

External Affairs
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INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SUPERVISION
AND CONTROL IN CAMBODIA.

Progress Report on the Implementation of the
Geneva Agreement
for the period January 1 to March 31, 1955.

PHNOM PENH, 11 April 1955.

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INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SUPERVISION
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Progress Report on the Implementation of the Geneva
Agreement for the period January 1 to March 31, 1955.

INTRODUCTION

1. In the period under review, there were major developments in the internal political situation which had their repercussions on the work of the Commission. On January 24, the Royal Government headed by His Excellency M. Penn Nouth resigned and gave place to an Elections Government under the leadership of His Excellency M. Leng Ngeth. It was officially announced at that time that General Elections would be held on April 17. A referendum seeking the verdict of the people on the "Royal Mission" also took place on February 7 in which a large majority of votes in favour of the King was registered.
2. After the referendum, the King proposed important changes in the Constitution. His Majesty announced that a second referendum would be held to ascertain the wishes of the people on the proposed reform project. It was stated that elections would be postponed pending the result of the referendum on the reforms.
3. As a result of related political developments in the country and due to his own desire to free himself from the fetters of kingship so as to be able to work more freely, King Norodom Sihanouk announced on March 2 his abdication in favour of his father and mother, King Norodom Suramarit and Queen Kossaman. On March 15, the Royal Government announced that it had decided to drop the proposal to hold a second referendum on the reform project. It also announced that elections would be held on September 11, 1955.
4. These internal political developments caused a great stir in the country, particularly as they concerned an outstanding personality as King Norodom Sihanouk. The normal work of the Commission took second place, though a certain amount of progress was recorded in the first few weeks of the period in tying up some loose ends. Because of these developments, the earlier expectations that the political phase of the Commission's work would be completed by May, have not fulfilled. But it must be recorded that in the latter half of March the internal political situation returned to normal and the Commission is now looking forward to a period of fruitful activity.

MEETINGS WITH GOVERNMENT:

5. It was stated in the last report that the Commission had established a satisfactory working relationship with the Royal Government. In the months of December and January, the Commission had weekly meetings with the Government which were cordial and frank. The results of the meetings can be summarised briefly as follows:

REINTEGRATION:

- (a) The Royal Government agreed to the suggestion of the Commission that it should issue a statement outlining the procedure for receiving reintegration cards and clarifying its policy regarding the right of the reintegrated persons to constitutional political activity.
- (b) The Government, in co-operation with the Commission, examined the cases of Vietnamese left behind by the Vietnamese Military Units and detained by the authorities, to decide which of the individuals concerned should be evacuated.
- (c) The Government agreed to examine each individual case of the former members of the K.R.F. under arrest and take disciplinary action against officials if there had been any abuse of powers.
- (d) The Government's Amnesty of October, 1954, was discussed fully, particularly the principles governing the decisions of the "Commission de Grace".
- (e) The raids from South Vietnam across the southern frontier of Cambodia were discussed at length. Fully sympathetic to the concern felt by the Government, the Commission took up the matter with the Vietnam Commission with a view to stopping these troublesome incursions into Cambodian territory.
- (f) As a result of the discussions the Commission had a better appreciation of the Government's policy in regard to the right of political propaganda and the limitations thereon.

6. The Commission would like to place on record its appreciation of the cooperation extended to it by the Royal Government headed by His Excellency M. Penn Nouth. A copy of the notes taken in the first meeting between the Commission and the Government is attached as Appendix "A". The Commission believes that these Notes will not only throw light on many issues that concern both the Commission and the Government, but will also reveal how freely and frankly the two bodies approached their common problems. The Commission would like to point out, however, that these Notes are an unofficial record and are not for publication.

7. The machinery of weekly meetings was continued for some time after the new Government under His Excellency M. Leng Ngeth took over. The talks were mostly exploratory, being mainly concerned with electoral laws and regulations. Two or three practical problems were also dealt with. Because of the internal political crisis, these meetings were suspended in the middle of February. The Commission which enjoys good relations with the present Government, hopes to resume in the near future the weekly meetings which had been so fruitful of results in the past.

REINTEGRATION:

8. As indicated in the last report, the problem of reintegrating the former resistance personnel into the national community in terms of Article 6 has presented difficulties as there are deep-rooted suspicions and a

good deal of hesitation on both sides. The situation was by no means eased by the attitude of certain over-zealous local officials who in some cases subjected the former resistants to petty harassment. The Government, on its side, was hesitant because not all the top leaders of the resistance movement had come out into the open and it felt that there was the nucleus of an underground opposition movement. While there may be no basis for suspicions on either side, it was clear that the climate of confidence necessary for broad national reconciliation was not present.

9. Petitions from former members of the resistance movement who were still in detention or who found it difficult to obtain identity cards and other papers or who were subjected to petty harassment by the police, have been received in the period under review. The Commission approached this problem in two ways. First, it took up the cases where harassment or arrest of former members of the K.R.F. was reported. Second, it sought to satisfy itself that the Government was adopting a generous and politically correct policy towards the former resistants in terms of Article 6.

10. The Commission felt that, in some cases at least, there was genuine misunderstanding in the minds of those who were still afraid to come forward to collect their identity cards. It was also felt that it was necessary for Government to restate its attitude to the former resistants so that local officials also understood Government policy correctly.

11. At the suggesting of the Commission, made at the weekly meetings, the Government agreed to issue a statement outlining once again the procedure for receiving reintegration cards and clarifying its policy towards constitutional political activity. The Government prepared a draft appeal which was then finalised in consultation with the Commission. The appeal which was issued by Government on January 14 is as follows:

"Wishing to complete the unification within the community for the liberty, peace and prosperity of the nation, the Minister of the Interior, on behalf of the Royal Government, reminds all those who have not submitted on this date that it is their duty to return to the Khmer community in order to consolidate the independence of our country.

"To attain this goal, Independent Cambodia needs to be united in order to be strong and prosperous and those who still remain outside the community must cease all activities which produce delays and contrary forces harmful to the rapid development of unity, peace and prosperity in the Kingdom. They are therefore invited to apply for re-admission to the national community.

"The procedure for requesting re-admission is simple. Principal points can usefully be recalled: those who wish to rejoin the community should report with their weapons, if they have any, to the administrative authorities of the Khums, Sroks or Khets, or to the military authorities. The latter will forthwith issue them with a card of re-admission into the Khmer community, with which they may return home and move freely through the whole country without being troubled. This card may immediately be

...exchanged for an identity document under the same conditions as for any other citizen. The Government, after their re-admission, those who will have rallied to the national community will be able to freely exercise every normal political activity within the framework of the Constitution."

12. In the opinion of the Commission, the Government statement was most welcome, particularly the assurance regarding the right to normal political activity. The Commission has satisfied itself that the Government's appeal was widely broadcast in French and Cambodian newspapers and over the Radio. Publicity in the villages has been fairly satisfactory.

AMNESTY:

13. Although under the terms of the Amnesty of October 12, 1954, the Government had released all prisoners held because of their participation in the resistance movement, there were still prisoners charged with both criminal and political crimes. These were what the Government called "Mixed Cases". The Government had decided to have these cases adjudicated by a "Commission de Grace" which was composed of judges. The procedure adopted by the "Commission de Grace", was to invite petitions from individual prisoners or their relatives who considered the amnesty applicable to their cases. The Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Justice also submitted cases to it.

14. The International Commission discussed with the Government the principles of the amnesty and guiding considerations in deciding whether a crime was or was not to be considered part of war activities. (A reference to these discussions may be made to the Notes attached as Appendix "A"). It was made clear to the Government that although the International Commission had no intention of interfering with the action taken by competent authorities, it had to be in a position to report accurately on the implementation of Article 6 of the Geneva Agreement.

15. The Minister of Justice gave the following figures to the Commission regarding the scrutiny of the "Mixed Cases" undertaken by the "Commission de Grace":

(i) Total number of cases reviewed: 818

(ii) 28 persons were completely pardoned.

(iii) 232 persons who were awaiting trial have been amnestied. The charges against them have been withdrawn.

(iv) In the case of 275 persons who had been sentenced in absentia remission of the remaining sentence has been decided upon. These people who had taken flight can now come out in the open as free men.

(v) In the case of the remaining 283 persons charged with common law offences, no measure of pardon has been given. In actual fact, only 8 out of these 283 are in prison, the other 275 being fugitives from justice.

16. The "Commission de Grace" has completed its work, but an ad hoc group has been set up by the Ministry of Justice to consider any further cases that might be presented. An analysis of the 818 cases mentioned above shows

that the results are not unsatisfactory. However, the International Commission has reserved the right to forward petitions from individual citizens who consider that they are entitled to benefit by the amnesty and the Government has agreed that they will be considered by the Ministry of Justice.

PETITIONS:

17. Petitions continued to be presented to the Commission from former resisters or their relatives seeking redress or protesting against acts of the authorities. The teams of the Commission were kept busy in investigating these petitions. It will be adequate for the purposes of this interim report if we refer to the main types of petitions and the action taken thereon.

18. The Commission received petitions stating that persons had been arrested because of their participation in the resistance movement. The teams investigated these petitions to determine the circumstances of the arrests. The Commission, through its Political Committee, examined the investigation reports with an eye to ensuring that the arrested persons were being treated in accordance with the law and that there were no grounds to believe that the arrests constituted reprisals. One essential point in determining whether the Commission should intervene was whether the alleged crime was committed during or after cessation of hostilities and whether the crime could be construed as an act which was part of the hostilities.

19. Other petitions concerned the continued detention of former members of the K.R.F., extortion of money by local officials, harassment of relatives, harassment of released prisoners, etc. In all these cases, the teams were asked to investigate if the complaints related to the ex-K.R.F. and the matter was then further taken up with the Government or the local authority concerned. It must be said that the provincial authorities, with one or two exceptions, were not slow in examining complaints brought to their notice by the Commission.

20. The overall picture regarding reintegration of former resisters is that the position is more encouraging than at the time of the last report. The number of complaints has begun to diminish. The attitude of the Government towards normal political activity is changing for the better, though a measure of suspicion towards the ex-K.R.F. still persists in certain quarters.

COMPLAINTS FROM GOVERNMENT;

21. Numerous complaints have been received from the Government which have been investigated by the Commission. They can be divided broadly under the following heads:

- (a) That there is reluctance on the part of former members of the K.R.F. to reintegrate themselves into the national community and that they continue to make propaganda against the Government. Armed bands too, the Government said, were roaming the countryside.

(b) Border raids by forces of Hoa Hao and, in one or two instances by the units of the South Vietnam Army, across the southern frontiers of Cambodia have been reported. The Government have also alleged that Cambodians in Cochin-China are being persecuted.

(c) That arms are being discovered by the Government from time to time and that they are proof that the former resisters are planning to create trouble in the future.

22. As regards (a), a reference to this problem of reintegration was made earlier. The situation has eased though the Government has the feeling that some of the leaders of the resistance movement are still underground. It may be stated that investigations by our teams do not bear out the charge of the Government that bands of former K.R.F. are moving round the country.

23. As regards (b), the Commission has investigated these complaints. It is established that these raids across the border are organised by the irregular forces of the "war lords" in South Vietnam. Information supplied by the Government and such facts as have been gathered by the Commission, have been passed on to the Vietnam Commission for necessary action. But representations to the French authorities in South Vietnam have not yielded any tangible results. It is agreed on all sides that only direct talks between the governmental authorities of South Vietnam and Cambodia can bring about a satisfactory settlement. In the last few weeks, however, the situation on the border has eased and fewer raids are reported.

24. As regards (c), the Royal Government has reported to the Commission that arms had been discovered in various parts of Cambodia. The Government's aim in reporting these cases is to prove the non-observance of the pledge given by the ex-K.R.F. at the time of their demobilisation in August 1954 and by the Viet Minh forces at the time of their withdrawal from Cambodia in October, 1954. It may be recalled that Colonel Nguyen Than Son, President of the Delegation of the Vietnamese Military Units and Khmer Resistance Forces on the Joint Commission (dissolved on October 20, 1954) had informed the Commission that arms and ammunition used by the K.R.F. had been destroyed in various spots in Cambodia. The Cambodian Government has maintained that, far from destroying arms, the Viet Minh had carefully concealed them with the intention of using them in the future.

25. The teams have carefully investigated all cases of arms discoveries reported by the Government. The quantum of arms and ammunition involved has been small and most of it is not in a serviceable condition. In most cases it has not been possible to fix responsibility for the cache on any particular party. In Appendix "B" to this report is given a list of important cases handled by the teams during the period under review.

26. The Commission has taken much trouble in investigating cases of arms discoveries. In order to arrive at the fairest possible assessment of each case, a very exhaustive questionnaire for the guidance of the teams has been issued by the Commission. The said questionnaire is attached as Appendix "C" to this report. In addition,

the terms of reference for each individual investigation are very carefully framed by the Military Advisers' Committee.

27. As will be readily appreciated, the teams have often to work for long hours and under difficult conditions in investigating such complaints. As an illustration of the arduousness of their tasks, the report of an investigation by the Fixed Team at Kampot is attached as Appendix "D" to this report.

VIETNAMESE DETAINED IN CAMBODIA:

28. One of the problems left over from the earlier phase of the work was the future of Vietnamese domiciled in Cambodia who had helped the resistance movement in some capacity or other. Nearly 150 of them have been in virtual detention for over five months in different parts of the country. They had been left behind by the retreating Vietnamese Military Units as a result of disagreement in the Joint Commission on this question. The Government view was that all Vietnamese (there are 300,000 of them in Cambodia) were foreigners and if any of them had participated in the hostilities in whatever capacity they should be expelled. The difference arose in the Joint Commission over the interpretation of the Cambodian law of citizenship. After some discussion the Commission accepted the Government view as it is firmly based on the Cambodian Civil Code, Laws of Nationality, and tradition. (The Vietnamese never voted in elections in the past). But in interpreting Article 4 (c) of the Geneva Agreement, the Commission held that only those Vietnamese who had been soldiers or those who held supervisory or directive positions in the war should be evacuated, while the "lesser offenders" should be allowed to remain in Cambodia. After a careful scrutiny of each individual case, the Government and the Commission have agreed that 117 out of the 155 detained Vietnamese should be evacuated from Cambodia.

29. Though the decision regarding the persons to be evacuated was taken in mid-January, it has not been possible up to date to agree on the modalities of the evacuation. Under the Geneva Agreement, evacuation is a responsibility of the two sides and the Commission has been trying to forge an agreement between the two parties on this question. The Cambodian Commission, through the Commission at Hanoi, has been acting as an intermediary between the Royal Government and the Viet Minh High Command and proposals from each side which have, so far, been unacceptable to the other side, are passing backwards and forwards through us. At the time of writing, the Commission is hopeful that an agreed formula will be accepted by both sides. The proposal under consideration is to concentrate the detained Vietnamese in one area and hand them over for evacuation to a civilian liaison officer to be sent by the Viet Minh High Command for that purpose.

PRISONERS OF WAR:

30. As of December 31, 1954, the problem of the release of prisoners of war and civilian internees had been reduced to a certain number of complaints from both sides that not everyone had been released.

31. The Royal Government of Cambodia had submitted lists of 793 names of persons it wished released. It is possible that this number may be reduced considerably when the lists are brought up to date by the Royal Government, for they contain approximately 70 names of persons who in October 1954 were indicated by instance as liberated but prevented from rejoining their homes, or presumed dead. In addition, when the lists were transmitted to the appropriate authorities of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam it was pointed out that there was overlapping of some lists and as a result 185 names were duplicated. If the Royal Government gives confirmation on these points, the number of persons claimed may then total approximately 540. The authorities of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam have advised that 64 of these persons were released in October, 1954, in Central Vietnam, and that they now hold no persons mentioned in the Cambodian lists. This information has been transmitted to the Royal Government.

32. In January, 1955, after the Cambodian "Commission de Grace" had completed its work in connection with the political amnesty, the International Commission requested the Royal Government to advise it of what record there was of the 375 prisoners still claimed by the K.R.F. and V.M.U. Delegation when the Joint Commission concluded its work in October, 1954. Of those concerning whom it had records, the Royal Government was asked to state the number of released, and the number still in custody. If some were still in custody, the Royal Government was requested to state the charges on which they were held and the action which had been taken. A reply is awaited.

33. It may be pointed out that given the nature of the hostilities in Cambodia, the loose organisation of some of the forces involved and the consequent inaccuracy of the records which they could keep and given the variety of spellings of names and the use of adopted names - it is often difficult to identify persons with any degree of certainty.

ENTRY OF WAR MATERIAL INTO CAMBODIA:

34. Under Article 13, sub-para (c) of the Geneva Agreement on Cambodia and as amplified under Article 7 of the said Agreement, the International Commission has the responsibility of supervising at ports and airfields and along the frontiers of Cambodia, the introduction into Cambodia of military personnel and war materials on grounds of foreign assistance.

35. The Royal Government has given the International Commission a tentative programme of the expansion of their Defence Forces which it considers necessary for the effective defence of Cambodia. They have further told the Commission that the Government will use only two supply routes for the entry of foreign war material into the country. The first route is the main road Saigon-Phnom Penh and the second is up the Mekong from the sea. Both routes converge at Phnom Penh.

36. The International Commission team most concerned with the entry of war material is the Fixed Team located at Phnom-Penh. This team received a weekly list of stores received by the Government and is at liberty to enter the Government depots and installations at Phnom Penh to check the stores and equipment received. In addition,

whenever there is an important road or river convoy bringing stores to Phnom Penh, the team obtains prior notice of the arrival of the convoys. The team then proceeds to the place specified and supervises the unloading of the convoy. The procedure is working satisfactorily. During the quarter under review, only small quantities of arms, vehicles, ammunition of various categories, some signal stores and a small quantity of barbed wire has been received. Most of the equipment and stores received were of French origin and only a few were of U.S.A. manufacture.

37. The other teams which are concerned with the entry of war material into Cambodia are the teams at Svay Rieng, Kratie and Stung Treng. The team at Svay Rieng checks the border between South Vietnam and Cambodia and also watches the traffic by road and river from Saigon to Phnom Penh. The team at Kratie supervises the French Up and Down convoys from Saigon to Laos during their transit through Cambodian territory. It has not been possible for the French authorities who operate these convoys to give any prior notice of their entry into Cambodian territory owing to the administrative difficulties involved. As soon as a convoy reaches the staging post at Kratie, the Convoy Commander informs the team which then checks the convoy against the manifests held by the Convoy Commander. The team at Stung Treng carries out very much the same procedure at Stung Treng in North Cambodia as the team at Kratie. The checking at Stung Treng is a sort of cross check to ensure that no war material is left surreptitiously in Cambodian territory by the French convoys during their transit through Cambodia. This procedure is working well so far.

38. In order to tighten up further the check on the war material in transit through Cambodia on its way to Laos, the team at Stung Treng has been instructed to establish close liaison with the Laos Commission team stationed at Pakse in South Laos. The two teams will receive information from each other on the convoys passing their posts and will thus be able to cross-check the manifests.

39. Occasionally, the Fixed Team at Tan Chau belonging to the Viet-Nam Commission sends us prior information regarding the river convoys destined for Cambodia. This information has been found to be of great value in the cross-checking of information supplied to this Commission by the Royal Government of Cambodia.

40. There is only one large-sized aerodrome in Cambodia, i.e. at Phnom-Penh. The Fixed Team at Phnom-Penh regularly visits the aerodrome to see if any war material comes into Cambodia by air. Reports so far have always been nil.

41. In the matter of the establishment of bases and the conclusion of foreign military alliances, the International Commission has again nothing to report in the period under review.

REFERENDUM:

42. As stated earlier in the Report, on January 24, it was announced that the Government headed by His Excellency M. Penn Nouth had resigned and that the King had appointed an all-party Government presided over by His Excellency M. Leng Ngath which was entrusted with the task of preparing and organising the legislative elections, after holding a referendum on the results of the Royal Mission. The referendum was to be held on February 7 and the period of 70 days' preparations for the elections was to begin on the same day, the elections themselves being scheduled for April 17.

43. A Royal Message published on January 24, after referring in detail to the achievement of national independence by Cambodia, stated:

"On this day, when I address you the present Message, I believe within my soul and conscience that I have accomplished the mission for the Fatherland and yourselves with which you had entrusted me.

"In accordance with my promise, I submit the results of this Royal Mission to your judgment which you will freely express with regard to myself in a referendum.

"In order to keep another promise I had made in respect of the parliamentary regime, the general elections for constituting the new National Assembly will be organised immediately after the referendum.

"This referendum and these elections, except in a case of force majeure, will take respectively on 7th February and 17 April, 1955.

"An Elections Government, entrusted with the task of preparing and organising this referendum will be constituted immediately, comprising as usual the heads or representatives, properly designated, of all political parties which have been legally constituted."

44. The text of the Royal Message quoted above is attached as Appendix "E".

45. The exact wording of the question to be put to the people in the national referendum was published on January 28, and it was: "Has the Royal Mission been accomplished to the satisfaction of our people?" The affirmative reply "Yes" to this question was to be symbolised by the voter inserting a white voting slip into the box and the negative reply "No" by inserting a black voting slip. Army personnel and Bonzes (Buddhist monks) were also to take part in the referendum, though under Cambodian law they are not allowed to participate in parliamentary elections.

46. The International Commission decided that the referendum did not fall within its competence since it was not envisaged at Geneva and was also extra-constitutional. The Commission came to the further conclusion that the referendum was an internal domestic matter, for the conduct of which it had no responsibilities to discharge.

However, it asked the teams to observe the referendum and make a report on the basis of a questionnaire sent to them for their guidance. A copy of the questionnaire to the teams and a copy of the memorandum on the team reports are appended as Appendix "F" and "G" respectively. The memorandum shows that the referendum was an open ballot. It must be stated that the Government never claimed that the referendum would be secret. However, the result, as announced, was an overwhelming endorsement of the Royal Mission.

REFORM PROJECT:

47. Certain political developments took place after the referendum which upset the time-table for the parliamentary elections as laid down in the Royal Message of January 24. After the referendum, people from the interior of the country started coming into Phnom Penh by boats, lorries and buses to demonstrate against the holding of elections. These crowds were received by the King in the Palace grounds. It was announced officially that the petitions presented by the demonstrators were to the effect that Deputies, once elected, completely neglected their constituencies and that the people had no confidence in them. It was learnt from the press that the demonstrators urged the King to retain all power in his hands and not to hold any elections. The King advised caution and pointed out that he had given a pledge to hold elections. He told the people, however, that he would see to it that elections were held on a reformed basis which would allow for direct participation of the people in Government without "intermediaries"

48. On February 19, the King summoned the members of the International Commission and the Diplomatic Corps to the Palace "to explain to them the political situation of the country and more especially the proposal to reform the representative regime in Cambodia." At the meeting the King told the diplomats that people had been coming to the Palace in thousands from all over the country to submit petitions demanding cancellation or postponement of the General Elections and retention of power in Royal hands. He had told the demonstrators that absolute monarchy was out of the question since he had solemnly promised to lead the people to democracy. The people's complaints against incompetence and corruption inherent in "government by party" must, however, be met and he was, therefore, proposing major changes in the electoral system, in the character of the legislature and in the powers of the Executive.

49. The Cambodian Constitution of 1947 which provided for direct election of party candidates to the National Assembly, from single-member constituencies, without residential qualifications must, said the King, be changed to provide for Assemblies in two tiers to be formed by people's representatives who would stand as individuals and not as party candidates and who would have to possess the qualification of three years' residence in the constituency. The scheme of reform proposed was as follows:

(i) The Mekhum (Mayor) of a Khum (Commune or group of villages) will be elected directly by the people and will also represent the Khum in the Provincial Assembly. (There is no such body in the present Constitution).

(ii) Mekhums of all Khums (Communes) is a Srok (District) sitting as an electoral college, will elect one Srok (or District) representative to the National Assembly.

(iii) Provincial Assemblies will vote provincial budgets, levy provincial taxes, administer provincial laws and have authority to remove from office the Governor of the Province.

(iv) At the centre, the Legislature will have two Chambers: (a) the Consultative Committee of 20 members, nominated by the King, from among Privy Councillors, ex-Ministers and Civil Servants; and (b) the National Assembly to be elected as described above.

(v) Laws, budgets, etc., shall be drafted or initiated by the Consultative Committee, but voted upon by the National Assembly.

(vi) For election to the National Assembly, political parties may exist and publish newspapers but candidates will have to stand as individuals from areas concerned and not as party candidates.

(vii) The National Executive will be composed of Secretaries of State appointed by the King and without any collective responsibility to the legislature. Individual Secretaries will, however, be removable by a vote of the National Assembly, for misconduct or incompetence.

(viii) In case of difference of opinion between the King's Government and the National Assembly, the question will be referred back to the Assembly, and if the difference still persists, after two reconsiderations by the Assembly, the latter body shall be dissolved.

50. Outlining these proposals to the diplomats, the King said that the prescribed method of introducing amendments to the Constitution and having them passed by two-thirds majority in the National Assembly was impossible of adoption because the Assembly stood dissolved. Since, however, all laws were expressions of the people's will, the King proposed to hold a popular referendum on his new constitutional reforms. He described the appeal to the people as supra-constitutional. Elections would be held either under the old or the new constitution as decided by the people in the proposed referendum. In view of the referendum, elections might have to be postponed, but not beyond June.

ATTITUDE OF COMMISSION

51. The reform proposals outlined by His Majesty the King were far-reaching in character. The Commission, however, was not concerned with the merits of the reform project. It was only bound to examine the scheme from one aspect, namely, whether any of the changes proposed were or were not in conformity with the international obligations undertaken by the Cambodian Government at Geneva. The main questions to be decided were: In view of the reference made to the Cambodian Constitution in Article 6 of the Geneva Agreement and in Point 3 of the Final Declaration of the Nine Powers participating in the Conference, are major changes in the existing Constitution permissible till the first elections after Geneva are held? Will not such changes alter the terms on which the two parties at Geneva agreed to a political settlement? If such changes are permissible, should such amendments be made in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Constitution or not? Are any of the proposed changes discriminatory against the former resisters in terms of Article 6?

52. While the issues posed above were in the minds of the Commissioners, the International Commission did not take an official stand on the reforms till the time of the abdication of King Norodom Sihanouk. The reasons for this were two-fold: (a) Firstly, the Commission was awaiting a copy of the official text of the reform proposals, which had been expounded by the King orally at the meeting on February 19 but of which no authorised version had been communicated to the Commission; (b) Secondly, in view of the unexpected and far-reaching character of the reform project, the Commissioners had wanted time to consult their Governments. So the position was that though the Commissioners had doubts on the compatibility of some aspects of the reform project with the international commitments given by the Cambodian Government at Geneva, they had not officially defined their attitude as a Commission. A statement adopted by the Commission on March 9 for its own records may be quoted here to explain the part played by the Commission in the abdication crisis:

"In view of certain statements made in the press regarding the part supposed to have been played by the International Commission in the developments leading to the abdication of King Norodom Sihanouk, it is necessary to place on record the facts.

"The International Commission did not take an official stand on the proposals of King Sihanouk for constitutional reform up to the time of his abdication.

"It had the opportunity of listening to His Majesty at the Palace on February 19 when he explained the nature of his proposals. The International Commission was awaiting the official publication of His Majesty's study on the proposed reform. Only when it was in possession of that document and had had time to examine it did the Commission intend to make any comments on the King's reform in its relation to the obligations which the Royal Government of Cambodia had undertaken at Geneva.

"His Majesty first revealed his reform proposals on February 19. When the Commission met the Prime Minister on February 24, it declined to express any views on the proposals even when invited to do so by the Prime Minister. It informed the Prime Minister that it was awaiting the official report.

"On February 26 the Commission wrote to the Prime Minister requesting an audience with His Majesty to seek clarification on certain aspects of the reform proposals. The Prime Minister confirmed on February 28 that elections would be held on the basis of the present Constitution. In view of this decision the Chairman informed the Prime Minister that the Commission wished to withdraw its request for an audience with His Majesty. Nothing further was done by the Commission in this matter till March 2 when it learnt that His Majesty King Norodom Sihanouk had abdicated.

"This resume of events shows that the Commission had not taken any official position on the King's plan for constitutional changes.

"Any informal suggestions that were made by the Commissioners in their individual capacity were meant to persuade the Government, before it took any final decisions, to examine quietly and carefully the problem whether or not the Royal reforms were compatible with the international obligations undertaken by Cambodia at the Geneva Conference.

"The International Commission has at no time been the recipient of complaints from any Minister of the present Government nor has it had any petitions from any political party as such. It has received a few petitions from individuals commenting on the nature of the proposed constitutional changes, but the International Commission has not to date considered these petitions."

ABDICATION AND AFTER:

53. For a variety of reasons, most of them concerned with developments in the internal political situation in Cambodia, King Norodom Sihanouk decided to abdicate in favour of his parents. An unofficial version of his address over the radio on March 2, announcing his decision to abdicate, is appended as Appendix "H". No official text of the broadcast has reached us from authorised sources.

54. King Norodom Sihanouk's decision to renounce the Throne came as a complete surprise even to his closest advisers. Naturally there was a great deal of speculation as to the reasons for the decision. Since no authorised version of his abdication broadcast was available, there were all kinds of rumours as to what he had said and whom he had criticised. The Commission came in for criticism in a certain section of the foreign Press which based itself on misleading reports circulated by a particular news agency. The charges made against the Commission were:

(a) That it had opposed the Royal reforms and that its opposition was responsible for King Sihanouk's abdication;

(b) That it had interfered in the internal affairs of Cambodia;

(c) That it was influenced by certain local political parties.

In view of the persistent nature of the press campaign, the Commission eventually wrote to the Prime Minister of Cambodia on the subject and having received a satisfactory reply, issued the following communique on March 14:

"For some weeks past the International Supervisory Commission has been the object of irresponsible and baseless stories which have found their way into the world press and radio. The tendency of these stories is to create an impression of tension in the relations between the Royal Government of Cambodia and the International Commission.

"With a view to correcting the false impressions created by such misleading stories, the International Commission wrote to the Prime Minister of Cambodia drawing his attention to them. In his reply, His Excellency Leng Ngeth has pointed out that neither His Majesty Norodom Sihanouk nor His Majesty Norodom Suramarit nor the Royal Government have in their messages, speeches and public declarations ever mentioned the International Commission. The letter also makes it clear that neither the Cambodian Press nor the Cambodian Radio has stated anything at all which might cast a slur on the reputation of the International Commission.

"The International Commission wishes to point out that at no time has any complaint regarding its activities been received by the Commission from the Royal Government. On the contrary the Commission has always enjoyed good relations with the Royal Government.

"The International Commission's sole responsibility in Cambodia is to supervise and observe the implementation of the provisions of the Geneva Agreement."

55. The communique helped to clear the air of misleading reports and in particular the impression that there was tension in the relations between the Commission and the Royal Government. With the publication of the communique, the campaign in the Saigon press also stopped. Prince Sihanouk's reference to the work of the Commission at Calcutta on March 16 also helped to correct wrong impressions. This was what the Prince said to the Press at Calcutta:

"The International Commission in Cambodia has been fulfilling its tasks satisfactorily. I have no observation to make regarding its activities. The main part of its job is finished with the evacuation from Cambodia of foreign troops. It now has only to assist at the elections which are to be held in September."

56. A copy of the Joint Communique issued in New Delhi at the conclusion of the talks between Prince Norodom Sihanouk and Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India, is attached as Appendix "I". The reference to the Geneva Agreement in this communique has, in our opinion a relevance to this report.

GENERAL ELECTIONS:

57. On March 15, the Royal Government of Cambodia announced in a communique that it had abandoned the proposal to hold a referendum on the reform project. The communique also announced that parliamentary elections would be held on September 11 and that the electoral period, in accordance with the Cambodian constitutional convention, would commence on July 4. The text of the Government communique is attached as Appendix "J".

CONCLUSION:

58. It will be clear from the preceding paragraphs of this report that the work of the International Commission in the period under review was mainly of a political nature. The referendum, the ex-King's project of reform, his abdication and the accession of his parents to the throne of Cambodia caused an interruption of the normal working arrangements which the Commission had had with the Royal Government. Nevertheless, the work of investigation and supervision went ahead and the list of specific tasks to be done was gradually reduced. The false and irresponsible attacks in the foreign press appeared for a time to jeopardize the position of the International Commission which, however, rode out the storm. At the beginning of April there is every reason to believe that the relations between the Royal Government and the Commission have been unimpaired and that for the remainder of its stay in Cambodia the Commission will be permitted to do its work with the support of the authorities. It is not thought that its activities will be very great until the electoral period commencing on July 4 and ending with the elections on September 11. After the elections -- and possible before then -- consideration might be given to a reduction in the numbers and hence the cost of the Commission.

(Sgd.) G. PARTHASARATHI

Representative of India,
Chairman of the
International Commission.

(Sgd.) R. DUDER

Representative of Canada.

(Sgd.) W. GROSZ

Representative of Poland.

With the signing of this report, His Excellency M. Wikter Grosz, Chairman of the Polish Delegation, concludes

his tour of duty in Cambodia. His Indian and Canadian colleagues would like to place on record their deep appreciation of his loyal cooperation with them in the accomplishment of the tasks undertaken by the International Commission in Cambodia.

Case Number 1

(Sgd.) G. PARTHASARATHI (a)

Representative of India,
Chairman of the
International Commission.

(Sgd.) R. Duder.

Representative of Canada.

Phnom-Penh, - 16
April, 11, 1955.

Local Rifles

(b) The Fixed Team at Kamput investigated the case and visited the location of the cache. Witnesses who originally reported the cache were examined by the team. The team inspected the arms which were supposed to have been discovered in Phum (village) Veal Rahn and which were now stored at Prey Nop. The arms were found rusty or damaged and unfit for further use. The team came to the conclusion that:-

(i) The weapons in question were cached or buried by the KRF under the orders of local Vietnamese Military Units' commanders.

(ii) The manner in which the weapons were cached, especially the absence of even normal lubrication or grease preservation made it hard to believe that there was any intention on the part of the KRF or the Viet Minh Forces to use them in the future.

Case Number 2

(a) This case arose out of the late but voluntary surrender of certain arms by some former members of the KRF consequent upon the announcement made on behalf of the Cambodian Government by one Van Hang, Mekum (Herdman) of Trapeang Reang. The weapons surrendered were not registered. The Governor of Kamput had asked the Fixed Team at Kamput to inspect these arms. The arms involved were as under:-

Country made rifles - 66
Barrels - 30
Pistol - 1

(b) The Fixed Team at Kamput investigated the case and inspected the weapons in question which are now held in possession of the Government. They were surrendered by 95 former members of the KRF living in 14 villages of Khum Trapeang Reang. Among them 42 rifles were found to be in fairly good condition and 21 unserviceable. The barrels consisted of ordinary metal tubes and the pistol was scrap iron.

NOTE:- A "Khum" is a group of villages and a Mekum is a minor official in charge of a Khum.

Appendix "B"

SOME CASES OF CACHES OF ARMS AND AMMUNITION
INVESTIGATED BY THE TEAMS

Case Number 1

- (a) The Royal Government of Cambodia reported to the Commission that a cache of arms and ammunition alleged to be hidden by the Viet Minh and Khmer Resistance Forces (KRF) had been discovered at Trapeang Muel-Veal Rinh, 42 Kilometers north-west of Kampot. The cache consisted of the following:-

Tubes for local Guns	-	89 Cartridges	-	23
Local	-	16 Trap Grenades and Mines.	-	3
Local Rifles	-	4		

- (b) The Fixed Team at Kampot investigated the case and visited the location of the cache. Witnesses who originally reported the cache were examined by the team. The team inspected the arms which were supposed to have been discovered in Phum (village) Veal Rinh and which were now stored at Prey Nop. The arms were found rusty or damaged and unfit for further use. The team came to the conclusion that:-

- (i) The weapons in question were cached or buried by the KRF under the orders of local Vietnamese Military Units' commanders.
- (ii) The manner in which the weapons were cached, especially the absence of even normal lubrication or grease preservation made it hard to believe that there was any intention on the part of the KRF or the Viet Minh Forces to use them in the future.

Case Number 2

- (a) This case arose out of the late but voluntary surrender of certain arms by some former members of the KRF consequent upon the announcement made on behalf of the Cambodian Government by one Van Hang, Mekhum (Headman) of Trapeang Reang. The weapons surrendered were not registered. The Governor of Kampot had asked the Fixed Team at Kampot to inspect these arms. The arms involved were as under:-

Country made rifles	-	66	Pistol	-	1
Barrels	-	30			

- (b) The Fixed Team at Kampot investigated the case and inspected the weapons in question which are now held in possession of the Government. They were surrendered by 95 former members of the KRF living in 14 villages of Khum Trapeang Reang. Among them 42 rifles were found to be in fairly good condition and 21 unserviceable. The barrels consisted of ordinary metal tubes and the pistol was scrap iron.

NOTE:- A "Khum" is a group of villages and a Mekhum is a minor official in charge of a Khum.

Case Number 3

(a) This case was similar to number 2 above. The Royal Government of Cambodia informed the Commission that certain inhabitants, alleged to be former members of the KRF, of the Khums of Kraing-Sabu, Kriang-Svay and Beng-Srange (Chhuk) handed over to the local communal authorities some arms and ammunition. The arms and ammunition alleged to have been handed in were as under:-

(i) Khum of Kriang-Sabu

Local Rifles - 6 Cartridges 36 - 20
Cartridges Enfield 60

(ii) Khum of Kriang-Svay

Local Rifles - 11 Gun barrels - 7

(iii) Khum of Beng-Srange

Local Rifles - 18 Gun barrels - 26

(b) The Fixed Team at Kampot investigated this case. Their findings were as under:-

(i) On 26 December 1954, one Ourng-Meas had dug up 6 rifles, 6 grenades and 65 cartridges near Phum Mon and had turned them over to the Mekhum who had asked everyone to surrender their weapons. Ourng-Meas, who is a former KRF person, had seen two members of the KRF bury the arms after the cease fire and hence knew where they were. The arms had been buried in a hole in the ground and were not in a box or a bag. They were rusty when dug up.

(ii) In January 1955, after the Mekhum had explained to the inhabitants of his Khum that hostilities were over and that all weapons should be handed over to the Government, and that later anyone found with a weapon not authorised by the Government would be in trouble, about 53 former members of the KRF in Khum Kriang-Svay turned in 34 local rifles and 20 barrels.

(iii) In January 1955, the Mekhum of Beng Srange explained to the inhabitants of his Khum that hostilities were over and as such all unregistered arms should be surrendered to the Government and that in future anyone found with unauthorised arms would be punished. As a result, about 40 former members of the KRF turned in 19 local guns, 23 gun barrels and one mortar bomb.

Case Number 4

(a) The case arose out of the Government of Cambodia's complaint alleging the finding of a cache of military stores and weapons in the region of Kompong Som. The arms and stores were as under and were alleged to have been left behind by the Viet Minh Forces:-

Grenades.	1063	Mines	9
Pistols	6	Cartridges Cases	5000
Air machines	2	Typewriter.	1
Cylindrical tubes (iron & copper)	19	Large amount of material for munition workshop.	

(b) The Fixed Team at Kampot investigated the case and their findings were as follows:-

- (i) From the evidence collected it appeared that these arms were left by the Viet Minh Forces in heaps on the ground.
- (ii) The Viet Minh operated an arsenal at Kompong Som Loeu during the hostilities.
- (iii) The Viet Minh officials had informed their Cambodian associates regarding the presence of these arms with the intention that the latter indicate the location of these arms to the Government authorities in due course.

NOTE:-A full report on this investigation will be found at Appendix "D" to this Interim Report.

Case Number 5

(a) The case arose out of a report from the Government that during a search operation for weapons alleged to be hidden by the Viet Minh and Khmer Resistance Forces in the mountainous region of Khums Kbal-Trach, Ansa-Shambak and Stung certain arms were discovered. The arms and other stores involved were as under:-

On the Phnom of Sophea-Ten ("Phnom" is a hill in Cambodia)

Box of one cubic metre, empty and without lid.. 1

On the Phnom of Khnang Kangong

Hand Grenades -	42	Guns without wooden parts	3
Mine Detonator -	1	Helmets metal	2

(b) The Mobile Team at Kompong Chhnang investigated the case and interrogated the informer by the name of Nhaung Bun. The informer stated that he was a former member of the KRF and that he had served in Bo Dai, i.e. a unit of the Resistance Forces. He further stated that the arms cache was shown to him by the Viet Minh Forces before they left Cambodia. These arms, he stated, were hidden under the orders of the Viet Minh officer in charge of the group named CAP. He did not know the reasons for forming this cache.

Case Number 6

(a) The Government reported that two inhabitants of Kok in the province of Kompong Chhnang had discovered two anti-vehicle mines weighing 3.5 Kgs each with fuses. The Government alleged that these mines were hidden by the Viet Minh Forces and that the latter had placed no visible signals to show the location of these mines and had thereby violated the terms of the Geneva Agreement.

(b) The Mobile Team at Kompong Chhnang inspected these mines and their findings were as under:-

- (i) The mines were of unknown pattern.
- (ii) The body of the mines was made of steel and they were in an advanced stage of corrosion.
- (iii) The fuses had been removed to make them safe for handling.
- (iv) In the opinion of the officer commanding the local garrison the mines were of local manufacture.
- (v) It could not be established who had left the mines in Kok.

Case Number 7

(a) The case arose out of a report received by the Mobile Team at Stung Treng on 31 January 1955 from the local military authorities stating that some arms and ammunition had been discovered in the forest near Sampang. The Government further alleged that these had been left behind by the Viet Minh Forces. The arms and ammunition were as under:-

Boxes of ammunition	- 10	Armour Firing Rounds	- 668
Tracer rounds	50" calibre	33 Mortar Bomb	82 MM - 1
Signal Rocket Launcher	6 feet high.		1 1

(b) The Mobile Team at Stung Treng investigated the case and the statements of various witnesses were recorded.

The Team came to the conclusion that:-

- (i) The arms and ammunition found had not been concealed but left behind by mistake.
- (ii) The area in which they were found was held by the Viet Minh and the KRF Forces during April 1954.
- (iii) It was not possible to say when the weapons were stacked but the hut in which they were found was about five or six months old.
- (iv) There appeared to be no intention of caching at all.

Case Number 8

(a) The case arose out of a report made by the Governor of Kompong Cham that three cavalry magazine rifles alleged to have been left behind by the Khmer Resistance Forces had been found near the Cheang Cheach Military Post.

(b) The Fixed Team at Kompong Cham who investigated the case gave their findings as under:-

(i) The arms were burnt by the resistance forces in a pit before leaving the post but the burning had not been very effective.

(ii) The post was manned by the French troops, the Royal Cambodian Army and afterwards by the resistance forces personnel. The post was evacuated after the cease fire.

(iii) There appeared to be no intention of caching.

(iv) In the opinion of the officer commanding the local garrison the mines were of local manufacture.

(v) It could not be established who had left the mines in Kok.

Case Number 7

(a) The case arose out of a report received by the Mobile Team at Stung Treng on 31 January 1955 from the local military authorities stating that some arms and ammunition had been discovered in the forest near Gampang. The Government further alleged that these had been left behind by the Viet Minh Forces. The arms and ammunition were as under:-

- Boxes of ammunition - 10 Armour Firing Rounds - 668
- Tracer rounds 50" calibre 33 Mortar Bomb 82 MM - 1
- Signal Rocket Launcher 6 feet high - 1

(b) The Mobile Team at Stung Treng investigated the case and the statements of various witnesses were recorded.

The Team came to the conclusion that:-

(i) The arms and ammunition found had not been concealed but left behind by mistake.

(ii) The area in which they were found was held by the Viet Minh and the KRF Forces during April 1954.

(iii) It was not possible to say when the weapons were stacked but the pit in which they were found was about five or six months old.

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(b) The Fixed Team at Kompong Cham who investigated the case gave their findings as under:-

FIXED TEAM KAMPOT INVESTIGATION REPORT

CASE NUMBER: KAMPOT - 4 OF 1955

INTRODUCTION

1. (a) The case relates to the discovery of arms and ammunition by Khmer Army troops in the region of the Srok of Kompong Som-Loeu in the province of Kampot.
- (b) This case was entrusted to the Fixed Team, Kampot on 26th January, 1955, for investigation but due to lack of means of conveyance to this far-off region of Kampot province it was kept in abeyance till a warship was made available to the team on 1st March, 1955 to proceed to Sree-Umbell by sea, which was to be our advance base to carry out the investigation. The team consisting of Commander R.S.MALIA (India), Captain MALONE (Canada) and Captain KORPUS (Poland) and a team of five interpreters left Kampot on 1st March 1955 by sea and returned on 5th March, 1955.

THE JOURNEY

2. A brief description of the journey undertaken will not be out of place as it forms a most interesting as well as hazardous part of the operational account of this team which works both on land and at sea.

3. By sea

The first leg of the journey was 90 nautical miles through the Gulf of Siam on board the Royal Cambodian Naval Ship "L-Impeuteux". In the Bay of Kompong Som the team was off-loaded and boarded a L.C.M. craft provided by the French Navy based at Lem-Dem. It carried us through the approaches of Kompong Som Bay and up the river Sree-Umbell. It took three hours to reach the place as the safe navigation through the river depends on high tide.

By land

4. The team established a base at Sree-Umbell living in a straw hut and sleeping on bamboo sticks. This was the best that could be obtained.

5. The Rendezvous

The region of Kompong Som-Loeu was approached from there through 35 miles of arduous journey through thick jungle and mountains - about the first 10 miles on cycles and the rest carrying the cycles on shoulders, crossing 13 destroyed bridges and numerous streams.

6. The return trip was accomplished in three little canoes down the river of Kompong Som for 6 hours, for most part of the night the members of the team pulling the oars. It was all done in one day as the team was not prepared to stay the night at the place of investigation. The members of the team had to forego meals and sleep to gain time.

7. It may be mentioned that four harnessed elephants were put at our disposal at Kompong Som-Loeu, to enable the team to penetrate further into the jungle if required.

PROCEDURE OF INVESTIGATION

8. (a) Before proceeding to Kompong Som-Loeu the team interviewed the local Khmer Army Commandant at Kampot to get necessary information on this case. He submitted a copy of a letter which he had received from his officer at Sree-Umbell who had discovered these arms in Kompong Som area. The letter is attached herewith as Annexure I.

(b) After arriving in the area of investigation the team interviewed the following persons:-

(i) Khmer Army Lieut - In charge of the army unit based at Sree-Umbell.

(ii) The Mekhum (Headman) of the region of Kompong Som-Loeu.

(iii) The First Assistant of the Mekhum who is a resident of the area of Kompong Som, and who was also directly concerned with the discovery of these arms.

The statements of these four persons are summarised below in para 10. The detailed evidence may be seen in Annexure II attached.

INSPECTION OF ARMS

9. At the conclusion of the investigation the team carried out a physical muster of these arms under reference and inspected every item. The arms were kept by the Lieutenant of the Army Unit at Sree-Umbell. The inspection report is attached as Annexure III.

SUMMARY OF THE CASE

10. The case is summarised as below:-

(a) Lieutenant Krouch Kram

(i) He is the Company Commander now stationed at Sree-Umbell. He was holding this appointment from September, 1954 to 15th December, 1954. During September, 1954 he was informed about the presence of these arms in Kompong Som by the First Assistant of the Mekhum of that place. But this officer himself did not investigate this case as he was under orders to proceed to Battambang.

(ii) According to the information he has been able to gather from this informer (First Assistant of the Mekhum) and other inhabitants of the place, he is of the opinion that these arms were left behind by the Viet Minh Forces who used to manufacture them at Kompong Som-Loeu during the war. This area was under the control of the Viet Minh Forces at that time.

(iii) No Royal Khmer Army personnel are stationed at Kompong Som.

(iv) This officer had these arms in his possession at Sree-Umbell which had been previously brought from Kompong Som-Loeu by his predecessor. But he had no list to check their quantity.

(v) According to his information these arms were not buried in the ground. They were discovered lying in heaps.

(b) Mekhum of Kompong Som-Loeu (Yant Kit)

(i) He took over his duties from the previous Mekhum (who is his First Assistant now) on 14th January, 1955.

(ii) He saw these arms after their discovery by the Lieutenant of the Khmer Army in Kompong Som area.

(iii) He informed the team that the Srok of Kompong Som-Loeu was administered by the Viet Minh Forces during the war.

(c) The First Assistant - Chet Khouth

(i) He worked with the Viet Minh Forces during the war and was appointed Mekhum of Kompong Som-Loeu by them.

(ii) He was present at the time of the discovery of the arms on 26th December, 1954. He saw the Viet Minh Forces leaving these arms at that place. These were abandoned by the Viet Minh. He was asked by the Viet Minh chiefs to inform the Government authorities about the presence of these arms..

(iii) He saw the Viet Minh arsenal in operation in that area where these arms were being manufactured. He used to supply labour to the Viet Minh.

(iv) He recognised the arms and the workshop equipment discovered along with the arms to be the same as those left behind by the Viet Minh.

(v) When Sous-Lieutenant Chan-Ek-Than came to Kompong Som-Loeu he informed him about these arms and they were thus discovered by the authorities.

(d) Third Assistant of the Mekhum - Ey Oung

(i) He worked with the Viet Minh during the war as a tax collector.

(ii) He saw the Viet Minh manufacturing arms at Kompong Som-Loeu. When the Viet Minh left they informed him along with three others regarding these arms which they were leaving behind in Kompong Som-Loeu.

(iii) He reported the presence of these arms to the authorities in November, 1954.

FINDINGS BY THE TEAM

11. (a) From the above evidence it appears that these arms were left by the Viet Minh Forces. They were abandoned in heaps.

(b) That the Viet Minh operated an arsenal for the manufacturing of such arms at Kompong Som-Loeu.

(c) It also appears from the evidence of "Chet Khouth" and "Oung" (third and fourth witnesses) that the Viet Minh officials had informed them regarding the presence of these arms in Kompong Som-Loeu before their departure from the country after the cease fire, with the intention that they indicate the location of these arms to the Government authorities. These two persons were directly employed by the Viet Minh during the war.

Sd/- R.S. MALIA

Sd/- J.C. MALONE

Sd/- V. KORPUS

(INDIA)

(CANADA)

(POLAND)

TRANSLATION

KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA

3rd Autonomous Mobile

Battalion

No. 885

To

The Head of the Battalion
Commanding the Kampot Area

Subject:- WAR MATERIALS OF THE VIET MINH FORCES

On the 24th December 1954 I was leading a patrol in Kompong Som-Loeu, Srok of Kompong Som, Kampot Province, the place where the Viet Minh (VM) had manufactured war materials. We reached the Champa Pagoda at about 7 a.m. About 6 kilometers from this pagoda, I spotted sheds and materials detailed below:-

1st Shed (Photo No. 10)

- Hand Grenades 45
- Mines (big) 8
- Printing material 1
- Mechanical blower 1
- Pistols 4

2nd Shed (Photo No. 7)

- Fuseless Hand Grenades .. 218
- Cases of cartridges .. Half a bag.
- Steel 5 sheets
- Steel tubes 5 sheets

3rd Shed (Photo No. 9)

- Small copper tubes 78 pieces

4th Shed (Photo No. 8)

- Hand Grenades 100
- Mechanical blower 1
- Iron in bloc 1 piece

5th Shed (Photo No. 4, 5 and 6)

- Iron joints 1 Heap
- Copper Tubes 19
- Cramp 1
- Pistols 2
- Mine (big) 1
- Hand Grenades 700
- Cauldrons 2
- Iron Wire 1 reel
- Cartridges 81

These war materials have been recovered and kept at the Sree-Umbell post. I attach herewith the photos taken on that occasion.

Khsach - Kraham / 5th Jan. 1955

Captain 2nd in Command of 3rd B.A.M.

Sd/- HEM KHAN

(Refers to Case No. Kampot-4 of 1955)

STATEMENTS OF WITNESSES

1. First Witness, Lieut Krouch-Kram -
Post Commander of Sree-Umbell states:-

"I am in charge of the 5th Coy of 3rd Autonomous Mobile Battalion at Sree-Umbell. I know that some arms were discovered in the region of Kompong Som-Loeu, on 26th December 1954. These were discovered by the First Assistant of the present Mekhum of Kompong Som-Loeu. He worked with the Viet Minh during the war and was also a Mekhum of that place at that time. The Mekhum of Kompong Som-Loeu informed me about these arms on 10th September 1954.

2. "I have been holding this appointment at Sree-Umbell since September 1954 but at two intervals. First from September, 1954 to 15th December, 1954. When I left for Battambang. Again I came back here on 27th February.

3. "The name of this First Assistant of the Mekhum of Kompong Som is 'Khouth', of Phum Daung, Khum Kompong Som-Loeu. He stays near Kompong Som. Besides this Mekhum, the other inhabitants in Kompong Som-Loeu are 'Ey-Oung', 'Khok', 'Hai' and 'Hak'. When these arms were reported to me in September, 1954, I did not go to Kompong Som-Loeu to see the site but S/Lt. Chan-Ek-Than went from here. He has been transferred to Siem Reap now. All other Army personnel also from this unit who helped in the discovery of these arms have been transferred from here. These are the arms and other material discovered from Kompong Som-Loeu (he pointed to a heap of grenades and mines and other items). These were brought here before I came to Sree-Umbell. I have no other records or list concerning these arms giving their exact number.

4. "These arms consist of 9 mines, 5 big and 4 small grenades, one pistol in deteriorated condition, two air machines, 17 cylindrical tubes and other material. All these were discovered at the same place. They were not cached or buried in the ground but were lying in a heap on the surface. They were found in a Bamboo shed. These arms were left by the Cambodian soldiers known as Khmer Issaraks working with the Viet Minh during the war. This is the place where the Viet Minh manufactured arms. They abandoned these grenades and mines and other things after the end of the hostilities. These weapons were not greased but just left under the shed at Kompong Som-Loeu.

5. "During the war the area of Kompong Som was occupied by the Viet Minh Forces and Khmer Issaraks who collaborated with the Viet Minh till the end of the hostilities. No Royal Khmer troops are stationed near Kompong Som - this fort at Sree-Umbell is the nearest Army unit to that place. It was established in September 1954. When I was informed about these arms in September, 1954 I did not proceed to Kompong Som-Loeu as I had to go to Battambang.

6. "Out of these grenades, only four were armed with fuses; the remaining were as they are now. I heard from the inhabitants of this area that these had been left by the VM".

7. Having recorded the above evidence of the Army Lieut, it was decided that the team should proceed to Kompong Som-Loeu to examine other witnesses on the spot.

MORE WITNESSES AT KOMPONG SOM

8. Second Witness - Mekhum of Kompong Som-Loeu

Name	-	Vang Kt
Khum (big village)	-	Kompong Som-Loeu
Srok (District)	-	Kompong Som

9. "This village where the International Commission team is now sitting in Kompong "Tra-Mung" - Khum Kompong Som-Loeu. I have been the Mekhum here since 14th January, 1955. Before me my First Assistant was the Mekhum here. At the time of the discovery of the arms in this area of Kompong Som I was at Sree-Umbell. I saw the grenades and mines there when taken by the soldiers from here. One Lt. Prom Sen of the Royal Khmer Army came here when called by the inhabitants of this village in order to take away these grenades and mines which had been found here. This 'Srok' of Kompong Som was administered by the Viet Minh Forces during the war. At that time it was divided into two zones - southern and northern. This Kompong Som zone was under VM rule. I do not know whether these grenades and mines were discovered buried in the ground or found on the surface. I do not know from where these arms came as I came to this place just now during January, 1955."

10. Third Witness - First Assistant of Mekhum of Kompong Som-Loeu

Name	-	Chet Khouth
Phum	-	Tamey
Khum	-	Kompong Som-Loeu

11. "I have been the First Assistant of the Mekhum of this Khum Kompong Som-Loeu since January, 1955. Three years ago I was working with the Viet Minh during the war. At that time I was appointed Meknum of this place by the Viet Minh authorities. I left the VM Forces in October, 1954. The name of my leader was Phouk who was a Vietnamese. The administrative group of the VM Forces was based here in Kompong Som. I know that on 26th December, 1954 some arms were discovered in this region of Kompong Som-Loeu. I saw these arms with my own eyes. The VM Forces who manufactured these arms had informed me about their presence. The VM manufactured these arms at Kompong Som-Loeu at the same place where they were discovered. It was an area for the production of arms, like grenades and rifles. These arms were not buried in the ground but left in heaps and the places marked with plaques. I was actually present on the spot the day the Viet Minh left these arms here. In my opinion they left these arms to be abandoned as balance of the stock of arms

not used. Before the arms were left, no grease was applied - they were just left in the rainy season. The two VM leaders - La and Vou-Kek - who were the chief administrators of the production of these arms here, ordered these arms to be abandoned. They were both Vietnamese.

12. "When one Lt Pram Sen of the Royal Khmer Army came to Kompong Som-Loeu, I reported to him regarding these arms. I gave this information to him voluntarily. Besides the arms consisting of grenades and mines etc., the workshop equipment taken to Sree-Umbell by Army personnel, was the same that I used to see with the VM at this place. I actually saw the production of arms at this place. I used to supply labour for the arsenal. Only the outer cases of grenades were manufactured here, not explosives. After the discovery of these arms, the quantity was the same that was left by the VM. After cease fire one day the two VM Chiefs called me to dine with them. On that occasion they showed me the arms they were going to leave behind. I was asked by them to inform the Government authorities regarding the presence of these arms. I waited to reveal this till the Lieutenant came to Kompong Som-Loeu but I did not tell him that I was required to do so. Before joining the VM Forces I was a cultivator. After the cease fire I did not report to the administrative authorities. I reported this to the Sous Lieutenant of the Khmer Army who appointed me First Assistant of the Mekhum."

13. Fourth Witness - Third Assistant of Mekhum of Kompong Som

Name	-	Ey Oung
Phum	-	Thmy
Khum	-	Kompong Som-Loeu
Srok	-	Kompong Som-Loeu

14. "During the war I worked with the Viet Minh as a collector of taxes. I was employed by them. I was a member of the Khum Committee. I left the VM in July 1954. Before joining the VM I was a cultivator. Now I am the 3rd Assistant of the Mekhum of Kompong Som-Loeu. I saw grenades and mines at this place in Kompong Som where these were manufactured by the Viet Minh Forces during the war. I reported it to the Government authorities during November 1954. These arms were left behind by the VM in April 1954. They were left heaped on the ground. I actually saw them about 20 days after the Viet Minh left this area. I heard from others that these arms were left behind in order to be abandoned by the Viet Minh. These formed part of the stock of arms they did not use. The quantity of arms discovered was the same as that was abandoned. I was told by the Viet Minh authorities that if the Cambodian Government asked for them they should be reported. I was summoned by Viet Minh authorities along with three others - Khok, Hak, and Hai - and told this."

Annexure III to Appendix "D"

(Refers to Case No:Kampot - 4 of 1955)

INSPECTION OF ARMS

1. The team inspected these arms which were discovered at Kompong Som-Loeu. Each grenade and mine was checked over. The following are the total number of items thus checked:-

- (a) Grenades - 973 in number and 4 live grenades.
- (b) Mines - 8 in number.
- (c) Rifle empty cartridges - 1220
- (d) Rifle bolts - 2 (damaged)
- (e) Automatic pistol - 1
- (f) Cylindrical copper tubes - 17
- (g) Workshop material:
 - Anvils - 2
 - Vices - 2
 - Metal melting tray - 1
 - Clamp vice - 1 (hand operated)
 - Jack for lifting weights - 1
 - Iron cylinder - 4 ft of 9" diameter
 - Typewriter - 1 (scrap only)
 - Bellows - 2 (for blowing air in furnace)

2. The workshop material, except for one bellow, although rusty, can be used for any work in a workshop.

3. Condition of arms

(a) Grenades

4 Grenades primed with explosives and striker mechanism. 973 grenade cases only. No explosive fillings. No plugs or striker mechanism. Two types - cylindrical and normal round shapes. Do not carry any arsenal number or any other marking. A number of them had no threading. Surface rusty and corroded. Apart from a few grenades which had cracked surfaces, the remainder could be repaired with proper tools in a workshop.

(b) Mines

- 5 - Anti-personnel mines filled with explosives and with striker mechanisms.
- 1 - Land mine (empty - damaged).
- 1 - Heavy mortar bomb - approximately 120 M/M calibre. Empty no tail assembly.
- 1 - Anti-personnel mine (empty - damaged)

The last three empty mines were unserviceable, rusty; carried no marking on surface.

(c) Rifle empty cartridges

1220 in number (Calibre, 30 inch rimless). Rusty but could be re-filled again in an armament factory.

(d) Rifle bolts - 2 (damaged - unserviceable).

(e) 9/M/M automatic pistol

1 casing only (scrap)

(f) Cylindrical tubes

17 in number (1/4" diameter - 6 to 7 ft in length).

(g) Lead Balls

39 in number (1/4" in diameter - Mine fillings - No markings).

Iron cylinder - 1 ft of 9" diameter

Typewriter - 1 (scrap only)

Belows - 2 (for blowing air in furnace)

The workshop material, except for one below, although rusty, can be used for any work in a workshop.

Condition of arms

(a) Grenades

4 Grenades primed with explosives and striker mechanism. 23 Grenade cases only. No explosive fillings. No pins or striker mechanism. Two types - cylindrical and normal round shapes. Do not carry any arsenal number or any other marking. A number of them had no threading. Surface rusty and corroded. Apart from a few grenades which had cracked surfaces, the remainder could be repaired with proper tools in a workshop.

Appendix "F"

Enclosure to Letter No. IC-AD/MAC/24

INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SUPERVISION AND CONTROL IN CAMBODIA

QUESTIONNAIRE TO INSPECTION TEAMS CONCERNING REFERENDUM TO BE HELD THROUGHOUT THE KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA ON 7TH FEBRUARY 1955

No IC-AD/MAC/24

PHNOM PENH

1st February 1955

GENERAL NOTES

To

The purpose of the referendum is to ask all eligible citizens to vote for or against the proposed constitution. All Fixed and Mobile Teams

Subject: REFERENDUM

1. In order to keep the International Commission informed of the conduct of the referendum, it has been decided to ask the team to prepare a factual report along the lines of the attached questionnaire.
 2. It is emphasised that the International Commission has no responsibilities in regard to the referendum. The Commission merely wants to keep itself informed of what is essentially an internal domestic matter. It should, therefore, be clearly understood that the teams must enlist the help of the local authorities in collecting this information and must also conduct themselves in as unobtrusive a manner as possible in order to avoid creating the impression that the International Commission is supervising or interfering in any way with the conduct of the referendum.
 3. The teams are not to enter the polling booths during the progress of the voting.
 4. If any complaints are received from citizens that they were not allowed to participate in the voting, these complaints should be passed on to the Headquarters of the International Commission.
 5. The teams will submit the factual report based on the Questionnaire to reach PHNOM PENH by the morning of Wednesday, 9th February 1955, by a special DR, if necessary.
 6. If the members of the teams form different estimates as a result of their observation, the differing views should merely be listed. On no account should the despatch of the report be delayed.
 7. The teams should visit as many places where polling takes place as possible. Fixed Teams will work in splinter groups, one group mainly confining its activity to the Headquarter station and the adjacent areas and the other to one or two or more stations as may be possible.
- Issued as directed by the Commission. This letter issues with the knowledge of the Military Advisers' Committee.

Sd/- GIS KULLAR

Brig

Chairman, MILITARY ADVISERS' COMMITTEE.

Appendix "F"

Enclosure to Letter No. IC-AD/MAC/24 dated 1st February 1955

QUESTIONNAIRE TO INSPECTION TEAMS CONCERNING THE REFERENDUM TO BE HELD THROUGHOUT THE KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA ON 7TH FEBRUARY 1955.

GENERAL NOTES

(1) The purpose of the referendum is to ask all eligible electors the following question:

"Has the Royal Mission been accomplished to the satisfaction of our people?"

(2) Every male inhabitant aged 20 years or over and inscribed on the electoral rolls is entitled to vote on this referendum.

(3) All members of the Cambodian Armed Forces are entitled to vote.

(4) All bonzes are entitled to vote.

(5) There are no definite rules of procedure established on this referendum which is conducted under the authority of the Governors of the Provinces and the Governor of PHNOM Pneh for this city.

(6) An essential difference between this referendum and the national election which is to follow is that no political activities of any sort are permitted, such as meetings, propaganda etc.

QUESTIONNAIRE

(A) Before Referendum

(1) Publicity

(a) Has news of the referendum been published.

- (i) in newspapers?
- (ii) by radio?
- (iii) through notices posted in public places or any other place?

(b) Has there been any other kind of publicity

- (i) by word of mouth?
- (ii) through Governor of the Province?
- (iii) through Mekhum or other Municipal authorities?
- (iv) through the bonzes in pagodas?

(c) Have the inhabitants been told where they would have to cast their votes?

(i) Has a time limit been set for the voting?

(ii) If so, between what hours?

(2) Electoral Activities

Since no campaigning or propoganda of any sort (except as explained above) is allowed

(a) Have public meetings been held?

(b) Have you heard of any private meetings being held concerning this referendum?

(B) During Referendum

(a) Where was the polling booth established?

(b) How was it advertised or displayed?

(c) At what time did poll open/close?

(d) As far as you could ascertain were there electoral lists at the poll?

(e) Were the names of the voters ticked off from the list after they had cast their vote?

(f) Was the voters' identity checked?

(g) Who were the returning Officers?

(h) Were they Government officials?

(i) Were there any representatives present who were not Government officials?

(j) Was the voting secret?

(i) Did only one person vote at a time?

(ii) Was there a partitioned booth where the elector could fold his ballot?

(iii) Was there a sealed or otherwise closed voting urn in evidence at the polling table?

(iv) How were the voters supplied with black and white cards?

(v) Were they handed both cards at once or did they have to ask for one of them?

(c) After Referendum

(a) Did you hear of anybody not having been allowed to vote?

(b) If so, were any reasons given and what were they?

(c) Can you obtain from local officials the percentage of votes cast in relation to the total number of electors? It will be sufficient to get these figures in two or three polling centres in your area.

(d) Have you heard of any private meetings being held concerning this referendum?

(B) During Referendum

(a) Where was the polling booth established?

(b) How was it advertised or displayed?

(c) At what time did poll open/close?

(d) As far as you could ascertain were there electoral lists at the poll?

(e) Were the names of the voters ticked off from the list after they had cast their votes?

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(g) Who were the returning Officers?

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(iii) Was there a sealed or otherwise closed voting urn in evidence at the polling table?

(iv) How were the voters supplied with black and white cards?

(v) Were they handed both cards at once or did they have to ask for one of them?

APPENDIX "G"
Memorandum on the Referendum held in Cambodia
on 7th, 8th and 9th February, 1955.

1. Prior to the Referendum which was held throughout the Kingdom of Cambodia on February 7th, 8th and 9th February, 1955, all the inspection teams of the International Commission were instructed to observe all activities concerned with this Referendum and to report to the Commission through answers to a questionnaire previously sent to them.
2. All the reports from the teams have been received and the purpose of this memorandum is to collate and summarise the information obtained.
3. The referendum was widely and adequately publicised in all parts of the Kingdom through the medium of newspapers, radio, notices posted in public places, loud-speaker equipped trucks and leaflets dropped by aircraft.
4. In each province, the Governor, the Mekhums and other municipal authorities explained to the local population the purpose of the referendum, the adopted procedure and the time and place of the voting. There was some variance in the voting hours, but generally these were from 0700 hrs to 1900 hrs on the 7th, 8th and 9th February, 1955.
5. All male citizens, aged 20 years and above, including bonzes and military personnel were qualified to vote. Polling booths were established in pagodas for the bonzes and at local headquarters for military personnel.
6. The teams are unanimous in reporting that no electoral activities such as public or private meetings, occurred before or during the referendum, except of course, as mentioned above, the public meetings where the Governors or Mekhums explained the referendum to the population.
7. In most places the polling booths were established in the salakhum; in the others, they were set up at some central place in the village. They were well displayed with bunting, posters, flags, arches and in some cases with pictures of the King.
8. Electoral lists were kept at the polls and the names of the voters were ticked off from it after they had voted. The polling booths opened and closed at the scheduled hours.
9. Although the procedure varied from one province to another, the reports indicate that the identity of the voters was adequately varified. The voter affixed his thumb print on a green electoral card in the presence of the returning officer who then compared this impression with the thumb print already on the card made at the time of the issue. The card was retained by the returning officer. This was the mode of identification generally adopted.

10. In all cases, returning officers were local government official such as Chauvaysroks or Mekhums or their representatives; in many instances these officials were assisted by one or two citizens of the village.

11. The voting was not secret except in one booth in Kompong-Cham province. No where was there a partitioned booth where the elector could choose and fold his ballot in secrecy.

12. The general procedure was that the electors presented themselves at the voting table, one at a time, although in rush hours the electors formed a queue. Voting urns were prominently placed on the voting table. These were locked, nailed or otherwise sealed. The voting cards, black or white, were stacked separately on the voting table and the method of handing them to the electors varied from place to place.

13. In most instances, the elector, after identification, chose a card from one of the stacks, folded it in front of all persons present and placed it in the urn. In other places, the elector gave his ballot to the returning officer who deposited it in the box in his presence. Elsewhere, the voter was asked which card he desired and was handed the one he chose which he then folded and then deposited in the box. Still another method was to hand the voter two cards at once, one of which he put in the box, while he destroyed the other.

14. The final official figures on the results of the referendum as announced in the press were as follows:

Total Number of votes cast:	927,646
White ballots	925,812
Black ballots	1,834
Percentage of majority approving of the Royal Mission:	99.8%

Phnom-Penh
17th February, 1955.

8. Electoral lists were kept at the polls and the names of the voters were ticked off from it after they had voted. The polling booths opened and closed at the scheduled hours.

9. Although the procedure varied from one province to another, the reports indicate that the identity of the voters was adequately verified. The voter affixed his thumb print on a green electoral card in the presence of the returning officer who then compared this impression with the thumb print already on the card made at the time of the issue. The card was retained by the returning officer. This was the mode of identification generally adopted.

Text of Joint Communique issued at New Delhi on March 18th, 1955, at the conclusion of the talks between Prince Norodom Sihanouk, leader of the Cambodian Delegation, and Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India.

"At the invitation of the Government of India, Prince Norodom Sihanouk Varman and the Prime Minister of Cambodia have come on a brief visit to India. During their stay in New Delhi, they have had friendly and informal talks with the Prime Minister of India. These talks have dealt with many matters of common interest for the two countries as well as some aspects of world problems which affect them.

"The historical connections and close cultural affinity between India and Cambodia, which date back to a remote past have enabled the leader of the Cambodian Delegation and the Prime Minister of India to understand and appreciate each other's point of view. They also provide a guarantee for the continuance of friendly relations in the future.

"The leader of the Cambodian Delegation expressed his appreciation of India's general approach to world problem and desire for the maintenance of peace. The Delegation and the Prime Minister of India agreed that the best guarantee for peace in the world and for friendship between countries is to adhere to the principles of the recognition of each other's sovereignty, independence and integrity, of non-aggression, of equality and mutual respect and of non-interference in the domestic affairs of each other or of other countries and on the promotion of conditions for peaceful co-existence.

"The two Governments were also agreed that the Geneva agreements should be fully implemented and that every effort should be made to preserve and strengthen the independence of Cambodia and improve the condition of its people. The best guarantee of peace and democracy lies in the pursuit of a progressive social and economic policy.

"The two Governments will co-operate to the maximum extent possible in cultural matters.

"The Government of India assured the Cambodian Delegation of their desire to give such assistance to Cambodia as lay in their power.

"The two Governments agreed to exchange diplomatic missions on a Legation level at an early date".

The Royal Government thus found itself on the morrow of that abdication in a delicate situation in the face of this rising tide of hundreds of thousands of popular voices hostile to the return of deputies like those of the preceding legislatures. To proclaim a liberal and free election campaign in the difficult

CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT COMMUNIQUE DATED
MARCH 15, 1955.

Certain leaders of the political parties are impatient to know the new date of the legislative elections which the present ministerial cabinet is entrusted to organise; that of 17th April, 1955, announced by the King in his message of 23rd January last cannot any longer be adhered to, due to the progress of events.

These events are known to all. The Royal Government believes it is its duty to recall them in a few words; immediately after the referendum of 7th February, hundreds of thousands of citizens have presented to His Majesty the King motions demanding either the suppression or the adjournment sine die of the legislative elections and praying His Majesty the King to exercise directly all the powers to save the country from anarchy.

In refusing to exercise all the powers in accordance with the wishes of the population, the King proposed to the people an equitable compromise. He suggested in the form of reform, some amendments to the present Constitution of the Kingdom in order to permit the people to enjoy a true democracy.

To that end a second referendum has been envisaged by the sovereign to know exactly whether the majority of the citizens desire to proceed with the constitutional reform or to respect the status quo before organising the legislative elections. The thousands of people who came to the Palace during the last few days of the month of February last to renew their confidence in His Majesty the King, went away satisfied with the Royal project of reform.

But certain leaders of political parties have criticised the proposed reform as contrary to the Constitution according to which only the National Assembly is qualified to effect modifications of that Constitution, while eminent jurists were of the opinion that in a democracy the referendum constitutes the sovereign decision and that it is supra-constitutional--"the voice of the people is the voice of God."

In order to avoid all misunderstanding in the future, His Majesty the King has decided to abandon the project of popular consultation through a new referendum. These are in short the principal events which have taken place from 7th February to 2nd March, 1955.


Nevertheless the representations of the population of the towns and countryside continued to flood the Royal Cabinet after as before the abdication of His Majesty Norodom Sihanouk.

The Royal Government thus found itself on the morrow of that abdication in a delicate situation in the face of this rising tide of hundreds of thousands of popular voices hostile to the return of deputies like those of the preceding legislatures. To proclaim deliberately the opening of the electoral campaign in the difficult

period which the Royal Government has just traversed would have been, on the part of the Government, a defiance launched against these hundreds of thousands of compatriots who do not want any more deputies (of the old pattern). That is why the present Electoral Cabinet considers this an immense popular movement against the legislative elections and that this is a case of force majeure creating an obstacle to the elections announced for 17th April next. A certain delay appears to be indispensable to make the compatriots understand the reasons for which the Sovereign and his Government have decided to reconsider the promised referendum.

On the other hand, the coming to the throne of the new sovereigns, the celebration of their crowning which should take place next June, occupy the attention of the Royal Government as much as the elections of the deputies.

That is why during its meeting of Monday 14th March, 1955, the Council of the Cabinet has decided to postpone the date of the legislative elections to Sunday 11th September, 1955, the opening of the electoral campaign being due to take place on 4th July of the same year.



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