


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



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
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International Perspectives



International Perspectives is published in Canada six times a year by International Perspectives, (95312 Canada Inc.), 302-150 Wellington St., Ottawa, K1P 5A4. Telephone: (613) 238-2628

Editor and Publisher:

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Business Manager:

Ruth Macfarlane

Advertising Manager:

Gordon Pearson

Subscription Rates:

In Canada:

- Single issue — \$1.75
- One year (six issues) — \$9
- Two years (12 issues) — \$17
- Three years (18 issues) — \$23

Other countries:

- Single issue — \$2.25
- One Year (six issues) — \$12
- Two years (12 issues) — \$22
- Three years (18 issues) — \$30

Subscription address:

P.O. Box 949,
Station 'B'
Ottawa, Canada
K1P 5P9

International Perspectives is a journal of opinion on world affairs. It advocates no editorial position. The opinions expressed by authors are their own and, unless otherwise stated, are not to be taken as presenting the official views of any organization with which the author is associated.

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In the centre Information Supplement:

For the Record: reference material on Canadian foreign relations presented by the Department of External Affairs.

Letters to the Editor

Central Agency

Sir,

Belatedly I have just read Professor W.M. Dobell's most interesting article "Is External a Central Agency?" which appeared in your May/June/July/August issue and having just lost my inhibitions as a public servant I would now like to pick a small bone with your author.

It seems, according to the article, that External fails to qualify as a central agency of government because it does not have "leadership control of, say, international commercial policy." In his definition near the beginning of the article, Professor Dobell says that a central agency must, *inter alia*, have a co-ordinating role and a leadership role *with respect to the co-ordination*. By the end of the article, however, "leadership role with respect to co-ordination" has become "leadership control". There is quite a difference.

Everyone agrees that the Treasury Board is a central agency and although there have been times when it has seemed to be exerting "leadership control" over the programs of other government departments, it has always staunchly denied any such megalomaniac intentions. What Treasury Board claims the right to do is to take the lead in co-ordinating programs that might otherwise conflict with each other or run counter to some basic policy of the government.

Using the criteria of Professor Dobell's definitions, it can be argued that External does in fact exercise a leadership role in *co-ordinating* international commercial policy with other Canadian policies in the foreign environment. It would be a simple take-over of I.T. and C.'s role for it to do more than that. Nevertheless, if some aspect of commercial

policy as proposed by I.T. and C. were to run counter to some other foreign policy interest of comparable importance, External could, and I trust would, take the matter up, if necessary to Cabinet. Whether it would win in such a confrontation is another and not unrelated question. The ability of External, like the ability of Treasury Board, to play its assigned role depends on the willingness of the government of the day to let it.

While doing some work on this subject a few years ago I used a rough working definition of a central agency as including all those performing operations of government without which there would be no state; the irreducible minimum of governmental activity. Under this rule the following functions qualified: Head of State/Head of Government; Revenue Raising/Expenditure Controlling; Administration of Justice; Relations with Other States. While these functions are almost never carried out exclusively by the agency formally entrusted with them, the responsibility remains and the minister charged with it is legally and politically answerable. It is no doubt true that on occasions External has been and is still being by-passed, just as the Treasury Board's injunctions have been successfully thwarted by ingenious and courageous deputy ministers. Where this has happened it means that the central agencies concerned have failed or not been permitted to perform their functions, not that they have ceased to be central agencies.

Arthur Andrew
Halifax, Nova Scotia

Disarmament delusions

Sir,

No better summary critique of Mr. Epstein's article ("Canada's Disarmament Initiatives," *International Perspectives*, May/June/July/August, 1979) can be given than the one he himself provides: "In general, the session may be regarded as a constructive but not particularly productive follow-up to UNSSOD (except perhaps in terms of the number of resolutions adopted)." Indeed, the whole exercise of multilateral disarmament at the UN seems to be little more than a orgy of resolutions with no meaning and an approach devoid of any relation to arms control both in theory and practice. Mr. Epstein is correct in calling the return of Canada to active involvement "noteworthy". What is noteworthy about it is that it suggests the return of the "helpless fixer" and friend of the "non-aligned" image; an image which draws upon the least useful aspects of the Pearsonian and Trudeau foreign policies.

Arms control is not a multinational political goal like the eradication of disease or of illiteracy, it is a "tool of national strategy". It represents an alternative to force building as a means of achieving an overall improvement, or at least those which prevent a deterioration, in national security measured in military terms. A given country, rather than build a particular offensive weapon system, which it has reason to suspect may be nullified by the intended target country's building of a defensive system or a better offensive system, may decide instead to initiate arms control talks. If successful, there would be no reciprocal build-up and security would be assured at a lower level of costs.

While there are a number of variations on the above theoretical scenario, the main point is that those countries in possession of nuclear weapons, especially strategic nuclear weapons, can effectively limit their nations with, as Mr. Epstein puts it,

an increased interest in disarmament", can have any impact.

This leads to consideration of the SALT process. If Canada is to have any impact on arms control, it is in its capacity as an ally of the United States. Of course, here the Canadian ability to participate is marginal, certainly behind that of the Germans and the British. And the weapons under consideration are mainly strategic, those dealing with the direct security of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Nevertheless, SALT is where the action is and where Canada ought to concentrate its attention. The realities of modern arms control are played out in the committee rooms and back offices of the U.S. Senate and not in the elegant halls of Geneva. What resulted from the last SALT ratification process and what is likely to result from the current process, should give Canada pause to reconsider arms control in general and SALT in particular.

Mr. Epstein complains that despite SALT I, the qualitative advance in weaponry had increased markedly. This is undoubtedly true. But the reason for this can partly be found in the nature of successful arms control efforts, which as Edward N. Luttwak notes, tend to channel the competition for military power into newer weapons and into those weapons which defy further efforts of control because of the difficulty of verification of compliance. Added to this, is the nature of the American ratification process, which results in the Administration having to buy Senate approval with more, not less, expenditure on strategic nuclear arms.

Now, the recently announced MX missile system is undoubtedly needed, but the timing of its introduction casts doubts on the whole SALT process. Moreover, there are other outcomes of the strategic debate in the U.S. which will be of immediate concern to Canada. First, aside from the MX and other strategic weapons improvements, the price of SALT would be increased at least in terms of attention given to conventional forces in Europe by the U.S. and the Euro-

pean allies. This in turn would entail additional demands on Canada to upgrade its forces along the Rhine. Second, the failure to include the Soviet Backfire bomber under SALT II will likely mean greater attention to the air defence of North America. Although the Soviets say they will not use the Backfire against targets in the U.S., no responsible American military planner can discount their potential.

Third, and most important, SALT is likely to, and indeed already has, become a further source of Soviet-American friction. The agreement not only raised expectations of Soviet good will in sticking to the "spirit" if not the letter of the treaty, it implicitly raised expectations that the Soviets will behave in the non-nuclear sphere and added tensions will result when they do not. Much of this is due to the fact that SALT, and arms control in general, became for certain groups in the American government an end in and of itself and not a tool of national strategy. To this extent, SALT introduced an element of instability in the relationship between the two super-powers that cannot be in Canada's best interest.

These are some of the realities of arms control today. And if Canada is to put its effort anywhere, it may well be best placed in trying to moderate the influence of professional arms controllers in the U.S. government and force them to reconsider the fruits of their misguided labours. Granted, this is a difficult task, but at least it would be one that has a reasonable relationship to Canada's national interest.

What Canada must avoid is the kind of ephemeral activity advocated by Mr. Epstein. Efforts to "suffocate" the arms race only themselves become suffocated in endless debate and self-righteous posturing. Canada is not a third world nation, nor is it non-aligned, (as its negative vote on the resolution to produce a UN anti-war film indicates). It should not join in the propagandistic behaviour of some of these countries. There is simply nothing to be gained

in engaging publicly in disarmament delusions. Expenditures of time, money and diplomatic credit would be better made in those areas, such as health, technology transfer and even direct foreign aid, where Canada has something concrete to contribute and where the impact would be greatest.

Certainly a country such as ours can offer the world something more than empty rhetoric. And certainly, a country as deeply concerned with the strategic balance of nuclear power as Canada should be, can find a better forum to make its views known.

Joel J. Sokolsky
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Editor's note: Mr. Sokolsky's letter was written before the SALT II ratification process was suspended in the wake of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.

Human rights

Sir,

Douglas Roche's article "Towards a foreign policy for Canada in the 1980s" (*International Perspectives* May/June/July/August 1979) was thought-provoking because it touches on many issues confronting us in formulating our foreign policy. Although, by and large, I am in agreement with what the author has stated, I wish to comment on the subject of human rights. When we talk of violation of human rights in other countries we usually forget that we are not free from the malady ourselves. In her statement to the U.N. General Assembly on September 25, 1979, Secretary of State for External Affairs, Flora MacDonald, gave her sober assessment of UN failures in protecting human rights around the world. She also admitted that Canada's own record was not free of blemish. About our own country she was referring to the plight of native Indian

women despite the proclamation of the Canadian Human Rights Act a few years ago. Let us examine our own record in human rights and civil liberties a little further.

Burning of buildings because of political dissent, trial of a consultant in the name of national security, treatment of immigrants and their shooting by police, imposition of religious prayers in the public schools, to quote a few, are grim warnings that we are not above reproach.

Now I come to the much publicized issue of treatment of scientists in the U.S.S.R. Are we any better than the Soviets? Only in degree, perhaps! We may not have imprisoned a scientist or sent him to a mental asylum or a concentration camp because of his political views. Generally speaking, however, we use the same methods usually employed for isolating, oppressing, demoralizing and persecuting scientists because they dissent from doctrines, loyalties or attitudes which are widely held and imposed in their countries. The majority of scientists in Canada work for the government and you can imagine how a civil servant can be intimidated by the employer. A government scientist's travel to scientific conferences could be stopped on flimsy grounds, funding to his projects could be cut, his locked drawers could be broken into at night to harass him and when under these conditions he cannot perform well, his work could be labelled "unsatisfactory" and he is then ready to be released from employment "legally" under the Public Service Employment Act due to incompetence.

In closing, let me say that I am not against the new morality in foreign policy as it applies to human rights and which Douglas Roche advocates. What I am suggesting is that until we clean our own house we are as hypocritical as the U.S.A. (see "President Carter and human rights: the contradiction of the American policy" by Louis Balthazar in the same issue of *International Perspectives*). Miss MacDonald's suggestion in her UN

General Assembly speech to create a post of Under Secretary for Human Rights, in my opinion, would not have solved the problem. An Under Secretary is not going to be any better than the UN Commissioner on Human Rights which we already have. What the world needs is a UN system comparable to the European Commission of Human Rights at Strasbourg where even an individual from a signatory country can take his complaint against his government. If the Commission finds the complaint admissible and it cannot be amicably resolved, the case may go to the European Court of Human Rights which can issue a judgment binding on the defendant government.

G.R. Saini,
Fredericton, New Brunswick

Boat people

Sir,

1979 saw an outpouring of righteous indignation over the plight of the "Vietnamese boat people". The images of drowning, overcrowding and despair are horrendous. We must indeed be concerned, lest we abrogate our sensibilities, our morality.

Let us cry, and let us help. But let us not be hypocritical in our eagerness to assign blame. The desperate poverty that fueled some of the exodus is our fault more than it is Hanoi's. Devastation of the agricultural potential that fed the "Viet Cong" was a deliberate policy of war. Vietnamese provinces famed for their agricultural exports had their soil and vegetation destroyed by herbicides manufactured in the U.S. and Canada. The land will remain dead for years to come. Leaves will not grow, seed will not sprout.

We might also take greater note of the fact that most of the refugees belong to Vietnam's Chinese minority. It is a minority which refused to be integrated, which manipulated

control over export/import trade its peculiar advantage, and which established and operated a black market that seriously undermined the dictates of national planning and distribution. China openly encouraged its development of a "state within a state", and insisted on the right of its members to retain Chinese citizenship. Within the context of escalating Sino-Vietnamese tensions, tensions that erupted into this spring, it was inevitable that the "fifth column" spectre would begin to haunt Vietnam's policy makers.

Under similar circumstances during the Second World War, U.S. and Canada put their Japanese citizens and residents into concentration camps. The Japanese their civil rights, their homes, their businesses. Vietnam's Chinese minority was not incarcerated. seas threatened, and took their but survivors were free to enjoy the hospitality of those who espoused their cause. That they have faced instead with overcrowded refugee camps and minimal prospects is not an eventuality decreed by noi. Rather, it points to another aspect of hypocrisy in our attitude. We demand that Vietnam, Russia and other countries (though not perhaps China, since we find her friendship convenient — permit their satisfied to emigrate. But we do admit that we have a responsibility to accept the fruits of our labour trumpet the numbers that we do not the fact that these numbers count for but a fraction of the total. Not only does it account for a fraction of the "Vietnamese" problem when contrasted with the far larger problem of the world's refugee population, the forgotten millions of South Asia and elsewhere.

Our concern must not be ended. But perhaps our posture should.

C.G. Jacobsen,
Wolfville, Nova Scotia

Kenneth Taylor's press conference after escape of "the six" from Iran

Editor's note: On February 1, 1980, the day after his return to Ottawa Ambassador Taylor held a press conference. His words received widespread news coverage. Readers, however, might find the full text of the conference illuminating. Editorial revision of the transcript has been kept to a minimum and introduced only when necessary for clarity.

Chairman: Good afternoon. Welcome back home, Ambassador.

Ambassador Taylor: Thank you.

Chairman: The Ambassador will have brief opening statements in English and then he will answer your questions for 45 minutes.

Ambassador Taylor: I would say I am delighted to be home, believe me. I thought I would try to answer your questions this afternoon. Some of them may not be as full answers as you would like, but I will certainly come to terms with them the best way I can.

Last night briefly at the airport I mentioned that I am only representing all the people in the embassy. I would like to particularly mention John and Rena Sheardown, Roger Lucy, Sergeant Gauthier, my secretary, Laverna Dollimore, the communicator, Mary O'Flaherty. And there were many others involved at the same time who made whatever we did a reasonable and easy task.

I thought that I could, if you would like, go through a small sequence as far as dates are concerned. When you could ask questions from there. Or, on the other hand, would you like to start with questions right away?

Chairman: It is up to you.

Ambassador Taylor: You will remember, the unfortunate day of November 4 — that was the day the "messe" embassy was taken over. On November 8, we received a phone call from one of the Americans that they had been able to leave the compound from the consular office sometime after the attack. They had managed to find temporary lodging, but it was becoming increasingly more difficult and they were wondering if we could provide a safe haven and sanctuary.

We discussed this in the embassy and the conclusion among us, of course, was unanimous. We wanted to do everything we could to help the people who, we had no idea at that time, how long they would be in Tehran. I recommended to Ottawa, to the Minister, that this would be the embassy recommendation, to which they immediately concurred.

On November 10, that is the Saturday, we received a phone call saying that their position was becoming more difficult, increasingly difficult, and would it be acceptable if we made a rendezvous on the Saturday afternoon. From the Saturday afternoon on, they remained with us until their departure on Monday (January 28).

The situation remained uncertain in Tehran. Of course, I think you will remember that there were a number of times when it looked as if it would be resolved sometime during mid-November. However, by November 22, it appeared that we may be in for a longer siege than we first anticipated. At that time, I proposed to Ottawa, although we weren't alarmed about the "house guests" safety, we may wish to look at some contingency plans for departure.

On November 22, I heard from one other American staff member who had been out of the compound at the time of the takeover, had been staying with friends but found his position becoming one which needed a move. Again, we went through the same situation and he arrived to join us on November 22. So that made the six. I am sorry, I may not have made that clear earlier. I meant the five joined us and then the sixth.

Early in December, approximately December 10 or 11, there was a possibility that the story may break from Washington. There were discussions held, and from what I gather, the story was put back and rescheduled until an indefinite time. This was a bit unsettling, but at the same time, we had no problem with the integrity of the press. And the story, as you know, did not break. However, it did — what would you say — encourage us to look at contingency plans with a bit more immediacy than we had in the first place.

Continually during the time there was an effort to assess the degree of risks our friends had with us, and the degree of risk they would be exposed to for the exfiltration, by whatever means the exfiltration took place.

On January 3 and 4, arrangements were made in Ottawa for the issuance, or the authority to issue passports for the individuals. In all our considerations, par-

ticularly as time went on, it was our conclusion that given the possible surveillance American passports would have, that it was preferable that our guests leave by Canadian passports. They had passports in hand by mid-January.

Approximately the third week in January, we received an unidentified phone call saying that the caller was aware the we were harbouring the house guests. At that point, we began to look seriously at the preferable date for departure.

Question: What date was that, sir?

Answer: That was about January 19.

About January 19, again, it appeared as if several newspapers, magazines were also aware of the story, and although the concern was not that it would be prematurely broken by the press, there was just the higher risk and incidence of possibly word being revealed either in Ottawa, Washington, New York or Tehran itself. So the decision was made. I proposed to the minister that we should proceed before the end of the month. The concurrence was received.

We had cut down the staff from say last February as of the revolution because of the lack of activity primarily in the commercial section. But starting in mid-January we began to gradually phase out all officers except for the four remaining, that was Miss Dollimore, my secretary, Mr. Lucy, the first secretary political, Miss O'Flaherty, the communicator and Sergeant Gauthier, the security guard.

Our friends left on Monday, January 28. The remainder of us left on the afternoon of January 28.

I will just make one other comment, and then some questions, or you may want to go over the dates again. But I am talking often times, say, in terms of recommendations, conclusions reached. I would like to stress that the network was almost an ever-revolving one between myself, to Ottawa, Ottawa then to our embassy in Washington possibly, their advice received back here in Ottawa considered and then again gone over with me. So most of the decisions taken were understood by all three locations.

The timing and what-have-you, because of being located in Tehran, was largely in my hands as far as the proposal to make.

Q. You have already touched on my question a little bit at the end, but I wonder if I could ask you to go into it in a little more detail. That is, I am wondering about the decision-making process in what you have described here, particularly the lines of communication between you, Canada, the U.S., back and forth. Who called the shots? Or who had input, and that sort of thing.

A. I think leading to that question is, again, why the departure time. I think you can say three questions.

One is that the six people were always in remarkably good spirits. You have got probably the six best read foreign service officers now. I would nominate any

one of them for the world Scrabble champions. Some of our carpets are a bit threadbare by pack back and forth, but other than that they were in very good spirits right to the end. However, when it appeared that it would be some time possibly, it seemed to be opportune to move when the mood was right.

The political situation at that time in Tehran was uncertain, so there was no reason at that point, in an event, to wait for resolution.

Now, the proposals as to when we should move when to take place, were from Tehran. These were made to the Department of External Affairs. They were then discussed with Washington. That is the general sequence.

Q. That covers the actual movement. I guess what I am thinking about is: surely there must have been some discussion about what happens if we are caught — what do we do. I assume everything was going by code. What happens if the code is broken, and, I know, what sort of assistance might have been available?

A. We had talked to other friendly embassies in Tehran in case something should go awry. We had an identified villa nearby my residence which could have been used as a fall back. The codes and the communications we felt were 100 per cent secure, so we had no problem in that light. So although we did have



back positions, I think everyone — and this is what was extremely important — particularly the six people were, if I can use the word although maybe not appropriate, brimming with confidence. They felt that it was set up and good enough to work. I am not suggesting that there weren't some moments of nervousness or concern, or that we didn't try to develop contingency plans in case something quite unexpected would have gone awry.

Q. I am wondering, Mr. Ambassador, you have mentioned some concern about the press reports being broken. But beyond that, is there any time frame that was particularly difficult for you? Was it the final days? Or what did you think, in a kind of a gut reaction, was the most difficult time for you?

A. I think nearing the conclusion, so to speak. I think that was both because of the inevitably increasing number of people who were aware. The phone call and, at the residence. The possibility of a press break, and then the activity of the last seven days knowing that you had a deadline to meet and that the arrangements were tailored to that deadline. And if something unforeseen came up, it would be, again, difficult both from a practical point of view and psychologically to get everybody up again to be as assured of success as had that time, the second time.

Q. How did you keep the secret? Peter Jennings kept saying that he couldn't believe you would have dinner and a drink and not blow it.

A. There is not much to drink in Tehran these days.

Q. I meant tea!

A. I think, as well as people here, you attempted, whenever you were outside your house, to put it totally out of mind. It was not a subject that you let yourself sort of talk about. It was particularly difficult I think when everyone would ask you, but how can you add up the number of hostages. Well, I said, I can never add up the number of hostages. There were 43 there, seven there. And some of the stories coming out were suggesting that, in fact, there were 15 Americans at large. But the stories, fortunately, never went past that point or they lost their way in the thing. So when Peter was perplexed, I was as perplexed as he was sometimes.

Q. Puis-je vous poser ma question en français, Monsieur l'Ambassadeur?

R. Oui.

Q. Voici. C'est une question un peu spéciale. On a entendu hier le chargé d'affaires iranien à Ottawa nous dire qu'un règlement pour la libération des otages qui sont à l'ambassade américaine est en vue. Monsieur Clark nous a répété la même chose ce matin en disant que Monsieur Carter avait discuté de ça avec lui au téléphone.

Maintenant, vous dites: nous avons choisi ce moment pour évacuer les Américains hors de Téhéran. Est-ce qu'on n'est pas un peu tenté de croire que si vous avez choisi ce moment c'est parce qu'effectivement un

règlement est en vue à l'ambassade américaine et qu'il a été plus facile pour vous de le faire vu le contexte psychologique?

R. Non, je ne pense pas. C'est l'occasion de la possibilité de la presse de faire une histoire de cette chose. It was not necessarily tied to the imminent negotiations, it was more tied to the fact that the risk was increasing greatly each day.

Q. Vous n'êtes pas au courant alors d'un effort sérieux en vue d'une possibilité sérieuse de règlement.

A. Yes. I was aware, but there was not a great deal new. Say, we are talking now of two weeks ago. I think that is a decision, as I said, was the decision of the 26th, and that was made a week before, and now it is a week later. I understand there have been some possibly positive developments in the U.N. over the last week and a half, but quite honestly it was not one of the critical reasons for moving at that time.

Q. Mr. Ambassador, clearly there was a discussion among, in effect, friendly Western embassies that decided the Canadian embassy was the most secure. Could you explain why the Canadian embassy was chosen? And secondly on a point of detail, did the six Americans actually work at any time as if they were Canadians?

A. The first question. There was no consultation among embassies where the six should go, although if, I think, there would have been, the Canadian embassy may have been the logical place to go. Its location is out from the downtown area, away from the British, Russian, French, Italian, American embassies — up more in the residential area. Secondly, our relations with Iran are traditionally very good. There was no troublesome aspect to them, so it would have been a neutral place to put them. But in point of fact the decision was taken by the six themselves.

The second part of the question is: No, they were not working or doing anything, they were either in my residence or in another Canadian residence during the time that they were in Tehran.

There is one question you asked this morning, Mr. Gwyn, too, which is very pertinent, I think. And that is the matter of the locally-engaged staff. If I could address that one too. It was a preoccupation to us but, at the same time, there was no Iranian at any time involved in the operation to exfiltrate the Americans.

The locally engaged staff, that is the Iranian staff at the embassy were given instructions on Sunday, January 25, that since I would be away from Tehran shortly the office would be temporarily closed until at least the following Sunday. So if there had been — which there hasn't been — any possible investigation they would not be caught at the office.

Q. Can you tell me why your confidence seemed to continue throughout this entire thing? Why there wasn't more fear? You have alluded to the good spirits that seemed to be present. What was your relationship,



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for example, with people like Ghotbzadeh and others? Was it a good one? And did that help give confidence to your house guests?

A. Well, I think the house guests — it was essentially a true test of character. If they saw themselves becoming somewhat depressed, they immediately looked at their position, vis-a-vis everybody else. They never thought that they would not get out, and soon were able to maintain their good relations.

My own experience and own relationship with Iranian government officials was a good one. I think much the same as an ambassador from a medium-sized country — Scandinavia, New Zealand, Australia — there were no particular problems. And I enjoyed the same access to the foreign ministry, as I imagine the rest of my colleagues did.

Q. We all know there were six people in the embassy. But just a little before you were counting people and you said 42 there and seven there. Who is that seventh? And is there another American in Tehran today?

A. No —

Q. Why this number of seven?

A. What I meant is — getting back to the Christmas Eve visit, and I believe at that time they said there were 43 or there were 6, and when I was speaking to Mr. Mills it was to give an indication of the lack of clarity as to the numbers in the compound. I believe it is, as the State Department I believe normally says, approximately 50. So, I meant the six were not the missing six or seven.

Q. You referred earlier to possibly positive developments in the U.N. regarding the release of the hostages. Can you say whether you heard anything while you were still in Tehran that would lead you to place greater credence on this, that would indicate that the release of the hostages is anywhere near at hand?

A. No. I had heard of no new significant developments during the last few days I was in Tehran. I tried to keep pace with what was going on, but our telex traffic was very limited during the last few days, so I didn't have the opportunity to keep as current during those last few days as maybe I would have liked to. But, again, I take some heart from the remarks which were referred to earlier at the U.N.

Q. Would you care to comment on the statement of Mr. Adeli yesterday, the Iranian chargé d'affaires, that the arrangements, such as they were, whatever stage they may have been at, have been set back as a result of the Canadian "caper"?

A. No. I have heard no sort of sense of remark from Tehran of that nature, except Mr. Ghotbzadeh's initial response that it is a probability. However, there has been no other indication that I have heard, either from Mr. Bani-Sadr or from Mr. Beheshti of the revolutionary council.

Q. Mr. Ambassador, I have two questions. You mentioned you had a phone call on or about January 19. I

wonder if you can tell us a little bit more about that; who it came from, or the nature of it. Was it a menacing or friendly phone call?

A. Well, during that period, I started with the assumption that all phone calls were menacing. But it was a phone call when I was not home. It was answered by Mrs. Taylor. They wanted to speak to me. When she said I wasn't home, they said they would insist on speaking to Mr. and Mrs. Stafford. They would not identify themselves, and yet they said "we know there are two people of such names there."

Q. In this circular decision-making route that you described earlier, obviously, Canadians and Americans would have to contemplate the risks involved for the remaining hostages. How, at the time, did you assess those risks? And what then made you determined to go ahead with the escape in light of those risks?

A. I think that was probably one of the predominant worries we had: that the last thing we possibly wanted to trigger was any negative implications for the remaining 50 at the compound. However, our reading of the situation was such that it would not provoke a negative reaction in Iran.

Q. Why?

A. Because of the nature of the time, the Iranians themselves were preoccupied with the resolution of the hostages at the compound. I don't think they were particularly concerned by six having been outside the compound, and that if the six in fact left Iran, it was really marginal to the entire issue at hand.

Q. Mr. Ambassador, I want to ask you something about housekeeping details during this time that you gave hospitality to six Americans. Did that present any kind of a problem? For example, bringing in food and things like that. Who did that? And how was it arranged so that nobody became suspicious because all of a sudden you were feeding six more people than you should.

A. As I said, there were some points where they were in other Canadian residences, so it was spread around somewhat.

Q. You mean the six were spread around in one building?

A. No, not all the time. What I can confirm to you is that at no time were they ever in the Chancery itself — not in the office itself.

Now, the housekeeping and what have you was not as difficult as it may seem. The residence I am in has an unobtrusive side street. The other residences or houses often times have interior garages. In Tehran, food shortages were of such a nature — they were never serious, they were often just spot shortages — that whenever you could buy 50 pounds of that or 30 dozen of that, you did it. So it was not unusual to see someone making purchases of what you would not call a sort of corner confectionery type dimension or magnitude.

Q. Monsieur Taylor, pourriez-vous confirmer la remeure selon laquelle l'ambassade de Suède aurait été l'un des refuges des six diplomates américains tout au début avant qu'ils ne fassent appel à vous?

R. Non, je ne peux pas.

Q. Est-ce qu'ils l'ont demandé?

R. Peut-être, mais je ne pense pas.

Q. Mr. Taylor, Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh has warned on a number of occasions that the escape of the six Americans could make the situation worse for the 50 Americans still in the U.S. compound. Do you share that view? And, secondly, we would much appreciate having your expertise on the general optimism shared by a lot of people that the new President-elect Bani-Sadr is now committed to an early ending of the crisis.

A. I think that our first reading was that no, it would not have a negative impact on the people at the embassy. I don't think there has been a statement from the people holding the embassy, vis-a-vis the exit of the six that you could see as a negative turn or having a negative sense to it. The new president has not made a formal criticism or statement of the departure.

As I say, I think given the massive support he received at the polls and his intent to get on with ruling the country, it would seem to most people — and I think this accounts to some degree for the optimism — that he is seeking an early resolution on mutually satisfactory terms to the conflict.

Q. One supplementary. Do you have any sense that the government in Iran has any real control at all over the student militants? One has this feeling that they are acting almost entirely independently of the state.

A. No. I think there has always been a line of communication between Qum and the compound; between the revolutionary council, to a lesser extent, and the compound. Really, since I just left at the time of the new government, I am not in a position to mention how the framework or the link is right at this time. But the news seems optimistic.

Q. Early in the takeover of the U.S. Embassy, the Minister for External Affairs talked about the fact that the Canadian Embassy was remaining in order to assist other U.S. citizens to get out of the country. Why could not these people be handled in the same way?

A. I think the main reason was that the other people we helped get out of the country were with private firms, rather than the embassy, and didn't experience that much difficulty; it was largely just administrative help we provided. They left on their own documents. However, we provided whatever consular assistance we could, but not of the nature of the assistance we offered to the six who departed.

Q. Mr. Ambassador, will you share with us in as minute detail as possible the daily life styles of the Americans? Did they venture forth? Did they go to movies? What would they do with their time? As a

follow-up to that, could you tell us a little bit about last preparations leaving the country. Were the soldiers told to mask their accents? Were they given Canadian clothes, Canadian luggage, that type of thing?

A. They are the only people to ever wear two Maple Leaf pins! The days were, I know, rather long for some of them, because they did not leave the residence or house unless it was absolutely necessary, so there was no freedom of movement.

They had left the American Embassy offices and had had only an opportunity to pick up a few suitcases so they had essentially no personal effects. This was helped out by some members of our staff who were approximately the same size. I never determined whether they were the same style or taste, but they are approximately the same size.

The days largely were made up of what you would do on a weekend vacation, extended over three months. Maybe playing bridge, Scrabble, reading, talking, sleeping in a bit later than if you were employed at the embassy during normal times.

A. Are any of them writing a book, for instance?


A. I don't know. They didn't mention it. But I am sure a number of them kept their own remembrances or their own diaries. The departure, as I say, they went largely with normal suitcases which we had provided with clothes again which had been provided by ourselves.

Q. Mr. Ambassador, when did your wife leave the country? Was it a week or two ahead of you? And, did you bring out all your own clothes with you or you leave a lot of stuff, including any special possessions in the embassy. I ask the question against a background of knowing that the security people who are Canadian Armed Forces personnel left without uniforms at all, just in plain clothes, to leave unobtrusively, and I assume that is about \$600 or \$700 of taxpayers' money down the drain.

A. No. Pat left Sunday morning. That is the day before we left. As far as what sort of personal effects got out, some were luckier than others. I have another suit, I think. But that is okay. We had our belongings packed in time. However, we are not entirely certain where they are or whether we will see them again for a while.

Q. Mr. Taylor, the actual departure, you have touched on it at all. Could you give us a run down of exactly how six Americans and yourselves got out. A number two, you said that there were no Iranians involved in the operation — were there any Iranian senior or otherwise apart from the anonymous telephone caller who were aware of it, if not involved.

A. There is one thing. The anonymous telephone caller may not have been an Iranian. The accent was clear.



CP photo

three years abroad this time, so possibly I would come back to Ottawa or another diplomatic post.

Q. Can you describe the trial runs that were apparently held before the departure?

A. I think the trial runs, what is essentially inferred from the trial runs is not that the people involved or others attempted to do the same thing to see how it would work. Once was fine.

The trials were associated largely with people who were leaving ordinarily looking at the means and conditions of exit.

Q. And how closely your passports were being looked at, that sort of thing?

A. And the checks, and what have you.

Q. I have two areas of questions. One is movement of the Americans while they were there. How did they arrive at the embassy? Did they all arrive at once? You said they never left the embassy unless it was absolutely necessary. What would have been necessary, and how often did they do that?

A. It was necessary a couple of times. Once a few were staying temporarily in another house, the landlord insisted on selling it, so that meant he had to bring people over. I thought it was very unfair of him to sell the house during the time we had the people there. But he did want some potential customers to come and see and we couldn't very well say, "Well, you can see everything but the last bedroom from the right on the second floor" on an occasion like that, for example. And the coming in — they arrived openly in cars to where we were, we met them. It was during the day time. There really isn't too much scrutiny or what have you.

Q. The second question is about contingency plans. There must have been a number of different ways you could have handled the situation. You could have done this whole thing publicly. We announced that these people were here in the embassy and that you were going to safeguard them. I understand you were considering using Department of Defence planes to fly them out. Could you perhaps tell us of some of the other things you considered?

A. I think when I say considered, I am not saying that they got past the drawing board or what have you. There is certainly the other obvious one which is overland down to Bandar Abbas in the south and then out by the Gulf to the Gulf states. But I think everything seemed to work out in favour of moving visibly through the airport. It is the normal thing to do when you are leaving the country. And the others implied considerably more setting up and a lot of chance once you left Tehran, given the uncertainty.

Q. I just wondered — you mentioned about getting passports. But you didn't mention anything about exit visas. Would you tell us how those were falsified or what you did about that?

A. Well, I got the passports. And I think the rest is

It wasn't necessarily an Iranian? Did he have any noticeable accent?

No, I don't think so. Then you had one other question.

The actual departure.

Yes. It was in the morning. I will try again. Do you mean the sort of way to the airport, or...?

Yes. Could you give us a run down of what happened?

They went to the airport in our embassy cars. The fact would have been they were Canadians who were sitting with me. So it was a natural thing, given the difficulty of assuring yourself of cabs early in the morning, that the embassy would drop them off.

Was this Monday morning, Mr. Ambassador?

That is right.

Canadian diplomats who perform noteworthy acts to sink like stones afterwards. I am wondering if you have any inkling what turn your career might now take?

I am not entirely certain whether this occasion will happen again. But in the meantime, until we work out what happens, vis-a-vis Tehran, whether or not I could be going back — I am just going to discuss it with the Department of External Affairs — I have no particular plans in mind. Essentially, we have been

what you call — surely you have got it in journalism too — a trade-secret.

Q. One other specific item. I wondered if a certain Canadian who was in Tehran until fairly recently, I believe who worked for Staedler-Herder — I think you know to whom I am referring.

A. Yes.

Q. Is he still in Tehran?

A. The individual referred to had a contested tax problem with the Iranian government, but just before we were to leave, I believe that was resolved, and I think he is on his way out.

Q. On his way out, or still there?

A. He may well be out by now. It would seem to me he was going to be out by the next day or two.

Q. Monsieur l'Ambassadeur, on a d'abord pensé que les six Américains avaient couru, s'étaient échappés de l'ambassade des Etats-Unis le 4 novembre et avaient couru directement à l'ambassade du Canada. Vous nous dites maintenant qu'ils ont téléphoné le première fois le 8 novembre pour vous aviser que leur situation était difficile et ils vous ont rappelé une seconde fois le 10 novembre, c'est-à-dire six jours après la prise des otages à l'ambassade américaine.

Voudriez-vous nous dire ce qu'ils ont fait? Es-ce qu'ils se sont adressés à d'autres ambassades pendant ces six jours et comment se fait-il que vous n'avez pas répondu favorablement à leur demande des le 8 novembre?

A. Two parts to that. There was a favourable reply on November 8. The only aspect that was lacking at that time was the commitment which was certain, I anticipated, of the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for External Affairs. They did not, however, seek a total commitment November 8. They said they were free from the embassy. They had temporary lodging, but they would not feel safe to be there longer than say the coming weekend. At that point, we asked them to be certain to phone back by Friday or Saturday at which time we would be able to give them directions and instructions.

Q. Vous n'avez pas répondu, Monsieur l'Ambassadeur, à la première partie de ma question qui était: est-ce qu'à votre connaissance entre le 4 novembre et le 8 novembre ils s'étaient adressés à d'autres ambassades qu'à la vôtre?

A. Most of the time, essentially pretty well all the time from the sixth to say the tenth, they were in an uninhabited bungalow. It may have been they were contemplating asking for sanctuary at another embassy, but I say this with good certainty, I do not think that they asked any other embassy for full-fledged sanctuary. It is possible they may have asked them for some nature of assistance or possibly a haven for a day or two. But that is the extent of their involvement or, I think, contemplation of seeking asylum or sanctuary in another embassy.

Q. Back to that phone call and the possibility I guess, that it was Iranian. Is it possible that the Iranian authorities knew of this or had some inkling in any way, and were prepared to give it benign neglect?

A. Yes, I think it may well be possible. At no time did an Iranian official approach me and say "we understand there are six American staff who are still in Tehran". I think that possibly (there is some suggestion that this was the case, but it never came out) the clergy who visited December 24 were aware that there were six outside the compound.

Q. Mr. Ambassador, were there at any time any communications between Ottawa and your embassy in Tehran concerning the advisability of any further action on the part of Canada to show support for United States diplomatic or economic activity? And so, what was your recommendation?

A. I was in, again, constant touch with External Affairs both on the basis of my own assessment and talking with colleagues as to how to bring an end to the confrontation, and I think any number of approaches going from a very conciliatory one to somewhat stern measures were advanced. But I think I was, again, really doing the same job as anyone else; and that "how do you resolve the situation". There are a number of measures that I think have been outlined to do so.

Q. Did the government do exactly what you recommended?

A. I can't recall any time over, say, since November 4, that there was a conflict between what I would propose myself or in terms of what guidance or counsel Ottawa would send back.

Q. Mr. Taylor, I would like to know in as much detail as you can provide about the nature of the identities assigned to the Americans. You mentioned that they were technically visitors. Were they given the identities of real Canadians, falsified names, and what professions were they supposed to have, and what was the status of their presence?

A. No, they were not given real Canadian names. Then you could say, well, were they given real American names. But, again, I don't mean to back away from the question, but I am really not in a position to say.

Q. You can't say what professions they were given on their passports?

A. Not right now.

Q. Or whether they were visitors, tourists, relatives, staff members?

A. No. I think that is as far as I can go.

Q. Just a quick one before I ask my question. Following on that one. Was it a diplomatic passport?

A. No.

Q. My question has to do with the timing, sir, of your decision to get the Americans out of there. At what point did you decide that you couldn't wait for the

incident at the American Embassy to end, and you had to get them out of there?

It was largely that period from, say, mid-January.

Did External at any time tell you to wait?

No. I think it was my telex almost coincided with

a message from Ottawa, saying: "What is your reading? From our vantage point it seems about the end of January." In fact, I was really saying almost the same thing to them.

Chairman: Thank you very much, sir.

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Zimbabwe: a new beginning after 14 years of Ian Smith

by Clyde Sanger

One of the less remembered prime ministers of Southern Rhodesia, Winston Field, tried to put his country's problems in a nutshell when he said, "The trouble here is fear of the unknown."

That was in 1962, and we were making an inspection tour (for he was a paternalist, of military bearing) of his tobacco farm near Marandellas. There seemed little to fear, that pleasant evening. But the Rhodesia Front (RF) of which he was the first leader, was soon busily spreading trepidation: its prize effort, for the elections of December 1962, was a poster-photograph of schoolgirls' legs—black and white, all mixed up together. That's what will happen to your daughter, if you vote for Whitehead and let him repeal the Land Apportionment Act! So the properly frightened whites abandoned Sir Edgar, and the RF came to power, and within 16 months Ian Smith had pushed Winston Field aside and began accelerating down the dirt road that led him to his Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in November 1965. Smith kept telling everyone that independence would end uncertainty.

He was, of course, absurdly wrong. Through his UDI he simply enlarged the uncertainty and multiplied the fears and agony of thousands of Rhodesians for 14 long years. The British were frightened of using force (they might have called it "police action") to snuff out his rebellion, either because they thought they would mess it up or because they thought the risk too high of shooting some kith and kin and outraging public opinion at home.

For his part, Smith was too stupid to grab the two chances Harold Wilson gave him, in December 1966 and October 1968 aboard HMS *Tiger* and HMS *Fearless*, of a legalized independence with a national assembly dominated by whites and only a small group of black M.P.'s to provide a "blocking quarter" (17 out of 67 seats) that would prevent the "retrogressive amendment of the constitution". Ian Smith's talents lay in devising means of short-term survival, a few months at a time, by dividing his enemies: dividing the African nationalists by pegging them down separately in prison, detention area or exile; and dividing the British politicians and Commonwealth leaders by sow-

ing suspicions of some secret deal. (He tried playing the vulnerable Kaunda in this way against Nyerere. It was only through stalwart work by the first Commonwealth Secretary-General, Arnold Smith, through general good sense prevailing at Heads of Government Meetings that his opposition did not fall apart in the years before the Zimbabwe guerrilla armies grew to any strength after 1972. Then his time began running out inexorably.

Final effort

Rather than attempting a necessarily inadequate summary of all these years of rebellion, or a comparison of the half-dozen efforts to conclude a political settlement, it is preferable to concentrate on some of the tails of the final effort—let's call it the Carrington settlement, to give credit to its author—and to peer over his shoulder a few years into the future of Zimbabwe. For Winston Field's fear of the unknown is still with us. The six million people of Zimbabwe will move into a state of internationally recognized independence in February, March or April while the leading figures among the 230,000 whites and the rest of the people—whether they are politicians or farmers or teachers or soldiers—still hardly know one another. This is part of the legacy of the rebellion.

But before becoming too gloomy about the prospects for Zimbabwe, it is worth recalling how the feelings expressed about a somewhat similar situation in Kenya in the early 1960s were marvellously allayed.

Remember those days? A nervous British governor, Sir Patrick Renison (who ended his days less obviously, running the Playing Fields Association), refusing to release Jomo Kenyatta from detention, calling him "the leader to darkness and death" and then saying he couldn't let him loose because he didn't "know what is in his mind". There were fears that forest fighters, unexorcised of their Mau Mau oath, would wreak vengeance on their fellow Kikuyu who had been loyalists and "home guards", and then drove out the white farmers without ceremony or compensation. And British ministers did their best to institutionalize the division between the KANU and KANU parties by imposing an independence constitution that gave large and residual powers to six regional legislatures. Even for those who didn't read Robert Ruark's titillating novels, there were grounds for fear in Kenya's approach to *uhuru*.

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The horrors never happened. Kenyatta was soon "Mzee" to everyone, and won the support of white farmers at a single remarkable meeting in Nakuru when he talked to them about common problems like stock thefts and by the end had them up on their feet shouting "Harambee" — Pull together. ("The Turning-Point Speech", it was called on the memorial record sold when he died.) Some of the country's best farmland in the Rift valley was turned over to African ownership by orderly purchase, covered by a British Government loan. Forest fighters were quietly pensioned off. Tom Mboya, as Kenyatta's troubleshooter, speedily replaced the regionalist constitution with a centralized form of unitary government, and KANU and KADU converged rather than clashed. Of course, not everything came up roses: some white farmers trundled south, telling alarming stories to explain their move; Mboya and the KADU leader, Ronald Ngala, met violent ends. But Africans with their characteristic skill in human relations overcame many chasms that had seemed frightening.

And so to Zimbabwe, and the Lancaster House conference that began on September 10. It took 14 weeks of hard bargaining for Lord Carrington to hammer out agreement on three matters: an independence constitution, arrangements for the period of transition between a ceasefire and independence (including elections), and the ceasefire arrangements themselves. Let us address two questions. Which delegation came out of the marathon conference with the balance of advantage? And what hopes are there that these arrangements will lead to lasting peace and prosperity for Zimbabwe?

Fug-of-Peace

The Salisbury delegation led by Bishop Muzorewa began unsteadily and also unrealistically, but not for long. It started by tabling, as its contribution to the debate on an independence constitution, a copy of the current constitution that is based on the March 3rd Agreement between Smith's Rhodesia Front, Muzorewa's UANC and smaller groups led by Ndabaningi Sithole and Chief Chirau. Since under this constitution 28 white M.P.s could prevent, for at least 10 years, the Africanization of senior posts in the civil service, police and army, it was hardly what Bishop Muzorewa really wanted. He was happy after two weeks to manoeuvre Ian Smith into being a minority of one, while the other 11 delegates accepted Carrington's proposals. These reduced the number of M.P.s to 20 out of 100, and removed their veto powers by providing that a constitutional amendment bill could be passed by a 70 percent vote (although to alter the Declaration of Rights requires an unanimous vote).

After that, although the Bishop made a show of saying no fresh elections were needed to implement these changes, his delegation was swift to agree to successive British proposals on transitional arrangements

and cease-fire plans. It was also smart to do so. For its quick acquiescence produced a two-to-one situation in which Lord Carrington, tough in that urbane way some British patricians have, spent his weeks tugging the Patriotic Front on to the common ground he now shared with Muzorewa and which he claimed was middle ground. He had remarkable success.

The two sections of the Patriotic Front, Joshua Nkomo's ZAPU and Robert Mugabe's ZANU, came to London well prepared and in a mood of cool determination. They were not going to walk out in a temper, and give the game to Muzorewa; just to make sure, comrades from the front line states of Tanzania, Mozambique and Zambia paced round the periphery of the conference to encourage the PF leaders to stay in it. They maintained unity in public very convincingly; the ZANU and ZAPU spokesmen, Edison Zvogbo and Willie Musururwa, were an amiable and astute duo in daily briefings. Nevertheless, the PF leaders conceded a great deal, starting with the acceptance at each of the three stages that the British proposals rather than their own documents should form the basis for negotiations.

To give the main examples, the British team offered minor accommodations on the constitution: it lowered the qualification for a High Court judge from 10 years to seven years of being qualified to practise as an advocate; and it reshaped the Senate to give the Assembly and Prime Minister together the nomination or election of half of the 40-strong chamber, instead of 10 out of 30. But these concessions are insignificant when compared with the constitutional points on which the PF yielded:

—instead of an executive president, they accepted a constitutional head of state, elected by M.P.s, and an executive prime minister.

—they opposed the automatic granting of Zimbabwean citizenship to everyone who is now a Rhodesian citizen or has the qualifications for becoming one, saying that the critical date should be November 1965 (UDI time); they reasoned that those who had come to Rhodesia after UDI were likely to be white supremacists unwanted in Zimbabwe.

—they argued against the "racialism" of having any reserved seats voted for by a separate roll (in Kenya and Tanzania non-blacks have been elected on a common roll), and then accepted the provision of 20 which seats — a figure wildly out of proportion to the whites' 3 percent share of the actual population.

—they objected to the whole idea of paying white settlers off if their farmland is expropriated, but have now accepted as part of the Declaration of Rights the obligation to make "prompt payment of adequate compensation . . . remittable within a reasonable time to any country outside Zimbabwe".

Further concessions by the PF followed during the seven weeks spent arguing on the arrangements for a ceasefire and pre-independence elections. The British

strategy throughout has been to hurry the talks along and telescope the timetable to independence as much as possible, presumably for fear that doubts would be compounded and difficulties increased if the momentum slackened. They have been able to maintain the momentum in a way that the Labour Government team never did during the 1976-77 talks in Geneva. For they were prepared to move at better than convoy speed, unlike Anthony Crosland the Foreign Secretary in 1976, leaving the PF behind if necessary (and if that was a bluff, it was an effective one). They were also prepared to move boldly into an exposed position, as when Lord Soames was despatched to Salisbury as Governor before a full ceasefire agreement.

Measured Pace

The Patriotic Front's strategy, on the other hand, was to negotiate at a measured pace and to plan for a longer transition period. Was that to give its armed forces time to move further into strategic parts of the country, or to claim a reasonable time for organizing and campaigning in the most important election Zimbabweans have ever faced? Or for both reasons? In any case, the PF leaders in the end dropped these important demands:

—they wanted a six-month transition period, but accepted the British plan for a period of only two months from ceasefire to polling.

—they wanted a United Nations force, to help maintain order during this period. Field Marshal Lord Carver, the Governor-designate in 1977-78, worked out such a scheme then. Mrs. Thatcher was strongly against a UN force: nor did Britain invite troops from six Commonwealth countries suggested by the PF (Ghana, Guyana, India, Jamaica, Nigeria and Sierra Leone). Instead it asked Australia, Fiji, Kenya and New Zealand to provide 500 troops alongside a 700-strong British contingent. Their job: to keep an eye on the separated armies after disengagement.

—as for the maintenance of law and order, the PF accepted that the British South Africa Police would remain in charge, although now under Governor Soames' ultimate command.

—and when negotiating on "assembly points" where PF forces would gather and remain during the election campaign, they asked for a number equal to that occupied by the Salisbury forces and also for the grounding of the Rhodesian Air Force. They ended with 16 assembly points, less than half the other side's number, and only one on the strategic spine of the country, the high veld between Salisbury and Bulawayo.

Set out like this, the Patriotic Front leaders can be seen during the 14 weeks to have abandoned so many of their original positions that one must wonder why they have done so. Were they simply outgunned by the British team? It was a formidable team, but the PF had a line of men, sharpened by years of detention (Mugabe

and others took law degrees in prison), who were a match for Carrington, Gilmour and Duff. Were they Bishop Muzorewa alleged in a spiteful statement in London after signing the cease-fire agreement, utterly deceitful and "making promises not worth the paper they're written on"? I don't believe so, and I know the world quite well. Were they greatly concerned to appear reasonable rather than rigid, and to rid themselves of a terrorist image, and therefore prepared to sacrifice some points to this end? Perhaps. Are they so confident of winning an election that they believe they have a margin to bargain away? Or did they become worried that Bishop Muzorewa was by November already pioneering with some effect and the British might move ahead with election plans, leaving them out in the cold? Have they concluded that, after a seven-year stalemated war that has left 30,000 dead and life in rural areas utterly dislocated, the people are desperate for peace. Perhaps, to all of these.

Let's now look briefly into the future.

Writing before Christmas 1979 it is risky to the point of folly to predict what may happen by the end of February 1980 and after the elections. Having said that, I offer a set of predictions, as a means of highlighting some of the problems immediately ahead.

As many as six major political parties may contest the elections. With 20 seats reserved for whites elected on a separate roll, one African party has to win 51 of the 80 remaining seats to gain a majority. It is more than possible that a bloc of right-wing whites led by Ian Smith will end up holding the balance of power. This is certainly to the tactical advantage of Smith's Rhodesians to encourage divisions among sub-groups of the Shona people (Robert Chikerema's Zezuru group of Mambasa split from the Bishop in 1979 in protest against his favouring the Manyika group) and between the Shona and Ndebele peoples.

It will be a mixed blessing, having a constitutional president and executive prime minister. An older politician may be given the presidential job (Nkomo or Bishop?) while Mugabe or conceivably Dr Siala Mawema or dawarara becomes prime minister; and this may help to forge a two-party alliance to secure majority government. It can equally be, in the phrase of constitutional expert Dr. Claire Palley, "a recipe for discord", since the president can dismiss the prime minister. Remember Kasavubu and Lumumba in the Congo?

The formation of a Zimbabwe national army will be a major problem. Lord Carver had plans for a 10,000-strong force, balancing Salisbury and PF forces with new recruitment and starting the integration process before independence. Carrington ducked the problem, leaving it to the incoming government on a winner-take-all basis. To judge by General Walls' remarks on the day the cease-fire agreement was signed (Nkomo and Mugabe "are agents of Soviet imperialism" and their election victory would bring "bloody civil war") he will be more hindrance than help in



Patrician Front leaders Robert Mugabe (left) and Joshua Nkomo are shown at the London conference in September. While the conference continued, rumours spread that there was a danger of 'civil war' between guerrilla followers of

rocess — and might even engineer a coup. He was certainly adding to "the fear of the unknown" among his shallow whites.

African cultivators are jam-packed into Tribal Trust Lands — 3.6 million people subsisting where only a million can reasonably live. About 4,000 farmers are doing well enough in the African Purchase Areas to produce for the commercial market. On the other hand, at least a third of the 6,700 white farms are abandoned, and another third are much underused. Massive changes in land tenure and use are needed. "Set compensation for the expropriation of 4,000 white farms could cost one billion dollars.

Role for Canada

Canadian governments under Lester Pearson and Pierre Trudeau played an important part, directly and indirectly at Commonwealth meetings, in making sure that Britain did not conclude a sell-out deal with Ian Smith. Canada can take some credit that majority rule has eventually come to Zimbabwe. But that's the beginning of the job, not the end.

It is unfortunate that Zimbabwe's independence comes at a time when External Affairs and CIDA are cutting back on programs, and certainly not looking for

new commitments. There are 10 countries in southern Africa that will have to be covered from Canadian missions in Pretoria and Lusaka — until one is set up in Salisbury. Since one will certainly have to be established there some day, it is best to do it right away and gain the knowledge and the influence that comes of being there early.

If it is altogether too expensive to contemplate taking this step alone, then the government should try a daring new experiment and suggest sharing a mission in Salisbury with another Commonwealth country — Australia is the obvious choice. As for CIDA, its tied aid provisions made it difficult to help much with tropical agriculture, since few Canadians had such skills; but Zimbabwe is far enough south of the equator for Canadian farming experts to be useful there.

In the past 15 years, many Canadians — politicians and editors alike — have refrained from wholeheartedly backing the Zimbabwean nationalists on the grounds that they could not support violence (ignoring that the prime violence was white repression and racial discrimination). Even today the timid may hold back, pleading austerity. It will be a deep shame for Canada if we do not do all we can to help turn the promise of peace into a lasting reality.

Genesis of the next revolution

by Luis Barrios

The possibility of a future scenario modeled on the Nicaraguan revolution cannot be overlooked in the tiny and densely populated Republic of El Salvador. The spontaneous eruption of political violence and civil war is imminent not only because Nicaragua's recent revolution is potentially exportable, but also because the severities of economic and social deprivation in this country invite revolutionary response. Already a major groundswell of conflict and polarization is visible in many parts of El Salvador, promising to escalate into a wider crisis of national proportions. At present the nature of the governmental system is such that repression comes first and politics is secondary. Personalism and authoritarianism run rampant while Revolution with a capital "R" stands in the wings waiting to enter the social and political system, with violence as the only alternative.

Impending Crisis

All the variables which normally constitute conditions that give rise to social disequilibrium are present in El Salvador. This predominantly agrarian nation has the smallest territorial size of any continental American country (5240 square kilometres) but also the densest population for all of Latin America (215 persons per square kilometre). The chronic overcrowding of El Salvador's 5.3 million people is further complicated by an annual population growth rate of 3.4 per cent which has sustained itself for the past decade. These factors alone exert formidable pressures on the unresolved problems of inequitable land ownership, unemployment, and the lack of basic services.

In the past decade the problem of intensive demographic pressure was aggravated by the closure of the border with Honduras after the so-called "Soccer War". Prior to the 1969 war Salvadoreans migrated into Honduras and occupied a sizeable amount of land across the frontier thus helping to relieve internal population

pressures. Now with the population expected to double within 20 years, the relocation of Salvadorean farm peasants and tradesmen is bound to cause not only increasing internal tensions but international ones as well. In addition, the predominantly rural composition of El Salvador's population (approximately 60 per cent) means the persistence of illiteracy, low productivity, health problems, low technology, low skills and feudalistic social structures.

Most of the productive *latifundia* which constitute approximately 50 per cent of the arable land are held by some 300 extended families, while the *campesinos* (rural workers) — the great majority — hold only 10 per cent of the land (*minifundia*) in plots of usually less than ten hectares. The scarcity of land coupled with its unequal distribution results in gross inefficiency of land use and uneven economic growth in the agricultural sector, which accounts for 25 per cent of the GNP, 75 per cent of foreign earnings and 46 per cent of the labour force.

But these factors alone do not necessarily produce a revolution or political turmoil. Many Central and South American states have similar conditions which more often than not result in long-term political stability, notwithstanding static economic growth. Certainly, inequality is present everywhere in Latin America but in the case of El Salvador, small size and a well-developed communications system serve to heighten antagonism and dissatisfaction among people. The obvious imbalance between those who have and those who have not is highly visible in Salvadorean society, and the revolution of rising expectations engenders great political instability with each economic setback.

It is because of this that El Salvador serves to exemplify James C. Davies' "J-Curve" theory of revolution. According to Davies, it is not an absolute amount of inequality that encourages revolutionary behaviour. Instead it is relative deprivation (the gap between what people expect and what they get) that facilitates political and social violence. Davies posits that revolution will likely occur when "a prolonged period of rising expectations and rising gratification is followed by a short period of sharp reversal, during which the gap between expectations and gratification quickly widens and becomes intolerable."

Dr. Barrios is a native of Venezuela who has recently completed doctoral studies in Latin American Politics at the University of St. Louis, Missouri. He is a former OPEC staff member.



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- No. 63 (August 16, 1979) United Nations Conference on Science and Technology for Development, Vienna, August 20 to 31, 1979.
- No. 64 (August 23, 1979) External Affairs Appointment: Gordon S. Smith as Deputy Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs (Management and Planning).
- No. 65 (August 31, 1979) Official visit of the Vice-President and Commissioner (Social Affairs) of the Commission of the European Communities, Mr. Henk Vredeling.
- No. 66 (September 11, 1979) Canada-U.S. Discussions on tuna fishing off the west coast of Canada.
- No. 67 (September 12, 1979) Canada-U.S. Talks on west coast fisheries problems.
- No. 68 (September 21, 1979) Secretary of State for External Affairs at thirty-fourth UN General Assembly Session.

- No. 69 (October 1, 1979) West to East oil pipeline.
- No. 70 (October 2, 1979) Food Aid Program to Portugal.
- No. 71 (October 3, 1979) Renewal of Canada-Cuba Hijack Agreement.
- No. 72 (October 9, 1979) External Affairs Senior Appointments: L.H. Amyot as Chief of Protocol; A. Couvrette as Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs; R. de Clotal as Minister (Cultural Affairs and Information) Canadian Embassy in Paris; J. Gignac, the additional responsibility for International Humanitarian Affairs; A. Legras as Director, Canadian Cultural Centre in Paris; McKinney as Special Economic Adviser; L. Rogers as Coordinator for Canadian Participation, Madrid Meeting; the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe; L.A.H. Smith as Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.
- No. 73 (October 15, 1979) Canada-U.S. research consultants group on the long-range transport of air pollutants.
- No. 74 (October 17, 1979) Canadian pledges under Caribbean Group for Co-operation in Economic Development (CGCED).
- No. 75 (October 17, 1979) Repeal of Canada-France Trade Agreement Acts (1933, 1935).
- No. 76 (October 18, 1979) Canada-EC Meetings, October 16, 1979.
- No. 77 (October 18, 1979) Statement to plenary session on International Year of the Child by Douglas Roche, M.P., Parliamentary Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs and representative of Canada to Second Committee thirty-fourth regular session of UN General Assembly, New York, October 17, 1979.
- No. 78 (October 19, 1979) Canadian contribution to international relief effort for Kampuchea (Cambodia).
- No. 79 (October 22, 1979) West to east oil pipeline.
- No. 80 (October 23, 1979) Diplomatic Appointments: M.D. Chahorne as Ambassador to Austria, concurrently accredited as Resident Representative to International Atomic Energy Agency, Governor for Canada and Permanent Representative to United Nations Industrial Development Organization; J.G. Harris as Ambassador to Yugoslavia, concurrently accredited to Bulgaria; M.A. Macpherson as Ambassador to Denmark; R.W. Stewart as Consul General in Atlanta.
- No. 81 (October 25, 1979) Independence of St. Vincent and the Grenadines.
- No. 82 (October 25, 1979) Food Aid: notes for a statement by Douglas Roche, M.P., Parliamentary Secretary to the Secretary of State for External Affairs and representative of Canada to the Second Committee of the thirty-fourth Regular Session of the UN General Assembly, New York, October 23, 1979.
- No. 83 (October 26, 1979) Trials of Czech Dissidents.
- No. 84 (November 2, 1979) Secretary of State for External Affairs to Attend United Nations Pledging Conference for emergency assistance to people of Kampuchea November 5, 1979, New York.
- No. 85 (November 13, 1979) Canada signs Convention on Long-range transboundary airborne pollution, Geneva, November 13, 1979.
- No. 86 (November 13, 1979) Official visit of Mr. Dankoulodo Dicko, Secretary General of the Agency for Cultural Technical Co-operation.

(November 14, 1979) The Situation in Kampuchea: notes for a statement by Douglas Roche, M.P., Parliamentary Secretary to the Secretary of State for External Affairs and Representative of Canada to the thirty-fourth Regular Session of the UN General Assembly, New York, November 14, 1979.

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(November 16, 1979) Canadian contribution to the Maduru Oya Reservoir complex in Sri Lanka.

(November 20, 1979) Canadian declaration under Article 41 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

(November 20, 1979) Canada Hosts the Canada/CARICOM Joint Trade and Economic Committee.

(November 22, 1979) Secretary of State for External Affairs' visit to Europe, December 10-18, 1979.

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(November 28, 1979) Erik Nielsen attends opening of Grantley Adams Airport, Barbados.

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(November 30, 1979) Claude Cheysson to visit Canada December 2-5, 1979.

(December 4, 1979) Diplomatic Appointments: C.G. Bullis as High Commissioner to Nigeria; R.W. Clark as High Commissioner to Sri Lanka; A.W.J. Robertson as Ambassador to Finland.

(December 13, 1979) Financial assistance to performing arts companies and soloists.

(December 13, 1979) Joint statement by NATO countries on Iran.

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China, People's Republic of

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Ottawa, October 19, 1979

In force October 19, 1979

With effect from October 13, 1979

Protocol on Economic Cooperation between the Government of Canada and the Government of China.

Ottawa, October 19, 1979

In force October 19, 1979

Cuba

Exchange of Notes constituting an Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Republic of Cuba renewing the 1973 Agreement between Canada and Cuba on Hijacking of Aircraft and Vessels and Other Offences

Havana, October 3, 1979

In force October 3, 1979

With effect from February 15, 1978

Italy

Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Republic of Italy relating to the Canada Pension Plan

Ottawa, May 29, 1970

In force May 29, 1970

With effect from January 1, 1969

Terminates December 31, 1979

Germany, Federal Republic of

Treaty between Canada and the Federal Republic of Germany concerning Extradition

Ottawa, July 11, 1977

Instruments of Ratification exchanged

August 31, 1979

In force September 30, 1979

Poland

Long Term Grain Agreement Between Canada and Poland

Warsaw, October 4, 1979

In force October 4, 1979

Sudan

General Agreement between the Government of Canada and Government of the Democratic Republic of Sudan concerning

Development Cooperation

Khartoum, September 16, 1979

II Multilateral

International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries

Done at Washington, February 8, 1949

Entered into force July 3, 1950

Canada's Instrument of Ratification

deposited July 3, 1950

Entered into force for Canada July 3, 1950

Canada's notice of withdrawal deposited

June 29, 1979, effective December 31, 1979

British Commonwealth Merchant Shipping Agreement

Done at London, December 10, 1931

Entered into force December 10, 1931

Canada's notice of withdrawal from Agreement

dated October 20, 1978

effective October 20, 1979

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

Done at New York, 19 December 1966

Entered into force March 23, 1976

Canada's Instrument of Accession

deposited May 19, 1976

Entered into force for Canada

August 19, 1976

The following Declaration by the Government of Canada under Article 41 of the Covenant was deposited October 29, 1979:

Declaration

"The Government of Canada declares, under Article 41 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, that it recognizes the competence of the Human Rights Committee referred to in Article 28 of the Covenant to receive and consider communications submitted by another State Party, provided that such State Party has, not less than twelve months prior to the communication by it of a communication relating to Canada, made a declaration under Article 41 recognizing the competence of the Committee to receive and consider communications relating to itself."

International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants

Done at Paris, December 2, 1961

Revised at Geneva, November 10, 1972

and October 23, 1978

Signed by Canada October 31, 1979

Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution

Adopted at Geneva, November 13, 1979

Signed by Canada, November 13, 1979

Final Acts of the 1979 World Administrative Radio Conference

Done at Geneva, November 19, 1979

Signed by Canada, subject to

approval, November 19, 1979

The state of the economy has tended to give hope and raise the expectations of the lower classes as El Salvador has entered the earliest phases of industrialization. In fact, this country is more highly industrialized than its other Central American neighbours. Manufacturing accounts for 17 per cent of GNP and 23 per cent of exports. The largest industry is textiles, followed by food processing. Some expansion has taken place in the cement, chemical and steel industries. But top priority has been given to small industries, with generous incentives being granted to export-oriented companies.

In 1979, the government of General Carlos Humberto Romero Mena was overthrown in a *cuartelazo* led by Colonels Adolfo Arnoldo Majano and Jaime Abdul Fuerte. The *golpe* was a last minute attempt by the military to present a fresh look to the government in the face of a groundswell of leftist opposition. Public resentment towards President Romero had become widespread because of his violations of human rights in the application of the infamous "Law for the Defence and Guarantee of the Public Order" (referred to as the Public Order Law). It is doubtful whether the present government can carry out the ambitious five-year plan (1978-82) initiated by Romero which called for a 7.5 per cent annual growth rate. The plan emphasized private sector investment, but also social development projects such as food provision, medical care, housing, education and transportation. The government promised to employ 20 per cent of the unemployed over the next five years, with the assistance of such projects as the free trade zone at San Bartolo, which is expected to generate 15,000 new jobs. Other proposed projects include the construction of 140,000 dwellings and the building of regional hospitals. With the help of international lending institutions, such as the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), substantial funding has been flowing into El Salvador. The IDB funded the San Lorenzo hydroelectric project, which is expected to provide 80 per cent of El Salvador's energy needs by 1981.

All of these projections have given the economy a seemingly healthy impetus in the wake of a decline in revenues from coffee.

In fact, economic conditions generally appear to be hanging for the worse — notwithstanding expected improvements — increasing the probability of class conflict and political instability. The upward trend in the economy is artificial and may suddenly reverse. The real growth of the GNP did not reach 5 per cent for 1979, following a 6 per cent growth in 1978 and a 7 per cent growth the previous year. The inflation rate continues to be a serious problem and rose to 20 per cent in 1979. The International Labour Office (ILO) of the United Nations estimates that El Salvador has the highest rate of unemployment/underemployment in the continent — almost 50 per cent. This, coupled with escalating prices on all consumer goods, resulted in

economic conditions slipping drastically in the latter portion of 1979. Thus, a growing tide of labour and political unrest is expected to continue into 1980 as the aspirations of Salvadoreans for a better life rise more rapidly than does the capacity of the economy to satisfy them.

Opposing groups

Historically, violence and political turmoil have characterized executive government in El Salvador since independence in 1821. From the beginning, the problem of land use produced polarization between the government and the majority of peasants. Bloody peasant uprisings took place over this issue in 1872, 1875, 1898 and continued sporadically into the 1940s. Most of the uprisings were influenced by Marxist thought and organizational skills. What developed and persisted to the present from this revolutionary influence was an official fear of the "red scare", provoking a ruthless response from successive military governments. The Communist Party was organized in 1925 and became actively engaged in peasant reforms by 1930. President Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez, known as a sorcerer and necromantic strongman, launched a massive campaign to hunt down anyone remotely related to Communism. As a result an estimated 20,000 people, including innocent women and children, were executed by the military in 1931.

Since then the idea that the country must choose between communism and democracy has pervaded Salvadorean politics. Stiff anti-Communist legislation has existed since President Julio Rivera, in the early 1960s, tried to squash the militant leftist Revolutionary Party of April and May (PRAM). The Communist Party, PRAM, and a number of small leftist splinter groups have been prevented by law from competing with other political parties in the country. However, it is a mistake to underestimate the quality of Communist organization and leadership in spite of the fact that the rank and file do not appear to be numerous.

As long as barriers to upward social mobility remain for urban dwellers and acute injustices continue in the land tenure system and in the destitute *barrios*, leftist initiatives will gain momentum, like the Sandinistas in neighbouring Nicaragua. In the past two years leftist guerrilla groups such as Fuerzas Armadas de Resistencia Nacional (FARN) and Ejercito Revolucionario Popular (ERP) have increased terrorist activities against the government. FARN's militant tactics have been designed to attract international attention. They have collected an estimated \$40 million in ransoms and have claimed responsibility for the deaths of internationally known coffee exporter Ernesto Liebes and Japanese executive Fujio Matsumoto. These activities are defended as retaliation for government-related terrorism such as the 1972 military intervention at National University and the 1975 massacre of student demonstrators by the National Guard.

Prior to the demise of the Romero regime the polarization process was activated by a number of government-sponsored organizations functioning in rural El Salvador. The most ruthless was the Democratic Nationalist Organization (ORDEN), a paramilitary security force made up of 50,000 rural workers created especially to combat communism in the countryside. Members of ORDEN were immune from criminal prosecution and served as vigilante watchdogs to monitor leftist activities. The October 1978 Amnesty International report on El Salvador indicated that ORDEN functions as a government goon squad to frighten local people, break up community meetings, foster electoral fraud, torture and murder peasants and children. Until it was dismantled in October, 1979 ORDEN was a massive state control apparatus which had the support of the Army, Air Force, Navy, National Guard, National Police, Customs, Treasury Police and the Salvadorean Territorial Service. Extreme right wing terrorist groups such as the White Warrior Union engaged in strong-arm tactics to check the expansion of the militant left. The continuing presence of these groups and government organizations solidified opposition to the Romero government.

What is still threatening from the junta's standpoint is the widespread support attracted by the 70,000 member Bloc Popular Revolucionario (BPR), a broad-based opposition movement that gains valuable support with each passing day. Because of BPR's activities the Romero government was forced to cancel its planned festivities marking the nation's 158th independence anniversary in September, 1979. Much like the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, the BPR and similar groups are mounting popular support for their cause. The country is bracing itself for more violence in the months ahead. Already foreign investment has dried up and businesses are suffering from open terrorism in both the countryside and the urban centres.

The electorally dominant party in El Salvador is the Party of National Conciliation (PCN) which has functioned as the political arm of successive governments since 1961. It is very much a traditional-personalistic party representing a coalition of industrial, banking, business, and military interests. The PCN fails to legitimize the ubiquitous presence of the military, and the programs and platforms of the party have been plagued by fundamental contradictions which increasingly have eroded its credibility in the eyes of the middle and lower classes of El Salvador.

The most serious electoral threat to the government-controlled PCN has been the Christian Democratic Party (PDC), led by José Napoleon Duarte, an important minor party, though one with a limited role in the eventual overthrow of the Romero regime. Much like its sister parties in other Latin American countries the Christian Democrats claim to offer a new and cohesive ideological centre intent on implementing reform within a democratic framework. But the in-

terventionary nature of the military is a constant threat to the reformist strategy of the present junta and the middle classes who are pressuring for structures are aware what the fate of the PDC will be in a contest between them.

The Roman Catholic Church is becoming powerful in the gradual shift of popular support towards members of the revolutionary BPR. The increasingly difficult conditions of the countryside are a concern of the Church, whose attention to rural problems had been prodded by the social ferment in El Salvador during the 13 year dictatorship of Hernandez Martinez. The Church has tried to re-establish its presence among the rural parishes by sponsoring literacy programs, community development activities and religious revival. But the relationship between General Romero's government and the Catholic Archdiocese deteriorated beyond repair. Archbishop Oscar Romero (no relation to the General), a recent nominee for Nobel Peace Prize, had been accused of involvement in a terrorist plot to overthrow the government, although no evidence was available to support government suspicions. The Archbishop successfully fought against the Public Order Law and provided the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) with much information which brought human rights violations to the attention of the international community.

Human rights violations

Apart from the revolution of rising expectations which has placed El Salvador on the brink of economic and social chaos, political turmoil is almost certain because of the gross violations of human rights by successive military governments since 1932. These violations take the form of flagrant forms of torture, taking political prisoners, causing disappearances, creating paramilitary repressive groups, campaigning to murder peasants and fierce government opposition to church advocacy of social reform. In 1932, when the peasants desperately fought for land reform against "los catorce", they were branded by the military as communists and about 30,000 of them were brutally murdered. Today, years later, the conditions of repression and government negligence still remain and the haunting spectre of 1932 looms. History often may not repeat itself, in El Salvador the past is prologue. 1977 saw the murder of the popular Father Putilo Grande because of reformist activities in rural El Salvador. Churches were desecrated and peasants were shot by government forces. Later that year, another priest, Father Alfonso Navarro, was sub-machine-gunned to death by the army. A government sponsored right wing terrorist group, Union Guerrera Blanca (UGB) planned to execute all Jesuit priests in El Salvador because of their subversive work with the poor to implement agrarian reform. When the Church brought the threat to the attention of the international community, public opinion quickly mounted and prevented completion of night.

procity. But in the early fall of 1977, the military executed two church workers who wanted to continue the work of the priests in the countryside.

Violence continued unabated into 1978 when more than 50 peasants were murdered by government security squads near the town of San Pedro Perulapan. Later that spring many abductions and detentions were reported by the Church and Amnesty International. These kinds of activities continued right up till the civilian-military junta deposed President Romero and promised "an end of repression". But the composition of the junta suggests that there will be internal conflict. Cabinet posts have been distributed both to individuals of the left opposition, such as Minister of the

Presidency Dr. Ruben Zamora, and to those associated with repression, such as Defence Minister Col. Jose Guillermo Garcia.

The prospects for stability in El Salvador seem dim. The unnecessarily violent suppression of popular dissent by the military has triggered a retrogressive period of instability which may lead to chaos and disorder. Such retrogression may sound the death knell of the praetorian approach to modernization. El Salvador seems destined to evolve toward the left as perhaps a statist, socialist or syndicalist society. What is certain is that the old U.S. fears of domino communism in the western hemisphere are very much a possibility as we move into the 1980s.

Aspects of NATO

Canada's other commitment: the defence of Norway

by Joseph T. Jockel

overshadowed by the more visible forms of Canadian participation in NATO — the Canadian land and air contingents in Germany, and Maritime Command's takeable in the defence of the North Atlantic — Canada's other substantial NATO commitment is often overlooked: units of the Canadian Armed Forces stationed in Canada are earmarked for the reinforcement of NATO's northern flank, above all, Norway. In recent years Canada has moved to strengthen its ability to deploy forces to Norway in the event of a crisis; negotiations between the Norwegian and Canadian governments are currently underway with a view towards further improvement, based particularly on the pre-positioning of Canadian military equipment on Norwegian soil.

That Norway has entered discussions about reinforcement from abroad is not surprising — or new. As the only European NATO member to share a border with the U.S.S.R., and not wishing to engender fears in the U.S.S.R. concerning security threats from Norwegian soil, Norway adopted in 1949 a self-imposed ban on foreign (including NATO) troops being based on Norwegian territory. In 1961 a similar reservation concerning nuclear weapons was adopted. Given these limitations, and given its relatively small population, Norway is dependent upon external reinforcement for defence against the Soviet Union's growing military might.

A good portion of that Soviet might is located just across the Soviet-Norwegian border on the Kola Peninsula, home of the expanding northern fleet, the most important in the Soviet navy. The expansion of this fleet has led many in Norway to question the security of Norwegian access to NATO reinforcements from abroad to meet not only the threat by sea, but also from the formidable air and land units the Soviet armed forces maintain in, or could bring into, the area. Thus the standing committee on defence of the Norwegian *Storting* warned in 1973: "It is clear that the transfer to Norway of reinforcements will in many ways become more difficult. . ." Affecting Norwegian security concerns in recent years have been two additional factors: the slow (if not decelerating) pace of East-West "détente", and the disputed Soviet-Norwegian maritime boundary on the Arctic continental shelf.

That Canada would be responsive to Norwegian concerns is also neither surprising nor new. Involvement in Norwegian defence allows Canada to render Norway and the Alliance an important service in an area which has become of increasing concern to NATO

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planners — a service which does not involve the expensive maintenance of Canadian troops overseas. Moreover, given the rugged Norwegian terrain, a large amount of heavy armour is not necessary for the Canadian units slated for deployment to Norway, and the rough similarity in Canadian and Norwegian climates is conducive to harmonizing the training, tactics, and equipment of Canadian and Norwegian armed forces units.

In 1964, Canada became actively involved in the defence of NATO's northern flank when it committed itself to send by air an infantry battalion to that area in an emergency as part of Allied Command Europe's (ACE) Mobile Force — Land AMF(L), a small force of about brigade strength. The 1971 Canadian White Paper on Defence would later describe it well as "multinational, quick-reaction, air-transportable force designed to act as a demonstration of allied solidarity in times of tension on the flanks of the Treaty area." Thus, AMF(L) is a "flag flying" operation designed to place a multinational NATO force, albeit a small one, in the line of fire. In 1972 Canada bolstered its AMF commitment by assigning a squadron of CF-5 tactical fighters to AMF(L)'s air counterpart, AMF(A).

Combat group

To assist in the provision of more substantial reinforcement for the northern flank beyond that which would be provided by AMF, Canada moved in 1968 to establish the Canadian Air/Sea Transportable (CAST) combat group. Armed forces units based in Canada totalling about 5,000 men were given the CAST assignment. At the same time the Canadian commitment to sent two reinforcement brigades to Germany by sea was quietly terminated. It was also later decided to provide the combat group with Canadian tactical air support in the form of a squadron of CF-5's.

The CAST combat group was, as structured, a strategically questionable proposition. Concern about it in the Department of National Defence, bubbled to the top; in November 1975, the Minister of National Defence, James Richardson, wrote his Cabinet colleagues about the CAST commitment's difficulties:

First, there were problems with the area of deployment. The combat group was committed to the northern flank with the possibility of deployment in either Norway or Denmark. "...the planned deployment area in Denmark is an extension of the Northern German Plain," the Minister wrote, "where hostilities would almost inevitably involve heavy armoured combat for which the CAST combat group is not equipped. It would be dependent upon armoured support from adjacent allied forces, which in fact have insufficient armour to meet adequately their own requirements and thus no surplus to provide the necessary support to make the Canadian formation viable in combat... On military grounds, therefore, consideration should be given to negotiating out of the Danish dimension of the

CAST commitment."

Secondly, and still a nagging question today, "military practicality of the entire CAST concept is open to question because of problems associated with the sea-lift aspect. It is doubtful whether adequate shipping capacity (which Norway is committed to provide) would in fact be available to carry out the commitment in time for the force to be useful." (Indeed, it would appear that it would have taken the CAST combat group a month for it to be in Norway in full strength.) Moreover, and to again quote the Minister, "...the ships in question would be highly vulnerable to enemy attack and to have any reasonable prospect of getting through would require powerful protection against submarines, surface and air attack en route."

He suggested three alternatives: limiting the CAST commitment to the Norwegian deployment area, thereby overcoming the armour-related difficulties by reducing the combat group to an air-portable battalion group of about 1,500 men; or abolishing it altogether. In a period during which the Canadian government was "rediscovering" NATO, the last two alternatives were rejected. The government chose the first; by 1977 (after consultation with SACEUR and Canada's NATO allies) the CAST combat group was formally committed to the defence of northern Norway along with AMF(L). In addition, while the Canadian battalion assigned to AMF(L) continues to be formally committed to the northern flank, informal assurances from NATO have been obtained to the effect that if AMF(L) and the CAST combat group are deployed, and if the Canadian battalion in AMF(L) is not originally deployed to northern Norway, it will be repositioned to join the CAST combat group.

Sceptical

Barney Danson, who took office as Minister of National Defence in late 1976, was originally sceptical about the viability of Canada's Norwegian commitment. After a review, however, (which included a 1977 ministerial visit to Norway) his opinion changed. In October, 1978 he announced at Canadian Forces Base Petawawa, in the presence of his Norwegian counterpart, that the Canadian government "continues to place great importance on our ability to reinforce the north flank with proven soldiers as quickly as possible in the event of an emergency."

At the same time, Mr. Danson announced the restructuring of the CAST commitment, effective September 1980: "In an attempt to reduce the lift requirement and deployment time," the CAST combat group will be based as much as possible on "one...balanced, lightened formation...". This formation will be the newly-created Special Service Force (SSF), stationed at Petawawa. The basing of the CAST combat group on the SSF will entail a reduction in manpower from 5,300 to 4,000. This quantitative reduction is more than offset, according to DND officials, by the qualitative

the SSF as an "airportable/airborne quick reaction force." (Until September 1980, the CAST commitment will continue to be borne by the 5e Groupement de Combat/5e Groupement Brigade du Canada, based at Valcartier, Quebec.) In the meantime, negotiations between the Canadian and Norwegian governments have opened to facilitate the Canadian recommitment to Norwegian defence.

These negotiations centre around the pre-positioning of Canadian equipment for the combat group on Norwegian soil, thereby reducing the transit time between Canada and Norway in the event of an emergency. Such negotiations were impossible until Canada dedicated the combat group solely to northern Norway; the expense of maintaining sets of military equipment in both Denmark and Norway would have been prohibitive.

It should be noted, however, that Canada is not planning an American-style "POMCUS" (Prepositioned Material Configured to Unit Sets) pre-positioning of almost all necessary equipment. Nor is Canada planning an increase in its airlift capability, which consists of 23 slow-moving Hercules (C-130) aircraft and five limited-capacity Boeing 707's. Rather, the negotiations, based on limited Canadian pre-positioning and a Norwegian commitment to improved shipping capacity (based on the large Norwegian merchant-mane fleet) are aimed at allowing the CAST combat group to reach full, equipped strength in Norway in about two week's time. The moment is now ripe, therefore, to consider the question: Could the combat group, with a transit time of two weeks, make a useful contribution to the defence of Norway?

Restricting the usefulness of the combat group could be not only the two-week delay, but also the overwhelming Soviet naval capabilities in the Norwegian Sea. It appears almost certain that the Soviets will attempt to push their forward defence line at sea using hostilities right to the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) Gap, cutting off access by sea to Norway. Even if the gap is not closed, the Norwegian Sea will be the site of intense naval combat making successful transit by the combat group all but impossible.

Thus in the case of a hypothetical sudden Soviet attack on Norway, not preceded by a lengthy period of Norwegian-Soviet tension, there would be little or no chance of deploying the CAST combat group. NATO planners have publicly speculated that such an attack beginning with six or more divisions, plus naval infantry and naval and air units — might require but a week's initial preparation by the Soviet Union. Given the CAST combat group's planned two-week transit time, and given the fact that the Soviets would move to establish control of the Norwegian Sea, an attempt to deploy the combat group would be fruitless. Such an attack does not, however, seem probable: The Soviets re-

alize that such an attack on Norway would lead to a direct clash with the United States, including the possibility of escalation to general war. The occupation of Norway is not worth the risk.

A second possibility — and one which is viewed by many strategic commentators as more probable — is a Soviet attack on Norway in support of a Warsaw Pact invasion of Germany, i.e., one in which the Soviets had decided on general war in hope of realization of fundamental objectives in central Europe. Given in this case, its need to concentrate its forces on the key central front, the Soviet Union could be expected to launch a limited attack on northern Norway of about 15,000 men (involving air, land, and sea strikes) during the first week of the war. The Soviets would attack this area in order to attempt to prevent the continued operation of Norwegian radar stations and air bases which could harass the operations of the northern fleet.

If such an invasion of Western Europe were a bolt from the blue (or as close to it as the Soviets could come), the chances of deploying the CAST combat group would again be small. If, on the other hand, NATO obtained adequate warning (partly from a state of tension between the alliance and the Warsaw Pact) that the U.S.S.R. was planning or seriously contemplating such an invasion, there might be time for deployment. Once in place, the combat group, in conjunction with the Norwegians and other NATO allies, might deter an attack on northern Norway or, if need be, attempt to defend it. The Troms area in northern Norway where the combat group would be sent offers its allied defenders a number of tactical advantages, among these an easily interdicted roadway network.

A third possible form of Soviet-Norwegian conflict is one in which the Soviet Union subjects Norway alone to a lengthy series of stated threats (perhaps of invasion) coupled with provocative gestures — at sea, or perhaps in Svalbard, or near the Soviet-Norwegian frontier. Such a situation might result from a dispute over the still-unsettled Soviet-Norwegian maritime boundary coupled with a Soviet attempt to exploit Norway's relative isolation. An appropriate Norwegian response might be to mobilize the 160,000-man reserves (bolstering the 40,000-man regular Norwegian forces), to ask NATO to quickly deploy AMF(L) and possibly AMF(A) as a symbol of solidarity, and to call upon Canada to send the CAST combat group — or portions thereof by air — as a further gesture of NATO commitment. The arrival of the Canadians would signal firmness, but would be less provocative to the Russians than the presence of Americans, or Germans. (The United Kingdom and The Netherlands also maintain forces which can be deployed to Norway.) The confidence of the Norwegians would be strengthened, and the Soviets might successfully rebuffed.

No one should be under the impression, though, that should the situation deteriorate further, and the

Russians launch a major invasion of Norway, the Norwegians could hold out for long — even where bolstered by the AMF and other small allied forces, including the CAST combat group. Such a defence would require further reinforcements — above all by air from the United States. The Canadians would, though, assist the Norwegians in attempting to hold out until those reinforcements arrived. Again, the Canadian unit would take advantage of its Troms deployment area.

Thus in the second, and in particular, the third case, the CAST combat group could serve a deterrent, or defensive function. It must, however, arrive in time. The impending decrease in transit time from over a month to about two weeks improves the combat group's chances of such a timely arrival. Obviously, though, in a crisis of rapid escalation, two weeks would prove insufficient.

Enhanced value

This suggests, of course, that the value of the CAST combat group could be still further enhanced. Above all, steps could be taken to reduce transit time. This could be accomplished through a true POMCUS-style pre-positioning of equipment coupled with an expansion in Canadian airlift capabilities. (The Canadian government might consider the purchase of some C-5 transport aircraft.) These steps would allow the combat group to be entirely air-lifted, and to arrive in Norway in a day or so. The expense, however, of such improvements would be great, and as is well known, Canadian defence dollars are hard to come by.

It is clear that the Norwegian-Canadian defence relationship, "bilateral within the context of NATO," is becoming a closer one — cemented by relatively frequent joint Norwegian-Canadian manoeuvres, and soon by pre-positioning of equipment. The immediate causes of this new closeness are also clear: first, Norwegian concerns over the security of access to reinforcements from abroad, concerns made acute by the growth of Soviet power in the Kola area; and secondly, the Canadian decision, based on worries about the Danish deployment area, to limit the commitment of the CAST combat group to northern Norway.

This relationship could produce a growing Norwegian reliance on Canada, despite the small size of the CAST combat group, even in relation to the Norwegian armed forces. The CAST combat group's sole NATO task, unlike other allied reinforcement units with a Norwegian deployment option, is the defence of Norway. Thus during a crisis with the Soviet Union — not a full-scale Soviet assault — Norway might call for the early deployment of the Canadian combat group as a symbol of NATO support, for that combat group can only go to Norway. Norway would realize that Canada need not hold the CAST combat group in reserve, pending events in, say, Germany or Denmark, where reinforcements also might be needed. Moreover, further in-

ducement to call for the Canadians (and, should circumstances warrant, the British and the Dutch) might be found in the fact, discussed above, that Norwegians might believe it wise to first resist Soviet threats by calling for some other form of reinforcement than the United States Marines.

Canada's obligation in such a crisis, particularly the third type, involving limited Soviet gestures or threats against Norway alone, would be heavy. As a senior Norwegian defence official has pointed out, Norway were to call for the deployment of the CAST combat group, and the Canadian government were to hesitate for long, or refuse, the feeling of being let down by such close allies might encourage the "Finlandization" of Norway. The testing of NATO support for Norway, in the hope of encouraging such a response, might be the aim of Soviet policy — not the preparation of a major assault involving, eventually, direct confrontation with the United States. Thus, in slowly-escalating crises on the upper reaches of the northern flank, Canada might find itself as involved as any NATO member.



Canadian troops in northern Norway supply artillery support as part of Arctic Express exercise.

The debate on modernizing Europe's nuclear capacity

by Paul Buteux

is characteristic of NATO that the political and strategic issues that arise in connection with nuclear weapons are never entirely novel, nor are they ever eventually resolved. Such is the case with respect to an issue that is currently prominent on the alliance agenda: the modernization of nuclear forces deployed in Western Europe. At the NATO Council meetings last December, a step towards the modernization of the alliance's long-range nuclear forces was taken with the conditional decision to deploy 572 new missiles in Western Europe. The course of the debate on whether to deploy new missiles, and on the question of the modernization of the alliance's theatre nuclear forces generally, has raised questions reminiscent of those which so exercised the alliance in the late Fifties and early Sixties concerning the role and value of the nuclear weapons actually deployed in Western Europe. Now, just as it seems unlikely that these questions will receive a definitive answer. Rather, what has happened in the past, is that with the recent decisions taken in Brussels some more or less satisfactory political accommodation has been made. Nonetheless, decisions made with respect to the theatre nuclear arsenal are important, both in terms of their effect on allied security and their consequences for inter-allied relations.

The alliance has been considering the modernization of theatre nuclear weapons since the early Seventies and a number of changes and developments in the character of the theatre nuclear arsenal have already occurred. So far these changes have taken the form of a changing "mix" of warheads, improved command and control arrangements, greater security for the weapons and, more controversially, new warheads and delivery systems. During 1977 and the early part of 1978 public attention was aroused by the question of whether or not enhanced radiation warheads (the so-called "neutron bomb") should be introduced into Central Europe. However, following President Carter's decision to postpone the production and deployment of these weapons, the rather superficial and generally misinformed public concern dissipated. Nevertheless the strength of the public reaction to the neutron bomb issue caught many allied governments by surprise, and served to demonstrate that in many cases they were politically and

technically ill-prepared to deal with the issue. This was true of the Canadian government as much as it was of several others. As a result, to the embarrassment of many allied political leaders and officials, whatever their position on the neutron bomb, the Soviet Union scored a major propaganda victory.

New Issue

Since then a new issue has arisen concerning changes in the alliance's theatre nuclear forces. This is the question of whether new weapons should be deployed with a range sufficient to deliver nuclear warheads on the territory of the Soviet Union from bases in Western Europe. Formal alliance consideration of the possibility of deploying new long-range systems goes back to the NATO summit of May 1977 which announced alliance agreement on a long-range defence program. Ten task forces were set up to examine different areas where the defensive posture of NATO could be improved. The task of studying the modernization of theatre nuclear forces was given to an established alliance body, the Nuclear Planning Group, which in turn set up a "High Level Group" to examine the issue and report to allied governments at the ministerial level. By the early part of 1979 there was some degree of agreement among the allies that they should aim for a decision by the end of the year, and this deadline was met at the ministerial meetings of the NATO Council which took place in Brussels in December.

Although the allies had benefitted from extensive study and consultation at the official level on the implications of any decision taken, they were nonetheless subject to many pressures that led some of them to temporise and attempt to avoid for the time being a categorical commitment to the introduction of new long-range weapons. Despite the fact that the neutron bomb experience provided lessons to the allies on how they should proceed in these matters (with respect to both

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allied political consultation and management of domestic opinion) for all the allies involved, any major innovation in the nuclear arsenal deployed in direct support of the alliance will always be politically sensitive. Ideally, it is a task of alliance diplomacy to balance these political sensitivities against military and strategic needs, and this is something that has been attempted through the processes of alliance consultation on long-range theatre nuclear force (LRTNF) modernization.

A number of strategic developments provide the background against which the value and purpose of the NATO deployment of long-range theatre nuclear weapons can be evaluated. Foremost among these has been the recognition, formally enshrined in the SALT I and SALT II agreements, of parity between the United States and Soviet Union at the level of strategic nuclear forces. Among the consequences has been a widespread view that strategic parity has had a negative effect on the credibility of the American strategic guarantee to the European allies. Thus the argument has been made that given the ability of the Soviet Union to retaliate, it is unlikely that the United States would initiate a strategic nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union except in terms of a direct and immediate threat to itself. The United States would wish to respond to any assault on its European allies at much lower levels of violence than would be implied by strategic strikes directly against Soviet territory.

Military Balance

This in turn leads to a consideration of the military balance in Europe itself and to the ability of the NATO force posture effectively to deter undesired Soviet actions; an ability that provides the crucial military underpinning to allied security in Europe. The strategic doctrine informing the current military posture of the alliance is that of "flexible response" by which the alliance seeks to sustain the ability to counter any Soviet military action with an appropriate level of response. Should the alliance fail to achieve the desired effect at any particular level of military response, then the strategy seeks to provide the alliance with options to escalate, including, if need be, the option to initiate the use of nuclear weapons. The argument is that the alliance should be able to respond to any aggression at a level commensurate with the assault, but that through the threat of escalation the alliance should be able to persuade the adversary of the great risks and costs of continued violence. The credibility of this strategy is thus dependent on the ability of the alliance to provide a range of military options from conventional to nuclear and to link them together in an escalatory chain which includes the strategic forces of the United States.

Anything that can be interpreted as "decoupling" the strategic forces of the United States invariably arouses allied fears and concerns. Consequently, in a

situation of strategic parity the strength of the link in the escalatory chain assume greater importance; to reinforce the credibility of the American guarantee providing the President with options other than strategic nuclear exchange. Insofar as the alliance possesses credible threats below the strategic level (credible because they have some plausibility of being effective), then the commitment of the United States to its strategic weapons in certain extreme but undefined circumstances itself retains a degree of credibility. Given the likely enormous and disastrous consequences of any use of strategic nuclear weapons, the remote but potent threat that they might be used has far been sufficient to convince the allies that the strategy of flexible response is adequate to their security needs.

Increasingly, however, there has been a feeling among a number of allied countries that the alliance is losing the ability to implement its declared strategy. These feelings underlined allied acceptance of the long-range defence improvement program and helped generate the current interest in long-range nuclear forces. The reasons for this loss of confidence are to be found in the military build-up of the Warsaw Pact in recent years. In the past, the NATO allies have generally conceived conventional superiority to the opposing alliance; instead of relying on a capacity for stalwart conventional defence and the threat of nuclear escalation to meet the needs for military security. Now, unfortunately, changes in the military balance in Europe have cast these assumptions into question. The improvement in Warsaw Pact conventional capabilities raise doubts about the ability of NATO to maintain a stalwart conventional defence, and, perhaps more importantly, improvements in Soviet theatre nuclear capabilities have overturned assumptions underlying NATO's own theatre nuclear posture.

Implicit in the NATO threat to escalate through the nuclear threshold has been the assumption (surely felt by skeptics would say blind hope) that the alliance possessed theatre nuclear superiority, that it would be able to raise the nuclear ante and to rely on the deterrent effect of the increased possibility of general nuclear war. NATO superiority in this area no longer exists. Improvements in the number and technical capabilities of Soviet battlefield nuclear systems when coupled with new long-range "Eurostrategic" systems have now led some observers to suggest that the Soviet Union now possesses clear theatre nuclear superiority.

Soviet systems

The new Soviet systems that have given rise to greatest alliance concern are the SS-20 mobile medium-range ballistic missile fitted with multiple warheads and the "Backfire" bomber. These systems when fully deployed will give the Soviet Union improved counterforce capability over the whole of NATO Europe.

As Senators Bartlett and Nunn pointed out in an influential 1977 report, within the framework of strategic parity these recent developments in the Soviet theatre nuclear force posture suggest that the Soviet Union is seeking to neutralize NATO's tactical nuclear options under flexible response.

Of course, Western European cities have been at risk from Soviet medium-range missiles and bombers for over 20 years, but the strategic significance of the new weapons lies in their lessened vulnerability, the greater flexibility and counter-force capabilities. It is feared that these new long-range systems, in association with the general increase in Warsaw Pact military strength, will provide the Soviet Union with substantial pre-emptive options against NATO's theatre nuclear weapons, while at the same time continuing to hold Western European cities hostage. Such a state of affairs could give the Soviet Union not only a decisive battlefield advantage, but also "escalation dominance" in circumstances in which the facts of nuclear parity would inhibit the United States from the use of its strategic forces. That is, the bargaining advantage in escalating to a higher level of conflict would lie with the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact rather than with the United States and NATO. It is thus possible to argue that in effect the Soviet Union would obtain a decisive first-strike advantage at the theatre level: something that orthodox theory has always regarded as extremely destabilising were it to occur at the level of strategic weapons.

The case for deployment by NATO of countervailing systems arises then within the context of these strategic developments. This case has to be measured against the fact, however, that the alliance already deploys nuclear systems capable of reaching targets in the Soviet Union. Presumably the strategic case for new weapons can be made only if the existing systems are felt to be inadequate to the task of countering the "Backfire" and the SS-20. Among the weapons available to NATO are the "forward based systems"; these are aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons on Soviet targets from European bases, and to all intents and purposes are presently confined to the American F-111 strike aircraft based in the United Kingdom and the British force of Vulcan bombers. Also available are the Poseidon and Polaris missiles deployed on the American and British submarines assigned to NATO and targeted through SACEUR.

Unfortunately, all of these systems suffer from certain deficiencies when viewed as possible counters to the "Backfire" and SS-20. The British V-bombers are at the end of their operational lives and are scheduled to be withdrawn from service in 1982, and anyway they are downgraded strategic systems not particularly suited for a precision counterforce role. The F-111s, though effective strike aircraft, are neither numerous enough nor invulnerable enough to be with-

held as a counter to the Soviet long-range systems, and, in addition, doubts about their ability to penetrate Russian air defences reduce their suitability for this task. The F-111's presently seem to be deployed primarily in a nuclear interdiction posture.

Details of how the Poseidon and Polaris submarines are targeted are kept very close of course, but there is a presumption that the Poseidon missiles assigned to SACEUR do have a role in countering the older generation of Soviet SS-4 and SS-5 missiles targeted against Western Europe. This has led to suggestions that additional Poseidons be assigned to SACEUR to cover the newer Russian systems. The Polaris missiles form the central element in the implicit British posture of minimum deterrence, and despite being nominally assigned to SACEUR, given their operational capabilities it is difficult to believe that they can be targeted in anything other than an essentially counter-value role. But however targeted, both Polaris and Poseidon suffer from the drawback that they are strategic systems; their use as a counter to the Russian long-range theatre systems immediately escalates the conflict to the strategic level where the credibility of an American nuclear response is weakest. From the point of view of the non-nuclear allies, submarine forces also suffer from the handicap of a lack of "visibility", and of being to all intents and purposes outside any form of alliance control. (French nuclear forces present a special case and are not considered here.)

With these drawbacks in mind, it is doubtful if the existing NATO long-range systems are adequate to the task of providing a response to the "Backfire" and SS-20. Thus the military case follows for the deployment of new long-range systems on behalf of NATO, the primary candidates for which have been the Pershing II extended-range mobile missile and the long-range ground launched cruise missile (GLCM). According to the communiqué issued at the conclusion of the December NATO meetings, it is planned to deploy 108 Pershing and 464 cruise missiles. All the Pershing missiles would be deployed in Germany, but the intention is to deploy the cruise missiles in a number of allied countries. Germany, Britain and Italy have agreed to take cruise missiles, while Belgium and the Netherlands have deferred a final decision on the matter. Technically these systems offer a number of military advantages: they are accurate enough to be used in a counterforce role; they are flexible enough to be targeted in accordance with a variety of options, and they could be deployed in ways which would reduce their vulnerability to a pre-emptive strike. Why then the hesitations of allied governments over their deployment?

The answer to this question is to be found in a number of strategic and political-psychological considerations that affect in their most acute form primarily the allies engaged on the Central Front in NATO. In order to cover the required targets, and in order to meet the security concerns of the Germans who natu-

rally feel directly threatened by the Soviet long-range forces, the Pershing II and a long-range GLCM have to be deployed on West German territory. This marks the first time that nuclear weapon systems capable of reaching targets in the Soviet Union will have been deployed in German. Naturally, not only the Germans but other allies too are concerned with the implications of such a step for East-west relations, fearing that there may be adverse consequences for *détente* in Europe. It is worth noting that this in itself is a comment on the extent to which the shift in the military balance in Europe has affected Western European political attitudes towards the Soviet Union.

Anti nuclear

Quite apart from the implications for *détente* of new nuclear deployments, after the neutron bomb experience, allied governments are bound to be sensitive to the anti-nuclear sentiments of sections of their domestic public. This is particularly so for the ruling German Social Democrats for whom nuclear issues are extremely divisive. However, the alliance, in determining its policy towards long-range theatre nuclear force modernization, must take into account similarly strong sentiments elsewhere, and particularly in the Netherlands and Scandinavia. The Germans, reluctant to appear diplomatically and strategically exposed, have taken the attitude that if these new weapons are to be deployed on their territory then other continental allies should accept them too. It is for this reason that the last-minute decision by the Dutch and the Belgians to defer deployment was so politically significant.

Partly in order to put the decision to deploy the new systems in a more favourable light, the possibility of tying-in the proposed deployment with an arms control agreement with the Soviet Union is being explored. A "Special Group" of senior defence and foreign service officials was established in the spring of 1979 to enquire into the arms control implications of theatre nuclear force modernization. The idea of linking theatre nuclear force modernization with expanded arms control negotiations with the Russians goes back to Helmut Schmidt's Alistair Buchan Memorial Lecture in October 1977, but without doing something about the emerging disparity in Eurostrategic forces, the prospect of fruitful arms control in this area would seem remote. Thus many have seen the NATO arms control proposals that accompanied the decision to deploy new long-range missiles as essentially cosmetic in purpose, designed to appeal to doubting governments and their publics. Nonetheless, the arms control aspects of what have been termed the "grey area" systems, because they fall between the strategic weapons covered by the SALT Talks and the more clearly tactical nuclear weapons designed to have direct effect on any nuclear battlefield, will continue to have salience for the alliance.

The future course of any further bilateral arms

control negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union will ensure that this is so. Already in the three-year Protocol to the SALT II agreement, limitations on ground-and-sea-launched cruise missiles have been accepted; to the concern of some Europeans who fear that this might foreclose future options for them with respect to long-range systems. Any time the Russians have made clear their interest in exploring any SALT III negotiations to include European based systems. Thus whatever the outcome of the recent decisions on long-range theatre nuclear force modernization in NATO, the topic will not disappear from the alliance agenda.

It is significant in this respect that the December communiqué was unclear as to the range of the missiles planned for deployment. There are two versions of the existing Pershing Ia under development; one is an improved version of the existing missile with a similar range of about 450 nautical miles, and the other has an extended range that would enable it to reach targets in the western parts of the Soviet Union from bases in the Federal Republic. Clearly the military and strategic significance of the two versions are quite different. The communiqué was also silent as to whether the proposed GLCM's would have a range in excess of the 600 km limit imposed by the SALT Protocol. Again, with a range limited to 600 km, the cruise missiles would be unable to reach targets in the Soviet Union. Although it is quite clear that the discussions at the official level in the High Level and Special Groups were based on the assumption that missiles with a capability of striking the Soviet Union would be deployed, the communiqué provides no clear political commitment that will be so.

It is probable that this ambiguity reflects the continuing doubts that exist among the various allies as to the consequences, both international and domestic, of deploying new nuclear weapons in Western Europe. Also, of course, at this stage such ambiguity helps to keep open bargaining options in any arms control negotiations. For example, some people may see the announcement that the withdrawal of 1,000 nuclear warheads from NATO Europe would begin immediately as an attempt to secure some substantive measure of arms control in the area of theatre nuclear weapons; others may see it as the removal of redundant warheads which themselves will not affect the nuclear balance in Europe one way or the other. Whatever the case, some hard bargaining and further difficult decisions are ahead for the alliance in the field of long-range theatre nuclear force modernization, and the issues were by no means settled by the decisions taken in Brussels in December.

Despite these uncertainties, the outline of an alliance consensus on theatre nuclear force modernization has emerged. There is agreement that some response to the emerging Soviet Eurostrategic threat is necessary, and that any NATO action in this respect should

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be accompanied by serious arms control efforts. It is also clear that any NATO deployment of long-range theatre nuclear systems will not try to match Soviet capabilities on a one-for-one basis. The proposed deployments are on a scale sufficient to fill a perceived gap in the range of deterrence options available to the alliance, but will not match either existing or likely future Soviet long-range theatre nuclear forces. In other words, the justification for NATO's acquisition of increased long-range theatre nuclear capabilities lies in

their reinforcement of the existing alliance strategy of a flexible response by not allowing the Soviet Union to have a credible threat to which the alliance itself does not have a credible response. This consensus has been sufficient so far to prevent the alliance to move considerably along the way of a most radical revision of the contents of its theatre nuclear arsenal since the early 1960's, but the taking of further steps will be a considerable test of the ability of the alliance to make and implement joint policies in the area of nuclear weapons.

Book Review

From Balfour to Begin

by Sydney A. Freifeld

This intriguing book by Lord Nicholas Bethel — Cambridge scholar, junior member of the Conservative Government in 1971-72, member of the European Parliament since 1975 and author of *The Best Secret*, which dealt with Anglo-American collusion in the forcible repatriation of Russians between 1944 and 1947 — is distinguished from the many studies on the same subject by his deep mining of British Cabinet and War, Foreign and Colonial Office archives hitherto unavailable under Britain's 30 year rule. These files have also turned up messages passing between the Jewish Agency in Palestine and London, decoded by British cryptographers. He complements his findings by discussions with still-living personalities involved with Palestine between 1917 and 1948 — including Malcolm Macdonald, Menachem Begin, Harold Beeley, Lord Caradon, and many others. He has quite a keen nose for the official euphemism. He tells quite a story.

It begins with the Arab revolt against Jewish immigration fostered by British governments under the promises of the Balfour Declaration and League Mandate, and against the implacable opposition of most of the Arab world and of many Foreign Office and War Office officials, who insisted that Arab sympathy, or at

least an absence of hostility, was essential for Imperial security in the Middle East. The Jews, faced with mounting persecution and forced emigration throughout Hitler's Europe and then with the unprecedented mass murder of the extermination camps, became more desperate to escape, and most of all to reach Palestine; most Western, and Canadian, doors were closed to them.

The British, fighting desperately for their — the civilized world's — survival, grew exasperated with the conflicting pressures, as the archives reveal with frankness. The Jews, officials argued, had nowhere else to turn, and offending or frustrating them was a negligible strategic risk. Charles Bateria of the Foreign Office wrote: "Let us be practical. This is anybody's game these days". Late in 1944, with the extermination of the Jews at its height but with victory in sight, Armine Dew in the Foreign Office expressed irritation in a memo "in my opinion a disproportionate amount of the time of this office is wasted on dealing with these wailing Jews" while, after the King David Hotel explosion, a general wrote to recommend "stipulating the Jews in a way the race dislikes as much as any, by striking at their pockets and showing our contempt of them". In a grisly preview of today's boat people horrors, a number of small boats during the war tried to reach Palestine with refugees — each vessel a death trap and an amalgam of separate tragedies. In 1942, the *Struma*, with 769 Jewish survivors from the Black Sea to Istanbul, was turned back by the British. The British Ambassador tried to assist them, but Stephen Luke in the Colonial Office to note "this

Mr Freifeld, an External Affairs officer since 1947, retired after serving at the Canadian Mission to the UN, Mexico City, Dublin, Montevideo and Ottawa. His last post was Ambassador to Colombia and Ecuador.

...the Turkish Government has shown any signs of being ready to help in frustrating these illegal immigrant ships, and the Ambassador goes and spoils the whole effect on absurdly mis-judged humanitarian grounds". The Foreign Office's Boyd observed that the Ambassador had failed to take use of a "heaven-sent opportunity of getting these people stopped at Istanbul and sent back to Constantinza". Eventually, these pressures succeeded and the *Arma* was sent back into the Black Sea and went down; there were two survivors of the 769. The continuing barrage of memos of this kind moved Prime Minister Winston Churchill to disparage the "usual silly objections" to everything human and Anthony Eden's private secretary to bewail "must HMG take such an human decision?"

While pinpointing Jewish and Zionist faults and misdeeds, Bethel, on balance, seems perhaps more sympathetic to their dilemmas than to those of the Palestinian Arabs. He nevertheless subjects Jewish personalities, organizations and tactics to clinical examination, from which even Chaim Weizmann does not emerge without tarnish. Bethel presents more of the beginning than the Ben-Gurion version of the armed struggle that brought Israel into existence and the early Irish years of Israel's current Prime Minister receive rigorous reassessment. One of this book's most valuable facets is Bethel's tracing of Irgun-Sternaganah interrelationships. Begin protagonists may discover that the Irgun had little to learn from the IRA of the Thirties and Forties, or the Stern group from the reach of ETA.

The Arab figure to receive most attention from Bethel is, inevitably, the first major Palestinian leader, prior to Yassir Arafat, Haj Amin Al-Husseini, Grand Mufti of Jerusalem and *bête noire* not only of the Jews but of the British; from 1941 he supervised Axis broadcasts in Arabic, called on Egypt to assist Axis troops, assured Hirohito after Pearl Harbour that the Arabs were praying for a Japanese victory, protested Bulgarian plans to release Jewish children to Palestine, urged Yugoslav Moslems to fight against Tito, incited Arabs to massacre Jews in Palestine and pressed Hitler to speed up and widen his extermination program.

But Bethel's main focus is on the British record, with all its tergiversations that earned mistrust first from the Arabs and much later from the Jews and with its procession of discordant policies that culminated in facing the problem in the UN's lap. No less a scholar than Prof. A.J.P. Taylor finds that Bethel has presented the record "with admirable clarity and conviction...that no Englishman can read without shame."

Bethel, Nicholas. *The Palestine Triangle: the struggle between the British, the Jews and the Arabs 1935-48*. London: Andre Deutsch/Collins, 1979.

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
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Ranger's Arms and Politics

by G. A. H. Pearson

Any account of negotiations on arms control or disarmament over a period of more than five years or so must address the question of why they have failed to make any notable difference to the defence policies of governments. The usual answer is that such negotiations have failed to reconcile the contradictory needs of states to provide for their own security, needs which are in turn rooted in the states system itself. If all states were exactly equal in every respect it is possible that statesmen might find it easy to agree on measures of disarmament that applied equally to all. But even in such a world, could they long be sure that agreements would be kept unless some supra-national body was available to arbitrate disputes?

As it is, the great imbalances between the 160 or more existing states virtually ensure that no universal agreement to reduce arms is feasible, except in cases where a few states hold weapons of mass destruction such as nuclear or chemical weapons. Such agreements as have been reached apply either to weapons that do not exist or to parts of the world where weapons are not deployed (with the exception of the agreement to ban biological weapons). Nevertheless, agreements to control the use of weapons have been reached (especially of nuclear weapons) and the effort to expand these areas of agreement continues. Indeed, there has recently been more activity of this nature than ever before, despite the uncertain prospects of success.

Robin Ranger considers this subject from a more limited perspective, confined largely to super-power negotiations between 1958 and 1978 on nuclear weapons and on European security. His thesis is that U.S.A. policies during this period, beginning with the surprise attack conference in 1958 and ending with SALT II, have been marred by a technical bias towards scientific arms control conditions, and that this bias has weakened U.S.A. security in the face of U.S.S.R. political goals ranging from confirmation of the *status quo* in Europe to the achievement of global military superiority, or at least parity.

He argues further that this same bias resulted in misunderstanding of the trend to proliferation of nuclear weapons and thus to inadequate safeguards in the NPT of 1968 against such proliferation. There is a useful chapter on India in this regard, all the more because, for a Canadian reader, this is the only occasion

on which sustained reference is made to Canadian policies. After considering Western and Soviet tactics in the MBFR negotiations on reducing forces in central Europe, and their relationship to the 1975 conference on co-operation and security in Europe, there are including reflections on arms control as a political process and on the efforts of the Carter administration to bring SALT to a bumpy landing.

Professor Ranger is a "revisionist" on arms control. He believes the U.S.A. has followed unrealistic policies which have failed to take into account the diplomatic and political goals of the Soviet Union, especially in the Nixon/Kissinger era of super-power *détente* when both powers pursued nominal arms control policies as an adjunct to *détente*. Even then, however, U.S.A. is regarded as having misread Soviet intentions, which Ranger apparently views with the dark foreboding. He believes the Soviet Union never intended to negotiate significant limits on strategic arms and either ignored or misunderstood such U.S.A. doctrines as mutual assured destruction and essential equivalence. While this may be true, Ranger does not make clear whether the Soviet Union is still trying to catch up or whether it is now following some more ambitious goal. He appears to think it is time for U.S.A. to catch up, and thus prescribes the medicine "increases in U. S. strategic and tactical nuclear forces" (p.217).

Marshal Shulman, adviser on Soviet Affairs to the State Department, has spoken recently of "the irony of the situation that both countries are looking at the aspects of the military competition in which they feel a deficiency". This book illustrates the point. It has some useful insights. There is indeed a requirement to clarify the means and ends of arms control policies. Technical solutions for diplomatic problems are often wrong-headed. The accumulation of arms under the guise of stable deterrence does seem a bit of a confidence trick. But I do not find solace in the view that traditional arms control itself is a confidence trick. After reading this book (and it should be said that it is not easy to decipher the jargon of strategic analysis which it employs) one is little closer to a convincing answer of how to achieve strategic stability, or even what this means, in the nuclear age.

Mr. Pearson is Advisor on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs in the Department of External Affairs.

Ranger, Robin. *Arms and Politics 1958-78*. Toronto: MacMillan, 1979

Defining development

by Thomas R. McCoy

A reader of *What Development is All About* could easily be persuaded that two books are enclosed within its covers. The first "book" is divided into two parts — an account of a six-week journey in Asia in 1977 where Mr. Roche examined the Chinese development model and the second part where he examines an entirely different model in Indonesia and Bangladesh. The second "book" is the 14-page "Afterword" written two and a half years after the trip to Asia. The reader progresses through the thesis and antithesis of Parts 1 and 2 to the synthesis in the "Afterword". One shares the author's compassion and his experiences during the baffling search for a ready-made development model.

Mr. Roche was an Opposition member of Parliament when he went on his tour of Asia and a member of Parliament for the governing Conservative party when he wrote the "Afterword".

In the first paragraph of the introduction, Mr. Roche, who is founding editor of the *Western Catholic Reporter*, puts himself squarely among the humanist development philosophers. Although not given in the context of framing a definition he does present a simple and succinct definition of the humanist — someone "helping to make self-reliant human beings out of the world's poverty-stricken millions".

It is against this criterion that he judges much of what he experiences and carries it into his afterword written in 1979. This is perhaps why he writes so much about China. In Parts 1 and 2, Mr. Roche makes two very important decisions. First, China is abandoned as a possible model. He appreciates that what has been done in China is uniquely Chinese. This model of development could not be fostered by Canada and then transferred to — or imposed upon — a Third World country even if Canada wished to. Even the Chinese do not attempt to export their model of development.

The second decision by the author is that he resists the temptation to present a trite, simplistic model when he is still feeling the rather deep emotional impact and culture shock of his trip. He simply states on leaving Bangladesh, "I want to think for a while".

He justifiably praises the type of development in China. Nevertheless, some development experiments

by the Chinese have been catastrophic in nature. He also praises the work being done by Canadian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) despite the fact that some of them have made, and will make, many serious mistakes also. The reader should also note that large sums in the form of matching grants are often given by CIDA and some provincial governments to NGOs. Without these government grants, many of the Canadian NGOs would not be nearly as effective as they now are. Indeed, some NGOs could not exist without the government grants.

This book could well be prescribed reading for any person or organization participating in the debate on the review of the Canadian federal government policy for international development.

If one does not agree with Mr. Roche in some of his statements and suggestions, one is bound to respect the skill, dedication and many years of experience in investigative journalism and development work that have gone into this book. He has certainly made a case for a major overhaul of both philosophy and implementation.

The "Afterword" is well worth a second reading. In it the author, who was appointed Parliamentary secretary to Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs, has not only presented a comprehensive update of the development scene, but he begins to work on his conclusions and in so doing, to synthesize some opposing philosophies of development.

Two large questions are likely to arise in the minds of those who analyze the "Afterword" thoroughly, particularly those with experience in the field of Third World development. The first — is Doug Roche's criterion of success too rigid and too narrow? The second question is — does he expect Canada to do too much in too many fields? To give one example — let us assume Canada has an appropriate philosophy of international development and an effective method of implementation. However, the millions of dollars given to UN agencies would be spent by them according to their lights and capabilities. These may well be in conflict with Canadian development concepts and requirements for accountability and cost benefits.

Although the model Mr. Roche comes up with requires more work, there are some messages that come through quite clearly:

—different philosophies and methods can be complementary;

Mr. McCoy is a consultant specializing in agricultural development projects in the Third World. For six years he was executive director of the Canadian Hunger Foundation.

—there can be an element of self-interest but it must be enlightened self-interest and be mutually beneficial to Canada and Third World nations;
—methods and technologies cannot be condemned

out of hand. The real test is whether the methods and technologies are appropriate to the socio-economic conditions that prevail in the developing country in question and whether they contribute to self-reliance

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When Mackenzie King went to the San Francisco Conference he told the Commons that Canada had played its part in winning the war and it was now its duty to play a part in 'the shaping of peace'. John Holmes was a participant in that work and draws on his experience in this history and analysis of Canadian activity in the peace of settlement and in the establishment of the United Nations and other international institutions. Although the book records the principal events, its emphasis is on the ideas and basic philosophies which Canada applied to the world scene at the time.

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Roche, Douglas. *What Development is All About*. Toronto: NC Press Limited, 1979.

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

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Second Class Mail Registration Number 4929.

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
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ISSN 0381-4874

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In the centre Information Supplement:
For the Record: reference material on Canadian foreign relations presented by the Department of External Affairs.

Letters to the Editor

Hungarian minority

Sir,

I read with certain interest the article on Hungarian Minority in Romania in the *International Perspectives* of January/February 1979, many months ago. Indirectly it prompted my recent trip to Transylvania.

What I could observe and hear from the native ethnic minorities seems to fully substantiate what Jonesco stated in an assembly of European writers: "the present day Romania has the most oppressive regime in all of Europe".

Indeed human rights as we understand them simply do not exist there (neither does, apparently, a life free of fears for the Hungarians).

Bringing to light injustice, such and similar articles serve noble causes and foster a better understanding of the world around us.

Charles Borrossa,
Montreal, Quebec

Proportional representation

Sir,

Opposition to recent proposals for the adoption of a system of proportional representation in Canadian elections appears to me to reflect a disregard both for the most basic principle of democracy and for the lessons of recent history.

Surely the idea that a Party receiving nearly five percent fewer votes than its opposition gets to form the government (as happened after last year's election), is a travesty of democracy. Surely the idea that the relatively large number of Liberal votes in the West should not result in a single parliamentary seat, or that most Conservative voters in Quebec should be similarly disenfranchized (as happened in this year's election) is an equal travesty.

Proportional representation may often lead to minority government if no Party proves able to persuade a majority of the electorate, as indeed it should according to the precepts of democratic representation. But that

does not equate with bad government. Many consider Trudeau's minority government of 1972-73 have been his most effective. It should also be pointed out, emphasized and reiterated, that the countries that have passed us in the standard of living league (Norway, Sweden, Germany, etc.), nearly all have some form of proportional representation, and minority governments. Yet they have been more stable and more successful than our own. Even troubled Ireland can boast a better economic record (not bad for a 'worst case' example). Finally, to those who fear 'Party annihilation' it should be pointed out that proportional representation is not based on party lists, nor does it have to be based on the total of a nation's population. One can have a mixture of individual and all constituencies and proportional representation (as in Germany and Ireland). Or one might have constituencies that group ten or old variety and 'elect' whichever individuals receive the most votes. That would still not entail party 'representation'. But it would mean that any group that could muster ten percent support would elect a member, and not be disenfranchised as it would under today's system.

C.G. Jacobsen,
Wolfville, Nova Scotia

Update...

Between the time when the articles in this issue were written and press time, a number of developments have occurred.

—In early April Premier Levesque of Quebec announced the date on which his government will go to the people of Quebec with the referendum seeking a mandate to negotiate "sovereignty-association" with the rest of Canada. The vote will be held on May 20.

—In the April 14 throne speech at the opening of

parliament, the Trudeau government announced the continuation of its strategy of suffocation for nuclear weapons. The government also announced that it will create the post of "Ambassador for Disarmament".

—The Royal Society of Canada announced that Les Green who wrote our article on diplomatic immunity in the wake of Tehran and Bogota has been elected a Fellow of the society. Congratulations!

Foreign policy in the 'new' Quebec

by John Starnes

The Quebec government's White Paper, entitled "Quebec: A New Deal", should dispel any doubt that the over-riding objective of the present government is complete independence. All else is secondary. The main thrust of the paper is to justify that objective to persuade Quebecers, and others, that the option offered for achieving sovereignty is practical and desirable.

The defence and foreign policies pursued by an independent Quebec will be important. All those who might become Quebec citizens, whether or not they are French-Canadian, would be closely affected by the defence and foreign policies of the new state. Such policies would have a direct bearing on the continued security, freedom and economic well-being of Quebecers.

Neighbouring states, especially the United States, and countries which might be potential allies, would be no less interested and affected by Quebec's foreign and defence policies, particularly if they proved to be in conflict with their own policies.

The White Paper, however, says precious little about external relations and defence, even within the context of sovereignty-association. Apart from brief allusions to foreign relations and defence matters, contained in about a dozen sentences scattered throughout the paper there are only two short passages (pages 56-57 and 94-95, English version) foreign relations, and one on defence (page 95).

It is tempting to conclude that this paucity of comment is deliberate. However, given the importance of these attributes of sovereignty (even within the context of sovereignty-association) it seems inconceivable the Quebec government sought deliberately to avoid the issues. It is more likely the authors of the paper simply were unable to formulate their ideas with greater clarity of precision.

General terms

Foreign and defence policy objectives are couched in such general terms that it is difficult to take exception to them. At the same time it is hard to find in them clues to the real orientation which the foreign and defence policies of an independent Quebec might take.

Phrases such as "Quebec's foreign policy will be based on the general principles that govern relationships between countries — human rights, the peaceful settlement of conflicts, rejection of any recourse to force, non-interference, etc. — as expressed in the

United Nations Charter and again in the Helsinki Accord", have about them a ring of high purpose. However, they offer few clues as to how such broad principles would be translated into specific policies. For example, if suitable terms of association with Canada could not be negotiated, would a sovereign Quebec give a quite different orientation to its foreign and defence policies? If so, what form would that orientation take? Neutrality, non-alignment or something quite different such as association with the United States?

The general lack of precision and realism in the paper about foreign relations and defence matters is exemplified in the following brief paragraph which appears under the heading, 'External Relations'. "Quebec will continue to be bound by the treaties to which Canada is now signatory. It may withdraw from them should the occasion arise according to the rules of international law. Consequently Quebec will respect the agreement on the St. Lawrence Seaway and will become a full partner in the International Joint Commission. As for Alliances such as NATO and NORAD, Quebec will respect its responsibilities and offer its contributions in accordance with its aims."

Treaties

At present Canada is a signatory to 360 multilateral treaties and has 746 bilateral agreements with approximately 135 countries and organizations or agencies. The net total of such agreements appears to be increasing at the rate of about 20 to 30 each year.

The complexity and importance of such contractual undertakings varies greatly. There are relatively simple agreements, such as that between France and Canada concerning the construction, maintenance and operation of a cattle quarantine station in the territory of St. Pierre and Miquelon, which came into force on April 3, 1969. Many of the agreements, however, are important, complex and sometimes lengthy. Two examples in this category are the Geneva Convention for

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the Protection of War Victims, which entered into force for Canada on November 14, 1965, and the Status of Forces in the Federal Republic of Germany agreement between the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty and the Federal Republic of Germany, which entered into force for Canada on July 1, 1963. The latter agreement consists of 83 articles and a long Protocol.

The White Paper refers specifically to the bilateral agreements on NORAD and the St. Lawrence Seaway as under-takings which Quebec would wish to respect. Assuming Canada and the United States agreed, these particular under-takings, and presumably many others, would have to be opened up and re-negotiated to permit Quebec to become a signatory. This, of course, would be done in the light of the circumstances then prevailing; circumstances which could result in agreements quite different from those now in force.

There are a great many other bilateral agreements between Canada and the United States, some of which would be relevant and important for a sovereign Quebec. For example, in the decade between 1965 and 1975, there were a total of 75 agreements concluded between Canada and the United States, covering such diverse topics as atomic energy, boundary waters, defence, fisheries, commerce, petroleum, radio, science, navigation and taxation.

Insofar as multilateral agreements are concerned, the subject matter is very broad in scope — boundaries, submarine cables, diplomatic relations, narcotics, economic cooperation, tariffs and trade, global communications, international labour organization, law of the sea, patents, satellites, trademarks, terrorism, world health organization, universal postal union, human rights and wheat, to mention some of the more obvious.

Even a brief study of the *Canada Treaty Series* demonstrates the great number, complexity and scope of Canada's multilateral and bilateral under-takings. One wonders if the present Quebec government, in stating that an independent Quebec would continue to be bound by the treaties to which Canada is a signatory, fully understood the sweeping nature of the solemn commitment they were making? To honour such obligations could prove a heavy burden for a fledgling state. Even to withdraw from them would require a massive diplomatic effort.

Alliances

The countries with which it is stated Quebec would seek to enter into military alliances, and especially the United States, might be forgiven for thinking that the authors of the paper would like to have their cake and eat it too. The most generous interpretation of the statements on defence policy in the White Paper suggest the new state's contributions to defence would be minimal and token.

For example, it is stated that Quebec would wish to become a partner in alliances such as NATO and


NORAD, "in accordance with its aims". However, it is important from the standpoint of potential military partners, would be to know the means by which Quebec would be able to fulfil its military obligations. How many troops, guns, tanks, aircraft, warships and other military assets could a sovereign Quebec contribute, and what kind of military infrastructure would it have to support the effort? No attempt is made to address such tough questions. Statements such as "Quebec's contribution to collective security through NATO can be justified [*sic*] by the fact that Quebec's future is linked to the lot of American and European democracies, not to mention that the Atlantic Alliance, beyond its military pursuits, encourages international changes in several areas", do nothing to dispel the impression that, at best, Quebec would be an unenthusiastic partner.

Declarations that "Quebec will maintain the military installations already located on its territory, and preserve the jobs of several thousands of Quebecers in that sector", and that the aim of the new state would be "to increase equipment and supplies budgets spent at home, while trying to save part of the enormous amounts of money federal Defence costs us every year", strongly suggests that the authors of the paper see military alliances principally as a means of achieving protection of Quebec territory, a voice in important international forums and a share in the defence product pie in return for a minimum contribution in manpower and military hardware.

The rationale for a sovereign Quebec seeking to participate in NORAD is couched in the following whimsical language. "Though technological progress has put an end to several geographical constraints, Quebec still occupies a strategic place within North America insofar as its territory controls the airways that, from the Arctic or the North-Atlantic, end up on the east coast of the continent. This is why Quebec intends to fulfil its commitments toward NORAD". No doubt the geographical importance of Quebec would be a good reason for its participation in NORAD, but is it the only reason?

Elsewhere in the same passage it is stated that Quebec's defence policy "will be based on three main concerns; its internal security, the security of the North American continent and the West and its involvement in United Nations peace-keeping or arbitration missions." Any one of these four different tasks would represent a heavy burden for the new state in financial terms, and in terms of acquiring the training manpower, and the necessary military infrastructure. Certainly over the past decade Canada, with its greater resources, has found it very difficult to fulfil these four tasks. One wonders if the authors of the paper were serious in suggesting that a sovereign Quebec realistically could support such a broad defence policy. It is difficult to escape the impression that they cannot.

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CP Photo

Quebec's Premier, René Lévesque, brought out his government's white paper on sovereignty association last November. He is pictured at the news conference at which the paper was unveiled.

René Lévesque is reported as saying recently that a 'yes' vote in the forth-coming referendum and the consequent prospect of the Maritime provinces cut off from the rest of Canada would, "bring Canada to its knees" and force negotiation of a "new deal". A similar thought is expressed in the White Paper. "We must not be taken in ... but ... on the contrary, convince ourselves that if the majority of Quebecers say YES in the Referendum, Ottawa and the rest of Canada, though they will be disappointed, will have no choice; they will negotiate." The statement is revealing of the tactics being employed in preparation for the referendum. It also is disturbing since it may be based on a complete misunderstanding of the mood of Canada outside Quebec.

Glib assumption

The glib assumption that a merely "disappointed" Canada would be forced to negotiate on Quebec's terms is open to serious question. Divorce between groups of peoples is no less difficult than it is between husband and wife. It is a highly emotional affair, usually filled with recrimination, bitterness, hostility, suspicion and sometimes even violence. There is no reason to believe

that Quebec's separation would be anything other than a bitter, unpleasant affair having little to do with 'fellowship' and 'companionship', words sometimes used to define 'association'.

More important it seems not to have occurred to those advocating an independent Quebec, that, following secession, a viable political entity with which Quebec can negotiate association might cease to exist within a relatively few years. In my view the natural north-south links gradually but inexorably would replace the more artificial bonds which now keep Canada together and which would be rent asunder by Quebec's secession.

Contrary to what the authors of the paper wish us to believe, Canada outside Quebec, does not consist of homogenous, predominately Anglo-Saxon groups dedicated to remaining united. Although the *lingua franca* outside Quebec is English, large numbers are not of Anglo-Saxon origin and culture. Thus, English Canada, in the sense the phrase is used throughout the paper, is an outdated concept.

Canada is, and has been since Confederation, a fragile notion. The anti-centrifugal forces which have been so strong in the last fifteen years have underlined that fragility. Even without the possibility of Quebec's secession, regional differences, disputes between different levels of government and a growing unwillingness by some Canadians to place the national interest above parochial interests, could weaken Confederation to the point where a national presence ceases to exist in certain vital areas. Those advocating Quebec's independence have contributed to these tendencies.

Quebec's secession could trigger a series of events eventually leading to Canada's break-up, a process, which, once started, probably would be irreversible. In such circumstances a newly sovereign Quebec could find itself attempting to forge a partnership with a disintegrating political entity. One assumes this would not be something which a majority of Quebecers would regard as desirable or in their own best interests. Yet, it would be a development which the present Quebec government would have brought about.

Few people would dispute the fact that Quebec could become a viable sovereign state. It has infinitely more assets than a majority of the countries which have become independent in the last quarter of a century. The real question is whether Quebec's sovereignty, in the different ways and circumstances in which it could be brought about, e.g. association with Canada, some special relationship with the United States or a unilateral declaration of independence would be in the best interests of its citizens. Such a judgement can only be made after considering the alternatives and the implications in many fields, and not the least in the areas of defence and foreign policy. Certainly in these important areas the White Paper lacks substance, precision, accuracy and realism.

Ryan's alternative

The present state of affairs

In a federation, international relations often pose problems of constitutional jurisdiction. Canada has not escaped these difficulties, which have, in a sense, been accentuated by the fact that at the time of Confederation in 1867, Canada was not an independent state. It was then represented by England in its international relations and only gradually gained its independence in this matter.

In recent years Quebec has sought, through various initiatives, to develop its own role in international affairs. Other provinces too, perhaps more discreetly, have established foreign offices. This has gradually given rise to a situation where the law does not totally correspond to the effective division of powers within the Canadian federation. Furthermore, Canada has difficulty concluding international agreements in matters relating to provincial jurisdiction, as the courts refuse to give effect to them. Only the consent of the provinces in these fields of provincial jurisdiction can ensure compliance with the federal government's international commitments.

In addition, Canadian presence abroad has not always reflected the dualism of Canadian society, and its regionalism. In future, as a matter of course, the federal government should more adequately reflect the dualism of Canadian society in its international relations and representation abroad.

Federal jurisdiction

A new constitution should confirm the traditional role of the federal government in matters of foreign policy, relations with other states, and defence. This attribution is essential to the integrity of the Canadian state. Such a jurisdiction should not be shared. To be

truly effective it should fall exclusively within competence of the federal government.

The federal government would continue to conclude international treaties. However, these would affect matters falling within the jurisdiction of provinces without their consent.

The central state would also ensure a quality diplomatic representation abroad which respects constitutional obligation to reflect the dualism of Canada and the interests of its regions. Furthermore, the constitution would impose an obligation to ensure adequate representation of the member provinces in a Canadian delegation to an international organization dealing with matters falling within their jurisdiction. This participation will be particularly essential in such international organizations as UNESCO, which deals with educational issues, the International Labour Bureau, or the World Health Organization.

Provincial jurisdiction

The provinces, for their part, would be entitled to establish delegations or foreign offices, in order to meet their own responsibilities. They would also be able to conclude agreements relating to matters within their jurisdiction, provided these were generally in line with Canada's foreign policy.

In no case would these new rules allow the provinces to develop and carry out diplomatic policy independent from that of the federal government, which must remain the federation's principal representation in international affairs. A province should not be allowed to maintain special foreign relationships with a given country, even in the sphere of culture, in the event of severance of diplomatic ties or of a state of war between that country and Canada.

Extract from *A New Canadian federation* published by the Constitutional Committee of the Quebec Liberal Party.

Soviet invasion of Afghanistan calls for strategic reappraisal

by G.R. Skinner

At the height of the British Empire, "Afghaning" was an expression in currency to describe the process of thinking about geo-politics in ways that did not really matter — in other words, wheel-spinning. While of limited importance in itself, Afghanistan and the events which the country has come to represent have now assumed a higher order of significance than might have ever been imagined.

The importance of Afghanistan derives almost wholly from its strategic position, and the problem posed by the Soviet invasion cannot be considered in any meaningful way divorced from the invasion's strategic implications. By way of interpreting the significance of the invasion, there are frequently two analogies suggested: the Great Game analogy; and the Vietnam analogy.

The Great Game

The Great Game analogy is based on the assumption that history plus geography will equal similar strategies and motivations on the part of those involved today as in the past (making allowances, of course, for the importance of the Arabian Gulf in the twentieth century). In the nineteenth century, Imperial Britain and Czarist Russia played the game for influence in and around Afghanistan, Britain for the purpose of defining the pre-eminence of British global supremacy and of blocking the Russian drive south. The Russian motivation was to establish a warm water port in the Persian Gulf, and Afghanistan was the geographical stepping stone to the achievement of this goal.

In its contemporary form, the Great Game scheme holds that the Soviet drive to a warm water port is given additional impetus by the ideological nature of Soviet expansionism, and by the strategic goal of gaining proximity to vital western oil routes. Proponents of this analogy point out that the occupation of Afghanistan by Soviet forces has extended Soviet influence to within 350 miles of the Arabian Gulf and that Soviet power is separated from that body of water only by the Pakistani province of Baluchistan, the inhabitants of which harbour strong nationalistic — and indeed fissiparous — tendencies.

One conclusion inspired by this school of analysis is Helmut Sonnenfeldt's assessment of the consequences of the invasion, in terms of the exercise of Soviet military power elsewhere: the Soviet Union has acquired, he writes in the *Washington Post*, the capability "to influence events in remote areas and the habit of defining its interests in a global rather than a solely continental basis." The Soviet Union, however, had been thinking in such terms ever since it became a super-power sometime in the late 1950's.

The Great Game analogy suffers from a number of defects. In the 19th century, strategy was cast in geographic terms, and was based on mountain barriers and oceans. Blocking the Russian advance toward the valley of the Indus, therefore, was considered to be an enterprise having a geographic framework, hence the importance of the Khyber Pass.

Times have changed since those days, and geography *per se* is not as important as the global calculus of power and stability in a complex international environment. The Great Game analogy, moreover, inadequately explains Soviet motivations. As an example, one corollary of this analogy is the supposed Soviet desire for a warm water port. There is not now any sizable port along the Baluchistan coast because the hinterland cannot sustain it, and one would have to be built from the ground up, and supplied from outside. Moreover, Soviet access to port and naval facilities in East Africa and South Yemen have already been acquired, and naval technology has obviated the need for proximate facilities. In short, even if it were feasible, a port is not necessary to interfere with western oil supplies, again assuming that Soviet intentions lie in that direction, an assumption not proven beyond doubt.

Vietnam analogy

The Vietnam analogy suggests that the Soviet Union had little choice but to intervene in a situation where a client regime was falling apart, and losing a war at the

Mr. Skinner is Director of South Asia Division in the Department of External Affairs.

same time. The essence of this view is that Soviet troops moved to bolster the regime (even if it meant replacing those at the top) and winning the war by a kind of military 'pacification' operation. The Vietnam scenario suggests that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan may also have been designed to secure a solid Soviet foothold in an area where stability was rapidly deteriorating.

The analogy loses its way, however, once the actual nature of the intervention, and the motivations behind it, are addressed. The character of the opposition to the regime in Kabul is fundamentally different from that faced by Diem, his predecessors and successors: it is unorganized, comparatively primitive and relatively unsophisticated (there is no Ho Chi Minh and certainly no General Giap). It lacks significant outside material and psychological support. The terrain is different. There is no ground cover, and while rebels may hide amongst the rocks, bringing in supplies in any significant quantity without detection and interdiction is a virtual impossibility. In Afghanistan, while the country may never be totally pacified, it is unlikely that there will be a long, drawn-out agony. (A variation of the 'Vietnam' theory and its 'domino effect' corollary suggests that the Russians invaded so as to insulate the Soviet Moslem republics from the Islamic resurgence endemic in the neighbouring area. There is, however, no evidence of dissent or unrest in those republics).

The fact that these two analogies can be found wanting does not make the task of interpreting the significance of events in Afghanistan any easier. Nevertheless, one may look at the actual effects of the invasion, and consider alternate explanations of why the invasion took place.

Effects of Invasion

The effects exist on four discernible levels. The first level is the immediate one of Afghanistan itself. The invasion is reminiscent of the Soviet overhaul of Hungary in 1956 when the regime had collapsed and military intervention was necessary to preserve the Soviet interstate system in Eastern Europe. The Afghanistan case, however, is different in two fundamental respects. The defensive purpose of the operation is not so easily discernible; and the invasion represents the first *de facto* territorial acquisition by the Soviet Union since the Second World War.

The political situation in Afghanistan figured in the decision to invade. A leftist alliance, composed of Parcham (Banner) and Khalq (Masses) factions, named after their respective newspapers, overthrew the Daoud regime in April 1978, but never did work properly. The Khalq faction, led by Taraki, eventually gained the upper hand — and Soviet support. His replacement by Amin seems to have been the result of internal politics within the Khalq. Amin's errors that would make his downfall inevitable were two-fold: he

had not secured Soviet acquiescence for his own and appeared determined to adopt a Titoist role for himself, despite the fact that he was losing the countryside.

The operation to install Karmel was not unopposed. Despite Karmel's legitimate revolutionary credentials, available evidence suggests that he was not in Kabul during the first stages of the Soviet invasion. The Soviet explanation that military assistance had been provided "at request of the Afghanistan government" therefore makes little sense, especially since the government was still in power. (This was one of the major objections voiced by Third World and other delegates to the United Nations Emergency Session in January, 1980). The consequence is that the present regime in Kabul suffers from a lack of international recognition and internal support.

Despite the discouraging background, it is possible to argue that the final victory of the Parchamite faction over the Khalq factions in Afghanistan could, if conditions were right, potentially stabilize the long-festering border issue between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The border line, drawn in 1893, 'formalized' the 1,000-mile border between Afghanistan and British India. Afghan governments have traditionally supported secessionist movements within Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier Province. Because the Khalq faction depended on Pashtun support, it was more sympathetic to separatist elements in those two provinces than the Parcham faction. Equally interesting is that the Khalq had developed apparently close and cordial working relations with the Iranian Tudeh (communist) party, and presumably links between it and the Parchamite regime will have to be built from the beginning.

Adjacent areas

The invasion has greatly increased the probability of a considerable adjustment to the structure of relationships within the area. Indeed, these relationships were changing even before the Soviet invasion, as events in Iran so obviously show. The reappearance of Mrs. Gandhi in India has created a number of questions for the American decision to provide additional military and economic support to Pakistan, notwithstanding the nuclear issue, will inevitably have an impact on the Indo-Pakistani relationship, given India's security concerns. The Chinese role has been muted so far, but one cannot assume that it will always remain so. Within the subcontinental region, the results of the invasion of Afghanistan is to add greatly to the complexity of an already complex — and unstable — series of inter-locking relationships.

In Third World terms, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan comes as a dramatic precedent. Treaties similar to the Soviet-Afghanistan Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation of December 5, 1978 have been concluded with a number of developing countries including Af-

is own Mozambique, Iraq, India, Vietnam and Yemen. All
ist right these treaties are loosely structured, and do not
g the the Soviet Union to any particular course of ac-
not un this has not prevented the Soviet authorities from
tionar ing to the Soviet-Afghan Treaty in defending the
he we of a regime by outside force where such treaties
et inv had taken place only in Eastern Europe (and
stahap North Korea and Mongolia).


The Conference of Islamic Foreign Ministers,
tan pe being in Islamabad at the end of January, reaf-
nce Af firmed the Third World's condemnation of the Soviet
one ced first pronounced at the United Nations Special
other on Agency Session held earlier in the month. A new
ision in the Third World's dealings with the Soviet
presen ess is therefore visible; and the Islamic Foreign
ternat on Ministers' Conference may mark the beginning of a
is pos era in Soviet-Third World relations, with the So-
emite Union no longer able to take for granted the sup-
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n. The represent a mile-stone in that a group of Third
1,000 old countries have staked a collective claim of polit-
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Western reactions to the Soviet invasion have ranged
action in general condemnation to practical measures such
mpat as economic sanctions and freezing contacts and ex-
es the economic sanctions and freezing contacts and ex-

changes. The strength of the western reaction, especially the cultural field, has been reinforced by the subsequent Soviet decision to send the dissident nuclear physicist, Andrei Sakharov, into internal exile. Not encouraging before the invasion, prospects for agreement, this time round, on SALT II have by and large disappeared. While the question of whether the Olympic Games should still be held in Moscow has seized the public imagination, its overall significance in the East-West equation is marginal, despite its undisputed symbolic value.

One of the most immediate effects of the Soviet invasion has been the sharpening of the debate in western countries about the nature and purposes of the detente process. Generally speaking, detente up to now has been defined in only two contexts — in the European context, and in terms of the strategic relationship between the USA and the USSR. Europeans have a heavy investment in detente, both from the point of view of their security and the effort they have put into its realization. They do not wish the relationships that have been so carefully — and often painfully — constructed between East and West in Europe to be put into question by outside events.

On the other hand, the American view of detente places greater weight on its universal applicability, given American global responsibilities and concerns, and American foreign policy has on a number of occasions sought to establish 'linkages' between progress in



AP Wirephoto

Afghan refugees have set up a makeshift tent city at the Janghir, Abad refugee camp in Pakistan's Bejaur Valley. Some 100,000 Afghans have crossed the border into Pakistan to flee the Soviet invaders and create the world's newest refugee problem.

furthering bilateral detente and Soviet sponsored activities abroad, as in Somalia or Angola. Europeans and Americans are agreed that detente must now be redefined, and that a reappraisal of the assumptions upon which it rests is necessary.

By contrast, the Soviet definition of detente is global, although where China fits into the scheme of things is unclear. It encompasses such propositions as peaceful coexistence (tolerating the continued presence of states with different and opposing social systems, but carrying on the international struggle for socialism by all means short of war) and the 'Brezhnev doctrine' (a postulate of limited sovereignty, which holds that the gains of socialism can be defended, if necessary, from outside). It is unlikely that the Soviet definition of detente will be reconsidered in the light of Afghanistan. Indeed, the long-standing Soviet insistence that the detente process be made "irreversible" appears aimed at deflecting western countries' concern about Soviet activities in parts of the world other than Europe.

Obviously, a Soviet move across borders in Europe would provoke a western reaction different than that elicited by Afghanistan. Thus, while Soviet activity outside the European or USA-USSR contexts will inevitably affect East-West relations, it does not mean that each issue is subject to identical treatment. Events in Afghanistan are specific to that part of Asia. This has been recognized, in effect, by the tempered nature of the western response, which has also taken into account the interests of the countries of the region.

Straightforward

The logic behind the Soviet decision to invade appears deceptively straightforward. From a Soviet view-point, the costs probably looked small, and the timing looked right. As in 1956, when western attention was focussed on Suez, and the Soviet invasion of Hungary could be achieved with relatively little cost, so was the west, especially the United States, preoccupied with Iran. Western relations with the USSR had soured lately (over issues such as concluding the SALT II Treaty and installing improved theatre nuclear weapons in Europe) and there was little to be lost by the inevitable western cries of outrage.

Soviet planners may have estimated that the western response would not go much beyond words, and would be of a shortterm nature. A strong reaction from the USA, particularly in material terms, seemed unlikely, given the apparent lessons about American behaviour on Iran, and it would be recalled that Presidential election years had the effect of dampening the potential for American action to crystallize as Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968) seemed to show. Finally, Soviet experience with the Third World held little evidence that any coherent reaction should be expected. The anger of the Moslem countries appeared to have a purely American direction, an estimation sup-

ported by evidence in the form of violent American demonstrations over the Mecca incident from Pakistan to the Mahgreb.

So far as Afghanistan was concerned an elite group of Afghan Marxists, led by Babrak Karmal, dispersed in the USSR and Eastern Europe. Karmal himself had been sent in diplomatic exile to Czechoslovakia as ambassador, but was ready to replace Amin in Kabul. (As it developed, this pattern is reminiscent of the Soviet drive in the early 1950's to replace the grown Eastern European communists who had participated in the wartime resistance and hence had an independent powerbase, with those national communists who had sought refuge in Moscow during the war.) The situation in Afghanistan, furthermore, was getting out of hand. Amin had seized power (without authentic support from Moscow. Besides flaunting his independence from Moscow (he had demanded the recall of the Soviet ambassador), Amin had added insult to injury by losing the guerilla war. Despite some sectarian differences, evidence was accumulating that the revolution were inspired by the Islamic revolution in Iran, and Afghanistan was rapidly losing its value as a buffer.

Beyond Afghanistan and Iran there was the complex of unstable relationships represented by the Pakistan-India-China triangle. The Soviet Union's long term interests in that area, had come into sharper focus as the re-election of Mrs. Gandhi suggested possibilities for a renewed Indo-Soviet relationship. The Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. Gromyko, was one of the first to visit Delhi after the elections.

A second complex of unstable relationships, moreover, existed in the Gulf, and extended to the Mediterranean. Secure control of Afghanistan was pivotal to the realization of Soviet objectives, and the control of the Gulf was at the nexus of Soviet interests in the area. Conversely, an unstable or unreliable Afghanistan would restrict Soviet options and limit the Soviet ability to influence events in this crucial area of the world.

Another reason frequently cited for the invasion was the Soviet fear that the Islamic resurgence was threatening the Soviet Union's 'soft, Islamic underclass'. There is, however, little evidence of unrest in the USSR's Moslem Union Republics since the 1930s, and no empirical evidence that it is particularly 'soft'.

(a) *Offensive/Master Strategy*

This school of thought holds that expansionism is inherent in the nature of the Soviet political and ideological system, and that motivations behind Soviet global outreach are based on the calculus of world power relationship (or the world "correlation of forces" as Soviet writers call it). Detente, the argument goes, is regarded in Moscow as essentially a transitory phase in relations between the Soviet Union and the non-Communist states pending the "final triumph of socialism". The invasion of Afghanistan is therefore interpreted as a

a planned and deliberate strategic Soviet advance through the Third World, so as to be posed to strike at Western interests in the Gulf and elsewhere, despite whatever the short term costs might be.

Defensive/Reactive

This explanation of Soviet motivations suggests that the rapidly deteriorating situation along the Soviet Union's southern flank made military intervention the logical outcome of the Soviet Union's concern for its own security. Historical parallels are sometimes cited to support this view. The Communist takeover of Czechoslovakia in 1948 brought Soviet military power to the heart of central Europe and to within striking distance of Munich and Vienna. From the Soviet standpoint, however, the Soviet takeover was necessary in order to remove a geographic wedge which could split Eastern Europe in half, with the sharp end pointed at the Soviet Union itself. A similar logic applies to Afghanistan.

A variation of this approach suggests that the Soviet intervention was anticipatory in nature in that the Russians wished to be prepared for what they believed would be strong American action in Iran.

Opportunism

This explanation emphasizes the short-term, tactical approach the USSR has adopted in exploiting opportunities wherever they are found. According to this theory, the central strategic position of Afghanistan, while important in So-

viet calculations, was a factor matched by the circumstances in and around Afghanistan which apparently favoured military intervention. The geopolitics of the area (i.e., Afghanistan was on the Soviet border; the rest of the area was weak and divided militarily, and lacking firm western security guarantees) plus practical logistical considerations argued in favour of the exercise of direct Soviet power rather than of resorting to some kind of indirect intervention by proxy through the use of surrogate troops.

(d) *Situational Approach*

While taking into account strategic and ideological factors, this treatment of Soviet motivations stresses the context of the time. Deteriorating conditions in Afghanistan were equalled by unsettled conditions outside it. Afghanistan's rough politics had made a political and physical casualty of Taraki, the man whom the Russians apparently trusted — or at least, were prepared to accommodate in their own plans. But in ways that are not yet fully clear, it seems that the gathering crisis over the question of leadership succession also had a bearing on the Soviet decision to invade. The result is that the calculations of Soviet decision-makers, particularly those in the Politburo may have been coloured to a significant extent by domestic considerations as well as situation on the ground in Afghanistan.

While these alternative explanations of Soviet motivations are not mutually exclusive, it is this last which comes closest to answering why the decision was taken to invade in the first place. The actual reason remains a mystery:

the Soviet objective of "gaining control" of Afghanistan had already been achieved by the April 1978 revolution; securing that control could have been undertaken by means less draconian — and much less costly — than a full-scale invasion.

Whatever Soviet motivation may have been, the international system, both regional and world-wide, has been presented with a *fait accompli*, and adjustments will have to be made to come to terms with its consequences. If Soviet decision makers did not foresee the strength and extent of western and Third World reaction, they were nevertheless prepared to pay a considerable price for full military control of Afghanistan.

The significance of Afghanistan, then, reaches far beyond its immediate impact upon the region. The Soviet invasion has affected every aspect of East-West relations, profoundly disturbing assumptions about the structure of postwar international relationships not only in Europe and North America, but in the Third World as well. As a new decade begins, a period of accommodation to new and difficult realities is at hand. Yet, in the final analysis, this may be no bad thing, for expecting too much of the detente process could be as ill-advised as expecting too little.



CP Photo

Afghan army soldiers patrol the streets of Kandahar.

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Mounting international tensions underline need for disarmament

by William Epstein

Canada is, by tradition and culture, definitely not a militarist country; on the contrary, it is a notably peaceful one. Canadians can aspire with a perhaps more valid claim to that much-abused appellation of "peace-loving" than can many other nations that lay claim to it for themselves. With very rare exceptions, they adore the ethic of the conference and abhor the ethic of conflict. In the 20th Century, they have also demonstrated repeatedly their faith in international organization and collective peaceful measures for world security, which are much more to their style and liking.

It is true that Canada has been particularly lucky in its choice of neighbours, although this good fortune counts for much less now than it did in the pre-nuclear world. Canadian leaders of all political parties have realized that in the age of nuclear weapons and of instant annihilation, it was not only moral and wise but also necessary for selfish national reasons to promote a better and safer world. They have all, at one time or another, subscribed to the belief that in the nuclear age idealism might well be the only sensible form of realism. They also thought that by promoting collective security through international organization Canada could lessen its dependence on the United States for security. Accordingly, Canada has supported collective and international action aimed at enhancing human welfare and the prospects for human survival.

For some two decades after the end of the second world war, it also played an active role in the disarmament debates and negotiations. But for most of the last decade it has been content to leave the field either to the United States and Soviet Union or to the activist non-aligned countries such as Mexico, Sweden and Yugoslavia and, more recently, Nigeria. The 1978 United Nations Special Session on Disarmament marked a turning point and Canada resumed a more active role and took new initiatives.

The change was heralded when Prime Minister Trudeau presented the General Assembly in 1978 with a new plan for "a strategy of suffocation ... to halt the arms race in the laboratory". Mr. Trudeau's disarmament proposals are discussed by the same writer in the March/April 1979 issue of *International Perspectives*. Canadians presented a resolution each year calling on

the Geneva Committee on Disarmament, that is charged with negotiating agreements, to pursue consideration for halting the production of fissionable materials for weapons (referred to as the cut-off). This Canadian initiative attracted wide support; in 1978 the resolution was adopted by a vote of 108 in favour, 10 against (the Soviet bloc), and 16 abstentions (including France, India, Argentina and Brazil); in 1979 the vote was 118 to 9, with 12 abstentions. The resolution ensures that the Canadian proposal will be included in the international agenda of disarmament negotiations. While a great deal of time and work will have to be invested in the efforts to promote the cut-off, particularly in the present unfavourable climate for disarmament, the measure is, on its merits, a logical, reasonable and feasible next step in curbing the nuclear arms race.

Despite the sudden revival of tensions due to the invasion of Afghanistan, which may hopefully prove to be of short duration, there is no doubt that the development of detente, the thawing of the Cold War and the current situation of relatively stable deterrence has greatly reduced the likelihood of a deliberately planned war between the United States and the Soviet Union. But as the nuclear arsenals grow, with a greater variety of weapons, the danger of a nuclear war by inadvertence grows. A nuclear war could be unleashed as a result of human or mechanical failure, by accident, by miscalculation, as a result of ineffective command, control and communications procedures or capabilities, by the escalation of a local conventional war, by blackmail or terrorism, or by sheer madness.

Likelihood increasing

The likelihood of nuclear war by accident is increasing. An unrestricted arms race multiplies the danger. It poses a threat not just to the superpowers but to the entire world. Canada, which in the pre-atomic age was relatively safe because of geography, is particularly exposed and vulnerable in the age of inter-continental

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nuclear missiles and long-range bombers and submarines. It has been compared to the ham in a sandwich or the nut in a nut-cracker between the U.S. and USSR. As long ago as 1955, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev warned then External Affairs Minister Lester Pearson during a visit to the Crimea that Canada would be destroyed if there were ever a war between the U.S. and USSR. A quarter of a century later, that likelihood has been considerably magnified.

These considerations make it not only desirable but indeed essential and inevitable that Canada should seek by all means at its disposal to contain and curb the arms race and to avoid the threat of nuclear war. The most direct and effective course is to struggle unceasingly and with all its power, alone and in concert with other similarly motivated nations, to promote and achieve meaningful disarmament treaties and agreements, and in the first place in the nuclear field. This means exerting persistent pressure and influence on the superpowers, who not only still have, but increasingly have, the power of life or death over the countries and peoples of the world.

The escalating technological arms race means that modern weapons systems, conventional as well as nuclear, become vastly more expensive than the simpler, older systems they replace. Global military expenditures are now more than \$500 billion per year or more than \$50 million every hour of the day. They continue to escalate at a faster pace than inflation with no end in sight. In addition, they make increasing demands on scarce natural resources and highly trained manpower. This helps fuel inflation, exchange and monetary imbalances and unemployment. Contrary to popular misconceptions, military expenditures do not increase employment but rather result in a net relative decrease as compared to any other form of government expenditure. Military production today is not labour-intensive but is highly capital-intensive and hence is not job-productive. Since military expenditures do not create either producer's goods or consumer's goods but are devoted to the acquisition and use of military hardware that is eventually scrapped, it is a form of waste.

Canada, with its limited population, its tradition and (despite its high per capita income) its relatively low Gross National Product (GNP), simply cannot become a major military power without putting an excessive strain on its material and human resources — at great cost to its economic and social standards and its way of life.

As the arms race continues with its resulting spiral of expenditures, governments will become reluctant to spend the vast and increasing sums of money that will be required for modern armaments and the trained forces necessary to man them. There will be increasing pressures in a number of countries, to acquire nuclear weapons, which are comparatively less expensive than conventional weapons and armed forces and which produce "a bigger bang for a buck". As other

countries "go nuclear", a sort of chain reaction will cur compelling still more countries to do so. Eventually, even Canada, despite its traditions and culture the fact that it is, willy-nilly, under the American clear umbrella, may be unable to withstand the growing pressures and may have to take the painful dangerous decision to go nuclear. This spiral of proliferation would greatly increase the risk of nuclear war.

Past record

In the period from 1945 to the middle 60s, Canada played an active role in both substantive and procedural matters of disarmament and sometimes took important initiatives. Canadian initiatives tended to decrease however in the following years, and many Canadian initiatives were relatively limited in scope and very few in number. In 1970, Canada initiated proposals for a seismic reporting network to verify and monitor underground nuclear tests, which has been useful in increasing the pressures to stop testing. Canada also played a leading role in promoting the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and in 1976, was the first country to announce that it would in the future restrict its nuclear exports to those countries which accepted full-scope international safeguards over their entire nuclear programs. Canada has never suggested a disarmament item for the agenda of the General Assembly and not since 1962, when Canada first formally proposed the denuclearization of outer space at the Geneva Disarmament Conference, has Canada taken any new major initiative at the negotiations. Nor has Canada ever submitted a draft treaty on any disarmament measure. Until the 1978 UN Special Session on Disarmament, it has been content to leave the major initiatives to the superpowers or to the more active "aligned" states.

During that time, Canada, of course, performed its most useful function in promoting the work, in facilitating agreement and in improving substance and quality, but this has been largely confined to a secondary or supportive stance rather than to a primary or initiatory role. This was all the more regrettable because Canada is peculiarly fitted to play a leading role at the UN in the field of disarmament.

Canada helped the United States produce the first Atomic-bomb in World War II. It also unwittingly, against its intentions, helped India produce its first nuclear explosive device. It is a leader in the field of nuclear technology and is engaged in the export of nuclear materials, equipment and technology for peaceful uses. It is the only country that participated in the work of producing the first A-bomb that has not proceeded to manufacture its own, although it has had the knowledge and capability to do so. It has been a participant in the nuclear and conventional disarmament efforts from the beginning. It is the only NATO power that has renounced the possession and therefore the first use of nuclear weapons by its forces in Europe.

is the only country in the world that has nuclear weapons on its territory and has decided that all of them will be phased out. In addition, Canada's per capita military expenditures are amongst the lowest in NATO and in the industrialized world. Because of its close association and involvement with nuclear energy and nuclear weapons, its very considerable expertise, and its own low armaments posture it would seem that Canada, as an active and responsible member of the world community, would assume some special responsibility for promoting nuclear (and also conventional) disarmament.

Moreover, Canada is very fortunate in not being plagued with any acute international disputes of situations. It has never been the subject of a formal complaint or the object of any item on the agenda of any UN organ. In addition, Canada, as a consistent supporter of the UN and as a leader in its peacekeeping and development activities, has acquired a large fund of goodwill and considerable influence in the international community. But unfortunately its record in the work of disarmament has not matched its leadership in other fields or that of some smaller powers.

As a member of NATO and NORAD and as a good neighbour of the United States, there are of course some constraints on Canada's freedom of action in the field of international security and disarmament. Nevertheless, as a middle power with fewer foreign responsibilities and entanglements, Canada does not have the manifold and complex concerns and responsibilities or the conflicting interests and pressures that tend to inhibit and constrain the policies and actions of the great powers.

Leadership position

Thus Canada is in a highly favourable position to exercise moral and political leadership in the field of disarmament. Since effective world-wide measures of arms limitation and disarmament are in Canada's national interest as well as in the world interest, it would seem that Canada has a responsibility to do everything in its power to promote an end to the arms race and real progress towards disarmament. It also has a legal obligation to pursue such measures. As a party and strong supporter of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Canada has accepted a legal commitment under Article VI of the Treaty which provides:

Each of the parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

Arguments have been raised that because it is not a leader in the arms race, Canada should not be a leader in disarmament efforts. In addition it has been said that, because of its special relationship with the United States and its association with its NATO allies,

Canada ought not to "rock the boat" by taking independent initiatives. It can, of course, be argued in reply that its own low arms profile and its ability to talk to and lobby its allies from the inside with confidence, provide better opportunities for Canada. Moreover, the present circumstances do not really differ from those which have existed for more than a quarter of a century during which period other alliance members as well as Canada have at times taken major independent initiatives and played a leadership role.

I sometimes find myself becoming impatient with Canadians who seem to under-rate or are overly restrained in their evaluation of Canada's role and influence in the world. Such people (in my experience only Canadians, never non-Canadians) question the wisdom, if not the right, of Canada to intervene or interfere in what they regard as superpower or big-power affairs. Most seem to forget that what the superpowers do — or do not do — vitally affects every nation and all people, and thus creates not only the right but also the obligation to intervene. If war is too serious to be left to the generals, then nuclear war and disarmament are much too serious to be left to the superpowers.

There are many examples in international affairs where the intervention of smaller powers has had a most important beneficial effect on peace and security, although the interventions were often unwanted and, at times, resented. In the field of international peacekeeping, the Canadian initiative taken by Mr. Pearson during the 1956 Suez crisis played a decisive role, although both superpowers and the then Secretary-General of the United Nations were at first very skeptical about it.

Green initiative

In the disarmament field, I cannot help but recall the initiative taken by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Howard Green, at the first session of the 18-nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. On 27 March 1962, Mr. Green proposed the specific text of a draft declaration intended to ban nuclear weapons from outer space that was to be subscribed to by all 18 members of the Committee. The Canadian proposal came as a great surprise to the members of the Committee. The U.S. delegation, which had outer space on its tentative list of arms control measures, was clearly displeased, and indeed somewhat shocked by the initiative which had not been cleared with it. The Soviet Delegation was startled and somewhat confused, not knowing whether the Canadian proposal was a strictly Canadian initiative or whether it was in reality an American one, with Canada merely launching the idea on behalf of the U.S.

A draft treaty was introduced to the Disarmament Committee in June 1963 and the declaration was finally adopted by the General Assembly in October. Thereafter, the UN Outer Space Committee elaborated the Outer Space Treaty, which was finally approved in

1966, and which contained a specific ban on orbiting or stationing nuclear and other mass destruction weapons in outer space. Thus, the initiative taken by Mr. Green, which had at first failed to receive the support of the superpowers, came to full fruition.

It is of course quite possible, perhaps even likely, that the U.S. and USSR would have eventually reached agreement without any assistance from Canada. But the Canadian proposal served to focus attention on the problem and unquestionably helped to promote and hasten agreement. Even though Canada was not then capable of launching anything into outer space, which was at that time a preserve of only the two superpowers, the 1962 Canadian initiative is an excellent example of how smaller powers can exercise important influence by playing a sort of third party role. More initiatives by Canada and other middle and smaller powers, both aligned and non-aligned, are needed to help the superpowers to cope with their baffling problems.

It is of course true that the present mood and climate of relations between the two superpowers is not the most propitious for disarmament. It seems that the time is always propitious for arming, but never for disarming. The very fact, however, that the world now seems to be moving towards a revival of the Cold War makes it all the more necessary that new initiatives be taken that could help arrest that movement and serve to maintain a continuous communication link and dialogue between the two superpowers. Disarmament is a field where the two powers and all other nations have a common and necessary interest and goal, and it is essential that the process of disarmament not only be kept alive but that it remain active and forward-looking. During even the darkest days of the Cold War and the Korean War, international disarmament discussions proceeded without a halt. Indeed, the United States conceived and promoted several imaginative proposals, such as the Baruch Plan and Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace Plan during that time. It is a matter of some encouragement that both the U.S. and the USSR, despite the tensions in Afghanistan and the Middle East, have within recent weeks reaffirmed their intentions to continue their disarmament efforts and negotiation in both bilateral and multilateral conferences.

Made to order

The current situation seems almost made to order for Canada to pursue its ideas for halting and reversing the nuclear arms race in all forums. The indefinite postponement of the SALT II ratification process, and the convening of the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in August 1980, would all seem to call for some new action in the field of nuclear disarmament.

There are a number of possibilities for Canada to take action in the whole field of international security. New dangers and threats to the peace in the Middle East, and elsewhere in Asia and Africa, provide not only

great challenges but also new opportunities. A discussion of these matters, however, is outside the scope of this article which focuses on disarmament as one of the important areas where urgent steps can be taken to promote and enhance international peace and security.

In the disarmament field all the four measures proposed by Prime Minister Trudeau in 1978 are anything, even more urgent and necessary than anything else. While the U.S., U.K., and USSR will continue their three-year-old negotiations for a comprehensive nuclear test ban, these appear for the moment to be at an impasse. Canada can and should strongly support the efforts of other countries in the Geneva Committee for Disarmament to obtain a full report on the status of the tripartite negotiations and to insist that detailed negotiations be conducted in the Committee on Disarmament without further delay.

In regards to a ban on the flight-testing of strategic delivery vehicles, the reduction of such flight testing was discussed in the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks and some limitations were in fact included in the 1979 SALT II Treaty. Since the question of ratification of the Treaty is now in abeyance, any new initiatives in this area are hardly likely to be very fruitful and might better be deferred until the situation regarding SALT is clarified.

The third point of the "strategy of suffocation" of the nuclear arms race, dealing with a cut-off of production of fissionable material for weapons purposes, is an area where progress seems definitely possible, an area where Canada has taken the leadership. It is discussed in more detail below.

The fourth measure, concerning a freeze and reduction of military expenditures for new strategic weapons, is part of the larger question of limiting and reducing military expenditures in general and is the subject of an expert study now being undertaken in the United Nations.

A number of other studies are also being undertaken by the United Nations on various aspects of disarmament. After a number of years of reluctance, Canada is now taking a more active role in such studies. Canada is involved in several of these studies, either by having appointed or nominated Canadian representatives by Canadian experts having been chosen by the Secretary-General to participate in their work. These are the studies on disarmament and development, disarmament and international security, on nuclear weapons, on a comprehensive test ban, and on confidence-building measures. Canada can and should play an active role in making experts available for these and other studies and in implementing the reports that the Secretary-General will be submitting as a matter of due course.

Adviser on disarmament

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- 80/3 The Commission on Human Rights after thirty years. A declaration by Ambassador Yvon Beaulne, Canadian Representative to the thirty-third session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, New York, February 4, 1980.

III. Other Publications

Canada and NATO.

The Department of External Affairs (Reference Series No. 17).

3. Treaty Information (prepared by the Economic Law and Treaty Division).

I. Bilateral

Bangladesh

General Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh concerning Development Co-operation.

Dacca, December 14, 1979

In force December 14, 1979

Barbados

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of Barbados constituting an Interim Agreement on International Air Services.

Bridgetown, November 23, 1979

In force November 23, 1979

Agreement between Canada and Barbados for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital.

Bridgetown, January 22, 1980

Brazil

Long Term Wheat Agreement between Canada and Brazil

Brasilia, January 10, 1980

In force January 10, 1980

With effect from January 1, 1980

Jamaica

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of Jamaica constituting an Agreement to provide for the exchange of Third Party Communications between Amateur Radio Stations of Canada and Jamaica.

Kingston, October 2 and 4, 1979

In force October 19, 1979

South Africa

Trade Agreement between the Dominion of Canada and the Union of South Africa.

Ottawa, August 20, 1932

In force June 30, 1933

Terminated July 25, 1979

Effective January 25, 1980

Exchange of Notes constituting a Commercial Agreement between Canada and the Union of South Africa.

Pretoria and Ottawa, August 2 and 31, 1935

In force August 31, 1935

With effect from July 1, 1935

Terminated July 25, 1979

Effective January 25, 1980

United Kingdom

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland constituting an Agreement amending the 1971 Agreement concerning a training scheme for Armed Forces of the United Kingdom in Canada.

Ottawa, November 26, 1979

In force November 26, 1979

United States of America

Exchange of Notes (June 30, 1953) between Canada and the United States of America constituting an Agreement concerning the Installation of an Oil Pipeline from Haines to Fairbanks, Alaska.

Ottawa, June 30, 1953

In force June 30, 1953

Amended by Exchange of Notes March 31, 1960

Amended by Exchange of Notes April 19, 1962

Canadian Notice of termination of Agreement

dated January 12, 1979

to be effective January 12, 1980

Exchange of Notes between Canada and the United States of America concerning the Final Disposition of the CANOL Facilities.

Washington, March 31, 1960

In force March 31, 1960

Terminated January 12, 1980

Exchange of Notes between Canada and the United States of America granting permission to the United States to construct, operate and maintain Three Additional Pumping Stations in Canada on the Haines-Fairbanks Pipeline.

Ottawa, April 19, 1962

In force April 19, 1962

Terminated January 12, 1980

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America constituting an Agreement on Vessel Traffic Management for the Juan de Fuca Region.

Ottawa, December 19, 1979

In force, December 19, 1979

Yugoslavia

Agreement on the Protection of Investments between the Government of Canada and the Federal Executive Council of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (with Exchange of Notes constituting an Understanding).

Belgrade, December 21, 1979.

II. Multilateral

Amendments to the title of substantive provisions of the Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (Resolution A.371(s).)

Adopted at London, November 9, 1977

Canada's Instrument of Acceptance

received IMCO London, 2 November 1979

Deposited - United Nations, New York, November 19, 1979

Amendments to the Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization to the institutionalization of the Committee on Technical Co-operation in the Convention (Resolution A.400(x).)

Adopted at London, November 17, 1977

Canada's Instrument of Acceptance

received IMCO, London, November 2, 1979

Deposited - United Nations, New York, November 19, 1979

Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution.

Done at Geneva, November 13, 1979

Signed by Canada, November 13, 1979

Geneva (1979) Protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

Done at Geneva, June 30, 1979

Signed by Canada June 30, 1979

Entered into force January 1, 1980

Protocol Supplementary to the Geneva (1979) Protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

Done at Geneva, November 22, 1979

Signed by Canada December 17, 1979

(subject to acceptance)

Entered into force January 1, 1980

Arrangement regarding Bovine Meat

Done at Geneva, April 12, 1979

Signed by Canada, December 17, 1979

Entered into force January 1, 1980

Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade

Done at Geneva, April 12, 1979

Signed by Canada, December 17, 1979

Entered into force January 1, 1980

Agreement on implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Anti-Dumping).

Done at Geneva, April 12, 1979

Signed by Canada, December 17, 1979

Entered into force January 1, 1980

Agreement on the Interpretation and Application of Articles XVI and XXII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Subsidies/Countervail).

Done at Geneva, April 12, 1979

Signed by Canada, December 17, 1979

Entered into force January 1, 1980

Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft.

Done at Geneva, April 12, 1979

Signed by Canada, December 20, 1979

(subject to reservation)

Entered into force January 1, 1980

Reservation

"The Government of Canada reserves its position with regard to the obligations in Article 2 pending the completion of the domestic legislative procedures. The Government of Canada will, however, afford duty free treatment equivalent to that provided for in Article 2 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade as of January 1, 1980 and will promptly pursue completion of the necessary domestic legislative procedures. The reservation will be withdrawn when these procedures have been completed."

Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Customs Valuation).

Done at Geneva April 12, 1979

Accepted by signature by Canada December 17, 1979

(subject to reservation)

Entered into force January 1, 1980

Reservation

Notwithstanding Articles 24 and 25 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (hereinafter referred to as the Valuation Agreement), Canada will implement the Valuation Agreement no later than January 1, 1980, provided that before that date there has been implementation under Article XXVIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade on such matters as to maintain Canadian tariff rates as may be necessary to maintain tariff protection at the level which would prevail were Canada not to implement the Valuation Agreement.

Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures.

Done at Geneva April 12, 1979

Signed by Canada December 17, 1979

Entered into force January 1, 1980

International Sugar Agreement, 1979

Done at Geneva October 7, 1977

Canada's Instrument of Ratification

deposited December 30, 1977

Entered into force January 2, 1980

International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages

Done at New York, December 17, 1979

Signed by Canada February 18, 1980

role and increase its effectiveness are mainly in the realm of public information on disarmament and the decision-making process in government. An important step forward was taken in 1978 with the establishment of the External Affairs Department's Office of the Adviser on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs and the appointment of a Consultative Group of Experts interested in the field to advise the Office, comprised of both civilian and military experts and representatives of non-governmental organizations. But more is needed.

The Adviser on Disarmament to the Undersecretary has less authority and influence than did the first holder of the original position from 1960 to 1968 who was the Adviser to the Government. The original adviser had a staff, both in Ottawa and in Geneva, which included a Department of National Defence component. His recommendations could go to the highest level of Government without a veto exercised in advance either by DND or senior officials of DEA. In the United States, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is empowered by statute to report directly to the President, to the Secretary of State and to the Congress, with its recommendations, thus giving it independent status and authority and the assurance that its views will be considered at the highest level.

The recommendations of the Adviser on Disarmament can be over-ruled or modified by the Undersecretary, by the SSEA or by DND and never reach the Prime Minister, the Cabinet, the Members of Parliament or even the Standing Committee on External Affairs and Defence. They have no more weight than the routine recommendations of any senior official heading any office in DEA.

In the United States, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has the benefit of the advice of a General Advisory Committee consisting of distinguished members of the business, labour, academic and scientific communities who are appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. The appointment of the Group of Consultants by the Disarmament Adviser to advise his Office on certain specific aspects of disarmament such as research activities and the dissemination of information was a useful and welcome step. If the subject of disarmament, however, is as important as the Prime Minister stated to the UN Special Session on Disarmament, it would seem fitting that the Consultative Group should be given a broader mandate and should be empowered to make an annual report to the Standing Committee on External Affairs and Defence.

Another shortcoming of the new Office is its limited budget, which was fixed at \$100,000 for its first year of operation. As was stressed by the Group of Consultants at its first session, the funds allocated to the Office are simply not sufficient for it to discharge its task. In order to enable the Office to carry out its mandate in a really effective way, its budget would have to

be increased about tenfold to one million dollars, which is really a very small sum when viewed in the light of the budgets of other government departments and, in particular, the billions of dollars provided for the Department of National Defence. If the Canadian Government were to implement the proposal of the UN Secretary General, to devote to disarmament one-tenth of one percent of its military expenditures, the resulting sum would be more than four and one-half million dollars.

It is a regrettable fact that although Members of Parliament and their constituents are deeply interested in disarmament, as is indicated in many public opinion polls, very few of them do much about it. Both M.P.'s and the public are insufficiently informed about the complexities and intricacies of the problems of the arms race and of disarmament, and members of the public hesitate to communicate their views to the Government and to their Members of Parliament. The latter, who are in any case overworked, are also reluctant to embark into a difficult and largely unknown area and are not disposed to take any new initiatives or raise any issues that are not matters of active concern to their constituents.

What is needed is a much greater effort of information and education by the publication of information bulletins and periodicals and by encouraging and supporting programs of education at all levels — in the schools, high schools and universities. Of greater importance would be the funding of a number of chairs on peace and disarmament in universities to parallel the chairs on strategic studies funded by the Department of National Defence. The Government might also arrange to provide support for institutes engaged in peace and disarmament research on many of the problems of arms limitation, disarmament, and verification, including the conversion of military industries and production to peaceful civilian purposes, which would create many more jobs. The Office should also arrange to undertake studies and publish reports of the effect on disarmament, and on the Government's policy and the negotiations relating thereto, in all cases of the proposed acquisition of new military weapons and systems, as is now done in the United States by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Status

Finally, if the Consultative Group was given a more formal status, the authorization to make an annual report to the Standing Committee on External Affairs and Defence could provide more information and assistance to Members of Parliament and thus facilitate more extensive consideration and greater study in depth of the complex problems of defence and disarmament policies and their impact on both domestic and international affairs.

The above suggestions, both of substance and of procedure, for improving the decision-making process

and the Canadian role in disarmament are far from exhaustive. They represent only those regarded as most urgent and important. If Canada wishes to make a better and more effective contribution to the struggle for disarmament and peace and to promote and enhance the prospects for human survival and human welfare, their implementation would help to achieve those objectives.

There are other initiatives Canada can also take by herself or in cooperation with other states in various fields of both nuclear and conventional disarmament. (See my article in the March/April 1979 issue of *International Perspectives*.)

In my opinion, the area in which Canada can play the most useful role in the immediate future is the cut-off of production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. This proposal is important to help curb both vertical proliferation (the nuclear arms race of the nuclear powers) and horizontal proliferation (the spread of nuclear weapons to additional non-nuclear powers). Because of the indefinite deferment of the SALT negotiations and because the second review conference on the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) will take place in August of this year — and on present indications is likely to prove a disaster in the absence of a SALT Treaty and a comprehensive test ban — it is all the more important that new initiatives should be taken

and announced before or at the review conference.

Since Canada has already taken the lead in promoting the cut-off, other like-minded countries look to Canada to continue its leadership and to maintain it if possible, accelerate its momentum. There are a number of initiatives Canada can and should take to promote the cut-off. It can plan a series of statements on the cut-off at the Geneva Committee on Disarmament and encourage the half-a-dozen other members of the Committee who joined in co-sponsoring the Canadian resolution in the General Assembly to do likewise to press for early action. It can prepare a draft treaty on the cut-off, or a working paper outlining its ideas, the contents of a treaty for submission to the Committee and to the NPT Review Conference. It can propose a formal international study by experts of the problems involved in implementing the cut-off. And, finally, it can formally submit an item on the cut-off for inclusion in the agenda of the next session of the General Assembly, which would ensure that the subject receives greater attention and a more focussed discussion. Above all, it can take a leaf from Howard Green's book and not be deterred from taking such actions by a lack of enthusiasm or even reluctance of the two superpowers. The worst thing for Canada to do in the present circumstances if it is really serious about making progress, is to do nothing.

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Niceties and necessities— the case for diplomatic immunity

by L.C. Green

all the rules of customary international law, perhaps one of the oldest established and most universally recognized is that relating to diplomatic immunity. This goes back at least to ancient Greece when diplomats, originally the carriers of messages from one city to another, were regarded as being under the protection of the gods. Their immunity was so generally accepted that the diplomat who carried a declaration of war from one state to another was permitted to return to his own state even though the declaration had taken effect. In fact, this principle of immunity extending beyond the outbreak of hostilities, though it had not been written into any treaty, was observed right up to the outbreak of World War II, when it was breached in the case of Sir Lancelot Oliphant, British Ambassador to Belgium, who was caught and held by the invading Germans.

In the thirteenth century, Genghis Khan, for example, wreaked vengeance upon the Shah and sacked Tehran as retaliation for the seizure and murder of his envoys. Even during the period between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, (when ambassadors of one European country to another did not hesitate to bribe statesmen or conspire with opposition groups to overthrow rulers) the courts to which those ambassadors were accredited generally declared these unwelcome guests *personnae non gratae* and either expelled them or demanded their withdrawal.


Even though the ambiguity of Sir Henry Wotton's famous aphorism that "an ambassador is an honest man sent to lie abroad for the good of his country" was recognized, it was accepted that ambassadors had a twofold task. On the one hand, it was their duty to represent and further the policies of their own government at the court to which they were accredited, and this might well mean supporting an opposition. At the same time, they were required to report back to their own authorities on the policies of the country to which they were accredited, particularly on the extent to which these policies might affect the well-being of their nation, and this might well involve some measure of espionage, particularly in an effort to ascertain what alliances the host country might be entering which could have an adverse effect on the sending country's interests. Moreover, once countries started

sending military attachés as members of their diplomatic missions, there was tacit agreement that to some extent at least espionage had become acceptable.

If diplomats were to fulfil their functions adequately, it was essential that host countries should facilitate their activities and that the diplomats should be free to move about to the extent that their operations might so require. Moreover, it was recognized at a relatively early date in the European state system that diplomats constituted a united body, in the sense that threats against the freedom of movement of any of them tended to threaten the rights of all of them. At the same time, host governments were conscious of the need to accept this solidarity, for they were anxious to preserve for their own diplomats equal freedoms and equal concerted action. Perhaps one of the best examples of this is to be found in the background of the British Diplomatic Privileges Act of 1708, which was the basis of the law in Canada as well as in England for some two centuries or more.

Although it may be assumed that countries will endeavour to select their diplomats with care to ensure that they do not unnecessarily run the risk of expulsion, and this was probably true even then, at least insofar as their private activities were concerned, it sometimes happens that diplomats do in fact infringe the local laws and *mores*. This was true of Matueof, the Russian Ambassador at the Court of St. James. He had failed to meet the demands of his creditors, who had therefore employed collection agents who forcibly removed the ambassador from his sedan chair and applied pressure to him. The entire diplomatic corps presented a *démarche* protesting at this assault of their privileges, and demanded punishment of the offenders. The British authorities proposed a bill which would make acts directed against the dignity of diplomats criminal offences. The bill, however, was drafted in the normal parliamentary manner suggesting that the immunity was granted by the British parliament and that the offences were being created by English law.

Prof. Green teaches law at the University of Alberta. He is currently on leave and working for the Judge Advocate General.



The Ayatollah Khomeini's son, Ahman, confers with Iran's President Abolhassan Bani-Sadr (right) at a Tehran in early April. The crowd, estimated at 200,000, heard Ahman Khomeini deliver a message from his ailing father

The diplomatic protested that all the bill was doing was giving statutory effect to England's obligations under international law. The bill was withdrawn and the preamble redrafted to make this clear.

What happened in London at the beginning of the eighteenth century has been repeated countless times in the two hundred and fifty years since, with the entire diplomatic corps at a capital city presenting their protest and demanding reparation whenever they have felt that one of their number has been treated in a fashion inconsistent with the rights and privileges to which diplomats are entitled in accordance with international law.

Customary Law

Although there was general recognition that diplomats were entitled to fairly extensive rights and freedoms under international customary law, the International Law Commission of the United Nations, (in light of the appearance on the international state of a large number of new states which had not participated in the development of this law) considered it useful to codify the law in treaty form. This was done by drawing up two conventions, one dealing with diplomatic rights and privileges, and the other with the rights and privileges

of consuls. These Conventions were adopted at Vienna in 1961 and 1963 respectively. They provide for the immunity of diplomats from local jurisdiction of diplomats at all times while the rights of consuls are somewhat less extensive and are restricted generally to activities essential to the fulfilment of their tasks.

Diplomatic buildings and documents are to be respected and may not be seized, which would indicate that the evidence upon which the Canadian courts convicted Mr. Rose at the time of the Gubitchev scandal could probably not be used today. The host countries are obliged to ensure that their citizens fully recognize the immunities of diplomatic missions and personnel and they undertake to prosecute acts committed by their citizens which are directed against diplomatic missions. In addition, the host countries are to offer diplomats the security that is necessary for the fulfilment of their tasks and must provide them with adequate protection. It should be noted that this protection does not extend to permanent twenty-four hour guard, although it is known that a particular missions or members of a mission may be at risk, then the protection offered must be commensurate. This treaty has been accepted by many countries in the world although its contents, generally speaking, accord with the traditional rules of cus-

law and would therefore be binding anyway. The Convention has been ratified by Canada, as well as the United States and Iran, while the latter two in light of recent controversies, have accepted the Protocol conferring jurisdiction upon the International Court of Justice over any dispute relating to the interpretation and application of the Convention.

Abuse of Hostage-taking

In the last fifteen or twenty years terrorist groups, particularly in Latin America, have indulged in terrorist acts of a variety of kinds frequently directed against foreign diplomats. The purpose has been to secure the maximum of publicity, while at the same time hoping that the home state of the diplomat concerned would exert pressure upon the host state to secure the diplomat's freedom, even if this should mean that the host state would be compelled to surrender to all the demands presented to it by the terrorists. It is only rarely, as in the case of the 1970 kidnapping of James Earl Ray, that the ploy has failed and the diplomat's country has abstained from applying such pressure. Because of the number of such incidents, the United Nations in 1973 adopted a convention concerning acts of terrorism directed against internationally protected persons including diplomats. However, political idealism on the part of a number of third world countries led to the inclusion of an exception in favour of such acts perpetrated by national liberation movements in the name of self-determination. By this Convention, states are obliged to act in a strenuous fashion against those committing such acts, which are to be made punishable as grave offences under the local criminal code.

In November 1979, a group of militants seized the United States Embassy in Tehran and took a number of American diplomats captive. The hostages were held by the militants pending the return of the deposed Shah, who was then undergoing medical treatment in the United States, to stand trial for alleged atrocities. They also demanded an acknowledgement by the United States of its guilt in cooperating with and sustaining the Shah during the last twenty years of his rule. They further alleged that the diplomats in question were guilty of espionage and of interference in the internal affairs of Iran.

In the normal course of events one would have expected that the government of Iran, in accordance with its obligations under both customary and conventional international law, would have taken steps to deal with the problem and to secure the release of the hostages, even though there might have been some risk for the hostages if violent means of rescue were undertaken. Only a year earlier, the United States embassy in Kabul was occupied by Afghans and the Ambassador held prisoner. The Afghan authorities with the aid of Soviet advisers attacked the terrorists and although the ambassador was killed the United States government thanked both the Afghan and the Soviet authorities for

the efforts they had made. Nevertheless, in February 1980, the United States Senate issued a report highly critical of the Soviet role, and almost accused that country of murder.

In Tehran, far from acting against the terrorists, the government issued a variety of statements in their support and treated them as heroes of the revolution. In addition, three American diplomats who had been on business at the foreign ministry at the time of the seizure were detained at that ministry, with the foreign minister declaring that if they attempted to leave he would have them arrested and handed over to the militants in the embassy.

So far as is known, unlike previous events against diplomats, on this occasion the diplomatic corps did not make a joint *démarche* to the Iranian authorities, although it appears that individual ambassadors did attempt to intervene on behalf of their colleagues. When it became clear that the Iranian government had no intention of taking any steps to secure the freedom of the hostages, Kurt Waldheim, Secretary General of the United Nations, at the prompting of the United States, referred the matter to the Security Council. In due course, the council unanimously condemned the seizure, reminded the Iranian authorities of their duties under international law and called for the release of the hostages. The Secretary General was instructed to go to Tehran to negotiate the release of the hostages, but when he got there he seemed more willing to discuss Iranian complaints against the Shah and the United States, than to pursue his mandate. After visiting a cemetery alleged to contain victims of the Shah's secret police and making consolatory comments to survivors of alleged atrocities, he was prevented from seeing the hostages and returned to New York with his mission unaccomplished. Since Iran refused to obey the Security Council resolution, the United States asked the Council to apply sanctions, but this effort was frustrated by a Soviet veto.

Since it was clear that there was no possibility of effective action through the United Nations, the United States sought a judgment from the International Court of Justice. The claim was for a declaration that Iran was in breach of its obligations under the treaties, under customary law and under a bilateral treaty between the United States and Iran. It also wanted to order Iran to free the hostages, allow them to continue in their diplomatic function or leave Iran without risk, to punish those who had seized the embassy and to pay compensation to the United States. The mills of international justice grind exceedingly slowly and therefore the United States requested an interim judgment by way of provisional measures, calling for condemnation of the action and freedom for the hostages. By a unanimous judgment, without a single separate opinion, the court condemned Iran for its breaches of the law and called for the immediate release of the hostages. Iran had refused to appear before

the court contending that the seizure was part and parcel and a comparatively minor and unimportant part of a much wider problem, namely, the criminality of the Shah and the complicity of the United States.

Canadian caper

In February 1980, the world was surprised to learn that six United States diplomats, who had received asylum from the Canadian ambassador since the seizure of their own embassy, were able to leave Iran by using Canadian passports and carrying what were purported to be Iranian visas. It was only to be expected that this action would be condemned by the Iranian authorities and militants as a blatant breach of Iranian sovereignty, an unlawful intervention in its internal affairs and a complete abuse of diplomatic privileges and of the niceties of inter-state relations. What was perhaps not quite so understandable was the reaction of various Canadian do-gooders who used the same arguments and talked, moreover, of forged passports.

Insofar as Iran was concerned, the complaints were somewhat presumptuous in view of its own complete disregard of legal obligations and of diplomatic rights and immunities. As to the Canadian protesters, they can be dismissed as complainants ignorant of both Canadian and international law. It has always been recognized that an embassy is entitled to provide asylum for those who are in imminent danger, although this is not true if they are wanted to stand trial for ordinary criminal acts. Although there were accusations of espionage in the case of the diplomats, it had been made clear that the real reason for holding them was so that they could be used as hostages. In fact the allegations of criminal acts only followed the illegal seizure of the embassy. Moreover, as has been pointed out, diplomats are immune from local judicial processes.

As to the alleged intervention in Iranian affairs, it must be remembered that Iran was in breach of customary and treaty obligations concerning diplomats, was disregarding a unanimous resolution of the Security Council and ignoring an equally unanimous decision of the World Court. It must also be remembered that in both the Security Council's decision and the Court's judgment the votes were contributed by representatives of the free and the communist world, as well as the third world including Muslim states. This is a point of some significance, in view of the fact that the Ayatollah Khomeini, the titular head of Iran, was describing the confrontation with the United States as one between Islam and the infidel. Since there was such a blatant disregard of all its obligations by Iran, and a refusal to recognize the rights of diplomats and to assist those who were in danger from the mob, it was open to any other diplomat, regardless of his nationality, to take such action as he saw fit to enable those diplomats to enjoy the freedom to which they were entitled.

Regarding the allegation that the passports forged, it must be borne in mind that passports within the discretion of a government as limited by its own legislation. If the national authorities are prepared to issue a passport, (which only serves as a means to other countries that the issuing authority is extending protection to the holder intimates that the holder will be admitted by the issuing country if expelled within the competence of that authority to issue passports to whom it pleases, and it is by no means common for countries to issue passports to stateless persons or refugees. In fact, when this is done, the people who condemned the Canadian action tend to be among the first to congratulate Canada for taking action on behalf of those refugees - so long as they do not open to agree with the political colouration of the issues in question, or disagree with the policy of the country from which they have fled.

As to Iranian visas, there is no obligation on Canada to ensure that the Iranian emigration authorities are able to distinguish between an authentic and an imitation visa. If it had been considered that, for example, a Chinese laundry ticket had served the same purpose, it would have been open to the Canadian ambassador to obtain such tickets. If the document in question was in fact a forged visa, all that needs to be pointed out is that since Iran was unwilling to fulfil its obligations and issue the correct documents, it was open to any other diplomat to issue or secure whatever other document was necessary to achieve the same purpose.

After this escape had been effected, the Iranian foreign minister, Sadegh Ghotbzadeh, stated that the Canadian ambassador had informed him of the presence of the fugitives, he would have arranged for their care and safety. He overlooked his own statements with regard to the treatment that he would mete out to the three Americans confined in his ministry if they had left that establishment.

Despite the continuation of the incident, the United States still hesitated to take any action of a punitive or a salvage character. Not even the seizure of embassies in Latin American countries seems to have brought the American authorities into realization that their own acquiescence in the action of the militants perhaps acting as a stimulus to terrorists elsewhere. However, Dr. Waldheim announced that he was sending a commission of inquiry to Tehran. It would appear that this decision was made solely on his own initiative and within his own analysis of his competence, and there has been no resolution of any United Nations body to authorise such a mission. Those who believe in the necessity of upholding the rule of law, particularly on the international state, were prepared to accept such a means of negotiating the freedom of the hostages. However, the Secretary General's commission has attempted to secure this end. Instead it has confined itself to examining allegations of atrocities by the

issuing lengthy statements condemning his rule before finishing their task.

The Iranian authorities have shown an inability to work with their own militants who refused to cooperate with the mission or allow them to see, let alone free, the hostages. Even while the mission was mouthed in the name of the Iranian people, the Ayatollah announced that the hostages would not be freed until a decision had been made by an Iranian parliament which had not yet been elected. At the time of writing it was unlikely that this terrorist imprisonment would terminate before mid-April. At the same time, the Iranian Revolutionary Council indicated that the militants had agreed to hand the hostages over to the care of the Council, which itself announced that this would not in any way hasten their freedom which would still be delayed for parliamentary sanction. For the representatives of the Council to hold the hostages merely to aggravate the situation, increase the involvement of the Iranian authorities and compound its breaches of international law.

No obligation

In such circumstances, there can be no obligation upon the United States or any other country to observe the diplomatic niceties insofar as Iran is concerned. Necessity has often been regarded as a ground for disregarding international obligations which are proving excessively burdensome. In this instance, the safety of the diplomats and the need to uphold the principles of international law would justify any action taken against Iran in an attempt to terminate this unlawful seizure. To surrender in any way to the demands of the terrorists, or even to effect a compromise, means to encourage further incidents of like character. Therefore for the U.S. to take whatever action it may consider necessary to uphold the rule of law — even at the risk of the loss of the hostages — is something which the world should support.

The continuance of the Tehran incident, with the apparent immunity of the terrorists and government involved from any punitive action, can only serve as a precedent for similar action elsewhere. The most serious such incident has been the invasion in March, 1980 of the Dominican embassy in Bogota, Columbia, with the seizure of some twelve or more ambassadors and a further twenty or so diplomatic personnel. The terrorists in this case are not receiving governmental support as they are in Tehran. Instead they are enemies of the government. They announced that they were prepared to release their hostages in return for \$50 million, the release of more than 300 'political' prisoners, safe conduct out of Columbia and the publication of their revolutionary manifesto in the newspapers of all the countries whose ambassadors are involved. It makes little difference whether one agrees with the sentiments of such revolutionaries, or whether one regards the government against which they are acting as brutal and autocratic. The principle involved is exactly

the same. The rights and privileges that belong to the country or countries affected by such terrorist action must be maintained at all costs.

Diplomats from foreign countries must be treated in accordance with international law. They are above or outside the local political struggles and are entitled to the protection and rights that international law has conferred upon them. Columbia should do all in its power to effect their rescue. At first sight, this may mean delay, procrastination and compromise to secure their liberty. It may also mean a frontal assault (even though the hostages' deaths could result) as took place in Kabul or in Guatemala. After all, the diplomatic profession is rapidly becoming the highest-risk occupation in the world, and those following it are aware of this. Further, no government can be expected even by its friends and allies to present revolutionaries with immense sums of money with which to buy arms to seek its own overthrow. Nor can a government be expected to release prisoners which it holds for treason or violent crime, even though those offences have been committed in the name of a political ideology, and even though Amnesty International is prepared to describe them as political prisoners. Apart from all this, the recent history of terrorism, going back to the earliest aerial hijackings, indicates that surrender to the demands of terrorists only leads to an intensification of such demands when later incidents occur.

From the point of view of humanity one may be tempted to agree with the Austrian Ambassador in Bogota (freed by the Columbian terrorists on the strange, but very sound propaganda ground that his wife was sick and her illness was being aggravated by his capture) stated that any rescue attempt would result in a massacre of all the hostages involved. It is less easy to sympathize with the comments of the United States representatives who have expressed satisfaction with everything being done by the Colombian government on behalf of the hostages, for nothing of any consequence has been done initially by that government. However, if one looks at the situation as it affects the security of the Colombian government, as it affects the rule of law, as it affects the question of bowing to terrorist blackmail, and as it affects the future of the entire diplomatic function, the scenario changes. If there is to be any upholding of the rule of law, it is essential that those who may be tempted to simulate their confrères in Tehran or Bogota be warned in advance that any such operation will prove fruitless and that there will never again be humiliation of a great power and of the United Nations like we have seen in Tehran. Instead, it is essential that the country subjected to this type of terrorist blackmail be supported in its efforts to crush the offenders, even though it may mean the loss of the victims. Terrorism has declared war on the World. In war, the innocents frequently suffer with the aggressors. In such circumstances, niceties disappear in the face of necessities.

Negotiation as art and science

by Gilbert R. Winham

Negotiation is normally thought of as a procedure for resolving conflict. It is an important procedure in international relations because conflicts are frequent and because negotiation is usually preferable to the other means of resolving conflict: namely, ignoring the conflict or "resolving" it through hostilities. As a conflict resolution procedure, the practice of negotiation is fairly straightforward. Parties to a dispute agree to put their positions forward to the other (this itself is a result of considerable accommodation), and they begin to discuss alternative means for resolving the difference. The process often involves a movement towards a compromise position through step-by-step concessions. Parties are encouraged to think about their positions in terms of what they desire and what they will settle for, and they attempt to move their adversary as close as possible to their desired outcome. Negotiation in this model can be conceptualized in terms of a continuum, and agreement is a result of a convergence process whereby parties move from opposite ends of the continuum to a settlement somewhere in the middle range.

However valid this model may be for some negotiations, it does not adequately describe many of the large-scale and complex negotiations that are increasingly occupying the efforts of foreign offices. Nations are negotiating more and more today, but it is less and less to resolve conflicts. Nations negotiate today principally to manage interdependence. They behave much like large corporations in an oligopolistic market; that is, they seek to create a negotiated environment which will produce more benign, predictable and orderly results than might have occurred otherwise. Modern negotiation can be seen as a mechanism of control, and it amounts to an extension of national policy making. The process itself tends to be more exploratory than conflictual, even though conflict is inherent in the interaction. Furthermore, such negotiation is extraordinarily complex. Parties are often required to manage large amounts of information, and they must respond to a bewildering array of diverse interests. Negotiation in this model is more a matter of puzzle solving than of convergence on a continuum, and the trick is for parties to find a solution that will accommodate their overlapping and conflicting interests.

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The negotiations which the description fits would include multilateral conferences like the Law of the Sea Conference, the Tokyo Round or the MBFR talks. It would also include bilateral talks like the SALT negotiations, the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement and the Canada-U.S. fisheries and boundary negotiations. The purpose of such negotiations is to build structures that reconcile the policies and interests of the participating nations. Such negotiations are a complex and bureaucratized process, performed by bureaucrats who are motivated to secure their nations' interests as well as their own interests within their national governments.

Two Fronts

Most international negotiations are conducted on two fronts: external and internal. The external negotiation is where nations seek the best deal they can get from other nations, but it is usually in the internal negotiation within government where the important decisions about change and accommodation are made. Internal negotiation is especially important at the beginning and end of a negotiation; that is, when nations draw their opening positions, and when they decide to accept or reject a settlement. The greater struggles usually occur in the internal negotiation, and often negotiations in the external negotiation are prepared to delimit more in the way of a negotiated agreement than would be acceptable to their own governments.

Negotiations are usually characterized as a competitive exercise, where people struggle to persuade representatives of other nations to accept their points of view. However, from a more distant perspective, they can equally well be portrayed as a cooperative endeavour where participants in a single decision-making unit struggle to find a single proposition which will win approval from their respective governments. How well participants do this depends on how well the external negotiations can generate solutions that will carry the day within respective governments. The test of the external negotiation is thus a performance test, assuming that the positions of national governments are not *prima facie* irreconcilable. The task of negotiators is to create a process that will expand the decision-making capacity of the external negotiation.

Good negotiation requires organization and bureaucratic leadership much more than it requires competitive strategizing or one-upmanship. To be successful, negotiators and their political superiors should

First, define the goals they seek in the negotiation and mobilize support for those goals. Second, negotiators should create a team that can handle large amounts of information and can generate the additional information that is needed by the negotiating process. Third, negotiators should create a task-oriented working relationship between contending parties to conduct the negotiation itself. Modern negotiation is a complicated and intensely creative process, it is not an arbitration procedure where different national positions are resolved by splitting them down the middle. Negotiators should know how to structure what they want, to define new relationships and in effect to create international *legislation* to handle issues that cannot be dealt with adequately by unilateral national policy processes.

Negotiation today is policy making by another name. The processes of negotiation are not that much different from the processes of policy making either in government bureaucracies or in large corporations. However, negotiation is more difficult than domestic policy making because the relevant actors come from very different backgrounds, and they represent nations that have occasionally worked out very different procedures for handling similar problems. These differences must be overcome if a negotiation is to be successful.

Negotiating skills

It is common to describe negotiation as a process of psychological manipulation. Indeed, President Anwar Sadat has reinforced this viewpoint by once describing the Middle East negotiations as "70 percent psychological." However, the Middle East negotiations are probably unrepresentative of most of the international negotiation conducted today. Most international negotiation, especially where it involves economic or structural matters, is more a business than a sensitivity session. The individuals who negotiate in multilateral forums are usually bureaucrats and they describe each other as professionals, which means they pay more attention to the facts of the situation than to the personalities involved. In these circumstances, psychological manipulation is simply not as important as other things. People tend to value those things that make the greatest impact in a situation; consequently, the highest praise a negotiator can earn from his or her colleagues would have to do with good managerial skills or technical expertise, and not with trickery or cunning. It would seem times have changed since Meternich.

Organization skills are likely to be crucial in most contemporary international negotiation. Many of the requirements of sound organization are self-evident to government bureaucrats, although they are easier to theorize about than to practise. One organizational skill in international negotiation that is perhaps less obvious is information handling, which is important because of the complexity of most international negoti-

ations. Intellectually, information handling is a matter of achieving a perceptual organization of the subject matter of a negotiation. The initial stages of most negotiations are confusing, and some clarity is needed if action is to be taken. Clarity can often be achieved through the establishment of agendas, or trade-offs, or sets of principles that will guide the negotiations. Such principles occasionally evolve into a bargaining language which helps the parties to exchange subsequent proposals. For example, in the area of trade negotiations, where nations have a long continuous experience in negotiation, the notion of formulas and bargaining language (e.g., the concept of reciprocity) have long been accepted. Such principles can also provide useful building blocks in other negotiations, even where the data may be less easy to aggregate than in international trade.

Information handling also has a managerial component. Mainly, this entails creating a data-making process that will facilitate decision making. Information in a negotiation must be gathered, collated and organized before action can be taken. Carrying out such a task is usually difficult in its own right, but it is all the more difficult because information processing usually involves matters of definition about which parties to a conference will often feel strongly. Generating a data base helps to structure a negotiation by cataloguing the relevant information and by establishing priorities or hierarchy in the information. An example, again from the trade field, is the establishment of inventories of non-tariff barriers (NTB's), which have been created to support the Tokyo Round trade negotiations. One of the real difficulties of negotiating NTB's in the past has been that the sheer variety and number of these trade restrictions have discouraged attempts to eliminate or reduce them. With the NTB inventories, trading nations now have a better understanding of the overall levels of protection, and hence are better able to reduce their barriers with greater assurance that they will receive reciprocal benefit.

Another managerial component of information handling entails the conduct of the negotiation itself. The negotiation of complex issues is a trial-and-error procedure, and negotiators tend to react to proposals, rather than to calculate where the process is taking them. The process itself, essentially that of debate, tends to outline the boundaries of an acceptable agreement which can sometimes be quite different from the original intention of the parties. It is usually helpful to get proposals on the table as soon as possible. This aspect is somewhat different from the conflict resolution model of negotiation, where negotiators will often decline to make specific proposals until a thorough discussion of the issues has been completed.

Once the proposals are out on the table, negotiators must be prepared to evaluate quickly and communicate effectively to their government the effects of position changes on the whole package. Negotiations

often involve a large number of relationships, and consequently a position change on one issue can have enormous impact elsewhere in the negotiation. Since positions can change rapidly, negotiators should have an implicit flow chart of information that keeps track of the main relationships in the data being handled. This capacity improves the efficiency of the negotiation, which increases the opportunity for negotiators to maintain the confidence of their political superiors at home.

Efficiency is an important factor in modern negotiation. It has not been a commonplace concern in negotiation theory, perhaps because negotiation is usually thought of as a dispute settlement process, and one tends to assume the process is a slow one. However, as negotiations are increasingly used to manage international problems, efficiency will become more valued, simply because inefficiency will create an intolerable

opportunity cost in terms of failed initiatives. In a world when citizens are continually scrutinizing governments for new examples of bureaucratic mismanagement, it is unlikely that they will long be tolerant of mismanagement at the international level.

Efficiency in a negotiation entails two criteria: behaviour that *creates* a smooth flow of substance over time and behaviour that *avoids* obvious time-wasting activities. Negotiations often bog down not because the parties have irreconcilable interests, but because they do not understand each other, or are talking past each other. When this occurs, negotiators should seek common definitions or perspectives that transcend existing mind sets, a task that is obviously easier to spell out in advance than it is to put into practice in the midst of a difficult negotiation. Another suggestion to help create efficiency is for negotiators to be especially aware of the need to maintain timely and effective communication.

The message from Willy Brandt— Peace, Justice and Jobs

by James H. Adams and Bernard Wood

The foreign policy shadow-boxing of the 1980 Canadian Federal election campaign came nowhere close to the full debate the country badly needs. The 'Canadian Caper', the Olympic boycott question and new East-West sabre-rattling are undoubtedly all significant, but the exchanges on the hustings failed to clarify international issues which have never been closer to the bread-and-butter concerns of Canadians than they are today.

Foreign policy discussion should not fade with the din of the election campaign. As an experienced Government and newly-experienced Official Opposition gird themselves for the 1980s, a major international report released in April should set the tone for sober discussion of Canada's place in the world. Former West German Chancellor Willy Brandt and twenty colleagues from around the world have attempted to cut

through the mystifying jargon and double-talk of major global problems, and they may just have succeeded. A lion's share of these problems relate to international development, or North-South, questions. These questions have inspired a plethora of international bureaucracies, conferences, programs and statements of official goodwill, but have yet to foster the elusive 'political will' which might lead to effective action and change. The heralded 'North-South dialogue', the seventies product of a union between the new muscle of the OPEC cartel and the long-standing demands of the world's poor majority, has bogged down.

Attack on Poverty

Two years ago, at the suggestion of the World Bank's Robert McNamara, Brandt agreed to chair the Commission on International Development Issues, which was to comprise prominent political business, labour and other leaders representing East and West, North and South. Its mandate was to study "the global issues arising from the economic and social disparities of the world community," and from their

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between negotiating teams and their governments. Good communication flow between decision centres is a crucial variable in the performance of any system, yet it is easily overlooked by harassed negotiators involved in drafting complex agreements.

Negotiators should also seek to avoid inefficiency, as well as trying to create efficiency in the negotiation process. A common source of inefficiency in negotiation is lengthy debate over trivial issues. This problem cannot be avoided entirely, because negotiations are frustrating and frustrated people often engage in arguments they later wish had never occurred. Also, it is characteristic of the negotiation process to generate long arguments about unimportant issues, and this can even be useful behaviour since the barriers to agreement are sometimes emotional and not intellectual and can take some time to resolve. However, long unproductive discussions can create an obvious threat

to the negotiation when there is an effective deadline. To avoid these, negotiators should be detached from the personalities and substance of the situation. Generally, it is detachment that helps a negotiator to retain the judgment needed to avoid unproductive or trivial deadends.

In the last analysis, an efficient process is one that is both creative and yet organized. If either element is lacking, it is doubtful whether a complicated or difficult negotiation can ever be concluded successfully. Both factors are ultimately a function of organizational leadership, where leadership means the ability to encourage sufficient decentralization to achieve creativity, and sufficient centralization to achieve control. Good leadership (the corollary of which is sound, intelligent and imaginative followership) is a necessary attribute for all national delegations if a negotiation is to be concluded successfully.

suggest means of resolving development problems and attacking the absolute poverty which today afflicts 800 million people in the Third World.

The Brandt Commission's recently released report, entitled *North-South: A Program for Survival*, has the potential, in its poignancy, clarity and analysis, to shake the public and their political leaders into an awareness of the contemporary crisis and of the need for action before it is too late. The sense of the acuteness and immediacy of the crisis and of the dangerous inadequacy of lethargic or defensive responses permeates every one of the report's 304 pages.

One might legitimately ask why this report is likely to be any more convincing or successful in stimulating change than the various other recent pleas for reform: in many ways the underlying message has changed little since the work of the Pearson Commission which appeared over ten years ago. Certainly the eminence and the practical political background of the commissioners, e.g., former political leaders like Brandt himself, Eduardo Frei of Chile, Olof Palme of Sweden, Britain's Edward Heath, or other prominent

figures such as Guyana's Shridath Ramphal and Canadian labour leader Joe Morris, lends extra weight to the recommendations, but does it make them any less visionary and impracticable?

The answer is yes, because the report's call for immediate action is not founded only or primarily on moral argument or on the need to forestall the imminent upheaval of the world's underprivileged. In fact the thrust of its plea is based on the cold and concrete analysis of a global economic system which has become so inter-linked and interdependent that all stand to lose, and lose badly, unless it is made to work better.

The North and the South are inextricably intertwined: that the industrialized countries rely increasingly on Third World resources is apparent, but how aware are we of the fact that Third World markets play a critical role in Northern export efforts? These countries consume on average 20 percent of the North's exports, and are the fundamental reason why hundreds of thousands of Northern workers have not lost their jobs in the current recession. The South has offered a major growth area for transnational firms

whose assets there exceed \$80 billion. Northern commercial banks, flushed with liquidity, have found in the developing countries a major credit outlet: the banks' books today show approximately \$150 billion in outstanding loans to the Third World.

But these items are obviously one-sided. What is the South's stake in this interdependence, and how do ties with the industrialized world serve developing countries' needs? Again, trade is paramount. The South is still greatly dependent on commodity exports to Northern markets, and, increasingly, on the export of manufactured goods to the industrialized world. Further, the North possesses much of the technology and managerial and marketing know-how which are essential to mobilize development in many Third World countries.

Shared Interests

Apart from these ties, the North and the South also have shared interests in the control of global inflation, the revamping of the international financial system, the provision of food security, the protection of the environment, the exploitation of the oceans and, as always, in the control of the arms race. "All of these," as Brandt put it in an introduction, "create problems which affect peace and will grow more serious in the absence of a global vision." It is painfully obvious to the Commission that this vision is now widely lacking. Political myopia is exemplified in the inordinate bickering on "new international economic order" proposals; and, more ominously, in the rise of protectionism against Third World exports, timed (with bitter irony) to coincide with shrinking aid budgets.

What then does the Commission propose? There are four basic components to the package, some new and some which parallel others found elsewhere, but all expressed with unique simplicity and conviction. First, trade: the stabilization of international commodity markets is absolutely essential to the development efforts of Third World exporters (and to assure future supplies for Northern consumers). The shortsightedness of rising protectionism—much of it against Third World products—is attacked head-on: "there can be no doubt that such a defensive reaction will be disastrous as it was in the years before the Second World War." All the strengths of a socialist politician who presided over the world's most robust and adaptable free-market economy show through in Brandt's own statement on this challenge: "Protectionism certainly leads in the wrong direction for it helps to maintain—at considerable cost—structures that are becoming obsolete. . . . To avoid too sudden changes, which create abrupt frictions and severe social setbacks, new rules on adjustment must be mutually accepted. . . . The inter-relationship between exports and imports will become much stronger than people are aware of. Only if the North provides better access to its own markets can it expect to export more."

Second, the international institutional framework must be reshaped to accommodate the growth of interdependence and the needs of the South. The World Bank and other development banks must give borrowers more say in policy and management, and the lending power should be doubled. The International Monetary Fund's Special Drawing Rights would be reinforced as the basis for a reformed monetary system. Consideration should be given to the creation of a new financial institution—the World Development Fund—which would provide program lending and channel resources raised from proposed levies on world trade, travel and on ocean mining. Other elements of the renewed framework would include membership of Communist countries and the establishment of codes of behaviour for transnational enterprises.

Increase in Aid

Third, transfers of resources to the South must be dramatically increased and made automatic. The Commission urges an increase in aid of \$30 billion a year by 1985, the focus of which is to be the poverty belts of Africa and Asia and other least developed countries. Definite timetables should be set for countries to meet the .7% of GNP aid target, and moves must be taken to render the transfer of development assistance resources more immune to the "vagaries of legislatures."

Finally, disarmament: the world spends close to \$450 billion annually on armaments, i.e., over twenty times the global aid budget. The report remarks curtly that, "more arms do not make mankind safer, or poorer," and recommends that the "public must be made more aware of the terrible danger to world stability caused by the arms race, of the burden it imposes on national economics, and of the resources it diverts from peaceful development." Suffice it to say that the cost of one jet fighter—\$20 million—could set up 40,000 village pharmacies or 20,000 classrooms for 600,000 children.

Both the Liberal and Progressive Conservative Governments which held office in 1979 recognized the need for basic review of international development strategies for a new decade. Willy Brandt's urgent agenda shows that the record of the past, however complex, can be assessed intelligibly and that prescriptions must mesh a broad global vision and hard national realities. It is clear that Canadian aid dollars, while desperately needed, are only one part of the picture.

Canada's international development strategy must be discussed as a piece in conjunction with domestic industrial strategies, and with trade policy, inflation control, defence spending and many other national issues. Most importantly, they must be discussed in vigorous, informed parliamentary and public debate. As Brandt demonstrates, the shaping of foreign policy in the 1980s will test the basic values and the vital interests of all Canadians and is far too important to be left to governments and experts alone.

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
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
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International Perspectives is published in Canada six times a year by International Perspectives, (95312 Canada Inc.), 302-150 Wellington St., Ottawa, K1P 5A4. Telephone: (613) 238-2628

Second Class Mail Registration Number 4929.

Editor and Publisher:

Alex Inglis

Editorial Assistant:

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Subscription Rates:

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ISSN 0381-4874

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In the centre Information Supplement:
For the Record: reference material on Canadian foreign relations presented by the Department of External Affairs.

Letters to the Editor

Human Rights

Censorship Charged

Sir,

At first glance, I was pleased to see my letter in print in your January/February 1980 issue if only to become, seconds later, genuinely disappointed by your exercise of excessive editorial liberty. Namely, you omitted the entire penultimate paragraph of my letter without any indication of having done so. In consequence, the point of my contention was completely lost. Your elliptical treatment of the text thus effectively prevented the readers from being reminded of a Canadian *cas macabre* somewhat comparable to Soviet handling of politically dissident scientists. The expurgated paragraph was written in lieu of an illustration for the tentative conclusion expressed through: "Are we any better than the Soviets? Only in degree, perhaps."

Please restore my faith in your respect for your readers' opinions by publishing the lines that you deemed not fit to print. The censored passage ran as follows:

"University professors perhaps may be safer than the government scientists but when one looks at the case of Leopold Infeld it does not appear to be so. Infeld, a Polish Jew, came to work with Albert Einstein in Princeton in 1936. After working with Einstein for two years he immigrated to Canada to accept a teaching position at the University of Toronto and became a Canadian citizen later. He was one of the original signers of the Einstein-Russell manifesto which led to the Pugwash Movement on Science and Public Affairs. He went back to his native Po-

land in 1950 (see *Why I left Canada* published by McGill-Queen's University Press 1978).

"I cannot sit in judgment about his case because I may not have all the facts. However, it depresses me and sometimes frightens me to think how in peace time, many years after the war, Canadian government of that time deprived his Canadian born children of their Canadian citizenship with a special Order-in-Council for the 'sins' of their father. The treatment of Canadians of Japanese origin during the Second World War was one thing but treatment as given to Infeld children during peace time is, in my opinion, inexcusable."

Gulshan R. Saini
Fredericton, N.B.

Editor's note: We plead 'not guilty' to Mr. Saini's charge of censorship. Having devoted three pages of the January/February issue to Letters to the Editor, space limitations prevented us from printing all the material available. It was our editorial judgment that the paragraph in question could be omitted without loss to the opinion which Mr. Saini was expressing. We may have erred in that judgment. Indeed, the last paragraph of the following letter suggests that we did. If so, we apologize to both writers and to our readers. We do still, however, reserve the right to accept or reject material for publication and to edit it to fit the space available. Readers may be assured that such editorial decisions will never be made with a view to censoring or suppressing the free expression of opinions.

Sir,

In your January/February issue, which reached me with delay, you published a letter by G.R. Saini on Human Rights.

One is, frankly, astonished to read there that "we already have a UN Commissioner on Human Rights. I wish we did, but anyone interested in the field must know that this proposal, dragging on for many years, and strongly opposed by the Communist governments, has not materialized yet. Later, Saini advocates, rather naively, "UN system comparable to the European Commission of Human Rights at Strasbourg." How can one have hope for such a solution in the heterogeneous context of the UN? Communist delegations, voting in 1966, in favour of the two International Covenants on Human Rights, abstained in the vote on the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. And none of them had a dream of ratifying that Protocol, however limited it may be.

Finally, while recognizing the shortcomings in the field of human rights in one's own country (or, in that matter, in the United States, zeroed in on in an article by Mr. Athazar in your May/June/July/August 1979 issue), one should not go to the extreme of denying oneself the right to criticize much worse systematic excesses in certain other countries. President Theodore Roosevelt's message to Congress in 1907 in connection with pogroms of Jews in Russia and of Armenians in Turkey comes to mind: "We have plenty of sins of our own to war against and under ordinary circumstances we can do more for the general uplifting of humanity by striving with heart and soul to put a stop to civic corruption, to brutal lawlessness and violent race prejudices at home than by passing resolut-

this region remained mostly isolated from Western influence for some centuries. Decades have passed since the exposure of the Middle East to the West's influence, yet the gap between these two cultures has remained wide open. The most recent tensions in the Middle East are evidence of the unmanageable gap between these two seemingly opposed systems. Neither one of the two systems, nor a poor mixture of both, would be viable in the long-run in the Middle East. A simple mixture of both fails because it lacks the spirit and faith of both Middle Eastern culture and the West.

The Islam-oriented Middle Eastern culture which remained almost intact despite Western influence for some centuries, was a complete socio-economic system. As in any system, parts of the organs more or less functioned in harmony; education was fit to employment, as was agriculture to the environment, the status of women to man's responsibilities and so on.

The impact of the West eventually undermined this system by replacing some of its parts with new ones from the West. For example, parts of the old system (such as Islamic criminal law) were now forced to work with newly grafted-on parts (such as judicial procedures) in the same system. The consequence was the malfunctioning of the system. Moreover, due to the rather sudden impact of the West upon Islamic culture, the friction today between new and old in the system is particularly severe in the Middle East.

There could be a political or socio-economic system which would be both modern and Islamic, or at least consistent with the essential teaching of Islam. Such a system should fill the gap now existing between western ways of modern life and traditional Middle Eastern ways. Historical precedent in this region indicates that any attempt that emphasizes either modernization or Islamic culture fails if it denies the other.

A new and dynamic creed will be required to really bridge the gap.

I can envisage an Islamic approach which, while encouraging the adoption of technology and science from the West, uses it to serve all without discrimination. It would at the same time reject the amoral, materialistic aspects of the Western culture which degrades man's dignity and converts him to a machine.

Obviously, the Middle East needs technology but not at the expense of its cultural existence. The oil rich Middle East can have technology through trade but not aid. It requires no sacrifice from the West. If the Western world is willing to do something more than trade with the Middle East, it should do anything possible to preserve its cultural entity. This kind of cooperation requires the West to be benevolent. In the long run, it is to the benefit of the West and the whole world to have a modern, but culturally unchanged, Middle East.

There is also a general feeling among the masses of the Middle East that the Western world, while keeping close relations with autocratic regimes in this region, showed no sympathy for the oppressed people living under these regimes. These regimes are gradually being replaced by more or less popular and democratic ones. Therefore close ties with the common people will be a good base to start from to establish warmer relations with governments in this region.

A great need for faith in moral values and spirituality in the West on one hand and a demand for technology in the Middle East on the other could be assumed as a potential source of new ties and warm relations between the two cultures. It is not technology which can save the world from catastrophe but some spiritual forces such as faith, morality and love. This solution is neither in the hands of the West nor the Middle East. Both cultures may contribute to a synthesis and to finding a way out of the predicament of mankind.

Laghaollah Fanaian

Ottawa, Ontario

Military Power

Sir,

Today one hears much of the alleged weakness of U.S. military power in the Indian Ocean, said (by most pretenders to the American Presidency, among others) to have contributed to, if not actually precipitated, the double blow to Western interests brought about by the crises in Iran and Afghanistan. The call reverberates throughout the West for a vastly increased future presence to deter both Soviet expansionism and challenges mounted by the local states of the area.

The stark truth is that many times the amount of military force currently available in the vicinity (and certainly the rather marginal increments which are or would have been politically or economically feasible) would have done nothing to prevent the events in question from occurring. Indeed, future increases in force-levels may only fuel the tension, both regional and super-power, which tends to spawn incidents of this kind.

The "lesson" of Afghanistan, on the other hand, is that one super-power cannot possibly prevent the military expansion of another into an area previously conceded to be in the latter's sphere of interest, and in which geographical contiguity confers a practically insurmountable local military superiority. In terms of one super-power deterring another, what counts most is the strength

of one's stated commitment, together with the calculus of relative interests directly at stake. In Afghanistan the former was largely absent from the Western side, while the latter suggested a much greater Soviet determination to persevere with its policies, regardless of cost.

Too often during the current crises, the sheer amount of raw military power available to the United States in the northwestern quadrant of the Indian Ocean has been slighted or seriously underestimated. The West has always held a superior position in the area's maritime balance, the largest standing naval force traditionally belonging to France, rather than the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, American naval circles, alarmed by the initial intrusion of their Soviet counterparts just over a decade ago, have ever since been agitating for the creation of a full-fledged "Indian Ocean Fleet". The fall of the Iranian "regional policeman" together with the Soviet aggression in Afghanistan, have presented these interests with a marvellous opportunity to push forward their plans for regional military expansion.

Yet the creation of such a fleet will not prevent future Irans or Afghanistans; nor would it have solved the problems currently faced. The very presence off Iran of such vast naval forces—emasculated as they are by political constraints—probably only adds to

the sense of humiliation and very real damage being done to American prestige world-wide as a result of the patent inability of the U.S. to bring about a swift, peaceful resolution of the hostilities. The fleet's presence off the coast symbolizes, in a most dramatic and concrete way, the impotence of a militarily-supreme super-power in the face of political terrorism attempted by a Third World nation.

Militarily the consequences have been far-reaching, significantly altering the regional balance of power in Moscow's favour. To do so solely, or even primarily, on the pretext of tempting to match Soviet power, the introduction of outside military forces, however, would be a shortsighted and foolish, not to say impossible. Realistically, the West is faced with two choices. It could fully acknowledge the newly consolidated Soviet sphere of interest and do its best to contain it, by bolstering indigenous anti-Soviet regimes and groups throughout the region, pursuing a more active policy which could lend concrete assistance to Afghan rebels, hoping to create a Soviet 'Vietnam'. Whichever of these paths is chosen, however, it is clear that reliance will have to be placed mainly on the will and determination of indigenous populations to resist further Soviet advances.

Thus, the recent events in Iran and Afghanistan demonstrate the need for a dramatically increased Western military presence in distant areas of the globe, if they do the obvious limited utility of direct military force in many Third World contingencies. One would well to heed the warnings of many regional governments—including several key Western allies—against raising outside military involvement to a point where super-power rivalry becomes the dominant factor and the local states—regardless of their political orientation—threatened equally by both sides.

Ron Purver,
Kingston, Ontario

Update...

— Copies of the report discussed in W.A. Wilson's article beginning on page 11 can be obtained from the Domestic Information Programs Division of the Department of External Affairs.

— At press time, the last round of U.S. primaries were completed. Both Carter and Reagan have won enough support to ensure a first ballot victory at their conventions.

— President Carter has ordered a halt to the shuttle of refugees from Cuba to Florida. The vessels defying the order are being impounded and their captains arrested.

— The Iranian government has sponsored a conference on the 'Crimes of America'.

Neo-conservatism sets tone for U.S. presidential election

by Robin Ranger

The 1980 U.S. Presidential election is unlike any since 1944. It is dominated by foreign policy issues, notably the Iranian and Afghanistan crises, but this is nothing new. What is new is that the two U.S. political parties, and their candidates, are offering the electorate a real choice between two quite different foreign policies. To borrow Barry Goldwater's phrase from 1964, "It is a choice, not an echo."

The Democratic Party's expected nominee, President Jimmy Carter, would continue his liberal foreign policy, tempered by the more conservative elements introduced by these crises and by the growing neo-conservative mood in the U.S. This has already forced him to begin the re-arming of America, albeit on a very limited scale.

The Republican Party's likely challenger, former California Governor Ronald Reagan, proposes a conservative alternative in foreign policy. To counter Soviet expansionism, he would return to the Cold War policy of containing the Soviet Union politically and militarily, increasing American defence spending substantially to provide the necessary military capability, and combining this with the political will to use it. Reagan's argument, which may well convince enough voters to put him in the White House, is that Carter's liberal foreign policies have visibly failed, whilst Carter cannot be trusted to implement the conservative alternative, because it goes against his basic beliefs. A conservative foreign policy requires a truly conservative President to make it work.

President Carter naturally rejects these criticisms, portraying Reagan as a reckless Cold War warrior who would involve the U.S. and her allies in unnecessary wars. The media in the U.S. and Canada have, until recently, tended to share this unsympathetic view of Reagan and consequently under-estimated the extent to which he represents a major new factor in the U.S. foreign policy debate, the neo-conservative movement.

Search for consensus


In a broader sense, the Carter-Reagan debate reflects the search for a new consensus on foreign policy within the U.S. political system. The old, bipartisan consensus

of the Cold War era was destroyed by the Vietnam War and has yet to be rebuilt. Back in 1976, President Carter's victory offered the hope that a new consensus could be built around a liberal foreign policy. He has been selected by the liberal wing of the Democratic Party to unify a party split by the Vietnam War, and a country divided by the same War, as well as by the Nixon presidency and Watergate. Carter's foreign policy rejected the outmoded Cold War concepts that had led to the Vietnam War and what the President called, in his 1977 Annapolis speech, "an inordinate fear of the Soviet Union."

The Carter Administration certainly tried to follow through on his campaign promises with unusual consistency; although, paradoxically, plagued by a lack of cohesiveness in its foreign policy. This was epitomized by the constant public differences between the President, his Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and his Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, that culminated in Vance's resignation in April 1980. Vance had become the spokesman for the liberal doves in the Administration, so his resignation posed the question of whether President Carter's liberal foreign policy, so attractive in theory, had failed in practise.

The basis for this policy was what could be called the Vietnam syndrome—the belief that the U.S. mistake in Vietnam was the attempt to use military force to solve an essentially political problem. By extension, the U.S. should refrain from using, or threatening to use, military force in the Third World, either to protect U.S. interests or to counter Soviet expansionism. Only the defence of Western Europe against a massive Soviet invasion, which was, in this view, virtually unthinkable, would justify military action by the U.S. Instead, U.S. interests would best be served by detente with the Soviet Union, symbolized by the SALT II

Dr. Ranger, a specialist in strategic studies and defence matters, teaches Political Science at St. Francis Xavier University. He has recently been awarded a NATO fellowship for 1980-81.



U.S. President Jimmy Carter.

Wide World photo

Agreement signed by Carter and Brezhnev on July 14, 1979; by a drive for human rights, even at the cost of the fall of the Shah of Iran; by holding down the U.S. defence budget to relatively low real levels—about 5 per cent of Gross National Product—and by cancelling or delaying deployment of new nuclear weapons systems, both strategic and tactical.

Enunciating this policy was easy for candidate Carter: implementing it has proved almost impossible for President Carter. Internally, he encouraged the expression of different opinions on foreign policy, enabling him to choose between the advice of the doves and the hawks. The result was confusion and an impression of zig-zagging on important issues, like the 1978 decision to deploy the neutron bomb (Enhanced Radiation Weapon) in NATO. This was abruptly reversed, leaving West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, out of a political limb.

Brezinski was the spokesman for its harder-line members within the Administration. He was, however, a hawk only in relative terms compared to Ronald Reagan. Moreover, while Brezinski talked of a "New Cold War" with the Soviet Union, and described the crescent from Pakistan to Turkey as "the new arc of crisis," he was also head of the National Security Council (N.S.C.). The N.S.C. was Carter's source of per-

sonal foreign policy advice and was, in fact, remarkably liberal, so that N.S.C. staff recommendations differed from Brezinski's.

President Carter compounded these divisions by compartmentalising his decisions on foreign and defence policies, without apparently realising that they were interrelated. Thus, for example, his 1977 cancellation of the B-1 strategic bomber helped force, against his wishes, to authorise, in 1979, deployment of the M-X mobile ICBM, while delaying SALT II's ratification by the U.S. Senate. Even in 1977, it was clear that the U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent would be vulnerable, technically, to a Soviet first strike by 1982. Cancelling the B-1 therefore meant cancelling a whole series of options to counter this threat if SALT II failed, as it did, to address the U.S. vulnerability problem. The pressures for deploying the M-X, even though it cost \$50 billion, thus became irresistible. But, because it was the only option he had left himself, the President's decision did nothing to dispel the impression, among moderate, as well as conservative, Senators, that he was not doing enough for defence. This contributed to the Senate's delay in ratifying SALT II until, in the end, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan made it impossible in 1980 and probably forever.

Muskie's demand

The Carter experiment in a liberal U.S. foreign policy was thus flawed in execution, if not in conception. The new Secretary of State, former Senator Edmund Muskie, has insisted that he must become the single foreign policy spokesman for the Administration, but there must be doubts about his chances of success. This would also mean an increase in the State Department's influence and, consequently, an increase in the influence of considerable conservative elements in the liberal Carter foreign policy. But there were already acute contradictions between the liberal policy Carter wanted, and the conservative policy he has been forced to adopt. He often seemed like a Lockian President, seeking peaceful compromise, in a Hobbesian world, where states preferred victory through force.

These contradictions have become almost irreconcilable because of external events. The continuing Iranian seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan produced the Carter Doctrine in President Carter's January, 1980, State of the Union Address. The Carter Doctrine threatened war if the Soviet Union invaded any of Afghanistan's neighbours, or otherwise threatened the Persian Gulf oil suppliers. It was a new version of the old Truman Doctrine, announced in 1947, which had formed the basis for the conservative, Cold War, U.S. foreign policy. There is, however, a very real question as to whether the liberal Carter can run a conservative foreign policy. If a conservative foreign policy is required (with

of course, questionable) the alternative of replacing Carter with a Cold War warrior as President has to be considered.

Conservative alternative

Ronald Reagan's emergence as the Republican Party's Presidential candidate and, much more importantly, as a potential victor in the elections, is indicative of the strength of the neo-conservative tide in U.S. politics. This is clearly one of those profound changes in political moods which take even experienced observers by surprise, and are usually under-estimated. The 1980-81 U.S. defence budget reflects this neo-conservative mood; the Senate will clearly approve President Carter's request for about a 5 per cent increase in real spending, and may increase this significantly, while it moves to reinstate draft registration. In this sense, the re-arming of America is already underway, although its pace would increase dramatically if Reagan is elect-

The former Governor of California has made it clear that his belief in a conservative, hard-line, U.S. foreign and defence policy is not new. He likes to say that his position has been unchanged for 20 years; what has changed is the mood of the American people. They, too, have come to share his belief that the only way to contain the Soviet Union is to build adequate defence forces for the United States and her allies, using them whenever and wherever necessary. The Cold War policy of containment was the right one and was only weakened by the U.S. loss of nerve, shared by the rest of the West.

What is significant is that the Primary elections have shown that these views are supported not only by registered Republican voters, but by a significant number of Democratic voters who have crossed party lines to vote for Reagan's nomination. When combined with the defeat of Senator Edward Kennedy's campaign for a more liberal Democratic Party alternative to President Carter, this indicates a very conservative mood indeed in the American electorate.

The emergence of a new conservatism—often called neo-conservatism—has been evident since the mid-1970s. It is neither new, nor unique to the United States. British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's 1979 election victory was, perhaps, the most striking evidence of the strength of neo-conservatism. She, like Ronald Reagan, emphasized that she offered a real, right-wing, alternative, a choice, not an echo.

Thatcher's Conservative Party victory was also interesting because it was in an election dominated by domestic issues. Last year it seemed likely that the same would be true of the 1980 U.S. elections. Most Americans were pre-occupied with domestic problems, which President Carter was, perhaps unfairly, being blamed for not solving. They worried about getting jobs and keeping them, getting enough gas to get to their jobs, paying their gas bills, and paying their other bills


after taxes, and double-digit inflation. Given these problems, they might have voted for Ronald Reagan, not because they thought he had all the answers, but because he could not do any worse. President Harry Truman said that if you understand politics in Kansas City, you understand everything you need to understand about politics. An old political friend of Truman's in Kansas City summed up the American mood last summer this way: foreign policy issues are something East Coast intellectuals worry about; they are not real problems.

Change

The seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran combined with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan turned this attitude of indifference to foreign policy into one of concern. It may also have reversed the apparent lessons of the Vietnam War, that wars are not popular in the U.S., and neither is the vigorous assertion of U.S. interests. Put bluntly, the 1980 Presidential election, as distinct from the primaries, is going to be a 'Jingo' election. The phrase originated, significantly, when Russia appeared to be aggressive and expansionist to the British, in 1884. A music hall song caught the popular mood:

We don't want to fight
But by jingo if we do
We've got the ships, we've got the men
we've got the money too.

The U.S. public do not want a war, but if pushed too far would rather fight than be humiliated and are tired of seeing the U.S. pushed around by smaller countries.



Republican candidate Ronald Reagan. Wide World photo

Whether this perception is accurate is irrelevant. There is no doubt of its strength. Most foreign policy issues are abstractions: the seizure of a U.S. embassy and its personnel is not. Nor are Soviet armies marching across the frontiers of Afghanistan. Initially, most Americans supported President Carter's decision not to use force. But the continued intransigence of the Iranian authorities, and the failure of the U.S. rescue mission, is changing this climate of restraint into one of belligerence, leaving the President politically vulnerable. The short-run rallying behind the President, normal in a crisis, is turning into a longer-term questioning of his policies. Unless Carter can obtain the return of all the hostages, unharmed, the electorate may well choose Ronald Reagan as their President. If any of the U.S. hostages in Iran are killed, war with Iran will enjoy the same popularity as McKinley's War against Spain in 1898, immortalised by Teddy Roosevelt as "that bully little war". The U.S. battle cry in 1980 will be "remember Tehran" just as the battle cry in 1898 was "remember the Maine"

A more recent, but equally relevant, analogy is the British surrender to Hitler at Munich in 1938, allowing him to take over Czechoslovakia. Munich became the symbol of appeasement and of the folly of trying to buy off expansionist dictators. Essentially, the U.S. (and Western) Cold War policy was based on the Munich syndrome—on the avoidance of appeasement and

the willingness to contain aggression by force if necessary. The no-more-Munichs rule was intelligible to the electorate, and grounded in painful experience. The viet invasion of Afghanistan appears to have confirmed its soundness. As President Carter himself put it, unchecked aggression only leads to further aggression.

U.S. foreign policy in the 1980s will therefore have as its priority to halting Soviet aggression and expansion, directly, or indirectly. The new slogan will be "No-more-Munichs-or-Afghanistans" not "No-more-Viet nam". The real question for the U.S. electorate, and for America's allies in Canada and around the world, is whether this return to the old, conservative foreign policy of neo-conservative America is to be implemented by liberal Carter or the (neo-) conservative Reagan. U.S. foreign policy is clearly at a turning point; how far, how fast, it turns towards the new conservatism will be much to shape the 1980s. Whether the new U.S. President is Jimmy Carter or Ronald Reagan, he will face the difficult task of protecting U.S. interests in an increasingly hostile world, particularly against an apparently ascendent Soviet Union. It is to be hoped that the Presidential election campaign will clarify the foreign policy alternatives offered by the Democratic and Republican Parties, so that the U.S. can make an informed choice in November. Much depends on it. Canadians should wish their American friends well in their choice.

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Foreign affairs survey reflects Canadian regionalism

by W.A. Wilson

The use of public opinion surveys for political purposes is commonplace in Canada and, at least during election campaigns and lengthy periods of tension such as the issue of sovereignty-association has created in Quebec, have become increasingly popular as a journalistic tool. Their use for governmental or administrative purposes has been much more rare, although not unknown. This use of the techniques of sampling to ascertain the views and feelings of the public has been not uncommon in Ontario but hardly employed at all at the federal level when the intent was simply to use the results as an administrative aid.

In 1979, however, the Department of External Affairs employed the firm Goldfarb Consultants to explore public opinion in six areas bearing upon its operations. The subjects covered public perceptions of the department's own operations, Canadian views on foreign policy and the aims that should be pursued. The department and the consultants collaborated in designing the questionnaire that was used last summer. The survey used the acceptable national standard of 1,024 interviews which is deemed to provide an accurate reading of within 4 percent nineteen times out of twenty.

Probably not to anyone's surprise, the survey revealed distinct regional differences in viewpoints and perceptions but while the fact that this would show up could have been expected it is unlikely that some of the precise regional variations in outlook would have been anticipated. Few would be surprised that Quebecers place greater importance on relations involving French-speaking countries than do other Canadians. Nor is it remarkable that people in British Columbia attach greater importance to relations with Asia than most other Canadians do.

It would have been hard for most Canadians to predict, however, that the people of the Prairies attach greater importance to Western Europe than do other parts of the country. Surprising, residents of the Prairie provinces attach greater importance to the Caribbean region than other parts of the country do.

The survey showed many differences in outlook between men and women, between youthful and older people, between rural and urban dwellers and between

income groups. In studying the results of the survey, most of these variations seem fairly predictable, unlike some of the regional differences of outlook that were revealed. In general, the affluent are more likely to be interested in Canada's relations with other countries than lower income groups simply because they enjoy greater freedom to travel abroad and, in some cases, no doubt because their businesses or professions bring home to them the importance of this country's external relationships.

The department which commissioned the survey must have been both gratified and a little surprised at the response to the first question put to the 1,024 individuals in the sample. It was aimed at discovering how many Canadians are aware of the services their government can provide when they are travelling outside the country. Only 20 percent mentioned the passport office, essential to people travelling overseas. This probably reflects the fact that far more Canadians travel to the United States, where they have no need of a passport to secure admission, than to overseas countries. Of those who did refer to this office, however, 80 percent were very satisfied with the service they had received, 14 percent were "somewhat satisfied" and only five percent dissatisfied.

One quarter were aware of the services which Canadian embassies and consulates abroad can render a traveller from this country and, of those who had travelled abroad in recent years, 14 percent actually had made use of these facilities. This is about five percent of the total and here an unexpected regional difference shows up. Travellers from British Columbia make use of Canadian embassies or consulates abroad far more frequently than people from other parts of Canada. In this sample, 12 percent of British Columbians had done so against three percent from Quebec. In most regions, the percentage was four or five but travellers

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from rural areas rarely use these services. Only one percent said they had. The survey did not seek to identify the reasons underlying such differences but in this case it could be speculated that a higher percentage of British Columbia travellers may go to destinations in Asia than people from other parts of Canada and that they may have more need to contact an embassy than, say, a Torontonians travelling in Western Europe. The reason may well be no more than functional.

Interest level

Many non-Canadians consider this country's people remarkably uninterested in international affairs and this view is common among foreign diplomats stationed in Ottawa. The survey sought to find out just how much interest Canadians do have in this field.

Thirty-nine percent of those questioned rated their personal interest in international issues as high and another 48 percent thought they were "somewhat interested." Only 13 percent had no interest at all. People in British Columbia far outstripped those from other areas in rating themselves as interested — 48 percent from that province reported that they were "very interested." People from Ontario came next — 42 percent. Those from the Prairies and Quebec had a lower level of interest — 37 and 35 percent respectively in the high interest bracket. Again a pronounced regional difference shows up. People from the Maritimes have the least interest. Only 32 percent said they were keenly interested which, coincidentally, is the same percentage of keen interest as shows up among rural people.

At this point, a question arises about the survey itself. Traditionally, people in the Maritime provinces have shown a considerable interest in the United States. The survey did not distinguish between interest in this aspect of international relations and overseas ones. This could easily produce a distortion because many Canadians, through their familiarity with the United States, do not think of it as foreign in the same way that they do European or Asian issues and relationships. A question that asked Maritimers their level of interest in American affairs and Canadian re-

lationships with the United States would surely show a much higher percentage than this survey.

Age and income differences show up very clearly in this portion of the survey. People over 30 and with incomes over \$20,000 annually have a far higher interest in international affairs than those who are younger and those with lower incomes. The report submitted by Goldfarb Consultants notes that throughout the survey the under-30s were the most apathetic group when foreign issues are involved and suggested that research warrants some investigation to see how their awareness could be increased.

Overall, Canadians rely first on television, then on daily newspapers and after that radio for information on international questions. Weekly newspapers, magazines, university lectures and seminars and public meetings play a much smaller role in the dissemination of this sort of information. The under-30s get the information from the same media in the same order of importance except for university facilities where they are more active than the older groups. The consultants concluded that television is the most effective medium for increasing public awareness of foreign policy questions.

Perceptions challenged

At this point, the survey turned its attention to the question of what Canadians think is important in the field of foreign policy. Here at least one of the responses seems to be at variance with an earlier perception by the government of Canadian views and feelings.

The orientation towards television is at its strongest in the Maritimes, among women and in rural areas, not as strong among males and the under-30s. The over-45s and the more affluent make greater use of newspapers with the exception of Quebecers. Radio gets its greatest usage in this connection from people in British Columbia and Ontario, the more affluent and English-speakers. It is less popular with Quebecers, the less affluent and rural Canadians. Prairies residents, along with the under-30s, make more use of university lectures and seminars as a source of information than other Canadians. Only 18 percent of Ca-

Interest in international affairs

% of Respondents

| | Region | | | | | Language | | Area | | |
|-----------------|---------|-------|----------|---------|--------|-----------|---------|--------|-------|-------|
| | Total | B.C. | Prairies | Ontario | Quebec | Maritimes | English | French | Urban | Rural |
| Very interested | 39 | 46 | 37 | 42 | 35 | 32 | 43 | 35 | 41 | 32 |
| Some interest | 48 | 42 | 53 | 44 | 50 | 55 | 44 | 52 | 46 | 53 |
| Not interested | 13 | 12 | 10 | 14 | 15 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 15 |
| Base | (1,024) | (110) | (165) | (365) | (275) | (109) | (517) | (507) | (785) | (239) |

adians consider themselves "very well informed" on foreign issues. But they consider themselves individually better informed than Canadians in general, although this trait is less common in Quebec than elsewhere. Quebecers have a distinctly higher opinion of the level of knowledge among other Canadians than people elsewhere do. About three Canadians in 10 express a keen interest in being better informed while 51 percent have a moderate interest in this.

Self-perceptions of being informed about issues

% of respondents who say...

| | very well informed | Somewhat informed | Not informed at all |
|---------------|--------------------|-------------------|---------------------|
| Total | 18 | 63 | 18 |
| <i>Region</i> | | | |
| B.C. | 16 | 67 | 17 |
| Prairies | 16 | 64 | 20 |
| Ontario | 20 | 60 | 20 |
| Quebec | 21 | 65 | 14 |
| Maritimes | 9 | 67 | 24 |

When the Americans were extricating themselves from their involvement in Viet Nam they were extremely anxious to have a Canadian truce observer team on the spot. One was in fact sent for a time but the government in general, and the external affairs minister of the day in particular, were convinced that it was not a popular move with Canadians. Mitchell Sharp, the minister, held that view with some conviction. He may, of course, have been right at that moment, given the controversial aspects of the war in Viet Nam.

Nonetheless, among the foreign policy elements to which Canadians now attach primary importance is this country's role in United Nations peacekeeping forces. That is not quite the same thing as the observer role played for a relatively short time in Viet Nam a few years back but it is in the same order of things. In this survey, 89 percent of the sample attached primary importance to the peacekeeping role. The only elements of foreign policy which came ahead of this were protection of our oceans and proper management of fisheries, 96 percent, and trade and tariff negotiations, 92 percent.

Peacekeeping activities have been an integral part of Canada's international role for a quarter century now and governments, until the end of the late Lester

Pearson's period, attached great importance to it. With the advent of the Trudeau regime, a sense of weariness with the role became apparent to many observers and it is certainly clear that the government itself believed that Canadians shared this feeling. Whether this perception by government was wrong at the time, or whether it is a case of the pendulum having swung one way and now having swung back, the current attitude of Canadians seems to be identical with that when peacekeeping was viewed with popular enthusiasm.

Yet, by contrast, Canadians seem to have accepted fully a viewpoint that was expressed in the documents that followed the Trudeau government's early foreign policy review. This is that foreign policy should be directed towards national self-interest, a viewpoint that is not unusual in itself but that was expressed with exceptional clarity a decade ago by the Trudeau regime — exceptional, that is, for a Canadian government.

The secondary foreign policy interests of Canadians are efforts to control and reduce the arms race (89%), collective security arrangements (82%), the Commonwealth (82%), foreign aid (76%) and human rights in other countries (76%). Interest in collective security arrangements, such as NATO, is strongest on the Prairies, in the Maritimes and among rural Canadians, lower in British Columbia and among the less affluent and the young. Concern with peacekeeping did not show regional differences: all Canadians have essentially the same outlook no matter where they live. Concern with tariffs and trade is greatest in the Maritimes and among older Canadians, those of 45 or older. Concern over the arms race is higher in the Maritimes and Quebec than elsewhere and least among those under 30. Rural residents, over-45s and those living on

Perceived importance of relationship with various regions

| | Index of Importance (Maximum 100) |
|-------------------|-----------------------------------|
| The United States | 97 Primary |
| Japan | 83 Secondary |
| China | 78 Secondary |
| Western Europe | 77 Secondary |
| The U.S.S.R. | 74 Secondary |
| Asia | 65 Tertiary |
| Mexico | 63 Tertiary |
| Latin America | 56 Tertiary |
| 50 | Tertiary |
| Base | (1024) |

the Prairies have the highest interest in the Commonwealth while most of those in British Columbia stress it to a lesser degree. So do the under-30s.

US importance

All Canadians felt that the United States was the country of greatest importance to them, a view especially strong in the Maritime Provinces, which bears on the earlier point of the supposedly lower Maritime interest in international relationships. Japan came second as respondents listed countries they thought to be of importance to Canada with China and then Western Europe following. The USSR, Asia generally, Mexico, Latin America and the Caribbean region followed these countries viewed as of primary importance. The ranking of Japan as the country of second importance after the United States was particularly pronounced in British Columbia, among males generally, in rural areas and among the more affluent. Women and the less affluent did not accord it as much importance.

There is a pronounced regional variation in the importance which Canadians attach to the Soviet Union. It is strongest among people in the Maritimes and the Prairies, lower in Quebec and Ontario. Regionally, interest in Mexico and Latin America is highest in Quebec. The Caribbean, however, receives the highest importance rating from Prairies people. Regional variations show up again where the United Nations is involved. Overall, two thirds of Canadians think it is very important but this feeling is much stronger in the Maritimes than in British Columbia — 80 percent against 57 percent. This is one of the wider of the many regional differences which showed up in the survey.

The final effort of the survey was to ascertain the extent to which Canadians think international developments have an important bearing upon what happens within their own country. In general, they do

think so and over a fairly wide range of Canadian affairs.

Highest importance was attached to the effect the value of the Canadian dollar of events that take place outside the country. In this case, the popular reception probably would be disputed by most economists and the authors of the report produced from the survey comment that "Canadians seem willing to place at least part of the blame elsewhere when difficulties arise".

Far more than a majority of the respondents — and 81 percent — believe that economic welfare and prices are very heavily affected by external developments. The proportion of those who attribute high prices heavily to developments elsewhere is smaller than that which think prices generally are subject to these forces — 77 percent. Slightly smaller portions of the sample felt the same sort of forces heavily influence both resource development and employment levels.

At the end, there remains a question: what is the value of a survey such as this commissioned as an aid to good administration? Neither political parties nor the media are in doubt about the value of the polls they sponsor. In one case they learn (or hope to) their standing with the public and in addition derive some ideas from public views and pre-occupations. In the other, the answer is even simpler: opinion polls have news value. The administrative use of opinion surveys is another matter.

The department clearly has a better idea of regional reactions and responses to international questions and issues. At best, polls such as this one should assist a government department in its educational function of building popular understanding of its purposes. At its least, it is probably like many royal commission studies: interesting but destined for a dusty pigeon hole.

Perceived importance of foreign policy subjects

| | Index of Importance (Maximum 100) |
|---|--------------------------------------|
| Protection of oceans and management of resources | 96 Primary |
| Negotiation of tariffs and trade | 92 Primary |
| Participation in UN peacekeeping | 89 Primary |
| Control and reduce arms race | 82 Secondary |
| Collective security such as NATO | 82 Secondary |
| Promoting understanding and development through Commonwealth | 77 Secondary |
| Aid to developing countries | 76 Secondary |
| Promoting and defending human rights | 76 Secondary |
| Promoting understanding and development through la Francophonie | 63 Tertiary |
| Base | (814) |

Recap of 34th General Assembly

by Jeremy Kinsman

In reviewing the work of the General Assembly at its 34th Annual Session since the United Nations was founded, it would be wise to stand back for a moment to take a look at the UN itself. It is a complex and difficult animal.

Its life is generally misrepresented in the public mind; its image is that of a separate institution with its own sense of direction and of will, peopled as it were by an implicitly separate race of beings subject to different imperatives than the rest of us. "What's the UN doing?" or "Where's the UN going?" are perfectly valid questions, but they tend to give the UN too much life of its own.

The UN is not a thing apart. It is neither more nor less than the reflection of the disarray in the collective state of mind of the participating member states. The result seems obvious: not much action and a lot of opinion.

True, much that goes on there is internal to the organization itself. Some of the opinions and many of the tactics reflect the priorities, sometimes exaggerated, and the emphases, often misplaced, of the New York delegates, rather than those of the villagers, commuters, soldiers, shepherds, and even of the politicians and public servants in the member states themselves.

Still, in one way or another, most of the world's problems come up at the General Assembly and it provides a legislative focus for the world's agenda of issues. Their treatment is similar in one respect: resolutions are adopted expressing the General Assembly's point of view on each. Treatment varies, however, in whether or not the resolution is a negotiated one, leading to a consensus adoption without opposition, or whether it is a text pushed quickly to a vote, expressing a partial political view.

Tailored speeches

The major issues facing humanity were put before the Assembly, often eloquently, in the long public debates which are in fact not debates at all, but are instead packages of individually tailored speeches. Some of the visitors this year were particularly distinguished: Pope John Paul II; Fidel Castro; the President of Mexico. However, the negotiators find that the noblest senti-

ments in public do not assure agreement in private.

No General Assembly resolution is legally binding in a strict sense on individual member states, but if it is adopted by consensus, the states are more or less morally obliged to support its purposes. Resolutions in the economic area calling for a next step in negotiation, or commenting upon the report from a Programme relying on voluntary contributions are usual examples of negotiation and consensus action.

If, however, a resolution is meant to comment upon a political situation where a solution is far from available, its purpose is frequently hortatory, and a text reflecting only the majority view is often pushed to the vote. Resolutions concerning the Middle East are frequent examples.

Seldom is a problem or perception actually new. Most are carried over from previous Assemblies. This accounts for much of the impression of repetition and apparent irrelevance: the same votes on the same issues, year after year. However, different General Assemblies can differ from one to another in the political atmosphere affecting decision-making. The 34th Assembly may be seen to be one of the more important in this respect: there was apparent a possibly new pattern of similarity of view on the parts of countries of 'the West', notably the USA, and many developing countries on some important issues. If this pattern confirms itself over the next year or so, in the Security Council and in the various other meetings of the United Nations, a considerably strengthened UN system could emerge.

UNGA 34

The Assembly began on September 18. There had been important developments in the preceding months. African countries were aware of the prospect of a satisfactory settlement in Rhodesia, to be worked out through the Commonwealth and many found themselves now

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willing to give this avenue a chance. For Asians, Kampuchea remained the principal running sore, and the Vietnamese invasion had given the ASEAN countries in particular considerable alarm. The hideous record of the Pol Pot regime which the Vietnamese maintained they were only trying to unseat, was not enough to allay their anxiety about the real motives of the Vietnamese, on top of the sordid affair of the "boat people" the preceding year.

Moreover, for virtually all oil-importing developing countries, the OPEC price shocks of 1979 had added a new dimension of economic crisis. While the industrialized countries had, in their eyes, made little contribution to progress on the North-South agenda, the policies of the oil exporters were seen to be as damaging to their economic prospects. All in all, the world situation was more complex, more so than suggested by documents agreed to in September by the Non-Aligned nations at their Havana summit.

The complexities and nuances worked their way into the General Assembly sessions. By the time the session concluded on January 7, delayed for two weeks while Cuba and Colombia vied in ballot after ballot for the two-thirds majority needed for election to the Security Council, Cuba had suffered a blow to its prestige as head of the Non-Aligned, and the Assembly was ready to deliver a devastating judgment against the USSR for invading Afghanistan.

In themselves these apparent results are not reason for self-congratulations on our part. However, it is the sign of a healthier world organization that the bulk of developing countries is no longer systematically arrayed against the West in general, and the U.S.A. in particular. This result is not only because the USSR and its allies have committed egregious offence. It hopefully also devolves from signs of more sensitive policies on the part of Western countries on political issues of concern to the Non-Aligned—the Middle East, Southern Africa, and South-East Asia—permitting more readily the perception of common interest on the part of Non-Aligned countries on specific issues.

Canadian participation

Before reviewing the work of the General Assembly in this and other respects, against the political background described above, a special word about Canadian participation is merited. A new Canadian Government was in office, and the Canadian Delegation was headed by a foreign minister who brought to bear on events her own conviction that the world in general, and the General Assembly in particular, could do something to advance the cause of individual human liberties. As a result, a major part of the emphasis of our efforts was in the form of a Canadian initiative to strengthen UN human rights machinery. Our proposal did not receive sufficient support to enable us to see it through, for a variety of reasons, but it did advance a dialogue on human rights, and it did confirm continu-

ing Canadian interest in the area.

A corollary to Flora MacDonald's stress on individual human rights was her stress on the collective man right of the poorest peoples to be free of the bondage to poverty and misery. Our participation in the economic discussion was ably led by Douglas Roche, M.P., and Parliamentary Secretary to MacDonald; his public efforts to keep an effective political focus in the UN on the fundamental needs of the world's poorest also reflected a constant Canadian concern.

This, then, is the general background of the autumn General Assembly. Its work can be broken into the broad divisions of political—including disarmament; economic; social affairs and human rights; legal and budget and finance, bearing in mind that the aims and working methods of each area can be quite different.

The political area is still the prestige address of traditional diplomats at least, in part because it is the area of activity where countries are explicitly named and their political interests thereby directly engaged. Sadly, however, there is little of direct applicability in this area on which General Assembly members are able to agree, and the UN's work often seems irrelevant to the situation on the ground, as far as practical effect is concerned.

Pol Pot regime

South-East Asia was the first focus of the Assembly when the credentials of the Pol Pot regime of democratic Kampuchea were challenged at the outset of the Session. While international reaction to the atrocious activities of the Pol Pot regime became increasingly horrified as the country slowly opened up again to foreign press and enquiry, efforts to unseat Pol Pot's representatives in favour of those of the Vietnamese backed Hang Semrin government were unsuccessful largely because of real reservations over Vietnamese intentions, particularly on the part of the other countries of the area. Kampuchea stayed a major preoccupation of the Assembly throughout the Session, highlighted by a successful Pledging conference which raised over \$200 million in emergency relief. Late in the Session, a very strong majority in the General Assembly supported a resolution calling for the immediate withdrawal of foreign forces from the country, showing the extent to which the Vietnamese hand was weakened internationally, as well as traditional Third World resistance to external invasion. The resolution had no direct effect on the situation but may indirectly have helped to ease the administrative and political bottlenecks which were holding back desperately needed emergency assistance by pressing the Hang Semrin regime to work harder for greater international recognition.

On the Middle East, the General Assembly was as far from reaching agreement on the issues as the principal antagonists themselves. A variety of generally

unbalanced resolutions were adopted, on the rights of the Palestinians, on Israeli practices in the occupied territories and on the general situation, were as divided and as inconclusive as ever. These followed a pattern of support for the PLO and condemnation of Israel with which the Assembly is familiar. The new element, however, was the widespread willingness on the part of all but Western countries to condemn the Camp David Agreements as being inadequate on the situation and prospects of the Palestinians. There was also apparent greater frustration, even among Western countries, with the policies of the Begin government on the issue of the occupied territories. Canada joined in supporting unanimous resolution condemning Israel for arresting and deporting the Mayor of Nablus, an act later reversed by Israeli authorities. The success of participants in the Camp David Agreement in going beyond the bilateral Egyptian-Israeli relationship will depend on their progress on Palestinian autonomy, and the General Assembly's call for a New Conference on the Middle East, while not supported by Western countries at this Assembly, may gain greater credence if this progress is too limited.

African issues were also a source of division. The Lancaster House Accords on Rhodesia were signed on December 17, just before the General Assembly debated a resolution on Rhodesia. The African-co-sponsors had slanted the resolution to favour only one of the factions contesting the election (the Patriotic Front), which was inconsistent with the spirit of the Lancaster House agreement. The vote on the resolution was divided, causing some tension in African/Western relations just at the time when they seemed bound to improve. In retrospect, the resolution was not particularly relevant to events in Rhodesia up to the point of the election itself, and though it had anticipated accurately the strong public position of Robert Mugabe, it underestimated the fairness of the process and the determination of all parties to see it through.

The Namibia exercise was the object of seven resolutions on various aspects of the situation in Namibia, calling in general for an end to delay on the part of South Africa and immediate compliance with U.N. resolutions calling for the transition to majority rule in Namibia. Here, too, votes were divided. There was little disagreement about the objectives above, but differences as to emphasis. Africans, with wide support, urge a tough line on South Africa but in language sometimes too generalized and extreme. At this Assembly, Canada gave full support to the ends involved but abstained on all substantive resolutions together with the other members of the "Western Five" (1977-78 Western members of the Security Council) who initiated and have negotiated the settlement proposal. The Five abstained on these resolutions on the basis that at this time their role in the negotiating process still required a more distanced and objective position.

Cyprus as well defied consensus action by the As-



sembly, as resolutions were adopted by votes which perpetuated the opposition of Greece and Turkey, and reflected the continuing antagonisms which mark the island's experience. While the Assembly has called for renewed efforts to resolve the community differences, this is not on terms agreeable to all parties. Meanwhile the U.N. Forces, in which Canada plays a key role, continue to supervise the truce.

Tehran hostages

Perhaps the only major political issue on which there was generalized political consensus during the General Assembly was that of the fate of the USA hostages taken in Tehran. While the question was not on the General Assembly agenda, Security Council debate became a focus of attention, first on the occasion of the consensus urging their release, and then later, on efforts on the part of the Secretary-General to contribute to the resolution of the crisis.

The various controversial political issues thus remained as problematic at the Session's conclusion as they had been at its opening, as reflected by the contested voting patterns on the various resolutions. However, there was little spill-over into other areas of the Assembly's work. A certain amount of the Middle East controversy emerged in economic and social affairs, but in a generally self-contained way. A possibly new characteristic is, in fact, the extent to which divisive political issues are now seldom linked to each other. Middle Eastern issues are treated in their own context, as are African, Asian, and others respectively. The invasion of Afghanistan in late December put the lie to the notion that the same Western forces were responsi-

ble for offences to Arab interests, African objectives, and those of progressive forces everywhere, but the judgment in this direction had already emerged earlier in the General Assembly in the treatment, however contested, accorded each principal political issue. Each was seen by its sponsors to be best presented in its own context, according to its own characteristics.

The context of the discussion of disarmament in the United Nations is necessarily that of the international scene. Its increasingly disturbed nature as well as delays in the ratification of the Salt Treaty did not favour major progress in disarmament at the 34th General Assembly. About 40 resolutions were adopted in the First Committee, most of them following-up initiatives flowing from the 1978 Special Session of the General Assembly on Disarmament, and the great majority of them by recorded vote, making their practical effect pretty negligible. Canada did, however, succeed in attracting an increased majority over last year for our initiative calling on the Committee on Disarmament to consider the question of the cessation of production, prohibition of fissionable material for weapons purposes.

Second Committee

Economic issues, on the other hand, are generally not handled in a divisive way. Increasingly, these represent the political issues of greatest importance to the bulk of the General Assembly's membership. The Second (Economic) Committee adopts well over twice as many resolutions as any other, and more than a third of those of the General Assembly as a whole. What is more significant, however, is that a consensus is negotiated in over 90 percent of these resolutions. Only the Third Committee on Social and Humanitarian Affairs, and the Legal Committee, are always over 50 percent in this respect. In fact, if one accepts that only resolutions adopted by consensus have a real and continuing impact on events (outside of the Budgetary Committee where 80 percent of resolutions appropriating funds are in fact voted upon), it is interesting to note that well over half of these are economic in nature.

Working methods are in consequence distinct. The bulk of productive time is spent in closed negotiations to produce text acceptable to all. Given the constraints which affect the ability of developed countries to go very far at this time in negotiations with developing countries, the negotiations themselves were protracted and difficult. On particularly contentious issues, such as inflation, protectionism, and monetary reform, time ran out and recourse was had to a vote, making the texts then adopted by a large majority more or less meaningless as a guideline for action.

In these negotiations, the developing countries (the Group of 77) function as a group with one spokesman and with necessarily agreed positions. While this practice is seen by many to be essential to the negotiating process, it often prevents the General Assembly

from going to the substance of matters, since substantive considerations are those of concrete economic circumstances which belie the sort of excessive generalization affecting a position common to countries as disparate as Brazil and Botswana. Paradoxically, it is the developing countries who wish to see the General Assembly take on greater substantive responsibilities in the economic area but until its working methods for effective work on specifics are further refined, responsibilities will be confined to fairly generalized political treatment of the economic issues, and specific substantive questions will continue to be dealt with in depth in specialized agencies and programmes devised for that purpose.

Unga 34's most prominent achievement was probably the decision to launch a global round of economic negotiations, including energy, commencing at a Special Session of the General Assembly in September 1980 and continuing through 1981. The background to the decision was one of difficulty. UNCTAD V in Manila had not been a success; a conflict had emerged between OPEC countries and non-oil developing countries; Fidel Castro addressed the General Assembly and called for a transfer of financial resources to the poorer countries too massive to be considered politically realistic; generally, industrialized countries remained preoccupied and constrained by their own economic woes.

The Group of 77 sought a new round of negotiations — a sort of global CIEC — to regenerate progress on the whole range of trade, monetary, aid, and raw materials issues, including for the first time, energy. During extended negotiation, OECD countries tried to make such a decision conditional on agreed effective preparatory arrangements. In the end, the decision was taken to launch the negotiations but on the basis of preparations covering general understandings of other organs in the UN system, as well as on the value of dealing with economic issues in the UN by consensus.

Many other economic resolutions and decisions were passed — on food, energy, the environment, science and technology — accepting and commenting upon the reports of subsidiary organs and programmes and winding up some world conferences on sectoral issues and preparing for others. These all constitute part of the continuing legislative process and they were responsibly negotiated by delegations conscious of the need for the system at least to run itself in a coherent way, even if they could not contribute together to much concrete progress on the substance of world-wide economic difficulties.

The basic challenges of the 1980s and 90s, remain however: the need for a more effective world organization as well as the will to cope with the pressures of shrinking resources and expanding populations against the background of an intractable swath of poverty. Until now, there has been little progress. The New International Development Strategy for the dec



Flora MacDonald, then External Affairs Minister, at the The United Nations General Assembly in September, 1979.

ade did not receive much of a boost from the Session and its drafting lags far behind schedule. Still, delegations remain more or less determined to work together and the economic area can be considered one of the more productive work-places of the General Assembly.

Not so for Social and Humanitarian Affairs, though it is not for want of trying. A basic dilemma affects the work of the Third (Social) Committee: Social policy is subjective: subject to different cultural, political, social and other perceptions. This is particularly so, sadly, for human rights. In an organization of states, which is what many states consider the UN to be (not an organization of peoples), internal affairs are not considered by many to be fair game. As a result, the ordered negotiating techniques of the Second Committee are not available in the Third, and though consensus emerges on a lot of questions, it is evasive on some really important issues, including human rights conditions in specific countries or circumstances.

Canadian initiative

It was in this area that the Canadian Delegation played out its major initiative of the Session, seeking to create the post of Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Human Rights, to assist him in providing his good offices to help in improving situa-

tions where flagrant violations of civil liberties apply. While our hard-pursued initiative was well received by many delegations hitherto opposed to a High Commissioner for Human Rights, it eventually had to be shelved because this support was not in the end sufficient. The majority of member states remain wary of human rights as a centrepiece of East-West controversy and as a potential barrier to progress on development questions. As an inherently political issue it remains controversial. Still, emphasis on the subject by those states who see a clear role for the UN in setting standards has contributed to an international public climate which is itself something of a constraining feature on mass violations.

There were some solid accomplishments of the Committee — the elaboration of a Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, and agreement on a Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials. These represent useful standards for national legislation though it will be some time before their provisions are generally applied in fact.

The gap between standards and performance emerges graphically from the sentiments represented by the adoption by consensus of a Convention Against the Taking of Hostages in the Sixth (Legal) Commit-

tee. If widely ratified and properly interpreted, the Convention could become an effective tool in the prevention and punishment of hostage-taking. Against the outrages on the political landscape, the Convention takes on direct pertinence. However, it will take more than the goodwill of negotiators to give the intentions of the Convention real effect.

Other accomplishments of the Session of a legal nature include agreement to undertake work on legal principles governing the use of nuclear power sources in outer space, an issue in which Canada played, with the USSR, a role of consequence. The Session also approved the text of a Treaty on Activities on the Moon. However, on a variety of other contentious issues, delegations pushed matters of legal principle to precipitous votes in such a way as to raise disturbing implications for the process of codification of international law through the Assembly, which must be in an orderly way if general observation is to be expected.

Housekeeping

In the area of finance and management, divisive votes also characterized the Session, not least on the UN budget itself. The Secretary-General made a major effort to bring forward an austerity budget with real growth limited to 0.8 percent. Though some substantial additions were made to the budget during the Session itself, which lost it the support of some Western countries, the end result showed a more modest rate of growth than in previous years, and Canada gave the budget our support.

Efforts to improve the UN's management are constant. This year, Canada put forward a proposal for the reform of the UN audit system. Here, too, a Canadian initiative will take time to take hold on delegations to which the idea is novel.

Other difficulties, affecting the Secretariat personnel situation in particular, abound, but the organization still functions very well considering the inherent complexities of a multilingual and multicultural Secretariat trying to serve the often diverse demands of a Board of Directors of 155 states. A good deal of effort has also been put into running the General Assembly sessions well. If the product cannot be guaranteed as to relevance or consensus, at least we can all save time. A Canadian initiative was at the basis of a variety of measures of procedural reform which the very effective President of the Assembly managed to have adopted at the Session's outset.

Unfortunately, despite every effort, the President, Ambassador Salim Salim of Tanzania, could not solve for weeks the most time-consuming exercise of all: the Assembly's inability, after more than 150 ballots, to resolve the stand-off between Cuba and Colombia for the two-thirds majority required for election to the Security Council. The issue was finally resolved in favour of a compromise candidate, Mexico. The USSR invasion of Afghanistan cut into support for the Cubans sufficiently to convince them they had to withdraw in order

to end the stalemate.

Thus, the Session ended in a mist of political controversy, obscuring some of its more real accomplishments over almost four months of work. It remains to be seen after the mist has cleared whether new patterns forming will promote more systematic accomplishment in future years, but this is at least one realization of the possibilities.

The United Nations is a forum whose interest to its member states varies, as determined by their estimate of its effective relevance to their perceived problems. High interest in the United Nations presupposes high interest in the collective global condition. Generally, however, the most powerful nations consider the UN the least, since it seems less useful than their perceptions of self-interest. Changing patterns of cooperation on major issues, if sustained, could change this. In any case, Canadians should probably have a greater interest in the UN emerging as an effective instrument of collective decision-making than large countries.

We are effective there; influential. We should use that influence to support collective action whenever possible on a sound basis, not least by supporting the forum itself by paying attention to the views expressed. Where collective action on common problems is stymied by division or parodied by sloganeering, we have to keep working away. Because of the range of lateral and other possibilities open to them the large countries are not at play in the United Nations. However, governments still need to be able to maintain a longer-term focus on the sort of collective action necessary in the next two or three decades, and the UN forum, in one form or another, is the only universal forum we will have for the purpose.

Gremlins Attack!

As we went to press with the March/April issue we were aware that the gremlins had attacked. It was a question of accepting their incursions or delaying publication. We opted for the former and apologized to readers for the inconvenience of too many typographical errors. To date, we are aware of only one error where the author's meaning was left in doubt. In the third paragraph, right column of page 22, in Leslie Green's article, the first sentence should have read:

After this escape had been effected, the Iranian foreign minister, Sadegh Ghotbzadeh, stated that had the Canadian ambassador informed him of the presence of the fugitives, he would have arranged for their care and safety.



supplied by External Affairs Canada

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Voting patterns as a measure of foreign policy independence

by Thomas F. Keating and Terence A. Keenleyside

Given their neurotic preoccupation with identity, Canadians have long been fascinated by the question of whether or not their country has an independent foreign policy. Little consideration has been given in this debate as to whether, in fact, it is meaningful to speak of any state as having an 'independent' foreign policy when all countries are to a greater or lesser degree influenced in their policies by other international actors. Similarly, there has been little discussion whether or not, when common policies are pursued with other states, it reflects a 'basic community of thinking' stemming from shared values and interests rather than an absence of independence. Rather, for Canadians the key thing has been evidence of difference, especially with the United States; the more of it the more clearly does Canada have an 'independent' foreign policy, and the more comfortable can Canadians rest in the assurance that they have a separate identity.

Curiously, despite this preoccupation with an 'independent' foreign policy, there has been little systematic analysis by Canadians of the degree of convergence or divergence of their policies in various issue areas with those of other states. Regularly, Canada's maintenance of trade relations with Cuba despite the U.S. economic boycott, and its trade relationship with and subsequent recognition of the Peoples' Republic of China have been trotted out as evidence of an 'independent' foreign policy, while its unreadiness to criticize and totally dissociate itself from the U.S. involvement in Vietnam, and its continuing membership in NATO and NORAD have been used by critics to make the case that Canada's foreign policy is essentially subservient to that of the United States, despite, as George Grant described them in *Lament for a Nation*, the occasional "pinpricks of disagreement." However, we have not moved much beyond these highlights of Canadian foreign policy into more detailed analyses, measuring the degree of agreement or disagreement between Canadian policies and those not only of the United States, but other countries as well, in specific issue areas.

eral Assembly on colonial and racial questions, issues which because of their persistence and continuity over time lend themselves to this type of inquiry. While we have compared Canadian voting with a total of 27 states, this article concentrates on comparisons with nine countries, the United States, Great Britain, Australia, India, the Scandinavian states of Norway, Denmark and Sweden (examined collectively), Belgium and the Netherlands. This more limited focus enables the respective voting records to be presented in simple, readable tables and facilitates concentration on the degree of similarity or difference in Canadian voting with those states and groups with which it has most often been suggested that Canadian foreign policy closely corresponds.

The reasons for the inclusion of the United States in such a comparative study are obvious and do not require elaborate explanation. Suffice it to say that to date it has been widely assumed that in the context of policy at the United Nations, as in other areas, Canadian behaviour has closely paralleled that of the United States. Thus, for instance, John Warnock has claimed in *Partner to Behemoth* that because of Canada's military alliance with the United States, it "played the same role in the United Nations that Poland played for the Warsaw Pact". Similarly, the Australian scholar, T.B. Millar (*The Commonwealth and the United Nations*), has asserted that the voting record of Canada at the UN, like those of Australia and New Zealand, is an expression of its "military dependence on the United States."

Because of its historical relationship with Canada, it is also natural to include Britain in such a comparative study. Indeed, the general assumption is that "there were no serious divergences of British and Canadian policies on important international issues until the Suez crisis of 1956." (D.C. Thomson and R.F. Swanson, *Canadian Foreign Policy: Options and*

Focus

Knowledge of the relationship between Canadian policy and that of other states can be expanded by focussing on the subject of voting in the United Nations Gen-

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Perspectives). John Holmes has gone still further, suggesting in *Canada: A Middle-Aged Power* that Suez distorted a picture of close cooperation between Britain and Canada in "world diplomacy" throughout the 1950s. This cooperation, he stated in an article written as late as 1966, extended to the area of colonial questions at the United Nations on which Canadians were "loyal in support of Britain through many difficult years."

Australia and India have been incorporated in the select group of states in addition to Britain to establish in this particular area of policy-making the extent to which Canadian policy has or has not converged with that of other Commonwealth countries, both old and new. John Holmes, for instance, has asserted that "the Commonwealth as a group remained an active force during the first decade of the United Nations" and that the similarity of outlook of its members "did establish a habit of common action, a feeling, not altogether unjustified, that there might be a Commonwealth way of looking at world issues." Other scholars, notably Thomas Hovet in *Bloc Politics and The United Nations* and Arend Lijphart in *The Analysis of Bloc Voting in the General Assembly* have contended that the Commonwealth has tended to divide into two voting groups, the old white Commonwealth states and the new non-white members. India was selected as the representative of the developing Commonwealth countries not only because it was present from the inception of the UN, but also because it has been frequently alleged that "in the decade following Indian independence, an intimate relationship developed between Canada and India that has been described as the 'Indo-Canadian entente', and even the 'Indo-Canadian love affair'". According to Thomson and Swanson, "the reciprocal influence of the statesmen of the two countries on one another during this period was significant" and "at the United Nations, the delegations of the two countries worked closely together."

The Scandinavian states have been included in this study because of the suggestion from time to time of a "Scan-Can axis" in international affairs. In particular, attention has been directed at their cooperation in the United Nations in the areas of peace-keeping, the environment and economic and social affairs, and outside the UN in the area of improving East-West relations. In June, 1969, then Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mitchell Sharp, following a trip to Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Finland and Iceland, commented in the House of Commons that on a wide range of questions he "found that more often than not our appreciation and approach were very close to those of the various Nordic governments." The theme of a close foreign policy link with the Scandinavian states was well summarized by Thomson and Swanson in a 1971 text:

Canadians have always felt a special affinity with the Scandinavian countries, and this fact has been

reflected in a proximity of views on many international questions. Co-operation with them within framework of the United Nations has been frequent and fruitful.

The voting behaviour of the Scandinavian states Norway, Denmark and Sweden is treated collectively in this study. These countries collaborate closely at UN in the form of a regular caucus. Their voting record in the General Assembly reflects this close cooperation and only rarely on the resolutions under analysis their votes differ; the few instances where they did, position of the majority was recorded for the purposes of this study.

Finally, Belgium and the Netherlands (together with Britain and the United States) have been included in this analysis not only because of their close relations with Canada since the war, but also to establish whether or not in this area of foreign policy there was a general similarity in the behaviour of a number of member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or at least a similarity in the behaviour of some of the non-great members. Different opinions have been expressed concerning NATO foreign policy cohesiveness. In an article entitled "Canada's Relations with Africa" written in 1975, Robert Matthews implies the existence of a common NATO policy towards decolonization prior to 1960 when he explained that "Canada's aloofness from colonial questions" up until that time was related to its "interest in maintaining a strong united alliance in the west against the Soviet bloc." Lijphart in his study of UN voting in 1963 found that Canadian behaviour in the late 1950's tended to correspond to the approach of a number of other states in the western alliance. On the other hand, such scholars as Geoffrey Goodwin and Thomas Hovet (*The Expanding United Nations: Voting Patterns*), have argued that NATO has had "little effect on the voting behaviour of its members in the General Assembly."

From this nine state comparison it will be apparent that Canadian behaviour at the UN on colonial and racial questions has, in fact, diverged substantially from many of those states and groups with which Canada has traditionally been associated, although it has corresponded relatively closely, especially in more recent years, with the Scandinavian countries and such non-great NATO powers as Belgium and the Netherlands. A comparison of the Canadian record with a number of other states is, however, included at the end of the study on the basis of which some expansion of Canada's voting group becomes necessary.

Voting record

Table 1 compares Canada's level of support with the nine main states under analysis on 185 UN General Assembly roll-call votes on colonial and racial questions over the thirty year period 1946-1975. Because of the uneven number of resolutions in different years, making annual figures of support unreliable, the res-

Table 1

Indices of Support for Resolutions on Colonial and Racial Questions

| Period | N | Canada | U.S. | U.K. | Australia | India | Scan. | Belgium | Netherlands |
|--------------|-----|--------|------|------|-----------|-------|-------|---------|-------------|
| 1971-75 | 73 | 68.4 | 9.0 | 23.6 | 82.1 | 100 | 76.7 | 60.2 | 65.7 |
| 1966-70 | 41 | 43.9 | 0 | -4.5 | 12.1 | 95.1 | 54.8 | 33.7 | 32.9 |
| 1961-65 | 32 | 48.4 | 31.2 | 18.5 | 37.5 | 100 | 79.6 | 29.6 | 48.4 |
| 1956-60 | 14 | 82.1 | 82.1 | 17.8 | 39.2 | 92.8 | 96.4 | 42.8 | 75.0 |
| 1951-55 | 13 | 19.2 | 53.8 | 0 | 3.8 | 100 | 46.1 | 3.8 | 11.5 |
| 1946-50 | 12 | 20.8 | 50 | -2 | 0 | 100 | 41.6 | -4.5 | -0.5 |
| Mean Support | 185 | 47.1 | 37.6 | 9.9 | 32.4 | 97.9 | 65.8 | 26.3 | 38.9 |

Indices have been grouped into five-year periods. The votes included are those reported in the *UN Monthly Chronicle* for the periods of the annual General Assembly sessions and for which data were available for all of the states. Every resolution was so worded that a vote in favour of any one was indicative of support for decolonization or racial equality while a negative vote reflected lack of support, or at least was so interpreted by the resolution's proponents. Accordingly, each state's level of support for the resolutions was computed simply by subtracting the number of its negative votes from its affirmative votes plus one half of its abstentions, and recording the remainder as a percentage of the total number of the state's recorded votes over each five-year period.

In the case of Canada, the table indicates at least a modest degree of support throughout the thirty year period for decolonization and racial equality: that is Canada's affirmative votes outnumbered its negative votes in all six five-year periods, although by significant margins only in the last four periods. The table would seem to indicate a fluctuating level of Canadian support for decolonization and an end to racial discrimination, with the level low for the first ten years, rising suddenly between 1956 and 1960, declining sharply over the following two periods and then recovering appreciably between 1971 and 1975. However, two important considerations which modify this conclusion need to be taken into account. First, the number of what can be described as action resolutions (i.e. resolutions which call upon the member states under analysis to take some specific action to further decolonization and racial equality, such as ceasing "any assistance to and co-operation with South Africa,") has increased dramatically since about 1960, relative to what can be described as declaratory resolutions (i.e. ones which do not request the particular member

states under examination to perform any specific type of action).

Over the first thirty years of the UN, Canada's support for action resolutions lagged behind that for "declaratory" resolutions by a ratio of about three to one. Thus, the marked increase in the number of such resolutions over the last half of the period under analysis deflated the Canadian—as well as other states'—level of support for resolutions on colonial and racial questions relative to what it would have been had the mix of action and declaratory resolutions remained the same as in earlier years.

Second, the tone of both action and declaratory resolutions changed significantly after the 1950's. With their increasing majority in the General Assembly, Third World countries were more and more in a position to introduce and successfully pass resolutions which often employed vituperative language, were harsher in their criticisms of the remaining colonial powers, called for recognition of and support to various liberation movements and sometimes advocated the use of force. Canada, like other western states, was unprepared to support many such resolutions, despite the fact that its attitude towards decolonization and racial equality had advanced sufficiently since the 1950's that it would now have been prepared to support many of the milder resolutions characteristic of the earlier years of the UN which at that time it had not supported. These considerations make comparisons of an individual state's voting over different five-year periods difficult. The figures are, however, useful for comparing the relative level of Canadian support over time with that of the other nine states under study.

US voting

United States' support for resolutions on colonial and racial questions was substantially higher than that of

Canada over the first ten years of the United Nations and the same over the next five, but after that time it slipped significantly behind Canada's level, especially over the last two five-year periods. Thus, while the mean levels of support of the two countries were relatively close for the total thirty-year period, they tended to move in opposite directions over this time frame.

The differing levels of support over the early years are perhaps accounted for by Canada's deference to its Commonwealth partners, Great Britain (during that period one of the leading colonial powers) and South Africa (the main target of UN resolutions dealing with racial equality) which held it back from support for many resolutions, while the United States was freer to give vent to its historical antipathy for colonialism. What appears to have happened later is that with British colonial rule fast drawing to an end and South Africa "expelled" from the Commonwealth, Canada felt freer to support decolonization and racial equality and as Matthews suggests in "Canada and Anglophone Africa", perhaps believed it mandatory to do so "to prevent the Soviet Union from using the colonial issue as a means of fostering anti-Western feelings among the states of Africa and Asia". By contract, the United States seems to have become increasingly reluctant to support change as the main remaining colonial areas were narrowed down to the Portuguese colonies, Rhodesia, South Africa and Namibia, in all of which areas it was doubtless feared that liberation would rebound to the advantage of the Communist states rather than the West. The Soviet naval build-up in the Indian Ocean area may have contributed to this U.S. resistance to change.

Despite the above suggestion that Canadian support in the early years of the UN may have been moderate out of deference to Britain, this can have had only a modest effect on Canadian behaviour, for Canada's level of support was always higher than that of Britain. Indeed, as Table 1 indicates, the United Kingdom had the lowest level of support of any of the states under analysis and in three periods the number of its affirmative votes either exceeded or was only equal to the combined total of its affirmative votes and abstentions.

Table 1 also discloses a marked variation in Canadian support compared to the other Commonwealth states in the study. Australia's level of support lagged behind Canada's except during the 1971-75 period primarily Labour Government in Australia, and India's level of support was consistently far above Canada's, even in the early years of the UN when the highest degree of Commonwealth solidarity is believed to have existed. With regard to the remaining states, Scandinavian countries consistently exhibited high levels of support than Canada, and Belgium and the Netherlands lower.

In sum, the data demonstrate that the Canadian pattern of support was significantly different from most of those states with which Canada has traditionally been regarded as in accord. Overall, its behaviour was closest to that of the Netherlands of any of the states under study.

Alternative method

Table 2 provides an alternative and perhaps more effective method, for the purposes of this study, of comparing the Canadian voting record on colonial and

Table 2

Indices of Agreement for Resolutions on Colonial and Racial Questions

| Period | N | U.S. | U.K. | Australia | India | Scan. | Belgium | Netherlands |
|----------------|-----|------|------|-----------|-------|-------|---------|-------------|
| 1971-75 | 73 | 67.3 | 78.0 | 78.0 | 69.1 | 90.4 | 87.6 | 89.0 |
| 1966-70 | 41 | 74.3 | 72.3 | 82.9 | 56.0 | 91.4 | 89.0 | 87.8 |
| 1961-65 | 32 | 89.0 | 75.9 | 89.0 | 67.1 | 85.9 | 85.9 | 96.8 |
| 1956-60 | 14 | 89.2 | 57.1 | 71.4 | 75.0 | 85.7 | 75.0 | 85.7 |
| 1951-55 | 13 | 80.7 | 80.7 | 84.6 | 50.0 | 80.7 | 84.6 | 92.3 |
| 1946-50 | 12 | 62.5 | 79.1 | 79.1 | 54.1 | 70.8 | 75.0 | 75.0 |
| Mean Agreement | 185 | 77.2 | 72.2 | 80.8 | 61.9 | 84.1 | 82.8 | 87.8 |

questions with those of other countries. In this table the figures indicate the degree of agreement with Canada of the nine other states in their voting on the resolutions. Each state's index of agreement with Canada was computed by adding the number of times which it voted the same way as Canada to one-half of the times in which they were in partial agreement (i.e., one state abstained while the other voted either affirmatively or negatively) and recording the sum as a percentage of the total number of the recorded votes of both countries over each five-year period.

In evaluating the significance of the indices of agreement that follow, it is important to bear in mind that even in instances where one would expect marked differences in the voting behaviour of two states, moderately high indices of agreement are, nevertheless, common. For instance, it could logically be expected that Canadian voting behaviour would differ most dramatically with communist states like the USSR and conservative colonial powers like Portugal (during virtually all of the period under analysis). Yet, Canada's mean indices of agreement with these two states during the thirty-year period under study were 54.5 and 57.8 respectively. Thus, only very high indices of agreement (perhaps those well above 80) can be taken as indicating a really significant degree of congruence in voting behaviour.

Looking first at the Canada-United States voting relationship and bearing the above in mind, Table 2 demonstrates clearly differences in voting behaviour between the two countries on colonial and racial questions. The mean index of agreement over the six five-year periods was third lowest of the states under study, and in the last period lower even than Canada's index of agreement with the Soviet Union (71.2)! Only during the middle periods of 1956-1960 and 1961-1965, when Canadian and American support levels tended to converge while moving in opposite directions, was there a high degree of voting congruence.

A detailed examination of voting on specific resolutions would also disclose that Canada and the United States frequently differed in their voting on important matters at the UN (particularly over the last ten years), including such issues as the use of force to remove the Smith regime in Rhodesia and the granting of self-determination to the Portuguese colonies in Africa.

Furthermore, apart from the 1956-1965 period, other states under study were closer to the U.S. in their voting records than was Canada. This was particularly true in the last two periods, suggesting perhaps a growing tendency for Canada to pursue an "independent" course in international affairs, particularly after Prime Minister Trudeau assumed office in 1968. In the 1966-1970 period Australia (89.0), the United Kingdom (88.1), Belgium (82.9), and the Netherlands (81.7) had all significantly higher indices of agreement with the U.S. than did Canada (74.3), while in the 1971-

1975 period, Britain (84.0), Belgium (72.9) and the Netherlands (68.0) were all closer to the U.S. in their behaviour than was Canada (67.3). The data thus point to the validity, at least in so far as the UN issue of colonialism and racism are concerned, of John Holmes' assertion in *Canada and the United States: Political and Security Issues* (1970) that "an examination of the positions adopted by allies of the United States on various international issues ... would show Canada as having acted a good deal more independently than most of the others, Britain and Australia in particular."

Britain

The same difference in behaviour is apparent vis-à-vis Britain, with which Canada had the second lowest level of voting agreement over-all (72.2 percent). Only during the first two periods was the index of agreement around 80 percent, suggesting that in the early years of the United Nations Canada may have moderated its outlook on colonial and racial questions somewhat in the interests of harmony with the U.K., although even at that time there was not a particularly marked degree of consensus. The relatively high level of agreement with Australia during the 1946-1955 period further points to some tendency of the white Commonwealth countries to pursue similar policies in this issue area during the first decade of the UN. However, thereafter, with British-Canadian agreement declining, white Commonwealth harmony was never very high.

The mean index of agreement with India of 61.9 percent over the six five-year periods also indicates the absence of any broader Commonwealth solidarity on colonial and racial questions, as well as the gap between Canadian policy and that of third world countries. Surprisingly, the first two periods exhibited the lowest levels of agreement, a finding which casts doubts on the existence of any sort of Indo-Canadian entente, at least in this area of foreign policy, during the early post-war years.

With regard to the Scandinavian states, the mean index of agreement over the six five-year periods was moderately high (84.1), but Canada and these countries have drawn even closer together in this area of foreign policy in more recent years. The indices of agreement were 91.4 and 90.4 percent in the last two five-year periods, as Canada's support for resolutions on colonial and racial questions started to catch up with that of the Scandinavian states.

The relatively high mean indices of agreement with Belgium (82.8) and the Netherlands (87.8) as well, however, indicate not so much the emergence of a special "Scan-Can" relationship in this area, as a tendency for a broader group of smaller, western states to pursue similar policies. This congruence of Canadian voting with the Scandinavian states (two of which are NATO members) and Belgium and the Netherlands, particularly over the last fifteen years (during which the index of agreement never fell below 85.9), shows a

similarity in the outlook of the non-great NATO powers in this area of foreign policy. However, the absence of a convergence in Canadian voting with that of the United States and Britain (and France, Greece and Portugal on the basis of our larger study) points to a lack of NATO harmony overall.

To establish whether or not it is valid to argue that Canadian policy in these issue areas has been closest to that of the Scandinavian states and Belgium and the Netherlands, rather than some wider group of western countries, Canada's record was compared with the remaining states of Western Europe which were members of the United Nations during part or all of the period under study. Pakistan, Nigeria, Ghana, Brazil and Mexico were also included in this expanded study as representatives of different developing regions, in order to establish whether or not the findings regarding India were typical of Canada's voting vis-à-vis other third world countries. Finally, the indices of agreement with the USSR and Poland were computed in order to establish the likely outer limit of voting divergence.

Table 3 portrays the mean indices of agreement of these additional states with Canada over the six five-year periods. It indicates high levels of Canadian agreement with the states of Austria, Italy and Finland in particular. Indeed, for all three of these states their overall indices of agreement with Canada were higher even than those of the Scandinavian countries, Belgium and the Netherlands. Not surprisingly, the indices were by contrast, low for such conservative western states as Greece, Spain and Portugal, for the additional developing countries, all of which had indices of agreement with Canada similar to that of India and for the Soviet bloc countries which, as expected, exhibited the lowest mean indices of any of the twenty-seven states analyzed.

Independent

It seems, therefore, that Canadian voting at the United Nations on resolutions dealing with colonial and racial questions over the period 1946-1975 has been essentially 'independent'. While the Canadian pattern was close to that of some states, it was far from being identical with any, and over time there were divergences from all states under analysis. This suggests that Canadian policy in this area at least has been determined on the basis of specifically Canadian evaluations of the situation, and has changed as Canada itself has felt that adjustments were necessary.

More specifically the data indicates marked divergences in Canadian behaviour vis-à-vis most of those states and groups with which Canada is usually compared. Particularly significant in this respect is the lack of a high degree of consensus with the United States.

Finally, the study has pointed to the tendency of Canadian policy in the area of colonial and racial questions to correspond most closely with that of an amorphous group of smaller, western powers, including not only the Scandinavian states and Belgium and the Netherlands, but also Italy and the neutralist states Austria and Finland, while at the same time excluding a number of other non-great western powers. Additional study is required, however, in order to establish whether or not this rather mixed group has behaved similarly in other areas of international affairs, and also to answer the difficult question as to why the similarities exist. For the moment, though, Canadians can take comfort in the thought that they may have more acceptable bedfellows in some fields of foreign policy than many of them have long believed to be the case.

Table 3

*Mean Indices of Agreement with Canada
of 18 Additional States for Resolutions
on Colonial and Racial Questions*

| Western European States | |
|-------------------------|------|
| Austria | 90.6 |
| Italy | 90.2 |
| Finland | 88.6 |
| Ireland | 81.8 |
| Luxemburg | 81.8 |
| Turkey | 79.3 |
| France | 73.5 |
| Greece | 72.4 |
| Iceland | 71.5 |
| Spain | 71.1 |
| Portugal | 57.8 |
| Developing States | |
| Ghana | 67.5 |
| Brazil | 67.0 |
| Nigeria | 65.7 |
| Mexico | 64.9 |
| Pakistan | 60.9 |
| Soviet Bloc States | |
| USSR | 54.5 |
| Poland | 53.8 |

Yugoslavia after Tito: the time of testing

by Edward Whitcomb

There is a Yugoslav joke that the situation of the country can be explained by a mathematical formula: Yugoslavia has seven neighbours, six Republics, five nations, four languages, three religions, two alphabets, but only one real Yugoslav - Josip Broz Tito. The question which has troubled people for decades, both in Yugoslavia and throughout the world, is what happens in Yugoslavia now that the one genuine Yugoslav has died.

In fact, the diversity, and hence the problem of future stability, is even greater than the above mathematical formula suggests, for there are also over a dozen minorities, major economic divisions, and significant groups who do not accept the present system or even the existence of the Yugoslav state. Much depends on the suitability of the socio-political system Tito and his colleagues have devised. There is therefore a need to identify and analyze both the problem of divisiveness and the aspects of the Yugoslav system designed to counter and contain this divisiveness. If the solutions are appropriate for Yugoslavia's peculiar circumstances, then the unprecedented stability of the past three decades should continue provided, of course, that there are no major external interventions.

Yugoslavia is almost hopelessly divided and it is these divisions which create the centripetal forces that, some fear, could destroy the country. Geography has been unkind to Yugoslavia. The coastline is so sharply cut off from the interior that for centuries the coastal towns had virtually no contact with villages less than fifty miles away. The southwest half of the country is so rugged that the German armies never could surround Tito; and the Turks were unsuccessful in a centuries-long attempt to subdue the Montenegrins. The Danube plain and the hills that run from Belgrade to Greece are more open; but the result has not facilitated unity. Rather, it provided an avenue for invasion and permitted foreign armies to divide the area into Austrian, Hungarian and Turkish sectors. Belgrade has just celebrated its thirty-fifth year without a foreign invasion, one of the longest periods of peace in its entire history.

Geography helps dictate the other divisions. There

are four distinct nations; the Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, and Montenegrins, plus possibly a fifth, the Macedonians, who, to an outsider, are virtually indistinguishable from the Bulgarians. There are at least eighteen minorities, called nationalities, including one million Albanians and half a million Hungarians, and numerous Italians, Romanians, and Bulgar minorities who, along with Yugoslavia outside the borders, create the potential for problems with neighbours. Three of the languages are official—Slovene, Serbo-Croat, and Macedonian; but a dozen others are spoken, not to mention dialects. The northwest and the coast are Catholic; the east and the south Orthodox; and large portions of the interior are Moslem, with religious minorities scattered through all these areas. Ultimately, the main difference between a Serb and a Croat is religion. In Bosnia, this becomes the only difference, leaving the problem of what nationality to attribute to the people who are of the same stock, but are neither Catholic (Croat) nor Orthodox (Serb). The answer is to call them Moslems, one of the few places in the world where national origin is defined exclusively by religious affiliation.

Inevitably, there are vast cultural differences between these groups, both caused and magnified by the fact that the country was long subjected to three totally different empires and civilizations. The coastal cities are Venetian, with a long history of international commerce. The northwest (Slovenia and Croatia) are clearly Austrian. The centre and south lived under the Turks for three centuries. Prosperity and development came to the areas under Austrian and Venetian domination, while it is argued that the south was poorer in 1900 than when the Turks came in the 1600's! This economic division persists; the northwest being six times richer than the south, creating yet another layer of resentment and hatred, which is reinforced by negative northern views on the work habits and birth rate of the south.

Mr. Whitcomb is an officer of the Department of External Affairs who recently returned from a two-year posting in Belgrade.

History

The historical evolution of Yugoslavia as a country has been unfortunate. While there were pan-Slav elements throughout the country before 1914, it is questionable whether they were in a majority and large numbers of people were quite content with Austrian rule. Not so the Serbs, who bear a good portion of the blame for World War I and who used the war to create a unified Balkan country comprising the above-mentioned national, religious, and cultural groups, but excluding several other Balkan nations such as the Bulgars. The Serbs (40 percent of the population) believed they had created the country and set out to run it accordingly. They provided the King, the capital city, the army, the officer corps, the government, the foreign policy, and they set out to exploit the area so many of them had died to acquire. The south soon discovered that it was little better off than under the Turks, only exploitation was now inexcusable coming from a government of fellow Slavs. Croatia and Slovenia were probably much worse off than under the Austrians and their economy stagnated while taxes were drained off to support an army whose foreign policy they did not accept and to support the industrialization of Serbia, an area they viewed as economically backward. The history of the inter-war period, then, added to the existing divisions within the country by accentuating differences and creating political hostility and competition based on national and religious lines.

This bitterness exploded in World War II. The Croats naturally welcomed the return of the Austrians and Germans and formed a German satellite state. Bits of the country were given to Germany's allies, thus increasing hostility to Hungarians, Italians, Bulgarians and the large German minority. The nationalities turned on each other in a vicious civil war, which was conducted within a national war against the Nazis and a political war between Communists and Royalists. The war cost over 1,700,000 lives, more than 10 percent of the population, mostly killed by Yugoslavs. Whole villages were destroyed—men, women and children—in a wave of cruelty that shocked even hardened Nazis.

From the beginning of the civil war, Tito had his eyes on two objectives—the defeat of the Germans and the post-war situation. Early on, he devised his formula for a post-war solution and he never strayed from it. For want of a better definition, it is unity in diversity; unity in that the Communist Party would be the only political organization; diversity in that it would rule through some form of federal structure which would give considerable local control. Thus, at the federal level, compromises would be worked out by Communists from all areas and groups; and, at the local level, decisions would be made by local Communists and not Serbs or Croats or Catholics or Orthodox in Belgrade.

In spite of many modifications, this formula has persisted and is the basis of the system Tito has devised for the future of Yugoslavia. There are, in fact, more than a dozen facets to the Yugoslav socio-political system. Each can be analyzed, but it is vitally important to realize that they are all parts of an interlocking system which is extremely intricate and sophisticated. The late Edward Kardelj, top political theorist and number two in the regime for decades, has even given the system a theoretical framework based on Marxism which, it is argued, is far more pure than the Soviet variety.

Collective leadership

One of Tito's first creations was collective leadership. He may have made the final decisions when agreements proved impossible, but since the 1940's, he has surrounded himself with a group of colleagues representing different points of view; and he has tried to ensure that their ideas were reflected in the decisions. This will not be replaced. He will be succeeded by this same collective leadership minus himself. He cannot be replaced as final arbiter for three reasons. There is no one like him in Yugoslavia—is there an equivalent in the world? Secondly, he cannot be replaced because a Serb would accept permanent leadership by a Croat and vice versa; and it is absurd to rotate the leadership among the lesser nationalities. Finally, it is constitutionally impossible for one person to succeed Tito in his two positions, President of Yugoslavia and President of the Communist Party (known as the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, the LCY).

An elaborate system has been established to avoid the domination of one man (or nationality). The position of President of Yugoslavia will devolve on the State Presidency, consisting of eight members, one from each Republic or Province, each taking one-year turns as President and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. Tito's position of President of the Party will likely disappear; the Party being led by a Chairman and a Presiding Officer, each of these positions rotating after one or two years among the 24 members of the Party Presidium in such a manner that no area or person can accumulate too much power; and no one nationality can supply both the State President and leading Party positions at the same time.

In Yugoslavia, decisions will be made by a shifting combination of persons, depending on the issue, on their positions, on the area or group they represent, on their personal influence. The combination will include, though not exclusively, the State President, the Party Secretary, and the Party Presiding Officer (currently Lazar Kolisevski, Dusan Dragosavac, and Branko Mikulic), the Prime Minister (Vaselin, Djurajevic), the Defence and Interior Ministers (N. Ljubecic and F. Herljevic), the leading Serb(s) (P. Stambolic and M. Minic), and the leading Croat (V. Bakavic). Others such as Stane Dolanc will drift in and out of the

decision-making body, depending on issues and "politics". This collective leadership should survive because it has been in effect for years (while Tito's "role" cannot be exaggerated, his influence on decisions can and has been), and because its advantages (avoiding strife) outweigh its disadvantages (slowness or indecision). A future crisis may force a concentration of power in one man's hands, but no one can foresee this now. After the crisis, collective leadership could well reassert itself.

All of the above are members of the Communist Party, and almost all are on its 24-man Presidium, which heads a 150-man Central Committee and a membership of over one million. Roughly one-fifth of the active male Yugoslavian population is in the Party including all policemen and military officers. The one-party state may be unacceptable to Western liberals but it suits Yugoslavia quite well. If there were two parties, they would inevitably divide on linguistic or regional lines as has happened in many Western democracies. Western institutions and societies are sufficiently stable to sustain this luxury; Yugoslavia is not. A competitive two-party system would divide between Serb and Croat and/or north and south. The result would be strife, not individual freedom. But the one-party system permits the airing of a wide range of opinion within a single policy and with a discipline to enforce collective decisions. It is unlikely it will change. Great care is taken to see that every group is represented at all levels of the Party.

This Party staffs all the positions in a federal system. Tito knew that a Serbian-dominated country could not survive, so he created a federal system. One Republic was created for each of the four nations—Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, and Montenegro, and another for the new "nation" of Macedonia. A sixth was created for the mixed Serb-Croat-Moslem area of the centre, Bosnia-Herzegovina. Parts of Serbia were given to Bosnia and Macedonia, but it was still too large so the mixed Hungarian areas to the north became the Province of Vojvodina; the mixed Albanian part to the south becoming Kosovo. Thus a federal structure was created which no one Republic or nation could dominate.

Division of Power

Equally important was the division of powers between federal and state governments, the most important issue in any federal system. The people who wield power at any time, and Communists and Socialists especially, have a tendency to prefer centralization. While less centralized than the pre-war monarchy, Tito's federation was too centralized for Yugoslav circumstances. That led to political crisis in the early 1970's when Croat nationalism and resentment of federal (to them, still Serb-dominated) power led to riots and demonstrations which held the sympathy of much of the Croat Communist leadership. Tito, as usual, was both ruthless and clever—he purged the Croat leadership and

addressed the grievances that produced the crisis. Several years of intense debate led to a new Constitution that established a highly decentralized state, with the federal government limited to defence, foreign affairs, the post office and things like inter-state communications and trade. The question now is whether it is too decentralized; as Republics enter uneconomic competition for oil refineries and car factories.

This decentralization is part of an entire philosophy developed by the Yugoslavs, called self-management. It is the theological basis of their system and was developed by Edward Kardelj as the purest form of Marxism. In international affairs, Yugoslavs are non-aligned, refusing to take orders from either bloc and, hence, are self-managed. The Republics have decentralized power so that each commune and city is self-managed. Finally, and this is what they are most proud of, each collective farm and factory is self-managed and "power to the workers" is achieved. Decisions as to whether to plant wheat or oats, make cars or trucks, invest or pay higher wages are made in the plant and not by some civil servant in Belgrade or financier in Zagreb. One can quibble over the relative strength of workers and managers in each factory and one can certainly find examples where national views have influenced local decisions; but, to a considerable extent, decisions are made in the factory and large farms; and the workers do have an influence. The system is both inflationary and inefficient, but it has also helped produce a low strike rate and one of the highest economic growth rates in the post-war world. They are not about to trade it in for either Russian centralism or branch plant economy.

Within this overall political system there are two unique features—parity and rotation. Parity implies that each Republic is entitled to the same proportion of positions in the federal government (the Provinces slightly less). Thus, each Republic has one member of the State Presidency, a minimum of three Cabinet seats, 30 men in the lower, and 20 in the upper house, two judges in the federal court, and a share of the army officers and ambassadorial positions. The same applies to the Party and the local assemblies and governments. This annoys the Serbs, who are more numerous (on the principle of representation by population, they would get 40 percent of all positions) and the Croats and Slovenes, who are often better educated and more highly qualified. But the fact is that the Serbs do obtain many jobs through sheer weight of numbers (9 of 32 Cabinet seats and a plurality of army officers); and the Croats and Slovenes dominate the economy; and these three nations run their own Republics, which constitutes most of Yugoslavia. Parity is, in effect, essential to ensure that Macedonians, Moslems, Montenegrins, and the minorities have a fair voice in federal decisions and an equitable number of federal positions.

A second underlying principle of the whole system is rotation. With few exceptions, a person cannot serve

longer than two four-year terms. After that he rotates Government to Party, federal to Republic, political to non-political (business or university). This helps prevent stagnation or the building of a power base. Civil servants and politicians have almost always served in both levels of government and understand both federal and regional concerns. In Belgrade, they are forced to work with other nationalities and a person from one region is usually replaced by someone from another so that no nationality can dominate one branch of government. The biographies of the Yugoslav leadership almost all reveal this pattern—a half-dozen years in some combination of Party and Government jobs, at national or local level, possibly a stint with business or in the diplomatic service. Only the banks and armed forces are outside this system. Naturally, it has its disadvantages, including instability, appointment on the basis of nationality rather than ability; and it takes more people to run the system. But they clearly prefer to have an inefficient system that works politically.

Security forces

There are two security forces that back up this system, the armed forces and the police. The armed forces are the only truly all-Yugoslav institution, with no reference being made to the Republics. As always the Serbs are disproportionately represented, as are the warrior-like Montenegrins, and the Croats dominate the navy. The officer corps is all Communist. Conscripts serve their enlistment outside their home Republic (and often marry women from another area). They are especially trained in guerilla warfare and, if history is our guide, will not easily be subdued by any outside force. While Tito has given the forces the task of preserving national unity, they are, in fact, highly a-political. The police, on the other hand, are drawn from the areas they supervise; it would be intolerable to have an outsider enforce the law in any Republic. They are possibly amongst the most effective police anywhere, as evidenced by the extremely low crime rate and the safety accorded politicians, businessmen, and foreign diplomats. There are also rumours that the police can be ruthless — they have been accused of murdering opponents in Western Europe. One Cominformist (pro-Russian) went to sleep in Switzerland and was “discovered” by the Yugoslav police sleeping in a car on the highway near Zagreb. He is now serving a 25-year sentence.

Three policies — language rights, regional disparities, and freedom — should also be identified as parts of this system. Before the War, the government followed a policy of Serbianization, which contributed mightily to the hatred. In contrast, the present regime has an excellent policy on languages. Anyone can speak in, deal with, or obtain documents from the federal government in any of the three main languages. In the Vojvodina, Hungarian is an official language; as is Albanian in Kosovo; and municipalities deal with

significant minorities in their own language such as Italian near Trieste. Tito's collected works are, of course, available in every language spoken in the country.

To combat the divisiveness and bitterness of regional disparities (rich north, poor south), a fund of 1 percent of GNP is divided between the poorest regions on a mathematical per capita/per income basis. The decisions on whether to spend this on infrastructure, mining, tourism, agriculture, or any other project in the National Plan, are made by the local governments. This gives the people of these areas a control over their own destiny unknown in the poorest parts of most countries. They, and not some distant bureaucrat, are responsible for the programs. Local power provides an incentive for some of the brightest to stay instead of drifting to the center of economic activity as happens so often elsewhere. It also gives the local people a considerable confidence and pride in their own achievements. It is, of course, resented in the northwest, but a price worth paying for the richer parts because it helps maintain a common market and reduces discontent.

Visitors to Yugoslavia are often amazed to discover how free the society is. Yugoslavs and foreigners are free to travel within and across borders. Western newspapers are readily available. But, in fact, freedom of speech is limited in four areas: one cannot criticize the Head of State; one cannot advocate joining NATO or the Warsaw Pact; one cannot advocate adopting a different social system; and one cannot make derogatory comments about another race or religion. The reason is, of course, the fear that free speech in these areas would lead to racial conflict, because the various peoples do not equally agree on the compromises that have been worked out. However, these restrictions are qualified by the fact that Yugoslavs are free to emigrate if they find the restrictions intolerable. Hundreds of thousands have left, but largely for economic rather than political reasons. The right to leave itself is a safety valve; few actually feel obliged to take advantage of it and thousands retire to the homeland at the end of their careers in the West.

The above description of the Yugoslav system is, of course, highly generalized. Anyone knowledgeable about the country will identify dozens of places where qualifications and reservations and more detailed explanations could have been added (and would have been in an article five times longer). There are also interpretations implied with which some will disagree. One must also add another important qualifier: the Yugoslavs are highly pragmatic, flexible, and innovative. If any aspect of the system does not work, they will not hesitate to alter or ignore it.

Nevertheless, this is essentially their system of government—a decentralized federal structure governed by one party, self-managed throughout, with parity for the groups and rotations in office, headed

collective leadership and supported by large armed forces and an effective police. Language rights are protected, freedom is extensive and considerable efforts are being made to reduce gaps between rich and poor areas. For 35 years, a record in the history of the area, this and this system have provided peace, stability and prosperity — not long enough to heal the scars of the past, not long enough to turn Serbs and Croats into Yugoslavs, not long enough to close the gap between north and south. On the one extreme, Cominformists want a re-imposition of Stalinism; on the other, Croat

separatists want the state destroyed. No regime could have solved Yugoslavia's problems in 35 years, but the accomplishment to date is truly impressive. The present system is balanced and there are advantages in it for almost every group and nationality in the country. The ones not satisfied constitute small minorities. It is difficult to imagine any other system or any major changes in the present one, which would come so close to satisfying the unique circumstances of Yugoslavia. It is in the interests of the vast majority of Yugoslavs that it survive. For that reason, it probably will.

Khomeini and the 'big lie'

by Sidney A. Freifeld

At the beginning of April—more than three weeks before the abortive attempt to rescue the United States Embassy hostages in Tehran—Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, in a statement to the Iranian news agency Pars, said that President Carter was a person who found it easy to lie. While this was one of the Iranian cleric's blander characterizations of the American President, it was a curious example of the pot calling the kettle black. Whatever high level of spirituality and morality may be attributed to the Ayatollah, many of his utterances during the past year compel the conclusion that, at least by Western standards, he must be considered one of the more extravagant liars of modern times.

While the record may be conclusive to a degree that makes it possible to predict what his reaction will be to a wide range of political events, the motivation remains less clear. It may be too facile, for example, simply to ascribe this propensity to an attempt to adapt the Hitler-Goebbels 'big lie' techniques of the 1930s and 1940s to the circumstances of present-day Iran. In any event the examples provided below should by no means be considered a complete record of this phenomenon; they are presented neither in temporal sequence nor in order of their internal or foreign political propaganda potential.

Americans blamed

During the past year three major assassinations have been perpetrated within Iran for which 'credit', i.e. responsibility, was quickly claimed by Forghan, a small, mysterious and clandestine terrorist group that has been variously described as anti-clerical, Islamic fun-

damentalist, rightist, leftist or just 'confused'. The most prominent of its victims was a close clerical associate of Khomeini—the Ayatollah Morteza Motaheri—who was a prominent member of the Revolutionary Council. The others were the dean of Tehran University's divinity school and a senior commander of the armed forces supporting the new regime. After each of the three assassinations Khomeini promptly charged that, notwithstanding Forghan insistence, 'American imperialists' had carried out these murders.

After the new Iranian Islamic constitution was adopted last year and an election was called to select the first president (the election eventually won by Abolhassan Bani-Sadr), an embarrassing multiplicity of 90-odd candidates came forward. Only a few could be considered to have viable candidatures, and some were oddballs who had emerged from the flotsam and jetsam of the revolutionary situation. The sheer number of candidates, let alone the peculiarities of a number of them, presented unexpected obstacles to the authorities responsible for the electoral process. As the election's successful conclusion appeared to be threatened, Khomeini charged 'American imperialists'—and this time throwing in 'Zionist colonialists'—with a plot to confuse and divide the Iranian people and disrupt the election.

Mr. Freifeld's last post before retiring from the Department of External Affairs in 1975 was Ambassador to Colombia and Ecuador. During the 1930s he was an early analyst of Nazi and Italian Fascist propaganda and psychological warfare techniques.

For decades—under Mohammed Mossadegh, the Shah's father and Shah Reza Pahlavi—Iran has experienced severe internal strains from the thrust of its numerous minority racial groups for varying degrees of autonomy. The 'restive Kurds' resisted against Iran for generations. Before and after Khomeini's accession to power, there have been disturbances of greater or lesser severity among the Baluchis, Turkmen, Pushtus and Arabs. The serious outbreaks in Azerbaijan have had a special additional cause. The Azerbaijanis' spiritual leader, Ayatollah Shariat-Madari, was critical during the considerations for the new Islamic Constitution of the powers that Khomeini would be given as *Faghi* (guide or authority): power to dismiss the elected president, declare war, name the top judicial and military officials and other powers that, in their totality, Shariat-Madari considered far too sweeping. On a number of occasions serious outbreaks took place among his more militant supporters and those of Khomeini. In seemingly knee-jerk fashion following virtually every disturbance in the provinces, Khomeini blamed 'American imperialists'—sometimes throwing in 'Zionists' for good measure.

Perhaps the most flagrant and explosive example of Ayatollah Khomeini's lying capabilities came on November 20, 1979, when about 500 armed men burst into the courtyard of Islam's holiest shrine, the Grand Mosque in Mecca, just after 40,000 worshippers had finished their prayers. According to the Saudi Arabian authorities the leader of this unprecedented episode was Juhayman bin Mohammed bin Seif al-Oteibi, a 36 year old member of the Saudi Arabian Wahabi sect, and his most important followers was 26 year old Mohammed bin Abdallah al-Qahtani, whom Oteibi intended to designate as the awaited Mahdi, whom all Muslims must obey.

It took two weeks of strenuous fighting, with hundreds of casualties on both sides, before the Saudi Arabian government forces put down the armed eruption. The invaders were finally subdued on December 4, and on January 9, 1980, Oteibi and 63 of his followers (including persons from Egypt, Yemen, South Yemen, Iraq, Sudan and Kuwait) were beheaded by the Saudi Arabian authorities. Oteibi, like most of his followers, was an extreme xenophobe, as fanatically opposed to the Shi'ites, whom he considered outlaws in Islam, as to Christians and Jews. His attack on the Grand Mosque, a bizarre eruption of religious fanaticism that constituted a severe threat to the prestige and stability of the Saudi regime, was bound to offend Moslems throughout the world.

With the high inflammatory potential of this tinderbox, Khomeini charged that 'Americans' and 'Zionists' were responsible for the attack on the Grand Mosque. As soon as this was reported to the world, enraged Pakistanis attacked and burned the United States Embassy in Islamabad, resulting in several deaths. The American Embassy in Tripoli, Libya was also attacked

by angry mobs. It is small wonder that, in the circumstances, Khomeini's lie did not spark a *jihad*, or war, against non-Moslems throughout the Islamic world and outside of it.

Khomeini's Lessons

Would Khomeini really like to foment a *jihad*? A decade ago he gave a detailed exposition of his views in a series of 'Lessons' delivered at a theological school in Baghdad, which was subsequently published in Arabic and only this year brought to public attention in the West in a short article by a distinguished journalist, Ted Szulc, formerly of the *New York Times*. According to his report, Khomeini in his 'Lessons' called repeatedly for Islamic political revolutions and for uprooting of all Western influences from the Moslem world. "... The agents of colonialism and their educational and political agencies have injected their poison into the people's minds and ethics until they corrupted them ... The sick ideas coming from abroad must be uprooted and every form of ... deviation in society must be fought."

To this end, Khomeini says that "We must begin our work with propaganda activities ... ceaseless efforts must be exerted to enlighten the people, to expose the criminal plans and the deviations among the temporal authorities ... all the masses are thus polarized and the goal is thus achieved." Several times in the 'Lessons' Khomeini repeats the inflammatory lie that the fire that broke out in the Al Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem in 1969—a fire which had been set by a mentally disturbed Australian farm hand visiting the Holy Land—was the work of the "Jews." More ominously he wrote: "Our responsibility today, and at a time when all the forces of colonialism and its agents, the treacherous rulers, Zionism and atheistic materialism are collaborating to distort Islam, is heavier than ever before ... We must expose this treachery and must shout at the top of our voices so that we may make the people realize that the Jews and their foreign masters seek to smear Islam and pave the way for Jews to dominate the entire world. The worst that can be feared is that they achieve their goals in their special ways. Because of our weakness, we may awaken one day to find a Jewish ruler ruling our country, God forbid." This is perhaps reminiscent less of Hitler's *Mein Kampf* than of the pogrom-provoking forgery of the Czarist regime, the infamous '*Protocols of the Elders of Zion*.'

Abortive Rescue

The propensity to lie is by no means confined among the Iranian clergy to Khomeini. For example, after the failed American hostage rescue attempt in April, the head of the Islamic Revolutionary Council, Islamic Judge Ayatollah Sadegh Khalkhali, presided over a macabre televised display of the charred corpses of the eight American dead and stated that 18 U.S. planes, helicopters and 3000 men took part in the rescue attempt.

tempt. Ayatollah Hussein Ali Montazeri, who may well succeed Khomeini as *Faghi* — leader of the nation—accuses dissident Kurdish leaders of being “agents of Zionism and imperialism”; and in a speech at the Iranian New Year ceremonies he urged that “all our brothers and sisters . . . make our best effort to export our revolution to the world.”

Proof will not be offered here that the Americans did not use 18 planes, 20 helicopters and 3000 men in their rescue mission that failed, that Oteibi and his fundamentalist followers who attacked Mecca's Grand Mosque were not C.I.A. or Israeli agents, that the excessive number of presidential candidates were not inspired to emerge by Nixonian veterans of Watergate-style ‘dirty tricks.’ The reader will be left to judge for himself whether the cited assertions of Iranian clerics are plausible or false.

If they are false, as this writer believes, one question that arises is whether the Ayatollah Khomeini is consciously and calculatedly adapting Hitlerian ‘big lie’ techniques to present-day Iran, with the aim of fanaticizing support for his Shi'ite state internally and in order to humiliate and sow dissension among his real or imagined enemies abroad. Or are the lies simply borne of his intense hatred for the Shah, the West, modernization, the United States, Britain, and the Jews? Whatever the answer may be, we would be well advised in the 1980s to pay more attention to Khomeini's ‘Lessons’ than most of the world did to *Mein Kampf* in the 1930s. Certainly things seem to have changed since Herodotus, visiting Persia five centuries before the Christian Era, found that “their boys are taught three things only: to ride, to use the bow and to tell the truth.”

Faltering revolution sparks mass exodus from Cuba

by J.C.M. Ogelsby

The recent exodus of tens of thousands of Cubans from their homeland provides considerable evidence that the Cuban Revolution has over-extended itself. Cuba's leaders have denounced the *emigrados* as thieves, perverts, worms, and, in general, “anti-social elements”. They have also furnished some truth to the denunciations by releasing prisoners from jail to join the migration. Government statements and rallies against the migration have received considerable coverage in foreign reporting. Their play in the controlled domestic media have ensured that Cubans, as a whole, are breathing a sigh of relief at the departure of these unwanted citizens.

Cuban leaders, while acknowledging the country was facing hard times (an example was Raul Castro's December speech on the economic situation), have expected Cubans to continue to accept rationing of food and clothing; to live in crowded quarters owing to a shortage of housing (which the exodus may alleviate); to watch favoured bureaucrats, party members and military personnel pass by in their own or government-provided new cars while they queue for increasingly antiquated public transportation; and to feel that they are under constant surveillance at home and at work.

A bus stop provides a useful place for the police to demonstrate their constant vigilance against “anti-social elements”. An effective technique is for a patrol car to cruise past a crowded stop. A person standing apart from the crowd is singled out for questioning by a patrolman. It is all done with utmost courtesy, including the search of the shopping bundle, but the message is clear.

While it is not my intention to emphasize buses it seems appropriate given the fact that six Cubans seeking asylum rammed a bus through the gates of the Peruvian embassy on April 1st to begin the whole affair. They killed a Cuban sentry in the process; an angry Cuban government withdrew its protective force from around the embassy; and up to ten thousand Cubans took advantage of its removal to seek asylum.

Costa Rica assisted Peru in its efforts to remove the refugees by offering to take in some and to provide transit services for others. The United States agreed to take only 3,500 of those passing through Costa Rica.

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The Cuban government, probably not wanting too many disaffected Cubans tarnishing its image in Latin America and sensing an opportunity to divert some of the embarrassment it suffered in this incident to the U.S., ceased the airlift to Costa Rica and established the port of Mariel, located west of Havana, as the only port of exit. It also announced that all those Cubans who wished to emigrate could do so.

Thousands applied for exit permits as Cuban exiles while Cuban-Americans in the U.S. seized the initiative from the U.S. government and began a boat-lift from Mariel in the third week of April. In mid-May the U.S. government continued to struggle to find a policy that would not alienate Cuban-American voters and would bring some order into the exodus, while the Cuban government, having provided a safety-valve to relieve Cuba of malcontents at a moment of difficulty, could only hope that all the disaffected would be able to leave.

Discontent in Havana

The majority of *emigrados* probably come from Havana. With over one-fifth of Cuba's ten million inhabitants, Havana has deliberately been allowed to suffer for the benefit of the rest of Cuba. Throughout the Revolution the government has preferred to spend its limited funds elsewhere on the island. Moreover it is the *Habaneros* who are exposed to the weaknesses of the Revolution. They see the government's favourites receiving better housing, automobiles, televisions and other material benefits that they might be able to buy (if at all available to the general public) only at higher prices at government centres or on the black market.

The black market flourishes in Havana, spurred on probably more by the Russians than any other group with access to the stores that cater only to diplomats, tourists and foreign advisers.

In Havana, too, there is ample evidence of the breakdown in the block system of Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDR). In the first flush of the Revolution the CDR's were meant to inspire revolutionary fervour by demonstrating a team spirit in keeping the block clean. For years now, the CDR representatives have paid more attention to recording the comings and goings of the block's residents for the security services.

Havana residents are also very much aware that there is no shortage of paint and materials for those areas in which there is heavy traffic of visitors attending the numerous international gatherings the Cuban government sponsors as part of its political programme. The Cuban people, of course, have to bear the expense of these gatherings.

The recent thaw between the Cuban exile community in the United States and the Cuban government has permitted large numbers of Cuban exiles and Cuban-Americans to visit their families on the island. Press reports have indicated that these visits contrib-

ute to discontent. The suggestion has some validity. The visitors also carry suitcases jammed with hard-to-obtain goods which they leave behind on the island. The visitors also probably regale their hosts with accounts of their life of economic prosperity and, in many cases, demonstrated political influence. But Cubans have, as a whole, known about life in the United States for the entire period since 1959. They have not been shut off from communication. Therefore other factors must have come into play to make the *emigrados* reject the Revolution.

Foreign policy

It may well be that Cuba's relatively successful foreign policy has fuelled the exodus. Reports from the island indicate that activities in Africa and the Caribbean, particularly in Grenada, Jamaica and Nicaragua, have forced Cubans to sacrifice more for what the government calls "socialist solidarity" and "national liberation movements" abroad at a time when Cuba's own economy is in decline. Rumours circulating in Havana shortly before the Easter occupation of the Peruvian embassy, for example, told of a mutiny on a Cuban vessel carrying beans from Spain to Nicaragua. The crew thought the beans should be going to Cuba; evidence that some Cubans apparently were beginning to think about the cost to themselves and their compatriots of Cuba's international role, a role which, paradoxically



Cuban refugees arrive in Florida

Wide World photo

had achieved unprecedented heights in the years 1975-

Fidel Castro's Cuba has never been very far from the forefront in international affairs. In the 1960s it experienced some failures because Latin America was not receptive to its revolutionary image and Castro had failed to strengthen Cuba's economy. But he had achieved a long-held Cuban goal of gaining the support of a major European power—the U.S.S.R.—in order to balance the presence of the United States. The intimate relationship with the Soviet Union strengthened over the years advanced as the Soviets purchased Cuban sugar and nickel at more than world prices and provided petroleum at well below.

In 1970, the Soviets insisted that Cuba rationalize its economy. Castro, while still the obvious personalist leader of all Cuban activity, turned the economy over to the control of technocrats respected by the Soviets. He then sought new fields for his revolutionary ardour. Given the failures of the late 1960s Latin America was clearly excluded. Africa, still in the process of decolonization, was an obvious alternative.

Cuba already had links with Portuguese Africa's socialist liberation movements which had sought Cuban assistance as early as 1962. Cuba had willingly provided military training to guerrillas from Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique.

Angola

Portuguese Angola was particularly attractive. Its leader, Agostinho Neto, was a poet and *independentista* in the image of Cuba's national hero, José Martí. It also appeared threatened by the Republic of South Africa, whose racial policies made it a leading target of Black African nations whatever their political persuasion. An active military and development assistance role in Angola also offered the Cuban government an opportunity to stress its African heritage as part of the programme to bring Cuban blacks from their position of social inferiority in pre-Castro Cuba to their present prominence. (While no black sits on the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party, Cuba shrewdly posts black diplomats to Caribbean countries.) As Castro pointed out in a major 1976 address justifying Cuba's Angolan role, "many things unite us to Angola: the cause, the common interests, the politics, the ideology. But there is also the blood [applause], and the blood in the double sense of the word: the blood of our ancestors and the blood that we have shed together on the battlefields [prolonged applause]."

Cubans also shed their blood in defence of Ethiopian territory and Cuban advisers can be found in a number of African countries. All these activities heightened Cuba's and Castro's image in Africa and the world-at-large. He drew huge crowds wherever he went in Africa. His ties to the Soviet Union meant that in much of the West he was seen as a Soviet surrogate.

It appears, however, that although Castro seems to be emulating the Captains-General of the Cuban past in the service of another empire, Cuba has usually been the initiator while the Soviets have benefitted from the activity and have exploited the gains. Cuba's military, probably the best in Latin America, have also benefitted. It has gained combat experience and has had modern equipment willingly provided by the Soviets.

The military campaigns, the maintenance of about 25 percent of Cuba's forces on the African continent, and the government's determination to provide civilian technicians, teachers and medical personnel as part of the proclaimed "sense of mission" have put considerable strain on the civilian populace. Cubans have had to bear the economic burden in exchange for rhetoric on the importance of this military activity.

Castro used his people's sacrifices to propel himself and his country into a position of leadership among the non-aligned, Third World nations. Cuba, of course, is hardly non-aligned. Article II of the Foreign Policy Resolution of the 1976 Congress of the Cuban Communist Party affirms that the "centre of the Foreign Policy of our party is the unbreakable alliance that unites . . . Cuba and the Soviet Union". By the criterion of the Non-Aligned Movement however, Cuba's lack of adherence to a formal military alliance with the Soviet bloc permits the island to be a member. Moreover, Castro has demonstrated that of all Third World leaders he is the best at capturing international attention.

Non-Aligned

Castro, who struggled to gain the Movement's chairmanship in 1978, worked assiduously to swing the Movement into an alliance with the Soviet Union. He argued that the Soviet Union was the Movement's "natural ally" against the United States and its friends. Although the Movement has resisted his effort, he did succeed in creating an almost strident anti-U.S. mood at the September 1979 Non-Aligned Summit meeting in Havana.

Castro also had the world's attention when he represented the Movement before the United Nations General Assembly in November. There he called on the industrial powers to relieve the developing nations of their tremendous debt burden. He was touching on a major Cuban concern. There is at present a moratorium on the principal and interest of Cuba's huge debt to the Soviet Union. The moratorium expires in 1986 and there is, as yet, no indication of whether the Soviets will be willing to extend it further.

The Soviet debt hangs over Cuba and may influence Cuban actions over the next few years. The Soviets have been supplying the equivalent of several billion dollars annually to the island. Clearly they are willing to pay a considerable price for this window into the Western Hemisphere and they have gained obvious political advantages from Cuban-Soviet relations.

Nonetheless, since at least 1969, they have been urging closer Cuban-U.S. ties as a means of achieving some relief from this expenditure.

In any event, the United Nations speech was the high point of Castro's influence at home and abroad. The Soviet Union intervened in Afghanistan and Castro lost much of what he had gained the previous September. His refusal to join the Non-Aligned nations and others in voting for a UN resolution condemning the intervention cost him dearly.

Cuba was among the 18 Soviet bloc countries opposing the resolution. The Cuban defence that the resolution was a U.S. scheme did not convince many Non-Aligned listeners. Cuba had been engaged in a close contest with Columbia (the U.S. choice) for a 'Latin-American' seat on the Security Council. In the wake of the resolution on Afghanistan, support for the Cuban candidature diminished and Mexico was elected as a compromise candidate.

The recent setbacks will not lessen Fidel Castro's enthusiasm for revolutionary causes in Africa or the Western Hemisphere. His government, for example, welcomes any opportunity to work with sympathetic American nations like Grenada, Jamaica, Guyana and Nicaragua, whose leaders use the Cubans to strengthen their own 'revolutionary' image at home while conveniently side-stepping Cuba's continued dependence on Soviet largesse.

Certainly the Cuban health and education programmes are worth emulating in countries where such basic needs are unavailable to the great majority of the people. Nicaragua recognized this in August, 1979, by accepting some one thousand Cuban teachers. Cuba has also demonstrated its willingness to send military advisers (and on occasion military forces) abroad to keep sympathetic governments in power.

Relations with U.S.

These activities have not endeared Cuba to the United States. Cuba certainly needed a power to balance against the U.S., and the Soviets have more than filled that role. But the ties have not only brought economic dependence on the Soviet Union, it has also caused Cubans to return to a pattern that has been all too prevalent in their society. Influential Cubans tend to develop a colonial mentality. Even nationalists have tempered their nationalism with a predilection to subordinate it to the influence of the current dominant power whether it be Spain, the United States or the Soviet Union. If the past is any guide there are probably Cubans in government who believe that their country is best served by Soviet rather than Cuban interests. Soviet influence permeates the bureaucracy, the military, the security services, television, and even the kiosks where *Soviet Union* has replaced *Time* as the magazine for what V.S. Naipaul, in describing another colonial context, called *The Mimic Men*.

Cuba's future, whether it likes it or not, is tied to the United States. For all its success in international affairs and its seeming ability to twist the Eagle's feathers, the fact remains that the island is still a target to continued reasonable relations between U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Castro recognizes this and made numerous gestures during the past decade. These gestures have included permitting sports changes, resolving air piracy disputes, releasing political prisoners, and joining the U.S. in reestablishing limited diplomatic contact, through what is termed 'Interest Section', in each capital. He is probably unwilling to go farther because it is to Cuba's advantage to do so given the heavy Soviet influence in Cuban affairs. But he can hardly be seen to be giving into U.S. demands.

The exodus offers Castro an opportunity to involve the U.S. into the negotiations. The Cubans want an end to the U.S. economic embargo and the return of Guantanamo Bay U.S. naval base (the base had been part of the price Cuba paid to receive its independence in 1902). In a U.S. election year such an action on the part of President Carter seems unlikely. So U.S. Cuban ties remain limited and provide an example of the U.S. inability to produce a coherent and consistent hemispheric policy.

Castro relishes his international image and has readily demonstrated many times that he can make himself miserable for both U.S. and Soviet policy-makers. He has also shown that he has the ability to shift gears when his policies and the policies of his government run into difficulties. 1980 did not start auspiciously for the Cuban leader. He first had to deal with the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and then with the rush of Cubans to leave the island when his government gave them the opportunity. But few should doubt that Cuba will once again manage to submerge its troubles in the sea of new international activity. The recent departure of those disenchanted with the Revolution provides Cuban leaders with room to continue an active role in Africa and the Caribbean for a few more years—especially if the economy improves at home. However should the economy remain stagnant or decline further, the emergence of a new wave of discontent is likely.


The Cuban leaders might do well to consider the possible message the recent exodus imparts—rather than expend their revolutionary enthusiasm abroad they should perfect the Revolution at home. This, of course, may be impossible. Perhaps Cuba's international efforts actually indicate, all other arguments aside, that the Revolution at home has gone as far as it can. If that is the case, then it may well mean that further internal discontent will cause large numbers of Cubans to ask whether it is they or their leaders who should leave the island.

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
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International Perspectives is published in Canada six times a year by International Perspectives, (95312 Canada Inc.), 302-150 Wellington St., Ottawa, K1P 5A4. Telephone: (613) 238-2628
Second Class Mail Registration Number 4929.

Editor and Publisher:
Alex Inglis
Editorial Assistant:
Robert Albota
Business Manager:
Ruth Macfarlane

Subscription Rates:

In Canada:

Single issue — \$1.75
One year (six issues) — \$9
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Three years (18 issues) — \$24

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ISSN 0381-4874
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For the Record: reference material on Canadian foreign relations presented by the Department of External Affairs.

Letters to the Editor

Arms and the woman

Sir,

As one who labours in the overly masculine world of national security issues I believe a distinctively feminine approach to disarmament is needed. I am remarkably struck by a qualitative difference in the writing of the distinguished Swedish internationalist, Alva Myrdal, and particularly by her appeal for a rational and ethical strategy to disarmament. In her book, *The Game of Disarmament*, she warns that the arms race is an irrational threat to national and international security and not a safeguard; that we exist precariously in a world of senseless overkill, having long ago produced and deployed more arms than could ever be needed; that it is more and more probable that war may occur through technical accident or error. To quote Myrdal:

"We must oppose the arms race not only on the grounds of its irrationality, but also on the grounds of morality. Each new generation of arms becomes more inhumane. Every new war tends to become more cruel. For centuries, rules about how warfare is to be conducted have been accepted as international law, but these rules are now disregarded in the most flagrant way. They must be expanded, modernized and respected. They must guide our efforts to restrain the use and production of and trade in cruel weapons. . ."

Myrdal is right—the arms race does defy all reason. It is indeed irrational that peace requires the condition of constant preparedness for war; that weapons of war are justified in the name of peace. The ethical quality of Alva Myrdal's writings—her thinking with feeling—reflects an inherently feminine approach to the resolution of questions of international peace and

security, an approach that is sorely needed today.

Western society, a culture based on the masculine model, is ruled by the masculine drives of competition, aggression, materialism and raw intelligence. Man has been the enemy of nature—out of fear and distrust, he has killed, uprooted and polluted. There is male prejudice and sexual inequality. Women have been grievously disparaged and under-valued. However, if, by emancipation, women understand the adoption of the masculine, we are lost! We need women as women, not *ersatz* men. This overly masculine world needs changing much more than sharing. Women can and must provide a counter-balance to the masculine drive. Woman is the ally of nature—out of trust and respect, she tends to nurture and to preserve balance. She is a humanitarian and an altruist.

It is important to note that the feminine quality also resides in the nature of man, as does the masculine in woman. The truly great minds are androgynous—they strive to cultivate and integrate the masculine and feminine to achieve a

fuller personality. It is lamentable that such minds are rare.

The feminine has been re-evaluated and uplifted to its proper place—alongside the masculine in political participation. Women today comprise half of the human race and possess in abundance those qualities desirable for international peace-making. We need the voices of women scientists to temper political and military attitudes on the issue of arms control. We need women in senior posts within national governments and international organizations. Where are they and why are their numbers not greater? What can be done to increase the participation of women?

It is still a rare achievement when women of talent, motivation and courage can realize and reconcile their professional ambition with their personal desires for marriage and family life. For most women, it is a painful dilemma of having to choose one and sacrifice the other. I firmly believe in the value of the feminine sensibility. I urge men and women to understand and appreciate this part of the human heritage—for women to express it without fear—for men to discover it within themselves—and to harness its power in the cause of a peaceful global civilization.

Anna Maria Magnifico
Ottawa, Ont.

IP Book Service

The Book Service has been omitted from this issue. It will return in the September/October issue with a selection from the new books being published this Fall. In addition a catalogue containing a fuller selection of books is being prepared for distribution in September. In keeping with our pledge not to inundate readers with unsolicited mail the catalogue will only be sent on request. Readers who wish to use IP Book Service for their book purchases—and enjoy the 10% discount available—should write for a copy of the catalogue to:

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Impotence of the Big Seven in the wake of Afghanistan

by Michel Vastel

The sixth Summit of the seven most industrialized Western allies held in Venice will undoubtedly pass into history as one of powerlessness and of lost opportunities. And yet, on Sunday June 22, when the seven heads of State and government set foot on the Island of San Giorgio, officials and ministers were still hoping for a miracle.

A long draft communiqué—tightly constructed around three now traditional themes: the macro-economy, energy, and the North-South dialogue—had been carefully prepared. The Europeans had even agreed momentarily to abandon economic questions and to devote a working session to political matters.

The sixth Summit augured well. But, as the hours went by, the host in Venice, Italian President Francesco Cossiga, began to read to more than 1,000 journalists from all over the globe a long series of confessions of powerlessness:

—first, a political inability on the part of the seven largest Western industrialized nations to consolidate their common position in the face of Soviet aggression in Afghanistan;

—a powerlessness to resolve the major economic problems “unless we can deal with the problems of energy”;

—and finally, the failure of Canada to initiate a serious resumption of the North-South dialogue. The Club of Seven now no longer wishes to be alone in carrying the burden of dialogue with the Third World. They are placing the ball into the court of the petroleum-producing countries and of the Socialist bloc.

The Prime Minister, Pierre Trudeau, has already indicated the Summit of 1981, which Canada will host, will be a return match. “The next Summit will be very productive,” he stated several days after the end of the Venice talks. Which is a polite way of saying that the Venice Summit achieved little.

The seven member countries of the economic Summit—the United States, Canada, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany—control in themselves more than half of world production and 80 percent of that of the industrialized countries. They appeared, however, in Venice, to be giants with feet of clay at the mercy of outside countries for the direction of their annual meetings.

The political agenda of the sixth Summit was modified at the last minute, by an unexpected announcement on the part of the Soviet Union. During the night of Sunday June 22, President Leonid Brezhnev took everyone by surprise—except for President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing of France—by announcing a ‘partial’ withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

Immediately, the American, German and Canadian delegations sensed a trap. The officials talked of a political ‘bluff’ and considered this to be an attempt to torpedo the Summit through the interposition of the French President. The spokesman of the Elysée Palace, for his part, was exultant: President Brezhnev’s courtesy to Giscard d'Estaing in letting him know as early as Friday evening the news of the Soviet withdrawal “proves that the dialogue is useful and that the French President was well advised to accept the secret meeting of May 21st at Warsaw with the President of the Supreme Soviet”.

Consequently the agenda for the first day of the Summit was strongly modified. In fact, as early as breakfast on Sunday morning, the Seven decided to make only a rapid survey of economic questions, leaving questions of detail to their ministers of Finance and Energy. Their luncheon session and three hours in the afternoon were reserved for political questions. It is said that more than half of these working sessions were devoted to the Afghan crisis. According to the Canadian Minister of External Affairs, Mark MacGuigan, the final communiqué, read on Sunday evening by the Italian President, “showed no more than the tip of the iceberg.”

The participants at the Venice Summit, according to this communiqué, had taken careful note of the Soviet intention to withdraw ‘some’ troops from Afghan territory. But they vigorously reaffirmed that only a

Mr. Vastel, a Parliamentary correspondent based in Ottawa, covered the Venice Summit for Le Devoir. His article is translated from the original French which is being published in the Summer, 1980, issue of Perspectives internationales.

complete withdrawal and the reaffirmation of the rights of the Afghan people to self-determination would satisfy them. This was really the main element in the 40 line communiqué on the 'political situation' except for the last paragraph which held a tragic confession of powerlessness. It read: "Those governments represented at this meeting which have taken a position against attendance at the Olympic Games (in Moscow) vigorously reaffirm their positions." In reaffirming this position, the countries participating in the boycott, including Canada, only emphasized that the others had failed to take the same step. Also, the communiqué did not mention the economic and diplomatic sanctions already in place against the Soviet Union. Moreover, it failed to announce new sanctions or a strengthening of the measures decided in the Spring.

Of course, the Soviet Union, despite its last minute manoeuvre, did not escape another condemnation of its Afghan invasion. But the tone of the communiqué could be no more disturbing than a resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations. This was, as well, the first time the Seven had met since the hostage incidents of Tehran, London and Bogota. It had already been understood that they would examine this question and adopt a common position. The strength of the resulting communiqué contrasted with the rather vague tone of the declaration on the Afghan crisis. Informed sources noted that the participants of the Venice Summit agreed upon mutual assistance when personnel or possessions of their missions or consulates are at stake. This was, in a way, official approval of the measures taken (sometimes at the edge of legality) by the Canadian Embassy in Tehran to free the six American diplomatic officials.

The Summit participants also adopted two other 'political' communiqués, one on hijacking which only recognized the progress made since the adoption of the 1978 Bonn resolution, and the other on refugees. Neither communiqué contained new decisions; they were only solemn declarations with little political impact.

Trudeau's role

Canada was more than satisfied with the results of the first day of the Venice Summit. Despite its fears of being excluded from the major political discussions, it had fully participated in a long discourse on international politics with the 'Big Four' (The United States, France, Great Britain and West Germany).

On Sunday evening, the Canadian Minister of External Affairs encouraged this impression of strong success by implying that Canada and Mr. Trudeau had played a determining role in the talks. In fact, by the very next day, Mr. Trudeau, a little embarrassed, had toned down the pronouncements of his young minister. Mr. Trudeau knew very well that ultimately the only man truly capable of playing the role of mediator between Europe and the U.S. was the German Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt.

The Prime Minister and the German leader had, in fact, held long discussions before the Summit, but little is known of their content. What is clear is that the Chancellor's visit to Moscow in July was the main subject. Mr. Trudeau had openly criticized the French President's trip to Warsaw. While it is probable, it is impossible to confirm that the Canadian Prime Minister cautioned the Chancellor against being too hasty in re-opening the dialogue with the Soviets.

Since the invasion of Afghanistan, and particularly since the failure of the West to reply effectively, it appears that Mr. Trudeau can no longer be counted on as an optimist. Shortly after the Summit, as he was travelling through Scandinavia, Mr. Trudeau intimated some doubt on the chances of success of the Madrid Conference on European Security and Cooperation in November. He predicted that, if the Soviets become mired in Afghanistan and increase their forces of occupation, "the detente will be in deep trouble."

"The invasion of Afghanistan is a very grave offence against the spirit of Helsinki and we cannot go along with it pretending to ignore it," added Mr. Trudeau, seemingly torn between two extreme positions. "Everything depends upon the Soviets" he repeatedly stated in referring to the hard line and the breaking of the dialogue, and the influence upon this of the Soviet conduct in Afghanistan. But almost immediately, he would add, in a confidential tone, that he "preferred dialogue to isolation between the two blocs."

As with the boycott of the Olympic Games, it seems probable that if the United States leads the way for abstention at the Madrid CSCE, Canada will follow. But uneasy with such a decision, the Prime Minister will again leave it to his minister of External Affairs to make the announcement to the House of Commons and to justify the decision of the government to the public.

The economic agenda appears to have escaped the control of the heads of state and government participating in the Summit. The ministers and their officials had drafted an ambitious communiqué apparently to prepare world opinion for a 'synchronized' recession. The intention was, as in Bonn in 1978, to give out the bad news in explicit terms: an increase in the number of unemployed by 15 percent, double digit inflation, and zero GNP growth for 1980-81.

Their final communiqué carefully steered clear of shocks. "The reduction of inflation is our immediate top priority" they again affirmed at the end of the Summit. Also, as in Bonn, they looked to "shifting resources from government spending to the private sector and from consumption to investment," and "avoiding or carefully limiting actions that shelter particular industries or sectors from the rigours of adjustment." In the field of international commerce, the Seven promised to "resist pressures for protectionist actions, which can only be self-defeating and aggravate private inflation." But, despite these general commit-

ments, the heads of State and government admitted that "in the short term, it will be difficult to take measures of this nature . . ."

Mr. Trudeau correctly recalled in a private interview that too many of the heads of state and government at Venice were facing elections for the Summit to be 'productive': "Japan did not even have a Prime Minister at the Summit," Mr. Trudeau explained. (Japanese Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira died before the June legislative elections. Japan was represented by foreign minister Saburo Okita). There was the American head of State who is facing considerable domestic opposition and who will know only in November if he stays in power. Mr. Schmidt has elections in October and his chances are very good, and it seems probable that he will win, but . . . in a democracy, one never knows what can happen. Valéry Giscard d'Estaing is in about the same situation . . ."

"But I draw the conclusion," commented Mr. Trudeau during the same interview, "that the next Summit, in Canada, will be very productive because, by then, elections will have taken place in Japan, Germany, the United States and France. In Great Britain also, where Mrs. Margaret Thatcher is well installed . . . The belief I have is that no one will feel in a weak position."

The election outlook for at least four of the seven governments represented at Venice is not the only reason for the cautiousness of the final communiqué. In fact, the Seven in 1980 found themselves in exactly the same position as at the Rambouillet in 1975; the only difference is that the situation has occurred for the second time, and that nothing has allowed them to think they are protected from it, or that it will not happen again.

The situation they are facing, is, of course, an increase of more than 100 percent in petroleum prices, over which they have no control. As powerful as they are, the Seven have admitted to each other at Venice, that they are at the mercy of small nations such as Iraq or Libya, who have the ability to force OPEC into another ferocious price war.

"The economic message from this Venice Summit is clear," the Seven concluded on June 23. "The key to success in resolving the major economic challenges which the world faces is to achieve and maintain a balance between energy supply and demand at reasonable levels and at tolerable prices. The stability of the world economy . . . depends upon all of the countries concerned recognizing their mutual needs and responsibilities: the industrialized states, the petroleum exporting countries and the non-oil producing developing countries."

The members of the European Economic Community (EEC), who had their own Summit meeting, also in Venice a few days before the gathering of the Seven, were able to obtain the support of Japan and of the U.S. and Canada for a four-point petroleum saving plan:



CP photo
After being out of office for the Tokyo Summit, Pierre Trudeau returned to the international arena at Venice.

- acceleration of the conversion of oil-fired power-plants to other fuels;
 - acceleration of the substitution of petroleum in industry;
 - encouragement of energy-saving investment in residential and commercial buildings;
 - introduction of increasingly fuel efficient vehicles.
- Governments noted their intention to accelerate the change in vehicle models by "gasoline pricing and taxation decisions."

The members of the EEC offered the seven larger industrialized nations an ambitious program for production of new sources of energy, other than petroleum, representing by 1990 the equivalent of 15 to 20 million barrels of crude per day. In short, after having promised at Tokyo to reduce their oil imports, the industrialized nations agreed in Venice to develop new sources of energy to lessen their dependence.

The key message which emerges from the energy communiqué of the Seven—a section comprising more than 40 percent of the total document—is that "we must break the existing link between economic growth and consumption of oil."

The industrialized states established a target of reducing to about 0.6 percent—from 0.8 percent today—the ration between the growth in collective energy consumption and growth in the economy. But the danger of a new flare-up in the price of oil remains a reality for the industrialized nations. This is why the

most important political aspect of the Venice Summit was possibly the near-anguished appeal for dialogue with the petroleum producing states. "We would welcome a constructive dialogue on energy and related issues between energy producers and consumers in order to improve the coherence of their policies."

It is not yet known what form this dialogue could take. It seems, according to the statements of Mr. Trudeau, that a new type of conference is not the answer. The Canadian Prime Minister indicated that the Seven would prefer to make a place for the oil-producing states in existing international financial and economic institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and some of its affiliates.

North-South

Public awareness of the economic—if not political—importance of the oil-states thus permitted the participants to quietly shelve a question which they were obviously unprepared to discuss at Venice: resumption of the North-South dialogue.

Canadian officials were perhaps a little naive to hope in advance that Venice would witness such a resumption. The political and economic background was so poor that it would have been useless to have illusions beforehand. The position of the Seven grew out of a tragic economic fact: the oil bill of the developing countries has more than doubled in the last two years. It now amounts to more than \$55 billion, more than twice the aid given by the industrial states to the Third World.

The Seven finally postponed until next year any serious discussion of the question of development aid. "The democratic industrialized countries," the Venice communiqué stated, "cannot alone carry the responsibility of aid and other different contributions to developing countries: it must equitably be shared by the oil-exporting countries and the industrialized communist countries. The personal representatives (of the Seven heads of state and government) are instructed to review aid policies and procedures and other contributions to developing countries and to report back their conclusions to the next summit". This promise—"until next year"—undoubtedly explains why Mr. Trudeau appeared much less disappointed than his officials. Time is in his favour and he understands that well.

By the next Summit, early next summer, the Special Assembly of the United Nations will have met (in August); a Canadian House of Commons working group is preparing for it under the chairmanship of the New Brunswick Member of Parliament, Herb Brault, who, incidentally, accompanied Mr. Trudeau on his European tour.

Mr. Lopez Portillo, the Mexican President, and Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky will undoubtedly by then have been able to organize their 30 country mini-Summit; this will include representatives of the Socialist states and oil-producing nations.

Also, in 1981, the Canadian Prime Minister will have the great advantage of being the host to the Summit, and of having better control on the direction of discussions. Finally, at that time, there is the possibility that economics will have replaced politics. Mr. Trudeau undoubtedly hopes, without saying it, that by then, the Afghan crisis will have been solved or 'stabilized' at the Madrid CSCE in November.

In short, conditions are ideal and Canada has a unique opportunity to take a lead in the resumption of the North-South dialogue. But, from what political base? This is the question being asked today.

In Venice, and during his European tour, the Canadian Prime Minister had always in hand the Brandt Commission report. The only representative Canada ever had on this commission was the former Canadian Labour Congress President, Joe Morris. At no time was there any mention of *For a Common Future* which the Economic Council of Canada had produced after two years of work. The Economic Council's report suggested that the Government should adopt a global policy on relations with developing countries. "It is not reasonable to give aid to developing countries while at the same time erecting barriers against their exports or to encourage immigration to fill positions in industries that must be protected from products exported by the countries of the very same immigrants. . . We must at all costs avoid the separation of thought from action."

The Economic Council also suggested the creation (as in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands) of an independent ministry fully responsible for integrating the various aspects of relations between Canada and the developing countries.

The government has twelve months left to study this report as well as other material from the Canadian International Development Agency. Otherwise, it is probable that, as at Venice and the four other Summits in which it has already participated, Canada will have to improvise her position in the course of international meetings; this is because she will not have at hand a coherent document from which to establish consistent international policy.

During his time in Sweden, Mr. Trudeau realized that creating illusions cannot long disguise the lack of real policies and concrete actions. While the Prime Minister was presenting himself in Stockholm as the champion of renewed North-South dialogue, someone reminded him that Canadian development aid had slid from 0.52 percent of the GNP to 0.47 percent in 1979. In Sweden, a country where, in the same period of time, the ration had risen from 0.90 percent to 0.94 percent, it was difficult for his claim to be taken seriously.

With next year's economic Summit concentrating on North-South dialogue, Mr. Trudeau, the host, will wish to avoid any further such embarrassing remarks. Perhaps this is why he has already promised to increase the aid budget to developing nations.

Sovereignty questions remain after century in the Arctic

by Evan Browne

One hundred years ago, on September 1, 1880, the islands of the North American Arctic passed from British to Canadian control. Great Britain had been the only nation to act in a concerted manner in this region of the North and although her claim to the Arctic Islands was not necessarily strong (the final territorial delimitation of the islands would not come for another 67 years) the claim was far stronger than any other nation could advance. The uncertainty about what had been given and received caused lingering doubts about the validity of Canada's title to the far North. Oddly enough, there are still doubts voiced today: is Canada sovereign in its own North? To examine this question, some clarifications are necessary: what is meant by sovereignty and what constitutes the area in question?

The complex concept of sovereignty derives from an ancient relationship of the feudal period which detailed the intricate interplay of rights and responsibilities between superior and subordinate that was part of the master-servant relationship. For modern purposes, an acceptable definition of sovereignty is that condition where a body politic can exercise exclusively any or all of the powers of an independent state.

Such absolutes are useful in theory, but the 'real world' suggests that they do not apply as definitively in practice: in a world of treaties, interlocking agreements and unvarnished self-interest, a state often finds itself precluded from exercising in full all the powers it has in a display of arbitrary independence, for to do so would damage many of its other interests. Thus, a nation can assert sovereignty with the plain understanding that its partners and allies will in no way be inconvenienced by this assertion. In addition, there are a number of widely accepted international conventions restraining the power of states from being applied in an arbitrary manner.

In this sense, sovereignty in the Canadian Arctic can be seen to be the exercise of authority in ways that will be of benefit to Canada, but which will not have a negative influence on Canada's allies and partners.

The question of what constitutes the Canadian Arctic is equally vague but, for the purposes of this discussion, the southern limit will be the coastline of the North American continent proper. There are, however,

various theories about the amount of territory involved. The sector theory assumes an extreme area of Canadian control extending over the entire area bounded by 60 degrees west longitude on the east, 141 degrees west longitude on the west, reaching north in a pie-shape to the North Pole. A much more restrictive theory suggests that Canada is sovereign only over those islands which it now occupies. The existing situation finds Canada controlling all of the land surfaces (i.e. islands) roughly within the 'pie' formed by the sector theory. The problem of sovereignty over the islands, in fact, is something of a dead issue: Canada's claim to the islands themselves has not been questioned for 50 years and there have never been serious rivals to Canadian (and before 1880, British) supremacy in the Arctic islands. The requirement of occupation as a prerequisite to the exercise of sovereignty was exempted by the Permanent Court of International Justice in its decision on the East Greenland case of 1933, an example of common sense and legal opinion finding common ground.

The issue of Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic, then, relates not to the control of the land, but to the control over the waters. If the sector theory were to hold, Canada would also control all the waters within the pie-shaped area noted above. At the minimal limit, Canada might only be able to exercise certain limited powers in a three mile band of water surrounding each island (the three mile limit is specified here because this distance represents the traditional width of territorial waters although many nations, including Canada, have unilaterally extended their territorial waters—in Canada's case, to 12 miles; in the extreme case of Brazil, to 200 miles).

In discussing this problem, it should be noted that there are three distinct types of waters as far as international law is concerned:

a) internal waters, which are either surrounded by land or lying to the land side of baselines used to determine the width of the territorial waters. Internal

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waters include freshwater lakes, deeply indented bays, harbours and waters surrounding coastal islands. In internal waters, the coastal state exercises complete authority and the waters, to all legal intents and purposes, can be considered the same as the land;

b) territorial waters, which are the coastal waters of a country extending seawards for a specified distance from either the coast or baselines enclosing internal waters. In territorial waters, the coastal state exercises limited controls and cannot arbitrarily prevent the innocent passage of the vessels of other states;

c) the high seas, which are international waters where no state can exercise controls over the shipping of other states.

These definitions, as well as a body of rights, privileges, practices and customs are known as the Law of the Sea. It must be remembered, however, that the current Law of the Sea is the product of an evolutionary process spanning many centuries and can hardly be regarded as a set of absolutes. The traditional uses of the sea and the technologies of seafaring have changed rapidly in the last century, and it would be naive to approach any consideration of the Law of the Sea and the rights of both coastal states and seafaring (or flag) states without recognizing that the existing formulation of these laws, so firmly grounded in tradition, may favour (and thus be supported by) certain states and in effect penalize (and thus be opposed by) others.

Were the nature of the Canadian Arctic waters being questioned solely on the basis of the above criteria, the matter might be resolved fairly easily. Regrettably, in the Canadian Arctic another problem area exists: the status of the famed Northwest Passage. The Law of the Sea also concerns itself with international straits, and the question being debated hotly right now is whether the Northwest Passage is or is not an international strait.

The Law of the Sea defines international straits as any passageway leading from one area of the high seas to another, or from the high seas to the territorial waters of a coastal state. An international passage exists to permit the innocent passage of any vessel (with the possible exception of warships); such passage may not be impeded by the coastal state through whose waters the strait passes, even if the passage runs through internal waters.

Canada's position on the status of its Arctic waters is that those waters within the island cluster (archipelago) are internal waters on the basis of historical usage. Insofar as the Northwest Passage is concerned, Canada maintains that it has never been used as an international strait, and since the waters through which it would pass are internal, it certainly will not become an international passage now. In addition, Canada has also enacted the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act which established regulations to control shipping in a zone extending 100 miles out from shore in order to ensure that the Arctic environment is safeguarded


from pollution caused by shipping or as a result of maritime accidents. Concern for the Arctic environment was heightened during the 1969 traverse, through the Northwest Passage, of the United States tanker *Manhattan*. Canada maintains that entry into Canadian Arctic waters cannot automatically be classed as innocent passage because of the dangers attending navigation in ice-filled waters. As a result of the declaration that the waters of the archipelago are internal waters, Canada asserts that there can be no maritime activity within the waters of the Arctic Islands without Canadian permission and control. Because the right of innocent passage does not exist through the waters of the Arctic Islands, the Northwest Passage may not be used without similar Canadian permission and control.

Controls

The precise controls that Canada claims over the waters of the Canadian Arctic are as follows. Working from the shore outwards, there is the absolute control Canada exercises over activities in its internal waters, which in the case of the Arctic constitute all the inter-island waters in the Arctic archipelago. Second, there is the 12-mile territorial limit where innocent passage is permitted but where the coastal state can apply certain regulations controlling safety standards, pollution controls, etc. to vessels entering the territorial waters. Third, there is the 100-mile Arctic pollution control zone established by the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act. Lastly, there is the 200-mile zone of jurisdiction under the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act. In addition, Canada also exercises sovereign rights over the Arctic continental shelf in accordance with the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf.

The assertion of sovereignty is one thing; the exercise is something else. What, then, is the effect of Canada's declaration that the waters of the archipelago are internal? In fact, at the time that the pollution controls were enacted and the territorial waters extended to 12 miles, Canada took great pains to stress that there was no intention whatsoever of stopping maritime activity in the Arctic. "To close off these Arctic waters," Prime Minister Trudeau suggested at the time, "would be as senseless as placing a barrier across the entrance to Halifax or Vancouver harbour."

Canada, in fact, committed itself actively to develop the Northwest Passage for safe navigation by ships of all nations. The Arctic waters can be used by any vessel, as far as Canada is concerned, as long as the regulations are followed and the vessel construction standards met. This intense attention to maritime control in the Arctic is hardly a case of a country flexing its muscles for effect. There are genuine problems that have to be dealt with and as a coastal, arctic state, Canada feels strongly that preventative, protective measures must be taken, and disaster anticipated. Concern about pollution in the Arctic is not overblown.



Top of the top of the world showing the historic Northwest passage (solid line) and the pie-shaped dimensions of the Canadian "sector" (broken line).

Courtesy North/Nord magazine

the ecosystem that has evolved in the North can cope with truly awesome climatic conditions, but the price of this hardness is a very limited diversity in plant and animal life, and excessive concentrations of biological activity. The biologically productive areas of the Arctic, such as Lancaster Sound, are few and far between. In the event of pollution in one of these areas, bird and animal populations might be reduced drastically. The additional danger is that their number could be reduced below a self-sustaining level, and an oil spill incident, for example, followed by a cold summer that eliminates the young animals (the latter happening with fair frequency) could result in entire populations vanishing.

Not only are the animals and plant life of the North endangered by pollution, but the climate itself adds complications. The cold discourages dispersal and degradation of hydrocarbon spills, with the result that oil spills remain more highly toxic over greater periods of time than would be the case in warmer water. In addition, the ice cover of the Arctic waters can trap pollutants, hindering clean-up operations and allowing spills to remain hidden for extended periods of time.

With the magnitude of disaster that water-borne pollution can wreak upon the Arctic environment, it comes as no surprise that Canada has been adamant that 'innocent passage' meant something far different in ice-filled waters. That the North is not like most

other maritime areas of the world is obvious. That the rules under which vessels are to operate in the Arctic must be different is similarly apparent. That the international community has as yet been unable to agree on the necessary protective and preventative steps is as regrettable as it is expected. The problem comes in transmuting obvious realities into international order.

In acting unilaterally as it has, Canada is in a somewhat exposed position: until such time as all flag states agree to the laws Canada is applying in its northern waters, Canadian actions fall outside of international law. In realistic terms, at this point in time, Canadian laws can only be enforced if Canada is willing to apply the necessary muscle and tolerate a degree of unpleasantness from those flag states who disagree with the Canadian actions and insist on challenging Canadian controls.

Clearly, from Canada's point of view, it is far better to have the Canadian position accepted in the international forum. This, in fact, has been one of the major thrusts of Canadian diplomacy over the past decade, working towards gaining a consensus in the international community that confirms the steps that Canada has taken to address what in world terms is virtually a uniquely Canadian Arctic problem.

This is not to say that the Canadian steps in this realm have been greeted with great enthusiasm in some quarters. Major countries, including the United

States, are clearly nervous about the Canadian stance regarding the status of the inter-island waters and the Northwest Passage. "Should Canada deny the existence of this strait," the thinking goes, "what is to stop other coastal states from taking the same step?" The danger is that the mass closing of the many international straits that run through coastal or internal waters could have disastrous effects on sea-borne commerce and the movement of naval vessels throughout the world. The point is well taken indeed.

But it is as senseless to court disaster by permitting the indiscriminate use of the ice-filled waters of the Canadian Arctic as it is to permit the closing of the traditionally used straits in other parts of the world for political purposes. The answer does not lie in considering the problem to be an 'either-or' choice: because the circumstances are so different, the cases must be separated. The resolution of the problem, then, lies at the diplomatic level, with all countries agreeing that the North is indeed a special case, so different from the conditions that were considered as the norm in the evolution of the Law of the Sea that special standards must apply.

On the level of policy development, the Canadian approach to Arctic maritime activity has been a pragmatic one. To date, by far the greatest amount of shipping in the Arctic is conducted by the Canadian government, moving supplies to the various communities throughout the North. In the Beaufort Sea, the situation is different only to a degree: Dome Petroleum's fleet of drill ships and support vessels are working successfully under the terms of the Canadian regulations. The company has even gone so far as to build its own ice-breaker, the technologically innovative *Kigoriak*, in order to improve its fleet's capacity to operate in ice and, Dome hopes, to gain governmental approval for an extension of the drilling season.

The standard pattern of Arctic shipping is changing from the re-supply function towards the possible shipment of resources out of the Arctic. Although the economic and technological prophets have envisaged ice-breaking bulk carriers crunching their way up and down the Northwest Passage, this vision has yet to materialize.

There are mineral and hydrocarbon resources in the Arctic, but the mere presence has not stampeded the Government into pouring money into massive ice-breakers that have not yet been required. Work has already been done: the M.V. *Arctic*, an ice-breaking cargo ship, was built in 1978, with substantial government assistance, at a cost of \$40 million. *Arctic* is a Class Two vessel according to the Canadian Arctic Shipping Pollution Prevention Regulations. For a bulk liquid natural gas (LNG) carrier to operate year-round to Bridport Inlet on Melville Island (where it could tap into the Panarctic developments in the Sverdrup Ba-

sin), it would have to be built to Arctic Class Seven specifications. This is also the requirement for year-round operation through the Northwest Passage. *Arctic*, by comparison could only operate in this area for a three month period beginning mid-August.

There are obvious advantages to the marine mode of transportation, but it is quite apparent (from the price tag on *Arctic*) that ice-breaking bulk carriers would be formidably expensive. Such vessels would have to be built to cope with the maximum ice conditions they would meet, but such conditions would obviously not hold for their entire operational route, nor for the entire year. As a result, the capacity to operate in ice, paid for at a very high price, would only be utilized for a small portion of the vessel's operating life. This suggests that the debate over pipeline vs. bulk carriers for moving oil and gas from the Arctic to southern markets may not be a closed book by any means. That groups such as Petrocan are proceeding with the planning of proposals such as the Arctic Pilot Project (an ice-breaking LNG carrier system) is perhaps no more than good business sense. For all the expense, planning and talking are far cheaper than building or buying. Parallel planning keeps all the options open.

But should there be a massive increase in Arctic shipping, and if other flag states should become involved, Canada's pragmatic approach to policy will have to adapt quickly. Canada's ice-breaking capacity at the present time is adequate to the demands placed upon it—adequate, but no one would argue that there is much excess capacity. In line with the pragmatic approach, the Canadian Coast Guard Service has in its files some very impressive design studies, including a Class Ten nuclear powered proposal. The latter's time has not and indeed may never come.


The fact remains that Canada is committed to maintaining control over the waters of the Arctic. If the Northwest Passage is to become an important shipping route that can be used without endangering the environment, Canada will have to do some very specific things, some of which are already in place while others are either in process or merely nascent: refined regulations covering technical specifications; operating procedures which would probably include the mandatory use of Canadian pilots in the transit of the Northwest Passage; high grade ice and weather reporting facilities; and last but not least, all-season shipping assistance and control capabilities. As was mentioned earlier, because the Canadian controls are unilateral, some provision for enforcement of these controls must be available. For the moment, in any case, the Canadian 'wait and see' stance, while not exactly dynamic or exciting, is a useful response to the uncertainties of the future. The Canadian commitment to the maintenance of sovereignty in the Arctic waters also implies a continuance of the diplomatic activities to further international understanding of the unique Arctic conditions and acceptance of the need for special controls.

There are, happily, indications that the Canadian view of Arctic navigation (as an activity requiring a special framework of regulations) is winning international approval. The definitive action Canada took ten years ago in acting unilaterally to protect the Arctic waters is gradually being recognized in the capitals of the world as a realistic and appropriate response to a unique problem that could readily degenerate into an ecological disaster.

The level of activity that the government has maintained in the Arctic has always tended to be a function of the priorities that have been applied to the national resources available. The kinds of ice-breakers that could be needed; the control and surveillance systems that would have to be established; and the personnel that would be required in the event of a massive expansion of maritime activity in Canadian Arctic waters would total up to an impressive bill that would

have to be paid by the Canadian taxpayer, or in some manner, by those who would benefit from the use of these services (which is to say, for example, the consumers of the gas or oil brought out of the Arctic). This is not to suggest that sovereignty in the Arctic should be self-financing (any more than other instruments of sovereignty such as the armed forces should be), but certain of the costs can be directly attributable to the economic activity, and perhaps could be recoverable in the same way that lockage fees are collected from users of the St. Lawrence Seaway.

In many respects, Canada commemorates the 100th anniversary of the transfer of the Arctic islands in somewhat the same frame of mind as existed on September 1, 1880. Then, Canadians asked what the cost accepting the transfer would be. Today, there are questions about what the future holds and Canadians are still wondering what the costs of sovereignty will be.



NFB photo

Canadian ice-breaker *John A. Macdonald* cutting its way through the Tanquary Fjord almost 20 years ago. Later the ship accompanied the *Manhattan* on its voyage through the Arctic.

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Freedom of innocent passage versus territorial expansion

by Carl Edgar Law

Order at sea, the recognition of laws and conventions which enable ships to pass upon their lawful occasions is a basic part of world political, and economic order."

The essence of that passage by Michael Howard is found in "conventions which enable ships to pass upon their lawful occasions." That is precisely what is being threatened by the growing tendency, not only of maritime powers but also of littoral states, to arrogate territorial seas and economic zones. The right of navigation and overflight (more questionably sub-surface transit) is one of the central questions being debated at continuing sessions of the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

The sea, as Johan Jorgen Holst notes, is the last great common of mankind, but just as the highland crofters of Scotland were driven from their land by the Enclosure acts, so mariners are being driven from waters that once belonged to Everyman. Though certain guiding principles have emerged from UNCLOS, the problems to be resolved remain so complex that all-encompassing treaties appear unlikely in the future.

The wellsprings of the international law of the sea arose in the 17th century under the tutelage of Hugo Grotius, considered by many to be the father of international law. The sea belonged to everyone, he wrote in 1604, and at the same time belonged to no one in particular. However, as U.S. Navy Lieut. Commander Joel B. Heaton points out, "as early as 1580, Elizabeth of England asserted, in reply to Spanish protests concerning the voyages of Sir Francis Drake, that the seas were free for all."

Territorial limit

Thus arose the concept of the three mile territorial limit (3.5 statute miles) which, conveniently, was based on the range of a cannon. This was consonant with the widely held principle in international law that a nation is considered to assert sovereignty over an area only when it can be shown to have the capability of physically exercising that control. Heaton suggests that though this system catered to the arbitrary demands of the mercantile powers, it was "simple, and surprisingly just and humane."

There were several reasons why this system existed successfully well into the 20th century. The world was not environmentally conscious so the question of pollution caused by ships was not an issue. Technology did not permit plumbing of the ocean's oil and mineral resources nor did the number or efficiency of fishing vessels fuel international fears of fish stock depletion. True, there have been centuries of competition in the fisheries but conflict was joined by the arbitrary use of sea power rather than by the conventional dictates of territorialism. In terms of security, shipping did not then possess the stand-off ordnance projection capabilities of modern vessels.

Maritime powers retained a vested interest in freedom of the seas while less powerful littoral states neither perceived onerous disadvantage from the *status quo*, nor were in a position to force change. The uses of the sea remained, therefore, virtually restricted to transit and strategic mobility.

Transit and strategic mobility were held inviolate because all major commerce and movement of personnel depended on it. There were no aircraft, fast railways or interstate highway systems to promote the flow of goods, cavalry or infantry to distant parts. Furthermore, as defenders of commerce on the high seas and as foreign policy arms of large nation-states, navies would under no circumstances brook restrictions on navigation. Naval strategist Hedley Bull has summarized the all-encompassing role of great navies in the conduct of international relations as follows: "as an instrument of diplomacy, sea power has long been thought to possess certain classical advantages vis-à-vis land power and, more recently, air power." Among its characteristics are:

a) Flexibility. A naval force can be sent and withdrawn, and its size and activities varied with a higher expectation that it will remain subject to control than is the case with land forces.

Mr. Law is an Ottawa-based journalist accredited to the Parliamentary Press Gallery and a naval reserve officer.

b) Visibility. By being seen on the high seas, or in foreign ports, a navy can convey threats, provide reassurance or earn prestige in a way that troops or aircraft, in their home bases cannot do.

c) It is universal and pervasive. The fact that the seas are an international medium which allows naval vessels to reach distant countries independent of nearby bases, makes a state possessed of sea power a neighbour of every other country that is accessible by sea.

d) Limited engagements at sea between powers are bound to produce less destruction than hostilities expanded to land. Accordingly, they inhibit the expansion of war because the population ashore is not confronted directly with the ongoing action in such a manner as to inflame the national passion to a desire for confrontation.

If Bull's contentions are accepted, then naval power becomes a classic adjunct to international relations. Any restrictions on the transit of naval power, conversely, inhibit certain diplomatic tools short of war and actually serve to increase friction and the potential for conflict. Yet this is precisely the chimera invoked by growing demands of littoral states for territorial zones of varying magnitudes, involving varying restrictions.

One new factor in ocean politics, a factor which underlines the problem, is the recently achieved ability of small littoral states to project disproportionate force. This is not a forum for technical discussion but it must be understood that rapid changes in weapons technology have converted several formerly minor states into major naval powers. It is sufficient to point out that this has been achieved largely by the advent of conventional and tactical nuclear missiles, either deployed from the beach or from small, fast and inexpensive patrol boats. The immediate implications of such technological change include certainly the fact that one must take more seriously the proclamation of varying territorial limits whether they are proclaimed arbitrarily or not. The North Korean capture, in 1968, of the intelligence-gathering (tattle-tale) vessel, USS *Pueblo*, is an example of the imposition of the will of a small state on a major seapower. The sinking of the Israeli destroyer *Eilat* by Egyptian fast patrol boats and similar events during the 1971 war between India and Pakistan are others. Having taken seriously the threat posed to high seas shipping by even small littoral states, the conclusion must be reached that in the absence of an international agreement to solve the 'innocent passage' problem, maritime powers must negotiate specific contractual rights with individual littoral states. Such negotiations leave the instigating state open to unreasonable or unilateral demands; to the vagaries of fragile agreements that might be terminated at any time; and to the possibility of having to negotiate such an agreement rapidly when unforeseen events involve geographic entities not previously envisaged

as states through whose waters it would be necessary to steam. In short, as Holst puts it: "This could provide sources of conflict."

The spectre of gradual encroachment of freedom of the seas began in the early 1900s when Imperial Russia claimed a 12 mile exclusive fishing zone, later transformed by the Communist government into a Soviet 12 mile territorial sea. Major maritime powers, including Britain, the United States and others, tacitly acquiesced in this claim. But, that precedent was upgraded by U.S. President Harry Truman in 1945, when he proclaimed the jurisdiction of the United States over the seabed resources of the continental shelf. U.S. Ambassador at Large Elliot Richardson stated in *Foreign Affairs*: "though scarcely comparable to the attempt by Spain and Portugal in 1494 to divide all the world's oceans between themselves in accordance with precepts enunciated by Pope Alexander VI, the Truman Proclamation constituted the first major breach in modern times of the classic principles of ocean law laid down by Hugo Grotius..." By 1974, when UNCLOS really got down to business, 76 countries had claimed territorial seas ranging from 12 miles to 200 miles. Today, more than 100 countries have done so, though only one quarter of them extend their territorial thinking to the 200 mile extreme.


The right of innocent passage for aircraft is equally affected and three main problems are involved. The *raison d'être* of travel by aircraft is speed. Any deviation from the shortest distance between two points is detrimental to the good humour of passengers and the timely delivery of sensitive or perishable goods. Strategic mobility may be affected as has indeed been the case with, for example, the 1976 "Entebbe" rescue mission launched by Israel which, for maximum efficacy, relied on the goodwill of other governments in granting permission for overflight of their states. More recently, aircraft track diversion has resulted in increased fuel costs, a problem that began in the mid-1970s. The extension of territoriality to the 12 nautical mile limit by all states (independent coastal states now number 135) would close more than 100 straits worldwide. These straits are more than six, but less than 24 miles wide. This takes in all the world's most important straits, including: the Strait of Gibraltar, the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, the gateway to the Indonesian Archipelago, the Strait of Hormuz at the entrance of the Persian Gulf and the Bab el Mandeb Strait connecting the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea and the Suez. Added to this is the problem of archipelagos which arises from demands by several states whose geography includes closely grouped islands to establish political hegemony over all the water within the outer limits of the islands. Enforcement by nations of a 200 mile limit would, at one stroke, remove 40 percent of the world's oceans from the inventory of the "high seas"—an area greater than the earth's land mass. To again quote Richardson: "all the important seas—the

Mediterranean, the Caribbean, the Black Sea, the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf and the Sea of Japan among them, are consumed by coastal zones less than 200 miles wide." Not only navies, but also merchant shipping fleets are potentially threatened by such strictures. Heaton says maritime transport of high density, low value, raw materials and manufactured goods still dominates all other uses of the sea. More than 95 percent of international trade moves by ship and it has increased more than five-fold since 1950, to 2.5 billion tons, from 500 million long tons.

Superpower implications

Ironically, this scenario unlike many others does not place the United States and the Soviet Union at loggerheads since both have vital and extensive interests in maintaining maximum freedom of the seas. As Robert Osgood notes, the superpowers not only have an obvious motive in securing unimpeded passage for their men-of-war, but also in securing the unannounced passage of sub-surface ballistic missile submarines. Indeed, destroying secrecy by forcing these vessels to surface in certain areas would undermine the most survivable leg of the nuclear triad with unhappy consequences for strategic deterrence. Further, the superpowers have an interest in placing listening devices on continental shelves to monitor submarine channels. These devices are most effective in waters less than 200 metres deep. Further, the Soviet Union maintains four fleets, whose access to ocean routes is impeded by waterways bounded by west-oriented countries. The Black Sea fleet must negotiate not only the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, but also Gibraltar. The Baltic fleet is hemmed in by the Scandinavian ring. The Pacific fleet, operating largely from Vladivostok, is unhappily situated within the Sea of Japan and the Northern fleet, though somewhat better off, must run the well honed anti-submarine warfare gauntlet thrown down by the Western alliance in the waters between Greenland, Iceland and the United Kingdom. Any peacetime attempt to restrict innocent passage of Soviet vessels would create obvious and serious dangers. Indeed, both the United States and the Soviet Union are clearly aware of the annoying possibilities for marginal conflicts which overweening claims to territorial seas could invoke.

Several analysts have considered that for those reasons, the U.S.S.R. has far more to gain from sea freedom than does the United States, but these arguments break down under close scrutiny. The U.S. has its own needs for unchallenged rights of navigation and overflight, although these are not as acute as those of the Russians. Areas of U.S. interest include the Pacific archipelagos and unrestricted access to the Red Sea, the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. Further, as Richardson points out, "the absence of any universally accepted legal foundation for the freedoms of navigation and overflight through



Off-shore oil rig on man-made Sarpik Island in the Beaufort Sea.

Imperial Oil photo

straits and 200 mile zones could lead to unpleasant and otherwise unnecessary strains on our relations with our allies." Also, any restriction on sea and air mobility of Soviet forces places unbearable pressure on the U.S.S.R. to achieve navigation control by any means. Less often noted is the fact that the political framework of the United States, heavily dependent on public opinion, creates a requirement that the U.S. be seen to be acting properly and legally wherever events permit. The United States, incidentally, is one of 23 nations which still adhere to the traditional three mile limit for territorial seas.

The interests of the superpowers in achieving freedom of the seas are shared in varying degrees by several other maritime nations. Australia and New Zealand are among these. Canada, theoretically, sits on both sides of the fence. On the one hand, her naval squadrons deploy in concert with the western allies and have qualitatively similar requirements for strategic mobility—though quantitatively fewer. Canada, similarly, has a common interest in the freedom of the seas because of her importance as a trading nation. Conversely, Canada's arctic archipelago and Northwest Passage are areas in which the question of sovereignty remains only partially resolved. Having said all this, the prospects for new rules of the sea, an order which satisfies the requirements described, are not likely. Osgood maintains that the agenda is too large, too many nations are involved and the pattern of interests among states is too fragmented and fluid. "The prospect is better for a detailed, well accepted, limited

treaty similar to the negotiating text that emerged from Committee II at Geneva, [a treaty] that will satisfy the interests of coastal and maritime states with respect to passage through, under and over international straits and territorial waters while accommodating the interests of most coastal and straits states in regulating non-military activities in a 200 mile economic zone." Osgood suggests, however, that certain key straits are unlikely to sign such a treaty. His remarks are qualified by his inclusion of all the other thorny issues of UNCLOS—seabed mineral rights, fishing zones and pollution issues among them.

Granting the sea freedoms that the superpowers want would probably do more to deflate the egos of several involved states than to deflate their economic and social interests. There is little opposition to the prospect of littoral states creating charted sea lanes and traffic control arrangements within certain areas and of establishing economic restrictions and protective measures pertaining to fish, energy, seabed minerals, marine ecology, scientific research and security.

Ultimately, the superpowers will enforce their right to freedom of innocent passage, using their own definitions, by any rational means possible because they see it as imperative to do so. But, there is a strong desire to avoid the political and military consequences of what is rapidly becoming unfashionable—trampling on the rights of minority states. Militarily, the sudden ability of weak states to project strong naval force, not only by surface-to-surface missiles, but also by deployment of air-to-sea strike power and mine-laying, raises the stakes to a level considerably higher than that of the prospect of international embarrassment with its ensuing diplomatic problems.

It is an axiom of human conflict that no nation will long tolerate international situations which undermine its economy to the point of threatening the internal political structure. Sea denial—and more recently, energy denial—is a significant factor in precipitating just such an intolerable model. Yet the old order of the sea no longer operates and no new structure has been evolved to replace it.

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I. Bibliography of recent publications on Canadian foreign relations (prepared by the Library Services Division)

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2. List of recent publications of the Department of External Affairs (prepared by the Domestic Information Programs Division).

I. Press releases

No. 67 (August 14, 1980) New Zealand Deputy Prime Minister visits Ottawa.

No. 68 (August 18, 1980) Diplomatic appointments. The Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mark MacGuigan, announces the following appointments:

Raymond C. Anderson to be High Commissioner to Australia, replacing J. Alan Beesley.

Marc Baudouin to be Ambassador to Turkey. He will replace C.J. Marshall.

Ronald J.L. Berlet to be Consul General in Hamburg replacing M. Maddick.

Arthur E. Blanchette to be Ambassador to Tunisia replacing J.M. Touchette.

Jean-Marie Déry to be Consul General in Boston replacing T.A. Williams.

Robert Elliot to be Ambassador to Egypt. He replaces Jean-Marie Déry.

Michel Gauvin to be Ambassador to the People's Republic of China, replacing Arthur Menzies.

John G.H. Halstead to be Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council in Brussels. He replaces J.E.G. Hardy.

Frank T. Jackman to be Consul in Dallas, Texas. He replaces G.D. Valentine.

Karl Johansen to be High Commissioner in Tanzania. He replaces E.J. Bergbusch.

Geoffrey A.H. Pearson to be Ambassador to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics replacing R.A.D. Ford.

Marc Perron to be Ambassador to Senegal. He replaces J.J. Asselin.

Maldwyn Thomas to be Consul General in Dusseldorf. He replaces F.T. Jackman.

No. 69 (August 20, 1980) Canadian delegation to the Sixth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders. Caracas, Venezuela, August 25 to September 5, 1980.

No. 70 (August 21, 1980) Canadian delegation to the Eleventh Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly.

No. 71 (August 22, 1980) Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between Canada and the Republic of Equatorial Guinea.

No. 72 (August 22, 1980) Diplomatic Appointments. The SSEA, Mark MacGuigan, announces the following appointments: D'Iberville Fortier to be Ambassador to Belgium. He replaces Lucien Lamoureux.

J.E. Ghislain Hardy to be Ambassador to Italy. He replaces D'Iberville Fortier.

A.R. Menzies to be the first Ambassador for Disarmament. H.O. Ring to be Consul in Glasgow. She replaces J.B. McLaren.

G. Douglas Valentine to be Ambassador to Colombia replacing D.B. Laughton.

No. 73 (August 22, 1980) Canada-U.S.A. Tuna Agreement.

No. 74 (August 25, 1980) Understandings with the People's Republic of China on Consular and other matters.

No. 75 (August 29, 1980) Visit of member of the Commission of the European Communities for Development Policy, Claude Cheysson.

No. 76 (August 29, 1980) Appointment of Robert A.D. Ford as Special Adviser on East-West Relations.

No. 77 (August 2, 1980) Canada and Japan Exchange Notes Bringing Nuclear Protocol into Force.

No. 78 (September 5, 1980) Participation of the Secretary of State for External Affairs at the 35th Session of the United Nations General Assembly.

No. 79 (September 12, 1980) Diplomatic Appointments. The SSEA, Mark MacGuigan, announces the following appointments: Jacques D.E. Denault to be Ambassador to the Cameroun. He replaces Mr. Gilles Duguay.

Gilles Duguay to be Ambassador to Morocco. He replaces Michel Gauvin.

Lucien Lamoureux to be Ambassador to Portugal. He will replace Daniel Molgat.

Sinclair H. Nutting to be Ambassador to Ecuador. He re-opens the post in Quito.

- No. 80 (September 19, 1980) Canadian delegation to the 21st Session of the General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).
- No. 81 (September 19, 1980) CIDA to contribute \$1,500,000 to PISC.
- No. 82 (September 19, 1980) Canada-U.K. Air Service Negotiations.
- No. 83 (September 23, 1980) Joint Announcement Canada and the United States Agree on monitoring arrangement for the Poplar river.
- No. 84 (September 24, 1980) Press release at the conclusion of the State visit of the President of the Rwandese republic, His Excellency General Juvénal Habyarimana.
- No. 85 (October 1, 1980) Visit to Canada of the Belgian Minister of the French Community, Michel Hansenne.
- No. 86 (October 1, 1980) Joint Press Statement on the Occasion of the Visit to Canada of the Foreign Minister of Brazil, His Excellency Mr. Ramiro Saraiva Guerreiro, September 28 to October 1, 1980.
- No. 87 The Foreign Minister of the Republic of Singapore, the Honourable S. Dhanabalan, visits Ottawa.
- No. 88 Diplomatic Appointment The SSEA announces J. Alan Beesley is to become Ambassador to the Law of the Sea Conference, New York.
- No. 89 (October 17, 1980) Appointments to the Board of Governors of the International Development Research Centre (IDRC).
- No. 90 (October 21, 1980) Visit to Canada of Mr. Louis-Gaston Mayila, Minister and Secretary General of the Government of the Republic of Gabon.
- No. 91 (October 23, 1980) Arthur Menzies takes up his appointment as Ambassador for Disarmament.
- No. 92 (October 31, 1980) Communiqué at the Conclusion of the Visit to Canada of Mr. Louis-Gaston Mayila, Minister and Secretary General of the Government of the Gabonese Republic.
- No. 93 (November 10, 1980) Canada Signs Claims Agreement with Cuba.
- No. 94 (November 17, 1980) Second Annual Report of the Canada/United States Research Consultation Group on the Long-Range Transport of Air Pollutants
- No. 95 (November 18, 1980) Meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers in Dakar on December 8 and 9, 1980

II. Statements and Speeches

80/9 Suggestions for Future Directions of the ILO. An Address by the Minister of Labour, the Honourable Gerald Regan, to the Plenary Meeting of the Sixty-Sixth Session of the International Labour Conference, Geneva, June 13, 1980.

80/10 Plea for True Solution to the Crisis in Kampuchea. A Statement by Louis Duclos, Parliamentary Secretary to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the United Nations Conference on Kampuchean Relief, Geneva, May 27, 1980.

80/11 Current Issues in Canadian Foreign Policy. A Statement by the Honourable Mark MacGuigan, Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Ottawa, June 10, 1980.

80/12 Equality, Development and Peace. An Address by the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, Minister Responsible for the Status of Women, to the United Nations Decade for Women, Copenhagen, July 15, 1980.

80/13 Development: A Global Search for the Future. A Speech by the Honourable Mark MacGuigan, Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the Eleventh Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, August 26, 1980.

80/14 Canada Looks West—Increasing Links Across the Pacific. An address by the Honourable Mark MacGuigan, Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the Canadian Business Association, the Canadian Club of Hong Kong, and the Canadian University Association, Hong Kong, July 2, 1980.

80/15 New Dimensions in North-South Relations: A Canadian Perspective. An address by the Honourable Mark MacGuigan, Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, England, July 7, 1980.

80/16 A Security Imperative for the Eighties. A speech by the Honourable Mark MacGuigan, Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the World Federalists of Canada, Winnipeg, Manitoba, June 13, 1980.

80/17 Channelling the Winds of Change into Collective Achievement. An address by the Honourable Mark MacGuigan, Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the Thirty-Fifth Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, September 22, 1980.

80/18 Disarmament and Development. A speech by the Honourable Mark MacGuigan, Secretary of State for External Affairs, to Parliamentarians for World Order, New York, September 23, 1980.

Denmark

Agreement between Canada and the Kingdom of Denmark concerning Faroese Fishing off the Canadian coast.
Ottawa, June 3, 1980

Finland

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of Finland constituting an agreement extending for a period of five years the Air Agreement between Canada and Finland signed on May 16, 1977.
Ottawa, April 15, and May 6, 1980
In force May 6, 1980

Germany, Federal Republic of

Exchange of notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany concerning German Air Force Flight Training in the vicinity of Goose Bay, Labrador during 1980.
In force 26 June 1980

Haiti

Exchange of notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Republic of Haiti constituting an agreement concerning Foreign Insurance Investment.
Port-au-Prince, June 11, 1980
In force June 11, 1980

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of Republic of Haiti constituting a Reciprocal Amateur Radio Agreement.
Port-au-Prince, June 11, 1980
In force June 11, 1980

Mexico

Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Governments of the United Mexican States on Industrial and Energy Cooperation.
Ottawa, May 27, 1980

New Zealand

Convention between the Government of Canada and the Government of New Zealand for the avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal evasion with respect to Taxes on Income.
Wellington, May 13, 1980

United States of America

Exchange of notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America constituting an Agreement extending for one year the North American Air Defence Command (NORAD) Agreement of 1975.
Washington, May 12, 1980
In force May 12, 1980

Protocol amending the Agreement for co-operation concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America, as amended.

In force, July 9, 1980

II. Multilateral

International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 (with annex) Done at London, November 1, 1974

Canada's Instrument of Accession deposited at London, May 8, 1978
Entered into force May 25, 1980

Food Aid Convention, 1980

Done at London, March 6, 1980

Opened for signature at Washington, March 11, 1980

Canada signed, April 30, 1980

Canada's Instrument of Ratification

deposited at Washington, May 12, 1980

Amendments Nos. 17, 18, 20 and 51 to the Convention on the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organizations (Resolutions A/450) (XD)

Adopted at Geneva, November 15, 1979

Canada's instrument of Acceptance

received at IMCO, London, May 12, 1980

deposited at the United Nations, New York,

May 23, 1980

Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women.

Adopted at the UN on 18 December 1979

Signed by Canada at Copenhagen, July 17, 1980

Protocol modifying the Conventions relating to International Exhibitions, 1928, as amended.

Done at Paris, November 30, 1972

Signed by Canada, November 30, 1972

Entered into force, June 9, 1980

Senior Appointments

The following senior appointments within the Department of External Affairs have been announced:

de Montigny Marchand to be Associate Under Secretary of State for External Affairs.

J.H. Taylor to be Deputy Under Secretary of State for External Affairs.

Daniel Molgat to be Deputy Under Secretary of State for External Affairs.

Foreign service consolidation

by Jack Maybee

"A program for consolidation of Canada's foreign service will be started immediately", said Prime Minister Trudeau on March 21, 1980. For the departments of External Affairs, Industry, Trade and Commerce and Employment and Immigration consolidation will involve a full integration into external affairs of their foreign service officers at the senior executive level. Heads and deputy heads of diplomatic and consular posts abroad will normally be drawn from this pool. The consolidation plan will also mean that management control of foreign service personnel at the operational level—which ranks below the group mentioned above—will be divided between the departments of External Affairs and Industry, Trade and Commerce. The operational group in External will include foreign service officers from the Department of Employment and Immigration and some officers from the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), as well as those already in External. In Trade and Commerce the operational group will include the trade commissioners at that level, plus foreign operations personnel from the Canadian Government Office of Tourism.

The announcement of the plan raises a host of questions. Why is consolidation being undertaken now? What are the purposes? How will they be achieved? How will consolidation affect policy formation and decision making? Will it make any difference to how Canada conducts its foreign relations? What are the prospects that the plan will really be carried through?

"We were a bit stunned by the suddenness," said an immigration official. No doubt the move was meant to be sudden. While government organization is recognized as a prerogative of the Prime Minister, well-entrenched ministers are likely to be resistant to changes which affect the size and scope of their departments. Clearly the best tactic for the Prime Minister was to act as early as possible in the life of his new government.

In a broader sense the move was not quite such a surprise. The Privy Council Office had been examining foreign service consolidation before the general elections of May, 1979. Some optional courses of action

were proposed to Prime Minister Clark after he took office, but he chose to commission a further study before deciding on a plan. Barry Steers, a former trade commissioner who had served as Ambassador to Brazil and Consul-General in New York, was asked to re-examine the problem. He rendered his report in late August, but the Clark government took no action on it before the election of February 18, 1980.

Earlier Efforts

A previous consolidation start had been made in 1970, but was not carried through. A committee of deputy ministers from the departments principally concerned, the Interdepartmental Committee on External Relations (ICER), was directed by the government to implement a decision in principle on foreign operations integration. The ICER integrated the foreign operations support services of 22 departments, boards and agencies then carrying on programs abroad, transferring about 1,000 employees (mostly locally engaged staff at posts abroad) from these departments to the department of External Affairs.

Subsequently the ICER deferred further structural integration until it had dealt with the problem of policy coordination at headquarters between departments and agencies responsible for programs with international dimensions. Some constructive measures were adopted, but momentum diminished. The ICER met less and less frequently, and never did return to the idea of further structural integration.

There were apparently two developments which inspired the Privy Council Office early in 1979 to re-examine the possibility of bringing the various components of the foreign service into a single management system. One reason was recurring complaints from heads of posts, who said they could not work with maximum efficiency and economy, because they lacked sufficient control over the manpower and resources assigned to the post for carrying out the programs of

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other departments. The other reason was the obverse: some departments were canvassing the possibility of stationing their own personnel abroad, as they were not satisfied with the service they were getting from foreign service officers at posts. A background paper on foreign service consolidation identified these and related problems in the following terms:

While the demands on our foreign service . . . are ever increasing, the resources which are available for all of the government's foreign operations are limited . . .

The management of our foreign service resources is fragmented . . .

The training of foreign service officers is narrowly departmental in focus . . .

Our foreign operations tend to compartmentalize activities related to economics and financial concerns or trade problems and promotion rather than pulling all of these together . . .

Our posts abroad do not necessarily function, and are not always perceived as functioning, as representative of the whole of the Canadian Government . . .

Heads of post . . . have been given authority over all post operations, but, because their control of post personnel is incomplete and because their own career development has usually not provided them with sufficiently broad experience either at home or abroad, they are not often capable of fulfilling this function as effectively as should be the case.

Some old foreign service hands feel that the case, as outlined above, has been somewhat overstated and that most important posts have been able to do their job a good deal more effectively than the foregoing would suggest. Nevertheless, some of the abovementioned shortcomings probably apply to nearly all posts in some measure.

Trudeau's Statement

The purpose of consolidation of the foreign service was set forth in the Prime Minister's press release of March 21:

- to improve the economy and efficiency of foreign operations without affecting the policy and program-development roles of the departments involved;
- to unify the management of Canada's foreign posts and the image of Canada they project;
- and to improve the career prospects and broaden the experience of foreign service personnel.

From these statements it is clear that there are two primary points of focus in the consolidation plan: the Canadian post abroad and the career concerns of the foreign service group. Some improvements in economy and efficiency will be possible at posts abroad as a result of foreign service consolidation. Work at posts will be less compartmentalized and will enable a head of post to eliminate overlapping between different sections of his staff and to better organize their work. For

instance, all aspects of Canada's economic relations with the host country will be dealt with as parts of a coherent whole—economic analysis, trade policy, trade promotion, development assistance planning, labour and manpower analysis. When officers travel outside the capital, the head of post will be able to direct them to carry out tasks on behalf of two or three programs during their trip—dealing with a consular case, checking on a development assistance project, calling on an importer. Greater efficiency—and some marginal economies—should be achieved as a result.

With respect to the career prospects for foreign service officers, the system as planned should open up new opportunities, but may also face individual officers with some rather painful dilemmas. The senior executive group—the pool from which heads of post and senior deputy heads of post will normally be drawn—will be made up of officers who have, through service in a variety of appointments both within the foreign service departments and elsewhere in government, acquired a good grasp of government operations in a number of different fields. Promotion into this pool will go to those who have acquired sufficiently broad experience.

At the operational level, however, a 'streaming' system will operate, corresponding to the six main foreign service functions—political and economic affairs, development assistance, trade and tourism, public affairs, immigration and consular affairs. Officers who develop an interest in and an aptitude for work in a particular functional stream will have to decide when to leave a specialized stream in order to acquire the variety of experience necessary to enter the management group.

The consolidation plan is personnel-oriented rather than program-oriented: it touches only lightly on the problem which some departments may have in ensuring that their programs are properly implemented by External Affairs' enlarged foreign service corps. CIDA and Employment and Immigration have been understandably worried about this. They formerly commanded their own troops in the field: henceforth it appears that they will have to deliver their orders to External—or directly to the post—and hope for the best.

Head of post

There are a number of sanctions, however, which will apply and will help to ensure that the requirements of the client departments are properly fulfilled. The system emphasizes very strongly that the head of post will be held accountable for all the programs under his direction. He will have powerful motives to ensure that all his clients are satisfied, as client departments will continue to contribute to the appraisal of heads of post. External as a department will also have compelling reasons to ensure that effectively implemented programs are "delivered" to the client depart-

ments: its service reputation will be on the line.

One of the objectives of foreign service consolidation, according to the background paper, is "to contribute to improving the method of setting priorities and to improving the resource allocation process for foreign operations." Because of the symbiotic service/client relationship this seems likely to happen. External Affairs will be inclined to restrain other departments from expanding their program actively abroad to ensure that a head of post is not held responsible for implementing more programs than he has qualified manpower to handle.

This situation of creative tension may compel the client department to do some careful priority setting, to determine what activity on its behalf the post may drop in order to accommodate the new program. Alternatively, if the client department can persuade External Affairs and the head of post that the new program activity is desirable, the program of a third department may be singled out for oblivion—something which would require some more policy consultation. External Affairs' negotiating and leadership capacity will be challenged to achieve settlement of these problems without forcing a showdown at the ministerial level.

Will consolidation make any difference to how Canada conducts its foreign relations? That will depend on whether External Affairs can maintain and increase its capacity to be creative in the policy field. The absorption into External Affairs of some 400 foreign service personnel from Industry, Trade and Commerce, Immigration and CIDA will add considerably to the department's strength at the junior and middle working levels, but less at the policy level. By acquiring responsibility for program delivery abroad for all government departments—and particularly for Immigration and CIDA—External will inevitably tend to become more of a central service department. In essence, a sort of external department of Supply and Services.

Some people therefore question whether after consolidation External Affairs will be a favourable environment for training officers in intelligence analysis, the formulation of policy and the conduct of negotiations. Some officers both in and out of External speculate that foreign service consolidation may not be the last step in the department's evolution—that at some future date there may be a need to designate a ministry of foreign affairs to deal with policy matters separate from a department of external services designed to implement government programmes abroad. Others oppose such a separation, arguing that the best place to work up new policy ideas is a corner of the workshop, not an ivory tower.

In the shorter term the general public may not notice much change in the way the government conducts its foreign relations after consolidation provided, of course, that the people principally affected—the members of the foreign service—fall in line and support the change. The fact that the foreign service officers'

union, the Professional Association of Foreign Service Officers (PAFSO), already brings together into a single bargaining unit members of External Affairs, the Trade Commissioner Service and the foreign branch in the Department of Immigration, is a positive factor of considerable importance on which management should capitalize. PAFSO has been largely ignored in the preparatory phases of the consolidation plan, despite an understanding that the organization would be consulted. Failure by management to consult with the union in the implementation phase might stimulate the suspicion and balkiness that most people would feel in the face of such organizational change. An associated drop in morale in the officer group as a whole could prejudice the success of the consolidation process.

Opposition to consolidation

One public constituency which has consistently opposed the absorption of the Trade Commission Service into External Affairs is the export community. Through the Canadian Exporters' Association they lobbied against integration in the early 70's and have kept the government informed in the last year or two of their continuing opposition to any such scheme. Following the Prime Minister's announcement on March 21 the Association sent a telegram to the Minister of State for Trade, registering its disappointment and the strong opposition of its members to "organization changes such as those now proposed which would tend towards diluting the effectiveness of the trade promotional activity." The exporters have since received assurances from the Minister of Trade and Commerce that the quality of the services to exporters will be maintained, but clearly some doubts remain.

Since little other opposition to consolidation is apparent either inside or outside the government, the prospects that it will take place more or less as planned seem very good. Although responsibility for carrying out the consolidation plan was assigned to the three departments most directly affected, with External Affairs in the lead role, it has been made clear that the Privy Council Office will be closely monitoring progress. The ICER Personnel Management Committee, which is directing the implementation of the consolidation plan, held its first meeting on April 18. Its plan of operations calls for the absorption of the Immigration Foreign Service Officer group first, then the CIDA component, and finally the executive level group of the Trade Commissioner Service. While arrangements for the transfer of the Immigration group to External Affairs are being worked out, Industry, Trade and Commerce will be organizing the absorption of the Canadian Government Office of Tourism personnel into the Trade Commissioner Service. Target date for completion of the consolidation scheme is April 1, 1981.

The personality factor will be important in the realization of the consolidation plan. Prime Minister Trudeau has always had a lively interest in govern-

ment organization: the air was full of innovative ideas in this field during his first term of office. That was the period of the 1970 foreign policy review, culminating in *Foreign Policy for Canadians* and its proposals for foreign service integration. Much of this innovative activity was cut short by the electoral near-disaster of 1972. Now, in his final term of office, Prime Minister Trudeau has the opportunity for another go at foreign service integration.

The architect of the 1970 scheme for integration, Michael Pitfield, was at the time Deputy Secretary (Plans) to the Cabinet, but was not the Privy Council Office representative on the ICER. The deputy ministers, who were members of the ICER early in the 70s, had little enthusiasm for schemes for organizational change. They have passed on, but Pitfield is back, this time with formidable leverage as the Prime Minister's number one adviser. For Pitfield, the opportunity to see the implementation of a favourite blueprint could not be better.

Finally, in Allan Gotlieb, External Affairs has an Undersecretary who strongly supports foreign service

consolidation. In a public lecture in Toronto on February 15, 1979 on leadership and service, he developed the theme that External Affairs is a central agency of government and should be recognized as such. He did not advocate foreign service consolidation—that would have been quickly labelled as empire building—but he dwelt on some ancillary factors such as the usefulness of the revived ICER and the accountability of heads of post for all post programs. (See article entitled "Is External Affairs a central agency?—a question of leadership controls" by W.M. Dobell in *International Perspectives*, May/June/July/August, 1979.)

In his speech Gotlieb said that "The Government considers the Department of External Affairs to be a central agency because it has a responsibility to provide other departments with coherent policy and priority guidance covering the full range of Canada's international relations. We must ensure that we offer to government the leadership and service which are expected of us." This policy leadership role is the companion activity to the service role which External Affairs will acquire in full after consolidation.



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Canada and the uranium cartel

by Larry Stewart

The Supreme Court of Canada's unanimous judgment on March 18, 1980, not to release secret documents requested by the Gulf Oil Corporation of Pittsburgh once again thrust Canada's role in an international uranium cartel to national attention.

One of the most interesting aspects of the cartel was the fact that it was created, operated, dismantled and continues to be shrouded in near-absolute secrecy.

The complete story of the uranium cartel remains untold largely because of the refusals by both the Liberal and Conservative parties of Canada to release documents on the subject considered crucial in current billion dollar uranium litigation involving both Canadian and American corporations. These refusals by both governments have challenged the integrity of the Canadian government and the fundamental Canadian right of freedom of information. In considering the present controversy over the release of these classified documents describing the operation of the cartel, it is necessary to examine why the formation and operation of the cartel were guarded with such secrecy.

In early 1972, Australia, France, South Africa, Canada and Rio Tinto Zinc of Britain formed an international cartel to control the world price and supply of uranium through a complex scheme of price-fixing, bid-rigging and the allocation of markets. Specifically, the corporations involved from Canada included: Rio Algom Ltd.; Gulf Minerals Canada Ltd., (GMCL) a Canadian subsidiary of the Gulf Oil Corporation; Uranerz Canada Ltd., (UCL), a West German Company involved in a joint venture development with GMCL at Rabbit Lake, Saskatchewan; Denison Mines Ltd; Eldorado Nuclear and Uranium Canada, both crown corporations. France was represented by Uranex, which acts as a marketing agency for French uranium companies, while South Africa voiced its opinion through the Nuclear Fuels Corporation which is a marketing body in that country. Australian companies included Queensland Mines Ltd.; Pancontinental Mining Ltd.; Peko-Wallsend Ltd.; Electrolytic Zinc and Ranger Mining Ltd.

Canadian initiatives

Exploratory talks among the potential members, initiated most likely by Canada, began in February of 1972 in Paris and were designed to stabilize prices and eliminate "cut throat" competition within the industry. By June of 1972, after five months of sporadic negotiation,

in different locations around the world, the details of the arrangement were finalized in Johannesburg, South Africa, and the uranium cartel was formally established. The structure of the Société d'Etudes de Recherches d'Uranium, as the uranium cartel was referred to for the purposes of secrecy, consisted of an Operating and Policy Committee and a one-man Secretariat "buried" in the large headquarters of the French Commissariat à l'Energie Atomique (CEA) in Paris. The Secretariat reported to the Operating Committee which was composed of one representative and an alternate from each participating country. The main task of the Secretariat was to review all contracts to ensure compliance with the cartel's guidelines. The Operating Committee met on a bi-monthly basis to consider new business and to review the operation of the cartel. The higher-ranking Policy Committee met less frequently, considering more important matters such as pricing and market allocation policies.

The marketing arrangements, which excluded the markets of the United States and the participating nations, consisted of a quota system which divided the uncommitted world market among the members according to the production levels of each country. The cartel membership also devised an elaborate scheme of bid-rigging in order to create the illusion of competition in the world uranium market. Two bidders were selected by the Secretariat after conferring with members of the Operating Committee; one was to act as a lead bidder while the other would be a runner-up. The selection of a lead bidder was made among the five participating members according to the country which needed its quota filled to keep it at a uniform rate with the sales of the other producers. The producers also agreed that they would sell to middle-men engaged in the resale of uranium, such as Westinghouse and General Electric, at prices fifteen cents per pound of uranium higher than the already elevated price charged to the Japanese and then only if the end use of the material was known, to prevent these middle-men from

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competing with the cartel members. By late 1974 the cartel's importance lapsed as uranium prices were overtaken by market forces and increased seven-fold over a two year period. Although the cartel became unnecessary, it continued to meet intermittently until October, 1975.

Secret discussions

The secret cartel discussions which were initiated in the spring of 1972, held a number of advantages for Canadian officials. Because the negotiations over the structure and creation of the cartel were confidential, the government was allowed to be flexible in its position. This secrecy eliminated any fear of losing face before the electorate if the agreement did not succeed. As well, the secrecy avoided a debate which could have killed the sense of urgency among all the participants and eliminated any chance of the government being criticized in an election year.

Even after a formal price-fixing, quota-setting agreement was reached by the uranium producers in Johannesburg, secrecy was still considered essential. Internal memoranda circulated within the cartel were labelled "secret", "highly confidential" and "specially confidential". Furthermore, it was agreed that the minutes of each meeting would consist of as brief a summary as possible of the principal points discussed and one participant added that "as few copies as possible be made in order to avoid eventual difficulties". Members of the 'Club of Five' were instructed to stonewall the press and avoid using the word 'cartel' in any correspondence.

For the Trudeau government, participation in the cartel represented such a break with traditional foreign policy that it was perhaps felt unwise to immediately inform MPs and the public. With a minority position in Parliament between 1972 and 1974, the Liberals were extremely vulnerable to criticism. Additionally, there no doubt were fears of political and/or economic retaliation from the United States as well as possible problems with both American Anti-trust and Canadian Combines laws. Perhaps there also existed the fear that the United States Atomic Energy Commission (USAEC), which then controlled the majority of the world's enrichment capability, would withhold its services.

Moreover, Canada's policy of participating in a developed-country cartel sharply contradicted its refusal to join Third World producer associations. Throughout the first half of the 1970's, Canada rejected membership in Third World producer associations in iron ore, copper, mercury, silver and tungsten. Noting that the uranium cartel, solely a developed state organization, had been formed prior to OPEC's late 1973 success in quadrupling the world price of oil and before the proliferation of Third World commodity organizations, it would have been difficult for Canadian officials to attack Third World attempts to establish cartels. The

case of the uranium cartel could have been used by developing countries as a precedent for creating either producer associations or cartels in other commodities.

Many of the reasons for the secretiveness may have been rooted not in an overwhelming Canadian desire for secrecy, but rather in the multi-national nature of the arrangement. And finally, at that time the cartel members may have appeared to be strange bed-fellows, especially to the domestic population of Canada. For example, relations between Canada and France were at a very low level and the government was being publicly critical of South Africa's apartheid policies.

Leaked documents

During the summer of 1976, the cartel's elaborate security system was toppled when confidential cartel documents were leaked by the *Friends of the Earth*, an Australian environmental group opposed to uranium mining, to a U.S. House Subcommittee set up to investigate the cartel. The Subcommittee then subpoenaed Gulf Oil Corporation documents detailing the role of its Canadian subsidiary, Gulf Minerals Canada Ltd., in the cartel. The documents came from an ongoing cartel-related trial in a Chicago District Court involving the Westinghouse Electric Corporation. Westinghouse, a prominent uranium middle-man which argued that the cartel's price-raising had made it impossible to sell uranium at the prices it had previously guaranteed, filed an anti-trust action against 29 uranium corporations, many of which were involved in the cartel.

Working through the U.S. State Department, the Canadian government and Gulf requested that the documents which the Sub-committee threatened to release be held in strict confidence, arguing that the documents were diplomatically sensitive and raised a question of international comity between nations. The request was denied.

In this instance, the government had sought secrecy for good reason. The documents revealed that Canadian uranium producers had violated the Combines Investigation Act with the knowledge and support of high government officials. The government was further embarrassed because some of the material which had been passed by GMCL to its American headquarters, and from there subpoenaed, had been provided to Canada on a confidential basis by other members of the cartel.

Canada's reputation

Similarly, Canada's international reputation would have been damaged if the government had been forced to acknowledge its participation and leadership in an OPEC style price-fixing cartel. This was especially true as it was a period when OPEC members were testing their new-found economic strength. One must also remember that the stigma attached to cartels from pre-World War II times continued to exist. Secondly, the

revelations came at a time when Canada was entering the final round of GATT negotiations. At those meetings, Canada's major bargaining lever was its strength in natural resources. Thirdly, the Rabbit Lake, Saskatchewan, joint venture between GMCL and UCL was created to give Canada a preferred position in sales of uranium to West Germany and was in accordance with the so-called 'Third Option' policy outlined by Mitchell Sharp in 1972. Public disclosure of Canada's role in the cartel could have adversely affected Canadian-European relations, despite the fact that the French government through Uranex was an active member of the cartel and West German officials knew of the cartel's activities. As one Gulf Oil Corporation official noted: "the zeal with which Dr. W. Schlieder, head of the EEC Anti-trust Division, is enforcing the provision of the Treaty of Rome must surely give rise to anxiety." Finally, it was perhaps anticipated that the release of the five Canadian documents would have had a negative effect on Canadian-American relations.

Once the documents were released, however, then Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources, Alastair Gillespie, argued that Canada's role had not been a secret and had indeed been announced by the government early in 1972. Despite the extraordinary measures taken by the members to protect the privacy of the group, the cartel's existence was common knowledge to many individuals who were involved in, or closely related to, the world uranium industry. The initial Paris meetings of the cartel in February, 1972, were reported in many North American newspapers while subsequent meetings were noted in various nuclear industry trade journals.

Yet the information then available does not support the Liberal government's contention that the activities of the cartel were publicly known from 1972 to 1975. The newspaper accounts and government statements issued during this period only transmitted the information that representatives from uranium producing countries met from time to time to work on an agreement to stabilize uranium prices. The explicit details of the existence of a Policy and Operating Committee and Secretariat, and indeed of the cartel, and the fact that prices were fixed, were never publicly reported until the cartel ceased to operate (and this was not done with the support of any of the cartel members especially not Canada), or at least until the formation of the London-based Uranium Institute, which represents the interests of both uranium producers and consumers in the world. The intention of the cartel members to keep the organization secret was clear; the fact that it was not very successful at this task does not support the Canadian claim that the cartel was openly and purposefully discussed in public from its creation.

Gillespie's proclamation was surprisingly followed by the Canadian Cabinet's passage of an Order-in-Council (SOR/76-744) under the Atomic Energy Control Act entitled the Uranium Information Security

Regulation which silenced discussion of the subject in Canada. Unprecedented in Canadian history, the regulation was designed to prevent the release of information on the cartel to foreign governments. The regulation went further, however, in that it effectively 'gagged' discussion of the subject by the media, general public and Members of Parliament while in the House of Commons. Violation of the regulation was punishable by a five year prison term and/or a \$10,000 fine.


Gag order

Under heavy pressure from the Opposition Parties and growing public criticism that the regulation was a restriction of the fundamental right of freedom of speech, the 'gag order' was revised by the Trudeau Government on October 13, 1977 to allow discussion of documents already in the public domain on the uranium cartel. Yet it remained illegal for those with direct knowledge of the cartel to release new information (SOR/77-836). Despite this, the Conservative Party applied for judicial review of the original regulation in the Supreme Court of Ontario. The court ruled that the subject could be discussed in Parliament and that the regulation was properly promulgated under the



EMR photo

Uranium stockpile at the Eldorado Nuclear Refinery at Port Hope, Ontario.



Atomic Energy Control Act on this and one other occasion (in *Re: Westinghouse* and *Re: Clark et al. v. Attorney General of Canada et al.*).

The major purpose of the regulation which the Liberal government refused to compromise was that Canadian sovereignty had to be protected against the extra-territorial application of American law to an action the Canadian government had taken in reaction to American protectionist policies. If the Canadian government had transferred information to the United States Justice Department or the Westinghouse Electric Corporation to assist in the prosecution of American subsidiaries based in Canada, which had acted at the request of the Canadian government, it would have been unlikely that corporations in a similar situation in the future would have implemented national economic policy without first checking American laws. The final result could have been that American subsidiaries would be more responsive to American law in determining the extent to which they would act in Canada's interest.

This argument is no longer valid. At different times, the Gulf Oil Corporation, Rio Algom Ltd., and Denison Mines Ltd., all members of the cartel, have requested that the Canadian government allow them to use the confidential documents concerning the operation of the cartel to comply with court rulings in the U.S. These former cartel members now feel that these documents would be helpful in their court battles. The Gulf Oil Corp. of Pittsburgh, for example, has sought permission to disclose the documents to prove that GMCL was compelled by the Canadian government to participate in the cartel.

In simplified terms, the decision to release or withhold the documents involved considerations of straining relations and undermining the positions of Australia and Britain, which have both passed tough laws to prevent the disclosure of information on the uranium cartel; protecting Canadian sovereignty against the extra-territorial application of American anti-trust laws; or helping Canadian corporations currently involved in billion dollar litigation.

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Under the guidance of Trudeau, the Liberals have consistently refused these requests. As the official Opposition, the Conservatives, led by Joe Clark and Sinclair Stevens, vociferously attacked the Liberal attempts to prevent discussion on the issue and release the documents. Yet in reversing their pre-May 1979 election protestations against the Liberal failure to release the documents, the Conservatives side-stepped the issue until December 13, 1979. On this date, the very day the Conservative government was defeated, the Cabinet decided not to release the documents in a manner that appeared to conflict with their proposed freedom of information legislation.

Both governments' actions reveal that Canada is perhaps bound to secret agreements with the former cartel members not to release the information. Indeed, it is possible that Canada made some political concessions to South Africa in order to acquire its support in the cartel, for uranium mining in South Africa was never as seriously affected by American protectionist policies as it was in Canada. One possible area could have been a lessening of Canadian criticism of South African apartheid laws. More likely, however, is the explanation that Canada, the United Kingdom and Australia are jointly working to limit the extra-territorial application of American law, with Canadian-Australian co-operation being particularly close.

There are other reasons why it is unlikely that the regulation will be revoked. First, the release of new information could resurrect past U.S. Justice Department and Grand Jury investigations into the subject, thereby increasing the chances that costly court judgments would go against Canadian companies involved. While the most incriminating material would probably still be held in Cabinet documents, perhaps the material released would not sufficiently help and indeed only further hinder the defence of Canadian corporations. Second, if material is released that tipped the balance away from Canadian producers now in court battles, forcing them to pay large damages to Westinghouse, the stability of the uranium industry and communities in Canada would be jeopardized, not to mention the adverse affect such a development would have on the foreign exchange received from the export of uranium. Such a setback to the uranium industry would also have federal-provincial repercussions because of the present large uranium exploration and mining efforts in Saskatchewan and Ontario.

U.S. Protectionism

Reflecting on past events, few would argue that Canada was not justified in participating in the uranium cartel against the protectionist and damaging uranium importation policies of the United States. In 1964 the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission issued a regulation banning the use of American-enriched foreign ura-

anium in domestic reactors, thereby eliminating access by foreign producers to 70 percent of the world market. Uranium from foreign sources could still be enriched in the United States and American utilities could have bought and stockpiled it but not for use in domestic reactors. The USAEC had imposed this restriction to protect the domestic market from foreign competition during the transition from a government to a commercial market after the passage of the Private Ownership Act of 1964 and to promote energy self-sufficiency for strategic reasons under a plan known as Project Independence. Three years later, the USAEC further antagonized international uranium producers when it began to compete aggressively for the remaining 30 percent of the world market by offering enriched uranium for \$8 per pound. Intense price competition and a persistent slippage in demand, as reactor construction in the United States was unexpectedly delayed, resulted in a further decline in uranium prices.

At the time, Canada and South Africa were the only two major producers of uranium outside of the United States. South African companies were not severely affected because their total annual production of uranium was less than Canada's and uranium was mined as a by-product of gold-mining operations requiring little capital investment and no increase in the labour force.

On the other hand, the Canadian uranium industry was seriously affected by the changes in American policy for it had been created by, and therefore was (and is) dependent upon, the demand generated for uranium within the United States. Canada had no comparable market in which to sell its uranium, and federal officials were faced with the problem of supporting the populations of numerous mining communities which were solely dependent on the export of uranium for revenue, employment and survival.

Many, however, would argue that the failure of the government to fully disclose its role in the uranium cartel has become a national embarrassment. Further, present evidence reveals that the government transformed the cartel from a defensive organization to an aggressive, price-raising, output-restricting one; invariably, Canada was at the heart of all cartel attempts to force drastic increases in the price of uranium.

The Supreme Court's recent decision not to release the documents on the basis that it would be against the 'national interest' should be questioned. Chief Justice-Bora Laskin's judgment that the documents were withheld in order to assert Canadian sovereignty and to resist the extra-territorial application of U.S. anti-trust laws will undoubtedly generate little opposition. Yet, despite Laskin's assertion to the contrary, the basic problem remains. Canadians are still largely left in the dark concerning the role of their government in an international price-fixing cartel unprecedented in Canadian history.

Prospects for the Madrid CSCE

by D.C. Arnould

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan coupled with the new wave of measures against Soviet dissidents including, most prominently, the arrest of Dr. Andrei Sakharov in February, has understandably raised questions about the Madrid session of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) which is scheduled to take place in November 1980 as a follow-up to the Helsinki Final Act of August 1975.

People are asking if there is any point in holding the meeting? Can any positive results be expected or will it simply degenerate into a bout of mutual vituperation even more sterile than the Belgrade Meeting held in 1977-78? These are all valid questions and in looking for the answers one must go back to fundamentals and examine what the 35 Final Act signatory countries see in the CSCE process in the way of advantages and benefits. Of course, the 35 do not by any means see these considerations in the same way. They can be grouped, albeit reluctantly by some, into three categories: the Western allies, the Warsaw Pact and the neutral and non-aligned nations. Broadly speaking, each group has its particular interests, although there are important shades of opinion within each of them.

At the beginning of the process there was reluctance on the part of a number of Western countries to agree to holding the CSCE on grounds that it was essentially designed by the Soviet Union as a substitute for the elusive final treaties for the formal conclusion of the Second World War. It seemed to be a roundabout attempt to achieve the Soviet aim of validating its territorial and political gains in Eastern Europe. But the idea of accepting the status quo in Europe had its attractions for those who believed that a new relationship could be built on it. Viewed realistically, a change in the situation by anything more than a slow historical, evolutionary process can be excluded. The Western nations looked about to see what benefits they themselves could see as coming out of such a conference. The search was made in three major areas: political, economic and what was called human contacts and cultural exchanges.

It was found that there were attractive possibili-

ties in all three areas, notably the third, which could serve as a possible means of assisting in the movement of people caught on the wrong side of ethnic frontiers, family reunification, other types of emigration, the free flow of information and contacts of all types.

As the Helsinki process evolved, these three areas of interest developed momentum. It became apparent that among the neutral nations of Europe outside the two pacts and among the smaller East European countries as well as in the West, great importance came to be attached to a substantial result from the Conference. But no one foresaw the extraordinary spontaneous demonstrations of interest in the Final Act which arose within certain sectors of the public in virtually all the East European countries, and in the Soviet Union itself. While giving the Russians what they wanted in the form of a declaration that there would be no changing of frontiers by force, the political section of the Final Act also included a series of voluntary confidence building measures designed to take some of the tension out of military manoeuvres and troop movements. The measures included in the Final Act under this title were modest but a belief had grown up during the Conference that the drafting of the Final Act should not spell the end of the discussions. A dynamic process had been started in Helsinki upon which one could build over the years.

While some members envisaged a continuing process from the start, it was by no means a foregone conclusion at the beginning of the conference that this view would prevail. But little by little the idea gained acceptance. There were two main purposes for continuity in the process: review of implementation and new proposals. The first was of great value because the Final Act was not a legally binding instrument, but a moral undertaking. Such an undertaking on so great a scale had never been tried before. It seemed essential, as part of the process of examining whether such an ap-

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proach had any validity, that there should be a way of assessing the change in climate and in actual practices that came about as a result of the signature by the 35 nations of the Final Act. The importance attached to new proposals in the second element was based on the idea that such a valuable beginning in international co-operation should be capable of some sort of dynamic evolution and extension: The CSCE process could become the tangible instrument of detente.

Belgrade Conference

It was agreed that two years after the 1975 signature of the Final Act, a further meeting would be held in Belgrade. The general assessment following the 1977 Belgrade meeting was that little came out of it. The Conference overran its projected time schedule by several weeks. Much of its time was taken up by recriminations in the human rights field directed at the Soviet Union and its allies. Predictably, the accusations were vehemently resisted. In such an atmosphere very little of a positive nature could emerge. Nonetheless, three conferences of a technical nature on specific subjects were agreed for the interim period between Belgrade and the next major gathering of the signatories: a scientific conference organized by the West German government, a legal conference on Compulsory Arbitration organised by the Swiss and a third conference, held in Malta, which was seen by the Maltese hosts as being more than a purely technical meeting on specific Mediterranean problems. (For a detailed account of the Belgrade CSCE, see *International Perspectives* July/August 1978.)

Looking back at Belgrade and its three offspring, there was much understandable disappointment. This was accompanied by the determination that the following CSCE meeting to be held in Madrid in November 1980 should have more positive results. The NATO allies set up a system of consultations on all aspects of the Madrid Meeting. Also, a vast bilateral network of contacts grew up, as virtually all signatories of the Final Act appointed senior officials as national coordinators for the forthcoming conference. These officials have been travelling widely to sound out views, to share thinking, to discuss proposals, and to harmonize positions so that Madrid might take on a more positive character than Belgrade. The contacts between East and West through this network of senior officials revealed a very great interest on the part of the East European nations in a successful conference. They saw in the CSCE process a means of underlining their individual national personalities and enlarging the radius of their international contacts. Furthermore, when detente flourished there was more room to manoeuvre, to move outward the edges of tolerance of the Soviet Union for national experiments and priorities. This interest was fully shared by the neutral and non-aligned European nations as well as by members of the Western alliance.

Proposals originated on all sides. The Eastern nations gave theirs particular prominence in a series of communiqués emanating from the Warsaw Pact Consultative Committee and through speeches by President Brezhnev himself, notably a speech in East Berlin on October 6, 1979.

An area which gained a great deal of attention concerned confidence building measures. It was linked generally in the minds of the Western Allies with the various discussions that were going ahead in the SALT process, the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction negotiations in Vienna and the work going on in other disarmament fora. They were seen as an important additional element in a new push toward meaningful results in the arms control and disarmament fields: a sort of new try for the new decade, as spelled out in the NATO communiqué of December 14, 1979.

Confidence building measures are particularly well-suited to the CSCE process. It is a happy combination of practical proposals with concrete and visible benefits, linked with idealism, or optimism, that touches the imagination of people. Generating a positive psychology is one of the chief characteristics of the CSCE. A general belief seemed to be growing on all sides that something really important could be done in the political basket of the CSCE under the general title of 'confidence building,' which could make a major contribution to extending the dialogue of Europe, which was the essential underlying purpose of the CSCE process. If military manoeuvres could be limited, or constrained, as the term of art has it; if they were fully predictable and visible, then there was greater reassurance for all. It would also mean that troop movements not connected with exercises would stand out more clearly and thus be more difficult to undertake. All of this would be of great value for lowering tension in Europe.

A further proposal coming from France has also excited interest. The proposal foresees a 'Conference on Disarmament in Europe,' to be approached in phases, beginning with a series of confidence building measures. It is to be confined to conventional forces only, which again has many attractions for the West which is particularly concerned with the current imbalance in these forces. It also called for application of its provisions to an area stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals, a vast piece of geography echoing General de Gaulle's concept of a Europe defined in these terms. One can guess, however, that such a concept will not be received with unbounded joy in Moscow.

It was generally recognized on all sides that the CSCE process should proceed on the basis of balance between the three main areas, or baskets. It was feared by many Westerners that a heavy overloading of the political basket, albeit with some distinctly attractive proposals, would tend to draw attention away from Basket III entitled *Co-operation in Humanitarian and Other Fields*. This is the key area for discussions of hu-

man rights and the most difficult area for the Soviet Union to view dispassionately, especially in light of the surprising spontaneous echoes in the USSR and the other countries of Eastern Europe that have grown out of the publication of the Helsinki Final Act. Groups have arisen virtually everywhere throughout these closed societies demanding an accounting from governments of their actions in the light of their signed undertakings.

The Final Act has already produced some important results in certain countries of Eastern Europe, in the form of relaxation of some arbitrary and restrictive procedures which hinder the freedom of movement of their citizens, the free flow of information and access by journalists. But by and large, this part of the Final Act has produced many problems for the countries whose governments operate on the theory of total state control.

Little has been written here about Basket II, the Economic Basket, because the exchanges under this heading, economic relations, science and technology and the environment, have already reached important levels and were developing favourably. This might not be quite so true for the third of these fields, but that is as much a national problem as one of East-West co-operation. There are already a number of other mechanisms of co-operation, both bilateral and multilateral, to carry the process forward outside the strict framework of the CSCE process. The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe has existed for more than 30 years. If its results regarding East-West co-operation have been slim, it is an existing mechanism which could take up new proposals as a result of the impetus given by the Final Act. Most CSCE countries have useful bilateral mechanisms for promoting an increasing range of exchanges and co-operation in technical and economic fields. While certain useful proposals could be put forward in this basket, the consensus focussed inevitably on Baskets I and III and the balance between them.

Throughout 1979 not everyone had been totally convinced of the positive character of the times. There were signs of an increased cooling of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. But whether there were reservations on the part of some more than on the part of others, there was a general agreement among Western governments that the approach to Madrid should be positive. Generally speaking, there remained a certain amount of optimism: the climate looked bright for a productive meeting.

It was suggested by some Western ministers, rather unkindly, but not incorrectly, that in order to save the CSCE process from 'bureaucratization' (that is to say management by diplomats and officials alone), there should be provision for ministerial level sessions at an appropriate time during the Madrid meeting to give the process the necessary political push and to keep all eyes on the broader meaning of the process in

terms of detente and an improving atmosphere in Europe.

Afghanistan invaded

Then, as 1979 drew to a close, came the shock of the invasion of Afghanistan. So much of the optimism about the CSCE process was based on the belief that detente was of great importance not only to the East European states but to the Soviet Union itself and that the Soviet Union would try to preserve the necessary atmosphere of good relations to ensure that the benefits of detente would continue. The military action of the Soviet Union against a neutral and essentially friendly neighbour shattered this belief.

Remarkably, however, there was an instinctive agreement on all sides, for all of the difficulties that surrounded the CSCE process and the lack of very many dramatic results since 1975, that it would be to no one's advantage if the CSCE became a casualty of the crisis. Of course, the Soviet Union's action sobered expectations considerably, but in the concentrated thinking that went on in the wake of Afghanistan the adoption of confidence building measures and a new and determined push on arms control and disarmament was seen as being even more necessary than before. If the pollyanna glow in some capitals had dimmed, there was a general realisation that the CSCE process and the lines of communication it offered between East and West were extremely valuable. The crisis pointed out the necessity of mechanisms to acquaint each side with the thinking of the other, so as to remove errors of perception and analysis. If the confidence building measures seemed to be something of a misnomer, since what little confidence there was had been severely battered, the purpose of the measures to give reassurance about the nature and scope of military movements and manoeuvres assumed an even greater importance.

Human contacts and exchanges of all sorts, the subject of Basket III, needed to be kept in mind as parts of an important mechanism for creating the occasion for dialogue on whatever subject, to maintain East-West links.

This having been said, the already difficult task of ensuring a positive meeting of minds at Madrid had been made infinitely more complicated and the questions posed at the outset of this piece sprang up in many minds. If there was a general determination that the CSCE process should not founder, there was much less clarity on just how the Madrid conference could be approached so that something of a positive nature could emerge. All sides have subscribed to the concept of balance among the baskets, but what does this mean in actual practice? Was it reasonable to expect the Soviet Union to accept meekly criticism, under the examination of implementation, including a basic criticism of its conduct in Afghanistan? Its actions, after all, run directly counter to the declaration on principles guid-

ing relations between participating states, contained in the Final Act. Principle II, for example, opens with the following words:

The participating states will refrain in their mutual relations, as well as in their international relations in general, from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state . . .

Principle VI, although it is written to apply to the participating states of the CSCE, when read in the light of the more general terminology of Principle II can be expected to imply a wider application. The following words of Principle VI are particularly relevant:

They will . . . in all circumstances refrain from any . . . act of military, or of political, economic or other coercion designed to subordinate to their own interest the exercise by another (participating) state of the rights inherent in its sovereignty . . .

Afghanistan is, of course, not a participating state, but a principle of this sort has a universality about it that cannot simply be brushed aside. It is as well a paraphrase of important undertakings contained in the United Nations Charter. Can the Western states really gloss over such a fundamental breach of principle? Should they mute their criticism for the sake of advancing certain other important matters? Arguments can be made in both directions. But in my view, there is an insidious danger in setting aside principles, even for the best of reasons. Putting them aside has an uncomfortable way of coming back to haunt later .

Soviet repression

There is another aspect of Soviet conduct, which has its psychological linkage with Afghanistan, and that is the new wave of repression against dissidents and advocates of religious beliefs in the Soviet Union. This brings into play Principle VII asking the states to "promote and encourage the effective exercise of civil, political, economic, social, cultural and other rights and freedoms all of which are derived from the inherent dignity of the human person . . ." and also the wording that follows on this thought, regarding freedom of the individual "to profess and practice . . . religion or belief acting in accordance with the dictates of . . . conscience". The dilemma is there. Should one, in the name of balance, reject highly interesting possibilities in the political basket at the cost of time for consideration and review of implementation of the guiding principles and matters pertaining to Basket III? Inevitably there is a linkage between the willingness of the East to work fruitfully with the other CSCE members on Basket I questions and the mood of the East after having sustained a severe battering over the guiding principles and Basket III.

There seems to be only one way to proceed which gives some chance to the Madrid meeting. This is to prepare all aspects of the work of the conference soberly and intelligently. This means developing the

main proposals in the three baskets in such a way as to point out their considerable mutual benefits. In this way, the 'new proposals' aspect of the conference could have an important attraction for all signatory states.

How one tackles the review of implementation part of the conference is much more problematical. If the CSCE process is to continue to have meaning, the guiding principles and the various other undertakings of the signatories cannot simply be brushed under the carpet. Can these criticisms and failures on the Eastern side be brought out in such a way as to relate them to the desirability of continuing the CSCE process? Can one perhaps shape the criticism in such a way that the future rather than the past is stressed? As a piece of diplomatic legerdemain this will not be easy to achieve. Of course, the Soviet Union and its allies will not fail to have answers and counter-criticisms. Western societies with their healthy penchant for self-criticism offer many quotations from Western sources about the failings of the free democracies. These failings essentially run counter to the rule of law and the sense of equity in our societies and are not conscious acts of policy such as one finds in the suppression of the dissidents in the East. This basic difference will have to be left for discovery by thoughtful students of the contemporary world. Nonetheless, this thorny path is perhaps the only one that offers some hope of the meeting not foundering during the review of implementation stage of its work. It is worth trying.

There are also other important requirements for a successful conference. Belgrade suffered from an overload of not always very well thought out or thoroughly prepared proposals. Madrid will have to have a lighter diet if it is not to suffer from the same sort of indigestion which added to the problems in Belgrade. There is every sign that the way Madrid is being prepared has benefited from the lessons of Belgrade. The process is much more thorough and far-reaching. If the Preparatory Meeting in September is ruthless in removing all proposals that have not stood the test of numerous bilateral soundings, then this hurdle can be overcome.

To sum up, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has cast a dark shadow over the Madrid Meeting. The relative optimism that prevailed in many capitals has all but evaporated. There is however a general acceptance of the importance of the CSCE process as a valuable instrument for the long-term haul of creating a more cooperative situation in Europe. Of course, the possibility of failure at Madrid cannot be dismissed. The strains created by the Soviet Union are many and serious. But the determination to preserve the CSCE process, even in this unpromising time of tension, might just bring about the necessary conditions for some results from what will inevitably be an extremely difficult and demanding conference. There is a possibility of accomplishing something; at a minimum, foundations can be laid for future useful work when the world returns to a more propitious time.

Growing up with Eayrs

by Tobias Fisher

Growing up Allied is the fourth volume of the *In Defence of Canada* series, and extends Professor Eayrs pre-eminence in the field of Canada's defence and foreign policy into the Cold War era. The eight years from 1947 to 1955 studied in this volume, cover Canada's participation in the conception, birth and troubled childhood of NATO.

The author is no less specific with his point of view. This is history at the inner circle, where the ideas of mandarins and ministers mix and meld to form policy. The names of the politicians, bureaucrats and diplomats will be familiar: Pearson, Claxton, Heeney, Robertson, Foulkes, Wrong, Reid and Wilgress. Eayrs allows this "policy community" to speak for itself in carefully arranged primary sources which take up fully 75 per cent of the book. The organization of the material must have been a formidable task requiring an elaborate cross-file index. It is to the author's great credit that he has managed to marshal the relevant material and present it in a flowing prose.

Even more than in his previous volumes Eayrs is reluctant to insert his own observations and opinions. The approach is less justifiable with this volume than in the earlier ones. When Eayrs began the series, there was virtually no literature in the field. His first volume pioneered the subject and that in itself guaranteed the book a place of honour in Canadian historical writing. This is not the case for the story of the early years of NATO. Canadian participants (notably Lester Pearson and Escott Reid) have already told much of the story. What is needed now is a greater degree of analysis than Eayrs has provided. Instead, he reserves his comments to terse and sometimes puzzling chapter conclusions. Following a quotation making a rather harsh judgment of Lester Pearson, Eayrs asks: "Is it justifiable? The verdict is left for the statesman's biographers to deliver. 'Biography is about chaps': national security studies are (mostly) about gaps." This is taking the easy way out.

Mr. Fisher is an Ottawa-based journalist.

The neutral approach leaves the reader to make his own judgments, but the density of ideas expressed in the voluminous correspondence makes it difficult to form an overview. Occasionally the arguments become repetitive and split hairs.

It is ironic that 'the view from the top' should be so narrow. What were the domestic political considerations? What did parliament, the press and the Canadian public think of NATO and of Canadian troops serving in Europe so soon after the war? The public mood must have had some bearing on policy, but with the exception of Mackenzie King's reservations about Pearson's carefree "internationalism", we are left to make our own assumptions.

Canada as a 'middle power' takes on a second meaning in the book. Apart from our military status, there develops a variety of "special relationships" which allow Canada to serve as a go-between. Whether the dispute is between the U.K. and France over German rearmament, the U.K. and the U.S. over the Suez Canal or the 'big three' riding herd over the smaller allies, Pearson and his clique are invariably in the middle offering soothing words and compromise solutions and resolutions. To this day Canadians at NATO enjoy a reputation as neutral 'fixers'.

Although *Growing Up Allied* does not convey the mood of the time, we do get a good look at the policy making process and the policy makers. The process took the form of a high-level written debate. Reports coming in from the various diplomats were subjected to rigorous scrutiny by the External Affairs department and passed along to the Minister and Cabinet. Comments and instructions would return to the field by the same route.

Disputes

There was generally consensus within the "policy community", but occasionally disputes arose, as when assistant under-secretary Escott Reid drafted instructions for the Canadian representative at the treaty negotiations, Hume Wrong. A copy of Reid's instructions which embodied his high-minded ideal of a "spiritual

alliance", was sent to Norman Robertson, then serving as High Commissioner in London. Robertson did not approve: "I see no need for rhetoric in a secret working paper . . . Specifically, I would cut out all the three-decker phrases . . . most of the double-barrelled ones, and any remaining echoes from the Anglican prayer book."

Reid's zeal to create an alliance with "economic and moral force" was shared, to a more sensible degree, by Lester Pearson, who by this time, 1948, had become Secretary of State for External Affairs and the prevailing voice in the "policy community". Pearson saw the alliance as "a real commonwealth of nations" with the potential to diversify into areas of non-military co-operation. His proposals for economic collaboration and cultural exchange were written into the Treaty as Article Two, which became known as the 'Canadian article'.

Book Review

Tucker's foreign policy

by Peyton V. Lyon

Has any government, in any country, tried harder than the first Trudeau administration to impose a theoretical framework and systemic management upon its foreign policy? Did all that effort, and occasional turmoil, make a significant difference in the actual conduct of Canada's external relations?

Michael Tucker's unequivocal answer to the second question is 'no'. "In its style and substance," he concludes, "Canadian foreign policy in the Trudeau era conformed with the internationalist traditions in Canada's post-1945 external behaviour". Had 'Pearsonians' remained at the helm, "had there been no questioning", it is unlikely that at the end of the 1970s Canada's foreign policies "would have differed markedly."

Fair enough, up to a point. Trudeau has enjoyed his diplomatic successes. He has even acquired a modest reputation for statesmanship. But would anyone maintain that this is the result of consistent adherence to the myopic doctrine that emerged from the foreign policy review of 1968-70? Or systematic management? Fortunately Trudeau's deeds were generally more traditional, and therefore better, than his words. By decade's end even his rhetoric was increasingly internationalist and the restless search for the right organizational structure was still proceeding.

But Tucker overstates his case. By his early state-

Pearson's commitment to an expansive alliance cannot be doubted. When the American state department, in response to congressional pressure, balked at the non-military proposals, word was sent from Ottawa that "the Canadian government would have to review its position on the whole project".

Unfortunately, the diluted 'Canadian article' has never been considered to be more than a token gesture. The failure of the Trudeau government's 'contractual link' with the European Communities serves to remind us that our other contractual link with Europe, NATO, remains primarily a military alliance.

Eayrs, James. *In Defence of Canada: Growing Up Allied*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980.

ments, Trudeau deflated the legitimate pride many Canadians took in their country's international vocation, and thus weakened one argument for a strong and united Canada. Many officials, moreover, did adopt the more hard-boiled, national-interest approach that Trudeau advocated and seemed not to notice when he himself shifted to a loftier emphasis on universal, humanitarian values, especially in dealing with North-South issues.

Tucker is least persuasive when attempting to demonstrate that, as prime minister, Trudeau was always an internationalist. This he does by delineating a confusing variety of 'internationalisms.' Trudeau is then portrayed as a champion of the 'mentor-state' brand, one based on the belief that a nation best serves the common cause, not by teamwork, but by taking unilateral initiatives. Although example setting was always difficult to reconcile with Trudeau's professed modesty about Canada's influence and his rejection of 'role-playing,' a few of his early statements do support Tucker's interpretation. The establishment of diplomatic relations with Peking in 1970, moreover, and Ot-

Dr. Lyon teaches Political Science at Carleton University. He specializes in Canadian foreign policy and international affairs.

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tawa's pioneering in nuclear safeguards policy properly be cited as examples of 'mentor-state' internationalism.

On the other hand, to present Canada's oceanic expansionism as a form of internationalism is to stretch the concept beyond utility. Tucker is far from alone in his enthusiasm for Canada's energetic and greedy law of the sea diplomacy and domestic demands were beginning to push even the Pearson government along this path. However, Tucker should have acknowledged that Trudeau's early unilateralism, especially the rejection of the authority of the World Court constituted a major departure from Canada's internationalist tradition. It is better seen as the most obvious example of what Trudeau meant by projecting domestic interest into the international environment. Moreover, since Canada could not defend all its new maritime claims by military means, it scarcely deserves commendation for seeking to embody them in the emergent law of the sea. Nor does Tucker make any effort to square Canada's oceanic acquisitiveness with Trudeau's commitment on our behalf to a more equitable distribution of the world's resources.

Tucker considers Trudeau's early unilateralism towards NATO to have been an 'egregious' error. However, this was not, he suggests, because it departed from Canada's internationalist tradition but because it prejudiced Canada's ability to maintain the close trans-Atlantic ties needed as a counterweight to its relations with the United States. Somewhat inconsistently, the purchase of the *Aurora* aircraft is censured on the grounds that it is more suitable for a NATO role rather than for 'sovereignty-protection', the first of Canada's defence priorities as enunciated by Trudeau. Tucker demonstrates with ease that the *Aurora* decision-making process failed to correspond with the 'rational actor' model. He appears not to question the greater irrationality in proclaiming 'sovereignty-protection' as the ultimate goal of Canada's defence policy.

Professor Tucker's new study is intended neither as a comprehensive survey of Trudeau's foreign policy nor as an introductory text. Rather, it is a collection of recent case studies and a fragmentary but frequently perceptive commentary on the dilemmas of foreign policy planning, and on the Trudeau failure to escape from the reactive, *ad hoc*, patterns of the past. Tucker's treatment is scarcely more systematic than the policies he assesses, and easy reading is sometimes impeded by a needlessly complex style. Many passages, however, are informative, judicious and stimulating. The book is well worth reading, especially for those already familiar with the earlier studies of Trudeau's foreign policy by Thordason, Dobell, and Thomson and Swanson.


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
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International Perspectives is published in Canada six times a year by International Perspectives, (95312 Canada Inc.), 302-150 Wellington St., Ottawa, K1P 5A4. Telephone: (613) 238-2628
Second Class Mail Registration Number 4929.

Editor and Publisher:
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ISSN 0381-4874

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In the centre Information Supplement

Futurists consider prospects for the Third World
at the Global Conference on the Future

Special Feature by
the International Development Research Centre

Letters to the Editor

Editor's note: The article entitled "Khomeini and the Big Lie", published in the May/June 1980 issue of *International Perspectives* and reprinted in the August 5 edition of the *Globe and Mail*, sparked a heated exchange of letters between author Sidney Freifeld and the Iranian Chargé d'Affaires. The two letters below are reprinted from the *Globe and Mail*.

Iran's revolution

The article by Sydney (sic) A. Freifeld *Khomeini's Pet Weapon: The Big Lie* has offered nothing but distortion, fabrication and insults. The writer, not having been able to analyse events properly, has made some baseless accusations without offering proof. Therefore, there are some facts to be cleared:

1. It is unrealistic to ignore the undeniable destructive role of U.S. imperialism, international Zionism and racism in Third World countries toward liberation movements. The political histories of these countries are full of stories and instances of oppression and domination by imperialist powers.

2. The Islamic Revolution of Iran, due to its independent nature, has kicked out and destroyed the U.S. and Zionist interests and influences within the country.

3. In addition to its many interferences before the revolution, the United States, aiming to regain its power in Iran and consequently

to strengthen it in the region, has continued to plot and conspire against our popular, genuine Islamic Revolution. Hundreds of documents found in the former U.S. Embassy in Tehran are solid evidence of hostile action taken by the United States. These documents revealed many facts. Among them are:

a. The so-called fundamentalist group (Forghan) had had relations with the U.S. Embassy on a regular basis and got advice from it.

b. The United States had been trying to disrupt the general elections and had contacted and paid their local elements in this regard. The purpose was to create chaos and anarchy within the country to that the ground would be ready for a 1953-style coup:

c. The United State collaborated and organized its elements (Savak and pro-shah agents) to provoke and mislead several tribes in Kurdistan and other regions.

d. Regarding U.S. military aggression, the so-called 'rescue mission' was designed to make a coup in Iran. Even North American newspapers reported many times that the United States intended to do the job inside Tehran with the help of the 5th column of 3,000 Iranians. It seems that Mr. Freifeld does not even recall the reports of his own city papers.

4. That the attack on the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Quds (Jerusalem) by Zionist elements and the attack on the Grand Mosque in Mecca were the result of U.S. and Zionist plots cannot be denied.

5. In conclusion, I wish to warn spiteful writers as well as the paper not to continue their fabrications and distortions about Iran because you are creating an atmosphere of hostility among the people of many countries. Be aware that though this may seem useful in the short run, it will definitely be damaging and harmful in the long run.

Truth cannot be hidden forever even by a huge propaganda machine such as yours—in the end, it will finally prevail. You owe the truth to your people—not distorted accounts to fill them with revenge and hatred toward another nation.

S.M.H. Adeli
Chargé d'Affaires
Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran,
Ottawa

Freifeld's reply

If his letter to the *Globe and Mail* (Iran's revolution, Aug. 25) is any criterion, Ayatollah Khomeini and the Iranian Revolution are not well served by their representative in this country, Mr. S.M.H. Adeli, Chargé d'Affaires of the Iranian Embassy in Ottawa.

The Iranian revolution needs to be understood in the West in all of its aspects. Its complex currents require not only objective analysis but to be viewed through Iranian and not simply Western perspectives.

Mr. Adeli does not help at all by simply repeating the Ayatollah's lies which I cited in the article reproduced from *International Perspectives* by the *Globe and Mail* on August 5. Those lies are on the record and my purpose in bringing them up was to seek some light on the Ayatollah's motivation.

Khomeini attributed last November's incredible attack on the Grand Mosque in Mecca to 'American imperialists' and 'Zionists', and Mr. Adeli now repeats that charge, knowing it to be false.

The Saudis beheaded 64 persons on January 9 for that attack, one of the most potentially volatile terror-

...st episodes in recent years. Who were they?

The leader was Juhayman bin Mohammed bin Seif al-Oteibi and his most important follower was Abgallah al-Qahtani. They and others in the attacking group were members of Saudi Arabia's Wahabi sect, and the remainder were Yemenis, South Yemenis, Sudanese, Iraqis, Kuwaitis and Egyptians. All were extreme xenophobes, fanatically opposed to Christians, Jews—and Shi'ite Moslems.

To believe Mr. Adeli and Aya-tollah Khomanei, you have to believe that the Saudis beheaded the wrong people!

Sidney A. Freifeld

Emigration

Sir:

(Re: article by J.C.M. Ogelsby "Faltering Revolution Sparks Mass Exodus from Cuba" in *International Perspectives*, May/June 1980.) If the exodus of people from one country to another is an evidence of the country of origin, I would like to comment on the following: in Latin America, the highest percentage of (legal and illegal) immigration is in Venezuela. Since 1975, particularly after the deterioration of the political and economic conditions of several countries in the *cono sur* (i.e., Argentina, Chile and Uruguay) some 400,000 people have come to Venezuela. In addition, there is a constant wave of other Latin Americans (Colombians, etc.) that arrive at the rate of some one thousand persons per day. This makes a grand total of over three million foreigners living in Venezuela, or some 20 percent of the population.

On the other hand, there are many people here emigrating to the United States, i.e., Florida, because they think that the situation here is unbearable. Many claim that Miami is partially owned by Venezuelans, and I believe it. A third point is that many people in Latin America wish they could go to the United States, particularly if an emigration

system 'a la cubana' was to be offered to them. Finally, I believe that if the United States were to open its doors to everybody, I wonder how many millions would go there, including many from the Western European countries. Probably then, the Americans would have to emigrate *en masse*.

Territorial Waters

Sir:

The excellent article by Mr. Carl E. Law on "Freedom of Innocent Passage versus Territorial Expansion" (see *International Perspectives* July/August 1980) justifiably commands the attention not only of the interested citizen but of the professional as well. On its first page there is a minor matter, in no way impairing the fundamental quality of the piece, which should be discussed.

The long standing and frequently reiterated proposition that the old three mile limit of territoriality (the marine league) sprang from the maximum range of coast artillery in the early formative years of international law cannot be sustained. In the 16th and 17th centuries no one had a piece of ordnance that could hurl its projectile for anything like 3½ statute miles, nor do

I think that many, right or wrong conclusions, can be reached here, but Dr. Ogelsby, for one, should stay studying history and leave Political Science to political scientists.

Luis Salomon Barrios,
Barquisimeto, Venezuela

military historians concerned with materiel recount such an extraordinary cannon.

Is it not possible that the marine league, as a once commonly accepted measure of the extent of territorial waters, came forth because, at that range, a sentry of then average height, standing at sea level, could first become aware of a vessel as it came over the curve of the earth from hull-down concealment? This is a matter which at least could be verified empirically through modest experimentation involving a few five footers with normal eye sight and a sailing vessel of appropriate size.

In any event, none of this belies the profit to be derived from careful consideration of Mr. Law's article. It merely twinges my pedant nerve to find this oft-repeated error conveyed still once more.

Melvin P. Straus,
El Paso, Texas.
U.S.A.

Note to our readers

In the article by Jack Ogelsby on the Cuban exodus (*International Perspectives*, May/June 1980) an editorial change led to the distortion of the author's meaning. A sentence which read "... (Castro) achieved a long-held Cuban goal of gaining the support of a major European power—the U.S.S.R.—in order to balance the presence of the United States.", incorrectly cited the Soviet Union as the only European power favoured by Cuba to act as a counterbalance to the U.S. Professor Ogelsby wishes to point out that after gaining independence, Cuba looked to Great Britain, then a major power, to fulfil that role and only later did Cuba turn to the U.S.S.R. after the balance of power shift in international relations made it the obvious choice. The editor apologizes for the error.

Turbulence of world scene underlines interdependence

by J.G.H. Halstead

The 1980s have started with a bang. The lengthy diplomatic hostage-taking incident in Iran, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the unwelcome further increases of OPEC's oil prices are among the recent dramatic events which spell significant change in international relationships. We seem to be moving out of an era in which we perhaps took too much for granted and into a phase in which we can take very little for granted. We are entering a decade which gives every indication of posing some of the most serious challenges we in the industrialized democracies have ever faced.

Energy, as represented by the catch-word 'oil', has become the focus of global concerns in this last quarter of the 20th Century. Sharp, irregular oil price movements and major changes in the structure of the international oil market are playing havoc with rational economic planning and are having serious effects in terms of less growth, more inflation and higher interest rates. Moreover, oil is not the only finite resource which threatens to be in short and uncertain supply. There is every reason to fear an undignified and dangerous scramble for ever scarcer raw materials. The stockpiling of strategic goods has increased in all major western nations and measures have had to be taken to curb speculation in world markets for some valuable minerals.

The Third World countries are united in their search for national self-fulfilment and their demand for what they call "a more equitable world economic order". Understandably, their grievances are more often than not directed against the erstwhile colonial and mercantilist powers. They are united on little else, however, and the Non-Aligned movement, to which many of them look for refuge between the power blocs, is full of strains and contradictions. Moreover, the rush for industrial and technological progress in these countries has often been pressed with little regard for the resulting social tensions or for their capacity to absorb

the inflows of capital. Such countries often find themselves forced to reconcile conflicting value systems in an atmosphere of continual crisis. Small wonder that economic progress in many cases outstrips social change with violent results. If this is true in an oil-rich country like Iran, how much more so is it in the oil-poor countries, where stability will increasingly hinge on finding a solution to the energy problem.

Soviet aims

Recent events have also reminded us of the continuing threat to the independence and integrity of smaller states which is posed by the ruthless use of military power in the service of an expansionist ideology. The Soviet Union has been showing increasing boldness in pursuit of its aims as a superpower and as the self-proclaimed leader of the Communist world. In East Berlin in 1953, in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968 the Soviets demonstrated their determination to maintain their grip on Eastern Europe regardless of the views of the inhabitants. Elsewhere in the world they seemed content to rely on proxies and surrogates to take advantage of "national liberation movements" to expand their influence. In Indochina, Hanoi (with the aid of massive infusions of Soviet military equipment) completed its conquest of South Vietnam and embarked last year on the subjugation of neighbouring Cambodia. In Africa, Cuban legions bore the brunt of the fighting for pro-Soviet regimes in Ethiopia and Angola. In Afghanistan, however, the Soviets have made it clear that they are prepared to use direct intervention, if necessary, outside the Warsaw Pact area in support of their foreign policy objectives.

What are those objectives? For a recent answer we can turn to an election speech by Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko in February, in which he described the paramount factors in international affairs in the following terms: a strong cohesive 'socialist community' as its political and security base and rejects any shrinkage of that base. Once a country joins the community it must not be allowed to leave again. Secondly, Moscow seeks to exploit the indigenous nation-

alist movements in the Third World and to harness

Mr. Halstead, who until recently was Canada's ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany, is now permanent representative to the delegation of Canada at the North Atlantic Council in Brussels.

them to Soviet aims by demonstrating as far as possible that the Soviet Union is the natural friend and ally of such movements. And, finally, Moscow seeks to ensure its own security through the pursuit of detente and the maintenance, at a minimum, of strategic parity with the United States. In this view, detente is a sort of insurance against nuclear war. But detente is specific to Europe and does not at all rule out ideological rivalry and even military intervention in the Third World, where no defined status quo exists. Nor does strategic parity with the United States exclude the ability to challenge American power and influence in specific circumstances, particularly where the U.S. can be denied regional associates or allies.

We see that instability and upheaval have become characteristics of the Third World at a time when the importance of the developing countries in the East-West context is increasing and also when the ability of the United States to play the role of global policeman is in decline. Afghanistan is only the latest and most striking example of this combination of trends. It illustrates the need for an overall, long-term western concept capable of dealing not only with Soviet policy but also with the circumstances which offer the Soviet Union opportunities to exploit. It also illustrates the degree to which the local and internal preoccupations of Third World countries have prevented them from even recognizing, let alone tackling the broader tasks of international co-operation and collective security. This will no doubt continue to be the case as long as regional problems in the Middle East and elsewhere remain unresolved. The achievement of majority rule in independent Zimbabwe gives ground for cautious hope in southern Africa. It seems a coherent Western policy between the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean will remain impossible as long as the Arab-Israeli quarrel festers.

These developments are not entirely new, of course; they have been taking shape for years. However, they have underlined once again the fact of our global interdependence. We are all in the same boat in this shrinking world of ours. Sooner or later (and I hope it is sooner) we will have to consider seriously the practical implications of interdependence to our way of life and try again to find answers to some of the most pressing and persistent questions of our times.

One of these is how we are to adapt our security policy to an era of detente. The nuclear stalemate and the agreements between the U.S. and the Soviet Union on strategic arms limitations have certainly increased the inhibitions on the use of military force by the two superpowers and reduced the danger of nuclear war. They have not eliminated the risk of conflict or pressure below the nuclear threshold, however. At the same time the success of NATO in deterring aggression and promoting detente has reduced the perception of the threat and created confusion about the continued

need for defence. Both sides have agreed that there is no alternative to detente (in the sense of no general war) but each side has a very different idea of what detente really means. For the West it means a more open relationship in a spirit of live and let live. But the Soviets want to have their cake and eat it too, promoting greater co-operation between states so as to increase access to Western markets and technology, while retaining rigid controls over the movement of people and information, maintaining the ideological conflict and making mischief in the Third World.

Deterrent capability

To answer this question satisfactorily we will have to find the right mix of detente and defence. The only sensible approach is to maintain, on the one hand, a sufficient deterrent capability, both conventional and nuclear, until we can negotiate with the Warsaw Pact a reduction in the level of forces in Europe; and on the other hand, to insist that the detente process must provide for an easing of relations between people as well as between states. We must formulate policies designed not merely to reduce East-West relations in the short term but to create more lasting conditions of stability and predictability based on balance and dialogue. We must also explain clearly and repeatedly to the public what we are doing. Experience shows (as in the matter of medium-range missiles in Europe) that it may sometimes be necessary to forego some easing of tension in the short run in order to achieve a more balanced, stable and healthy relationship in the long run.

Another question is how we should deal with the interaction between the East-West division and the North-South cleavage. Is detente divisible? Can we afford to see the world divided into a zone of detente, where peaceful coexistence reigns, at least for the time being, and a zone of unbridled rivalry, where the USSR takes advantage of every opportunity to spread its influence by any means?

Related to this is the question of how we are to solve the new global problems of energy, food resource management and the environment. These are problems which are of a medium and long term structural nature and for which there are not quick answers. We therefore need to approach them not as isolated North-South issues but as part of a world-wide attack on structural problems which we need to overcome for our own future. Their solution depends not primarily on military factors but on economic, technological and other such 'functional' factors but which, are nevertheless of extraordinary significance for our security. They are also problems which obviously can be solved only on a global scale, either in the United Nations (as in the case of the Law of the Sea) or by other international machinery, and this must involve working with the developing countries of the Third World. This means in turn finding more lasting forms of co-operation with those countries which will take account



Canadian Forces photo

West German and Canadian personnel check map at a traffic control point during 1978 NATO exercise.

not only of their need for assistance but also of their desire for self-respect. I believe that we have now come into a situation where such non-military factors should be added to the traditional military factors to create a sort of new dimension to our security concept.

Perhaps the most fundamental question of all is the following: How are we to maintain the cohesion of our free societies in this rapidly changing world? Certainly not solely on the basis of our opposition to Communism. Nor on the assumption that fear of attack is alone sufficient to maintain our alliance. We must revive our efforts to reconcile our consumption-oriented growth with our moral values and the imperatives of our involvement. We must also come to grips with the awkward fact that the non-Communist world is not synonymous with the free world as we understand it. Western values are not self-evident and democratic practices are not accepted without question in the Third World. The surest way to enlist the understanding of Third World countries is to regard them as equal partners and not as pawns on the global chessboard.

Another factor to be taken into account is that, with the formation of new centres of economic and political gravity in the European Community, Japan and China, a new constellation of international relationships has emerged in which power is more widely diffused and relationships are far more complex. This tends to lead to a more unstable situation of greater rivalry in the non-Communist world and to complicate the capacity of the industrialized democracies to de-

velop rapid collective response to situations which may arise on the fringes of the Alliance or beyond. We have seen the development of strains between the United States on the one hand and the European community and Japan on the other. Serious difficulties have been experienced in trying to deal with the problems of energy, Africa, the Middle East and most recently Iran and Afghanistan. For the future the sort of role which China should play in the East-West relationship seems likely to be a sensitive and potentially divisive subject of inter-allied consultations.

Let us look for a moment at the challenge presented by the Afghanistan crisis. There is no doubt that the Soviet invasion of that country dealt a heavy blow to detente and that the West must make it clear that such behaviour is unacceptable and has its price. To do so requires a co-ordinated western approach based on a common analysis of Soviet motives and a common definition of Western objectives and the best means of achieving them. Otherwise it is the West, rather than the Soviet Union, which will be paying a price in terms of ineffectiveness and disunity.

It seems clear that the Soviets were motivated mainly by fear that Afghanistan was in danger of leaving the Soviet sphere of influence again. And the fact that 50 million Moslems live in the south of the Soviet Union certainly has something to do with it as well. The Soviet aim now is to establish a Marxist, pro-Soviet government which can administer the country along lines laid down by Moscow. This can obviously

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not be done without Soviet troops and is likely to take a long time. In these circumstances the Soviets can hardly be seriously interested in proposals for the neutrality of Afghanistan, if they require Soviet withdrawal. On the other hand, the West can certainly not accept what the Soviets would like, which is an end to all interference in Afghanistan except Soviet intervention, followed by an international guarantee of the Afghanistan government, which would put a Western seal of approval on the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul.

There are in my view only two ways which are likely to bring the Soviets to consider withdrawal seriously. One is the provision of sufficient assistance to the national resistance forces in Afghanistan to make the Soviet pacification campaign too costly, politically and militarily. The other is the development of sufficient criticism among the non-aligned countries to persuade the Soviets that Afghanistan is not worth the attendant loss of influence in the Third World. It is not yet clear whether one or other of these factors will materialize.

Western solidarity

Meanwhile, Western policy should be directed toward condemning the Soviet use of force, calling for Soviet withdrawal and seeking a guarantee against the repetition of such aggression. To back such policy up it is important for us to reinforce and modernize our defences. At the same time it is important to avoid a return to the Cold War and to retain those elements of our relations with the Soviet Union (and even more so our relations with the Eastern Europe) which are demonstrably in the Western interest. We must try to strike a balance between signaling the dangerous strains created by the Soviet action and continuing the East-West dialogue. We should be ready, for example, to talk about the further development of the detente process under proper circumstances and about measures to prevent nuclear confrontation.

Finally, it is important to do all we can to harmonize the Western and Third World reactions to the Afghanistan crisis. For this we must be ready for long and patient efforts to persuade the non-aligned countries of the significance of the Soviet invasion and to encourage their participation in the search for a solution. In this connection a resolution of the Iran hostage question and some form of rapprochement between Iran and the United States seem to be indispensable elements. And that, of course, is why the hostage drama, in addition to its humanitarian aspects, is at once so fateful and so excruciating.

Under the sober impact of events in Iran and Afghanistan the United States has been going through a process of re-appraising its role as a superpower and as leader of the free world, with implications for all of us. No one should underestimate the traumatic effects on the United States of the long, agonizing war in Vietnam. It sapped not only American blood and resources

but also much of the United States' political will and sense of purpose. Never before had a foreign war so rent the fabric of American society and American political life and brought home too starkly the lessons of the limits of power. But the trauma of Vietnam and the partial paralysis it caused is receding, and much of President Carter's new assertiveness is due to a renewed sense of determination on the part of the American people and a greater willingness to exercise their leadership role.

To the extent that this means a more realistic approach to the task of maintaining the balance of power on which the peace and security of all of us depend, it is certainly to be welcomed. At the same time, leadership is not enough without solidarity, and solidarity requires a sharing of purposes and tasks. The interests at stake in the questions examined above are common interests because they are vital to the survival of our free societies. That many of them lie outside the NATO area of course poses an additional problem of co-ordination. In my opinion the solution is not to be sought in an extension of the Treaty area but rather in a pragmatic division of labour among the Allies according to their respective positions and capabilities.

There is therefore more than ever a need for solidarity among friends and allies; it must be our highest priority. But perceptions can be different even when interests are basically the same. The fact that Americans and not Europeans are being held hostage in Iran means that the emotional involvement on the two sides of the Atlantic is different. And the fact that the United States is in North America and the Europeans share a continent with the Soviet Union also causes a difference of perceptions. When combined with different political systems and habits of thoughts it carries the constant danger of divergence which adversaries are quick to exploit. Solidarity therefore calls for careful reflection before acting and for close and continuing communications, especially between the North American and European members of the Atlantic Alliance. It also calls for heightened sensitivity on the part of all of us—a conscious effort by each of us to put himself in the other's shoes. Both our domestic procedures and our multilateral mechanisms of consultation must be geared to this requirement.

Against this background there is a requirement, in my view, for a re-examination of relations between Europe and North America. One of the practical implications of interdependence in the 1980s is that Europe, and particularly the Federal Republic of Germany, is bound to be called on to shoulder more responsibility as a major partner in the free world. This is a natural consequence of Western Europe's growing economic, political and military integration and a reflection of the Community's increasing weight in world affairs. It suggests that the Community should in turn be taking a new look at its relationship with North America, not

only with the United States but also with Canada.

In this context, what sort of role can Canada play? Clearly, we are not in the same league as either the United States or Europe. Although ours is the second largest country in the world, our sparse population of under 24 million and our vast distances impose limits on what we can do. Yet, we are not only an Atlantic power, we are also a Pacific power and an Arctic power. Economically, Canada is of major importance, particularly as a producer of many of the free world's critical raw materials. Strategically, Canada is of significance not only to the U.S. in the defence of North America but also to Western Europe in the protection of the vital Atlantic sea lanes. Canada's political significance should also not be underestimated, especially in the longer term.

It is obvious that as a North American country, Canada's relationship with the U.S. is of first importance. At the same time we have a long tradition of cooperation and understanding with Europe. This reflects the European origins of most of our people, as well as a common experience and participation in the events of this century which have created the Europe of today. But Canada's political significance is also demonstrated in our growing ties with the Third World, through our programmes of development assistance and our manifold ties in the Commonwealth and more recently *La Francophonie*. We have been a major partner in most of the United Nations peacekeeping and truce observation operations around the world. All these links have made us an *interlocuteur valable* for our friends in Europe and elsewhere in the world.

Canadian role

Canada recognizes its strategic importance to the free world as well as the importance of Europe to Canada's security. Canada's full participation in NATO, both politically and militarily, remains a firm commitment. We regard the defence of Western Europe as our own first line of defence. In addition to the land and air forces stationed in West Germany, we have earmarked forces ready to contribute to the defence of the Northern flank and to the allied naval forces in the North Atlantic. We also receive German armoured troops for training in Manitoba and fighters of the German *Luftwaffe* have been moved to Labrador to undertake low-level flight training.

In economic terms, Canada offers a large and varied base of renewable and non-renewable resources as well as a relatively stable and secure environment for their exploitation. In addition to its strong agricultural and forest industries, Canada is a reliable and proven supplier of industrial and raw materials and a world leader in the production and export of non-ferrous metals. But Canada offers more than that. It also offers favourable opportunities for the further processing of such resources prior to export and for the development



Canadian Forces photo

Canadian armoured personnel carrier rolls through a West German village during 1977 NATO training exercise.

of other secondary industry. There is scope for combining European capital and technology with Canadian resources and manpower and, in increasing measure, our own technology. There is also scope for combining European concerns about security of supply with Canadian aspirations to upgrade our raw materials and find better access to foreign markets for the output of our processing and manufacturing industries.

For all these reasons Canada's contribution to Western solidarity, both actual and potential, should not be under-estimated. Canada is prepared to support a co-ordinated approach to the problems of the post-Afghanistan situation. We are ready to endorse such counter-measures (such as the boycott of the Moscow Olympics) as may be globally agreed on. We are ready to play a part in the continuing discussion of a diplomatic solution to the Afghanistan problem when the time is ripe. We are ready to make a contribution to supporting countries of the region like Pakistan and Turkey.

Looking further ahead, the time may well be near when we should be thinking in terms of a new kind of trans-Atlantic partnership designed to meet the challenges of the 1980s and 1990s, and based on a higher level of reciprocal interests, privileges and obligations. Such a partnership would be not only to the mutual advantage of Canada and Europe but also in the broader interest of solidarity and co-operation in the free world.

Canadian Labour Congress as an international actor

by John Clark

"The important thing in the international arena is to follow through on the rhetoric, because the international arena is largely rhetoric."

A lot of people might not agree with that assessment of world diplomacy by Canadian Labour Congress (CLC) President Dennis McDermott. A lot more might not agree with his belief that the CLC has itself taken the step and evolved beyond the rhetoric in its own international affairs activities. Romeo Maione, at the non-governmental organization directorate of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), is, however, one person who does agree. "The trade unions," he says, "are moving from what I would call a 'romantic international solidarity' rhetoric... into a much more realistic kind of internationalism based on hard economic facts." The CIDA official speaks from first-hand knowledge. He was, at one point, international affairs director at the CLC.

In fact, Canada's unions have been active internationally for many years. For example, the CLC and its predecessors, the Canadian Congress of Labour and the Trades and Labour Congress, have been participating in the International Labour Organization (ILO) since 1919. But to many observers, the CLC's international activities have taken on added substance in the past two or three years. For one thing, it is offering alternative policies for the resolution of the world's problems—policies that do not always correspond with the view expressed by official Ottawa.

At a time when the business press reports the stock markets' favorable response to war rumours, Canada's largest labour federation offers urgent pleas for disarmament. While governments around the world preach policies of restraint, the CLC argues that fighting inflation at the expense of employment will produce "nothing but compounding economic disaster." As government institutions increasingly pay heed to human and trade union rights around the world, the CLC is an old hand in the area. This last factor may help to explain the enhanced relationship with the federal government.

The primary task of the CLC international affairs department is to get the Department of External Affairs to realize the indispensibility of the congress in

achieving a real understanding of social and political developments outside Canada, says its director John Harker. External Affairs seemed to take at least some recognition of this argument about a year ago when it entered into an agreement for an exchange of personnel with the CLC. Under the agreement, Bruce Gillies, a foreign service office who had dealings with the ILO in Geneva, has been seconded to the CLC to serve as assistant international affairs director. He is to remain in the position for two years before returning to the federal bureaucracy. When he returns, he will bring with him greater knowledge of the international trade union movement and a newly developed area of expertise. So far, the CLC has not fulfilled its part of the exchange, a fact blamed on a lack of resources. But it hopes to send someone to External Affairs within a year.

Personnel exchange

The personnel exchange is only one part of the intensified relationship between the labour congress and the federal government. CIDA is contributing over \$500,000 dollars this year to assist the CLC in implementing international education programs where experienced Canadian trade union leaders impart their knowledge to help speed development of trade unions in the Third World. CIDA feels its investment is in the national interest because the only way the world can survive today is "by assuring that everybody is developing... justly," said Maione. External Affairs has slightly different reasons for its cooperation with the CLC. It has publicly declared its interest in the greater expertise it will obtain from the personnel exchange program, but more interesting insights can be obtained in private background briefings with departmental officials. Some officials are somewhat nonplussed by the new relationship with the CLC, which they consider to be a lobby group like all the other, but just a little bigger than most.

External Affairs has observed what it perceives as an apparent anti-American stance by the CLC. It feels there has been a growth of Canadian unions away from

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their American counterparts. As part of this growth, Canadian trade unionists have been independently exposed to such things as human rights views of Swedish trade unions. Ties between the congress and various church groups dealing with international human rights was also one of the things pinpointed during the briefing. However, one comment during the session was more than a little puzzling. It was suggested that dialogue between the department and the CLC in the past might have been hampered by the close CLC ties to the New Democratic Party (NDP). As a result, communications tended to be more with the political party than with the labour organization. If that is true, it is difficult to understand why the communication channels have changed when it is considered that the CLC-NDP ties are, perhaps, tighter than ever before. Even if some of the reasons are puzzling, the two sides are talking and both see this as a positive step.

Economic Summit

Sometimes the communications channels are elaborate. Labour's input to the prime ministerial briefing for last June's economic summit in Venice, is a case in point. The process began in February when the CLC received a draft statement from the Trade Union Advisory Committee (TUAC) of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development in Paris. The statement was being prepared for the summit of trade union leaders from the seven major economic powers, scheduled for Rome just prior to the Venice gathering of the heads of State. The draft document was reviewed by the International Affairs and Research and Legislation departments at the CLC and observations and comments were relayed back to Paris. There, a paper incorporating the changes suggested by the various national trade union central bodies was adopted by a TUAC meeting at the end of May.

In the meantime, External Affairs was informed of the general direction the CLC expected the trade union summit to take and thus, the direction labour wanted the governments to take. Any last minute changes in Rome (there were none) would have been communicated to the department as well. At the 1979 economic summit in Tokyo, CLC officials personally briefed then Prime Minister Joe Clark the day before he met other heads of government. Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau did not receive a similar briefing in Venice because the CLC's McDermott was unable to go to either Rome or Venice.

The trade unions summit had called upon the government leaders to pay particular attention to the international development concepts outlined in the Brandt Commission report on North-South relationships. Instead, the Venice meeting seemed to concentrate more on East-West political questions and the energy issue. It is impossible to say whether there would have been any noticeable change in this position had McDermott been able to meet with Trudeau. But the

CLC is hopeful that Prime Minister's personal interest in the North-South issue will lead him to concentrate on it in future. Trudeau had already indicated the topic will play a major role at the 1981 summit to be held in Canada.

Other lines of communication between the CLC and the federal government are less complex than the steps leading up to the meeting of the Big Seven. There are periodic communications between Harker and Allan Gotlieb, Undersecretary of State for External Affairs. Neither of the two is reluctant to call the other on specific issues. Regular contacts are maintained with External Affairs desk officers who sometimes use the CLC network of contacts to obtain information on specific areas. Relationships with CIDA are good and some contacts are maintained with the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce (ITC).

Communications, however, sometimes break down. For example, when the government was drafting a code of conduct for Canadian companies operating in South Africa, it would not give the draft to the CLC. Having obtained a pirated copy, the CLC was able to approach External and ITC to point out where it believed the code needed strengthening "to have a modicum of realism." It also forwarded copies of the draft code to churches for their input, despite the fact that the government had displayed no initial interest in involving church groups. Now the CLC plans to monitor how well companies are following the code, which it still does not regard as strong enough.

The code of conduct is not the only area where the CLC feels it has played a leadership role in the country's foreign affairs. It takes much of the credit for initiating the legal action against Space Research Corporation, an arms manufacturer convicted in the United States of illegally shipping arms to South Africa. The company has since been fined \$50,000. The CLC started to build an extensive file on the corporation after Zimbabwe's ZAPU leader Joshua Nkomo charged, in 1977, that illegal arms shipments were being made to South Africa from Canada. Nkomo made the allegations during a news conference at the CLC's Ottawa headquarters. Using its trade union contacts, the labour organization provided then External Affairs minister Don Jamieson with shipping, docking and loading details. But despite these efforts, the CLC was not believed.

The CLC enhanced its credibility in its 1979 'Operation Solidarity' donations of more than \$500,000 in supplies to war-torn Nicaragua. The government assisted that initiative by providing aircraft to transport the goods. 'Operation Solidarity', however, raised other problems for the CLC. The scope of the exercise led some groups to expect the CLC to continue its substantial relief effort—even if it meant jeopardizing a principle labour holds dear. The Nicaraguan end of the emergency operation had been coordinated by CUS, the

International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) affiliate in the central American nation. CUS had since been subjected to threats and harassment because of its refusal to disband and become part of the Sandinista sponsored central trade union body. The CLC feels this intimidation campaign raises serious questions about the right of the Nicaraguan workers to freedom of association. Yet some supporters of Nicaragua in Canada have suggested the CLC forget its concern about what is happening to CUS and continue pouring in aid. It is a suggestion labour will not accept.

The CLC works to develop workers' organizations abroad through such efforts as development of the Commonwealth Trade Union Council (CTUC) which employed its first secretary general earlier this year. The formation of the council required roughly two years of hard work and confounded those people who believed the CLC did not have the ability to deliver on its promise. CLC President McDermott is also the first president of the CTUC which he describes as "being a common meeting place for people with a common affinity." It is an alternative organization for Third World members of the Commonwealth who otherwise might be forced to choose between the Soviet and American camps. McDermott believes Canada has an affinity with the Third World because "we are unique in the sense that we are considered to be a developed nation, but we aren't." He bases that belief on the large degree of foreign control of Canada's economy which makes us "in many ways as exploited as a number of the Third World countries."

Occasionally, the CLC's international involvement can pose the threat of physical injury. In September 1980, International Affairs Director Harker and representative Javier Sandoval avoided imprisonment and beating by only a few hours in La Paz, Bolivia. The two had been part of a ten member official mission from the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) which visited Bolivia to render assistance to the families of trade unionists detained as political prisoners in the country. Their purpose was also to visit government and church officials to learn about the effects of the July 17 military coup on Bolivian human and trade union rights. For much of the visit, Bolivian authorities maintained their distance from the group. However, several members of the ICFTU delegation who stayed behind to confer with Interior minister General D'Arce, head of the secret police, were arrested and forced to turn over \$30,000 raised to aid prisoners' families. Two of them were beaten and tortured. Harker and Sandoval escaped these events since they had flown out of La Paz hours earlier.

If projects such as the CTUC lead many to believe the CLC has developed a higher profile internationally, the message may be escaping a large proportion of the organization's 2.3 million members. Many union members are troubled because their congress is in-



President Dennis McDermott.

CLC photo

involved in the international arena. They believe their union leaders would be better occupied protecting their interests at home. Criticism of the strong international ties maintained by former CLC president Joe Morris reached a level where he was often disparagingly called 'Geneva Joe'. Relatively few CLC members cared or even knew that Morris was so well regarded internationally that he was chosen, after his retirement, as the only North American member of the Brandt Commission on North-South issues.

Harker said the CLC has not been as effective in communicating its international affairs message to its constituents as he would like. To overcome that problem, a new member was added to his department to handle education and communications. The CLC might enhance that role if it can demonstrate to its members the practicality of what it is doing. Ringing declarations of lofty principles have little impact on workers whose immediate concern is the continued existence of their jobs and the rising cost of living.

The CLC is doing practical things internationally, such as providing a tractor and dairy equipment to a group of cooperative villages started on former ICFTU land in India. Harker sees labour's 'basic needs' strategy as a means of adequately distributing the resources of developing nations, making them less vulnerable to totalitarian economic philosophies. He also makes the economic argument that exploitation of workers in developing nations will eventually lead to reduced employment opportunities in Canada. Both arguments need to be made more forcefully if the CLC is to truly have the full support of its members. It would also be helpful to Canadian workers if they were shown what they stand to lose if such international efforts are abandoned.

CIDA's Maione said the interests of most people in society extend first to their families and then to their communities. Only for a few people do interest spheres extend to encompass broader international issues. Assuming this is true, the CLC would be well advised to redouble its efforts to show workers how events in other countries have an impact, direct or indirect, on their personal circumstances. Improved domestic education and membership communication are tasks the CLC has cast for its immediate future with the hiring of its new staff member.

Preparatory negotiations for the 1981 economic summit to be held in Canada rank high on the agenda. The CLC is anxious to avoid a repetition of this year's Rome trade union summit which was boycotted by the AFL-CIO because it objected to the communist leanings of one of the host Italian labour centrals. The CLC quest for world peace will continue unabated. If this quest bears echoes of the 1960s peace movement, that is because McDermott believes the mood of that activist decade are even more relevant today in the face of confrontations such as Afghanistan and with the prospect of a hawkish Ronald Reagan becoming president of the United States.

The CLC will continue its efforts to ensure that multinational corporations fulfil their social responsibilities. In the same vein, it will work to build international trade union strength as a countervailing force to the power of the multinationals which it sees as the

controlling element of the world economy. Does this mean the CLC will be stronger internationally in the future than it is now? And is it stronger now than it has been in the past? One would have to be a seer to answer the first question. Kalman Kaplansky, retiring director of the International Labour Office in Ottawa and first CLC international affairs director, provides an answer to the second: "There is a tendency (to say that everything starts with yesterday and finishes today. Tomorrow there's a new start. I believe there's a continuity of effort and that the basic thrust of the international involvement of the trade union movement of Canada has been there for many years. Kaplansky added: "each individual, each new president, new officials add a new dimension. . .but the seriousness of it the objective, the dedication, has long been in the trade union movement of Canada for a very long time."

Even though the trade union commitment has existed for years, McDermott believes the government is just starting to take that commitment seriously. "I think they discovered that we aren't just busybodies who don't know what we are doing; they're quite surprised at the expertise and the sophistication that they discovered in us," he said. "The trouble is, we haven't had the dialogue we should have had. We were perceived as posturing all the time. And they had no real appreciation of the role we are capable of playing or, indeed, of the role that we are playing. But they are beginning to understand."

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Canada

Diplomatic hostage-taking: a retrospective look at Bogota

by Sidney A. Freifeld

The diplomatic profession—at least its practice outside one's own country—has surely become one of the world's higher-risk occupations in recent years. After a year of such episodes as the seizing of diplomats as hostages in Tehran, Bogota and London, as well as dozens of lesser but equally violent affairs, diplomats and consular officials can hardly be blamed for wondering whether they are fast becoming an 'endangered species'.

As crisis managers in foreign ministries have been learning, the motivations of terrorists laying siege to embassies, the nationality or political affiliations of intended victims, and the 'institutional' circumstances in which an operation is conducted can markedly affect the ways a diplomatic hostage-taking incident develops, determine the way it should be handled and influence the end result.

In Tehran, for example, the 'militants' holding the American diplomats are wildly applauded by the masses outside the United States embassy, witness huge demonstrations against their prisoners and receive the support of the local authorities and of the supreme power, Ayatollah Khomeini. They operate within a friendly environment, have freedom of movement and can rotate their chores, obtain sleep and food, return to their homes, resume classes (if indeed they are students), visit girl friends, receive supplies and voice their propaganda at home and around the world.

By contrast, the dissident Iranian Arabs from Khudestan who attacked the embassy of Iran in London in May faced the implacable hostility of their captives and their own government, the armed opposition of the British authorities and their superb 'Special Air Services' (the strike force) and the anger of the vociferous Iranian student community outside the embassy, who were allowed to demonstrate by the British. On the other side of the ledger, the terrorists received some support from small groups outside, the benevolent curiosity of the London crowds and tremendous coverage by the world's mass media, which they could monitor from the inside. Their objective of securing the release of dissident Arab comrades held by the Tehran author-

ities was by no means implausible although their larger aim—promotion of autonomy for the Arabs of Iran's Khudestan province—probably was.

Hostile environment

In Bogota the 'institutional' setting was again different. The M-19 terrorists who attacked the Dominican Republic's Embassy and held it from February 27 to April 27 were operating within their own country but faced a hostile environment and total opposition of the political and military authorities. By contrast with Tehran and London, the terrorists bore no special animosity either to the Dominicans or to the other victims—a mixed bag of foreign diplomats attending a National Day reception and representing countries ranging over a wide political and geographic spectrum. Furthermore some M-19 objectives—which included release of comrades, payment of ransom, amelioration of treatment of political prisoners, cessation of alleged internal repression and focussing of publicity on domestic social ills—were *a priori* plausible and potentially realizable, so long as they did not clash with the laws and constitution of the Republic.

Another special 'institutional' difference in Bogota, which was of no little importance in achieving a happier outcome than in Tehran and London, was that the terrorists were a local group apparently without entangling links with, support from, or obligations to, other exponents of international terrorism such as Italy's Red Brigades, the Japanese Red Army, the Baader-Meinhoff group in West Germany or especially Palestinian and other Middle Eastern extremist organizations. However much they might have wanted to embarrass the present government, M-19 was not seeking to retrieve a Shah, oust a Quadaffi, undermine Camp David, promote a regional autonomy or secession, precipitate a war with neighbouring states, foment Shi'ites against Sunnis or Moslem fundamentalists

Mr. Freifeld was Canadian Ambassador to Colombia and Ecuador from 1970 to 1975, when he retired from the Department of External Affairs. He was Chargé d'Affaires in Uruguay and also served in Mexico, Ireland and the Permanent Mission to the U.N.

against Western-oriented modernizers.

A brief analysis of how negotiations developed in Bogota may serve to illustrate how important such 'institutional' factors can be for foreign ministry crisis managers coping with diplomatic hostage-taking by terrorists.

Who are the M-19 and how did they manage, as a local guerrilla group, to achieve world-wide attention and partial realization of their objectives? Although the group first came to public attention as recently as 1974, the Colombian guerrilla movement from which it springs was about the earliest to emerge in Latin America and grew out of conditions peculiar to Colombia.

In many ways Colombia is a microcosm of all Latin America and combines its varied social, political, economic, racial and geographical peculiarities. Lying athwart the Panamanian isthmus, it stands at the crossroads of Central and South America. It has a Pacific as well as an Atlantic and Caribbean coastline and orientation. It is ribbed not by one but by three Andean *cordilleras* separated by tropical jungle, rain forest, great plains and high plateaus, which force its 27 million inhabitants to combat some of the most difficult physiography in the Western Hemisphere; as late as the 1920s it took a Colombian foreign minister 12 to 18 days by horse, carriage, paddle-wheeler, rail and barge to reach the Atlantic coast port of Baranquilla to set sail for New York or Europe. The population comprises whites, Indians, blacks, *mulattos* and *mestizos* who, alongside much primitive agriculture, have developed some of the largest-scale industry and the finest coffee cultivation in South America. While the oligarchical upper class is as sophisticated and urbane as any in Latin America, it is more cultivated than most; it is for good reason that Bogota has been known as the 'Athens' of South America. There is a mass of impoverished and illiterate peasantry and the per capita income barely reaches mid-way on the low Latin American scale. The small middle class is diffused in numerous medium-sized cities and the capital does not dominate the nation—more like Italy and Germany than Britain or France.

Democratic system

What distinguishes Colombia from the other South American countries is that it has managed remarkably to maintain a democratic system of government for virtually all of this century, although its political life has been dominated by the traditional Liberal and Conservative parties and the general socio-political process is not as entirely unblemished as the oligarchy and the government would like to believe; they would not always find the reports of Amnesty International and the International Press Institute entirely to their liking.

The only military regime during this

century—and it was not a very harsh one—lasted from 1953 to 1957. Its vaguely populist leader, General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, was no old fashioned *caudillo* blazing his way to power by a military coup. As head of the armed forces, he was invited by the Liberal and Conservative leadership to take power as an alternative—or third force—to quell *La Violencia*, an insensate, internecine and fratricidal civil war. *La Violencia*, which left tens of thousands of casualties, was not a class struggle pitting impoverished peasants against absentee landlord but a war between Liberal and Conservative villages and peasants, and its cause dynamics have continued to fascinate political scientists and sociologists to this day. It abated slowly after 1958, when the warring Liberal and Conservative leaders, fearing total disintegration of their country again came together—this time to remove the General who wanted a second, unelected term. They re-instituted elections and a democratic regime through a unique 20-year power-sharing experiment just ended.

One by-product of that era was an extraordinary rise in petty, and not-so-petty crime, especially kidnapping by criminals for ransom, which has remained endemic in Colombia. Another legacy of *La Violencia* was the birth of three native guerrilla groups, who were forerunners of the better-known *Tupamaros* in Uruguay, *Montoneros* in Argentina and other violence-prone Latin American activists. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), Moscow-oriented and with ties to the local Communist Party, is based in the remote mountainous areas of south eastern Colombia, occasionally displaying strength in villages uncomfortably close to the capital. The National Liberation Army (ELN), Castro-oriented, operates in the jungle and mountains of the 'Medio Magdalena'—about half way down the Magdalena River, the St. Lawrence of Colombia. The People's Liberation Army (EPL) is vaguely Maoist, and surfaces fitfully in the mountains of the state of Antioquia in the northwest.

Still another legacy was the creation by General Rojas Pinilla of a vaguely populist party, *Anapo*, as a vehicle for a political comeback after his 1958 ouster from the presidency, and it was welded by his redoubtable daughter, Maria Eugenia, into a potent challenger to the Liberal and Conservative power-sharing monopoly. The General nearly won the 1970 presidential election but Maria Eugenia, who in the 1974 election became the first woman to seek the presidency of any Latin American country, did not fare well at the polls. The party began to decline, but both the General and his daughter denounced the use of force to achieve power.

Origins of M-19

M-19 was formed as a clandestine military wing of *Anapo* by some left-of-centre academic activists, ex-army officers and middle class professionals; their

acronym stands for *Movimiento de 19 abril*, the date of the presidential election which General Rojas lost—they claim—because of fraud. It first came to public attention in 1974 with an exploit designed to attract publicity and demonstrate its *urban* capability, by contrast with FARC, ELN and EPL. It raided Simon Bolivar's old home, now a museum in downtown Bogota, and stole the Liberator's famous sword. A few weeks later M-19 occupied the premises of the Bogota Municipal Council and in 1975 harrassed some members of the consular corps.

By 1976, M-19 may have realized that its Robin Hood exploits achieved little else than publicity. It began to be taken more seriously by the state's counter-insurgency forces. Its Latin American terrorist counterparts were resorting to more and more violence. For one or more of these reasons M-19's image changed sharply, from that of dedicated amateurs seeking to publicize alleged repression and promote human rights to that of a violent urban guerrilla group. During the next two years it assassinated the head of the Colombian Workers Confederation, occupied key hydroelectric installations, kidnapped a former cabinet member to force higher wages for his workers, secured a large ransom by kidnapping a prominent member of the oligarchy who had been ambassador in Paris, kidnapped the Nicaraguan ambassador to protest Somoza's repression of the Sandanistas and assassinated Texaco's chief executive after holding him several months for ransom. Like the *Tupamaros* during their earlier days in Uruguay, they varied outright terrorism with Robin Hood derring-do such as stealing food for the poor.

In early 1979 it was reported in Bogota that the authorities had secured—presumably from a captured M-19—a long hit list which included the names of the United States, Chilean and Nicaraguan ambassadors. After vandalizing a United Nations office, M-19 performed its most spectacular exploit by tunnelling into the arsenal of a barracks in the Bogota suburbs and seizing 5,000 weapons including mortars and bazookas. This provoked the heaviest counter-insurgency offensive ever mounted by the Colombian military, which succeeded not only in recovering most of the arms but in capturing about a thousand members and suspected M-19 members, including prominent intellectuals such as the former Columbia University (N.Y.) sociologist, Professor Fals-Borda. Their long detention before being brought to trial before military tribunals under 'State of Seige' legislation, the conditions of their incarceration, the slow and protracted nature of the trials under way (400 were being tried for rebellion against the 'system') and the immobilization of M-19 leaders and consequent determination to show that M-19 could still mount an offensive against the regime were the prelude to the assault against the Dominican Republic's Embassy on February 27, 1980. The siege was triggered by the torture and murder of

an M-19 guerrilla, captured by the Army in Cali after failing in a bid to kidnap the wife of a wealthy engineer.

Embassy raided

The Dominican's modest embassy residence is located near the football stadium in a nondescript area, far from Embassy Row. Invitees to the National Day reception, called for 11 a.m., included the usual clutch of Colombian and foreign diplomats, armed service chiefs, Supreme Court justices and prominent civilians. Punctuality for social engagements in Bogota is notoriously relaxed and it was not surprising that only a trickle of guests showed up during the first hour; the main flow arrived around noon.

The United States ambassador, Diego Asencio, arrived around 11.15 a.m. The ambassador of the Soviet Union came a few minutes later and was soon joined by three heads of mission from other Eastern European states. The four communist diplomats paid their respects, drank their *coup de champagne*, explained they had to be off to attend the presentation of the new East German ambassador's credentials and left around 11.45 a.m. Despite much subsequent speculation, there is no evidence that their early departure was anything but fortuitous; it hardly seems plausible that M-19



Wide World photo
A young M-19 guerrilla guarding Dominican Republic embassy during hostage-taking incident last March.

would have risked their enterprise by alerting the whole East European diplomatic group.

In a nearby field a couple of dozen men in sports clothes were kicking a football around, watched by four girls. When Mr. Asencio appeared in the doorway ready to depart just after noon, the footballers donned masks, took weapons out of their *Adidas* bags and stormed the embassy. One was killed during the shoot-out (by a U.S. bodyguard) but there were no further casualties during the ensuing two months' seige, either among the terrorists, the hostages or the Colombian armed forces.

Several days later the usually reliable Spanish news agency reported that the armed forces had captured a second M-19 group in a nearby house, with a large quantity of arms and sophisticated communications equipment; this group was to have joined the attack but, for whatever reason, failed to do so. The football players, who delayed the attack as long as possible, had to strike without their colleagues. Their 'bag' inside the embassy was about 80 persons, including the Papal Nuncio, who is Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, and the Ambassadors of Austria, Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica, Egypt, Guatemala, Israel, Mexico, Switzerland, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, the Dominican host and some local diplomats and consuls. M-19's initial demands included \$50 million ransom, release of political prisoners, publication of a manifesto (about internal repression, torture of prisoners and assorted domestic ills) in the newspapers of countries whose representatives were being held, and safe conduct out of the country.

From the outset negotiations with the terrorists were directed personally by Colombia's (Liberal) President, Julio César Turbay Ayala. President Turbay quickly let it be known that Colombian law, which he was determined to uphold, would prevent payment of any ransom by the State. He later said "since the Dominican Embassy enjoyed extraterritoriality", friends of the hostages or other interested parties would not be impeded from arranging some payment; Foreign Minister Diego Vargas indicated that the President did not intend this to mean that a country could arrange to buy its Ambassador's freedom but that if some entity were able to persuade M-19 to release all the hostages following some payment, the Colombian government would not stand in the way.

Turbay's position on prisoner release was similarly supple. However much his government was concerned about the lives of the hostages, it was obliged to protect the integrity and constitutionality of the state and it could not overturn decisions already reached by the courts without undermining its democratic institutions. Turbay insisted that no one had been convicted for his beliefs or for M-19 membership, but for the commission of criminal and illegal acts. If suspects being held were subsequently released it would not be because of M-19 membership but because they had been

found innocent of criminal acts. While asserting that the government could not release already convicted members of M-19's High Command, he hinted that the military might find it possible to release some suspects for lack of evidence.

During the 61-day duration of the seige there were several developments of interest to students of hostage liberation and the 'Stockholm syndrome'. The Colombian negotiators were to display remarkable restraint and flexibility, seeking to ensure that each encounter yielded some progress, if only by enhancing mutual familiarity or by obtaining some concession, however small, in exchange for a concession from their side (such as securing the release of a sick or unimportant hostage in exchange for allowing a new shipment of food). They sought to maintain a momentum and the semblance of some progression, and to prevent a serious downturn from whatever plateau had been reached; an attack by the armed forces or execution of a hostage would have created a stalemate and undermined the whole enterprise. Such tactics were in support of their central strategy of inducing, through time, a realization by the terrorists of the impossibility of ultimate success in achieving all their aims.

Lengthy negotiations

M-19 were neither xenophobic nor irredentist and since they had no links with, or personal support from, other exponents of international terrorism, they were not shackled by exogenous, doctrinal or operational impediments. After releasing the majority of their captives (persons other than ambassadors) through the earlier days of negotiation, they were left with a group of foreign diplomats for whom they felt no particular grudge and who represented diverse countries in whose policies they had no special interest or concern. This made possible the development of a *rapport* that would have been impossible if M-19 had been concerned, say, to support the P.L.O. or torpedo Camp David in addition to achieving their domestic aims. The Mexican Ambassador, Ricardo Galan, who became 'spokesman' for the hostages, became involved in the negotiating process and helped the terrorists re-draft or modify their proposals aided by colleagues. This served to maintain the dialogue, forestall precipitate action, and lead to further links.

The Israeli Ambassador, Eliahu Barak, made an interesting contribution to this process. He was a military man rather than a professional diplomat and a newcomer to Bogota. To maintain the morale of his colleagues and to induce respect from the captors, he kept the ambassadors busy by organizing a strict regime of housekeeping chores. He also arranged for the ambassadors to give talks on subjects of their expertise, in which the captors could participate or, in any event, not fail to hear.

A key factor was the introduction of an outside



Global futurists consider Third World prospects

by Bob Stanley

Our planet is nothing more than a tiny mudball spiralling through space. So says Frank Feather, director-general of the First Global Conference on the Future, which took place in Toronto during the last week of July. It is a somewhat less elegant concept than Barbara Ward's spaceship Earth, but it makes the same point: ours is a small and precarious world.

Just how precarious existence is on our mudball-spaceship was a recurring theme of many of the more than 400 sessions at the 4-day conference. And if the general tone was one of guarded optimism, most of the speakers were more than ready to concede that the road to that bright future that begins sometime in the next century is not likely to be an easy one. The consensus seemed to be that humanity is in a period of transition. If we survive, things will be better, maybe much better. But we have to find ways to survive—together.

In the words of the conference's honorary chairman, Maurice Strong: "I believe its outcome is not predetermined. Most of the basic forces that are shaping our future are the result of human actions and human failures. We are today in command of our own evolution."


That concern with taking command of our destiny, with shaping the future rather than drifting into aimlessness, become increasingly apparent at a variety of levels as the world moves inexorably towards the psychological turning-point of the year 2000. In January, there was the Brandt Commission Report *North-South: A programme for survival*, with its eloquent warnings of the dire consequences of continued failure on the part of the industrialized nations to meet the real needs of the Third World countries. As its title indicates, the report also presents a detailed program designed to overcome these disparities.

July saw the publication in the U.S.A. of *Entering the 21st Century—the Global 2000 Report to the President*. It too, concludes that "the problems of preserving the carrying capacity of the earth and sustaining the possibility of a decent life for the human beings that inhabit it are enormous and close upon us." It calls for "prompt and vigorous changes in public policy", and

warns that the time for action is running out.

Also in July, the Parliamentary Task Force on North-South Relations, which was set up only in May, issued its first interim report in Ottawa, stating: "The Task Force has no more important job before it than to demonstrate in concrete and practical ways that our interests as a people are bound up in the 1980s with the well-being of the developing countries."

Elsewhere the interim report is more specific: "Closing the rich poor gap is no longer just a matter of striving for social justice, although that goal is still paramount. It is also important to the continued economic development of the industrialized countries. North and South have more interests in common than is generally recognized: energy, commodities and trade, food and agriculture, monetary solutions and in-



Clean water: Ethiopian children drink from a simple pump developed with IDRC support. IDRC photo

flation control, technological innovations, ground and space communications."

All these and many more were topics at the Global Conference on the Future. Although the cost and complexities of international air travel meant that only a handful of developing country delegates were among the 5000 futurists in Toronto, the importance of Third World issues was strongly reflected in the program. And if the array of topics under discussion in any given time slot was sometimes bewildering, that was perhaps, as the chairman suggested, "a reflection of the diversity and complexity of the real world in which we must make our choices."

Food or Famine?

On the subject of food production and the danger of famine, the Brandt Commission warns of mass starvation by the end of the century unless "major efforts of investment, planning, and research" can make enough food available to feed a projected population of six billion. The need for better planning was strongly endorsed at the conference by Canada's Minister of Agriculture, Eugene Whelan, who flatly told a session on *Food in the 80s* that he was far from satisfied with the present state of affairs.

"The present hodge-podge of food aid organizations lacks coordination," declared Mr. Whelan, accusing their staffs of using their resources mainly "to play political games and fight one another." A recent meeting of the World Food Council, of which he is a member,

Technology Transfer that Works

In spite of all those horror stories about tractors rusting in the fields for lack of parts or proper maintenance, there is ample evidence that agricultural technology transfer can work—if the local scientific community is involved.

In Canada researchers at the National Research Council laboratory in Saskatoon designed a prototype grain dehuller to meet the need for small-scale grain processing in African rural towns. In Botswana scientists adapted the machine to local requirements and are now manufacturing an even smaller dehuller that is proving very efficient for village-level milling operations.

Researchers at the International Rice Research Institute in the Phillipines came up with the '10 horsepower mechanization' concept to meet the demand for a versatile, inexpensive machine for the small farmer. IRRI's ideas have been incorporated into a similar line of small farm equipment in Egypt, where the state-owned Behera Engineering Company has developed and manufactured five different implements that are all powered by the same basic 10 h.p. engine.

Both projects are supported by grants from the IDRC as part of its post-production systems program for agriculture.

had ordered a study of all the 20-odd UN agencies involved in food-aid, he said. This should lead to "less duplication and empire building."

While he called for the rich countries to increase their aid budgets, Whelan cautioned that no amount of money can completely solve the food problem. The only long-term solution, he said, was for developing countries to increase their own food production capacity.

Plans are being implemented in a number of countries to do just that. In Bangladesh, a food-importing country, self-sufficiency is the target for 1985. Professor M. Abdul Majid, economist and planner, described how Bangladesh has managed to avoid starvation despite its high population density. With the use of improved seeds and other inputs such as irrigation and fertilizers, a 5-year plan that calls for accelerated development and the harnessing of its vast natural gas resources, Bangladesh can double its present production of 14 million tons in four to five years, he said.

Another country on the subcontinent—India—has similar hopes. "By making the best possible use of science and technology, India will become a food exporter by the end of the century," claimed Dr. P. Seth. Increasing food production is not sufficient to achieve this goal, however. He pointed to India's 20 percent loss of harvests during transport and storage and to inefficient distribution systems, problems that must be solved locally.

"But if developing countries are to make the leap into the future in terms of meeting their basic needs, particularly food needs, they need not a food bank but a technological bank. Technological cooperation formulas will need to be worked out," he advised participants.


This approach was supported by Doug Daniels, an agricultural economist with the planning office of the International Development Research Centre (IDRC), Ottawa, who was one of the panelists in a session on agricultural technology for the Third World.

"The key to solving the food problem is the Third World scientist," said Daniels. He pointed out that at present the developing countries account for 70 percent of the world's population, 45 percent of food production, 20 percent of gross domestic product, and a mere 2 percent of research and development expenditures.

Technology can be successfully transferred from developed to developing countries, said Daniels, but the primary source of new agricultural technology for the Third World must be the scientific community in the developing countries. This was why IDRC-funded projects almost invariably were headed and staffed by local scientists, and included provisions for training more researchers.

Overcrowded Planet

In some parts of the developing world, however, population growth continues to outstrip food production increases. With one million people added to the global population every five days, the Brandt report offers the "nightmarish vision of a hopelessly over-



Technology transfer: Egyptian engineers designed and built this small diesel-powered thresher basing it on a machine developed in the Philippines.

IDRC photo

crowded planet" unless support for population programs and policies is increased dramatically. The futurists also were concerned about the widespread impacts of population growth, not only on food supply, but on resources, the environment, education, housing, and health.

Rafael Salas, executive director of the United Nations Fund for Population Activities, warned that in the long run resources are not given, but are determined by human activity. "Population pressures lead not only to a depletion of the shrinking resource base," he said, "but also disrupt the fragile ecological equilibrium, perhaps irreversibly."

Salas predicted that the world population growth rate would continue to decline to about 1.6 percent by the year 2000, but he pointed out that this would still mean another 2 billion people added to the world population in the next two decades—90 percent of them in the developing countries. This would result, he said, in the demand for an additional 600 million jobs in the Third World, and a dramatic population shift that would see three-quarters of the people in the developing countries living in urban areas—a complete reversal of today's situation.

One of the results of this shift will be a rapid increase in the number of super-large cities with populations from 10 to 30 million, according to Alan Simmons, associate director of social sciences for IDRC, and a specialist in population issues. Simmons predicted that attempts to slow the growth of cities will be only partially successful, even in the centrally planned

economies. The options, he said, were to create new towns as 'growth poles' that would attract rural-urban migrants, to improve conditions in the rural areas, to open up frontier areas such as the Amazon Basin, and finally, of course, to stop population growth.

Swallowing up Farms

All of these, predicted Simmons, might slow city growth, but not stop it. "Super-large cities are on the way in many developing countries whether we like it or not." But he concluded that, because of economies of scale and the application of new technologies, life in the large cities of tomorrow will be livable. In fact "there is hope that it will be somewhat better, not worse, than the life of the rural poor today."

The creation of growth poles in presently rural areas is not without its dangers, however. Aurelio Peccei, Italian industrialist, founder and president of the Club of Rome, warned that "the new settlements needed to accommodate a swelling population will inevitably gravitate around cultivated areas, swallowing up more of them." He echoed the preoccupations of Lester Brown, president of the Washington-based Worldwatch Institute, who identifies the deterioration of basic biological systems—fisheries, forests, and grasslands—as mankind's greatest threat. Loss of cropland by erosion and a continued conversion of farmland to non-farm uses is undermining our long-term productivity, he said.

The problem can be summed up in two words: misuse and overuse. And there is no doubt in Norman

Myers's mind who is responsible—we all are. Citing the destruction of tropical moist forests as an example, Dr. Myers—who is a consultant in environment and development, based in Kenya—outlined how tropical timbers are harvested by transnational corporations to serve markets in affluent countries. In Latin America, forests are cleared to make way for artificial pastures on which to graze cattle intended for North America, Western Europe and Japan.

We all suffer from the deterioration of these forests, which although they cover only seven percent of the world's surface, harbour 40 percent of all species. We will lose one million species by the end of this century, said Dr. Myers, many of which could be useful in meeting medical, energy, and industrial needs.

"The problem of disappearing species in general can be intimately related to the other major issues of an interdependent global community," says Dr. Myers. "It is not going too far to say that the challenge of conservation of species is a microcosm of broader problems that arise from integrated living in the global village."

Not a Threat

It was Lewis Perinbam, vice-president of CIDA, who finally raised the subject of the Brandt Commission's report and its relevance to the futures conference. Speaking on the subject *Third World: threat or promise*, he pointed out that the developing countries have not always been poor relations. The reason that many of them stay poor today is simply that the world economic system is stacked against them. The developing countries, he said, need not just aid—which represents only a small part of their economies—but also a "better shake" in the international system. The industrialized nations must recognize that aid is not "just a give away," it is also a subsidy of their domestic economies.

"The developing countries are not a threat," Perinbam stressed. "They are a new frontier of immeasurable promise. For the first time in history we possess the resources, the knowledge, and the expertise to lay the foundations of a just world order."

To achieve a major breakthrough that would rid the world of poverty required something of the order of a new Marshall Plan, he added. In the immediate post-war years, America devoted 3 percent of its GNP to rebuilding Europe, and the job was done in two years. Today it devotes just one-tenth of that amount of development assistance. The report of the Brandt Commission—with its call for reform of monetary institutions, a world taxation system, and reductions in military spending—could be the blueprint for a similar initiative for the 80s, he claimed.

To help translate some of the Commission's ideas into action, he suggested that Canada offer a home and facilities for a 'Futures Secretariat'. Such an institution would be financed from both public and private

funds, he said, because "this is not a matter of governments alone. . . this global initiative which affects the future of us all."

External Affairs minister Mark MacGuigan told the UN General Assembly in August that Canada intends to create a 'Futures Secretariat' under the auspices of CIDA. It will have the primary mandate of presenting activities to inform and involve Canadians about North-South issues, he said.

The Brandt Commission was supported by a number of independent institutions, one of which was IDRC. In 1978 the Centre provided a one-year, \$100,000 grant towards the Commission's total operating budget of about \$3 million.

IDRC president, Ivan L. Head, has called the Brandt report "an extraordinary and possibly unprecedented body of knowledge. . . an imperative primer for the troubled world." Above all, says Mr. Head, the Brandt Commission demonstrates persuasively that "changes of a significant character are required in order to make the future function."

Clean Water, Better Health

The 1980s have been designated by the U.N. as the International Water and Sanitation Decade. One of the prime needs if the effort is to succeed is for simple but effective technology. Too often the pumps that are used in rural water supply programs break down and cannot be repaired for lack of costly parts. A simple plastic pump that can be manufactured locally is now being rigorously tested in six developing countries, with promising results. The original prototype was developed at the University of Waterloo, Canada, with the support of an IDRC grant, and the Centre is also supporting the testing program.

Another simple technique being tested with support from the Centre's water and sanitation program, is the filtration gallery. Water from a stream or river is diverted through a sand-filled channel that delivers it to the village clean enough to drink. Scientists and engineers studying the effectiveness of several of these systems in Panama will produce a manual to show rural people how to build their own filtration galleries.

Combined with effective sanitation and public education programs, such simple technology can do much to improve the health and well-being of the rural people—and help prevent the drift to the cities.

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
Communications Division (IP),
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Canada K1G 3H9.

'third force'—the Human Rights Commission of the Organization of American States—as an element in the negotiating framework. Agreement was reached for Commission members to observe court martials of M-19 suspects and to consult with the accused and their lawyers to ensure fair trial; they were allowed to monitor prison conditions and trial decisions could be overturned if the Commission found that evidence had been obtained under duress.

The Human Rights Commission thus provided a fig leaf for both sides. To the terrorists it pointed to a way out, once they realized they could not force release of convicted comrades, and it provided a decorous instrument which M-19 could construe as satisfying its pronouncements on the protection of human rights for prisoners. To the government it provided an unembarrassing vehicle for instituting improvements in legal and penal procedures while refusing a general release of terrorists; the government could appear firm on principles but flexible in tactics, protecting foreign diplomats for whom it had accepted responsibility while not obstructing a privately-made ransom payment (far lower than M-19's original demand and only a token by comparison.)

As final agreement neared, Cuba had agreed that the terrorists and their remaining diplomatic hostages could be flown to Havana, from which all the latter would be allowed freely to depart. The Uruguayan ambassador, had escaped earlier, by jumping through a window. The Austrian ambassador had been released, after much complaint that his wife was suffering from his incarceration. On the eve of the departure, M-19 agreed to free the Israeli, Egyptian, Venezuelan and Dominican ambassadors at Bogota airport. The remaining ambassadors and their 17 captors, a Red Cross official and the Cuban ambassador, flew to Havana on April 27, from which they were able to depart without problems (the Cuban kept a low profile throughout).

Thus, M-19 managed to come out of this terrorist diplomat-seizing venture looking somewhat less like bloodthirsty fanatics and perhaps even like reasonable individuals dedicated to promoting human rights and reforming ills that some Colombians themselves recognize to exist in the present system. President Turbay's government, confronted by a major terrorist challenge to defend its domestic legitimacy and its international ties, was able to emerge from the ordeal with both enhanced—and it will now face the dual formidable task of combatting terrorism and subversion while preserving human rights. That task was made no easier by the ominous challenge issued in Havana by *Comandante Uno*, a University of Cali social sciences professor, that he would return to Colombia as soon as possible to resume the struggle. Only a fortnight later, a group of M-19 seized the American Binational Centre



Wide World photo
A hooded female M-19 guerrilla escorts Mexican ambassador Ricardo Galan.

in Medellin, the 'Milan' of Colombia, painting revolutionary slogans while haranguing the incumbents.

The importance for crisis managers of the far-reaching difference in the 'institutional' circumstances between Tehran, Bogota and London and especially the difference in behaviour of governments will be apparent. It is clear that when governments tolerate, facilitate or foment terrorism against diplomats, as the Iranian authorities have done, they undermine not only formal relations between states but the entire fabric of international intercourse—which was the foundation upon which the solution in Bogota, although less than ideal, was so laboriously built.

What to do? Professor Paul Wilkinson of the University of Aberdeen, writing in *The Listener*, thinks it would be 'extremely valuable' to establish a 'flying squad' of police and security experts in each region of the world, under the aegis of the United Nations or of a regional organization such as the EEC, OAS, OAU and ASEAN; the squad would provide emergency help on

the request of a member government to cope with, for example, a terrorist embassy seizure.

It is surely impractical to assume that such a force might even be established under the 'aegis' of bodies such as the U.N. or the OAU and even more impractical to assume that they could agree on its deployment (is the target terrorist, commando, guerrilla, freedom-fighter...?). The U.N. accomplishment in the field of peace-keeping does not seem a valid analogy. However, various intelligence and operational arrangements to combat international terrorism already exist among some like-minded countries and they have been growing in effectiveness.

Stenographers and clerks, as well as ambassadors and ministers, are provided with a booklet entitled "Tips on Terrorism" in addition to all the usual information about living conditions in their new country.

Perhaps the chief problem in coping with terrorism against diplomats is the lack of political will. Nu-

merous international instruments already exist, e.g. three conventions on aerial policy, the Vienna conventions on diplomatic and consular relations and the U.N. conventions on internationally-protected persons and on hostage-taking. Furthermore most countries' criminal law covers virtually all terrorist criminal acts. Yet terrorism continues, partly because some governments still prefer to downplay the problem when certain national interests are conceived to be involved.

The trends of the decade now ending nevertheless indicate that firm government resolve can deter terrorism and that common policy and common action, at least among like-minded governments, can combat international terrorism effectively. Significantly, the heads of government, including Canada, at the Venice Summit agreed that they would provide one another's diplomatic and consular missions with support and assistance in situations involving the seizure of their diplomatic personnel.

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Value of food as weapon more symbolic than real

by Olivier Nicoloff

On Christmas day 1979, the Afghan people received a curious present: the Soviet Union invaded their territory and installed a puppet regime in Kabul totally subservient to the dictates of the Russians. The heavy thump of Red Army boots which pounded against the Afghan soil was also felt by a tense Jimmy Carter, in the midst of his quest for re-election. Denounced as weak and indecisive by his political opponents, notably Ronald Reagan, he chose to reply harshly. Along with a series of other measures, Carter imposed an embargo on grain destined to the Communist bloc. However, barely two months later, a State Department official in Washington admitted that the embargo had become purely a symbolic gesture. This example, to be detailed here, will enable us to give a first account of what is now commonly known as the food weapon.

Precedents

Using food as an instrument of force against an enemy is not a new concept. It probably dates from the dawn of civilization. Who has not heard of besieged towns that were starved into submission? And Cambodia, in 1980, shows us horrifying scenes of populations deprived directly of food for the greater glory of arms. The West's 'humanized' version of the food weapon does not go that far, of course; still, in 1974, the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was hoping that "Washington could bring within its grasp the near-power of life and death over the fate of the impoverished multitudes." They saw this as "extraordinary political and economic influence." Even before this celebrated report made fashionable the concept of the food weapon, our neighbours to the south had twice used grain embargoes for two totally different conditions and objectives: once against Japan and later the other against Chile.

It is to be remembered that, in 1970, the Chilean people elected the Marxist President Salvador Allende as their Head of State. Frightened that this example of a truly democratic turn to Socialism would spread, mainly to France and Italy, the United States decided to use any means possible to bring about the downfall of the new regime. One of the tactics they did not hesi-

tate to use was, precisely, the food weapon. But, unlike 1980, that weapon was not employed officially. For, while one method consists of merely stopping grain shipments, another is to cut credits. Thus, the U.S. refused any further loans to the Allende government and compelled the international monetary agencies to do the same. Without inflows of other currencies, Santiago was unable to purchase foreign grain. The population did not starve, but they were frustrated in their hopes of seeing a quick rise in their standard of living. It is, of course, very difficult to estimate the extent to which this unofficial embargo hurt the regime which eventually was overthrown by the army. Undoubtedly, however, its impact cannot be ignored.

The case of Japan was highly different since the conflict between two economic powers was, by nature, purely commercial and monetary. On one hand, Washington was concerned about 'Japan's unwillingness' to revalue the yen which, according to the White House, would have assisted in reducing the large American deficit in the balance of payments between the two nations. On the other, there were purely internal reasons: with strong inflation in the U.S. American consumers were putting considerable pressure on their government so that sales abroad, which caused domestic shortages, would stop forcing up costs.

Just at this moment, Peru, principal exporter of anchovies, announced a catastrophic fall in catches. The flour made from this fish is a perfect substitute for soya. Therefore, the Japanese rushed to buy this on the American market, one which, for slightly less than a year, had already been penetrated by the Soviets. President Nixon ordered the exports stopped. However, the impact of the embargo was much less than expected: the Japanese increased their own production while Brazil started an industry, capturing nearly 10% of the

Mr. Nicoloff, who is completing graduate studies in political science at Laval University, is also employed by the Quebec Centre for International Relations. His article is a translation of the original French, which is being published in the Fall 1980 issue of Perspectives internationales.

world market. While it is nearly impossible to estimate the effect of this food weapon upon the Japanese, it is clear that the Americans lost part of their market. The profits were uncertain, but the costs real.

Already, before this, there had been mention of "blackmailing the stomach," when under the law forbidding trade with an enemy, the Americans refused to sell grain to China, as well as Cuba and Vietnam. Whatever the intentions of this legislation, the results were not conclusive. This was thanks to Canada, which, as early as 1961, was taking advantage of the 'Cold war' climate by carrying on lucrative trade with China, although she did not recognize the Peking government.

CIA report

However, it was not until 1974 that the food weapon openly became a diplomatic tool. The CIA publicized this theme in its report entitled: *Potential Implications of Trends in World Population, Food Production and Climate*. Forecasting the worst, a cooling of the planet which would affect all agricultural areas except the United States, the CIA concluded that the rest of the world would become increasingly dependent upon America for food supplies: "This could give them a power that they never had before—perhaps a political and economic hegemony greater than the years immediately following the Second World War."

Americans, both the man in the street and the leader, began to dream again. They were already making Machiavellian plans. In 1975, *Business Week* contended that this was a powerful means to force other countries to trade. They had in mind titanium from India, chromium from the Soviet Union, and petroleum from Iran. Petroleum was the word on everyone's lips: America felt humiliated by what she considered to be a band of Bedouin fanatics from another age. Suddenly, the American dream of continuous material progress was collapsing. The United States saw itself as dependent upon a highly symbolic product (oil is energy; in other words, power) under the control of others. But, suddenly these others were in themselves becoming dependent upon the United States: oil against wheat. Could there be a better basis for exchange?

However, then Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, had a negative view on this. He considered that the Arabs should not be the only ones blackmailed. He had more distant and developed aims; in exchange for wheat, he attempted in the summer of 1975 to gain oil at a reduced price from the Soviets. The unfortunate official put in charge of this mission, undersecretary of State Charles Robinson, of course returned empty-handed from Moscow: never would the leaders in the Kremlin have accepted such a one-sided deal. And when the Americans that year stopped the shipments of grain to the Russians, they ultimately gained only an accord to formalize this trading link. This meant that now, while the Soviets were committing them-

selves to a minimal quantity of cereals per year, they concurrently were gaining permanent access to the American market.

This first attempt to use the food weapon against the Russian giant had been a failure, and had shaken the Administration of Gerald Ford. This is why, when the U.S.S.R. intervened during the Angolan crisis with its Cuban armies in order to push back the South Africans, Washington did not attempt to use this instrument of force which many considered formidable. Were they right?

Carter's awakening

In 1976, Democratic candidate Jimmy Carter promised never to use food as a weapon. To punish a population for the crimes of its leaders was unacceptable, particularly at a time where the President's electoral campaign was based on the necessity of renewed morality in international relations. But when Soviet troops descended on Afghanistan, he felt humiliated; he had wanted to put the relations of the two superpowers on a sounder basis than force, such as the policy pursued by Kissinger. It was at this precise moment that he attempted to have the SALT II treaty ratified by a very reticent Congress. One of the most fundamental objections of the American legislators was the weakness of means of surveillance under the agreement, particularly after the events in Iran. They felt strongly that it was impossible to trust the Russians, hungry for expansion; the Afghanistan affair seemed to justify their concern. Carter's arguments were collapsing, as were his hopes of a new basis for Soviet-American relations.

It was then, in a fit of anger, that he reconsidered his promise to never use the food weapon. He imposed an embargo on the massive quantities of grain which had been promised to the U.S.S.R.: 10 million tons over and above the 8 million already agreed to in 1975, an accord still respected in 1980.

There was immediate turmoil in the stockmarkets of Minneapolis and Chicago. For, in the preceding year Secretary of Agriculture Robert Bergland had, surprisingly, not imposed restrictions on areas under cultivation. To the contrary, he encouraged seeding on as wide a basis as possible, stating that there would be no difficulty in selling the extensive surplus, because of a predicted catastrophe in the Soviet harvest.

And indeed there was: 185 million tons of cereals instead of the projected 237 million. The Americans were very satisfied until the unexpected announcement of the embargo: Suddenly millions of tons of grain were pouring onto the market. The President created a last-minute program, by closing those grain markets for two days and by promising to buy part of the surplus directly. Reaction to the move came swiftly.

Seth S. King of the *New York Times* entitled an article: "With or Without the Soviets, Farmers Depend on Exports" maintaining that the embargo would hit the American farmer much harder than the Soviet Union. Meg Cox of the *Wall Street Journal* followed much the same line. That writer conjectured that this unfortunate business would adversely affect the United States in three ways. First, the cost would be extremely high because the government would have to purchase the surplus. Second, this would have a bad effect upon potential markets: indeed, who, after what had happened, could still trust the United States? To the contrary, stated Cox, nations which felt they were too dependent upon the U.S. would attempt to diversify their sources of supply, and the potential customers now prefer to look elsewhere. According to the same writer, this would induce other grain producing and exporting countries to increase their production. These arguments did not fall on deaf ears, particularly as American farmers had hoped to make almost \$2 billion from supplementary sales to the Soviet Union. But, counting on their patriotic feelings, President Carter appealed to them to act as conscientious citizens. What exactly was he expecting from this embargo? Probably he did not know himself, for he had acted impulsively, as the events of the following days were to prove.

Embargo fails

Washington knew, this time, that Ottawa would not attempt to take advantage of the situation. The recently elected Clark government seemed more favourable to American intentions than any of its predecessors. However—and it seems so unreal to be unbelievable—the White House appeared to have forgotten Argentina, which (since 1976) had been a major exporter of cereals, and now in 1980 had obtained an important surplus. An American emissary was frantically dispatched to Buenos Aires to beg the President, General Videla, not to take advantage of the situation. On the contrary, Videla, deeply irritated by Carter's human rights campaign, took a malign pleasure in playing a mean trick on his thin-skinned mentor: he succeeded in filling 60% of the Soviet requirement. From then on, as was emphasized by a high-ranking State department official, the embargo became purely symbolic. But this was not all.

Several European countries, including Spain, also rushed to sell grain to Moscow, which paid fabulous prices: \$225 per metric tonne of wheat, instead of the approximate \$185 offered at that time. In order to compensate for their sales, these European states were replenishing themselves directly from the American market, where, because of the embargo, prices were at their lowest. However, there was an even greater insult to come.

Time magazine, in its April 14, 1980 edition, revealed that American ships, used by American compa-

nies for carrying American cereals to Third World states, mysteriously changed their course in mid-ocean and headed towards Rumania and Poland. This blatantly confirmed that profits are the sole loyalty of the multinationals.

Two months after its implementation, the American embargo on grain to the U.S.S.R. was described as a fiasco. Food, dreamed by some to be the counter-weapon to oil, had not worked.

This should cause little surprise, as it is sufficiently clear today that the 'food weapon' was primarily a propaganda instrument for internal use. We should examine the facts. It was the CIA which propagated this theme, my making public—a very rare event—a shattering report. But the date of its publication is even more intriguing: 1974. The mid 1970s were without doubt the most difficult period on America's prestige. The Vietnam war, which had divided American society, had been hopelessly lost. At the same time the population of the most powerful nation on earth realized that the offended sensibilities of a band of Arabs could force them to leave the car in the garage or to turn down the thermostat. Worse, the Presidency, this most sacred American institution, was tainted by scandal. "I'm not a crook" swore Richard Nixon before television cameras as Watergate loomed over the political horizon.

Therefore, at this time, America was shaken to its foundations. It was a crisis of confidence. And suddenly the CIA—a discredited institution—was offering the food weapon, promising the nation that it would again be a leading and confident power; and that this weapon would give the nation a strength it had never had before. This was marvellous!

But we have learned since—and the last example is the most conclusive—that there is a difference between theory and practice. While it is true that the United States produces 50% of the world's wheat exports, this does not imply control. In 1980 it was clear that American companies preferred to put aside patriotic feelings in order to go after the highest bidder, that is to say, the U.S.S.R., the general target for the 'food weapon.'

It is not certain, however, whether the United States will not one day be able to control their grain exports, although achieving this would mean having to overcome their present aversion towards the concept of an active and forceful government. Another condition for creating an effective weapon would be the organization of a cartel of exporting countries, but, as the example of Argentina proved, even countries considered as American clients are sometimes only too pleased to show their independence.

In conclusion, the food weapon seems for the moment and for the coming years, inapplicable. It failed when used against the U.S.S.R. and was not even attempted against Iran. Can we be anything but happy with this outcome?

UN food office in Cairo closed by Arab pressure

by C.F. Schuetz

Recent trends in international relations have turned such seemingly minor decisions as recognizing a country's capital city into major issues affecting peace. While Canada's Prime Minister Joe Clark last year agonized over the proposed relocation of the Canadian embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, Canadian officials were also engaged in another international dispute involving a type of recognition, this time Cairo, an Arab capital.

The struggle was a consequence of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's peace negotiations with Israel. A number of Arab countries met in Baghdad, Iraq, in March 1979 to consider their response to the Camp David peace initiatives concluded five months earlier. As an expression of protest, 18 countries severed diplomatic relations with Egypt.

Even though it seems to be a rather unfortunate response to peace initiatives, breaking off diplomatic relations is a perfectly legitimate instrument of international relations. It is an expression of protest by one sovereign international actor against the policies of another sovereign actor. No third state should interfere with such an action, just as no third state should presume to tell another what its policy on recognition should be. The countries attending the Baghdad meeting, however, also demanded that the United Nations relocate the regional bureau of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) to some other Arab city. Cairo had been the centre designated by the FAO to serve the Middle Eastern region. The demand implied a withdrawal of recognition or a form of severing diplomatic relations in the context of the international organization. It might be argued that the action would be just another simple administrative rearrangement. A closer look at its implications, however, presents a very different picture.

The FAO is one of the specialized agencies established by the United Nations to promote peace by helping all the peoples of the world. Of all the functional agencies of the UN, perhaps none satisfies more clearly the idea of building a grass-roots structure of peace by

alleviating human misery. This feature was partly the reason why it became the first permanent specialized agency. It was launched by the UN in 1943, before the end of the Second World War. When the FAO was formally initiated in Quebec City in 1945, its constitution provided for a wide range of services in the area of food production. But these services would contribute to genuine peace only if the relief offered was on the basis of need rather than on the basis of political considerations.

Politicising food

Removing the regional bureau from Cairo amounted to much more than a simple relocation of offices. It meant a political imposition on a functional, humanitarian service. Inasmuch as it was a demand made in reaction to Sadat's peace initiative, withdrawing recognition from the Egyptian regional office meant a perversion of UN purposes. Rather than promoting peace as the UN Charter suggests (and as all member states have promised to do) relocating the Cairo office really turns the FAO into a political weapon to punish Egypt for signing a unilateral peace treaty with Israel.

During the first 30 years of its existence, the food agency enjoyed worldwide respect and smooth international cooperation. The first attempt to convert food into a political instrument was made in 1975. It happened at the biennial session of the FAO conference in Rome. Typically, the move was not made in an obviously objectionable form. It came in the context of a report proposing on the one hand more aid to newly emerging countries and on the other hand food-aid to liberation fronts 'fighting against racism'.

There was, of course, no problem with the first proposal. Emergent countries, particularly Angola and Mozambique, were in dire need of such aid. Naturally, the members of the FAO agreed to provide it. The problems started with the second suggestion. It was clearly directed against 'racist' Israel, a member of the FAO. In turn, the liberation front fighting against 'racism' was the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). By

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getting the FAO to approve the purely administrative extension of its services, the proposing countries hoped to use the international agency to give legitimacy to the less peaceful PLO and cast an aspersion over a member state. Although nothing came of this proposal, Libya and Syria in the ensuing debate demanded the expulsion of Israel from the FAO. The agency did not comply. Rather, true to the UN ideal of universality, it gave some recognition to the PLO by granting it observer status.

Cairo boycotted

The battle to retain Cairo as the regional bureau of the FAO was joined by Canada in early 1979. Through its membership in the FAO, Canada became involved in a struggle against extremist countries which had objected to its planned embassy move. Only this time, the target of the attack was a fellow Arab country.

To serve the 24 countries of the Middle Eastern area, the FAO established a regional office in Cairo in 1948. By 1979, it had a staff of 92, of whom 27 had been recruited internationally. For the current budget period of 1980-81, it was slated to spend about \$5.2 million out of a total FAO budget of \$278 million (Canada's share is about four percent or in excess of \$11 million).

After breaking off diplomatic relations with Egypt, several countries boycotted the regional FAO bureau in Cairo. Most of these countries were forced to join the boycott because of pressure from the radicals and because of strategic circumstances. Egypt's policy of accommodation with the Jewish state forced a polarization of such intensity that most of the middle ground utilized by moderates had been eliminated. Consequently, the moderates went along with the boycott in order to maintain the discretionary latitude of their foreign policy.

The net effect was a still serious challenge to the FAO usefulness in the area. In June 1979, the executive organ of the agency, the FAO council, found itself in a heated debate over the issue. As a consequence, no decision was made. Yet, at the request of the representative of Saudi Arabia, the issue was aired publicly at the full membership of the FAO conference held in Rome in November 1979. In the centre of the storm was the Director-General of the FAO, Edouard Saouma of Lebanon. The relocation issue was actually the lesser of his worries. He also faced the need of getting a sizable budget increase accepted by the membership. The Western countries, in particular, would have to provide the largest share (the United States alone pays for one quarter of the expenses, amounting to almost \$35 million in 1980). Yet these countries were also the members who most strongly objected to the political implications of closing the Cairo office.

Realizing the potential danger to the entire FAO

operation, Saouma tried to appeal to reason. His main emphasis was placed on the functionally satisfactory performance of the Cairo bureau ever since its inception. In a report prepared for the FAO conference, he analyzed the implications of relocation. It would invariably bring a dislocation of services, to say nothing of the wasted resources that really are meant to alleviate food shortages. In the estimate of the Director-General's Report, the move would take at least 18 months and possibly even as much as four years.

But, the hard-liners in the Middle East increased their pressure. After a meeting of the Arab Organization for Agricultural Development, another set of formal notes was sent to Saouma. This time they came from the more moderate governments of the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The Saudis also made a payment of their \$2.9 million share in a Middle Eastern cooperative program organized by the FAO. But, they immediately blocked over \$2.8 million pending the relocation of the Cairo office. To complete the picture, the government of Iraq threatened to suspend payment of FAO dues altogether.

Clearly, the confrontation seemed headed for a showdown at the FAO conference. The simple matter of the location of a regional office had become a major issue of international justice which threatened the very existence of the food agency.

Compromise

Faced with the intransigence of the extremist Middle Eastern governments, Saouma felt it was imperative to avoid a public demonstration of antagonism. With the support of the majority of non-aligned countries which included about a 100 beneficiaries of FAO services, he was able to prevent a discussion of the Cairo affair by the Plenary Session of the conference. Instead, an intensive effort was made to find a compromise solution. In this process, the representatives of Belgium and France played an important role. They assisted Saouma to negotiate a way to avoid the worst possible outcome.

The resulting compromise meant the closing "for the time being" of the regional office in Cairo. The local staff was laid off during the period of 'suspension'. After obtaining general agreement, Saouma included the compromise in Resolution 20/79 whereby the compromise was formally approved without a vote.

Certainly, Mr. Saouma must be complimented for his skilful handling of the problem and for preventing a worse result. Open dissension could have been disastrous for the future of the FAO, especially as a \$68 million increase in the biennial budget was at stake. Indeed by keeping the issue of relocation from being discussed officially, one could even claim that it remained what it actually was, namely and administrative matter.

Yet, there are disturbingly negative aspects to the compromise solution. The basically anti-peace bias of

the issue was not eliminated. Even if in the last analysis, no other Arab country was awarded the relocated Cairo office, it was still effectively closed by the suspension of services. Egyptians were still penalized for their peace initiative—at least temporarily.


Unfortunately, there is a very strong possibility that the 'suspension' will not merely be a temporary one. Immediately after the compromise had been agreed upon, the Saudi representative stated that his government considered the compromise to be a permanent solution. Moreover, to counter any accusation of wasting FAO resources, the Arab members promised to pay an additional one million dollar contribution to the food agency.

By accepting the compromise, the FAO members also allowed political concerns to prevail over functional ones. The immediate advantage of preventing an open confrontation in the hope of future pacification, may in the end have hardened the resolve of radical governments and reduced the flexibility of moderates. Facing problems quickly prevents unjust solutions from acquiring any kind of legitimacy by being tolerated. Indeed, one may wonder whether the Saudi request to have the relocation debated in the plenary session of the FAO conference may not have been motivated by just such a consideration. Certainly, the larger forum of the conference could have rejected the relocation demand for what it was; a political interference in functional affairs. Such a result would have freed the moderate states from having to expose themselves to the same punitive measures that the radical

states had managed to impose on Egypt through the compromises.

By a strange twist of history, Cairo was not the only Egyptian city serving as a regional centre for a UN agency. Alexandria was in a similar position. Being the regional bureau for the World Health Organization, it too came under attack by the anti-peace strategy of the radicals. In this instance, however, the demand for relocation did not result in a compromise. Rather, it was simply overruled by a majority of the area membership. Being larger than the region served by the FAO through the Cairo office, such a result was easily achieved.

Today, the belief is spreading that nations get their way by radicalizing every aspect of international relations. When Prime Minister Clark was concerned about the question of re-locating the Canadian embassy, some kind of settlement of the Jerusalem question seemed possible. Today, this possibility has been destroyed by extreme measures of declaring the entire city an eternal capital. On the other side, it is not surprising that the main leader of the solidarity front has initiated a destructive fratricidal intervention against a Moslem neighbour merely to adjust the terms of a negotiated settlement. If small issues cannot be settled in a rational way, how can it be achieved with real problems? Peace cannot be achieved by force. Nor can it be achieved by expedient compromises. That food and health must be available to all people regardless of whether they are powerful is a reality that brooks no compromise.



Wheat harvested in western Canada.

Agriculture Canada photo

Lost people of the world mark each passing turmoil

by Nicholas G.L. Vincent

I return, back to the crucial points of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in this clarification of certain thoughts through twenty years.

In the days just before Phnom Penh fell to the Khmer Rouge in 1975, flights over that beautiful, besieged capital, with fires burning on the defence perimeter, the desperate struggle to get supplies in and the machine-gun and rocket-riddled tugs that attempted the suicidal river route, in counting off the hours before it fell, the presaging intimations of the bloodbath to come, the increasingly frightening telexes and communiqués that came to our news service in Saigon from our people in Phnom Penh, the evacuation plans, the knowledge among some that horror was in store for that beautiful land, yet no one realized quite so terrible and end as the return to Year Zero.

Some sensed, felt intimations: the word 'bloodbath' still rings out repeatedly from the telex I keep that marked the beginning of the real end. Beautiful Cambodia: this was the end, the coldly calculated death of millions that was to be in the years to come.

Twenty years, opening windows upon the world, as seen in journeys through incidents that revealed in their short moments, empires slipping, the vanquishment of old colonialism amidst the growth of others, superpowers stumbling, and most particularly—the subject of this piece—the shock of these cascading events upon individuals and whole constituencies of human beings. These are as observed in a rough progression of magnitude and understanding in a series of journeys through these years in Africa, the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia. These incidents in microcosm reflected the effect of failed visions and the impact of brutality when temporary masters gain control of deadly power and friends.

Speed of change

In 1974, I asked in an *International Perspectives* article (see "Impact of the energy squeeze on evolving balances of power" July/August 1974) whether the speed of change could so disorient peoples that values in themselves and perceptions of humane conduct could become warped. Following this I went to Vietnam. With the realizations gained there, and in subse-

quent years including a visit to Iran and the other troubled Asian states after the fall of the Shah, the answer I had suspected to my 1974 question began to be confirmed. The series of impressions I gained in these years began to unite with the impressions formed during Asia and African sojourns of the late 1960s to consolidate into one term to describe the outcome of such events: lost people.

Increasingly we edge towards a world out of control. An international energy consultant with much involvement in the developing world recently called it a "march towards death." Our instruments of perception increase in speed of delivery and response, yet without desired effect. The events of Cambodia, of famine in Africa, of alien turmoil in Iran aid us to curative action and yet in the face of the real issues, impotence remains. Out of these events are thrown the lost people: individuals and populations that flee, or find instead, that they have become prisoners of sudden deprivation.

Several potent visions guided this writer from his earlier years and exposure to these formulating events, from the pre-Vietnam era of certainty (of Western mission) to the question of speed of change and humanity. Certain scenes, the subsequent investigation, and the thoughts that have come out of that, are touched upon here.

It is 1965. We stop in a Somali mountain village for the night: Borama. The highlands of the Ethiopian frontier loom to the west. The houses here are one room and made of mud and sticks. The local school teacher, a tall slim Somali, takes us on a walk through the village. He shows us in this dimming light amongst the desolate hills, a crater, where once a house had been, and says: "This is where the Ethiopian airforce bombed our village last year; they used American jets."

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It is ten years later, and we are in the mountains around Vang Vieng, in central Laos. We are on foot on a trail in increasing jungle. We stop by a collection of impoverished tents that remind me of the camps of the poorer Sahara tribes. The people come out to see us.

Yes, they say through our guide, they have been here a long time, camped in this unremarkable drift to the side of this isolated trail. Why did they come here? Because one day fire rained down from the sky. They had lived in a mountain-top village and one day their existence, their trail of passage of generations was removed by fire from the sky. They still did not understand; they were still, and will still be, in slow-motion shock. Still recovering. They still could not visualize what came down upon them and its origins. They had not seen the B 52s. It is conjectural as to whether the word 'American' meant anything at all. They are innocents. Perhaps now they have new homes in the valleys of Vang Vieng, or perhaps they are another statistic in the refugee camps on the Thai frontier.

War, and going back to the shock of change on peoples, that period of the 1963-64 aftermath of the Algerian War. In the Sahara there is the fading away of a defeated people, the French. In a Colomb-Bechar sandstorm, the wind's roar is undermined by the rumble of long columns of armoured cars and big six-wheeled Renault desert command jeeps, with their radio antennae whipping back and forth. They are pulling out.

The Legionnaire is saying that it is finished now, that next year after his long years of service he will be going to Canada; he has relations there and wishes to become a big game guide. His life is a miniature of the French colonial defeat and of the precipitous events that brought about its end. He was a Czech; he fled the invading Nazis in 1938. He fought first with the British and then, following the war and the subversion of his own country, he joined the Foreign Legion and served among numerous locales. These included Indochina, where he was so badly and repeatedly wounded that now, as a Chief Sergeant, he had been relegated to quartermaster duties, carrying the curious souvenirs of metal fragments that could never be removed from his body.

Waning colonialism

This era is the shock of change; colonialism is slipping and wars ferment on the African continent. I am in the southern Algerian desert. So empty here, not a living thing seems to appear. From over the horizon against the shimmering mid-day heat, and silence, a convoy of Algerian army trucks full of soldiers in ill-fitting uniforms and awkward in new boots, comes by, rests, and then moves on south to another war with impoverished Mali—a forgotten unrecorded conflict, not visible to us until, in this desolate expanse, we come upon a bullet and shell-fractured sign proclaiming the frontier of Mali.

Incongruities persist. In the desert, in Algeria still, we stop at the Reggan oasis. As night falls, a blue

luminescence reigns over a plateau that rises steeply above us. I am told that in the middle of this boundless Sahara Desert upon that height, General De Gaulle has constructed a city and installations for the testing of his independent nuclear deterrent. These are juxtapositions that are hard to comprehend for only a few days later, after travelling across empty terrain away from this alien technology, we are in Tessalit in Mali black craters in the desert.

We are entering a region and a people soon to be destroyed by endless famine, that to this day grows across the heart of Africa. A famine that seems to have been compounded by the mistakes of technology, by the brutal forces of political tumult left by decolonization, and by the disillusionment with all except power. The people are impacted by this change into starving skeletons where they live, or join wavering columns into camps and territories where life may possibly continue but where all that these millions had once lived for is gone. That is the future; in 1964 the Tuaregs are proud and stride in resolute independence, but there are indicators of change: there is a military camp on the dusty track into Tessalit. There are three field guns drawn into defensive position. Despite the conflict with Algeria, they all point into the heart of Mali. But this intimation is gained from the completeness of hindsight.

More border wars of this era. In a thorn-desert east of Garissa, in Kenya, in a no-man's land Kenya security forces pursue Somali Shifta tribesmen. We are caught in an ambush. At that time this represents solely a hair's breadth incident. Now, in retrospect, the conflict, in which our capture was so minor a part, is seen more clearly: a permutation of a new and frantically poor nation's (Somalia) desire for its lost tribes and territory.

Within Somalia, so recently sliding out from the colonial arm, signs abound of a nation impoverished to the extent that there appears little to hold it together. In the capital salt sea-water runs from the taps, and what roads there are have been constructed under the colonial dream of Mussolini and most were falling into ruins. The population's size was uncertain, medical care non-existent.

Yet already powers were finding this desperate, poor and uneducated people a fertile hope for their own designs. Then the nation was simply poor; now just as poor 15 years later, it feistily clings to its outward urge, while within its borders the toll of refugees mounts.

At this time, elsewhere in Africa, populations roll under the uncertain benefits of colonial change and struggles for power. The poignant missed opportunity is in Rhodesia, where the British Labour government fights the drift to independence by the whites; sends out Sir Arthur Bottomley, known as Bumley to the Rhodesians, on despairing missions to hold the rebellious colony in check. As in Algeria, where the recurring image is of long convoys of sand-coloured military

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Jubilant supporters of the Eritrean People's Liberation Front ride on a tank captured from Ethiopia during 1977 civil war.

Wide World photo

vehicles pouring through Colomb-Bechar in the long night of French colonial retreat, so, too, a similar exactness of moment and time surrounds the arrival of Royal Air Force Transport Command aircraft at Salisbury on those lush tropical evenings in late 1965, as British and Rhodesian whites attempt their last manoeuvres to gain an accord and to assure each other as to the continuing certainty of events.

But the Rhodesian whites are traumatized by the 1978 Shaba province uprising in Zaire. They have seen the white refugees streaming down from the north with horror stories of what took place when the lid was 'taken off', the whites are traumatized by the luxury of many years rule over black servants, and upon whom depended so many of the daily economy, work and leisure. Here, in retrospect, history cries 'blindness,' for a generous white move then towards staged black majority rule would have avoided the sorrow of the next 15 years. Now, in 1980, in this change of tide, the whites themselves may become refugees. Will history bear much sympathy?

Two images come to mind from the sojourn there: the sudden challenge to authority by a vociferous member of the black work force, names Isiah. He is quickly marked out by white eyes as a terrorist, and the treatment begets counter-treatment; fear, and the rain-forest is close. Did the angry Isiah survive those years? Or, this is remembered too: the eyes of a white BSAP policeman dilate as he describes how and when he "blew the heads off" several black rioters in Bulawayo. From this ugly moment it is later learned that he had immigrated from Kenya, where, as a small boy, in an isolated farm house he had come down to breakfast one morning and found his mother, father and sisters murdered by the *Mau Mau*.

In Iran and the ancient conservatisms of the Middle East, the impact of sudden change, the tensions, are at first obscured by the mythology of progress. Iran in the mid-1960s. Those of us there, had we been astute, may have looked through the windows of certain incidents for a glimpse of the real current un-

derneath, had we been so inclined or so brave. Now in the passage of time and event, these windows and the landscape beyond become clear. The shock of sudden change on old societies can only be borne by a certain degree before incipient collapse begins. It is still too soon to say that such incipency, when noticed, may be controlled; however the lessons are clear and threatening.

Iran at that time was well on the path that terminated in January 1979, a path of illusion by the Shah and his supporters who believed that the technology of change could be introduced without subsidiary impacts from those western cultures which produced that technology. Of course, as happened in Iran, and as has hap-

pened or is threatened in other ancient desert societies of the region, technological change brings with it inalienable seeds of cultural and political demand. One cannot import advanced printing and photographic technology without some little import of the same seed of *Penthouse* magazine; one cannot import armaments for ill-adapted armies without sowing the seeds of chaos. Even in its last Imperial days, the Persian military depended upon American professionalism for its operations technology.

Beneath the smooth surface of the Shah's sense of destiny, so manifest by the 1960s, indicators abounded for a crisis at some point in the future. The society could not digest the alien influx.

Witness this: Using our aerial photographs, and



Tehran mob in anti-American demonstration reflects Iran's rapidly changing society.

Wide World photo

maps draw up by the British Indian Army in days of hemispheric British imperial incursion, we enter mountain villages, only 15 years ago, where the arrival of Europeans was an extraordinary event. We are approached, quietly and shyly by the inhabitants, coming to use from fires scabbled together from twigs combed from these desert ranges, coming out of encampments that have not changed in design or materials since that time when Islam came. They approach us shyly; they have a child with pneumonia, or a broken leg, or an old grandmother is dying; have we in our possession that amazing instrument they have heard about that will reverse death and mend broken bones? We have this; it is called aspirin.

We come back from our work in the mountains, past camps of nomadic Turkistanis, of liquid eyes and olive skins, who still make their periodic migrations with forage and the seasons; down dry river canyons we stumble over grave-stones neatly laid out in elliptical formations, marking the locations of villages that have long since disappeared when North America was still a wilderness. Or the Iran of 1965, where the only unveiled women in western dress in a city such as desert-wrapped Yezd, were considered prostitutes. Today, it is Yezd where the exacting cycle of intolerance is again reaching out and the firing squads kill those of the Ba'hai, and the other unacceptable faiths.

Iran of that decade before the '70s: of the unintentional arrogance of the many American military advisers who were already there when they spoke of the inability of their charges, so recently from the desert, to comprehend the elementary questions of technology; of the invasion of foreign firms, of the endemic corruption, of the foreign call girls from Germany, of the daily fear of SAVAK felt by any who suggested the truth of what was actually coming to pass, or what might come.

How clearly the seeds are sown in hindsight, of a society and politic being pushed over its own sense of balance by alien forces with which it had not been established to contend. How ignored were the indicators: that the tolerances were very slim, that the technology from the West could not be introduced without the rest of the western cultural regalia, that a breaking point in these tensions would arrive; that the conflicts were elementary, that just as western societies were ceasing (temporarily it now seems) capital punishment for crime, bodies were swinging from modern American highway lamp-posts above the crowds on Ferdowsi Avenue, in Tehran. That for the young-educated Iranian it was vogueish to speak English with an American accent, preferably broad and ugly; that these new managers would return to their homeland, and find that by some peculiar process their educational absence had in reality been an exile; that they would return and find themselves isolated from the very people whence they sprang, isolated in their odd mélange of American ideas and inherited conflicting habits of their forebears. And they were supposed to lead the

Shah's technological revolution, and the Imperial, the hopeless Imperial dream.

The same tremors of impact, the alienation, permeate the other Middle Eastern states; the conflicts of the returning, of those exposed to other ideas; returning to their societies where yawn uneasily imbalances between wealth, position and expectations; between the demands of modernity and of adherence to old loyalties; between that which was once static and proved, and the unnerving speed of change.

In my return, in May and June 1979, the Shah has fallen, but where, in the sudden hostility of Tehran, does one see these returning young, now one generation on, who had been educated and so dangerously exposed abroad? What has happened to those sons and daughters of the lucky middle class? Where are the returning, now half-American, or half-British, children of the Shah's dream? As I walk down the streets of the uneasy city, a strange phenomenon takes place; they come up to me and tell me the same sad story, with only slight variations on the theme.

Disillusionment

No longer are they the returning forced-broad-American-accented-and-hearty young of the mid-1960s. Now they are the disillusioned and the bitter. Many in their mélange of Imperial favour and alien education, supported the opposition to the Shah, worthy in itself insofar as opposition to a tyrant is always justified. But they went too far; they supported, increasingly, an impassioned and highly energetic elderly man of concentrated purpose: the Ayatollah Khomeini. They believe that *his* vision and their truly republican vision could exist side-by-side after the overthrow of the Shah. At the juncture of Imperial passing they flock back to Iran to cheer the Ayatollah's return, to ignore the clear fact that Qom, the desert-bound religious capital, has not embraced any Western culture, native to Iran's interest.

They pray that in the Ayatollah's robes walks another Mossadegh with some favour towards honourable republican nationalism. Now, already, by May 1979, three months after the overthrow, they are disillusioned. Distraught, they come up to me in crowded streets, and dangerously, for themselves, talk openly of their despair of all that has come to pass. I have noticed on these busy, uneasy streets, that their messages to the new regime's secret police have already, with painful fulfilment, come to being.

I remember one conversation, typical of broken dreams, a voice of the betrayed: "I was studying to be an electronics technician in Texas. I like America, it is very nice. I supported the revolution because I thought it would be a republic, Islamic perhaps, but a free republic. I left my studies and came back here with the fall of the Shah. We were very glad to see Ayatollah Khomeini return and take over. Now I am sad. There is no republic. The photographs of Khomeini are every-

where, just like they were for the Shah. He rules like the Shah. I want to go back (to the U.S.) but I cannot now. There is no way out. I cannot get a visa. It is very sad. You know Dallas, Houston, San Antonio, it is really very nice there. I had a girlfriend. . . ."

There are other casualties of this betrayed vision, many others. They talk to me in stores and on the street. I cannot feel too sorry for them, because so many were the sons of the privileged, and for a long time lived in the best of both worlds. On the slow train, lumbering across the desert below Qom, just before my own edgy confrontation with the successors of SAVAK, I find one for whom I feel greater sympathy: a true person, and not an uneasy mixture of foreign and indigenous overlays.

Unlike the pretence of the many others, this young technician had actually participated in the fighting in Tehran, had witnessed the worst of the Shah's security forces before their collapse, had used his car as an ambulance, and had driven out from under the gunfire of the wounded to sympathetic hospitals or medics in areas beyond Tehran that had slid into revolutionary hands; he had frantically driven an 11 year-old boy bleeding to death from bullet wounds, through riot-torn streets, in a hopeless race for aid to stop his dying.

As we sat in the swaying old coach he explained how he came to be there: "It was supposed to be a democratic Islamic republic; we were prepared to accept Islam because we believed it would be democratic; now we find it is only Khomeini. Khomeini everywhere. After the Revolution, my American employers left, but I found work (as a foreman) in a factory. While I was there I saw that the factory workers were very badly paid and treated still, despite the Revolution. I went to the management and asked if this would change. The next I knew, a member of the (new) Islamic Worker's Committee came to me and told me that I was a Communist and a trouble-maker; I had to leave. I thought the Revolution was supposed to be against the exploitation of the people. I am not a Communist; I thought the reason for change was that we are supposed to make a better country."

Breaking point

It is not easy to take the baton and run with it in the company of honourable losers. They are still the victim of impacting change, and opportunities for survival are mixed or do not exist. It is seen now in broad regions of the earth: individual groups and classes are thrust out into a societal wilderness, or are confined or murdered outright. And there is the great flow of refugees. This is at the breaking point, when a society can endure no more, and its structure breaks and runs. In Vietnam it occurred in its most aggressive form with the sudden onslaught of the 'Boat People', but the savagery of dislocation had been building for many years, whether from the flow of refugees, its internal cities or from the profound indicator: in certain key regions the



Lost people: children of Vietnam

Wide World photo

fighting had become so heavy and constant that the farmers and families, instead of temporarily squatting on the highways and waiting for the fire-fight to end, with a return to their paddies and field in store, had quietly broken and had not returned home one day and instead joined the slow and steady migration to the cities. At some point a society breaks and the people are no longer a coherent whole; they disintegrate into individuals, without illusions, with only a hope as a base-line of survival, and they trickle or flood out of the cracks of their ruined nations.

I remember a journey to Tay Ninh, a besieged provincial capital 60 miles north-west of Saigon. It was being struck by rocket and ground attacks so that the centre was evacuated, except for the headquarters of the Vietnamese 25th Division and a few of the old who would never go. The town, this beautiful tree-shaded provincial capital, so close to the Cambodian border, was overshadowed in its plain by the legendary Black Virgin mountain. It is too long to go into the history of that mountain or of the fighting which had preoccupied so much of its time, but the end result was that in these dying days of the Republic of South Vietnam, the Viet-

cong and North Vietnamese Army forces held the top, and they could therefore pour rocket fire into the soft heart of the town below.

In the tense and silent street, beside the emptiness of the central market and old man wheeled a load of bricks from a pile that had been established for the purpose of re-building homes as they were destroyed by the missiles. He was moving towards a house that had been struck the night before and in which most of a family had died. Why was he there? Was he the father, the uncle?

His journey crystallized those tensions that exist when a population decides to stay or to flee. In this case, the resistance of Tay Ninh was to finally die two months later at the fall of Saigon.

There are the twin factors of natural courage and

of the breaking-point of human beings. There are limits to tolerance under afflicting pressure, when the spirit is suddenly gone and resilience trounced. It is here that defeat begins and a vague wandering, wanting to leave, takes hold. We see on many nations now, the tired-out riders of war and famine. We see old societies submerging as the technology of change evolves and eats its children. There are two differences that have spread to so many lands of the poor of the Earth in recent years: the speed and impact of change and the causal destructive power that is unleashed intentionally, or by mistake, when hands take the lever of power with small conception of what they are doing. It is the outcomes of such change that cause nations to exude lost people. On the face of the world, it is a spreading condition.

Book Review

Pragmatic approach to strategy in Martin's nuclear age

by Paul Buteux

In this collection of essays the editor has brought together seven examples of strategic thinking in the nuclear age. Despite the presence among the contributors of a Frenchman, nonetheless the papers collected here can be said to represent a particularly Anglo-American approach to the study of strategy. Were a collection of essays under this general title put together in France or Germany (or, indeed, in some American academic circles), one suspects that the editor would have imposed on his authors a more explicit theoretical or doctrinal framework that has Laurence Martin in this volume.

The essays represent a pragmatic, instrumental approach to strategy, and any intellectual unity they possess stems from this common attitude. The authors share a style of strategic analysis, but no consistency of explanation or strategic theory. Each author surveys

this topic from a position that might be described as one of mid-Atlantic orthodoxy: a position which, let it be said, is not to be understood as denigrating the results, but it is one which contributes little that is especially novel to the subject matter considered.

The editor and his contributors have addressed themselves to a number of concerns in the mainstream of the subject; thus such familiar topics as the role of force in the nuclear age, limited war, disarmament and arms control are all dealt with. The inclusion of Louis-François Duchêne's essay on the economic factors in the world balance reminds us, however, of the very broad contemporary understanding of what constitutes strategy. Duchêne develops a theme to be found in the

Mr. Buteux teaches at the Department of Political Studies of the University of Manitoba.

editor's introductory chapter; that in the Western democracies it is extremely difficult to mobilize the population in support of forward and active military policies. Both Martin and Duchêne reflect a prevalent view that in advanced industrial societies there has been both a rejection of military values and an increasing scepticism as to the utility of military forces. Duchêne argues that since 1945 economic success has come to be regarded as an indicator of state power on a par with more traditional military indicators of strength, while Martin suggests that, paradoxically, nuclear weapons have led to a belief that their very destructive power has made it possible to treat the details of the military balance with "benign neglects". But, as both authors point out, the problem of military security remains, and both suggest that familiar landmarks in the international system and long-accepted assumptions about the state of the military balance are either disappearing or requiring major overhaul. Both believe that in a changing world the task of providing for security is not going to become less burdensome for the advanced industrial democracies.

The volume as a whole provides a very useful survey of the major issues which have been of concern to contemporary strategic studies, and offers a good description of some of the major features of the strategic landscape as it had developed in the last twenty-five years. However, there are few attempts to indicate in more than impressionistic form what this landscape might look like in the eighties. Still, such forecasting is a hazardous undertaking, and at least it is useful to know where we have been before deciding where we might be going.

Strategic intelligence

In this respect, Klaus Knorr's essay on strategic intelligence is interesting. His discussion of the problems and strategic intelligence stresses the limitations and uncertainties of threat assessment. The historical record, according to Knorr, is not an encouraging one for those who would rely on intelligence as a major tool for the making of strategic decisions, or who would stress the necessary importance of intelligence estimates in evaluations of the military balance. Unfortunately, intelligence estimates must be made, at least by the major powers, and policy will be affected by these evaluations. Knorr points to many examples when evaluations have been crucially wrong, either through faulty estimation, or because policy makers have mis-perceived what their intelligence services have been telling them. Moreover the old nostrum of relying on capabilities rather than intentions when assessing threats is also questioned by showing that estimates of capabilities are not necessarily more reliable than estimates of intentions. While making a number of suggestions as to how intelligence and decision might be better related for more effective policy-making; in the end, Knorr in effect is forced to enjoin

policy-makers to prudence and scepticism when dealing with the products of the intelligence process.

Scepticism as to the value and effectiveness of still widely held liberal approaches to the problems of international security characterises the majority of the essays in this volume. Nowhere is this more evident than in John Garnett's discussion of arms control and disarmament. As the author points out, arguments for disarmament are little different today than they were during the period of the League of Nations. Now, as then, there exist powerful arguments as to the desirability of disarmament; now, as then, there are powerful reasons militating against its achievement. Since 1945, at least in the context of East-West relations, the alternative approach of arms control has exercised policy-makers, but this, in Garnett's opinion, remains no more than a useful palliative to the problems of order in the international system.

The remaining essays in the collection all consider the ambiguities facing Western policy-makers in general, and those of the United States in particular, in circumstances of a changing and uncertain strategic environment. Perhaps Coral Bell, in her summary of crisis diplomacy, is the most sanguine as to the ability of the central powers to continue to conduct their regulations according to the existing conventions of the nuclear age. Robert Osgood, on the other hand, argues that although a strategy of limited war still has relevance for the United States, unfortunately a variety of political and technical factors call into question the utility of limited war as a strategy for the United States in the very areas of the world where the prospect of local wars is greatest (a point to be noted in the aftermath of Afghanistan and Iran). A reminder of the inertia which attempts to change strategic policy must overcome is provided by Henry Rowen's depiction of the evolution of American strategic nuclear doctrine. Despite the polemics and debates conducted by advocates of 'assured destruction', 'flexible options' and the like, Rowen, in a very informative essay, shows just how slowly the targeting policy of the United States has responded to declaratory strategy. Change has occurred, but the responsiveness of operational planning to changes in strategic fashion has by no means matched the intellectual nimbleness of many of the 'strategic community'.

All in all, this is a literate book which demonstrates that strategic discussion can be technically sophisticated without degenerating into scientism. Any student of international politics will find value in these pages, and the authors offer a convincing retort to those who have decried the study of strategy as being too theoretical to be real.


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November/December 1980

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International Perspectives

The Canadian journal on world affairs



The Reagan presidency:
Canada-US relations
US-European relations

Interview with Ivan Head

War in the wake of the Shah

Schmidt's new mandate

Trading for Latin American oil

Royal Commission on
Conditions of
Foreign Service



Commission royale d'enquête sur
la situation dans le
service extérieur

Invitation for Submissions

The Royal Commission on Conditions of Foreign Service has been established by the Government of Canada to:

- seek the views of those most directly involved in or with the foreign service and its operations;
- examine into changes in the conditions of foreign service; and
- report on steps the Government of Canada might take to accommodate these changes in its approach to the legal, administrative and operational framework of the Foreign Service.

The Commission is consulting members of the foreign service and their families in a broadly representative group of posts abroad and in Ottawa. It wishes at the same time to hear from ex-foreign service members and from persons or organizations who make direct use of the foreign service. To assist in the preparation of submissions, a discussion guide to the main issues of the inquiry is available.

Copies of the guide and information about the times when the Commission will be available to receive oral submissions or discuss written submissions with their authors can be obtained from the Executive Secretary at the address given below.

The deadline for the receipt of submissions is March 1, 1981 and hearings will be held in Ottawa (and other Canadian centres if appropriate) between March and June, 1981.

Pamela A. McDougall
Commissioner

P.O. Box/C.P. 1850,
Station/Succursale 'B',
Ottawa, Canada K1P 5R5
(613) 996-3552

Invitation à présenter des mémoires

La Commission royale d'enquête sur le service extérieur a été instaurée par le gouvernement du Canada en vue:

- de recueillir les points de vue des personnes les plus directement concernées par le service extérieur et ses activités;
- d'étudier les changements survenus dans les conditions du service extérieur; et

— de faire rapport des mesures que le gouvernement pourrait prendre pour s'adapter à ces changements dans le contexte du cadre légal, administratif et opérationnel du service extérieur.


La Commission consultera les membres du service extérieur et leur famille, dans un groupe de postes assez représentatif de l'ensemble des postes du service extérieur à l'étranger et à Ottawa. Elle souhaiterait en même temps recueillir les impressions d'anciens membres du service extérieur, ainsi que celles des personnes ou des organisations qui font directement appel au service extérieur. Pour faciliter la préparation des mémoires, la Commission met à la disposition des personnes intéressées un guide évoquant les principaux points qui seront examinés au cours de l'enquête.

Pour obtenir des exemplaires de ce guide ou des précisions au sujet des dates auxquelles la Commission pourra entendre les présentations orales ou se pencher sur les mémoires qui lui auront été remis, en compagnie de leurs auteurs, prière de s'adresser au secrétaire, à l'adresse ci-dessous.

La date limite pour la présentation des mémoires est fixée au 1^{er} mars 1981. Les audiences auront lieu à Ottawa (et, si nécessaire dans d'autres villes canadiennes) entre les mois de mars et de juin 1981.

Le Commissaire
Pamela A. McDougall

International Perspectives



International Perspectives is published in Canada six times a year by International Perspectives, (95312 Canada Inc.), 302-150 Wellington St., Ottawa, K1P 5A4.

Second Class Mail Registration Number 4929.

Editor and Publisher:
Alex Inglis

Assistant Editor:
Robert Albota

Business Manager:
Ruth Macfarlane

Subscription Rates:

In Canada:

Single issue — \$1.75
One year (six issues) — \$9
Two years (12 issues) — \$17
Three years (18 issues) — \$24

Other countries:

Single issue — \$2.25
One Year (six issues) — \$12
Two years (12 issues) — \$22
Three years (18 issues) — \$30

Subscription address:

P.O. Box 949,
Station 'B'
Ottawa, Canada
K1P 5P9

International Perspectives is a journal of opinion on world affairs. It advocates no editorial position. The opinions expressed by authors are their own and, unless otherwise stated, are not to be taken as presenting the official views of any organization with which the author is associated.

ISSN 0381-4874
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In the Information Supplement:

For the Record: reference material on Canadian foreign relations presented by the Department of External Affairs.

A tribute to Jules Léger

by Charles Ritchie

Jules Léger began as a young man of simple background, speaking only French, with no advantages of money or influence. He attained the direction of a great Government department, was Ambassador to Paris and finally became Governor-General of Canada. When his future was put in jeopardy by a stroke he fought his way back to put a full and useful life.


His was a career of remarkable achievement but success never changed his nature. He remained a modest man of generous instincts and genial humour. He was also a man of outstanding ability. A career in the public service such as his cannot float on noble aspirations alone. It has to have a foundation of pedestrian hard work. In his profession as a foreign service office, Jules had his feet very firmly on the ground.

While he was accustomed to the thinking of the international scene, and the interests of Canada in the long perspective he was also a shrewd judge of practicalities in the business of government. It was remarkable that his appointment as Under-secretary of state for External Affairs ahead of officers older in years and experience than himself caused no resentment but was welcomed by his colleagues. This was a tribute to the fact that those who had worked with him recognized in him a man above pettiness of any kind who brought both common sense and understanding to bear in all his dealings.

When he left Ottawa for service in posts abroad, he soon proved himself an admirable representative of his country. He had natural dignity without a trace of official pomposity. In negotiation he was patient and tenacious and never did he show those qualities more than during the period of his Embassy to Paris when General de Gaulle sought to render the position of the Canadian Ambassador a difficult one.

In his representational role abroad and later as Governor-General, he was greatly aided by his wife, Gaby. Indeed it is impossible to think of Jules without thinking of Gaby. She matched and complemented him in her sparkle of originality. Her warm heart and quick intuition into the feeling of others brought everything alive around her. Together in Paris, they humanized that beautiful but overpowering official residence on the Rue St. Honoré so that it became a welcoming home. In the same way their natural courtesy and democracy was later—during Jules's régime

Mr. Ritchie was Canada's High Commissioner in London and Ambassador in Washington.



*M. Bedford photo
Ottawa*

*The Rt. Hon. Jules Léger
April 4, 1913 — November 22, 1980
Governor-General of Canada 1974-1979*

as Governor-General—to make Government House a place where all who entered felt welcome and at ease. Jules's acceptance of the position of Governor-General was inspired by his devotion to the public service. The trappings of high office meant little to him. Under his calm exterior he was a man of enthusiasm and strong emotions and his love of Canada and of his native Québec was the motive of his life. Canadians knew this and felt for him not only respect but an affection rarely bestowed on public men.

As a companion Jules was a delight. In conversation he was witty with an unexpected earthy aptness of phrase. He was a lover of books and pictures. He was at home with large and general ideas but delighted in talk of people's idiosyncracies and loved a joke. He had a sharp eye for the ridiculous and could puncture pretention and affectation very neatly if need arose. As a friend he was most loyal and steadfast.

Jules had goodness without dullness, a warm heart, a true faith and a brave spirit. He was one in whom his fellow Canadians could indeed feel pride.

Constants and variables in Canada-US relations

by Maxwell Cohen

While it is often an exaggerated fantasy to forecast the destinies of neighbours and their political lives together, by focussing on individual leaders, the prospect of the Reagan presidency is nevertheless clearly a valid point of departure for speculating on the Canada-United States future.

Canada-U.S. relations may be divided into three large categories which reflect the opportunities for manoeuvre and decision-making by Canada and the importance of the internal Canadian pressures that inhibit the hands of politicians. The first group may be defined as those issues where Canada's room to decide for itself is severely limited. This includes most major economic questions with trade, investment, some resource uses, interest rates and related areas as the necessary core of the category. Here also are found all security and defence questions. The NORAD-NATO umbrella is the living reality for a vulnerable Canada with a three-ocean front, an immense northern airspace and caught by nature and history living out a relatively 'secure' existence as an air-land buffer between the two superpowers. Finally, in this group are the complex mix of selected boundary environmental questions, both coastal and continental, from a fragile Arctic to the mid-continent threat of acid rain. For these the potential success of Canadian choices and policies must be measured in relation to what the United States will or will not do in some joint environmental protection arrangement.

The second class of matters, where the elbow room improves, includes the delicate balance to be drawn between cultural nationalism and the reality of the American media almost swamping the world, let alone Canada, where the open boundary and common language offer no moat to safeguard the national psyche.

Similarly it might be argued that in this group there is some but not much scope for dealing with non-boundary resources, e.g. minerals, where the principal market is in the United States. Here the complex of oil and natural gas issues is almost self-explanatory in the odd mixture of dependence, interdependence and a much sought for independence. Prime Minister Joe Clark canonized self-sufficiency, if temporarily, while the recent MacEachen/Lalonde budget and energy

plan seems to have substituted 'national control' for the 'self-sufficiency' of the short-lived Conservative Government.

Independent decision-making

Finally, the broadest areas for independent Canadian decision-making, occur where there is minimal dependence and equivalent two-way flows. These include the large and equal interactions ranging from boundary waters to some coastal fisheries, both subject to strong Canadian input of authority because of a one-to-one relationship. The relationship can be either institutional, as with the International Joint Commission (IJC), or *ad hoc* as with the temporary agreements dealing with west coast fisheries questions, or the present Acid Rain Research Group. Indeed, it may be argued that the search for the largest opportunities for Canadian decision-making, where U.S. interests are also heavily involved, has best been resolved by mechanisms that 'equalize' decisions, in the face of the manifestly unequal power involved. That certainly has been the significance of the IJC's operations: an independent and jointly-created agency has brought an equilibrium between the two countries where the power realities flowing from the asymmetrical facts of life of a 'junior' Canada facing an immense neighbour might otherwise have prevailed.

Even here much depends on the wisdom of the governments' policy in appointing members of the Commission. In recent year both countries have been somewhat casual, highly political and basically without a coordinated policy for manning this most durable and constructive of Canada-U.S. institutions. Viewing each of these areas of "little room to manoeuvre"; "some

Mr. Cohen, a former Chairman of the International Joint Commission, is Professor Emeritus at McGill University, a Scholar-in-residence at the University of Ottawa and Adjunct Professor at Carleton University. He specializes in international law and international relations.

room to choose"; and, finally, "the optimum situation" for Canadian "parity of action", some telling judgments can be made.

Tariffs

With respect to the minimal manoeuvre group, it will be remembered that up to 80 percent of Canadian exports to the U.S. will be duty free as a result of the Tokyo round of GATT. Similarly, more than 65 percent of Canadian imports from the U.S. will shortly be duty free. About 75 percent of foreign investment in Canada is of U.S. origin. Probably no two countries in the world have so interlocking a relationship and so clear a superior-subordinate image of what has now become almost a 'joint economy'. Of course, none of these movements toward 'free trade' can eliminate the variety of non-tariff barriers which range from local procurement legislation to seasonal or weak-industry quotas. To that extent, therefore, there may be a semi-unreal quality to the attempt to describe the emerging Canada-U.S. trade patterns, even with the Tokyo Round, as ultimately amounting to the creation of a large North American 'free trade' area—an objective that Congress authorized for Executive study (with Mexico included) in the U.S. Trade Act of 1979, and where a number of research projects are underway.

Hence there may be some room to manoeuvre here through the use of Canadian non-tariff barriers to offset the U.S. barriers when they occur; specific and coordinated planning and agreement is likely to be undertaken to minimize these if it appears to be in the national interest of either or both countries to do so.

Certainly, it remains surprising that given the very large volume of trade and investment, that has now created an emerging joint economy, there should not yet be evolving some permanent machinery to monitor and maintain common fact-finding and advisory (not executive) procedures about this immense two-way trade and investment flow. It is almost a cliché now to wonder and cavil at the delay in establishing a Canada-U.S. Joint Economic Commission when the reasons for doing so have been self-evident for so long.

Autopact

To all of this economic interplay between the two countries there should be added the considerable achievements and the new anxieties about the Autopact as well as the role of the U.S. multi-nationals in Canada—with their dominating presence in petroleum and mining activities and in a major portion of Canadian secondary industry. It is little wonder that Canadian vulnerability to the U.S. should be always a sensitive point among all political parties. Indeed, the failure of both governments to proceed to find some better concepts for having the advantages of U.S. presence without its real (and imagined) disadvantages, through setting up adequate joint advisory and fact-

sharing machinery, becomes inexplicable. Certainly, the sad case of Canadian research and development, generally, and the parallel story of U.S. head office reluctance to encourage research by subsidiaries, has fostered Professor H.E. English's 'Miniature Replica' metaphor for the Canadian economic dimension in North America. This situation is, of course, to the detriment of long-run Canadian innovation and entrepreneurial activism. Finally, in this connection, the curious double standard of United States' trade and investment policy toward Canada is to be seen in the attempt to apply, for example, U.S. anti-trust laws to subsidiaries in Canada and related companies. Indeed, even if these are wholly Canadian-owned whenever their behaviour may run up against the 'effects' doctrine of the Supreme Court and the Department of Justice these companies or persons may be charged with violating U.S. anti-trust laws. Yet at the very same moment the parent companies may be planning world-wide manufacturing and distribution programs that limit the sales area for a Canadian subsidiary and such policies appear not to be inconsistent with the domestically sensitive U.S. 'effects theory', although the effects in and on Canada, and its export independence, may be significant and detrimental.

To all of these major and traditional complaints now must be added the uncertainty surrounding the President-elect's policies. Canadians will be forgiven if they have the impression that he favours stiffer local procurement legislation; that he will not see in the 1965 Autopact any urgent obligation to further Canadian expectations of investment in Canada for the major re-tooling needed if the Big Three (General Motors, Chrysler and Ford) are to survive in the world of successful Japanese-European small car makers; that he will encourage U.S. national programs for oil and gas production, synthetics, conversion to coal and that these incentives may lead to the United States and Canadian capital finding the U.S. more profitable than Canadian investment; and that, over all, a protectionist flavour with an advocacy for some kind of United States-Mexican-Canadian 'accord' in aid of the U.S. long-term needs, will mark the new administration. In such a program, there are few assurances of short-run or medium-term benefits to Canada. Indeed, the reverse may prove to be true even if the Reagan tripartite 'accord' concept is explored seriously for its potential benefits to the three countries.

With respect to security matters there is again very little room for Canadian choices particularly once the decision to buy the F-18A has been made final. Of course, some defence production sharing arrangements will continue to be elements of our NORAD-NATO involvement. But Canada lost its chance, with the cancellation of the Arrow (in 1959), to be in the warplane manufacturing business and perhaps it was inevitable that so high cost and high risk a program would rest

with the large industrialized countries. Nevertheless, if Sweden can continue with its high technology production programs from cars, warplanes to anti-aircraft equipment etc., it is not undue carping to wonder why the Canadian component in all of this has become sadly secondary even though in some advanced areas, e.g. nuclear reactors, radar, some computers, flight simulators and in communications satellites, the Canadian achievements are real, significant and totally competitive.

Realistically, 'the only game in town' in this Canada-U.S. arena is to play a minor 'second fiddle' to the world leadership of the United States in economic and security matters and for obvious Canadian self-protection interests to encourage, but participate in, that supremacy. But the less happy feature of this situation is to recognize that Canada is a prisoner of the 'overkill' capabilities of the super-powers. In this inglorious moment of history, when total planetary destruction is no longer science fiction, there is the traditional Canadian belief that the 'special relationship' with the United States will give Canada Washington's ear on the great issues. This expectation of being listened to is good for self-esteem, but not for political realism.

Security

President Reagan's position on global security matters will likely be little influenced by Canadian views. Indeed, while he has in George Schultz and Richard Allen some appreciative students of Canadian foreign and defence policy, few of his own statements so far reveal a special understanding of, or concern for, the Canadian mood and mind at this critical moment in Canadian history—although, in fairness, two of his top aides visited Ottawa as far back as the fall of 1979 to take some preliminary soundings. In short, Canada may have as low a priority in the early concerns of President Reagan, in the security-foreign policy areas, as doubtless it has had for most of his predecessors. But at least he has committed himself to take a fresh approach to Mexico and Canada and his November 13, 1979 New York statement concerning his candidacy is a commitment that could open the door to a friendly review of the welter of Canada-U.S. common interests and unresolved conflicts.

Possibly the most realistic approach Canadians therefore can take to the Reagan presidency in relation to Canadian security policies is to make an assumption that on the high issues of nuclear strategy and arms control Canadians could have the President's attention not because of our NORAD/NATO relationship but because Canada has something useful and original to say. Yet except for one or two experts there is a curious lack of Canadian effort in the arms control-disarmament fields or in the more general intellectual concerns with strategic studies. Moreover, even the special experience that Canada has in peace-keeping,

because of its involvement in almost every UN exercise since 1946, has not been exploited in some effective, academic-bureaucratic research format so as to be internationally known for its research and publications and, therefore, internationally influential.

To that extent the only clout with the Reagan White House and State Department, on these larger issues, that Canada is likely to have, arises from the probable purchase of the F-18A and the joint production arrangements and systems which grow out of these expensive procurement decisions. Since there has not been, however, a systematic Canadian white paper on defence and related foreign policy questions for many years, and few significant developments in official, academic or public opinion, it is unlikely that Canada will be able to present a formidable or persuasive intellectual-policy front as the Reagan administration evolves its own global and regional attitudes.

Response needed

Doubtless, the significant security activity for Canada in the immediate future will be the attempt to find effective responses to its new surveillance duties following the extension of its coastal jurisdiction under the Law of the Sea Treaty, shortly to be made final and signed. To this very substantial patrolling, monitoring and investigative activity on the Atlantic and the Pacific coasts there will have to be added the special and highly controversial issues that arise from Canadian responsibilities for, and claims to, the management of its Arctic archipelago and the internal waters of that island system. The United States continues to challenge Canadian jurisdiction there in a variety of ways and it is unlikely the 'hard nosed' image that earlier surrounded the beginnings of the Reagan candidacy will be too accommodating in this very sensitive area. Or perhaps rhetoric already is being eroded by responsibility.

For example, not only has the total Canadian claim to the archipelago within the Canadian 'sector' not been accepted by the U.S. but this reluctance includes also a rejection of claims to the waters within the islands structure as "internal (Canadian) waters"—a concept well understood for many coastal if not for oceanic archipelago systems. The Law of the Sea Treaty accepts such concepts subject to the rights of innocent passage or "transit" through *accepted* coastal or inter-oceanic straits and navigable waterways of long standing. The effect of the United States coolness on the question of Canadian jurisdiction has its most striking consequences for the waters of the Northwest Passage.

The grounds for the Canadian claim are very simple, namely, that not only are these "internal Canadian waters" but two of the narrows, namely Barrow Straits and Prince of Wales Strait, because their navigable width is less than twenty four miles, are "territory



rial waters" and come within the jurisdiction of the coastal country. Canada argues therefore that these are straits under Canadian control. Any right of transit by the United States is subject therefore to the rules of territorial waters that include those two straits. Possibly more important to the Canadian position is the claim that the passage from east to west, or west to east, simply is not an established route from one part of the high seas to another both because the Beaufort sea is not part of the high seas and, perhaps more important, because the route has no historic or commercial character to found an "innocent passage-rights of transit" claim. Moreover, this Canadian stance is buttressed by the proposed Treaty's acceptance of the doctrine of special protection required for a fragile environment such as the Arctic. The Canadian position, therefore, is reinforced by the inclusion of that concept within the proposed Treaty.

Finally, the Arctic potential for disputes between the U.S. and Canada is enhanced by the failure to agree on the boundary between Canada and the U.S. in the western Arctic-Beaufort sea area with the "sector theory" giving Canada a larger share than the (1) "median line" (2) equidistance—special circum-

stances line, or (3) the new equitable equidistance line would provide. To all of this should be added that while there is a NATO/NORAD interest in water-air-space systems in the high and mid-Arctic, there is a specific Canadian interest in patrolling its own archipelago, both within the security needs of the two countries and outside of it, as part of the Canadian assertion of sovereignty for its sector of the Arctic basin.

Another area of Canadian-United States foreign policy dealings, where complementary or conflicting ideas may arise, will become evident in the evolution of the Reagan approach to human rights and the North-South dialogue. Certainly the Carter emphasis on human rights is likely to shift with the President-elect to much less demanding claims on, or criticism of the record and behaviour of, allies, friends and neutrals. This means that the continuing Canadian interest in the international human rights program, less strident in any case than the Carter expression of it, nevertheless, is likely to be seen as more activist in word and spirit by contrast with what now should be expected from the new State Department policies. This may lead to degrees of conflict in perception, and votes, in the United Nations and elsewhere. But it is unlikely to affect the

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basic agreement between Canada and the United States on Helsinki where both countries will continue to see in Basket Three, the human rights part of the Agreement, a proper lever to employ in pressing for a more humane approach to that immense Eurasian Gullag that still confronts the West and the world with an oppressive Soviet image and reality. Nevertheless, even here, it is improbable that Canadian policy will emulate the more vocal moments of the Reagan perception of the Communist bloc and, indeed, there may emerge some significant differences between Ottawa and Washington over human rights in, and general tactics toward, the Soviet world in the years immediately ahead.

Similarly, differences may develop on North-South issues. The recently re-defined commitment of Canada to help speed up the process of enabling the developing world to move more rapidly forward in its search for equity, equality and economic effectiveness, may not be always matched by rising U.S. grants, both with and without strings (but mostly with) that has characterized much of U.S. postwar policy. The difficulty here will be to try to reconcile the modest amounts and programs (by U.S. standards) that Canada can allocate and design for Third World needs with whatever might be a new and more cautious tone, and perhaps more conditional attitude, emanating from the traditionally large aid policies of the U.S. administration. Again, there is some potential for conflict here, although the issues are so complex that the web of Third World demands is likely also to be a source of Canada-U.S. cooperative humility and frustration as much as it is a basis of conflict on aid-trade policies—at least so it is to be hoped.

Fisheries

The areas where Canada-U.S. relations may become most difficult, (as they really are now), are the mix of environmental-resource questions on the three oceans as well as in mid-continent from the middle west to the Atlantic. The unresolved east-coast fisheries Agreement, and its related adjudication of the boundary of Georges' Bank, is not likely to invite a Republican Senate 'consent' any more quickly than was possible with the Democrats—although Senator Charles Percy, as Chairman-to-be of the Foreign Relations Committee, bears progressive credentials. Indeed, the optimism recently expressed that the Treaty might be revised modestly and obtain early Senate consent even before Mr. Carter leaves office is highly improbable. Instead, there is the probability of a severe renegotiation process ahead, and meanwhile, over-fishing in the absence of true co-management will endanger some stocks and this condition becomes worse as time delays the planned husbanding of resources under an Agreement. Similarly, the failure to agree on the Georges' Bank line (through adjudication now delayed) raises problems of environmental hazards

arising from the licensing of drilling in the Banks area, on both sides of the unmarked line, with different systems of regulation exposing the waters to dangers because of accidents, spills, fisheries interference, etc.

Indeed, the general question of how to deal with the United States in the making of agreements has been dramatized by this case because henceforth it will be almost impossible for Canadians to accept a State Department-White House signature as warranting the belief that the Senate will provide its necessary two-thirds consent to a Treaty. Some new techniques will have to be devised by both governments, to avoid the treaty system by using Executive Agreements, Exchanges of Notes, parallel domestic legislation, etc., and thereby achieve reliable results without the detailed and systemic clarity provided by a formal treaty. If treaties are to be used then the Senate members directly involved in the subject matter or the region should be part of the negotiating procedures at every stage—to the satisfaction of all parties concerned.

Similarly oceanic problems are to be found on the west coast where temporary agreements about tuna and salmon must somehow be converted into long-term arrangements that do for these recent questions what the older Halibut and Salmon (Sockeye and Pink) agreements did for these stocks for so many years and so successfully. To these recent tuna-salmon fishery disputes must be added the serious and unresolved matter of protecting the total Pacific Canadian archipelago, from the Dixon Entrance—where the seaward boundary also needs adjudication—to the Queen Charlotte and Georgia Straits—Juan de Fuca, all now threatened by tanker traffic from Valdez, Alaska, transporting Alaskan oil by this shorter route to U.S. west coast ports. While joint cleanup-contingency plans and U.S. vessel and cargo insurance requirements, provide some protection to Canada, they are no answer to broad, comprehensive environmental-navigation control systems. What is required are agreements where joint management of the coastal environment safeguarding the whole region is undertaken and with permanent administrative and advisory machinery fixed in place to operate such a program of joint responsibility.

In the Arctic, the off-shore drillings in the Beaufort sea are alleged to be a hazard to the U.S. since the direction of the flows would bring the results of a bad Canadian spill or accident over to the U.S. side of the line and toward Alaskan waters and shores. It is already late in the day for some systematic approach to determining the boundary of the U.S.—Canadian seaward claims in this area—and even more important, towards establishing an agreed upon environmental protection system in the interest of both countries in that region.

Will these three oceanic groups of problems find, in the Reagan administration, the same anxieties

about the environment that now upset many Canadians—except for the policies of governments in Canada toward some off-shore drilling developments that seem less demanding than in other Canadian areas under domestic environmental control? It is possible that there will be less disagreement between the Reagan administration and Canada on Atlantic and Arctic oceanic and environmental problems, where there is a common interest in seabed resource development, in contrast to the Pacific archipelago where the tanker traffic will be American in origin and the conflict between Canada and the U.S. more openly one-sided.

Environmental issues

While the great mid-continent and transboundary environmental issues from Skagit river valley in the west, to the Poplar river in Saskatchewan-Montana, to the Garrison Diversion in Manitoba-North Dakota, to toxics and contaminants in the Great Lakes, are all continuing matters of concern providing sources both of irritation and cooperation, the more difficult issues ahead, however, have to do with the long distance transport of pollutants. Acid rain has become the most conspicuous and urgent of these; but there is now new evidence, recently presented to the IJC by its Great Lakes Science Advisory Board, that the long distance movement by air of heavy metals, PCBs and other toxics, presents an equal or greater threat to the ecology of the whole mid-continent area.

The Reagan team have given strong hints that the environment will not receive the high priority it had under President Carter. Given the new President's support for the shift to coal and the encouragement of shale development and synthetics there are two consequences here of grave moment to Canada. The conversion to coal will escalate the acid rain problem and both coal mining and synthetics, with the conversion of shale to oil, are immense consumers of fresh water. When to all of this is added the earlier Reagan suggestion of a shared continental resource system with Mexico and Canada, and possibly shared water resources, the potential for Canada-U.S. misunderstandings could reach an intensity level beyond anything in recent experience. But offsetting these fears is the very creditable reputation of Governor Reagan in California on a number of environmental issues, notably automobile emissions and general air quality controls. That record together with the return of Russell Train to some influence is very promising since he was the first, and a most effective Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency under the Nixon and Ford administrations.

Mr. Reagan's assumed bias in favour of a 'conservative' judiciary and a less constrained security services-police force complex, may have a subtle, indirect significance for Canada. If the United States Su-

preme Court begins to reflect a less activist mode—however unlikely—because of Reagan's appointees, this will take place at a moment when the Supreme court of Canada seems to be searching for a philosophy of initiatives for itself without necessarily becoming a mirror of the U.S. model.

Even more sensitive may be the transboundary effects of policies toward the police and security services—the FBI and the CIA in particular. The tight reins of the post-Watergate years are likely to be loosened to restore both image and effectiveness because of 'right' and 'left' international terrorism, particularly the former (also with the revival of the Ku Klux Klan), and because the range of Soviet arms acquisitions now invites the United States to rediscover the symbols of firmness at home and of power abroad. These may have repercussions in Canada. For the McDonald Royal Commission on the activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police is soon to issue its final reports. It is unlikely that a pro-police mood in a new U.S. administration would not find a responsive echo in suggestions for the future of police powers in Canada, and for the administration of the security services in particular. Indeed, the proposed Canadian Charter of Rights already tilts away from doctrines that would limit too strictly the enforcement instruments that the Canadian state possesses today. That is one of the draft Charter's more startling characteristics and is now the subject of severe public debate.

Middle East

The Middle East may present problems for Canadians as the Reagan policies unfold. Canada's sympathy and friendship for Israel, long established, is likely to be reinforced despite the recent temptations toward a different inclination that has been all the more beckoning because of oil pressures and the market opportunities that petro-dollar countries so openly invite. The President-elect has made clear his support for the 'Camp David' process and, too, for the central role that Israel will continue to have in the United States security arrangements for the Middle East region. Those suggesting a 'cooling-off' by Canada from an established and honourable support for Israel's survival are likely to find little comfort from a Washington that may have even more vigorous things to say about that survival—so necessary for a U.S. presence—than did the vacillations of the Carter administration in its final days. Canadian Middle Eastern policy, therefore, if it is affected at all, may see in the new U.S. regime a reason for maintaining that successful mix of friendliness and objectivity now marking the 32 years since Israel was created and when the Canadian moral commitment became deeply engraved in its foreign policy.

The general belief that President-elect Reagan is more moderate in deed than in words may be a reed too thin to lean upon with confidence, but it may be

the only reed available. But with Messrs. Haig, Weinberger, Allen and Train, moderation is very likely to prevail. Certainly the decline of the imperial presidency and the rise of a self-confident Congress, and particularly of the Republican led Senate, will make it imperative for Canadians to have their voices heard in the Congress almost as much as they traditionally must be heard in the White House and the State Department. Moreover, the rise in the number of Canadian studies programs in U.S. universities should increase the volume and quality of knowledge, and the degree of U.S. sensitivity to Canadian concerns, in all of these areas analyzed above.

Canada-U.S. institutions

In the end, however, Canadians would be wise to explore, with imagination and vigour, the development of systems to increase the likelihood that decision-making in the U.S., on matters directly affecting Canada, will have a Canadian input that is not solely dependent upon the *ad hoc* luck of successful diplomatic negotiations, or on private sector resources and foreknowledge often required to make such negotiations timely and effective. Instead, the Canadian interest may be served best by developing more Canada-U.S. institutions that will monitor and advise on oceanic as well as transboundary economic matters where the common concern cannot await the adversary spirit and unilateral fact-gathering to meet crises or contingencies. The possibility of a more 'severe' Reagan economic and environmental posture toward Canada should encourage Canadian initiatives to develop countervailing measures and systems that will ensure the 'equality' of Canadian voices and views on the facts that are involved and that must be agreed upon. For decisions are likely to be more intelligently made by both sides where the facts have a common basis as determined by permanent bilateral institutions. That has been the experience with so sensitive a matter as shared water resources along or crossing the 5,000 mile boundary. There is no reason to delay the application of these lessons to the complex of Canada-U.S. dealings in other and vital areas of common concern.

As for the many other issues: the ongoing conflict over broadcasting advertising; tourism losses in Canada because of the tax requirements of U.S. law; Canadian tax policies that prevent deducting advertising in U.S. journals; U.S. quotas and other non-tariff barriers; Canadian content in broadcasting; and discriminatory incentives for energy development in both countries; most of these are more irritating than substantial. Yet a 'common frontier' benevolence ought to be able to find institutions and answers to the vital and continuing Canadian insistence on independence balanced by the reality of a continental interdependence.

Much will depend also on who is the next Secretary of State and how much he knows and cares about

Canada. Certainly Henry Kissinger, for example, gave his neighbour the cordial impression of a rather low priority on his list of concerns. A more deliberate military preparedness policy, and a support of generally reliable allies such as Saudi Arabia, Israel and Egypt, may mark the tougher pragmatism of the new White House and the Secretaries of State and Defence.

Caspar Weinberger, the new Secretary of Defence and General Alexander Haig, now to be Secretary of State, are moderating influences held over from the Ford administration.

Anything more is speculation beyond the limits of credible soothsaying. Canadians can only hope that the new leadership in Washington will have a concern for Canada and that its personal knowledge of Canadian anxieties, however limited, will be buttressed by information and abilities of the old or new 'professionals' who both know and care.

Above all, the present Canadian political crises—constitutional, linguistic, regional and economic—will need the cautious distance of a compassionate neighbour. Any temptations to interfere should be wholly resisted; for only harm could come from any positions that suggest a U.S. hand where it does not belong.

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Constraints for both sides in US-European partnership

by Paul Buteux

The election of Ronald Reagan on November 4, 1980 as President of the United States brought to an end an electoral process that had begun at least 18 months before. The primaries, and then the election campaign itself, were but the concluding, if crucial, phases of what to outsiders seemed an inordinately lengthy way of choosing a chief executive.

The rest of the world watched this campaign, as they had others since the end of World War II, with a great deal of interest and concern. The reason for this attention lay, of course, not so much in a desire to participate vicariously in an expensive, exhausting and occasionally colourful campaign, but because the outcome was seen by many of the onlookers as having potentially a direct impact on their own interests and objectives. Thus the outside observer of American presidential elections frequently develops distinct preference as to what would be a desirable result. This is particularly true of those governments whose policies, both domestic and foreign, are affected in some significant way by the policies and actions of the United States. Given the continued power and influence of the U.S. in the international system, this means that many countries, adversaries as well as allies, have a stake in the outcome of the American election. Indeed some have attempted from time-to-time, and in more or less subtle ways, to influence the result. After all, it was always Nikita Khrushchev's boast that he had helped elect John F. Kennedy as President of the United States and, in 1976, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt made no secret of his preference for President Gerald Ford over the candidacy of Jimmy Carter.

However, it should be remembered that the determinants of choice as seen by the interested outsider are unlikely to be those perceived by the American electorate. The American voters' preferences are not necessarily those of non-Americans who will be affected by the outcome. The American electorate may well be affected by the views and preferences of others, but this will be but one factor among many, and not likely a de-

cisive one as that. American elections, like other free elections, are essentially exercises in the domestic political process. It is this conflict between the external significance of American elections and the inherently parochial concerns of the American electorate that, in many cases, accounts for the exasperation and incomprehension with which the outsider views the American electoral contest.

This is not to suggest, however, that foreign policy is not of significance in American presidential elections. Since the Second World War, the American electorate has demonstrated that it does not care about issues beyond the borders of the United States, and that foreign policy can be an important factor in the electoral campaign. The assiduousness with which presidential hopefuls attempt to foster an image of competence in foreign policy and their carefully contrived and publicized "fact-finding" trips to foreign capitals, testify to their perception that the American electorate finds the President's foreign policy function important.

Nevertheless, whatever the electoral impact of foreign policy issues, inevitably the electoral result will have political consequences beyond the boundaries of the U.S. Although other governments, by-and-large, have a negligible ability to affect the result, they will nonetheless attempt to anticipate it, and to adjust their interests and policies accordingly once the result is determined. Nowhere is this more so than among the countries of the North Atlantic area, for it is in this region that the network of issues and relationships that binds the U.S. to other countries is most salient, complicated and interdependent. However, in recent years it has become clear that the structure of relationships in the North Atlantic region has been undergoing fundamental change. In particular, the relationship of the U.S. to Western Europe has altered, and along with it, there have developed new strains and tensions.

No longer can the American President expect his administration to be able to determine almost unilaterally the parameters of the transatlantic relationship. Although the U.S. remains pre-eminent in many areas, President Reagan will quickly learn, if he and his advisors do not already understand, that his ability to impose preferences on reluctant European allies is

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limited. Despite the continuing rhetoric surrounding the "Atlantic partnership", it can now be seen with increasing clarity that matters of common concern are not necessarily matters of common interest. The agenda of issues that confront the European-American relationship are more and more subject to difficult negotiations and lengthy consultation.

Dependence

The fact remains, however, that the Europeans remain dependent on the U.S. in many spheres. For all its political and economic resources, the European Community is in no position to act as though it, itself, were a superpower, and individual European countries simply do not possess the power to pursue their major foreign policy goals independently. For many years now, a basic tension in the transatlantic relationship has stemmed from the desire of the Europeans, on the one hand, to act in concert within the framework of an evolving European identity; and, on the other hand, to associate themselves with the United States in order to secure their primary security and economic objectives. Through their 'Europeanism', the allies seek their independence, but through their continued close association with the U.S. they seek to ensure those objectives that they are unable to secure either individually or in concert.

In short, each side of the transatlantic relationship attempts to associate the other with its preferred policies and objectives; each knowing that it needs the other if many of those policies are to succeed and its objectives obtained. In this respect, at least, the election result makes no difference to the underlying reality of the situation. However, the ease with which accommodations can be reached and the kinds of policies adopted can be very much affected by the incumbent in the White House. It is not only that the political views of the President and the senior members of his administration will shape the content of policy, but that the personalities involved will crucially affect the 'style' of the United States' dealings with others. In foreign policy, as in other areas of politics, form is frequently more important than substance.

As far as relations with Western Europe were concerned, the difficulties encountered by President Carter during his term of office had as much to do with form as substance. Although there were a number of issues which generated substantive and substantial disagreement, in many instances these disagreements were exacerbated by what the Europeans saw as incoherence and vacillation on the part of the Carter administration. Moreover, although many West European governments had strong policy differences with the Republican administrations in which Henry Kissinger had played so prominent a part, they nonetheless found the language of *Realpolitik* more comprehensible than the rhetoric of 'Born Again Christianity' which seemed to colour so many of President Carter's policy initiatives. Carter did not establish himself in

European eyes as a credible and trusted leader of the Western alliance, and, as a consequence, this reinforced the trend in Western Europe to take independent initiatives in matters which were still of mutual transatlantic concern.

This was particularly the case with France and West Germany. For France to take a line independent of the Americans and apparently indifferent to their interests was nothing new; but for the Germans to dissociate themselves from American policy and so publicly and so frequently marked a significant new step in the re-emergence of West Germany as a major international actor. The German chancellor made little attempt to hide his dislike of Jimmy Carter, and this on a number of occasions led to a breakdown in communication. A good example was provided last summer. Washington leaked to a German magazine the text of a strongly worded letter from President Carter to Schmidt in which the Chancellor was upbraided for appearing to renege on a decision to modernize NATO's long-range theatre forces. The situation was not helped, of course, by the fact that both men were engaged in election campaigns.

However, President Reagan will confront an agenda of issues concerning the transatlantic relationship that will antedate the long electoral season of 1980, and on which his policies will be limited by the actions of the previous administration. As already indicated, Carter did not establish the best of working relationships with his European opposite members, something which exacerbated the problem of resolving the substantive points at issue between the U.S. and her European allies. No attempt will be made here to list all the major points of conflict that affected American relations with Western Europe during the Carter presidency. It is sufficient for this review of the consequence of the American election for relations with Western Europe to indicate what have been three or four major areas of dispute.

First, there have been problems arising from the difficulties of the international economy. All the Atlantic powers accept the need for cooperation in the management of the international economy, and they understand that the basis on which that cooperation must be built has changed. In this area, above all others, there has been a major shift in the relative weights of the transatlantic powers. The U.S. can no longer act as the central directing banker and manager of the Western international economic system, despite the fact that America remains by far the largest single economy within it. Nonetheless, the United States, even though it cannot impose its own solutions, can frustrate, by neglect or design, the initiatives of others.

The task of economic management requires much more sensitive and careful diplomacy than it has in the past. The institution of a series of Western economic summits at the initiative of the French is one means by which the multilateral management of the interna-

tional economy has been attempted. On the other hand, there have been unilateral actions designed to insulate the domestic economy from the consequences of the vicissitudes of others. President Carter's relative neglect of the international position of the dollar during the first three years of his presidency provides one such example. The Franco-German initiative to establish a European monetary system within the framework of the European Community can be seen, in turn, as a counteraction resulting from dissatisfaction with American inaction. Here again, from the perspective of Western Europe, doubts about the course of American policy stemmed as much from a belief that the Carter administration did not have a clear understanding of the realities of the contemporary international economy and the role of the U.S. within it, as it did with the actual direction of American policies.

Economy

Economic difficulties spilled over into differences over policies in other areas. For example, this can be seen clearly in the Middle East. Though Europeans generally have welcomed the Camp David initiative, they also attempted their own initiatives when they felt that the Camp David approach had run out of steam. The *démarche* of the European Community towards the PLO is significant in this respect since it ran counter to a fundamental tenet of American policy. Of course, the very great dependence of Western Europe on Middle East oil for its energy needs does much to explain European policy towards the Palestinian question. However, the greater dependence of Europe on imported energy also served to underscore differences with the Americans on a wide range of energy related issues. The continued failure of the Carter administration to implement an effective conservation policy weakened the American position, and the energy issue became linked with broader economic and political differences affecting the transatlantic relationship.

It was certainly not absent from the highly sensitive area of East-West relations. The growing importance of Western Europe's trade with the COMECON countries, and the significance of the energy and resource component within it, meant that the Europeans were bound to be reluctant to use economic levers against the Soviet Union in order to show their opposition to Soviet policy in Afghanistan and elsewhere. The attempt by President Carter to use economic sanctions against the Soviet Union failed to recognize that the relative costs of such a policy were far higher for Western Europe than they were for the United States. Similarly, for many Europeans, and especially for the West German government, the maintenance of detente has a high priority indeed. They are unwilling to link good relations with the Soviet Union in Europe too closely to Soviet behaviour elsewhere. There is a feeling that the American interest in, and conception of,

detente is different from that of Western Europe, and that the price of the collapse of detente would be borne more by the Europeans than by the Americans.

It should be recognized, however, that the Europeans have shown serious concern with the consequences and implications of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. But this awareness has been expressed largely by diplomatic means. The Europeans, either individually or collectively, are not in a position to respond to Soviet global challenges in any other way. But, even here, to be effective, any attempt by the U.S. to line up diplomatic support must take into account the particular political interests of the countries involved: interests which the Europeans will, if necessary, seek to advance independently of the United States. Most European governments will be unsympathetic to any American policy which seeks to align them with the U.S. in a pattern of global confrontation.

Nevertheless, the Europeans will, perforce, continue to defer to the U.S. in its role as a world power. After all, the U.S. is the only superpower the West has, and Western security is intimately bound-up with the contribution that the Americans make to the global balance. However much some might wish it were otherwise, decisions concerning peace and war remain fundamentally an American responsibility. Thus the European allies are responsive to the Soviet-American military balance and to changes to it. The debate on the adequacy of American military power, which was one of the major features of the campaign, in recent years has been echoed in allied capitals, if not among allied publics at large. Within NATO, for example, much attention has been given to the consequences for the alliance of the emergence of parity in strategic nuclear forces between the Soviet Union and the United States: a parity which has been the essential basis for the strategic arms limitations talks (SALT) talks between these two powers. One result of this attention has been the decision to modernize the alliance's theatre nuclear forces. This decision, however, was a controversial one, and the issue of theatre nuclear weapons is likely to be a contentious one in the alliance for some years to come. Indeed, from the perspective of Western Europe, although by-and-large welcoming the SALT II agreements and pressing for their ratification, there is nonetheless apprehension as to what the consequences of the changed strategic balance might mean.

Strategic parities

Within NATO, for example, much attention has been given to the consequences for the alliance of the emergence of parity in strategic nuclear forces between the Soviet Union and the United States: a parity which has been the essential basis for the strategic arms limitations talks (SALT) talks between these two powers. One result of this attention has been the decision to

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Strategic parity is seen by many Europeans who examine these matters as a mixed blessing. On the one hand, it is seen as a necessary prerequisite for detente; but, on the other hand, if detente were to break down, then there is the fear that the existing military balance might prove inadequate to European security needs. In a sense, many Europeans see the continuation of detente as necessary to the continued credibility of the American nuclear guarantee to Western Europe. This not only helps account for the European interest in the course of detente, but also for the close monitoring of Soviet-American relations. With the possible exception of London, major European capitals shared the view of the many American critics of the Carter presidency who argued that it did not succeed in establishing any clear or consistent policy towards the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, there is nothing in the Reagan record to show that he has any clear or realistic policy towards the Soviet Union either.

Like many Americans, European observers of the American election also felt that the choice was unsatisfactory. Even more than the American electorate, those Europeans concerned with the consequences of the result discounted independent candidate of John Anderson and concentrated their attention on the contest between Carter and Reagan. If they were critical of the Carter record, then they are even more concerned about the likely policies of the Reagan presidency. This is partly because President Reagan is such an unknown quantity, but also because his simplistic definitions of the American national interest and his campaign gaffes raised serious doubts as to his credibility as an occupant of the White House. (To be fair, these doubts were shared by considerable numbers of Americans who voted for Carter and Anderson, or who did not vote at all.) A priority task for President Reagan will be to establish his authority and credibility in the eyes of the international community, and to convince allies and adversaries of his ability to preside effectively over the massive and complicated foreign policy machinery of the U.S.

Still, the dynamics of the campaign did lead both major contenders on to common foreign policy ground; including, in particular, an emphasis on the reinforcement of American military capabilities. Both candidates committed themselves to increased expenditures and a further military build-up. The commitment to military build-up, in itself, did not contribute to too

much European concern, but it did imply that reinforced military capabilities might be used as a substitute for skillful foreign policy, and the careful and flexible diplomacy that would have to accompany it. Europeans are in favour of a militarily strong U.S., but they are also reluctant to see a return to the foreign policy simplicities of the Cold War. In any case, the U.S. no longer possesses the military, political and economic predominance that enabled American leaders 30 years ago to present the world in simple black and white terms, while, at the same time, pursuing reconstruction policies of considerable vision and subtlety. It is far easier to sustain a disjunction between the declaratory and actual policy from a position of predominance, than it is in a situation in which there is a distinct sense of relative decline.

Complexities

The very fact of his victory will enable Reagan to move away from the more egregious simplicities of the election campaign. The exigencies of office and the ongoing operation of the foreign policy machinery will inevitably educate the President into the complexities of the international situation in which the United States finds itself. Given his inexperience, and despite the campaign rhetoric, the new president will probably conduct his foreign policy on a far more pragmatic basis than many of his detractors would expect. Nonetheless, the election of Ronald Reagan is a reflection of a generally 'conservative' mood in the U.S. and this, when combined with the expectations of his supporters, will condition American foreign policy in the next few years. Whether it will be easier to build a foreign policy consensus from the right than President Carter found possible from what, at the beginning of his term, was a more liberal position, remains to be seen.

This more conservative position, with its greater emphasis on the re-assertion of the United States as a global military power will confront the President with difficult 'guns or butter' choices. In order to sustain domestic programmes, the temptation to demand that the European allies do more to share the economic and military 'burden' is likely to become overwhelming. But it is doubtful if the Europeans will undertake much in the way of additional military obligations, or be in a position to make many concessions to the difficulties of the American economy. In the absence of a severe deterioration in the international economy, or in the European security position, it is difficult to see the Europeans moving far from their present stance in the transatlantic relationship. This may well reinforce those voices in Congress and elsewhere who argue that the United States should define its security interests more restrictively, and let it be known that clients and allies will simply have to fend for themselves far more than in the past.

As a result, there may well be an attempt to apply a renewed 'Nixon Doctrine' (under some other guise, of course), to Western Europe; or, at least, there will be pressure on the administration to do so. This will make more difficult the reconciliation of policies towards Western Europe with policies directed to other areas of the world which also affect the relationship. Obviously, of primary importance here is the state of Soviet-American relations. It will be a very bad outcome of the election if the new president finds himself abandoning the search for an acceptable basis for detente with the Soviet Union while, at the same time, making unrealistic demands on Western Europe. Such a state of affairs will lead to a great deal of stress in the American relationship with Western Europe. For example, unless the Soviet-American talks about arms control get back on track, the American led attempt to revise NATO's military posture will not be successful. This does not necessarily mean the ratification of SALT II in its present form (something which looks to be politically impossible at this juncture), but it does mean the reopening of an arms control dialogue. Perhaps the Soviet-American contacts established in Geneva in October on limiting their respective European nuclear arsenals will do this. If President Reagan is to sustain a productive transatlantic relationship, then he must also establish a satisfactory relationship with the Soviet Union.

Whatever happens, short of a major international crisis, the European allies can be expected to seek and practice a greater autonomy in their foreign policies. The danger is that an ineffectual American foreign policy will lead both sides of the transatlantic relationship to lose sight of the fact that each side needs the other. Therefore, it is to be hoped that Western Europeans, and such leaders as Helmut Schmidt and Valéry Giscard d'Estaing in particular, be sensitive to the political difficulties of the American presidency.

The electoral victory of Helmut Schmidt in October should make it easier for West Germany to play a mediating role here and make it easier for the Chancellor to overcome any personal reservations he might have about the occupant of the White House. Where possible, it is in the European interest to compensate for the failures of American leadership, not by taking initiatives that are independent and inconsiderate of American interests, but which recognize that there are mutual interests in the transatlantic relationship which are of vital importance to all. If the Europeans justify their independent actions in matters of common concern in terms of the inadequacies of American leadership, then it can be demanded of them that, within their limitations, they exercise a leadership that is superior to the one they criticize.

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Vital interests at stake in crisis of development

After ten years as Special Assistant to Prime Minister Trudeau, dealing mainly with foreign policy, Ivan Head was appointed to the presidency of the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) in March, 1978. A lawyer and former Professor of Law at the University of Alberta, his professional work in international affairs included a period with the Canadian foreign service in Southeast Asia. As President of the IDRC he heads a unique development agency. Although IDRC is funded by the Canadian government, its activities are directed by an international Board of Governors. Under the Board's authority, the Centre supports research projects which, in addition to the immediate value of their results, will help develop an indigenous research capability in developing countries. This interview with Mr. Head was conducted in Ottawa by *International Perspectives* editor Alex Inglis in mid-November.

International Perspectives: How did you develop the interest that led you into this position with the IDRC?

Ivan Head: My first direct involvement with development was in South East Asia, when I was a foreign service officer with the Department of External Affairs. The Department, in those days, was lighter on the ground than it is now, and I was Third Secretary in the Canadian High Commission in Kuala Lumpur, Malaya, prior to the country evolving into Malaysia. But we were concurrently accredited to Burma and Thailand with some responsibilities for Singapore. I had ample opportunity to travel around those several countries and came face to face, for the first time in my life, with the depth of poverty and with the immense potential for a better future which is part of the dynamic that is development. It made a deep impression upon me and since that time, I've continued to have a great interest in it and an increasing belief in its importance to the future, not only for the people who live in developing regions of the world, also for those of us in the industrialized countries such as Canada.

I.P.: You have a reputation for having restored the Commonwealth to its place when you were in the Prime Minister's Office as foreign affairs adviser. Did this interest spring from those days as well and was it a development interest?

Head: Partly so, in answer to each of your questions. Malaya, of course, was part of the Commonwealth as were other countries in South and South East Asia. I had the opportunity in those days to participate in some regional and in some technical Commonwealth conferences and was very impressed with the pragmatic way in which issues were approached and, in

many instances, solved. There was none of the formality that tends to surround multilateral get togethers that are sponsored by the United Nations. I don't mean to suggest that that is always an encumbrance of U.N. activity, but it is much less likely to be so in the Commonwealth for a variety of reasons not all of which I have been able either to identify or to evaluate.

The second part of your question, with respect to the Commonwealth and development, flows rather naturally. Within the Commonwealth are a great number of developing countries. Measured in terms of population, excluding the People's Republic of China, more than three-quarters of the population of the developing countries of the world reside within the Commonwealth countries. The two, therefore, seem to go hand in hand. I should add as well that the Colombo Plan which was one of the first multilateral development exercises in the world, was in its origins a Commonwealth inspiration and activity. It appeared to me as I worked with it that it could be expanded and made into a more sophisticated kind of activity as has been the case.

I.P.: I wonder if we could take a look at the past, present and future. The 1970s were the second development decade. You have pointed out elsewhere, that it was punctuated by two World Bank reports, the Pearson and the Brandt Commissions. Pearson referred to 'the great challenge'. Ten years later, Brandt talks about the 'crisis' and the need to 'avert catastrophe'. Was there no advance at all in the 1970s?

Head: No, I think there was considerable advance, but in proportion to the need and more particularly in pro-

portion to the need for a changed attitude or perception on the part of those in both North and South, it was a disappointing period. Mr. Pearson argued that the case for development was self-evident. He was bolstered, of course, by outstanding spokesmen of the late 60s such as Pope John XXIII, who stated with conviction that "the new name for peace is development". As well, however, there was, an understandable degree of naivety about the development process. The general theory was that the enhancement of the infrastructure and of the economy of a developing country would inevitably help those who were on the bottom end of the pile through 'the trickle down process'. Thus, those who were designing development programs tended to believe that by providing some of this massive infrastructure required in order to permit a developing country to put its own economy in order would in the end benefit the poorer people in the society. That theory has not borne itself out.

Secondly, other ingredients in the development process have now been identified. There had been too much hope placed in a simple transfer effect, as had taken place with the Marshall Plan. But, what one must never forget is that the countries of Europe, although devastated by World War II, were possessed of a skilled, educated population, with decades of industrial and organizational tradition behind them and thus were capable of absorbing the transferred technology. The developing countries are in a much different situation and the problem has to be approached from a variety of points of view. One of them, certainly is from the point of view of their position in the international trading system. If these countries are not able to participate, to earn their own way increasingly, then, whatever techniques we bring to bear, will be dooming them to a permanent position of second-rate actors on the world scene, dependent on handouts from those of us in the north who profess to want nothing more than to have them independent and self-sustaining.

I.P.: This organization, International Development Research Centre, of which you are the President takes a fairly unique approach to these problems in that, while it's Canadian government supplied money, it's administered by an international Board of Governors and it goes mainly to projects that are defined by the developing countries. Since the decade that IDRC has been in existence coincides with that second development decade, do you think this approach needs to be expanded upon and is it happening elsewhere?

Head: I'm happy that you suggested that the decade proves that our approach perhaps needs to be expanded upon rather than thought through. I think it must be expanded upon. The Centre came into being at the time of the Pearson Commission Report in response to the declared and identified need of developing coun-



"There has been whetted an appetite for imported foods."

IDRC photo

tries to have a greater capacity to deal with their own problems and to engage in the research which is so often a precondition to problem solving. The Brandt Commission Report emphasized ten years later that this was still one of the requirements of developing countries and, of course, it was emphasized in considerable detail at a major United Nations Conference in Vienna in 1979. The attitude of the Centre is perhaps as unique as anything else about it. It is that the Centre must respond to a developing country's request, and not *vice versa*. This is a very important element in everything that we do.

Secondly, we have a double bottom line in our particular balance sheet. One, of course, is the hope that our support will provide, or assist in providing, solutions to soluble problems. Two, that the activity will be conducted in a way that will enhance the capability of the research community in the developing country so that in the future they will be able to face similar or related problems and themselves be able to deal with them. What we must understand is that in the developing world one of the biggest problems is simply that of identifying what the problem is. Outsiders are seldom sufficiently experienced to be able to undertake that first phase and, only by trial and error, will those who live there become expert in doing so.

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I.P.: You mentioned a few moments ago the need for changes in the international economic structure to allow for a new economic order to take place, and over the last few years, in different contexts, we've heard about the structural changes that have taken place in the world economy. I'm thinking, mainly in terms of oil and the energy question. What do you see has happened in the structure of the international economy and does what has happened help development or does it hinder the development of the less-developed countries?

Head: It goes in a number of directions at any given time. One of the difficulties that we in the industrialized countries face is in attempting to quantify the various forces and the various ingredients in the development process. We in Canada, for example, are, in many respects, still a developing country: in the frontier areas of the North; in our attempts gradually to increase the value in the products which come from our mines and which are destined for export markets; in the creation of a social or cultural infrastructure which reflects adequately the needs and aspirations of Canadians in different parts of the country. We, ourselves, then, are only beginning to understand all the factors at play. The situation becomes much more difficult in developing countries where histories and social considerations are different, where the economies have been created to reflect the interests not of the people, but of either a multinational or a colonial regime located thousands of miles away. To change these things around, and allow these countries to benefit from modern techniques in a way that permits them to make decisions themselves and to ensure that the benefits flow to their peoples is really very difficult.

Let me cite two examples. The first, of course, is that the most influential members of these communities generally live in the larger cities, often the capital city. They are the ones who have been educated, sometimes abroad. They are the ones who occupy important positions, either in government, in industry or in the universities. They are the ones who make the greatest demands upon the government for goods and services. In a sense, they are the only enfranchised element of the entire society. In order to maintain their stature, therefore, governments find themselves pressing increased resources into urban arrangements to satisfy the rising expectations of this elite.

All of this, of course, works to the disadvantage of the great bulk of the population who live, often in desperate circumstances, in the rural areas. We tend, in the North, to be very critical of this sort of situation, and critical we should be. But, equally, we should not forget that in Britain prior to the passage of the (1867) Reform Act, in the last half of the 19th century, the governments of the day paid no attention at all to the disenfranchised multitudes who lived, many of them, in the cities. There was no political reason to respond to

their needs, and thus, they had some of those same dreadful consequences of lack of social legislation until it became absolutely necessary for the politicians of the day to respond to these needs, evident though they had been for decades.


A second problem facing developing countries is one that has only been heightened by the increasing oil prices and this is the crushing shortage of foreign exchange. In some instances they are partially the authors of their own misfortune. There has been whetted an appetite for imported goods in some of these countries. Most sadly, that appetite is sometimes for imported food. When, through ill-designed government programs, on the part of both the Northern and the Southern countries, a developing country starts to become dependent on imported food, the tastes of the population start to change. We don't in our country think of wheat and wheat flour as a luxury product, but it is looked upon that way in developing countries. It is a food stuff that is more convenient to use than is local food. It may or may not be more nutritious, depending on the fashion in which it is prepared, but it enjoys a status incomparably higher than that of even sorghum, but certainly of cassava and some of the other crops. As people become used to this product, as it is available to them in stores, a country finds itself incapable of sustaining its own population with its own agricultural production. This is a problem of immense dimensions that the governments of developing countries must face up to and deal with. All of these issues add immeasurably to the complexity of the development problem and each is linked in a large measure to others. No answer to any single issue is going to satisfy any major segment of the problem—they have to be dealt with across the board.

I.P.: Going back to what you were saying about social injustices and relating that back to earlier days in our own society—do you think it is ever appropriate to tie the Northern efforts in development to pressures for political and social reform especially in the more repressive regimes. Should we back away from giving aid in those areas?

Head: This is a question that has divided both practitioners and theoreticians of developmental assistance for a number of years. My own view is somewhat mixed. In the first instance, I contend that the suffering population of a developing country is likely to be all the more unfortunate if it faces not only economic difficulties, but, as well, a government which is repressive and authoritarian. Simply because those of us on the outside are impatient with a repressive regime that we all feel should be replaced is perhaps, not adequate reason to contribute further to the suffering of the peoples beneath them.

At the same time, of course, if a repressive regime feels that because of this understandable human wish of outsiders to assist its deprived people it can virtu-

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“... stability is inextricably woven into economic advance.”

IDRC photos ally count on a friendly, humanistic attitude, then there will be little incentive for it to change its ways. Frankly, I'm not at all convinced that outside influence can be very effective in changing societal attitudes or government structures of a developing country. As often as not a regime, no matter how repressive, can employ as a rallying cry the allegation that outsiders are attempting to bring pressure to bear upon it. This is not to say that we can't be influential in changing attitudes. There are many ways of doing so. But the more blatant linkage of a carrot and a stick is not, in my view, likely to succeed. In those days when all of my efforts were directed to foreign policy as distinct from development, I contended that one should always measure the worth of one's policies and their implementation by whether they were effective. If they are not effective, then they have to be redesigned.

I.P.: In the next year, we're going to hear a lot more about development questions—especially when the Economic Summit meets here in Ottawa next summer. Do you think the Summit can be an effective instrument in changing perceptions or in leading into new paths in the development field? Or is it just going to be another publicity campaign?

Head: Well, publicity by itself seldom does much in the long run. On the other hand, without a raising of the consciousness of the voting publics in the industri-

alized countries and, more to the point, raising the perceptions of the leaders of those countries, then nothing is likely to work. Democratic societies are going to reflect, in a large measure, the interests of their electorates. At the present time, and I think the Brandt Commission is proof of this, neither the leaders of the industrialized countries nor the bulk of the populations are really seized of the complexity of the issues or of the very distressing consequences if solutions are not found. The Brandt Commission had a very luminous number of participants from North and South. They brought with them attitudes that scarcely seemed capable of being drawn into a single report. Each of them, in the end, became convinced that the North-South dimension was the critical one for the future of many aspects of the world community. One important element, of course, is the biosphere, the ecology. At the present time, the environmental practices in the South, because of shortages of fuel, because of shortages of food, because of shortages of technology, are depriving this planet with horrifying speed of its forest cover with all of the terrible consequences that follow upon lack of forestation. One example: the world climate.

Secondly, the Brandt Commission makes a good argument that political stability is inextricably woven into economic advance. In today's world with all of the opportunities for mischief-making by outsiders, and with the mounting frustration in developing countries, we're not likely going to enjoy a situation in which armed conflict is not increasingly breaking out unless some of these economic issues are dealt with.

Finally, of course, and I think most persuasive, is the Commission argument that today the industrialized countries are, to an immense degree, dependent upon the markets of the developing countries for their exports of merchandise. Unless these markets are given some opportunity to mature and to expand, then the stagnant condition of our own manufacturing industries will continue. Again, the heavy involvement of Northern banks in the circulation, or 're-cycling', of oil funds to countries in the South has exposed them to considerable risk. So much so that today the North and the South are each a critical and inextricable part of the economic structure of the other.

No longer should we be approaching development only on the issue of assisting human beings who are existing in wretched circumstances elsewhere. The conditions of these people reflect, not just spiritually upon us, not just upon our conscience, but upon our own well-being be it political, economic or ecological. If a conference, such as the forthcoming Economic Summit, can bring these points to bear, I am quite confident that government leaders and people at large will look at this whole issue from an entirely different perspective.

I.P.: Conventional wisdom is that until economic good times return and restraint is lifted from government, there is not going to be much room for growth in devel-

opmental assistance. Are you suggesting the exact opposite—that good times aren't going to return until we do open up to the developing world?

Head: This, indeed is the message of the Brandt Report and of other very respected economists in the world. They argue that way, not simply from a position of moral stature, but from hard headed statistical evidence that they claim can support their thesis. The other fact, of course, is that some of these changes that have to take place go beyond the transfer of resources that we have in the past unfortunately called 'foreign aid'. Some of these other issues can be dealt with without the expenditure of funds and this may be an opportunity to do that. But we really are the authors of our own misapprehensions on all of this. We've tended all too often in the past to regard developmental programs as foreign aid, and we look upon it, therefore, from the point of view of charity. Charity, as we all know, begins at home. So long as there are nearby problems, then why should we worry about these admittedly desperate people in far away countries of the world? In reality, of course, we are doing little to add to the dignity of those persons if they believe that our only interest in them is in giving them a hand when there is something left over, and not dealing with their problems in the fundamental way that they deserve.

I.P.: I was going to ask you what you felt was at stake, was it really the survival of mankind or what that the rhetoric of enthusiasts. I don't have to ask that—you have already answered it—you think that the survival of mankind is at stake.

Head: Yes.

I.P.: Are you hopeful or not?


Head: I must say that I have always regarded myself as an optimist and I hope that I continue to do so, but the confidence that I once held in the ability of the human race to understand its problems and come to grips with them has lessened considerably in the past twelve months. Annually, I'm asked to give the opening address to the National Defence College and to offer what I regard as the state of the world in which we all live. The conclusion of my opening address during the September term of 1980 was considerably more pessimistic than it was in 1979. To a large degree that was because of the Brandt Report which offers us, not only the argument for doing something, but indicates the desperate condition that we'll find ourselves in if we don't do anything. Perhaps I'm a bit depressed because of the grossly inadequate attention that has been paid to this report by communicators, politicians and others. One of the activities at IDRC and those of us acting personally, although identified with IDRC, is to increase the awareness of these arguments. The game is far from over—the final score is far from in—but the Brandt Commission points out quite convincingly that while wars can bring about conditions of poverty and degradation, equally, conditions of poverty and degradation

can lead to war. With arsenals of nuclear weapons the stakes are very high indeed and we do not, any longer, possess the margin for error that was once available to mankind.

I.P.: One last, very brief point. I'm sure that we can find political will in Canada to pressure other governments, but can we find the political will in Canada to do what we have to do?

Head: I very much hope so. If the argument is made simply on a sharing basis we might not. But if the argument is put, as I think all sound arguments are, that it is in our interest; that there is an interdependence; that there is a global nature to this community; that we will suffer if these issues are not addressed and not satisfactorily dealt then we can, indeed, muster that political will. Whether I'm an optimist in the final analysis, or a pessimist, I think we have no alternative but to continue working with as much industriousness as we can bring to bear towards the attainment of that political will.

I.P.: Thank you.



“... conditions of poverty and degradation can lead to war.”

Iran's instability after Shah paved the way for Iraqi attack

by Paul Malone

The clash of arms between Iran and Iraq which escalated in September from prolonged border skirmishing added an ominous new dimension to the Middle Eastern complexities. The destructive warfare on land, air and sea threatens production and delivery of 40 per cent of the non-Communist world's petroleum supplies from the Persian Gulf region. New divisions and tensions were created swiftly in Arabic and Islamic worlds. Although international concern over the presence of Soviet military forces in Afghanistan and the seemingly insoluble Palestinian problem was distracted by fighting in the Persian Gulf, there is concern over the indirect involvement of the super powers providing logistical supplies for the combatants. Meanwhile, the shifting of Iranian military units from the frontier with the Soviet Union to points of confrontation with the Iraqi invaders were reported to have weakened Iranian northern defences.

Inroads into Iranian territory (Iraq established forces on both sides of the Shatt-al-Arab waterway and penetrated several miles into Iranian territory) jeopardized Iranian control of their most important petroleum production facilities. Ground and air attacks on Iranian oil installations and distribution facilities (Abadan and the port city of Khorramshahr) were reported to have inflicted heavy damage in an area vital to Iran's economy. Counter blows on Iraqi territory by Iranian aircraft and saboteurs have been less effective because Iraqi planning ensured major land battles would be fought, at least initially, on Iranian soil.

Efforts by the United Nations, Arabic and other Islamic intermediaries to halt hostilities had been ineffective at the time of writing. Declarations by Iranian leaders of determination to continue fighting as long as Iraqi troops remain on Iranian soil discourage optimism concerning an early cessation of hostilities.

Uncertainty concerning the objective of Iraq in resorting to open warfare underlines the danger of hostil-

ities spreading throughout the Gulf with the consequent interruption of oil exports from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the smaller Emirates, in addition to Iran and Iraq. Downfall of the erratic Khomeini regime in Tehran is undoubtedly one goal. This is a development that would be welcomed by the Gulf states who view the revolutionary turmoil gripping Iran as a contagious threat to their own stability.

The ruthless purges of the Iranian armed forces and the summary executions of officers suspected of loyalty to the regime of the late Shah evidently persuaded Iraqi leaders that the military balance had swung in their favour. The unquestioned superiority enjoyed by Iran under the Shah no longer prevailed. The military domination of the Gulf achieved by Iran following withdrawal of British forces in 1971 came into question with the decline in the efficiency of the Iranian defence establishment. Under these circumstances the Iraqi decision to resort to arms to settle escalating differences with Tehran and to broaden Iraqi influence throughout the Gulf area appear to be understandable if reckless.

Iraqi renunciation of the territorial agreement negotiated with the Shah in 1975 accompanied the outbreak of hostilities. Concentration of the Iraqi invading forces on Iran's Khuzestan province suggests Iraq may intend to deprive Iran of its main oil resources by establishing a separatist government on the basis of the predominantly Arab population in the province. Loss of Khuzestan would deal a crippling blow to the Iranian economy and undermine remaining Iranian influence in the Gulf. Such a disaster would encourage other dissident Iranian minority groups, including those residing in Kurdistan province, to seek independence or autonomy. If Iran is defeated in the war, it would alleviate the difficulties the Iraqi government encounters with its Moslem Shi'ite population who consider Iran the main champion of their faith. Efforts by the revolutionary regime in Iran to export its ideology to the Shi'a faithful incensed the rulers of Iraq who traditionally have been members of the Sunni branch of Islam.

Although the emergence of Iraq as an influential power in the Middle East in contemporary times has

Recently retired after a 37 year career in the Canadian foreign service, Mr. Malone was ambassador to Iran from 1962 until 1967. He was also accredited concurrently as non-resident ambassador to Iraq and Kuwait.

been due to the development of its vast oil resources, the historic land of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers is heir to ancient civilizations mentioned frequently in the Old Testament of the Bible. During this century, archaeologists have located and identified ancient population centres in the north and the south of the country. The violent overthrow of Babylon is described there with accuracy and dramatic force. Other civilizations flourished during the many centuries before the birth of Christ. Invading armies—Greek, Persian, Parthian, Roman and Sassanian—campaigned throughout the land and ruled it spasmodically. A new era began in 635 A.D. when crusading Arab armies conquered it in the name of Islam. Mesopotamia, the forerunner of modern Iraq, has remained Arabic and Muslim ever since.

A century of achievement and splendor began in 749 A.D. when Baghdad became the seat of the Caliphate under the Abbasid leader. Subsequent centuries of fragmentation and decline led to Mesopotamia becoming a province of the Ottoman empire. The defeat of Turkey by the Allied powers in the First World War resulted in Britain, which had sent forces into the area during the war, becoming the mandatory ruler. Frontiers of the new state were established without regard for ethnic and religious groupings. This accounts for the large Shi'a and Kurdish components. Both proved barriers to national unity.

The independence of Iraq was recognized in 1932. The monarchy established by the British mandatory authorities before independence was overthrown in 1958 in a violent revolution led by politically-minded army officers. The brutal murder of the King during the coup incensed the Shah who had been his personal friend. Revolutionary policies of the new regime increased Iranian resentment of border concessions Iran was obliged to make under foreign pressure during the British mandate. Iraqi control of navigation in the Shatt-al-Arab estuary providing a boundary between Iraq and Iran at the head of the Persian Gulf became a source of constant friction between the two countries. Sea lanes leading to the main ports of both Basra, in Iraq, and Abadan and Khorramshahr, in Iran, pass through the Shatt which is formed by the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates in Iraq and the waters of the Karun river in Iran (the fertile territory at the junction of the two Iraqi rivers, according to local legend, was the site of the Garden of Eden).

Iran's superiority

A steady build-up of Iranian military clout enabled the Shah to assert military superiority in the Gulf zone following the departure of British forces in 1971. The Shah seized the opportunity to negotiate the 1975 treaty with Iraq which recognized a median line in the Shatt as the international boundary at the head of the

Gulf. Concurrent cessation of Iranian military assistance to Kurdish tribesmen in Iraq established a rare season of tranquility in Iranian-Iraqi relations. This was shattered abruptly with the overthrow of the Shah's regime by revolutionaries led by Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979.

Unlike neighbouring Mesopotamia, Iran was successful in maintaining its independence with few interruptions for more than 2,500 years of recorded history. The Persian people are believed to have originated in India. Ethnically, they are distinct from the Semitic peoples. Persian racial characteristics inspired the myth of Aryan supremacy.

Invasions of Persia by Alexander the Great, Arab, Afghan and European armies (Russian and British forces occupied Iran during World War II) were resisted and repulsed. The eras of greatest achievement for the Persians were guided by powerful dynasties which extended Persian influence abroad while establishing peace and security domestically. The Achaemenid (550-330 B.C.), Sassanian (226-650 A.D.) and Safavid (1,500-1,722 A.D.) dynasties made distinctive political and cultural contributions to international development and civilization.

The ambition of the late Mohammed Reza Pahlavi to elevate the dynasty founded in 1925 by his peasant-born father to the level of achievement of the great Persian dynasties inspired his efforts to modernize his country and make its influence felt throughout the world.

January 26, 1963, was an auspicious day in the life of Reza Shah. In a national referendum held that day, voters gave overwhelming support to his "White Revolution" reform program based on land reform, women's suffrage, literacy and health campaigns employing educated army conscripts, profit-sharing by workers in industry and other progressive measures. In addition to winning the right to vote, women were encouraged to abandon the traditional black *chador* which covered their bodies and concealed their faces. For the first time during his turbulent 21 year reign, the Shah found himself empowered to remove the vestiges of feudalism which had enabled a reactionary alliance of hereditary landlords, politically-minded clerics and rich merchants to block reforms.

"White Revolution"

Even with violent opposition, including assassination of the Prime Minister, an assassination attempt on the Shah himself, mob-led riots and anti-reform demonstrations, the "White Revolution" was launched successfully. The reform program gained momentum. Despite a shortage of personnel capable of directing and controlling the ambitious program, effective use of the nation's increasing oil revenues permitted simultaneous strengthening of the armed forces. When British protective forces withdrew from the Gulf, the Shah moved to fill the vacuum while maintaining strong de-

fensive forces on the country's long border with the Soviet Union. Development of improved relations with the latter facilitated important contracts for export of natural gas which had been a wasted by-product of Iranian oil production.

Rocketing revenues following the 1973 oil crisis and the emergence of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries as a powerful bargaining agent were warmly welcomed in Iran. But sudden wealth had disastrous consequences for the national economy. Inflation sent prices soaring. The government was unable to prevent a small minority from monopolizing the inflow of wealth while the mass of the population could see little benefit from it. Profiteering and corruption flourished. Political repression by security police expanded as conscientious critics of the Shah's dictatorial policies combined with the reactionary elements which had opposed the revolution from its beginning to bring pressure on the regime. The Shah's failing health added to his declining effectiveness, seemingly draining his enthusiasm and determination.

The "White Revolution" exposed the Shah to a relentless propaganda campaign abroad inspired by opponents of his reforms. Faults of his regime were magnified and achievements ignored by hostile countrymen who organized anti-Shah demonstrations on the occasion of his state visits to democratic countries. Ironically, the participants usually were students benefitting from the Iranian government's ambitious scholarship programs designed to bring western skills, technology and learning to Iran to accelerate the reform program.

Despite the failure of his "White Revolution" and the Shah's flawed performance in the last years of his reign, critics cannot deny his loyalty to his friends in the West on whom he relied to help defend the independence of his country. The desertion of the Shah by former supporters abroad when he most needed support helped open the Pandora's Box of mischief which led to the hostilities between Iran and Iraq. The refusal of western governments to grant refuge to the Shah when he was dying provided a sorry example of ingratitude and inhumanity.

Power vacuum

The reckless destruction of human life and productive facilities involved in the Iranian-Iraqi warfare, the loss of oil supplies urgently required by an energy-hungry world and the power vacuum in the Gulf provide belated justification for the Shah's costly arms build-up—one of the main targets of his critics in his lifetime. The disastrous decline in Iran's ability to defend its frontiers and maintain normal relationships with its neighbours is attributable directly to the policies of the erratic new regime in Tehran. Internal chaos promoted by them has set back tragically the clock of progress the Shah advanced commendably during his good years.

The Shah returned from a brief exile in 1953 with increased determination to serve his country. The erratic politician, Mohammed Mossadegh, with the enthusiastic assistance of the *Tudeh* (Communist party), had forced him from the throne. Convicted of treason following the Shah's return, the elderly Mossadegh was sentenced to death. The Shah pardoned him. Mossadegh lived out his final years in peace on his estate. Ayatollah Khomeini, the leading Muslim mullah in Iran in 1963, was arrested on a charge of inciting violent opposition to the "White Revolution". The Shah released him, permitting him to seek refuge among his Shi'a brethren in Iraq. His subsequent departure from Iraq is not unrelated to his hostility to Iraq and his regime's efforts to stir up trouble within the Shi'a population there. The sorry contrast between the Shah's leniency toward Mossadegh and Khomeini and the vengeful cleric's relentless pursuit of the dying King and his family has been ignored by the critics of the Shah.

Strategic position

Initial successes of the Iraqi armed forces in penetrating Iranian defences and laying siege to Abadan and Khorramshahr gave promise of an early end to hostilities, but an Iranian population three times as large and a land area four times that of Iraq support Iranian resistance. A strategically superior position in the Gulf waters, based on its control of the shoreline on one side and the islands guarding the Strait of Hormuz at the entrance of the waterway is another factor in Iran's favor. The Shah's earlier decision to occupy the unguarded islands now provides the hard-pressed Tehran regime with a decisive card in regard to shipping, entering and leaving the Gulf. The Iranian naval force in the Gulf, which appears to have been purged of its command personnel less drastically than Iranian land and air forces, should prove capable of keeping the inferior Iraqi navy in check. Iranian resources for defensive warfare and the fanaticism of the revolutionaries suggest the probability of a drawn-out struggle ending indecisively when both Iran and Iraq have exhausted energy and supplies.

Prolongation of the warfare on any scale would spell economic disaster and possible political upheaval for both sides. Oil exports from Iran have already been reduced to a trickle. Iraqi exports would virtually cease if Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz to ships carrying exports from and imports to Iraq. The dangers call for realism, logic and the spirit of conciliation which have been sorely lacking in the Middle East since the establishment of the state of Israel. The outlook for stability in an area vital to western interests becomes gloomier with every day of battle and the threats of direct involvement of the super-powers become more menacing.

German foreign policy position enhanced by Schmidt's victory

by Robert J. Jackson

The October election in the Federal Republic of Germany firmly established the stability of this 'Fourth and Richest Reich', as it has been termed by author Edwin Hartrick. The election campaign and result indicated fairly clearly where West Germany will head in both domestic and foreign policy in the next few years.

On October 5, 1980, after one of the most personally vindictive campaigns in modern German history, 88.7 percent of the eligible voters in the Federal Republic went to the polls to elect a new *Bundestag*. Campaign rhetoric had inexorably cast Social Democratic Party (SPD) leader Helmut Schmidt as an arrogant pension swindler, Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) leader Franz Josef Strauss as an emotional anti-Communist madman.

Clear mandate

Before the results were tabulated, American journalists speculated that the only result that would augur badly for the United States was a clear SPD majority, which would make it independent of its coalition partner. The SPD coalition with the Free Democratic Party (FDP) increased their majority from 10 to 45, but most of the increase was due to the FDP, the small coalition partner led by Hans Dietrich Genscher. It moved up its percentage of the vote from 7.9 to 10.6 for a total of 14 more seats.

With the four seat increase of the SPD, the coalition now has 271 seats compared to 226 compared for the CDU/CSU. The splinter parties and the 'Greens', the environmentalist party, fell well below the five percent minimum that is required for representation in the state or federal parliaments.

As expected, the CDU lost more votes in the North than the South. For many northern voters, Strauss was simply not acceptable. The FDP, which possesses a small stable vote of only three percent, gained mostly in the North where many voters did not want the SPD to be too strong, but nevertheless wanted to keep out Strauss.

The parties tended to neutralize each other because the heavy SPD concentration on foreign policy during the campaign contrasted with the CDU/CSU

concern with domestic policy. The CDU played on the traditional fears of war and inflation, and the themes of *Ostpolitik*, domestic debts and pensions were all hotly debated in the campaign.

Since coalition victory was expected, the fact that Schmidt is safely ensconced in office for another four years means that German foreign policy will be fairly predictable and along the lines already established. Under his tutelage, the Federal Republic has already quietly increased its role in world affairs. A tired Helmut Schmidt in the last days of the campaign elaborated on that role by describing a dangerous world within which he was working to create a more relaxed and united central Europe, underlining that it was he, along with Giscard d'Estaing, who kept detente alive by getting the West talking again.

In both foreign and domestic policy, the strong mandate the ruling coalition received will give Mr. Schmidt much greater leverage to pursue his goals. The left wing of the SPD will have considerably less significance now that the FDP is stronger, and the poor showing of the ecologist party will allow him more freedom internally to develop his nuclear policy.

Three pillars

In view of these results, the efforts of the new government will almost certainly continue to build on what have become the three pillars of Mr. Schmidt's foreign policy; *Ostpolitik*, Europe and NATO. Domestically, the state of the economy and energy policy will dominate.

The Schmidt commitment to *Ostpolitik* was one of the most contentious issues of the election campaign. For him, exchange of information and cooperation be-

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tween the East and West is vital to Germany, and the importance of detente cannot be minimized. Schmidt has firmly adopted the role of loyal but critical ally of the United States. His July 1980 trip to Moscow illustrates his determination to avoid freezing relations between Washington and Moscow and assure that an East/West dialogue continues.

SPD criticism of U.S. policy centers on two issues: lack of consultation and the lack of predictability of the United States actions. The first is best typified by the Afghanistan crisis in which Schmidt maintained that it was up to the Russians to create a climate for the Olympics and did not immediately agree to a boycott. In the end, however, rather than break the position of loyal ally, he went along with the United States.

An example of the second criticism, lack of predictability in American policy, occurred over the neutron bomb issue. Against the counsel of some of his own advisors, Schmidt revised the course of action he had adopted in order to follow the American lead, only to have Carter change his mind and withdraw from that course declaring that the neutron bomb was no longer acceptable to the United States.

These recent strains in U.S.-German relations foretell not a breakdown in relations, as Strauss portrayed during the election, but an opening up of new initiatives by the German government. While the Federal Republic has grown immensely in economic power, it has tended to disguise its foreign initiatives behind those of NATO and the EEC. The newly elected Chancellor can be expected to show somewhat more open international leadership.

The proximity of the military threat from the East has spurred West German defence efforts in spite of the reluctance of many citizens. Mr. Schmidt reiterated during the campaign that West Germany does not aspire to be a super power. He has stressed, however, that as long as the United States and the Soviet Union are roughly balanced in the nuclear field, Bonn is in a position to exert influence on other medium sized powers, especially in Europe. There have been several examples of West German initiatives in the last two years. When the United States wanted to lead a trade embargo against Iran, for example, Bonn pressured other European states to support this decision. Last July, when Schmidt visited Moscow, he got a small concession from the Soviets on nuclear missiles.

Within NATO, the West German position has been to agree to the deployment of new intermediate range nuclear missiles in Germany on the condition that arms reduction talks begin, and that other NATO members in Europe also agree to provide sites for weapons. Schmidt has called this balance the "unalterable prerequisite for the preservation of peace". The left wing of the SPD has never accepted the idea that the missiles should be deployed, but now that the Chancellor's coalition majority is large enough, he can

withstand their pressure which will undoubtedly be strong unless Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands make a clear statement of intent in accordance with the German policy.

Morale in NATO is low, and it was a serious blow to both NATO and the U.S. when, instead of taking a strong leadership role within NATO as the U.S. wanted after the election, West Germany joined Belgium, the Netherlands and Denmark in cutting military expenditures in order to maintain high social service levels. The U.S. also wants West Germany to make multi-million dollar improvements in American military installations in West Germany, but this will now be a matter of negotiation and possible irritation.

Germany has tended to operate within the European Community in tandem with the French. Mr. Schmidt works well with Giscard d'Estaing who is likely to win another seven year term of power in France's Presidential election next spring. With this new mandate, it is likely that Schmidt's Germany will show even more independence from France in areas where their interests do not clearly coincide, such as over the problems of the Common Agriculture Policy.

Domestic Policy

On the domestic scene, although the German economy is strong in relation to other European countries, there are disquieting economic projections which indicate that a foreign leadership role will have to be tempered by more stringent economic policies. This could be particularly true in the area of foreign aid, which could diminish West Germany's influence in the Third World.

For the first time in 15 years, there is a large foreign trade deficit. Germans have become less industrially competitive, buying many more finished and semi-finished goods abroad than they used to. At the same time, the unions are agitating for a shorter work week, and there are disquieting signs that labour problems are building. During the campaign, the SPD and their coalition partners could not agree on a position of equal partnership between management and labour on the management boards of some industrial concerns.

Unemployment now stands at only 3.7 percent, which seems low by North American standards, but if it were calculated on the same basis as in the U.S., (government-combined) the percentage would be considerably higher. One government commissioned report predicted that the current rate will double over the next four years.

The most serious domestic issue is over nuclear power. Because of disputes about the overall effects of atomic reactors, no nuclear power plants have been built in West Germany since 1977. Schmidt has endorsed the use of German coal for heating and generation of electricity but has kept open the nuclear energy option. It is quite possible that a further movement toward nuclear development will occur rather quickly

now that the SPD/FDP majority has increased.

Issues between Canada and the Federal Republic are happily few and indirect. Trade has increased to just under three billion dollars, and is only slightly tipped to Germany's advantage. By the end of the 1978, German investment in Canada had reached \$2.9 billion. Comparable Canadian investment in West Germany was only 567 million Deutsch Marks in 1977. Cultural relations too have moved steadily forward, and next year, Canada will hold its largest ever multicultural exhibition in Berlin.

There are, however, several possible sources of minor friction in the immediate future. The first concerns competition for nuclear reactor sales to Argentina. The Canadian nuclear energy business reacted with bitterness and frustration when they lost out to the Federal Republic in the competition for a sale of a third nuclear reactor to Argentina. Initially, the Canadians thought that the loss meant they would also automatically lose out to the Federal Republic in the next three nuclear reactors that Argentina is scheduled to build. They are now somewhat more optimistic.

Reactor sales produce very high profile public issues, and economic nerves are easily touched when one country wins a contract over another. Informal discussions have continued between Canadian and German officials to clarify misunderstandings which were generated during the competition period. At the time there were criticisms within Canada that the Canadian government had lost the Argentina deal by demanding extremely strict requirements on safeguards, and that in order to win the competition West Germany has been more lenient. Although there has been considerable progress since then, tensions still have not been fully resolved.

A second, closely related issue is uranium sales. While new possibilities for increased commercial sales from Canada to the Federal Republic exist, there are difficulties over the terms under which uranium can be reprocessed. Sales regulations are negotiated between the Canadian government and the EEC through Euratom. Negotiations have been far from smooth. Canada has been demanding what Europeans regard as extreme concessions over safeguards which affect EEC domestic policies. For example, the government wanted the right to veto uranium sales for certain purposes. The Community felt this was an infringement of their nuclear power policy. Canadian demands were relaxed slightly and an interim agreement was put into effect under which sales are currently taking place. Although the agreement expires in 1980, it will likely be extended until a new one is reached. There would seem to be agreement on general principles between Canada and the Community on nuclear policy, but obviously each of the participant countries have separate economic interests to protect.

There could be a fisheries issue too. Basically, the problem is over a 'waters' for 'markets' agreement be-

tween Canada and the EEC. Canadian officials would like to conclude a deal in which Germany, along with its partners, would have greater claim to fish within Canada's 200 mile zone in return for a competitive formula for selling Canadian fish in Germany and Europe. Nevertheless, formal negotiations have broken down because Canada persists in tying market access to quotas. For example, the government wants the right to sell 22,000 tons of cod fillet at the same time as the Norwegians do. The EEC only offered about 3,000 tons. Although efforts are still being made to establish a new negotiating position, the problem is difficult because there is no common EEC fisheries policy; for example, there is a France-Canada agreement still in force so that these two countries occasionally negotiate directly. The Canadian fishing industry is also pressuring the government not to conclude a deal because they consider fish stock to be insufficient.

Another possibility of difficulty stems from the Foreign Investment Review Agency (FIRA), which seeks to ensure that firms operate to the benefit of Canada with increased Canadian ownership. The depreciated dollar makes Canada, as well as the U.S., fertile ground for investors from hard currency countries. FIRA wants all multinational corporations to report and comply to certain guidelines. If these are enacted too vigorously, there is concern in business circles that it will discourage foreign investment. West German businessmen, like those of many other countries, want capital to flow freely without government interference.

New initiatives

There are several possibilities for new initiatives between Canada and West Germany under the new Schmidt government. These include an extension of German military training, probably at Goose Bay, Labrador. If the Schmidt government decides to build more nuclear reactors, there will possibly be an increase in uranium sales to Germany. West German businessmen would like to invest in Canada's coal mines, gassify the coal and send it to Germany. There are, however, many details to be worked out. German businessmen want to be assured that they will be able to export the gas to the Federal Republic and that it will not be handled like oil, with a domestic and a foreign price.

The Economic Summit taking place in Canada in 1981 will provide an opportunity for a Trudeau-Schmidt initiative on development questions. The Third World situation is "shifting before our eyes" and something must be done. The Venice Summit required officials to review the whole context of the North/South dialogue and some concrete arrangements may come from the 1981 Canadian summit. A senior minister declared privately that there is no doubt Prime Minister Trudeau wants to make a "major initiative" at the Ottawa summit next summer. He can do this best in cooperation with Chancellor Schmidt.

Trading for Latin American oil

by David Murray

Throughout the 1970s, Canada followed a conscious policy of increasing ties with individual Latin American nations and with multilateral inter-American organizations. In Canada's foreign policy of the 1980s, the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean will loom even larger. Within this inter-American context, Canadian officials see two predominant themes: oil and trade.

The availability of energy may be the single most important global issue of the decade. For Canada, the prime concern of the moment is a secure oil supply. Almost 20% of Canada's crude oil is imported, and that percentage could rise, perhaps even double, over the next ten years. This stark reality, combined with the volatility of the Middle East, has brought Canadian relations with Venezuela and Mexico increasingly into the limelight.

Oil from Venezuela

Canada has been importing 100,000 barrels of oil a day from Venezuela for some time and this has been taken up entirely by refineries from Montreal to Halifax. No formal agreement exists between the two governments to cover these oil imports, although Venezuela has indicated a desire to have a government to government agreement instead of a contract with multinational oil companies. Now that Canada has signed such an agreement with Mexico, and with the political disputes about the nature and powers of Petro-Canada settled by the 1980 Canadian federal election, an agreement with Venezuela, similar to that with Mexico, may be possible.

The lack of a government to government agreement is not the only problem in the Canadian-Venezuelan relationship. Canada runs a huge trade deficit with Venezuela because of the cost of the oil imports. Of Canada's oil imports in 1979, 40 per cent came from Venezuela and the trade deficit exceeded 858 million dollars. Canada's Venezuelan imports grew from nearly 1.3 billion dollars in 1978 to over 1.5 billion in 1979 largely because of the increased cost of oil and petroleum products. The deficit was kept down to \$858 million only because of record high Canadian exports worth \$700 million. Should the rapid escalation of world oil prices continue, not even record-breaking Canadian export sales to Venezuela can prevent the trade deficit increasing. Within several years, it could exceed a billion dollars.

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The oil link between the two countries does hold out opportunities for new forms of technological collaboration, for example, in areas like the extraction of heavy oil from tar sands. Whether it poses new problems or creates conditions for co-operation, oil will likely determine Canadian-Venezuelan relations in the 1980s even more than has been the case until now.

But Venezuela no longer stands alone among Latin American nations as a Canadian oil supplier. Mexico is about to join her, making that cross-Caribbean energy axis between Venezuela and Mexico of vital importance to Canada in the coming years.

Early in 1979, the Trudeau government initialled an agreement with Mexico providing for Mexican oil sales of up to 100,000 barrels a day for ten years. No precise delivery schedules were included in the agreement nor were they announced by Mexico. The coming to power of Joe Clark's Progressive-Conservative government in 1979, and the possibility of Petro-Canada's dismantlement, delayed the formal signature of the Canadian-Mexican oil agreement. Finally, the two countries agreed to sign the agreement during President José López Portillo's visit to Canada in May 1980.

Mexican oil pact

Two weeks before the arrival of the Mexican President in Ottawa, the Canadian government received word that the Mexicans wanted to re-negotiate the oil agreement which the two leaders were to sign. Canada wanted to preserve the original Mexican commitment to supply up to 100,000 barrels a day but President López Portillo, claiming he could not bind his successor, refused to commit his country to more than 50,000 barrels a day.

When the frantic two weeks of negotiations were over, the two governments had come up with a triad approach to describe their conclusions; (a) an agreement on industrial and energy co-operation signed by the respective Cabinet Ministers (b) a lengthy communiqué issued jointly by Prime Minister Trudeau and President López Portillo and (c) an oil contract which remained to be negotiated directly by the two government oil companies, Pemex and Petro-Canada, covering price and delivery schedules.

Since the Canadian government refused to include specific amounts of oil purchases in the agreement itself, these were left to the communiqué. The Mexicans somewhat mollified Canadian frustration over not preserving the 100,000 barrel commitment by agreeing to speed up delivery schedules in order to provide 50,000 barrels of oil to Canada by the end of 1980.

Subsequently, further problems have developed, viewed from the Canadian side. The Canadian government to its surprise discovered the proportion of Mexican heavy oil will be higher than expected, perhaps as much as 60 per cent of the total. Even so, the 50,000 barrel a day commitment by the end of 1980, specified in the joint communiqué, may not be reached.

The Mexican government made clear in the talks preceding these agreements and in the joint agreement itself that the oil sales had to be matched on Canada's part by a commitment to industrial and economic co-operation. The specific areas of economic co-operation were identified in the joint communiqué: mining and processing, wood products and by-products, transportation equipment, agro-industry and food processing, petroleum and gas equipment and services, petrochemicals, telecommunications equipment, electrical power generation and transmission equipment and consulting services. Mexico is looking for ways to accelerate the transfer of technology from more industrialized countries and in these linkage agreements, tying oil sales to specific commitments in designated industrial areas, she has discovered a mechanism to achieve it. Although President Lopez Portillo refused to commit his government to more than the 50,000 barrels a day figure, he did leave the door open for a future increase. This was also linked to Canada's fulfillment of her pledges in industrial co-operation. The message was clear. If Canada wants more Mexican oil in the 1980s, she has to make a maximum effort to help Mexico through transfers of technology in those designated areas of special expertise. This is the challenge which faces Canadian government and industry alike. The pay-off for success will be greater export contracts and closer ties with Mexico, as well as an opportunity to purchase more Mexican oil.

The dominant issues of oil and trade have shifted the whole focus of Canadian-Latin American relations, as Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mark MacGuigan, made clear in his first speech on Canada's foreign policy on behalf of the newly elected government of Pierre Trudeau. Canadian policy is consciously moving away from treating Latin America as one entity or region, although in areas like aid through the Inter-American Development Bank or Canada's permanent observer status at the Organization of American States (OAS) the regional view will remain. Canadian policy will now try to concentrate on specific bilateral or country-to-country relations. But not every Latin American country will be accorded equal treatment. The criteria for Canadian policy will be the economic and political interest to Canada, with economic considerations ahead of and in many ways dictating the political interests. Using these criteria, the External Affairs minister underlined the special importance of Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela for Canada. He cited Brazil's economic potential not just for trade, but also for Canadian investment.

The government's decision this year to upgrade the Canadian consulates in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro to consulates-general in the hope of expanding bilateral trade is another illustration of Brazil's growing economic importance to Canada. A study published in 1971 for the Canadian Association for Latin America (CALA) suggested that Canada's direction in trade policy in turn would determine Canadian aid and investment policies in Latin America. The executive director of CALA in a recent speech claimed that Canadian assets in the Latin American and Caribbean regions now exceed 18 billion dollars with more than 2.5 billion invested in the southern and central region of Brazil. Certainly, Canadian investment in Latin America has multiplied rapidly during the last decade and there is every reason to think this growth will continue, especially given the economic thrust of the Liberal government's Latin American policy. As MacGuigan implies, the principal shift in policy towards Latin America is the stress on trade and economic co-operation and the focus on selected countries where the commercial opportunities seem greatest.

Lobby group

This new policy appears to echo the sentiments of Canadian business as expressed through its large and increasingly powerful lobby, CALA, which celebrated its tenth anniversary last year. It now represents upwards of 200 companies, a marked expansion from the 50 that founded it in 1969 and a demonstration of the growing interest of Canadian business in Latin America. Although CALA is partially supported by government funds, its real function is to represent the views of Canadian business to the Canadian government and to encourage trade and investment between Canada and Latin America. Two Ministers of State for Trade, Michael Wilson (in Joe Clark's government) and the incumbent Minister, Ed Lumley, each made his first ministerial speech to a CALA conference. In 1976, Pierre Trudeau addressed a CALA conference in Venezuela. As the unified voice of Canadian business interests, the association is playing an even more influential role in the development of Canadian policy towards Latin America.

Canadian business, not surprisingly, endorses the new commercial strategy. Businessmen are anxious to develop what they see as a potential for new markets in the southern cone countries of Argentina and Chile. They are equally desirous of increasing trade with Cuba, Canada's fourth largest Latin American trading partner. Ideology is irrelevant to Canadian businessmen. They are as happy to trade with the military dictators of Argentina and Chile as they are with Fidel Castro. They are also prepared to search out new forms of trade and economic co-operation, sensing economic benefits in joint ventures and in international partnerships involving both public and private enterprise. The transfer of advanced technology to countries now clas-

sified as industrialized or on the verge of industrialization is an opportunity businessmen do not want to miss.

The Canadian government also wants to divorce trade from ideology if it can, although for domestic political reasons it is trying to maintain an arm's length approach especially towards the military dictators of the southern cone. Trudeau has retained the conservative innovation of a Minister of State for Trade as a means of promoting exports. Visits by a Minister of State to Latin American countries are seen as unobtrusive ways of facilitating the necessary government-to-government contacts without attracting the undesirable political attention which the Secretary of State for External Affairs, for example, would receive.

OAS membership

The question of whether Canada should become a full member of the OAS has been one longstanding item of Canadian-Latin American concern conveniently buried in this change of direction. For years, and especially during the 1960s, membership in the OAS was the only issue in Canadian-Latin American relations. In 1972, the Trudeau government applied for and received the status of permanent observer to the OAS. During the 1970s, little internal debate occurred within Canada over whether to apply for full membership and there was no visible pressure on the government to join. Historically, Canadians have perceived the OAS as an institution dominated by the United States. We have been reluctant to insert inter-American political rivalries into our relations with the United States. Canadian-American bilateral relations have seemed complicated enough to most Canadians without mixing in hemispheric problems.

With the coming to power of the Clark government, the issue of Canada's membership in the OAS resurfaced for a brief moment. CALA began to beat the drum of full membership as a symbol of Canada's commitment to the Americas and Flora MacDonald, Clark's Secretary of State of External Affairs, was prepared at least to study the possibility more seriously than the previous Liberal government. With Clark's defeat in February 1980, no more has been heard about Canadian membership in the OAS. Canadian diplomats confirm privately that the financial constraints imposed upon the Department of External Affairs have made the cost of membership one of the chief obstacles. The price tag for Canada joining the OAS is estimated at six million dollars, and adding in the cost associated with membership could bring the bill to ten million dollars. With cutbacks in diplomatic personnel abroad and budgetary pressures everywhere, the consensus within External Affairs headquarters is that Canada can find better things to do with her money than spend it on the OAS.

Can the Canadian government pursue an aggressive commercial strategy in Latin America and still re-

tain a commitment to human rights? Mark MacGuigan, in his speech on Canada's Latin American policy last spring, took particular care to reaffirm what he termed "our long, proud record of concern for human rights." He warned that continued abuses would affect "the tone and substance" of Canadian relations with individual Latin American countries. Yet there was little in his speech or in subsequent actions of his government to suggest a tougher line even against the worst offenders, the military dictators of the southern cone.

Canadian business does not want to risk the loss of commercial opportunities in Argentina and Chile and has been counselling the government against any strong pressure on these countries. The businessmen argue that human rights issues can be raised in a general way by the government in appropriate international forums, but they strongly oppose direct open condemnation of specific regimes as harmful to business prospects. Thus the government is caught in a difficult Hobson's Choice situation in Latin America. If it adheres completely to the dictates of business, it cannot even protest human rights violations; if it acts openly to condemn human rights abuses, it may lose potential markets for Canadian business.

Human rights

There is growing public pressure within Canada for a more positive government stance on human rights issues. Trade unions, church representatives, Amnesty International groups and students have vigorously lobbied government and have arranged public meetings in an effort to make Canadians aware of the reality of the appalling human rights abuses in countries like Argentina. The Board of Trustees of Queen's University sent a representative in April to the annual meeting of the Board of Directors of Noranda Mines to attempt to persuade the company to halt its investment program in Chile. To date, there is little sign that these efforts have had much effect. Noranda's investment program is intact and the Canadian government's action has been limited to what it calls behind-the-scenes pressure.

There is little moral consciousness left in the new hard-headed commercial approach to Latin America. The Canadian government goes through the ritual of upholding the cause of human rights in Latin America without much enthusiasm or even a belief that its intervention can do any good. Its real interest has narrowed to questions of oil and trade, securing the supply of the former and expanding the latter. The one common element in the Latin American policies of the short-lived Clark government and the Trudeau government which succeeded it is their open courting of Canadian business. In Canada's Latin American policy for the 1980s, Canadian business will be the piper and the Canadian government shows every indication of being happy to dance to the tune.

Sawatsky's men in the shadows

by Mark McClung

This readable and thought-provoking book by focussing attention on the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) Security Service raises two major questions to which Canadians, startled by the public disclosures from the Keable and McDonald Commissions, need to have thoughtful answers. First, the historical question: since security is not predominantly a matter of law enforcement but rather one of preserving the safety of the state, how did the RCMP get into the security business? The second question is critical or evaluative: how effective has the Security Service been? Former *Vancouver Sun* reporter John Sawatsky's concentration on the first of these questions to the neglect of the second greatly limits the usefulness of his book.

Sawatsky's historical accounts begin with the work of the RCMP in the whole field of subversive activities in Canada from the early 1920's on. By 1945, as the sole repository in Canada of information in this field, the Force was in a strong position to undertake the enquiries required by Soviet spy Igor Gouzenko's defection in 1945, although the results showed the almost total inadequacy of the Force's counter espionage work up to that time.

The second question is more complicated because it calls for an evaluative judgement based necessarily on as complete a mustering of matters of fact as circumstances permit. Sawatsky decided to work within the tradition of the investigative reporter who interviews relevant persons and to ignore almost completely the public records of the Keable and McDonald inquiries. The book's most serious flaws stem from this omission. However, Sawatsky's book does provide some exciting accounts of Security and Intelligence operations such as the highly successful surveillance by the Watcher Service and the surreptitious activities of Special Section E, a group of specialists in all surreptitious operations such as breaking, entering, wire-tapping, bugging and other intrusion methods.

The author also provides present useful accounts of the internal troubles to obtain independence from traditional police controls, problems in attracting and retaining suitable civilians, on operations reflecting police biases such as a witch hunt for homosexuals, and the many conflicts with the Department of External Affairs and other episodes and forces that shaped the present Security Service.

However, the serious limitations in Sawatsky's approach of ignoring the public records of the McDonald

Commission become evident in his superficial treatment of one of the most fundamental problems facing both the Security Service and the government, a problem still unresolved. It is known in official documents as the problem of inherent contradiction,

Briefly stated, the Mackenzie Royal Commission on Security observed that a security service will inevitably be involved in actions contravening the spirit if not the letter of the law. A police force, however, is under explicit oaths and obligations to enforce the law and to observe it at all times. Hence, there arises an inherent contradiction for Security Service personnel to reconcile the necessities of operations with their duty as RCMP officers to obey the law.

Morale in the entire force became low especially during and after the 1970 October crisis in Québec. Headquarters was aware of the growing concern by members who put themselves at risk of arrest, trial and punishment for performing acts they and their senior officers deemed essential to effective performance. In August 1970, a draft statement of policy on this matter was drawn up for then Commissioner Higgitt's signature. In substance it declared that a member acting with the express approval or direction by a superior officer or with the tacit approval of such an officer would be protected as far as possible from criminal or civil penalties. If the member acted without senior approval such protection would not be provided.

This book reproduces as an appendix a document to all Commanding Officers, CIB officers and Security and Intelligence branch officers entitled "RCMP Protection for Members Engaged in Sensitive or Secret Operations", apparently signed by Higgitt. Here the author's neglect of the testimony before the McDonald Commission led to an important error of fact. Higgitt, in his testimony of 24 October 1978, said that he did not sign the draft memorandum: he initialed it. In summary, he ordered that under no circumstance should anything in writing be circulated to members. Instead the policy should be disseminated orally at training classes for both criminal and security personnel at headquarters.

In the fall and winter of 1970, after the Québec situation had quietened down, the government expressed

Mr. McClung is a retired public servant who worked as a civilian researcher in the RCMP Special Branch from 1951-1960.

its displeasure with the failure of the RCMP to have so penetrated the *Front de libération du Québec*, that the two kidnappings (those of James Cross and Pierre Laporte) and the murder of the latter, could have been prevented or at least their rescue effected quickly. A top secret Cabinet memorandum dated November 20, 1970 was prepared by a committee of officials under the chairmanship of the deputy Minister of Justice. It went before the Cabinet Committee on Priorities and Planning of which the Prime Minister was and is the Chairman. The paper contained among other things a presentation of the problem. It is evident from the public testimony that the Force assumed that acts illegal or of doubtful legality could properly be performed by members in the course of their official duties.

The Cabinet Committee reached no decision on the problem. Instead the Prime Minister directed that the memorandum be re-written and presented to the Cabinet Committee on Security and Intelligence of which he was also the chairman. It too took no decision on this obviously thorny question. This reviewer has been informed by reliable sources that the problem still has not received the attention by Cabinet so obviously required.

Moreover, it was not until March 27, 1975 that Cabinet defined the mandate of the Security Service as revealed by then Solicitor General Fox in the House of Commons on October 28, 1977. Indeed, Fox tacitly admitted this failure by the government to address the problem of conflicting responsibilities when he said: "It is of very little help to transpose the dilemma to the level of ministers of government. The basic question remains the same."

In his final chapter entitled "Dirty Tricks in Vancouver", however, Sawatsky has most usefully put real flesh on the dry bones of the public testimony. The Commission heard public testimony from two Security and Intelligence officers, on the founding, purpose and operations of a unit in the directorate devoted exclusively to operations to counter and to disrupt subversive activities. Some of the evidence was released as the 'Checkmate File'.

It disclosed that after the Québec crisis in the fall of 1970, the government expressed its dissatisfaction with the performance of the RCMP in Québec, and did so in most emphatic terms. Mr. Fox, in his statement in the House of Commons on October 28, 1977, after revealing that in 1966 the government recognized the need for the Security Service to give greater attention to the separatist movement in Québec, especially to those in the movement who planned to use violence, stated: "Nonetheless, when the October crisis of 1970 struck, there was an immediate realization that information on groups responsible for the crisis had been wholly inadequate." Instead, the War Measures Act was proclaimed, unnecessarily as events proved.

The Force reacted by establishing a unit called Special Operations Group, not to collect intelligence

but to counter and disrupt subversive activities. The Checkmate File as made public described the Group's operations in minimal terms; no place or personal names were used. Only the barest outline was provided. One was described as planning to relieve a person of a file cabinet or box by grabbing and running with it while other Security Service members assaulted the person's companions. Sawatsky's final chapter fills in the gaps in the public account of this operation. He shows it to have been a thoroughly misguided, maleficent and totally unjustifiable operation. It reeks of the *Gestapo*.

The scene is Vancouver, October 1971. The persons to be assaulted were members of the Partisan Party, an openly Marxist group that had grown up in the atmosphere of the radical student movement of the late sixties and early seventies. The group was not following a policy of change by violence and other subversive means. Instead, its program called for spreading the Marxist gospel among community organizations to win more support for openly Marxist programs.

The plan for assault and seizing the file case was to be executed by three RCMP noncommissioned officers imported from Ottawa headquarters for this special purpose, a precaution to avoid the chance of recognition. Their cover story, in case they were caught, was that they were unemployed and looking for work in Vancouver. They had false names and carried no identification. It is important to note that the operation had no intelligence objective since the party had been thoroughly penetrated by informers and electronic means.

The operation was cancelled only when the local commander, whose consent was necessary for its execution, learned that the person to carry the file case was not only a woman but pregnant. The concerned citizen will be relieved to know that Special Operations Group has since been disbanded. This does not, however, preclude similar operations occurring under Security Service auspices.

The book is marred by some avoidable errors of fact. In his account of "the International Security Network", the author described Hamilton Southam as "publisher of the Ottawa Citizen". Not so. John Starnes was the son of a Montreal grain broker who was not 'wealthy' as Sawatsky claims.

Despite its shortcomings, however, *Men in the Shadows* can certainly be recommended to Canadians as a stimulating introduction to the history of Security and Intelligence work in Canada. A critical examination will have to await publication of the reports of the McDonald Commission.

Sawatsky, John, *Men In The Shadows: The RCMP Security Service*. Toronto: Doubleday Canada Ltd., 1980

For the Record

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1. Bibliography of recent publications on Canadian foreign relations (prepared by the Library Services Division).

I. Books

Balawyder, Aloysius

The Maple Leaf and the White Eagle: Canadian-Polish relations, 1918-1978. Boulder, Colo.: University of Colorado Press, 1980. (East European monographs, no. 66).

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The evolution of export and import structures and barriers to trade in Canada. A study prepared for the Economic Council of Canada by Vittori Corbo and Oli Havrylyshyn. Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1980.

Carroll, John E. and Roderick M. Logan

The Garrison Diversion Unit: a case study in Canadian-U.S. environmental relations. Washington, D.C.: National Planning Association; Montreal: C.D. Howe Research Institute, 1980. (Canada-U.S. prospects).

Cohn, Theodore, H.

Canadian Food Aid: Domestic and Foreign Policy Implications. Denver, Colo.: University of Denver, School of International Studies, 1979. (Monographs series in world affairs).

Doern, G. Bruce and Robert W. Morrison

Canadian Nuclear Policies. Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1980.

Girard, Charlotte S.M.

Canada in World Affairs: volume 13, 1963-1965. Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1980.

Issues in Canadian/U.S. transborder computer data flows:

Proceedings of a conference held in Montreal at the Four Seasons Hotel and sponsored by the Institute for Research on Public Policy, September 6, 1978. Edited by W.E. Cundiff and Mado Reid. Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1979.

Jenkins, Glenn P.

Costs and Consequences of the New Protectionism: the case of Canada's clothing sector. Ottawa: North-South Institute/L'Institut Nord-Sud, 1980.

Kirton, John James

The Conduct and Co-ordination of Canadian Government decision-making towards the United States. Thesis (PhD), Johns Hopkins University, 1977. Ann Arbor, Michigan: Xerox University Microfilms, 1980.

Lindsey, G.R.

The SALT Treaty from a Canadian Point of View. Ottawa: Operational Research and Analysis Establishment, Department of National Defence, 1980. (ORAE report no. R74).

Natural resources in U.S.-Canadian relations.

Edited by Carl E. Beigie and Alfred O. Hero. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980. Vol. I: The Evolution of Politics and Issues.

Orvik, Nils

NATO and the Northern Rim. Kingston, Ont.: Centre for International Relations, Queen's University, 1979.

Protheroe, David R.

Imports and Politics: trade decision-making in Canada, 1968-1979. Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy/Institut de recherches politiques, 1980.

Shapiro, Daniel M.

Foreign and Domestic Firms in Canada: a comparative study of financial structure and performance. Toronto: Butterworths, 1980.

Shaw, Timothy M. and Kenneth A. Heard

The Politics of Africa: dependence and development. London: Longman and Dalhousie University Press, 1979.

Stiles, John A.

Developing Canada's relations abroad. Sackville, N.B.: Mount Allison University, 1980.

Tucker, Michael

Canadian foreign policy: contemporary issues and themes. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1980.

Zeman, Zavis P.

The Men with the Yen. Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1980. (Occasional paper, no. 15.)

II. Articles

Aronsen, Lawrence

"Imperialism and dependency: some reflections on Canadian-American economic relations, 1945-1957." In *Bulletin of Canadian studies* vol. 4 no. 1. April 1980. pp. 23-37.

Byers, R.B. and David Leyton-Brown

"The strategic and economic implications for the United States of a sovereign Quebec." In *Canadian public policy/Analyse de politiques* vol. 6: 325-341 Spring/printemps 1980.

Copes, Parzival

"British Columbia fisheries and the 200-mile limit—perverse effects for the coastal state." In *Marine policy* 4: 205-214 July 1980.

Eayrs, James

"Apocalypse then: aspects of nuclear weapons—acquisition policy thirty years ago." In *Dalhousie review* 59: 635-650 winter 1979-80.

Howard, Rhoda

"Contemporary Canadian refugee policy: a critical assessment." In *Canadian public policy/Analyse de politiques* vol. 6:361-373 Spring/printemps 1980.

Litvak A. and C.J. Maule

"Canadian outward investment: impact and policy." In *Journal of world trade law* vol. 14: July/August 1980.

Nossal, Kim Richard

"Les droits de la personne et la politique étrangère canadienne: le cas de l'Indonésie." In *Études internationales* 11:223-238 juin 1980.

Orvik, Nils

"Choices and directions in Canadian defence policy. Part 2: a new defence posture with a northern orientation." In *Canadian defence quarterly/Revue canadienne de défense* vol. 10 no. 1 Summer/été 1980 pp. 8-13.

Sanguin, André-Louis

"La zone canadienne des 200 milles dans l'Atlantique, un exemple de la nouvelle géographie politique des océans." In *Études internationales* 11: 239-251 juin 1980.

Shields, R.A.

"Imperial policy and the role of foreign consuls in Canada 1870-1911." In *Dalhousie Review* vol. 59: 717-747 Winter 1979-80.

Sweeney, Terrance

"Sound the alert to Canadian industrialists: the Tokyo round of trade negotiations." In *Business quarterly* vol. 45 no. 2 Summer 1980 pp. 83-86.

Symmons, C.R.

"The Canadian 200-mile Fishery Limit and the delimitation of maritime zones around St. Pierre et Miquelon." In *Ottawa law review* vol. 12 no. 1, 1980 pp. 145-165.

Westell, Anthony

"Canada as partner." In *Report* vol. 3 no. 9 September 1980 pp. 6-8.

Wigley, Phillip

"Beyond the North Atlantic Triangle: Canadian-American relations, 1945 to 1970." In *Bulletin of Canadian studies* vol. 4 no. 1 April 1980 pp. 5-22.

2. List of recent publications of the Department of External Affairs (prepared by the Domestic Information Programs Division).

I. Press releases

No. 67 (August 14, 1980) New Zealand Deputy Prime Minister visits Ottawa.

No. 68 (August 18, 1980) Diplomatic appointments. The Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mark MacGuigan, announces the following appointments:

Raymond C. Anderson to be High Commissioner to Australia, replacing J. Alan Beesley.

Marc Baudouin to be Ambassador to Turkey. He will replace C.J. Marshall.

Ronald J.L. Berlet to be Consul General in Hamburg replacing M. Maddick.

Arthur E. Blanchette to be Ambassador to Tunisia replacing J.M. Touchette.

Jean-Marie Déry to be Consul General in Boston replacing T.A. Williams.

Robert Elliot to be Ambassador to Egypt. He replaces Jean-Marie Déry.

Michel Gauvin to be Ambassador to the People's Republic of China, replacing Arthur Menzies.

John G.H. Halstead to be Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council in Brussels. He replaces J.E.C. Hardy.

Frank T. Jackman to be Consul in Dallas, Texas. He replaces G.D. Valentine.

Karl Johansen to be High Commissioner in Tanzania. He replaces E.J. Bergbusch.

Geoffrey A.H. Pearson to be Ambassador to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics replacing R.A.D. Ford.

Marc Perron to be Ambassador to Senegal. He replaces J.J. Asselin.

Maldwyn Thomas to be Consul General in Dusseldorf. He replaces F.T. Jackman.

No. 69 (August 20, 1980) Canadian delegation to the Sixth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders. Caracas, Venezuela, August 25 to September 5, 1980.

No. 70 (August 21, 1980) Canadian delegation to the Eleventh Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly.

No. 71 (August 22, 1980) Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between Canada and the Republic of Equatorial Guinea.

No. 72 (August 22, 1980) Diplomatic Appointments. The SSEA, Mark MacGuigan, announces the following appointments: D'Iberville Fortier to be Ambassador to Belgium. He replaces Lucien Lamoureux.

J.E. Ghislain Hardy to be Ambassador to Italy. He replaces D'Iberville Fortier.

A.R. Menzies to be the first Ambassador for Disarmament.

H.O. Ring to be Consul in Glasgow. She replaces J.B. McLaren.

G. Douglas Valentine to be Ambassador to Colombia replacing D.B. Loughton.

No. 73 (August 22, 1980) Canada-U.S.A. Tuna Agreement.

No. 74 (August 25, 1980) Understandings with the People's Republic of China on Consular and other matters.

No. 75 (August 29, 1980) Visit of member of the Commission of the European Communities for Development Policy, Claude Cheysson.

No. 76 (August 29, 1980) Appointment of Robert A.D. Ford as Special Adviser on East-West Relations.

No. 77 (August 2, 1980) Canada and Japan Exchange Notes Bringing Nuclear Protocol into Force.

No. 78 (September 5, 1980) Participation of the Secretary of State for External Affairs at the 35th Session of the United Nations General Assembly.

No. 79 (September 12, 1980) Diplomatic Appointments. The SSEA, Mark MacGuigan, announces the following appointments: Jacques D.E. Denault to be Ambassador to the Cameroun. He replaces Mr. Gilles Duguay.

Gilles Duguay to be Ambassador to Morocco. He replaces Michel Gauvin.

Lucien Lamoureux to be Ambassador to Portugal. He will replace Daniel Molgat.

Sinclair H. Nutting to be Ambassador to Ecuador. He reopens the post in Quito.

- No. 80 (September 19, 1980) Canadian delegation to the 21st Session of the General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).
- No. 81 (September 19, 1980) CIDA to contribute \$1,500,000 to PISC.
- No. 82 (September 19, 1980) Canada-U.K. Air Service Negotiations.
- No. 83 (September 23, 1980) Joint Announcement Canada and the United States Agree on monitoring arrangement for the Poplar river.
- No. 84 (September 24, 1980) Press release at the conclusion of the State visit of the President of the Rwandese republic, His Excellency General Juvénal Habyarimana.
- No. 85 (October 1, 1980) Visit to Canada of the Belgian Minister of the French Community, Michel Hansenne.
- No. 86 (October 1, 1980) Joint Press Statement on the Occasion of the Visit to Canada of the Foreign Minister of Brazil, His Excellency Mr. Ramiro Saraiva Guerreiro, September 28 to October 1, 1980.
- No. 87 The Foreign Minister of the Republic of Singapore, the Honourable S. Dhanabalan, visits Ottawa.
- No. 88 Diplomatic Appointment The SSEA announces J. Alan Beesley is to become Ambassador to the Law of the Sea Conference, New York.
- No. 89 (October 17, 1980) Appointments to the Board of Governors of the International Development Research Centre (IDRC).
- No. 90 (October 21, 1980) Visit to Canada of Mr. Louis-Gaston Mayila, Minister and Secretary General of the Government of the Republic of Gabon.
- No. 91 (October 23, 1980) Arthur Menzies takes up his appointment as Ambassador for Disarmament.
- No. 92 (October 31, 1980) Communiqué at the Conclusion of the Visit to Canada of Mr. Louis-Gaston Mayila, Minister and Secretary General of the Government of the Gabonese Republic.
- No. 93 (November 10, 1980) Canada Signs Claims Agreement with Cuba.
- No. 94 (November 17, 1980) Second Annual Report of the Canada/United States Research Consultation Group on the Long-Range Transport of Air Pollutants
- No. 95 (November 18, 1980) Meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers in Dakar on December 8 and 9, 1980

II. Statements and Speeches

- 80/9 Suggestions for Future Directions of the I.L.O. An Address by the Minister of Labour, the Honourable Gerald Regan, to the Plenary Meeting of the Sixty-Sixth Session of the International Labour Conference, Geneva, June 13, 1980.
- 80/10 Plea for True Solution to the Crisis in Kampuchea. A Statement by Louis Duclos, Parliamentary Secretary to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the United Nations Conference on Kampuchean Relief, Geneva, May 27, 1980.
- 80/11 Current Issues in Canadian Foreign Policy. A Statement by the Honourable Mark MacGuigan, Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Ottawa, June 10, 1980.
- 80/12 Equality, Development and Peace. An Address by the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, Minister Responsible for the Status of Women, to the United Nations Decade for Women, Copenhagen, July 15, 1980.
- 80/13 Development: A Global Search for the Future. A Speech by the Honourable Mark MacGuigan, Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the Eleventh Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, August 26, 1980.
- 80/14 Canada Looks West—Increasing Links Across the Pacific. An address by the Honourable Mark MacGuigan, Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the Canadian Business Association, the Canadian Club of Hong Kong, and the Canadian University Association, Hong Kong, July 2, 1980.
- 80/15 New Dimensions in North-South Relations: A Canadian Perspective. An address by the Honourable Mark MacGuigan, Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, England, July 7, 1980.
- 80/16 A Security Imperative for the Eighties. A speech by the Honourable Mark MacGuigan, Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the World Federalists of Canada, Winnipeg, Manitoba, June 13, 1980.
- 80/17 Channelling the Winds of Change into Collective Achievement. An address by the Honourable Mark MacGuigan, Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the Thirty-Fifth Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, September 22, 1980.
- 80/18 Disarmament and Development. A speech by the Honourable Mark MacGuigan, Secretary of State for External Affairs, to Parliamentarians for World Order, New York, September 23, 1980.

3. Treaty Information (prepared by the Economic Law and Treaty Division).

I. Bilaterals

Argentina

Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Argentine Republic on Economic, Commercial and Industrial Co-operation.

Ottawa, October 8, 1980
In force, provisionally

Greece

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Hellenic Republic constituting a Reciprocal Amateur Radio Operating Agreement.

Athens, August 4 and September 20, 1980
In force September 20, 1980

ICAO

Supplementary Agreement between the Government of Canada and the International Civil Aviation Organization regarding the Headquarters of the International Civil Aviation Organization.

Ottawa, September 12, 1980 and
Montreal, September 16, 1980
In force, September 24, 1980

Japan

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of Japan constituting an Agreement concerning Textile Restraints.

Ottawa, July 15, 1980
In force, July 15, 1980

Protocol amending the Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of Japan for Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy of July 2, 1959, particularly insofar as it relates to safeguards.

Tokyo, August 22, 1978
Entered into force by an Exchange of Notes at
Ottawa, September 2, 1980

Norway

Exchange of Notes constituting an Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of Norway for the purpose of facilitating the reciprocal enforcement of Maintenance Orders between Norway and the Province of British Columbia.

Ottawa, October 16, 1980
In force October 16, 1980

Peru

Treaty between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Republic of Peru on the Execution of Penal Sentences.

Lima, April 22, 1980
Instruments of Ratification Exchanged at
Ottawa, July 23, 1980
In force, July 23, 1980

United States

Protocol between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America to amend the Convention for the Protection, Preservation and Extension of the Sockeye Salmon Fisheries in the Fraser River System, as amended.

Washington, February 24, 1977
Instruments of Ratification exchanged
at Ottawa, October 15, 1980
In force October 15, 1980

Protocol amending the Convention between Canada and the United States of America for the Preservation of the Halibut Fishery of the Northern Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea.

Washington, March 29, 1979
Instruments of Ratification exchanged
at Ottawa, October 15, 1980
In force October 15, 1980

Exchange of Notes between Canada and the United States of America amending the Agreement concerning the Application of Tolls for the St. Lawrence Seaway (1959), as amended

Washington, October 7, 1980
In force October 7, 1980

Convention between Canada and the United States of America with respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital.

Washington, September 26, 1980.

II. Multilaterals

Protocol amending the Interim Convention on Conservation of North Pacific Fur Seals,

Done at Washington, October 14, 1980

Customs Convention on the International Transport of Goods Under Cover of TIR Carnets (TIR Convention) with annexes.

Concluded at Geneva, November 14, 1975
Entered into force March 20, 1978
Canada's Instrument of Accession deposited
at New York, October 21, 1980
Enters into force for Canada April 21, 1981

Customs Convention on the International Transport of Goods Under Cover of TIR Carnets (TIR Convention) with annexes.

Concluded at Geneva, November 14, 1975
Entered into force March 20, 1978
Canada's Instrument of Accession deposited
at New York, October 21, 1980
Enters into force for Canada April 21, 1981

Amendments to the International Plant Protection Convention done in Rome, December 6, 1951 contained in Resolution 14/79 adopted by the Twentieth Session of the Conference of the Food and Agriculture Organization.

Canada's Instrument of Acceptance deposited
September 16, 1980

Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.

New York and Vienna, March 3, 1980
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