






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


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PART III.

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And the Pretensions of France

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In which are Consider'd all the Obligations
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the Allies. With a full and
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Now on the Arrival of a Letter from
and of the French Ministry
A Paris, the 11th of June 1757.

Has Printed by J. B. Neave, at the Sign of the
1757

L O N D O N

Printed for A. Baldwin, near the Office
of the Secretary of State, in Strand, 1757

Price One Shilling

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THE
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Defended against
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And the Present Friends of *France*.

PART III.

In which are Consider'd all the Objections made against the *Emperor, Portugal,* and the rest of the Allies : With a further Vindication of the *Dutch* ; and some Reflections on the *Spanish* War ; on the Nature of Alliances in general ; and on the apparent Ill Designs of that Author.

Oblitus decorisque sui; sociumque salus.

Hæc Promissæ Fides ? Sic nos in Sceptra reponis ? } Virg.

LONDON:
Printed for *A. Baldwin,* near the Oxford-
Arms in *Warwick-Lane.* 1711.

Price One Shilling.

THE
A L L I E S
 AND THE
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 DEFENDED
 Against *FRANCE*, &c.

THE Author of *the Conduct of the Allies*, &c. whom we may consider as the *English Menager*; having chastised the *States* to the entire Satisfaction of the *French* one; and without the least Spark of Modesty, Candor, Ingenuity, or Truth; Virtues, which in Politicks *France* and her Faction are perfect Strangers to: He falls out next upon the *Emperor*, who must expect but little Quarter at such unmerciful Hands; after the most injurious Treatment of those Allies, upon whom next our selves the Burden of the War has chiefly lain; whom Learning and Religion, the same Interests, and common Danger, should join together in the strictest Union. After this nothing can surprize that it shall please this Author to say
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against the *Emperor*: By which Word he means the *Imperial Court*, under the two last Emperors, as well as while there was none at all. And the present Emperor having remonstrated against the Peace, which he and his Friends are so very eager for; this may prepare us to expect a heavier Charge, if possible, against the *Imperial Court*, than what he has brought against the *States*: And how well he has answer'd what might be expected from him, I come now to examine.

But before I enter into the Particulars, I cannot help taking notice of one Passage, Page 46. relating to the present Emperor, when he was no more than King of Spain. He says King Charles was paid in July 1711, all his Subsidies to January, and yet hath complain'd for want of Money. This being said by way of Encomium on the present M---y, as well as to insult King Charles; I must tell him, that the late M---y always took care that his Subsidies shou'd be paid him by the first of *May*: But in behalf of King Charles I wou'd ask this Author, what Sum of Money was at that time paid him: Whether it were a Year's Subsidy clear, or only paying him what on the Ballance of old Accounts wou'd be left: For that might be a very small Sum in Reality, while in Figures 'tis the whole Year's Subsidy. Another Question I wou'd ask, is, Whether when our Troops in *Catalonia* shou'd have taken the Field that Year, there was not Eight or Nine Months Substante due to them; and whether for want of timely Remittances we have not less a great Prospect of pushing the War in the

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Parts with good Success, considering the ill Condition the Enemy were in, if want of Money had not made it impossible for our Troops to take the Field?

As one thing leads to another, our Author can't omit another Passage concerning *Subsidies*, to shew how much Foreigners reckon themselves Masters of our Money, whenever they think fit to call for it. *Prince Eugene* happening to pass by Berlin, and an Arrear being due from the Emperor to the Prussian Troops in Italy, His Highness frankly promis'd them, that in consideration of this Deficiency, Britain and the States should increase their Subsidies to 70,000 Crowns more between them. The Dutch refus'd consenting to it. But the Prussian Minister here prevail'd on us to agree to our Proportion, before we could hear what Resolution would be taken in Holland. Now for a full Answer to this Passage, I might have refer'd my Author and his Friends to the Prince himself, when he was here; for they certainly saw him, and he was best able to tell them, whether Berlin fell by chance in his way, in his Road from Vienna to the Hague; or whether he went so far out of his Way, to solicit something for the Service of the Emperor, and the Common Cause. He like wise can best inform them, whether he was so impertinent as to engage Britain and the States in Payments, without any Powers so to do. Till I have better Authority for it, than this Author's Word, I shall believe there is nothing more in it, than that upon the King of Prussia's starting new Difficulties about those Troops, to get more Money for them, the

Prince of *Savoy*, to satisfy the King, and remove these Difficulties, undertook to use his Endeavours with us and the *States*, to make the Augmentation he insisted on; by which Means the Continuance of those Troops in *Italy* was obtain'd; and yet neither we nor the *States* were engag'd to make the Augmentation of the Subsidy, if we did not think fit; and the *States*, it seems, did not. Why then, let me ask this Author, did we? For this Question he can answer best, this Transaction is no older than last Year. The late Treasurer was remov'd the Beginning of *August*; there was no Convention then made for the Payment of this Money: It did not come before the Parl----t till *December*; nor then, neither, properly speaking; it not appearing to the House as an Augmentation, when the first Estimate for Subsidies was given in; but reckon'd in lieu of an Abatement to the Duke of *Savoy*; which Abatement however afterwards upon Second Thoughts was not abated. So that for the Discharge of this Author 25,000 Crowns the Estimate stands not charged with an Augmentation of above 46,000. Now to let this Management pass in which it must be confessed they have outdone the Old M----y, I wou'd only ask the Author, Whether there was not time enough between *July* and *December* to have known what Resolution the Dutch had taken in this Matter: And therefore the not knowing it can be a Reason why we did it, if it was wrong; nor indeed, in that Case, ought we to have agreed to this Payment, tho' the Dutch had. But if we are to judge by the Estimate, it was

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not very unreasonable, it being there said to be in Consideration of the extraordinary Charge the King had been at to recruit his Troops.

Our Author having given this Last in passing, to K. Charles, Prince Eugene, and the King of Prussia, goes on to the Particulars of the Charge against the Emperors. The first is, that instead of Ninety thousand Men, which they ought to furnish, neither of the two last Emperors, ever had Twenty on their own Account, except once in Italy. Which is an Assertion just as true, as what he says of there not having been for several Campaigns so many Men under the D. of M. in Flanders as the Queen alone maintains for that Service. The Emperor did certainly raise at the beginning of the War his Quota of Troops; and I dare say the Corps that make the Number stipulated, still subsist, tho' the distant and hard Services they have been employ'd in, the low Condition the Imperial Finances are reduc'd to, by continual Wars, and the great Degree to which the Hereditary Countries are exhausted of Men, have made it impossible for the late Emperors to recruit them well. Once indeed this Author allows the Imperial Court did exert themselves. Why don't he tell us they did it without Allies? And that if they had not done it, the Liberty of Europe had been lost beyond a possibility of recovering? Let him consider what a prodigious Expence that first Campaign put the Court of Vienna to; and what a noble Body of Troops were destroy'd to make Head against France, when all was in Danger

ger of being swallow'd up, and must have been so, without that wonderful Effort. And if the Emperor has since done less, those who know the State of the House of *Austria*, how long their Power has declin'd, the many Wars they have been engag'd in at the same time, and how little Respite they have had; how imperfect their Oeconomy and Government is; how very little Opportunity they have to recover themselves, when their Strength is once exhausted, thro' the great Expence they are at of keeping up a considerable Number of Troops in Time of Peace; and the small Resource they have by Trade: Whoever considers these Things, or looks no farther back than to the feeble Efforts of the whole Empire the Last War, must own, they have done more than cou'd be expected. For the late Emperors did make very considerable Efforts in *Italy* for Six Campaigns at least; that is, till the *French* were driven out of it; as this Writer himself confesses. For he says, *When they had succeeded in their Attempts on the Side of Italy, they soon found out the most effectual Expedient to excuse themselves.* This is fairly Confessing, that till they had succeeded in *Italy*, they did not excuse themselves. But that they certainly had not done, till the Battel of *Turin*; their Affairs in *Italy* having never since the Beginning of the War been in more Danger than they were at that time. Nor does this Author want to be told, that they had not even then succeeded in *Italy* to their Content: they were not easy, as long as *Naples* was in *French* Hands, which he himself makes a Crime

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Crime in them; this therefore made them
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 more. Here then are Eight Campaigns, be-
 fore the *Imperial* Court were at leisure to look
 out for this Expedient to excuse themselves.
 And for all the following Campaigns, 'tis
 known they have had a considerable Body
 of Troops in *Flanders*, which in Conjuncti-
 on with those under the D. of *M.* had by a
 vigorous War set us above the Necessities of
 an Ill Peace: If this Author and his Friends
 had not join'd with *France*, to con. and the
 most Hopeful Prospect of Affairs that *Europe*
 has seen this Fifty Years, or is like to see in
 Fifty more, if the Designs in view succeed.
 And besides these Troops, 'tis certain the Em-
 peror has for several Years past sent more than
 his Quota to the *Rhine*, that other Princes
 might be thereby induc'd to follow his Ex-
 ample. Nor has there been any Complaint
 of their being backward in their Preparati-
 ons on the Side of *Savoy*: If nothing has
 been done there for these Four Years past,
 'tis not for want of the Emperor's Troops be-
 ing ready to do their Part, but from the Dis-
 putes between him and the Duke of *Savoy*:
 which how far it would have been reasonable
 for either Side to have yielded to the other,
 'tis not my Business to determine. All I
 contend for at present is, that it has not been
 for want of Troops on the Emperor's Part,
 that nothing has been done so long on that
 side. But if the Emperor has been ready to
 do his Part in *Savoy*, has furnish'd more than
 his Quota to the *Rhine*, and has, to promote
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the Common Cause, sent a good Body of Troops to *Flanders*, which he was no way oblig'd to; because that is the only Part the War could be push'd in with Success; which yet without these Troops it could not have been; (as has been shewn to Demonstration in the *Management of the War*;) If, I say, the Imperial Court has done this, what can be more false than to say, that neither of the Two last Emperors ever had Twenty Thousand Men on their own Account in the Common Cause? And how injurious is it to impute their not doing more to an Expedient they found out, *to excuse themselves*? And that too at a time when all the World is sufficiently convinc'd of their Inability. And the great Interest they pay here in *England* for Moneys borrow'd on the best Funds they have, will suffer no body to be ignorant of the Straights they are reduc'd to; and this Writer, I doubt not, has many other Proofs of this, that don't come under common Observation, nor is it fit they should. But there is a Scing in this Expedient for the D. of M. and that must not be lost, especially at this Juncture, that he is so perverse, that no Terms can bring him in to our Author's noble Scheme. *They computed easily, that it would cost them less to make large Presents to one single Person, than to pay an Army.* In answer to which I do confess, that the Emperor *Leopold* indeed did, in acknowledgment of his having sav'd the Empire by his unparallel'd Wisdom and Conduct, make him a Prince of it; and that he might have the

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Honour of a Vote in the Dyet, did erect *Mindelheim* into a Principality. Which, after several times declining it, he did accept, with the *Queen's* Leave and Approbation. And I have heard besides, of four or five Pictures given him, which having been the Elector of *Bavaria's*, were a very natural and decent Present to him, who had freed the Empire of an Enemy, and oblig'd him to seek for Refuge in *France*, who but a little before had conceiv'd great Hopes of driving the Emperor from *Vientna*, and assuming to himself the *Imperial* Dignity. Besides these Presents, I have never heard of any; but have just Grounds to believe, that He never receiv'd so much as one; and that there is not a more false and malicious Insinuation than this in the whole Libel; which is enough to say of it. And had this Writer any Sense of Honour or Conscience, he would not, to Murder the Reputation of a Man, who has done so much Honour to his Country, and to whose Services, under God, *Europe* owes its Liberty, put such Constructions on Things, as he knows, have no Truth in them; he would not impute the Effects of the *Emperor's* Inability, to the Person that sav'd his Empire; he would not look for an *Expedient* in Presents, that were not made; nor interpret in so villanous a manner, Acknowledgments which all the World thought so well deserv'd, and will think so, in spite of this Author and his Friends.

After this General Complaint against the Two last Emperors, for not furnishing their *Quota's*, and leaving it to us to fight their Barrels, this Author descends to Particulars;

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and gives us Three Instances to prove how little they regarded their Allies, whenever they thought the Empire it self was secure. But I would be glad to know when this was, that the Empire was thought to be so secure. 'Tis the first time I have heard it was so; and with this Author's Leave must tell him, I don't take it to be secure yet; nor can it be, if his Schemes take place. Is an Empire secure, that lies open to the Enemy, and by the Negligence of the many Princes 'tis divided between, is in a very defenceless State? Is the Empire secure, that can't bring an Army into the Field till the middle of Summer, and till then may be invaded by the Enemy with a very small Body of Troops, and ravag'd without any Opposition, as it was in 1707, and would have been since, had not the Duke of M. every Year drawn the Enemy's Attention another way, and oblig'd them to look to themselves, instead of invading others. Where then is this Security of the Empire? To say nothing of the constant Apprehensions of an Insurrection in *Barvaria* which might kindle a new Fire in the Heart of it, in Concert with the Enemy. If therefore the Emperor would not venture to disregard his Allies till the Empire was secure, we can have no Reason to complain upon the score yet. But further; if the Emperor has by several Instances, shewn how little he regards his Allies, then this Disregard is not peculiar to us; His other Allies have Reason to complain of it as well as our selves; and they have sometimes done it in a decent way, not in Scandalous Libels and Invectives,

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in proper Remonstrances both to the Imperial Court, and to the Dyet of the Empire; to press them to exert themselves after the Example of the Maritime Powers; who, as the Dutch M---rs have often told them in the Name of the *Queen* and the *States*, have made extraordinary Efforts, beyond what they were obliged to by their Treaties, and even beyond their Strength, to Reduce the Exorbitant Power of *France*, and preserve the *Liberty of Europe*, and the *Rights of the House of Austria*. This Author can't but have seen several of these Memorials; and therefore can't but know, that if the Emperor and Empire have not done more, it was not for want of being call'd upon and importun'd in the most pressing manner possible. But this Author's Quarrel is not with the Empire, who have been really in fault, but with the Emperor: The Restitution of the *Spanish Monarchy* being his, not their Concern, 'tis little or nothing that this Peacemaker has to say to them.

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But to come to his Instances: The First is his not putting an End to the War in *Hungary*; which he might have done several times upon Terms not at all unbecoming either his Dignity or Interest. Now if the Court of *Vienna* were to blame in this, did the Late M---ry tamely offer it? Does not he know very well, how the M---rs of *England* and *Holland* labour'd on this Point? What Pains the Earl of *Sunderland* and Mr. *Stepney* particularly took in it? The Latter residing constantly at *Vienna*, and the Former going thither expressly for that

very Service. Did ever any Men press an Accommodation more forcibly than the Late M---rs did this? When I see another M---ry follow an Affair so long together with so much Spirit, Argument, and Good Sense, as can be produced on this Subject, for the Honour of the Late M---ry, and those employ'd by them, I shall then with Patience let this Author and his Friends accuse them of *only suffering the Emperor to sacrifice the whole Alliance to his private Passion.* But as to the Merits of the Cause: Did not the Late Emperors make several Attempts for an Accommodation, and offer Terms, and admit the Interpositions of our M---rs? And as it was very much for the Interest of the *Common Cause*, that an End should be put to that War, Did not *England* and *Holland* press it with the greatest Earnestness? But when that was done, are not all Governments themselves the best Judges in these Affairs? And therefore if they can't be ended as is wish'd, they are only to be pity'd for so great a Misfortune: And their Pursuit of an Affair that so nearly concerns them, can't with any Justice be interpreted to be a Disregard to the *Common Cause*, or a Neglect of their Allies; as in this Case we are sure it was. For during great part of the Time of those unhappy Troubles, the Emperor's Affairs both in *Italy* and the *Empire*, were in the utmost Danger, especially in 1707, when the *Empire* was invaded by *Mareschal Villars*, and the King of *Sweden* with a Victorious Army gave as just Apprehensions as if he had been at the Gates of *Vienna*: To say nothing of

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the Danger King *Charles's* Affairs were in at
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 whence I make these Three Inferences. *Firstly*,
 That this Refusal very probably was not the
 Effect of private *Passion*, but of Reason and
 Reflection; else it must have given way to
 the Weight of so many and so near Dangers
 that then threaten'd them. *2^{dly}*, Whatever
 were the true Cause of this Refusal, if such
 Dangers had no more Influence on the Em-
 peror than the Solicitations of his Allies, his
 continuing that War is no Proof at all of his
 Disregard to his Allies. If they had as much
 Weight with him, as such great and immi-
 nent Dangers had, they might have a great
 deal, tho' not enough. But *3^{dly}*, If the Im-
 perial Court were as much in Fault in this
 Affair, as this Author would have them
 thought to be, no Blame can on that account
 be thrown on the Late *M--ry*, who did all
 that Men could, to persuade them to put an
 End to it.

The next Instance of the Emperor's *Indiffe-*
rence, or rather Dislike of the Common Cause, at
the Business of Toulon; the Miscarriage of
 which he imputes wholly to the Emperor.
 Upon this Head, every Proposition advanced
 is false in whole or in part. First, he tells
 us the Design was discover'd here by a *Crea-*
ture of a certain Great Man, laying Wagers
 about the taking of it. This is a very odd
 Preamble to a Proof that *Toulon* was lost by
 the Emperor's Fault, to tell us, that probably
 it was not; the Design was discover'd here.

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But these Inconsistencies are nothing with this Writer, if he can but bring in one or two certain *Great Men*, whose Reputation stands cruelly in his way, and will do so, let him employ nayer so many Pens to blacken them. Now in Answer to this, I affirm, that this Design was not discover'd by the Creature of this *Great Man*, but by the Clerk of another *Great Man*, who was then Sec--- of S---. But to go on; our Author argues, that the Emperor had no mind *Toulon* should be taken, because he detach'd 12000 Men to seize *Naples*, as he ingeniously expresses it. That the Emperor did at that time make an Expedition to *Naples*, is true; but was it because he had no mind *Toulon* should be taken? No; 'twas because those who would make a scandalous Peace now, were attempting the same thing then; and he was afraid the Interest of his Family in *Italy* wou'd have been sacrific'd to other Views. This was the true Reason of that Expedition; and this Writer knows it was; which makes his Virulence and Malice the more impardonable. As Things were manag'd, 'tis plain, there was a Want of Troops. But when the Emperor was press'd to put off that Expedition, he did not want an Answer. He told them, That without those 12000 Men, they had as many as they had before desir'd; and indeed as many as would be able to find Subsistence, and that more would be but a Burthen to them; that while they were employ'd in the Reduction of *Toulon*, the other Troops should by great Marches hasten to *Naples*; and then return to join them for any further Services.

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But 'tis manifest, says our Author, that the Emperor had no mind we should take Toulou, because the Attempt might have succeeded, if Prince Eugene had not thought fit to oppose it. This is false again. The Duke of Savoy had the chief Command in that Expedition, and not Prince Eugene. What was the true Reason they delay'd so long the Beginning of that March, I can't pretend to say; but when they had pass'd the *Var*, I desire this Author would tell us, who it was that propos'd the holding a Council of War on Board the Fleet; and did hold one, to consider, whether they should proceed directly to *Toulou*, or besiege *Antibes*. A Man must be a very ill Judge in Affairs, that could not from that Step see, what was likely to come of the Expedition. Again, to clear up this Affair, I would fain know, who govern'd the Motions of the Army, till they came before the Place; for 'tis incredible, how so small an Army could be so many Days making so short a March. And if they had advanc'd with half the Speed, that they retir'd, 'tis certain they might have invest'd the Place before the Works the Enemy were making would have been finish'd, and before any considerable Number of the Enemy's Troops were arriv'd. But the Slowness of our Motions made our Arrival too late in both those Respects. And the Enemy's Troops were in Possession of the high Ground about the Place, before we came in Sight of it. And therefore if the Duke of Savoy did not seem willing to attack the Enemy, that is not very hard to account for; nor might it be any Fault in Prince Eugene, that

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he did not think it reasonable. But besides, there was a particular Reason at that time to think, the Prince might have strict Orders from *Vienna*, to be very cautious how he expos'd that Body of Troops. And that was, the Neighbourhood of the King of *Sweden*, who was pleas'd to pick many Quarrels with the Emperor, and no body could tell where his Demands would stop, or what would satisfy him. This gave very great Umbrage to the Imperial Court; and had they lost that Body of Troops before *Toulon*, they had reason to fear they should soon feel the Want of them. This was certainly a good Reason for not venturing a Battel to Disadvantage, where the least Misfortune would have been the Ruin of them all. But had that Expedition either been begun Ten Days sooner, or the March from the *Vor* had been made in less Time, the Design would have succeeded without the Hazard of a Battel. There is more might be said upon this Subject; but I am not in so much haste to discover some Truths, as our Author is to tell the most pernicious Lies.

Upon this Instance then, I must observe First, That the Expedition to *Naples* was not the Effect of any Disregard to the Allies, but of *Self-Preservation*. 2. That Prince *Eugene* declining a Battel, was not the Cause of our Ill Success against *Toulon*. 3. That it is not way chargeable on the Late *Mary*; who form'd the Design with the greatest Secrecy, and made the most effectual Preparations for it, and did all they could to put off the Expedition to *Naples*, and remove every Difficult

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ty that might hinder the Success of it. And
 Lastly, That it was nor discover'd first by any
 Creature of the Late M^rry, nor had France
 any Suspicion of it, till the Expedition was
 actually begun; as any one may see, that
 will look back into the History of that Af-
 fair.

The Third and Last Instance, and that a
much greater than either of the foregoing, how little
the Emperar regards us, may be brought from the
Proceedings of that Court not many Months ago.
 The Substance of this heavy Complaint is,
That the Imperial Court being desired by the Queen
to send 8000 Men to reinforce the Duke of Savoy
before the end of the Campaign, that he might be
able to take Winter Quarters on this side the Moun-
tains: This Desire not being complied with, the
Hopes from that Project are lost, and the War is
left in the Method, which is like to continue it
longest. And this is said to be treating the
 Q. in a most contemptuous manner. Now for a
 little Truth, at the Sight of which this great
 Contempt will vanish into nothing, and this
 mighty Project with it.

First, this Refusal in the Imperial Court, to
 send 8000 Men to the D. of Savoy, did not
 proceed from the least Disrespect to the Q.;
 on the contrary, at that Juncture they were
 most desirous to oblige her Majesty, that they
 might engage her in the Interest of King
 Charles, in order to secure more effectually
 his Election to the Empire; a Point of infi-
 nite Concern to that Court; and therefore
 there was nothing in their Power they wou'd
 nor willingly have done; and if in these
 Difficult Circumstances they did not do what the Q.
 desir'd,

desir'd, 'twas because they could not. This Author himself owns, that they *alleged the Impossibility of complying with the Q.'s Demands upon any Consideration whatsoever.* Nay, they did not so much as give the *Queen's Majesty an Opportunity to tempt them with any particular Sums.* If this Author had not a very particular Talent at Reasoning, he cou'd never, to shew this to be an Instance of Contempt to the Q. say the Things that prove quite the contrary. Is the pleading an *absolute Impossibility, a contemptuous Treatment?* Or is it a sign of its being only a pretended Impossibility, that they did not give an Opportunity to tempt them with any particular Sums? If this be Contempt, what wou'd it have been, if they had given such an Opportunity, and after some Offers the Affair had broke off? Wou'd not the listening to these Offers have been a good Argument to prove that they cou'd do the thing desir'd, if they wou'd; but refus'd to comply in a Point of so much Consequence, for a paltry Sum, because we wou'd not come up to their full Price? Had they acted thus, there wou'd have been some Colour for Reproaching them in this Manner, tho' it wou'd have been but a Colour only. For if the sending such a Body of Troops wou'd have requir'd such a Sum of Money, beyond what the *Imperial Court* (which is often the Case of that Court) cou'd at that time furnish, and the Q. on Her Part did not think fit to bear that Expence; 'tis certain, the Treaty for these Troops must break off without Effect, and there wou'd be no room to pretend, that was an Affront to the Q. or using Her ill

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But it did not come to this; no such Handle
 for Complaint was given: The Impossibility
 of complying was so evident, that without
 entering into any Parly; they declar'd they
 cou'd not do it upon any Consideration whatsoever.
 And 'tis not hard to see many great Difficulties
 that would naturally hinder the Imperial Court
 from complying with this Demand at that
 juncture; tho' this Author pretends they offer'd
 nothing to excuse themselves, but some
general speculative Reasons, and trifling Pretences.
 Had they been so trifling, I am apt to think
 this Author wou'd have told us what they were,
 or if a little Misrepresentation cou'd have
 made them look so; and from his Silence
 therefore I shall take leave to conclude they
 were not trifling. What Reasons the Imperial
 Court did give, I can't tell; but some few they
 might have given, are these: First, they
 cou'd not spare such a Body of Men from
 Hungary at that time, for two very weighty
 Reasons; one with Respect to the *Malecon-*
tents, and the other to the Motions of the
Turks. Our Author indeed takes no notice
 of this last; but for the other, is pleas'd to tell
 us, they cou'd not plead their old Excuse; the War
 with the *Malecontents* being at an end. And
 was this War so effectually ended, that they
 might draw their Troops from Hungary with-
 out Danger? Does not this Author know that
 Prince *Rygotzki*, who was the Head of the
Malecontents, and all the other Chiefs, except
 Count *Caroli*; refus'd to submit to the Terms
 offer'd them: And that the Submission of the
 rest was very little to be depended on; it hav-
 ing been made upon Terms offer'd in the

Emperor's Name, and personally to him, who was really dead, at the time the Submission was made; as soon after appear'd; which unhappy Circumstance had like to have undone all; the Act of Submission, and all that depended upon it, being *ipso facto* void. What Security now was there, that upon this Turn of Affairs the *Malecontents* wou'd not re-assemble under their old Leaders, and take fresh Heart, in hopes of obtaining better Terms from the Necessities this unexpected Accident put the *Imperial* Court under? What cou'd be of greater Concern to that Court, than the Loss of *Hungary*? And when cou'd they have just Cause to apprehend the Losing it? Did not the Garrison of *Mongaz*, a Place almost impregnable, refuse to surrender for a considerable Time after this Submission, under pretence of waiting for Orders from Prince *Ragotski*? And was not he doing all he cou'd in Conjunction with the Agent of *France*, to kindle that War anew? Was not this very much for the Purpose of *France*? Does not this Author know how much they have solicited the *Port*, either to make open War with the Emperor, or at least to take the *Malecontents* under their Protection? Has not all our News from those Parts, this last Summer told us of the Ticklish State the Affairs of *Hungary* were in on these Accounts? What then does this Author mean by saying, *they cou'd not plead their Old Excuse*? But suppose this Submission had been made in the Emperor's Life, and been in all Respects as valid as it cou'd be, and Prince *Ragotski* had come in, and all the Places the *Malecontents* were

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possess'd of, had been surrender'd early in the Year; was the *Turkish* War an Affair that did not deserve the Attention of the *Imperial* Court? Is it not the Point they are most nearly concern'd in? Cou'd any thing have been more fatal to the House of *Austria*, than to have the *Port* declare War against them in that Juncture? Was not the Condition of Affairs in *Hungary*, and the Death of the *Emperor*, a very great Temptation to them? And can we think *France* did not press it with all their Might? How then cou'd the Court of *Vienna* be secure the *Port* wou'd not break with them? And without such a Security, how cou'd they with any Safety draw their Troops from *Hungary*? which, God knows, with all the Troops they had in it, wou'd have been able to have made but a very poor Defence, against a tolerable Army of *Turks*. Had not the *Port* broke with the *Muscovite* without any such Provocation, notwithstanding they had but Two Months before with great Solemnity renew'd the Peace for Thirty Years? And why might they not break their Treaty with the *Emperor* as easily, when they had so much Temptation to it? This was a Point of the utmost Consequence; and all the Precaution the Court of *Vienna* cou'd use on this Occasion, must be allow'd by all reasonable Men to be but prudent and necessary; especially considering the Artifices and Endeavours of the *French* to divide and embroil the Empire, which they threaten'd to invade with a great Army at the same time, that they might throw Things into Confusion, break the *Austrian* Interest, and prevent the Election of King

King Charles. Wou'd it not in this Ticklish Juncture have been very wise in the *Imperial* Court, in order to favour an impracticable Project in *Savoy*, to send a Body of their best Troops, and almost their All, to so great a distance from them; and leave themselves naked on the Side of *Hungary*, where an old War was not quite extinguish'd, and a new one, 'twas apprehended, wou'd very soon break out? Shou'd they have tempted these Dangers by neglecting them; and left unguarded a Fire, that was cover'd rather than put out; when at the same time they saw a new one beginning with great Pierceness in their Neighbourhood, which, shou'd it spread towards them, as there were great Endeavours us'd for it, the Remains of the past Fire wou'd soon have rekindl'd, and the Flames of both wou'd in a little time have reach'd the Capital it self; and then all Attempts to extinguish them might have been too late, besides that the more Help they shou'd want, thro' the Distractions of the Empire during the *Interregnum*, the less they wou'd have had? Let People put themselves in their Case, and they will presently be convinc'd, these were not *Speculative Reasons*, or *Trifling Pretences*, for not Complying with the Q.'s Demands; but such as made their Compliance absolutely impossible. And had these Dangers been out of the Question, so that the *Imperial* Court cou'd have spar'd the Men, (tho' 8000 be no trifling Number for a Court, who, if we may believe this Writer, have never this War, but once, had 20000 in the Field on their own Account,) yet where shou'd

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should they find Money to put these Troops
 in a Condition to March, who, we may be
 sure, wanted Cloaths, and Arms and Horses,
 and had great Arrears due to them, and must
 be paid when they are to serve out of their
 Country, tho' very little or no Pay contented
 them, while they serv'd in it, in a plentiful
 and rich Soil, and where every thing they
 could lay their Hands on was their own: A
 Circumstance, which should make this Au-
 thor not so fond of *Intestine Wars*, tho' they
 carry no Money out of the Country that is the
 unhappy Seat of them. Where now should
 the Imperial Court find Money for these Pur-
 poses; when the Return of King *Charles*, the
 Management of his Interests in the *Empire*,
 and the necessary Expence of his *Election*,
 would call for much greater Sums, than ei-
 ther their *Exchequer* or their *Credit* could fur-
 nish, without such Methods as nothing but
 the last Necessity can make advisable, or
 render practicable? If therefore ever De-
 mand was impossible to be comply'd with,
 in this extraordinary Juncture of Affairs,
 it must be allow'd this was so. Where
 then is this pretended Contempt of the Q.?
 where this Disregard and Neglect of the
common Cause, because they did not do, what
 'tis very evident they could not? As it was
 the Interest of the House of *Austria*, to shew
 all possible Deference and Respect to the
 Queen and the *States*, in this Situation of
 Affairs, so in my Humble Opinion they did;
 and I think King *Charles* in particular could
 not give a greater Instance of it, than in leav-
 ing it to them, as he did, to govern his Mo-
 tions,

tions, in a Matter of so great Concern; when instead of returning to *Vienna*, as soon as he heard of his Brother's Death, he waited for the Opinion and Sense of his Allies; and in compliance with them stay'd at *Barcelona* above Five Months after, that the War in *Spain* might not be neglected on his part; tho' the Want of Money made it impossible for us to use our Troops, or make any Advantage of his Presence with them. And when at last it was necessary for him to come away, that Affairs might suffer as little as possible by his Absence, he took the brave Resolution to leave his Queen behind; a Resolution all have great Reason to be pleas'd with, who are not in the Interest of *France*, that is, all except this Author and his Friends; whom a contrary Conduct in King *Charles* would have satisfy'd much better, as what would have facilitated the Loss of all we have left in *Spain*, and enabled them to remove the Blame of it from themselves.

But what makes this Complaint against the *Imperial* Court, for not complying in a Point they could not, still more unjust, is, That the Common Cause suffer'd little or nothing by it; for the Design of this Demand was, to enable the Duke of *SAVOY* to take *Winter Quarters on this side the Mountains*; and all that was desir'd, was, that they should join him *before the End of the Campaign*. Now I desire this Author would let us know, what the Duke of *Savoie* did towards the Execution of this Project, or to make these Troops useful, if they had join'd him at the Time appointed? Could he take *Winter Quarters on*

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*this side the Mountains, without penetrating in-
 to Dauphiné?* This was indeed expected that
 he would have done ; and considering how
 the Campaign open'd on that Side, 'tis a Sur-
 prize to every body it was not done. But in
 Fact he hover'd about the Passes, without at-
 tempting to penetrate, till the Duke of Ber-
 wick had taken the necessary Precautions, and
 made Lines, and receiv'd considerable Rein-
 forcements from *Alsace*, and other Parts. By
 which means the Campaign was spent in the
 two Armies looking at one another ; and the
 Duke of *Savoy* was oblig'd to leave the Field
 first, for want of Forage and Provisions to
 subsist the Troops he had. Suppose now
 these 8000 *Imperial* Troops had join'd him
 some little time before ; wou'd he with this
 Addition have been able to penetrate, after
 the D. of *Berwick* had taken his Measures to
 hinder it, and drawn together what Troops
 he wanted ? Or if this Addition of 8000
 wou'd have been too much for the other to
 oppose, with the Strength then with him,
 Cou'd the March of these Troops have been
 conceal'd ? And wou'd not that have put the
 Enemy upon proportionably increasing their
 strength, by drawing more Troops from the
Rhine, where they were not wanted to be on
 the Defensive only ? And if this wou'd not
 have been sufficient, but the Enemy must have
 been oblig'd to draw some Troops from *Spain*,
 which I can't by any means allow they wou'd,
 yet this wou'd have been of no use to us
 on that Side ; since, as I said before, it was
 impossible for our Army there to take the
 Field,

Field, tho' there had been no Enemy to oppose them.

But, to make this Author greater Concessions than a modest Man can ask. Suppose these 8000 Men. wou'd have enabl'd the D. of *Savoy* to penetrate into *Dauphiné*; what is it he could have done there, besides Raising Contributions, and Ravaging the Country? Would he have begun the Siege of *Briançon*, the Place which the Enemy knows all his Views end in, when the Campaign is drawing to an end, and the Snows begin to fall? What time do's this Author suppose such a Siege would take up? Or where should the Troops find Forage, while they were employ'd in it? Could they take a Town of that Strength without Time, or without Forage for the Time? Or could he take up Winter-Quarters on this Side, without so much as one Town to cover them? I'll go one Step further, and suppose for once such a Siege could have been compass'd with Success, and that Winter-Quarters might be taken; I would then ask, how they should be kept? How shall an Army on this Side the Mountains subsist, when all Communication with the other Side is cut off, and the Passages are shut up with the prodigious Snows that fall in those Parts for Eight Months together? Did this Author ever hear of an Army keeping Winter-Quarters for Half that time in an Enemies Country, when they receiv'd no Subsistence from their own? And if ever this were possible, which it is not, how can this Army possibly defend themselves against the Enemy, who can attack them

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hem early in the Spring with what Numbers
 hey please; while those that are attack'd,
 can receive no Relief or Support from any
 Part? What can Troops unassisted do, who
 have been mouldring away a whole long
 Winter in bad Quarters, wasting themselves
 to find Subsistence in an Enemy's Country,
 and perpetually harras'd by their Parties?
 'Tis impossible for Troops in such a Condi-
 tion, half-naked and starv'd, without Money
 or Provisions, and reduc'd perhaps to less than
 Half their Number, to make head against a
 fresh Army: They can neither take the
 Field, nor keep their Quarters, unless they
 were Masters of more strong Places than they
 would be by this Supposition; according to
 which they will have but one only, for more
 Sieges than one they can't be expected to
 make in so short a time on this side the Moun-
 tains: Nor will Places of Strength surrender
 without a Siege; so that all their Troops must
 be drawn from the open Country, and crowd-
 ed into this one Place and its Neighbourhood.
 And what hurt Starving could be the Conse-
 quence of this, tho' the Enemy did nothing
 else but make a Sort of Blockade? But if
 they should not be content with that, but re-
 solve by a vigorous Siege to recover this Place
 again, who shall hinder it? How can a Place
 be expected to be preserv'd, that can't hope
 for Relief in 3, or perhaps 4 Months, from
 the Day on which the Siege of it shall be be-
 gun? For the Duke of *Savoy* therefore to
 take Winter-Quarters on this Side of the
 Mountains for any considerable Body of
 Troops, unless his Campaigns begin earlier
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than they have yet, and more Progress be made in them than what we have ever yet so much as hop'd for; I can't but look on as a Project utterly impracticable; at least so it was this last Campaign: And had he been join'd by the *Imperial* Troops, it had serv'd to no other purpose but to consume so much Forage, and consequently oblige him to leave the Field so much sooner. So that the great Crime the *Imperial* Court are here charg'd with, upon full Examination into it, appears to amount to no more than this; that they could not spare a considerable Body of Troops from *Hungary*, where they were absolutely necessary, to make a terrible long March, for which they were in all respects unprovided, to assist the D. of *Savoy* in a Project which it was impossible could take place.

But this Author thinks, they ought to have comply'd with this Demand, *without considering whether they wanted them for their own Defence or not.* For did we, says he, ever once consider what we could afford, when our Assistance was desired, even while we lay under immediate Apprehensions of being invaded? To which I answer, Yes, we did; and had been much to blame if we had not, when we lay under the Apprehensions of being invaded: He knows, a good Body of our Troops embark'd at *Ostend*, and sail'd for *Scotland*, and more were ready to follow, had there been Occasion. And I hope the present M---y, if the same Apprehensions should return, would do the same thing. And if this Author's Malice did not make him forget himself, he would have remember'd, that but a few Pages before he

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makes it there wa sent thei furnish'd own Exa they may not comp without con if we had is that a foolish on presented on their s than they on this Int First, Tha 'tis brought us. And i Constructi any Article be, to come which the all their does it aff not tamely Misfortune the New M which is mo on them, t Omissions in flect on the but observe, that of the States and th no older Da before us; v

makes it a Crime in the *Dutch*, that when
 there was only a *Rumour of an Invasion*, they
 sent their *Quota* to the *Mediterranean*, and
 furnish'd nothing to us. If therefore our
 own Example may be a Rule to our Allies,
 they may from thence justify themselves for
 not complying to the Demand made them,
without considering what they could afford. But
 if we had not acted a wise Part our selves,
 is that a Reason why they should act a very
 foolish one? If their Case was as I have re-
 presented it, they had but too much Reason
 on their Side, nor could they do otherwise
 than they did. I shall end what I have to say
 on this Instance, with these Three Remarks.
 First, That it is no Instance at all of what
 'tis brought to prove, *the Emperor's Disregard of*
us. And if it could be strain'd to such a
 Construction, 'tis, Secondly, no Breach of
 any Article in any Treaty, which it shou'd
 be, to come under his general Proposition, in
 which the Allies are accus'd of breaking
 all their Treaties with us. Nor, Lastly,
 does it affect the late M — y; they did
 not *ramely suffer this*, if it was a Fault; 'tis a
 Misfortune, if it be one, that has befall'n
 the New M — . And if this Instance,
 which is most complain'd of, does not reflect
 on them, then by Parity of Reason, other
 Omissions in our Allies don't necessarily re-
 flect on the Late M — y. Indeed I can't
 but observe, in Justice to the Late M — y,
 that of the Five Instances urg'd against the
States and the Emperor, Three of them are of
 no older Date than this last Year; this now
 before us; what is said of the Reception of
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Sir *J. Wishart*, and of the Consent refus'd to the D. of *M.*'s Project for Winter Quarters. And the other two, which relate to *Toulon* and the *Malecontents*, were as just Matters of Complaint when the Offices of State and War were fill'd with those who are the great Support and Ornament of the present Times, as they can be now; and therefore affect them as much as Any of the late *M---y*. And since they must reflect Blame on one as well as the other, this Author will allow me to conclude, they reflect none on either.

The next Ally we are to be made out of Humour with, that our Treaties with him may be broke into with less Ceremony, is the King of *Portugal*: With what Unfairness and Injustice this Author has condemn'd our Alliance with this Crown, I have already shewn; and now that he returns to *Portugal* again, *p. 92*. one would expect to be told how many things he has done in Breach of these Alliances, or rather how many he has left undone; but to our great Surprize in this Article of *Portugal* there is not one Fault found with them; the *States* and the *Emperor* run so much in this Writer's Head, that he can think of nothing less. And first for the *Emperor*, he soon declared himself, 'tis said, unable to comply with his Part of 12000 Men, and of a Million of *Patacoons* that he was to furnish by the Treaty. By which means two Thirds were left on us, who very generously undertook the Burden. And for the *Emperor*, if he cou'd not do his Part, perhaps it was so understood by *England* at the time of the Treaty; tho' the Recovery of the *Spanish* Monarchy being properly the Con-

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cern of his Family, it was thought fit, that he should be one of the Parties in this Treaty with the *Portuguese*, for the sake of other Articles, I mean the Concessions to be made to *Portugal*, which was the Inducement to them to come into the Alliance; and which no body could make but the Emperor himself. So that his Share must lye on the other Two; and if *England* took Two Thirds upon themselves, 'twas not *Generosity*, but *Wisdom* and *Necessity*. We endeavoured first to persuade the *Dutch* to divide the *Emperor's* Share with us, but as they were ready to perform their Part of the Treaty, we cou'd not oblige them to do more; *Portugal* was on Account of Trade most our Concern, and we were undeniably most able; and therefore after this Matter had been thoroughly considered, we consented to take the *Emperor's* Part upon our selves. Now if it were understood at the Time of the Treaty, that the Emperor could not do his Part, as I confess, I can't see how he could, then there lies no Blame upon him; but whether there does or not, it don't affect the *Dutch*, they were to furnish but a Third, and a Third they did furnish. But such is the strange Talent of this Author, such his Pique against the *Dutch*, a Quarrel with them being most for his Purpose, that he can't leave this Article before he has prov'd the *Dutch* are most in Fault. But neither is this, says he, the worst Part of the Story; for tho' the *Dutch* did send their Quota, yet they never took care to recruit them. How now does he prove this? Why, because in 1706. the *Portuguese* Army, instead of going back to

Portu-

Portugal, were oblig'd to retire into Valencia; and after that time the Dutch never sent a Man to Portugal, nor paid one Penny of their Subsidies. Whereas the Q^{ueen} has at several times, increas'd Her Establishment to 10,500 Men. What the New M^{inistry} have done, I know not, but the Q^{ueen}'s former Quota was 8000 Men; and I can't find, that in 1710. we had in Portugal more than 8 Batallions of Foot, and 7 Regiments of Dragoons, newly rais'd by my Lord Gallway, which very little exceed Her Majesty's Quota of 8000 Men; and are maintain'd at a much less Expence, than when they were all English Troops. But to return to the Dutch. Does it follow, they never recruited their Quota before 1706. or in that Year, because they have not done it since? But has this Author never look'd into the Impartial Enquiry into the Management of the War in Spain? Does he hate any thing, that is Impartial to that Degree, that he can't bear the Sight of it? Or does he not, without looking into it, very well know, that what he says, is false; that after the first 4000 Men the Dutch sent to Portugal in 1703. they sent 4 Regiments more in 1705. and in Feb. 1708. 1200 Men, and 4000 more the same Year, with the Troops sent under my Lord Rivers? How then can this Author say, they never recruited their Quota, when they sent in Three Years 7700 Men, besides lesser Numbers of Recruits at several times? Well, but they have sent none, since the Portuguese Army retir'd into Valencia. First, that is not strictly true; for they were then in Valencia when the 4000 last mentioned fail'd out of

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the Channel. Since that time, 'tis true, they have sent no Men to Portugal; but instead of the Troops they should have there, they have constantly, as an Equivalent, increas'd their Quota in Flanders by the same Number, as may easily be judg'd by the List of their Forces I gave the Reader in my last; from which 'tis very evident, that they have more Troops in that Service, than any Treaty does oblige them to. And if we have not follow'd their Example in this Point, it has been for these Reasons: First, That we have had a better Opinion of the War on that Side than they; and hop'd it would turn to more Account than in Fact it has: But the principal Motive with us to keep that War alive, has been to preserve a good Understanding with the King of Portugal; which 'tis more necessary a great deal for us to cultivate, than for the Dutch, in regard to the Advantages resulting from that Trade: And upon that account I thought we had good Reason not to examine too nicely into the Failures on their Part: Besides, that with all their Faults, and their worst Circumstances, they have been of Use, by diverting a considerable Number of the Enemy's Troops from acting elsewhere.

For an Instance how ill we are treated by our Allies, he tells us a Story of Seven Portuguese Regiments: The Substance of which is this; That after the Battle of Almanza these Regiments went off to Catalonia, which the Queen consented to pay, provided the King raised as many more to supply their Place; which he engaged to do, but never did.

This is the Complaint

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gainst the Portugueze ; but not made so much
 to blame them, as to have something to say
 right or wrong against the Late M---ry. My
 Lord G---, he says, constantly paid the King of
 Portugal his Subsidies for almost Four Years, with-
 out any Deduction for these Regiments; direct-
 ly contrary to the 7th Article of the Offensive Alliance
 with that Crown. According to this Repre-
 sentation my Lord G--- ought to have de-
 ducted the Pay of these Seven Portugueze Re-
 giments out of the King's Subsidies for the
 Years 1707, 1708, 1709, 1710; for in Aug-
 1710, this Author knows his Lordship was
 remov'd. Now this Representation I say
 scandalously false; and that my Lord G---
 did not pay the King his full Subsidies, and
 these Seven Regiments too, for the Four last
 Years of his M---ry, nor indeed for any one
 Year; which he knows to be true, and which
 to them that don't know it, I prove thus: First
 The full Pay of these Regiments, as appears
 by the Establishment, is 124,707 l. 5 s. 4 d.
 Now to the 22d of December, 1708, what Money
 pay was paid to them in Catalonia, was upon
 the Commissary's Vouchers deducted at
 bow out of the King's Subsidy: So there
 Two Years of this Charge struck off at
 And since that time, there was paid for these
 Regiments by my Lord G--- but one Sum
 80,000 l. which is not above Three Fifths
 of One Year's Pay; and even this Sum was
 never put on the Establishment, or as
 to be made good by Parliament, nor was
 Payment of it order'd, but upon the
 urgent Necessity; as those knew, who had
 Honour to command the Q.'s Troops at

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time in *Catalonia*. For both the Ambassador
 and General of the Portuguese, the Counts
 of *Assumar*, and *Atalaya*, did declare they could
 nor serve that Campaign without Money,
 Bread, or Cloaths; and that if we did not
 give them Subsistence, they would ask a Pass-
 port of the D. of *Anjou* to return to their
 own Country. This was at a time, when
 whose Troops could not be spar'd, for they
 made the greatest Part of our Cavalry, and
 were very good Troops. For as that Nation
 have formerly distinguish'd themselves in all
 those Parts of War, which a long Peace has
 made them since forget; by the Experience of
 this War, they have recover'd in some Mea-
 sure their Ancient Virtue. Besides, it was
 much to be fear'd, a step of this Nature wou'd
 not have stopp'd there, but would have been
 soon follow'd by others; which every Bo-
 dy who knows how necessary this Alli-
 s, as appear
 of the most fatal Consequence. Upon these
 Considerations Her Majesty was pleas'd to or-
 der a Sum without Account, but did not de-
 clare it was to be over and above their Subsi-
 s; on the contrary, there are Letters under
 my Lord G---'s Hand, that he would
 secure enough in his own Hands to have it
 deducted at a Peace; but did not think it pro-
 per then to dispute such a Sum with so neces-
 sary an Ally, and a Court so much inclin'd
 to the *French* Interest, as that is known to be.
 This now is what the late Treasurer did, and
 the Reasons why he did it; which it seems are
 these: *The Understanding of the present Lord Tr---*
who has been so uncourtly as to stop it. I am as

just an Admirer of the Great Things perform'd by the present Tres —, as this Writer can be; but with Submission must say, he has not a very good Hand at Pauegryck, or else he would not, while he seems to commend the Successor, really vindicate the other, as he does here. He does not indeed say, that this new Treatment of the King of Portugal has occasion'd the Reports we have had of some secret Negotiations between him and the Enemy; but tells us, that in effect we have got nothing by it; that it has put *the King upon Expedients to make Amends for this Deduction, by raising the Price of Forage, and demanding new Duties of us.* Now if this be the Effect of our uncourty Usage of him, I submit it to the Reader's Judgment, whether it be better to oblige so necessary an Ally, and keep him firm to us, by making an Annual Payment, which he can't in strictness demand, or hazard the losing of him by refusing it, when in the mean time it puts him upon such Methods that in the end nothing will be sav'd by it. Let this Author blame the *Portuguese* as much as he will, the Success of our new Measures in their Attempts to mend the Matter, will by all impartial Men be thought a full Vindication of the old Ones; and particularly of my Lord G —, whose Administration the more 'tis examin'd into, the more will he appear to deserve the Character that has so universally been given him.

What this Author has said of *Portugal*, is interrupted, p. 54. with a Paragraph upon the *Spanish War*, which would have come in as pertinently in any other Part of his Book.

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For here is no Ally complain'd of, no Pre-
 tence of any Treaty broke, no Demand from
 any of them refus'd to be comply'd with.
 All he says, is, *That the War in Catalonia has*
been carry'd on almost entirely at our Cost. Which
 might be made Matter of Complaint against
 the late M — y perhaps, if it could be re-
 concil'd with that Neglect of Spain they have
 been accus'd off, or with that particular Care
 of it, that has been both by the Q — and
 Parl — t recommended to their Successors.
 But how this reflects any Blame on our Allies,
 or involves them in any Crime, I can't see;
 unless it could be shewn, that they have not
 done in this Point, what they were oblig'd to,
 which is not here so much as oblig'd to,
 much less prov'd against them. And there-
 fore, there is but one possible Reason, for
 saying what he does of the Spanish War in
 this Place; which must be this; That if
 England, who have been at almost all the
 Charge of the Spanish War, shall be willing
 to give up Spain at the next Treaty, as tis
 plain this Writer and his Friends design we
 should, the Allies in that Case, have no Rea-
 son in the World to complain or interpose,
 since they have done little or nothing towards
 recovering it. This is the Q — 's War, the
 Allies have no Part in it, and therefore She
 may, without Regard to them, put an End to
 upon what Terms She will. This is plainly
 our Author's Aim. But this, as all the other
 parts of this wretched Cause, we shall see is
 wretchedly supported. For, First, 'Tis not
 true that they have done so little even in Spain,
 as this Author would insinuate; nor, were it
 true,

true, is the Argument good he would draw
 from it; unless it could be shewn, that no-
 thing can effect or contribute to the Restitu-
 tion of *Spain*, but the War that is made in
Spain it self; whereas the contrary has been
 prov'd in the *Management of the War*, with
 the greatest Evidence, that *Spain* never can
 be gain'd by a War in *Spain*, but thro' *France*,
 and consequently by the vigorous Prosecution
 of the War on the Side of *Flanders*; which
 has both by Reason and Experience been
 shewn to be the only Part, in which the Al-
 lies can weaken *France* enough, to make them
 quit their Hold of *Spain*. But if this be the
 proper way to recover *Spain*, then those who
 have contributed to a vigorous War in *Fland-
 ders*, have contributed to the Recovery of
Spain, and consequently have a Right to in-
 sist on the Restitution of it; and *England*
 can't, without a Violation of their Rights,
 make a Peace on Terms by which so Essen-
 tial a Point of their Treaties shall be given up,
 supposing it were consistent with our own
 Interest, which 'tis as clear as the Sun, it is
 not, nor can be on any Terms; no Equiva-
 lent can possibly be given for it, as every body
 would be convinc'd from what has been
 writ on this Subject with unanswerable Rea-
 son, if the Time were yet come, that the
 Voice of Reason could be heard.

But if the War in *Spain* were the likeliest
 way to recover it, 'tis not true, that the Al-
 lies have done so little towards this Part
 of the War, as this Author would insinuate, nor
 has *England* so much. The *Spanish Army*,
 that has been employ'd on the Side of *Catalonia* is, or

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be; about 50000 Men, exclusive of *Portu-
 gal*, and our Troops at *Gibraltar*; which are
 indeed no more than Two weak Battalions.
 And this whole Army is paid by the Q^{ty},
 excepting only Seven Battalions, and 24
 Squadrons of *Dutch*, and *Palatines*; and even
 1500 (he should say 1200) of these are
 in our Pay, besides the Sums given to King
Charles for Subsidies, and the Maintenance
 of his Court. This Author would have
 oblig'd us, if he would have given us the
 particular Numbers of which this Army is
 made up, and explain'd his *ought to be*. For
 to look back to the Three last Years of this
 War before the Change; in 1708, I can find
 but 22,450 Effective Men in *Catalonia*, inclu-
 ding the *Portuguese* Troops, of which 22,432
 only were paid by the Q^{ty}; nor were
 there of our own Troops more than one Re-
 giment of Horse, 3 of Dragoons and 7 of Foot.
 And to take it according to the Establishment,
 of 47,848 Men, 40540 only were paid by the
 Q^{ty}. The next Year the Q^{ty}'s own Troops in
Catalonia were augmented to 5 Regiments of
 Horse, 8 of Dragoons, and 13 of Foot; besides
 which the whole Number of Foreign Troops
 paid by *England* was 12,200. and so the Q^{ty}'s
 Part in this War continu'd for the next Year
 50. Now during this time I find in this Ar-
 my 7000 *Portuguese*, to whom only 80,000 l.
 was paid by the Q^{ty}, which I have already
 shewn, is not above three Fifths of their full
 Pay for one Year. There were likewise be-
 sides the 1400 *Palatines* paid by the Q^{ty}. 6000
 paid by the *Dutch*, and Seven Regiments also
 of Horse and Foot, of their own Troops. And

as for King Charles's Part, he rais'd what Troops he cou'd in Catalonia; at least Four thousand more than his Subsidy from the O. wou'd maintain, after the Maintenance of his Court is deducted; and to do what he cou'd further for the Support of this War, there is no body who looks into News, but knows that considerable Sums have from time to time been sent from Milan and Naples to King Charles; and from the fall of these Places we hardly hear of any thing, but of the Pains and Application of the Vice-Roy, to find Ways and Means to support the Service in Catalonia, which are push'd to that Extremity, as makes the People very uneasy, and gives the Government almost the perpetual Trouble of preventing Tumults or appealing them: But this doing nothing for the Spanish War? Or does any body imagine the Money rais'd for this is sunk into the King's Coffers; instead of being applied to the Service? Is not great Part of it, perhaps much the greatest, spent upon the Place in fitting out Convoys with Necessaries of one kind or other for the Army; either Arms, or Cloaths, or Provisions besides now and then some Troops? But if this be true, as we all know it is, then King Charles his Part in this War, if not so great as cou'd be wish'd, is more considerable than this Writer represents it, and as much as cou'd be expected from him, considering his Circumstances.

All that follows in this Paragraph of the charge of *transporting Forces from Genoa, and of the Money rais'd for Men and Horses, and of the Manner of our Fleet being thus employed,*

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this is nothing but a necessary Consequence of a War in *Spain*; unless an Army can be raised without Men and Horses, or subsist there without Recruits; or they cou'd sail from *Genoa* by Land. To make therefore these Objections, is nothing else but to condemn the *Spanish War*, which both Her Majesty and her People have so much at Heart. For if we will have an Army in those Parts, 'tis infinitely easier to support it from *Italy*, than *England*. And I may add, that the *Dutch* have had their Share in the Trouble of Transportation, that is so much complained of; nor have their Fleet been employed in any Enterprizes for the good of their Countrey, any more than our own. But 'tis time to leave this Paragraph, which reflects no Blame on the late M---y, nor upon any of our Allies, nor when examined into, is it of any use to his Cause. Only give me leave to add in the last Place, that if we go back to the beginning of the *Spanish War*, which is the only way to judge impartially about it, we shall see the Imperial Court it self did not contribute a little towards the probable Success of it, tho' they had furnish'd neither Men nor Money towards it, in giving us the *Archduke* to be at the Head of it. If we consider how much *England* solicited this, how impossible it was that we cou'd succeed without it in *Spain*, where we pretended to nothing else but to favour a Revolution; How much the Honour of the House of *Austria* was expos'd by making a nominal King, when we cou'd not give him Possession of any Part of the Monarchy; how much the

Succession of the Imperial Family was hazarded, by sending one Brother upon so much Danger, when the other had no Son; how serviceable his Presence in Spain was at first to us, and by what improbable Accidents, our Hopes of an entire Revolution have more than once been disappointed: Whoever considers these things impartially, must allow, that the Imperial Court in giving us the Archduke, gave us a great deal towards the Spanish War; and so I am sure we all thought then; and therefore to have given Spain from King Charles to the Duke of Anjou, unless the Fate of the War had made it necessary, had been a great Injustice to the Imperial Court, if either his Father or Brother had liv'd, which yet was as much designed then as it is now; and if it wou'd have been unjust then it is so still.

Page 50. We have a new Complaint against the last Emperor, for draining into his own Coffers the Wealth of the Countries conquer'd or recover'd for him by the War, without increasing his Troops. King Charles, the present Emperor, I believe would be glad to find any Truth in this; but the Mischief is, all the World knows tis false. His Coffers, we are sure have for a long time been very empty, and his Successor no doubt will find it so. The Revenue arising from conquered Countries is much less than this Author seems to think it is; very little of it comes into the Emperor's Coffers, and the little that does come, enables him to support his Part of the War, better proportionably than he cou'd otherwise. Which is very evident from what I have al-

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ready said of the Supplies sent from *Milan*
and *Naples* for the Service of the War in *Spain*.
But to see what a small Sum these boasted
Revenues come to, we must consider, that
there is no conquer'd Country can be kept
without a great Expence while the War lasts:
That upon the Conquest of a Country ma-
ny of the most considerable Persons com-
monly remove from it, and those that stay
are to be gratified and kept in the Interest of
the Conqueror, by such Favours as intercept
the Conqueror, by such Favours as intercept
great Part of the Revenues. There is also
many times a Necessity of remitting some
Duties in consideration of what the People
conquer'd have suffer'd by the War. Add
to this the Extraordinary Charge of redu-
cing the strong Places of these Countries,
and the no less Extraordinary Charge of re-
pairing the Works that have been ruin'd in the
Reduction of them, and perhaps of adding
new Fortifications to several Places of a
Country, that before in one part or other
lay too open. And all these Places must be
provided with Garrisons, and furnished with
sufficient Magazines of all Sorts. If these
Articles are examin'd into, I'm confident we
should find that the Emperor's Conquests, in-
stead of filling his Coffers, have many of
them been rather an Expence to him; and
that the best of them have yielded him very
little, for want of better Management than
that Court has been ever thought to be ac-
quainted with. To talk therefore of draining
that Wealth into Coffers, speaking of the Em-
peror, is all over a Jest, and too gross Ban-
ter.

ter, I hope, to amuse any one who has the Honour to Represent his Countrey.

The next Paragraph contains nothing in it but what we are told of in this Book at least Twenty times, of the many Towns we have taken for the Dutch; and therefore I should take no Notice of it, but for a Sting in the Tail of it; but which has the Misfortune like most of the rest, not to have in it a word of Truth: *The Hollanders, says he, have made such good use of their Time, that in Conjunction with our C—n, the Oppressions of Flanders are much greater than ever.* I wonder how our Author could miss so fair an Opportunity of giving the New M—ry their due Praises for putting such an effectual Check as they did to the further Oppressions of these poor People, by removing the Person that resided at *Brussels* on the Part of Her Maj. and sending a fitter in his Room: Nor is it less strange that he should not give us a Black List of these Oppressions, when it was so much for his Purpose, were there any other Reason for it, but that he can't: And that he can't, to my certain knowledge is not for want of due Enquiry. Why then don't they tell us in what Manner my Lord M. has oppress'd these Provinces? Why don't they Impeach his Favourite C—n, as they threaten'd; whose Services in this War are too great to be forgiven? Why don't they tell us how their Publick Money has been misapply'd? With what Confusion must they own, upon the Report of their most faithful Emisaries, that all the Clamours of Oppression from the D. of M. have nothing in them? To supply this Au-

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author's Silence in this Part, I will tell the
 Reader in few Words how these People were
 oppress'd, and how they have been reliev'd.
 Since 1708, when the Duke of *M.* was join'd
 by Prince *Eugene* with a Body of *Imperial*
 Troops, besides a few Regiments rais'd and
 maintain'd by this Countrey, they have found
 Bread and Forage for these Troops; To an-
 swer this Charge, and other necessary Ex-
 pences of the War, the Annual Revenue of
 these *Provinces* not being sufficient, Money
 was borrow'd upon some Branches of it, to
 carry on the Service; none of which are en-
 gag'd for above Ten Years, and some not a-
 bove Four or Five. This is the great Op-
 pression of these People. Now I would de-
 sire this Writer to tell me, whether the War
 could have been carried on with the Success
 it has been, without these Troops? And if
 not, which way he proposes they should have
 been maintain'd. Should the Emperor have
 been at that Expence? He declares, that tho'
 Bread and Forage are found for these Troops
 by the Allies, yet that they are a greater
 Charge to him, than if they had serv'd upon
 the *Rhine*. Shall the *Queen* and the *States* be
 at that Expence? Is not the War already
 chargeable enough to us? Where then can it
 fall, but upon these *Provinces*? Is there any
 Reason why they should not share in the Bur-
 then of the War? Is there any Reason that
 their Revenues should be kept clear and dis-
 engag'd, when those of all the rest of the
 Allies are so much anticipated? What Pre-
 tence have they to complain? Has not the
 Assistance of these Troops enabled my Lord
M. to

M. to carry the War out of their *Provinces*, which must otherwise have continued the unhappy Seat of it? And are not the Sufferings of one Campaign, when Two such Armies as ours and the *French* live upon them, greater than all these other Oppressions the War has brought upon them? Is not there every Year a great deal of Money spent in all their great Towns? Don't they find in the Army a good Market for the Produce of their Countrey? Are these no Advantages? And is it not by the Conduct of my Lord M. that they enjoy these Advantages, without those Inconveniences they would be attended with, if the Neighbourhood of the Armies were not removed to such a Distance from them? Besides, Is not their own Preservation, and the Interest of their Prince, concern'd in the Success of the War? Why then should they not contribute their Share towards it? My Lord M. instead of being the Oppressor of these *Provinces*, has been their greatest Benefactor: And 'tis very certain no one Act of Oppression is by any of these *Provinces* personally imputed to him. But 'tis pretended Mr. C---n has oppress'd them under his Protection, and for his Interest. But if either of these could be proved, nothing is more certain, than that we should long since have heard of them: But to prove that Mr. C---n has not oppress'd them, I shall shew, he could not; it being well known, that neither he, nor the Deputies of the States, who are called the *Conference*, ever touch'd a Penny of the Publick Moneys; their Business was to represent to the *Council of State* what

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Sums the would wa actually v called Opp main'd no was levied of their ow could be an of Mr. C---n sicult indee do what wa this obliged rough with Demands m they had no of and find Raising the Conference ha of State in th States and every body Treachery, a Inclinations the French a found it nee fair of so mu Endeavours, Magistracy b the Allies and were Oppres Provinces hav Year: which they could del and Forage f Troops, they provide for so

Sums the several Branches of the Service would want, and oblige them to comply effectually with those Demands: And this is called Oppression; but after this, there remain'd no more for them to do. The Money was levied and collected, and issued by Hands of their own; which made it impossible there could be any Fraud or Oppression on the part of Mr. *Carroll*, or the Deputies; 'twas difficult indeed often to make the *Council of State* do what was necessary for the Service; and this obliged the *Conference* to be sometimes rough with them, and let them know, their Demands must be complied with; and that they had nothing else to do, but to consider of and find out the most proper Means for Raising the Money that was wanted. The *Conference* have likewise over-ruled the *Council of State* in the Business of choosing their *Magistrates* and since the Surprize of *Gand*, which every-body is convinced was the effect of Treachery, and the discovery that made of the Inclinations of many in those Provinces to the *French* and *Bavarian* Interest, they have found it necessary to intermeddle in an Affair of so much consequence, and to use their Endeavours, that none might be put into the Magistracy but Men of known Affection to the Allies and the House of *Austria*. If These were Oppressions, it must be own'd these *Provinces* have been oppress'd, till this last Year: which has given them all the Relief they could desire, for instead of finding Bread and Forage for the whole Body of *Imperial* Troops, they have this Campaign refus'd to provide for so much as one single Regiment of

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of *Huffur*, which *Prince Eugene*, when he march'd to the *Rhin*, was prevail'd on to leave behind him, the Service being in great want of them: And I have been assur'd, there is not the least thing which my Lord *M.* asked of them this last Campaign for the Service, that was not either absolutely denied; or not complied with, but after repeated Demands, and with great Difficulty; nay, their Disaffection to the Common Cause, nor with such Encouragement, that towards the End of the Campaign, when the Army could no longer subsist in the Neighbourhood of *Bouchain*, without a Supply of Forage from these *Provinces*, tho' my Lord *M.* found means to subsist the Army longer than any Body expected without coming to this resource; and the immediate Consequence of their Refusal, to say nothing of remote ones, must have been our Army's retreating back into these *Provinces*: Tho' this was represented to them in the most moving and earnest Manner possible, and it was evidently for their own Interest to comply with a Demand that was so necessary, yet did they for some Days refuse to do so, and sent a Deputation to the Army to desire they might be excus'd. And by these Delays the Troops suffer'd not a little. So happily are Affairs changed with this Oppressed People as to the share in the War, which they were before oblig'd to submit to: Now are they less relieved in the Point of choosing their Magistrates; and the good Use they have made of their Liberty in this respect is, that they have put into the Magistracy of *Gand*, the very Persons that are suspected of

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having betray'd it to the *French*; so, that it would be no surprize, if I should hear the same thing was done again; and their other Towns are fill'd with Persons of the same Faction. These are the *Oppressions*, and this the *Relief* of these poor *Provinces*. And let this Author disprove a Word of this if he can, or shew that my Lord *M.* has in any other sense join'd with the *States* to oppress them in any one Instance.

The last Part of our Author's Charge against the Allies, is pointed against the *Princes* of the *Empire*, of whom the *Q.* has hir'd Troops; but the *Dutch* are so perpetually in this Writer's way, that he can dart his Venom to no Point in the Compass, but some of it will fall on them. In order, says he, to augment our Forces every Year in the same proportion as those for whom we Fight diminish theirs, we have been oblig'd to hire from several Princes of the *Empire*. In this Sentence there are more Falsities than Words; We did not begin to hire, in order to augment our Forces: Our first 40,000 Men were for the greater Part compos'd of hir'd Troops, to save *English* Blood, and husband our Money to the best Advantage; and that at the end of the War, there might lie fewer on the Nation to be provided for. These Forces we have not augmented every Year; and whenever we did augment our Troops in *Flanders*, the *States* did, as I have already shewn, equally augment theirs; so far were they from diminishing their Troops from Time to Time, as this Author frequently insinuates; much less could the proportion in which they diminish'd their Troops, be the

Rule by which we increas'd ours; nor is it for them we Fight, but for our selves; the Concern is common, and our Safety is inseparable. But, secondly, the Ministers of these Princes have perpetually importun'd the Court with unreasonable Demands, under which our late M^{ty} thought fit to be passive.

All the Princes of whom we have hir'd Troops, have not been importunate with unreasonable Demands; particularly not the Elector of *Hannover*; to name no others; nor have the rest been perpetually so unreasonable, tho' they are, it must be confess'd, for making as good Bargains as they can; nor when their Demands were unreasonable, were the late M^{ty}s so very passive, which is said to intimate as if they were well paid for doing so, the General in particular. Whereas I will undertake to shew, that upon any one unreasonable Demand made by any one of them, there was more Argument and Expostulation us'd on the Part of my Lord M^{ty} before he was comply'd with, than can be produc'd from certain Offices for the whole four Years. Some Great Men were in them; and there's hardly one Instance, wherein these importing Ministers have not in some degree receded from their first Pretensions, and many have been utterly refus'd. But, Thirdly, those Demands were always back'd with a Threat to recall their Soldiers, which was a thing not to be heard of, because it might discontent the Dutch. If they have threatned to recall their Troops (which, by the way, has been more since the New M^{ty}s, than since the Beginning of the War,) it has been chiefly upon pretence

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that they were necessary for their own safety; and that they must therefore recall them, unless the Allies would concur in the necessary Measures to secure the Peace of the Empire, and oblige Sweden so far to a Neutrality. But whatever was the particular Occasion the Treaties for their Troops are but for a Year only; and when they are to be renew'd, they are at liberty to insist on new Articles: and if they are unreasonable in this, tis because they know they are necessary, and that the War is our Concern more than theirs; and that is the Reason they insist sometimes on Demands that are thought not very reasonable. And if the calling their Troops is a thing not to be heard of, not because it might discontent the Dutch, but because the Dutch and we both want them; for the Dutch hire Troops as well as we, and of the same Principles, and are importund with the same Demands; and after their utmost Endeavours to beat down the Price, they make the same Concessions we do, and for the same Reasons: That a stop may not for a little matter be put to the Progress of our Arms, and the Fruits of a glorious War be lost after so much Success: Which is of such consequence, that the French would be glad to take the Bargain out of our hands, and would give these Princes more Money to keep their Troops at Home, than we and the States pay to have them in the Field. A Man must be a Fool not to see the Consequence of having a Body of good Troops recall'd in the beginning or middle of Campaign, which yet had been our Case the very last Campaign, had not

the Care and Prudence of the D. of M. prevented it, who found out a Way to keep the Troops, without yielding to any one unreasonable Demand.

Lastly, *These Princes never sent their Contingent to the Emperor, but ever for an Excuse, that we had already hir'd all they had to spare.* There is more Truth in this Sentence than is usual with this Writer; 'Tis true, they have not furnish'd their Contingents, generally speaking, so well as they should do; and that they have made this their Excuse, that they had lent their Troops to us, or rather they pretended, there was a sort of Merit in this, and that therefore more was not to be expected from them. But this Author knows, that this is a Pretence only: that those Princes who think themselves at a good Distance from Danger, have in no Times furnish'd their Contingent well; and that if they have not this Excuse, they will find another. But is this any Fault in our Principal Allies? Is it a Fault in the late M—y, that the Princes of the Empire don't send their *Quota's* to the *Rhine*, as they should? Is it not well known that the Emperor himself can't cure this? That it is a Fundamental Fault in the Constitution of the Empire, that there is no where lodg'd a sufficient Power to oblige the several Princes to contribute effectually to the Defence of it the Share they are oblig'd to, by the Resolutions of the *Diet*; tho' that *Diet* be themselves, and the Resolutions of it consequently their own Acts. This Deficiency therefore on the Part of these Princes, is no Fault neither in the late M—y, nor in the

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States, nor avoidable: very Nature. No Body has ever r Account o (a) Movem into most tish, entie not own'd. But to tents himse we have, ces, in Wode this gre a finishing reative; in in such Fall can excuse, form'd Dess land to Care expence; w English Just pains must b to it. The h, says he, ain by Subsid in every occas (though they we refuse so co bet, so uncase ster of all the sidies. Is this ces, for Estate or a Dozen Words of Inf

States, nor in the Emperor himself; tis an unavoidable and incurable Evil, arising from the very Nature and Form of that Government. No Body can doubt of the truth of this who has ever read Puffendorff's short, but judicious Account of Germany, Publish'd under the Name of *Monsieur de Mowatino*, which has been Translated into most Languages, and in 1689 into English, entitul'd, *The History of Germany*, but not own'd to be a Translation.

But to return: As this Writer never contents himself with saying one thing but once, we have, P. 22. a Reflection on those Princes, in Words so very scandalous, that I wonder this great Master did not reserve them for a finishing Stroke to this most impudent In-rective; in which our Allies are represented in such False and Odious Colour, as nothing can excuse, or possibly account for, but a form'd Design to break all Faith with Them, and to Caress the Common Enemy at their expence; which is a thing so shocking to English Justice and Honour, that tis no little pains must be us'd to prepare them to submit to it. The Reflection is this; *There is, hardly, says he, a Petty Prince, whom We half maintain by Subsidies and Pensions, who is not ready upon every occasion to threaten us to recall his Troops, (though they must ROB or Starve at home) if we refuse to comply with him in any demand how ever so unreasonable.* Here is a general Character of all the Princes to whom we pay Subsidies. Is this Language fit for Sovereign Princes; for Estates and Crown'd Heads? Are Ten or a Dozen Princes to be branded with such Words of Infamy at once? Should not the

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Elector of *Hannover*, at least, be in decency excepted from the common Herd? Those that are acquainted with the Empire can tell this Writer, that some of these Princes, whom he treats in so villanous a manner, are so venerable for their Wisdom and Goodness, that they would command the Respect of all that have the Honour to know them, tho' their Dignity were laid aside; but that, at least, should secure them from such bold Insults, whatever their Personal Merit be. Shall not the high Station of Princes protect them from such Language? Shall Sovereigns be treated thus by a Man who would make implicate obedience to the Prince one of his distinguishing Characters? Shall it be a Crime in an honest *English-man*, when he speaks of a Tyrant, who has made *the World a Wilderness*, and is ever thirsting for the Ruin of Us and our Religion? Shall it, I say, be a Crime to speak of his Falshood and Perfidiousness, Barbarity, and Cruelty, his horrid Persecutions, his unjust Wars, his boundless Ambition, his Bigotry and Superstition, of the Millions of People he has destroy'd, and the vast Extent of Countries he has laid waste; Shall it be a Crime to speak of these things in Words proper to them, because he is a Crown'd Head? And shall it be permitted to an insolent Scribler, to treat in this licentious manner, Princes, who are our Friends, in the same Interest with us, and Two of the same Religion? For under this Character of *Petty Princes*, are included, and indeed principally intended, the Kings of *Denmark, Prussia, and Poland*; the First of whom might expect better Treatment from

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an *Englishman* as a Protestant Prince, and an
 Old Ally, and upon account of his particu-
 lar Relation to Her Majesty. The Second
 has been a very hearty and zealous Promoter
 both of the Common Cause and of the Pro-
 testant Religion; his Purse and his Country
 are always open to poor Refugees; and his
 Endeavours to reconcile the Two Reformed
 Religions can never be enough commended.
 And the last of these Princes, tho' it will al-
 ways be a Blemish to him, that he parted with
 his Religion for a Crown; amidst all the
 Troubles he has had, he has been always true
 to the Allies, and done something for the
 Common Cause whenever he was able; while
 his Victorious Enemy, instead of sending his
 Quota to the Assistance of the Empire, forc'd
 the Emperor to remit by a dishonourable
 Treaty, all Demands past, present, and to
 come, till he shall have put an end to the Wars
 he is engag'd in. These are some of the Prin-
 ces, who we are told must do that, the Sound
 of which the meanest Man of common ho-
 nesty abhors, R O B, or Starve, if it were not
 for our Subsidies. If this Author be in the
 Secret, what must we think of our Alliances?
 For this is the Language of an Enemy; 'tis
 Language which a generous Enemy would
 scorn to use. I can't but think from many Pas-
 sages in this Book, and this, among others,
 that the Writer of it is at bottom an Enemy
 to every thing an *Englishman* has a value for;
 to our Trade, to our Succession, to our Religi-
 on, to all Alliances that are for our Security,
 to every thing that interferes with the Inte-
 rest of *France*, to Faith, Honesty, and good
 Manners

Manners; else so many Things could not fall from him, that are not consistent with any other Character.

These are the Crimes charg'd on our Allies; and these the Answers to them. Let now one be set against the other; and I leave it to every indifferent Reader to judge whether this Writer has prov'd his Point. *That our Allies have each of them broke every Article in their Treaties with us.* Or whether on the contrary it be not plain, That this Charge is in every part false, more or less: And that the Faults they are accus'd of, are either no Faults at all; or not voluntary, much less design'd to prejudice the Common Cause, or the Effects of their Neglect and Disregard to the Queen. The Failures they are charg'd with, are either not true, or but few, and in Cases where they could not be avoided; proceeding from their general Weakness and Inability, or from the Difficulty or Necessity of their Affairs, at some particular Junctures. Or if there are any Instances that can't be thus excus'd; yet the Late Majesty have been so far from being passive under them, that they have always us'd the most proper Methods to make them act up to their Alliances, and exert themselves in the most effectual Manner against the Common Enemy. There has indeed been little need of such Remonstrances or Expostulations with the States; as every body may judge from what has till now been the universal Sense of all, even among our selves. And notwithstanding what this Author affirms, of their furnishing

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 vasion, and of their then sending away their
 Fleet to the Streights; we have the Authori-
 ty of Queen, Lords, and Commons, against
 him; For Both Houses in their Joint Ad-
 dress at that Time tell Her Majesty, *all Her
 Good Subjects were very sensible of the Zeal the
 States General had shewn upon that Occasion:*
 And Her Majesty in Her Answer has these
 Words: *I am also very well pleased with the Fu-
 rior you have done the States General, in taking
 notice of their timely Care for our Safety, and their
 Readiness to give us all possible Assistance.* But
 with respect to our other Allies, the late
 M——y both by themselves, and in Con-
 junction with the States, always prest the
 Service of the Common Cause with the
 greatest Earnestness. And the Remonstran-
 ces that have been made in the Name of the
 Q——, and the States, this War, would fill
 many Volumes. Great Numbers of which
 are still in being, and can on Occasion be
 produc'd to the Confusion of those, who
 while they reproach the late M——y with
 Neglects they knew them to be not guilty of,
 will never themselves in Ability or Diligence
 appear equal to them. But if after all the
 Pains they could take, some Imperfections
 have still remain'd in our Allies, and all Parts
 have not done what by their Treaties they
 were bound to, is there any thing strange in
 this? Was there ever any great, or indeed
 small Alliance where it was otherwise, or
 can we reasonably hope in any future Alli-
 ance, there would be room for such Com-
 plaints? What then would this Writer have?

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When he can shew us an Alliance without Faults, in all past Histories; or how there ever can be one, he may be allow'd to blame the present Confederacy, as freely as he will; but till then, I must tell him, instead of Blame, it will excite the Esteem and Admiration of all Impartial Men to consider, how an Alliance consisting of so many Parts, which are under very different Forms of Government, and no less different Interests, could be form'd under such disadvantageous Appearances, as there were at the Beginning of this War; or how it could be kept together so many Years, and be render'd successful against so powerful an Enemy. 'Tis really wonderful, if we consider either the Power, or the Artifices of France, that in so long Time, no Part of a Confederacy, consisting of so many Members, has been forc'd or corrupted into separate Measures; this is without Example, and what we must not hope to see again, if some Men can obtain the Ends they have in View. Nothing is more known, or more obvious to the most ordinary Understanding, than the Advantage a single Power has over a Confederacy: But what is it this Advantage consists in? Is it not, that all the Parts of it are not under the Direction of one; that their Strength can't be limited to, as to bear all at once; that they will have different Views; that some or other thro' Weakness, or Corruption, or ill Government, won't do their Part; that all Projects must be liable to the Debates and Opinions of many independent Powers; that this will make some be laid aside, others de-

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lay'd; others at last very imperfectly executed; and all will be expos'd to be discover'd to the Enemy; while their Designs can be kept with the utmost Secrecy? Are not these and the like Inconveniencies incident to all Alliances in the very Nature of them? Nay farther; has not *France* by the absolute Power of the Prince, a great Advantage over not only the Confederacy; but over any single Power in it? *Cae. Etyhml* it self, which makes the greatest Figure in the Marriage Things with that *Vigor* and Dispatch, and secretly, that the Councils of *France* are govern'd with? It is plain; that the Nature of our Constitution and Government by Parliaments makes this impossible under the best Prince; and the wisest Administration. But if *France* has an Advantage over us in this respect, it has a much greater over the *States*; and these are really seven Confederate Republicks; that one; and nothing can be resolv'd without the Consent of each of their Representatives; nor can those Representatives consent in any Cases of Importance, without Instructions from their respective Provinces; which is a Constitution very ill form'd for War; however, it may subsist in times of Peace, which their Government is form'd for; and which therefore, when it can be safe, they are necessarily dispos'd to. But still much greater is the Advantage of *France* over the *Empire*; on this account; that is such an imperfect Constitution, that it wants a Name; the Independency of the Parts is so great, and the Coercive Power of the *Emperors* so weak, that they can neither

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simply take Resolutions, nor execute them vigorously when they are taken; by which means a vast Body, which were it well united under one Head, would it self be almost a Match for the Power of France; is now so languid, feeble and unactive, that it is not able to defend it self from that very small Part, which the Maritime Powers have left the Enemy at liberty to turn against them;

But if France has so much Advantage over each of the Principals in this War, is it any Wonder an Alliance made up of them, and several other weaker Parts, can't act with that Vigor and Unity, and Dispatch and Secrecy, a single Power can? Will there not unavoidably be Delays and Differences of Opinion, and Failures and wrong Management on one account or other in the whole, when every Part it consists of, is it self subject to each of these Imperfections and Inconveniences? Has not all Experience confirm'd the Truth of this? What then can be more unjust than to complain of our Allies, or of the late M — y, because in the present Confederacy these necessary Evils could not wholly be prevented? The Success of the Alliance is the best Proof; that it has in the main answer'd the Ends for which it's form'd; and that not only beyond former Example, but even beyond what could reasonably be expected from it; as all know who are acquainted with History, or remember what has pass in Europe for these last Fifty Years; or no longer backward than the last War; or with what disadvantages the present War was begun. The Vigor, Unanimity, and

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Secrety with which this long War has been conducted; and the firm adherence of all the Parts of it to the Interest of the Common Cause, will make a Noble Figure in History, if it continues but a very little longer, and be the Admiration of Posterity; and its Success will reflect Immortal Honour on the late *Ministry*; who by their disinte- and steady Conduct, by their Prudence and Address were able to keep so long together so great an Alliance, and to make the several Parts of it act in such concert, as to pull down, and humble, a Power so Exorbitant, as that of *Spain* at the beginning of this War; a Power which then so little dreaded all the Efforts the Allies could make; that they would not have given an Inch of Ground in *Flanders* to purchase a Peace. A Man of the least Candor and Ingenuity must own, that this in Fact is true; that this is the success this Confederacy has been attended with, and that 'tis owing to the Abilities and Integrity of the late *Ministry*.

But the Objections of this Writer against our Allies, are not only unjust but absurd, and in their consequence fatal and destructive to us and our Allies both. For if no Confederacy must be made or kept up till these inconveniencies can be avoided, 'tis to no purpose to think of making any; and we must of necessity submit to the Common Enemy. For when one Power is exorbitant, no single Power can stand against it, for if it could, that other would not be exorbitant. If therefore a single Power would preserve it self, it must be by associating with other Powers; but that

that can never be done, or at least not to any purpose, if these Powers so associating, shall quarrel among themselves, and dissolve, upon the first failure or difference of any one of them: No Alliances at this rate can be practicable: But if the single Powers of *Europe* can defend themselves, neither with nor without Alliances, they must one after another inevitably be destroy'd, and submit their Necks to him, who is such an hard far any one single; tho' could they unite, and bear with one anothers Imperfections, they might be able to make a Stand, and by exerting themselves in proportion to their strength, they might at length subvert him, who without such a Confederacy would in half the Time have ruin'd them: And Alliances ever was, or ever will be attended with less Imperfections, than the present has been; and therefore, if this Authors Advice be taken, this must be dissolv'd, and for the Future, no new one must be made; and then there will no part be left for *England*, but to submit to *France* cravenly without resisting, or to make a short-lived Resistance, that can't but end in the certain Ruin of it. What Folly and Deceit is at the Bottom of this fatal Advice, if *England* could be so far deluded, as to fall into it, we may easily see, by reflecting on the Consequences that would attend *Holland* or the *Empire*, if they, whose Governments is a Sort of Confederacy, should follow these Councils. Suppose, because the Circles of the *Empire* don't all do the part they are oblig'd to, and furnish their respective Contributions for the War, an Incendiary, such as

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This Author, should take upon him to sow
 Divisions among them, and raise a Ferment
 in that great Body; and represent in the
 most aggravating Manner to the *Circles* most
 expos'd, upon whom the Burthen of the
 War has lain heaviest, the great Negligence
 of the rest, and their Disregard to the Com-
 mon Interest of the *Empire*; and by these
 Invectives, those *Circles*, who hitherto have
 done more than their Part, should be so in-
 cens'd against the rest, as to resolve
 to do no more; what would be the Conse-
 quences of this? Must not they themselves,
 who are thus incens'd, be ruin'd first, either
 by submitting to the Common Enemy, or
 making a less Resistance than they did before?
 And would not the Ruin of one Part draw
 after it that of another; and that again of a
 Third, till the whole *Empire* was destroy'd?
 And it would be the same with *Holland*, if
 the Two *Maritime Provinces* should discon-
 tinue their Efforts against *France*, because the
 Inland ones don't exactly perform their Parts,
 according to the Proportions agreed on among
 themselves; tho' by the Necessity of their
 Affairs, some Misfortune that has befall'd
 them, or by a Decay of Trade, or some
 other Reason, they really can't do so much
 as they ought; or perhaps thro' the ill Ma-
 nagement, or Perverseness, or Corruption of
 some of their Governours, won't. Would
 not this Procedure unavoidably end in the
 Ruin of the whole? If any Part of a Con-
 federacy don't do what they can, or by their
 Treaties are oblig'd to, it becomes the rest to
 use their best Endeavours to induce them to
 it;

it; but when that won't do, they must make the best of a bad Market; a little Assistance is better than none at all: And if they have upon the whole, Hopes that they can maintain their Ground, while the Alliance is preserv'd, they ought to preserve it, since without it, and upon their own Bottom they are sure they cannot.

But what I have said of *Holland* and the *Emperor*, 'tis easy to apply to an Alliance of many Confederated Powers, which can no way support themselves against the common Enemy, but by a good Agreement among themselves; and a good Agreement can't be long preserv'd, if the stronger Parts won't bear with the Failures of the weaker, or every Difference in Sentiments shall be thought a just Cause for breaking off, or throws them into Quarrels and Animosities, which whether design'd or not, must in a little time end in a Dissolution. This must be the Consequence of following the Measures this Author would lead us into. And I defy him to shew what other End his villanous Invective against our Allies can tend to, or is design'd for? Wou'd not one think there was a Resolution taken to break with our Allies, and the Business of this wicked Libel was to prepare People for it, and inflame them, if possible so far, as to make them fond of, or at least be patient under the Breach of an Alliance, which cou'd end in nothing but the Ruin of us and our Posterity? For whatever Reasons can be given for dissolving this, will hold against all that ever shall be made; and if this miscarries when

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'tis so near obtaining the end, it aims at, 'tis
 easy to see, so good a one, can possibly be
 form'd again. And therefore, if we don't
 succeed now, *England* with or without Allies
 must be ruin'd. A Man that should attempt
 in so open a manner to dissolve the Confe-
 deracy of *Holland* or the *Empire*, would be
 hang'd for his Pains; and since this Author's
 Design is not less pernicious, I can't but wish
 he may meet with the Reward that he de-
 serves.

Having finish'd what I had to say in De-
 fence of our Allies, and in behalf of the Con-
 federacy, on the Preservation of which, the
 Safety of *England* entirely depends; I was
 oblig'd to keep this Part a good while from
 the Press, in expectation of further Light into
 some Facts: With which I shall con-
 clude this Paper. And I am in the last Place
 to consider what this Writer has to say against
 the *Management of the War by the late M* — y;
 whose Defence will appear to be a very easy
 Task, there being nothing with respect to
 them, hard to be accounted for, but that
 after having had for so many Years the
 Thanks of the Nation, and of all *Europe*, they
 should now be thought to need any Defence.
 But this I must reserve for a Fourth Part, in
 which I shall likewise take some Notice of
 the Five Reasons for an ill Peace, with
 which this Author fills his 70 last Pages;
 and with a very few Words, in Answer to
 them, shall put an end to all that I can think

I bid Uw, adieu.

needful to be said by way of Antidote to the Poison of this Book, which is the Sublimate of his Faction, and the last Effort of their Skill in Political Chymistry, to work the Nation into a Phrensy, to make them court their own Ruin, or at least lull them into a Security, which if indulg'd but for a little while, may prove fatal to us all.

The following is a list of the names of the persons who have been mentioned in the foregoing pages, which were extracted from the original manuscript, and are here inserted for the sake of the reader, who may be desirous to know more of the persons mentioned in the foregoing pages.

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Postscript

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Postscript.

TH E following Particulars having been lately receiv'd, which were either omitted, or not so fully explain'd before ; they were thought proper to be added, as further Proofs of the Author's Candor, Modesty, and Truth.

Page 54. He says, *the whole Army in Catalonia, which is, or ought to be, 50000 Men, exclusive of Portugal and Gibraltar, is Paid by the Queen, excepting only Seven Battallions, and Fourteen Squadrons of Dutch and Palatines ; and even 1500 of these are in our Pay ; besides the Subsidies to King Charles.* He does not therefore in this Number include the Spaniards, who have always been Paid out of the Subsidy, and never received a Farthing out of any other Money. According to his Relation, the Queen pays about 43500 Men out of the 50000. Now to satisfy the World with how much honesty our Author sets forth this Matter, here follows an exact Abstract of all the Forces that have been every Year paid by the Queen, or provided for by Parliament, for the Service of Catalonia, or to act on that side since the commencement of the War there, which was in

the Year 1705, exclusive of Portugal, and besides the Subsidies granted the King of Spain.

For the Year Ending at Christmas, 1705. 4970

For the Year 1706. 18757

N. B. In this Number is included 1170 Men which the Parliament provided for, to serve in other Parts, viz. One Regiment to serve in Portugal, Four in Flanders, & the Battalion of Guards on the Establishment of Guards & Garrisons.

For the Year 1707, the Numbers provided for, to serve in Spain and Portugal, were 29295 Men, of which the Corps that serv'd in Spain, exclusive of Gibraltar, if compleat, according to their Establishment, would amount to 25141 Men. And adding the Batallion of Guards, and the Marines. 27141

N. B. Of this Number Six Regiments of Foot were reduc'd, and Officers sent home on the 1st of March 1709.

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For the Year 1708, of the Troops provided for, to serve in Spain, Portugal, and other Parts, there serv'd on the side of Catalonia, ————— 17910.

N. B. The Numbers voted for this Year to Serve in Spain and other Parts, were 30530 : Of which, 12620 serv'd in Portugal, Gibraltar, Great Britain, and on the Expedition under General *Arle*.

For the Year 1709. Of the Troops provided for, to serve in Spain, Portugal, and elsewhere, there serv'd on the side of Catalonia, including 2800 Portuguese, to which Number they were reduc'd from 7000 Men; towards whose Pay the Queen gave 80000 l. for this Year. ————— 22644

For the Year 1710 of the Troops granted for Spain and elsewhere, there serv'd on the side of Catalonia, including the Garrison of *Port Mahone*, and the 2800 Portuguese. ————— 22998

For the Year 1711, ————— 32900

N. B. Several Regiments taken at *Brihuega*, the latter end of the Year 1710, continuing still Prisoners, are not included here, altho' provided for to serve in Catalonia.

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But we never paid for the Transportation of One Man or Horse, but those that were actually in the Queen's Pay. The Dutch constantly paying the Charge of those in the Pay of the States. And as to the Levy-Money, there was never One Farthing paid for the Horse. What was allow'd was 5*l.* for each of the effective Men that should be actually embark'd; and it was only for the Imperial Regiments, none being paid for the *Italians, Neapolitans, or Grifours*; and if we had paid for the Man and Horse it would have come to Twenty Pounds at least.

P. 56. He says, "Seven Portuguese Regiments after the Battel of *Almanza* went off, with the rest of that broken Army, to *Catalonia*; the King of Portugal said he was not able to pay them while they were out of his Country; the Queen consented therefore to do it Her self, provided the King would raise as many more to supply their Places. This he engag'd to do, but never perform'd. Notwithstanding which, his Subsidies were constantly paid him by my Lord G ———, for almost four Years, without any Deduction upon account of those Seven Regiments. Every word of this is utterly false.

Five of these were Horse, and the other Two Foot; Their Pay, when compleat, amounted to 124,797*l.* 5*s.* 4*d.* per Annum, which was entirely born by the King of Portugal to the last of December 1708; but having in the Year 1708, rais'd a new Army, and the Expence of these Seven Regiments increasing

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increas'd by the extraordinary Charge of supplying Money, Provisions, and other Necessaries for them, in a Country where the Court of Portugal had but a slender Credit; The Queen, to ease the growing Charge, consented to pay 80000 ^{l.} towards their Pay for the Year 1709. And they were paid about the like Sum for the Year 1710, and for the present Year 1711, they receive Subsistence for their Effectives in like manner as the other Forces. And from the end of December 1708, to which time the Queen did not expend one Groat for the said Seven Regiments to the end of August 1710, which was the last Month's Subsidy the King of Portugal ever receiv'd in Lord Godolphin's time, is 20 Months. Which this excellent Author assures us, is almost 4 Years.

And notwithstanding what he says, that the King of Portugal rais'd no Forces in the room of these Seven Regiments: He knows that the Portuguese Minister, upon an Enquiry into this Matter last Winter, gave the Court here entire Satisfaction to the contrary. Nor is he ignorant, that in the Year 1708, there was 29000 ^{l.} paid out of the Treasury here in part of the Subsidy for buying Horses on this side, towards remounting the King of Portugal's Cavalry, which was expended accordingly, and the Horses transported at his Charge, and the Money deducted out of his Subsidy. This alone would go near to mount 4 of the 7 Regiments of Horse aforesaid.

In the same Paragraph he takes notice of our being put to double Expence in maintaining our

our Troops by as false as the well those in those upon the furnish'd b merchants and almost entire and Ireland; an contract is got ears at the Mi has been fo h People to e Year beginn as such an Ad n, that the Ra ur at a greater low for it out re the Exceed charge to the e Expence to out 5000 ^{l.} beginning Mich higher Price; so the Queen f Michaelmas 1712, provided the Tro rding to their e many Regim hers drawn off, above 10000 ^{l.} e Charge of r worthy Aut ew how little I has in the ese Contracts uch the greater

ur Troops by the Charge of Forrage; which
 as false as the rest. The Army in Portugal, is
 as well those in the King of Portugal's Pay, as
 those upon the Qu — n's Establishment,
 are furnish'd by Contracts made with English
 Merchants and Factors. The Corn they use
 almost entirely the Product of Great Britain
 and Ireland; and the Rate agreed upon in the
 Contract is govern'd by the Price the Corn
 bears at the Market of Lisbon. Of late Years
 has been so high, that it became difficult to
 get People to Contract; insomuch that for
 the Year beginning at Michaelmas 1710, there
 was such an Advance in the Price agreed up-
 on, that the Ration of Bread or Forrage came
 out at a greater Rate than the Soldier cou'd
 allow for it out of his Subsistence; and there-
 fore the Exceeding became an Extraordinary
 Charge to the Government, and occasion'd
 an Expende to the Queen for that Year of
 about 5000 l. The Contract for the Year
 beginning Michaelmas 1711, was still at a
 higher Price; so as the Extraordinary Charge
 to the Queen for the Year which ends at
 Michaelmas 1712, wou'd amount to 30000 l.
 provided the Troops there are compleat, ac-
 cording to their Establishments: But as there
 are many Regiments already reduc'd, and
 others drawn off, this Charge will not amount
 above 10000 l. a Sum very short of double
 the Charge of maintaining our Troops, as
 our worthy Author affirms it is. And to
 shew how little Interest the King of Portu-
 gal has in the Extraordinary Expende by
 these Contracts, wherein he bears, by
 such the greatest Part for his own Troops since
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when this Matter was taken notice of here
D. Luis da Cunha, the *Portugal* Envoy, pre-
 sented a Memorial to Her Majesty, proposing
 that She wou'd be pleas'd to give Direction
 for Furnishing her Troops in *Portugal* with
 Bread and Forrage by Commissaries or Con-
 tractors of her own Appointment, and upon
 the best Terms they cou'd for the Advantage
 of her Majesty; for that the Court of *Portu-
 gal* found it very difficult to get Persons to
 Contract, altho' at much dearer Rates than
 usual.

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