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STATEMENTS AND SPEECHES

INFORMATION DIVISION
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OTTAWA - CANADA

No. 55/1

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

Approval of Protocol on Accession of Federal Republic
of Germany

Statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L.B. Pearson, made in the House of Commons January 20, 1955.

The Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L.B. Pearson, moved:

Resolved, that it is expedient that the Houses of Parliament do approve the protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the accession of the Federal Republic of Germany, signed by Canada at Paris on October 23, 1954, and that this House do approve the same.

Mr. Pearson spoke as follows:

In rising to speak to this resolution -- or rather I should say, in view of the state of my voice, in attempting to speak to this resolution -- I am afraid I will have to crave the indulgence of the House in that, voice permitting, I think it will take me longer to go into this important matter than I would normally like to detain the House. But it is, and I am sure hon. members will agree with me, a very important question indeed. I doubt whether any matter placed before the House this session will have greater long-range implications for our country and for peace. Because of its importance I should like to examine this particular protocol in its context.

What is that context? Part of it is the series of related agreements which were worked out at the London and Paris meetings last autumn, and which with this particular protocol make up a co-ordinated programme. But more fundamentally the context in which we should consider this protocol is, I think, nothing less than the present position of the cold war and our chances for peace.

Incomparably the most important political problem facing Canadians today is the danger of that cold war becoming a blazing thermonuclear one. We know that such a war, of course, would threaten the very existence of every nation, indeed of the whole human race. The supreme task of statesmanship today, therefore, is to act so that the fantastic physical power which scientists are placing at man's disposal will be used not for warfare but for welfare.

Related to this danger of thermonuclear war or thermonuclear annihilation is the problem posed by totalitarian imperialism. The communist dictators have already dragooned hundreds of millions of men into highly centralized empires which deny the dignity and worth of the individual except as a creature of the state. This imperialist and materialist conspiracy has recruited its dupes in the rest of the world and organized them into fifth columnists. It thereby seeks, through propaganda and subversion, to foster disunity in the non-communist world while it expands the area of its own direct control by coup d'état or military forces around its periphery in Europe and in Asia.

Facing up to these fundamental problems, there are three main areas in which we must seek to advance. The first area involves a search for agreement on effective disarmament, substantial enough to lessen the burden of present defence expenditures and including the total and effective prohibition of all weapons of mass destruction. But such a programme must be carefully balanced to avoid creating the incentive to aggression, and with reliable safeguards, inspections and controls to guarantee that it will be carried out.

For years the Canadian Government has taken an active part in the search for such an agreement. Last autumn at the United Nations Assembly the Canadian Delegation, I think it is fair to say, took the lead in submitting proposals of certain principles and procedures with a view to further negotiations on this vital matter. These proposals, after arduous negotiations conducted on the Western side, under the skilful and devoted leadership of my colleague, the Minister of National Health and Welfare (Mr. Martin), won the unanimous approval of all the governments represented at that world organization. We will continue to do all we can to pursue agreement on effective disarmament.

As I see it, there is nothing inconsistent between this policy and the agreements I am about to discuss. Indeed, if the communist powers would accept the level of armaments, as well as the limitations and controls, in these agreements, we would be well on our way to a universal United Nations disarmament treaty which would make limited defence arrangements such as NATO and those under the Western European Union unnecessary. The limitations on national prerogatives involved in the provisions of the relevant Paris agreements, dealing with the maximum size of forces, with international inspections, controls and deployments are, I suggest, significant as a development illustrating to the world at large that international supervision and control of national armaments is possible, granted a genuineness of desire and a willingness on the part of nations effectively to harness and check the destructive potential of national forces.

It is true that the Paris agreements apply only to a limited group of nations. They are however, not only consistent with but may some day

be recognized as a useful precedent for an effective universal system. Meanwhile, pending agreement on such a universal and therefore a better system, an essential step in maintaining peace lies in building and in maintaining controlled and defensive strength in the free world to deter aggression. That, I suggest, is the second area in which we must move forward.

The third area in which progress is essential, and this area is the most fundamental of all, lies in improving relations between states; in removing the causes of war and in the development of the international community, which involves fostering wherever we can an effective sense of co-operation and unity amongst the free peoples. We cannot do very much to promote this idea amongst the unfree. It involves patient efforts to heal national rivalries, to heal the causes and tensions of war, and to bind the peoples together. Yet we cannot afford to be naive or unrealistic; so while we must do everything we can to make war impossible, through trying to resolve issues that divide, and promote co-operation through the United Nations and elsewhere and through seeking effective disarmament, we must, as I have just said, consolidate our deterrent strength and by removing the greatest temptation of all to aggression which, in the present circumstances, is weakness, strengthen the chances of peace.

I believe that our activities in the development of the North Atlantic community are a vitally important contribution to this specific purpose. For the time being at least, in this tense and dangerous world, the unity and strength of the North Atlantic nations unquestionably provide the most important and immediate existing guarantee of peace. But the North Atlantic community -- this has been said many times before -- is potentially far more than a military alliance. These other non-military aspects of the development of NATO will, I think, grow more important as the military danger recedes, as we must hope it will in the course of time. The attitudes and agencies of co-operation among these free nations which NATO fosters can then remain to chart the way to a better state of society long after the present danger of military aggression has passed into the limbo into which history eventually tosses all tyrannies.

So I am asking the House today to approve the adherence of the Federal German Republic, not only to the North Atlantic defensive alliance but also to this North Atlantic community which we are seeking to develop, and to which the free and democratic Germany of today has the right to belong. The Soviet government and its satellite governments are seeking to prevent this development by an unparalleled campaign of intimidation, of cajolery and distortion, by the exertion of every kind of pressure through the lure of promises and the threat of punishment. In our own country the communists are doing all they can, of course, to further this campaign, by a propaganda barrage

focusing on the statement that a vote for this protocol is merely a vote for German rearmament. Such an over-simplification is grossly misleading. It is, indeed, the most insidious type of distortion, a fractional truth.

Communists themselves, as agents of Moscow, have so far abandoned intellectual integrity and simple honesty that it is futile to try to enlighten them by discussing their charges. But in this case their campaign unquestionably strikes some response in the hearts of many honest and sincere Canadian patriots, who have good reason to remember and fear the dread effect of German arms. It must therefore be objectively and exhaustively examined.

There are several significant features of the Paris agreements which we have to consider today. It is I think reasonable to expect that in the long run the most fundamental and durable of these features will be, first, the restoration of German freedom and sovereignty-- that is, freedom and sovereignty to the people of West Germany; second, acceptance of the voluntary adherence of these people to the western coalition. Those two features, as I see it, are fundamental.

The third feature of course is the provision that is being made for the Federal German Republic, in the exercise of the first right of sovereignty, to bear a fair share of the common burden of defence in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, through the Western European Union. In this connection I think hon. members would delude themselves if they conceived of the people of the German Federal Republic today as a nation of militarists straining at the leash for freedom to rearm, to tax themselves for weapons, and to conscript themselves for military service.

The fact is that in Germany, as elsewhere, there is revulsion against war and militarism from which Germans as well as the rest of us have suffered so much and so recently. In the Federal Republic of Germany today as elsewhere in free countries, rearmament, when it is supported -- and there is a strong body of opinion in Germany which does not support it, some from good motives and some from bad motives -- but where rearmament is supported in Germany today, as it is supported by the freely elected government of that country, it is generally regarded at best, as indeed it is here, as a tragic necessity.

In Germany as elsewhere moods and attitudes can change; but at present the situation is, I think, as I have described it. West German policies are of a kind which merit our support, and West German leadership is of a character that we should encourage. Indeed if that leadership had been in existence in Germany in 1914 and 1939 we would have avoided, I think, two world wars. Nothing, it seems to me, could be more calculated to discourage the development of healthy political forces in Germany; or to encourage a dangerous relapse into

narrow nationalism and disillusionment with democracy, and ultimately into dangerous militarism, than a rejection by the parliaments of the West of the plans worked out by the democratic government of Germany and other western democracies for the integration of that people into the West European and North Atlantic communities, where they can play a proper and worthy role.

It is also a gross distortion to represent the London and Paris agreements as an aggressive move which threatens the people of Russia. It is too late in the day to be surprised by the falsity and hypocrisy of Soviet propaganda in this matter, but I am still sometimes astonished by the continuing gullibility of some who are taken in by it.

So let us not forget, and let us keep on emphasizing, that the defence policies of the west in EDC or in NATO or in these Paris agreements are not the cause but the result of the aggressive policies of Russian imperialism, and of the huge communist armies backing those policies; of aggressions in Berlin, Czechoslovakia and Korea. It was all this, with the fear that followed it, that forced the world reluctantly to regather some of the strength it had thrown away in 1945, while Russia remained under arms on land, on sea and in the air.

It is also worth recalling in particular that the Russians began the rearmament of Germans in the Eastern Zone as long ago as 1948, when there was not a soldier in the Federal German Republic. The communists have made a transparent effort to disguise this by calling the armed forces in East Germany, which they had organized, barrack police. Quite apart from some 80,000 frontier and civil police, there are almost 100,000 more of these barrack policemen organized into army corps and divisions, and into air force and naval formations on Soviet lines. The East German army units have some 600 tanks, 250 self-propelled guns and 1,700 other pieces of artillery. Any ex-Nazi who wishes to sell himself to communism is welcomed into these forces and into their leadership. Their strength would be even greater if the communist masters felt that they could count on the reliability of more of their German subjects, if they were given arms.

For many years the Russians have also been organizing military forces in other European nations, including those who were our fascist enemies in the last world war and are supposed now to be disarmed by treaty. There are, for example, about a quarter of a million Bulgarian troops, over 225,000 Hungarian troops and some 350,000 in the Roumanian forces. There are in all, 75 satellite divisions, some of them armoured, and over 2,500 planes. All are under complete Russian control, and in Poland that control has been carried to the point where the Defence Minister in that country is a Soviet marshal. But far more important even than these are some 500,000 Soviet

troops in occupied Europe west of the Soviet frontiers, no less than 400,000 of whom are stationed in Eastern Germany, where they are the European spearhead of the 175 divisions of the Soviet army.

So much, then, for the absurd contention that the present Western defence programme is a hostile, aggressive move which threatens the Russians and their peace-loving friends, who have never had any policy or any plan, so we are told, except peaceful coexistence in a world without arms.

We should also examine the false assertion that the adherence of the Federal German Republic to the West European and North Atlantic communities would make the west responsible for perpetuating a partition of Germany, which the Soviet Union would like to see ended. It is worth recalling in this connection that the original plan, which was agreed to at Potsdam in 1945 among the four victorious allies, called for a peace treaty with a democratic, freely elected all-German government. Hon. members will recall, I am sure, the frustrating years when, despite Western efforts to implement the Potsdam agreement in this regard, the Soviet Government refused to allow their zone to co-operate economically or otherwise, with the three other zones of Germany. The Soviet rulers had decided that unless and until they could ensure a united Germany which would do their bidding, they would make of East Germany a communist puppet state, which of course they have done. And so it was this policy that resulted, in September 1949, in the creation of the German Federal Republic, in order to achieve the maximum degree of democratic unity which was possible in the circumstances.

There are those today who are saying, some with sincerity but others, the communists, with calculated deceit, "Why do we not have one more conference with the Soviet on German unification and on a peace treaty before taking the final step to ratify these agreements?" I would remind those persons that from October 1950, until the present time there have been at least 16 occasions on which France, the United Kingdom and the United States, the occupying powers of Western Germany, have in notes to the Soviet Government or the Government of the German Federal Republic, in notes to the authorities of East Germany, proposed, as a basic condition of agreement on German unification, the holding of free elections under a form of international supervision which would ensure that those elections were honestly carried out.

One of those occasions was the conference in Berlin among the foreign ministers of France, the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union, which took place less than a year ago. For 25 days every possible avenue of approach to a mutually acceptable solution of the problems of German reunification, and peace treaties for Germany and Austria, was exhaustively examined, but all to no avail. Surely that conference exposed in a clear-cut and unmistakable way the obstinate

refusal of the Soviet Government to allow any settlement of the German and Austrian problems except on terms which, regardless of the wishes of the peoples themselves, would in effect guarantee the continuation of Soviet control of those countries equal to, if not exceeding, that already obtaining in the areas which they were occupying. There is no reason I can see to believe that this attitude has now suddenly changed, in spite of the honeyed but ambiguous words which are now issued from the Kremlin and other communist centres.

A reason for, if no justification of, the adamant stand of the Soviet against German unity on the basis of free elections is shown by the results of two recent elections in Germany and Austria. In certain Austrian areas under Soviet army occupation -- and this of course if very significant -- our type of free election took place in August 1954, and the result was a resounding repudiation of the Communists; right under the intimidating shadow of Russian military might. In the Austrian provinces, all or partially within the Soviet zone, the communist party won only 6 out of 100 seats in Vienna and 3 out of 56 in lower Austria. The overwhelming majority of seats were divided fairly evenly between the two government coalition parties. In the two other provinces where elections were held the communists candidates failed to gain any seats at all. In West Berlin only a month or so ago, in elections for the Berlin House of Representatives, the Communists, under free elections, again could do no better than poll 2.7 per cent of the vote. They got about 41,000 votes against 684,000 for the Social Democrats, 466,000 for the Christian Democrats and 190,000 for the Liberal Democrats. No wonder the Communists shudder at the prospect of free elections.

The Berlin Conference then made it quite clear that an honourable and acceptable basis for German unity could not be found. Therefore surely the only possible course that offered any hope of progress was for the West to make its own arrangements with the German Federal Republic, without losing sight of the essential objective of unification, because Germans rightly insist -- and we certainly should support them in this -- that unification must remain the essential goal of German policy.

It is well to keep this background clearly in mind now that we are being urged in some quarters to scrap our present policy and agree to another conference with the Russians immediately; a conference designed by Moscow not, I suggest, so much to achieve constructive results as to delay and prevent the ratification of these agreements, and to divide and disunite the West.

Experience surely shows that we should refuse to be lured into this false course, but should follow through with the policy charted in the Paris agreements for the restoration of

sovereignty to the German Federal Republic, the integration of this sovereign Germany into the Western community, and the appropriate participation of Germany in that community's common defence effort to deter aggression. Once that has been done conferences or diplomatic discussions with the Soviet union on Germany, on Austria or on any other subject can be resumed and the west can then talk from strength and unity.

It was hoped about a year ago that we would implement this policy of German association with the west through the European Defence Community. Those hopes, of course, have been destroyed. We supported the European Defence Community. We supported it in this house two years ago. So it was with deep concern that we watched the dramatic developments of last summer when Mr. Mendès-France undertook to obtain at a special conference in Brussels the agreement of the other signatories to the modification in the EDC treaty which he claimed would be necessary if that treaty, after two years of indecision, was to be approved by the French Parliament.

As we all know, the Brussels conference did not succeed, and soon after EDC was rejected entirely. The resulting dangers were great. Western solidarity and unity of purpose were shaken. The hopes which EDC has aroused for closer European unity and Franco-German co-operation and friendship were in danger of being replaced by disillusionment and despair. In the German Federal Republic the unceasing effort of Chancellor Adenauer to rally the German people to support a close and lasting alliance with France and with her other free European neighbours might soon be lost in cynical and destructive nationalism. The danger also existed that the allies, short of patience and dismayed by the difficulties entailed in devising a new European system, might try to disregard France and work out separate agreements with the Federal Republic of Germany.

During those months which saw the end of the European Defence Community, and indeed in recent weeks also, there has been talk of a European and Atlantic security system functioning without France. In my view this is careless talk, or worse, as it ignores the great importance of France politically, strategically and industrially. I do not think any Atlantic or European system of security really could be satisfactory or effective to which France did not willingly contribute.

The importance of France to collective European security is not restricted to its strategic or economic role. We should be poorer culturally and weaker spiritually if we had to attempt to arrange our own defences of those of our civilization without the participation of the country to which we owe so much. Therefore a Western alliance which excluded France or which was forced on France against the wishes of the majority of the population is not, as I say, a

prospect which would be faced with any satisfaction by the Canadian government or people.

At this time it is well to remember that the danger last summer was not limited merely to the exclusion and possible isolation of France, fateful as that might have been. The very existence of NATO, the whole North Atlantic concept, was threatened. Just as there has been among some sections of Europeans an understandable, but in my opinion a superficial and mistaken, tendency toward what I might call continental neutralism or isolationism, so there has been among some North Americans a tendency to move toward either bilateral or continental defence arrangements. There was developing a few months ago a "go it alone" psychology in this part of the world, due in part to impatience with allies but rationalized by strategic theories, based on impregnable continental defences coupled with almost exclusive reliance for victory against aggression on massive retaliation by long range planes and missiles of the intercontinental or global range. Certainly, as we all know, continental defences for North America are vitally important and may well become more important, but any implication that in themselves they would ever be an adequate basis for security is quite another matter.

I ventured to point out in an address to the National Press club in Washington last March that in my view any idea that the great coalition which we have formed for peace should be replaced by an entrenched continentalism would make no great appeal to Canadians as the best way to prevent war or defeat aggression. Nor would it be likely to provide a solid basis for good United States-Canadian co-operation.

Indeed the idea of continental self-sufficiency, in the military as in the economic or political fields, makes no appeal, I suggest, either to our sense of reality or to our deepest Canadian instincts as exemplified over the whole of our history. In 1914 and 1939 Canadians were quick to recognize that a threat to the democracies of Western Europe was a threat to their own freedom; and subsequent events confirmed rather than upset this deep-seated conviction that it would not be safe or ultimately possible for us on this continent to stand aside from events in Europe. And so NATO, with the United Kingdom, the United States and France in it, is for us an indispensable instrument both for co-operation and defence. But last autumn NATO was in danger of being lost.

I may appear to be digressing, but certainly these thoughts were very much in the minds of those of us who had the responsibility for action on behalf of the government during the rapidly moving events of last summer and last autumn. I think it is well that these considerations should be put on the records of this House.

In this situation so full of danger which followed the French rejection of the projected European Defence Community immediate remedial action was required to weld together the cracks which were appearing in the north Atlantic structure and to continue the progress toward European unity which had been interrupted. It was more important, we felt at that time, to look ahead than to indulge in recriminations as to who was responsible for the set-back. It was in that spirit that we took part in the developments of that time.

The initiative to restore the situation came from the United Kingdom, whose earlier refusal to join the European Defence Community had heightened French distaste for that treaty. Therefore I am sure it was with a profound feeling of admiration and relief that all of us in Canada followed the skilful and untiring effort of the United Kingdom foreign secretary, Sir Anthony Eden, as with the strong backing of the United States secretary of state he gathered support in the main European capitals for a new approach to the problems arising from the failure of EDC.

As we over here watched those developments, while we were happy over the initiative taken in London, we were also concerned that any arrangement to replace the European Defence Community should not impair the strength and unity of NATO as the organization primarily responsible for defence planning and for co-operation in the non-military field, we desired that progress toward European unity should be made within the larger framework of the Atlantic community. We wanted all these things to be done within the framework of our North Atlantic Organization to the greatest extent possible. For this reason we felt, and indeed we suggested, that the new proposals to replace EDC should be submitted initially to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Council for consideration. However, that idea did not command general support, and it became clear that the majority of the countries most directly concerned were in favour of the United Kingdom proposal for a conference in London of the countries signatory to the proposed EDC, along with the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada.

We were glad to support that procedure and to accept an invitation to attend the London conference as a country with a direct and important stake in any arrangement to take the place of EDC, and as a member of NATO with sizeable forces on the European continent itself. As a participant in this conference we endeavoured with some success to stress the importance to NATO of the solutions which were discussed in London, and to ensure as far as we could that these problems should be discussed and solved within the NATO concept.

At these London meetings, which began on September 28, we were able to work out the broad lines of an agreement for associating the Federal Republic of Germany with the Western community on a basis of equality, the only basis of course which was possible, and to further the aims of Western defence and European unity within the North Atlantic alliance.

Moreover, it was recognized that these historic decisions together formed part of one general settlement which was directly or indirectly of concern to all the members of NATO. It was therefore agreed that the final act of the London conference, which outlined the main understandings reached, should be put into the form of more detailed agreements which would be submitted later, as appropriate, either to the four powers, the seven Brussels powers, or to the whole NATO council. That was done, and we met in Paris on October 22. All the resulting agreements were signed the next day, October 23.

I approach this result in no defensive, defeatist or apologetic manner. I think it was a great achievement. I can say that with more conviction because it was an achievement which others had far more to do with bringing about than we did. I think it was a great achievement, all the greater in view of the price we would have had to pay for the failure to bring it about, a failure which seemed so close only a few weeks before.

Mr. Speaker, I apologize for the length of time I am taking, but I believe the House would expect me to say a few words about the actual terms of the agreements, their general significance and also their particular relation to the question of German rearmament which is so much in our minds, as well as their significance to Canada itself.

These Paris agreements can be divided, for purposes of consideration, into four parts. There are the four-power agreements signed by the three occupying powers and the West German Government, which provide for restoration of sovereignty to the German Federal Republic and for the present and future stationing of foreign forces on the soil of that republic. Then there are a series of seven-power agreements which provide for the reconstitution of the Brussels Treaty Organization to include two new members, namely Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany, into a new organization which we now call Western European Union. Then finally there are certain NATO agreements which include the protocol now before the House and certain resolutions designed to strengthen the NATO defence structure.

So far as the first series of agreements are concerned -- and they are of immediate importance to Canada because we have troops in Germany -- the special problem of the four powers was to determine how and when the Federal Republic should be given its sovereignty, in a manner which would permit it to function as an equal partner in the western coalition and which at the same time would not preclude eventual unification of all Germany. In addition, it was necessary to provide a legal basis for the stationing on German soil of foreign forces when the Federal Republic became a member of NATO.

In effect, what was done was to provide that the occupation regime, which was already pretty much of an anachronism, should be ended as soon as possible and that, in the meantime, until that regime ended legally and formally, the occupying powers would act in accordance with the spirit of the agreements under consideration.

Regarding disarmament and demilitarization, however, it was provided that the three powers should continue to exercise certain responsibilities until the Federal Republic became a member of NATO. Also the continuing responsibilities of the three occupying powers with respect to German reunification and a peace treaty are reaffirmed.

To answer the criticisms -- and we hear criticisms -- of those who might view the agreements as a deliberate step in the direction of the permanent division of Germany, the three powers issued a joint declaration during the London conference -- to which later in Paris Canada and the other NATO members subscribed -- which stated among other things:

A peace settlement for the whole of Germany freely negotiated between Germany and her former enemies, which should lay the foundation of a lasting peace, remains an essential aim of their (i.e. the three powers) policy. The final determination of the boundaries of Germany must await such a settlement.

And further:

The achievement through peaceful means of a fully free and unified Germany remains a fundamental goal of their policy.

That is the policy of the NATO countries. I am sure all hon. members would agree that this statement of policy provides a fairly clear response to any who may maintain that in their efforts to associate the German Federal Republic with the West, the Western Powers had lost sight of the ultimate aim of a peace treaty for a united Germany.

I now turn to the second series of arrangements, which are intended to associate a sovereign German Federal Republic with NATO and with the move toward European unity which has been interrupted. When these agreements go into effect we shall have a new organization which we now call Western European Union. That new organization is essentially a modified version of the structure based on the Brussels Treaty of 1948, with this one important difference which I have already mentioned. To the original members of the Brussels organization are now added Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany. So Western European Union can be considered as an alternative method of achieving much the same purposes which the European Defence Community had been designed to achieve.

There are, of course, some differences. There are in particular two main differences: The first difference is the inclusion of the United Kingdom in Western European Union with that historic, courageous and, in my opinion, far-reaching pledge which she gave for the maintenance of four divisions and the second tactical airforce on the continent of Europe for another 44 years. The second main difference is that the European Defence Community placed greater emphasis on supra-national features.

Western European Union will have a permanent council, an assembly and an agency for the control of armaments to be set up by and under the authority of the council. The council will sit in London and the armament control agency is to sit in Paris, where it will work in close co-operation with the NATO secretariat and for carrying out its duties will use to the greatest possible extent NATO personnel.

I now come to an extremely important part of the WEU agreements, namely that part which gives Germany the right to rearm. Much attention has been paid to this right which it is now proposed to give, but not so much attention has been paid to the way in which it is limited and controlled. I should therefore like to put on record what these limitations and controls are.

The first is that the maximum forces to be permitted to Germany under WEU are the same as those which would have been permitted under EDC, namely 500,000 men organized into not more than twelve divisions with 1,350 fighter -- that is defensive -- aircraft. That number must not be increased except by the unanimous consent of the Western European council. Second, all German forces, if and when they are constituted, are to be brought under the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, SACEUR, and are to be integrated into NATO forces. That means that there will be no separate German national army apart from NATO. Nor has Germany, under this agreement, the right to deploy her own forces. That can only be

done by SACEUR, subject to political guidance from the NATO council. Furthermore, German forces -- and I think this is extremely important -- are to be dependent upon NATO rather than upon national logistic support.

It is worth remembering in this connection that the whole system of logistic support for forces in Europe, which includes such vital things as fuel pipe lines, transportation, communication facilities, air fields and other essentials for the conduct of modern war, has been organized on a highly integrated basis under NATO. As such it makes for economy and efficiency. But it would also -- and this is probably more important in the context of the matter we are discussing -- make it incomparably more difficult for any NATO country to operate its forces separately because they are mixed up, especially in such vital things as logistics, with the other NATO forces. In other words this provision involves important built-in safeguards against purely national action.

Third, Germany agrees unconditionally not to manufacture atomic, biological or chemical weapons and also not to manufacture long-range aircraft and guided missiles, mines, warships, except some small ones for coastal defence, or bomber aircraft; and she can only be relieved from these obligations by a request of the supreme allied commander, Europe, which received a two-thirds majority of the Western European Union council.

Fourth, certain other types of heavy armaments, a long list in fact, are to be controlled for all members of the Western European Union, including Germany, by the arms control agency of the Western European Union. There are other proposals for limiting and pooling the manufacture of arms which are at the moment under discussion in Paris.

Fifth, and I have mentioned this, there has been set up an arms control agency in Paris to work closely with the NATO authorities and to use NATO inspectors to visit and check national plants for the production of arms whenever they see fit in order to see that the limits accepted are being observed.

Sixth, and finally, there are also certain political controls and limitations written into these agreements. Germany solemnly pledged at the London conference that she would conduct her foreign policy in accord with the principles of the United Nations Charter and the North Atlantic Treaty, and in particular she undertook:

... never to have recourse to force to achieve the reunification of Germany or the modification of the present boundaries of the German Federal Republic -- and to resolve by peaceful means any disputes which may arise between the Federal Republic and other states.

If Germany should violate these undertakings a special provision contained in the joint declaration of the three powers, to which the other members of the NATO Council later subscribed, would come into play. The pertinent paragraph of that provision, by which we would all be bound, reads as follows:

They --

That means the NATO powers.

-- will regard as a threat to their own peace and safety any recourse to force which in violation of the principles of the United Nations Charter threatens the integrity and unity of the Atlantic Alliance or its defensive purposes. In the event of any such action, the three governments --

Now it is 14 governments.

-- for their part will consider the offending government --

It might be the German government; it might be any other government.

-- as having forfeited its rights to any guarantee and any military assistance provided for in the North Atlantic Treaty and its protocols. They will act in accordance with article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty with a view to taking other measures --

That is, against the offending member of NATO.

-- which may be appropriate.

Now, sir, I submit that it would be difficult to devise a more impressive set of safeguards than these. But I know that when I say this I will be asked what guarantee there is that they will work. Can we expect these limitations and controls that Germany has accepted to be of any value? Will she throw them aside whenever she feels like doing so? We are conscious of the fact that this has been done in the past.

All international agreements, even those we make with our friends and neighbours, have this element of risk and uncertainty. It is inherent in international arrangements; but some of those who now are stressing that element and challenging the value of these agreements with Germany are, however, quite ready to take the same risk in making another effort to bring about an agreement with Russia which they think would remove all our fears and uncertainties about Germany.

I frankly admit, however, that we have every right to be concerned with German good faith in this series of agreements. Many Canadians, including many of us in this House, and even more of our allies who are taking this decision with us and with all its consequences, bear on their bodies and in their minds scars from the German war machine. We remember how Hitler, with shocking and unscrupulous design, and with Soviet connivance and assistance, started World War II in 1939. We do not forget how the Nazis conducted that war with savage brutality, and how the German people supported it.

While we do not forget that and cannot forget it, it is my considered view that support of these agreements with the safeguards I have described is both wise and far-sighted, and of all the courses that are open to us this is the best course to follow in our effort to shape a better future.

I do not suggest that we should ignore the lessons of the past. Indeed, as George Santayana has said, "Those who will not learn from history are condemned to repeat it". But we should draw the right conclusions from the past, and we should also not ignore the vision of the future. Indeed, experience of the past teaches us that if a nation only looks backward to justify its fears of the future, it is likely by that very fact to suffer again the same tragedy which in the first place caused that fear. The past must influence but, I suggest, it should not determine and distort the future.

So, Mr. Speaker, it is because of my appreciation of history and not in spite of it that I believe the safeguards which we have worked out in these agreements within our North Atlantic Community Organization against unilateral abuse by Germany, or any other member, are of real value and make even stronger the case for a coalition which will include the Federal Republic of Germany with its sovereignty restored and on an equality with the other members. I also believe that the institutions and habits of co-operation which our Atlantic community is developing, and with which we now desire to associate Germany, may well be of even greater value than military safeguards in removing the risk that might follow from putting arms in the hands of Germans.

In the very nature of things there can never be on this earth, as I see it, absolute assurance or safety for anyone, individual or nation, because the future will depend among other things on attitudes and choices which we shall have to adopt from time to time. But there are good grounds, I think, for reasoned confidence in this matter. Moreover, whether this confidence will be justified will depend upon our own policies as well as upon those of Germany.

We now have a type of government and a political system in western Germany which are democratic and European-minded. Surely -- and I mentioned this a few minutes ago -- we should do what we can to encourage and strengthen that type of government, not weaken it by suspicion, mistrust and rebuff. That government, moreover, is led by a man who believes in freedom, peace and co-operation, a great European and internationalist, Herr Adenauer.

It is also, I believe, reasonable to believe that national self-interest will counsel the Germans to stand by these agreements, which are not imposed on them but which have been freely negotiated with and accepted by the government which they have chosen for themselves. Surely in that respect the situation is very different from that of the 1920's, when relations of the victors in the war with Germany were characterized by uncertainty and vacillation. We never did make up our minds then whether to treat Germany as a new friend or an old foe, and as a result we got the worst of both worlds.

Quite apart from the pressing fact of the Soviet threat to Western Europe it would, I submit, be wrong and foolish to deal with Germany now as a rejected, unequal people in international society. If we do so they will soon conclude that their choice lies only between isolation and a brooding introspection, or seeking domination and aggressive strength on their own. Surely the sensible course, even if the threat of communist aggression were removed, would still be to bring the Germans into the West European Community, which includes the United Kingdom, and into the North Atlantic Organization where they would only be one of 15 members, including the United States, and which they could not hope to dominate. It is precisely by such participation in partnership that nations as well as individuals learn to prefer co-operation and good will to domination and submission.

Though I can certainly understand and deeply sympathize with the hesitation and soul-searching which I know are involved for very many in the issues we face, it is nevertheless my conviction, I repeat, that the course of wisdom is to bring about German participation in the western coalition where we can work together for the common security and welfare.

I believe I should take enough time to examine another aspect of the matter. What are the alternatives? There is a good deal of criticism of this course, part of it sincere and genuine criticism, but very rarely do I ever read or hear of any satisfactory or better alternative than the one which is before us. What are the alternatives which would produce a better policy?

Well, the first -- these are the only ones I have been able to think of, but there may be others -- is to keep Germany disarmed and neutralized as at present. This might seem to many people an appealing course, and would indeed be so in a world where all arms were limited and controlled. But it is impossible under present circumstances. It was impossible in the twenties. How then could it be done now, with the victors of the last war divided and bitterly hostile and in the face of the control of a rearmed communist East Germany by an aggressive, mighty Russian imperialist power? Is Russia likely to give up that control for a genuine international system of supervision of a disarmed, neutral and united Germany which, in its turn, assumes a situation in which the east and west would work amicably and altruistically together for a common peaceful purpose?

The question answers itself from the history of the last ten years. Even if it were possible, how long would a dynamic, powerful and proud people like the Germans -- fifty millions in the heart of Europe -- be willing to accept a position of this kind? In short, the neutralization or disarmament of Germany, as I see it, would be difficult under any conditions, impossible under present conditions. It would, in any event, leave a vacuum right in the heart of Europe. A vacuum may be regarded by nature as something to be abhorred, but it is regarded by the communists as something to be filled.

A second alternative would be to do nothing, continuing as long as possible the present occupation arrangements and hoping that something would turn up. As I see it, that would be a futile and negative course. What turned up would probably be a Germany increasing in strength, with a growing national feeling, taking advantage of every opportunity to end or whittle away the occupation and determined to remove restrictions or her sovereignty as she grew stronger. At best such a policy would lead to an increasingly resentful and unfriendly Germany. At worst the result would be reminiscent of the thirties, with extremists in control.

A third alternative which has been suggested would be to give west Germany back her sovereignty unconditionally, but without making any arrangements for associating her with the Atlantic system or the Western European Union, and again hoping for the best. That might be followed by a separate alliance between Germany and one or more of those western powers which desired it; or the Federal Republic of Germany might remain outside any collective arrangement while we merely hoped, in our turn, that if there were aggression against the west she would line up with us. We would also hope, and I do not know what basis there would be for our hopes, that under such circumstances Germany would not move east or, even more likely, play the east and west against each other to her own advantage.

Any of the above courses I believe, especially in view of the declared United States policy, would mean the end of the Atlantic alliance we have been building up and which is now our greatest deterrent against aggression. It would also end the move toward European unification, which through these dreary post-war years has been a bright hope for peace and prosperity in free Europe.

We return, then, to the only possible solution in my view, bringing a free Germany into closer association with a group of other free countries in an alliance through which Germany may contribute to collective security, but which will be so constructed that no one member can possibly dominate the others.

Now before I resume my seat, I did indicate that I would say something about the effect of these agreements more particularly on Canadian policy and what, if any, the effect will be on Canadian commitments or obligations in Europe. I should like to apologize for the length of time I am taking.

So far as the NATO resolutions passed last October are concerned, those resolutions have strengthened SACEUR's powers and have increased the mutual inter-dependence of NATO forces. So far as those resolutions are concerned, they will not make any significant change in the position of Canadian forces in Europe, because our forces are already closely integrated with those of other NATO countries. They are subject to the over-all authority of SACEUR in military matters. Their movement in Europe would take place only as part of agreed NATO strategy. Therefore the new arrangements -- and they are outlined in the documents before you -- merely set down in writing and make generally applicable the arrangements by which we are already bound.

With respect to the new territorial commitments involved in the protocol before us on German accession to NATO, the situation so far as Canada is concerned is similar to that which arose in June 1952, when this House approved the NATO protocol extending to all members of the European Defence Community the assistance guarantee of the North Atlantic Treaty. I pointed out in this House then that since the Federal Republic of Germany was the only member of the European Defence Community not a member of NATO the effect of the protocol, if it came into force, would be to extend the obligations which Canada had undertaken under the North Atlantic Treaty to the Federal Republic of Germany.

I emphasized then, as I should mention now, that this extension of our obligations was more theoretical than real, because under article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty, by which

we are bound, we were already under an obligation to come to the assistance of the NATO forces stationed in the territory of the German Federal Republic. The situation then, is substantially the same under the present protocol in so far as extending our territorial guarantee is concerned.

While I am on the subject of commitments -- and there has been some discussion about this previously outside the House -- I should like to assure the House that the Canadian Government took no new commitments in London or in Paris to keep Canadian forces in Europe at any given level or for any given period. What was emphasized at the conference was our determination to continue to play our full part in the North Atlantic Organization. As I stated to the nine-power conference in London last October -- and this statement was made public immediately --

As I see it, European unity cannot be effectively secured unless the lines not only across the channel but across the Atlantic are strong and unbroken. My country has a part to play in this Atlantic aspect of the problem. Therefore, we accept the continuing obligations arising out of our membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and we are resolved to continue to do our best to discharge them.

Also at the same time I declared to that conference:

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization remains the focal point of our participation in collective defence and of our hope for the development of closer co-operation with the other peoples of the Atlantic community. As such, it remains a foundation of Canadian foreign policy. Indeed --

I hope I was correct in saying this; I think I was.

-- enduring and whole-hearted support for NATO is for us a policy above politics on which I think our friends can rely.

As regards the proposals for an arms pool, which by hon. friend from Prince Albert (Mr. Diefenbaker) brought up the other day, these proposals, which as I mentioned a minute ago were submitted originally by the French government, are now under active discussion among the European governments concerned. We are being invited to send an observer to those meetings when matters come up which are of interest to us. As this matter is under discussion it would be premature for me to comment on it now. But our direct interest in the arms pooling proposals would of course relate only to the allocation of Canadian

arms made available through our mutual aid programme to our allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

I may say that we are quite satisfied with the present procedure, and we are not anxious to have it changed -- the procedure under which recommendations for the allocation of these arms are made by the standing group of the NATO organization. But if a proposal emanated from the conference which concerned our allocation of mutual aid, then of course we would give it consideration.

Now, finally -- and this is final -- I wish to come back just for a moment to the argument, the most impressive one to my mind advanced against this policy, that these agreements will not make for peace but will make for division and controversy and renewed trouble in Europe; that they will provoke the Soviets into violent reaction, and will drive that country into intransigent Stalinism again at a time when its government, under new leaders, seems to be getting somewhat more co-operative and less hostile.

As to the first, I do not think there is cause for undue alarm over Soviet threats to retaliate -- and we have heard these threats in strong language -- by forming a heavily armed eastern European alliance. While we should never dismiss pronouncements from Moscow as unworthy of serious examination, I do not think we should become unduly worried by Soviet "kicks" any more than we should become unduly elated by Soviet "carrots". Both are often offered for the same purpose, to weaken our resolve and confuse our purpose.

There is certainly no reality behind the threat of an eastern NATO, because they have now a military alliance system, as I have tried to show, which is already more heavily armed than NATO, and under complete Soviet control. There are certainly no limitations or controls over armaments or men or anything else in that line. They could hardly go any further. As to the second point, there is no possible validity to the contention that these agreements justify or make inevitable an intensification by the Soviet Union of the cold war, at a time when it seemed to be lessening.

I point this out because in the harsh and unreasonable things which the Soviet government has been saying recently about western policies, there is the constant accusation that western nations respond to offers of peace and friendship from the Soviet Union by the warlike action of arming Germans for an eventual attack on the Soviet Union. It is hard to believe that the Soviet leaders can make these claims seriously.

The Soviet government has never shown any inclination to discuss these agreements on a rational basis, or to take any reasonable attitude toward Germany or Austria. It has avoided constructive discussion and made no attempt to find out about or to seek reassurance or any point about western policy toward the German Federal Republic which it regarded as menacing to the Soviet Union.

No one of course would deny to the Soviet Union, which suffered so cruelly from German arms, the right to issue warnings about German militarism. But we cannot regard Soviet judgments on this subject as superior to those of other nations, which also suffered from the same source.

The logic of the Soviet position on this matter seems to be either that Germans in the German Federal Republic, regardless of the prior rearmament in East Germany, must never possess the right to carry arms, even within a defensive association which imposes controls, or that any arming of Germany can be carried out only on Soviet terms. Looking back a few years this logic seems pretty strange. According to it the western powers had no right to feel alarmed when the Soviet Government, contrary to agreements with allies about the occupation of Germany and without any regard for the wishes of these people, armed its eastern satellites and bound East Germany into the monolithic unity of communist Europe.

The Soviet Government now claims the right to regard almost as a provocation to war the culminating act of a slow process whereby the German Federal Republic, with the consent of its freely elected government and that of 14 other free nations, enters into an association which has as one of its chief purposes the prevention on a permanent basis of German militaristic nationalism.

So we would be unwise and shortsighted if we yielded to Soviet threats about what will happen if these agreements are ratified. Nor in my view will that ratification provoke warlike retaliation, unless the Soviet government, for other reasons, desires to pursue such a belligerent policy.

I think myself that the chance that such retaliation will happen and war might follow are less now than they were last summer after EDC was rejected. On our part we have made it abundantly clear that NATO policies in Europe are defensive and pacific. Among many others, President Eisenhower and Mr. Dulles have both recently emphasized that the aim of the West is to be strong enough to defend itself, to be moderate in responding to the provocations of others, and to be active in seeking every means of easing tensions and ensuring peace.

We know that the political and moral values which we cherish and the political system on which we rely do not thrive in conditions of war or continued tension. Our preparations are made for defence only, and war is for us not a means of combatting ideologies which we do not like. Therefore any genuine Soviet move to lessen tension, even if it affects only a limited area of international relations, should be welcomed by us, and we should be willing to go half way at any time to meet it.

There is, of course, the constant danger of conflict from a misunderstanding on both sides of each others motives. In the West we remain with good reason alarmed by the threatening and aggressive policies of the U.S.S.R. in recent years. In turn I think it is not inconceivable, given the atmosphere of totalitarian isolation and ignorance in Moscow, that the Soviet people, and even certain Soviet leaders, may at times consider -- sincerely consider -- that they are threatened by the West. One of the great tasks in the next few years in diplomacy is to try somehow to bridge this gap in misunderstanding, to build what His Holiness the Pope recently so aptly described as "a bridge of truth" between East and West.

I wish in closing to reaffirm my confidence that we are on the right path, and that the agreements we drew up in London and Paris will make an important contribution to security and peace. From the foundations of defence strength and constructive unity, which they will provide the West, I sincerely trust that it will now be possible to convince the Soviet leaders of our firm intention, and indeed determined resolution, to defend ourselves without in any way menacing them, or without rejecting any opportunity to ease a state of international tension which is both sterile and dangerous.

For all these reasons I hope this House will give strong support to the resolution which is before it.

S/C