



# Statements and Speeches

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## A GLOBAL INITIATIVE TO IMPROVE THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE

Address by the Right Honourable Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Prime Minister, Queen Elizabeth Hotel, Montreal, November 13, 1983.

... If our future depended on Canadians alone, we could be confident that it was safe and sound. But no nation today holds its future securely in its own hands. We share this planet with about 160 other nations, all of whom interact with us in a global system embracing our security, our economy, the health of our environment, and the quality of our lives.

Those 160 governments are, however, by no means the only players. The stage is crowded with alliances, with regional associations, with international institutions such as the United Nations, with multinational corporations, with cartels, pressure groups and lobbies of all kinds.

We are all of us — you and I, our friends and families, citizens, governments and corporations — on that crowded global stage, which is alive with our hopes and our fears, our failures and our successes. But there are today three dominant and disturbing trends which, when set side by side, threaten to bring down the curtain on our human performance.

The first trend is an increasing resort to the use of force in the settlement of international disputes. Despite the solemn affirmation of the UN Charter that "all members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force" there have been, since 1945, approximately 130 conflicts in which 35 million human lives have been lost.

There is a habit of aggression which is gaining ground: an abdication of the political process in deference to military solutions; a coarse element of belligerence, of menacing rhetoric, of governments which rise and fall at gun-point. The trend is global — and it is gathering speed.

This brutalization of political life takes on a particularly dangerous tone when it is driven by the clash of confrontational ideologies, and armed with sophisticated weapons, which claim an annual expenditure in the order of \$600 billion of nuclear and conventional arms combined. These weapons which claim too great a share of the budgets of impoverished Third World nations, promote a rising tide of violence and engulf more peaceful ways to resolve disputes. That is the first trend: the brutalization of international relations.

The second trend is the steady unravelling of the international regime designed to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

This proliferation has two fundamental directions. We call it vertical proliferation when we mean the development of ever-larger nuclear weapons programs, ever more-advanced in destructive technology, by the five nuclear-weapons states: the USA, USSR, France, the United Kingdom and China. We call

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it horizontal proliferation when we mean the potential spread of nuclear weapons to other states, especially to those who now have the capacity to produce nuclear arms, or soon will have that capacity.

We are today preoccupied mainly with the evident need to assert restraint over the arsenals of all five nuclear powers. But from a global perspective, and in the near term, the consequences of horizontal proliferation to other states pose an equally grave threat. Perhaps more grave, since the use of nuclear weapons by other nations would be unchecked by the assurance of mutual destruction which obtains among the five powers.

It was precisely to arrest both kinds of proliferation that a formal agreement — the Non-Proliferation Treaty — came into effect in 1970, and is up for review in 1985. That treaty represented an implicit covenant between those nations with nuclear weapons and those without: an undertaking by the nuclear powers that they would pursue negotiations in good faith on arms control and on limiting the spread of their weapons technology; and an undertaking by other states that they would forego the military use of nuclear energy in return for the benefits of its peaceful use, in fields such as energy, medicine, or agriculture.

But the trend is for this bargain to come unstruck. The treaty stands now at a crossroads between peaceful aspiration and military strategy. It is the crossroads at which nuclear and non-nuclear countries — East and West, North and South — preoccupied with their survival, with their sovereignty, or with current conflicts, will decide whether the covenant still holds.

The third trend which threatens the global system is the worsening state of relations between East and West, particularly of relations between the two superpowers. Two weeks ago, when I spoke in Guelph, I deplored the absence of high politics in East-West relations, and the tendency for arms control negotiations to run their course outside any structure of understanding of, and respect for, each other's security needs. I reaffirmed our fidelity to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization "two-track" decision, and declared my hope that we might add a "third rail" of political energy, of dialogue and of confidence, in order to improve the downward course of relations between East and West.

So I ask you now to consider these three trends in relation to each other — laminated together, as they are in real life: an increasing resort to the use of force; the growing reality of the proliferation of nuclear weapons; and a superpower relationship charged with animosity. I believe it is evident that only a global approach to peace and security can reverse the path of this sinister, composite trend-line.

Because, as tensions build, the East-West relationship becomes particularly vulnerable to events on the periphery. An endemic instability is evident in areas largely understood to be the sphere of influence of one or the other superpower. At other flashpoints, such as the ever-volatile Middle East, we see the tinder for a spreading conflagration.

The penetration of East-West rivalry into the Third World will reach its deepest and most dangerous point if, despite the Non-Proliferation Treaty, front-line antagonists — locked in rivalry or combat — begin to arm themselves with nuclear weapons.

As Canadians, our energies are deeply devoted to the security of the Western community, on this continent and in Europe. But our loyalties, our national and global interests, by no means end there.

Canada's place on the Pacific Rim gives us a privileged relationship with Japan, with China, and with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and, of course, with Australia and New Zealand. Our extensive program of development assistance takes us to many parts of the world, remote in distance, but close in partnership. Our standing in the community of francophone nations, and in the Commonwealth, demands that we share the full range of political, economic and security concerns to which our national character gives us access.

That is why, in pursuing an initiative to improve the prospects for peace, I determined from the start that our approach must be global in scope and in perspective. Such an approach is dictated by the complex interlinkage of disarmament and development; of superpower animosity and Third World rivalries; of the resort to force and the availability of weapons; of nuclear balances in Europe and in Asia.

One man representing one country cannot promise a miracle, let alone deliver one. I have absolutely no illusions about the complexity of the issues in play. Nonetheless it is essential, in my judgment, to seek stability at a number of points along the downward trend-line, and to recognize that peace and security in the modern age are indivisible.

Moreover, I am not alone. Other leaders have joined their concerns with mine. There is a growing community of political leadership which is determined to subject the science of arms to the art of politics. I draw encouragement from the support of that community.

You will know that I have just returned from meetings in Europe with several leaders of the Atlantic Alliance, with His Holiness the Pope, and with Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands. I return from Europe with clear expressions of support for my initiative, confident that my sense of urgency is shared by our friends and allies. I found a particular consensus of the need to lay down a third rail of confidence and communication — a rail charging our dealings with the other side with a current of political energy.

I took to my European colleagues for discussions, and for refinement in light of their own views, elements of a program for political management of the current crisis. I return with the assurance of their personal attention to this program. Let me set out some of the elements.

The first is the need to establish, as soon as possible in the course of the coming year, a forum in which global limits might be negotiated for all five nuclear-weapons states. This proposal is without prejudice to the INF [intermediate-range nuclear forces] or START [Strategic Arms Reductions Talks] talks between the USA and USSR. But those talks, and rightly so, do not cover British, French or Chinese nuclear forces.

What we must seek to provide is a negotiating forum for those five states which recognizes the right of the United States and the Soviet Union as strategic equals — what a recent Trilateral Commission report calls "inevitable parity" between them — and which provides a mutually acceptable and stable

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framework for the relationship between the forces of the other three states and those of the superpowers.

In this way neither Britain, nor France, nor China need fear that their forces will be subject to restraints which do not recognize their own national interests.

Once relative levels of armament were stabilized, I believe the five nuclear powers could begin to address the reductions called for by the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and to consider measures to control the qualitative aspects of the strategic arms race.

A second element is remedial action to shore up the Non-Proliferation Treaty itself — that covenant between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states which I mentioned a few minutes ago. The Treaty has been signed by some 119 nations. But a number of key states remain aloof, including several with the capacity now, or the potential soon, to develop their own nuclear arms.

If the five nuclear-weapons states could begin to strengthen their side of the non-proliferation bargain, then the rest of us could more easily bring good sense to bear on those who have not yet signed on. No doubt we need to increase the incentives for Third World states to forego nuclear weapons — there must be a direct linkage between disarmament and development. And we shall also have to ensure that a full range of safeguards adequately governs the transfer, from all nuclear suppliers, of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. The area of safeguards is one in which Canada has taken a leading part for many years, and will continue to do so.

Those two elements begin to address the global dimension of security in the nuclear age. But we must also recognize that there is in the heart of Europe a most dangerous concentration of forces — conventional as well as nuclear. A war in Europe could destroy everything that each side desires to protect.

Throughout my talks with European leaders, there ran a common theme of concern at the present imbalance of conventional forces between the two sides. The Warsaw Pact conventional forces heavily outweigh those of NATO. There is an apprehension in Western Europe that the Warsaw Pact forces could be tempted to gamble on a conventionally-armed attack. They would throw down the challenge to Western leaders either of accepting defeat, or of being the first to resort to the use of nuclear weapons.

As long as this imbalance of conventional forces persists, so does the risk that nuclear weapons would be brought into action at an early stage of any conflict. That is why we say that the nuclear threshold in Europe is too low. And of course we can never be certain that the use of nuclear weapons in the European theatre would not escalate rapidly to ever more-massive nuclear retaliation on an international scale. The conclusion we draw is that the best way to raise the nuclear threshold is to establish a more reasonable balance of the conventional forces on each side.

How then do we achieve this balance? This question prompts the third element of my approach, The simple, though expensive, answer is for the West to increase its conventional forces until they match those of the Warsaw Pact. I see this as a last resort. The far more sensible approach would be for both sides to reduce their conventional forces to mutually agreed levels, a task to which we have devoted

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the past ten years at the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks in Vienna. There is today some sign of movement in those talks, but at far too slow a pace. Hard questions remain to be resolved. That is why I explored, with my colleagues in the Alliance, ways to break the deadlock in Vienna, ways to give fresh political impetus to the MBFR talks.

Another negotiating forum will open soon in Stockholm, this January. Its lengthy title, showing the complexity of its task, is the "Conference in Confidence and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe". It is imperative that this conference not lose its way in litigation about procedures, or in the linguistics of technicality. In other words, we don't have to follow the same path with this conference, on disarmament in Europe, to which countries attach so much importance, as we have followed in the Vienna negotiations where, as I have said, we have talked for ten years without really arriving at an agreement. I have therefore proposed that we consider the merits of high-level political representation at the very start of the Stockholm negotiations. You see, I come back always to the notion of the third rail, the need to inject political will, and the presence of political people, into these debates. They have become debates among technicians, among weighers of balances, among nuclear accountants. These technical quarrels can harm the process, rather than giving it a real push, a political impetus, which I call the third rail.

Finally, a fourth element in my initiative flows from the strategy of suffocation which I first proposed to the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament in 1978. That strategy — which still requires, and awaits, the support of the five nuclear powers for its implementation — needs further elaboration to keep pace with technological advances. Arms control measures must address those new technologies which, by their very nature, would make stability a more elusive goal.

I have in mind a ban on the testing and deployment of those anti-satellite systems designed to operate at high altitude. Such weapons could attack the global communications which are of critical importance for crisis management. Destruction of the other side's command and control network, at a time of crisis, would leave him blind and mute at the very moment when stability demands awareness and response, not the panic reaction of "launch on warning".

That is the fear we have, when we think of destabilizing weapons of that kind. These are weapons or techniques which make an adversary feel unable or ill-equipped to respond to a nuclear attack from the other side. Whether the fear is that one's communications system will be disrupted, or that one's weapons will be rendered useless, the danger is that, in a moment of crisis, the side which feels threatened will launch its nuclear missiles before the other side has a chance to strike first. It is this fear which is aggravated by destabilizing technical advances such as high-altitude anti-satellite weapons.

Neither superpower has yet developed an anti-satellite system for high altitudes. An agreement not to do so is, therefore, still possible. No agreement means vast expenditure by both sides — funds better spent on more worthy projects. No agreement means a further spiral of competition — a competition particularly vulnerable to accident or miscalculation. Moreover, an agreement could encourage movement toward negotiations about anti-satellite weaponry designed to operate at lower altitudes.

I am also concerned about another potentially destabilizing development, which is the possibility that

new intercontinental strategic weapons may be so highly mobile as to be virtually invisible. This would call into question the ability of either side, or any international body, to verify arms control agreements. You see the paradox. These questions are so intellectually difficult that, too often, the public and their leaders are tempted to leave these problems to experts, to nuclear accountants, to the people who understand the technology, but who do not consider the political dimension of the issue. If missiles stay in one place, the enemy knows where they are, and could destroy them by launching a first strike, so that the side under attack could not respond with an attack of its own. One side would win the war simply by destroying the other's nuclear missiles.

That is why these weapons are destabilizing. You must use them or lose them. For that reason, making these missiles mobile also make them more stabilizing weapons, in the sense that a first strike by the enemy would not destroy them. He would not know exactly where they were and, therefore, he would not start a war, because the other side would still be able to send missiles back at him. That would assure the destruction of both sides, which is not in the interest of the side which might otherwise be tempted to launch a first strike.

But there is a further paradox in the fact that, if these missiles are too mobile, you could not count them, even by using satellites. And if you cannot count them, neither side could verify that the other was respecting the treaties, such as SALT I, and other agreements which might be reached.

Canada continues to devote attention, and resources, to problems of verification which must be resolved if arms-control measures are to be durable and trusted. We believe that the prospects for arms control would be considerably enhanced if the verification factor were taken into account in the developmental stage of any new strategic system — rather than leaving it to the point where systems are put on the bargaining table.

It is therefore my intention to introduce, at the appropriate time and in the appropriate disarmament forum, papers calling for: (a) international agreement to ban the testing and deployment of high-altitude anti-satellite systems; (b) to restrict excessive mobility of intercontinental ballistic missiles; and (c) to require that future strategic weapons systems be fully verifiable by national technical means. That is to say that the space satellites of each side can see what is being prepared, constructed and developed on the other's territory.

These are measures of substance, often technical in their detail. But if we can generate a political impulse toward a five-power nuclear conference, toward renewed political commitment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, toward action at the MBFR talks to balance conventional forces and to raise the nuclear threshold in Europe, toward a restriction of qualitative developments in strategic technology, and toward their verification, then we would have motivated a truly global and comprehensive approach to the crisis of peace and security.

It is essential, as I told my colleagues in Europe, that this interlocking program, this safety net for our very survival, be guided by political leadership at the highest level. That our own consultations, and talks with others, be quickened by a jolt of political energy. That we work to identify steadily increasing areas of mutual interest, starting from our common humanity and our common fate on this earth.

I return from Europe profoundly encouraged by the extent to which my purposes are shared by a community of other leaders. Therefore I would like to confirm tonight my intention to travel to Japan, to consult Prime Minister Nakasone in Tokyo next Saturday.

Japan's association with the Williamsburg Declaration last May, in which the leaders of the industrialized democracies agreed to devote our full political resources to reducing the threat of war, expresses both the resonance of history and the reality of the present day. My visit there will bear witness to the indivisibility of global security in the nuclear age.

I can also announce that, in addition to the consultations under way with the United States, I have initiated consultations with the Soviet Union and with China — two nuclear powers upon which much depends.

I look forward to taking an active part in the discussion of peace and security issues at the New Delhi meeting of Commonwealth heads of government, where I will be heading after Japan. I look forward particularly to consultations with Prime Minister Indira Gandhi on the matter of non-proliferation, and on her perspective, as current chairman of the council of non-aligned nations, on the linkage between disarmament and development.

I am encouraged by this momentum, and heartened by the response. But I am also well aware that critics of my initiative have difficulty in grasping this step-by-step approach. Some would prefer the passionate embrace of an unattainable ideal. Others are paralyzed by the complexities of the issues in play. I believe that peace must be waged steadily, with caution and with realism. We must work with due respect for the fragility of political trust, for the importance of building carefully, for the need to search out common ground on which to stand.

The imperative of political action is made all the more urgent by the pace of conflict and confrontation, which threatens to overtake our ability to understand what is happening, and our capacity to manage it.

Let me remind you that when Alfred Nobel invented dynamite in 1867 he believed that the prospect of its military application was so awesome that governments would be forced to live in peace. And yet today we have long since lost the ability to comprehend the force of a nuclear blast in terms of any comparison with traditional explosives.

Peace and security are not cold abstractions. Their purpose is to preserve the future of mankind, the growth of the human spirit, and the patrimony of our planet.

The choice we face is clear and pressing. We can without effort abandon our fate to the mindless drift toward nuclear war. Or we can gather our strength, working in good company to turn aside the forces bearing down on us, on our children, on this Earth.

As for me, I choose to move forward, and I know I do so with your support.

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