



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


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LETTER

TO THE

RIGHT HONOURABLE

THE

EARL of B***.

[Price One Shilling and Six-Pence.]

1871

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L E T T E R

To the Right Honourable

The EARL of B * * * ,

O N

A late important RESIGNATION, and
its probable Consequences.


The T H I R D E D I T I O N .

*Such Flames as high in Patriots burn,
Yet stoop to bless a Child or Wife.*

POPE.

L O N D O N :

Printed for J. COOTE, at the King's Arms, in
Pater-Noster-Row. MDCCLXI.



A

L E T T E R, &c.

M Y L O R D,

I AM persuaded that neither your lordship nor the public will imagine that the ensuing pages are meant to revive any of our political controversies, which, ever since his present majesty's happy accession, have been confined to the cabinet, but have not divided the people. The latter, when satisfied either through opinion or experience of the honesty and sufficiency of the ministers, are more tractable to government, and more unanimous in sentiment, than perhaps any people in Europe.

But, my Lord, though the people of England, with a pleasing kind of resigna-

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tion

tion to the will of their superiors, beheld a French minister, the most obnoxious to them, perhaps, of any that could have been sent from the continent, negotiating at this court upon the most important concerns ; yet an event has happened, that, if not explained, bids fair to unhinge that unanimity, which has so lately become the glory and happiness of this island. It is my zeal for its continuance, that draws upon your lordship this address ; in which, under the sanction of your lordship's name, a name so agreeable and respectable to the public, I shall endeavour to prove,

First, That a solid, honourable, and advantageous peace, in the present circumstances of Great-Britain, exhausted as her people, and multiplying as her debts are, is preferable to the most splendid successes of war.

Secondly, That such a peace would give Great-Britain an opportunity, with honour and credit for the future to decline all continental connections, attended with such a profusion

profusion of blood and treasure, as those she is now engaged in.

Thirdly, *That this system can receive no manner of shock by the resignation of the right honourable gentleman who a few days ago gave up the seals of his office.*

Fourthly, *That the same right honourable gentleman and his friends, whose patriotism and disinterested attachment to their country cannot be questioned, will and must, in consistence with that character, co-operate in the same good work, whether he or they are in place, or out of place, as they cannot be suspected of distressing his majesty's measures, even supposing those measures not to be their own.*

My Lord, I cannot enter on a discussion of the first of those propositions, without observing that, notwithstanding the greatness of our successes, neither his majesty, nor his royal grand-father, have said they would *prescribe*, and not *negotiate* a peace. The appointment of the congress at Augsbourg, the naming pleni-

potentiaries, the intercourse of ministers, are all of them so many steps that indicate a *negociation*; and where there is a *negociation* previous to a treaty, it has, in all the course of history antient and modern, been supposed that somewhat is to be given up on both sides; on that of the *prevailing*, as well as on that of the *declining*, or even *prostrate*, party. Edward the Third, my Lord, though at the gates of Paris with a victorious army, gave up a great deal by the treaty of Bretigny; nor did Henry the Fifth disdain to conclude that of Troyes, while in fact he was possessed of three-fourths of all France.

This being premised, it is necessary, in order to fix the terms of a just and honourable peace, that we examine what is to be given up by Great-Britain, should the congress of Augsbourg take place; for I shall not affront our sanguine patriots so much, as to presume that France has any thing to give us, but her acquiescence in what shall be agreed upon at the congress,
and

and her good faith in performing it. But even this acquiescence, I must humbly suppose, must be purchased by some concessions on the part of Great-Britain. What those concessions ought to be, is the present question.

I am not, my Lord, afraid to say, that according to the situation, the interest, and even the genius of the British nation; they ought to aspire to no acquisitions but those of commerce. The present war was begun not with a view of enlarging, but of protecting, our trade. But the expence of blood and treasure with which it has been attended, renders it far from being unreasonable that we should be indemnified by the enlargement, as well as the security and protection, of that trade. The French encroached upon our back settlements; they erected a chain of forts that bade fair; and that too in a few years, either to thrust us from all our possessions upon the continent of America, or to render them insignificant to their mother-country.

country. The question is, while matters were in that situation, what terms would the English crown and ministry have insisted upon ?

As I believe there is not a man of sense in Europe, who does not believe that at the beginning of the war, security for our American settlements was all we expected, and all we required, I must be of opinion that had the French *then* offered us that, they might have had that peace which I believe they would be glad of *now*. Their obstinacy was equally insolent as unsurmountable ; nor can we wonder at it in a people that measures *right* by *power*. They had a flourishing marine on the seas of Europe, and on the continent of America a great empire, which they thought nature and art equally contributed to render inaccessible to our arms. Some events at the beginning of the war, disadvantageous to us more in imagination than reality, confirmed them in their obstinacy, and threw us into a despondency,

despondency, or rather fever, that gave the seals to the right honourable gentleman who lately resigned them.

No minister, perhaps, ever entered into power with greater advantages on his side. His personal and family connections, the good opinion his sovereign had of him, with the homage the people paid to his integrity and abilities, left him nothing to wish for. All the departments in government were filled up by his nomination, and every scheme he laid down was adopted, even before it was examined.

As I here intend to stick close to the first head I proposed, I shall not deviate from it (tho' perhaps it would be no deviation) by any observations on the vast accessions his popularity acquired by the miscarriage of our fleet in the Mediterranean, and that unaccountable ridiculous measure of sending for Hessians and Hanoverians to protect Great Britain, with many other favourable accidents of the same kind. It is unquestionable, that his
first

first measures were more vigorous, and therefore more to the taste of his master, than any that had ever been proposed before: I cannot, however, be of opinion, that all of them were of equal utility. The first expedition which was schemed, I mean the conquest of Rochfort, had it been successful, would have been of vast and durable advantage to this nation. But tho' it miscarried, the honourable gentleman's enemies, if he had any, were much more candid to him than his friends were to the former ministry in the case of Byng's miscarriage, and the loss of Minorca. No tongue or pen was employed in imputing to him the failure of that expedition, tho' it was effected perhaps through as shocking mismanagement as any to be met with in the British history. As to the two descents on the continent of France, said by the gentleman's friends to have been projected by him, to make the French sensible that they were vulnerable in their own territories, I can by no means see the
good

good effects they were attended with to this nation. I think they have proved the French to be invulnerable ; because I must be of opinion that there is a difference between a *scratch* and a *wound*. Perhaps, when we consider that both those expeditions cost us an immense expence, and some blood, if not disgrace, it will puzzle the warmest friend the right honourable gentleman has, to point out one national purpose they answered, if we except the splendid parade of carrying the cannon of Cherbourg to the Tower of London, and the proof that France was accessible upon her own coasts. Were I to hazard conjecture, I might perhaps say they have been so far detrimental to us, as they have taught France the manner of our descents, and the means of guarding against them for the future.

The conquest of Canada, it may be said, was a plan laid down by the same right honourable gentleman. I shall admit that it was, and that it has redounded greatly

to his honour. But will the most idolatrous admirer of that gentleman deny, that had not Providence, for I shall not call it Chance, co-operated with the incredible resolution of the British troops, and the British general, it must have been *felt* as the most *fatal*, and *considered* as the most *extravagant* scheme that ever was attempted to be put into execution by this country. Whoever throws his eyes upon the last letter on that subject, written by the brave general Wolfe, compared with the subsequent operations, which almost, by miracle, proved to be successful, must be of that opinion. Notwithstanding this, I shall admit, that the conquest of Canada was a great, a solid, and a glorious acquisition to Great Britain.

I shall not here dispute, tho' perhaps I might be supported in disputing it, whether the reduction of Louisbourg was planned by him or not. Be that as it will, it is certain the conquest of Louisbourg was but a *negative* advantage, and no acquisition

quisition to Great-Britain ; and that the same was not only planned but executed under a ministry, in which I believe neither the right honourable gentleman, nor his friends, will pretend that they had the smallest interest. Your lordship may perceive that I do not here attempt to raise any argument from the very disputable measure of demolishing the fortifications of that place, which, by the privateering turn, to our disadvantage, the war has taken in those place, must, if standing, have been of infinite service to the British shipping.

I shall readily admit, that the conquest of Goree and Senegal was entirely owing to him ; and that he shewed great sagacity in falling in with the plans laid before him for reducing those places, by persons who were acquainted with their strength and situation. But, my Lord, the question with me is, whether Great-Britain hitherto has found those acquisitions to be of so great advantage as they were given out to

be to our interest and commerce ; whether they are not, in fact, the grave of English subjects, or whether they ever can compensate for that immense mortality that is entitled upon our possessing them.

The conquest of Belleisle, my Lord, is another flower I shall readily admit to have been added to the British garland by the same right honourable gentleman. I call that conquest, my Lord, a flower, because I think no reasonable man, either at home or abroad, can imagine that it will be permanent ; or if permanent, that it will not cost us fifty times more than it is worth. I shall, however, admit, that it was right to reduce that island, because, whatever it may be worth to us it is of vast consequence to France, and may claim a proper equivalent in a subsequent negotiation ; not to mention the great figure we have acquired by the conquest of it in the eyes of all the rest of Europe.

Our conquests in the East-Indies, my Lord, I can by no means admit to have
been

been in any degree owing to the councils of the right honourable gentleman in question; for tho' both the royal troops and shipping were employed in them, yet the plan was laid and attempted long before the right honourable gentleman came into the administration; and considering the present constitution of that company, it may be disputed whether the advantages resulting from those conquests are national or partial.

I have stated those considerations, my Lord, not from any malignity towards the honourable gentleman, but because *Amicus Plato sed magis amica veritas*, I love him much, but my country more; and I am sorry to see too many of my fellow-subjects so far deluded, as to think that the resignation of Mr. P— is but another term for the destruction of Great-Britain. Their zeal, by the bye, pays but a very sorry compliment to his present majesty and his royal grandfather, and the constitution of this country; for they cannot
 attri-

attribute all our successes and glory to him without supposing him to be what is inconsistent with the British government, a *first*, a *sole*, nay an *independent* minister. Your lordship, I am sure, knows far better than I do, that no man can dictate at a British council-board; and that every public scheme that is to be executed, must have the approbation of the sovereign, or a majority at his council-board, or both.

Having said this much, my Lord, give me leave to add, it has been too frequent in this country, in the heat of conquest, and while the acclamations of triumph are tingling in our ears, for both ministers and people to strike into splendid deviations from the national interest; and I think every conquest is such when it costs more than it is worth; and when its importance does not answer its maintenance. I shall not here positively aver this to be the case with regard to the conquests of Great-Britain during the present war; but if it is a safe, and an honourable peace, (that
I may

I may keep to my first proposition,) may certainly be made tho' we give such conquests up. I have hitherto designedly avoided the mention of our acquisition of Guadaloupe, because the public voice, or rather one part of the public, seems to put it in competition with that of Canada. That it was conquered during the administration of the right honourable gentleman here pointed at, is certain; but that it was conquered in consequence of his plan, is more than questionable. If the plan was originally his, he intrusted the execution of it to perhaps the most improper officer, with regard to enterprize, in his majesty's service. The consequence was suitable to the character of the person employed, for it miscarried, and miscarried in such a manner, that the public is still at a loss to account how it possibly could miscarry. That it was resumed will not, I believe, be pretended by the gentleman's friends, to have been owing to his advice or direction; and all the world knows,

knows, that we owe the possession of the island to that temerity, which, when unsuccessful in war, is termed *madness*, and when successful, *heroism*. I am far from saying this to derogate from the merit of the general, the officers, and the troops who made the conquest. The greatest names in history owe their lustre to a happy temerity; and had not the attempt been resumed, the enemies of Great-Britain might have laughed her to scorn at seeing her arms baffled.

This review, my Lord, of our victories and conquests during the right honourable gentleman's administration, can by no means be thought impertinent, because however important or unimportant they were, it is extremely plain, that the public voice did him injustice in attributing them solely to him. But let us fall in with the madness of his admirers so far, as even to admit he was the sole director, shall we swell his other praises with that of having been frugal of the public money?

ney. My Lord, I do not say that he squandered it, but I must be of opinion, that his was the most expensive administration that Great-Britain ever did see, and, I hope, ever will see again: and that all the emoluments that possibly can accrue to us from our conquests, are insufficient to indemnify us for the sixth part of the annual interest of the money they cost.

I know, my Lord, the common cant of shallow politicians, that the money is all spent among ourselves. Admitting it is, and that no kind of consideration is to be had to the principal, but still the yearly interest must be paid, and it cannot be paid without a yearly multiplication of taxes; what the consequence of this must be in the end, is worthy of serious attention.

When the right honourable gentleman first came into the direction of affairs, we were told from the throne, that the more vigorous our preparations for war were, and the more briskly it was pushed, we

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must

must the sooner come to an end of it ; or, in other words, the more money you lay out this year, you will be obliged to lay out the less next year. The public cheerfully adopted this doctrine : the money was raised without murmuring, and the war went on with vigour ; but, however, it was far from being ended. Next year, double the money was wanted, the same language was made use of, and the public were taught, in terms of the homely proverb, Not to lose a hog for a halfpennyworth of tar. The money accordingly was again raised without murmuring. Now, to be sure, this immense sum must do the business ; France, before the campaign is over, must be brought to her marrow-bones, and then there is an end of those immense demands. No ; the next, and another session is ushered in with the same assurances, and the same demands ; and should the war continue, I shall not at all be surprized to see the ensuing session opened in the same strain.

Taxes,

Taxes, my Lord, as well as all other matters of policy, have their bounds, and these are fixed in a just proportion between the exigencies of the state, and the abilities of the people. Exigencies foreign to the interests of a people; exigencies contrived to replenish the rattle of popularity, or to gratify an useless, favourite, perhaps a baleful, passion in the people, must in the end create demands that surpass their ability to satisfy. This, my Lord, ever has been, and ever will be, attended with one of two consequences; either the crown must become absolute, or contemptible. In this country, where public faith is the faith of parliament, the last consequence is most to be feared. The manufacturer, the labourer, and the mariner, must work for the credit of the public; and a sufficiency will not remain to support either the proper dignity or power of government, or to answer the future necessary exigencies of state. Supposing, for instance, the present war

was to last, at its present expence, for two years longer, that is, supposing the public debt to be increased about 800,000l. a year; add this to the immense annual interest we already pay, and let me ask any reasonable man, whether Great-Britain, extended as her commerce, and powerful as her armaments are both by sea and land, will be able to answer the demand, and at the same time raise the money for the necessary purposes of government.

Your lordship may perceive that I make no question about raising the principal sum, for I make no doubt that in two years time it might be raised. But, my Lord, I am singular enough to think that to be one of the worst symptoms attending the civil state of Great-Britain, because it plainly evinces the immense profit arising to the public creditors, and which must absolutely accrue from the labour of the husbandman, the merchant, the mariner, and the manufacturer. Here
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I know it may be said, and it has been said, why not tax the funds? The answer is, such a taxation would be unjust in itself, and destructive of public credit. They who have money in the funds, pay, in common with those who have not, their proportion in the taxes upon the ordinary necessaries, conveniences, or luxuries of life; and should the parliament break in to the bargain they made with the public creditors, it must depart from its good faith, the only consideration which hitherto has supported public credit.

From what has been said, I apprehend it to be extremely clear that the credit of the public must be overstrained, the moment our debts become such that the government cannot, within the year, raise the annual interest of them; and I should be glad to know how we can more effectually come to that melancholy pass, than by continuing the galloping manner we have been in for some years past. There

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is not want of money, says a sanguine citizen, for carrying on the war. I say, so much the worse. The difficulty does not lie in the subjects supplying the government, but in the government repaying the subject. In short, can this nation, with all its riches and grandeur, in time of peace, every year raise eight millions of money? Frugality and oeconomy I know can do great things; yet give me leave, my Lord, to say they cannot work impossibilities. I call it an impossibility to reduce the interest owing to the creditors of the public.

I admit that that interest has been reduced. But how? not by making the parliamentary faith *felo de se*, in saying to its creditors you shall accept of so much interest, whether it pleases you or not; but by giving the creditor a fair and honest option, which is frequent in common life, "Either accept of the interest I am willing to pay, or take back your principal." A government, my Lord, may talk that language

guage when it owes but sixty millions, without much danger of being taken at its word ; or if it is, without much difficulty of fulfilling it ; but where is the minister who will venture to speak in that stile when the public debt is more than double that sum, and when the alternative lies between the creditor's receiving his principal, or his accepting an annual sum that falls short of the natural interest of money in this country ? But this point is of itself so extremely clear that I shall insist upon it no longer.

I am, however, somewhat concerned to reflect, it is possible some well-meaning people may think I ought not to tell those matters in *Gath*, or to publish them in *Askalon*. Alas ! my Lord, they are truths that are already but too well known to the Philistines, and even to the daughters of the Philistines : they are the truths that make them rejoice. They are truths that seem to be hid only from ourselves ; and for that reason they the more require to be published. The whole present dependence

pendence of France is upon our continuing the war till our public credit shall be overstrained ; and then we must do without an equivalent, and with shame, that which we may do now to our advantage and with honour.

I hope I shall not be understood as suggesting, that we are to forego all we have gained by this war, rather than continue it. No ; nothing can be farther from my thoughts ; nothing ought to be farther from the thoughts of any man who values the interest and reputation of this country. But, my Lord, I am free enough to say, I think we have done enough for the purposes of advantage, and perhaps too much for those of glory. His majesty must have thought, in the terms of my first proposition, that a solid, honourable, and advantageous peace, is preferable to the most splendid successes of war ; when in the middle of those successes he named his plenipotentiaries for the congress of Augsbourg. Were that congress now holding (and I must acknowledge I am sorry it is not)

not) we should not be obliged to comply with unreasonable demands. Should the French say to us, " You shall give us back Quebec, Guadaloupe, or Senegal," we say, no. What is the consequence? the war continues, but not a war of enterprize and offence, but of self-defence and justice. We are in possession ; let us throw the labouring oar upon France ; let her spend those sums upon enterprize and offence that we have expended, and then let us see how long she will continue in her imperious mode. But as I cannot help looking upon the French to be a sensible people, so I can by no means imagine that they will talk in that strain, or that they are not willing to make proper allowances for those successes that have been attended with such a profusion of our blood and treasure.

The question however still recurs ; what is a solid, honourable, and advantageous peace ? To solve this question, my Lord, I must have a retrospect to the principle upon which the war was under-

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taken

taken and conducted, which was that of security to our American possessions. The conquest of Quebec and Canada, tho' rather an accidental, than a primary, object, is said to be conducive to that security; and if it really is, let us retain both. Your lordship best knows, whether M. Buffy, before he departed from London, did not publicly declare that his master never would renounce his right to Quebec, were he besieged in his palace of Versailles by a hundred thousand men. But, my Lord, I am far from thinking that this declaration was either sincere or unreasonable. It is well known that ministers, especially French ministers, employ the loudest language when they are instructed to make the amplest concessions. Had such a minister as Sir William Temple heard M. Buffy make such a declaration, he would immediately have whispered into his master's ear, that he was sure he had something very like a *Carte Blanche* in his pocket. I must therefore think the declaration was made to enhance
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the value of his concessions, and from some symptoms, he imagined he discovered in his majesty's council, of fondness for peace on any terms.

But, my Lord, as I have already hinted, supposing the declaration to be sincere, I cannot think, that even if his Most Christian Majesty sticks by it, it can be of the least obstruction to our concluding a solid, honourable, and advantageous peace. Our possession of Jamaica is of, at least, as much consequence to us as our possession of Quebec ; and yet the Spaniards, notwithstanding the many treaties we have had with them, and the friendship that has for these twelve years subsisted between us and them, have never renounced their right to Jamaica. We keep it notwithstanding, and I hope we always shall keep it. In short, my Lord, were a peace made to-morrow under the amplest renunciation on the part of France, of all we have conquered, I should think possession our best, if not our only, security. He must be a novice in history, indeed, who

is ignorant that the capital maxim of the French monarchy is, that all renunciations are, of themselves, void and of no effect, if they tend to the prejudice of the crown; and, my Lord, on the principles of monarchy linked with those of hereditary succession, I am not sure but they are in the right. At least, were I a British minister or counsellor, I should be extremely tender of advising his majesty to renounce, even for himself, the most disputable right he has.

“ But the French will not make peace, unless we give back Quebec.” Then let them make war, and try to recover it. As they can have no hopes of that, it is absurd to imagine that, with the viper, they will lick the file, and imagine their blood to be ours. Upon the whole, therefore, if it is in our breast to keep possession of Canada, against all the power of France, as it undoubtedly is; and if that possession is necessary for the security of our American colonies, we never can imagine, that the negotiations for peace will be obstructed

fructed on that account. I should not even be either surpris'd or sorry to see the treaty between us and France published by authority, without either Canada or Quebec being once mentioned in it. No man of the least knowledge or experience in life can doubt, that the most express stipulations on the part of France on that head, will last no longer than her inability to break them.

I shall now turn my view to the other important conquest we have made upon the French in America; I mean that of Guadaloupe. This, tho' a fortunate acquisition, must be acknowledged to be extraneous to the original necessary principle upon which the war began; and therefore I must be of opinion, that our returning it cannot affect that security for which we fought at first. But are we to return it after the expence we have been at in conquering it? I should be as loth, my Lord, as any man in England, to agree to our giving back the smallest portion of what we have acquired from France, did

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I not think such a cession infinitely preferable to the continuance of this devouring expensive war. But, in fact, is our retaining Guadaloupe of that vast consequence to this nation as has been represented? Have not those representations been exaggerated beyond the bounds of truth, probability, and give me leave to say, of possibility, by a set of men in this island, who find their interest in discouraging the planters of our own islands, and in endeavouring to render their commodity a drug? I shall readily admit, that the greater the quantity of sugar is that comes to Great Britain, it is so much the better for us. But can that sugar be raised no where but in Guadaloupe? If the public is not grossly misinformed by those who have the best opportunities of knowing, the neutral islands, which France is willing to relinquish to us, and which, at a very little expence, we can render tenable against all her power may with proper cultivation be made capable of producing more sugar than either Guadaloupe or Martinico,

co, or indeed both together. When I mention this, I am far from undervaluing the acquisition of Guadaloupe. I know it to be of great importance, but important as it is, I think the restoration of peace to this country is more so; especially if our resigning Guadaloupe can be compensated, as it certainly may be, by our peaceable possession of the neutral islands. Add to this, that Guadaloupe is by no means necessary, as Quebec is, to the preservation of our American possessions. Rationally speaking, therefore, upon the whole, that peace must be solid, honourable, and advantageous, that not only answers the end for which we took up arms, but gives us such an additional security, as renders it almost morally impossible for the French ever to become again either our rivals or our enemies in North-America.

Thus far I have confined myself to what was properly the primary object of the war. I now proceed to a few considerations concerning the consequences, or the secondary objects; and such I take our concern

concern in Germany to be. Our connections with the king of Prussia were tormented by the injustice of France, who, in consequence of a quarrel in America, attacked his majesty's electoral dominions in Germany. The right honourable gentleman who has lately resigned, is the best judge in what terms he and his friends used to talk of continental connections. They too can best account why, in the progress of the war, those connections grew more extensive, and more important, than they had ever been since the accession of the present family to the crown of Great Britain, even under administrations that were the most odious and unpopular on that account. But, my Lord, I am not disposed to find fault, and scarcely animadvert upon inconsistencies. I think Great Britain has acted not only generously, but wisely, in the assistance she has given to his Prussian majesty, and the protection she has afforded to the electorate of Hanover; but I must at the same time be of opinion, that a British minister might, with a very good grace

grace towards his country and all Europe, admit of a negotiation for peace, without insisting upon full and ample amends for all that the king of Prussia, and the elector of Hanover, have suffered since the commencement of this war. Were such indemnifications to be always insisted on, no peace could be made. The French, as well as their enemies, have had their losses.

The right honourable gentleman's friends, I know, have said that a separate peace between Great-Britain and France would be of very little service to his Prussian majesty, as the two empresses appear determined not to lay down their arms but with his ruin. In answer to this, we are to observe, that his Prussian majesty himself, who understands his own situation and interest, at least as well as we do, is of a different opinion, and thinks, that if he was eased of the French, he could give a very good account of his other enemies, numerous as they are ; but, even granting that not to be the case,

is Great-Britain to suffer because two women are obstinate and vindictive? We have done for his Prussian majesty all that we could do, and more perhaps than any ally ever did for another. Should the malice of his enemies continue, we shall be enabled to do more, if we are at peace with France; and a very little will turn the scale in his favour, as the balance even at present is very little more than doubtful. The British ministry, therefore, my Lord, may very honestly, and very consistently with the character of true patriotism, enter upon a negotiation, of which the neutrality of France with regard to Prussia and Hanover is a preliminary stipulation. Were such a preliminary established, it would then be in the power of Great-Britain to give the king of Prussia more effectual assistance than ever, and with far less detriment to herself: nor can I look upon any minister, who should oppose a negotiation on such a basis, in any other light, than that of being an enemy, not only to peace
but

but to his country. All Europe would applaud such a negociation; and whatsoever the event of the war might be between his Prussian majesty and his other enemies, the constitution of the Germanic body must revert to its natural system. France, as guarantee of the treaty of Westphalia, never, in her cooler hours, can approve of those connections which rage and resentment against Great-Britain hurried her into with the house of Austria: it never can be her interest to see the protestant cause ruined in Germany, where a balance of power against the court of Vienna is necessary for her safety. In short, my Lord, I can consider the present and late conduct both of France and Austria, only as that of two persons in a delirium, or a fever. France has given some indication that the crisis of her distemper is approaching, and it was the business of a British minister to have encouraged and promoted her cure. The ruin of the electorate of Hanover and Brandenburg could serve only to aggrandize

grandize the house of Austria to the prejudice, and in the end perhaps to the ruin, of that of Bourbon.

Can we imagine that there is a thinking man in the French king's dominions, who is insensible of this truth, and who will not lend his hand towards dissolving the present unnatural connections between the two houses. In what I say, I am far from pleading the cause of France. Her dangerous views, her perjuries, and perfidy, with her perpetual enmity to the peace of Europe and the interest of Great-Britain, are but too well known; but, in this case it happens for once, that her interest, and that of Great-Britain, when rightly understood, are the same; a consideration of which a British minister ought to avail himself, and if, properly attended to, may not only close up the wounds of war, but raise us to a pitch of secure greatness, that this nation never experienced before. France is now sensible of her error in attempting to extend her commerce, which she could not protect.

tect. The experiment of her rivalling
 the marine of Great-Britain has failed
 her ; the purposes for which her absurd
 connections with the house of Austria
 were formed have not answered their
 ends ; her fleets are irretrievably ruined ;
 she is fighting in Germany against the
 only natural allies she has there, the
 protestants ; and should she even carry
 her point against the electorate of Hano-
 ver it will neither be worth her while,
 nor in her power, to maintain her acqui-
 sition ; and every intelligent reader may
 see that she is sensible of this truth by the
 motions of her armies on the frontiers of
 that electorate. Could she have prevailed
 against Great-Britain, she would have
 indemnified herself for her expences in
 the war, not in Germany, but in Ame-
 rica. As she has not prevailed, and as
 she has not now the smallest probability
 of prevailing, what is she to do, but to
 relinquish to us the primary objects for
 which both nations went to war, and let
 each

each of us make the best we can of the secondary ones.

This, my Lord, brings me to the second proposition I have laid down, which is, that a solid, honourable, and advantageous peace, would give Great-Britain an opportunity, with honour and credit for the future, to decline all continental connections, attended with such a profusion of blood and treasure as those she is now engaged in.

I cannot properly handle this proposition, without some slight review of the right honourable gentleman's conduct while he was in the administration, with regard to the affairs of Germany. When he entered upon the high post he has lately resigned, he professed himself to be an anti-continentalist, to a degree that I think (and I believe so did every well-wisher to the house of Hanover, and the balance of power on the continent) was inconsistent with the honour and interest of Great-Britain. He was scarcely, however, warm in his post, when some very
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useful distinctions were made between oc-
 casional and systematical assistances; be-
 tween temporary and permanent mea-
 sures, and the like; all which went so
 well down with the public, that on the
 18th of January 1758, nobody was sur-
 prized when, as s——y of st—e, he pre-
 sented a message from his late majesty for
 a supply to the Hanoverian army, *until*
the further necessary charge thereof could
 be laid before the house. In consequence
 of this message, 100,000 l. was unani-
 mously granted, to be taken immediately
 out of the supplies of last year unapplied,
 and to be remitted with all possible dis-
 patch. Soon after this, the descent upon
 France, under the duke of Marlborough,
 was executed, and the French were
 obliged to evacuate Hanover: and here
 our minister's anti-continental system seems
 to have been entirely at an end. A new
 convention was entered into between his
 Britannic majesty and the king of Prussia,
 and signed at London on the 11th of
 April, whereby the king of Great-Britain
 engaged

engaged to pay his Prussian majesty the yearly sum of 670,000l. sterling, and each of the contracting powers engaged to conclude no peace without the participation of the other ; and the sum raised that year by parliament exceeded eleven millions of money.

The public submitted to this expence without a murmur, and the extraordinary supplies of troops which began now to be sent to Germany, created rather matter of surprize than opposition ; while the public, with the most respectful resignation, waited for the event. In the meantime the news of the reduction of Louisburgh, and some other advantages gained by our fleets both in Europe and America, gave a new turn to our politics. It was then pretended, by the honourable gentleman and his friends, that the anti-continental system never was meant to be pursued longer than the naval power of Great-Britain had secured her American possessions from insults, and left us nothing to fear, either there or in Europe, by sea.

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Our connexions with the continent now multiplied ; our troops were poured faster than ever into Germany ; our expences were redoubled ; the convention between his Britannic majesty and the king of Prussia was renewed on the 17th of January 1759 ; and at the same time a new convention was concluded between his Britannic majesty and the landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, by which 19,000 Hessians were taken into the pay of Great-Britain, instead of 12,000 lately employed in the British service ; and the landgrave was to receive, besides the ordinary pay of those troops, the sum of 60,000 l. in consideration of his immense losses in support of the common cause. On the 21st of May thereafter, Mr. Secretary Pitt presented to the house of commons a very alarming message, signed by his majesty, desiring the house to enable him to defray any extraordinary expences of the war, incurred, or to be incurred, for the service of the year 1759 ; and to take all measures as may be necessary to disappoint or defeat any enterpri-

zes or designs of his enemies, and as the exigency of affairs may require. In consequence of this message, a vote of credit was granted for a million of money. After this, on the 30th of the same month, followed the invasion panics; and the same right honourable gentleman had again the honour to present to the house of commons another message from his majesty, informing them not that he would order any part of the great army we paid in Germany to come over to our defence, at a time when the nation was so destitute of regular troops, that we could scarce guard our coasts from smugglers; but that his majesty would, if he thought proper, cause the militia, or such part thereof as shall be necessary, to be drawn out, and embodied, and to march as occasion shall require.

What followed since is too recent to be repeated here. Providence certainly interposed, almost miraculously, in our favour at the battle of Minden: but I must be free enough to own, that the odds

odds against us before that engagement was fifty to one ; and nothing is more certain, as appears by the defence of the noble lord who was disgraced on that occasion, than that the victory was owing, next to the courage of the English troops, to their happy disobedience of the g—n—r—l's orders. Had matters fallen out otherwise, in what a situation here must the minister have been, who advised, and even hastened, the sending over a body of troops, that, to all appearance, were too few for conquest, but too numerous for butchery. Next to Providence, they had only their valour and spirit to thank for their deliverance.

Notwithstanding our success at the battle of Minden, his late majesty, as well as the king of Prussia, were sensible how much they had been indebted to Providence ; and they wisely resolved not to presume too much upon its care, but began to entertain some serious thoughts of peace. Accordingly, on the 25th of November 1759, declarations from their Bri-

tannic and Prussian majesties were delivered at the Hague to the ministers of the belligerent powers, importing that they were ready to send plenipotentiaries to the place that should be judged most convenient for holding a congress for the re-establishment of the public tranquillity. Why this proposal did not take place, especially as we could have treated under the powerful mediation of Spain; and as his most christian majesty offered to treat of a particular league with England, under the same mediation, is as yet a secret to the public. The refusal of the two empresses, and the French king, to treat separately with his Prussian majesty, and without admitting the ministers of Sweden and Saxony, was so far from being a reason why England should drop all separate negotiations with France, that it was the strongest reason for their being continued. Had the separate treaty gone on, there was no room to doubt that the general conferences must have had a favourable issue, The losses of the French were at
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that time so enormous, and they were so entirely destitute of resources for the means to continue the war, that had we made the smallest advance towards a separate treaty, which most certainly was the interest of Great-Britain to have done, as she was no principal against any other power but France, the other parties must have agreed to such equitable conditions, as must have put an end to the war, and have saved this nation many millions, besides the lives of men, in prosecuting it upon the continent, as we have since done to no manner of purpose.

But, my Lord, though a separate treaty with France was, at that time, the natural, and the only probable expedient that could give peace to Great-Britain, and to Europe, we happened to be so unfortunately hampered by our engagements with Prussia, that, in fact, we could not act as an independent power: for while this very negotiation was in agitation, a fresh treaty was concluded with the king of Prussia on the 9th of November 1759,

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the fourth article of which, after renewing our subsidy of '670,000 l. a year, is as follows :

“Their high contracting parties moreover engage, viz. on the one part of his Britannic majesty, both as king and as elector ; and on the other part his Prussian majesty, not to conclude any treaty of peace, truce, or neutrality, or any other convention whatsoever, with the powers who have taken part in the present war, but in concert, and by mutual consent, and expressly comprehending each other therein.”

What purpose could the renewal of this article serve while a negotiation for peace was proposed, but to continue, if not to perpetuate, the war. On the one hand, we knew his Prussian majesty wrote to his late Britannic majesty, in terms not very respectful, even upon a surmise of a neutrality for Hanover. We knew that he would stick close by the above words of the fourth article of the convention, and leave nothing either to chance or our management ; so that, in fact, by this renewed

ed convention, war or peace did not depend upon our but upon his pleasure. I cannot place this situation in a stronger light, than by supposing that this article had been omitted, as it undoubtedly ought to have been, considering the vast alteration of affairs out of the renewed convention. What must have been the consequence? None; but that Great Britain would have been left at liberty to have acted for her own interest, and perhaps much more for the interest of his Prussian majesty than she is enabled to do at present.

Instead of that, it appears by the answer which the king of Prussia sent to the French king's father-in-law, king Stanislaus, when he offered his capital of Nancy for the place of congress, "that we had not ventured to take a single step without his leave." This answer is dated from Freyburg, February 8, 1760, and contains in substance, that the courts of Vienna and Russia had refused to come into the measures which the king of England and he himself

himself had proposed to them. Here is not a single word of France having refused; "but," continues his Prussian majesty, "it is likely that they will draw the king of France into the continuance of the war; the advantages of which they alone expect to reap." This, we may reasonably presume, France was as sensible of as his Prussian majesty; and it was the very strongest inducement for her to have agreed with us upon just and equitable terms, which, besides the effusion of blood, would have saved us at least ten millions of money, for I cannot estimate our useless campaigns in Germany of seventeen hundred and sixty, and seventeen hundred and sixty-one, at less.

But to make all the concessions that the right honourable gentleman and his friends can require, let us suppose the fourth article of the renewed convention of the 9th of November, 1759, to have been omitted; what must have been the consequence? We were by that time become not only the allies, but the protec-

tors of his Prussian majesty. Was not the British nation to be trusted with its own interests? Why should we be guided in Prussian trammels, or in Prussian leading-strings? It is absurd to think, supposing we had made a separate peace with France, we either would or could have sacrificed the king of Prussia. Far from that, it was our interest to preserve him, and in him the Protestant cause in Germany. A peace between Great Britain and France must have left us at liberty to have served him so effectually, as I have already observed, that the two empresses would have had neither the stomach nor the means to have continued the war.

But, in fact, the alternate stipulation I have quoted is, perhaps, unprecedented in history. His Prussian majesty binds Great Britain,—to do what? Not to make peace with those powers she is already at peace with; for I know no war now subsisting between Great Britain and either of the empresses, or the crowns either of Poland or Sweden. This, I say, is an unprece-

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dedented measure, and perhaps irreconcilable to common sense ; tho' it is plain his Prussian majesty made it binding upon us. But, what has been thrown into the scale of Great Britain, to counter-balance this incredible concession. Why, that the king of Prussia shall not, without our consent, make a separate peace with any of the belligerent powers ! Would to God, in the present situation of things, that it was in his power to do do it ? Happy would it be for Britain. Hanover would soon then be out of danger, and we might avoid the evils of the most widely diffused, and the most expensive war that this or any other nation ever was engaged in.

Thus far, my Lord, I think it is evident beyond all contradiction, that the mutuality of the fourth article in the convention of November 9, 1759, has been of terrible consequences to this country, and that it is high time for Great Britain to close the scene of war. Perhaps some reasons of a different nature from any I have
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have yet mentioned, may make a solid, honourable, and an advantageous peace, still more desirable. We have had, for some years past, an army of the finest troops the sun ever saw, serving under a foreign prince, and in what we may call a foreign quarrel. To the amazement of England, and I may say of Europe, after Broglio had taken the field with one hundred thousand men, when the count de St. Germain commanded a separate army upon the Rhine, six regiments of English foot were sent to Germany, under the command of major-general Griffin, and were followed by Elliot's light-horse; so that, at the beginning of the campaign of 1759, we had in Germany twelve regiments of heavy and one of light-horse, twelve regiments of foot, and two battalions of Highlanders; and, in the course of the campaign, we had no fewer than twenty-five thousand British troops, serving in the fields of Germany, while those of England were in danger of lying waste for want of cultivation; for in propor-

tion, as hands were sent abroad, the evacuations were supplied by militia, who, after being embodied, are to all intents and purposes, as regular troops, and under as strict military discipline as those which form, what we call, our standing army.

Since the ridiculous flaunting expeditions two hundred years ago, under Henry VIII. into France, such a numerous body of British troops never has served upon the continent. But, my Lord, how have they been rewarded? By being taken at their word; by having the post of honour assigned to them. But why? because it was the post of danger. If a desperate attack was to be made; if an untenable pass was to be defended; if a fatiguing march was to be undertaken, all, all, was to be thrown upon the English. If any remonstrances, however, dutiful were made, the answer was ready: "I was unwilling to disoblige you; you desired to have the post of honour, and you have had it; it is due to your valour." Thus, under the colour of having the post of honour,

nour, two or three campaigns passed, in which the British troops were exposed to all the fury and superior number of the enemies. Of this the battle of Felinghausen is a flagrant and a recent proof. The English general was to support himself the best way he could against three times the number of those he commanded, for above twelve hours, until his brave allies found leisure to come to his assistance, which, by the bye, they seem never to have done.

I mention those things, my Lord, not because I think the war is unfortunate, but because I think we are unfortunate in being at war upon the continent of Europe. Our successes in all other places, joined to the magnanimity of his late and present majesty, in exposing Hanover to all the fury of its enemies, rather than conclude an inglorious peace for Great Britain, have, by this time, awakened the French out of their favourite dreams of obtaining any thing from Great Britain, if they demand it by the way of Germany, and that
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too, sword in hand. If therefore we can, with honour, and without hurting our interest, as I apprehend we easily can, (unless our notions of honour are romantic, and those of our interest extravagant) make a peace with France, there never can a juncture exist hereafter, that will call upon us to engage in a continental war. I do not mean by this, that Great Britain is never to have any concern in the affairs of the continent. That would be as irrational as her having too great a concern in them; but I must be of opinion, that she never can have a call upon her for the same ruinous connections with it that she has at present.

I now, my Lord, come to the third proposition I laid down, which was, That a pacific system can receive no manner of shock by the resignation of the right honourable gentleman, who, a few days ago, gave up the seals of his office. We have been *hurt*; we are not *ruined* by the present war; and if we stop at this very crisis, all may yet be recovered. Peace is naturally

naturally the favourite system of a minister ; though the right honourable gentleman is the second minister within these twenty years who has risen into power by war. But to use the words of the poet :

“ ——— ’Tis an impious greatness,

“ And mixt with too much horror to be
envied.”

The milder virtues of civil life are easily cultivated, and more generally understood. The honourable gentleman and his friends themselves cannot, and will not deny, that a continental war is a misfortune to this country. The landed interest feels it severely, and all ranks and degrees amongst us endure it patiently, only because *as matters have been managed*, it is become a necessary evil ; an evil that is not the less lamented, because bravely supported ; and an evil, supported by that spirit of loyalty and patriotism, not to be paralleled in all the preceding annals of British history. Very few arguments, my Lord, therefore will suffice to prove
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the truth of my third proposition. The people of England, even at this time, a little resemble the case of Sancha Patchá, and his master: they think their patriot minister the best, the wisest, and the most upright servant any king or nation ever had yet; yet, sometimes they know not what to make of him; and they wish his conduct were a little more reconcileable to their plain capacities. Some late incidents have helped to encrease their perplexities.

His Most Catholic Majesty, as is natural for every prince who has the means of doing it, is putting his marine upon a respectable footing. The situation of his affairs with those of his son and brother in Italy, and the formidable preparations of the Turks, said to be designed against Malta, which is a kind of bulwark to his dominions, might very well account for all the preparations he is making. The people of England, plain and uninform'd as they are, had no manner of apprehension that his Catholic majesty intended,
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that his naval armaments should take part with France against Great Britain. Common sense told them, that the Spaniards in a war with England had every thing to fear, and nothing to hope for; and that England could maintain a war against both the crowns with as little expence as she is at with one. In short, they thought that a Spanish war was too good news to be true, provided the Spaniards themselves fought for it. On the other hand, there was not, and I believe is not, a man of common sense in England, who thinks it would be right for us to promote such a war; and that while Spain gives us no offence, we must be little better than pirates should we give her any.

But there was a time, viz. in the year 1718, when Great-Britain, without any formal declaration of war, destroyed the whole marine of Spain; and therefore nothing is to serve us, but to send a young nobleman of spirit in the double character of plenipotentiary and admiral, or commodore, to demand from them a categorical

gorical answer as to the destination of their armaments; and upon that not proving satisfactory, to sink, burn, and destroy.

That Sir George Byng, in that year, did as is said above, is admitted; but how different are the junctures? Great-Britain was then guarantee for the emperor's dominions in Italy; and, while his imperial majesty was engaged in a bloody war against the Turks, the Spaniards in a most ungenerous manner endeavoured to deprive him of the island of Sardinia. The British court had employed all manner of pacific means to obtain from that of Madrid a suspension of arms, but to no purpose; and their admiral was instructed to sail to the Mediterranean, and, if possible, to prevent any further breach of the neutrality of Italy; but, if possible, to avoid coming to hostilities. Every one knows what followed: according to our accounts, the Spaniards were not only intractable, but were the aggressors. The
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consequence was, that their fleet was destroyed.

How different are the circumstances of the two junctures. His catholic majesty has but lately mounted that throne ; he is applying himself to the arts of peace ; he is endeavouring both to cultivate and protect commerce ; he, as well as his predecessor, has hitherto maintained the most irreproachable neutrality in the present war between us and France ; (for I mind not the unauthenticated suggestions in news-papers) and the interests of his people point out the friendship of Great-Britain, as the surest means of their happiness and safety. His catholic majesty himself, sensible of this, and at the same time, not ignorant of the effects of popular reports in this country, shews dispositions for continuing and strengthening the peace between us, and orders his ministers to give the strongest assurances to our ambassador for that purpose. In what a light must we appear to all Europe ; in what a light, my Lord, must we ap-

pear to ourselves, should we wantonly provoke such an ally ?

This being the case, what has this nation to apprehend from the honourable gentleman's resignation ? Will France, will the empress queen, will any of the other belligerent powers, take it amiss ? it would be ridiculous to imagine that they will. Will his Prussian majesty object to it ? Not if he mistakes not his own interest ; and no man understands it better ; for humanly speaking, it is peace alone that can re-instate his affairs, secure what he possesses, and recover what he has lost. Will the people of England take this resignation amiss ? No ; not if they are properly informed. It has been attended with the highest marks of royal favour towards the resignee ; which have been respectfully accepted. And, I believe, there is scarcely a man in England, who does not think, that the right honourable gentleman resigned, only because a great majority at a certain board differ from him as to the manner of making

making peace ; for I must be of opinion that war itself is one manner of making peace. The people of England are too rational to think that any subject is vested with infallibility, and that his majesty and his council have not a right to the use of their own senses. Give me leave to add, that notwithstanding all the vapouring and blustering in our papers, and other publications, the people of England in general are heartily tired of the war, and will be extremely glad to sit quietly down, under such a peace, as it is, even at this time, in our power to command. None clamour for the continuance of war, but those who gain by it, and who, like the coasters in Cornwall and Shetland, subsist upon storms and shipwrecks. Honesty and industry, that is, such part of the subjects as pay the taxes, through which the war is continued, devoutly wish for the return of peace ; and never was the happiness of any state permanent when the welfare of such was not consulted. Mean while, I
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am not to be understood as if the nation was disposed to accept of a dishonourable peace. Heavy as the expence, and cruel as the devastations of war are, I never heard a Briton throw out the smallest expression tending that way, but was rather for continuing the war, than for accepting of such a peace.

But, my Lord, the right honourable gentleman and his friends may possibly differ from others, about the manner of continuing the war. Supposing France, contrary to all truth and probability, should insist on our accepting terms dishonourable for us, the war must then continue; but is there a necessity for its being an offensive war? Are we to continue to multiply our expences, perhaps to double them, under the delusive prospect of future expeditions, the success of which is precarious, and may be abortive? Are we to keep up the complement of our army in Germany, where the sword is scarcely wanted to hasten that destruction which famine, fatigue, and

and wants of every kind is daily precipitating? There is another consideration, perhaps more important than all: That the power of Great-Britain is at present higher than ever was known, shall not be disputed; but, my Lord, the greatness of any people never was known to be permanent but through the moderate use of power. A people, who shall indulge a wanton spirit of conquest, renders all other nations jealous of them, a misfortune which a trading people, of all others, ought chiefly to avoid. Commerce subsists by intercourse, and intercourse by friendship. There is a point of greatness, that a wise government will not wish to exceed. Hitherto our conquests have been such as to give no just umbrage to the other powers of Europe; but who can answer for the consequences, should we reject terms of accommodation that every other power in Europe may think to be just and honourable. I speak not this, as if I imagined that the marine of Great-Britain is not at present a

match for that of all Europe combined ; I think it is, but I think at the same time, that by such a combination our commerce may suffer in its most sensible parts ; and will still go farther, and say, that the moment we declare ourselves the Draw-cansirs of Europe, such a combination will take place. Upon the whole, my Lord, therefore, justice and moderation at such a period as this, will do more for the honour and interest of this kingdom, than the most commanding genius, and the most refined abilities. If the right honourable gentleman's resignation of the seals has removed from his majesty's councils all temper and equity, we are certainly in a dangerous way. But if there are still to be found at that board, men of candour and integrity, of practicable abilities, and upright intentions, I must be of opinion, in the words of my third proposition, That a pacific system can receive no shock either at home or abroad by that resignation, or twenty such.

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My fourth proposition, my Lord, is, That the same right honourable gentleman and his friends, whose patriotism and disinterested attachment to their country cannot be questioned, will and must, in consistence with that character, co-operate in the same good work, whether he or they are in or out of place, as they cannot be suspected of distressing his majesty's measures, even supposing them not to be their own.

This proposition does not require to be illustrated, for the information or conviction of the right honourable gentleman, or any of his friends in parliament, but for the sake of others without doors, who, for want of opportunity of knowing better, may think the honourable gentleman hardly treated, and therefore may disturb that unanimity without doors, that is so conspicuous at present. In the days of party bondage, when the people of England were ground between the two mill-stones of Whiggery and Toryism; while they were wedged in between

noise and nonsense ; when all regard was held to men, and none to measures, the most uninformed subject in the kingdom could tell the fate of every question brought into parliament, let him know but the name of the person who brought it in, and the numbers by which it was lost or carried. After those destructive sounds of *whig* and *tory* began to lose their magical force, another distinction more plausible, but equally unmeaning, took place ; I mean that of court and country ; and the right honourable gentleman and his friends enlisted themselves under the banners of the latter, which they advanced in so many wordy combats, that they were at last worn to tatters, and most ungratefully thrown aside ; for the moment that the right honourable gentleman and his friends came into power, I mean, directive power, all distinctions were abolished, and court and country became the same.

The juncture is so recent, and the facts so well known, that it would be superfluous

fluous to put either your lordship, or them, in mind of what followed ; but because many without doors may either have forgot, or never known them, I shall but just mention some particulars, to the honour of that part of the administration, which, till that time, had generally been distinguished by the name of the court party. The right honourable gentleman and his friends may well remember the clamour raised without doors on account of our disgraces in the Mediterranean, and the infinite advantages they promised themselves from their enquiry into the causes of the loss of Minorca. The public were taught to believe that such scenes of corruption, cowardice, and mismanagement, would be discovered, during the course of that enquiry, as would overwhelm the ministry, or what we may call the court-party, with shame and confusion, and disable them from ever again recovering the smallest credit, either with his majesty or the people. The ministry, conscious of their inno-

cence, to their credit be it spoken, dared their enemies to do their worst ; brought the only culpable person to justice, against all the efforts of the right honourable gentleman and his friends, to divert, or, at least, to protract his fate, and stood the fiery trial of the enquiry, from which they came out more pure than before. Notwithstanding all this, irreproachable as their conduct was found to be, so loud was the popular clamour which had been artfully and wickedly raised against them, that they did not think themselves capable of doing his majesty the service they could wish to do in their several stations, and they were the first who solicited his majesty to fill them with persons who were, *at that time*, more agreeable to his people. Those resignations took place ; but I remember no pension that was entailed upon them, though one noble d—e who then resigned, was the oldest minister his majesty had, and had served him and his family in so generous, so disinterested a manner, that it was reasonably

ably to be supposed a pension could be no disagreeable appenage to his retirement from public business.

The merit of those resignations were the greater, as it was well known that the resignees, had they pleased, might have continued in power. Yet this merit, great as it was, was not comparable to that of never once opposing the measures of the new ministry, tho' they might have done it with the fullest effect. Even personal resentments were dropt in their zeal for the public service, and sacrificed to the unanimity which, in the beginning of a war, they considered as the great basis of his majesty's glory, and the credit of the public. Whatever difference of opinions might have been in the council, or the cabinet, none appeared in parliament, or to the public; and it was hard to say, whether the old or the new ministry were the most ready in forwarding his majesty's measures. A conduct so moderate, so self-denied to all resentment, so superior to all views but those of serving the public,

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lic, was perhaps the greatest, if not the first, example of true patriotism ever exhibited in this country. It was, in fact, that which laid the foundation of that unanimity, in which his majesty so justly gloried in the first speech he made to his parliament.

Are we then to suppose that a *party* (I will avoid the hated word *faction*) raised to power upon comprehensive, because constitutional, principles, established upon the maxims of public unanimity, will not follow the glorious precedent that was set them by those whom they had no reason to think were their private friends. Should his majesty and his council think proper to conclude a peace, which shall appear to them to be solid, honourable, and advantageous to this country, can we imagine that such a set of men would overcast the auspicious dawn of his reign with the clouds of dissatisfaction, discontent, and opposition. Will they revive the national reproach of discord, the extinction of which his majesty has told us he looks upon

upon to be his greatest glory, by opposing in parliament what has been agreed upon in council ? This, my Lord, would be reviving the most pestilential qualities of party-spirit. The game of Whigs and Tories, when they happened to be out of power, was no other. Under the plausible, but at last, exploded pretext of public welfare, they rendered the crown contemptible, by thwarting, in parliament, the best concerted measures of the cabinet ; and thus each party, in their turns, encreased the public difficulties or distresses.

Supposing his majesty and his administration should think proper to close the scene of blood, and to withdraw our troops from their shambles in Germany ; can we imagine that any set of men will stand up and say, We must have more slaughter ; Great Britain is not yet sufficiently exhausted ; a more plentiful effusion of blood will do her service ? Supposing a defensive war to be concluded upon, and that it is resolved to turn the
tables

tables upon France, and oblige her either to give us reasonable terms, or to act in America the same expensive part that we have done since the commencement of this war : Should this be the determination, can we imagine any set of men to be so abandoned as to say in parliament, You are too rich ; your manufactures are too flourishing ; have at all, or nothing ; never give over your offensive war, while France has a foot of land in America or the East Indies ; and put all the powers of Europe, friends as well as foes, to defiance ? Should his majesty fall upon the means of averting the impending danger of Hanover, and of indemnifying his Prussian majesty, for withdrawing our troops from Germany, can any objection be raised to such measures, but such as must proceed from malignant dispositions, and impotent resentment ?

We must therefore, my Lord, if we reason consistently with common sense, conclude, that the right honourable gentleman and his friends never will forfeit the

venerable appellation of patriots, by attempting either to renew or to continue the distresses of their country? If ever unanimity was necessary to a nation, it is to us at this juncture; and the first man who attempts to break it in parliament ought to be considered as a public enemy to his country. Great Britain has nothing to fear but from disunion; and if we keep sight of our interests with the smallest portion of common sense, no such disunion can now happen. The right honourable gentleman having resigned his *post* is no argument of his having lost his *power* or influence in his majesty's councils. A minister so well-intentioned, as all the nation pronounces him to be, never will withdraw, out of post, the same assistances he would have given to government had he been in post. Should he ever be over-ruled at a certain board, he will think that the breach of national unanimity is a far greater evil than his submitting to the opinions of others ever can prove; and no private resentment,

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ment, either of his own, or of his friends, will ever influence his public conduct. The generous mark of regard which his majesty has bestowed upon him for his past conduct, claims his future services. If his majesty had not even conferred that recompence upon him, yet a patriot will always be ready in the service of his master and his country, whether he is a minister or a private person.

Thus, my Lord, I have endeavoured to obviate every possible apprehension that can be raised in the minds of the people, either in their collective or representative capacity, at this important crisis. The alteration this interesting resignation may produce, can, in fact, be attended with no bad consequences, but from the ferment that it may occasion in the minds of those who are well intentioned, and who may be worked upon by the art and insinuations of those who are enemies to this country. To obviate those consequences is the well-meaning design of this address. When the people of England recovers a
surprise,

surprise, or a consternation, they are the most reasonable people on the face of the earth.

I own, in the mean time, my Lord, that I had another view in this address, which was, to second the wishes of the people, which undoubtedly are for peace, without our insisting upon our romantic inadmissible terms ; and to let them know, that the resignation of one minister, be his abilities, his station, and his popularity ever so great, never can, or at least never ought, in the present juncture of unanimity, distress the measures of a prince beloved by his people, or a people trusted by their prince.

I have the honour to be,

My LORD,

Your lordship's most obedient

Humble servant.

