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# The Volunteer Review

## AND MILITARY AND NAVAL GAZETTE.

A Journal Devoted to the Interests of the Military and Naval Forces of the Dominion of Canada

VOL. VI.

OTTAWA, (CANADA,) MONDAY, MAY 6, 1872.

No 19.

### CORRESPONDENCE.

[The Editor does not hold himself responsible for individual expressions of opinion in communications addressed to the VOLUNTEER REVIEW.]

#### THE INVASION OF CANADA.

To the Editor of the VOLUNTEER REVIEW,

SIR:—In writing for the amusement or instruction of your readers the narrative of the invasion of Canada in 1874. I have been chiefly actuated by two reasons viz:—

First to combat the theory advanced by Col. Jervis, and other military engineers, reiterated by the Hon. Jos. Howe in his much quoted speech at Ottawa; that the western peninsula of Canada (*i. e.* the Province of Ontario) is indefensible.

Next to urge upon our administrators the necessity for taking steps to increase the efficiency, and the strength, of our first Line of Defence.

In the pursuance of my first reason, I have followed few details, simply because the information afforded (if any) would be equally useful to enemy as friend, but by a slight sketch of the probable consequences of an invasion at different points; I have endeavoured to prove the fallacy of such an unqualified assertion, with the proviso that Lake Ontario should be held by our Navy.

To carry out this *sine qua non*. I would urge upon the Government the purchase of one or two suitable gun-boats. The U. S. Government already possess four Revenue cutters on Lakes Ontario and Erie, and two more are building at Buffalo. These vessels however insignificant in a naval point of view, are iron-clads compared to the vessels dignified by the name of gun-boats in our service, and would ensure, at the outset, naval supremacy on the lakes. The possession of a few gunboats built for the purpose, such as may be seen by the dozen at Portland or Plymouth would turn the scale the other way, and they might be bought cheaply enough from the imperial Government. By stationing them on the Fishing grounds, and at the depots of the various naval Brigades formed to man them, they might be made useful as schools for the education of our navy, and for the protection of the Fish-

eries, as I don't think they will be given up just now.

To condense the ideas I endeavoured to convey in the furtherance of my second reason, I would urge upon the Government to amend the existing Militia Laws in the following respects,

1st, By abolishing distinctions between the Volunteer and Active Militia Force, and rendering a certain period of service compulsory.

By imposing a special tax for Militia purposes, to be paid by those not actually serving in the Militia for the time being.

3rd. By creating from the passed service men of the Active Force, Battalions, and Divisions of Reserve, with their proper staff organizations.

4th. By popularizing the service by special immunities and grants.

These changes would allow:

1st. The organization of a 3 years drilled Militia.

2nd. Their retention for 3 years longer in an organised Reserve.

3rd. Their complete equipment in Artillery, service stores, and ammunition, to take the field as the first line of Defence, and the following increase of Departmental efficiency, viz:—

1st. A trained staff of each Brigade and Division.

2nd. Reserve stores in each District.

3rd. Organized Transport.

Without these changes I very much fear that the Invasion of Canada in 1874 would end less happily in reality than in my narrative.

It is useless to say more on a subject upon which so much has already been said, but with an earnest wish that such, or kindred measures may be adopted to increase the efficiency of our Canadian Militia.

I remain,

Yours, &c.

CENTURION.

To the Editor of the VOLUNTEER REVIEW.

SIR:—Can any person recruit for a Rural Battalion in a Town where there is a Town Battalion Head-Quarters? ENQUIRER.

Belleuille, Ont., April 30th, 1872.

ANSWER.—There is no law to prevent recruiting in any district, it is not etiquette to do so however, but as the volunteer is free in his choice of corps it is merely a question of local personal influence.—Ed. Vol. Rev.

#### A WIMBLEDON FOR THE UNITED STATES.

Our American friends have never paid much attention to the subject of Rifle shooting. They have been surprised at the enthusiasm with which it is practised in Great Britain and Canada, and some leading journals speak of the apathy displayed on a subject of so much importance. A National Rifle Association has been formed, however, and a bill has been introduced into the New York Legislature in its behalf, granting ground for the purpose of practice, and authorising the Government of the State to offer prizes for competition amongst marksmen. The New York World says: "Wimbledon has long been a butt of English and American Humorists. But the complications arising out of the Alabama claims have made many Americans question whether England might not find her account in her Wimbledon. He laughs best who laughs last. The 150,000 English volunteers are trained marksmen, so are the 45,000 Canadian volunteers. But beyond the formation of the National Rifle Association nothing has been done towards fitting our militia to cope with them. Our militia can march well, some of them, and of course they are all heroes, but they cannot shoot straight. By all means let us have an American Wimbledon." This shows that the Americans are becoming alive to the importance of the subject. It is gratifying to know that satisfactory progress has been made in Canada in rifle shooting. The imperative order which obliges each volunteer to put in the required practice while performing his annual drill, is productive of good results. We do not expect that a marksman can be made in a few weeks, for it requires years of constant practice to become skilled in the use of the rifle—but the annual course of training must accustom the members of the volunteer force to rifle shooting, if it does not make all first class marksmen. We hope to see the spirit kept up, and that the number of marksmen will increase steadily every year. It is gratifying to find the Government disposed to encourage in every way the development of the shooting qualities of the volunteers. The money laid out in this way is well spent, and the result is such as justified the expenditure.

### COLONEL MIDDLETON ON OUTPOST DUTY.

By the kindness of Colonel Middleton, the Superintendent of Garrison Instruction, we are enabled to give the full text of the very interesting lecture on outpost duty delivered by him to Volunteer officers, at the Royal United Service Institution, on the 22nd February:—

Mr. President and Gentlemen.—The subject of my lecture is "Outpost Duty." Now to any of you who have at all studied this subject, as doubtless lately many of you have, it must be evident that to condense all connected with this important part of tactics into one night's lecture would be a feat in homoeopathy which I for one am certainly not going to attempt. I propose therefore to treat the subject more with the view of drawing your attention to its great importance and general principles. Outpost duty may justly be termed "high art" as regards the duties required of a soldier in the field. For its due and proper performance, perfect discipline, great intelligence, thoughtfulness, activity both of mind and body, presence of mind, self-reliance, unceasing watchfulness, and I need hardly add courage, are required added to which certain physical qualities are almost indispensable, such as good eyesight, acute hearing and bodily strength; and I may almost say that all these qualities, to a greater or lesser extent, should be found not only in every officer, but in every non-commissioned officer and soldier engaged in this duty, for to them one and all, the protection and safety of the whole army is entrusted—nay, perhaps of their country. As Colonel (now General) MacDougall writes in his book, "The Theory of War," an officer in command of an outpost should invariably act as if the safety of the whole army depended on his individual vigilance, and he should impress the same feeling of responsibility on the minds of every one of his sentries. Moreover, this is actually the case, for if one link of the chain is broken the great object with which it is stretched may be lost. Now we are accused of neglecting this important part of our profession, and there is, I am afraid, some truth, or rather has been hitherto, as regards time of peace, though many officers have been aware of its necessity, and have done their best to make others think so—notably the late Lord Fitzclarence, whose little book on "Outposts" is well worthy of perusal. In the wars we have been engaged in from time to time in our colonies, they having been either against savages, who rarely move at night, or against badly disciplined Asiatic troops, we have not been forced to carry out such strict outpost duty as is necessary when acting against an enterprising European enemy, so that our colonial wars have not done us much good in that way. In peace-time we have, until lately had no opportunity of practising outpost duty. The fact has been that after every European war the good people of England have begun to think it must be the last, or that if there should be another, we were sure to have nothing to do with it. Their interest in the Army died out and reduction became the order of the day. The army itself could not help being influenced by all this. Then the jealousy with which the civil law watches and over-rides every act of the military law tends to make our peace soldiering more like playing soldiers than is the case with foreign armies; hence we have always required the stern realities of war to awaken us. Nothing is so likely to remedy this state of things as the newly introduced and

long wished for system of autumn manoeuvres, when the want of a stimulus in the shape of the enemy's fire, is made up by the sharp, but generally just, pen of the newspaper correspondent. That in time of war we can soon make good outpost soldiers, is easily proved by referring to the records of the Peninsular war. Decker, a Prussian staff officer, and a writer of some note, in 1822, in a work entitled "La Petite Guerre" writes as follows.—"The English to this very day carry out the duty of outposts with great pedantry; in general, they have only a very superficial idea of the use of light troops. Thus, in the wars in the Peninsula they employed exclusively their German troops for this duty." He also says that in making your disposition of outposts, the character of your adversary is a consideration of some influence. For instance, he remarks, in that respect—viz., outpost duty—it is said, "The Frenchman is brave, the Austrian troublesome, the Russian dangerous (on account of his numerous Cossacks) the Spaniard lazy, and the English dull; whilst the German is docile, full of zeal and good will, and learns everything." That there was some little truth, however, in what Decker said is shown by the fact, generally admitted, that General Crawford, who commanded the incomparable light division in Spain, formed his system of outposts principally from that of the 1st Hussars of the German Legion (who were I believe, Hanoverians, and who formed part of his division but that we exclusively employed our German auxiliaries for outpost duty during the Peninsular war is contradicted by the fact that most of Crawford's division, which eventually performed nearly all the outpost duty of our army, consisted principally of British troops; and that they were neither pedantic or dull in their performance of these duties, let the answer be the operations in the tract of country between the Poa and Aguada in 1810, where the light division, consisting of never more than 3,500 infantry 800 cavalry, and six light guns, held a tract of country, with at first a front of forty miles, for four months, in face of two entire corps of the French Army under Massena.

When we went to the Crimea I am afraid we had forgotten most of our Peninsular outpost knowledge. The Russians say that their spies could always penetrate the English lines easier than the French, and at Inkerman we were nearly surprised owing to our outposts failing in their duty. Towards the end of the Crimean War, as usual, we were nearly perfect. Altogether, then, it may be concluded that we have never experienced any difficulty in making good soldiers of any description so long as we had time on active service to do so. But shall we have that time? No, we shall not; and this is a fact which should be brought home to every Englishman be he soldier or be he civilian. Colonel Chesney, in his admirable lecture on the "study of Military Decision in time of Peace," delivered at this Institution May 5, 1871 says on this point, as describing the process by which Wellington formed the Peninsular Army—viz., by the pressure of actual experience in the field—"Such was the manner in which the Army of the Peninsula was formed, but its formation in that way, I take leave to say, has been in one sense a real national misfortune to our country," because, he goes on to say "you are constantly met with the objections" to Army reform, "Why do you require army reform when we had so perfect an army in the Peninsula?" He adds that it cannot be too often or too clearly declared that no English general will ever again have the time to form an army in that

Wellington had. In the old days, when wars lasted for years, we were able to expend a year or so in learning our work, and the results generally crowned us with victory, but at a heavy cost, as Sir William Napier forcibly and eloquently puts it in his "History of the Peninsular War": "In the beginning of each war England has to seek in blood the knowledge necessary to insure success, and like the Fiend's progress towards Eden, his conquering course is through chaos, followed by death." In these days, however, owing to the greatly increased attention which is paid to the science of war, the vast improvements in the precision and range of all arms, the rapidity of movements caused by the use of steam and the electric telegraph, wars no longer drag on their weary length year after year. We have seen of late four European wars, the longest of which was of scarcely a year's duration, and which prostrated two of the great Powers of Europe. Hence, it is evident that in future campaigns, every man, officer or soldier, must take the field learned in the art of war so far as it can be taught in time of peace, and to what perfection that teaching can be carried we have in the late exploits of the Prussian Army a most convincing proof. That we in this country have resolved that in future England shall not have to seek in blood, the knowledge necessary to insure success in war, is apparent from the efforts of Government, backed by the general opinion of the country, especially of late; and it only remains for all of us who constitute the military forces of Great Britain to second these efforts with that hearty zeal and determination which is so characteristic of our nation when engaged in what we know and feel to be right and necessary. If we only do this, I for one, certainly fear not the result of our meeting the armies of any power in existence, whilst we have right on our side, and without that, I think there is little fear of Great Britain ever entering into a war with King or Kaiser, and I might add, in these Republican days, with President either. Now, I have already given you to understand that of all duties, outpost duty is the most important and difficult, owing to so much being demanded from those who undertake it, and as requiring, I think more practice: and it seems likely that in future wars these duties more than ever will be entrusted to picked troops specially selected, and when I say picked troops, I do not mean picked out for height or smartness of appearance, or because belonging to this or that regiment, but because they possess those qualities which I have already enumerated as necessary to make a good outpost soldier. Some of these qualities, I will allow, can only be ascertained in actual warfare—the others can be as well ascertained in peace time, much more than with regard to other operations; and for this reason: When bodies of men are moving against each other in peace time the true test of good performance, owing to the absence of real fighting, is wanting; whereas, in the case of outpost duty, actual fighting is a small part of the test; quickness and correctness of eye in seizing advantageous cover and ground, ability in disposition, and obtaining information of the enemy's movements, being the most important part of the duty, a knowledge of which can only be obtained by constant practice, and their performance can almost be as well estimated in peace time as in war time. For this reason I should like to see in our autumn manoeuvres some practical attempts made to test the outpost duty knowledge of both officers and men, by moving one force against another without any previous warning.

Now having stated that none but the best troops, not only in point of ability and intelligence, &c., but also in point of discipline, can ever be good light troops, especially outpost troops, it may be said that owing to the peculiar constitution of the Volunteers of England, and the shortness of the time that you are able to devote to your military duties, it would scarcely be worth while to practise so difficult a one as outpost duty; but in my humble opinion such is not the case. So long as the practice is carefully carried out under the superintendence of some one who is competent to teach it, good must accrue therefrom, and if, as I trust will be the case, some of you are going to take part with the Regulars in the autumn manoeuvres, you may find a knowledge of outpost duty necessary. Moreover, I fancy that with some of you occasionally a want of space for drilling in large bodies (that is in regiments) may exist, though ground suitable for the practice of outpost duty could be easily found; and it must be remembered also that a captain can practice his company at picket duty alone as well as a colonel can practice his regiment in outpost duty, and if it is carried out with care and intelligence it will not be lost time; and certainly no men ought to be able to bring to bear on it more intelligence than the Volunteers of England. Outposts, speaking generally, consist primarily of sentries or videttes (the former being infantry, and the latter cavalry) pickets, and supports. It may be worth while here to point out that different writers on outpost duty give slightly different names to these component parts. Colonel Hamley calls them sentries, pickets and main guard, Colonel Sir Garnet Wolseley calls them sentries pickets, and grand guards; Sir C. Staveley calls them sentries, pickets and supports; at Aldershot they are called sentries supports, and reserves; and in the Drill-book you will find that they are called sentries pickets and reserves, when the pickets are distant from the main body. The drill book also mentions inlying pickets. These are pickets who remain in camp accoutred and ready to turn out, and assist the pickets in case of an attack. These pickets, if the reserves were out, would be almost in the place of the Prussian main body of outposts, which I shall allude to presently, and it would seem better that, like it, they should be posted in advance of the camp, instead of in it. No doubt these different terms mean much the same thing, the principle being the usual tactical one of skirmishers, supports, and reserves. If there is no main body of outposts, the skirmishers are represented by sentries, the supports by the pickets, and the reserves by the supports to the pickets. If there is a main body, it would act as reserve, and the pickets become reinforcements to the skirmishers.

As I said before, the principle is the same still, I cannot help wishing to have a more recognized nomenclature system. The former might be as follows: There would be the sentries or videttes, the pickets, and supports to the pickets, and the main body of the outposts. This latter might, or might not, be always necessary. In certain cases, to be explained hereafter, there would be an additional line of parties between the pickets and the sentries, which might be called detached posts.

The part of the Drill book on pickets is very good as far as it goes, but it requires to be supplemented by a more elaborate description.

The Prussian system differs a little from ours, though not so much from our drill-

book rules as is thought. In fact, if the English outlying pickets were called out, or if as is sometimes the case, the Prussian supports are not posted out, there would be almost the same disposition in both cases. The Prussians have sentries, pickets, supports to the pickets or reserve, and a main body of outposts. They, as well as ourselves, may, owing to the peculiar nature of the ground, have another line, as it were, called non-commissioned officers' posts, or detached posts, as will be explained presently. One peculiar fractional part they have which I think we should do well to adopt. They allow no one to penetrate through the line sentries except by a road, if there should be one running through the front, at a certain spot, if there is no road; on this road or spot there is posted a sentry in line with the other sentries (please to remember that all outpost sentries are double) whose duty it is to stop all comers, and call the corporal in charge of the party furnishing this sentry, the said corporal and his party consisting of four men besides the sentry, being posted a little in rear of and in sight of him. This non-commissioned officer, who is selected for his intelligence, examines and questions all people wishing to pass, and according to his orders in passing or turning them back. Outposts may be posted under two slightly different circumstances—viz., when thrown out to protect an army halting for a night only, and when in front of an army in position for any time, or besieging a fortress; in both cases the objects with which they are thrown out is the same; though, perhaps, when the enemy is very close, as would be the case at a siege, greater precautions, if possible, and greater strength might be required. When outposts are in front of an army halted, they are generally relieved about day-light as that is the time attacks are generally made, and this insures a larger force at what may be the critical moment. The objects with which outposts are thrown out are generally said to be two—viz., first, to prevent the army in war from being surprised; and secondly, to gain information of the enemy's movements. But I hardly think this explanation explicit enough; for instance, to save an army from surprise, means to give it time to form in line of battle, but the outposts may be required to give it time to retire and thus decline battle. Then again, a proper disposition of outposts may not only enable you to gain information of the movements of the enemy, but it ought to prevent him from gaining information of the movements of your own force. Again, another object is gained, inasmuch as the rest of the army is able to obtain repose at night and thereby the necessary strength for the work of the coming day; and for this reason it is so great a necessity that the army in general should have implicit confidence in their outpost troops, as was the case in the Peninsular War. One thing must always be borne in mind by all concerned in outpost duty, that they are not meant to fight if they can help it. They are watch-dogs, but are not to bark or bite unless hard-pressed; above all, sentries must be careful not to fire unnecessarily, as one shot is likely to cause another, and if the alarm is false, the camp will have been awakened for nothing, and have lost their rest, which is worse. If really attacked, sentries and pickets must retire slowly, fighting, and, if necessary, sacrifice themselves to obtain the necessary time for the forces in rear to form. Having stated the objects for which outposts are intended, the next question is, how are these objects to be best obtained. And the answer involves a description of the composition

of the outposts, the distance they should be in advance of the army, their disposition, &c. Now it is really impossible to lay down any fixed rules as to these points, because such different circumstances may have to be considered in deciding them. Speaking in general terms, we may say that their composition should be suitable to the country they are required to act in; thus they would have more or less cavalry, according as the country was open or close; but some infantry would always be used, especially at night or in thick weather. In some cases artillery would be used; for instance, if a defile of water-communication had to be defended, or if the country was very favourable for that arm, and the outposts were expected to make a prolonged defence. As to how outpost duties are furnished: In the Drill-book it is laid down that pickets in the field may be taken by brigades, the different regiments furnishing one or more companies as required, the whole under charge of a field officer of the day, or an entire regiment may be employed under its own officers. Now in my opinion—and I think in that of most military men—the latter system is infinitely to be preferred, and should be always carried out on a larger scale if necessary; that is to say, if the front to be guarded is extended enough, the duty should be done by a brigade under its brigadier, and so on. In fact, the advantage of having this duty performed by men, officers, staff, and generally accustomed to work together, and bound together a strong *esprit de corps*, brigade or division, as the case may be, is so evident that I think there is little doubt but that in future it will be carried out. No body of troops, small or large, ought ever to move on active service without an advanced guard, which is only a moving outpost; and as it is equally *de rigueur* that no body of troops should ever halt without having outposts, it seems natural and convenient that the advanced guard should resolve itself into outposts when a halt takes place. It might so happen that owing to circumstance, it may be considered advisable to place fresh troops on outpost duty, but is still necessary that the advanced guard should take up the ground at once, though it may have to be relieved directly after.

There is rather a remarkable instance in the records of the Peninsular War, where neglect of at once establishing outposts temporarily might have produced a great effect—might, indeed have materially altered the state of Europe. When the Duke of Wellington had determined to make a stand against the French, under Joseph and Victor, near Talavera, during the movements necessary to take up the position, the allied advanced guard, under General MacKenzie, was occupying the ground near the Casa de Selina, which was in the middle of a wood, the infantry being in the middle of a wood, and the cavalry in the plain. The Duke rode up to the Casa, and mounted to the top of the building to observe the enemy. Suddenly the infantry were attacked by Victor's skirmishers so unexpectedly that several of the men were killed lying on the ground. The rest were driven into the plain, where they rallied, and supported by the cavalry retired in good order. Sir Arthur had barely time to descend from the Casa and reach his horse. The top of the Casa commanded to a great extent a view of the country, but the French skirmishers got up to the wood unseen, owing to the smoke from some burning hats. Had an outpost been thrown out, this surprise could not have occurred.

Large armies in the field move in so many columns, and if the several lines or roads on which they move are very far apart,

each column would have its own advanced guard and set of outposts furnished from it, connection being kept up between each. If the front of the army is a narrow one, it might be covered by a division which would have its advanced guard, and from which the outposts would be furnished. Colonel Hamley, in his 'Operations of War,' says advanced guards may consist from one-twentieth to one-tenth of the whole force, according to circumstances, when an army is advancing on different roads, and in the case of a division being in advance, its advanced guard would be in the same position, which will give us an idea of what the strength of outposts should be. Then with regard to the distance between them and the main body, the rule is this, that they should be so far in front, that if attacked and obliged to retire, sufficient time would be given to the army in rear to form up in line of battle; so that the distance would depend on the length of time required by the force to form, or in other words, on the amount of the force. At the same time they must not be so far advanced as to be liable to be cut off, and thus completely fail in attaining their object. Good cavalry well in advance, however, ought to prevent any fear of this happening. You may remark that the nature of the ground would have a strong influence in the decision of all of the foregoing points. And now we come to the disposition. As I have already told you, outposts have three principal component parts—sentries, piquets and their supports. These are disposed in three concentric lines, at certain distances and at lateral intervals, the whole being somewhat in the shape of a fan. The outer and most extended line consists of parties of two forming a continuous chain. The next line consists of the piquets which furnish the sentries, and is less extended, and the third line of the support still less extended. Each of these lines are kept in constant communication—some times by sight but always by means of patrols, or small parties of men, under a non-commissioned officer sent out to see what is going on. It is usual to rest the flanks of outposts on impassible obstacles, natural if possible. If they cannot be obtained, we sometimes rest them upon artificial ones, such as field works; or the outposts may be thrown back to connect with the main body, or regular flank outposts may be established on the flanks of the main body. Lateral communication is kept up by the same means between each party, communications being made through walls or hedges, if any, and at night lateral communication is kept up by the sentries. Thus it ought almost be impossible for a cat to pass through these lines without being detected. Now, as the actual posting of the several component parts of the different lines: First we will take the sentries. In posting them the first rule or desideratum is that they should see and not be seen. Of course it may happen that both these points cannot be obtained, in which case the latter must be disregarded. Then as few men should be used as is compatible with the work they have to perform—viz, to leave no part of the ground unwatched, especially roads and paths leading from the enemy. It may be asked here, Why should outpost sentries be always double, as it would seem to be contrary to the rule just given? But there are several good reasons for doing so. If men were posted singly at night, they would have a tendency to close on one another, and thus leave gaps in the line, and being two and two prevents that, and gives them more confidence. Then at night, and in thick

weather, each sentry has to communicate with its neighbor, and if it was single, he would lose the spot on which he was posted, and leaving an opening; whereas, when double, one man remains on the post, looking out to his front, while the other patrols to his right, and by relieving one another, they prevent drowsiness. Then in day or night time, if anything is seen in front which must be reported, it might be necessary for the man seeing it to go back to report it to the officer, and if only one man was on the post, he would have to leave it unwatched, and might not be able to find the spot again. Then one man might go to sleep, be taken ill, have a fit, or desert; whilst it is not so likely that two men would do so at the same time. It is evident, however, that at night or in thick weather more sentries would be required than in day time, and they are generally brought back a little also. In day-time the sentries lay quiet, and do not move about, but at night they act as I have already told you. They would not fix their bayonets if there is sunshine or moonlight, as the gleaming of the bright steel is likely to betray their position. Sentries should never be posted near a wood, ravine, or spot in their front, from which a sudden rush could be made upon them. If there is an obstacle in front—such as a river, canal or marsh—the sentries as a rule, should not be placed on one side and the piquet on the other. There has been, and is, a difference of opinion about allowing a sentry to smoke. I believe the Prussians rather wink at it, especially with regard to their videttes. It certainly would tend to keep a man awake, and and were it not for the first lighting, a pipe would not show so much, but on the whole, I think a man on sentry or vidette had better do without his pipe, or he might chance to have it put out in an unpleasant manner. Sentries should be relieved every two hours by day, and every hour by night or in severe weather. Sentries on outpost duties pay no compliments. This is the only case in which the strict respect to officers, most properly required from all soldiers in our service, is not demanded, and the reason is evident, that, as the soldier is employed in an important duty, which requires all his attention, even the respect due to his superior, which is inculcated in him from the first day he joins, must give way in this case. Sentries must be warned not to fire unnecessarily, especially at night time. They should pay attention to the slightest thing they see; a cloud of dust may mean a great deal, the glitter of arms, barking of dogs, rushing of cattle or game without an apparent cause, and a thousand other things may convey important matter to the mind of an intelligent man, and be of great use in obtaining information as to the position of the enemy. The necessity of being more on the alert in bad weather must be impressed strongly not only on the sentries, but on everybody on piquet, that being the time generally selected by the enemy in making an attack; Inkerman again was an instance of this. The piquets are posted about the rear of the centre of their line of sentries. The distance would depend on circumstances. They should of course, be near enough to be able to support their sentries if attacked, and out of sight of the enemy, and in sight of the sentries if possible. It is recommended that they should take advantage of a hollow or rise in the ground, if convenient, or may lay behind a house or yard, but never in a house. A piquet should never shut itself up unless distinctly ordered to do so, which would rarely be done. If it did so in case of an attack, it might be surrounded, and the enemy would then press on and

leave a few men to contain them, and the object with which they were posted would be frustrated. But a piquet may, and should, strengthen itself by means of slight trenches, obstacles, &c.; thus enabling it to hold out longer and rally its sentries. Sir William Ried mentions, in reference to this, a case of an officer of the 52nd Regiment, who, when in charge of an outpost during the operations of the Passage of the Nive, in 1813, strengthened it so well that the piquet had no occasion to retire until their sixty rounds were nearly expended, thus enabling the troops behind to assemble, for it was December, and the troops were scattered in houses. Having decided on the spot, the officer commanding takes measures to inform his sentries where it is, piles arms, and puts a single sentry on them, whose duty besides to watch for any signal from the sentries. If circumstances do not admit of that, it may be necessary to place another man in advance between him and the sentries as a communicating sentry. The officer then communicates with the piquets on each side of him and with the reserve, sending to the field officer of the outposts a sketch of his ground if possible. With regard to fires, it is always better, if the weather will admit of it, that there should be none, and that the men should bring their rations cooked. However, the field officer of the day would settle that point. If a fire is allowed, it should be concealed as much as possible, and only part of the men allowed at a time to lay near it, particularly at night. The rest, being on one side, would flank a sudden rush on the men at the fire, who would be visible to the enemy.

There should always be two or three cavalry soldiers with each infantry piquet, who should be used solely for carrying back in formation. When there happens to be a high building, or even a tree; near the spot where the piquet rests, a sharp non-commissioned officer should be sent up with glasses to reconnoitre, who could communicate by means of a string with those below. All information should be sent back in writing, and the source from which the information was received should be stated; also the number or name of the piquet, and the hour at which the messenger was sent off. A piquet should not retire hastily, unless pressed firmly by superior numbers. If the attack is not made by a large force, a piquet should not retire until it sees its flanks are being turned. If one flank only is turned, and the enemy few in number, by remaining firm, it may be able to attack them in flank, or in rear if they press on. The position of the piquet should be changed at night, or, if the army is halted for any time, the officer in command should be careful to make his men sleep by squads in the day-time as much as possible, doing the same himself; the rest remaining on the alert. By this means they will all be more able to do the night duty, which is the more important. We now come to the reserve, or support to the piquet. It is not necessary that every piquet should have its reserve or support, but generally one for every two. The same directions as to the posting of the piquet hold good as regards the reserve. It is generally posted on or near a main road, at a convenient distance, and the field officer would remain with it during the night, unless there was a main body of outposts. Piquets and their supports pay no compliments, further than when a general officer, or the field officer of the day, approaches, they fall in and stand to their arms.

The reserve or support, must connect with the piquet by means of sentries (single) and patrols, and with the neighboring reserves

by means of patrols. In thick weather, or very close country, patrolling would have to be almost constant. It may be considered necessary, for the reserve, besides its communicating sentry, to throw out one to single sentry to its right and left. If there is a main body of outposts, they may do the same, besides having a communicating sentry.

There remain two parts of the system of outposts to be mentioned—viz., advanced posts and patrols. And first, concerning advanced posts. When there happens to be some peculiar feature of the ground, such as a small hill or rise in front of the sentries, and that it is necessary to hold it, but to include it in the line of sentries, would extend them too much, that an advanced post is placed close to this spot, which furnishes the particular sentry for that spot, and becomes a sort of a standing patrol. Again if any of the sentries are too far off in a lonely spot, or if any obstacle, such as a wood or water, lies between them and the piquet, then a detached post is detached to furnish such sentries and be nearer to them; thus giving them confidence.

Lastly, we come to patrols, and, though I mention them last, they are by no means the least. In fact patrolling is one of the most important parts of outpost duty. Without it little or no information could be obtained of the intentions and movements of the men. If possible, the same men should always patrol, and in the same direction. There are three sorts of patrols—visiting patrols, reconnoitring patrols, and the morning reconnoitring patrol, which is stronger than either of the other two. The visiting patrol generally consists of a corporal and two men, who visit the sentries by day and night between each relief, and in case of a shot being fired it immediately proceeds to the spot to ascertain the cause. This patrol always moves inside the line of sentries, and establishes some sort of a signal with the sentries to avoid the necessity of being challenged and having to answer messages on account of men sleeping. The reconnoitring patrol is a more important one, and goes beyond the line of sentries towards the enemy, they move with the greater caution, and generally consists of a non-commissioned officer and three men. As a rule, infantry patrols should not advance further than a mile, but cavalry, of course, can go much further. The commanders of the patrols are expected to report everything they see while out—all features of the ground, houses, woods, &c. They must never forget that they are not sent out to fight, and if they should chance to meet a patrol of the enemy they should return, if possible, without firing a shot.

The large morning patrol is sent out just before daybreak, and must proceed with immense caution, as it may fall in with the enemy waiting to attack at daylight.

### THE CONDITION OF THE SOUTH.

Seven years have passed since the conclusion of the American civil war; and it might have been supposed that by this time some progress would be shown in the effort to restore the Union. The theory of the Federal Government was and is now that of a fraternal union of the several States; but the practical treatment of the South is that of a conquered territory. The control of affairs in the various States has been handed over to a class of ignorant scoundrels from the North, called "carpet-baggers," and the still more ignorant blacks just emancipated; while the educated native whites who are

more particularly interested in the welfare of the country have been disfranchised. What effect this arrangement has had on the social condition of the people it is, of course, difficult for those at a distance to say. But there are some facts brought out in figures, in regard to which there can be no doubt. The property of the eleven States in 1860, exclusive of slaves, was valued at \$2,723,825,000. At the end of the war their increased liabilities and loss, exclusive of slaves, was \$1,272,900,390. This, however, was only the State loss. Secretary Belknap fixes the rebel debt, on the 1st of April, 1865, at \$2,345,297,823, making the total loss of the rebellious States by the war \$5,262,303,554. This sum, it will be seen, is about twice the assessed value of all Southern property in 1860, exclusive of slaves. Five eighths of Southern property is gone, and the taxes upon the remainder are four times that upon the original property before the war. This, it might be said, was the natural consequence of their own act of rebellion against the constituted authorities, and for which they should expect no sympathy, especially as the Northern States also suffered great losses, and came out of the war with a heavy debt.

This may be true—the case being looked at from a Northern point of view; but the condition of the several States since the war has been steadily growing worse. The debt of Alabama in 1866 was \$5,000,000; under the carpet-baggers' rule it has advanced to \$24,000,000. South Carolina is still worse. The figures tell a singular tale. In 1860 the State debt was \$14,000,000; in 1865, at the close of the war, it was \$20,000,000; in 1868, after three years of military rule, it had reached \$24,000,000; and in 1871 the three years of carpet-bag robbery had increased it to \$34,000,000. The increase of debt since the war has been more than twice what it was during the war. It looks very much as though war was cheaper than peace; certainly it cost South Carolina less. It is not difficult to say where the greater portion of this money has gone to. Some few dollars have been expended on public works, but the mass of it has gone into the pockets of the legislators. In 1860 South Carolina paid for offices and salaries \$123,800; in 1871 it paid \$381,640. In two years \$1,208,577 has been spent for which no vouchers can be found. Legislature would vote money to fit up committee rooms, and then the members would spend it to fit up their private apartments. The negro legislators, in particular, appear to go in for a barbaric splendor in their furnishings—their private rooms being gorgeously fitted up with Brussels carpets, sofas, mirrors, gildings, porcelain spittoons, &c.

Some of the old pro-slavery party are exceedingly bitter against the negroes for their extravagance; but without reason, we think. Just emerged from the darkness and ignorance of slavery, none need wonder at their fantastic ideas of liberty; nor be surprised that they use for their personal gratification powers intended for the public welfare. We have no doubt that these ignorant people are simply employed as tools by the designing whites who obtain rule through them. To show the predominance of those who were so lately slaves, it is sufficient to point out that in the legislature of South Carolina elected in 1869, there were twelve black and twenty white senators; eight of the twelve black senators paid no taxes. In the House, there were 66 black and 37 white members; 68 black members paid no taxes. This is a new phase of despotism; those who don't pay taxes spending the money and making the law for the tax-payers. As long

as this continues there will be no limit to the robberies of these carpet baggers, and no improvement in the misery and penury so wide spread over the South. And we see no remedy save in the passage of an act of amnesty. Unless the influential white men, who will have some interest in conserving the affairs of their several States, have their franchise restored to them, no amelioration in the condition of the South need be expected for many years.

There has been a culpable negligence, to give it the mildest term, in the treatment of the Southern States, by the victorious North that is highly discreditable. If the Federal Government is disposed to consider the evils endured by Southerners as a just punishment for their rebellion, it would be much better to pass a law in Congress burning up a few towns, or laying the whole South under a heavy tribute, or something of that sort, rather than hand them over to the tender mercies of a pack of swindlers, whose robberies go into their own pockets, and whose extortions have not even the coloring of being done under law; more especially as the carpet-baggers have not rendered any services to the Federal Government which should entitle them to the privilege of preying upon the defeated rebels. If the union between North and South is anything more than theory it is time for it to be seen in the treatment of the Southern States by the dominant party.

A SURE MARKSMAN.—We have pleasure in copying the following from the *Lora Observer* about one of our oldest and most respected citizens.—“For several years past there has been a Rifle Association at Guelph with many members, and the proficiency they have acquired is considerable, the most expert marksman being Mr. James Hazleton, who has just earned the Association medal for the second time, and therefore retains it. Mr. Hazleton is the son of a soldier, with all the ardor of a professional himself, and we should be glad to see him represent this County at the next Wimbledon—with him there would be no squabbling about pay for his time.” We may add that Mr. Hazleton made the highest score in nearly all the challenged rifle matches shot by the Guelph Rifle Club in 1871.—*Guelph Evening Mercury*.

It must be satisfactory to the public of Canada to see what a rapid growth has taken place in the traffic of the main Canadian lines of railway during the last few years. The most conspicuous increase has been the Grand Trunk Railway. For the year 1867 the gross receipts were \$5,360,868, whilst in 1871 they were no less than \$8,313,014, showing an increase of very nearly \$2,000,000 in four years, or about 30 per cent. The greatest increase has been in the last year, the receipts over 1870 having increased by no less than \$1,043,273, or about 14½ per cent, in one year. Now if the improvement in time would only keep pace with the traffic this would be eminently satisfactory. The time this winter is, however, considerably better than last, and when the whole line is relaid with steel rails and a double track laid we hope for something like perfection.—*Oshawa Vindicator*.

REMITTANCES Received on Subscription to THE VOLUNTEER REVIEW up to Saturday, the 11th inst:—

BELLEVILLE.—Col. Campbell, (per Agent) \$2.00.  
KINGSTON, Ont.—Ens. J. W. Power, \$2.00  
GANANOQUI.—Lieut. Thos. M. Cornitt, \$2.00.  
ST. JOHNS, N.B.—Major M. H. Maher, \$2.00.  
SOUTH ST. ANDREWS, Man.—Ens. A. Ross, \$2.00.

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## The Volunteer Review,

AND

### MILITARY AND NAVAL GAZETTE.

"Unbridled, unbought, our swords we draw,  
To guard the Monarch, fence the Law."

OTTAWA, MONDAY, MAY 6, 1872.

LIEUT-COLONEL WAINSWRIGHT GRIFFITHS, at present on a tour through British Columbia, has kindly consented to act as the Agent for the VOLUNTEER REVIEW in that Province.

ENGLISH Military Journals criticise the *Brighton Review* on Easter Monday with undue severity, and it would appear for no better or more intelligible reason than that the force was composed of men serving voluntarily.

A careful analysis, however, demonstrates the fact that the volunteers as soldiers marched well, and worked splendidly over exceedingly difficult ground, that they are moderately well handled (in this case a marked improvement on Sir Hope Grant's was manifest) and that in fact they made as creditable a display for the hour and one half the field evolutions lasted, as any troops regular or otherwise could do over ground so entirely new to them, with a course of evolutions in strategy and tactics hastily and loosely improvised at short notice.

It is very evident that the patriotism and military spirit that could bring together over 24,000 men for the hard work of a field day like that described, is capable of far greater development than its critics are willing to afford it credit for, and the hostility manifested towards such a valuable force can only be explained on the grounds of the utter disbelief of the English Press in anything but a Regular, Army.

The complicated system known as Mr. Cardwell's "Reorganization of the British Army" may work well, but of that we have grave doubts, the retention within Great Britain of a force of 130,000 men, the localization of battalions and the putting up of commissions to competition like starships in a primary school, will in the end smother what military spirit may remain amongst the people while the improvement of the ballot will distribute the burthen of military service unequally.

There seems then to be little wisdom in decreeing a force which would leave the whole population with trained soldiers whose knowledge was acquired for the mere love of military life and not mechanically.

In illustration of this quality and its value every regular officer who has come in contact with our Canadian Volunteers are unanimous in describing them as the very best military material they ever saw, the easiest drilled and most intelligent soldiers, and that not in one arm of the service but equally so in the Artillery or Cavalry.

If our militia law forced into the rank the idle, unwilling coward, or men whose labors would be better and more profitably employed elsewhere, such a result would not be possible, we would have material that could be drilled like machines if time were allowed, but not intelligent soldiers.

As the pleas on which the Whig Radicals succeeded in withdrawing the Regular troops from the Colonies and concentrating them in Great Britain were *economy* and *Defence*, the employment of a volunteer force would alone answer all the conditions, and it is an enigma why they have persistently neglected the development of such a force.

Great Britain will always require a large force for foreign service that must eventually be drawn from the Volunteer Force, and the result of the whole will be the latter will alone be looked to as capable of affording the necessary security against foreign invasion.

We are perfectly secure without a regular soldier, because our whole population are enrolled, a large portion have served in the Volunteer Force, and we could at any moment assemble in forty eight hours twenty thousand men at any threatened point.

With the experience England has had with the difficulty experienced in many a small corps (for her) of regular troops, it is wonderful that she has not profited thereby, and by encouraging the volunteer element have the force always at the threatened point.

The safety of any nation will be only assured by training all its population possessing military instincts to the use of arms, and providing in an emergency for arming the whole; with the large population England possesses no difficulty could exist in confronting an invader at any point with an over-

whelming force of local troops, and in such a case the value of the volunteers is apparent; but to have that force efficient it is not at all necessary to turn them into *barrack* yard soldiers, or do more than give them a good rough drilling in which the intelligent and accurate use of the rifle would be the principal feature.

Such field days as that at Brighton are indispensable to soldiers whose periods of training are intermittent; if properly placed under the command of an officer who thoroughly understood the organization of the force and their capabilities, the volunteers would acquire an idea of their duties in the field, and if ever the time comes to test their value the importance of those field days would be very soon apparent.

Indeed it does not appear that on the late occasion within the one hundred minutes or so the troops were engaged that greater or more egregious blunders were perpetrated than at any time during the course of the celebrated autumnal campaign.

In all such cases a series of blunders will be perpetrated, especially with troops unused to such work, and the difficulty of distinguishing friend from foe owing to sameness of uniform, but such will be merely regarded as accidents quite as likely to occur in real warfare and with well trained troops.

At the time of Sir Hope Grant's famous report we advised the British Volunteers to avoid in future the error of being commanded by Brigadiers unacquainted with the troops, although the late Review has been better handled in this respect, we see no reason to change our opinion; the establishment of the Volunteer Force should be independent of the Regular Service for the greater part of its staff.

With an intelligent and zealous officer at its head, like our Adjutant-General, the volunteers would have a very different experience and a far more practical knowledge of what field work really was like as well as a more satisfactory record at each anniversary of their now historical Easter Monday Review.

THE United States *Army and Navy Journal* of the 27th April has an article entitled "1861 and 1872" which merits grave attention from the calm and dispassionate manner in which the real basis of the now celebrated *consequential damage* question is treated.

It opens with great contempt of expression for the proposition so strongly insisted on by the supporters of the monstrous claims put forward by the Washington Government, "that the escape of the Alabama and the countenance given to the Southern Confederation by England prolonged the war," and while insisting that it was a fact for the historian to deal with if not the jurist, boldly declares that the real cause of its prolongation was the un-

prepared state of the United States' Government and people to meet the issues in a state of military preparedness.

At the opening of that disastrous contest in 1861 the United States had no navy and no army; however the former might be recruited from the mercantile marine, the latter did not exist in any sense or degree amongst the people, and notwithstanding their nominal standing army of 13,000 the very material for the rapid creation of an efficient military force did not exist amongst the population.

It is not meant that the soldierly qualities of courage and endurance was not to be found, for those were amply manifested during the contest, but the habits of discipline and the rudimentary knowledge of the soldier's life did not exist and could with difficulty be enforced on a people whose political institutions were lax to the very verge of licentiousness.

It required some stunning and disastrous defeats to awake the people to a sense of what was required, and as a result they first solved the problem of what has been credited to Prussia, "of the value of an armed nationality," exhibiting the extraordinary phenomenon of an ultra Republican system, and a military despotism combined, not under forms of law or constitutions but in direct contravention of both.

The result is matter of history, disaster stimulated energy and that quality was developed till the mere momentum of force decided the disastrous contest.

Trading on the traditions of past success on the over-estimated assertion of National powers, on the fears of the English plutocracy and on the sentimental politics as well as the Republican tendencies of the Whig Radicals, the Washington politicians in order to divert popular opinion from local mal-administration and the pressure of a severe and unsound financial system got up the cry for compensation for damages done by the Southern Privateer the "Alabama;" if we mistake not it was General Bunk's that first raised the issue which was so monstrous that Earl Russell refused to look at or entertain it in any case.

The fears of the English Stockholders compelled a consideration of what was to all intents and purposes a most unjust demand by a people notoriously untrue to their neutrality engagements, the Washington Treaty has been the result; the consequential damages claimed under its provision are so monstrous that even Manchester has been compelled to show fight.

In this connection an investigation into the power and resources of the United States showed the feet of clay to the composite gigantic statue, in other words its army was a mere relic of the past; its Navy, a myth and sham, and that while its claim would be pushed with a reckless and shameless effrontery, it had no power to enforce them in any degree or any case.

To this conclusion the able article in the

*Army and Navy Journal* points, and probably with refined State craft draws the comparison between "1861 and 1872" as an incitement to the Government and people of the United States and a warning to Great Britain, that in the event of hostilities although she might be successful in the commencement, yet the national vitality was such that the States would eventually conquer and repeat the programme of the last contest.

We cannot but admire the manly spirit that will not acknowledge defeat in nationalities or individuals, and we hope our own people will benefit exceedingly by the example which the United States affords in this case.

At the same time, we must in justice to ourselves point out a material difference which the *Army and Navy Journal* wisely leaves in the back ground: in 1861 the United States had no National Debt, in 1872 it is the heaviest in the world, measured by the rate of taxation which is \$20 per capita of the population, or by her foreign commercial relations.

It is manifest that if English Statesmen are wise a period has arrived when they can become emancipated from the fear of the efforts of the great Democracy, and that the United States may be placed in her true position both on this continent and the comity of nations.

The unscrupulous bullyism of her politicians and the garrisoning egotism of her Press, with the self sufficiency of her people combined, to force her into a position respecting other powers to which she was not entitled by her power, importance, or wealth.

We shall be able to give our readers portions of the Adjutant General's "Report on the state of the Militia" for 1871, in our next issue, as many of them will not be able to procure a copy we shall print a large portion of this valuable historical document in the VOLUNTEER REVIEW.

The present volume contains the usual valuable statistical information on the state of the force and the progress made in organization and discipline, which the Adjutant-General declares to be highly satisfactory, the indications of the progressive increase of our population is marked by the fact of enrolment of nearly 700,000 of a reserve force and over 43,000 men of all arms as the active force under discipline. Taking our population as given by the last census, this active force would be equal *pari passu* to a British Army of 331,000 men allowing the population of the British Isles to be 27,000 of souls, so that it cannot be said we are not fairly represented by an armed force.

It is, moreover, very certain that our system has partially drilled within the last ten years at least 100,000 men of which much the largest proportion still remain in Canada, and we are satisfied that in case of

necessity it would not materially affect our interests to place 150,000 men under arms at once.

The whole of this state of preparation is due to the admirable militia law devised by the present Minister of Militia, and to proper appreciation of its provisions and of the *morale* of the force with which he had to deal by the Adjutant-General.

It is only necessary to read the able report now before us to be convinced that the Canadian Army is commanded by a soldier eminently gifted with every quality necessary to accomplish the Herculean and unique task of creating what may truly be called a civilian army.

The completeness of the staff arrangement and the ability of the various officers in charge of the different departments of military administration and control are evidenced by the Reports of those officers, and we may safely challenge the military literature or annals of any army for a more complete methodical instructive analysis of its yearly operations.

The people of Canada have before them in these volumes a full history of the organization of their army, every item of expenditure thereon, the detailed duty of its staff officers, and how fulfilled, and an accurate account of the progress made in drill, organization, and discipline.

Such a document most unmistakably proclaims the touch of a master hand and is at once a valuable class-book on military organization and an historical document of great importance.

The Trade and Navigation returns for the fiscal year ending June, 1871, show that the total exports amounted to \$74,173,688, the imports to \$86,947,482; being an increase on the fiscal year ending June, 1870, of \$600,128 of exports and \$15,709,879 of imports.

The great bulk of our trade lies with Great Britain and the United States; our exports to Great Britain are: \$24,173,244; to the United States, \$30,975,642; our imports from Great Britain being \$49,168,170; from the United States, \$29,022,387; being nearly \$2,000,000 less than our exports to that country, so that the balance of trade is decidedly in our favor which could not be said to be the case under reciprocity; our imports from Great Britain has increased 27.40 per cent.; from the United States, 17.3 per cent.

Our exports to the British West Indies show an increase of \$538,671 while that to the Spanish Main has declined about \$203,000.

The total tonnage employed in foreign and home trade amounted to—Inwards, 6,576,771; Outwards, 6,549,257 tons.

Our new Province of Manitoba figures for the first time in the list—the tariff on which duties are collected existed at the time of the organization of the Province, and the rates are below those of the general tariff of



the Dominion—the value of goods entered for six months, ending 30th Jan., 1871, is \$286,337; duties collected, \$15,723.

The number of vessels built in Canada during the year is as follows:

Ontario, 55; tonnage, 7,777.

Quebec, 80; tonnage, 20,061.

Nova Scotia, 146; tonnage, 44,307.

Now Brunswick, 103; tonnage, 353.

These figures will give our readers an idea of the importance of the trade and commerce of the Dominion of Canada and its steadily progressive prosperity.

“The Yankoo fishermen want the extension of the three mile limit to the Canadian Lake shores, or in other words, the same privileges with regard to our inland fisheries, as the Washington Treaty gives them upon the sea coast. To accomplish this there is to be a Convention of U. S. fishermen at Detroit shortly. Wonder what next our cute neighbors will be attempting? Give them an inch, and they will take twenty. These fishermen must have a vast amount of “cheek.” Hadn't they better come and gather our grain harvest next autumn and claim a share of our cattle and sheep and pigs and horses.”

The above paragraph which we take from the *Belleville Intelligencer* appears to be merely the natural action of the Treaty of Washington and shows the danger of conceding a single privilege to the people or Government of the United States.

It is very evident that we are at the commencement of a series of troubles and encroachments for which the conditions of that treaty will furnish a pretext, and that in the end we will be obliged to resist, the result being an appeal to arms to rectify the blunders of diplomacy.

As a matter of course the inshore fisheries involve the right of shore occupation.

In another page will be found an article copied from an Exchange entitled: “The Conditions of the South,” the consideration of which we earnestly recommend to the *Northern Journal* and the few advocates of the Republican persuasion which flourish under monarchical institutions in this free and happy country.

The vast mass of our people need no warnings against the falsehoods or shams of the pure democracy so much lauded by the little clique of *doctrinaires* to be found in Montreal and Quebec, the beauties of the system are too apparent to need very much comment, and the Canadian farmers will be converted to Republican ideas when the Greek *calends* arrive, but there is very little likelihood of that consummation being arrived at one day sooner.

What a splendid chance carpet baggers would have if Canada was annexed, the beauties of their rule in South Carolina and Alabama would be repeated on a large scale, and it would furnish a splendid opening to our incipient Jim Fisks, as no doubt certain members of the genus are to be found in

our large cities whose energies are cribbed, cabined, and confined by the stringent rules of law and order only requiring democratic rule to flourish and blossom into full maturity.

MODERN science as applied to practical mechanics has changed the Art of War, not so much by the improvements effected in arms or material, as in logistics and major tactics, as far as supervision of the various movements and intelligence is concerned.

The railway and telegraph have produced far greater revolutions than the breech-loading rifle, the mitrailleuse or rifled artillery.

Experience during the last contests in Europe proves that as far as mere weapons of precision are concerned little or no difference is perceptible in the results of an actual battle between those instruments of destruction and Brown Bess of a century since, in both cases close fighting and the bayonet decided the contest, no difference of any consequence having occurred in the number of cartridges used or in the killed and wounded.

Practically then the conditions are changed by the power given—to move armies—bring forward supplies—and as it also enables a much larger force to be brought to the front to enable the General to direct operations over an area whose extent would make supervision impossible under the *ancien regime*.

As Prussian success has dazzled the understanding of most military men a synopsis of the mode by which they utilized the great powers supplied by those mechanical contrivances, and the part they played in their tactical and strategical movements will be instructive.

An able article in the *Edinburgh Review*, for January on “Railway Organization during the late war” lays down the following principles as the advantages to be derived from railways in supplying an army.

“1st—Railways enable supplies to be drawn from almost unlimited distances; formerly an army was dependent for its food upon a small circle of country from which the supplies had to be conveyed by a laborious process.”

“2nd—The loss or damage suffered by supplies in transit is considerably diminished.”

“3rd—The number of reserve magazines or depots which it is necessary to establish in the rear of an army as it moves forward is materially lessened.”

“4th—The cost of transport is enormously diminished, and especially the number of men necessary as escorts or drivers. It has been calculated as an illustration that one day's supply for an army of 35,000 men can be conveyed 400 miles by one train in forty hours.

“The same amount of supplies conveyed by road would require 275 light carts (two

horses each) and from twenty five to thirty days on the road.”

A train would require an engine and fireman, and there are four brakemen or guards, whilst each cart at least would require one driver. In the concentration of troops it is calculated that railway locomotion has increased the facilities six fold.

Railways afford facilities for bringing troops to the front without loss by straggling, war as conducted on the old principle involved long and tedious marches the loss by this means was often an important agent in deciding the success of an operation.

They also enable a general to march troops at any point and to move them during an engagement to any desired position; and lastly they enable him to dispose of his prisoners without weakening his force by detachments as escorts or guards.

In order to make all these powers of a railway available, a careful and well-trained organization of the traffic department is necessary, and this the *Review* says was prepared with great care at Berlin, but an article from the *United States Army and Navy Journal* published in another column tells a very different story as it describes the system as being entirely too cumbersome for practical utility.

The system described by the *Review* consisted of a mixed committee of staff officers and employees of the Ministry of Public Works, and it provided that “twelve full and twelve empty trains were to run daily on the single line of rail, eighteen full and as many empty on the double lines, besides six or seven goods trains.”

Since the introduction of railways into Prussia, great care has been taken to make the various lines subservient to strategical considerations, every carriage placed thereon is constructed with a view to its utility as a vehicle for conveying infantry, cavalry, artillery, horses or munitions of war, provisions and general stores being conveyed on covered trucks.

Each military train contains a battalion and it required 1,300 of those trains to move the fifteen *corps d'Armee* to the Prussian frontier in fourteen days.

With reference to the use of the telegraph the *Review* says: “The direction of an army from the rear would scarcely be possible without the existence of good maps. Topography is a necessary adjunct to success.

“A topographic department is useful as a means of collecting information in peace, but in war every officer should be a topographer capable of supplying the defects of the local maps.”

The Quarter-Master General's department in the Prussian service is divided into three sub departments, as follows:

1st—The supply of men, horses, provisions and military stores.

2nd—The removal of sick, wounded and prisoners.

3rd—The maintenance and repairs of rail

ways and telegraph lines, the police and postal arrangements.

Such is a general outline of the system employed and for want of it the French failed, it was no doubt cumbersome, unwieldy and badly organized, but it was the story of the Zundnadalgawhor against Brown Bess repeated,

The topography of the country and its geographical outline have happily compelled the construction of railways in Canada as strategical lines, in other words they followed the natural formations.

No effort has yet been made to take advantage of that happy accidental circumstance, and we have not yet acquired a staff corps in any sense of the term.

The necessity for this measure has repeatedly been urged on our military authorities without any apparent success, although the fact is notorious that a reliable topographical map of any part of the Dominion does not exist.

As the creation of a staff corps will cost the State nothing the great wonder is that its value is not appreciated and an effort made to supply a want so apparent.

The fourth annual meeting of the Dominion Rifle Association was held on Wednesday, 1st May, in the Western Departmental block, the president, C. S. Gzowski, Esq., in the chair, there were present the following officers:

Lieutenant-Colonel Stewart, Secretary; Lieutenant-Colonel Macpherson, Treasurer; Lieutenant Colonels, Jarvis, Casault, Grey, Lawrie, French, Brunel; Majors Worsley, Ross, White, and other officers and members.

The report of the Secretary was read detailing the operations for the past year, it was unanimously adopted. A most important special report by the President addressed to the Minister of Militia was read of which the following is an extract:

Prize meetings have now been held in the following Provinces; First at the city of Montreal; next at Toronto; third at Fredericton, and last at Halifax. The working of the present system has therefore been thoroughly tried. The results show that at the first two prize meetings in Montreal and Toronto, large numbers of competitors were assembled from all parts of the Dominion, whilst the last two at Fredericton and Halifax, were confined almost exclusively to local competitors. The number of entries and the receipts were correspondingly diminished.

At Montreal the total number of entries was 2,076; do. receipts, \$12,487 91.

At Toronto the total number of entries was 1,366; do. receipts, \$9,413 46.

At Fredericton the total number of entries was 990; do. receipts, \$6,271 68.

At Halifax the total number of entries was 983; do. receipts, \$86,319 03.

The President did not attribute this diminution to any lack of interest in shooting, but to the great distance between the several Provincial capitals and the time lost in making the journey.

In order to carry out the objects for which the Association was organised he therefore considered that a change in its working was necessary. There were two methods.

"First—by so enlarging the Prize List as to make it a pecuniary object to Riflemen to attend, with the view of reimbursing themselves for the outlay of time and money expended in so doing; or, secondly, by centralizing the Association at Ottawa, and limiting its operations chiefly to the selection of a competent team to represent annually Canadian Riflemen at Wimbledon. The first method I am far from wishing to advocate, on the contrary I fear such system would develop a class of men who would calculate on the earnings of their rifles as on any other means of support, and thus defeat the object of the Association. The other is the plan which I beg most respectfully to bring to your notice, with the hope that it will be favorably considered."

Ten representatives should be sent from each Province to compete in Ottawa, where they will be taken care of by the officers of the Dominion Rifle Association; and twenty of the most eligible competitors will be sent to Wimbledon.

After some discussion the Report was adopted.

An able detailed statement was submitted by the Treasurer showing the financial condition of the Association.

The election of officers then took place with the following results:

C. S. Gzowski, Esq., President; Vice-presidents, Lieutenant Colonels Gray and Laurio. For the Provinces the following gentlemen were elected:

Ontario—Allan Gilmour, Esq., Ottawa.

Quebec.—Lieut.-Col. C. J. Brydges, Grand Trunk Railway Brigade, Montreal.

New Brunswick—Lieut.-Col. Hon. J. H. Gray, M.P., St. John.

Nova Scotia—Lieut.-Col. A. J. Laurio, Halifax.

Auditors—John Langton, Esq., Auditor-General, Ottawa; T. D. Harington, Esq., Deputy Receiver-General.

Treasurer—Lieut.-Colonel Macpherson, D.A.A.G., Ottawa.

Secretary—Lieut.-Colonel Stuart, Militia Department, Ottawa.

A few names were changed in the election of members of the Council.

The business of the annual meeting being concluded, the Council held a meeting and appointed an executive Committee to attend to matters of detail during annual rifle meeting. The Committee is composed as follows:

The Adjutant-General of Militia.

Lieut.-Colonel Powell, D.A.G.

Lieut.-Colonel Wiley.

Lieut.-Colonel Brunel.

" " Chamberlin, C.M.G.

" " Grey.

" " Forrest.

Major Ross.

" White.

It was then decided that the next Dominion Rifle match should be held on the 17th of June, the Wimbledon team to sail for England on the 22nd of June.

The value of the Association to Canada cannot be reckoned by its previous record, it has done good and honest service and well and zealously managed by its President, Secretary, and Treasurer.

The latter two officers have devoted valuable time to its development, and were active advocates of the change which has so happily been effected in its *modus operandi*.

We heartily congratulate the President and all concerned on the success of this step in the right direction and are certain the Canadian Wimbledon will be as great a success as the English; its value to the Canadian Army is incalculable.

The Deputy Adjutant Generals of the various Military districts are in town, relative to matters connected with the annual drill.

#### NEWS OF THE WEEK.

Telegraphic reports states that the Washington Cabinet have abandoned the claims for consequential damages and that Mr. Gladstone in the House of Commons and Earl Granville in the House of Lords will take the occasion of the announcement of a termination of the misunderstanding to compliment General Grant.

The Prince and Princess of Wales are still at Rome, where they have been treated with great distinction and kindness by the Italian Government.

The Empress Augusta (of Germany) is expected at Windsor.

A Polar expedition is projected under the auspices of the Royal Geographical Society.

Lord Northbrook, the new Vice-Roy of India, has arrived at Calcutta.

A large number of the members of the International Society have been arrested at Lyons.

Gambetta opposed the abolition of the passport system unsuccessfully, the true Republican only wants liberty for his own purposes.

Trochu's suits for libel against the *Figaro* has terminated against the *feuilletonist*, a fine of 5,000 francs and one month's imprisonment being inflicted, the result, however, is in reality that it has made the fortune of the *Journa'* and ruined Trochu. The evidence effectually stripped him of every scrap of military reputation he was supposed to possess, established his character as a blundering and dangerous fool, alike faithless and unprincipled, equally incapable of forming an opinion or of acting on that of others.

Investigations proves what has been long suspected that the Emperor Napoleon was  
(Continued on Page 223.)

## AT THE LAST.

The stream is calmest when it nears the tide,  
And flowers are sweetest at the eventide,  
And birds most musical at the close of day,  
And saints divinest when they pass away.

Morning is lovely, but a holier charm  
Lies folded close in Evening's robe of balm;  
And weary man must ever love her best,  
For morning calls to toil, but night to rest.

She comes from heaven, and on her wings doth  
bear,  
A holy fragrance, like the breath of prayer;  
Footsteps of angels follow in her trace,  
To shut the weary eyes of day in peace.

All things are hushed before her, as she throws  
O'er earth and sky her mantle of repose;  
There is a calm, a beauty, and a power  
That morning knows not, in the Evening hour.

Until the Evening, we must weep and toll;  
Plough life's stern furrow, dig the weedy soil,  
Tread with sad feet our rough and thorny way,  
And bear the heat and burden of the day.

Oh! when our sun is setting, may we glide,  
Like summer Evening, down the golden tide;  
And leave behind us as we pass away,  
Sweet, starry twilight round our sleeping clay.

## REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON REORGANIZATION OF THE BRITISH ARMY.

Continued from page 203.

96. The mode of raising Artillery recruits will be twofold, according as plan (a) or plan (b) may be applied to particular artillery districts.

97. In those districts in which plan (a) might be adopted, the Militia Artillery Permanent Staff would be attached to the artillery centre and would recruit from that centre over the whole area of the artillery district.

If Militia Artillery alone were in question, the recruiting parties detached from the artillery centre for the purpose of raising recruits for Militia Artillery, would have considerable distances to travel with a comparative small result as regards recruits enrolled, and judging by the results obtained from the mode hitherto practised of raising recruits for a Militia regiment within the circumscribed limits of its own county and the large cost of enrolling such recruits per head, the financial result of recruiting for Militia Artillery over an area comprising many counties, from one centre, might be very unsatisfactory in a financial point of view.

The disadvantage expressed in the last paragraph will, however, be diminished by combining the recruiting for the Royal and Militia Artillery under the superintendence of the artillery lieutenant-colonel; as well as by the expedient, if approved, of detaching a certain number of the Militia Artillery Permanent Staff for the instruction of Volunteer Artillery during the non-training periods of the year, since these last would act as recruiting agents of the artillery lieutenant-colonel at their respective localities.

98. In those districts in which plan (b) might be adopted, the permanent staff sergeants of any Militia Artillery regiment would be attached to the depot centre of the infantry district to which the regiment territorially belongs, a certain number being detached for the instruction of the Volunteer Artillery corps within the limits of the said infantry district.

These artillery sergeants would act under the orders of the artillery lieutenant-colonel in raising artillery recruits within the said infantry district; the Royal Artillery recruits so raised being forwarded to Woolwich, or to the artillery centre of the artillery district, according to circumstances; while the Militia Artillery recruits would

be sent for their recruit *Infantry* training to the depot centre of the infantry district.

99. Under the operation of either of the plans (a) or (b), where artillery recruits might require to be raised in infantry districts possessing within their limits no Militia Artillery special recruiting parties must be employed under the authority of the general of the division.

100. Practically it may be anticipated that Militia Artillery regiments will recruit in their own counties. In England the counties, with a few exceptions, represent infantry brigade districts; and to require any such district to supply two infantry battalions of 1,000 strong, in addition to an existing artillery regiment, would altogether overweight its capability. In this view it would appear desirable, by raising the standard of Militia Artillery recruits, to drive Militia Artillery regiments farther a-field to obtain them and thereby relieve their immediate localities of part of the pressure of artillery recruiting.

101. It is with reference also to those counties or districts now possessing Militia Artillery, that it has been recommended to fix two Militia Infantry battalions at a minimum strength of 750 rank and file as the quota of each brigade district in England, and 650 rank and file as that of each district in Scotland.

## ON THE MOST CONVENIENT NUMBER OF LOCAL CENTRES.

102. The committee was instructed to consider the question whether—in view of desirability of having two Militia Infantry battalions in every line district, and of the difficulty of maintaining more than a hundred such battalions in England and Wales—it might not be expedient to reduce the fifty-three line districts into which by the scheme submitted by the committee England and Wales were divided, to fifty.

103. With reference to this question, it is to be remarked that, although the scheme nominally creates fifty-three districts or centres in England and Wales, four of these are metropolitan districts, so that practically there are only forty-nine depot centres, irrespective of Guards and Rifles.

104. It would doubtless be possible to effect a further reduction by uniting in each of the counties of Yorkshire and Lancashire two of the proposed depot centres into one; an arrangement which would reduce the number of infantry centres in England and Wales to forty-seven; and would set free from the district distribution as now proposed four Line battalions, to be provided with a territorial home elsewhere, by attaching them permanently as third Line battalions to four of the existing two-battalion districts.

105. Although in some respects it might appear advantageous to have a certain number of districts possessing three battalions while the remainder possess only two battalions, there would be a peculiar inconvenience in such an arrangement, which the committee desires to point out as follows:—

It is true that, according to the scheme submitted, one of the districts in England had three Line battalions allotted to it; but this arrangement was imposed by the fact that the infantry battalions of the army form two pairs of seventy and one odd battalion, and by the necessity of giving to the odd battalion a territorial home. The odd battalion in this case becomes really a floating battalion, and may be employed in any manner that may be thought desirable without interfering in the smallest degree with the working of the general system.

106. But the effect of creating four additional districts, each within three Line battalions, would be as follows:—

The normal condition being that seventy battalions shall always be abroad, and seventy-one battalions always at home; a special roster would be necessary for these four districts, so that two of them would at all times have two battalions abroad and one at home, while the other two should always have one battalion abroad and two at home. If this roster were disturbed we might find three districts out of the four, each with two battalions at home. This would disturb the equilibrium of foreign and home battalions, because to maintain that equilibrium the four districts under consideration should always possess in the aggregate six battalions at home and six abroad. In the case we are supposing, however, seven battalions would be at home and five abroad, and to restore the balance it would be necessary that some one of the two-battalion districts should have both of its battalions abroad, which in ordinary times is contrary to the principles of the organization proposed.

107. The actual condition of affairs as regards the distribution of Militia infantry battalions is as follows:—

The main deficiency is in Scotland. Five of her nine centres possess each only one battalion of Militia Infantry; while one centre has no Militia Infantry whatever. But this portion of the empire does not contribute its fair quota in proportion to population.

Ireland, on the other hand, has a Militia establishment in excess of her proportion, which practically there is difficulty in raising. If, therefore, the establishments of Irish regiments were reduced in the aggregate by 5,000, the same number added to the existing Scotch Militia would suffice to provide each Scotch centre with two battalions of 700 rank and file; or of 650 rank and file if the increase were limited to 4,000.

108. In Lancashire, Yorkshire, Staffordshire, and Northamptonshire, where there exist at present Militia battalions of great strength, a sufficient number of battalions to complete the proportion of two to each district can easily be added.

109. Of the centres which remain, six possess only one Militia Infantry battalion, but they each possess one regiment of Militia Artillery.

Kent, which comprises two centres, has at present only two Militia Infantry battalions instead of her proper quota of four; but a third battalion might be raised in the county of Kent, which possess in addition one regiment of Militia Artillery.

Surrey, which comprises two centres, has at present three Militia Infantry battalions, which might be increased to the desired quota of four.

There remains only the centre of Berks, which has now only one Militia Infantry battalion; but it is suggested that in Berks and Northants, which must on the score of population be worked together for recruiting purposes, a second infantry battalion might be raised for the Berks centre.

110. The centres exceptionally referred to in the foregoing remarks are shown in Appendix (G).

111. It would be desirable to form the existing Welsh regiments of small strength into battalions of eight companies each.

112. It appears that if the strength of Militia battalions for England and Wales were, as a rule, fixed at 800 rank and file, a redistribution of the existing numbers would suffice, in connection with the increase recently authorised, to provide the additional battalions proposed to be formed according to the plan here suggested, on the condition that a minimum strength of 750 should be

accepted for those districts which possess Militia Artillery.

ON SUCCESSIVE TRAINING OF MILITIA BATTALIONS.

113. Referring to the proposition on which the committee was instructed to report, to utilise existing barracks for the yearly training of successive Militia regiments, they submit the following observations.

114. A Militia battalion called out for training requires to be provided with the following staff, exclusively its own whether trained at the depot centre of its district, or at a distance from that centre, viz. :—

Adjutant	} These are all attached to and must be drawn away from the depot centre for training duties.
Sergeant-major	
Quartermaster sergeant	
Orderly-room clerk	
Sixteen company sergts.	
Eight drummers	

115. If trained at a barrack, not being a depot centre, the battalion must be provided in addition with—

Quartermaster.  
Surgeon and hospital staff.  
Musketry-sergeant.  
Drum-major.

116. If trained at the depot centre, the duties of the several officers and non-commissioned officers last enumerated would be performed for the Militia battalion by the permanent staff of the depot.

117. But if trained at a barrack not being a depot centre, either each battalion must be independently provided, or a permanent staff, consisting of quartermaster, surgeon &c., musketry-sergeant, and would not be a profitable arrangement unless the barrack could be utilised for Militia training throughout the year.

118. It is therefore desirable that any barrack that might be selected for the training of successive battalions of Militia, should be at the same time a depot centre, conveniently situated with respect to the battalions there required to be successively trained.

119. Militia battalions would, moreover, be likely to derive greater benefit if associated during training with the permanent regular organization of a depot centre, possessing an experienced commander and staff, than if isolated for training under their own officers.

120. This being promised, it appears that the proposed system of training by successive battalions would be advantageous, but that its application must be limited to those localities where Militiamen can come out for training during a great part of the year irrespective of particular seasons. The system is, moreover, commended by the following consideration :—

121. If it be decided to increase the number of Line battalions at home, it is presumed that the existing barrack accommodation must be increased in proportion; and it might be a matter both of convenience and economy to effect the necessary increase in such a manner, that the newly-constructed barracks should serve as winter quarters for Line battalions, and might be occupied by Militia during the special seasons when those Line battalions might be under canvas at Aldershot or the Curragh.

122. The following would appear to be the localities where the system would be applicable.

Lancashire possesses seven Militia Infantry battalions, which it is proposed to increase.

The training barrack proposed is Fleetwood. This has been selected as a depot centre. Its capacity is now—Equal to the accom-

modation of 41 officers, 716 N.C. officers and men.

The capacity of a depot centre has been estimated to accommodate in quarters 11 officers, 276 N.C. officers and men.

Surplus of accommodation at Fleetwood 30 officers, 440 N.C. officers and men.

Accommodation required to be added for a battalion of Militia, 300 N.C. officers and men.

If two Militia battalions were trained together, one of each pair under canvas, during the four summer months, nine battalions could complete their training from May to September inclusive; and the barrack would therefore be available for a Line battalion from October to April inclusive.

The place of training proposed for Yorkshire is at or near York.

Middlesex and the Metropolitan Districts with Surrey possess eleven Militia Infantry battalions, of which seven might train at Aldershot during the summer months.

It is proposed to train the remaining four battalions, as well as two Essex battalions, singly in succession from December to May, at Warley, a proposed depot centre, where increase of accommodation would have to be provided for about fourteen officers and 250 non-commissioned officers and men; and where there is already plenty of land for that purpose the property of the public.

Cheshire, Stafford, and Warwick, possess seven Militia Infantry battalions. These might all perform their training, from May to September inclusive, at Stafford, a proposed depot centre; supposing additional accommodation for one battalion to be provided. From October to April inclusive this accommodation would be available for a Line battalion.

Ayr, Dumfries, Renfrew, Lanark, Stirling, possess six Militia Infantry battalions, which might all perform their training, from May to September inclusive at Ayr, a proposed depot centre, supposing additional accommodation to be provided. From October to April inclusive this accommodation would be available for a Line battalion.

123. In all other cases but those above enumerated it will probably be advisable to train Militia battalions at the depot centres of their respective districts, as large a number as possible being accommodated in the barracks, the remainder under canvas.

IRELAND.

LINE AND MILITIA INFANTRY.

124. Although Ireland possesses only seven national battalions, it has been found necessary, with a view to uniformity of organization, to form eight infantry districts in that island; a measure which entails the localising in Ireland of nine Line battalions which have no nominal connection therewith. Of these nine battalions, several possess already a real connection with Ireland through recruiting; while three others, having been lately transferred from the Indian establishment, can have no predilection of long standing for any particular locality.

125. Should there exist at any time a surplus of recruits in Ireland, other battalions will send parties to enrol them, as in similar cases in the districts in England.

126. Under a system of voluntary enlistment, battalions localised in England, Ireland, or Scotland, need not necessarily become either purely English, purely Irish, or purely Scotch; and by means of the recruiting arrangements suggested in paragraphs 81, 82, the much to be desired result might be obtained of battalions in which the three sister kingdoms would all be represented.

127. It will be observed that it is proposed to establish three depot centres in Ulster, two in Leinster, one in Connaught, and two in Munster.

Five of the districts would each possess four Militia Infantry battalions; two districts would each possess six battalions; one district would possess only three battalions. But it should be borne in mind that these are for the most part weak, as will be seen by reference to Appendix (A)

128. The actual aggregate strength of the Militia force in seven of the districts varies from 2,000 to 2,200. In the remaining district the aggregate strength is 2,470. It may be expected that these numbers will be increased by one-third, if the present establishment be maintained; but if the establishment be reduced, as suggested, by 5,000, the above aggregate strength will be reduced.

129. In applying to Ireland the plan which has been proposed for Great Britain, it will therefore be necessary to increase the capacity of Irish depot centres. An increase of one-fourth will probably suffice, since the number of Line battalions for each district will not increase with the number of Militia Infantry battalions, but will be in variable at two for each district.

130. As a general rule the Militia battalions might train, during summer, partly under canvas at their respective depot centres. In exceptional cases they might train at their county head-quarters.

131. Where the number of counties comprised in any infantry district exceeds four, the Militia regiments of the counties most distant from the depot centre would have considerable distances to travel between their homes and their training stations if trained at depot centres, and these are the exceptional cases referred to in the preceding paragraph. In such cases it may be advisable to leave the head quarters and staff of the regiments most distant from their depot centres as now in their respective counties, attaching them, however, to those centres for the purposes of command, inspection, and correspondence.

132. The Inspector-General of Irish Militia states that the counties would, for the most part if not in all cases, undertake to build barracks for their Militia regiments, provided they could depend on receiving from the Government, as interest for the outlay, the yearly sums now represented by billet-money.

ROYAL AND MILITIA ARTILLERY.

133. It is proposed to divide Ireland into two Artillery districts; the one comprising Ulster and Leinster, minus Kilkenny and Wexford; the other comprising Connaught and Munster, plus Kilkenny and Wexford.

These districts would contain respectively four and five regiments of Militia Artillery.

The most convenient training stations now available would be, for the Northern districts, Carrickfergus, Lough Neagh, Letterkenny, and the Pigeon House Fort, Dublin; and for the Southern district, Duncannon Fort and Kinsale.

134. The proper stations for the artillery lieutenant-colonels of these two artillery districts would be Dublin and Cork.

135. The arrangements for recruiting the Royal Artillery, as well as those for the recruiting for the infantry recruit training, and for the special artillery training of the Militia Artillery, might all be the same as proposed for Great Britain.

136. To carry out the conditions of the memorandum on Organization, it is found that the number of officers therein proposed exceeds the number now borne by the estimates of the regular army by 417.

\*A paymaster-sergeant is not considered necessary; colour-sergeants should not for their respective companies in that capacity.

In the diminution of this excess, however, may be reckoned the following officers now borne on the estimates of the reserve forces who are included in the new proposed organisation, viz.:-

Militia Adjutants.....	132
“ Quartermasters.....	113
Staff Officers of Pensioners.....	66
Superintendents of Recruiting and District Paymasters.....	11
Chatham and Chichester Depot.....	11
Assistant Adjutant Generals for Recruiting and Inspectional purposes*	8
Total.....	341

still leaving an excess of 102 officers, an excess which has been occasioned by the increase of the establishment of subalterns of all the battalions at home to admit of a proportion of the sub-lieutenants of every regiment being withdrawn for instruction.

137. As regards non commissioned officers— N. C. Officers.

The number proposed to be employed exceeds the number now borne on the estimates of the Regular Army by.....	2 419
Against which are to be reckoned non-commissioned officers now borne on the Militia estimates.....	3,058
Showing a saving of non-commissioned officers of.....	639

138. As regards drummers— Drummers.

The number proposed exceeds the number now borne on the estimates of the Regular Army by.....	500
Against this are to be reckoned drummers now borne on the Militia estimates.....	821

Showing a saving of drummers.....	321
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139. The details showing establishment of battalions at home and abroad, and of depot centres is given in Appendix (B).

The total numbers of each rank or grade is compared with the present numbers as shown in Appendix (C).

The distribution of the Army between home and abroad as applied to 66 local centres and rifle depots is appended, marked (D).

The estimated cost of the pay of these establishments and the estimated sums available to meet the additional expense is shown in Appendix (E).

CAPACITY OF DEPOT CENTRES.

140. The calculations must be based on the number of casualties which each district would have to supply yearly, in time of peace, for its Line and Militia battalions.

Casualties of 2 Line battalions (one being at home) say 1,640 rank and file, at 15 per cent.....	247
Casualties of 2 Militia battalions, say 1,640 at 12 per cent.....	197

Total yearly casualties.....	441
Allowing, therefore, for a maximum number of recruits at the depot at any one period during peace.....	200
And for old soldiers.....	50

Total..... 250  
The total number of 250 supplies the basis of calculation as to the capacity and construction of depot centres, which is given in the appendix (H).

141. It is proposed to provide storage at each depot centre for the arms, clothing,

and all articles of personal equipment belonging to the local Infantry force of its district.

Storage for personal equipment of Militia Artillery should be afforded either at the artillery centre of the artillery district or at the depot centre of the infantry district to which any Militia Artillery regiment territorially belongs according as plan (a) or (b), detailed on page 11, may be applied to particular localities.

For articles of general equipment central issuing stores have been formed in sufficient numbers to admit of convenient groups of infantry districts being attached to their own respective issuing stores for such supplies, and among them camp equipment, as it would not be profitable to store at depot centres.

142. An approximate estimate of the cost of building, &c., involved in the foregoing scheme is appended and marked (K).

The estimate embraces the following services, viz.:-

The formation of depot centres in Great Britain and Ireland.

Construction of training barracks in Great Britain, for the training of successive Militia battalions where practicable.

Additions to, and alterations in, existing barrack accommodation consequent on the above measures.

The purchase of a large exercising ground in the north of England.

ON THE CONCENTRATION OF REGULAR TROOPS IN BRIGADES OR DEMI-BRIGADES COMPOSED OF THE THREE ARMS.

143. The concentration above specified would not in any way interfere with the general plan proposed in this Report, which seeks to effect the organisation of Great Britain and Ireland in Administrative Brigades consisting of reserve forces and depot centres, by means of which last the reserve forces of each district would be closely connected with each other and with the Line.

144. The concentration of regular troops, as proposed by the quartermaster general, would accomplish the organisation and quartering of all the regular forces stationed at home, excluding only the regular element of the depot centres, in tactical brigades of the three arms; and the advantage to the efficiency of the army of such a system of quartering troops over that which now prevails can hardly be exaggerated.

145. According to the general scheme explained in this Report, 40 stations or existing barracks have been recommended to be appropriated for depot centres; in exchange for which, compensating accommodation would require to be provided elsewhere. And it is recommended that such accommodation shall be provided, as far as possible, with a view to the concentration of troops of all arms at important stations.

146. The total cost of creating the compensating accommodation alluded to will be found under heads 6 and 8 of Appendix (K) and includes the purchase of land for a large training and tactical station in the north of England, which might afford a site for the quartering of one of the tactical brigades or demi-brigades contemplated by the quartermaster-general, as well as for a Militia training barrack and depot centre; besides supplying a valuable exercising ground for the Regular and Reserve Forces of the surrounding districts.

P. I. McDUGALL, Major-General.  
W. A. MIDDLETON, Colonel R. A.  
G. J. WOLSELEY, Colonel.  
C. B. EWART, Lieut. Colonel R. E.  
RALPH. H. KNOX:

(Continued from Page 225.)

not accountable for the disasters of Sedan, and that he was the only man there who seemed to understand what the crisis demanded, the capitulation was the only resource left, and he concluded it at the right time. The whole misfortune arose from the action of his ministry which was forced on him by the Representatives of France, so much for Representative Governments.

The remaining departments will be evacuated when the war indemnity is paid.

The Carlists are in arms in Spain, several engagements have occurred between them and the Royalist troops in which some hundreds are reported to have been killed. Disaffection is reported as rife amongst the troops, and it is evident the stability of the Sardinian dynasty of Spanish Sovereigns stands on a slight foundation. It is not possible just yet to get at the real facts of this insurrection, but it has been of an extensive character. Bismarck has sent 10,000,000 francs to King Amadeus to aid in putting down the rebellion.

Mount Vesuvius has been in an active state for some time, its eruptions lately have been attended with great loss of life and property.

The Washington Government have been endeavouring to get over the difficulties which the claims for consequential damages has involved that Cabinet and country in. Its immediate effect has been to paralyze all financial measures connected with United States in the European money markets, the stagnation of business, the fall in securities and rise in rate of interest has been too much for the politicians and a back down is inevitable. We are informed that President Grant and his Cabinet are busily engaged devising measures for avoiding the dilemma and offering a compromise, which simply concedes the points on which Great Britain insists.

Fighting is the order of the day in Mexico, it is said revolutionists are gradually assuming the ascendancy, as in Spain it is impossible to tell anything of the actual state of affairs.

In Canada the Parliament is in Session, busily engaged in legislating for the good of the Dominion at large.

The Revenue returns are before the country and show a surplus of over three million of dollars.

The now Governor General will leave England on the 11th June for New York, we should prefer his landing at Quebec, but there is no accounting for tastes.

Throughout the Dominion the signs of enterprise are manifest, great activity prevails, and there can be no doubt of the progressive prosperity which has blessed the land.

Reports from Lake Superior point to rich deposits of minerals in the country surrounding that inland sea, and the same may be looked for towards the North in that territory.

All indications point to an early spring and a season fully as prosperous as the one passed.

\*The assistant adjutants-general of the North British, the Northern, and the Western Districts, will each continue to require assistance for Reserve Forces correspondence. This might be afforded by a deputy assistant adjutant-general in each case.