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DESTABILIZATION OF THE FRONTLINE STATES OF SOUTHERN AFRICA, 1980-1987

by Dan O'Meara

INTRODUCTION

The 1987 Commonwealth summit in Vancouver was dominated by the *apartheid* issue. In place of further sanctions against South Africa, Britain advocated increased assistance to the six Frontline States (see box). Although devastated by over a decade of South African destabilization, these countries themselves sharply reject any attempt to delink aid from sanctions. President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia urged the Commonwealth not to "just fatten us up so the Boers can come and slaughter us."¹

TWO GROUPINGS USED IN THIS PAPER

A. Frontline States

- Angola
- Botswana
- Mozambique
- Tanzania
- Zambia
- Zimbabwe

B. SADCC Member States

- all 6 Frontline States, plus
- Lesotho
- Malawi
- Swaziland

Canada has played a leading international role on the *apartheid* issue since 1985. Limited sanctions have been imposed against South Africa, and the government seems convinced that the crisis of *apartheid* threatens the entire Southern African region.

However Canadian policy has also sought to move in concert with "our major partners" — specifically the US and UK — and the government now confronts what Tory MP Walter McLean has called "a crisis of nerve."² The Reagan and Thatcher governments are not going to support effective sanctions against Pretoria. Canada is faced with the uncomfortable choice of joining — with more than just rhetoric — the Third World Commonwealth countries on this issue, or of losing much credibility.

In making such choices however, it is crucial to understand the evolving pattern and objectives of Pretoria's destabilization policies, and to grasp their place in the ongoing domestic crisis of *apartheid*.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE TOTAL STRATEGY

Between 1978 and 1984 South Africa's domestic and regional policies were consistently hinged around a coherent Total Strategy. The Total Strategy responded to four crucial developments in the 1970s:

- 1) The defeat of Portuguese colonialism and independence of Angola and Mozambique under socialist governments in 1975 — followed by the debacle of South Africa's 1975/6 invasion of Angola;
- 2) the re-emergence of large-scale black opposition inside South Africa;
- 3) the appearance of deep structural faults in South Africa's economy;
- 4) Pretoria's increasing isolation.

Together these developments precipitated a prolonged political crisis and John Vorster's eventual replacement as prime minister by P.W. Botha in September 1978. Based on a new political collaboration between the military and large corporations, the

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Total Strategy now became official policy.

As outlined in the South African Defence White Paper in 1977, the Total Strategy envisaged a realignment of political forces in both South and Southern Africa. A complex mix of minor domestic reforms and active intervention in Southern Africa sought to modify some of the cruder forms of *apartheid* in order to preserve the basic structure of economic and political power, and to defuse political unrest. Carrot and stick policies offered minor concessions to black political actors willing to cooperate with a reformed version of *apartheid*, and overwhelming military and economic sanctions against those who were not.³

Botha's reforms eased some barriers to social mobility for middle class blacks. However, they did not address the central issue of political rights, but significantly strengthened domestic repression and some basic props of *apartheid*.

IMPLEMENTING THE TOTAL STRATEGY IN SOUTH AFRICA

The regional component of the Total Strategy sought to internationalize Pretoria's problems. Instability and conflict in South and Southern Africa were blamed not on *apartheid* but on external intervention. Elaborate conspiracy theories of a total onslaught against South Africa — involving both the Soviet Union and the United States — were proposed.

The Total Strategy argued that South Africa's international isolation could be eroded through a transformation of *regional* relations. All countries would then have to acknowledge South Africa's legitimate interests in its Southern African sphere of influence.

However the overriding goal of Pretoria's regional policy was now defined as the creation of a "Constellation of Southern African States" (CONSAS) — a regional political and economic alliance around South Africa. This proffered joint economic projects and South African development assistance, explicitly designed to lure regional states into non-aggression pacts with Pretoria.⁴

This medium-term CONSAS goal also embodied five short-term regional objectives:⁵

(1) Obliging neighbouring states to end their support for and police the activities of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) in Namibia and the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa;

(2) Ensuring that Soviet bloc powers regained neither diplomatic, political nor military footholds in the region;

(3) Strengthening regional economic dependence on South Africa;

(4) Ensuring that neighbouring states would shield South Africa against demands for sanctions;

(5) Moderating the "heady anti-South African rhetoric" of regional states.

The pursuit of these objectives also led to a systematic reorganization of the *apartheid* state. Under the new "National Security Management System," South Africa underwent a virtual *de facto* military coup. By 1981 effective decision-making had passed from the Cabinet to the military-dominated State Security Council (SSC) — itself responsible only to the Prime Minister. The SSC set up military-dominated parallel administrative structures to coordinate the implementation of its Total Strategy and to oversee domestic and regional planning, administration and implementation.⁶

The military budget more than tripled between 1977/78 and 1986/87 to reach R5.1 billion, with *real* spending estimated at R8.7 billion.⁷ A crash armaments development programme after 1977 transformed the state-owned Armaments Corporation into the second biggest industrial conglomerate in South Africa. New military units were developed for use against neighbouring states. These included dissident groups such as the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), the Mozambican National Resistance (MNR), the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA), and so-called "Super-Zapu" in Zimbabwe. Purporting to be indigenous resistance forces, and drawing most recruits from these countries, these groups fall under the strategic control of the South African Defence Force (SADF) Special Forces Command which keeps them supplied and financed.⁸

The Total Strategy also devoted much study to ways in which existing regional economic links could be used either as incentive levers or as disincentive levers against neighbouring states. The former included offers of South African aid or joint infrastructural projects. The latter amounted to large-scale sanctions explicitly designed to change political policies in the region.⁹

THE TOTAL STRATEGY IN ACTION

The ways in which the Total Strategy was applied depended on various external and internal factors. Four distinct phases stand out.

1) 1978-80: CONSAS and SADCC

First proposed in 1979, the Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS) was hinged on the assumption that Zimbabwe would become independent under the pro-South African Bishop Abel Muzorewa and join CONSAS — obliging Zambia, Zaire and probably Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland to follow suit. Robert Mugabe's conclusive victory in the February 1980 Zimbabwean independence elections defeated such plans however. Zimbabwe joined the Frontline States and helped form the

Southern African Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC) — grouping all nine black Southern African states in a joint strategy to reduce economic dependence on South Africa.¹⁰

By 1980 South Africa clearly felt its domestic and regional interests threatened. Of the *cordon sanitaire* of white-ruled states on which its regional policies and sense of security had been built, now only Namibia remained. There too Pretoria's control was stretched. Inside South Africa many blacks perceived Zimbabwean independence as another military victory over white rule. The banned African National Congress capitalized on this in June 1980 when it began a series of spectacular sabotage attacks inside South Africa.

The formation of SADCC underlined the collapse of Pretoria's political hegemony and directly challenged its economic domination. An alternative regional transport and communications network presaged a loss of leverage throughout the region. Zimbabwe's developed manufacturing sector could undermine South Africa's vital regional export markets. Regional economic independence potentially threatened both South Africa's US\$1.5 billion annual trade surplus with SADCC and the flow of labour to its mines and agriculture.

The political consequences were unthinkable. Pretoria saw its regional economic dominance as the unquestionable pre-condition of South African capitalism. Moreover, economic domination guaranteed South Africa's overwhelming political role which Pretoria believed essential to curbing what it saw as externally-provoked resistance to *apartheid*. Finally, given the geopolitical structure of Southern Africa, any success for SADCC would benefit radical Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zimbabwe and thereby radicalize SADCC as a whole. It might mean that socialism would be seen by South Africa's black population to present a viable alternative to *apartheid* — the South African government therefore set out to defeat the SADCC strategy.

2) 1980-1981: search for a response

For much of the next 18 months, unsure of its immediate regional objectives, Pretoria lashed out fairly indiscriminately against its neighbours. Direct military attacks and indirect aggression through puppet groups were launched against Angola, Mozambique, Lesotho and Zimbabwe. An explicit threat was made to turn Swaziland into a second front. Restrictions were imposed on the use of South African rail and port facilities and on the import of labour. A dual track strategy in Namibia sought to build an internal settlement whilst escalating military attacks against SWAPO bases in Angola.¹¹


During this phase the most important development from Pretoria's point of view was the advent of the

Reagan administration. President Ronald Reagan's constructive engagement policies promised much greater American sympathy than under Jimmy Carter. State Department briefing notes for a May 1981 meeting between Secretary of State Alexander Haig and Foreign Minister Roelof (Pik) Botha, show many common priorities between the two governments. Both gave priority to combatting Soviet influence in the region, both sought to prevent a SWAPO victory in Namibia. Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, Chester Crocker, expressed the fundamental aims of US policy in the region as the need to end South Africa's "pariah status" and to re-integrate South Africa into "the network of Western security interests."¹² This produced the celebrated "linkage" policy — no settlement in Namibia until Cuban troops were withdrawn from Angola. The new administration used its Security Council veto to forestall condemnation of South Africa's massive August 1981 invasion of Angola.¹³ Pretoria certainly believed it had US support for its far more aggressive regional policies.

3) 1982-March 1984: effects of destabilization

By early 1982 Pretoria had worked out its immediate regional objectives. It sought firstly to get regional states to limit the numbers and to police the activities of ANC members in their countries and secondly to shatter SADCC economic initiatives — particularly in the transport sector.

The more conservative states such as Swaziland and Malawi were seen as potential collaborators and were offered concessions to deepen ties with Pretoria. Landlocked Swaziland accepted South African assistance in building a new rail link with the South African port of Richard's Bay, and a supplementary



US\$45 million payment under the Southern African Customs Union Agreement. Most controversially, Pretoria offered to cede to Swaziland part of South Africa's KaNgwane and KwaZulu bantustans. Not surprisingly, Swaziland concluded a secret non-aggression pact with South Africa in February 1982. The Swazi government now clamped down on ANC members and indicated that much of Swazi exports would be diverted from the rail link with Mozambique, to the new Richard's Bay route.

On the other hand, states seen as unfriendly to South Africa were subjected to sustained military and economic destabilization. During 1982 and 1983, the South African army or air force directly attacked all nine SADCC member states except for collaborating Malawi and Swaziland, and distant Tanzania, and physically occupied vaster areas of Angola. Assassination attempts were made against the Prime Ministers of Lesotho and Zimbabwe.¹⁴ A total trade embargo was briefly imposed against encircled Lesotho. Pretoria fostered and backed dissident groups which brought chaos to Angola and Mozambique, and less serious disorder in Lesotho and Zimbabwe. South Africa sabotaged the railways and ports carrying the external trade of all SADCC members except Tanzania, and disrupted the oil supplies of all except Mozambique and Tanzania.

However the brunt was borne by Angola and Mozambique, and to a lesser extent Zimbabwe and Lesotho. While Pretoria clearly wanted to remove the Angolan and Lesotho governments, it apparently preferred to keep the governments of Mozambique and Zimbabwe weak and vulnerable — to “change political behavior, not political structures.”¹⁵ In Namibia the internal settlement collapsed in January 1982, and while the regime cast around for an alternative internal political initiative, SADF commanders now claimed that they could defeat SWAPO militarily.

During this phase of destabilization, the US placed strong pressure on all states — but again particularly Angola and Mozambique — to deny sanctuary to the ANC. The ANC was informed that Washington sought to exclude it from Africa “South of Cairo.”¹⁶ By mid-1983 the US was advocating *rapprochement* between Southern African states in terms of its regional security doctrine.¹⁷

The softening-up effect of destabilization began to yield results. A non-aggression pact was concluded with miniscule Swaziland and, following a bloody raid in December 1982 by the South African Defence Force, Lesotho reluctantly expelled many ANC members. By late 1983, civil strife in Zimbabwe had weakened the government, and devastating material and political damage had been inflicted on Angola and Mozambique. In early 1984, after prolonged negotiations, Angola signed the Lusaka Agreement

with South Africa, and Mozambique accepted the Nkomati Accord.

4) March 1984-end 1985: triumph of the Total Strategy

The Lusaka Agreement stipulated a phased withdrawal of South African troops from Angola, while Angola undertook to allow neither SWAPO nor Cuban troops into the vacated areas. Many observers saw the agreement as the first step of a US-supervised settlement leading to Namibian independence.

The Nkomati Accord was a non-aggression pact. Mozambique agreed to limit the ANC presence to a small, tightly controlled diplomatic mission. South Africa pledged to end all support for the Mozambican National Resistance (MNR) dissidents, and give Mozambique some of the economic carrots of the Total Strategy.

The Nkomati Accord was a great triumph for South Africa. Pretoria had always seen non-aggression pacts as a key first step to bringing any state into CONSAS. P.W. Botha's speech at Nkomati pointedly referred to his “vision” of a “veritable constellation of southern African states.” A seemingly implacable Marxist-Leninist state had been obliged to cut support for an historic ally.

The jubilation that greeted the Accord in Western capitals seemed to herald a break out of twenty-five years of international isolation. In June 1984 P.W. Botha visited a series of European capitals — inconceivable before Nkomati. Pretoria believed that its claim to be the regional power with legitimate interests was now widely accepted, and saw Nkomati as a profound defeat not just for the ANC, but also for Soviet interests in Southern Africa.

By mid-1984 the South African government brimmed with a confidence bordering on arrogance. Various South African newspapers proposed Foreign Minister Pik Botha for the Nobel Peace Prize. A grand tour through Africa by P.W. Botha was mooted. The threat of sanctions receded, South Africa's credit rating rose sharply, and much of the international anti-*apartheid* network was demoralized. Domestically, the regime had won a huge vote of confidence from the white electorate on its new constitution setting up an executive presidency and a segregated tri-cameral parliament. Though this new dispensation totally excluded the African majority and was overwhelmingly rejected by Indians and Coloureds, the South African government seriously believed that this constitutional tinkering would paralyze the domestic opposition.

Parading as the peacemaker in Southern Africa, Pretoria now threatened Zimbabwe, Lesotho and Botswana with “economic havoc” unless they signed similar security pacts.¹⁸ The Lusaka Agreement was soon renounced on the pretext of an Angolan violation. In mid-1984 Pretoria increased its support for UNITA, seemingly convinced that Angola's Marxist govern-

ment would soon collapse. In Namibia, a new internal settlement plan was put forward and attacks against SWAPO forces stepped up.

However, Mozambique provided the key to Pretoria's real intentions. Surprised and embarrassed by the vigour of Mozambique's implementation of the Nkomati Accord, the South African government was divided over how to proceed. It is now clear however that covert support for the MNR was maintained while Pretoria sought to use the Nkomati Accord to force a political settlement between MNR dissidents and Mozambique's FRELIMO government. South African-sponsored proximity talks produced the October 1984 "Pretoria Declaration" by FRELIMO, the MNR and South African government, which seemed to herald a ceasefire and the beginnings of such a political solution. Foreign Minister Botha announced that South African troops would monitor the ceasefire and "be used in an emergency role to tackle socio-economic problems" in Mozambique.¹⁹

COLLAPSE OF THE TOTAL STRATEGY

The Pretoria Declaration marked the high point of the Total Strategy. It came to nothing however. The South African army was unwilling to abandon the MNR, and the MNR leaders refused to accept the relatively modest role in the coalition which Pretoria mapped out for it. Mozambique was unwilling to negotiate the sharing of power with what it called "kidnappers, bandits and criminals."²⁰ Barely six weeks later President Samora Machel publically accused Pretoria of consistently violating the Nkomati Accord, and the war in Mozambique grew more intense.

In August 1985 Mozambican and Zimbabwean forces seized the main MNR base. Captured documents confirmed uninterrupted South African strategic and logistical assistance after Nkomati.²¹ Pretoria was now forced to admit what it called "technical violations" of the Accord.²² These included:

- supplying the MNR with new radios and maintaining constant radio contact with SADF headquarters;
- ferrying MNR commanders in and out of Mozambique by submarine;
- regular air drops of humanitarian supplies to MNR forces in Mozambique;
- various clandestine visits by a South African cabinet minister to MNR bases in Mozambique, while South Africa commandos secured the area.

By early 1985 Pretoria abandoned all pretense of seeking regional political solutions, and overtly resumed its assault against its neighbours. In May 1985 SADF commandos were captured attempting to blow up US-owned Angolan oil installations. Large-scale incursions into Angola were resumed in September 1985. Pretoria now admitted its long-standing support

for UNITA.²³ The SADF attacked Botswana in June. At the end of 1985 a clandestine South African hit squad killed nine people in the capital of Lesotho on the same day that a rare public statement by the State Security Council warned that six neighbouring countries would pay a heavy price unless they accepted South African representations about the ANC.²⁴

The Total Strategy had always been a relatively sophisticated package of carrot and stick tactics geared towards a combination of short, medium and long-term objectives. By the end of 1985 this package had given way to the simple, brutal exercise of force. Pretoria was unable to deliver on any of the positive aspects of the Total Strategy. Its very successes in early 1984 revealed its always flawed premises, sharp contradictions and real limits. Despite the rhetoric of peaceful coexistence, in the final analysis, Pretoria could not live in peace with independent black governments.

This had a clear domestic parallel. The Nkomati Accord coincided with the last promised domestic reforms. The opening of the new tricameral parliament in 1984 made it clear that the envisaged power-sharing was simply modernized *apartheid*. Nothing more was on offer. Domestically the Total Strategy ended with more sophisticated white domination, just as the culmination of the Total Strategy in Southern Africa ended in the unchecked use of brutal force.

However by far the most important factor highlighting the limits of South African regional strategy was the two-year urban uprising which began in South Africa just six months after the Nkomati Accord. The Total Strategy was first formulated in the mid-1970s as a response to the four important developments, described above. By mid-1985, each was far more aggravated than in 1977:

- 1) a vast, urban uprising seemed to threaten the very existence of white rule in South Africa;
- 2) South Africa was more isolated than ever and sanctions were now a reality;
- 3) the regional balance of power had shifted fundamentally and only the routine use of overwhelming force against its neighbours preserved Pretoria's position;
- 4) the South African economy confronted its worst ever recession. The Rand had collapsed and Pretoria was soon forced to default on part of its foreign debt.

From the perspective of the Botha regime, what it defined as reform at home and peacemaking in the region had not achieved their fundamental goal of forging political stability. For the generals who dominated the State Security Council, and the former Minister of Defence who presided over it as State President — all of whom were fundamentally incapable of entertaining a negotiated dismantling of *apartheid* — a military solution was the only possible domestic and regional alternative.

TOTAL DESTABILIZATION

The axe fell first on Lesotho. A total blockade by Pretoria in January 1986 precipitated a *coup d'état* which replaced the independent-minded government of Leabua Jonathan with one more amenable to Pretoria. South Africa's May raids against Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe scuttled the Commonwealth's Eminent Persons Group initiative just when some progress seemed possible. Clandestine hit squads targeted ANC sympathizers in Lesotho and Swaziland.

Once again, however, the major burden fell on Angola and Mozambique. A further large-scale military incursion into Angola was made in August 1986. In September, 12,000 South Africa-backed MNR dissidents attacked central Mozambique from Malawi. This offensive was designed to cut the narrow Beira corridor linking Zimbabwe with the Mozambican port of Beira, and split Mozambique in two. In early October, Pretoria threatened military action against Mozambique and deported thousands of Mozambican workers. Barely a week later the Mozambican president, Samora Machel, and 28 of his aides died in a suspicious air crash.²⁵

In 1987 Pretoria's undeclared wars with Angola and Mozambique had shifted significantly. The Angolan government launched a major military offensive against UNITA in September. Its reported significant early successes led to the sixth major South African invasion of Angola. While thousands of Angolan troops were apparently killed, South Africa also took unprecedented losses — including a number of fighter aircraft. One British journal reported the "decimation" of South Africa's notorious 32 Battalion and South African newspapers reported mutinies in two others. Pretoria has admitted it intervened to prevent the defeat of UNITA.²⁶ Coupled with the visit by President Botha and senior Cabinet ministers to SADF positions in Angola, this has confirmed UNITA's status as a simple South African surrogate. And Pretoria is being sucked deeper into a war it cannot win.

In Mozambique the MNR offensive in the central provinces was finally contained. Pressure by the Frontline States appears to have ended Malawi's covert support for the MNR, and Malawian troops now patrol the northern rail line. The war has shifted sharply into southern Mozambique. MNR attacks are now carried out by concentrations of up to 500 trained, well-equipped and highly mobile men, many of whom are believed by the Mozambican government to have served with the SADF in Angola. The random terrorist attacks on the population have now escalated into regular large-scale massacres of civilians, employing a savage level of cruelty. These seem designed to spread terror throughout southern Mozambique, isolate the capital, Maputo, and accentuate the urban discontent stemming from the deep cuts in social spending decreed

by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

These tactics are now also being used in Zimbabwe. Throughout the whole of Southern Africa, Pretoria's war of destabilization grows ever more brutal. South African death squads roam the region. Responding to journalists after South Africa was obliged to return Swiss citizens kidnapped from Swaziland by one such death squad — in yet another violation of the non-aggression pact with Swaziland — Foreign Minister Pik Botha stated that the regime was no longer interested in diplomatic niceties.²⁷

Pretoria has made it very clear that it will use its overwhelming regional economic and military power to pursue four broad objectives in Southern Africa:

1) to destroy the ANC and punish any state which can be even remotely connected with this or that ANC incident;

2) to undermine the SADCC initiatives, not just in the transport sector but also in the new SADCC emphasis on production and intra-regional trade;

3) to undercut sanctions in the region, shift the burden of sanctions on to its neighbours;

4) finally, the coup in Lesotho — and possibly the death of Samora Machel — points to a new desperation in Pretoria's regional politics.

In the past, destabilization was geared "to change political behaviour, rather than political structures."²⁸ Now Pretoria seems intent on replacing what it sees as hostile regimes. This was relatively easily done in Lesotho. Again Mozambique seems to be the focus of this effort. How it will work out will largely depend on international involvement. However, the peoples of Southern Africa will continue to pay a hideous price.

CONCLUSION: THE COSTS OF DESTABILIZATION

The human casualties of over a decade of destabilization have never been reliably measured. Close to two million people have been displaced as refugees. Almost 10% of Namibia's population are either refugees or in exile. The Southern Africa specialist, Joseph Hanlon, estimates the number of deaths due to destabilization of Angola and Mozambique *alone* between 1980 and 1986 at a staggering 735,000:

Mozambique war	50,000
Mozambique famine	100,000
Angola war and famine	50,000
Mozambique children	215,000
Angola children	320,000
TOTAL	<u>735,000²⁹</u>

In 1985 SADCC estimated that "South African aggression and destabilization had cost the nine member countries in excess of US\$10 billion" between

1980 and 1984, broken down as follows:

Direct war damage	US\$millions 1,610
Extra defence expenditure	3,060
Higher transport and energy costs	970
Lost exports & tourism	230
Smuggling	190
Refugees	660
Reduced production	800
Lost economic growth	2,000
Boycotts & embargos	260
Trading arrangements	340
TOTAL	10,120³⁰

Escalating destabilization in 1985 and 1986 cost an estimated additional US\$15 billion, bringing the total cost for the period 1980 to 1986 to over US\$25 billion.³¹

This staggering damage is twice the combined foreign aid received by all nine SADCC members during this period. It equals half the total SADCC exports; five times the projected costs of all SADCC projects; and is roughly equivalent to the total 1984 GDP of the SADCC countries. The overwhelming bulk of these costs have been borne by Angola and Mozambique.

Official Mozambican figures show that between 1981 and 1983, 140 villages were destroyed, together with 900 rural shops, 840 schools and over 200 health posts. The total cost was estimated at US\$3.8 billion, or roughly twice the pre-1975 GDP. Over the next two years, despite Mozambique's non-aggression pact with South Africa, the damage was even greater. More than 1,800 schools were closed down together with an additional 300 health posts. By the end of 1985 total damage was estimated at US\$5 billion.³² Prior to 1981 Mozambique made modest, but important economic progress. However the massive destruction orchestrated by South Africa has now virtually destroyed the national economy. A *negative* growth rate of -7% in 1983 was followed by one of -14% in 1984 and -20% in 1985. Mozambique's debt service ratio is now officially estimated at between 160% and 190% of *planned* 1987 export revenues.³³

South Africa has achieved most of its aims in Mozambique. All ANC cadres have been expelled, Samora Machel is dead, FRELIMO's socialist project lies in tatters, and the Mozambican people are exhausted by a generation of war and six years of famine. Mozambique is today economically more dependent than ever on South Africa. One-third of its US\$180 million foreign revenues in 1985 originated in South Africa. Despite a recent 800% devaluation, and the deep cuts in social spending, Mozambique is obliged to spend 42% of its budget — itself financed by "the timely arrival of grants or credits" — on defence.³⁴

The costs in Angola have been, if anything, even higher. Official Angolan figures speak of 60,000 dead,

over 600,000 internal refugees and total damage estimated at US\$12 billion since the first South Africa invasion in 1975. Over 50% of Angola's budget is now devoted to defence. Angola has the highest number of war paraplegics per capita as a result of the UNITA practice of mining peasant farms. While Angola has partly been able to cushion these costs through oil and diamond exports, the 1986 collapse of the oil price led to a 50% cut in imports of consumer goods, and a drop in imports of intermediate goods to one-third the 1985 level.³⁵

The burden on the other South African countries has been heavy though not of the same order. Prolonged destabilization of Lesotho precipitated a coup in January 1986. The new government concluded a security agreement which gives Pretoria the right to vet all refugees in Lesotho, and has been rewarded with joint development projects dangled for 20 years before its predecessor. An attempt to foment an MNR-like dissident problem in Zimbabwe seems to have been crushed, but Zimbabwe is obliged to maintain a substantial military establishment and a permanent military presence along the Beira corridor at the cost of some Z\$12 million a month. Defence spending now consumes 16% of the Zimbabwean budget, forcing sharp cuts in key development and social programmes.³⁶

SADCC's original vision of steadily reduced economic dependence on South Africa has been shattered. The central prop of SADCC strategy — a 1 alternative regional transport system, centred around Mozambique — has been virtually destroyed. The total debt of SADCC countries stands at US\$16.6 billion, or roughly 66% of their combined GDP. Tanzania and Zambia all have debt service ratios of over 80%.³⁷

Other costs cannot be measured. The psychological trauma of a generation of war; the profound loss of hope and now prevailing apathy throughout much of the region; the social and economic consequences of the loss of precious skilled personnel (especially health and education workers) routinely selected as targets by UNITA and the MNR; these are costs which cannot be reduced to cold statistics. It is likewise difficult to measure precisely the cost of a generation of militarization of political struggles, the reduction in just six short years of all efforts to forge economic independence, and reasonable living standards for the peoples of the region to a remorseless war for simple survival. The militarization of politics, of planning, of most economic decisions, of cultural life — indeed the subordination of much of daily living throughout large areas of Southern Africa to military exigencies — these must exact a very heavy toll in the years to come.

The tragic fact remains that peoples of Southern Africa will know no peace while the *apartheid* regime remains in power in Pretoria. This is the inescapable truth confronting Canadian policy in the region.

NOTES

- ¹ *The Globe and Mail*, 19 September 1987.
- ² Speech to Workshop entitled, "The Forgotten War in Southern Africa: Namibia and Angola," Skyline Hotel, Ottawa, 2 September 1987.
- ³ Discussed at length in D. O'Meara, "From Muldergate to Total Strategy," Centro de Estudos Africanos, Eduardo Mondlane University, Maputo, 1984.
- ⁴ D. Geldenhuys and D. Venter, "Regional Cooperation in Southern Africa," *South African Institute of International Affairs Bulletin*, December 1979, p. 54.
- ⁵ Spelled out in: D. Geldenhuys, "Some Strategic Implications of Regional Economic Relations for the the Republic of South Africa," *ISSUP Strategic Review*, January 1981, pp. 17-24.
- ⁶ There is a wide literature on the role of the military in government since 1978. For a good summary, see: South African Council of Churches briefing paper, summarized in *Weekly Mail* (Johannesburg), 3 July 1987. See also: R. Davies and D. O'Meara, "Total Strategy in Southern Africa," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol. 11, No. 2, 1985.
- ⁷ *Weekly Mail*, 27 March 1986.
- ⁸ For detailed evidence on Pretoria's relations with the MNR, UNITA and other dissident groups — including evidence of the Rhodesian Intelligence Officer who formed the MNR in 1976 and handed it over to South Africa in 1980 — see: P. Johnson and D. Martin, *Destructive Engagement*, Zimbabwe Publishing House, Harare, 1986. On the reorganization of the SADF see: R. Davies, D. O'Meara and S. Dlamini, *The Struggle for South Africa*, Zed Books, London, 1984, Vol. 1, pp. 179-182; and P. Frankel, *Pretoria's Praetorians*, Cambridge University Press, 1985.
- ⁹ Analyzed in D. Geldenhuys, 1981, *op. cit.*
- ¹⁰ The deep and complex ties binding the SADCC states to the South African economy are exhaustively analyzed in Joseph Hanlon, *SADCC: Priorities and Progress*, Economist Intelligence Unit, Special Report No. 182, London, 1984.
- ¹¹ Analyzed at length in R. Davies and D. O'Meara, 1985, *op. cit.*
- ¹² "Scope Paper," Chester Crocker to Secretary of State Haig, published by TransAfrica, 1981. The most detailed, well-documented analysis of US policy in Southern Africa in this period is W. Minter, *King Solomon's Mines Revisited*, Basic Books, New York, 1986.
- ¹³ UN Security Council Draft Resolution S/14654, 27 August 1981.
- ¹⁴ Documented in Joseph Hanlon's exhaustive study, "Beggar Your Neighbour: Apartheid Power in Southern Africa," Catholic Institute for International Relations, London, 1986.
- ¹⁵ D. Geldenhuys, "The Destabilization Controversy," *Politikon*, Vol. 9, No. 2, December 1982.
- ¹⁶ Report of a 1983 meeting of US State Department officials with ANC leaders, delivered to Canadian anti-apartheid groups by the Chief Representative, ANC Mission to Canada, Ottawa, September 1985.
- ¹⁷ Under Secretary of State, Lawrence S. Eagleburger, "America's Responsibility for Change," Department of State, Washington, 23 June 1983.
- ¹⁸ *Guardian* (London), 25 May 1984, and *Rand Daily Mail*, 14 June 1984.
- ¹⁹ *Rand Daily Mail*, 4 October 1984.
- ²⁰ For a detailed analysis of each of these points, see: R. Davies, "South African Strategy Towards Mozambique in the Post-Nkomati Period," CIDMAA, Montreal, 1985.
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- ²² See: the Johannesburg *Financial Mail*, 27 September 1985 and 11 October 1985.
- ²³ Statement by Defence Minister in bulletin of SADF, *Paratus*, November 1985.
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- ²⁶ South African casualty reports, *Africa Confidential*, 18 November 1987; Namibia mutinies, *Weekly Mail* (Johannesburg), 4 November 1987; South African admission, *The Star* (Johannesburg), 18 November 1987.
- ²⁷ *International Herald Tribune*, 11 February 1987.
- ²⁸ Geldenhuys, 1981, *op. cit.*
- ²⁹ Memo to the Swedish International Development Agency, dated 16 February 1987. UNICEF has calculated that without South African destabilization, infant mortality rates in Angola and Mozambique would have fallen to that of Tanzania. The 100,000 famine deaths is definitely an underestimate, as at least this number of people are known to have died in the 1983 famine alone.
- ³⁰ Memorandum presented by SADCC to the 1985 Summit of the Organization of African Unity. SADCC terms these figures "conservative." One authoritative source has doubled the estimate of "lost economic growth" to US\$64 billion. Reginald H. Green and Carol B. Thompson, "Political Economies in Conflict" in Johnson and Martin, 1986, *op. cit.* By mid-1987 the cost of "additional military spending" was probably well over US\$5 billion, or more than the total projected costs of all SADCC projects.
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