



STATEMENTS AND SPEECHES

INFORMATION DIVISION
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OTTAWA - CANADA

No. 58/42 PEACEMAKING: FISSION AND FUSION

Second lecture in the Henry Marshall Tory Lectures
Delivered by Mr. Sidney E. Smith, Secretary of State
for External Affairs, University of Alberta,
Edmonton, Alberta, October 29, 1958.

Since this evening I shall be speaking to a much larger audience (I should like to believe that it is not an entirely new one) than that which I had the pleasure of addressing yesterday, it would perhaps be appropriate for me to reiterate my appreciation of the honour which has been done me by the Friends of the University of Alberta in inviting me to deliver these lectures established in the memory of a great Canadian scholar, Henry Marshall Tory, whose contributions and achievements have left a permanent mark on the national life of this country. In the major concerns of Henry Marshall Tory's career - education and science - can be apprehended two of the most important forces or trends in modern thought, trends which have had a revolutionizing effect upon human life, and while I may be guilty of attempting to universalize my own immediate concerns, I nevertheless maintain that in few other spheres of human endeavour has the impact of science and education been more acutely felt than in the conduct of foreign policy.

Science and technology have brought what were once thought of as the remote four corners of the world closer together so that the contacts and, therefore, the points of friction between nations have become more numerous and more heated. More important, however are the most recent and dramatic developments of science. Man's pioneering advances into outer space are inspiring, or should inspire in our endeavours a sense of cosmic humility for it is becoming more and more evident that all of us who live on this planet enjoy, as it has been gracefully expressed "a very undistinguished location in a faint spiral arm of an ordinary galaxy". This realization might have a salutary effect on our view of ourselves as individuals, as nations and as members of the international community if it were not so closely related to those

less constructive influences which the fruits of science and technology have brought to bear more directly on our international rather than our inter-planetary relations. Science has placed in the hands of national governments sufficient power to destroy not only their adversaries, but themselves, and perhaps the totality of human life. Confronted with this terrifying possibility, the task of the peacemaker has become the more difficult and the more urgent.

I also referred last evening to the effects which increased educational opportunity in our society has had upon the conduct of international relations in our time. Where foreign policy was once regarded as the private preserve of an initiated élite, it has now become just as much a part of the life of the man in the street as any other aspect of his government's policies. Education and the relative ease with which the enquiring mind can obtain accurate information on which to base his own judgments have given to the private citizen a sense of involvement in international affairs which, in its bearing on government action in a democratic society, is really quite new in the Western political experience. As I indicated last evening in this context, it is, however, reasoned influence rather than mass pressure to which I refer.

With forces of this magnitude coming to plan upon the scene in which the work of the diplomat is carried out, it is inevitable that some changes will have been wrought in the techniques and procedures of diplomacy and with this in mind I sketched some of the changes which have, for example, come about in the role of diplomatic representatives. I also referred to the difficulties which are encountered by negotiators by reason of the fact that the change in the climate of diplomatic relations has been accompanied by a deterioration in the precision of language so that in some quarters words now mean the revers of what they pretend.

Out of the state of flux in which diplomacy has found itself in recent years, there has been emerging what I designated as the phenomenon of fusion - and I use the word in a political rather than in a scientific sense. In the altered circumstances in which we find ourselves, I attempted to point out that the pursuit of independent ends and objectives by nation states was no longer an adequate modus operandi because no one nation can, in and of itself provide an adequate response to these new international challenges. As a result there has developed a remarkable degree of co-ordination and co-operation among certain groups of nations and as an example I spoke of the work of NATO, an organization which has an important influence on the formulation of Canadian policy. Other influences I mentioned in the same context were our membership in the Commonwealth, our membership in the United Nations and our friendship with the United

States. From each and all of these we must derive encouragement, help and guidance; to each and all of them we have perhaps something unique to offer. Peacemaking in the age of fission and fusion has become indeed a complex and comprehensive undertaking.

In concluding my first lecture last evening, I pointed to some of the difficulties which governments experience or encounter in dealing with international problems of contemporary magnitude. While the wars of an earlier day were slow in getting started and relatively limited in character, it is all too clear, from contemporary forecasts of any future war, that such a war could be instantaneously devastating. In view of such a strategic assessment, the need for swift and decisive action is only too painfully evident and this, for democratic governments which are apparently slower moving, though in the long run no less effective than authoritarian ones, presents great difficulties.

A moment ago I used the phrase 'strategic assessment'. There is also the problem of political assessment which must precede strategy. I spoke of the necessity and indeed the obligation of the traditional diplomatic assignment of keeping our assessment of the international problems confronting us up to date, realistic and fresh. It is this idea which I desire to explore further in this lecture, and to describe in greater detail the international situation that confronts us at present and to make some suggestions about the way in which it might be approached.

To understand that situation, it is necessary to look back, however briefly, over the course of international affairs since the end of the war. While the countries of the West were demobilizing the large forces which they had mustered for the prosecution of the war, the Soviet Union maintained its forces almost intact, and used them as a means for fastening Soviet control on the countries of Eastern Europe, and for threatening the security of other countries around the perimeter of the Communist empire. The USSR also attempted to foment unrest in Western Europe and it made a determined effort to cut the communication links with Berlin. All these acts heightened mistrust of Soviet intentions and caused widespread apprehension. This was raised to fever pitch by the coup which extinguished the independence of Czechoslovakia.

The response of Western countries to all these provocations by which they felt themselves threatened was the formation of the North Atlantic alliance. The purpose of the alliance was to protect the member-countries from Soviet attack and to provide a shield behind which they could work out their own political and economic destinies. However, the forces at the disposal of the North Atlantic alliance in Europe would not have been so effective as they were in deterring Soviet attacks

had they not been supported by the even greater deterrent force represented by the nuclear weapons available to the United States Air Force. It was the nuclear superiority that clearly rested with the United States in the years immediately after the war that, more than any other factor, set limits to Soviet ambitions and Soviet pressure.

As we all know, however, the era of nuclear superiority was of very brief duration. The Soviet Union exploded an atomic bomb in 1949 and followed that success with the successful testing of a hydrogen bomb in 1953. The relative nuclear capabilities of the United States and the Soviet Union cannot be assessed exactly. But there can be no doubt that while the United States assuredly had the power to inflict a devastating nuclear attack on the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union for its part would also be able to launch an attack on North America which could wipe out a number of our largest cities. In these circumstances, the notion of nuclear superiority would seem to have lost most of its meaning. Instead, we would seem to have entered an era of virtual nuclear stalemate.

In general, the most urgent objective of the West during the past decade has been to provide the defensive strength and political unity that have been necessary to check the outward thrust of Soviet ambition and Soviet policy. We must still continue to keep that objective rigorously in mind. Any other course might well be suicidal in view of the ambiguous nature of Soviet intentions. But the time has come, it seems to me, when we must try to supplement the policy of containment with a more supple and soberly approach. In a situation so critical and so dangerous that any serious miscalculation might result in a holocaust to destroy not only civilization but the race itself, we cannot rest content with a policy of drawing military lines between the antagonists, necessary though that may be. We must be searching with all the patient skill and clear insight that we can command for solutions which will place a greater margin of safety between humanity and the abyss.

It is my deep conviction that we in the West can move forward in this momentous task only by a scrupulous, energetic and imaginative effort to understand the civilization which has chosen to be antithetical or even antagonistic to much of what we are and what we stand for. The immediate challenge is one of the diplomacy of the West; but in an age of informed and influential public opinion, the ultimate challenge is to our Western educational systems. For it is a fact that the so-called Iron Curtain is culturally a thousand years old, that our educational systems still limit the content of instruction to human experience west of the Elbe, and that our conventional academic disciplines, more particularly in the social sciences, have evolved primarily from a contemplation and analysis of Western society. I am not unmindful of the fact that during the

past ten years or so several of our Canadian universities have developed departments which provide for the specialized study of the humanities of Eastern Europe; but I am very conscious of how much we have yet to do in ensuring that every university graduate acquires at least some inkling of human experience and human thought in Eastern Europe during the last millennium, - to say nothing of the ancient civilizations of Asia and the Far East.

I believe that our intellectual concentration on the Roman West to the exclusion of the Byzantine East lies close to the heart of the present global - indeed, should I now say cosmic? - misunderstanding between the peoples, and so between the governments of East and West. We draw a disparaging contrast between our Western democratic tradition and an Eastern authoritarian tradition; and we forget that we have not been articulate about "democracy" for very long. We forget that all human political experience has not been Western, and Lawrence Durrell has reminded us that to understand modern Greece and Cyprus, we must make reference to the political and social customs of Byzantium. The same is true for an understanding of the U.S.S.R. Academic enquiry into the dynamic and far from simple processes which activate the Soviet body politic has really yet to begin in the West and, in these circumstances, our Western mind tends to fall back on untested assumptions and to interpret a highly complex phenomenon in crude and oversimplified terms.

What has been sadly lacking in the West, it seems to me, has been a realistic appraisal of Soviet intentions. Such an appraisal must be made in the light of our knowledge not only of Marxist theory but also of Soviet experience and Soviet action. It must also take into account the basic truth that however different the operations of the Soviet political and social system are from those to which we are accustomed, they nevertheless obey many of the same laws that regulate other human societies.

Our collective political experience in the West has taught us something of the practicalities of foreign policy; especially of how these practicalities affect the more distant aspirations of government. Our collective political experience is nothing more than the common sense of practical politics, and we in NATO and the West enjoy the bulk of the human heritage of articulate thought about this collective experience. It is this heritage that teaches us, among other things, that the intentions of governments are a function of needs, capacities and external factors, most of which lie outside their control; that most

governments are so fully occupied with urgent problems that they can rarely contemplate more distant objectives; that most governments must conduct their foreign policies with reference to immediate questions; and that the ambitions of most governments are limited by the experience of what it takes to achieve and to maintain the status of a great power. It is in the light of such knowledge that our Western mind and our Western conscience freely subject Western policy to devastating analysis. Yet why is it, as an eminent English historian recently asked, that we do not subject Soviet policy to similar examination? Why is it, indeed, that our Western mind tends, on the contrary, to proceed on the pessimistic - and in the light of our knowledge of the practicalities of foreign policy - the remarkable assumption that Soviet policy is at once consistent and successful, and, moreover, is both of these things with reference to a sustained and sinister millennial purpose?

The challenge to our Western mind is then to develop a sensible view of the Soviet achievement and a reasonable assessment of the limits of Soviet ambition as these have been delineated by practical Soviet experience. The challenge is to penetrate beneath the language with which the Soviet Government conducts its external relations, a language which owes its peculiar violence to a unique background and to a peculiar ideology, whose essential poverty seems to be increasingly manifest to the fertile and developing mind of its own people. We must penetrate beneath a sustained attitude of suspicious hostility and mistrust and focus in particular on those decisions which have actually committed blood and treasure to the enterprise in hand. In this way, by shrewd interrogation of the evidence on practicalities, we will be able, I think, to enlarge our understanding of the Soviet challenge to the West. If we are to eliminate misconceptions, we must concentrate neither on the morality nor on the integrity of Soviet conduct, but rather on understanding, for we cannot cope positively with a global antagonist by despising him and sending him to Coventry. What is more, we incur increasing risks if we fail to place a reasonable construction on his probable aims. I therefore suggest that we in the West should re-examine the record of Soviet conduct and ask certain questions of the evidence which, for the most part, we have so far failed to pose.

In the very preliminary and tentative appraisal of Soviet intentions, that I wish to make this evening, I should like to ask you to consider the evidence provided by the use that has been made of Marxist ideology; by the part that has been played by the international communist movement; by Soviet diplomacy; and by Soviet attitudes towards international law.

First of all, I invite you to consider what has been the fate of the Marxist ideology in Soviet Russian hands, and the note that no one in the West has yet attempted a definitive answer to this question. I would suggest that while the basic doctrine has not altered, the assumptions which have underlain the Soviet approach to the West have been subject to considerable erosion. Ever since Lenin and Stalin deduced from Marxism that an attack on the U.S.S.R. was inevitable and switched the focus of official concern to national security, no one has restored the doctrinal primacy of world revolution. Since 1934, no Soviet leader has publicly spoken of the imminence of world revolution, and it was completely ignored in Stalin's last will and testament of 1952. Since 1939, even the achievement of Marxist communism at home has been indefinitely postponed, and Khrushchev has reduced this to the concrete goal of catching up with the West in output per head. When the communist parties of the world met in Moscow a year ago they proclaimed their unity in the cause of peace; and the idea of revolution, illogically confined to the parties of the communist bloc, was merely used to argue the need for party unity and the supremacy in their respective states.

Whereas Stalin left it to the zealous to infer that world revolution would somehow be the consequence of the successful advance of the Soviet Union, Malenkov openly recognized that nothing would survive a nuclear war, and although Khrushchev had to discredit him in order to preserve the rationale of his party, he too has demolished the Leninist prediction of inevitable war by telling his people that they are now secure from attack and by asserting that the notion of capitalist encirclement must be reconsidered. It is only now that Russian thought - several centuries after Western thought - is beginning to be secularized and to be separated from Marxist idolatry. Many intelligent Russians recognize that the only element of the Marxist prophecy which has been realized in the U.S.S.R. is the nationalization of ownership and they themselves have protested against the grosser forms of statism which have developed. More and more they are coming to realize that the pursuit of a Utopia is nothing more than the belief in material progress, a belief which they now consciously share not only with the West, but with all the less developed peoples of the world.

Nor have we in the West yet subjected the Soviet use of the international communist movement to searching analysis. Yet it is surely clear that this movement has long been exploited, not for the extension of communism or Soviet power, but for the immediate purposes of the Soviet state - to combat Fascism, to expose what they call the predatory United States, to break up NATO, to weaken Western influence in the less developed areas, and to promote schemes of partial disarmament that would be in the interest of the Soviet Union.

A movement which, in theory should have been informed with a militant, messianic vision has been reduced in Soviet hands to a protest movement with a protest ideology. The U.S.S.R. has used an increasingly conventional foreign service for critical matters and has been little indebted to the international Communist movement for such diplomatic successes as it has had. The Comintern had outlived its usefulness by twelve years when it was abolished in 1943. Its successor in 1947, the Cominform, was a hasty riposte to the Marshall Plan, and not all of the bloc countries have yet agreed to support an international journal, which even bears in its title the more modest term "socialism" rather than "communism". The Communist parties throughout the world have followed the Communist party in the Soviet Union in regularly thinning their membership; and the Soviet preference for controlling minorities rather than for proselytizing majorities suggests a preoccupation with purposes more immediate than the extension of Soviet influence. Whereas Stalin was vague about the circumstances in which he would commit the Red Army to further revolution in other countries, Khrushchev has gone so far as to seek a rapprochement with Yugoslavia, and by asking the West to recognize the status quo and offering a non-aggression pact, would seem to have formally renounced any obligation to use the Soviet forces to expand communism, at least in Western Europe. If we may suspect that Stalin found the international communist movement of relatively little use, Khrushchev sometimes gives the impression that he might prefer to get rid of it altogether.

Let me turn now to the record of Soviet diplomacy. The official Soviet view of the international situation has been formulated at fifteen party congresses since 1917, and this view has implied one abiding objective for Soviet diplomacy - the security of the Soviet state. The pattern begins in 1920 when Soviet representatives began to serve specific and conventional goals; to postpone the inevitable Western attack, to break out of isolation, and to accelerate national recovery by extending diplomatic and commercial links. By 1929 the Litvinov Protocol had temporarily solved the problem of the Western border by joining the U.S.S.R. and its immediate neighbours in a non-aggression pact. In the '30s the formula was collective security against Fascism. But the diplomatic failure to contain Germany led to a pact with Hitler and to absorption of the Baltic states and much of Poland; i.e. to strategic action to organize the Western border defences which was typical of a desperate regime accustomed to total solutions to crucial problems. If Moscow had hopes of extending its power beyond Germany in the Second World War, these do not seem to have conditioned its strategic thinking. Unless we can believe that Moscow would be pleased by the prospect of a communist

Germany, then we must conclude that since 1941 it has never foreseen any formula other than partition. The U.S.S.R. used the war to attempt a total solution to her Western border which had been vulnerable for ten centuries, and applied a similar formula in the Far East, although it was content to leave Manchuria to the Chinese communists. Since 1945, the U.S.S.R. has steadily tried to secure the removal of Western power from the vicinity of its borders; but it has failed to remove the West from Berlin and from Korea, and it has had to measure the failure of its propaganda campaign of thirteen years to secure the withdrawal of troops from foreign bases by the proportionate multiplication of Western bases around the Soviet periphery.

The successors to Stalin have retained his security objectives but they have been compelled to reduce the costs and dangers of his policy and to try to reduce international tension. While the real thrust of their policy has until recently fallen in Europe, they have lately sought a share in high council on the Middle East and they have sought to secure a respectable global presence for the Soviet state by extending their commercial links. Excessive and unco-ordinated industrialization in the bloc and the gradual sophistication of the thinking of the economists and administrators who must make the Soviet economy work have both tended to sharpen the need for the U.S.S.R. to expand its commercial links with the outside world. Moscow can not have it both ways. It cannot seek to multiply its long-term commercial links with the non-communist world and, at the same time, ensure stability at home and foment chaos and collapse abroad. Under the impact of reality, the official rationalization of trade with the non-communist world has become less and less Marxist, and the party is under pressure to reconcile its formal view of the prospects for Western capitalism with the assumptions underlying the actual policy of the Soviet state. In this respect it is confronted by a mounting dilemma.

The Soviet attitude towards international law must also have implications for the Western assessment of Soviet external ambitions. The U.S.S.R. has never repudiated the principles of international law; indeed during the past twenty years Soviet jurists have unceasingly concentrated on the implications of existing law for the immediate external problems of the Soviet state. The Soviet approach to international law is ultimately shaped by expediency and is increasingly conservative. Its most troublesome characteristic is a pathological obsession with sovereignty and the Soviet insistence on an absolute attitude to this question, which delays international agreement and prevents it from exercising a maximum influence in international organizations, indicates the degree to which the Soviet regime is nervously preoccupied with problems which are defensive and domestic in character. Acceptance of the principles of international law, adherence to the major conventions for the prevention of war, and a steady appeal to the law to indict an antagonist and to justify itself, all these mean that

the U.S.S.R. has multiplied the formal legal obstacles in the paths along which it should be moving according to Marxist doctrine. This may not be inconsistent with the classical Marxist ethic, but is it practical policy on the part of a government which entertains unlimited ambitions?

This tentative appraisal of some of the evidence available to throw light on Soviet intentions suggests to my mind that we must enquire how far actual Soviet policy has been a response to concrete problems, as these have appeared to Moscow, rather than simply a manifestation of a Marxist initiative, how far the interplay of power politics has monopolized Soviet energies, how far Soviet attention has really been directed downward to what H.A.L. Fisher has called the urgent, the contingent and the unique, rather than upward toward a distant and ambitious future, how far the unlimited ambitions of 1917 have been adjusted to reality? It would seem that the Soviet regime has found that its domestic political formula has been too crude to control a developing population. In a parallel field, we must ask how far a nation which began life by destroying, exiling and renouncing all of the slender experience in foreign affairs which had been painfully accumulated under the Czars has begun to recognize the inadequacy of its political formula abroad, and to learn the lessons of practical politics on a global scale.

One possible interpretation would seem to be that the present Soviet leadership is a group of men who have learned that they must modify the implications of their inherited hostility to the West, but who cannot formally deny the faith and yet preserve the present political structure of the U.S.S.R., and who having harped incessantly on the contradictions they claim to be inherent in Western society, now find themselves involved in plentiful contradiction of their own.

As the U.S.S.R. has acquired power, it has tried to emerge from isolation. In so doing, it has found that hostility to the West, which was relatively facile in isolation, is vastly more difficult in the complexity of world politics. It has also found that the contradictions between the logic of power and Marxist theory have increased. Moscow cannot indefinitely stifle nationalism within the bloc and support it in Asia. A nation with thirty million Moslems cannot encourage an Arab renaissance without complicating her position in the Middle East, if not without incurring risks to her national security. Moscow cannot export commodity surpluses without impoverishing those whom she is trying to woo, and without forcing the West to close markets which she needs to penetrate. Moscow cannot maintain an arms race and still grant its people the long-delayed promise of a decent life. Moscow cannot seek long-term commercial links with the external world and still isolate her economy from the depressions in other countries which her ideology commands her

to foment. Moscow cannot develop such links and still isolate her planning procedures and her pricing policy from the eroding influence of a Western world which is far less statist than her own. A capital-poor country cannot endlessly export producer goods without developing an interest in ensuring a return on the investment and, therefore, an interest in stability. I repeat, the Soviet political formula has already proved to be too crude at home. Moscow may be beginning to learn how crude this formula has been abroad.

I have been trying, as fairly and accurately as I can, to present the evidence from a number of different fields that seems to be relevant to an appraisal of Soviet external intentions. As I have suggested, I can see real grounds for optimism in the evidence. But it is important to avoid drawing too large conclusions from such grounds for hope as may be detected. It would be folly to forget the Soviet incursions into Iran immediately after the war, or the brutal extinction of the independence of Czechoslovakia, or the support given to the attack on Korea, or the savage repression of the revolt in Hungary. Above all it would be folly to ignore that if we in the West were to let down our guard, the Soviet Union has it in its power to destroy us. Nor do I know of any evidence to suggest that the present Soviet leaders would hesitate to use any means, including force, to extend the area of Soviet influence and control if that could be done with impunity. On the other hand, the evidence does suggest that they would not be inhibited by the absolutism of Marxist doctrine from adjusting their ambitions and their policy to developing reality.

I must insist, however, that part of that reality is formed by the determination that the West has shown to defend itself and to maintain a military power to deter Soviet aggression. We will not be shaken by any blandishments or by any terror from continuing to contribute to that deterrent power, since we know that in it lies the key to our own security. Today the deterrent power of the West is composed principally of the long-range bombers armed with nuclear weapons which are at the disposal of the United States Strategic Air Command. It is essential, however, that the crucial force be supplemented by an effective air defence throughout North America; and it is for that reason that we in Canada are being called upon to strengthen the defensive system on Canadian soil by installing new means of detecting hostile aircraft, new weapons to bring them down, and a complicated ground environment to ensure that warnings are quickly gathered and interpreted and that orders are quickly transmitted. In a very few years the problem of deterrence may change radically with the advent of the inter-continental ballistic missile. That this will require a new defensive system and new defence expenditures, I have no doubt. But equally, I have no doubt, that Canadians will want to play their part in adjusting the air defence of North America to these new circumstances in order to maintain an effective deterrent against Soviet aggression.

I am also certain that Canadians will not be tempted by changing circumstances to falter in their allegiance to, and support for, the North Atlantic alliance. The alliance was created almost ten years ago to meet a military threat. Since then the threat has undergone several mutations, but it has by no means disappeared; and the unity of the countries banded together in the North Atlantic alliance is as much needed today to counter the threat as it ever was. Moreover, the Treaty is based on a genuine community of interest and historical background. To believe that the way of life which has spread from the maritime fringe of Northwest Europe is the best political arrangement which man has yet devised is no sentimental or historical delusion but a matter of hard common sense and practical politics; and if we believe this, then it behoves us not only to preserve but to enlarge our concept of Western unity and purpose. This task has taken on new importance as the new flexibility in Soviet policy since the death of Stalin has led to a greater emphasis on political and economic activity rather than on the military threat which, to a high degree, was responsible for the creation of the alliance.

I have been particularly encouraged in recent months by the great growth of political consultation within the North Atlantic Council. I do not conceal from you that political consultation in NATO has not always been either so constant or so detailed as we would wish. The absence of consultation at the time of the Suez crisis was a severe setback to the developing cohesion of the alliance. It was also a cause of regret to us that the rapid development of events in the Middle East a few months ago did not permit detailed consultation in NATO before the despatch of forces to Lebanon and Jordan. On the other hand, however, ever since the launching from Moscow last November of the first of a series of long distance notes, there have been the most detailed and constructive discussions within NATO on all those aspects of East-West relations that might be discussed at a summit meeting.

In six weeks or so a meeting will take place in Paris at which Ministers from the fifteen NATO countries will examine the state of the alliance, and will exchange views on the international situation. Our deliberations will not be limited to the military situation, though that, of course, will form an important part of them. We will be discussing the developments in various parts of the world where international tension is most acute. In preparation for this meeting discussions are currently being held among the Permanent Representatives of the NATO Governments in Paris on these same questions. Indeed, these discussions proceed without interruption in the NATO forum and they are having the effect of deepening and broadening the basis of co-operation among the countries of the West.

Yet it is undeniable that the world situation has changed radically since the North Atlantic Treaty was negotiated. A global nuclear war would not be so destructive that no man in his senses could regard it as a continuation of policy. Indeed, it would be a final apocalypse rather than another chapter in a continuing story. I have described the world as now having entered an era of virtual nuclear stalemate. When both sides have the power of inflicting appalling damage on the other, it is perhaps improbable that either of the great antagonists will be willing to run the risk of precipitating a general war. But the present equation of mutual terror is highly precarious. A miscalculation could upset it. A local war could spread to engulf it. In such circumstances, it seems to me that the diplomacy of the West must now be looking far beyond the urgent objectives of the past decade, beyond the provision of defensive strength and unity, for some positive policy which will supplement all that we have understood by "containment", for some accommodation with the Soviet Union which will introduce a measure of stability into a highly precarious international situation. The defensive strength that we have now amassed suggests to my mind that we can safely embark on such a search, so long as we keep our wits about us and continue to test every proposal against the touchstone of our vital security interests. And the assessment that I have made of Soviet intentions suggests that such an effort would not be fore-doomed to failure, since, while there can be no doubt of the rooted animosity of the Soviets towards us, the evidence would seem to indicate that they are not so deluded by Marxist doctrine as to be incapable of adjusting to the realities of the nuclear age.

Such an accommodation with the Soviet Union would necessarily include some degree of disarmament. Here I am glad to be able to report that some modest progress is already being made. In the summer of 1957 we joined with our principal allies in submitting a linked set of disarmament proposals to the Soviet Union. We still believe that those proposals are fair and reasonable, and would constitute a sound basis for disarmament negotiations. But we were never so wedded to them as to rule out consideration of alternative approaches. We made it clear that if some modification of them seemed likely to open up a more helpful avenue of negotiation, without imperilling our own security, we would certainly be prepared to adopt a different procedure. If, in particular, it seemed that progress might be made more readily by unwrapping the package proposal which we had joined in presenting a little more than a year ago, and by attempting to reach agreement separately on some of its components, we would be prepared to consider whether that course could not be safely followed.

In fact, it has been along such lines that progress has been made in disarmament discussions during the past few months. Earlier this fall agreement was reached at a meeting

in Geneva at the technical level on methods for supervising a cessation of nuclear tests. This technical achievement is to be followed by a further meeting in Geneva at the political level which will endeavour to reach agreement on the cessation of tests and on how it might be monitored and supervised. All this has been in accordance with a declaration by the Right Honourable Mr. Diefenbaker last April when he said: "My hope is that the nations of the free world will announce in the immediate future their desire and willingness to discontinue nuclear tests except for the application of known explosive techniques to peaceful purposes, provided that there is suitable international supervision."

Progress, although at a slower rate, is also being made in efforts to establish methods of preventing surprise attack. In this case as well, the procedure that is being followed is to tackle first the technical issues that are involved. These are to be considered at a meeting of experts early in November. If progress is made at that meeting we can anticipate, I think, that the discussion will move to the political plane in an attempt to reach definitive agreement.

There is one feature of these disarmament discussions that would have pleased Henry Marshall Tory, with his scientific training as well as his keen interest in international affairs. It is the important role that scientists are playing in them. More and more of our defence scientists are finding that they are having to turn their experience inside out, as it were, in order to assist in finding practicable disarmament agreements and efficient means for monitoring and policing them. This has been true of the discussions looking toward a cessation of nuclear tests; and I am sure it will also be true of the effort to find ways of preventing surprise attack.

There is one other problem, too, in the general field of disarmament for whose proper solution we will need the best scientific help we can get. I am thinking of the use to be made of outer space. This is a subject far too serious to be left exclusively to the military and to the writers of science fiction. Indeed, I can think of few conquests that are now-a-days more urgent than the annexation of outer space for peaceful purposes. It has been well said that of all the marvels in the world none is more marvellous than the starry heavens and the moral law. One of the tasks laid on our generation is no less than to make the writ of the moral law our own throughout the inter-stellar spaces. For the successful accomplishment of that task there will clearly have to be some re-deployment of scientific manpower so that we can be guided and counselled by those through whose skill such far-distant tracts are for the first time being furrowed by human invention.

I can even foresee that we in Canada, possessed of vast territory and free from any suspicion of military ambition may have a particularly significant part to play in international efforts to make peaceful forays into outer space and to bring it under international control.

Commerce between the scientific communities of the Soviet Union and the West would be, I feel sure, to our mutual advantage. Indeed, it may well be indispensable if we are to find a way out of the dangerous impasse in which the world now stands. But I am emboldened to think that a much wider interchange of persons would also be to our advantage. You may recall that the earliest democracy in Europe 500 years before Christ, prided itself upon the fact that: "We leave our city open to all men, nor do we ever by banishing strangers, prevent them from studying or observing any of those things which, if not hidden, might be of benefit to an enemy. We do not rely upon tricks of secret preparation and deceit, but upon our own courage in action". In a different age, the simplicity of that principle no doubt requires modification. But I hope that we will display something of the vigorous self-confidence that characterized Athenian democracy.

With that quotation from Thucydides, I return to some of the fundamental values on which our civilization rests. In the effort to find an accommodation with the Soviet Union, I have no doubt that there will be many points on which we will have to negotiate and compromise. There are some points, however, on which no compromise is possible. They include our convictions concerning tyranny and freedom, concerning aggressive and peaceful intentions, concerning justice and injustice, concerning cruelty and kindness, and concerning liberty and serfdom. Upon these matters, for all the ease of our relationships within our frontiers and with our allies and friends throughout the world, we are prepared to make no compromise whatsoever. We in Canada have no very long tradition of political experience. But I do not believe it is naive of us to think that there is something significant in the direction which refugees take when, in despair, they try to escape from conditions which they find no longer tolerable. It is our hope and our determination, if it is permitted to us, to live on terms of friendship and of respect with countries everywhere; but at the same time we will not abandon our conviction that there is a difference between a prison and a haven. Whatever may happen to us, may we never lose that conviction, and all that stems from it.