



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

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
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SPEECH

OF

SIR WILLIAM MOLESWORTH, BART. M.P.,

IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS,

ON THE 10TH OF APRIL, 1851,

FOR A

REDUCTION OF THE COLONIAL EXPENDITURE


OF THE

UNITED KINGDOMS.

LONDON:

JAMES RIDGWAY, PICCADILLY.

PRICE ONE SHILLING.



S P E E C H,

ETC. ETC.

SIR,—I must apologise to the House for again bringing under its consideration a subject to which I have repeatedly called its attention in the course of the last two or three years—I mean, the amount of the expenditure of this country on account of the colonies. One of my chief reasons for asking the House to reconsider this question is, that there is a strong desire amongst various classes of the community, that certain obnoxious taxes should be repealed; in order to repeal them, there is a great wish that our national expenditure should, if possible, be diminished. Can any reduction be made in that expenditure without injury to the interests of the British empire? The greater portion of that expenditure is on account of the interest of the national debt, and in that no reduction can be made. The remainder of the national expenditure is on account of the government of the united kingdoms and of the colonies. I will not now express any opinion whether any considerable reduction can be made, and ought to be made, in the expenditure on account of the united kingdoms; but I must say, that I entertain a strong conviction that a considerable portion of our expenditure on account of the colonies is excessive, and that it can be diminished without injury to the interests either of the united kingdoms or of the colonies; and, therefore, I think that steps should be taken to relieve the people, as speedily as possible, from a portion of that burden.

Reason for motion.

Wish to reduce expenditure.

In order to sustain these positions, I will first state, as correctly as I can, the amount of the annual expenditure of this country on account of the colonies. I am sorry that I cannot do so completely and correctly for any period later than the year 1846-47; because no later returns upon which I can rely have been presented to Parliament. Since that period some reductions have been made in our Colonial expenditure, for which the Colonial-office deserves credit; but I believe they have been inconsiderable in amount compared to those which, in my opinion, could be made. In the year 1846-7, the expenditure of this country, on account of the colonies,

Expenditure for colonies.

B

amounted to 3,500,000*l.* It consisted chiefly of two items: namely, civil expenditure about 500,000*l.*; and military expenditure about 3,000,000*l.*

Military
expenditure:

I will begin with the military expenditure,* under which head I include ordnance and commissariat expenditure. This expenditure has increased very rapidly in the last twenty years. In 1832 it was only 1,800,000*l.*; in 1835 it became 2,000,000*l.*; in 1843-4 it amounted to 2,500,000*l.*; and in 1846-7 to 3,000,000*l.*; an increase of 1,200,000*l.* in the interval between 1832 and 1846-7. The sum of 3,000,000*l.* did not by any means represent the whole military expenditure of this country on account of the colonies for the year 1846-7;

Effective;

it was merely the effective expenditure; that is, the sum actually paid by this country for military services then being performed in the colonies; or, in other words, the sum required for the pay, clothing, maintenance, and establishments of the 45,700 regular troops, artillerymen, and engineers then serving in the colonies. Besides the effective military expenditure, there is non-effective military expenditure on account of the colonies; that is, the sum annually paid for military services which have been performed in the colonies; I mean the sum paid in the shape of half-pay, pensions, and retiring allowances to the soldiers who have served in the colonies; or, in other words, that portion of the dead weight which has been produced by the military force which has been maintained on account of the colonies.

Non-effective;

Therefore, to estimate the whole military cost of the colonies to this country, I must add to 3,000,000*l.* of effective military expenditure a proportionate amount of the dead weight. Now, in the year 1846-7, our whole military expenditure, including ordnance and commissariat, amounted to 9,000,000*l.*; of this sum 6,600,000*l.* were effective expenditure, and 2,400,000*l.* non-effective; of the 6,600,000*l.* of effective expenditure, I have already said that 3,000,000*l.*, or 5-11ths were on account of the colonies; I am therefore entitled to infer that 5-11ths of the dead weight, or about 1,000,000*l.* of it, were also on account of the colonies. So that the whole military cost of the colonies to the united kingdoms in the year 1846-7 must have amounted to 4,000,000*l.* To this sum I should be entitled to add a further sum on account of the extra troops which are required to be kept in this country for the purpose of relieving the troops in the colonies; and I will quote high authorities for so doing. The late Sir R. Peel, in making his financial statement for 1845, said:—

Reliefs;

“The main expense on account of the army is caused by

* See Note, page 38.

the extent of our colonial possessions. To make no provision for the relief of the troops serving in them would be inconsistent with humanity in the first place, and with prudence in the second. . . . You have thirty-five battalions at home, not, as it is supposed, for the purpose of restraining the population, but for the purpose of maintaining the system of relief for your regiments serving abroad. Your rule is five years at home and ten years abroad for your regiments."

Military Ex-
penditure;

The other night the Secretary at War, on proposing the army estimates, stated that one of his great arguments for keeping up an effective military force at home was to maintain the system of relief established by Sir R. Peel's Government. According to that system, for every two regiments serving in the colonies one regiment would be required to be maintained at home to afford relief. Last year the military force in the colonies, exclusive of colonial corps, which do not require to be relieved, amounted to about 30,000 men, and that force would consequently require 15,000 men in this country for their relief. I should likewise be entitled to charge to the colonial military account a considerable sum for native wars, rebellions, and other extraordinary events. If I put nothing down for these two items, I can scarcely be accused of over-estimating the military cost of the colonies to the united kingdoms when I reckon it at not less than 4,000,000*l.* a-year; a sum amounting to about nine shillings in the pound sterling on our exports to the colonies in 1849; exceeding by 600,000*l.* the whole of the local revenues of the colonies for that year; and equal to the sum collected from the window-tax and the excise duties on soap, paper, and hops.

Extraordi-
nary.

Can any reduction be made in this expenditure? It is evident that no immediate reduction can be made in the 1,000,000*l.* of dead weight, for that depends upon the number of troops which have been maintained in the colonies. If, however, the military force there were permanently reduced, ultimately the dead weight would be reduced. It is only, then, in the 3,000,000*l.* of effective expenditure that any immediate reduction can be made. How is this sum expended? The greater portion of it is spent on the pay, clothing, and maintenance of the troops in the colonies. In the year 1846-7 the military force there consisted of 42,000 regular troops, 3,000 artillerymen, and about 700 engineers, in all 45,700. At present, I believe, the number is about 43,000, exclusive of the reinforcements which have been sent to the Cape of Good Hope. In 1846-7 the pay, clothing, and maintenance of the troops in the colonies cost this country about 2,100,000*l.* These troops were scattered over

Can it be
reduced?

How spent?

Pay;
Clothing;
Food;

thirty-seven colonies; in each colony there is one or more stations; in each station there is a commissariat, ordnance, or barrack establishment, and, generally, all three; to these establishments are attached commissariat officers, barrack-masters, storekeepers, clerks of the works, and sundry workmen. The salaries of these persons cost this country, in 1846-7, 280,000*l*. In each station there is a storehouse; in each storehouse there is a quantity of stores; according to a return presented to the committee on ordnance expenditure, the value of the stores in the colonial storehouses in 1846-7 amounted to 2,500,000*l*.—a quantity of stores sufficient for twenty years' consumption during peace, if they do not perish previously; yet in that year we spent in ordnance stores for the colonies 140,000*l*. In connection with these stations there are generally either fortifications, or ordnance works, or other military buildings; these buildings have been erected at a great expense, and cost this country annually a large sum for improvements and repairs. We expended, in the interval between 1829 and 1847, 3,500,000*l*. on these buildings; and in 1846-7 we paid 330,000*l*. for improvements and repairs to these buildings. The last item I will mention is the transport of troops and stores, which in 1846-7 cost 110,000*l*. Adding these items together, their sum is about 3,000,000*l*. It is evident that the cost of all these things must, in a series of years, be in proportion to the number of troops we maintain in the colonies. For if we keep a large body of troops in the colonies, they must be well paid, fed, and clothed; there must be barracks for them to dwell in, stores for them to consume, fortifications for them to defend, ships to transport them to and from the colonies; and, finally, half-pay and pensions for them when unfit for service. I will not deny that some saving might be made in the details of this expenditure, but that saving cannot but be trifling compared to the whole sum expended, as long as we maintain the present amount of military force in the colonies. Therefore, if we wish to make a reduction in the military cost of the colonies, we must begin by making a reduction in the military force maintained there at our expense.

Commissariat; Barracks; Salaries; Stores; Works; Repairs; Transport; In proportion to force.

Can force be reduced? How employed?

Can we reduce the military force in the colonies without injury to the interests of the British empire? Do we require that 45,000 troops should be maintained in the colonies at the expense of the United Kingdom? and, if so, for what purposes, and how are they employed? In 1846-7 about 3,000 men were serving in the convict colonies of Bermuda and Van Diemen's Land; about 16,700 men kept garrison in the military stations, including Ceylon; and the remainder,

amounting to about 26,000 men, were stationed in the colonies, properly so called.

I will say nothing on the general question of convict colonies, except that in such colonies troops must be kept to preserve order among the convicts. In Bermuda, in 1846-7, the military force amounted to 1,361 men, and cost about 74,000*l.*; in Van Diemen's Land, in the same year, the military force amounted to 1,500 men, and cost about 93,000*l.* With regard to Van Diemen's Land, I have given notice that on an early occasion I will move an address, praying Her Majesty to comply with the prayers of the inhabitants of that colony, by discontinuing transportation to it. If their universal prayer be listened to, and transportation discontinued, the troops might be ultimately withdrawn from Van Diemen's Land, with a saving in the effective military expenditure of this country to the amount of about 93,000*l.* a-year.

I next proceed to the military stations. Omitting those which are situated within the boundaries of the colonies properly so called, our chief military stations are Gibraltar, Malta, the Ionian Islands, the stations on the west coast of Africa (including the newly-acquired Danish forts), St. Helena, the Mauritius, Hongkong, Labuan, and the Falkland Islands; and to these I will add, for the sake of brevity, Ceylon. The military force in these stations in 1846-7 amounted to about 16,700 men, and they cost about 710,000*l.* I will not now inquire whether we ought to maintain a garrison in every one of these places. On a former occasion I attempted to prove that it was not worth while to keep about 3,000 troops in the Ionian Islands at the cost of about 90,000*l.* a-year; that we had thrown away about 400,000*l.* on fortifications at Corfu; and that the fortresses of Malta and Gibraltar, which we were then repairing and improving, at an estimated cost of about 460,000*l.*, were sufficient for all the wants of Great Britain in the Mediterranean. I also attempted to prove, with regard to the stations on the west coast of Africa, that, by abandoning our crusade against the slave trade, these stations might be dispensed with; and that, by so doing, and also withdrawing the African squadron, a saving might be made in the military and naval expenditure of this country to the amount of 450,000*l.* a-year. I also remarked that Ceylon properly belonged to our East Indian system of states; that, in all probability, it would be better governed if it were transferred to the East India Company, and that a saving might thus be made of about 83,000*l.* a-year.

Sir, I must observe, that the motives which have led this

Convict colonies;
Bermuda;

Van Diemen's Land;

Military stations:

Ionian Islands;

Malta;

Gibraltar;

West Coast of Africa;

Ceylon.

Why Eng-
land ac-
quired
military
stations.

country to acquire military stations are very different from those which have induced us to promote the plantation of colonies; and that our policy with regard to military stations is quite of a different character from our policy with regard to colonies properly so called. The motives under the influence of which this country has acquired military stations may be stated in a very few words. Great Britain has long been, and in the opinion of its statesmen, its Parliaments, and its people, ought to continue to be, essentially a naval power. It aspires to be the first naval power on the earth, to carry on commerce in every portion of the globe, and to protect that commerce with its fleets. It desires that those fleets should patrol the ocean, and be the maritime police of mankind. In order to refit those fleets, to afford shelter to them, and to give protection to its merchant ships when war is raging, it has been the policy of the statesmen of England, with the consent and approbation of the people and Parliament, to take military possession of harbours in various parts of the world. Assuming this policy to be a sound one, I ask, what are the rules which should determine the number of our military stations, and the selection of their sites? I think the rules should be, that, subject to the condition of accomplishing the objects of the naval policy of Great Britain, our military stations should be as few in number as possible, and that each station should be selected so as to cost as little as possible. They should be as few in number as possible; for every military station must cost a considerable sum of money annually; therefore every superfluous military station is a permanent source of unnecessary expense. It is also a cause of weakness; for an empire is strong, *cæteris paribus*, in proportion as it has fewer points to defend; for the fewer points it has to defend, the more it can concentrate its forces, and therefore the more powerful it is either for offence or defence. In order that our military stations may be as few in number as possible, consistently with the attainment of the objects of the naval policy of Great Britain, it is evident that they should be carefully chosen, so as most readily to afford shelter and protection to our ships. Therefore they ought to be situated as near as possible to the great commercial highways of the ocean. Secondly, each military station should be selected with the view of costing as little as possible. Now, the cost of a station depends chiefly upon the number of troops required to defend it; and that number depends upon the military strength or weakness of the position of the station; therefore the best place, *cæteris paribus*, for a

What they
should be:

Few in
number:

Command-
ing pos-
itions;

Costing
little;

military station is one which can with difficulty be attacked, Easy of
 and can easily be defended by a small garrison. It is evident defence :
 that these conditions are best fulfilled by small islands, or
 peninsular extremities of continents; the less connected with
 the adjoining land the better. I think, therefore, that the
 true policy of this country, with regard to military stations, is
 to occupy only a few commanding positions with good har- Small ;
 bours. They should be small, isolated, salient points; easily isolated.
 defended, and close to the beaten paths of the ocean. I hold
 it to be quite contrary to the true policy of Great Britain to
 take military possession of large islands or vast portions of
 continents. I consider it to be utterly absurd for an essen-
 tially naval power to attempt the military defence of exten-
 sive coasts or long lines of frontier. That attempt has been
 made in South Africa with disastrous and costly results. If
 similar attempts be made, and vast, numerous, and costly
 military stations be occupied by this country, I fear much
 that the result will be, that the extremities of the empire will
 gradually drain it of its wealth and vital powers, that the
 centre will thus become paralyzed, and that finally the empire
 will fall abroad and perish of exhaustion. I think that
 amongst our military stations those which best fulfil the con- Our best
 ditions of good military stations are Gibraltar, at the mouth of stations.
 the Mediterranean; Malta, near its centre; Bermuda, in
 mid-Atlantic; Halifax, commanding the coast of North
 America; Barbadoes, amongst the Islands of the West
 Indies; the peninsular extremity of South Africa, on the
 route to India; the Mauritius, on the same road, and com-
 manding the Persian Gulf; Singapore, at the entrance of the
 China Seas; and perhaps Hongkong, amidst those seas. I
 have named these eight stations, because I am inclined to be-
 lieve that it is not necessary, for the attainment of the objects
 of the naval policy of Great Britain, that we should keep mi-
 litary possession of more than these eight stations. To gar-
 rison them as they were garrisoned in 1846-7, a military force
 of 17,000 men would be sufficient; and they would cost about
 850,000*l.* a-year in effective military expenditure. This is
 not much more than the sum which the colony of the Cape Our worst
 of Good Hope, with its Kafir wars, annually costs us on the one.
 average of years. I think that this fact illustrates, in the
 most striking manner, the importance of the rule which I have
 laid down with regard to the selection of military stations.
 For if we consider, as some persons do, the whole colony of
 the Cape of Good Hope to be merely a military station, then
 the expense of this one ill-chosen station would be equal to
 the expense of our eight best-chosen stations; and the sum of

money which we lavish upon the Cape of Good Hope would, in my opinion, be sufficient to defray the military expense of all the stations which our naval policy requires.

True
colonies.

I will now proceed to the colonies properly so called. I mean the North American colonies, the West Indian plantations, the Australasian colonies, with the exception of Van Diemen's Land, and our South African empire. The military force in these colonies in 1846-7 amounted to about 26,000 men, and they cost about 2,000,000*l.* in effective military expenditure. If to this sum be added a proportionate amount of the dead weight, the whole military cost of these colonies to the united kingdoms would amount to about 2,600,000*l.* a-year. This sum is equal to 8*s.* 6*d.* in the pound on our exports to these colonies in 1849, and was as large as the whole amount of their local revenues in that year. I have heard some persons who take merely a commercial and economical view of these questions, ask, why do we retain dominion over these colonies? Would it not be better for us if they were independent? Our independent colonies of the United States, say these gentlemen, cost us only about 10,000*l.* a-year for consular and diplomatic services, and we sent them in 1849 12,000,000*l.* of exports, or twice the value of our exports to colonies which are costing us 2,600,000*l.* a-year, or 260 times as much as the United States. Now, I answer, that the greater portion of this expenditure is unnecessary, or may ultimately be rendered unnecessary. I maintain, that if these colonies were governed as they ought to be governed, no troops ought to be maintained in them at the expense of the united kingdoms, except for strictly imperial purposes, and that the expenses of all troops required for local purposes ought to be paid by the colonies. And, if these views be correct, it appears to me that the military force maintained in the colonies at the expense of this country might ultimately be reduced to the men required for the military stations.

Military
cost;

Unneces-
sary.

With the permission of the House, I will explain, as shortly as I can, the reasons which have led me to the conclusions which I have just stated. I have said that the policy of this country, with regard to its true colonies, is of a very different character from its policy with regard to military stations; for the motives which have induced it to plant colonies are quite different from those which led it to occupy military stations. We all know that, ever since the new world was discovered, it has been the unceasing desire of England to plant that new world with new Englands. It was the ardent wish of this country that its children should occupy the uninhabited portions of the earth's surface, and carry along with them to their

Why
England
planted
colonies.

new homes the laws, the institutions, and feelings of Englishmen; that they should there become bold, energetic, and self-relying men, capable and willing to aid their parent in times of need, and not weak puling infants, ever crying to their mother for assistance, and emptying her purse. Now, it is as true of bodies of men as it is of individual men, that the best mode of developing in them energy, courage, and self-reliance, is not to coddle and fondle them, and to tie them to a mother's apron, but to throw them upon their own resources, and to let them rough it and battle it with the world. Therefore, it was the old polity of this country, with regard to plantations, and it still is the recognised constitutional doctrine with regard to them, that their inhabitants should take care of themselves, and manage their local affairs, and govern themselves by representative institutions. Now, most of our colonies, properly so called, do possess representative institutions, and all of them are about to possess those institutions. With such institutions no taxes can be levied in these colonies without the consent of the representatives of the people; and their inhabitants cannot be constitutionally compelled to contribute out of their taxes to the revenues of the united kingdoms. Therefore, reciprocally, the people of the united kingdoms ought not to be called upon to pay out of their own taxes any portion of the local expenses of such colonies; and, consequently, in such colonies all expenses for local purposes should be paid out of local revenues, while all expenses for imperial purposes should be paid out of imperial revenues.

Why
England
planted
colonies.

Old polity
of England;

Not to pay
local ex-
penses.

I will now proceed to apply the principles which I have laid down, to answering the question, who ought to pay for the military force which is maintained in a colony? To do so, I must first endeavour to determine, among the various purposes for which a military force may be required in a colony, what are those which ought to be considered as imperial purposes, and what are those which ought to be considered as local purposes? In answer, I say there are only two objects for which a military force can be required in a colony; namely, either for war with external foes, or to preserve order and tranquillity within the colony. First, with respect to war with external foes; a military force may be required in a colony in consequence of its being engaged, or likely to be engaged, in war with a foreign potentate (with a lawful power, to use the language of the law of nations), or a military force may be required in a colony for war with savage tribes on its frontier. Now, it is evident that a colony cannot be lawfully engaged in war with a lawful power without the empire of which it is a part being also engaged in

Who should
pay for
troops?

What are
they wanted
for?

Imperial wars.

that war. Therefore, every such war is, necessarily, an imperial war; the troops employed in it are employed for imperial purposes, and, consequently, their expenses ought to be paid by the imperial government; though, in certain cases, it would not be unreasonable to expect that the colonies should assist the empire both with troops and money; and I feel convinced that, if the colonies were governed as they ought to be, they would gladly and willingly come to the aid of the mother country in any just and necessary war. They would do as the men of our old North American plantations did during a war with France, when they willingly bore a large portion of the burden of the contest with that monarchy and its Indian allies, and in every way proved themselves to be the hardy and generous sons of England.

Native wars.

I will next speak of wars with savage tribes on the frontier of a colony. The answer to the question, whether such wars ought to be considered as strictly local wars or not?

Who should pay?

whether any portion of the expense of such wars ought to be defrayed by the local government or not? The answers to these questions depend upon the nature of the government of the colony. If the inhabitants of a colony have representative institutions, and the management of their local affairs, and if the relations between them and the frontier tribes be conducted by local officers; then the local Government must be held responsible for the result; and, if the result be war, and that war be conducted by local officers, and the expenditure on account of it be under local control, then I think that it is quite clear that the whole expense of that war should be paid by the colony, and no portion of it by the united kingdoms. And I feel convinced that, if the local governments had to pay the expense of native wars,

When colony pays; Economy.

those governments would take care not rashly to engage in war; and, when engaged in it, it would be for their interest to bring the war to a termination as speedily as possible, and at the least possible cost. Unfortunately it is quite different when the imperial Government has to pay for a native war. Then it is the interest of many persons in the colony that the war should be made as expensive as possible. Now, it is very difficult for the imperial Government at home to exercise any efficient control over such expenditure. For instance, no one in this country has a distinct idea how 2,000,000*l.* were spent in the last Kafir war. Sir Henry Pottinger told Lord Grey that it was impossible to convey an adequate idea of the confusion, the unauthorised expense, and the attendant peculation which prevailed during that war. And the Commissioners of Audit have reported that

When England pays;

Extravagance.

they could not audit the accounts, for no accounts had been kept. I believe that it is almost impossible for the imperial Government at home to exercise any real check over such expenditure; and I believe that it is also very difficult, if not impossible, for the imperial officers in the colony to resist the claims poured in upon them from every quarter; for, the imperial purse being considered inexhaustible, every one in the colony is intent either upon picking it himself, or assisting others in picking it, whenever a fair opportunity like a native war occurs. On the other hand, the resistance offered by the imperial officers in a colony is generally languid, for they have no clear and permanent interest in offending those around them by keeping down imperial expenditure, provided it do not become so extravagantly great as to cause a great outcry in this House; and, generally speaking, honourable members know nothing about the matter till two or three years after the money has been spent. Then it is too late; fair promises are made, which are invariably broken. It appears to me to be of the utmost importance that we should not, if possible, be made liable for any bill on account of native wars; for such a bill will always be a most extortionate one; and yet in no one case that I remember were the extortioners contented, but invariably accused us of being mean, shabby, and not paying enough. If in any exceptionable case it should be deemed expedient to assist a colony possessing self-government, in a native war, I am inclined to think that the wisest plan would be to give the colony a round sum of money, and let the local government employ it in the manner which it deems best. On the other hand, I must admit that if the inhabitants of a colony do not possess representative institutions, if they have no voice in the management of their local affairs, if they are governed by the Colonial-office, and if the relations between them and the native tribes are conducted by officers responsible to the Colonial-office; then the Colonial-office, that is, the imperial Government, must be held responsible for the result, and if the result be war, as the war will be conducted by imperial officers, as the expenditure on account of it will be under imperial control, as such wars are apt to be hastily produced, unnecessarily prolonged, and conducted with lavish expense, it would not be just to throw the whole burden of such wars on the colony; but a portion at least of the expense ought to be paid by the imperial Government.

I will now proceed to the question, who ought to pay the expense of the troops which may be required in a colony to

When
England
pays;

Fraud;

Extortion.

When Eng-
land should
pay.

Troops to
keep order.

preserve internal order and tranquillity? I think the answer to this question depends, also, upon the nature and form of the government of a colony; for disorder, riots, and insurrections are almost invariably the consequences of bad government. Therefore, if the inhabitants of a colony have representative institutions, and the management of their local affairs, and if they mismanage those affairs, then they should

When co-
lony should
pay.

be held responsible for the result; and if the result be riots and insurrections, then it is clear that the expense of the troops, required to preserve internal order and tranquillity in the colony, ought to be paid by the colony. On the other hand, if the inhabitants of a colony do not possess representative institutions, but are governed by the Colonial-office, then the Colonial-office, that is, the imperial Government,

When Eng-
land should
pay.

should be held responsible for the result; and, therefore, if troops be required to preserve internal order and tranquillity, the expense ought to be paid by the imperial Government.

England
justly fined.

For the Colonial-office is responsible to Parliament; therefore, if the Colonial-office misgovern a colony, Parliament is to blame; and it is but just that the people of this country should pay the penalty. It is also a good thing that they should every now and then be severely fined on account of Colonial-office misgovernment. Because, generally speaking, little attention is paid in this House to the grievances of the colonies, and little redress given, unless those grievances are likely to be presented to us in the shape of a long bill for a war, or a rebellion, or something else of the same kind. For instance, Canada obtained responsible government by sending us in, according to my honourable friend the member for Montrose, a bill of 5,000,000*l.* for a rebellion. The last Kafir war, with a bill of 2,000,000*l.*, set us all a-thinking about representative institutions for the Cape of Good Hope; and I have no doubt that the present Kafir war, with another bill of 2,000,000*l.*, will convert us all into Lycurguses and Solons, so far as that colony is concerned.

Conclusions.

Sir, if the arguments which I have used are sound, they lead to the conclusions—1st, that no troops ought to be maintained at the expense of the united kingdoms, in any one of our true colonies, after it has obtained self-government, either for war with native tribes, or to preserve internal peace and tranquillity; 2d, that when the British empire is engaged, or likely to be engaged, in war with a foreign potentate, then the expense of the troops required to defend the colony should be paid by the imperial Government; and, 3dly, if it be expedient, for imperial purposes, to garrison certain fortresses or naval stations, situated within the boun-

daries of our true colonies, then the expense of those garrisons ought also to be paid out of the imperial revenues.

I will now proceed to consider separately each group of North American colonies. I will begin with our North American colonies. In the years 1834 and 1835, a committee of this House was appointed to inquire into our colonial military expenditure. Lord Fortescue was chairman of that committee. Lord Hardinge, the late Sir Henry Parnell, and my right hon. friend the member for Coventry, were members of it; and I am sure that my views with regard to the North American colonies differ very slightly, if at all, from those of my right hon. friend. I am delighted to see him in the House, because I know that there is no person in the House who understands colonial questions better than he understands them; and I feel deeply grateful to him for much good advice he has given me on these subjects. This committee recommended that the strictest economy should be observed in every branch of our Colonial military expenditure. According to a return presented to that committee, I find that the number of troops, including artillery and engineers, in the North American colonies in 1835, was 5,369 men. The effective military expenditure for these colonies in that year amounted to about 337,000*l.* Since that period there has been a great increase in the military force and expenditure in the North American colonies. In the interval between 1829 and 1846-7 we spent 1,300,000*l.* on ordnance works in these colonies; and in 1846-7 the number of troops in these colonies amounted to 9,743 men, and the effective military expenditure was 645,000*l.*—an increase, therefore, as compared to 1835, of 4,374 men, with an augmentation in expenditure of 308,000*l.* I find that in 1846-7, we spent for military objects in these colonies a sum equal to six-sevenths of their local revenue, and amounting to 5*s.* 8*d.* in the pound on our exports to them in 1849. Last year the military force in the North American colonies was about the same as it was in 1846-7. This year the noble lord the Prime Minister stated that it is somewhat less than it was last year; still, according to the noble lord's own statement, it far exceeds what it was in 1835. I ask the House to consider whether there is any necessity for this force being greater than it was in 1835. I ask, why was it increased? It was first increased in consequence of the rebellion in Canada. That rebellion was caused by Colonial-office mis-government, for which we were justly fined. Since then the North American colonies, and especially Canada, have obtained responsible government, and far more self-government than they had in 1835; in

North American colonies.

Force in 1835.

Force in 1846-7.

Why increased?

Wise policy
of Lord
Grey.

Troops not
wanted ;

To resist
annexation.

Halifax and
Quebec
military
stations.

fact, at the present moment they possess in some respects more control over their local affairs than the neighbouring States of the American Union; and I must say that I think Lord Grey deserves much credit for the wise and prudent policy which he has pursued with regard to these colonies, and especially for having determined to empower the Assembly of Canada to settle the question of the clergy reserves. According to the principles which I have laid down, no troops ought to be maintained at our expense in those colonies, except for strictly imperial purposes. Now, are there any imperial purposes for which it is necessary that troops should be maintained in these colonies? I have sometimes heard it said that we must keep a military force in these colonies to prevent annexation to the United States; but there is no danger of annexation to the United States, unless the majority of the inhabitants of these colonies desire annexation; and if they were to desire it, it would be great folly to attempt to resist annexation by force of arms; for such an attempt would certainly be unsuccessful, and the presence of a body of troops would only tend to lead to a disastrous, fruitless, and costly struggle. But I believe that there is, and will be, no wish on the part of the North American colonies to separate from us, as long as the wise and prudent policy of Lord Grey towards those colonies be adhered to. I have also heard it said that we must maintain a military force in the North American colonies, to guard against a sudden aggression from the United States. But before we fear such an aggression, let us consider the amount of the regular military force of the United States. In 1850 I believe it amounted to about 10,000 men. Now, if this amount of military force be sufficient for all the vast territories of the United States, extending from the river St. Lawrence to the Gulf of Mexico, from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific, how very much less than a third of 10,000 men, would, according to the standard of the New World, be sufficient for our North American colonies? There is no danger of a sudden aggression from the United States as long as our North American colonists are sincerely attached to the British empire; and if such an event were to occur, I firmly believe they would be willing, as well as capable, to resist it. I have admitted that Halifax is a valuable naval station, and some persons consider Quebec to be an important imperial fortress, and consequently it is said that garrisons should be maintained in them at the expense of the united kingdoms. What amount of force would be required for these purposes? In 1835 the garrison of Halifax consisted of 1,549, and that of

Quebec amounted to 1,107 men, making in all 2,656 men : Reduction of force. therefore, according to my view, 3,500 men would be more than sufficient for all imperial purposes in the North American colonies. By reducing the force in these colonies to 3,500 men, a saving might be made in our effective military expenditure for the North American colonies to the amount of 400,000*l.* a-year, as compared to the expenditure in 1846-7.

I will now proceed to our West Indian plantations; they are 16 in number; in 13 of them we have barrack establishments and troops; a couple of hundred men in one insignificant island, 150 in another, and so on. In the interval between 1829 and 1846-7 we spent 600,000*l.* on ordnance works in these colonies; and in 1846-7 the military force in them amounted to 6,261 men, and our effective military expenditure on account of them was 496,000*l.*—a sum equal to 6-7ths of their local revenues, and amounting to 5*s.* 6*d.* in the pound on our exports to them in 1849. In former times, when slavery existed, a military force was required to keep down the slaves; but with the cessation of slavery that reason for a military force ceased. But if a military force be now required for these colonies to preserve internal order, it follows, from the principles which I have laid down, that the expense of such a force ought to be defrayed by the colonists; for most of them possess representative institutions, and therefore they ought to defray the expense of all troops required for local purposes, and troops required to preserve order in a colony are evidently required for local purposes. Now, are there any imperial purposes for which it is necessary to maintain a military force in these colonies? I have heard it said that a military force must be maintained in those colonies to guard against aggression from the United States. But I repeat that there is no danger of aggression from the United States, unless the majority of the colonists wish to separate from us; and if they were to entertain such a wish, I maintain that it would not be worth our while to retain them by force of arms. But if it be necessary to guard against foreign aggression, as most of the colonies are islands, it is evident that a naval force would be the best means of defending them; and as the House determined the other night not to diminish our naval force, we have abundant naval means to defend these colonies from aggression from any quarter. It is also said that Jamaica and Barbadoes are important naval stations, in which garrisons ought to be kept, in conformity with the naval policy of Great Britain. If so, I ask what amount of troops would be required to garrison those stations? I find that in 1846-7, the number of troops

West Indies.

Force in 1818-7.

Colonies should pay.

Jamaica and Barbadoes naval stations.

Reduction
of force.

in Jamaica was 1,692 men, and in Barbadoes 1,353 men; consequently about 3,100 men would be sufficient for all imperial purposes in the West Indian colonies. If this opinion be correct, then our military force in these colonies might be reduced to half the amount it was in 1846-7, with a saving of about 250,000*l.* a-year in effective military expenditure.

Austral-
asian colo-
nies.

Next, I will speak of the Australasian group of colonies.

I have omitted Van Diemen's Land, because Van Diemen's Land is a convict settlement; and, as convicts are transported to that colony for the alleged advantage of the people of England, it is but just that the people of England should pay for the troops required to preserve order among the convicts.

Van Die-
men's Land.

Strictly speaking, I have nothing to do with the question of the number of troops which ought to be maintained in Van Diemen's Land; but I must observe that, in determining the number of troops to be kept in that colony, two facts should be borne in mind; first, that we have just given to the inhabitants of Van Diemen's Land representative institutions; secondly, that the great majority of these inhabitants are most strenuously opposed to the continuance of transportation; therefore it is probable that the first use they will make of their new institutions will be to resist the continuance of transportation. Now I beg the honourable gentleman, the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, to remind his noble friend the Secretary of State for the Colonies of these facts, and to tell the noble Lord, that if he do not wish to repeat the farce he acted with regard to transportation to the Cape of Good Hope, if he do not intend to yield to threats and menaces, and if he be determined to continue transportation to Van Diemen's Land, he must augment the number of troops in that colony, in order to keep down the free colonists, as well as to preserve order among the convicts.

Australia.

On the continent of Australia the number of troops in 1846-7 was 2,286 men, and the effective military expenditure was 92,000*l.* Since that period the greater portion of these troops have been withdrawn. I am glad to find, from despatches lately presented to Parliament, that Lord Grey intends to apply to the colonies of New South Wales and Victoria the principles which, in my opinion, ought to regulate our military expenditure with regard to our colonies properly so called. The noble Lord has stated his intention to reduce the military force, in the colonies which I have just named, to a simple guard in their capitals, namely, in Sydney and Melbourne. He has informed the Governor of New South Wales, that "if a greater amount of force is required, the local Legislature must either make provision for

raising a more considerable body of police, or provide for the pay and allowances of an additional number of troops." In another despatch the noble Lord makes a remark well deserving of attention with regard to the next colony which I am about to mention, namely, New Zealand. That remark is, "That in the earlier days of British colonization the colonists were left to depend, in a far greater degree than at present, on their own exertions. The inhabitants of what are now the United States of America were left, with exceedingly little assistance from the mother country, to defend themselves from the numerous and warlike tribes of Indians by whom they were surrounded." Now, I only ask you to return to the old policy of England with regard to her plantations, and to leave them to depend upon their own exertions, giving them, at the same time, local self-government.

I am sorry next to inform the House, that a considerable portion of the troops which were stationed in New South Wales have, by Lord Grey's directions, been transferred to New Zealand. In 1846-7, the military force stationed in that colony amounted to 1629 men, with an effective military expenditure of 85,000*l.* Since then there has been a considerable increase both in force and expenditure. In 1848 the number of troops was 2948, and they must have cost us at least 150,000*l.*, exclusive of the 20,000*l.* or 30,000*l.* which we vote every year for civil expenses. This is a preposterous amount of expenditure for these islands; it is equal to more than 20*s.* in the pound on our exports to them, and is four times the amount of their local revenues. I must mention, also, with regard to these most costly possessions, that in the northern island, where the troops are stationed, there were, in 1848, almost as many soldiers as European men: the number of European men being only 3157, and therefore exceeding the number of soldiers only by 209 men. And, in fact, in the province of New Ulster the number of soldiers, amounting to 1798 men, exceeded the number of European men by 298 men. Why do we maintain this amount of force in New Zealand? For native wars. I will reserve my observations on native wars till I reach South Africa, and I will only express my conviction that if we were to give to the colonists of New Zealand free institutions, and the management of their local affairs, we might withdraw our troops from New Munster at least, and the colonists would be able to defend themselves, and would take care to be on good terms with the natives.

Lastly, I arrive at South Africa. The committee of 1834 on colonial military expenditure, approved of a reduction of

South
Africn.

six men per company, in the military force which was then stationed in the Cape of Good Hope. It amounted to about 2000 men, at a cost, in 1832, of about 100,000*l.* Since then there has been a large increase, both in force and expenditure, in consequence of Kafir wars. In 1835 there was a Kafir war, and our effective military expenditure in that year was 240,000*l.* In 1846-7 there was another Kafir war; the military force was augmented to 6196 men, and our effective military expenditure became 685,000*l.*, a sum equal to 26*s.* for every pound of our exports to that colony, and three times the amount of its local revenues in 1849. The last Kafir war cost us 2,000,000*l.* The present Kafir war appears to be even more formidable than the last one, and I am afraid is likely to cost as much.

Kafir War.

I wish now to call the most serious attention of the House to the present Kafir war. It confirms and illustrates every one of my positions. The outbreak of that war was one of my chief reasons for giving notice of this motion, and I must therefore ask the indulgence of the House while I make some observations with regard to it. There are three important questions with regard to the present Kafir war, namely, Who is to pay for it? What has led to it? And what steps ought to be taken to relieve this country from any liability on account of similar wars? To the first question I answer, that, according to the principles which I have laid down, we are not entitled to throw the whole burden of the present Kafir war upon the colony of the Cape of Good Hope, and that we are bound to bear a very considerable portion of the expenses of this war. First, because the inhabitants of the Cape of Good Hope do not possess representative institutions; they have not the management of their local affairs; they are governed directly by the Colonial-office, through the agency of Sir Harry Smith, and the relations with the Kafir tribes have been conducted by Sir Harry Smith, and very strangely have those relations been conducted. Secondly, we are not entitled to throw the whole expense of this war upon the colony of the Cape of Good Hope, because it has broken out in British Kaffraria, which is no part nor portion of the colony of the Cape of Good Hope, but a separate province, governed by Sir Harry Smith, under a commission separate from that under which he is governor of the Cape of Good Hope. There can be no doubt, therefore, that we shall have to pay.

Who is to
pay?

Causes of
War.

I proceed next to the question, what have been the causes of this war, and who is to blame for it? I think the papers which have been lately presented to the House clearly prove one of two things, either that Sir H. Smith was very igno-

rant of the state of British Kafaria, and the feelings of the Kafirs, or that this outbreak has been produced by his mismanagement. The despatches which I now hold in my hand were delivered to hon. members at the commencement of this session. In every one of them Sir H. Smith described, in glowing language, "the unprecedented state of tranquillity" of British Kafaria. He consoled Lord Grey for the failure of his attempt to transport convicts to the Cape of Good Hope by the gratifying intelligence, that "everything progresses most satisfactorily on the eastern frontier of this colony;" that the Kafir police was most useful; that frontier depredations were almost unknown; that "we are overcoming witchcraft;" and that "the Kafirs were contented and happy under the British rule." Lord Grey was delighted at this intelligence, and the noble lord declared that he had no doubt of the wisdom of Sir Harry's arrangements, and of their beneficial results. Thus the noble lord and the gallant general bandied compliments, and we, relying on their statements, began this session under the happy delusion that British Kafaria was a sort of terrestrial paradise; that our eastern frontier was safe, and, above all, that our pockets were safe from Kafir inroads; and, therefore, that we might enjoy a squabble among ourselves about the disposal of a surplus revenue. Alas! all is now changed. The wise arrangements of Sir Harry Smith are upset; the frontier system of Lord Grey is a failure; the sanguine anticipations of the noble earl are disappointed; the Elysium of British Kafaria has become a Tartarus; our pockets are in the act of being picked, and our surplus revenue is disposed of. What are the causes which have led to this sad change? I think they may be classed under three heads:—1. Encroachments by Europeans on the lands of the Kafir. 2. The frontier system of Sir H. Smith, sanctioned by the Colonial-office, which consisted in a minute, perpetual, and irritating interference with the affairs of the Kafirs, and in an unceasing and galling attempt to subvert the influence and authority of their chiefs.

Ignorance of
Sir H. Smith;

Of Lord
Grey.

Causes of
War.

Lord J. RUSSELL.—Just the reverse.

Sir W. MOLESWORTH.—I hope the noble lord will hear me, and then answer me. The noble lord relies on the statements of the Colonial-office, and those are generally erroneous. The third cause of war was, the complete ignorance of Sir H. Smith, and the consequent ignorance of the Colonial-office of the feelings which the Kafirs entertained with respect to Sir H. Smith, and his proceedings.

I must observe, with regard to the first mentioned cause of war, that almost all wars between Europeans and native

Disputes
about Land.

tribes may be traced directly or remotely to disputes about land. These disputes generally arise from the encroachments by Europeans on the lands of the natives. These encroachments drive away the wild animals, the game of the hunter tribes, and curtail the pastures of the pastoral races: then the native tribes, deprived of their means of subsistence, must either starve, or encroach upon the lands of neighbouring tribes, and war with them, or rob and assail their European foes. The timid and gentle races lie down and die; the fierce and energetic resist. Sir, among savages few excel the Kafirs in vigour, courage, and audacity; and they have often declared that they prefer death by our swords and bullets to death by starvation. Now, we have extended our empire in South Africa, not slowly, not gradually, as our population increased, and the natives decreased, slain by our liquors, diseases, and civilization; but Sir Harry Smith has, within the last five years, extended that empire by huge, gigantic, and extravagant strides.

South Africa
described.

To explain Sir Harry Smith's proceedings in South Africa, I must ask permission to describe in a few words the form and character of our South African empire. South Africa is a lofty and elevated tableland: it projects from the Equator towards the Southern Pole in the shape of a huge promontory, bathed by the Atlantic, Southern, and Indian oceans. From the shores of these oceans the land mounts up by flights of mountain steps to the tableland of the interior. Between these mountain ranges and the Southern and Indian oceans there is a narrow strip of fertile land. There, in former times, dwelt the tribes of the Hottentots. Just two centuries ago the Hottentots were assailed simultaneously by two most formidable foes. From the north-east came the Kafirs, a negro race, probably with a large mixture of Arab, or rather Caucasian blood. Increasing numbers, or a want of pasture for their cattle, or the attack of hostile and kindred tribes, had compelled them to abandon their homes under the tropics, and, like the Huns and Scandinavian swarms of old, to seek in the south new lands whereon to subsist. One of these swarms, called the Amakosa, under their great chief Togul, wrested from the Hottentots the territory between the Kei and Keiskamma rivers, now known by the name of British Kafiraria, the seat of the present war. About the same time, in the year 1650, the Dutch landed at the southwestern extremity of Africa, where Cape Town is now situated. The Hottentots, assailed on the one side by the Dutch, and on the other by the Kafirs, were exterminated or enslaved. Finally, Kafir and Dutch, advancing from opposite direc-

Hottentots.

Kafirs.

Dutch.

tions, met in the province of Albany. There a petty warfare ensued, similar to the border warfare of England and Scotland. The Kafir, like the Scot, deemed it a meritorious act to steal the cattle of his foe; and the Dutch, like the English, were not slow to retaliate. The Dutch Boers, encamped in military villages, were able not only to defend themselves, but, as their numbers increased, they gradually pushed the Kafirs back. In 1806 we took final possession of the Cape of Good Hope. We soon began to interfere with the border system of the Dutch, and establish military posts on the frontier, with garrisons of regular troops. The imperial expenditure on account of those garrisons attracted very many Europeans to the frontier. The presence of the troops encouraged, facilitated, and hastened the encroachments of the Europeans on the lands of the Kafirs; and, on various pleas, we took possession of their territories, and claimed authority over their chiefs. The Kafirs resisted, stole the cattle of the colonists, and committed numerous depredations. The colonists retaliated; the troops were called out; and a Kafir war ensued. With the termination of each war we added to our territories, and thus sowed the seeds of more cattle-stealing and more wars. As war followed on war, the Kafirs improved in the art of war, acquired something of the skill of their opponents, and learnt the use of European weapons. Therefore, successively, every Kafir war has become more formidable than the preceding one, requiring more troops, and costing a larger sum of money. In 1832, as I have already said, our military force in South Africa amounted only to 2,000 men, and our military expenditure for that year was about 100,000*l*. In 1835 there was a Kafir war, and our military expenditure for that year amounted to 240,000*l*. In 1846-7 there was another Kafir war, and the number of troops in South Africa was 6,196 men, and our military expenditure for that year amounted to 685,000*l*. On the conclusion of that war Sir Harry Smith, with the sanction of the Colonial office, added to the colony of the Cape of Good Hope, on its north-eastern side, the provinces of Victoria and Albert, containing about 3,600 square miles. Beyond these provinces, still to the north-east, Sir Harry Smith then added to our South African dominions, but not to the colony of the Cape of Good Hope, the territory of British Kafaria, in which the present war commenced, and which contains about 3,900 square miles. Not content with these acquisitions, Sir Harry Smith then crossed the mountains which guarded the northern frontier of the Cape of Good Hope, and took possession of the whole tract of country between them and the Orange River;

Border
Wars.

English
arrive.

Military
Posts.

Increase of
Territory.

Victoria;
Albert;

British Kaf-
aria;

Northern
Desert;

Increase of territory. an area of the size of England, containing about 50,000 square miles of as barren a desert as any on the face of the earth. This desert had made our northern flank secure against the attacks of barbarians. Having uncovered this flank, Sir Harry Smith, still travelling northwards, crossed the Orange River in pursuit of the rebel Boers. These Boers had fled from Colonial-office oppression to Natal. There we first permitted them to establish a government. Then we sent our troops to subdue them, and thus added to our dominions 10,000 square miles, situated on a harbourless ocean, with Kafirs on one side, and their kinsmen, the equally warlike Zoolahs, on the other side. The taking possession of this worthless territory was an achievement of a former government. In consequence of it, the Boers fled again, and crossed the mountains to the plains of the interior. Sir Harry Smith, as I have said, pursued them, and defeated them, and proclaimed the sovereignty of Great Britain over all the plains between the Great Orange River and the Vaal or Yellow River; an area of about 48,000 square miles, with a frontier of 600 miles, exposed to the incursions of the Zoolahs and other tribes of the same origin as the Kafirs. Again, some of the Boers have fled northwards, and crossed the Yellow River, and if we persevere in our policy of pursuing them, we shall have to follow them to the Mountains of the Moon, and to add to our dominions all Africa south of the Equator. Thus Sir H. Smith, with the sanction of the Colonial-office, has since 1847 added 105,000 square miles to 'our South African possessions; an area nearly equal to that of the united kingdoms; and our South African empire now covers the vast space of 282,000 square miles, an area equal to the whole of the Austrian empire, including Lombardy, and adding Piedmont to it.* I calculate that on the frontier of this empire there is a line of 1,000 miles, as far as from here to Rome, exposed to the attacks of savages of the same blood as the Kafirs, and as fierce, warlike, and energetic, as the Kafirs, whom Sir H. Smith in his last despatches describes as the most determined and reckless of barbarians. As yet we have fought only with the Kafirs along a line of 200 miles; but the same causes which gave birth to wars with the Kafirs are coming into operation along the whole of this frontier of 1,000 miles, and are likely, in course of time, to embroil us with all the native tribes which I have mentioned. I dare not attempt to calculate what it would cost us to defend this frontier with regular troops, in the same manner as we have defended the north-eastern

* See Note, page 40.

frontier of the Cape of Good Hope. To defend these 200 miles we have spent of late years not less than 600,000*l.* annually. From these data hon. gentlemen may calculate what the defence of 1,000 miles would cost.

To show some of the consequences of the encroaching policy of Sir H. Smith and of the Colonial-office, I will now refer to the blue-book which has last been delivered to us. I open it, and the first subject I see in it is entitled, "Boundary Dispute between Dutch Farmers and Tambookies." I will give the substance of Sir Andries Stockenstrom's account of that dispute. It was about land. The land belonged to the Tambookies, a Kafir tribe, who had generally been on friendly terms with us. Prior to Sir Harry Smith's arrival on the frontier, in the winter of 1847, this land was situated without the colony. The Boers on the frontier memorialised Sir H. Smith to annex it to the colony, and give it to them. Sir Harry Smith, in a reply written and signed by himself, granted the prayer of the memorial. A portion of the land in question was forthwith measured out for some of the Boers, and it so happened that the land so measured out belonged to a chief who had been our ally in the last war. This, said Sir Andries Stockenstrom, rendered the governor prodigiously popular at the time. The Tambookies, however, refused to give up their land. The Boers threatened to expel them, and bitterly complained that they had been deceived by the fine words of the governor. Sir Andries Stockenstrom, in his letter of the 1st of July last, addressed to the Colonial Secretary, commented upon these proceedings of Sir H. Smith in the following words. These proceedings were calculated to "set the Boers and Tambookies at mutual slaughter," "to convert Her Majesty's most devoted servants into desperate rebels," and "it was with the most gloomy forebodings that he (Sir A. Stockenstrom) trembled at the prospect of the almost inevitable consequence of these proceedings." Unfortunately these gloomy forebodings have come to pass. According to the last accounts in this blue-book, these Tambookies have attacked the frontier, captured a quantity of cattle, and committed a long list of murders, and the Boers throughout the colony have displayed a rebellious spirit by their "dogged inactivity."

The next subject of importance in this book to which I will refer is entitled, "Excitement throughout Kafirland, by the Prophecies of a Witch-doctor." Sir Harry Smith had assured Lord Grey that he was putting down witchcraft: Sir Harry Smith was not so successful as he thought. Last autumn the belief in witchcraft sprang up again in Kafirland, in consequence of the want of rain. From a long-continued

Increase of territory.

The Consequences.

Boers and Tambookies.

Conduct of Sir H. Smith.

Forebodings of Stockenstrom.

Witch Doctor.

Want of Rain.

Want of
rain.

drought, the pastures of the Kafirs were burnt up, their cattle became skeletons and lost their milk, one of the chief means of subsistence of the Kafirs; the calves died, the hopes of the future were destroyed, and the sufferings of the Kafirs became intense, and produced amongst them feelings of desperation and animosity towards us. For before we came among them, when there was a want of rain, the Kafirs used to lead their cattle from the plains to the mountain sides, where water is generally to be found; or they used, by changing their pastures, to follow the rain, for frequently when there was a drought in one part of their territory, rain was falling in another. In consequence of our encroachments, the power of the Kafirs to change their pastures was greatly diminished, and, consequently, their sufferings from drought greatly augmented. In former times, I believe, the Kafirs were permitted to pasture their herds at certain seasons on the unoccupied lands of the provinces of Victoria and Albert, which were then called the neutral ground; but since Sir Harry Smith added these provinces to the colony of the Cape, that permission has been refused. Sir, under the influence of these sufferings, the feelings of the Kafirs towards us are (as the well-informed writer of an interesting tale of the Kafir was justly observes) the same as those of the Gael to the Saxon, described in the verse of Sir Walter Scott. The Kafir chief would exclaim, like Roderick Dhu:—

Sufferings of
the Kafirs.

They hate
us:

“ These fertile plains, that softened vale,
Were once the birthright of the Gael.
Where dwells he now? * * *
Think'st thou we will not sally forth
To spoil the spoiler as we may,
And from the robber rend his prey?
While of ten thousand herds there strays
But one along yon river's maze,
The Gael, of plains and river heir,
Shall, with strong hand, redeem his share.”

Cannot be
Extermi-
nated.

These were the feelings of the Gael, and are the feelings of the Kafir towards us. We subdued and civilized the Gael; but then their numbers were limited. We cannot subdue and civilize the Kafir races, because their numbers are unlimited. We may, to use the words of Sir Harry Smith, exterminate those on our immediate frontier; but beyond them are others, and beyond them are innumerable others, extending to the Equator and beyond. In course of time we might exterminate them up to a given line—I mean the line beyond which the European race cannot increase and multiply, and which line intersects the eastern coast a little to the north of Natal; but beyond that line there are innumerable and pro-

life hives of barbarians, whence they will for ever swarm forth to attack us with wars perpetual and costly.

I will now return to the subjects of the want of rain and the witch-doctor. There is a belief in Kafirland, as there is in certain parts of this country, that certain persons called "witches," and certain things called "bewitching things," can cause injury to human beings, and to cattle, and prevent the falling of rain. The Kafirs also believe that there are certain persons called "witch-doctors," who can discover witches and "bewitching things." Now, the Kafirs attributed the drought of last year to witches, and a great witch-doctor appeared in British Kafraria. He pretended, like Sir H. Smith, to put down witchcraft. Sir Harry was much astonished at his pretensions, and, as two of a trade never agree, Sir Harry ordered Colonel Mackinnon to secure this Mahomet, as he termed him, and to transport him to Robben Island. Colonel Mackinnon, however, told Sir Harry that this seizure would cause great irritation among the Kafirs, and would endanger the tranquillity of the colony; that there had been nothing mischievous or warlike in the conduct of the witch-doctor; and that he ought not to be molested. On the other hand, I must state that it was generally believed in the colony that the witch-doctor had prophesied against the Europeans, and had attributed to them the sufferings of the Kafirs; and that these prophecies had produced much excitement in Kafirland. Sir Harry Smith and Colonel Mackinnon, on the contrary, attributed the excitement in Kafirland to the efforts of Sir Harry Smith to overthrow the authority of the native chiefs. Without attempting to decide whose opinion was right, certain it is that great excitement did exist last autumn among the Kafirs in British Kafraria. That excitement produced much alarm among the frontier farmers; that alarm was increased by finding their Kafir servants suddenly leave them; they began, therefore, to take precautions against an attack from the Kafirs; and those precautions, according to Sir Harry Smith, alarmed the Kafirs, who thought that the Boers were going to attack them. In the midst of this alarm and excitement, Sir Harry Smith wrote to Lord Grey, on the 14th of October last, that though "he attached no importance to this excitement," he would proceed at once to the frontier, and, on his arrival, he would report without delay. Accordingly, he wrote to Lord Grey on the 21st of October, and stated that "his Lordship need be under no apprehensions of an outbreak," and that a meeting of Kafir chiefs was summoned for the 26th of October, when he, Sir Harry, would explain to them their true position. That meeting

Witchcraft.

Witch-doctor.

Excitement in Kafirland.

Alarm of Farmers.

Sir H. Smith's proceedings.

Calls Meeting of Kafirs.

Sir H. Smith's proceedings. had very important consequences. The great Gaika Kafir chief, Sandilli, did not attend it. He had been informed that he was accused of being on friendly terms with the witch-doctor, and he knew that an attempt had been made, by the order of Sir Harry Smith, to seize the witch-doctor. Sandilli declared that he was afraid of attending the meeting, lest he should be put in prison, for that once before, when he had attended a meeting, he had been put into prison. He therefore disobeyed Sir Harry Smith's order. Sir Harry immediately issued a proclamation, deposing Sandilli from the rank of chief. On the 31st of October Sir Harry announced this event to Lord Grey, and assured the noble Earl that Sandilli possessed neither influence nor respect among his people. Never did Sir Harry Smith make a more incorrect statement. Twice has an attempt to capture Sandilli caused an outbreak of the Kafirs. They rose one and all to defend him last winter, and there is not a man among them who would not gladly rush between a bullet and the person of Sandilli. In the same despatch Sir Harry stated, with reference to the deposition of Sandilli, that "a crisis had arrived which would test his system," that "he had no apprehension of the result," that the Kafirs "were as fully sensible of their position as the most civilized beings could be," that "every Kafir who possessed anything was a supporter of the present government," and that "if the chiefs had endeavoured to excite the people they had signally failed." In the next despatch, dated the 6th of November, he assured Lord Grey that the crisis had passed most happily, and that therefore he should immediately leave the frontier and return to Cape Town. On his arrival there he wrote again to Lord Grey, on the 26th of November, assuring the noble lord that "he had left British Kafiraria in a state of perfect tranquillity, the Kafir people fully satisfied, and the chiefs expressing similar feelings." In the same despatch there is a passage which deserves the attention of the House, for it shows how events have falsified every expectation of Sir H. Smith. In that passage he informed Lord Grey that he was going to organize, in the colony of the Cape of Good Hope, a rural police, analogous to the Kafir police, which had been "so remarkably efficient in British Kafiraria." According to the last accounts, almost every one of the Kafir police has deserted to the enemy with their horses, arms, and ammunition. Whereon Sir Harry moralizes in the following strain:—"Thus is again recorded in history another instance of the danger to be apprehended from arming men from hostile populations." And, with this sentiment in his mouth, Sir Harry Smith proceeded forthwith to order the governor

Deposes Sandilli.

Sir Harry's mistakes.

Crisis arrived;

Happily passed.

Perfect quiet.

Efficiency of Kafir police.

of Natal to arm and lead into the field, against the Amagaika, Sir Harry's mistakes.
 3000 warriors of the hostile population of the Amazoolah. To return, however, to my narrative, the "perfect tranquillity" which Sir Harry Smith described in his despatch of the 26th of November, did not continue long. On the 5th of December he wrote:—

"My dear Lord Grey,—The quiet I have reported in Kafirland, and which I had so much and so just grounds to anticipate, is not realized. I start this evening. The moment I reach King William's-town you shall hear from me."

Accordingly, on the 12th of December he wrote again, and assured Lord Grey that "he perceived little or no difficulty in restoring tranquillity." Lord Grey was delighted at receiving this despatch, for in reply he wrote how "glad he was to learn that all immediate danger of an outbreak was at an end." Nodanger of anoutbreak. Unhappy Lord Grey! This letter was written on the 5th of March; the next day he received intelligence that the outbreak had commenced with fearful violence. It is evident, therefore, that the two persons who ought to have been pre-eminently well-informed on these matters were pre-eminently ignorant. One (Sir Harry Smith) was either stone-blind to all that was going on around him, or this outbreak has been caused by his mismanagement. The other (Lord Grey) reposed blind confidence in the wisdom of Sir Harry Smith's arrangements. The next and last despatch to which I shall refer displays, in the highest degree, the blindness of Sir Harry Smith. It is dated the 20th of December last, four days before the commencement of the war. It begins with an account of a meeting between the T'Slambie T'Slambies faithful. tribes (who dwell in the neighbourhood of King William's-town) and Sir H. Smith. He stated that the conduct of the chiefs and the feeling of the assembled people were all that he could possibly desire. The chiefs expressed their determination to adhere faithfully to the present order of things, and to obey Her Majesty. According to the last accounts, they have fought against our troops, and intercepted the communications with King William's-town. In the same despatch, Sir Harry stated that he "had received accounts of a very improved character as regards the conduct of the Tambookie Tambookies tranquil. chiefs, and he looked forward with every confidence to being able to restore general harmony and tranquillity." These are the chiefs about whom Sir Andries Stockenstrom entertained such gloomy forebodings. According to the last accounts they have, as I have already said, attacked our frontier, carried off a quantity of cattle, committed a long list of murders, and, I am afraid, Cradoek is in great danger

Sir Harry's mistakes. from them. Next, Sir Harry was sorry "to inform Lord Grey that the majority of the farmers on the frontier had abandoned their homes, and removed far into the interior." "His advice and influence had been exerted to induce them to remain," but, "unfortunately they had disregarded his counsel." Most fortunate it was for them that they did disregard his counsel—that his advice had no weight nor influence with them—that they did abandon their homes and move far into the interior; for if they had believed in Sir H. Smith most of them would have been slaughtered. In the same despatch he stated that he was happy to bring under Lord Grey's notice the good and loyal feelings which prevailed among the colonists. According to the Colonial Secretary, they have displayed the most dogged inactivity, and cannot be induced to move to Sir H. Smith's assistance. Lastly, in this same despatch, Sir Harry describes his great meeting with the Gaika tribes, on the 19th of December last, at which 3,000 Kafirs were present. According to Sir Harry, the meeting went off in the most satisfactory and gratifying manner. He informed Lord Grey that it was evident that "Sandilli and other Gaika chiefs had endeavoured to excite the people against the present rule; that they had signally failed; that the people saw the advantages they derived from the present state of things;" that they were tranquil, contented, and happy; that he anticipated that his system would be perpetuated; and he declared that he had "every confidence in the prospect before them." Four days after this despatch was written, the Gaikas rose in arms, defeated Colonel Mackinnon, then surrounded Sir H. Smith in Fort Cox, and then repulsed Colonel Somerset when he attempted to open communications with Sir Harry.

Panic of farmers. System never-lasting. Outbreak. Its cause. Sandilli.

Sir, I ask what made the Gaikas rise in arms? I have said it already—it was the attempt to capture Sandilli. Now, one word with regard to Sandilli, who is unfortunately too well known to us. He is of the purest Kafir blood. Son of the great Gaika by a wife of the sacred race of the Amatembu, he is ninth in descent from the conqueror Togul. The Kafir war, which began in 1846, was rekindled in 1847, in consequence of a dispute between him and Sir H. Pottinger. That dispute arose about thirteen or fourteen goats which had strayed, or had been stolen, from the colony. Sir H. Pottinger ordered Sandilli to restore them, and to give up the thief. Sandilli did restore twelve goats, but declared he knew nothing about the remainder, nor about the thief, if there was one. Sir H. Pottinger was

not satisfied. He sent a secret expedition to capture Sandilli. War of 1847.
 The Kafirs rose in his defence, and the expedition failed. According to Sir H. Smith, "in this bit of a brush with Sandilli 56,000*l.* were spent on waggon-hire alone." This fact will give the House some faint idea of the probable expense of a contest with Sandilli. Sir H. Smith, soon after his arrival in the colony, assembled the Kafirs at King William's-town. At these meetings, which took place in December, 1847, and January, 1848, Sir Harry Smith pretended to depose Sandilli from the rank of Great Chief, and to appoint himself the Inkosi Inkulu of the Kafirs. He did so with the strangest ceremonies. He described to Lord Grey his proceedings on one occasion in the following words:—"The Kafirs being arranged in a circle, I rode into the midst of them, bearing in my right hand a sergent's halbert, well sharpened, the emblem of war; in my left hand a magic wand, my baton of peace and authority, surmounted with a brass knob. I directed each chief to come forward, and touch whichever he pleased—it was immaterial to me. They all touched the symbol of peace; then each chief kissed my foot, exclaiming 'Inkosi Inkulu.' I then shook hands with each, never having done so before. Three cheers were given; and thus I commenced the foundation of their social condition." At another meeting he made the Kafir chiefs swear "to obey his commands," "to disbelieve in witchcraft," "not to buy wives," and every year to give a fat ox to Her Majesty. On the same occasion he treated the Kafirs to a little conjuring. He had a waggon stationed on an eminence at a considerable distance, with no one whatsoever near it. "Now," said Sir Harry to the Kafirs—I quote his own words—"You dare to make war! You dare to attack our waggons! See what I will do if you ever dare to touch a waggon or the oxen belonging to it! Do you see that waggon, I say? Now hear my word—Fire! (The waggon is blown up.) Ah! do you see the waggon now? And you would, and shall, be blown up with it if you ever again attempt to touch another. So be good, and believe in your father." Sir Harry said, that the astonishment of the Kafirs at this trick was excessive, and so ought to have been Lord Grey's when he read it. Sir Harry also harangued the Kafirs in speeches full of bombast and rhodomontade, with a mixture of religion, or rather of blasphemy, beginning with a curse and ending with a prayer, much after the fashion of a mock oration of a trooper of Cromwell. Thus, by alternately coaxing and threatening the Kafirs, by alternately praising and reviling them, by playing up all manner of fantastic and

Sir Harry arrives;

Calls meetings;

Becomes Inkosi Inkulu;

Blows up a waggon;

Harangues Kafirs.

Sir Harry
 as Kafirs : mountebank tricks, by aping the manners of the savage, Sir Harry thought to civilize the Kafirs and to impose upon them; but the Kafirs laughed at him, turned him into ridicule, and imposed upon him. At the great meeting of the 19th of December last, Sir Harry acted a somewhat similar farce. According to the reports of the colonial newspaper he denounced Sandilli as a rebel and an outlaw, and offered a reward of 500*l.* for his capture; the Gaika chiefs remonstrated, and entreated him to show mercy to Sandilli. Sir Harry declared that he could not do so, for if he were to show mercy to Sandilli the great Queen of England would cut off his (Sir Harry's) head, and that he would not lose his head for such a rebel as Sandilli. The next day Sir Harry proclaimed a successor to Sandilli, and wrote to Lord Grey that he had every confidence in the prospect before us; two days afterwards, in a postscript to the same despatch, he assured Lord Grey that the best feeling pervaded the Kafirs, and that the Gaikas were much pleased with his conduct. Finally, on the 24th, finding that no Kafir would betray his chief even for the enormous reward of 500*l.*, Sir Harry sent Colonel Mackinnon with a force of 587 men to capture Sandilli; that expedition failed, as a similar one had failed in 1847: the Gaikas rose in defence of their chief; they attacked our troops in a narrow defile, from which our troops were with difficulty extricated, with serious loss. Then the Kafirs destroyed the military villages on the frontier, slaughtering the inhabitants; next they surrounded, and nearly captured, Sir H. Smith in Fort Cox, owing to which accidental circumstance (to use the strange language of the honourable gentleman the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies) Sir H. Smith was for several days prevented from communicating with the colony. Next, the Kafirs repulsed Colonel Somerset in his attempt to open communications with Fort Cox. Finally, Sir H. Smith escaped, and on the 31st of December reached King William's-town. Immediately he issued a proclamation, calling upon the colonists to rise *en masse*, destroy and exterminate the barbarous savages, and promising the colonists unlimited license to plunder. At the same time he sent post haste to Natal for the assistance of 3000 Zoolahs. According to the latest accounts, though the Kafirs have been defeated in their attacks upon some of our forts, they have committed great ravages. Not only have the Gaikas attacked us, but the T'Slambies have intercepted our communications with King William's-town; the Tambookies have assailed us on the north; the Kafir police have deserted; the Kat River Hottentots have rebelled: the Boers

Outlaws
Sandilli;

Attempts to
capture
Sandilli;

Is nearly
captured;

Proclaims
extermination,
and
plunder.

are doggedly inactive; disaffection prevails amongst the coloured classes on the frontier, who were our best allies in the last war; and throughout the whole of the eastern provinces martial law has been proclaimed. Martial law proclaimed.

Sir, I fear much that a serious war has commenced, and that it will be a costly one. I have seen in the colonial newspapers an official notice, calling upon all able-bodied men to enrol, offering them a bounty of 2*l.* for six months' service, with the ominous promise of an additional bounty of 1*l.* for every additional three months' service. These men are to have 6*d.* a-day pay, with arms, clothing, and accoutrements, and rations for themselves and families. I do not doubt that all this is necessary, yet I read this notice with great alarm. For I remembered the vast sums which had been expended during the last war on rations, the fraud and speculation which had attended their distribution, the impossibility of the imperial government to control the expenditure on account of them. I remembered the statement of Sir H. Pottinger that a few persons on the Kat River had, on the plea of defending the frontier, been receiving rations at the rate of 21,000*l.* a-year, and that a number of Kafirs, while fighting against us, had been receiving rations from us. I read this notice, therefore, with great alarm, and thought what we should have to pay. For pay we must; because Sir H. Smith and Lord Grey are responsible for this war. It has broken out in their own peculiar kingdom of British Kafraria, which is no part nor portion of the colony of the Cape of Good Hope. It is the consequence of the encroachments which they have sanctioned, of their ignorance of the feelings of the Kafirs, and of their frontier system of perpetual and vexatious interference in the affairs of the frontier tribes. That frontier system has completely failed, and Sir Harry Smith, in despair, declares, that "what is ultimately to be done with these barbarians remains a problem." War will be costly.

The last question is, what steps ought to be taken to relieve this country from any expense on account of future wars with the Kafirs? It is clear that, first, we must defeat the Kafirs and reduce them to subjection, and pay for so doing. What should we then do? Adhere to the present system of defending the frontier by troops at the expense of this country? In 1848 I presumed to warn the House that, under that system, we should have a Kafir war every three or four years, with a long bill to pay for it; that there was only one way to save our pockets, and that was to give to the colonists of the Cape of Good Hope the freest institutions, and the un- We must pay.

What should be done?

Self-govern-
ment and
self-defence.

controlled management of their local affairs, and especially of their relations with the savage tribes on the frontier. Then we should make them distinctly understand that they must, like the men of our old North American plantations, defend themselves against the savage, and pay the expense of so doing; and, finally, we should withdraw our troops from the frontier, and only retain a garrison in the military station of Cape Town. If the House will not sanction these measures, we must make up our minds to pay roundly, there will be no use in grumbling. We shall have to pay at least from 600,000*l.* to 700,000*l.* a-year for the Cape of Good Hope—a sum exceeding our exports to it. Now, I say that the Cape of Good Hope is not worth that sum of money. The only portion of it which is worth anything is a narrow slip of land between barren mountains on one side, and a harbourless sea on the other, the rest being as barren a desert as any on the face of the earth. With free institutions, and the management of their own affairs, I believe the colonists of the Cape of Good Hope would be slow in embroiling themselves with the savage, and when necessary they would be quite able to defend themselves. A short time ago, they bid defiance to the might of England, and threatened to resist by force of arms any attempt to land convicts on their shores; let them display similar energy and self-reliance in their wars with the Kafirs, and they will be more than a match for Sandilli and all his followers.

Summary.

I have now concluded my observations with regard to the military expenditure of Great Britain on account of the colonies, which are neither military stations nor convict settlements. I have attempted to prove that no troops ought to be maintained at our expense, in any one of those colonies, after it has obtained free institutions, except for strictly imperial purposes; and that it is not just to call upon the people of this country to defray out of their taxes any portion of the expense of the troops required for local purposes. I have endeavoured to show that by applying these principles to our North American colonies and West Indian plantations, a considerable reduction might immediately be made in the amount of force which we maintain in these colonies, with an ultimate reduction in our effective military expenditure on account of them to the amount of about 650,000*l.* a-year. I have also attempted to show, that if we were to give self-government to our colonists in New Zealand and South Africa, a very considerable reduction might ultimately be made in the amount of force which we maintain in these

Reduction
of military
expenditure.

colonies, with an ultimate saving to this country of about 550,000*l.* a-year, in effective military expenditure. Therefore, the total saving which I now propose for the consideration of the House, would amount to about 1,200,000*l.* a-year in effective expenditure; if to this sum be added a proportionate amount of the dead weight, the whole saving would in course of time amount to about 1,600,000*l.* a-year. If my views with regard to military stations be correct, and were to be acted upon, then a much larger reduction than that which I have mentioned might be made in our Colonial military expenditure.

Reduction
of military
expendi-
ture.

Saving
1,600,000*l.*
a-year.

I have still to mention the civil expenditure of this country on account of the colonies. On this subject I have very little to say; for it is evident that the principles which I have laid down with regard to colonial military expenditure are equally applicable to colonial civil expenditure; and if they are correct, it follows that whenever a colony which is neither a military station nor a convict settlement has representative institutions, all civil expenses for local purposes ought to be paid by the colony, while all civil expenses for imperial purposes ought to be paid by the united kingdoms. In 1846-47 our colonial civil expenditure was 500,000*l.* Of this sum about 300,000*l.* were for the clothing, maintenance, and transport of convicts; and 70,000*l.* were expended on the military stations; these two sums, therefore, were required for imperial purposes, and it was proper that this country should pay them. Of the remaining 130,000*l.*, 11,000*l.* were paid to the North American clergy—that charge will cease with the lives of the present clergy; 14,000*l.* were paid in the shape of presents to the Indian tribes in Canada; about 80,000*l.* were spent in the West Indies in salaries to clergymen, stipendiary magistrates, and governors; and, lastly, about 20,000*l.* were spent in New Zealand. It appears to me that the whole of this sum of 130,000*l.* ought, according to my principles, to be ultimately saved, with the exception of the sum required for the salaries of colonial governors; for, in my opinion, as long as colonial governors are appointed by the imperial Government, they should be looked upon as imperial officers, and, therefore, their salaries should be paid by the united kingdoms.

Civil
expenditure.

How spent.

Convicts;

Clergy;

Presents;

Magistrates;

Governors.

In concluding my observations on our colonial expenditure, I must remark, that in every colony there are many persons who have a strong sinister interest in the amount of imperial expenditure. These persons have made, or expect to make, large gains by contracts, jobs, and by the innumerable other modes of robbing the mother country. They rejoice on every

Sinister
interests.

Sinister
interest.

Hostile to
reduction.

Return to
old polity.

Self-govern-
ment and
self-pay-
ment.

increase of imperial expenditure. To them a Kafir or a Maori war or a rebellion is a Godsend. I have heard on good authority that in the Canadian rebellion the enormous gains of these persons were equal to the losses of the rest of the community, and that they have been heard to toast the good old times of that rebellion, and the speedy commencement of the next. Sir H. Smith has stated in one of his despatches that during the last Kafir war many persons amassed large sums of money; that the consequences were a redundancy of money at the Cape of Good Hope, with general prosperity, and a tendency to over-speculation. I have heard similar statements with regard to New Zealand. And it is self-evident, that, with an imperial expenditure many times greater than the local revenues of a colony, there must be a fine harvest for the jobbing and peculating tribe, and that noxious race must flourish and multiply. To this class, and it is not an unimportant one in our modern colonies, any proposal for a reduction of imperial expenditure is in the highest degree distasteful. Corrupted by that expenditure, they have not the feelings of self-reliance and self-respect, which, according to the just remark of Lord Grey, our old colonies displayed in their conflicts with the Indians, and even with the might of France. Many of these unworthy Anglo-Saxons would, in their hearts, prefer Colonial-office despotism, with huge imperial expenditure, to the freest institutions with imperial economy. We are to blame for this degeneracy, which every high-minded and every right-minded colonist deplures. We are to blame for having departed from our old colonial polity, and demoralized our colonial children by our waste and extravagance. The sooner we return to the old polity the better for them morally, for us pecuniarily; their character will be elevated and ennobled by becoming self-reliant, and obtaining self-government; and our money will be saved by bestowing upon them the freest institutions, and strictly enforcing the maxim—no imperial expenditure for local purposes. That maxim is the sum and substance of my first resolution. These resolutions express my idea of the true colonial policy of Great Britain, which is self-government for true colonies, and no imperial expenditure except for military stations. With that policy the more true colonies we have, and the fewer military stations we have need of, the richer and more powerful the British empire will be. I move these resolutions in no hostile spirit to the Government, but, on the contrary, to encourage them to pursue boldly and vigorously the policy which they have commenced on the continent of Australia. I ask them to assent

to this motion. I ask all honourable members to support it who wish to reduce the national expenditure; for if there be any portion of that expenditure in which a considerable reduction can be made without injury to the empire, that portion is our colonial expenditure; and that expenditure can only be reduced by acting in conformity with the principles contained in the resolutions which I now beg leave to move: —“ 1. That it is the opinion of this House that steps should be taken to relieve this country, as speedily as possible, from its present civil and military expenditure on account of the colonies, with the exception of its expenditure on account of military stations or convict settlements. 2. That it is expedient, at the same time, to give to the inhabitants of the colonies, which are neither military stations nor convict settlements, ample powers for their local self-government, and to free them from that imperial interference with their affairs which is inseparable from their present military occupation.”

Resolutions.

NOTE ON PAGES 4, 5, 6,

And in correction of an error in an article in the "Edinburgh Review" for April, 1851.

Authority
for state-
ments of co-
lonial ex-
penditure.

Par. Pa.
(224)
1849.

Error of
Edinburgh
Reviewer.

The statements contained in these pages, with reference to the effective colonial military expenditure of Great Britain for the years 1832, 1835, 1843-4, and 1846-7, are taken from a series of Parliamentary papers, the first of which was prepared for the committee on colonial military expenditure, which sat in the years 1834-5; the last (No. 224, 1849), was ordered for the use of the committee on army, navy, and ordnance expenditure, which sat in the years 1848, 1849, and 1850. As a member of this committee I had ample means of inquiring into the details of the colonial military expenditure of Great Britain; I carefully examined the estimates of this expenditure under its various heads in the army, ordnance, and commissariat estimates; I compared these estimates for several years, with the returns of the expenditure; and I arrived at the conclusion, that the Parliamentary paper (224), 1849, gives, with considerable accuracy, the effective colonial military expenditure of Great Britain for the year 1846-7. This paper has unfortunately escaped the notice of the writer of an article on the colonies, in the number of the *Edinburgh Review* for April, 1851. In that article the Reviewer alludes to a speech of mine delivered in 1848, and quotes the Parliamentary paper, dated April 27, 1849, (239), as authority for his statements of the colonial military expenditure of Great Britain, and for his assertion that, since 1843-4, this expenditure "has been greatly reduced" (page 485). This assertion is quite at variance with mine, in page 4, in which I affirm, that in 1846-7, our colonial military expenditure exceeded by 500,000*l.* the expenditure for 1843-4. I do not know what it was in the intervening years, for, in consequence of the difficulty of making out the returns, the order of the House of Commons, that it should be made out for every year since 1835, has been disobeyed, except for the years 1843-4 and 1846-7. The Reviewer's Parliamentary paper is a useful

and, I believe, correct return. I relied upon it as my authority for the distribution of the troops in the colonies in the year 1846-7, and it confirmed me in the belief of the general accuracy of the Parliamentary paper (224) 1849, upon which, as I have already observed, all my statements of colonial military expenditure in 1846-7 are founded. If the Reviewer's Parliamentary paper were such as he supposed it to be, it would return the colonial military expenditure of Great Britain for 1846-7, at 2,170,000*l.*, or 830,000*l.* less than I have stated it to have been. The discrepancy between my statements and those of the Reviewer is easily accounted for. The Reviewer's Parliamentary paper contains, not as he supposed, a return of the *whole* colonial military expenditure of Great Britain, but only of the *portion* of the expenditure which the House of Commons ordered to be returned in that paper. The title of the Reviewer's paper is a return *not* of the "*colonial military expenditure of Great Britain,*" (which is the title of Parliamentary paper No. 224, 1849,) but of "*the cost for pay as well as commissariat expenses*" of her Majesty's troops stationed in the colonies. This return contains, therefore, only the cost of the first of the five items of colonial military expenditure, which I have enumerated in page 5. For that item, namely the net cost, (after deducting colonial contributions) of the pay, clothing, and maintenance of troops, I put down for 1846-7, 2,100,000*l.*, or about 70,000*l.* less than the gross cost of that item, according to the Reviewer's paper. The four other items of colonial military expenditure of which the Reviewer has taken no account, are military establishments, ordnance stores, military works and repairs, and transport of troops. In 1846-7, the first of these items cost about 280,000*l.*, the second about 140,000*l.*, the third about 330,000*l.*, and the fourth about 110,000*l.*; and their total cost in 1846-7, was about 860,000*l.* This sum is about the difference between the amount of the effective colonial military expenditure of Great Britain, as stated by the Reviewer on the authority of what he mistook to be a complete return of that expenditure, and the amount as stated by myself, on the authority of what the chairman of the committee on army, navy, and ordnance expenditure obtained for the use of that committee, as a complete return of the colonial military expenditure of Great Britain. I believe both of these Parliamentary papers are accurate within a limit of error of probably from five to ten per cent., and within the same limit of error I believe my statements of the colonial expenditure of Great Britain

Error of
Edinburgh
Reviewer.

Its cause.

Omission of
four items of
expenditure.

Amount,
£860,000.

Ignorance
of Colonial-
office.

Its returns
likely to
mislead.

are likewise correct. I must, however, observe, that there is great difficulty in obtaining accurate statements from the Colonial-office on the subject of colonial expenditure. The chief functionaries of that office are very ill-informed on that subject. For instance, on the 10th April last, Mr. Hawes made, in reply to me, precisely the same erroneous statements with regard to the amount of the colonial military expenditure of Great Britain as the Edinburgh Reviewer has made; and Mr. Hawes quoted, as his authority, the same Parliamentary return as that quoted by the Reviewer. This return was presented to the House of Commons by Mr. Hawes himself, and had been made up at the Colonial-office probably from estimates; though substantially correct, it was likely to lead persons unacquainted with the details of colonial military expenditure into erroneous conclusions with regard to the total amount of that expenditure. The return upon which I have chiefly relied was furnished by the Treasury, and made up from the accounts of monies paid by the commissariat officers, who are the bankers of Great Britain in the colonies.

NOTE ON PAGE 24.

Authority
for extent
of South
African
empire;

For length
of frontier;

The statements contained in this page, with regard to the area of our South African Empire, were given to me by my friend Mr. Wyld, the Member for Bodmin; and from his maps, and those presented to Parliament, I calculated the extent of the frontier of that empire. In a debate in the House of Commons on the Kafir war, on the 14th April last, my statement that "on this frontier there is a line of 1,000 miles exposed to the attacks of savages of the same blood as the Kafirs," was contradicted; and it was asserted that there are no Kafirs in the vicinity of Natal, that the Zoolahs are not Kafirs, and that the Zoolahs are a peaceful race, from whom no attacks need be apprehended. All these assertions are erroneous. For according to the maps which I have mentioned, on the north-eastern frontier of the colony of the Cape of Good Hope there is a line of about 200 miles, along which we are now fighting with the Amakosa and the Amatembu; on the southern frontier of Natal there is a line of about 120 miles exposed to the Amaponda; on the northern frontier of Natal there is a line of about eighty miles exposed to the

Amazoolah; on the northern and western frontiers of the Orange sovereignty there is a line of about 600 miles along the Vaal River, exposed likewise to the Amazoolah, and kindred tribes. The extent of these four frontiers is, therefore, about 1,000 miles. According to Prichard, and every other writer of repute on the subject of the races of men, all the tribes who dwell along these frontiers belong to the great South African race of negroes; they all speak dialects of the same language, can generally understand each other, are very warlike; and the more northern and central tribes, especially the Amazoolah, possess a considerable amount of military organisation. The name "Kafir" is not used by any of them; for it is an Arab word, applied by the Arabs to all the South African negroes, and generally to all nations who are not of the faith of Mahomet. Our South African colonists have confined the meaning of the name "Kafir" to the tribes with which they first came in contact on the north-eastern frontier; namely, to the Amakosa, the Amatembu, and the Amaponda; the latter dwell on the southern frontier of Natal, and therefore there are in the vicinity of that settlement Kafirs in the limited sense of that name, as used by the colonists. And lastly, the Amazoolah are a very warlike race; within the last half century, under their ruler Chaka, they have been a conquering people, and their conquests produced great commotions and movements of tribes in South Africa; they drove out of Natal the tribes we call the Fingoes; and then attacked, and would have destroyed the Amakosa, if we had not come to their assistance. Under Dingaan the Amazoolah fought with the Boers, both in the Orange Sovereignty and in Natal, and at first inflicted great losses on the Boers. Finally, under Panda they have been a constant cause of apprehension to the Lieutenant-Governor of Natal; and, according to the last accounts, the fear of an attack from the Zoolahs has prevented him from sending, to the assistance of Sir Harry Smith, any portion of the fugitive Zoolahs who now reside under our protection in Natal.

For description of native races.

Meaning of word Kafir.

Zoolahs very warlike.

