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Are There Lessons for India and Pakistan From the Argentine-Brazilian Nuclear Rivalry?

Hal Klepak and Donald Neill

Prepared for the
International Security Research and Outreach Programme
International Security Bureau


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Department of Foreign Affairs
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Ministère des Affaires étrangères
et du Commerce international

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PREFACE

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views or positions of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade or of the Government of Canada.

The International Security Research and Outreach Programme commissioned a study to assess avenues for action concerning international efforts to promote nuclear arms control and disarmament with regard to Indo-Pakistani nuclear proliferation issues, in light of the peaceful resolution of the Argentine-Brazilian nuclear rivalry.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The test detonation of nuclear devices by India and Pakistan in the summer of 1998 surprised many and engendered renewed worldwide calls for proliferation controls. Despite the resultant international condemnation, both states have forged ahead with the development of delivery systems, command and control technologies and nuclear doctrine. The danger of further proliferation, to say nothing of the potential for a nuclear conflict in the subcontinent, has led governments worldwide to seek options for mitigating the problems these developments have created and, if possible, roll back India and Pakistan's nuclear programmes.

A similar, albeit not so far advanced, nuclear stand-off between Argentina and Brazil was resolved in the early 1990s, when both states, despite a long history of poor relations, agreed to dismantle their respective nuclear weapons programmes. Security perceptions and military governance gradually gave way to democratization and social discomfort with the nuclear option, while the desire for domestic stability and American investment eased the transition. While similar conditions exist in India and Pakistan, the problem is exacerbated by dominant external security threats (China and, from Pakistan's perspective, India), religious differences, the simmering Kashmir conflict and the perceived need for nuclear technology to bolster industrialization. Popular support for the nuclear option in both nations complicates the issue, as does the fact that with the 1998 tests, both states crossed a significant line.

A number of diplomatic, aid-oriented and arms control solutions are available to Canada to help mitigate the India-Pakistan nuclear crisis. However, international solutions to this problem will, by virtue of the size of the two states in question and the advanced state of their nuclear development, be large, difficult to design, and even more difficult to implement. The Government would be well advised to proceed cautiously, in concert with like-minded allies, and with due regard for the legitimate security and domestic concerns of the states involved.

RÉSUMÉ

Les essais d'explosion d'engins nucléaires menés par l'Inde et le Pakistan au cours de l'été 1998 ont surpris bien des gens et ont suscité une recrudescence, dans le monde entier, des appels au contrôle de la prolifération des armes nucléaires. En dépit de la condamnation de ces essais par la communauté internationale, les deux États ont poursuivi la mise au point des systèmes de lancement et des technologies de commande et de contrôle ainsi que l'élaboration d'une doctrine nucléaire. Le danger d'une prolifération accrue, sans parler du risque de conflit nucléaire dans le sous-continent, a amené les gouvernements du monde entier à chercher des options pour remédier aux problèmes découlant de ces événements et, si possible, réduire les programmes nucléaires de l'Inde et du Pakistan.

Une situation nucléaire semblable entre l'Argentine et le Brésil, quoiqu'à un stade moins avancé, a été résolue au début des années 1990 lorsque les deux États, malgré leurs mauvaises relations de longue date, ont convenu de démanteler leur programme nucléaire respectif. Les préoccupations de sécurité et les gouvernements militaires ont progressivement été remplacés par un mouvement de démocratisation et par un sentiment de gêne éprouvée par la société face à l'option nucléaire; le désir de maintenir la stabilité intérieure et d'attirer l'investissement américain ont par ailleurs facilité la transition. Bien qu'on rencontre des conditions semblables en Inde et au Pakistan, le problème est aggravé par de sérieuses menaces extérieures à la sécurité (la Chine et, du point de vue du Pakistan, l'Inde), des religions différentes, le conflit qui fait rage au Cachemire et l'impression qu'il est nécessaire de posséder des technologies nucléaires pour soutenir l'industrialisation. L'appui de la population à l'option nucléaire dans les deux pays vient compliquer la question, tout comme le fait que les deux pays ont franchi une étape importante, lors des essais de 1998.

Un certain nombre de solutions diplomatiques, orientées vers l'aide et visant le contrôle de l'armement s'offrent au Canada afin qu'il puisse contribuer à régler la crise nucléaire entre l'Inde et le Pakistan. Toutefois, les solutions internationales en vue de résoudre ce problème seront vastes, difficiles à élaborer et encore plus difficiles à mettre en œuvre, compte tenu de la superficie des deux pays et du stade avancé de leur développement nucléaire. Le gouvernement ferait bien d'agir avec circonspection, de concert avec des pays d'optique commune, et en tenant dûment compte des préoccupations nationales et de sécurité légitimes des États concernés.

ARE THERE LESSONS FOR INDIA AND PAKISTAN FROM THE ARGENTINE-BRAZILIAN NUCLEAR RIVALRY?

This paper aims to provide a discussion of in what ways there may be lessons from the successful end to the nuclear rivalry between Argentina and Brazil for that of India and Pakistan. It is of course understood at the outset that the two rivalries are greatly different, and that the strategic contexts and domestic circumstances of the latter two countries are immensely different from those of their South American contemporaries. However, there is enough which is similar in the two contexts for one to feel that the study of how the ending of the Argentina-Brazil rivalry took place does have some lessons to offer those interested in a similar end occurring in South Asia.

INTRODUCTION

Nuclear weapons are of course not an unalloyed ill in the modern world. Much scholarship has suggested a major role for them in providing the kind of mutual deterrence between East and West that may well have ended up assisting in the maintenance of world peace rather than disturbing it over many years of the cold war. Be that as it may, the destructiveness of such weapons and the dangers inherent in their testing and use, visible to all at the end of the Second World War but evolved into much greater ones since, have made most of the international community greatly interested in seeing them abolished or at least greatly reduced in numbers, size, testing, and number of countries holding them.

This international drive has seen regional as well as global efforts to limit their development, testing, deployment, stockage, and transit. The most significant of the latter has of course been the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968, an ambitious project aiming at stopping the spread of such weapons to non-nuclear weapons states and limiting nuclear powers in terms of their arsenals of such weapons and their future status.

Despite major successes, the NPT has not of course been able to bring nuclear proliferation to a halt. A number of countries have become threshold states since 1968 and could cross that threshold to actual development and deployment of weapons in relatively short order. Others have unfortunately chosen to move forward with testing such weapons as part of nuclear programmes that included nuclear weapons as elements of national defence.

Some countries have, however, found it possible to pull back from the brink on the issue of nuclear weapons development. Despite the advantages those weapons could bring them in prestige, defence, deterrence, technological, and other senses, they have decided that the costs of such development were too high and the risks too great.

Two such states have been Argentina and Brazil, South American countries with a long history of rivalry and distrust. On the other hand, two countries which have not been able to reach such a happy state have been India and Pakistan, states with a shorter rivalry but one which has been

characterized by much greater levels of distrust and threat perception than anything ever seen in the Southern Cone of South America.

This paper seeks to show how the Argentines and Brazilians found it possible to pull back from the nuclear brink even though they could probably be classified as having been threshold states for some time when they chose to do so. What were the domestic and international factors that allowed this to happen? What obstacles had to be overcome in reaching that stage? Finally, and most important, are there lessons from this experience which can be helpful in the case of the India-Pakistan confrontation?

To do this, the paper will first give a brief description of the history and nature of the Argentina-Brazil rivalry, following this with its nuclear dimension. It will then address the question as to what were the features of the bilateral relationship, and the domestic situations in the two countries, which allowed for them to climb down from the confrontation to an extent where the nuclear option was no longer interesting for them.

It will then be time to discuss the India-Pakistan rivalry, again following it with the nuclear dimension added. The current state of play of the confrontation will then be discussed. Once completed, it will be possible to discuss the main differences between the two bilateral relationships, and address what specific differences arising from the nuclear question exist in the India-Pakistan context that did not in the Argentine-Brazilian. It will be important to assess what there is about the former case that makes it so much more thorny than the latter, as well as emphasise those elements of interest from the earlier case that might have resonance in South Asia.

Finally, something will be said about where there might be entry points for moving the India-Pakistan situation forward, especially those that might reflect South American experience. This discussion would end with the underscoring of those activities of the international community that might help to effect positive change.

It will be seen that through this historical approach to the subject, something in the nature of a typology for discussing the two contexts will emerge. In both cases, if to greatly varying degrees, one will see at play factors such as:

- the strategic context of each party, in particular the influence of internal and external threat perceptions on the development of nuclear policy;
- the strategic context of the region as a whole, to wit the impact of the larger strategic picture and the regional roles played (or not played) by major international actors;
- the influence of government and comparative stability of regimes. This is of particular interest given the instability of the two states in question, with Pakistan's due largely to the excesses of militarism, and India's, to the excesses of democracy;
- the relative influence of the armed forces of each state on the internal policymaking process;

- the influence of bureaucratic and scientific bodies on the development of policy and nuclear decisionmaking;
- the role (and potential roles) of the international community in influencing nuclear decisionmaking;
- the economic context of the players and their respective drives for modernization, industrialization and the betterment of the lot of the body politic;
- the importance of the quest for prestige and international recognition; and
- the role of nuclear power in answering the power generation demands of economic and industrial development.

It is important to acknowledge from the outset that although Pakistan and India will be compared and contrasted from the perspective of similar typologies and assessment factors, the relative impact of these factors on each state may differ widely. A balanced and open-minded approach is essential in order to ensure that the assessment of driving factors is not unduly biased ante-facto.

THE HISTORY AND NATURE OF THE ARGENTINA-BRAZIL RIVALRY

While the recent rivalry between Argentina and Brazil has rarely been as ferocious as many others in the world, it would be a mistake to underestimate it. For this negative relationship has been extremely lengthy and has brought the two countries to war twice since independence and into undeclared fighting, arms races, and all manner of other conflictual situations since well before that status was achieved. Thus despite its relatively benign nature in recent years it would be wrong to think of it as lacking depth or seriousness.

The Portuguese and Spanish crowns vied for influence in Latin America ever since shortly after Columbus discovered the New World in 1492. Papal concern over the outcome of that early rivalry led to the famous Treaty of Tordesillas which drew a line by Papal Bull between the parts of the non-Christian world which would be open for Portuguese initiatives and those which would be available for Spanish. That line went through what is now eastern Brazil, leaving the rest of the New World to the Spanish while rewarding the Portuguese with Africa and most of the East.

Needless to say, the Protestant powers, and even most of the other Catholic ones, gave little credence or legitimacy to this division of the world. The British and Dutch, and even the French, were to pay no attention of any serious kind to the Bull. Even the two Iberian powers were not above playing with its provisions. The Spanish in the Philippines and the Portuguese in Brazil quickly showed a highly elastic vision of the actual territorial limitations imposed by the agreement.

The Portuguese in particular paid little attention when it did not serve their interests. Spanish interest concentrated on the populated regions of great mineral wealth in Mexico and Peru, and while the River Plate came to have a significant role in transporting the products and needs of some of the mines, the eastern tip of South America appealed to them hardly at all. Even the Portuguese for long

concentrated their attention on more lucrative colonies in Africa and Asia.

Portuguese expansion inland was based first on the pursuit of slaves and then on the discovery of mines in the hinterland of Brazil which soon engaged the energies of Brazilian adventurers, known as *bandeirantes* (literally, carriers of the flag). As a result the Portuguese, despite their relative weakness in Europe, expanded deep into the heart of the continent and did so at Spanish expense. Some such expansion went southwards and struck the Spanish settlements along the delta of the River Plate. Here the Spanish resisted as they did not and could not deeper in the continent. And the centuries-long struggle for dominance of the delta began.

In the early 19th century, Argentina began a struggle for independence from Spain, and then the country fell into a state of anarchy and civil war that did not end until the 1860s and had some shocks still well after that date. The Brazilian experience could hardly have been more different. When Napoleon invaded Portugal in 1807, the royal family simply boarded ships of the Royal Navy and sailed to establish the imperial capital in Rio de Janeiro.

The subsequent evolution of Brazil is tied up with the presence of the royal family and the court in the country. Evolution it was when compared with the revolutionary events occurring almost everywhere else in Latin America. The independence of Brazil in 1822 was in many respects a dynastic issue although local nationalism played a major part in it. For a series of reasons, Brazil moved then to an essentially peaceful independence. Equally important, its new freedom was as a united monarchy instead of the quarrelsome and unstable republics that surrounded it.

Thus Brazil was able to increase the pressure on its newly independent neighbour Argentina as its domestic unity came into play. War over control of the delta and its ports occurred between the two countries in 1827 but settled little. British power put paid to such fighting over Uruguay when that country was carved out of the border zones, and especially the River Plate (Argentina), shortly afterwards. But the rivalry lived on.

The two countries still had border disputes in the regions near Paraguay but much more importantly, they began to play in the complex balance of power relationship developing in the whole of the Southern Cone of the continent. This led to war again in 1855 but this time Brazil merely backed one of the contenders in yet another Argentine civil war. Despite this animosity, the two countries came together in 1865 in order to jointly (and with the help of Uruguay) prosecute a five-year war with Paraguay. Such an alliance did not last, however and the two countries returned quickly to their mutual distrust and contradictory ambitions.

The last years of the monarchy in Brazil, overthrown in 1889, saw the rivalry continue but at a less fierce level. The end of the old century and the beginning of the new brought great change to both countries, a transformation that was to alter the relationship but not end the distrust. Both countries received untold numbers of European immigrants with Argentina getting the lion's share. The same was true of European technology, loans and capital. Argentina leapt ahead of Brazil and became a thoroughly European country in terms of race, language, urban society and much else.

While the South of Brazil was to know something of the same, the North, backward, rural and poor; made sure the national image did not take the same steps forward as did that of Argentina.

As the 20th century wore on, however, Brazil's great advantages became more manifest in power terms. The huge land spaces of the interior dwarfed those of Argentina, in themselves very impressive. Domestic disorders related to the Great Depression sapped much political energy in the more southern country and while there was some reflection of this in Brazil, it was on a smaller scale. Immigration, one of the keys to Argentine urbanity and progress, began to slip with the First World War and never recovered.

The impact of all this was not immediately clear. Brazil and Argentina had no occasion in the 20th century to test their relative mettle as they had had in the 19th. Despite poor relations in many senses, they restrained themselves and never actually went to war again. Instead, their disputes became more and more about prestige and leadership in Latin America rather than about *terre à terre* matters. Arms races were commonplace but despite temptations on several occasions, cooler heads prevailed and war was avoided.¹

Prior to the First World War, Brazil's foreign policy was handled by the exceptional Baron de Rio Branco. His policy was revolutionary in that it accepted the United States as a positive factor in inter-American life rather than a threat to Latin American independence and sovereignty. This policy was to last most of the 20th century but in the early days it allowed Brazil to lean on a powerful ally in its struggles with the viscerally anti-US Argentines.² When war came, Brazil alone in South America declared war on the Central Powers.

In World War II, Brazil did much more. It sent an infantry division to the Italian front, conducted joint anti-submarine warfare with the United States Navy in the South Atlantic, and allowed US forces to maintain the vital air bridge to North Africa from Brazilian shores. In return, the US made Brazil eligible for Lend-Lease provision of ships, aircraft, armoured vehicles, and much more. Meanwhile, Argentina remained anti-US (though pro-British), refused to declare war on the Axis until the very last days of the war (even then only in order to be allowed into the United Nations in the post-war period), and opposed hemispheric cooperation in support of the war effort.

The war was crucial in setting the scene for the changes in the bilateral balance of power one was to see in the post-war era. While Argentina began a steady slide from its impressive showing in the previous century, Brazil slowly moved forward to greater economic and military power, as well as greater social cohesion. The crisis of Peronism in Argentina had no equivalent in the neighbouring country and while Buenos Aires linked itself with a Britain in decline, Rio became

¹ See Helio Jaguaribe, *Novo cenário internacional* (Rio de Janeiro, Editora Guanabara, 1986), pp. 167-79.

² The story of Rio Branco's original policy *vis-à-vis* the United States and Argentina is given in Alvaro Lins, *Rio Branco* (São Paulo, Alfa-Omega, 1995).

increasingly connected with a United States enjoying enormous expansion.

The Rivalry in the Nuclear Era

Wartime governments in both countries had argued for autarchy in strategic affairs. This had been less pressing for Brazil than for Argentina because of the United States alliance but even in Rio the benefits of self-sufficiency in strategic affairs gained ground as an idea. In Buenos Aires, it became something of an obsession. Military officers claimed that the experience of the two world wars and the Great Depression made manifest the need for an ability to ensure national defence without access to Europe or the United States.³ As early as the Depression steel production linked to national defence needs had been set up and in 1941, a directorate-general of military production was created. By 1943, Argentina was producing its own tanks.

The nuclear era was then upon us. Argentina and Brazil were of course old hands at international politics by the time of Hiroshima. As mentioned, they were in an international rivalry and balance of power situation reminiscent of European traditional diplomacy. At the same time, both countries, but especially Argentina, considered themselves players of importance on the world stage and Western nations of some dignity.

Neither country had significant energy resources in either hydroelectric terms (later on this was to change) or in coal. Both saw significant and growing needs for energy for continuing economic development. The growth of the extraordinary city of Buenos Aires as more than just a capital and rather a European city in the midst of a still very Latin American *arrière-pays*, combined with the speedy electrification of the country in previous decades, emphasized these needs. Brazil's lesser industrialization made these requirements less evident but nonetheless present.

In addition, Argentina had significant quantities of uranium on its territory, a fact that helped stimulate interest in nuclear energy. Military reviews started to discuss nuclear weapons but few indeed considered the feasibility of Argentina acquiring such a thing. In 1950, Argentina founded the National Commission for Atomic Energy, the first of its kind in Latin America. For a decade and a half work centred around the preparation of human resources comfortable in the field and the eventual construction of research reactors.

Brazil was at this stage doubtless behind its neighbour in the nuclear field. Only in the mid-1950s did nuclear power get some priority and this was in the context of help from the long-standing ally, the United States, and its Atoms for Peace programme. A bilateral nuclear cooperation deal was signed in 1955 and two years later Brazil opened its first research reactor.

³ Enrique Obando, *Industrias militares en América del sur* (Lima, Centro Peruano de Estudios Internacionales, 1991), pp. 17-8.

Meanwhile Argentina's political decline was even more marked. The country's political situation was such that people began to think of it as ungovernable and this resulted in a military *coup d'état* in 1966. US reaction included a freeze in military cooperation, leading Argentina to turn to Europe for weapons and military equipment and assistance in producing its own. Two years after the coup, Argentina decided to construct its first nuclear reactor Atucha I, in cooperation with the German firm Siemens.

All of this occurred in the context of the beginning of what was to be called the "Brazilian miracle." A coup in Brazil in 1964 led to a military government that ensured national unity and stability at home, and this in turn attracted much investment from abroad. From 1968 to 1978 the growth rate in Brazil exceeded that of any country in the Americas. Demographic trends were already making Brazil beat its neighbour in population growth but now economic and industrial growth as well dwarfed the Argentine competition.⁴

Relations between the two countries did not improve at this time, despite military governments off and on in Buenos Aires and constantly in the new capital of Brasilia. Indeed, the nationalism of the two countries' armed forces at this time added fuel to the rivalry and Argentine sensitivity to its reduced circumstances increased the tendency to be annoyed by Brazil's continued successes and obvious moves to overtake its often rather smug rival.

This drift towards worse relations must be seen in the context not only of the two countries moving towards increased use of nuclear energy but also in ways related to the Treaty of Tlatelolco of 1967, banning the production and acquisition of nuclear weapons in the Americas but allowing for the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of the following year. The Tlatelolco accord was signed by both countries in 1967 but Argentina did not ratify it. And while Brazil ratified the agreement, it was on the condition that it would only apply when ratified by all Latin American states. Neither country placed its activities in the nuclear field under the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

As for the NPT, both Argentina and Brazil joined others saying the accord was merely a way for the established nuclear powers to stop others from acquiring the very weapons they had ensured already for themselves, as well as a means to maintain their technological dominance on the world scene. The promises by nuclear weapons states to cut or abolish their own arsenals were of course for many years *lettre morte* and this ensured considerable freedom of movement by non-nuclear states.

By this time the prestige of both countries was closely linked to the nuclear issue. Brazil in particular became active as not only a regional power but also potentially one with world status.

⁴ Details of economic and population growth over this period are given in Enjolras José de Castro Camargo, *Estudo de problemas brasileiros* (São Paulo, Editora Atlas, 1989), pp. 29-66. See also the interesting handling of these matters in "Brazil- unstoppable," *The Economist*, I(303) (25 April 1987), pp. 3-26.

Dreams of *grandeza* seemed possible of fulfilment as economic and demographic growth became tied to an active nuclear development policy. Arguing that peaceful nuclear explosions might well be necessary for national development, especially in the crucial Amazon region, Brasilia rejected out of hand arguments that it eschew such options. Argentina could not be seen to be behind in this and pressed on with its programme as well with similar arguments for its validity.⁵

Both countries saw nuclear energy, and potentially nuclear weapons capabilities, as ways to force their way into key international forums from which they were currently excluded. The Brazilians in particular pointed to recent French and then Chinese experience as showing that nuclear weapons were important not only for national prestige but also in order to be invited to the club where real decisions in the world were being taken. Military and nationalist regimes in both countries were likely to take such arguments very seriously indeed. The place of nuclear research in wider national technological programmes of development was also emphasized. It was simply not possible, Brazilian officials argued, to be in the scientific game if one excluded nuclear power from one's legitimate spheres of activity.

In Argentina, a further reason for nuclear research and power, and even for nuclear weapons, surfaced in these years. This was the "great equalizer" argument. It suggested, in classic geopolitical terms, that with Brazil outstripping Argentina in population, size of armed forces, to some extent quality of military equipment, economic and industrial production, and many other fields of national power criteria; Argentina could not afford to give up its relative advantage in nuclear power. Indeed, given Brazil's conventional and overall national strength, the now weaker Argentina would be obliged to develop nuclear weapons in order to stand on equal terms with its now stronger neighbour.⁶ Such a development would be in the armed forces sphere but of course its impact would be political as much as military.

Not much noise was to be made on these points, given the stark opposition to nuclear proliferation shown at this time by the great powers. However, it was possible to carry on with early development of nuclear power without unduly ruffling feathers of important countries, and later on turn such research to weapons development if needed.

The 1973 war shocked the world in terms of many nations' dependency on energy sources from abroad and especially with regard to the supply of petroleum from the Middle East. Price rises

⁵ Jorge A. Aja Espil, "Argentina," in Jozef Goldblat, *Non-Proliferation: the Why and the Wherefore* (London, Taylor and Francis, 1985), pp. 74-7.

⁶ Two sets of figures will illustrate the trends. In 1955, Argentina had a military establishment of 131,500 soldiers compared to 133,500 Brazilians. Twenty years later, Argentina had 133,500 while Brazil had moved to an establishment of 254,500 personnel. In 1960, Argentina's GDP was \$32.7 billion while Brazil's was \$55 billion. In 1980, the figures for the two countries GDP were \$62.6 billion and \$229 billion respectively. These figures come from Wayne A. Selcher, "Brazilian-Argentine Relations in the 1980s: from Wary Rivalry to Friendly Competition" *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs*, XXVII(2) (Summer 1985), p. 28.

for petroleum troubled both South American regional powers and more attention was suddenly given to nuclear questions. A year later, Buenos Aires decided on both a second nuclear plant and on greater autonomy in nuclear energy production through natural uranium for Atucha I. This would one day permit national control of the whole nuclear cycle.

The Indian nuclear test of the same period also acted as a detonator of increased interest in nuclear power. But Canadian reactions to their role in the Indian developments complicated bilateral cooperation between Buenos Aires and Ottawa on the nuclear side. Unilateral cancellation of cooperation agreements led the Argentines to be even more anxious to achieve independence of foreign collaboration in their nuclear programmes.

Brazil noticed with interest what it viewed as the growth in Indian prestige and international importance caused by the explosion. Suddenly, viewed from Brasilia, the Indians were being listened to in ways unknown before the event. After disappointments with the United States over IAEA safeguards in their cooperative efforts, Brasilia turned in 1975 to West Germany for the purchase of a maximum of eight reactors, a deal that would give Brazil the complete nuclear fuel cycle. Despite a storm of protest from Washington, the Brazilians were taking a major step towards a nuclear weapons option.

Argentina in 1978 began construction secretly of a uranium enrichment plant at Pilcaniyeu, one capable of producing each year from 1985 on some 500 kg of enriched uranium. The next year saw Brasilia launch what was called the "parallel programme" with most of the elements of a weapons programme. An open Nuclebras (Brazilian state enterprise) civil programme was to be one leg of the national effort, giving guarantees, based on imported technology, and aiming to develop a national nuclear energy plan for the whole country. The other leg was to be an "autonomous" or parallel programme, headed by a general officer, with homegrown technology and no safeguards. Although secret, the existence of a parallel programme was soon suspected by a number of countries.⁷

Everything suggested then that during the seventies and the early eighties the two countries were determined to develop a nuclear weapons capability. Nationalist and military opinion, dominant in both countries while they were under military governments, ensured the programmes' life and influential geopolitical thinking gave them their *raison d'être*. Tension was high as well at this time as a result of the halting of the Argentine armed forces' drive for war with Chile through the Papal intervention of 1978-9. Many in Brasilia felt Buenos Aires would search for another way of uniting public opinion behind the governing junta and that with Chile a difficult victim, Brazil might offer too much temptation to resist.

⁷ See Leonard Spector, *Nuclear Ambitions: the Spread of Nuclear Weapons 1989-90* (Boulder, Westview Press, 1990), pp. 243-4, and Hal Klepak, "Le Tango de la dénucléarisation: le duo Argentine-Brésil," in Albert Legault and Michel Fortmann, *Prolifération et non-prolifération nucléaires: stratégies et contrôles* (Québec, Centre québécois de relations internationales, 1993), pp. 367-418.

Pulling Back from the Near-Brink

How can it be explained that two countries with such advanced programmes in nuclear energy, ones with clear weapons capability objectives, could in only a few years have moved from mutual suspicion and a series of knee-jerk reactions to the actions of the rival state, to a situation of cooperation in nuclear matters which would be admired by most of the world? What were the elements pushing for improvement in the bilateral relationship and in the nuclear contest thereof, and what elements were working to sustain the negative picture of previous years?

The answer lies largely in the political situation of the two countries as the early eighties advanced. And the key evolution must be seen in the context of Argentina's internal and international politics. The 1978 near conflict with Chile (Argentine Special Forces were actually on Chilean soil when Papal intervention finally brought both sides sharply up) left elements of the Argentine forces spoiling for a fight and for an opportunity to unite the country behind the increasingly unpopular military government. In 1981-2 plans were made for either war with Chile or invasion of the British colony of the Falkland Islands, long claimed by Argentina and a source of great public frustration over many years.

The decision was of course made to go for the Falklands which were seized in early April 1982 with a miscalculation of the then state of British political resolve and military capabilities which seems inconceivable to most observers. Be that as it may, the Argentine armed forces were routed in a campaign that showed them to be poorly led, hopelessly divided in conducting the war (really one war for each armed service was conducted), and simply incompetent. Having shown for some time that they could not run the economy, the armed forces had now shown that they were useless at winning wars as well.

The result was a public outcry that brought the end of the military government the next year. A new civilian president Raúl Alfonsín replaced the military junta's head after elections that year and benefited from a vast public rejection of the military and all they had stood for in the "dirty war" against leftist armed movements at home and the Falklands shambles abroad. The new civilian government had its hands more free on foreign and defence policy matters than any for decades. The public perception of the armed forces could not have been lower and nationalist opinion makers, deemed partially responsible for not only defeat in war but also the collapse of the economy, had been totally discredited by recent events.⁸

Two years later, in very different circumstances, the military government in Brazil yielded power to one of a civilian stripe. Here, however, the military did not leave as a humiliated and

⁸ David Pion-Berlin, *Through Corridors of Power: Institutions and Civil-Military Relations in Argentina* (University Park (Pennsylvania), Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), pp. 63-74; and Alejandro Dabat and Luis Lorenzano, *Argentina, the Malvinas and the End of Military Rule* (Thetford (Derbyshire), Verso Press, 1982), pp. 145-56.

discredited part of the body politic. Instead, the armed forces left government as part of a "pact" with civilian political parties. The forces kept their prestige intact and gave way gracefully with timings for surrendering power that they themselves decided upon. Nonetheless, as of 1985 there were to be civilian governments in both Brasilia and Buenos Aires for the first time since the mid-1960s.⁹

This was to have enormous consequences for the bilateral relationship as well as for the two countries' nuclear programmes. It is important to realize, however, that even before these events there were some signs of change in Brazilian-Argentine relations and especially in the nuclear field. A point easily forgotten in the midst of discussions of the rivalry between the two countries is that throughout their independent history, they were quite able to forget their differences when greater priorities of a shared kind showed themselves. At various stages their foreign policies had aimed at shared objectives and this had been especially true in the 20th century. This may have particular resonance in terms of long-term progress in the India-Pakistan context. Those societies also over history have done things successfully together and not allowed their antagonism to halt entirely processes which might benefit both. But these occasions have been rare indeed since independence.

It is also true that elements of the military governments of each country were concerned about the dangers of the rivalry, and especially the nuclear side of it, as they moved closer to nuclear weapons capability. Prudence became more visible in the bilateral relationship as the two sides became aware of just how close they were to becoming nuclear powers. Each showed increasing sensitivity to the concerns of the other. Diplomatic activity as well as carefully phrased public statements demonstrated this effect. Doubtless this was a result of the arrival of democratic governments in both capitals and the new context of those civilian regimes finding their feet and troubled by potential dangers, as well as the more personal anxiety on the part of both Alfonsín and Sarney to keep the lid on potentially destabilizing nuclear matters. Those concerns carried the day despite military reluctance in both capitals.

Argentina was certainly keen to keep its perceived head-start over Brazil in nuclear matters, and Brazil equally wanted to enhance its prestige and move forward in the nuclear game, but neither was willing to take major risks on nuclear matters which might actually have a serious negative impact on the bilateral relationship. In this context the accord on the development of a joint hydro-electric complex at Itaipú appears to have been decisive. Mutual suspicions had held up the plan for many years but in 1979, following key Argentine concessions, a deal was made. Energy sources other than nuclear were to be much more available in the key northern regions of Argentina and the equally vital southern ones of Brazil.

⁹ This issue is given a good overview in Alain Rouquié, "The Military in Latin American Politics," in Leslie Bethell (ed), *Latin America: Politics and Society since 1930* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp.145-216, especially pp. 195 and 204-5.

Even in this context, it should be mentioned that as early as 1977 Argentina, facing what it saw as Western attempts to hamstring its nuclear programme, suggested to Brazil that the two countries could cooperate in their programmes with a view to lessening the impact of outside interference. It should be noted, however, that Buenos Aires was at this time also afraid of the impact of the deal Brasilia had just made with Bonn on nuclear cooperation and one should not make too much of this offer at this point in time. In a 1980 accord, Argentina agreed to furnish Brazil with zirconium for its reactor fuel and in return would receive from that country enriched uranium produced by the Resende plant. Despite military and nationalist governments in both capitals, mutual advantage and the need to reassure the other about one's intentions appear to have counted even at this early date.

It is interesting to speculate on how the balance between this desire to reassure the other side and the need to posture played out. While nothing has been written about the subject, it can surely only be that cooler heads were prevailing in defence ministries when something as serious as nuclear weapons was at issue. Such seriousness was after all a constant theme of both countries' relations with the rest of the world, including those with the United States. And finally, of course, there was a visible reluctance on the part of the military of both countries to actually discuss nuclear weapons as useful tools of defence policy beyond the exclusively deterrent role. All of this must be seen in the context of a still highly limited threat perception on the part of both players.

Later moves in the direction of *détente* mattered much more and were to have decisive importance. And again Argentina was at the centre of the evolving situation. In addition to the collapse of military influence and power in domestic politics, the 1980s also saw the collapse of the economy, long suffering but now shattered by policies consistently out of line with world trends. When the Alfonsín government yielded power early to that of Carlos Menem the economy could hardly have been in worse shape. Inflation running at thousands of percent had ruined the middle classes, had sapped the energy of the public and destroyed confidence.

The country simply could not afford expensive programmes, military or civilian. And funds for the nuclear programme were hit early and hard. Added to this was a realism, growing under Alfonsín but which under Menem became the rule of thumb for the country, which in effect accepted that in so far as the historic rivalry with Brazil was concerned, surrender was the only option open. Alfonsín had been a constant opponent of the nuclear programme since its inception, as had been his Radical Party. Indeed, only one wing of the Peronists actually favoured the acquisition of nuclear weapons, although others supported a civilian programme in line with national energy needs. Argentines increasingly saw that the costs of continued competition with their northern neighbour were simply too high to be any longer sustained. And in the context of greater realism, it was also conceded that more could be gained from collaboration with the obvious regional giant than could be obtained through continued confrontation.¹⁰

¹⁰ See the chapters on the late 1980s and early nineties in Silvia Ruth Jarabe (ed), *La Política exterior argentina y sus protagonistas 1880-1995* (Buenos Aires, Grupo Editor Latinoamericano, 1996).

In February 1985 Tancredo Neves, Brazil's new civilian president, met Alfonsín. The latter proposed a wide programme of nuclear cooperation, including guarantees and inspections, with a view to establishing greater confidence between the two countries. Neves was not as much a free agent as Alfonsín, whose military were quite cowed at this stage. Instead, he faced armed forces just recently in the saddle and well able to exert pressure on his government. And those forces were still keen on a nuclear programme. By November the two made a joint statement on nuclear policy and announced a mixed working group headed by their respective foreign ministries to sustain relations between the two countries in the nuclear sector. At the same time both stated that they would not acquire nuclear weapons.

It was of course easier for Argentina than Brazil to keep these promises. The armed forces were to keep their control of the Brazilian parallel programme for some time still. Some Brazilians were also suspicious of the Argentine offers, saying that Buenos Aires could make such proposals because it was further ahead than Brazil in this domain and had little to lose by freezing research at that time. But in August the new president Sarney announced to the Germans a reduction in Brazilian resources to be given over to the joint programme. This was going even further than the Argentines who nonetheless meanwhile signed their first treaty outlawing a nuclear activity, in this case, nuclear testing in the atmosphere.

Brazil even went so far in December as to invite the Argentines to visit one of their main nuclear centres. Alfonsín returned the favour for the next year. The next month the disclosure of secret bank accounts connected with the parallel programme was added to other disquieting information on related matters. While troubling for the Argentines in the short term, in fact these events strengthened Sarney's hand with the military. Cuts followed to the national body dealing with nuclear energy and its director resigned. Relations with Brazil were now improving so fast that Alfonsín was able to receive Sarney at the key centre for nuclear arms projects - Pilcaniyeu. The next year, Menem responded in kind, insisting that the high cost of the nuclear programme could simply no longer be sustained.

For the Argentines, internal political and economic contexts were added to international ones. In addition, on the international front, the Menem government did not hesitate to suggest that pragmatism would dominate. Contesting Brazilian, and indeed US, power had cost Argentina far too much in the view of the new government. Logic obliged the country to look for a reinsertion into the international community, especially on the economic front, if it was to launch the economy again.

Menem moved quickly to reduce tensions with the British over the Falklands (the 1982 war had still not been declared officially over by Buenos Aires as late as 1989), reestablish diplomatic relations with London, and establish a wide range of confidence building measures (CBMs) with Britain. Knowing that the route to better relations with Europe ran through London, Menem swallowed his pride and put the sovereignty issue on hold ("under an umbrella", as it was termed). One of the CBMs put in place was British assistance to strengthen relations between Argentina and Europe.

In addition, relations with the United States could not really be normalized until such time as some progress was made on the dispute with the United Kingdom. The reestablishment of diplomatic relations with London aided much in making this now possible. But other issues still rankled with the United States. One of these was the danger of nuclear proliferation in Latin America and the other was dangerous missile technology spreading to the region, especially in the case of the *Condor II* surface to surface missile. Menem could see the advantages, some would say the vital need, to move to placate the United States on both these issues. Pressure from Washington on each was fierce and rarely let up. And Argentine economic weakness, as well as its political isolation, placed the United States in an exceptionally favourable position to finally influence events on these matters after decades of a virtual impossibility to do so.

A context then existed for Argentina to accept the abandonment of not only nuclear weapons research but also of missile research potentially connected to it. The "great equalizer" argument simply lost all significant weight in the context of a rivalry which was being abandoned by Argentina as impossible to win. If one was going to abandon the competition with Brazil across the board in a context of regional cooperation replacing rivalry, then a great equalizer was no longer relevant. And this meant that Brazilian nationalists and military thinking would have to adjust as well. If Argentina was going to reduce its defence spending, as well as cut its nuclear and missile programmes in this context of the actual abandonment of the rivalry, the impact on Brazil was obvious. It would be possible to be magnanimous without fear and take the Argentines under one's wing, as well as question many of the military measures previously being taken because of the Argentine "threat."

It must also be said that at this time, and with the steady work of Itamaraty, the foreign ministry; the Brazilians were extremely subtle and intelligent in handling the period of deep crisis in Argentina. Brasilia insisted that Buenos Aires be treated in every sense as an equal each time there was an event of importance. At no time was there the slightest indication that Brazil was either looking down on the Argentines or treating them as a has-been. And the nuclear issue, far from being the main cross for both to bear, soon became a sort of showcase area where progress could be shown as both possible and profitable. In the context of the thorn it had been in the relationship before, this change was important indeed.¹¹

The year 1990 was to be key. Both sides showed increasing willingness, indeed keenness, to expand the areas of cooperation in nuclear matters. In November an accord allowing for bilateral inspections included as well a major integration of most parts of the two programmes. Given that both countries were now considered to have the means to rapidly move to arms production, this accord was crucial. The next year an accord was signed with the IAEA whereby the bilateral agreement was integrated into the system of international guarantees. And in the next years both

¹¹ Rut Diamint, "Argentina y los Procesos de verificación de las medidas de fomento de la confianza," in Francisco Rojas Aravena (ed), *Medidas de confianza mutua: verificación* (Santiago, FLACSO, 1996), pp. 197-232, especially pp. 204-12.

countries not only ratified the Treaty of Tlatelolco (the recalcitrant Cubans coming in as the last player) but also the NPT.

The "happy ending" appeared to have arrived. But analysts were quick to point out that it had been a "near run thing." If military or nationalist governments had continued to rule in one or both countries, things might have turned out very different indeed. If the Argentine armed forces had not been so thoroughly discredited, along with nationalist opinion in that country, anything would have been possible. If the Argentine economy had recovered earlier and without Menem's shock therapy, such pragmatism in international affairs might have been more difficult to achieve. If Brazil had really been determined on regional hegemony, temptations might have been too great to beg off early from nuclear weapons and the prestige that often goes with them. If both sides had not applied careful diplomacy to each stage of the last years of this story, nationalist opinion might still have carried the day.

Thus the South American nuclear story could have been very different from the one we know today. Indeed, it is a fair argument that a return to military government, or nationalist authoritarian regimes, might well bring calls for a return to nuclear programmes with weapons options. And a return to military government cannot be completely discounted in the future. Both countries, but especially Brazil, face stark social and economic problems, especially a spiralling crime wave, which may eventually make a return to a harder government more palatable. And the collapse of the Mercosur trading and common market proposal, which offers so much hope to the Southern Cone today, could lead to greater, not lesser, feelings of antipathy. Such scenarios seem far away but they do help to keep one's eyes open to the very special diplomatic, political, economic, civil-military relations and other contexts that played a role in bringing this rivalry back under control.

THE HISTORY AND NATURE OF THE INDIA-PAKISTAN RIVALRY

India and Pakistan received independence from the United Kingdom as late as 1947. They were thus almost a century and a half later in controlling their own diplomacy than were Argentina and Brazil. And their rivalry and disputes date from a mere half-century ago rather than two to five centuries. Thus it is tempting to say the problem is a more recent one, and of course in some senses it is. Furthermore, India and Pakistan were under the same administration with the Raj, while this had not happened with the two South American giants since the early 17th century. A complicated partition arrangement was expected to reduce much of the animosity between the founding peoples of what were to be two states emerging from the vast polity of British India.

Such thoughts do not, however, tell us much about the degree to which the disputes between the two South Asian countries are deep and pervasive. The sub-continent is a region of great and ancient cultures that have produced powerful states in the past. The Muslim tradition in Pakistan is impressive, and the country considers itself an inheritor of much of the great past of that religion, including links with an *ouma* (community) around the globe, and a history of military prowess and power. The Moghul Empire, a Muslim state, was the last to rule most of the region and gave way

only as the British were first seen to be active interlopers on the local scene. The Hindu religion is an ancient and widespread one as well with roots in much of Asia, and branches as far afield as southern and eastern Africa and the West Indies.

Under the Raj, there were differences between these two main founding peoples of India and Pakistan but many more among the large number of other groups making up especially what was to be the new Indian state. A policy of "divide and rule," normal under European and indeed Moghul imperialism, was perhaps in some ways more benign under London but was nonetheless extremely visible. Those divisions, already enormous, were not helpful when, once exacerbated by the politics of British India and plans for its future independence, they took more stark national and ethnic forms.

Partition took place under dreadful circumstances with enormous amounts of civil strife and vast numbers of dead and injured as the price. A dramatically and geographically divided Pakistan reached independence alongside a more ethnically divided India but one that was infinitely richer and larger. Problems of social and political cohesion under a united India were to have impacts on international relations issues of vast consequences in the newly independent context of 1947 and beyond.

The two countries nonetheless lived in peace for a number of years after the fighting over Partition. They did that despite a simmering conflict over control of the wide Kashmir region in the north, any number of trans-border difficulties, inherited unhappiness from the Raj and partition experiences, and more minor irritants. In 1965, India and Pakistan had their first real post-independence war but it should be remembered this was three years after India's first open conflict with China. Thus the automaticity of conflict may well be exaggerated by some. Indeed, the conflict was not very large either, however troubling it was to prove. There had been small-scale clashes in the disputed Rann of Kutch district in April and May of that year, and these were followed by a 22-day undeclared war, sparked by internal Kashmiri problems, which saw limited ground action take place. Air operations, except for very reduced air combat, was restricted to support operations and strikes at airfields and installations. And naval action entailed merely the Pakistani bombardment of Dwarka. A UN-sponsored cease-fire put paid to the fighting at that stage.

For the first eighteen years of independence, the India of Nehru was known for a peaceful diplomacy of great breadth. Foreign policy was activist, non-aligned, and inventive. Pakistan's was perhaps less noticed by the rest of the world, lacking size and a leader of Nehru's stature, but it took on a reputation for seriousness as well. The first round of war, however limited, shook the region. In the first place, it added to India's insecurities since it was the exacerbation of yet another conflict situation to be placed alongside the difficult one with neighbouring China. And it shook India's self-image as a pacific nation anxious to take a special part in fashioning international security. In the context of the preceding conflict with China, and the potential for some sort of joint reaction to it, the India-Pakistan war seemed to show that those two South Asian countries were somehow destined to remain in dispute.

When war came again only six years later, it was even more serious. This time India backed the break-up of Pakistan, the latter country losing what was to become Bangladesh to separatist forces determined on independence from Karachi. The rump of Pakistan now had only a fraction of India's population, gross national product, scientific and technical skills, territorial space, and potential. It felt much more exposed and insecure in the post-1971 world than before. These feelings were not helped by having neighbours, especially Iran and Afghanistan, who were often to make the region a hotbed for international intrigue.

Indian legitimacy as a state for a number of years was rarely seriously questioned in any very dangerous sense even though separatist movements of various kinds existed. It may well have been, as optimistic observers in the past asserted, that the very number and variety of groupings making up the union acts as a break on the excessive assertiveness of some. But this is clearly not perceived as such by Indians struggling to maintain national cohesion in the midst of growing ethnic nationalism. And Pakistan has suffered from even greater questioning of the state leading not only to the 1971 collapse of the two-section union between East and West Pakistan but to continuing separatist pressures since in what was the West and is now Pakistan *tout court*.

The Nuclear Dimension of the Rivalry

At the time of Hiroshima there was of course neither the Indian state which we know today nor Pakistan. There was one British India although, it must be said, an India waiting for the long awaited promise of independence to be fulfilled. The thorny issue of partition was soon upon the country although many hoped that it would not be as painful a process as it eventually proved to be. Be that as it may, the impact of the advent of the atomic era was perhaps understandably less in societies not yet independent or in charge of their own foreign and defence policy than it was in South America with its long tradition of independence and domestic control over policy decisions.

While this may in some senses be accurate, it is easy to understate the early interest of India in nuclear matters. In fact, through the influential scientist Homi Bhabha, the Tata Institute for Fundamental Research, already in existence in 1945, became fundamental for the development of Indian nuclear power. Faced with what would otherwise be a dependence on unacceptable foreign sources for specialists and fuel (India had little uranium), New Delhi opted virtually from independence for control of the nuclear fuel cycle as a national objective essential for effective national control of a technology deemed crucial for the future of the new state. And bureaucracies most closely linked to development strategies helped ensure this point of view remained to the fore.

Such a nationalist view fitted in perfectly with Nehru's non-alignment policies in foreign affairs as well as what was to be known as the "developmentalist" school of state planners. As Michel Fortmann has shown, India's early leaders wanted no dependence on foreign powers, priority to economic and technical development, autonomy in foreign policy, and active roles as a leader of the Third World, and in support of international peace.

Thus early on India saw nuclear power as a central element in a policy aimed at putting the country squarely in the lead among Third World countries where new technologies, independence, and activism were concerned. In the early years there was little idea of the military use of such technologies. When opening the first reactor in 1957, the prime minister made clear that such energy would never be used for what he termed "reprehensible" purposes. Such words convinced the major powers and without them Canadian and others' aid in the nuclear field would have been impossible to imagine.

Fortmann argues convincingly that the changes in Indian views on nuclear weapons, while certainly affected greatly by external factors, were by no means simply caused by them. He places the beginning of the elite and the bureaucracy's debate about the nuclear weapons option in 1959, well before the 1962 border conflict with China, that country's nuclear test of 1964, or the 1965 war with Pakistan. India was not certain how to react to these events and was hardly united as to the best policy to adopt. And while nationalist opinion frequently supported the weapons option, it was not united. For example, armed forces headquarters feared a programme that would hurt their budget for conventional armament. The government of the time was also sensitive to international opinion and feared great power negative reaction to a nuclear weapons programme.¹²

It is also worth noting, says Fortmann, that China was the main *point de repère* for the Indian debate on nuclear weapons, while Pakistan was totally absent from it during this period. Scientists' opinions were valued greatly and they had more influence than those worried about any sort of Pakistani threat. Indira Gandhi also had electoral matters in mind in yielding to the scientists and others asking for a peaceful nuclear explosive test even though she was conscious of the risks of a regional nuclear arms race.

In these early years Pakistan was much farther still from priority given to nuclear issues. This country, lacking the democratic experience and traditions of India, is of course also much more difficult to analyse. Few sources exist and discussions of the Pakistani nuclear programme usually bring out more heat than light. What is clear is that in the 1940s and fifties there was no scientific and developmental reason, as in India, behind the interest in nuclear energy. Nor did it have any significant priority or access to funds. In these early years Pakistan looked to its alliances for security, not to spectacular, and costly, weapons. Even in the early sixties, when there was greater interest, the programme took a distinct civilian twist.

It was the 1965 war with India that changed things. The debate on nuclear weapons was one of the results. And it was in diplomatic and political circles that support for that option was strongest. Even then little was done until 1971 added fuel to the fire. Having discovered the slight value of its defence links with the United States and China, Pakistan realised perhaps for the first time that it must look to its own defence. The Bhutto government, argues Fortmann again

¹² See Michel Fortmann, "Le duo indo-pakistanaïse: l'ambiguïté et la solitude," in Legault and Fortmann (eds), *op.cit.*, pp. 307-66, especially pp. 314-17.

convincingly, wished above all to restore Pakistan's deteriorated international image, use the sudden popularity of the nuclear option to reinforce his political position and his posture *vis-à-vis* his own armed forces, mobilize the solidarity of other Muslim states, use the slowing of the programme as a counter to obtain international aid, and pressure India on arms control. Strictly defence issues thus seem to have been less central than is sometimes said. As with India then, it is important not to underestimate the simple prestige factor in the decision-making process.¹³

In the following years it is unclear to what extent either country invested significantly in a real nuclear weapons policy. Both argued that their interest in such capabilities was limited to peaceful uses. Each emphasised the need to retain its potential to react to an unfavourable evolution of events.

The 1974 test is difficult to assess in this context. India does not appear to do very much with the event in terms of emphasizing major foreign policy points, changing military postures, or even using new means for development projects. Fortmann goes so far as to suggest that indeed the explosion was costly in several diplomatic senses, most particularly in that it appears to have been a major spur to the Pakistani nuclear programme and hence in creating another element of rivalry that had not existed beforehand. Indeed, Pakistan finds in the test a club with which to hit the Indians in international forums where it can claim to be the victim of irresponsible Indian nuclear adventurism.

Be that as it may, positive prestige and scientific reasons appear to have still counted for more than these negative issues. India had shown the world what it was capable of doing, by itself, in technological terms. And nationalist bureaucratic and military opinion supported fully the move. Elements of a more expansionist foreign policy followed the explosion. New Delhi was feeling its muscles and wanted to ensure that all neighbours, and not just China or Pakistan, noticed them. Great powers were neither welcome nor needed in a region where India was now clearly and completely superior to any other state.

As with Argentina facing obvious Brazilian superiority in so many fields, so with Pakistan facing India, many voices were raised in Islamabad suggesting that nuclear weapons for Pakistan could act as the great equalizer in a competition where Indian dominance was absolute. This argument has had a durability in Pakistani discourse that it has not been able to retain in Argentina. In this context, the Pakistani programme as it developed showed consistency and longevity. Aid from other Muslim countries began to arrive in earnest after 1976 as part of Bhutto's call for more cooperation in defence among Muslim states. Prestige counted for a great deal in all this, not only prestige on the international stage but at home where national unity remained difficult to maintain. The ability to pressure the United States for assistance with national security concerns did, and does as well.

¹³ *Ibid*, pp. 322-23.

It will be useful at this stage to suggest what are the driving factors which push the two countries currently, and to some extent expand on those mentioned so far as doing so, where nuclear weapons programmes are concerned. We will then go on to see how one might in perhaps limited ways counter such drives, emphasizing the Argentine-Brazilian experience.

India - Driving Factors

Four factors govern India's perception of regional and global security issues: history, geopolitics, internal politics and regional conflict. From New Delhi's perspective, history is the largest single driving factor in India's quest for nuclear weapons. India's colonial legacy, coloured by three centuries of rather paternalistic imperial governance, may well be a major engine driving India's desire for recognition as a nascent global power. That legacy has, in a sense, been exacerbated by the manner in which Independence led to internecine conflict, Partition and strife rather than promised prosperity. Nuclear weapons are one more piece of a mosaic that includes the development of first-rate educational institutions, the drive for a naval power-projection capability, the quest for nation-wide industrialization and the development of an indigenous space programme.

These are perceived to be the measures of First World or "Great Power" status, and New Delhi considers that these achievements merit recognition of India as a global player. In this context, India's nuclear capability is in part an attempt to redress perceived technological inferiority. It is in great measure for this reason that India's pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability has consistently received such a high level of public support.

The second problem complicating the puzzle is China, with whom India has twice gone to war. The Indian nuclear programme took its first significant steps following China's 1964 and 1967 tests, respectively, of first-generation and thermonuclear weapons, and that programme was accelerated when it became clear, with the negotiation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in the late 1960s, that China would be the last nation to "slip in through the door" as a "legal" Nuclear Weapons State. Among India's neighbours, only China has had the motive and the means to pose a significant conventional threat to Indian security and while that does mean that its tests were mere reactions to China, it does mean they were an answer to the series of factors discussed above, of which a major element was China.

The third problem complicating the Indian side of the equation is the nature of India's internal political structure. At any one time, the *Lok Sabha* is a maze of conflicting parties, priorities and interests. Coalition politics and compromise are the order of the day, with the result that governments, when they eventually take power, may be so hobbled by partisan interests that little can be accomplished, and so unstable that the outbreak of minor discord can bring a government down. The decline of India's political institutions, interestingly, has been matched by a rise in grass-

roots political mobilization.¹⁴ Any benefits that may eventually be gleaned from this development, however, may well be years in the future. In the interim, governance by opportunity is likely to remain the norm. It is perhaps ironic that decades of this type of governance served to keep the question of "weaponizing" India's nuclear capability in the shadows; it was only when a relatively stable and well-supported party came to power in 1998 that Delhi finally elected to indulge in an overt display of that capability.

India's decision to conduct its nuclear test programme in 1998 was to a large extent an effort to bolster a sagging coalition by appealing to Hindu nationalism. The programme had not been introduced earlier because an ambiguous posture was less likely to lead to Pakistani weaponization, was not as certain to bring down international opprobrium on India, and was lacking as much public support as it was later to garner. In addition, other factors were present. The Hindu nationalist government was less liable to suffer from serious criticism of weaponization than those which preceded it. The rise in nationalism and anti-Pakistani sentiment, as well as the heating up again of the Kashmir issue, made weaponization more valuable politically than in the past. And on the military front, India's maturing launch capability meant that nuclear MRBM and ICBM capability were becoming viable. Finally, Indian relative self-sufficiency in technology meant that sanctions would have a lesser impact. None of these reasons would have been sufficient in and of themselves to push forward the decision on the nuclear option. Instead, it was the political conditions that had come into play, and especially the rise of Hindu nationalism and Indian national pride reflected in the election of a Hindu nationalist government, which contributed most to the programme.

As a result of its decision, India exchanged a condition of nuclear ambiguity tempered by conventional superiority (in numbers, if not necessarily in quality) for a situation where Pakistan is both more capable of deploying and more likely to deploy nuclear weapons; strategic warning time is likely to be reduced; relations with China are likely to be damaged; and the groundwork for an unwinnable nuclear arms race with Beijing may have been laid.¹⁵ If nothing else, the decision to test in 1998 demonstrates unequivocally the role of India's internal political mechanisms in further complicating the strategic calculus.

In addition to internal politics, the health of India's social fabric is a driving factor. India is a study in contradictions, possessing world-class technological and industrial concerns manned by people who often live in poverty. That said, the Indian middle class is already the largest in the world, and is growing. Power generation is a major concern as literally hundreds of millions of people acquire the means to purchase increasingly available electrical appliances. Lacking significant reserves of fossil fuels, India has for the past thirty years been working to meet its power needs through nuclear means. From the perspective of the developed world, this is a double-edged

¹⁴ Sumit Ganguly, book review "Democracy, Security and Development in India", *Studies in Comparative International Development* 33(2) (Summer 1998), pp. 125-26.

¹⁵ Spurgeon M. Keeny Jr., "South Asia's Nuclear Wake-Up Call", *Arms Control Today* (May 1998), p. 2.

sword; Western assistance both helps to stabilize Indian society and prevents New Delhi from adopting less reliable technology, but it also provides the means of furthering India's nuclear weapons programme.

Finally, there remains the thorny issue of Pakistan, with whom India, since Partition, has fought such important conflicts. All posturing and rhetoric aside, Pakistan, with one-eighth the population and a moribund economy, poses no serious conventional threat to India. The possibility of Pakistan developing an indigenous nuclear capability, so long as the condition of "ambiguous deterrence" remained undisturbed, never played more than a marginal role in New Delhi's quest for nuclear power status. Now that both parties have openly declared their status as nuclear weapon states, however, Pakistan's nuclear capability will play a large role in India retaining, improving and expanding its nuclear capability.

This is likely for three reasons. First, the fact that both states possess and are improving ballistic missiles capable of reaching each others' major cities drastically reduces decision-making time in a crisis (to the order of 8-10 minutes, as compared to 20-30 minutes for Washington and Moscow during the Cold War), and greatly reduces the possibility of recalling a strike force. The result is gravely destabilizing, particularly given Pakistani political instability, and it is likely for this reason that both sides have to date resisted the urge to arm or deploy their nuclear-capable ballistic missiles.

Second, unlike the superpowers during the Cold War, neither India nor Pakistan possesses even a modest ballistic missile early warning system. The lack of such a system further lowers confidence. Third and finally, neither party has made significant progress towards developing a submarine-launched ballistic or cruise missile capability. The lack of a small survivable deterrent force increases the need for a large force of land-based missiles to ensure a survivable second-strike capability, and adds to the likelihood of both states adopting policies based on less stable launch-on-warning rather than more stable launch-under-attack doctrines.

Pakistan - Driving Factors

The factors driving Pakistan's quest for a nuclear weapons capability are fewer and less nebulous than those underlying India's nuclear programme. They are threefold: the threat posed by India, the problem of internal politics, and the deteriorating social fabric of Pakistan.

The single largest engine is of course India, with whom Pakistan is locked in persistent and bitter conflict over Kashmir. India's nuclear developments in the wake of the Chinese nuclear tests coincided with the 1971 war that resulted in the shattering of the divided Pakistani state, highlighting the potential threat to Pakistan that India, already vastly superior in conventional forces, would pose if armed with nuclear weapons. Unlike India, where the quest for international recognition played a large role in the decision to develop a nuclear weapons capability, Islamabad has sought nuclear status almost solely in response to India's decision to do so, viewing India, in a sense, in the same

light in which India views China. Pakistan looks to nuclear weapons both to offset India's conventional superiority, and to provide a last-ditch deterrent to Indian aggression in the event that conventional deterrence fails.¹⁶

The Pakistani nuclear equation is complicated by the turmoil in Pakistan's political institutions, as witnessed by the 1999 coup by Army Commander General Pervais Musharraf. Successive elected governments in Pakistan have demonstrated a lamentable tendency towards corruption, the commonest charge leading to the fall of government after government throughout the 1990s. The result is that Pakistan's finances are in deep trouble, with Islamabad shouldering a gigantic debt burden, the IMF and the World Bank perennially threatening foreclosure, and the Pakistani military clamouring for arms to meet the Indian threat. Despite repeated promises to "clean up" government, corruption has persisted unabated, and was the primary pretext for the 1999 coup.

In the long run, the most recent coup could do Pakistan more good than ill. Unlike India, where the military is held on a tight leash by government, and has to fight to be included in the decision making process on military and strategic issues, the armed forces in Pakistan enjoy a considerably higher degree of prestige and public confidence, so much so that the Pakistani populace often looks to the Army as a legitimate alternative to corrupt politicians. The support for the military in Pakistan, and the highly professional nature of the Pakistani military, are not well appreciated outside, with the result that military coups in Pakistan tend to receive rapid condemnation from the Western powers despite the fact that they frequently meet with the approval of the majority of Pakistanis.¹⁷

That said, the powerful position held by the military in Pakistan virtually ensures that nuclear weapons programmes (and delivery systems, such as ballistic missiles) will continue to receive high priority in the budgetary decision making process; Pakistan's finances are sufficiently crippled that Islamabad cannot afford both guns and butter, and with the gun-wielders making the decisions, the people are likely to suffer. While Indian progress towards collective affluence is hardly rapid, it is well ahead of Pakistan's.

The Pakistani socio-political environment is further complicated by the decay of the social order, evidenced by continuing sectarian violence and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, spurred by the use of Pakistan by Taliban and Mujaheddin activists as a base of operations. Fundamentalism can pose another stimulus to nuclearization; Pakistan, as the first Muslim state to develop a nuclear

¹⁶ The manner in which the utility of nuclear deterrents is perceived respectively by New Delhi and Islamabad is discussed by Pavin Sawhney in "How inevitable is an Asian 'missile race'", *Jane's Intelligence Review* (January 2000), pp. 30-4.

¹⁷ Rahul Bedi offers an intriguing glimpse into the extent to which the Indian governmental and military institutions are often at loggerheads in "Indian military, MoD try to settle turf wars", *Jane's Intelligence Review* (January 2000), pp. 27-9.

weapons capability, has been lauded as possessing the "Islamic Bomb." Viewed as Pakistan's answer to India's "Hindu Bomb", this is a growing problem of perception that threatens to introduce additional elements of emotion and rhetoric to the regional nuclear debate, further weakening the chances for non-proliferation and roll-back.

INDIA-PAKISTAN VS. ARGENTINA-BRAZIL: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

There are many reasons to emphasize the differences between the two contexts discussed in this paper, that between Argentina and Brazil, and that between India and Pakistan. However, it should also be said that there are major similarities between the two cases as well. Elements of our early typology will be seen in different lights here.

First, there is the issue of international and domestic prestige. We have seen the importance of prestige considerations in the two bilateral rivalries and especially in the nuclear dimension of those rivalries. Brazil's drive for status and *grandeza* has been a constant in its interest in nuclear energy as well as related interest in missile technology. And Argentina has replied to this interest with a desire to be seen to be still in the game where the two countries' historic dispute is concerned. There has also clearly been a continuing importance to the idea of technological prowess and the demonstration thereof for both countries.

These elements apply even more in the India-Pakistan context. Nuclear power has consistently been seen by India, if not so much by Pakistan, as a major factor in national prestige. Showing off the nation's scientific capabilities has been a source of national pride and cohesion for a society with infinite internal problems. And nowhere has this been more visible than in the area of nuclear energy. And if Pakistan was slow to see the utility of this demonstration of potential power and development, it has now definitely understood the lesson. Before the international community, the region, and the Muslim world, the prestige value of nuclear energy and nuclear weapons potential is now clear to Islamabad.

Domestic prestige for leaders or political movements is also of weight here. As we have seen, this factor intervened repeatedly for Indian and later Pakistani leaders although less dramatically for Brazilian and Argentine. The military leaders of these South American countries headed regimes that were far from personalist although they often had individual agendas and personal support bases. Nationalist *prises de position* could often improve their own and their governments' reputations with the press and public opinion. And if the role of the nuclear question was never as key personally for Argentine or Brazilian generals as it was for Indira Gandhi or General Zia, it could affect domestic politics.

Then, there is the issue of domestic politics. Indeed, the role of the question in domestic politics, while different in the four countries, is present in all. In Argentina it became an issue in civil-military relations with the armed forces largely supporting a weapons programme and most of civil society, other than nationalist sectors, opposed. In Brazil this same situation was reflected but

with many more civilian sectors in favour usually on the basis of the need for such weapons in order to reach great power status.

In India, timing was of the essence. Few wanted a weapons programme in the early years but this changed over time to where large and influential elements of civil society favour it now. But international pressures made defending the nuclear weapons option popular with wide segments of the nation, not just extreme nationalists. Equally, being seen as in favour of the nuclear option appeared to show independence of mind, national pride, determination to see India seated with the great, and other positive elements.

At the same time, Pakistan's much less open "debate" on such issues was more closely linked with specific defence issues, dominated on many scores by armed forces views which could be just as political as anything seen elsewhere. Nationalist and military support were absolutely central for political survival in the country, and with the need to make more equal the security relationship with India, possession of nuclear weapons was crucial.

History as well weighed heavily in all cases. Many Argentines felt bitterly that despite their successes in many fields, they had still been the victims of the peace in key ways. The River Plate viceroyalty had been torn apart by separatism and imperialist intrigues which had left a rump state, shorn of Paraguay, Uruguay, the Falklands and other parts of the North and South of the old colonial entity. The country had nonetheless built itself up to being the most prosperous, urban, educated, and culturally European state in all of Latin America. Its position, many argued, required that such superiority be recognized. And such recognition would come with, among other things, nuclear power and weapons, or so argued the nationalists and military.

Brazil had always been the largest country in Latin America and sole representative of another tradition, the Portuguese, in the Americas. Its slow rise to prominence had been blocked, according to nationalist tradition, by imperialism from without the hemisphere, and Argentine resistance, from within. The Second World War and after had shown that such prominence could no longer be delayed. And here again, nuclear power and weapons would assist in staking out the proper place for Brazil in the inter-American and wider global community.

India felt even greater frustrations. A region long dominated by the Muslim minority under the Moghuls, then by the British, a free India would be a worthy successor taking advantage of the unity established by London but developing into a great country whose achievements would be trumpeted to the world. No longer held back by others, citizens of the new country would show the international community of what they were capable. Development as a significant member of the community of states was a sacred duty. In all this, nuclear energy and weapons would assist.

In the case of Pakistan, a smaller and less self-assured country came into existence through the failure of the prospective Indian state, and its British predecessors, to convince the huge Muslim minority to stay in the new country. But the new state was prone to separatisms from the beginning, and the unique bifurcation of the country was sensed as dangerous for its survival, especially in the

light of enemies' designs.

Whatever one can say on these scores, there are clearly some ways in which both India and Pakistan could be helped along in seeing the advantages of moving back from, not the near-brink as in the Argentine-Brazilian case, but what is a very real brink today. What then are those potential ways?

India - Reversing the Path to Nuclearization

For all the reasons we saw earlier, India will resist giving up, reducing or even freezing its nuclear capability in the near term. That said, there are a number of incentives, internal and external, that are available to help encourage India to reconsider its position.

As previously mentioned, India views nuclear power generation as one of the primary means of catering to the growing electrical appetite of India's economy. The international community could offer to assist India in the task of answering those mammoth needs. India now possesses first- and second-generation nuclear weapons capability, and it is unlikely that further assistance in developing nuclear power generation can do any more damage to non-proliferation efforts. Instead, international assistance might prove invaluable in ensuring that New Delhi develops a reliable nuclear power generation capability, subject to robust IAEA monitoring and safeguards. If India continues to develop indigenous nuclear generation capability, it may do so using outdated Russian technology, and compliance with IAEA safeguards will be voluntary. Thus international monitoring of the fuel cycle would be limited. If foreign assistance is provided, India could benefit from some of the best technology in the world, and IAEA supervision and fuel cycle monitoring could form part of the deal.

By the same token, India is attempting to redress one of the major impediments to economic progress by "boot-strapping" itself through an abbreviated "industrial revolution". Remarkable progress has been made, but India has a long way to go before it will be able to boast a comprehensive industrial infrastructure comparable to more developed nations. International assistance in developing that infrastructure would accelerate the process of industrialization, while augmenting India's ability to address pressing social concerns, including poverty and unemployment.

Conflict resolution assistance is a riskier option with less probability of success. Like most high-risk games, however, the potential pay-offs are enormous. The Kashmir dispute is a festering sore on the social and political fabric of the sub-continent, the resolution of which would pave the way not only for reduction of regional tensions, militaries and possibly nuclear arsenals, but also for the bettering of the social condition of the disputed region's inhabitants. The risks of this option, however, are manifold, and include alienating one or more of the parties and exacerbating regional tensions.

Finally, there is the ever-present option of financial assistance, ranging from World Bank and IMF loans through direct infusions of cash to forgiveness of debt. This option has the benefit of keeping the First-World states at arms' length from regional problems, but also has the considerable disadvantage of eliminating the ability of donor states to control how money is spent. In the absence of some resolution of regional tensions, any money thrown at the problem risks feeding regional militarization and nuclear proliferation.

In addition to these internal incentives, there are a number of external ones available for exploitation which may enable the developed nations to bring non- or counter-proliferation pressure to bear on India. The foremost of these is the reduction of tensions and eventual normalization of relations between Beijing and New Delhi. This is far easier said than done, particularly in view of Chinese activities in Tibet and Myanmar, and the resultant refugee crises created in India. It would require resolution of outstanding border disputes between the two countries, and some form of realistic and verifiable non-aggression pact. While there are some of what might be called tactical CSBMs in place on the Assam-China border designed to control border incidents, these are very limited. More strategic CSBMs, such as surveillance overflights, challenge inspections, exchanges, and the like, have proven more difficult to establish. For these reasons, near-term normalization of relations and the development of meaningful CSBMs between New Delhi and Beijing are not promising options.¹⁸

A more hopeful possibility would be securing agreement from Beijing to suspend weapons of mass destruction (WMD) technology assistance to Pakistan, and to observe the strictures of the NPT, the CTBT and the MTCR. Chinese assistance is the largest single affront to Indian nuclear sensitivities and, given the existence of advanced indigenous missile and nuclear weapons programmes in Pakistan, is probably no longer vital to Pakistan's ability to maintain a minimum deterrent posture. Chinese-Pakistani nuclear cooperation is a thorn in the side of relations between the world's two most populous states, and must be resolved before significant progress may be made in reducing regional tensions.

Finally, rhetoric issuing from New Delhi ever since the 1974 PNE has consistently offered complete nuclear disarmament in conjunction with the "Big Five" offering to do the same. That this has major propaganda elements is suggested by the fact that India has continued to expand its nuclear programme despite significant cuts to strategic forces by the United States, Russia, Great Britain and France. India will not significantly reduce or eliminate its arsenal so long as the P-5, and China in particular, fail to do the same. To date India has quite consistently offered full denuclearization if the rest of the world's powers do the same. In making this offer, the Indians have rarely had to consider seriously the possibility of making good on this offer, since the rest of the world will, of course, not be doing the same. But if this situation were to change India's position on this matter would have to do so as well. Accordingly, pursuit by the developed world of

¹⁸ For a more in-depth discussion of the Sino-Indian security calculus, see Therese Delpech, "Nuclear weapons and the 'New World Order': Early Warning from Asia?", *Survival* (Winter 1998-99), pp. 57-76.

significant reductions in strategic forces could well help push New Delhi into action.

If the two principal factors driving India's nuclear weapons programme – China and international status – can be linked to counter-proliferation (through reduction of the Chinese threat, and the linkage of international status to arms reductions rather than increasing nuclearization), then there will be a real if slight prospect of freezing, and perhaps eventually rolling back, India's nuclear arsenal. However, the issues which matter to India, such as a seat on the Security Council, acceptance of its nuclear status, renegotiation of the NPT, acceptance of its position on Kashmir, show the enormous distance there is to cover merely on the international status side of the national nuclear issue. On the Chinese threat side, there would be a need to see one or some of the following: a reduction in Beijing's conventional and nuclear forces, an end to what India sees as its hegemonic aspirations, a halt to sabre-rattling in the South China Sea, a change in the status of Tibet, and a rejection of the policy of nuclear and missile assistance to Pakistan. The challenge is clear.

Pakistan – Reversing the Path to Nuclearization

In view of the forces driving Pakistan's decision to "go nuclear", there are a number of potential internal and external incentives and pressure points available to the outside world. Foremost among the internal incentives is rebuilding Pakistan's economy. Islamabad is faced with a debt crisis in which debt servicing is consuming an unsustainable proportion of the nation's wealth. Debt cancellation and financial assistance are therefore two of the readiest levers for the international community to exploit. These could be linked to developmental incentives and assistance, particularly with the process of industrialization, national infrastructure (particularly transport and communications, both of which have been allowed to decay in recent years) and the provision of social services.

As with India, Pakistan would benefit greatly from nuclear power assistance from the Western world, with a view to both providing the energy needed for industrialization, and to ensure that nuclear power development is consistent with the highest safety standards. Again, given the state of Pakistan's nuclear programme, it is unlikely that the provision of such assistance would do any significant further damage to non-proliferation.

An option with fewer prospects of success would be to offer qualified support to Pakistan's position on Kashmir, particularly with respect to the fate of its Muslim inhabitants. With no actual peace agreement between India and Pakistan (which Western support for one side would almost certainly preclude) there should be no suggestion of Western military involvement, but this option, while it would alienate India, might, if sufficiently equitable and broadly-based, convince New Delhi to demonstrate flexibility on the issue and facilitate the beginnings of meaningful negotiations. This option would have to be tied to considerable incentives for India and it is difficult to imagine how those could be put together in the present context.

Finally, recognition of the Musharraf government would be a small but significant incentive, and an important first step towards enabling Pakistan under military governance to work with the international community. It may be necessary that, despite traditional Western distaste for such governments, the West appreciate the unique circumstances of Pakistan, and learn to work with military governments rather than vilifying them. There is no other option if one wishes to work seriously with the Pakistanis.

External incentives to elicit Pakistani cooperation on nuclear issues are not numerous, due largely to the fact that Pakistan is less interested in its role on the world stage and answering the Indian threat than in resolving its burgeoning social problems. However, considerable progress could be made if Islamabad and New Delhi could be brought to an accommodation on Kashmir. Any government contemplating a diplomatic intervention, however, would do well to recognize the very real historical, ethnic and religious grievances at play, and be prepared to invest heavily in seeking an equitable solution. The Kashmiri question is not susceptible to a quick-fix solution.

Further external incentives include mitigating the problem of Islamic fundamentalism in Pakistan which, if the country's social condition fails to improve in the near term, may gain a sufficient popular following to form a governing party. The prospect of a second and larger Iran – this one armed with nuclear weapons – is not pleasant and is a source of very real consternation for New Delhi. Like much religious extremism, Islamic fundamentalism can be seen in large part as the result of poverty, conflict and ignorance, and thus can only be treated by improving the social conditions by which it is engendered. This brings us back to the question of conflict resolution and financial assistance, implying working with the Musharraf government.

In order to fully engage Islamabad in any prospective counter-proliferation efforts, it is vital that the international community deal with Pakistan as it deals with India. The experience, for example, of the Pressler Amendments prohibiting military sales to Pakistan was a prime example of the unbalanced and ideologically-motivated use of punitive measures, while failing to apply similar sanctions to equally guilty states world-wide. Regardless of the rationale underlying the inequitable application of sanctions, Pakistanis invariably interpret such actions as being discriminatory in nature. At all costs, in dealing with India and Pakistan, the international community must not use "sticks" with one and "carrots" with the other.

It must be remembered that in addition to official motivators for obtaining nuclear weapons, states develop non-official motivators for retaining them. Psychological, political, bureaucratic, economic and scientific constituencies tend to spring up around nuclear weapons policies, programmes, industries and stockpiles, and these constituencies in turn resist reducing or eliminating those stockpiles. State-specific internal factors will play an important role in any arms control activities in the region, and must be understood well in advance of any initiatives being undertaken.

Finally, little attention has been paid to the utility of linking disincentives to denuclearization. The use of disincentives has been a hallmark of "forced denuclearization" programs to date only where the target state has committed a grave international transgression (and has therefore justified,

ante-facto, the use of "any and all means" to eliminate its capacity to do harm), and is incapable of responding to the disincentive program. Post-Gulf War Iraq is one such example.

Where nuclear states have not flagrantly violated international law – for example, Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Israel – disincentives have never been seriously applied. In all such cases, carrots have proven more useful than sticks – and it is debatable, despite a decade's concentrated effort by the international community, whether sticks have succeeded in depriving Saddam Hussein of his nuclear weapons capability. The use of "stern" disincentives in the Asian subcontinent would, in the absence of flagrant violations of international norms (such as an overt act of war or nuclear terrorism), seriously undermine the prospects not only for denuclearization but also for regional (if not global) peace and stability, while the use of "mild" disincentives (such as heavy sanctions) would serve little purpose other than to reinforce already widespread perceptions of First-world interference in regional affairs.

ARMS CONTROL OPTIONS

In addition to the internal and external initiatives outlined above, there are a number of options along the arms control continuum that may be pursued by external actors with reasonable expectation of success. Each has a number of caveats, however, many of which may prove to be "show-stoppers" unless significant progress is made, or incentives are offered, in some of the areas outlined above.

The first of these is a return to *ambiguous deterrence*, that is a policy of refusing to confirm or deny whether one possesses a nuclear arsenal. It is questionable how ambiguous deterrence can be once both states have demonstrated a viable nuclear weapons capability; however, if both India and Pakistan can be persuaded to agree not to further develop or construct warheads capable of being transported atop ballistic missiles, to cease the production of weapons-grade fissile material, and to deploy ballistic missiles in exclusively conventional roles, then at least a degree of ambiguity may be preserved. This option demands a degree of roll-back, but stops short of denuclearization. The drawback of this option is the importance of third-party monitoring and enforcement, in the face of considerable unwillingness by both India and Pakistan to allow external verification agencies into their nuclear design and test facilities.

A second attempt, which might credibly be pursued in conjunction with "ambiguous deterrence", would be to broker a condition of *non-weaponized deterrence* between New Delhi and Islamabad. This option varies in degree rather than in kind from the first, and would involve both India and Pakistan agreeing not to arm either combat aircraft or ballistic missiles with nuclear weapons; rather, such weapons would be kept, disassembled, under lock and key at well-known storage sites. While less stabilizing than the previous option, such an agreement would increase the decision-making time available in a crisis, and draw well-defined "lines in the sand." Surveillance assistance from the international community would enable both New Delhi and Islamabad to monitor activity at weapons storage sites, and provide early warning of a decision by either side to escalate

a crisis by breaking weapons out of storage. This option likewise has the disadvantage of relying upon third-party monitoring and "good faith".

A third, more ambitious option, would be to attempt to broker a Tlatelcolo-type regional *non-nuclearization/denuclearization agreement*. If this could be achieved, it might entirely resolve the problem of regional nuclearization. However, as previously mentioned, the presence of an intractable third-party actor would likely kill any such initiative at birth since India is unlikely to agree to divest itself of its nuclear capability, while China is viewed as an expansionist, hostile and nuclear-armed opponent.

One of the more successful arms control agreements of the 1980s was the 1986 Intermediate Nuclear Forces, or INF Treaty. This agreement achieved the *regional elimination of a highly destabilizing class of weapons*, including all ballistic and cruise missiles with a range of 500 to 5500 kilometres and a payload of 600 kilograms. A similar treaty might be negotiated on the Sub-continent (this in fact was proposed by Bailey and Morimoto in a 1998 article in *Comparative Strategy*), aimed at eliminating the most destabilizing class of weapons: tactical, theatre and medium-range ballistic missiles, offering short flight times and low trajectories. The elimination of these weapons would leave both India and Pakistan capable of using aircraft delivery for their strategic weapons, increasing decision making time in a crisis, and augmenting regional nuclear stability. The disadvantage of this option, of course, is that Islamabad and New Delhi are less than an hour apart by combat aircraft, so the gain in stability will not be great; and, to further complicate the problem, India considers the development of an indigenous space programme a hallmark of a First World state, and thus would be loathe to divest itself of its hard-won long-range ballistic missile capability.

Other arms-control options might include encouraging India and Pakistan to **ratify the CTBT**, and the brokering of a comprehensive and verifiable **Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty (FMCT)**. In this context, it is worth noting that, for example, pushing both states to ratify the CTBT will take some doing; Musharraf's foreign minister, Abdul Sattar, recently announced that even if Pakistan ratifies the CTBT, it would not forego its right to conduct reciprocal nuclear tests *vis-à-vis* India.¹⁹ Both states could, and should, also be encouraged to **observe the NPT in principle** as "compliant non-signatories." This would serve to bolster their reputations, and convince the world that although they intend to remain nuclear weapons states, they will at least be responsible ones. They could do so by following its provisions voluntarily, particularly with regard to not sharing nuclear technology with other states. While far from a panacea, this would be an effective good-faith gesture by both countries.

¹⁹ Both India and Pakistan are discovering that it is one thing to possess nuclear weapons, but quite another to devise the robust, reliable and responsive command and controls structures, without which nuclear weapons are so much sophisticated junk metal. For the Pakistani perspective, see Umar Farooq, "Pakistan tests new missile and revises command structure", *Jane's Defence Weekly* (16 February 2000), p. 3.

Finally, the most promising of options, and the one most susceptible to near-term success, would be to assist New Delhi and Islamabad in developing the kind of *confidence- and security-building measures* (CSBMs) that came into being during the long and nervous period of US-Soviet tension. CSBMs range in nature from the technical to the diplomatic, and include such elements as launch detection and early-warning systems; a more comprehensive "hot line" capability between heads of government, foreign ministers, defence headquarters and other organizations; the establishment of regular joint consultative mechanisms; the institution of a programme of exchanges, visits to nuclear facilities, verification overflights and surprise inspections; and any of a host of other initiatives designed to increase mutual trust and understanding. With the exception of the creation of early warning networks, these options are the least costly, the least intrusive of sovereignty, the least likely to elicit counter-demands for unlikely great power nuclear disarmament, and the most likely to generate near-term results. This is one area where the international community has indisputable experience, and it is likely that both states would be eager to put that experience to use. While it can be argued that Soviet-American examples are only so useful here, they are where the world's experience with nuclear CSBMs comes from. And as mentioned, the East-West stand-off does have some characteristics of that between India and Pakistan: short decision times, armed conventional clashes at least between proxies, ballistic missile issues, direct ideological/religious conflict, and the like.

A WAY FORWARD?

There are a number of strategic impediments to outside involvement in the India-Pakistan nuclear debate. The first is that regional security concerns are *real*. India and Pakistan remain locked in a real if periodic hot war in which India is unquestionably superior. China can remain a real threat to India. In short, before condemning either New Delhi or Islamabad, it would be appropriate to "walk a mile in their moccasins".

As previously mentioned, India is an enormous nation, the second most heavily populated in the world. India is also a struggling democracy, and Indians do not appreciate being lectured by other democracies with less pressing social problems. In order to "move" a nation the size of India, one needs either a very long lever (in terms of money, diplomatic power, or military power), or a very large fulcrum (in terms of the relative importance of the issue in the minds of the Indian populace). It is very difficult for external actors to find an incentive large enough to outweigh, in the minds of India's politicians, the opinions of a billion people. The only nation powerful enough to have a reasonable hope of so doing – the United States – is not sufficiently motivated by regional interest to risk serious involvement.²⁰

²⁰ Sumit Ganguly, "Arms Control in South Asia: History and Prospects", *Defence Analysis* 12(1) (April 1996), pp. 65-75.

Third, there is China. Unless Beijing can be brought into the security equation as an active and willing participant, it will be very difficult to make concrete gains. However, China is even larger than India, is more self-sufficient in terms of energy, production and military technology, is ruled by a hard-line government, is expanding its role as a regional hegemon, and is even less susceptible to external pressure than is India. US interest in the Chinese security threat is limited largely to other parts of the region. The fact is that there are no levers or fulcrums big enough to move China, and China lies at the heart of much of the Asian nuclear equation.

Complicating the calculus is the fact that much international credibility has been lost through ill-considered or uneven application of "carrots" and "sticks" to these security questions. The American tendency to treat Islamic nationalism, however benign, as fundamentally bad while remaining more or less indifferent to Hindu nationalism likewise sends negative signals. The pervasive Western distaste for military governments, regardless of the popular support those governments enjoy and the character of the regimes they replace, further erodes credibility; and the continued reliance of all Western nations upon American (and British, and French) nuclear forces for their deterrent value, while decrying similar attitudes in developing states, does not help.

Diplomacy

There are some further thoughts on what might be done. International diplomacy offers a number of options of varying utility. Foremost among these is the traditional offer of "good offices" to broker discussions between Islamabad and New Delhi. The ability of the international community to offer good offices could be crucial in combination with other initiatives. While this proved unnecessary in any direct way in the Latin American context, there may be room for it in South Asia. And even in Latin America the indirect role of other states was real.

A second diplomatic option is assistance with developing confidence and security building measures (CSBMs). These have been very present in Latin America and have been wide ranging and inventive in the Brazil-Argentine case. Indeed, the nuclear cooperation put into place was considered as a CSBM for the two countries. These measures fall into two categories: diplomatic, and technical. Diplomatic CSBMs include the establishment of regular political- and military-level staff talks and consultations, senior and working-level military and technical exchanges, regular conferences on strategic issues and a variety of potential agreements ranging from joint crisis consultation to the establishment of a "hot line".

Other diplomatic options, not used in Latin America but which were discussed, involve attempts to establish dispute resolution mechanisms aimed at mitigating the Kashmir conflict (a complex and high-risk option with limited chance of success, but with an enormous potential payoff), and the establishment of bilateral or multilateral talks aimed at achieving the same goals. The difficulty with these options is that while increasing the number of participants tends to decrease costs, diffuse the responsibility for and consequences of failure, and decrease risks, it also prolongs the process, introduces linkages and reduces the probability of near- or mid-term success.

From a diplomatic perspective, then, three potential initiatives offer an acceptable mixture of cost, risk and probability of success: establishing extensive, broadly-based bilateral contacts and mechanisms with both New Delhi and Islamabad; leveraging these to explore the establishment of diplomatic confidence-building measures; and further exploiting bilateral contacts to develop, examine and implement dispute-resolution options designed to mitigate the impact of the Kashmir conflict on the New Delhi - Islamabad dialogue.

Aid and Assistance

The international community has great and long experience with assistance to developing countries and no doubt used them in the Latin American situation. This assistance ranges from the provision of monies (with or without strings attached) to assistance with providing clean water, power, industrialization, medical services, jobs training and a vast array of other programmes. All of these options are available to help mitigate the India-Pakistan nuclear problem; some, however, offer greater prospects for success than do others.

As with Argentina and to some extent Brazil earlier, cash flows and trade balances are a problem afflicting both India and Pakistan, although the latter is clearly experiencing considerably more difficulty in making ends meet than India. As previously mentioned, both states are having difficulty in balancing "guns and butter", but the problem is particularly severe in Islamabad, due both to the greater influence of the Pakistani military in governmental decision-making (particularly since the 1999 coup), and to the fact that Pakistani society and industry are well behind India's in terms of development.

Direct financial aid, therefore, would doubtless help to alleviate some of the crippling social problems facing the region, and would be more useful if targeted to Pakistan, where the severity of the debt crisis and the smaller population would allow a greater per capita impact. One could examine the possibility of linked financial incentives, such as tying limited loans or debt forgiveness to demonstrable progress in reducing tensions, accepting CSBMs, and accepting or acceding to arms control measures and regimes. These measures, albeit of limited effectiveness, could be applied to both India and Pakistan on an equitable basis, and are relatively low-risk from the perspective of international actors. The political risks of tying aid to progress on denuclearization would, however, be for Islamabad and New Delhi considerably higher, if not prohibitive. Even if such a quid-pro-quo could be achieved, it is probable that large amounts of assistance would be necessary to elicit even minimal compliance on roll-back from either state.

A more expensive but more promising option is the offer of direct technical assistance targeted to solve the fundamental problems with industrialization faced by both states. Argentina and Brazil's closer links with the West since settlement of the nuclear issue show elements of this. Two areas are available for exploitation: assistance with nuclear power technology, and general industrial assistance, most likely in the area of high technology, with examples such as recycling and pollution control, automotive industries, and water purification. These options offer a number of advantages,

some of which have been described above but the most important of which is the opportunity to assist both states in developing safe, reliable and internationally-verifiable nuclear power systems and distribution networks. The risks of further proliferation, given that both countries already possess second-generation nuclear weapons technology, are comparatively low. Nuclear power and industrial assistance should be considered as initiatives to be explored.

Arms Control

The domain of arms control offers a wide array of potential initiatives for the international community to explore and exploit, ranging from inexpensive to costly, short- to long-term, narrow- to broadly-based and benign to risky. Among the most promising are encouraging both India and Pakistan to voluntarily observe the NPT and CTBT in principle, the establishment of technical CSBMs, brokering an effective and verifiable fissile materials cut-off treaty (FMCT), implementing effective export controls, and reinforcing stability by granting both New Delhi and Islamabad access to real-time data from Western defence support and surveillance systems. The first crosses the line between diplomatic and arms control initiatives, but represents a relatively minor concession by both governments, and one which in any case could not be formalized without modifying the NPT – a process rendered, by the drafters, sufficiently complex so as to virtually prohibit any substantive changes.²¹ However, voluntary adherence to the strictures of existing arms control agreements would be a small but important first step that would allow the international community to "get the ball rolling" in the region while at the same time allowing both New Delhi and Islamabad to demonstrate their good faith. We saw examples of this in the Argentine-Brazilian case.

Assistance with CSBMs and early warning are more concrete and would require considerable assistance and flexibility on the part of the United States. Washington would in all probability be more than willing to assist in offering technical CSBM assistance in the areas of ground-based surveillance, early warning and communications systems, but would likely be considerably more reticent to allow either actor access to missile early warning data. The impact on regional stability of such assistance, however, would be major, and would offer a key incentive to India and Pakistan to back away from confrontation and eschew nuclear brinkmanship.

Another potentially valuable arms control initiative would be the establishment of a joint exchange and verification mechanism. This would have to be brokered by a third party, and preferably by one which is not one of the "Permanent Five", a factor not applicable in the Argentine-Brazilian situation. An agreement along the lines of "Open Skies" could be concluded between India and Pakistan, with a ground-based challenge and inspection regime designed to allow short-notice access to nuclear design, development, construction and storage facilities. This measure, although complex in both design and execution, would be relatively inexpensive and would serve to further

²¹ The NPT, in essence, was designed to be impossible to amend in any realistic sense, thus one attempted to render illegitimate ante-facto the efforts of a sixth or subsequent nation to become a member of the nuclear club.

increase confidence and stability.

More ambitious arms control options might include pushing New Delhi and Islamabad to ratify the CTBT and develop a FMCT. Similarly, given the destabilizing impact of nuclear-armed ballistic missiles between neighbours, it might be worthwhile to seek Chinese, Indian and Pakistani re-dedication to the principles of the MTCR – and to develop disincentives.

There may be some flexibility to be found in adjusting the nuclear postures adopted by both states. Both India and Pakistan, as demonstrated by some of the draft nuclear doctrine recently published, are grappling with employment and deployment. These new doctrines do away with what has been described *inter alia* as "ambiguous deterrence" - India's refusal, despite the 1974 PNE, to confirm or deny whether it had weaponized and deployed nuclear weapons. This proved remarkably stable, despite repeated conventional clashes between India and Pakistan; regrettably, the 1998 tests effectively eliminated ambiguity, and may have put paid to any possibility of returning to the *statu quo ante*. That said, there is still some hope for encouraging both states to commit to a policy of "non-weaponized deterrence", in which neither state would deploy, stockpile or even assemble a nuclear arsenal. This would serve to increase decision-making time in a crisis to days or even weeks, further stabilizing the regional nuclear balance without eliminating the ability of either India or Pakistan to respond in short order to an emerging threat. As a corollary, with no robust early-warning or command, control and communications systems for nuclear weapons, non-weaponized deterrence may prove to be the safest policy option in a region where the first false alarm could well be the last.

In addition to these options, there are a number of more ambitious initiatives that probably do not have any prospect of near- or even mid-term success. These include encouraging both New Delhi and Islamabad to adopt a nuclear "freeze"; to reverse the growth of arsenals and "roll back" the nuclear capability of both states; to seek nuclear disarmament in the Sub-continent; and to accede to the NPT as non-NWS. While these are laudable goals, only the first has even the slightest prospect of near-term success, and the second could probably not be pushed with any credibility by the Permanent Five until these states have made more significant cuts to their nuclear forces. Finally, nuclear disarmament and NPT accession, for India in any case (and therefore, for Pakistan), will continue to be a non-starter until the Permanent Five begin talking disarmament as well. This was not true in South America but is surely so in South Asia.

Track II

Non-governmental solutions were not very present in the Argentine-Brazilian nuclear story. As so much else in Latin American history, it was state-to-state relations which were vastly more important. Nonetheless, there was a context so favourable for increased contact and cooperation between Brazil and Argentina as the years went on that it would be wrong not to mention Track II. All manner of business, cultural and people-to-people contacts were being established between Brazil and Argentina as the post-war years evolved. Tourism between the two countries had become

massive. Cultural exchanges were numerous and events related to them well attended. The idea of a Latin American commonwealth, long in being, was gaining importance. And most importantly, a feeling that one could no longer go it alone in today's world provided a positive context for a rapid evolution of press and public opinion on the bilateral relationship.

Few actual events occurred to sustain this assertion. But it is a visible fact of the time that ideas of a common people with a common future were gaining ground enormously at the cost of previous geopolitical and nationalist opinion. It may be worth mentioning that the recent Peru-Ecuador settlement of 1995 was doubtless favoured by this same sort of element. A feeling of a common future ruined by the mind-set of nationalism was vital for moving the two countries to settlement of their centuries-old dispute. And in that context, press seminars bringing together journalists and showing them how in the past jingoistic stances had cost their countries dear were highly successful at bringing down temperatures and improving journalism in both countries. At the same time, meetings of historians of Peru and Ecuador to work on *common* themes, showing how one had done impressive things in the past together, took their toll as well on obscurantist nationalist views.

Given the entrenched positions of the parties involved, people-to-people contacts and cooperation may, in the final analysis, offer more hope of long-term progress than government-to-government activities. With the ruling elites in both New Delhi and Islamabad reluctant to take risks in order to break the diplomatic "log-jam", grass-roots movements may offer the greatest chance of success.²² But patience would be the key here. As in Latin America, economic integration, if seen as a route to real economic progress, can not be excluded as a tool here, even if the road to doing so is bumpier.

FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

It is clear from all that has preceded that we are talking of two hugely different contexts and that the difficulties in drawing parallels between the nuclear situation in the Southern Cone of South America in the 1980s and early nineties and that of South Asia in the beginning of the new millennium are legion. Be that as it may, we have also seen many similarities as well and some thoughts have emerged.

It is not easy to reach any other conclusion than one that suggests that one state in each context has tended to be the crucial one in terms of what actually happens. The key state where South Asian nuclear proliferation is concerned is India. Pakistan's moves towards nuclear weapons have been squarely reactive to actions by India. The same, with *nuance*, can be said of Argentina in South America. That country had to take steps to move back from making effective its nuclear

²² Iftikhar Malik, book review, "Mending Fences: Confidence and Security-Building Measures in South Asia", in *Contemporary South Asia* 7(3), pp. 354-55.

weapons ambitions in order to give room to the Brazilian civilian government to do the same, and to argue that the country could do so without excessive risk.

Of course, the problem in this sense is in large part, but hardly exclusively, that of China. India can and does argue that its *marge de manoeuvre* is greatly limited by Chinese strategic posturing, Chinese regional activities, and China's growing nuclear arsenal and ambitions. Given that no such force acted on the South American scene, even though Argentina was of course highly sensitive to the evolution of Chilean conventional forces and intentions over this period, only so many lessons can be expected here.

Outside that factor, however, there are clearly some points one can make. Democracy, and the return to democratic rule first in Argentina and then in Brazil, was crucial for the abandoning of nuclear weapons ambitions initially by Buenos Aires and then by Brasilia.

Given the nature of the "great equalizer" and other geopolitical arguments in Argentina, it was essential that it move first in leaving those ambitions behind. And that needed a major reduction not only in the influence of the military on national policy, especially on security in particular and foreign affairs in general, but also in the power of nationalist and geopolitical thinking in the Argentine body politic.

The armed forces, and indeed nationalist opinion, were in the driver's seat for long in Argentina but at no time more than in the military governments of the 1960s through the early eighties. The press reflected these perceptions, echoed them, and few influential persons or mass media sources dared to question their validity. Secret programmes were considered perfectly normal in the Argentina of the day and necessary given what was viewed as the hypocritical views of the great, and nuclear, powers on the question of nuclear proliferation. Until this situation changed dramatically, there could be no thought of turning back on nuclear programmes even though, to be fair and as we have seen, military governments were increasingly careful about sending the wrong signals to their rivals as they came closer to actually having advanced nuclear potential useful to weapons programmes.

Thus democracy, an end to excessive military influence in government, and a good dose of revisionism of the geopolitical prism for seeing international relations were all necessary for Argentina to change course on nuclear issues. And without Argentina doing so, there was no likelihood that Brazil would do so. The latter country was so superior to Argentina, as we have seen, by the 1980s that it could afford to be magnanimous on nuclear issues if it could be assured that Buenos Aires was serious about stepping back from what we have called the near-brink.

The two democratic governments, under successive presidents, certainly got along better than their military predecessors and this gave context to much of what they did. Their priorities were elsewhere, largely with ways to get their countries out of the debt crisis and wider economic difficulties, out of their relative isolation after being so long under unsavoury military regimes, and back on net with the major Western states where the technological revolution was concerned. They

were also survivors of long repressive governments that had left their democratic movements weakened. Hence, they had little reason to be impressed *a priori* with the nationalist and military rhetoric behind so much of the security and nuclear weapons debate in their countries.

Related to this were those new priorities themselves, obvious enough in the Argentina and Brazil of the 1980s. Argentina could simply not afford a security policy any longer based on high levels of threat perception and other elements of classic geopolitical thinking in Latin America. It could not afford either a heavy defence budget or a foreign policy which rejected an active policy of seeking not only *détente* with neighbouring countries but real friendship. The dominant thinking as the decade ended, not only in the Southern Cone but throughout Latin America, was that only integration and a common front towards the outside world would allow the region the clout it needed. Such influence was required not only to get out of the debt crisis but also to advance to a more favourable position for future negotiations on the new world being designed and to leave behind the horrors of the "lost decade." Inherited security problems which held up progress on wider issues were not to be tolerated any longer and neither the discredited armed forces nor the now laughable nationalists could put up much resistance, especially after Argentine economic disaster in the late eighties.

The two countries, but especially Argentina, needed help from the major powers. Buenos Aires, especially under Menem, put reinserting the country into the West at the top of its foreign policy, and indeed security policy, agenda. Things that held up acceptance by the central powers were simply going to have to be jettisoned. And as we have seen, not just the nuclear side suffered on this score but also the central missile programme of the armed forces and the national arms industry as well. Thus the outside world had considerable leverage over the two countries but especially over Argentina. And as we have seen, the United States made it clear that progress on outstanding security matters like missiles and nuclear proliferation were the *sine qua non* for the status of important partner that Buenos Aires so desired. If Brasilia was less clear on this score, it was nonetheless working along many of the same lines.

The more powerful Brazilian armed forces were of course not under the same pressures as those of their southern neighbour. They were more able to resist change. But at the same time civilian governments could point increasingly clearly to progress in the bilateral relationship, overall and even in defence and nuclear terms, as well as to the obvious Argentine acceptance of Brazilian predominance regionally, as ways to convince the armed forces that times had indeed changed and that Brazil could finally put down its guard at least to a sufficient extent to allow the integration and collaboration experiment a chance.

In South Asia, few of these circumstances exist. While democracy shows great robustness in India, it is much weaker in Pakistan. And it must be said that nuclear weapons were rarely debated in the Southern Cone of South America. Nationalist opinion and the armed forces wanted them so when those currents were dominant, such programmes made progress. In India, with time, the debate on nuclear weapons for the country garnered considerable public interest, especially on occasions when India was, in nationalists' view, being pilloried by the West. On the other hand, as

we have also seen, such a debate was in many senses a largely internal military one in Pakistan, less influenced by public opinion.

Nuclear weapons are now popular in India.²³ And responding to the Indians' nuclear posture with one of one's own appears welcome by Pakistanis. Nationalism is alive and well. And even fanaticism is gaining ground. Thus that part of the picture is a much less favourable one in South Asia today than in South America ten to fifteen years ago. Nuclear weapons were never a really popular option in either Latin American country and little enthusiasm for them could be garnered at any stage of what passed for debates on their acquisition. For this reason, India and Pakistan are likely to remain relatively insulated from international opinion, and are therefore for the foreseeable future more likely to pay lip service to international norms than to willingly engage in proactive dialogue, unless considerable incentives are offered. Furthermore, unlike in the Brazilian-Argentine case, the widespread public support in both India and Pakistan for the nuclear option makes nuclear weapons programs relatively immune to changes in political leadership.

It would appear that the challenge in this context is to discover what sort of democracies and contexts for those democracies can act as breaks on nuclear weapons development. The Latin American strategic context was one of low threat perception on all sides. In South Asia it is certainly not that. But civil society in Latin America did act as such a break, at least in terms of producing civilian presidents uninterested in the prestige and national security arguments of their military chiefs where nuclear weapons were concerned. Is there a way for such elements of civil society to develop in South Asia? Is there a way of curbing popular support of a nationalist kind which tends to favour nuclear options? The answers would require a major study of how democratic forces in the two countries operate. But it can be said that the Latin American case shows that it is possible. In a context of two proud and prestige-oriented publics there developed an opposition or indifference to the nuclear option which allowed leaders to stand up to the nationalists and military on the issue.

Discussion of military influence on policy might raise some of the same points. Strategic issues matter much more in South Asia at this time than they did in Latin America in the years studied. As discussed, threats are real and cannot be taken lightly by those responsible for national defence. In this context, although it might seem at first glance that the India-Pakistan dynamic can be explained through a realist approach based largely on questions of international security, it would be imprudent to ignore the important – some would suggest dominant – influence of domestic social, religious and political pressures. Such pressures, and the changes they produced, were in large part responsible for the decision by Brazil and Argentina to withdraw from the nuclear brink. The pressures in India and Pakistan are different and, at least for the moment, are either focussed in favour of nuclear weapons or, where they are not, are subordinate to – or at least balanced by – larger security concerns. It is conceivable that the major subcontinental societies will evolve to the point

²³ An interesting study based on polling results is offered by Samina Ahmed, David Cortright and Amitabh Mattoo in "Public Opinion and Nuclear Options for South Asia", in *Asian Survey* XXXVIII(8) (August 1998), pp. 727-44.

where the nuclear option is publicly decried rather than acclaimed; however, such evolution is difficult to predict, and even more difficult to influence.

International pressures and encouragement is also a complex subject. We have seen that India in particular is not susceptible to being cajoled by powers that it sees as in any case hypocritical on nuclear matters. And a package meant to show the concrete advantages offered by the international community for good behaviour on the part of India would have to be so large and impressive in order to have any significant effect that it can be considered a real challenge to design, much less implement. All of this is very different from a Latin America keen to be re-integrated into the Western community and desperate for technical assistance, debt relief, access to markets and the like.

CONCLUSION

The above suggests caution and modesty where moves towards resolution of the India-Pakistan nuclear rivalry are concerned. There are limited if often interesting lessons one can draw from the South American experience in this field. But their limitations seem often to dwarf their utility. The differences are so vast as to be daunting in the extreme. Those differences involve chiefly, as we have seen, the role of the international community and especially the United States and Europe, the utility of democracy as a spur to reason on these issues, the prospects for regional economic integration as a rubric for discussions of the advantages of cooperation replacing confrontation, the place of geopolitical, nationalist and military thought, and the simple level of threat perception in place.

In the Latin American case bureaucracies and scientific communities doubtless directly involved had a role in keeping the nuclear issue alive. But this is easily exaggerated. During the long years of military dictatorship it was not they but the military bureaucracy itself, embedded in government at every level, which worked to push forward interest in a nuclear option. Its lack of more permanent clout became clear later on as the very slight likelihood of Latin American nuclear programmes surviving the return of democracy combined with financially stringent circumstances showed itself. In South Asia, state and scientific bureaucracies played a greater role and were in fact the focus for such debates as there were at a variety of stages.

What we have found is that a large number of significant factors added up to the possibility for recently returned civilian regimes to opt to abandon nuclear programmes that had only in a small way captured the imagination of those countries' public opinion. A crisis atmosphere joined hopes for the future engendered by the opportunities for economic growth and renewed prosperity to bring about an end to those programmes in the context of vastly changed foreign and defence policy in Argentina, with the result that Brazil could follow the lead and reduce its threat perception as well.

This happy context, as we have seen, is far from the one in place in South Asia. But is it too much to imagine that sound policies on the part of the international community, combined with inventive arms control, building confidence not only between the two main parties but also with China and with emphasis at government and popular levels placed more on the potential for growth and prosperity coming from collaboration instead of confrontation could at least begin to create an environment more propitious for progress? If Argentina and Brazil could find ways to perceive their situation as one which was slowing economic and social progress through wasteful defence costs and lost opportunities to develop themselves jointly, is there not some hope that India and Pakistan can do the same? There are obstacles to be sure but many parts of the world, and not just the Southern Cone of South America, give examples of the benefits of working together in the face of massive economic and social problems, bringing progress much faster than circumstances of confrontation and defiance.

In 1980, such possibilities were considered unimaginable in Latin America. A decade later, the rivalry was over. While the contexts of the two cases explored above are very different, political courage, international interest and concern, public interest, and a desire for change in Argentina and Brazil wrought much. And as was discussed, various strategic and economic factors in play further reinforced those forces pushing for a new, non-geopolitical and non-nationalist examination of the issues at stake between these two countries. However, the India-Pakistan case will remain a much more difficult nut to crack. And without those concomitant elements, particularly a change in the internal Indian and Pakistani political contexts where nuclear weapons and regional peace and cooperation are concerned, this situation will likely remain unchanged.

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