





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

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PACIFIC RAILWAY,

CANADA.

BRITANNICUS LETTERS, &C., THEREON,

—BY—
M. McLEOD.

“A momentous subject is now brought to the notice of the people of Great Britain—it ought not to be neglected, until, perhaps a voice from her Colonial children may go forth proclaiming ‘it is too late’—for then, the opportunity of uniting, in firm and friendly bonds of union, ‘this wondrous empire on which the solar orb never sets,’ will have passed away for ever.”—
Pamphlet by Major Robert Carmichael Smyth, R. E., 1849.

“I hope to see, or at least that my children will see, a Railway, wholly on British territory from Atlantic to Pacific.”—*Answer of Hon. Chief Justice Draper, as Special Commissioner of Canada, to the Commons of England, 1857.*

PRINTED BY A. S. WOODBURN, ELGIN STREET, OTTAWA.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

PHYSICS DEPARTMENT

RESEARCH REPORT

PHYSICS DEPARTMENT

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PACIFIC RAILWAY,
CANADA.

Selection from Series of Letters by "Britannicus"
(from 1869 to 1875) on the Subject,
WITH ADDITIONAL REMARKS.

PREFACE.

This little pamphlet may, especially to the Legislative mind more immediately appealed to, appear an obtrusion.

In the way of excuse (if called for), I have but to refer to its own pages in explanation of the position and act of the humble writer, in this matter of British Pacific Railway.

The subject, in its vital importance and extended bearings, is one which, I have ever felt, and now, more than ever, feel, should be taken up and dealt with—*duly* dealt with—by abler minds than myself, and in a manner worthy of the subject and the emergency.

As explained in my Britannicus letters of 1869, and in my work "Peace River", (of 1872), and also as appears from Mr. Fleming's Pacific Railway Survey Report of 1874 (page 13), it is to the accident of my special knowledge of the vast wilds to be traversed—wilds yet unshown by blue book or authentic record—that I have appeared in this connection.

If, in the course of my writing on the subject I have seemingly taken a part against any (so-called) "political party" of the day, I beg to say that such was not, and is not, my intent. I *know* no "political parties" of the day in Canada, save in this: On this Empire Field of Canada, I see two CAMPS—one BRITISH; the other, "AMERICAN." The former, disorganized by unsuspecting of danger; the latter, covertly most aggressive.

As to myself, let me say. A mere unit, humble—a "nobody"—in the four million mass of Canadians more immediately concerned, I, under Providence, arise in the new scene as but a "leather-stocking" guide (as it were) through the pathless forest to be traversed, to meet the lurking foe, and—as my brave old father and grandfather did—forward, westward, the path of empire in enterprise boldly dare to cleave. Pioneers in adventure of the fur trade—keenly militant in its early struggles—the "Flag" in their case, but "*followed* Trade."

M. McLEOD.

AYLMER, Co. Ottawa, Q., 4th February, 1875.

NOTE.—The matter within brackets, in the following pages, is new, and, in most instances, is thus introduced to avoid the inconvenience of foot notes.—M. M.

PACIFIC RAILWAY, CANADA.

(The Ottawa Times, May 27, 1869.)

BRITISH RAILWAY TO THE PACIFIC— AN IMPERIAL NECESSITY.

LETTER I.

To the Editor of the Times.

SIR,—“I hope to see, or, at least, that my children will see,” said Chief Justice Draper, before the Commons Committee of 1857, on the question of the “Hudson’s Bay Territories,” “a railway, wholly on British territory, from Atlantic to Pacific.” The answer was in bold and noble defiance to antagonistic interrogation on the part of the Hon. Edward Ellice and other Hudson’s Bay magnates on that great committee of twenty and two. Chief Justice Draper, as our delegate, was then fighting the battle of Canada in the enemy’s stronghold—an enemy that, most prudently, declined the gage, then and there (or, rather, nearly a month before) formally given by him, of a judicial test of their charter. The same body, or influence, tried, in earnest self-defence, to balk our high mandatory; but in vain. The report of that committee is one worthy of a British Parliament.

Ten years before that, another, of some authority, spoke, and earnestly wrote on the same theme, viz: British railway from Atlantic to Pacific. In 1849, Major (*i. e.*, then Major, but subsequently of higher grade) Robert Carmichael Smyth wrote a book—a brochure of 68 pages—in which he thus discourses: “A momentous subject is now brought to the notice of the people of Great Britain—it ought not to be neglected, until, perhaps, a voice from her Colonial children may go forth proclaiming ‘It is too late’—for then, the opportunity of uniting, in firm and friendly bonds of union, ‘this wondrous empire on which the solar orb never sets,’ will have passed away for ever.”

Such was the heart-ery of a true British officer of the Royal Engineers, twenty years ago, when he had seen part, at least, of our grand land, and had returned to the

“Mother Isle.” The book is full, not of argument only, but of indisputable fact and proposition, always true, and given, as might be expected from such a mind, and one so trained, with almost the force of mathematical demonstration. No doubt some allowance is to be made for the inspiration (ever strong) of his “*compagnons de voyage*” (Haliburton and Howe) he so gratefully speaks of; but still they could only have lent a word, *con amore*, on the subject, and given their own thoughts and aspirations, approvingly on it, in chime with the old “Clockmaker” of 1838. As to the feasibility of such a railway, at a time when such works were of the level plain, and the iron horse had not yet dared the mountain leap, none but a strong and daring mind, and one master of its mystery—none, it may be said but a British (or *Americo-British*) civil engineer—one of that body of intellectual men who span the deep, and make straight the crooked, and smooth, the rugged places of the earth, would have so spoken; and, moreover, have written a book on the, to the world then, so wild a theme. Hear him! He speaks from purest philanthropy—not only for the conservation of British right, and power, and glory, but for the amelioration of her overcrowded poor, and the happiness of her varied millions of our common humanity:

“Between the north-eastern and north-western shores of America, and through our loyal, long-tried and devoted American Colonies, there might,” says he, “be undertaken a great, a noble and a most important work, that would give remunerative employment to the population, to the wealth and to the inventive genius of England. Did his Grace,”—he is speaking of the Duke of Wellington as Premier in 1830, and when, with great foresight, he held to Oregon against American pretension, and thereby secured to us (notwithstanding the lamentable treaty, subsequently, of 1846) sufficient of the Pacific coast for a harbour—“Did his Grace”

says he, "in short, look forward to a *grand national railway* from the Atlantic to the Pacific? If not, let his Grace" (N. B.—That was in 1848-49) "do so now!" "Let the people of Great Britain do so! Let her Colonial Minister, startling as it may at first appear. A little reflection will show that England and her children have the power to make it: that it *must* be done, and will become valuable property—for it would increase our commerce and trade to an extent not easy to calculate." And here he cites from *J. S. Mill, on political economy*: "Considering," says Mill, "all the natural and acquired advantages that we possess for this purpose, it should rather create surprise and regret that our commerce is so small, than engender pride that it is so large."

"We may conclude, then, that improvements in production and emigration of capital to the more fertile soils and unworked mines of the uninhabited or thinly peopled parts of the globe, do not, as it appears to a superficial view, diminish the gross produce and demand for labour at home; but, on the contrary, are what we have chiefly to depend on for the increasing of both, and are even the necessary conditions of any great or prolonged augmentations of either; nor is it any exaggeration to say that, within limits, the more capital a country like England expends in these two ways, *the more she will have left.*" Then proceeds Major Smyth—"But such a noble work must not be looked upon merely as a money question; although, if only considered in that light, England must reflect, that if she wishes and intends to retain her high pre-eminence amongst the nations of the earth, she must, most assuredly, pay for it. No country can have all the blessings and advantages of England, and have them for nothing, nor can she retain them without great exertion. Her accumulated wealth can not be allowed to remain idle; nor will it. No one will deny for a moment that every economy that will make the poor man richer and happier ought to be practised; but let us take care that we do not, from too strong a desire to retain that wealth which Providence has thrown into the lap of England, even in the midst of war, deprive her labouring children of legitimate employment and just remuneration (all that the industrious classes of our

fellow-countrymen require). But the undertaking proposed has even a higher claim to our attention. *It is the great link required to unite in one powerful chain the whole English race.*"

And so on, in intelligent and high patriotic appeal, he puts the case in all its phases, physical, political and social. And, further citing *Cobden*, he says—"The exportation of labourers and capital from the old to the new countries, from a place where their productive power is less, to a place where it is greater, increases, by so much, the aggregate produce of the labour and capital of the world." And then, citing *Mill* again, he says—"The question of Government intervention in the world of colonization involves the future and permanent interests of colonization itself, and far outstretches the comparatively narrow limits of purely economical considerations alone. The removal of population from the overcrowded to the unoccupied parts of the earth's surface is one of those works of eminent social usefulness which most require, and which, at the same time, will best repay, the intervention of Government. No *individual or body of individuals* could reimburse themselves for these expenses." "Government," continues Major Smyth, "on the contrary, *could* take from the increasing wealth caused by the construction of this Railway and consequent great emigration, the fraction which would suffice to repay with interest the money advanced."

Such, and such like citation and argument does the author earnestly and strongly advance on the subject. He proposes a "National Railway," from Halifax to the Pacific by the shortest line possible, which he estimates at 3,025 miles—the work to be begun simultaneously in different sections, and the convict labour of England, say 20,000, to be utilized at different points where local population may not be available. On this head, and as to feasibility, cost and immediate *Imperial* as well as Dominion necessity, more anon—in my next.

Your's,

BRITANNICUS.

OTTAWA, 25th May, 1869.

LETTERS 2 to 7, inclusive, give, in descriptive detail as to physical features,

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give, in de-
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heights and distances, a feasible line of route for railway from Montreal to Bella-coola, Pacific tide water at the head of the North Bentwick Arm. *via* Lake Nipissing (north side), Lake Nepigon (south side), Fire Steel river (summit source), Rat Portage (N. of Lake of the Woods), Stone Fort (head of sloop navigation of Lake Winnipeg—Red River), Yellow Head Pass, Quesnel Lake and River, Chilcotin Plateau, and the remarkable Gorge and Valley of Bella-coola, about 83 miles in length, and from $\frac{1}{2}$ to 5 miles in width through the Cascade range to Ocean.

All, with the exception of about 20 miles between the North Thompson river and the head waters (N. eastern) of Quesnel Lake, has been examined and reported on in Mr. Fleming's exhaustive, or, at least, almost exhaustive reports, and found to be correct, or approximately so, within margins of absolute determinations by instrumental measurement, so close, as to warrant assumption of my correctness in the main.

See Appendix, "Pacific Railway Routes."

Ottawa Times, about 27th June, 1869.

A BRITISH PACIFIC RAILWAY—AN IMPERIAL NECESSITY.

LETTER 8.

To the Editor of the Times.

SIR,—The following is a summary of the sections treated of:—

	Terminal Points.	Length in Miles.	Cost per Mile.	Total.
Montreal to Ottawa City, <i>via</i> Vaudreuil.....		105	\$25,000	\$2,625,000
Ottawa to summit between Nipissing and Ottawa R....		190	30,000	5,700,000
Nipissing L. to Michipicoton River		320	35,000	11,120,000
Michip. R. to Fire Steel River.....		10	40,000	12,400,000
Fire Steel R. to Selkirk (Red River) Settlement.....		340	35,000	11,900,000
Selkirk to Edmonton.....		750	20,000	15,000,000
Edmonton to Milton Pass (Leather or Yellow Head)...		250	35,000	7,500,000

Milton Pass to Bella-coola.....	400	\$60,000	\$24,000,000
		2,663	\$90,245,000
Say.....			\$100,000,000

These distances and estimates are entirely on my own calculation, and were made long before the publication of Mr. Russell's work. Mr. Russell's is an admirable work, well and faithfully put together, so far as I can judge from a glance at it, for it has only within the last few hours come to my hand. I am glad to see that his projective line of railway from Michipicoton River to Fort Garry agrees with mine—or mine with his. The rest of his line, *viz.*, from Ottawa city up Montreal river to near the height of land in the direction of James's Bay is, I think, a detour which may be avoided; I take the southern flank of an uprise of which he takes the northern.

The line I propose from Montreal to Bella-coola (Pacific tide water) is the most direct, shortest, easiest, and in every respect the best possible, from sea port to sea port, north of Mexico. Its leading points, determining it, are the north shore of Nipissing, the south one of Neepigon, the north one of the Lake of the Woods, the Milton Pass, and, finally, that Pacific water-gate, the remarkable gorge of Bella-coola. No tunneling is necessary; and, if at all, only some ten miles of snow cover. The only bridging of any extent will be that across the two branches of the Saskatchewan; unless, as may, most wisely (for fuel and safety from the "Plain Indians)," be done, the line be slightly diverted, so as to strike the main Saskatchewan below the "forks," and follow the north shed of the N.—the woody—branch of that noble stream.

The Fraser River presents less difficulty. The most formidable obstacle to an Atlantic and Pacific Railway through British territory was, undoubtedly, the bridging of the St. Lawrence. *That* ("eighth wonder") has, by the genius and talent of a Keefer (Thomas C.) C. E. of Canada, who first personally gauged the problem, and by his elaborate and thoroughly practical plans and specifications for the purpose won the faith of even Stephenson of England, been overcome. And so, I feel assured, will it ever be with every seeming difficulty in the way. There is native skill and practical ability in the country to cope with every

physical obstacle incident to the special physical character and climatic agencies of Northern America.

However, as it must, essentially, be an English road—the sole international *British* highway across this Continent; one for all human time, it must be laid as such, at any necessary cost. More than half a century ago, England spent, in war alone, one hundred and fifty million pounds sterling, (£150,000,000) in a single year! and within twenty years, over three thousand millions of dollars in a fight alone!! She has tripled her wealth since; and commensurately stand her responsibilities to human progress in the comity of nations; for, “to whom much is given, of him much shall be required.” “So the notes ring”—ever ring, ever ring.

Before proceeding, however, to the consideration of “ways and means” on which, by the way, I shall say as little as possible at present, for until thorough exploration *ad hoc* be had, all estimate must, to some degree, be necessarily arbitrary—let us take a glance at the relative merits and demerits of the route proposed with the American one now established, and also, so far as may be, with the others in progress.

1. From sea port to sea port, the Britannia Railway Line, as proposed, is nearest to air line between mid-England and mid-Japan and China, is shorter, by more than eight hundred miles than the present one from New York to San Francisco, or than any possible line of railway from Atlantic to Pacific, across United States territory.

2. Liverpool, Milton Pass, Cariboo Centre, and Bellaçoola are on the same line of latitude, viz.: 53° degrees N. or nearly so; not varying thirty minutes: and Nankin (mid-China) and Jeddo (mid-Japan) are nearly on the same isothermal line.

3. The altitude of the Britannia summit is less, by one-half, than that of the present “American” one; or, I believe, than any American one that may be hereafter tried.

Moreover, from that fact, the latter, though farther South, will ever have more snow and mountain storm to contend with, than the comparatively low and ever sheltered British line, with its mile breadth (or two) of wood (a fuel preserve) all along, save, of course, in the open prairie, where unwooded.

4. The Britannia line has every material and element necessary for construction,

and working in exhaustless abundance along its whole length; for even in the prairie to be traversed, the line verging on the wood lands, touches out growths here and there, and local supply of fuel is assured throughout.

On part of the route, viz.: between the N. Saskatchewan water shed to near the Milton Pass, coal, highly bituminous, and supposed to be fit for locomotive fuel, is abundant—cropping out on the river banks near the surface, and showing strata of from fifteen to twenty feet in thickness.

The American line, on the other hand, is totally destitute of coal, and even of wood through half its length, and even of water in the alkaline desert wastes, extending over spaces varying from one hundred and fifty miles downwards, throughout the high plateaux traversed by it.

5. The American line, for about one thousand miles, is on Indian battle ground, with Indian hostility, the fiercest—for the Indian of the Northern American plain is born, and lives, and dies in fight—besetting the way, while, on the other hand, the British line is entirely free from such molestation.

6. The extreme and sudden vicissitudes of climate on the American route, especially from the hot valleys of California to the immediate snow heights of Nevada (“snow range”) forbid, in a measure, pleasure travel; whereas the equable Northern one, by which one might travel from Peking to London in the same garments, would, in this respect, attract it.

That in point of scenery, the British offers, infinitely, more pleasing features, and that, even in winter; the route being largely pine-clad.

7. From mid-China and Japan to New York is over one thousand miles shorter *via* Bellaçoola and Montreal, than by San Francisco.

8. From England to Australia the British line is over one thousand miles shorter than by any possible American one; and to China is from two to three thousand miles shorter, according to port to be reached.

9. The American road is, it is authentically reported, of cheap and hurried construction and scarcely safe.

[Note.—January, 1875—Even yet the Government of the United States, it is reported in the American Press, hesitates to

exhaustless length; for the line touches out local supply

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The Britannia would, of course, be a thorough English road; substantial, well appointed, and offering every security and efficiency.

Such are some of the relative excellences of the British road and route.

The next point I would touch on is as to "ways and means," to provide not only the \$100,000,000 aforesaid for construction, but for the running of the road, a cost, probably, of nearly ten millions of dollars per annum, in the case of a large traffic. The magnitude of the cost necessary, is a ground of Imperial assumption, in considerable part, in measure, at least, of obvious imperial interest in the matter. On this point, Mr. Editor, I hold a very strong opinion.

The gigantic task is beyond the power of this nascent Dominion. Already its debt is considerable, and it has yet much to expend, and that, forthwith, in the establishment of *internal* means of development, and more especially in the opening and utilization of her water ways. Her staple products are of a nature to call for the *cheapest* transport. Why should the produce of the Far West be subjected to railway rates, high and destructive of its legitimate commerce? It wants outlet—canals and economic navigation—life channels.

But neither for these, nor for railways, nor for any object whatever, let there be *Land grants*, I would say. Land—our "mother earth"—is for cultivation; not for speculation in the marts of Mammon. We have had enough of that already.

The wild is the heritage of every son of Adam who, by the law of his nature, first seeks to till it. By the "sweat of his brow" he consecrates it as *his*, and as his, *his nation's*. 'Tis thus that British freemen in America live, and alone *can* live. Every man is, in a sense, his own sovereign in this free, broad, uncastled land of our's. No "lordship" is sufferable with us. As is our God-given "free-will," so, with co-ordinate responsibility do we desire to live. In this, as proved, is the cure, the specific for all political discontent, disloyalty or even Fenianism itself. The Irishmen of Canada—freeholders—resisted, to a man, every attempt to tamper with their loyalty. All in our untrammelled

workfield are loyal. Even with the savage of the wild, the "King George man" as he, with child-like confidence, calls himself, loyalty to the British Crown has the force of an instinct—is a holy thing with him. Touch it not! Foster it, I would say to England; and no less so to her young fiduciary, the Dominion of Canada. People the fertile waste with husbandmen—freehold husbandmen—FREE LAND GRANTS—MUNICIPAL INSTITUTIONS, of Upper Canadian mould—A FREE POLL—A FREE PARLIAMENT—These are the bases we desire to build on—build on, into nationhood; and so, under Providence, will it be, else faith deceives.

But, to take up the last head of our subject. The Roman of old, when he conquered a country, bound his spoil with a Road—a "military road"—till, at last, he had one three thousand miles in length. It was so with the ancient Peruvian; it is so with modern Russia; it is so with all national powers; concentration, i. e., the power thereof, is the measure of military force; for that, the rail is supreme. What, without the precious "bit" of railroad through the sloughs of Balaclava gorge, would have availed all the might of England against Sebastopol? "Stuck in a mud-hole!" Ignoble verdict!

The RAIL is the sceptre, as well as the plough and sword of the day. By it alone can national power hold its own, or even rule its owu internally. In this sense—in both senses—it is an imperial necessity in all countries. The proposition requires no special illustration; it is obvious everywhere. It is on this political axiom that every civilized country, of every physical aspect—on the heights of the Swiss, as on the flats of the Dutch; on the steppes of Russia, as on the apices of Spain and Italy—the rail runs and rules as a dominant reality.

But the *cost*, say some. What of that? I answer thus: Suppose that not a ton of freight, not a single passenger on pleasure or business, nought but mails, guns and ammunition, and navy and army stores should pass over that road, it would pay; at least, there is reason to believe it would. A saving of *one-tenth* in navy and army expenditure would yield, even now, \$7,000,000 (seven millions of dollars) per annum. Mail service would yield, say, one million. Four millions of dollars per annum would

run the road for such limited purposes, leaving, for interest on cost, four per centum per annum.

But sir, the question, the great and main question involved is, in fact, that of motor of nearly ten millions of tons (I predicate on the figures of Dr. Cullen—a British authority—to the Society of Engineers in England) ten millions of tons per annum of the most precious of earth's produce, in commerce, from furthest East to furthest West, and throughout the whole world of human industry.

[On this subject of general transport in the line in question, see "Financial Basis."]

One-tenth of that, at only *two-thirds* of current railway rates, viz.: two cents instead of three cents per ton per mile, would yield *fifty-three millions of dollars* per annum. Fifty passengers a day, each way, at, say \$100—half of the American first-class rates—would yield over three millions of dollars a year. But we may, for the second or third years of function double that item, and ever afterwards more than treble it; for the Mandarin of China, the Taja of Japan, rich, intelligent, and, at last, new awakened as from a long, long sleep, eager to see, and realize their dreams of the world and the hitherto hidden wonders thereof; yea, the essentially commercial masses of the Chinese and Japanese proper—the latter, to a man, all readers and writers, and of a most sprightly intelligence and social disposition. Yea, half the globe itself, and that the most active part, will seek travel; are, in fact, on the move already, and settling wherever, dove-like, they can find a resting place in the moving world of waters. Look at that East at the present moment! It is the burst of incubation, intellectual, of half a world. The *débâcle* of forty centuries, or more, of their frost in the human cycle. The American—shrewd—sees it, and hence the triple effort—when even prostrated by war—at all cost—cost of almost all his available lands for cultivation, viz., one hundred millions of acres, or nearly so, and, for one road alone, over one hundred millions of dollars in Government bonds, besides the land grant—and seeing the coming flood of wealth and power endeavours thus to catch it, direct it, and secure it. Yes, Mr. Editor, on this score of travel alone, within the next ten years, we may, for the nonce, calculate on at least ten millions a year.

Add all that. It is over seventy millions. Call it seventy. Halve it. It will pay over working cost, twenty-five per cent. Quarter it. It will pay ten per cent.

[NOTE.—These estimates have been fully borne out by the traffic returns since of the American Pacific Railway (Union and Central), which, during the last four years—so far as can be gathered from press reports—amount to about fifty million dollars.

In connection with the railway, a new (subsidized) Pacific Steamship Line for the China and Japan trade has just been organized, with a capital of \$10,000,000, all subscribed, principally, in California.]

But, it will be said, these are mere wild estimates—arbitrary. Granted that they are to some degree. They are so from the nature of the case—one *sui generis*—a problem of vast elements, unparalleled, and with quantities somewhat indefinite, factors necessarily somewhat arbitrary. Still we have some authenticated statistics to go on—and I have read them most carefully in our Imperial blue book. The logic of arithmetic is unanswerable—irresistible. But even did it fail us entirely. Is all political movement, every national act, for present or future good to be determined by a simple rule of arithmetic? If so, then truly indeed, are we "but a nation of shopkeepers," and foolish at that. No! It is not so. Thank God! England is mistress of the seas—of the highways, heaven laid, of human intercourse and progress. For human good we, of her, believe her to be so; and so, we believe, she under Providence, will ever be, till time be no more. Her ocean throne is, at the present moment, by cunning accident, riven it is true—riven by a foreign iron-rod suddenly struck. It is for her to counteract that, and, more firmly to weld her seat of power. True also, that at present, prospectively in menace, if not actually, that the *short ways*, the opening highways of the earth, viz., the Isthmus of Suez, and that of Darien, are, virtually in foreign rival hands, and that to her are left but the old round abouts the "Cape" and the "Horn," but that also, by the same means, she can fully meet and remedy. Before her, inviting, she has, against all these, a save-all, a guard-all, a defy-all. In the gorge for railway—Bellacoola—port-hole to the Pacific—gunned and charged direct from her inexhaustible

arsenals at home, she has a thing of superlative power. It lies before her. Her destiny is there. *There, her NECESSITY.*

Yours, &c.,

BRITANNICUS.

OTTAWA, June 24, 1869.

(Canadensis.)

Ottawa Times, about 3rd July, 1869.

NOTE.—The Editor, in a very able article, embodying what might be considered the main arguments advanced for the principle of Land Grants for public works, had taken issue with me as to what I said on the subject. Unfortunately, I have no copy of the article, and must refer the enquirer, as to it, to the parliamentary or other public files of the paper.

RAILWAY LAND GRANTS.

To the Editor of the Times.

SIR,—I am glad to see your remarks in exception to what I advance, as to the impolicy of extensive land grants to any railway company, or other enterprise by any incorporated body, or company of private individuals. The question is an imminent one; and it is well it should now be discussed. However, it is not for me—w^o, as you are aware, am not of the arenas of public discussion in such matters—to assume the lead in it; and, moreover, professional duties (somewhat in arrear) render it utterly impossible for me, at present, to bend myself to the task, or to meet you as I should; and I can only pray that the press, here and elsewhere, may take up the question, and give it fair dealing.

The side you have taken has, of course, its "arguments;" but, to my mind (from natural defect, of course) it is, to reciprocate a term—"very inconclusive." In other words, we are both sincere, very earnest, very enthusiastic, perhaps, and therefore somewhat blind to each other's particular merits on the other side. This is natural, and gives no ground for complaint. We view the matter from different stand points. I speak as one of the soil; and with a paramount, a nostalgic desire for the establishment of a Government there, under the British flag, of the utmost civil liberty; untrammelled by any of those *imperia in*

imperio created by such land grants. True, you say that "my argument is very inconclusive," inasmuch as "I cannot show that 'our British constitution' has been imperilled by a grant of wild lands for the promotion of any public enterprise." How could I? There has been no case in point throughout the whole British realm. Canada, in her general policy, has refused such grants, as to Upper Canada. Millions of acres of wild lands in Lower Canada have, it is true, in a way, but ever most reluctantly, and on very special grounds, been promised conditionally for certain railway enterprises; none of which, however, were carried out, nor, in fact, effectually begun. Not a single rail of railway has been laid in virtue of any such grants.

There is an instinct, it seems to me, in the British heart, which repugns such policy on British ground; a something stronger, purer, and wiser than a Provincial Parliament hard pressed, with its play of party, and internal *guêts à pens* (stand and deliver). But it is not for me to give good and sufficient reasons for such uniform failure, nor to probe the esoteric thereof. The fact is significant. But if the contrary had been the case; and that those millions of acres had passed into the hands of these railway companies, it would not have raised that danger, which I deprecate, as to the entirely *new* land in question. The North Shore Railway Company, of Quebec, and the "St. Maurice Railway and Navigation Company," and all such "land granted," or rather land promised corporations, might have taken all, and still have been no appreciable power, no disturbing element in the Government of the country. They could not, by landed railway navvies sweep more than a few polls, along their line of privilege; they could not have carried out any *class* legislation in furtherance of their own special interests—unless, in case of dead lock of parties, as an "Irish brigade" in the House; they would, in fact, be comparatively harmless in the bulk of other general countervailing interests in the country. As to a country *wholly new*, like the Northwest Territories, where the very rudiments of the social fabric have yet to be made and laid, the case is very different. The former was, for the nonce and the hour, a mere supervenience. The latter is the creation of a lasting reality, a people; mayhap a nation. Such a propri-

etary as that proposed would, at the very outset, hold the country in its grasp, and keep its most fertile parts a waste, till prices should rise; would be a combination of capital whose sole principle would be the reproduction of itself—such is its law—at any and every sacrifice of *individual* interest, or public interest, save its own. The *experiment* would, I fear, be fatal to British connection, in those borders; and a cruel one to those whose lot might be cast there, at the mercy of such a body, soul-less and money-mad.

The principle is not a British one—at least not yet—nor do I believe will it ever be so. It is an American one—of *Dollar-dom*—of most recent inception; and, even there, *yet* to be tried and tested in its results; the fruition has yet to come.

I have no personal knowledge of the general character of the cast of votes in the Illinois elections since it became a railway State. But there is this to be said of it, viz., that there the scheme was new and had to win its way into public favour; and there is this more to be said of it, viz., that after the railway in question its land became the dearest in the whole United States: such, at least, has ever been my impression.

It will be interesting to see the immediate result, in the political chess-board, of the late Pacific Railway land grants. On this point there can only be conjecture—so we leave it, for the present. It is only recently that railways, “Pacific railways,” have become, it would appear, the dominant interest in the political economy of the United States. With them, as we can readily understand, the matter was one of vital necessity, and powerless, otherwise, to raise the means to accomplish the national aim, they gave lands. It was, with them, in their utter prostration of financial resources, a supreme necessity. It is not so with England. She has money to spare to lend by the millions to Russia, to make railways to her precious coveted East, and to another, but a different Sebastopol.

The fundamental principle on which I take my stand is the *inalienability* of the public domain, *saves* for a “manifest public advantage, or in case of pressing necessity”—those are the words of Vattel. That domain (*dominium directum*), though nominally in the “Crown” is the property of the Nation, not only for the day, but

for *all time* in the prospective existence of that nation. The holding, by Crown or Government, is in *trust*—in administration, for national life only. The proposition opens a large question, but I cannot, in present limits, enter into it.

In the present instance there is, it is true, some degree of manifest public advantage, but it is outweighed by the inevitable evil deprecated. Certainly there is no “pressing necessity” for such an alienation.

I say there is *no necessity*; for the country could be developed without the railway in question. The present effort for opening the British water route, with connecting roadways from Lake Superior, is in the right direction; it will give outflow from the foot of the Rocky Mountains. It will, I believe, under any circumstances, become the main commercial channel of the products of the country. Passenger and light freight traffic will probably seek the American ways.

In this there is danger to the continuance of British connection. The mere gravity of commerce, self-interest and magnetism of association will naturally force the new people into national association. That tendency—“drift”—can only be counteracted by a British railway, a national highway, the work of the *nation*, and not of its youngest progeny. In *this*, I hold, is there an Imperial necessity for Britain to make *her* road from the Atlantic to the Pacific, for *her* own special interests, not only in America, but the world over. It is not for us, poor struggling colonists, with poor servitude, to build roads and give of our own, in crushing measure, besides imposing debt on posterity merely to enrich still more the England that, in very plethora of wealth, lends to her enemies, her greatest, bitterest and most dangerous. Loyalty is a contract of *mutual* right and duty. We will, as ever, do our duty to her; but she must do her's. In all loyalty I say this. But to return to the more immediate argument with you, Mr. Editor.

You say “a railway or a canal, or a macadamised road adds a certain ascertainable value to every acre of wild land contiguous to it; and whether the Government of the country or a company of private individuals adds to this value, they

have an undoubted right to be remunerated for it."

Unquestionably so—*remunerated—fairly* remunerated, but no more; all beyond is wrong. But I am sorry I must stop here to catch the mail. I would have replied sooner, but, being absent, yours has only just come to hand.

Yours,

BRITANNICUS.

June 30, 1869.

The Editor having, with a candour which commends itself, yielded in some measure to my argument, proposed, *in lieu*, a system of *hypothecation* of the lands in question, for the object in view—to which I conceded, in the following terms:

RAILWAY LAND GRANTS.

To the Editor of the Times.

SIR,—Allow me, in final reply, to thank you for the liberality of your columns to "Britannicus," and to apologize to your readers for trespassing on their kind indulgence. As to the proposition with which you close, viz.: the mere *hypothecation* of a certain extent of the domain more immediately benefited, and the establishment of a sinking fund to meet debentures, I heartily agree with you. It would, in my humble opinion, be an admirable compromise; *provided* an imperial guarantee or subsidy, or both, in some approximate measure to *national* interest in the work as a *through* line, be also had.

We have all, evidently, a common aim, viz.; the realization, speedily, wisely and effectually, of our Dominion. In this all parties are *one*. In this there is every hope—every gratulation. With UNION we may do much; without it we may wholly fail.

Yours, &c.,

BRITANNICUS.

OTTAWA, July 6, 1869.

(The Ottawa Times, Thursday, July 8, 1869.)

REPLY BY EDITOR.

We have this morning a few lines from our correspondent, "Britannicus," closing up the discussion on the "Railway Land

Grants." Our readers are much indebted to him for the valuable information he has given concerning the great Pacific Railway project; and we are glad to find that, while he is still, no doubt, as sternly as ever opposed to granting lands to private companies, he endorses our suggestion that the Government might raise the money by debentures, hypothecating a portion of the public lands as an additional security, over the general credit of the country, for their redemption.

There is certainly a wide difference between this proposition and that of a large land grant to a private company, and we are not surprised that our correspondent should approve the one while condemning the other. The main object in view is to secure the railway, and we think that the land might be utilized for this purpose, either in the one way or the other; though, for ourselves, we should much prefer that the road were to be built by the Government, as thereby excellence of construction would be better guaranteed, and the management of the Crown domain set apart towards defraying the cost would be regulated with the view to promote settlement rather than to realize a large amount of money. At all events, the cry of "land monopoly" and all danger of monopoly would be avoided, which is no small recommendation in favour of the course we have proposed.

It would certainly be gratifying could the Imperial guarantee be obtained for the Pacific Railway debentures. It would be useless to ask a subsidy, because the British Parliament would scout the idea. The prevailing sentiment in Britain, on the connection with Canada, would have to be radically upset before this could be hoped for. But a request for the Imperial guarantee might fairly be pressed. The amount for which it should be asked need not be more than ten times that of the Intercolonial guaranteed loan; and the advantages the Pacific road would confer upon the Empire would be twenty times as great as those to be derived from the Intercolonial. Indeed, it is only as part of the trans-continental project that the Intercolonial can fairly be said to have any great Imperial importance, because it is only by extending Canada from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and strengthening its population and commerce, that its perma-

ment importance to the Empire can now, in the altered state of affairs, be guaranteed. To connect Quebec and Halifax by railway was a grand project thirty years ago; to-day it is but forging a link in the chain which must span the Continent; and as England has guaranteed some fifty or sixty millions sterling for railways in India, of the value of which she is already fully convinced by experience, it would not seem an unreasonable demand to ask for a guarantee of half the amount to Canada, for a railway that would contribute so much to the advantage of British commerce.

In any case we hold, as the *Montreal Gazette* said the other day, that "the land must build the railway." If with the Imperial guarantee so much the better; if without it still the land is able to bear the burthen, or such portion of it as the railway itself could not repay. It is seemingly a serious obligation to undertake a fresh financial obligation equal perhaps to twenty cents per acre of all the real valuable lands of the Northwest Territory. But it should be remembered that at the outside, not more than ten millions of dollars would, or should, be expended yearly, the true policy being to open the road from the settled portion of the Dominion, through the wilderness, and to promote settlement along the route as the work progresses. After the very first year, there would be a direct return to the outlay, because lands could be sold, and no doubt would be readily taken up, at reasonable prices, according to their value and situation. The indirect benefit of such an outlay would tell immediately on the commerce of the country and the public revenue. Such a sum of money, added to the trading capital of the country year by year, with the large influx of population, which would concurrently take place, would give unwonted prosperity, and so increase the revenue by existing means and rates of taxation, that with the sale of the lands, and the appropriation of the money to the redemption of the railway debt, there need be no sensible addition to the people's burthens.

This grand scheme necessarily partakes of the character of a venturesome speculation. To be successful it would require to be pushed with energy, honesty and intelligence. The fostering of immigration

would be an indispensable condition of its success, and the bending of the whole national effort to the accomplishment of this particular and would involve the practice of rigid prudence and economy in every other direction. To incur even a portion of the debt and delay the pushing forward of the road, at the points most available for immediate settlement, would be to court disaster and defeat. But with intelligent management and by proceeding cautiously at first, there is every probability in the entire success of such a project, if the Government had, as we said before, "the dash and courage" to take it in hand, and the people the faith to sustain them in the work.

FINANCIAL BASIS.

NORTH WEST LANDS—VALUE—IMMIGRATION
—TRAFFIC, &C.

LETTER III.

To the Editor of the Gazette.

SIR,—In my last, I concluded with an incidental allusion to the *imperial* considerations which invest this subject. Four and a half years ago, in other columns in our metropolitan press, under the caption, "A British Pacific Railway — an Imperial Necessity," I laid down my humble views of the subject, in a manner to call forth, at least, editorial recognition, but with the remark—a true one—that it would require much to move England to the work. It has required much, and requires much more still. The scheme, thanks to Sir Hugh Allan and those who moved in the matter with him, has been on "Chango," and, on its merits, practically received, though, for the moment, placed in abeyance. Sufficient at least has been accorded to it to inspire hope in England's "money bags." But to proceed to state my proposition briefly.

The work in question is not only a commercial, but *quoad* British national interests, is a military—an imperial necessity; certainly as much so as the Intercolonial Railway. It should therefore be constructed on the same principle, and in like manner, *without land grants*, and solely on the financial resources of the power or powers immediately concerned. I say "without land grant," because—

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1. The land in question, as I understand British government, though nominally "Crown Domain," is held but in *administrative* duty and in *national trust*: trust, not for alienation in mass to parties—foreign persons or bodies corporate mayhap, but for the settlement of British subjects in the manner most conducive to national purposes.

2. All experience in British North America, and if I mistake not, in Australia, has proved, that large land grants to companies of capitalists are obstructive to speedy extension of settlement. The Plutocracy who invest in such "fancy stocks" ever, naturally, wait for a "rise," until rudely forced to give way by some such motor as a sale for municipal taxes—a motor itself the creature of settlement.

3. The creation, artificially, of a large and predominating *class* interest, and that, more particularly of a landed proprietary, is antagonistic to that individual liberty, which is the inherent right of citizenship in the new great land Columbus found, and on which the British flag waves with no diminished freedom.

4. The cost of the work in question, say, even \$120,000,000, or more, is within the financial resources, without risk or strain, of Canada or Britain, and even of Canada alone, with Britain's guarantee, in whole or in part, *pro forma*.

How? it will be asked. Thus—I answer.

For basis of operations, Canada, in her North West territories, and in British Columbia, as per agreement, *ad hoc*, has fully half a million of square miles (332,000,000) acres of lands* of large economic value, an area requiring but a railway to give current, life, and development to its boundless treasures. The moment such highway is made, every acre will average five dollars in value, and in five years after, double that, say \$3,000,000,000 (three thousand million dollars), and more, for the coal measures, vast and good, are beyond estimate. Such heritage—heritage of *future* as well as of the present generation, is for settlement in *due* course, by a proper system of immigration under governmental control and its immediate superintendence,

*VALUE OF LANDS.—The details of my estimates of economic areas in our North West Territories, "Hupert's Land" and British Columbia are given, in geographic designations, under the heads "North West Territories" and "British Columbia," in "Lovell's Gazetteer of British North America,"—a work published about a year ago. The same information, but in more extended terms, and with abundant reference to the

as an important function proper to our new Dominion.

On this land, for its improvement, I would propose an *hypothecation* for payment of Dominion debentures carrying 6 per cent interest, and 2 per cent for sinking fund, per annum, and running twenty-five years. From what I know, personally, of the land and its value, I feel assured, that after the first year or two of the commencement of the work, land sales would amply pay such interest and per centage of sinking fund.

The Imperial Government could not fairly refuse to give its guarantee, at least in some fair measure, to Dominion debentures for *such* a work.

Yours,

A BRITISH AMERICAN,

(M. McLEOD.)

December 26, 1873.

(*Montreal Gazette*, Jan. 1874.)

LETTER IV.

To the Editor of the Gazette.

SIR,—One point more, and I shall close this obtrusion on your generous columns.

But first, in supplement to what I advanced in my last as to hypothecation for railway debt, I would, to the lands (*i. e.*, wheat and pasture lands, with their invaluable coal measures and other mineral wealth) add the *Railway* itself, from its initiation, and as finished, in section after section, as a subject for mortgage; the Winnipeg and Pembina and Nepigon or Thunder Bay branches to be considered as integral parts of the main line. Such security ought to be beyond all cavil.

As to the time proposed for payment of principal, viz., twenty-five years, it has struck me since writing that, inasmuch as the next and the following generations will benefit most from the work, it would be but just to the present to leave to such beneficiaries the payment of the bulk of such principal, in so far as that can be done by debentures running beyond twenty-five years, say from thirty to forty years, and with, of course, a corresponding diminution of per centage for sinking fund.

sources of information on the subject," viz., the journals, reports, &c., of my father, and other partners and chief officers of the Hudson's Bay Company, and correspondence from all quarters of the Hudson's Bay Company's Territories with my father, when in charge of central and important posts, is given in the appendix to my work of spring, 1872, "Peace River," published in Ottawa. Besides all this, I could and do speak

The annual amount required, if the work has to be done within seven years, would (on each of such annual instalments, supposing them equal), be only about a million and a half of dollars per annum—only three times as much as the comparatively little, old and exhausted Province of Quebec has just realized out of her "Crown Lands" during the last year. Dominion Crown Land sales may, in two years after the commencement of our Pacific Railway, be ten-fold—certainly five-fold—that amount. But to come to my last point.

IMMIGRATION.

On this head, under the very special circumstances of the case, it is impossible to advance ought but predicate—which, of course, might be objected to as matter for "financial basis." Still, we have, in the recorded flow of this gulf stream of humanity to our ever hopeful shores, "something to go by," even for financial estimate." In that way a minimum, or even a fair medium, may be struck, as to determined results. But that does not, and cannot in effect meet our case—the problem before us of an abnormal, and, probably, super-excited migration of peoples, in considerable masses, from Europe and Asia. Manitoba, of the moment, even though unroaded, isolated, and to general emigration comparatively inaccessible, is evidence of this. Her Winnipeg of 1870—a hamlet of 300—is now a city of 5,000. What will the in-pour of immigration, from East, West and South be when the gates of ready access, by steam ways, are opened? No one can say with certainty; and speculation, on the factors and incidents of the hour before it, on this theme, may well start at its own shadow—its own honest forecaste.

From personal knowledge of most of the vast region in question. All exploration and report of travel since in those "Wild North Lands," such as the report, full, faithful and exhaustive of Professor Macoun, the botanist (from Belleville) engaged by Mr. Sandford Fleming to examine and report on the flora and agricultural resources of our North West, from the shores of Lake Superior to the Pacific prove this. He and his companion (Mr. Horetsky) "speak," as Mr. Fleming states in his official report of 1874, "in glowing terms respecting the beauty of the country, the fertility of the soil, and the salubrity of the climate over wide areas on the eastern side of the Mountain Zone." When the travellers got on the western side winter had set in, but there was nothing found by them to indicate a less favorable flora, in the same latitudes, on the western side of the Rocky Mountains.

Captain Butler, in his admirable book of travel, "The Wild North Land," writing in 1873, says (page 358), "It will yet be found that there are ten acres of fertile land lying north of the North Saskatchewan for every one acre lying south of it."

On this subject of fertility, extent and intrinsic value of lands offered in grant for the railway, there was no difficulty

It has been calculated that every immigrant to North America, is, on average, worth \$1,000 to the State, whose revenue and natural resources and general national development, he contributes to. At that rate, one year's immigration, after our Pacific Railway shall be fairly under way in construction, might, in a sense, pay the total cash cost of the work. However, it would, probably, scarcely be advisable to assume so much in argument for "financial basis." I do so, rather in support of what, I think, would, indirectly, but in no small measure, contribute to "financial basis," viz., a liberal apportionment of fairly economic lands—good farming lands, grazing and agricultural—for *Free Land Grants*, along our first highways—say, river ways, and inland "territorial roads" (central), and also along the line of Pacific Railway proposed. Free Grants, to better themselves, are apt to buy "sale lands." There will, moreover, be ample left, for sale, for settlement, in regular course. And in the proceeds of such, with that of the various city, town and village lots, to be laid off by Government, and in the proceeds from our valuable coal lands—which, by the way, appears by one of his Acts of Parliament of last session, the Hon. Mr. McKenzie seems so anxious to throw away for comparatively nothing, to wit, "one dollar an acre," to anybody that will buy them—there will, I presume, be abundant to pay interest and sinking fund on railway cost, and that, without the sale or grant of a single acre of the Crown, the peoples' domain, to the railway company, save the strip, and perhaps adjoining wood lots (for fuel, ties, and road maintenance) along their narrow line-way of rail.

As to any plan of immigration, I have, in remarks in my pamphlet, entitled

in floating the scheme on the London Money Market. I hold evidence of the fact in the private correspondence to myself, from that quarter, in reference to the special information given in my writings on that subject, and the correctness of which it was ever in the power of capitalists in London to check, by reference to the official reports, charts and other received internal information on the subject of the Hudson's Bay Company, in their chief office in London. That Company now comprises about or over two thousand stockholders, and probably embraces a very large majority of "Dealers on London Change." Be that as it may—the men with the necessary millions to make the road were satisfied with the consideration presented, in the Land Grant, irrespective of trade speculations, and were ready at once to make the necessary advances—as the Hon. Mr. Abbott stated when examined on the Royal Commission, *ad hoc*, it was only owing to the sudden distrust (inspired by agencies opposed to the work) as to the ability of the Government (Dominion) of the day to continue to hold its political power, in face of the combination against it—combinations avowedly to defeat the project as then laid—that they failed to succeed!

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"Peace River," with its map, with yellow lines indicating what I would consider the best routes to adopt for "territorial roads," assumed that the subject is of such primary importance to the Dominion, that it had better be left to the control, entirely, even in working detail, of the Government. Unfortunately (but perhaps unavoidably) Provincial co-operation is now invoked. The experiment may succeed. It is to be hoped it will. But there will always this to be said of it. That for *financial* considerations, the entire control of a general scheme of immigration, in the hands of the Dominion Government, free from any possible disturbing element in the shape of Provincial jealousy or antagonism, would inspire more confidence, in the money market, than a divided or *quasi* divided holding by the various Governments.

On this subject, if, as may be the case, there be a clash of interests between the Dominion and Provincial Governments, on the face of the Union Act of B. N. A. it should, in its importance to all interests involved, viz., Imperial, as well as Dominion and Provincial, be rectified, and permanent remedy be at once established by Imperial Act of Parliament.

The object to be more immediately sought in this direction is, that the emigrant from any land, foreign or "home," shall feel assured, when he buys his ticket for Canada settlement, that he has a *national* guarantee for what it contracts, on its face, viz., assured transit, and choice, on view, of available settlement land.

BRITISH (IMPERIAL) TRADE RETURNS.

(Last—A.D. 1873.)

CHINA, exclusive of Hong Kong and Macao—
Page 263.

Imports from ..	£12,454,234 stg.
Exports (United Kingdom) to.	4,882,701 "
" (Foreign and Colonial).	5,017,334 "
	£22,354,269 " say \$111,771,345

CHINA, including Hong Kong and Macao.

Imports from ..	£13,303,117 stg.
Exports (U. K.)	8,294,669 "
" (F. & C.)	8,627,599 "
	£30,225,385 " say \$151,126,975

HONG KONG—Pages 257-8.

Imports from ..	£ 783,457 stg.
Exports (U. K.)	
to.....	3,411,968 "
" (F. & C.)	
to.....	3,610,265 "
	£7,805,390 " say \$39,026,950

JAPAN.

Imports from ..	£ 5,611,340 stg.
Exports (U. K.)	
to.....	1,680,017 "
" (F. & C.)	
to.....	1,884,145 "
	£9,175,502 " say \$45,877,500

ISLANDS IN THE PACIFIC.

Imports.....	£ 47,492 stg.
Exports (U. K.)..	23,716 "
" (F. & C.)	101,317 "
	£172,525 " say \$861,625

STRAITS SETTLEMENTS—Pages 257-8.

Imports from ..	£3,464,279 stg.
Exports (U. K.)	
to.....	2,101,221 "
" (F. & C.)	
to.....	2,170,819 "
	£7,786,319 " say \$38,681,595

AUSTRALIAN COLONIES.

VICTORIA—Pages 260-1.

Imports from (exclusive of gold).....	£ 5,743,141 stg.
Exports (U. K.)	5,643,544 "
" (F. & C.)	7,286,104 "
	£19,672,789 " say \$78,363,945

NEW SOUTH WALES—Pages 262-3.

Imports from (exclusive of gold).....	£ 3,696,019 stg.
Exports (U. K.)	4,333,719 "
" (F. & C.)	£4,723,729 "
	£12,753,467 " say \$63,767,335

SOUTH AUSTRALIA—Page 259.

Imports (exclusive of gold).	£3,214,869 stg.
Exports (U. K.)	2,016,843 "
" (F. & C.)	2,228,313 "
	£7,450,025 " say \$37,330,525

QUEENSLAND—Page 269.

Imports from (exclusive of gold).....	£871,235 stg.
Exports (U. K.)	815,638 "
" (F. & C.)	890,828 "
	£2,577,701 " say \$2,577,701

WEST AUSTRALIA—Page 258.

Imports from..	£162,085	stg
Exports (U K)	167,368	“
“ (F & C)	185,102	“
	£514,555	“ say \$2,572,775

TASMANIA—Pages 265.

Imports	£425,375	stg
Exports (U K)...	271,478	“
“ (F & C)	306,392	“
	£1,003,730	“ say \$5,016,225

NEW ZEALAND—Page 266.

Imports (exclusive of gold).	£3,149,970	stg
Exports (U K)	3,361,562	“
“ (F & C)	3,645,168	“
	£10,156,700	“ say \$50,783,500

“Gold,” which as a natural product of Australia and New Zealand, is very properly, referred to under head “Import,” from the Australian Colonies and New Zealand to Great Britain, can only be estimated approximately (as the “bullion” return is notoriously defective) by allowing for it, the difference between Imports (as above given) and exports, and which I render thus:

Gold Colonies, viz.: Victoria, New South Wales, South Australia, Queensland, and New Zealand—as per tables aforesaid:		
Total Exports	£35,915,071	stg., say \$179,575,355
Total Imports (exclusive of gold)	16,675,934	“ “ 83,374,670

Total Gold Imports	£19,240,137	“ “ \$96,200,685
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SUMMARY of Australian Gold Colonies and New Zealand Trade.

Total Import (exclusive of gold)	£15,675,934	stg., say \$ 83,374,670
Total Import gold	19,240,137	“ “ 96,200,685
	£35,915,071	“ “ \$179,575,355
Total Export (as above)	£35,915,071	“ “ 179,575,355
	£71,930,142	“ “ 359,150,710

These Colonies have always paid 20 shillings in the £. They do so still.

Add for Australian Colonies not producing gold.

TASMANIA as above	£ 1,003,730	stg, say \$ 5,016,225
WEST AUSTRALIA as above.	514,555	“ “ 2,572,775

Total Aust. C. and New Zealand	£73,448,427	“ “ \$366,739,710
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NOTE.—The marked and continuous progress and prosperity of these Colonies preclude any assumption of “balance of trade” against them. Their rate of progress during the past decade, warrant an estimate of 50 per cent. in advance, in the next five years.

GENERAL SUMMARY OF BRITISH PACIFIC TRADE.

China, including Hong Kong and Macao	\$151,126,975
Japan	45,877,500
Islands in the Pacific	861,625
Straits Settlements	38,681,595
Australian Colonies and New Zealand	366,739,710
Total	\$502,287,405

UNITED STATES TRADE RETURNS.

(Last A.D. 1873-4 to June 30, 1874.)

Pacific, Eastern, and Australian Trade.

Extracts from Commerce and Navigation Returns of 1874.

Page 433.

JAPAN—Trade at Free Ports A.D. 1873.

Amount stated in Japanese “Yens” and fractional “sens.” The former is equivalent to the American dollar (gold). The latter I omit:

IMPORTS from.		
Specific	21,340,785	yens
Ad Valorem	4,722,160	“
Duty free	2,244,717	“
Department Stores	797,394	
		say \$29,105,056

EXPORTS.		
Specific	18,337,850	
Ad Valorem	1,835,318	
Duty free	644,849	
	20,818,017	\$49,923,073

NOTE.—This total is what my addition makes it, but in this blue book it is given at “21,217,481” a difference of

Total	\$50,322,547
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Page 124.

CHINA AND JAPAN.

Note by Author.—There is no separate entry under head China, at least I could not find one.

Imports from	\$36,445,314
Exports (Domestic)	15,000,751
“ (Foreign)	2,775,493
	\$54,221,554

This, I take it, does not include the special entry as to the “Free Ports,” but is principally, probably almost wholly, as to China trade, with some accidental and exceptional trade, en route within Japanese waters.

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SANDWICH ISLANDS.	
Imports	\$1,316,270
Exports (Domestic)	654,103
" (Foreign)	43,088
	\$2,013,461

" BRITISH EAST INDIES AND AUSTRALIA."
(Thus lumped in official report.)

Imports from	\$19,998,165
Exports (Domestic)	4,082,747
" (Foreign)	66,695
	\$25,147,607

DUTCH EAST INDIES.

Imports from	\$7,556,962
Exports (Domestic)	255,134
	\$7,812,088

BULLION.

CHINA AND JAPAN.

Imports from	\$ 1,349,761
Exports to	11,235,694
Re-export	2,759,726
	\$15,395,181

SUMMARY OF TOTALS.

Japanese Free Ports	\$ 50,322,547
China and Japan	54,221,554
Sandwich Islands	2,013,461
British East Indies and Australia..	25,147,607
Dutch East Indies	7,812,088
Bullion—China and Japan	15,395,181

Total

ADD

British Pacific Trade Total as aforesaid	\$502,287,405
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Present Total of North and South
Pacific Trade

At the present rate of progress of the Pacific Trade, it would, in five years (before which, of course, the Railway could scarcely be built), probably rise to a thousand million of dollars. On that, less than one per cent. would "run" the road, 2 per cent. pay cost, and 3 per cent. give good dividends on stock—verifying my estimate *ad hoc* in my Britannian's letter 8 of 1869, as given above.

In relation to the above authentic data, it is to be remarked that they do not include that, on the whole, not inconsiderable trade in the two Pacifics which customs returns but very imperfectly represent, especially as to value.

The most marked feature in the above tables is the exhibit of enormous balance of trade, in products and manufactures, against both Britain and the United States, and yet it is much less than it used to be. Both pay largely, most largely, in coin (principally silver, I believe) for their imports from China and Japan.

This balance must, I humbly consider, naturally diminish, with the increased facility of communication with those peoples, and with the removal of that "Chinese wall" of non-communication with foreigners which present Chinese emigration and Japanese liberalism in government, are fast demolishing in that quarter. The change in this respect within the last three years is marvellous, and is one of the most pleasing and encouraging of human movements, *en masse*, in the true direction, in the history of the human race—a movement which, all, however indirectly concerned, should take part in, and should, to best ability, assist.

To show its progress (rate of progress) a comparative table of past annual trade returns would be necessary—but these I cannot here well give, without encumbering what, I feel, is already too much encumbered. On this point, therefore, I must refer the reader to the trade returns in question.

But in addition to these official data, I might legitimately point to certain notable facts, stated in press, in relation to the American Pacific Transit Trade, which indicate a growth and extent of such trade, and its enormous profits, beyond all recorded calculation.

1. The United States Government demand from that part (probably about a half) of the transcontinental railway called the Union Pacific, over one million dollars as the claim ("5 per cent") of the Government (on condition of subsidy, I presume,) on the nett returns of the road. This, I take it, is for one year—the last. The other portion of the road ("Pacific Central") from San Francisco westward, may, for the argument, be fairly assumed to have realized to the same extent. This would represent an annual nett revenue of forty million dollars—just about what I calculated in my Britannian's letter No. 8, in June, 1869, five and a half years ago, when really, I had not much of booked fact to go on.

And here I feel tempted to state a fact somewhat personal and therefore objectionable perhaps, but which may explain in some measure, how, I, an humble individual in northern Canada, and not in trade, should venture to thus write on such a subject.

Twenty-four years ago I wrote the

BRITISH

\$151,126,975
45,877,500
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38,681,595
366,739,710
\$502,287,405

RETURNS.

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M. S. all ready for publication, of a small work on Japan, with a glossary of over five hundred Japanese words and phrases in ordinary use, there. The work was not published, however, because the magnificent and very full United States Government report, on Japan, of the day, on the conclusion of the Commodore Preble expedition to that country for the release of certain American shipwrecked mariners, held in confinement, there, took the ground from me.

In writing up the work I had to look into all available works on Japan, and the trade—and general foreign policy of that country, and also of its neighbour China. I was drawn to the little (a leisure) task, by the story, with a few notes, and a well told narration from an old native born British Columbian, Mr. Ranald McDonald, son of the late Chief Factor Archibald McDonald, of his adventures, in an eleven months residence in Japan. Let me give his story, briefly, as I gave it once before in my Britannicus letter No. 7, giving an account of his exploration and charter right for a waggon road with tollage from Bellacoola (Pacific tide water) to Cariboo, in 1862.

RANALD McDONALD'S ADVENTURE IN JAPAN.

"McDonald, born in Astoria, educated in Red River, and Canada, in sheer adventure, took passage in a whaleship bound for the North Pacific waters, on the express stipulation that when the ship should be off the coast of Japan he was to be permitted to leave her, in the pinnace or small boat he bargained for and took. This was about thirty years ago, when the rigour of the Japanese decretal of exclusion was carried in utmost rigour even against shipwrecked mariners. McDonald presented himself as a cast-away. His total baggage was a small box, with his books, viz.: Bible, Euclid, histories, &c. for his idea was if spared, to teach, and himself learn. He was conveyed, by land and sea, from Yesso, the extreme north of Japan to Nagasaki, in the South, the then sole port open to any foreigners, and that only to the Dutch, and even to them, under very close restrictions. There, he was put to a series of most severe ordeals of his courage, veracity and motives. He faced all, and braved all, with great tact, though at times, as he

told me, he thought every moment they would chop off his head. At last, in assembled court, full of armoured pageantry, he was told to bow his head, like all the other people, including all the "nobles" present to the ground. At a sign, all did so: McDonald alone, excepted, who sat staring at the Governor: at last, in a burst of admiration, his Excellency exclaimed, in Japanese, "You have a big heart." From that hour he "lived in clover," as Hildroth (pages 502-3) says of him, making him, however, as the historian says, "teach them English." Many years afterwards in reading of the English and American treaties with that power I recognized in the name of the chief interpreter, or one of the chief interpreters—for they always act in "double" in Japan—that, (viz., Mooryama), of McDonald's brightest and favourite pupil.* I give this episode, to show that my humble authority† is not quite a nonentity. He in his own humble way, contributed to obviate the difficulty and inconvenience of Dutch interpretation in the communication of British thought and sentiment to a people, who, of all others I know of, have the closest affinity of spirit to the British race. They, in fact, in heart and mind, are the British of the East. They require but the *iron link* to bind them in cognate bonds."

2. Another fact, worthy of notice, as indicative of the immensity, and *elan* of this new American Pacific Transit-Trade—is the enormous profit of the very first Steamship Line across the Pacific to China and Japan in connection with the railway. From the Customs record of their American Port, and from that Company's own showing their freight returns for the last year amount to about \$3,000,000 (three million of dollars)—for "passage fare" we may fairly add, I presume, \$2,000,000 more.

In addition to that we have the significant fact that the Company, before being two years in existence, I think, had a million of dollars, or about that, to spare, for "crumbs" in Congress, to the "needy" and actually so spending it, yet grew rich, still richer.

3. A second Pacific Steamship Line, for

* The same, I believe, who, about 25 years afterwards was first Ambassador of State, for Japan, at Washington.

† "Authority" as to the Bellacoola route as the best across British Columbia to Pacific Port, and as to the difficulties—"impossibilities" as he termed them—of the Butte Inlet route for a "waggon road, or even mule trail."

the same trade has just been started with a capital of \$10,000,000, paid up—and that principally, if not wholly, in California alone.

4. We have just had, in the report of interview of the Delegation of leading merchants in the Tea Trade of Canada, with the Hon. Mr. Cartwright, as Finance Minister, a most intelligent and lucid, and, I would say startling exposition of not only what Canada is neglecting and losing every day, but of the present, actual and fast growing mischief to Canadian Trade in general as well as in Tea from China and Japan.

Tea, as we all know, is what the Trade calls "a leading article," and draws, into its own groove and working, very much besides, even in other branches of trade.

The gentlemen from Montreal, Hamilton, Brantford and London Boards of Trade who composed that delegation, were, so far as I know, of all political parties, some of them—such as Mr. Cramp, a prominent supporter of the present Ministry. What do they say?

Extracts from Report of Interview, 22nd Jan. 1875.

Hon. Mr. CARTWRIGHT—What is the exact estimate of the tonnage you make?

Mr. BROWN (of Hamilton "spokesman") said somewhere in the neighborhood of 5,000 tons, or ten millions of pounds. The American Government had serious intentions of re-imposing duties on tea and coffee, and if it occurred it would make the matter one of comparative ease for the Dominion Government to impose the proposed tariff.

Hon. Mr. CARTWRIGHT—Would you import the whole five thousand tons?

Mr. BROWN said no, the English market supplied a good deal of our teas.

Hon. Mr. CARTWRIGHT—How much do you suppose would come direct?

Mr. BROWN said he was not prepared to say the relative quantity, but Mr. Cramp, of Montreal, could. As long as the policy of the Government would be to develop the direct China trade, the great bulk would come from China.

Mr. GILLARD (of Hamilton) said that the Custom House returns at Hamilton showed that the last nine months of 1873, that city, in round figures, imported from Great Britain 170,000 pounds of green tea;

from China, 181,000 pounds; and the United States, 89,000 pounds; then for the corresponding nine months of 1874, the imports of the same port were from Great Britain, 61,000; from China, 133,000 pounds, and from the United States, 217,000 pounds; showing a decreased import from the Great Britain of twenty-five per cent.; from China, thirty per cent.; and from the United States an *increased import* of 140 per cent. over 1873, demonstrating clearly that the direct import trade is fast falling back into the hands of the New York merchants.

Mr. BROWN said in general terms they claimed that abolition of this duty had seriously effected the trade between Canada and China, and they now asked for fair play at the hands of the Government as Canadian importers.

Hon. Mr. CARTWRIGHT—The tea you import from China is usually green, and the black tea is imported from Great Britain?

Mr. CRAMP said the large consumption of tea in Canada was green tea, but both green and black tea were imported from China as well as from Japan by Canadian importers. He thought the importation of black tea from England was quite as unnatural as the importation of green tea from there. They felt that the present condition of the law in the United States was singularly unjust towards Canada. It was particularly aimed at Canada. The importers therefore felt that they should be protected by the Dominion Government. They were quite willing to let the Americans have the use of our markets if they would let us have the use of theirs.—This ten per cent. may be said not to be in the interest of consumers. He thought they could show, however, that the imposition of this ten per cent. tax against the United States would not increase the cost of tea to consumers in Canada, but would simply transfer the tea trade from the United States to Canada and England. It might be said why then did they fear United States competition?—but it turned entirely on small matters such as commission, storage, transfers, &c. If the present state of affairs were permitted to continue without any advantage to the consumer, they would let the United States take the whole China trade which should be in the hands of Canadians. It could not be said that the importers wanted to make money out of the

consumer by this move, as he did not think it would raise the price of tea one penny in the pound, if anything. Whenever the Americans were disposed to let Canadians into their markets, he did not think there is a man in Canada who would want to secure a monopoly. Canadian tea importers had all lost a great deal of money by the late change in the tariff.

Hon. Mr. CARTWRIGHT—The total value of tea imported is three or four millions of dollars.

Mr. ROBERTSON said it averaged about 33cts per pound.

Hon. Mr. BURPEE—I think the returns will show last years' importation was about thirteen million pounds, seven millions and a half of green tea and five millions and a half, nearly one million and a half of which came from the United States.

Mr. CRAMP (of Montreal) said the Canadian importers did not import all their teas into Canada now. They imported large amounts into New York, where they allowed it to remain in bond and imported it into Canada as they required it, so as to take advantage of the rise and fall in the American market, and what came in that way into Canada was classed as American tea.

Hon. Mr. BURPEE said it was entered for the country from which it came.

Hon. Mr. CARTWRIGHT said he did not suppose Canadian importers look so much at the four or five thousand tons of shipping as to the control of the tea trade.

Mr. CRAMP thought if this ten per cent. having been left off was put on again, the Americans would seriously consider the question of taking off their ten per cent., as they valued much the trade with Canada, and if we could get admission to their market through that change instead of the four or five thousand tons we now import into Canada, we might import very largely to supply the Western States.

Hon. Mr. CARTWRIGHT said he understood that the Americans were extending their trade east from the Pacific.

Mr. ROBERTSON said they claimed that this ten per cent. duty would not increase the price of tea to the consumer. The tendency was not to make large profits or losses under peculiar circumstances, but it was a continuous thing which was leading New York to be the centre of distribution of teas for all Canada. The American and Canadian importers purchased their

teas in the market. They were delivered equally cheap in Canada and the United States, and as long as the two markets kept at the same level the merchants were on the same footing, but Canadian importers had to suffer from the fluctuation of the American markets. If trade were depressed in the United States and good in Canada, the Americans immediately flooded our market and brought it down. If prices raised in the United States the American merchants had the advantage of it, whilst Canadian merchants were kept out of it by the ten per cent. tariff.

Mr. CARTWRIGHT said he quite saw the loss to Canadian importers, but that was not the point.

Mr. BROWN contended that the competition between importers in Canada was sufficiently keen to protect the consumer in the price he will have to pay.

Hon. Mr. CARTWRIGHT said that in the last year in which they had the ten per cent. tariff, that in spite of it we imported nearly one million and a half pounds of green tea from the United States, paying the ten per cent. duty on it, which was *prima facie* evidence that the price of tea was raised to the consumer, as the consumer had to pay that duty.

Mr. GILLARD said his experience was that their importations were not half as large now as they would be if they had a market for their teas. There were ten importers in the United States now for the one there used to be, and Canadians had to compete against the most speculative market in the world. They had energy and enterprise enough, however, to meet the Americans if their markets were thrown open to us. The consumer did not reap any advantage where the fluctuations in the markets were spasmodic.

Hon. Mr. CARTWRIGHT—If it were you on one side and the American on the other I would not have two words to say on the matter, but the third party, the Canadian tea consuming public, has to be consulted. How many distinct cargoes of tea were imported into Montreal for the year ended the 30th June, 1874?

Mr. CRAMP said he could not tell. A few years ago it was an important interest, but it had now died nearly out. There were plenty of means and plenty of enterprise to do this trade, but they were forced by legislation to employ New York merchants

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to import for them. A large amount of their own individual trade had been done in New York lately.

Mr. GILLARD said they would have lost a great deal of money on their teas this year if they had not left them in New York in consequence of the number of competing merchants who came in here from the United States.

Mr. BROWN—We claim that by the abolition of this duty a serious injury has been done to the direct trade with China. We also believe that its reimposition—as we cannot get equal rights from the United States—would revive the material interests of our merchants. We also particularly claim that the return to the old state of affairs, the reimposition of the ten per cent. duty, would practically benefit the consumer, and from our own experience in Canada in the past we cannot refuse to accept the very high authority of the President of the United States, that in their country the consumer is not benefited in any manner by the abolition of the duty. I am free to confess that I was one with many others in the country who were gratified with the idea of a free breakfast table, but whenever the profit is made in the passage from China to Canada it certainly does not reach the consumer. I am sure that from the sentiments I heard expressed in the west, particularly from the expressions of public opinion, that we have too high a feeling of fair play to advance our peculiar views with regard to personal interests if they were detrimental to the interests of the country." * *

I give these facts somewhat at length, and as bearing on the question of policy as well as the subject more immediately in hand under this caption of "Financial Basis," but their importance justifies them.

5. Mail and military service.

6. The statistics first above given as to the Pacific Trade of Great Britain and the United States, apply, of course, only to those countries. But on this general subject of "through transit trade," the trade of all Europe with the further "Orient" and with all Pacific parages, is to be taken into consideration.

The population of Continental Europe relatively to that of Britain may be laid at ten to one, and its contribution to an Americo-transcontinental transit trade may

certainly be assumed as equal to that of Great Britain.

LOCAL TRAFFIC.

By the time the railway, from Ocean to Ocean, would be finished, at least a million of inhabitants, industrious settlers, would be living along its way, and would contribute some amount of local traffic. Two dollars per head per annum is, I believe, the usual estimate on this score. Say two millions on local traffic, at the very start.

More, much more, under this general head of probable traffic, might be advanced in support of the scheme—but in the face of the actualities and portentous facts above referred to, and in view of their significance to us of Canada, and to Britain herself, the question, in trumpet tone, arises

WHY NEGLECT THIS THING ?

CONSTRUCTION AND LINE—NATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

(*Montreal Gazette 19 Dec. 1873.*)

LETTER II.

To the Editor of the Gazette.

SIR,—As to the immediate construction of a railway from Winnipeg to Pembina, that, all must admit, is of first necessity. The "Allan Contract," we all know, promised it for 1874. As a mere off-shoot or branch of the main line—main line from Halifax to Pacific—it could no more affect the national or military character of that Imperial highway than does any one of our inter-American railway connections affect or threaten our present Grand Trunk or the Intercolonial Railway. The line, in its whole length, by its position—back of settlement, and with the St. Lawrence and the peopled breadth of Canada and our Indian plains between it and the border is impregnable. But of course, as any one may see, to dispense for "all time," with a line wholly on Canadian soil, between Winnipeg and the Ontario system of railway would be to practically Americanize, not only such piece of road, but all westward to the Pacific. On this point, as you well show by reference to the predictions of the *Globe* (Toronto) itself, both parties—all parties—are agreed.

But "faith must at once be kept with British Columbia," says the new Premier. Certainly. That is just what, with every

possible, and with wondrous energy, was being done by those who, with an intelligent sense of the need, had undertaken the mighty work, when, in stealth and in darkness, the spoiler came by and stopped them. At the moment almost the entire force of the Survey staff was in British Columbia, seeking exhaustively, a choice of routes feasible. One route, ascertained by instrumental survey, viz, that to the mouth of the Fraser—a point only about half an hour's steaming from Puget Sound (only six miles from the American boundary) would answer the American Company admirably. Hence the "grab,"—but there are other considerations—To get to Puget Sound—a harbour of harbours, the finest in the world, the American line would, from the east side of the Rocky Mountains east, I estimate, about twenty million dollars more than our line from Jasper House (east side of the Rocky Mountains) to the mouth of the Fraser, say Burrard's Inlet. I know both routes, personally; the American line has to cross much higher, and broader and more ranges of mountains—regions which even the fur trade could not thoroughly penetrate save by routes most sinuous. True, there is a large land grant, and very much,—say one-half—of that from Pembina to Puget Sound, well fitted for agricultural settlement, and on the western side of the Rocky Mountain, especially near the coast, exceedingly rich in merchantable timber, as well as being good farming land, but on the other hand there is—as is admitted in pages 8 and 9 of the pamphlet prospectus of the Northern Pacific Railroad Company itself,—(page 8,) "Detached portions"—these are the very words of the book—"of the vast region tributary to the Northern Pacific Railroad, where, for the present—" (Query, *When will it be otherwise?*) "the rainfall is insufficient for most crops, and irrigation is necessary, yet even in these localities the grazing is unusually good." (Page 9,) "Not more than one-fifth of the land from Red River to Puget Sound is unsuited to cultivation, "and this fifth is largely made up of mountains covered with bunch grass "valuable timber, and filled with precious metals." As to the remark about the "bunch grass," it is to be observed that it is of very limited vertical area, not over two thousand feet, and does not cover one-half of the mountains in question. At the same time, I must

say that in the main the pamphlet in question, garish though it be, is, so far as I know the country, correct in the main.

Still, the sober truth, as established by abundant official records of experts, as to our line of projected railway via the Yellow Head Pass, proves that on every foot of the way, from Red River to the Pacific, man may live out of the abundance of the teeming earth beneath him. Even on the height (highest) of the Pass, near Abreda Lake, a survey party of 13, from choice, comfortably (wood sheltered) wintered. In fact, in every respect, in shortness, grade, coal, wood supply, in woods protective against snow drift, and every facility of working, *inter alia* freedom from Indian trouble, our line is infinitely superior to all others possible—so superior that the N. P. may well sacrifice its present all—go into bankruptcy &c., to get it, or even a partnership in the concern. All that has been shrewdly calculated, no doubt, and hence the desperate effort to get it *per fas aut nefas*.

But, it seems to me, that there is more than mere *individual* effort to wrest this national highway supreme from us* We have to look further and deeper for adequate motive" in the move against us as a British people in this matter. Whence comes that move? Why? For what?

These are questions which we all must meet, each in his respective and appointed way, and as good citizenship may call forth. In Parliament, in the Press, at the Polls, and in every legitimate manner of free discussion let it, squarely and openly, be put: What does all this mean? "Use the road for *American* purposes for *all time!*"—What does that mean? "Canada First."—What does that mean? Does it mean, Britain—our Mother-county, *last?*" "Reciprocity—everything for that."—What does that mean?" Does it mean that in this precious Canada of ours, for which Britain, our mother, has spent her gold in untold millions and given so largely and freely of her blood, her flag is to be *sold* as a rag to any* * * * * across the way?

Commerce is power. Yes! and by it, and it alone can the seas, and in the seas,

*Subsequent developments, in insolvency, show a singular connection with the Naval Department of the United States with this "Jay Cooke" railway, in the course of which, a seizure conservatory, at law of the "Iron" got for the railway and pledged to the Secretary of the Navy, to secure the Navy's deposits to the house of McCulloch, Cooke & Co., of London," was made at the time of the Jay Cook & Co. failure.

the isles, and other teeming shores be ruled. Give to the United States, with their immense material resources and wondrous vitality and enterprise, the monopoly, practically, of the transit trade between the two oceans, and they, in a trice, will cover the seas. Then, the Great Republic will "march the deep." On the other hand, let Britain, still "Mistress of the Seas," but hold and use as her own the ocean-link which her Canadian sons propose to forge her, and her flag may for another thousand years safely brave all battle and the breeze. In this sense, the work is of highest Imperial necessity—as an iron bulwark of British empire, thing great and sacred, calling for all jealous guard. On this theme I may have more to say. It is one for quick and earnest consideration and action.

Yours,
A BRITISH AMERICAN,
M. McLEOD.

Dec. 12 1873.

(*Montreal Gazette Jan. 1874.*)

EASTERN TERMINUS.

When the question of *Eastern Terminus* of our Pacific Railway came up, some two years ago or more, Mr. Blake, in emphatic vaunt, in his place in our Commons, declared, after determination by the House for the south side of Lake Nipissing, that he would yet bring the line round by the west side of the Lake. The Chief Engineer (Mr. Fleming) had, I understood, given *en connaissance* his opinion against the Western side as being full of difficulties (transverse rock, ridges, &c.) and out of the direct line from extreme northern objective point to nearest seaport. However, Mr. Blake, speaking for *Western Ontario*, and more particularly Toronto, had a reason, and it was obviously this. From the physical features of the country, and especially in face of that fifteen hundred feet height between the Ottawa Valley and the Huron watershed on the line of route in air line, to nearest seaport and to which I have already alluded; a railway terminus at the west end of Lake Nipissing, or any where near they would, if not impracticable or inaccessible to Eastern railway, be most favorable for Toronto, the natural trend of railway route from such western point being that way. Moreover, it would, to Quebec

or eastern railways, present a greater breadth of Ontario to be got or bought (if possible) and to be traversed under an Ontario charter (if procurable.) In fact, a Western Nipissing terminus would practically bend the main line to Toronto and thereby *lengthen it over three hundred miles*: an elongation which would be fatal to at least one distinctive excellence in our route, viz: shortness beyond all others possible, north of the Gulf of Mexico. Such a project is not in *Dominion* interest, however well it will serve Toronto, New York, and other foreign American behests. True, the present Premier, in the immediate interest of the Northern Pacific Railway Company (a bankrupt concern with just "assets" enough to trouble us) speaks of starting from Pembina and going thence only westwards for "all time", as the "organ" gives forth,—but still, in alternative, Mr. Blake's threat aforesaid, rings in our ear. We here, we see, we feel the dangers of the hour, and, as need be, shall act. Suddenly, in coward, silent cunning, our very polls are sprung on us. So be it!

Yours,
A BRITISH AMERICAN.

(M. McLEOD.)

December 31, 1873.

EASTERN RAILWAY CONNECTIONS.

(*Montreal Gazette 5 Oct. 1874.*)

PACIFIC RAILWAY TERMINUS (EASTERN)—
CHANGE BY MR. MACKENZIE—QUEBEC
RULED OUT.

To the Editor of the Gazette.

SIR,—According to the reported answer of Mr. Mackenzie to the deputation of the other day requesting that "before a subsidy should be granted to any railway connecting with the Eastern terminus of the Canada Pacific Railway through the Ottawa Valley, a thorough examination of the North Shore route through Pontiac should be made from Almer to Nipissing," it seems that the point fixed by Parliament, some three years ago, for Eastern Terminus, viz., on the South side, (i. e. Shore) of Lake Nipissing, is, in the mind's eye of this most singular "Premier," and by his (or Mr. Brown's) simple "*sic volo, sic jubeo*," to be removed 50 miles, South—

50 miles nearer *Toronto*—and all that distance off the direct line to nearest Canadian seaport. Why not make the Terminus in *Toronto*, at once, *Mr. Brown!* Then *New York* would be nearest sea-port, the year through, and our great railway interoceanic would, essentially, be truly *American*, for all practical purposes. There are crooks enough already in the "*Mackenzie Line*,"—so called—and there can be no wisdom in making it more "*zany*" or serpentine. We want a line straight and short as possible.

But there is another important consideration in this matter. The digression proposed would place the Terminus in question on the western slope of the range of elevated land between the *Ottawa Valley* and the *Huron watershed*, a range rising to about two thousand feet above the sea (1,500 feet above the *Ottawa River*) as shown by the Geological Reports, with topographical charts of Sir *William Logan*, in 1856-7 and 8. *The natural trend of railway route from such point is southwards towards Toronto. In this light, the change would be a gigantic fraud; a trick so monstrous and startling, as to call for the most energetic resistance not only by the Province of Quebec but by all concerned in the general interests of the scheme, and more especially by the people of the Ottawa Valley (both sides), and by all, in fact, east of Toronto.*

Unfortunately, little is known of the physical features of the region in question—little known even by members of Parliament—but there, in authentic blue book, are the leading physical facts I state. But in any case, this change of terminus, in the teeth of what Parliament has determined on this point, cannot be legally made by the mere *ipse dixit* of even an "Order in Council." As to the refusal by *Mr. Mackenzie* to recognize, by Dominion subsidy, *Ottawa North* as part of *Canada* proper in the minion field of railway enterprise in connection with our proposed *Pacific Trunk Line*, all I shall at present say is, that *Quebec*, (the *Port of Quebec*) and *Montreal*, with their joint line of railway in course of rapid construction from the *Port of Quebec* to *Nipissing Terrain* as declared by Parliament should see to this. A *deni de justice* so glaring, so insulting in fact, should rouse the whole Province of *Quebec* as one man in assertion and vindication of right. But, alas! that whole magnificent stretch from

Quebec to near *Nipissing*—nearly 500 miles—continuous, of *Quebec* counties of immense natural resources of wealth, and requiring but railway for developement, has not a single representative in the Dominion Cabinet. The "*British*" of this Province have for "*rep*" at the Council Board only *Mr. Huntington!*—of the "*American Border*"; the *habitué* of the *Jay Cooke & Co.* offices of the United States, &c., &c. As to the French members in the Cabinet, they, evidently, count as *nil*, or as mere crew under the command of *Commodore-General Brown*, who with his *Lieutenant Mackenzie*, is now sailing our *Ship of State* into *American* waters.

More anon, perhaps.

Yours, BRITANNICUS.

Montreal, 28th, September, 1874.

SECOND DEPUTATION, viz: From the *Quebec North Shore Railway Company*, and the *Montreal Northern Colonization Railway Company*.

(*Montreal Gazette*, 14th Dec., 1874.)

CANADIAN PACIFIC RAILWAY—EASTERN TERMINUS CONNECTIONS.

To the Editor of the Gazette.

SIR,—A railway meeting, joint of the Boards of Directors of the *North Shore Railway* and the *Montreal Northern Colonization Railway Companies* has just been held in *Quebec*, and at which several resolutions in their common interest were adopted, and one appointing a deputation to the Premier of the Dominion Government for the presentation of a memorial on their behalf. Considering the nature, extent and importance of the interests involved, it may, I think, be fairly said that no more important meeting, save that for the Confederation of *Canada*, has been held in *British North America*. These two Boards represent, in effect, the Province of *Quebec* in a supreme effort, in a sense, for the justice due it in the *Federal Pact*. They represent nearly 500 miles of railway in the shortest and best possible line from the eastern terminus in question, as fixed by Act of Parliament, to nearest Canadian seaports—*Montreal* and *Quebec*.

The work, to the amount of about \$2,000,000 or, perhaps, double that, is already far advanced, and has been so, and is still

being advanced on *solely Provincial resources*, viz, municipal aid and governmental subsidy, in lands and money.

Essentially, however, it is a *Dominion work*, as being the *shortest and best possible* connection of the Canadian Pacific Railway with nearest Atlantic sea ports. Abundant survey, by civil engineers of highest standing, have ascertained and officially reported the fact.

On a former occasion, some two months ago, Mr. Mackenzie very emphatically gave the Ottawa and Pontiac counties delegation to understand that they need not expect any aid from "his Government," and that *he* intended to remove the Eastern Pacific Railway terminus some *fifty miles south of Lake Nipissing*.

As to the effect (inevitable) of such removal to *shunt* off the main line towards Toronto over two hundred miles *off* the direct line to nearest sea port, I wrote at some length in your columns at the time, giving, as my authority as to the physical features of the region in question, on which I so predicated, Sir William Logan's reports and accompanying topographical maps. No higher exists, nor, I believe, can exist, Mr. Mackenzie's informants to the contrary (whoever they may be) notwithstanding.

But here an important question arises, viz: Can Mr. Mackenzie (or "his Government") remove the terminus in question so far south? I humbly hold he cannot, without authorization from Parliament. Let us see what has been the legislation on this point.

The first legislation on it is to be found in section 10 of chap. 71 of 35-V, (1872), which runs thus:—"A railway, to be called 'the Canadian Pacific Railway' shall be made in conformity with the agreement referred to in the preamble to this Act, and such railway shall extend from some point on or near Lake Nipissing and on the south shore thereof, to some shore of the Pacific Ocean, both the said points to be determined by the Governor in Council, and the course and line of the said railway between the said points to be subject to the approval of the Governor in Council."

The next legislation on the point is chap. 14, sec. 1 of last session—the "Mackenzie

Act so called—which reads thus—"A railway to be called the 'Canadian Pacific Railway' shall be made from *some point* NEAR to and South of Lake Nipissing, to some point in British Columbia on the Pacific Ocean, both the said points to be determined and the course and line of the said railway to be approved of by the Government in Council."

It is to be remarked that the first of the above acts, says "ON THE SHORE" while the latter says merely "near the shore."

In connection with this it is to be borne in mind, that Mr. Leggo's report, as well as those of Messrs. Shanly & Clarke, show, authoritatively, that there is no physical obstacle, but, on the contrary, marked facility, for such work as the terminus in question and its incidental city site, "on the South Shore of Lake Nipissing," viz, at, or on the shore, near the mouth of "South River," where even already there is, according to Mr. Leggo's report, a prosperous settlement. That point, according to him, can be reached from the Ottawa Valley by an average gradient of only five feet to the mile, the crest being, according to Mr. Shanly's report, only 170 (one hundred and seventy) feet above the Ottawa river at the mouth of the Matawan.

From the extensive flat—comparative flat—bordering for 4 or 5 miles or so back, the southern shore of Lake Nipissing at its east end say, the land (according to Sir W. Logan's reports, which give heights as scientifically determined by him and his staff, in much detail) rises gradually, till at the source of the Meganatawan, the nearest, and main stream south, of the little river called South River, it attains a height of *over fourteen hundred feet* above the sea, and which to all Ottawa Valley roads, to a point "50 miles south of Lake Nipissing," would necessitate gradients tantamount to at least forty miles of extra railway, on the old rule that a gradient of 19 feet to the mile is equal to a duplication of road in its working. The Toronto roads, being on the west side of this great "hog-back" of obstructive Laurentian or Huronian rockland, would avoid the necessity of such "clime" to or from terminus. In other words, the removal of terminus to such point (viz, 50 miles south of Lake Nipissing) would enormously increase cost to all eastern connections. In some measure should they have aid from Mr. Mac-

kenzie's Government. Writing hurriedly, I may supplement this with further development of this argument.

Yours,

BRITANNICUS.

December 9, 1873.

Article on *first report* [imperfect, as subsequently appeared] of interview.

PACIFIC RAILWAY—EASTERN CONNECTIONS.

To the Editor of the Gazette.

SIR,—The important railway deputation from the Province of Quebec, referred to in my last, has just had its interview with the Premier of our Dominion. The result seems on the whole to have been satisfactory to the delegation—more so, certainly, than that accorded to the Ottawa Pontiac Counties deputation, as reported, some two months ago or more. Now, it would appear that Mr. Mackenzie intends to remove the terminal point in question, not "50 miles or more," "directly south" of Lake Nipissing, but to some point not defined yet, but, perhaps, somewhere on a line of route running east and west from the mouth of French River to the Village of Renfrew [the present terminus of the Canada Central Railway], a distance of 217 miles according to Mr. Fleming's report.

As to the construction of this stretch of railway through an utter wild, Mr. Mackenzie (it is reported in the local press) assured the deputation "that the Government would feel themselves bound to take into consideration any suggestion that the road from the mouth of French River, east, to the vicinity of Renfrew, should be built *entirely by Government*; and he also assured the Northern Colonization Railway Company that they would be secured the right of running their trains over any portion of the subsidized road to connect with the Pacific Railway."

All this, be it remarked, is for facility of all railway connection with the Upper Lakes (Huron, Michigan and Superior), and *not* specially, nor even very apparently, for connection with the Pacific Railway terminus as fixed, contractually, by Act of Parliament, chap. 71 of 35 V., viz., "on the south shore of Lake Nipissing." These are the very words of the Act on this

point—an enactment after exhaustive discussion *ad hoc* in the House.

However, for the present, Eastern connection have no reason to complain of what Mr. Mackenzie offers. The line (new line) he has just found is evidently a fairly good one to what may be assumed as the best point for terminal harbor in Lake Huron for Western transit trade, American and Canadian, to nearest seaports. The line avoids—but *just* avoids—that obstructive rise of land [more southerly] indicated in Sir William Logan's reports, and which Mr. Legge as well as myself have referred to; and in fact in half its length, viz, from Renfrew to "Burnt Lake" [107 miles], is the very line I projectively advocated in my letters of 1869 on this subject, and which may be seen, in green line, on the map in my pamphlet "Peace River." What the precise distance of "Burnt Lake" is from the south shore—say south-east corner of Lake Nipissing—is not given, but it may be assumed to be about 40 miles in railway line. From it, *via* the valley of the South river, there is not, according to Mr. Hazlewood's report to his chief [Mr. Fleming] any material difficulty for railway route, and the whole valley of the South River [28 miles] is reported as "wide and offering no serious obstructions to the location of an easy line throughout." South river, it is to be borne in mind, runs in a general direction from north to south into Lake Nipissing near its south-east corner, and is almost in air line between Renfrew and the south-east shore of Lake Nipissing, the point contemplated by the Statute cited for Eastern terminus of our Pacific Railway.

If the valley of the South river, for any considerable distance, be adopted by Mr. Mackenzie for his line in question, it would approach the south shore of Lake Nipissing near enough [possibly within 8 or 10 miles] to meet, at least *his* statutory enactment on the subject, which says merely "near to and south of Lake Nipissing." The variance is not material, and I thus refer to it now, in no spirit of cavil, but to show, exhaustively as it were, the point at issue, viz, the site, to be, of Canada's chief railway centre—a city large. The compromise presented is a fair one, and for it, Mr. Mackenzie [*i. e.*, the Cabinet of which he is head] deserves, under the special circumstances of the case, our humble good word.

His next "link" promised, is that from

Lake Superior to Fort Garry, I mean not only the Portage links of the Dawson route but the main line between Nepigon Bay, or Thunder Bay, and Lower Fort Garry. Let Mr. Mackenzie bend himself to that task with his usual energy, and even "Britannicus," with all his past sharpnesses against his policy as to this matter of Pacific Railway, will wish him 'God speed.'

In its time we will, no doubt, have the *through line* straight [as possible] and strong for every material good to Canada.

Yours,

BRITANNICUS.

Ottawa, Dec. 18, 1874.

Article on fuller and more correct report of said Interview—Montreal Gazette 30 Dec. 1874.

"GEORGIAN BAY BRANCH"—A MATTER OF TEN MILLION DOLLARS.

To the Editor of the Gazette.

SIR,—In my letter the other day on this subject, predicating on the brief report just then, on the same day, given by a local paper [*Ottawa Citizen*] of the interview of the railway delegation from Quebec and Montreal, I had unavoidably to touch on points as to physical features of the route in question, which required clearer and more definite explanation than that vouchsafed by the press report at the time. Since then I have had occasion to receive fuller information from an expert of high standing in such matters, present at the interview.

From him I learn that the place for Pacific Railway terminus indicated by Mr. Mackenzie, in his map for the nonce, to the Deputation, is inland, about 25 miles south of Lake Nipissing, and that the line proposed thence east-wards will "actually" [so my informant says, but I think he errs by about 15 or 20 miles] run over the fourteen hundred [and more] feet height reported by Sir William Logan, and to which Mr. Legge and myself have referred. It is to be remarked that Mr. Hazlewood [on whose "letters" alone—not formal professional reports—Mr. Fleming has made up his "memo" for Mr. Mackenzie's use] does

not deny such height of land. On the contrary, his reference to "rugged country" at or near the height of land, "transverse" and also "oblique ridges," and "elevations" would seem to bear out the Sir William Logan reports with their elaborate and most carefully constructed map, and charts, on scientific determination of heights, &c. These reports were made about 20 years ago., viz, 1856-7-8, when no one dreamt of railways there, and without any conceivable reason why Sir W. Logan (knighted for his correctness in such like works) should state and give forth, officially, aught but the truth. It is true, one of his staff, [Mr. Murray] has been got to say, in a newspaper letter published by the Parry Sound Railway promoters, that there was no "mountain crest" in the way. Nobody ever said so; at least I never did [and I was the first—even before Mr. Legge, to refer to the fact in press], nor did Mr. Legge, save in using the word "crest," in the sense of apex of an interposing height of land between the Ottawa and the Georgian Bay.

On this point there is no authority whatever that can be invoked against Mr. Legge, whose work, in *actual location* of the Montreal N. C. Railway from Montreal to the Mattawa, as well as careful exploration thence to the mouth of French River, and of the country between it and the Ottawa, including all the south shore east of French River and miles back, at all available for terminus of a Pacific Railway, and of all which he [the chief engineer of no less than thirteen railways in Canada] has given full and exhaustive reports with all the weight of his professional name. As to Sir William Logan, Mr. Mackenzie—so it is reported—disposed of him, with the summary remark, [with waive of hand] "his reports on such subjects are totally unreliable."

That, I beg to say,—and all the world will say—is not true; and further, Mr. Mackenzie, on such occasion, should not have so expressed himself. The Premier of the Dominion of Canada should not so belittle the illustrious Canadian who, by his achievements in science, achievements not only in the closet, but in the rough fields of our northern rock wilds, disclosing in geologic bed work untold wealth for his country, has thrown lustre on the name of Canada, the world over.

I inclose to you the memorandum on

which Mr. Mackenzie bases *his story of facts*, in the case. Mr. Fleming, as Chief Engineer, signed it, but in no way does he give it the weight of *his high authority*, he never having gone over the ground, nor having had any "report of survey," nor ought really reliable on the subject. In fact the "gleanings" [so called by Mr. Fleming himself] culled bear internal evidence of, at least, this, viz., that Mr. Hazlewood has found and reported enough to make Mr. Mackenzie pause, for more light, before committing himself on the subject.

I must confess, that in common with many influenced by the first report [imperfect, as it now appears], I considered the connection of "running privilege" on subsidized line to be really an advantage; and if the line had been at the *comparatively low level of the height of land*, say about 8 or even 10 miles south of Lake Nipissing [where the height evidently rapidly lowers northwards—so, at least, the Hudson Bay Co's charts show, and so do *all official reports since* viz., Shanly's, Clarke's, Legge's and probably others], the concession—if practically and faithfully carried out—would, to all intents and purposes, to all eastern connections, make the eastern end of the subsidized extension or link the Pacific Railway Terminus, thereby obviating to the line from 110 to 150 miles of railway construction where no municipal aid could be had.

As the facts are now laid before me, I regard the matter very differently, and feel but confirmed in what I have advanced as to the superiority, paramount, of Mr. Legge's route *vid* the natural gateway at the southeast corner of Lake Nipissing to Huron slope. The difference of summit on the two routes is tantamount, as I have before said and shown, to an operative equivalent [if I may coin such term] of forty miles in favor of this line, and I am assured, and from personal knowledge of much of the route, I believe, that the whole, say from Ottawa to the Pacific Railroad terminus, can be made as a first-class work, with iron bridges and steel rails, for \$33,000 per mile, and with wooden bridges and iron rails for \$28,000 per mile, and at the same time leave a margin of about half a million for profit on contract. If desired, and at the same time authorized, I could give responsible names on this point.

The other route, rocky throughout and

rugged, a region in the main of pine, rock and ever running transversely [save perhaps some fifteen or twenty miles in the valley of South River] with a summit of about 1000 feet above the Ottawa River at the mouth of the Petawawa, whose valley is just in line, in the main, would cost, I am sure, from \$40,000 to \$50,000 per mile—say in all, according to the distances given by Mr. Hazlewood, "217 miles" from Renfrew to the mouth of the French River, about or over \$10,000,000.

On what?

Mr. Hazlewood's letters, as "gleaned," as aforesaid? On what else in the way of specifications, pray? Yet to-day, 21st Dec. is the last day for tenders, as advertised! This is really worse than the Pacific Telegraph expropriation of public moneys, not only without authority from Parliament, but in the teeth of its Act.

But there is another point to be touched. According to Mr. Mackenzie's map and plan, the spot for the Pacific Railway terminus is [so I am told] marked about 25 miles south of the nearest shore of Lake Nipissing, and, mischievously for *all eastern* connections, on the *west* side of the height of land in question.

In fact, Mr. Editor, Mr. Mackenzie's "Georgian Branch," ostensibly of the "Pacific Railway," is really *not* that, nor, if a Dominion Statute, determinative of covenantal matter, [as was, I hold, Ch. 71, of 35 Vic.] be anything in law, or right, can it possibly be.

There is in this matter, something, really, I fear, of a "Pacific Scandal."

Yours,

BRITANNICUS.

Ottawa, N, 21 Dec., 1874.

EXCLUSION OF ALL CANADA, EAST OF TORONTO, FROM THE WESTERN TRANSIT TRADE.

(From the "Quebec Chronicle" 8th Jan. 1875.)
Editorial, citing "Britannicus" of "Montreal Gazette" of 5th January 1875.

We would particularly call the attention of our Quebec readers to the important letter of Britannicus published below, the facts therein stated being of vital interest.

The placing the eastern terminus of the Pacific Railway a considerable distance to the south of Lake Nipissing, instead of directly on its southern border, as contemplated by the Act, will materially lengthen the transit to Quebec, while it correspondingly shortens it to Toronto, as a careful inspection of the map will show.

The true policy of the Quebec members, as it appears to us, should be to insist on the terminus being placed on the northern side of the lake, where, we are credibly informed, the *best* as well as the most direct line exists.* It would there connect naturally and easily with the Northern Colonization Railway, now under construction as far as Aylmer, and for whose extension West a good line has been obtained the past summer as far as the Mattawan.

Even located *north* of the lake, the Toronto lines would still have the advantage in point of distance.

The men of Quebec will indeed be derelict in duty if they do not exert themselves to the utmost to have the original terminus, at any rate, as arranged by the Act, adhered to.

TORONTOGRITISM vs. ALL CANADA.

(To the Editor of the Montreal Gazette.)

SIR,—This may seem a strange heading, yet, though reluctantly, I feel it but citizen duty to point to it at this juncture. All, of course, must condemn the raising of sectional issues in matters of general import to the Dominion, and in such case there must be blame somewhere.

In the following remarks I propose to show where and in what it is:

In former letters I have briefly, but, I think, pretty clearly shown that the inevitable effect of "fixing" the eastern terminus of our proposed Pacific Railway "50 miles," or even "25 miles," directly south of the shore of Lake Nipissing, instead of "on," or even "near" such shore, will be to encumber and practically block all eastern connections, and thereby divert the transit to Toronto, over two hundred miles, as I have said before, from the direct and best line to nearest Canadian seaports.

* This undoubtedly is the fact; but as service of Western trade, via French River Harbour, and also Pacific Railway extension to Sault Ste. Marie, were matters of first moment in this direction, the terminal point was, by Dominion Act, ch. 71, of 35 V., restricted to the *south* shore of the Lake Nipissing.

In connection with this feature in the present scheme of the Government of the day, I would respectfully, as a matter, of the very gravest consideration for all concerned,—and in this, *all*, I contend, are, for the present and future most deeply concerned,—submit the following facts and propositions:

1. That by such change (one in the teeth of original statute *ad hoc*, as I have already shown) all Canada east of the meridian of Toronto (nine-tenths of the country as peopled) would be debarred from all or any benefit in the Pacific and North Western States transit trade.

2. That the effect of this, in ordinary course of international transit commerce with the United States, would be to make, especially in winter, Toronto the *entrepôt* of New York for our Pacific and North Western trade.

3. That the establishment of such a main line of inter-oceanic and North Western commerce would be a prejudice, grievous and disastrous in some degree, not only to all Canada, *eastwards* from Toronto to Halifax, but to the high national interests involved in such a scheme.

4. That such a scheme is not only antagonistic to the interests and rights, in the Federal compact, of all constitutional Provinces besides Ontario, but even to Ontario itself from Toronto eastwards, say three-fourths of the population.

5. That all railway enterprise, from Halifax westwards, has, more or less, been predicated on this ultimate and even early western connection or extension, so as to secure, in measure, transit traffic with the Great West and North West.

6. That the physical features of the regions to be traversed by such traffic, and as authoritatively made known to us, present, on this score, the following salient points, objective, of the proper line or lines of route to be adopted by us:—

From the Straits of Mackinaw to nearest sea port, (summer) Montreal, the distance in air line, is only about 550 miles; and of which about 200 miles is easy lake navigation, say to proposed terminal harbour at mouth of French River. From this point to the Ottawa Valley, *via* the South-eastern shore of Lake Nipissing, and the Ottawa Valley thence to Montreal, a railway route of easiest gradient, presenting every facility for construction and working, presents

itself. Allowing a broad margin for curvature Mr. Legge, C. E., [who has recently actually located the line from Montreal to Mattawan—300 miles] gives in page 22 of his report of 1874, the following estimate of route from Chicago to Montreal:—

Chicago to mouth of French River—Water.....	530 miles.
French River via Matawan and Ottawa—Rail.....	414 “

944 “

In the same pages, in contrast, he gives the following as to the same terminal points:—

Route via Collingwood and Toronto—Water.....	575 miles.
Route via Collingwood to Montreal—Rail.....	427 “

1002 “

In gradient some advantage can be claimed in favor of the Ottawa route, which at no point rises higher than 650 feet above the sea, while on the other route the Grand Trunk rises to considerably over 1,000 feet above the sea, if I remember right. On this score of gradient an advantage of 20 miles may be fairly claimed for the Ottawa Valley. In any case, an advantage of fully sixty miles in shortness over the existing shortest or possible one, can be urged for the Ottawa route from Lakes Superior, Michigan, and northern part of Lake Huron, to Montreal or other eastern seaport. In juxtaposition with the above, it may be stated that the total distance from Montreal to Chicago, via the great lakes and the St. Lawrence, is “1,348 miles.”

7. With the accretion of export from the great West in question, will rival lines from the chief Atlantic ports be extended to the great railway centre in the Nipissing basin, and as a subject of legitimate enterprise to all Canadian enterprise in the way of railway traffic, the policy of the day, as to such, ought to be one of utmost fairness to *all* in the direction of the true interests of the country.

I might say much more on this important subject, Mr. Editor, but, for the present I merely offer humbly the above for the consideration of my fellow-countrymen of Canada.

Yours,
BRITANNIUS.

AMERICAN AND ANTAGONISTIC POLICY OF THE PRESENT DOMINION GOVERNMENT.

(*Montreal Gazette*, 17 Oct., 1874.)

“And be these juggling fields no more believed,
That palter with us in a double sense;
That keep the word of promise to the ear,
And break it to our hope.”

To the Editor of the *Gazette*.

SIR,—The policy of the present Ministry of Canada is, and has ever been, one of marked bent to *American* rather than to *British*, or even to *Canadian* interests *per se*. I firmly believe this, and I believe the mass of the people of Canada now begin to believe it. Our ears are dinned by a loud-mouthed cry of loyalty, but in their mode of expression, be it on political platform, “stump,” in banquet hall, “meeting-house,” parliament or elsewhere, there is ever, for *American* ears, *sotto voce*, a covered assurance of fidelity adhesive to their dollar-dominion. Even in their State papers and Acts of Parliament, and in their press, there is a strange manner of double talk, of speech to two sets of ears, avoidance amounting often to actual self-contradiction, *double entendre*, and of absurdity, when treating of matters—like the Canadian Pacific Railway—of immediate bearing on the political position, now and prospectively, of Canada. In the case of the proposed treaty there is something even worse.

The theme is a large one, and I shall not enter on it at present, further than in the following limited line of remark which I feel called on at this juncture to make.

The events of the last eighteen months in the political arena of Canada, force us to note, *inter alia*, the following facts:—

1. That in deadly opposition to the scheme of a Canadian Pacific Railway—one of such pre-eminent and unrivalled advantages in every respect, whether for the world's inter-oceanic commerce, or for the settlement of the Pacific Slope (the richer side probably, of the North American continent)—the gigantic railway interests of New York, Boston, Chicago, and of all the United States, in fact an aggregate equal to the national debt of Britain—have, by means most foul, accidentally, swept our late polls, and that it is to that our present masters owe their place.

That interests and its cognates are an ac-

tive potentiality in our midst, doing their own dark work, by agencies drawn from amidst ourselves. *Timeo Dancoo et dona ferentes.*

2. Our own Canadian bogot Grand Trunk Railway itself is now, by its American connections east and west, in effect an American institution, and as such has opposed *à outrance*, our Canadian Pacific Railway scheme. In my humble opinion, its proprietary—English-stockholders—have been misled into a false position in this matter, and that, too, to the prejudice of their material interest as a necessary LINK—a most important link—in the line of traffic from Nipissing to Atlantic seaport.

3. The remarkable growth of Canada in material wealth and progressive industry since the abrogation of the late Reciprocity Treaty, and that in the face of disturbing influences incidental to the process of change of our political status as British Colonies, has but whetted American desire for our absorption.

4. For the command of the Pacific Ocean trade—a cardinal point in present American national effort—monopoly of inter-oceanic communication by rail is necessary, or, at least seems so. To this end, even already, for *obstruction*, and for that solely—for the *San Juan* channel leads only to British waters, British shores, British ports and a British Province—the American is erecting forts on that impregnable fortress rock-isle, with its thousand-foot hill top, all ready for batteries of Rodmans, fit to sink, in one short day, all the navies in the world. A fearful fact! So that, should our Pacific Road be made to Bute Inlet, Burrard's Inlet, or any point on the Georgian Gulf, *American guns* would practically command its western terminus. This is an indisputable fact, and is established by Mr. Fleming and Captain Butler, and other writers, whose word on the subject cannot be questioned. To me, it is strange it should be so much ignored in present and past negotiations about British Columbia.

5. In consonance with this American policy to grapple our Grand Trunk Road, and bend it to American ends, is this change, by Mr. Mackenzie, of eastern terminus to a point "50 miles south of the south shore of Lake Nipissing," thereby, in effect, *shunting off* towards Toronto and New York, and other American marts, all the railway commerce by our Pacific line, and

which, *properly*, should be allowed to flow through more easterly channels to nearer sea port, and in subservience to Canadian interests at large, and to British, rather than to those that are foreign.

6. Convinced, of late, that the *people* of Canada, *en masse*, insist on a Pacific Railway and that, as soon as possible, the present Cabinet, the very men, who, when returned, shouted—to please their American masters—"that the road should not be made for forty years, *if ever*,"—now to keep their snug places of full \$7,000 each per annum, *ac., ac.,* pretend to yield to the cry; but, at the same time, they, in their own peculiar way, determine to "kill the thing" by twisting, lengthening and breaking it into utter uselessness; or worse still, to make, ghoul-like, political food ("capital") out of the carcass. The details on this head are too long for present writing, and they have been already indicated briefly, under other signatures in your columns; in answerable, they remain unanswered.

7. The present Ministry, even yet so far as can be gathered from their avowed organs, such as the "*Canadian Monthly*" of Toronto (see page 248 of last number, September) look upon the work in question as "not primarily a through freight road." These are the very words of the article, evidently meant to be a leading one—but, it goes on to say—"for the purposes of *domestic* economy;"—and further, in preceding page, in "conclusion" (a most absurd *non-sequiter* like all the rest of the "5 conclusions" of the *lucus a non lucendo* "argument" of the 20 page article in question) it is laid down—as principle, of course,—that "as no section of "the mainland of British Columbia is so "thickly settled, or likely soon to be so, as "to require railroad facilities, *ample* time "should be taken in selecting a route," *ac.*

These are singular conclusions, and are expressive of what may be termed the "cart before the horse" and "milk-cart" policy of our new Ministers of State. Our idea (poor dunderhead that we are!) was to make the iron horse first carry, over trackless wilds, our good emigrants to those glowing distant pastures of our great North-West, to utilize them for their own good and ours, and that, under our own dear old flag before *another people* should therein walk and take possession by right "divine" of primal squattership, and rifle. We live and learn.

De plus—We thought the road—as a sort of land ferry between the two oceans—was to be as short as possible, and essentially, a “through freight one,” assuming ever that by law of “(actual evolution,” lateral roads, common and rail, would grow from the main and ever living, ever feeding, ever fruiting Grand Trunk. But no! Mr. Mackenzie’s road is, it would seem, to be a “domestic” one—*quid est*, I take it to be, in a way brought to every man’s door—like a “milk cart,” as aforesaid—*provided*—it is to be presumed—the customer be “Grit.” What of the non-Grits? For *them*, the road is to be bent, in avoidance, I suppose! Of such nonsense it is impossible to speak except in its own way. *Ad absurdum, absurdum*. Such an exhibition of really worse than drivelling incapacity for statesmanship as we have in this “Mackenzie Ministry and policy,” so-called, is beyond, not only all precedent, but belief, save to those who have closely observed them. There is, not unnaturally, and excusably, a measure of general faith in the office of Minister of State, given by the people, “subjective;” but in this instance—one *sui generis*—the principle [if we can call it a principle] is mis-applied. There is, moreover, mischief to largest and highest public interests in the matter, and it should, at the earliest moment, be checked and remedied.

8. The Pacific Telegraph scheme* is either based on a foregone conclusion to have no Pacific Railway, or it is a huge and hideous fraud. There are no means of finding in the field, *where*, survey for railway, has been made—and that, in the wildest wilds of North America, where for hundreds of miles at a stretch, probably no white man ever trod, before Mr. Fleming’s staff did so, in hurried exploratory survey

* The only warrant for Pacific Telegraph expenditure is 57 V., chap. 14, sec. 5 (Canada), and is obviously in subservience to, and for the railway. It runs thus: “A line of electric telegraph shall be constructed in advance of the said railway and branches, along their whole extent respectively, as soon as practicable after the location of the line shall have been determined upon.” At the time of “contract” by the Mackenzie Government not a foot of the railway line in question was, nor in fact, could be, “located,” in the sense of the statute.

The terminal points were undetermined—save the proviso for the eastern one on the “south of Lake Nipissing,” as per Act of Parliament—and the principal objective points, e.g., those north of Lake Superior, varying, at Lake Nipigon, about 100 miles in transverse distance, and those in passage of the Rocky Mountains, varying from the Yellow Head Pass to the Peace River Pass, at least 235 miles, according to my calculations. Starting from “Lower” Fort Garry (Stone Fort)—a naturally objective point—the angular difference of the two routes, each about 1,100 in length, by Y. H. and P. R., would be about 15°. At the Nipigon divergence, it would be three times greater. *Ergo*. No line of telegraph could serve the alternate routes in question.

winter and summer, during the last year or two. With the burning of the Pacific Railway office, on the advent of the present Ministry into power, all the field notes and plans of survey—worth a million and a half—so tells us, Mr. Fleming—were utterly destroyed—burnt to smoke! As well try to follow a chalk line on ocean, as try to find the old lines! Besides, there was no “location” of line; nor could there yet be. On parts of the route, viz: From Manitoba Lake to Fort Edmonton, 750 miles—no line has been surveyed for railway. From Thunder Bay to Red River is a continuous stretch of over 400 miles of rock, swamp and water, utterly uninhabitable. The Dawson route with its chain of widely branching lakes and deep bays does not admit of a telegraph line. As to British Columbia, from Albrede Lake direct to the present telegraph line there, is the hardest piece of country in British America to traverse, and strange to say, though I know it to be traversable—for I lived close by about four years—it has not yet been done, so far as I know, by any white man! Our true railway route to the Pacific, I know is there, but the men who ought to see it, *won't* look at it. In the face of such facts, the \$800,000, or more—say the million—of the people’s money, signed away by Mr. Mackenzie, the other day is—What? Mr. Editor—Give it name, if you can, I cannot—“Sunken in the sea,” it would be comparatively harmless [save loss of the money]—but *will* the said million so disappear, and buried, harmless sleep? No Sir! It will work—work, as such things of corruption ever work, and the result will be! Ah! who can tell? We must see to this in time.

Yours,

BRITANNICUS.

[*Montreal Gazette* 16 Dec. 1873.]

“under such circumstances, we should use the American route not only in the meantime but for all time.”—*Ottawa Times*, Dec. 5, 1873.

To the Editor of the Gazette.

SIR,—Excuse me for assuming to touch in your columns on this subject, one on which you have adduced such abundant, and to my humble mind, such unanswerable argument. But, as “every little makes a muckle,” you will perhaps be kind

enough to allow me, as one, like yourself and all true Britons, most deeply concerned in this matter of Pacific Railway, to take note of the above passage, and say a word on it.

To say the least of it, it is, I think all must admit, candid—yea honest—as it is bold. “Use the *American* route for *all time*,” is certainly plain speaking. It is the trumpet blast of the new bought Metropolitan organ of the Government of the day, and speaks no uncertain sound. Thanks for the warning! Thanks for the challenge!

But a word on the pretended grounds on which the above is avowed as the policy now and for ever, proper for Canada. The article from which the above citation is made, runs, in its preceding sentence, thus—“For our part, from all we can learn, we imagine that the link north of Lake Superior would be ruinously expensive, if feasible even, and that Canada should not attempt to make it if this be the case.” Now, sir, the fact is, that, beyond doubt or cavil, it has been ascertained by exhaustive survey, and established by the official progress report of Mr. Fleming, Chief Engineer charged with the work of survey of route for the proposed Canadian Pacific Railway, that north of Lake Superior and Nipigon a route not only *feasible*, but presenting, as a plateau, remarkable facilities for a railway has been found. Allow me further to say (I give my name, &c.), that I have crossed the said plateau, and know, personally, the physical features of the country in question* * * * *

But further, Mr. Fleming (the highest authority on the subject), has reported that from Forth Garry (an objective point) to the nearest sea port (Montreal) via N. of Lake Superior, as surveyed—chained—by him and his staff (a distance of 1,250 miles), would be between two and three hundred miles *shorter* than any possible line along the South of the Lake, between the same points.

As to relative cost of the two routes, it requires no engineer to see that that on the S. side would be a most costly one, being throughout, as any good maps will show, a succession of transverse rocky ranges, irregular, broken, and of intractable metallic character. Whereas on the N. side, back

along the level rim of the Hudson's Bay basin from the Ottawa Valley to English River, the route, as surveyed, is of special facility for a railway, viz; along the Ottawa valley to the mouth of Montreal River thence along the remarkably level valley of that stream (a favorite canoe route to Hudson's Bay), thence along the rim of the Hudson's Bay horizontal silurian, and thence by English river, the easiest route, for canoes, in the whole vast regions of Rupert's Land and the Northwest.

I believe, Sir, that the Northern or Fleming route would not cost one-half that of the Southern or American route. But, query—Who? What body of capitalists, propose to construct a railway from Duluth to Ste Marie? It cannot be Mr. McMullen, for that “would be death to *Chicago*.” Sir Hugh can't make it, that is evident. No, Mr. Editor, all that has been advanced as to a railway from Duluth to *St. Marie* is, so far as I know, not only not true, but is, in view of large actual, vested and jealously controlling railway interests far south of Lake Superior, such as the Milwaukee, Chicago, and *New York* great lines, entirely out of the question—is, in fact, beyond the pale of possibility in the circle of passing and forecasting events across the border. But, be that as it may. To us, Canada—in our autonomy and rising nationhood such schemes of the hour, mooted for a purpose, delusive, if not sinister, are but political anomalies which at once, in repulse, strike that sentiment of true fealty to the empire, land, and flag which, thank God, we can yet call our own.

A word as to the *value* of the Hudson's Bay “wild.” For two hundred years a dozen or so quiet old gentlemen of England's London [“merchant adventures,” as the charter calls them], on a paid-up capital of at first, £3,000, after that £10,000 stg., in all only £13,000, coined out of the said “wild”—gold by the shipload, and that, in face of costly fight—*verbum sapientibus*.

As to the middle and western part of our C. P. R. R., I shall speak in my next.

Yours,

BRITISH-AMERICAN,

Dec. 12, 1873.

Montreal Gazette, Sept. 24th, 1874.

THE BRITISH COLUMBIA DIFFI-
CULTY—WHAT NEXT!

To the Editor of the Gazette.

SIR,—In the present hull of newspaper comment on this subject—one of deep and vital importance to Canada, I feel tempted to offer a remark or two, which, I believe, will express the feeling of the mass of the people concerned.

It has been admitted on all hands that the incorporation of British Columbia in the Dominion of Canada is a necessity to give it form and strength for working in both oceans, and for its proper development.

To this, British Columbia herself, while an independent unity, has, in consideration of her own interests, spontaneously committed herself.

As to the preliminaries of her entry into the Confederation, it may be a question whether, in strict law, they can, from the legal character of the two contracting parties—mere corporate bodies with their assigned limitation of functions—import any *resolutive* condition of contract. Public policy forbids such interpretation. There is a power of *con-federation*, but not of *de-federation*—if I may coin such a word. National self-disintegration would be social suicide. This vital principle is one of jealous observance, so far, in the history of the British Nation, and I doubt much whether she would tamper with it in any experimental reconstruction of that "Dominion"—so called by herself—which she as a first gift of the kind, has given to us, her sons in America North. In other words, she may—*intro se*—make a Dominion, but she can do so, only "for good government" for national benefit. Whether she can *un-make* it, in any degree, for even "national benefit" at large, might be a question in some minds; it certainly is not in mine, on the principle that in this, as in other matters, the greater good—or good of the greater—should carry the less.

The issue between the British Columbia Government and the present one (so-called Mackenzie Government) is familiar to the

public. The former complains of the non-fulfilment of the railway construction clause, which promised "breaking ground" on the Pacific Coast and on the eastern side of the Rocky Mountains within two years, and which period expired on the 20th of July, 1873. It is proved by Mr. Fleming's reports, that every effort in reason has been made on the part of the late Dominion Government to do this, but that the unexpected physical difficulties of the route have prevented them. *Nemo ad impossibile tenetur* is a maxim of old black letter which holds in this as in all matters beyond the domain of absolute and rampant tyranny. But, on the other hand, *due and utmost diligence* for, as the lawyers term it, "equipollent fulfilment," is continuously obligatory. The practical repudiation of such obligation by the present Dominion Government is a wrong, for which remedy can be sought only at the foot of the Throne: and there, most properly, and in proper moving, so far as I understand, stands the aggrieved praying for right.

The offer, from the Crown for arbitration, is an act of grace, and ill becomes Mr. Mackenzie and his colleagues (as reported) to scout it, as they have done, after insultingly, day after day, keeping Her Majesty's Ministers of State waiting for an answer to their proposition.* It is a small exhibition of "horn and hoof," which comes well in its way. Dominion "Ministers of State," like other things of life, are to be judged by their fruits, and be treated accordingly.

What next, Mr. Mackenzie?

What next, Mr. Brown?

Is Canada sold, or is it to be?

These are questions started by the events of the day and hour, and it is for us, the *people* most concerned to see to them, and answer them as best we may.

Yours,

W. McLEOD.

September, 8, 1874.

* It was not until about December, after four months of inter-communication between the Dominion and Imperial authorities that a conclusion, (reported to be "satisfactory," but yet to be made known to the public) was arrived at; and that, according to best information, was due entirely to the eminent sagacity, tact and firmness of the Earl of Carnarvon as Secretary of State for the Colonies.

Montreal Gazette, November, 1874.

CANADA FIRST PARTY AND THE PACIFIC RAILWAY.

To the Editor of the Gazette.

SIR,—In the "platform" of this "new party," I remark the absence of the all important subject of our Pacific Railway. "Hamlet without *Hamlet*," is scarcely satisfactory. Next to the fundamental one of British connection, this, to us, all-important matter, should, I humbly think, be the chief "plank" in any Canadian political "platform" of the day. The avoidance of the subject by Mr. Blake, in his Aurora address, and the silence of the "Party" on the theme—silence, at least to the general public—calls for enquiry, and suggests a line of interrogation somewhat in the following strain:—

1. What as to the Pacific Railway?
2. Do Messrs. Blake and Moss *still* hold to the "Mackenzie scheme" on this point?
3. Do the Party intend to carry (if possible) Canada into "Imperial Federation," as a *unity*, or as the *disjecta membra* of Mr. Mackenzie's break-back policy?
4. Does Mr. Blake *still* intend, for a purpose, to bend the Pacific Railway line to the *west* side, instead of the east side, of Lake Nipissing?
5. What as to the "British Columbia difficulty?"
6. What as to the issue or issues between our present Dominion Government and the home authorities in this all important matter of Pacific Railway—issues the most grave between Canada and the Fatherland?

These are material questions, pressing

on us with the weight of vital significance to our national fate. We have to discuss them, and, in our own way, as best we may, in due and constitutional course, decide on them. There is much, very much, to be said on the theme of British colonial policy, but what we have more immediately to look to is the "putting of our own house in order" before we presume to take place with other colonists in such discussion. We cannot, I humbly think, enter into the consideration of "Imperial Federation" or any other experimental change of relation with the parent State while this matter of Canadian Pacific Railway remains all unsettled, unhinging us for any work of political reconstruction, and presenting us to the world's gaze as but the fragments of a broken purpose.

On the other hand, to enter the arena with a proposition to leave the work to Britain to do, as one essentially of national behoist, would probably startle the whole U.S.D. "school" of England's tax-payers out of the "argument" and precipitate "disruption."

Let Canada, I would respectfully say, first settle this matter of inter-oceanic railway, and that in a manner to serve "Imperial Federation" or any other form of British national *être* which may be determined on, or the British people as now being, and then she may, with some vantage ground from the work itself, enter into such discussion, and, in a way, *dictate* her own terms in the measure of her command of the material interests, vast beyond measure, served and secured by such work on her part.

Yours,

BRITANNICUS.

CONCLUSION.

In taking up my pen for th's, I feel that either I should say a good deal, in the way of harmonizing comment on the several and perhaps somewhat varied letters in the public press I have written on the subject of Pacific Railway and North West development in general for some twenty years past—or say as little as possible.

I have no desire to play Mentor, for that is not my "place"; but appealed to as I have been, especially of late, from all quarters, from Cariboo to London, to start an organization of practical agency for the object advocated by "Britannicus," I would, for present conclusion, but repeat my invariable answer to such application, viz. :—"It is not for me [a "nobody"] to "start such a work, but for the *chiefs* " [whoever they might be] of the party " [Conservative, and *loyal* of the Reform]—"for surely there is brain enough in the "heads that have made Canada what it is, "to know how to keep it, now that, under "their fostering care, it has become so "well worth keeping."

The answer—I am advised—has struck; but with, or for what results remains to be

seen. My own opinion, I must candidly say, is not a very hopeful one. A spirit of potty personal rivalry, in a quarter where such unwisdom is most mischievous in its effects, seems to rive and paralyze that body of *Patres Conscripti* to whom we habitually look for good and faithful government—government in true fealty to the British Crown—in Canada.

The combination against them is one of a character to require much sacrifice of purely personal considerations in resistance. But casting a retrospect on the general history of statesman-life in Canada [including the Maritime Provinces] we find record of heroism enough to warrant some hope for the best. Yes! Even among the many who in the present House of Commons are, in the main, supporters of the present Ministry, there is, I verily believe, a loyalty, really true as steel, and which but needs to be disabused, to ensure its true place in the present, silent but deadly struggle against the national existence of Britain in America. Virtually, our Flag is snatched! It is our's to save it—and with it, our young national life, and its every bright, great promise.

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