




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
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A N
A N S W E R
To a PAMPHLET call'd, The
C O N D U C T
O F T H E
M I N I S T R Y
Impartially Examined.

In which it is proved,

That neither *Imbecillity* nor *Ignorance*
in the M——r have been the CAUSES of
the present unhappy SITUATION of this
NATION.

By the *AUTHOR* of the FOUR LETTERS
to the People of *England*.

*Falsus honor juvat, et mendax infamia terret;
Quem nisi mendosum et mendacem. HOR.*

L O N D O N :

Printed for M. COOPER, at the *Globe, Pater-noster-Row.*

M D C C L V I .

[Price One Shilling and Sixpencé.]

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TO THE
A U T H O R

OF THE

*Conduct of the Ministry im-
partially examined.*

S I R,

BEFORE I take Notice of the personal Attacks upon me, in the introductory Part of your Defence of the Ministry, I shall examine the Justness of your Arguments in their Behalf; how well you have executed your Attempt; how impartially you have adhered to Truth; and what Degree of Credit ought to be paid to that which you have written. I shall then leave it to our Readers to decide, whether the Aspersions you have so liberally bestowed upon me, may not, with more Equity, be retorted upon yourself; whether *you*

B

or

or I appear to be most like the *Thief* and *Knave*; and whether you do not resemble a *subborn'd Evidence*, in favour of a *Criminal* your *Accomplice*, in supporting the *M—rs*, more than I do a common Incendiary in the *Fourth Letter to the People of England*. After having finish'd your introductory Leaves, where you say, in the last Paragraph of the eighth Page (how truly I shall shew hereafter) “ That you intend neither Panegyric
 “ nor *Abuse*, but the *Cause* of your Country
 “ only, &c.” You then begin, “ But be-
 “ fore I enter upon this Task, give me
 “ Leave to take some little Notice of a
 “ Pamphlet which has been just now put
 “ into my Hands; and which I am told has
 “ met with Attention from the Public, on
 “ account I imagine, of the Facts it is sup-
 “ posed to contain; for surely, if I, who
 “ am no Author, may venture to pronounce
 “ on the Stile and manner of Writing, both
 “ are below Criticism.”

INDEED you may venture to pronounce any thing, who have pronounced the Absurdities which shall be shewn in the following Pages; but as a Sample of our Stiles, let our Readers compare what you have transcribed from the *Fourth Letter*, with what
 is

is to be found in your own, and then decide.

You then say, “ The charge opens against
 “ the Ministry, or rather against Truth and
 “ Matter of Fact,” and close the Paragraph
 with saying, my own Words will shew me
 in the true Colours of a Libeller, which you
 quote, “ In the Year One thousand Seven
 “ hundred and Forty-nine or Fifty, some
 “ *American* Traders, Subjects of the King
 “ of *Great Britain*, travelled to the Borders
 “ of the *Ohio*, to traffic with the Natives of
 “ those Parts; this being known to the
 “ *Canadian French*, Messengers were dis-
 “ patched to acquaint them, that unless they
 “ withdrew from their Master’s Territories,
 “ their Effects would be confiscated, and
 “ themselves carry’d to Prison at *Quebec*;
 “ this Message the Traders thought fit to
 “ obey, and withdrew in Consequence of
 “ it.

“ The succeeding Season another Com-
 “ pany of *British* Subjects came to trade on
 “ the *Ohio*: and not withdrawing on a like
 “ Message with the former, their Goods
 “ were confiscated, and themselves carried
 “ Prisoners to *Quebec*, from whence they

“ were brought to *Rochelle* in *France*, AND
 “ STILL DETAINED IN PRISON.” By
 printing these Words in Capitals, I suggest
 you conceived I meant detained in Prison
 when I wrote the Fourth Letter; here you
 exhibit a very glaring Proof of neither un-
 derstanding Sense nor Grammar: *were* brought
 to *Rochelle* and *were* still detained in Prison,
 that is at their Time of landing in *France*,
 is the manifest Sense of these Words; other-
 wise I should have said *were* brought and
are still detained; that they *were* detained
 in Prison, you yourself confess by the first
 Letter from Lord *Albermarle* to Lord *Hol-*
dernessè. Thus then this first Remark of yours,
 so distinguished by Capitals, returns with
 Shame upon yourself. You then proceed,
 “ Not conscous of having violated the Laws
 “ of Nations, or traded on any Ground to
 “ which the King of *Great Britain* had not
 “ an undoubted Right, they *remonstrated* to
 “ the *British* Ministry, *insisted* upon being
 “ claimed as *British* Subjects, and honour-
 “ ably discharged from Prison, as Persons
 “ unoffending the Laws of Nations; nay,
 “ they *entertained* the *honourable Hopes* of
 “ *Englishmen*, that the *Ministry* of *England*
 “ would not cease to *demand* an *Indemnifica-*
 “ *tion* for the Loss of that Merchandize,
 “ which

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“ which had been unjustly taken from them;
 “ and Reparation for the Insult and long Im-
 “ prisonment of their Persons. Expecta-
 “ tions becoming Men who value their Li-
 “ berties, Properties, and Nation’s Honour :
 “ *In this they were deceived, the true Spirit*
 “ *of an English M———r no longer dwell*
 “ *amongst us.*”

Now, Sir, I imagine that the Parts of this
 Passage distinguished by Italics, are those,
 against which, you except; otherwise you
 really forget to tell us what particularly gives
 you so much Offence. Let me see then,
 whether the Truth of this cannot be made
 out by the very Letters which you have
 quoted as authentic. In the first Letter, my
 Lord *Albemarle* writes to Lord *Holderness*,
 “ In the Month of *November* I received a
 “ Letter from three Persons, signing them-
 “ selves *John Patton, Luke Erwin, and Tho-*
 “ *mas Bourke*, representing to me that they
 “ were *Englishmen*, who had been brought
 “ to *Rochelle*, and put into Prison there,
 “ from whence they wrote: having been
 “ taken by the *French* Subjects, who seized
 “ their Effects as they were trading with
 “ the *English*; and other *Indians*, on the Ri-
 “ ver *Ohio*, and carried them Prisoners to
 “ *Quebec*;

“ *Quebec*; from whence they have been sent
 “ over to *Rochelle*, where they are hardly
 “ used.”

TELL me then, is it a Violation of Truth to say, this Letter sent by these Men to the Embassador, was a Remonstrance to the *British Ministry*? That they insisted upon being claimed, and that they entertained the honourable Hopes of *Englishmen* that the M—y of *England* would not cease to demand an *Indemnification*; I say, does not this Letter, written by them, prove the Truth of what I affirm'd, tho' Lord *Albemarle* does not express it in that Manner to the Secretary of State, is that a Proof it was not in their Letter to his Lordship? Is not this Confession of such a Letter, equal to all I assert?

FARTHER, being at *Paris* at that Time, I knew it to be so, and will now tell you the Reason for their writing in that Manner: They had been in Prison almost two Years from their first Captivity; and tho' Remonstrances had been repeatedly made on that Head, from *America* to the M—r in *England*, (shameful Neglect!) no Notice had been taken of the Imprisonment of our *British* Subjects, to the Court of *France*, by that of *England*.

England. This it was which determined them to apply to Lord *Albemarle*, and seek their Liberty that Way. And as to the *Indemnification* for the Loss of that Merchandize, it is plain the M—y have *ceased* from demanding it, nay that they never demanded it at all, unless barely naming the Word *demand*, and then relinquishing all Right to it, can be denominated a *Demand*.

Now where is the Absurdity or Fashood, in saying these *Men were deceived*, and that *the true Spirit of an English Minister no longer dwelt amongst us*. If it had, would he not have insisted on receiving *Reparation* for the Insult on this Nation; *Indemnification* for the Merchandize unjustly taken; and *Satisfaction* to *those* who had been *illegally* imprisoned? And all these being never obtained, how much short is it of a Demonstration that the Men were discharged on a *Request*, and not on a *Demand*? or wherefore did the M—rs relinquish Claim to the other three *Demands*, if the Subjects of *England* were released in Consequence of a *Demand*? since the *French* in giving them Liberty on such a Remonstrance, must have acknowledged the *English* Right to the other three Articles. Wherefore then did the M—r neglect the latter,

if

if the former were not set at Liberty in Con-
sequence of a *Request*.

You then continue to quote “ The Ambaf-
“ fador at *Paris* instead of demanding those
“ Subjects of his Master, as Men unjustly held
“ in Prison, and Reparation for the Wrongs
“ they had received, was ordered by the Mi-
“ nistry to solicit as a Favour from the Court
“ of *France* the Discharge of them, only
“ acknowledging their Offence.”

IN Support of this latter Part only, you can
quote the Letters from Lord *Albemarle* to
Lord *Holdernesse*, and Part of a Memorial de-
livered to Mr. *Rouillé*.

Now, Sir, when I said that Lord *Albemarle*
had never *demand*ed these Men and their Ef-
fects, it could not be understood that I meant
to say he had not *asked* to have them released ;
because the Men were released. All that
could be meant then, was that these Men
were not released in *Consequence* of a *Demand*,
but of a *Request*. And if this appear to be
true, tho’ the strict Expressions in Lord *Albe-*
marle’s Letter puts it in the Light of a *De-*
mand; yet the Circumstances of the Case
speak against it ; and I have not violated the
Truth.

Truth. Besides, the *French Memorial* of Justification, given to all the Courts of *Europe*, and printed since the writing the *Fourth Letter*, states the *Affair* as I relate it, in Consequence of a *Request* *. Thus then the Word of one *M—r* supposing *your Letter to be authentic*, stands directly against another, and ought to be equally regarded ; only this is to be remarked, that your inserting the Copy of this Letter never yet printed and avowed to be genuine, is not equal to the Evidence of the *Authenticity of that Memorial* printed in all the *Dutch* and other *Gazettes*, and signed by the *French Ministers*, particularly as our *M—rs* have never made any Reply to prove the Falshood of the Assertion in that Memorial. So far then, the Argument is in my Favour, that these Prisoners were never demanded. Let me now endeavour at some collateral Proofs to sustain the Truth of what I have asserted.

* Le Marquis de la Jonquiere envoie cès quatre Anglois en France. Detenus quelque temps prisonniers à la Rochelle, ils implorent la protection de Mylord Albemarle, alors Ambassadeur d'Angleterre. Ce Seigneur s'occupe de leur liberté sans se plaindre du motif qui les en a privés. S. M. Très-Chrétienne ordonne qu'ils soient élargis, leur fait même donner quelque argent, & Mylord Albemarle en remercie le Ministre de la Marine, comme d'une grace qui lui est personnelle. En 1751.

FIRST then, if the Prisoners had been released on a *Demand*, why did our *M—rs* discontinue to *demand the Indemnification* for our Subjects, and *Reparation* for the Insult on the *British Crown*, both which they ceased to claim after the Release of the Prisoners, tho' two Years expired between that Time and the committing Hostilities against *France*? Had we not an equal Claim to all, since these Particulars were founded on equal Justice? Had the Subjects been released on a *Demand*, as you assert, the Merchandize must have been restored also? Is it unreasonable then to conclude, since neither the *Insult* has been acknowledged, nor the *Effects restored or paid for*, that the Prisoners were not set at Liberty on a *Demand*? In farther Support of this, I must remark, that Lord *Albemarle* received the Letter from these Prisoners in *November*, and that his Letter, giving an Account of their Imprisonment, was in *March*, at least three Months after. Was my Lord *Albemarle* all this while silent on this Head to his Court? If he was, how will *he* be justified as an Ambassador in his Duty towards the Subjects of *England*? or the *M—rs* justified in the Choice of so negligent a Man? But I am apt to believe, as he says, whether he had mentioned it to his Court or not before, that

he had *demand'd* the Release of the Prisoners and the Restoration of their Effects, if that can be called a Demand of the M—r, before he wrote of it to his Court, and soon after he knew the Affair. But you see that this Release of the *Prisoners only*, was not comply'd with in *March*, and the Restoration of the Effects at no Time; this *Demand* then, if made, had no Effect on the *French*.

OUR Embassador says, in the Beginning of the second Paragraph of his first Letter, “ I find by the Paper your Lordship has sent me, these three Persons are of the Number of those demanded by Mr. Clinton, and named in Mr. *De la Jonquiere's* Letter.” Now, Sir, unless you tell me what Orders accompanied this Paper, I must still insist that these Prisoners were never *demand'd*; or, which was all I meant, and all that has been understood by it, never *released* in Consequence of a *Demand*, but a *Request*.

HIS Lordship adds also in this Letter, “ next Tuesday I will represent the Case to Mr. *St. Contest*.” But does this prove he did it, for you hear no more of it? He says in the next Letter, of *March* 8, that he had seen Mr. *Rouillé*, and given his Paper of

Complaints, which consist (as quoted in the Memorial by you) of demanding express Orders to be sent to *De la Jonquiere*, to desist from such unjust Proceedings, and in particular to cause the Fort at *Niagara* to be razed, and the *French* to retire ; as likewise to set the six *Englishmen* at Liberty, and to make them ample Satisfaction for their Losses and Wrongs ; and for the punishing the Persons who had committed these Excesses.

BUT does *asking* a Thing by one Man prove it to be granted by another ? on the contrary, Time has shewn us, that not a single Article of these *Demands* have ever been *comply'd* with ; the Fort of *Niagara* remains untouch'd to this Hour ; the other three Men in *Canada* were never released. The same Conduct has been pursued in *America*, by the *French*, and no Satisfaction made for Loss of Effects and Liberty to the Prisoners, or Loss of Honour to the Crown : and the Court appears to be satisfied with that vague and indefinite Answer which Mr. *Rouillé* gave our Ambassador, *That he would use his best Endeavours for that Purpose ; that it was the Intention of their Court to prevent Disputes ; and that we might depend upon such Orders being sent to their Governors accordingly.*

WAS

Was this an Answer which ought to have satisfied a M——r; and yet on this he has all along rested, though things continued as justly to be complained of as before; and though Lord *Albermarle* said he would examine the two Men which came to *Paris*, in order to support their *receiving Satisfaction*, was it ever done? It was not. And the Reason for it was, that our M——r at home, by means of the *French* Ambassador in *London*, had obtained, as a *Request*, the Release of these three Men, and given up all Claim to the Effects and other Things which were mentioned in the Memorial. Wherefore Lord *Albermarle*, in consequence of Orders, desisted from endeavouring to obtain an Indemnification for the *British* Subjects.

Now, Sir, will an unprejudiced Man believe, in consequence of what you have laid down, and of the M——r's Letters, *unauthenticated*, that the Prisoners were discharged in compliance to a *Demand*, which has never been complied with in the other Particulars depending on the same Cause of Complaint against *French* Injustice? or from what I have said, and the *French* Manifesto sign'd by their M——rs, *unreply'd to* by the Court of *England*, that the Releasement
was

was made in Consequence of a *Request*? Let me now again ask *you*, If our Sovereign's Rights and our Privileges were not shamefully invaded? Were not the Lands on the *Ohio* confess'd to belong to the King of *France*? were not the *French* justified in imprisoning our Fellow-subjects and confiscating their Goods, by this tame Behaviour of the B——sb M——r. You then add, that I assert that the “ M——r's *timidly* be-
 “ *secching* as a Favour what he had a Right
 “ to demand as Justice from the *French*, has
 “ given that Nation a better Foundation to
 “ the Claim on the *Ohio*.” And who is there that does not join in this Assertion? And then you say, in about fifteen Lines lower, “ He asserts again, That the Timidity
 “ of the M——r gave the *French* no Founda-
 “ tion at all.” In this Place you either cannot read, or have exhibited an Example of your Love for Truth scarce to be parallel'd; the Words are absolutely different in themselves and in their Meaning, as the Passage will prove, which is as follows; “ If it be
 “ asked, whence it comes to pass that this
 “ Behaviour of the B——sb M——r has
 “ never been mentioned in the *French* Me-
 “ morials relative to the Disputes in *America*;
 “ it may be answer'd with Truth, that the
 “ *French*

“ *French* Ministry perfectly knew this *ceding*
 “ the Territories of *England* by the *Timidity*
 “ of the M——r was no *legal* relinquishing
 “ the B——*sh* Rights to these Lands, and
 “ that the King and *People* would never ac-
 “ quiesce in this Concession.”

Let me ask you, If your Effrontery is not
 extraordinary in this Quotation ; nay, much
 heighten'd by your Declaration in the Begin-
 ning, that you have no *Cause* to serve but that
 of *Truth* and your *Country* ? What is become
 of that Matter of Fact and Truth which you
 mention ? And how am I a Libeller in the
 Paragraph you have quoted ? What Mis-
 creant but yourself is unacquainted with this
 Truth, that many Things may afford a *Founda-*
tion for a Claim that do not constitute a
legal Right ; otherwise by what Means are
 so many Law-suits brought into *Westminster-*
Hall concerning Property ? Are all those who
 lose their Suits without *Foundation* for a
 Claim, because not possess'd of a *legal* one ?

Here then in your own Words I join Issue
 with you, and desire that our Credit with the
 Public for *Veracity* and *Candour* in what-
 ever else is asserted in my Letter and your
 Libel (at least, if mine is so) be determined
 by

by the Truth or Falschood of the Fact before us.

Now, Sir, I will explain to you why Lord *Albermarle* might in all Appearance be employed to *demand* the Prisoner, &c. M——rs in *England* know that the P——t may require the Papers of their Transactions to be laid before them; wherefore the Face of a Negotiation is made, by Memorials and Orders to Embassadors, to represent something very different from the secret Springs and secret Manner of accomplishing the Business, as I have Reason to believe was done in negotiating this very Affair.

AFTER having thus disproved all you have offer'd, I ask you, on what Reason you presume to say, I have been guilty of Scurrility in the Passage you have been quoting? and I tell you, that no Face can well be endowed with more audacious Hardiness than that of a Man who, whilst he is condemning a Writer for Scurrility where it does not exist, is, himself, the most scurrilous of all Men; and I believe the M——rs, if they understand *Latin*, will, by the time they have read thus far, send back your Scrap of that Language to yourself, and tell you,

Non

*Non tali exilio, nec defensoribus istis
Tempus eget.*

Your next Paragraph begins with saying,
 “ you had intended to drop me here ; but
 “ my next is stated as falsely and ignorantly
 “ as this, which we have seen so unanswer-
 “ ably confuted.” Would not you have
 acted wiser in tarrying to see what could have
 been said against you, before you had *pro-*
nounced that Paragraph so *unanswerably con-*
futed? However, to do you Justice, this Pa-
 ragraph is as false as the former ; for I flatter
 myself, that having proved the former to be
 true, I shall have as much Success with this
 also. Wherefore as things equally true are
 equally false, for once you are right, though
 in a very different Sense from what you in-
 tended. You then continue, by saying,
 “ That I had not the smallest Knowledge of
 “ what I was writing about ; and that I am
 “ unacquainted with the Nature and Form
 “ of Business ; that the M——r is blame-
 “ less, and every other Person in the Ad——n.

In order to prove this, you give an Account
 how the Quaker and his Company became
 possessed of the Grant of the Lands of the *Ohio*.

D

You

You there tell us, “ That *Henbury* petition’d
 “ the King for those Lands on certain Con-
 “ ditions; that the Board of Trade thought
 “ this Application was Part of a Former,
 “ transmitted by the Lieutenant Governor of
 “ *Virginia*, that it might be for his Majesty’s
 “ Service to comply with this Request, and
 “ accordingly that Instructions were sent on
 “ this Head to the Lieutenant Governor of
 “ *Virginia*. You tell us then the Result
 “ of the Opinion of the Board of Trade,
 “ and of their Report; and that this was taken
 “ into Consideration by the Lords of the
 “ Committee of Council, who agreed in Opi-
 “ nion with the Board of Trade, and accord-
 “ ingly a Draught of an Instruction was ap-
 “ proved in Council and transmitted to the
 “ Lieutenant Governor.”

Your next Paragraph proves, that in Obe-
 dience to these Instructions the Grant was made
 to the *Ohio* Company, because you say, “ the
 “ President of the Council of *Virginia*, in a
 “ Letter to the Board of Trade 1749, set
 “ forth the Difficulties the *Ohio Company* la-
 “ boured under, from the Fickleness of the
 “ *Indians*, the Claims of the *Pennsylvanians*
 “ with respect to Limits, the Expence of
 “ erecting and garrisoning a Fort.” Here
 it

it evidently appears the Grant was made, otherwise there could have been no *Ohio Company*; the Cause of the Fickleness (as it is called) of the *Indians*, may be determined by what their Chiefs said to our Governors on that Head, printed in the News Papers of *America*, that they knew of no Right which we had to those Lands, either by Treaty or Sale, and opposed our settling, as they have justly done ever since; and as to the Expence of erecting and garrisoning a Fort, their begging Indulgences was not only ridiculous but insolent, because the very Grant, as you say Page 22, was ask'd and comply'd with on these Conditions. At the same time this Quaker, to give farther Instances of his and his Company's Modesty, after having obtain'd this Grant, and desired to be indulged with Fort and Garrison, endeavour to shew that the *French* Claim to the *Mississippi* is not just, because it is contrary to a Grant King *Charles I.* made to Sir *Robert Heath*, which was followed by a Settlement of the *English* long before the *French* had been in those Parts.

Now, Sir, should this Grant of these Lands, by *Charles I.* in Consequence of Priority, be allowed equitable, and which Lands have since, by Treaties, been acknowledged to be-

long, and allow'd to remain with the *French*, will it not afford an unlucky Argument against all new Families that come to settle any where after the former have *abdicated*? Wherefore I think it not defensible in this Place; however were not the *French* acquainted with this conscientious Request of the Quaker, and to this is it not chiefly owing that they took care to defend the Possession of those Parts, and that the present War was brought on?

You then tell us that “ the *Ohio Company*
 “ with respect to their *Grant*, made no farther Application till 1754, when they presented a Petition to his Majesty; reciting the former Transactions, and adding that the late Governor and Council had made large Grants to private Persons, to the Amount of near 1,400,000 Acres, &c. and therefore praying that their Boundaries may be fixed by certain Rivers, &c. But it appearing to the Board of Trade that the Limits mentioned in the Petition would include too great a Quantity; (and, you might have added, robbed as honest Men as themselves; to whom the 1,400,000 Acres had been granted, of their just Possessions) they concluded it should not be comply'd

ply'd with, when they propos'd some In-
 structions to the Governor, relative to this
 Affair in their Report; (then comes the *Cream*
 of all in *Italics*;) *but this Report still remains*
under the Consideration of the Council, and no
Order at all has been made on it to this Day.

IN what Manner does all this contradict
 what I have said in the Passage you refer to?
 which is, "It seems however before this
 timid Acquiescence of the B—b M—r
 in thus acknowledging that Part of *Ame-*
rica to be the Property of *France*, he had
 granted the Lands on the *Ohio* to a Qua-
 ker of the City of *London* and his Associ-
 ates." Do you imagine that the Lords of
 the Committee, who had given a Power of
 granting these Lands, were not of the M—y?
 or that it was done without the Consent of the
 M—r? or do you conclude because the *Li-*
mits are not settled according to the *Ohio*
 Company's Inclinations, that therefore no
 Lands were granted, and that they were no
 Company at all? The very Manner in which
 you relate the Affair, proves the contrary of
 what you drive at. If there are no *Lands*
granted, how came these Men to be a *Com-*
pany? and if they are not a *Company*, what
Right had they to complain about the *Condi-*
tion

tion of those Lands; or to petition for a Fort and Garrison, and *Limits* to be ascertained for *Parts* in *America* which did *not belong to them*? If two neighbouring Gentlemen disagree about the Boundaries of their Estates, does it thence follow that one or both of them has no Estate at all? And yet you conclude, because the *Company sues* for a *Settlement* of the *Limits* of *their Lands*, that they have for that Reason, *no Grant* at all of these *Lands*, (admirable Logic!) Your Reasons are equal to your Love of Truth, and Exhibitions of Modesty.

THUS, Sir, you have not only not contradicted any Thing I have said, by pretending to give authentic Accounts to the contrary; but you have confirmed also that the *French* were not the first Aggressors in *America*, by saying that the Quaker, honest Man, not content with his Grant of the *Ohio*, was showing that the *French* had no Right to the *Mississippi*; and by that Means, leading towards a Claim of that Territory also. Can it be wondered at, or complained against with Justice then, that in consequence of this the *French* prepared to oppose an Invasion, which might be justly expected on that Quarter? nay, did not *Washington*, by intercepting a Convoy of *French*

French Provisions, begin Hostilities? and when he was afterwards defeated and taken Prisoner, did he not *acknowledge* this by signing a Paper, in which it was said, he had been guilty of an *Assassination, in attacking the French?* Now, Sir, who best understands what he is writing about, and the Nature of Business? And is not the Quaker proved by you to be the Cause of the War? I fancy by this Time, the M——rs, whom you pretend to defend, will think themselves but little obliged to you for thus justifying the Proceedings of our Enemies; and when next they *chuse* an Advocate for their Conduct, they will infallibly *pass* by you.

YOUR next Paragraph begins, “I now *descend* at once into the Subject;” and it must be confessed by your greatest Enemies, that you are excellent in the Art of *Sinking*; you will soon be at the very Bottom of the Bathos. You then vouchsafe to tell us great Secrets; “that the present War was “just and necessary.” But was it for that Reason just and necessary that it should be conducted in this insufficient and pernicious Manner? You add, “that the People “in general, and the commercial Part more “especially, were unanimous and clamorous

“ for it.” Are they not as clamorous and unanimous against its being conducted as it has been? “ That the Current of Parliament “ ran violently that Way also.” It may run as violent against the M——r probably this Winter ; or will that justify male Administration? “ And, lastly, the Administration “ would have been looked upon as Enemies, “ had they retarded this favourite Measure.” Very true ; and therefore you infer they are exempt from all Faults in having been guilty of male Conduct. You then add, “ they supported what was begun with all the Alacrity of Preparation.” Tho’ this is not true ; or, if it was, not to be placed to their Merit ; you shall have that granted too, if you will ; the next Sentence will be sufficient for me. “ And *all the Vigour of Execution.*” Here you and I must debate that Matter a little, and then, as you say, “ let the Facts, for “ those alone are Evidence, prove this Assertion in Detail.”

LET me ask you then, what are the Effects of this Vigour of Execution? Was it the *Loss of Minorca*? Was it the *Loss of Oswego*? Was it the *ill stationed Cruise of Mr. Boscawen and Mr. Holbourne*, or *that of Mr. Hawke*? There remains then nothing but the

the taking the little Isle of *Chaussée*, the Product of all this Vigour of Execution, and this great Conquest may possibly escape the Knowledge of Posterity, as it has not been enter'd into the *Gazette*, so remarkable at present for authentic Intelligence.

You then talk “ of the Duke de *Mirepoix*'s Professions of sincere Desire to adjust all Disputes subsisting in *America*, and forget the Breach of Honour by our M—r; of the *French* having dispatch'd Orders for arming a considerable Fleet; their mysterious and extraordinary Step, and our general Alarm, which made it indispensably necessary for the King to equip a Fleet which might frustrate any Attempts of *France*, and protect at the same time the *British* Rights and Dominions.” And then roundly add, “ *This was done.*” What was done? Was a Fleet equipt which might frustrate the Attempts of *France* and protect the *British* Rights and Dominions? How will you justify the M——e M———r then in not effectuating what you confess to have been in his Power by Means of this Fleet? for can you point out one *French* Attempt that has been frustrated? Is it in *America*? The *French* succeed but too well on that Continent,

as the Loss of our Ships on the Lake *Ontario*, the Demolition of our Forts, the taking our Army Prisoners, and the reducing Lord *Loudon* to act on the Defensive, are too melancholy Proofs. Is it in *Europe*? The entire Loss of *Minorca* is a fatal Demonstration to the contrary. Where then are our Dominions protected? Not in the *American* Islands, these, particularly *Jamaica*, every Man knows is, by the neglect of a proper Squadron to defend it, in hourly Danger from the superior Fleet and Force of our Enemies in those Parts.

WHAT a Power of Face you must be blessed with, who dare to *defend* the M—rs, after every Attempt of theirs offensive and defensive has miscarried! And you have asserted, that a Fleet was prepared which might frustrate the Attempts of *France*, and protect the Dominions of *England*. Why were they not defended? How greatly the M—rs are obliged to you for this excellent Defence of their Conduct! What Place will you choose?

You then tell us of *Boscawen's* and *Holbourne's* failing, of *Macnamara's* failing and returning, and then beg to be indulged in two Remarks, both which I beg to be in-

indulged in examining. You say, " Every
 " Child in Politics knows, that after receiv-
 " ing Orders as to the Nature of the Service
 " he is to be employed in, and as to the
 " *general* Destination, the commanding Of-
 " ficer in all very distant Expeditions, is and
 " must be intrusted with a discretionary
 " Power; first to choose such particular
 " Stations as may be most proper to effect
 " the Business intended, and to vary them
 " afterwards, according as different Exi-
 " gencies arise, or as the earliest Intelligence
 " he can obtain may render it adviseable."

Now, Sir, if you mean by general Desti-
 nation a Space to cruize in, unlimited by Or-
 ders, you are *worse* than a Boy in Politics ;
 if this were permitted to an Admiral, how
 could the Admiralty know where to send
 him Intelligence on particular Emergencies ?
 or how could a Commander be called to Ac-
 count for any Miscarriage in missing the Ene-
 my's Fleet, if some private Inclination should
 prevail on him to cruize where the Enemy
 was *not* like to pass? he cannot be guilty of
 breaking Orders on that Head, when none
 are given him. Now, Sir, no Admiral is
 ever intrusted with discretionary Power to
 choose his Stations, or to vary them, but as

he receives Intelligence from the Admiralty. All Orders are given to cruize between two specified Latitudes and two Longitudes, as near as they can observe the Latter; or so many Leagues to Eastward, Westward, or some other bearing from a Cape of Land or Sea Coast; and no Indulgence is ever given to depart from the Extremes of this Station, but on absolute Necessity. Thus there is no Distinction to be made between general and particular Orders, and all the discretionary Part given to the Admiral is the Choice between the Extremes. And in this manner the Orders were given to Mr. *Boscawen* and to Mr. *Hawke*; and therefore you cannot avail yourself of this evasive Falshood to defend the M——r: for unless you can prove that either of these Gentlemen have exceeded the Limits given them in their Orders, the whole Charge still rests on the M——e M——r, who only has *discretionary* Power, with *which* the present Head of the Ad——y is remarkably endowed, to choose their Stations, and who is supposed best to understand in what manner the Service that Commanders are sent upon is to be accomplished. Then you add, “ That the Merchants must
 “ be sensible, that to lay before the Public
 “ Instructions of such a Nature, even were
 “ it

“ it in your Power so to do, is a Step of too delicate a Nature for any private Man to take, however *just* they may be in themselves, however warranted by the Laws of *Reason and Self-defence, the War that occasioned them is still carrying on.*” Admirable indeed, those Instructions *just* in themselves, *warranted by Reason and Self-defence*, are to be *concealed* because we are still at *war*.

Now declare, for once, *honestly* if you can, Do you believe that these just and reasonable Instructions by being published can discover any thing which can affect the Success of Mr. *Boscawen's* Cruize, which has been finished more than a Year since? Do you believe that the *Reason and Justice* of them would excite other Nations to join our Enemies? Do you think they would irritate the *French*, and so create, as it were, a double War by the increased Violence? Do you imagine the People of *England* would be inflamed against the M—r for having destin'd the Fleets with *Justice and Reason* and for *Self-defence*? Can the M—rs then whom you are defending be hurt by publishing such Instructions? Would they be silent if the Discovery of such Secrets could serve them in their

their present Perils? Tell me then, what is this pretended Prudence and Necessity of Concealment more than a wretched Evasion to avoid the attempting to justify that which you know is impossible to be supported?

YOUR next Remark is extremely shrewd indeed; that “ whenever the Administration
“ makes use of Means duly proportion’d to
“ the End propos’d, and chooses for obtain-
“ ing such End, Men of acknowledged Abi-
“ lities in their Profession, fully instructed and
“ impowered to act, they have done their
“ Duty.” And I suppose you will allow also, that when such *Men* have *not* been *chosen*, and *such* things *not done*, that then the M——r has *not done* his *Duty*.

TELL me, was Mr. *Braddock* acknowledged to possess Abilities for a General, who had never commanded at any one Place; or, as I have been inform’d, seen any one Action? Was Mr. *S——y*, bred to the Law, a proper Person to be put at the Head of an Army? Here, at least, the M——r fail’d in his Choice of Men; you shall see how he did in Means, immediately.

You

You then declaim very prettily indeed, and tell us a vast Secret; “ that no Minister “ was ever Master of Events;” and then, with an Apology for the *Triteness* of the Observation, tho’ I believe it is the first Time it has ever been made; “ That the *Sea* continues the *most* inconstant of all the Elements.” You have forgotten the *Air*, out of which the Winds are formed. Then you say, “ If our Vice-Admiral could not intercept the whole *French* Fleet, either in its going to *America* or returning, is the *Atlantic* no wider than the Channel between *Dover* and *Calais*?” Had the Ocean been as wide as the Universe, it would have been of no Effect to prevent their being taken is evident from your own Account: because you say, “ the two Fleets saw and felt “ in with each other more than once.” That Storms did not vex our Fleet, or prevent theirs from being seen, you and the Account from the Admiral confirm, who mentions nothing of that Nature; and the Nights in that Part of the World are so short at that Time of the Year, that no Fleet can fail thro’ another between Sun-set and Sun-rising, so as to be out of Sight, or out of Reach of it in the Morning. Their Escape is to be placed
to

to that Account, to which the Admiral ascribes it, "the Fog prevented him." A Fog continuing a Month, perhaps two, as effectually concerning Ships as the darkest Night: These Fogs in that Part of the World are not uncertain Meteors, which come and go at no settled Time, as in this Island; but as regular in those Months in which the *French* Fleet pass those Parts, as the Monsoons or trade Winds in other Latitudes; and as well known so to be by all Seamen who understand the Nature of their Profession. Why then was our Fleet sent to meet that of the Enemy in those Seas? Was it thro' Ignorance or Design in the M——r? Is this becoming the Knowledge or Integrity which ought to reside in the Head of the A———? Is there a Defence for this Behaviour concealed amongst your *warrantable, just, and reasonable* Instructions? And here I cannot avoid remarking your Design of saying what has been already confuted in Relation to the Orders given by the A———y to the commanding Officers; it was visibly to remove the Blame of choosing this mistaken Station from the M——e M——r, and to lay it on the Admiral, to save the Guilty by accusing the Innocent. Is this an Action becoming the Man
 who

who sets out with saying, he *has no Cause to serve but that of Truth and his Country.*

AFTER this, you give an Account of taking two *French* Ships, and say nothing of losing one of our own; of taking eight Companies of *French* Soldiers, and seven thousand six hundred Pounds sterling of their Money. And then instance a *second Proof* of the wrong Destination of this Fleet, by the *Fogs* saving *Monfieur de la Motte* in his going into the Gulph of *St. Lawrence*; after which you add, that we buried upwards of two thousand Sailors in this *well* appointed Cruize; you now tell us that the *French* Squadron escap'd *Mr. Holbourne* through the Streights of *Belleisle*, an unfrequented and hazardous Navigation, which had never before been attempted by any *Fleet* or *Squadron* of Ships: But had it not by single Ships? Now let me suppose you saw another Reasoner as clear headed as yourself, pass thro' a Door, would not you conclude that twenty such clever Fellows might pass the same Way one after another? The M—e M——r ought to have known, in consequence of the Duty of his high Commission, that single Ships of War had pass that Way; and he *ought* to have had Understanding enough also, to have in-

fer'd that twenty might have done it for the same Reason. For Ships, tho' in a Squadron, are not obliged to sail a-brest. But however, tho' their Ships escaped Mr. *Holbourne*, you give us great Comfort in assuring us he paid them going in another Way ; he chased *one* that could *not* be overtaken ; and the *Edenburgh*, *Dunkirk*, and *Norwich* pursued two others which *were* not to be overtaken. Indeed you say, " the *Dunkirk* came near " them, but directly to Windward ;" Which was to Windward, the *Dunkirk* or the *French*, for you don't determine ? If the *Dunkirk*, then, had she continued the Pursuit with the two others, probably the *French* had been taken by sailing before the Wind ; and if they had been pursued and overtaken already by turning to Windward, in either Case, why were they called off by the Admiral ? If this Story be true, I am afraid you have brought Mr. *Holbourne* into a more criminal Behaviour than Mr. *Byng* has been reported to be ; because I don't see how you will clear the Admiral's Conduct in calling off *three Englishmen* of War from engaging with *two French*, when they were so near as to be all in Sight of each other ; and the *English* had overtaken the *French* in the Chace. Are not three *English* Ships of War a Match for two *French* ?

I hope you will reason the same in the Case of Mr. Byng ; as to be sure *this* is said for the Sake of *Truth*, and not serving any Cause but that of *your Country*. The *French Attempts* then, were not frustrated by this *Expedition* ; and now the whole Advantage reaped from this expensive Equipment, when it comes to be sum'd up together, was *taking two French Ships*, and *losing one of our own* ; *taking a thousand Frenchmen Prisoners*, and *burying near three thousand Englishmen*, taking seven thousand six hundred Pounds of *French Money* ; and spending perhaps, half a Million of this Nation's ; *chasing three Frenchmen of War*, and *taking never a one* of them. Ample Satisfaction for so expensive an Expedition, and a thorough Justification of the M——r. Now, Sir, I think your plain Deduction of Facts will not serve the Purpose of vindicating the M——e M——r ; and when you say that *nothing* has been *kept back* from our View, you *forget* yourself ; an unlucky Circumstance for a Man who treats *Truth* as you do. Have not you kept back the *reasonable and just Instructions* ? And when you say *nothing* has been brought *too forward*, what think you of your Endeavours to throw the *Blame* of an *ill judged Station* on Admiral

Boscawen, and your puffing about *Holbourne's Chaces*; and here you exclaim, " That you
 " should rank yourself amongst the worst of
 " Mankind, as not deserving the common
 " Benefits of Air and Water, much less the
 " Privileges of a Free *Briton*, if from Levi-
 " ty or Malice you should debase your Pen so
 " far as to unsettle the Affections of your Fel-
 " low-subjects, by spreading Lies of Men
 " merely because they are Ministers, or to
 " enforce the Calamities of your Country
 " merely to shew your Talent in Ridicule and
 " Ribaldry."

Now, Sir, as to the Lies that have been told by me, according to your Account, does not the contrary of that pretty plainly appear at present, and that Imputation revert doubly upon you? And as to your lying through *Malice or Levity*, probably you excuse yourself by saying, you are *paid* for it; then tell me, which deserves the Interdiction of Fire and Water, he who lies to support a ruinous M——r against the public *Voice* of his *Country*, and criminales the *Innocent* to excuse the *Guilty*; he who *misrepresents* and *falsifies* through the whole, because he is defending an *iniquitous Ad——n*, and at-
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tempts to persuade the most respectable Body of Men, the Merchants of *London*, that their *Destroyers* are their *Friends*; or I, who having thus far justified all I have written; who, by speaking Truth, have laid open the nefarious Ways by which my Country has been almost undone by the most profligate of Men, and attempted, at least, the Preservation of our little remaining Liberty and Constitution, by the very Letter which you wish to condemn.

WHOM then ought the People of *England* now to avoid? Against the Infusion of whose Writings should they guard themselves? Which of us is most probably the Miscreant? Who will *betray his Friend* or *assassinate his Father*, he who endeavours to *save his Country* from the Hands of its Destroyers; or he who has given a Demonstration that he is *prepared* for any kind of *Iniquity*, by daring to deceive his Countrymen into a Belief that those who have brought this Nation to the Threshold of *Perdition*, are yet a blameless Set of *Men*, in order that they may be permitted to *fill* the Measure of *their Iniquity* and *our Ruin*, and *close* eternally the Door upon our *Liberties, Privileges, and Constitution*; no Man ever was or ought to be accounted

honest

honest who defends the Enemies of his Country,
Hic niger est hunc tu Britanne caveto.

YOUR next Paragraph begins with saying, “ our Object was the intercepting of the “ *French* Fleet;” you mis’d it then; which is followed by an Assertion equally true as the former is just, “ the same Plan which “ had succeeded so well in the last War was “ pursued in this.” Was there a Fleet sent to cruize on the Banks of *Newfoundland* in the foggy Months, or was the *Mediterranean* left without a sufficient naval Defence for *Minorca* and *Gibraltar* during the last War? What Regard is to be paid to such *hard faced* Writers, who dare to contradict the united Knowledge of all *England*? You then say, “ That the same Officers who had distinguished themselves then were employed “ now;” and undoubtedly they would have rendered their Country equal Service at this Time, if the same Men had presided at the Head of the Ad——y and destin’d the Stations of our Ships which did the last War; and then you lug in, by way of palliative Cant, the Uncertainty of Issues, and their being in the Hands of Providence, as a Screen for the M——e M——r. Are you ignorant that it is the certain Rule of Provi-

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Providence, tho' Ignorance and Folly may at first succeed, that good Sense shall soon prevail? And surely our Misfortunes have been long enough continued to prove the Superiority of good Sense in our M—rs, if they are possess'd with that necessary Qualification, and I know of no Intervention of Providence in Favour of our *Enemies* or against *us*, which can countenance your unnatural Search of this Observation in their Favour, unless you call the Ignorance or Perfidy of the M——r an Intervention of Providence in Favour of our *Enemies*, and to our own Ruin.

YOUR next Article is the Praise of the Administration for taking *French* Effects and *French* Sailors before the War was declared; an Action which all *Europe* has beheld with *Horror*, and ruin'd our Character of *Humanity* in every State of it; will the Design of preventing the *French*, in a Time of *Peace*, from assisting themselves of their *own* Subjects, justify our confining their Sailors in loathsome Dungeons, half starved by the cruel Method, conniv'd at by the M——r, of letting out the Privilege of feeding them from one to another, till from Sixpence, allow'd by the Government, it becomes probably Threepence only to him who provides for the unhappy Prisoner,

by

by which Means the Price is reduced so low, their Food is scarce better than Poison: this together with close Confinement and putrid Air finishes the Lives and Miseries of innocent Men. Are Politics and Mercy such utter Strangers, that in Peace even these Cruelties cannot be prevented? Are the M——rs of such Crimes to be applauded for their Actions? particularly as you have justified the *French*, by mentioning the *Mississipi* Overture of the Quaker, in guarding themselves from sult on that Side; and, I think, when Mr. *Washington* signed those Articles which denominate him an Assassin, he proved himself the Aggressor. Besides is it credible that the confining *eight* thousand out of *eighty* thousand registered *Seamen*, and being the Bane of half of them, can have prevented an *Invasion* from *France*. And though you are pleased to say, that those who ridiculed the Attempt, would have been the first to tremble at it; yet believe me, there is one Symptom of Cowardice which *you* have given, and *they* not, the Approbation of *Cruelty*. How scrupulously you obey the Dictates of that Master, which you pretend to preach, in loving your Enemies, when you approve of Barbarity against those who were *not* so at that Time. But what Wonder is it, that a
 Man

Man who has disclaimed all Affection for his Country, by defending the Iniquity of M—rs, her greatest Enemies, should renounce the Feelings of *Humanity* and the Mandates of his *God*. When you were attempting to justify this Measure, which has branded the *English* Nation, by the Crimes of their M—r, with Piracy, through all the States of *Europe*, would you have persisted, had the following manner of thinking enter'd your Imagination? that the M——r by consenting to a Militia almost two Years past, might by that Means have protected the Kingdom from all Danger of Invasion; have then declared War against *France*, and by rendering our Troops useless at home, sent them immediately to attack *Quebec* supported by a Squadron of our Navy? These, joined by the *Americans*, would, in the Condition that City then stood, have rendered all *Canada* no difficult Conquest. Whilst *Minorca* might have been render'd impregnable in our Possession by another Part of the Fleet and Soldiery; thus *France* might have been completely humbled; at half the Expence which has been already so fruitlessly and fatally wasted, and of this the *French* were not a little afraid. In this manner Men of understanding would have behaved, instead of which the M——rs,

justly afraid of a People they have so long and so egregiously injured, withheld Arms from their Hands, kept too many of the Navy and Troops at home, half-ruin'd *America*, by permitting the *French* to land their Forces in *Canada*; suffered *Quebec* to be placed in Safety, by their sending Succours; and lost that important Island of *Minorca*, by the same Management; all this while chearing themselves with the Thoughts of acting like Pirates, and doing that, which though it injured a few of the *private Subjects* of *France*, effected almost nothing against it as a Nation; for what is the Value of all that has been taken in *three hundred Ships*, when considered as a national Loss? How many Millions have we spent to obtain that Trifle? If the M——rs had been determined to act like Pirates, they should have imitated the *superb Thieving* of the King of *Prussia* in invading *Saxony*, and not the mean-spirited Pilferers on the Highway. But by their Behaviour in this Particular they have branded this Nation with the Stigmata of Inhumanity and Piracy, as they had before with that of Folly, by our suffering the Imbecillity and Profligacy of their Administration. And yet such Men *you* have the Hardiness to defend.

THE next Assertion which you make is as replete with *Truth* as the former is with *Humanity*, you say, “ It cannot be denied, while
 “ our own Trade never was better nor more
 “ generally protected in any Period during
 “ a War, the Trade of our Enemies never
 “ suffered more at the same Time.” You mean, I suppose, when we took the *French* and they return’d, or did not take, our Ships.
 “ The Consequence of which is, that the
 “ homeward bound Ships from the *French*
 “ Settlements are from 40 to 55 *per Cent.*” This those very Merchants to whom you write will deny; they know that 40 *Guineas per Cent.* is the highest which has been given for the Insurance of *French* Merchandize from those Parts; 10 and 12 *per Cent.* are things of no Consideration, and indeed ought not to be to a Man determined, as you are, *per fas et nefas*, to vindicate a ruinous M——r.

THOSE very Merchants also to whom you write, will inform you, that the contrary of this Attention to the protecting our Trade is true, and that, when they petition’d for a stronger Convoy for their Ships to our Sugar Islands, through Apprehension of *Perrier de Salvert’s* superior Squadron, they were denied, and answer’d, that *Salvert’s* Squadron was

greatly magnified. They know also that *Jamaica* as shamefully open to the hourly Invasion of the *French*, thro' Neglect of a sufficient Squadron; and that the Trade of the other Islands is in the same ruinous Condition, from a similar Inattention; and the Neglect, if it deserves no worse Appellation, of *Minorca*, is that a Proof of M——l Attention to the Care of *English* Commerce? Tarry till next Spring, and then decide whose Commerce has suffer'd most, that of the *French* or that of *England*; unless, happily, some superior Understanding presides over the Affairs of this Kingdom, and prevents the approaching Mischief.

You then recount what Squadrons have been fitted out and commanded by *Boscawen*, *Hawke*, *Byng*, *Osborne*, *Hawke* again, and lastly *Byng*, once more, for the *Mediterranean*; what is the shameful History of these Fleets? Have not the Cruises of all been render'd ineffectual by their Insufficiency and the ill-judged Stations to which they have been destined? what Merit is there in fitting out Navies, when such unparallel'd Imbecillity renders the whole Effect abortive? You then add, "That much licentious Invective has
" been thrown out, at random, on that To-
" pic

"pic by those who of all Men knew the
 "least of what they were to condemn or ap-
 "prove." We shall soon discern whether
 you are not more ignorant than those you dare
 to condemn: You then tell us, "This Squadron
 "was not only design'd to intercept *Du Guay*,
 "but even *La Mothe* and *Salvert*; and that
 "*Du Guay's* going from *Lisbon* to *Cadiz*,
 "render'd the Conjecture extremely proba-
 "ble, that he was to join those other Squa-
 "drons in their Return, at some fix'd Ren-
 "dezvous, and by that Means secure their
 "safe Entry into *France*." Now to whom
 was this *extremely* probable? Was it to the
 M——e M——r? Do you speak this
 from Authority also? If you do, you and
 that sagacious Head are the only two to
 whom it has ever appeared *barely* probable;
 and if your Ignorance of Geography did not
 surpass every thing that can be imagined, if you
 knew Land from Sea, in the Map, you could
 not have uttered such things. You say, *Du*
Guay went from *Lisbon* to *Cadiz* in order to
 join *La Mothe* and *Salvert*; that is, *he* did as
 you have done in this Defence, he went en-
 tirely out of his Way. *Louisbourg* lies a-
 bout the Latitude of 46, *Brest* of 48, the
 Course from *Louisbourg* then from this last
 named City is East a little Northerly; *Du*
Guay

Guay at *Lisbon*, about the Latitude 39, 136 Leagues distant from the Course to *Brest* from *Louisbourg*, not being sufficiently out of the Way, however sails to *Cadiz*, which is more than twenty Leagues farther out of the Road in Latitude, and almost as much in Longitude, with Design to meet *La Mothe* and *Salvert*: was there ever a Man who pretended to write upon naval Expeditions so ignorant of the Map? But then to mend this Matter, and justify your M——e M———r, you say, Mr. *Hawke* was destin'd to cruise where he did, to intercept them all; and if you speak this from authentic Accounts also, you have proved your M———r even more ignorant than he was conceived to be before, a thing which most People thought impossible; because Mr. *Hawke* being station'd off Cape *Finisferre*, about the Latitude 43, was five Degrees, that is reckoning only sixty Miles to a Degree, a hundred Leagues south of the Course from *Louisbourg* to *Brest*; if then the M——e M———r had suggested a Rendezvous of *Du Guay* and the *Louisbourg* Squadrons, and therefore station'd Mr. *Hawke* off the Cape, does he imagine that *Du Guay*, who must know of *Hawke's* Station, would not have inform'd those of it whom he was appointed to meet, and have avoided,

as he did alone, that Fleet under Mr. *Hawke*? You are excellent in the Science of Defence. Have not you justified this Station of Mr. *Hawke* to Admiration, by this New Light you have thrown upon it? How reasonable it is to admire both the M——e M——r and *yourself*, the more one is let into the *Knowledge* of *you*. But I ask Pardon for omitting to take notice that *one* Ship of the *Canada* Squadron was taken (the *Irish* way) by being *not* taken at all, for she sunk; another of greatly *superior* Force was *engaged* by *one* of our cruising *Frigates*, the *Frenchman* was finely paid going I warrant you; and a *Third* escaped by our Ship that chased carrying away her Topmast; and you might have added, so did all the rest by the wrong Station of our Fleet by the M——e M——r, and not by Mr. *Hawke*; this would have made a round Account of it. Now, pray who knows most of what he has been talking, you in this Letter, or I in the Fourth to the People of *England*?

You now begin to improve greatly upon our Hands, and tell us, “ These different
 “ and necessary Steps, on the Part of *Great*
 “ *Britain*, produced, and could not fail of
 “ producing, in the *French* an *ardent Desire*
 “ of

“ of *Revenge*.” What, for escaping our Squadron, and for succeeding in their Designs in *America*? these, indeed, would be strange *Motives to Revenge*. You should have said, an *egregious Inclination to laugh*, and a great Contempt for the M—e M—r of E——d. Indeed the Treatment of their Fellow-subjects, which you so *tenderly* approve, did awaken them to the Desire of taking *Revenge*. You say also, that their Squadrons, after only a common Passage to and from *America*, could have suffered very little; and yet, Page 45, you tell us, that Admiral *Boscawen* return'd from near the same Place, by the same Course, in a very *bad* Condition, as the whole Squadron had suffer'd in their *Masts, Yards, and Rigging, were without Stores*, and lost *great Numbers* of their *Crews*. Now this would be surprizing in any Writer but yourself, that the *French* should be *little* the worse for a Voyage which had almost *ruin'd* the *English*; was this owing to the *French* being *better* Ships than *ours*? To the *Commanders* and *Sailors* being *better* to command and obey? to the *Forgetfulness* of our sending out *Stores*? were the *Winds* and *Waves* in *League* with *Lewis XV.* against *George II*? or what was the Reason? Neither of these. It was necessary in your *Defence* that our Fleet should

be

be *shattered* and *distrest*, to account for their being kept *at Home* from the *Mediterranean*; and the *French Fleet* in good Repair, to keep up in your Writings the *Idea* of the *Probability* and *Terror* of a *French Invasion*. But, methinks, you might have cover'd this with more Skill, and remembred when you were writing of the *English*, what you had said of the *French Fleet*. You ought to have a better Memory, according to the old Saying; and considering whom you intend to support.

You now grow formidable in your Accounts
 “ of great Bodies of Troops spread along
 “ the Coasts of *Picardy*, *Normandy*, and *Brit-*
 “ *tany*, *threat'ning* a Descent on this Island, or
 “ *Ireland*.” And you judge of the Inclination of
 the *French M—y* by the *Threats* of the Sol-
 diers. Besides, whatever Intention there might
 be against *England*, one would imagine that
 the Troops designed against *Ireland* would
 scarce have been posted in *Picardy* and *Nor-*
mandy, because the Navigation would have
 been long, and more apt to be interrupted in
 sailing down the Channel, than if they had
 been embarked at the Ports of *Britany* and
Guienne; but you are fit to read Lectures in
 Geography; “ and yet we had *repeated* and
 “ *sure Intelligence*.” Of their *Threats* you mean,

it could not be of their coming, I humbly presume; and indeed I believe, they *never* intended coming, because they *never* did come. But probably, from what appears in your Manner of Reasoning, you may have concluded they *were* coming, because they did *not* come; and I, that this Alarm was only contrived from a thorough Knowledge of our M——l Capacity, to amuse us, whilst they were preparing to invade *Minorca*. You then say, “*we* knew,” (meaning yourself and the Government I presume, from your repeating, “I say that all this was early “known to the Government) that they “meditated an Invasion of *Minorca*;” and what is execrable in *them*, “after they had “solemnly guarantied it to *England* against “all Powers whatever?” What against *themselves*, in Time of Hostilities? after you had been taking their Ships for many Months, and confining their Subjects to Jails and Death? the Breach of this Guarantying must certainly aggravate their Offence; being Guarantees against themselves. Do you conceive the *French* make Treaties to deprive the Nation of its own Powers after War is begun, like our M——rs in that between *H—r*, *E—d*, and with *Prussia*; and so attack *Minorca* with the left Hand because they are at War with us; and defend it with

the right because they have guarantied it to us?]
 You then add, “ In consequence of the In-
 “ vasion being known, the M——r was not
 “ so *ill* inform’d as hundreds, that do *not* be-
 “ lieve what they publish, have dared to
 “ assert.”

I am but *one* of these hundreds; and up-
 on my Word, *how little* soever the others
 have believed and asserted, concerning the
 M——r’s Ignorance of what was passing at
Toulon, I have always *believed* what I have
 published; and even, as you say, that the
 M——r was much *better* informed than I
 have *dared* to *assert*. And yet, I trust *you*
 will do me the Justice to acknowledge that I
 am not the most scrupulous in asserting what
 I know to be true; in this one Particular, we
agree then. But I should imagine the M——e
 M——r will not *agree* to thank you for what you
 have *asserted* here, because it may create an En-
 quiry, wherefore, after having received such
 good Intelligence, he did not, in consequence
 of it, proceed to *defeat* the Enemy’s Design
 at *Toulon*? Why a Fleet was not *sooner* sent
 into the *Mediterranean*, and a *stronger* after
 it had been so *long* delay’d? Why, when this
 M——e M——r knew that *twelve* were e-
 quipping at *Toulon*, he assured Mr. *Byng* that

five Ships only would oppose him, and no more than *seven* could be brought to Sea. Had not you better adhere to the Ignorance of the M——r for his Defence, and prove from the whole Tenor of his Proceedings, that he was *non compos mentis*; and therefore, tho' a proper *Object* of national Enquiry, not an *Object* of national Punishment? this may save his Head at least. Take my Word, the most convincing Arguments in his Favour, are to be drawn from this Side; and I think, (tho' probably you may suspect the Advice as coming from me) that a *Pamphlet* full as well written as this I am examining, would be very acceptable to the Public, and advantageous to the Cause of the M——r you are defending.

BUT alas, here again you grow extremely discreet, and whip yourself under a Secret, as a Mole does under Ground, because his Eyes cannot bear the Light of Heaven, any more than yours the View of Truth. You tell us four Months after *Minorca* is taken, it would be *premature* and *hazardous* to expose such Intelligence; and therefore, lest *Minorca* should be taken, twice, I suppose you meant prudently to conceal——what every one sees, and the Reason for so doing; it makes against your M——e M——r. “ This Decla-
 “ ration,

“ ration, you say, would be to copy after the
 “ pernicious Example of some other Writers,
 “ who, while they pretend to inform us, afford
 “ real and *dangerous* Information only to our
 “ *Enemies.*” And I suppose you would have
 them afford *dangerous* Information to our
Friends only, as you have done, in this Defence,
 to your Friend the M—e M——r. It is im-
 possible to omit observing how much your
 Secrets resemble those of him you would de-
 fend. In the Beginning of the War, he was
 very secret also, when nothing was to be
 revealed. “ Let it suffice then, you sub-
 “ join, for the present to say, that by a Let-
 “ ter from abroad, dated the 24th of *Dec.*
 “ you accidentally read in the Original, it
 “ appeared the *French* were then going upon
 “ an Equipment of a Squadron at *Toulon*, and
 “ that this Squadron was to consist of *twelve*
 “ Ships of the Line; those Ships were in effect
 “ got ready in about *two* Months after the
 “ Intelligence came; and failed to support
 “ the Attack upon *Minorca*, where they ar-
 “ rived the 18th of *April.*” And in this
 Place I find you are as good an Arithmetician
 as Geographer; from the 14th of *December*
 to the 14th of *February* makes two Months;
 this Fleet then from *Toulon* was two Months
 at Sea, because it did not arrive at *Minorca*
 till

till the 18th of *April*, a long Voyage for so short a Distance ; or it did *not* sail till the 14th of *April*, and was but four Days ; either you do not know that from the 14th of *December* to the 14th of *April* is four Months ; or you have said what all *Europe* knows to be false, take which you please, the Credit of the Ignorance or of the Falshood, or if you like both take them, indeed they are not equal to your Deserts. Now why was this Discovery (by means of this early Intelligence) not attended to ? Did the Letter come through *your* Hands to the M———r ? And did *he* know your Love of *Veracity* at that time as well as *I* do at present, and therefore believe that nothing *true* could come from *you* ? plead this in *his* Excuse next time you write, and this you can assert from your own *authentic* Intelligence *within*. You see how dangerous it may prove to the Nation to have Men, suspected of being *Liars*, about a M———r.

You now tell us, that “ Mr. *Byng* set sail
 “ from *St. Helen’s April* the 6th, and arrived
 “ in three and forty Days off *Minorca* ;” and
 then add, “ here doubtless, it will be, as it
 “ has been often already ask’d, Why there
 “ was not a Squadron in the *Mediterranean*
 “ early

“ early enough to have blocked up the
 “ *French* Fleet in Port, or to have intercept-
 “ ed it in its Passage to *Minorca*? And why
 “ for this *most* necessary Service it did not
 “ fail from hence by the Beginning of *March*,
 “ at the latest?” This indeed has been asked
 and never answered; I wish you better Luck
 than those who have preceded you; but we shall
 see. You then say, “ It will be asked again,
 “ why this Squadron, even when join’d with
 “ the three already in those Seas, was supe-
 “ rior in *Number* to the *French* Ships by *only*
 “ *one* Ship of the *Line*?” Indeed this Que-
 stion will never be ask’d; it may be enquired,
 why the *English* Fleet was *one* inferior?
Eleven to twelve *French* Ships of the *Line*,
 as the *Deptford* and *Portland* being but 48
 Gun Ships, are never reckon’d of the *Line*.
 Hence it appears, Sir, you either do not know
 that *twelve* *French* Ships are more than *eleven*
English, or what constitutes a *Line* of Battle
 Ship; and thus you exhibit another Proof of
 your Skill in Arithmetic, or of your Know-
 ledge in naval Affairs. Then you add, “ I
 “ have stated the Questions fairly, Gentle-
 “ men, and I will answer them with the
 “ strictest Truth.” Indeed you have mista-
 ken already in the stating, by two Ships;
 and you will *not* answer with the strictest
 Regard

Regard to *Truth*, as you shall see immediately.

To do this effectually you say, “ It is
 “ proper to take a Review of the State of our
 “ Navy during the Autumn and Part of the
 “ Winter : in these Months thirty-one Ships
 “ of the Line had been employ’d in cruizing
 “ to the Westward ;” to which you should
 have added *uselessly*. Thus the Fleet of
England, once so Formidable, became an
 unavailing Expence to this Nation, and the
 Object of Ridicule in the Eyes of our
 Enemies ; returning as you confess shatter’d,
 distress’d, disabled, during which time *many*
hundred Men, braver than himself, were also
 sacrificed by the sinister Conduct, or from
 some worse Motive, of *one* pernicious Man.

You then continue, “ Vice Admiral *Bos-*
 “ *cowen*, with the Ships under his Com-
 “ mand, to the Number of thirteen of the
 “ Line, return’d from North *America* about
 “ the Middle of *November*.” (Now I could
 tell you a Reason for this his Delay ; but I
 am determin’d once in my Life, to be as *se-*
cret as you.) “ Most of these were in bad
 “ Condition, had suffered greatly in Masts,
 “ Yards, Rigging ; and the whole Squadron
 “ was

" was quite bare of Stores, and greatly di-
 " minished in their Compliments of Men,
 " by Death and Disease." This is not yet
 quite bad enough, " the last Winter was di-
 " stinguished by being the most hard-hearted
 " and cruel, the most stormy and turbulent
 " under every Appearance, till near the End
 " of *January*, that has been known these 40
 " Years; these inevitable Accidents greatly
 " retarded the Cure of the sick Men, as well
 " as the refitting our Ships again for Ser-
 " vice." These Accidents indeed, had the
 Ships been at Sea, would have been very great
 Obstructions to their being refitted; but how
 the high Winds and high Waves at *Sea*
 should retard the refitting of Ships in *Chatham*,
Portsmouth, and *Plymouth* Docks, is
 not so easily to be comprehended; or how
 the Winds and Waves should affect the
 Sailors Health on Shore. You then tell
 " us, that those that were *dead, run away,*
 " and *render'd unfit for Duty*, had diminish'd
 " the Number so greatly that even unusual
 " Means could not supply the Navy." And
 here you should have added, *these Things were*
owing to the Want of Ventilators and of good
 Provisions on board, and to that inhuman Ty-
 ranny of forcing a liberal Race of Men from
 I their

their Families, which are dear to them, bound like Felons.

HOWEVER, it seems, notwithstanding this *Train* of unhappy Circumstances, twenty-five Ships of the Line, and three for Convoys, in all twenty-eight, were ready by the Middle of *January*; thirteen of these sailed *January* the 30th, and return'd in sixteen Days. Now, Sir, as you are pleased to tell us, that you saw a Letter dated on the 24th of *December*, which I conclude came to hand before the thirtieth of *January*, Why was that Fleet of Mr. *Osbourne's* not sent into the *Mediterranean*, after having convoyed the Ships to the Place he left them? And why was that *most* necessary Service, as you term it, at that time neglected? For as those Ships could be spared to convoy a Fleet for sixteen Days, notwithstanding the dread of an Invasion, could they not have been sent to save *Minorca*? Twenty-eight were ready, should not the three that went as Convoys have been detained, because the more important Service ought to supersede the less; the M——— then, if an Invasion was apprehended, acted weakly to deprive us of the Use of that Fleet for sixteen Days, during which time it might have been carried into Action; or if he was
under

under no Dread of that Kind, he behaved with great Imbecillity, or something more criminal, in not sending it to *Minorca*.

You then inform us, that Sir *Edward Hawke*, with fourteen Ships of the Line, set sail about the Middle of *March*, to cruise off of *Brest*; you then subjoin, “ Now it appears, by a true State of our Fleet, that not fewer than forty-nine Ships were employed at the Beginning of this Month (*March*) for indispensable Home-services; ” whereof it seems but *eighteen* were of the *Line*; consequently, however shewy the Number Forty-nine may appear, no more than eighteen ought to be deducted from the whole Number of the Line in Commission. Now where were the rest, and what Truth is there in this Expedition of fitting out Ships attributed to him whom you would defend, when eighteen of the Line only were ready for Sea. You tell us after this, “ that there remained in Port, *not under Orders to proceed to Sea*, forty-six Ships of the Line.” And how many under *Orders to proceed to Sea* you do not choose to mention. “ Of these, twenty were only in a Condition for Service, had their due Numbers of Men been complete: but in these

“ they were deficient by Two thousand Two
 “ hundred and Fifty-six. The Comple-
 “ ments of the other twenty-six Ships a-
 “ mounted to Thirteen thousand Seven hun-
 “ dred and Forty-eight. But from this Num-
 “ ber, deducting the Officers, Petty-officers,
 “ and Servants, there remained only about
 “ Two thousand Two hundred Foremast-
 “ men ; as there could be no other imme-
 “ diate Way of furnishing out the Comple-
 “ ments of the twenty Ships, ready in all
 “ other Respects, it is undeniably evident,
 “ that the doing so, would have stripped
 “ the other twenty-six of almost all their
 “ Foremast-men.

The first Observation, on this Part, is that
 in giving this Detail, you say, “ That twenty
 “ Ships only could be fitted out, besides
 “ those under sailing Orders.” Pray let
 me ask you, Are sailing Orders irrevocable ?
 And if they are not, why were they not con-
 tradicted for the sake of that *most important*
Service, the Preservation of *Minorca*, which
 you knew had been menaced ever since
December ? Do you act like a Lover of
 fair Representation ? by screening the true
 Number of *fitted* Ships, in excluding those
 under sailing Orders, is not your Design seen
 through ?

through? And when you assert that taking Two thousand Two hundred Foremast-men would deprive the twenty-six Ships of *all* their Foremast-men, do you not play the Sophist most egregiously? You first tell us, to excuse a Fleet's not being sent into the *Mediterranean*, that but twenty Ships could immediately be *mann'd*; and exclude those under *sailing Orders*. And then to excuse their *not* being completely *mann'd*, that taking Two thousand Two hundred Seamen from the other twenty-six Ships, would have strip'd them of almost *all* their Foremast-men.

Now, Sir, according to your own Way of reckoning, that Ships unman'd, tho' in Commission, should never be carried to the Account of active Ships, till their Crews are complete; as there were but Two thousand Two hundred Seamen amongst the twenty-six, the taking these Hands would probably not have render'd any *one* Ship inactive; because, if so few Men were equally spread amongst *all* these Ships, then, not *one* of them was near ready for the Seas. And therefore, not *one* could be render'd *useless*; and if these Two thousand Two hundred Seamen had been

dis-

disposed in a Manner to make whole Crews, then about *three* Ships only could be deprived of their Hands. Thus, instead of stripping twenty six of their Crews, and thereby rendering so many Ships ineffectual, as you would insinuate, from taking Two thousand Men; in the first Manner, of disposing these Men, they would not have deprived the Kingdom of the Use of *one* Ship, because none were a Quarter complete in their Crews; and in the second Manner, *three* Ships only could have been render'd inactive, because the whole Amount of Foremast-men did not exceed the Crews of so many capital Ships. Now at a Moment when all Europe was convinced of the Danger of *Minorca*, and you and the M—e M——r had known it, why in the Month of *March*, after repeated Intelligence of the Design at *Toulon*, were not those Men taken to complete the Crews of the Ships which wanted them? and why were not the sailing Orders of those Ships remanded, and others given whereby to have completed a Squadron for the Preservation of *Mahon*? This would effectually have prevented the whole Scheme of attacking *Minorca*. Now, Sir, need I intreat your serious Attention to these Particulars?

*lars? is not what you have adopted, taken from
uncertain Memoirs and deceitful Suggestions?*

BESIDES what has been already said, there is yet another Reason which will perfectly efface all the palliative Defence, that you have made. Even supposing that the Ships were so few as you affirm, and were necessary at home at that time, whence arose this Necessity? Was not the P——t of E——d then fitting? Was not a Militia-bill the ardent Pursuit of all who loved their Country? Why then had this Act, so necessary for the Preservation of every thing dear to honest Men in this Island, been rejected? Why had it not been pass'd the preceding Year? since Fleets were then known to be difficultly mann'd, and much Service must be inevitably wanted from them, to protect our Trade, Colonies and Possessions: by this Means all the Men of War almost might have been destin'd to the *useful* Service of their Country, and not rode at *Spithead* in mock Parade for your M——e M——r to go on board, hoist his Flag one Day, and then, as Admiral absent on Leave, receive a thousand a Year of the Nation's Revenue ever since; infamous Instance of the Thirst of Money in *him!* and Profligacy in *those* who acquiesce in

it. Why don't you insist upon it, that *ONE* Family ought to engross all the Riches and Honours of the Nation.

Answer these Things, and then tell me, whether Ignorance or Design, Avarice or Patriotism influenced most in this Conduct. As a farther Pretext for keeping the Fleet at home, again you tell us, "The *French* Troops were all along their Shore, and that the small Craft was numerous in their Ports, and that they had it in their Power to insult this Island whenever our Inferiority should furnish them the wished-for Occasion."

And here you must permit me to tell you, that all the Navy of *England*, destined as that was at *Spithead*, cannot prevent a Descent on this Island coming from *France* in small Craft; and that the stationing a Fleet on that Account, on that Spot, is as erroneous and absurd as the destining Mr. *Boscawen* and Sir *Edward Hawke* has been proved to be. Whatever Invasion shall come in small Craft from *France* will undoubtedly be sent from the Ports of *Flanders* and *Picardy*, because the Passage is much the shortest between the Coasts of those Provinces and those

of

of *England*, and particularly in the Winter Months, small Craft cannot dare to transport Troops where the Distance is great; this Craft, rendezvous'd at *Dunkirk*, *Calais*, and *Bologne*, would certainly have waited a fair Wind to come over: the Wind then blowing from South-east to North-east would have landed all this Craft, either on the Shores of *Kent*, *Sussex*, or *Essex*, untouched by any Fleet from *Spithead*, the very Winds which are so fair to bring over the *French* being contrary to the Fleet of *Spithead*, if it should attempt sailing to oppose their Landing. To protect the Island from a Descent of small Craft, a *Spithead* Expedition will avail nothing; and a Squadron before *Brest* prohibited the coming out of their Ships of War. Thus even had our Danger been ever so great, from small Craft, a Fleet kept at home would have been ineffectual. Would not these Ships then have proved more sensibly employed in defending *Mahon*, which they could have saved, than *England* which they could not? If you say, that a sufficient Number of Ships were then in the *Downs* to prevent the Embarkation and Descent in small Craft, then those at *Spithead* were still more useless; if you answer there were not, which as that is the *Truth*, probably you will not; then why were those Ships detain'd at *Spithead* which

were necessary in the *Downs*? Besides this, every expert Seaman knows, that Ships of the *Line* are of little Service to prevent a Descent made in the Night, in small Craft, and across so narrow a Channel, as that between *Flanders, Picardy, and England.*

Thus, Sir, you have clench'd the Arguments which have been already urged against the M——r by your manner of defending him; and when you exhibit your awkward and ill-judged Pathos of throwing a *Veil* over a *Scene in your Eye*, a kind of bungling your Eye, I presume, you let fly an Arrow against the M——r, which wounds more fatally than any thing which has yet parted from me: You say, “ Had a Descent
“ been then attempted; had they even sa-
“ crificed Fifteen or Twenty thousand Men
“ in the Attempt, What must have been the
“ Consequence to this great Capital?” Then you choose to *veil* it in your *Eye*, and ask the Merchants, if they don't entirely feel your Reasons for so doing. What can be a more envenom'd Satire against those M——rs you are defending, than suggesting that Fifteen or Twenty thousand Men would have produced a Distress which *you* are afraid to look upon? for that is the *English* of the *Veil* and the *Scene*. Good Heavens! that you, a Sub-

Subject born to Freedom, should renounce the *Love* of your *Country*, the first Christian and Pagan Virtue, and have the Face to defend the Actions of M——rs, who you confess have reduced and left this once opulent and powerful Island, containing *two Millions* of Men able to bear Arms, open to Invasion, and to suffering such *Scenes*, as *even you* are afraid to look upon, from *fifteen* or *twenty thousand Frenchmen*. How similar in their Lives and Characters are those who defend the Destroyers of their native Land to the Men they dare to justify. I hope there are but three Men more in the Kingdom who would dare such an Action, *S—e*, *B—w*, and *T--k--r*. And this wretched State to which *England* is reduced, it is that the Merchants feel so intimately when they read your Defence.

After all the Danger and Distress of that *Scene* in your *Eye*, express with such puffing Pathetic, you tell us, “ The Ad—n did not
 “ look upon it as a Measure taken absolutely
 “ at *Versailles*, nor as the only one in the Plan
 “ of that ambitious Court ; they were fully
 “ apprised of the Preparations carrying on
 “ at *Toulon*, and they were aware that ei-
 “ ther of these Schemes might prove the
 “ Feint or Reality ;” and therefore very cunningly provided against *neither* of them.

Not against *that* for the taking *Minorca*; the Event has proved, not only by not sending Succours and a sufficient Fleet, but by sending none that could arrive till long after they must have been assured the *French* were landed. And you, by confessing the Danger we were in from Fifteen thousand Men, have acknowledged, as well as by the stationing of the Ships, that this Island was equally neglected. You then say, “ This *French* Fleet might sail thro’ the Straights of *Gibraltar*, either to succour their Colonies in North *America*, or to put our Fleet in the Ocean betwixt the two Fires of the *Brest* and *Toulon* Squadrons.” You mean, I suppose, by *might*, it was barely possible; but was it more probable than their attacking *Constantinople* by way of reducing *England*? If your M—e M—r knew the Fleet was sitting at *Toulon*, he knew the Nature of the Ships which were engaged for transporting the Troops; these were chiefly Tartans, Vessels adapted to the mild Seas and short Voyages of the *Mediterranean*, as little able to bear the Storms of the *Atlantic* Ocean as you are to defend the M——r. Was it probable then that these Ships were designed for *America*, particularly when it was known that the Duke *de Richlieu* was to command the

the Expedition, who would as soon attempt to defend your Writings as a Voyage to that Part of the World? And pray, were the *old Women* and *live Oxen* to go to *America* in Tartans also? Was this probable to any Heads but such as yours and of those whom you defend? Improbable as this must appear, the coming with all this Apparatus of two hundred Transports, to put our Fleet between two Fires, is yet even more incredible and ridiculous. Could that from *Toulon* and that from *Brest* have met as regularly as the two Parts of a Pair of Scissars, and have cut off our Fleet betwixt them? If not, one coming before the other, must, as it was inferior to ours, probably have been beaten, and, not unlikely, the other after it; and surely they would not have incumber'd themselves with so many Transports in such an Undertaking. But let us suppose either of these was the Design, was the *Toulon* Fleet therefore to be neglected, and not a sufficient Force sent to oppose it? Thus you see that the Head and Heart had been left exposed to Danger, if the two Fleets, according to your own Account, had taken ours between two Fires, and the Limbs have been as little taken care of also; for I believe that those two Fleets, after engaging ours off of *Brest*, where their Superiority would most likely have

have given them the Victory, might have proceeded directly to the Heart, for any Interruption that the Fleet which you have described could have given them; and thus, according to your Way of thinking, the delaying a Fleet for the *Mediterranean*, lay open the Head and Heart of *England* to an Invasion.

BUT now you come to tell us, our most *vigorous* Endeavours however were used to secure *this* Part of the *British* Dominions likewise; as well as to send out a *Force sufficient* for our *Colonies*; that is, on the second and third of *March*; two Months after you acknowledge the having seen a Letter which gave an Account of the *Toulon* Squadron and Expedition. You say, *our*, that is, *yours* and the M——e M——r's most vigorous Endeavours were used to secure this Part of the *British* Dominions also. I am afraid that this *Vigor* in preparing a Fleet is pretty much like a *Vigor* of another Kind, for which he has been no less remarkable. At this Distance of Time, you say Orders were first issued for pressing from Protections, and laying an Embargo on all Merchant-ships. Now pray, why were these Orders so long delay'd? Do you imagine
your

your Note asserting that *March* is the ordinary Month for fitting out Ships will be an Excuse for the Delay? The Merchants will tell you that *January* and *February* are equally so, and where would you drive the Sailors in any of these Months more than in *March*, when an Embargo was laid on the Merchant Ships? And why were the Ten Ships *first* order'd to be fitted out on the *third* of *March* for the *Mediterranean*, when you and the M——r had certain Intelligence of the *Toulon* Preparations in *December*? Then you say, “From this fair Deduction of Particulars, it follows clearly, that a Squadron of equal Strength could not have been dispatch'd to the *Mediterranean* consistently with the Security of this Kingdom. And thus much in Reply to the first Question.” Now, tho' this Reply has been evidently proved to be totally insufficient, I shall immediately show you that your last Words are all a Falshood, and that a much greater Fleet might have been spared, *consistent* with the *Security* of this Kingdom.

WE now come particularly to the Case of Mr. *Byng*; where you tell us, “the ill Success of our *Mediterranean* Squadron has given Occasion to say, that a greater Force
“ should

“ should have been sent. Let us see then,
 “ whether we could have reasonably spared
 “ more Ships at that Time; and to judge of
 “ this, we must look *impartially* into the
 “ State of our Fleet at Home, just before the
 “ Squadron in question put to Sea. Exclu-
 “ sive of it, and Six Ships more for the Co-
 “ lonies, there remained either cruising or
 “ going to cruise, Twenty-six; and in Har-
 “ bour Twenty-four, *not under sailing Orders*.
 “ Of the latter, Nine only were otherwise
 “ ready, could they have been manned; but
 “ they wanted of their Complement above
 “ Eleven hundred; and the Six Ships design’d
 “ for the Colonies wanted Three hundred and
 “ Seventy-seven. The remaining Fifteen, of
 “ the Twenty-four in Harbour, were either
 “ fitting or refitting. They muster’d about
 “ Eight hundred Foremast-men; however
 “ you say, by means of these, and stripping
 “ one Ship, it would be just possible to man
 “ the other *eight*; and then Thirty-four Ships
 “ of the Line were the whole Force we had
 “ to employ in Services at Home; of which
 “ it was now indispensably necessary to have
 “ *nineteen* cruising before *Brest* and *Roch-*
 “ *fort*.”

HERE,

HERE, I fancy, it will be proved, you did not know the State of the Fleet, or have designedly misrepresented it. It appears that some of these were actually cruising. You should have told the Number and of those going to cruise also. Do you imagine that Ships being *named* to cruise, is a sufficient Reason that they shall not be *countermanded*, when a greater Service requires them? Their being *destined* to cruise then, is no Justification for their not being sent to the *Mediterranean*, tho' their being on actual Cruise may. And yet, even in this Case, those should have been recall'd for this *most* important *Service*; as all lesser Advantages ought for ever to yield to the acquiring greater, when both cannot be obtain'd. But, "thirty-four, (you say, exclusive of Mr. *Byng's* and the *Common* Squadron) were all that could truly be reckon'd fit for the Sea; and the whole Force we had to employ in Service at Home; of which it was now indispensably necessary to have *nineteen* cruising before *Brest* and *Rochfort*." Here, Sir, you misrepresent or forget; Sir *Edward Hawke* had sail'd, according to your own Account, the 12th of *March*, with *fourteen* Sail of the *Line*. Now if nineteen were judged neces-

fary to cruife before *Brest*, five additional Ships would have completed that Number. For certainly you don't mean to fay, that the former fourteen were to be join'd by nineteen more, in all thirty-three Ships, or to be changed after a three Weeks Cruife. Thus, instead of nineteen being wanted, five only of the thirty-four were necessary; and then the remaining Number would have been twenty-nine, besides Mr. *Byng's* Squadron, and that for the Colonies. Is it not Pity that such an *impartial* Writer, such a candid *Lover* of Truth, a *Man* divested of all Design to serve any *Cause* but that of his *Country*, should have so short a Memory? Thus, Sir, you have given a false Representation, according to your own Way of stating the Navy; and as Things did *not* stand as you represent them, all *your* Reasons deduced from thence must fall to the Ground; and your Arguments, which were offer'd for not sending a Fleet into the *Mediterranean* in *March*, and refuted, are here again proved to be absolutely insufficient.

You affirm also, " that there was not the
 " least apparent Necessity for sending a Fleet
 " sooner than this under Mr. *Byng*;" tho'
 you have already said, you were acquainted
 with

with the *Toulon* Preparations as long since as *December*. And then say, "That ten Sail, " with three already in those Seas, making " in all eleven of the Line, and two Forty-eight Gun Ships, composed a Strength superior to any the *French* could have there, " even according to the largest Accounts." And this, after you have told us, that you knew in *December* the *French* Fleet would consist of twelve Ships of the Line. You increase every Minute in the Goodness of your Memory, or your Love of Truth. And such a Fleet you say, " might probably have ensured Success." But how was the M——r sure that Mr. *Byng* and Mr. *Edgecumbe* could join? We shall see immediately if this Probability was well founded.

THE next Thing you enter upon, is the Equipment of Mr. *Byng's* Fleet; in which you as strenuously adhere to the Truth, as you have all along. You declare no Fleet was ever better equip'd, or mann'd with abler Hands. As to the Equipping, the contrary is remarkable; not a Store-ship, Fire-ship, or Hospital-ship, Things never omitted till then, was to accompany so large a Fleet. These, three essential Particulars then, were wanting in the Equipment; the *Intrepid*

also, which arrived at that Time, was given in at *Spithead* to the Admiral, by Captain *Young*, as unfit for a foreign Voyage; because she had made so much Water thro' her upper Works, tho' the Ports were caulk'd, that he had been obliged to skuttle the lower Deck, to let the Water into the Hold, in order to be pump'd up: in this Condition she sail'd. One of the Squadron was not well equip'd then; besides which, one or two more of the Fleet wanted careening. Your next Assertion is, " That the *Toulon* Squadron " was ill mann'd, made up of the Sweepings " of *Toulon*, old Men past Service, and Boys " not come to it." These things are easily said, though the contrary is easy to be proved; but supposing the Fleet ill manned at its leaving *Toulon*, it was much otherwise on the Day of Battle; the Admiral had all the Sailors of two hundred Transports to add to his Crews, and then to choose the best for his Squadron, and put the worst to look after the Transports at Anchor; and by this Means no Fleet was ever better mann'd than that of *La Galissoniere* on the Day of Battle. What Regard then is there to be paid to what you say? You then stop to make an Observation worthy so keen an Understanding, " that " Ships though in Commission, yet not pre-
 " pared

“pared for the Seas, ought not to be reckoned fit for Service.” Which is as shrewd as my old Aunt’s Observation, that *Sampson*, though the strongest Man, could not put on his Breeches before he had them.

You then say, “With such a Squadron, that is, with ten Ships of the Line, Mr. *Byng* set sail the 6th of *April*; and that it is with equal Shame and Indignation you pursue the Sequel of the Narrative, wishing it to be buried in Oblivion, for the Disgrace it has brought on the *British* Flag, and the fatal Disasters consequent on that Disgrace, by ONE MAN’S ———, but let the Justice of the Nation give it a Name.” And I add, fix who that ONE MAN is, if they are not already unanimous that this Misfortune is owing to the same MAN, who has never station’d one Fleet right since the Beginning of the War. Then you are taken with a fit of Tenderness about condemning the greatest supposed Criminal, just after you have been exerting every thing but Truth to condemn him in your Readers Opinion. Are not you, in fact, the Thing you pretend to abhor, unjust, ungenerous, and a-kin to Cowardice?

AND

AND in this Place you must excuse my choosing to insert a few Things which you have *chosen* to suppress, it is the different Behaviour of Mr. *Byng* and the M——e M——r for a little while before the Admiral failed, and then ask you a few Questions.

IT most undeniably appears, that the hastening out the Fleet was not the Pursuit of the M——e M——r, because at Mr. *Byng's* Arrival at *Portsmouth*, he was ordered positively not to man his Fleet out of the *Torbay, Essex, Prince Frederick, Colchester,* or *Greyhound*, or, if possible to be avoided, with any Ships Crews in a serviceable Condition, under the Notion of being wanted on more pressing Service. Was not this done with Design to delay his Departure as much as possible, and preferring the inferior to the superior Object, as no such pressing Service has ever since wanted them?

DOES it not seem to coincide with the Idea of giving up *Minorca*, all along so visible, by still detaining the Means of Relief? On the 21st of *March*, in the Evening, the Admiral received a Letter from the Secretary of the A——ty, at the Command of Mr. *Fox*,
pressing

pressing the utmost Diligence in getting his Squadron into sailing Order, explaining the Necessity he was under of being ready for immediate Service in the *Mediterranean*, and inclosing the Reasons in an Extract of a Letter from Lord *Bristol* at *Turin*, to Mr. *Fox*, communicating the Intention of the *French* to invade *Minorca*.

In answer to this, the Admiral expresses his using all possible Dispatch, and that in *eight* or *ten* Days he hoped to be ready; at the same time accompanying this with a State of the Ships, intimating thereby that from these, if an Order was dispatched to him to take what were ready, he might be at Sea in a few Hours.

And here, not to do as you do, lump the Ships cruising and not cruising, under sailing Orders and not under sailing Orders; I will give you the Names of those that were at *Portsmouth*: There was the Admiral's Division of ten, besides this, the *Prince* of 90, the *Prince George* of 80, the *Invincible* and *Torbay* of 74, the *Monmouth*, *Yarmouth*, *Essex*, *Nassau*, and *Prince Frederick* of 64, the *Nottingham*, *Princess Augusta*, and *Anson* of 60 Guns; all these Ships, twelve of
the

the Line, were full mann'd, or had more than their Complements.

IN the Harbour, the *Royal Ann* and *Duke* of 90, the *Barfleur* of 80, the *Swiftsure*, *Bedford*, and *Elizabeth* of 64, the *Bristol* and *Colchester* of 50, the *Romney* 40, the *Greyhound*, *Gibraltar*, *Nightingale*, and *Unicorn* of 20 Guns. All of which except the four first were mann'd.

TELL me then, why the M——e M——r did not immediately order a Squadron to proceed to Sea, and increase it by the Means of these Ships ready for sailing; particularly as Mr. *Kepple* was ordered by the Letter received, in answer to Mr. *Byng's*, to sail as soon as possible with the *Effex*, *Gibraltar*, and *Unicorn* on a Cruise? These might have been added to the *Mediterranean* Squadron, without lessening the home Defence? Why did he not order full mann'd Ships to be taken, and change the *Intrepid*, and those that wanted Careening, for Ships perfectly equipt? Why did he not order the Admiral to man his Fleet immediately from the others? Why did not he add three Line of Battle Ships to the *Effex*, and join them to the *Mediterranean* Squadron? Three Ships could
not

not have preserved this Nation. Why did the M——e M——r delay the Fleet from the 25th of *March* to the 6th of *April*, after the Letter came to Mr. *Fox's* Hands and from him to the Admiral, by not doing as is just said, and by still ordering Mr. *Byng* to man his Fleet from Tenders and Hospital-ships only; and then not till the *Sterling-Castle* was provided with her Complement? These are Things which you did well to hide amongst your Instructions, not fit to be revealed, for the same Reason that this was concealed. Is there any Man who can longer believe even such Ignorance as the M——e M——r possesses could have been the sole Cause of this Delay, especially after Mr. *Fox* had order'd him to expedite the Fleet and shewn him his Intelligence? There must be some other Reason in this premeditated Delay; I wish I was not convinced that the Duke *de Mirepoix* had Two hundred and Seventy-four thousand Pounds remitted him from *France* a little before he left this Kingdom.

Putting all these Things together, is it credible that *Minorca* was ever intended to be relieved; particularly when it is observed, that the general and subaltern Officers

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of

of the Regiments at *Mabon*, to the Number of sixty, were all the Time of this Preparation at *Toulon* suffer'd to remain in *England*; that Six thousand Troops offer'd to this Court by the *Modenese* Minister, were refused; and that no Reinforcements were sent, nor Reward paid to *Blakeney's* Request, who is but now suffer'd to return, hoping, as they were, that old Age might close those Lips from uttering such Truths as must undo the M—r.

AND lastly, when it is farther remarked, that a Fleet even *beaten* before the *French* had landed in *Minorca*, could have saved the Place, because it would have had a Harbour to retire to and refit, and supplied the Garrison and Island with Men to repel the Enemy.

As to the Determinations of the Council of War, you will excuse me if I believe that those Men on the Spot, Judges of the whole Affair, have founded their Decision on better Reasons than you have conceived to found your Conclusions on; and when you tell us they reason'd amiss in determining that *Gibraltar* was in danger if the Fleet was *beaten*, and that it ran no danger at all because it has not been *since* attacked. I will allow you the Force of this Argument, if you please,

I

taking

taking the same Advantage to myself also, that this Kingdom has *not* been in danger of an Attack, because it has *not* been attacked; and therefore our whole Fleet might have been sent on real Service: Besides, the Defence of *Gibraltar* was one Article in Mr. *Byng's* Orders. The Council of War then were not more out in their Judgment than the M——e M——r. How impartial you appear in the Representations and Inferences which you make in the two similar Cases of *Gibraltar* and *England*.

You now come to “ Mr. *Byng's* arriving off *Minorca* at the very Time that a Commander of Spirit and Enterprize would have wished precisely to arrive,” as you declare; and then you add the Reason, “ because such a Commander had an Opportunity of engaging the Enemy's Fleet, and *probably* ruining the whole Undertaking, with most Reputation to himself and most Glory to his Country. Could a *Greenville* or a *Drake* arise for a Moment from the Dead, to pronounce upon this Opinion, I am confident, by all they thought and acted upon similar Occasions, they would heartily confirm it.” And I am confident that as you have been *confidently* wrong in all you have said hitherto, that you are in this

also, and that *Greenville, Drake*, and you may add Admiral *Warren*, are of Opinion, that in comparing the two Actions of the M—e M——r and Mr. *Byng*, that of the first in the Channel, and that of the latter in the *Mediterranean*; if your Friend deserved a Barony for that Action, *Byng* deserves a Dukedom for his, and if *Byng* deserves Death, the other deserves it with Torture; for certain it is, the Success of that Action in the Channel was entirely owing to the superior Skill and Courage of Sir *Peter Warren*; and if being distant from the Enemy is a Crime, how great is that of the M—e M——r, who was not within nine Miles of the Enemy during the Engagement? why is he seized with Horrors at the Word CHACE? and had not Sir *Peter* broke thro' the Orders of the Commander in Chief, the whole *French* Fleet would have escaped, as too many did by the preposterous Behaviour of the Man you dare to defend. Wherefore an Examination of Mr. *Byng* and him, as Commanders in the Day of Battle, may probably be given to the Public hereafter. Let me now enquire on what you ground your *Probability* of all this Glory to Mr. *Byng* and the Nation; this will be best done by comparing the two Fleets.

FIRST the *English* and *French* Fleets were equal in Number of Ships. From this Circumstance no *probable* Advantage could be drawn in favour of one Side above another.

La Galissoniere was superior in Number of Guns, according to the M———l Account, by twenty-two, and according to the true Account, fifty. Here the Probability of Success is against Mr. *Byng*, as much as fifty can influence in 932 Cannon, which is equal to a Fifty-gun Ship; thus *La Galissoniere* in this Respect was thirteen to twelve against *Byng*.

IN Weight of Metal, the Shot of the *Foudroyant* exceeds that of the *Ramillies*, in each general Discharge, by five hundred seventy-two Pounds, almost a third of the whole Weight; in Men allow'd for Small-Arms, the same Superiority exists in Favour of the *Foudroyant*, as may be seen in the *Appeal to the People*. Thus then on account of these superior Powers, if you add, a Third of the Number Twelve, to *La Galissoniere*, the *French* will be increased as sixteen to twelve; and then taking in also the Number of fifty Guns, already mentioned, as another Ship, the

the Enemy's Fleet must be considered as seventeen to twelve. Now, Sir, on what *Probability*, in Favour of *England*, could an Admiral of Spirit and Enterprize found his Expectations of ruining the Undertaking of the *French*? Nay, had he conquer'd, is there a *Probability* of his being able to keep the Seas and relieve *Mahon*, as he had no Soldiers to land, and his diminished Crews would have required all his Hands to navigate his Ships, through fear of being attacked in returning home? Are not you as excellent at calculating Probabilities as in the Knowledge of common Arithmetic, measuring Time, Acquaintance with Geography, Love of Truth, and Service of your Country? Now do you still believe, the Probability of Success remains on the Side of *England*, if *Greenville* and *Drake* could be Judges? You then let loose a Rant "about a dastardly half-soul'd
 " Race — Romantic — Visionary — Gallantry
 " — Nobleness of Spirit — *Britain* — de-
 " generate Pirates and Free-booters; that
 " our Commanders solicit Employments,
 " not for the sake of glorious *Danger*, but
 " to wear the Livery for humbler Motives." Is not this the Scurrility you complain of? This I am afraid hits as hard as any thing can well do upon your M—e M——r,
 whose

whose Voyage round the World was more of that piratical and free-booting Order than any I remember, and who, snug from *Danger*, at present wears the Livery and is paid for only having hoisted his Flag at *Spithead*, dined on board with the D—e, as Admiral, on Leave of Absence from that time to this. Had not you better have blotted out this Passage?

You now tell us, the *French*, discovering the *English* Fleet, sent for a Reinforcement from the Duke *de Richlieu*; and that those Men were sent out in Tartans to the Assistance of the Fleet. And then you ask, if this is not a Confirmation of the bad Condition in which their Fleet put to Sea? Now these Men were all *Land Soldiers* to increase the Number of Small Arms; an admirable Proof of the Fleet's Want of *Sailors*; just as good as if I should infer that having no Beef a-board Ship, the Fleet wanted Water; or because you have not *common* Sense in your Arguments, that therefore you want a *good* Stomach. The Numbers on-board were still, notwithstanding the taking these, and preventing more, as 17 to 12; was not that Superiority enough? Indeed I think with you, *that Day* of *Battle* will be long remember'd by the
 Friends

Friends of *England* with Pain ; and I hope will be mark'd with exemplary Justice on those who conspired [to produce the Calamities which it has already, and must hereafter, bring on this sinking Nation.



You now, as you advance, grow more refined in your Observations ; and pronounce
 “ that the taking One hundred and six Men,
 “ Officers and Soldiers, in two Tartans, was
 “ *particularly* encourageing ; and might have
 “ been interpreted without much Superstition
 “ into an Assurance of Victory.” And why ?
 “ Because every Circumstance to confirm
 “ the Bold, or animate the Fearful, concurr-
 “ ed on our Side, the Sailors all in high Spi-
 “ rits, the Officers determin'd and eager to
 “ shew themselves *Englismen* ;” and how
 do you know but the *French* were as high-
 spirited, and as eager to shew themselves
Frenchmen ? “ And the Wind blowing all
 “ Day long to favour our Attack ;” which is
 no Favour at all, unless the Admiral had been
 prepared with Fire-ships to send in amongst
 the Enemy's Fleet to Leeward ; and those
 your M——e M——r had not permitted to
 accompany him. Now do you and the saga-
 cious head you are defending believe that high
 Spirits, Eagerness, and a fair Wind, ought
 to

to create an Assurance of Victory combined with the taking two Tartans and One hundred and six Men, against an Enemy's Fleet which was as seventeen to twelve ; and all the other Circumstances upon an equal Footing ?



I shall now wave your next Paragraph, and tell you the Reason. Admiral *Byng* has never entertain'd the least Idea of justifying himself to the People, concerning his Conduct, except in relation to the Parts of his Letter, which were castrated by the M——r ; and this with Design only to take off that popular Prejudice which had by means of those Omissions, and other mean Artifices, been raised against him : that his Fate might not, under the People's Resentment, be *determined* by his Enemies, to skreen themselves, and satisfy the Nation ; whose Anger they had so artfully contrived to be kept alive against him.

You say, “ You can give no Account of “ his Behaviour on the Day of Battle ; ” As good as *you* have given of any other Part, I am convinced ; but tho' *you* can *not*, Mr. *Byng* will ; and such as your M—e M——r *would* give one half the Bocty of his Voyage round the World to be able to produce in





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favour of his Conduct. Mr. *Byng* wishes to be tried, and seeks no Compact to prevent Justice and the Day of Trial, as those Men do, whose whole Endeavour is to cede their Places on the *scandalous* Conditions of *no* Impeachment; and which it is presumed, the Men who have so far proceeded to serve our Country, will exert every Endeavour to prevent; obtaining *Justice on our domestic Enemies*, ought to be the Cry of every honest *Englishman*. Wherefore, it is astonishing to the honest Part of the Nation, that whilst Mr. *Byng* is close confined for what is now even in the worst View considered as a much inferior Crime, the great Author of our present Evils, by wrong Conduct, from Ignorance, or some more iniquitous Motive, is suffer'd to be at *large*, and probably to escape the Nation's *Demands* for *Justice*, by flying into the Lands of those to whom he has so remarkably proved the Friend,

HERE again you return to a Fit of Tenderness, and Abhorrence of the popular Aversion to Mr. *Byng*, and those who have promoted it; in which I can scarce believe you are sincere, because you must then *bate* the very *Man* you are defending, who has been the most instrumental in those Disgraces to our national Character.

racter. But probably you wish to suppress this Spirit in the People, thro' Fear that hanging and burning the M——e M——r may one Day become as common as that of Mr. *Byng* has been.

You then finish your Paragraph by saying, “ Another and a more equitable Tribunal than that of popular Fury, must determine what we are to think of this Day's Action, and of this Gentleman's Behaviour ;” and I hope of the M——e M——r's: Or, I conclude, the People of *England* will never rest satisfied under the Ignominy and Injury which has been brought upon the Honour of the Crown and Nation.

You now call *The Letter to a Member of Parliament*, in Favour of Mr. *Byng*, a *Libel*; What then is *your Defence*? But let the Author of that Letter take Cognizance of you on that Account, and I will tell you where you may see sufficient Proofs that your M——e M——r had determined to serve himself by the Admiral's Destruction; in the *Appeal to the People*, which you have never mention'd, tho' publish'd long before your Defence, and for good Reasons; otherwise, without such Intention, would they have cut out of his

Letter his Justification for not returning to *Minorca* after the Battle, the Ships being so greatly damaged, the Sickness of the Sailors, and no Hospital-ship? his not being able to preserve *St. Philip's*, from having no Soldiers? his doing all he could for the Citadel, before the *French* appear'd in Sight? and the great Damage he had received from the heavier Weight of Metal, and Inferiority of his Ships? Other Parts would have told you of the neglected State of *Gibraltar*; the Admiral's Resolution of returning to seek the Enemy as soon as refitted; and how necessary in his Opinion and in fact, a Reinforcement was towards Success in relieving *Makon*; and lastly, his retiring to cover *Gibraltar*; which made one of the Articles of his Orders. Are not these Omissions then so many Proofs that Mr. *Byng's* supposed Errors were to be augmented, and their own *real Ones* excused?

IN the same Sentiments of preserving the Idea of Mr. *Byng's* Delinquency, before the Eyes of the People, and themselves from being observed; it was reported, he had sold forty thousand Pounds out of the Stocks: with a View of insinuating, that he set out with a Determination never to return. That
 he

he had taken Money formerly before *Genoa* : to intimate he was capable of being bribed. That a Ship got into *Mabon* the Day of the Battle, to prove he might have done the same ; then he and Mr. *West* were sent for Home to be confined ; and Mr. *West* permitted his Liberty without a Witness examined, to insinuate one guilty and the other innocent ; and all this on the sole Evidence of the Enemy's Letter. Then the Judgment of the whole Council of War was depreciated, to add to the Crimes of the Admiral. He was then escaping, running mad, attempting Suicide ; after this the *honest* Informer in the *Evening Advertiser* was put upon his Back to *inform* the People of his Crimes. All these Things having been proved false, and maliciously invented, are they not so many Particulars which prove that he was destin'd the Scape-goat of a pernicious M——r ? and as all these Attempts have turn'd against those who design'd them against Mr. *Byng*, you now come in once more to recall the People's Resentment upon him, and to defend the M——r ; both which are equally impossible. You then ask, if his Saying, " every one was of Opinion he could be
 " of no Use to General *Blakeney*, as by
 " all Accounts no Place was secured for
 " a Landing, is the Language of Courage ?"

Yes,

Yes, and of Prudence too, or every Officer in the Expedition must be condemn'd of Cowardice, a thing not easily to be believed. And because Mr. *Boyd*, in an open Boat, went out and returned to *Mahon*, you conclude that a thousand Boats might have landed Troops unmolested; and yet forget that the M——r ought to have sent Troops with him, if he intended any should have been landed before the Engagement; and, after it, the Condition of Mr *Byng's* Fleet would not have permitted him if he had carried them out with him.

FROM what has been said, does it not fairly follow, that all which *you* have asserted, in defence of the M——r, is exactly like what *he* has done for the Nation, false, and pernicious? Nay, may I not venture to affirm, that had all that you have uttered been true, it could have been no Vindication of the M——r.

How could this have justified his raising such enormous Taxes, on a harrassed People, six times the Sum which was levied at the Revolution? His Profusion of the public Money, gotten by the hard Labour of the industrious Natives, squander'd in *German* Schemes,

Schemes, on mercenary *Hanoverians* and *Hessians*; concluding contradictory Treaties, affronting *Russia*, renouncing *Austria*, disarming and keeping disarmed the *English*, exempting foreign Hirelings from the Laws of the Land, spreading Corruption every where, preferring Men of infamous Characters in the Church, to the Neglect of Learning and Piety, excluding Men of Sense and Integrity from the M——y, selecting those who are void of Principle and Understanding, added to what has been already proved, completing an Accumulation of Guilt, that no M——r, till now, has ever heaped together, nor this Nation ever beheld,

TELL me then, with what Face you could presume to call this an impartial Examination of the Conduct of the Ministry, who have not dared to speak of their Capital Delinquencies, and have only confirmed the contrary of what you intended to have justified ?

To promote the Service of my Country was the Cause of my writing, and as far as you have proved to the contrary hitherto, nothing but Truth ; and if I eat my daily Bread from this Service, no Man has ever yet lived on
honest

honester Bread than that which passes my Lips ; for as long as the Endeavour to preserve the Liberties and Constitution of a Nation shall be deemed honourable, so long must my Attempts be esteemed amongst Mankind ; this nothing but my own Fault can ever deprive me of, and till I have forfeited my Right to it, nothing can divest me of a Pleasure which lives continually in my Breast, that I have assisted in removing the Destroyers of the Kingdom from before the King and People, and that the very Men, who must save (if it be yet possible to preserve) this Country, have espoused the same manner of thinking, and are chosen for that very Reason : I have the Nation adopting and uniting in what I say ; you the iniquitous Dependants of more iniquitous M——rs ; and though you say in the Beginning, that you have done every thing to avoid being imposed upon and imposing, you bear through the whole such deep-burnt Stigmas of Falsification, that Ignorance, great as yours, cannot cover them from the Eyes of your Readers.

Who then deserves the Name of Libeller, you who dare to Attempt the screening Men who have brought their Country to the brink of Ruin, or I who have held out a Light

to the People to warn them of approaching Destruction? If mine be a Crime, it is laudable silently to behold a House in Flames and never attempt to extinguish it; to see Thieves robbing my honest Neighbour, and not endeavour to oppose it. If yours be praise-worthy, to plunder and consume in Flames are honest: and which you would probably perpetrate also, for your Advantage, could it be done with Impunity. As I now know that the Acquisition of your Fortune, from not being trusted with a Loaf, has risen from *defrauding* your Country, and *starving* the unhappy *Prisoner*, who, the Moment he becomes a *Captive*, in all generous Minds, *ceases* to be an *Enemy*.

IN defending the M——r you strive to defend *yourself* in vain, with whom you have long been a close and iniquitous *Associate*.

No wonder then you express such Antipathy to Gallows-makers, when seeing over whose Heads they hang, and reflecting on your Deserts, you tremble to think how near they are to your own, especially should the *Magnanime* and the Six thousand Pounds, with other similar Circumstances, shoot a-cross your Mind at the same time.

As to myself, I have no personal Pique against those who have lately been eminently superior in Power and Destruction, nor personal Esteem for those who at present promise their Endeavours to save this Land; equally unknowing of and unknown to each. I entertain no Chagrin from Denial, because I have never asked; I have never expected, and therefore can never have been disappointed, and would rather *live* and *die* like *Massaniello*, the bare-footed Fisherman of *Naples*, and be instrumental in saving my Country, than enjoy all the Riches, Honors, Posts, and Power of the Lord ——— and his Family, in the manner which he has obtained them. But let it be your Employment to persist in justifying the Ruiners of your Country and Fellow-subjects, and mine the laying open their nefarious Designs, then let the World decide whether I most resemble the *Incendiary*, who writes Letters to extort Money from the Worthy; or you a *suborn'd Evidence* in favour of *Accomplices* more criminal by this *Defence* which you have written for the M——r.

F I N I S.

E R R A T A.

Page 12, l. 13, after *restored also*, dele ? ; p. 27, l. 10, dele " ; p. 28, l. 22, for *what Place*, r. *what higher Place*; p. 42, l. 26, for *preach*, r. *follow*; p. 46, l. 2, r. *Jamaica is as*; p. 55, l. 26, for 14th r. 24th; l. 27, for 14th, r. 24th; l. 28, r. was *almost two*; p. 56, l. 4, for 14th, r. 24; l. 5, read *is*, dele *most four*.

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