







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


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THE  
ALLIES  
AND  
THE LATE MINISTRY  
DEFENDED.

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PART III.

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

The Late Ministry

Dated at London,

ВЕРХ

And the President's friends of course

[illegible][illegible]

1948

Printed for A. Bellamy, near the Office  
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THE  
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Defended against  
FRANCE,  
And the Present Friends of France.

PART III.

In which are Consider'd all the Objections made  
against the *Emperor, Portugal,* and the rest of  
the Allies : With a further Vindication of the  
*Dutch* ; and some Reflections on the *Spanish*  
War ; on the Nature of Alliances in general ;  
and on the apparent Ill Designs of that  
Author.

*Oblitus decorisq; sui; sociũq; salutis.*

*Hæc Promissæ Fides ? Sic nos in Sceptra reponis ?*

} Virg.

L O N D O N :

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THE  
**A L L I E S**  
 AND THE  
 LATE MINISTRY  
 DEFENDED  
 Against *FRANCE*, &c.

**T**HE Author of *the Conduct of the Allies*, &c. whom we may consider as the *English Menager*; having chastised the States to the entire Satisfaction of the French one; and without the least Spark of Modesty, Candor, Ingenuity, or Truth; Virtues, which in Politicks France and her Faction are perfect Strangers to: He falls now next upon the *Emperor*; who must expect but little Quarter at such unmerciful Hands; after the most injurious Treatment of those Allies, upon whom next our selves the Burden of the War has chiefly lain; whom Learning and Religion, the same Interests, and common Danger, should join together in the strictest Union. After this nothing can surprise that it shall please this Author to say  
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against the *Emperor*: By which Word he means the *Imperial Court*, under the two last Emperors, as well as while there was none at all. And the present Emperor having remonstrated against the Peace, which he and his Friends are so very eager for; this may prepare us to expect a heavier Charge, if possible, against the *Imperial Court*, than what he has brought against the *States*: And how well he has answer'd what might be expected from him, I come now to examine.

But before I enter into the Particulars, I cannot help taking notice of one Passage, Page 46. relating to the present Emperor, when he was no more than King of Spain. He says King Charles was paid in July 1711, all his Subsidies to January, and yet hath complained for want of Money. This being said by way of Encomium on the present M---y, as well as to insult King Charles; I must tell him, that the late M---y always took care that his Subsidies shou'd be paid him by the first of May: But in behalf of King Charles I wou'd ask this Author, what Sum of Money was at that time paid him: Whether it were a Year's Subsidy clear, or only paying him what on the Ballance of old Accounts wou'd be left: For that might be a very small Sum in Reality, while in Figures 'tis the whole Year's Subsidy. Another Question I wou'd ask, is, Whether when our Troops in Catalonia shou'd have taken the Field the Year, there was not Eight or Nine Months Substante due to them; and whether for want of timely Remittances we have not less a great Prospect of pushing the War in the

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Condition the Enemy were in, if want of  
Money had not made it impossible for our  
Troops to take the Field?

As one thing leads to another, our Author  
can't omit another Passage concerning Sub-  
sidies, to shew how much Foreigners reckon  
themselves Masters of our Money, whenever  
they think fit to call for it. *Prince Eugene*  
*happening to pass by Berlin, and an Arrear being*  
*due from the Emperor to the Prussian Troops in Italy,*  
*His Highness frankly promis'd them, that in con-*  
*sideration of this Deficiency, Britain and the States*  
*should increase their Subsidies to 70,000 Crowns*  
*more between them. The Dutch refus'd con-*  
*senting to it. But the Prussian Minister here pre-*  
*vail'd on us to agree to our Proportion, before we*  
*could hear what Resolution would be taken in Hol-*  
*land. Now for a full Answer to this Passage,*  
I might have refer'd my Author and his  
Friends to the Prince himself, when he  
was here; for they certainly saw him,  
and he was best able to tell them, whether  
*Berlin fell by chance in his way, in his*  
*Road from Vienna to the Hague, or whether*  
*he went so far out of his Way, to solicit*  
*something for the Service of the Emperor, and*  
*the Common Cause. He like wise can best in-*  
*form them, whether he was so impertinent*  
*as to engage Britain and the States in Pay-*  
*ments, without any Powers so to do. Till I*  
*have better Authority for it, than this Au-*  
*thor's Word, I shall believe there is nothing*  
*more in it, than that upon the King of*  
*Prussia's starting new Difficulties about those*  
*Troops, to get more Money for them, the*

Prince of Savoy, to satisfy the King, and remove those Difficulties, undertook to use his Endeavours with us and the States, to make the Augmentation he insisted on; by which Means the Continuance of those Troops in Italy was obtain'd; and yet neither we nor the States were engag'd to make the Augmentation of the Subsidy, if we did not think fit; and the States, it seems, did not. Why then, let me ask this Author, did we? For this Question he can answer best, this Transaction is no older than last Year. The late Treasurer was remov'd the Beginning of August: there was no Convention then made for the Payment of this Money: It did not come before the Parliament till December; nor then, neither, properly speaking; it not appearing to the House as an Augmentation, when the first Estimate for Subsidies was given in; but reckon'd in lieu of an Abatement to the Duke of Savoy; which Abatement however afterwards upon Second Thoughts was not abated. So that for the Discharge of this Author 25,000 Crowns the Estimate stands not charged with an Augmentation of above 46,000. Now to let this Management pass in which it must be confessed they have only done the Old Manner, I wou'd only ask the Author, Whether there was not time enough between July and December to have known what Resolution the Dutch had taken in this Matter: And therefore the not knowing it can be a Reason why we did it, if it was wrong; nor indeed, in that Case, ought we to have agreed to this Payment, tho' the Dutch had. But if we are to judge by the Estimate, it was

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not very unreasonable, it being there said to be in Consideration of the extraordinary Charge the King had been at to recruit his Troops.

Our Author having given this Last in passing, to K. Charles, Prince Eugene, and the King of Prussia, goes on to the Particulars of the Charge against the Emperor. The first is, that instead of Ninety thousand Men, which they ought to furnish, neither of the two last Emperors, ever had Twenty on their own Account, except once in Italy. Which is an Assertion just as true, as what he says of there not having been for several Campaigns so many Men under the D. of M. in Flanders as the Queen alone maintains for that Service. The Emperor did certainly raise at the beginning of the War his Quota of Troops; and I dare say the Corps that make the Number stipulated, still subsist, tho' the distant and hard Services they have been employ'd in, the low Condition the Imperial Finances are reduc'd to, by continual Wars, and the great Degree to which the Hereditary Countries are exhausted of Men, have made it impossible for the late Emperors to recruit them well. Once indeed this Author allows the Imperial Court did exert themselves. Why don't he tell us they did it without Allies? And that if they had not done it, the Liberty of Europe had been lost beyond a possibility of recovering? Let him consider what a prodigious Expence that first Campaign put the Court of Vienna to; and what a noble Body of Troops were destroy'd to make Head against France, when all was in Danger

ger of being swallow'd up, and must have been so, without that wonderful Effort. And if the Emperor has since done less, those who know the State of the House of *Austria*, how long their Power has declin'd, the many Wars they have been engag'd in at the same time, and how little Respite they have had; how imperfect their Oeconomy and Government is; how very little Opportunity they have to recover themselves, when their Strength is once exhausted, thro' the great Expence they are at of keeping up a considerable Number of Troops in Time of Peace; and the small Resource they have by Trade: Whoever considers these Things, or looks no farther back than to the feeble Efforts of the whole Empire the Last War, must own, they have done more than cou'd be expected. For the late Emperors did make very considerable Efforts in *Italy* for Six Campaigns at least; that is, till the *French* were driven out of it; as this Writer himself confesses. For he says, *When they had succeeded in their Attempts on the Side of Italy, they soon found out the most effectual Expedient to excuse themselves.* This is fairly Confessing, that till they had succeeded in *Italy*, they did not excuse themselves. But that they certainly had not done, till the Battel of *Turin*; their Affairs in *Italy* having never since the Beginning of the War been in more Danger than they were at that time. Nor does this Author want to be told, that they had not even then succeeded in *Italy* to their Content: they were not easy, as long as *Naples* was in *French* Hands, which he himself makes a

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Crime in them ; this therefore made them  
 exert themselves, at least one Campaign  
 more. Here then are Eight Campaigns, be-  
 fore the *Imperial Court* were at leisure to look  
 out for this Expedient to excuse themselves.  
 And for all the following Campaigns, 'tis  
 known they have had a considerable Body  
 of Troops in *Flanders*, which in Conjunction  
 with those under the D. of M. had by a  
 vigorous War set us above the Necessities of  
 an Ill Peace : If this Author and his Friends  
 had not join'd with *France*, to con. and the  
 most Hopeful Prospect of Affairs that *Europe*  
 has seen this Fifty Years, or is like to see in  
 Fifty more, if the Designs in view succeed.  
 And besides these Troops, 'tis certain the Em-  
 peror has for several Years past sent more than  
 his *Quota* to the *Rhine*, that other Princes  
 might be thereby induc'd to follow his Ex-  
 ample. Nor has there been any Complaint  
 of their being backward in their Preparati-  
 ons on the Side of *Savoy* : If nothing has  
 been done there for these Four Years past,  
 'tis not for want of the Emperor's Troops be-  
 ing ready to do their Part, but from the Dis-  
 putes between him and the Duke of *Savoy* ;  
 which how far it would have been reasonable  
 for either Side to have yielded to the other,  
 'tis not my Business to determine. All I  
 contend for at present is, that it has not been  
 for want of Troops on the Emperor's Part,  
 that nothing has been done so long on that  
 side. But if the Emperor has been ready to  
 do his Part in *Savoy*, has furnish'd more than  
 his *Quota* to the *Rhine*, and has, to promote  
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the Common Cause, sent a good Body of Troops to *Flanders*, which he was no way oblig'd to; because that is the only Part the War could be push'd in with Success; which yet without these Troops it could not have been; (as has been shewn to Demonstration in the *Management of the War*;) If, I say, the Imperial Court has done this, what can be more false than to say, that neither of the Two last Emperors ever had Twenty Thousand Men on their own Account in the Common Cause? And how injurious is it to impute their not doing more to an Expedient they found out, to excuse themselves? And that too at a time when all the World is sufficiently convinc'd of their Inability. And the great Interest they pay here in *England* for Moneys borrow'd on the best Funds they have, will suffer no body to be ignorant of the Straights they are reduc'd to; and this Writer, I doubt not, has many other Proofs of this, that don't come under common Observation, nor is it fit they should. But there is a Scing in this Expedient for the D. of M. and that must not be lost, especially at this Juncture, that he is so perverse, that no Terms can bring him in to our Author's noble Scheme. They computed easily, that it would cost them less to make large Presents to one single Person, than to pay an Army. In answer to which I do confess, that the Emperor *Leopold* indeed did, in acknowledgment of his having sav'd the Empire by his unparallel'd Wisdom and Conduct, make him a Prince of it; and that he might have the Honour

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Honour of a Vote in the Dyet, did erect *Min-  
delheim* into a Principality. Which, after se-  
veral times declining it, he did accept, with  
the Q-<sup>ueen</sup>'s Leave and Approbation. And I  
have heard besides, of four or five Pictures gi-  
ven him, which having been the Elector of  
*Bavaria's*, were a very natural and decent Pre-  
sent to him, who had freed the Empire of an  
Enemy, and oblig'd him to seek for Refuge  
in *France*, who but a little before had conceiv'd  
great Hopes of driving the Emperor from  
*Vienna*, and assuming to himself the *Imperial*  
Dignity. Besides these Presents, I have ne-  
ver heard of any; but have just Grounds to  
believe, that He never receiv'd so much as  
one; and that there is not a more false and  
malicious Insinuation than this in the whole  
Libel; which is enough to say of it. And  
had this Writer any Sense of Honour or Con-  
science, he would not, to Murder the Repu-  
tation of a Man, who has done so much Ho-  
nour to his Country, and to whose Services,  
under God, *Europe* owes its Liberty, put such  
Constructions on Things, as he knows, have  
no Truth in them; he would not impute the  
Effects of the *Emperor's* Inability, to the Person  
that sav'd his Empire; he would not look for  
an *Expedient* in Presents, that were not made;  
nor interpret in so villanous a manner, Ac-  
knowledgments which all the World thought  
so well deserv'd, and will think so, in spite  
of this Author and his Friends.

After this General Complaint against the  
Two last Emperors, for not furnishing their  
*Quota*, and leaving it to us to fight their  
Battles, this Author descends to Particulars;

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and gives us Three Instances to prove *how little they regarded their Allies, whenever they thought the Empire it self was secure.* But I would be glad to know when this was, that the Empire was thought to be so secure. 'Tis the first time I have heard it was so; and with this Author's Leave must tell him, I don't take it to be secure yet; nor can it be, if his Schemes take place. Is an Empire secure, that lies open to the Enemy, and by the Negligence of the many Princes 'tis divided between, is in a very defenceless State? Is the Empire secure, that can't bring an Army into the Field till the middle of Summer, and till then may be invaded by the Enemy with a very small Body of Troops, and ravag'd without any Opposition, as it was in 1707, and would have been since, had not the Duke of M. every Year drawn the Enemy's Attention another way, and oblig'd them to look to themselves, instead of invading others. Where then is this Security of the Empire? To say nothing of the constant Apprehensions of an Insurrection in *Barvaria* which might kindle a new Fire in the Heart of it, in Concert with the Enemy. If therefore the Emperor would not venture to disregard his Allies till the Empire was secure, we can have no Reason to complain upon the score yet. But further; if the Emperor has by several Instances shewn how little he regards his Allies, then this Disregard is not peculiar to us; His other Allies have Reason to complain of it as well as our selves; and they have sometimes done it in a decent way, not in Scandalous Libels and Invectives,

in proper Royal Court, to press the Example of the *Dutch* Name of the extraordinary obliged to b their Streng France, and the Right Author can't Memorials; that if the one more, all'd upon a ng manne Quarrel is n been really or: The Re hy being, h nothing th ment.

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in proper Remonstrances both to the Imperial Court, and to the Dyet of the Empire; to press them to exert themselves after the Example of the Maritime Powers; who, as the *Dutch M---rs* have often told them in the Name of the *Queen* and the *States*, have made extraordinary Efforts, beyond what they were obliged to by their Treaties, and even beyond their Strength, to Reduce the Exorbitant Power of *France*, and preserve the Liberty of Europe, and the Rights of the House of Austria. This Author can't but have seen several of these Memorials; and therefore can't but know, that if the Emperor and Empire have not done more, it was not for want of being call'd upon and importun'd in the most pressing manner possible. But this Author's Quarrel is not with the Empire, who have been really in fault, but with the Emperor: The Restitution of the *Spanish Monarchy* being his, not their Concern, 'tis little or nothing that this Peacemaker has to say to them.

But to come to his Instances: The First, his not putting an End to the War in *Hungary*; which he might have done several times, upon Terms not at all unbefitting either his Dignity or Interest. Now if the Court of *Vienna* were to blame in this, did the Late *M---ry* tamely offer it? Does not he know very well, how the *M---rs* of *England* and *Holland* labour'd on this Point? What Pains the Earl of *Sunderland* and Mr. *Stepney* particularly took in it? The Latter residing constantly at *Vienna*, and the Former going thither expressly for that

very Service. Did ever any Men press an Accommodation more forcibly than the Late M---rs did this? When I see another M---ry follow an Affair so long together with so much Spirit, Argument, and Good Sense, as can be produced on this Subject, for the Honour of the Late M---ry, and those employ'd by them, I shall then with Patience let this Author and his Friends accuse them of *by suffering the Emperor to sacrifice the whole Alliance to his private Passion.* But as to the Merits of the Cause: Did not the Late Emperors make several Attempts for an Accommodation, and offer Terms, and admit the Interpositions of our M---rs? And as it was very much for the Interest of the *Common Cause*, that an End should be put to that War, Did not *England* and *Holland* press it with the greatest Earnestness? But when that was done, are not all Governments themselves the best Judges in these Affairs? And therefore if they can't be ended as is wish'd, they are only to be pity'd for so great a Misfortune: And their Pursuit of an Affair that so nearly concerns them, can't with any Justice be interpreted to be a Disregard to the Common Cause, or a Neglect of their Allies; as in this Case we are sure it was. For during great part of the Time of those unhappy Troubles, the Emperor's Affairs both in *Italy* and the *Empire*, were in the utmost Danger, especially in 1707, when the *Empire* was invaded by *Mareschal Villars*, and the King of *Sweden* with a Victorious Army gave as just Apprehensions as if he had been at the Gates of *Vienna*: To say nothing of

the Danger the same with the contents whence I That this Effect of Reflection the Weight that then were the Dangers h peror than continuing Disregard Weight w nent Dang deal, tho perial Cou Affair, as thought to be thrown that Men c End to it.

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the Danger King *Charles's* Affairs were in at  
 the same time. Yet all this could not prevail  
 with the Imperial Court to give the Male-  
 contents the Terms they insisted on. From  
 whence I make these Three Inferences. First,  
 That this Refusal very probably was not the  
 Effect of private *Passion*, but of Reason and  
 Reflection; else it must have given way to  
 the Weight of so many and so near Dangers  
 that then threaten'd them. 2. Whatever  
 were the true Cause of this Refusal, If such  
 Dangers had no more Influence on the Em-  
 peror than the Solicitations of his Allies, his  
 continuing that War is no Proof at all of his  
 Disregard to his Allies. If they had as much  
 Weight with him, as such great and immi-  
 nent Dangers had, they might have a great  
 deal, tho' not enough. But 3. If the Im-  
 perial Court were as much in Fault in this  
 Affair, as this Author would have them  
 thought to be, no Blame can on that account  
 be thrown on the Late M--ry, who did all  
 that Men could, to persuade them to put an  
 End to it.

The next Instance of the Emperor's Indiffe-  
 rence, or rather Dislike of the Common Cause, is  
 the Business of Toulon; the Miscarriage of  
 which he imputes wholly to the Emperor.  
 Upon this Head, every Proposition advanced  
 is false in whole or in part. First, he tells  
 us the Design was discover'd here by a Crea-  
 ture of a certain Great Man, laying Wagers  
 about the taking of it. This is a very odd  
 Preamble to a Proof that Toulon was lost by  
 the Emperor's Fault, to tell us, that probably  
 it was not; the Design was discover'd here.

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But these Inconsistencies are nothing with this Writer, if he can but bring in one or two certain *Great Men*, whose Reputation stands cruelly in his way, and will do so, let him employ nayer so many Pens to blacken them. Now in Answer to this, I affirm, that this Design was not discover'd by the Creature of this *Great Man*, but by the Clerk of another *Great Man*, who was then Sec--- of S---. But to go on; our Author argues, that the Emperor had no mind *Toulon* should be taken, because he detach'd 12000 Men to seize *Naples*, as he ingeniously expresses it. That the Emperor did at that time make an Expedition to *Naples*, is true; but was it because he had no mind *Toulon* should be taken? No; 'twas because those who would make a scandalous Peace now, were attempting the same thing then; and he was afraid the Interest of his Family in *Italy* wou'd have been sacrific'd to other Views. This was the true Reason of that Expedition; and this Writer knows it was; which makes his Virulence and Malice the more impardonable. As Things were manag'd, 'tis plain, there was a Want of Troops. But when the Emperor was press'd to put off that Expedition, he did not want an Answer. He told them, That without those 12000 Men, they had as many as they had before desir'd; and indeed as many as would be able to find Subsistence, and that more would be but a Burthen to them; that while they were employ'd in the Reduction of *Toulon*, the other Troops should by great Marches hasten to *Naples*; and then return to join them for any further Services.

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But 'tis manifest, says our Author, that the Emperor had no mind we should take Toulou, because the Attempt might have succeeded, if Prince Eugene had not thought fit to oppose it. This is false again. The Duke of Savoy had the chief Command in that Expedition, and not Prince Eugene. What was the true Reason they delay'd so long the Beginning of that March, I can't pretend to say; but when they had pass'd the *Var*, I desire this Author would tell us, who it was that propos'd the holding a Council of War on Board the Fleet; and did hold one, to consider, whether they should proceed directly to *Toulou*, or besiege *Antibes*. A Man must be a very ill Judge in Affairs, that could not from that Step see, what was likely to come of the Expedition. Again, to clear up this Affair, I would fain know, who govern'd the Motions of the Army, till they came before the Place; for 'tis incredible, how so small an Army could be so many Days making so short a March. And if they had advanc'd with half the Speed, that they retir'd, 'tis certain they might have invested the Place before the Works the Enemy were making would have been finish'd, and before any considerable Number of the Enemy's Troops were arriv'd. But the Slowness of our Motions made our Arrival too late in both those Respects. And the Enemy's Troops were in Possession of the high Ground about the Place, before we came in Sight of it. And therefore if the Duke of Savoy did not seem willing to attack the Enemy, that is not very hard to account for; nor might it be any Fault in Prince Eugene, that

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he did not think it reasonable. But besides, there was a particular Reason at that time to think, the Prince might have strict Orders from *Vienna*, to be very cautious how he expos'd that Body of Troops. And that was, the Neighbourhood of the King of *Sweden*, who was pleas'd to pick many Quarrels with the Emperor, and no body could tell where his Demands would stop, or what would satisfy him. This gave very great Umbrage to the Imperial Court; and had they lost that Body of Troops before *Toulon*, they had reason to fear they should soon feel the Want of them. This was certainly a good Reason for not venturing a Battel to Disadvantage, where the least Misfortune would have been the Ruin of them all. But had that Expedition either been begun Ten Days sooner, or the March from the *Var* had been made in less Time, the Design would have succeeded without the Hazard of a Battel. There is more might be said upon this Subject; but I am not in so much haste to discover some Truths, as our Author is to tell the most pernicious Lies.

Upon this Instance then, I must observe First, That the Expedition to *Naples* was not the Effect of any Disregard to the Allies, but of *Self-Preservation*. 2. That Prince *Eugene*, declining a Battel, was not the Cause of our Ill Success against *Toulon*. 3. That it is not way chargeable on the Late *Ministry*; who form'd the Design with the greatest Secrecy, and made the most effectual Preparations for it, and did all they could to put off the Expedition to *Naples*, and remove every Difficult

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ty that might hinder the Success of it. And Lastly, That it was not discover'd first by any Creature of the Late M-ry, nor had France any Suspicion of it, till the Expedition was actually begun; as any one may see, that will look back into the History of that Affair.

The Third and Last Instance, and that a much greater than either of the foregoing, how little the Emperor regards us, may be brought from the Proceedings of that Court not many Months ago. The Substance of this heavy Complaint is, That the Imperial Court being desired by the Queen to send 8000 Men to reinforce the Duke of Savoy before the end of the Campaign, that he might be able to take Winter Quarters on this side the Mountains: This Desire not being complied with, the Hopes from that Project are lost, and the War is left in the Method, which is like to continue it longest. And this is said to be treating the Q. in a most contemptuous manner. Now for a little Truth, at the Sight of which this great Contempt will vanish into nothing, and this mighty Project with it.

First, this Refusal in the Imperial Court, to send 8000 Men to the D. of Savoy, did not proceed from the least Disrespect to the Q.; on the contrary, at that Juncture they were most desirous to oblige her Majesty, that they might engage her in the Interest of King Charles, in order to secure more effectually his Election to the Empire; a Point of infinite Concern to that Court; and therefore there was nothing in their Power they would not willingly have done; and if in these Difficult Circumstances they did not do what the Q. desir'd,

desir'd, 'twas because they could not. This Author himself owns, that they *alleged the Impossibility of complying with the Q.'s Demands upon any Consideration whatsoever.* Nay, they did not so much as give the Queen's M---y an Opportunity to tempt them with any particular Sums. If this Author had not a very particular Talent at Reasoning, he cou'd never, to shew this to be an Instance of Contempt to the Q. say the Things that prove quite the contrary. Is the pleading an *absolute Impossibility, a contemptuous Treatment?* Or is it a sign of its being only a pretended Impossibility, that they did not give an Opportunity to tempt them with any particular Sums? If this be Contempt, what wou'd it have been, if they had given such an Opportunity, and after some Offers the Affairs had broke off? Wou'd not the listening to these Offers have been a good Argument to prove that they cou'd do the thing desir'd, if they wou'd, but refus'd to comply in a Point of so much Consequence, for a paltry Sum, because we wou'd not come up to their full Price? Had they acted thus, there wou'd have been some Colour for Reproaching them in this Manner, tho' it wou'd have been but a Colour only. For if the sending such a Body of Troops wou'd have requir'd such a Sum of Money, beyond what the Imperial Court (which is often the Case of that Court) cou'd at that time furnish, and the Q. on Her Part did not think fit to bear that Expence; 'tis certain, the Treaty for these Troops must break off without Effect, and there wou'd be no room to pretend, that was an Affront to the Q. or using Her ill

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But it did not come to this; no such Handle for Complaint was given: The Impossibility of complying was so evident, that without entering into any Parly; they declar'd they cou'd not do it upon any Consideration whatsoever. And 'tis not hard to see many great Difficulties that would naturally hinder the Imperial Court from complying with this Demand at that juncture; tho' this Author pretends they offer'd nothing to excuse themselves, but some general speculative Reasons, and trifling Pretences. Had they been so trifling, I am apt to think this Author wou'd have told us what they were, or if a little Misrepresentation cou'd have made them look so; and from his Silence therefore I shall take leave to conclude they were not trifling. What Reasons the Imperial Court did give, I can't tell; but some few they might have given; are these: First, they cou'd not spare such a Body of Men from Hungary at that time, for two very weighty Reasons; one with Respect to the Malecontents, and the other to the Motions of the Turks. Our Author indeed takes no notice of this last; but for the other, is pleas'd to tell us, they cou'd not plead their old Excuse; the War with the Malecontents being at an end. And was this War so effectually ended, that they might draw their Troops from Hungary without Danger? Does not this Author know, that Prince Rugotski, who was the Head of the Malecontents, and all the other Chiefs, except Count Caroli, refus'd to submit to the Terms offer'd them: And that the Submission of the rest was very little to be depended on; it having been made upon Terms offer'd in the

Emperor's Name, and personally to him, who was really dead, at the time the Submission was made; as soon after appear'd; which unhappy Circumstance had like to have undone all; the Act of Submission, and all that depended upon it, being *ipso facto* void. What Security now was there, that upon this Turn of Affairs the *Malecontents* wou'd not re-assemble under their old Leaders, and take fresh Heart, in hopes of obtaining better Terms from the Necessities this unexpected Accident put the *Imperial* Court under? What cou'd be of greater Concern to that Court, than the Loss of *Hungary*? And when cou'd they have just Cause to apprehend the Losing it? Did not the Garrison of *Mongaz*, a Place almost impregnable, refuse to surrender for a considerable Time after this Submission, under pretence of waiting for Orders from Prince *Ragotski*? And was not he doing all he cou'd in Conjunction with the Agent of *France*, to kindle that War anew? Was not this very much for the Purpose of *France*? Does not this Author know how much they have solicited the *Port*, either to make open War with the Emperor, or at least to take the *Malecontents* under their Protection? Has not all our News from those Parts, this last Summer told us of the Ticklish State the Affairs of *Hungary* were in on these Accounts? What then does this Author mean by saying, *they cou'd not plead their Old Excuse*? But suppose this Submission had been made in the Emperor's Life, and been in all Respects as valid as it cou'd be, and Prince *Ragotski* had come in, and all the Places the *Malecontents* were

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possess'd of, had been surrender'd early in the  
 Year ; was the *Turkish* War an Affair that did  
 not deserve the Attention of the *Imperial*  
 Court ? Is it not the Point they are most  
 nearly concern'd in ? Cou'd any thing have  
 been more fatal to the House of *Austria*, than  
 to have the *Port* declare War against them in  
 that Juncture ? Was not the Condition of  
 Affairs in *Hungary*, and the Death of the *Em-*  
*peror*, a very great Temptation to them ? And  
 can we think *France* did not press it with all  
 their Might ? How then cou'd the Court of  
*Vienna* be secure the *Port* wou'd not break with  
 them ? And without such a Security, how  
 cou'd they with any Safety draw their Troops  
 from *Hungary* ? which, God knows, with all  
 the Troops they had in it, wou'd have been  
 able to have made but a very poor Defence,  
 against a tolerable Army of *Turks*. Had not  
 the *Port* broke with the *Muscovite* without any  
 such Provocation, notwithstanding they had  
 but Two Months before with great Solemnity  
 renew'd the Peace for Thirty Years ? And  
 why might they not break their Treaty with  
 the *Emperor* as easily, when they had so much  
 Temptation to it ? This was a Point of the  
 utmost Consequence ; and all the Precaution  
 the Court of *Vienna* cou'd use on this Occasi-  
 on, must be allow'd by all reasonable Men to  
 be but prudent and necessary ; especially con-  
 sidering the Artifices and Endeavours of the  
*French* to divide and embroil the Empire,  
 which they threaten'd to invade with a great  
 Army at the same time, that they might  
 throw Things into Confusion, break the *Au-*  
*strian* Interest, and prevent the Election of  
 King

King Charles. Wou'd it not in this Ticklish Juncture have been very wise in the *Imperial* Court, in order to favour an impracticable Project in *Savoy*, to send a Body of their best Troops, and almost their All, to so great a distance from them; and leave themselves naked on the Side of *Hungary*, where an old War was not quite extinguish'd, and a new one, 'twas apprehended, wou'd very soon break out? Shou'd they have tempted these Dangers by neglecting them; and left unguarded a Fire, that was cover'd rather than put out; when at the same time they saw a new one beginning with great Pierceness in their Neighbourhood, which, shou'd it spread towards them, as there were great Endeavours us'd for it, the Remains of the past Fire wou'd soon have rekindl'd, and the Flames of both wou'd in a little time have reach'd the Capital it self; and then all Attempts to extinguish them might have been too late, besides that the more Help they shou'd want, thro' the Distractions of the Empire during the *Interregnum*, the less they wou'd have had? Let People put themselves in their Case, and they will presently be convinc'd, these were not *Speculative Reasons*, or *Trifling Pretences*, for not Complying with the Q.'s Demands; but such as made their Compliance absolutely impossible. And had these Dangers been out of the Question, so that the *Imperial* Court cou'd have spar'd the Men, (tho' 8000 be no trifling Number for a Court, who, if we may believe this Writer, have never this War, but once, had 20000 in the Field on their own Account,) yet where shou'd

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shou'd they find Money to put these Troops  
 in a Condition to March, who, we may be  
 sure, wanted Cloaths, and Arms and Horses,  
 and had great Arrears due to them, and must  
 be paid when they are to serve out of their  
 Country, tho' very little or no Pay contented  
 them, while they serv'd in it, in a plentiful  
 and rich Soil, and where every thing they  
 cou'd lay their Hands on was their own: A  
 Circumstance, which shou'd make this Au-  
 thor not so fond of *Intestine Wars*, tho' they  
 carry no Money out of the Country that is the  
 unhappy Seat of them. Where now shou'd  
 the Imperial Court find Money for these Pur-  
 poses; when the Return of King *Charles*, the  
 Management of his Interests in the Empire,  
 and the necessary Expence of his Election,  
 wou'd call for much greater Sums, than ei-  
 ther their *Exchequer* or their *Credit* cou'd fur-  
 nish, without such Methods as nothing but  
 the last Necessity can make advisable, or  
 render practicable? If therefore ever De-  
 mand was impossible to be comply'd with,  
 in this extraordinary Juncture of Affairs,  
 it must be allow'd this was so. Where  
 then is this pretended Contempt of the Q.? *Q.*  
 where this Disregard and Neglect of the  
*common Cause*, because they did not do, what  
 'tis very evident they could not? As it was  
 the Interest of the House of *Austria*, to shew  
 all possible Deference and Respect to the  
 Queen and the *States*, in this Situation of  
 Affairs, so in my Humble Opinion they did;  
 and I think King *Charles* in particular could  
 not give a greater Instance of it, than in leav-  
 ing it to them, as he did, to govern his Mo-  
 tions,

tions, in a Matter of so great Concern; when instead of returning to *Vienna*, as soon as he heard of his Brother's Death, he waited for the Opinion and Sense of his Allies; and in compliance with them stay'd at *Barcelona* above Five Months after, that the War in *Spain* might not be neglected on his part; tho' the Want of Money made it impossible for us to use our Troops, or make any Advantage of his Presence with them. And when at last it was necessary for him to come away, that Affairs might suffer as little as possible by his Absence, he took the brave Resolution to leave his Queen behind; a Resolution all have great Reason to be pleas'd with, who are not in the Interest of *France*, that is, all except this Author and his Friends; whom a contrary Conduct in King *Charles* would have satisfy'd much better, as what would have facilitated the Loss of all we have left in *Spain*, and enabled them to remove the Blame of it from themselves.

But what makes this Complaint against the Imperial Court, for not complying in a Point they could not, still more unjust, is, That the Common Cause suffer'd little or nothing by it; for the Design of this Demand was, to enable the Duke of *SAVOY* to take *Winter Quarters on this side the Mountains*; and all that was desir'd, was, that they should join him *before the End of the Campaign*. Now I desire this Author would let us know, what the Duke of *Savoie* did towards the Execution of this Project, or to make these Troops useful, if they had join'd him at the Time appointed? Could he take *Winter Quarters on*

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this side the Mountains, without penetrating in-  
 to Dauphiné? This was indeed expected that  
 he would have done ; and considering how  
 the Campaign open'd on that Side, 'tis a Sur-  
 prize to every body it was not done. But in  
 Fact he hover'd about the Passes, without at-  
 tempting to penetrate, till the Duke of Ber-  
 wick had taken the necessary Precautions, and  
 made Lines, and receiv'd considerable Rein-  
 forcements from Alsace, and other Parts. By  
 which means the Campaign was spent in the  
 two Armies looking at one another ; and the  
 Duke of Savoy was oblig'd to leave the Field  
 first, for want of Forage and Provisions to  
 subsist the Troops he had. Suppose now  
 these 8000 Imperial Troops had join'd him  
 some little time before ; wou'd he with this  
 Addition have been able to penetrate, after  
 the D. of Berwick had taken his Measures to  
 hinder it, and drawn together what Troops  
 he wanted? Or if this Addition of 8000  
 wou'd have been too much for the other to  
 oppose, with the Strength then with him,  
 Cou'd the March of these Troops have been  
 conceal'd? And wou'd not that have put the  
 Enemy upon proportionably increasing their  
 strength, by drawing more Troops from the  
 Rhine, where they were not wanted to be on  
 the Defensive only? And if this wou'd not  
 have been sufficient, but the Enemy must have  
 been oblig'd to draw some Troops from Spain,  
 which I can't by any means allow they wou'd,  
 yet this wou'd have been of no use to us  
 on that Side ; since, as I said before, it was  
 impossible for our Army there to take the  
 Field,

Field, tho' there had been no Enemy to oppose them.

But, to make this Author greater Concessions than a modest Man can ask. Suppose these 8000 Men. wou'd have enabl'd the D. of *Savoy* to penetrate into *Dauphiné*; what is it he could have done there, besides Raising Contributions, and Ravaging the Country? Would he have begun the Siege of *Briançon*, the Place which the Enemy knows all his Views end in, when the Campaign is drawing to an end, and the Snows begin to fall? What time do's this Author suppose such a Siege would take up? Or where should the Troops find Forage, while they were employ'd in it? Could they take a Town of that Strength without Time, or without Forage for the Time? Or could he take up Winter-Quarters on this Side, without so much as one Town to cover them? I'll go one Step further, and suppose for once such a Siege could have been compass'd with Success, and that Winter-Quarters might be taken; I would then ask, how they should be kept? How shall an Army on this Side the Mountains subsist, when all Communication with the other Side is cut off, and the Passages are shut up with the prodigious Snows that fall in those Parts for Eight Months together? Did this Author ever hear of an Army keeping Winter-Quarters for Half that time in an Enemies Country, when they receiv'd no Subsistence from their own? And if ever this were possible, which it is not, how can this Army possibly defend themselves against the Enemy, who can attack them

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hem early in the Spring with what Numbers  
 hey please; while those that are attack'd,  
 can receive no Relief or Support from any  
 Part? What can Troops unassisted do, who  
 have been mouldring away a whole long  
 Winter in bad Quarters, wasting themselves  
 to find Subsistence in an Enemy's Country,  
 and perpetually harass'd by their Parties?  
 'Tis impossible for Troops in such a Condi-  
 tion, half-naked and starv'd, without Money  
 or Provisions, and reduc'd perhaps to less than  
 Half their Number, to make head against a  
 fresh Army: They can neither take the  
 Field, nor keep their Quarters, unless they  
 were Masters of more strong Places than they  
 would be by this Supposition; according to  
 which they will have but one only, for more  
 Sieges than one they can't be expected to  
 make in so short a time on this side the Moun-  
 tains: Nor will Places of Strength surrender  
 without a Siege; so that all their Troops must  
 be drawn from the open Country, and crowd-  
 ed into this one Place and its Neighbourhood.  
 And what but Starving could be the Conse-  
 quence of this, tho' the Enemy did nothing  
 else but make a Sort of Blockade? But if  
 they should not be content with that, but re-  
 solve by a vigorous Siege to recover this Place  
 again, who shall hinder it? How can a Place  
 be expected to be preserv'd, that can't hope  
 for Relief in 3, or perhaps 4 Months, from  
 the Day on which the Siege of it shall be be-  
 gun? For the Duke of *Savoy* therefore to  
 take Winter-Quarters on this Side of the  
 Mountains for any considerable Body of  
 Troops, unless his Campaigns begin earlier  
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than they have yet, and more Progress be made in them than what we have ever yet so much as hop'd for; I can't but look on as a Project utterly impracticable; at least so it was this last Campaign: And had he been join'd by the *Imperial* Troops, it had serv'd to no other purpose but to consume so much Forage, and consequently oblige him to leave the Field so much sooner. So that the great Crime the *Imperial* Court are here charg'd with, upon full Examination into it, appears to amount to no more than this; that they could not spare a considerable Body of Troops from *Hungary*, where they were absolutely necessary, to make a terrible long March, for which they were in all respects unprovided, to assist the D. of *Savoy* in a Project which it was impossible could take place.

But this Author thinks, they ought to have comply'd with this Demand, *without considering whether they wanted them for their own Defence or not.* For did we, says he, ever once consider what we could afford, when our Assistance was desired, even while we lay under immediate Apprehensions of being invaded? To which I answer, Yes, we did; and had been much to blame if we had not, *when we lay under the Apprehensions of being invaded.* He knows, a good Body of our Troops embark'd at *Ostend*, and sail'd for *Scotland*, and more were ready to follow, had there been Occasion. And I hope the present M---y, if the same Apprehensions should return, would do the same thing. And if this Author's Malice did not make him forget himself, he would have remembered, that but a few Pages before he

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makes it there was sent their furnish'd own Exa they may not comp without con if we had is that a foolish on presented on their than they on this Int First, Tha 'tis brough us. And i Constructi any Article be, to come which the all their does it aff not tamely Misfortune the New M which is mo on them; t Omissions in flect on the but observe, that of the States and th no older Da before us; v



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makes it a Crime in the *Dutch*, that when  
 there was only a Rumour of an Invasion, they  
 sent their *Quota* to the *Mediterranean*, and  
 furnish'd nothing to us. If therefore our  
 own Example may be a Rule to our Allies,  
 they may from thence justify themselves for  
 not complying to the Demand made them,  
*without considering what they could afford.* But  
 if we had not acted a wise Part our selves,  
 is that a Reason why they should act a very  
 foolish one? If their Case was as I have re-  
 presented it, they had but too much Reason  
 on their Side, nor could they do otherwise  
 than they did. I shall end what I have to say  
 on this Instance, with these Three Remarks.  
 First, That it is no Instance at all of what  
 'tis brought to prove, *the Emperor's Disregard of*  
*us.* And if it could be strain'd to such a  
 Construction, 'tis, Secondly, no Breach of  
 any Article in any Treaty, which it shou'd  
 be, to come under his general Proposition, in  
 which the Allies are accus'd of breaking  
 all their Treaties with us. Nor, Lastly,  
 does it affect the late M — y; they did  
 not tamely suffer this, if it was a Fault; 'tis a  
 Misfortune, if it be one, that has befall'n  
 the New M — . And if this Instance,  
 which is most complain'd of, does not reflect  
 on them, then by Parity of Reason, other  
 Omissions in our Allies don't necessarily re-  
 flect on the Late M — y. Indeed I can't  
 but observe, in Justice to the Late M — y,  
 that of the Five Instances urg'd against the  
 States and the Emperor, Three of them are of  
 no older Date than this last Year; this now  
 before us; what is said of the Reception of  
 Sir

Sir *J. Wishart*, and of the Consent refus'd to the D. of *M.'s* Project for Winter Quarters. And the other two, which relate to *Toulon* and the *Malecontents*, were as just Matters of Complaint when the Offices of State and War were fill'd with those who are the great Support and Ornament of the present Times, as they can be now; and therefore affect them as much as Any of the late *M---y*. And since they must reflect Blame on one as well as the other, this Author will allow me to conclude, they reflect none on either.

The next Ally we are to be made out of Humour with, that our Treaties with him may be broke into with less Ceremony, is the King of *Portugal*: With what Unfairness and Injustice this Author has condemn'd our Alliance with this Crown, I have already shewn; and now that he returns to *Portugal* again, *p. 92*. one would expect to be told how many things he has done in Breach of these Alliances, or rather how many he has left undone; but to our great Surprise in this Article of *Portugal* there is not one Fault found with them; the *States* and the *Emperor* run so much in this Writer's Head, that he can think of nothing less. And first for the *Emperor*, he soon declared himself, 'tis said, unable to comply with his Part of 12000 Men, and of a Million of *Patacoons* that he was to furnish by the Treaty. By which means two Thirds were left on us, who very generously undertook the Burden. And for the *Emperor*, if he cou'd not do his Part, perhaps it was so understood by *England* at the time of the Treary; tho' the Recovery of the *Spanish* Monarchy being properly the Con-

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cern of his Family, it v<sup>as</sup> thought fit, that  
he should be one of the Parties in this Trea-  
ty with the *Portuguese*, for the sake of other  
Articles, I mean the Concessions to be made  
to *Portugal*, which was the Inducement to  
them to come into the Alliance; and which  
no body could make but the Emperor him-  
self. So that his Share must lye on the other  
Two; and if *England* took Two Thirds upon  
themselves, 'twas not *Generosity*, but *Wisdom*  
and Necessity. We endeavour'd first to per-  
suade the *Dutch* to divide the *Emperor's* Share  
with us, but as they were ready to perform  
their Part of the Treaty, we cou'd not oblige  
them to do more; *Portugal* was on Account  
of Trade most our Concern, and we were  
undeniably most able; and therefore after  
this Matter had been thoroughly consi-  
der'd, we consented to take the *Emperor's*  
Part upon our selves. Now if it were  
understood at the Time of the Treaty,  
that the Emperor could not do his Part, as I  
confess, I can't see how he could, then there  
lies no Blame upon him; but whether there  
does or not, it don't affect the *Dutch*, they  
were to furnish but a Third, and a Third  
they did furnish. But such is the strange  
Talent of this Author, such his Pique against  
the *Dutch*, a Quarrel with them being most  
for his Purpose, that he can't leave this Article  
before he has prov'd the *Dutch* are most in Fault.  
But neither is this, says he, the worst Part of the Sto-  
ry; for tho' the *Dutch* did send their Quota, yet  
they never took care to recruit them. How now  
does he prove this? Why, because in 1706.  
cent the *Portuguese* Army, instead of going back to  
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Portugal, were oblig'd to retire into Valencia; and after that time the Dutch never sent a Man to Portugal, nor paid one Penny of their Subsidies. Whereas the Q<sup>ueen</sup> has at several times, increas'd Her Establishment to 10,500 Men. What the New M<sup>inistry</sup> have done, I know not, but the Q<sup>ueen</sup>'s former Quota was 8000 Men; and I can't find, that in 1710. we had in Portugal more than 8 Batallions of Foot, and 7 Regiments of Dragoons, newly rais'd by my Lord Gallway, which very little exceed Her Majesty's Quota of 8000 Men; and are maintain'd at a much less Expence, than when they were all English Troops. But to return to the Dutch. Does it follow, they never recruited their Quota before 1706. or in that Year, because they have not done it since? But has this Author never look'd into the Impartial Enquiry into the Management of the War in Spain? Does he hate any thing, that is Impartial to that Degree, that he can't bear the Sight of it? Or does he not, without looking into it, very well know, that what he says, is false; that after the first 4000 Men the Dutch sent to Portugal in 1703. they sent 4 Regiments more in 1705. and in Feb. 1706. 1200 Men, and 4000 more the same Year, with the Troops sent under my Lord Rivers? How then can this Author say, they never recruited their Quota, when they sent in Three Years 7700 Men, besides lesser Numbers of Recruits at several times? Well, but they have sent none, since the Portuguese Army retir'd into Valencia. First, that is not strictly true; for they were then in Valencia when the 4000 last mentioned sail'd out of

the Channel have sent the Troop constantly Quota in may easily Forces I g which 'tis Troops in t oblige them their Exam these Reason better Opini they; and hount than Motive with een to press the King of eary a great e Dutch, in alking from ount I thou amine too r art: Besides their worst Use, by di the Enemy here. For an Insta Allies, he eze Regiment is; That after ents went off sent to pay, to supply the the never did

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the Channel. Since that time, 'tis true, they have sent no Men to Portugal ; but instead of the Troops they should have there, they have constantly, as an Equivalent, increas'd their Quota in Flanders by the same Number, as may easily be judg'd by the List of their Forces I gave the Reader in my last ; from which 'tis very evident, that they have more Troops in that Service, than any Treaty does oblige them to. And if we have not follow'd their Example in this Point, it has been for these Reasons : First, That we have had a better Opinion of the War on that Side than they ; and hop'd it would turn to more Account than in Fact it has : But the principal Motive with us to keep that War alive, has been to preserve a good Understanding with the King of Portugal ; which 'tis more necessary a great deal for us to cultivate, than for the Dutch, in regard to the Advantages resulting from that Trade. And upon that account I thought we had good Reason not to examine too nicely into the Failures on their Part : Besides, that with all their Faults, and their worst Circumstances, they have been of Use, by diverting a considerable Number of the Enemy's Troops from acting elsewhere.

For an Instance how ill we are treated by our Allies, he tells us a Story of Seven Portuguese Regiments : The Substance of which is this ; That after the Battle of Almanza these Regiments went off to Catalonia, which the Queen sent to pay, provided the King raised as many more to supply their Place ; which he engaged to do, but never did. This is the Complaint a-

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gainst the *Portugueze*; but not made so much  
 to blame them, as to have something to say  
 right or wrong against the Late M---ry. My  
 Lord G---, he says, constantly paid the King  
 Portugal his Subsidies for almost Four Years, with-  
 out any Deduction for these Regiments; direct-  
 contrary to the 7th Article of the Offensive Alliance  
 with that Crown. According to this Repre-  
 sentation my Lord G--- ought to have de-  
 ducted the Pay of these Seven *Portugueze* Re-  
 giments out of the King's Subsidies for the  
 Years 1707, 1708, 1709, 1710; for in Aug-  
 1710, this Author knows his Lordship was  
 remov'd. Now this Representation I say  
 scandalously false; and that my Lord G---  
 did not pay the King his full Subsidies, and  
 these Seven Regiments too, for the Four  
 Years of his M---ry, nor indeed for any one  
 Year; which he knows to be true, and which  
 to them that don't know it, I prove thus: First  
 The full Pay of these Regiments, as appear-  
 by the Establishment, is 134,707 l. 5 s. 4 d. of the most  
 Now to the 22d of December, 1708, what M-  
 ney was paid to them in *Catalonia*, was up-  
 the Commissary's Vouchers deducted at L-  
 bor out of the King's Subsidy: So there  
 Two Years of this Charge struck off at once by my Lord G---  
 And since that time, there was paid for the  
 Regiments by my Lord G--- but one Sum-  
 80,000 l. which is not above Three Fifths  
 of One Year's Pay; and even this Sum was  
 never put on the Establishment, or as to the *French*  
 to be made good by Parliament, nor was  
 Payment of it order'd, but upon the most  
 urgent Necessity; as those knew, who had  
 Honour to command the Q's Troops at

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time in *Catalonia*. For both the Ambassador  
 and General of the Portuguese, the Counts  
 of *Assumar*, and *Atalaya*, did declare they could  
 nor serve that Campaign without Money,  
 Bread, or Cloaths; and that if we did not  
 give them Subsistence, they would ask a Pass-  
 port of the D. of *Anjou* to return to their  
 own Country. This was at a time, when  
 whose Troops could not be spar'd, for they  
 made the greatest Part of our Cavalry, and  
 were very good Troops. For as that Nation  
 have formerly distinguish'd themselves in all  
 those Parts of War, which a long Peace has  
 made them since forget; by the Experience of  
 this War, they have recover'd in some Mea-  
 sure, their Ancient Virtue. Besides, it was  
 much to be fear'd, a step of this Nature wou'd  
 not have stopp'd there, but would have been  
 soon follow'd by others; which every Bo-  
 dy who knows how necessary this Alli-  
 s, as appearance is to us, will perceive would have been  
 of the most fatal Consequence. Upon these  
 Considerations Her Majesty was pleas'd to or-  
 der a Sum without Account, but did not de-  
 clare it was to be over and above their Subsi-  
 sence; on the contrary, there are Letters under  
 my Lord G-  
 s Hand, that he would  
 be secure enough in his own Hands to have it  
 deducted at a Peace; but did not think it pro-  
 per then to dispute such a Sum with so neces-  
 sary an Ally, and a Court so much inclin'd  
 to the French Interest, as that is known to be,  
 This now is what the late Treasurer did, and  
 the Reasons why he did it; which it seems are  
 the Understanding of the present Lord Tr-  
 who has been so uncourtly as to stop it. I am as



just an Admirer of the Great Things perform'd by the present Tres —, as this Writer can be; but with Submission must say, he has not a very good Hand at *Pauegrick*, or else he would not, while he seems to commend the Successor, really vindicate the other, as he does here. He does not indeed say, that this new Treatment of the King of *Portugal* has occasion'd the Reports we have had of some secret Negotiations between him and the Enemy; but tells us, that in effect we have got nothing by it; that it has put the King upon Expedients to make Amends for this Deduction, by raising the Price of Forage, and demanding new Duties of us. Now if this be the Effect of our uncourtly Usage of him, I submit it to the Reader's Judgment, whether it be better to oblige so necessary an Ally, and keep him firm to us, by making an Annual Payment, which he can't in strictness demand, or hazard the losing of him by refusing it, when in the mean time it puts him upon such Methods that in the end nothing will be sav'd by it. Let this Author blame the *Portuguese* as much as he will, the Success of our new Measures in their Attempts to mend the Matter, will by all impartial Men be thought a full Vindication of the old Ones; and particularly of my Lord G —, whose Administration the more 'tis examin'd into, the more will he appear to deserve the Character that has so universally been given him.

What this Author has said of *Portugal*, is interrupted, p. 54. with a Paragraph upon the *Spanish War*, which would have come in as pertinently in any other Part of his Book.

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For here is no Ally complain'd of, no Pretence of any Treaty broke, no Demand from any of them refus'd to be comply'd with. All he says, is, *That the War in Catalonia has been carry'd on almost entirely at our Cost.* Which might be made Matter of Complaint against the late M ———y perhaps, if it could be reconcil'd with that Neglect of *Spain* they have been accus'd off, or with that particular Care of it, that has been both by the Q ——— and Parli ——— t recommended to their Successors. But how this reflects any Blame on our Allies, or involves them in any Crime, I can't see; unless it could be shewn, that they have not done in this Point, what they were oblig'd to, which is not here so much as pretended, much less prov'd against them. And therefore, there is but one possible Reason, for saying what he does of the *Spanish War* in this Place; which must be this; That if *England*, who have been at almost all the Charge of the *Spanish War*, shall be willing to give up *Spain* at the next Treaty, as 'tis plain this Writer and his Friends design we should, the Allies in that Case, have no Reason in the World to complain or interpose, since they have done little or nothing towards recovering it. This is the Q ———'s War, the Allies have no Part in it, and therefore She may, without Regard to them, put an End to upon what Terms She will. This is plainly our Author's Aim. But this, as all the other parts of this wretched Cause, we shall see is wretchedly supported. For, First, 'Tis not true that they have done so little even in *Spain*. This Author would insinuate; nor, were it true,

true, is the Argument good he would draw from it; unless it could be shewn, that nothing can effect or contribute to the Restitution of *Spain*, but the War that is made in *Spain* it self; whereas the contrary has been prov'd in the Management of the War, with the greatest Evidence, that *Spain* never can be gain'd by a War in *Spain*, but thro' *France*, and consequently by the vigorous Prosecution of the War on the Side of *Flanders*; which has both by Reason and Experience been shewn to be the only Part, in which the Allies can weaken *France* enough, to make them quit their Hold of *Spain*. But if this be the proper way to recover *Spain*, then those who have contributed to a vigorous War in *Flanders*, have contributed to the Recovery of *Spain*, and consequently have a Right to insist on the Restitution of it; and *England* can't, without a Violation of their Rights, make a Peace on Terms by which so Essential a Point of their Treaties shall be given up, supposing it were consistent with our own Interest, which 'tis as clear as the Sun, it is not, nor can be on any Terms; no Equivalent can possibly be given for it, as every body would be convinc'd from what has been writ on this Subject with unanswerable Reason, if the Time were yet come, that the Voice of Reason could be heard.

But if the War in *Spain* were the likeliest way to recover it, 'tis not true, that the Allies have done so little towards this Part of the War, as this Author would insinuate, nor has *England* so much. The Spanish Army, says, on the Side of *Catalonia* is, or was

was 20,000 Foot, and 10,000 Cavalry. And the exception of the Squadrons of 15,000 in our Army. Charles I. of his Country oblig'd us to a particular made up to look by War before but 32,350. And the Part only were there of our Regiment of Foot. And to take of 47,848. The number of *Catalonia* we have 8 of which the war paid by England. Part in this War. Now we pay 7000. Part paid by us. Now, is not pay for one. And the 1400 paid by the Dutch. Horse and Foot.

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be, about 50000 Men, exclusive of *Portu-  
 gel*, and our Troops at *Gibraltar*; which are  
 indeed no more than Two weak Battalions.  
 And this whole Army is paid by the Q<sup>ueen</sup>,  
 excepting only Seven Battalions, and 24  
 Squadrons of *Dutch*, and *Palatines*; and even  
 1500 (he should say 1200) of these are  
 in our Pay, besides the Sums given to King  
 Charles for Subsidies, and the Maintenance  
 of his Court. This Author would have  
 oblig'd us, if he would have given us the  
 particular Numbers of which this Army is  
 made up, and explain'd his ~~ought to be~~. For  
 to look back to the Three last Years of this  
 War before the Change; in 1708, I can find  
 but 22,450 Effective Men in *Catalonia*, inclu-  
 ding the *Portuguese* Troops, of which 22,432  
 only were paid by the Q<sup>ueen</sup>; nor were  
 there of our own Troops more than one Re-  
 giment of Horse, 3 of Dragoons and 7 of Foot.  
 And to take it according to the Establishment,  
 of 47,848 Men, 40,540 only were paid by the  
 Q<sup>ueen</sup>. The next Year the Q<sup>ueen</sup>'s own Troops in  
*Catalonia* were augmented to 5 Regiments of  
 Horse, 8 of Dragoons, and 12 of Foot; besides  
 which the whole Number of Foreign Troops  
 paid by England was 12,200: and so the Q<sup>ueen</sup>'s  
 Part in this War continu'd for the next Year  
 50. Now during this time I find in this Ar-  
 my 7000 *Portuguese*, to whom only 80,000 l.  
 was paid by the Q<sup>ueen</sup>, which I have already  
 shewn, is not above three Fifths of their full  
 Pay for one Year. There were likewise be-  
 sides the 1200 *Palatines* paid by the Q<sup>ueen</sup> 6000  
 paid by the *Dutch*, and Seven Regiments also  
 of their own Troops. And

as for King *Charles's* Part, he rais'd what Troops he cou'd in *Catalonia*; at least Four thousand more than his Subsidy from the Q. would maintain, after the Maintenance of his Court is deducted; and to do what he cou'd further for the Support of this War, there is no body who looks into News, but knows that considerable Sums have from time to time been sent from *Milan* and *Naples* to King *Charles*; and from the last of these Places we hardly hear of any thing, but of the Pains and Application of the Vice-Roy, to find Ways and Means to support the Service in *Catalonia*, which are push'd to that Extremity, as makes the People very uneasy, and gives the Government almost the perpetual Trouble of preventing Tumults or appeasing them: Is this doing nothing for the *Spanish* War? Or does any body imagine the Money rais'd for this War is sunk into the King's Coffers, instead of being applied to the Service? Is not great Part of it, perhaps much the greatest, spent upon the Place in fitting out Convoys with Necessaries of one kind or other for the Army; either Arms, or Cloaths, or Provisions besides now and then some Troops? But if this be true, as we all know it is, then King *Charles's* Part in this War, if not so great as cou'd be wish'd, is more considerable than this Writer represents it, and as much as cou'd be expected from him, considering his Circumstances.

All that follows in this Paragraph of the charge of *transporting* Forces from *Genoa*, *Eight* *Admirals* for Men and Horses, and of the *Maintenance* of our Fleet being thus employed,

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this is nothing but a necessary Consequence of a War in *Spain*; unless an Army can be raised without Men and Horses, or subsist there without Recruits; or they cou'd sail from *Genoa* by Land. To make therefore these Objections, is nothing else but to condemn the *Spanish* War, which both Her Majesty and her People have so much at Heart. For if we will have an Army in those Parts, 'tis infinitely easier to support it from *Italy*, than *England*. And I may add, that the *Dutch* have had their Share in the Trouble of Transportation, that is so much complained of; nor have their Fleet been employed in any Enterprizes for the good of their Country, any more than our own. But 'tis time to leave this Paragraph, which reflects no Blame on the late M---y, nor upon any of our Allies, nor when examined into, is it of any use to his Cause. Only give me leave to add in the last Place, that if we go back to the beginning of the *Spanish* War, which is the only way to judge impartially about it, we shall see the Imperial Court it self did not contribute a little towards the probable Success of it, tho' they had furnish'd neither Men nor Money towards it, in giving us the *Archduke* to be at the Head of it. If we consider how much *England* solicited this, how impossible it was that we cou'd succeed without it in *Spain*, where we pretended to nothing else but to favour a Revolution; How much the Honour of the House of *Austria* was expos'd by making a nominal King, when we cou'd not give him Possession of any Part of the Monarchy; how much the



Succession of the Imperial Family was hazarded, by sending one Brother upon so much Danger, when the other had no Son; how serviceable his Presence in Spain was at first to us, and by what improbable Accidents, our Hopes of an entire Revolution have more than once been disappointed: Whoever considers these things impartially, must allow, that the Imperial Court in giving us the Archduke, gave us a great deal towards the Spanish War; and so I am sure we all thought then; and the more to have given Spain from King Charles to the Duke of Anjou, unless the Fate of the War had made it necessary; had been a great Injustice to the Imperial Court, if either his Father or Brother had liv'd, which yet was as much designed then as it is now; and if it wou'd have been unjust then it is so still.

Page 55. We have a new Complaint against the last Emperor, for draining into his own Coffers the Wealth of the Countries conquer'd or recover'd for him by the War, without increasing his Troops. King Charles, the present Emperor, I believe would be glad to find any Truth in this; but the Mischief is, all the World knows tis false. His Coffers, we are sure have for a long time been very empty, and his Successor no doubt will find it so. The Revenue arising from conquered Countries is much less than this Author seems to think it is; very little of it comes into the Emperor's Coffers, and the little that does come, enables him to support his Part of the War, better proportionably than he cou'd otherwise. Which is very evident from what I have al-

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ready said of the Supplies sent from *Milan*  
 and *Naples* for the Service of the War in *Spain*.  
 But to see what a small Sum these boasted  
 Revenues come to, we must consider, that  
 there is no conquer'd Country can be kept  
 without a great Expence while the War lasts.  
 That upon the Conquest of a Country ma-  
 ny of the most considerable Persons com-  
 monly remove from it, and those that stay  
 are to be gratified and kept in the Interest of  
 the Conqueror, by such Favours as intercept  
 great Part of the Revenues. There is also  
 many times a Necessity of remitting some  
 Duties in consideration of what the People  
 conquer'd have suffer'd by the War. Add  
 to this the Extraordinary Charge of redu-  
 cing the strong Places of these Countries,  
 and the no less Extraordinary Charge of re-  
 pairing the Works that have been ruin'd in the  
 Reduction of them, and perhaps of adding  
 new Fortifications to several Places of a  
 Country, that before in one part or other  
 lay too open. And all these Places must be  
 provided with Garrisons, and furnished with  
 sufficient Magazines of all Sorts. If these  
 Articles are examin'd into, I'm confident we  
 should find that the Emperor's Conquests, in-  
 stead of filling his Coffers, have many of  
 them been rather an Expence to him; and  
 that the best of them have yielded him very  
 little, for want of better Management than  
 that Court has been ever thought to be ac-  
 quainted with. To talk therefore of draining  
 that Wealth into Coffers, speaking of the Em-  
 peror, is all over a Jest, and too gross Ban-  
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ter, I hope, to amuse any one who has the Honour to Represent his Countrey.

The next Paragraph contains nothing in it but what we are told of in this Book at least Twenty times, of the many Towns we have taken for the Dutch; and therefore I should take no Notice of it, but for a Sting in the Tail of it; but which has the Misfortune like most of the rest, not to have in it a word of Truth: *The Hollanders, says he, have made such good use of their Time, that in Conjunction with our C—, the Oppressions of Flanders are much greater than ever.* I wonder how our Author could miss so fair an Opportunity of giving the New M—ry their due Praises for putting such an effectual Check as they did to the further Oppressions of these poor People, by removing the Person that resided at *Brussels* on the Part of Her Maj. and sending a fitter in his Room: Nor is it less strange that he should not give us a Black List of these Oppressions, when it was so much for his Purpose, were there any other Reason for it, but that he can't: And that he can't, to my certain knowledge is not for want of due Enquiry. Why then don't they tell us in what Manner my Lord M. has oppress'd these Provinces? Why don't they Impeach his Favourite C—n, as they threaten'd; whose Services in this War are too great to be forgiven? Why don't they tell us how their Publick Money has been misapply'd? With what Confusion must they own, upon the Report of their most faithful Emissaries, that all the Clamours of Oppression from the D. of M. have nothing in them? To supply this Au-

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author's Silence in this Part, I will tell the  
 Reader in few Words how these People were  
 oppress'd, and how they have been reliev'd.  
 Since 1708, when the Duke of M. was join'd  
 by Prince Eugene with a Body of Imperial  
 Troops, besides a few Regiments rais'd and  
 maintain'd by this Countrey, they have found  
 Bread and Forage for these Troops: To an-  
 swer this Charge, and other necessary Ex-  
 pences of the War, the Annual Revenue of  
 these Provinces not being sufficient, Money  
 was borrow'd upon some Branches of it, to  
 carry on the Service; none of which are en-  
 gag'd for above Ten Years, and some not a-  
 bove Four or Five. This is the great Op-  
 pression of these People. Now I would de-  
 sire this Writer to tell me, whether the War  
 could have been carried on with the Success  
 it has been, without these Troops? And if  
 not, which way he proposes they should have  
 been maintain'd. Should the Emperor have  
 been at that Expence? He declares, that tho'  
 Bread and Forage are found for these Troops  
 by the Allies, yet that they are a greater  
 Charge to him, than if they had serv'd upon  
 the Rhine. Shall the Queen and the States be  
 at that Expence? Is not the War already  
 chargeable enough to us? Where then can it  
 fall, but upon these Provinces? Is there any  
 Reason why they should not share in the Bur-  
 then of the War? Is there any Reason that  
 their Revenues should be kept clear and dis-  
 engag'd, when those of all the rest of the  
 Allies are so much anticipated? What Pre-  
 tence have they to complain? Has not the  
 Assistance of these Troops enabled my Lord  
 M. to

M. to carry the War out of their *Provinces*, which must otherwise have continued the unhappy Seat of it? And are not the Sufferings of one Campaign, when Two such Armies as ours and the *French* live upon them, greater than all these other Oppressions the War has brought upon them? Is not there every Year a great deal of Money spent in all their great Towns? Don't they find in the Army a good Market for the Produce of their Countrey? Are these no Advantages? And is it not by the Conduct of my Lord M. that they enjoy these Advantages, without those Inconveniences they would be attended with, if the Neighbourhood of the Armies were not removed to such a Distance from them? Besides, Is not their own Preservation, and the Interest of their Prince, concern'd in the Success of the War? Why then should they not contribute their Share towards it? My Lord M. instead of being the Oppressor of these *Provinces*, has been their greatest Benefactor: And 'tis very certain no one Act of Oppression is by any of these *Provinces* personally imputed to him! But 'tis pretended Mr. C. has oppress'd them under his Protection, and for his Interest! But if either of these could be proved, nothing is more certain, than that we should long since have heard of them: But to prove that Mr. C. has not oppress'd them, I shall shew, he could not; it being well known, that neither he, nor the Deputies of the States, who are called the *Conference*, ever touch'd a Penny of the Publick Moneys; their Business was to represent to the *Council of State* what

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Sums the several Branches of the Service would want, and oblige them to comply effectually with those Demands: And this is called Oppression; but after this, there remain'd no more for them to do. The Money was levied and collected, and issued by Hands of their own; which made it impossible there could be any Fraud or Oppression on the part of Mr. *Carter*, or the Deputies; 'twas difficult indeed often to make the *Council of State* do what was necessary for the Service; and this obliged the *Conference* to be sometimes rough with them, and let them know, their Demands must be complied with; and that they had nothing else to do, but to consider of and find out the most proper Means for Raising the Money that was wanted. The *Conference* have likewise over-ruled the *Council of State* in the Business of choosing their *Magistrates*; and since the Surprize of *Gand*, which every body is convinced was the effect of Treachery, and the discovery that made of the Inclinations of many in those Provinces to the *French* and *Barbarian* Interest, they have found it necessary to intermeddle in an Affair of so much consequence, and to use their Endeavours, that none might be put into the Magistracy but Men of known Affection to the Allies and the House of *Austria*. If These were Oppressions, it must be own'd these Provinces have been oppress'd, till this last Year: which has given them all the Relief they could desire; for instead of finding Bread and Forage for the whole Body of *Imperial* Troops, they have this Campaign refus'd to provide for so much as one single Regiment of

of *Huffar*, which *Prince Engel*, when he march'd to the *Rhin*, was prevail'd on to leave behind him, the Service being in great want of them: And I have been assur'd, there is not the least thing which my Lord *M.* asked of them this last Campaign for the Service, that was not either absolutely denied; or not complied with, but after repeated Demands, and with great Difficulty; nay, their Disaffection to the Common Cause, mer with such Encouragement, that towards the End of the Campaign, when the Army could no longer subsist in the Neighbourhood of *Bouchain*, without a Supply of Forage from these *Provinces*, tho' my Lord *M.* found means to subsist the Army longer than any Body expected without coming to this resource; and the immediate Consequence of their Refusal, to say nothing of remoter ones, must have been our Army's retreating back into these *Provinces*: Tho' this was represented to them in the most moving and earnest Manner possible, and it was evidently for their own Interest to comply with a Demand that was so necessary, yet did they for some Days refuse to do so, and sent a Deputation to the Army to desire they might be excus'd. And by these Delays the Troops suffer'd not a little. So happily are Affairs changed with this Oppressed People as to the share in the War, which they were before oblig'd to submit to: Nor are they less relieved in the Point of chusing their Magistrates; and the good Use they have made of their Liberty in this respect is, that they have put into the Magistracy of *Gand*, the very Persons that are suspected of having

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having betray'd it to the *French*; so, that it would be no surprize, if I should hear the same thing was done again; and their other Towns are fill'd with Persons of the same Faction. These are the *Oppressors*, and this the *Relief* of these poor *Provinces*. And let this Author disprove a Word of this if he can, or shew that my Lord *M.* has in any other sense joyn'd with the *States* to oppress them in any one Instance.

The last Part of our Author's Charge against the *Allies*, is pointed against the *Princes* of the *Empire*, of whom the *Q.* has hir'd Troops; but the *Dutch* are so perpetually in this Writer's way, that he can dart his Venom to no Point in the Compass, but some of it will fall on them. In order, says he, to augment our Forces every Year in the same proportion as those for whom we fight diminish theirs, we have been oblig'd to hire from several Princes of the Empire. In this Sentence there are more Falsities than Words; We did not begin to hire, in order to augment our Forces: Our first 40,000 Men were for the greater Part compos'd of hir'd Troops, to save *English* Blood, and husband our Money to the best Advantage; and that at the end of the War, there might lie fewer on the Nation to be provided for. These Forces we have not augmented every Year; and whenever we did augment our Troops in *Flanders*, the *States* did, as I have already shewn, equally augment theirs; so far were they from diminishing their Troops from Time to Time, as this Author frequently insinuates; much less could the proportion in which they diminished their Troops, be the Rule



Rule by which we increas'd ours; nor is it for them we Fight, but for our selves: the Concern is common, and our Safety is inseparable. But, secondly, the Ministers of these Princes have perpetually importun'd the Court with unreasonable Demands, under which our late M<sup>ty</sup> thought fit to be passive.

All the Princes of whom we have hir'd Troops, have not been importunate with unreasonable Demands; particularly not the Elector of *Hannover*: to name no others; nor have the rest been perpetually so unreasonable, tho' they are, it must be confess'd, for making as good Bargains as they can; nor when their Demands were unreasonable, were the late M<sup>ty</sup>s so very passive, which is said to intimate as if they were well paid for doing so, the General in particular. Whereas I will undertake to shew, that upon any one unreasonable Demand made by any one of them, there was more Argument and Expostulation us'd on the Part of my Lord M<sup>ty</sup> before he was comply'd with, than can be produc'd from certain Offices for the whole four Years. Some Great Men were in them; and there hardly one Instance, wherein these importing Ministers have not in some degree receded from their first Pretensions, and many have been utterly refus'd. But, Thirdly, these Demands were always back'd with a Threat to recall their Soldiers, which was a thing not heard of, because it might discomfite the Dutch. If they have threatn'd to recall their Troops (which, by the way, has been more since the New M<sup>ty</sup>s, than since the Beginning of the War,) it has been chiefly upon pretence

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nor is it necessary for their own safety; and that they must therefore recall them, unless the Allies would concur in the necessary Measures to secure the Peace of the Empire, and oblige Sweden so far to a Neutrality. But whatever was the particular Occasion the Treaties for their Troops are but for a Year only; and when they are to be renew'd, they are at liberty to insist on new Articles: and if they are unreasonable in this, tis because they know they are necessary, and that the War is our Concern more than theirs; and that is the Reason they insist sometimes on Demands that are thought not very reasonable. And if the calling their Troops is a thing not to be heard of, not because it might discontent the Dutch, but because the Dutch and we both want them; for the Dutch hire Troops as well as we, and of the same Principles, and are importun'd with the same Demands; and after their utmost Endeavours to beat down the Price, they make the same Concessions we do, and for the same Reasons: That a stop may not for a little matter be put to the Progress of our Arms, and the Fruits of a glorious War be lost after so much Success: Which is of such consequence, that the French would be glad to take the Bargain out of our hands, and would give these Princes more Money to keep their Troops at Home, than we and the States pay to have them in the Field. A Man must be a Fool not to see the Consequence of having a Body of good Troops recall'd in the beginning or middle of Campaign, which yet had been our Case the very last Campaign, had not

the Care and Prudence of the D. of M. prevented it, who found out a Way to keep the Troops, without yielding to any one unreasonable Demand.

Lastly, *These Princes never sent their Contingent to the Emperor, but gave for an Excuse, that we had already hir'd all they had to spare.* There is more Truth in this Sentence than is usual with this Writer: 'Tis true, they have not furnish'd their Contingents, generally speaking, so well as they should do; and that they have made this their Excuse, that they had lent their Troops to us, or rather they pretended, there was a sort of Merit in this, and that therefore more was not to be expected from them. But this Author knows, that this is a Pretence only: that those Princes who think themselves at a good Distance from Danger, have in no Times furnish'd their Contingent well; and that if they have not this Excuse, they will find another. But is this any Fault in our Principal Allies? Is it a Fault in the late M——y, that the Princes of the Empire don't send their *Quota's* to the *Rhine*, as they should? Is it not well known that the Emperor himself can't cure this? That it is a Fundamental Fault in the Constitution of the Empire, that there is no where lodg'd a sufficient Power to oblige the several Princes to contribute effectually to the Defence of it the Share they are oblig'd to, by the Resolutions of the *Diet*; tho' that *Diet* be themselves, and the Resolutions of it consequently their own Acts. This Deficiency therefore on the Part of these Princes, is no Fault neither in the late M——y, nor in the

States, nor avoidable: very Natural. No Body has ever r Account o (a) *Mowen* into most *life*, entire not own'd. But to tents himse we have, cess, in Wor der this gre a finishing rective; in in such Fall can excuse, form'd Dess and to Care expence; w English Justi pains must b to it. The h, says he, ain by *Subsidie* in every occasi (though they we refuse to co over so unreasona ber of all the sidies. Is this ces, for Estate or a Dozen Words of Inf

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States, nor in the Emperor himself; 'tis an un-  
avoidable and incurable Evil, arising from the  
very Nature and Form of that Government.  
No Body can doubt of the truth of this who  
has ever read Puffendorff's short, but judicious  
Account of Germany, Publish'd under the Name  
of *Monsieur de Mowatino*, which has been Translated  
into most Languages, and in 1689 into En-  
lish, entitul'd, *The History of Germany*, but  
not own'd to be a Translation.

But to return: As this Writer never con-  
tents himself with saying one thing but once,  
we have, P. 22. a Reflection on those Prin-  
ces, in Words so very scandalous, that I won-  
der this great Master did not reserve them for  
a finishing Stroke to this most impudent In-  
vective; in which our Allies are represented  
in such False and Odious Colours, as nothing  
can excuse, or possibly account for, but a  
form'd Design to break all Faith with Them,  
and to Caresse the Common Enemy at their  
expence; which is a thing so shocking to  
English Justice and Honour, that 'tis no little  
pains must be us'd to prepare them to submit  
to it. The Reflection is this; *There is, hard-  
ly, says he, a Petty Prince, whom We half main-  
tain by Subsidies and Pensions, who is not ready up-  
on every occasion to threaten us to recall his Troops,  
(though they must ROBB us Starve at home) if  
we refuse to comply with him in any demand how-  
ever so unreasonable.* Here is a general Char-  
acter of all the Princes to whom we pay Sub-  
sidies. Is this Language fit for Sovereign Prin-  
ces; for Estates and Crown'd Heads? Are Ten  
or a Dozen Princes to be branded with such  
Words of Infamy at once? Should not the  
Electors

Elector of *Hannover*, at least, be in decency  
 excepted from the common Herd? Those  
 that are acquainted with the Empire can tell  
 this Writer, that some of these Princes, whom  
 he treats in so villanous a manner, are so ve-  
 nerable for their Wisdom and Goodness, that  
 they would command the Respect of all that  
 have the Honour to know them, tho' their  
 Dignity were laid aside; but that, at least,  
 should secure them from such bold Insults,  
 whatever their Personal Merit be. Shall not  
 the high Station of Princes protect them from  
 such Language? Shall Sovereigns be treated  
 thus by a Man who would make implicate  
 obedience to the Prince one of his distinguish-  
 ing Characters? Shall it be a Crime in an  
 honest *English-man*, when he speaks of a Ty-  
 rant, who has made *the World a Wilderness*, and  
 is ever thirsting for the Ruin of Us and our  
 Religion? Shall it, I say, be a Crime to speak  
 of his Falshood and Perfidiousness, Barbarity,  
 and Cruelty, his horrid Persecutions, his un-  
 just Wars, his boundless Ambition, his Bigo-  
 try and Superstition, of the Millions of Peo-  
 ple he has destroy'd, and the vast Extent of  
 Countries he has laid waste; Shall it be a  
 Crime to speak of these things in Words pro-  
 per to them, because he is a Crown'd Head?  
 And shall it be permitted to an insolent Scrib-  
 ler, to treat in this licentious manner, Princes,  
 who are our Friends, in the same Interest  
 with us, and Two of the same Religion? For  
 under this Character of *Petty Princes*, are in-  
 cluded, and indeed principally intended, the  
 Kings of *Denmark, Prussia, and Poland*; the First  
 of whom might expect better Treatment from

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an *Englishman* as a Protestant Prince, and an  
Old Ally, and upon account of his particu-  
lar Relation to Her Majesty. The Second  
has been a very hearty and zealous Promoter  
both of the Common Cause and of the Pro-  
testant Religion; his Purse and his Country  
are always open to poor Refugees; and his  
Endeavours to reconcile the Two Reformed  
Religions can never be enough commended.  
And the last of these Princes, tho' it will al-  
ways be a Blemish to him, that he parted with  
his Religion for a Crown; amidst all the  
Troubles he has had, he has been always true  
to the Allies, and done something for the  
Common Cause whenever he was able; while  
his Victorious Enemy, instead of sending his  
Quota to the Assistance of the Empire, forc'd  
the Emperor to remit by a dishonourable  
Treaty, all Demands past, present, and to  
come, till he shall have put an end to the Wars  
he is engag'd in. These are some of the Prin-  
ces, who we are told must do that, the Sound  
of which the meanest Man of common ho-  
nesty abhors, R O B, or Starve, if it were not  
for our Subsidies. If this Author be in the  
Secret, what must we think of our Alliances?  
For this is the Language of an Enemy; 'tis  
Language which a generous Enemy would  
scorn to use. I can't but think from many Pas-  
sages in this Book, and this, among others,  
that the Writer of it is at bottom an Enemy  
to every thing an *Englishman* has a value for;  
to our Trade, to our Succession, to our Religi-  
on, to all Alliances that are for our Security,  
to every thing that interferes with the Inte-  
rest of France, to Faith, Honesty, and good  
Manners

Manners; else so many Things could not fall from him, that are not consistent with any other Character.

These are the Crimes charg'd on our Allies; and these the Answers to them. Let now one be set against the other; and I leave it to every indifferent Reader to judge whether this Writer has prov'd his Point. *That our Allies have each of them broke every Article in their Treaties with us.* Or whether on the contrary it be not plain, That this Charge is in every part false, more or less: And that the Faults they are accus'd of, are either no Faults at all; or not voluntary, much less design'd to prejudice the Common Cause, or the Effects of their Neglect and Disregard to the Queen. The Failures they are charg'd with, are either not true, or but few, and in Cases where they could not be avoided; proceeding from their general Weakness and Inability, or from the Difficulty or Necessity of their Affairs, at some particular Junctures. Or if there are any Instances that can't be thus excus'd; yet the Late Ministry have been so far from being passive under them, that they have always us'd the most proper Methods to make them act up to their Alliances, and exert themselves in the most effectual Manner against the Common Enemy. There has indeed been little need of such Remonstrances or Expostulations with the States; as every body may judge from what has till now been the universal Sense of all, even among our selves. And notwithstanding what this Author affirms, of their

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nothing is nothing on the Rumor of the In-  
vasion, and of their then sending away their  
Fleet to the *Streights*; we have the Authori-  
ty of Queen, Lords, and Commons, against  
him: For Both Houses in their Joint Ad-  
dress at that Time tell Her Majesty, *all Her*  
*Good Subjects were very sensible of the Zeal the*  
*States General had shewn upon that Occasion:*  
And Her Majesty in Her Answer has these  
Words: *I am also very well pleased with the Ju-  
dice you have done the States General, in taking*  
*notice of their timely Care for our Safety, and their*  
*Readiness to give us all possible Assistance.* But  
with respect to our other *Allies*, the late  
M——y both by themselves, and in Con-  
junction with the *States*, always press'd the  
Service of the Common Cause with the  
greatest Earnestness. And the Remonstran-  
ces that have been made in the Name of the  
Q——, and the *States*, this War, would fill  
many Volumes. Great Numbers of which  
are still in being, and can on Occasion be  
produc'd to the Confusion of those, who  
while they reproach the late M——y with  
Neglects they knew them to be not guilty of;  
will never themselves in Ability or Diligence  
appear equal to them. But if after all the  
Pains they could take, some Imperfections  
have still remain'd in our *Allies*, and all Part  
have not done what by their Treaties they  
were bound to, is there any thing strange in  
this? Was there ever any great, or indeed  
small Alliance where it was otherwise, or  
can we reasonably hope in any future Alli-  
ance, there would be room for such Com-  
plaints? What then would this Writer have

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When he can shew us an Alliance without Faults, in all past Histories; or how there ever can be one, he may be allow'd to blame the present Confederacy, as freely as he will; but till then, I must tell him, instead of Blame, it will excite the Esteem and Admiration of all Impartial Men to consider, how an Alliance consisting of so many Parts, which are under very different Forms of Government, and no less different Interests, could be form'd under such disadvantageous Appearances, as there were at the Beginning of this War; or how it could be kept together so many Years, and be render'd successful against so powerful an Enemy. 'Tis really wonderful, if we consider either the Power, or the Artifices of France, that in so long Time, no Part of a Confederacy, consisting of so many Members, has been forc'd or corrupted into separate Measures; this is without Example, and what we must not hope to see again, if some Men can obtain the Ends they have in View. Nothing is more known, or more obvious to the most ordinary Understanding, than the Advantage of single Power has over a Confederacy: But what is it this Advantage consists in? Is it not, that all the Parts of it are not under the Direction of one; that their Strength cannot be united so, as to bear all at once; that they will have different Views; that some or other thro' Weakness, or Corruption, or ill Government, won't do their Part; that all Projects must be liable to the Debates and Opinions of many independent Powers; that this will make some be laid aside, others de-

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lay'd, others at last very imperfectly exe-  
 ted; and all will be expos'd to be discover'd  
 to the Enemy; while their Designs can be  
 kept with the utmost Secrecy? Are not these  
 and the like Inconveniencies incident to all  
 Alliances in the very Nature of them? Nay  
 further, has not *France* by the absolute Power  
 of the Prince, a great Advantage over not  
 only the Confederacy, but over any single  
 Power in it? Can *England* it self, which  
 makes the greatest Figure in the marriage  
 Things with that Vigor and Dispatch, and  
 secrecy, that the Councils of *France*  
 are govern'd with? It is plain, that  
 the Nature of our Constitution and Govern-  
 ment by Parliaments makes this impossible un-  
 der the best Prince; and the wisest Admini-  
 stration. But if *France* has an Advantage over  
 us in this respect, it has a much greater over  
 the States, which are really seven confederate  
 Republicks, not one; and nothing can be re-  
 solv'd without the Consent of each of their  
 Representatives; nor can those Representa-  
 tives consent in any Cases of Importance,  
 without Instructions from their respective  
 Provinces; which is a Constitution very ill  
 form'd for War; however, it may subsist in  
 times of Peace, which their Government is  
 fram'd for; and which therefore, when it  
 can be safe, they are necessarily dispos'd to.  
 But still much greater is the Advantage of  
*France* over the *Empire* on this account; that  
 is such an imperfect Constitution, that it  
 wants a Name; the Independency of the  
 Parts is so great, that the Coercive Power of  
 the *Emperor* is weak, that they can neither  
 unite, while but of

ciously take Resolutions, nor execute them vigorously when they are taken; by which means a vast Body, which were it well united under one Head, would it self be almost a Match for the Power of France; is now so languid, feeble and unactive, that it is not able to defend it self from that very small Part, which the Maritime Powers have left the Enemy at liberty to turn against them;

But if France has so much Advantage over each of the Principals in this War, is it any Wonder an Alliance made up of them, and several other weaker Parts, can't act with that Vigor and Unity, and Dispatch and Secrecy, a single Power can? Will there not unavoidably be Delays and Differences of Opinion, and Failures and wrong Management on one account or other in the whole, when every Part is consists of, is it self subject to each of these Imperfections and Inconveniences? Has not all Experience confirm'd the Truth of this? What then can be more unjust than to complain of our Allies, or of the late M — y, because in the present Confederacy these necessary Evils could not wholly be prevented? The Success of the Alliance is the best Proof; that it has in the main answer'd the Ends for which 'tis form'd; and that not only beyond former Example, but even beyond what could reasonably be expected from it; as all know who are acquainted with History, or remember what has pass in Europe for these last Fifty Years; or no longer backward than the last War; or with what disadvantages the present War was begun. The Vigor, Unanimity, and

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Secrety with which this long War has been conducted; and the firm adherence of all the Parts of it to the Interest of the Common Cause, will make a Noble Figure in History, if it continues but a very little longer, and be the Admiration of Posterity; and its Success will reflect Immortal Honour on the late Ministry; who by their Disinterested and steady Conduct, by their Prudence and Address were able to keep so long together so great an Alliance, and to make the several Parts of it act in such concert, as to pull down, and humble, a Power so Exorbitant, as that of France at the beginning of this War, a Power which then so little dreaded all the Efforts the Allies could make; that they would not have given an Inch of Ground in Flanders to purchase a Peace. A Man of the least Candor and Ingenuity must own, that this in Fact is true; that this is the success this Confederacy has been attended with, and that 'tis owing to the Abilities and Integrity of the late Ministry.

But the Objections of this Writer against our Allies, are not only unjust but absurd, and in their consequence fatal and destructive to us and our Allies both. For if no Confederacy must be made or kept up till these inconveniences can be avoided, 'tis to no purpose to think of making any; and we must of necessity submit to the Common Enemy. For when one Power is exorbitant, no single Power can stand against it, for if it could, that other would not be exorbitant. If therefore a single Power would preserve it self, it must be by associating with other Powers; but that

that can never be done; or at least not to any purpose, if these Powers so associating, shall quarrel among themselves, and dissolve, upon the first failure or difference of any one of them: No Alliances at this rate can be practicable: But if the single Powers of Europe can defend themselves, neither with nor without Alliances, they must one after another inevitably be destroy'd, and submit their Necks to him, who is such a hard far any one single, tho' could they unite, and bear with one anothers Imperfections, they might be able to make a Stand, and by exerting themselves in proportion to their strength, they might at length subvert him, who without such a Confederacy would in half the Time have ruin'd them. No Alliance ever was, or ever will be attended with less Imperfections, than the present has been; and therefore, if this Author's Advice be taken, this must be dissolv'd, and for the Future, no new one must be made; and then there will no part be left for England, but to submit to France, namely without resisting, or to make a short-lived Resistance, that ends but in the certain Ruin of it. What Folly and Delusion is at the Bottom of this fatal Advice, if England could be so far deluded, as to fall into it, we may easily see, by reflecting on the Consequences that would attend *Holland* or the *Empire*, if they, whose Governments is a Sort of Confederacy, should follow these Councils. Suppose, because the Circles of the *Empire* don't all do the part they are oblig'd to, and furnish their respective Contributions for the War, an incendiary, such as

this Author's Divisions, in that most aggraving word, War has been of the rest mon Inter-Invectives, done more cens'd ag to do no quences of who are th by submit making a le And would after it that Third, till And it would the Two d anne their E Inland ones according to themselves Affairs, som them, or by other Reason is they ough nagement, o some of the not this Proc Ruin of the v federacy don Treaties are p ase their best



This Author, should take upon him to sow  
 Divisions among them, and raise a Ferment  
 in that great Body; and represent in the  
 most aggravating Manner to the *Circles* most  
 expos'd, upon whom the Burthen of the  
 War has lain heaviest, the great Negligence  
 of the rest, and their Disregard to the Com-  
 mon Interest of the *Empire*; and by these  
 Invectives, those *Circles*, who hitherto have  
 done more than their Part, should be so in-  
 cens'd against the rest, as to resolve  
 to do no more; what would be the Conse-  
 quences of this? Must not they themselves,  
 who are thus incens'd, be ruin'd first, either  
 by Submitting to the Common Enemy, or  
 making a less Resistance than they did before?  
 And would not the Ruin of one Part draw  
 after it that of another; and that again of a  
 Third, till the whole *Empire* was destroy'd?  
 And it would be the same with *Holland*, if  
 the Two *Maritime Provinces* should discon-  
 tinue their Efforts against *France*, because the  
 Inland ones don't exactly perform their Parts,  
 according to the Proportions agreed on among  
 themselves; tho' by the Necessity of their  
 Affairs, some Misfortune that has befall'n  
 them, or by a Decay of Trade, or some  
 other Reason, they really can't do so much  
 as they ought; or perhaps thro' the ill Ma-  
 nagement, or Perverseness, or Corruption of  
 some of their Governors, won't. Would  
 not this Procedure unavoidably end in the  
 Ruin of the whole? If any Part of a Con-  
 federacy don't do what they can, or by their  
 Treaties are oblig'd to, it becomes the rest to  
 use their best Endeavours to induce them to  
 it;



it; but when that won't do, they must make the best of a bad Market; a little Assistance is better than none at all: And if they have upon the whole, Hopes that they can maintain their Ground, while the Alliance is preserv'd, they ought to preserve it, since without it, and upon their own Bottom they are sure they cannot.

But what I have said of *Holland* and the *Emperor*, 'tis easy to apply to an Alliance of many Confederated Powers, which can no way support themselves against the common Enemy, but by a good Agreement among themselves; and a good Agreement can't be long preserv'd, if the stronger Parts won't bear with the Failures of the weaker, or every Difference in Sentiments shall be thought a just Cause for breaking off, or throws them into Quarrels and Animosities, which whether design'd or not, must in a little time end in a Dissolution. This must be the Consequence of following the Measures this Author would lead us into. And I defy him to shew what other End his villanous Invective against our Allies can tend to, or is design'd for? Wou'd not one think there was a Resolution taken to break with our Allies, and the Business of this wicked Libel was to prepare People for it, and inflame them, if possible so far, as to make them fond of, or at least be patient under the Breach of an Alliance, which cou'd end in nothing but the Ruin of us and our Posterity? For whatever Reasons can be given for dissolving this, will hold against all that ever shall be made; and if this miscarries when

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'tis so near obtaining the end it aims at, 'tis easy to see, so good a one can possibly be form'd again. And therefore if we don't succeed now, *England* with or without Allies must be ruin'd. A Man that should attempt in so open a manner to dissolve the Confederacy of *Holland* or the *Empire*, would be hang'd for his Pains; and since this Author's Design is not less pernicious, I can't but wish he may meet with the Reward that he deserves.

Having finish'd what I had to say in Defence of our Allies, and in behalf of the Confederacy, on the Preservation of which, the Safety of *England* entirely depends; I was oblig'd to keep this Part a good while from the Press, in expectation of further Light into some Facts: With which I shall conclude this Paper. And I am in the last Place to consider what this Writer has to say against the *Management of the War by the late M — y*; whose Defence will appear to be a very easy Task, there being nothing with respect to them, hard to be accounted for, but that after having had for so many Years the Thanks of the Nation, and of all *Europe*, they should now be thought to need any Defence. But this I must reserve for a Fourth Part, in which I shall likewise take some Notice of the Five Reasons for an ill Peace, with which this Author fills his 30 last Pages; and with a very few Words in Answer to them, shall put an end to all that I can think necessary to be said.

needful to be said by way of Antidote to the Poison of this Book, which is the Sublimate of his Faction, and the last Effort of their Skill in Political Chymistry, to work the Nation into a Phrensy, to make them court their own Ruin, or at least lull them into a Security, which if indulg'd but for a little while, may prove fatal to us all.

THE following Remarks, which were sent me, are not so fully explain'd before, as they might have been, but I thought it proper to insert them, as they are the Property of the Author, and I thought it proper to insert them, as they are the Property of the Author, and I thought it proper to insert them, as they are the Property of the Author.

Page 54.  
nia; which is of Portugal excepting only Squadrons of 1500 of shalps to King Charles this Number always been never receive Money. Acco pays about 41 to satisfy the our Author se an exact Abst been every Y ided for by Catalonia, or to encement of

**Postscript**

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nia; which is of Portugal excepting only Squadrons of 1500 of shalps to King Charles this Number always been never receive Money. Acco pays about 41 to satisfy the our Author se an exact Abst been every Y ided for by Catalonia, or to encement of

# Postscript.

**T**HE following Particulars having been lately receiv'd, which were either omitted, or not so fully explain'd before ; they were thought proper to be added, as further Proofs of the Author's Candor, Modesty, and Truth.

Page 54. He says, *the whole Army in Catalonia, which is, or ought to be 50000 Men, exclusive of Portugal and Gibraltar, is Paid by the Queen, excepting only Seven Battallions, and Fourteen Squadrons of Dutch and Palatines ; and even 1500 of these are in our Pay ; besides the Subsidies to King Charles.* He does not therefore in this Number include the Spaniards, who have always been Paid out of the Subsidy, and never received a Farthing out of any other Money. According to his Relation, the Queen pays about 43500 Men out of the 50000. Now to satisfy the World with how much honesty our Author sets forth this Matter, here follows an exact Abstract of all the Forces that have been every Year paid by the Queen, or provided for by Parliament, for the Service of Catalonia, or to act on that side since the commencement of the War there, which was in

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the Year 1705, exclusive of Portugal, and besides the Subsidies granted the King of Spain.

For the Year 1705 Ending at Christ- Men  
mas, 1705. 4970

For the Year 1706 18757

N. B. In this Number is included 1120 Men which the Parliament provided for, to serve in other Parts, viz. One Regiment to serve in Portugal, Four in Flanders, & the Battalion of Guards on the Establishment of Guards & Garrisons.

For the Year 1707, the Numbers provided for, to serve in Spain and Portugal, were 29,295 Men, of which the Corps that serv'd in Spain, exclusive of Gibraltar, if complete, according to their Establishment, would amount to 25,141 Men. And adding the Battalion of Guards, and the Marines. 27141

N. B. Of this Number Six Regiments of Foot were reduc'd, and Officers sent Home on the 1<sup>st</sup> March 1709.

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Portugal, and  
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For the Year 1708, of the Troops  
provided for, to serve in Spain, Por-  
tugal, and other Parts, there serv'd  
on the side of Catalonia, ————— 17919.

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N. B. The Numbers voted for this  
Year to Serve in Spain and other  
Parts, were 30530 : Of which,  
12620 serv'd in Portugal, Gibral-  
tar, Great Britain, and on the  
Expedition under General Ales-

For the Year 1709. Of the Troops  
provided for, to serve in Spain, Por-  
tugal, and elsewhere, there serv'd  
on the side of Catalonia, including  
3800 Portuguese, to which Number  
they were reduc'd from 7000 Men;  
towards whose Pay the Queen gave  
80000 l. for this Year. ————— 32644

For the Year 1710 of the Troops gran-  
ted for Spain and elsewhere, there  
serv'd on the side of Catalonia, in-  
cluding the Garrison of Port-Mahone,  
and the 3800 Portuguese. ————— 33998

For the Year 1711, ————— 32900

N. B. Several Regiments taken at  
Brihuega, the latter end of the Year  
1710, continuing still Prisoners, are  
not included here, altho' provided  
for to serve in Catalonia.

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The Subsidies granted the King of Spain, were

For the Year 1706,                      10,000

For the Year 1707,                      10,000

For the Year 1708,                      10,000

For the Year 1709,                      10,000

For the Year 1710,                      10,000

For the Year 1711,                      10,000

Out of this has been defrayed (besides paying the Spanish Troops) the Charge of Fortifications, (except those of Portmahon and Gibraltar) with the Charge of subsisting great Numbers of Spaniards at Lisbon, and elsewhere, as they deserted from the Enemy, pursuant to the Encouragement given by the Queen's General in his Manifesto, and some other Heads of Expence; so it may be imagin'd what great Number of Troops cou'd be kept on foot by the Remainder.

In the same Paragraph he says, *We were at the whole Charge of Transporting all the Troops from Italy, and paid Levy-Money for every individual Man and Horse.*

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But we never paid for the Transportation of One Man or Horse, but those that were actually in the Queen's Pay. The Dutch constantly paying the Charge of those in the Pay of the States. And as to the Levy-Money, there was never One Farthing paid for the Horse. What was allow'd was  $\text{5} \text{ l.}$  for each of the effective Men that should be actually embark'd; and it was only for the Imperial Regiments, none being paid for the *Italians*, *Neapolitans*, or *Grifours*; and if we had paid for the Man and Horse it would have come to Twenty Pounds at least.

P. 56. He says, "Seven Portuguese Regiments after the Battel of *Almanza* went off, with the rest of that broken Army, to *Catalonia*; the King of Portugal said he was not able to pay them while they were out of his Country; the Queen consented therefore to do it Her self, provided the King would raise as many more to supply their Places. This he engag'd to do, but never perform'd. Notwithstanding which, his Subsidies were constantly paid him by my Lord G ———, for almost four Years, without any Deduction upon account of those Seven Regiments. Every word of this is utterly false.

Five of these were Horse, and the other Two Foot; Their Pay, when compleat, amounted to  $124,797 \text{ l. } 5 \text{ s. } 4 \text{ d. per Annum}$ , which was entirely born by the King of Portugal to the last of December 1708; but having in the Year 1708, rais'd a new Army, and the Expence of these Seven Regiments increasing

increas'd by the extraordinary Charge of supplying Money, Provisions, and other Necessaries for them, in a Country where the Court of Portugal had but a slender Credit; The Queen, to ease the growing Charge, consented to pay 80000  $\text{l}$  towards their Pay for the Year 1709. They were paid about the like Sum for the Year 1710, and for the present Year 1711, they receive Subsistence for their Effectives in like manner as the other Forces. And from the end of December 1708, to which time the Queen did not expend one Groat for the said Seven Regiments to the end of August 1710, which was the last Month's Subsidy the King of Portugal ever receiv'd in Lord Godolphin's time, is 20 Months. Which this excellent Author assures us, is almost 4 Years.

And notwithstanding what he says, that the King of Portugal rais'd no Forces in the room of these Seven Regiments: He knows that the Portugal Minister, upon an Enquiry into this Matter last Winter, gave the Court here entire Satisfaction to the contrary. Nor is he ignorant, that in the Year 1708, there was 29000  $\text{l}$  paid out of the Treasury here in part of the Subsidy for buying Horses on this side, towards remounting the King of Portugal's Cavalry, which was expended accordingly, and the Horses transported at his Charge, and the Money deducted out of his Subsidy. This alone would go near to mount 4 of the 7 Regiments of Horse aforesaid.

In the same Paragraph he takes notice of our being put to double Expence in maintaining our

our Troops by as false as the well those in those upon the furnish'd by merchants and almost entire and Ireland; and contract is got ears at the Mi has been so h People to the Year beginn as such an Ad n, that the Ra at a greater low for it out re the Exceed charge to the Expence to out 5000  $\text{l}$ . beginning Mich her Price; so the Queen f Michaelmas 1712 rovided the Tro rding to their e many Regim hers drawn off, above 10000  $\text{l}$ . e Charge of r worthy Au ew how little I has in the ese. Contracts ach the greater

Charge of the Troops by the Charge of Forage; which is as false as the rest. The Army in Portugal, so well as those in the King of Portugal's Pay, as those upon the Queen's Establishment, are furnish'd by Contracts made with English Merchants and Factors. The Corn they use almost entirely the Product of Great Britain and Ireland; and the Rate agreed upon in the Contract is govern'd by the Price the Corn bears at the Market of Lisbon. Of late Years has been so high, that it became difficult to let People to Contract; insomuch that for the Year beginning at Michaelmas 1710, there was such an Advance in the Price agreed upon, that the Ration of Bread or Forrage came out at a greater Rate than the Soldier could allow for it out of his Subsistence; and therefore the Exceeding became an Extraordinary Charge to the Government, and occasion'd an Expence to the Queen for that Year of about 5000*l*. The Contract for the Year beginning Michaelmas 1711, was still at a higher Price; so as the Extraordinary Charge to the Queen for the Year which ends at Michaelmas 1712, would amount to 30000*l*. provided the Troops there are compleat, according to their Establishments: But as there are many Regiments already reduc'd, and others drawn off, this Charge will not amount above 10000*l*. a Sum very short of double the Charge of maintaining our Troops, as our worthy Author affirms it is. And to shew how little Interest the King of Portugal has in the Extraordinary Expence by these Contracts, wherein he bears, by such the greatest Part for his own Troops as are

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when this Matter was taken notice of, here *D. Luis da Cunha*, the *Portugal* Envoy, presented a Memorial to Her Majesty, proposing that she wou'd be pleas'd to give Direction for Furnishing her Troops in *Portugal* with Bread and Forrage by Commissaries or Contractors of her own Appointment, and upon the best Terms they cou'd for the Advantage of her Majesty; for that the Court of *Portugal* found it very difficult to get Persons to Contract, altho' at much dearer Rates than usual.

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