substantial fund. Do you see from that any detriment or any penalty being imposed on the Canadian taxpayer, given the situation where those concerned were afforded the opportunity of making a choice?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: I would not want to make an off-the-cuff judgment on very bare figures like that. I would like to see them projected. There are various other factors which actuarial people could assess before I could answer that.

Mr. FORRESTALL: That is fine. Those are the only two areas I wanted to question on. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN: I have Mr. Macaluso down here. My gosh, he is down for the third time—the Perry Mason of the Defence Committee—Mr. Byrne and then I see Mr. MacInnis. Mr. Byrne would you go ahead, please.

Mr. BYRNE: Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Air Marshal Miller, in reply to a question by Mr. MacInnis last evening you said that there was a contract between the servicemen and the government. What do you mean by a contract? Is that in the enlistment papers?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: I used the word "contract" as what I hoped would mean a little more than just the straight process of enlistment you go through when you sign for three years or five years and you are bound by that. You cannot break it unilaterally without a penalty. "Contract" is not the word for it but I thought it conveyed the idea.

Mr. BYRNE: Your implied that following the passing of this bill, any serviceman in any one of the three services should be entitled to resign and re-enlist, or resign from whatever service he may be in. Is that correct?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: The point of view I had was that a man who enlists in the navy, when you abolish the navy as you do in this bill, with all

moral and democratic background that we have in Canada, should be given the option rather than forcing him into the new service.

Mr. BYRNE: The new service. You are insisting that this is a new service?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: You are doing away with the service that he joined.

Mr. BYRNE: The National Defence Act which we are amending, Part II, section 15 says:

> The Canadian Forces are the naval, army, and air forces of Her Majesty raised by Canada and consist of three Services, namely, the Royal Canadian Navy, the Canadian Army and the Royal Canadian Air Force.

The short title of this bill is:

> This Act may be cited as the Canadian Forces Reorganization Act.

Do you agree that the constitution of the forces now is the Canadian forces made up of these elements?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: You abolish the Royal Canadian Navy. This bill does away with that.

Mr. BYRNE: Clause 5 of Part I of the amending bill says this:

> (2) The units and other elements of the Royal Canadian Navy, the Canadian Army and the Royal Canadian Air Force existing at the coming into force of this Part shall, subject to the provisions of the National Defence Act, continue to be the units and elements of the Canadian Forces.

So that the—

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: I am not saying for one minute that the Parliament of Canada cannot legally enact a bill saying that all the people who formerly were in the navy will now be members of the Canadian forces.

Mr. BYRNE: Well, does not the—

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: The legal thing can be done, but I am saying that in view of the political atmosphere and environment in which we live, this element of compulsion I do not think is practical.

Mr. BYRNE: The National Defence Act which we are amending again sets out enrolment:

> (1) Commissions of officers in the Royal Canadian Navy, the Canadian Army and the Royal Canadian Air Force shall be granted by Her Majesty during pleasure.
>
> (2) Persons shall be enrolled...as men for such terms of service as may be prescribed in regulations made by the Governor in Council.

So that they are, by the existing National Defence Act, required to remain in the services at the pleasure of the Governor in Council. Is that not correct?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: If they can be; I do not know if this is the way it is going to be done or not. They can be. Certainly, Parliament can make a law transferring them. Whether or not you can say to a man, "your navy is abolished, sign here as a member of the forces," and compel him to do so, in the sense of the rightness and fitness of things—

Mr. BYRNE: But again the National Defence Act which we are amending under, Enrolment, section 24, says this:

> The enrolment of a person binds that person to serve in the Canadian Forces—

capital letters, "Canadian Forces"—

> until he is, in accordance with regulations, lawfully released.

So that he is bound to the Canadian Forces by the existing Defence Act. Is that not correct?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: No; I do not agree with you. The Canadian Forces as such does not exist in the present Defence Act, as far as I am aware. It has not been a legal entity heretofore, anyway.

Mr. BYRNE: I have pointed out that the short title of this bill is:

> This Act may be cited as the Canadian Forces Reorganization Act.

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Yes.

Mr. BYRNE: And I have shown, by quoting these sections, that the elements of the Canadian Forces—

Mr. FOREST: Is this in the present act?

Mr. BYRNES —are made up—the existing act—of air, naval and army.

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: No, they are not. They are Royal Canadian Navy and the Canadian Army and the Royal Canadian Air Force. The people who are in the forces now signed up within those forces.

Mr. BYRNE: To do specific duties within—

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: They do whatever they are told to do.

Mr. BYRNE: I have also quoted subclause (2) of clause 5 of Part I of the bill which says:

> The units and other elements of the Royal Canadian Navy, the Canadian Army and the Royal Canadian Air Force existing at the coming into force of this Part shall, subject to the provisions of the National Defence Act, continue to be the units and elements of the Canadian Forces.

Clause 7 of the same Part says this in respect of the choice to be made by the individual under the amendment, and you have said that you feel he should not be bound to change from one service to another:

> Except in an emergency, no officer or man who was a member of the Royal Canadian Navy, the Canadian Army or the Royal Canadian Air Force immediately prior to the coming into force of this Part shall, without his consent, be required to perform any duty in the Canadian Forces that he could not have been required to perform as a member of such Service.

Does that not give him some privilege in so far as changing his service is concerned?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: No. I have not read the bill. I apologize for this because I have been away. If you are going to explore the legal tests associated with this, there are much better witnesses than I am who could be available to

you, I am sure. I am dealing with this in a very general and moralistic way apart from the legal way, I would say.

Mr. BYRNE: It is more a question of nomenclature than anything else is it not? The individual will be required to serve in relatively the same capacity as before?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: That is right, but compelled.

Mr. BYRNE: That is all.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Mr. Chairman, I had not intended to follow up that particular line of questioning. I am convinced, as you are Air Marshal Miller, that morally and democratically there is an obligation to give each and every serving man an opportunity to sign with this new force if he so desires, and likewise for anybody who does not wish to do so there is an obligation to allow him to go his own way.

Mr. Chairman, I had asked that the Committee inquire from the Justice Department for a legal point of view on this. I will say no more except I would suggest also—I do not have the opportunity of being fed my questions by the officials—that this legal opinion be asked for from the Justice Department and suggest possibly some research be done because there are many precedents.

The CHAIRMAN: Well, Mr. MacInnis, as you know the matter will come up when we come to clause by clause consideration of the bill. I think that would be the appropriate time for you to raise the issue again.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Air Chief Marshal Miller, I would like to ask you a question with respect to the morale in the air force prior to your retirement. What did you find the morale to be?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: We do not have any morale gauges. One of the very difficult things is to measure morale. In times of uncertainty there are people who are raising questions and doubting whether what they are doing is worthwhile. There is always a certain amount of beefing not only in the armed forces but in any organization. I would say that the morale was not as high as I would have liked it to be. It was not as high as it could be if we had answers to some of the things that are plaguing people's minds but you go over and see the people out on the squadrons doing the job—and you asked specifically about the air force—but the morale was not bad.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): I take it from your answer you consider that prior to your retirement and during this discussion on integration and the eventual steps leading to unification, this was the time of uncertainty among the air force personnel?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Oh, yes; unanswered questions and what is the future and is it really worthwhile? These are questions that are accentuated under an atmosphere of uncertainty and change.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): As Chief of Staff would you be in a position to comment on the question of morale both in the army and the navy? Was it similar to that in the air force?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: I think so, yes. The same conditions prevailed in some areas. The drop in strength in the navy was more accentuated than the others and they were probably under more difficulty than the other two forces.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Do you see unification as a cure-all for morale?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: No.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): While you were Chief of Staff were you made aware of the shortages and run-down state of our equipment?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Yes.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Were you aware of the fact that the militia units in Canada, in some cases, had better equipment than the permanent force?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: No, I was not aware of that.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): This was never brought to your attention?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: It could not have been brought to my attention or I would have known.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Yes, thank you.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I have a very brief question and perhaps the Air Chief Marshal will not be able to answer it. It is with regard to the precedence concerning reattestation of people in the forces. My recollection is that at September 1, 1939, when I was acting as an assistant to the adjutant of the Fort Garry Horse that we signed people on to what was called the Canadian Field Force. Within a very short interval an Order in Council was passed altering the name to the Canadian Active Service Force and we reattested the people into that force and then subsequently we had to carry out one more operation to find out whether or not they would volunteer for service outside of Canada. I would ask the Air Chief Marshal if he recalls that particular episode at that time?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: I am afraid I do not because I was not in the administrative side of it at that time. I recall being dragooned in and asked whether I would serve outside of Canada and being highly insulted in the process. Whether I signed anything, I do not know.

Mr. CHURCHILL: In the Official History of the Second World War written by Colonel Stacey these precedents are mentioned. The original attestation forms had to be destroyed or altered and there was a wastage of $65,000, he points out. Then the Canadian Active Service Force was the title of the force under which people were enlisted and then he indicates the third step, where people had to be asked to volunteer for overseas or not. That is contained in the official history of the war and is the precedent with regard to what we have been talking about, that if men who have enlisted are expected to change from what they have signed on for they should be given the opportunity of stating their opinion again. Stacey points out that after the enlistment into the Canadian Active Service Force a very small proportion of the number failed to reattest for service outside Canada. So they were given the opportunity to make a decision on their own. I do not know whether the Air Chief Marshal has been aware of that historical fact or not.

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: I was not Mr. Churchill, but I would point out that under emergency conditions of war you can probably get away with elements of compulsion that you would not want to use under non-emergent conditions.

Mr. CHURCHILL: But even then, under those war conditions, compulsion was not used. Every officer and man had that opportunity of making the decision on his own. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MACALUSO: My question was already asked by Mr. Byrne, dealing with clause 7. I was just going to bring that clause to the attention of the Air Chief Marshal. Thank you; that is all I had.

The CHAIRMAN: Are there any further questions?

Mr. SMITH: I have one further question which relates to the question asked last night, Air Chief Marshal, and it was when we were talking about the force commitments where you put me straight by saying that the Mobile Command was a command and not a force in being. Is that right?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: It is not a commitment.

Mr. SMITH: It is not a commitment, and the elements of Mobile Command are taken from here and there from the various forces; is that right?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: They are regrouping under a command structure the forces that were already in being.

Mr. SMITH: And it could be, of course, that elements of the brigade in Germany might form part of the Mobile Command?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Oh yes; when they are home they will be part of Mobile Command.

Mr. SMITH: Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN: Are there any further questions?

Mr. MCINTOSH: I have one. Air Chief Marshal, from your remarks I take it you did not encourage or advise the Minister to go into the plan of unification. Could I ask what plan you advised the Minister to follow?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Here we go again.

Mr. MCINTOSH: The same thing, right?

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, we seem to have come to the end of the questions and at this time I want to thank Air Chief Marshal Miller on behalf of all of you, for coming here.

Mr. MACALUSO: Mr. Chairman, when we reconvene this afternoon will it be to start the clause by clause consideration of the bill? Is that the agenda?

The CHAIRMAN: Yes, if we follow along the way we have been doing with the report of the subcommittee. It still has not carried but we seem to have found a way of operating within that framework. I will ask the Committee to reconvene here at 3.30 p.m.

Mr. MACALUSO: If you can just hold your verbiage for a second, Mr. Chairman, I am just asking whether it will be in camera. I understand clause by clause consideration on all committees is in camera.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Macaluso if you will recall the Transport Committee of which you were Chairman, clause by clause consideration of that bill was not done in camera and on the precedent you have so ably established we will have the meeting open.

Mr. MACALUSO: On a point of order, Mr. Chairman. I want to bring to your attention, since you were a member of that committee, that you were not paying

much attention. Clause by clause consideration was done in camera, sir, and that is why I asked the question today.

The CHAIRMAN: We will do it the way you did it, Mr. Macaluso.

Mr. MACALUSO: It will be in camera then, sir.

Mr. LAMBERT: The Bank Act was done publicly. It was a very complicated document, there were many points at issue and it worked out well. The only in camera part was for an addendum with regard to procedure to be recommended to the House.

The CHAIRMAN: Just before we rise, I do not want any visitor who is in this room to feel intimidated by anything they have heard in the last moment or two. We will assemble here at 3.30 this afternoon. Gentlemen, before you leave Air Chief Marshal Miller wants to say something.

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: I am sorry, gentlemen, that you did not escape. I promise to be very brief. It has been brought to my attention that there was a meeting of the Cabinet Defence Committee on February 12 and March 24 to consider the White Paper and integration. When I said I had not discussed this matter of reorganization I was referring specifically, I thought, to the question of unification.

Mr. CHURCHILL: What year was that?

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: I think this would probably be quite early after the White Paper was issued.

Mr. CHURCHILL: That would be in 1964.

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: Gentlemen, could I say thank you for your courtesy and understanding. I would like, because of the difficulty I have encountered with impressions other witnesses have left with you, to say that I have been honoured and proud to serve with the Canadian Forces. I think they are outstanding national representatives of Canada. I think only of making them better and I am convinced that they have embarked upon a very imaginative and, I think, proper development in this matter of integration providing a single management and a single planning and a single financing operation.

I feel the next step that was forecast in the White Paper, that of doing way with the services, will cause the loss, against this business we have been discussing recently, of a lot of people we cannot afford to lose and that we will not get very much of a benefit from this single service proposal. Maybe after the lessons of integration have been learned and the team has worked out—and they are not through the integration learning process—the follow-on then of a single service will be a natural and non-argumentative course. But I make a plea for you to interpret my position as being in favour of integration as we have it now, as it is developing. I am not closing the book at all on some future unification but because of the need to get the integration machinery oiled up and working I would not want a disruptive influence such as unification to be thrown into the machinery at this time. That is my personal view and I want to make it and leave it very clearly with you.

Mr. FOY: It is going to be done very slowly, Air Marshal, with the assurance that it will take at least five years.

Air Chief Marshal MILLER: I thank you, and I think that is all I have to say.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much, Air Chief Marshal. The meeting is adjourned.

HOUSE OF COMMONS

First Session—Twenty-seventh Parliament

1966-67

STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. GRANT DEACHMAN

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 36

TUESDAY, MARCH 21, 1967

(Afternoon Meeting)

Respecting

Bill C-243, An Act to amend the National Defence Act and other Acts in consequence thereof.

WITNESSES:

The Honourable Paul Hellyer, Minister of National Defence; and Brigadier W. J. Lawson, Judge Advocate General.

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY
OTTAWA, 1967

26027—1

STANDING COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. Grant Deachman

Vice-Chairman: Hon. Marcel Lambert

Mr. Brewin,	Mr. Latulippe,	Mr. McIntosh,
Mr. Byrne,	Mr. Legault,	Mr. McNulty,
Mr. Churchill,	Mr. Lessard,	Mr. Nugent,
Mr. Crossman,	Mr. Loiselle,	Mr. Rochon,
Mr. Ethier,	Mr. Macaluso,	Mr. Smith,
Mr. Forrestall,	Mr. MacInnis (*Cape*	Mr. Stafford,
Mr. Foy,	*Breton South*),	Mr. Winch—(24).
Mr. Hopkins,	Mr. MacRae,	

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

TUESDAY, March 21, 1967.
(73)

The Standing Committee on National Defence met at 3:40 p.m. this day with the Chairman, Mr. Deachman, presiding.

Members present: Messrs. Brewin, Byrne, Churchill, Crossman, Deachman, Ethier, Forrestall, Foy, Hopkins, Lambert, Legault, Lessard, Loiselle, Macaluso, MacInnis (*Cape Breton South*), MacRae, McIntosh, McNulty, Nugent, Rochon, Smith, Stafford and Winch (23).

In attendance: *From the Department of National Defence:* Honourable Paul Hellyer, Minister, and Brigadier W. J. Lawson, Judge Advocate General.

Clause 1 of *Bill C-243*, having been previously called, was allowed to stand.

On Clause 2

The Chairman called *section 15* of the National Defence Act. The said section was carried, *on division*: Yeas 12; Nays 9.

The Chairman called *section 16* of the National Defence Act. The said section was carried, *on division*: Yeas 12; Nays 9.

The Chairman called the amendment to *section 17 (1)*, which was proposed by Mr. McNulty on March 20, 1967, and the said amendment was carried.

The Chairman called *section 17* of the National Defence Act. The said section was carried, *on division*: Yeas 12; Nays 9.

The Chairman called *section 18* of the National Defence Act. The said section was carried, *on division*: Yeas 13, Nays 8.

The Chairman called *clause 2, as amended*. The said clause was carried, *on division*: Yeas 13; Nays 18.

On Clause 3

The Chairman called *clause 3*. The said clause was carried, *on division*: Yeas 13; Nays 8.

On Clause 4

The Chairman called *clause 4, as amended*. The said clause was carried, *on division*: Yeas 12; Nays 9.

On Clause 5

The Chairman called *clause 5, as amended*. The said clause was carried, *on division*: Yeas 12; Nays 8.

On Clause 6

Mr. Churchill moved, seconded by Mr. Nugent,

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That clause 6 be amended by adding thereto the following sub-clause (3):

No Officer or man who was a member of the Royal Canadian Navy, the Canadian Army or the Royal Canadian Air Force immediately prior to the coming into force of this Part shall be enrolled in the Canadian Forces without his consent registered by re-attestation

and sub-clause (4)

Any Officer or man who was a member of the Royal Canadian Navy, the Canadian Army or the Royal Canadian Air Force immediately prior to the coming into force of this Part who does not enrol in the Canadian Forces shall receive an honourable discharge and the full pension benefits to which he may be entitled.

The question being put on the amendments, they were negatived, on the following division: Yeas 6; Nays 14.

The Chairman called the amendment to *sub-clause 2 of clause 6* which was proposed by Mr. McNulty on March 20, 1967 and the said amendment carried.

The Chairman called *clause 6, as amended*. The said clause was carried, *on division*: Yeas 14; Nays 6.

The Chairman called *clause 7*. The said clause was carried, *on division*: Yeas 13; Nays 6.

At 6:15 p.m., the Committee adjourned until 8:00 p.m. this day.

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

TUESDAY, March 21, 1967.

The CHAIRMAN: Order. Gentlemen, I see a quorum.

Before proceeding with the work for the afternoon, first of all I must offer an apology to Mr. Macaluso for saying that his Transport Committee clause by clause study had not been held in camera. Indeed, the meetings were held in camera. I checked into this at noontime and perhaps it was because Mr. Macaluso's committee was such a lively committee that I thought his in camera meetings were open meetings.

Nevertheless, I want to make some observations about our own meetings from now on. I looked up some points on this at noontime as well. We have, as you know, passed a number of clauses, some 20 odd, of this bill in open session and with reports of the meeting being taken. We also passed, I note, Bill No. C-90 in open session and with the recording on and the transcript taken. So, we have set already something of a precedent for proceeding in that fashion and I see nothing wrong with the practice unless there is some objection to it here. It is not an unusual practice for a committee either to carry on its proceedings in clause by clause with a recording available and the transcript being taken or to do it in camera without transcription. I suggest that we proceed in the manner in which we have already started unless there is some serious objection to that from gentlemen here.

There is another point I want to raise with you and this is the difficulty of dealing with clause by clause consideration of the bill with a number of sections incorporated in a clause. It might be useful at this time to have some advice from experts and we have some experts here on what is the best way to proceed with these. Shall we call the clause and listen to general discussion on the clause, if there is a general discussion, and then shall we carry the sections one by one and finally carry the clause, or precisely how is it your wish to proceed? I think we might as well clear this question up now and then we do not have to have it arise when we are dealing with the clauses.

I refer you, for instance, to the first example which would be clause 2 in which you will find sections 15, 16 and 17, all of which may result in some comment. My suggestion to you is that when I call clause 2, we are open for general discussion on clause 2 and then I will ask that section 15 carry, section 16 carry, section 17 carry and that the clause carry, if that is the logical way to proceed.

Some hon. MEMBERS: Agreed.

The CHAIRMAN: That is agreed then. As you know, we have stood item 1 since the beginning when David Groos as chairman stood that in order to hear the Minister. We will remain with clause 1 stood and continue with clause 2.

On clause 2—*Canadian Forces, Canadian Armed Forces*

Mr. LAMBERT: Mr. Chairman, we have had a considerable amount of testimony, both pro and con, in connection with unification and this is in essence the clause that will effect the unification into the one service of the present three armed services. Nothing that has been said in this context with regard to the advantages of having one service over the three services has convinced me that there is at this time any compelling reason why this bill should be passed, outside of the non-unification clauses.

I think, if anything, the testimony that we heard this morning more than convinces me that this proposal is entirely premature. I think that we cannot disregard the sincere evidence given by men of great ability in the services, some of whom retired recently under the normal course of events and others who were prepared to put their careers on the line. I think that there are a great number of senior officers who have made an issue of it whose sincerity and whose expertise must be respected. There are, in addition, hundreds—the evidence may be varying—but there are many others who have withdrawn silently because they could not agree with this proposal.

Having regard to the evidence concerning the progress that has been made with integration—and there has been a great deal of unanimity perhaps not a hundred per cent but certainly well up towards that, in the efficacy of integration—there may have been some differences as to degree but all in all it has been with a sincere desire that integration be completed as a really effective step and that it be fully assessed before one would pile onto its back the turmoil and the effect of the proposals contained in the first few sections of this bill. For that reason, briefly, I am quite opposed to the passage of sections 15, 16, 17 and 18 which comprises clause 2 of this bill.

Mr. NUGENT: Mr. Chairman, it has been obvious for some time from the way in which this Committee has operated that the Liberal members are not disposed to take a serious look at the evidence, whatever presented, and it is obvious that everyone wants to rush it through and report it back to the House, despite the fact that if there is one thing that is particularly clear from the evidence it is that there is no hurry to put this through. In fact, even those who think unification might be all right say—not now.

But still, facing realities and realizing that there is another chance in the House, I will choke back the natural tendency I have to start reviewing the evidence of each of these people in detail to prove why this bill should not go through and content myself with voting against each clause which has anything to do with unification. I do think, Mr. Chairman, that I cannot refrain from pointing out this evidence without pointing out very clearly that it is the duty of this Committee to do this exhaustive study, to review extensively the evidence and to warn that in the House, of course, the job must he done.

I thought it was one of the duties of a committee to save the time of the House wherever possible so that on detailed work and detailed study, only a small number of us might be tied up for a long period of time. I can only say that from the attitude of this Committee and the obvious wish of the majority—the Liberals on it—they prefer that the time of the House be taken and therefore, knowing that I will have the chance to fight it step by step thoroughly and exhaustively in the House, I will wait until that time.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Mr. Chairman, I would like to echo the words of Mr. Lambert and Mr. Nugent. I, too, would like very much and look forward to the opportunity of getting in and bringing forth the weight of evidence that is now before us, or even stated by reasoned and reasonable men, with regard to the propriety of moving ahead with what can only be termed total unification or total integration of the armed services at this time.

This is particularly true in the case of the navy which is, and probably will always be, a much different, a much more readily identifiable unit of the three elements or environments that make up our Canadian Forces. Because of that, and because of other reasons I, too, think I will simply voice my objections and vote against certain clauses as we come to them and deal with them at much greater length when the matter comes before the house.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Churchill and then Mr. Winch.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Mr. Chairman, if this Committee were really giving a report to the House based on the weight of evidence that has been presented to us, it would decline to have this bill recommitted or would certainly advise the House of Commons that the bill should be thrown out. We have had evidence presented to us here from four of the five senior members of the headquarters staff of the Canadian Forces who were in office just one year ago. Air Chief Marshal Miller; the Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff, General Moncel; the Chief of Technical Services, Air Marshal Annis, and the Comptroller-General, General Fleury and I believe, had we heard from the former Chief of Personnel, Vice Admiral Dyer, we would have had similar evidence from him.

Nevertheless, four of the five senior officers of the Canadian Forces Headquarters staff have reported against proceeding immediately with unification. Their advice, based upon years of military service, should not be lightly dismissed. As a consequence, as a member of this Committee I cannot support the proposal in this bill to abolish the Royal Canadian Navy, the Canadian Army and the Royal Canadian Air Force and substitute for them one service to be called the Canadian Armed Forces.

As other members have said, it is open to us to debate at very considerable length the problems presented by this bill. Thanks to the freedom of speech that we enjoy under the parliamentary system, that opportunity recurs again if the government intends to proceed with this bill in the House of Commons, and on that occasion we can present our cases more fully. My hope is that in the interval the government will withdraw this bill pending further consideration. But rather than delay the progress of this Committee, I will content myself with registering my vote against clause 2.

Mr. WINCH: Mr. Chairman, I am not going into a discussion at this moment on the question or the principle of integration or unification but there is one facet on which I personally would like to have a bit of clarification if I could.

Under clause 2 here, dealing with section 15, the wording is:

> The Canadian Forces are the *armed forces* of Her Majesty raised by Canada and consist of *one Service called the Canadian Armed Forces.*

I cannot conceive, and I am certain that nobody else can conceive, of the service called the Canadian Armed Forces not being composed of an army, a navy and an air force. That being the case, in the majority of cases unless you are in a

completely integrated service such as materiel or something like that, you will be in the army, the navy or the air force.

Because it has been made so clear to us by almost everyone, who has given evidence that if they are in the navy they like it to be known that they are in the navy or the air force or the army, can I be given some good reason, some logical explanation as to why, even if you have the principle as enunciated here of one service called the Canadian Armed Forces—you are a member under this of the Canadian Armed Forces—there cannot be the wording here that there will be nothing wrong in your particular unit of having the designation that you are in a particular phase of the one service, the Royal Canadian Air Force or Royal Canadian Navy and the Canadian Army?

I have been puzzling over this in the weeks that we have been hearing evidence on it and for the life of me I cannot see where the objection can be, even with the one service called the Canadian Armed Forces, to including by statute the RCN, the RCAF and the Army. Could I hear any logical reason why that could not be incorporated because in my opinion, sir, it would not basically upset or offset what might be the purpose of unification but, in my estimation, it would remove a vast amount of the antagonism and the opposition and the ill feeling which have been so evident in all that we have heard and from those whom we have met.

I hope I have not made it too confused but can we not have some indication that might be possible?

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Winch, I will ask the Minister to answer that question.

Honourable Paul HELLYER (*Minister of National Defence*): Mr. Winch, I think this is the fundamental principle of the bill. In most modern armed forces, 50 per cent or more of the total personnel are involved in the supporting services—the doctors, the dentists, the lawyers, the support officers, technicians and all of the people necessary to support the fighting arms. If you divide a service into army, navy and air force and designate them as such, then the question arises as to which one of those three services the support personnel will belong to and identify with, and it is because in an integrated service there is really no adequate answer to that question which is satisfactory to all of the people in the support services and which enables them to have all of the advantages of career opportunities open to them by serving through one or more environments and identifying with the whole force as such, that we are proposing the single service idea.

Otherwise, there are two options: one, to continue as at present and to arbitrarily assign either a specific support service to a service, as in the case of a dentist. You could make all of the dentists, army; you could make all of the doctors, navy; you could make all of the lawyers, air force, or something like this, but it would be a strictly arbitrary assignment which would not then relate to their future employment. Or, you could divide them in some sort of numerical fashion. You could enrol 20 per cent of the doctors in the navy, 40 per cent in the army and 40 per cent in the air force; 20 per cent of the lawyers in the navy and 40 per cent in the army and 40 per cent in the air force, and then you come up to all of the both technical and psychological problems described by the Judge Advocate General the other day when he was talking about his experience in operating an integrated branch over a long period of time.

So, the reason for a single service is to overcome the problems created by integration. I think Air Marshal Miller made it perfectly clear that integration of the kind that we have adopted is farsighted and imaginative, and I am sure he would say if he were asked to project that it would work to the satisfaction of everyone and give leadership in military organization. But it does create one problem and that is the problem we are trying to solve in this bill. It is the identification of the non-combat arms with one of the combat arms or with the total service. We have come to the conclusion that it is better to have not only the non-combat people but also the combat people as well, for reasons which I explained in my second reading speech, to identify with the force as a whole, rather than to the extent they have in the past with three separate services.

Mr. WINCH: Mr. Chairman, on the basis of what the Minister has just said, it rather strikes me that you are just raising something for the purpose of knocking it down. I cannot follow your reasoning at all in the way you have put it. If you have under integration, as you mentioned, the chaplains and the doctors and the dentists and perhaps your Materiel Command and all that which can function on the overall picture of all three, it makes no difference whether it is navy, army and air force. What is wrong, then, with them being CAF., the Canadian Armed Forces, and the badge would say whatever it was—C.A.F.? But if you were—

Mr. HELLYER: Well, because, Mr. Winch, they do not want to be CAF unless the rest of the force is.

Mr. WINCH: Why?

Mr. HELLYER: Because they do not want to be considered second-class citizens.

Mr. WINCH: I do not see how they are second-class citizens. They are fulfilling a function. It is just the same as the last war when I was in the army. It was known that I was in the army and my badge said "Canada" but everybody who knows anything about ranks or anything else also knew that I was a member of the Irish Fusiliers. I was a member of the Irish Fusiliers in the army. Why can it not be that you are a member in the navy in the Canadian Armed Forces? I just cannot yet see why this cannot be worked out.

Mr. HELLYER: I think, Mr. Winch—I know this is difficult—

Mr. WINCH: It would remove a great number of the problems and objections if we could work something out.

Mr. HELLYER: If I may say so, specialties will still have some identification for the particular specialty whether they are sailors, soldiers, airmen or doctors or some other specialty. But, at the same time, it is considered important—and I certainly believe, on the basis of my experience that it is not only important but essential—that all of these people identify then with a single service rather than with Royal Canadian Navy, Canadian Army or Royal Canadian Air Force.

Mr. WINCH: Well, they will be identified because they all have CAF.

Mr. HELLYER: They will all be identified with the single service.

Mr. WINCH: Yes, but why then can you not have the additional?

Mr. HELLYER: Well, they will have some additional identification.

Mr. WINCH: Well, why can it not be known as the RCN or the RCAF? It is only nomenclature, that is all.

Mr. LAMBERT: May I ask a supplementary question? Arising out of what Mr. Winch has said, is it the objective and the purpose of the armed forces to have a fighting force or a force that is to be managed.

Mr. HELLYER: This is a cliché, Mr. Lambert.

Mr. LAMBERT: It is not a cliché.

Mr. HELLYER: It is. It is a fighting force but a fighting force cannot operate without the people to support it, and they have to operate as one team with a single purpose. The way that they will operate most successfully is if they identify as part of a single overall organization.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Mr. Chairman, the Minister spoke of arbitrary decisions to place professional men like doctors, lawyers and dentists and other professions in a certain category. Has any objection ever been raised by, say, a dentist to the fact that he is in the dental corps and because of such he is attached to the army?

Mr. HELLYER: Not to my knowledge.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Was there ever any mention of an arbitrary decision on the part of the government that he is an army man?

Mr. HELLYER: It was an arbitrary decision at some stage, I am sure.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): What is arbitrary about the decision of any dentist to join the dental corps? This is still left to the individual to decide. If he is a dentist and he wishes to practice in the service, he joins the army. What is arbitrary about that?

Mr. HELLYER: I am afraid I do not follow your views.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): You do not follow your own arguments.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, if there are no further comments on clause 2, I will call the sections. Shall section 15 carry?

Some hon. MEMBERS: Agreed.

Mr. LAMBERT: Poll the Committee.

The CHAIRMAN: We will poll the Committee by numbers. Those in favour of carrying section 15? In favour? Opposed?

Section 15 agreed to: yeas, 12; nays, 9.

The CHAIRMAN: Shall section 16 carry?

Some hon. MEMBERS: Agreed.

The CHAIRMAN: We will poll the Committee again on section 16. In favour? Opposed?

Section 16 agreed to: yeas, 12; nays, 9.

The CHAIRMAN: Shall section 17 carry?

Some hon. MEMBERS: Agreed.

Mr. LAMBERT: Unfortunately I was involved elsewhere at the time Brigadier Lawson proposed that this amendment be introduced in the act to restore the

original wording. It would appear that on the basis of that it is now agreed that the original wording was preferable to what had been proposed. I say the original—that which appeared in subsection 5 of section 16 in the act as it now stands today. Are you satisfied, Brigadier Lawson, that there will not be any inhibitions at all in the interpretation of the section as it is now amended?

Brigadier LAWSON: I think it will be perfectly satisfactory in its re-amended form.

Mr. LAMBERT: I see, all right.

The CHAIRMAN: Shall the amendment to section 17 carry?

Some hon. MEMBERS: Agreed.

The CHAIRMAN: Shall section 17 carry?

Mr. MACALUSO: Mr. Chairman, it would save time by just polling every clause.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): That is the Chairman of the Transportation Committee for what it is worth.

The CHAIRMAN: Do you want this polled?

Mr. WINCH: What are we on? We have passed the amendment.

The CHAIRMAN: We have passed the amendment. The amendment is carried and now shall section 17 carry?

Section 17 as amended agreed to: yeas, 12; nays, 9.

The CHAIRMAN: Shall section 18 carry?

Section 18 agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN: Shall clause 2 carry?

Clause 2 as amended agreed to: yeas, 13; nays, 8.

On clause 3—*Commissioned officers*

Mr. LAMBERT: This has to do with the period of service for which subordinate officers and men—that is warrant officers, NCO's and men—may be enrolled for the service. Now, there is a degree of, shall we say, flexibility in so far that it is said for indefinite or fixed periods of service. Now, this is hardly in keeping with what I have felt was indicated by the Minister in his speech of December 7, because he indicated there that the men would be enrolled for an initial period and then an indefinite period.

If it is meant to have a mix as the formula, then I think it should say so. But what I am primarily concerned about is that the regulations which may be published in regard to this, be referred back to the Standing Committee on Defence for examination, as I will propose for any regulations which may be made with regard to any amendment, and that these be examined. We have had this undertaking in the Finance Committee under the Bank Act where a sort of carte blanche is being given to the Minister to flesh out a general authority given by Parliament. I think that the more we develop the practice in this Parliament that regulations made pursuant to these general authorities be referred back to the Committee which is dealing with the legislation, the better off we are going to be. Far to great a practice has arisen in the years past to rely on this carte blanche authority, which is not reviewable by Parliament. I would like to know what the Minister—

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Lambert, for clarification may I ask precisely what it is that you want referred back to this Committee?

Mr. LAMBERT: I want the regulations as indicated in section 21 (2) as proposed be referred back and the Minister can be given an invitation here. We respect that type of undertaking, as we have done in the Finance Committee with regard to the Bank Act, with what we have done with the Insurance Deposit Act and others. These regulations will be, as soon as they are prepared and if the House is sitting and this Committee is sitting, brought in and referred back to the Committee, not merely tabled as an Order in Council.

The CHAIRMAN: Now, I have one more point for clarification and then I will call on the Minister to deal with your question. Do you want these passed back before they are passed, or after they are passed by Order in Council? Are you asking for draft, or are you asking to review the regulations after they have been in force?

Mr. LAMBERT: We want to review the regulation after is has been drawn up. There is nothing wrong with the government backing away from an Order in Council and amending an Order in Council, but in no way have we indicated that Orders on Council in draft form shall be presented to a Committee of the House. No, this is not it. What my ultimate aim is that we will eventually have a standing committee to review delegated powers.

Mr. HELLYER: If you mean regulations after enactment, I do not see why this could not be arranged.

Mr. LAMBERT: There has never been any suggestion that it be otherwise. But not merely tabled in the House and then someone has to go and dig out and then cannot bring it up, but that they are formally tabled for referral back to the Committee on Defence for examination.

Mr. HELLYER: I do not think there is any objection on the undertaking in so far as this is concerned. Certainly, I would only make the undertaking for the first regulations, however, because this is subject to change from time to time and I cannot bind successors as to what might be done in the future. I would undertake to agree to their assuming that I still have the responsibility.

Mr. LAMBERT: This is quite all right as far as I am concerned, because ultimately I hope that we will have this committee on delegated legislation and that all the Orders in Council passed under any of this type of authority would be automatically referred to it for review.

Mr. HELLYER: That might be a more systematic way of handling it in the future.

Mr. LAMBERT: That is right, but for the present, since we have not got that committee, I would like to have any and all regulations passed pursuant to general authority which may be granted on the passage of this bill, if it does pass, brought back to this Committee for examination. Frankly, within this proposed section and the next one and possibly others, and Brigadier Lawson indicated the other day that there could be some other regulations passed under the general powers section of the National Defence Act which will materially affect the whole of this proposal and this is what we want to see as well. Not just the bare outline, we want to see whether you have it or you have not.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Lambert, I think you have made your point very well.

Mr. NUGENT: Mr. Chairman on clause 3. Apart from the fact that it is part of the unification bill which I am against and this is the first reason I opposed it, this suggestion of indefinite or fixed periods of service in view of the Minister's stated policy that this "indefinite" was going to be such a great thing, and the evidence we have heard in this Committee of why it would be so dangerous, I think that the question of whether it is indefinite or fixed is sufficiently important that it be policy and by this method the Minister avoids the touchy question of having to state what the government policy is. It can be either one, and then he can pass a regulation when he finds out how far he is going to go.

That is the second reason I am opposed to this and I think it is up to the government to announce its policy, to enunciate it, and where there is such a difference as this, to make up its mind and go with either a fixed or an indefinite period of service and, therefore, I am opposed to the passage of this section for that second reason that I do not believe in allowing him a regulation whereby he can lay down policy after he finds out when the bill has gone through, how it works, or how much difficulty he is going to have.

Mr. HELLYER: Mr. Nugent, I think perhaps you misunderstand the intent here. The present policy has been stated. It is to enrol for an initial fixed period and then thereafter by mutual consent for an indefinite period. Now under the present law we do not have this flexibility. Only fixed-term enrolment is possible—if I recall and the Brigadier can correct me—so that we need this flexibility for the policy which has already been announced and which has been described to the men in the field.

I do not think you should assume that this is immutable for all time. If the policy is attractive to the men and women of the armed forces and works, why no doubt it will be continued, but if for any reason it was found that indefinite periods of enrolment were not as acceptable as the definite, then I am sure that the policy would be reviewed. But the act as it is drafted here would give the Governor in Council the flexibility necessary to make changes from time to time based on how the policy, in fact, was working out.

Mr. NUGENT: The Minister has not answered or changed one thing I said. Now, the other act provides fixed terms of service for the men, but this one will allow the Minister, some time in the future, if he thinks it wise, to change that policy. All I am suggesting is that when it comes to policy you announce it and have it in the bill. If you want to change it in the future, come back and have the act changed. This simply gives the Minister the right to change it sometime in the future and from the way he was talking, this new idea of fixed terms of service for the men or indefinite terms for the men, was going to be a great advance. The evidence we have heard is that it is going to be bad. I do not think the Minister should be in the position of changing policy some time in the future. He should make up his mind on it now.

Mr. HELLYER: Mr. Nugent, if I many and I do not want to labour the point, we already have the authority under the act to enrol officers for either fixed or indefinite terms. We do not have that authority for other ranks and that is what we are asking for in this bill.

Mr. LAMBERT: With regard to the proposed subsection (1) of section 21, it is indicated that officers will be enrolled during pleasure. In other words, they are

not permanent commissions to all officers enrolling in the future. What about men who are on short service commissions today?

Mr. HELLYER: Mr. Lambert, this wording, I understand, allows you to enrol officers for either fixed or indefinite terms. There is no change in the wording from the present act.

The CHAIRMAN: Shall clause 3 carry?

Mr. LAMBERT: Wait a minute. Is it the purpose, then, to continue the present policy with regard to short service commissions for part of the aircrew, and regular commissions—

Mr. HELLYER: The policy has just been changed, but I think the important point is that Her Majesty expresses her pleasure at the beginning of the engagement or on enrolment as to whether it was fixed term commission or an indefinite commission.

Mr. LAMBERT: Right, I will accept the interpretation of whether there is authority as to fixed or indefinite periods of service under a commission, but what is to be the policy with regard to aircrew? Is it to be continued that pilots shall be given permanent commissions?

Mr. HELLYER: Subject to correction by Captain Solomon, I think the policy that we intend to pursue is to grant permanent commissions to aircrew in the future. Is that not correct, Captain?

Captain SOLOMON: Yes, sir.

Mr. LAMBERT: Since when has that been effective?

Mr. HELLYER: It is not effective yet, but this is the intention.

Mr. LAMBERT: In other words, all commissioned officers of aircrew and there are few, if any, non-commissioned—

Mr. HELLYER: There are no non-commissioned aircrew in the air force that I know of.

Mr. LAMBERT: They are all commissioned, so therefore they will all have permanent commissions—navigators, engineers and what have you?

Mr. HELLYER: Not engineers, Mr. Lambert. I think that was the exception.

Mr. LAMBERT: I beg your pardon?

Mr. HELLYER: Not flight engineers.

Mr. LAMBERT: No.

Mr. HELLYER: Navigators and—

The CHAIRMAN: Shall clause 3 carry?

All in favour?

Opposed?

Clause 3 agreed to: Yes 13; nays, 8.

On Clause 4—*Ranks of officers*

Mr. MACRAE: I wanted to ask the Judge Advocate General in the case of those three warrant ranks, is it intended—that is 12, 13 and 14—that one

warrant will be issued and then promotions made from the one warrant as in the case of commissioned ranks or will there be three warrants issued in that particular case?

Brigadier LAWSON: I am afraid I do not know what the practice is now on issuing warrants.

An hon. MEMBER: One warrant.

Mr. MACRAE: There would just simply be one warrant issued and that would be it, from then on? The other area in which I wanted to touch on very briefly is that of 17, the private rank. As it stands at the moment, the rank of Lance Corporal is not noted at all and I take it that that is being abolished completely.

Brigadier LAWSON: Of course, Lance Corporal is an appointment, not a rank. Private soldiers are appointed Lance Corporals.

Mr. MACRAE: That is right, but he still wore a stripe and he carried that name, though.

Brigadier LAWSON: Yes.

An hon. MEMBER: And authority.

Mr. MACRAE: And authority and he was paid for it, you see, which is important. Following the same principle with aircraftman II and I, is it intended that there will be no appointments in those ranks? What is the policy to be there? My reason for raising this is that it seems to me, from a fair amount of military experience, that you have to have some area there. You have to have some appointments; somebody with authority in between the rank of private and corporal.

Mr. HELLYER: I cannot answer the question on that one but I think it is proposed that there will be different grades of private depending on the amount of experience. In other words, something comparable to the previous arrangement in the Air Force with the AC2, AC1 and LAC.

Mr. MACRAE: Do I take it from your answer, then, that—

Mr. HELLYER: From the time a recruit enters until the time he becomes a fully qualified soldier there would be some gradation.

An hon. MEMBER: I take it that there is a rank that comes after warrant?

The CHAIRMAN: One at a time on this question. I will hear Mr. Lambert, Mr. Forrestall and then Mr. MacInnis on this subject and then Mr. Nugent and Mr. Smith.

Mr. LAMBERT: I take it that all these provisions that we are talking so airily about are going to be prescribed in regulations, but I would like to get an outline of the Minister's thinking or that of his advisers in this regard because if we are going to end up with some sort of thing like Private First Class or Private Second Class, which is an unfortunate example taken from another armed force that is friendly to ours, but which I certainly find most repugnant—

Mr. SMITH: Like boot camp.

Mr. LAMBERT: Or are we going to have boy soldiers or young soldiers to get a distinction in among your private soldiers, without this indication that you

have to have a Lance Corporal or some rank and that you are not going to detail everybody off under a corporal? I think anybody with fighting experience will know that you will not detail off a man either just merely by reason of the fact that he is a private and he is going to have charge of four men and that is all and he is not going to get any other pay or any other authority.

Also, there is the matter of maintenance of discipline, the striking of a superior officer and all of these things. I am sure this has been discussed, but why do we not get it down and outlined in detail just what is meant because there are some horrible gaps in this schedule.

Mr. HELLYER: There are different pay levels but with the one rank. This was really set out in the changed pay scales last October.

Mr. LAMBERT: Where is the brilliant inspiration for this? Within those pay groups, the Minister is certainly aware that there will be howls of protest.

Mr. HELLYER: Very few, on balance.

Mr. LAMBERT: Well, I do not know; somebody is wearing cotton wool in their ears or ear plugs over at National Defence Headquarters.

Mr. HELLYER: There are some trades which felt they were in the wrong place in the pay scale, but by and large, it was quite well received.

Mr. LAMBERT: What I am talking about is the fighting soldier. If I may say so, there is an undue pre-occupation with management of the tail of the armed services.

Mr. HELLYER: On the contrary, Mr. Lambert, the fighting arms were the ones which were recognized in the new pay scales in October in a way that they had not been recognized before, and this was for just the reason that you have raised, but it is contrary to the impression that you have gained.

Mr. LAMBERT: Yes, but what I am talking about now is that a troop leader who had a job to get done by two or three men had a Lance Corporal available, because you certainly did not detail a Corporal in this type of job. This still exists, you know, there—

Mr. HELLYER: There is nothing to prevent that under this act.

Mr. LAMBERT: Yes, but there is no indication.

Mr. HELLYER: There was not before.

Mr. LAMBERT: There certainly was.

Mr. HELLYER: It was never in the act.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Forrestall, do you have any questions on this one?

Mr. FORRESTALL: No, I will wait until we get to the schedule of the act.

The CHAIRMAN: I have Mr. Nugent, Mr. Winch and Mr. Smith on this one.

Mr. NUGENT: If I may get technical, Mr. Chairman, should that not be called 1 of Schedule A since we have more than one schedule?

Brigadier LAWSON: No, we have only one schedule for the National Defence Act.

Mr. FORRESTALL: What are the other schedules referred to?

Brigadier LAWSON: Schedule A is a schedule to the bill, but we are inserting one schedule in the National Defence Act and it is just the Schedule to the National Defence Act.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Mr. Chairman, I would like clarification from the Minister of what he meant when referring to Mr. MacRae's question on the matter of Lance Corporals to the effect that this would be taken care of based on experience. Does this mean that experience is going to give everybody the appointment of Lance Corporal?

Mr. HELLYER: As the Brigadier explained Lance Corporal is an appointment—

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): That is exactly what I said. Is experience going to give this soldier the appointment?

Mr. HELLYER: That has been the basis in the past.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): It has not; I defy the Judge Advocate General to say so. This has never been the experience in the past. Everybody who goes into the service, based on their experience, is not given a Lance Corporal's appointment. What do you mean it has been the experience in the past? You had better go back and ask another question, Mr. Minister.

Mr. HELLYER: Mr. MacInnis this is one subject on which I have some minor knowledge because I was a Lance Bombardier once myself.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): I have one more question, Mr. Chairman. The Minister also indicated to Mr. Lambert that recognition was given to the fighting arm of the services in the last pay increases. Can this be interpreted to mean that the soldier who goes on parade on Parliament Hill here during the hot summer months receives more pay than the private who may be working down at headquarters?

Mr. HELLYER: It depends on his trade.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): We are not talking trade; we are talking about the pay increases that were provided recently. You said to Mr. Lambert—

Mr. HELLYER: An infantryman on the hill would get more pay than a private doing clerical work in headquarters? Yes.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Why would the infantryman get more pay?

Mr. HELLYER: Because he is in a higher pay group, a higher pay category.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, I would remind you that the estimates are coming up soon and that these kinds of questions can be examined pretty exhaustively at that time.

Mr. SMITH: I do not think it is quite as simple as the answer seemed to make it. What is bothering us somewhat about the ranks is the means of identification of the private who has an extra qualification or is likely to follow or be second in command to a corporal in an infantry section, because I think there still will be infantry sections in the army. We feel that this is one of the reasons that

supports Mr. Lambert's argument that these regulations—the first set of regulations made under this act—ought to be discussed by the Committee. But, my questions were going to relate to categories 12, 13 and 14, Chief Warrant Officer, Master Warrant Officer and Warrant Officer. Has any discussion been developed or is there any plan as to how you are going to address these people? When I see a Master Warrant Officer, how am I to address him?

An hon. MEMBER: Master?

Mr. SMITH: No, no; let them suggest it. This is the thing that I think should be thought out. A WO 1 in the army where I spent a little time was referred to as Mister, and a WO 2 was referred to as Sergeant-Major and a WO 3, when we had WO's 3 up until 1940 or 1941, a third platoon commander in a regiment, was also referred to as Mister. Now, what form of address is to be used when you are speaking to or giving an order to a Chief Warrant Officer, a Master Warrant Officer and a Warrant Officer?

Mr. HELLYER: I would like to refer this to the defence staff who are responsible for it.

Mr. SMITH: You would think that they would have been ready with this answer. It would seem to be a matter of some concern.

Mr. HELLYER: I am sure they are, Mr. Smith, but—

Mr. SMITH: I cannot visualize speaking to a WO 1 as "hey, you".

Mr. HELLYER: I think the chairman is going to propose that all ranks be called Mister as a simplified solution.

Mr. SMITH: That does not simplify things at all. It only confuses them. You get too damned much democracy.

Mr. NUGENT: On this, I do not think that the amendment has really done anything to this act. There is still the difficulty "may make regulations prescribing the circumstances in which a person shall be referred to," etc. So, we have a situation where the act purports to say your rank shall be, but we may make regulations. In other words, the Minister may make regulations allowing everybody to use and retain in the navy, for instance, every rank that has been there and not imposing any of these new ones; in other words, completely nullify the effect of this act, and we do not know until such time as those regulations are made.

It harks back to what I said on clause 3. We do not know whether there is going to be a fixed period of service. In this Committee we had considerable evidence and a very eloquent plea from General Allard that the only trouble with morale in the services was this uncertainty. They are up in the air; they do not know where they are, and as soon as this uncertainty is over with, then morale is going to start to improve.

We have had this Committee rushing through, so anxious to get this bill, and members over there saying we have got to have this uncertainty cleared away, and here we have two sections in a row and I do not know how many more we are going to come to. If there is any sincerity whatsoever on the other side of this room, and the reason that we want to rush this through is to get away from this uncertainty, how can we pass a bill in this situation where it is going to leave them completely up in the air? They will not know what their term of

service may be in the future. They will not know what rank they may be called or how much the rank structure may be interfered with.

Mr. HELLYER: The answer to that question is that before this act is proclaimed the regulations covering all of these points which you have raised or which might occur to you, will be drafted and promulgated. It is anticipated by the staff that this will take some months after passage of the act before it is proclaimed, and I can assure you that is one of the reasons that we are so anxious to get the bill through the House and to get Royal Assent so that then all the detailed administration, including the orders and the answers to all of the questions that you have raised, and many, many others will be answered in a form which will be clear and unmistakeable.

Mr. NUGENT: There is nothing wrong with preparation going forward now for these regulations. It is complete nonsense that you have to wait for the passage of the bill because the planning and everything could be done. Next we have had the evidence of General Allard—

Mr. HELLYER: You cannot really do—

Mr. NUGENT: —in an attempt, I suppose, to lull this Committee into the feeling that we are not really rushing contrary to all the advice and, since the evidence is so overwhelming, we should not rush. We have had his assurance that it would not be rushed in, that he and his staff would advise the government when it should be brought into effect, and you cannot have it both ways.

Mr. HELLYER: You cannot draft regulations until you know what is in the bill. Already there have been some amendments which would affect regulations.

Mr. NUGENT: On this, the Minister has had this fuzzy idea in his mind and it is still just as fuzzy. That is why there have been no regulations drafted and that is why the Minister is now still trying to put off that day when he has to make some policy. That is why this uncertainty still remains and why he wants the authority to be able to make decisions later. I suggest you cannot have it both ways. Either you want to settle with uncertainty or you do not, and I suggest that it should be settled now.

Mr. WINCH: Mr. Chairman, I thought you had forgotten me for a while.

The CHAIRMAN: No, sir.

Mr. WINCH: Mr. Chairman, once again I would like clarification so I would hope that the Minister will rise and expatiate. I cannot for the life of me understand the necessity for the establishment as this clause does of a common rank structure for the three services. It has not only created a lot of confusion but undoubtedly a lot of antagonism and, I think, unnecessarily so. The only basis that I can see for this common rank structure is for the matter of keeping records and the pay, and so on, which I understand is going to be done by computers.

If it is because of the computer setup that this is required, then I would like to suggest that, computers being what they are today, you can feed into a computer the knowledge that any reference to an admiral, a general, or an air chief marshal is a general, or that a vice-admiral, an air marshal is a lieutenant-general for the matter of records, for the matter of pay and whatever is required in the way of bookkeeping, and so on. But I just cannot see why, from the

viewpoint of efficiency or public relations or co-operation and understanding with our allies and the other navies and air forces and armies of the world, we should have to go ahead with the introduction of this common rank structure. It just does not make sense to me. Will you expatiate?

Mr. HELLYER: Well, Mr. Winch, I do not know what I can add. First of all, I think as far as two services are concerned, they are quite content perhaps even more than content to have common rank designation and most members of the air force, I think it would be fair to say, would prefer the army rank designations.

As we have already indicated, it is not our intention to impose these on seagoing people certainly for the immediate future and, perhaps, for some considerable length of time—because the contacts that they have in other parts of the world are more familiar with the rank designations which they now use. But I think, as far as the public relations standpoint is concerned, there is a difficulty here from the standpoint of public recognition. Perhaps it is as much related to insignia as it is to the rank designations themselves, but I have watched this Committee in action now for a number of weeks and there have been a number of occasions when members of this Committee have not recognized the rank designations of the officers appearing before them. As a matter of fact, I think if you were to poll today the Canadian public you would not find one person in a thousand who could recognize and identify the insignia representing the rank designation for the three armed services.

An hon. MEMBER: Noble serving men; that is all that is necessary.

Mr. HELLYER: I think in the armed services themselves you would be lucky to find one person—well, I want to be careful now, here—but I think you would find very few who would be able to recognize and identify the insignia and the rank designation for all non-commissioned and commissioned ranks in the three services. So, there is something to be said for simplicity and although it is our intention that the sailors will be given considerable latitude in the use of the seagoing terminology it is also our intention to use the same insignia throughout the whole service so that there will be no misunderstanding as to what the relative rank is, and I think that this simplification will be welcomed by most members of the public and by most members of the armed forces as well.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): You say now, Mr. Minister, that there are a number of servicemen who are unable to identify their serving officers by the rank designation. What gives you the idea that they will have any more interest in the single service than they would in their own particular service today?

Mr. HELLYER: I do not think it is a matter of interest because they are all interested, but there are so many permutations and combinations that it is difficult to remember them all.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Does your remark refer to, say, a sailor in the navy; that he does not recognize all the ranks by their designation?

Mr. HELLYER: In the three services I think most of them would have some difficulty.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): I am talking about the sailor in the navy or the airman in the air force.

Mr. HELLYER: He would have some difficulty in recognizing all of them.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Well, then, what is going to simplify it if he is going into one service? If he does not know it now, what is going to simplify it in one service?

Mr. HELLYER: He only has a third as many to remember.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): He has got one third to remember now, if you want to put it down to that. I am asking about the airman in the air force or the sailor in the navy. If he cannot recognize these ranks now, what is going to simplify it in a single service?

Mr. HELLYER: You are just talking about the ranks in his own service.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Exactly.

Mr. HELLYER: We are talking about integrated forces here, integrated commands where—

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): I know. I know you are.

Mr. HELLYER: —it is advantageous to recognize—

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Go over your own argument and you will see the fallacy of it.

Mr. NUGENT: I was intrigued by the Minister's remark that there was no intention to force this rank structure on the navy immediately and, perhaps, not for a considerable period of time, and I suppose part of that is because we want to reassure them they will not be too different from other navies. But it certainly does reinforce what I said a minute ago about putting it off and leaving things up in the air because the Minister has just said, in effect, we are going to keep this hanging over their heads for a long time. They will not know where they are.

The CHAIRMAN: Shall clause 4 as amended carry?

Some hon. MEMBERS: Agreed.

The CHAIRMAN: Those opposed?

Clause 4 as amended agreed to: Yeas, 12; nays, 9.

On clause 5—*Continuation*

Mr. CHURCHILL: This clause and the one that follows brings into the act now the compulsory feature, and I think it is quite wrong in the note on the opposite page simply to call it transitional. It should be called "compulsory transfer". Here you have the beginning of the bad practice to which we have already drawn attention of, by arbitrary action and by compulsion, bringing the officers and men of the Royal Canadian Navy, the Canadian Army and the Royal Canadian Air Force into a new unit to be known as the Canadian Forces. I think that this is wrong unless there is something introduced into the act which will provide for reattestation and for choice on the part of the people who are being transferred.

This morning I gave an example from memory, corroborated by the official historian of world war II with regard to the reattestation that occurred when the change of nomenclature was introduced into the attestation papers and when a decision had to be made as to whether a man in the Canadian Active Service

Force would serve outside of Canada, so it is an established precedent. It is not the only precedent, but it is valid in Canadian history. There is a precedent in British history. When the East India Company was taken over by the British government in 1858, there was an attempted compulsory transfer of the soldiers formerly employed by the East India Company. There was an apprehended mutiny which almost resulted in strife and the government had to give way and permit the men who had been compulsorily transferred to make a choice of whether they wished to enter the British army and a reattestation was pursued in that instance.

Now, this is the trouble that we are getting into here by this compulsory feature. That is one of the reasons why I am opposed to clause 5 and the clause which follows.

The CHAIRMAN: I think, Mr. Churchill, if I am correct, the points which you make are contained more in subclause (1) of clause 6 than in clause 5. Nevertheless, I think you commented that you were discussing clauses 5 and 6. Mr. Nugent, you had a question.

Mr. NUGENT: I was just going to say that I thought Air Chief Marshal Miller put it very succinctly as something we should bear in mind, that it would be a disgraceful way to handle people who are volunteer servicemen in a peacetime force in a democratic country if we have to transcript them into a new force. I think that is the only basis on which we can look at this and remember what we are doing; and I think we should reconsider it.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Winch?

Mr. WINCH: Mr. Chairman, I do not want to repeat what I have said before, but I do want to comment that clause 5(2) definitely states that:

> The units and other elements of the Royal Canadian Navy, the Canadian Army and the Royal Canadian Air Force existing at the coming into force of this Part shall, subject to the provisions of the National Defence Act, continue to be the units and elements of the Canadian Forces.

Therefore, if you are going to maintain them as units and elements of a single force, I still do not see why you cannot have RCN, RCAF and Army. To me, I just cannot understand the objection of the Minister.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. MacInnis?

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): On this point, the Chair indicated that we have heard from Air Chief Marshal Miller and we have heard from General Simonds to the effect that in a democratic country their interpretation is that the individual serviceman does have an agreement with the service he is in at present and, as such, should be given the opportunity either to sign up again, or, if he so wishes, to go back to civilian life without any penalty involved, which is as it should be. Now, these are expressions of opinion. Neither of these gentlemen were too sure of the legality of this particular move, but the Chair did indicate to me, when this matter was first brought up, that they would look to the Department of Justice for a legal ruling on this. Has the Department of Justice been contacted?

The CHAIRMAN: I will ask Brigadier Lawson to speak on that point now, Mr. MacInnis.

Brigadier LAWSON: Yes, Mr. Chairman, I did discuss this matter with officials of the Department of Justice. I explained the problem; I explained what I have said my opinion was, and they expressed themselves as fully agreeing with the opinion I had expressed when I last gave evidence before the Committee. The act, as drafted, appears to be perfectly legal.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Was this all of your representation to the Department of Justice?

Brigadier LAWSON: I put forward to them the various arguments that had been raised in the Committee.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Did you have at your disposal the precedents that have already been established on this particular line?

Brigadier LAWSON: What precedents do you refer to?

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): I refer to the precedents that Mr. Churchill has already repeated two or three times in the Committee.

Brigadier LAWSON: Well, they do not affect the legal situation; they affect, perhaps, the factual situation, but not the legal situation. The legal situation, I think, is quite clear that if Parliament enacts this, this is the law, and that is it.

An hon. MEMBER: Compulsory service.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Compulsory service, then, you will agree.

The CHAIRMAN: I think that is—

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): No, just a minute, Mr. Chairman, the Judge Advocate General is going to answer that question.

Brigadier LAWSON: I think, Mr. Chairman, there are two sections in the present act that I should draw to the attention of the Committee again. The first is section 24; this says, and this has always said this:

> The enrolment of a person binds that person to serve in the Canadian Forces until he is, in accordance with regulations, lawfully released.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): That is right.

Brigadier LAWSON: And all the people who are in today, came in under that section.

Then I point out section 34, which says:

> The regular forces, all units and other elements thereof and all officers and men thereof are at all times liable to perform any lawful duty.

Now, everybody who came into the regular forces subscribed to that obligation, "to perform any lawful duty".

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): That is right, we are not arguing that point; nobody is arguing that point with you. Certainly I am not arguing the point you make from section 24, either. What I do argue is that there is, or there should be—and just because you say so, I will have to accept what you say—but I still am firmly convinced that no man need be arbitrarily placed in the new Canadian forces. He has signed his agreement with the service in which he is

now performing, and when that service goes out of existence what is his position? For instance, when we deal with the clause on desertion how could there be any judgment or disciplinary action taken against a man for deserting something which is no longer in existence?

Brigadier LAWSON: Under the bill he would be in the new force, and he would be deserting from the new force.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): As a lawyer, sir, do you find any ambiguity in different laws?

Brigadier LAWSON: I find no ambiguity in this bill.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): I am not talking about this act; I am talking about the laws. As a lawyer you have studied law, and you know the law. Do you find ambiguity in the acts?

Brigadier LAWSON: Many laws are ambiguous.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Then what would prevent another law coming up whereby the civilian courts would support the individual against this supposedly arbitrary action of putting them into another service? Are you prepared to say that there is no such law that would protect the man?

Brigadier LAWSON: I would say that he would not be successful. The law to me, as expressed in the bill—

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Are you not prejudging something now? Can you put your finger on the law?

Brigadier LAWSON: All I am doing is giving my opinion; my opinion might be wrong, of course.

The CHAIRMAN: There are some other questions; Mr. Lambert had his hand up, then I will see Mr. McIntosh and Mr. Nugent.

Mr. LAMBERT: Is this not in the same category as a number of government contracts where they give the minister the power of life or death to abrogate, to deny, to do this. In other words, it is all loaded on the one side. Regardless of that, I put to you that this is, in effect, what is being proposed: Notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, the Minister may—and he will do this—put a man from the Navy into another force which he had never even contemplated joining. I think it is engaging in semantics to suggest that because the National Defence Act says that a man will carry out every lawful duty this will impose upon him the obligation of being transferred, that he signed on under clause 24 of the act, and it was never contemplated by either of the parties that he would serve in the forces regardless of the shape that they are in.

I would put it to you that there is an overriding consideration—and I am addressing my remarks more to the Minister here than to Brigadier Lawson—in dealing with a volunteer force even though highly qualified and highly professionalized. You are taking every man in the services, and you are saying to him, or you are asking Parliament to say to him, in effect, "we do not care a fig for what you think about your service; what you think means nothing to us. Your devotion to the concept of the navy as a separate service, we care nothing for that because we are telling you that willy-nilly, as of tomorrow morning, you are going to be in the Canadian forces and there is no longer a navy".

Mr. FOY: They are not going to tell them that way.

Mr. LAMBERT: This is precisely what you are telling him, because his service is gone.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): You are not telling them at all; you are letting them find out for themselves.

Mr. LAMBERT: It is gone, the service is gone. The army is gone.

Mr. FOY: What do you mean, this willy-nilly business?

Mr. LAMBERT: Well, without any say on his part, and regardless of any other consideration, it is gone; it no longer has any existence. His legal rank is being taken away from him in the same way. His legal rank is being abolished.

Then we get these regulations—this pasting up—and I suppose someone is going to tell us that today you can join the navy as a subordinate officer and carry through all the way to an admiral.

An hon. MEMBER: I think you are imagining this kind of a thing.

Mr. LAMBERT: No, it has already been suggested that this may take up to a lifetime. Therefore, a man could come in as a subordinate officer today and, if he insists, carry through all the way out to his normal retirement as an Admiral. Well, I simply say that that is a hell of a way to run a ship; and that it is merely a patchwork. But coming back to this particular clause, I find it entirely repugnant. Any serviceman who signed up voluntarily has rights too; they are not all on the side of the Crown embodied in the Minister. And I do not want to be party to an abrogation—a unilateral abrogation—of those rights, of the choice of what he is going to do. Therefore, I am unalterably opposed, unless there is introduced the option to every serviceman to say "yes, I will re-engage," or "I will get out without the penalties, and without the squeeze that is now being exerted on it". If you want to make that much of a change, all right—be prepared to take the consequences of it. If you want fundamentally to change the Canadian forces, well change them; but do not ask us to do it.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. McIntosh, and then Mr. Nugent.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Brigadier Lawson, you referred us to section 24 of the act and the term "Canadian forces" there. I want to refer you back to section 15 which says:

> The Canadian Forces are the *armed forces* of Her Majesty raised by Canada and consist of *one Service called the Canadian Armed Forces.*

And in your explanatory column you say:

> The purpose of the amendment to section 15 is to provide that the Canadian Forces will consist of one Service called the Canadian Armed Forces, rather than three Services as at present.

I would assume the three services at present are the Canadian Forces as you refer to in section 24, but that now they are called the Canadian Armed Forces; do you say they are one and the same thing?

Brigadier LAWSON: No, I do not.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Legally, you would say they are one and the same thing—the Canadian Forces and the Canadian Armed Forces.

Brigadier LAWSON: Oh, yes, you mean under the bill.

Mr. McINTOSH: Under section 24 that you referred us to.

Brigadier LAWSON: The Canadian Forces are now defined, under the existing National Defence Act, as follows:

> The Canadian Forces are the naval, army and air forces of Her Majesty raised by Canada and consist of three Services, namely, the Royal Canadian Navy, the Canadian Army and the Royal Canadian Air Force.

That is the section we are proposing to amend.

Mr. McINTOSH: But you are changing that structure and you are now calling it the Canadian Armed Forces; this is the point that I am getting at. The terms are similar, but you could call one black and one white and they would not be the same.

Brigadier LAWSON: There are still Canadian Forces under the bill; they may now be called the Canadian Armed Forces, but throughout the bill you will notice we have referred to Canadian Forces which is a perfectly legal term under the bill as drafted.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Nugent?

Mr. NUGENT: I am surprised that the Brigadier would use that argument on section 24, because I am sure he will agree with me that the enrolment of a person serving in the Canadian Forces is simply a short description rather than using "enrolment in the Royal Canadian Navy, and the Royal Canadian Air Force, or the Canadian Army". For the purpose of brevity they simply said "Canadian Forces" meaning—and I am sure that you cannot refer me to any section where it has been interpreted as anything other than this—enrolment in one of the Canadian forces.

However, I have another comment or two. I would like to know if you have at hand, as it might be interesting to look at, the oath of attestation of a man going into any one of our armed services just now? When we see that it will be possible to determine, perhaps, whether a new form will be needed. If it is just to bear allegiance to Her Majesty, we would perhaps have no difficulty.

Also, while we are looking for that, if the Brigadier will listen just for one minute to an argument on this question of the legality, I am not as convinced as the Brigadier is on the right of Canadian Parliament to pass this bill. I know that you have told us that it may be held that this is not a contract between a person enrolling and the Canadian government. I feel for instance, if my home province of Alberta passed a bill of rights, bearing in mind the exclusive jurisdiction of the province over property and civil rights, and if the wording in that bill of rights stated that any man who has entered into any kind of an agreement with any government, whether it is municipal, provincial, or federal, shall have the same rights as private contracting individuals, that it cannot be changed by any government unilaterally or he is freed from it. Would you then say, in the face of that, that this would still be held legal by the courts bearing in mind that this is peacetime; it is a voluntary service; there is no national emergency; no colour of right or pretense that the federal government can intrude on that, and it is a volunteer service in a democracy.

Brigadier LAWSON: Yes, I would certainly say that the federal Parliement, in the face of such an act that you suggest, could legally enact this clause,

because it clearly comes under defence, I think, and the British North America Act.

Mr. NUGENT: But since it is not a necessary provision for carrying out the purpose of dealing with the defence matter at stake, and since it is directly transgressing on the civil rights of those people—changing the terms and so on of the agreement they entered into, or the method by which they entered into Her Majesty's service—you say it is still a matter of defence rather than civil rights. I am afraid I am not nearly that certain on it.

Brigadier LAWSON: I would think so, having in mind the line of cases that holds that the federal authority can infringe on the provincial field—the property and the civil rights—if it is clearly under of the heads of section 91 of the British North America Act.

Mr. NUGENT: They do not usually hold that unless it is necessary to infringe, do they, Brigadier? Here there is certainly no necessity, since it is considered a volunteered service and people can volunteer again.

Brigadier LAWSON: We are getting into pretty complicated arguments; I do not think the courts have gone that far.

The CHAIRMAN: I think we are beginning to move into some pretty complicated legalities here. What about this oath of attestation?

Mr. LAMBERT: Mr. Chairman, surely there is nothing too complicated and too legal for Parliament to discuss.

The CHAIRMAN: I should think not. I want to deal with this question of attestation and then I have questions from Mr. Byrne and Mr. MacInnis.

Brigadier LAWSON: This is the oath taken by a Canadian or other British subject:

> "I,... (full name), do swear (or for a solemn affirmation, solemnly affirm) that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Hajesty, Queen Elizabeth II, her heirs and successors according to law. So help me God."

There is a different form of oath for foreigners who take the oath, and so on.

Mr. NUGENT: The same form would be suitable for any one of our armed services.

Brigadier LAWSON: Yes, it is the same form that is used in all services.

Mr. FORRESTALL: How long has that been in use?

Brigadier LAWSON: It has been in use for as long as I can remember.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Byrne.

Mr. BYRNE: I would like to ask Brigadier Lawson, in connection with this section, if it were government policy to invoke conscription, would it be within the—

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Byrne, would you put the microphone in front of you? I would hate not to see your words recorded for posterity.

Mr. BYRNE: If it became government policy to invoke conscription would it not be within the competence of Parliament to enact such a law?

Brigadier LAWSON: Yes.

Mr. BYRNE: Is there anything inconsistent then, with—

An hon. MEMBER: I would say this is conscription.

Mr. BYRNE: I am not arguing one way or another about conscription, but I would be prepared to take a stand on it if Mr. MacInnis would care to do so.

Mr. Nugent has drawn attention again to section 24 of the National Defence Act, but he neglects at the same time to draw attention to clause 5 (2) which says:

> The units and other elements of the Royal Canadian Navy, the Canadian Army and the Royal Canadian Air Force existing at the coming into force of this Part shall, subject to the provisions of the *National Defence Act*, continue to be the units and elements of the Canadian Forces.

Having regard to this section 24, is it not true that the servicemen would be bound to remain in the service but would not be required to be employed in any of the other two elements under clause 7 of Part I.

Brigadier LAWSON: He has a choice to remain in his own element.

Mr. BYRNE: In his own element.

Brigadier LAWSON: Yes, that is what the clause tells you.

Mr. BYRNE: And it is consistent with Parliament ary prerogatives to enact such a thing.

Brigadier LAWSON: I believe so.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. MacInnis.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Mr. Chairman, the Minister has indicated to us that unification is being well received by the services. If that is the case then would the Minister have any objection to the re-attestation to allow those who wish to carry on as volunteers, to do so, and allow the others to withdraw from the services? In other words would you be prepared to—

Mr. HELLYER: The present policy, Mr. MacInnis, is that—

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): It is just a "yes" or "no" answer, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HELLYER: Mr. MacInnis, sometimes you have an ability to over-simplify important issues. At the present time the policy is not to prevent officers or men from leaving the service, on application, subject to the conditions that I stated generally yesterday, notice or fulfilling the length of an implied contract—in a term contract where some special benefit has accrued to the individual—or other exceptional cases. But the general policy is, and I have stated it many times, that in a peacetime voluntary force it is impossible to keep people in unless they want to stay in. It is my expectation that no one will stay in the new service beyond the period for which they would be obligated for special training or other benefit that they had received, unless they want to stay in.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Mr. Minister, on three occasions you have used the sword "contract". This would sort of support the legal aspect of the argument that neither Air Chief Marshal Miller or General Simonds wished to go into. But you, yourself, now have used on a short answer, the word "con-

tract" in respect to a serviceman signing up. If there is a contract there; is there not an obligation also to re-new that contract?

Mr. HELLYER: This is an understanding within an understanding, or a contract within an enrolment—

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): There is the word again.

Mr. HELLYER: —that regular officers, trainees for example, enroll with permanent commissions.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Would you explain what a regular officer trainee is?

Mr. HELLYER: Yes, these are students who are provided university training at the Department of National Defence expense. They are enrolled into the service on the basis of a permanent commission. But it is an understanding which exists between the enrolee and the department that there is an obligation for them to serve for a minimum period.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): An obligation, provided that at the end of their education they do not want to repay the government what the government invested in them.

Mr. HELLYER: That is right; they have the option of either repaying the investment or of carrying out the minumum service upon which the understanding was based.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): It is an understanding now, not a contract.

Mr. HELLYER: It is this policy which would continue, and therefore there is really nothing to prevent anyone from leaving the service if they do not wish to continue.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Then you would not mind having all the service personnel—

Mr. HELLYER: I really think it would be redundant, and I think that many of them would feel the same way that Air Chief Marshal Miller said he felt this morning when he was asked to volunteer for overseas service.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. MacInnis, the Judge Advocate General has a case bearing on this in which I think the Committee would be interested. With your permission, I will ask him to deal with this.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Mr. Chairman, I cannot see how he has a case bearing on this when the bill for unification has not passed the House yet. Any case the Judge Advocate General may bring up would not necessarily have a bearing on unification; it has not become a reality yet.

The CHAIRMAN: The case in point, Mr. MacInnis, is as to whether or not a soldier is under a contract.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Well, the Minister just said he was, three times.

The CHAIRMAN: With due respect to the Minister, I think this appeals to an even higher legal authority.

Mr. HELLYER: I would like to say, Mr. Chairman, I am surprised at Mr. MacInnis' tribute to my legal competence.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Just because the Chairman said there was a higher authority, do not get sore.

The CHAIRMAN: I will ask the Judge Advocate General to deal with this point, which I think the Committee will be interested in hearing.

Brigadier LAWSON: Mr. Chairman, just on the point as to whether enlistment is a contract, I have here a case of Cooke against the King, decided in the Exchequer Court. I am just reading the headnote which is very short:

> Held, that enlistment by a subject under the Militia Act, is in the nature of a formal transmutation of a citizen into a soldier for the time being, and as required by the defence of the realm, and does not constitute a contract between the subject and the Crown creating mutual rights and obligations.

That is the headnote of this case. There are many other cases of this nature.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): I never used the word "contract".

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Lambert.

Brigadier LAWSON: 1929 Canada Law Reports, at page 20.

Mr. LAMBERT: That was under a different act than exists today.

Brigadier LAWSON: It was a different act, but it has been held, in a subsequent case, that this principle applies under the National Defence Act as well; the National Defence Act did not change the principle.

The CHAIRMAN: Shall clause 5 carry? All in favour? Opposed? Yeas 12; nays 8.

Clause agreed to.

On clause 6—*Officers and men members of Canadian Forces.*

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Churchill, and Mr. Forrestall.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I touched on this when I was discussing clause 5. This is a crucial clause; it introduces the compulsory feature to which we have been objecting. It deals specifically with the officers and men who are members of the three well-known services. It states that they become members of the Canadian Forces on the passing of this bill.

Now, there is nothing here to indicate that a choice will be permitted to the officers and men as to whether they become members of the new force or not. Whether or not this has been sufficiently tested in law, is perhaps beside the point; I think there is a moral obligation here when you are dealing, as the Air Chief Marshal mentioned this morning, with volunteers in a democratic country, people who are accustomed to giving their services of their own free will and accord and to withdraw those services of their own free will and accord. This is the first time in our history, except for the conscription of 1917 and of 1944 that we have made any attempt to introduce into our law a compulsory feature; and despite the fact that the men in the services have entered those services voluntarily and are in the armed forces of Canada, nevertheless, a major change is envisaged by the passage of this bill. Any man who purposely enlisted in the air

force, because he chose that in preference to the other two services, now will find himself, if the bill passes, as simply a member of the armed forces, not distinct in any way from his comrades in the army or the navy, and that was not the choice he made when he entered the air force.

I think that under the circumstances we should give to officers and men an option here of either entering the forces or withdrawing, and it should be by reattestation if they are going to remain in the services. And if they decide that they do not wish to remain in the services, then I suggest that they should be permitted to withdraw under the status of an honourable discharge and with the full pension benefits to which they may be entitled at the time that they make that decision. Now there is nothing in the bill which makes provision for this. This bill contains a strict compulsory factor and simply states that men now in the services will become members of the single unified force without their leave being given.

I gave examples this morning of the experience in September 1939 and I suppose, without looking into the law, that those of us who enlisted or volunteered for service in the Canadian field force, as we did on the 1st and 2nd of September, could have been shifted into the Canadian active service force in the following days without any substantial complaint on the part of those who volunteered for service. But nevertheless, the government of that day decided that reattestation should follow, in accordance with my recollection. Of course I was with only one unit. I do not know what transpired with other units. And even after the formation of the Canadian active service force, which was designated for service in Canada, the government of the day made it optional as to whether officers and men so enrolled would volunteer to serve outside of Canada. Yet, I suppose, Parliament being supreme, that it could have passed a law saying all members of the Canadian active service force should serve anywhere in the world. But Parliament did not do that. The option was given and the basis of the whole operation was voluntary. It was not until the re-enforcement crisis of 1943 and 1944 that Parliament took that other step. Now if we are going to maintain the voluntary basis to which we have been accustomed as Canadian citizens in the course of four wars in this century, I think that we should maintain it at this particular moment, and that we should stress this point.

I do not know how many countries in the world subject their young men to compulsory service, and the day may come when Canada will have to do the same; but we have been rather proud of the fact over so many years that our forces are comprised of volunteers. I think it should stay that way until there is a change in policy or a change in public opinion.

I suggest, Mr. Chairman, that if this compulsory feature is not modified in some way, that unrest in the three services will result. This is the normal reaction of Canadians, in my experience. They do not want to be compelled to do things without their consent. It is a basic freedom. I therefore, propose submitting in respect of clause 6 two amendments, to be numbered respectively three and four, which would read as follows:

That Clause 6 be amended by adding thereto the following subclause (3):

No officer or man who was a member of the Royal Canadian Navy, the Canadian Army or the Royal Canadian Air Force immediately prior to

the coming into force of this Part shall be enrolled in the Canadian Armed Forces without his consent registered by reattestation.

and subclause (4)

Any officer or man who was a member of the Royal Canadian Navy, the Canadian Army or the Royal Canadian Air Force immediately prior to the coming into force of this Part who does not enrol in the Canadian Armed Forces, shall receive an honourable discharge and the full pension benefits to which he may be entitled.

I am not certain, sir, of the actual phraseology from a legal draftsman's point of view but the substance of my amendments I think will be obvious to the committee. The first amendment says: get the officer's or man's consent and, secondly, if his consent is not forthcoming, give him an honourable discharge and his full pension benefits.

Mr. McINTOSH: May I ask a question on clause 6 of the minister or the Judge Advocate General?

The CHAIRMAN: I wonder if you would wait a moment, Mr. McIntosh, until we deal with the amendment moved by Mr. Churchill. The question arises regarding the admissibility of these two amendments. All I can say about it is that whatever the legality of the two amendments may be, I do not think it is very difficult for any member, at some point in the introduction of the bill, to introduce two such amendments. The questions of whether or not they fit exactly into Clause 6 and should be numbered 3 and 4 of Clause 6 is certainly not ones I am going to dispute. It is as good a place as any in the bill to take up the points at hand. So, using these as a rough guide, I would be quite prepared, as your Chairman, to say that these are valid amendments, and that we will deal with them, as amendments to Clause 6. We will deal with them properly, and I will hear those who wish to speak on them.

Mr. LAMBERT: On a point of order, the amendments used the phrase "Canadian Armed Forces". The bill has disarmed them and they are known as the Canadian Forces. So I think Mr. Churchill would accept that his amendment should refer only to the Canadian Forces because that is the legal terminology of the act.

The CHAIRMAN: Is that acceptable to you, Mr. Churchill?

Mr. CHURCHILL: Yes.

The CHAIRMAN: Will those who wish to speak on the amendment please raise their hands. Just before doing so, I think there was a question which Mr. McIntosh wanted to put for clarification to the minister. Is that correct?

Mr. McINTOSH: That is right.

The CHAIRMAN: While that is going on, will you please raise your hands in connection with the amendments.

Mr. McINTOSH: Clause (2) states:

(2) Every officer who immediately prior to the coming into force of this Part held a commission in the Royal Canadian Navy, the Canadian Army or the Royal Canadian Air Force . . . .

And everyone who held that commission—in my case it was the army—received

a scroll which said you had a commission in the army, not in the navy or the air force. In other cases, if they joined a different service, it would be different. I imagine it would say that you hold a commission in the air force or a commission in the navy. What is going to happen once this bill is passed? Will everybody get a new scroll or a new commission?

Mr. HELLYER: I think not, Mr. Chairman. There are precedents for this, and there have been previous changes in the name of services. So you will find that there are already officers or probably are officers in the services today who have commissions that do not read in this way but are still deemed to be commissions in the Royal Canadian Navy, the Canadian Army and the Royal Canadian Air Force.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I am asking about the one that reads this way, and a lot of them still have them.

Mr. HELLYER: I am not sure I should answer this question off the cuff, but I do not think there is any intention to provide new commissions.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Well what happens to an officer on the reserve list who holds a commission in the army?

Mr. HELLYER: Just remain exactly the same as it is and he would, by the terms of this bill, hold a commission in the Canadian armed forces.

Brigadier LAWSON: Perhaps I might add that as a matter of law there would be no need to issue another commission because the section of the act takes care of that. But, as a matter of policy, it might be desirable.

The CHAIRMAN: On the amendment of Mr. Churchill: Mr. Forrestall, Mr. Nugent and Mr. Winch in that order.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Mr. Chairman, I will at a later date, anticipating what will happen to that amendment, myself move an amendment to this clause that embodies much of the essence of Mr. Churchill's amendment but goes a little bit further. I would like, if I might for a moment or two, speak to the validity of the points being made by Mr. Churchill's amendments. It seems to me—and again this may be a bit repetitious but nevertheless important enough to again just go back over it and review it—that what is happening is the transferral without consent. If there is any one issue in the minds of at least those who serve in the Royal Canadian Navy that gives rise to their greatest concern it has got to be this issue. It has to be the substance and the end product and the end result to them and their careers—the very forceful impact of this section on their own free will. There are two or three things essentially that find disfavour among serving officers, at least in the navy, with this particular section. These have been pointed out and I will point them out again.

The first, as I mentioned, is the lack of an option or a choice. Indeed, not every officer would choose to opt out and take his pension. I do not even think the majority of them would, but there are a large number of them who are very seriously concerned with it. I think they might find themselves in the positions of desiring to take whatever course is necessary in any event. At least I think we have a moral obligation to consider the proper course for them to follow if they do not wish to serve. The amendment of Mr. Churchill meets that in a very substantial way.

I think, secondly, Mr. Chairman, that this section of the act negates any recourse or assurance, as does indeed the rest of the act, as to the position these men are in with regard to their pensions, which are wholly contributory, and notwithstanding the actuarial comments we have had on the application of pensions, we have already had pointed out to us by Admiral Landymore the gross injustice that could occur. Again, I say the men are very vitally concerned about what would happen to the funds they had paid in, particularly those officers and men who have been in for 10, 12 or 14 years, and those who have been in longer than that are pretty much prisoners now of their pension position. In other words, it is a lot easier to sweat it out than it is to take the substantial loss that would accrue by early retirement. However, those that have been in for 10 or 12 years have by any actuarial account paid in enough to warrant a full pension based upon that contribution. The very obvious lack of any reference to this in either this clause or any other clause of the bill, again, I say, is the second reason why there is grave concern. The third reason—and this is a little bit more intangible on the part of serving officers and men—is this. Many of the men might accept the concepts and principles embodied in this clause if, indeed, the minister could find in his heart a way, instead of simply telling them that, despite the passage of the act, it will be some years before it is fully implemented. If the minister could find some way of spelling that out by simply saying that notwithstanding, for example, the passage of this act or anything in it, or even after Royal Assent or whatever the proper phraseology is, the full intent of the act in any event would not come into effect for a period of five years.

These three things alone would do much to alleviate, perhaps, the greatest area of concern of those who have seen fit to raise this whole matter of unification with myself. They are not the only areas of concern but they certainly are among the gravest. Two of these points I raised, I think, extend Mr. Churchill's amendment. I would perhaps not at this stage but in any event in the House, serve notice that I intend to introduce an amendment that goes substantially further.

I would just like to say one thing, in closing, on this particular clause. If there are those in the committee who are convinced that serving officers and men in the three armed services are in support of this measure, I would invite them to put themselves out a little bit, find an opportunity to garner the trust of some of these men and find out what it is they are really thinking. The RCN have some 17,000 to 18,000 men. I will repeat again that I have in my possession well over 4,000 personnally written letters to me about this bill. Whether the bill is right or wrong, these men are concerned; whether it is in their best interest, they are concerned; whether it is in the best interest of the country in the long run, they are concerned. I suggest that to be misled to be totally and morally convinced of the full rightness of the bill, in terms of the obligation we have to the men who comprise the services, is to do not only them an injustice but to do the work of this committee an injustice. They are concerned. They will not say this to their superior officers who come and visit them, to the ministers and the ministerial assistants. It is not natural. It would not be natural for them to say: Well, this is a mess you have here; are you going to change it? Indeed, it is unlawful. I understand it is unlawful for these serving officers and men to speak to us. I think there were some threats of courts martial about it and this type of thing. It in nonsense. These men are very, very vitally concerned.

A different approach to the substance of clause 6 of this particular bill, I think, might have resulted in a vastly different atmosphere at this particular time. I would urge all of those, in considering the amendment made by Mr. Churchill, to give some weight to the fact that these men are concerned. Their livelihood, their whole careers, their entire professional lives are at stake for most of them. They are going to have to move out of the services, and many of them will, into fields of endeavour that are unnatural to them and in which they will not be satisfied, as they were in the service of Canada. I would just ask you to give very serious consideration to that because it is a fact. The letters were not all marked personal and confidential; many of them were unsigned. It would be a pure delight for me to present them to the minister, so he could see. They are all unsolicited on my part. I never called a serving officer or a man and asked him what his opinion about this bill was. Every comment that has ever come to me has come voluntarily, and that includes Admiral Landymore, Admiral Brock and all the other Chester Club, as you see fit to joke about them. None have ever had information solicited from them. It has come from men who never, in their whole careers, would ever even think of talking to a politician. This alone is evidence of concern in the embodiment to be found in clause 6.

Mr. NUGENT: Mr. Chairman, I will try not be too lengthy but I do feel a very important point has been raised by this amendment. I am not at all satisfied yet—or at least not as satisfied as the brigadier is, that this is a case where Parliament has the right to do it or that it is constitutionally valid. However, I think that we should take very seriously into account Mr. Churchill's remarks when he introduced his amendment, and if we are satisfied Parliament has the authority, remember it is bound on a very thin technical line and that the courst have held enlistement is not a contract between the government and the enlisted men, although we always think of it as such and I am sure would want to treat it as such. If we are going to rely on a very narrow legal definition then we are not going to feel very comfortable about it—unless we really have to, and I cannot see any reason why we have to. It boils down to this: if we do have the power should we exercise it? Certainly I think we should all pause before we decide that we have the power, which automatically makes it our right to use it. Certainly there is a vast difference between having the power and having the moral right to use it. I am concerned, in this day and age when there is so much concern about civil rights within the provinces, that if the appearance of this is such that we are dealing with the serviceman who, to all intents and purposes, has a contract, who is a volunteer serviceman in a peacetime force in this democratic country, who has made his contract with the government and he is the only person employed by the government of Canada who is being so treated, that his rights of contact are being taken away by this act is a way that nobody else's right of contract in this country is interfered with. It certainly looks like it is, in essence, an interference with civil rights and would be regarded, I think, by most of those people who cherish and who are most protective of the civil rights of the provinces, as an unnecessary interference. You will remember the brigadier said the court will hold the federal government does have the right to trespass even in the civil rights field, if necessary or when they have to. I do not think there is any necessity for it here. In fact, I will put it this way: Why not give them the chance to re-enrol?

We have heard the minister, General Allard and some others on his staff, assure us that the servicemen are enthusiastic about this, that the only lowering of morale has been the uncertainty, that really it gives them all these benefits of wider scope for advancement and all the rest. In fact, every word, the minister has said about the benefits this will give to the serviceman should be a reassurance to members of this committee, if they believe the minister, that of course we should give them a chance to re-enlist because as a matter of courtesy it will make them happier and it will not disrupt the services because there will be so many of them. If you want to vote against it, I would suggest that you are suggesting perhaps you believe some of the other evidence by Admiral Landymore and some of the rest, that the serviceman are very much against this. By registering your vote against giving them a chance to re-enlist you are showing your faith in those other witnesses and lack of confidence in the minister. Again, I cannot see how it can be otherwise. While we have discussed this many times, and witnesses have talked about it, no one has brought up any reason why they should not be given the chance to re-enlist, and I certainly hope we will hear the minister or someone on his behalf suggest why it cannot be done. Mr. Churchill has pointed out that it was done in wartime, in a state of national emergency and so on. These people who are going to stay in the armed forces, I am certain, are going to be a lot happier and work a lot more effectively for us if they are assured we have treated them right. I cannot see how they are going to have that assurance if we refuse them this, what I think would be no more than a courtesy, and what I really feel is an absolute right.

On the second part of the amendment, the pension rights, I think the amendment perhaps does not quite go far enough. If the changed circumstances of the contract of enlistment have been brought about by the government, when a man has gone that far in his career that it is most difficult to adjust—it is not so bad if he has only served two or three years and he is young and can get out—when he has spent 10 or 15 years in the forces and he is then in the position, as the example Admiral Landymore gave, where early retirement is going to be a very severe penalty on his pension then, obviously, Mr. Churchill's amendment is not adequate. We should go a little further. We should soften the effects of the penalties on pensions by prior retirement; or else, perhaps, if there are going to be a lot of them, bring in some of the advantages that we gave to people who retired from the army at the end of the war, such as re-training schemes, university, and so on, so that if they have to take the option, if they cannot live with it, if they have to change their career plans in the middle, that we have done something adequate for them. I do feel, whether you agree with my legal arguments, whether you feel that there is nothing in the argument on civil rights, and even if you are not convinced, just because we have the power, that you should not have to look at the question of whether to exercise it, certainly you must feel that there can be no harm done in making sure these people will be happier in the service by the assurance that parliament has bent over backwards, if you feel it is bending over backwards, to give them a chance to be treated in this manner.

Mr. WINCH: Mr. Chairman, I think I could support the general intent of the amendments which are before us, but in balance, I am afraid that I could not give my vote in favour of the amendment in the manner in which it is now worded. I mean, good wishful thinking is all right but all of us, as members of

this Committee, have to be practical and most certainly we have to be responsible. We have approximately 104,000 in our armed forces. Canada, whether we agree with them or not, has a number of commitments. We have our armed services, not only across Canada, but in various parts of the world, and in my estimation, on the present wording—as I said, I thought the intent was good—it is not very difficult to visualize that if the amendment, as presently worded, was carried, within hours or days of proclamation you could have the entire armed services of this country completely disorganized and disorganized to a point of—

Mr. BYRNE: It is irresponsible.

Mr. WINCH: Where we would not be able to keep our commitments or, perhaps, even be able to support those overseas. For us to allow a condition where that could come about, in my estimation, would be completely irresponsible. If the principle, the intent of this is to be carried through, I do believe there would have to be the addition of words in order to enable any necessary re-organization or re-adjustment to take place in order to be able to carry on the intent and the purport of the armed services of Canada.

What I am trying to say is that I do not think it would be responsible to say that there can be a cut-off immediately if you are not prepared to sign a new attestation. There would have to be a transitional period, if you like, there would have to be a time, period—perhaps six months. I just use the term six months because I believe that the statement was made by the Minister the other day that, on re-enlistment, in a period of six months or on six months' notice they could get out. I believe, without saying much more, you can see the point I am trying to make because, as it is now, I am afraid it would be far too dangerous and irresponsible and I could not support it. If this other was included, so that there would not be the complete disruption of our armed services and its commitments—a period or six months or something like that, it would place it, as far as I am concerned, in a different light. That is the only point, Mr. Chairman, that I wanted to raise because I do feel it is of vital importance.

Mr. NUGENT: Will you concede, Mr. Winch, that the only way there could be a complete disruption is that this is so unsatisfactory that wholesale numbers would be getting out of our armed forces?

Mr. WINCH: I have not a crystal ball in front of me and I do not know whether there would be a dozen men or whether there would be 12,000, but I do not think, in legislation, that we can take a chance with this situation. I believe they should have the right of re-attestation but I do not believe that we should bring it in in a manner which could conceivably entirely disrupt the armed services organization.

Mr. MACINNIS: Mr. Chairman, I speak in support of this amendment because the amendment provides the serviceman with what he is entitled to in this free democratic country. This was very much emphasized by Air Chief Marshal Miller yesterday and by General Simonds. I can understand the argument that Mr. Winch has used and his fear of chaos erupting in the armed services should the servicemen be given the opportunity to sign up again or, if not, go back to civvy street, but his argument only supports the contention that neither Mr. Winch, and I might point here, Mr. Byrne, since he interjected the word "irresponsible"—that Mr. Winch nor Mr. Byrne believe what the Minister has been saying about the effects of unification. If Mr. Byrne is convinced that his

minister is right, he should be among the first to stand up and say, yes, because this is going to make the serviceman happier; he should be given the permission to say so himself, and re-attestation should take place. But, no, Mr. Byrne said it would be irresponsible to give the man the choice; therefore, this is a clear cut indication that Mr. Byrne does not believe and cannot accept what his own minister has been driving down the throat of his supporters in this Committee. I might say here right now, Mr. Minister, I do not think it is at all fair that officials of your department should be feeding questions to the members on the Committee.

Mr. MACALUSO: Ah, well—

Mr. MACINNIS: Mr. Macaluso, you say "ah, well—"; you might find it a little more difficult if you had to dig up all your own.

Mr. MACALUSO: On a point of order, Mr. Chairman, I am completely fed up with these asinine statements by the members opposite with respect to questions coming from the minister's staff. I can very well take care of myself; I would be most happy to do so. Mr. Chairman, if the members opposite cannot spend the time to do proper research that is not my fault.

The CHAIRMAN: Order. Mr. MacInnis, would you go on please.

Mr. MACINNIS: Well it is very obvious that Mr. Macaluso could defend himself but all members of the Committee could not.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. MacInnis, there is an old chinese proverb that says, "Softly, softly, catchee monkey". I do urge you.

Mr. MACINNIS: Mr. Chairman, at the risk of being accused of oversimplifying matters, this amendment grants the serviceman his rights, only what he is entitled to. I would say a vote for it is what every member of this Committee should register. A vote against it, and I would point this out quite clearly, and I will point it out elsewhere—a vote against the opportunity to re-attest themselves would be a vote for nothing less than conscription—nothing less than conscription, because this is an arbitrary action; and it is nothing short of conscription if these men are not given the opportunity to designate their choice. Just keep that in mind when you vote.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, shall the amendment of Mr. Churchill carry? All in favour? Opposed, if any? Yeas 6; nays 14.

I declare the amendment lost.

Now there is a small amendment to clause 6 which is dependent or consequent upon clause 4 which we have already carried.

I will call the small amendment:

Army or Royal Canadian Air Force, set out in column 2, 3 or 4, etc.

Shall the amendment carry?

Amendment agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN: Shall the clause, as amended, carry?

Some hon. MEMBERS: No.

The CHAIRMAN: All in favour? Opposed, if any? Yeas 14; Nays 6.

Clause, as amended, agreed to.

On clause 7—*Restriction on employment.*

Mr. CHURCHILL: Mr. Lambert, I think, drew attention to this clause in one of our earlier meetings, and he suggested that the regulation with regard to this be recorded in the Committee's hearings. Is that available now? How is this to be determined and in what form will it be put in front of the officers and men? Is there a regulation drafted to that effect already?

The CHAIRMAN: Brigadier Lawson says that the regulation was read before to the Committee, Mr. Churchill. Do you wish that regulation read again?

Mr. CHURCHILL: It would fit in now.

The CHAIRMAN: Very well. Can you produce the regulation at this time, Brigadier Lawson?

Brigadier LAWSON: I have it here.

The CHAIRMAN: Would you go ahead, please?

Brigadier LAWSON: The regulation I have suggested would read as follows:

"For the purposes of this article,

(1) (a) "crew" means officers and men serving in a ship or employed in the operation of an aircraft, but does not include officers and men taking passage in a ship or aircraft; and

(b) "land force" means a unit or other element whose normal role is combat, or training for combat, on the ground.

(2) Except in an emergency and subject to paragraph (3),

(a) no officer or man who immediately prior to the coming into force of Part I of the Canadian Forces Reorganization Act was enrolled in, or had been transferred to, the Royal Canadian Navy shall without his consent be required to serve as a member of a crew; and in a land force;

(b) no officer or man who immediately prior to the coming into force of Part I of the Canadian Forces Reorganization Act was enrolled in, or had been transferred to, the Canadian Army shall without his consent be required to serve as a member of a crew; and

(c) no officer or man who immediately prior to the coming into force of Part I of the Canadian Forces Reorganization Act was enrolled in, or had been transferred to, the Royal Canadian Air Force shall without his consent be required to serve as a member of the crew of a ship or in a land force.

(3) Where an officer or man mentioned in subparagraph (a) or (b) of paragraph (2) was, at any time prior to the coming into force of Part I of the Canadian Forces Reorganization Act, employed in the operation of aircraft of the Royal Canadian Navy or the Canadian Army, or under training to be so employed, his consent to serve as a member of the crew of an aircraft is not required.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I would like to know this for clarification. Is the intent of that regulation that no man will be required to perform combat duty other than that for which he has already enlisted, but that people in the support services may be shifted about in the support and administrative services without their consent?

Brigadier LAWSON: Mr. Churchill, it is partially that, but not fully, of course, because it provides, for example, that no man who joined the army can be required to serve as a member of a crew of a ship, in any part of the ship. Of course, there are many administrative duties on a ship, so that there are exceptions; but basically this is so, that administrative people could be moved, but fighting people could not.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. MacInnis, you are next.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): I would ask the Brigadier in what category he would place the jump-master with an airborne infantry battalion, or a paratroop battalion?

Brigadier LAWSON: He would be a part of the land force, I suppose.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Would he not also have responsibility for the jumpers under his command?

Brigadier LAWSON: Yes; but remember the definition of "crew":

> "crew" means officers and men serving in a ship or employed in the operation of an aircraft—

Now, the jump-master is not employed in the operation of an aircraft, as such. This is normal army employment, and this would be his duty.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): But while he is in that aircraft, is he not still responsible for the men under his command?

Brigadier LAWSON: Oh, yes. But he is not part of the crew. They are passengers in the aircraft. The paratroops and the jump-master are passengers in the aircraft. They are not part of the crew of the aircraft.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Forrestall, you may proceed.

Mr. FORRESTALL: One question has come to my mind, and it is peculiar that it has not been thought of before—and this might not be the place to ask it—but when people join the new force what will happen? Will they be asked whether they want to serve in a sea, land or air environment, or if they would like to serve in an administrative capacity? How do we get someone in position, whether he is crew or not? Does he have any choice about that?

Brigadier LAWSON: This regulation, of course, applies only to people who were in the force when the bill comes into effect.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Then when you join afterwards can you do anything?

Brigadier LAWSON: This does not apply to people who join afterwards.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Well, we have to do something about them.

The CHAIRMAN: Shall clause 7 carry?

Some hon. MEMBERS: No.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Could we not have some explanation of this?

Mr. BREWIN: I would like to have a bit more explanation about it. Would there not be—

The CHAIRMAN: Order, please. Mr. Forrestall's time is not up yet. I am sorry if we moved too fast.

Mr. FORRESTALL: I would like to know what happens to the people who join after this comes into effect.

The CHAIRMAN: I think this is an area of questioning for the Minister, Mr. Forrestall.

Mr. HELLYER: This is a matter of policy that I think we went into on one previous occasion, Mr. Forrestall. It would be very similar to the policy now in effect, that a man would, in fact, have a choice on entering the service. He might be given aptitude tests in the process of enrolment, which would indicate where he could best serve; but, again, in a voluntary force of the kind that we operate you just cannot force a man to engage, and continue, in employment that does not meet his wishes.

Therefore, as is the present case in the air force, for example, if a man is enrolled in air crew and washes out he is given the option of remustering or mustering out. This, in effect is the way that the force will operate, in principle, regardless of any detail that—

Mr. FORRESTALL: Once he has settled on becoming a very competent combat man, is there anything in the act to prevent his being summarily shot off to a ship, or—

Mr. HELLEYER: It would not make any sense, would it, because the first time he came up—

Mr. FORRESTALL: It would not make any sense, but you have seen fit to protect the people serving presently from having this happen to them. What about later on?

Mr. HELLYER: Yes; but it has not happened with the present law, and it would not make any more sense to have it happen then than it does now.

Mr. FORRESTALL: A lot of things happen that do not make sense. You do not think that it is necessary to include in the act any protection that level either?

Mr. HELLYER: No, I do not think so, because this would be a term of enrolment; but certainly if the man was employed in a manner which was not suitable to him he would take advantage of the administrative procedures available to him and take his release.

Mr. FORRESTALL: Mr. Brewin, I am finished.

Mr. BREWIN: I think my question is probably for the Minister, because it does not relate to the legal aspect of this.

Would it not be an extraordinary proposition to have mixed up in a single unit—a section or a platoon—50 per cent of people who had enlisted afterwards and had to go ahead and do what they were required to do, as covered by this clause and 50 per cent who, because they had enlisted before and had stayed on were not required to, and could say: "Well, this is an emergency. You take half the platoon."

Mr. HELLYER: Can you think of a real situation where that would apply, Mr. Brewin?

Mr. BREWIN: No; I think the whole thing is unreal. I think the whole clause is very unreal. I would have thought that if you were going to require them to serve all in one service, whether in an emergency or otherwise—and I agree with

you—common sense would dictate that you would not take them out of the environment they were trained in; but I would have thought that once they were in this sort of clause would have no meaning whatever.

Mr. HELLYER: The regulation based on this clause is to ensure that people who are presently in the forces, including the support personnel that we were talking about, would not be required to serve in an environment which was completely foreign to the service in which they had enlisted.

Mr. BREWIN: I know; but as I understand it you are going to have a new unified service in the future, and you have told us that if they do not like this they can opt out of it by giving proper notice. I would have thought that once they were in the service, then it was no question of an emergency or otherwise; they were all in the same box and they would all comply with the same rules and regulations. To have half a platoon required to do a duty and the other half not seems to me a chaotic situation.

Mr. HELLYER: But this situation you have just described is not a real situation.

Mr. BREWIN: Well, then, the whole situation contemplated by the clause is not a real situation either.

Mr. HELLYER: I disagree.

Mr. BREWIN: Well, all right.

Mr. HELLYER: There is a distinction in this respect, that whereas there will be protection for those now in the service, say a person involved in the supply or logistics end, who is now restricted by his service to a particular environment, would be expected to serve in any environment on enrolling in the service after proclamation. Now, this—and I have to keep coming back to this—does not mean that you are going to interchange combat elements, but it does mean that if a person is trained as a supply individual, or in many of the other trades which are common, and were required to serve in different environments he would be expected to do so.

Mr. BREWIN: Your explanation leads me to the conclusion that clause 7 is window-dressing.

Mr. HELLYER: No; this is a real protection, in the way that it will be applied, for those presently in the service.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Clause 7 says:

Except in an emergency—

and an emergency means war, invasion, riot and insurrection real or apprehended. Now, would this apply in a peacekeeping or a peace-restoring role? Would that be covered by war, invasion, riot or insurrection?

Brigadier LAWSON: Not normally, no.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Not normally?

Brigadier LAWSON: Certainly not in a peacekeeping role.

Mr. MCINTOSH: In a peace-restoring role?

Brigadier LAWSON: Well, that is war.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Mr. Chairman, I want to go back to the question put by Mr. Forrestall about new recruits coming into the Canadian Force.

It has been indicated that they would be given an aptitude test, but that is not to say that on an aptitude test an electronics engineer would not end up as a cook.

On enlisting in the Canadian Forces—we all know this and have seen examples of it—a young man may want to become a pilot, another young man may want to follow the sea environment and another young man may just want to be in the service. What procedure is going to be followed to ensure that persons trying to enlist for the first time will have the opportunity to follow a sea, air or ground environment?

Mr. HELLYER: Mr. MacInnis, if he wants to be a sailor, he can be a sailor; if he wants to be a soldier, he can be a soldier; and if he wants to be an airman, he can be an airman; provided he has the qualifications for it. If he has not, then he has the two options that I mentioned before, of remustering or mustering out.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Remustering or mustering out? The man has not signed up yet. I am taking about someone walking into the recruiting office.

Mr. HELLYER: He may have actually been enrolled, but this—

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): I am talking about a young man walking off the street into a recruiting office. Is there any administration set up whereby this man has the choice of following any of the three environments?

Mr. HELLYER: Absolutely.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): This is another reason why your unification bill is just a lot of hog wash.

Mr. HELLYER: But I am sure you will vote for it.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): The hell I will.

Mr. NUGENT: Mr. Chairman, I wonder if the Minister would reconsider amendment number 6 that was just defeated? We might have another chance in the House. Is it not more simple? Number 7, as Mr. Brewin says, seems to be mere window-dressing, because we cannot see that there is much protection. All that is necessary is the amendment to number 6, to permit re-enlistment, and then you do not have any mix-up of new men and old men, where some can act one way and some another. Number 7 is quite ridiculous, and the other way is so simple. I hope that they will reconsider this before we get into the House.

Mr. HELLYER: Mr. Nugent, the operative difference is that you were asking that everyone presently in the armed forces be asked to opt in; whereas the policy in effect will be that all members of the armed forces will be in unless they opt out. This is the difference.

Mr. NUGENT: You mean they are in until they cannot get out?

Mr. HELLYER: No; unless they opt out.

The CHAIRMAN: Shall clause 7 carry?

Clause 7 agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, it is after 6 o'clock and we will meet again at 8 o'clock.

The meeting is adjourned.

HOUSE OF COMMONS

First Session—Twenty-seventh Parliament
1966-67

STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. GRANT DEACHMAN

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 37

TUESDAY, MARCH 21, 1967

(Evening Meeting)

Respecting

Bill C-243, An Act to amend the National Defence Act and other Acts in consequence thereof.

INCLUDING FIFTH AND SIXTH REPORTS TO THE HOUSE

WITNESSES:

The Honourable Paul Hellyer, Minister of National Defence; and Brigadier W. J. Lawson, Judge Advocate General

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY
OTTAWA, 1967

26047—1

STANDING COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. Grant Deachman

Vice-Chairman: Hon. Marcel Lambert

Mr. Brewin,
Mr. Byrne,
Mr. Churchill,
Mr. Crossman,
Mr. Ethier,
Mr. Forrestall,
Mr. Foy,
Mr. Hopkins,
Mr. Latulippe,
Mr. Legault,
Mr. Lessard,
Mr. Loiselle,
Mr. Macaluso,
Mr. MacInnis (*Cape Breton South*),
Mr. MacRae,
Mr. McIntosh,
Mr. McNulty,
Mr. Nugent,
Mr. Rochon,
Mr. Smith,
Mr. Stafford,
Mr. Winch—(24).

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

REPORT TO THE HOUSE

WEDNESDAY, March 22, 1967.

The Standing Committee on National Defence has the honour to present its

FIFTH REPORT

Pursuant to its Order of Reference of Thursday, February 2, 1967, your Committee has considered Bill C-243, An Act to amend the National Defence Act and other Acts in consequence thereof.

Your Committee held 55 meetings from February 7, 1967 to March 21, 1967, and heard the following witnesses (listed in order of appearance before the Committee):

The Honourable Paul Hellyer, Minister of National Defence

Air Marshal F. R. Sharp, Vice Chief of the Defence Staff

Air Marshal E. M. Reno, Chief of Personnel

Major-General M .R. Dare, Deputy Chief Reserves

Brigadier W. J. Lawson, Judge Advocate General

Mr. Robert H. Hilborn, President, Tri-Service Identities Organization

Mr. Robert I. Hendy, Vice-President, Tri-Service Identities Organization

Mr. George Penfold, Secretary-Treasurer, Tri-Service Identities Organization

Mr. Robert I. Hendy, Chairman of the Committee on the Maritime Component of the Canadian Defence Forces

Mr. Robert G. Bundy, President of The Naval Officers' Associations of Canada

Mr. R. C. G. Wilson, President, Ontario Division of the Navy League of Canada

Mr. J. E. Koyl, Vice-President, Ontario Division of the Navy League of Canada

Mr. Richard Gaunt, Executive Committee, Navy League of Canada, Montreal Branch, RCN(R)

Mr. Frank C. Manchee, President, Toronto Branch, The Naval Officers' Associations of Canada

Rear-Admiral Jeffry V. Brock

Rear-Admiral C. J. Dillon

Rear-Admiral W. M. Landymore

General Charles Foulkes

26047—1½

Mr. K. R. Patrick
Lieutenant-General R. W. Moncel
Air Marshal Clare L. Annis
Air Vice-Marshal M. M. Hendrick
Lieutenant-General F. J. Fleury
General J. V. Allard, Chief of the Defence Staff
Vice-Admiral H. S. Rayner
Air Marshal W. A. Curtis
Lieutenant-General Guy G. Simonds
Air Chief Marshal F. R. Miller

Your Committee has agreed by majority vote to report the said Bill, with amendments.

Your Committee has ordered a reprint of Bill C-243 embodying the amendments adopted by the Committee.

A further report, setting forth the above-mentioned amendments to Bill C-243, is being prepared and will be presented.

A copy of the Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence relating to Bill C-243 (*Issues Nos. 14 to 37*) will also be tabled.

Respectfully submitted,

GRANT DEACHMAN,
Chairman.

REPORT TO THE HOUSE

MONDAY, April 3, 1967

The Standing Committee on National Defence has the honour to present its

SIXTH REPORT

In its Fifth Report to the House, presented March 22, 1967, your Committee reported Bill C-243, An Act to amend the National Defence Act and other Acts in consequence thereof, with amendments.

Your Committee now reports the amendments to Bill C-243 as follows:

Clause 2

Strike out line 13 on page 2 and substitute therefor the following:

"Canada under the United Nations Charter, the North Atlantic Treaty or any other similar instrument".

Clause 4

Strike out clause 4 on page 3 and substitute therefor the following:

4. Section 22 of the said Act is repealed and the following substituted therefor:

"22. (1) For the purposes of this Act, the ranks of the officers and men of the Canadian Forces shall be as set out in Column I of the Schedule.

(2) The Governor in Council may make regulations prescribing the circumstances in which a person holding a rank set out in Column I of the Schedule shall use, or be referred to by, a designation of rank set out in Column II, III or IV of the Schedule opposite the rank held by him."

Clause 5

Strike out sub-clause (1) of clause 5 on page 3 and substitute therefor the following:

"5. (1) The Services known before the coming into force of this Part as the Royal Canadian Navy, the Canadian Army and the Royal Canadian Air Force are embodied in the Canadian Forces."

Clause 6

(a) Strike out lines 20 and 21 on page 4 and substitute therefor the following:

"Army or Royal Canadian Air Force set out in Column II, III or IV respectively of Schedule A shall, on the coming into force of"

(b) Strike out "Column IV" in line 23 on page 4 and substitute therefor "Column I".

Clause 8

Strike out sub-clause (8) of clause 8 on pages 5 and 6 and substitute therefor the following:

(8) Section 2 of the said Act is further amended by adding thereto, immediately after paragraph (36) thereof, the following paragraph:

"(36a) "subordinate officer" means a person who holds the rank of officer cadet;"

New clauses 9, 10, 11

Insert immediately after clause 8 the following new clauses 9, 10, 11:

9. Section 6 and 6A of the said Act are repealed and the following substituted therefor:

"6. The Governor General may at any time by commission under the Great Seal appoint an Associate Minister of National Defence who shall exercise and perform such of the powers, duties and functions of the Minister as may be assigned to him by the Governor in Council."

10. Subsection (2) of section 7 of the said Act is repealed.

11. Subsection (2) of section 8 of the said Act is repealed.

Renumber

Renumber former clauses 9 to 61 in the Bill as 12 to 64.

Renumbered clause 16

Strike out the renumbered clause 16 on page 7 and substitute therefor the following:

16. Section 28 of the said Act is repealed and the following substituted therefor:

"28. An officer or man may be attached or seconded to another component of the Canadian Forces or to any department or agency of government, any public or private institution, private industry or any other body in such manner and under such conditions as are prescribed in any other Act or in regulations, but no officer or man of the reserve force who is not serving on active service shall without his consent be attached or seconded pursuant to this section".

Renumbered clause 17

Strike out lines 26, 27, 28 and 29 of the renumbered clause on page 7 and substitute therefor the following:

"(b) in consequence of any action undertaken by Canada under the United Nations Charter, the North Atlantic Treaty or any other similar instrument for collective defence that may be entered into by Canada".

Renumbered clause 24

Strike out renumbered clause 24 on page 13 and substitute therefor the following:

24. Paragraph (b) of section 80 of the said Act is repealed and the following substituted therefor:

"(b) fails to take any steps in his power to cause the apprehension of a person whom he knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, to be a deserter."

New clause 62

Insert immediately after renumbered clause 61, the following new clause 62:

"62. The said Act is further amended by adding thereto the Schedule set out in Schedule A".

Renumber

Renumber clauses 62 to 64 (which were originally numbered 59 to 61 as 63 to 65.

Renumbered clause 63

Strike out the word "and" at the end of paragraph (a) of the renumbered clause 63 on page 26, add the word "and" at the end of paragraph (b) and add thereto the following paragraph:

"(c) any rank set out in Column II, III or IV of Schedule A is mentioned or referred to, such mention or reference shall be construed as including a mention of or reference to the rank set out opposite that rank in Column I of Schedule A.

Schedule A

Delete Schedule A on page 28 and insert the following new Schedule A:

SCHEDULE A.

I	II	III	IV
		OFFICERS	
1. General	Admiral	General	Air Chief Marshal
2. Lieutenant-General	Vice-Admiral	Lieutenant-General	Air Marshal
3. Major-General	Rear-Admiral	Major-General	Air Vice-Marshal
4. Brigadier-General	Commodore	Brigadier	Air Commodore
5. Colonel	Captain	Colonel	Group Captain
6. Lieutenant-Colonel	Commander	Lieutenant-Colonel	Wing Commander
7. Major	Lieutenant-Commander	Major	Squadron Leader
8. Captain	Lieutenant	Captain	Flight Lieutenant
9. Lieutenant	Sub-Lieutenant Commissioned Officer	Lieutenant	Flying Officer
10. Second Lieutenant	Acting Sub-Lieutenant	2nd Lieutenant	Pilot Officer
11. Officer Cadet	Midshipman Naval Cadet	Provisional 2nd Lieutenant Officer Cadet	Officer Cadet
		MEN	
12. Chief Warrant Officer	Chief Petty Officer, 1st Class	Warrant Officer, Class 1	Warrant Officer, Class 1
13. Master Warrant Officer	Chief Petty Officer, 2nd Class	Warrant Officer, Class 2	Warrant Officer, Class 2
14. Warrant Officer	Petty Officer, 1st Class	Squadron-Quarter-master-Sergeant. Battery-Quarter-master-Sergeant. Company-Quarter-master-Sergeant. Staff Sergeant	Flight Sergeant
15. Sergeant	Petty Officer, 2nd Class	Sergeant	Sergeant
16. Corporal	Leading Seaman	Corporal Bombardier	Corporal
17. Private	Able Seaman Ordinary Seaman	Trooper Gunner Sapper Signalman Private Guardsman Fusilier Rifleman Craftsman	Aircraftman

Amended Schedule A was allowed to stand.

Schedule B

(a) Strike out section 5 on page 33 and substitute therefor the following:

5. Clause (B) of subparagraph (i) of paragraph (f) of subsection (1) of section 44 is repealed and the following substituted therefor:

(b) three thousand dollars per annum if his rank is lower than warrant officer, or five thousand dollars per annum if his rank is warrant officer or higher, and"

(b) Strike out the amendment to the Geneva Conventions Act on page 41 and substitute therefor the folowing:

"(2) A prisoner of war described in subsection (1) shall, for the purposes of the Code of Service Discipline, be deemed to be under the command of the commanding officer of such unit or other element of the Canadian Forces as may be holding him in custody."

(c) Strike out section 2 on page 44 and renumber section 3 as section 2.

A copy of the Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence relating to Bill C-243 (*Issues Nos. 14 to 37 inclusive*) is appended.

Respectfully submitted,

GRANT DEACHMAN,
Chairman.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

TUESDAY, March 21, 1967
(74)

The Standing Committee on National Defence met at 8:10 p.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. Deachman, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Brewin, Byrne, Churchill, Crossman, Deachman, Ethier, Forrestall, Foy, Hopkins, Lambert, Legault, Lessard, Loiselle, Macaluso, MacInnis (Cape Breton South), MacRae, McIntosh, McNulty, Nugent, Rochon, Smith, Stafford and Mr. Winch (23).

In attendance: From the Department of National Defence: Honourable Paul Hellyer, Minister; Air Marshal F. R. Sharp, Vice Chief Defence Staff; Air Marshal E. M. Reno, Chief of Personnel; Brigadier W. J. Lawson, Judge Advocate General.

On Clause 8

The Chairman called the amendment to sub-clause 8 which was proposed by Mr. McNulty on March 20, 1967. The said amendment was carried, *on division:* Yeas 10; Nays 4.

The Chairman called *clause 8, as amended.* The said clause was carried, *on division:* Yeas 12; Nays 4.

On New Clause 9

The Chairman called *new clause 9* which was proposed by Mr. McNulty on March 20, 1967. The said clause was carried, *on division:* Yeas 12; Nays 5.

On New Clause 10

The Chairman called *new clause 10* which was proposed by Mr. McNulty on March 20, 1967. The said clause was carried, *on division:* Yeas 12; Nays 5.

On New Clause 11

The Chairman called *new clause 11* which was proposed by Mr. McNulty on March 20, 1967.—The said clause was carried, *on division:* Yeas 12; Nays 4.

On Renumbered Clause 14 (formerly Clause 11)

The Chairman called *renumbered clause 14* which was carried, *on division:* Yeas 12; Nays 4.

On Renumbered Clause 15 (formerly Clause 12)

The Chairman called *renumbered clause 15* which was carried, *on division:* Yeas 12; Nays 4.

On Renumbered Clause 16 (formerly Clause 13)

The Chairman called *renumbered clause 16*, with the amendment porposed by Mr. McNulty on March 20, 1967. The said clause, as amended, was carried, *on division:* Yeas 12; Nays 5.

On Renumbered Clause 17 (formerly Clause 14)

The Chairman called the amendment to section 32(1) (b) of the National Defence Act, which was proposed by Mr. McNulty on March 20, 1967. The said amendment was carried.

The Chairman called *renumbered clause 17, as amended*, which was carried, *on division:* Yeas 13; Nays 6.

On Renumbered Clause 18 (formerly Clause 15)

The Chairman called *renumbered clause 18* which was carried, *on division:* Yeas 11; Nays 7.

On Renumbered Clause 20 (formerly Clause 17)

The Chairman called *renumbered clause 20* which was carried, *on division:* Yeas 12; Nays 7.

On Renumbered Clause 21 (formerly Clause 18)

The Chairman called *renumbered clause 21* which was carried, *on division:* Yeas 13; Nays 7.

On Renumbered Clause 22 (formerly Clause 19)

The Chairman called *renumbered clause 22* which was carried, *on division:* Yeas 13; Nays 7.

On Renumbered Clause 29 (formerly Clause 26)

The Chairman called *renumbered clause 29* which was carried, *on division:* Yeas 13; Nays 7.

On Renumbered Clause 32 (formerly Clause 29)

The Chairman called *renumbered clause 32* which was carried, *on division:* Yeas 13; Nays 7.

On Renumbered Clause 35 (formerly Clause 32)

The Chairman called *renumbered clause 35* which was carried, *on division:* Yeas 12; Nays 7.

On Renumbered Clause 36 (formerly Clause 33)

The Chairman called *renumbered clause 36* which was carried, *on division:* Yeas 12; Nays 7.

On Renumbered Clause 37 (formerly Clause 34)

The Chairman called *renumbered clause 37* which was carried, *on division:* Yeas 13; Nays 7.

On Renumbered Clause 38 (formerly Clause 35)

The Chairman called renumbered clause 38 which was carried, *on division:* Yeas 12; Nays 7.

On Renumbered Clause 39 (formerly Clause 36)

The Chairman called *renumbered clause 39* which was carried, *on division:* Yeas 12; Nays 7.

On Renumbered Clause 40 (formerly Clause 39)

The Chairman called *renumbered clause 40* which was carried, *on division:* Yeas 13; Nays 7.

On Renumbered Clause 41 (formerly Clause 38)

The Chairman called *renumbered clause 41* which was carried, *on division:* Yeas 13; Nays 7.

On renumbered Clause 48 (formerly Clause 45)

The Chairman called *renumbered clause 48* which was carried, *on division:* Yeas 14; Nays 4.

On renumbered Clause 49 (formerly Clause 46)

The Chairman called *renumbered clause 49* which was carried, *on division:* Yeas 14; Nays 7.

On Renumbered Clause 50 (formerly Clause 47)

The Chairman called *renumbered clause 50* which was carried, *on division:* Yeas 14; Nays 7.

On Renumbered Clause 52 (formerly Clause 49)

The Chairman called *renumbered clause 52* which was carried, *on division:* Yeas 14; Nays 6.

On Renumbered Clause 53 (formerly Clause 50)

The Chairman called *renumbered clause 53* which was carried, *on division:* Yeas 14; Nays 7.

On Renumbered Clause 54 (formerly Clause 51)

The Chairman called *renumbered clause 54* which was carried, *on division:* Yeas 12; Nays 4.

On Renumbered Clause 55 (formerly Clause 52)

The Chairman called *renumbered clause 55* which was carried, *on division:* Yeas 13; Nays 7.

On Renumbered Clause 56 (formerly Clause 52)

The Chairman called *renumbered clause 56* which was carried, *on division:* Yeas 14; Nays 7.

On Renumbered Clause 57 (formerly Clause 54)

The Chairman called *renumbered clause 57* which was carried, *on division:* Yeas 12; Nays 9.

On Renumbered Clause 58 (formerly Clause 55)

The Chairman called *renumbered clause 58* which was carried, *on division:* Yeas 12; Nays 9.

On New Clause 62

The Chairman called *new clause 62* which was proposed by Mr. McNulty on March 20, 1967. The said clause was carried, *on division:* Yeas 13; Nays 7.

On Renumbered Clause 63 (formerly Clause 59)

The Chairman called the amendment to *renumbered clause 63* which was proposed by Mr. McNulty March 20, 1967. The said amendment was carried, *on division:* Yeas 14; Nays 7.

The Chairman called *renumbered clause 63*, as amended, which was carried, *on division:* Yeas 13; Nays 7.

On renumbered Clause 64 (formerly Clause 60)

The Chairman called *renumbered clause 64* which was carried, *on division:* Yeas 14; Nays 7.

On Renumbered Clause 65 (formerly Clause 61)

The Chairman called *renumbered clause 65* which was carried, *on division:* Yeas 14; Nays 8.

On Schedule A (As Amended)

The Chairman called *schedule A* with amendments as proposed by Mr. McNulty on March 20, 1967. The said schedule, as amended, was carried, *on division:* Yeas 14; Nays 8.

On Schedule B (As Amended)

The Chairman called *schedule B* with amendments as proposed by Mr. McNulty on March 20, 1967. The said schedule, as amended, was carried, *on division:* Yeas 14; Nays 8.

On Clause 1

The Chairman recalled *clause 1* which was carried, *on division:* Yeas 14; Nays 8.

Title

The Chairman called the title of the Bill which was carried, *on division:* Yeas 14; Nays 8.

Bill (As Amended)

The Bill, as amended, was carried, *on division:* Yeas 12; Nays 8.

On motion of Mr. Macaluso, seconded by Mr. Loiselle,

Resolved, That Bill C-243, as amended by the Committee, be reprinted.

The question being put on the motion, it was resolved in the affirmative: Yeas 14; Nays 8.

On motion of Mr. McNulty, seconded by Mr. Foy,

Resolved,—That the Committee proceed to sit *in camera* to consider the Report to the House on *Bill C-243.*

On motion of Mr. Macaluso, seconded by Mr. Foy,

Resolved,—That the Committee report Bill C-243, as amended by the Committee, together with information concerning the number of meetings held and witnesses heard, and

—That the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure approve the form of the final Report to the House. The question being put on the motion, it was resolved in the affirmative: Yeas 12; Nays 3.

The Committee adjourned at 10:05 p.m., to the call of the Chair.

Hugh R. Stewart,
Clerk of the Committee.

EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

TUESDAY, March 21, 1967

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, order, please. I am happy to see that a quorum has just bustled in.

We rose at the end of part I. The next clause is clause 8 which appears on page 4. Clause 8 continues through to page 5, and there is an amendment to clause 8 at the foot of page 5; then it carries over on to page 6 for two lines. I will call clause 8.

The CHAIRMAN: Shall the amendment carry?

Some hon. MEMBERS: Carried.

The CHAIRMAN: Do you want these polled, or shall we carry them?

Mr. CHURCHILL: I want the privilege of voting against every clause.

The CHAIRMAN: You want to vote against every clause.

Mr. Macaluso, please do not impede the democratic process.

Shall the amendment carry? Those in favour? Those opposed?

Yeas 10; nays 4.

Shall Clause 8 as amended carry?

All in favour? Those opposed?

Yeas 12; Nays 4.

Clause 8 as amended agreed to on division.

Now, there are three clauses, 9, 10 and 11, which are amended. You have a slip of paper in your book covering those. After clause 8 you insert these, and the old clause 9 is re-numbered clause 12.

The CHAIRMAN: Shall clause 9 as amended carry? All in favour? Those opposed?

Yeas 12; Nays 5.

Shall clause 10 carry? All in favour? Opposed?

Yeas 12; Nays 5.

Shall clause 11 carry? Those in favour? Opposed?

Yeas 12; nays 4.

Clauses 9 to 11 as amended agreed to.

The Chairman: Re-numbered clause 12 has already been carried. Clause 13 has been carried.

Shall clause 14 carry. Those in favour? Opposed?

Yeas 12; Nays 5.

Clause 14 agreed to.

Shall clause 15 carry? Those in favour? Those opposed?

Yeas 12; Nays 4.

Clause 15 agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN: We are now on clause 16 on page 7.

Mr. WINCH: I would like to have an explanation of what seems to me to be the rather peculiar language in the amendment.

The CHAIRMAN: That an officer may be attached or seconded to another component...

Mr. WINCH: Yes; or to any department, or agency, or public or private institution".

Brigadier LAWSON: It has always been in the Act that way, Mr. Winch.

Mr. WINCH: Are you putting it back in again?

Brigadier LAWSON: No, we are taking out the provision that

> An officer or man may be attached or seconded to the armed forces of any state.

We are taking that out because it is in the Visiting Forces Bill which is now before the House. We do not want it duplicated.

Mr. WINCH: I see.

Mr. CHURCHILL: This clause has dropped out the reference to the services, as it used to be in the old Act. Consequently, I will vote against it.

The CHAIRMAN: Shall clause 16 as amended carry?

Clause 16 as amended agreed to on division: Yeas 12; Nays 5

On Clause 17, as amended in paragraph (b).

The CHAIRMAN: Shall Clause 17 as amended carry?

Clause 17, as amended agreed to.

Mr. WINCH: I have a question there, there may be an obvious answer, and I guess there is. It says:

> The Governor in Council may place the Canadian Forces or any component on active service anywhere in or beyond Canada at any time when it appears advisable so to do.

Does this, Brigadier, conflict in any way with what I believe is generally assumed, that the sending any Canadian troops outside of Canada requires a motion in the House of Commons?

Brigadier LAWSON: The next Clause, Mr. Winch, Clause 33.

Mr. WINCH: You do not think Section 33 should be apart. I mean, it does not say in 32 that it is consequent upon Clause 33...

Brigadier LAWSON: Whenever the Governor in Council places the forces on active service Parliament must be called. The one follows the other automatically. I do not think it will make any difference to have them in the same clause. Thirty three is still a legal requirement that Parliament be called.

Mr. WINCH: There is no possibility of clause 32 being taken alone?

Brigadier LAWSON: Oh, no. Not with Clause 33 there, and the way it is worded.

Mr. WINCH: Although it does say that they may place them on active service.

Brigadier LAWSON: Yes; the Governor in Council may place them on active service, but when they do they must call Parliament under 33 within ten days.

The CHAIRMAN: Shall clause 17 carry, including 32, 33, 34 and 35 and 36 on page 9?

Clause 17 agreed to on division: Yeas 13; Nays 6.

Clause 18 agreed to on division: Yeas 11; Nays 7.

The CHAIRMAN: Clause 19 has already been carried.

Clauses 20 to 22 inclusive agreed to on division.

The CHAIRMAN: Clause 23 has been carried. Clause 24 as amended has been carried. Clause 25 has been carried. Clause 26 was carried on division. Clauses 27 and 28 were carried.

Clause 29 agreed to on division: Yeas 13; Nays 7.

The CHAIRMAN: Clauses 30 and 31 have been carried.

Clause 32 agreed to on division: Yeas 13; Nays 7.

The CHAIRMAN: Clauses 33 and 34 have been carried.

Clauses 35 to 40 inclusive agreed to on division.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Macaluso, are you voting and eating at the same time?

Mr. LAMBERT: I want to raise a point of order. A Committee is an emanation of the House, and we know very well that that sort of thing is not carried on in the House.

Mr. MACALUSO: Mr. Chairman, I wonder if the honourable gentlemen will allow me to have my dinner?

Mr. CHURCHILL: Well, in all seriousness, this is a public meeting. It is a part of the House of Commons. We have to exercise a certain amount of decorum here, just as we do in the House.

The CHAIRMAN: Well, Mr. Churchill, I heartily concur in what you say, I certainly hope that anyone offending like that will cease to do so.

Mr. MACALUSO: Now, I have offended Mr. Churchill's sensitivities.

The CHAIRMAN: Order, order.

Clause 41 inclusive agreed to on division: Yeas 13; Nays 7.

The CHAIRMAN: Clause 42 was one of the non-contentious clauses and was carried the other day on division.

Clauses 43 and 44 were carried.

Clause 45 was stood, but has since been carried.

Clauses 46 and 47 were carried.

Clause 48 was stood.

Shall clause 48 carry?

Mr. CHURCHILL: Clause 48 is the one that we were talking about the other day, Mr. Chairman. The Minister agreed to withdraw this. I think that the

Committee, now being in a very co-operative mood, should go along with the Minister. It is an opportunity for us to show our support for him.

The CHAIRMAN: I wonder whether we could have the explanation of the Minister again and then we will vote on whether or not to retain or withdraw the clause.

Mr. HELLYER: Well, I defer to the Judge Advocate General on the reason for it.

Mr. MACINNIS: Was there not an invitation to withdraw it the other day?

Mr. HELLYER: No, not at all.

The CHAIRMAN: No, Mr. MacInnis.

Mr. HELLYER: An explanation was asked for.

Mr. MCINTOSH: You said you had no qualms about withdrawing this Clause.

Mr. HELLYER: That is what I said, and I will not contradict myself.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Mr. Chairman, I have something to say about this, unless there is some explanation that we have not heard before.

The CHAIRMAN: I think it might be a good idea to have the explanation of the Judge Advocate General on record at this point. I will call on him.

Brigadier LAWSON: The only reason for the proposed amendment, Mr. Chairman, is to relieve the Treasury Board of dealing with these rather minor matters. These arrangements that we make with the various bridge authorities for the payment of tolls normally involve a comparatively small sum of money, and it is simply a matter of relieving the Treasury Board of the necessity of dealing with them, and of allowing the Minister to deal with them instead.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I would like to ask a question with regard to this. Does this apply to areas outside of Canada?

Brigadier LAWSON: I suppose it could. I do not know of any case where it has applied. We would have to pay them. The law would not exempt us outside of Canada. If there was a toll on a bridge or a road we would have to pay it, as anybody else would.

Mr. CHURCHILL: There is another point here. I think the explanation about what had gone on in the past is satisfactory, and what is going on at the present is satisfactory; but things might happen in the future that might be unsatisfactory, and yet the Minister is being given authority to authorize payment of duties and tolls.

Now, I have read, or heard, that schemes have been put forward to give some training to Canadian forces in tropical areas, which means in the Caribbean. If that is the case, there would likely be expenditures for landing places, quays, wharfs, highways, roads, and things of that nature. This gives to the Minister the chance to make the authorization for those things, and it might be wiser for the Treasury Board to do so.

Now, as I say, this is in the future. It is to guard against the future arrangements. It concerns me because of the stories that I have heard about possible training areas in the Caribbean. That is why I would prefer that this should stay with the Treasury Board, if something like that is going to happen.

Brigadier LAWSON: Mr. Churchill, this clause could not apply outside of Canada. The parliament of Canada has no authority to say that no tolls will be charged on a road or a bridge outside of Canada. It can only deal with roads, bridges, and so on, in Canada. The clause could not possibly apply in the situation you mentioned.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Does the Minister of Public Works have the same authority?

Brigadier LAWSON: No, he does not require it. I am not sure, but I do not think he has because he does not require it. Remember, this is an old section, it has been in the act for many years. It simply provided, in the old days, that no tolls were payable by the military forces for the use of roads, bridges, and so on. We decided that this was unfair, really, so we made a provision that we could pay tolls if the Treasury Board authorized it. This was to compensate people—private corporations, and so on—who built bridges at great expense and it was only fair that we should pay some compensation to them for using the bridges. We are now taking the authority from the Treasury Board and giving it to the Minister.

Mr. SMITH: Brigadier Lawson, how does this operate in relation to publicly-owned toll roads which are starting to get—

Brigadier LAWSON: I suppose these roads would be owned by the provinces, and we would make an arrangement with the provinces, if it was thought equitable, to pay some compensation for the use of the roads.

Mr. FORRESTALL: In connection with this, do we make any compensation to the provinces in lieu of vehicle licensing, for example?

Brigadier LAWSON: No, we do not. We just pay a very small sum for the cost of the licence plates.

The CHAIRMAN: We did not finish with the question put by Mr. Forrestall.

Mr. FORRESTALL: What do we do? Do we pay a small token amount, a dollar or something, to cover the cost of the plate itself?

Mr. HELLYER: Yes, I think there is some variation, but it is something of that order.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, you will have to make up your own minds what you want to do about this clause. I will now ask that the clause carry, and if it does not carry it will be withdrawn.

Clauses 48 to 50 inclusive, agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN: Clause 51 has been carried. Shall clause 52 carry?

Clauses 52 to 58 inclusive, agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN: Clauses 59, 60 and 61 have been carried. Shall clause 62, as amended, carry?

Clause 62, as amended, agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN: Shall the amendment to clause 63, paragraph (c) carry?

Amendment to clause 63, paragraph (c) agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN: Shall 63, as amended, carry?

Clause 63, as amended, agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN: Shall clause 64 carry?

Clause 64 agreed to.

On Clause 65—*"Coming into force"*.

Mr. CHURCHILL: This clause shall come into force by proclamation of the Governor in Council. When the Chief of the Defence Staff was giving evidence I think he told us on three occasions that the act would not be proclaimed until he had given instructions to the Minister so to do. I would like to know what the situation is with regard to the proclamation of this act. Is proclamation to follow shortly after Royal assent, or is it to be delayed for three months or six months or a year, or indefinitely? Perhaps the Minister could throw some light on this most unusual circumstance—I have never heard of this before—where an official of the Crown will be the person to determine when an act is to be proclaimed.

Mr. HELLYER: Mr. Chairman, perhaps I might ask the Judge Advocate General to explain why it will take some time for the preparation of the necessary orders before the act—

An hon. MEMBER: We do not want to rush into this, you know.

Brigadier LAWSON: Mr. Churchill, for one thing it will obviously be necessary to amend the Queen's regulation very extensively before we can proclaim the act. These amendments cannot be drafted until we know the form the act is going to take. There have been a number of amendments made in this Committee that would change the regulations very materially. I think, it will take at least four months by the time we get them drafted, get them translated, have them printed and get them distributed. Remember, they must be distributed to the services before we can proclaim the act, because the officers and men must know what the regulations under the act are before the act can be proclaimed. I would think this would involve a delay of at least four months. There may also be other things. There are policy decisions to be made. Some sections, of course, could be proclaimed very quickly. The disciplinary provisions that were passed the other night that were not related to unification could be proclaimed very soon, but those relating to unification certainly cannot be proclaimed for some months.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Until the act is proclaimed no steps may be taken with regard to unification.

Brigadier LAWSON: That is correct.

Mr. CHURCHILL: So, the uncertainty then will continue and be prolonged?

Mr. HELLYER: Mr. Churchill, I do not think that should go unchallenged, but I do not think you mean it exactly as it sounded.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Did not which?

An hon. MEMBER: Because the uncertainty would last longer than the proclamation.

Mr. FOY: If the Queen passes the bill the armed services will know where they stand.

Mr. CHURCHILL: This is the odd part about it. Here we have another delay being imposed. If the government is so unwise as to proceed with this bill, and if

the opposition is very co-operative, the bill might get through sometime in May or June, and then there is the four months of waiting for proclamation. Would it not be wiser to postpone the bill until the regulations and orders are drawn up, based on what may be anticipated by the government, and then bring the bill forward so that at the time the bill passes, accompanied by the regulations and orders, it can be proclaimed within a very short interval. This would then leave the situation as it is at the present time and there would not be that uncertainty with regard to the future. The uncertainty with regard to what is going to happen is now going to carry through the greater part of this year

Mr. HELLYER: Mr. Churchill, it comes as a shock that an experienced parliamentarian like yourself would suggest that the government anticipate Parliament in a matter of this importance. I am sure you would agree that rather than postpone the uncertainty, which would inevitably result from not passing the act, and allowing the regu'ations to be prepared on the basis of parliamentary approval, this whole process would then delay the uncertainty that would inevitably continue with all the ramifications which have been explained to you by the Chief of the Defence Staff and which you seem to feel so keenly and understand so well.

Mr. CHURCHILL: It is not a question of anticipating the action of parliament, because the legal draftsmen are very busy every year drafting bills in advance to be presented to parliament—sometimes well in advance—and then they modify them accordingly as the House of Commons studies the bill. Preparing regulations and orders based on the present bill would not be any more out of place than preparing the bill itself or proposed amendments to the bill, or things of that nature.

Mr. HELLYER: There might always be the haunting fear on the part of someone that some future government—heaven forbid—would not be so farsighted and would not continue.

An hon. MEMBER: A haunting fear or the highest hopes?

Mr. MCINTOSH: The greatest uncertainty will start after the bill goes through the house.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Did I understand the Minister to say that he quite possibly thought proclamation could follow in about four months?

Mr. HELLYER: The Judge Advocate General said something of the order of four months would be about the minimum time in which the regulations could be prepared and promulgated before proclamation.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): Has anybody taken it upon themselves to advise General Allard of this? I ask that question in view of his last statement, which I would read to the Committee:

> In summary, then, gentlemen—the situation is this. The idea of a single force—in a single, distinctively Canadian uniform—working—living—training—and—most important—thinking together as one entity is an exciting and challenging idea. After all it is designed to meet the problems of the modern world—a scientific world—which is growing away beyond the barriers of the past at a speed that cannot stand the slow pace of yesterday. For all this—you know that we do not intend to

proceed in haste—but rather in a carefully planned manner which will extend over a number of years. All that is required now is the authority to do so.

Would it not be nice if General Allard was made aware of the Minister's thinking in this matter?

Mr. HELLYER: I think that is a classic statement.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): I think so, too.

Mr. HELLYER: I think it should be enshrined in the hearts of all.

Mr. MACINNIS (*Cape Breton South*): I think it should be, too. I certainly believe it should be, beyond the speed of yesterday.

Mr. HELLYER: The General refers to the proclamation and he was very much aware of the orders that have to be drafted, and that is what he was referring to before the Committee.

The CHAIRMAN: Shall Clause 65 carry?

Clause 65 agreed to.

Schedule A, as amended, agreed to.

Schedule B, as amended, agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN: Shall Clause 1 carry? Just a moment, please, gentlemen. Mr. Brewin?

Mr. BREWIN: I do not know what the procedure is that was agreed on. After this clause, which I take it is the only one left to carry, if it is carried, is it intended that the Committee will then go into camera to discuss its report?

Mr. CHAIRMAN: We had not counted on that. That would be a matter for discussion the moment we conclude the bill as the next item of business.

Mr. BREWIN: I did not want to forego my opportunity to say that we should report, because I voted for many of these clauses as we went through them as being the best form available, but I still think we should have a discussion on the principles involved before we decide what to do with the bill as a whole and report it.

The CHAIRMAN: All right. That will be kept in mind, Mr. Brewin, as an item of business the moment we finish this. Mr. Churchill?

Mr. CHURCHILL: Mr. Chairman, as a guide to the Committee when it goes in camera to consider this bill, I think that it should seriously consider suggesting to the house that the bill be withdrawn or postponed or shelved or put in cold storage for a very considerable period. Because of the weight of the evidence that has been produced before this Committee over the last several weeks, and the experienced evidence that has come from the former members of the National Defence Headquarters who were in office just a year ago, three of whom retired earlier than the regular retirement age factor, that wisdom would dictate that it should be postponed.

Now nobody who has a sense of responsibility to Canada and to Canada's defence preparations wants any further disruption of our Canadian forces and we have been told by men who know, senior experienced officers, that the

situation within the forces is not as good as it was a few years ago, and that in view of the unusually large retirement of experienced officers and experienced men during the last two years, that the forces have been disrupted, to a certain extent. We have had the warning sounded to us by the former Chief of the General Staff that if this proposed unification is not proceeded with slowly there may be further disruption of our defence forces.

Now, to a Canadian citizen that simply means that our defence services will not be in a position to carry out their duties as we expect them to do. The defence of Canada is just as important to every citizen of this country as it is to the men who are in the services, and the services carry our trust that they will devote themselves to the adequate defence of this country. We admire the men who have volunteered to serve in those defence forces and our obligation as citizens is to see that their interests are protected just as we expect them to protect our interests.

Now, surely on the weight of the evidence that has been presented to this Committee the sensible thing to do is to call a halt to the program and do what the experienced officers have told us should be done. Give the integration part of the program time to be sorted out and to become effective and efficient and then, and only then, consider any further step, rather than rushing headlong into creating a single unified service before the basic supporting elements have been organized in accordance with the present plan.

Now, that is why I think when we consider this, and our report to the House, that we should bear these things in mind so that we can give sound advice to the House of Commons. After all, we have had the experience here of days and weeks of intensive and serious study of this bill and the propositions, and if a committee of the House of Commons is to do its job adequately, that is the type of advice that I think should emerge from this Committee.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Brewin?

Mr. BREWIN: I wonder if I might add that in raising the question on clause 1 I assume that this Committee, before reporting this bill finally, in the light of the evidence that we have received, would discuss whether we should urge immediate passage of it, postponement of it under conditions, or throwing it out. We might do any one of those three. We have had a lot of evidence. I think we should discuss that. It is my understanding, Mr. Chairman, perhaps wrongly, that in the procedure of committees the substance of our report is usually discussed in camera, and that is the reason I raise the matter now rather than attempt to discuss my own views as to what we should do.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Macaluso?

Mr. MACALUSO: Mr. Chairman, first of all I want to clarify the remarks made about wanting the clauses considered in camera. I requested a clarification of what procedure you were going to use this morning, Mr. Chairman, and that was the only reason for my raising the matter. It was not that it was to be studied, but what procedure you were going to use.

As far as Mr. Brewin's suggestion is concerned, I find that a very surprising statement, to be very honest about it. Of course, we can all assume certain things but it has been my belief that the only report that a Committee

can make dealing with legislation is that once it is passed on and voted on clause by clause, as we have done in a recorded vote, that all we do is report the bill back to the house with the recorded votes on the clauses.

Mr. BREWIN: No.

Mr. MACALUSO: Well, perhaps that is not what is in your mind, but it has been the practice as far as I have ever seen.

Mr. WINCH: Other committees make their reports—

Mr. MACALUSO: In the report which states whether or not you are in favour of the principle of the bill or not in favour of the principle of the bill, you certainly show your intentions by voting on each particular clause and having a recorded vote. I do not know what procedure you are going to use, Mr. Chairman. It is strictly in your hands, of course, but certainly I would think that to discuss a—

The CHAIRMAN: It is in the hands of the Committee, Mr. Macaluso, to guide me in what procedure I should use. I think while we are on clause 1 is as good a place as any to tidy up just where we are going to move next. I will hear Mr. Macaluso.

Mr. MACALUSO: Mr. Chairman, it is my submission, therefore, that the only report that this Committee should make is one stating the number of meetings that we have had and the number of witnesses that have been before this Committee. The evidence will be in the minutes of the Committee. Even you know that, Mr. Lambert, and I would assume it will be before the house before this bill is dealt with in the House, I would suggest, therefore, Mr. Chairman, that there is no need to make any great report on the principles of the bill. They are widely known in the press, in the second reading and in the statements that will be in the minutes of proceedings and evidence of this Committee. Everyone is well acquainted with the principles of the bill and I for one do not believe that there should be a great report on why you voted for or against or what the principles are or are not.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Lambert?

Mr. LAMBERT: Mr. Chairman, my only comment is that it is unfortunate that Mr. Macaluso did not continue his very brief association with the Finance, Trade and Economic Affairs Committee, because that committee considered at even greater length a much longer bill which it passed clause by clause, as we have done here, in public, and then it retired in camera to prepare a shorter report of certain recommendations that it was making in regard to a number of matters in connection with the bill. I would suggest to Mr. Macaluso, if he has not done so already, that he read the report of that committee and that he can perhaps stump the chairman of that committee. I know his relationship while he was with us briefly was not of the best, Mr. Chairman, but I would point out that this is an example of a committee that did a lot of good work, as this one did, and that it also made some pertinent observations with regard to the bill, which it put into clauses, because there can be no comment on the particular clauses, but the committee can certainly make a report if it retires into camera to do that.

Mr. NUGENT: Mr. Lambert said, although it is not customary, a committee can report a bill with or without recommendations. The question we are deciding

now is whether we pass clause 1 and report the bill in that manner, and then go into whether we report it with recommendations or have a debate on whether we have recommendations while we are considering clause 1. I do not care which way it is done, but it is obvious, Mr. Chairman, that some of us in the committee want to debate the question as to recommendations, if we have any, and if we do have any, what those recommendations are. I do not think it matters much whether we do it in clause 1 or whether we do it afterwards, so long as passage of clause 1 does not mean it is the end of the debate on this bill.

Mr. FORRESTALL: This is not directly related, but just by way of inquiry and assurance that we can get it, will all the evidence be available to us before the bill is received back in the house and before we proceed with it? Could we have that before us?

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Forrestall, it has to be, under the rules of the House of Commons. In other words, we may now report the bill to the House of Commons, and this simply means that the bill with amendments is laid on the table. Before we get to the committee stage in the house the proceedings must be available. These are the rules of the House of Commons. They must be observed.

The first question to which I have to turn my mind the moment we rise from reporting this bill is to see that printing and translation, and the like, are made available for this bill just as fast as it can be done.

Mr. Foy had his hand up and then Mr. Macaluso wants to speak again. We are having a good round of discussion.

Mr. FOY: Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to make a suggestion. We have been doing so well tonight, we have been co-operating and it has really been a joy. I am wondering if we could not pass clause 1. There is lots of time. For my own information, could you tell me who writes the report? Is it the chairman?

The CHAIRMAN: The committee sits with the chairman and they write a report and the report is voted on.

Mr. FOY: I was wondering if we could take the rest of the evening for the Chairman to get the advice of the members of the committee on what should go into the report?

Mr. MACALUSO: Mr. Chairman, if I might suggest a procedure. I wonder if we could pass clause 1 and then the Steering Committee could meet thereafter and draft a report, and the committee as a whole could come back tomorrow to deal with the report.

The CHAIRMAN: We have had a round of discussion on this and I wonder whether you would permit the Chairman to make the suggestion that you carry the bill and finish it now and then we can go in camera and consider the question of a report. If we do not get the report finished tonight, I am quite sure we can finish it tomorrow and put it in to the house. If we are able to finish it tonight, so much the better. I would suggest we proceed in that way, if that is agreeable to the gentlemen here. Does that meet with agreement?

Mr. NUGENT: We passed on one subject here.

The CHAIRMAN: We are going to pass the bill now, and the understanding amongst all of us right now is that I am asking you as your chairman if you will

go along with this procedure, and then we can go in camera and discuss the question of a report in a relaxed manner. It will be something of a relief, I am sure, to all of us to get the bill past us and to settle down to a little discussion on the matter of a report. I see no objection to that. Does that meet with the agreement of everyone?

Some hon. MEMBERS: Agreed.

The CHAIRMAN: Shall Clause 1 carry?

Clause 1 agreed to.

Preamble agreed to.

Title agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN: Shall the bill as amended carry?

Some hon. MEMBERS: Agreed.

The CHAIRMAN: I think the proper way to do it is to report the bill together with our other report. I need a motion to reprint the bill as amended.

Motion agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN: Now, may we have a motion that we continue this session in camera.

Motion agreed to.

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