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
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
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OF THE COLONIES.

ADMINISTRATION

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ADMINISTRATION

OF THE

COLONIES.

By THOMAS POWNALL,

Late Governor and Commander in Chief of his Majefty's Provinces, Melfachulets-Bay, and South-Carolina, and Lieutenant-Governor of New-Jerley.

THE THIRD EDITION, Revised, Corrected, and Enlarged.

To which is added,


AN APPENDIX, Nº. III, containing, Confiderations on the Points lately brought into Question as to the Parliament's Right of taxing the Colonies, and of the Measures necessary to be taken at this Crifis.

Pulchrum est benefacere reipublicæ, etiam benedicere haud absurdum est. SALLUSTIUS.

LONDON:

Printed for J. DODSLEY, in Pall-Mall, and J. WALTER, at Charing Crofs. MDCCLXVI.

1766 .



TOTHE

RIGHT HONOURABLE

GEORGE GRENVILLE,

First Lord Commissioner of His Majesty's Treasury, Chancellor of the Exchequer, &c. &c.

SIR

Wheever confiders the importance of the North-American colonies, and the neceffary connection of their affairs with those of Great Britain, must congratulate the public upon having a minister, who will take pains to understand the commerce and interests of the colonies, A who

who will ferioufly enter into the adminiftration of them, and who is equal in firmnefs to purfue thofe interefts in that line only, which connects them with the welfare of the mother country; who, convinced that the mother country has a just and natural right to govern the colonies, will yet fo administer the power of that government in the genuine fpirit of the British Constitution, as shall lead the people of the colonies, by the spirit of laws and equity to that true and constitutional obedience, which is their real liberty.

The experience I have had in the affairs of the colonies must at least have given me a practical knowledge of them: And the relation I have borne to the people has given me an affection for them. Not being employed in any department, wherein that knowledge can be reduced to

to practice, I thought it a duty, if indeed it may be of any use, to publish my sentiments on this subject; and I have taken the freedom, Sir, of addressing them to you.

I have profeffed an affection for the colonies, becaufe having lived amongst their people in a private, as well as public character, I know them; I know that in their private focial relations, there is not a more friendly, and in their political one, a more zealously loyal people, in all his majesty's dominions.

Whatever appearances or interpretation of appearances, may have raifed fome prejudices againft their conduct on a late occafion, I will venture to affirm, that fairly, firmly, and openly dealt with, there is not, with all their errors, a people who has a truer fenfe of the neceffary A 2 powers

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powers of government; and I will reft the truth of this affertion on the good effect, which you will have the pleafure to fee derived to this country, and to the colonies, from the firmnefs and candour with which your part of the American bufiness has been conducted.

When the fubjects, especially those of a popular state, become alarmed, they are soon inflamed; and then their demagogues, perhaps the worst, as well as the lowest part of the people, govern. The truly great and wise man will not judge of the people from their passions — He will view the whole tenor of their principles and of their conduct. While he sees them uniformly loyal to their King, obedient to his government, active in every point of public spirit, in every object of the public welfare — He will not regard what they are led either

to

to fay or do under these fits of alarm and inflammation; he will, finally, have the pleasure to see them return to their genuine good temper, good sense and principles. The true movements of government will again have their effect; and he will acquire an ascendency over them from the steady superiority of his conduct.

While fuch is the temper of the great minifter, there cannot be too much caution and prudence exercifed in preventing the inferior members or officers of government from acting under any fenfe of refentment or prejudice, against a people improperly supposed to be under disfavour : For by the mutual aggravation and provocations of such misunderstanding towards each other, even a wife people may be driven to madness. Let not the Colonists imagine that the people of England have any ill idea

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of them, or any defigns of oppreffing them. The people of England love them. Let not the people of England imagine that the Colonifts have a wifh but for their welfare, and to partake of it as fellow-fubjects -For the people of the colonies would facrifice their dearest interests for the honour and prosperity of their mother country; and the last with of their hearts will be for ever to belong to it. I have a right to fay this, because experience has given me this impression of them. I do not fay it to flatter them; I never did flatter them, when I was connected with them in bufinefs, but I fpeak it as a truth which I think should be known, left the intemperance and imprudence of their falfe or mistaken patriots should give any undue impreffions to their difadvantage, and cause any alienation of that natural affection which at prefent fubfifts, and

and will, I hope, for ever subsist between the people of Great Britain and those of the colonies.

May that minifter who fhall interweave the administration of the colonies into the British administration, as a part effentially united with it, may he live to fee the power, prosperity, and honour, that so great and important an event must give to his country.

With the higheft efteem and regard, I have the honour to be,


SIR,

Your most obedient,

and most humble fervant,

T. POWNALL.

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ТНЕ

ADMINISTRATION

OFTHE

COLONIES.

HE feveral changes in interefts and territories, which have taken place in the colonies of the European world on the event of Peace, have occafioned a general idea of some new state of things arifing, of fome new channel of bufinefs opening which may be applied to new powers ;----which ought to be guarded against, on one hand, or that is to be carried to advantage on the other. There is an universal apprehension of some new crisis forming: yet one does not find any one precife comprehensive idea of this crisis : and confequently, all that is proposed, is by parts, without connection to any whole; in temporary porary expedients without general reference to that eventual state of things which may be the effect of such measures or expedients. Our politicks have regard only to particular branches, without any systematical police, directed to the interest of all as of a One Whole.

This state of the business has tempted me to hazard my fentiments on this fubject. My particular fituation in time past gave me early opportunity of feeing and observing the ftate of things, which have been long leading to this crifis. I have feen and mark'd, where it was my duty, this nafcent crifis at the beginning of this war, and may affirm, have forefeen and foretold the events that now form it. My prefent fituation by which I stand unconnected with the politics of ministry, or of the colonies, opens the fairest occasion to me of giving to the public, whom it concerns, fuch an impartial uninfluenced opinion of what I think to be the right of things, as I am convinced the following theets contain. I know what effect this conduct will have, what it has had, on this work and on myfelf. I may be thought neither by the ministry nor the Colonists to understand this fubject, the one may call this work the vision of a theorist, the other will represent the doctrine which it contains, as the

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the prejudices of power and ambition. The one may think me an advocate for the politicks of the colonies, the other will imagine me to be an evil counfellor against the colonies to the ministry: But as I know that my aim is, without any prudential view of pleasing others or of my own interest, to point out and to endeavour to establish an idea of the true interest of the colonies, and of the mother country as related to the colonies, I shall equally disregard what varies from this on the one hand, and equally reject what deviates from it on the other.

In the first uncultur'd ages of Europe, when men fought nothing but to possifies, and to secure possifies power of the *fword* was the predominant spirit of the world; it was that, which formed the Roman empire; and it was the same, which, in the declension of that empire, divided again the nations into the several governments formed upon the ruins of it.

When men afterward, from leifure, began to exercife the powers of their minds in (what is called) learning; religion, the only learning at that time, led them to a concern for their fpiritual interefts, and confequently led them under their fpiritual guides. The power of *religion* would hence as naturally B 2 prepredominate and rule, and did actually become the ruling fpirit of the policy of Europe. It was this fpirit, which, for many ages formed, and gave away kingdoms; this which created the anointed Lords over them, or again excommunicated and execrated thefe fovereigns; this that united and allied the various nations, or plung'd them into war and bloodfhed; this, that formed the ballance of the power of the whole, and actuated the fecond grand fcene of Europe's hiftory.

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But fince the people of Europe have formed their communication with the commerce of Afia; have been, for some ages past, fettling on all fides of the Atlantic Ocean, and in America, have been poffeffing every feat and channel of commerce, and have planted and raifed that to an interest which has taken root;---fince they now feel the powers which derive from this, and are extending it to, and combining it with others; the fpirit of commerce will become that predominant power, which will form the general policy, and rule the powers of Europe: and hence a grand commercial interest, the basis of a great commercial dominion, under the prefent feite and circumstances of the world, will be formed and arife. The rife and forming of this commercial interest is what precifely conftitutes the prefent crifis. The lly beof Eumany s; this them, ed thefe ied the to war ballance ctuated iftory.

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The European possessions and interests in the Atlantic and in America lye under various forms, in plantations of fugar, tobacco, rice, and indigo, in farms of tillage and pasture, in fisheries, Indian hunts, forests, naval stores, and mines; each different scite produces fome special matter of supply neceffary to one part of that food and raiment become requisite to the present state of the world; but is, as to its own local power of produce, totally deftitute of fome other equally neceffary branch of fupply. The various nature of the lands and leas lying in every degree and afpect of climate, and the fpecial produce and vegetation that is peculiar to each, forms this local limited capacity of produce. At the fame time that nature has thus confined and limited the produce of cach individual scite to one, or at most to few branches of fupply, at the fame time hath the extended the necessities of each to many branches beyond what its own produce can The Weft India islands produce fupply. fugar, meloffes, cotton, &c. they want the materials for building and mechanics, and many the necessaries of food and raiment: The lumber, hides, the fifh, flour, provifions, live-flock, and horfes, produced in the northern colonies on the continent, must fupply the islands with these requisites. On the other hand, the fugar and meloffes of the B 3 fugar

fugar islands is become a necessary intermediate branch of the North American trade and fisheries. The produce of the British fugar islands cannot fupply both Great Britain and North America with the neceffary quantity; this makes the meloffes of the foreign fugar islands also necessary to the present state of the North American trade. Without Spanish filver, become necessary to the circulation of the British American trade, and even to their internal course of fale and purchase, not only great part of that circulation must cease to flow, but the means of purchasing the manufactures of Great Britain would be equally circumfcribed: Without the British supplies, the Spanish settlements would be fcarce able to carry on their culture, and would be in great diffrefs. The ordinary course of the labour and generation of the negroes in the West India islands makes a constant external fupply of these subjects necessary, and this connects the trade of Africa with the West Indies; the furr and Indian trade, and the European goods neceffary to the Indian, are what form the Indian connection.--- I do not enter into a particular detail of all the reciprocations of those wants and supplies, nor into a proof of the neceffary interconnections arifing from thence; I only mark out the general traites of these, in order to explain what I mean when I fay, that by the limitation of

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intermean trade e British t Britain ry quane foreign lent state out Spacirculaind even urchafe. on must rchaing ould be British ould be d would ourfe of groes in ant exy, and ie Weft ind the an, are do not e recies, nor ections he geh what itation of

of each, all are interwoven into a neceffary intercourfe of fupplies, and all indificiubly bound in an union and communion of one general composite interest of the whole of the Spanish, French, Dutch, Danish, and Bri-This is the natural flate of tish settlements. the European possessions in the Atlantic and in America; this general communion is that natural interest under which, and by which, they must subsist. On the contrary, the fpirit of policy, by which the mother countries fend out and on which they establish colonies, being to confine the trade of their respective colonies folely to their own special intercourse, and to hold them incommunicable of all other intercourse or commerce, the artificial or political state of these colonies becomes diffinct from that which is above described as their natural state.-The political state is that which policy labours to establish by a principle of repulsion; the natural one is that state under which they actually exist and move by a general, common, and mutual principle of attraction. This one general interest thus distinct must have some one general tendency or direction diffinct alfo, and peculiar to its own fystem. There must be some center of these composite movements, fome lead that will predominate and govern in this general interest-B 4 That

That particular branch of buliness and its connections in this general commercial interest, which is most extensive, necessary, and permanent, fettles and commands the market; and those merchants who actuate this branch must acquire an ascendency, and will take the lead of this interest. This lead will predominate throughout the general intercourse, will diffolve the effect of all artificial connections which government would create, and form the natural connections under which these interests actually exist,-will fuperfede all particular laws and cuftoms, and operate by those which the nature and actual circumstances of the feveral interests require. This lead is the foundation of a commercial dominion, which, whether we attend to it or not, will be formed : whether this idea may be thought real or visionary is of no confequence as to the existence and procession of this power, for the interest, that is the basis of it, is already formed ;---yet it would become the wildom, and is the duty of those who govern us, to profit of, to poffefs, and to take the lead of it already formed and arifing fast into dominion; it is our duty so to interweave those nascent powers into, and to combine their influence with, the fame interefts which actuate our own government; fo to connect and combine the operations of our trade with this interest, as to partake of its

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its influence and to build on its power. Although this interest may be, as above defcribed, different and even diffinct from the peculiar interefts of the mother countries, yet it cannot become independent, it must, and will fall under the dominion of fome of the potentates of Europe. The great queltion at this crifis is, and the great ftruggle will be, which of those states shall be in those circumstances, and will have the vigour and wildom fo to profit of those circumstances, as to take this interest under its dominion, and to unite it to its government, This lead feemed at the beginning of the late war to ofcillate between the English and French, and it was in this war that the dominion also hath been disputed. The lead is now in our hands, we have fuch connection in its influence, that, whenever it becomes the foundation of a dominion, that dominion must be ours.

It is therefore the duty of thole who govern us, to carry forward this flate of things to the weaving of this lead into our fyftem, that Great Britain may be no more confidered as the kingdom of this Ifle only, with many appendages of provinces, colonies, fettlements, and other extraneous parts, but as a grand marine dominion confifting of our poffeffions in the Atlantic and in America united

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As the rifing of this crifis above described, forms precisely the *object* on which government should be employed; so the taking leading measures towards the forming all those Atlantic and American possessions into one Empire of which Great Britain should be the commercial and political center, is the *precise duty* of government at this crifis.

The great minister, whose good fortune shall have placed him at this crifis, in the administration of these great and important interests—will certainly adopt the system which thus lies in nature, and which by natural means alone, if not perverted, must lead to a general dominion, founded in the general interest and prosperity of the commercial world, must build up this country to an extent of power, to a degree of glory and prosperity, beyond the example of any age that has yet passed ;— * id est viri et ducis non deesse fortunæ præbenti se, et oblata casu flectere ad concilium.

The forming fome general fystem of administration, fome plan which should be (whatever may be the changes of the mini-

* Liv. 1. 28. § 44.

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ftry at home, or in the governors and officers employed abroad) uniformly and permanently purfued by measures founded on the actual state of things as they arife, leading to this great end, is, at this criss, the precife duty of government. This is an object which ought not to be overlooked or mistaken. It ought not to be a state mystery, nor can be a fecret. If the Spanish, French, and Dutch governments can oppose it, they will; but if it be founded in nature, fuch opposition will only hasten its completion, because any measures of policy which they can take to obstruct it, must either deftroy the trade of their own colonies, or break off their connection. If they attempt to do this by force, they must first form an alliance, and fettle the union of their mutual interests, and the eventual partition of the effect of it; but this will prove a matter of more difficulty, than can eafily be compassed, and under the disadvantages created thereby, there will be much hazard of the utmost effort of their united forces.

To enable the British nation to profit of these present circumstances, or of the future events, as they shall successfully arise in the natural procession of effects, it is necessfary, that the administration form itself into such establishments for the direction of these interests terests and powers, as may keep them in their natural channel, as may maintain their due connections with the government, and lead them to the utmost effect they are capable of producing towards this grand point.

The first spring of this direction, the bafis of this government, is the administration at home. If that department of administration, which should have the direction of these matters, be not wifely and firmly bottomed, be not fo built, as to be a practicalbe not fo really supported by the powers of government, as to be an efficient administration, all measures for the administration of these interests, all plans for the government of these powers are vain and self-delusive; even those measures that would regulate the movements and unite the interests under a v. actical and efficient administration, become mischievous meddling impertinencies where that is not, and must either ruin the interefts of these powers, or render a breach of duty necessary to avoid that ruin.

That part of government, which should administer this great and important branch of business, ought, in the first place, to be the center of all information and application from all the interests and powers which form it; and ought from this center, to be able, fully, them in ain their ent, and are caid point.

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hould ranch to be cation form able, fully, fully, uniformly, and efficiently, to diffribute its directions and orders. Wherever the wildom of state shall determine that this center of information shall be fixed; from whatever department all appointments, orders, and executive administration shall issue, it ought fomewhere to be fixed, known, of record, and undivided; that it may not be partial, it ought to extend to all times, and all cafes. All application, all communication, all information should center immediately and folely in this department : this fhould be the fpring of all nominations, infructions, and orders.----It is of little confequence where this power of administration is placed, fo that the department be fuch, as has the means of knowledge of its bufinefsis fpecially appropriated to the attention neceffary to it-and officially fo formed as to be in a capacity of executing it. Whether this be a Secretary of State, or the Board of Trade and Plantations, is of no confequence; but it ought to be intirely in either the one or the other. Where the power for the direction is lodged, there ought all the knowledge of the department to center; therefore all officers, civil or military, all fervants of the government, and all other bodies or private perfons ought to correspond immediately with this department, whether it be the Secretary of State or the Board of Trade. While

While the military correspond with the Secretary of State, the civil in one part of their office with the Secretary of State, in another with the Board of Trade; while the navy correspond in matters not merely naval with the Admiralty, while the engineers correspond with the Board of Ordnance, officers of the revenue with the feveral boards of that branch, and have no communication with the department which has, or ought to have, the general direction and administration of this great Atlantic and American, this great commercial interest, who is to collect? who does, or ever did collect, into a one view, all these matters of information and knowledge? What department ever had, or could have, fuch general direction of it, as to discuss, compare, rectify and regulate it to an official real use? In the first place, there never was yet any one department form'd for this purpose; and in the next, if there was, let any one acquainted with bufinefs dare to fay, how any attempt of fuch department would operate on the jealoufies of the others. Whenever, therefore, it is thought proper (as most certainly it will, fome time or other, tho' perhaps too late) to form fuch department, it must (if I may fo express myself) be fovereign and fupreme, as to every thing relating to it; or to fpeak plainly out, must be

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be a fecretary of state's office in itfelf. When fuch is form'd, although the military, naval, ordnance, and revenue officers, should correspond, in the matters of their respective duties, with the departments of government to which they are more immediately fubordinate and responsible, yet, in general matters of information, or points which are matters of government, and the department of this state office, they should be instructed to correspond and communicate with this minister. Suppose that fome fuch minister or office now existed, is it not of consequence that he should be acquainted with the Geography of our new acquisitions ? If, therefore, there have been any actual furveys made of them, should not such, or copies of fuch, be fent to this minister or office ? If a due and official information of any particular conduct in our colonies, as to their trade, might lead to proper regulations therein, or might point out the neceffity of a revision of the old laws, or the making further provision by new ones, would it not be proper that the cuftom-house officers fettled there should be directed to correspond and communicate with this minister, or office, on these points? Would it interfere with their due subordination, as officers of the revenue, to the commissioners of the customs ?-If there were any events arifing, or

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or any circumstances existing, that might affect the state of war or peace, wherein the immediate application of military operations were not necessary or proper, should not the military and naval officers be directed to communicate on these matters with this minister, or office ? Should not, I fay, all these matters of information come officially before this minister, if any such state minister, or office, was established ?

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As of information and knowledge centering in a one office, fo also of power of executing, it should spring from one undivided department. Where the power of nominating and difmiffing, together with other powers, is separated from the power of directing, the first must be a mere privilege or perquifite of office, ufelefs as to the king's bufinefs or the interest of his colonies, and the latter must be inefficient. That office, which neither has the means of information. nor can have leifure to attend to the official knowledge produced thereby, nor will be at the trouble to give any official directions, as to the ordinary course of the administration of the American matters, must certainly be always, as it is, embarraffed with the power of nomination, and fetter'd with the chain of applications, which that power drags after it. On the other hand, what effect t might crein the perations not the ected to this mifay, all officially te mini-

entering executndivided f nomih other r of diprivilege e king's ies, and t office. mation. official will be ections, hinistraertainly ith the vith the power , what effect effect will any instructions, orders or directions, have from that board, which has not interest to make or difinis one of the meaneft of its own officers : this, which is at prefent the only official channel, will be defpifed ; the governors, nay, every the meaneft of the officers in the plantations, looking up folely to the giving power, will fcarce correspond with the directing-nay, may perhaps contrive to make their court to the one, by paffing by the other. And in any cafe of improper conduct of these officers, of any neglect of duty, or even of mifdemeanour; what can this directing power do, but complain to the minister who nominates, against the officers appointed by him? If there be no jealoufies, no interfering of interests, no competitions of interfering friends, to divide and oppose these two offices to each other: if the minister is not influenced to continue, upon the fame motives upon which he first appointed; if he does not fee these complaints in a light of opposition to his nomination and interest; some redress may. after a due hearing between the party and the office, be had ;--the authority of the board may be supported, and a fort of remedy applied to the fpecial bufinefs, but a remedy worfe than the difeafe-a remedy that dishonours that board, and holds it forth to the the contempt of those whom it ought to govern.

It is not only from the natural impracticability of conducting this administration under a divided State of power and direction, that the neceffity of forming a fome one ftate office, or minister of state, for the executing it arifes: but the very nature of the business of this department, makes the officer who is to administer it a state officer, a minister for that department, and who ought to have immediate access to the closet. must here repeat, that I am no partizan of the Secretary of State's office, or for the Board of Trade: I have ceafed to have any connection of business with either, and have not the least degree of communication with the one or the other. Without reference. therefore, to either, but with all deference to both, I aim to point out, that the department of the administration of Trade and plantations, be it lodged where it may, fhould be a State office, and have a minister of state. That office, or officer, in a commercial na-** tion like this, who has the cognizance and direction (fo far as Government can interfere) of the general trade of the kingdom-whofe duty it is to be the depository and reporter of the flate and condition of it; of every thing which may advance or obstruct it, of the ftate

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state of manufactures, of the fisheries, of the employment of the poor, of the promoting the labour and riches of the country, by ftudying and advifing every advantage, that can be made of every event which arifes in commercial politics; every remedy, which can remove any defect or obstruction ;---who is officially to prepare every provision or revision necessary in the laws of trade, for the confideration of parliament; and to be the conductor of fuch thro' the neceffary meafures-is certainly an officer of state, if the Secretary of State, fo call'd, is. That office, or officer, who has cognizance and direction of the plantations in every point of government, in every matter judicial or commercial; who is to direct the fettlements of colonies, and to fuperintend those already fettled; who is to watch the plantations in all these points, so far as they stand related to the government, laws, courts and trade of the mother country-is certainly an officer of state, if the Secretary of State, fo called, is. That office, or officer, who is to report to his Majefty in council on all thefe points; whole official fiat, or negative, will be his Majesty's information in council, as to the legiflature in the colonies—is certainly an officer of state. That office, or officer, who is to hear and determine on all matters of complaint, and mal administration, of C 2 the the crown officers and others, in the plantations; and can examine witneffes on oath —is furely an officer of flate. That office, or officer, who is to correspond with all the fervants of the crown on these points, and to be the iffuer of his Majesty's orders and instructions to his servants, on these many, great, and important points of state—is certainly his Majesty's secretary, and certainly a secretary of state.

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But if it be confidered further, who the perfons are, that conftitute the very great and extensive commission of the Board of Trade and Plantations; namely, all the great officers of state for the time being, with the bishop of London, the secretaries of state for the time being, and those more especially called the commissioners of trade. it will be feen, that it is no longer a doubt or a queflion, as to its being an office of state : it is actually fo; and has, as an office, as a board, immediate access to his Majesty in council, even to the reporting and recommending of officers. This was the plan whereon it was originally founded, at its first institution, by Lord Sommers.

That great flatefinan and patriot faw that all the powers of government, and feveral departments of administration difunited, were planoath office, all the , and rs and many, is cerrtainly

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v that leveral inited, were were interfering with, and obstructing each other on this fubject, and not they only here in England, but that the respective officers of these several departments carried all this distraction into the detail of their business in the colonies, which I am afraid is too much the cafe even at this day : he faw that this administration could not be conducted but by an intire union of all the powers of government, and on that idea formed the board of trade and plantations, where, and where alone, these powers were united in a one office. In which office, and in which alone, all the bufinefs of the colonies ought therefore to be administred; for if such union be neceffary, here alone is that official union. Unhappily for the true interest of government, partly from an intire neglect of this administration in time past, and partly from the defective partial exercise of it, fince some idea of these matters began again to revive, this great and wife plan hath been long difused; but it is fortunate for the public in this important crifis, that fuch is the temper of particulars, fuch the zeal of all for his Majesty's service, such the union of his fervants, that the spirit of fervice predominates over these natural defects : so that all who wish well to the interest of this country, in its trade and colonies, may hope to feethat union, at prefent only ministerial, be-C 3 come

come official in this bufinefs, and revive again that great, wife, and conftitutional plan of office, actuated under the real fpirit of it.

The only queftion at prefent is, who fhall be the executive officer of this department of flate; whether the fecretary of flate, properly fo called; or the first lord, and other commissioners, properly called the board of trade; or whether it shall remain divided, as it is, between the feveral great departments of administration; or whether fome more official and practical division of this administration may not be made.

Suppose now, it should be thought proper, that this administration be placed in the secretary of state's office, all the administration of the plantations may be given to the fouthern department: yet the great object of the general trade of Great Britain must be divided between the fouthern and the northern, as the matters of confideration happen to lye in the one or in the other department; and how will the fouthern department act, when any matter of commerce arises in the plantations, that has special connections or interferings with the Dutch, Hamborough, Danish or Russian trade?

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It cannot lie in the board of trade, properly fo called, until it be found proper, and becomes a measure of government to erect that board into a fecretary of state's office for this department, which, first or last, it most certainly will do. That, therefore, the great bufinefs of trade and plantations may not run into confusion, or be at a stand ;---that it may be carried to the effect proposed, held forth, and defired by government, and neceffary to it; all that can be done at prefent is, to put the whole executive administration, the nomination, correspondence, iffuing of constructions, orders, &c. under the fecretary of state, if he has leifure to attend to it, and can undertake it; and to make the board of trade a mere committee of reference and report; inftead of reporting to the king in council, to report to the fecretary of state, who shall lay the matters before his Majesty, and receive and iffue his orders ;---who shall refer all matters to this committee, for their confideration, and shall conduct through the legislature all measures necessary to be determined thereby. If this be not practicable, there is no other alternative, than to do directly what ought to be done, and what, fome time or other, must be done; the making the officer who conducts this department a minister for that department, with all the powers neceffary thereto. For C 4 until

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until a practical and efficient administration be formed, whatever the people of this country may think, the people of the colonies, who know their business much better than we do, will never believe government is in earnest about them, or their interest, or even about governing them; and will, not merely from that reasoning, but from necessity of their circumstances, act accordingly.

Knowing, therefore, that first or last, the nature and state of the king's fervice must, in spite of every idea to the contrary, bring this measure into execution, I have only curforily suggested fome hints of the grounds on which it will arise: but removed as I am from every communication with administration, and uninformed, I have not presumed to enter into the discussion of this great point. Wherever it is taken up, it must be by perfors who, with the benefit of real, official information, and confidential knowledge of measures, must have superior, and the only lights, in which it ought to be viewed, and determined.

Upon a fuppofition, therefore, that this matter is fettled, as most certainly it will be, fome time or other, I will proceed, confining myself folely to the matters of the colonies, n

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this be, finloics, nies, to review fome points that deferve, and will require, the confideration of government, if it ever means to profit of, and lead the great Atlantic and American intereft which it has acquired, and to unite it to its dominion.

Whenever this neceffary measure of making that department of administration, which is to direct the trade and plantations of this kingdom, a fecretary of state's office, is carried into execution, the several points explained in the following observations will be taken up, as matters of busines; but until that time comes, they will be treated as matters of speculation, and mere useles, opprobrious theory.

Before entering into these matters, I do not think it would be impertinent just to mark the idea of colonies, and their special circumstances, which makes it a meafure in commercial governments, to establish, cultivate, and maintain them.

The view of trade in general, as well as of manufactures in particular, terminates in fecuring an extensive and permanent vent; or to speak more precisely, (in the same manner as shop-keeping does) in having many and good customers: the wisdom, theretherefore, of a trading nation, is to gain, and to create, as many as poffible. Those whom we gain in foreign trade, we poffefs under reftrictions and difficulties, and may lofe in the rivalship of commerce: those that a trading nation can create within itfelf, it deals with under its own regulations, and makes its own, and cannot lofe. In the establishing colonies, a nation creates people whofe labour, being applied to new objects of produce and manufacture, opens new channels of commerce, by which they not only live in ease and affluence within themfelves, but, while they are labouring under and for the mother country, (for there all their external profits center) become an increasing nation, of appropriated and good cuftomers to the mother country. These not only increase our manufactures, encrease our exports, but extend our commerce; and if duly administered, extend the nation, its powers, and its dominions, to wherever these people extend their settlements. This is, therefore, an interest which is, and ought to be dear to the mother country: this is an object that deferves the best care and attention of government : and the people, who through various hardships, difafters, and difappointments; through various difficulties and almost ruinous expences, have wrought up this interest to fuch gain, Thofe poffefs may thofe hin itations, e. In creates new opens 1 they within ouring (for r) beoriated untry. Aures, comextend nions, lettlewhich other s the : and líhips, ch vas exeft to fuch

fuch an important object, merit every protection, grace, encouragement, and privilege, that are in the power of the mother country to grant .--- It is on this valuable con-fideration, (as Mr. Dummer, in his spirited defence of the colonies fays) that they have a right to the grants, charters, privileges and protection which they receive; and also on the other hand, it is from these grants, charters, privileges and protection given to them, that the mother country has an exclusive right to the external profits of their labour, and to their cuftom. As it is the right, fo it becomes the duty of the mother country to nourish and cultivate, to protect and govern the colonies: which nurture and goverip whet should precifely direct its care to two enential points. 1st, That all the profits of the produce and manufactures of these colonies center finally in the mother country; and 2dly, That the colonies continue to be the fole and proper cuftomers of the mother country.-To thefe two points, collateral with the interefts, rights and welfare of the colonies, every measure of administration, every law of trade should tend : I fay collateral, becaufe, rightly understood, these two points are mutually coincident with the interefts, rights and welfare of the colonies,

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It has been often fuggested, that care should be taken in the administration of the plantations; left, in fome future time, these colonies should become independent of the mother country. But perhaps it may be proper on this occasion, nay, it is justice to fay it, that if, by becoming independent is meant a revolt, nothing is further from their nature, their interest, their thoughts. If a defection from the alliance of the mother country be fuggested, it ought to be, and can be truly faid, that their fpirit abhors the fenfe of fuch; their attachment to the protestant fuccession in the house of Hanover will ever stand unshaken : and nothing can eradicate from their hearts their natural, almost mechanical, affection to Great Britain, which they conceive under no other fense, nor call by any other name, than that of bome. Befides, the merchants are, and must ever be, in great measure allied with those of Great Britain; their very fupport confifts in this alliance, and nothing but false policy here can break it. If the trade of the colonies be protected and directed from hence, with the true spirit of the act of navigation, that fpirit under which it has rifen, no circumstances of trade could tempt the Colonists to certain ruin under any other connections. The liberty and religion of the British colonies are incompatible with either

t care ion of time. endent it may justice lepenurther their lliance ought ir fpittachn the aken; hearts fection under name, chants eafure r very thing f the d dirit of which could er any ligion with either

either French or Spanish government; and they know full well, that they could hope for neither liberty nor protection under a Dutch Any fuch fuggestion, therefore, is a one. false and unjust aspersion on their principles and affections; and can arife from nothing but an intire ignorance of their circum-Yet again, on the other hand, flances. while they remain under the fupport and protection of the government of the mother country; while they profit of the beneficial part of its trade; while their attachment to the prefent royal family stands firm, and their alliance with the mother country is inviolate, it may be worth while to inquire, whether they may not become and act independent of the government and laws of the mother country : - and if any fuch fymptoms should be found, either in their government, courts, or trade, perhaps it may be thought high time, even now, to inquire how far these colonies are or are not arrived, at this time, at an independency of the government of the mother country :--and if any measure of such independency, formed upon precedents unknown to the government of the mother country at the time they were form'd, should be infisted on, when the government of the mother

country was found to be fo weak or dif-

tracted at home, or fo deeply engaged abroad

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in Europe, as not to be able to attend to, and affert its right in America, with its own people :- perhaps it may be thought, that no time fhould be lost to remedy or redrefs these deviations—if any such be found; or to remove all jealouss arising from the idea of them, if none such really exist. En

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If the colonies are to be possefield, as of right, and governed by the crown, as demeines of the crown, by fuch charters, commiffions, inftructions, &c. as the crown shall, from time to time, grant or iffue; then a revision of these charters, commissions, instructions, fo as to establish the rights of the crown, and the privileges of the people, as thereby created, is all that is neceffary. But while the crown may, perhaps juftly and of right, in theory, confider these lands, and the plantations thereon, as its demeines, and as of special right properly belonging to it; not incorporated and of common right with the dominions and realm of Great Britain : in confequence of which theory, fpecial rights of the crown are there established; and from which theory, the fpecial modification under which the people poffess their privileges is derived .- While this is the idea on one hand, the people on the other fay, that they could not forfeit, nor lofe the common rights and privileges of Englishnd to, s own that edrefs d; or idea

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Englishmen, by adventuring under various difasters and difficulties, under heavy expences, and every hazard, to fettle these vast countries, to engage in untried channels of labour, thereby increasing the nation's commerce, and extending its dominions; but that they must carry with them, whereever they go, the right of being governed only by the laws of the realm; only by laws. made with their own confent :--- that they must ever retain with them the right of not being taxed without their own confent, or that of their representatives; and therefore, as it were by nature divided off from the share of the general representation of the nation, they do not hold, by tenor of charter or temporary grant, in a commission, but by an inherent, effential right, the right of representation and legislature, with all its powers and privileges, as poffeffed in England. It is, therefore, that the people do, and ever will, until this matter be fettled, exercise these rights and privileges after the precedents formed here in England, and perhaps carried, in the application, even further, than they ever were in England; and not under the reftriction of commissions and instructions : and it is therefore also, in matters where laws, made fince their eftablishment, do not extend to them by special provifo, that they claim the right of direct-

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ing themfelves by their own laws. While these totally different ideas of the principles, whereon the government and the people found their claims and rights, remain unfettled and undetermined, there can be nothing but difcordant jarring, and perpetual obstruction in the exercise of them; -there can be no government, properly fo called, but merely the predominancy of one faction or the other, acting under the mark of the forms of government. This is the fhort and precife abstract of the long and perplexed hiftory of the governments and administrations of the colonies, under the various shapes with which their quarrels have vexed themfelves, and teized government here in Britain.

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If this idea of the crown's right to govern thefe as demefnes be juft, and be as right in fact, as it is fuppofed to be in theory, let it be fettled and fixed by fome due and fufficient authority, what it is, and how far it extends. But this is not all; let it be fo eftablifhed, that where it ought, it may actually, and in practice, be carried into execution alfo. If this right be doubted; or if, being allowed, it finds itfelf in fuch circumftances as not to be able to carry its powers into execution, it will then become an object of government, to fee that thefe colonies /hile printhe ree can pernem; ly fo one maſk s the and and the: irrels vern-

gobe as thedue how it be may exe-; or ciry its tome thefe onies colonies be governed, and their affairs adminiftered fome other way. There is no doubt in the theory of our conftitution of the king's right, in time of war and array, to exercise martial law: and yet in practice it has been found right, (and would not otherwise be permitted) that this martial law should be confirmed by parliament.

If, therefore, the feveral points wherein the crown, or its governors acting under its instructions, differ with the people be confidered, and it be once determined what, in order to maintain the subordination of the government of the colonies to the government of Great Britain, is necessary to be done,-the mode of doing that will be eafily fettled. If it be a point determined, that it lies wholly with the crown to fix and actuate this order of government-the crown will duly avail itself of that power, with which it is entrusted, to enforce its administration. But if it be found that, however this may lie with the crown as of right, yet the crown is not in power to establish this right,---it will of course call in aid the power of the legiflature, to confirm and establish it. But if, finally, it should appear, that these colonies, as corporations within the dominions of Great Britain, are included within the imperium of the realm of the fame,-it D will

will then of right become the duty of legiflature to interpose in the case; to regulate and define their rights and privileges; to establish and order their administration; and to direct the channels of their commerce. Tho' the first of these measures should be, in firict justice, the crown's right-yet the fecond is the only next practicable one : and altho' the fecond, as fuch, may most likely be adopted-yet the third is the only wife and fure measure. In the fecond cafe, the crown, having formed its feveral general instructions for the several governments, according to their various charters, grants, and proprietaries, will order the fame, in those points which it cannot influence and determine by the effect of its own negative, to be laid before parliament, to be confidered and confirmed by the legislature, in the fame manner as are the rules for governing the army. In the third cafe, the crown will order its ministry to lay before parliament, the rights and powers of the crown; the rights, privileges and claims of the people; with a general state of the colonies, their interest and operations, as related to the crown, as related to the mother country, as related to foreign powers and interests, and to the colonies of foreign powers, as related to the laws and government of the mother country ;---perhaps pointing out fome general plan

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plan of government, judicatory, revenue and commerce, as may become, what I hinted at in the beginning of this paper -a leading measure to the forming Great Britain, with all its Atlantic and American posses, into one great commercial dominion. In the one cafe, the inftructions of the crown, either fome general form of fuch, or the fpecial ones given to each governor, on each fresh nomination, will be confirm'd by parliament, as the rules and orders for governing the army are. In the other, a general bill of rights, and establishment of government and commerce on a great plan of union, will be fettled and enacted : the governments of the feveral colonies, on the continent and in the islands, will be confidered as fo many corporations, holding their lands in common foccage, according to the manor of East Greenwich, united to the realm; fo that, for every power, which they exercife or poffefs, they will depend on the government of Great Britain; fo that, in every movement, they may be held, each within its proper fphere, and be drawn and connected to this center : and as forming a one fystem, they will be fo connected in their various orbs and subordination of orders, as to be capable of receiving and communicating, from the first mover (the government of Great Britain) any political motion, in the direction D 2 in

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in which it is given. Great Britain, as the center of this system, must be the center of attraction, to which these colonies, in the administration of every power of their government, in the exercise of their judicial powers, and the execution of their laws, and in every operation of their trade, must tend. They will be fo framed, in their natural and political interefts; in the rights, privileges, and protection they enjoy; in the powers of trade, which they actuate, under the predominating general commerce of the nation, that they will remain under the conftant influence of the attraction of this center; and cannot move, but that every direction of fuch movement will converge to the fame. At the fame time that they all confpire in this one center, they must be guarded against baving, or forming, any principle of coherence with each other above that, whereby they cohere in this center; having no other principle of intercommunication between each other, than that by which they are in joint communion with Great Britain as the common center of all. At the fame time that they are, each in their respective parts and fubordinations, fo framed, as to be actuated by this first mover,-they should always remain incapable of any coherence, or of io confpiring amongst themselves, as to create any other equal force, which

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which might recoil back on this first mover; nor is it more neceffary to preferve the feveral governments fubordinate within their respective orbs, than it is effential to the prefervation of the empire to keep them difconnected and independent of each other: they certainly are fo at prefent; the different manner in which they are fettled, the different modes under which they live, the different forms of charters, grants and frame of government they posses, the various principles of repulsion that these create, the different interests which they actuate, the religious interests by which they are actuated, the rivalship and jealousies which arise from hence, and the impracticability, if not the impoffibility of reconciling and accommodating these incompatible ideas and claims, will keep them for ever fo. And nothing but a tampering activity of wrongheaded inexperience milled to be meddling, can ever do any mifchief here. The provinces and colonies are under the best form as to this point, which they can be. They are under the best frame and disposition for the government of the mother country (duly applied) to take place. And as there cannot be a more just, fo there cannot be a wifer measure than to leave them all in the free and full poffession of their several rights and privileges, as by grant, charter, or commif-D 3 fion

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fion given, and in the full exercise thereof, fo far, and no further, than as derived therefrom. If, upon a revision, there be found any, and perhaps fome one fuch at least, may be found, who have grossly and intentionally transgreffed these bounds, such should be an exception to this rule, and be made an example also to others.

Under the guidance therefore of these principles-that the final external profits of the labour and produce of colonies should center in the mother country,-that the colonifts are the appropriated fpecial cuftomers of the mother country,---that the colonies, in their government and trade, should be all united in communion with, and fubordination to the government of the mother country, but ever disconnected and independent of each other by any other communion than what centers here :--- Under the guidance of these principles, with a temper and fpirit which remember that these are our own people, our brethren, faithful, good and beneficial subjects, and free-born Englishmen, or by adoption, possessing all the right of freedom :--- Under the guidance of these principles, and with this temper and spirit of government,-let a revision be made of the general and several governments of the colonies, of their laws and courts of juftice,

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tice, of their trade, and the general British laws of trade, in their feveral relations in which they stand to the mother country, to the government of the mother country, to foreign countries, and the colonies of foreign countries, to one another; and then let those measures be taken, which, upon such a review, shall appear necessary; and all which government can do, or ought to do at present, will be done.

Upon fuch review it will appear, under this first general head, in various instances, that the two great points which the Colonists labour to establish, is the exercise of their several rights and privileges, as founded in the rights of an Englishman; and secondly, as what they suppose to be a necessfary measure in a subordinate government, the keeping in their own hands the command of the revenue, and the pay of the officers of government, as a fecurity of their conduct towards them.

Under the first head come all the disputes about the King's instructions, and the governor's power, as founded on them.

The King's commission to his governor, which grants the power of government, and directs the calling of a legislature, and the establishing courts, at the fame time that

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it fixes the governor's power, according to the feveral powers and directions granted and appointed by the commission and instructions, adds, " and by fuch further powers, " instructions, and authorities, as shall, at " any time hereafter, be granted or appointed " you, under our fignet or fign manual, or " by our order in our privy council." It fhould here feem, that the fame power which framed the commission, with this clause in it, could also iffue its future orders and instructions in consequence thereof: but the people of the colonies fay, that the inhabitants of the colonies are entitled to all the privileges of Englishmen; that they have a right to participate in the legiflative power; and that no commands of the crown, by orders in council, instructions, or letters from Secretaries of State, are binding upon them, further than they pleafe to acquiefce under fuch, and conform their own actions thereto; that they hold this right of legiflature, not derived from the grace and will of the crown, and depending on the commission which continues at the will of the crown; that this right is inherent and effential to the community, as a community of Englishmen: and that therefore they must have all the rights, privileges, and full and free exercife of their own will and liberty in making. laws, which are neceffary to that act of legiflation,

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e-0, giflation,—uncontrouled by any power of the crown, or of the governor, preventing or fufpending that act; and, that the claute in the commission, directing the governor to call together a legislature by his writs, is declarative and not creative; and therefore he is directed to act conformably to a right actually already existing in the people, &c.

When I fpeak of full uncontrouled independent powers of debate and refult, fo far as relates to the framing bills and paffing them into laws, uncontrouled by any power of the crown or of the governor, as an effential property of a free legislature; I find fome perfons in the colonies imagine, that I reprefent the colonies as claiming a power of legislature independent of the King's or governor's negative.-These gentlemen knowing that it is not my intention to do injustice to the colonies, with me to to explain this matter, that it may not bear even the interpretation of fuch a charge-I do therefore here defire, that the reader will give his attention to diftinguish a full, free, uncontrouled, independent power, in the act of legiflation,-from a full, free, uncontrouled, independent power, of carrying the refults of that legislation into effect, independent either of the Governor's or King's negative. The first right is that which I represent the Colo-

Colonists claiming, as a right effential to the very existence of the legislature : The second is what is also effential to the nature of a fubordinate legislature, and what the Colonifts never call in question. That therefore the point here meant to be stated as in lebate, is, Whether a fubordinate legiflature can be instructed, restricted, and controuled, in the very act of legislation ? whether the King's instructions or letters from secretaries of state. and fuch like fignifications of his Majefty's will and pleafure, is a due and conftitutional application of the governors, or of the royal negative?-The Colonists constantly deny it. -and ministry, otherwife fuch instructions would not be given, constantly maintain it. After experience of the confusion and obfruction which this dubitable point hath occafioned to bufinefs, it is time furely that it were fome way or other determined. I do not here enter into the discussion of this point; I only endeavour fairly to state it, as I think it is a matter which ought to be fettled fome way or other, and ought no longer to remain in contention, that the feveral matters which ftand in inftruction, and in difpute in confequence of it, may be finally placed upon their right grounds; in the doing of which it must come under confideration, how far the crown has or has not a right to direct or reftrict the legiflature of the

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the colonies,-or if the crown has not this power, what department of government has, and how it ought to be exercised ;---or whether in fact or deed, the people of the colonies, having every right to the full powers of government, and to a whole legislative power, are under this claim entitled in the powers of legislature and the administration of government, to use and exercise in conformity to the laws of Great Britain, the fame, full, free, independent, unrestrained power and legiflative will in their feveral corporations, and under the King's commission and their respective charters, as the government and legiflature of Great Britain holds by its conftitution, and under the great charter.

Every fubject, born within the realm, under the freedom of the Government of Great Britain, or by adoption admitted to the fame, has an effential indefeafible right to be governed, under fuch a mode of government as has the unreftrained exercise of all those powers which form the freedom and rights of the constitution; and therefore, " the " crown cannot establish any colony upon— " or contract it within a narrower scale than " the subject is entitled to, by the great " charter of England *." The government of

• Historical Review of the Constitution and Government of Fensylvania, p. 11.

each

each colony must have the fame powers, and the fame extent of powers that the government of Great Britain has,-and must have, while it does not act contrary to the laws of Great Britain, the fame freedom and independence of legislature, as the parliament of Great Britain has. This right (fay they) is founded, not only in the general principles of the rights of a British subject, but is actually declared, confirmed, or granted to them in the commissions and charters which gave the particular frame of their respective constitutions. If therefore, in the first original establishment, like the original contract, they could not be established upon any scale short of the full and compleat scale of the powers of the British government,-nor the legiflature be established on any thing lefs than the whole legiflative power; much lefs can this power of government and legislature, thus established, be governed, directed, restrained or restricted, by any posterior instructions or commands by the letters of Secretaries of State. But upon the fuppolition, that a kind of general indetermined power in the crown, to fuperadd instructions to the commissions and charter be admitted, where the Colonists do not make a question of the case wherein it is exerted, yet there are particular cases wherein both directive and reftrictive inftructions are given, and avowedly not admitted

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mitted by the Colonists. It is a standing in-Aruction, as a fecurity of the dependence of the government of the colonies, on the mother country, that no acts wherein the King's Rights, or the rights of the mother country or of private perfons can be affected, shall be enacted into a law without a claufe fufpending the effect thereof, till his Majefty's pleafure shall be known. This suspending clause is univerfally * rejected on the principles above, because fuch suspension distranchises the inherent full power of legislature, which they claim by their rights to the British liberties, and by the special declarations of fuch in their charters. It does not remove this difficulty by faying, that the crown has already in its hands the power of fixing this point, by the effect of its negative given to its governor. It is faid, that if the crown should withdraw that instruction, which allows certain bills to be paffed into laws with a fuspending clause, which instruction is not meant as a restriction upon, but an indulgence to the legiflatures; that if the crown thould withdraw this inftruction, and peremptorily reftrain its governor from enacting laws, under fuch circumstances as the wildom of government cannot admit of,

• In fome cafes of emergency, and in the cafes of the concerns of individuals, the inftruction has been fubmitted to, but the principle never.

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that then these points are actually fixed by the true conftitutional power; but whereever it is fo faid, I must repeat my idea, that this does not remove the difficulty. For waving the doubt which the Colonifts might raife, especially in the charter colonies, how far the governor ought, or ought not, to be reftricted from giving his affent in cafes contrary only to inftructions, and not to the laws of Great Britain; waving this point, let administration confider the effects of this In cases where the bills, offered measure. by the two branches, are for providing laws, absolutely necessary to the continuance, support, and exercise of government, and where yet the orders of the crown, and the fenfe of the people, are fo widely different as to the mode, that no agreement can ever be come to in these points.—Is the government and administration of the government of the colonies to be fufpended? The interest, perhaps the being of the plantations, to be hazarded by this obstinate variance, and can the exercise of the crown's negative, in such emergencies, and with fuch effect, ever be taken up as a measure of administration? And when every thing is thrown into confusion, and abandoned even to ruin by fuch measure, will administration justify itself by faying, that it is the fault of the Colonists? On the contrary, this very flate of the cafe

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wil ma fut nie try cafe shows the necessity of some other remedy.

The fettling and determining this point is of the most effential import to the liberties on one hand, and the fubordination on the other, of the government of the colonies to the government of the mother country .----In the examination of this point, it will come under confideration, first, Whether the full and whole of legislature can be any way, in any special case, suspended; and next, whether the crown, by its inftructions, can fufpend the effect of this legislature, which by its commission or charters it has given or declared; if not, the crown, whether the parliament of Great Britain can do it, and how: whether it should be by act of Parliament, or whether by addreffing the crown upon a declarative vote, that it would be pleafed to provide by its inftructions, for the carrying the effect of fuch vote into execution, as was done in the cafe of the paper-money currency.

In the course of examining these matters, will arise to confideration the following very material point. As a principal tie of the subordination of the legislatures of the colonies on the government of the mother country, they are bound by their constitutions and

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and charters, to fend all their acts of legiflature to England, to be confirmed or abrogated by the crown; but if any of the legiflatures should be found to do almost every act of legiflature, by votes or orders, even to the repealing the effects of acts, fulpending establishments of pay, paying fervices, doing chancery and other judicatory bulinefs: if matters of this fort, done by these votes and orders, never reduced into the form of an act, have their effect without ever being fent home as acts of legislature, or fubmitted to the allowance or difallowance of the crown : If it should be found that many, or any of the legiflatures of the colonies carry the powers of legiflature into execution, independent of the crown by this device,-it will be a point to be determined how far, in fuch cafes, the fubordination of the legislatures of the colonies to the government of the mother country is maintained or fufpended ;---or if, from emergencies arifing in these governments, this device is to be admitted, the point, how far fuch is to be admitted, ought to be determined; and the validity of these votes and orders, these Senatus Confulta fo For a point of fuch great far declared. importance in the fubordination of the colony legislatures, and of fo questionable a caft in the valid exercise of this legislative power,

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power, ought no longer to remain in queftion.

The next general point yet undetermined, the determination of which very effentially imports the fubordination and dependance of the colony governments on the government of the mother country, is, the manner of providing for the support of government, and for all the executive officers of the The freedom and right efficiency crown. of the conftitution require, that the executive and judicial officers of government should be independent of the legislative; and more efpecially in popular governments, where the legiflature itself is fo much influenced by the humours and paffions of the people; for if they be not, there will be neither justice nor equity in any of the courts of law, nor any efficient execution of the laws and orders of government in the magiftracy: according, therefore, to the conftitution of Great Britain, the crown has the appointment and payment of the feveral executive and judicial officers, and the legiflature fettles a permanent and fixed appointment for the fupport of government and civil lift in general : The crown therefore has, à fortiori, a right to require of the colonies, to whom, by its commission or charter, it gives the power of government, fuch per-

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permanent support, appropriated to the offices, not the officers of government, that they may not depend upon the temporary and arbitrary will of the legislature.

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The crown does, by its inftructions to its governors, order them to require of the legiflature a permanent support. This order of the crown is generally, if not univerfally rejected, by the legislatures of the colonies. The affemblics quote the precedents of the British conftitution, and found all the rights and privileges which they claim on the principles thereof. They allow the truth and fitness of this principle in the British constitution, where the executive power of the crown is immediately administred by the King's Majesty; yet fay, under the circumstances in which they find themfelves, that there is no other measure left to them to prevent the misapplications of public money, than by an annual voting and appropriation of the falaries of the governor and other civil officers, iffuing from monies lodged in the hands of a provincial treasurer appointed by the affemblies : For in these subordinate governments, remote from his Majefty's immediate influence, administred oftentimes by neceffitous and rapacious governors who have no natural, altho' they have a political connection with the country, experience has shewn that fuch governors have mifapplied the monies

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nies raifed for the support of government, so that the civil officers have been left unpaid, even after having been provided for by the The point then of this very imaffembly. portant question comes to this isfue, whether the inconveniencies arifing, and experienced by fome inftances of milapplications of appropriations (for which however there are in the King's courts of law, due and fufficient remedies against the offender) are a sufficient reason and ground for establishing a measure fo directly contrary to the British constitution : and whether the inconveniencies to be traced in the hiftory of the colonies, through the votes and journals of their legiflatures, in which the support of governors, judges, and officers of the crown will be found to have been withheld or reduced on occasions. where the affemblies have fuppofed that they have had reason to disapprove the nomination,—or the perfon, or his conduct ; whether, I fay, these inconveniencies have not been more detrimental, and injurious to government; and whether, instead of these colonies being dependent on, and governed under, the officers of the crown, the scepter is not reverfed, and the officers of the crown dependent on and governed by the affemblies, as the Colonists themselves allow, that this measure * " renders the governor,

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* Smith's Hiftory of New York, p. 118.

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" and all the other fervants of the crown, " dependent on the affembly." This is mere matter of experience; and the fact, when duly enquired into, must speak for itself:-but the operation of this measure does not end here; it extends to the affuming by the affemblies the actual executive part of the government in the cafe of the revenue, than which nothing is more clearly and unqueftionably fettled in the crown. In the colonies the treasurer is folely and entirely a fervant of the affembly or general court; and although the monies granted and appropriated be, or ought to be, granted to the crown on fuch appropriations, the treafurer is neither named by the crown, nor its governor, nor gives fecurity to the crown or to the Lord High Treasurer, (which feems the most proper) nor in many of the colonies, is to obey the governor's warrant in the iffue, nor accounts in the auditor's office, nor in any one colony is it admitted, that he is liable to fuch account. In confequence of this fuppoled necessity, for the affembly's taking upon them the administration of the treafury and revenue, the governor and fervants of the crown, in the ordinary revenue of government, are not only held dependent on the affembly, but all fervices, where fpecial appropriations are made for the extraordinaries which fuch ferwn, s is fact. r itfure umitive rearly In eneral and d to reanor wn ich the t in ofed, ifethe ra-20the not Jut are ch er-

fervices require, are actually executed and done by commissioners appointed by the affembly, to whole disposition such appropriations are made liable. It would be perhaps invidious, and might tend to prejudging on points which ought very ferioufly and difpaffionately to be examined, if I were here to point out in the feveral inftances of the actual execution of this affumed power, how almost every executive power of the crown lodged in its governor, is, where money is neceflary, thus exercised by the affembly and its commissioners. I beg leave here to repeat, that I do not enter into the discuffion of these points; my only aim is, fairly to ftate them, giving the ftrongeft and cleareft explanations I am capable of to both fides, that the difcuffion may be brought to fome determinate iffue; --- and from that ftate of them to fuggeft, the abfolute neceffity there is of their being determined by that part of government, which shall be found to have the right and power to determine them; and to be fo determined, that while the rights, liberties, and even privileges of the colonies are preferved, the colonies may be retained in that true and conftitutional dependance to the mother country, and to the government of the mother country, which shall unite them to it as parts of one whole. E 3 It It is a duty of perfect obligation from government towards the colonies, to preferve the liberty of the fubject, the liberty of the conftitution: It is a duty alfo of prudence in government towards itfelf, as fuch conduct is the only permanent and fure ground, whereon to maintain the dependance of those countries, without deftroying their utility as colonies.

The conftitutions of these communities. founded in wife policy, and in the laws of the British constitution, are established by their feveral charters, or by the King's commiffion to his governours, being in the nature of a charter of government. In thefe, all the just powers of government are defcribed and defined, the rights of the fubject and of the conftitution declared, and the modes of government agreeable thereto established. As these pass under the great seal, no jurisdictions or offices will be inferted in the powers granted, but what are agreeable and conform to law, and the constitution of the realm. This the King's commiffion is barely a commiffion during pleafure, to the perfon therein named as governor, yet it provides for a fucceffion without vacancy, or interregnum, and is not revoked but by a like commission, with like powers: It becomes the known, established conflitution of that province which hath been eftablifhed

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established on it, and whose laws, courts, and whole frame of legislature and judicature, are founded on it : It is the charter of that province : It is the indefeafible and unalterable right of those people: It is the indefeafible right by which those colonies thus established, are the colonies of Great Britain, and therefore not to be altered; but by fuch means as any reform or new establishment may take place in Great Britain: It cannot, in its effential parts, be altered or destroyed by any royal instructions or proclamation; or by letters from fecretaries of state: It cannot be superceded, or in part annulled, by the iffuing out of any other commissions not known to this constitution.

In these charters, and in these commissions, the crown delegates to the governor for the time being, all its conftitutional power and authority civil and military-the power of legislation to far as the crown has fuch-its judicial and executive powers, its powers of chancery, admiralty jurifdiction, and that of fupreme ordinary .- All those powers, as they exift and refide in the crown, are known by the laws and courts of the realm, and as they are derived to the governors are defined, declared, and patent, by the charters and commissions patent. It is therefore the duty and true interest of the Colonists to maintain E 4 thefe

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these rights, these privileges, this constitution: It is moreover the duty and true interest of King, Lords, and Commons, to be watchful over, to fupport and defend these rights of the colonies : It is the duty of administration to have constant regard to the exercife of them, otherwife it will be found a dangerous thing to have given fo much of civil power out of the King's hands, and to have done fo little to maintain those into whofe hands it is entrufted. How far the establishment of the office and power of a military commander in chief, not subordinate but fuperior to these constitutional commanders in chief, with a jurifdiction extending over the whole of the British empire in America, is conformable to law, to prudence, or found policy, is matter of very ferious confideration.

All military power whatfoever, as far as law and the conftitution will juftify the eftablifhment of fuch, is refident in the eftablifhed office of governor, as Captain general and commander in chief. There is no power here granted, but what is fpecified and defined by the nature of the conftitution. The fubject and ftate is duly guarded againft any extensions of it, by the feveral laws which the legislatures of the feveral colonies have provided to limit that power; and it can be exercifed by none but fuch perfons as are within the jurifdiction of the province, who deriving their powers from the fupream powers are amenable to the laws of the province; and to the governor, who is himfelf fpecially responsible for the trust. This power thus limited becomes part of the conftitution of the province, and unless thus limited, and thus confidered as part of the conftitution of the government, it may be matter of great doubt, whether the crown would be advifed to erect any military powers whatever. But under fuch limitations, and as a known established part of the constitution, the crown may fafely grant these powers, and the people fafely live under them, because the governor is " required " and commanded to do and execute all " things in due manner, that shall belong " unto the trust reposed in him, according " to the feveral powers and authorities men-" tioned in the charter." That is to fay, according to those powers which in charter governments are expressly part of the conftitution; and which from the very nature of the commission patent in fuch constitutions as are called King's governments, are likewife to be confidered in the fame light .---When this military branch of the governor's office is established and received as part of the constitution, the King may fafely grant, 6 and

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and the people fafely act under " a power " to levy, arm, muster, command, and " employ all perfons whatfoever refiding " within fuch province, to refift and repell " both at land and fea, all enemies, pirates, " and rebels, and fuch to purfue in or out " of the limits of the province, to erect and " build forts, to fortify and furnish, and to " commit the command of the fame to fuch " perfon or perfons as to fuch governor shall " feem meet-and the fame again to dif-" mantle or demolifh, and to do and execute " all and every other thing which to a cap-" tain general doth or ought of right to be-" long, as fully and amply as any other the " King's captains general doth or hath ufual-" ly done, according to the powers in the " commission and charter granted." It becomes hence a question of highest import, and leading to the most dangerous confequences ----Whether, after the conftitutions and offices of a colony or province are thus effablished, the King himfelf can difmember the fame. fo as to grant to any office or officer not known to the constitution, any part whatfoever of those powers, as he cannot diffranchife a people having fuch powers, under fuch charters, of any the least right or privilege included in, or as derived from, the establishment of their constitution of government? This is a queftion that it would

would behave the crown lawyers well to confider, whenever it shall be referred to their confideration. If every military power that can legally be included in any commiffion which the crown will be advised to iffue, is already included in the office of governor, as part of the conflitution of these provinces and colonies, what commission can supercede the fame, or give power to any other officer than the governor to exercise these powers within fuch province? It was fuggefted by the writer of these papers at the beginning of the late war, that if the neceffity of the cafe in time of war urged to the appointing a military commander in chief of all North America, who should command all military operations, and prefide in general over all military eftablishments for the general service, independent of, and superior to, the powers and authorities already granted to the governors and captains general of the provinces,-it was fuggested, that no commissions under the private feal and fign manual could fupercede, revoke, or take precedence of these powers granted by letters patent under the great feal, and it was determined accordingly, that the military commander in chief must have his commiffion patent under the great feal. But when it came to be confidered what powers fhould be granted in this commission, the wildom and prudence of the great statesman and lawyer who

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who was then entrusted with that feal, iffued the commission for the commander in chief, in general and indefinite terms, " to have, " hold, exercife, and enjoy the faid office dur-" ing pleafure, together with all the powers, " authorities, rights and privileges, thereunto " belonging, fubject however to fuch reftric-" tions, limitations, and instructions, as are " given, or to be given, from time to time, un-" der the royal fign manual, and charging and " requiring all the governors, lieutenant go-" vernors, deputy governors, and prefidents " of the council of the respective colonies and " provinces of North America, and all other " officers civil or military within the fame, to " be aiding and affifting in this command." These general powers undefined and unknown, and fuch as no minister who advises the iffuing fuch commission will venture to defcribe, these general words, power and command, either mean nothing, or suppose every thing, when a justifiable occasion, or perhaps a colourable pretext calls for the exercife of them. It was feen that these general defcriptions were either dangerous or nugatory, and therefore the commander in chief had another commission under the private feal and fign manual, in which were inferted all the powers for governing the forces, &c. which were not thought proper to be included and granted by letters patent under the great feal.

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feal. I am no lawyer, and do not therefore prefume to give an opinion of decifion, but venture to affirm, that it ought well to be confidered. Whether if this commission be now in time of peace interpreted to extend to any one purpose at all, it must not extend to much more than can be justifyed by either law or the constitution? Whether (the conflitutions of the provinces and colonies remaining) the office of a commander in chief exercifing fuch powers as are fuppofed neceffary to the execution of that command, can be established over all North America? These military powers, as they exift in the governor's commission, exist and must be exercifed under the civil limitations and regulations of the constitution, nor can any law martial, or any other military ordonnances be published, without the concurrence of the other branches of the legiflature. But the difference of this dictatorial power of a military commander in chief, and the confular power of the provincial governor, can not be better defcribed than in the following passage: Ea potestas (scilicet dictatoria) per fenatum more Romano magistratui maxima permittitur, exercitum purare, bellum gerere, coercere omnibus modis socios atque cives: domi militiæque imperium atque judicium summum habere : aliter sine populi jusju nullius earum rerum confuli jus cft*.

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* Salluft. Bellum Catilinarium.

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If it fhould upon confideration and advice, of which I am no judge, be found that the dictatorial power and command of a military commander in chief, fuperior to the provincial governors (however neceffity, in time of war, might juftify it, *nè quid refpublica detrimenti capiat*) is not agreeable and conformable to law, and to the conftitution either of Great Britain or of the colonies in time of peace; it may be fuppofed that fuch will not be continued in time of peace, and that as foon as the hoftile ftate of Indian affairs ceafes, this power will be made to ceafe alfo.

In the confiderations above, I have fuggefted the doubt; whether this commission may be right as to law and the constitution. But if there be only a doubt of its legality, and there no longer remains an absolute neceffity for the continuance of it; I think it may be fairly made to appear, that neither prudence nor found policy can justify it.

Such powers with fuch a command may be dangerous to the liberty of the fubject, to the liberties of the confliction of the colonies on one hand : And on the other hand, there are no people in the whole world, when their liberties fhall become infected and undermined, fo liable to become the inftruments of dominion, as a people who have 2 live Th Gr feli bec

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lived under a free and popular government. This has been the fate of the free flates of Greece and Italy; this the fate of Rome itfelf:—But may heaven avert, that this ever becomes the flate of the British colonies.

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
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
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ave ved There is not, there cannot be any danger in this power at prefent in any degree;—but thus planted when it comes to grow, occulto velut arbor ævo, when it has taken root, and has foread its branches through the land, it will foon overtop and overschadow all the weaker, humbler shoots of civil liberty. Set once this lord of the forest on a permanent footing, it will soon have, as Mr. Harrington fays, "Toes that have roots, and arms that " will bring forth what fruit you please."

It is a common obfervation, but it is as trivial as common, which fuppofes the danger of the colonies revolting, and becoming independent of the mother country. No one colony can by itfelf become fo---and no two under the prefent flate of their conflitutions, have any poffible communion of power or intereft that can unite them in fuch a meafure; they have not the means of forming fuch; they have neither legiflative nor executive powers, that are extended to more than one; the laws of one extend not to the other; they have no common magiftracy, no







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no common command, in fhort, no one principle of affociation amongst them: On the contrary, as I have faid elfewhere. the different manner in which they are fettled, the different modes under which they live, the different forms of charters, grants, and frame of government which they poffers, the various principles of repulsion that these create, the different interefts which they actuate, the religious interests by which they are actuated, the rivalship and jealousies which arife from hence, and the impracticability, if not impoffibility, of reconciling and accommodating these incompatible ideas and claims, will keep the feveral provinces and colonies perpetually independent of, and unconnected with each other, and dependent on the mother country. The particular danger here meant to be pointed out, is that of furnishing them with a principle of union, by establishing a commander in chief over the whole. If ever the colonies revolt, and fet up an empire in America, here begins the history of it; from this period as from the first dynasty, will future historians deduce their narrative. The Romans, as long as they governed their provinces by the vigour of policy, preferved their dependence, and fee what that policy was.-I will produce two inftances, one in Italy, the other in Greece; Cæterùm habitari tantùm, tanquam urbem,

wrbe pus ciliu lico, inter The had all D but volt, or p and verin Mac giona

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‡ I exam of ur of ke them, ftrict respect their urbem, Capuan, frequentarique placuit : corpus nullum civitatis nec fenatûs, nec plebis concilium, nec magistratus este. fine consilio publico, fine imperio, multitudinem nullius rei inter se sociam ad consensum inhabilem fore*. The other is as follows, after the Romans had entirely overcome Perseus, and reduced all Macedonia, they restore it to its liberty; but to disarm that liberty of all power of revolt, they divide Macedon into four regions or provinces, not barely by boundary lines, and geographical distinctions, but by disfevering and separating their interests; divisa Macedonia, partium usibus separatis, et regionatim commerciis interruptis ‡.

Under this policy they preferved their provinces, and maintained the empire of Rome; but when they took up the falle policy of establishing and continuing, in time of peace, military commanders in chief in their provinces, the people of the provinces became an army, and that army subverted

† I beg that it may be here understood, that while by this example, I mean to point the danger of giving any principle of union amongst the feveral colonies, and the fure wisdom of keeping this difunion of council and imperium amongst them, I do from principles of policy as well as those of strict justice, invariably recommend the prefervation of their respective constitutions, in the full use and exercise of all their rights and privileges.

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[•] Liv. lib. 26. § 16. lib. 45. § 30.

the empire. " By how much the more remote (fays Machiavell) their wars were, by fo much they thought those prorogations more convenient, by which it happened that the commander might gain fuch an interest in the army, as might make it disclaim the power of the fenate." Publius Philo was the first to whom his military commission was prolonged, and this precedent once fettled, we hear next of the foldiers in Spain declaring L. Marcius imperator in the field. Res mali exempli imperatores legi ab exercitibus et solenne auspicatorum comitiorum in castra et provincias, procul ab legibus magistratibusque, ad militarem temeritatem tranferri *. " This " it was that enabled Marcius and Sylla to " debauch the army; this it was that en-" abled Cæfar to conquer his native country. " It may be objected, that their great affairs " could not have been managed at fo great " a distance, without such commands :- It " is poffible indeed, that their empire might " have been longer before it came to that " height, but then it would have been " more lafting; for the adverfary would " never have been able to have erected a " monarchy and destroyed their liberty fo " foon."-This power, monarchical from its very nature, may have been dangerous to

* Lib. 26. § 2.

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a commonwealth, and have ruined the republic by establishing a monarchy upon it; but it will be asked, How can this ever be the cafe in a regulated monarchy? Can it be fuppofed that any future King can ever with to change that conflitution in which his power is established? Can it be supposed that a free people could ever be fo wild as to put themselves under an unbounded military power, in order to become independent of a limited and civil power? What may be the turn of future events, Heaven only knows; yet experience has taught us that former Kings have thus mistaken their real interest, and former people have been driven to this distraction: And if, on any such suture occafion, there should be found established by repeated and continued cuftom, by unrefifted precedents, the office of commander in chief of all North America, not only in the poffeffion, but in the actual exercise of these powers :- Exercitum parare-bellum gerere -coercere omnibus modis socios atque cives-He might like another Monck, in fuch critical fituation, give the turn to the balance, and negotiate, either with the prince, or the people, as his inclinations and interefts lead him, for the liberties of Great Britain.---If in any future period of events the fate of war should reduce Great Britain to struggle for

for its rights, its power, perhaps its fafety, on terms hardly equal, with all its force, to its support in Europe; and in the course of that ftruggle, there be established in North America a commander in chief, with an army at his command; with a degree of authority prefiding over the civil power, and civil governors; with an extent of command capable of affociating and uniting a number of powers, otherwise, incapable of fuch union: If fuch a man, at fuch a crifis, should have ambition enough to wifh, and fpirit enough to dare to fet up an independent empire in America, he could want, in fuch crifis, no fupport that a wife and artful enemy to Great Britain would not give him: Nunc illud effe tempus occupandi res dum turbata omnia novâ atque incondità libertate essent, dum regis stipendiis pastus obversaretur miles, dum ab Annibale milli duces allueti militibus juvare pollent incepta*. The enemy could not with better ground, than fuch an establishment fo circumstanced at fuch a crifis, nor could take a more effectual measure for the ruin of Great Britain, than fetting up and fupporting an American empire; for there could be no doubt of the fuccefs of the measure, and no doubt of its effect.

* Liv. lib. 24. § 24.

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The prefent government found already established, from the necessity of things in the state of the last war, such a power-and as the effects of that war in America can not be faid wholly to ceafe, while the Indian affairs wear fuch an hoftile appearance, this power is for the prefent continued : But we may confide in the true genuine principles of liberty, which animate the royal breaft; we may trust in the wifdom and prudence of the King's ministry,—that no fuch officer as that of a military commander in chief, prefiding over all North America, and preceeding in military matters, and in the power necelfary to the execution of that command, the conftitutional power of governor; we may truft, I venture to fay, that no fuch office will ever be made an establishment in time of peace. Regular troops are in the fame manner and degree neceffary in North America, as in Britain or Ireland;-but we shall fee them established there under the fame relations to the civil power as in Ireland; we shall fee again the civil governments, as established under commissions patent, and charters, predominate. If I, a private perfon. and wholly removed from all advice or confultation with ministry, might be permitted to indulge a conjecture, I would fuppofe, from fome leading measures which are already taken, of dividing the American army F3 into

into commanderies, and putting a ftop to draughts on general contingencies, that the danger and expence of the office of commander in chief, will foon ceafe: and that the feveral commandants of the troops appointed, each to their respective districts. having every power necessary for the difcipline and government of the regular forces under their command, will be established in the fame relation and fubordination to the civil power of that government, within which their command lies, as the commander in chief in Ireland stands to the fupream civil power of Ireland :--- and that as a commander in chief of those forces may in case of the commencement of hostilities, or of actual open war, be again neceffary;---if fuch neceffity appears first here in Europe, his Majefty will immediately appoint fuch, and that if such necessity should appear first in America, there will be proper provision and regulations made for the giving effect to fuch neceffary powers, without leaving it to the judgment or will of the army to fay when that is neceffary, or what powers in fuch cafe are neceflary .- The feveral governors of the colonies should have instructions, in cafe of fuch emergency, to meet, and in council to give effect to this command, with fuch powers as they shall judge necessary and fafe to a General commanding in chief, until his Majefty's Ma fav. of and veri pre all ord con oth can ter of $\mathbf{m}\mathbf{i}$ to ext ce fue til ſu th pe ca ar fr e

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Majesty's pleasure can be known; that is to fay, power of engaging in general expences, of ordering embargoes, of demanding veffels and carriages, of calling upon the feveral governments for their aid in troops, &c. of preparing an army, of taking poffession of all posts, forts, and castles, (which in the ordinary course of the King's charters and commissions patent to his governors, must otherwife be under their commands-and cannot be taken from them, unless the charters of the government can be fuperceded) of having the command and disposal of all military ftores-none of which powers ought to refide in any one office, whole jurifdiction extends over all North America, and preceeds the civil power of governor- unlefs in fuch cafe of neceffity-unless confirmed (until his Majesty's pleasure can be known) by fuch council, and under fuch reftrictions as the prudence of that council would fee proper. Under fuch an establishment, every cafe of fervice that could arife is previded for, and every cafe of danger that might arife from a predominant military power, is guarded against.

I must the rather fuppose that the military establishment will have that mode given to it; as already the commander in chief, as the commission now stands, is instructed in F_4 "making " making any fuch preparations as shall be neceffary, and are not contained in his instructions, that he shall take the opinion and affistance of the governors."

A review and fettlement of doubted points is no where more neceffary, than in the maxims and rules of their law, and the state of their courts. It is a rule univerfally adopted through all the colonies, that they carried with them to America the common law of England, with the power of fuch part of the statutes (those concerning ecclefiaftical jurifdiction excepted) as were in force at the time of their eftablishment; but, as there is no fundamental rule whereby to fay, what statutes are admissible, and what not, if they admit all, they admit the full eftablishment of the ecclesiastical jurisdiction, from which they fled to this wilderness for refuge ;--- if they once make a diffinction of admitting fome, and rejecting others, who shall draw the line, and where shall it pass? Befides, as the common law itfelf is nothing but the practice and determination of courts on points of law, drawn into precedents; where the circumstances of a country and people, and their relation to the statutes and common law differ fo greatly, the common law of these countries, must, in its natural course, become different, and sometimes even concontr com cafes the f This tries arbit care their derir ferer to, a ther mor thin the fron loni of t I very tho « f " d " 1 ** (« t 66 65

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contrary, or at least incompatible, with the common law of England, fo as that, in fome cafes, the determinations arifing both from the statute and common law must be rejected. This renders the judicatories of these countries vague and precarious, dangerous, if not arbitrary: This leads neceffarily (let what care will be taken, in forming and enacting their provincial laws) this leads to the rendering the common law of the country different, incompatible with, if not contrary to, and independent of, the law of the mother country, than which nothing can be more difadvantageous to the fubject, and nothing more derogatory from the power of the government of the mother country, and from that fundamental maxim, that the Colonifts shall have no laws contrary to those of the mother country.

I cannot avoid quoting here at length, a very precife and juft obfervation of the author of the Hiftory of New York. "The "ftate of our laws opens a door to much "controverfy. The uncertainty with re-"fpect to them, renders property precari-"ous, and greatly exposes us to the arbi-"trary decifion of bad judges. The com-"mon law of England is generally received, "together with fuch ftatutes as were enacted before we had a legislature of our own; "but (74)

" but our courts exercife a fovereign autho-" rity in determining, what parts of the " common and statute law ought to be ex-"tended; for it must be admitted, that the "difference of circumstances necessarily re-" quires us, in fome cafes, to reject the de-" termination of both. In many inftances, " they have also extended even acts of par-" liament, paffed fince we have had a diffinct " legislation, which is greatly adding to our " confusion. The practice of our courts is " not lefs uncertain than the law. Some of " the English rules are adopted, others re-" jected. Two things therefore feem to be " abfolutely neceffary for the public fecurity.

"First, The paffing an act for fettling the extent of the English laws.

"Second'y, That the courts ordain a ge-""neral fet of rules for the regulation of the "practice."

From this representation of things, by an eminent practitioner in those courts, it must be seen that something is wanting, to fix determinately the judicial powers.——But from a further review made by government here, it will be found that much more is wanting.—First, to determine (I do not at all take into confideration which way it be dedetern points other ought ment

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determined, only) I fay, to determine fome points on this head, which are, and will otherwife remain in difpute; but which ought by no means to be fuffered one moment to remain in difpute.

The crown directs its governor to erect courts and appoint the judges thereto .---The actual appointment of the judges is no where directly disputed.-But the power of crecting courts, according to this instruction, is, I believe, univerfally difputed ; it being a maxim univerfally maintained by the Colonists, that no court can be erected but by act of legislature.---Those who reason on the fide of the crown,-fay,-that the crown does not, by crecting courts in the colonies, claim any right of enacting the jurifdiction of those courts, or the laws whereby they are to act.---- The crown names the judge, establishes the court, but the jurifdiction is fettled by the laws of the realm; -and " * cuftoms, precedents, and com-" mon judicial proceedings of a court are a "law to the court, and the determination " of courts make points to be law."-The reafoning of the Colonifts would certainly hold good against the erection of any new jurifdiction, established on powers not known

* Rep. 16. 4. Rep. 53. fol. 298.

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to the laws of the realm; but how it can be applied to the opposing the establishment of courts, the laws of whole practice, jurifdiction and powers are already fettled by the laws of the realm, is the point in iffue, and to be determined. It will then be fixed. beyond difpute, whether the crown can, in its colonies, erect, without the concurrence of the legislature, courts of Chancery, Exchequer, King's Bench, Common Pleas, Admiralty, and Probate or Ecclefiaftical courts.-----If it should be determined in favour of the reasoning, and the claims of the Colonists,-I should apprehend that the confideration of the points under this head, would become an object of government here, even in its legiflative capacity.----In which view it may be of confequence to confider, how far, and on what grounds, the rights of the crown are to be maintained by courts of King's Bench, &c. and how far the revenues by courts of Exchequer, and how far the crown and fubject may have relief by courts of equity.----If in this view we confider the defects which must be found in Provincial courts, those point out the necesfity of the establishment of a remedial general court of Appeal; but if we view the only mode of appeal, which at prefent exifts, we shall see how inapplicable, how inadequate that court is. I cannot, in one view, better

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better defcribe the defects of the provincial courts in these infant governments, than by that very description which my Lord Chief Justice Hales gives of our county courts, in the infancy of our own government, wherein he mentions,

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" First, The ignorance of the judges, who were the freeholders of the county.

" Secondly, That thefe various courts bred variety of law, efpecially in the feveral counties, for the decifions or judgments being made by divers courts, and feveral independent judges and judicatories, who had no common interest amongst them had no common interest amongst them cefs of time, every feveral county would have feveral laws, customs, rules, and forms of proceedings.----

"Thirdly, That all the bufinefs of any moment was carried by parties and factions, and that those of great power and interest in the county did easily overbear others in their own causes, or in such wherein they were interested, either by relation of kindred, tenure, fervice, dependence, or application."

Upon the first article of this parallel, it will be no dishonour to many gentlemen fitting

ting on the benches of the courts of law inthe colonies, to fay, that they are not, and cannot be expected to be lawyers, or learned And on the fecond article it is in the law. certain, that although it be a fundamental maxim of colony administration; that the colonies shall have no laws contrary to the laws of Great Britain, yet, from the fluctuation of refolutions, and confusion in the construction and practice of the law in the divers and feveral colonies, it is certain, that the practice of their courts, and their common law, must be not only different from each other, but in the confequence different alfo from that of Great Britain. In all the colonies the common law is received as the foundation and main body of their law; but each colony being vested with a legislative power, the common law is thereby continually altered; fo that (as a great lawyer of the colonies has faid) " by reafon of the di-" verfity of the refolutions, in their refpec-" tive fuperior courts, and of the feveral " new acts or laws made in them feverally; " the feveral fystems of the laws of those " colonies grow more and more variant, " not only from one another, but alfo from " the laws of England."

Under the third article, I fear experience can well fay, how powerfully, even in 2 courts, courts, have be But in every q for a te faid, a people of hun judges, lawyer the rig the spi fions o fuppor which fuppol it be a to rem practic comm lation of cro liamer ment take i ralty: great were of the every in the

courts, the influence of the leaders of party. have been felt in matters between individuals. But in these popular governments, and where every executive officer is under a dependence for a temporary, wretched, and I had almost faid, arbitrary support to the deputies of the people,-it will be no injustice to the frame of human nature, either in the perfon of the judges, of the juries, or even the popular lawyer to fuggeft, how little the crown, or the rights of government, when opposed to the fpirit of democracy, or even to the paffions of the populace, has to expect of that fupport, maintenance, and guardianfhip, which the courts are even by the conftitution fuppofed to hold for the crown-Nor would it be any injustice to any of the colonies, just to remark in this place, how difficult, if ever practicable it is in any of their courts of common law to convict any perfon of a violation of the laws of trade, or in any matter of crown revenue. Some of our acts of parliament direct the profecution and punifhment of the breach of the laws of trade, to take its courfe in the courts of Vice-admiralty: And it has been thought by a very great practitioner, that if the laws of trade were regulated on a practicable application of them to the state of the colony trade, that every breach of them fhould be profecuted^{*} in the fame way. That there should be an advo-

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advocate appointed to each court from Great Britain, who, having a proper falary independent of the people, should be directed and empowered to profecute in that court, not only every one who was an offender, but also every officer of the customs, who through neglect, collusion, oppression, or any other breach of his truft became fuch.-Here I own, was it not for the precedent already established by some of the laws of trade. I should doubt the confistency of this measure with the general principle of liberty, as established in the trials by a jury in the common law courts. If these precedents can reconcile thefe proceedings to the general principles of liberty, there can be no more effectual measure taken ; yet such precedents should be extended with caution. The defect in most, and actual deficiency in many of the colonies, of a court of equity, does still more forcibly lead to the necessity of the measure of some remedial court of appeal and equity.----In all the King's governments fo called,-the governor, or governor and council are the chancellor, or judges of the court of chancery.----But fo long as I understand that the governor is, by his general instruction, upon found principles of policy and justice, restrained from exercifing the office of judge or justice in his own perfon, I own I always confidered the gover-

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governor, taking up the office of chancellor, as a cafe labouring with inexplicable difficulties. How unfit are governors in general for this high office of law; and how improper is it that governors should be judges. where perhaps the confequence of the judgment may involve government, and the administration thereof, in the contentions of parties. Indeed the fact is, that the general diffidence of the wildom of this court thus conftituted, the apprehension that reasons of government may mix in with the grounds of the judgment, has had an effect that the coming to this court is avoided as much as poffible, fo that it is almost in difuse, even where the establishment of it is allowed. But in the charter governments they have no chancery at all. I must again quote the opinion of a great lawyer in the colonies, " there is no court of chancery in the char-" ter governments of New England, [and I believe I may add alfo in Penfylvania] " nor " any court vested with power to determine " caufes in equity, fave only that the juf-" tices of the inferior court, and the justices " of the fuperior court respectively, have " power to give relief on mortgages, bonds, " and other penalties contained in deeds, in " all other chancery and equitable matters, " both the crown and the fubject are with-" out redrefs. This introduced a practice " of

" of petitioning the legislative courts for re-" lief, and prompted those courts to inter-" pose their authority. These petitions be-" coming numerous, in order to give the " greater difpatch to fuch bufinefs, the le-" giflative courts transacted fuch business by " orders or refolves, without the folemnity " of paffing acts for fuch purposes; and " have further extended this power by re-" folves and orders, beyond what a court of " chancery ever attempted to decree, even " to the suspending of public laws, which " orders or refolves are not fent home for " the royal affent. The tendency of these " measures is too obvious to need any ob-" fervations thereon." Nor do I fee how this measure of proceeding can be ventured upon in the colonies, or fuffered to continue by the government here, if it be fuppofed that by 1 Hen. 4. 14. " it is accorded, and " affented, that no appeal be from hence-" forth made, or in any wife purfued in " parliament in time to come." The general apprehension of these defects occasioned, that at the first planting of the colonies, the King in council here in England was effablifhed as a court of appeals from the provincial judicatories.-----At the time of fettling these colonies, there was no precedent of a judicatory befides those within the realm, except in the cafes of Guernfey and Jerfey, the 9

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the remnants of the dutchy of Normandy, and not united within the realm : according to the cuftom of Normandy, appeals lay to the Duke in council; and upon this ground, appeals lay from the judicatories of these islands to the King here, as Duke in council; and upon this general precedent (without perhaps attending to the peculiar cafe of the appeal, lying to the Duke of Normandy, and not to the King) was an appeal from the judicatories of the colonies to the King in council fettled.-But, befides the inapplicableness of such appeal to the modes of the English law; befides, that this appeal does not actually take place in general, and is in fome of the charter colonies actually excluded, except in perfonal actions, wherein the matter in difference exceeds 300 l. fterling; _____befides the difficulty of this appeal, and inefficiency of this redrefs,-the King in council never being, by the conflitution, in any other cafe, between fubject and fubject, formed as fuch a court of appeal, it fcarce ever, in the temporary and occafional fittings, looks like fuch a court; but is rather accidentally or particularly, than officially attended.

These general apprehensions and reasonings, upon experience, have led many very knowing and dispassionate men in the colo- G_2 nies,

nies, into a conviction of the necessity of fome established and constitutional court of appeal and redrefs: and the following meafure has not only been fuggested, but even taken up as matter of confideration by fome of the ableft lawyers in that country ;---namely, the establishment of a supreme court of appeal and equity, not confined to any one government, but circuiting through a certain diftrict of governments; perhaps as follows; one to Nova Scotia and New England; one to New York, New Jerfeys, Penfylvania, and Maryland-one to Virginia, the Carolinas, and Georgia. It has been imagined, that this court should be established by a commission iffued to two or more perfons, learned in the law, not only of the mother country, but of the feveral governments in its faid district: that this commission should give full powers of a court of chancery, with power also of judging on matters of law, to be brought before this court, by writ of error, from the feveral fuperior courts of the district, which this extended to. Such court would become an established court of appeals and redrefs, would regulate all the courts of law, fo that they could not exceed their jurifdiction; would have a general fuperintendency over all inferior courts; would tend to establish fome regularity, and introduce a conformity, not only amongst the

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abho polit mat the courts themselves, of the different colonies, but a conformity also to the courts of the mother country, in the conftruction and dispensation of law: fuch court would, more than any other measure, not only tend to preferve the laws, and practice of law in the colonies, under a conftitutional conformity to the laws of the mother country; but would also maintain that dependency therein, which is of the effence of colony administration.

There are gentlemen on this fide the water, who feeing that this measure is not without defect, and not feeing the neceffity of a court of chancery at all, as there is nothing contrary to the fundamentals of law, that these law-courts already established should equitize; (if I may fo express myself) —think, that instead of establishing any new courts of chancery, —it would be very proper to abolish even those already established, extending the power which the law-courts already take in chancering bonds, Cc.—by impowering them to equitize: and after that to take such meafures as may best establish a fixt and constitutional court of appeals here in England.

Senfible of the danger of innovations, and abhorrent from tampering in experiments of politics, I mention the following rather as a matter of fpeculation, than to recommend G_3 the the trial: yet I cannot but observe, that while the conflitutions of the governments of the colonies take fo exactly the model of the British constitution, it always struck me as a strange deviation in this one particular, that the governor's council of state, although a diffinct, and I had almost faid, an incompatible board,-with the council, one branch of the legislature, is yet always constituted of the fame perfons, in general nominated and liable to be fufpended by the governor.-One may fee many advantages, befides the general conformity to the government of the mother country, in having these boards diftinct in their perfons, as well as their office. If the council of state remaining under the fame conftitution as at prefent, was compofed of men of the best experience, fortune, and interest in the colony, taken in common from the legiflative council, the house of representatives, or the courts, while the members of the legiflative council, independent of the governor for their existence, had all and only those powers which are neceffary to a branch of the legislature, much weight would be added to administration in the confidence and extent of interest that it would thereby obtain; and to the legislature a more true and political distribution of power, which, instead of the false and artificial lead, now held up by expedients, would throw

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throw the real and conftitutional balance of power into the hands of government.

There is a matter which at first or last will be found abfolutely neceffary to be done, and I would wish to recommend it at this time: that when the Lords of council shall take under confideration the general state of the administration of the King's delegated powers in America, they would order a general revision of the feveral powers granted by the feveral boards here in England, to the officers of different kinds, under their respective departments: If upon fuch revision they shall find that these powers are given and granted without any general concert, or any reference to that union which they ought to have, as parts of the one power centering in, and derived from the crown; if they shall find that the feveral officers and offices in America. though all branches of the one united power of the crown, are by mischievous rivalship of departments, perpetually croffing and obstructing each other; if they shall find them alternately labouring to depress and to depreciate that part of the crown's power, which does not fall within their own delegation; if they shall find that while the several powers of the crown are thus by parts impeached, and rendered contemptible in the eyes of the people, the whole cannot long G 4 remain remain with that authority which should be able to exert an equal and univerfal adminiftration throughout the colonies : if this difconcerted delegation of powers, accompanied with this distraction in the exercise of them, should be found to lead to such confequence, it will be found, as I have repeatedly faid elfewhere, " That it is a dan-" gerous thing to have trufted fo much of " civil power out of the hands of the crown; " and to have done fo little to maintain those " to whom it is entrusted." If this should be found to be the state of things, and there should arife a serious intention of putting the administration of the colonies on a practicable footing, their Lordships will advise, that these powers of the crown, delegated through the powers of the feveral boards and offices in England, shall be fo granted as not to interfere with each other; fo granted as not to ferve the power or purposes of individuals, either board offices, or officers; but in fuch manner as shall unite, strengthen, and maintain the powers of the crown, in the true and conftitutional establishment of them; and in fuch manner as shall render the administration of them in the colonies, aniform, equable, and universal, the common bleffing and protection of the whole. This ought to be done, and it can be done no where, but at the council board-fitting 28

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As depar fter t lony point ture nate alond can t as a this what I do but Brita of (and Lor nity prei was to d in t ing me the ter be as the real, and true, and only efficient board of trade and plantations.

As government, by those ministers whose department it is to fuperintend and adminifter the public revenue, hath taken the colony revenue under confideration; and as the point of right, whether the fupreme legiflature of Great Britain (paffing by the fubordinate legiflatures of the colonies, wherein alone the Colonists fay they are represented) can tax the colonies, is now brought forward as a matter of dispute; I do, as writing on this fubject, think it my duty not to conceal what has always been my idea of the matter. I do suppose that it will not bear a doubt, but that the fupreme legislature of Great Britain is the true and perfect reprefentative of Great Britain, and all its dependencies: and as it is not in the power of the House of Lords or Commons to exempt any community from the jurifdiction of the King, as fupreme magistrate, fo that it is not, nor ever was, or could be in the power of the crown, to exempt any perfons or communities within the dominions of Great Britain, from being fubject and liable to be taxed by parliament. If the fettlers of the colonies were at their migration, prior to the grants of charter and commiffioned-conftitutions, liable to be taxed by parliament, no charters or powers of of any kind granted by the crown could exempt them. When the doubt arifes on expediency, whether parliament should exercife this right, where the colonies have legiflatures that do respectively in each colony lay taxes and raife revenues for the use of the crown in that colony, I think it cannot but be observed, that as there are in each respective colony fervices which regard the support of government, and the special exigences of the ftate and community of that colony, fo there are general fervices which regard the support of the crown, the rights and dominions of Great Britain in general :- That as lands, tenements, and other improved property within the colony, confidered as the private especial property of that community, should be left to the legiflatures of those colonies unincumbered by parliament, should, as the proper object of taxes within the colony, be the special funds of those colonies; so revenues by imposts, excise, or a stamp duty, become the proper fund whereon the parliament of Great Britain may, with the utmost delicacy and regard to the colonies power of taxing themfelves, raife those taxes which are raifed for the general fervice of the crown; becaufe these kind of taxes are (if I may be permitted the expression) coincident with those regulations which the laws of the realm prefcribe to trade in general; to manufactures and

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are duties which arife from the general rights and jurifdiction of the realm, rather than from the particular and special concerns of any one colony.—Whenever therefore this point, now a question, shall be decided, and government shall find it expedient to extend to America, those duties under which trade, manufactures, and bufiness, is carried on in Great Britain, the proper taxes, fo as not to interfere with the fpecial internal property and rights of the colonies, will arife from an impoft, excife, and stamp duty.-The first will arife from cuftoms paid by the exterior trade of the colonies, regulated as hereafter to be mentioned, Secondly, As the objects of manufactures, the product of the colonies, and all articles confumed by the manufacturers, ought not to be exempt from those duties which are paid on the like objects and articles by the manufacturers in England ;- As the manufacturers in America ought in this cafe to be under the same predicament as they are in England, the extension of the excise laws fo far as this rule of equality goes, can never be thought any matter of injustice by the Colonists: But in these laws one caution must be carefully observed, that no article bought by the Colonifts in England, wherein the excife duty already paid is part of the price which they give for it, ought to be liable

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liable to a fecond excife in the colonies. Lafly, As all matters of bufinefs between man and man, transacted either in proceedings or by the directions of law, all matters of bargain or fale done and performed, are done under the regulations and fanction of the laws of the realm, it can never be objected to, as to a point of injustice, that these matters and things in America should be fubject, mutatis mutandis, to the fame duty as the like matters and things are in England. However one doubt will here arife that ought to be well attended to, namely, how far these colonies, who for the neceffity of government and the emergencies of fervice, have already by their proper powers laid these duties on the people, and granted the revenue arifing therefrom to the crown, by acts which have received the confent of the crown; how far these colonies may or may not be fuppofed to have precluded any act of administration here on these heads.—I mention this matter as a point of doubt, which would unavoidably arife; but do not pretend to determine on it.

The rates at which the impost duty should be laid, ought to be estimated by the consideration of the restraints and burthens already lying on the colony trade, by the act of navigation.

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The rates of any excife, if ever it fhould be found proper to extend those laws to America, fhould be estimated by an average made between the price of labour, the price of provisions, and expence of living in those countries, compared with the fame articles here in England, both which may easily be known.

The rates of the ftamp duty ought to be much lower than those laid here in England; because the same kind of transactions, acts, and deeds, passed and done in America, as those here in England, are done for concerns of much less value; but if that duty be laid *ad valorem*, it must regulate itself to the strictest point of equity.

The Colonifts fay with great propriety, that before the mother country determines on the meafure of taxing them, it ought to be well informed of the abilities of the feveral colonies, as to the fpecies and extent of tax which each is refpectively able to bear; that none but their reprefentatives can be *duly* informed of that, and therefore by the very fpirit of the British conftitution, it hath been always hitherto left to the colonies " to judge by their reprefentatives of the ways and means by which internal taxes should be raifed railed within the respective governments, and of the ability of the inhabitants to pay them."

To which it may be anfwered,—that fo long as it is maintained by the government of Great Britain, and not difallowed by the colonies, that the mother country has a right not only to judge of, but to regulate by its laws, the trade, produce, and manufactures of its colonies; the mother country ought to be fuppofed to have the means of being *duly* informed of the ftate of thefe, and therefore to be the proper, and indeed the only proper judge of the whole of this fubject, as a matter of police as well as revenue; in which perhaps the only true grounds and right of laying duties by impoft and excife may lie.

It is faid that the abilities of the colonies are not known, but it is a fhame that it fhould be fo faid; that ignorance fhould be thus imputed to those who ought to be fully informed of this subject; or the art of concealing their circumstances, imputed to those who can have no justifiable reason for concealing them from government:—But this affertion arises from a mistake. Government here in Britain does, or at least may at any time know,

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1. The number of rateable polls.

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- 2. The number of acres in each province or colony, both cultivated and lying in wafte.
- 3. The numbers and quantity of every other article of rateable property, according to the method used by the provinces themfelves, in rating estates real and perfonal.
- 4. Government may know, and ought always officially to know it, what the annual amount of the feveral province taxes are, and by what rates they are raifed, and by what estimates these rates are laid.

From whence, by comparing this effimation with the value of each article, they may always collect nearly the real value of the property of fuch province or colony; all which compared with the prices of labour, provifions, and European goods imported, on one hand, and with the value of their exports, on the other, will as fully and precifely, as all the knowledge and juffice of their own reprefentatives could do, mark their abilities to bear, and the proportion which they fhould bear of taxes with the mother mother country. When this proportion shall be once fettled for the feveral parts, by the fupreme legiflature which can alone extend to the whole; fo long as the arguments and reasoning of the Colonists " that they should be permitted to judge by their reprefentatives of the ways and means of levying thefe internal taxes by rates on polls and effates real and perfonal," go only to the matter of expediency and good policy; whilft this privilege is not claimed as an exclusive right, and extends only to these internal funds, I own that I cannot but think that it would be expedient and of good policy, to continue to them these privileges exercised on these objects, as their proper funds.

As it is my opinion that the polls and eftates real and perfonal are, as the fpecial internal private property of the province, the proper object of the province taxes, and that these ought to be left as the special funds of the province unincumbered by parliament; my endeavouring here to give fome idea of the extent of these funds, and what they would produce annually, at one shilling in the pound on the produce, cannot be misconstrued to be a pointing out of these, as taxes proper to be laid on the colonies by Great Britain : Yet on the contrary, it may show what little reason the Colonis have to complain of those tho mo to unt qua vine ces, Sou Ne the lifts enc tho WOI ma Ih an ma to t hig tur fur on rea the pro tha de tha 1

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those moderate duties and imposts, which the mother country expects them to bear in aid to her, whilst government leaves to them untouched these internal funds, so fully adequate to all the internal fervices of each province.

The following estimates of the provinces. Maffachufett's-Bay to the northward, of South-Carolina to the fouthward, and of New Jerfey in the center, are founded in the tax-lifts of each province; which taxlists, being of ten Years standing, must, in encreafing countries as the colonies are, fall fhort of the numbers and quantity which would be found on any tax-lift faithfully made out at this time. The effimates which I have made thereon are in general at fuch an under-valuation, that I should think no man of candour in the provinces will object to them; although they be, in fome articles, higher than the valuation which the legiflatures directed fo long ago to be made, as the fund of the taxes that they order to be levied on them. This valuation of the effates. real and perfonal, gives the grofs amount of the principal of the rateable property in the province. I think I may venture to affirm, that no man, who would be thought to understand the estimation of things, will object that I over-rate the produce of this property, H when when I rate it at fix *per cent*. only of this moderate valuation; when he confiders that money, in none of those provinces, bears less than fix *per cent*. interest; and that under loans of money, at five *per cent*. most of the best improvements of the country have been made.

The valuation of the provinces, New-York and Penfylvania, lying on each fide of New-Jerfey, are calculated in a different manner, by taking a medium between the fuppofed real value and the very loweft rate of valuation. Without troubling the reader, or encumbering the printer with the detail of thefe tax-lifts, and the calculations made thereon, I will infert only the refult of them, as follows.

The provinces under-mentioned could annually raife, by one shilling in the pound on the produce of the rateable property, estates real and personal in each province :

		£.		
Province	Massachusett's-Bay,			
	New-York,			
	New-Jersey,			
	Penfylvania,	15761	10	0
	South-Carolina, -	6971	I	II
	Sterling, L.	49395	10	01

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Suppose now the rest of the \pounds . colonies to be no more than able to double this fum :

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The fum-total that the colonies will be able to raife, according to their old tax-lifts, and their own mode of valuation and of rating the produce of eftates, real and perfonal, will be, at one fhilling in the pound on the produce, per annum,

In justice to the rest of the provinces, particularized above, I ought to observe that, by the equallest judgment which I can form, I think that the province of South-Carolina is the most under-rated.

I should also point out to the American reader, that, as the calculations and lifts above referred to, are taken from the private collections of the writer of these papers, without any official communication of fuch papers as ministry may be possessed of, I defire him to give no other credit to them, than fuch as, by referring to his own knowledge of the flate of things in the colonics, he finds to be just and near the truth. I should, on the other hand, inform the Englifh reader, that these were collected on the fpot, and communicated by perfons leading, H 2 and

and thoroughly conversant in the business of their respective provinces.

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Another remark is neceffary, That, except what relates to Penfylvania, these collections were made nine years ago; so that, wherever any difference may arise, from the different proportion in which these provinces have encreased, that ought to be carried to account; at the same time, that a certain addition may be made to the whole from the certain encrease of all of them.

If this moderate tax, raifed by the above moderate valuation, be compared with the internal annual charge of government in the refpective provinces, that charge will be found much below the fupplies of this fund. The whole charge of the ordinary expence of government in the province Maffachufett's-Bay, which does, by much, more to the fupport of government, and other public fervices than any other province, is, in time of peace, fterling 12937 *l*. 10 *s*. whereas that of New-York is not more than about, fterling, 4000 *l*. annually.

When these points shall be fettled, there cannot be a doubt but that the same zealous attention, which all parties see and confess to be applied in the administration of the British department to the public revenue, will be ap-2 plied plied to the establishing and reforming that of America.

A proper knowledge of, and real attention to, the Crown's quit-rents in America, by revifing the original defects, by remedying the almost infurmountable difficulties that the due collection of them is attended with, may render that branch a real and effective revenue, which at the fame time will be found to be no inconfiderable one.

By proper regulations for fecuring the Crown's rights in waifs and wrecks, in fines and forfeitures, and by proper appropriations of the fame, that branch of revenue may be made effective: But, whenever it is taken up in earneft, whenever it fhall be refolved upon to give a real official regard to the revenue in America, the office of *Auditor General of the plantations* must cease to be a mere finecure benefice, and be really and effectively established with fuch powers as will carry the duty of it into execution, yet under fuch cautions and restrictions as shall fecure the benefit of its fervice to the use of the crown.

Here it will be neceffary to remark, that, while administration is taking measures to fecure and establish those duties which the H 3 subject fubject ought to pay to government, it much behoves the wifdom of that administration to have care that the fubject hath some species of money out of which to pay.

The British American colonies have not, within themfelves, the means of making money or coin. They cannot acquire it from Great Britain, the balance of trade being against them. The returns of those branches of commerce, in which they are permitted to trade to any other part of Europe, are but barely sufficient to pay this balance .---By the prefent act of navigation, they are prohibited from trading with the colonies of any other nations, fo that there remains nothing but a fmall branch of African trade, and the fcrambling profits of an undefcribed traffic, to fupply them with filver. However, the fact is, and matters have been fo managed, that the general currency of the colonies used to be in Spanish and Portuguese coin. This supplied the internal circulation of their home bufinefs, and always finally came to England in payments for what the colonifts exported from thence. If the act of navigation should be carried into fuch rigorous execution as to cut off this fupply of a filver currency to the colonies, the thoughts of administration should be turned to the devising fome means of supplying the colonies ch to e-

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(103) colonies with money of fome fort or other : and in this view, it may not be improper to take up here the confideration of fome general principles, on which the bufiness of mo-

ney and a currency depends. SILVER, by the general confent of mankind, has become a DEPOSITE, which is, THE COM-MON MEASURE of commerce. This is a general effect of some general cause. The experience of its degree of fcarcenels compared with its common introduction amidst men, together with the facility of its being known by its visible and palpable properties, hath given this effect: Its degree of scarceness hath given it a value proportioned to the making it a DEPOSITE, and the certain quantity in which this is mixed with the poffeffions and transactions of man, together with the facility of its being known, makes it a COMMON MEASURE amongst those things. There are perhaps other things which might be better applied to commerce as a common measure, and there are perhaps other things which might better answer as a deposite; but there is nothing except filver known and acknowledged by the general experience of mankind, which is a deposite and common Paper, leather, or measure of commerce. parchment, may, by the fanction of government, become a common measure to an extent beyond what filver could reach; yet all the H_4

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the fanction and power of government never will make it an adequate deposite. Diamonds, pearls, or other jewels, may in many cases be confidered as a more apt and fuitable deposite, and may be applied as fuch, to an extent to which filver will not reach; yet their fcarcity tends to throw them into a monopoly; they cannot be subdivided, nor amafled into one concrete, and the knowledge of them is more calculated for a mystery or trade, than for the forensic uses of man in common, and they will never therefore become a common measure.

This truth established and rightly underflood, it will be feen that that flate of trade in the colonies is the beft, and that adminiftration of the colonies the wifeft, which tends to introduce this only true and real currency amongst them. And in this view I must wish to see the Spanish filver flowing into our colonies, with an ample and uninterrupted stream, as I know that that stream. after it hath watered and fupplyed the regions which it paffeth through, muft, like every other stream, pay its tribute to its mother ocean : As this filver, to speak without a metaphor, after it hath paffed through the various uses of it in the colonies, doth always come to, and center finally in Great Britain. The

The proportion of this measure, by the general application of it to feveral different commodities, in different places and circumstances, forms its own scale. This scale arises from the effect of natural operations, and not from artificial imposition : If therefore filver was never used but by the merchant, as the general measure of his commerce and exchange, coin would be (as it is in fuch cafe) of no use; it would be confidered as bullion Although bullion is thus fufficient for only. the measure of general commerce, yet for the daily uses of the market fomething more is wanted in the detail; fomething is wanted to mark to common judgment its proportion, and to give the scale: Government therefore, here interposes, and by forming it into COIN gives the scale, and makes it become to forenfic use AN INSTRUMENT in detail, as well as it is in bullion a MEASURE in general.

This artificial marking of this fcale on a natural meafure, is neither more nor lefs than marking on any other rule or meafure, the graduate proportions of it: And this artificial marking of the fcale, or graduating the meafure is of no ufe but in detail, and extends not beyond the market;—for exchange reftores it again in commerce. No artificial ftandard therefore can be impofed. Having

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Having this idea of money and coin, I could never comprehend to what general uses, or to what purposes of government, the proclamation which Queen Ann iffued, and which was confirmed by statute in the fixth year of her reign, could be supposed to extend, while it endeavoured to rate the foreign coins current in the colonies by an artificial standard. It would feem to me just as wife, and anfwering to just as good purpose, if government should now iffue a proclamation, directing, that for the future, all black horfes in the colonies should be called white, and all brindled cows called red. The making even a law to alter the names of things, will never alter the nature of those things; and will never have any other effect, than that of inroducing confusion, and of giving an opportumay to bad men of profiting by that confufion.

The fafeft and wifeft measure which government can take, is not to difcourage or obstruct that channel through which filver flows into the colonies, —nor to interfere with that value which it acquires there ;—but only fo to regulate the colony trade, that that filver shall finally come to, and center in Great Britain, whither it will most certainly come in its true value ;—but if through any fatality in things or measures, a medium of trade, a curin w ci tr J ii

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a currency of money, should grow defective in the colonies, the wisdom of government will then interpose, either to remedy the cause which occasions such defect, or to contrive the means of supplying the deficiency. The remedy lies in a certain address in carrying into execution the act of navigation; but if that remedy is neglected, the next recourse must lie in some means of maintaining a currency specially appropriated to the colonies, and must be partly such as will keep a certain quantity of filver coin in circulation there,—and partly such as shall establish a paper currency, holding a value nearly equal to filver.

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On the first view of these resources, it will be matter of serious confideration, whether government should establish a mint and coinage specially appropriated for the use of the colonies; and on what basis this should be established. If it be necessary that solver, which in bullion is a common measure of general commerce, should, that it may be instrumental also to the common uses of the market, be formed into coin, it should be fo formed, that while it was the duty of the public to form this coin, it may not be the interest of the individual to melt it down again into bullion.

If

If a certain quantity of coin is neceffary for the forenfic uses of the colonies, it should be so formed as *in no ordinary course* of bufines to become the interest of the merchant to export it from thence.

This coin fhould be graduated by alloy, fomewhat below the real fcale, fo as to bear a value in tale, fomewhat better than the filver it contains would fetch after the expence of melting down the coin into bullion, fomewhat better as an inftrument, in common forenfic ufe, than the merchant in ordinary cafes could make of it, in applying it as a meafure by exporting it.

I have here inferted the caution againft ordinary cafes only, as I am not unaware that the lowering the intrinfic worth of the coin for America, will have in the end no other effect, than to raife the price of the European goods carried thither, while the coin will be exported to Great Britain the fame as if it were pure filver.

If fuch a neceffity of an artificial currency fhould ever exist in the colonies, and if fuch a coinage wasestablished, the Colonists would, for the purposes of their forensic business, purchase this instrument either in gold or filver fi p

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filver, in the fame manner as they do now purchase copper coin for the fame purposes.

There are two ideas of a paper currency. The one adopts a meafure for eftablishing a bank in the colonies, which is quite a new and untried measure; the other turns the view to the regulating the prefent paper money currency, which the colonies have had experience of in all its deviations, and to the establishing the same on a sure and sufficient basis.

I have feen this plan for a provincial bank, and think it justice to the very knowing perfon who formed it, to fay, that it must be because I do not understand it, that many objections arise in my mind to it. Whenever he shall think fit to produce it, it will come forth clear of all objections, with that force of conviction with which truth always flows from a mind in full and perfect possififion of it.

In the mean while, I will recommend to the confideration of those who take a lead in business, a measure devised and administered by an American affembly.—And I will venture to fay, that there never was a wiser or a better measure, never one better calculated to serve the uses of an encreasing country, that

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that there never was a measure more steadily pursued, or more faithfully executed, for forty years together, than the loan-office in Pensylvania, formed and administered by the Assembly of that province.

An encreasing country of fettlers and traders must alway have the balance of trade against them, for this very reason, because they are encreasing and improving, because they must be continually wanting further fupplies which their present circumstances will neither furnish nor pay for :---And for this very reason also, they must alway labour under a decreasing filver currency, though their circumstances require an encreasing one. In the common curfory view of things, our politicians, both theorifts and practitioners, are apt to think, that a country which has the balance of trade against it, and is continually drained of its filver currency, must be in a declining state; but here we may fee that the progreffive improvements of a commercial country of fettlers, must neceffarily have the balance of trade against them, and a decreasing filver currency; that their continual want of money and other materials to carry on their trade and bufinefs must engage them in debt-But that those very things applied to their improvements, will in return not only pay those debts, but create

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create also a surplus to be still carried forward to further and further improvements. In a country under such circumstances, money lent upon interest to settlers, creates money. Paper money thus lent upon interest will create gold and filver in principal, while the interest becomes a revenue that pays the charges of government. This currency is the true Pactolian stream which converts all into gold that is washed by it. It is on this principle that the wission and virtue of the affembly of Pensilvania established, under the fanction of government, an office for the emission of paper money by loan.

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Some matters which were intended to have been inferted here, are fufpended for the prefent, for reafons which I hope may lead to more public benefit, than the making them public in this work could do. —I proceed therefore to the confideration of the ordinary mode of making paper-money, by the legiflatures of the colonies iffuing government-notes, payable at a certain period by a tax. It may be useful to give fome defcription of this, and to point out fuch regulations as will become neceffary in this cafe.

This paper-money confifts of promiffory notes, iffued by the authority of the legiflature of each province, deriving its value from being being payable at a certain period, by monies arifing from a tax proportioned to that payment at the time fixed. These notes pass as lawful money, and have been hitherto a legal tender in each respective province where they are issued.

As any limitation of the USES of these notes as a currency, must proportionably decrease its value; as any infecurity, infufficiency, or uncertainty in the FUND, which is to pay off these notes, must decrease their value; as any QUANTITY emitted more than the necessities of such province calls for as a medium, must also decrease its value; it is a direct and palpable injustice, that that medium or currency which has depreciated by any of these means from its real value, should continue a legal tender at its nominal value.

The outrageous abufes practifed by fome of those legislatures who have dealt in the manufacture of this depreciating currency, and the great injury which the merchant and fair dealer have suffered by this fraudulent medium, occasioned the interpofition of parliament to become necessfary :----Parliament very properly interposed, by applying the only adequate and efficient remedy, namely, by prohibiting these colony legislatures from being able to make the paper curP

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currency a legal tender. And government has lately for the fame prudent reafons made this prohibition general to the whole of the colonies. For, when this paper-money cannot be forced in payment as a legal tender, this very circumftance will oblige that legiflature which creates it, to form it of fuch internal right conftitution, as fhall force its own way by its own intrinfic worth on a level nearly equal to filver. The legiflature must fo frame and regulate it as to give it a real value.

These regulations all turn upon the fufficiency and certainty of the FUND, the extent of the USES, and the proportioning the QUAN-TITY to the actual and real necessities which require fuch a medium.

The FUND should at least be equal to the payment of the principal in a limited time; and that time should be certainly fo fixed, as that the legislature itself could not alter it. Where the paper currency is treasurer's notes given for specie actually lent to government, the fund whereon it is borrowed should be also capable of paying, ad interim, a certain interest, as is the case of treasurer's notes in the province Massachusetts-Bay.

This medium ought to be applicable to all the equitable as well as legal uses of filver I money

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money within the colony or province, except that of being a legal tender.

The QUANTITY ought always to be proportioned to the neceffity of the medium wanted; which (the fund and uses being fairly and abfolutely fixed) may always be judged of by the rife or fall of the value in its general currency or exchange: for where the quantity iffued is more than neceffity requires, the value will depreciate : and where the fund is good, and all proper uses of the medium fecured, fo long as no more paper is iffued than neceffity does require, it will always hold a value near to, though fomewhat lefs than filver. On this fubject I here refer the reader to the following very judicious tract, written and given to me, feveral years ago, by Tench Francis, Efq; late attorney-general of the province of Penfylvania, conversant in these matters, both as a lawyer and a merchant. I print and publish it by leave of a near relation, and fubjoin it as containing the most exact and decifive fentiments on this fubject that I have any where met with. I entitle it, CON-SIDERATIONS ON A PAPER-CURRENCY.

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ALL value is given to things for their fitnefs or power to anfwer or procure the neceffary

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This value may be confidered as abfolute or relative. Abfolute value terminates in our efteem of any thing, without referring to any other; relative is that which it has compared with another. The latter only I shall have occasion to treat of.

Men have power to difcover qualities in a thing, which fhall give it value. They can by laws, cuftoms, or fafhions, greatly increafe that value; yet, to know or fix its worth or price, compared with other things à priori, has always been found beyond their reach and capacity.

This is owing to an inability to forefee, eftimate, and govern exactly all the points and circumftances, on which the value of things turns, which are fuch as are in, or follow the nature and order of things in general, and then may be forefeen and judged of with fome certainty; or which confift of the paffions, prejudices, and mifapprehenfions of mankind, whofe number and influences we cannot rate or calculate.

From the *natural* flate and order of things, I think it may be affirmed, that the worth I 2 or or price of any thing will always be, as the quantity and uses amongst mankind; as the uses directly, and as the quantity reciprocally or inversely. Use is the sole cause of value, and value the necessary effect of use. Abating these distinctions of cause and effect, useless and worthless, are fynonymous terms. Every man must agree, that if you add to a caule, you must increase the effect; substract from it, and the contrary effect must follow. Let the quantity of any thing be as 20, and the uses as 20, and let it have a value; let the uses be increased to 30, without inlarging the quantity; it is plain, the equal proportion that every man can enjoy will be as 20 divided by 30, $\frac{2}{3}$ ds only. But this being lefs by + than each man requires, the demand for it, and confequently the value must rife. Substract 10 from the uses when 20, and then under an equal distribution, each shall have double the value he wants. which must leffen the demand, and the value dependent upon it.

Governing the uses is one of the rational powers, that men have over the value of things.

Experience teaches the meaneft underftanding, that price depends on quantity, and that they are to each other inverfely, or the more m as pe of pl rie

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tity of a fhal in t trar any and ufe tim more of one the lefs the other. Water is as neceffary as any thing, and a diamond perhaps as little; yet the fuperfluous plenty of one has rendered it of no worth in most places, and the fcarcity of the other has carried it to an extravagant price.

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Limiting the quantity is another rational power men have over the value of things; and I do not know a third.

From hence it appears, that increasing the uses, and leffening the quantity, and leffening the uses, and increasing the quantity, must always have the fame influence upon the rates and prices of things. Therefore, whenever I shew the effect of one, for brevity's sake, let it be understood, that I suppose the fame consequence will attend the other respectively.

Although I affirm, that variation in quantity or use shall cause a change in the price of a thing, yet I do not fay, that this change shall be in proportion equal to the variation in the quantity or use; for I think the contrary. To instance in quantity, let it be in any thing as 30, and let the use be as 30, and it shall then have a mean value. The use unchanged, let the quantity be at one time as 20, at another 40. Whoever con-I 3 fiders the prevalence of men's appetites for a fcarce commodity, under the dreads and apprehenfions of wanting it, with their different abilities to procure it, on one hand, and their great contempt of ufelefs excefs on the other, must agree it is more than probable, that the difference between the means and the extremes shall not be the fame in the prices, as in the quantities. Merchants, by experience, have found the truth of what I advance. I think they have observed, that leffening a commodity one third from the mean quantity, cæteris paribus, nearly doubles the value; adding a third, fubstracts one half from it; and that by further increasing or diminishing the quantity, these disproportions between the quantity and prices vaftly increase.

It is extremely difficult, if not impoffible, to inveftigate these proportions mathematically; but events springing from use and experience have equal certainty in them, and to all practical purposes are as much to be relied and depended upon.

It is further worth observation, that whatever fluctuates much in quantity, and consequently in worth, will fink beneath its mean value.

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Suppose the quantity of any thing produced in every 50 years be exactly the fame: let the annual product be as one answerable to the neceffities of mankind, then the value in each year shall be as one, and the whole equal to 50. But if the quantity of the annual product fluctuates, there will be annual fluctuations in the value; but as the proportions of the decrease of value, from experience above stated, will be greater than the proportions of the increase of value, this fluctuation will caufe a deficiency in the mean value, which deficiency will always be in proportion to the greatness and quickness This, I presume, is occaof the changes. fioned by the defire of mankind in general to reft on certainty, rather than rely on what is fluctuating and inconftant, though they should expect gain equal to the risque, and by the low circumstances of the majority of men, whose fortunes, in all prudence, direct to the first, rather than the latter. The case of infurances is an evident proof of this remark. If the infurers gain, which I think must be admitted, then they receive a premium beyond the value of the rifque, and this gain the infured pay for certainty against contingent loss.

These few rules of estimating the value of things, well applied, will, I presume, I 4 shew fhew when it is convenient to introduce paper-money into a country, and when it will prove hurtful; what are its advantages and inconveniencies, general and particular, when introduced; of what great importance it is to prevent an excefs in quantity, and to extend the ufes; and nearly what its value will be in any given flate.

If a nation has a quantity of money equal to its commerce, the lands, commodities, and labour of the people shall bear a middle price. This flate is the beft, and tends most to enrich the people, and make their happinefs lafting. If they fhould mint paper to pass for money, the increase of quantity in the former will leften the value of the latter, will raife the price of lands and rents, and make the labour of fuch a people, and the commodities, be rated higher than in other places. Men's fortunes will rife in nominal, not real value; from whence idlenefs, expende and poverty shall follow. Under thefe circumftances, their real money, inftead of their commodities, shall be exported from them. Here the paper will be their bane and destruction. But if their commerce, or ules of money, exceed the quantity of it, their lands, labour, and commodities thall fink beneath their worth in other countries. Few purchasers of lands will be found

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found in regard to the fuperior profit that must attend the use of money in trade: the wealthy merchant shall be at the head of affairs, with few competitions; he shall be able to grind down the farmer in the fale of his commodities, and, when those fail to support him, in the purchase of his lands. The artifan's labour shall be depreciated by the merchant who exports it, or the needy farmer that The wealthy only shall accumulate ules it. riches, the commonwealth shall decline, and in time farmers and artifans must defert the place for another, where their labour shall be better rewarded. Here the use of papermoney will thake off the fetters and clogs of the poor. Merchants will multiply; they will raife the price of labour, and of the Auits of the earth, and thereby the value of lands. An equal diffribution of gain and profit shall succeed, and destroy the partial accumulations of wealth.

I think thefe marks, taken from the value of lands, labour, and commodities, compared with their worth in other countries, will be found the only infallible rules to judge of an equality, excefs, or defect of money in any place wherefoever; and confequently will, at all times, unerringly fhew the neceffity of increasing coins, or the contrary. Had a neighbouring province well understood and

and weighed these points, they had not created a paper credit far exceeding all their ules for money, when they were able to fupply themselves with gold equal to their trade, nor at the fame time have dammed up fo many uses for it, which now cover them with clouds and confusion, that no man can The beft method they fee his way through. can use is to fink it as fast as possible, and not let their fund lie in Britain at an interest lefs than 4 per cent. when it is worth 6 in their own country, and their paper paffes 50 per cent. less than the nominal value. But to return : when it is found neceffary to add paper-money to the coin of any country, to fupport its value ought to be the main and principal view. This will turn upon the FUND, the uses, and the QUANTITY.

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All value arifing from the ufe, I beg leave to call *extrinfick*.

Having thewn that paper-money acquires its extrinic value from the ufes, which ufes apparently may be encreafed or diminithed; I think it would be needlefs and mitpending the reader's time, to demonstrate, that this value must be in direct proportion to the ufes; for it would really amount to no more than the proof of an axiom univerfally acknowledged, that the effect thall always be adequate adequate to the cause. Therefore, in all future arguments, I shall take it for granted.

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The fund ought to be as fatisfactory to mankind as human wildom can devile and furnish.

The community should become security to answer all deficiencies in the FUND; this is not only the highest justice, but the best policy. It is just, because it is a creature of their own, calculated for their private utility and advantage, and is in the management of the country by their reprefentatives and officers. But when they receive an interest from the money, the equity of it is unanfwerable: for it feems wholly inconfistent with justice, that one should receive the interest, and another run the risque of the principal. Policy requires it, because the community will certainly receive more profit from its credit under their fupport, than, with due caution, they can probably lofe by accidents in the fund.

Our next confideration, with refpect to the value, turns on what the fund is to pay, and when. These are arbitrary, being within the power of those by whose authority the money is emitted. But for the present purpose: let us suppose it is to ray filver money, according (

according to the late Queen's proclamation, to the value of 1000 *l*. for fo much of the paper, as, according to the nominal value, amounts to that fum at the end of 15 years. In this flate the 1000 *l*. paper, with regard to the fund alone, at the time of its emiffion is worth no more proclamation money than what will produce 1000 *l*. of that money at the end of the term, at compound interest, under as good fecurity.

For example, take a 1000 *l*. paper, and let it represent that the possibility of the possibility of the process of the possibility of the process of the proces of the process of the process of the process of the pr

On this ftate it appears, that the longer the term, the lefs the value, with regard to the fund alone. From whence it follows, that by increasing the term, this value may be reduced to a degree beneath estimation. But whatever the value thus proved be, I call it *intrinfick*. us re

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The FUND established, I proceed to the uses as they next require our attention in regard to the value of the paper-money.

If value, in respect to the uses of things, shall always be in direct proportion to those uses, (which I prefume I have heretofore proved in general, and shall hereafter shew is true in relation to paper-money) and we defign to raife the power, it follows clearly, that to bring this to pass, we ought to give it all the uses of money, or coined gold and From these uses filver in other countries. alone it must derive all the worth it shall bear beyond what I called the intrinsick value. For the purpose take the case stated on the Fund only, that the poffeffor of 1000 l. paper shall receive 1000 /. proclamation money in exchange for it, at the end of 15 years. On this account the paper appeared to be worth but 417 l. 15 s. 31. But suppose this 1000 l. paper may be immediately exchanged for 800 l. proclamation money, which is $382 l. 14 s. 8\frac{1}{2}$ more than the intrinfick worth, how has it acquired this exceeding price or value? I think plainly from the uses. $\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{0}}$ prove the truth of this, fuppofe all the uses as money taken away; unqueftionably then the worth of 1000 l. paper in proclamation money will be reduced to what I call the intrinsick value; because, depending upon the

the fund alone, it will be exactly in the state of a fund to be paid at a future day; for in neither cafe can the creditor use it in the But if the creditor can by any mean time. contrivance use the fum in that time, as he may the paper when it paffes for money, that use must be something worth. And when experience flews, that under this use the value advances from 417 l. 15s. 31 to 800 l. I apprehend it is evident to a demonstration, that the difference is derived from the ufe. To deny it must be as irrational and abfurd, as if, upon adding and extracting an ingredient to and from a composition, we perceived properties in the composition appear and difappear, and yet were to deny that fuch ingredient was the caufe of those properties. This leads me to attempt the folution of a question I have known frequently made. If we in Penfylvania, upon a fufficient fund answerable in filver, at a future day, mint a quantity of paper equal to the uses of the people for money, and they willingly and univerfally accept of the paper in all payments, why fhould it not, at all times, have value equal to the nominal value, or to the fum chargeable on the fund at the day to come. This reason, urged by many, to fupport the paper to this degree, is drawn from the nature of money in general. Money, fay they, is but a ticket or counter, which represents to the mind of the possessor a quan-

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a quantity or degree of power. No man, on the receipt of it, ever examines how, or from whence it acquired that power, but in order to difcover its reality and duration. For inftance, when an English crown is received, does the acceptor regard any properties in the metal, or the figures of it, but those which are to convince him that it is what it appears to be? a crown. It must be confessed, he does not. If fo, then why may not a piece of paper, under diftinguishing characters and impressions, affixed by law and common confent, have the power of an English crown annexed to it? It is to pass in the same manner as a crown does, and in the end will as certainly be a crown as the real one.

Therefore they conclude, that the paper may, and ought at all times, to be efteemed equal to the quantity of filver the fund is to yield for it at the end of the term.

I confess I think this reasoning fair, and the conclusion just and fatisfactory, if we do not use filver in our commerce, foreign or domestick: otherwise not. The fact is, we do use filver in our foreign commerce. I prefume it will be easily admitted, as the paper represents the filver in the fund, and from thence obtains its credit, that it shall always be

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be at leaft of equal use with, or be as readily received as paper. Then if filver in hand has one power, one use more than the paper, to wit, that of procuring foreign commodities, it is impossible we can effeem them equally. For that would be to controul the different virtues and influences of things over the mind of man, which neceffarily depending upon the things themselves, no laws or confent can, by any means, vary or direct. Wherefore, in the case stated, it feems to me certain and undeniable, that the paper must have less worth than the filver.

Having faid, that the uses of the paper should be as many as possible, it may be proper for me to speak of some of those uses, the equity and advantage of which have been very much controverted. But here let it be understood, that I proceed upon the case last stated, that the quantity of paper is to be equal to all the uses of money within the country. For that state, and a partial supply of paper credit, differing in principles, requiring different reasoning, and infer quite opposite consequences.

First, then, it feems just and reasonable to compel all perfons contracting for filver money, after the law that raises the paper money to be paid in the country, to receive the ily

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the paper in lieu of it, and at the value ftruck from the fund, although that be inferior to the real value. This perhaps may not be frict equity between the contracting parties, but it is just from the community, who have power from the confent of every member, by laws, to prohibit the exercise of a particular natural right inconfistent with the welfare of the whole, and to inflict a penalty upon difobedience to the law. To ufe filver or gold with the paper, must depreciate the latter. Therefore the law forbids This can't be unfair, because every man it. has notice of what coin he is to be paid in, and is not obliged to exchange more for the paper, than he thinks agreeable to the real And if any should endeavour such worth. use, the loss of the difference between gold or filver and paper, is a kind of penalty for violating the law, which must be as just as any other penalty imposed on an act, not evil in itself, but probibited only.

Again, upon breach of contracts for payment of money in foreign countries, I think it both convenient and right, that fatisfaction should be made in the paper. The convenience of it will appear, if we suppose the debtor a member of the society amongst whom the paper passes; for as such, being restrained by law from trafficking for gold

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or filver, and thereby difabled from procuring them, he must either pay paper in compensation, or lie in a goal, if the feverity of his creditors requires it. In these circumstances, no man in his senses would dare to contract a foreign debt, or transfer foreign money in the usual manner, by exchange; the bad consequences of which are too numerous and obvious to admit of, or need particular mention, and evidently prove the convenience of allowing fatisfaction to be made in paper.

The equity of this fatisfaction will be indifputable, if the debtor pays a fum of paper really of equal value with the foreign money. It is the common cafe on breach of fpecifick contract. If it cannot be performed, the most exact justice requires no more than an equivalent compensation.

Some perfons imagining the real worth of the paper equal to the nominal, have affirmed, that it ought to difcharge these debts at the nominal vulue; others confessing a difference between these values, under some political views, have afferted the same. As I shall have occasion to speak on these opinions hereaster, upon a point similar to this I shall only add here, that if this mode of payment should take place, it would as ef-I

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I fu muí of d bour depe on tl filver try. this of hi pofec If th of th ken could ther a pa fectually deftroy foreign credit and negociations by exchange, as if gold or filver were to be infifted on here, to difcharge a foreign debt. In one cafe, it would be the higheft imprudence to be the debtor, in the other, it must be equally indifcreet to become a creditor.

Purfuing the uses, I come to that of difcharging by paper, the filver debts contracted antecedent to the law that raises the paper.

To shew the necessity of admitting this, I suppose it will be granted me, that there must at all times be a very great number of debtors who depend on their future labour and industry to pay their debts. This dependence is reafonable and just, founded on the natural right of all fairly to purchase filver, the then current money of the coun-The debtor has the continuation of trv. this right in view and expectation at the time of his contract; without it he cannot be fuppofed either prudent or honeft to borrow. If then, for the convenience and advantage of the whole fociety, this right must be taken away by a fublequent law which he could not foresee, it annot be agreeable either to reason or good confcience, to exact a payment in fpecie; for that would be re-K 2 quiring

quiring a performance when we had expressly taken away the means. Therefore I think it clear in respect to the debtor, that the paper should have this use. But how will this stand with the right of the creditor, who upon the contract as certainly expected to be paid filver, as the debtor did the opportunity of acquiring it to pay.

I prefume, if he receives as much paper as shall be equal in power or value to the filver, it will be just in itself, and perfectly fatisfactory to him. But can any man offer fo high a degree of violence to his own reason, and the understanding of others, as to affirm, if he is forced to accept lefs, that still he has justice dispensed him. If I borrow 100% in filver before the law, under agreement to repay it at the end of the enfuing year, and before the day of payment the law takes place, commanding the lender to receive 100% paper for it, which shall be worth, or have power to procure 821. filver money only; with truth can this be called a rational or upright law? Certainly no. Nor shall it be any justification to me in conscience to detain 181. of my creditor's money.

The rules of natural juffice flowing from our fixed and unchangeable relations to each other,

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other, and the invariable nature and order of things, inforced by the express commands of God, are of eternal and indifpenfible obligation. No laws, no combinations of human power, customs, usages, or practice, can controul or change them. We may, by the confent of a majority, tie up the compulsory hand of the civil magistrate, and thereby diffolve the power of coercive laws, but can no more abfolve from the moral duty, than we can reverse decrees inrolled in heaven. If my debtor should be fo extremely weak, as to suppose this not criminal because it is legal, (which I think next to impoffible to imagine of a rational creature, and I make bold to affirm, never was the cafe of a creditor of understanding, fufficient to know the measure of his demand) his opinion perhaps may ferve for an excuse, or extenuation of his crime. but never can prove the rectitude of the act, and still the guilt must rest somewhere. The lawmakers, the authors of his mistake, are culpable, unlefs they are under the fame delufion, which is yet more difficult to appre-Some, who gave up the justice of the hend. law, defend their practice under it, by faying, they are creditors as well as debtors: and as they are obliged to receive, fo they fhould have liberty to pay. Alas! what feeble arguments fatisfy, when they are cafe K 3 into into the scale of interest, and gain is the confequence of conviction. If the actions of men towards us are to be the measures of our dealing with others, then he that is cheated by any perfon, may justly plunder the next he meets. And truly I can't fee why it should stop here; for as we may be many times defrauded, and not know it, to be fecure, and keep the ballance on the right fide, we should pillage our neighbours as often as an opportunity offers. This may feem fevere reafoning, but really I think it fair from the first position; that because one keeps back part of another's due, therefore he may honeftly detain the right of a third innocent perfon.

Again, paying an equivalent cannot be injurious to the debtor. For fuppofe he pays 120 l. paper. If 100 pounds worth of coin'd filver, reduced to bullion, will then yield him to much, what does he more than perform his contract to pay 100 l. of coin'd filver? feeing a compleat recompence is perfectly confiftent with the right of each contracting party. Any remaining objections must arife from its being hurtful or injurious to the fociety in general. This has been afferted, and endeavours have been used to fupport the truth of it, by this kind of reafoning.

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First, if the law should oblige the debtor (for the purpose) to pay 120l, paper in lieu of 100l filver, the legislature would thereby confess the inferior worth of the paper, which will be attended with this ill confequence, that the general current value of the paper shall be less than if the law had declared it equal to filver.

Secondly, That leffening the current value will be a lofs to the fociety in general. To the first, That obliging to pay a larger sum of paper for a lefs of filver, acknowledges an inequality of value under the like denominations is self-evident. But from thence to infer, that the paper shall pass in general, at lefs value than if they had been declared equal, with submission, I think mistaken, and inconclusive reasoning.

To be clearly underftood, permit me to examine this upon the fact. Suppose the law, in the ftrongest terms, enacts that the paper shall be in value equal to filver money, according to their several denominations. Carry the paper from thence to use, by offering it in exchange or payment for some commodity, and then I ask a short question, Who it is that really sets a value on the paper, the legislature, or the person that has the commodity to fell? If it be answered, the first, then I say, this cannot be, unless they K 4 also

alfo limit the price of the commodity. For if the feller can raife and proportion the price of it to what he thinks the real worth of the paper, the law-maker's declaration notwithftanding, it is he that ftrikes the value, and not they. For instance, put the cafe; a farmer, just upon emitting the paper, has a bushel of wheat to fell, which he rates at, and will not part with, under three filver shillings. The future current worth of the paper being unknown to him, let him by guels imagine these three shillings equal to four shillings paper. A purchaser then preffes him, under the influence of the law, to accept of three paper shillings for this wheat; but he, without regard to the law, according to his own opinion, demands and receives four shillings for it. Will any man fay, the legiflature determined the value of the paper here? Apparently the feller did. For the legislature commanded, that the three paper shillings should be valued at three of filver, but the farmer has made his estimate at three fourths of that value only. Unquestionably the vender must always have this power, unlefs, as I' faid before, the law-makers can limit the price of all commodities, which is not practicable, confiftent with the order of things in the prefervation of men's properties. But it may be alledged, although the receiver of the money

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ney is not bound to obferve the legiflative command, yet ftill it may have fome weight. He may confider it to be the impartial opinion of the wifeft part of the fociety, what the future current value of the paper fhall be, and thereby add, in fome degree, to its worth.

In answer I must observe, first, this gives up the point of power, and changes it to a matter of meer advice. Then, supposing that of any import, furely delivering it in a mandatory way, will be very little able to produce the defired effect. Imperative advice (pardon the expression) favours too much of felling the rabbit, to prevail or perfuade. In fhort, the words command and advife, convey two ideas fo widely different, and fo opposite and repugnant to each other, that it is abfolutely impossible we should take the first for the last. But granting it to be interpreted as a piece of cordial advice. Shall it be received implicitly, and pass without any examination? I prefume not. When it comes to be examined, if the people should be informed, that, upon a nice examination, the legislature had found a fourth, fifth, or fixth difference between filver and paper, as fuch calculations are generally out of the reach and comprehension of most people, it seems not improbable that the paper might pass at firft.

first, agreeable to the given difference. I fay at first; for I contend, if the calculation should be erroneous, (which the use of the money in time will discover) this effect shall not be lasting. But if, on the contrary. they learn that the paper, without any calculation, by guefs, was pronounced equal to filver, which every man's judgment, who knows the superior power of the last, must difapprove of, what influence can the legiflative advice then have? Undoubtedly it will be univerfally rejected, and each perfon turned at large to make his estimate as well as he can, without the least regard to the legiflative opinion.

Once more, take it, that the quantity of filver in 100 shillings proclamation money is now worth 120 paper shillings in Pensylvania, and suppose this requisite had hitherto been omitted in all laws relating to the paper: let the supreme authority to-day enact, that from henceforth all perfons shall give as much for 100 shillings paper as they do now for that quantity of filver, would this make the least alteration in the current value of the paper? Might a man, with reafon, expect to buy more bread or wine to-morrow with 100 paper shillings, than he can to-day? if the legiflative power can bring this to pass, perhaps it may prove more than loine

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fome people defire; for I conjecture it will fhew, that we never had any occasion for paper. Whatever quantity of filver we had amongst us, when the paper was struck, might have been extended in value proportionable to our wants, and all the business of paper-money done at once. The absurdity of this lies open to the meanest capacity; yet I aver, that to raife the value of paper by authoritative words or commands, is equally irrational and unfeasible.

I know no just means whereby mankind can give value to things, but increasing or leffening the uses or quantity. The paper derives its intrinsick worth from THE FUND which is stable and fixed. The uses give it further value, but that shall always be in inverse proportion to the quantity. The quantity is absolutely under the direction of the legislature, but the uses not. As they are raifed, fo they must be limitted, by our neceffities, and the disposition and order of things. The utmost the legislature can do, or is needful to be done, is to make the paper answer all those uses. When they have afcertained the FUND, the uses and quantity, their power expires. And the current value, if the people receive it, flows from them by fo unavoidable and a neceffary confequence, that whatever the legiflature or others will

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will or do, (if it alters not the fund, uses, or quantity) can work no change in it in general. For a time, as long as people are ignorant, I confess it may; but when experience, that excellent mistress, has disclosed what worth they give, all imaginary value shall cease and vanish, and on the three requisites, as on a folid and firm foundation, it shall ultimately rest and settle.

I conclude what I have to fay on this point with a fhort observation. That all the attempts of affemblies in America in this way even by penalties on disobedience, have proved fruitless and abortive. And it has been extremely remarkable, that although transgreffing the law, by making a difference between filver and paper, has been every day's practice, not in fecret, but openly, I have never heard, that any perfon has been fo much as queftioned publickly, or has loft any degree of reputation privately for doing it. So far do the dictates of just and right reason surpass and transcend the force and power of any human device or inflitution, that opposes or contradicts them.

I come now to confider the fecond polition; that leffening the current value will be difadvantageous to the fociety in general.

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f Y This cannot be maintained without proving, that it will occasion a loss, or obstruct fome gain.

A fociety can gain but two ways, from the earth, and from their neighbours. When I fay from the earth, I do not mean from her fimple productions only; for I include therein mens labour and manufactures upon them afterwards. Excepting diffinction, which has no weight in the prefent queftion, they can lofe only by the contrary, neglecting the fruit and product of the earth, and fuffering their neighbours to carry away their wealth.

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I prefume it will be very hard to shew, how a different valuation of the money can influence the industry of the land-holder or the artifan.

Upon the quantities of the fruits of the earth, and manufactures produced, entirely depend the wealth of the country. A farmer and tradefman, for a certain portion of their commodities one year receive 8 fhillings, and with them can purchafe an ounce of filver. The money being raifed in value next year, they can get but 7 fhillings for the fame quantities; but ftill that fum will buy an ounce of filver. Can this difference,

ference, in the value of the paper, caufe the one to till the more or lefs ground, or the other to make a greater or lefs quantity of his manufacture? What is it to them how the money is rated, if they receive and part with it at the fame value? Gold, comparing quantity to quantity, is more valuable than filver. If filver was to vanish out of the world, and gold should be made the only medium of commerce, can any one imagine that mankind would grow more industrious to procure it, because more valuable than filver, when the quantity they shall get must be proportionably less? Do we in fact find these different effects from gold or filver at prefent? I think we may as reafonably expect, that varying the measure of the bushel or yard, will induce people to make more or lefs corn or cloth, as that changing the value of the money, which is another kind of measure for commodities, should excite or abate men's diligence to raife and make them.

All gain from our neighbours must be by getting their money or their goods. These are to be acquired only by conquest or commerce. The first I pass over as impertinent to this purpose. Then let us see whether advancing the value of the money can reflect any gain to us from them in the latter. Gain in trade may be considered as derived rive The circo of find adv from

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W value tion; in no per expe it at rived from the manner or the measure of it. The manner of trade in general is of short circuit, and confists of importing foreign money or commodities, and the exportation of our own. In these negociations we shall find the worth of the paper affords us no advantage over, or an opportunity to get from our neighbours.

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Suppose a foreigner imports 800 l. proclamation money, and finding That not the medium of our commerce, proposes to exchange it for paper. Let the value of the paper be such, that he can get but 800 l. of it for his filver. With the paper he purchases corn, which he transports. What have we got from this foreigner ? 800 l. in filver. Should we have got less had he received 1000 l. for his filver, and with it bought the same quantity of wheat? Certainly no. Neither case makes us richer or poorer than the other; and the same consequence will be found to attend all foreign imports whatever.

When we export our commodities, the value of the paper is quite out of the queftion; for in their fales, or the returns, it is in no fort concerned. If we fend the paper abroad, and fell it, unlefs it by kept in expectation of what the fund will yield for it at the end of the term (which I intend to fpeak

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fpeak to hereafter) we shall find it but an exchange of merchandizes between us and them. For the feller brings the goods he receives here, and the buyer, by means of the money, carries back our goods; the paper is but a measure, as it was in the case of imports and exports in return; and if it be rated alike abroad and at home, no loss or gain can ensue to either country, or to the traders from a high or low valuation of it.

He that is not fatisfied by these reasons, may perhaps be convinced by the experience of others. The coins of England being finer than those of Holland, quantity to quantity, are of more value; but was it ever thought the English had therefore more power or traffick, to obtain the money and merchandize of other nations, than the Dutch ?

Were it possible that the profit of trade could be affected by lowering the coin, that cunning and skilful generation would hardly have debased theirs by design, much less have continued for so long a time as they have done. The paper-currency of New England, by a great excess in the quantity, is funk to a shameful degree. From hence we hear of much fraud and discould discuss amongs them; but it was never yet objected that it injured them in trade. In truth, if it had, as they principally subsist by commerce,

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merce, they must have been ruined and undone long ago.

The currencies of North and South Carolina are in the fame condition; but still their trades go on as ufual, without the least alteration. In respect to the measure of our commerce, it is evident that cannot be impaired by reducing the value of our money, unlefs we are thereby deprived of a fufficient quantity to carry it on : for instance, if 60,000 /. proclamation money be neceffary to carry on all our trade, and we strike 60,000 l. paper, in hopes it shall have that value, upon experience it proves worth but 50,000 l. proclamation. Then, for want of the remaining 10,000 l. fome of the wheels of trade must stand still or move flower, which apparently will obstruct a part of our gain. But the impediment vanishes, by raising an additional fum of paper equal to the 10,000 /. deficiency. The power of doing this we have hitherto enjoyed and exercised without any reftraint; and probably shall retain as long as we use it with difcretion and prudence.

Seeing then, that by raifing the value of our money, we are not likely to get any thing from our neighbours, let us now try whether by lowering it they can get any thing from us. I prefume I have proved, that in com-L mon

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mon commerce, receiving and returning the money for merchandizes, they cannot; confequently no method remains, but keeping the money to receive filver from the fund at the end of the term. By these practices they can gain from us only upon one fuppolition; that they purchase the money at lefs than what I call the intrinfick worth: for if at more they lofe by it, and we gain I have thewn, rating interest from them. at 6 per cent. per annum, that 1000 l. payable at the end of 15 years, is worth 500 l. to take a round fum, in hand. If our neighbour can buy it for 400% he gets 100%. from us. But on the contrary, if he gives 800 l. for it, he lofes 300 l. For he lends us 800 % for 15 years, at 2 % 8 s. per cent. per annum, when it is really worth 61, and the difference, which on computation will be found in the whole to amount to 300% or nearly, we gain from him. But neither of these cases can possibly happen while men have the leaft capacity to difcern and preferve their own interest. Indeed 1 have never heard one found reafon, either moral or political, for this manifest deviation from justice So far is it from good policy, and equity. that if I am not mistaken, it must work an effect contrary to the defign ; and inftead of fupporting the credit of the paper, undermine and diminish it.

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The public authority is guarantee for the payment of all juft debts. Every body muft agree, that the value of paper money is nothing but fo much public credit. Now, is it poffible for the public authority to break its own engagements, in refpect of the payment of the debts, without in fome degree blafting that credit which is to be the fupport of the money? Public and private faith are, in this refpect, exactly alike; and it is as eafy to fee how violating one public obligation fhall impair the value of the paper-money, as how a known breach of private contract in a goldfmith fhould leffen the worth of his bills or notes.

A fecond inconvenience attending it, is loss of foreign credit, which must be a great misfortune to a trading country. This is occafioned in the fame manner, by which I just now shewed the value of the money might be affected; and let it not be thought amifs that I mention a third inconvenience, namely, proftituting and debafing the dignity and excellence of the divine and moral laws in the eyes of the people, and encouraging them, by ill practices and examples, to depart from true honefty and virtue. For if a man can once believe, he may juftly, by human authority, transgress those laws, he lofes much of the due and neceffary respect L 2 that

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that ought to be paid them, and fhall afterwards be able to refift their checks and admonitions with greater eafe and facility: and he that owes to 20 people, and pays them with five fixths of their due, and fees his neighbour do the like, under colour of law to-day, will, I am afraid, with lefs regret and compunction, defraud his creditors without a law to-morrow.

But now, granting entire recompence ought to be made, it may be afked how the quantum of paper to be paid for antecedent filver debts shall be afcertained.

The legiflature cannot fettle it with exact justice, because no skill can discover what the future current value shall be; and if the people are left to do it themfelves, it will introduce many law-fuits and oppreffions, and ftill they may be as far from right as if the legiflature had done it. The greater inconveniencies in the latter, rationally determine the power to the former. When they come to exercile it, if it is the first experiment of the kind, I imagine they can do little more than guess at the value. But as it is within demonstration, that the paper cannot be equal to filver, furely it ought not to be rated fo. Impartiality requires the guess to be as near as may be, and then, although it may inay be mistaken upon the laws of change: it may be perfectly equal, because either party may lofe or gain. It is a common cafe in life, and must be always fo in untried things, and no man can justly complain of the event, becaufe all errors are owing to . our weaknefs, not our faults.

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If any of our neighbours have iffued paper-money, the value of theirs will afford us ftrong lights to difcover the worth of our own, and allowing for different circumstances, we ought to rate ours as they have found theirs upon trial. But when experience has taught us the true worth of the money, all difficulty ends, and whatever debts or precontracts remain (as many from their growing nature must) should be fatisfied according to that value.

I have now run through all the uses that occur to me worthy of observation; and therefore shall proceed to the quantity.

When it is defigned, that paper shall be the only money of a country, the quantity, according to the nominal value, ought to be, as near as poffible, adequate to the ules, or in other words, to all commerce, foreign and domeflick. It is eafier to fee the truth of this rule in fpeculation, than to reduce L it

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it to practice; because the number and extent of the ules of money, in a populous and industrious country, are far beyond our knowledge and comprehension. From the circumstances of other places, the quantity of money current before iffuing the paper, and the value of their exports, rational conjectures may be formed, but experience alone can teach us what fum will fuffice. To ftrike the neceflary quantity at once, would be most advantageous to the fociety, and equal with respect to individuals; but as that cannot be known, let it be approached as near as may be. And fince we may expect to err, I prefume it will be better to err on the fide of deficiency than excels, feeing additions are eafy, but substractions oftentimes very difficult after emiffion.

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FROM what I have faid above, which the foregoing treatife doth fully confirm and elucidate, the following propositions, which I apprehend to be truths, do arife. That in colonies, the effence of whofe nature requires a progreflive increase of fettlements and trade, and yet who, from the balance of trade with the mother country being against them, must fusfer a constantly decreasing quantity of filver money, a certain tain quantity of paper-money is neceffary. It is neceffary to keep up the increafing operations of this trade, and thefe fettlements; it is alfo neceffary, in fuch circumftances, to the equal diffribution and general application of thefe benefits to the whole colony, which benefits would otherwife become a monopoly to the monied merchant only: it is prudent, and of good policy in the mother country to permit it, as it is the fureft means of drawing the balance of the colony trade and culture to its own profit.

These reasonings further shew, how, by fecuring the *fund*, extending the *uses*, and regulating the *quantity*, this measure of a paper-currency may be carried to the utmost extent of which it is capable. Nor do they shop here; for as they give the rule whereby to judge of the excess or defect of money in any place whatsoever, so do they, at all times, shew the necessity of encreasing it, or the contrary.

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Although the reasonings, which from my own sentiments of the matter, I have applied to this subject, and those, with which I am able to oblige the world, by publishing the above very judicious and able tract, do perfectly coincide in these points: yet upon the point of the USES, in considering the reme-L 4 dies dies to be provided against the iniquity of any fallacious depreciation of this paper-money, our reasonings seem to divide on quite different fides of the question. The author of the above tract afferts, that in colonies, where paper-money is created, the people of that colony fould be compelled by law to receive it in payments: and he states two or three different cases in proof of his affertion. My opinion fuggefts, that this paper-money ought by no means to be a legal tender : and yet, different as these propositions may appear, they will be found to coincide in the application of the remedy; in the only proper and radical remedy, the not permitting the paper-money to be a legal tender. This gentleman experienced in the politicks of the colonics, and knowing the danger, if not the impracticability, of any legiflature in these colonies adopting this maxim, takes up the reafonablenets and neceffity of this papermoney being forced into payments by law;but then, in all the cafes wherein he ftates the remedy in equity, against the injustice, which may arife from the artificial value of this paper-money thus declared, he firmly aud juftly declares, that the payment thus by law forced upon the creditor in paper, ought not to be according to the nominal legal value of that paper, but according to the real value, an equivalent to the debt.-This

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This judgment totally deftroys the maxim of its being a legal tender. In the application therefore of the remedy, our opinions do not differ, but the truth of them becomes the more elucidated by this coincidence of two thus feemingly different propositions .---I will therefore proceed in faying, that by the reasonings above it appears, that the only and proper remedy, against the iniquities of a falacious, depreciating paper-currency, is that radical one, of not permitting this papermoney to be a legal tender.----On the other hand, fo confirmed am I in my opinion of the neceffity and propriety of a certain quantity of paper money in the colonies, that were I not convinced, that the reftraining of it from being a legal tender, will not deftroy the existence of it, but, on the contrary, amend its currency; I would even facrifice my conviction to this point of utility: but whatever apparent value this paper-money may feem at first view to lose by restraint of this one use, this very restraint, (if the colonies will have paper-money) must become an occasion of to meliorating and fecuring the fund, of fo exactly regulating the quantity, and of adding fome other valuable ufc, namely an interest, or some premium equivalent to it; that the paper-money shall become thus intrinfically, and of its own nature, a better and furer currency than all the power and authority of colony-government could make

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For not being forced into curmake it. rency, by any external value derived from authority, it must, like bullion in coin, derive its currency from its intrinsick value and applicableness to the purposes of money;fo that thus becoming, from neceffity, a more determinate measure, a more practical instrument of trade, and a more beneficial deposit, as bearing an interest even while in currency, it becomes to have all the uses of bullion in coin, and one more,----fo as even to bear a premium,—which in fact is the cafe of the treasurer's notes in the province of the Maffachufetts-bay in New England, though they are not a legal tender.

However, here, as on every other point, I have flated the reafonings on both fides of the queftion :-----I have brought the queftion to its iffue, and left those, whose duty it is, and who have a right to do it, to determine the truth and right of it.

Matters being revifed and regulated as to the feveral points of the conftitution, and internal police, our politicks ought next to confider and have regard to those relations, by which the interests of the American settlements stand referred to the Indian country, and its inhabitants. Our colonies must neceffarily

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neily ceffarily have connections both of trade and politicks with these people, of a nature different from any other, as they are planted in countries inhabited by a race of people, who differ in their circumstances and in their politicks from any other nation with whom there remains, either in history or on record, any example of alliance.

Perhaps it may not be unentertaining, I am fure it is neceffary to the true knowledge of Indian affairs, to take up this fubject fomewhat higher than has been ufual in the ordinary way of confidering it.

The different manner in which this globe of earth is posseful occupied by the different species of the human race which inhabit it, must form the specific difference in their interests and politicks.

The human race, which are at prefent found on this earth, may be precifely divided into three families, generically, and in their effential properties, diftinct and different each from the other. And, for aught I know, it is to this natural truth, that the heavendirected pen of the author of the books of Mofes may refer, when he gives precifely and only three fons to Noah. These three different species, or race, are—The white race—

race-the red-the black. It is not barely the colour of these two first, which distinguishes them; the form of their skull, and their hair, where there has been no mixture, is fpecifically different from each other; and a true Indian will not judge by any other diffinction: the black race has wool instead of hair, as also a form of skull different from each. These books, after having given a philosophical account, cloathed in drama, of the origin of things, feems to confine its real narrative to the hiftory of the white family, to that race of people who have been landworkers from the beginning, who, wherever they have fpread themfelves over the face of this globe, have carried with them the art of cultivating vines, and fruit trees-and the cultivation of bread corn ; who, wherever they have extended themfelves, have become fettlers, and have constantly carried with them the sheep, goat, oxen and horfe, domiciliated and fpecially applied to the uses and labour of a fettlement.

Of the black family I fay nothing in this place, as not concerned in the prefent confideration.

The red family, wherever found, are wanderers. The Tartars are in one part wandering herdfmen, and in other parts hunters hui hal the in ple oth the of fpe gua for

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
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
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hunters and fifhermen. The American inhabitants, Indians, as we call them, from the word Anjô, or Ynguo, fignifying a man in their language, are the fame race of people from one end of the continent to the other; and are the fame race or family as the Tartars, precifely of the fame colour, of the fame form of fkull, of the fame fpecies of hair,—not to mention the language and their names.

America, in its natural state, is one great forest of woods and kes, stocked not with sheep, oxen, or horses; not with animals of labour, and fuch as may be domiciliated, but with wild beafts, game and fifh; vegetating not with bread-corn, but with a fpecies of pulfe, which we call maize, of which there is great doubt whether it be indigenous or not.—All therefore that this country afforded for food or raiment must be hunted The inhabitants confequently would for. naturally be, as in fact they were, not landworkers, but hunters; not fettlers, but wanderers. They would therefore, confequently, never have, as in fact they never had, any idea of property in land, of that property which arifes from a man's mixing his labour with it. They would confequently never have, as in fact they never had, any one communion of rights and actions as extendcd







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ed to fociety; any one civil union; and confequently they would not ever have any government. They know no fuch thing as administrative or executive power, properly to called: they allow the authority of advice, a kind of legiflative authority; but there is no civil coercion amongst them: they never had any one collective actuating power among the whole, nor any magistrate or magistrates to execute fuch power.

The race of white people migrating from Europe, ftill continue landworkers, and have made fettlements in parts of America which they occupy, and have transported thither bread-corn, sheep, oxen, horses, and other usual and domestic animals, that are domiciliate with these fettlers.

They are a community—they are a fociety—they live under government, and have a fixed property in their lands, have a fixed permanent intereft, which must fubfift under a continued feries of fecurity. The locality of the labour of these fettlers, neceffarily produces a reciprocation of wants and an intercommunion of fupply, by exchange of mutual neceffaries. This also leads to an intercourse of commerce with others, who are not immediately within their communitynit to

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nity—And hence arifes a commercial interest to these settlers.

From the European defire of having the furs and peltry of the Indian hunters, and from the Indian defire of having the more uleful and neceffary tools and inftruments of improved life, an artificial reciprocation of wants has arilen between the European fettlers, and the original inhabitants of America, which hath gradually extended itfelf to many articles not at first called for—And from this intercourse of commerce has arisen a neceffary relation of politicks between them.

The only true spirit which ought to actuate these politicks, must arise from a due knowledge of the circumstances and interests of each, and from a constant invariable attention to that composite interest which is formed by their alliance.

The interest of a community of settlers must lye in a permanent series of security to their cultured lands, as the making settlements is by the successive yearly application of repeated labour, and of its eventual future effect. Settlers and landworkers want but small tracts of land; but must have a fixed and permanent local property therein. A nation of hunters require a much greater extent

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foand ye a ofift locefand nge o an vho nuyextent of country, in proportion to the wide extended produce of a hunt, to the local bounded produce of a farm or fettlement; fo that the Indian property of country confifts of two forts, their dwelling lands, and their hunt.

The interest of a tribe of wanderers lyes in the protection and support of the aged, of the women and children—under the temporary locations of dwelling, which the feverity of the winter season, the occasion of the procuring pulse in the season of vegetation, and the times of parturition, render neceffary even to wanderers.

As fixed regulations and protection of trade, must be the effential spirit of the politicks and the law of nations to a commercial nation *, so an exact and strict obfervance

* Hunting being but the amufement, the diversion of a nation of fettlers, the rights and laws of it may not appear as national points—but to a nation of hunters thefe become the national interests and the laws of nations.—A violation of thefe laws of nations; as subfissing between nations of hunters, was the caufe of the war between the Five nation confederacy, and the Oilinois. The Ohio hunt, to the fouth-east of lake Erie, was common to these nations; the laws of the hunt required, that at each beaver-pond, the Indians should leave a certain number of males and females; the Oilinois, on fome occasion of pique, destroyed all. The fe te fa fa fa bonn

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erfion t may hunws of t fubof the l the l ake of the dians hales; ed all. The fervance of the laws of fporting, the protection of the game, and the most rigid fanction of the *bunt*, (better perhaps underflood by our fportsmen than our politicians) become the *laws of nations* to an *bunting nation*.

From these principles let us carry our confiderations into facts.

The European landworkers, when they came to fettle in America, began trading with Indians; and * obtained leave of the Indians to cultivate fmall tracts as fettlements or dwellings. The Indians having no other idea of property, than what was conformable to their transfent temporary dwelling-places, eafily granted this. When they came to perceive the very different effect of fettlements of landworkers creating a permanent property always extending itfelf, they became

The Five-nations declared war against the Oilinies. The Indian war ends not but in the total reduction of the one or the other. The Oilinies were totally conquered. The conquered country, as well as the hunt, became the right of the Five-nations, and were, amongst the rest of their lands, put, by them, into the hands of the English in trust.

* Perhaps New-England may be an exception : The Indians began an unjuft war against them; they.conquered these Indians, and their claim is best, as well as justly, founded in conquest, which the Indians acknowledge.

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very uneafy; but yet, in the true fpirit of justice and honour, abided by the effects of concessions which they had made, but which they would not have made, had they understood beforehand the force of them.

From this moment the politics of the Indians were fixed on, and confined to two points. The guarding their dwelling lands and their hunts from the encroachments of the European fettlers; and the perpetually labouring, to our utter fhame, in vain, to establish fome equitable and fixed regulations in the trade carried on between them and the Europeans.

The European encroachments, not only by the extent of their fettlements, but by their prefuming to build forts in the Indian dwelling lands, and in the territories of their hunts, without leave, or by collution; and the impositions and frauds committed against the Indians in trading with them, has been the occasion of constant complaint from the Indians, and the invariable fource of Indian hostilities: and yet even these might have been furmounted, were it not that we have conftantly added an aggravation to this injustice, by claiming a DOMINION in confequence of a landed poffeffion. Against this the free spirit of an Indian will revolt, to the last drop of his blood : This will be perpetual, unreof of ch er-

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unremitted cause of war to them against us. Against it, they have at all times, and upon all occasions protested, and they will never give it up. As long as we keep up this ufelefs, faithlefs claim of dominion over them, fo long shall we be embroiled in war with them. The European power may perhaps finally extirpate them, but can never conquer them. The perpetual increasing generations of Europeans in America, may fupply numbers that must, in the end, wear out these poor Indian inhabitants from their own country; but we shall pay dear, both in blood and treasure, in the mean while, for our horrid injustice. Our frontiers, from the nature of advancing fettlements, difperfed along the branchings of the upper parts of our rivers, and scattered in the difunited valleys, amidst the mountains, must be always unguarded, and defenceless against the incursions of Indians. And were we able, under an Indian war, to advance our fettlements yet farther, they would be advanced up to the very dens of those favages. A fettler, wholly intent on labouring on the foil, cannot stand to his arms, nor defend himfelf against, nor seek his enemy: Environed with woods and fwamps, he knows nothing of the country beyond his farm: The Indian knows every spot for ambush or defence. The farmer, driven from his little M 2 cultured

cultured lot into the woods, is loft: the Indian in the woods, is every where at home; every bush, every thicket, is a camp to the Indian, from whence, at the very moment when he is fure of his blow, he can rush upon his prey. The farmer's cow, or his horfe, cannot go into the woods, where alone they must subsist: his wife and children, if they that themselves up in their poor wretched loghoufe, will be burned in it : and the husbandman in the field will be shot, down while his hand holds the plough. An European fettler can make but momentary efforts of war, in hopes to gain fome point, that he may by it obtain a feries of fecurity, under which to work his lands in peace: The Indian's whole life is a warfare, and his operations never discontinued. In short, our frontier fettlements must ever lie at the mercy of the favages : and a fettler is the natural prey to an Indian, whofe fole occupation is war and hunting. To countries circumstanced as our colonies are, an Indian is the most dreadful of enemies. For, in a war with Indians, no force whatever can defend our frontiers from being a constant wretched fcene of conflagrations, and of the most shocking murders. Whereas on the contrary, our temporary expeditions against these Indians, even if successful, can do these wanderers little harm. Every article of their property

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property is portable, which they always carry with them — And it is no great matter of diftrefs to an Indian to be driven from his dwelling ground, who finds a home in the first place that he fits down upon. And of this formidable enemy, the numbers, by the latest accounts, are 23105 fighting men.

If we entertain an idea of conquest, in fupport of this ambitious folly of dominion, we must form fuch a feries of magazines and entrepôts for stores, ammunition and provisions; we must maintain in constant employ fuch a numerous train of waggons for the roads, fuch multitudes of boats and veffels for the waters; we must establish such a chain of fortified posts; we must support fuch a numerous army; we must form and execute fuch an enlarged and comprehenfive fystem of command, as shall give us military poffeffion of the whole Indian country. Let now any foldier or politician confider the enormous endless expence of all this conduct, and then answer to what profitable purpose fuch measure leads, which may in a much better and juster way be obtained.

If our government confiders this well, and will liften to those who are best versed in Indian affairs, it will be convinced that honesty is the best policy; and that our domi-M 3 nion nion in America, will be best and surest founded in faith and justice, toward the remnant of these much injured natives of the country.

In this hope, and with this view, I will endeavour to flate the Indian rights and our duty toward them; and to point out that line of conduct, which leads to it—And first of the Kenunctioni, or the Five-nation confederacy.

The Indian lands are of two kinds-Their dwelling land, where their caftles are. and their hunting ground. The dwelling lands of the Kenunctioni, or the Five-nation confederacy, is called Kenunctioniga, and is at the top or highest part of the continent, from whence the waters run every way-By the waters of Canada into the gulph of St. Laurence, by all the rivers of the English colonies into the Atlantic ocean, by the waters of the Miffiffippi into the gulph of Mexico. They may, in a general manner, be thus defcribed, by a line run from near Albany, north-westward, along the Mohawk river on the north fide of it, north round Oneida lake, to the north-east corner of lake Ontario; thence along the lakes to Canahôga on lake Ofwego or Erie; thence fixty miles directly back into the country; thence tØ the

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to Shamôkin, on the Susquehanna river; thence along the Cushïêtung mountains; thence again to the lower Mohawk caftles. The Indiansthemfelvesdescribing, under confidence, to a friend of mine at Onondaga, this their fituation, faid, " That it has many advan-" tages superior to any other part of America. " The endless mountains separate them from " the English, all the way from Albany to " Georgia. If they should have any de-" fign against the English, they can suddenly " come down the Mohawk's river, the De-" laware, the Sufquehanna, and Potomac, " and that with the ftream. They have the " fame advantage of invading the French, " by the waters of the river St. Lawrence, " Sorel, &c. If the French should pre-" vail against this country, they can, with " their old men, wives and children, come " down the ftreams to the English. If the " English should prevail in attacking their " country, they have the fame conveyance " down to the French; and if both should " join against them, they can retire across " the lakes."

Their hunting lands are—*First*, Couxfachraga, a triangle, lying on the fouth-east fide of Canada, or St. Lawrence river, bounded eastward by Saragtoga, and the drowned lands; northward, by a line from M 4 RegiRegiôchne point (on lake Champlain, or, as the Indians call it, Caniaderiguarûnte, the lake that is the gate of the country) through the Cloven Rock, on the fame lake, to Ofwegatchie, or la Galette; fouth-weftward by the dwelling lands of the Mohawks, Oneidas, and Tufcaroraos.

Secondly, Ohio, all that fine country (and therefore called Ohio) lying on the fouth and east fides of lake Erie, fouth-east of their dwelling lands.

Thirdly, Tieuckfouckrondtie; all that tract of country lying between the lakes Erie and Oïlinois.

Fourthly; 'Scaniaderiada, or the country beyond the lake; all that tract of country lying on the north of lake Erie, and northweft of lake Ontario, and between the lakes Ontario and Hurons.

The right of the Five-nation confederacy to their dwelling lands and the hunting ground of Couxíachrága, and even down to the bottom of lake Champlain, was never difputed. The lands to the northward of Regiôchne, and la Galette, have long fince been ceded to the Canada Indians as an hunting ground. ing as and dee

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In the year 1684, the Five Nations finding themfelves hard preffed by the French and their Indians, did, by a treaty at Albany, put the lands and caftles of the Mohawks and Oneidas under the protection of the Englifh government : and the Englifh accordingly undertook the trust to guarantee them to these Indians. And as the external mark, by which this act and deed should be anounced, the Indians defired that the duke of York's arms might be affixed to their caftles,

The right of the Five-nation confederacy to the hunting lands of Ohio, Tieûckfouchrondite and 'Scaniaderiada, by the conquest they had made in subduing the Shaöanaes, Delawares, (as we call them) Twictwes and Oïlinois, may be fairly proved as they stood possible thereof, at the peace of Refwick, in 1697.

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In the year 1701, they put all their hunting lands under the protection of the English, as appears by the records, and by the recital and confirmation thereof in the following deed.

In the year 1726, the Seneccas, Cayougaes and Ononda-agaes acceded to the fame terms of alliance, in which the Mohawks and Oneidas were already—So that the whole whole of the dwelling and hunting lands of the Five-nation confederacy were put under the protection of the English, and held by them IN TRUST, for and to the USE of these Indians and their posterity.

Copy of Agreement with the Sachems of the Five Nations.

TO all people to whom this prefent infrument of writing shall come, Whereas the Sachems of the Five Nations did, on the nineteenth day of July, One thousand seven hundred and one, in a conference held at Albany, between John Nanfan, Efg; late lieutenant-governor of New York, give and render up all their land where the beaverhunting is, which they won with the fword, then 80 years ago, to Coorakhoo *, our great king, praying that he might be their protector and defender there, for which they defired that their fecretary might then draw an inftrument for them, to fign and feal, that it might be carried to the king, as by the minutes thereof, now in the cuftody of the fecretary for Indian affairs at Albany, may fully, and at large appear.

W E, Kanakarighton and Shanintfaronwe, Sinneke Sachems; Ottfoghkoree Dekaniforee and Aenjeueratt, Cayouge Sachems;

* It is by this name that they mean the King of England.

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Raclyakadorodon and Sadageenaghtic, Onondaga Sachems, of our own accord, free and voluntary will, do hereby ratify, confirm, fubmit and grant ; and by these presents do (for ourselves, our heirs and successors, and in behalf of the whole Nations of Sinnekes, Cayouges and Onondages) ratify, confirm, fubmit and grant unto our most Sovereign Lord George, by the Grace of God, King of Great Britain, France, and Ireland, Defender of the Faith, &c. his heirs and fucceffors for ever, all the faid land and beaver-hunting, to be protected and defended by his faid majefly, his heirs and fucceffors, to and for the USE of us, our heirs and fucceffors, and the faid three Nations; and we do also of our own accord, free and voluntary will, give, render, fubmit and grant, and by these presents do, for ourfelves, our heirs and fucceffors, give, render, fubmit, and grant unto our faid Sovereign Lord King George, his heirs and fucceffors for ever, all that land lying and being fixty miles diftance taken directly from the water, into the country, beginning from a Creek called Canahôge, on the lake Ofwego, all along the faid lake, and all along the narrow passage from the faid lake to the falls of Oniâgara, called Canaquaraghe, and all along the river of Oniâgara, and all along the lake Cataraqui to the creek called Sodons, belonging to the Sinnekes, and from Sodons to the hill called Tegechunckserôde, belonging to the Cayouges,

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youges, and from Tegechunckserôde to the creek called Cayhunghâge, belonging to the Onondages; all the faid lands being of the breadth of fixty English miles as aforefaid, all the way from the aforefaid lakes or rivers, directly into the country, and thereby including all the castles of the aforefaid three Nations, with all the rivers, creeks and lakes, within the faid limits, to be protected and defended by bis faid majesty, bis beirs and success for ever, to and for our USE, our heirs and successors, and the faid three Nations.—

In testimony whereof, we have hereunto fet our marks and affixed our seals, in the city of Albany, this fourteenth day of September, in the thirteenth year of his majesty's reign, Annoque Domini 1726.

The mark of Raclyakoderodon. The mark of Kanakarighton A Sachem of the Onondages. (L. S.) a Sachem of the Sinnekes. (L. S.) The


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Signed, fealed, and delivered, in the Prefence of us

Philip Livingston, Peter Vanbrugh, Mynderst Schuyler, Lawrance Clausen.

Secretary's Office, New-York. The preceding is a true copy of the Record in Lib. Patents, Numb. 9. p. 253, 254. Examined and compared therewith by

GEO. BANYAR, Deputy Secretary.

Inftead of executing this trust faithfully and with honour, by extending to the Indians our civil protection against the frauds of the English, and our military protection against the attempts of the French, we have used this trust only as a pretence to assume a dominion over them—We have suffered the English setures to profit of every bad occasion to

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to defraud them of their lands-We have never made any effectual regulations to prevent their being defrauded in their trade : and until our own interest appeared to be affected, we abandoned them to their own chance and force, opposed to the strength of a powerful enemy. Nay, when at last we thought necessary for the fake, not of national faith and honour, for the fake, not of these our faithful allies, but for the sake of our own fafety and interest to interfere, in opposing the French encroachments, we took it up as difputing the empire of America with the French; not as protecting and guarding the Indian lands and interest to their use, agreeable to the facred trust by which we were bound.-And thus these favages (as we to our own fhame call them) repeatedly told us, " That both we and " the French fought to amufe them with fine " tales of our feveral upright intentions; " that both parties told them, that they " made war for the protection of the Indian " rights, but that our actions plainly difco-" vered that the war was only a contest " who should become masters of that coun-" try, which was the property neither of " the one nor the other." Since we have driven the French government from America, we have confirmed this charge of the Indians against us, by affuming that dominion which

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which in faith and justice we cannot fay we have gained over the Indians, which, in fact, we have not gained, and which, be it remembered, will coft more blood and treafure before we do gain it, than it is for the honour and interest of Great-Britain to expend in fo bad and ufeless a cause. While these poor tribes of hunters remain, it will be our own fault if they do not remain in perfect harmony and good alliance with us. As hunters, their interest can never interfere with ours, as fettlers; but, on the contrary, will become the fource of the natural and most profitable trade to us as traders. They are continually wearing away, and as they diminish or retire, they cede their lands to us in peace; which we, thus in time as fast as we can really want them, may poffers in right and justice, untainted with the impeachment of having been gained by murder and fraud. While therefore we do remain a great and just nation, as we pride ourselves Great-Britain is, we fhould abhor the black base thought of using the power which providence hath given us, to the ruin and destruction of these brave and free people; of these people who gave us our first settlement in this country, and have lived with us, except under fome temporary interruptions, in a feries of faithful alliance.

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If these confiderations, taken up in the course of that general review of the colonies, and of the administration of their affairs, which I now publish, were intended as an express treatife on Indian affairs, I should think it right to examine all the complaints and feveral claims of justice which the Fivenations have made, and have repeated for many years, which I would found first on extracts from the records of Indian affairs. and fecondly, on the hiftory of the landed patents, and thirdly, of the occasions taken to erect, without their leave, forts on the Indian lands, which measure the Indians always confider as an act of dominion. In this general view I shall only point out that shameful patent of Ka-y-adarofferos above Albany : that pretence of claim by the corporation of Albany for the Mohawk-flats, the very refidence of the Mohawks, and fome others on the carrying place, at the head of the Mohawk river---all which ought to be taken into immediate confideration, that justice may be done both to the Indian and European claimants; and that the matter may not remain perpetual cause of umbrage, and perhaps the fource of war. Government ought alfo very ferioufly to revife the principles on which they are now endeavouring to take poffestion of the Indian country by forts and N garifons ;

garifons; built many within the Indian dwelling lands, and many within their hunting lands, and on the paffes and communications of thefe. It is undoubtedly right to maintain the command of that country; but there is a way to do it with fafety and juffice. The measures we are taking by force will be found to have neither the one nor the other in them; nor do I fee how common prudence can adopt the enormous charge to which fuch measures must lead.

We have feen that Sir William Johnson, although he took Niagara from the French by force of arms, never confidered this as a conquest of these lands from Indians; but has, agreeably to his usual prudence and his perfect knowledge of Indian affairs, obtained by formal treaty, a ceffion of these lands from the Indians to the crown of Great-The wifdom, as well as the fuc-Britain. cefs of this example, ought to lead our politicks to the fame conduct in every other cafe, where we have built or obtained forts within their lands, especially as many of them were built under express promife of their being difmantled as foon as the war fhould ceafe : and as the Indians were exprefsly and folemnly promifed to have a fatisfaction given to them for the use of these lands.

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The Shawane fe and Delawares are more inte mediately connected with the province of Penfylvania; and although, as fubdued, they are under obedience to the confederacy of the Five-nations; yet, under tutelage and protection of the confederacy, they poffers their rights to their own country. Was this, as I have faid, a particular treatife on Indian affairs, I might here point out "the causes of the alienation of the Deluwares and Shawanele Indians from the British interest, by extracts from the public treaties, and other authentic papers relating to the transactions between the government of Penfylvania and the faid Indians for near forty years past," as set forth in a memoir which I have had by me for many I could also from a series * of letters vears. for ten years, from Monfieur de Vaudreüil, while governor of Louisiana, to his court, point out those neglects and errors, as alfo the manner in which the French profited of those our errors, by which we lost the Che+ rokees, and other fouthern tribes.

After what has been explained, it will be fufficient here to fay, that, 1ft, Doing justice to our faith and honour, by treating the In-

* These letters in manuscript are authentic; but I am not at liberty to say how they came into my posses fion.

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dians according to the real fpirit of our alliances with them; 2dly, That doing the Indians juffice in their lands, and 3dly, giving up that idle, ufelefs claim of dominion over them, are points abfolutely and indifpenfibly neceffary to be adopted into our politicks, unlefs we have ferioufly taken the refolution to force our way by war. Until thefe points are adopted, we never fhall have peace—And it deferves thorough and mature deliberation how we engage to fettle and poffefs America by war.

These measures of found policy once fixed upon, the next step is to establish an Administration for the conducting Indian affairs-This part of the plan is in part adopted, by dividing the management of Indian affairs into two Intendencies-one for the northern, the other for the fouthern nations-But, as every thing which I could fay further on this head hath been some years past stated in the memorial annexed to these papers, I will here refer the reader to that memorial on these points. The measures recommended therein I have by an opportunity of comparing them with the events of eight years, found to be fuch as I do most fincerely wish to see carried into And if a private perfon might execution. prefume to obtrude advice, that has not formerly been neglected, I would now venture to

to recommend the confideration of these meafures to those whose duty it is to act upon these matters. When these matters shall be fettled as they ought to be, then it may be time to take up the confideration of proper regulations for the Indian trade; and when that time comes, if a plan, which I have accidentally seen, be carried into execution, I would venture to say, that every thing which can or ought to be done in Indian affairs will be effected.

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If with the fame fpirit, guided by the fame principles *, a revision was made of the laws of trade, fo far as they respect the colonies, it would answer more wife ends of government, and more the interest of the governed, both here as well as in the colonies, than any endeavour, even tho' fuccesful, to carry the present laws into execution.

The principles on which the act of navigation is founded are juft, and of found policy, but the application of them, by the modes prefcribed, as the laws now fland, to the prefent flate of the colony trade, is neither founded in juffice or prudence. Any fpirit that would force this application, would injure the principles themfelves, and prove injurious to that commercial intereft, which

* This hath been in part done by the late American revenue act.

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those very acts of trade mean to secure to Great-Britain : whereas, upon a due revision of those laws, it would appear that there are means of producing this same end consistent with the particular interest of the colonies, and what would carry the general commercial interest of the mother country to the utmost extent that it is capable of.

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Before I proceed I cannot avoid quoting, and laying before the reader a paffage in a letter written by Sir William Temple to lord Effex, in July 22, 1673, concerning the state of Ireland, wherein the reader will fee the furvey taken of the trade of that country, at that time fo appointe to the flate of the trade of the colonies at this feafon, that it will be impoffible not to apply it. " In " this furvey one thing must be taken notice " of as peculiar to this country, which is, " that as in the nature of its government, " fo in the very improvement of its trade " and riches, it ought to be confidered not " only in its own proper interest, but like-" wife in its relation to England, to which " it is subordinate, and upon whose weal " in the main, that of this kingdom " depends, and therefore a regard must be " had to those points wherein the trade of " Ireland comes to interfere with any main " branches of the trade of England, in which " cafe the encouragement of fuch trade ought to to " to be either declined or moderated, and fo " give way to the interest of trade in Eng-" gland. Upon the health and vigour " whereof the strength, riches and glory " of his majesty's crown seem chiesty to " depend. But on the other fide, fome fuch " branches of trade ought not wholly to be " fuppressed, but rather so far admitted as " may serve the general consumption of the " kingdom, lest by too great an importation " of commodities, though out of England it-" felf, the money of this kingdom happen to be " leave a stock sufficient for turning the trade " at home."

The general principle of the laws of trade regulating the colony trade, is, that the colonies shall not, on one hand, be supplied with any thing but from a British market, nor export their produce any where but to a British market. In the application of this principle, the present laws direct, except in some special particulars, that the colonies shall import all their supplies from Britain, and carry all their produce to Britain.

If now, instead of confining this market for the colonies to Britain only, which is a partial and defective application of the general principle whereon the act of Naviga-N 4.

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tion is founded; this colony trade was made, amidst other courses of trade, an occasion of establishing British markets even in other countries, the true die would be derived to the general interest from these advantageous circumftances, while in particular the colonies and the mother country would be mutually accommodated. In the first case, the general interest, perverted to partial purposes, becomes to far forth obstructed; in the fecond, it would be carried by the genuine fpirit of it to its utmost extent.-If, under certain reftrictions, fecuring also those duties which the produce of the colonies, carried to marke;, ought to pay to the mother country, the colonies were permitted to export their produce (fuch as are the bafis or materials of any British manufacture excepted) directly to forein countries, if fo be they fold it to any British house established in such place, and were also permitted, if they bought their supplies from a British house established in those parts, to fupply themselves with the natural fruits and produce of that country (all manufactures that any way interfere with the British manufactories excepted) paying there to fome British officer, or upon their arrival in the colonies, the fame duties as they would have paid by purchasing the same commodities in England, every end propofed by the principal of the act of Navigation would be answered; the exports of the colonies would

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F a i would be encouraged; and the British market greatly extended.

The colonies would not only trade to. and be supplied by, a British market, but would become an occasion of establishing that British market in foreign countries. The fame reasons of commerce, which, in a narrower view, became the grounds for eftablishing factories at Petersburgh, Riga, Hamborough, Lifbon, Cadiz, &c. would on a more general and extensive basis become the foundation for establishing and building up thefe British markets in every region to which our trade extended itself; for while it necesfarily enlarged the special interest of the colonies, it would enlarge it only at British markets, and to the final profit of the British general commerce. The profits of such market finally centering in Great Britain. If this maxim be not true, that the profits of the factories fettled in foreign ports finally center in Great Britain, the measure of effablifting fuch is false in policy; if the maxim be true, the permitting our colony exports to go directly to the ports where fuch factories are established, is not contrary to the principle on which the act of Navigation arofe, but becomes coincident with, and aiding to it, in extending the British navigation and British markets, and fecuring the final profits thereof to Britain only.

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If this method of reafoning be found not contrary to the principle of the act of Navigation; if this measure at the same time that it encourages the trade of our colonies. is found to do it in a way fubfervient to the general commerce of Great Britain, extending the British markets, and fecuring the final balance of profit to Britain only; if this fpirit of administration, fo far as government has a right to direct the course of trade, be adopted in this part of it, the great points which it has to fecure, are first, that the colony exports to, and the fupplies purchased by them from these foreign ports, be fold and bought at a British market only.---- The government has a right to extend its laws to thefe colony traders, and to the factories established in foreign ports.----It can therefore, partly by fuch laws as it finds proper to enact, for the regulation of this factory trade, and partly by obliging these colony traders to give bond before their departure from the colonies, fecure and confine all thefe transactions of that commerce, which is permitted at any fuch port, to a British market only, the laws that established these being a favour extended to the colonies, and promoting the interest of these factories, would, as all laws of trade should do, execute themselves; and by giving the requifite powers to a conful or naval officer refident

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dent there, would be eafily administered by fuch officer.

The next point to be guarded, would be the fecuring those duties which this trade ought to pay to the government of Great Britain; If the fame duties were paid, or fecurity for them taken in these foreign ports, as would be or should be paid by the colony trade, if the traders were still obliged to come to Britain, every end would be anfwered to the government revenue, and these charges might be sufficiently secured, by obliging all these traders to fail under bond. The arrangements to be taken in fuch cafe ought to be that of adding to the office of conful, fuch powers as in the colonies, before the establishment of special revenue officers there, were given to the naval officer, or to establish a naval officer. The conful or naval officer, in this branch of his administration, should be fubordinate to the commiffioners of the cuftoms and the lords of the treasury. If the duties were collected by him, in the ports of his diftrict, he should account and give fecurity for the fame; if bonds only, as fecurity for the payment at fuch British or plantation ports, were given, he should keep the register of the fame, and correspond with the commissioners of the cuftoms, and fuch officers as they direct, as

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as to the fulfilling, cancelling, or profecuting to effect faid bonds. These general arrangements taken, together with such further special regulations, as the experience of the commissioners of the customs should suggest, the revenue of the colony and factory trade, under this mode of administration, would be well secured, chearfully paid, and easily collected.

Under the administration of fuch measures, there does not appear any reafon why all the produce of the British colonies, which are not the basis of, or do not interfere with the British manufactures, might not be carried directly to a British market at a foreign port, -and why the carrying of rice to foreign ports might not be extended, under these laws, to all fuch foreign ports whereat a Britifh factory is established.----Nor under this mode of commerce can any fufficient reafon upon earth fubfift, why the colony traders fhould not be permitted to load at these ports, the fruits, wine, oil, pickles, the produce of that country, and also fuch raw unmanufactured produce, as would not interfere with the manufacture of Great Britain, inftead of being obliged to come to Britain to buy or reload here, after the expence of an unneceffary voyage, those very commodities which they might have bought in a British market,

market, at the port which they left. Why not any of these as well as falt, as well as wines from the Madeiras and western isles ? In the fame manner, by the fame law, why may not our colony traders be permitted to carry fugar, ginger, tobacco, rice, &c. to fuch ports in the rivers Wefer and Elbe, in the Sound and in Russia, whereat a British factory is, or may be established ? It can never be right policy to fuffer labour in vain in a community : it is just fo much lost to the community: and yet this coming round by England is labour in vain: If the fubordinacy of the colony-trade, and the duties arifing thereon, can be by any other means fecured, it is fo much labour loft. The two points of a British market, and the revenue of the duties being fecured, why may not these traders be permitted to load at these ports directly for the colonies, hemp, yarn, and fuch coarfe linens, as do no way interfere with the British manufactories? These measures taken, which would prove to be the true means of encouraging the colonytrade, the best method to put a stop to the contraband trade carried on in this branch of bufinefs, and the true grounds whereon to establish the general commercial interest of Great Britain, Government could not be too firict in enforcing the execution of the laws of trade, nor too fevere in punishing the

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the breach of them.-Wherever they found these traders endeavouring to carry from these ports to the colonies raw filk, filks, velvets, foreign cloths, laces, iron, steel, arms, ammunition, fails or rigging, or any manufactures whatever, that interfere with the manufacture of Great Britain: whenever they found these traders endeavouring to carry from the colonies to those ports, any dyingwood whatever, indigo, cotton, filk, bees or myrtle-wax, flax-feed, naval stores, furs, fkins or peltry, hides, provision, grain, flour, bread or biscuit; whale-oil, blubber, bone; or any other fifh-oil, or tallow, or candles, with an exception perhaps to myrtle and candles, Government could *fpermaceti* not be too ftrict and watchful to reftrain Under proper regulations, the rum them. of the northern colonies should be carried to Africa, and the fale of it to the French on the banks of Newfoundland encouraged, if fuch vent could be procured, as we should thereby reap at leaft fome share even of the French Fishery.

In the above revision of, and the proposed regulations for the colony trade, as connected with that of Europe, it will be feen that all mention of East India goods is purposely omitted. I think a special measure might be contrived of supplying the colonies with Eastind ele ets. maca nahey ILLA ng+ ees urs, JUr, ne; lles. and ould rain um ried on , if uld the

ofed fted t all fely ght with aftEast-India goods, in a way that would effectually put a stop to that contraband trade, by which it is complained they are at present supplied, in a way by which one of the greatest marts in the world, with every attendant advantage to the British general commerce, and the special interest of the East-India trade, might be established.

If measures were at this juncture taken, between the government and the East-India company, fo that an East-India ship might annually ftop at fome island in the West-Indies, the traders, not only of the West-Indies, but of North America, would supply themfelves with every advantage at fuch mart, not only for their own proper confumption, but also for a trade of the greatest extent; and this mart, in return, would be to the East-India company, the collector of all the furplus filver of America, and perhaps even of fome of the gold and ivory of Africa alfo. The extensive advantages of this measure cannot but be seen; nor would this any way interfere with that fupply with which the East-India trade, by way of the Manilla's, furnishes the Spanish West-Indies, so far as our East-India company may be fuppofed to be concerned, but would, in other respects, open a better channel of trade between the East and West-Indies, which OUF Q

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our company must command. The difficulties in the execution lie in fecuring to government the revenue that should arise from the duties duly paid by this trade, and in fecuring the company against the perversion of this trade to the profit of their officers and fervants.——If some of the islands furrendered to us, as the Granadas, or of the neutral islands, were made the place of this mart, with a grant of lands to the company, at the fame time that a profit might derive hence to the company, the collateral good advantage to the public would arise, of having created a very beneficial settlement.

In the fame manner, fome revision of the ftate of the trade of the colonies of the feveral maritime powers amongst each other will be neceffary.----The laws and ordon-nances of these do in general prohibit all trade of foreign colonies with their own ;--and yet, without fome fuch trade as supplies the Spanish provinces with British goods and provisions, as supplies the British colonies with Spanish filver, as supplies the French islands with British lumber, fish, provisions, horfes, and live ftock, as fupplies the Britifh colonies with French moloffes, the trade and culture of these colonies would be greatly obstructed and impaired; and yet notwithstanding this fact, our laws of trade, by

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by an impracticable duty, extend to the prohibiting the importation of French melloffes into our colonies .- If the government, under this law, could prevent effectually this importation, not only into the northern colonies, but into the British isles also, the reward of that pains would be the destruction of a beneficial branch of trade, perhaps of driving the British American distillery into the French, Dutch, or Danish isles, or of forcing the French, contrary to their own false policy, into a profitable manufacture of that produce which they now fell as refuse materials. I need not point out here the very effential change that this would make in the colony trade.----On the contrary, it is the duty of government to permit, nay even to encourage, under proper regulations, these branches of trade; in the first place, in order to extract out of the foreign colonies, to the benefit of the British commerce, as much as poffible the profits of these colonies, and which is more material, in order to create a neceffary dependance in the trade and culture of those colonies for their fupplies on the British commerce.---When it is remembered that the law, which lays a duty equal to a prohibition, on the importation of French melloffes in the British colonies, was obtained at the folicitation of the Britifh isles, it will be feen, that the obtaining this

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this law is not fo much meant to prohibit totally the introduction of French melloffes into the British trade, as to determine a ftruggle between the Weft India and North American traders, who fhould have the profits of it. And thus, from the predominant interest of these partial views, has government been led to embarraís the general courfes of its trade.----But as the West India traders fee that this law has not, never had, and never will have the effect proposed, they will be better reconciled to its ceafing; and as government must now, after the experiment, fee the false policy of it, there is no doubt but that it will cease, so far as to reduce the duty to a moderate and practicable charge, fuch as will be paid, and fuch as will raife to the crown a very confiderable revenue thus paid.

I speak not this by guess; but, from a comparison of the quantity of sugars and melloss brought to account in the customhouse books of the King's revenue, with the quantity of the same article, in the same ports, brought to account in the impostbooks of the colony revenue, for fix years together, could, with some precision, mark the extent of it. I own I did always apprehend that two-pence per gallon on foreign melloss imported into any British plan(195)

plantation, and fo in proportion of fugars, was the best rate at which to fix this duty ; that being thus moderate, it might be easier and with lefs alarm and oppofition collected. and might therefore the fooner introduce the practice of fair trade, and the fooner become an effective revenue : But when I fee a groundless clamour raifed, which represents the rate fixed by the late revenue-act as destructive of the American distillery, as ruinous to the American fishery, as a prohibition of the returns made from the foreign islands for the North American fish; I must own that I have never feen any fact stated, or calculation fairly made on which fuch affertions found themfelves.

The French illes, fince the furrender of Canada and Louifiana, must depend entirely for their supplies of lumber, staves, heads, provisions, live stock, horses, &c. on the Britifh colonies, immediately exported from thence to those isles, unless by some means fupplied from markets created at New Orleans and the island of St. Peter, as from another Isle of Man; it will therefore be the duty of government to keep a watchful eye to the formation and extent of these markets ;- fo at leaft, if they be permitted, as to have the command of them, and fo as to prevent their being, to the French traders, 02 the

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commeltomh the fame pofts tomark s apritifh planthe means of supplying the Spanish markets also, as well as their own.

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Since the writing of what the paragraph above contains, very proper regulations have been by the late American-revenue act provided; and if proportionate care be taken in the execution of it, this danger is for the prefent guarded against.

Some revision also will be necessary in the laws about naval ftores, especially that respecting the masts. The present law, under an idea of preferving the White Pine or mast trees, directs, That no White Pines shall be cut or felled within the limits of any township, if not actually private property .---This part of the law arifes from a mistaken apprehension of a township, there being no. lands within fuch but what are private property.-2dly, That no Pines out of a township, of the dimensions of 24 inches and upwards, diameter, at the heighth of 20 inches from the ground, shall be felled .---This part of the law is felo de fe.-Thofe who find their profits in cutting down thefe trees for logs or making thingles, &c. or who know the embarrafiments which would arife to their property, if they should ever apply for a grant of these lands, by letting fuch Pine-trees, the property of the crown, grow

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the render naft hall any V .---aken g no. prownand of d.---hofe thefe c. or ould ever tting own, grow grow there, never (if they have not other means to evade this law) will permit thefe Pines to come to this dimension which makes them royal property. The falle policy of this law, and the defects in the establishment of an office of furveyor-general of his Majesty's woods, will foon, if not obviated, be felt in the fcarcity and price of mafts, which will be the effect of it. The necelfity of their going a great diftance from the rivers for the masts has already taken effect, and the cafe of there being none within any practicable diftance will foon follow. The navy-office finding that their mast ships do come regularly hitherto to England, cannot entertain any fear of fuch want, and it will be the interest of others to suppress and contradict this fact; yet it is a fact, and will be foon known in is effects. On the contrary, if it is confidered how difproportionate a value the price of the Fine-tree growing bears to the price of the maft when brought in the middle of winter, over the fnow, with 70 or 80 yoke of oxen to the water-fide; if, instead of aiming to make these trees, thus growing, royal exclusive property, the crown was not only to permit a free mafting in lands not granted, and to make the masttrees of all dimensions, private property on lands actually granted, but also (as it is done in other cafes of naval stores) to give a bounty bounty befides the price, to the perfon who fhould bring down any fuch mafts to the water-fide, it would have an immediate effect in fupplying the crown with mafts at a cheaper rate, and in the prefervation of these trees, thus become a branch of trade.

I would with here also to recommend the giving fome advantages and encouragement to the importation of American timber into Great Britain.

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I have not gone into the thorough examination of these subjects above-mentioned, nor have I pointed out, in all their confequences, the effects that this or that state of them would have. I have only pointed them out as worthy the attention of government; and, I am sure, whenever government takes them under consideration, they will be better understood than any explanation of mine can make them.

Were fome fuch arrangements taken for a revifion and further eftablishment of the laws of trade, upon the principle of extending the British general commerce, by encouraging the trade of the colonies, in fubordination to, and in coincidence therewith, the trade of the colonies would be administered by hO he até afts ion of

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by that true fpirit from whence it role, and by which it acts; and the true application of the benefits which arife to a mother country from its colonies would be made. Under this fpirit of administration, the government, as I faid above, could not be too watchful to carry its laws of trade into effectual execution.-But under the prefent state of those -laws, and that trade, there is great danger that any feverity of execution, which should prove effectual in the cafes of the importation into the colonies of foreign European and East-India goods, might force the Americans to trade for their imports, upon terms, on which the trade could not fupport itfelf, and therefore become in the event a means to bring on the neceffity of these Americans manufacturing for themfelves. Nothing does at prefent, with that active and acute people, prevent their going into manufactures, except the proportionate dearness of labour, as referred to the terms on which they can import; but encrease the price of their imports to a certain degree, let the extent of their fettlements, either by policy from home or invation of Indians abroad, be confined, and let their foreign trade and navigation be, per-currency limitted within too narrow bounds, and the exclusion of that trade which hath ufually fupplied them with filfeverely infifted upon; ver-money too -this 4

-this proportion of the price of labour will much fooner ceafe to be an object of objection to manufacturing there, than is commonly apprehended. The winters in that climate are long and fevere; during which feafon no labour can be done without That application therefore of their doors. fervants labour, to manufactures for home confumption, which under any other circumstances would be too dear for the product created by it, becomes, under these circumstances, all clear gains. And if the colonists cannot on one hand purchase foreign manufactures at any reasonable price, or have not money to purchase with, and there are, on the other, many hands idle which used to be employed in navigation, and all thefe, as well as the hufbandmen, want employment; these circumstances will soon overbalance the difference of the rate of labour in Europe and in America. And if the colonies, under any future state of administration, which they fee unequal to the management of their affairs, once come to feel their own strength in this way, their independence on government, at least on the administration of government, will not be an event fo remote as our leaders may think, which yet nothing but fuch false policy can bring on. For, on the contrary, put their governments and laws on a true and conftitutional basis, regulate their money, their revenue,

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revenue, and their trade, and do not check their fettlements, they must ever depend on the trade of the mother country for their supplies, they will never establish manufactures, their hands being elsewhere employed, and the merchants being always able to import such on * terms that must ruin the manufacturer. Unable to subsist without, or to unite against the mother country, they must always remain subordinate to it, in all the transfactions of their commerce, in all the operation of their laws, in every act of their

* This is a fact too well known and understood to need any particular proof-but if need were, the writer of these papers could demonstrate this from the prices of wool, hemp, and flax, and the labour of carding, drefsing, fpinning, weaving, &c. in North America, compared with the prices of the fame articles of produce and labour in Britain. It is therefore an idle vaunt in the Americans, when they talk of fetting up manufactures for trade; but it would be equally injudicious in government here to force any measure that may render the manufacturing for home confumption an object of prudence, or even of pique in the Americans. And yet after all, should any thing of this fort extend itself to a degree that interfered with the exports of Great Britain to the colonies—the fame duties of an excife which lie upon the manufactures of Great Britain, levied upon those of America, would soon restore the balance. This confideration, one might imagine, would induce those who are prudent in America, to advise the reft to moderation in their opposition.

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
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
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government: — The feveral colonies, no longer confidered as demefnes of the crown, mere appendages to the realm, will thus become united therein, members and parts of the realm, as effential parts of a one organized whole, the commercial dominion of Great Britain. The TAKING LEADING MEA-SURES TOTHE FORMING OF WHICH, OUGHT, AT THIS JUNCTURE, TO BE THE GREAT OBJECT OF GOVERNMENT.

The END.





APPENDIX.

SECTION I.

A LTHOUGH the following papers, at the time in which they were written, had reference to the flate of the fervice as oppoled to the French measures and power in America: Although they are parts of another work intended to be published at fome future time, yet they are here annexed to the Administration of the Colonies, as they treat of matters very worthy prefent confideration; and as in general they contain ideas of police, which respect the posses of the fervations which our conquests have put into our hands, and the forming them into fome fystem of Empire that shall be the Empire of Great Britain.

The first paper, which had for its object the forming of the British possession of the British possession of the British possession of the those of our allies the Indians, into a system of barrier against the French, was written at a time when the subject was entirely new, for ever brought forward to confideration here in England, and when authentic accounts of the true state of the country as possess of the true state of the country as possess of the English and French, were with great difficulty, if at all, to [A] be be obtained; and I may venture to fay, utterly unknown to our military.

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The latter of these papers, was written after it became neceffary to change the object of the war; and the only thing which I wish to fay of the ideas that it contained, is, that they were literally justified by the events.

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STATING the NATURE of the SERVICE in NORTH AMERICA, and proposing a GENERAL PLAN of OPERATIONS, as founded thereon.

Drawn up by Order of, and presented to, bis Royal Highness the Duke of Cumberland, 1756.

H IS Majefty has now united the fervice in North America into one power of action, and under one direction, by appointing a commander in chief over all North America, with powers to direct, and with force to carry on this fervice as a one whole. The next and neceffary point therefore is, that there fhould be fome one general plan of operations fixed, which may be carried on, not only by the general forces employed in the general and military part of this plan, but by every particular province and colony, within its own private councils, and own 2 rly

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ice in ction, comwith n this reffary ne one ay be ay be as emof this nd cod own private private operations, coincident with the whole. When fuch plan is fixed, every fum of money that is raifed for this fervice, will be applied to what shall be of real fervice and permanent use; and every the most minute operation that is undertaken, will become as part of fuch plan, "Eevor sis aisi ;-----and every (the most otherwife infignificant) measure would become of more importance, and more fervice, than twenty the. most expensive and bustling operations, that arife from momentary and partial ftarts of whim, vanity, or intereft : There could not even a logg house be built, nor scarce a piquet fluck down in any part of the country, but what would be a neceffary measure and whose use (however trifling the thing in itfelf) would extend to the grand fervice of the whole : There would not be a pound, fcarce a penny raifed, but would have its fhare in this grand fervice. On the contrary, while private perfons, or particular independent bodies of people, have confulted only the momentary partial starts of whim, vanity, party, or interest, under the influence of fuch motives, without any general scheme to the defence of the country, the taking poffeffion of it, or the command of it, without any reference to any general idea, forts have been built up and down the country, that could never have been of use, have never been used, have never been supported, have been left to go to ruin, have been abandoned to the enemy; or, if they have been kept up at all, have been a private flanding job to all concerned in them: While thus large fums of money have been fquandered away to no ufe, or bad ones; while thus fruitless detached measures, that have [A 2] been

been of no use, but a perversion and incumbrance on the general fervice, and interfering amongst each other, have been purfued by vague, random fits and ftarts, the public fervice has not only been ruined, but the people have loft all opinion and confidence in military operations, have been discouraged and alienated from engaging in any active measures, and always fuspicious, that whatever fums they give to fuch, are either thrown away, or put into the private pocket of fome jobb. On the contrary, were there fome one general plan of operations formed, upon the practicability and really intended execution of which they might confide, the affemblies might be perfuaded, the people would be willing, and I verily believe, would be perfuaded to give amply and chearfully : So that it is not only neceffary to the gaining the end proposed, but also absolutely necessary to the gaining the means, that fome fuch general plan fhould be fixed.

In order to which, the following paper propoles to confider,

1st, The fite of the country :

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3dly, The state of the fervice in America.

It becomes neceffary to a right understanding of these proposed objects, to recur and run up to the first principles on which they were founded, not

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nding up to nded, not not only because the subject is new, but because it has been misconceived, and misrepresented.

1/f, Prior to any observations on the settlers and settlements, it will be necessary to take some notice of the peculiar state and site of the countries, in which they are settled : For it is the site and circumstances (I mean those that are unchangeable) of a country, which give the characteristic form to the state and nature of the people who inhabit it.

The confideration of the continent of America may be properly divided into two parts, from the two very different and diftinct ideas that the face of the country prefents, but more especially from the two diftinct effects which must neceffarily, and have actually arisen, from the two very different forts of circumstances to be found in each tract of country.

All the continent of North America, as far as known to the Europeans, is to the weftward of the endlefs mountains, a high level plain ; All to the fouth-east of these mountains, flopes away fouth-eafterly down to the Atlantic Ocean. By a level plane, I must not be understood, as if I thought there were no hills, or vallies, or mountains in it; but that the plane of a fection, parallel to the main face of the country, would be nearly an horizontal plane, as the plane of a like fection of this other part would be inclined to the horizon, with a large flope to the Atlantic Ocean. The line that divides thefe two tracts, that is the fouth east edge of these planes, or the [A 3] higheft higheft part of this flope, may in general be faid to run from Onondaga, along the wefternmost Allegehani ridge of the endless mountains, to Apalatche in the gulf of Mexico.

2*dly*, In confidering first the main continent, this high plain, it may be observed, with very sew exceptions in comparison to the whole, that the multitude of waters found in it is properly speaking but of two masses: The one composed of the waters of the lakes and their suite, which difembogue by the river St. Lawrence; the other that multitude of waters which all lead into the Missifippi, and from thence to the ocean; the former into the gulf of St. Lawrence, the latter into the gulf of Mexico.

There are in all the waters of Miffifippi, at leaft as far as we know, but two falls; the one at a place called by the French St. Antoine, high up on the weft or main branch of Miffifippi; the other on the eaft branch called Ohio. Except thefe, and the temporary rapidity arifing from the freshes of spring, and the rainy feasons; all the waters of the Missifippi run to the ocean, with a still, eafy and gentle current.

As to all the waters of the five great lakes, and the many large rivers that empty themfelves into them, the waters of the great Otawawa river, the waters of the lake Champlain, of Trois Rivieres, and the many others that run into the river St. Lawrence above Quebec, they may all be confidered in one mafs, as a *flagnation* or lake of a wildernefs of waters, fpreading over the country d to egetche

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country by an infinite number and variety of branchings, bays, straits, &c. for although at particular places of their communications, and at the mouths of their ftreams, they feem to pour out fuch an immense ocean of waters, yet when they are all collected and affembled together, as at a general rendezvous where they all difembogue themfelves into the river St. Lawrence, the whole embouchure of this multitude of waters is not larger than the * Seine at Paris; the waters of each respective mass not only the leffer streams, but the main general body of each going through this continent in every course and direction, have, by their approach to each other, by their interlocking with each other, by their communication to every quarter and in every direction, an alliance and unity, and form one mass, a one whole.

Let any one raife in his mind the idea of fome low country incapable of being travelled, except on the roads, caufeways, dykes, &c. that have been made through it, and that these roads have throughout the whole country a communication which connects and forms them into a one fystem of defign, a one whole: Such perfon will readily conceive how easily and with what few numbers a General may take possession and hold the com-

* About 12 French leagues above Quebec, over against a place called la Loubiniere, the river St. Lawrence appears to be of a very confiderable breadth; but when the tide, which runs up much higher than that place, has at its ebb entirely retired, that breadth which one would have judged to have been that of the St. Lawrence river, remains all dry, except a small channel in the middle, which does not appear to be much larger than the Seine at Paris, nor the waters of it that pass there to have a greater current.

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mand of this country; and when once poffeffed how eafily he may defend it, by fortifying with redoubts and fuch works, the ftrong holds and paffes in it, and at what an almost infurmountable difadvantage any one who aims to recover it must act, even with twenty times the numbers. If these roads and lines have thus a communication forming a one whole, they are the foundation or basis of a command throughout the whole country; and whoever becomes possible of them has the command of that country.

Now let any one behold and confider the continent of America, as it really is, a wildernefs of woods and mountains, incapable of land carriage in its prefent natural unwrought form, and not even to be travelled on foot, unless by the good will of the inhabitants, as fuch travelling in those woods and mountains is perpetually and unavoidably liable to ambufcades, and to the having the communication from the one part to the other cut off: Let fuch perfon also know, that the waters for these reasons have ever been the only roads that the inhabitants use, and until art and force make others. are the only roads that any body of people can in general take. Compare this state of country with what is above described, and the fame conclusion, mutatis mutandis, will be found to be derived from it.

Seeing this, as fact and experience fhews it to be, let fuch perfon then recollect what is faid above of the communication and alliance amongst the feveral waters of this continent—of the unity, one mass, and one whole, which they form ; he will see in a strong light how the watry element claims and holds dominion over this extent of try

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of land; that the great lakes which lie upon its bofom on one hand, and the great river Miffifippi and the multitude of waters which run into it, form there a communication,—an alliance or dominion of the watry element, that commands throughout the whole; that thefe great lakes appear to be *the throne*, the *centre of a dominion*, whofe influence, by an infinite number of rivers, creeks and ftreams, extends itfelf through all and every part of the continent, fupported by the communication of, and alliance with, the waters of Miffifippi.

If we give attention to the nature of this country, and the one united command and dominion which the waters hold throughout it, we shall not be furprized to find the French (though fo few in number) in possession of a power which commands this country; nor on the other hand, when we come to confider the nature of this eastern part of America, on which the English are fettled, if we give any degree of attention to the facts, shall we be surprised to find them, though fo numerous, to have fo little and languid a power of command even within the country where they are actually fettled. I fay a very ftrong reason for this fact arises out of the different nature of the country, prior to any confideration of the difference arifing from the nature of their government, and their method of taking possession of this country.

This country, by a communication of waters which are extended throughout, and by an alliance of all these into a one whole, is capable of being, and

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and is naturally a foundation of a one fystem of command : Accordingly, fuch a fystem would, and has actually taken root in it under the French. Their various possessions throughout this country have an order, a connection and communication, an unity, a system, forming fast into a one government, as will be feen by and by: Whereas the English settlements have naturally, neither order, connection, communication, unity, nor fystem. The waters of the tract on which the English are settled, are a number of rivers and bays, unconnected with, and independent of each other, either in interest or natural communication within land. The vague diffipated random fettlements therefore, fcattered up and down thefe, will have no more communication or connection amongst themselves, than there is amongst the various independent streams they are fettled upon .- This country, instead of being united and ftrengthened by the alliance of the waters which run in it, is divided by thefe feveral various ftreams, detached from, and independent of each other, into many feparate detached tracts, that do naturally and have actually become the foundation of as many feparate and independent interefts.

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As far as the communion of the waters of any river, or the communion there may be between any two rivers extends, fo far extended will arife a communication of fystem, of interest and command; the settlements therefore on this tract of country, would be naturally, as they are actually, divided into numbers of little weak, unconnected, independent governments—Were I to point out the naı of uld. the this mfaft and naicaract ber deatudifered muhan ams d of e of hefe indeally and any

any omnd; try, ided ndethe nanatural division of these tracts and interests, it would point out a new division of the governments of the colonies, which is not the purport of this paper.

The confideration of this country, fo far as it is connected with, or has any effect upon the interefts and politicks of the English fettlements, prefents itfelf to view divided in two ideas. 1/1, The country between the fea and the mountains: 2 dly, The mountains themfelves. The first part is almost throughout the whole capable of culture, and is entirely fettled : The fecond, a wildernefs, in which is found here and there in fmall. portions, in comparison of the whole, folitary detached fpots of ground fit for fettlements : the reft is nothing but cover for vermine and rapine, a det for wild beafts, and the more wild favages under in it. whe

Thus far of the fite of the country, as it becomes the foundation of a natural difference between the English and French possession in America. The next point that prefents itself to confideration is, the manner in which the English and French have taken possession of, and settled in this country : And,

ist, Of the French.

The French in their first attempts to fettle themfelves in these parts, endeavoured to penetrate by force of arms, to fix their possessions by military expeditions, till through the perpetual and constant abortion of these measures, and the cercertain difappointment and fure loss that attended them, they through a kind of despair gave over all thoughts of fuch attempts.

Whether the dear-bought experience that they learnt from hence, or whether defpair leaving their colony to make its own way, or whether rather, the right good fenfe of Mr. Frontenac and Mr. Calliers lead them to it, is neither eafy nor material to determine; but fo it was, they fell afterwards into that only path, in which the real fpirit and nature of the fervice led.

The native inhabitants (the Indians) of this country are all hunters; all the laws of nations they know or acknowledge, are the laws of fporting, and the chief idea which they have of landed pofferfions, is that of a *bunt*. The French fettlers of Canada univerfally commenced hunters, and fo infinuated themfelves into a connection with thefe natives.

While the French kept themfelves thus allied with the Indians as hunters, and communicated with them in, and ftrictly maintained all the laws and rights of fporting, the Indians did eafily and readily admit them to a local landed poffeffion; a grant which rightly acquired and applied, they are always ready to make, as none of the rights or interefts of their nation are hurt by it : While on the contrary, they experience and receive great ufe, benefit, and profir, from the commerce which the Europeans therein eftablifh with them. Whereas on the contrary, the Englifh with an infatiable thirft after landed poffeffions, have gotten

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gotten deeds and other fraudulent pretences grounded on the abufe of treaties, and by these deeds claim pofferion even to the exclusion of the Indians, not only from many parts of their hunting grounds, (which with them is a right of great confequence) but even from their house and home, as by particular inftances from one end of the continent to the other might be made appear. Upon these pretences they have driven the Indians off their lands.—The Indians unable to bear it any longer, told Sir William Johnson, that they believed f in they should not be able to hunt a bear into a hole in a tree, but some Englishman would claim a right to the property of it as being his tree :- And whatever the great proprietors, patentees, and land jobbers, may affirm or affect to prove, or however angry they may be with those who declare this truth; this is the fole ground of the loss and alienation of the Indians from the English interest, and this is the ground the French work upon.-On the contrary, the French possessions interfere not with the Indians rights, but aid and affift their intereft, and become a means of their fupport. - This will more clearly and better appear, by a more minute and particular attention to the French measures in these matters.

1/t, No Canadian is fuffered to trade with the Indians, but by licence from the government, and under fuch regulations as that licence ordains. The main police of which is this. The government divides the Indian countries into fo many hunts, according as they are divided by the Indians themfelves. To thefe feveral hunts there are

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are licenfes respectively adapted, with regulations respecting the spirit of the nation whose hunt it is; respecting the commerce and interest of that nation; respecting the nature of that hunt.

The Canadian having fuch licence, ought not to trade and hunt within the limits of fuch hunt, but according to the above regulations; and he is hereby abfolutely excluded under fevere penalties to trade or hunt beyond these limits, on any account whatever.

It were needlefs to point out the many good and beneficial effects arifing from this police, which gave thus a right attention to the intereft of the Indians, which obferved the true fpirit of the alliance in putting the trade upon a fair foundation, and which maintained all the rights and laws of the hunt, that the Indians most indispenfably exact.

But the confequence of the most important fervice which arifes out of this police, is a regular, definite, precife, affured knowledge of the country.

A man whole interest and commerce are circumscribed within a certain department, will pry into, and scrutinize every hole and corner of that district: When such a hunt is by these means as full of these courcurs des boix, as the commerce of it will bear, whoever applies for a licence must betake himself to some new tract or hunt, by which again begins an opening to new discoveries and fresh acquisitions.

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When the French have by these means establissed a hunt, a commerce, alliance and influence amongst the Indians of that tract, and have by these means acquired a knowledge of all the waters, passes, portages, and posts, that may hold the command of that country, in short, a military knowledge of the ground, then, and not before, they ask and obtain leave of the Indians to strengthen their trading house, to make it a fort, to put a garrison in it.

In this manner, by becoming hunters and creating alliances with the Indians as brotherfportfinen, by founding that alliance upon, and maintaining it (according to the true fpirit of the Indian law of nations) in a right communication and exercise of the true interest of the hunt. they have infinuated themfelves into an influence over the Indians, have been admitted into a landed poffeffion, and by locating and fixing those possessions in alliance with, and by the friendly guidance of the waters, whole influence extends throughout the whole, they are become poffeffed of a real interest in, and real command over the country. They have thus throughour the country fixty or feventy forts, and almost as many fettlements, which take the lead in the command of the country, not even one of which forts, without the above true (pirit of policy, could they support, with all the expence and force of Canada: Not all the power of France could; 'tis the Indian interest alone, that does maintain these pofts.

Having

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Having thus got possession in any certain tract, and having one principal fort, they get leave to build other trading houses and entrepôts, at length to strengthen such, and in fine to take possession of more and more advanced poss, and to fortify and garrison them, as little subordinate forts under the command of the principal one.

Though these principal forts have subordinate forts dependent on them, they are yet independent of each other, and only under the command of the governor general; there is a routine of duty settled for these, and the officers and commanders are removed to better and better commands: What the particulars of this are, and of the distribution of the troops, I have not yet learned as to Canada; but in general the present establishment for this service is three thousand men, of which there are generally two thousand three or four hundred effective.

I have not been able to get an exact lift of the forts in Canada, but the following is fufficient to fketch out the manner in which they conduct this fervice.

It will be neceffary first to describe the line which now divides Canada and Louisiana in the Illinois country. It begins from the Oubasch at the mouth of Vermillon river, thence to the post called Le Rocher on the river Pæorias, and from thence to the peninsula formed at the confluence of Rocky river and the Missifippi.

Forts

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Forts in CANADA.

St. Frederick,	St. John. Carilion or Ticonderôga.
FRONTENAC,	L' Prefentation. Les Coudres. Quintez.
NIAGARA,	Torento. One other.

MISSILIMAKINAC, and its Dependencies,

Du QUESNE,

2

Presq' Isle. Riviere au Bœuf. One other.

LE DETROIT,

Two { 'Twas proposed to the Court in the year 1752, to erect this into a Lieutenancy du Roy.

The Post MIAMIS and SIOUX.

NIPIGON,

Two or three. One on the River Michipocoton. One other on the Long River. and one other.

ST. JOSEPH, and one off LE PETIT PARIS. ALIBI. SAGUENAY. ST. JOHNS, in Nova Scotia. In all about fixty.

Most of these forts have fine settlements round them, and they do entirely support themselves; [B] it (18)

it being usual for both officers and men to defer receiving their pay till the garrifon is relieved, which is generally in fix years; and fcarce any thing is fent to these garrifons, but dry goods and ammunition.

There is a fine fettlement at Detroit, of near two hundred families; a better ftill at St. Joseph, of above two hundred; a fine one at St. Antoine, many fine ones about Petit Paris. But the French government does not encourage these, and has, by a positive ordonance, absolutely forbid any one to make a settlement without special licence; which measure they found necessary to take, in order to referain the Canadians from totally abandoning Canada.

The establishments, posts, and settlements of Louisiana, are as follow:

Thirty feven companies of fifty men each, and two Swiffe companies of feventy five men each.

1. The garrifon of New Orleans :

French - 900 Swiffe - 75

Out of which are garrifoned the outpofts of Baliffe, and other small posts.

Detour Anglois: The garrison of this confifts of four companies, which have their tour of duty with the Mobile, Illinois, &c. Mobile, Mob Sv

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Mobile, eight French companies, and one Swiffe 475

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"It is neceffary to fix this number here, on account of the proximity of Panfacola, on one part, and of the English on the other; as alfo to influence the Indians, as there are at our meetings and treaties, held here annually with the Indians, fometimes 2, fometimes 3,000 Indians prefent •.

Tombechbé, Alibamous, One company each, a detachment from the garrifon of Mobile.

Four companies of this garrifon relieved every year.

300

The Illinois, fix companies =

The pofts were, in 1752, Cafkafias. Fort de Chartres. Village de St. Philip. Praire de Rocher. Cohôkias. Village de St. Jeune Veuve.

The Akanfas, a lefs principal poft, one company - 50 The Natches, one company - 50 • Mr. Vaudreuil to the court. [B 2] The

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Brought over 1850

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The Nachitoches, one company - - for the prefent, on account of their not being able to prevent defertions to the Adages, a Spanish post within 7 leagues of it. They propose, when they shall be able to settle a cartel with the Spanish governor, and his Majesty approves of it, to fix two companies there, it being a frontier post.

The Point Coupe, one company -	-	50
The German Settlement, one company	1	50

Total 2,000

The fettlements of Louisiana in general, produce Indigo equal to the Guatimalo, which admit three cuttings or crops annually; rice in great abundance, cotton, but they find great difficulty in cleanfing it from the feeds that accompany its growth here, tobacco, pitch, tar, they have a trade with their own islands; flour, peas, beans, falted or corned wild beef, and pork, hams of hogs and bears, tallow, greafe, oil, hides, lumber, planks; they have also myrtle wax, which they export to France; they do alfo, in fmall quantities, manufacture the buffalo wool. From the abundance and natural growth of mulberry trees, they have their thoughts turned to filk, iron, lead, copper, and coals in abundance; befides the fkins and coarfe furs, arifing from the Indian trade and hunt, they had, fo long ago as in the year 1744, feveral veffels at their port, which came from Florida and Havanna, and the bay of Campeachy, to trade for boards, lumber, pitch, dry

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pieces of eight. They had a fettled treaty of commerce with the Royal Company of Havanna, by the terms of which, the French were to deliver them at Louisiana, pitch at two piastres a barrel, tar at three piastres a barrel, boards at two reals each. Their settlements towards the mouth of Missifippi, are almost deferted and ruined, the settlers not being able to support the expence of banking against the inundations of the set and land floods. Mr. Vaudreuil fays, in a letter to the court, September 28, 1752, he thinks it would be much better, to defer for some years attempting settlements here, till the ground be more raised and elevated by the accretion of soil, as it has been three feet in fifteen years last past.

I mention nothing here of the posts of New Orleans, Detour Anglois, and Balife, nor of Mobile; becaufe, being marine posts, the confideration of them does not come within the scope of this paper. I will observe, that they require our particular attention : They are become the ports to which all the men and ftores, with which the country of the Ohio is furnished, are fent annually and conftantly; as from New Orleans to this country, the way is much shorter than through Canada, the diftance being at the most, where they are obliged at low water to follow all the windings of the river, not more than 340 French leagues; but at the usual times that they fend their convoys, not more than 200, and to which they can go up with decked floops, nine or ten months in the year. The trade comes down from the Illinois, about the latter end of De-[**B** 3]

December, and goes up towards the latter end of January, or the beginning of February.

I shall describe the post of Tombechbe, from Mr. Vaudreuil's letters.

This post restrains the Alibamous, Talapouches, April 20, Abekas, and Cowêta, preferves the commu ica-1751. tion between the waters of Mobile, Alibamous river and the Miffifippi; 'tis necessary for us in order to keep up amongst the Chactaws, the spirit of January 6, warring against the Chickafaws; 'tis alfo necef-1746. fary as an entrepôt in our expeditions against the October 28, Chickafaws and English. From hence we can 1746. go within feven or eight leagues of the villages of the Chickafaws with periaugors, by the river Tombechbé, over which, feven or eight leagues of land carriage, we can eafily go by land, and carry cohorns and light field pieces : from hence alfo it is, that we must fend out our parties March 6, against the Carolinians; yet this fort being a heavy expence, and with great difficulty fupplied, 1749and being fo fituated as to be of no use to hinder the English from going to the Chactaws, when that nation is inclined to receive them, as they may conduct their convoys a little above, or a little below the fort, without our being able to This being the cafe, were the September oppose them. 24, 1751. Chactaws entirely fecured in our interest, were the Chickafaws deftroyed, and had the English loft and given up all hopes of ftrengthening themfelves in that quarter, as we hope to effect, I then think it would be no longer necessary to January 12, keep up this post; yet till this be effected, it 1751. must be kept up, and more especially as by suppreffing felv môu left to i not app Mr. the fecu

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prefling it now, the Chactaws would think themfelves abandoned. This post, as well as Aliba- May 30, môus, should always be victualled for a year, left by any revolution in Indian affairs, the road to it should be obstructed.

As to the pofts in the Illinois country, I am not able to defcribe them particularly; but what appears to be of more confequence, I collect from Mr. Vaudreuil's letters, (from 1743, to 1752) the general idea upon which the fortifying and fecuring that country is founded.

The first fort of their plan, in fortifying the Illinois country, was on the peninfula, in lat. 41. 30. This was a check upon, and barrier against August 30, the feveral nations of Sioux (not then in confederacy with them.) The next post in this plan was on the river Dorias, (fo called after the junction of the Illinois river and Theakiki) which would be of more especial use, if situated on the north of the lake on that river, whence the roads divide, that lead to Maffilimakinac and St. Iofeph : This he defcribes as the key to the Illinois country from Canada.

The next is the garrifoning and fortifying the country, from the mouth of Milfouris to Kafkafias, where there are five posts. Mr. Vaudreuil May Ic. thinks that Kaskasias is the principal, as it is the pass and inlet of the convoys of Louisiana, as also of those of Canada, and of the traders and hunters of the post Detroit, and that of the greatest part of the lavage nations.

There

July 18. 1743. 1744.

1751.

1751.

There is also at this post, a river where the floops which come from New Orleans, may be fafely laid up in winter.

Mr. M'Car- But Mr. M'Carty, who was on the fpot, thinks tey to Mr. Vaudreuile, the environs of Chartres a far better fituation to January 20, place this poft in, provided there were more in-¹⁷⁵² habitants. He vifited fort Chartres, found it very good, only wanting a few repairs, and thinks it ought to be kept up.

The next post (I take them in order of place, not of time) which comes into this plan, is on the Ohio, over against the mouth of the Cherokee November river : This, he fays, would be the key of 4, 1745. the colony of Louisiana, would be a sufficient August 30, barrier against the English, and restrain their in-1744. croachments, and would obstruct their designs in May 15, alienating the Indians of the Ohio; it would re-\$751. ftrain the incursions of the Cherokees, on the river Ouabash, and river Missifippi; it would also check the Chickafaws, and would by thefe means fecure the navigation of the Miffifippi, and the November communication with our posts. He here ex-4, 1745. prefies the greatest uneafiness, (as the French court did not care to engage in the measure at that time) left the English should build a fort here, in which cafe, fays he, we must give up all communication with the Illinois; for the Englifh would become mafters of all the navigation of that country.

April 8, Mr. Jonquiere proposes another fort at the ³⁷⁵² mouth of Rocky river, (this is in the government ment the t fays the l again lies t the C

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but fite, eftab with com feffeq ment of Canada) which, he fays, would fecure the tranquillity of the fouth of Canada. This, fays Mr. Vaudreuil, together with the poft of the Illinois, would reftrain and become a barrier against the Engliss, and cover all our Indian allies to the west, from our enemies, the English, the Cherokees, Catawbas, and others.

By these posts above, and the posts of the Miamis, this whole country is fecured and fortified. This country, fays Charlevoix, (in 1721) will become the granary of Louisiana, and in 1746 we find it actually becoming fo; for in that year it fent down to New Orleans fifty ton of flour; in 1747, we find it well furnished with provisions, and having fine crops; and in a letter of Mr. Vaudreuil's 1748, we have an account of its produce and exports-flour, corn, bacon, hams, both of bears and hogs, corned pork and wild beef, myrtle wax, cotton, tallow, leather, tobacco, lead, copper, fome fmall quantity of buffalo wool, venifon, poultry, bearsgreafe, oil, fkins, and fome coarfe furs; and we find a regular communication fettled with New Orleans, by convoys which come down annually the latter end of December, and return at lateft by the middle of February.

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Thus the French do not only *fettle* the country, but also *take poffession of it*; and by the form, fite, and police of fuch possibilities, (led on and established by the guidance of, and in alliance with the waters,) a natural foundation of a one command, have they acquired, and become posfessed of *the command of this country*.

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By these means, I repeat it, have they created an alliance, an interest with all the Indians on the continent; by these means have they acquired an influence, a command throughout the country : They know too well the fpirit of Indian politicks, to affect a superiority, a government, over the Indians; yet they have in reality and truth of more folid effect, an influence, an afcendency *, in all the councils of all the Indians on the continent, and lead and direct their measures, not even our own allies, the Five nations, excepted; unless in that remains of our interest, which, partly the good effects of our trading house at Ofwego, and partly General Johnson, has preferved to the English, by the great efteem and high opinion the Indians have of his fpirit, truth, and honor.

* I mention nothing here of the influence of the Jefuit miflionaries, because nothing is meant lefs than religion by them.

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EAST.

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In the French Intereft.

Efquimaux. St. John's. Micmacs. Penobícots. Noridgwalks. Abenakais. St. Francis Indians. Cachnewage. Scaatecoke. Ofwegatchie.

Senekes. Onondagas. Cayuges. Oneides. Tufkaroras.

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Mohawks. 7 Wholly in the Bri-Mchikanders. 5 tifh Intereft.

Delawares. Shawenefe. Loft to the Englifh, except a few on Sufquehanab.

Catawbas. Cherokees. Chickafaws.

WEST.

French.

Sioux. Nadonefferies. Illinois. Tawigtwaes. Miamis. Piankefshanaes. Wawyaftaes. Picques. Kafkufkies. Cawetas. Abekas. The four Nations of the Talaponches. Alibamõus. Bove.

North.

Wholly French.

Affinipoeles, Adirondacks, Algonkins, Outawawaes, Chononderdes or Hurons, Meffifagues, Outagamies, Mifeontiris, Sakis, Chriftanaux; Almipogins, Nipifenes,

Skaniadereroenuce.

South.

Ofagaes. Akanfaes. Chactaws. Panimaes. Adages.

The English American provinces are as fine fettlements as any in the world; but can scarce be called pofficients, because they are so fettled, as to have no possession of the country: They are fettled as farmers, millers, fishermen, upon bays and rivers, that have no communication or connection of interest, consequently, the settlers belonging to these rivers, bays, &c. have no natural connection.

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But further, the fettlers upon any one river or fet of waters, which waters having a connection, might become the natural feat of a one interest, are yet so fettled, that they have no connection nor union amongst each other, scarce of communion, much less of defence.

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Their fettlements are vague without defign, fcattered, independent; they are fo fettled, that from their fituation, 'tis not eafy for them to unite in a fyftem of mutual defence, nor does their intereft lead them to fuch fyftem, and even if both did, yet through the want of a *police* to form them into a community of alliance, unity, and activity amongst themfelves, they are helplefs and defencelefs; and thus may the English be confidered as having, for many hundred miles, a long *indefensible line of frontiers*, prior to the confideration of the nature of the enemy they may be engaged with.

3 dly, The ftate of the fervice as arifing from the above facts.

It appears from the first cast of the eye, that the English, without some *preparative measures*, will not be able to carry into execution any military expeditions against the French in the upper part of America; because from any post where they can form an army, and lay in all its stores, ammunition and provision, they must undertake for many hundred miles, a long, dangerous, and tirefome march, by roads the most harassing, and of almost insuperable difficulty, through a wilderness of woods and mountains, without magazines mar

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zines of forage, &c. or any other affiftance; through a country liable to ambuscades, and all the ftrokes of war; through a country whereof the French are possified of the command, or if through any part where their personal command does not actually exist, yet where Indians, (the most dangerous enemies in such a wilderness) where the Indians, I fay, are masters, and posfessive of every hold and pass.

To put this matter in a ftill ftronger light, let any one confider, whence arifes the danger of marching through a fortified country; whence the danger of a general's leaving behind him any enemies fort or garrifon, not taken.-It is that the enemy, who has poffeffion of thefe, has the command of the whole country, except the fole confined fpot where the ftronger army is prefent, can forbid and reftrain the inhabitants from furnishing you with fuch affiftance as the country is otherwife capable of affording; can, by fallies from these posts, cut off and intercept all your parties and convoys, all your intelligence; can cut off all communication with your magazines, and your own pofts; can perpetually harafs and obstruct your march, and return within cover, before any fuperior party, fent out from the main body, can reach them; you are alfo always liable to furprize, even within your camp.

A march from any post where the English can at present form any army, and collect its flores, ammunition, provisions, carriages, &c. through the country, as at this day above circumstanced, is, is, literally and precifely in its effect, the fame thing as the march here defcribed.

While the Indians, whole chief art of war is that of forming ambuscades, who have acquired from practice and art, a peculiar method of fecretly traverfing the woods and lying concealed in them; -- while the Indians, whole military skill of fighting either fingle or in parties amidst these woods, renders the lituation to them equivalent to fighting under cover; -- while the Indians thus trained, and incredibly expert in the art, can at any time fally out from the holds, fastness, lurking places, and ambufhes, in which the country abounds, (and all which they know) nay, even from the cover of the woods, and drive in all your fmall out parties, prevent fuch foraging as the country will afford, intercept and obstruct your convoys, cut off your communication of intelligence, provisions and fuccours, and retire again within cover, out of danger of any purfuit, and continue thus constantly to harrais and, perhaps, furprize your army : while they can do this, and (believe it) all this they can do and will do, your army is to all intents and purposes, as to the war with the Indians, marching through a country of forts and fortreffes. Let any one here, compare this flate of the cafe with the cause and reasons of the failure of the several military expeditions on this continent, and its truth will be ftill more evinced.

As then no general would think of making a campaign in any country, to reach which, he must march through an enemy's fortified country, without with mare here fures

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Le the f bit, a muft precithis c which any above actual would without forme previous measures to maintain his march and secure his retreat through such; so here (I repeat it) there are some previous measures necessary.

The first of these measures is, the settling the police of our alliance with the [Kenunctioni] or Five-nation confederacy, upon a permanent, solid, and effectual basis, so as to restore and re-establish our interest with them.

The *fecond* is, taking possession of, and fortifying a fystem of advanced posts, entrepôts, viz. magazines whereat to collect stores and provistions, camps from whence (within a reasonable distance and by a practicable way) to make our fortis.

Thirdly, The fecuring the dominion of lake Ontario for the prefent, and laying a foundation for the like dominion on lakes Erie, Huron, and Michigan.

Let now any one confider the above flating of the form of the country that the English inhabit, and in which the operations of our arms must lie: Let him raife in his mind feriously, the precife idea of the native inhabitants who possible this country, and of the kind of operations by which we are, and shall be attacked, and by which we may be able to defend ourselves: Let any one, I fay, by a ferious attention to the above facts, form to himself that idea, which an actual and practical knowledge of the country would give him: Let him then be told a melancholy

lancholy truth, that almost all those Indians. whofe friendship and alliance were once our best and fecurest barrier, are now by the French debauched and alienated from us, nay even turned against us, and become the fervile instruments of the French robberies, massacres, and treachetous incroachments : Let then his eye be turned upon the ftate of our back inhabitants, fettled in a vague, unconnected, defenceless manner, up to the , mountains, to the very mouth of the dens of thefe favages .---- Any one attentively confidering the above facts, will fee the English colonies in not only a weak defenceless flate, but exposed to, and almost at the mercy of a very powerful enemy: Confidering this, and the above facts, he would fee how fuperficial, wild, and falfe an idea of the fervice that is, which would create a barrier by a line of forts; a barrier that might as well pretend to cut off the bears, wolves, and foxes from coming within it, as the Indians; a barrier that would have no more effect than fo many fcarecrows, unlefs you could actually build another Chinese wall, and so another, still advancing your wall-fence, as you advanced your fettlements; a barrier that would take more troops to man it, than the country inclosed within it would take people to cultivate it; a line of 13 or 14 hundred miles, that is at last no line at all; he would, I fay, fee this measure not only impracticable, but ineffectual : Nay, were it practicable, and could it take effect, yet the infupportable expence of it, would render it impossible to be engaged in. Any one reafoning on the ideas as above flated, and knowing them to be what they really are, fatts, would turn his thoughts

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thoughts on those objects which experience, fact, and reason point out to be one part of our barrier: Namely, a real and stable alliance with the Indians, formed on such articles as should give us the same kind of possession and command in the Indian country, the same influence in Indian

First, As to that part of our barrier, and the fervice which is connected with, and depends on our alliance and interest with the Kenunctioni, the confederacy of the Five nations, I can only repeat what I have faid formerly on this subject.

" The original natural form under which the Indian country lay being that of a foreft, flocked not with sheep, or oxen, or horses, not with beafts of labour and domeftic animals, but only with wild beafts and game, all that the country afforded for food or raiment must be hunted for : The Indians, therefore, would conftantly be, as they were in fact, not land-workers, but hunters, not fettlers, but wanderers; they would therefore, confequently never have, as in fact they never had, any idea of property in land; they would confequently never have, as in fact they never had, any one common fixed interest, any one communion of rights and actions, one civil union, and confequently not any government; they know no fuch thing as an administrative or executive power, properly fo called. They allow the authority of advice, a kind of legislative au-, thority, but there is no civil coercion; they never had any one collective, actuating power of [C] the

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affairs, as the French have. And,

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whole, nor any magistrate or magistrates to execute such power.

But the country now appearing under a very different form, and they, the Indians, being under very different circumftances, arifing from trade, treaties and war, begin to feel rather than fee, to find by experience rather than reafon, the neceffity of a civil union of power and action; and that these circumftances have in fact, for many years been formed, and have at length formed to them fuch a collective power: These people are precifely in that point of circumftances, where a community: that was before only a community of fociety, is becoming that of government.

In all their actions, therefore, of late years, whether of treaty or war, they have recurred to fome agent to actuate this power: They are not only become capable of fuch a general leading, but their circumstances require it. The circumftances with which they are connected, had formed them into a state, but from the circumstances of the fociety under which they live, they can never have amongst themselves a statebolder; their circumstances require and look out for some such : fome fuch they must have, and if we do not find fuch for them, the French will, and are, actually attempting it. Further, as they know not, nor acknowledge any leading power, but that of authority, there can be no nominal, vilible appointment of fuch leader; they will never appoint fuch within themfelves, nor will they ever fubmit to any one appointed from without. This was the miftake of the governor of Canada, which

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fait poi gro len which had like to have loft him all the Cachnuagas two years ago.

Therefore fuch perfon or perfons only, as can acquire, or actually are, in possession of this leading power, this authority with them, can be this agent, this leader, this STATEHOLDER.

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For this manager, this ftateholder, the government hath appointed Sir William Johnfon; a perfon not only the proper one, but precifely the very and only perfon that the above circumftances and nature of things pointed out; the perfon whofe knowledge of Indians, whofe influence, by the opinion the Indians have of him, whofe very uncommon zeal for the intereft of his country, whofe integrity and bravery, will, by fuch measures as the Indians can really and indeed truft in, if properly fupported, reftore this branch of our affairs to its falutary effect.

He has, in his papers communicated by me, mentioned every thing neceffary, as to the management of this Indian administration: I cannot but add, as a collateral measure, that would strengthen and finally confirm such our interest amongst the Indians, the making little settlements at Oswego, Niarondaquat, and Niagara, and at our other forts, by leave of the Indians.

Secondly, We should then, according to good faith and truth, leave the Indians in full and free possible possi of which, by the fame treaty, we have undertaken the protection : We should guaranty and protect fuch to them, to their use, and also all their hunting-grounds.-This part of the general scheme also, is in some degree carried into execution, by the inftructions given by general Braddock to general Johnson, for his direction in his late treaty with the Indians; which inftructions were, at the defire of general Braddock and governor Shirley, drawn up by your memorialist, having been first proposed by him. This meafure will be abfolutely neceffary to preferve thefe Indians to our alliance, as may be feen in almost every treaty held with them fince the first furrender of those lands; it is also necessary to support ourselves against the western French Indians: This proposed measure will be fo far from being an impediment or hurt to our interest, that the greatest advantages may be made of it, both in the means towards executing the general plan, and in the final execution of it. The uses that may be made of this measure towards the executing of this plan, are, That while we are undertaking the protection of the Indian country and hunting grounds, we are actually becoming poffeffed of the command of the country. Of which, in the whole, when we are poffeffed of the command and protection (by means of a very few forts neceffary to be crected, which I do not here mention) upon which, in part, according to the proposed colonies and fettlements, when we are fettled, the Indians will be preferved and protected to their fatisfaction, and yet cannot move to war, nor even to hunt, nor fublift, but as they maintain their alliance with the English; and

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and yet in conjunction with us, their whole force by these means being become infinitely greater, may be directed at any time into the heart of the enemy's country.

Thirdly, As to the administration of * Indian affairs to the fouthward, the first step necessary to be taken is, that there be an absolute step put to all provincial administration; that there be no more agents, commissions, or interpreters, appointed by, and acting under the private orders of a particular province or proprietories, from whence arises interferings and confusion, and opposition in our Indian affairs, always to the obsitructing, often to the utter ruin, of the British general interest.

Inftead of thefe, there fhould be one only principal commiffary (who understands the language and interest, and is acquainted with the people of that nation) appointed feverally to each

• Thefe Indians are the Catawbaes, Cherokees, Chickafaws, and Creeks. The Creeks are in part debauched and alienated from us by the French, and attend the French treaties conftantly at the Mobile, efpecially the Alibamôus, Cowëtaes, Talapôuches, and Abekaes, and are in great meafure held under fubjection by the French forts at Alibamôus, and Tombeckbá.

The Chickafaws are greatly weakened, and almost ruined by the intrigues of the French within them, and by the wars with the Chactaws, and other French Indians, being unfupported by us.

The Cherokees and Catawbaes, but ill supported by us, are constantly harrassided and warred upon by the Five Nations, at the instance of the French influence among that people.

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nation: This perfon fhould have under him feveral ftore-keepers, and fmiths.

All these principal commissions should be fubordinate to a one general agent or superintendent *, who should be under the orders of the commander in chief only,—acting by his orders and instructions, form'd on a one general idea of the English and Indian interest, of our alliance, and of the measures to be constantly and uniformly pursued.

As the being supplied with European goods. is to the Indians the first effential interest of their politicks, is the fole and actual object of their alliance with us, and the only real and permanent motive of their attachment to us; and as. according to the cuftom of these people, all public transactions are executed by exchange of prefents, all public friendship preferved and animated by public hospitality and liberality, the first and fundamental object of the English measures should be to provide for these, in a regular and fufficient manner. The being able to do this, is our peculiar advantage and fuperiority over the French in these affairs; their measures are perpetually impeded and diffreffed, through their being unable to do this; it is the only difficulty that they have not furmounted, and cannot furmount; it is this that makes our alliance, if we did conduct it as we ought, the true and natural interest, the true and natural politicks of the Indians.

• N. B. There has been one fince appointed, Mr. Stewart, a very active, intelligent, and able man.

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There ought therefore to be concluded with these fouthern nations, a general alliance of friendship and mutual defence and affistance, founded on the British general interest, not any provincial private one, upon a one general, uniform plan : The Ist article of which should be, To do justice to all their claims, to rediefs all their wrongs.

zdly. To maintain with them all public hospitality and friendship, by public, annual, and occafional prefents, by entertaining them, and by all other usual affistance, to establish a fair and just trade with them, and fettle stores within their countries, or wherever is most convenient for them, with a conftant fupply of goods at a fettled and cheaper rate than the French do fupply them.

2dly, Mutually to affift each other against all attempts of the French or their Indians, or any hoftile attempt whatfoever upon either, conftantly and faithfully to give all intelligence to each other, to mend their guns when they have occafion to go to war, to fupply them at fuch times with ammunition, and always to fend fome of our people along with them if they require it, except against Indians in alliance with the Englifh; and whenever the English call upon them, to go out with them to war, that the English fupply fuch as want them, with arms, and all with provisions and ammunition, and defend and maintain their wives and children in the mean time.

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This being done, a fund capable of anfwering the above engagements, and of conftantly and faithfully executing them, and also capable of fupporting an administration of Indian affairs, that may work effectually to the preferving and maintaining the British interest in such measures, should be settled on a general and permanent foundation; which may be as follows:

That the feveral colonies who have hitherto conftantly raifed monies for Indian affairs, as a private provincial fervice, fhould for the future appropriate fuch monies to this general fund.

That fuch colonies as have never raifed any monies for thele fervices, fhould, for the future, raife and appropriate to this fund, fuch fums under a quota, in proportion to the benefit received, or the harm avoided, by the barrier arifing from this general alliance and administration of Indian affairs; and it becomes worthy of confideration, whether the iflands in the Weft Indies, their intereft being infeparably connected with that of the continent, fhould not bear a certain proportion of taxes towards the charge of the war.

Matters within ourfelves being thus prepared and provided for :

The first step of our measure in this branch should be, establishing, by the advice of people of the best authorities, and most knowledge of the affairs of each nation respectively, at proper places, general magazines for this service, at the most convenient entrepots between marine and inland land refp fupp mof one or or othe ver nah.

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land navigation of carriage, whence leffer flores, refpectively fubordinate to thefe, might be beft fupplied within the Indian countries, or where is most convenient for the Indians: As for instance, one at Schenectady, or rather at Mount Johnson; —one either at William's ferry on the Potomac, or at Fort Cumberland on Will's creek;—one other somewhere on the Roanoak, or James river;—one other at fort Augusta, on the Savanah.

From these general magazines, the several national or tribe-ftores fhould be conftantly fupplied : Thefe ftores fhould be also public truckhoufes, and the ftore keeper be also a public truck mafter: Thefe to be fixed in each particular nation, in fuch places, and in fuch number as hath been usual, or will be best for the good of the fervice, at each of which there should also be a fmith. The commiffary appointed to the affairs of each nation, to command and superintend all the flore keepers, truck mafters, fmiths, and all the flores, and to be conftantly circuiting through thefe, living always at fome one of them, and attending respectively at any of them, wherefoever he is commanded by the general agent, or the good of the fervice requires: Alfo at all times (unlefs in matters of a more public general import, when the general agent is to attend) to negotiate and transact all matters of business which fuch nation may have to do with any other, or with any colony, and to interpret between the Indians of the nation he is appointed commiffary to; and in general, within the powers of his inftructions, to do all these matters and things as have have ufually been done by provincial agents or interpreters; that the flore keepers and fmiths do keep conftant journals, and make report to the commiffary; that the commiffaries keep a regular journal of these reports, and of their own transactions, and report to the general agent, and he likewise to keep a journal and record, and report to the commander in chief.

The order then of the public prefents, the public hospitality and liberality being settled, according to the nature of those Indians and our alliance with them:

The method and laws of the trade with them being also fettled :

The next step to be observed, I take entirely from the French; and it is a measure, according to my idea, absolutely necessary. Observing the want of subordination among the Indians, the French make a number of fachems, to whom they give medals, and appoint them to preside as chiefs, leaders, counsellors, speakers, &cc. some over eight, some over ten villages, and so on as their influence extends; being easily, by presents and money, possessed of these medal-chiefs, they thus easily acquire a more uniform and stable management of their Indians, then the Indians even know of amongst themselves.

Let it be a flanding inftruction, faithfully in all and every matter, to execute and fulfil, according to the true spirit and intent, the above treaty and alliance, both as to the true interest of the the I into my I T

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T zines eithe with way, prov thefe is fo com then are the Indians, and as to the forming their alliance into a firm barrier against the French, and enemy Indians.

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The feveral people employed in Indian affairs to have conftantly in view, the fcheme of uniting thefe feveral nations into a confederacy like that of the Five Nations. In order to this, that there be found out and fixed upon fome one place in the back country, whereat the general agent fhould hold all his general treaties and parlies with thefe Indians, as the French do at the Mobile; which place, upon the fuccefs of this fcheme, to be the council place,—as Onondaga is to the Five Nations. Let any one confider how a little republick, formed by the Welinis on the river Ouäbafch, by fome free and independent Indians, did greatly embarafs, and had well nigh ruined the French affairs there.

This third branch (according to my idea of our barrier) being thus or in fome fuch way provided for and administred.

The fourth, is, that of a fystem of magazines and fortified camps as entrepôts, whereat either to collect for defence, or from whence, within a reasonable distance and by a practicable way, to make our fortis. This branch is in part provided for; for by removing and advancing these thores, and at length, when a proper place is found to fix them on that would defend and command the country, getting leave to fortify them, and so erect them into forts, the Indians are defended, are at the same time held within proper proper terms, and we have within a friends country, advanced pofts or entrepôts,—that would answer all the purposes of defensive or offensive operations against the enemy; and all that could be in this place faid on that head, I have very minutely entered into in that part, where I explain the nature and state of the fervice, as arising from the nature and state of the country and its inhabitants. I will only add their opinion of one post, which we once had, and of another that they feared we were about to make.

Mr. Vaudreuil, governor of Canada, in his letter to the court, May 10, 1744, mentioning the leave which the English had got to build a fortified trading house at Ockfusques, amongst the Creeks, fays, "If the measure of which this might be a foundation, should be properly carried into execution, it would oblige the French to retire from their fort of Alibamôus down to the Mobile."

And again in another letter, September 17, 1744, he mentions this ftore-house having opened a traffick with the Chactaws,—yet this the English abandoned; and the French have now a fort on each main branch of the river Mobile; one at Tombechbé, and fort Toulouse at Alibamôus.

In another letter of November, 1748, he fays, it would be very eafy for the English, by means of the river Ohio, to form an entrepôt at Prudehomme to ferve them as a retreat, having the nations of the Shawoänaes, Cherokees, and Chickafaws, on their back to support them. From this entreentrep netrate and M counti were b Engli the inl but al be fo cours to it, poft, would muft 1 to aba be fo nois t extend Natch poft o be too

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entrepôt, it would not be difficult for them to penetrate to the Ackanfas, Panis, Ofages, Padouces, and Misouris, and all the other nations of that country, if the posts and settlements of the Illinois were broke up, as they would certainly be, did the English settle and fortify at Prudehomme; not only the inhabitants of the Illinois would be loft to us. but also the inhabitants near New Orleans, would be fo greatly diffreffed for the want of the fuccours and provisions of this country, the granary to it, by loss of the benefit of the trade with that post, it would be difficu't for them to sublist, it would be impossible to maintain the expence they must live at without it, and they must be obliged to abandon the colony: But should not matters be fo bad as this, yet, were the post of the Illinois taken away, the colony would not be able to extend itself at furthest, beyond the post of the Natches, without a very ftrong garrifon at the post of the Ackanfas, and at best that post would be too low to cover the hunting country.

When fuch forts are erected, the commanding officer at each fort fhould be a kind of comptroller on the commiftary or flore keepers for that divifion, and fhould be furnished with provisions and neceffary flores to make presents to, and to entertain the Indians when they come to him, and to supply their necessfities: He should, for this reason, have a right to make an order on the magazine of his division for this purpose.

Fiftbly, In other parts of our frontier, that are not the immediate refidence and country of Indians, fome other species of barrier should be thought

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thought of, of which nothing can be more effectual than a barrier colony; but even this cannot be carried, as is hereafter explained, into execution and effect, without this previous measure of a fystem of entrepots in the country between us and the enemy. The nature of this fystem, must depend on the nature of the ground, which can only be determined by a particular view, and will then immediately be best known to military men; but all mankind must know that no body of men, whether as an army, or as an emigration of colonifts, can march from one country to another, through an inhospitable wilderness, without magazines, nor with any fafety without pofts, communicating amongst each other by practicable roads, to which to retire in cafe of accidents, repulfe, or delay.

It is a fact which experience evinces the truth of, that we have always been able to outfettle the French, and have drove the Indians out of the country more by fettling than fighting; and that wherever our fettlements have been wifely and completely made, the French neither by themfelves, nor their dogs of war, the Indians, have been able to remove us. It is upon this fact that I found the propriety of the measure of fettling a barrier colony in those parts of our frontiers, which are not the immediate refidence or bunting grounds of our Indians. This is a meafure that will be effectual, and will not only in time pay its expence, but make as great returns as any of our prefent colonies do; will give a ftrength and unity to our dominions in North America, and give us possession of the country as well well ftate fuch abfo they at a and land fub a co I ther be tain

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well as *fettlements* in it. But above all this, the ftate and circumftances of our fettlements renders fuch a measure not only proper and eligible, but absolutely necessary. The English fettlements, as they are at prefent circumftanced, are absolutely at a stand; they are settled up to the mountains, and in the mountains there is no where together, land fufficient for a settlement large enough to subsolve the fettlements.

If the English would advance one step further, or cover themselves where they are, it must be at once, by one large ftep over the mountains, with a numerous and m .ary colony. Where fuch should be settled, I do not now take upon me to fay; at prefent I shall only point out the measure and the nature of it, by inferting two schemes, one of Mr. Franklin's; the other of your memorialist; and if I might indulge myfelf with scheming, I should imagine that two fuch were fufficient, and only requifite and proper; one at the back of Virginia, filling up the vacant space between the Five Nations and fouthern confederacy, and connecting, into a one fystem, our barrier : The other somewhere in the Cohais on Connecticut river, or wherever best adapted to cover the four New England colonies. Thefe, with the little fettlements mentioned above, in the Indian countries, compleats my idea of this branch.

The dominion then of the lakes being maintained by a British navy of armed veilels, fuited to the nature of the service, according to a plan proposed

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
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
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posed by your memorialist, in June 1754, to the commissioners met at Albany; which part of the general frontier is, according to that proposal, by order from England, and at the expence of the crown, now carried into execution, compleats the whole of my idea of this frontier.

Thefe matters being thus proposed, I do not at all enter into that point of their execution which is the duty of the military, as it is a matter in which the judgment of a civil man may not have its weight, nor into the manner of removing the French from their encroachments ; yet I cannot but in general observe, that as the present military object of his Majesty's service in this country, is either to erect forts, or to demolifh those erected by the French on his Majesty's lands; and as the way to all fuch lies through woods and wilderneffes, there is a proper fphere of action peculiar to each, both for his Majefty's regular troops, and for the provincial troops of the country. The provincial forces of these countries, as irregulars or light troops, can, the beft of any forces in the world, efcort his Majefty's troops through these woods, to where their proper scene of action lies; they can also in the fame manner hand up all their convoys, and would, 1 am perfuaded, fhould any occasion call for their fervice, act with bravery and fpirit: They are also fit for what may be properly called an expedition, some excursion a la brusque of ten or twenty days continuance : They should therefore be employed either as a covering army, or kept with the regular army, in companies of light infantry, for efcorts, fcouring and fcouting parties :

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ties; while the regular troops, as a main body, marching by these means without being harrassed, fustain them; while his Majesty's troops alone are fit for the various duties and services of a continued regular campaign, and for the fatigues and perfeverance, and skill, necessary in a street.

I must also observe, secondly, that this is not proposed as a scheme to be executed all at once; but, as a general plan of operations, to be preferved and attended to in the whole; to which every part of our measures, as they shall arise into action and come upon the field, are to be referred; to which, in all seasons and at all occafions, as from time to time such shall offer or ferve, our measures must be directed; and to which every individual, and every part, must configure and co operate to form a whole.

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SECTION II,

THE ideas of the fervice contained in the paper above, lead by fair confequence to the following propolition, that after the English had been repeatedly difappointed in their attempts to penetrate the country, by the way of Crownpoint and lake Champlain, and had loft Ofwego and the command of the lake Ontario, confidering the reason there was also to expect the defection of the Indians in confequence of it, there remained no other alternative, but either to make peace, or to change the object of the war, by making a direct attack, up the river St. Lawrence, upon Quebec itfelf, urged to a total reduction of Canada. The writer of these papers came over to England in the latter end of the year 1756, to propose and state these measures, nearly in the same form as was afterwards repeated by the paper that follows, particularly marking the neceffity of two fleets, and two armies: One army defined for the attack; the other under orders to invest Canada, by taking post fomewhere between Albany and Montreal, fo as to cover the English colonies : One fleet to efcort and convoy the army up the river St. Lawrence; and the other to cover and protect the fea-line of the colonies. The object was adopted. Why nothing was done in the year 1757, and why no more was done in the year

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to it prov prov then year 1758, than the taking of Louisbourg, will be explained on a future occasion; the ideas contained in the following paper lead to the rest.

IDEA of the SERVICE in AMERICA, for the Year 1759.

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BOSTON, December 5th, 1758.

TF the point difputed between us and the French, be determinately and precifely underftood, the manner of conducting it may be foon fixed: If we are still, as we were at the first breaking out of the war, disputing about a boundary line, and for the possession of such posts, communications and paffes, as may be a foundation to our possessions of a future dominion in America, we are still engaged in a petty skirmishing war: from the state of which it was always plain, and experience now proves it, that we shall ever be inferior, and beaten by the French; for the French have long ago, by a continued fystem of measures, been taking poffeffion of fuch pofts as hath given them that foundation: They have already established that which we must fight to establish, inch by inch.

If we have changed the point, and brought it to its true iffue, its natural crifis, whether we, as provinces of Great Britain, or Canada as the province of France, shall be superior in America; then the service to be done, is a general invasion [D 2] of of Canada, in conjunction with the European troops and fleet; then is our natural ftrength employed, and we must confequently be as naturally fuperior.

This being fixed, the next point is, where the real attack must be made : the fame reasons that show the necessity of such a general attack, show that it will never effectually be carried on over land; for, if it could, Canada might as effectually be destroyed, by the petty skirmishing war, for posts, passes, &c. as by a general invasion. But experience has now fhown, what reafon might have feen fome time ago, that as the ftate of the fervice is circumstanced between us and the French, that cannot be; the pofferfion which the enemy has of the posts of strength, the carrying places, paffes, water communications. and roads, by forts, redoubts, and their Indians, would render the paffage to Canada by land, the work of a campaign, even with fuccefs; but finally alfo, the fuccels doubtful. The road to Quebec, up St. Lawrence river, we poffeis by the superiority of our marine navigation. There is neither danger nor difficulty, nor do I fee how there can be any opposition, to hinder the fleet getting up to the Isle of Orleans; and a superior army in poffession of that, may, by proper measures, command the reft of the way to Quebec. If our army can once fet down before Quebec, it must take it : If Quebec be taken, the capitulation may at least strip Canada of all the regulars, after which the inhabitants might poffibly be induced to furrender.

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If this attack be determined, the fleet of tranfports will be efforted up the river by the frigates, bombs, and other fmall veffels of war: But while our forces are all up the river, a very firong fquadron feems neceffary to cover the maritime parts of our own colonies.

I am told, that many French veffels proceed early in Spring, to the bay of Gaspee, before the river St. Lawrence is navigable, and lie there till the river breaks up, then flip up without danger, when for fome time it would be almost impoffible to crofs the gulf; for as foon as the ice breaks up in the river, it is prefently clear; but the ice embayed in the gulf, fwims about for a long time, and renders the navigation of that gulf extreamly dangerous, long after the river may be navigated with fafety. If this fact be true, it feems neceffary, that two or three of the ships of war should proceed to Gaspee, before the river St. Lawrence breaks up, in order to prevent any fuccours being fent up the river in Spring.

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But although this attempt on Quebec, by way of St. Lawrence river, may be the only real, and will be the only effectual attack on Canada; yet one other, if not two falfe attacks will be neceffary, one by way of lake Champlain; the other by way of lake Ontario. That by way of lake Champlain may, as far as Crown-point, be offensive, and should then change into a defensive measure, by taking strong post there, with a garrison which will effectually check the enemy at that gate of the country, and from whence [D 3] (

continual fcouting parties, to harrafs the fettlements, and beat up the quarters of the enemy, should be fent down the lake. As there are now fo many regiments at Albany, Sckenectady, fort Edward, and the posts on the river, the taking fort Carillon, at Tieonderôga, and of confequence fort St. Frederick, at Crown-point, might be effected with these, together with fuch provincials as shall be thought necessary, (if not in winter) yet, before the time for embarking for St. Lawrence river approaches: and this time appears the more proper, as it may poffibly be before the French can sufficiently relieve it. The reason that makes me think that this should be attempted is, that the possession of this post is an effectual invefling of Canada in that quarter: The reason why I think no more should be attempted is, that it would prove unfuccefsful, and that all the labour and expense that is employed in the attempt, is loft as foon as it is given over.

As we have now fo good an entrepôt towards lake Ontario, as the fort at the Oneida carrying place, it is now in our power to attempt acting on that lake; the want of this rendered all attempts there before, abortive and unfupportable. An appearance of an attack on Canada by that way, must greatly alarm the enemy at Montreal; and, though I do verily believe we shall never fucceed to make an effectual irruption that way, until Quebec be taken, yet as whatever shall be done on that lake towards fuch an attempt, viz. taking post at some part on the lake, and building vessels, will have a collateral effect; even supposing the first to prove abortive, that will prove a most

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most effential point of fervice, namely, the gaining dominion of the navigation of the lake. So that should nothing elfe be done, yet what is done, and what is fpent, will not be thrown away; but remain a chief corner-stone in the foundation of the British dominion in America :- Besides, if we remain. during the campaign, fuperior in the lake, the enemies communication with their fouthern pofts is cut off, their connection with the Indians of the Five Nations interrupted; and we may, in the course of chances, possibly take Niagara. This amphibious kind of fervice feems adapted to the provincials, especially those of New York and Rhode Island, accustomed to privateering and batteauing : but thefe fhould be supported by good garrifons of regulars, in fuch pofts as may be found neceffary to be taken at the entrepôt on the Oneida carrying place, and at the port it shall be found neceffary to poffefs on the lake.

As to the number of regular troops necessary for the attack on Quebec, I have not prefumed to speak, for I am no judge; but a number of provincials will certainly be neceffary, and these fuch as are used to the water, and marine navigation, for fuch will be of the most effential fervice in the passage of the army from the lower end of the Isle of Orleans to Quebec, where most of the difficulty and danger will lie. Now for this fervice, none can be fo well adapted as the people of the province of Maffachufetts Bay, as they are all, in the fouthern parts, whalers and fishermen. After the troops are landed near Quebec, numbers will be wanted, fuch as are used to carrying heavy lumber and timber, &c. through the woods. Now for this fer-

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fervice, none can be fo well adapted as the inhabitants of New Hampshire, and the county of York, in the province of Maffachufetts Bay, who are fo perfectly accustomed to the masting fervice, that is, fetching the great masts down from the woods; befides, the people of Maffachufetts in the counties of Hampshire, Worcefter and York, are the best wood hunters in America; and would therefore, disposed in proper outposts, be the best adapted to the keeping the camp before Quebec quiet from the enemies partizans and Indians, or perhaps in breaking up the enemies fettlements in the country, while the regulars were taking their towns. For this purpose allo, I should think, if about a hundred thorough wood hunters, properly officered, could be obtained in the county of York, a fcout of fuch might make an attempt upon the fettlements by way of Chaudier river. Such a fcout, to the purpofes of alarming and keeping the enemy in abeyance there, or perhaps breaking up the fettlements, is practicable; and, I think, with early notice, fuch a fcout may be obtained.

These are the services our people are fitted for; and therefore, as far as relate to the people of the province his Majesty has committed to my care, I can be positive, that if his Majesty's General would have a real and effectual fervice from them, they must be employed in such. Take those who live inlund and carry them to sea, or those who have lived by the sea, and march them through the woods, they will be useless and sickly. Employ each in their proper element; let those who are naturally connected with Hudson's river, and and ploy weff are the the the

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and acquainted with inland navigation, be employed up in the back country, and lakes to the westward; and those who border on the sea, and are used to marine navigation, be employed in the service that goes by sea to the eastward; and then for every ten men on paper, there will be ten men's real service.

I have in this paper confined my idea to the invafion of Canada, and the attacks on that country, and fo have faid nothing of that very neceffary fervice, the erecting a fort at Penoblcot river, which on different occasions I have before repeatedly expressed.

I have confined my idea to Canada, and have therefore faid nothing of fort Du Quesne; but if I had extended my idea to that part, I should have endeavoured to confider how far, or not, it might be practicable to break up the enemies fettlements on the Ohio, and the Illinois country, founded on this opinion of Mr. Vaudreuil himfelf, in his letter to his court, when governor of Louifiana, November 1748.----- "It would be very eafy for " the English, by means of the river Ohio, to " form an entrepôt at Prudehomme, to ferve " them as a retreat, having the nations of the " Shawöanefe, Cherokees and Chickafaws on their " back and to support them. From this entre-" pôt it would not be difficult to penetrate to the " Akanfaes, Panis, Ofagaes, Padouces, and " Miffouris, and all the Ohio nations of that " country, if the posts and fettlements of the " Illinois were broken up, as they would cerstainly be, did the English fettle and fortify " at " at Prudehomme; not only the inhabitants of " the Illinois would be loft to us, but also the " inhabitants near New Orleans would be for " greatly diffreffed for want of the fuccours and 66 provisions of this country, the granary to it, " by the loss of the trade with that post, that it " would be difficult for them to fublift, it would " be impossible to maintain the expence they " must live at without it, and they must be " obliged to abandon the colony: But fhould " not matters be fo bad as this, yet, were the " posts of the Illinois taken away, the colony " would not be able to extend itfelf at furtheft " beyond the post of the Natches, without a " very ftrong garrifon at the post of Akansaes, " and at best that post would be too low to cover " the hunting ground."

I fhould have extended my idea to an attempt by a Weft India fquadron, with troops raifed in the islands on Mobile, for nothing would more embarrais the enemy's Indian affairs in Louisiana, than the taking this place, the grand rendezvous at all their treaties. For they support a garrifon here; amongst other reasons, for this also, (as Mr. Vaudreuil, in one of his letters to the court, fays) "to influence the Indians, as there are at our "meetings and treaties, held here annually with "the Indians, fometimes 2, formetimes 3,000 "Indians prefent."

I fhould also have recommended the taking post at Ockfulqué amongst the Creeks, because, fays Mr. Vaudreuil, "If the measures of which "this might be a foundation, should be properly 5 "car" ca ob " A

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feffi a fe pro abc wa tha " carried into execution by the English, it would

" oblige the French to retire from their fort at

" Alibamôus down to the Mobile."

To the Right Honourable Mr. Secretary Pitt.

The reader is here defired to refer to the events of the year 1759 in America.

Quebec was taken by general Townshend, the moment that the army was enabled to set down before it, by the greatly hazarded, and gloriously successful stroke of general Wolf.

The operations of the army under general Amherst, could not, by all the skill and determined perfeverance of that excellent officer, be pushed further than Crown-point, and there became defensive by fortifying that point.

The operations up the Mohawks river, and on lake Ontario, were carried just to that effect which opened the way for the next campaign, 1760, when general Amherst went that way to take posseficition of Canada.

Amidft these objects, I mention the taking poffession of the Penobscot country, and the building a fort there by the governor of the Massachuletts province, merely as it was proposed in the paper above, and as the proposal and execution of it was approved by the King and his ministers at that time.

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The whole fleet was taken up the river St. Lawrence, where, as general Wolf exprelly declares. it was a part of the force leaft adapted to the object: The fea-line of the colonies was left uncovered and open. If the French had had fenfe enough to have fent two fhips of the line, with a frigate or two, and one or two bomb-ketches, they might have burnt Halifax, Boston, New York, or Philadelphia, without interruption; or even if fuch measure had not been carried to that degree of fuccefs, they might have raifed fuch an alarm as fhould have broken up fome of our active, offensive operations, in order to come to the defence of this fea-line; and, perhaps, thus the whole of the operations of 1759, have been disconcerted and defeated. To enquire why this was done, would at this time become a mere criticism, for as, by good luck, no such accident happened, it is right that fuccess should justify every measure.

To give reasons why nothing was attempted towards the quarters of Louisiana at that time, will be the solution of some future discussion.

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APPENDIX.

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SECTION III.

CONTAINING

Confiderations on the Points lately brought into Question, as to the Parliament's Right of taxing the Golonies, and of the Measures necessary to be taken at this Criss.

A S in the Dedication of the Adminifiration of the Colonies, I have fo ftrongly pledged my opinion for the principles, fpirit, and temper of the Colonifts, and have reprefented that fpirit and principle to be fo entirely contrary to those dispositions which feem to animate their prefent conduct, I cannot but think fome apology either for myself or them necessary.

And first, as to their attachment to the mother country and to the government and constitution thereof, I will venture to repeat my affirmation, and will appeal to [E] every every man of interest or business in those countries for the truth of it, That for an hundred years to this time there has not been an American to whom in the genuine feelings of his heart, the interest, welfare. and happiness of Great Britain was not as dear as that of his own colony, having no other idea but that they were always one and the fame: I do not believe that the idea of Great Britain ever heretofore arole in an American breast without the idea of its being HOME. If of late they have learned to call the British produce and manufactures foreign and Britons foreigners, it is not from an American idea that they have learnt it, it is from an idea that is foreign alfo.

Next; as to the propositions lately taken up and brought forward into question, Whether the fupreme legiflature of Great Britain should or should not agreeably to the actual prefent state of the British constitution, exercife the power of laying taxes on the Colonies: And whether confistent with the rights of Englishmen and the supposed the English constitution, fpirit of the can be taxed unlefs by their Colonifts own respective legislatures, or unless the Colonies have by their proper reprefentatives a share in the legislature of Great Bri-I will affirm that the reasoning which tain. ftates - states these propositions, as matters under question and doubt, never did or could arise from the principles of an American politician. The fundamental maxim of the laws of those countries is, first, That the common law of England together with fuch flatutes or acts of Parliaments (the ecclefiaffical laws excepted) as were passed before the Colonies had a legiflature of their own, Secondly, That their own laws together with fuch acts of Parliament as by a special clause are extended to America fince that time, are the laws of that country. The jurifdiction and power of every court effablished in that country; the duty of every civil officer; the process of every transaction in law and bufinefs there, is regulated on this principle. There is not a man of bufinefs in the Colonies that ever held an office who does not know this, and who hath not always acted on this principle: There never was a man that ever acquired a lead or intereft in the politics of those free countries. who did not defend this principle as the palladium of their liberty, that they were to be ruled and governed only by acts of Parliament, together with their own laws not contrary to the laws of Great Britain : And as a friend to the Colonies I would venture to add, That it is under this principle that every act of Parliament paffed fince the efta-[E 2] blifhment

blifhment of the Colonies, which respects the general police of the realm, and the rights and liberties of the subject of the realm is, without the intervention of their own confent by their respective legislatures or representatives, confidered, and, I think I may venture to fay, adopted as part of the law and conftitution of those countries. It is under this principle, without the intervention of their own confent, that they may beft and most fafely claim all the rights and privileges of Englishmen confirmed in the Bill of Rights. It is under this principle that I should hope, could an American ever have need to claim it, that they may beft claim those benefits and priviledges, which by the feventh of William the Third, are declared and provided to the subject in case of accusation of treason; even though those acts stand enacted without the intervention of their confent, without being by any special clause extended to America, otherwife than as extending by power of the supreme legislature to every subject within the realm. But should the Colonists doubt the power of the fupreme legiflature in these cases, I believe it never was yet doubted in that country but that when an act of Parliament was by a special clause extended to America, it had its full force there, nor was ever yet any principle found out, by which to diffinguish the

the exercise of the power of Parliament in making laws which respected the property, the rights, liberties, and lives of the subjects there, from a power to make laws for that country which should demand, by ways and means, as to that Parliament seemed meet, aids by taxes towards the maintenance and support of government.

I have heard and read many arguments advanced on this late occasion, and to give fair fcope to them I will examine the principle from which they must all derive, and on which they must all depend, namely, the right which every Englishman hath to a fhare in the (commune concilium regni) Common-council of the realm, as fettled by Magna Charta. That we may not wander and be bewildered in general theories, it will be neceffary to fix on the actual flate of the English constitution as our pole star. However just in theory, and however proper in practice, where that can be done, an equal representation of every individual Freeman in the Common-council may be; and however happy it is for the Colonies that they do actually poffefs fuch within their refpective states, yet it is not the fact in the English constitution. Freeholders, Burghers, and Citizens, according to their ancient rights, are alone the conftituents of repre-[E 3] fentatives,

fentatives, are alone, according to these late arguments, the perfons actually reprefented : and yet these are not one third of the people of England, one third of those Englishmen in England who have the fame claim by birthright to all the rights and privileges of an Englishman, which the Colonists have or can claim, either under the general rights of the constitution, or by the 13th Geo. II. as lately quoted by them.

Article XIV. of Magna Charta declares, that no foutage or aid shall be imposed, except by the Common-council of the realm. And I believe no one will deny, that the King, Lords, and Commons, in affembly met, are that Common-council of the realm, whether that Common-council be or be not conflituted according to the theory lately infifted upon.

The fame charter, after having declared and confirmed the cuftoms, right, and privileges of the city of London, declares in article XVI. that all cities, boroughs, towns and ports, shall have their cuftoms, rights, and privileges, & ad habendum commune concilium regni de auxilio assidendo. Which declaration (apart the fact) may be underflood two ways; either that they shall be included within the declaration of right contained in article XIV. of not having

having any affefiment made upon them but by the Common-council of the realm; or, 2dly, that they also shall have the right of being of the Common-council of the realm. The latter I should the rather take to be the true reasoning, and is, I believe the actual fact. Let us fee then how this applies to the cafe in question. The Colonists, confirmed by the theory of the right and justice of a general equal representation in Common-council, do from this declaration of the charter fay, that they ought not to be taxed but by Common-council of the realm; and that any Common-council in which they do not fit by their representatives, is not to them a Common-council (commune concilium) fo far as respects their rights and privileges, ad habendum commune concilium regni: That therefore they must either retain, as by charter granted, the power of taxing themfelves, or be admitted to feffions in parlia-This reasoning feems to fair, let us, ment. I fay, fee how it applies to fact in the courfe of the English history; and first, as it stands explained even in Magna Charta it-Upon the declaration and confirmation felf. of thefe rights as above, in articles, XIV, XV, XVI. The charter proceeds to regulate the manner of isluing the writs for calling together this Common-council of the realm, namely, (article XVII) that the king [E 4] will

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will fummon archbishops, bishops, abbots, earls, and great barons, that is to fay, the house of Lords, by special letters, particularly directed to each lord in parliament. But as to the reft. who hold of the crown in capite, (article XVIII) viz. the cities, boroughs, towns, ports, and perhaps alfo may be herein included the counties, or leffer barons: he shall direct his sheriffs or bailiffs to fummon and return them: those only who held in capite, or by their antiquas libertates & liberas confuetudines had then the right, are fummoned to the Common-council, according to the fundamental principles of the feudal conftitution then existing. However, through the various changes which the conflitution of the government hath undergone fince that time to the revolution, that fpecies of reprefentation by Lords and Commons (though perhaps not at that time fitting in feparate houses) confisting as above, of archbishops, &c. in their own perfons; and of the representative of cities, &c. returned by the fheriffs or bailiffs, hath been confirmed to be, with the King affembled, the true and real Common-council of the realm. Those towns, corporations, counties, &c. which were not included according to their antiquas libertates & liberas confuetudines in this commune concilium, but have fince acceded to the realm, or encreased within the realm

realm to a degree of power and interest, for as to be equally concerned to have knights or burgefles in the high court of Parliament, of their own election; to represent them equally as other inhabitants of the realm, have, according to whatever was the form of the conflitution at the time, been called to a fhare in the Common-council of the realm, as were the Welch, the county palatine of Chefter, and the county palatine of Durham. But until fo called, they " were liable to all rates, although they " were not represented," as those rates were laid only per commune concilium regni.

And it is under this just principle and fair reasoning, that the duties which, by the laws of trade, are settled and rated to be paid by the trade of those colonies, ever fince the year 1673, have never in any one instance been refused, or the principle by which they were laid upon the colony trade called in question. Nay, the tax laid on the northern colonies by the sugar act, was follicited and obtained by the intervention and defire of that part of the Colonists who inhabit the sugar islands. These acts have been evaded, but whenever the offender has been convicted, he hath suffered the penalties

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nalties fixed upon fuch offence by act of Parliament.

I believe there never was an inflance in America that the tax laid by act of Parliament on feamen's wages towards the fupport of Greenwich-Hospital, was ever refused or disputed.

I do not believe that there ever was an inftance when this principle of the fupreme Legislature's power to raise monies by taxes throughout the realm of Great-Britain, was ever called in question, either in the assemblies or in the courts of the Colonies; nor did I ever hear of any book, treatise, or even News-paper essay, that ever, until this moment, even moved it as a question of right.

However general this claim of exemption from being taxed by act of Parliament may have become of late; however fuddenly this wild plant, forced by an artificial fire, may have fprung up and fpread itfelf, it is neither the natural produce nor growth of America. The Colonifts in their fober fenfes know too well the neceffary powers of government; they have too well confidered the relation which they, as Colonifts, bear to the realm of Great-Britain: their true and real liberties and charter rights are dearer dearer to them than that they fhould hazard them by grasping after shadows and phantoms. I will therefore abide by what I have faid in every part of my work, that as they understand thoroughly the necessary powers of government on one hand, and as they are zealous for liberty on the other, fo were they by affection as well as principle, ever attached to the mother-country and to the government thereof. I fpeak of them as I knew them, nothing aggravating, nothing extenuating. But there is no anfwering for the defects of a delirium. I know nothing of the fpirit of those who have raifed and would direct the form in the present wild uproar in America, nor do I believe that they themselves know what spirit they are of. Ignorant of the constitution of Great-Britain, and of their own best liberty as derived from it, they have mifled the good people of America to difclaim the wildom and temper of their true friends, to doubt the virtue and zeal of those good citizens who have for fo many years by their fuperior abilities and real patriotifm had the charge and conduct of their interests. Frantic, like madmen, they have fallen first upon those who have been hitherto near and dearest to them, and then giddy with the wild outrage they have begun, they have proceeded (I had almost faid to take up arms) againft

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against the authority of that very conftitution to which they owe the rights and priviledges that they contend for.

They are ignorant of the theory as well as the fact of the British constitution, if they fuppose that even the King by any Grant, Charter, or Patent whatfoever can exempt any perfon, family, or colony, within the realm and dominion of Great Britain, from being liable to be taxed by act of Parliament. They are equally ignorant of the fame when they fay, That any Colonists, or any perfon whatfoever, who has neither freehold in a county in Britain, nor tenure as a burgher of fome borough, nor freedom in the corporation of fome city, has either on one hand a right to fend (fo far as his voice goes) a deputy to Parliament, or on the other hand a right to refuse any taxes laid on him and his property, as being laid without his confent, or the confent of his reprefentative, as not laid per commune concilium regni. All those perfons in Great Britain who living in counties have not freeholds, who living in boroughs are no burghers, who living in cities are not freemen of the corporation. All the poffeffors of property in the public funds, as fuch, fend not their deputies or reprefentatives to Parliament, and yet are taxed without their own confent as much and

and in the fame manner as the Colonists are. Will any advocate for the new maxims fay, That the inhabitants of the county palatine of Durham were not liable to all payments, rates, and subfidies granted by Parliament, equally with the inhabitants of other counties, until by the 25th of Car. II. they were enabled to fend knights and burgheffes to represent them in Parliament. No one who knows, as I faid, either the theory or the actual state of the constitution will venture to affirm this; and the very reasoning and express declaration in the preamble of that act of Parliament fixes this principle, That they were liable to all rates, &c. although they were not represented. The preamble having first fixed the matter of right in such declaration, the fupreme legiflature, as the inhabitants were concerned [not entitled] to have knights and burgheffes in the High Court of Parliament of their own election, to reprefent the condition of their country, equally the inhabitants of other cities as and boroughs, proceeds to enact that they may If this right had been a fundahave fuch. mental infeparable right of the British subject, the Parliament need not to have made an act to establish it, but would have declared it, and prayed the King that his Majesty's writ might be awarded by the Lord Chancellor or Lord Keeper of the Great Seal of England,

England, and directed to the proper officers for the election of representatives for fuch county.

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If the Colonifts were to address themfelves to Parliament, praying that they might have reprefentatives of their own election in the High Court of Parliament, on this ground of expediency, namely, " That " they were concerned equally with others " the inhabitants of this kingdom, to have " fuch to reprefent the condition of their " country," that would be quite another cafe, and would become a very ferious matter highly worthy the confideration and deliberation of Parliament. If the Colonifts did this, why should not also all those parts of Great Britain, which are very unequally if at all reprefented ; why should not the isles of Guernsey and Jersey be reprefented as well as the ifle of Wight; why should not the British possessors of that very important property which lies in the funds. apply alfo on the fame principle for the fame privileges; why not the corporation of the East India company, for in this very extenfive proportion of British property, fuch expediency becomes in the fame manner well founded, not only in that the proprietors of this property are, as fuch, equally concerned with others, the landed proprietors, burghers, and

and citizens of Great Britain, to have in Parliament perfons of their own election to represent their condition, but also as the important interest of this property is equally connected and united with the interest and perhaps existence of the government of Great Britain, as the most important interests If upon any fuch of the colonies are. application from the Colonies to Parliament, the wifdom of that high court should fee the expediency and practicability of this measure, and find the proper means of enacting it into a law, That for the future the Colonies should Send representatives to Parliament, I fee no danger nor inconvenience that could arife to Great Britain; on the contrary fuch measure would have a tendency throughout the Colonies to extend loyalty towards the crown, and affection towards the mother country, as it extended the fpirit and influence of general liberty to that people made, by this communication of it, one body and mafs with the people of Great Britain.

Perhaps one caution might be found neceffary, that is to guard against forming too powerful connections between the interests of the great trading cities and towns here, (already very powerful) and the interests of these trading Colonies and corporations. I think

mink that trade and commerce ought to have. its full weight of representation in Parliament, but it is equally necessary that the landed interest should have its full weight and force alfo. The Colonists in their refpective countries have had frequent experience of the effect pointed out in this remark, and have paffed laws to reftrain it. This matter therefore may be eafily provided for by the mode of representation to be established, according to what the wisdom of the Colonists have done in this cafe, as well as from the number of representatives limited thereby : And if ever the wildom of Parliament should fee proper to take up the confideration of this measure, that mode might be eafily pointed out by those who have a practical as well as a general knowledge of the Colonies and their affairs. However visionary this may feem to those who judge by parts, and act by temporary expedients, those truely great ministers who shall ever take up the administration of the Colonies as a fystem, and shall have a general practical and adequate knowledge of that fystem, as interwoven in that of the mother country, will, on the contrary, find this measure prudential if not a necessary one, as leading to that great and abfolutely neceffary measure of uniting the Colonies to Great Britain as parts of the realm, in every degree

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degree and mode of communication of its rights and powers. And until fome fteps are taken which may lead and approach to this fyftem of union, as the intereft and power of the Colonies approach to the bearing of a proportion with that of Great Britain, the real intereft of Great Britain and her Colonies will continue to be very inadequately and very unhappily administred, while the businefs of the Colonies shall in the mean time become a faction instead of a constitutional part of the administration.

The center of power, instead of remaining fixed as it now is in Great Britain, will, as the magnitude of power and interest of the Colonies encreases, be drawn out from the ifland, by the fame laws of nature analagous in all cafes, by which the center of gravity of the folar fystem, now near the furface of the fun, would, by an encrease of the quantity of matter in the planets, be drawn out beyond that furface. * Knowing therefore the laws of nature, shall we like true philosophers follow, where that system leads, to form one general fystem of dominion by an union of Great Britain and her Colonies, fixing, while it may be fo fixed, the common center in Great Britain, or shall we without ever feeing that fuch center must

• Vide Administration of the Colonies, page 5, 10.

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be formed by an inter-communion of the powers of all the parts which form the dominions of Great Britain, like true modern politicians, and from our own narrow temporary ideas of a local center, labour to keep that center in Great Britain by force against encreasing powers, which will, finally, by an overbalance heave that center itself out of its place? Such measures would be almost as wife as his who standing in a scale should thrust his stick up against the beam to prevent it from descending, while his own weight brought it the faster down.

Having gone thus far, I will fpeak out my opinion and go further. If the measure here fuggested be right, Why should we wait for the application of the Colonies? It appears by fome of their refolves, that they fee no propriety in their being admitted to feffions in the British legislature, even under the prefent state of the Colonies; and if from a foretafte, as it were, of their own ftrength, they flould not now apply for it, they never will hereafter; nay, perhaps, even refuse the measure when proposed to them: Why therefore if the measure be conform to the actual state of the British constitution, if it be founded in the actual circumstances of the state of the British dominions, Why do we not require of the Colonies to take their feffions ? feffions? Why do we not oblige them to fend their reprefentatives to the Common Council of the realm, as hath been done in England with regard to towns and boroughs in former times? The Reader will fee that I have given the form of queftion and inquiry to this paragraph, as it treats of a matter of too high and too interefting a fpeculation for me to decide upon.

I may poffibly have my own queftions retorted here upon me, that as the fame expediency urges for an equal reprefentation of all interested parts in England, and also for the actual representation of the funds and trading corporations, " as equally concerned," Do I hold that the fame measure should be extended to those cases likewise? I fancy nobody will deny either the expediency or the falutary propriety of the first case, were it practicable under the present spirit of politics; nor of the latter case, could one be flattered to think the object of those interests as permanent as it is important.

Whether the prefent time, all circumftances and occurrences of the prefent time confidered, be the proper occasion in which to take up the confideration of this measure, and whether if this communication of right of representation was offered by the mother [F 2] country, country, the Colonists would now accept it, is subject to great doubt. But what step previous to or concomitant with such schemes

of politics are neceffary, is matter of confideration which requires advice of the most prudent and temperate, as well as the most spirited council which this nation ever had occasion for.

There is a measure which I have long foreseen to be necessary, which I have recommended as fuch even before this crifis. and which I would hope now to recommend to government, that would in its proper time lead to and lay the foundation of a true, real, and political union of the mother country with its Colonies, by an union of its government, and yet fix and keep the center and throne of that government in England. This measure would, in the mean time, give the Colonies proper and conftitutional means of stating their conditions, their grievances, and of proposing regulations for the future, adequate, and equal administration of their interests, and have a direct tendency to fix the power of government, while it quieted the minds of the people. It is a measure that has its precedents in times when the bufiness of the Colonies was not less (if not better) underftood than it is at present; but as this has been mentioned to government ment as proper in this crifis, and as there appears to be a difposition in administration to adopt every thing which on mature deliberation shall be found right and practicable, I forbear all publication that may embarrass and obstruct it.

How to recommend to administration any conceffions in government, I am fure I know not, when the Colonies themfelves will not even give grounds to government whereupon to take up fuch, were it inclined. But if the Colonies have loft all temper and prudence, and feem willing, as far as lies in their own power to brave their own ruin; furely, by fo much the more, temper and prudence in government here is neceffary, as government has in its hands the actual power of ruining them. I will beg to quote a paffage out of Sir William Temple's observations upon the United Provinces: " The nobility of the " country, and the richeft of the people in " the cities, though unfatisfied with the " government, yet feeling the effects and " abhorring the rage of popular tumults, as " the worst mischief which can befal any " state; and encouraged by the arrival of " the King's concessions, began to unite their " counfels and forces with those of the Go-" vernefs, and to employ themfelves both " with great vigour and loyalty, for fup-[F 3] " prefling " preffing the late infurrections, that had " leized upon many, and shaked most of " the cities of the provinces; in which the " Prince of Orange and Count Egmont " were great instruments by the authority of " their great charges, (one being Governor " of Holland and Zealand, and the other of "Flanders) but more by the general love " and confidence of the people, until by " reducing Valenciennes, Maestricht, and " the Burfe by arms; the fubmiffion of Ant-" werp and other towns; the defection of " Count Egmont from the counfels of the " confederate Lords (as they were called); " the retreat of the Prince of Orange into "Germany, and the death of Brederode. " with the news and preparations of King " Philip's fudden journey into the Low " Countries, as well as the prudence and e moderation of the Duchefs in governing « all these circomstances, the whole estate « of the provinces was perfectly reftored to e its former peace, obedience, and, at least, « appearance of loyalty. King Philip, whe-" ther never having really decreed his journey into Flanders, or diverted by the pacifi-« cation of the provinces, and the apprere henfion of the Moors rebelling in Spain, c or a distrust of his fon Prince Charles's se violent passions and dispositions, or the expectations of what had been refolved at " Bayonne,

44 Bayonne, growing ripe for execution in " France, gave over the difcourse of seeing " the Low Countries, but at the fame time " took up the refolution for difpatching the " Duke of Alva thither, at the head of an " army of ten thousand veteran Spanish and " Italian troops, for the affiftance of the " Governess, the execution of the Laws, " the fuppreffing and punishment of all who " had been authors or fomenters of the late " feditions. This refult was put fuddenly " in execution, though wholly against the " advice of the Duchefs of Parma, in " Flanders, and the Duke of Feria, one of " the chief ministers in Spain, who thought " the prefent peace of the provinces ought " not to be invaded by new occasions, nor " the royal authority leffened by the being " made a party in a war upon his. fubjects, " nor a minister employed where he was " fo profeffedly both hating and hated as " the Duke of Alva in the Low Coun-« tries.

" But the King was unmoveable, fo that in the end of the year 1567, the Duke of Alva arrived there with an army of ten thousand of the best Spanish and Italian foldiers, under the command of the choicest officers, which the wars of Charles V. or Philip II, had bred up in [F 4] "Europe, ⁶ Europe, which with two thousand Ger-⁶⁶ mans the duchels of Parma had railed ⁶⁶ in the late tumults, and under the com-⁶⁷ mand of fo old and renowned a general ⁶⁶ as the duke of Alva, made up a force ⁶⁷ which nothing in the Low Countries ⁶⁶ could look in the face with other eyes ⁶⁶ than of aftonishment, submission, or de-⁶⁶ fpair."

" Upon the first report of this expedition, " the trading people of the towns and " country began in vast numbers to retire " out of the provinces, fo as the Duchefs " wrote to the King, that in a few days " above a hundred thousand men had left 'f the country, and withdrawn both their mo-" ney and goods, and more were following " every day, fo great antipathy there ever " appears between merchants and foldiers; " whilft one pretends to be fafe under laws, " which the other pretends shall be subject " to his fword and his will. And upon " the first action of the Duke of Alva, after " his arrival, which was the feizing of the " Counts Egmont and Horne, as well as the " fuspected death of the Marquis of Berg-" hen, and imprisonment of Montigny in of Spain (whither fome months before they " had been fent with commission and in-" ftructions from the Duchefs) fhe immediff ately

" ately defired leave of the King to retire " out of the Low Countries.

" This was eafily obtained, and the Duke " of Alva invefted in the government, with " powers never given before to any governor. " A council of Twelve was erected for tryal " of all crimes committed against the King's " authority, which was called by the people, " the council of blood : great numbers were " condemned and executed by fentence of " this council, upon account of the late in-" furrections, more by that of the inqui-" fition against the parting advice of the " Duchefs of Parma, and the exclamation " of the people at those illegal courts. " The towns stomached the breach of their " charters, the people of their liberties, the " Knights of the Golden Fleece the charters " of their order, by these new and odious " courts of judicature. All complain of " the difuse of the states; of the intro-" duction of armies; but all in vain: the "King was constant to what he had de-" termined; Alva was in his nature cruel " and inexorable, the new army was fierce " and brave, and defirous of nothing fo " much as a rebellion in the country; the " people were enraged, but awed and un-" headed ; all was feizure and process, con-" fiscation and imprisonment, blood and horff ror,

" ror, infolence and dejection, punifhments " executed, and meditated revenges; the " fmaller branches were lopped off apace, the " great ones were longer a hewing down. " Counts Egmont and Horne lasted several " months, but, at length, in fpite of all " their fervices to Charles V. and to Philip, " as well as of their new merits in the quiet-" ing of the Provinces, and of fo great " fupplications and interceffions as were " made in their favour, both in Spain and " in Flanders, they were publickly be-" headed at Bruffels, which feemed to break " all patience in the people, and, by their " end, to give those commotions a begin-" ning which coft Europe fo much blood, " and Spain a great part of the Low Country " provinces."

From experience of this unfortunate example of measures, under circumstances so very apposite to the present case of the infurrection in the Colonies, let us consider to what situation, and to what a strange dilemma, 'Great-Britain would be reduced, if while it aims to extend its government as it extends its dominions, it so a strange to the to labour that point under a disputed right, and with a discontented people, " who " can neither (as Sir William Temple fays of Portugal on its accession to Spain) " be " used " used like good subjects and be governed " without armies, nor like a conquered na-" tion, and fo made to bear the charge of " its forced obedience."-From the ruinous effect of measures of violence and of arms. when used by the body politic against its own limbs and members, where every fuccefs and victory must be an oppression of its own interest, let all resolutions which lead to fuch be fuspended, at least to the very last extremity.-Those who have known the spirit of the Colonies in times prior to these events, would hope that there would be no fuch neceffity, especially when they know that the Colonists must be confcious of the abfolute impoffibility of their refifting, fhould they now be mad enough to draw upon themselves that fatal dreadful necessity. But on the contrary, let all parties unite, the present Ministry, with those gentlemen whom they have fucceeded, and they again with their predeceffors; let all, whether concerned in the business of government or of commerce, unite in a firm, steady, and confitutional maintenance of the right of the fupreme Legiflature of Great-Britain to lay taxes on all parts and perfons within the realms of the fame; let them unite as in well policied, fo in well concerted meafures, of enforcing this right, of enforcing it rather

ther by teaching the Colonies their duty. than in exacting it of them by force of This may be best done by the genarms. tlemen of the late Ministry, on their part fairly and candidly joining iffue in reconfidering (from experience of what has occurred fince the enacting the late revenue acts for America) these measures solely on the ground of expediency, and from the openness and candour with which they did act, by giving a year's notice of their intentions, and taking the fense of the house before they proceeded to bring forward the measure, in a bill. We may be assured, that if any one can fhew any inexpediency in the way to the effect, or any grievance in the execution of the measure, which does not equally lie against the revenue acts of the fame nature in Great-Britain, we may be affured that they will readily, and in all juffice join, to give fuch relief as the wifdom of Parliament shall find proper and neceffary. If the prefent Ministry will, as most certainly they ought, and as I make no doubt they will do, join with the last in maintaining and supporting the right of the fupreme Legiflature in the mothercountry : the gentlemen of the last will most certainly not refuse to refurvey their works, whenever any default can be pointed out in that ground whereon they laid their foundation.

dation, or in the structure which they built upon it.

Convinced therefore, whatever may be the perfonal animofities of particulars, whatever may be the ftruggles and jealoufies of contending parties for power and interest, where either power, interest, or revenge is to be come at, that at this very perilous and important crifis, wherein nothing can arife but ruin to the Colonies and trade, and danger to Great-Britain in its funds, its peace, its power, and perhaps its fafety, all perfons and parties will join in a ferious and Parliamentary confideration of these matters : convinced, I fay, of this, for fuch ever has been the good fortune and good fenfe of this country, when the danger was really at our doors, that all parties coinciding in one common love of this country, will, as they have ever done, unite in guarding and faving it; I do proceed, as far as my poor experience may fuggest, to point out, to those who have the fortune to be in bufinefs, or to be connected with those who are, and who can give efficiency to their endeavours, fuch measures as are most likely to reduce the Colonies to their duty. and to unite them as in affection, fo in polity, with the mother-country.

Previous

Previous to any proposals that I shall here make, I beg to repeat what I have already urged in * the Administration of the Colonies, that until an effective administration for Colony affairs be established by government, all plans for the governing of those countries under any regular fystem of policy, will be only matter of fpeculation, and become mere useles opprobrious theory. All official information given and transmitted by those whose duty it is to give it, will, as accident shall decide, or as the connexions of parties shall run, be received or not; nay, it may fo happen, that those officers who should duly report to government the state of these matters, will, as they find them. felves confcientioufly or politically difpofed, direct that information to those who are in, or to those who are out of administration. Every leader of every little flying fquadron will have his runner, his own proper channel of information; and will hold forth his own importance in public, by bringing his plan for American affairs before it. All true and regular knowledge of these affairs being difperfed, will be evaporated; every administration, even Parliament itself, will be diffracted in its councils by a thousand odds and ends of propofals, by a thoufand pieces and parcels of plans, while those furely,

* Vide Administration, page 11-25.

furely, who are fo deeply concerned as the Americans themselves are, will not be excluded from having their plan alfo; they will have their plan alfo, for however peaceably they may fubmit to the direction of the powers of government, derived through a regular established permanent mode of administration, they will by any means that they can justify, refuse to have their interefts directed and disposed of by every whim that every temporary empiric can force into execution. If therefore we mean to govern the Colonies, we must previously form at home fome practical and efficient administration for Colony affairs.

Before the erection of the Board of Trade as a particular office, the bufiness of the Colonies was administered with efficiency: the king himfelf in council administered the government of his Colonies; the stateofficer, each in his proper department was no otherwife Minister than as ministerially executing the orders which he received, or officially reporting from his respective department, the information which he had to lay before the king in council. Since the eftablishment of that office called the Board of Trade, the administration of the Colonies has either lain dormant, or been overlaid; or, if taken up, become an occasion of

of jealoufy and struggle for power between that Board and every state officer who hath been deemed the Minister for the time being. From this jealoufy and this ftruggle, this Board hath been supposed to interfere at different times with every other office, while at one time it hath had the powers and held the port of a minister's office, and at another hath become a mere committee, inefficient as to execution, unattended to as The Colonies, and the officers reporting. of the Colonies, have one while been taught to look up to this Board as the Minister for their affairs, and at another, have learned to hold it in that contempt which inefficiency gives; which contempt, however, hath not always stopped there.

To prevent, on this critical occafion, all fuch appearances on one hand, from mifleading those who are to be governed, and to put an end on the other, to all interfering amongst those who are to govern in this line of business—The Board of Trade should either be made what it never was intended to be, a Secretary of State's office for the Plantations, or be confined to what it really is, a committee of reference for examination and report, for stating and preparing business, while the affairs of the Colonies are administed folely by the King in council, really acting acting as an efficient board for that purpole. Some where there ought to be an efficiency, and in this fupreme board is the proper refidence of it. To place it here would be really and in fact the eftablishing of an administration for Colony affairs, and they would be adequately and effectually adminiftered.

Matters being thus eftablished at home, fend out *fome very confiderable* perfon to America, as Commander in Chief both of navy and army, with a council under fuch instructions, and with fuch directions as may and will re-establish the British government in its American Colonies, over a free, loyal, and dutiful people. More than this, I do not at prefent think myself at liberty to publish, but certain it is, that the very appearance of fome such very confiderable perfon, under such instructions, but for a feason in that country, would compose all diforders, and reftore peace and government.

Magno in populo cum sæpe corta est Seditio; sævitque animis ignobile vulgus Jamque faces et saxa volant, Furor arma ministrat.

Tum pietate gravem ac meritis fi forte virum quem

Conspexere, silent arrectisque auribus astant Ille regit dictis animos et pectora mulcet. [G] This This measure being taken as the only effective and adequate plan, which will reach and heal the malady without deftroying the patient; other temporary and feasonable meafures may be taken under confideration in the mean time.

In order to this confideration, let us fee what are the feveral grievances complained of, as fuffered by the Colonies. They complain, 1ft, That they are taxed without having equally, as other freemen of England have, their fhare of reprefentation, which might in Parliament flate their condition, or give their confent as to taxes.

2dly, That a fevere and ftrict execution of the laws of trade as they now ftand, and as the trade of that country is circumftanced, must have an effect oppressive and ruinous to the Colonies as a commercial people.

3dly, That a want both of filver and paper money, as a medium or currency, which is a legal tender in the Colonies, cloggs even the neceffary bufinefs of the domeftic market, ftops all improvements and new fettlements in the country, obftructs their commerce, and finally renders them incapable of making their returns of payment to England, land, or the payments required by the Impost and Stamp Duties.

4thly, That the Impost and Stamp Duties directed to be paid into the Receipt of the Exchequer, must finally drain the Colonies of their money.

5thly, That the rate of the duties laid by the late Revenue Act, as duties now to be collected (for before that time fome of them were meant rather as a prohibition than a duty) is higher than the trade of the Colonies can bear, or at least is higher than is confiftent with the reasonable profits of that trade.

6thly, That gold and filver paffing current in the Colonies, according to a certain rate of exchange, namely at 133 and one third for a hundred (which rate is fixed by act of Parliament confirming a proclamation iffued by Queen Anne.) Money, whether filver or paper, becomes at that rate of exchange the lawful money of America : that it becomes therefore hard, inconvenient, and a matter of grievance to oblige them to pay the duties laid upon them in sterling, in filver which they have not, or in paper, while their paper money shall cease to be a legal tendure. [G 2]

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7thly, That

7thly, That having, as every other Engglifhman hath, a right to be tried both in their property and in their perfons by their country, that is by a jury, they complain of the jurifdiction of the court of Admiralty, but more especially of the extension of it in the Stamp Act, to what they call internal taxes.

To the first complaint, as far as my judgment informs me, the matters contained in the former part of this Appendix are an an-The point in question is of great defwer. licacy and of very high importance, it is what concerns the rights, privileges, and liberties of a great country, of a people, Englishmen as well as ourselves; I would not therefore be thought to pronounce rafhly, or to give an air of decifion to my opinions : I beg it may be understood that I speak them under every fense of, and regard for these important interests, not only as they concern the Americans, as they concern the the prefent age, but also under an idea of the relation they may bear to the future liberties of mankind.

Upon the fubject of the fecond, I have already, in the Administration of the Colonies *, declared my opinion, and have long

* Vide page 181.

ago given it officially, That a revision of the laws of trade respecting the Colonies is a measure absolutely necessary. That meafure should commence by an actual view taken of the real course and state of that trade: Upon this information, should be formed (ftrictly adhering to the principle of the Act of Navigation) a system of commercial law, which should not oppress or pervert the Colony trade, but fo regulate and direct its motions in coincidence with and in fubordination to the trade of the mother country, as to fecure the most effential benefits of its effect to Great Britain, by drawing all the furplus profits which are derived from it, to center there finally.

The difficulties mentioned under the third may be eafily remedied, as it is within the power of government to take fuch measures as shall supply the Colonies with that medium or currency *, the want of which is complained of, for first, if that trade which introduces the Spanish and Portuguese bullion into the Colonies is not obstructed or restricted further than the material and effential limitations of the Act of Navigation require, That trade will, as it hath ever hitherto done, supply the Colonies with filver in part of their necessary currency.

* Vide Administration, page 104, 106.

[G 3]

adly, As

2dly, As the act lately passed for restraining the affemblies of the Colonies, from making their paper-money a legal tender, was not meant to exclude the Colonies from having a paper-currency, but to remedy the defects and fraudulent abuses of it : If the effect of that law hath had a tendency to prevent a fufficient quantity of this money from being current *, it becomes a very proper occasion for government to interpole, and to do in confequence of this exigency, what ought always to have been done from motives of wife and just policy, to provide for the Colonies by authority of Parliament, a paper-money which shall have none of those limitations or defects which the local paper-money of any particular Colony must have: which paper-money may be made by the fame authority a general currency and a legal tender throughout the continent, and yet not be capable of being abufed to those fraudulent depreciations complained of in that paper-money, which hath been made by fome of the particular Colonies. Such a mode of paper-money may be eafily formed under authority of Parliament, and be iffued by government to the Colonies, as shall not only remove every difficulty here complained of, but shall carry with it to the Colonies every benefit that money can procure to a

* Vide Administration, page 110, 111.

country

country in its forenfic uses, in the improvement and culture of its lands and in the extenfion of its trade and commerce: which will at the fame time fecure to government all those rights and powers which the fupreme magistrate ought to have in the forming, direction, and administration of money, fo far as it becomes a legal tender either in coin, or in any other fpecies by authority of government: This species of paper-money here referred to, may further, by the manner in which government shall issue it, raise a very confiderable revenue to the crown, without being even in appearance the burthen of a tax upon the people, and of which revenue not one farthing will be paid without their own confent.

Such a paper-currency would relieve every grievance complained of under this head, by providing for the Colonies a fpecies of money, which being a legal tender within the continent, at a fixed rate of exchange, would fupply every demand for payment of the Impost, Stamp, and other duties.

For the fame reafons that the publication of this feheme was fufpended in the fecond edition of the Admistration of the Colonies it is again infpended, under hopes that from the good dispositions of administration to-[G 4] wards

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wards the colonies, a measure so beneficial to the Colonies, and so advantageous to Great Britain, may be taken up and carried into execution.

The complaint contained in the fourth article above stated, is not made in general, it is rather the mistake of those who make it than a real matter of complaint. The monies raifed by these duties are directed to be paid not actually into the Exchequer, but into the Receipt of bis Majesty's Exchequer, to be entered separate and apart from all other monies, and referved at the disposal of Parliament, for the fervice of the Colonies. The monies raifed, or to be raifed, in America are deposited and referved in that country, to be applied at the disposal of Parliament to the fervice of that country only, nor is one penny ordered or intended to be drawn out of the country.

To the fifth article of complaint made, one may, I think, from the candour and friendly difpositions of gentlemen of all parties, towards the Colonies, venture to affirm, That if the Colonists would have exhibited, or will now exhibite fair, precife, and authentic flates of their trade, and of the reasonable profits thereof, or fhow that the duties charged on fuch business business as requires Stamps, are higher than is confistent with the nature of the transactions charged, or create obstructions and inconveniencies to fuch bufines, more than Parliament could ever intend for the fake of any revenue, or point out any other matter of grievance or hardship by means of these duties, which does not attend every tax and duty laid, upon the people of England; one may, I think, venture to affirm, That the late would, or the prefent ministry will give fuch representations every confideration that the Colonists can wish, and that all will join iffue in giving every relief which the cafe fairly requires *. And if it shall be the opinion of Parliament that these duties are too high, or that fuch fums as are estimated and expected to be raifed by them at the rates at which they are now fixed can be spared, relief (should such be thought fufficient) may be given, by declaring all those rates to be paid at the rate of proclamation, or the lawful money of the Colonies, instead of sterling at the rate of filver at five shillings and fix-pence per ounce.

The fixth article of complaint would be founded on a real grievance, if as the paper money of the Colonies ceases to be a legal

* Vide Administration, page 194.

tender,

tender, the Colonies could not be admitted to make payment of these duties but in specie or in coin, which they have not a fufficient currency of to answer that end. Copper is not ufually current in America; all. payments therefore under the value of any filver coin ufually current there, will be impracticable for want of change, as will also all payments that do not coincide with the divisions and aliquot parts of fuch coins, either of gold or filver, as are usually current there. If from a want of a paper currency, and a confequent infufficiency of filver, there really should be a want of specie of any kind in which to pay thefe duties, the grievance would then really exift. But this is a confequence at which rather to be alarmed, than to expect ; for the act does not require the payments to be made in sterling money or filver, but only prefcribes that the payments required shall be deemed and underftood to be sterling, according to the proportion and value of filver at five fhillings and fixpence the ounce, and shall be paid and received at a rate of exchange or currency, according to that value. The providing therefore a paper currency, which by authority of Parliament shall be a legal tender, removes all these difficulties, and relieves all these grievances.

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As to the matter of grievance complained of under the feventh head as here stated. it may be faid, first, that tryals in cases of revenue and trade before courts of admiralty in the Plantations, is no novel meafure, and therefore not particularly to be complained of on the prefent occasion; If the neceffity of eftablishing in the Plantations fuch a mode of profecution and trial for offences against any of the revenue acts did ever justify this measure, so that it hath been submitted to for many years, the events confequent on the enacting of the laws creating the late impost and famp duties, must thoroughly justify it on the prefent occasion. For under the late opinions and principles adopted in the Colonies as to these duties. where would the crown find a jury which would give a verdict of conviction upon any profecution in this cafe*. If (while the laws of trade are meant to be carried into execution) any other mode of profecuting to conviction offences against them can be devifed, I should hope that there is not a Briton throughout the realm who does not wish to fee the tryal by juries invariably adhered to and infifted upon in all cafes whatever; and that fuch never will be deviated from, but where the neceffity is unavoidable,

* Vide Administration, p. 79.

avoidable, and where that deviation is regu-lated and authorifed by act of Parliament only. That the jurors shall be of the vicinage is equally a principle of law; but cafes may happen wherein the jurors cannot be taken from the vicinage, as in the cafe of rebellions, and general oppositions made to laws. On the other hand, truth and juftice must declare how much it is to be wished. that all offences in the Colonies against the acts of trade, should be tried in some of the courts of record there. He, therefore, who shall devise the means of securing justice to the crown in these cases, where a predominant spirit runs through the Colonies against the carrying of the acts into execution, will do his country, will do the general cause of liberty, a most effential service. I am no lawyer, and can form no opinion whether there be or not in the course of our laws, in the proceedings of our courts, any process by profecution in the court of Exchequer; any remedy by attainting juries, by writ of error, or by appeal, by which fuch justice may be effectually secured. Whether the erecting in America, by act of Parliament, courts of Exchequer for the express purposes of the crown's revenue would anfwer this end, I will not even venture to form a guess; but furely it deferves the confideration of the crown lawyers. And here I will not

not fuffer myfelf even to doubt but that any remedy, which upon fuch confideration can be propoled as effectual to remove this grievance, will be unanimoufly received and carried into execution.

A difficulty of a very different and much more intricate nature arifes from the strange predicament into which the Colonists have brought themselves. The stamp act requires *, that the feveral parts of the Colonies and Plantations be fufficiently furnished with vellum, parchment and paper. ftamped or marked with the respective duties. If the commissioners for managing the ftamp due is had not taken care to fend fuch stands to the Colonies, or if being fent, these stamps, one and all, had perished by the danger of the fea, the Colonies would not have been furnished with them, the Colonifts would not have been in blame, and yet the act could not have In fuch cafe fome remedy taken place. must have been provided by Parliament. From the outrages and unjustifiable conduct of mobs and riots in the Colonies, the fame cafe exifts, and therefore apart all confiderations of the offenders and the offence, fome remedy becomes neceffary. It is faid, that fome of the Colonies taking up this

* § 14.

this cafe as an exigency to be provided againft, have framed to themfelves a remedy, by ordering, ordaining or refolving that all bufinefs, all officers and offices in fuch respective Colony, shall proceed as though no such act as the ftamp act exifted. However unjuftifiable and criminal the measures which have brought on this state of things, may be, whoever they may be who are to blame. are certainly queftions of the highest import; but the first matter to be confidered is, what provision is immediately necessary for the actual state in which the Colonies stand at present. Scarce any one act in the process of law, or in the course of trade is legal and valid without the fanction of stamps; no deed can be received in evidence without that fanction, and yet the fact is (apart the confideration of the crime) that the Colonies have not ftamps. If they had not been fent, fo that the Colonies should be supplied, or if they had been lost by the act of Providence, and not a fresh supply fent, some provision must have been immediately applied to this flate and condition in which the Colonies would have been, whatever had been the proceedings of government towards the criminal caufes of this state: and in whatever light government may confider the prefent caufes of this state of the Colonies, and in whatever manner it may

may be found wife and prudent to act towards them, yet fome provision, as in the fame cafe and of the fame nature, is immediately neceffary; fome act of indemnity as to perfons and actions which may be involved in the disqualifying circumstances confequent on the want of stamps. The commissioners of stamps should forthwith furnish the Colonies with a constant and repeated fupply of Stamps, from time to time fo long as the act continues in force; and fo long as it is the fense of government that no reasonable or just ground can be shown, why it should not continue in force of law. Some power, or other interpolition of government, is immediately and abfolutely neceffary to render practicable the distribution of those Stamps, and the execution of the feveral offices established by virtue of faid act. And if after all is done, which government in the course of civil administration can do. without applying force, the refistance and oppugnancy in the Colonies against government, will urge matters to the last question and to the last extremity; that question must be taken up, which all wife and good people * pariter susceptam neglectamque timerent. Matters will be then brought to a crifis, the neceffity of which calls for a decision, for a decision which will admit of no palliation,

· Livius, lib. 8. § 29.

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no thifting off the danger, no middle way. The power of government must either be maintained, vindicated and exerted, or be given up for ever. There cannot be a doubt, one vould hope that the Colonists themselves have not fo contemptuous an idea of government, as to doubt that it will not exert its power, fo long as any Law or act of its own calls for that exertion.

How this power is to be exerted, is the great question at this important and decifive crifis. Whether it shall be best and most effectual to the good of the whole, to exert the power of government by modes of policy, or to put forth the force of government by arms. Force of arms must beyond all doubt fubdue the Colonies, and reduce them to obedience, but it will be a forced, a temporary, and an unprofitable obedience, which will continue no longer than while the hand of force hangs upon its neck. On the other fide of this question, there may be found modes of policy which shall govern the Colonies by communicating to them, according to precedents in our conftitution, those rights, privileges, and liberties, which give, by an union of powers, an actual share in that government by which they are governed. Such an union of thefe encreating and beneficial parts of the dominions.

nions, would be in reality an extension, and in Effect the establishment of the King's government throughout the realm. Although I have hazarded my opinion in stating queftions of this high import, and of fuch dangeroufly interesting consequence, yet I have not prefumption enough to dare even to fuggest a decision on them from any private opinion; I will therefore close this paper, by giving to the reader two precedents of the opinion and conduct of the Roman Senate, in fome cafes of the like nature.

The Latins had revolted from the Romans, they were reduced to obedience by L. F. Camillus. When Camillus returned to Rome after finishing his business, he reported the flate of it to the Senate in the following words *: " Reliqua confultatio eft " quoniam rebellando fæpius nos follicitant, " quonam modo perpetuâ pace quietos ob-" tineamus. Dii immortales ita vos potentes " hujus confilii fecerunt, ut fit Latium deinde, " an non fit, in vestra manu posuerint. " Itaque pacem vobis, quod ad Latinos " attinet, parare in perpetuum vel fæviendo " vel ignoscendo, potestis. Vultis crude-" ter confulere in deditos victofque? Licet " delere omne Latium; vastas inde solitu-" dines facere, unde fociali egregio exercitu * Livius, lib 8. § 13.

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e per multa bella magnaque sæpe usi estis. " Vultis exemplo majorum augere rem Ro-" manam victos in civitatem accipiendo? " Materia crescendi per summam gloriam " suppeditat. Certe id firmissimum longe " imperium est, quo obedientes gaudent. Sed " maturato opus est, quicquid statuere placet. " Tot populos inter spem metumque suspensos " animi babetis. Et vestram itaque de iis " curam quamprimum absolvi et illorum " animos, dum expectatione stupent, seu pœna " feu beneficio, præoccupari oportet. Nof-" trum enim fuit efficere, ut omnium rerum " vobis ad confulendum potestas effet. Vestrum " est decernere quod optimum vobis reique " publicæ fit."---- Upon this opinion, the Senate determined to examine in what predicament each town or people of Latium ftood, and to all who had not forfeited every ground of favour, fo as to exclude themfelves even from pardon, the freedom, rights, and privileges of Rome were given Civitas data eft.

Upon an event of the like nature in the cafe of the Privernates. "Quum ipfa per "fe res anceps effet, prout cujufque ingenium erat, atrociùs mitiùfve fuadentibus; tum incertiora omnia unus ex Privernatibus legatis fecit, magis conditionis in qua natus effet, quam prefentis neceffi-"tatis " tatis memor: qui interrogatus à quodam " triftioris fententiæ auctore, quam pænam " meritos Privernates censeret? eam, inquit, " quam merentur qui se libertate dignos " censent. Cujus cum feroci responso in-" festiores factos videret consul eos qui ante " Privernatium causam impugnabant; ut " ipfe benigna interrogatione mitius respon-" fum eliceret, Quid si pænam, inquit, " remittimus vobis, qualem nos pacem vo-" biscum habituros speremus? Si bonam de-" deritis, inquit, & fidam & perpetuam: " fi malam baud diuturnam. Tam verò " minari, nec id ambiguè, Privernatem, " quidam, & illis vocibus ad rebellandum " incitari pacatos populos. Pars melior fe-" natûs ad meliora responsa trahere & di-" cere, Viri & liberi vocem auditam, an credi " poffe ullum populum, aut hominem deni-" que in ea conditione, cujus eum pæniteat, " diutius quam necesse sit, mansurum ? Ibi " pacem esse fidam, ubi voluntarii pacati " fint : neque eo loco, ubi servitutem esse ve-" lint, fidem sperandam esse. In hanc fen-" tentiam maxime conful ipfe inclina-" vit animos, identidem ad principes fen-" tentiarum confulares uti exaudiri pof-" fet a pluribus, dicendo, eos demum " qui nihil praeterquam de libertate co-" gitent, dignos esse qui Romani fiant. " Itaque

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" Itaque in senatu causam obtinuere, " & ex auctoritate Patrum latum ad Po-" pulum est-UT PRIVERNATIBUS CI-" VITAS DARETUR."

FINIS.



