Canadian
Institute for
International
Peace and
Security

World Order and
Double Standards

Peace and Security 1990–91

BERNARD WOOD

World Order and Double Standards

Peace and Security 1990–91

BERNARD WOOD

TABLE OF CONTENTS

*"The coupling of the two terms [peace and security]
together in the Charter reflects the judgement that the
requirements of security may conflict with
those of peace, and that in this event the latter will not
necessarily take priority."*

Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, p. 18

*"Le «nouvel ordre international» préconisé par M. Bush se
contentera-t-il de donner à un «gendarme»
les moyens de contrainte nécessaires pour faire respecter le
désordre établi sur la planète ? Mécanismes d'un sous-
développement aggravé, pillage des ressources naturelles,
taux élevé de mortalité infantile, famines et épidémies,
ample corruption, pouvoirs dictatoriaux, etc. : ce désordre
ne pose pas seulement un problème moral que
les «réalistes» évacuent d'un hochement de tête. Il entretient
l'instabilité dans des régions stratégiques, menace
la sécurité et la paix mondiales."*

Claude Julien, "Un gendarme ambigu": *Le Monde diplomatique*, Oct. 1990, p.16

SUMMARY

For the second dramatic year in a row, the world's political system has rocked and shaken on its axis. Even before the Cold War was finally interred, a major new challenge to world order had opened up in the Persian Gulf, and the whole world was scrambling to design and maintain an appropriate response. Meanwhile Canadians, who are the envy of the world for virtually everything except our climate, have somehow managed to turn in upon ourselves and put our own extraordinary country on the world's endangered list.

This second "year of living dangerously" at the global level has revealed how primitive is both our understanding of world order and our institutions for managing it. It is time for Canadians and others to take stock of the state of thinking and action at this historic crossroads of peace, war, law and order. We should also try to outline an agenda of issues that will have to be confronted in winding down the Cold War, in dealing seriously with conflict and arms races outside the East-West arena, and in seeking a more coherent definition and ideal of international and world order.

East-West Relations After the Cold War

The new approach to a post Cold War Europe, ratified in Paris in November, stands a very good chance of limiting the classic dangers of European history in which the inevitable localized conflicts escalate through the intervention of major powers.

At the global level, however, nuclear arsenals remain huge and will, even after a START agreement. Possible destabilizing modernization of weapons is a continuing problem and must be capped. While the present climate of political cooperation exists, the opportunity must be seized for a rapid and massive "build down" of nuclear and conventional weapons, buttressed by strong verification and an "open skies" regime. It is also time to extend arms reductions to the oceans (even if the US Navy resists), and to the Pacific and other regions.

While future instability in the Soviet Union could trigger renewed East-West threats, such a consequence of the break-up of the Soviet Union is not inevitable. Much of what can be done – in arms control

1

and arms reductions, in political, diplomatic, human and economic efforts – can help to ensure that any further conflict in the USSR will be contained and localized.

From East-West to North-South Confrontation?

We now face a paradoxical situation. The ending of the Cold War can reduce the great power interference which has frequently exacerbated Third World conflicts; at the same time, the lifting of the omni-present hand of those powers may also encourage or permit new assertiveness, aggressiveness and opportunism by others.

The Kuwait Invasion as a Test Case

Whether we like it or not, the world's response to Saddam Hussein's aggression is the first test case of the post Cold War order, and by all historical standards, the international community has responded well. To say that because the world has not applied similar standards of international order in the past, Kuwait should not be made a test case, is surely to preclude ever making progress. There will be another test before very long and probably it will come in some region that is not of as much economic or strategic interest to major world powers. If, at that stage, this new international consensus and the new international security structure fail to respond with equal vigour and even-handedness, the cynics will have been vindicated, and more importantly, the world will be plunged backward.

The UN's Mandate and Procedures

The UN Charter has been followed further and more faithfully than ever before in relation to the peace and security functions which are at the centre of the UN's structure. Because the measures have not been applied previously there is debate about how to do so now. It would have been easier if the Military Staff Committee of the UN and "stand-by forces" had been in place, in the Fall of 1990, but since they were not, it will inevitably be the governments of the US and of Saudi Arabia which will make the key decisions about the use of force. There will be grounds to debate their rhetoric, tactics and timing, but it is critical that the overall strategy of the Security Council, and its resolutions which have the force of law, have the unequivocal support of the government of Canada, and of all Canadians committed to the United Nations.

The machinery for dealing with breaches of the peace under Chapter VII must now be strengthened to ensure the wider representativeness of enforcement action; it can also act as a deterrent to potential aggressors. At the same time, we must define future approaches to the use of the permanent members' veto and perhaps even question its continued existence.

Regional Approaches

One way to avoid overloading the still-fragile UN Security system is to draw, whenever feasible, on regional security approaches and institutions. A promising method may be to adapt and propagate the CSCE model, which helped to end the Cold War in Europe, to other regions. The ideas of External Affairs Minister Clark, and others, for Pacific forums for security and cooperation are extremely interesting as a way of treating broad security problems. Recent preliminary assessments in the Southern African region suggest that the withdrawal of Cold War intervention, and the beginning of the end of apartheid and destabilization, may well permit dramatic new advances in regional cooperation and security.

Even in South Asia or the Middle East we should not despair of the potential for new security arrangements in this global climate. In the Middle East, most conflicts *are linked* whether we like it or not. If the initiative in managing those linkages is not relinquished to enemies of Israel, the world could even see a new era of security and cooperation in the Middle East encouraged and advanced by the resolution of the current situation in the Persian Gulf.

International Order, World Order and Human Order

In an era of global communications, the division of humanity between a privileged quarter and a deprived three-quarters can no longer be sustained. The ending of the Cold war removes the last of the great excuses for distraction and neglect. There is a relatively short time for the current international system to begin addressing this human "disorder" in a serious way, and to be seen to be doing so.

Will the Western nations find that the evaporation of their Communist common adversary merely liberates them further to pursue their divergent interests? The parlous state of the GATT and the open trading order strongly suggest this possibility. In many ways, the moral and

political vulnerability of Western standards of order to the charge of double standards is much greater in other areas of world order than in the maintenance of peace and security.

Poverty, protectionism, environmental burden-sharing and debt-relief will be the test cases in these areas.

The Machinery of War and the Machinery of Order

One fundamental change that must be implemented for a viable world order, is to take seriously and act upon the issues of proliferation of weapons, of trafficking in weaponry, of arms races and build-ups. The worst possible outcome would include the massive diversion of existing weapons stocks and future arms exports from areas of East-West confrontation to other parts of the world. Canada must now push, as a first order of priority in our foreign policy, for further steady arms reductions among industrialized countries and for tough and fair regimes against proliferation elsewhere.

Canada and World Order

The world looks to Canada for special contributions to building the new world order because of its capabilities, its historical record of innovation and participation, and a political culture which has been viewed as one of the world's best models for the management of linguistic, ethnic and regional diversity. Canada's world role has been insufficiently understood and appreciated by post-war generations of Canadians to contribute to the fibres of national pride, unity and purpose. If four decades of paralytic confrontation between the superpowers has led many Canadians to see themselves more as spectators and critics than as actors on the world stage, they had better recognize, for better or for worse, that the world has changed.

INTRODUCTION

For the second dramatic year in a row, the world's political system has rocked and shaken on its axis. Even before the Cold War was finally interred with German reunification and with treaties on arms reduction and future cooperation in Europe, a major new challenge to world order had opened up in the Persian Gulf, and the whole world was scrambling to design and maintain an appropriate response. Meanwhile Canadians, citizens of "the world's first international nation", as Barbara Ward described us some 20 years ago, who are already the envy of the world for virtually everything except our climate, and whose stakes in the future shape of the world are as high as anybody's, have somehow managed to turn in upon ourselves and put our own extraordinary country on the world's endangered list.

At the international level we are now confronted with issues of peace, war, law and order that are more complex and more exciting than at any time in living memory. A global hegemonic struggle is coming to an end, without the major war that has classically been the end to such struggles. The re-ordering of the international system which must follow the end of such a struggle is taking place, but it must do so without the structure of a Congress of Vienna, a Conference of Versailles or San Francisco, and without the simplifying hierarchy of power among victors and vanquished. Simultaneously, and possibly even more importantly, this re-ordering can, and must, now include the majority of the world's states and the majority of the world's peoples who have largely been bystanders in the past, but who will stand and watch no longer. The world has a brief "window of opportunity" to set some new patterns for managing conflict and cooperation on a global scale. Otherwise, new patterns of confrontation will almost certainly set in and they could be at least as ugly as the Cold War and much more unstable.

This second "year of living dangerously" at the global level has revealed how primitive is both our understanding of world order and our institutions for managing it. The great simplifying structure of ideological and military confrontation in the Cold War pitted two universalist ideals of international society against one other; in the process it overshadowed both the continuing brutal anarchic tendencies in interstate behaviour and the contrary tendency to a gradual elabora-

tion of at least minimum rules of international law and international relations. Good humoured jokes about President Bush's alleged references to "this new world order thing" are in fact symptomatic of an inarticulate and confused approach to international and world order which we all share.

It is time for Canadians, and others, to take stock of the state of thinking and action at this historic crossroads of peace, war, law and order. We should also try to outline an agenda of issues that will have to be confronted in winding down the Cold War, in dealing seriously with conflict and arms races outside the East-West arena, and in seeking a more coherent definition and ideal of international and world order. That agenda will have to include ways of using and strengthening the existing institutions of international order, particularly the United Nations system, which has come closer to centre stage from the wings, where it stood in wait for decades.

EAST-WEST RELATIONS AFTER THE COLD WAR

A cautionary note about prediction is in order when we think about East-West relations in the post-Cold War era. The respected American scholar, Robert Gilpin wrote the following in 1981:

> "An evaluation of the current international situation re-inforces the hope that a gradual process of peaceful change rather than war may characterize the present era of world politics. An extremely important reason for guarded optimism is the relative stability of the existing bipolar structure and the internal condition of the United States and the Soviet Union."[1]

This respected scholar of international relations went on to elaborate his reasons for optimism: the major destabilizing tendencies of past bipolar international systems seemed unlikely to recur and he stressed, "the basic domestic stability of the United States and the Soviet Union today helps to ensure that revolutionary upheavals in these societies will not disrupt the international system."[2]

Obviously, Dr. Gilpin was dramatically wrong in his confidence about the stability of the Soviet Union. To point this out is not to be unkind about the necessary and courageous task of prediction in international relations. Nor is it to suggest the inevitability of the worst-case outcomes internationally because of a collapse of the Soviet Empire. But it is worth juxtaposing both predictions with the subsequent reality in order to underline the huge shifts in reality and in perceptions which have taken place. We are all scrambling to keep up with a world that has a whole new set of rules.

What then remains and what has really changed in the adversarial East-West relationship that has so largely dominated the structure of the international system for nearly half a century? One way of appraising the situation is to say that the steam has gone out of the Cold War but much of the engine is still intact. The 34 members of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) met at the Summit in Paris in November 1990 in the most important such gathering since the Congress of Vienna. This conference ratified the end of the confrontational division in Europe and the beginning of an historic enterprise to forge what Gorbachev has called "the common European home".

At the same time 22 of these governments ratified the largest arms control agreement in history, which, in turn, eliminated the traditional scenarios of surprise attack and conventional invasion in Central Europe. These agreements will demand massive reductions and destruction of weaponry. Similarly, the Summit launched new institutions and approaches for managing the political relationship and limiting security risks under an overarching framework of the CSCE. All of the "baskets" of the Helsinki Accords will be covered, and national "ceilings"on military equipment will be carefully observed. Confidence and security-building measures will be implemented, together with conflict prevention, in the new Conflict Prevention Centre in Vienna; an Office for Free Elections will be set up in Warsaw; Foreign Ministers and Heads of Government will meet regularly; human rights machinery will be developed further, as will economic and environmental cooperation.

This new approach to a post Cold War Europe, ratified in Paris, stands a very good chance of limiting the classic dangers of European history in which the inevitable localized conflicts escalate to major ones through the intervention of major powers. It will be very important to seize every current opportunity to reduce the levels of armaments as far as possible and as quickly as possible on a balanced and verifiable basis, since the remaining levels, even after the Conventional Forces agreement and unilateral reductions, are still at historic highs. It is also sobering that the verification provisions of the first conventional forces reduction agreement are not yet as intrusive as many people had been led to expect, and that the concept of "Open Skies", championed by Canada and Hungary, is not an immediate prospect.

Another major source of encouragement is the withdrawal of the superpowers from many of their past investments in political and military confrontations in other regions of the world, thus reducing the dangers of the exacerbation and escalation of those conflicts.

However, at the global level it must be stressed again that existing nuclear arsenals remain huge and will still be so even after a START agreement. Furthermore, modernization in these systems is proceeding on both sides, with the potential for destabilization. Deterrence, and particularly the extension of the US strategic deterrent to Western Europe through NATO, remains legitimate and necessary as long as these capabilities exist in Europe or elsewhere. At the same time, while the present climate of political opportunity exists, there is a strong possibility of pushing forward a rapid and massive "build down". This new Europe, from Vladivostock to Vancouver, is still far from being what

Karl Deutsch, the integration theorist, long ago described as "a security community" which "exist among independent states which do not expect or fear the use of force in relations between them" – but this goal is the one clearly and urgently prescribed by the Charter of Paris.

It is significant that the process of arms reduction and control is already encountering serious resistance. The disproportionate conventional arms reductions by the Soviet Union in the first CFE agreement seem to have made the Soviet military reluctant to accept intrusive verification as well. So far, there have been limited reductions, if any, in the production of major weapons in East or West. The level of economic desperation in the Soviet Union is such that it will be an intractable problem for any Soviet government to dismantle the military industry rapidly; it is one of the relatively few areas of the economy that at least continues to function at some level.

Similarly, inertia prevails in much of the military industrial capability in the West where many people have seized on evidence of Soviet slowness and/or developments elsewhere in the world, like the Iraqi aggression, to justify business as usual in military spending, research and development. It is true, as well, and should be underlined that an arena like the North Pacific has been much less affected than Europe by warming East-West relations. The Cold War has not ended for the Japanese and they certainly drive home the message very strongly that North Americans and Western Europeans are giving great credit and assistance to the Soviet Union when Moscow has done comparatively little to meet Japanese concerns, especially over the disputed Northern Islands. It is possible that President Gorbachev's visit to Tokyo next April will break the log-jam.

Some of the military technologies which are evolving and are continuing to be modernized involve Canada directly. The possibilities exist that we will actually have to spend more on aerial surveillance and defence, and research into space-based surveillance systems because of still-expanding bomber and cruise missile capabilities. The next NORAD renewal exercise – due to be completed in May 1991 – will test the respective strategic assessments of Washington and Ottawa and their views on the future of joint approaches to continental defence.

This range of issues in the East-West relationship reveals a number of continuing problems, but it remains true that there is a special opportunity that should be seized to achieve as much reduction of tension and weaponry as possible. Further rounds of Conventional Forces

reductions should proceed apace (with more detailed verification built in) and "Open Skies" agreements as well, to avoid getting back into the corrosive debates about forces (based on secret intelligence sources) which again loomed up at the Paris Conference. Negotiations on reducing short-range nuclear forces (SNF) should proceed as promised, and it is time to extend new security and arms reduction arrangements to the oceans and to the Pacific, whether or not the US navy or others resist such moves.

While future instability in the Soviet Union or some of its component parts could trigger renewed East-West threats of various kinds, such a consequence of the break-up of the Soviet Union is not inevitable. Much of what can be done in the interim – in arms control and arms reductions, in political, diplomatic, human and economic efforts – can help to ensure that any further conflict in the Soviet Union will be as contained and localized as possible. Certainly the most immediate concern of the Soviet Union's westerly neighbours is that economic desperation and the newly-gained freedom to emigrate may lead to mass migrations to the West. No country can accept unlimited numbers of immigrants and other European countries may be compelled to stem the flow forcibly to the extent that they can. Only a better life at home can effectively counter this kind of "threat", and there are definite limits to what outsiders can contribute in this regard.

FROM EAST-WEST TO
NORTH-SOUTH CONFRONTATION?

The eruption of the crisis in the Persian Gulf, even before the Cold War was declared over, has led some to question whether the world may be moving toward a new North-South axis of international conflict, filling a kind of "vacuum" of international tension. Those who speculate about such a possible new global confrontation range from the atavistic right in Western countries who cannot conceive of a world without a looming threat and readily find it in the world's deprived non-white majority, to those who are concerned with the desperate plight of the developing countries and cannot conceive of a peaceful world while it persists.

In fact, the consolidation of Third World alienation into dangerous North-South confrontation could happen and rapidly, unless the countries of the "North" fundamentally change their thinking and action in relation to the three-quarters of humanity in the "South". The agenda for "security" as seen from the developing countries is also very different. For ordinary people, it centres on poverty, underdevelopment, environmental vulnerability, and oppressive social structures. For states, the combination of pressures, internal and external is constantly at the breaking point. For the world community it translates into security concerns with terrorism, drug trafficking, mass migrations, and environmental conflict as well as larger and worse wars.

Perhaps we have to be reminded that, from the perspective of most of the world's people, the Cold War can be seen as just another chapter in the arrogant history of several centuries of European hegemony. One of the effects of this epic and global ideological struggle between two great "European empires" was to obscure and/or appropriate unto itself many of the deep-rooted conflicts which simmer and frequently boil up in Asia, Africa and Latin America. More than 20 million people have died in wars of various kinds since 1945, and while the Cold War kept a kind of peace in the Northern hemisphere, it frequently contributed to bloody wars elsewhere.

We now face a paradoxical situation. The ending of the Cold War can simultaneously reduce the great power interference and intervention which has frequently exacerbated Third World conflicts; but, at

the same time, the lifting of the omni-present hand of those powers may also encourage or permit new assertiveness, aggressiveness and opportunism by others.

The Kuwait Invasion as Test Case

It will be long debated whether Saddam Hussein's aggression in Kuwait was spurred by a calculation that he had a new opportunity in the wake of the Cold War but, if so, he appears to have made a colossal blunder. The world's response to this aggression is the first test of the post Cold War era and the post Cold War order, and by all historical standards the international community has responded with remarkable skill and unity of purpose. It should be stressed that Kuwait is a test case, not only for the Middle East but also for conflicts everywhere else on the planet, including future relations among some of the Cold War "veteran" countries themselves.

There are arguments made against the claim that this is a test case for world order, and it is worthwhile to address these because they go beyond the current debate to some fundamental attitudes toward international standards and toward order itself.

Some argue that oil, rather than order, has caused the response to this aggression, and that the world cannot hope for consistency or constancy in other crises where the direct interests of the rich and powerful are not so directly engaged. In taking this cynical view, many of yesterday's "idealists" about international relations are becoming today's "realists". They may ultimately be proved right, and they may contribute to the realization of their own prophecy. "Hell no, we won't go, we won't die for Texaco!" is a slick piece of street sloganeering, but it obscures far more than it clarifies. It is a bizarre twist of logic to suggest that because this challenge comes in a strategic region and because there is a perceived threat to the energy jugular of the industrialized and developing worlds, this crisis is in some way disqualified or diminished as a test of international order.

A related argument against the world treating this aggression as a test case is the assertion that a double standard is being applied. There is no question that the international community has not responded similarly in the past, although it is also worth recalling that the aggression in Kuwait is a very unusual kind of aggression: an outright, naked, unprovoked aggression with annexation. No claim was advanced, or could be, of any defensive pretext, or of a temporary intervention to re-

store order or protect foreign citizens. The Iraqi claim to be uniting a divided country was both late and lame. So this aggression is in many ways in a class by itself, with very few parallels in recent history, although some would argue that the annexations of Tibet and East Timor fall into the same general category.

But, even if it were not, to say that because the world has not applied similar standards of international order in the past, this should not be made a test case, is surely to preclude ever making progress. The ending of the Cold War terminated the situation where the international community and the UN were polarized and paralyzed, and it created a new opportunity and a new responsibility. There will be another test before very long and probably it will come in some region that is not of as much economic or strategic interest to major world powers. If, at that stage, this new international consensus and the new international security structure fails to respond with equal vigour and even-handedness, the cynics will have been vindicated, and more importantly, the world will be plunged backward.

A third argument against the response to Iraq being taken as a test of international order is grounded in the assertion that this is a unilateral, not a multilateral response – that, in fact, it is the US and not the UN which has taken the action. One can certainly regret that this test came too early after the Cold War thaw for a new mechanism to have been properly organized, but history demonstrates that often it is only the pressure of crises which pushes things ahead. Because this crisis came so early, the United States was the only power which was ready, willing and able to step in rapidly and forcefully to ensure that there would not be further aggression and to demonstrate that the international community would stand firm against military aggression. The past history of unilateral American interventions has been used by many critics to attack this one, without acknowledging the striking differences in the multilateral interests at stake and in the multilateral approach taken by Washington.

The UN's Mandate and Procedures

In a related point, there has been concern and confusion over the UN mandate and procedures under which the international response has proceeded, with assertions that this response is out of line with the letter or spirit of the world organization's mandate. Here, the critics need only read the Charter to realize that in this case, it has been followed further and more faithfully than ever before in relation to the peace and

security functions which are at the centre of the UN's structure. As Alan James pointed out in his 1987 analysis, "Manifestly, the new Organization was not meant to be lacking in teeth. The absence of enforcement provisions was seen as a principal failing of its predecessor [the League Covenant]".[3]

However, we are finding that when this document is dusted off after 45 years and the attempt is made to make it work, the member-states have left the system incomplete, and even if they had not, its implementation is not an easy task and there is no assurance of success. The rising scale of sanctions outlined in the Charter to counter and reverse aggression – and it should be stressed that military enforcement is the ultimate measure on that rising scale of sanctions – is not an automatic or predictable formula to achieve the desired change in behaviour of leaders or states.

The issue of moving to the final sanction, to "take such actions by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security", as specified in Article 42, is inevitably made much more murky by the fact that prior action has never been taken to implement Articles 43 through 46 (negotiating advance arrangements for standby forces and other types of assistance to be available to the Council) or Article 47 (providing for the establishment of the Military Staff Committee to give support to the Council for military planning and operations). James' comment on the failure to prepare for Article 42 implementation, especially through advance agreements on standby forces, was an apt warning about the current situation:

> "Clearly, their absence would not be fatal to the hope that the United Nations would be able to take strong measures in support of peace, for it would always be open to Member States to provide forces voluntarily and *ad hoc*. But from the point of view of a tidy and well- planned system, ready to meet all major contingencies with both speed and efficiency, it would obviously be desirable for the United Nations to know in advance what forces it could count on."[4]

Once embarked on the course laid out in the Charter – and this course was set on 2 August 1990 – there are grounds for honest differences and debates about how to apply these measures, how to assess the effect they are achieving, and when to intensify them. In making these decisions, too, both the Charter and practical realities dictate that the permanent members of the Security Council, and the principal contributors of forces, will have the dominant "say".

In the present case, it is the governments of the United States and of Saudi Arabia which will have to make the critical determinations about the use of force, since the more collegial structure implied by the Military Staff Committee is not in place, and they are overwhelmingly the largest contributors. Such an approach to decision-making is far from ideal. The United States is no more willing or able to play the long-term role as *gendarme* to the world (even if others could be induced to help finance it) than the rest of the world is keen to see any one state carry that role. There will be grounds to debate American and Saudi rhetoric, tactics and timing but it is critical that the overall strategy of the Security Council, and its resolutions which have the force of law, have the unequivocal support of the government of Canada, and of all Canadians committed to the United Nations.

The time is ripe for the international community to apply more systematically the Canadian "functional principle of representation" under which states are accorded influence on decisions proportionate to their contributions and stakes in the fields in question. The implication is that applying effective police capability would never again be left by default to one power, and that decisions could then be more widely shared, together with the burdens involved. It is worth noting that the Canadian "functional principle", while it was mainly designed to influence the management of the post war world, had its origins in the sometimes stormy conduct of the war effort itself. In fact, one of the first clear articulations of this principle was in a memorandum for the Under Secretary of State for External Affairs on 20 January 1942 in which the author, Hume Wrong, referred to:

> "The principle... that each member of the grand alliance should have a voice in the conduct of the war proportionate to its contribution to the general war effort. A subsidiary principle is that the influence of the various countries should be greatest in connection with those matters with which they are most directly concerned."[5]

Much more realism is needed as well, in recognizing that once an aggressor is identified, and the rising scale of sanctions provided in Chapter VII is invoked, the UN is no longer an arbiter – it becomes an adversary of the aggressor, and potentially a military adversary. If the transgressor refuses to comply with the demands and milder pressures of the international community, this adversarial status will grow more stark and more dangerous. The UN is at a tactical disadvantage in having to debate, plan and implement its measures in a fishbowl, and this

can become a critical disadvantage if all else fails and the move must be made to military enforcement action. This operational problem is ignored in much of the discussion, but it is a serious issue for the international community to address and resolve. So far, in the present crisis, it has been managed in a much more genuinely multilateral way than were similar issues in Korea, but there are still serious difficulties.

Even while the world is struggling to cope with the present crisis and the test it represents, the international machinery must now be strengthened so as to be ready the next time. Because there is an extraordinary measure of consensus among the major powers and indeed the huge majority of nations in the world, the present opportunity must be seized to strengthen the machinery in a durable way.

Some analysts argue that it would not, in fact, be wise, now or ever, to try to implement the preparatory articles (43 to 47) of the Charter's Chapter VII. Hardly ever, they suggest, will the necessary consensus prevail among the permanent members to allow the system to be used in the precise ways outlined in the Charter. Thus, to invest heavily in setting up the system now might create both excessive expectations and dangers of further serious conflict about using the system, since the great powers may once again be at odds with one another. Given adequate political will and skill, they argue, suitable constitutional authority to act can be found elsewhere in the Charter, and *ad hoc,* improvised arrangements can be made which will provide the flexibility of action which is often needed. The contrary view suggests that even if a very small minority of breaches of the peace or threats to the peace will actually provide appropriate occasions for involving this full machinery, its standing existence would in no way jeopardize any of the other instruments to which the international community can have recourse. This standing machinery would, however, ensure the wider representativeness of any Chapter VII enforcement action that might be taken, and its existence could be expected to have a healthy "deterrent" effect. It could also have the additional benefit of "confidence-building" and "early-warning", since it would involve close and regular contact among senior military commanders of the permanent members and others.

But we must be careful not to overload the system of multilateral order-building in its relative infancy; moderate and realistic expectations are needed as to how many conflicts the international community and fragile international institutions can handle.

In the large majority of cases, it will continue to be unclear and legitimately debatable as to whether outright aggression has occurred, and where the responsibility lies. In such instances, the international response will have to be more in the traditional form of seeking cease-fires, offering good offices, mediation or, less probably, arbitration, truce supervision and peacekeeping.

There is a fundamental question as to whether some conflicts may also prove simply too big or volatile to be amenable to Security Council enforcement action. For example, the possibility of a major military conflict in South Asia, which has seemed imminent a number of times in the recent past, particularly between India and Pakistan, would be an extraordinarily difficult situation in which to try to apply Chapter 7 measures.[6]

More pointedly still, we must now define future approaches to the use of the permanent members' veto and perhaps question its continued existence. If the accusation of double-standards by the UN is to be disproved in the future, and international order strengthened rather than morally undermined, the veto can never again be exercised with the moral ease that prevailed in the past. If the veto or the threat of veto is to have any continuing legitimate purpose, it cannot be simply to deflect any political embarrassment to a permanent member, its friends or its clients, or to mask blatant transgressions on their part. Nor can its exercise be provoked for purely propaganda purposes, as has too often been the case in the past.

The veto was originally accepted in the Charter for two basic reasons. One was the frankly hierarchical assumption that the major powers would retain special prerogatives and special responsibilities in the operation of international systems. There was and is debate about whether such an assumption is legitimate and/or inescapable, and also about whether the permanent members' exercise of special responsibility has been commensurate with their special prerogatives. Further, there is a serious debate, even if the legitimacy of a hierarchical structure is accepted, as to which powers should now be accorded such special status and by what criteria. Originally there was a vague mixture of power (mainly military power), prestige, and a measure of geographical representation, based on the realities of the world of 1945. Certainly the world of 1990 would suggest a somewhat different list and the only possible justification for maintaining the present one is the fear that re-opening such a Pandora's box might produce chaos.

The second, and perhaps most important, justification for the veto was the conviction that with the prevailing fragility and debatability of the standards of international order, a "safety valve" would be needed to prevent the Security Council undertaking a mandatory enforcement action against one of the great military powers, which threaten the collapse of the UN system itself and probably bring on another world war. There have been a number of occasions, through the Cold War era, when this safety valve has served its purpose and the terminal break with a major power has been averted, permitting the continuation of at least some level of dialogue and negotiation. It is a serious question whether the ending of the Cold War and the current unprecedented climate among the major powers might permit the "safety valve" of the veto to be abandoned or modified. If not, it will certainly be important for the permanent members to declare, and to demonstrate, that they will exercise much more stringent standards of restraint and consistency in any future use of the veto.

Regional Approaches, Including the Middle East

One way to avoid overloading the still-fragile UN Security system is to draw, whenever feasible, on regional security approaches and institutions, which, at their best, have always been conceived as "building blocks" to world-wide order. They are explicitly recognized, endorsed and mandated for carrying such roles in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. Moreover, there may now be extraordinary potential for reinforcing such regional systems where they exist, or introducing them where they do not. A promising method may be to adapt and propagate the model of the process which helped to end the Cold War in Europe to other regions of conflict or potential conflict. Here, for example, the ideas that External Affairs Minister Clark has raised for a North Pacific forum for security and cooperation, and related proposals by the Australians and others, are extremely interesting as a way of trying to treat the broad security problems of another region.

Needless to say, there must be great sensitivity in trying to apply any model from one region of the world to any other, but at the same time the spectacular achievement of the Helsinki process in helping to break down the greatest confrontation in history must surely inspire interest and a receptivity to any of its techniques which may prove applicable elsewhere. Some recent preliminary assessments in the Southern African region suggest that with all the dramatic change underway in that area, the withdrawal of Cold War intervention and the beginning of the end of the apartheid system and the relationships it spawned between South Africa and its neighbours, there may well be a possibility

for a framework, forum and ultimately a regime for security and coop-
eration in that region. Lessons of various kinds might also be inte-
grated into Central America's own continuing peace processes.

At the same time the world should be looking elsewhere for "suc-
cess stories" and useful lessons. It is worth recalling that 10-15 years
ago, among the potential trouble spots in the world, the "ABC" coun-
tries – Argentina, Brazil and Chile – were invariably included as a seri-
ous region of tension, military and political competition, and potential
conflicts. For a fascinating set of reasons the region has come off the
critical list; essentially, some new kind of stability has been achieved.
Whether the new stable situation is permanent or not, the reasons
deserve analysis for possible application and adaptation elsewhere.

There is no reason even to despair of the potential for new secu-
rity arrangements in South Asia or the Middle East in this new global
climate. Even though the stakes are high and the conditions volatile,
the ending of superpower competition clears many complications and
many excuses for procrastination.

The countries of the South Asian region themselves launched a
major effort toward cooperation in 1985 and, in spite of all the pres-
sures to which it has been subjected, the "South Asian Association for
Regional Cooperation" (SAARC) network remains a beacon of hope
that can be strengthened.

In the Middle East, if the initiative is maintained and properly
managed by the international coalition – with vigorous initiative
by those countries in the world community which take the security
interests and concerns of Israel seriously – the world could even see
a new era of security and cooperation in the Middle East encouraged
and advanced by the resolution of the current situation in the Persian
Gulf. It is crucial that Saddam Hussein not be allowed to succeed in
obscuring his aggression or blunting the international response to it by
attempting to create "linkages" where none exist – Israel had nothing
whatever to do with his invasion and annexation of his Arab neigh-
bour. Moreover, he is one of the least promising candidates on the en-
tire planet for successful promotion of a wider resolution of the
problems in the Middle East.

The "linkages" that the Persian Gulf crisis reveal, however, can no
longer be ignored or wished away. It does constitute a linkage that Sad-
dam Hussein could engender dangerous levels of support when he

dragged in the irrelevant issues of Israel and the Palestinians in a convoluted attempt to justify his aggression. Worse, it is a linkage when, desperately encircled as he is, the option of provoking direct conflict with Israel – which would be catastrophic for all – looms constantly and menacingly over all international efforts to achieve a resolution. Finally, there has, from the outset, been an implicit political and moral linkage for many people because of the accusation of double standards.

Regrettably, the Israeli government itself has now made this linkage explicit. Israel has long been dependent on a small minority of UN members and Security Council vetoes to distinguish its actions from the kind that have now, in the case of Iraq, attracted near-universal condemnation and mandatory UN sanctions. Israel's continuing occupation and subsequent colonization of the West Bank, the Gaza strip and East Jerusalem was unanimously repudiated by the Security Council in 1967, 1973 and 1980, meaning that this illegal occupation remains unfinished business of the legitimate peace and security organ of the international community (as are the issues of East Timor, and Cyprus, with Tibet an unresolved concern of the General Assembly). Some states have accepted some of the delay, being equally sensitive to Israel's demonstrably legitimate security concerns, including its need for viable defence frontiers (also recognized by the Security Council), pending implementation of the wider resolutions for justice and stability in the region.

When, however, in the midst of this first major crisis of the post Cold War era – with exacting standards being applied against one of its adversaries elsewhere in the region – the Israeli government refuses cooperation with the Security Council on a new resolution relating to the Temple Mount investigation, and Prime Minister Shamir deliberately underlines the government's intention to defy a series of existing resolutions by stating, on November 18, 1990, that the occupation will be made permanent and sealed with massive colonization by immigrants, the Israeli government itself makes it impossible to avoid much greater linkage.

It is still a logically and legally defensible position, however, for the Security Council and the international community to give priority to the major crisis of Iraqi aggression and the measures to end it, and to resist making this conditional on resolving other, unrelated problems in the region. However, it has now become morally, politically and legally inescapable for the international community, and the West in particular, to indicate firmly that, as soon as this crisis is under control, the unfinished business of other Security Council resolutions on

the festering problems of Arab-Israeli conflict and the situation of the Palestinians will be seriously addressed. The Canadian Government, among many others, favours the convening of an international conference on the issues, and the basic approach outlined by President Mitterand in September has much to commend it. In such a conference or elsewhere, Canada will continue to be among the firmest supporters of Israel's legitimate rights and security interests, as will the United States and others in the West with the capacity to guarantee secure arrangements. Such staunch friends of Israel, however, are increasingly convinced that the strengthening of international order, being tested and applied in the Gulf, is also the only durable guarantee of security in the region and the world, and that its standards cannot be applied or waived selectively.

INTERNATIONAL ORDER,
WORLD ORDER AND HUMAN ORDER

This survey of security concerns outside the East-West arena not only suggests the positive potential for strengthening international order in this new era. Regrettably, it also suggests a huge potential for explosive disorder if the countries with the strongest position in the existing order fail to seize the new opportunities to widen its legitimacy and its base of support. The Cold War may have provided a rationale, and/or an excuse, for the relative neglect of a whole range of burning global issues, but the North as a whole, that is, the East and the West, now faces the real prospect that a great deal of conflict and alienation of an economic, religious, cultural, political and environmental kind could consolidate in the form of North-South confrontation. Some forewarning of this potential is found in Saddam Hussein's attempt to appropriate to himself the causes of Arab alienation, of Islamic alienation, of Third World alienation. Some courageous and skilful leaders in other parts of the Arab World and the Third World in general have resisted and refused to let him hijack the legitimate content of those causes. But those causes are real, and they are urgent.

In an era of global communications, the division of humanity between an unbelievably privileged quarter and an unbelievably deprived three-quarters can no longer be hidden. The ending of the Cold War removes the last of the great excuses for distraction and neglect, and the universal human values, long championed by the West, will again come under siege if they and their benefits are shown not to be universal in fact. There is a relatively short time for the current international system to begin addressing those issues in a serious way and to be seen to be doing so. If they continue to be neglected, the current order will be confirmed in the eyes of most of humanity merely as a protective cover for the privilege of the *status quo* – the consequences could well be cataclysmic.

Most of the discussion above has been focussed on questions of *international* order – the management of relations and conflicts among states, and in relation to the framework of rules of international law and the United Nations. These rules are premised on the primacy of state sovereignty and independence. They ultimately centre on issues

of peace and security, and they still take relatively little account of the diffusion of other disparate linkages, values, interests and struggles which now cross political boundaries and make up the *world* order and wider *human* order, or some would say disorder.

The fact that this first major testing of the UN rules for international peace and security comes in an era of global communications and growing interdependence is not an accident, and may prove to be either a blessing or a curse.

As suggested earlier, this tension, and sometimes confusion, among conceptions and ideals of international order, world order, and human order is far from new. In 1977, the Australian scholar Hedley Bull drew on a framework by Martin Wight to suggest that:

> "Throughout the history of the modern states system there have been three competing traditions of thought: the Hobbesian or realist tradition, which views international politics as a state of war; the Kantian or universalist tradition, which sees at work in international politics a potential community of mankind; and the Grotian or internationalist tradition, which views international politics as taking place within an international society [or society of states]."[7]

Bull brilliantly analyses the many variants and hybrids of these three broad orientations, and their waxing and waning over the decades and centuries. A great deal of the other literature in the field of international relations has also been directed to analyzing, espousing or applying versions of these approaches.

One of the most interesting insights to be gained from revisiting this analysis now is to recognize that the Cold War was rooted in one of these broad conceptions, and that its ending may uproot some of our most basic assumptions about the ends and means of international society. While "Hobbesian" amorality has remained a feature of much of international life, and the "Grotian" rules of inter-state relations have continued to operate and to permit coexistence and cooperation, both Communism and anti-Communism have been directed and fuelled by competing universalist visions of the appropriate character of a potential community of mankind.

The struggle is over, and a reading of the Charter of Paris signed by the leaders at the CSCE summit makes it unmistakably clear that the anti-Communist vision of the community of mankind has prevailed

in the greater Europe. Open, pluralistic, democratic states with guaran-
tees for individual rights and the development of market economies are
the sole accepted standard.

The deeper question is what this dramatic change may mean for
the conception and conduct of relations both within this widened
"community" of European and North American states, and between
them and all the others outside the "common European home". Will
the Europeans and North Americans, and those other nations geograph-
ically removed but politically like-minded, find that the evaporation of
their Communist common adversary merely liberates them further to
pursue their divergent interests in a modified Hobbesian style, with
only minimal Grotian restraints? The parlous state of the GATT and
the open trading order and prosperity which depend upon it, would
strongly suggest this possibility.

Will this community of states as a group, while nurturing and
deepening their now-shared universalist values, view them as essen-
tially messianic and seek actively to propagate them to the rest of the
world? Or is this community of values to be content simply to co-exist
and cooperate with others, under Grotian rules, unless threatened? Is it
inevitable, on the other hand, that such co-existence of world-views
will break down because of intolerance on one side or the other, or be-
cause the Grotian rules themselves may be, or come to be, viewed by
"non-European" states as alien, imposed, and thus illegitimate?

At worst, there is a danger that this wider European community of
states, plus perhaps, Japan and a few others, could come to view itself
(or to be viewed by others) much as did the Christian international so-
ciety or Christendom of the 15th to 17th centuries; as a narrower circle,
bound by stricter rules for relations among themselves than the vaguer
strictures of natural law which prevailed in their relations with others.[8]
The implications of such a philosophically, economically, and racially
stratified international society being continued in an era of global com-
munications are truly appalling to contemplate in a world of huge dis-
parities, closer interdependence, and proliferating security threats.

This scenario is not inevitable, but its avoidance will demand far
more coherent and far-reaching strategies than have ever been applied
in the past. It can be argued that some of the basic values that have fi-
nally prevailed in the East-West competition have also, for a variety of
reasons, won very broad acceptance in the rest of the world. In many
ways, however, the moral and political vulnerability of Western stan-
dards of order to the charge of double standards is much greater in

other areas of world order than in the maintenance of peace and security. The West's Achilles' heel is also exposed to the dominant concerns of the "non-European" states, and their peoples. The lingering legacy of colonialism, the manifest disparities and discriminatory character of current bargaining power, and the stark inequities of human welfare and opportunity, frequently lead to the complex realities of North-South relations being crystallized in an over-simplified, but powerful, claim of systematic injustice.

It is difficult to envisage, for example, how a liberal free-market policy, or a belief in interdependence, can indefinitely survive the discriminatory exclusion or restriction of developing countries' products in Western markets. What are the prospects for the survival of fragile democratic systems, or for the respect for human rights, in societies that are unable to provide for the basic human needs of their populations, let alone the spiralling expectations spurred by their citizens' vicarious exposure to the affluence of the North? How can humanity hope to mobilize all its nations in such urgent common enterprises as the preservation of the environment and human life-support systems when the minority, which so far has done most to cause the problems, monopolizes the potential means to their solution, such as money and environmentally-sound technologies, and further adds insult to injury by exacting the crippling repayment of bad loans which would long since have been written off by the good capitalist rules prevailing within any of the creditor economies. It is also worth remembering that increases in oil prices as a result of the crisis in the Gulf impact disproportionately on the already fragile economies of the South.

Even such a thoughtful commentator as Claude Julien of *Le Monde Diplomatique* has been induced by the disparities of power and in the conditions of *human* order between North and South to question the profound legitimacy of the current effort in the Persian Gulf to maintain and reinforce international order. While recognizing that this international response could provide foundations for a better military order, limiting the risks of armed conflict, he fears that this system may stop only at protecting the *"désordre établi sur la planète"* at the human level. Is this to be another double standard, undermining the moral claims of the new campaign for order?

It seems clear that there is room, and urgent need, to secure universal confidence in some of the *world order* values that have gained a tenuous toe-hold far beyond the "European" community of states. The West will have to pay a price to demonstrate the consistency of those

values. But there is still a long and difficult road ahead before an adequate base of world-order values and practices is achieved. Even if immediate and dramatic remedial steps helped to rectify imbalances of opportunity and responsibility among states and people, it would take many years to see the solution of the most serious problems and more substantial equity of outcomes: an evolutionary path is inescapable. It is difficult to conceive of how an international revolutionary overthrow of the existing arrangements of order, or such abstract, interventionist programmes as the New International Economic Order schemes of the 1970s, could either be achieved or would improve the prospect if it were. In moving toward accepted and acceptable standards of *world* order, with a sense of real urgency,it will still be critical to maintain a framework of accepted Grotian rules for predictable and civil *inter-state* relations, unless the North-South world is to revert to Hobbesian norms in an era of nuclear and other mass-destruction weaponry.

THE MACHINERY OF WAR
AND THE MACHINERY OF ORDER

Even while this new world tries to come to grips with the philosophy of international and world order, we are forced to reassess and retool all the machinery for managing and promoting acceptable relationships. One fundamental and pervasive change that must be implemented if the world is to successfully manage the further changes to a viable global order, is finally to take seriously and act decisively upon the issues of the proliferation of weaponry, of trafficking in weaponry, of arms races and arms build-ups all around the world.

For decades during which the developing countries have steadily increased their share of world arms purchases, and arms production, they have resented and resisted international expressions of concern. They have claimed, once again, that a double standard was being applied when Northern countries still accounted for an overwhelming, and hugely disproportionate share of the world's armaments, and when nothing was being done by the industrialized world to control and limit arms. Arms reductions between East and West have finally begun to undermine the charge of double standards, and further reductions will further strengthen the moral and political case for limitations worldwide. The last review conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, in September 1990, was evidence of how the sterile diplomatic posturing of the past is irrelevant and unhelpful to meeting today's real needs and opportunities. There is now no inconsistency or discrimination if Canada pushes, as a first-order priority in our foreign policy, for further steady arms reductions among industrialized countries and for tough regimes against proliferation elsewhere.

Arms in themselves do not cause wars, but the capacity to control the flow of arms, particularly into volatile regions and particularly with today's horrifically destructive "conventional" and non-conventional weapons, can do a great deal at least to contain conflicts and limit their damage. Clearly the history of armaments diffusion in a region like the Persian Gulf, where the capacity of Saddam Hussein to menace his neighbours was largely imported – sold to him mainly by the Soviets and the French, with special advice from a Canadian arms designer – has been short-sighted and dangerous. The logic of supporting regional

balances of power still does have some merit under contemporary conditions of order, but the imperative of maintaining those balances of power at the lowest possible levels of armament is now an inescapable responsibility for arms-supplying countries and for the international community.

Now that the largest arms reduction scheme in history has actually been agreed in Europe, there is an opportunity to continue those reductions to still much lower levels, to dismantle much of the arms-production apparatus of both East and West, and to give top-level priority to arms reduction and the limitation of arms trafficking world-wide. Such a campaign will confront formidable political and economic obstacles and interests, now including those of military industrial complexes in new producer countries, but if the international community cannot generate the discipline to manage that kind of problem much better, disaster will be inevitable. The worst possible outcome would include the massive diversion of existing weapons stocks and future arms exports from areas of East-West confrontation to other parts of the world.

What is the current inventory of the world's machinery for order and its prospects? Recognizing the continuing Hobbesian traits of some international behaviour, state capabilities and alliances will remain important. Countries will insist on managing their own security as long as there are clear threats and incomplete multilateral machinery to protect them. But the extraordinary challenge and opportunity now is to downsize, reshape and to moderate that machinery. A particular challenge for the NATO alliance is to maintain its continuing vital importance as an extender of nuclear deterrence to Europe (primarily to avoid the necessity of any other state expanding or developing nuclear forces) and yet not become locked into trying to maintain a structure which for many of its purposes has now been bypassed by time and changing circumstance.

At a second level of machinery, it should be reiterated that regional cooperation and security arrangements can make a vital difference and may prove to be vital building blocks toward a new world order. Rather than starting by attacking arms races which are essentially symptoms of conflict, the Helsinki process that helped bring the end of the Cold War, chipped away first at some of the roots of conflict, in ideology, in human and economic links and increasingly in the environmental area. As the process unfolded, it gradually moved to strengthened confidence-building measures and ultimately to arms reductions, at the point where the poisonous animosity had been drained from the relationship.

Thirdly, regional institutions of a more structured kind can be strengthened or created to assist in maintaining international order. ASEAN provides an interesting example, especially if we look back at some of the relationships among the ASEAN countries themselves 25 or 30 years ago. It has brought tremendous change. The various Latin-American institutions and structures have knitted together more of a security community and help to explain why the ABC countries are no longer seen as an explosive problem region. The Arab League has some interesting potential. At one stage, it was the key link for promoting moves toward resolution in Lebanon and in fact has contributed, particularly through the Taïf agreement. At this stage, the Arab League is bitterly divided and may remain so, although somewhere in the middle ground that lies between capitulation and catastrophic war in the Persian Gulf situation, there is a potential for an Arab grouping to play a special role. The recent attempt by the West African ECOWAS countries to apply peace enforcement in the chaotic internal conflict in Liberia is by no means a totally encouraging model, but there will be important lessons to be learned about such regional attempts at intervention.

Much of the content of this paper has focussed on the implementation, after decades of neglect, of the UN's Chapter VII provisions for the maintenance of international peace and security. As has been stressed, however, there have been many other contributions made by the international institutions to peace, security and order over that time and they, too, stand ready to be strengthened in the post Cold War international climate. One clear possibility is to strengthen the office, resources and capabilities of the UN Secretary-General to help stimulate and guide the Organization's contributions to peace-making, peace-keeping and peace-building. The process of selection itself for Secretaries-General and other senior leaders of international organizations has a vital bearing on both the credibility and influence of their mandates, and two thoughtful veterans of the system have recently advanced timely proposals for improvement, geared to the selection of the next Secretary-General.[9] The functions to be filled will include improved early-warning systems (on which the Office for Research and the Collection of Information has made a start), possible operational readiness and planning work with a Military Staff Committee, and more activity and initiative in providing "good offices", conciliation and mediation. Secretaries-General may also have to make some new contributions in ensuring that lines of effective consultation and cooperation are kept open within the Security Council, and especially between its permanent members and the rest of the member states, since

even a general acceptance of the present two-tiered system of responsibilities will not imply an unquestioning acceptance by the rest of the world of a closed directorate of the great powers.

Little by little, step by painful step, international law is extending and strengthening its grasp as a force for international and world order, giving the lie to the cynical aphorism that "international law is that form of law which the wicked ignore, and the righteous refuse to uphold". Canada's ambassador to the United Nations, himself a distinguished jurist, was able in a speech in October 1990 to point to close to a dozen major legal milestones achieved by the United Nations over recent decades. They deal with individual rights as well as inter state relations, with trade, the environment, the seas and outer space as well as the treatment of diplomats and the outlawing of hostage taking. Moreover, it is not only in the formal, final conventions that progress can be made in extending the rule of international law. While there are still great debates among legal scholars about the nature and scope of international law, there is a widespread recognition that it is still building steadily on precedents of practice in everyday relationships. International law is shaped by an evolving set of moral, political and social principles, at least some of which are gaining deeper and more universal adherence. Once again, a sense of perspective must be maintained and lay peoples' expectations of international law must not be inflated by invalid analogies to domestic law, where the coercive power of the state gives to "law" a qualitatively different meaning. But the strengthening of international law can and must be accelerated, and there is a plethora of proposals available for measures that would help the law respond better to modern conditions of interdependence.

Less conventionally, it is also appropriate to focus on the "infrastructure" of international society as part of the machinery of order. The term "infrastructure", in this context, attempts to capture the phenomena of communications, of cultural contact and the promotion of tolerance and cultural respect, of education, the sharing of technology, and, indeed, the sharing of opportunity in the world, particularly on the North-South axis. Increasingly, experience suggests that forward movement in these areas is what actually strengthens international society and that many other measures are mainly damage control or ex-post facto recognition of the cross-border links that human beings have forged.

Military security is damage control and much of international law and the activity of international institutions is damage control. Developing this other machinery at the human level, at the non-official level,

is the key to real progress. Most of the "functional organizations" that help states groups and individuals to maintain and deepen these linkages have functioned relatively well, but even they have suffered at times from the fractiousness of the Cold War and thus can now be strengthened further.

One of the best examples is the European Community, that great experiment launched by Jean Monet and his colleagues essentially to render impossible war between the bellicose tribes of Western Europe, by knitting together their economies, societies, values and cultures. In spite of all the remaining chauvinisms and obstacles to integration, it is now inconceivable that the nations of Western Europe would go to war against each other. This is a striking victory for the integration of societies, and elements of the Western European experience are certainly very significant for their applicability to other regions and to the wider world.

In that wider world, the issue of economic opportunity must certainly be recognized as one key element, and it is worth noting that even when the primary concern is security in its traditional sense, the outcome of the GATT talks in Geneva may well prove to be the most crucial determinant of how much world order will progress in the next decade. The agricultural subsidies issue – the most down-to-earth kind of political, economic and social problem – will provide the proof of whether or not the industrialized countries will abide by some fundamental, sensible laws of economics or whether they will continue to use governmental power in a protectionist way to try and advance narrow national or regional interests. If leaders now fail to maintain the basis of an open international trading system between Western Europe, North America, and Japan, by definition they will also be failing to open that system to all the other countries of the world who ask only for a chance to compete on a fair basis. And the agricultural subsidies issue is of the essence for developing countries. If the Western countries, which shape the system, cannot even provide a modicum of fair opportunity for trade (under their own Western rules) in those sectors critical to developing countries, how can the developing countries fail to be institutionally alienated from the system? They will be forced to conclude that the rules are stacked against them – that these in fact are not their rules, that if this is order, it is not their order.

CANADA AND WORLD ORDER

For Canada and every single Canadian, these great changes and challenges in world order will determine whether conditions of peace and prosperity will prevail. Moreover, the world looks to Canada for special contributions to building this new order because of its capabilities, its historical record of innovation and participation, and a political culture which has been viewed as one of the world's best models for the management of linguistic, ethnic and regional diversity.

Canada's world role has been insufficiently understood and insufficiently appreciated by post war generations of Canadians to contribute as much as foreigners would expect to the fibres of national pride, unity and purpose. The obsessive popular preoccupation with testing every foreign policy action, *pro* or *con*, against those of our superpower neighbour, obscures the real achievements and potential of one of the world's leading middle powers, and that same fixation debases and bowdlerizes much of the Canadian foreign policy debate.

This new era of order-building in the world is not an easy one for Canadian foreign policy. Our unparalleled record of support for the UN, honourably discharged through peacekeeping and many other contributions, now calls for the ultimate commitment to arms if necessary. It also calls for creative and tough-minded diplomatic and political contributions to do everything we can responsibly do, to make that terrible final sanction unnecessary.

The UN Charter was written amidst the ashes of the second world war and an era of barbarity that threatened all civilized values. The Charter was clear and firm about the requirements of maintaining peace and security and its provisions merit re-reading today (see annex). Canada participated fully, proposed its own article (No. 44) which was accepted, and repudiated the legacy of the "low, dishonest decade" of the nineteen-thirties by accepting the new Charter's tough responsibilities and obligations.

After the huge contributions of the war, Canadians saw and accepted themselves as full participants, with a clear and realistic idea of how to share the responsibilities and costs of international action. If four decades of paralytic confrontation between superpowers has led

many Canadians to see themselves more as spectators and critics than as actors on the world stage, they had better recognize, for better or for worse, that the world has changed.

Endnotes

1. Gilpin, Robert, *War and Change in World Politics*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1977, page 18

2. *Ibid,* page 237

3. James, Alan, "The Enforcement Provisions of the United Nations Charter", in *The United Nations and Maintenance of International Peace and Security,* United Nations Institute for Training and Research, Martinus Nijhoff Publ., Dordrecht, 1987, page 214.

4. *Ibid,* page 215

5. Canada DEA 3265-A-40 Wrong to Robertson, 20 January 1942, page 4. Cited in: A.J. Miller "The Functional Principle in Canada's External Relations", *International Journal,* Vol. XXXV, No. Spring 1980, p. 314.

6. Even here, it is worth stressing that a cooperative climate and shared peacemaking agenda among major powers can make a huge difference. Selig Harrison has documented the fact that concerted American-Soviet pressure helped restrain Pakistan and India in the Spring of 1990. *Peace&Security,* Vol. 5, No. 3, Autumn, 1990

7. Bull, Hedley, *The Anarchical Society,* Columbia University Press, New York, 1977, page 18.

8. *Ibid,* pages 28–29

9. See Urquhart, Brian and Childers, Erskine, *A World in Need of Leadership: Tomorrow's United Nations,* Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, Uppsala, Sweden, 1990, page 30.

ANNEX

CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Chapter VII
Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression

Article 39

The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Article 40

In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional measures.

Article 41

The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

Article 42

Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.

Article 43

1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces,

assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided.

3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security Council and Members or between the Security Council and groups of Members and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.

Article 44

When the Security Council has decided to use force it shall, before calling upon a Member not represented on it to provide armed forces in fulfillment of the obligations assumed under Article 43, invite that Member, if the Member so desires, to participate in the decisions of the Security Council concerning the employment of contingents of that Member's armed forces.

Article 45

In order to enable the United Nations to take urgent military measures, Members shall hold immediately available national air-force contingents for combined international enforcement action. The strength and degree of readiness of these contingents and plans for their combined action shall be determined, within the limits laid down in the special agreement or agreements referred to in Article 43, by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

Article 46

Plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

Article 47

1. There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament.

2. The Military Staff Committee shall consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives. Any Member of the United Nations not permanently represented on the Committee shall be invited by the Committee to be associated with it when the efficient discharge of the Committee's responsibilities requires the participation of that Member in its work.

3. The Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council. Questions relating to the command of such forces shall be worked out subsequently.

4. The Military Staff Committee, with the authorization of the Security Council and after consultation with appropriate regional agencies, may establish regional subcommittees.

Article 48

1. The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all the Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine.

2. Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United Nations directly and through their action in the appropriate international agencies of which they are members.

Article 49

The Members of the United Nations shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council.

Article 50

If preventive or enforcement measures against any state are taken by the Security Council, any other state, whether a Member of the United Nations or not, which finds itself confronted with special economic problems arising from the carrying out of those measures shall have the right to consult the Security Council with regard to a solution of those problems.

Article 51

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Chapter VIII
Regional Arrangements

Article 52

1. Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.

2. The Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council.

3. The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council.

4. This Article in no way impairs the application of Article 34 and 35.

Article 53

1. The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception of measures against any enemy state, as defined in paragraph 2 of this Article, provided for pursuant to Article 107 or in regional arrangements directed against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of any such state, until such time as the Organization may, on request of the Governments concerned, be charged with the responsibility for preventing further aggression by such a state.

2. The term enemy state as used in paragraph 1 of this Article applies to any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory of the present Charter.

Article 54

The Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security.

*The Director's Annual Statement is published near the end of
each year to highlight issues and events of that year, and to draw
attention to important future issues. Opportunities for Canadian
interests and action form the basis of the review and forecast.*

*The Statement is the work of the Director, and he alone is
responsible for its contents. In the preparation of the report, he has
relied heavily on the advice and support of the Institute staff to
whom he offers his sincere thanks.*

WORLD ORDER AND DOUBLE STANDARDS
PEACE AND SECURITY 1990-91

For the second dramatic year in a row, the world's political system has rocked and shaken on its axis. Even before the Cold War was finally interred, a major new challenge to world order had opened up in the Persian Gulf, and the whole world was scrambling to design and maintain an appropriate response. This second "year of living dangerously" at the global level has revealed how primitive is both our understanding of world order and our institutions for managing it. We must wind down the Cold War, deal seriously with conflict and arms races outside the East-West arena, and seek a more coherent definition and ideal of international and world order.

BERNARD WOOD

Bernard Wood is the Chief Executive Officer of the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, a position he has held since Feburary 1989. Previously, he was the founding director of the North-South Institute, an independent centre for research and information on international development, established in 1976.