


The **Disarmament** Bulletin

A review of national and international disarmament and arms control activities

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SSEA Address to the Fortieth Session of the United Nations



The Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, addressing the General Assembly, September 25, 1985.

Canapress

On September 25, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, addressed the fortieth session of the United Nations. Following are excerpts from that address.

"Surveying the landscape of world affairs on this fortieth anniversary, we find no field is bleaker than that of arms control and disarmament. We must face the fact that not a single substantive agreement has come out of the multilateral arms control process during the first half of the Second Disarmament Decade. Not at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, not

at the MBFR talks in Vienna, not at the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe.

But I have not come here to lament, rather to offer the encouragement and support of Canada in building a climate of confidence necessary for disarmament agreements. No matter the frustration, we must never give up in our determination to construct a world security system that depends on fewer, not more, arms. If more political will is necessary, then let us assert that political will, particularly as we move into 1986, which has been designated International Year of Peace.

The Disarmament Bulletin is published periodically by the Department of External Affairs. It is intended to be a source of information on arms control and disarmament issues to a broad spectrum of Canadians. If you wish to be placed on our mailing list, or need additional copies, please write to:

The Editor, *The Disarmament Bulletin*, Arms Control and Disarmament Division, Dept. of External Affairs, 125 Sussex Drive, Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0G2

Cette publication existe également en français.

In the complex process of arms control and disarmament, priorities must be set straight.

First, Canada believes that deep and verifiable reductions in the existing arsenals of nuclear weapons is the highest priority. Moving to lower levels of arms while preserving the stability of the balance at each successive stage of reduction is the only practical way to make progress. Thus we give our full support to the bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union now taking place in Geneva. The summit meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, in 55 days' time, provides an opportunity to chart a new course for the future, leading to practical steps to unlock the disarmament impasse.

Second, for Canada, the achievement of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty continues to be a fundamental and abiding objective. Our aim is to stop all nuclear testing.

Third, the early conclusion of a Chemical Weapons Treaty is now within reach in the Conference on Disarmament.

Fourth, the prevention of an arms race in outer space is now on the world agenda.

Thus, we know where we are going in arms control and disarmament measures. The Final Document of the First Special Session on Disarmament in 1978 should continue to be our guide. The remarkable consensus achieved by the world community on that occasion must again be renewed as we look towards the Third Special Session on Disarmament.

The successful review of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which concluded last Saturday in Geneva, was a significant step forward. For, by consensus, the states attending the review reaffirmed the viability and vitality of this 130-nation treaty that prevents the spread of nuclear weapons while assuring the international community at large of the benefits of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The international cooperation that characterized the NPT review shows that the multilateral process can and does contribute to strengthened world security.

Canada will continue to play an active role in all the multilateral forums and to strengthen our contributions to confidence-building. In this respect, Canada has devised a Programme of Action for the latter half of this Disarmament Decade. In this Programme, we will step up our work in improving the



Canadian logo marking the fortieth anniversary of the United Nations.

verification process, so necessary to ensuring compliance with negotiated treaties.

To advance work on the verification of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, we will upgrade our analytical capability in seismic research. We will improve our large seismic facility in the Canadian North. We will expand the ability to differentiate between small earthquakes and underground nuclear tests.

As part of the Programme of Action, we will develop, and make available to the UN, practical studies on chemical weapons use along with Canadian specialists to investigate allegations of the use of chemical weapons.

Moreover, we will pursue a multilateral agreement to ban the possession as well as the use of all radiological weapons. I call on the United States and the Soviet Union to conclude an effectively verifiable treaty banning radiological weapons. Canada is ready to sign such a treaty immediately.

Details of the day-to-day Canadian work of building the foundation of treaties that will endure will be spelled out in the First Committee.

Also, the relationship between disarmament and development needs further constructive examination. A global military expenditure of nearly \$1 trillion — in the face of dire poverty, famine and destitution in many places in the developing world — is not acceptable. The Canadian people, so well represented in a widening network of non-governmental organizations, feel this discrepancy intensely. They want a world of true human security, in which there is more food and fewer weapons."



The Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark (left), has point of interest shown to him by Canada's United Nations Ambassador, Stephen Lewis, just before Mr. Clark's address to the United Nations General Assembly. Canapress



Canada's National Agenda for Peace

On October 16, Canada's Ambassador for Disarmament, Mr. Douglas Roche, made the Canadian address to the United Nations First Committee, the main UN General Assembly forum for arms control, disarmament and international security matters. Following are excerpts from that statement.

"Canada, which has a seat at every multilateral disarmament forum, is determined to strengthen the multilateral process in building an enduring peace. We bring to these forums a Canadian policy on arms control and disarmament, which focuses on six areas:

- negotiated radical reductions in nuclear forces and the enhancement of strategic stability;
- maintenance and strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime;
- support for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty as a fundamental and abiding objective of Canadian foreign policy;
- negotiation of a global chemical weapons ban;
- prevention of an arms race in outer space;
- confidence-building measures to facilitate the reduction of military forces in Europe and elsewhere.

To support this policy, the Canadian Government has developed a Programme of Action for the remaining half of the Second Disarmament Decade. Concentrating on practical measures, the Programme aims at laying the groundwork for the creation of confidence and trust vital to achieving disarmament agreements.

With an annual budget of one million dollars, the Department of External Affairs, Verification Research Division, concentrates on several key issues relating to a Comprehensive Test Ban, a global chemical weapons convention and the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

Both the UNSSOD I Final Document and the Declaration of the Second Disarmament Decade recognized that arms control and disarmament agreements must provide for adequate measures of verification. Some allege that verification is a smokescreen to prevent agreement. But that is not Canada's view. We



Douglas Roche

believe that verification is indispensable because meaningful arms control agreements that will endure cannot be negotiated on the basis of trust alone.

To advance work on the verification of a CTB, Canada will expand seismic research by upgrading our large seismic facility in Yellowknife, in northern Canada. As well, we are continuing work designed to differentiate between small earthquakes and underground nuclear tests. We have participated substantially in the International Seismic Data Exchange.

To support the negotiations on a global chemical weapons ban, Canada has lent its expertise to investigating allegations of chemical weapons use and will shortly present to the UN a manual of procedures for use in such investigations. As well, Canada has undertaken specialized research on a portable kit for the detection, identification and quantification of certain mycotoxins. During its past session, the CD's progress towards concluding a chemical weapons convention was minimal. We call upon all members to redouble their efforts in the urgent conclusion of a global chemical weapons ban.

On the Outer Space question, Canada welcomed the establishment of an *Ad Hoc* Working Group to discuss in greater detail this complex issue. In support of the CD's deliberations, Canada has sub-

mitted a comprehensive study of existing international law relating to arms control and outer space. This survey identifies a number of important themes for examination if an international treaty preventing an arms race in space is to be successfully written. It also serves as an excellent example of the evolution and contemporary relevance of international law to the disarmament process. Canada is also working on the application of space-to-space remote sensing for arms control and disarmament purposes. Follow-up work on the application of space-to-ground sensing is planned.

While much of the world's attention is focused on nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, there is a fourth weapon of mass destruction — radiological weapons. Although these weapons were identified by the United Nations almost 40 years ago, there is, as yet, no international agreement of any kind regarding radiological weapons. Since these weapons do not yet exist, the international community has a rare opportunity to prohibit a potentially devastating weapons system, to prevent even its conception, and to do so while the political obstacles to such a ban are at a minimum. There is an urgent need to conclude a Radiological Weapons Convention.

Since 1979, the United States and the Soviet Union have been agreed on the basic text of a treaty to ban radiological weapons. Despite the fact that there has been little or no objection to the substance of the draft treaty, agreement has eluded the Conference on Disarmament which has tried to meet the concerns of some nations to provide, in the same treaty, provision for adequate protection of peaceful nuclear facilities. We believe that agreement on a radiological weapons ban should not await the resolution of this particular problem.

On September 25, in his speech to the General Assembly, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, called on the US and the Soviet Union to conclude a verifiable treaty banning radiological weapons. As well, he indicated Canada's immediate readiness to sign such a treaty.

Canada's Programme of Action, then, is comprised of specific, practical contributions designed to make the arms control process viable and the goal of disarmament realizable."

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Canadian Address to Third Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference

Following are excerpts from the statement by the Head of the Canadian Delegation, Douglas Roche, Ambassador for Disarmament, in the General Debate of the Third Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in Geneva on August 29.

"Mr. President, no one under-estimates the gravity of the present situation in the world; there are too many nuclear weapons in existence, and the potential for further development, in quality and quantity, is too strong. There are inequalities among states, resentments, fears. We have to deal with all these reactions. But in the end, logic compels, history demands and the people of the world plead that governments build the process of order, not degenerate into anarchy. Any weakening of the NPT will lead to the very condition — nuclear anarchy — that we are pledged to prevent. The implications of nuclear proliferation are so dangerous for all that we must find a realistic way to constrain such an unacceptable threat to common security and stability. In short, the existing nuclear arms race must cease and the spread of nuclear arms blocked off to prevent nuclear anarchy.

It is with the solid reputation of a country committed to non-proliferation, as well as to nuclear cooperation, that Canada comes to the Third Review Conference of the NPT. Canada's credentials have long been established. Although Canada participated together with the United Kingdom in helping the United States develop the world's first atomic weapons during World War II, it was the first country consciously to forgo the development of nuclear weapons, despite clearly having the technology and capability to do so from the earliest days of the nuclear era. Canada declined to develop a capability to produce nuclear weapons and has adhered firmly to this principle ever since. Instead, Canada has concentrated all of its efforts to the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Canada's nuclear programme is strictly for peaceful purposes and entirely subject to safeguards. With respect to nuclear exports, Canada has a comprehensive nuclear exports policy which is based upon and fully recognizes the central



Aerial view of the Palais des Nations in Geneva, the European Office of the United Nations and site of the Third Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, which was held from August 27 to September 24.

UN Photo

value of the NPT as the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime. Specifically, Canada will only export nuclear materials, equipment and technology to those non-nuclear weapon states which have made a comprehensive binding commitment to non-proliferation, either by ratifying the NPT or by having taken an equivalent binding step, and have thereby accepted IAEA safeguards on their entire nuclear programme, current and future....

Mr. President, as we go through our complete review of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, it will be important to be con-

scious of the successes and failures of not only the past five years but those since the beginning of the nuclear age. Keeping in mind the problems of the present international security situation, Canada will strive to achieve two basic objectives at this Review Conference:

— the maintenance of the NPT as the basic element of an effective international non-proliferation regime;

— the reaffirmation by the Review Conference of the purpose and provisions of the NPT.



These objectives, which may appear modest at first glance, are truly critical ones in the long run. They mean that we must ensure that the debate on Article VI issues contributes in a positive manner to the overall objectives of the NPT and does not degenerate into an acrimonious debate which will only hold hostage progress in other areas of the NPT. They mean a reconfirmation of the need for nuclear weapon states, and particularly the United States and the Soviet Union, to negotiate in good faith towards the adoption of effective measures to achieve a cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and a significant reduction in nuclear arms.

Progress towards a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty has been traditionally associated with compliance on Article VI. For Canada, the achievement of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty continues to be a fundamental and abiding Canadian objective. We believe that a CTB is a concrete, realistic measure which would constitute a major step in curbing the development of new and more sophisticated nuclear weapons. It is regarded as an extremely important step towards halting both the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. As the UN Secretary-General stated earlier this year, 'It is of direct importance to the future of humanity to end all nuclear explosions. No other means would be as effective in limiting the further development of nuclear weapons.'...

While a review of events in the field of international security provides a checkered image of progress achieved, the situation is quite different if one turns to Articles III and IV of the Treaty. In the area of nuclear non-proliferation/nuclear cooperation, the Treaty has served the world well. Proliferation risks have largely been contained and enhanced cooperation has taken place....

Regarding Article VII, and consistent with Canada's policy of promoting an effective non-proliferation regime based on the NPT, Canada has been strongly supportive of the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZ) where they command the support of the countries in the area and promote regional and international stability. Such zones are not a fully satisfactory alternative to the ratification of the NPT by some of the countries of the areas concerned; nonetheless, in the absence of

universal or near-universal adherence to the NPT, the creation of such zones can make a significant contribution to the objective of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Canada has supported United Nations resolutions calling for such zones in Africa, the Middle East and South Asia and has welcomed the very important recent declaration of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone. Canada has also backed measures which would consolidate the establishment of a NWFZ in Latin America in accordance with the Treaty of Tlatelolco, in spite of Canadian opposition to a provision in the Treaty which allows for the explosion of nuclear devices for so-called peaceful purposes.

In this regard, under Article V, we reiterate Canada's view that the economic value of the peaceful applications of nuclear explosions remains in doubt. We believe that the independent possession of peaceful nuclear explosive devices by

non-nuclear weapon states would pose a threat to regional and international security.

Mr. President, any agreement that brings together so many diverse nations will be subject to certain strains and problems of compliance. In the international community, it is difficult to legislate security — that is what certain articles of the NPT are attempting to do. The NPT, for all its strengths and weaknesses, is still an international instrument whose credibility and applicability must be constantly monitored and nurtured. The NPT cannot be taken for granted. It is a valuable international instrument, having at once both practical and moral dimensions. The fact that countries are continuing to sign the NPT, and continuing to feel that they should sign the NPT, is a tribute to both the moral force and practical utility of the Treaty. It reflects a basic belief within the international community that proliferation is a bad thing and the absence of the NPT would have disastrous results."

NPT Conference a "Glowing Success"

Canada's Ambassador for Disarmament, Douglas Roche, discussed Canada's objectives at the NPT Conference and the results of that Conference during his appearance before the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence (SCEAND) on October 6. Following are excerpts from his address to SCEAND.

"A significant step in this direction was taken by the NPT Review Conference. In fact, it was a glowing success. While bad news is frequently its own messenger, good news often goes unnoticed, yet the review, which occurs only every five years, shows what can be achieved in multilateral diplomacy when cooperation replaces confrontation at the basic negotiating stance.

By consensus, the states attending the review reaffirmed the viability and vitality of this 130-nation treaty which prevents the spread of nuclear weapons while assuring the international community at large of the benefits of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The 1980 review

had not been able to achieve this consensus. A second perceived failure would have weakened the NPT at a time when its effectiveness at stopping nuclear weapons proliferation is vital to world security. Thus, the review reaffirmed participating nations' commitment to the NPT as essential to international peace and security. The Conference affirmed its continuing support for the treaty's objectives, which are: preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, achieving the cessation of the nuclear arms race and promoting expanded cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Canada's own objectives in the Review Conference were clearly met. Those were two: the maintenance of the NPT as a basic element of the non-proliferation regime and a reaffirmation of the purpose and provisions of the NPT. As well, a wider and enduring objective of Canadian foreign policy was also met. That is, the strengthening and enhancing of the multilateral process. Multilateralism, like an effective global non-proliferation regime, is a cornerstone of Canadian foreign policy."



NATO Ministerial Communiqué

The North Atlantic Council met in Ministerial Session in Lisbon, June 6-7. The following is the text of their joint communiqué.

"1. We are a defensive Alliance dedicated to the preservation of peace and the protection of freedom.

2. Reaffirming the principles of last year's Washington Statement on East-West Relations, we remain determined to maintain both our political solidarity and the military strength necessary for our defence. On this basis, we seek genuine *détente* through constructive dialogue and broad cooperation with the Soviet Union and with each of the countries of Eastern Europe in all areas. We call on the new Soviet leadership to join us in seeking tangible improvements in East-West relations, which would permit us to build on areas of common interest. A positive Soviet response to the US approach at the US-Soviet negotiations recently opened in Geneva would contribute substantially towards that end.

3. We do not seek military superiority for ourselves. None of our weapons will ever be used except in response to attack. But, faced with the continuing build-up and modernization of Soviet nuclear and conventional arms, we shall preserve credible deterrence through sufficient conventional and nuclear forces. The Allies participating in the military structure of the Alliance are making an effort to improve, in particular, their conventional capabilities. Our strategy of deterrence has proved its value in safeguarding peace; it remains fully valid. Its purpose is to prevent war and to enable us to resist intimidation.

4. The security of the North American and European Allies is inseparable. The cohesion of the Alliance is sustained by continuous consultations on all matters affecting our common interests and security.

5. Deterrence and defence together with arms control and disarmament are integral parts of the security policy of

the Alliance. We wish to strengthen the peace by establishing a stable military balance at the lowest possible level of forces.

6. In this spirit, we welcome the US-Soviet negotiations in Geneva on their strategic nuclear weapons, on their intermediate-range nuclear weapons and on defence and space systems. These negotiations are intended to work out between the two countries effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms and at strengthening strategic stability. We strongly support US efforts in all three areas of negotiation, and we call on the Soviet Union to adopt a positive approach. The Allies concerned reiterate their willingness to modify, halt, reverse, or dispense with Longer-Range INF (LRINF) deployment as part of an equitable and verifiable arms control agreement. In the absence of such an agreement, they will continue to deploy LRINF missiles on schedule. We will continue to consult closely on all of these issues¹.

7. We are determined to achieve progress also on other aspects of arms control and disarmament and urge the Soviet Union to work with us for balanced and verifiable agreements. In particular:

- in the Vienna MBFR negotiations the participating Allies are seeking equal collective manpower levels through verifiable reductions in conventional forces in Europe and effective associated measures;
- in Stockholm (CDE) we are seeking agreement on militarily significant, politically binding and verifiable confidence and security building measures covering the whole of Europe to give new, concrete effect and expression to the existing duty of all participating states to refrain from the threat or use of force;
- in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament we seek in particular a worldwide comprehensive and verifiable ban on Chemical Weapons; we remain deeply concerned about the proliferation and use of such weapons.

8. We attach great importance to the full implementation by all participating states



Opening statement by Portuguese Prime Minister Mario Soares at the start of the NATO Foreign Ministers meeting in Lisbon on June 6, 1985. Reuters/Bettmann Newsphotos

¹ Greece and Denmark reserve their positions on the INF part of this paragraph.



of all principles and provisions enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act and to balanced progress in the CSCE process in all its aspects. The tenth anniversary of the Final Act in August 1985 should be commemorated by a meeting of the participating states at Ministerial level. We would like to see the anniversary marked by substantial progress in the CSCE process, including meaningful results at the important meeting on Human Rights in Ottawa. We also hope for a positive exchange of views at the Cultural Forum in Budapest in the Autumn.

9. We strongly condemn terrorism and will continue to work to eliminate this threat to our citizens and to the democratic values we hold in common.

10. In the spirit of Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty, we remain fully committed to promoting the stability and well-being of our community of free nations, sharing common values. We consequently reaffirm the importance of special programmes for less favoured partners.

11. The maintenance of a calm situation in and around Berlin, including unhindered traffic on all access routes, remains an essential element in East-West relations. We support the efforts of the Federal Republic of Germany to achieve progress in inner-German relations which can make a significant contribution to the building of confidence in Europe and benefit the German people, particularly the Berliners.

12. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, now in its sixth year, violates fundamental principles of international law. We urge the Soviet Union to put an end to the suffering of the Afghan people, by withdrawing its troops and agreeing to a political solution restoring the independence and non-aligned status of Afghanistan.

Events in Poland underscore the continuing need for genuine dialogue between the various elements of society and for national reconciliation.

We, for our part, respect the sovereignty and independence of all states. We will remain vigilant and will consult on events outside the Treaty area which might threaten our common security."

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Spain reserves his Government's position on the present communiqué.

Prime Minister's Statement Regarding the Strategic Defence Initiative

On September 7, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney made the following statement regarding Canadian participation in the Strategic Defence Initiative.

"On March 26 the United States invited Canada and other friendly countries to participate directly in research under the Strategic Defence Initiative. After careful and detailed consideration the Government of Canada has concluded that Canada's own policies and priorities do not warrant a government-to-government effort in support of SDI research. Although Canada does not intend to participate on a government-to-government basis on the SDI research program, private companies and institutions interested in

participating in the program will continue to be free to do so.

As stated in the House of Commons on January 21, 1985, by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, this Government believes that SDI research by the United States is both consistent with the ABM Treaty and prudent in light of significant advances in Soviet research and deployment of the world's only existing ballistic missile defence system.

I conveyed this decision today to the President of the United States and informed him of this. I had discussed it, as you might imagine, with my caucus and my cabinet. And that is our position with regard to this particular item."

The Strategic Defence Initiative: Nielsen Letter

On September 7, the Prime Minister's Office released the text of a letter from the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Defence, Erik Nielsen, to the US Secretary of Defence, Caspar Weinberger. The following is the text of that letter.

"Dear Mr. Weinberger:

On March 26 you wrote to me extending to the Government of Canada and to other friendly governments an invitation to participate directly in research under the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI).

My colleagues and I have given this issue careful and detailed consideration. A Parliamentary Committee has conducted extensive public consultations across the country. Upon reflection, the Government of Canada has concluded that Canada's own policies and priorities do not warrant a government-to-government effort in support of SDI research.

In conveying this decision to you, there are a number of additional points I would like to make. We believe that the

extensive existing cooperation in defence research between our two countries is mutually beneficial and should be encouraged to grow. The Government is committed to further development of this cooperation and will continue to welcome further research arrangements with the United States, consistent always with Canada's national interest and its research and development priorities. Although Canada does not intend to participate on a government-to-government basis in the SDI research program, private companies and institutions interested in participating in the program will continue to be free to do so.

As Canada has previously stated, our Government believes that SDI research by the United States is both consistent with the ABM Treaty and prudent in light of significant advances in Soviet research and deployment of the world's only existing ballistic missile defence system.

I look forward to continuing to work closely with you as we together address the vital security issues facing us.

Sincerely, Erik Nielsen"



The United Nations Disarmament Commission

The following article was prepared by the Arms Control and Disarmament Division of the Department of External Affairs.

The United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC), a deliberative body operating as an offshoot of the UN General Assembly, met at the United Nations in New York in May of this year. The six items on its agenda were the arms race in all its aspects, the reduction of military budgets, South Africa's nuclear capability, curbing the naval arms race, the role of the UN in disarmament and the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade. All 159 UN member states are represented in the UNDC.

On May 8, Mr. Douglas Roche, the Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament, made the opening Canadian address to the Commission. He said that a central task before delegates was to appraise the progress made during the Second Disarmament Decade. He pointed out that "at the midway point of the decade, achievement has been zero". He stated:

"Instead of concrete progress, we are slipping away from the goal to which all countries subscribed when they gave a consensus agreement to the Final Document of the First Special Session on Disarmament in 1978.

It is as though we have forgotten the ringing call to sanity that we flashed around the world in 1978: 'Mankind is confronted with a choice; we must halt the arms race and proceed to disarmament or face annihilation'."

In dealing with the item on the arms race, Ambassador Roche outlined the Canadian Government's priorities: to contribute to progress in the US/USSR bilateral talks; to work for a comprehensive test ban treaty; to ensure the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons; to work for the conclusion of a convention on chemical weapons; and to work towards the prevention of an arms race in outer space. He referred to the resumption of bilateral negotiations in Geneva between the United States and the Soviet Union as offering renewed hope for substantive cuts in nuclear arms. He said "every step possible must be taken in the multilateral forums to reinforce the bilateral

process" and that "we must find a way to break out of the present impasse on arms control and disarmament issues if the multilateral process is not to lose all credibility". As he pointed out, "our job — here in the UNDC and in all other multilateral forums — is clear: cut out the dithering and get down to work".

In addressing the other UNDC agenda items, he made the following points: "Last year the UNDC continued its effort to elaborate the principles that should govern states in freezing and reducing military budgets, but could not reach final agreement on a set of guidelines. The Canadian delegation has supported the idea of reducing military expenditures. In our view, the reporting exercise which the United Nations has devised is a prerequisite for progress on this issue and we have given it our support by annually completing the standardized reporting instrument. We urge states which have not yet completed the standardized reporting instrument to do so as soon as possible to enable real progress to be made in reducing military spending levels globally. Without such a data base, any attempt to reduce military budgets will remain but a pious profession of intent.

There is currently underway a comprehensive study on the naval arms race by a group of governmental experts established by the thirty-eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly... Consequently, the Disarmament Commission would be advised to consider this item only after completion of the study which is to be submitted to the fortieth UNGA.

It is our hope that a consensus can be reached at this session on the item relating to South Africa's nuclear capability. Canada's position is one of clear and consistent opposition to the repugnant apartheid policies of South Africa. We have also consistently attempted to strengthen the international non-proliferation regime. We, therefore, support calls for all states, including South Africa, to make an internationally binding non-proliferation commitment and to place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards."

In a later intervention when dealing

with the role of the United Nations in disarmament, the Canadian delegation warned the UN about "overextending its limited resources to too many inconclusive undertakings. It should aim at successfully accomplishing a few important tasks." What these tasks should be is a matter of priorities:

"Certain priorities have already been set in the UNSSOD I Final Document. The highest priority has been given to the question of nuclear weapons. Concern about preventing the weaponization of outer space before it is too late is also uppermost in the minds of most countries. The dangers regarding the proliferation and actual use of chemical weapons surely warrant that that subject be included in the short list as well. The UN has already embarked on two other global projects — the Reduction of Military Budgets and Disarmament and Development — on which it should follow through. Whatever mechanism is devised to set the UN's priorities, it surely will include these major items as requiring the UN's full attention at this stage."

The Canadian delegation expressed concern that "unless it can produce some concrete results, the United Nations General Assembly runs the risk of losing credibility and of having only a marginal role in arms control and disarmament matters."

The delegation made the following comments on ways to strengthen the UN's role in the field of disarmament:

"(a) We would like to see a sharper focus on top priority issues by the General Assembly.

(b) We would like to see strong, practical support for the United Nations disarmament efforts from the United Nations Disarmament Commission, the Secretariat and related United Nations bodies which will enhance the negotiating and deliberative processes and broaden public knowledge of the issues.

(c) We would like to see the removal of the procedural obstacles to negotiations by the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.

(d) We would like to see a greater sensitizing of the Security Council to the arms control and disarmament problem in the context of the broad efforts to



prevent the resort to force and to create the positive political atmosphere which is needed for negotiations on arms control and disarmament.

(e) We would also like to see the Secretary-General's good offices role developed further as a contribution to 'preventive diplomacy'.

(f) We believe greater attention needs to be paid to dealing with the tensions and sensitivities in a regional context, such as to reduce the pressure for armaments."

While focusing on improvement of the United Nations machinery for dealing with disarmament, the Canadian delegation emphasized the importance of improving the political dialogue among member states and groupings.

In another intervention concerning the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade, Ambassador Roche noted that the various objectives, goals and

priorities set out in the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade had yet to be realized.

He hoped that the spirit of cooperation which the USA and the USSR seemed to be seeking at the UNDC would be reflected in the bilateral negotiations in Geneva and that it would lead to significant and verifiable arms reduction agreements.

In outlining Canada's efforts, Ambassador Roche pointed out that:

"— Essentially, our objective is the prevention of all war in the nuclear age, not only nuclear war but conventional war.

— The task of preventing war requires all states to do their utmost to ensure that force is no longer viewed as an appropriate instrument for settling international disputes and that both its use and the threat of its use are eliminated from international relations as provided for in the Charter of the United Nations.

— It is our intention to contribute first and foremost, to the extent that we can, to improving the political atmosphere, particularly between East and West, in an effort to encourage the creation of trust and the political will that are essential for progress on these issues.

— It is also our intention to work towards practical proposals and to develop technical back-up for negotiations.

— There is a need for an improved climate of confidence, for concrete disarmament commitments and for respect for them.

— Effective disarmament commitments will be achieved only through negotiations that ensure international stability and security at the lowest level of arms.

— Disarmament agreements, to be accepted, will, in our view, require effective verification systems that will provide the necessary confidence and trust.

— We regard verification as a means for facilitating the conclusion of agreements on disarmament, not for dragging them out or preventing them."

The importance of establishing effective verification systems was underlined by the Canadian Government's allocation of \$1 million annually to a Verification Research Programme to provide back-up technical support to Canada's disarmament negotiations.

At the concluding plenary session on May 30, Ambassador Roche said that the UNDC session had not been devoid of some value. Among other things, it did reveal the direction of the international community's thinking on disarmament issues. Nevertheless, "any concerned observer would be forced to conclude that the UNDC had been sleepwalking through one of the most important moments in history". Canada hoped that the UNDC would begin to play a more worthwhile role.

If it were to do so, however, there had to be political will: "in the end, we come back, as we always do, to the question of political will... The words are so easily spoken, so difficult to generate. Yet we can never give up. Future generations depend on us".



Opening Session of the 1985 Disarmament Commission on May 6. Chairman Mansur Ahmad (Pakistan) (left) addressing the opening meeting. Next to him are Fehmi Alem, Secretary, and Don Arturo Laclaustra (Spain), Rapporteur.

UN Photo



Disarmament: The Western Approach

Canada, along with other members of the Western Group, submitted the following working paper on Agenda Item 4 of the Disarmament Commission entitled "The general approach to nuclear and conventional disarmament negotiations."

Working paper: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

"1. The objective of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, proclaimed for many years now, still appears remote in the light of the international situation and the current arms build-up.

2. In order to define a coherent and realistic approach to the problem of disarmament, the first question that must be asked is what were the determining factors in this course of events.

3. Most States have always considered their own military means of defence, or those of the alliances to which they belong, as an essential factor in their security and their independence.

4. The process of arms accumulation, triggered by a particular concept of defence requirements, is brought about by the mutual distrust which, in turn, it helps to aggravate. The sponsors of this document are aware of the risks stemming from the arms race in various sectors. Under these circumstances, general and complete disarmament cannot be envisaged in the absence of effective measures to eliminate the threat or use of force. Fundamental provisions in this respect were laid down by the founders of the United Nations, who called for peaceful settlement of disputes, sovereign equality and cooperation, and a collective security system.

5. For this reason, it is essential, in order to arrive at general and complete disarmament, to enhance the role of the United Nations, particularly the role which derives from the above provisions.

6. The countless violations of these prin-

ciples and the consequent realization that effective means of preventing or punishing them are lacking have given rise to an increase in the mistrust which is one of the basic causes of the arms build-up. The restoration of a climate of trust must be sought in specific commitments which would strengthen the principles already solemnly established so as to eliminate the gap between outward intentions and reality.

7. Solving the problem of disarmament must therefore necessarily entail a search for all possible means of ensuring that the solemn commitments already entered into are respected, and that the respect for them is not seen as lacking credibility.

8. The sponsors of this document are convinced that the objective of disarmament can be attained only in an international environment of increased stability and equilibrium, as well as through the application of balanced and verifiable reductions in all sectors of armaments.


9. They are equally convinced that all States have a vital interest in disarmament, and that each State therefore bears a share of the responsibility for efforts towards reducing armaments.

10. In the opinion of the sponsors, negotiations are the only realistic way of achieving progress in the sphere of disarmament. There is thus an urgent need to step up and broaden bilateral, regional and multilateral negotiations aimed at a balanced and verifiable decrease in the level of armaments.

11. The sponsors feel bound to emphasize their satisfaction at the resumption in Geneva of the bilateral negotiations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on nuclear and space weapons.

12. The vital importance of these talks should, however, not divert attention from all the efforts that must be made in other forums, or from the need for balanced and verifiable reductions in all types of armaments.

13. In this context, the sponsors of this document consider that the United Nations, as well as the Conference on



General view of the United Nations headquarters in New York. UN Photo

Disarmament at Geneva, have a basic role to play so as to make a decisive contribution to the attainment of the objective of disarmament under effective international control.

14. Since the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all their aspects is a matter of universal concern, all States are urged to contribute to the attainment of the objective of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. States should implement fully all the provisions of the relevant international treaties to which they are parties.

15. Under current international circumstances, it would appear that a general approach to disarmament negotiations can only envisage gradual or sectoral measures, which would, however, contribute to the objectives of balanced and verifiable reduction of the general level of armaments, to stability and to an improvement in the international climate.

16. To this end, it is essential to ensure that the application of future agreements should not give rise to doubts as to their effectiveness and to questions regarding compliance, since this would have the effect of increasing distrust and making the search for subsequent progress still more difficult.



17. It is for this basic reason that the sponsors of the present document believe it essential for any disarmament agreement to include an effective verification system. A general approach to disarmament negotiations can establish priorities only in the light of this fundamental requirement.

18. The magnitude of the risk that a nuclear conflict would entail has been, and still is, an essential element in the prevention of conflicts. It also explains the importance which is attached to disarmament negotiations in the nuclear field.

19. Successive events since 1945 have shown the consequences, in millions of deaths and in devastation, of the use of conventional weapons. The sponsors are therefore convinced that a gradual and balanced reduction of conventional weapons would have a positive impact on the reduction of tension and hence on the prospects for disarmament in general, and the reduction of nuclear weapons in particular.

20. The study on conventional disarmament carried out by the group of experts set up for this purpose drew attention to a series of other positive aspects which should make progress in this area possible.

21. On the basis of these considerations, the sponsors believe that a general approach to disarmament negotiations on both nuclear and conventional weapons should be based on the following principles:

- (a) The priority objective is the prevention of all conflicts;
- (b) all States should contribute to negotiations aimed at the conclusion of balanced and verifiable disarmament agreements, while bearing in mind the special responsibility of the two major Powers;
- (c) the agreements should provide for concrete measures, and should not be limited to declaratory and rhetorical commitments;
- (d) the agreements should include an effective verification system so as to avoid the risk of suspected or actual violations heightening mistrust between the parties;
- (e) the negotiations on the subject of disarmament should result in a balance at the lowest level of forces and promote stability;
- (f) with a view to preventing all types of conflicts, the negotiations should take

into account the risks not only of nuclear conflicts, but also of those of a conventional nature;

(g) within this framework, conventional disarmament should be considered as an essential element of the global disarmament process;

(h) negotiations in this field should be pursued with the parallel aim of concluding balanced and verifiable agreements

on measures to lessen the risk of surprise attacks and build confidence; (i) the Conference on Disarmament, as the single standing multilateral negotiating body, should play a leading role in solving the complex of items that are on its agenda, as well as in drawing up vital agreements such as the one now being negotiated on the subject of chemical weapons."

University of Saskatchewan Hosts Symposium on Bhopal Gas Tragedy

The following article was prepared by the Arms Control and Disarmament Division of the Department of External Affairs.

The University of Saskatchewan hosted an international symposium September 25-27 entitled "Highly Toxic Chemicals: Detection and Protection Methods". Participants came from the USA, UK, Sweden and France as well as from Canada. The keynote speaker was Professor J.M. Dave, Dean of the School of Environmental Sciences at Jawaharlal Nehru University in India. Professor Dave and his staff were involved in the immediate scientific investigation as well as in the longer-term inquiry related to the Bhopal gas tragedy in early December 1984.

The Arms Control and Disarmament Division of the Department of External Affairs recognized that there might be lessons to be learned from the Indian investigation of this tragic event which could be relevant to Canada's interest in developing procedures for the investigation of allegations of the use of chemical weapons. Given the scientific focus of the symposium and its relation to verification problems, it was partially funded by the Department's Verification Research Programme.

The tragedy that befell Bhopal had nothing whatsoever to do with the production or use of chemical weapons. It was an industrial accident, albeit one of mammoth scale, in which approximately 2 500 people are reported to have died and many thousands of others required medical treatment. Apparently the release of methyl isocyanate (used for the production of the insecticide Sevin) and, pos-

sibly, certain other chemicals occurred over a period of less than an hour. It is estimated that 150 000 to 200 000 people of a city population of 800 000 were exposed to the gas discharge.

In this context, the problems encountered by the Indian authorities in investigating the gas release and in determining the cause of injury and death were all of particular concern to participants in the symposium. Even in this well-defined situation where officials and scientists had timely access to the site and knowledge of what the plant was producing and of its production process, there is still considerable speculation and controversy over the cause of the immediate (as opposed to longer-term) deaths. If such problems exist in "verifying" an incident in which authorities have timely access with all of the necessary medical and scientific support, this highlights the difficulties involved in verifying allegations of the use of chemical weapons in remote areas where access — timely or otherwise — may not be permitted.

One presentation at the symposium, by Dr. Ron Sutherland of the University of Saskatchewan, drew a parallel between the requirements of investigations of accidental discharges of chemicals and investigations of the alleged use of chemical weapons. He suggested that an ancillary role for a technical secretariat, which might form part of the verification regime of a future chemical weapons convention (currently being negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament), could be to assist national authorities, especially of developing countries, in the event of industrial disasters in the future.



Canadian Statement at Helsinki Meeting

The Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, attended the meeting to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the signing of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, held in Helsinki, Finland, July 31. Following are excerpts from that address.

"Ten years ago, the signature of the Final Act evoked a wide range of reactions. Some believed that the hostility and uncertainty which had marked East-West relations for so long would quickly melt away under the bright sun of *détente*. Others viewed the Final Act as a hortatory set of principles which would be ignored and soon forgotten. Most of us, however, viewed the Final Act with both hope and realism. Certainly Canada did.

Hope was essential: Canada has deep roots in Europe; our historical origins are in Europe; and we have shared both the profound benefits of Europe's political and social ideals and the tragic costs of Europe's wars. Experience had shown that even longstanding divisions could



The Secretary of State for External Affairs addressing the Helsinki Meeting on the CSCE Final Act on July 31. Canapress

be healed, or at least managed peaceably. We wanted to nurture the hope that solutions could be found to those divisions which still threatened the peace and security of the family of Europe, wherever we might live.

Hope, however, was tempered by realism. The tortuous negotiations which had led to the Final Act made it painfully clear that distrust and hostility were very deeply rooted and that productive dialogue would take time, patience and, above all, commitment.

The Final Act, nevertheless, represented a beginning. A balanced product of compromise, it seemed to express a common determination among the participating states that desire for understanding and cooperation prevail over sterile confrontation. The CSCE had established itself as a multilateral forum in which participating states, without seeking to threaten the systems of others, could seek common ground. It agreed upon a set of norms and principles which, if adhered to in their totality, formed a sound basis for the conduct of civilized relationships not only among governments, but also between governments and their own citizens. Finally, the CSCE provided an opportunity for *all* signatory states to contribute to efforts to relax tensions between East and West.

It was therefore possible, in 1975, to be hopeful without being unrealistic, and Canada was determined to make a constructive contribution to a process which held out the promise of a new and positive approach.

We have maintained that commitment, Mr. Chairman, but when the accomplishments of the past decade are measured against the potential which seemed to exist in 1975, Canadians feel disappointment and concern.

During the review of the implementation of the Final Act in Belgrade and in Madrid, it was clear that there had been very little progress in implementing the undertakings of 1975, and what is worse, that in most fields, there had been a slipping back.

Since then, the situation has become

even less promising. Denial of self-determination to the people of one country began even before the Madrid meeting opened. It continues today, and is intervention in the true meaning of the sixth principle, even if the victim is not a participating state, since we all agreed in 1975 to behave towards states outside the circle of the 35 in the same way we behave towards the states within it. We have seen the fear of intervention affect a participating state during the course of the Madrid meeting. Non-compliance on this scale inevitably corroded the hopes we shared in 1975 and threatened the credibility of the CSCE process.

Canadians have a deep and abiding concern about human rights. The situation in some countries is much worse than it was in 1975. Individuals who believed the assurance of their leaders that they had the right to know and to act upon their human rights have paid for their trust in prison, in labour camps and in exile. In the recent Human Rights Experts Meeting in Ottawa, we did not attempt to expand the human rights which should be assured to all individuals. There is little point in adding new undertakings when some states will not implement the rights which they have already agreed are inherent in the dignity of human beings.

The Ottawa meeting did produce one good result: some states had claimed that the discussion of human rights in all countries of the Final Act was beyond the ambit of CSCE meetings, but made their own claim indefensible by themselves engaging in criticism of practices in other countries. This is a development we welcome. However, those countries — and they included those which maintained that the Final Act was a sacred text which could not be varied, having been signed by the highest political leaders — made an attempt to turn the Final Act on its head by claiming that rights which received only indirect treatment in the Final Act were of greater consequence than those fundamental human rights which were the main object of the seventh principle. It will have to be recognized that certain rights are fundamental and others are goals to be pursued — goals which will be progressively elaborated and expanded. This distinction is found in the language of the seventh principle and also in the United Nations documents to which the final paragraph of that principle particularly refers.



At the opening of the Ottawa meeting, I said that issues of central importance such as human rights cannot and must not be avoided just because they are sensitive and can sometimes give rise to disagreement between governments. The subject of human rights will remain prominent on the international agenda, because respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms is essential to the development of friendly relations and cooperation among us.

Mr. Chairman, when the Final Act was adopted, nobody expected an instant change in human rights practices, or in other fields. What we expected was a gradual improvement, just as those of us who believe deeply in individual human rights continually try to improve our own performance. It is movement in the opposite direction, inadvertently or deliberately, that we must guard against: non-compliance in one area raises serious doubts about the likelihood that commitments in other fields will be fulfilled.

I recognize, Mr. Chairman, that there is a gulf within the CSCE between two very different approaches to the relationship between the individual and the state. We would be deluding ourselves if we thought these differences in approach would disappear quickly. Others, however, would be mistaken if they concluded that Canada's concerns about human rights, human contacts and freer and wider dissemination of information arose from a desire to disturb the internal stability of other states; we simply do not believe that any government represented here is so weak or should feel so insecure that it must treat as criminals or traitors those individuals who believe that we all meant what we said in the Final Act. We take this occasion to affirm that failure to implement the provisions dealing with human rights is related directly to progress on other provisions.

In the field of security, results have been very slow in coming. After more than 18 months, the Stockholm Conference has not achieved any visible progress in concluding the tasks specified in the Madrid mandate. Canada has high hopes that substantive cooperation can emerge from honest dialogue — that the Conference can make a major contribution to the process of building mutual confidence. But these hopes become difficult to sustain — and difficult for our people to share — in the face of an



Group photo of 35 foreign ministers assembled in Helsinki to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the signing of the CSCE Final Act.

Canapress

apparent attempt to avoid negotiating a set of confidence-building measures, including a comprehensive programme for cooperation in military affairs. I think it is important to note, Mr. Chairman, that these measures were designed to apply equally to the two alliances in Europe. Security is reciprocal: it does not flow from one side demanding unilateral advantages at the expense of the other. We will go forward together, or not at all. Deeds, not words, are the key to mutual confidence, and we shall therefore continue to press for specific undertakings in the field of information and verification....

It is obvious that the CSCE process has not yet fulfilled the promise which so many of us saw in it in 1975. However, despite the lack of measurable progress, the CSCE provided, and will continue to provide, an opportunity for dialogue. That should not be underestimated, particularly if the many strands of dialogue can be woven into a fabric of greater understanding and broader agreement among all signatory states, regardless of their size. But if the CSCE degenerates further into a dialogue of the deaf; if we consistently talk past each other; if, indeed, the very words we use have different meanings, then what can we accomplish? If we continue to indulge in semantic manoeuvring and avoid concrete ac-

tion, how long can the credibility of the CSCE process survive? The credibility of the process is vital, Mr. Chairman. If we simply keep issuing documents and restating our obligations, without carrying out the undertakings we have committed ourselves to at the highest political level, then we run the risk of destroying faith in the utility of the CSCE system. Moreover, without steady progress towards full implementation of all aspects of the Final Act, it will be impossible to create the confidence which is essential to the improvement of East-West relations, which was our primary goal ten years ago. In my view, unless we can create that confidence, it will be particularly difficult to make progress in the fields of arms control and disarmament.

We must never lose sight of the fact that the people whose representatives and leaders we are, will inevitably — and justifiably — question the value of the forms of cooperation spelled out in the Final Act if they do not see concrete and tangible evidence of this cooperation touching their everyday lives. Does cooperation contribute to our sense of security? Does it make it easier for people to get together, regardless of the ideological community in which they live? These are questions for which our people expect more positive answers than we have provided so far."



Canada Contributes to CD Discussions on Outer Space

The following article was prepared by the Arms Control and Disarmament Division of the Department of External Affairs.

The Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva began detailed consideration this year of the question of arms control and outer space. On March 29 the 40 members of the CD agreed on a mandate for an *Ad Hoc* Committee (AHC) on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. This mandate called upon the AHC to examine, "through substantive and general consideration, issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space," taking into account all existing agreements, existing proposals and future initiatives.

Canada took an active role in the development of this mandate and, as in the past, participated in general discussions within the CD on the subject of arms control and outer space. For example, in 1982 Canada tabled the first substantive working paper on the issue which dealt with the possible stabilizing and destabilizing effects of systems in space. This year, with the establishment of the AHC, Canada made a significant, practical contribution to the AHC's deliberations by submitting two additional working papers.

On July 2, Canada's Ambassador to the CD, Alan Beesley, tabled a comprehensive, two-volume compendium of working papers and final records of the CD which relate to outer space (CD 606, July 4, 1985). The compendium is similar to those which Canada had previously tabled on chemical weapons and on radiological weapons. This working document had the practical aim of providing to the members of the AHC, early in their discussions, concrete documentation upon which they could draw. The size of the two-volume compendium also illustrated the extent of past work by the CD on this matter.

This Canadian contribution was very well received. The Swedish delegate, for example, speaking in the AHC on July 29, thanked Canada for this "excellent reference" source. Numerous other delegations also privately expressed



The Conference on Disarmament opened its 1985 Session in Geneva on February 5. At the presiding table are (from left to right): Ambassador R. Ian T. Cromartie (United Kingdom), outgoing President; Erik Suy, Director-General, UN Office at Geneva; Jan Martenson, Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs; Thomas Barthelemy (United States), Deputy Representative to the Conference; Ambassador Donald Lowitz (United States), President; and Miljan Komatina, Personal Representative of the Secretary-General.

UN Photo

their appreciation to Canada. More than 100 copies were distributed to the 40 members of the CD.

The second Canadian working paper was tabled on July 23 as part of Canada's participation in the AHC's review of existing agreements related to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Canada felt that such a review was an essential step to the fulfilment of the mandate of the AHC. Not only did it help underline the full scope of the questions involved but, more importantly, it helped to ensure that what the AHC accomplished would be in conformity with, and not at cross purposes to, existing treaties and international law. It was felt that the time spent in reviewing the existing legal regime would speed up rather than delay the successful results of the AHC's deliberations.

This second working paper by Canada, entitled *Survey of International Law Relevant to Arms Control and Outer Space* (CD/618, July 23, 1985), derives in part from a study undertaken by the Institute of Air and Space Law at McGill University in Montreal at the invitation of the Department of External Affairs. The McGill study forms part of a programme by the Government of Canada to include non-governmental organizations, where possible, in the arms control and disarmament process.

The working paper identifies more than 20 international agreements, including the United Nations Charter itself, which are of significance to the process in which the AHC is engaged. The paper does *not* put forth nor represent a Canadian Government position on any issue. Rather it seeks to provide a broad interpretation of a variety of views in a



balanced, non-provocative manner, so as to provide a useful data base for the benefit of each member of the CD.

The working paper highlights a number of areas in international law relevant to outer space which deserve attention. During the period between the end of the AHC's present deliberations and the commencement of the CD session in 1986, the Canadian Government will make full use of this survey when reviewing Canadian policy relevant to arms control and outer space. It is Canada's hope that other governments might similarly use the Canadian working paper as a reference point in their own review of the subject.

Several delegations publicly expressed their appreciation for Canada's second working paper. The Sri Lankan delegate, for example, speaking on July 30, congratulated Canada for the survey paper and stated, "We are particularly impressed by the non-partisan and objective approach of the paper apart, of course, from its sound professionalism and thoroughness."

Both Canadian working papers and Canada's active participation in the deliberations of the AHC on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space demonstrate Canada's sincere commitment to the successful fulfilment of the AHC's mandate. Canada will continue its practical efforts towards a thorough examination by the CD of this important area and towards taking whatever necessary steps emerge from this examination.

The Committee on Disarmament concluded its 1985 discussions on August 30. The wide-ranging discussions, which highlighted the complexity of a number of problems, led to a better understanding of positions. The importance and urgency of arms control and outer space were recognized.

Canada believes that the exploratory work begun by the CD this year under the AHC's mandate remains incomplete and that a similar mandate next year would be relevant and realistic. It would permit a considerable amount of concrete work to be accomplished while not interfering or prejudicing the bilateral negotiations underway on this subject between the USA and USSR.

Contribution to World Disarmament Campaign

The Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, announced on October 31, a Canadian contribution of \$100 000 to the objectives of the World Disarmament Campaign.

The Secretary of State for External Affairs said this contribution demonstrates the continuing support of the Government of Canada for the objectives of the World Disarmament Campaign — to inform, to educate and to generate public understanding and support for the objectives of the United Nations in the field of arms limitation and disarmament. The Government of Canada has made two previous contributions of \$100 000 each to the World Disarmament Campaign, in March 1983 and in October 1984.

The Secretary of State for External Affairs announced that Canada will direct \$50 000 of its contribution to the United Nations *Disarmament Yearbook*. The *Yearbook*, prepared by the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs, is a reference document serving both a specialized readership and those among the general public interested in learning more about activities in the multi-lateral arms control and disarmament forums. It fulfills an important information role in the context of the World Disarmament Campaign. Canada's contribution is to be used towards all aspects

of the production and distribution of the *Yearbook* so that this useful publication will be accessible to a larger audience.

Canada will direct \$40 000 of its contribution to the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). UNIDIR, based in Geneva, is an autonomous institution within the United Nations framework that was established in 1980 and undertakes independent research on disarmament and related security issues. UNIDIR is funded from voluntary contributions from states, public and private organizations. The Canadian contribution will facilitate research by UNIDIR into the verification issue in current arms control and disarmament negotiations. This is in keeping with the important role that verification has to play in this area and with the emphasis on verification in the Canadian Programme of Action for the second half of the United Nations Disarmament Decade announced by the Secretary of State for External Affairs in his address to the United Nations General Assembly on September 25, 1985. The Secretary of State for External Affairs announced that the remaining \$10 000 of the contribution would be directed to the International Year of Peace (IYP) Voluntary Trust Fund, to assist in the financing of activities undertaken by the United Nations during the IYP in 1986.



Canada's Ambassador to the United Nations, Stephen Lewis (left), presenting a cheque for \$100 000 to UN Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, Jan Martenson, on February 21. The cheque represented Canada's second voluntary contribution to the World Disarmament Campaign.

UN Photo



Nuclear Winter: Royal Society of Canada Report

In January 1985, the Committee on the Environmental Consequences of Nuclear War presented its report to the Royal Society of Canada. This study was undertaken at the request of the Government of Canada. Following are the summary and conclusions of the report.

"1. A nuclear winter in the wake of a major nuclear exchange appears to be a formidable threat. If calculations are correct — and the Committee believes them credible — temperatures in the interior of continents will plunge by many degrees shortly after the exchange, probably far below freezing in many mid-latitude areas. Severe damage or destruction will ensue for crops and vegetation. The winter will last for some weeks to several months, and will have lasting repercussions.

Strategic Considerations

2. Canada should consider at once the military, strategic and social consequences of such a major climatic anomaly, notwithstanding the many uncertainties;

3. A nuclear winter would globalize the potential environmental impact of major nuclear war. No country would be immune;

4. A nuclear winter would imperil the food and drinking water supplies of all survivors in mid-latitude nations, and probably the whole world;

5. An aggressor who delivered a first strike sufficient to knock out an opponent could not win. A strike on such a scale, even if there were no response, would trigger a nuclear winter even for the aggressor;

6. There would be few spectators; non-combatant nations would be the helpless victims of a nuclear winter, just as would the combatants;

7. Even if Canada were not attacked, there would be major damage to its agriculture, forests and fisheries. A summer exchange would be especially damaging to Canada;

8. The USSR is also extremely vulnerable. The nuclear winter would

affect her territories severely. Her agriculture is already very sensitive to drought and frost. It could not survive a nuclear winter.

There remain many uncertainties. We cannot be sure that these effects are certain, and we hope that they never happen. But we are convinced that the Canadian Government should include them in its strategic reckoning.

The Models

9. The models are for the most part credible as to the broad nature of the climatic impacts that will follow a major nuclear exchange, though the details are no more than plausible;

10. Although the results must be interpreted with care, a *prima facie* case has been made that a nuclear winter will follow from nuclear explosions of a wide range of severity, including those that are considered quite small in present strategic scenarios. Every effort should be made to clear up the uncertainties that remain;

11. Criticisms of the models by Teller, Singer, Maddox and others make some valid points, but do not invalidate the main thrust of the model results.

Climatic Impact

12. Although the main impact on climate would be manifest in three latitudes where the major nuclear exchange took place — presumably northern mid-latitudes — there would be substantial cooling and disturbance of the circulation in tropical latitudes and the southern hemisphere, and long-term climatic perturbations are possible;

13. To clarify the nuclear winter hypothesis, it is important that the impact of nitric oxide (formed in nuclear fireballs) on ozone levels be examined further. It has been widely assumed that decreases in ozone caused by nitric oxide produced in this manner would lead to ozone dissociation, and hence increased levels of damaging ultraviolet radiation at the earth's surface. This may be so, but other circumstances must now be taken into account. Related processes may result in substantial generation of ozone in the troposphere. The altered thermal

structure of the upper troposphere and lower stratosphere implies a possible radical change in the chemistry and dynamics of the ozone layer.

Biological Impact, including that on Agriculture and Fisheries

The Committee agrees with numerous spokesmen that the nuclear winter hypothesis implies severe threats to living communities, and thereby to the security of the human species. There may possibly be extinctions on a scale comparable with known events caused in the past by meteorite or asteroid impacts. But work on the biological impact is less advanced than that on physical events. Tentatively the Committee concludes that, in the case of a major nuclear exchange,

14. Canadian agriculture would be severely affected even if there were only small reductions in growing season temperature, and reductions in sunlight;

15. The degree of damage would depend to a great extent upon the season of attack. Damage might be extremely severe if it affected the early growing season, or destroyed seeds and rootstocks in late summer and fall;

16. Prairie agriculture would be severely affected by even small counterforce strikes, because the main US missile sites are close at hand;

17. Canadian forests are vulnerable to radiation damage from fallout. They might also suffer blow-down by blast from nearby detonations;

18. The forests might suffer extensive fire damage. A 50 megatonne detonation over forests might destroy from 13 000 to 500 000 square kilometres, depending on place and season;

19. All the above stresses would likely encourage pests and weeds at the expense of useful species, so that regrown ecosystems would be inferior in quality for many years and perhaps generations;

20. There may be damage to ocean ecosystems, and hence to fisheries. A few days of darkness could kill much of the phytoplankton, the green plants at the base of the food system. Increased ultraviolet when the sun returns would also damage phytoplankton. A wide-



spread loss of fisheries and of non-commercial fish within two to six months has been inferred;

21. The long-term rebuilding of agriculture and fisheries, once normal climate had returned, would be difficult because of our heavy dependence on technology, seed banks, fertilizers and other aids likely to be in short supply;

22. It is possible that long-term climatic anomalies caused by a nuclear war might hinder or prevent the re-establishment of pre-war (or indeed any) high-intensity agriculture in Canada.

Impact on Society

The Committee was not explicitly asked to consider the social impact of the nuclear winter, nor did its composition allow it to do so in an expert fashion. Nevertheless it tried to visualize what might happen. Clearly the answer for Canada will depend on at least these unknowns:

- the size and nature of the nuclear exchange
- whether Canada will be a target, and if so in what regions
- the extent of physical damage
- the impact on other countries, especially the USA
- the state of survival of services, infrastructure and institutions
- the degree of conflict or cooperation between urban and rural parts of the nation
- the state of preparedness (food storage, security of energy supply, hardening of communications against electromagnetic pulse, etc.).

In the light of these considerations the Committee came to no firm conclusions about the impact on society, but includes in the Supplement speculations on short, intermediate and long-term adaptations to the new, forbidding environment. One conclusion is that

23. The socioeconomic consequences of the various scenarios should be examined in much greater detail by a qualified group of social scientists."

Copies of the *Nuclear Winter Report* are available at a cost of \$15 from the Royal Society of Canada at 344 Wellington Street, Ottawa, Ontario, K1A 0N4.

Canadian Government Response

The following is the Government's response to the Royal Society of Canada report, as made by the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, in the House of Commons on June 27.

"The Royal Society's study focuses on the possibility of a nuclear winter and its consequences for Canada. The conclusions of the study are in basic agreement with the findings of other scientific organizations such as the Swedish Academy of Science and the US National Academy of Science. The principal conclusion is that a major drop in global temperature could follow a nuclear exchange. This phenomenon, popularly called nuclear winter, is the result of smoke and dust particles reducing the incoming energy from the sun.

The Royal Society puts forward many recommendations for further research to reduce the current scientific uncertainties surrounding the nuclear winter hypothesis. These uncertainties concern, for example, the amount of smoke that could be generated by burning cities and forests; how that smoke would be distributed in the atmosphere; the magnitude of the drop in surface temperatures; and most importantly, how these factors will affect agriculture, livestock and fish, other species and, of course, the survival of man.

There is general agreement within the Government that the nuclear winter hypothesis is scientifically credible even though the details regarding its magnitude and duration are subject to great uncertainties. Some of the scientific uncertainties may be reduced by continuing research within existing programmes.

The Government agrees with the Royal Society that any Canadian studies pertaining to nuclear winter should be fully coordinated with similar efforts in other countries. With this in mind, copies of the report will be forwarded to the United Nations in accordance with the resolution (39/148F) passed during the thirty-ninth session of the UN General Assembly. During the last session of the General Assembly, Canada stressed the importance for nations to carry out studies on the phenomenon and to report their findings to the United Nations as part of an international undertaking to reduce

the possibility of a nuclear war. The submission of the Royal Society's report to the United Nations will serve as a useful Canadian contribution to international recognition that in a nuclear war there would be no winners.

The Royal Society's study does support, however, the basic tenet of civil defence that there would be survivors. It is the humanitarian duty of government to have at least modest plans to increase the number of possible survivors. Current civil defence planning has concentrated on problems related to short-term survival. The nuclear winter hypothesis introduces new longer-term concerns and the Government accepts the Royal Society's recommendation that our post-nuclear attack preparedness, including the implications for agriculture, transportation, communication and general living conditions, should be re-examined.

Beyond its scientific nature, the Royal Society report also has national security implications. It is clear that a nuclear conflict would be catastrophic. This reinforces our basic conviction that any nuclear war must be prevented. Consequently, the Government continues to support NATO and its deterrence policy which has ensured our security for over 35 years. Our adversaries must appreciate that no nuclear war can be won in the traditional understanding of victory. The Royal Society report reinforces this basic conviction. It follows, therefore, that we must continue to do all that is within our power to deter the initiation of all war.

In this regard, Canada will maintain the high priority we have assigned to our participation in those multilateral arms control fora — Geneva, Stockholm, Vienna — in which we have a direct negotiating role. At the same time, we have welcomed the resumption of United States-USSR negotiations in Geneva and support the USA in its efforts to achieve a more stable strategic relationship at the lowest possible balanced level of nuclear forces.

Finally, the federal Government wishes to thank the Royal Society of Canada and its committee of experts for preparing this report. They have provided a unique and thought-provoking perspective concerning the possible implications for Canada of a nuclear war."

**Arms Control and Disarmament: Glossary of Acronyms****BACKGROUNDER**

ABM — Anti-Ballistic Missile (Treaty, system, etc.)

ACD — Arms Control and Disarmament

ACDA — Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (US)

ALBM — Air-Launched Ballistic Missile

ALCM — Air-Launched Cruise Missile

ASAT — Anti-Satellite

ASW — Anti-Submarine Warfare

AWACS — Airborne Warning and Control System

B-1 — Designation for a type of US heavy bomber

BMD — Ballistic Missile Defence — same as ABM in most contexts

BMEWS — Ballistic Missile Early Warning System

BW — Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons (Convention)

C³ — Command, Control and Communications

C³I — Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence

CAT — Conventional Arms Transfers

CBM — Confidence-Building Measure

CCACD — Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament

CCD — Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (1969-1979)
– Successor of ENDC (1969)
– Succeeded by CD (1980)

CD — Committee on Disarmament (1980-1983)
– Successor of CCD (1969-1979)
– Changed name in 1984

CD — Conference on Disarmament (1984-)

CDE — Conference on Disarmament in Europe (refer to CCSDMDE)

CCSDMDE — Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (“Stockholm Conference”)

CEP — Circular Error Probable

CIIA — Canadian Institute of International Affairs

CIIPS — Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security

CISS — Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies

COPUOS — Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
– Also: UNCOUOS

CPD — Comprehensive Programme on Disarmament

CSBM — Confidence- and Security-Building Measure

CSCE — Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe — “Helsinki Agreement”

CTB — Comprehensive Test Ban

CTBT — Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

“Cut-off” — Prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes

CW — Chemical Weapons

DEW — Distant Early Warning (replaced by “North Warning”)

DMZ — Demilitarized Zone

ENDC — Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament
– Successor of Ten Nation Committee

on Disarmament
– Succeeded by CCD (1969) and CD (1979)

ENMOD — Environmental Modification (Convention)

ERW — Enhanced Radiation Weapon
– Also: Enhanced Radiation Warhead
– Also: “Neutron Bomb”

EUREKA — Proposed by France in early 1985 as plan to unite Europe in field of high tech research

FBS — Forward-Based Systems

FROD — Functionally Recognizable Observable Difference
– Assists NTM to distinguish between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons of the same generic type under SALT II

GCD — General and Complete Disarmament

GLCM — Ground-Launched Cruise Missile

IAEA — International Atomic Energy Agency

ICBM — Intercontinental Ballistic Missile

ICDSI — Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues (Palme Commission)

INF — Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
– Also: IRTNF; (this acronym is replacing TNF)

INFCE — International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation

IOZOP — Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace

IRBM — Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile

IRTNF — Intermediate-Range Theatre Nuclear Forces — Also: INF or TNF

ISDE — International Seismic Data Exchange

ISMA — International Satellite Monitoring Agency

KT — Kiloton
– Equivalent to 1 000 tons of TNT



LOAD — Low-Altitude Defence (system)	NSG — Nuclear Suppliers Group	SDI — Strategic Defence Initiative
LRCM — Long-Range Cruise Missile	NTM — National Technical Means – Assets which are under national control for monitoring compliance with the provisions of an agreement. NTM include photographic reconnaissance satellites, aircraft-based systems (such as radar and optical systems), as well as sea- and ground-based systems such as radars and antennas for collecting telemetry.	SEWS — Satellite Early Warning System
LRTNF — Long-Range Theatre Nuclear Forces – Subsumed in I(RT)NF or TNF	NUF — Non-Use of Force	SIPRI — Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
MAD — Mutual Assured Destruction	NWFZ — Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone	SLBM — Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile
MAP — Mutual Assured Protection; also used for Multiple Aim Point basing system for MX	NWMD — New Weapons of Mass Destruction	SLCM — Sea-Launched Cruise Missile
MARV — Manoeuvrable Re-entry Vehicle – Manoeuvrable MIRV	NWS — Nuclear-Weapon State or North Warning System	SRAM — Short-Range Attack Missile
MBFR — Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (talks, negotiations) – Began in Vienna in 1973	PGM — Precision-Guided Munitions	SSBN — Nuclear-Powered Submarine Equipped with Ballistic Missiles
MIRV — Multiple Independently Targeted Re-entry Vehicle	PNE — Peaceful Nuclear Explosion	SSN — (SSBN Hunter) – Nuclear-powered attack submarine
MLF — Multilateral Force	PNET — Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty 1976	SSOD — Special Session on Disarmament – Also: UNSSOD
MPS — Multiple Protective Shelter – to shelter mobile versions of the MX	PUNE — Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy	“Stand-Off Missile” — An air-launched I, missile that can be fired beyond the reach of enemy air defences, an ALCM, for example
MRTNF — Medium-Range Theatre Nuclear Forces	ROMB — Reduction of Military Budgets	START — Strategic Arms Reduction Talks – Substitute for SALT acronym
MRV — Multiple Re-entry Vehicle	RV — Re-entry Vehicle	TNF — Theatre Nuclear Forces – Also: INF or IRTNF
Mt — Megaton – Equivalent to 1 000 000 tons (or 1 000 Kt) of TNT	RW — Radiological Weapons – Any device other than a nuclear explosive, designed to employ radioactive material by disseminating it to cause destruction; any radioactive material other than that produced by a nuclear explosive device, designed for employment, by its dissemination, to cause destruction	TTBT — Threshold Test Ban Treaty 1974
MX — Missile Experimental	SAC — Strategic Air Command (US)	UNCOPUOS — United Nations Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
NATO — North Atlantic Treaty Organization	SALT — Strategic Arms Limitation Talks – Also: Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty	UNDC — United Nations Disarmament Commission
NBC — Nuclear-Bacteriological (Biological)-Chemical	SALT I — 1969-72	UNGA — United Nations General Assembly
NFU — No-First-Use	SALT II — 1972-79	UNSSOD — United Nations Special Session on Disarmament – Also: SSOD – UNSSOD I (1978) – UNSSOD II (1982)
NFZ — Nuclear-Free Zone – Also: NWFZ	SAM — Surface to Air Missile	WDC — World Disarmament Campaign
NGO — Non-Governmental Organization	SCC — Standing Consultative Commission – Bilateral forum responsible for implementation of strategic arms limitation agreements between the USA and USSR	WDF — World Disarmament Fund
NNA — Neutral and Non-Aligned		WPO — Warsaw Pact Organization
NNWS — Non-Nuclear-Weapon State		WTO — Warsaw Treaty Organization – Occasional substitute for “Warsaw Pact”
NORAD — North American Aerospace Defence (Command)		ZOPFAN — Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality
NPT — Non-Proliferation Treaty		
NSA — Negative Security Assurances		

Canada Takes Part in Allied Consultations Prior to Geneva Summit

In a statement to the House of Commons on October 28, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney discussed the gathering of the leaders of five of the principal allies of the United States which was held in New York on October 24. Following are excerpts from the Prime Minister's statement.

"Mr. Speaker, many heads of state and heads of government had come to New York on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the United Nations. President Reagan took advantage of that rather unique situation and gathering to initiate discussions with the leaders of five of the principal allies of the United States of America, including Canada. The purpose was to exchange views about the forthcoming meeting between the President and General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva. I had already conveyed some of my views on this subject to President Reagan in private correspondence and telephone conversations.

The President was surely right to have taken this initiative. The first meeting between the Soviet and United States leaders at the summit in six years would

be a crucial event, whatever the circumstances. But it is all the more so now — it is all the more important. The Soviet Union has an impressive new leader and the United States has an experienced President who enjoys massive public support in his own country. That is so important because of the requirement of an American President to submit whatever is agreed to the Senate for ratification. As we met in New York, the six western leaders recognized that these circumstances represented perhaps a historic opportunity to set relations between the United States and the Soviet Union on a new and constructive course.


Our talks I think, Mr. Speaker, fully justified the unprecedented time devoted to them. In two sessions lasting more than five hours the President was able to present his own ideas at length and to take the views of others. The degree of mutual understanding was impressive. The President knows that he carries with him to Geneva the hopes and expectations not only of his own people, but those of all the western countries. He knows he has their full support. He understands and agrees that progress in arms control and disarmament is central

and vital. But equally, he shares the view that, if progress is to be made on the central issue, all other issues that bear upon it will have to be considered, among them human rights, trade and cultural relations and regional issues. The leaders agreed that it would be unreasonable to presume bad faith on the part of the new Soviet leadership. If an honourable agreement is possible at all, we shall seek to conclude one.

In New York we agreed that it would be extremely useful if the President could provide NATO members with a full debriefing immediately following the Geneva summit. As a result, Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to tell the House today that NATO heads of government will gather in Brussels on Thursday, November 21, to hear President Reagan's impressions of his meeting with Mr. Gorbachev....

We are aware of the deficiencies and limitations of the UN, but we continue to believe that what nations can accomplish by working together will always be greater than what any one nation can accomplish by doing it alone. In this regard I take particular satisfaction from the strength, unity and vitality of the western alliance. When the leaders of the United Kingdom, Japan, Italy, West Germany and Canada met with President Reagan to discuss the forthcoming summit, the strength of cohesion of our common purpose was strongly evident. We are all deeply committed to the alliance and the principles it represents. We were also agreed that every reasonable avenue must be explored and every thoughtful attempt made to reduce tensions and promote co-operation between the two superpowers.

I encountered no disagreement, Mr. Speaker, when, on behalf of all Canadians, I urged President Reagan to go that extra mile to seek a just agreement, to presume that Mr. Gorbachev is no less interested in a secure peace. These are the ingredients that Canadians view as indispensable to the conclusion of a fair and verifiable accord. The quest for peace is everyone's business, Mr. Speaker. While Canada will not be present at the table in Geneva, our interests will. We shall remain vigilant to ensure that they continue to be defended effectively and well."



Heads of government (from left): Bettino Craxi (Italy), Margaret Thatcher (Britain), Ronald Reagan (US), Yasuhiro Nakasone (Japan), Helmut Kohl (West Germany) and Brian Mulroney (Canada), at New York meeting.

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