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CANADA IN THE POST-WAR WORLD

Speech by the Canadian Ambassador to the United States, Mr. A.D.P. Heeney, to the Institute of International Affairs, Seattle, March 16, 1954.

It is, I think, fitting that one of the first official visits of a new Canadian Ambassador should be to the beautiful border State of Washington - and particularly to this fine city of Seattle which, since the opening of the Klondike and before, has had so many associations with my country. Canadians are not strangers in this vigorous centre of the commercial, industrial and financial life of the Pacific Northwest; nor indeed to the renowned University which has given us such a warm welcome here tonight.

I know, Mr. Chairman, that many business and professional men and women in this State have close and regular dealings across the nearby northern border. Indeed, your record of friendly co-operation with Canada and your record of friendly co-operation with Canada and Canadians has been a striking example of those intimate relations between our two countries which have long been a standard to the world - and the occasion for what familiar floods of after-dinner oratory! You in the Pacific Northwest are accustomed to joint endeavours with us in Canada in matters of economic development and commercial affairs - and tackling the many problems that we have in common - in as well in the scholarly and cultural activities in which so much initiative and vigour has been demonstrated on both sides of the boundary. It is true that, in all these departments, the competitive element has not been lacking between us; but this must surely be an additional symptom of our rude health and confidence.

The best evidence of the importance which the Canadian Government attach to your Pacific Northwest is the recent establishment in this city of a Canadian Consulate General, under my friend Norman Senior - a man of wide experience in our country's service. I know that you will find in him and his staff wise counsellors willing and able to advise in many Canadian affairs with which you are concerned. You will also find them good citizens of Seattle.

Tonight, Mr. Chairman, I am going to resist the temptation to speak of the dramatic material progress which Canada has made since the end of World War II. This is an exciting story - in part it is the story of the new frontier familiar to earlier epochs in your own history. The discovery and exploitation of vast new resources - of oil, gas, iron ore, uranium and many other forms of national wealth. It is also the story of immense and rapid industrial growth and development - on our own Pacific Coast, in central Canada, in the Maritime Provinces and elsewhere; a process which has in a decade changed the character of the Canadian economy. It is the story of increased population, of striking new levels in the national production and income, of large savings from our own earnings, of heavy investment. As I say, Mr. Chairman, the



temptation is strong. But, apart from anything else, I shrewdly suspect that the record of Canada's progress since the war is almost as well known in Seattle as it is in Vancouver.

At the same time this great physical development does have an important bearing on what I do propose to talk to you about, namely, certain features of Canadian foreign policy over the past ten years. In any event, Mr. Chairman, this is a subject more fitting perhaps to an Institute of International Affairs. And in this city of Seattle, which looks west to the Orient across the broad Pacific, I thought you might wish me to dwell especially on those phases of our external affairs which relate to Asia.

From the Second World War Canada emerged for the first time as a national entity of some considerable importance in world affairs. This was the result in part of the substantial contribution which Canadians had made to the Allied victory, even more, perhaps, to the greatly increased industrial and financial strength which made Canada, in peace or war, an ally of some consequence. The dark days of 1940 and the long pull before German and Japanese aggression were defeated convinced the great majority of Canadians that the only solid hope for a peaceful world lay in the collective strength of like-minded countries. Hitherto concerned for the most part in their external relations with the Commonwealth and the United States, Canadians, when the war was over, embraced enthusiastically the idea of the United Nations. And when, by 1948, it became evident that the attitude of the Soviet Union was obstructing the United Nations - whatever its other possibilities - from achieving world security by collective action, the Canadian Government and people were quick to join in the North Atlantic Alliance as a means of deterring aggression in the vital area of Western Europe. Canadian fighter squadrons and Canadian Army units in France and Germany, Canadian vessels in the North Atlantic forces of NATO, millions of dollars worth of Canadian equipment for our European allies, - these are the best evidence of the virtual unanimity of our people in their support of collective action for peace. The attitude of detachment from world affairs which characterized Canadian opinion between the great wars has been replaced by a realistic internationalism which transcends party lines. For practical purposes, foreign policy in Canada is not an issue in partisan politics. Parties may differ in their emphasis and in the relative importance they attach to various aspects of our external relations. But in the essentials Canadian political parties - and the Canadian people - are united.

It was natural for Canadians to respond warmly to the idea of an Atlantic community and to the challenge of NATO. For Canada is a North American country with a strong sense of Europe. Our willingness to assume substantial national responsibilities in an Atlantic coalition headed by our traditional allies - the United States, Britain and France - this in a sense was implicit in our history. By contrast, Canadian involvement in Asia and the development of a Canadian Far Eastern policy are relatively new. Indeed, our national concern with Asian affairs really dates from the outbreak of the last great war. Our Foreign Minister, Mr. L.B. Pearson, emphasized this when he wrote in 1951:

"In our Far Eastern relations we have not so much been opening a new chapter as opening a whole new volume; for, until only recently, Asia to most Canadians was a closed book."



To many Americans - particularly perhaps to you, who share with one of our greatest provinces an outlook on the Pacific - it must have seemed curious that Canada should for so long have paid little attention to the Far East; and this in contrast to the close and continued interest which Americans have maintained from quite early times. There are, of course, historical explanations for this difference. The United States - a great Power for many years - has for long had political and commercial interests which are world-wide. In the Far East you developed in the last century the "Open Door" policy towards China. The opening of Japan to Western influence dates from the exploits of Admiral Perry a hundred years ago. You have held overseas possessions in the Orient. The Philippine Republic - now your sovereign ally - these islands have been an active, living link over several generations between your country and the East.

Before the war, on the other hand, Canadian interests in the Far East were, even relatively, much less substantial and intimate. It is true that we had considerable commerce with and economic interests in Japan. Any many Canadian missionaries, businessmen and travellers journeyed to and from the Orient. But these relations were not of great political consequence nor of general concern to Canadians, to the large majority of whom Asia was mysterious and remote.

It was, I think, natural that such attention as Canadians were willing to give to their country's external affairs should, until quite recently, have been centred almost exclusively in the United States and in Europe. You were our great and powerful neighbour, with whom we were in continual contact in the multitudinous affairs of our private and national existence. The United Kingdom, at the doorway of Europe, was the centre of the old British Empire and, after 1931 of the new Commonwealth of Nations. To the Commonwealth we were attached by strong ties of loyalty and interest. The relatively peaceful process by which Canada attained her independence did not create among Canadians the same reservations about the "other side" of the Atlantic that were still widespread in this country even a generation ago. And the greatest volume of Canadian trade was conducted through a three-way channel with the British Isles and the United States. Further, the two great races to which most Canadians traced their origins were Anglo-Saxon and French. Finally, Canada had already been involved in one war to prevent a German conquest of Europe and seemed likely to be drawn into another.

So the most compelling factors in Canada's external relationships up until the Second World War combined to fix the attention of Canadians on this continent and on Europe. It should also be noted that, in the twenties and thirties, much of Canada was still undeveloped, large areas even unexplored. The ten million-or-so Canadians who made up the country's population in 1930 had plenty to preoccupy them at home. The Far East was far away and unknown. The great stirrings that were taking place among the millions of Asia attracted the interest of few and the study of only a handful of "specialists" in Canada's infant Foreign Office.

During and since the last Great War, this situation greatly changed. And the beginning of the change might fairly be marked from those fateful days in 1941 when, in the course of one of the first of that series of disasters which shook the free world, Canadian soldiers, scarcely arrived in Hong Kong to bolster the little garrison, were overwhelmed in the fury of the Japanese onslaught.



There are, I think, two main reasons why this change has come about - two reasons why, in this post-war world, Canadians are concerned, as never before, with what takes place in the Far East - why the Government of Canada has developed and put before Parliament a considered policy in Asian affairs. First of all, there is the obvious connection between events in Asia and the maintenance of world peace and security. The Korean War afforded a tragic illustration of the impossibility of leaving Asia out of account in our collective arrangements. Like Americans, we in Canada have come to realize that, in no part of the world, however remote, can we ignore the act of an aggressor. We know now that a threat to freedom in the East is a threat to our own security. Asia and the course taken by the vast populations of the great Asian countries has come to have a new and critical importance for us in North America.

The second main factor which has brought about this development in the attitude of Canadians, is the change which has taken place, since the war, in the structure and character of the British Commonwealth. Ceylon, India and Pakistan have achieved independence. Largely, I believe, because of the foresight and wisdom of British policy, these new Asian nations have yet chosen to remain within the Commonwealth. So it comes about that our association of free nations, of which the Crown is the symbol, affords an important and valuable link between East and West. There can be no doubt that Canada's sympathetic perception of Asian problems has been sharpened by the rise of these three great sister states which occupy the whole of the Indian sub-continent.

The policy of the Canadian Government in Asian affairs, as in foreign affairs generally, is, as I have said, based on the fundamental Canadian interest in collective security. It is also based on the twin foundation of our own interest in general economic stability and well-being. The specific application of these principles to Far Eastern questions was described by Mr. Pearson in the Canadian Parliament, last January 29, in these words:

- (1) There should be no compromise with Communist military aggression in Asia - as there should be none in other places;
- (2) We should not assume that every anti-colonial, nationalist or revolutionary movement in Asia is Russian Communist in origin or direction;
- (3) We must recognize that social, national and economic forces are at work in Asia which we cannot reverse or ignore without danger;
- (4) Our policy must be on a broader and more magnanimous plane than mere opposition to Communism; so that anti-Communism should not be the sole criterion for claims upon our assistance;
- (5) We should try to convince the Asian peoples that practical democracy can do more for the individual than Communist tyrannical government, through such means as mutual aid and constructive political policies of our own; we should avoid creating the impression that the Western allies are associated in the East only with reactionary



regimes and societies, which do not meet the desires of the masses for change in that part of the world.

Let me illustrate how we have tried to apply these principles in our relations with Asian countries.

First of all let us take Korea, where you Americans gave the lead to the free nations and where you have borne by far the largest share of the burden and made the greatest sacrifice in blood and treasure. We in Canada were not slow to recognize the importance of prompt joint action against the unprovoked aggression in Korea. It was for this reason that thousands of young Canadian soldiers embarked over the past few years - most of them from this port of Seattle - to take their places beside your own American boys in the United Nations front line. For this reason too, during these grim years, Canadian airmen have taken off in Canadian aircraft, week in and week out, from your McChord Field, and Canadian destroyers have been on duty in Korean waters in support of the United Nations Command.

So, Mr. Chairman, in embattled Korea Canada has given proof of her new awareness of the importance to the whole free world of events in Asia. Now the fighting has stopped, though the danger is far from past. And, largely as a result of the patient efforts of American statesmen, we look forward, without illusions but still with modest hopes that some further relaxation of tension may be achieved, to the meeting next month in Geneva.

Canada, I should add, has shown more than a military interest in Korea. We were members of the first Commission set up by the United Nations to try to effect the political organization and unification of the country after its liberation from the Japanese. More recently the Canadian Government, recognizing the pressing need of economic assistance, has been a zealous supporter of the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency.

My second illustration of the "new look" in the attitude of Canada toward the affairs of Asia makes a happier picture. It is drawn from an area where the battle is against poverty and disease and ignorance, where the forces of Communism have been controlled by the local authorities, against which no external aggression has yet struck. It is a picture, not without many sombre hues but one which is brightened and warmed by considerations and sentiments of fraternity and humanity. It represents, I believe, one of the most encouraging examples of free co-operation between East and West.

Partly because of the Commonwealth connection, partly too because of their obvious importance in the future, the countries and peoples of the vast Indian sub-continent have provided a special focus of Canadian interest in Asia these past ten years. From its establishment in 1950, Canadians have been enthusiastic supporters of the Commonwealth-sponsored "Plan for Co-operative Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia" - the so-called "Colombo" Plan. This is a co-operative scheme set up by agreement between the Governments of Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India, Pakistan, and Ceylon. It provides means by which technical assistance and capital investment - men and money - and detailed programmes are made available to the Asian members; to assist them in raising the living standards of their people;



that is, to help them help themselves. The Government of Canada are making large contributions under the Colombo Plan. About eighty million Canadian dollars have been voted by the Canadian Parliament over the last three years for the financing of a variety of specific projects to be undertaken by the three Asian governments concerned. For example, Canadian funds and Canadian technology are responsible for projects to aid the fishing industry in Ceylon for transportation improvements and the construction of large hydro-electric works in India, for irrigation works and the establishment of a cement plant in Pakistan.

Canada derives no direct material benefit from these large expenditures. The motives which actuate us and our partners are the same as those which inspired similar United States programmes. The same is true of the technical assistance and development schemes under the United Nations, in both of which Canada, like the United States also participates. We Canadians happen to be especially interested in helping the governments of our three sister nations in South Asia in their efforts to solve the staggering economic problems of their countries and raise the living standards of their huge underprivileged populations. We believe that this is not only good humanitarian behaviour, but that it is the soundest diplomacy and economics as well.

It is an evidence of Canadian interest in this aspect of our Asian relations especially that our Prime Minister, Mr. Louis St. Laurent, who has from the beginning been a first mover in these affairs, is presently on a world journey during which he has spent some time in New Delhi, Karachi, and Colombo before going on to Korea and Japan. Speaking in the House of Commons on January 29 before he left, Mr. St. Laurent said:

"Canada, I think, has welcomed the opportunity to share in the encouragement of freedom and economic improvement in Asia because we realize the importance of maintaining good relations between the Western world and the hundreds of millions of our fellow men in these ancient nations of Asia. I feel that we can maintain good relations with them only as long as we treat them on terms of complete equality, with respect for their older and perhaps somewhat less materialistic culture and achievements, and in a spirit of genuine understanding and co-operation. We must deal with them in the realization that while we may seem to have much to give they too have a very important contribution to make to the general welfare of the world."

It seems to us in Canada that the friendship and confidence of the free Asian states - and the success of their governments in achieving the betterment of their populations by democratic means - are of prime importance to the free world. It seems to us, too, that we should have special regard to the views on Asian problems of free Asian statesmen. We may not always share these views; frequently we will differ from our Asian friends. But in giving their opinions due weight and the respect we wish for our own, we will encourage that practical co-operation and mutual confidence which will be essential to the solution of the complex problems in which West and East are equally concerned. If, for example, the ideals of free and democratic government which we share with India are to survive and afford a compelling alternative to Russian, or Chinese, Communism, we must sustain and support



those who are contesting with Moscow and Peking the ideological leadership of Asia. We must do our part to make it possible for free democracy, and not Soviet or Chinese Communism, to be the champion of nationalism, racial equality and economic improvement in Asia.

In addition to Korea and the countries of the Indian sub-continent, there are of course other areas and nations in the East with which Canada's relations have quickened sharply in the past ten years - Japan, with whom we expect to have even more important commercial relations than before the war and with whom, together with you Americans, we now sit (in Vancouver, incidentally) on the North Pacific Fisheries Commission; Indonesia, where we have recently established a Canadian Embassy; the Associated States of Indo-China still struggling against ruthless Communist aggression. But my time - and I fear your patience - is running out. Nevertheless, I cannot conclude without some reference to the Canadian Government's attitude toward the complex, tragic problem of China.

The relations of the free nations with the new China have been the cause of great anxiety - and of mis-understandings and disagreement between the allies. These the Communists have not been slow to exploit. To us in Canada, China is an example of the disaster which can befall if Communism is permitted to take over and exploit for its own ends the forces of nationalism and economic revolution which are moving throughout the whole of Asia. We believe, however, that the Chinese people will remain true to their history and refuse to accept the subordination of their national interests to those of another power. The synthesis of Chinese nationalism and Soviet imperialism is surely not a natural phenomenon. In time - it may be a long time - the artificial bond contracted between Peking and Moscow will sunder on the rock of Chinese national interests. But we also believe that ill-considered attempts to hasten this process from outside may be dangerous in themselves and may tend to bring about the very opposite results.


The Canadian Government have not recognized the Communist Government in Peking. Nor would we contemplate recognition so long as that government maintain their present aggressive policies. There is little present evidence of any change in their attitude or hostile intentions. Nevertheless, the Canadian authorities have taken the position that, if the Peking Government do not renew the war in Korea and, in addition, give some tangible proof of abandoning their aggressive demeanour in Asia, we should probably wish to take a new look at the situation. There will be a good opportunity of testing the real intentions of the Chinese Communists at the Geneva Conference in April.

Mr. Chairman, I trust that I have been able to convey some impression of the way we in Canada regard the affairs - or some of the affairs - of the outside world. Especially do I hope that I have been able to give you an idea of how, in the past ten years, we have become aware of Asia and how we regard relations with that vast continent.

In these matters the Canadian viewpoint does not always correspond to that of the United States. Nor is identity of view to be expected in all matters at all times. The United States wishes no country to be its satellite. But we should take care not to exaggerate our differences, for in most great external questions we see eye to eye and, what is



most important, our objectives are identical. The United States stands at the head of the great coalition of free, independent nations of which Canada is proud to be a member. The ultimate purposes of this grand alliance remain as they were stated nearly nine years ago in the Charter of the United Nations - to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war and to establish a world order of decency, justice and freedom.



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