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NORTH AMERICAN SECURITY

An address by General A.G.L. McNaughton, delivered to the Canadian Manufacturers' Association, in Toronto, on May 25, 1950.

I count it a great honour as well as a great pleasure, to have the privilege of addressing the members of this group of leaders of the business world of the United States and of Canada. The subject on which I am to speak is "North American Security" and I welcome this opportunity to make a few observations on a question which is of fundamental importance to the peoples of both our countries. In doing so I will endeavour to bring before you some of the basic considerations which need to be taken into account in the present international situation, and I hope that in the course of my remarks I may indicate not only the very substantial progress which has been achieved between Canada and the United States within the wider grouping of the North Atlantic Treaty in translating ideas and sentiments into specific arrangements, but also that I may bring before you some aspects of these matters on which we have not as yet been able to arrive at arrangements which will provide that measure of effective co-operation which clearly is required.

At the present time the need for North American Security arises from one cause only, and that is the clear evidence that unless we make adequate defence preparations, the masters of the Soviet Union will continue to hold to their purpose of eventual world conquest and, whenever they deem the situation propitious for their purpose, will turn to war as a means of achieving their ends. This being so, it becomes most important for the nations who are threatened to bring themselves into close association so that, through mutual co-operation, they may create a deterrent which will check the evil designs of those who plan the disruptive policy of the Soviet Union.

In the circumstances which exist, the initiative for war must continue to lie with the Soviets for, by reason of our adherence to the principles of democracy, we cannot even contemplate a so-called "preventive" war for which a date might be set in advance to simplify planning and conserve resources. On the contrary we must take our guidance from the wise old saying that "The Strong Man Who Continues to be Armed Keepeth the Peace." As a consequence, and not having a point in time on which to focus, our preparations for defence must of necessity be at a level which we are physically capable of sustaining year in and year out. For that very reason, if our preparations are to prove effective in the brief time of warning likely to be available, our preparatory arrangements must be more comprehensive and costly than the preparations of those who plan to a specific date; and our effort may have to be long-continued.

Thus, the capacity for endurance has become a prime consideration and we must be very careful to guard against overstrain, whether it be in our military organization or in our social, economic or industrial fabric.

It is a happy circumstance that Canada and the United States, as two countries of North America, have come to realize the great interests which they hold in common; after the experience of two world wars, our peoples have learned the necessity for close co-operation in defence. We have learned also that the habit of co-operation is one which grows in intimacy with practice and so today, as we look out at a deeply troubled world, we can say not only do we understand one another's assessment of the dangers but our views are in close accord as to how the various contingencies should be provided for.

Most fortunately, I think, the leaders of our governments, and of public opinion, both in Canada and in the United States, have clearly recognized that an insular military defence, even if continental in scope and however elaborate, is by itself not enough to make us safe. On the contrary, to be effective our military plans must be supported in the economic, the social and the moral spheres, and all these measures must be amplified by association with like-minded nations elsewhere who believe with us in the fundamental principles of Democracy and in the freedom of the individual in contradistinction to the pagan tenets of Soviet Communism which have submerged so many fine peoples under the crushing heel of totalitarian despotism.

Every nation which has gone down before the onset of Soviet Communism is not only a loss to us but a gain to the dark forces which oppose us. In consequence, not the least of our endeavours, in our own interest as well as that of common charity must be to put an end to this process of engulfment of peoples. It is only by generous help to others in distress and in need and by the extension of our own endeavours that we can hope to solve the problems of our own defence and gain that enduring security we seek.

In the study of military defence it is most important to realize the very remarkable progress which has come about, particularly since the close of World War I in the application of science and engineering to war. Today, for those who are suitably prepared and equipped, distance has largely lost its former attenuating effect on the conduct of military operations. We must remember not only that continents are now within aircraft range of one another but that, with every new development, already shrunken space continues to shrink still further. Thus we have now become closer to Europe, both in terms of the reinforcements we can give to our friends and also in relation to the repercussions on this continent which would be the consequence of any enemy success there. We have become closer to Europe both in terms of the magnitude on which military operations might be conducted and also as regards the reduction of the time elements involved.

We have to contemplate the possibility of aircraft at supersonic speed and intercontinental radius of action, of guided missiles of great range; of the application of virulent bacteriological and chemical poisons; and most important, of Uranium and perhaps of Hydrogen atomic bombs of catastrophic power. We must realize that already these forms of bombardment may be rapidly followed up by considerable forces; airborne or seaborne in special types of vessels capable of landing on beaches without the use of established ports. Moreover these airborne and

seaborne forces will be capable of operating with great speed and effectiveness on the ground even in the face of widespread destruction and contamination which will have resulted from the long-range high explosive, bacteriological, chemical, or atomic bombardment.

With the increased range of action and of rapidity in transit of modern military forces, continents today have already become the smallest geographical units on the basis of which questions of defence can properly be studied; consequently, effective arrangements for the defence of the territory of one nation have become matters of vital concern to all other nations of that continent. Further, the particular anxieties which concern us as a result of present policies behind the Iron Curtain have necessitated an extension of association in defence beyond the continent of North America to include both the nations of North America and of Western Europe in order that we may create an adequate balance or counterpoise.

Perhaps I might refer to this matter first because, within the last year, the answer to these problems has been given in most convincing fashion in the Atlantic Treaty through which Canada and the United States are being brought into association with other nations of the North Atlantic community in Western Europe.

Through the organization which this Treaty provides we may expect that the democratic countries of Western Europe and of North America combined will be able to muster an overwhelming preponderance in military, economic and moral resources in opposition to any aggressor, and we may reasonably hope that, by the manifest intention of all concerned to make proper preparation for the discharge of the responsibilities they have assumed, there will be created an effective deterrent to any nation or group of nations which might be tempted to launch an armed attack against any of the Treaty signatories.

As the Prime Minister of Canada has said:-

"This Treaty is to preserve the peace of the world by making it clear to any aggressor that if he were so unwise as to resort to war he would be apt to finish with the Kaiser and Hitler and Mussolini."

And to quote Mr. Pearson, our Secretary of State for External Affairs:

"For the people of the North Atlantic community the Treaty is a new beginning. It carries the promise of a greater security and fuller co-operation amongst the nations."

Such is the nature of the plan which has been made in order to chart a course of action for Canada and the United States which associates us in defence with like-minded peoples overseas so that, all together, we may be so strong that our freedom will not be challenged - so strong that the leaders of those who may have contemplated aggressive action by armed force will be induced to turn, while yet they may, to co-operation in the great objectives for the benefit of all peoples, their own included, which may be achieved through the United Nations.

For the peoples of North America, arrangements in relation to defence collaboration with Western Europe, however

comprehensive, are in themselves not enough. From the very nature of the contingencies which may have to be dealt with and by reason of the locations of our resources in raw materials, manpower, economic facilities and manufacturing capacity, this North American continent has become literally the arsenal of democracy. It would present therefore a prize objective to attack, should the possibility for this be left open - and we are no longer immune by reason of distance from other continents.

Not only, therefore, is it necessary for us to join in defence arrangements for the protection of the North Atlantic community as a whole but, in view of our special problems in North America, it is also necessary to continue the intimate co-operation which presently exists between the United States and Canada in matters pertaining to the local defence of this continent; and if this co-operation is to be efficient - as it must be - it requires that we work closely together in all defence matters from the elementary planning for civil defence through the development of weapons and resources; in standardization and manufacture of equipments; in organization and training, on land, at sea and in the air - it calls for intimate association in all these matters right up to and including the employment of our forces in war, if that unhappy eventuality should come.

Such, then, is the vista of close collaboration between Canada and the U.S.A. in defence at home and overseas which extends before us and I think you may be particularly interested in some account of the methods which have been evolved by which we, in Canada, a relatively small nation, are enabled to make our due and proper contribution to the security of this continent without any sense of being overwhelmed or dominated by the circumstance that, in numbers and in the physical measure of defence resources, we stand to our mighty neighbour in a ratio no greater than perhaps of one in twelve.

The post World War I period was marked by two very important transitions in Canada. The first was the transition from a state of Colonial dependency in defence and international affairs to National responsibility under which we have assumed complete authority for the conduct of our affairs. It is one of the remarkable achievements of the age that this change has come about without any impairment of our association with the other nations of the Commonwealth.

The second transition was from an attitude towards the United States which I can only characterize as one of some anxiety, developing to that full measure of mutual confidence which now exists. Today in Canada there are very few who will question that in seeking the security of our homeland we need to give first place to a continuance of friendly relations with the United States.

As far as I can determine, the transition from the negative conception of Canada and the United States as two nations whose interests were separated by a frontier, to a recognition of a need for positive association in defence was first expressed publicly in Mr. Roosevelt's Declaration in August 1938, that

"the people of the United States will not stand idly by if domination of Canadian soil is threatened",

and in Mr. King's reply that

"we, too, have our obligations as a good friendly neighbour and one of them is to see that, at our own insistence, our country is made as immune from attack or possible invasion as we can reasonably be expected to make it, and that, should the occasion ever arise, enemy forces should not be able to pursue their way, either by land, sea or air to the United States, across Canadian territory".

As the former Prime Minister of Canada has said, these statements marked the first public recognition by both countries of their reciprocity in defence based on mutual interest in one another's security.

This being the situation, when war broke out with Germany in 1939 there was no occasion for any anxiety as to the attitude of the United States in the event of an attack on Canada and we could base our arrangements on the confident expectation that we would receive, as we did, every possible measure of help that it was open to the U.S.A. to give.

Again in 1939, as in 1914, Canada went to war when the United Kingdom became involved in the European conflagration. In 1914, the British Declaration of War was sufficient to embrace all the Dominions and dependencies of the Empire. In 1939 the situation was different. Our own Declaration of War was made of our own volition as the result of action by our own Parliament. While the procedure was different, the effect was the same and in each case, in a matter of weeks, a division, together with other units, was embarked for overseas to be followed by others in fairly rapid succession. In 1939, in addition to the Army, very large Naval and Air Programmes were undertaken. During the war the total enlistment in all Armed Forces, men and women, was 1,087,000 out of a population of about 12,000,000.

In supplement to the great effort of the Armed Forces there were many tens of thousands of men and women who were engaged on the farms, in the forests and mines and in industry. It is very satisfactory in reviewing these matters in retrospect to realize from the record that the arduous work of our civil population was marked by that same high spirit of grim determination and devotion as that which characterized our Armed Services and, in the result and despite the recruitment of personnel, the volume of production of all kinds was markedly increased. For example, Canadian war industry, which was organized and controlled by a Department of the Canadian Government, produced over twice as much for our allies as for ourselves, and its output embraced most of the articles and materials, raw and manufactured, which were wanted in quantity over the whole range of the requirements of the Armed Forces. Our Canadian War Industry was distinguished by the excellence of the product, by the improvement in weapons, explosives, motor transport, tanks and other equipment introduced, and by the low costs in man hours of labour which were achieved. This immense effort was organized and financed by Canada herself and the product was made available to our allies in such a manner as to contribute most effectively to winning the war. Under our Mutual Aid Act, which was the Canadian equivalent of U.S. lendlease, strategical necessity was the guiding consideration and no payment was required.

Canadian industrial performance in World War II stands out in marked contrast to World War I where the output

mostly took the form of raw materials or of such simple articles as shells and ammunition to sealed patterns designed elsewhere. Not a single gun or novel major piece of military equipment was made in Canada in World War I and the whole of the industrial organization which was then set up was under the direction of the Imperial Munitions Board, an organization directed and financed from London.

In World War II it was shown conclusively that we need not doubt our ability to invent, develop and produce any article of war short of the larger battlecraft which were, in size, beyond the capacity of our plants. We did not undertake to make everything because this would have been uneconomic in the case of supplies of satisfactory types otherwise available in sufficient quantities.

We are in no doubt that we must again endeavour to balance our industrial efforts with those of our other allies and particularly with the United States in order to gain the best overall advantage. This, as you know, is a matter which is under discussion between the countries.

I should now like to turn for a moment to the Canada - United States Permanent Joint Board on Defence, the body set up by the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Canada in August 1940, with terms of reference to undertake studies relating in the broad sense to the defence of the North Half of the Western Hemisphere in order to ensure the continued safety of our two countries.

The Permanent Joint Board is not a combined staff and likewise, in its national sections, it is not a rival to the Military Staffs in Washington or in Ottawa. Its strength for its special task lies in the fact that it has not been clothed with any executive responsibility. The Board's procedure provides for the comprehensive interchange of information and its free discussion, and the Board has the duty constantly to review the situation - and if any of its suggestions have not been acted upon it can draw this situation to the attention of the President and the Prime Minister. In practice this has proved to be ample authority.

During the war it was under the auspices of the Permanent Joint Board that the basic plans for the defence of Canada and Alaska were drawn up and that arrangements were made for such important defence undertakings as the Alaska Highway, the Northwest Staging Route for ferrying aircraft to Russia and China, the Crimson Route across Hudson Bay, Baffin Land, Greenland, etc. to Europe, etc.

It was at the instance of the Board also, that towards the end of the war in the immediate and post-war period, steps were taken to transform the international character of the various installations of these joint undertakings to ensure that full ownership and clear title to all establishments in Canadian territory should vest in Canada. Large sums were of course paid by Canada to the United States in this process of liquidation.

Since then the Board has concerned itself with the future. At an early meeting the Board recognized the need for wider interchange of officers and specialists, including those concerned with the design of new weapons, with a view to eventual standardization; for joint tests of new equipment and

methods; and for the interchange of observers on military exercises, etc.

The result of these discussions was made known in a statement given simultaneously on February 12, 1947 in Ottawa to Parliament by the Prime Minister, and in Washington by the Secretary of State. This statement defined the measure of agreement which had been reached for co-operation in our defence policies and I think that everything which is essential for the closest military co-operation was included; thus, through this declaration, there is provided a comprehensive basis on which either country may bring forward any defence matters which it may wish.

I think that it is particularly advantageous to Canada that we are enabled to make the very significant contribution of which I believe our engineers and scientists are capable in the fields of weapon development and research. It has been our concern to ensure that in this section of the nucleus of our war organization we are especially well-equipped and staffed and, in addition, we have available also the great facilities and experience of our National Research Council.

At the present time, as has been announced by Mr. Brooke Claxton, Minister of National Defence, in major items of equipment the attention of our technical staffs has been concentrated on naval craft for anti-submarine duties, on the Canadian high power turbo-jet aircraft engine for military purposes and on a new all-weather fighter which will have our new engine, and which has been especially designed to meet the conditions of air defence in our northern territories, or anywhere that a long-distance interceptor of high performance is required. These undertakings, in all of which Canada has had a long background of related experiences, are turning out very satisfactorily and, as a result, important items of new defence equipment are reaching the stage where we think that, in addition to meeting our own requirements, we can with advantage also supply the needs of our allies in exchange for items of war equipment of their manufacture which we need and which, having regard to the characteristics of mass production industry, they are able to produce more economically.

The next step in the orderly development of defence arrangements between Canada and the United States was announced on April 12, 1948, with the setting up of a Joint U.S. - Canada Industrial Mobilization Planning Committee whose duty it is to exchange information and work towards the co-ordination of the views of the two governments in connection with planning for industrial mobilization in the event of an emergency.

This is an aspect of co-operation the principles of which were thoroughly worked out during the last war between the Canadian Mutual Aid Board and the U.S. Lend Lease Administration and, as a result, Canada was able to make many scores of millions of dollars worth of equipment available to the Armed Forces of the allies.

In both Canada and the United States what needs to be done now to regain this facility is well understood, and we are beginning to evolve procedures which we may expect will operate practically under peacetime conditions.

As is well known, Canada buys on ordinary account very much more from the United States than the United States buys

from Canada. We have to make up the difference from our favourable balances with other countries or by making restrictions on the freedom of our people to travel in the United States or to purchase from there other than essential commodities. Even at the best of times the stability of these arrangements is precarious and it certainly would not be practicable to superimpose any large programme of military items on the top of our ordinary Canadian purchases.

Leaders of thought in Canada in government and industry have already emphasized the advantage of a renewal of something like the Hyde Park arrangements under which we would contemplate balancing the trade in arms between Canada and the United States outside our trade on ordinary account. As matters stand in the dangerous situation which exists it would not be sensible to consider trade in arms from the point of view of revenue. Rather we must look at it primarily for the purpose of promptly providing both of our countries and also our allies with the most modern, standardized weapons of the highest efficiency. Having regard to this and to the mutually-advantageous result which is sought as a contribution to the security of North America and of the other countries of the North Atlantic community, it seems to me that it is not unreasonable to expect the removal of legislative restrictions which introduce other considerations and so stand in the way of efficient organization and procedures. At least it would seem sensible that these restrictions should be confined in their incidence to our trade on ordinary account.

Until recently experience has shown that the principal barriers to progress towards making our defence arrangements has been of the character I have indicated and it is of the first importance that the situation should be corrected, or otherwise we, in Canada, would be compelled to spread our resources over the whole field of our requirements for weapons rather than that we should concentrate on those items which we can best produce, and use our surplus to exchange for equipments which can be produced more advantageously in the United States or by our allies in Europe. Once the difficulties of the moment are widely understood it would seem only reasonable to expect that appropriate remedial legislative action would be taken without delay. With the present widespread discussion of these matters I think we have reason to hope for early correction.

In this connection I would like to refer to the hopeful statement made by Mr. Claxton, Minister of National Defence, on May 19, when he announced a beginning of trade in military equipment between Canada and the United States on a reciprocal basis which is expected to amount this year to somewhere between 15 and 25 million dollars. This is a promising beginning of great value, as Mr. Claxton has said, not only to the defence potential of this continent but also to the overall defence arrangements under the North Atlantic Treaty.

There are two other factors in Industrial Preparedness for Defence which may be more difficult to correct because of the long time required for translation of needs into plans, and of plans into the finished work or facility. The facilities which fall into this category, which require conceptions and effective plans which may have to be a decade or more ahead of the current needs of industry are, first and foremost, transportation. We need to foresee the immense requirement for the movement of bulk commodities within North America for processing, and of finished military and other supplies for export. In an emergency these movements must be capable of taking place

immediately, as required, and with a high degree of speed. Also, we must foresee and prepare against the increased menace of the submarine so that we may not repeat our unfortunate experiences of the last war on the Atlantic seaboard.

The preparation for the early delivery of large blocks of electric power additional to the ordinary demands of industry is also an essential.

Equally essential is the advancement of preparations so that we can be certain of meeting our vast war requirements for iron ore. It seems to me that all these important categories of requirements show the best promise of timely satisfaction through the St. Lawrence Project for Power and for Navigation and through the new power developments envisaged at Niagara, which are embodied in Treaties which now await ratification.

Here again it would seem reasonable to expect that, when the vast portent of these Treaties in their relation to the immediate needs of Canada and the United States, particularly for power and vital defence requirements, is widely understood by the peoples of North America, we may expect that they will insist on completion and prompt implementation.

The factors which make for military strength have varied from country to country and from age to age. Sometimes it has been possession and skill in the use of a particular weapon, sometimes an advantage in movement or in communications; sometimes, though not often in history, it has been sheer numbers that have given advantage.

Today the military strength of North America rests on very special circumstances which exist on a scale presently unmatched elsewhere throughout the world.

Our young people, on whom the future depends, are most highly educated; they have been familiar since their earliest years with mechanism in all its forms and uses; they have shown inventive abilities of the highest order, and capabilities in research which are unexcelled; there is discipline when the occasion requires, and courage in action and capacity to endure adversity that have been proved beyond dispute.

Behind these priceless human and moral resources which are notable characteristics of the people of the Atlantic Region, the United States and Canada between them in North America possess the most comprehensive mass production industry in the world. We are particularly fortunate that, if we have to meet an emergency, we start from the satisfactory position that in the standards, in the methods and in the techniques of industry there is wide interchangeability between us. We have, or can have, ample supplies of most key materials required for peace, or for war; and, for any potential shortages, there is capacity to develop acceptable substitutes; capacity, too, for perfecting and rapidly producing the newer and better weapons of war as the occasion may require them for purposes of defence.

It is not on numbers in the armed forces that we in the North Atlantic community depend for defence against any possible aggression, though these must be sufficient. We depend in fact on the more highly-skilled and perfectly-equipped forces by sea and land and in the air which our special advantages make possible - hard-hitting forces which can be

mobile, far reaching, long enduring, and as matters stand, decisive in their power against any aggressor.

It is clear that if we are ever attacked, it is on "quality" forces and on "quality" weapons and equipment that we should place reliance. It is important that this be well-remembered down the years and particularly by those who have to do with the planning and conduct of industrial mobilization.

I think that in the period between World War I and World War II, both in Canada and in the United States, we learned the bitter lesson that unilateral disarmament is a delusion - a very expensive delusion that brought us very near to disaster and that cost us very dear in the lives of our young people. Just such a bitter delusion would be the surrender of any of the special weapons of great power, with which I include those based on atomic energy, until we have acceptable assurance through mutually-applicable safeguards and an effective international system of inspection and control which carries our confidence that they, or their like, will not be used against us.

On the contrary, as the situation stands, it is of the first importance that we give our closest attention and maximum effort to extending the margin of superiority which we now possess in these special weapons and in facilities for their manufacture and in ensuring that we shall be able to use them effectively should the occasion require.

In these matters, the advantage of safeguards now possessed by the people of North America and indeed by the whole of the free world is not something which we could retain if we ceased to progress; if we allowed our high capacity for invention and our industrial efficiencies to decline, then most certainly we would soon be overtaken and surpassed. The best protection for the countries of North America and Western Europe, as well as for the rest of the world, would be an effective universal organization of security under the United Nations but, until this can be brought about, the continued production and further improvement of all our weapons and the maintenance of industrial efficiency and preparedness are vital to the prevention of aggression by making impossible any prospect of its success.

I conclude these remarks on "North American Security" by saying that, until we secure the effective disarmament which we seek, and until the aspirations of all nations can be harmonized by peaceful means, we will continue to need our armed forces and all the resources which our industry can provide both as a deterrent to attack against ourselves and as an assurance to the nations of Western Europe and to all other peace-loving nations, who think with us, that the peoples of North America remain strong and well able to help them.

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