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**SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS:
AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY**



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**SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS:
AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY**

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE	ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	iii
INTRODUCTION	iv
PART A	
UNITED NATIONS, REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, AND INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS	1
PART B	
SCHOLARLY STUDIES	
B.1 ITEMS AVAILABLE IN 1993	5
B.2 ITEMS AVAILABLE IN 1994	6
B.3 ITEMS AVAILABLE IN 1995	9
B.4 ITEMS AVAILABLE IN 1996	31
PART C	
WORLD WIDE WEB SITES	50
PART D	
AUTHOR INDEX	52
PART E	
SUBJECT INDEX	53
ADDENDUM	57

PREFACE

Canada views the trade and use of small arms and light weapons to have potentially serious consequences. In particular, excessive accumulations of these weapons can pose significant dangers to internal security and economic development in many countries as well as to international peace and security. The traffic in and possession of such weapons can also have serious consequences for crime prevention as well as public health and safety.

While recognizing that states have a right of self-defence, as articulated in the United Nations Charter, as well as to acquire arms for their security, such rights are not unqualified. Canada firmly believes that the acquisition of small arms and light weapons must not lead to excessive accumulations that threaten international or internal peace and security. Canada also believes that international transfers of armaments should be restricted when such transfers contribute to human rights abuses.

Efforts to control the supply of small arms and light weapons, while important, are not alone sufficient to address satisfactorily the problems posed by these weapons. Such efforts must be accompanied by policies at the national and international levels to address the reasons behind the demand for such arms. These include, among others: social and political conflict, economic deprivation, terrorism, and drug trafficking.

The problems engendered by the trade and use of small arms and the solutions to these problems are multifaceted. There are, among others, non-proliferation, micro-disarmament and firearms regulation dimensions. Moreover, coordinated action by national governments, regional organizations and global bodies including the United Nations are imperative for successfully addressing this issue.

In Canada's view, addressing the negative consequences of the trade and use of small arms and light weapons is a formidable but not an insurmountable problem. The illicit nature of part of this trade itself provides a significant challenge to domestic law enforcement agencies, governments and the world community. While it may be difficult to eradicate completely the illicit traffic in and use of small quantities of small arms and light weapons, there is much that can be done through constructive action at the national, regional and international level to curtail the deleterious consequences of such weapons.

This *Annotated Bibliography* has been prepared to assist government officials and researchers in their work on the subject of small arms and light weapons. It is made available as part of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade's policy to share the results of independent research undertaken by the Department's Verification Research Program. The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade or of the Canadian Government.

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INTRODUCTION

The issue of small arms and light weapons proliferation has been a peripheral item on the international security agenda for some time, dating back at least to the attempt in the Brussels Act of 1890 to restrict arms shipments to Africa. With the end of the Cold War the issue has gained increasing international prominence.

Scope:

Small Arms and Light Weapons: An Annotated Bibliography comprises scholarly and analytical works written on the subject since 1993. The criteria for inclusion are as follows: first, the item must be published in or after 1993 and publicly available by August 1996; second, the item must contain some substantive analysis or assessment of the issue of small arms and light weapons proliferation or of possible responses to this issue. Items that merely report on weapons transfers, proliferation control measures, or current events, are not included. Finally, this *Bibliography* excludes literature dealing primarily with anti-personnel landmines; a separate bibliography has been produced on that topic¹.

Several items taken from international discussions dealing with firearms regulation and which relate to the issue of illicit arms trafficking have been included in this *Bibliography*. Because of time limitations no attempt has been made to cover this area in the same depth as for the disarmament literature. Nevertheless, it was thought desirable to include some material from firearms regulation discussions to help promote an awareness of the similarities between some of the approaches to the two issues -- firearms regulations and disarmament -- and to the relevant on-going discussion/negotiation processes.

Arrangement:

Small Arms and Light Weapons: An Annotated Bibliography is divided into five parts. Part A consists of annotations of documents from the United Nations, regional organizations and other international arrangements that are relevant to the issue of small arms and light weapons proliferation, organized in ascending chronological order. Each annotation summarizes the major arguments of the document and records any recommendations. For ease of reference, a serial number has been attached to each citation which begins with "I" (e.g., I-1) to distinguish it from entries in other parts of the *Bibliography*. The serial number appears in the left margin before each annotation, and corresponds to the numbers included in the author and keyword indexes.

Part B contains over eighty annotations of governmental, academic and other publications offering substantive comment on the issue of small arms and light weapons proliferation. Part B is sub-divided by year to provide the reader with a sense of the dramatic increase in the number and scope of the publications over the last three years. Within each annual sub-division entries are arranged in alphabetic order by author.

Each annotation in Part B reproduces any definitions offered for small arms and light weapons. This format allows the reader to garner a sense of the evolution of the material on the subject, as well as to trace the changing definitions for small arms and light weapons. Furthermore, each annotation attempts to describe the scope of the article or book being abstracted, lists the major arguments, and reports any conclusions or recommendations. As in part A, entries in this section have been assigned a serial number. Publications dated 1993 have serial numbers starting with 301; publications from 1994 start at 401, and so on through 1996 documents which begin with the number 601.

The advisability of attempting to control proliferation of small arms and light weapons has been argued in many ways, as reflected in items annotated in Part B. The vast majority of the works treat small arms and light weapons proliferation as a problem that must be confronted. Most authors are motivated by the desire to reduce the suffering resulting from the proliferation of small arms. Two items have dominated the agenda of researchers working in this field: first, raising the international profile of the causes of small arms and light weapons proliferation and its consequences; and, second, formulating a universally recognized definition of small arms and light weapons.

While the majority of documents favour controls, several reasons why small arms control may not be advisable are also suggested in the literature. First, controlling small arms and light weapons could infringe too easily upon Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which relates to states' rights of self-defence. Second, there is no universal

¹ *Anti-Personnel Land Mines: An Annotated Bibliography*, (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, October 1996).

norm against the transfer of small arms (e.g., the right to possess arms is enshrined in the constitutions of some countries). Third, diverting limited funds to administer a non-proliferation mechanism to deal with small arms and light weapons, without any guarantee of success, may be an inefficient way to employ scarce resources. Finally, small arms accumulation can be seen as a symptom of larger social and economic problems, and efforts would be better directed at solving the source of these problems. This, in turn, would have the effect of reducing the demand for small arms.

Part C of this *Bibliography* is a reference list of useful Internet sites on the subject of small arms and light weapons. Arranged alphabetically by web-site title, each entry includes a World Wide Web address (URL), a street address, telephone and fax number, and, if available, an email address. The annotation for each site provides a summary of the scope and purpose of the web-site. Serial numbers are attached to each world wide web address, preceded by the sign "WWW" (e.g., WWW-1), which permits researchers to identify world wide web sites quickly in the keyword index.

Part D is an Author Index which lists, alphabetically, the corporate and personal authors of documents contained in Parts A and B. Where an article was written on behalf of an institution (e.g., the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute), the institution is listed as the author. Following each author's name is a list of the serial numbers corresponding to his/her articles. The numbering system makes possible quick reference from the Author and Subject Indexes. For instance, the following reference appears in the Author Index:

Kartha, Tara: 302, 517, 610.

By virtue of the initial digits of these serial numbers, the researcher can determine that the annotations associated with Kartha correspond to three articles, published in 1993, 1995, and 1996 respectively.

Part E is an alphabetically organized Subject Index. Keywords listed in this section correspond to words or phrases that appear in the annotations or titles of items in Parts A, B and C of the Bibliography, and fit into at least one of the following categories:

- 1) a nation or region which is mentioned in the text of a study;
- 2) a group involved in the study of small arms and light weapons (e.g., the British American Security Information Council (BASIC));
- 3) a treaty or plan designed to confront the problem of small arms proliferation, for example, the New Forum agreement (now termed the Wassenaar Arrangement); or
- 4) an important term used in the discussion of small arms and light weapons proliferation.

Following each keyword are listed all the serial numbers corresponding to the relevant annotations. As with the Author Index, each serial number allows the researcher to determine the type of document, and in the case of scholarly articles contained in Part B, the year of publication. For example, the following entry appears in the keyword index:

Center for Defense Information (CDI): 524, 616, WWW-3.

From the numbers listed in this case, it is possible to determine that this organization is mentioned in two articles (published in 1995 and 1996) and in a web-site. In addition, acronyms have been included twice: according to their acronym (e.g., BASIC), and according to their full name (e.g., British American Security Information Council). This format allows the keyword index to function as a glossary of acronyms.

PART A

UNITED NATIONS, REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

- I-1.** United Nations General Assembly. *International Arms Transfers*. United Nations Resolution 48/75F, December 16, 1993.

This resolution notes the link between illicit arms transfers and threats to international peace and stability. All arms obtained illegally, even small arms, can be used by underground organizations to threaten the political stability of an affected State. Member States are called upon to effectively monitor arms transfers, and to "...give priority to eradicating the illicit arms traffic associated with destabilizing activities, such as terrorism, drug trafficking and common criminal acts."

- I-2.** United Nations General Assembly. *Measures to Curb the Illicit Transfer and Use of Conventional Weapons*. United Nations Resolution 48/75H, December 16, 1993.

This resolution recognizes that there are massive quantities of armaments available in the world and that these arms contribute to conflict. Member states are invited to take appropriate enforcement measures to end the illegal export of weapons. The Secretary-General is requested to seek the views of member states on effective means of collecting illegally distributed weapons.

- I-3.** United Nations General Assembly. *Assistance to States for Curbing the Illicit Traffic in Small Arms and Collecting Them*. United Nations Resolution 49/75G, December 15, 1994.

Adopted by a vote of 169 to none, with one abstention (United States), this document is based on Mali's request for assistance in the collection of small arms. Congratulations are given to the Secretary-General for his efforts to address the problem of illicit small arms transfers. Member states are invited to implement national control measures to curb the traffic in small arms, and are urged to give appropriate support to measures designed to facilitate this process.

- I-4.** United Nations General Assembly. *Measures to Curb the Illicit Transfer and Use of Conventional Arms*. United Nations Resolution 49/75M, December 15, 1994.

Adopted by the General Assembly without a vote, this resolution invited the Disarmament Commission to expedite its consideration of illicit arms trafficking, and to study measures to curb these transfers. Member states are invited to supply the Secretary-General with information on national control measures to regulate arms transfers. The Secretary-General was asked to seek the views of member states on effective ways and means of addressing the problem of illicit arms transfers, to examine the possibility of collecting these arms, and to report on the progress made at the fiftieth session of the UN General Assembly.

- I-5.** Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations*. UN General Assembly Document A/50/60, January 25, 1995.

The purpose of this supplement is "...to highlight selectively certain areas where unforeseen, or only partly foreseen, difficulties have arisen" (p. 3). The quantitative and qualitative changes in the post Cold War era are discussed (e.g., increased United Nations activities), as are the available instruments for peace and security.

Section D, "Disarmament," is of particular interest to students of small arms and light weapons (pp. 14-15). The report introduces the term "micro-disarmament," which refers to the "...practical disarmament in the context of the conflicts the United Nations is actually dealing with and of the weapons, most of them light weapons, that are actually killing people in the hundreds of thousands" (p. 14). Two categories of light weapons deserve special attention: small arms, and anti-personnel mines. Small arms are likely responsible for most of the deaths in current conflicts and are readily available. Several reasons for the current surplus of small arms are noted:

- 1) supplies given to states during the proxy wars of the Cold War;
- 2) internal conflicts;
- 3) competition for commercial markets;
- 4) criminal activity;
- 5) the collapse of governmental law.

The report notes that the search for a solution must begin now. Progress has been made in the realm of major and nuclear weapons. What must follow are parallel measures towards constraining the proliferation of light weapons.

I-6. Report of the Secretary-General. *General and Complete Disarmament: Assistance to States for Curbing the Illicit Traffic in Small Arms and Collecting Them*. UN General Assembly Document A/50/405, September 5, 1995.

This document reports on the progress taken towards curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and collecting them. Several initiatives are outlined (e.g., the progress of the advisory mission sent to the Saharo-Sahelion region to study the problem of illicit arms trafficking). The increased recognition given to the problem of illicit small arms trafficking is praised, and the Secretary-General urges "...that the momentum of effort among Member States to take practical steps to deal with this grave problem be increased" (p. 2).

I-7. United Nations General Assembly. *General and Complete Disarmament*. United Nations Resolution 50/70B, November 17, 1995.

This resolution requests the Secretary General to prepare a report, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts, on: "(a) The types of small arms and light weapons actually being used in conflicts being dealt with by the United Nations; (b) The nature and causes of the excessive and destabilizing accumulation and transfer of small arms and light weapons, including their illicit production and trade; (c) The ways and means to prevent and reduce the excessive and destabilizing accumulation and transfer of small arms and light weapons, in particular as they cause or exacerbate conflict."

I-8. Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. *The Secretary-General's Report to the General Assembly on the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters*. UN General Assembly Document A/50/391, 1995.

Researchers and observers of efforts to deal with small arms will be particularly interested in paragraphs 12 through 14 on micro-disarmament. The Board identified "...the need for a better understanding of the ways and means of conducting micro-disarmament in other situations where there was no formal peace settlement and perhaps no presence of the United Nations or a regional organization" (para. 12). Unless there are adequate levels of personal security in a country plagued by light weapons, there is little chance of a successful micro-disarmament program. The international community has an obligation to help affected countries work towards stability.

I-9. General Assembly. *Report of the Disarmament Commission*. UN General Assembly Document A/51/42, 1996.

Annex I of this document is entitled *Guidelines for international arms transfers in the context of General Assembly resolution 46/36H of 6 December 1991*. Concern is expressed about the problem of illicit arms trafficking, that is "...international trade in conventional arms which is contrary to the laws of states and/or

international law" (p. 10). Attempts must be made to eradicate this phenomenon. Suggestions are made for actions to be taken by each UN member state at the national, international and institutional level.

In the section on national efforts, special mention is made of the destructive nature of small arms and light weapons and their negative influence on regional and international peace and security, and on national security. To combat the problem of illicit arms trafficking, each state should:

- 1) ensure that it has adequate national legislation to control arms transfers;
- 2) attempt to eradicate bribery and corruption in connection with arms transfers;
- 3) establish and maintain effective export and import licenses;
- 4) obtain an import certificate from the receiving state covering exported arms;
- 5) provide for adequate numbers of customs officials;
- 6) define which weapons are appropriate only for military use;
- 7) take into account the relevant recommendations of INTERPOL (International Police).

At the international level, each state should:

- 1) require import or verifiable end-user certificates for international arms transfers;
- 2) cooperate with other states to combat illegal arms trafficking;
- 3) develop and enhance the application of compatible legislative and administrative standards;
- 4) comply strictly with United Nations embargoes;
- 5) report all relevant transactions to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms;
- 6) regulate private arms dealers.

Institutional arrangements can also help to curb the illicit traffic in armaments. The United Nations has a role to play in orchestrating efforts to control this traffic. In addition, states are called upon to "...use and further develop mechanisms for the exchange of information at the global, regional and subregional levels in order to assist institutions engaged in the control, tracking and seizure of arms in making full-scale efforts to eradicate illicit arms trafficking" (p. 14).

I-10. Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission. *Meeting of the Group of Experts on the Control of Arms and Explosives Related to Drug Trafficking, Final Report*. Caracas, Venezuela: Organization of American States (OAS/Ser.L/Xiv.2 CICAD/AREX/doc.13/96 rev.1), May 21-24, 1996.

Under the auspices of the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD), a Group of Experts on the Control of Arms and Explosives Related to Drug Trafficking has been formed with the view to studying the development of a *Model Regulation for the Control of Illegal Traffic of Arms and Explosives Related to Drug Trafficking*. A series of meetings of this Group have been held. Most recently in May 1996 the Group of Experts made progress towards these goals. Recommendations were made dealing, among other things, with the use of common information on import and export certificates; the sharing and exchange of information relating to the criminal use of firearms; the organization of systems within countries to regulate firearms, ammunition and explosives regarding identification, ownership and possession; as well as the re-exportation of munitions, explosives and firearms.

I-11. United Nations. *United Nations Survey on Firearm Regulation: Guidelines and Questionnaire*. May 1996.

The General Assembly on 18 December 1991 (Resolution 46/152) passed a resolution entitled "Creation of an effective United Nations crime prevention and criminal justice programme". This was taken up by the Ninth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (Cairo 1995). That Congress passed a resolution later endorsed by the Economic and Social Council entitled "Firearms Regulation for the Purposes of Crime Prevention and Public Safety". Among other things the resolution requested the Secretary General to initiate a study to examine a variety of issues relating to firearms regulation including the nature and extent of firearms smuggling and trafficking in countries and the measures taken to combat the problem. This study is a cornerstone of United Nations activity on this subject; it is impossible to measure the extent of the problem of the illicit movement of firearms without an adequate database on all matters relating to firearms. The Study Group has recently approved a *Survey on Firearm Regulation* and sent it out to some 80 countries. The analysis of the results of this survey should be completed by late 1996. A second phase of the

implementation of the Congress's resolution will focus on the holding of four regional workshops on firearms regulation as well as one or two inter-regional workshops.

This questionnaire requests information as it applies to firearms in the possession of civilians, and not as it applies to military or to state security forces. Fifty states are asked to complete the form to generate information on:

- 1) criminal cases, accidents and suicides in which firearms are involved;
- 2) the situation with regard to transnational illicit trafficking in firearms;
- 3) national legislation and regulations relevant to firearms regulations;
- 4) relevant initiatives for firearms regulation at the regional and interregional levels.

I-12. *Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls and Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies: Initial Elements as Adopted by the Plenary of 11-12 July. July 12, 1996.*

Representatives of 33 states met in Vienna, Austria on 11 and 12 July 1996 and decided to implement the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Technologies. Its purpose is to contribute to regional and international security by:

- 1) promoting transparency;
- 2) ensuring that transfers of relevant items do not contribute to excessive and destabilizing accumulations of arms;
- 3) complementing existing control regimes for weapons of mass destruction;
- 4) reducing the need for states to acquire advanced weapons or technologies.

PART B

SCHOLARLY STUDIES

PART B.1 ITEMS AVAILABLE IN 1993

301. Karp, Aaron. "Arming Ethnic Conflict." *Arms Control Today*. September 1993, pp. 8-13.

Despite recent attention to the arms trade, very little attention has been paid to the phenomenon of weapons transfers to sub-state groups. These transfers, involving mostly small arms and light weapons, have become the most destabilizing types of transfers in the post Cold War era.

Karp is critical of the model used by many analysts and policy makers which treats transfers to sub-state groups as "...a miniature version of the traditional state-to-state transfers of major weaponry, focusing on arming police and gendarmerie" (p. 8). By contrast, he argues that to understand this trade, researchers must first appreciate the severity of the threat. While there are no reliable statistics on the trade of light weapons, all general indicators suggest that the problem is increasing. Moreover, many of these weapons are not traded, but stolen, and are not subject to national counting procedures.

Karp also discounts the myth that the black market is a major source of arms for insurgent groups. This trade is too expensive for most sub-state groups, and this market is too risky for individual black marketeers. The major supplier of weapons to sub-state groups is a sponsor state (e.g., the Vietcong supported by the North Vietnamese).

He concludes that arms control will only be effective if diplomatic, political and economic instruments are combined to create regional conflict resolution. In the meantime, several approaches are available to work towards that goal:

- 1) control the black market;
- 2) create more export controls to deal with weapons used by sub-state groups (e.g., land mines);
- 3) focus on state sponsorship of insurgent groups to eliminate this common source of support.

302. Kartha, Tara. "Spread of Arms and Instability." *Strategic Analysis*. Vol. XVI, No. 18, November 1993, pp. 1033-1050.

Kartha explores the arms trade in Pakistan and its link with drug trafficking. The North West Frontier Province (NWFP) has only a loose respect for Pakistani law, and it is here that arms bazaars offer almost every kind of light weapon for sale. As arms became more available, they were used more often, prompting a renewed demand. The resulting spiral of violence has risen to the point where guns are now an accepted part of the culture.

The reaction of the state to curb this growing problem is analysed. Unfortunately, since state policing efforts have smaller budgets than do drug and weapons traffickers, control efforts have been largely symbolic. In 1992 the Pakistani army was called upon to restore order in the NWFP, with only modest results. Kartha points to the growing link between drug and weapons traffickers on the one hand, and political officials on the other. The whole area is poised to sink further into a gun-controlled culture: "The increasingly unstable situation in the country is tailor-made for fundamentalist/ revolutionary groups, which generally thrive on lawlessness and a criminalized polity" (p. 1047).

Kartha concludes that there is a definite link between the massive availability of arms and the destabilization of Pakistani society. This link has resulted in a worsening of existing ethnic and social tensions. She advises Pakistani officials to address the underlying forces which prompt Pakistani citizens to arms themselves, but concedes that such a process will be extremely difficult.

303. Smith, Christopher. *The Diffusion of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Pakistan and Northern India: London Defense Studies No. 20*. London: Centre for Defense Studies, September 1993.

Smith addresses the supply and flow of small arms and light weapons in areas of South Asia. These weapons are exacting a high price in political stability and in human lives. The Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan and the resulting American shipment of arms to the area remain the greatest developments in small arms and light weapons proliferation. Smith is critical of both superpowers for sacrificing the long-term stability of the region to their short-term geo-political aims.

Smith presents a series of case studies on the characteristics and history of small arms and light weapons proliferation in the region, focusing on the following: Sind Province; Khalistani movement and terrorism in the Punjab; Kashmir; Bihar; North East India; and, finally, Bombay.

Smith concludes that "...South Asia stands on the brink of being flooded with light weapons which will add a new and alarming dimension to the region's traditional and long-standing problems of nation-building, security and development" (p. 47). In Pakistan, implementing gun control may be impossible since the problem is so far advanced. Gun buy-back programs are not likely to succeed given the pervasive nature of the gun culture. While the widespread availability of light weapons cannot be said to have caused the current unrest, they have most definitely, Smith argues, exacerbated the problem.

For its part, India has tried to create political unity in the face of religious diversity but this goal continues to be elusive. Smith maintains that the "...growing proliferation of small arms and easy access to them is increasing both the communist polarisation and the incidence of violence" (p. 51). In both countries, the root of the problem remains political weakness and the failure to enforce law and order impartially. Simply working to stop the flow of light weapons will not be effective since the area is already saturated with weapons. Similarly, withholding spare parts as an anti-proliferation measure is also doomed to failure since the main weapon, the AK-47, rarely requires maintenance. As a result, Smith emphasizes the need to address the root cause of the recourse to weapons. Social and economic development and good governance must be promoted if the region hopes to reduce its gun problem. An interim solution could involve regulating the access to ammunition which, unlike the weapons themselves, is in short supply.

PART B.2 ITEMS AVAILABLE IN 1994

401. Dikshit, Prashant. "Proliferation of Small Arms and Minor Weapons." *Strategic Analysis*. Vol. 17, No. 2, May 1994, pp. 187-204.

Dikshit defines small arms according to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) definition, which includes "...all crew-portable direct fire weapons of a calibre less than 50 mm and will include a secondary capability to defeat light armour and helicopters" (p. 189). The accuracy and lethality of infantry weapons have increased dramatically since 1945. Estimates of the cost involved in eliminating the current light weapons proliferation problem hover in the \$85 billion (United States currency) range and are complicated by a host of problems:

- 1) the existence of an extensive underground system to ship armaments covertly to clients;
- 2) the huge profits to be made in gun-running;
- 3) for many states, the sale of surplus small arms as a way to secure hard currency.

A survey of the characteristics of light weapons proliferation is offered for several states: Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Cambodia, the African States, and Bosnia. Dikshit concludes that each state must create and enforce stringent gun control laws. In addition, states should create a register for small arms which includes transfers and procurement through domestic production. In the meantime, the international community must be made aware of the need to control light weapons proliferation.

402. Goose, Stephen D. and Frank Smyth. "Arming Genocide in Rwanda." *Foreign Affairs*. Vol. 73, No. 5, September/October 1994, pp. 86-96.

Goose and Smyth examine Rwanda as a case study of "...what can happen when small arms and light weapons are sold to a country plagued by ethnic, religious, or nationalist strife" (p. 86). They maintain that more research in this area must be done since relatively little is known about the global trade of light weapons.

The background which led to the massacre of thousands of civilians is detailed. In addition, comments are made concerning the culpability of several states for supplying weapons to Rwanda (e.g., France, South Africa, Egypt and Uganda). Attempts to curb the proliferation of light weapons must deal with the fact that the trade in these weapons is expanding and has a destabilizing effect through the world. Despite these ominous patterns, light weapons control remains a secondary issue for most nations.

The authors contend that an important first step is to make light weapons transfers as transparent as possible. They outline the major post Cold War transparency measure, the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, and conclude that despite its shortcomings it has helped to enhance peace and stability. It is recommended that the success of the Register be built upon by including a section to report on the transfer of light weapons.

The issue of light weapons proliferation provides a unique opportunity for the Clinton administration to show leadership in a critical, but under-examined threat to international peace and stability. Goose and Smyth point to the success of US leadership in curbing the proliferation of land mines, arguing that the US should adopt a similar leadership role in working to control light weapons.

403. Karp, Aaron. "The Arms Trade Revolution: The Major Impact of Small Arms." *The Washington Quarterly*. Vol. 17, No. 4, Autumn 1994, pp. 65-77.

Karp argues that the arms trade has changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War. He is critical of the literature published on the arms trade for failing to recognize that a revolution has occurred. Trade in major weapons systems has lost most of its military and strategic importance, leaving small arms and light weapons as the greatest threat to international stability.

Three factors which have been used by analysts to explain the arms trade are explored: technology, politics, and normative forces. He concludes that "...no approach to the arms trade emphasizing the salience of major weapons can capture the substance of the recent revolution" (p. 68). Instead of trying to adapt mechanisms used to control major weapons to suit small ones, policy makers should concentrate on formulating strategies for coping with the armaments actually used—light weapons.

One of the first steps to be taken is the formulation of a definition of small arms. Four suggestions are detailed which define small arms as:

- 1) weapons not covered by the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms;
- 2) those portable by infantry;
- 3) those transported by animals and light vehicles;
- 4) whatever is used in internecine conflict (including small numbers of major weapons systems).

Unlike many analysts, Karp does not see small arms as inherently more difficult to control than major weapons. He argues that governments may be more willing to impose controls on small arms exports since domestic markets are almost always sufficient to "...ensure the health of domestic producers" (p. 73).

Karp proposes four measures to control the proliferation of small arms:

- 1) treat small and light weapons with the seriousness they deserve (e.g., enforce export controls more closely);
- 2) work towards re-establishing dialogue on arms transfers (e.g., the Permanent Five talks);
- 3) modify national policies to curtail illegal exports;
- 4) extend the UN Register to include the transfer of small and light weapons.

He concludes that a total ban on light weapons will never materialize; however, it remains important to work towards that goal.

404. Klare, Michael T. "Awash in Armaments: Implications of the Trade in Light Weapons." *Harvard International Review*. Vol. 17, No. 1, Winter 1994-1995, pp. 24-26, 75-76.

With the end of the Cold War, increased attention has been paid to the proliferation of light weapons. These weapons are defined as "...small arms, grenades, land mines, machine guns, light artillery pieces, shoulder-fired anti-tank weapons and other such munitions" (p. 24). This recent emphasis on light weapons has confirmed what analysts of the arms trade have known for years: "...global arms patterns are largely shaped by the ever-changing exigencies of the world security environment" (p. 24). With the shift away from the bipolar world of the Cold War, there has been an increase in ethnic and sectarian violence, resulting in an increased demand for light weapons. Despite their increased deployment, little is known about the trade in light weapons. The international community must overcome this historical prejudice and study the trade in light weapons.

Four different channels of supply are analysed:

- 1) government-to-government sales or grants;
- 2) commercial sales;
- 3) covert deliveries by governments;
- 4) black market arms deals.

Given the diversity of supply channels, any efforts at controlling ethnic violence must also address the trade in light arms. Tougher national and international controls on the sale of arms and ammunition to UN embargoed countries are a first step. Ultimately, however, a control agreement like those for nuclear weapons will be needed. In the meantime, efforts should be directed towards limiting the arms trade, rather than trying to eliminate it.

405. Mills, Greg. "Small Arms Control: Some Early Thoughts." *African Defence Review*. Vol. 15, March 1994, pp. 42-54.

Mills argues that South Africa is not concerned as much about nuclear weapons proliferation as it is about the spread of small arms. His paper "...sets out the various areas around the subject of proliferation and control into which research is currently being conducted" (p. 42). Small arms are defined as including "...handguns, carbines or rifles and assault rifles" (p. 42).

Several factors are outlined which contribute to small arms proliferation:

- 1) poorly paid police forces;
- 2) loose control of government stockpiles;
- 3) an increase in the number of private security firms;
- 4) backyard production of weapons.

Mills emphasizes that the weapons themselves are not the cause of violence, "...and it is necessary to treat both the causes and the symptoms of the proliferation of weapons. The removal of illegal weaponry might lower the political temperature and the potential for destructive subversion, which remains the way to reduce violence" (p. 51). He offers six recommendations to combat light weapons proliferation:

- 1) tighten statutes regarding the possession of light weapons;
- 2) secure the weapons caches of the African National Congress (ANC) and other groups;
- 3) allow security forces to clear out weapons in the townships;
- 4) increase funding for disarmament efforts;
- 5) coordinate disarmament efforts regionally for greater effectiveness;
- 6) demobilize former soldiers, making sure to adequately re-integrate them back into civil society.

Until these, or similar, measures are in place, "...it would seem as if South Africa, in particular, is going to be an increasingly dangerous place" (p. 52).

406. Smith, Christopher. "Light Weapons - The Forgotten Dimension of the International Arms Trade." In *Brassey's Defence Yearbook, 1994*, ed. King's College London The Centre For Defence Studies, London: Brassey's, 1994, pp. 271-284.

Smith notes that much attention has been focused on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. However, relatively little attention has been paid to the consequences of light weapons transfers. This omission

becomes important in the current environment which has seen both a qualitative and a quantitative increase in the light weapons in circulation. The role of key states in the production and distribution of light weapons is examined: the former Soviet Union, Western European states, the U.S. and South Africa. He also notes that along with an increase in light weapons traffic, there is a growing link between light weapons and drug trafficking.

Smith emphasizes the need for a new arms control paradigm to deal with light weapons. The blueprints for controlling major weapons systems are not adaptable for service as guidelines to control light weapons because light weapons have already circulated all over the globe, making non-proliferation efforts only marginally effective. As a result, light weapons must be addressed from the perspective of control. Smith suggests the tagging of new weapons to make tracking easier. He puts more credence, however, in control efforts which will limit access to ammunition for light weapons. It is suggested that aid be made contingent on policies to control access to ammunition. Whatever policies are eventually adopted, Smith emphasizes the need to think globally. Ultimately, control of light weapons will only be successful in conjunction with widespread social and political development.

PART B.3 ITEMS AVAILABLE IN 1995

501. Adibe, Clement and Jakkie Potgieter. *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia (Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Geneva)*. New York and Geneva: United Nations, 1995.

This study is divided into three parts. The purpose of Part I is "...to examine in some depth the role of arms in explaining the current Somali conflict and the difficulties of multinational intervention in resolving this African tragedy" (p. 3). Part I is divided into five chapters: "Chapter 1 briefly discusses the Somali society and politics and provides the background to the conflict that ensued in 1991. Chapter 2 examines the regional and international contexts of the conflict, focusing particularly on early efforts to bring the conflict to the attention of the international community. Chapter 3 traces the involvement of the international community and the United Nations through various phases. Chapter 4 focuses on the evolution and implementation of the disarmament concept in Somalia. Chapter 5 discusses the lessons of the Somali experience for future involvement in disarmament and conflict resolution" (p. 3).

This last chapter outlines the major recommendations of the study:

- 1) understanding the nature of the society and the causes of the conflict are central to resolving intra-state conflicts;
- 2) disarmament should not be attempted without the political will to see the process through;
- 3) a positive human rights record should be a required condition for troop participation in UN peace missions;
- 4) field commanders must communicate effectively with one another;
- 5) UN forces should train together prior to deployment in an operational theatre;
- 6) the UN must demonstrate a staying power once a commitment to intervene has been made.

Part II is a bibliography of relevant sources. Part III duplicates the questionnaire responses which served as the primary source for the report.

502. Boutwell, Jeffrey, Michael T. Klare and Laura W. Reed, eds. *Lethal Commerce: The Global Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Committee on International Security Studies, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1995.

Preface

These essays represent a survey of the current knowledge of small arms and light weapons. The authors contend that since relatively little is known about this "lethal commerce," what is needed is "...a systematic survey of the available information to provide a more reliable assessment of the nature and scope of the trade in small arms and light weapons..." (p. 1).

Introduction

The publication itself is divided into three sections. Part I, "The New Prominence of Small Arms and Light Weapons," highlights the problem and the need for action to regulate the trade in small arms. It includes three essays, each annotated in this bibliography:

- 1) Karp, Aaron. "Small Arms -- The New Major Weapons" [Serial No. 515];
- 2) Klare, Michael T. "The Global Trade in Light Weapons and the International System in the Post-Cold War Era" [Serial No. 518];
- 3) Naylor, R.T. "The Structure and Operation of the Modern Arms Black Market" [Serial No. 530].

Part II, "Small Arms and Regional Conflicts," includes four articles which examine the role of small arms in various regional conflicts:

- 1) Smith, Christopher. "Light Weapons and Ethnic Conflict in South Asia" [Serial No. 537];
- 2) Mathiak, Lucy. "Light Weapons and Internal Conflict in Angola" [Serial No. 528];
- 3) García-Peña Jaramillo, Daniel. "Light Weapons and Internal Conflict in Colombia" [Serial No. 510];
- 4) Gonchar, Ksonia and Peter Lock. "Small Arms and Light Weapons: Russia and the Former Soviet Union" [Serial No. 513].

Part III, "Controlling the Global Trade in Small Arms," consists of two studies which offer "...a preliminary assessment of various avenues for controlling the trade in small arms and light weapons" (p. 12):

- 1) Husbands, Jo L. "Controlling Transfers of Light Arms: Linkages to Conflict Processes and Conflict Resolution Strategies" [Serial No. 514];
- 2) Laurance, Edward J. "Addressing the Negative Consequences of Light Weapons Trafficking: Opportunities for Transparency and Restraint" [Serial No. 523].

The editors grant that stopping the trade of small arms will not address the root causes of violence. However, they maintain that while arms are readily available, curbing global violence will remain problematic. A new international control regime, of the same scope as those used to regulate nuclear and biological weapons, should be the goal. Success should not be measured in terms of full compliance with such a regime, but "...rather by the significant reduction in the flow of arms and ammunition to areas of conflict..." (p. 13).

- 503.** Brady, Bronwyn. "Collecting and Organising Data on the Manufacture of, and Trade, in Light Weapons." In *Light Weapons and International Security*, [Serial No. 535], ed. Jasjit Singh, Nirankari Colony, Delhi: Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, British American Security Information Council, Indian Pugwash Society, and Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 1995, pp. 140-151.

A "research note," this article is a first step towards addressing the issues raised at the March 1994 British American Security Information Council's Project on Light Weapons, Advisory Group Meeting. Comments are included concerning a questionnaire circulated to those analysts working in the field of light weapons and small arms. Most of those who responded would welcome the creation of a comprehensive database on light weapons. The database of United Kingdom (UK) manufacturers of pistols, sub-machine guns, rifles and machine guns is also analysed, and it is concluded that its information is incomplete.

Appendix I lists the questions asked on the database survey. Appendix II duplicates the questionnaire's results.

- 504.** Cock, Jacklyn. "A Sociological Account of Light Weapons Proliferation in Southern Africa." In *Light Weapons and International Security*, [Serial No. 535], ed. Jasjit Singh, Nirankari Colony, Delhi: Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, British American Security Information Council, Indian Pugwash Society, and Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 1995, pp. 87-126.

Cock argues that the southern Africa region is awash with light weapons. Traditional analyses have focused on the technical and legal aspects of light weapons proliferation. This paper differs in that the "...fulcrum around which [it] turns is the assertion that this problem of light weapons proliferation is essentially social" (p. 87). As a result, any solutions to the light weapons problem must involve a social component. A brief background section outlines the fragile democracies and unstable economies of the region, and argues that the availability of light weapons compounds existing difficulties.

Part I outlines the social categories of state and non-state actors which create a demand for light weapons. The following list addresses the reasons why proliferation remains a problem:

- 1) weapons provide a means of subsistence (i.e., a form of currency);
- 2) weapons are tools for people who still define themselves as "soldiers" fighting a "war";
- 3) gender identity involves a militarised masculinity;
- 4) racial and ethnic identities are often antagonistically defined;
- 5) violence is accepted as a solution to problems;
- 6) weapons are a symbol of liberation.

In addition, nine groups (state and non-state actors) possess light weapons, and a brief discussion is offered for each: political extremists, criminals, self-defence units, poachers, hunters, mercenaries, private security firms, licensed firearm holders, and security forces.

Part II chronicles the past sources of supply. Original suppliers since 1975 include former Warsaw Pact countries (plus China and Cuba), western countries, and the apartheid regime in South Africa. Several examples are used to illustrate the point that a lack of effective disarmament in post-conflict peace-building is responsible for continued trouble. In addition, inadequate control over new armed formations has resulted in weapons continuing to disappear from armouries. Finally, demobilisation policies have failed to provide for the effective social integration of ex-combatants back into society, thereby continuing a martial culture. Cock concludes that each of these factors continues to ensure that there will be a market for light weapons.

Part III examines the present sources of supply. The illegal arms market is supported by cross border smuggling, illegal imports and leaks from state armouries and security force personnel. The legal arms market is supported by local manufacturers.

Part IV examines potential solutions. White members of the middle class have challenged the idea of a martial culture. Another group, Ceasefire, has been pursuing a national campaign against land mines. Both these groups are part of a necessary effort to transform social norms if efforts at arms control are to be successful. Thirteen other suggestions are made to limit small arms proliferation:

- 1) establish a regional arms register;
- 2) tighten border controls to stop illegal transfers of weapons from Mozambique, Angola and Namibia to South Africa;
- 3) create a stronger criminal justice system and police force;
- 4) legislate heavier penalties for illegal possession of firearms;
- 5) control ammunition stocks more effectively;
- 6) tighten control over state armouries;
- 7) institute bilateral and multilateral commissions to jointly investigate small arms proliferation;
- 8) develop more effective disarmament measures to implement after armed conflicts are settled;
- 9) provide adequate demobilisation policies which allow for the successful re-integration of former combatants into civil society;
- 10) expand the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms to include light weapons;
- 11) educate the citizenry on non-violent forms of conflict resolution;
- 12) formulate a strong and coherent foreign policy;
- 13) develop the local economy.

Cock concludes by emphasizing the link between small arms and social relations. Using Saul Mendlovitz's powerful metaphor "...comparing the arms trade to the slave trade, the challenge is to mobilize a social movement to restructure social and economic relations so that we can, as we did with slavery, despite massive interests and social organization embedded in it, achieve a different social order" (p. 118).

- 505.** Dikshit, Prashant. "Internal Conflict and Role of Light Weapons." In *Light Weapons and International Security*, [Serial No. 535], ed. Jasjit Singh, Nirankari Colony, Delhi: Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, British American Security Information Council, Indian Pugwash Society, and Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 1995, pp. 41-49.

Light weapons are playing a high profile role in current internal conflicts. Small arms are defined according to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) definition: "...all crew-portable weapons of a calibre less than 50 mm and include a secondary capability to defeat light armour and helicopters" (pp. 41-42).

This paper presents a series of case studies to illustrate the impact of light weapons proliferation. The triad of South Africa (Angola, Mozambique), Southern Asia (Afghanistan) and Cambodia are analysed in turn. In each case, the history of the conflict is chronicled and the role of the superpowers in equipping insurgent groups in the 1970s is detailed. Further examples, although more brief, also serve to demonstrate the prevalence of light weapons (e.g., Somalia and Bosnia-Herzegovina).

Dikshit concludes that the "internal conflicts of today are an expression of the perpetuation of the philosophies of "Low Intensity Conflict" [i.e., proxy wars] which gained currency several decades ago" (p. 48). While ending the cycle of negative repercussions will not be easy, the first step must be the stemming of the tide of light weapons proliferation.

- 506.** Dyer, Susannah L. "Stemming the Flow of Light Weapons." A Paper Presented at the UNIDIR Conference on the Proliferation of Light Weapons in the Post-Cold War World: A Global Problem. Berlin: May 4-5, 1995.

This paper is designed to provide a "...framework for analysis of policy proposals designed to limit the global flow of light weapons" (p. 1). Some of the concepts are borrowed from those used to control major weapons systems, but Dyer cautions that efforts to adapt these proposals to deal with light weapons must acknowledge the special characteristics of these smaller weapons.

Several traditional approaches are outlined, namely transparency, oversight and control. Transparency refers "...to the amount of information that is available on countries' arms transfer policies as well as on the transfers themselves" (p. 1). Prospects to increase transparency of light weapons transfers include: expanding the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms to include light weapons; developing smaller registers tailored to regional needs; and opening up national control processes to scrutiny.

Oversight refers "...to the process of regulating arms transfers" (p. 2). Since light weapons are relatively inexpensive, very little monitoring of these weapons transfers is done. Measures to improve oversight in this field include:

- 1) integrating light weapons into the COCOM (Coordinating Committee on Export Controls) successor regime;
- 2) enforcing current legislation which bars weapons sales to states with chronic human rights abuse records;
- 3) improving national oversight mechanisms to target light weapons;
- 4) enhancing national customs regulations.

Control refers "...to the quantity or quality of weapons transferred" (p. 2). Efforts should include control of both suppliers and recipients and could include the following:

- 1) encouraging unilateral restraint;
- 2) improving domestic gun control;
- 3) eliminating/restricting certain weapons;
- 4) eliminating black market sales;
- 5) supporting regional recipient restraints.

In addition, there are several cross-cutting issues which must be addressed. Dyer argues that different policy options are available depending on the stage of conflict. For example, before a conflict starts, or in its early stages, transparency might help diffuse tension. By contrast, during a conflict, limitations should focus on supplier restraint (e.g., embargoes).

Dyer emphasizes that policy makers must be informed of the high cost of allowing light weapons proliferation to go unchecked. In addition, efforts should be made to secure reliable sources of information on light weapons transfers. Finally, coalitions must be built which draw together different individuals and groups to offer unique perspectives on the cost and consequences of light weapons proliferation.

- 507.** Dyer, Susannah L. and Natalie J. Goldring. "Analysing Policy Proposals to Limit Light Weapons Transfers." In *Light Weapons and International Security*, [Serial No. 535], ed. Jasjit Singh, Nirankari Colony, Delhi: Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, British American Security Information Council, Indian Pugwash Society, and Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 1995, pp. 127-139.

This paper provides a framework in which to analyse policy proposals designed to limit the global flow of light weapons. While policies used for major weapons systems are a useful starting point, strategies for controlling light weapons proliferation must take into consideration the characteristics of this kind of weaponry. The first step is to raise awareness of the scope and consequences of light weapons proliferation.

Traditional approaches for controlling major weapons systems are credited with providing a foundation from which to address the issue of light weapons: transparency, oversight, and control. Transparency refers to the "...amount of information that is available on countries' arms transfer policies as well as on the transfers themselves" (p. 127). Several options are discussed which would modify this concept for light weapons:

- 1) expand the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms to include light weapons;
- 2) develop regional registers;
- 3) open up national export policies to scrutiny;
- 4) encourage disclosure of information on transfers as early as possible;
- 5) require transparency on military spending.

Oversight refers to the process of regulating arms transfers and could be adapted in several ways to address light weapons proliferation:

- 1) include light weapons in the COCOM (Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls) successor regime;
- 2) establish a norm against selling weapons to states involved in armed aggression or human rights violations;
- 3) increase national awareness of the problem of light weapons by stringently enforcing oversight mechanisms;
- 4) enhance national customs regulations.

Control emphasizes limiting the quantity or quality of weapons transferred. As was the case with transparency and oversight, several proposals are offered and analysed:

- 1) improve domestic gun control;
- 2) eliminate or restrict certain types of weapons;
- 3) stop black market military sales;
- 4) support regional recipient restraint;
- 5) cooperate to create more effective border controls;
- 6) limit the supply of surplus weapons;
- 7) strengthen international law;
- 8) investigate technical approaches (e.g., measures that render weapons inoperable after a certain time);
- 9) implement economic measures (e.g., aid contingent on participation in the UN Register).

Dyer and Goldring emphasize that there are issues which cut across these three factors. For instance, responses to conflicts must be tailored both to regional dynamics and to the stage of the conflict. In addition, new institutions must be created to suit the post Cold War world. The "New Forum" (i.e., the successor to COCOM) is introduced and analysed as a vehicle to discuss disarmament issues.

The authors conclude that the process of disarmament must be examined as a work in progress. While a universal solution would be welcome, at this juncture it is sufficient to work in that direction. The immediate task is to raise the profile of the issue, and to create an environment that is supportive of control. More information is needed on light weapons transfers and, when attained, should be publicized to demonstrate to policy makers the severity of the problem. The utility of case studies is noted, but Dyer and Goldring suggest that case studies of particular cities known as central players in the trade of small arms (e.g., Bangkok and Miami) would also be useful. A coalition of various groups (e.g., doctors, trade unionists, and environmentalists) should be drawn together to inform different aspects of the problem (e.g., health, economic and environmental consequences). Researchers would also be well served to learn from the progress made in the campaign against anti-personnel landmines.

508. Dyer, Susannah L. and Natalie J. Goldring. "Summary of Discussions." In *Light Weapons and International Security*, [Serial No. 535], ed. Jasjit Singh, Nirankari Colony, Delhi: Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, British American Security Information Council, Indian Pugwash Society, and Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 1995, pp. 161-166.

Dyer and Goldring summarize the discussions of the workshop co-sponsored by the Indian and American affiliates of the Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, the British American Security Information Council, and the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. The summary includes an overview of regional case studies (Southern Asia and Southern Africa), and comments on controlling the spread of small arms and light weapons, including several recommendations:

- 1) establish and publicize light weapons as a concrete problem through the creation of a UN world commission;
- 2) educate national parliaments (e.g., through the Inter-Parliamentary Union);
- 3) increase the involvement of police forces;
- 4) establish regional regulations on the production and supply of light weapons;
- 5) promote international cooperation on gun control;
- 6) emphasize the difference between demobilisation and dismantlement, and press for dismantlement in the wake of a peace agreement;
- 7) pursue controls of light weapons in the context of larger efforts to contain conflict;
- 8) develop a social impact statement which details the consequences of light weapons proliferation.

Also included is a list of possible future research efforts:

- 1) understanding the dynamics of light weapons flows;
- 2) increasing available information through case studies;
- 3) moving towards control.

509. Ezell, Virginia Hart. "Small Arms Proliferation Remains Global Dilemma." *National Defense*. Vol. 74, No. 504, January 1995, pp. 26-27.

Ezell argues that the only way to resolve the dilemma of small arms proliferation is to attack the source of supply and demand. One possible measure would be to expand the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms to include weapons carried by infantry. Another option would be for the United Nations to pass an international code of conduct to regulate small arms transfers. She concludes that "...in the same way that small arms are used at the lowest end of the conflict spectrum, policies to end their proliferation will have to consider the fundamental complexities of why men make wars" (p. 27).

510. García-Peña Jaramillo, Daniel. "Light Weapons and Internal Conflict in Colombia." In *Lethal Commerce: The Global Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons*, [Serial No. 502], eds. Jeffrey Boutwell, Michael T. Klare and Laura W. Reed, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Committee on International Security Studies, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1995, pp. 98-115.

Jaramillo uses Colombia as a case study in "...recent trends in the availability and use of light weapons and their relation to internal conflicts" (p. 98). It is the central contention of his paper that arms control must be redefined to address the fact that light weapons do more damage than conventional weapons.

Colombia is characterized by a long-term battle between a weak, corrupt state and various powerful and illegal armed organizations. This context has created a domestic arms race which has the wealthier citizens arming for protection, while the drug lords continue to stay one step ahead of governmental measures to limit the drug trade.

A distinction is drawn between legal and illegal arms markets. The legal market is controlled by a state owned arms industry (INDUMIC) which produces relatively small amounts of weapons for the Colombian army and police force. There is also a significant private arms market since "...gun control laws have traditionally been as lenient in practice as they are tough on paper" (p. 107). In contrast, the illegal arms market is dominated by the guerrilla insurgent groups and the narcotics cartels. Three major guerrilla groups are examined:

- 1) Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC);
- 2) National Liberation Army (ECN);
- 3) the People's Liberation Army (EPC).

All three are loosely joined in the Simon Bolivar Guerrilla Coordination (CGSB) network, and, along with the increased availability of light weapons in recent years, have escalated the scale of their activities. The drug cartels demand smaller and more technologically advanced weapons than do guerrilla groups.

Jaramillo argues that little scholarly analysis has been done on light weapons in Colombia until quite recently because of the lack of official information. For progress towards controlling the proliferation of light weapons to be made, efforts must be directed at solving the structural conflicts that generate domestic demand for light weapons: "Only by strengthening democracy and economic opportunity can one hope to replace guns with justice" (p. 113).

- 511.** Ginifer, Jeremy and Jakkie Potgieter. *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Rhodesia/Zimbabwe (Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Geneva)*. New York and Geneva: United Nations, 1995.

This study is divided into three parts. Part I is a case study of the peacekeeping mission in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe. It documents the efforts of the Commonwealth Monitoring Force (CMF), which arrived in December 1979, to demobilize the combatants after a pause in a fifteen year civil war. The attempt was initially viewed with hostility, but within three months, it "...managed to disengage the combatants, initiate reconciliation and integration and, critically, it created the conditions for elections to take place and for a new Zimbabwe state to emerge" (p. 4).

This peacekeeping effort was different from typical UN operations in several key respects:

- 1) disarmament was not attempted;
- 2) the UN was deliberately excluded (CMF was led by the British);
- 3) the model for UN peacekeeping was rejected, and the CMF used novel forms of monitoring;
- 4) the number of ground forces was limited.

Part I addresses several key issues:

- 1) it outlines the political and historical context of demilitarization;
- 2) it chronicles the role of external intervention in the settlement;
- 3) it discusses the process which led to the demilitarization mandate;
- 4) it examines the operational implementation of the demilitarization mandate.

The report concludes that the CMF was remarkable. Despite the fact that disarmament was not achieved, the election proceeded successfully. This is deemed to be significant since it demonstrates that demilitarization was possible, and it suggests an appropriate method. In addition, several lessons for the UN are outlined:

- 1) disarmament is not the only way to bring about demilitarization;
- 2) unilateral intervention can be effective;
- 3) consensuality was a good guiding principle adopted by the CMF;
- 4) clearly defining the operational mandate allows for effective operations;
- 5) securing the aid of an operational bureaucracy allows for the quick dissemination of new directives.

Part II is a bibliography. Part III is a duplication of respondents' answers to a questionnaire on the CMF effort in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe.

- 512.** Goldring, Natalie J., Michael T. Klare and Otfried Nassauer. *Research Sources on the International Trade in Light Weapons, Version 2.0*. Research Report Prepared for the British American Security Information Council, Project on Light Weapons. Washington: British American Security Information Council, March 24, 1995.

This paper, divided into eight sections, is valuable to researchers doing both primary and secondary research in the field of small arms and light weapons.

Part I introduces the paper and outlines its purpose as "...a discussion draft on available sources of data on the international trade in light weapons. It considers some of the major sources of information on the light weapons trade, and evaluates their quantity and quality" (p. 1). The main problem is that there are both quantitative as well as qualitative problems with data on the light weapons trade.

Part II discusses the available international statistics and data. Although there is no basic source of data, those that have published material are listed, with comments on the strengths and weakness of each:

- 1) U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA);
- 2) Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Yearbook;
- 3) Congressional Research Service (CRS);
- 4) International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and its publication, *The Military Balance*;
- 5) United Nations Register of Conventional Arms;
- 6) Publications of Jane's Information Group;
- 7) Edward C. Ezell, *Small Arms of the World, Small Arms Today*.

Part III lists national government data, such as United States and German publications. Information on Canada is still forthcoming.

Part IV outlines non-governmental sources, such as commercial production and sales data. This information is more difficult to obtain than that from other sources. Nevertheless, some is available from trade information services (e.g., Forecast International), trade magazines and newsletters (e.g., *Defense News*), trade expositions, and company data.

Part V details non-government sources that report on transactions involving particular groups and countries. Information of this sort is reported in newspapers or through public interest groups (e.g., Human Rights Watch).

Part VI analyses information on covert operations and black-market transactions. Information of this type is extremely rare, but some can be garnered through public hearings (e.g., the Iran-Contra Affair), or from INTERPOL (International Police) reports.

Part VII comments on future steps for improving data availability and reliability. The authors caution that progress will require a substantial commitment of time and money, and that there are no short term solutions. Twelve steps are outlined which could improve the available data:

- 1) determine which existing sources are most reliable, and make them publicly available;
- 2) agree on a common set of research questions to be investigated;
- 3) investigate lesser known sources carefully and develop a working bibliography;
- 4) work more closely with investigative journalists to obtain data;
- 5) consult domestic gun control advocates to determine their sources;
- 6) determine what materials are available internationally in the field;
- 7) develop more comprehensive lists on manufacturers of small arms and light weapons;
- 8) press companies to disclose their information;
- 9) create a database on light weapons transfers;
- 10) catalogue the responses of government officials to questions about the light weapons trade;
- 11) determine what materials are available under the U.S. Freedom of Information Act;
- 12) reimpose the requirement under section 657 of the Foreign Assistance Act for an annual report on the dollar value and quantity of all defense articles provided by the U.S.

Part VIII is a selected bibliography of secondary sources on the subject of small arms and light weapons.

- 513.** Gonchar, Ksonia and Peter Lock. "Small Arms and Light Weapons: Russia and the Former Soviet Union." In *Lethal Commerce: The Global Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons*, [Serial No. 502], eds. Jeffrey Boutwell, Michael T. Klare and Laura W. Reed, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Committee on International Security Studies, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1995, pp. 116-123.

In their analysis of the causes behind continued proliferation of small arms and light weapons from the former Soviet Union (FSU), Gonchar and Lock argue that humanitarian concerns have given way to economics. Three critical factors are cited to account for this phenomenon:

- 1) the large over-capacity in the small arms industry;
- 2) the launching of a new generation of weapons to increase market share;
- 3) the economic and political chaos of the FSU causing a rise in illegal production.

The number of players in the arms trade continues to grow. The four main categories of the Russian arms trade are examined:

- 1) the Russian government is still the largest player and subjects arms exports to some controls;

- 2) the Russian military has been accorded the right to sell arms and equipment to see to the "social needs" of officers;
- 3) private arms dealers were created in the wake of the break-up of the Soviet Union;
- 4) the illegal arms trade has increased as a result of various factors: "...weak governmental authority and legislation, general social disorder, loss of control over the armed forces, weak law enforcement and minimal public respect of the law, porous interstate borders, and the ready availability of weapons from the immense stockpiles of the former Soviet military establishment" (p. 122).

The easy accessibility to stockpiles of light weapons, coupled with ethnic, religious, national and other tensions in FSU states, make the region "extremely volatile."

- 514.** Husbands, Jo L. "Controlling Transfers of Light Arms: Linkages to Conflict Processes and Conflict Resolution Strategies." In *Lethal Commerce: The Global Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons*, [Serial No. 502], eds. Jeffrey Boutwell, Michael T. Klare and Laura W. Reed, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Committee on International Security Studies, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1995, pp. 127-139.

Husbands notes that a comprehensive body of literature on light weapons trafficking is just emerging. Three obstacles which limit the prospects for controlling the proliferation of light weapons are analysed:

- 1) the plethora of suppliers, recipients, and types of weapons available;
- 2) the scope of the problem which includes open commerce, black and gray markets and covert assistance given sub-national groups;
- 3) the paucity of information on light weapons transfers.

In the first part of the essay, the focus is on controls to limit the spread of light weapons. Several "fundamental questions" are analysed which must be addressed before supply-side controls can be effective. How much to try to control (e.g., limit the effort to the black market, or include covert assistance to subnational groups)? What are the goals of controls? What will one consider a "success"?

Citing the difficulty of answering the above questions, Husbands suggests that "...we should not think about controlling light arms transfers on the level of specific tools and tactics" (p. 130). Rather, a broader approach is needed which focuses on the fact that light weapons are the ones actually used in combat: "Put simply, the starting point for designing control strategies for light weapons should be the conflicts in which these weapons are likely to be used" (p. 131).

The policy tools available at three stages of conflict are also examined. First, before a conflict begins (or in its early stages) negotiation may be possible before a major battle erupts. To this end, national export controls or transfer records would be useful. Second, the scope of conflict might be limited through the use of weapons embargoes. Finally, when the fighting stops, negotiating a fair and sustainable peace settlement is essential.

Husbands concludes that an analysis of the stages and processes of conflict provides several policy tools since it "...illuminates the problem of light arms proliferation and could simplify the task of identifying, assessing, and ultimately implementing different arms control strategies" (p. 133).

Included also is an Appendix: "How Wars End - A Look at the Experience Since 1945."

- 515.** Karp, Aaron. "Small Arms - The New Major Weapons." In *Lethal Commerce: The Global Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons*, [Serial No. 502], eds. Jeffrey Boutwell, Michael T. Klare and Laura W. Reed, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Committee on International Security Studies, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1995, pp. 17-30.

Major weapons systems have been given a high profile in the twentieth century, but the nature of conflict around the world has been changing since the end of the Cold War. Growing numbers of civil wars, and ethnic and sectarian violence have all contributed to a revolution in the arms trade which accords a dominant role to light weapons.

Karp is critical of analysts for failing to adjust arms control paradigms in the wake of the end of the Cold War. Three paradigms used to analyse the arms trade are examined. One attributes the proliferation of weapons to technological innovation and its diffusion. Another credits the international distribution of power. A third emphasizes the role of international regimes, focusing on the ways that states buy and sell arms. Karp

maintains that all three of these constructs fail to account for small arms. He suggests that small arms should be given the attention they deserve by arms control specialists.

The first problem to overcome in this change of focus is a definitional one, namely what exactly are the weapons being discussed? Four definitions for small arms are examined:

- 1) those weapons not covered by existing data collections on major weapons (e.g., the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms);
- 2) those which are carried by infantry;
- 3) those that can be transported by pack animals and light vehicles;
- 4) those actually used in internecine conflict (including some major weapons systems).

Another problem is overcoming the "pessimism of experts." While experts argue that controlling the trade in small arms would be impossible, Karp takes the opposite view. Because these weapons are smaller and cheaper, Karp maintains, exporting governments do not have as vital an interest in promoting their export.

The first step in controlling light weapons is to treat them with the respect they deserve. The second is to coordinate export restrictions by resuming dialogue among the major suppliers (e.g., the Permanent Five talks). Next, illegal exports must be contained. Finally, the UN Register must be radically expanded to include small arms and light weapons.

The goal should not be the end of all wars, but an effort to move in that direction. Even if not sufficient, "...such measures will be necessary to achieve greater progress. In the long run it will be impossible to deal with the conflicts that torment the new world order without controlling the trade in small arms and light weapons" (p. 28).

516. Karp, Aaron. "Small Arms: The New Major Weapons." *Ploughshares Monitor*. September 1995, pp. 17-20.

This article is an abridged version of an article by the same name [Serial No. 515] which appeared in Jeffrey Boutwell, et al., eds., *Lethal Commerce: The Global Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons* [Serial No. 502].

The nature of conflict and the instruments used in war have changed since the end of the Cold War. Intrastate conflict has become the new threat to international peace and security, and small arms and light weapons have become the weapons of choice. Four definitions of small arms and light weapons are offered, although "none is completely satisfying" (p. 18):

- 1) those weapons not covered by existing data collections on major weapons (e.g., the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms);
- 2) those weapons portable by an infantry soldier;
- 3) those weapons that can be transported by pack animals and light trucks;
- 4) those weapons actually used in internecine conflict (i.e., an empirical definition).

Contrary to other analysts who suggest that controlling light weapons proliferation may be impossible, Karp maintains that there are grounds for optimism. Small arms are cheaper and lack the symbolic weight of major weapons, and, as a result, may be easier to control. The first step to finding a solution involves according light weapons the respect they deserve as a threat to international peace and security. Second, dialogue between major suppliers must be resumed to work towards export restrictions. Third, illegal exports must be stopped. In this respect, the greatest hurdle to overcome is not powerful lawbreakers, but weak lawmakers. Finally, the UN Register should be radically expanded to include all transfers valued at \$100 000 or more, enabling the tracking of most small arms transfers.

While progress will be slow, efforts must be made to curb the proliferation of light weapons if the world community hopes to diminish the size and severity of ethnic violence.

- 517.** Kartha, Tara. "Southern Asia: The Narcotics and Weapons Linkage." In *Light Weapons and International Security*, [Serial No. 535], ed. Jasjit Singh, Nirankari Colony, Delhi: Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, British American Security Information Council, Indian Pugwash Society, and Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 1995, pp. 63-86.

One thing which all countries in the Southern Asia region have in common is a pervasive and increasing trade in weapons and drugs which threatens the authority of the state. This paper attempts to explore the weapons-drugs linkage in Myanmar, India, Pakistan and Afghanistan.

The article is divided into sections which analyse the impact of drugs and weapons on each society. It is concluded that weapons and drug trafficking have a symbiotic relationship which conspires to undermine state authority. If the increases of recent years continue unabated, nefarious organizations may surpass the Colombian cartels in size and influence.

Included also are three appendices which refer to the Southern Asia region:

- 1) a list of drugs and arms available in the region's arms bazaars;
- 2) a summary of weapons seized between 1988 and 1995;
- 3) a table showing the destruction of property by militants.

- 518.** Klare, Michael T. "The Global Trade in Light Weapons and the International System in the Post-Cold War Era." In *Lethal Commerce: The Global Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons*, [Serial No. 502], eds. Jeffrey Boutwell, Michael T. Klare and Laura W. Reed, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Committee on International Security Studies, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1995, pp. 31-43.

The volume of arms deals has declined significantly since the 1980s. However, Klare argues, there has been a significant increase in the trade of small arms and light weapons since the end of the Cold War. Light weapons are defined as "...all those conventional munitions that can be carried by an individual combatant or by a light vehicle operating on back-country roads" (p. 33) and which require little logistical support.

Four supply channels of light weapons are detailed:

- 1) government to government transfers;
- 2) commercial sales (i.e., sold by private commercial firms);
- 3) clandestine operations (i.e., covert transfers of light weapons by a government to insurgents);
- 4) black market sales (executed by criminal or corrupt organizations).

The bulk of the article is dedicated to analysing the factors which account for the increased trade in light weapons. The factors in the first series arise from the end of the Cold War and the break-up of multinational communist states:

- 1) break-up of the former Soviet Union (FSU) and Yugoslav federation;
- 2) ethnic warfare within the successor states of the FSU and Yugoslav federation;
- 3) breakdown of central government authority in Russia and other Soviet republics;
- 4) diminished superpower control over 'proxy forces' in internal Third World conflicts;
- 5) surplus stocks of light weapons.

The other factors are systemic ones which typically reflect the growing trend to disorder *within* states:

- 1) proliferation of ethnic, tribal, and religious conflicts;
- 2) growing social, political, and economic disorder within societies;
- 3) growing importance of nonstate actors;
- 4) growing vibrancy of the global underground economy;
- 5) growing privatization of security and violence (e.g., private security firms to provide protection against criminal or insurgent forces).

All of these factors are generating an increased international demand for light weapons. Klare concludes that if the current trend towards light weapons and internal conflict continues, "...the trade in light weapons will become a matter of increased international concern and should provoke fresh interest in developing new mechanisms for its control" (p. 40).

519. Klare, Michael T. "Light Weapons Arms Trafficking and the World Security Environment of the 1990s." A Paper Presented at the UNIDIR Conference on the Proliferation of Light Weapons in the Post-Cold War World: A Global Problem. Berlin: May 4-5, 1995.

Klare argues that there has long been a recognized link between the world security environment and the nature of the global flow of weapons. When there is a change in the world security environment, the dynamics of the weapons trade changes as well. With the end of the Cold War, transfers from the two superpowers to their supporters declined dramatically, leading arms control analysts to note a decline in the dollar value of arms transfers since 1989. However, Klare contends, this conclusion glosses over a fundamental change in the nature of the arms trade which entails a rise in light weapons transfers for use in internal conflicts. He concludes that light weapons have not caused conflicts: the conflicts in the world today are the product of historical religious and ethnic animosity. Nevertheless, the "...sheer *abundance* [emphasis in the original] of light weapons in international circulation, and the ease with which they are transported to areas of tension, has undoubtedly contributed to the incidence, duration, and intensity of armed conflict" (p. 7).

520. Klare, Michael T. "Light Weapons Diffusion and Global Violence in the Post-Cold War Era." In *Light Weapons and International Security*, [Serial No. 535], ed. Jasjit Singh, Nirankari Colony, Delhi: Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, British American Security Information Council, Indian Pugwash Society, and Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 1995, pp. 1-40.

Conventional arms control over the last thirty years has focused on major weapons systems. More recently, intrastate conflicts have become more common and destructive, and the demand for light weapons has increased. While the older paradigm used in arms control efforts, the Proliferation/Arms Race model, was useful for the Cold War era, Klare posits a new one for the post-Cold War period: the Diffusion/Global Violence model. This model suggests study in two areas: the process of diffusion itself, and the relationship between diffusion and the propensity for armed violence.

Part I examines the diffusion aspect, critical in an era where light weapons are being traded in a variety of ways. Preliminary examinations of several types of weapons transactions are offered:

- 1) government grants;
- 2) government sales;
- 3) commercial sales;
- 4) technology transfers/domestic arms production;
- 5) covert arms deliveries by governments;
- 6) government gifts to allied paramilitary groups;
- 7) black market transfers;
- 8) theft;
- 9) exchanges between insurgent and criminal organizations.

Part II analyses the global violence part of the model. While no reliable statistics are available on the trade of light weapons, one thing is clear: "this cascade of arms is contributing everywhere to the frequency, duration and intensity of armed violence" (pp. 16-17). This section is constructed as a series of case studies of countries experiencing internal violence: Angola, Bosnia, Liberia, Rwanda, and Somalia. Each case study covers the history, the role of light weapons, and the human costs of the conflict. Klare concludes that the five case studies clearly demonstrate that the proliferation of light weapons has resulted in an increase in the lethality of intrastate conflict. Furthermore, the case studies show the continued impact that Cold War transfers of weapons by superpowers to client states has on the current availability of light weapons. The ready supply of surplus weapons has made the role of the United Nations more difficult as the international black market in light weapons is now developed enough to supply significant amounts of weaponry despite embargoes.

Appendix I lists national inventories of selected light weapons; Appendix II documents light weapons production in developing countries.

521. Klare, Michael T. "Stemming the Lethal Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons." *Issues in Science and Technology*. Fall 1995, pp. 52-58.

Since the end of the Second World War, the emphasis in arms control has been on major weapons systems. Relatively little attention has been paid to the trade in light weapons. Although there is no agreed-upon definition of light weapons, Klare defines them as "... any conventional weapon that can be carried by an individual combatant or by a light vehicle operating on back-country roads" (p. 54). Controlling these weapons is an essential step toward reducing global insecurity.

In the wake of the Cold War, conflict has shifted from interstate to intrastate, employing light weapons instead of major weapons systems. These wars are more destructive because of technological advances in weaponry, and have a twofold economic impact on the countries involved:

- 1) much needed resources are spent on weapons;
- 2) reconstruction is delayed while landmines are removed.

Despite these costs, there are no published statistics on the trade in light weapons (estimates place the total trade at thirteen percent of the total global weapons trade). Four channels of supply are analysed:

- 1) direct commercial sales;
- 2) government-to-government transfers;
- 3) covert arms deliveries by governments;
- 4) black market sales.

Given the diversity of available channels of supply, few international controls exist. Klare proposes several options for controlling the proliferation of light weapons:

- 1) increase transparency (e.g., expand the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms to include light weapons);
- 2) tighten national controls;
- 3) develop enhanced international controls (e.g., expand provisions in the inhumane weapons convention agreement);
- 4) suppress the global black market.

Klare concludes that each of these proposals is contingent on educating the world community about the consequences of light weapons proliferation.

522. Klare, Michael T. "The Trade in Light Weapons and Global Conflict Dynamics in the Post-Cold War Era." A Paper Presented at the UNIDIR Conference on the Proliferation of Light Weapons in the Post-Cold War World: A Global Problem. Berlin: May 4-5, 1995.

Klare notes that there has always been a close relationship between the world security environment and the global flow of weapons. Thus, when the world security environment changes fundamentally (e.g., the end of the Cold War), the patterns of the arms trade will change as well. The overall dollar value of arms transfers has declined in the wake of the Cold War, but this trend masks an increase in the number and lethality of small arms and light weapons transfers in the same period. Weapons used to be bought by states, mostly major weapons systems, for use in interstate conflict. Since the end of the Cold War, however, the prevailing trend has been the purchase of light weapons by states or sub-state groups for use in internal conflicts. Additionally, while politics was the major driving force during the Cold War, peoples have been the focus of conflict since then. Unfortunately, research into recent arms transfer trends are confronted with a paucity of reliable information. Analysts must find a way to secure reliable statistics on arms transfers "...if the world community is to make any progress in reducing the destructive impact of ethnic and sectarian strife..." (p. 9).

The major trends in small arms and light weapons trafficking are examined. Most importantly, no precise definition has yet been formulated to define light weapons. Klare defines them as "...all those conventional weapons that can be carried by an individual combatant, or by a light vehicle operating on back-country roads" (p. 10). The problem is further compounded by the growing lethality of light weapons and by their low cost.

Unlike major weapons systems, light weapons are produced by many countries around the world. The result has been the creation of several channels of supply:

- 1) government-to-government transfers;

- 2) commercial sales;
- 3) covert deliveries by governments;
- 4) black market sales.

Klare examines each of these avenues in turn. He concludes that there remains a paradox in arms control circles. Major weapons systems continue to receive international attention, and yet it is light weapons that are doing most of the killing. He emphasizes the need to alter the arms control focus to include the study of light weapons proliferation and its consequences.

523. Laurance, Edward J. "Addressing the Negative Consequences of Light Weapons Trafficking: Opportunities for Transparency and Restraint." In *Lethal Commerce: The Global Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons*, [Serial No. 502], eds. Jeffrey Boutwell, Michael T. Klare and Laura W. Reed, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Committee on International Security Studies, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1995, pp. 140-157.

Two momentous events since 1989 have transformed the international system: the end of the Cold War and the Persian Gulf War. While these events contributed to a decline in transfers of major conventional weapons, they also contributed to a steady increase in the trade in light weapons. A survey is offered of the impact of these seminal events on arms control of major weapons systems (e.g., the Permanent Five Talks, and the establishment of the United Nations Register of Conventional Weapons).

The international trade in light weapons has been facilitated by a number of factors. The disintegration of the Soviet Union has made available for sale massive amounts of light weapons. The end of the Cold War has created surplus stocks of weapons in other states as well (e.g., throughout Europe and China). Major powers have lost their ability to restrain ethnic and nationalist rivalries within states (e.g., former Yugoslavia). Conflicts since the end of the Cold War have been primarily intrastate, and not conducted with heavy weapons.

Laurance also details the characteristics of light weapons which separate them from major weapons systems. First, light weapons are smaller and less visible, making tracking and verification problematic. Second, due to relatively low costs, more people can participate in the trade of light weapons. Finally, light weapons have little political or strategic significance.

The negative consequences of the arms trade, specifically the aspects of major versus light weapons, are discussed. In general, the main difference is "...the lack of a consensus on the negative consequences of trading in these [light] weapons systems" (p. 145). The political consequences of a transfer of major weapons systems are measured in terms of loss or gain of influence, but the same measure does not apply to light weapons. A consensus exists that transfers of major weapons contribute to destabilizing situations, but no such agreement has been reached vis à vis light weapons. The enormous costs inhibit many countries from purchasing large weapons systems. Light weapons, however, are relatively inexpensive and there is little economic pressure to stop states from acquiring these weapons. Finally, one area where some action may be possible is in the humanitarian field (e.g., emphasize the human cost of light weapons proliferation).

Laurance argues that an international norm must be created which stresses the negative humanitarian consequences of the trade in light weapons. Another option is the promotion of transparency measures. The UN Register is examined for its applicability to the trade in light weapons. Unlike many experts, Laurance does not advocate its expansion to include light weapons: "The key here is that the Register focuses mainly on one type of negative consequences of excessive arms accumulations: the outbreak of armed conflict across international borders" (p. 153). Since light weapons are being used primarily in intrastate conflict, the Register would be of little utility. Instead, policy makers need to be constantly shown that the use and availability of light weapons have profoundly negative consequences. Lawrence calls upon the United States and other major powers to play a key role in developing this new norm.

524. Laurance, Edward J. "Surplus Light Weapons as a Conversion Problem: Unique Characteristics and Solutions." In *Coping With Surplus Weapons: A Priority for Conversion Research and Policy*, eds. Edward J. Laurance and Herbert Wulf, Bonn: Bonn International Center for Conversion, June 1995, pp. 31-36 (This publication is also available on the Internet: <http://bicc.uni-bonn.de/weapons/brief3/chap5.html>).

Laurance notes that the export of small arms has increased since the end of the Cold War, citing four factors. First, the disintegration of the Soviet Union resulted in the release of massive amounts of new and used

equipment. Second, the signing of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty ensured that other major powers suddenly had surplus stocks available for sale (e.g., European states). Third, the UN is not able to control the small-scale intrastate conflicts which have become the norm in the post Cold War world. Finally, the global nature of trade has facilitated the creation of illicit smuggling networks which traffic in light weapons.

Light weapons are unique in several respects. Unlike major conventional weapons systems, they are not easily traceable using satellites. In addition, they are inexpensive to procure, thereby opening up the field to a wide range of participants. To date, suppliers of light weapons suffer virtually no consequences (e.g., in the form of economic sanctions). However, the humanitarian consequences of light weapons proliferation are pronounced.

Laurance offers several proposals to confront the problem of light weapons proliferation:

- 1) create an international norm which emphasizes the negative consequences of light weapons proliferation;
- 2) explore the potential benefits of widespread gun buy-back programs;
- 3) add small arms (particularly landmines) to the existing United Nations Register of Conventional Arms.

He concludes by emphasizing the need for the United States to participate in improving the competence of the UN to solve international security problems.

525. Laurance, Edward J. *Surplus Weapons and the Micro-Disarmament Process*. Research Report Prepared for the UN Centre of Disarmament Affairs (UNCDA). Monterey: Monterey Institute of International Studies, 1995.

Laurance describes several definitions of small arms and light weapons. First, "...those which can be carried by an infantry soldier or perhaps a small vehicle or pack animal" (p. 2). Second, "...those weapons which do not need elaborate logistical and maintenance capability, and can be employed by insurgent groups and paramilitary formations" (p. 2). However, he maintains that a more useful definition requires "...an analysis of the weapons actually used in conflicts around the world [to] provide an empirical answer -- hand guns, carbines, assault rifles, submachine guns, machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades, light anti-tank missiles, small caliber mortars, shoulder-fired antiaircraft missiles and hand placed mines" (p. 2).

He cites four reasons offered by UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali for the accumulation of weapons:

- 1) earlier supply during the Cold War;
- 2) internal conflicts;
- 3) competition for commercial markets;
- 4) criminal activity and the collapse of governmental law and order.

The background to the internal conflict in El Salvador is described. Gun buy-back programs are examined as a practical method of micro-disarmament. Laurance outlines several aspects of potentially successful buy-back programs:

- 1) they must be implemented in conjunction with other plans which address the basic causes of crime and poverty;
- 2) they must be coordinated with efforts to enhance the operational capacity of police forces;
- 3) they must recognize that there are other objectives besides limiting the number of weapons in a society (e.g., promote community solidarity).

A tentative plan to implement a buy-back scheme in El Salvador is detailed. Laurance recommends beginning the process by collecting hand grenades. This early focus is advocated for several reasons:

- 1) these weapons are purely military in character and are not easily reproduced by criminals;
- 2) there are a finite number of grenades in circulation;
- 3) eliminating hand grenades would not deprive law abiding citizens of the weapons they consider essential to their protection;
- 4) targeting hand grenades decreases the likelihood of innocent civilians being harmed.

Laurance concludes that a "...buy-back program in El Salvador may provide a prototype that can be applied to other situations, and put some teeth into the concept of micro-disarmament" (p. 4).

526. Lock, Peter. "The Flow of Illegal Weapons in Europe." A Paper Presented at the UNIDIR Conference on the Proliferation of Light Weapons in the Post-Cold War World: A Global Problem. Berlin: May 4-5, 1995.

Lock argues that the legal and illegal arms trade are closely linked. He analyses the characteristics of the light weapons market. For example, supplier controls are unlikely to work because of the extensive stockpiles of light weapons and because of the diffusion of the technology required to produce them. Disarmament efforts will be further circumscribed by the reluctance of states to stop transfers of weapons they perceive to be in their national interest. Only sporadic evidence is available to understand the illegal trade of light weapons, and the full extent of the problem is impossible to judge.

The topology of the supply of light weapons is also examined. With the end of the Cold War, surplus stocks of weapons dramatically reduced the price of light weapons. In addition, military forces the world over suffered a legitimacy problem, resulting in a decline of status and resources. As a consequence, military forces have been selling equipment and technology to secure currency. A table is included which illustrates the actions taken by military forces to obtain money (e.g., sale of military property).

The demand side of the equation is the focus of the next section. Lock maintains that at the demand side there are a greater number and variety of actors than at the supply end. While little is known about the intermediaries that ship illegal weapons, more information can be ascertained concerning end-users. For example, fighting is more likely in an area where the state suffers from a legitimacy problem, or where economic polarisation is widespread.

He concludes by emphasizing the merits of creating a model to deal with illegal small arms proliferation which would allow predictions of patterns, thereby helping analysts to catch problems in the early stages.

527. Louise, Christopher. *The Social Impact of Light Weapons Availability and Proliferation (Discussion Paper 59)*. Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, March 1995.

This publication is divided into four parts. Part I introduces the paper and defines the scope of the problem, arguing that "...the linkages between the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, globalization and social disintegration have been greatly under-researched" (p. 1). Moreover, the social impacts of light weapons proliferation have become more pronounced in recent years. Finally, he introduces the two main arguments of the paper:

- 1) "...the proliferation and use of light weapons and small arms in societies around the world can be seen as symptomatic of deeper problems in the fabric of these societies" (p. 2);
- 2) "...it is apparent that the availability and use of these weapons affect the pace and direction of societal violence" (p. 2).

Part II outlines the paradox that the technology which has made global trends more common, has prompted an increase in ethnic and sectarian violence in the developing world. Light weapons have figured prominently in these conflicts. The military trends of the post Cold War era are analysed (e.g., surplus weapons released by superpowers in the wake of the Cold War), as well as the non-military trends (e.g., the civil and financial restraints that used to deter the use of weapons have been eroded, making recourse to violence more likely).

Part III analyses the social and political impacts of militarization. The increased lethality of light weapons has raised civilian casualties. This increase in civilian dead and wounded is also attributed to the fact that "conflict is no longer the struggle between states or ideologies -- it has become the struggle between peoples and cultural identities" (p. 10). Light weapons have contributed to the erosion of state authority. Sub-state groups have been empowered by the growing lethality and availability of light weapons. Many states are becoming increasingly militarized (i.e., acceptance of violence as a means through which to attain goals).

Part IV concludes the report, assessing the social impacts of light weapons proliferation. The major difference between Cold War and post Cold War violence is that civilians are now at "the heart of modern conflict" (p. 19). Two different approaches are offered to control the spread of light weapons. First, on the supply side, tackling weapons circulation with policy directives (e.g., limits on exports). Second, on the demand side, focusing on the causes of weapons proliferation (e.g., the social and economic factors which prompt a recourse to weapons to solve problems). He concludes that the major powers have an obligation to strive for effective solutions.

528. Mathiak, Lucy. "Light Weapons and Internal Conflict in Angola." In *Lethal Commerce: The Global Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons*, [Serial No. 502], eds. Jeffrey Boutwell, Michael T. Klare and Laura W. Reed, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Committee on International Security Studies, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1995, pp. 81-97.

A case study of the impact of light weapons on Angola, this paper looks at the civil war over the last twenty years. Arguing that the war was largely a proxy battle between the Soviet Union (USSR) and the United States (US), Mathiak attributes a significant portion of the blame for the current conflict to the two superpowers. She argues that the USSR and the US failed to examine the long term effects of their arms shipments to the region, sacrificing the future of Angola's people to achieve their immediate goals.

A history of the civil war analyses the role of the main participants. The US provided aid starting in 1976, through to the elections of 1992. Zaire channelled light weapons, supplied by the US, into Angola. South Africa, in an attempt to curry favour with the US, supplied weapons to the US-backed UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) forces.

Mathiak concludes that the decades long civil war in Angola raises important questions "...regarding the accountability and ultimate responsibility of governments that are belligerents in such conflicts" (p. 91).

Appendix 1 lists the arms and material delivered to Zaire through US operations in the 1970s. Appendix 2 summarizes the arms and material delivered to the FNLA (National Front for the Liberation of Angola) and UNITA during the 1970s operations.

529. Morrison, David D. "Small Arms, Big Trouble." *National Journal*. Vol. 3, No. 18, 1995, p. 712.

Small arms and light weapons form a significant part of the problem of global arms control. Morrison details several examples to indicate the scope of the problem (e.g., the Russians are producing a variant of the Kalashnikov rifle designed for women). He concludes that solutions are not immediately apparent, noting that "...the prospects of dramatically stemming the small-arms traffic appear about as bleak as those of shutting down the equally booming global trade in narcotics" (p. 712).

530. Naylor, R.T. "The Structure and Operation of the Modern Arms Black Market." In *Lethal Commerce: The Global Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons*, [Serial No. 502], eds. Jeffrey Boutwell, Michael T. Klare and Laura W. Reed, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Committee on International Security Studies, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1995, pp. 44-57.

Naylor argues that what differentiates the black market from the legitimate arms trade market is its "...covert methods of intermediating between supply and demand" (p. 45).

Once dominated by the superpower rivalry, supply-side controls are no longer as effective in the post Cold War era. The new market includes anything from embargoed states to criminal organizations, with clients buying arms from a wide variety of sources (e.g., governments, private companies, private dealers). Moreover, the international underground economy is growing and making effective control more elusive. In addition, with the bipolar structure of the Cold War, it was possible to monitor the trade in weapons. With the proliferation of suppliers, however, such measures are "...unlikely to represent more than a very passing disturbance to the functioning of the global black market" (p. 49).

Black market arms are typically more expensive than legitimate deals due to the additional costs incurred by the supplier in circumventing customs officials. The financing of weapons deals is done by exchanging economic, military or ideological concessions (e.g., weapons donated in exchange for a military base).

Naylor concludes that while the phenomenon of light weapons proliferation is clear, prospective solutions are not. Traditional supply-side controls are not likely to succeed since the pressure on politicians to export weapons to maintain defence jobs is "irresistible" (p. 55). Citing the ever increasing disparity in income, wealth and natural resource capital between states, Naylor contends that efforts should be directed at these problems which fuel the demand for light weapons.

A one page "note on sources" annotates the few scholarly appraisals of the black market for light weapons.

531. Neuman, Stephanie G. "The Arms Trade, Military Assistance, and Recent Wars: Change and Continuity." *The Annals of the American Academy*. Vol. 541, September 1995, pp. 47-74.

Neuman analyses the patterns of military assistance in recent wars, and examines the continuities and changes in the arms trade in the post Cold War era. Particular attention is given to "...the ways in which combatants obtained military supplies, training and support between 1990 and 1993" (p. 48).

A working definition is offered for small arms and light weapons which includes "...all conventional weapons that can be carried by an individual combatant or by a light vehicle. These are weapons that do not require an extensive logistical and maintenance capability" (p. 50). Small arms form only a small percentage of the total value of arms exports, but remain critical to international security since they are currently the combatants' weapons of choice. Due to the changing nature of conflict, from inter-state to intra-state, many countries are eschewing the advanced technologies of the Cold War era in favour of advanced training in the use of small arms and light weapons.

Using evidence from recent conflicts, the sources of light weapons are described:

- 1) governments;
- 2) ideological and political allies;
- 3) domestic military industries;
- 4) second and third tier producer states;
- 5) private entrepreneurs and the black market;
- 6) private companies;
- 7) captured stocks;
- 8) stockpiles;
- 9) international peacekeeping forces.

Included also is a discussion of the ways of financing intra-state conflicts, from the sale of natural resources to drug trafficking.

Neuman concludes that the arms trade in the post Cold War era is a curious blend of change and continuity. For example, aid continues to be supplied from both the East and the West, but "defense planners are revising their military doctrines to accord with local military threats and are using less advanced military technologies to achieve their war aims" (p. 74). The future pattern of the arms trade will be determined by the new power structure that develops in the wake of the Cold War.

532. Rana, Swadesh. *Small Arms and Intra-State Conflicts: Research Paper No. 34 (United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Geneva)*. New York and Geneva: United Nations, 1995.

Written in the wake of a workshop in Geneva in November 1994 to take stock of ongoing research on security and small arms, and to discuss ways and means of reducing and controlling the flow of such weapons, Rana's report is divided into four sections.

Part I introduces the study, and argues, citing the fact that small arms have caused 90% of casualties in conflicts since 1993, that control of small arms proliferation must be given priority on the international arms control agenda.

Part II offers an overview of the trends and characteristics of small arms and light weapons. *Small arms* are defined as "...any means of lethality other than the sheer use of physical force. In this sense, small arms need not be manufactured and may not even be seen as weapons until so used e.g. sticks, stones, fire, water" (p. 2). By contrast, *light weapons* include "...all conventional weapons that can be carried by an individual combatant or by a light vehicle. These are weapons that do not require extensive logistical and maintenance capability" (p. 2) and are operated from land. The factors which distinguish between one type of small arm and another are also summarized: weight/portability, explosive yield/size of the projectile, mode of operation, maintenance and logistic requirements, and rate of fire and calibre.

Over three hundred companies in fifty countries produce light weapons, an increase of 25% in ten years. Rana argues that the problem for controlling proliferation is that the requisite technology is readily available. As a result, "...there is little chance of controlling a further proliferation of small arms manufacture through supplier controls over transfer of technology" (p. 5). There are four key areas which distinguish trade in small arms from trade in major conventional weapons systems:

- 1) illicit traffic of small arms is much harder to track;
- 2) small arms are easier to steal;
- 3) transactions involving the transfer of small arms are frequently at the sub-national level, thereby avoiding governmental controls;
- 4) "there is no phenomenon in international trade in major weapons that can be compared to the leaking, rupturing and continuing pipeline of small arms" (p. 6).

Part III includes a global profile of the characteristics of the trade in small arms. Rana notes that the vast majority of conflicts in the 1990s have been intra-state, ranging from random incidence of criminality to full blown insurgency. She includes a survey of the general trends evident in these conflicts (e.g., ethnic hostility has increasingly erupted into violence).

Part IV is an analysis of the links between small arms and conflicts. The availability of small arms has increased as an "unintended fallout of recent progress in three of the most welcome political trends in the post-Cold War world" (p. 12). First, disarmament has forced manufacturers to promote exports as a means to retain employees. Second, demilitarization of several former military governments has caused former defense personnel to produce and sell small weapons. Finally, the conclusion of several intra-state conflicts has made surplus weapons available for purchase.

Rana emphasizes that the political fallout from the use of small arms in intra-state conflicts is larger than the actual military and operational value of the weapons. Small arms will continue to be a problem, most notably in weak states where the government does not have a monopoly over the use of coercion to uphold the rule of law. She concludes that the measures used to control the proliferation of major conventional weapons will not work for small arms. There have been some precedents however, which will help (e.g., mandates given the United Nations for involvement in intra-state conflicts). She suggests three options to work towards regulating the spread of small arms:

- 1) the creation of an international workshop under the aegis of UNIDIR (United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research) and the Commission on Global Governance;
- 2) the formation of an interregional working group with participants from regional groups such as the OAS (Organization of American States);
- 3) the convening of a high level panel of governmental experts to study the issue.

Annex I details the characteristics of small arms. Annex II lists the companies that manufacture small arms. Annex III reports the countries that manufacture small arms. Annex IV chronicles the armed conflicts in the world between 1989 and 1993.

533. Singh, Jasjit. "Controlling the Spread." In *Light Weapons and International Security*, [Serial No. 535], ed. Jasjit Singh, Nirankari Colony, Delhi: Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, British American Security Information Council, Indian Pugwash Society, and Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 1995, pp. 152-160.

The need to control the spread of small arms and light weapons is obvious, but progress towards achieving that goal will be difficult. In contrast to analyses which emphasize the trade, Singh argues that studies must be done on the link between small arms and armed conflicts, the motives and incentives of suppliers and recipients, and the roots of conflict. To date, few such attempts have been made.

The first step must be the creation of a definition of small arms and light weapons. A major obstacle to the eventual elimination of small arms is their use as standard equipment by police and para-police forces. Another barrier is the firm belief in many countries of the right to bear arms. States must secure firmer control over the instruments of violence, and the links between drug trafficking and light weapons must be examined more fully if progress is to be made.

Singh lists steps to curb the proliferation of small arms and light weapons:

- 1) enhance public perception of the dangers of light weapons proliferation;
- 2) formulate a standard definition;
- 3) increase transparency in production and supply;
- 4) tighten national regulations;
- 5) apply the same stringent export controls in place for major weapons systems and dual-use technologies to light weapons;
- 6) curb the black market trade;

- 7) destroy captured weapons;
- 8) control large surplus stocks against re-sale;
- 9) break the link with drug trafficking;
- 10) alter belief systems which promote light weapons ownership;
- 11) identify the motivation of suppliers;
- 12) improve border controls;
- 13) accord the phenomenon the attention it deserves;
- 14) educate the public about the dangers to the future of civil society;
- 15) create a database system to facilitate the study of the issue.

- 534.** Singh, Jasjit. "Light Weapons and Conflict in Southern Asia." In *Light Weapons and International Security*, [Serial No. 535], ed. Jasjit Singh, Nirankari Colony, Delhi: Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, British American Security Information Council, Indian Pugwash Society, and Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 1995, pp. 50-62.

The first step on the road to controlling light weapons proliferation is to understand the terminology. Singh defines the limits of "Southern Asia," and comments on the definitions used for light weapons. Although no commonly accepted definition of small arms exists, for the purposes of his paper, they are defined using the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) definition: "...all crew-portable direct fire weapons of a calibre less than 50 mm and will include a secondary capability to defeat light armour and helicopters" (p. 50).

Regular war between states appears unlikely in Southern Asia, but the likelihood of increased numbers and severity of internal conflicts has increased markedly in recent years. Since light weapons play an integral role in internal conflicts, they must be studied. Four reasons are offered to explain the shift, after the Cold War, from major interstate conflicts to lower levels of organized intrastate violence:

- 1) costs associated with regular war have constrained its use as a policy tool;
- 2) lower costs of irregular war have made it the more obvious policy tool;
- 3) light weapons offer low cost, high pay-off solutions to use of force for political reasons;
- 4) light weapons are readily available and ideally suited to small scale, intrastate conflicts.

Unlike other scholars who have emphasized the role of internal factors in perpetuating intrastate conflict, Singh argues that external factors must be analysed. For instance, since internal conflicts typically require external sources of weaponry, attention must be given these supply routes. In addition, defining the zone of conflict as the same as the frontiers of the state in turmoil is not as useful as locating the specific areas in which conflict is taking place. Another factor which must be examined is the technological upgrading of weapons which results in increased lethality. Finally, the link between drug trafficking and the trade in light weapons must be understood more fully; it may not be possible to limit the spread of light weapons without severing the link between these two phenomena.

- 535.** Singh, Jasjit, ed. *Light Weapons and International Security*. Nirankari Colony, Delhi: Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, British American Security Information Council, Indian Pugwash Society, and Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 1995.

Introduction

Singh relates that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) defines small arms as "...all crew-portable direct fire weapons of a calibre less than 50 mm and will include a secondary capability to defeat high armour and helicopters" (p. ix). The proxy wars of the superpowers during the Cold War greatly facilitated the recent spread of light weapons by placing enormous numbers in circulation. Singh notes two troubling aspects of proliferation: states are losing their monopoly over the instruments of violence; and technology has increased the lethality of small arms. He suggests placing the proliferation of small arms at the forefront of the international arms control agenda. Three proposals for curbing the spread of light weapons are offered:

- 1) international measures (e.g., greater transparency efforts);
- 2) national controls (e.g., improved border surveillance);
- 3) normative initiatives (i.e., work towards consensus against the trade and buildup of small arms).

Very little work has been done in this area. This collection of essays is designed to begin the process of raising awareness of the consequences of the proliferation of light weapons.

This introduction also describes the scope of and contributors to *Light Weapons* (Each of the essays, presented at the international workshop in New Delhi on "The Spread of Small Arms and Light Weapons, and Their Implications for International Security," October 21-23, 1995, is annotated separately in this bibliography):

- 1) Brady, Bronwyn. "Collecting and Organising Data on the Manufacture of, and Trade, in Light Weapons" [Serial No. 503];
- 2) Cock, Jacklyn. "A Sociological Account of Light Weapons Proliferation in Southern Africa" [Serial No. 504];
- 3) Dikshit, Prashant. "Internal Conflict and Role of Light Weapons" [Serial No. 505];
- 4) Dyer, Susannah L. and Natalie Goldring. "Analyzing Policy Proposals to Limit Light Weapons Transfers" [Serial No. 507];
- 5) Dyer, Susannah L. and Natalie Goldring. "Summary of Discussions" [Serial No. 508];
- 6) Kartha, Tara. "Southern Asia: The Narcotics and Weapons Linkage" [Serial No. 517];
- 7) Klare, Michael T. "Light Weapons Diffusion and Global Violence in the Post-Cold War Era" [Serial No. 520];
- 8) Singh, Jasjit. "Controlling the Spread" [Serial No. 533];
- 9) Singh, Jasjit. "Light Weapons and Conflict in Southern Asia" [Serial No. 534].

- 536.** Smith, Christopher. "Appendix 14F: The Impact of Light Weapons on Security: A Case Study of South Asia." In *SIPRI Yearbook 1995: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, pp. 583-593.

This appendix focuses on Pakistan and the North-Western part of India "...as a case study of the impact of the proliferation of light weapons on security" (p. 583). Light weapons are defined as "...crew-portable land-based armaments" (p. 583). Smith studies the increase in supply of light weapons for two reasons:

- 1) modern light weapons can change the balance of power between state and sub-state groups (e.g., drug traffickers);
- 2) the availability of light weapons may raise the level of societal violence.

The origins and types of light weapons in South Asia are analysed. Suppliers are motivated by political and/or commercial interests. Reliable data on the trade is not available, but it is clear that light weapons are produced in the region as well as imported. The greatest single source resulted from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1989-1988). Smith details the influx of light weapons in the Northwest Frontier Province, Sind Province, Kashmir, and Punjab (India).

The impact of light weapons proliferation in South Asia is also examined. Since Afghanistan was the location for continuous armed conflict for over fifteen years, huge quantities of arms have accumulated there. In addition, weapons trafficking has been linked with the drug trade in an ever widening circle of corruption. Smith contends that while light weapons have not caused the current ethnic conflicts in the region, they have definitely exacerbated them by making recourse to violence an option.

Smith concludes that the problem of light weapons proliferation must be seen from both a political and a practical viewpoint. Gun control laws must be more closely enforced, and a political solution to the long-standing feud between India and Pakistan must be worked out.

- 537.** Smith, Christopher. "Light Weapons and Ethnic Conflict in South Asia." In *Lethal Commerce: The Global Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons*, [Serial No. 502], eds. Jeffrey Boutwell, Michael T. Klare and Laura W. Reed, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Committee on International Security Studies, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1995, pp. 61-80.

Smith focuses on "...the supply and flow of small arms and light weapons in areas of northern South Asia, from Afghanistan through Pakistan to India" (p. 61). Despite the well publicized results of light weapons proliferation, relatively little attention has been given to the trade.

The India/Pakistan enmity is detailed, beginning with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. The United States (US) supplied vast amounts of material to *Mujahideen* leaders without careful accounting of the weapons transferred. In the short term, these transfers helped defeat the Soviets, but in the long term resulted "...in rising levels of violence and declining levels of human rights..." (p. 64).

Four different sources of light weapons are analysed:

- 1) arms leaked from the US supported arms pipeline;
- 2) captured Soviet weapons;
- 3) arms produced by small scale manufacturers in the region;
- 4) miscellaneous weapons from all over the world.

In addition, several regional issues are examined which fuel the demand for light weapons (e.g., Sikh separatism in the Punjab, and communal tensions in Bombay in the wake of March 1993 bombings).

South Asia has traditionally had difficulties with nation-building, but the recent flood of light weapons into the region will complicate the process further. Effective gun control in Pakistan, given the prevailing gun culture, will be difficult if not impossible. The fundamental problem is weak government in both Pakistan and India. Over the short term residents will buy guns to guarantee personal security, but over time, these purchases will "...have the opposite effect" (p. 77). Smith suggests that the impact of light weapons can be limited by strictly regulating the supply of ammunition. Before such an attempt could be successful, however, more information must be secured about the global patterns in the trade and effects of light weapons.

- 538.** Williams, Rocklyn. "Small Arms Proliferation in Southern Africa: Problems and Prospects." A Paper Presented at the UNIDIR Conference on the Proliferation of Light Weapons in the Post-Cold War World: A Global Problem. Berlin: May 4-5, 1995.

Most small arms smuggled into South Africa originates from Mozambique and Angola. This paper "...aims at analyzing the origins of the problem, the present state of small arms proliferation and some proposed resolutions of the problem" (p. 1).

Williams argues that there are four major developments in the history of the region which have created high social mobilization to secure small arms:

- 1) the history of the armed liberation struggles in the region (i.e., many arms have been shipped to the region);
- 2) the arming of rebel movements in the region by both the Rhodesian and former South African governments;
- 3) the disintegration of state structures in Angola and Mozambique;
- 4) the availability of locally manufactured small arms (especially in South Africa).

No solution to the proliferation of small arms will be possible until progress is made in resolving the socio-economic problems of South Africa and its surrounding countries. At the moment, it is more pragmatic to discuss working towards containing the problem rather than eliminating it. To this end, she makes eight suggestions:

- 1) create a South African arms trade register;
- 2) determine what types of arms were shipped to what groups during the Cold War;
- 3) determine the origins of shipments of ammunition to the region;
- 4) tighten control of commercial small arms sales in South Africa;
- 5) publicize weapon returning programs (e.g., gun buy-back schemes);
- 6) couple demobilization of the armed forces with a careful accounting of weapons;
- 7) institute bi-lateral and multi-lateral commissions to deal with small arms proliferation;
- 8) create effective border controls.

Williams concludes by emphasizing the need for more research on the problem of small arms proliferation before it spirals out of control.

- 539.** Wulf, Herbert. "Surplus Weapons: The Need for Control and Conversion." A Paper Presented at the UNIDIR Conference on the Proliferation of Light Weapons in the Post-Cold War World: A Global Problem. Berlin: May 4-5, 1995.

The surplus stocks of Warsaw Pact and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries have had a significant impact on the international arms market. The end of the Cold War has resulted in an increase in the number of weapons available and a corresponding decrease in their cost. Wulf contends that the international community must attach a high priority to dealing with the problem of light weapons proliferation.

Rather than exporting their surplus stocks, states can choose from the following list of options:

- 1) mothball the weapons;
- 2) allow weapons to become obsolete;
- 3) destroy extra weapons;
- 4) convert weapons for civilian uses (not easily done with light weapons);
- 5) utilize weapons for other purposes (e.g., targets).

In most cases, governments have adopted a "muddling-through" policy, trying at some point most of the options listed above.

Wulf analyses the specific problems associated with controlling particular kinds of weapons. Comments are made on nuclear and chemical weapons, missiles, and major conventional weapons systems, but he also offers substantive comment on the problems impeding progress in curbing light weapons proliferation. In the case of these weapons, their low cost, small size, ease of purchase, and lack of accountability to the supplier all make controlling their spread difficult. Despite these problems, Wulf offers several steps which must be followed for progress to be made:

- 1) develop a set of guidelines for researchers who will document the size and location of surplus weapons stocks;
- 2) present theoretical constructs to explain the problem;
- 3) start the research process in areas most threatened by light weapons proliferation;
- 4) introduce the problem to policy makers at local, regional, national and international levels.

PART B.4 ITEMS AVAILABLE IN 1996

601. Batchelor, Peter. "Disarmament, Small Arms, and Intra-State Conflict: The Case of Southern Africa." In *Small Arms Management and Peacekeeping in Southern Africa (Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Geneva)*, [Serial No. 625], Christopher Smith, Peter Batchelor and Jakkie Potgieter, New York and Geneva: United Nations, 1996, pp. 61-98.

Batchelor examines "...the relationship between disarmament during multilateral peace support operations, small arms, and intra-state conflict with reference to Southern Africa" (p. 61).

This article is divided into five sections. Section I "...compares and contrasts the disarmament components of the settlement agreements and mandates of the various multilateral peace support missions that have been deployed in Southern Africa since 1989" (p. 63). Section II examines "...the implementation of the disarmament components of the settlement agreements during the various multilateral peace support missions" (p. 68). Section III explores the link between the failure of disarmament and the ensuing proliferation of small arms and armed banditry. Section IV focuses on small arms proliferation, armed banditry and intra-state conflict in Southern Africa. Section V lists the article's conclusions and recommendations.

Batchelor concludes that while each peace settlement examined (Namibia, Angola and Mozambique) included a disarmament component, none were fully implemented. This oversight has contributed to light weapons proliferation, armed banditry and intra-state conflict. The result is a more complicated problem. In addition to controlling proliferation and diminishing the potential for intra-state conflict, disarmament efforts must also include efforts to reverse the process of militarization in Southern Africa. Only by incorporating all these aspects will the long term peace, security and development of Southern Africa be possible.

602. Berman, Eric. *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Mozambique (Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Geneva)*. New York and Geneva: United Nations, 1996.

This study outlines the results of UNOMOZ (United Nations Operations in Mozambique), arguing that the original UN plan was not implemented as specified (e.g., information on weapons and ammunition holdings was never forthcoming). This monograph "...addresses why the mission experienced these shortcomings and complications. The explanation does not lie in the fact that a better plan superseded the one that the Secretary-General originally laid out. No additional plan was proffered. Rather, the complex nature of the PKO [peace keeping operation] together with political considerations led to the failure to implement the plan faithfully" (p. 3).

The report is divided into four sections. Section I provides an overview of the history of Portuguese colonial rule, the struggle for independence and resulting civil war, and the factors which led the warring parties to the negotiating table. Section II examines the UN role in peace talks and its mandate for the peace keeping operation. Section III looks at the military context. Section IV analyses the PKO's plans and their implementation.

It is concluded that in the implementation of the UN plan, long term goals were set aside in favour of achieving short term solutions (e.g., leave disarmament and focus on securing a general peace agreement). The greatest problem with the UN mission was that "...it was too general. The non-specific nature of much of the GPA [General Peace Agreement] – especially as concerned disarmament and arms destruction – gave both parties room to manoeuvre in interpreting the plans" (p. 84). In Mozambique, the UN was presented with an opportunity to reduce the number of small arms available to threaten international peace and stability, but it failed to capitalize.

- 603.** Boutwell, Jeffrey, Susannah L. Dyer and Natalie J. Goldring. "Pugwash Meeting No. 210: 1st Pugwash Workshop on the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons: *Curbing the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons: The Need for International Cooperation and Constraints.*" *Pugwash Newsletter*. Vol. 33, No. 3, January 1996, pp. 159-168.

This article reports on the proceedings of the conference on curbing the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. An overview of small arms and light weapons issues is included with a summary of what was discussed at the conference (e.g., the dynamics of weapons flow, the development of a conceptual model for analysing the issue, and the objectives and means of data collection and organization).

Several recommendations are made to control the spread of small arms and light weapons:

- 1) establish and publicize light weapons as a concrete problem through the creation of a United Nations (UN) world commission;
- 2) educate national parliaments on the consequences of light weapons proliferation;
- 3) encourage cooperation between police forces;
- 4) implement regional regulations on the production and the supply of light weapons;
- 5) promote stringent national gun licensing measures;
- 6) dismantle weapons when conflicts end;
- 7) pursue control of light weapons within the framework of a larger effort to control conflict;
- 8) outline the major negative effects of light weapons proliferation on society.

Future directions for research in the area are also noted (e.g., understanding the dynamics of light weapons flows), as are potential ways to move towards control of light weapons (e.g., a feasibility study of a separate UN arms register).

- 604.** Dyer, Susannah L. and Natalie J. Goldring. *Controlling Global Light Weapons Transfers: Working Toward Policy Options*. Research Report Prepared for the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association. San Diego, California: British American Security Information Council (BASIC): Project on Light Weapons, April 16-20, 1996.

An update of a paper published in *Light Weapons and International Security* [Serial No. 535], this paper provides "...a framework for analysis of policy proposals designed to limit the global flow of light weapons" (p. 1). Many of the ideas are borrowed from efforts to limit the proliferation of major conventional weapons, but the specifics differ because of the characteristics peculiar to light weapons. The goal of the paper is to help

raise the profile of the need to limit the proliferation of light weapons. Three areas are introduced and discussed at length: transparency, oversight, and control.

Transparency efforts have focused on major conventional weapons and the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, but provide useful models for similar efforts for light weapons. Dyer and Goldring note several ways in which transparency can be increased with regards to light weapons:

- 1) expanding the Register to include light weapons;
- 2) developing arms registers tailored to regional dynamics;
- 3) opening up national import and export policies to scrutiny;
- 4) encouraging early accessibility to information on prospective transfers;
- 5) requiring transparency of national military spending;
- 6) integrating sources of information (e.g., merge data on government-to-government as well as commercial transfers).

Oversight refers to the process of regulating arms transfers (e.g., bureaucracies, legislatures, and international organizations). Given the relatively low cost of light weapons, these organizations do not track light weapons with the same thoroughness as they do for major systems. Dyer and Goldring emphasize the need to convince the international community of the need to monitor light weapons transfers. Several measures to improve and expand oversight of light weapons transfers are analysed:

- 1) including light weapons in the COCOM (Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls) successor regime;
- 2) establishing a proscription against selling weapons to countries that violate internationally accepted human rights standards or engage in acts of armed aggression;
- 3) improving national oversight mechanisms;
- 4) enhancing national customs regulations and improving international cooperation among western services involved with monitoring imports and exports of weapons;
- 5) observing commitments under international law.

Control refers to efforts aimed at limiting the quantity or quality of weapons transferred. Such actions must address all aspects of the arms transfer spectrum (i.e., from government-to-government to black market transactions). Several specific options to control weapons proliferation are examined:

- 1) improving domestic gun control;
- 2) eliminating or restricting certain types of weapons (e.g., anti-personnel landmines);
- 3) developing a global regime to eliminate black market military sales;
- 4) supporting regional recipient restraint (e.g., tailor control efforts to regional dynamics);
- 5) creating more effective border controls;
- 6) limiting the supply of surplus weapons;
- 7) strengthening international law;
- 8) investigating technical aspects (e.g., technology which renders a weapon unusable after a certain period of time);
- 9) implementing economic measures (e.g., make aid conditional on participation in the UN Register).

Dyer and Goldring observe that the way the international community responds to conflict determines the options available to it (e.g., embargoes are cosmetic if not enforced). New institutions must be built to replace those of the Cold War. In the meantime, the goal should not be the total elimination of light weapons. It is sufficient to work towards placing the concept on the international security agenda in order that further progress towards restraint can continue. Central to this process is a re-ordering of priorities. Economics should no longer be the primary determinant in arms transfers, but be relegated to the background behind security and humanitarian concerns. Efforts towards this goal would be facilitated by a co-alition of various groups (e.g., physicians, trade unions, peace and environmental groups), each bringing their own perspective to the problem of light weapons.

605. Gamba, Virginia and Jakkie Potgieter. "UNIDIR's Project on Managing Arms During Peace Processes: A Research Summary." A Paper Presented at the BASIC Conference on Light Weapons Proliferation and Opportunities for Control. London: June 30-July 2, 1996.

Gamba and Potgieter argue that "disarmament and weapons management *must be seen* [emphasis in the original] as part of a wider political process aimed at resolving underlying and structural sources of conflict" (p.

1). This was the rationale behind a series of publications written under the framework of UNIDIR's [United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research] *Disarmament and Conflict Resolution (DCR) Project: The Disarming of Warring Parties During Peace Operations*. This research paper is a summary of the conclusions from this series.

There has been an increase in United Nations peacekeeping in the last ten years. In addition, there has been an increase in the tendency towards peace enforcement as well as peace keeping. A general problem discovered in this research has been that even if two warring parties agree to a ceasefire, they are not willing to surrender their arms. The authors argue that, at the tactical level, force should be used to disarm these parties.

The DCR identified three common problems to disarmament; each is examined in turn. First, the common problems in multinational peace operation (e.g., lack of coordination among groups involved). Second, disarmament problems in UN Peace Operations (e.g., differing national doctrines related to the use of armed forces for peace operations). Third, issues that could enhance the performance of the mission (e.g., training of peacekeepers for multi-function missions, including disarmament).

The authors conclude that although disarmament agreements are often reached at the strategic level, they are often left unenforced at the tactical level. This pattern must stop, and methods should be designed to implement disarmament agreements at all levels. In addition, they offer three general conclusions. First, peace building must be viewed in a holistic manner, including both the sources of conflict and the instruments of violence. Second, coercive force should be used to implement consensual agreements at the tactical level. Third, the environment in which multilateral peace operations are now flourishing makes the enforcement of peace mandates difficult. Gamba and Potgieter conclude that "...in a context of dwindling resources, horrendously violent internal conflicts, and uncontrolled proliferation of all types of weapons, nations should do well to ensure that the few multinational peace operations they are involved in are as efficient as possible" (p. 16).

606. Goldring, Natalie J. "Research Note: High-Technology Light Weapons." A Paper Presented at the BASIC Conference on Light Weapons Proliferation. London: June 30-July 2, 1996.

Goldring argues that in analysing the proliferation of light weapons, researchers have tended to rely on quantitative rather than qualitative issues. She contends that "Technology-based studies may provide more insight into these issues, increasing the depth of understanding of specific technologies and their transfer, the effects of specific technologies on the outcome of conflict, and possibly sketching out new avenues for control" (p. 1). The prospects for controlling high-tech light weapons may be better than for their low-tech counterparts due to the fact that there are fewer suppliers.

There exists no universally agreed upon definition for light weapons. However, distinctions can be made between high- and low-tech light weapons in several ways:

- 1) the date a weapon is introduced into service (i.e., newer ones are more likely to be advanced);
- 2) whether or not the new weapon is a clear advance over existing technology;
- 3) the extent to which a technology conveys force multiplier effects to its users;
- 4) the lists generated by military services on "critical technologies" are a good indicator of what is advanced.

The goal should be to identify high-tech light weapons and to restrict their proliferation.

Goldring describes several risks associated with high-tech light weapons transfers. First, their transfer may lead to qualitative and quantitative arms races (i.e., one state upgrades its technology, prompting other states to follow-suit). Second, their transfer risks "boomerang" effects (i.e., weapons eventually used against the supplier). Third, their transfer reduces the technological gap between suppliers and recipient countries, resulting in an increased demand for research and development in the supplier countries. Finally, their transfer may spill-over to non-military areas (e.g., drug trade), increasing the risks and costs of policing these industries.

A series of questions for future research are presented to stimulate discussion. The goal of the section is "...to determine the most significant substantive gaps in the existing analysis, and what additional data would be useful" (p. 5). Questions are asked (e.g., what is a high-tech weapon?) and then followed by a brief commentary.

Goldring concludes that the analysis of light weapons proliferation remains at a "very early stage" (p. 7). She cautions against being content to work towards increased transparency, advocating instead a push for real progress on the control of light weapons proliferation.

Table 1 is a list of selected portable anti-tank weapons. Table 2 is a list of selected portable anti-aircraft weapons. Each of these tables includes the name of the weapon, the country of origin, and notes on the technology (Table 2 also includes a section "Evidence of Use"). Table 3 is a list of issues affecting proposals for control.

- 607.** Greene, Owen. "Developing Regimes to Promote Transparency, Accountability and Restraint in Light Weapons Transfers." A Paper Presented at the BASIC Conference on Light Weapons Proliferation. London: June 30-July 2, 1996.

Greene emphasizes that attempts to control light weapons can only be successful in the medium to long term. A theme running through the paper is that "...the development of international norms and principles relating to light weapons, without which coordinated and sustained international policy responses is unlikely, is in practice intimately related to efforts to agree and implement focused policy proposals" (p. 1).

He stresses the importance of developing potentially negotiable proposals. Some success has been achieved in recent years in raising the profile of the problems associated with light weapons proliferation. However, the present momentum will be lost if influential policy makers are not convinced that progress can be made. He notes several obstacles to concrete action:

- 1) light weapons include a huge range of weapons;
- 2) these weapons are traded extensively throughout the world;
- 3) these weapons are not subject to an international norm which prohibits their proliferation.

Despite these obstacles, there are several avenues available for action. First, cooperation controls or bans, such as the Inhumane Weapons Convention, could be created to address light weapons. Second, transparency measures, for example the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, could be extended to include light weapons. Greene cautions against this approach, advocating the creation of a separate register for light weapons. Finally, supplier regimes could be used to complement the first two options.

Greene suggests the creation of new international transparency, review or control regimes for light weapons. Several proposals are described:

- 1) provide lists of weapons production facilities of each state;
- 2) establish a "pledge and review" process to promote effective national controls;
- 3) destroy surplus stocks rather than sell them;
- 4) promote accountability for producers for the way in which weapons are used;
- 5) agree to maintain "firebreaks" (i.e., agree on what weapons should only be available to police and armed forces).

He concludes that these and other areas provide avenues where progress can be made in controlling the spread of light weapons.

- 608.** Husbands, Jo L. "Background Note." A Paper Presented at the BASIC Conference on Light Weapons Proliferation. London: June 30-July 2, 1996.

This paper is excerpted from a chapter included in J. Boutwell, et al, eds., *Lethal Commerce* [Serial No. 502]. In this version, Husbands incorporates new research into her argument that arms control efforts must focus on the conflicts in which the weapons are being used.

Basic questions must be answered before embarking on any attempt to control light weapons proliferation: How much to try to control? What are the goals of controls? What will one consider success? In each situation, the policy options available will be determined by the stage of the conflict. Before one begins, or in its early stages, benefits can be derived from monitoring arms shipments to the area. While the conflict is under way, progress towards peace can be made by using an arms embargo. When the fighting is over, provisions must be made for disarmament and demobilization to limit the chances of renewed fighting or of weapons being sold as surplus to fuel another conflict.

Husbands concludes by re-emphasizing the importance of tailoring efforts to control light weapons to the specific context of each conflict.

609. Johnston, Joel. *Current Projects on Light Weapons*. London: British American Security Information Council, February 1996.

This report is a compilation of projects currently underway on issues related to the problem of light weapons proliferation. Each entry is listed alphabetically by the name of the research group (e.g., British American Security Information Council), followed by a contact person's name. A brief summary of the work of each organization is also included.

610. Kartha, Tara. "Ammunition as a Tool for Conflict Control." A Paper Presented at the BASIC Conference on Light Weapons. London: June 30-July 2, 1996.

Kartha's starting premise is the importance of ammunition in making warfare possible. The paper "...examines the possibility of imposing some constraints on the supplies and production of ammunition, keeping in mind that while suppliers may be many (the black marketeer, drug lord, local politician etc) the producers are relatively few" (p. 1). She analyses the nature and requirements of conflict arguing that there are a number of sources of ammunition (the state, the black market, and the stocks of regional powers) which indicate that there has been an increase in the amount of ammunition in circulation since the end of the Cold War.

A review of ammunition availability in the following areas is conducted: Afghanistan, Pakistan, western India, and Tajikistan. She offers suggestions for controlling ammunition at policy, manufacturing, and global levels. At the policy level, Kartha offers five options:

- 1) promote regional cooperation;
- 2) institute unilateral transparency measures;
- 3) act on available information to control black market activity;
- 4) reduce the number of poorly trained security forces and replace them with smaller numbers of elite troops;
- 5) negotiate bilateral 'hot pursuit' agreements (i.e., ability of a state to chase gun runners across borders).

Kartha also offers several possible courses of action which can be initiated at the manufacturing level to curb the spread of ammunition. First, create strict manufacturing marking and numbering systems. Second, ban manufacturing of ammunition by states for weapons (like the AK-47) that they do not produce. Third, outlaw the production of 'look alike' bullets. Fourth, reserve certain kinds of ammunition for military use only. Fifth, apply restrictions to the 5.56 round while it is still in the early states of becoming the round of the future. Sixth, restrict the export of particularly lethal weapons (e.g., French built FAMAS). Finally, monitor states which serve as transfer points for weapons on the way to conflict areas.

She concludes by offering four suggestions which can be implemented at the global level:

- 1) reduce the stockpiles kept by each state to protect against the advent of war;
- 2) create a monitoring body which will report to the UN Security Council before a conflict begins;
- 3) promote the idea of an international embargo of ammunition transfers;
- 4) enhance global transparency efforts.

She emphasizes that even 'slender' chances of securing ammunition controls must be welcomed.

611. Klare, Michael T. "The Global Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons--An Overview." A Paper Presented To the Panel of Governmental Experts Appointed by the Secretary-General to Study the Global Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons. United Nations, New York: June 26, 1996.

Klare's paper is divided into three sections. Part I outlines the distinctive character of light weapons. He notes that light weapons were virtually ignored during the Cold War era when the focus was on major weapons systems. With the end of the Cold War, coupled with the rise of intrastate conflict fought predominantly with light weapons, light weapons have received more attention. They have several characteristics which distinguish them from major weapons systems:

- 1) low cost;
- 2) portability;
- 3) minimal infrastructure;
- 4) minimal training;
- 5) ease of concealment.

These characteristics make such weapons ideally suited for use in local conflicts which are structured around intimidating the local population.

Part II examines recent patterns in the spread of small arms and light weapons. Klare argues that "...recent trends in the diffusion of light weapons are contributing to the incidence and intensity of ethnic and internal conflicts, and are jeopardizing world security in new and distinctive ways" (p. 7). Several factors which account for this problem are analysed:

- 1) increased lethality of weapons;
- 2) proliferation of arms-making technology;
- 3) dispersion of Cold War stockpiles;
- 4) illegal arms trafficking.

Part III explores the need for new international constraints. It is no longer possible to ignore the consequences of light weapons proliferation. A new perspective is needed to analyse the proliferation of light weapons. Rather than looking at light weapons as an inconsequential part of the larger arms trade, Klare argues that it is essential to examine light weapons proliferation from the perspective that these are the weapons actually being used in today's conflicts. While he grants that light weapons do not cause wars, he does contend that their ready availability makes recourse to violence as a tool more likely.

Several proposals are put forward to control the spread of light weapons. Attempts to resolve conflicts must include measures to contain light weapons trafficking. Efforts should be made to suppress the black market in light weapons. The link between drug smuggling and light weapons trafficking must be severed. In the wake of a peace settlement, arms should be destroyed. Most importantly, however, Klare emphasizes the need for a new international norm to condemn transfers of light weapons which are likely to create destabilizing accumulations of arms.

- 612.** Klare, Michael T. "Light Weapons Trafficking and Ethnic/Internal Conflict in the Post-Cold War Era." A Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association. San Diego, California: April 17-20, 1996.

New international power relationships in the wake of the Cold War have led to an increase in ethnic, religious and sectarian conflict. Light weapons have been the preferred tools of combat in these uprisings for a number of reasons:

- 1) lacking recognition as states, insurgents are barred from traditional arms markets;
- 2) insurgents lack the technical and logistical support networks necessary to sustain major conventional weapons;
- 3) since secrecy is essential, light weapons suit the nature of combat;
- 4) light weapons are ideally suited to the task of intimidating the general population.

Case studies are offered of three conflicts areas: Kashmir, Liberia, and Rwanda. In each, the background of the conflict is detailed, as are the scale and nature of the conflict. From this evidence, Klare posits three conclusions for global policy. First, the global proliferation of light weapons "...is contributing significantly to the incidence, duration, and severity of ethnic/insurgent warfare in the post-Cold War era" (p. 9). Second, the international community finds it difficult to restrain these conflicts. Third, consequences of light weapons transfers have compelled governments to be more cautious in their arms sales.

Klare also provides a summary of the research in this field to date, and identifies the major channels of light weapons trafficking. There is no standard definition for light weapons, but Klare defines them as "...any conventional weapons that can be carried by an individual soldier or by a light vehicle operating on back-country roads" (p. 12). Four channels of supply are identified:

- 1) government-to-government sales;
- 2) commercial sales;
- 3) covert arms deliveries by governments;
- 4) black market arms transfers.

He concludes that much more research is required. One option to limit the proliferation of light weapons is to expand the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms to include light weapons. Another possibility involves a more detailed analysis of light weapons traffic and "...its relationship to the current upsurge in ethnic and insurgent conflicts" (p. 21).

613. Klare, Michael T. and David Anderson. *A Scourge of Guns: The Diffusion of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Latin America*. Research Report Prepared for the Arms Sales Monitoring Project. Washington, D.C.: Federation of American Scientists, July 1996.

This report is divided into seven chapters. Chapter 1, "Arms and Violence in Latin America," argues that since major weapons systems have been the focus of arms control analysts, little attention has been paid to light weapons. Latin America has imported mostly light weapons, but has done so in sufficient quantities to be destabilizing and to cause profound social and political problems. It is concluded that there is a close link between the diffusion of arms and the pervasiveness of violence in Latin America. Klare and Anderson suggest approaching the problem from a regional perspective.

Chapter 2, "Domestic Arms Production," examines the national arms production capacity of states in Latin America. Since domestic arms production is perceived as a symbol of sovereignty and as a way to promote research and development, most Latin American states have a significant production capacity. Case studies are related of the arms production capacities of several Latin American countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Dominican Republic, Mexico, and Peru.

Chapter 3, "United States and Soviet Military Assistance," documents the significant aid provided by both these countries throughout the Cold War. Both aid programs are examined, and it is concluded that the Soviet aid was as plentiful as the American support, but was more concentrated in a few countries, most notably Cuba, Nicaragua and Peru. The Europeans did play a minor role in arms transfers to the Latin American region, but most were done in the immediate post-independence era.

Chapter 4, "Commercial Sales" examines the relatively minor role of direct sales to governments in the region (i.e., as compared to grants from the superpowers). Several different avenues are analysed:

- 1) exports licensed by the U.S. State Department;
- 2) exports licensed by the U.S. Commerce Department;
- 3) exports conducted by European firms;
- 4) exports which derived from other countries (e.g., Israel).

It was not unknown for shipments to go directly to private individuals or security forces, but this trade formed only a small part of commercial sales as a whole.

Chapter 5, "Black-Market transfers," maintains that the black market exists in parallel with the legal arms market. However, there has been very little research into the phenomenon. Klare and Anderson provide several case studies which "...represent but a small sampling of illegal arms transactions, but do provide valuable insight into how the black market actually functions" (p. 54). The case studies address the following examples:

- 1) the Antigua and Barbuda connection;
- 2) the role of fake end-user certificates;
- 3) the role of the U.S. in the illegal trade;
- 4) the mechanics of gun smuggling from the United States.

Chapter 6, "Covert Gun-Running by Governments," shows that next to black market suppliers, this avenue constitutes the second major source of clandestine arms transfers (e.g., the Iran-Contra affair, initiated in 1981 by U.S. President Ronald Reagan). Also examined is U.S. aid to intelligence units in Guatemala and Honduras, as well as Soviet aid to countries in the region.

Chapter 7, "Findings and Recommendations," lists the conclusions of the report. Klare and Anderson argue that "...one conclusion appears inescapable: the nations of South and Central America have been inundated with small arms and light weapons, greatly contributing to the pervasiveness of violence, lawlessness, and criminality in the hemisphere" (p. 84). While the flow of weapons to the region cannot be measured exactly, it is surely one of the world's major markets for light weapons, resulting in a region "awash in light weapons" (p. 85).

The authors offer several reasons for the surplus:

- 1) long-time emphasis on security and counterinsurgency;

- 2) lack of funds to acquire more sophisticated weapons;
- 3) emphasis on internal security by the U.S. in their aid programs to the area;
- 4) widespread presence of groups (e.g., guerrillas) equipped with light weapons alone;
- 5) growing privatization of security forces in the region.

This problem affects all levels of society, and is fuelling intra-societal violence which poses "...the greatest threat to peace, security, human rights, and the advancement of democracy in the region" (p. 86).

Six conclusions are drawn to help future research into the field of light weapons:

- 1) Latin American countries produce, domestically, a significant number of light weapons;
- 2) light weapons remain in service long after the conflict for which they were made is over;
- 3) the U.S. and Soviet Union bear a significant part of the responsibility for the continued gun culture in the area since they shipped vast quantities of arms to the region over 50 years;
- 4) the black market poses a significant threat to the region's stability;
- 5) private producers in the U.S. are a major source of guns for the region;
- 6) present national and international measures to curb light weapons transfers are inadequate.

In addition, three recommendations are made for future progress. First, increase the transparency of light weapons transfers (e.g., establish a regional register of conventional arms). Second, enhance export controls (e.g., improve border controls). Third, demilitarize and disarm the region (e.g., reduce the size and pervasiveness of the armed forces). In each case, the goal is to work towards restraining the proliferation of light weapons.

An appendix includes a table of light arms production in Latin America.

- 614.** Latham, Andrew. "The Light Weapons Problem: Causes, Consequences and Policy Options." In *Multilateral Approaches to Non-Proliferation: Proceedings of the 4th Canadian Non-Proliferation Workshop*, ed. Andrew Latham, Toronto: Centre for International and Security Studies, York University, 1996, pp. 33-54.

Conventional weapons proliferation has earned a more prominent place on the post Cold War international security agenda. However, Latham maintains that the diffusion of light weapons remains seriously under-examined. His purpose is to "...contribute to recent efforts to raise the profile of the light weapons issue within the Canadian non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament community" (pp. 33-34).

Light weapons are defined in a variety of ways:

- 1) those not covered by the SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute), or the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms;
- 2) those carried by infantry;
- 3) those transported by animals or light vehicles;
- 4) those used in internecine conflict.

Latham posits his own working definition which includes "...all weapons that fall below the threshold of major conventional weapons systems" (p. 34). A further distinction is made between low- and high-tech light weapons. The former is the focus of this paper and denotes arms that are based on simple, widely-diffused technologies, do not require much skill to operate, and require only basic maintenance (e.g., AK-47).

The deleterious effects of the ready availability and widespread diffusion of light weapons are analysed. These factors have several negative impacts:

- 1) they undermine both traditional and modern institutions of human security;
- 2) they help sustain authoritarian governments and thwart progress towards democracy;
- 3) they create and sustain a 'culture of violence';
- 4) they contribute to 'inhumane' conflict;
- 5) they undermine confidence building measures (CBMs) and economic reconstruction.

Also examined are the factors contributing to the proliferation of light weapons:

- 1) the absence of durable political institutions in many parts of the world;
- 2) cultural factors which condone/encourage ownership of guns;
- 3) increased availability of light weapons in recent years;
- 4) poor import and export controls in many countries;
- 5) numerous and diverse supply channels (ranging from state-to-state sales to individual black market transactions);

6) the absence of "...any generally agreed upon international norm limiting the rights of states to acquire such weapons" (p. 43).

Various options for addressing the light weapons problem are analysed. Norm building would help develop legitimate limits on the trade in light weapons. Enhancing transparency measures would provide a more complete understanding of the arms trade. Strengthening controls (e.g., import and export laws) would limit the channels available for arms transfers. Finally, developing human security institutions would minimize the potential for inter-societal violence.

Latham concludes that light weapons proliferation will continue to be an important item on the international policy agenda. However, there are several areas which he considers to be under-examined:

- 1) definitions and classifications;
- 2) cultural factors promoting light weapons proliferation;
- 3) norms which might curtail proliferation;
- 4) merits of regional versus global arms registers;
- 5) technical measures for tracking transfers;
- 6) human security measures to promote peace;
- 7) practical micro-disarmament measures;
- 8) specific regional dimensions.

- 615.** Latham, Andrew. "Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament: Emerging Issues and Future Directions for Policy Relevant Research." In *Multilateral Approaches to Non-Proliferation: Proceedings of the 4th Canadian Non-Proliferation Workshop*, ed. Andrew Latham, Toronto: Centre for International and Security Studies, York University, 1996, pp. 135-146.

The objective of this article "...is to present the emerging issues and directions for future research that were identified during the discussions at the Fourth Annual Canadian Non-Proliferation workshops" (p. 135). A review is done for both conceptual research issues as well as practical research issues. Various types of weapons are considered:

- 1) weapons of mass destruction;
- 2) non-lethal technologies;
- 3) light weapons;
- 4) dual-use technologies.

At the conceptual level, Latham argues that a critical area to research is the causes and consequences of light weapons proliferation. A new conceptual arms control framework is needed to address the specific characteristics of light weapons. Efforts should begin by establishing a conceptual language to understand the dynamics of light weapons proliferation. Ultimately, however, "...the goal should be to frame a practical, long-term, realistic and sustainable strategy for advancing the light weapons non-proliferation agenda" (pp. 136-137).

- 616.** Laurance, Edward J. *The New Field of Micro-Disarmament: Addressing the Proliferation and Buildup of Small Arms and Light Weapons*. Research Report Prepared for the Disarmament Section (Ref. 242) of the Foreign Ministry of the Federal Republic of Germany. California and Bonn: Monterey Institute of International Studies (MIIS) and the Bonn International Center for Conversion, June 1996.

This report is divided into seven sections, followed by ten appendices. Part I provides background and comments on the purpose of the study to "...serve as a preparatory study on micro-disarmament..." (p. 1).

Part II focuses on the history, definition and evolution of the concept of micro-disarmament. First introduced by UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his January 1995 "Supplement to An Agenda for Peace," [Serial No. UN-5], the concept has gained prominence since then. Laurance outlines the relevant UN resolutions, and summarizes the work done by academics to date. He maintains that the profile of the issue is still small, but that it is gaining in popularity.

Part III examines the topology of light weapons and their accumulation. Both the quantity and the quality of light weapons have increased since the end of the Cold War, making their diffusion more problematic. The lack of an agreed upon definition for small arms and light weapons is noted, and several definitions which have

been put forward are reproduced (e.g., Swadesh Rana's from *Small Arms and Intra-State Conflicts*, [Serial No. 532]). Laurance suggests the creation of a catalogue of arms actually used in conflicts, to be monitored by the UN, which could form the basis of an empirical definition in the future.

Part IV comments on the negative effects of small arms and light weapons, emphasizing that these weapons are being used primarily in intrastate conflict. In most cases, an increased availability of light weapons will increase the chance of groups or individuals resorting to violence to achieve their goals. This in turn will impact on political, economic and social development.

Part V analyses five situations where micro-disarmament is practice:

- 1) preventive diplomacy;
- 2) peace-keeping operations;
- 3) post-conflict peace-building;
- 4) constraining proliferation and deployment of anti-personnel landmines;
- 5) curbing crime and violence which uses military style light weapons.

Part VI investigates the policies, tools and instruments available for micro-disarmament. Efforts can be made at both the national level (e.g., improve policing) and the multinational level (e.g., create regional arms transfer registers). In addition, a differentiation must be made between supply and demand strategies for control. For example, Mali has a problem with weapons flowing into the country, and is, therefore, in need of supply controls. By contrast, El Salvador already has a vast supply of weapons, and is, therefore, a candidate for demand controls. Whatever the policy, Laurance cautions that efforts must take into consideration the limitations of UN resources. The American experience of disarming its own population should be examined to see what can be learned.

Part VII serves as a conclusion, focusing on multilateral action for micro-disarmament. Laurance draws attention to the fact that micro-disarmament efforts "...must take into account a wide variety of concepts, issues and factors not normally part of the disarmament mandate" (p. 25). Laurance targets his conclusions at the UN, as the most likely organization to take action. To begin with, he offers several operations principles for UN micro-disarmament actions:

- 1) accumulations of light weapons leads to casualties;
- 2) weapons causing problems are military style and are not needed for personal security;
- 3) internal security forces cannot address the problem on their own;
- 4) internal security forces should be aided by the UN to enable them to conduct their own disarmament campaigns;
- 5) community and social structure should be developed enough to work with security forces to combat the problem;
- 6) initiative for action must come from UN member states.

In addition, Laurance offers several operative measures to guide UN disarmament actions:

- 1) build the capacities of states to develop their own services (i.e., after peace, help develop services like customs);
- 2) conduct field missions (i.e., identify problems before they become crises);
- 3) ban certain types of weapons (e.g., landmines);
- 4) promote transparency of weapons transfers (e.g., include small arms in UN Register of Conventional Arms);
- 5) create positive measures for disarmament (e.g., support demobilization plans);
- 6) continue efforts in post-conflict disarmament measures (i.e., try to limit arms available in society).

Appendix I is a list of current projects on light weapons, including lists of contact persons. Appendix II is an excerpt from "Supplement to An Agenda for Peace" (A/50/60, 3 January 1995), [Serial No. I-5].

Appendix III is a working paper of Working Group II of the United Nations Disarmament Commission. Appendix IV is an Interim Report of the International Commission on Rwanda. Appendix V is a case study of El Salvador's experience with light weapons proliferation. Appendix VI is an introduction to anti-personnel landmines and their effects. Appendix VII is a national military inventory of selected weapons. Appendix VIII is a commentary on voluntary weapons collection efforts and buy-back programs in the U.S., Haiti and Nicaragua. Appendix IX is a selected bibliography of works relating to micro-disarmament. Appendix X is a report of working group I on agenda item 4 (Guidelines for international arms transfers in the context of General Assembly resolution 46/36H of December 1991).

- 617.** Louise, Christopher. "Light Weapons Proliferation in Central America: A Preliminary Report on the Militarisation of Civil Society in El Salvador, Guatemala and Chiapas." A Paper Presented at the BASIC Conference on Light Weapons. London: June 30-July 2, 1996.

Louise argues that it is necessary to construct an analytic framework which examines light weapons proliferation in its social and economic context. The goal of this paper is "...to meet this mandate by seeking to understand the nature and causes of the excessive and destabilizing accumulation and transfer of small arms and light weapons, including the illicit production and trade, and by exploring the related and specific processes which have facilitated the militarisation of civil societies in the northern Isthmus [i.e., El Salvador, Guatemala, and the Southern Mexican region of Chiapas]" (p. 1).

In his analysis of the military patterns in Central America, Louise maintains that there are two key aspects to any analysis of the region. First, light weapons are a particular kind of weapon which reflect a particular feature in warfare. Second, the political context has fuelled supply and demand patterns in the region in the modern era. The trends in arms procurement and use since the end of the Second World War are detailed, followed by an examination of the patterns since 1992. Louise concludes that each of the regions in the northern Isthmus is at a different stage in the conflict management process, and that political experience has been a major factor in determining the nature of military trends. The three areas share a common problem in that they have poor border controls, which Louise calls the "single most important factor" (p. 6) inhibiting post-conflict reconstruction.

Also examined are the non-military trends and the phenomenon of societal militarisation. Since the 1980s, civilians in the region have been arming themselves and using small arms to further personal ambition or to defend their property. The result has been an arms race which has become endemic to the society (e.g., arming civilians in Chiapas, law and order problems in El Salvador, and increasing links with the drug trade).

Guatemala is examined as a case study. Calling it a state of insecurity, Louise examines several aspects of Guatemala's involvement with light weapons:

- 1) its involvement with both legal and illegal arms;
- 2) its increasing problems with criminal violence and organized crime;
- 3) its security forces;
- 4) its growing culture of violence.

Louise concludes that "...the process of micro-disarmament in the regions of central America covered by this study is as much a socio-psychological phenomenon as it is a military or legal determination" (p. 15). These two aspects must be addressed in future arms control efforts: the interdiction and control of light weapons proliferation (a law enforcement issue); and the acquisition and use of firearms (a human security issue). Endemic violence has been compounded by weak states unable to maintain a monopoly over the instruments of violence. Furthermore, micro-disarmament efforts must address the fact that light weapons proliferation is linked to other illegal activities (e.g., drug trafficking) and to economic problems. A holistic approach which addresses the whole spectrum of problems must be adopted if progress towards effective control is to be made.

- 618.** Mariño, Eduardo. "Arms and Drugs, the Nexus: Situations and Non-Policy Around the World." A Paper Presented at the BASIC Conference on Light Weapons Proliferation. London: June 30-July 2, 1996.

The link between drugs and arms shipments has been around since the opium wars of the nineteenth century. However, the link has prompted an increasing cycle of violence which has reached new heights in recent years. Divided into five parts, this article explores the arms and drugs nexus.

Part A is a close examination of armed conflicts around the world and it comments on the geographic dimensions of the problem. Designed to offer depth of coverage, the analysis begins in 1992.

Part B examines the financial aspect of the relationship between the drugs and the liberal arms market. Mariño concludes that the illegal trade of drugs is financing the legal trade in arms in many regions of the world.

Part C comments on the double standard in international law which is hard on drugs, and non-existent for light weapons. An appeal is made for treaties to control light weapons transfers which are similar in structure to treaties to curb the drug trade.

Part D summarizes the arguments made in the body of the paper. Several proposals are offered:

- 1) encourage further research on the link between drugs and light weapons trafficking;
- 2) test the hypothesis that the profits from the drug trade are a major driving force in the proliferation of light weapons;
- 3) invite discussion of a treaty to regulate all light weapons transfers.

Part E is a series of brief commentaries on incidents which demonstrate a link between the arms trade and drug trafficking. Several examples are given for countries in the following regions: Africa, Asia, Europe, Middle East, and the Americas.

- 619.** Mills, Greg, Glenn Oosthuysen and Jonathan Katzenellenbogen. "Disarmament and Arms Control in Africa: A South African Perspective." *Defence Analysis*. Vol. 12, No. 1, 1996, pp. 113-131.

The impact of small arms is of much greater concern to residents of the South African region than are weapons of mass destruction. Mozambique and Angola remain the main sources of the arms flooding into South Africa. The authors argue that "...in the long term this threat is to economic development; in the more immediate term the danger is posed by high and rising rates of armed crime" (p. 113). As a result, this article examines arms control and disarmament issues which have particular relevance to Africa.

A special section of the paper is devoted to analysing small arms proliferation. Four reasons are offered to account for the spread of small arms in the region:

- 1) the widespread conflicts in the region over the last thirty years;
- 2) radical political change and a move away from police control of the state;
- 3) reliance of the wealthy on private security firms for protection;
- 4) socio-economic decay.

While legislation to curb the spread of these weapons is not lacking, efforts must be directed at enforcing it.

The authors emphasize the need to create a new arms control agenda to address the proliferation of small arms in Africa. Failure to do so will result in the kind of violence which erupted in Rwanda. The route to effective arms control "...lies initially in the effective policing of the trade in and restrictions on the possession of weapons or, perhaps more effectively as a short-term measure, in the sale and export of ammunition. In the longer term the underlying causes of the conflict will have to be tackled. In South Africa, Mozambique, Angola and elsewhere that means full political rights for all, basic education, a buoyant economy and a strong welfare system" (p. 129).

- 620.** Potgieter, Jakkie. "Peacekeeping in Southern Africa: A Regional Model." In *Small Arms Management and Peacekeeping in Southern Africa (Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Geneva)*, [Serial No. 625], Christopher Smith, Peter Batchelor and Jakkie Potgieter, New York and Geneva: United Nations, 1996, pp. 99-114.

Conflict in the Southern Africa region has revolved around basic issues: ethnic and religious identity, nationalism, scarcity of resources, and internal wars. One of the most enduring legacies of past conflicts has been the availability of light weapons in large quantities. Potgieter argues that the countries of the region have realized that they must work together as a regional unit to solve their problems.

The article is divided into four sections. Section I outlines the regional peace and security efforts. Section II examines the implementation of cooperative security arrangements. Section III lists the factors to be considered in policy formulation for peacekeeping and relief operations in the region.

Finally, Section IV concludes the study. Potgieter emphasizes that "...only in a cooperative spirit and in an organized manner will the present violence, political instability, and increased light weapons proliferation be controlled and eventually reduced" (p. 113). The Southern African Development Community (SADC) remains, according to Potgieter, the only mechanism of the region to "...finally create the secure environment needed in order for stability and development to take root" (p. 114).

- 621.** Siddiqi-Agha, Ayesha. *Light Weapons Manufacture in the Public and Private Sectors: A View From Pakistan*. London: British American Security Information Council, February 1996.

The issue of small arms proliferation has just recently moved to the forefront of the arms control agenda. While most analyses have focused on the link between light weapons proliferation and political instability, this paper takes a different perspective. A case study of the public and private arms production in Pakistan, it examines the proliferation question from the manufacturers' perspective.

The Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF) are the main public sector producers of small arms. Structured to produce enough to equip the Pakistani army, this source of arms does not run at full capacity, is expensive to run, and is in need of an organizational overhaul.

Production in the private sector is divided into two sections. Organized manufacturers consist of all legal arms manufacturers. Unlike the POF, they have profit as a driving force, but excessive government regulations and taxes limit financial viability. In contrast, the unorganized private sector is not limited by government interference. The Darra Adam Khel area, where Pakistani law is not enforced, is a major producer of small arms. Managed strictly according to profit motives, most of the work is done by hand or with primitive tools, but remains of a high quality. While the public sector manufacturers produce only for the army, the private sector producers have four potential markets:

- 1) license holders;
- 2) terrorists and criminals;
- 3) influential people;
- 4) populations in regions of tension.

Although attempts have been made to control weapons proliferation, the efforts have been plagued by inconsistency. Constantly changing laws and lawmakers, compounded by corruption, befuddle law enforcement agencies. Siddiqa-Agha suggests that a successful effort to dissuade manufacturers from producing light weapons is "highly unlikely" (p. 9). Instead, efforts should be made to provide manufacturers with financial or business incentives that will make the illegal purchaser market undesirable (e.g., the Pakistani government could agree to buy a given number of independently produced weapons, provided that weapons were not sold to anyone else). It may be possible to limit proliferation by controlling the private manufacturers by "presenting them with better opportunities to make their profit" (p. 9).

622. Siddiqa-Agha, Ayesha. "Light Weapons Proliferation and Control in South Asia: The Three Dimensions." A Paper Presented at the BASIC Conference on Light Weapons Proliferation. London: June 30-July 2, 1996.

Siddiqa-Agha argues that there is a strong link between the Cold War and the post Cold War with regards to light weapons. He offers three ways to explain the linkage:

- 1) some of the conflicts in which light weapons are being used were started with the Cold War;
- 2) local conflicts were fuelled by light weapons shipments from the two superpowers;
- 3) matters not dealt with during the Cold War still threaten international peace and security.

In working towards a solution, light weapons proliferation must be viewed from a structural perspective. To this end, the paper is organized around five questions: How did the problem start? What are its implications? What are the main determinants of the light weapons trade? What kind of actors are involved in it? How can it be controlled? As a case study, the South Asian region is studied in detail.

Part I examines the causes and implications of light weapons proliferation from a variety of perspectives. The international connection is examined by describing the links between the Afghan crisis and the current light weapons problem. During this crisis, the United States shipped in vast amounts of weapons to help the *mujahideen* fight Soviet troops. This support supplied vast amounts of weaponry and demonstrated that low-intensity conflict can be successful, resulting in an increasing cycle of violence. The inter-state/regional connection is discussed in the context of the tension between Pakistan and India. In this political environment, light weapons have become tools in the hands of each government to pursue their political and military goals. Finally, the link between light weapons proliferation and its impact on society is examined. It is argued that the availability of weapons can deepen existing tensions.

Part II examines the dynamics of proliferation. The demand-supply network is described in detail and three different stages are analysed: end-users; manufacturers; suppliers.

Part III focuses on ways to control proliferation, arguing that any effective strategy must be multi-layered. Three perspectives necessary for such a strategy are discussed. First, at the national level, efforts must be made to create and then enforce laws to curb the problem of light weapons proliferation. The creation of a special anti-light weapons task force is suggested to combat the problem. Second, at the regional

level, efforts should be directed at reinforcing national initiatives (e.g., a network of non-governmental organizations can work on the same problem). Finally, at the international level, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank should play a vital role in raising the profile of light weapons issues. Siddiqa-Agha concludes that all three of these levels must work in concert for any progress to be made in controlling the proliferation of light weapons.

- 623.** Singh, Jasjit. "Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons." A Paper Presented at the Eighth Regional Disarmament Meeting in the Asia-Pacific Region. Kathmandu: February 21-24, 1996.

The starting premise of this paper is that "...the most serious threat to peace and security at the international, national, and societal levels emanates from the phenomenal proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the world" (p. 1). Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a decline in the number of conflicts; most are now intrastate in character, and are conducted in an irregular manner. Small arms and light weapons have figured prominently in these conflicts.

Ironically, disarmament and demobilization efforts in the wake of the Cold War have contributed to the proliferation of light weapons. For example, the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty rendered huge stocks of light weapons superfluous, but rather than destroy these weapons, many states elected to sell them at reduced prices. Efforts to control the problem must address two issues: the diffusion of arms that have already taken place; and the spread of light weapons that will take place in the future. Unfortunately, control efforts will be hampered by a number of factors. For example, states no longer have a monopoly over the instruments of violence. In addition, since small arms and light weapons are the main weapons of police and security forces, there will continue to be technological improvements in the lethality of these weapons.

Very little has been done to curb the proliferation of light weapons. While some progress can be made at the national level, "... real solutions can only evolve out of international consultation and co-operation" (p. 8). In the meantime, the dangers associated with light weapons proliferation must be publicized.

Singh offers two approaches to manage the proliferation of light weapons. First, transparency and accountability should be pursued, most likely in the form of a United Nations register of light weapons. Second, categorisation and classification of light weapons are essential, and, therefore, a universally accepted definition of light weapons must be formulated.

- 624.** Smith, Christopher. "Light Weapons and the International Arms Trade." In *Small Arms Management and Peacekeeping in Southern Africa (Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Geneva)*, [Serial No. 625], Christopher Smith, Peter Batchelor and Jakkie Potgieter, New York and Geneva: United Nations, 1996, pp. 1-59.

The impact and social cost of light weapons proliferation have increased dramatically since the end of the Cold War. However, these weapons have been largely ignored by the international community for the last fifty years in the context of concern over weapons of mass destruction and major conventional weapons. In the new security environment, it is no longer common to have to deal with interstate conflict. Instead, the international community must devise "...ways and means of preventing low-intensity conflict" (p. 4).

This article is divided into several sections (the first of which was the introduction). Section II details the characteristics of light weapons. Section III examines the global proliferation of light weapons stocks. The methodology employed is to examine a series of regions and compare and contrast the results (e.g., Europe and the former Soviet Union, Asia, Latin America, Middle East and North Africa, Africa). Section IV analyses peacekeeping and arms control efforts in Southern Africa using various examples: Mozambique, Namibia, Angola and Rhodesia. Section V examines regional peacekeeping and the implications for South Africa. Smith notes the existence of a huge influx of arms from Mozambique and Angola to South Africa. Several related issues are also investigated:

- 1) firearms trafficking and light weapons proliferation;
- 2) political and criminal factors which underlie demands for light weapons;
- 3) light weapons proliferation and its impact on civil society in South Africa and Swaziland.

Smith argues that while the peacekeeping expeditions to the region were successful with regards to ensuring elections, they failed with regards to disarmament. In the future, the UN must "...summon the

political and financial resources to ensure that weapons are collected and successfully decommissioned" (p. 57). This effort will be complicated by the increased financial burden and the increased cost in human lives (i.e., of UN peacekeepers). He concludes by offering several suggestions to govern future efforts:

- 1) disarmament goals should be clearly defined for each UN mission;
- 2) policies should be clear on how recovered weapons will be destroyed;
- 3) peacekeeping operations should receive the financial backing necessary to undertake effective disarmament;
- 4) demobilization must address the issue of weapons caches to avoid having them released after peace talks.

- 625.** Smith, Christopher, Peter Batchelor and Jakkie Potgieter. *Small Arms Management and Peacekeeping in Southern Africa (Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Geneva)*. New York and Geneva: United Nations, 1996.

This study is divided into three separate chapters, written by three different authors: Christopher Smith, "Light Weapons and the International Arms Trade" [Serial No. 624]; Peter Batchelor, "Disarmament, Small Arms, and Intra-State Conflict: The Case of Southern Africa" [Serial No. 601]; and, Jakkie Potgieter, "Peacekeeping in Southern Africa: A Regional Model" [Serial No. 620].

The introduction to this study, however, outlines some general points which are relevant to all three articles. Most importantly, it must be emphasized that the Southern Africa region is flooded with weapons left over from the proxy battles of the Cold War. To understand the current situation, researchers must focus on three issues:

- 1) the initial influx of weapons during the Cold War and the linkages of these arms policies to ongoing national struggles for political determination;
- 2) the second influx of light weapons (legal and illegal) which occurred during the lax security environment immediately following the end of the Cold War;
- 3) the fluid movement of light weapons within the region after peace settlements failed to enforce stringent demobilization and disarmament plans.

- 626.** Smith, Dan. "Light Weapons and Arms Control." *Disarmament Diplomacy*. March 1996, pp. 5-7.

Smith argues that the profile of the problems associated with light weapons proliferation must be raised. A new arms control framework must be created to deal with these weapons rather than amending the ones used to regulate major weapons systems and weapons of mass destruction. Formulating such a framework will be complicated by the fact that the causes of light weapons proliferation are so diverse: "In Southern Africa, the problem is peace. In Pakistan and northwest India, the problem is a continuing war. In the former USSR, it is an underpaid and demotivated army" (p. 6).

He advocates a role for the Conference on Disarmament in searching for an adequate model. Four policy options are presented, all of which share a common theme of treating light weapons proliferation as lawlessness:

- 1) chart the true dimensions of the problem;
- 2) consider the capacity of states to address the issue (i.e., financially, technologically);
- 3) examine international manufacturing standards to evaluate the possibility of including ways to track the weapons;
- 4) establish an international legal framework to confront the problem.

The Conference on Disarmament, Smith concludes, would be an appropriate place to begin.

- 627.** Spear, Joanna. "Arms Limitations, Confidence-Building Measures, and Internal Conflict." In *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict*, ed. Michael E. Brown, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1996, pp. 377-410.

Spear analyses the role of weapons in internal conflicts throughout the life cycle of the armaments, from production and transfer, through deployment and use, to disarmament. Light weapons are defined as "...small

arms, machine guns, grenades, land mines, artillery, shoulder-fired anti-tank weapons, and other forms of man- and truck-portable weapons" (p. 377). The article is divided into five sections.

Part I examines the relationship between arms and conflict. Arms can play one of three roles in internal conflict:

- 1) they can be the proximate cause (i.e., one side arms, causing the other side to carry out a preemptive strike);
- 2) they can be the permissive cause (i.e., weapons exacerbate an existing conflict);
- 3) they can determine the duration and intensity of the conflict.

Part II focuses on the changing patterns of arms supply. The post Cold War arms market is weighted in the buyers' favour in two respects: overproduction capacity and stockpiles of surplus weapons. The result has been an intense competition for arms contracts to employ surplus production capacity. Sales to unstable areas, the resurgence of the black market in weapons, and a decline in the capacity of supplier states to regulate their trade, have followed.

Part III discusses two ways to manipulate the trade in light weapons to resolve internal conflicts: imposition of arms embargoes, and strategic manipulation of weapons supplies. Unfortunately, the illegal market and existing stockpiles of weapons diminish the effectiveness of both of these strategies. Easy access to large numbers of small arms must be curtailed to enable the strategic manipulation of arms.

Part IV posits three initiatives to manage and control the light weapons trade. First, tighten national controls over light weapons transfers to curtail the black market. Second, expand the scope of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms to include light weapons. Third, develop an early warning system for internal conflicts (to include information on patterns of arms purchases, types of deployments, and the formation, training, arming and activities of militia groups).

Part V argues that confidence and security building measures are essential to diminishing the scope and severity of internal conflicts. Two options are examined: coercive (e.g., Somalia) and cooperative (e.g., Haiti) disarmament. Spear maintains that neither option has been completely successful in the past, but efforts must continue.

628. Ukwall-Uebelhart, Barbara, Andrei Raevsky and Jakkie Potgieter. *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Geneva)*. New York and Geneva: United Nations, 1996.

This report is divided into three parts. Part I is a case study of disarmament efforts in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. It details the background to the conflict, and the role of UNPROFOR (United Nations Protection Force) in brokering a peace plan. The focus, however, is on disarmament. This paper "...proposes to review the problems that UNPROFOR encountered in carrying out its mandate, to analyze the failures and successes of its disarmament operations and to assess the contributions of disarmament towards confidence building and conflict resolution" (p. 5). The fundamental argument is that disarmament was a critical factor in the success of the peacekeeping operation. A chapter is devoted both to the UN mission in Croatia and to the one in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In these two chapters, "...an attempt will be made to show the relationship between, and the evolution of, the events, the mandate, and the implementation of the mandate with particular emphasis on its disarmament components" (p. 6). The next three chapters each focus on specific disarmament operations (Sector West around the border between Bosnia and Croatia, Srebrenica, and Croatia) "...with a view toward identifying commonalities and the pertinence of the UNPROFOR model for other disarmament operations" (p. 7).

It is emphasized that disarmament was achieved "...during the presence of a real or perceived superior UNPROFOR strength, and with a credible threat of forceful implementation" (p. 152). For disarmament efforts to be effective, the multinational force must adequately address the security concerns of all parties involved. Two key elements must both be present for success: "(1) a mutually acceptable agreement which met the parties' interest; and, (2) the credible threat, or use, or force to compel the implementation of the agreement" (p. 153).

Part II is a bibliography. Part III duplicates the responses to a questionnaire of the role of UNPROFOR.

629. Vines, Alex. "Light Weapons Transfers, Human Rights Violations and Armed Banditry in Southern Africa." A Paper Presented at the BASIC Conference on Light Weapons Proliferation. London: June 30-July 2, 1996.

This paper examines the "...two main sources of light weapons in southern Africa and their impact on the region, and especially South Africa, which remains the main market" (p. 1). Both Angola and Mozambique, the two countries where most of the arms shipments to South Africa originate, are examined in detail. The internal conflicts in both Angola and Mozambique are analysed, along with commentary on the following:

- 1) effectiveness of arms embargoes (negligible);
- 2) disarmament efforts;
- 3) availability of guns;
- 4) re-integration of former combatants into civilian life;
- 5) increased armed crime;
- 6) role of the police;
- 7) military corruption.

Despite efforts over the last several years to curb the proliferation of light weapons, most of the weapons leaving Mozambique find their way to South Africa. Within South Africa itself, arms are stolen from legal owners (e.g., private security forces) and compound local problems. For example, the link between light weapons and drug trafficking continues to strengthen, with destructive results.

Several conclusions are offered:

- 1) social and economic forces fuel the demand for light weapons and must be addressed before progress can be made;
- 2) in both Angola and Mozambique, disarmament efforts have been anaemic. These efforts must be improved to avoid a further escalation of the arms trade with South Africa;
- 3) since ex-combatants are responsible for most violent crime, efforts must be made to re-integrate them into society;
- 4) more research must be done to determine the scope of the small arms trade in the region;
- 5) state armouries must be better protected against internal theft;
- 6) corruption within state police and security forces must be eradicated;
- 7) research must be done to explore the link between weapons availability and political violence;
- 8) a regional arms register should be created to include small arms transfers.

630. Volman, Daniel. "The Light Weapons Trade in Africa." A Paper Presented at the International Studies Association Annual Meeting. San Diego, California: April 17, 1996.

Violence has been escalating since the end of the Cold War and light weapons proliferation has played a critical role. This paper examines the evolution of the African arms trade "...to understand the reasons for these changes, to define the new patterns of the arms trade, and to analyze the impact of these developments on the nature of conflict throughout the continent" (p. 1).

The nature of the arms trade is determined both by external and by internal factors. During the Cold War African countries received weapons from the superpowers at concessionary rates. With the end of the Cold War, these subsidized transfers declined dramatically, making major purchases too expensive. As a result, states are more susceptible to armed challenges from insurgents. Internal factors, such as increased economic challenges and political problems, have made recruiting insurgents easier.

Three characteristics of the arms trade since the end of the Cold War are outlined:

- 1) a diversification of sources (i.e., an increase in the number of suppliers);
- 2) a shift towards light weaponry;
- 3) a growing link with crime (e.g., drug trafficking).

Each of these factors has a negative impact on the stability of African countries. This instability has been compounded by easy access to light weapons, making recourse to violence as a political tool likely.

As criminal and insurgent groups expand, they form "conflict clusters" or "spill-over zones" which span international boundaries. Several examples are detailed: North Africa and Western Europe; West Africa; Horn of Africa; Central Africa; and Southern Africa. The scale of the problem affects the global community (e.g., mass migration, need for aid, increase in illegal drug smuggling). The main problem is that no controls exist to

regulate the trade in light weapons. To further compound the problem, control efforts will also have to address the fact that controlling light weapons proliferation will eliminate many jobs in an area desperate for employment opportunities.

631. Wang, Jianwei, Col. R. Bendini, Lt. Col. I. Tiihonen and Jakkie Potgieter. *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Cambodia (Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Geneva)*. New York and Geneva: United Nations, 1996.

Conflict resolution has been viewed as a political problem. Thus, when the political difficulties are resolved, policy makers have concluded that there is no need to look at disarmament efforts since the reason for their use is gone. However, this project's authors contend that managing the primary tools of violence must be a priority in peace-building (i.e., must focus on long-term stability, rather than short-term needs).

The authors contend that there are three primary aspects which must be included in every approach to intra-state conflict resolution: "(1) the implementation of a comprehensive, systematic disarmament program as soon as a peace operation is set-up; (2) the establishment of an arms management program that continues into national post-conflict reconstruction processes; and (3) the encouragement of close cooperation on weapons control and management programs between countries in the region where the peace operation is being implemented [emphasis in the original]" (p. xv).

This is a case study of Cambodia and the United Nations involvement in establishing stability until democratic elections could be held (1992). The background, road to the peace agreement, peace agreement in practice, and end of the mission are all examined. In the end, disarmament proved impossible. It is concluded that the UN force "...realized its major objective of establishing a legitimate Cambodian government through democratic election" (p. 82). However, from a disarmament perspective, the mission was a failure.

A bibliography of sources is included along with a questionnaire analysis section (i.e., the data used to construct the report).

Part C

World Wide Web Sites

WWW-1. *Bibliography of Works on Small Arms and Light Weapons.*

URL: <http://cns.miis.edu/cns/pacdc/milbib.html>

Program for Arms Control, Disarmament, and Conversion (PACDC)
425 Van Buren Street,
Monterey, CA, USA
93940
Phone: (408) 647-3589
E-mail: (Centre for Nonproliferation Studies) cns@miis.edu

This web-site lists thirty-eight articles, conference papers, and reports relevant to the study of small arms and light weapons. This list format will remain in place until the Monterey Institute for International Studies (MIIS) and the Program for Arms Control, Disarmament, and Conversion are able to obtain the software necessary to make this web-site searchable. In the meantime, PACDC will "... periodically place on this page short bibliographies on selected topics on the arms trade."

WWW-2. *British American Security Information Council (BASIC).*

URL: <http://www.igc.apc.org/basic/>

USA: 1900L Street NW, Suite 401
Washington, DC, USA
20036

UK: Carrara House
20 Embankment Place
London, England,
WC 2N 6NN

Phone: USA: +1 (202) 785-1266 UK: +44 (171) 925-0862
Fax: USA: +1 (202) 387-6287 UK: +44 (171) 925-0861
E-mail: USA: basicusa@igc.apc.org UK: basic@gn.apc.org

This is the main web site for the organization. It includes references to the latest BASIC publications and a summary of BASIC's goals: "BASIC works to promote public awareness of defense, disarmament, military strategy, and nuclear policies in order to foster informed debate on these issues." The organization hopes to help influence policy makers to "...take full advantage of the opportunities for disarmament and cooperation." As one of the key non-governmental organizations supporting research in the field of small arms and light weapons, this web-site is an invaluable link to other researchers working in the field.

WWW-3. *Center for Defense Information (CDI) Arms Trade Database.*

URL: <http://www.cdi.org/atdb/>

1500 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC
20005
Phone: (202) 862-0700

E-mail: disenber@cdi.org
Contact: David Isenberg

Founded in 1972, the Center for Defense Information is an independent monitor of the United States military. This site's purpose is to "...inform the public, media, scholars, and governmental officials about the conventional arms trade." Ultimately, CDI hopes to help restrain conventional arms proliferation. This site is particularly useful for its links to other resources. Researchers will be interested in examining CDI's Arms Trade Citation List which includes specific references on light weapons publications. Included also are links to CDI's Arms Trade Database, a searchable arms trade database, and to other arms trade sites on the web.

WWW-4. *Federation of American Scientists: Light Weapons Diffusion and Global Violence.*

URL: http://www.fas.org/light_weapons/index.html

307 Massachusetts Ave., NE
Washington, DC
20002
Phone: (202) 675-1018
Fax: (202) 675-1010
E-mail: llumpe@fas.org
Contact: Lora Lumpe

The post Cold War world has seen an increase in the size and severity of internecine conflict. The goal of this site is to increase awareness of the dangers posed by the easy availability of light weapons and their role in fuelling conflict. This goal "...will be achieved through the development of a database on international light arms transfers and publication of a series of in-depth regional case studies, the first of which will cover light weapons trade in Latin America."

WWW-5. *Micro-disarmament.*

URL: <http://cns.miis.edu/cns/pacdc/microdisarm/default.html>

425 Van Buren Street
Monterey, CA, USA
93940
Phone: (408) 647-3589
E-mail: (Centre for Nonproliferation Studies) cns@miis.edu

This web-site was created by a department of the Monterey Institute of International Studies (MIIS), the Program for Arms Control, Disarmament, and Conversion (PACDC). This organization "... conducts research in support of the United Nations Centre for Disarmament Affairs, including the new initiative of the U.N. Secretary General on micro-disarmament which calls for policies and measures addressing the casualties and damage resulting from the excessive proliferation and accumulation of light weapons." The PACDC is currently researching several projects: a case study of the role of light weapons in El Salvador; a study of micro-disarmament prepared for the Federal Republic of Germany; and, finally, an examination of gun buy-back programs.

PART D

AUTHOR INDEX

This section is an alphabetical listing of the personal or corporate authors of the documents in Part A (United Nations, Regional Organizations, and Other International Arrangements), and Part B (Scholarly Studies). Serial numbers listed after each author's name refer the reader to the articles annotated in parts A and B. The serial numbers in which "I" appears (e.g., I-1) refer to the items from Part A. The numeric references correspond to the serial numbers in Part B. Numbers in the 300 series refer to items published in 1993. Similarly, numbers in the 400 series indicate items published in 1994, and so on through the 600 series which represents items available in 1996. This numbering system makes possible quick reference from the index. For instance, the following reference appears in this index:

Kartha, Tara: 302, 517, 610.

By virtue of the initial digits in these serial numbers, the researcher can determine that the annotations associated with Kartha correspond to three articles, published in 1993, 1995, and 1996 respectively — and these annotations can be found in Part B.

- Adibe, Clement: 501.
Anderson, David: 613.
Batchelor, Peter: 601, 625.
Bendini, Col. R.: 631.
Berman, Eric: 602.
Boutros-Ghali, Boutros: I-5, I-8.
Boutwell, Jeffrey: 502, 603.
Brady, Bronwyn: 503.
Cock, Jacklyn: 504.
Dikshit, Prashant: 401, 505.
Dyer, Susannah L.: 506-508, 603, 604.
Ezell, Virginia Hart: 509.
Gamba, Virginia: 605.
García-Peña Jaramillo, Daniel: 510.
Ginifer, Jeremy: 511.
Goldring, Natalie J.: 507, 508, 512, 603, 604, 606.
Gonchar, Ksonia: 513.
Goose, Stephen D.: 402.
Greene, Owen: 607.
Husbands, Jo L.: 514, 608.
Johnston, Joel: 609.
Karp, Aaron: 301, 403, 515, 516.
Kartha, Tara: 302, 517, 610.
Katzenellenbogen, Jonathan: 619.
Klare, Michael T.: 404, 502, 512, 518-522, 611-613.
Latham, Andrew: 614, 615.
Laurance, Edward J.: 523-525, 616.
Lock, Peter: 513, 526.
Louise, Christopher: 527, 617.
Mariño, Eduardo: 618.
Mathiak, Lucy: 528.
Mills, Greg: 405, 619.
Morrison, David D.: 529.
Nassauer, Otfried: 512.
Naylor, R.T.: 530.
Neuman, Stephanie G.: 531.
Oosthuysen, Glenn: 619.
Potgieter, Jakkie: 501, 511, 605, 620, 625, 628, 631.
Raevsky, Andrei: 628.
Rana, Swadesh: 532.
Reed, Laura W.: 502.
Siddiqa-Agha, Ayesha: 621, 622.
Singh, Jasjit: 533-535, 623.
Smith, Christopher: 303, 406, 536, 537, 624, 625.
Smith, Dan: 626.
Smyth, Frank: 402.
Spear, Joanna: 627.
Tiihonen, Lt. Col. I.: 631.
Ukwall-Uebelhart, Barbara: 628.
United Nations General Assembly: I-1, I-2, I-3, I-4, I-7.
United Nations Secretary General: I-5, I-6, I-8.
Vines, Alex: 629.
Volman, Daniel: 630.
Wang, Jianwei: 631.
Williams, Rocklyn: 538.
Wulf, Herbert: 539.

PART E

SUBJECT INDEX

This section is an alphabetically organized subject keyword index. Items listed in this section appear in the text of the annotations in Parts A (United Nations, Regional Organizations, and Other International Arrangements), B (Scholarly studies), and C (World Wide Web sites), and fit into at least one of the following categories:

- 1) a nation or region which is mentioned in the text of a study;
- 2) a group involved in the study of small arms and light weapons (e.g., the British American Security Information Council (BASIC));
- 3) a treaty or plan designed to confront the problem of small arms proliferation, for example, the New Forum agreement (now termed the Wassenaar Arrangement); or
- 4) an important term used in the discussion of small arms and light weapons proliferation.

Serial numbers corresponding to relevant annotations follow each keyword. United Nations Documents and other entries from Part A are indicated with "I" before the number (e.g., I-1). Scholarly articles are indicated by the serial number between 300 and 630. Numbers in the 300 series refer to items published in 1993. Similarly, numbers in the 400 series indicate items published in 1994, and so on through the 600 series which represents items available in 1996. Serial numbers which begin with "WWW" (e.g., WWW-1) refer the researcher to world wide web sites from Part C of the *Bibliography*. Thus, as with the author index, the serial numbers allow the researcher to determine what type of item is listed, and in the case of scholarly articles, the year an article appeared. For example, the following reference appears in the keyword index:

Center for Defense Information (CDI): 524, 616, WWW-3.

From the numbers listed it is possible to determine that this organization is mentioned in two articles (published in 1995 and 1996) and in a web-site. In addition, acronyms have been included twice: according to their acronym (e.g., BASIC), and according to their full name (e.g., British American Security Information Council). This format allows the keyword index to function as a glossary of acronyms.

ACDA (U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency): 512.

Afghanistan: 303, 401, 505, 517, 536, 537, 610.

Africa: 401, 402, 405, 406, 501, 504, 505, 508, 528, 538, 601, 603, 618, 620, 624-626, 629, 630.

African National Congress (ANC): 405.

ammunition: 303, 404, 406, 502, 504, 537, 538, 602, 610, 619.

ANC (African National Congress): 405.

Angola: 504, 505, 520, 528, 538, 601, 619, 624, 629.

armed violence: 520.

arms trade: I-9, 301, 302, 403, 404, 406, 504, 513, 515, 519, 522, 523, 526, 530, 531, 538, 611, 614, 618, 624, 625, 629, 630, WWW-1, WWW-3.

Asia: 303, 502, 505, 508, 517, 535-537, 603, 618, 622-624.

assault rifles: 405, 525.

Austria: I-12.

Bangkok: 507.

Bangladesh: 401.

BASIC (British American Security Information Council): 503-508, 512, 517, 520, 533-535, 604-610, 617, 618, 621, 622, 629, WWW-2.

bibliography: 501, 502, 511, 512, 534, 608, 616, 625, 628, 631, WWW-1.

BICC (Bonn International Center for Conversion): 524, 539, 616, WWW-1, WWW-5.

Bihar: 303.

black market: 301, 404, 506, 507, 512, 514, 518, 520-522, 530, 531, 533, 604, 610-614, 627.

Bombay: 303, 537.

Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC): 524, 539, WWW-1, WWW-5.

border controls: 504, 507, 533, 538, 604, 613, 617.

Bosnia: 401, 505, 520, 628.

Bosnia-Herzegovina: 628.

Brazil: 613.
 British American Security Information Council
 (BASIC): 503-508, 512, 517, 520,
 533-535, 604-610, 617, 618, 621, 622,
 629, WWW-2.
 Cambodia: 401, 505, 631.
 carbines: 405, 525.
 CD (Conference on Disarmament): 626.
 CDI (Center for Defense Information): 524, 616,
 WWW-3.
 Ceasefire: 504, 605.
 Center for Defense Information (CDI): 524, 616,
 WWW-3.
 Central Africa: 630.
 Central America: 613, 617.
 CFE (Conventional Forces in Europe) Treaty:
 524, 623.
 Chile: 613.
 China: 504, 523.
 civil war: 511, 515, 528, 602.
 civilian casualties: I-11, 527.
 COCOM (Coordinating Committee on Export
 Controls): 506, 507, 604.
 Cold War: 403, 404, 515, 516, 521, 523, 525,
 534, 604, 610, 611, 613, 616, 623, 624,
 625, 630.
 Committee on International Security Studies: 502,
 510, 513, 514, 515, 518, 523, 528, 530,
 537.
 Conference on Disarmament (CD): 626.
 confidence building measures: 614, 627.
 Congressional Research Service (CRS): 512.
 control measures: I-3, I-4.
 Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE):
 524, 623.
 Coordinating Committee on Export Controls
 (COCOM): 506, 507, 604.
 corruption: I-9, 536, 621, 629.
 covert assistance: 514.
 criminal activity: I-5, 525.
 Croatia: 628.
 CRS (Congressional Research Service): 512.
 Cuba: 504, 613.
 Darra: 621.
 data collection: 515, 516, 603.
 definition/defines: 401, 505, 515, 516, 521, 522,
 525, 527, 531, 533-535, 606, 612, 614,
 616, 623.
 demilitarization: 511, 532.
 demobilization: 538, 608, 616, 623-625.
 deployment: 404, 501, 616, 627.
 destabilizing accumulations of arms: 611.
 disarmament: I-4, I-5, I-6, I-7, I-8, 405, 501, 504,
 507, 511, 512, 525, 526, 532, 536, 601,
 602, 605, 608, 614-617, 619, 620,
 623-629, 631, WWW-1, WWW-2,
 WWW-5.
 Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project: 501,
 511, 601, 602, 620, 624, 625, 628, 631.
 domestic arms production: 520, 613.
 Dominican Republic: 613.
 drug smuggling/drug trade/drug trafficking: I-1,
 I-10, 302, 406, 510, 517, 531, 533, 535,
 536, 606, 611, 617-619, 630.
 economic development: 303, 619.
 Egypt: 402.
 El Salvador: 525, 616, 617, WWW-5.
 embargoes: I-9, 506, 514, 520, 604, 627,
 629.
 end-users: I-9, 526, 622.
 Europe: 406, 523, 524, 526, 613, 618, 623, 624,
 630.
 export controls: 301, 403, 506, 507, 514, 533,
 604, 613, 614.
 FNLA (National Front for the Liberation of
 Angola): 528.
 Former Soviet Union (FSU): 406, 513, 518, 624.
 France: 402.
 FSU (former Soviet Union): 406, 513, 518, 624.
 genocide: 402.
 Guatemala: 613, 617.
 guerrilla: 510, 613.
 Gulf War: 523.
 gun buy-back programs: 303, 524, 525, 538,
 WWW-5.
 Haiti: 616, 627.
 hand grenades: 404, 525, 627.
 hand guns: 302, 404, 405, 503, 510, 525, 537,
 613, 614, 627, 629.
 high-technology light weapons: 606.
 Honduras: 613.
 Horn of Africa: 630.
 humanitarian field: 523.
 IISS (International Institute for Strategic Studies):
 512.
 illegal arms trafficking: 611.
 illicit transfer: I-2, I-4, I-9.
 IMF (International Monetary Fund): 622.
 India: 303, 401, 503-505, 507, 508, 517, 520,
 533-537, 610, 622, 626.
 Indian Pugwash Society: 503-505, 507, 508, 517,
 520, 533-535.
 Inhumane Weapons Convention: 521, 607.
 insurgency: 532, 613.
 insurgent groups: 301, 505, 510, 525, 630.
 inter-state: 513, 521, 522, 535, 622, 624.
 internal conflict: see intra-state.
 International Commission on Rwanda: 616.

International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS): 512.

International Monetary Fund (IMF): 622.

international norms: 607.

International Police (INTERPOL): I-9, 512.

internecine conflict: 403, 515, 516, 531, 614, WWW-4.

INTERPOL (International Police): 512.

intra-state: 501, 516, 520, 521, 523, 524, 531, 532, 535, 601, 611, 616, 623, 625, 631.

inventories: 520.

Iran-Contra Affair: 512, 613.

irregular war: 535.

Israel: 613.

Kashmir: 303, 536, 612.

landmines: I-5, 301, 402, 404, 501, 504, 507, 511, 520, 521, 522, 524, 525, 531, 601, 602, 604, 610, 611, 613, 616-622, 624, 627, 629, 630.

Latin America: 613, 624, WWW-4.

lethality: 401, 520, 522, 527, 532, 534, 535, 611, 623.

Liberia: 520, 612.

light anti-tank missiles: 525.

light weapons trafficking: 514, 522, 523, 611, 612, 618.

machine guns: 404, 503, 525, 627.

major conventional weapons: I-2, I-5, 301, 402, 403, 406, 501, 506, 507, 510, 512, 514-516, 520-524, 527, 531-533, 535, 538, 539, 603, 604, 611-614, 617, 618, 621, 624, 626, 630, 631.

Mali: I-3, 501, 505, 520, 616, 627.

Mexico: 613.

Miami: 507.

micro-disarmament: I-5, I-8, 525, 614, 616, 617, WWW-5.

Middle East: 618, 624.

MIIS (Monterey Institute of International Studies): 525, 6161, WWW-5.

militants: 517.

military sales: 507, 604.

Monterey Institute of International Studies (MIIS): 525, 616, WWW-5.

Mozambique: 504, 505, 538, 601, 602, 619, 624, 629.

Mujahideen: 537, 622.

Namibia: 504, 601, 624.

narcotics: 510, 517, 529, 535.

National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA): 528.

National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA): 528.

NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization): 401, 505, 534, 535, 539.

New Forum: 507.

Nicaragua: 613, 616.

North Africa: 624, 630.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO): 401, 505, 534, 535, 539.

North Vietnam: 301.

North West Frontier Province (NWFP): 302.

northern South Asia: 537.

NWFP (North West Frontier Province): 302.

OAS (Organization of American States): 532.

Organization of American States (OAS): 532.

oversight: 506, 507, 601, 604.

P5 (Permanent Five) Talks: 403, 515, 523.

Pakistan: 302, 303, 401, 517, 536, 537, 610, 621, 622, 626.

para-police: 533.

paramilitary: 520, 525.

peace building: 504, 605, 616, 631.

peace enforcement: 605.

peace-keeping: 511, 531, 601, 602, 605, 616, 620, 624, 625, 628.

Permanent Five (P5) Talks: 403, 515, 523.

personal security: I-8, 537, 616.

Peru: 613.

police: I-10, 405, 504, 508, 510, 512, 525, 533, 603, 619, 623, 629.

policy makers: 301, 403, 506, 507, 523, 539, 607, 631, WWW-2.

post-Cold War: I-5, 301, 402, 502, 506, 507, 518-520, 522, 524, 526, 527, 530-532, 535, 538, 539, 612, 614, 622, 627, WWW-4.

private companies: 530, 531.

private dealers: I-9, 530.

private security firms: 405, 504, 518, 619.

proxy battles: 625.

Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs: 507, 508, 517, 533.

Punjab: 303, 536, 537.

regional arms register: 504, 629.

regular war: 535.

Rhodesia: 511, 538, 624.

rocket-propelled grenades: 525.

Russia: 513, 518, 529.

Rwanda: 402, 520, 612, 616, 619.

SADC (Southern African Development Community): 620.

Saharo-Sahelion region: I-6.

shoulder-fired antiaircraft missiles: 525.

Sikh separatism: 537.

Sind Province: 303, 536.

SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute): 512, 614.
 small caliber mortars: 525.
 social development: 527, 616.
 social disintegration: 527.
 societal violence: 527, 536, 613, 614.
 socio-economic problems: 538.
 Somalia: 501, 505, 520, 627.
 South Africa: 402, 405, 406, 504, 505, 528, 538, 619, 624, 629.
 South Asia: 303, 502, 536, 537, 622.
 Southern Africa: 504, 508, 538, 601, 603, 620, 624-626, 629, 630.
 Southern African Development Community (SADC): 620.
 Southern Asia: 505, 508, 517, 535, 603.
 Southern Mexican Region of Chiapas: 617.
 Soviet Union: 406, 513, 518, 624.
 Srebrenica: 628.
 Sri Lanka: 401.
 stability: I-1, I-8, 302, 303, 402, 403, 602, 613, 620, 621, 630, 631.
 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI): 512, 614.
 stockpiles: 405, 513, 526, 531, 610, 611, 627.
 submachine guns: 525.
 superpowers: 303, 505, 519, 520, 527, 528, 534, 613, 622, 630.
 supplier controls: 526, 532.
 supplier restraint: 506.
 supply-side controls: 514, 530.
 Tajikistan: 610.
 technology: 403, 520, 521, 526, 527, 532, 534, 604, 606, 611.
 terrorist: 621.
 transparency: I-12, 402, 506, 507, 521, 523, 533, 534, 604, 606, 607, 610, 613, 614, 616, 623.
 U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA): 512.
 Uganda: 402.
 UNCDA (United Nations Centre of Disarmament Affairs): 525.
 UNDC (United Nations Disarmament Commission): 616.
 underground economy: 518, 530.
 UNIDIR (United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research): 501, 506, 511, 532, 601, 602, 605, 620, 624, 625, 628, 631.
 UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola): 528.
 United Nations Centre of Disarmament Affairs (UNCDA): 525.
 United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC): 616.
 United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR): 501, 506, 511, 532, 601, 602, 605, 620, 624, 625, 628, 631.
 United Nations Operations in Mozambique (UNOMOZ): 602.
 United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR): 628.
 United Nations Register of Conventional Arms: I-9, 402, 403, 504, 506, 507, 509, 512, 515, 516, 521, 524, 604, 607, 612, 614, 627.
 United Nations Research Institute for Social Development: 527, 616.
 United States: I-3, 401, 406, 512, 523, 524, 528, 537, 613, 616, 622, WWW- 3.
 UNOMOZ (United Nations Operations in Mozambique): 602.
 UNPROFOR (United Nations Protection Force): 628.
 verification: 523.
 violent crime: 629.
 Warsaw Pact: 504, 539.
 Wassenaar Arrangement: I-12.
 weapons of mass destruction (WMD): I-12, 406, 615, 619, 624, 626.
 West Africa: 630.
 Western European states: 406.
 WMD (weapons of mass destruction): 406, 615, 619, 624, 626.
 World Bank: 622.
 Yugoslavia: 523.
 Zaire: 528.

ADDENDUM

The following documents were received too late to be annotated for this *Bibliography*.

- 1) "Workshop on Micro-Disarmament: Defining a New Item on the Disarmament Agenda". In: *Disarmament: A Periodic Review by the United Nations*, vol. XIX, no.2, 1996, pp. 31-68.

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 - Marrack Goulding, "Expanding the Disarmament Agenda";
 - Swadesh Rana, "Light Weapons and Current Conflicts";
 - Ivor Richard Fung, "Control and Collection of Light Weapons in the Sahel-Sahara Subregion: A Mission Report";
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