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
vol. 2

Open Skies Conference (1990 :  
Ottawa, Ontario)

Open Skies Conference . --

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OPEN  
SKIES

**Open Skies Conference**

CIELS  
OUVERTS

EDUARD SHEVARDNADZE'S STATEMENT

OFFENER  
HIMMEL

AT THE

OPEN SKIES CONFERENCE

CIELI  
APERTI

Dept. of External Affairs  
Min. des Affaires extérieures

SEP 11 1990

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FEBRUARY 12TH, 1990

43-257-159

Eduard Shevardnadze's  
Statement at the  
Open Skies Conference

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CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY

Mr. Chairman,  
Ladies and gentlemen,

The theme of Open Skies implies an open-minded debate, which may cover all its different aspects --from conceptual approaches to technical points.

My task, as I see it, is to set forth our vision of the problem, focusing on key issues and fundamental principles.

The Ottawa Conference is being held in winter--a winter which, for all the ups and downs in the temperature, has not been cold. Our meeting in the capital of Canada could be another clear sign that the Cold War is over. It went on for over forty years, leaving in people's minds the memories not only of a big political chill but, what is more, of fear, uncertainty about the future, and restrictions of what man values most--his freedom.

It is wrong to think that such restrictions affected societies only on one side of the Iron Curtain.

Passports stamped "Not Valid for Travel to Communist Countries" set a definite limit to freedom of movement in the West too.

The prefix "anti", applied, in both its Soviet and American versions, to countless things, was common on both sides of the political watershed.

But why recall all of this now?

Because we should not forget why the skies close or open.

As a poet once said, it is because someone needs it.

Walls, curtains and bans create fear, suspicion and intolerance. When the world had all of that in abundance, for long decades everyone needed closed doors. As a result, the skies were closed and divided, as was the world.

Today we need open skies, and not just the skies. The willingness of the participants in this conference to discuss this idea is evidence of tremendous changes in our perception of each other.

Last September in Wyoming, when my friend Mr. Baker suggested that we hold a round of talks on this problem outdoors, under the open skies, the weather was favorable to us. It was not windy, or raining, nor was the sun too hot. This is the point I want to make: the idea of Open Skies is only good in conditions of good international weather, and prerequisites for it have now been created.

We are abandoning the primitive concepts asserting that human and state entities are inherently aggressive.

We are taking a different view of the problem of force, becoming aware that it cannot help solve even the most trivial disputes, to say nothing of intricate conflicts. We understand that to acquire the resources needed for development it is cheaper and easier to buy them on the market than to seize them, that technology cannot be captured by force and made to work.

In the final analysis, anything open, whether skies or land, begins with open thinking. It alone is capable of recognizing and establishing as a norm the vital need to exchange information and openly seek to identify the truth and the universal, national and personal interests.

Over the past few years progressive thought has made major advances in understanding openness as the principal factor of any progress--intellectual, material and social. This process has also affected the area of security, in which for many years both sides played a game of hide-and-seek.

The historic threshold was crossed when at the Stockholm Conference all European states accepted the principle of on-site inspections.

Now this principle is being practically applied in verifying the destruction of nuclear missiles and as part of confidence-building measures. We have thus far not heard a single complaint that inspections and verification have impinged on anyone's security.

The success and usefulness of verification are so obvious and its sphere of application has expanded so much, covering not only military matters but also environmental, humanitarian, economic and other problems, that there is even a risk of complacency.

But it is too early to become complacent. Therefore, speaking of the Open Skies concept, one could logically ask: Do we need another type of verification when there are satellites, and inspector teams working on the ground?

Here we must say quite firmly: In verification, no excess is too much. And this is more than just a political statement. If we intend to continue moving as we have been doing until now, reducing troops and weapons, dismantling huge structures of military confrontation, adopting defensive doctrines and limiting military capabilities to levels of minimum sufficiency for defense, then we need an even more effective and multi-optional system of verification having a great margin of dependability.

I would even venture to propose this formula: sufficiency in weapons and redundancy as regards verification capabilities.

This formula is prompted not least by the trends and prospects of the current European situation. Before our eyes a new Europe is emerging, which no longer consists of three or four groups of states but rather is a space with a vastly different, more complex political configuration. To our regret, few would vouch today that this new configuration would not create new problems, cause new complications in various places, or open old wounds or scars.

In this situation the Open Skies regime could become an essential and effective way of maintaining and building confidence and removing the suspicions and apprehensions that might arise.

As you probably know, as soon the President of the United States Mr. George Bush suggested the idea of Open Skies, we immediately called for more than that, i.e. for extending the area of international glasnost and openness.

Of course, monitoring the Earth from above, we can get some idea of the movements of Navy ships and submarines. But can this be sufficient today when nuclear weapons, long-range cruise missiles, aircraft and combat helicopters are moving from land to the seas and oceans?

And yet, again and again at various negotiations the issue of naval arms and confidence-building measures affecting the activities of states on the seas and oceans is being left out of consideration and without resolution.

No serious argument is cited to justify this. It is just claimed that it is technically difficult to verify anything on ships and submarines. So an inspection team may visit a missile factory or a nuclear base but never a ship. Why? Because, we are told, naval commanders are born with a pathological dislike of inspections. But then, do ICBM commanders madly love inspections?

I think that we must begin to melt this iceberg we have inherited from the Cold War.

Can we feel quiet and confident knowing that an area which concentrates increasing numbers of the most sophisticated arms remains unaffected by glasnost, knowing that those arms are extremely mobile and intended above all for use in offensive actions?

Let us face the truth: today the easiest way to launch a surprise attack, a military invasion, or an aggression is from the seas.

Of course, it is easier to look for things where there is light rather than total darkness. Instead of putting more searchlights where there is already bright illumination, strong rays of light should focus on the darkest corners of military activity.

Take space, where they do not just grow chickens. It is oversaturated with more than just monitoring satellites. And can we really be sure that all this stuff is good for mankind and for peace?

Closed space could make irrelevant the very idea of open skies.

I am convinced that we should urgently develop a system for verifying the activities of states in space.

The advocates of continued existence of nuclear weapons like to talk about some crazy leader who might suddenly acquire a nuclear bomb or missile and threaten to destroy life on Earth.

This is a strong argument. But it belongs to the past.

Now that private companies are well able to launch space rockets and objects, we can have absolutely no assurance that some "company" would not launch into space something that would make the world hostage to its ambitions.

It is extremely regrettable that standing on the highest frontier of man's intellect, we do not have the gumption to observe elementary rules of safety.

If airplanes get certificates of air-worthiness, if pilots undergo strict medical check-ups and professional tests, such procedures must certainly apply to space objects.

Rigorous verification should be established, particularly on Earth, to make sure that weapons do not find their way into space. Glasnost, in our view, must begin with research. We should seek to create an environment in which neither a state nor a "company" could launch into space anything unknown, any "black boxes". What we need here is a kind of ecological expert board that would give a go-ahead to any space plans.

There is nothing unrealistic about the regimes of openness on land, on the seas and in space. Many forms of verification and control have already been tested and are being successfully used in everyday practice. There are numerous promising concepts, methods and proposals.

As regards the idea of Open Seas, we could agree to exchange information on fleet postures, send notifications of major naval exercises, movements of large naval formations, naval transfers of troops to areas that are close to the borders of other states, and invite observers to naval exercises and maneuvers.

As for the regime of Open Space, we propose the establishment of an International Space Inspectorate as part of an international verification system to bar weapons from space, and the creation of an International Space Monitoring Agency.

If we proceed from the principle of fairness and reciprocity which is as old as the world, we should have no insurmountable obstacles in developing measures and procedures that would truly make open the skies, land, the seas and space.

During the recent talks with Secretary Baker in Moscow we reached agreement on mutual visits by experts to certain radars in our two countries. We regard this as an important step in building confidence.

Now, a few considerations on the subject of our dialogue here.

There is no doubt that the Conference should begin movement towards agreement on an Open Skies regime. Even in its first phase specific results could be achieved. For example, a declaration of principles could be adopted, to serve as a basis for an agreement.

We view the Open Skies agreement as a document in its own right which would not be formally linked with other arms control agreements. There must, however, be a substantive link to make sure that the agreement would serve to prevent possible violations of other international agreements and treaties and, in that sense, to a certain extent affect them. So we have to retain the possibility of adjustments in it with due regard for its relationship with the obligations of the participating states under other arms control and disarmament agreements and with relevant verification arrangements.

As we understand it, the Open Skies regime would permit participating states on a mutual and equitable basis to fly unarmed planes over the territories of other participating states to monitor military activities.

For the Soviet Union, the purpose of the regime is to build confidence, ensure the predictability of military activities, and promote the process of arms control and disarmament and verification of compliance with obligations assumed.

As we see it, participants in the regime could at the initial stage include those countries which are now actively involved in the dialogue on issues of disarmament. However, we do not rule out the participation of other countries, too, in this process.

In other words, the Open Skies regime should, in our view, be the result of concluding a multilateral agreement, either spelling out the details of the future regime or briefly outlining its objectives and substance as specified in technical protocols appended to the agreement.



The Open Skies regime must rest on the principle of comprehensive and full equality.

Equality in the acquisition of and access to information, which must not be used to the detriment of any of the sides.

Equality as regards the area of application of the regime, covering the states' military activities not only on their national territories but also outside.

Equality as regards flight quotas, the use of airplanes and monitoring and data processing equipment.

We would like to hope that other participants, too, proceed from the need for equality of rights and a balance of interest.

Evidently, the Open Skies agreement should be open for subsequently incorporating into it provisions on Open Seas and Open Space and, of course, it should provide for the establishment of a coordinating body to consider all matters concerning compliance with the agreement and the resolution of unclear situations and disputes.

Progress towards greater glasnost, openness and global confidence-building would effectively contribute to constructing a comprehensive system of international security. It is precisely in this context that we support the measures being proposed.

I am confident that they will lay the groundwork for a really unique system of confidence which, in organic unity with the priceless experience amassed in this area before, will further enhance Europe's standing as the creative laboratory of openness, transparency, disarmament and joint search for ways towards a peaceful human community.

We would like to believe that this experience will be a lodestar for mankind, that it will be supported by the United Nations and by all continents and regions as an example and model for building a global confidence system.

Our warm thanks go to the government and people of Canada, who are giving such a hospitable welcome in Ottawa to this important Conference working in behalf of mankind.



Document : ICO-CS-012

**Open Skies Conference**

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INTERVENTION BY  
THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE  
KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS  
MR. H. VAN DEN BROEK

OFFENER  
HIMMEL

CIELI  
APERTI

ОТКРЫТОЕ  
НЕБО

**Netherlands**

CIELOS  
ABIERTOS

FEBRUARY 12TH, 1990



Mr. Chairman,

The idea of opening our skies to allow inspections by air over each other's territory is not a new one. It was President Eisenhower, who first made a proposal on the subject, during his summit meeting with General Secretary Khrushchev in Geneva in July 1955. At that time, the presentation of the proposal - according to President Eisenhower's memoirs - was immediately followed by a loud, unexpected clap of thunder, an electricity break-down, total darkness in the conference room and stunned silence. Seeing the large number of delegations present today both from East and West, I am happy to note that we have recovered from the shock eventually and that now we can discuss this bold and interesting idea.

I am grateful to President Bush for having launched the "Open Skies" proposal in May last year. I think that moment was well chosen. During the last few years dramatic changes have indeed occurred in the relations between East and West. Although different in form as well as thrust, these changes have in common that they mark the beginning of a new era that holds out bold promises; in paraphrasing Milton, one could say "Europe lost, Europe regained", although we have hardly reached the state of paradise yet in Europe. The unrelenting desire of the peoples to live in freedom and to build jointly, guided by a common heritage, a better Europe, has uncovered new horizons.

The cold war is behind us; new tasks lie ahead.

One of these is the "management of change", our joint responsibility to ensure that the new Europe will develop along peaceful lines and remain embedded in a structure of stability. As far as the Netherlands are concerned two indispensable elements of such a structure of stability are the European Community and the Atlantic Alliance. I am convinced that the process of European integration and the

trans-atlantic partnership will be two cornerstones of the new European architecture which we will have to design in the coming years. This architecture will have to be a robust one, strong enough to withstand any tendencies towards what I would call a re-nationalisation of European policies, meaning a falling-back to the instable and dangerous era of rampant nationalism and threatening power policies.

An important building-block in this new European architecture will also be a strengthened CSCE. The Helsinki-process provides us with an excellent instrument for intensifying the cooperation between all European countries and enhancing our security. Its agenda is the right one, ranging from human rights to disarmament and economic cooperation. Its members are not only 33 countries in Europe itself, but also those two European powers who geographically speaking lie on a different continent, but form in the political and cultural sense an integral part of the community of European nations: our host nation today, Canada, and the United States of America. Their continued participation in the affairs of Europe, also in the field of defense and security, is crucial for the peace and well-being of our continent.

Each of the three institutions I mentioned: the European Community, the Atlantic Alliance, and the CSCE, has its own role to play in the new Europe. There is no need to see them as some kind of alternatives and to presume that a strengthened CSCE can or should replace the Atlantic Alliance, or that the process of European integration in the framework of EC stands in the way of a greater economic cooperation between all European countries.

A CSCE-summit later this year on the occasion of the signing of the CFE-Treaty will lead, I hope, to a strengthening of the CSCE part of the new European architecture. In the view of my country the CSCE-summit will not only provide a forum for a stock-taking and a general debate on the fundamental changes that

have taken place in Europe in recent years. The Summit will also be the appropriate moment to take decisions on the updating of the Helsinki-process in accordance with the new circumstances.

These could take the form of new CSCE-commitments, which would consolidate the positive developments in the European countries concerning inter alia human rights and free elections and harvest the results of CSCE meetings such as the ones later this year in Bonn and Copenhagen.

Furthermore the summit will in the opinion of my country have to decide on new arms control objectives. The Netherlands is in favour of an immediate start of a new cycle of negotiations after the conclusion of a CFE-agreement, to enhance stability and security in Europe.

Moreover, the summit could decide on strengthening the structure of the CSCE-process by setting up a structure for consultations between the CSCE-countries at the level of Foreign Ministers and their officials. This structure should in our opinion be a flexible one, not based on a formal treaty and without an cumbersome bureaucracy.

Most importantly, at the summit the Ministers of Foreign Affairs could be given the mandate to elaborate proposals regarding the founding principles of a new European peace order and the role of the CSCE in that context.

In 1992, at the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting, the steps taken in the framework of the CSCE-process for the construction of the "just and lasting peaceful order in Europe" of which the Harmel report already spoke in 1967, could then be solemnly confirmed.

An important part of the new European architecture will be a unified Germany. Each day it becomes clearer that the German unification will figure prominently on

the summit agenda. The Netherlands welcome the prospect of a unified Germany. We have for decades supported the right of the German people to regain its unity through the exercise of its right to self-determination. Forty years of experience with the Federal Republic of Germany as a partner in European integration and Atlantic cooperation give us full confidence that also a unified Germany will play its full role in shaping a new European peace order, as a member of EC and the North Atlantic Alliance.

Mr. Chairman,

The negotiations on "Open Skies" form part of a wider agenda which also encompasses the CFE and CSBM negotiations in Vienna. In my view this conference offers a unique opportunity to all of us present here for giving a further impetus to the CFE negotiations. I would not dare to go as far as to describe the ministerial part of our conference here in Ottawa as a Vienna Plenary at ministerial level, but I am sure that all of us look forward to providing a political impulse to the Vienna negotiations. Indeed we should not fail to grasp the opportunities this conference offers to help bringing the CFE talks to a rapid, successful conclusion. Our publics expect nothing less.

Very recently, the West has tabled five new proposals which to my mind will meet most, if not all, of the concerns some countries may have had as to our previous proposals. By accepting the principle of conversion of helicopters, by excluding primary trainers as well as accepting a separate category for interceptors in our aircraft definition the West has - and may I stress that - made important and substantial concessions. Concessions which, hopefully, will be reciprocated by the Warsaw Pact countries.

As to tanks and armoured combat vehicles consensus over their definition and corresponding ceilings and sub-ceilings seem to be within reach now. Bridging our

differences on zones and the concept of storage also seem to be feasible shortly. Concerning US and Soviet stationed troops the positions seem to be getting nearer, although the Soviet Union has as yet not been able to accept the latest Western proposal.

As far as the presence of Western European forces on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany is concerned, we object to a treatment of these forces which would imply that their presence there is basically an abnormality, which has no place in a new European security architecture and should be ended at a certain point in time. On the contrary, as I said before, the process of European integration is destined to become one of the solid cornerstones of this new architecture. The stationed troops of the members of the European Community, which have set themselves the goal of a European Union, should therefore not be included in a ceiling on stationed troops.

Our common commitment to an early conclusion of the CFE negotiations offers us no other option, I think, than to grasp every opportunity to give a further impetus to our negotiators in Vienna. I therefore propose that we agree here in Ottawa, as political representatives of our countries, to commit ourselves to the conclusion of the CFE negotiations in the course of this year. Undoubtedly it will prove to be a truly Herculean task to complete all the technical details of the Treaty within the time limits we have set ourselves. All the more reason I would say, for us to try to identify common elements during our meetings here in Ottawa, on the basis of which our negotiators in Vienna could proceed further.

In this context I would like to draw your attention to the step the Netherlands took in Vienna in October last year. When the negotiators in Vienna agreed on a definition of artillery the Netherlands decided to voluntarily provide the participants with informal information on the Netherlands artillery holdings in the

area of application. Our initiative was generally welcomed and I therefore propose that all participating countries agree to provide, during the negotiations, on a voluntary and informal basis, all the relevant information on national holdings of treaty limited equipment. To start with, this may apply to artillery.

After the pertaining definitions have been agreed upon, this could be extended to other categories of treaty limited items (in first instance, tanks and armoured combat vehicles). By a process in which an ever widening group of countries would on an informal basis gradually release information on their holdings, we would not only make it possible to gain a further insight into the structure and numbers of the armed forces present in Europe, but also gain valuable experience and pave the way for the formal exchange of data which will take place at the signing of the Treaty. This will, in my opinion, be an important element in ensuring the immediate smooth implementation of the Treaty.

Also, Mr. Chairman, I propose that the CFE Joint Consultative Group, foreseen in the Western draft Treaty text (the Eastern proposal has something on the same line), be operational immediately upon the signing of the Treaty.

It is foreseen that in the transitional period between the signing and the entry into force of the Treaty the Parties will already begin to exchange substantial information, such as their maximum levels of holdings.

It will therefore be of the utmost importance that already in this interim period a forum will exist in which the Parties can discuss the exchanged information and, if necessary, ask for clarification. Mr. Chairman, let us not underestimate the tasks which we will be taking upon ourselves in implementing this Treaty. The timely installation and activating of the Joint Consultative Group can only enhance the prospects of a smooth implementation.



Mr. Chairman,

Let me now return to the subject of "Open Skies".

In the Netherlands view, the establishment of an "Open Skies" regime - consisting of regular, unarmed, surveillance flights, - is the logical next step in the confidence building process, between East and West.

It will strongly enhance the transparency between our countries with respect to each other's military situation.

It contributes to stability in a period of great changes in Europa and can facilitate the management of those changes.

Moreover "Open Skies" can usefully complement the verification arrangements under other arms control agreements.

We should try to create an "Open Skies" regime that is both flexible and effective. Heavy bureaucratic mechanisms and cumbersome procedures are to be avoided. The NATO-countries have already reached some specific understandings in this connection. Subjects to which we attach particular importance concern the co-ordination of the observation flights to be conducted, the pooling of resources and the sharing of information gained from "Open Skies"-flights.

There should also be the possibility for nations to group themselves into one unit for the purpose of hosting "Open Skies" flights and jointly accept the quota applying to the total land mass. I would like to inform the Conference that we have been discussing this possibility with Belgium and Luxemburg and that we are likely to present ourselves as one, Benelux group.

For the "Open Skies"-flights to be effective and credible, the aircraft conducting the observation flights should, in the opinion of my country be equipped with adequate sensors. Countries should be free in principle to decide on the sensors they wish to use; restrictions should be limited and specific.

Before closing, I may point out that as we appreciate the participation of the neutral and non-aligned countries in the CSCE-process, we should envisage the possibility to associate these countries to "Open Skies", once the system has proven that it serves its purposes.

Mr. Chairman,

This time nature has not interfered with our discussions on "Open Skies". I think this augurs well for the Conference, which, I sincerely hope, will be successful. I would like to thank the Canadian authorities for taking the initiative of bringing all together here and for the warm hospitality they have extended to all of us on this occasion.

Thank you.



DOCUMENT: ICO-CS-013

**Open Skies Conference**

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STATEMENT BY H.E. MR. KRZYSZTOF SKUBISZEWSKI  
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE  
REPUBLIC OF POLAND TO THE OPEN SKIES CONFERENCE

OFFENER  
HIMMEL

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**Poland**

CIELOS  
ABIERTOS

FEBRUARY 12TH, 1990



Mr. Chairman, Distinguished Colleagues,

May I be permitted to open my remarks by referring to the political context of our meeting.

The States of Central and Eastern Europe have rejected various forms of totalitarianism. The Europe of two ideologies and the confrontation based on them is becoming a thing of the past, though the two multilateral alliances still exist. Poland has been the originator of the changes in Central-Eastern Europe. We should all remember the Solidarność (Solidarity) movement and its impact on the various transformations that now take place in that region.

In fact, the East-West dichotomy has lost its former sense. As a result of successful efforts to bring about a change in our part of the continent, Western Europe, the United States and Canada, and other States, including Japan, have reacted to our endeavours and gave us economic help and other support. We express our gratitude. The word solidarity which has a special importance in Poland, has acquired an all European and Atlantic meaning.

A single Europe is emerging. It is a Europe of democracy, pluralism and humanism. The construction of a new system of European security, the rejection of the East-West formula of relationships and the making of new arrangements of cooperation and cohesion should be subordinated to these values.

All this offers a serious challenge to our statesmanship. Old structures usually outlive the circumstances that created them. The inertia of old behaviours and habits is strong. And there is a justified fear of instability. Such anxieties should not be disregarded. But we do believe that they will soon be overcome, and in any case we wish to act with prudence.

There is need to arrive at a long-term concept for the development of pan-European relations. Some most recent changes that are beginning to take place in the heart of Europe and that are fundamental require the creation of a new system of European security. It is with this in mind that we are considering the proposal to call a summit conference of the 35 states which participate in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. We feel that such a summit conference should consider various initiatives to modify the status of our continent. While the European Community constitutes the hard core of the effort to build united Europe, and the Council of Europe in Strassbourg plays a primary role, I wish to emphasise the importance of President Mikhail Gorbachev's concept of a "common European home" and of President François Mitterrand's idea of a European confederation.

In the Helsinki process we also need some institutional improvements and among other proposals to this effect I wish to refer to the suggestion by the Polish Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki to establish, within that process, a Council of European Cooperation. Let me add that this Council will not compete with any of the existing European organizations or institutions nor will it be a substitute for them.



Mr. Chairman,

This conference is devoted to a concept which was born a long time ago. This is not to say that it has lost any of its value. Far from it. The transformations I mentioned have created the conditions for its fruition. Hence our positive reaction to President George Bush's initiative on this matter.

Openness implies the absence of hidden and unfriendly intentions. Openness is a means of democratizing security relationships, for it enables an equal access to information.

Poland advocated the lifting of the curtain on those spheres of national military activities which arouse distrust and suspicion as to the credibility of declared intentions. On our part we are consistently declassifying information and making it available to our public and to other States in a spirit of good-neighbourly relations. We have just published a White Book on Defence. This document was presented to the participants of the seminar on military doctrines staged last month in Vienna.

Poland advocates the extension and consolidation of the principle of openness as a standard practice in European relations. It is from such a viewpoint that the Government of the Republic of Poland approaches the proposals put forward during the disarmament negotiations. All ideas which serve the openness and the building of confidence can count on our support. We are ready to open our airspace under the forthcoming agreement.

Distinguished Delegates,

My country represents the view that the "Open Skies" regime be based on principles which would make it an indispensable component of a new concept of European security. These principles are as follows:

First, it should be a regime that would not exclude other measures, would supplement them and amplify their functioning. Not only should the "Open Skies" regime lead to the transparency of military activities, but it should make the verification of disarmament agreements easier.

Second, it should be a democratic regime which means that its participants will be individual sovereign States. Those States should benefit in an equal degree from the "Open Skies" regime, regardless of their size and technical capabilities. While the agreement itself could be made accessible to some non-participants in the present Conference, though that matter still requires very careful consideration.

And third, the regime should be operationally effective. After all, it is not just a political symbol of the new times that we are seeking. The balance of cost and profit is the measure of effectiveness. This should be a cost-effective regime. Its effectiveness further means that collisions and complications should be eliminated and there must be respect for the rules of air-traffic safety, and for the interests of transit states. Above all, however, we should enhance the sense of security of all participating States.

Poland also evaluates the "Open Skies" concept from the viewpoint of its own geopolitical and geostrategic situation. We are located



in a densely populated, sensitive area of the continent. Poland will strive to have that specific situation of the region reflected in the agreement.

Mr. Chairman,

Many technical issues will have to be resolved before the "Open Skies" concept becomes a reality. This will, surely, be a time and energy consuming task. Various solutions have their merits. However, I do believe, that the political and military values inherent in an "Open Skies" agreement will prevail over its details. It is in such a spirit that the Polish delegation will try to contribute to our endeavours.

Mr. Chairman,

May I conclude by thanking the Government of Canada for its initiative in calling this conference and creating excellent conditions for its work. I also thank the Government of Canada for its great hospitality.

Thank you Mr. Chairman.



**Open Skies Conference**

STATEMENT BY H.E. MR. JIRI DIENSTBIER  
MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF  
THE CZECHOSLOVAK SOCIALIST REPUBLIC

**Czechoslovakia**

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FEBRUARY 12TH, 1990

Open Skies - Ottawa

Statement by H.E. Mr. Jiri Dienstbier, Minister  
for Foreign Affairs of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic

Mr. Prime Minister,

Mr. Chairman,

Ministers,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I thank the Prime Minister, the Right Honourable Brian Mulroney, for his welcome. I highly appreciate the care and hospitality extended to us by our Canadian hosts.

We are meeting at the time of dynamic changes in the Eastern half of the divided Europe which lead to fundamental shifts in the East-West relations. In this context, all our institutions, and often even thinking, are lagging behind the political development. Nor can we in this evade the question of the present and the future of the blocs - the Warsaw Treaty and NATO.

I agree with the view that until now the balance between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty has been a guarantor of European stability and security. How far is this valid for the future?

The new situation speaks against the existing concept of European security, resting on a bloc basis in the area of the Helsinki process.

The States of the Eastern alliance are today developing toward political and economic plurality. This is reflected, inter alia, in democratization of their allied relations - the Warsaw Pact ceased to be a tool for keeping totalitarian bureaucracies in power.

We desire a dynamic development in Europe in conditions of stability. The Czechoslovak Government of National Understanding, however, is not convinced that stability can be maintained, or even strengthened by conserving the status quo.

We proceed from the assumption that the prospect of European security should be based on a comprehensive, bloc-free, collective and democratic approach, that the bloc concept should be replaced by a pluralistic model. This dissolution of the blocs, of course, is not yet on the agenda of the day. But it is necessary to demonstrate political resolve to overcome blocs.

Today, the blocs are helping the disarmament process. They should bring this task, beneficial for peace and security, to a successful end. That is why, at this stage, we agree with those representatives who want to preserve the alliances as an instrument facilitating the arms control process. With the continuing development towards democracy, it should be their last major task.

We are sometimes criticized that our gentle revolution is here and there changing in a naive revolution. But our experience shows that it is only with a certain measure of "naiveté", of untraditional thinking and courage, that it is possible to change obsolete institutions, structures and mechanisms. Only by striving for the "impossible" is it actually possible to push through something essentially new.

For the transition from the bloc concept of safeguarding European security to a democratic and pluralistic concept there is a well-tested instrument - the process of the Conference on Security and cooperation in Europe. The adoption of the Helsinki documents in 1975 made possible the rise of the Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia, of the Committee for the Defence of Workers (KOR) in Poland, of the Helsinki groups in the Soviet Union, etc. Helsinki provided an international law basis for the independent

groups striving for the establishment of democracy. It has also significantly contributed to the current changes in the Eastern half of Europe.

For these and other reasons, Czechoslovakia will strive for the Helsinki process to acquire further new quality that would be in keeping with the development in Europe at the turn of the millennium. The new political, economic, cultural, humanitarian and security institutions should be created, which would be replacing gradually step by step, the structures of the bipolar world.

In the unfolding of this process we see great possibilities for a full-fledged participation of all member States of both alliances.

In this context we view as most timely the attainment of successful results at the Vienna talks of the 23 states on Conventional armed forces in Europe. But this phase of the Vienna talks should be successfully completed as soon as possible in this year. This would allow us to give the negotiators a new, much more emphatic mandate for the second phase: to prepare agreements that

would transform armed forces and their structures to purely defensive purposes, so that no country would possess enough soldiers and arms to be able to attack others with impunity.

My country has already embarked on the demolition of the rampant military machine. We shall continue along that path. We would welcome it, if all the participating States proceeded in a similar manner.

We have welcomed, with extraordinary satisfaction, the proposal by President Bush for a substantial reduction of the envisaged contingent of American and Soviet forces for Central Europe. The ceiling of 195,000 soldiers makes it possible to meet the wish of those States, among them also Czechoslovakia, which do not deem it necessary to have foreign troops stationed in their territories.

Mr. Chairman,

We are today jointly launching working in a cause that took more than thirty four years to mature to stage of its materialization in the form of a proposal put forward by President Bush on May 12 of the last year.

Czechoslovakia welcomes and unequivocally supports the proposal for the creation of an "Open Skies" regime. The reason why we do so is that, after major political changes that have occurred in our society, we are determined to contribute towards the all-round strengthening of confidence and progress in the process of disarmament where precise and consistent verification represents the basic prerequisite. Also because the proposal meets the calls for maximum transparency of military activities and military organizations. And, furthermore, because, in our view, this regime will significantly enhance collective security which is our ultimate goal. This precisely is the path to creating conditions in which military alliances will be gradually losing their justification.

It is, of course typical that today we discuss "Open Skies", while the skies have been already open for tens of years and for decades we have been able from satellites to read the licence plates on cars.

The "Open Skies" is therefore a symbol of the changing times. We are to agree on something which in one way or another has been here for a long time. But the concurrence of views demonstrates



our desire for transparency in military matters. If an agreement is reached, it will be an indisputable contribution towards overcoming the division of Europe.

We would wish that the "Open Skies" project might gradually be open to all the States of Europe, that it might develop into a system of confidence-building measures which would have a truly European-wide and, eventually, also a global character.

We also appreciate its significant positive implications from the humanitarian point of view. We trust that this regime would definitively do away with such manifestations of the cold war and its remnants as was the shooting down of civilian and other aircraft suspected of aerial espionage. After all, in the past the world found itself more than once in a crisis situation due to such conflicts.

The "Open Skies" project, the consideration of which we are today launching on political and expert levels, is in its potential so far without precedence. It represents, a new quality in the field of confidence-building and verification measures. Through this regime we would not only substantially raise the quality of

the system of observation of military activities, but would also significantly strengthen the principle of verification of compliance with arms control agreements.

The implementation of the "Open Skies" project of course, creates also some technical problems. Czechoslovakia at the present time possesses neither the necessary aircraft park, nor the appropriate equipment. The proposed options, whether it should be an allied, or a group or a national aircraft park, have both their advantages as well as drawbacks. Our experts should find the optimum variants, both from the point of view of national security, effectiveness as well as financial costs.

It is very important, in our opinion, to ensure equal access by all the participating States to observation equipment of identical technological level. My delegation will therefore propose uniform, jointly approved observation equipment.

In this connection, however, I feel the need to say openly that at a time when we are embarking of the very complicated period of transition to a market-based economy, we could only with difficulty assume excessive financial commitments. That, of course, does not in any way detract from our political resolve to

do our utmost for an expeditious launching of the "Open Skies" regime, nor does it change our decision to fully open the territory of Czechoslovakia to this form of international verification without any restrictions.

Mr. Chairman,

The Czechoslovak delegation, which I am so instructing, will do everything in its power to make this important Conference as successful as possible.

Thank you for your attention.



Document: ICO-CS-016

**Open Skies Conference**

**STATEMENT BY MR. KJELL MAGNE BONDEVIK**

**MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS**

**NORWAY**

**Norway**

**FEBRUARY 12TH, 1990**

OPEN  
SKIES

CIELS  
OUVERTS

OFFENER  
HIMMEL

CIELI  
APERTI

ОТКРЫТО  
НЕБО

CIELOS  
ABIERTOS



**Open Skies Conference**

**Statement by**

**Mr. Kjell Magne Bondevik**

**Minister of Foreign Affairs, Norway**

**12 February 1990**

Mr. Chairman,

The present meeting is the first gathering of the foreign ministers of the 23 member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Treaty Organization since the peaceful revolution that swept Central and East Europe as the eighties drew to a close. It is also the first East-West ministerial meeting of the nineties, a decade that at the outset would seem to hold more promise of political dialogue and East-West cooperation than at any point in the post-war period.

The old order which divided Europe and kept nations as well as individuals apart is increasingly being transformed. The overcoming of the division of Europe and of the ensuing ideological and political confrontation, which only a few months ago seemed an utopian dream, now has become a political objective within the realm of reality.

We have indeed passed a watershed in European history. The continent is advancing from confrontation to cooperation. From this point of view it is symbolically highly appropriate that the main reason for the presence of 23 foreign ministers here to-day is to launch negotiations on a proposal that was originally introduced some 35 years ago, in the heyday of the Cold War. The original Open Skies proposal fell victim to the chilly political climate that prevailed in those days, to the lack of trust and to feelings of suspicion between nations.

But the Open Skies proposal has been launched once more. We have come together to negotiate a regime in which individual states of the two groups will be allowed to overfly the entire territory of states of the other group. This in itself bears abundant testimony to the dramatic change that has taken place

in the East-West relationship and to the remarkable new commitment to transparency of the states represented here today. Norway attaches great importance to the Open Skies conference. We hope our negotiators will be successful in shaping over the next couple of weeks the outline of a mutually acceptable agreement which can be further elaborated, finalized and signed later this year.

But the present meeting is significant also because it provides an opportunity to give a political impetus to ongoing arms control processes, in particular the Vienna negotiations on conventional disarmament, and to exchange views on the future direction of the East-West process. Unprecedented achievements are within reach. The members of the Western Alliance have come here prepared to show flexibility and bringing along new ideas which we hope will contribute to eliminating some of the remaining obstacles to progress.

Mr. Chairman,

Open Skies to us is primarily, but not exclusively, a confidence building measure. The main function of the regime is to strengthen the feeling of security of each of the participating states by placing at their disposal a mechanism for satisfying themselves of the peaceful intentions of the other participants. Particularly from the point of view of smaller nations with limited resources and without access to sophisticated national technical means, such as satellite surveillance, it is important to be able to monitor areas of particular interest and concern, either through overflights of their own or in cooperation with their allies.

In order to be meaningful, an Open Skies regime will have to provide for overflights of the entire national territory of

participating states, without limitations other than those dictated by reasons of flight safety rules of international law. Exclusion of areas deemed to be militarily sensitive would negate the very purpose of the regime. Unrestricted overflight may in the eyes of some seem a high price, but it is clearly a necessary one if we are to be able to harvest the benefits in terms of enhanced confidence and transparency. Lack of openness clearly was a major cause of the suspicion and uncertainty that has previously characterized relations between the two parts of Europe. An Open Skies regime will therefore contribute to consolidating and codifying the new openness that we have seen recently.

The Open Skies regime will be negotiated and implemented by the 23 members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Transparency about the military activities of these countries clearly is of key importance in terms of the military balance in Europe. But at a later stage we would favour the inclusion in it of the European neutral and non-aligned states. They, too, clearly have a stake in military transparency and confidence-building and in the general stability and security of our continent.

Mr. Chairman,

It is essential that the Open Skies regime provide for equitable participation of all states concerned. To that end, great care must be taken in establishing criteria for the allocation of quotas. As we see it, the most relevant criteria would be the size of each participant's national territory. Let me add that total quotas for each of the groups will have to be large enough to allow for meaningful monitoring of military activities and installations. Similarly, the regime must provide for all-weather, night-and-day coverage if it is to be meaningful. These requirements will necessarily entail economic consequences.



The experience gained from the pioneering Canadian trial overflight of Hungarian territory, seems to indicate that the regime we are about to create will be costly. The primary objective is establishing a functioning regime capable of serving its purpose. We must, however, avoid creating a regime so costly that nations, particularly the smaller and less well-to-do, would not be able to make use of it. In this context it should be recalled that Open Skies is only one of a series of existing or imminent arms control agreements that all entail comprehensive, intrusive and costly verification schemes. The cumulative effects of all these schemes in terms of manpower, equipment and money must not become prohibitive.

Mr. Chairman,

The likelihood of drastic reductions in conventional forces means that the prospects for a lasting improvement in stability in Europe are better than they have been for a long time. A first CFE agreement will be a cornerstone of the new security structure in Europe. Everybody in this room is committed to the objective of concluding an agreement this year. The basic challenge confronting us is to make sure that our arms control efforts go forward in parallel with political events. The CFE process must not be overtaken by developments in the political arena. The present meeting offers an opportunity to accelerate the Vienna negotiations. We must make full use of that opportunity, for in spite of much progress, significant problems remain outstanding.

We hope our partners will respond favourably to the proposals recently tabled by the Western Allies and that they will contribute to the establishment of further common ground through proposals and flexibility of their own. If so, there is every reason to hope that the present meeting will be the energizing injection that the Vienna talks so obviously require if momentum is to be maintained.

While the brunt of the remaining work has to be borne by our negotiators in Vienna, it is clear that early conclusion of a treaty requires constant political level attention. For our part we would in principle be open to the idea of a possible CPE foreign ministers meeting later this year in order to facilitate progress in what we hope at that time will be a few remaining outstanding issues.

While concentrating on the final stages of the first phase of CFE, we also need to start looking beyond this. The agreement which seems now to be within reach is an important step towards a stable and lasting new security order for Europe. But it will not in and of itself solve all of the continent's security problems. Hence there must be no break in the conventional arms control process following a first agreement. The Allies are on record as foreseeing further steps to enhance stability and security in Europe. These could include i.e. further reductions, inclusion of new equipment categories and stabilizing measures.

Developments in the various individual areas of arms control are obviously interrelated. CSBMs can make a vital contribution to the consolidation of the emerging new security structure in Europe. The chances that a START agreement to reduce strategic nuclear arms by 50% can be concluded in the course of this year have obviously been increased as a result of the recent meeting between Mr. Baker and Mr. Shevardnadze. Significant progress appears to have been made also with regard to chemical weapons. Hopefully this will pave the way for early agreement, at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, on a global ban on chemical weapons. In the near future it will also be time to launch negotiations on landbased nuclear missiles of shorter range.

Mr. Chairman,

Last year was one of unprecedented political change and upheaval. This year's challenge is to see to it that the old security order in Europe, characterized by mutual antagonism and political and ideological competition, is replaced by new security structures based on cooperation and commonality of interest.

The CSCE process should in our view play a key role in this context, as a framework for the management of East-West relations and as a basis for the establishment of the new order of peace in Europe called for in the May 1989 NATO summit declaration. Norway is strongly in favour of convening a CSCE summit later this year. Therefore, we have noted with satisfaction the expressions of growing support for this proposal in all three major CSCE groupings.

A CSCE summit would give the process an energizing political impulse by underlining the importance the 35 attach to it as an instrument for peaceful, cooperative change. It would also provide an opportunity for discussion of the political future of the continent of Europe, the future direction of arms control, and the role that the CSCE process could play in the development of new patterns and structures of cooperation in Europe.

Mr. Chairman,

By way of conclusion, I should like to express my thanks to the Government and people of Canada for having arranged this important conference and for the generous hospitality they have extended to us.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.



Document : ICO-CS-018

**Open Skies Conference**

OPEN  
SKIES

SPEECH BY THE MINISTER  
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF SPAIN

CIELS  
OUVERTS

OFFENER  
HIMMEL

CIELI  
APERTI

ОТКРЫТОЕ  
НЕБО

**Spain**

CIELOS  
ABIERTOS

FEBRUARY 12TH, 1990



SPEECH BY THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF SPAIN. "OPEN SKIES" CONFERENCE, OTTAWA, 12 FEBRUARY 1990.

IN 1955, THE PROPOSAL BY PRESIDENT EISENHOWER TO THE SOVIET UNION TO SIGN AN "OPEN SKIES" TREATY DID NOT GET A POSITIVE RESPONSE. THIRTY-FIVE YEARS LATER IT IS PRECISELY THIS PROJECT, WHICH HAS SUMMONED US HERE IN OTTAWA, THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE MEMBER COUNTRIES OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE AND THE WARSAW PACT. WE MUST ASK OURSELVES: WHY IS IT THAT THOSE SKIES WHICH COULD NOT BE OPEN IN 1955 CAN BE NOW OPEN IN 1990?

I THINK THAT WE ALL AGREE ON THE ANSWER: BECAUSE WE HAVE WANTED AND KNOWN HOW TO SUBSTITUTE CONFRONTATION FOR COOPERATION. OR, IN OTHER WORDS: BECAUSE WE HAVE CEASED TO CONSIDER OURSELVES INCOMPATIBLE AND WE NOW WANT TO BE COMPLEMENTARY.

IN THIS CHANGE WHICH IS SO ENCOURAGING AND SIGNIFICANT, A MOTIVE POWER AS OLD AS THE WORLD AND WISER THAN ANYONE HAS TRIGGERED THE RYTHM OF HISTORIC TIME. THIS POWER HAS BEEN THE UNCONSTRAINABLE PRESSURE OF NATIONS WHOSE OWN DYNAMIC HAS ALLOWED THEM TO GO THROUGH A MUCH LONGER COURSE IN A FEW MONTHS, IN TERMS OF SUBSIDING DISTRUST AND DECREASING THREAT BETWEEN EAST AND WEST, THAN WE NEGOTIATIONS AND POLITICIANS HAVE GONE THROUGH

IN YEARS. EUROPE NO LONGER WALKS IN SMALL STEPS BUT IN LONG STRIDES AND IS JUMPING OVER FENCES AND OVERCOMING OBSTACLES PRACTICALLY EVERY DAY. THIS IS HERE AND NOW, MR. PRESIDENT, OUR STARTING POINT AND OUR CHALLENGE.

FOR YEARS WE HAVE BEEN NEGOTIATING A MILITARY BALANCE WHICH WOULD MAKE THE WORLD MORE HOSPITABLE. WE HAVE FOLLOWED A DOUBLE COURSE: ON ONE HAND BY ARTICULATING MEASURES WHICH WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO REDUCE THE DISTRUST LEVEL WHICH STARTED TO PREVAIL IN EUROPE RIGHT AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR. ON THE OTHER HAND, BY RESTRICTING THE QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE MARGINS OF ARMAMENT THAT THIS DISTRUST HAS LED US TO ACCUMULATE. ALL ALONG, WE HAVE ALWAYS KNOWN THAT CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT ARE NOT AN END IN THEMSELVES BUT RATHER MEANS OF REACHING ANOTHER GOAL, MUCH BROADER AND NOBLER: TO CREATE A WORLD WHICH MAY ASPIRE AFTER BEING FREER AND MORE JUST AS IT FEELS MORE SECURE.

I WOULD LIKE TO PUT FORWARD THREE CONSIDERATIONS ON THIS DISARMAMENT PROBLEM.

THE FIRST ONE IS THE NEED FOR DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS TO ADVANCE AT LEAST AT THE SAME RYTHM AS THAT OF POLITICAL EVENTS.

UNTIL NOW, IN EUROPE, OUR CLAIM IN THE FIELD OF DISARMAMENT HAS BEEN RELATIVELY MODEST. EUROPE IS THE CONTINENT WITH THE BIGGEST CONCENTRATION OF ARMAMENT IN THE WORLD AND UNTIL NOW WE HAVE NOT GONE BEYOND A PROJECT

OF LIMITATION OF HARM IN A CONTEXT OF RIVALRY AND DISTRUST.

DISARMAMENT MUST NOW BE THE CONSEQUENCE OF A NEW WORLD SITUATION, AND SEVERAL OF THE STATEMENTS WHICH APPEARED AS TOP OBJECTIVES ARE NOW MINIMAL OBJECTIVES AND WHAT APPEARED TO BE POINTS OF ARRIVAL ARE MERELY INTERMEDIATE STAGES.

THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS MUST END AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, NOT BECAUSE THEY ARE THE CONCLUSION OF THE DISARMAMENT PROCESS, BUT BECAUSE THEY ARE AN INITIAL AND NECESSARY STEP. THE CONCLUSION OF THIS NEGOTIATION FORCIBLY IMPLIES THE BEGINNING OF ANOTHER.

THE SECOND ASPECT OF DISARMAMENT WHICH I WISH TO REFER TO IS THAT THERE IS A EUROPEAN DIMENSION OF SECURITY WHICH WE MUST NOT FORGET AND THAT IS THE MEDITERRANEAN. THE MEDITERRANEAN SEA IS TODAY THE SCENE OF AN EXCESSIVE CONCENTRATION OF ARMAMENT. JUST AS THE PROCESS INITIATED IN HELSINKI HAS ALLOWED FOR A TRANSFORMATION OF THE EUROPEAN REALITY, WHY DON'T WE FATHOM A GREAT FORUM OF COOPERATION AND SECURITY THAT WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THAT EXPERIENCE IN ORDER TO LAY THE FOUNDATION FOR CONFIDENCE, DEMOCRATIC MODELS AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN THIS PART OF THE WORLD.

THIRDLY, LET US NOT FORGET THAT HOW MUCH MORE EUROPEAN DISARMAMENT PROGRESSES, THE UNIVERSAL DIMENSION OF THE PROBLEM BECOMES MORE EVIDENT. WE ARE TALKING ABOUT SOME PROBLEMS WHICH ARE NOT ONLY EUROPEAN BUT WORLD-WIDE.

IN THE CASE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS, FOR INSTANCE, BILATERAL AGREEMENTS ARE NOT SUFFICIENT, AS BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE UNITED STATES, BUT IT IS NECESSARY TO REACH A UNIVERSAL AGREEMENT TO ERADICATE THEM TOTALLY.

IN CONCLUSION, THE ASPIRATIONS AND THE DISARMAMENT PROJECTS WHICH HAVE CONSISTENTLY FAILED BECAUSE THEY WERE PREMATURE, FIND TODAY A POLITICAL CONTEXT WHICH GIVES THEM MATURITY. THUS, THE "OPEN SKIES" REGIME WHICH WAS EVIDENTLY PREMATURE IN 1955, IS NOW MATURE IN 1990. WE ARE CONVINCED THAT IT IS PERFECTLY POSSIBLE TO REACH A DOUBLE OBJECTIVE AT WHICH WE AIM WITH THIS REGIME: ON ONE HAND, THE OPENING OF THE AIR SPACES TO CARRY OUT OBSERVATION FLIGHTS IN ORDER TO STRENGTHEN CONFIDENCE AND TRANSPARENCY; ON THE OTHER HAND, COOPERATION IN THE PEACEFUL USE OF AIR SPACE BY MILITARY AIRCRAFT. THE ONSET OF THIS PROJECT WILL THUS COMPLEMENT THE VERIFICATION MEASURES WHICH WILL BE ESTABLISHED IN OTHER TREATIES OF ARMAMENT AND DISARMAMENT CONTROL AND, MOST PARTICULARLY, IN THOSE WHICH WILL BE ADOPTED IN THE TREATY OF CONVENTIONAL DISARMAMENT IN VIENNA.

THE CONCLUSION OF THIS TREATY -ANOTHER OLD AND FRUSTRATED ASPIRATION- ALSO FINDS TODAY CONDITIONS OF MATURITY. THE NUMERICAL MAGNITUDE OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENT AND ITS ASYMMETRICAL DISTRIBUTION IN EUROPE ARE NOT ONLY INCONGRUOUS WITH THE POLITICAL EVOLUTION WHICH IS RAPIDLY TAKING PLACE. WHAT IS EVEN MORE SERIOUS IS THE FACT THAT



THEY MAY END UP BY CONSTITUTING A DANGEROUS RESTRAINT TO THE ACTUAL CHANGING PROCESS AND THE EXPECTATIONS OF COOPERATION WHICH ARE BEING OUTLINED. FURTHERMORE, REACHING A CONVENTIONAL STABILITY IN EUROPE AT LOWER POWER LEVELS IS THE LEVER WHICH WILL ALLOW TO MOVE DECISIVELY ANOTHER PARALLEL PROCESS, AND NOT LESS IMPORTANT, THE DRASTIC REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR ARMS, THE "START" NEGOTIATIONS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS THE CONCLUSION OF THE GENEVA CONVENTION ON ERADICATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

WE MUST DIRECT OUR POLITICAL WILL IN THIS DIRECTION IN ORDER TO REACH PROMPT SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS WE FIND IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS. IN THE PAST WE HAVE OFTEN COVERED UP POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES UNDER THE VEIL OF TECHNICAL DIFFICULTIES. TODAY WE MAY RIGHTLY SAY THAT THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH STILL SUBSIST IN VIENNA ARE TECHNICAL, BECAUSE WE HAVE THE FIRM NEGOTIATING WILL TO REACH AN AGREEMENT WHICH WILL PROPORTIONATE CONVENTIONAL MILITARY REALITY IN EUROPE WITH ITS POLITICAL REALITY.

THE NEW PROPOSALS ON COMBAT AVIATION AND PERSONNEL STATIONED IN EUROPE MUST LEAD TO A PROMPT AGREEMENT IN BOTH AREAS WHICH ARE STILL OPEN. WE HOPE THAT FLEXIBILITY WILL ALSO CONTINUE TO PREVAIL IN OTHER PENDING MATTERS SUCH AS THE DELIMITATION OF SUBAREAS AND GUARDED ARMAMENT STOCKS, COMBAT HELICOPTERS AND DEFINITIONS OF THAT ARMAMENT WHICH IS SUBJECT TO LIMITATIONS, SO

THAT WE WILL BE IN A POSITION TO SIGN AN AGREEMENT ON CONVENTIONAL FORCES AND ALSO, PREFERABLY, THE AGREEMENT REFERRING TO MEASURES OF CONFIDENCE -BEFORE THE END OF THE YEAR-.

MR. PRESIDENT:

WE MUST NOT BE PROPHETS OF HISTORY, BUT WE ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT. WHAT IS TRULY NEW ABOUT THE TIMES THAT WE ARE LIVING IS THE RYTHM OF CHANGE WHICH MAY GENERATE A HISTORIC VERTIGO. WE ARE TAKING A RISK IN THAT THE INTELLECTUAL PROCESS MAY STAY BEHIND THE PROCESS OF CHANGE, AND THAT WE MAY NOT BE ABLE TO FORESEE OUR THINKING AND DOING AND RIGHTLY INTERPRET WHAT IS HAPPENING.

GOETHE, WHO WAS PRESENT AT VALMY, KNEW HOW TO RECOGNIZE CLEARLY THAT, ON THAT DAY, IN THE BATTLE FIELD, A NEW ERA IN THE HISTORY OF HUMANITY HAD IRREVOCABLY BEGUN. WE, WHO ARE WITNESSING A TRUE TRANSFIGURATION OF EUROPE, KNOW THAT THE CHANGES WHICH ARE OCCURRING MEAN THE RECOVERY OF A UNITARY CONSCIENCE OF OUR CONTINENT. THIS CERTAINTY COMPELS US TO ADAPT THE IDEAS THAT WE HAVE ENTERTAINED FOR A RIVAL AND DIVIDED EUROPE TO THIS OTHER EUROPE WHICH IS ALREADY COMING TO LIFE AS A COLLECTIVE HOPE. IN THIS NEW EUROPE THE POLITICAL ROLE OF THE EC AND THE DYNAMISM OF ITS UNITARY PROCESS ARE MORE IMPORTANT THAN EVER.

EUROPE HAS ALWAYS BEEN A REALITY OF WEIGHTS

AND COUNTERWEIGHTS WHICH WERE ARRANGED IN A FRAGILE EQUILIBRIUM. WE DON'T KNOW WHAT IT WILL BE CALLED NEXT CENTURY. BUT WHAT WE DO KNOW WITH CERTAINTY IS THAT WE ARE HEADING TOWARDS A NEW EUROPEAN BALANCE.

I BELIEVE THAT THE BEST FRAMEWORK IN WHICH WE CAN WORK WITH THE ELEMENTS AT HAND TO SHAPE THIS NEW BALANCE, IS THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE.


THE CSCE HAS BEEN AT ONCE THE WITNESS AND THE INSTRUMENT FOR THE TRANSITION FROM A EUROPEAN SCHEME OF CONFRONTATION TO A PLAN OF COOPERATION. THE FLEXIBLE AND OPEN STRUCTURE OF THE CSCE AS A FORUM OF EUROPEAN DIALOGUE, WHICH HAS MADE THIS GREAT SUCCESS POSSIBLE, MAY ALSO SERVE TO MAKE IT BECOME A CENTRE OF CONVERGENCE IN WHICH THE SYNTHESIS WE ARE AIMING AT FOR EUROPE WILL BECOME A REALITY.

WITH THIS LOGIC IN MIND, WE SUPPORT WITHOUT ANY RESERVATION THE OPPORTUNITY OF HOLDING, AT THE END OF THIS YEAR, A CSCE SUMMIT IN ORDER TO CARRY OUT A COLLECTIVE THINKING ON THE PRESENT OF EUROPE AND ITS FUTURE.

THE SUMMIT WOULD ENTAIL A LOADED AGENDA, FOR MANY COMMON QUESTIONS ARE RISING BEFORE US WHICH REQUIRE COMMON ANSWERS. OUR OBJECTIVE SHOULD BE TWOFOLD: SUMMING UP AND PROJECTION TOWARDS THE FUTURE. WE MUST MAKE AN OVERALL EVALUATION OF THE PROCESS, REVIEW THE

JURISPRUDENCE WHICH WE HAVE BEEN ACCUMULATING AND EVALUATE THE NEEDS FOR A NEW LEGISLATION. ON THE BASIS OF THE PRESENT SITUATION IN EUROPE, WE MUST DISCUSS THE MAIN OUTLINES OF ITS FUTURE ARCHITECTURE, SET NEW DISARMAMENT OBJECTIVES SO THAT MILITARY LOGIC WILL INCREASINGLY ADJUST ITSELF TO POLITICAL LOGIC AND AGREE ON THE STEPS TO BE MADE IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROCESS. FINALLY, WE MUST MEDITATE ON ITS REGULARIZATION AND CONSOLIDATION, AND REFLECT ON THAT WHICH WE HAVE ALREADY CALLED THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE CSCE.

AN EMINENT CANADIAN STATESMAN, LESTER PEARSON, SAID THAT "THE GRIM FACT IS THAT WE PREPARE FOR WAR LIKE PRECOCIOUS GIANTS AND FOR PEACE LIKE RETARDED PYGMIES". WE HAVE COME HERE, TO THIS CANADIAN LAND, WILLING TO PREPARE OURSELVES FOR PEACE AS PRECOCIOUS GIANTS, FOR A NEWLY MADE PEACE WHICH OPENS BEFORE US, IMPLACABLE AND ENCOURAGING.



Document: ICO-CS-019

OPEN  
SKIES

**Open Skies Conference**

CIELS  
OUVERTS

OPENING STATEMENT BY  
THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF  
ROMANIA  
HIS EXCELLENCY MR SERGIU CELAC

OFFENER  
HIMMEL

CIELI  
APERTI

ОТКРЫТОЕ  
НЕБО

**Romania**

CIELOS  
ABIERTOS

FEBRUARY 12TH, 1990



Mr. Chairman,  
Distinguished colleagues,  
Ladies and gentlemen,

This conference is indeed a symbol of the new spirit prevailing in the international relations, a spirit of openness now spreading way up into the sky. What seemed impossible 35 years ago becomes achievable today. We meet here in Ottawa in the name of our common willingness to lay down the foundation for the first agreement among States belonging to two opposite military alliances, as a substantive step toward increased mutual confidence.

Our deep gratitude goes first of all to the Canadian Government - to the Right Honourable Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, the Right Honourable Minister Joe Clark, and to the friendly Canadian people - for their constructive initiative and generous offer to host this Conference. It would have been difficult to find a more suitable venue. Symbolically, the sky above Ottawa the opening day was also cloudless.

We meet here in Ottawa - after having witnessed, some of us after having participated in, history-making changes in Europe. Minds and hearts have come open to a new reality, frontiers are no longer obstacles to contacts among people and nations, walls which were built on prejudice, fear and suspicion are falling down. In order to regain its freedom and dignity my country had to pay with the blood of its sons and daughters. A totalitarian police state crumbled down, a total and irreversible break with the past is now



doubled by an entire nation's firm commitment to the values of democracy, pluralism and human rights, to a market-oriented economy and to a foreign policy of openness to all horizons. We have come to realize that freedom has to be won, but democracy has to be learned, not taught. We in Romania are learning it the hard way.

I am glad of this opportunity to express the deep gratitude of the Romanian people and Government for the solidarity and support that all peoples and Governments represented in this hall have extended to us at our time of need.

Free and democratic Romania now proudly rejoins the European and world concert of nations.

Just a few words on our view of the future structures of European security and cooperation. After listening to the speakers who preceded me I feel strengthened in my belief that the recent events in Europe have revealed, among many other things, a lack of proper permanent institutional framework for debate and, possibly, joint decision on European matters of general interest. As a result, military-politically alliances may tend to take upon themselves tasks that they are normally not supposed to handle. It becomes increasingly obvious that the CSCE process which started as a bold initiative, and then gradually became a frame of mind rather than a structured framework will have to evolve, and quickly, into a real institutional structure. My government believes that an agreement, at least in principle, could be reached at a summit level meeting of the CSCE participating countries later

this year. We also are of the opinion that in view of the rapid and dramatic changes occurring on the continent, an active involvement of all the original signatories of the Helsinki Final Act is indeed essential.

Free Romania welcomes the progress achieved so far on arms limitation and reduction and hopefully expects the conclusion, during the current year, of the first negotiated agreement on conventional disarmament in Europe.

An impending "Open Skies" agreement, along with other existing agreements, will certainly strengthen confidence among the States participating in the two military alliances. It may hopefully encourage the elaboration and the adoption of other confidence building and disarmament agreements and measures by providing a broader view of an emerging system of verification and control. We believe that in order to reach that objective the current negotiations should take into account at least four fundamental challenges.

First, the "Open Skies" system should be conceived to function as a confidence-building instrument. It should not cause more suspicion, but rather alleviate the existing sources of mistrust.

Second, it should not become a burden for anyone. It should evolve in a natural way, on a basis of mutual goodwill, as a normal fact of life in the relations between States.



Third, it should offer equal chances for all participating States, irrespective of their size, military potential or level of technological development.

Fourth, the legal instrument to be negotiated should be simple and flexible enough to make possible the adjustments that will be required in the future to suit the specific conditions of a changing world.

Meeting these challenges will turn the original concept of a confidence-building measure into an effective instrument for fostering a climate of understanding and co-operation in a new Europe. One of the crucial issues our experts will have to solve is to ensure equality in the proper functioning of the proposed schema, considering the different technological capacity of various countries.

It will also be necessary to ensure a sound cooperative relationship between the observing and the observed during the inspection of the aircraft, to see that the observing mission is performed without interfering with the normal function of the national safety flight regulations. In addition, the participating States should be protected against possible commercial use, without their consent, of the information and data acquired by the observing State. And conversely, the parties must have access to all data and information concerning their territory, which have been obtained as a result of a flight under the "Open Skies" system.

At the same time, since it may happen that the information collected by an observing flight may not dispel all suspicions, it would fit the logic of the "Open Skies" system, as a confidence building measure, to include in the agreement a procedure whereby the observing State and the observed State would have valid incentives to sort out by dialogue all the aspects in question before making public statements or undertaking any unilateral measures.

As to the scope of the system, what is being called "Open Skies" should not be kept "closed" between military alliances. In fact, the system should be open for participation by all European countries if and when they may wish to join.

The Romanian delegation is confident that such a course of action would facilitate the negotiating process and foster the climate of co-operation that is required for a successful conclusion of our endeavours.



Document : ICO-CS-021

OPEN  
SKIES

**Open Skies Conference**

CIELS  
OUVERTS

OPENING BY HIS EXCELLENCY GYULA HORN

OFFENER  
HIMMEL

MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

CIELI  
APERTI

ОТКРЫТОЕ  
НЕБО

**Hungary**

CIELOS  
ABIERTOS

FEBRUARY 12TH, 1990



It would be hard to find anything better than the Open Skies initiative to symbolize the favourable changes in the political situation in Europe and the world. When the idea was launched, many did not conceal their skepticism as to its timeliness and feasibility, and now, nine months after President Bush's speech, we have come together in Ottawa in the hope that we can work out a treaty on an Open Skies regime and can begin implementing it soon.

Hungary gave tangible evidence of its confidence in the success of the Open Skies initiative and its willingness to make an active contribution to this success through its commitment to hosting the second phase of the Conference and through the execution, jointly with Canada, of a trial flight evaluated at the Budapest meeting of experts of the 23 States in January.

Skeptics, too, were convinced of the usefulness and timeliness of the Open Skies initiative by the rapid pace of events in recent months. The treaty, if signed in the near future, will ease concerns that arms control and security policies are increasingly lagging behind the accelerated pace of political changes. If the participants of our current talks do not lose sight of the political significance of the treaty to be worked out and they rely on the confidence created among the 23 States, the treaty could be signed as soon as May 12, the first anniversary of the initiative. It is likely that the first treaty will not be able to satisfy every expectation and need of all participants, but we are

convinced that these can be met later, on the basis of experience accumulated and mutual confidence further strengthened, through improvement and expansion of the operational system.

Signing a treaty as early as the first half of this year would give a boost to the Vienna CFE and CSBM talks and would undoubtedly have an impact on all other arms control fora, too.

Hungary as a Central East European state is particularly aware of the importance of creating soon a stable security policy background to the rapid and deep political changes. Our Conference can be an important step in a longer process putting changes occurring in our continent in a solid framework through interconnected confidence and security building as well as disarmament measures and leading to the emergence of a collective security system. The Open Skies regime can serve as a building block of this collective security system as the execution of flights requires a high degree of openness and cooperation among the parties. We deem it important that this treaty be an agreement of 23 sovereign States and thereby offer an opportunity for expansion through involvement of all interested European states.

We must strive to create a system that is not overly complicated and does not pursue maximalist goals. This will help us avoid unduly protracted negotiations as well as flights

resulting in wariness rather than strengthened confidence. The composition and technical level of the instruments used, the quotas, the minimalization of areas closed to flights will ensure that the flights result in an actual increase in military openness and transparency.

Mr. Chairman,

I would like to take this opportunity to raise a few ideas concerning the most important current disarmament forum, that is the CFE talks.

Our opinion is that these talks, too must adapt to the changing circumstances. Developments in the political and military situation in Europe make it indispensable that an agreement be reached in the year 1990, the outlines of this agreement having fully taken shape at the talks by now.

It is particularly important not to delay political decisions needed to reach an agreement. We are of the opinion that conditions necessary to making these decisions already exist regarding the most important issues at the talks.

Regarding the issue of air force we see a basic consensus in that the agreement must limit all combat aircraft, so the debate should focus on which of the disputed subcategories will be limited

and how. Requirements of European stability as well as those of an equal security of participants must be considered when working out an agreement. We believe that a common ceiling should apply to all units of combat capable aircraft, permanently land-based naval aviation and medium bombers. As for strategic bombers and for interceptors of Soviet Home Air Defence, special solutions will have to be worked out.

We appreciate and welcome President Bush's proposal of February 2 as a significant step forward on the personnel issue. The proposal is fully in compliance with the Hungarian concept presented in Vienna January 18, calling for a reduction of troops stationed abroad to the lowest possible level. This proposal enables us to outline an agreement acceptable to all based on a sufficiency rule establishing an upper limit on troops stationed aboard by any participant, while postponing a comprehensive limitation of personnel to be established by the next agreement.

I believe we need an open-minded approach to the post-CFE-I period. Our current perception is that the conceptual basis of the current talks, namely their alliance-based approach, cannot be maintained. We should use the period between the signing and entering into force of the agreement to work out, involving all

member countries of the CSCE, the mandate for the next phase of CFE talks. It would be important to see these talks start immediately upon the agreement's entering into force.

Mr. Chairman,

It is symbolic for us that the location for the signing of the treaty creating an Open Skies regime will hopefully be Budapest. Hungary considers intensified European cooperation an important guarantee of its own future and democratic development. We are interested in seeing the favourable political processes currently experienced in our continent stretching out to the fields of security policy and arms control. This fact is itself a guarantee to our doing our best to ensure the success of the whole Conference, including the Budapest Phase. And if the States concerned may come to an agreement, we would be ready to host, following the conclusion of the closing session at the Ministerial level, a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the 35 States participating in the CSCE process. That meeting would serve to lay the ground for the 1990 Summit of the Thirty-Five.

Getting back now to Ottawa, we are aware that the negotiating delegations will have to solve a number of complicated problems in the short time at their disposal. We are encouraged by our feeling that all the participating States have the political will needed to make this highly significant enterprise a success. It serves



the interest of all Europe that we proceed further on the road indicated by the historic disarmament and confidence building agreements signed or in the works. This can guarantee the durability of the current favourable trends in international politics and the opening up of skies over every State on our globe in the not too distant future.

I believe, Mr. Chairman, that the document formulating the common position of the Warsaw Treaty member States which I am tabling now, will serve as an appropriate basis to elaborating a treaty that meets the afore-mentioned requirements. The concepts outlined in this paper give shape to a flexible regime containing sufficient common ground the NATO's "Basic Elements" so as to start working together.



Document : ICO-CS-022

OPEN  
SKIES

**Open Skies Conference**

CIELS  
OUVERTS

STATEMENT BY THE MINISTER OF  
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF TURKEY,

OFFENER  
HIMMEL

H.E. MESUT YILMAZ

CIELI  
APERTI

ОТКРЫТОЕ  
НЕБО

**Turkey**

CIELOS  
ABIERTOS

FEBRUARY 12TH, 1990



(please check against delivery)

12 February 1990

OPEN SKIES CONFERENCE

OTTAWA

Statement by the Minister  
of Foreign Affairs of Turkey,  
H.E. Mesut Yilmaz

Statement by the Minister  
of Foreign Affairs of Turkey,  
H.E. Mesut Yilmaz

MR. CHAIRMAN, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,

AT THE OUTSET I WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS MY APPRECIATION FOR THE EFFICIENT EFFORTS DEPLOYED BY CANADA IN PROMOTING "OPEN SKIES". THESE EFFORTS CULMINATED IN THE SUCCESSFUL ORGANIZATION OF THIS CONFERENCE AND THEY RIGHTLY DESERVE OUR HEART-FELT CONGRATULATIONS. I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO THANK OUR HOSTS FOR THEIR WARM WELCOME AND HOSPITALITY.

THE OPEN SKIES CONFERENCE COINCIDES WITH MAJOR TRANSFORMATION TAKING PLACE IN EUROPE AND HENCEFORTH IN THE NATURE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS. THE SUCCESS OF THE REFORMS AND DEMOCRATISATION UNDER WAY IN THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WILL HOPEFULLY BRING ABOUT THE END OF THE ARTIFICIAL DIVISION OF EUROPE. THE PREVAILING CIRCUMSTANCES ALSO PROVIDE THE NECESSARY ATMOSPHERE FOR THE ACCELERATION OF THE ONGOING ARMS REDUCTION AND DISARMAMENT EFFORTS.

THERE ARE PROMISING SIGNS THAT THE FIRST CFE AGREEMENT AND A START ACCORD WILL BE SIGNED BY THE END OF 1990. AN AGREEMENT BANNING THE USE AND PRODUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS ALSO SEEMS WITHIN SIGHT. A CSCE SUMMIT WILL MOST PROBABLY BE HELD DURING THE LAST QUARTER OF THE YEAR. IF ALL THESE ARE REALISED, 1990 MIGHT BE QUOTED IN THE ANNALS OF HISTORY AS "THE YEAR OF DISARMAMENT". THE "OPEN SKIES" CONFERENCE WILL NO DOUBT CONTRIBUTE TO THIS PROCESS.



WE HAVE COME A LONG WAY SINCE THE IDEA OF "OPEN SKIES" WAS FIRST FORMULATED BY PRESIDENT EISENHOWER AND FORMALLY PROPOSED AT THE GENEVA SUMMIT IN 1955. THE VERY FACT THAT WHEN, 35 YEARS LATER, THE SAME IDEA WAS RE-LAUNCHED BY ANOTHER AMERICAN PRESIDENT, GEORGE BUSH, IT MET A FAVOURABLE REACTION IS A TESTIMONY TO THE FAR RANGING PROGRESS ACHIEVED IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS DURING THE PAST FEW YEARS.

IF, AS A RESULT OF OUR DELIBERATIONS WE SUCCEED IN ESTABLISHING AN "OPEN SKIES" REGIME, THIS WILL NOT ONLY CONSTITUTE A TANGIBLE PROOF OF IMPROVED INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, BUT WILL ALSO CONTRIBUTE TO THE FURTHER ADVANCEMENT OF THE CONFIDENCE BUILDING AND ARMS CONTROL PROCESS ALREADY UNDER WAY. INDEED BY DEMONSTRATING THE WILLINGNESS OF A COUNTRY TO OPEN ITS ENTIRE TERRITORY TO AERIAL OVERFLIGHTS, TO BECOME "TRANSPARENT", THE PROPOSED REGIME WILL BE A CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURE "PAR EXCELLENCE". MOREOVER, IT IS LIKELY TO BE VERY USEFUL IN ASSISTING THE VERIFICATION OF ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS UNDER NEGOTIATION. THEREFORE, AS STATED IN NATO'S "BASIC ELEMENTS" PAPER AND I CITE, "THIS DOUBLE CHARACTERISTIC OF AN 'OPEN SKIES' REGIME WOULD MAKE IT A VALUABLE COMPLEMENT TO CURRENT EAST-WEST ENDEAVOURS."

WITH THESE CONSIDERATIONS IN MIND, TURKEY ACTIVELY CONTRIBUTES TO THE CONSULTATIONS CARRIED OUT IN NATO. WE ARE READY TO DISPLAY THE SAME POSITIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE ATTITUDE DURING THE WORK OF THIS CONFERENCE AND CONTRIBUTE TO A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME.

TURKEY'S VIEWS FIND THEIR EXPRESSION IN NATO'S "BASIC ELEMENTS" DOCUMENT. SO I WILL NOT REPEAT THEM HERE. BUT I WANT TO EMPHASIZE A FEW POINTS OF PARTICULAR SIGNIFICANCE FOR MY COUNTRY.

FIRST OF ALL, IN ESTABLISHING AN "OPEN SKIES" REGIME AN IMPORTANT PRINCIPLE SHOULD BE TO CREATE EQUAL SECURITY FOR ALL PARTICIPATING STATES. THIS ENSUES NATURALLY FROM THE OBJECTIVES I HAVE JUST MENTIONED. IT FOLLOWS THAT EACH PARTICIPANT, WHATEVER ITS MEANS, SHOULD HAVE EQUAL OPPORTUNITY TO BENEFIT FROM THE REGIME TO BE ESTABLISHED.

AS TO THE FLIGHT RESTRICTIONS, THEY CAN BE LIMITED ONLY FOR FLIGHT SAFETY REASONS OR IN ACCORDANCE WITH OBLIGATIONS ARISING FROM RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. BUT THIS SHOULD NOT WAIVE PROHIBITIONS ESTABLISHED UNDER ICAO PROCEDURES FOR FLIGHTS OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THE "OPEN SKIES" REGIME. NEEDLESS TO SAY FLIGHTS OVER THE TURKISH STRAITS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE REGIME SHALL IN NO WAY CONSTITUTE A PRECEDENT FOR FLIGHTS OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THAT AGREEMENT.

MY LAST POINT IS RELATED TO THE PARTICIPATION TO THE "OPEN SKIES" REGIME OF EUROPEAN COUNTRIES OTHER THAN NATO AND WARSAW TREATY ORGANIZATION MEMBER STATES. IN PRINCIPLE TURKEY DOES NOT OBJECT TO SUCH AN ENLARGEMENT, PROVIDED THAT

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THEIR PARTICIPATION IS CONSIDERED AFTER THE REGIME IS WELL ESTABLISHED AND THE DECISION TO INVITE THEM IS TAKEN ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS AND BY CONSENSUS.

THANK YOU.



OPEN  
SKIES

**Open Skies Conference**

CIELS  
OUVERTS

OPENING STATEMENT BY

HIS EXCELLENCY JOAO DE DEUS PINHEIRO

MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

OFFENER  
HIMMEL

CIELI  
APERTI

ОТКРЫТО:  
НЕБО

**Portugal**

CIELOS  
ABIERTOS

FEBRUARY 12TH, 1990





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ALLOW ME FIRST, CHAIRMAN, TO EXPRESS MY GRATITUDE TO THE CANADIAN AUTHORITIES FOR THE WARM HOSPITALITY BESTOWED UPON US ON THIS OCCASION.

THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENTS' DECISION TO HOST AN "OPEN SKIES CONFERENCE" IS, IN FACT, A MOST TIMELY AND DECISIVE CONTRIBUTION TOWARDS A SUCCESSFUL RESULT OF AN INITIATIVE WHICH DESERVES OUR SINCERE PRAISE.

CONFIDENCE-BUILDING THROUGH THE ENHANCEMENT OF OPENNESS AND TRANSPARENCY HAS BEEN AMONG THE MAIN CONCERNS OF DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES.

BUT ALTHOUGH CONFIDENCE-BUILDING IS NO DOUBT THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF OPEN SKIES, THE REGIME WE





ARE ABOUT TO STRUCTURE WILL GO BEYOND WHAT HAS SO FAR BEEN ACHIEVED IN THE FIELD OF CSBMs: NOT ONLY DOES IT STRIVE TO PROMOTE TRUST AND REDUCE THE RISKS OF MISUNDERSTANDINGS, BUT IT CAN BE OF GREAT USE TO COMPLEMENT THE VERIFICATION OF ON-GOING OF FUTURE ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS.

IT WILL ALSO FOSTER COOPERATION IN AREAS OTHER THAN SECURITY, NAMELY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PURPOSES, AND IT WILL BE UP TO US TO MAKE THE BEST USE OF THE REGIME'S POTENTIALLY BENEFICIAL SPILL-OVER EFFECTS.

OUR COMMON ENDORSEMENT OF THE OPEN SKIES INITIATIVE IS AN ADDITIONAL GUARANTEE OF OUR





COMMITMENT TO ACCOMMODATE PEACEFUL CHANGE IN EUROPE IN A CONTEXT OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR ALL.

IN THE MILITARY FIELD, WE HAVE BEEN PURSUING THESE OBJECTIVES IN BOTH THE VIENNA CFE AND CSBM NEGOTIATIONS, AND WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT RECENT PROPOSALS ON THE AVIATION, PERSONNEL AND HELICOPTER ISSUES IN CFE WILL GAIN WIDE CONSENSUS, THUS PAVING THE WAY TO THE COMPLETION OF A CFE AGREEMENT IN THE COURSE OF THIS YEAR. BOTH THESE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE GIVEN US A CHANCE TO GET TO THE HEART OF EUROPEAN SECURITY NEEDS, AND HAVE AFFORDED AN OPPORTUNITY TO ELIMINATE FACTORS WHICH CONSTITUTE A THREAT AND REPLACE THEM WITH CONFIDENCE AND COOPERATION.



THIS PROGRESS WAS POSSIBLE BECAUSE THERE IS A NEW ATMOSPHERE IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS WHICH IS LINKED TO THE FUNDAMENTAL AND FAR-REACHING CHANGES WHICH ARE TAKING PLACE IN EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. THESE CHANGES ARE RADICALLY ALTERING THE POLITICAL ARCHITECTURE OF EUROPE, AND WE MUST ENSURE THAT THE COLLATERAL RESHAPING OF OUR SECURITY STRUCTURES WILL NOT LAG BEHIND.

THERE IS NO REAL AND LASTING SECURITY WITHOUT GENUINE CONFIDENCE AND TRUST. YET SECURITY IS A GLOBAL CONCEPT, ENCOMPASSING NOT ONLY DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL ISSUES BUT ALSO THE RESPECT OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS, AND THE



PROMOTION OF GREATER UNDERSTANDING AND INTERDEPENDENCE.

MR. CHAIRMAN,

DESPITE THE DIVISION OF EUROPE THAT PREVAILED FOR MORE THAN 40 YEARS THERE WAS ALWAYS AN AWARENESS OF A COMMON DESTINY UNITING THE PEOPLES OF OUR CONTINENT.

THEY WERE EMPHASIZED BY THE BREATHTAKING CHANGES THAT HAVE SWEEPED THROUGH MUCH OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE IN THE PAST YEAR.

BUT, TO ARRIVE AT A WHOLE AND A UNITED EUROPE MUCH REMAINS TO BE DONE IN THE POLITICAL, ECONOMICAL





AND CULTURAL DOMAINS AND AT THE TOP PRIORITY THE  
OBSOLUTE NEED TO REACH A DEFENCE AND SECURITY  
ARRANGEMENT WHICH IS CAPBLE OF ENSURING FULL  
SECURITY OF EACH COUNTRY AT THE LOWEST POSSIBLE  
LEVEL OF ARMAMENT.

TO BUILD THE NEW EUROPE WE MUST BE OPEN MINDED  
AND GENEROUS. BUT WE MUST ALSO BE PRAGMATIC. THAT IS  
WHY WE CONSIDER THAT ALL EXISTING "FORA" SHOULD BE  
CONSIDERED AND ITS POTENTIALITIES SCRUTINEZED BEFORE  
WE EMBARK ON SETTING UP NEW INSTITUTIONS WHICH  
WOULD DUPLICATE EXISTING ONES.

IT IS NOT POSSIBLE AT THIS STAGE TO FORESEE THE  
FUTURE EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS. YET, TWO IDEAS SHOULD  
BE KEPT: - THE FIRST IS THAT CSCE IS THE MOST APPROPRIATE





S. R.

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EMBAIXADA DE PORTUGAL

OTTAWA

"FORUM" TO CREATE AT THE PRESENT STAGE A GREATER INTERDEPENDENCE AND GREATER CONFIDENCE IN THE AREAS OF SECURITY AND DEFENCE FOR ALL THOSE CONCERNED WITH EUROPEAN FUTURE.

THE SECOND IDEA TO BE KEPT IS THAT THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EEC AND ITS MOVEMENT TOWARDS CLOSER POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IS NOT ONLY AN IRREVERSIBLE PROCESS BUT ALSO A "MUST" IN THE STABILIZATION AND PROSPERITY OF EUROPE.

WE MUST REALIZE THAT WE ARE WITNESSING THE END OF COLD WAR. AND JUST LIKE IN ANY OTHER WAR ITS END REQUIRES THE REAPPRAISAL OF RELATIONS AMONG COUNTRIES, THE ADJUSTMENT OF THE POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES, THE SETTING UP OF COOPERATION AND





ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS AND EVENTUALLY THE CREATION OF NEW (OR THE REVISION OF EXISTING) INSTITUTIONS FOR DIALOGUE AND COOPERATION.

IT IS IN THIS PERSPECTIVE THAT PORTUGAL SUPPORTS THE PROPOSALS FOR A CSCE SUMMIT IN WHICH THE DEFENCE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE WOULD BE POLITICALLY AND EFFECTIVELY REINFORCED.

A CSCE SUMMIT SHOULD THEREFORE BE THE PROPER OCCASION FOR THE 35 STATES PART OF THE CSCE TO GIVE A SIGNAL OF THEIR WILLINGNESS TO CONTINUE TO WORK FOR A NEW, FREER AND MORE STABLE EUROPE ON THE BASIS OF THE 10 PRINCIPLES OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT.







IT COULD ALSO BEGIN TO EVALUATE HOW FAR WE COULD GO IN STRENGTHENING THESE PRINCIPLES, WITH A VIEW TO THE NEXT CSCE FOLLOW-UP MEETING, IN HELSINKI IN 1992, WHERE DECISIONS TO THIS EFFECT COULD BE TAKEN.

MR. CHAIRMAN,

WE ARE IN THE EVE OF A TURNING POINT IN EAST/WEST RELATIONS, WHERE PEACE AND INTERDEPENDENCE, SOLIDARITY AND COOPERATION ARE THE KEY WORDS. THAT REQUIRES A LOT OF WORK AND A STRONG POLITICAL WILL. LET US NOT DEFRAUD HISTORY.



Document : ICO-CS-024

OPEN  
SKIES

**Open Skies Conference**

CIELS  
OUVERTS

ADDRESS BY THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

OFFENER  
HIMMEL

GIANNI DE MICHELIS

CIELI  
APERTI

ОТКРЫТОЕ  
НЕБО

**Italy**

CIELOS  
ABIERTOS

FEBRUARY 12TH, 1990





AMBASCIATA D'ITALIA  
OTTAWA

ADDRESS BY THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
GIANNI DE MICHELIS  
TO THE "OPEN SKIES" CONFERENCE  
(Ottawa, January 12, 1990)

Mr. Chairman,

I am most grateful to the Canadian Government for the hospitality that has been extended to us, and more particularly for having been the first to suggest this meeting, on the threshold of a year of paramount importance for Europe and the world as a whole. In a Europe that, until yesterday, was divided into opposing political and social systems, we had grown used to seeing arms control as the means for preparing the ground for political dialogue. Today, however the staggering political developments that have occurred have leap-frogged even the arms negotiations. And this is despite the successful direction that these are taking, holding out the opportunity for our Continent to shake off its melancholy destiny to be the locus of the greatest concentration of destructive weapons.

The swift acceleration of history which began last summer is far from ending. 1990 will be the year in which to consolidate the positive changes which have taken place in Europe in the last months and to lay the foundations of a new architecture of our Continent. We are perfectly aware of all this, and we shall draw on it to ensure that this meeting provides us with an opportunity to give a further boost to the cause of peace and stability.



Our primary task here is to give substance to the "open skies" idea, for what it signifies in terms of mutual confidence, transparency and awareness of the military capabilities and intentions of the other side. We have covered so much ground since the time Khrushchev greeted a similar proposal by the President of the United States by retorting that the Soviet Union would never allow anyone to spy in its own bedroom! And we have never really been sure whether secrecy was a means of concealing strength or weakness. With inadequate intelligence about the adversary, its capabilities are more likely to be over-estimated, and the response excessive.

Today, we are living in a wholly different climate, even in psychological terms, as demonstrated by the ready endorsement of the "open skies" idea. Ever since it was first broached, the Italian government has wholeheartedly backed President Bush's initiative for a system of free, mutual air observation of the territories of the member countries of the Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Pact.

Such measures are extremely useful for two main reasons. Firstly, they will help to strengthen mutual trust and confidence, consolidate and enhance transparency, and make dialogue more concrete and constructive; and secondly, they will be an important experiment for the verification and monitoring of military activities that could then be used in future disarmament agreements. The originality and the vast scope of the "open skies" system extending from San Francisco to Vladivostok will act as an incentive to contemplate extending it, after the initial running-in phase, the participation of other countries. This will also

enable us to offer a substantial complement to the results that will emerge from the negotiating table in Vienna on confidence-building and security measures.

With other member countries of the Atlantic Alliance, we have contributed to proposals for an "open skies" regime that could be acceptable by all the Twenty-three. We are perfectly receptive to any suggestions and ideas from any other party. We have instructed our negotiators to engage in flexible and earnest dialogue when drafting the technical aspects that will be discussed after the ministerial meeting.

Italy is ready to open up her territory to the air observation aircraft of the Eastern European countries, reducing restrictions to the bare minimum, with the exclusive purpose of guaranteeing air safety. We also confirm our readiness to take part in the second round of the negotiations expected to take place in Budapest this spring.

But we have gathered here today with a further purpose still; to give a decisive impetus to the Vienna talks on reduction of conventional forces. Proposals for reductions have been gathering pace recently. The disarmament race cannot be run unilaterally or in a state of uncertainty, because our goal remains that of achieving a balance of forces, a recognizable and controlled force balance. But we have to make haste, as I recalled last month in Vienna together with our colleagues Dumas and Gensher.

Another reason for moving with dispatch is connected with the spring elections to be held throughout the Eastern European countries. Public opinion that has been kept silent for so long will want to express the people's expectations through their parliamentary representatives. We must not create the impression that there can be an excessively long hiatus between the timing of the negotiations and the political decision-making.

In Ottawa we are therefore looking for a decisive step forward towards overcoming the constraints that still prevent an agreement for the reduction of conventional arms in Europe from being concluded by the summer.

As to the definition of tanks, and to regional differentiation and storage, we would like the convergence that emerged in the Vienna negotiations to be now consolidated. The Western countries have also recently advanced new proposals to overcome as rapidly as possible the differences that still exist regarding the two main outstanding negotiation issues: aircraft and military personnel.

We appeal to our negotiating partners in the East not to let slip this invitation to compromise, so as to be able to provide our respective negotiators with concrete guidelines for resolving the outstanding difficulties.

The first round of the Vienna talks must be brought to an end so that we can then move on to the next stage: further reductions, restructuring of military forces and evolution of military doctrines in a defensive direction, a

transition towards a form of security based on increased cooperation with the others. The ultimate goal must be to establish one security system in which the alliances form the main focus of convergence for their respective stances, and the independence and integrity of every State is guaranteed, regardless of the military group to which they may belong.

That is why I believe that we have to send out a third signal from Ottawa, no less fundamental than the other two, of which it is to a certain extent the natural consequence. I am thinking of the consensus to embark on a new round of negotiations of the Thirty-five, now that the CSCE had proved its mettle, setting coexistence in Europe on a new footing, and laying down the rules that will govern it from here the third millennium, making our continent an area of peace and prosperity.

Starting with the Summit of the Thirty-five countries to be held before the end of the year, we must immediately begin negotiations to build up coexistence in Europe on the basis of the changes I have mentioned, in a Europe that is no longer gripped by insecurity and anxiety because of the military balances of imbalances.

In Eastern Europe, political life is being enriched by a variety of movements and parties. The institutional implementation of the reforms still lies ahead, however. We know that they are still partly in the blueprint stage, needing to be substantially fleshed out. Redesigning the CSCE also means creating the best possible international conditions so that 1990 does not harbour any surprises,

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newly restored democracy is not obliged to take a roundabout route and its success becomes irreversible.

From many quarters we have been urged to seek out new ideas and think of new institutions since the end of the cold war. The extraordinary Summit of the Thirty-five must provide the global setting for a process that will restore fundamental freedoms, and draw together all the countries of our continent around common values. Coming as it will after a first CFE agreement (and hopefully after the CSBM as well, "Helsinki 2" will have to reaffirm the validity of the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and subsequent commitments, complementing them with new provision governing, for example, elections or the respect for the right of minorities. It is now our firm conviction that the respect for human rights is also a fundamental factor of our own security, and this is yet another reason why it is in the interests of all.

The necessity for the German people to be united is now being fuelled by sentiments that can no longer be bridled. It has become the only possible way to prevent a drift in the centre of Europe that might be even more destabilizing than the situation that presently exists. The countries of the European Community have expressed the hope in Strasbourg that this may come about in the framework of closer Community integration and a strengthening of the principles of the Helsinki Final Act. Integration, with all the difficult compromises and negotiations that this entails, will necessarily take longer than the phenomena that are now conspiring to forge the unity of a people divided by a long distant war, but the parallel between German unity and the





unity of Western Europe still holds good. The CSCE, moreover, is the only context that can offer the political framework for German unity and the certainty that it can be achieved against the background of maximum international stability. And in this connection, too, we see the relevance of a "Helsinki 2".

A new security is to be defined now that the threat we have lived with for forty years is waning. The great events of 1989, while not yet fulfilled, seem to be irreversible. We must take advantage of these new situations, and boldly and imaginatively capitalize on the dividends of peace. Then we have to move onwards towards eradicating the military confrontation, establishing equilibria that will do away with any possibility that either side might ever attack the other, enhancing the transparency and predictability of behaviour, and bringing strategic doctrines closer together. In this context, the Alliances are the structures that Europe needs to shake off the many uncertainties of the present.

Economic cooperation is also one of the keynotes of the new Helsinki agreement, re-directing our policy choices towards a very close association between the European Community and the EFTA countries and the Eastern European countries. This will give rise to an increasingly more homogeneous economic area, albeit with different degrees of integration between the various parties. It will be given a major boost from the drastic cuts in arms that we are presently negotiating, and from the resources that this will release.

And so the Ottawa conference is of fundamental importance, and I am sure that in the awareness that 1990 promises to be a year of great hopes, but also of great risks, we will find the way to make it an opportunity to confirm the former and contain the latter.

(REVISED)

OPEN  
SKIES

**Open Skies Conference**

CIELS  
OUVERT

STATEMENT BY H.E. JON BALDVIN HANNIBALSSON

OFFENER  
HIMMEL

MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF ICELAND

CIELI  
APERTI

ОТКРЫТО  
НЕБО

**Iceland**

CIELOS  
ABIERTO

FEBRUARY 13TH, 1990

Mr. Chairman:

Our Meeting here in Ottawa is a part of a process which has long been under way.

Looking back, it is difficult to conceive how this unique and - on the personal level - memorable meeting, might have taken place, had it not been for the patient, laborious groundwork laid during earlier stages of the CSCE process. I am referring in particular to the Stockholm Conference on Disarmament and the Vienna Follow-up Meeting last year.

Listening to the previous statements of our colleagues yesterday, no one could be in doubt, however, that we are on the threshold of a qualitatively new beginning. A new World Order is gradually taking shape.

We, who are gathered around this table, may consider ourselves fortunate in many ways; fortunate in being called upon to administer our nations' international relations during this historical period of transition: moving from an era of Cold War and confrontation and entering a new epoch of understanding, conciliation and co-operation among nations, a new epoch that has already inspired hopes of a better world for future generations. This welcome turn of events now offers humanity unprecedented opportunities for releasing resources, long absorbed by military confrontation, for more productive ends. This is a message of hope not only for the nations of Europe, East and West, but also for the developing nations, for the future relationship between North and South.

The task of apportioning credit for this auspicious turn of events is one that I shall happily leave to future historians. I would be amiss, however, if I did not take this opportunity to commend, in particular, the courage of the Soviet leadership in recognizing that the current flow of events is after all irreversible, and for persisting, in face of Herculean difficulties, in pushing through fundamental restructuring of their society from above.

All this testifies to the primacy of politics in initiating fundamental reform. Here no historical inevitability is at work. Never shall we forget the resilience and determination of the people of Central and Eastern Europe, who are now hopefully harvesting the fruits of their vigilant resistance to totalitarian rule over the last half century.

Overcoming the division of Europe has always been a part of the agenda of the Western Alliance. The attainment of that goal does not mean, however, that the Alliance has outlived its usefulness.

The Atlantic Alliance embodies not least the intertwining of the fates of Europe and North America, in good times and bad. This Alliance has served its purpose well in securing its member states' peace and freedom for forty years. In the coming years it will serve as our primary vehicle for managing the transition to a new peaceful order through, among other things, orderly and negotiated disarmament.

In seeking to establish that goal we must be careful not to precipitate sudden shifts in policy that might inadvertently undermine stability and peace in the Europe of tomorrow. Assurances now given by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany on the foreign policy orientation of a united Germany are particularly encouraging in that regard.

The Basic Elements Paper of the NATO Ministerial in December last year sets out the unanimous view of the NATO allies as to how we envisage the workings of an Open Skies regime in practice.

Our guiding principles are: transparency and openness, active participation and co-operation, inspection based on national quotas and the establishment of agreed procedures.

The task ahead for our negotiation is to identify and solve the problems associated with establishing that regime. A successful regime will contribute to progress in confidence-building and arms control, through enhanced predictability, mutual understanding and the confidence resulting from reciprocal openness. This is desirable primarily because, in the words of Mr. Skubiszewski, "Openness is a means of democratizing security relationships...."

Iceland fully supports the proposal to convene a CSCE summit this year and we wish to work actively for its success. A successful summit however, requires careful preparation and clarity as to its intended goals.

The objectives of the summit should be to revitalize the CSCE process. This can be done by holding a focused discussion on the changes in Europe and by reaffirming the Helsinki principles. And by consolidating the achievements of Vienna with the signing of a CFE accord. Furthermore, by incorporating the results of the CSBM negotiations and deciding on the next phase of the conventional arms control process.

In considering further steps in the field of conventional arms control the Western Alliance is committed to maintaining the political cohesion of the Alliance, no more, no less. The principle of the indivisibility of our security must be safeguarded.

We must avoid the creation of areas of unequal security. In particular, care must be taken that a reduction of the threat to the European continent does not result in relatively greater danger to stability on the oceans and the flanks.

This is a vital, if overlooked, element that must be borne in mind if the CSCE process is to serve as a framework for the promotion of peaceful evolution in Europe.

It is not least for this reason that my Government has stated time and again that the issue of naval CBMs and arms control must be dealt with without further delay in preparation for the next phase of the conventional arms control process in Europe. Here is indeed our iceberg - a remnant from the Cold War - that needs to be melted. That is a different sort of global warming.

I conclude by thanking you, Mr. Chairman, for your initiative in convening this conference, which, I feel confident, will lay the foundation of an Open Skies regime to be concluded in Budapest. Your initiative in bringing this about, Mr. Chairman, is in the best tradition of Canadian foreign policy and in keeping with the role of Canada as a generous host to the seekers of peace, prosperity and stability in a troubled world.



Document: ICO-CS-027

OPEN  
SKIES

**Open Skies Conference**

CIELS  
OUVER

Speech by Herr Hans-Dietrich Genscher,

OFFENE  
HIMME

Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany

CIELI  
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**Federal Republic of Germany**

CIELOS  
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FEBRUARY 13TH, 1990



We are gathered here at a momentous and promising stage of European history. The link between the North American democracies and Europe cannot be demonstrated more clearly than by holding the Conference here in Ottawa, Canada's capital. East and West are increasingly moving towards cooperation, Europe is growing together, the Berlin Wall has fallen. Hungary was the first country to take the bold decision to open the Iron Curtain. The determination of the nations of Europe and of the Germans to overcome divisions proved stronger than all artificial barriers. The people are demanding their inalienable rights peacefully, circumspectly and with a sense of responsibility.

At Davos on 1 February 1987 I called upon the West to take General Secretary Gorbachov seriously and not let a historic opportunity slip by. Today we know that his policies played a decisive part in the fundamental changes in Europe. The Germans in East and West realize the significance for our people of General Secretary Gorbachov's remark in Moscow on 11 February during our visit that the question of unity of the German nation can only be decided by the Germans themselves and that they must themselves choose in what political forms, in what periods, at what pace and under what conditions they will realize their unity.

We thank all our allies who stood by us during the past decades in our commitment to unity. Unforgotten are the declarations made by President Bush and President Mitterrand. As we Germans now follow the path of unity for which we waited for decades, we are aware of the historical dimension of this process. The historical dimension includes remembering all the suffering inflicted on other nations in the name of Germany. May the German post-war democracy and the resolute stance of the Germans in the GDR for freedom and human rights give all neighbours the reassurance that Germans united in freedom and democracy will contribute to a better Europe. I reaffirm what Thomas Mann said as early as 1952: We seek a European Germany, not a German Europe. That is our rejection of the power politics of the past; it is our recollection of the European mission of the Germans.



Vaclav Havel stated in Warsaw: "It is hard to conceive of a united Europe with a divided Germany. Likewise hard to conceive of is a united Germany in a divided Europe." The firm linkage of our destiny to that of Europe imposes great responsibility on us Germans. Our geographical position, our history and the weight of our nation increase that responsibility. We seek our unification out of responsibility for European peace, and we seek it as a contribution to stability in Europe. We seek German unification in the context of integration in the European Community, the CSCE process, East-West partnership for stability, the building of the common European house and the creation of a peaceful order throughout Europe.

We tell all our neighbours what we want to unite: the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic and the whole of Berlin - no less, and no more. We do not have territorial claims against any of our neighbours. I recall the words I addressed to our Polish colleague before the plenary of the United Nations on 27 September 1989.

We respect the rights and responsibilities of the Four Powers with regard to the whole of Germany. The negotiations that the two German states will hold with each other on unification will not take place behind the backs of the Four Powers. We, the Federal Republic of Germany, want the two German states to seek their participation and agreement with them.

We want to incorporate the unification of Germany in the pan-European process. We therefore attach special importance to the 1990 CSCE summit. We wish to assure the states represented there that we Germans want nothing but to live in peace and freedom with our neighbours.

1990 will be a year of disarmament, if we want it to be. This depends to a decisive extent on the governments gathered here. Let us provide the political impetus. Openness and confidence-building are a key to progress in security, arms control and disarmament. An Open Skies agreement will enable us to make a major step forward along the road to security through comprehensive transparency. Yesterday Foreign Minister Shevardnadze indicated new dimensions of such transparency. I thank my colleague, Joe

Clark, for his country's efforts in translating the Open Skies initiative into practice. When US President Eisenhower first proposed an Open Skies regime on 21 July 1955, this was still a revolutionary proposal that many did not consider realizable. Today the time is ripe for comprehensive transparency and confidence-building. The Open Skies regime proposed by President Bush on 12 May 1989 reaffirms the determination to proceed from confrontation to cooperative security. The CSCE Final Act of Helsinki, the Stockholm Document on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and the INF Treaty are milestones on this road.

The Open Skies regime opens up a new dimension of confidence-building. Countries which only a few years ago viewed each other with distrust want to permit members of the other alliance to carry out observation flights over their own territory. For the first time the Soviet Union and the United States will make their entire territory accessible to such a multilateral regime. What progress this is in terms of transparency! And what progress it is in cooperation between the countries of the two alliances, which will have to work together closely in performing the observation flights. I am convinced that this openness and cooperation will increasingly become the natural form of relationship in Europe and North America.

Here in Ottawa the network of cooperative security is being strengthened further. The extent of change can only be appreciated when seen in a historical context. In the 20th century mankind has suffered terrible wars, millions have lost their lives, immeasurable destruction has been caused and untold misery endured. The possibility created by the invention of the atomic bomb of destroying all life on Earth prompted the New York Times as early as 1945 to make the prophetic observation that civilization and humanity will only be able to survive if there is a revolution of political thinking.

Now, in the final decade of this century, we are witnessing such a revolution. Is the British historian Arnold Toynbee not right to regard history as cycles of challenge and response? The danger of nuclear suicide gave rise to creative forces with which the future can be mastered and peace secured. How political thinking has evolved from Heracleitus's view of war

as the father of all things and Augustine's concept of "bellum justum" to Clausewitz's theory of war as the "continuation of politics by other means" and on to the present-day recognition that war can neither be waged nor won!

The nations are compelling reflection on the values of freedom, human rights and democracy. They thus open up the opportunity of fundamentally reshaping Europe's future in the last decade of this century. The basic conditions of stability required for this process include above all the elimination of military confrontation. In Malta the presidents of the United States and the Soviet Union agreed that, now the Cold War is over, its instruments must also be removed, including the arsenals of weapons that have been built up over a period of 40 years.

At the negotiations on conventional arms control we must create the preconditions for developing a new security system for the whole of Europe based on cooperative structures. These preconditions are:

- First, the elimination of the imbalances persisting in the conventional sector and further substantial reductions of conventional forces and weapons. The forces of basing countries must also be included. We realize that this will have far-reaching effects on the strength of the Bundeswehr.
- Second, the removal of the capability for launching surprise attacks and initiating large-scale offensive action. We are determined to make our contribution to disarmament.
- Third, the restructuring of forces so as to strengthen their defensive nature and further reduce offensive capabilities.

Much of this already determines the ongoing Vienna negotiations on conventional forces. The more extensive goals must be negotiated in Vienna without interruption after the completion of the first set of negotiations. Otherwise our efforts towards disarmament and arms control will fail to keep pace

with the political changes. Vienna I must be followed without a break by Vienna II.

The nations of Europe and North America expect a first conventional disarmament agreement to be concluded by the end of this year. Time is pressing: The key problems must be resolved before the summer. It should be possible for the Heads of State or Government to sign that agreement at a summit this autumn. The tracks must now be laid. The talks that we hold here in Ottawa - bilaterally, among our allies and among all conference participants - afford an excellent opportunity in this respect. All participants must use this opportunity.

However, conventional arms control cannot be pursued in isolation. We therefore attach particular importance to expanding the system of confidence- and security-building measures agreed in Stockholm. We must make every effort so that the negotiations on a new set of CSBMs, in which all CSCE participants are involved, also produce results by the end of this year.

The open exchange of views between East and West at the recent seminar on security concepts and military doctrines within the framework of the CSBM negotiations reinforces the transition from confrontation to cooperation in Europe. The political changes cannot fail to have an impact on military doctrines and strategies. Military doctrines and strategies must exclusively serve the political goal of preventing war.

As soon as the implementation of a CFE agreement has started, negotiations must be commenced on the reduction of short-range nuclear missiles. Nuclear artillery must not be excluded from disarmament either.

The objective pursued by the United States and the Soviet Union of concluding by the end of this year an agreement halving their strategic nuclear arsenals also serves the security interests of the Europeans. We welcome the substantive progress made at the recent meeting of the foreign ministers in Moscow.

This year we also have the opportunity to achieve a global ban on chemical weapons. These dreadful weapons of mass destruction must no longer have a place in our world. The risk of chemical weapons spreading to Third World countries can now only be averted by a global ban.

On the road to cooperative stability in Europe, the Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Treaty Organization have a special political steering function to perform. The two alliances are in the process of overcoming their antagonism and arriving at cooperation. Once their members achieve increasing cooperation, the alliances cannot and must not remain locked in confrontation. Our goal must be to attain security not through confrontation, but through collaboration.

The alliances are acquiring new political functions with regard to confidence-building, dialogue and cooperation. They must help to form an East-West partnership for stability. They must become elements of new cooperative security structures, by which they will be increasingly overarched and into which they can ultimately be absorbed.

The change in Europe derives its strength from the substance of Europe, of the whole of Europe: its identity and its cultural unity. This is the yearning for an order that guarantees human dignity, human rights and social justice as well as the right of nations to self-determination. This European identity rests on the common history and on the awareness of the common responsibility for our continent's future. The United States of America and Canada, whose roots lie in this identity, share this common responsibility with the European nations. The aim of European politics must be to make this cultural unity also acquire political substance in the form of a peaceful European order reaching from the Atlantic to the Urals.

The basic conditions for this goal have never been more favourable than now. The dimensions of historic significance opened up for us by the Helsinki Final Act are becoming increasingly evident. The fundamental decision taken at Helsinki in favour of human rights and self-determination was the prerequisite and stimulus for the reform forces that brought about

radical change in Central and Eastern Europe. The CSCE process is now the most important instrument for controlling and consolidating this political momentum. It also continues to be the framework of the new partnership for stability that we seek for the whole of Europe.

The CSCE summit, at which the Vienna agreements can be signed, will take place this year. This recognition has gained acceptance everywhere. We must now make thorough preparations for the summit; its preparations do not brook delay. This summit should not replace the 1992 CSCE summit meeting, but it takes account of the recognition that it is necessary to act now. The CSCE summit faces great tasks; it opens up great opportunities.

1. The solemn reaffirmation of the principles embodied in the Helsinki Final Act can create new confidence.
2. The summit can provide orientation for common pan-European structures, not least in the field of security. It must make visible the architecture of the peaceful European order, of the common European house.
3. The CFE and CSBM negotiations must be continued with a view to forging cooperative security structures in Europe.
4. Pan-European institutions must be established to foster the coalescence of Europe within the CSCE framework.

Conceivable European institutions are an institution to coordinate East-West economic cooperation, a pan-European institution for the protection of human rights, a European environmental agency and European centres for conflict management and for verification. The CSCE process must be perpetuated and deepened. The establishment of a council of foreign ministers of the CSCE countries, meeting at regular intervals, can contribute to stability and confidence-building. We should also examine the opportunities

that may be inherent in the proposal made by Prime Minister Mazowiecki of Poland for a European Council of Cooperation.

We Europeans bear responsibility for the world. The global challenges of protecting the common sources of life, developing the Third World and safeguarding peace worldwide are growing. A Europe that is "whole and free", as President Bush put it, will possess greater strength for meeting those challenges. There is an increasing awareness worldwide that humanity's future can now only be safeguarded and shaped through common responsibility and common action.

1990 must be a year of cooperation, disarmament and European unification. The last decade of this century, which has caused so much war and suffering for the peoples of Europe, must bring about the transition to a just and lasting peaceful order on our continent. East and West have the unique opportunity of reaching that goal. We have the historic duty to seize that opportunity with all our energy. History does not repeat its offers.



Document: ICO-CS-025

OPEN  
SKIES

**Open Skies Conference**

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STATEMENT BY HIS EXCELLENCY BOYKO DIMITROV

OFFENER  
HIMMEL

MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF

BULGARIA

CIELI  
APERTI

ОТКРЫТОЕ  
НЕБО

**Bulgaria**

CIELOS  
ABIERTOS

FEBRUARY 12TH, 1990





Mr. CHAIRMAN,  
DISTINGUISHED COLLEAGUES,  
LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,

I WOULD LIKE FIRST OF ALL TO EXPRESS OUR APPRECIATION TO THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA FOR HOSTING THIS FIRST STAGE OF THE OPEN SKIES CONFERENCE. OUR SPECIAL THANKS GO TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, Mr. JOE CLARK, FOR HIS INITIATIVE OFFERED US ALL THE CHANCE TO PARTICIPATE IN A MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE GROUP OF 23. THIS MEETING, THE FIRST OF ITS KIND, MAY, PERHAPS, ACQUIRE UNIQUE SIGNIFICANCE BECAUSE OF THE MOMENT IN HISTORY WHEN IT IS BEING HELD.

FOR WHAT WE ARE NOW WITNESSING IN EUROPE IS THE RAPID DISINTEGRATION OF THE POST WAR INTERNATIONAL ORDER BASED ON BIPOLARITY AND DIVISION, ON IDEOLOGICAL, POLITICAL AND MILITARY CONFRONTATION. A DECISIVE FACTOR IN THIS PROCESS HAS BEEN THE DRAMATIC MOVEMENT TOWARDS DEMOCRACY, WHICH EMERGED IN THE EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, GIVEN IMPETUS BY THE WINDS OF GORBACHEV'S PERESTROIKA.

SINCE THE 10<sup>th</sup> OF NOVEMBER OF LAST YEAR BULGARIA HAS PROUDLY AND RESOLUTELY JOINED IN THIS MOVEMENT. THE GOAL IS THE PEACEFUL AND ORDERLY TRANSITION FROM A BUREAUCRATIC, MONOPOLISTIC AND OPPRESSIVE AUTHORITARIAN REGIME TO A MULTIPARTY DEMOCRATIC PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM, BASED ON THE RULE OF LAW AND RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND ENTRENCHED IN A PLURALISTIC, MARKET-ORIENTED ECONOMY. DESPITE PHILOSOPHICAL AND POLITICAL DIFFERENCES, THESE

OBJECTIVES ARE SHARED BOTH BY THE GOVERNING PARTY AND BY THE NEWLY EMERGED PARTIES AND ORGANIZATIONS OF THE OPPOSITION. IN ORDER TO TRANSLATE THIS BROAD CONSENSUS INTO NEW LEGISLATION AND INTO PRACTICAL POLICIES, WHICH WOULD ENJOY THE WIDEST POSSIBLE POPULAR SUPPORT, A NATIONAL ROUND TABLE HAS BEEN SET UP AND IS HOLDING REGULAR SESSIONS WITH A VIEW TO PREPARING GENUINELY FREE, OPEN AND COMPETITIVE GENERAL ELECTIONS.

THESE RADICAL INTERNAL CHANGES ARE NATURALLY REFLECTED IN BULGARIA'S FOREIGN POLICY, WHERE PRIORITIES, BASED ON THE NATIONAL INTEREST AND UNIVERSAL VALUES, ARE REDEFINED ON A DEMOCRATIC BASIS.

BULGARIA IS AN INTEGRAL PART OF EUROPE, OF ITS HISTORICAL HERITAGE, OF EUROPEAN MORAL, POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL VALUES. AT A TIME WHEN EXISTING ALLIANCE STRUCTURES AND CAPABILITIES ARE PUT IN DOUBT, WE ARE DETERMINED TO FIND A PROPER PLACE FOR OUR COUNTRY IN THE NEWLY-EMERGING ALL-EUROPEAN SOLUTIONS. THAT IS WHY WE WELCOME AND SUPPORT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEW AND COMPREHENSIVE EFFECTIVE SYSTEM OF SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE, BASED, TO AN EVER GROWING EXTENT, ON DISARMAMENT, CONFIDENCE BUILDING, POLITICAL GUARANTEES AND THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF ECONOMIC INTERESTS. IT IS PRECISELY FOR THIS REASON AND WITH THESE HOPES IN MIND THAT WE WELCOME THE IDEA OF HOLDING A SUMMIT CONFERENCE OF THE 35 CSCE MEMBER COUNTRIES, PRECEDED BY A PREPARATORY MEETING OF MINISTERS. WE BELIEVE THAT JOINT PREPARATORY WORK SHOULD START IN THE NEAREST FUTURE FOR THE CONVENING OF THIS SUMMIT AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE DURING THE AUTUMN OF THIS YEAR.

BULGARIA IS ALSO IN FAVOUR OF SPARING NO EFFORT SO THAT DURING THE CSCE SUMMIT THIS FALL, A TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES AND ARMS REDUCTIONS BETWEEN WARSAW TREATY AND NATO MEMBER COUNTRIES COULD BE SIGNED, AS WELL AS NEW AGREEMENTS BE REACHED ON CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES AMONG ALL 35 PARTICIPATING GOVERNMENTS.

Mr. CHAIRMAN,  
DISTINGUISHED COLLEAGUES,

LET ME REMIND YOU OF THE FACT THAT BULGARIA BELONGS TO A PART OF EUROPE WITH A TURBULENT PAST AND COMPLEX HISTORICAL HERITAGE. MOREOVER, IT IS ONE OF THE FRONTLINE STATES IN THE SOUTHERN FLANK OF EUROPE, WHERE PRONOUNCED MILITARY ASSYMETRIES EXIST. IN THE CONTEXT OF ON-GOING DYNAMIC AND RADICAL DEMOCRATIC REFORMS IN MY COUNTRY, WHICH LEAD TO A GROWING PUBLIC AWARENESS OF AND CONCERN FOR SECURITY MATTERS, THERE EMERGES A STRONG CONSENSUS ON THE NEED TO COMPLY WITH AND TO STRICTLY OBSERVE THE PRINCIPLE OF INDIVISIBILITY OF PEACE, STABILITY AND SECURITY IN EUROPE AS A WHOLE AND AGAINST ANY SOLUTION WHICH WILLINGLY OR BY SHEER NEGLECT WOULD ESTABLISH ZONES WITH UNEQUAL DEGREE OF SECURITY. THAT IS WHY, WHILE WHOLEHEARTEDLY SUPPORTING MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS FOR CENTRAL EUROPE IN CFE NEGOTIATIONS AND IN THE POSSIBLE AGREEMENT TO BE CONCLUDED BETWEEN THE 23 COUNTRIES, WE SHALL INSIST ON SIMILAR EQUITABLE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE SOUTHERN FLANK AREA, CONSONANT WITH THAT PROVISION IN THE MANDATE OF THE VIENNA TALKS WHICH STIPULATES "QUITE EQUAL SECURITY... FOR EVERY INDIVIDUAL COUNTRY AT ALL STAGES OF THE REDUCTIONS". IN TERMS OF SECURITY AND STABILITY, EACH AND



EVERY COUNTRY IN EUROPE SHOULD ENJOY EQUAL BENEFITS, WHETHER IT IS IN THE CENTRE OR ON THE PERIPHERY OF THE CONTINENT. THIS SHOULD BE THE GUIDING PRINCIPLE IN DISCUSSING AND SETTLING SUCH MATTERS AS REGIONAL DIVISIONS, REGIONAL SUBCELLINGS, THE POSSIBILITIES FOR REDEPLOYMENT OR REGIONAL REASONABLE SUFFICIENCY RULES. OUR SPECIFIC POSITION ON THIS MATTER WILL BE SHORTLY PRESENTED BY BULGARIA'S DELEGATION IN VIENNA. ONE OF THESE WOULD BE A PROVISION THAT NO SINGLE STATE SHOULD DOMINATE MILITARILY IN SOUTH EAST EUROPE, NAMELY, THAT NO STATE SHOULD POSSESS IN THIS REGION TROOPS AND ARMAMENTS ABOVE A CERTAIN PERCENTAGE / I.E. 30 PER CENT OF ALL THE FORCES/ WHICH IS ENOUGH FOR REGIONAL REASONABLE SUFFICIENCY.

Mr. CHAIRMAN,

ONE OF THE FACETS OF DEMOCRACY IS THE GENUINE OPENNESS OF SOCIETY. IT IS OBVIOUS, THEREFORE, WHY CONDITIONS FOR ESTABLISHING AN "OPEN SKIES" REGIME NOWADAYS ARE MORE FAVOURABLE THAN EVER.

THE BULGARIAN GOVERNMENT THEREFORE WHOLEHEARTEDLY SUPPORTS AND IS WILLING TO CONTRIBUTE TO A CONSTRUCTIVE DISCUSSION AND REALIZATION OF THE "OPEN SKIES" INITIATIVE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE USA. OUR SPECIFIC POSITION IS HOWEVER MOTIVATED BY THE FOLLOWING CONSIDERATIONS:

ONE: BULGARIA STANDS FOR FULL RESPECT OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUALITY IN THE OBSERVATION PROCESS, IN ORDER THAT ALL PARTIES TO THE AGREEMENT BE PLACED ON THE SAME FOOTING, REGARDLESS OF THEIR ECONOMIC, SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL POTENTIAL. GIVEN THE PRESENT REALITIES AND UNEQUALITIES IN THESE AREAS,

IT IS ONLY THE USE OF THE SAME SENSORS, OF AN INTERNATIONAL POOL OF AIRCRAFT, COMMON FOR ALL, AND OF JOINT DATA PROCESSING FACILITIES THAT COULD ENSURE THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THAT OBJECTIVE. THIS IS ESPECIALLY TRUE OF THE SITUATION OF SMALLER AND LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES AMONG WHICH BULGARIA BELONGS.

TWO: WE ATTACH GREAT SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE REGIME. IN OUR VIEW THE PURCHASE OF AIRCRAFT FOR THE JOINT INTERNATIONAL POOL AND OF JOINT EQUIPMENT SHOULD BE FUNDED THROUGH SHARE CONTRIBUTIONS OF PARTICIPATING STATES SIMILAR TO THOSE APPLIED TO FUNDING THE PRESENT CONFERENCE.

THREE: THE AGREEMENT SHOULD BE OPEN TO ACCESSION BY ALL OTHER CSCE PARTICIPATING STATES, AS WELL AS TO THE OTHER COUNTRIES THAT MIGHT WISH TO JOIN.

FOUR: OPENNESS AND CONFIDENCE ARE INDIVISIBLE. THE "OPEN SKIES" NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE FOLLOWED UP BY TALKS ON "OPEN LANDS", "OPEN SEAS" AND "OPEN SPACE" TALKS.

WE BELIEVE THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE CONDUCTED IN A DYNAMIC AND CONSTRUCTIVE SPIRIT, SO AS, THROUGH THE EFFORTS AND THE POLITICAL WILL OF ALL OF US, TO ACHIEVE POSITIVE INITIAL RESULTS HERE, IN OTTAWA, WITH A VIEW TO FINALIZING THE AGREEMENTS IN BUDAPEST IN THE SPRING OF THIS YEAR.

THANK YOU, Mr. CHAIRMAN.



DOCUMENT: ICO-CS-030

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**Open Skies Conference**

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OUVERTS

OPENING STATEMENT

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НЕБО

**Denmark**

CIELOS  
ABIERTOS

FEBRUARY 12TH, 1990



The Danish Delegation

February 12, 1990

**OPENING STATEMENT**

Mr. Chairman,

On behalf of the Danish government I express our gratitude to the government of Canada for the warm welcome and hospitality with which we have been received here in Ottawa.

I thank the Canadian government for its offer to host this conference on Open Skies. We highly appreciate the hard work that our hosts have done in order to ensure that this conference gets off to a good start.

Mr. Chairman,

We are meeting at a time of tremendous opportunities. Relations between East and West are now better and more productive than at any time since World War II. Developments in the Soviet Union and in Central and Eastern Europe have contributed greatly in this regard.

Denmark welcomes this new relationship of cooperation. We urge that all of us seize the moment to lay the foundations of lasting peace.

Progress is being made within all fields of the CSCE-process. The process has been given new life. Apart from progress in the security field, I would like to mention economic cooperation and the human dimension of the process both of which will be the subject of important meetings this spring and summer in Bonn and Copenhagen respectively.

A number of proposals have been made in recent months for the strengthening of cooperation structures in Europe. It is a common feature in all of them that the CSCE-process is accorded a prominent role. There is a need for an urgent examination of all new proposals.

The political structures which we have built in Europe since the Second World War must be seen in a new light following the dramatic developments in Central and Eastern Europe. The internal political structures in several states are under strain. The need for strengthening international cooperation is plain for all to see.

We are, therefore, very satisfied that the Soviet plans for a CSCE summit meeting have met with broad support from all sides. We now need to get on with the preparations. Thorough preparations are needed for such an ambitious conference to succeed with such short notice.



Not disregarding the complex technical problems, we must keep up the momentum at the negotiations in order that they may reach a first stage agreement as soon as possible. The opportunities for lasting progress have never been brighter.

Important political impulses to the negotiations should be given and are, in fact, being given. We welcomed from the outset President Bush's proposal concerning stationed troops. Also in the necessary task of establishing agreed definitions on all categories of weapons and equipment covered by the negotiations, new constructive proposals have been presented. This, inter alia, applies to combat aircraft.

We hope that these expressions of strong political will to bring CFE I to a speedy conclusion will be met with an equally constructive attitude.

Mr. Chairman,

Almost 35 years ago, in 1955, President Eisenhower tabled a proposal to establish an Open Skies regime. Already at that time, the Danish government welcomed the proposal and declared itself ready to let such a regime encompass Danish territory, including Greenland.

35 years later, the positive view which was expressed then is still valid. When President Bush in May last year took the initiative to re-launch the proposal on Open Skies and to expand its scope, the Danish government immediately stated that it regarded the proposal as a very positive contribution to greater openness and confidence between East and West.

Indeed, an Open Skies regime could not only help us achieve a larger degree of transparency as far as military activities are concerned. It could also serve as a tool in a verification context.

Open Skies will allow for virtually unrestricted aerial observation of the territories of North America, Europe and the Soviet Union. Thus, it will establish openness in a very concrete way, but on a very broad scale.

We must meet the challenges of the present. And turn them into results for the future.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.



Document: ICO-CS-031

**Open Skies Conference**

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SPEECH BY

OFFENER  
HIMMEL

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE JOE CLARK

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

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**Canada**

CIELOS  
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FEBRUARY 13TH, 1990

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Colleagues:

I believe this past day and a half have marked an important beginning in the construction of a new framework for political and security relations among our countries.

This has been a unique occasion.

It is the first time that the Foreign Ministers of our countries have gathered together since the dawning of the new age of democracy and freedom in Eastern Europe.

We are meeting not as old adversaries, but as new partners in a new task, the task of building a durable peace in Europe.

We also have a new type of challenge before us. That challenge is not so much to initiate change, it is to channel it, to ensure that it remains permanent and stabilizing in its consequences.

In effect, the challenge before us as Ministers is to keep up with change.

In breaking new ground, I detect much common ground.

That common ground goes beyond specifics. It also relates to a shared sense of purpose and mission.

Allow me, as Chairman, the luxury of summarizing what I see as the common elements of this shared purpose.

First, I think that all of us accept that we have entered a new era in relations between East and West. It is an era where the terms East and West are themselves beginning to lose meaning.

Second, I detect a consensus that we must act quickly. We must act quickly to consolidate the gains which have been made thus far and to ensure that future change proceeds in a way which enhances our common security rather than detracting from it.

Third, I believe there is agreement that there is an overriding requirement to be guided by the dual goals of stability and predictability.

We must act in such a way as to smooth the bumps on the road ahead and to maximize the predictability of change.

Fourth, I also detect a shared belief that a guiding principle of our future security framework should be the reduction of military forces to the lowest possible level consistent with national security requirements.

Fifth, I believe there is agreement that we must broaden the definition of security - and act upon that definition. That broadened definition of security relates to confidence building, verification and the legitimization of borders and frontiers.

Sixth, I believe we all share the view that a new framework for relations in Europe requires the continued clear involvement of North America in the various councils of the continent.

Those are broad issues where I, as Chairman, see little, if any difference between the 23 Ministers sitting around this table. That in itself is grounds for optimism.

There also seems to be a measure agreement on specific negotiations or institutions which have been the focus of our discussions so far.

There is a strong consensus among us regarding the desirability of Open Skies. An Open Skies agreement will solidify the gains in mutual confidence we have already achieved, and allow us to move forward to a new era of confidence-building.

Open Skies will allow each country represented here to see that no one of us is carrying on military activities threatening to the security of the others. It will assist in the verification of future arms control agreements. And it will help to create the climate that encourages signature of those agreements.

Most important, we are agreed in our expressed readiness to come to an early agreement that we can sign at Budapest in May.

How do we put our political will into practice? What sort of aircraft will be used? How many flights will each country be allowed? What are the operational details of an Open Skies regime?

Questions such as these are sometimes called technical questions. We should not let that label mislead us into thinking that they are somehow simple questions, with ready solutions, or that political considerations do not intrude on them. Rather, we should regard them as the challenges they are. We should be prepared to work diligently to come up with solutions. And, should we reach a point where agreement seems difficult, I would urge us to look back on what we have said here, to bear in mind our shared purpose, and to reaffirm our determination to move forward.

I pledge the full support of the Canadian delegation in this endeavour. Canada's unflagging support for Open Skies is well-known to all of you. It stems from our strong interest in verification and from our commitment to East-West confidence-building.

I believe it is fair to say that the approach of all of us to Open Skies is based on four criteria:

- simplicity
- cost-effectiveness
- flexibility.
- equity

The Open Skies concept is, by its very nature, a simple one. In building a structure to embody this concept we should not look for complexity where none need exist. We should keep restrictions to a minimum. We should ensure that openness means openness. We should create a regime that, in principle, is subject to no limitations save those imposed by flight safety considerations and rules of international law.

Open Skies should be cost effective. Open Skies need not be expensive. The technology exists and is well within the reach of all participants. Cost effectiveness also means we should avoid unnecessary bureaucracy.

We should construct a regime which is as flexible as possible in meeting the varying needs and requirements of the signatory States.

Equity allows all participants to benefit from the regime. No doubt there are differences as to what equity means and how it can be achieved.

NATO countries have put forward their conception of Open Skies in the basic elements paper. We have heard now from the various WTO foreign ministers. Mr. Shevardnadze has introduced the notion of equality which I take to mean equitable access to benefits. This is a concern we need to take seriously. In general, there appears to be a fair amount of common ground in our approaches. It is our task, as ministers, to identify that common ground in a communique, so that this negotiation will advance quickly, so that Open Skies can become a functioning element of East-West confidence-building as soon as possible.

I am greatly encouraged by the pace with which events have progressed so far. It has been less than a year since President Bush re-launched Open Skies in his speech in Texas, yet here we are ready to commence detailed negotiations on a treaty text with the evident desire to sign an agreement a few months hence. Those of you familiar with the history of arms control negotiations will see this a record.

I am encouraged also by the rapidity with which Canada's trial



overflight of Hungary was put into play. I want to emphasize the outstanding cooperation we received from our Hungarian and Czech colleagues in conducting the trial. The results of our joint experiment were discussed in detail at the Budapest preparatory meeting for this conference. I believe this has cleared away a lot of the technical questions that might otherwise hamper this negotiation. This test of the nuts and bolts of Open Skies demonstrated that if our will to cooperate remains strong, the concept can be made to work.

As we go into our closed session, I believe it is useful to outline the key issues with which we will be dealing:

- whether aircraft will be nationally or collectively operated;

- determining the types of sensors to be allowed onboard Open Skies aircraft;

- determining the number, or quota, of overflights each participating state will be obliged to receive or permitted to carry out. I believe a compromise can readily be found on this issue using a formula that takes into account, at its basis, the realities of geography, geographic size and population.

- determining the structure and language of an Open Skies treaty text.

In an effort to expedite the negotiation, Canada, in conjunction with its allies, has prepared a draft treaty text that we hope can serve as the basis of discussions over the next two weeks.

Let us move as far as we can towards agreement in Ottawa, so we can reconvene in the spring in Budapest to sign a final treaty text.

Let us make Open Skies our first step onto the uncharted ground of our future security in Europe. We face an enormous challenge, but also unprecedented opportunity. By putting our political will into practice we, together, can make the term "East-West" synonymous not with confrontation and rivalry, as it been for the last forty years, but with good will and cooperation.

We have also spoken today and yesterday about the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and about the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Some have spoken about the reunification of Germany, which we all acknowledge as a matter for the German people to pursue, and which we welcome, confident that those aspects that are of interest to others will be discussed in the appropriate forums.

The CFE negotiations are tremendously important. We are all greatly encouraged by what we have heard from President Bush and General Secretary Gorbachev in these past days about the reduction of troops in Europe. All speakers believe that we have the basis for proceeding rapidly to the conclusion of a CFE agreement. Let us do so in time for signature of a treaty at a CSCE summit meeting this year. Then let us move towards further measures to increase conventional stability.

We are all agreed that there should be a summit level meeting of the CSCE in 1990. The potential of the CSCE is enormous. Mr. Dienstbier spoke of the CSCE as a comprehensive framework for pluralism. It is the one body that has, in its composition and mandate, the ability to act as a framework for the construction of a new peace and prosperity in Europe.

How should we prepare for a summit? Some have suggested that we should do it at Copenhagen in June, or at the second Open Skies meeting, this spring in Budapest, or at a separate meeting of foreign ministers. These are questions to be decided. It is clear that a preparatory meeting will be needed involving not just the 23 nations represented here, but all 35 countries of the CSCE. But we need to discuss here what we believe should be the purpose of the summit itself, beyond signing a CFE Agreement. Is it to create the political setting for the 1992 follow-up meeting? Or will it also have a broader agenda setting in motion a process of activities that range through economic, social, environmental and humanitarian co-operation, as well as security affairs?

Today we are all politicians, in the best sense of that word. We are responsible to our publics for our actions. We must, therefore, be sensitive to those responsibilities on the part of others. We must be mindful constantly of the need to keep our efforts co-ordinated so that change is not purchased at the price of stability.

Under normal circumstances this would be a recipe for slowness. But we cannot afford delay. We must be present, at the political level, during all phases of this process, to ensure success which is quick and sure.

As we pursue our discussions today, in closed session, I am confident we will continue to apply the same openness to each other and to new ideas as is embodied in the concept of Open Skies itself.





Document : ICO-CS-033

**Open Skies Conference**

OPEN  
SKIES

CIELS  
OUVERTS

OPENING STATEMENT

OFFENER  
HIMMEL

CIELI  
APERTI

ОТКРЫТОЕ  
НЕБО

**Hellenic Republic  
République hellénique**

CIELOS  
ABIERTOS

FEBRUARY 13TH, 1990



HELLENIC REPUBLIC  
THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Mr. Chairman,

On behalf of my Government I would like to extend our warmest thanks to the Canadian Government for their initiative to host the "Open Skies" Conference in the beautiful city of Ottawa and our congratulations for the excellent organization of this meeting.

Greece strongly supports the "Open Skies" initiative and has welcome it from the outset. This initiative comes at a moment when historic political evolutions in Eastern and Central Europe are giving a whole new meaning to the basic concepts of international relations. These relations are increasingly being governed by the concepts of openness, confidence building, cooperation and the rule of international law. The conclusion of an "Open Skies" will contribute substantially to the attainment of these goals. It will provide a far greater degree of openness to the military activities of the two alliances than existed up to now. It will serve as another forum of fruitful cooperation in the new world architecture of peace and dialogue. By permitting the unrestricted aerial surveillance of the territories of the participating states, it will greatly enhance the degree of confidence in the alliances' mutual relations. Confidence will replace mistrust and cooperation will supplant confrontation.

The conference on "Open Skies" is thus placed in the direct line of a much broader process tending to transform the territories of North America, Europe and parts of Asia into a vast zone of cooperation and mutual trust. This process has its roots in the conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe which has played a major role in creating an advanced stage of cooperation among the participating states and which can provide the framework for even higher form of collaboration between these countries. For

this reason, my Government, would warmly welcome the participation of all the CSCE countries to the "Open Skies" initiative.

So, we wish to express our satisfaction over the invitation extended to the Neutral-Non Aligned countries to attend this conference as observers. We trust that this development is a further positive contribution to reaching the aims sought by this meeting in connection with the expediency of an ever increasing need for building confidence amongst all European nations.

Mr. Chairman,

The other very important aspect of the ongoing process for the transformation of our continent are the negotiations on the Conventional forces in Europe. Greece is fully aware of the historical significance of these talks. Because they aim at the overcoming of the ideological and political confrontation between States and groups of States in our continent. This goal, which a short time ago seemed at the most a far-way dream is now within our reach. My Government shares the objective of all participating countries to reach--as was clearly stated last night--before the end of the current year, a concrete and substantial agreement on the reduction and limitation of conventional armed forces in Europe. Such an agreement will open a new era in the history of arms control. It will achieve this goal by providing full and equal security to all participating states. Greece, as a small country must also insist on the obvious fact that no country, however small, should see her security diminished as a result of the treaty. In today's rapidly changing environment, the security of Europe does not depend only on the balance of forces between the two alliances. It increasingly depends on maintaining regional equilibrium. The reduction of conventional forces in Europe, welcome as it is, should not be allowed to upset such regional balances. Because the result could be increased instability in the region concerned and, ultimately, in the whole of Europe.

Mr. Chairman,

While reviewing the negotiations on the Conventional Forces in Europe, one is struck by the extent of the results achieved so far. It is remarkable that negotiations of so great importance and complexity, conducted between 23 sovereign states, have progressed so rapidly. However, there is still much to be done. Therefore, Greece is fully convinced of the need to give a strong political impulse to these negotiations. Our meeting here is designed to give them precisely such an impact. For the same reason we support the idea of convening a ministerial meeting of the 23 participating countries, during this spring in Vienna.

Finally, I would like to point out that the agreement to be signed this year will only be the link in a long process which will aim at the balance of forces at much lower levels. These new negotiations should begin immediately after the first accord is concluded.

Monsieur le Président avant de conclure je voudrais vous assurer de la ferme volonté de la Grèce de souscrire à tout effort qui contribuerait à la consolidation d'une nouvelle ère aux relations internationales, une ère qui se veut être celle de la transparence et par là, du Droit et de la Paix.

En guise de conclusion, permettez moi Monsieur le Président, de reiterer de la part du Gouvernement Hellénique et de moi-même, nos remerciements les plus chaleureux envers le Gouvernement du Canada ainsi qu'à vous personnellement de votre généreuse hospitalité et de cette organisation exemplaire.

I thank you Mr. Chairman.

OPEN  
SKIES

**Open Skies Conference**

CIELS  
OUVERTS

PRESS CONFERENCE BY MR. DOUGLAS HURD

OFFENER  
HIMMEL

FOREIGN SECRETARY OF THE

UNITED KINGDOM

CIELI  
APERTI

ОТКРЫТОЕ  
НЕБО

**United Kingdom**

CIELOS  
ABIERTOS

FEBRUARY 13TH, 1990

TRANSCRIPT A - FOREIGN SEC - PC - OTTAWA - 13 FEBRUARY 1990

FROM ECRC FOR CCI RADIO TECHNICAL SERVICES

TRANSCRIPT OF PRESS CONFERENCE

GIVEN BY THE FOREIGN SECRETARY, MR DOUGLAS BIRD,

IN OTTAWA,

ON TUESDAY, 13 FEBRUARY 1990

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TRANSCRIPT A

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

It has been a very busy 24 hours since I met some of you yesterday. I had a long meeting yesterday afternoon of more than an hour with Mr Shvardnadze. I have now met most of the East European Foreign Ministers, in fact I think all of them, and I seem to have been in continuous discussion through this time with Secretary Baker and M. Demis and Herr Genscher. And there have been a number of developments which from our point of view are very positive.

On the question of manpower ceilings, you will have read what the President of the United States said yesterday, that he is holding to his proposal of 225,000 US troops in Europe as a whole, 195,000 in the central sector. That coincides with the view which I expressed to Secretary Baker.



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## FOREIGN SECRETARY (CONT):

On Germany, which has really taken up I think most of the work in the last 24 hours, after a lot of work we are quite close to an agreement on procedure, an agreement on meetings of the two Germanys and the four-powers to discuss those matters which fall naturally within the scope of such a meeting. This strikes me as an admirable and common sense procedure.

If agreed, and we are waiting for the final agreement of Moscow, it will provide what the British Government has long pressed for, namely a framework for such discussions. And I welcome the emphasis which West German leaders and Herr Genscher again in his speech today put on the rights of the four powers.

We will play a full and energetic part in that procedure, if it is set up, and using it not in any way as holding up self-determination, self-determination is a matter for the German people, for the peoples who live in the Federal Republic and the GDR. That principle has never been in question and the rights of the four-powers could not be exercised to hold it up, but simply to make sure, as best we can, that that process, if that is what the German people want, fits harmoniously and clearly into a pattern of European security which is acceptable to everybody.

That leads me into substance. I think there is a useful weight of opinion forming against the concept of a united, neutral Germany. That is very important. The Soviet attitude is still evolving and different comments are made by different Soviet spokesmen, one can make no complaint about that, but it is now clear that a number of East European states - notably Poland and

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FOREIGN SECRETARY (CONT):

Hungary - are against the concept of a united, neutral Germany.

Our position, the British position, I made clear in Bonn exactly a week ago. We believe that if there is a united Germany it should be a member of NATO. We believe that arrangements need to be made to reconcile that with the legitimate security interests of the Soviet Union and of Poland. And we believe that in the work which will be necessary on that, that work should include studying restrictions on the stationing of NATO troops within what is now the GDR, the territory of the GDR.

We also believe that it is very important that there should be a clear and binding commitment to respect the present borders of Poland. It was a point discussed by the Polish Prime Minister with Mrs Thatcher yesterday in London and by the Polish Foreign Minister this morning with me here in Ottawa.

So there is a lot of work to be done, Ladies and Gentlemen, on that, but at least we can now see a framework emerging within which that work can be achieved.

Finally I would like to say that Herr Genscher will be stopping in London tomorrow for talks with the Prime Minister, Mrs Thatcher. This follows the sequence of very close contacts we have had with the Federal German Government, including my visit to Bonn and my talks with the Federal Chancellor exactly a week ago, and as I have said, the almost continuous contacts that I have had here in Ottawa with Herr Genscher.

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(QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS)

QUESTION (Richard Viddle, Dallas Morning News):

Could you tell us, besides the Soviet Union, which nations at this gathering are still talking about a neutral Germany?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

I have not heard anyone talk about a neutral Germany at this gathering. I have read various statements made by or attributed to Soviet spokesmen, although one particular statement attributed to a Soviet spokesman yesterday, which several of you picked up, has been repudiated by East European spokesmen today.

I have not heard anyone, except Herr Fischer, I think Herr Fischer's speech yesterday did commend the concept of a neutral Germany - the Foreign Minister of the GDR.

QUESTION:

Could you tell me a little bit more about the shape that a four-power conference might take, what sort of questions would be addressed, do you think it is important to get the legal questions out of the way first, the status of the four powers within Germany?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

We have not decided that. As I say, it is not in the bag yet, we are awaiting the final acceptance of Moscow and then there will need to be preparatory work which will need to cover obviously the agenda, the place, the timing of meetings and so on.

QUESTION:

The UK Government must have some idea as to what the role of the four powers will be?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

Of course we do, we have quite clear ideas, but I would like to expound them in the preparatory work, I am afraid, rather than publicly at this stage before the thing has even been set up.

QUESTION:

Any idea when it might happen, what sort of time frame we are looking at for a four power conference?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

I think that the preparatory work could start as soon as the announcement is made, as soon as agreement is reached. I think the actual meetings, the definitive work, definitive meetings would need to await the elections on 18 March.

QUESTION:

On the question of German reunification, could you elucidate on your earlier comments about the position of Poland and Hungary, what exactly that is, and could you say whether the British Government might support any sort of vote in a general referendum by the German people in a united country as a means of self-determination where they may vote on remaining in NATO, the Warsaw Pact or as a neutral nation?



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FOREIGN SECRETARY:

I think you must ask the Poles and the Hungarians, but my strong impression is that both of them are opposed to the concept of a neutral Germany. On the question of self-determination, in Britain and in most European countries the basic questions are decided through political elections. There are political elections in the GDR, it is very important that those elections on 18 March should happen in a free and orderly way so that no-one queries the results, and I think the crucial question will be what coming together there is of those who have been elected on 18 March and what attitude they take, what statements they pronounce, on the question of unification given that all the parties in the FRG, with the exception of the Greens as I understand it, are in favour of unification. So the elections on 18 March are the key and that is why it is so crucial that they should be held in a free and orderly way.

QUESTION (Charlotte Montgomery):

To go back to the four power meeting, you talked about issues which you felt were appropriate for them to be dealing with at those meetings. Surely you can give us some idea of what those issues are?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

We have fairly clear ideas about the agenda but I would rather not be drawn on that today.



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QUESTION:

Would it be possible at any point for a united Germany within NATO to have any kind of Soviet or Warsaw Treaty troops in the Eastern portion?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

You do have at the moment a large number of Soviet troops in the GDR and clearly one of the questions to be addressed, one of the questions in which the Soviet Union has a clear interest, is what the future arrangements for those should be.

QUESTION (Olivia Ward, Toronto Star):

To follow up on that question, how would the future of a NATO united Germany affect current negotiations on troop withdrawals and troop strength in Europe?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

I do not think they would. I mentioned manpower, we have now CFE discussions covering manpower levels. We believe that the relatively new American proposals are a correct Western move, as it were, in those negotiations and I do not think there is an intimate connection between that and the German question we are now considering.



QUESTION (New York Times):

Now that the President has come out in favour of maintaining the 225,000 figure and you said this is a position which your country supports, how do you see this deadlock being resolved, do you think that the NATO position will be to simply leave things as they are and count on the Soviets to simply unilaterally have to reduce their troops, do you see NATO making another presentation to President Gorbachev on this issue, where does this issue go from here?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

The position is that the United States has made a revised proposal. The Soviet Union has countered with a proposal of its own. The President of the United States has held to his original proposal. The Soviet proposal, as you know, offered a choice. I think the matter will no doubt be further discussed, but one stage at a time I think. We are pleased with the stance that the President has taken.

QUESTION:

Does that go for the entire Alliance?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

That I cannot say, that I cannot say. We were consulted, we were asked for our view by Mr Baker and on his return from Moscow, very promptly, we were all asked for our view. We were asked for



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FOREIGN SECRETARY (CONT):

our view here and I gave him his view yesterday. I cannot speak for others.

QUESTION:

... the Warsaw Pact and the NATO Alliance on open skies is the question of uniformity in aircraft, could you give us an indication of how close you are to resolution of that issue and why the West is resistant to the uniformity of aircraft? Also, was there any discussion between you and other Foreign Ministers on Lance deployment, whether there is some alternative now being discussed for follow-on to Lance deployment?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

So, we have not discussed the second point, there has been no re-opening of the comprehensive concept which, as you know, set out the procedures for discussing that. On the first point, I left the Plenary Session just as it was discussing that very question of aircraft types and agreed equipment for open skies. We believe that the whole point about open skies is that you are not afraid of technology. Of course the aircraft should be unarmed and you could have a list of things which were prohibited, prohibited equipment and so on. But the whole principle of it is that you are not afraid, you have not anything to hide and if that is so, then there is not really a need to specify types of aircraft or equipment because you are not saying: "I have got something that I need to conceal from advanced technology". You are saying it is open.



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FOREIGN SECRETARY (CONT):

Therefore, I think there is a contradiction between the concept of open skies and saying: "Oh but it can only be done by agreed aeroplanes or agreed equipment". Provided it is unarmed, provided it is quite clear that it is an unarmed process, there is no threat of attack involved in it. I think it should be open and as technology develops, those who develop it should be enabled to use it.

QUESTION:

(Inaudible).

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

You are rushing ahead with things which we have not discussed and are not being discussed here at Ottawa. No, we are satisfied, the comprehensive concept sets out the sequence of ways in which this should be discussed. And as I say, no-one has reopened that, indeed Herr Genscher has reaffirmed it, not here but previously.

QUESTION (APP):

You mentioned the problem of Polish borders, how do you address the concerns of the Poles with a 2 + 4 or 4 + 2 framework?



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FOREIGN SECRETARY:

In one way or another the concerns have to be addressed, whether in that framework or directly, there clearly needs to be a permanent resolution of their problem. Herr Genscher again today made a very welcome statement that when German unification was discussed they were talking about the peoples of the GDR, of the FRG and of Berlin. And he added: "Nothing less, nothing more." That, I know, is welcomed by the Poles as a restatement of assurances which he and the Federal Chancellor have given already.

What they would like of course is something which is permanent and is binding and which respects their Western border and we believe that that is right and I am sure that at the right time that will be worked out. That is an important aspect of the external, international implications of German unification and we have to find a way of addressing it. It is not clear yet what that way will be but we believe that there has to be found such a way.

QUESTION:

What kind of answer are you waiting for from Moscow, is it just acceptance of the mechanism, of the formula of 2 + 4, or do they want some kind of guarantee on substantive issues?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

I do not know, we have not had the answer yet, I do not know.



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QUESTION:

(Inaudible)

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

I think that is possible.

QUESTION:

Could you enlighten us on the arithmetics, is it 4 + 2 or 2 + 4?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

They each add up to 6.

QUESTION:

Yes, but the implication is that if it is 2 + 4, the two German states are best to sort out some of their internal matters first and then the four powers come in for the security arrangements whereas 4 + 2 would be the other way round?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

I think you will have to see the form in which it is announced, but the underlying point you are on is entirely correct. There are two aspects of this, there always have been. One is self-determination which is a decision of the German people, the German people in the areas I have described, and that is not to do with the four powers, that is not to do with the rest of us, that is their business and we have always supported their right to take



FOREIGN SECRETARY (CONT):

that decision. But there are, alongside that, certain matters which then have to be considered and decided if German unity is to fit into an harmonious Europe and we have been discussing those, we have just discussed one of them, and some of those issues would fall naturally within the framework that I hope will come into being of the six.

QUESTION (Bella Pick Guardian):

Could I ask you about the declaration on the CFE agreement that is apparently being prepared, is there going to be any kind of political commitment to concluding it this year and if so what is the substance that is going to be put out later today?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

I think there will be a general endorsement of the idea that the CSCE process is going to carry a good deal more weight and is going to be very important because as the Warsaw Pact disintegrates, the countries of Eastern Europe feel the need for something which brings the countries of Europe together. We believe of course passionately in the continuation of NATO and the EC, but neither of those for the time being is suitable for the countries of Eastern Europe so they want to put more weight on the CSCE process and I think that that is right. I think there will then be agreement, as you know Bella there is agreement really on the principle of holding a CSCE Summit later this year and I dare say that will be in the communique as well.



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FOREIGN SECRETARY (CONT):

As you know, we believe that must be accompanied by the signature of a CFE agreement.

QUESTION (Hella Pick):

I think you have misunderstood me a little bit. I thought there was going to be something on the Conventional Forces Agreement, that there would be a statement put out about that today.

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

I am sorry I thought you were talking about the CSCE?

QUESTION (Hella Pick):

So. Also, given the fact that you do not seem to have overcome the two major hurdles - manpower and aircraft - what of substance can you actually say before this meeting breaks up?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

I think that we have not yet discussed aircraft, that will be a discussion which will be going on later today before we break up. I do not know what progress we can make on that. On manpower, it has not been really discussed here because of the exchanges in Moscow and analyse the sequence. I think that what will come out on CFE, and I am sorry I misunderstood your question, will be mainly an endorsement of the need to reach an agreement this year. Behind the scenes there has been a lot of activity and that may



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## FOREIGN SECRETARY (CONT):

have had some ground clearing use on this. The impression I have had from the negotiators is that there has been a step backward on aircraft, that manpower does not seem to be a major, of course it is important but I doubt if there will be great conflict about that. Aircraft is more difficult, the other things seem to be yielding to treatment.

As I say, there will be a discussion later today on CFE among the Ministers and I do not know what the final shape of the communique will be but that is roughly what it looks like now. I do not think it will produce any sensations from your point of view.

(END OF TRANSCRIPT A, CONTINUED ON TRANSCRIPT B) BTBT

TRANSCRIPT B - FOREIGN SEC - PC - OTTAWA - 13 FEBRUARY 1990

FROM BGEG FOR C01 RADIO TECHNICAL SERVICES

TRANSCRIPT OF PRESS CONFERENCE

GIVEN BY THE FOREIGN SECRETARY, MR DOUGLAS HURD,

IN OTTAWA,

ON TUESDAY, 13 FEBRUARY 1990

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TRANSCRIPT B (CONTINUED FROM TRANSCRIPT A)

QUESTION:

If I may come back to the question of the 2 plus 4 for a moment, I would like you to expand a little on what seems to me to be a contradiction between your statement that the two Germanys must have it within their own powers of self-determination to make certain decisions about Germany and yet the assertion of four power veto rights, however you want to describe it. I would like to ask you why is it not a contradiction and a quick follow-up would be at what point in the process do you envisage the four power role would cease, would there be some document signed, some commitment made by the newly unified Germany and if so to whom would it be made or would the four power role continue essentially indefinitely until some further decisions are made by the four powers?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

I do not think there is a contradiction, it was dealt with admirably in Herr Genscher's speech today, both points, that it is not for the four powers to decide whether or not the Germans have the right of self-determination. Perhaps it was originally, but



TRANSCRIPT B - FOREIGN SEC - PC - OTTAWA - 13 FEBRUARY 1990

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END OF TRANSCRIPT B AND END OF VEHICLE TRANSCRIPT) ENDE





Document : ICO-CS-039

**Open Skies Conference**

PRESS CONFERENCE BY MR. DOUGLAS HURD  
FOREIGN SECRETARY OF THE  
UNITED KINGDOM

**United Kingdom**

**FEBRUARY 13TH, 1990**

OPEN  
SKIES

CIELS  
OUVERTS

OFFENER  
HIMMEL

CIELI  
APERTI

ОТКРЫТОЕ  
НЕБО

CIELOS  
ABIERTOS



TRANSCRIPT A - FOREIGN SEC - FC - OTTAWA - 13 FEBRUARY 1990

FROM HQSG FOR C01 RADIO TECHNICAL SERVICES

TRANSCRIPT OF PRESS CONFERENCE

GIVEN BY THE FOREIGN SECRETARY, MR DOUGLAS HURD,

IN OTTAWA,

ON TUESDAY, 13 FEBRUARY 1990

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TRANSCRIPT A

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

It has been a very busy 24 hours since I met some of you yesterday. I had a long meeting yesterday afternoon of more than an hour with Mr Shevardnadze. I have now met most of the East European Foreign Ministers, in fact I think all of them, and I seem to have been in continuous discussion through this time with Secretary Baker and M. Dumas and Herr Genscher. And there have been a number of developments which from our point of view are very positive.

On the question of manpower ceilings, you will have read what the President of the United States said yesterday, that he is holding to his proposal of 225,000 US troops in Europe as a whole, 165,000 in the central sector. That coincides with the view which I expressed to Secretary Baker.



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FOREIGN SECRETARY (CONT):

On Germany, which has really taken up I think most of the work in the last 24 hours, after a lot of work we are quite close to an agreement on procedure, an agreement on meetings of the two Germanys and the four-powers to discuss those matters which fall naturally within the scope of such a meeting. This strikes me as an admirable and common sense procedure.

If agreed, and we are waiting for the final agreement of Moscow, it will provide what the British Government has long pressed for, namely a framework for such discussions. And I welcome the emphasis which West German leaders and Herr Genscher again in his speech today put on the rights of the four powers.

We will play a full and energetic part in that procedure, if it is set up, and using it not in any way as holding up self-determination, self-determination is a matter for the German people, for the peoples who live in the Federal Republic and the GDR. That principle has never been in question and the rights of the four-powers could not be exercised to hold it up, but simply to make sure, as best we can, that that process, if that is what the German people want, fits harmoniously and clearly into a pattern of European security which is acceptable to everybody.

That leads me into substance. I think there is a useful weight of opinion forming against the concept of a united, neutral Germany. That is very important. The Soviet attitude is still evolving and different comments are made by different Soviet spokesmen, one can make no complaint about that, but it is now clear that a number of East European states - notably Poland and



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FOREIGN SECRETARY (CONT):

Hungary - are against the concept of a united, neutral Germany.

Our position, the British position, I made clear in Bonn exactly a week ago. We believe that if there is a united Germany it should be a member of NATO. We believe that arrangements need to be made to reconcile that with the legitimate security interests of the Soviet Union and of Poland. And we believe that in the work which will be necessary on that, that work should include studying restrictions on the stationing of NATO troops within what is now the GDR, the territory of the GDR.

We also believe that it is very important that there should be a clear and binding commitment to respect the present borders of Poland. It was a point discussed by the Polish Prime Minister with Mrs Thatcher yesterday in London and by the Polish Foreign Minister this morning with me here in Ottawa.

So there is a lot of work to be done, Ladies and Gentlemen, on that, but at least we can now see a framework emerging within which that work can be achieved.

Finally I would like to say that Herr Genscher will be stopping in London tomorrow for talks with the Prime Minister, Mrs Thatcher. This follows the sequence of very close contacts we have had with the Federal German Government, including my visit to Bonn and my talks with the Federal Chancellor exactly a week ago, and as I have said, the almost continuous contacts that I have had here in Ottawa with Herr Genscher.

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(QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS)

QUESTION (Richard Viddio, Dallas Morning News):

Could you tell us, besides the Soviet Union, which nations at this gathering are still talking about a neutral Germany?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

I have not heard anyone talk about a neutral Germany at this gathering. I have read various statements made by or attributed to Soviet spokesmen, although one particular statement attributed to a Soviet spokesman yesterday, which several of you picked up, has been repudiated by East European spokesmen today.

I have not heard anyone, except Herr Fischer, I think Herr Fischer's speech yesterday did commend the concept of a neutral Germany - the Foreign Minister of the GDR.

QUESTION:

Could you tell me a little bit more about the shape that a four-power conference might take, what sort of questions would be addressed, do you think it is important to get the legal questions out of the way first, the status of the four powers within Germany?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

We have not decided that. As I say, it is not in the bag yet, we are awaiting the final acceptance of Moscow and then there will need to be preparatory work which will need to cover obviously the agenda, the place, the timing of meetings and so on.



QUESTION:

The UK Government must have some idea as to what the role of the four powers will be?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

Of course we do, we have quite clear ideas, but I would like to expound them in the preparatory work, I am afraid, rather than publicly at this stage before the thing has even been set up.

QUESTION:

Any idea when it might happen, what sort of time frame we are looking at for a four power conference?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

I think that the preparatory work could start as soon as the announcement is made, as soon as agreement is reached. I think the actual meetings, the definitive work, definitive meetings would need to await the elections on 18 March.

QUESTION:

On the question of German reunification, could you elucidate on your earlier comments about the position of Poland and Hungary, what exactly that is, and could you say whether the British Government might support any sort of vote in a general referendum by the German people in a united country as a means of self-determination where they may vote on remaining in NATO, the Warsaw Pact or as a neutral nation?





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FOREIGN SECRETARY:

I think you must ask the Poles and the Hungarians, but my strong impression is that both of them are opposed to the concept of a neutral Germany. On the question of self-determination, in Britain and in most European countries the basic questions are decided through political elections. There are political elections in the GDR, it is very important that those elections on 18 March should happen in a free and orderly way so that no-one queries the results; and I think the crucial question will be what coming together there is of those who have been elected on 18 March and what attitude they take, what statements they pronounce, on the question of unification given that all the parties in the FRG, with the exception of the Greens as I understand it, are in favour of unification. So the elections on 18 March are the key and that is why it is so crucial that they should be held in a free and orderly way.

QUESTION (Charlotte Montgomery):

To go back to the four power meeting, you talked about issues which you felt were appropriate for them to be dealing with at those meetings. Surely you can give us some idea of what those issues are?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

We have fairly clear ideas about the agenda but I would rather not be drawn on that today.

QUESTION:

Would it be possible at any point for a united Germany within NATO to have any kind of Soviet or Warsaw Treaty troops in the Eastern portion?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

You do have at the moment a large number of Soviet troops in the GDR and clearly one of the questions to be addressed, one of the questions in which the Soviet Union has a clear interest, is what the future arrangements for those should be.

QUESTION (Olivia Ward, Toronto Star):

To follow up on that question, how would the future of a NATO united Germany affect current negotiations on troop withdrawals and troop strength in Europe?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

I do not think they would. I mentioned manpower, we have now CFE discussions covering manpower levels. We believe that the relatively new American proposals are a correct Western move, as it were, in those negotiations and I do not think there is an intimate connection between that and the German question we are now considering.



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QUESTION (New York Times):

Now that the President has come out in favour of maintaining the 225,000 figure and you said this is a position which your country supports, how do you see this deadlock being resolved, do you think that the NATO position will be to simply leave things as they are and count on the Soviets to simply unilaterally have to reduce their troops, do you see NATO making another presentation to President Gorbachev on this issue, where does this issue go from here?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

The position is that the United States has made a revised proposal. The Soviet Union has countered with a proposal of its own. The President of the United States has held to his original proposal. The Soviet proposal, as you know, offered a choice. I think the matter will no doubt be further discussed, but one stage at a time I think. We are pleased with the stance that the President has taken:

QUESTION:

Does that go for the entire Alliance?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

That I cannot say, that I cannot say. We were consulted, we were asked for our view by Mr Baker and on his return from Moscow, very promptly, we were all asked for our view. We were asked for



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FOREIGN SECRETARY (CONT):

our view here and I gave him our view yesterday. I cannot speak for others.

QUESTION:

... the Warsaw Pact and the NATO Alliance on open skies is the question of uniformity in aircraft, could you give us an indication of how close you are to resolution of that issue and why the West is resistant to the uniformity of aircraft? Also, was there any discussion between you and other Foreign Ministers on Lance deployment, whether there is some alternative now being discussed for follow-on to Lance deployment?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

So, we have not discussed the second point, there has been no re-opening of the comprehensive concept which, as you know, set out the procedures for discussing that. On the first point, I left the Plenary Session just as it was discussing that very question of aircraft types and agreed equipment for open skies. We believe that the whole point about open skies is that you are not afraid of technology. Of course the aircraft should be unarmed and you could have a list of things which were prohibited, prohibited equipment and so on. But the whole principle of it is that you are not afraid, you have not anything to hide and if that is so, then there is not really a need to specify types of aircraft or equipment because you are not saying: "I have got something that I need to conceal from advanced technology". You are saying it is open.



FOREIGN SECRETARY (CONT):

Therefore, I think there is a contradiction between the concept of open skies and saying: "Oh but it can only be done by agreed aeroplanes or agreed equipment". Provided it is unarmed, provided it is quite clear that it is an unarmed process, there is no threat of attack involved in it, I think it should be open and as technology develops, those who develop it should be enabled to use it.

QUESTION:

(Inaudible).

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

You are rushing ahead with things which we have not discussed and are not being discussed here at Ottawa. So, we are satisfied, the comprehensive concept sets out the sequence of ways in which this should be discussed. And as I say, no-one has reopened that, indeed Herr Genscher has reaffirmed it, not here but previously.

QUESTION (APP):

You mentioned the problem of Polish borders, how do you address the concerns of the Poles with a 2 + 4 or 4 + 2 framework?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

In one way or another the concerns have to be addressed, whether in that framework or directly, there clearly needs to be a permanent resolution of their problem. Herr Genscher again today made a very welcome statement that when German unification was discussed they were talking about the peoples of the GDR, of the FRG and of Berlin. And he added: "Nothing less, nothing more." That, I know, is welcomed by the Poles as a restatement of assurances which he and the Federal Chancellor have given already.

What they would like of course is something which is permanent and is binding and which respects their Western border and we believe that that is right and I am sure that at the right time that will be worked out. That is an important aspect of the external, international implications of German unification and we have to find a way of addressing it. It is not clear yet what that way will be but we believe that there has to be found such a way.

QUESTION:

What kind of answer are you waiting for from Moscow, is it just acceptance of the mechanism, of the formula of 2 + 4, or do they want some kind of guarantee on substantive issues?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

I do not know, we have not had the answer yet, I do not know.

QUESTION:

(Inaudible)

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

I think that is possible.

QUESTION:

Could you enlighten us on the arithmetics, is it 4 + 2 or 2 + 4?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

They each add up to 6.

QUESTION:

Yes, but the implication is that if it is 2 + 4, the two German states are best to sort out some of their internal matters first and then the four powers come in for the security arrangements whereas 4 + 2 would be the other way round?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

I think you will have to see the form in which it is announced, but the underlying point you are on is entirely correct. There are two aspects of this, there always have been. One is self-determination which is a decision of the German people, the German people in the areas I have described, and that is not to do with the four powers, that is not to do with the rest of us, that is their business and we have always supported their right to take



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FOREIGN SECRETARY (CONT):

that decision. But there are, alongside that, certain matters which then have to be considered and decided if German unity is to fit into an harmonious Europe and we have been discussing those, we have just discussed one of them, and some of those issues would fall naturally within the framework that I hope will come into being of the six.

QUESTION (Hella Pick Guardian):

Could I ask you about the declaration on the CFE agreement that is apparently being prepared, is there going to be any kind of political commitment to concluding it this year and if so what is the substance that is going to be put out later today?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

I think there will be a general endorsement of the idea that the CSCE process is going to carry a good deal more weight and is going to be very important because as the Warsaw Pact disintegrates, the countries of Eastern Europe feel the need for something which brings the countries of Europe together. We believe of course passionately in the continuation of NATO and the EC, but neither of those for the time being is suitable for the countries of Eastern Europe so they want to put more weight on the CSCE process and I think that that is right. I think there will then be agreement, as you know Hella there is agreement really on the principle of holding a CSCE Summit later this year and I dare say that will be in the communique as well.





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FOREIGN SECRETARY (CONT):

As you know, we believe that must be accompanied by the signature of a CFE agreement.

QUESTION (Hella Pick):

I think you have misunderstood me a little bit. I thought there was going to be something on the Conventional Forces Agreement, that there would be a statement put out about that today.

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

I am sorry I thought you were talking about the CSCE?

QUESTION (Hella Pick)

No. Also, given the fact that you do not seem to have overcome the two major hurdles - manpower and aircraft - what of substance can you actually say before this meeting breaks up?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

I think that we have not yet discussed aircraft, that will be a discussion which will be going on later today before we break up. I do not know what progress we can make on that. On manpower, it has not been really discussed here because of the exchanges in Moscow and analyse the sequence. I think that what will come out on CFE, and I am sorry I misunderstood your question, will be mainly an endorsement of the need to reach an agreement this year. Behind the scenes there has been a lot of activity and that may



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FORRIGH SECRETARY (CONT):

have had some ground clearing use on this. The impression I have had from the negotiators is that there has been a step backward on aircraft, that manpower does not seem to be a major, of course it is important but I doubt if there will be great conflict about that. Aircraft is more difficult, the other things seem to be yielding to treatment.

As I say, there will be a discussion later today on CFB among the Ministers and I do not know what the final shape of the communique will be but that is roughly what it looks like now. I do not think it will produce any sensations from your point of view.

(END OF TRANSCRIPT A, CONTINUED ON TRANSCRIPT B) EEEE

TRANSCRIPT B - FOREIGN SEC - PC - OTTAWA - 13 FEBRUARY 1990

FROM BGHG FOR C01 RADIO TECHNICAL SERVICES

TRANSCRIPT OF PRESS CONFERENCE

GIVEN BY THE FOREIGN SECRETARY, MR DOUGLAS HURD,

IN OTTAWA,

ON TUESDAY, 13 FEBRUARY 1990

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TRANSCRIPT B (CONTINUED FROM TRANSCRIPT A)

QUESTION:

If I may come back to the question of the 2 plus 4 for a moment, I would like you to expand a little on what seems to me to be a contradiction between your statement that the two Germans must have it within their own powers of self-determination to make certain decisions about Germany and yet the assertion of four power veto rights, however you want to describe it. I would like to ask you why is it not a contradiction and a quick follow-up would be at what point in the process do you envisage the four power role would cease, would there be some document signed, some commitment made by the newly unified Germany and if so to whom would it be made, or would the four power role continue essentially indefinitely until some further decisions are made by the four powers?

FOREIGN SECRETARY:

I do not think there is a contradiction, it was dealt with admirably in Herr Genscher's speech today, both points, that it is not for the four powers to decide whether or not the Germans have the right of self-determination. Perhaps it was originally, but



TRANSCRIPT B - FOREIGN SEC - PC - OTTAWA - 13 FEBRUARY 1990

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TRANSCRIPT B - FORRIGH SEC - PC - OTTAWA - 13 FEBRUARY 1990

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(END OF TRANSCRIPT B AND END OF VOICE TRANSCRIPT) ENTE





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